Participation of Young People in Governance Processes in Africa (Advances in Public Policy and Administration) [1 ed.] 1522593888, 9781522593881

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Participation of Young People in Governance Processes in Africa Jeffrey Kurebwa Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe Obadiah Dodo Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe

A volume in the Advances in Public Policy and Administration (APPA) Book Series

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Kurebwa, Jeffrey, 1982- editor. | Dodo, Obadiah, 1974- editor. Title: Participation of young people in governance processes in Africa / Jeffrey Kurebwa and Obadiah Dodo, editors. Description: Hershey, PA : Information Science Reference, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2019000520| ISBN 9781522593881 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781522593904 (ebook) | ISBN 9781522593898 (softcover) Subjects: LCSH: Youth--Political activity--Zimbabwe. | Young adults--Political activity--Zimbabwe. | Youth--Political activity--Africa, Southern. | Young adults--Political activity--Africa, Southern. | Zimbabwe--Politics and government--21st century. | Africa, Southern--Politics and government--21st century. Classification: LCC HQ799.Z55 P37 2019 | DDC 320.083/096891--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019000520 This book is published in the IGI Global book series Advances in Public Policy and Administration (APPA) (ISSN: 2475-6644; eISSN: 2475-6652) British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. All work contributed to this book is new, previously-unpublished material. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors, but not necessarily of the publisher. For electronic access to this publication, please contact: [email protected].

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Promoting Productive Cooperation Between Space Lawyers and Engineers Anja Nakarada Pecujlic (University of Cologne, Germany) and Matteo Tugnoli (European Space Policy Institute,Austria) Information Science Reference • ©2019 • 339pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781522572565) • US $215.00 Building a Sustainable Transportation Infrastructure for Long-Term Economic Growth Olga V. Smirnova (East Carolina University, USA) Engineering Science Reference • ©2019 • 309pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781522573968) • US $195.00 Industrial and Urban Growth Policies at the Sub-National, National, and Global Levels Umar G. Benna (Benna Associates, Nigeria) Information Science Reference • ©2019 • 418pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781522576259) • US $205.00 Analytics, Operations, and Strategic Decision Making in the Public Sector Gerald William Evans (University of Louisville, USA) William E. Biles (University of Louisville, USA) and Ki-Hwan G. Bae (University of Louisville, USA) Information Science Reference • ©2019 • 441pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781522575917) • US $215.00 Social Jurisprudence in the Changing of Social Norms Emerging Research and Opportunities Karla L. Drenner (Purdue University Global, USA) Information Science Reference • ©2019 • 174pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781522579618) • US $135.00 Capital Management and Budgeting in the Public Sector Arwiphawee Srithongrung (University of Illinois at Springfield, USA) Natalia B. Ermasova (Governors State University, USA) and Juita-Elena (Wie) Yusuf (Old Dominion University, USA) Business Science Reference • ©2019 • 379pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781522573296) • US $225.00

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Table of Contents

Preface.................................................................................................................. xv Section 1 Chapter 1 The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth.........................................................................................1 Ndwakhulu Stephen Tshishonga, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa Chapter 2 Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows Theories in Youth Violence: A Critical Juxtaposition............................................................................................22 Obediah Dodo, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe Mcdonald Makoni, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe Chapter 3 Youth Development Through Participation in Decision Making: A Case of South Africa – Development and Participative Decision Making........................35 Sharon Thabo Mampane, University of South Africa, South Africa Chapter 4 Youth Participation in Politics: The Case of Zambian University Students.........54 Sam Phiri, University of Zambia, Zambia Section 2 Chapter 5 Young People-Sensitive and Participatory Governance Approaches: Lessons for the Zimbabwean Government.........................................................................80 Jeffrey Kurebwa, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe



Chapter 6 Development and Distributive Politics: Multiple Rationalities in Governance and the Youth Empowerment Factor in Zimbabwe............................................100 Innocent Chirisa, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Emma Maphosa, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Wendy Wadzanayi Mandaza-Tsoriyo, Great Zimbabwe University, Zimbabwe Abraham Rajab Matamanda, University of the Free State, South Africa Chapter 7 Democracy, Habermasian Sphere, Social Media, and Youth Participation in Governance in Zimbabwe: Youth in Governance Processes in Africa...............127 David Makwerere, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe Chapter 8 Critical Examination of the Implications of Youth Unemployment in Zimbabwe............................................................................................................148 Tawanda Zinyama, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Chapter 9 African Youth’s Democratic Rights Awareness and Participation in Continental Governance: A Case Study of Zimbabwe.......................................176 David Makwerere, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe Section 3 Chapter 10 Activation of Student Politics and Activism Through #FeesMustFall Campaign in South African Universities............................................................199 Ndwakhulu Stephen Tshishonga, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa Chapter 11 A Youth Perspective to Participation and Local Governance in Zimbabwe’s Post-Fast Track Land Reform Farms..................................................................220 Tom Tom, Zimbabwe Open University, Zimbabwe Chapter 12 Exploring the Concept of Youth Bulge From a Linguistic Perspective: A Critical Discourse Approach...............................................................................247 Magret Jongore, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe



Chapter 13 Youth Participation and Representation in Community Governance at Cato Manor Township, Durban...................................................................................268 Ndwakhulu Stephen Tshishonga, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa Compilation of References............................................................................... 296 About the Contributors.................................................................................... 345 Index................................................................................................................... 348

Detailed Table of Contents

Preface.................................................................................................................. xv Section 1 Chapter 1 The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth.........................................................................................1 Ndwakhulu Stephen Tshishonga, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa Young people throughout the world are an afterthought of policy and program interventions. In Africa, and particularly in third world nations, the irony of sloganizing youth as the cream or the future of the nation exists alongside tendencies and behaviors that impede their development towards being responsible and full citizens which rather aggravates youth underdevelopment and marginalization. It is an undisputed fact that young people have been the vanguard of liberatory struggles that resulted in dismantling colonialism and apartheid. On one hand, the chapter examines strategies adopted to overcome intergenerational poverty by using narratives (daily experiences of youth) of post-apartheid South Africa. On the other hand, the chapter highlights the uncertainties and frustrations of living in a democratic South Africa, with its failure to open up opportunities for their socio-economic growth, the apartheid discriminatory system, and survival. Chapter 2 Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows Theories in Youth Violence: A Critical Juxtaposition............................................................................................22 Obediah Dodo, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe Mcdonald Makoni, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe The chapter is a comparative analysis of two theories, Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows, on their relevance and influence on youth participation in political violence that was recorded in Bindura town from year 2000. The analysis juxtaposed



the two theories in relation to what other scholars have said on the same subject matter. This was in view of the fact that there are some theoretical assumptions that are traditionally aligned to particular studies and social realities. The analysis concluded that while the two theories may not have influenced youth involvement in political violence in Bindura in the same way and gravity, they both played a role. It was established that most of the youth violence would have developed over time before a slight incident triggered its explosion. Chapter 3 Youth Development Through Participation in Decision Making: A Case of South Africa – Development and Participative Decision Making........................35 Sharon Thabo Mampane, University of South Africa, South Africa The purpose of this chapter is to argue that there is a need for youth development for participation in decision makings of the country. Programs for youth development should be geared towards changing the behavior of the youth from undesirable to desirable conduct. This chapter follows a qualitative approach in understanding and explaining in detail what youth development and participation in decision making in the society, entails. Data were collected via literature reviews on youth development and participation and on factors contributing to the importance of how laws, most notably laws on youth participation in matters, concern them. These factors are important, but key to developing the youth for participative decision-making and for ensuring that children’s right to participate is implemented. The aim of this paper is to ensure that the youth are involved as partners in communities because they are deemed to be assets in the decision-making process of the country. Chapter 4 Youth Participation in Politics: The Case of Zambian University Students.........54 Sam Phiri, University of Zambia, Zambia This chapter explores the manner in which Zambian university students engage with public policy decisions which are of immediate and future interest to them. It observes that the youths may have little faith in representative democracy and instead are utilizing social media platforms to directly engage with decision-makers and publics, and thus subverting the essence of the authority of parliament. The study uses descriptive survey design and the methodology of “Briscolage” to capture and scrutinize two politically charged cases, and concludes that the youth globally may be challenging liberalism and in that way fashioning a new narrative entrenched in postmodernism.



Section 2 Chapter 5 Young People-Sensitive and Participatory Governance Approaches: Lessons for the Zimbabwean Government.........................................................................80 Jeffrey Kurebwa, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe This study seeks to make a strong case for young people’s visibility in the governance framework, not only in the sectors that are traditionally linked to their wellbeing and development. Young people should be visible with respect to their role in governance and accountability. This will help ensure that commitments made across all these areas are translated into relevant actions on the ground; it will support young people’s ability to hold national and local authorities accountable, and strengthen young people’s active involvement in promoting good governance practices at the global, national and local levels, laying the foundations for their long-term engagement as active citizens. The state has the responsibility to perform a core set of duties that allow society to function and exist. In doing so, it forges a relationship with its citizens. Participatory governance is one of many strategies of governance, and refers to the processes and deliberations that citizens are engaged in when discussing the distribution of public resources and broader decision making. Chapter 6 Development and Distributive Politics: Multiple Rationalities in Governance and the Youth Empowerment Factor in Zimbabwe............................................100 Innocent Chirisa, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Emma Maphosa, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Wendy Wadzanayi Mandaza-Tsoriyo, Great Zimbabwe University, Zimbabwe Abraham Rajab Matamanda, University of the Free State, South Africa This chapter seeks to demonstrate how urban land has often been used by Zimbabwean politicians to trap the youth. In light of this, the chapter argues that the interplay of the factors of production (land, labor, capital, and enterprise) crystallizes into a matrix of persuasions, contradictions and thought that explain multiple rationalities behind the development and distributive politics. It engages document review and a case study approach in which various policies and programs and project initiatives have been started by the government since 1980, including the building brigades and cooperative housing production in the early 1980s, the institution of the national youth ministry and policy and the administration of the kurera/ukondla youth fund. The chapter suggests that the distributive arrangements for resources be based on innovativeness, acumen and skill by the youth, based on merit and credibility.



Chapter 7 Democracy, Habermasian Sphere, Social Media, and Youth Participation in Governance in Zimbabwe: Youth in Governance Processes in Africa...............127 David Makwerere, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe This chapter focused on the opportunities and challenges presented by social media in the democratization process in Zimbabwe. The chapter contends that youth participation on various social media podiums is very vibrant. The youth use social media to communicate issues affecting them and in most cases to express their displeasure with governing authorities. The types of the youth on social media can be categorized into three; the protestors, the defensive and the moderates. The protestors are those who simply use the platforms created by social media to vent their frustrations in a less constructive way. The defensive are those youths who believe in the status quo and are willing to defend the ruling elites at all costs. The moderates are those who believe that social media can be a platform for dialogue and constructive engagement. Chapter 8 Critical Examination of the Implications of Youth Unemployment in Zimbabwe............................................................................................................148 Tawanda Zinyama, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe The chapter examines youth unemployment and its dimensions and characteristics in relation to overall unemployment. Youth unemployment has become increasingly recognized as one of the more serious social problems confronting Africa. There are many reasons why the government of Zimbabwe and society feel increasingly concerned about this problem. At the human level, failure to secure satisfactory employment upon completion of schooling and training can cause intense frustration, despair and alienation. It may also be associated with such social ills as drunkenness, drug-taking, violence, robbery and prostitution. From a material point of view, youth unemployment represents a tragic waste of skills and talents, resulting in lower production, increase in dependency burden on the rest of the society, and in the longer run, a gradual deterioration in the quality of national human resources. The potential consequences of high levels of youth unemployment at personal, social and national levels are thus serious and warrant sustained efforts to find solutions to these problems. Chapter 9 African Youth’s Democratic Rights Awareness and Participation in Continental Governance: A Case Study of Zimbabwe.......................................176 David Makwerere, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe This chapter explored the democratic rights awareness among the youth in Zimbabwe. The youth who live in urban and peri-urban spaces are relatively aware of their



democratic rights and a significant number do participate in governance processes in the country, although their participation is largely defined by political party affiliation. There are those youths who are in rural and farming communities who have limited understanding of their democratic rights and responsibilities and most of them believe that participation in governance is simply about voting during national plebiscites and nothing more. The study also found that the development of rights awareness among the youths in Zimbabwe is state-centric and thus undermining the efforts towards effective youth participation. There are some civil society organizations in Zimbabwe that have worked to empower the youth in the country and to create awareness, but this has met with many challenges owing to the hegemonic influences of the ruling political elites and the general political polarization prevailing in the country. Section 3 Chapter 10 Activation of Student Politics and Activism Through #FeesMustFall Campaign in South African Universities............................................................199 Ndwakhulu Stephen Tshishonga, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa This chapter critically analyses the FeesMustFall (FMF) campaign led by tertiary students between 2015 and 2017 academic years and its impact in (de)activating student politics and activism at South African universities. Students through their various formations and movements went on a rampage. Considering the decline of students’ activism compounded by the dominance of mainstream political parties on campuses, this chapter argues that the 2015-2017 FMF campaign revived the student movement and was fundamental in activating student politics and activism. The chapter argues that despite the sporadic activities led by students, the student movement’s activism is in decline. Since this is qualitative study, data from secondary sources (books, accredited journals) were utilized, supplemented by empirical data from selected interviews with individual students and student movements involved in the FMF campaign. Chapter 11 A Youth Perspective to Participation and Local Governance in Zimbabwe’s Post-Fast Track Land Reform Farms..................................................................220 Tom Tom, Zimbabwe Open University, Zimbabwe The chapter provides a youth perspective to participation and local governance in Zimbabwe’s post-Fast Track Land Reform farms. The chapter provides a sociology flare to youth participation by incorporating the ‘sociology of youth’ dimension. Factoring in the youth perspective is a major contribution in addressing the lacunae



in understanding and improving land reforms in Zimbabwe. Broadly, scholarly debate and professional practice on Zimbabwe’s post-FTLRP have been informed by four ideological and empirical approaches namely, the neopatrimonial, human rights, livelihoods and political economy. However, in all four approaches, specific and deliberate focus on the youth is low. Based on the understanding that the youth are the future of societies, the central argument in the chapter is that the youth should be positively developed to practice their citizenship. This can be achieved through proactive incorporation of the youth in development and local governance. At a micro level, the ‘new’ farm communities and how they are locally governed should also be a turf for the youth, not only for the ‘gerontocrats’. The starting point for that noble departure is to understand the lived experiences and situated meanings pertaining to the achievements, opportunities, challenges and failures in youth participation in development and local governance of the farm communities. Beyond lip service articulation and application of a youth perspective in the farm communities, and broadly at the national level, are recommended. Chapter 12 Exploring the Concept of Youth Bulge From a Linguistic Perspective: A Critical Discourse Approach...............................................................................247 Magret Jongore, Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe The chapter tackles youth bulge according to a number of scholars. The analysis aims at bringing forth understanding of the concept from a linguistic perspective. In linguistics, any text can be analyzed using linguistic tools to unearth context, syntax, and semantics, pragmatic and socio-linguistic elements that inform it. Analysis of the likes of Callick, Hendrixson, Fantorpe, Collier, and others on youth bulge is done. Critical discourse analysis is used for analysis. CDA observes that texts are manifestations of politics. Texts are sites for struggle to maintain, influence, and persuade the general to respect the social order of the day. Thus, texts are replication of the society that reproduce them. Texts serve to maintain the powerful in their esteemed positions. Thus, texts are ideological and hegemonic in nature. Text reveals in language and visuals as signs, dress and artifacts. Thus, the chapter avails a number of standpoints of what youth bulge entails and institutes CDA to unravel politically and ideological permeated aspects of the concept. Chapter 13 Youth Participation and Representation in Community Governance at Cato Manor Township, Durban...................................................................................268 Ndwakhulu Stephen Tshishonga, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa This chapter deliberates on youth participation and (mis)representation in community governance structures at South African townships. Youth participation entails active participation of youth in the policymaking procedures happening



and problems disturbing their lives. Youth have the opportunity to influence their community governance structures. A study found that the current generation of youth are not aligned to the community governance structures. Youth participation and representation in community governance structures such as ward committees and community policing forums (CPFs) are essential as they could help youth fight issues such as teenage pregnancy, drug use, crime, unemployment, school dropout, etc. because they spend time in socially meaningful activities such as volunteering at different community structures. Compilation of References............................................................................... 296 About the Contributors.................................................................................... 345 Index................................................................................................................... 348

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It is very critical that young people should engage in governance processes in Africa. There is an intrinsic value in upholding young people’s rights to participate in decisions that affect them as enshrined in several international, continental, regional and domestic instruments. However, these policy commitments to young people’s development have not been matched by actions on the ground. Young people’s engagement in governance processes has also an instrumental value as they seek to improve policy and program outcomes. Young people are engaged in various issues that affect them on a daily basis within their communities. The major objectives of this book are to understand the role of young people’s involvement in the governance processes in Africa, and to demonstrate that young people are engaged in active citizenship. The book is targeted at academics, policy makers, researchers, universities, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and governments. While there has been robust economic growth in most African countries in terms of infrastructure and technology, this has not translated into improved outcomes for young people. The African continent is experiencing unprecedented urban growth. Projections are that more than half of the population will live in cities by 2040. Most of them will be young people migrating in search of opportunities that may not exist. Young people face various challenges such as unemployment, lack of education, health, protection, housing and safety, the search for sustainable livelihoods, lack of civil liberties, war and the lure of terrorism, political instability, bad governance, failed neo-liberal social and economic policies, lack of financial independence, and therefore the inability to support themselves. Participation in governance processes has also been weak especially for young people with disabilities, minority groups and those living in rural areas. African governments should promote overarching policy directions that tap into the huge and vast potential presented by young people. These policies will include: 1. Accounting for the diverse and demographic changes in the youth population. 2. Promoting investments that absorb the capacities of young people in sectors such as governance, education, health, employment, and civic education.

Preface

Discussing the concept of young people’s participation requires an understanding of the term young people. The term young people is used interchangeably with youth. There are various arguments on what constitute young people/youth. In some literature the term young people/ youth varies culturally and historically, and also from one context to another (Chigunta, 2006; United Nations, 2003). The United Nations definition of youth is 15 to 24 years, while the Commonwealth definition stands at 15 to 29 years. The African Union adopts a broader and wider definition of young people/youth as those aged 15 to 35 years. Other scholars such as Curtain (2003) argues that it is better to define young people/youth as a period of transition from child hood (dependence) to adulthood (independence). He further argues that the nature and length of being a youth within the African context varies from one individual or society to another (Curtain, 2003). Other scholars such as Honwana and De Boeck (2005) support the transition definition by Curtain (2003). Rather than using the definition of youth enshrined in the international, continental, regional and domestic instruments, young people or youth should be construed as a social category defined by societal expectations and responsibilities (Honwana & De Boeck 2005). Youth is a socially constructed life stage rather than simply chronological age. Youth-hood is a period during which individuals negotiate a complex interplay of both personal and socio-economic changes in the transition from dependent childhood to independent adulthood. Honwana (2012) suggests that youth-hood on the African continent is best explained by the concept of “waithood”, which describes the inbetween or liminal phase between childhood and adulthood. The idea of waithood suggests delays in the experiences and resources that young people need to become “social adults and full-fledged citizens” (Honwana, 2012, p. 4), which is a result of “endemic poverty and chronic unemployment resulting from failed neoliberal economic policies, bad governance, and political crises” (p. 165). Most contributors in this book project uses the African Union definition of young people/youth as people aged between 15 to 35 years old. In some cases the term young people/ youth is also used to include people who may not meet the African Union definition but who are regarded as youth in their respective societies and contexts. Young people’s/youth participation involves youth actively engaging in participatory governance. Participatory governance means that young people/ youth have opportunities to engage with their governments (Fioramonti & Heinrich, 2007). According to Dahl (1991) ample opportunities democratic governance offers include effective participation, voting equality at the decisive stage, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusiveness. Active participation means that young people are involved in a wide range of policymaking activities. These include determining levels of service delivery, budget priorities, and infrastructure development. Young people should be able to confront governments to attend to their community needs. xvi

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Chapter 1 focuses on the effects of inter-generational poverty and unemployment on South African township youth. The author argues that township youth faces a number of challenges. These include lack of education unemployment. Township youth experience deprivation and continue to live on the margins with the prospect of transmitting intergenerational poverty, unemployment and income inequalities in their lives. The chapter advocates for youth entrepreneurship as the strategy to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty and unemployment among South African township youth. Overcoming poverty and unemployment through entrepreneurship, youth capacity building of business skills and competencies, provision of financial resources, commitment by youth to be agents of economic freedom, and credible and effective youth-focused institutions are required. In Chapter 2 the authors make a comparative analysis of the youth bulge theory and the broken down windows theory and their relevance and influence on youth participation in political violence that was recorded in Bindura town in Zimbabwe from year 2000. The chapter provides a narration of political violence perpetrated by the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) against supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Bindura town. During the build-up of the violence, the ruling party meticulously deployed security agents, former liberation war veterans and some youth to unleash violence on known and perceived political opponents. The violence also included the establishment of torture centres popularly known as ‘bases’. The focus of Chapter 3 in on youth development through participation in decisionmaking with specific reference to South Africa. The author argues that there is a need for youth development for participation in decision-making. Programmes for youth development should be geared towards changing the behaviour of the youth from undesirable to desirable conduct. The youth should be allowed the opportunity to identify their needs and subsequently plan on how to solve these needs so as to improve their well-being and that of their communities. Youth engagement can be done through interventions and programmes guided by principles based on how the youth were affected by imbalances of the past and the need to redress these imbalances through equitable policies, programmes and the allocation of resources. In Chapter 4 the author focuses on youth participation in politics with particular reference to Zambian university students. The Chapter explores the manner in which Zambian university students engage with public policy decisions which are of immediate and future interest to them. It observes that the youths may have little faith in representative democracy and instead are utilizing social media platforms to directly engage with decision-makers and publics, and thus subverting the essence of the authority of parliament. This chapter traces the origins of youth activism, more specifically student politicking since independence in 1964, and then examines two recent instances in which Zambian university students, perhaps the most enlightened xvii

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section among the Zambian youths, use modern means of communication like the internet, and social media, to consolidate a participatory political culture and freedom of expression. The purpose of Chapter 5 is to make a strong case for young people’s visibility in the governance framework, not only in the sectors that are traditionally linked to their wellbeing and development. It argues that young people should be visible with respect to their role in governance and accountability. This will help ensure that commitments made across all these areas are translated into relevant actions on the ground; it will support young people’s ability to hold national and local authorities accountable, and strengthen young people’s active involvement in promoting good governance practices at the global, national and local levels, laying the foundations for their long-term engagement as active citizens. The state has the responsibility to perform a core set of duties that allow society to function and exist. In doing so, it forges a relationship with its citizens. Participatory governance is one of many strategies of governance, and refers to the processes and deliberations that citizens are engaged in when discussing the distribution of public resources and broader decision-making. In Chapter 6 the authors demonstrated how urban land has often been used by Zimbabwean politicians to trap the youth. The chapter argues that the interplay of the factors of production (land, labor, capital and enterprise) crystallizes into a matrix of persuasions, contradictions and thought that explain multiple rationalities behind the development and distributive politics. Distributive politics deals with how resources are allocated in an economy. The intention is to achieve justice in resource distribution for human welfare and civic betterment. These resources include funding, taxes, projects, and land and priority areas for development planning. The basic argument is that resources are allocated for securing electoral support in polls. Through distributive politics, the youth may be empowered or marginalized by the decision-makers. It is through the distributive politics that the role of the youth in advancing the political interests is gauged and they end up being incentivized or sanctioned depending on their political stance. Chapter 7 focuses on the opportunities and challenges presented by social media in the democratization process in Zimbabwe. The chapter contends that youth participation on various social media podiums is very vibrant. The youth use social media to communicate issues affecting them and in most cases to express their displeasure with governing authorities. The chapter argues that there are three types of social media users. These are protestors, the defensive and the moderates. The protestors are those that simply use the platforms created by social media to vent their frustrations in a less constructive way. The defensive ae those youths that believe in the status quo and are willing to defend the ruling elites at all costs. The

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moderates are those who believe that social media can be a platform for dialogue and constructive engagement. Chapter 8 examines youth unemployment and its dimensions and characteristics in relation to overall unemployment. The author argues that youth unemployment has become increasingly recognized as one of the more serious social problems confronting Africa. At the human level, failure to secure satisfactory employment upon completion of schooling and training can cause intense frustration, despair and alienation. It may also be associated with such social ills as drunkenness, drugtaking, violence, robbery and prostitution. From a material point of view, youth unemployment represents a tragic waste of skills and talents, resulting in lower production, increase in dependency burden on the rest of the society, and in the longer run, a gradual deterioration in the quality of national human resources. The potential consequences of high levels of youth unemployment at personal, social and national levels are thus serious to warrant sustained efforts to find solutions to these problems. The focus of Chapter 9 was to explore the democratic rights-awareness among the youth in Zimbabwe. The author argues that youth who live in urban and periurban spaces are relatively aware of their democratic rights and a significant number do participate in governance processes in the country although their participation is largely defined by political party affiliation. It further states that youth who live in rural and farming communities have limited understanding of their democratic rights and responsibilities and most of them believe that participation in governance is simply about voting during national plebiscites and nothing more. The findings of the study indicated that the development of rights-awareness among the youth in Zimbabwe is state-centric and thus undermines the efforts towards effective youth participation. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Zimbabwe have worked to empower the youth in the country and to create awareness. However, this has faced many challenges owing to the hegemonic influences of the ruling political elites and the general political polarization prevailing in the country. In Chapter 10 the author analyzed the FeesMustFall (FMF) campaign which was led by tertiary students during the period 2015 and 2017 and its impact in (de) activating student politics and activism at South African universities. During the FMF campaign, university students through their various formations and movements went on a rampage demanding free, quality and decolonized education. Students challenged university management and the Higher Education Department to transform the higher education sector. The radical nature of the campaign made political and social commentators draw some similarities between FMF and the 1976 Students Revolt as both did not only look at students related challenges, but also highlighted issues pertaining to the broader socio-economic and political transformation of South Africa. The decline of students’ activism compounded by the dominance of xix

Preface

mainstream political parties on campuses was revived during the 2015-2017 FMF campaign. The chapter argues that despite the sporadic activities led by students, the student movement’s activism is in decline. The fierce competition mainly between SASCO and EFFSC formations for student governance manifested itself through the struggle to lead the FMF campaign. Chapter 11 provides a youth perspective to participation and local governance in Zimbabwe’s post-Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) farms. The chapter provides a sociological flare to youth participation by incorporating the ‘sociology of youth’ dimension. Factoring in the youth perspective is a major contribution in addressing the lacunae in understanding and improving land reforms in Zimbabwe, and enhancing development and governance in general. Debates on Zimbabwe’s FTLRP have low-specific and deliberate focus on the youth. The chapter concludes by indicating that youth are the future of societies and therefore should be positively developed and proactively incorporated in development and local governance. The purpose of Chapter 12 is to understand the concept of youth bulge from a linguistic perspective. The chapter indicates that in linguistics any text can be analyzed using linguistic tools to unearth context, syntax, and semantics, pragmatic and socio-linguistic elements that informs it. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is used for analysis. It observes that texts are manifestations of politics. The author argues that texts are sites for struggle to maintain, influence and persuade the general to respect the social order of the day. Therefore texts are a replication of the society that reproduce them. Texts serve to maintain the powerful in their esteemed positions and therefore are ideological and hegemonic in nature. Texts reveals in language and visuals as signs, dress and artifacts. The author provides a clear understanding of youth bulge and its relevance to CDA as it unravels politically and ideologically permeated aspects of the concept. Chapter 13 provides an analysis of youth participation and (mis)representation in community governance structures with reference to Cato Manor Township in Durban, South Africa. Youth participation entails actively participating in the policymaking structures on issues affecting them. The author clearly indicates how youth can potentially influence their community governance structures. Youth participation and representation in community governance structures such as ward committees, Community Policing Forums (CPFs) are essential as they help youth contribute on issues affecting them such as teenage pregnancy, drug use, crime, unemployment, and school dropout. Jeffrey Kurebwa Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe Obediah Dodo Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe xx

Preface

REFERENCES African Economic Outlook. (2012). Promoting youth employment. OECD Publishing. Booysen, S. (2015). Youth and political participation in South Africa’s democracy: Surveying the voices of the youth through a multi-province Focus Group Study. Freedom House. Chigunta, F. (2006). The creation of job/work opportunities and income generating activities for youth in post-conflict countries. Paper presented at an expert group meeting on youth in Africa, Windhoek, Namibia. Dahl, R. (1991). Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Fioramonti, L., & Heinrich, V. F. (2007). How Civil Society Influences Government: A Comparative Analysis of CICVUS Civil Society Index in Post-Communist Europe. London, UK: CIVICUS and ODI. Honwana, A. (2013). Youth and Revolution in Tunisia. London, UK: Zed Books. Honwana, A., & De Boeck, F. (Eds.). (2005). Makers and breakers: children and youth in postcolonial Africa. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA. United Nations. (2003). World youth report 2003: the global situation of young people. New York, NY: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2017). Africa’s youth and prospects for inclusive development. New York, NY: United Nations.

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Section 1

1

Chapter 1

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth Ndwakhulu Stephen Tshishonga University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

ABSTRACT Young people throughout the world are an afterthought of policy and program interventions. In Africa, and particularly in third world nations, the irony of sloganizing youth as the cream or the future of the nation exists alongside tendencies and behaviors that impede their development towards being responsible and full citizens which rather aggravates youth underdevelopment and marginalization. It is an undisputed fact that young people have been the vanguard of liberatory struggles that resulted in dismantling colonialism and apartheid. On one hand, the chapter examines strategies adopted to overcome intergenerational poverty by using narratives (daily experiences of youth) of post-apartheid South Africa. On the other hand, the chapter highlights the uncertainties and frustrations of living in a democratic South Africa, with its failure to open up opportunities for their socioeconomic growth, the apartheid discriminatory system, and survival.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch001 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

INTRODUCTION Young people have been the vanguard of the liberation struggles that resulted into dismantling colonialism and apartheid governance systems in Africa (Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011). In Africa, and particularly in the third world nations, the irony of sloganising youth as the cream or the future of the nation exists alongside tendencies and behaviours that impede their development towards being responsible and full citizens, which aggravates youth underdevelopment and marginalisation. Youth sacrifices and their radical involvement not only rob them of their youth, but also deny them golden opportunities to advance themselves in areas of education, economics and welfare (Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011). South Africa is no exception. It is therefore not surprising that with the advent of democracy in Africa and in particular, South Africa, policies and programmes have been developed with the primary aim of restoring young people’s dignity and advancement for their development. At a national level, attempts have been made to address youth related challenges that have seen the introduction of the 1996 National Youth Commission, an enactment of the National Youth Development Policy (2002-2007) and the establishment of the National Youth Development Agency in 2008 (De Lannoy et al, 2015, p. 28). Among the functions assigned, these formations were to mainstream youth development within government departments, initiating, designing, coordinating, evaluating and monitoring programmes aimed at uplifting and empowering young people. The absence of youth engagement in policy development and implementation compounded by fragmentation and lack of co-ordination, gave birth to the National Youth Policy (2015-2020). The National Youth Policy (2015-2020) is anchored on five pillars geared towards enabling youth development: 1) economic inclusion and participation; 2) education, skills and training; 3) health and well-being; 4) nationbuilding and social cohesion; and 5) building a youth machinery for efficient delivery and responsibilities. Despite these policies, youth are still faced with deprivation and marginalisation which manifest themselves through the continuity of poverty, unemployment, and a lack of educational and economic opportunities for them to lead a decent life (Mlatsheni, 2010). It is against this background that this chapter interrogates factors and conditions that recycle intergenerational poverty and unemployment among youth people, especially those residing in South African townships. Compared to the older generation which was characterized by harsh conditions due to apartheid’s discriminatory laws, the current –born free’ generation have abundant opportunities at their disposal. However, most of these opportunities are often thwarted by educational deficits, lack of economic growth which in turn, results in rising unemployment, persistent poverty and social unrest (Kobokoane, 2019, p. 2). The biggest among these challenges is youth unemployment (Kuzwayo, 2019), which despite the government interventions 2

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

in the form of policies and programmes for youth development, youth unemployment remains the highest in the world at 54.4% (Leoka, 2019, p. 2). Among the affected, are the township youth whom without a solid education and created job opportunities, their future is bleak with no hope of fulfilling their dreams. Township youth experience deprivation and continue to live on the margins with the prospect of transmitting intergenerational poverty, unemployment and income inequalities in their lives. The chapter advocates for youth entrepreneurship as the strategy to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty and unemployment among South African township youth. Overcoming poverty and unemployment through entrepreneurship, youth capacity building of business skills and competencies, provision of financial resources, commitment by youth to be agents of economic freedom, and credible and effective youth-focused institutions are required. Essentially, Leoschet and Burton (2010 cited in Perold, 2012, p. 182) highlighted that community infrastructure; opportunities for youth to partake in preferred activities of choice and decision-making power including shared responsibility could be instrumental in instilling a sense of purpose and further reduce young people’s vulnerability. In addition, this chapter examines strategies adopted to overcome intergenerational poverty and unemployment by using narratives (daily experiences of youth) of post-apartheid South African townships. The chapter set off by exploring the theoretical conceptions of youth, followed by section dealing with the notion of intergenerational transmission of poverty and unemployment. The chapter also profiles the socio-economic realities of youth and five case studies have been used to analyse how intergenerational transference of poverty and unemployment manifest itself among the township youth.

BACKGROUND Theoretical Conceptions of (Township) Youth The state, the public in general and various organisations reinforce social exclusion and strengthen the theory of deviance having used the concept of youth in many countries. Sociologically, youth denotes an interface between childhood and adulthood. In South Africa, the definition of youth is young men and women aged between 14 and 35 (National Youth Policy, 2015-2020). There are various arguments for a longer age span of youth. Young people in Africa are faced with socio-economic challenges such as unemployment, poverty and various exclusions (Honwana, 2013). Therefore, their age span has been extended in order to address and compensate for the past injustices and lost youth. In this case, the meanings and connotations of youth within the South African context vary because their needs differ according to their age groups. The definition of youth according to the National Youth Commission 3

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

(1996) employs the term young men and women and it emphasizes the character of the youth sector that is gender-sensitive and inclusive. Chigunta (2002) argues that in Africa the tendency to extend the category of youth to 30 years and beyond seems to be a reflection of the emerging phenomenon of a prolonged period of youth dependence. This status Abdullah (1999) points out is a result of poverty and a reflection of the inability of young people to pursue independent or sustainable livelihoods as a consequence of the depressed economic situation in contemporary Africa. Adults’ perceptions of youth are validated by an ideology of dominance. Adults tend to prescribe the role of youth, by defining and limiting their responsibilities, opportunities and status (Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011). In South Africa as in many other African countries, youth are generally perceived as young, or irresponsible, thus providing justification for their being excluded in key decision-making positions (Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011 and Mlatsheni, 2012). Youth are perceived as having functional deficiencies and in need of nurturing (Moore 2004). It is evident that the definitions of youth among countries with youth differ according to social framework, and in both spatial and temporary terms. In defining youth in the post-colonial/apartheid eras it can therefore be argued, that the concept of youth is complex and often imbued by a variety of challenges and problems that cut across age categories in different environments and contexts (Moore, 2004). Thus, the concept youth is designed to serve different interests and purposes in different contexts. For the analytical purpose of this chapter, youth uses the age category 14-35 years as the definition of youth.

State of Youth Poverty and Unemployment in South Africa This section of the chapter profiles the socio-economic situation in South Africa in general, and townships in particular. Historically, South African youth both in rural and urban areas have experienced and continue to experience social dislocation and alienation. Noyoo, Patel and Loffell (2006) argue that prior to 1994 the position of youth was insecure and unpredictable. The apartheid regime had no programmes for African youths as they were perceived as enemies of the state. Although the apartheid regime saw them as enemies, the outside world perceived them as heroes after the 1976 Soweto uprisings (Duncan, 2016). It is an undeniable fact that through the relentless effort and bravery of youth that South Africa gained its democracy. Despite young people’s contribution, the youth are still in the majority of those mostly affected by poverty, unemployment, lack of housing and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In South African society, 39 percent of the population constitutes the youth aged from 14 to 35 (National Youth Policy, 1997), which has since risen to 41 percent in 2008. These statistics clearly signify a substantial part of society. Surely due to 4

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

apartheid and the failure of the current government, the youth have not been afforded the opportunities to develop their potential educationally and economically. According to the National Youth Report (1997) youth tend to not have access to health and education, live in poor conditions and have limited employment opportunities on the basis of where they live and institutionalised race-based criteria in the work place. In addition, youth are exposed to high levels of crime and violence perpetuated by them on other young people and society in general, and the dislocation of the family unit and community networks. Although there is a National Youth Commission (1996) to mitigate the problems and challenges faced by youth which aims to offer new opportunities to previously disadvantaged youth, evidence suggests that South African youth like other youth in Africa is going through change as a result of a changing culture and contradictions in the context of economic stagnation (Chigunta, 2002). South Africa in particular, has witnessed problems among youth in both schools and homes. Due to globalisation, as times change and as the media expands, African children have begun to absorb broader global knowledge, finding themselves at a crossroads where they encounter beliefs and practices that put them at odds with their own cultural values. The encountered beliefs may not be negative in any sense but they tend to conflict with existing norms and practices learnt from their parents and society as a whole. Although parents and society are suspicious of these new cultural beliefs, it does not necessarily mean that the youth would fall out completely because youth is a phase and most youth will eventually reintegrate back into mainstream society in due course. The legacy of apartheid affects all young people with African youth bearing the brunt of racially oppressive and constraining policies that continue to haunt them to this day. Added to the historical legacies and new challenges in the wake of democracy, problems facing youth continue to multiply. In South Africa, there has been economic growth but it has failed to absorb the youth into the job market due to rapid urbanisation, poor education, and disintegrating family structures. Several academic observers argue that deepening poverty in Africa is contributing to the breakdown of traditional value systems and social institutions, the backbone for social development in Africa (Mkandawire, 1996). Intergenerational poverty has left parents unable to fend for their families and the breakdown of traditional legacies have since lost respect because urban youth know they are not going to inherit anything from their parents. Urbanisation in many cases has incorporated different people from different ethnic backgrounds which Bennel (2000) argues has undermined kinship structures. Chigunta (2002) concurs with Bennel that the disintegration of societal structures is undermined and leaves a vacuum among youth in the urban areas. In South Africa, for instance, the breakdown of families and the violent legacy of apartheid have also fostered criminal activities such as violence against women 5

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

and children, drug and alcohol abuse, malnutrition and the scourge of HIV/AIDS. Of the 16.2 million youth population, 3.5 million are considered marginalised (Household survey, 1997). Marginalisation is approached in four ways namely; ‘Fine’ which refers to young people who are still part of the wider society who may need remedial support. ‘At risk’ is those that function fairly well but at the risk of being isolated and alienated by society. While some are defined as ‘marginalised’ referring to those alienated by society and lastly, the ‘lost’ referring to those that cannot be accounted for (National Youth Commission, 1997). The described four definitions of youth clearly reflect the diversity of their specific needs. The authors in this chapter are more concerned with those described as marginalised. Cato Manor, our study area falls under KwaZulu-Natal, which is one of the two provinces with the highest number of young men and women after Gauteng.

Notion of Intergenerational Transmission of Poverty and Unemployment Intergenerational poverty, by definition is designated to the occurrences of poverty that recycles itself through misfortunes and other socio-economic, political and policy challenges. Thus, the type of poverty or deprivation that is passed from one generation to another and the perpetual nature of intergenerational poverty in developing nations, particularly in South Africa, cannot be divorced from the legacy of apartheid and its discriminatory laws. In view of the legacy of political, social and economic injustices in South Africa, poverty can be defined within the scope of being structural and intergenerational. Linking structural inequalities to intergenerational poverty is historically rooted with bitter and adverse effects attached to it. The situation has also been aggravated by an educational policy of Bantu education including the Group Areas Act that championed the relegation of Africans to an inferior system of education that prepared them to serve as servants as opposed to being responsible citizens. Intergenerational poverty refers to the poverty induced by the socially and economically challenged background of a person’s parents (Commission on Poverty: 2005). Intergenerational poverty could be best described in terms of deprivation of material, emotional and intellectual of the older generation passed down the family line. The integrated nature of poverty manifests itself not only intergenerationally, but also through socio-economic, political factors and a disadvantaged environment. Young people often find themselves isolated in disadvantaged environments, whereby life sustaining opportunities are limited, coupled with a situation that socialises them away from the contemporary society. Exposure to such an alienating environment often closes doors and limits young people’s capacity to optimally make use of educational and developmental resources set aside by government related 6

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

programmes. Intergenerational poverty is the transfer of or absence of assets or capital in the context of social, institutional and policy environments. Moore (2004) argues that intergenerational poverty involves both transmission of poverty from older generations of individuals and families to younger generations, especially but not solely from parents to their children and lack of transfer of resources from one generation to the next. Moore further argues that transfer of poverty could be positive in the form of cash, assets and positive aspirations but sometimes negative through bonded slavery, poor diet or gender discrimination. The transference of intergenerational poverty is affected by social, cultural, political, economic and institutional contexts in which they occur. Youth exposed to intergenerational poverty face discrimination in many contexts. One such context is socio-economically bound, whereby poverty-related capital is often transferred through generations depending on the norms and values of entitlement based either on gender, position in family and marital or parental status (this is the ideal in African families). Within this context, intergenerational poverty is aggravated by institutional incapacity and biasness in treating members of the family and community unfairly or on gender basis. From a socio-cultural perspective, due to the cultural stereotypes that label young people as deviant and delinquent, culture is often used as a courier to recycle stigmatisation of youth, thus fostering youth anti-norms and values. This has a negative impact that perpetuates the imposition of cultural norms on the youth with little or no consultation regarding their inputs that engender the vicious cycle of poverty. Through this cycle, young people could grow into poor or even poorer adults. For instance, when parents cannot afford to educate and motivate their children to acquire a basic education, the uneducated child grows up to be an unemployable adult.

CASES OF YOUTH INTERGENERATIONAL POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT Policies and empirical studies often portray young people as having overwhelming challenges. Predominant challenges facing these young people, especially those residing in the townships, range from poverty, youth unemployment, health related predicaments such as HIV/AIDS to social ills in the form of alcohol and drug abuse, crime, suicide and depression (World Bank Group, 2018). Compared to the current youth, the older generation had suffered from and was affected by the perpetual and structural institutionalisation of apartheid discriminatory system. Case studies have been used to demonstrate intergenerational transmission of poverty and unemployment among the youth. Case studies below demonstrate the intergenerational transmission

7

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

of poverty and unemployment due to experienced job shortages, the scourge of HIV/ AIDS, missed educational opportunities (bunking classes), and poverty among youth.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on Youth Socio-economic predicaments faced by youth in townships are intrinsically linked to young people’s lack of a voice. Prominent among the youth problems are those relating to jobs and lack of employment opportunities. Empirical evidence showed the negative effects of unemployed youth are crime and alcohol and drug abuse (World Bank Group, 2018). Youth unemployment is rampant in South Africa (Kuzwayo, 2019) and the scourge of youth unemployment in South African townships has the potential to spread like cancer. The gravity of youth unemployment is a ‘ticking time bomb’ (De Lannoy et al,. 2015, p. 22) with statistical evidence pointing that ‘the unemployment rate among South Africans between the ages of 15 and 24 is the highest in the world at 52.4%’ (Leoka, 2109, p. 2). To validate the escalation of youth unemployment in South Africa, the Twenty Year Review (1994-2014, p. 75) adds that: Table 1. Case Study 1: Sdumo (Male age 20) I am 20 years old and I clean taxis in central Durban. I moved here from the rural areas of northern KwaZulu to seek work. When my father died he left nothing for us his children and all he left for us was poverty and debts. I worked in people’s fields as a labourer to help my mother pay for the incurred debts but the money was just not enough and the field jobs are seasonal. I have a wife and child and I cannot afford to bring them here because the rents are so high. I have so far changed jobs more than four times in the past two months because I can’t make ends meet. The little that I earn from washing cars does not go far. When I get money at most times it has already something waiting to eat it all. I sometimes scrape for a living selling perishable goods such as cigarettes and sweets to supplement what I get here. My experience with poverty is that it is like a tick which sucks the life out of you every time you make an effort to improve your life. You make a little money today and the next day it’s all gone on food, rent and maintaining and family in the rural areas. My family poverty keeps following me and I can’t escape. My father was a farm labourer and his father was one as well and he is the one who introduced my father to farm which I did for a short period of time. There is nothing else they could do they had no education at all. In my family, no one really had an opportunity to go to school we were underprivileged and my father could not afford to send us to school and his own father could not afford to him to have basic education. With the way things are going right now I am anxious for my child because I may not be able to send him to a good school and he would definitely follow my footsteps if I’m not careful. My wish is to go back to school to get out of this trap but I know I can’t because of the multiple burden on my shoulders.

Source: Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011, p. 186

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The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

Table 2. Case Study 2- Bongani (Male age 25) I don’t really know my birth date, I don’t have a birth certificate no one bothered to get me one and I have been trying all this time to get an identification number but I can’t because of that birth certificate. I did attend a little course in basic electric because I’m good with electrical stuff. I learnt it from an old man who used to mend refrigerators in the township. I did not get matric but dropped out of school at grade 9 and couldn’t’ go further because of the birth certificate and I was just too lazy to get up and go to school so I dropped out because I was also mixing up with the wrong crowds who were abusing drug which is an image of a masculine township boy. There are no job opportunities for people like me because the bosses want people with matric and identification number. Me and my family grew up in a small 2 roomed shack there is six of us in total. We live in extreme poverty we do not have anything as a family. My younger sister has just dropped out of school and the other one got pregnant while in grade 10 she works in a small shop owned by a Somalian who pays her very little. She can’t get a good job because of where we live most employers don’t like employing people from the shacks because most of us here lack education and skills and are always treated with suspicion. Looking back I can now see that my whole family from aunties, uncles and my own parents have been going through the same pattern of dropping out of school and no one encourages anyone to further our education. It’s like the whole clan has given up. My mother as well as her sisters and mother have all been domestic workers in the suburbs. My family has been poor for a long time and I think we are a product of history. You know, during apartheid, blacks were not given a chance to get educated or get better paying jobs. We were trained to become domestic workers or do manual work such as working on the farms and mines up there in Johannesburg. It’s frustrating that I can’t get a job yet I have a certificate from the community centre to say I was good in electrics. When you find yourself in a situation like mine as a young man you resort to petty crime which can become a serious criminal activity and it can become an option in order to earn a living. I really want to work to help my parents and siblings.

Source: Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011, pp. 186-187

Table 3. Case Study 3-Nobuhle (Female age 30) I was born out of wedlock and used to live between both parents. I stayed with my father during term time and went to stay with my mother over the holidays. Things turned bad for me when my father took in a girlfriend to live with us. She mistreated me and denied me food and always lied to my father that I did not respect or listen to her, you know all sorts of bad stuff was said about me. My father got fed up of the stories and sent me to live with my grandmother and other female cousins. Unfortunately my dear grandmother passed away all of a sudden and a group of us girls that is me and my cousins were left with no one to guide us. We were like wild animals and began to be involved in bad things. Firstly it was bunking school and smoking cigarettes. Then we graduated to consuming copious amounts of alcohol and going to night clubs with all sorts of men, boys, older men you name it we were having “fun”. Then my nightmare arrived, I got pregnant from a boy who was not even my steady boyfriend. I slept with him after having drunk too much alcohol I don’t even know whether it was consensual sex or he raped me I have no idea because I was under the influence. From then onwards my life changed drastically I dropped out of school. Out of desperation my steady boyfriend took me back. After giving birth I got pregnant again with my second child. To avoid burdening with a child of another man I sent my first child to live with his grandmother and moved with my boyfriend to Durban. I decided to look for a job as a cleaner at the local university. Things were relatively ok as I could bring in extra cash. Out of jealousy and preventative measure that I might end up hooking up with another man like in the previous relationship I got pregnant again with my third child. I did not plan for a third child since it was difficult to be supported by someone who also had children from a previous relationship. As death is unpredictable my boyfriend passed away leaving me with extra two mouths to feed. The situation became unbearable that I had to resort to go and stay with my mother in Cato Manor who had been surviving as a domestic worker. Due to peer pressure which led me to neglect my schooling, the circle of poverty keeps recycling itself. My fear now is that through the disadvantages inherited from my parents, my children too might not have schooling opportunities due to social and economic situation I find myself in. I feel hopeless and vulnerable and this resulted into me starting to drink again as a way of numbing the painful feelings I have inside.

Source: Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011, pp. 187-188

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The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

Table 4. Case Study 4 -Nomthando (Female age 23) I have always been poor. I don’t remember not being poor. I was orphaned at three. Both my parents died of AIDS. Back then in the early 90s no one knew what it was and everyone was in denial. As I grew up, I was told my parents were bewitched by our neighbours who were jealous of my father who was working in a restaurant in Johannesburg. But my mother’s sister told me recently that what my parents died of had symptoms of HIV. They were never diagnosed so nobody really knows. I have always taken care of myself, I have no siblings. The nuns at my church have helped me with my high school education. I got a scholarship to study at university but I do not feel like one of the students. They talk about their parents the cars they drive and shops and holidays they take which makes me feel very isolated because I have never been outside Cato Manor. The most difficult aspect of student life is that my peers seem to have everything they need from text books, writing pads, beautiful clothes and loads of cash to play with. My daily routine is so monotonous everyone said university would be fun but I’m not so sure. I plan everything to the minor detail because if I mess up I’m in big trouble. I think of my parents and often wonder how things would have turned up they were still around. I have inherited poverty from lack of parents and family on both sides of the family who have little to support themselves. They are actually looking forward to when I finish university so that I can help them. I know it will not be possible because they are so many of them. From what I gathered about my family, they have always been without. Nobody before me tried to climb the social ladder. I can say they are not a very ambitious people. When you are poor it’s hard to have hopes and dreams and it’s even harder to realize them. I only think about now because sometimes I don’t think beyond the little I have achieved which makes it difficult to read and concentrate. Like I said, I have always been poor and have always lived on left overs and cast offs of other people. I guess it’s just a kind of normality to me. It is hard to get out of poverty. I know I have a better chance than anyone in my family. I just pray I get through this, pass and get a good job. My life story is so depressing sometimes I lose the will to live.

Source: Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011, 188-189

Table 5. Case Study 5-Sbusisiwe (Male age 30) I grew up with my paternal grandmother because my mother was raped and murdered I was only two. My father was the working in the construction responsible for building the N1 road, who in most cases would come home once per month. In hindsight, one could conclude that for one to grow up in a dysfunctional family also contributed to a situation whereby instead of escaping poverty, the misfortunes of intergenerational poverty kept on following me. Initially I did not even have a birth certificate because of negligence from my parents. I picked up a date from the photograph of my mother that said I was born in 1977. My mother was not married to my father. My father married another woman who contributed towards paying my school fees since my grandmother could not to pay. My family moved from Escort to Ladysmith which meant me moving schools. The move made me repeat grades and because of mistreatment from my stepmother I had to go back to Escort and live with my maternal grandmother. My schooling kept being interrupted. I never finished school because of the infighting between IFP and ANC. Apart from the disrupted life I had, I managed to matriculate in 1996. After matric, I was recruited by my father to work as a labourer for a short while at the construction company he worked for. When the contract ran out I decided to move to Durban. In Durban, as part of surviving strategy, I entered into informal trading, selling fruits in order to earn a living and from there I got temporary employment as a bus conductor. It was in 2001 that I accidentally went home and was informed about the death of my father. Due to fact that I never had a steady job and never furthered my studies, I decided to go back and stay with my stepmother thinking that my situation would change and that I could find a direction in life. The situation got worse as my father was never married to my mother, my stepmother and step sisters assumed I had come to claim share of the little legacy that my father had left. It was at Ladysmith due to frustrations and peer pressure that me and some friends began to smoke dagga. My stepmother kicked me out of the house. It was at a later stage that I received a phone call from a friend in Durban who told me about security opportunities that I luckily ended up training as security personnel providing security services to various companies. Having moved from one company to another due to the fact that I could not afford a decent living with my salary, I ended up in providing family security services which for me was at times very risky and dangerous. This situation had been aggravated by the fact that I had no one to give me guidance. In 2005 I made a girl pregnant. According to Zulu culture I had to pay damages and in my case, the girl was a virgin and had to pay a fortune. With the coming of the second baby my dreams of furthering my education are shattered. I am no longer living for myself but for my children because I do not want them to lead the kind of life I’m living. By moving to Cato Manor life became a bit better because I could afford to rent my own place at the informal settlement and I could also walk to my place of work. Life could have been better if both of my parents were still alive they could give me some sort of guidance. I always think that if my mother was still alive even as she worked as a domestic worker she could have given me guidance and direction in life and also motivate me to make better choices in life. My family was not educated therefore; we were subjected to take up odd jobs which made life difficult.

Source: Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011. Pp. 189-191

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The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

Young people account for almost two thirds of the unemployed, thus bearing the brunt of unemployment. The National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) places the figure of young people who are neither in an educational institution nor in employment at about 2.8 million. At a national level, attempts have been made to address youth related challenges which has seen the introduction of the 1996 National Youth Commission (1996), an enactment of the National Youth Development Policy (2002-2007) and the establishment of the National Youth Development Agency in 2008 (De Lannoy et al, 2015, p. 28). Among the functions assigned these formations were to mainstream youth development within government departments, initiating, designing, coordinating, evaluating and monitoring programmes aimed at uplifting and empowering young people. The absence of youth engagement in policy making and implementation compounded by the fragmentation and lack of co-ordination gave birth to the National Youth Policy (2015-2020). The National Youth Policy (2015-2020) is anchored on five pillars geared towards enabling youth development: 1) economic inclusion and participation; 2) education, skills and training; 3) health and wellbeing; 4) nation-building and social cohesion; and 5) building a youth machinery for efficient delivery and responsibilities.

Legacy of Bantu Education on Current Youth Thus, the passing of the Bantu Education Act, No 47 of 1953 was seen as a direct challenge to the mission of the church (Abraham, 1989). It was this commission and its report that saw Bantu education being grounded through the Bantu Education Act of 1953 (Abraham 1989: 28). Since then, Bantu education came to be known as an educational system deliberately aimed at preparing students for little more than manual labour, hence a curriculum was imposed (Worden 1994: 96). Consequently, this Act had generated a lot of resistance not only from the churches running the missionary schools, but also from the liberation movements such as the ANC, PAC and BCM. For these liberation movements, the struggle against the Bantu Education Act was therefore also a struggle against the imposition of a rigid system which prescribed black people’s place in the economy and society as a whole (Taylor, 1997, p. 52). The failure by both the apartheid and democratic regimes to create jobs and offer quality education have created a cohort of a ‘lost generation’, young people who share inequalities emanating from an educational deficit (De Lannoy, Leibbrandt & Frame, 2015). First, lost generation was due to young people’s engagement with apartheid, hence the slogan ‘liberation first and education later’. Bantu education and its legacy had devastating effects on that generation to the extent that its impact continues to transmit poverty and underdevelopment to the current generation. The 11

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

second cohort of the lost generation falls under the post-apartheid youth who are commonly known as the ‘born frees’ (Tshishonga, 2017). Conceptually, these youth were born into democracy hence; they never experienced apartheid’s discriminatory laws (World Bank Group, 2018). The theoretical assumption is that these youth have little or no knowledge and experience of the brutalities of apartheid and its elaborate and systematic enfacement of racial discrimination (Maphunye, Kibuka-Sebitosi & Moagi, 2014, p. 51). Although South Africa is enjoying democracy, its education system needs revamping. For one, newspaper articles are saturated with violence that covers a wide range of criminal activities such as rape, stabbings and shootings (Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011). South African schools have been marred by conditions that seem to brutalise the youth physically and psychologically. The education system is the weakest link in the efforts to create jobs and curb unemployment among the youth in South Africa. For South Africa to uproot youth poverty and unemployment, investments by government, business and civil society should focus on overcoming poverty and unemployment through stimulating the economy and unlocking jobs (Dlamini, 2019, p. 16). Youth unemployment in Africa is prevalent (Honwana, 2013) and the rate of unemployment among the youth in South Africa has reached a peak. Poor education and slow economic growth coupled with mismatched skills are some of factors attributed to the appalling state of the youth (World Bank Group, 2018). Poverty and unemployment is ripe among the unskilled and uneducated youth and the 21th century is witnessing the emergence of ‘unemployed graduates’. Gwagwa (2018, p. 3) revealed that ‘there are about 9.3 million unemployed citizens, 6 million under 35’. These figures demonstrate the gravity of youth unemployment in general and among graduates in particular. In an attempt to highlight the scourge of unemployment among the graduates, this category of youth took to the street of Pretoria’s Union Building’s demanding jobs and employment opportunities (Gwagwa, 2018, p. 3). The graduates who marched to the Union Buildings have qualifications ranging from teaching diplomas and accounting degrees to diplomas in fine arts. This sentiment is also echoed by youth who have recently graduated from higher institutions of learning. It has been reported that there is a high drop out rate in both high school and university, because youth see no reason to further their education because both the universities’ graduates and dropouts face the same dilemma of a lack of jobs. Brenner (1996 cited in Chigunta, 2002) sums up the situation during his observation of school in Mali where he comments, “The school in contemporary Africa mainly trains students for unemployment”. A vivid case is the escalation of unemployed graduates in South Africa. For youth to escape this dire situation, education is key and as such Mlatsheni (2012, p. 36) argues that education plays an important role not just in finding employment, but also in the ability to create employment. 12

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

TOWNSHIPS AS THE BREEDING GROUND FOR POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT South African townships are characterized by multiple challenges that persistently continue to create a bleak future for young people. Created by the apartheid regime under the Group Areas Act of 1950, townships came to be known as the dumping grounds of black people. Based on the policy of separate development, townships for black Africans were Cato Manor, Mdatsane, Soweto, Motherwell, Khayelitsha, and Indian townships included Phoenix, Chatsworth, Manengberg, Elsies, Steenberg, Honuve, Heideveld, Bontthehuwell, Athlone, Redhill and Avoca while Clare Estate, Sydenham, Wentworth, Newlands, Lotus and Laudium are those designated for Coloured people. Each province and big cities have their own fair share of the townships based on spatial planning which was envisaged to separate people according to their race. For socio-economic survival, township residents are left with casual jobs, hence the World Bank Group (2018, p. 85) revealed that between 2000 and 2016, job growth was mainly in temporary employment. Townships are notorious for being located away from the city centres where employment opportunities are scarce or non-existent. For the majority of those employed in the Central Business Districts, implies that they have to commute daily to work, some taking more than three modes of transportation. This was reconfirmed by Ndlovu (2019, p. 8) who adds that: Today, poor and predominantly black people continue to live far away from centres of economic activity and jobs, meaning they have to travel great distances to access employment opportunities at great expenses. The common denominator for all these areas has been a deprivation trap with young people mostly negatively affected. With slow economic growth, lack of economic opportunities and the legacy of Bantu education, including the missed educational opportunities of the ‘born frees’, the ‘lost generation’ continue to haunt the youth (Maphunye, Ledwaba & Kobjana, 2014; Tshishonga, 2017; World Bank Group, 2018). For example, through the FeesMustFall campaign, the born frees went on a rampage protesting against the history of exclusion in higher education (World Bank Group, 2018, 27). As mentioned earlier, the South African economy is growing, yet the government has failed to create new jobs for the growing youth population. ILO (1999) confirms that the problem of youth unemployment in the third world is increasing and it has brought grave socio-economic problems as witnessed in the case studies. Although South Africa is highly developed and industrialised, empirical evidence indicates that youth unemployment is on the rise (World Bank Group, 2018). The majority of young people are unable to secure 13

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

employment due to the substandard education they receive and those that manage to secure employment are mainly male. South African townships become the breeding ground for poverty and unemployment among youth. With high rates of poverty and unemployment in the country (Terreblanche, 2012), unskilled and uneducated youth have the hope of eking out a living in the informal sector or marginal employment. The informal sector is known for insecure lowly paid employment where the elderly are retrenched due to a scarcity of jobs and stunted economic growth with no prospects of re-employment. However, on the contrary, the World Bank Group (2018, p. 96) revealed that about 18 percent of men and 15 percent of women work in the informal sector. The accompanying case studies sought to give empirical content of the notion of marginalisation and intergenerational poverty. Marginalisation was carefully assessed across education, employment, legacy of apartheid, hopelessness and exploitation (Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011). Marginalisation in this chapter comprised of alienation, dysfunctional families among other issues which when combined, provide an aggregate measure of poverty among youth. Adversely, youth who are marginalised and grow up in poverty are according to Mlatshieni (2012, p. 34) at risk forming or joining gangs in order to obtain an identity, status and a sense of belonging. Thus, in townships, evidence of poverty and unemployment among youth is visible at the shopping malls, streets and taverns loitering aimlessly with no sense of hope. These places have become second homes and meeting places for those that live on the margins. Given the lack of job opportunities, most young people in the townships engage in informal and seasonal casual work where conditions and wages are dismal. Due to the frustrations and hopelessness faced in their everyday lives, they resort to criminal activities in order to generate income to feed and clothe themselves.

UPROOTING POVERTY AND UNEMPOYMENT THROUGH YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP The failure of all these national and local interventions has left youth entrepreneurship as the last option for youth to escape underdevelopment and the deprivation trap through economic endeavours initiated, run and managed by youth themselves. Thus, promoting youth enterprise is slowly gaining momentum as a viable economic alternative for unemployed youth (Chigunta, 2002 cited in Zuze, 2012, p. 54). Considering that young people are resourceful and energetic, embarking on entrepreneurial projects beyond the common ones such as community gardening, cleaning, catering, co-operatives and so forth are imperative. Use of technology to create innovative projects in areas of security, marketing and advertisement, 14

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

agriculture, ICT, recycling are fundable by national and international organisations. There are increasing opportunities for formal education and training and learnerships and internships for youth empowerment as well as employment services aimed at improving job searches and job matches. Apart from these interventions, there is a promotion of entrepreneurial activities among youth in urban, rural and township areas (Twenty Year Review, 2014, p. 75). Entrepreneurship is associated to the work of entrepreneurs, people who according to Markley et al, (2005) creates and grows an enterprise through transforming ideas into business ventures. Government through its established centres and units tried to encourage young people to market the ideas and strategies for self-employment. In particular, the youth designated institutions such the National Development Youth Agency (NDYA) and the National Youth Service Programme (NYSP) were set up with the sole purpose of advocating youth development through harnessing the potential of young people (Mlatsheni, 2012). The development of youth enterprises became a key priority. In order for youth challenges such as the high unemployment rate, a lack of skills and improved employability needs to be dealt with, Mkasi & Tamukamoyo (2016, p. 18) argue that credible and effective youth-focused institutions are required. Poverty is invisible, it manifests itself through the prevalence of illiteracy, crime, alcohol and drug abuse, hopelessness, teenage pregnancies and large numbers of youth being unemployed (Mlatsheni, 2012). Youth entrepreneurship could be the panacea to most of these challenges in townships. The World Bank Group (2018, p. 96) advocates for informal enterprises by arguing that growing informal entrepreneurs could be instrumental in tapping into the growing demand based on comparative advantage, whereby jobs could be generated in the townships. Promotion and creation of entrepreneurial enterprises by young people is a noble idea, which would require financial support, skills development and business competencies. Turning youth into entrepreneurs demands young people learn new skills and make use of innovative strategies aimed at providing alternative solutions to old and emerging problems. According to Markley et al, (2005 cited in Gruidl & Markley, 2009, pp. 281-282), for entrepreneurs to succeed in running their income enterprises should possess the following capabilities: 1) ability to perceive opportunities, 2) ability to access and manage risks, 3) ability to build a team, 4) ability to mobilise resources, 5) ability to sustain creativity. These elements are fundamental ingredients for not only successful enterprises, but also businesses which are sustainable and competitive. Gruidl & Markley (2015, pp. 383-288) presented different types of entrepreneurs such as aspiring and start-up entrepreneurs, potential entrepreneurs, civic entrepreneurs, business owners-styles entrepreneurs, growth-orientated entrepreneurs and serial entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurial types represent a continuum that grade those at an early stage of developing their ideas to those well-established entrepreneurs 15

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

and those embarking on entrepreneurship for civic purposes. Evidence from the interviews with township youths across the nation is that unemployed youth are dominant in the informal sectors, especially the spaza (informal) shops. According to the World Bank Group (2018, p. 96), the informal sector such as street traders, spaza shops, and shebeens count for 44 percent with informal shops catering for domestic markets have been expanding tremendously. Additionally, the World Bank Group (2018) highlighted the advantage of the small informal sector in cushioning economic shocks over the established larger formal businesses.

FUTURE REASERCH DIRECTIONS In order for the author to have a comprehensive grasp of the issues confronting young people in the townships, the author used intergenerational transmission of poverty and unemployment. Intergenerational transmission of poverty and unemployment has been used as the framework to understand the gravity of socio-economic among young people in general and township youth in particular. As evidenced from various researches, challenges faced by young people are wide spread, among the common ones being poverty, unemployment, health related, abuse of alcohol and drugs, housing and low levels of education. In most cases, especially in the Third World, youth embedded challenges are also further aggravated by poor development and implementation of policies designed to promote youth development and employment. Additionally, the adoption of welfare approaches to youth development has contributed in stigmatizing young people as troublesome, lazy and useless waiting for handouts from government and other stakeholders working in youth sector. Without youth policies and programmes based on developmental approaches and integrated notion of youth empowerment and development, young people will continue to be economically marginalized and socially excluded. The chapter deliberated intergenerational transmission of poverty and unemployment as historical and with its trace to the legacies of apartheid discriminatory laws. Despite these policies youth are still faced with deprivation and marginalisation which manifests through the continuity of poverty, unemployment and lack of educational and economic opportunities for them to lead a decent living. Without doubt, the transmission and recycling of intergenerational poverty and unemployed experienced have devastating effects on welfare of youth especially those living on the margins in South African townships. Based on the challenges faced by young people in townships, there is a need for research with the specific focus on the socio-economic strategies used by rural youth. Such research should be aimed at exploring how natural resources such as land, agricultural and mining opportunities could be optimally utilized and maximized for youth economic empowerment. 16

The Effects of Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment on South African Township Youth

CONCLUDING REMARKS The chapter has wrestled with the notion of intergenerational poverty and unemployment in South African townships with particular reference to the youth. Mostly young people in townships and informal settlements continue to experience social dislocation and alienation. There are limited opportunities in the job market especially for unskilled and low skilled youth as well as those with no qualifications. This situation is further aggravated by the state’s failure to create new jobs for school leavers and graduates. The research reveals that the lives of youth are imbued by a myriad of challenges and problems which cut through educational backgrounds and age categories (Mafema & Tshishonga, 2011). Youth seem to be disengaged from mainstream social processes thus, they are either anomic or involved only in their sub-cultures which include living in informal settlements and immersed in criminal activities. This is because the state and civil society consistently fail to address youth concerns and as such, fail to communicate effectively with them through appropriate channels (not condescending). Thus, organisations focused on youth development should embrace technological strategies such as WhatsApp, Twitter, and Instagram, to reach out to young people. The chapter therefore concludes that youth apathy further attributes towards the situation starting from the time of the liberation struggle, young people have through these trials and tribulations having graduated from being a lost generation to being a marginalised generation. The challenges for all concerned, particularly the adults is to unlearn the tendencies and behaviours that treat young people as delinquents and in a manner that deprives and degrades their capacity towards empowerment and development. The chapter recommends that the government as well as other civil organisations such as the Youth Commission, National Development Youth Agency and youth initiatives within civil society and various government departments could design programmes to curb the intergenerational cycle of poverty and unemployment among youth in their own settings. Urban based programmes will not alleviate the problem but perpetuate it through rural migration. Marginalised rural youth need to be included rather than be excluded and exploited. For government to bring back marginalised youth into mainstream socio-economic life, various bodies of civil society would need to mobilise youth in building their capacity through training for employment as well as filling up gaps in missed education opportunities, health services and service provision (Mkansi & Tamukamoyo, 2016). For the youth, development should be perceived as a joint venture, where young people are encouraged to actively get involved either in youth oriented structures or government-municipality based initiatives such as Integrated Development Planning (IDP) and ward committees.

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REFERENCES Abdullah, I. (1998). Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 36(2), 203–234. doi:10.1017/S0022278X98002766 Bennell, P. (2000). Improving Youth Livelihoods in SSA: A Review of policies of programmes with particular emphasis on one Link between Social Behaviour and Economic Well-being. Report to the International Development Centre. IDRC. Chigunta, F. (2002). The Socio-Economic Situation of Youth in Africa: Problems and Prospects. Retrieved from http//www.yesweb.org/gkr/re/bg.africa.reg.doc Commission on Poverty (CoP). (2005). Tackling Intergenerational Poverty-Concept Paper. Author. De Lannoy, A., Leibrandt, M., & Frame, E. (2015). A focus on youth: An opportunity to disrupt the intergenerational transmission of poverty. In A. De Lannoy, S. Swart, L. Lake, & C. Smith (Eds.), South African Child Gauge (pp. 22–33). Cape Town, South Africa: University of Cape Town & Children Institute. Dlamini, S. (2019, January 21). Portraying the vision of a brighter future for all South Africans. The Mercury, p. 16. Gruidl, J., & Markley, D. (2009). Entrepreneurship as a Community Development Strategy. In R. Phillips & R. H. Pittman (Eds.), An Introduction to Community Development (2nd ed.; pp. 278–294). London: Routledge. Gwangwa, V. (2018, November 7). Unemployed graduates march for jobs. Pretoria News, p. 3. Honwana, A. (2013). The Time of Youth: Work, Social Change and Politics in Africa. Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press. Johnson, K., & Jacobs, S. (2012). Encyclopedia of South Africa. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Mafema, E. D., & Tshishonga, N. (2011). Living on the margins: The effects of Intergenerational poverty amongst youth at Cato Manor in Durban. In M. S. Mapadimeng & S. Khan (Eds.), Contemporary social issues in Africa: cases in Gaborone, Kampala and Durban. Pretoria, South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa.

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Maphunye, K, Kibuka-Sebitosi, E & Moagi, A. (2014). South Africa Twenty Years into Democracy: The march to the 2014 elections. Pretoria: WIPHOLD-Brigalia Bam Chair in Electoral Democracy in Africa. Maphunye, K. J., Ledwaba, M. L., & Kobjana, M. K. (2014). ‘Democracy without Accountability or Accountability without Democracy” ’Born-Frees Perspectives of Public Perspectives in South Africa’. Journal of Public Administration., 49(1), 161–179. Mkandawire, R.M. (1996). Experiences in Youth Policy and Programme in Commonwealth Africa. Unpublished Policy Document prepared for the Commonwealth Youth Programme Department. Mkasi, A., & Tamukamoyo, H. (2016). Credible institutions key to development of our youth. The Sunday Independent, 15(July), 18. Mlatsheni, C. (2012). The Challenges Unemployment Imposes on Youth. In H. Perold, N. Cloete, & J. Papier (Eds.), Shaping the Future of South Africa’s Youth: Rethinking post-school education and skills training (pp. 31–41). Somerset West, South Africa: African Minds. Moore, K. (2004). Chronic, life-course and intergenerational poverty, and South-East Asian youth. Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) and Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) and School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester, UK. National Planning Commission. (2011). Diagnostic Overview. Pretoria: The Presidency. Ndlovu, M. (2019). The shocking prevalence of hunger and food insecurity. Sunday Independent, 27(January), 8. Noyoo, N., Patel, L., & Loffell, J. (2006). The human development situation of Johannesburg’s youth. A Professional Journal for the Social Worker, 42(1), 93-100. Oakley, P., & Clegg, I. (1999). Promoting participatory development as a strategy of poverty alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A review of some current practice. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 14(1), 31–52. Perold, H. (2012). Opening the doors of Learning? Viewing the Post-School Education and Training Landscape from a Youth Perspective. In H. Perold, N. Cloete, & J. Papier (Eds.), Shaping the Future of South Africa’s Youth: Rethinking post-school education and skills training (pp. 177–195). Somerset West, South Africa: African Minds. 19

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Republic of South Africa. (1996). National Youth Commission Act. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Printers. Republic of South Africa. (2014). South Africa: Twenty Year Review (1994-2014). Author. Sen, A. K. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Taylor, V. (1997). Social Mobilisation: Lessons from the Mass Democratic Movement. Bellville, South Africa: Southern African Development EP. Terreblanche, S. (2012). Lost in Transformation: South Africa’s Search for a New Future since 1986. Johannesburg, South Africa: KMM Review Publishing Company. Terreblanche, S. (2012). Lost in transformation: South Africa’s search for a new future since 1986. Johannesburg, South Africa: KMM Review Publishing Company. Tshishonga, N. (2017). Born Frees and the Act of Citizenship through Voting in the 2014 National Elections: A Critical Introspection. In A. Amtaika (Ed.), The Democratization of Africa: Dynamisc and Trends (pp. 223–239). Austin, TX: PanAfrican University Press. World Bank Group. (2019). An Incomplete Transition: Overcoming the Legacy of Exclusion in South Africa. Cape Town, South Africa: UCT Press. Zulu, P. (2004). Poverty in Cato Manor: Perceived or actual? In P. Robinson, J. McCarthy, & C. Forster (Eds.), Urban reconstruction in the developing world: Learning through an international best practice (pp. 249-259). Sandown, South Africa: Heinemann Publishers (Pty) Ltd. Zuze, T. L. (2012). The Challenge of Youth-To-Work Transitions: An International Perspective. In H. Perold, N. Cloete, & J. Papier, (Eds.), Shaping the Future of South Africa’s Youth: Rethinking post-school education and skills training (pp. 41–59). Somerset West, South Africa: African Minds.

ADDITIONAL READING De Lannoy, A. S., Swartz, L.L, Lake, & Smith, C. (2015). South African ChildGauge. Cape Town: UCT & Children Institute. Perold, H., Cloete, N., & Papier, J. (Eds.). (2012). Shaping the Future of South Africa’s Youth: Rethinking post-school education and skills training. Somerset West, South Africa: African Minds. 20

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World Bank Group. (2018). An Incomplete Transition: Overcoming the Legacy of Exclusion in South Africa. Cape Town, South Africa: UCT Press.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Bantu Education: It was an apartheid system of education also known as gutter or inferior education passed through 1953 Bantu education Act and it was designed for black students to be laborers as opposed to quality education offered for white learners or students. Intergenerational Poverty and Unemployment: Poverty and unemployment transmitted from adult generation to younger generation due to economic marginalization, lack of skills transfer and low education level. National Youth Policy: Is a policy introduced by the South African democratic government with the sole purpose of addressing youth related challenges. Township: Is a residential area created by the apartheid government for black people in the outskirts of South African cities. Township Youth: These are youth who reside in the township and are often deprived of employment opportunities and other basic amenities due the legacy of apartheid especially Bantu education. Unemployed Graduates: These are higher education graduates in different fields of study who due to lack of labour demanded skills or slow economic growth are unable secure a job. Youth: An age category of population (14-24 or 15-35) that are still in the transition to adulthood and are often defined by their fearless sprit of radicalism. Youth Entrepreneurship: Is a process whereby creative and innovative ideas are transformed into enterprises initiated and managed by young people with the primary purpose of addressing their socio-economic challenges such as poverty and unemployment. Youth Poverty: That is the type of poverty that is visible among young people and it renders them vulnerable to challenges relating to education and employment.

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Chapter 2

Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows Theories in Youth Violence: A Critical Juxtaposition

Obediah Dodo Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe Mcdonald Makoni Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT The chapter is a comparative analysis of two theories, Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows, on their relevance and influence on youth participation in political violence that was recorded in Bindura town from year 2000. The analysis juxtaposed the two theories in relation to what other scholars have said on the same subject matter. This was in view of the fact that there are some theoretical assumptions that are traditionally aligned to particular studies and social realities. The analysis concluded that while the two theories may not have influenced youth involvement in political violence in Bindura in the same way and gravity, they both played a role. It was established that most of the youth violence would have developed over time before a slight incident triggered its explosion.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch002 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows Theories in Youth Violence

INTRODUCTION Various studies have been conducted on the youth in relation to their involvement and participation in violence (Reeler, 2009, RAU, 2012a, Dodo & Msorowegomo, 2012; Dodo et al, 2016). Equally, various studies have proffered various reasons for youth participation in violence in different settings. It has also been observed that youth in different settings have varying commitments to violence and the subsequent effect of the violence is often different. In view of the different arguments proffered by different theories, the article sought to juxtapose the implications and relevance of the two theories; Youth Bulge Theory (YBT) and Broken down Windows Theory (BDWT) on the involvement of youth in political violence. This is against a background of communities the world over defined by disorder, instability and conflicts at the instigation of the youth.

BACKGROUND Bindura town is a traditional mining town located 89 kilometres to the north of Harare, Zimbabwe. Traditionally, the town is economically sustained by mining and commercial farming activities. It lies in the ecological region two, which is good for crop farming. From the aforesaid, it shows that traditionally, the town was inhabited by migrant workers especially from Malawi and Mozambique who provided with cheap labour to both mining and agriculture sectors. Formal education and proper family systems in this environment were never prioritised (Dodo, 2010). Generally Bindura town is a run-down urban settlement with poor service delivery and poorly maintained infrastructure (RAU, 2012a). With the advent of the 2000 Land Invasions, commercial farming and all the mining activities collapsed subsequently impacting on the lives of the migrant workers. Because of the desperate conditions surrounding most migrant workers, the ruling party had always arm-twisted them for their political support and sympathy. Bindura urban has always been defined by political intolerance and violence given the fact that it is traditionally viewed a ZANU PF stronghold on account of the fact that the local migrant youth are prepared to play foot-soldiers’ role. This is despite the fact that the opposition political contestants have of late managed to wrestle power. Post-2000, the first recorded episode of political violence was during the Land Invasion era before it was upgraded to fatalistic levels during the 2002 Presidential elections (RAU, 2012b). This is not to say that there was no violence during the 2001 Parliamentary by-election. The other wave of violence was recorded in 2005 during the Murambatsvina (Operation Restore Order) exercise. The operation in a bid to clear urban areas of illegal settlements, ended up leaving 23

Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows Theories in Youth Violence

households in the open and exposed to diseases and cold. During the process, tens of people especially children and the sick died (RAU, 2012a). During the same period of 2005, Trojan Mine and Ashanti Goldfields, the two major mines that employed over 20000 people scaled down operations by over 90%. The retrenchments led to instability and subsequent violence by the youth (Dodo, 2010). In 2008, there were two national plebiscites. The first on 27 March was termed Harmonised elections when all Parliamentary, Senatorial, Local government and Presidential elections were jointly held. The election process was peaceful as it was guided by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Democratic Elections (Dodo, 2010). After the elections, there was no announcement of the results for 42 days during which time hostilities, mistrust and anger developed in the people against known and perceived political rivals. The following 35 days from the date when election results were announced were characterised by intense persecution especially by members of the ruling party supported by national security agents against members of the opposition political groups (Dodo & Msorowegomo, 2012). The 35 days of political violence leading to the second plebiscite on 27 June 2008 resulted in serious ethnicised, politicized and regionalized hostilities and violence. During the buildup of the violence, the ruling party meticulously deployed security agents, former liberation war participants popularly called ‘war veterans’ and some youth to unleash violence on known and perceived political opponents. The violence also included the establishment of torture centres popularly known as ‘bases’ (Dodo & Msorowegomo, 2012; Dodo et al, 2016). Particularly in Bindura, there were five political bases; Musvosvi Street, Kudzanayi Street, Tendai Hall, Chiwaridzo Hall and Chipadze Long-distance Bus Terminus holding over 531 youth; 377 males and 154 females (Dodo & Msorowegomo, 2012). During the youth-led violence in Bindura, there was destruction of property, assault of people, abuse of women and girls and robbing of vendors and other travelers. Most studies (Reeler, 2009; Dodo & Msorowegomo, 2012; RAU, 2012a; RAU, 2012b; Dodo et al, 2016) on political violence in Bindura during the period under review attribute the motivation towards political ideology, joblessness and criminal mentality. In 2008/9, especially after the elections, the economy literally collapsed leaving all the retail shops empty with basic food commodities running out of stock. There were running battles in most communities over the few available goods. This was worsened by politicized efforts by the government to avail food commodities through programmes run by the youth (Dodo, 2010). As a result, the food only benefitted supporters of a particular political party thus leading to violence. However, this analysis juxtaposes YBT against BDWT in relation to their influence on the political violence that was experienced from year 2000. The analysis seeks to establish the nexus between the violence recorded and the role of the youth. It also attempts to 24

Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows Theories in Youth Violence

compare the level of involvement and relevance of the two theories to the question of violence in the area under study.

METHODOLOGY The study is a qualitative comparative analysis of two theories; Youth Bulge and Broken down Windows on their relevance and influence on youth participation in political violence that was recorded in Bindura town from year 2000 till 2015. Bindura was chosen for the study because it has most of the characteristics of most urban, mining, farming and rural settlements while the population is of mixed ethnic and religious groups. Bindura has also experienced most of the conflicts ever recorded in Zimbabwe. The study defines the youth as active political participants aged between 15 and 30 years as defined by the 2013 constitution of Zimbabwe. In attempting to compare the level of involvement and relevance of the two theories to the question of violence, archival material and past literature were consulted specifically focusing on the literature produced during the period post-independence; 1980-2015. Content analysis was employed to critically comprehend the data.

Conceptual Overview This is a comparative analysis of the two theories; Youth Bulge and Broken down Windows on their relevance, influence and impact on the level of youth participation in political violence that was recorded in Bindura town from year 2000. Theories are formulated to explain societal hypothesis. It is against this thinking that the two theories assumptions’ are subjected to a critical comparison so that at the end of the day, the one that closely relates with the situation may be identified. The analysis simply sought to either confirm or refute the relevance and influence of some theories to real life experiences. The article analysis is focused on the youth in Bindura urban between year 2000 and 2015. Bindura was chosen for the study specifically because it has most of the characteristics of most urban, mining, farming and rural settlements while the population is of mixed ethnic groups. Besides, most conflicts ever recorded in Zimbabwe were also experienced in the town. Bindura town by its nature can easily represent most of the developing nations’ communities and its structure and youth dynamics and activities can also be generalisable to other towns.

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Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows Theories in Youth Violence

Youth Bulge Theory The theory was propounded by Gunnar Heinsohn in the mid-1990s. However, it gained prominence through Gary Fuller and Jack Goldstone (Goldstone, 2001). The theory argues that societies experiencing demographic transition are more vulnerable to such violent changes. Youth bulge is a state in which the population share of the 15-24 year-olds surpasses 20% of the entire population (Schomaker, 2013). It basically talks about competition for resources and opportunities between the traditional occupants and the new entrants who in this case are the youth who may be harbouring some developmental dreams. It is from the competition that the youth often find alternative and extra-legal means of survival. Some studies (Barakat & Urdal, 2009) posit that between 1970 and 1999, 80% of civil conflicts happened in societies where 60% of the population was below the age of 30. However, with regards to the violence in Bindura town, most of the violence was driven by a minute percentage of the population. It therefore dispels the assumption of the YBT that there has to be a bludgeoning youth population to incite violence. Besides, the violence in Bindura was never about resource scarcity but rather, political ideology and to some extent, illiteracy (Reeler, 2009; Dodo, 2010).

Broken Down Windows The theory of Broken down Windows (BDWT) was propounded by Wilson & Kelling (1982). According to the theory, if the windows to a building remain unfixed, anyone else who likes to break windows thinks that no-one has a responsibility and more windows will be broken. Eventually, all the windows will be broken. The theoretical assumption in relation to crime and violence is that, where violence is allowed to exist by the security agencies, it creates opportunities for more violent actions (Xu et al, 2005; Bratton & Kelling, 2006). The theory essentially assumes that chaos in a community has the capacity to impinge on the ways in which the same community members socially control each other. Lack of social control mechanisms exposes most communities to social instability (Gault & Silver, 2008). However, the theory points to an indirect and asymmetric relationship between youth violence and instability. The BDWT argues that physical disorder can have some influence on behaviours like crime. It is also argued that lack of proper upkeep of a public space motivates youth misbehaviour (ICPC 2008). If the responsible local authorities fail to attend to social issues like trash all over the place, doodles on the walls, broken windows, neglected infrastructure, and sometimes poor street lighting, it produces a situation that encourages crime (Alys & Makisaka, 2010). This is typical of the infrastructural situation in Bindura where most of the basic social services are collapsed and often forcing the youth to engage in illegal activities. 26

Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows Theories in Youth Violence

LITERATURE REVIEW Youth Violence Generally, most theories of violence see the manifestation of violence as a normal way of rectifying people’s concerns (Ellis, 2005). This is especially so with the YBT and the BDWT, which focus on the deprivation of youth expectations and gradual neglect of the same constituency by the leaders. Studies submit that an increase in risk factors like: crime, poverty, illiteracy and insufficient income, are linked to community violence (Luthar & Goldstein, 2004; Tolan et al, 2004). The same studies though contextually distant, also suggest that exposure to violence has the potential to socialise the youth into violence as well. However, it has to be established if such factors as peoples surroundings like schools, religious institutions and neighbouring communities can safeguard the youth from the negative consequences related to exposure to violence. Scarpa et al, (2006) argue that there are however some familial factors which have the capacity to protect the youth from socialisation into violence. With reference to the BDWT, it is evident that such familial factors like the presence of the mother in the home, family unity and support are lacking in most traditional Bindura town homes given its historical background. Youth violence in Bindura is seen from two clear planes: violence experienced as eyewitnesses and violence experienced as targets. Therefore, from this view, the definition of violence becomes somewhat broader and more complex. However as argued by Lederach (2003); Tolan et al, (2004) and Ellis, (2005), youth violence remains one that is fatal given the fact that there will be a variety of motivations behind: poverty, unemployment, political ideology, human instigators and criminal mentality amongst others. It is about physical and sexual assaults, murder, vandalism and theft amongst others (Siegel & McCormick, 2006; Dodo et al, 2016).

Urban Violence Urbanisation has seen massive influx of people in the towns. This is due to the effects of globalisation especially the industrialisation of urban areas. The development of urban areas has been the epicentre for economic growth opening up prospects for hordes of youth to secure formal employment and subsequently improve living conditions. World Bank (2009) submits that while poverty has reduced globally, it is increasing in several urban areas. Similarly, inequalities are growing as urban areas generate capital. According to WHO (2008), the world over, the rate of male homicide is approximately twofold that of females for all age sets though victimization by violence is more or less the same by gender. According to World Bank (2009), 27

Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows Theories in Youth Violence

violence has serious, adverse effects on economic development since it destroys and retards growth and creates long-term damaging social effects. It has been observed that urban areas that are most wrecked by violence correspondingly become the poorest (WB, 2010). Bindura is not spared by this form of violence that has affected its development and the improvement of the residents.

Causes of Youth Violence in Bindura The deterioration in the social services in Bindura and slow response to the calls for rehabilitation are most linked to the prevalence of poverty amongst the people and complacency on the part of the service providers. From a research perspective and according to Hong & Farley (2008) and Abdullahi et al (2016), such a community is crimogenic as it is defined by high levels of disadvantaged communities with pronounced levels of broken families, distorted and politicized aspirations, criminal mentality, drug abuse, poor housing, and joblessness. Dodo & Msorowegomo (2012), in their study of youth violence in Bindura contend that what often motivated violence amongst the youth is closely related to economic stagnation, joblessness, poverty, failure by the regime to prosecute perpetrators of previous political violence, poor social services and political intolerance. From the aforesaid, it becomes clear that the BDWT (Xu et al, 2005) is closer to the prevailing situation on the ground than the YBT. It is provable that the experiences of the youth culminating into their participation in violence, is a gradual build-up of issues over a long period of time without any appropriate attention from the responsible authorities. According to Wilson & Kelling (1982) and Bratton & Kelling, (2006), this is similar to the breaking down of a building’s windows without reasonable repairs and having more destruction on the same building. Very little is visible concerning the assumptions around YBT except the aspect on joblessness. Besides, a gradual deterioration of the services is markedly prominent. Borrowing from the YBT, which argues that if a cohort of the youth is allowed to develop over time without adequate planning for its absorption into the mainstream economy, there will be breeding of an explosive situation; Bindura town is an exception. It is an exception because there is very little interest in learning by the youth in the town. Rather, there has been a development of a sub-culture of violence, intolerance and political discrimination (Dodo & Msorowegomo, 2012), which adversely affected the development, politically, socially and economically of both the people and the town. The YBT argues that the failure by the leadership to create room for the absorption of the young ones into the same leadership circles may be a recipe for disaster (Doran & Lees, 2005). From the situation in the town politically, it is evident that all the prominent political parties have not embraced an effective leadership renewal policy. 28

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This is seen in the sit-tight leadership by the office bearers especially in the last two decades. According to Abdullahi et al (2016), equally imperative are youth-related programmes, which ensure that there is adequate capacity building for the youth and that business management skills training for the youth are timely availed. Ethnic socialisation as defined by Johnson (2005) is a culturally significant child-rearing practice that helps to highlight the significance of a particular group in society. It involves the spread of attitudes, philosophies and ideals about ethnicity from parents to children. Ethnic and political socialisation processes also take in the spread of both verbal and non-verbal messages with regard to the ideals, philosophies, customs and conduct of particular ethnic group (Johnson, 2005; Lesane-Brown, 2006). However, discreetly, the process sows hostilities, enmity and divisions in society so much so that eventually, communities will always be fighting. Such socialisation is seen in such statements especially by the leadership directed to a particular youth group ostensibly to impress so that ultimately, they may be abused through persecuting others described as less significant. Mazezuru ndiwo arikutonga (People of the Zezuru ethnic group are ruling Zimbabwe) Vatsigiri veMDC, vanotsigira varungu avo vakaponda madzitateguru edu (Supporters of the opposition MDC political party sympathise with the white colonialists, who murdered our fore-fathers). Hapana anokusungayi nekuti tisu tiri kutonga muno (You will not be arrested because your political party is in power) The build-up of these and several other messages confirm the BDWT where some youth are encouraged to partake in violence on the assurance of impunity (Gault & Silver, 2008). Similarly, the fact that they are told that they are more superior than every other ethnic group and that opposition members are betrayers, helps create hostilities and discriminatory tendencies amongst the people. Some scholars (Lia, 2005; Doran & Lees, 2005) suggest a strong correspondence between societies susceptible to civil conflicts and those with rapidly increasing youth populations. But has this always been the case? The same studies argue that societies with bludgeoning youth populations usually result in joblessness and huge populations of disgruntled youths who are vulnerable to conscription into violence ranks. However, seeing the youth crisis in Bindura from another perspective, it would also appear as if the youth populations in the town are not growing. Rather, they are just being exposed from their traditional sources of income that have over the period been forced to close due to economic challenges and bad governance. According to

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Dodo & Msorowegomo (2012), over 60% of the youth population in Bindura was traditionally engaged in agriculture and mining employment. Unfortunately, the two sectors have since folded. It is acknowledged that youth bulges provide a ready pool of youth to serve as fighters as it is common knowledge that the elders are not as effective, swift and flexible as the youth are in as far as fighting and violence are concerned. With regards to Bindura violence, it has never been about any bulges but just a few youth supported by the security agents and official impunity (RAU, 2012).

Analysis of YBT and BDWT A comparison of the two theories’ proximity to the involvement of youth in political violence in Bindura post-2000 requires that a critical review of each theory’s strengths and weaknesses be done making reference to other cases elsewhere. Indeed, the two theories have been analysed and respective results presented accordingly. The youth bulge theory has been used to explain the political instability in the Arab world (Lia, 2005). The same theory may not however be applied to explain civil wars in Uganda, Sudan, Libya and the DRC given that all the youth involved cannot explain their participation in violence (Urdal, 2006). They seek no jobs neither do they want money or education. All they want is to inflict pain and suffering on the opponents defined by their handlers as bad and evil. In the first place, most of the youth would not have attended school that they dream of securing good jobs. Rather, what is glaring in the Bindura case just like in cases; Sudan, Uganda and Mozambique (Lia, 2005) are a situation where the youth are socialised into believing that violence is good. They are made to believe that violence is the best option to conflicts. This is confirmed by the fact that most of them are born in conflict societies, grow up witnessing violence and adopt it as part of their culture. It may be safe to conclude that because the youth are gradually socialised into believing in violence, it becomes a case of BDWT. In Uganda, Somalia, Sudan, DRC and Bindura, the youth resort to violence even where talks are ideal. This is contrary to the violence experienced in South Africa, Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Harare and Kenya where the youth react to non-availability of basic services, unemployment and poor education amongst others. This explains the aspect of socialisation and tradition. Aptly, Lia (2005) explains that the propensity for youth recruitment for violence is thought to be higher when huge cohorts of educated youth are restricted from pursuing their dream careers by despotic and restrictive forms of governance. In that regard, it becomes easy for the youth to choose violence.

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Youth Bulge and Broken Down Windows Theories in Youth Violence

DISCUSSION Various studies and analysis have proven that there may not be a one size fits all approach to the challenges of youth violence. No one theory may be able to explain all the youth activities in different settings and parts of the world as argued by Urdal (2006). Therefore, both YBT and BDWT have part contributions towards the youth violence in Bindura post-2000 albeit with varying depth. Empirical researches by Ellis (2005); Urdal (2006); Hong & Farley (2008) submit that youth bulges correspond directly to an increased threat of political violence. However, recent studies suggest that governments have the capacity to lessen this threat through the availability of more and better chances for the youth (Alys & Makisaka, 2010). One of the several ways of achieving this according to Bratton & Kelling (2006); ICPC (2008); Barakat & Urdal (2009) is doing away with a culture of violence in the societies where most youth adopt the practice. In other words, both YBT and BDWT can exist almost simultaneously and yet one can be used to counter the other. Similarly, one can also be used to complement the other. What may be experienced in Bindura with regards to violence is that despite any form of development, violence may remain a challenge. This is because the youth in Bindura engage in political violence not because they want jobs or anything economic but rather political ideology. The youth have always participated in political violence to satisfy political expectations of their sponsors. Like it is argued by ICPC (2008), most of the infrastructure in Bindura has collapsed and little attention has been given towards their restoration. Therefore, fertile grounds for youth delinquency have been created as there are enough hiding places and other rendezvous for prostitution and criminality. Therefore, what becomes very clear according to Reeler (2009); Dodo & Msorowegomo (2012); RAU (2012a) & (2012b); Dodo et al (2016), is a manifestation of a culture of negligence, violence and intolerance which have over the years seen the youth perennially engaging in political violence. In most if not all of the conflicts and cases of violence ever recorded in Bindura, none has ever been over the need for either jobs or an improved economy. They have all been about political ideology. Probably it is because most of the youth are aligned to the ruling political party. All the same, does it then serve to confirm the argument that a system of negligence and intolerance has been nurtured over a period of time without redress?

CONCLUSION The analysis has shown that both theories did play some invaluable roles in the involvement of the youth in the violence recorded in Bindura from year 2000. 31

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However, what remained vague is the explanation for the weaknesses of the respective theories with regards to the experienced violence. It was shown that there is no one size fits all theory to explain all the youth violence. This is especially so with regards to the fact that youth are often believed to be pushed into violence by joblessness and poverty. Various studies have shown that partly YBT and BDWT are responsible for the same violent episodes. However, it was also shown that the involvement of each of the theories to the violence was shown by the depth of the influence that each had to the respective episodes.

REFERENCES Abdullahi, A. A, & Seedat-Khan, M., & Abdulrahman, S.O. (2016). A Review of Youth Violence Theories: Developing Interventions to Promote Sustainable Peace in Ilorin, Nigeria. African Sociological Review, 20(2), 40–60. Barakat, B., & Urdal, H. (2009). Breaking the waves? Does education mediate the relationship between youth bulges and political violence? Policy Research Working Paper, No. 5114. Washington, DC: World Bank. Bratton, W., & Kelling, G. (2006). There are no cracks in the broken windows. National Review Online. Retrieved from www.nationalreview.com/comment/ bratton_kelling200602281015.asp, 25/7/17 Dodo, O. (2010). Conflict and Development (Module MSPL, 512). Harare, Zimbabwe: ZOU. Dodo, O., & Musorowegomo, C. (2012). Political Intolerance, Diversity and Democracy: Youth Violence in Bindura Urban, Zimbabwe. American International Journal of Contemporary Research, 2(6), 134–143. Dodo, O., Nsenduluka, E., & Kasanda, S. M. (2016). Political Bases as the Epicentre of Violence: Cases of Mazowe and Shamva, Zimbabwe. Journal of Applied Security Research, 11(2), 208–219. doi:10.1080/19361610.2016.1137208 Doran, B. J., & Lees, B. G. (2005). Investigating the spatiotemporal links between disorder, crime, and the fear of crime. The Professional Geographer, 57(1), 1–12. Ellis, L. (2005). Theory explaining the biological correlates of criminality. European Journal of Criminology, 2(3), 287–314. doi:10.1177/1477370805054098 Gault, M., & Silver, E. (2008). Spuriousness or mediation? broken windows according to Sampson and Raudenbush (1999). Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(3), 240–243. doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2008.04.004 32

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Goldstone, J. A. (2001). Demography, environment and security. In P. F. Diehl & N. P. Gleditsch (Eds.), Environmental Conflict (pp. 84–108). Boulder, CO: Westview. Hong, T., & Farley, T. A. (2008). Urban residents’ priorities for neighbourhood features: A survey of New Orleans residents after Hurricane Katrina. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 34, 353–356. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2008.01.008 PMID:18374251 International Center for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC). (2008). Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives. Montreal, Canada: ICPC. Johnson, D. J. (2005). The ecology of children’s racial coping: Family, school and community influences. In T. Weisner (Ed.), Discovering successful pathways in children’s development: Mixed-methods in the study of childhood and family life (pp. 87–109). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Lederach, J. P. (2003). The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing. Lesane-Brown, C. (2006). A review within race socialization within Black families. Developmental Review, 26(4), 400–426. doi:10.1016/j.dr.2006.02.001 Lia, B. (2005). Globalisation and the future of terrorism: Patterns and predictions. London, UK: Routledge. Luthar, S., & Goldstein, A. (2004). Children’s exposure to community violence: Implications for understanding risk and resilience. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 33(3), 499–505. doi:10.120715374424jccp3303_7 PMID:15271607 Reeler, T. (2009). Subliminal terror? Human rights violations and torture in Zimbabwe during 2008. Johannesburg, South Africa: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU). (2012a). Political violence. Harare, Zimbabwe: Author. Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU). (2012b). Political violence and intimidation of teachers in Zimbabwe. Report prepared for the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe. Harare, Zimbabwe: RAU. Scarpa, A., Haden, S. C., & Hurley, J. (2006). Community violence victimization and symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder: The moderating effects of coping and social support. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 21(4), 446–469. doi:10.1177/0886260505285726 PMID:16501214 33

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Schomaker, R. (2013). Youth bulges, poor institutional quality and missing migration opportunities - triggers of and potential counter-measures for terrorism in MENA. Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies, 15(1), 116–140. Siegel, L. J., & McCormick, C. (2006). Criminology in Canada: theories, patterns, and typologies (3rd ed.). Toronto, Canada: Thompson. Tolan, P. H., Sherrod, L. R., Gorman-Smith, D., & Henry, D. B. (2004). Building protection, support and opportunity for inner-city children and youth and their families. In K. I. Maton, C. J. Schellenbach, B. J. Leadbeater, & A. L. Solarz (Eds.), Investing in Children, Youth, Families and Communities. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. doi:10.1037/10660-011 Urdal, H. (2006). A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence. International Studies Quarterly, 50(3), 607–630. doi:10.1111/j.14682478.2006.00416.x Willman, A., Makisaka, M., & SDV, V.T. (2010). Interpersonal Violence Prevention: A Review of the Evidence and Emerging Lessons. World Development Report 2011. Background Paper. Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. (1982). Broken windows, the police and neighbourhood safety. Atlantic Monthly, 249(3), 29–38. World Bank. (2009). Interim Strategy Note for the Democratic Republic of TimorLeste, FY 2010–2011. Author. World Bank. (2010). Violence in the City Understanding and Supporting Community Responses to Urban Violence. Washington, DC: Author. World Health Organisation (WHO). (2008). Preventing Violence and Reducing Its Impact: How Development Agencies Can Help. Geneva: WHO. Xu, Y., Fiedler, M. L., & Flaming, K. H. (2005). Discovering the impact of community policing: the broken windows thesis, collective efficacy and citizens’ judgment. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 42, 147-186.

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Chapter 3

Youth Development Through Participation in Decision Making:

A Case of South Africa – Development and Participative Decision Making Sharon Thabo Mampane https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3789-600X University of South Africa, South Africa

ABSTRACT The purpose of this chapter is to argue that there is a need for youth development for participation in decision makings of the country. Programs for youth development should be geared towards changing the behavior of the youth from undesirable to desirable conduct. This chapter follows a qualitative approach in understanding and explaining in detail what youth development and participation in decision making in the society, entails. Data were collected via literature reviews on youth development and participation and on factors contributing to the importance of how laws, most notably laws on youth participation in matters, concern them. These factors are important, but key to developing the youth for participative decision-making and for ensuring that children’s right to participate is implemented. The aim of this paper is to ensure that the youth are involved as partners in communities because they are deemed to be assets in the decision-making process of the country.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch003 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Youth Development Through Participation in Decision Making

BACKGROUND This chapter highlights issues on the development of the youth through participation in decision-making for empowerment as future leaders in South Africa. Youth development entails mainstreaming youth issues into society, and, facilitating youth development activities within all sectors of society (National Youth Policy, 2015). Communities and the government should help the youths to develop knowledge and skills required to obtain technologically sophisticated jobs, which are an emerging part of the global economy (Israel, Beaulieu, and Hartless, 2001). Government committed to advance youth development and made extensive consultations with diverse stakeholders, including the youth, to give input on how young people can be developed to contribute to important issues that affect their lives. Evidence shows that policies and programmes designed after consultation with users are more likely to be effective. By using youth participation it is more likely to get it right the first time and time and money are not wasted on services young people don’t want to use (Jacquez, Vaughn, and Wagner, 2013). Research also indicates that such participatory approaches to development, can ensure greater efficiency and effectiveness and contribute to processes of democratisation and empowerment (Wong, Zimmerman, Parker, 2010). Participation and involvement of the youth in decision making requires an understanding of the process of participatory development, crucial for the youth, community development practitioners and other stakeholders. Stakeholders’ understanding of the socio-economic conditions surrounding the youth may ensure that a positive development programme sustainable for youth development is maintained. Youth development for participatory decision makings should enable the youth to address challenges of adolescence and adulthood and to achieve their full potential (National Planning Commission, 2012). Youth’s have a right to participate in decisions that affect them and these are articulated across several international human rights conventions such as the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights; article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Youth to participation. (Collins, 2016). Youth related issues are high on the list of governments globally, hence the laws advanced to make provision for the participation of children in judicial and administrative proceedings (Jacquez, Vaughn and Wagner, 2013). The previous South African National Youth Policy on youth development covered the period 2009-2014, and currently the new National Youth Policy (NYP) builds up on the first NYP (2015-2020), and addresses youth participation in challenges they face in South Africa. In 2017 the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) was established to develop the youth through participative decision-making and to enable them to tackle challenges they face in the nation. Currently, there is minimal research on the 36

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inclusion and development of the youth in decision making, in both the literature and in practice. Most studies done on youth development are based on the need for more programmes that seek to change the behaviour of the youth from undesirable to desirable conduct (Lerner, Almerigi, Theokas, Phelps, Geostdottir, Naudeau, Jelicic et al., 2010) and address negative stereotypical policies that assume that young people can never contribute to the common good (Zeldin, McDaniel, Topitez & Calvert, 2000). Chege (2011), indicates that South African youth development and involvement in decision making is not prioritised because communities consider them a risk to society. Mostly strict decisions on what is right or wrong, are handed down to them by government programmes, adults and guardians, because of such negative stereotypes. Assumptions are that young people are unable or unwilling to contribute to the common good, and these are also sustained by public policies (Zeldin, McDaniel, Topitez & Calvert, 2000). Therefore the purpose of the study is to highlight the development of the youth and participatory decision-makings opportunities provided to them through development. Findings from this study can be used as a global benchmark of youth participation in decision making.

INTRODUCTION Youth development through participatory decision making is central to the promotion of social, ethical, emotional, physical, and cognitive competencies (National Planning Commission, 2012). Development of the youths as future leaders of the nation, targets skills and connections young people need to take part in society to reach their potential (Afrikan Legacy, 2017). Guidance in youth development is geared towards identification of needs for subsequent planning of how to solve the needs in order to improve the youths’ well-being and that of their communities (National Planning Commission, 2012). The South African youth development programmes for participation in decision making are defined and conceptualised in terms of education, programs, and opportunities in the country. Therefore youth participation is often used as a shorthand for youth participation in many forms of decisionmaking in activities where the youth were historically not engaged. Participation aims at strengthening personal and social development, providing expertise for youth programs and services, and promoting a more democratic society (Checkoway, 2011). Involving the youth in the country’s decision making processes increase competence, and may result in a mutual working relationship among all citizens, eliminating finger pointing, because of the different participants’ shared accountability (Republic of South Africa, 2009). Youth development that encourages decision making creates opportunities for young people to be involved in influencing, designing, 37

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shaping and contributing to policy and the development of societal services and programmes (http://www.youthaffairs.govt.nz/working-with-young-people/youthdevelopment-approach.html#Whatisyouthdevelopment1). Where there is lack of agreement on the basic content of youth development, youth participation as a field of practice and subject of study will be limited (Jacquez, Vaughn and Wagner, 2013).

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Literature on youth development is reviewed from various academic disciplines and professional fields to establish how the youth development process prepares young people for decision making in challenges of adolescence and adulthood and result in achievement of their full potential. According to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in South Africa, the youth is defined according to cultural, socioeconomic & political factors and age. The definition of youth according to age differs according to contextual issues, for example, the UN/World Bank puts the youth at ages 15-24 years; the African Youth Charter at 15-35 years, and South Africa at 14-35 years (Swartz, 2009). Again the concept of youth is divergent across policies, where the Constitution places the youth at ages 0-18 years, and the White Paper on Social Welfare places the youth at 16-30 years. For the youth to can vote or have a driver’s license, in South Africa, the minimum age is 18 years and the legal age of majority is said to be 21 years. Youth development process for participation in decision making draws upon various academic disciplines and professional fields, in order to contribute to knowledge development and advancement of the field. According to Chege (2011), the youths are involved as active partners in communities because they are assets of the country. Any youth afforded the opportunity of participation may be able to identify needs and subsequently plan for the needs identified to improve their well-being and that of their communities. This means that the youth who are developed can actively participate in the decision-making processes and programmes development in the community. The government’s developed programme of engaging the youth through interventions and programmes, has guiding principles that addresses imbalances of the past using equitable policies, programmes and resource allocation to address issues that affect the youth (Republic of South Africa, 2009).

Youth Participation in Decision Making Involving the youth participatory decision making creates opportunities for the youth to be able to influence, shape, design and contribute to policy development, service delivery and programme development (Ministry of Youth Development, n.d). 38

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These opportunities are created through the development of a range of formal and informal mechanisms for youth participation, such as youth advisory groups that work to support youth-led projects (Jacquez, Vaughn and Wagner, 2013). Youths developed through activities and programme experiences, establish enhanced social, ethical, emotional, physical, and cognitive competencies (Lerner and Lerner, 2005). Therefore initiatives involving youth development, whenever they exist, should include issues of conflict, power and diversity (Hart, 2013). Developed youths can easily be involved and engaged in community and state decision makings, as legitimate partners (Israel, Beaulieu and Hartless, 2001). Key to the youth’s development in decisions that affect them, is the fact that participation in the country’s decision making processes is articulated across international human rights conventions such as the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.

The Law and Youth Development The law supports and protects the youth, however, the rights of the youth are in most cases deliberately violated in most societies in the world, resulting in the youth not being involved in participatory decision making. Several laws that recognise and promote the right of the youth to participate in decisions of the home, school, community and government, have been put in place for youth decision-making in South Africa. Policy and law-making, health-care, disciplinary and governance proceedings within schools, at community and home level, develops the youth and ensures their right to participate is guaranteed (Bray & Moses, 2011; Jamieson, 2011; Moses, 2008). The UN Convention on the Rights of the Youth, formally and explicitly acknowledges the youths’ rights in international law, and has introduced an additional dimension that recognises young people as subjects of rights, rather than recipients of adult protection. The UN convention stipulates that the youths’ rights demand that they be heard (Warren, 2009), thus, involving the youth in policies created for the country, will ensure they are more accountable. Youth programmes should develop the youth to participate in judicial and administrative proceedings that include health-care decisions, disciplinary and governance proceedings within schools, and for decisions at a community and home level in societal forums, (Martin, 2012). Youth participation in such decision-making is enshrined in the young people’s Act (Bray & Moses, 2011; Jamieson, 2011). Examples of processes included in the law for youth participation in decision making include consultation in: the development of local health planning (Department of Health, Act No. 61 of 2003); conflict with the law in all judicial and administrative proceedings (Republic of South Africa, Act No. 75 of 2008); divorce and adoption matters and other alternative placement decisions (Republic of South Africa, Act No. 38 of 2005, as amended); consenting to medical treatment, marriages and customary 39

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rituals (Republic of South Africa, Act No. 38 of 2005, as amended, Department of Social Development, Act No. 70 of 2008; Republic of South Africa, Act No. 92 of 1996); the development and change of policies (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2011); the development of school codes of conduct, disciplinary matters, school governance, education policies and family-level education decision (Department of Education, Act No. 27 of 1996; Department of Education, Act No. 84 of 1996; Republic of South Africa, Act No. 38 of 2005, as amended). Foucault (1991), acknowledges that the youth are capable of self-governing and becoming politically active, and urges the government to involve them in work that develops them into managers of their life, to achieve a technology of liberal governance. Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Youth, gives the youth the right to have their views given due weight in all matters affecting them (Lundy, 2007). It also recognises the youth as a full human being with integrity and personality, and the ability to participate freely as future citizens. The youth’s participation as future and active citizens, is considered valuable, especially in their contribution of improving policy, programme outcomes and for the overall development of the country. Knudsen, (1995), states that participation in decisions may not only promise a better integration, but may achieve higher efficiency, and effective management of people and productivity.

Developing the Youth for Participatory Decision-Making Developing the youth for participatory decision making aim at promoting equal opportunity and equal treatment of youth, in an environment which supports continued development and learning. The youth’s participation in democratic processes, community and civic decision-making, and responsiveness to the needs, aspirations and challenges of youth, recognises the importance of youth development initiatives, their peculiar needs, transparency, accountability and accessibility (RSA, 2009). Youth development programmes for the acquisition of knowledge should lead to the development of others, with local and indigenous knowledge, and should follow a number of steps that will ensure good youth participation practices. Principles that support the involvement of young people in participatory decisionmaking should entail: organisational commitment; support for staff developing the youths for participation; adequate resource allocation; building a positive relationship with the youth; developing a sense of belonging and security; making youth participation fun and challenging; offering real roles and relevant issues to youths; creating youth friendly environment for a diverse range of young people; providing information about the development and decision-making process; involving youths from the beginning to the end of the process; valuing contributions, and acknowledging cultural beliefs and values to ensure participation opportunities; 40

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assuring youths of non- obligation to participate but indicating the importance of participation; providing timely feedback about the decision-making process and how their input was used ((Jacquez, Vaughn and Wagner, 2013). Research also suggests the importance of increasing open relations between the youth and adults being optimal for youth development (Lerner, Almerigi, Theokas, Phelps, Geostdottir, Naudeau, Jelicic et al., 2010).

Policies, Laws and Programmes for Youth Participation Several other national policies, laws and programmes allow for the youth’s participation in the political and social spaces, and these are: The National Education Policy (Department of Education, 1996) that regulates the procedures for policy determination, and requires consultation with national student representative; the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (RSA, 1996), that recognises the consent of girl learners to an abortion; the South African Schools Act (Department of Education, 1996), that provides regulatory framework for governance and disciplinary processes within schools, and obliges learner participation in both; the Local Government Municipal Systems Act (RSA, 2000), that recognises the right of local communities (including the youth) to participate in the planning of local government services; and, the National Health Act (Department of Health, Act No. 61 of 2003) that regulates the participation and consent of the youth in local health planning, research and experimentation. The Children’s Act (RSA, 2005, as amended), is a legislative framework for holistic youth protection strategy that considers Children’s views in matters affecting them. The Youth Justice Act (Republic of South Africa, Act No. 75 of 2008), provides for the participation of children in processes of conflict with the law affecting them. The Prevention of and Treatment for Substance Abuse Act (Department of Social Development, 2008), requires youth consultation in the treatment of substance abuse. The National Youth Development Agency Act (RSA, 2008), requires participation of all youth between the ages of 14 and 35 years in democratic decision-making processes (Martin, 2012). Other areas where youths participate in South Africa (SA) include street-based protests; participation in school governance and participation in policy-making processes, research and evaluations (Bray & Moses, 2011; Jamieson, 2011; Jamieson & Mukoma, 2009; Moses, 2008; UNICEF South Africa, 2011; Nomdo & Roberts, 2011; University of the Western Cape, 2001; Clacherty & Donald, 2007; Pendlebury, 2011).

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Youth Development Initiatives The South African democratic government has established support programmes and strategies to empower the youth as future leaders in the country. Various development programmes such as the refurbishment, rehabilitation, and maintenance of community infrastructure were established across the country. Positive youth development is operationalised through the Five Cs: competence, confidence, character, connection, and caring, resulting in youths’ contributions in decision making. Youths’ strengths are aligned across adolescence; with family, school, and community resources, provided for positive youth development to provide life skills training, education and encouragement. Training is offered to young people between the ages of 12 and 25 years during public school holidays. Other initiatives are in the form of bursaries, internships and learnerships (Government of South Africa, 2018), for community-based, out-of-school youth development programmes and government programmes (Lerner and Lerner, 2005). The learnerships and internships provided focus on skills development of unemployed young people, in urban and rural areas, through Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETA). Artworks by youths are showcased alongside established designers (Government of South Africa, 2018). The Department of Higher Education and Training’s other initiative is the Central Application Clearing House (CACH) service provided to learners who qualify for higher education studies but were not accepted or were late in applying at institutions of their choice. The CACH service verifies the learner’s information and forwards it to institutions that still have unfilled places. Applicants meeting the requirements of these institutions are offered available places. NYDA, a government agency, focusses on: tailor-made interventions for job preparedness and placement, scholarship provision for excellent students; the scaling up of the Youth Build Programme for out-of-school youths; second chance opportunities for matriculants; and the intensification of career guidance programmes (Government of South Africa, 2018). Understanding the youths’ socio-economic conditions ensure a positive and sustainable programme development and the recognition of their rights.

Promoting the Rights of the Youth The state’s obligation is to protect, respect and promote youths’ right to participate in decisions that affect them. This is in line with the international, African and national legal instruments. The laws covering the youths’ rights, most notably, recognise that youths participate in matters that concern them, in an appropriate way, and are given due consideration when expressing their views (Bray & Moses, 2011; Jamieson, 2011; Moses, 2008). The right to participate applies to all proceedings, actions and decisions by any organ of state, in any matter concerning them in general 42

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(Bray & Moses, 2011). Government’s commitment to engage the youths aims at highlighting and solving challenges of unemployment, education and social cohesion. The intrinsic value in upholding young people’s rights to engage in governance processes are for the improvement of policy and programme outcomes that affect the daily lives of the communities (Martin, 2012). Youth’s rights are expressed, explicitly or implicitly, in a number of articles in the Convention: for example, Article 5 – parental provision of direction and guidance with respect to Children’s evolving capacity; Article 9 – non-separation of children from families without the youths’ views considered; Article 12 – the right to be listened to and taken seriously; Article 13 – the right to freedom of expression; Article 14 – the right to freedom of conscience, thought and religion; Article 15 – the right to freedom of association; Article 16 – the right to privacy; Article 17 – the right to information; and Article 29 – the right to education, that promotes respect for human rights and democracy (UNICEF, 2001). These rights offer the youth the opportunity to be engaged in governance processes and participate in decisions that affect them as enshrined in the international, continental, regional and domestic laws.

Gaps in Implementing Children’s Participation in Decision Makings The Convention on the Rights of the Youth (CRC), which came into force in 1990, gives the youth the right to ‘express their views freely’ in all matters affecting them (UN 1989: article 12.1), and emphasises youth participation as a key element of their rights (White, 2002a; Harper, 2002). Arguments are raised about the appropriate degree of participation to be afforded the youth from both a practical and a human rights standpoint, and whether it is an end in itself, a means to the end for promoting and protecting human rights, or both (UNICEF, 2001). The CRC demands considerable - sometimes profound - change in cultural attitudes towards the youth from adults who are utterly sympathetic to the principle of enabling the youth to express their views. Adults sometimes feel uncomfortable with the ways, means and implications of putting this into practice, while the youth themselves, sometimes also experience similar feelings of unease. Research suggest that the degree of involvement in decision making, may sometimes result in diverse representation of young people’s opinions, experiences and interests made to government for supporting the best possible decision-making. Acts, however, do not give the youth the right to control over all decisions, irrespective of their implications, but, introduces a radical and profound challenge to traditional attitudes, which assume that the youth should be seen and not heard (UNICEF, 2001). In other words, an obligation is imposed on adults in their capacity as parents, professionals and politicians, to ensure that the youth are enabled and encouraged to contribute their views on all relevant matters. 43

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This does not, of course, imply that the youth should be required to give their views if they are not willing or interested in doing so. The youths’ right to be heard extends to all actions and decisions that affect their lives – in the family, in school, in local communities, and at national political level. It applies both to issues that affect individual youths’ decisions about where they should live following their parents’ divorce, and to legislation determining the minimum age for full time work. It is, however, not sufficient to give the youth the right to be listened to while we do not take what they have to say seriously. The youths’ views should inform decisions made about them, but, this does not mean that whatever the youth say must be complied with, but their views should receive proper consideration. The weight given to youths’ views needs to reflect their level of understanding of the issues involved. There are many issues that the youth are capable of understanding and to which they can contribute thoughtful opinions, however, competence does not develop uniformly according to rigid developmental stages. The social context, the nature of the decision, the particular life experience of the youth and the level of adult support will all affect the capacity of a youth to understand the issues affecting them (UNICEF, 2001).

Theorising Youth Development and Participation Sinclair’s (2000) theory on developing the youth through participation is aimed at upholding the rights of the youth; fulfilling their legal obligations; improving their decision making skills; improving their service in the community; enhancing democracy; promoting youth protection; and empowering them to enhance their self-esteem. Matthew (2003) agrees that youth participation is an essential and moral ingredient of any democratic society because it empowers and enhances the quality of life of the youths; encourages their psycho-social well beings and provides a sense of inclusiveness. The argument, however is that the benefits reflect different forms of benefits; from a sense of fitting in and belonging, through feelings of empowerment and social worth, to consciousness of democratic citizenship. If the purpose of participation is to improve the youths’ sense of personal worth, how it is done and evaluated will determine the outcome, than if the objective was to improve decisions about the provision of public service. If the aim is to strengthen democratic citizenship, then the process may be more complex because most participation focuses on service delivery and gives less attention to policy development (Thomas, 2007). It is necessary for youth development and involvement through participation to enable the youth to develop as active citizens. The development balances young people’s social rights with their responsibilities. The concept of youth participation and decision making, however, is used loosely because participation differs in the

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extent or mode of participation, with regards to area or content of participation, and to level of participation (Marchington, 1980). Governments’ policies on development through participation have a significant impact on the youth and requests they be given the opportunity to make input (National Children’s and Youth Law Centre (1995). Good policy needs to be informed by the viewpoints of those the policy intends to benefit. By including youth participation in public decision-making processes, research shows there can be a marked improvement in the quality of programmes and services received by young people (International Save the Children Alliance, 2005). Young people are valuable members of the community and have a wide range of experiences, viewpoints and ideas to contribute alongside other citizens. There is a powerful body of evidence showing how prevailing attitudes towards the youth, based on the view that adults both know best and will act in their best interests, have failed many young people. Many of these failures have resulted from a refusal to listen to the voices of the young themselves (UNICEF, 2001). Young people who are supported to participate in decision-making are more likely to have increased confidence and self-belief; to exercise positive career choices and have greater involvement and responsibility in the future. Giving young people a place in decision-making builds a broader base of citizen involvement and creates stronger, more inclusive communities.

Benefits of Youth Development for Decision Making Recognizing and involving youth in a community’s decision-making processes is about more than engaging young people for the sake of inclusivity. It’s about recognizing the measurable benefits youth offer to organizations and whole communities. Youth development ensures the youth feel like they are involved in something important, have a valued say in what happens and the opportunity to work with other youth and adults in the community. The effects of increased participation in decision making is to afford the youth development and support from adults and youth leaders within the society. Youth participation is a necessity for the development of active citizenship because it balances young people’s social rights with their responsibilities. Increased participation in decision making is associated with increases in both adult and organisational support. The relationship between participative decision making and support enhances key youth skills usually ignored in the published literature. Suggestions for enhancing the involvement of the youth in decisions is to address limitations and opportunities for future research. Youth development for participative decision making also benefits adults who soon realise that involving youth in decision-making means the youth are developed to be contributors. Stereotypes that youth are incompetent are broken down. The developed youth become active community members who are more likely to vote 45

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and be engaged in the democratic process (Adminpeernet, 2005). Since the degree of youth participation in decision-making in South Africa is very low and only adults have access or rights to participate in the decision-making process, most youths who do not have opportunities to influence decisions made in the country manifest a great desire to participate in the decision-making process. These youths tend to be concerned with decisions affecting their daily lives, and develop a strong feeling of association. When assuming responsibility and taking charge, this leads to increased productivity. The main obstacles to the participative decision making by the youth within the country are mainly due to a lack of interest, a lack of initiative and support and development from the community and the government, and an unwilling approach to share decision-making power with the youth by adults who hesitate to accept the youth as valuable partners in making decisions. Thus, the youth do not recognise the educational level as an obstacle to their participation in decision making, and consider decision making a human rights issue that fulfils their right to be involved and the recognition of their full citizenship. Developed youths can be given the opportunity to assume leadership roles to gain skills and practical experience by leading in more effective decision-makings in the future. Granting the youth control over decisions affecting their lives builds capacity are enables the youth to take ownership for their lives in their communities (AdminPeerNet, 2012). There is also a flip side to everything; participative decision making has its disadvantages. Whereas this style of leadership or decision making leads to better participation by the youth, decision making may slow down the processes in the country. Inputs and feedback may take time when meanings and decision makings are verified. There are some security issues too, arising from the fact that too many people are involved to lots of facts and information and information may be leaked out. The advantages, however, seem to outnumber the disadvantages. Because countries and societies are different, a deep understanding of both is required in order to finally accept participants in decision making.

Literature Analysis This chapter employs a descriptive research methodology wherein literature analysis of documents was done based on data extracted from secondary sources of information. A key finding is that youth development for participation creates opportunities that allow the youth to influence, solve problems, inform, shape, design and contribute to an societal activities and programmes (Ministry of Youth Development, nd), and that youth projects or workshops should be led by people who possess the personality characteristics that indicate responsibility for ensuring development and participation of the youth in societal matters. The challenge with youth development, however, is

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that adults in positions of power over the youth, sometimes exploit and abuse their powers to the detriment of the well-being of the youth.

FINDINGS Research indicates that the youth in countries throughout the world exposes the extent to which the youth cared for in institutions are sometimes subjected to systematic abuse by the very adults charged with responsibility for their development. This means that adults do not always act in the youths’ best interests. During the course of the 20th century, adults with responsibility for the youth across the professional spectrum have been responsible for decisions, policies and actions that have been inappropriate, if not actively harmful to the youth, while claiming to be acting to promote their welfare. And these actions are characterized by a consistent failure to consult or involve the youth themselves. Examples are: the placement of the youth in large, unloving institutions that deny them emotional and psychological wellbeing; the practice in some countries of automatic custody of the youth being granted to either fathers or mothers following a divorce irrespective of circumstances; the failure to provide education for the youth with disabilities; and attempts to remove the youth from the streets by institutionalizing them. These acts have led to the recognition that the youth have been more harmed than helped by these practices, yet they have all been, and in many instances continue to be justified by adults while the youth themselves have gone unheard (UNICEF, 2001). Informed by this finding, youth development for participatory decision making, recognises the increasingly important role the youth play in the community, and therefore requires the importance of project leaders/managers possessing skills to develop the youth through participative decision making in society. In order to involve and develop the youth through supervision, advisory group leaders need to possess knowledge of youth related issues offered at camps. All these skills require innovative ways of support and training for helping the youth in solving problems related to societal issues. In fact, youth development for participative decision making can play a significant role in transforming and empowering the youth in a country like South Africa, into productive students, by equipping them with knowledge based learning and need-based skills, necessary for maintaining a decent standard of living. This theory therefore employed a social constructivist approach with the view that all knowledge and the meaningful reality is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world and transmitted within the social context (Justus & Nangombe, 2016). The youths’ acquisition of knowledge through decision making is therefore concerned with

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how the youth development programmes and national educational policies improve participation during training as a lifelong learning (Chen & Chin, 2016, p. 116).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS Youth development for participating in decision making may result in young people effectively influencing participative decision makings in their country. A number of ways, that include ways in which the youth can be engaged in participative decision making, are based on policy-making. Youth development through participative decision-making occurs at the local, state or national level, for the decision making to effect long-term changes. Youth development through guidance and trainings by youth leaders and supervisors at camps or workshops, afford youths participation in decision making from diverse youth voices, including youths from the poorest families. While the channels through which the youth and young people can influence policy are significant, it was also important to examine the actual issues on which the youth have been able to influence or effect change. Issues identified for youth development and decision making for youths are related to societal matters on service delivery, lack of access to good schools, and policy issues. A pattern that emerged from the analysis was that the youth can be most successful in influencing decision-making at the local level, where it is less likely to challenge the power relations of society, or engage in decision-making on issues significant enough to be referred to as ‘policy’. Few interests are threatened if the youth get together to improve access to services at a local level, because individual empowerment only represents a minor threat to the status quo. It is noted that youth development for participation in decision making indicate that the main purpose is essentially developing greater youth integration into the society. Despite considerable legislative development on the rights of the youth to participate in decisions that affect them, there is a significant disjuncture between the intent and actual implementation and outcomes of the laws in question. The implementation of the law requiring youth participation in decision making is not implemented as prescribed because of lack of skills, resources and understanding of participatory processes. Further challenges are the adverse social and cultural attitudes among adult professionals and caregivers. Lack of skills, knowledge and resources affect implementation, in the educational practices that are unfriendly. Parents lack knowledge and practices necessary to implement the provisions in the country’s Acts related to informed consent (Bray & Moses, 2011; Kruger & Coetzee, 2011; Moses, 2008; Bray, 2010). Likewise, in the educational setting, participation by learners in school governing bodies (SGBs) has not been meaningful; learners are marginalised and SGBs are criticised on the engagement with learners (Jamieson, Bray, Viviers, Lake, Pendlebury & Smith, 2011). In addition, cultural barriers, cultural 48

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practices and attitudes related to the status and role of the youth within the family and community, inhibit the protection and promotion of participatory rights because parents lack the necessary skills and harbour social and cultural norms related to the youth. Youth participation is not an obligatory state-funded democratic-prescribed process in all political and social spaces, and remains largely an ad hoc NGO-driven intervention (Moses, 2008; Bray & Moses, 2011; Jamieson, 2011). The majority of laws governing Children’s participation, as well as the participatory processes that are followed, exclude the participation of pre-teen, the youth and, many of the other most vulnerable groups of the youth in society, such as the youth with disabilities, the youth living in extreme poverty and the youth living on the street (Bray & Moses, March 2011; Percy-Smith & Thomas, 2009; Bray, 2010).

REFERENCES Admin Peer net. (2012). Benefits of Involving Youth in Decision-Making. Available at http://www.peernetbc.com/benefits-of-involving-youth-in-decision-making Afrikan Legacy. (2017). The importance of youth participation in decision making. Available at https://theafrikanlegacy.com/ Bray, R. (2010). Effective youth participation in social dialogue. South African Youth Gauge, 2011, 30–35. Bray, R., & Clacherty, G. (2011). Reflecting on Youth and Youth Participation: A publication for programmers and policy makers in East and Southern Africa. Academic Press. Bray, R., & Moses, S. (2011). The youth and participation in South Africa: Exploring the landscape. Perspectives in Education, 29(1), 6–17. Chege, S. E. (2011). Assessing youth participation in decision-making processes in community development programmes: A case study of the Spes Bona High School dream2be peer education programme (Master’s thesis). University of the Western Cape. Clacherty, G., & Donald, D. (2007). Youth participation in research: Reflections on ethical challenges in the southern African context. African Journal of AIDS Research, 6(2), 147–156. doi:10.2989/16085900709490409 PMID:25866064 Collins, T. M. (2016). A youth’s right to participate: Implications for international youth protection. International Journal of Human Rights, 21(1), 14–46. doi:10.10 80/13642987.2016.1248122 49

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Delpit, L. (2006). Other people’s the youth: Cultural conflict in the classroom. The New Press. Department of Education. (1996). The National Education Policy Act. No 27 of 1996. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Department of Education. (1996). The South Africa Schools Act No. 84 of 1996. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Department of Environmental Affairs. (2011). White Paper on the National Climate Change Response. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Department of Health. (2003). The National Health Act No. 61 of 2003. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Department of Social Development. (2008, Act No. 70). Prevention of and Treatment for Substance Abuse Act. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Edelman, A., Gill, P., Comerford, K., Larson, M., & Hare, R. (2004). Youth Development & Youth Leadership. A background paper. Institute for Educational Leadership. Hart, R. A. (2013). Children’s participation: The theory and practice of involving young citizens in community development and environmental care. London, UK: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315070728 International Save The youth Alliance Ltd. (2005). Practice Standards in Children’s Participation. London, UK: Academic Press. Israel, B. A., Parker, E. A., Rowe, Z., Salvatore, A., Minkler, M., López, J., ... Halstead, S. (2005). Community-Based Participatory Research: Lessons Learned from the Centres for Children’s Environmental Health and Disease Prevention Research. Environmental Health Perspectives, 113(10), 1463–1471. doi:10.1289/ ehp.7675 PMID:16203263 Israel, G. D., Beaulieu, L. J., & Hartless, G. (2001). The influence of family and community social capital on educational achievement. Rural Sociology, 66(1), 43–68. doi:10.1111/j.1549-0831.2001.tb00054.x Jacquez, F., Vaughn, L. M., & Wagner, E. (2013). Youth as partners, participants or passive recipients: A review of children and adolescents in community-based participatory research (CBPR). American Journal of Community Psychology, 51(12), 176–189. doi:10.100710464-012-9533-7 PMID:22718087

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Jamieson, L. (2011). Children’s rights to participate in social dialogue. In South African Youth Gauge 2010/11. Cape Town, South Africa: University of Cape Town. Jamieson, L., Bray, R., Viviers, A., Lake, L., Pendlebury, S., & Smith, C. (2011). South African Youth Gauge 2010/2011. Academic Press. Jamieson, L., & Mukoma, W. (2009). 6 Dikwankwetla–The youth in Action. A Handbook of The youth and Young People’s Participation: Perspectives from Theory and Practice, 73. Lerner, R. M., & Lerner, J. V. (2005). The Positive Development of Youth Report of The Findings from the First Seven Years of the 4-H Study of Positive Youth Development. Academic Press. Lundy, L. (2007). Voice’ is not enough: Conceptualising Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Youth. British Educational Research Journal, 33(6), 927–942. doi:10.1080/01411920701657033 Marchington, M., & Armstrong, R. (1984). Employee participation: Some Problems for Some shop stewards. Industrial Relations Journal, 15(1), 68–81. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2338.1984.tb00470.x Martin, P. (2012). Children’s participation. PAN: Advocacy Aid. Ministry of Youth Development. (n.d.). Youth participation benefits for your organisation. Wellington, New Zealand: Author. Available at: http://www.youthaffairs. govt.nz/documents/resources-and-reports/publications/youth-participation-benefits/ youth-participation-benefits-for-your-organisation.pdf Moses, S. (2008). The youth and participation in South Africa: An overview. International Journal of Children’s Rights, 16(3), 327–342. doi:10.1163/157181808X311178 National Children’s and Youth Law Centre. (1995). Promoting Youth Participation: A Rights Perspective. University of New South Wales. National Planning Commission. (2012). National Development Plan 2030: Our future–make it work. Pretoria, South Africa: Presidency of South Africa. National Youth Policy 2015 – 2020. (2015). We are generation2020. We don’t want a hand-out, we want a hand up! #NYP2020. Author. Nomdo, C., & Roberts, H. (2011). Children’s involvement in government policy and budget analysis. YouthGauge, 49.

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Pendlebury, S. (2011). The youth and school governance: Representation, participation and power. YouthGauge, 2010. Percy-Smith, B., & Thomas, N. (2009). A Handbook of The youth and Young People’s Participation: Perspectives from Theory and Practice. Routledge: Republic of South Africa. (2000). Local Government Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Republic of South Africa. (1996). Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Republic of South Africa. (1996). Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act No. 92 of 1996. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Republic of South Africa. (2005). The Children’s Act No. 38 of 2005 as amended. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Republic of South Africa. (2008). National Youth Development Agency Act No. 54 of. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Republic of South Africa. (2008). Youth Justice Act No. 75 of. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Gazette. Republic of South Africa. (2009). National Youth Development Agency Act, 2008. Government Gazette, 8 January 2009. Pretoria, South Africa: Government Printers. Shek, D. T., Sun, R. C., Chui, Y. H., Lit, S. W., Yuen, W. W., Chung, Y. Y., & Ngai, S. W. (2012). Development and evaluation of a positive youth development course for university students in Hong Kong. The Scientific World Journal, 2012. PMID:22619630 Sherrod, L. R., Flanagan, C., & Youniss, J. (2002). Dimensions of Citizenship and Opportunities for Youth Development: The What, Why, When, Where, and Who of Citizenship Development. Applied Developmental Science, 6(4), 264–272. doi:10.1207/S1532480XADS0604_14 Swartz, S. (2009). Youth development in SA: Legislation and key issues. Parliament Portfolio Committee 11 August 2009. Pretoria, South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council. UNICEF and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2011). A Handbook on Youth Participation in Parliament. Inter Parliamentary Union and UNICEF. United Nations. (1989). Convention on the Rights of the Youth. Available at: www. unicef.org/crc/crc.htm 52

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University of the Western Cape. (2001). The youth and the creation of a new Children’s Act for South Africa. UWC. White, S. (2002). Youth Brigade: An Organisation of Street and Working the youth in Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Save the Youth, Sweden. White, S. (2002a). From the politics of poverty to the politics of identity? Youth rights and working the youth in Bangladesh. Journal of International Development, 14(6), 725–735. doi:10.1002/jid.919 White, S. (2002b). Being, becoming and relationship: Conceptual challenges of a youth-rights approach in development. Journal of International Development, 14(8), 1095–1104. doi:10.1002/jid.950 Wong, N. T., Zimmerman, M. A., & Parker, E. A. (2010). A Typology of Youth Participation and Empowerment for Youth and Adolescent Health Promotion. American Journal of Community Psychology, 46(1-2), 100–114. doi:10.100710464010-9330-0 PMID:20549334 Youth Rights Information Network (CRIN). (2002). The youth and young people’s participation. Newsletter no.16.

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Chapter 4

Youth Participation in Politics:

The Case of Zambian University Students Sam Phiri University of Zambia, Zambia

ABSTRACT This chapter explores the manner in which Zambian university students engage with public policy decisions which are of immediate and future interest to them. It observes that the youths may have little faith in representative democracy and instead are utilizing social media platforms to directly engage with decision-makers and publics, and thus subverting the essence of the authority of parliament. The study uses descriptive survey design and the methodology of “Briscolage” to capture and scrutinize two politically charged cases, and concludes that the youth globally may be challenging liberalism and in that way fashioning a new narrative entrenched in postmodernism.

INTRODUCTION Zambia has enjoyed a multi-party system since 1991. This is a good 27 years since its governance system was changed from the less participatory system of the one party state to a more democratic system. A good number of the youths therefore are the ‘born-frees’ who never experienced the draconian political reality where alternative views and political thoughts were not the norm. Before 1991, Zambia was from 1973, a single party dictatorship where political participation was limited to members of the then ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) led by the mercurial Kenneth Kaunda. Until his defeat to the Movement DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch004 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

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for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 1991, Zambia’s founding President Kaunda had been in office for 27 years, that is from 1964. By 2018, a further 27 years had passed, in which a whole new generation had grown-up. This is a group of youths who are generally oblivious to the circumstances that prevailed during much of the earlier post-colonial 27 years. However, since 1991, the year that marked Zambia’s transition back to multi-party democracy, there has been a massive growth in the utilisation of the internet, for discourse and for political activism on social media and other platforms, in Zambia and across the world. Some two decades into the 21st century, it is estimated that about 80 per cent of Zambians have access to cell phones or the internet (Malakata, 2018). The increased access to these digital communication platforms has important consequences for democratic participation among citizens (Lindgren, 2017. p147), especially the youth. This is so because generally, technical determinists have contended, from as far back as the 1990s, that the ubiquity and easier availability of the internet does engender a more pro-active digital citizenship which brings about a more critical population and in turn, produces a much more politically participative system Furthermore, it is assumed that a well-functioning democracy flourishes in a society where citizens are active members of political processes by providing checks and balances on power holders. Such a society is built upon a collective intelligence (Fuchs, 2017. P 67) that buttresses various challenges to political power; and also ensures that barriers to free expression and open civic engagement are scrapped. In such a society, grassroots’ freedom of expression and participatory democracy is thus extended to “all realms of society” (ibid). This chapter traces the origins of youth activism, more specifically student politicking since independence in 1964, and then examines two recent instances in which Zambian university students, perhaps the most enlightened section among the Zambian youths, a majority of whom are under the age of 27, use modern means of communication like the internet, and social media, to consolidate a participatory political culture and freedom of expression. The chapter explores how youth activism has metamorphosed in recent times, and how it manifests itself nowadays. Two specific examples are given to illustrate youth civic engagement in Zambia today. Furthermore, the discourse acknowledges that although the inspiration for participatory democracy may have emerged from among youthful students (Lynd, 1965) of the 1960s, there is now an even more urgent need to examine whether that abrasive and radical approach to politics has been carried through by the current generation using both the new and mainstream media platforms.

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Background and Chapter Focus More specifically, this study looked at how students use Facebook among several other social media platforms, as well as the University of Zambia (UNZA) Radio station, to openly tackle issues that are close to them, and even those that broadly affect the Zambian nation at large. Two issues are problematized in this study. The first is the announcement by the Zambian government that graduates from UNZA and the other public higher education institution, the Copperbelt University (CBU), would commence paying back student loans from the end of September 2018. The recovery period is set to be between four to 10 years for each individual graduate. The scheme, which was introduced in Zambia for the first time in 2004, is a new venture in Zambia’s educational and political life. It affects students who graduated from the two institutions in the past 14 years, and leaves out the earlier graduates. The interest rates for the loans is pegged at 15 per cent. As this was the first time in the history of Zambia that such a scheme was being enforced, it became a major debating point among current students at UNZA. The second issue is President Edgar Lungu’s ‘State of the Nation Address’ delivered to the Zambian Parliament on 14 September 2018. This speech came at a time when Zambia was said to have over borrowed from external financiers, especially the Chinese. More important to this study was the heightened anti- Chinese feelings, reaching almost xenophobic proportions, among some Zambians. The apparent dislike of the Chinese by some Zambians was possibly amplified by several news reports around relations between Zambians and the Chinese living and working in Zambia. China has actively been present in Zambia since 1967 when the first aid agreement was signed between the two countries. However, by 2011, there were more than 35 on-going Chinese aided projects in Zambia ranging from agriculture to infrastructure development (Ostvoid, 2013). We will briefly look at these two topics below because they form the topical backdrop of this study. Furthermore, the limitation to the two issues, and to Zambia, avoids the “unnerving...readiness of so many researchers [who] try to extrapolate by silent implication” the findings from a single country to the broader universal nature of a phenomenon (Downing, 2003.p 498) such as youth activism. Zambia is a subset of sub-Saharan Africa. As such, the findings in this study, should be viewed as contributory elements towards a better understanding of global youth activism without necessarily extrapolating the results to the rest of the continent. This is so because the adopted approach is a specific and unique “way of looking at, and explaining a particular phenomenon” (Johari, 2013. pp 99 - 102; Johari, 2014.pp19 - 21). Still, like any other scientific method, such a study could be broad enough so as to cover the whole continent, or it may just embrace the national aspect. 56

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Nonetheless, although geographically limited as this study is, the bottom line is that in this research, the scientific “collection and selection of evidence followed by an investigation and analysis of a particular hypothesis” for academic purposes (Johari, 2013. pp 99 - 102; Johari, 2014. pp19 - 21) was determined by the scholar’s orientation and standpoint. Thus, while the scholarship reflects upon the broader theme of youth activism, the study substantially limits its attention to only two current expressions of youth activism as elaborated below.

Students’ Loan Scheme From 1966 when Zambia established its first indigenous university, the UNZA, the government financially assisted all students who undertook higher education within and beyond its borders through bursary grants. However, with the decline in the national economy due to lower copper prices, increased prices for imported oil, and higher demands for university education from about 55, 000 students who annually left secondary schools in the 1990s, the government in 2004 turned the bursaries into student loans. But these ‘loans’ continued to be non-repayable grants (Mwelwa, 2014) until 2018. The pressure on national treasuries, including Zambia’s, caused by the massive increase in demand for higher education across Africa had by the late 1990s escalated to unmanageable levels. For instance, by 2006, more than 9 million post-secondary school pupils were in search of higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2010). Pressure was on the African countries to increase enrolments in colleges and universities. For example, in Zambia, the two public universities, UNZA and Copperbelt University (CBU) had in the 1990s just under 6, 000 students in total. But by 2011, the number of scholars at the two institutions had risen to 25, 000 (Mwelwa, 2014). These numbers placed heavy demands upon bursary schemes, national resources, teaching spaces and thus necessitated some drastic changes to the financing structures of higher education in Zambia. It was at this stage that the bursary scheme was officially abandoned and replaced by the loan system in 2004. However, in a large measure, policy intentions were divorced from practice. That is, although students signed unto the loan scheme, no recoveries were ever made for more than 14 years. The reasons for this failure have not been explained. But suddenly in 2018, it was announced that the recoveries would be initiated immediately. According to media notices at the end of August 2018, the Zambia Higher Education Loans and Scholarships Board (HELSB) was to start recoveries from September 2018. Beneficiaries had a choice of repaying the sums in either one lump sum, or within a period of four to ten years. The HELSB head, Ireen Chirwa, said former students employed by government and quasi-governmental institutions would be the first targets. These were easier to locate as government had their records. 57

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Those in the informal sector however, would be identified through the national revenue authority while entrepreneurs with own companies would be tracked down through the records at the Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA), a government agency that registers all companies in Zambia. Graduates living abroad would be located through their passports and other immigration documents, including the obligatory National Registration Cards that every Zambian above the age of 16, carries around with them. Chirwa said that by August 2018, some 4, 000 former students had been identified and systems were activated to extract the monies from them. Chirwa estimated that within four months, that is up to December 2018, government expected to recover more than $1.2 million from this exercise (Lusaka Times, 2018). Clearly, these sudden and drastic measures, raised an uproar among current students at both UNZA and CBU who solemnly did not expect to repay the loans, going by the history of the scheme since 2004. This study partially reviews UNZA students’ responses to this scheme.

China Factor The other issue is Zambia’s relationship with China. UNZA hosts the massive Confucius Centre for teaching Chinese Han language and culture across Zambia. Presently its tentacles reach 19 learning institutions including CBU, Mulungushi University and several secondary schools spread across the country. China has become so important to Zambia that Confucius Centre’s Acting Director, a Zambian, Sande Ngalande, declares that “economic development in Zambia...demands the visibility of the Chinese language education... Therefore, Chinese language, as an important carrier for intercultural communication, appears to be indispensable” (Ngalande, 2018). It is estimated that there are 80,000 Chinese living in Zambia compared to 13,000 Indians (Review, 2018). This number is way above the 70, 000 Europeans who lived in Zambia at independence in 1964. Most of these Europeans left soon after. It was therefore hoped that Zambia’s President Lungu when addressing Parliament, at a time when the nation was gripped with discussions about Zambia’s debt and its relations with China, would reflect on this issue - and indeed he did (Times, 2018). Until recently, Zambia was said to be popular among Chinese investors because of its “political stability” and the “welcoming attitude” (Chang, 2014). Perhaps because of that environment, Chinese presence in Zambia goes back to 1967 when the first aid agreement was signed between the two countries. By 2011, there were more than 35 Chinese aided projects in Zambia ranging from agriculture to infrastructure development. This resulted in more than $620 million invested by China into Zambia from 2004 to 2010. Today, there are Chinese companies active in almost every sector of the Zambian economy. This has not been without its consequences. Recently,

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there has been a “growing resentment” among Zambians about this heavy presence of China in the country (Ostvoid, 2013). At the continental level, estimates are that since 1956, China has been involved in more than 900 development projects in Africa, and provided more than 18, 000 scholarships to Africans. Regardless of these generous numbers though, documented African student experiences inside China have generally been “unpleasant and racist overall. Prejudices, stereotypes and racism adopted by some Chinese individuals towards Africans remain crucial issues that must be addressed and rectified” (Chang, 2014). Perhaps some expectations among the youths was that since President Lungu had just returned from the Forum on China- Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in China, and in the midst of sustained international media reports that Zambia was losing its sovereignty to China because of high debts (Observer, 2018), Lungu would deal with some of these pressing issues in his address to parliament. In a way, Lungu did refer to these issues. This Chapter therefore, also reviews how the educated youths in Zambia responded to Lungu’s speech.

Theoretical Context The point of departure is Dahl’s (1994) theory that there are largely, two broad sets of theories of democracy. These are ‘decision-democracy’ and ‘participatory democracy.’ The older of the two sets are decision type theories in which the predominant assumptions are that a people’s participation in governance is centred around elections. That is, through regular elections, citizens delegate the authority for decision-making to elected representatives. This is delegated democracy or plebiscitary democracy. In this form of democracy, an electoral victory symbolises the triumph of “those whose goals and preferences meet most of the members of the civil population” (Szucs, 2016). In delegated democracies, decisions taken by chosen representatives are considered more legitimate than the decisions taken by leaders in countries with unelected political leadership. Although this view is contentious, it forms the basis for much of the determination by ‘international observers’ of African electoral processes as being either free or fair. Accordingly, such resolutions are assumed by local and international observers in African elections, as laying the foundations for countries’ political stability as well as generally, the legitimacy of later-day decisions made by the elected leadership. Nonetheless as Szucs (2016) argues, in a liberal democracy a citizen is still an individual opposing state power, defined by his [sic] own preferences; his status is defined by the subjective laws of freedom which defend him from the abuses of the state as well as from the unjustifiable strivings for power of their fellow countrymen 59

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Three things are poignant in Szucs testament: firstly, it is that the individual pushes back on state power, secondly that some level of freedom, which is protected by subjective laws, facilitates that push-back no matter how meagre; and thirdly, individuals managing state power continue to claw upon the freedoms of the citizens. What is even worse is that although liberal democracy is deemed to be practical, central to its praxis and electoral contestations, is the acquisition of political power by some individuals, not necessarily for public service but self-interest. As such this democracy remains an incomplete project if the system marginalises the majority of the people in between the elections. Moreover, what is also left unsaid in these pro-liberal democracy arguments is that representation could intrinsically be undemocratic within itself, as Rehfeld (2011) argues, representation is a complicated concept. On one side, representation embodies the “promissory” aspect whereby the elected representative keeps the promises of the voters through some expected future performance, or retrospectively, the voting public reward the candidate for the past ‘good’ performance. Then secondly, there is the “anticipatory” aspect where representation is assumed by the voters to be a form of expectation, whereby candidates will correctly implement their promissory policy positions. In turn, the candidates retrospectively anticipate that voters will sanction them for breaking promises, or conversely, reward them for keeping their undertakings (Rehfeld, 2011). In both cases though, voters and representatives’ political gazes are either forward-looking, in hope or resentment; or backward-glancing – again in hope or resentment. In either case, the questions are: Does representation require that representatives say and do what the voters want; or are representatives “obliged to act as if their citizens were acting for themselves”; or is representation limited to the correct interpretation of the voters’ opinions while acting independently (Keane, 1991)? Perhaps, ‘representation’ is nothing more than surrogate and proxy postulation which excludes the true public participation in policy-making. In the considered view of Gathafi (1983, p 7), Parliament is originally founded to represent the people, but this in itself, is undemocratic as democracy means the authority of the people and not an authority acting on their behalf. The mere existence of a parliament means the absence of the people but true democracy exists only through the participation of the people, not through the activity of their representatives. Parliaments have been a legal barrier between the people and the exercise of authority, excluding the masses from power while usurping sovereignty...People are left with only a false external appearance of democracy. What Gathafi deplores is perhaps what might be termed as the drought in the values of liberal democracy. The probability therefore is that political liberalism will, 60

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in the near future, be replaced by a new form of “mosaic democracy” (Toffler, 1991) because “mass democracies” have all along been designed, and were expected to only respond to mass inputs, mass movements, mass pressures, mass political parties and the mass media, not on the core force of the individual. Instead, in the future, the internet and social media shall be deployed to effect a new form of “connective activism” (Lindgren, 2017) whereby campaigns and public initiatives shall be based on networked digital tools and platforms, including in the advocacy for good and better governance. This new era, hopefully, shall engender forms of a participatory culture and participatory decision-making whereby those who are directly affected by situations, do take decisions for themselves, and together (Fuchs, 2017) and not through other’ representative’ people. Thus the second set of theories place a much higher premium upon not only on the quality of the electoral processes themselves, although those may be crucially important, but also, over and above that, on the participatory nature and the handson activities of the electorate, long after the elections. More importantly, a much higher value is placed upon the individual’s “increased personal influence in matters concerning one’s own interests” (Dahl, 1994). In other words, post elections day, what is important for a functional democracy are the higher levels, and quality, of daily participatory activities, by individual citizens in governance issues. In turn, such participation should influence governments to shift their attention to what really constitutes ‘public interest’. Such, is the exceptional form of participatory democracy in which processes that underpin public policy decisions are held in the open, are dynamic and are undertaken through surface-level interactions which are both horizontal and vertical. The understanding in this second set of theories, leans away from majoritarianism where the minority genuflect towards the majority party’s decisions until the next elections. Instead, what is aspired for are regular and legitimately facilitated compromises over all contentious, and non- contentious issues of common interest. In general, debates are based upon free and open discourses which are centred on individuals’ equally-weighted contributions. In that regard, ‘participation’ means that individuals not only claim, but also have the right to decision-making, to governing themselves, and to controlling, on a daily basis, the social structures that affect them (Fuchs, 2017). Such participation should not merely remain an anticipatory goal, but should become the authentic practical reality that leads towards a “digital democracy” where the “media is [sic] everyone,” and the media are ubiquitous and the media speedily check the “accuracy of politicians promises” so as to alert other people to politicians’ dishonesty (Watson, 2012). Moreover, it can be argued that the “essence of democracy consists in discovering new values and questioning old ones, or at the very least reviewing and improving them” (Nzouankeu, 1991).

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This is where the youth, social media, democratic participation and other internet platforms converge. For our purposes therefore, we assume that political participation refers to the UNZA students’ social and mainstream media political activities that, in some way, go towards influencing government policies. This is irrespective of how those activities are undertaken. In this discussion therefore, we will confine the conception of participation to activities on online platforms (Dettort & Yank, 2016). In reality, that participation took many forms. It included writing directly to politicians using online facilities in the hope that politicians could read those postings; sending political messages; posting online newspapers; responding to blogs; or sharing political views with friends (Dettort & Yank, 2016). This is the definition that we adopt and utilise in this discussion.

Approaches to Youth Activism in Zambia In tracing the role played by the youth in the political development of Zambia, and the impact the youth may have had on the political processes over the past 52 years, it would be helpful to wear the lenses of historicism. According to Popper (1966, pp 23 – 24; 1986, p 209), historicism takes the view that social classes, or institutions, have a history of social action. In that respect, a historian believes that credible scientific knowledge on any social class is derived from, and determined by, that class’s history. Furthermore, Macdonalds (1995, p 242) argues that historicists believe that by knowing the evolution of societies, or social classes, they can possess the know-how of the law of social evolution as well as grasping the explanatory frames of social progress. It is in that vein that this Chapter examines the youth class’s origins of political participation, its development, current manifestations and the potential for the future. Such a method is distinct from social engineering projects which ignore past circumstances but instead, focus upon analyses about whether classes, or institutions, are well organised, or better designed, to serve their objectives. It is therefore pertinent that in examining the Zambian youth’s participation from a historicists perspective, that we recognise the concepts of “methodological essentialism” and “methodological nominalism” (Popper, 1966.pp 31 - 32) Within essentialism, Popper argues that there are three ways of knowing any social construct. These are, coming to grips with its essence; knowing the definition of that essence; and lastly, knowing the reality of that social construct. On the other hand, within nominalism, Popper argues that the main aim is neither to know the social construct, nor to define its nature, but rather to describe how the social construct behaves in various circumstances. As Nerome (2003. p 95) argues, a “historical analysis of anything should be a lesson in the constructedness of anything.” So it is that this 62

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discussion adopts the essentialist, nominalist and historicist positions in exploring youth civic and political participation in Zambia. Nonetheless, it is appreciated that youth activism is a global phenomenon that has been experienced over the ages. In the Western world, youth political activities are traceable to the 1860s when young people protested for more rights; higher wages; fewer working hours, and; access to more services (Fletcher, 2014. p 8). By the 1930s in the United States, the youth held a national conference that produced the ‘Declaration of Rights of American Youths’, in which they advocated for more concise youth focused national agendas. During the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 60s, youth campaigns were incorporated into the movement then sweeping across the United States. In fact, Claudette Calvin, a 15-year old was among the first people to refuse to give-up her seat on the bus to a white woman. This was nine months before the more famous Rosa Parks did so (Fletcher, 2014. p 8). In Africa, youth have been in the forefront of anti-colonial movements. Perhaps more spectacularly, was the 1976 Soweto uprising in Apartheid South Africa which completely changed the political dynamics of that nation. A mere 14 years after the Soweto youth riots, the 400-year monolith of white rule abruptly ended.

Fundamentals of the Youth in Zambia In January 2019, estimates were that Zambia’s population had peaked at 18 million. This was a sharp ascent from 3.4 million Zambians at independence in 1964. Within the current population, 8.4 million are children below the age of 15 years (Country Meters, 2019; Open Data, 2019). However, according to Open Data Africa, using figures derived from Zambia’s Central Statistical Office portal, the youth within the age ranges of 15 and 35 years’ account for under 900, 000 people. In terms of literacy, 6 million adults or 63% are literate while 3.5 million cannot read or write. Among the youths, 69% among the 410, 000 males are literate compared to 62% among the 435, 000 women youths. Generally, estimates are that in 2015, about 91.5% of Zambian youths aged 15 to 24 could read, write and had the ability to make simple arithmetic. This figure is above the African continental average which is pegged at 77% (Knoema, 2019) but below world beaters like Andorra with 100% or Singapore with 99.93% youth literacy rates. Although the above statistics somehow follow the Zambian National Youth Policy and the African Youth Charter descriptions of what constitutes youth, it should be known that there is “no universal agreement on which youth are” while some people prefer to state that youth is “a state of mind than a time of life” (Fletcher, 2014. p 3). Nonetheless, in this discussion we define youth as a distinctive time of

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a person’s life. More precisely, youth in Zambia are people between the ages of 15 to 35 years (PMRC, 2015).

Methodology The study adopted the Descriptive Survey Design that aimed at obtaining some indepth understanding of the specific perceptions, opinions and attitudes (Tshuma & Mafa, 2013. p 116) facilitated by media platforms used by UNZA students among themselves and in communicating with communities around them. Among others, the specific method used in data collection, was content analysis that entailed the reduction of complex sets of media texts and then systematising them into frames to enable a much easier understanding of the discourses taking place. Typically, focus was on the “characteristics” of the communication text, so as to subjectively learn and interpret the underlying attitudes and biases, as well as to intuitively determine the nature of communication taking place in those texts (Rubin, Rubin, & Piele, 1990). In particular, the coding procedures followed two dimensions. The first was semantic in that, what was said in the texts was identified and the distinct texts were separated and grouped into similar broader themes. Secondly, the syntactical technique was used to look into the meanings of, or how, somethings were said, by the closest examination of words, grammar and the stylistic content of the texts (Bauer, 2013). This assisted in the proper systematisation of the texts and sentences into patterns and themes that reflected particular biases and meanings (Leedy & Ormrod, 1985). Thus the coding frame relied heavily upon the social constructs of the theories of political participation, representation and also, the assumptions that the intelligibility of media texts and codes lie within particular [Zambian] cultural settings and ideologies (Mumby, 1997). The period covered was from August 2018 to the end of September 2018 when as already indicated above, two burning issues were raging among the educated youths in Zambia. The two issues were the students’ loan repayment scheme and Chinese presence in Zambia. The main sources of data were the UNZA Radio broadcast, the radio station’s Facebook Wall and blogs on the ‘UNZA Network’ portal. Additionally, but to a minor extent, and for the purposes of expanding data sources, other social media platforms like ‘UNZA AGONY’ and ‘UNZA CONNECT’ pages, were minimally reviewed, but all of them limited to the postings made within the above stated two months. As this study goes beyond broadcasting into the arena of social media, the application of these methodologies entailed that the mining of data and their analyses be through a combination, and the triangulation, of such varied techniques which are necessary for increased validity in assessing such events within the digital society. Therefore, what was mostly included in this survey were “consequential data,” that is information or data, which were collected from outcomes of secondary 64

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transactions that initially, had nothing to do with the objectives of this study. What was important in this exercise was to reach out to the best materials available at that particular time (Sutherland, 2010). As such, these “self-published” data were already in the public domain and this study simply took advantage of their ready presence. This approach to data mining is what Lindgren (2017) refers to as operational pragmatism which escapes the “methodological positioning within the existing field of methods literature.” It is also what is termed as ‘Bricolage’, which denotes acts of improvisation and adaption of existing methods of research (ibid, 236). This approach, requires the utilisation of prevailing data for purposes other than what the data was originally intended for. In other words, Bricolage also refers to the “framing of narratives out of materials” at hand, or to the kind of work that puts together narratives from materials already there (Sutherland, 2010).

Sampling Frame The main platforms explored were the UNZA Radio broadcast discussions on its Facebook wall and the debates on the UNZA Network portal. The history of UNZA Radio is that it started in May 2000 as a teaching and community radio station within the university’s Department of Media and Communication Studies. Its initial equipment and technical expertise was from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) while donors like the Open Society Institute (OSI) came in later. The station’s staff are from within the student body and volunteers from townships outlining the university (Mutale, 2018). The station broadcasts on 1000-watt transmitter covering the city of Lusaka. Its potential audience are the 3 million inhabitants of Lusaka (Mutale, 2018), although its focus is on the 26, 000 students, teachers and workers at the UNZA campus. The students’ average age ranges from 18 to 30 years, with the profile of a youth known as ‘Mojo’, who is “up-to-date with current news...wants to be informed...is friendly, approachable, engaging, lively, creative, altruistic...highly aware...knowledgeable, street smart, but with an affinity for technological gadgets and accessories” (Mutale, 2018). The station’s objectives are to provide “professional and quality broadcasting”, prepare students for professional journalistic activities, and to offer a forum for debate (Mutale, 2018). These claims may be, in some respects, outlandish because past research elsewhere on the African continent, seemingly suggests that the “communityness” of campus radios is a doubtful prospect because of the limited participation offered to non-students and that such stations try to be “all things to all people” (Dunu, 2013).

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Observations and Analysis of Findings From the historical perspective, it is clear that youth participation in Zambian politics, or globally, is not a new phenomenon. In fact, in the case of Zambia, youth political activism dates back to pre-independence days when young people joined hands with other pressure groups, such as labour unions and the churches to press for an end to colonialism (Mwanakatwe, 1994). This unity of purpose existed between 1955 and 1962 although Mwanakatwe argues that there was no equal understanding between students and the black political class about the “nature and form of government after independence.” Evidently, as later events revealed, the roots of conflict between the two groups lay in that mis-understandings. Less surprising is that open student hostility towards the new government emerged shortly after Zambia’s independence. This conflict degenerated into some form of “class struggle” especially after UNZA was established in March 1966. The conflict has taken many forms and has been sustained over the past 52 years. All along, students at the university have tended to regard themselves as proponents of good governance and overseers of democracy. For example, throughout the years, students have opposed the One-party state introduced by Kaunda in 1973; joined and took leadership positions in opposition political parties like the United Progressive Party that was banned in 1971; opposed Kaunda’s support for the Angolan rebel movement, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) based in Zambia and led by Jonas Savimbi; Kaunda’s secret talks with apartheid South Africa at the height of the liberation struggle; French military sales to South Africa; British inaction following rebel leader Ian Smith unilaterally declaration independence in 1965 in neighbouring Rhodesia now Zimbabwe; establishment in 1982 of the Institute for Human Relations at UNZA that was fashioned along the lines of South Africa’s Institute for Race Relations but was meant to teach Kaunda’s philosophy of humanism; government’s structural adjustment policies pioneered by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s; withdrawal of subsidies on Zambia’s staple food, maize meal; and supported the re-introduction of multi-partism in the 1990s (Mwanakatwe, 1994; Larmer, 2009; Hamalengwa, 1991; Mwewa, 2011; Hamalengwa, 1992; Chisala, 1994). Most of these clashes and differences of opinion led to countless violent closures of UNZA; detention without trial of several student leaders; expulsion of students from UNZA; deportations of expatriate university lecturers; declarations of states of emergency which restricted people’s freedoms; or the banning of cyclostyled student publications (Wele, 1995). The police brutality that followed each of the mass student opposition to government policies, only goes to augment Phiri’s (2006) argument that new African states were closely modelled around colonial governments which were based on “bureaucratic authoritarianism” and “force rather than consent.” Subsequently, 66

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African political leaders, who themselves were a product of colonial history, and had never experienced the flowers of liberal democracy, followed the governance footpaths laid by the colonial master. In Phiris’s view, only in very rare cases have African opposition political parties or groupings, been considered governments-inwaiting other than gatherings that should be eliminated. For example, in Zambia, in between January 1975 and October 1981, about 684 people were arbitrary detained for opposing the policies of the Kaunda regime (Moore, 1992). A good number of detainees were youths, university students, or former student leaders (Wele, 1995). The drives for these detentions, as one of Kaunda’s ministers, Henry Shamabanse, once said, was the “natural tendency of the African” to have no opposition because “having no opposition is God’s wisdom... that is why the sun never fails to rise from the east to west” (Pitch, 1967. p 94). This political approach can be likened to sentiments expressed by Carl Schmitt when he argues that politics “requires that you treat your opposition as antagonistic to everything in which you believe. It’s not personal; you don’t have to hate your enemy. But you do have to vanquish him (sic) if necessary” (Wolfe, 2009. p135). This strategy has little to do with the outcomes of voting in the electoral process. Although voting results in democracies may be taken to mean that the majority side has the justification, for a period of time, to make laws, “this doesn’t not imply that the laws enacted are just” (Rawls, 1971.p 356). If therefore, there is no assurance that laws even in a democracy are just, the prospect brings in the vista of resistance to policy positions taken by even elected governments. This may also be so because as Max Weber once said, democracy is a system in which the people choose a leader who then tells the people that “now shut up and obey me” or because as Jeremy Betham argues, “governments are always ruled by self-interest” (Keane, 1991. p 178) Also, Shamabanse’s justification for authoritarianism above, does not fully explain the existence of public protests in African societies. Instead, and according to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997.p 128), political protests signal the “crisis of legitimacy” in incumbent political leaderships. It shows that citizens have lost confidence in the government and have withdrawn their consent. As such, protesting citizens “proclaim that, although the state may be dominant, it has lost its hegemony.” This is so because government actions, or decisions, are only legitimate in as far as they rest upon “the consent” of the governed because that consent is the defining characteristic of the relationship between the people and the governing political class (de Waal, Currie, & Erasmus, 2003.pp 15 -16). After glancing over past students’ protests above, below we briefly examine how Zambian youths questioned the legitimacy of government decisions in two cases:

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Chinese Factor When a lowly-ranked but vocal Patriotic Front member of parliament, medical doctor Jonas Chanda, was in September 2018, asked by UNZA Radio to come on air to analyse the presidential speech to parliament, public comments inevitably turned towards the presence of the Chinese in Zambia. Apart from the mainstream broadcast, the discussions were streamed live on the UNZA Radio station’s Facebook page. Practically, UNZA Radio was utilising the facilities provided by converged modern technologies. This means that the station was not just able to broadcast the programme on its airwaves but also on the internet and on WAP enabled cell phones. Clearly, there was a hybridisation, intertextuality, intermediality and multimodality (Fourie, 2007) in the manner in which UNZA radio encouraged public participation in its programme. People did not only listen to studio discussions from radio-sets, but they also followed from their cell phones, computers, or in their cars. But more importantly, the public were able to phone-in or directly post their comments on the station’s Facebook wall as part of the discussion. The questions and comments raised from outside the studios were subsequently posed to the guest, Chanda, in the studios. In a way, this intertextuality minimised the controls and parameters that the radio station may have wished to maintain around the programme. Direct public participation liberated the programme from the claws and controls of the managers of the radio station. It democratised the debate as it extended the questioning beyond the reporters hosting the programme. An overall analysis of what followed shows that instead of merely analysing the presidential speech, public comments shifted the focus of the programme to the burning issue of the Chinese presence in Zambia. Also, the public utilised the UNZA Facebook platform to communicate with fellow citizens, with other organisations like parliament where Chanda came from, and to monitor the flow of discussions on the internet. This was definitely an expression of the new form of communication that is facilitated by social media (Fuchs, 2017). Ultimately, 10 people phoned-into the nearly two-hour long programme. Of those, five callers, or 50% had concerns about Chinese activities in Zambia, the rest discussed other issues. For example, the first person who referred to himself as ‘Golden Voice’ during the phone call, said that during the leadership of Kaunda, Zambia did not borrow money from China but the Chinese were given specific contracts for infrastructure construction. He argued that these days, the Chinese have “taken over everything.” Jessica followed up by asking Chanda to explain whether China had taken over state enterprises like the national broadcasting station, the ZNBC, Lusaka’s Kenneth Kaunda International Airport (KKIA) and the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO). A claim that Chanda denied. 68

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Caller Mwiinga said the presidential speech was “poor” and asked Chanda to request the Chinese to “help you provide jobs.” Kumbele advised politicians to research why the public were condemning the Chinese, while Mutale saw no hope in the presidential speech saying with regard to China, that it was clear that China borrows money within China on behalf of Zambia, and then gives construction contracts to Chinese companies so that the borrowed funds flow back to China with not much gain for Zambia. In terms of Facebook and other social media platforms, UNZA Radio has 30, 661 Facebook followers and 30,565 ‘likes’ with an additional 1, 077 followers on Twitter (UNZA Radio, 2018). Comparatively, other student-run Facebook walls have the following analytics on their pages: UNZA Agony has 14, 148 followers, UNZA Connect has 3,202 followers and UNZA Memory Lane has 8, 940 followers. Clearly the radio station has a much larger audience than these other platforms. However, if those figures are anything to go by, then the UNZA Radio Facebook page has a substantial amount of ‘following’ within its targeted audience. It thus may be possible that a good number of its followers listened to Chanda’s programme in September 2018. This is so because the analytics on its Facebook site show that a total of 494 people viewed the live streaming of the programme, some of whom were outside the borders of Zambia. Of these followers, 17 ‘Liked’ the discussions while a total of 21 people commented on the programme. Among the 21 comments, the single majority of eight (8) were related to China, or Chinese debt to Zambia, while nine (9) were on various issues which included teachers’ recruitment, corruption in government, presidential empowerment schemes of the youths, and presidential tours. Four comments praised the manner in which Chanda defended President Lungu’s speech. So going by this disaggregation, a major issue on the mind of active followers of the programme on that day was Chinese presence in Zambia. However, the dominance of the Chinese issue in live broadcasting was also reflected by the aggregation of social media postings. At least 50% of the postings on social media were on Chinese issues while they were unevenly divided among other issues. This division was also similar among people who directly phoned-into the programme. For example, in the Facebook posting, Chipepo Chibesakunda wondered when details of the agreement over the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) signed with China will be released; while Pathias Lutaka argued that although government was denying that it was selling some parastatals to China, this was in fact true. Enock Seith asked: “can you be able to state one factor in terms of human development that you can boastfully point out” as arising from the acquisition of Chinese debts? Mazuba Muntanga asked:

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What do you say on [the] Chinese who are beating up people here in Zambia? It’s like they have more power than we the locals, and what do you say on the same Chinese who are selling tomatoes, chicken, roasting maize, selling fake things; and why allowing them to have their bank [while] you cannot find a Bank of Zambia in China? The near xenophobic dislike of the Chinese in both the live broadcast and the social media postings were undeniable. Moreover, whereas the programme was meant to analyse the presidential speech, it was clear that both the callers and the bloggers were more interested in dealing with Chinese issues. The enforced shifting of emphasis of the focus of the radio station’s programme proves that the public is slowly democratising the media themselves by forcing new agenda on, for instance, programming.

Students’ Loan Scheme The issue of the loan scheme was extensively discussed on the UNZA Network Facebook Wall. This portal claims to be the “home for all Zambian students and university graduates” (Network, 2018) and thus includes both current and former students of UNZA. It has 45, 454 followers and as a result, the loan scheme was of much interest and was expansively debated with a total of 129 comments listed on the portal. In analysing the postings, an analytical framework was used in which comments were grouped into four broad areas: For, Against, Neutral and Laughable. Those in support of the recoveries were considered ‘For’ the scheme; comments deemed opposed to the recoveries were ‘Against’ and the remarks which did not take a firm position on either side of the debate were considered ‘Neutral’ while the others which took a humorous turn, or poked jibes, at the government’s attempts at recovering the loans fell under ‘Laughable’. Ultimately, the ‘Laughable’ were brought together under the umbrella of those opposed to paying back the loans. In summary, the overwhelming majority of the postings on the site, or 41% (refer to figure below) were against current and former students paying back the loans. Additionally, 30% scoffed at the suggestions and thought the idea was not only unworkable but belonged to the satirical heap of policy implementation as it was unworkable. However, 9% of the commentaries were fully supportive of the repayment scheme. The rest, 20%, did not care either way. At surface value, these bland figures may not necessarily reflect the true character of the deep feelings by current and former students. As shown in the pie above, a total of 71% of the bloggers were either sceptical or fully opposed to the idea of paying back the educational loans. Among them were 30% who thought it was bad joke. 70

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Figure 1.

In that respect, this means that seven out of ten bloggers thought that the government decision to immediately effect recoveries was illegitimate. By so doing – even without pouring into the streets – the youths had withdrawn their consent in as far as that decision was concerned. That is, even if the ‘protest’ was limited to media platforms, the youths suggested that although the state may remain dominant with all its coercive apparatus at its disposal, on this matter, the state’s hegemony in decision-making on the matter was lost (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997. p128). To appreciate the significance of youth feelings and political positions, below we highlight some of the statements posted on the website. For instance, many of those who were against paying back the loans suggested that fairness would require that everyone who graduated from the UNZA since 1966, should be compelled to pay back. This includes President Lungu, government ministers, UNZA’s past and present Vice Chancellors and other senior executives and lecturers. For example, Henry Mwiche Mulenga described the loan-repayment idea as a “crazy” idea, asking that why attacking the struggling fraction of the population which got educated by the government?...Why exclude the already established people in society from paying back such as President Lungu...[opposition leader] Hakainde Hichilema and so many others who are at the pinnacle of success? They have all they need. Only to target a poor struggling child who graduated yesterday and still seeking for employment to pay back such hefty amounts is wrong. This is unreasonable. Another blogger accused the political leaders of strategically excluding themselves while Easter Mwangelwa scoffed at the idea, adding that “wait, let me save a baby 71

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almost falling from a building; maybe I can get citizenship in France!” This was in reference to an African immigrant Mamoudou Gassama from Mali who was immediately awarded French citizenship after he saved a child dangerously perched on the fourth floor apartment balcony in Paris in 2018. However, another commentator asked why it took so long to implement “such a good policy” or was government in financial trouble that it sought to “get water even from a rock” Yet another claimed the loans were forced upon the students since government said education was a human right. A commentator planned to stop work so that government lost the prospect of ever getting back its loans. One pointedly advised fellow youths that if government wanted “their money, they need to employ you.” Among the 9% who were willing to pay back, was Samson Munthali who said: “like it or not, you have to pay back so that others can benefit as well [because] this is one way of alleviating poverty by allowing the marginalised to go to universities by getting government loans...it must be rotating like that.” Another said she will “pay them their money.” Them, being government officials. Clearly this later comment suggests a disconnect between the students and policy-makers. The youths, in this instance, do not see themselves as having been a part of decision making around the loan issues. Broadly however, what is clear in these quasi-statistics is that the majority of the former and current students do not want to repay the loans. This figure increases to a deafening 71% if you added those who scoffed at the idea of repayment as either absurd or because it was unworkable and discriminatory. More importantly though is the social reality that has emerged in Zambia as a digital society of networked individuals involved in robust debates about everything and anything of mutual concern. This could probably be part of the process of the emergence of a “new form of global democracy” that is participatory and perhaps, fearless. This is a society where people debate freely and openly although with limited prospects of transforming society or of leading it to new and better directions (Lindgren, 2017). There is thus no evidence that in spite of the huge opposition to the loan repayment scheme, that the Zambian government will reverse its decision in the near future. In the case of the anti-China feelings that dominated the UNZA Radio debate and Facebook platform, two things are clear: The first is that the public utilisation of new media platforms demonstrates the shifting balance of power in the management of the flow of debates away from professional journalists into the hands of the public with access to social media. This has forced increased openness in programming of radio station. The media managers are no longer in full control of setting the agenda on call-in programmes. For instance, it is possible that UNZA Radio managers could have preferred that the debates be limited to the pro- and cons of the President’s speech. Instead, the callers and bloggers who followed the live 72

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streaming of the discussions shifted the agenda to Chinese debts to Zambia. This “power shift” (Toffler, 1991) is an inescapable reality of the new digital society. It is also a foundation for future student activism.

SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS This discussion has deliberated upon two issues that were of immediate interest to the youth in Zambia. The first was on the future of a country reportedly losing its sovereignty to China. Whether this is potentially true or not, is something that the next generation will have to deal with. The other is the student loans scheme. Only those who have graduated from UNZA over the past 14 years are targeted. This cut-off point is an issue, as is the question of how the unemployed youths can repay the loans. In all respects though, it is clear that with the arrival of new media technologies, the new generation has shifted emphasis, and they are not fully subscribed to the view that representative democracy works best. Representation is taken to be a negation of their direct participation. With their access to new media technologies, the youth take direct interest in their immediate concerns and act on them using social media platforms before the next elections. The youth believe that policy decisions taken in these matters should have their direct input. In a way, the youth do not believe in the sanctity of Dahl’s ‘decision democracy’ which is centred around electoral processes. They do not believe that political participation ends at the polling booth. Whereas in the past UNZA students may have resorted to all manner of militant protests including demonstrations, supporting opposition political parties, publishing alternative newsletters, they are now increasingly resorting to the utilisation of social media platforms. In that respect, the youth are demonstrating that it is possible to act outside established grievance channels, including traditional media. That is whereas in the in the past they depended on mainstream traditional media to multiply their viewpoints, today they engage directly with decision-makers through social media. For sure young people are not prepared to surrender and delegate policy-making exclusively to parliamentary representatives. Through social media, the youth are asserting their spaces within the public sphere and side-lining established channels of expression. It can thus be argued that the grandeur and legitimacy of representative democracy is slowly but surely being eroded by the participatory nature of the emergent digital society. Recent global attempts to gag this movement, through cyber laws or state surveillance activities, could be claw-back actions by the vanishing liberal ‘horse’ of representative democracy. In contrast to liberalism’s optimism expressed in early 73

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1990s through expressions like the “end of history” following the collapse of Soviet communism and the assumed triumph of liberalism (Fukuyama, 1992), what is being witnessed today could in fact be a new historical narrative within post-modernism.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS The two issues discussed above are case studies on how Zambian youths used broadcasting and social media platforms to broaden their political participation and change the format of the debates. The findings are limited to one country and the two cases. It is therefore important that youth activism be explored beyond Zambia and Africa, and the two media platforms. This search should include an examination of the impact that youth social media activism may have in changing parliaments and representative democracy.

CONCLUSION The Chapter has raised issues around current and future courses of public policymaking in one African country. It has been noted that the youth, especially those from universities feel left out of the political processes and are now talking directly to the public using social media platforms. In that way, the youths have learned a way of speaking to, and past, the political authorities through the ubiquitous social media and similar platforms. It has been argued that these alternatives are daily subverting and challenging settled institutions like parliaments. The battle lines are more subtle compared to the violence of the 1960s and 1990s. However, this creeping rebellion has an undefined end point as it is no longer valid to argue, as Nerome (2003. p 95) does that public opinion is expressed and “exists only through representation.”

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Network, U. (2018, Sept. 30). UNZA Network. Retrieved from https://web.facebook. com/UnzaNetwork/app/20678178440/ Ngalande, S. (2018, Sept. 29). Confucius Institute, The University of Zambia. Retrieved from https://www.unza.zm/confucius/about/director-s-message Nzouankeu, J.-M. (1991). The African attitude to democracy. International Social Science Journal, 373–394. Observer, Z. (2018, Sept. 3). Zambia risks losing sovereignty to China – Africa Confidential. Zambia Observer. Retrieved from https://www.zambianobserver.com/ zambia-risks-losing-sovereignty-to-china-africa-confidential/ Open Data. (2019). Zambia Age Distribution. Retrieved from Zambia. opendataforafrica.org/vzgcijrf/age-distribution Ostvoid, P. K. (2013). China in Zambia: Aid, investments and poverty reduction (Unpublished Master’s thesis). University of Oslo. Phiri, B. J. (2006). A political history of Zambia. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. Pitch, A. (1967). Inside Zambia - and out. Cape Town, South Africa: Howard Tiamins. PMRC. (2015). National Youth policy Analysis: Policy Analysis. Lusaka. Public Monitoring and Research Council. Popper, K. R. (1966). The Open Society and its Enemies: Vol. 1. The Spell of Plato. London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Qathafi, M. (1983). The green book. Tripoli, Libya: World Centers for Study and Research of The Green Book. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rehfeld, A. (2011). The concepts of representation. The American Political Science Review, 1–11. doi:10.1017/S0003055411000190 World Population Review. (2018, Sept. 29). Retrieved from http:// worldpopulationreview.com/countries/zambia-population/ Rubin, B. R., Rubin, M. A., & Piele, J. L. (1990). Communication research: Strategies and sources. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Sutherland, J. (2010). 50 Literature ideas you really need to know. London, UK: Quercus.

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Szucs, L. G. (2016). The human rights in Habermas’ discoursive democracy. Communicatio, 3, 7–18. The new radicals and ‘participatory democracy. (n.d.). Dissent. Toffler, A. (1991). Power Shift. New York, NY: Bantam. Tshuma, R., & Mafa, O. (2013). Research Designs. In S. M. Tichapondwa, Preparing your dissertation at a distance: A research guide (pp. 114 - 137). Vancouver, Canada: VUSSC & SADC-CDE. U. N. Z. A. Radio (2018, Sept. 30). UNZA Radio 91.7 FM. Retrieved from https:// web.facebook.com/unzafm/ Watson, R. (2012). 50 Ideas you really need to know: The future. London, UK: Quercus. Wele, P. M. (1995). Zambia’s most famous dissidents - from Mushala to Luchembe. Solwezi, Zambia: PMW. Wolfe, A. (2009). The future of liberalism. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. World Bank. (2010). Financing Higher Education in Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Blogs: Public responses to news items or postings on websites. Democracy: Political means of choosing national leaders. Participation: Being involved in debating public policies and determining national resource expenditures. Policy: Action program for the nation or organization. Representation: Manner in which public official symbolizes the will of the people. Social Media: Web-based or internet-based platforms that include Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc. Zambia: A country in Central/Southern Africa.

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Section 2

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Chapter 5

Young People-Sensitive and Participatory Governance Approaches:

Lessons for the Zimbabwean Government Jeffrey Kurebwa https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8371-8055 Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT This study seeks to make a strong case for young people’s visibility in the governance framework, not only in the sectors that are traditionally linked to their wellbeing and development. Young people should be visible with respect to their role in governance and accountability. This will help ensure that commitments made across all these areas are translated into relevant actions on the ground; it will support young people’s ability to hold national and local authorities accountable, and strengthen young people’s active involvement in promoting good governance practices at the global, national and local levels, laying the foundations for their long-term engagement as active citizens. The state has the responsibility to perform a core set of duties that allow society to function and exist. In doing so, it forges a relationship with its citizens. Participatory governance is one of many strategies of governance, and refers to the processes and deliberations that citizens are engaged in when discussing the distribution of public resources and broader decision making.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch005 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Young People-Sensitive and Participatory Governance Approaches

INTRODUCTION This study seeks to make a strong case for young people’s visibility and inclusion in the governance framework for the benefit of their well-being and development. Young people should be visible in all sectors of governance and should ensure that governments are accountable through their active participation. This will help ensure that commitments made by governments are seriously translated into relevant actions on the ground; support young people’s ability to hold national and local authorities accountable, and strengthen young people’s active involvement in promoting good governance practices at the global, regional, national and local levels. Such a situation will lay a strong foundation for their long-term engagement as active citizens. The purpose of the study is to unpack and contextualise the advantages and disadvantages of different youth-sensitive governance approaches, recognising that each may have merits depending on the context and circumstances where they are applied. The state has the responsibility to perform a core set of duties that allow society to function and exist. In doing so, it forges a relationship with its citizens. Participatory governance is one of many strategies of governance, and refers to the processes and deliberations that citizens are engaged in when discussing the distribution of public resources and broader decision-making. There are three core reasons why it is critical that young people engage with governance processes. First, there is a significant intrinsic value in upholding young people’s right to participate in decisions that affect them. Young people’s right to participation is articulated across several international human rights conventions such as the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights; article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which affords children up to the age of 18 the right of participation; and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the African Youth Charter. Secondly, there is an instrumental value in young people’s engagement in governance processes due to the value they provide in improving policy and programme outcomes. Thirdly, there is an instrumental value in young people’s engagement due to the ongoing reward of developing active citizens who can play a key role today in improving overall development gains local, nationally, regionally and globally, and who can become more active and participative adults to secure future improvements. This study therefore explores how evidence from young people’s involvement in governance processes in other countries can provide lessons and guidance for the government of Zimbabwe in creating spaces for young people’s participation in governance processes. The study further focuses on mechanisms to ensure accountability, which can enable active citizen participation by young people, focusing on the role that they can, and should, play. Young people’s participatory governance

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covers a wide spectrum such as education, anti-corruption, local decision-making on young people’s issues, and environmental awareness.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework This research is framed within the applied post-structuralist approaches that presume that young people’s participation mechanisms are a technique by which unengaged young people come under governance, surveillance and control. In particular, the research was attentive to the capacity of various young people’s participation mechanisms to engage young people as empowered citizens who are aware of the terms of their engagement, who are accountable to, and able to hold accountable the government (Bessant, Sercombe, & Watts, 1998; Sercombe, 1992). The work of French theorist Michel Foucault is central in the production of these ideas. Young people’s participation is what Foucault calls a technology of liberal governance. Through it individual young people are transformed into citizens by what Foucault (1991) calls technologies, discourses, programmes and other tactics aimed at making these young people politically active and capable of self-government. It involves young people doing considerable work on the self so that they can become the managers of their life. Even when this doesn’t appear overtly coercive, it works by getting young people to see their own interests being served. Young people become ‘self-empowered’, ‘self-determining’, and ‘self-managing’ citizens. Ideas and practices regarding representation, control of populations and resistance are significant when governmentality is concerned and are of interest to Foucaultians with regards to the application of their methods to the study of young people’s participation in governance processes. This includes the study of the history of ideas such as participation, youth development and citizenship or to what Foucault describes as archaeology and genealogy (Foucault, 1972).

Defining Young People Many countries define young people as the age at which a person is given equal treatment under the law. This is often referred to as the ‘age of majority’. This age is often 18 in many countries, and once a person passes this age, they are considered to be an adult. However, the operational definition and nuances of the term ‘young people’ often vary from country to country, depending on specific socio-cultural, institutional, economic and political factors (Bessant, Sercombe, & Watts, 1998). Debate exists around the notion of a homogenous young people category; hence the definition of the term young people or youth is far from simple.

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Definitions of young people are contextually specific and can be conceptualised in different ways. Broadly however, young people can be understood as the period of time in which a person makes various life transitions from dependence to independence. It is during this period where young people make important decisions about studying, finding employment, starting a family, taking responsibility for their health and lifestyle and exercising active citizenship. In different cultures and social contexts, these stages might take place at different ages. They might occur simultaneously, or gradually over many years (Oaktree, 2016). There are many different definitions of young people. The United Nations defines young people as people between 15 and 24 years of age (United Nations, 2000). Another meaning, used in discussion of the policy responses of Governments to the particular problems faced by young people, is based on a sociological definition of young people as a transition stage between childhood and adulthood. More precisely, it comprises a series of transitions “from adolescence to adulthood, from dependence to independence, and from being recipients of society’s services to becoming contributors to national economic, political, and cultural life” (UNDP, 2000, p.15). In contrast, the African Youth Charter defines young people/youth as ‘every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years’ (African Union Commission, 2006). The Constitution of Zimbabwe indicates that: The State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level must take reasonable measures, including affirmative action programmes, to ensure that youth, that is to say people between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five years1. Have access to appropriate education and training; 2. Have opportunities to associate and to be represented and participate in political, social, economic and other spheres of life; 3. Are afforded opportunities for employment and other avenues to economic empowerment; 4. Have opportunities for recreational activities and access to recreational facilities; and 5. Are protected from harmful cultural practices, exploitation and all forms of abuse. (2) An Act of Parliament may provide for one or more national youth programmes. The age bracket adopted by any government should have regard to how young people define themselves, their unique development challenges, skills, knowledge and insights that they possess. This study will adopt the UN and African Youth Charter definitions. Young people’ in this study refers to older children, adolescents and 83

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youth under the age of 25. The term refers to girls, boys, young women and young men, although specific issues might have variable effects on the active participation of each of these groups in governance processes at all levels. Another important note is that the literature often conflates the term ‘youth’ with ‘young men’. This poses a challenge to including adolescent girls and young women in any debate on the issues that affect young people. Engaging young people in national and global governance is critical. The world now has the largest generation aged 15-24 in history, making up a quarter of the world’s population (Pereznieto and Harding, 2013). Almost 90% of these young women and men live in developing countries (UNICEF, 2012). The sustainability of any development effort, global or national, will therefore require their ownership, involvement and participation. Yet young people are generally excluded from decision-making and governance processes.

Governance and Participatory Governance Governance refers to the processes through which a State exercises power and the relationships between the state and citizens. The state has the responsibility to perform a core set of duties that allow society to function and exist. In doing so, it forges a relationship with its citizens (Plan UK, 2012). Participatory governance is one of the various strategies of governance, and refers to the processes and deliberations that citizens are engaged in when discussing the distribution of public resources and broader decision-making. Young people, as citizens, have a relationship with the state and as such are entitled to hold the state – and its decision-makers – accountable for their duties and performance. Young people should be included in decision-making processes, particularly on issues that affect their lives directly (e.g. the need to invest in quality education), as well as on broader issues that affect their communities (e.g. fighting corruption or ill-use of state resources, which has a bearing on all aspects of public life and service delivery). Young people’s participation refers to the way in which they voice their views and concerns, exercise their rights, and engage in dialogue with and influence decision-makers – that is, the way they engage as active citizens. As articulated above, this involvement has intrinsic value in terms of respecting young people’s right to participate in decisions that affect them. But it also has instrumental value in the sense of the knowledge and credibility that young people bring to governance dialogues and their development as active citizens, today, and as participative adults later in life. In terms of an instrumental role, Plan UK (2012) highlights that governance work with young people aims to enable them to hold duty-bearers to account for their actions (such as the services they provide) and to strengthen young people’s relationship with decision-makers. Such work focuses on young people’s participation 84

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in decision-making processes, including, for example, how their school is run or how local government funds are allocated for community development. Governance work with young people might also include influencing policy on health, education or child protection, to ensure that young people’s own priorities are made visible and acted on, and looking at how these policies are implemented locally. By contrast, an intrinsic approach recognises that governance work needs to build the capacity of young people to engage, collectively and individually, with government and decision-makers to demand their rights. Governance can be understood as an end in itself, with the ‘good governance and peaceful societies’ dimension seen as quite a normative objective. The High-level Panel’s report on the post-2015 framework (United Nations, 2013) took a strong stance on the importance of including good governance in the post-2015 framework. It indicated that: People the world over expect their governments to be honest, accountable, and responsive to their needs. We are calling for a fundamental shift – to recognise peace and good governance as core elements of wellbeing, not optional extras. Governance work with young people also entails building the capacity of decisionmakers to engage with and respond to their concerns and needs. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play an important role, supporting young people to navigate these complex structures and processes and bringing their voices to the fore. It may also involve supporting governments and decision-makers to be more transparent by making their information available and accessible to young people, bearing in mind their diversity and different capacities. The ultimate aim of governance work is to improve the well-being of young people and their communities.

Case Studies on Youth-Sensitive and Participatory Approaches A review of the available best practice literature regarding young people’s engagement in governance processes shows that there are broad-based and long-term advantages to facilitating and fostering participation in governance and accountability for young people. Young people can become powerful agents of change and active citizens at local, national and global levels (Zeldion, 2004). In Argentina, for example, budgeting schemes that involve young people at the municipal level have flourished and, over time, have enabled the young people involved to become increasingly more integrated into decision-making processes. Young people now have a say in the design of youth services in their city and in the allocation of resources over the course of a six-month annual cycle (CSO Youth Working Group, 2010). In Sierra Leone, where 73% of the population is under 35 years, and where more than half (around 1.5 million) of the 2.7 million citizens registered to vote 85

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in 2012 were aged 18-35, it was particularly important for young people’s views and concerns to be heard and taken into account by those working to ensure a peaceful and fair voting process. As such, Restless Development (an international Non-Governmental Organisation) worked with young people to develop a ‘youth manifesto’, which demonstrated their commitment to working towards democratic rule and good governance. The manifesto was a platform that gave young people and youth representatives the opportunity to publicly share their opinions about the elections and the future development of the country, highlighting the positive and valuable contribution that young people can make to the elections process and the deepening of democracy in the country (Restless Development, 2012). In Embakasi district, Kenya, a Plan International Kenya programme working with young people improved development and democratic outcomes through the active engagement of young citizens in policy, planning, resource mobilisation and programme implementation. This occurred in sectors including youth and governance, reproductive health and life skills, economic empowerment, environmental management, and information and communication technologies. The programme promoted active engagement with local authorities as well as transparency and accountability, making information about the use of public funds available to the public for the first time (Ashley, 2011). These are examples of youth-focused initiatives do not only address young people’s concerns directly but also enable young people to engage in wide-ranging public issues of governance. As these examples suggest, young people can be actively engaged in promoting governance through a range of actions and at different levels. In doing so, young people can play different roles. These include being a target group (beneficiaries), collaborators in the initiative (partners), or initiators who ‘create’ governance space (leaders) – or a combination of these (Huxley, 2012). For each of these roles, there are different ways of working with young people and providing them with support in order to strengthen their role in and contributions to participatory governance. In this process of actively engaging young people, it is necessary to continually remind policy-makers and practitioners of the need for sensitivity towards marginalised and excluded young voices – including those of girls and young women, ethnic minorities, young people with disabilities, or other excluded groups. Such recognition will guarantee more equitable representation and a richer representation of young people that reflects the reality of their diversity.

Participatory Approaches Participatory approaches involve young people in determining the services that are delivered to them. Participatory approaches enable young people to express their views, share decision-making and influence the delivery of services to ensure that 86

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provision reflects their interests and needs. Participatory approaches can improve young people’s outcomes, partly by helping to build trust and respect and developing young people’s skills and confidence. But more broadly, the experience of inclusion and empowerment and especially the balancing of power relations between adults and young people foster better engagement. Young people value being listened to and their behaviour is likely to improve as a result. Furthermore, with more effective engagement, staff job satisfaction may also increase. Active participation can also facilitate the shift in a young person’s identity that is necessary for them to engage fully with the service and the wider community.

The Importance of Youth Participation in Governance Processes The world has the largest generation of young people in history with 90% of this population living in the Global South (World Bank, 2007). This means that young people make up more than half of the population of the Global South, and this population is still growing (DFID, 2010). Despite this, young people are not represented in development programmes and processes in a way that reflects their population size and potential. Systems and services have been unable to meet the needs of young people, excluding them from vital opportunities in areas such as education and employment (Lim and Grant, 2014). This exclusion has resulted in more people falling into poverty and could lead to disenfranchisement on a generational scale. The aspiration and promises of the world’s 1 billion young people have not been realised. Approximately 85% of these young people live in developing countries (UNDESA, 2014). These young people face significant challenges in realising their rights. Globally, 126 million young people lack basic reading and writing skills, with over 60% being young women (UN, 2014). In sub-Saharan Africa, just 39% of young men and 28% of young women had a comprehensive understanding of HIV and AIDS (UN, 2014). An estimated 75 million young people are unemployed worldwide (ILO, 2014). These statistics are linked to persistent challenges across a number of countries, such as conflict and fragility, climate change, poor governance, economic and social inequality, discriminatory social norms, and human rights violations. Young people are experiencing these challenges in a crucial period of their lives that will help to shape and define their futures. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will ultimately fail to achieve their aims unless they explicitly recognises the unique challenges that young people face and their role in actively participating in their development. Most African countries offer few opportunities for young people to participate in governance processes or in the design of programmes and policies that aim to address these issues. Just one in three countries worldwide have consulted young people when developing their national poverty reduction strategies 87

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(UNFPA, 2013), and just over half have national youth policies designed to meet the unique needs of young people (Youth Policy Press, 2014). Political participation as a key pathway of formal accountability is often limited for young people due to a number of factors, which also include voting age limits and political disillusionment. Results from a survey conducted by the Inter-Agency Network on Youth and Development in August 2012 found ‘a lack of opportunity for meaningful participation in decision-making processes’ to be one of the main challenges for a majority of the 13,000 respondents from 186 countries (UNDP, 2014). Programme documentation from Plan International (2009) reinforces this finding, highlighting the exclusion and lack of recognition that young people face in decision-making. The lack of widespread meaningful participation of young people is a great cause for concern from both rights-based and instrumental perspectives. Despite the above risks, the youth bulge represents a massive development opportunity. In order to harness the potential of young people and mitigate these risks, it is crucial to dramatically increase the participation of young people in governance processes. Young people are in the best position to come up with effective and creative solutions to issues that affect them. Including young people in governance processes allows them to realise their rights, increases the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of programming, and represents an opportunity to invest in the current and future capabilities of social change agents in the governance processes. Some of the benefits of youth participation include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Improving relevance and effectiveness of programmes; Enhancing the participants’ sense of ownership in programmes; Building the leadership capacity of young people; Stimulating new, creative, synergistic ideas and energy from both adults and young people in governance processes; Establishing credibility of young people-oriented ideas and youth-directed implementation; Helping adults better understand and value young people’s perspectives and contributions and vice versa; Helping adults recognise young people’s capabilities and experiences and vice versa; and Helping young people acknowledge adults as allies and vice versa

Indicators to Measure Sensitive and Participatory Governance Approaches Two approaches to measure young people’s participation have been identified by this study. This will enable the Government of Zimbabwe to be able to evaluate progress 88

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and realise the active and effective engagement of young people in the decisions that affect them as individuals, groups and as a constituency. First, it is important to identify key indicators or benchmarks against which to evaluate evidence of a cultural climate in which the rights of young people to be heard and taken seriously is firmly established. Second, it is necessary to be able to measure the extent, quality and impact of the actual participation in which young people are engaged (Lansdown, 2004). Without such measurement, it is not possible to engage in any critical appraisal of what is being done in the name of participation or, indeed, of whether it is actually impacting on the lives of young people. Most significantly, young people must be directly involved in any processes to evaluate what participation is taking place. The extent of young people’s actual engagement can be assessed by considering the level of their involvement alongside the point at which they become involved. For example, young people’s participation in governance processes can be broadly classified at three levels indicated below.

Consultative Participation This is where the government seek young people’s views in order to build knowledge and understanding of their lives and experience. While it is government led and managed, and does not involve sharing or transferring decision- making processes to young people themselves, it does recognise that young people have expertise and perspectives which need to inform government decision-making. Consultation is an appropriate means of enabling young people to express views, for example, when undertaking research, in planning processes, in developing legislation, policy or services, or in decisions affecting individual young people within the family, in health care or in education and any other governance processes.

Collaborative Participation This provides a greater degree of partnership between the government and young people, with the opportunity for active engagement at any stage of a decision, initiative, project or service. Young people can be involved in designing and undertaking research, policy development, peer education and counselling, participation in conferences, or in representation on boards or committees. Individual decisions within the family, in education and in health care can also be collaborative rather than consultative, and involve young people more fully in decision-making processes. Collaborative participation provides opportunity for shared decision-making with the

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government, and for young people to influence both the process and the outcomes in any given activity.

Young People-Led Participation This takes place when young people are afforded the space and opportunity to identify issues of concern, initiate activities and advocate for themselves. Young people can initiate action as individuals, for example, in choosing a school, seeking medical advice, pressing for the realisation of their rights through the courts, or utilising complaints mechanisms, or as a group through establishing and managing their own organisations for the purposes of policy analysis, advocacy, awareness raising, through peer representation and education, and use of and access to the media. The role of the government in young people-led participation is to act as facilitators to enable young people to pursue their own objectives, through provision of information, advice and support. All the three levels above are appropriate in different contexts, and initiatives which begin at a consultative level can evolve to enable young people to take more control as they acquire confidence and skills. For example, a local authority may decide to consult young people on a regular basis on aspects of policy and planning. As the young people become more familiar with the governmental processes, they may seek to establish their own council or local parliament through which to take a more proactive and representative approach to bringing issues of concern to the notice of the government. In respect of public participation, all three levels can also engage young people at different points of decision-making processes. Whether young people play an active role in situation analyses, planning, programme design, implementation or monitoring and evaluation will have a significant impact on the degree of influence they are able to exert. Overall, therefore, in order to measure the extent of young people’s engagement, these two dimensions relating to the level of participation and the point of entry need to be considered. The quality of young people’s participation in governance processes must be assessed against a set of indicators relating to the principles or standards that are widely agreed to represent appropriate practice when working with young people. Participation of young people must be transparent, accompanied by appropriate information, voluntary, respectful, relevant, young people-friendly and enabling, inclusive, safe and sensitive to risk and accountable. The impact of young people’s participation in governance processes needs to be measured. In any individual initiative or activity, the indicators of effectiveness will need to be determined by the young people, together with the relevant government ministries or agencies involved. These may include indicators of impact directly on the young people themselves (for example, in terms of confidence, skills building or 90

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self-esteem), on the project or programme outcomes, on staff, parents or attitudes towards young people within local communities, as well as on the broader realisation of the rights of young people. Participation can be defined as “the process of sharing decisions which affect one’s life and the life of the community in which one lives” (Hart, 1992, p.5). Political theorists have long argued about the extent of direct political participation needed to uphold democratic principles, however they tend to agree that some participation is essential to this form of government (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Pitkin, 2004; Rousseau, 1969). Before considering possible definitions of political participation, it is useful to consider how young people’s participation in community life more broadly can be conceptualised. UNICEF (1991) suggests that participation is the means by which democracy is built and is a standard against which democracies should be measured (Hart, 1992). Wilson (2000) believes that participation can be classified into two main categories, the first being superficial or tokenistic, the other being “deep” participation or “democratic play” (Wilson, 2000, p.26). “Deep” participation is an umbrella term encompassing “active”, “authentic”, “meaningful” participation (Wilson, 2000, p.26). Deep participation means young people experience elements of citizenship and democracy in their everyday lives, in real and holistic situations with meaningful outcomes or actions (Bessant, 2004a; Wilson, 2000). Providing a space for young people to participate by engaging in dialogue and exchange allows them to learn constructive ways of influencing the world around them. It provides young people the opportunity to assume increasing responsibilities as active democratic citizens (Bessant, 2004a; Hart, 1992; Matthews, Limb, Harrison, & Taylor, 1998). These authors assert that the goal should not be simply to increase participation, but to increase meaningful participation in the social, political, cultural and economic life of the country (FaCS, 2005a; Hart, 1992; Pitkin, 2004). Participatory practices give young people the ability to contribute to democratic dialogue and practices in various domains (Bellamy, 2002). Young people cannot be expected to make transitions into the adult world if they are not given the opportunity to experience economic and political realities (Bessant, 2004a; Jukes, 2002). Engaging in community life and participating is empowering and assists young people in feeling that they are capable of making a valuable contribution to society (Smith, 1981). There is also evidence to suggest participation has numerous health benefits that result from feeling valued by the community. Promoting meaningful participation of young people is essential to ensuring their growth and development (Bellamy, 2002; Bessant, 2004a). Participation also benefits the wider community. Encouraging young people to be creators rather than simply consumers means they are more likely to be agents for social change rather than social control (Bessant, 2004a; Bessant, Sercombe, & Watts, 1998; White, 1990). Furthermore, if 91

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young people experience projects which are open and accountable, this encourages democratic principles and respect for democratic ways of operating (Crane, 1999; Hacking, 1986; Wyn, 1995).

Principles for Young People’s Participation Having explored the various contexts of youth participation, it is important to consider some overarching principles of participation, in order to provide a framework to build meaningful participation. A number of theorists have proposed frameworks or ‘typologies’ which articulate the degree of participation individuals have in any given project or social endeavour. Manly (2000) states that there may not be opportunities for young people to participate elsewhere in their lives other than those in the public and community arenas, and numerous other authors reiterate this point (Bessant, 2004a; H. Matthews, Limb, Harrison, & Taylor, 1998; Wierenga, 2003). According to the Foundation for Young Australians (FYA), the following broad principles need to be used as the basis of youth participation strategies (FYA, 2003). Firstly, young people’s participation should be beneficial for young people. Two questions should be asked; (i) Why should young people be involved in participation? and (ii) What do they stand to benefit from their participation? This includes consideration of: informed choice; enjoyment; relevance; developmental benefits, for instance social, political and economic awareness; educational opportunities both formal and informal; relationship opportunities such as chances for young people to build wider networks; support, supervision and monitoring; resourcing; and direct benefits such as payment for consultation on a specific issue (FYA, 2003). These principles are also echoed by Bessant (2004a). Secondly, young people’s participation should recognise and respect the needs and contributions of all involved. It should be sensitive to intrinsic difference in experience, status, power, control, knowledge of resources and language. Other issues to consider include: accountability (including monitoring and feedback); goals and strategies whereby young people identify the problem as they see it and examine alternatives; a sense of ownership for participants; value regarding their participation; negotiation concerning young people’s role and adult responsibilities and commitments; the avoidance of tokenism; the flexibility and space to incorporate young people’s value systems, availability, commitments, language skills, culture, financial resources and access to transport for instance; acknowledgment that young people are not a homogenous group; recognition that some tasks need to be undertaken by trained professionals; ongoing evaluation; appropriate recruitment processes; and confidentiality. Arnstein (1969) published a seminal article on citizen participation that included eight levels, symbolized by a ‘ladder’, representing the degree of control a citizen 92

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has over an initiative (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein has influenced numerous other developments of the ‘ladder metaphor’, to create different models of participation and empowerment, each with different goals, purposes and methods (Paul, 1986; Biggs, 1989; Guijt, 1991; Adnan, 1992; Farrington & Bebbington, 1994; Stiefel & Wolfe, 1994; Cornwall, 1995; Selener, 1997; Guijt & van Velduizen, 1998). The four most well-known models of participation and empowerment for young people have been constructed by Hart (1992; Westhorp, 1987; Shier, 2001 and Rocha, 1997). Hart’s ladder of participation has eight levels which reflect who drives the development initiative (Hart, 1992). The first three levels (manipulation, decoration and tokenism) are classified as non-participatory. Hart (1992) argued they serve adult purposes in reality affording no real opportunity to participate, a point made also by Bessant (2004a). The top five rungs (assigned but informed, consulted and informed, adult-initiated, shared decisions with youth and youth-initiated, shared decisions with adults) of the ladder represent increasing degrees of participation. Hart’s non-participatory levels include such processes as events where young people have no idea of the (real) purpose, but are invited to attend to do a performance, for example. They may be attending for the participation ‘perks’ rather than the cause. Other practices that are deemed to be non-participatory are when adults are employed to engage young people in an organisation, so that the organisation can be seen to be consulting with young people. These activities can include action groups, workshops and forums. What needs to happen in order for these processes to move to being participatory is for young people to be able to influence the structure and running of these organisations, where young people initiate the action (Hart, 1992; Wilson, 2000).

Contemporary Young People’s Participation in Governance Processes Although young people’s participation is recognised as an ideal, there has been little serious investigation of the process of direct young people involvement in decisionmaking, and little critical examination of the impact of such involvement (Calvert, Zeldin, & Weisenbach, 2002) Questions such as: are youth truly empowered?; do they want to be? And, dare we say; are they capable? Have not been seriously investigated in the past. Rocha (1997) has attempted to understand empowerment and other authors have contributed to a collective understanding of participation. It seems that there is more knowledge about what not to do than there is about effective practices. While many young people feel disenfranchised from the processes of power and their ability to make a difference, they still care deeply about issues relevant to them, such as education, employment, the environment, health and sexuality 93

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(Hallett, 1999). Genuine participation in decision-making should deal with issues of most concern to them (Newman, Barnes, Sullivan, & Knops, 2004). However, there is a problem ensuring serious participation and representation by young people in Zimbabwe’s political institutions due to a culture of limited institutionalised avenues for their input.

Lessons for the Government of Zimbabwe Zimbabwe’s political institutions and actors fail to be aware of, or respond to, social intelligence about the values and aspirations of young people (Pitkin, 2004). Pitkin asserts that “as for those who set policy and shape the images, insulated from any reality, they soon become captive to their own fictions” (Pitkin, 2004, p.341-342). Young people find themselves engaging in meaningless consultations, workshops and forums and fail to have any effect on policy makers. Instead they need to find ways to engage that are appropriate to the time and technology available to make their voices heard (Bessant, 1998). Increasing public or political representation or inclusion of young people requires overcoming widespread beliefs that young people are incapable of contributing to public debate (Prout, 2001; UNYA, 2003). In fact, it has been shown that where young people have experiences with, and overt permission to participate in, decision-making processes, their competence in reasoning increases (Matthews, Limb, Harrison, & Taylor, 1998). That is, the more autonomy young people are given, the better they are able to exercise it (Bowen, 1998). Therefore, for their voices to be heard there needs to be a change in how we perceive and construct ‘young people’ (Fergusson, 2004; White, 1990). Young people have been shown to have a ‘standpoint’ and from this position, social life looks different (Fergusson, 2004; Prout, 2002). Each young person experiences and interprets their social reality from a range of multiple and intersecting positions involving aspects of their identity such as class, gender, ethnicity and disability (Sercombe, 1992). It is argued that adding young people’s voices and views to social research enriches our understanding by completing it (Saggers, Palmer, Royce, Wilson, & Charlton, 2004). Fostering social cohesion and trust through an inclusive and participatory peacebuilding process during and after a transition or conflict is a challenging but necessary task. Many key stakeholders remain on the margins or excluded from the process. In particular, the potential contribution and inclusion of young people to effective peacebuilding has received little attention and support. Yet young people’s leadership and roles in preventing and resolving conflict, violence and extremism are rich resources essential to achieving sustainable peace. Young people are valuable innovators and agents of change, and their contributions should be actively 94

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supported, solicited and regarded as essential to building peaceful communities and supporting democratic governance processes and transitions. Moreover, young people’s participation promotes civic engagement and active citizenship. Promoting the participation of young people in governance processes requires multiple approaches. These include: 1. A human rights-based approach, grounded in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the African Youth Charter and the World Programme of Action on Youth; 2. An economic approach that identifies young people as central to the economic development of their country, and promotes their access to economic opportunities as essential for their own development; 3. A socio-political approach that connects young people to civil society and the political arena, and provides them with opportunities, training and support for their active engagement and participation in public life; and 4. A socio-cultural approach that analyses the roles of young people in existing structures and supports dialogue – including inter-generational dialogue – about these structures.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS What has emerged from this study is that the ‘young people’ category has been artificially constructed by various social, political and economic factors and this has led to a range of responses from government. The result is that the ‘young people’ category is now able to be manipulated, measured and controlled and this is done in the best interests of society. Exclusion and the need for ‘young people’s participation’ in the governance processes are key themes that emerge as a consequence of these processes. If young people were engaged and included, the need for participation would be superfluous. Hence a range of initiatives and methods have been explored as a means by which participation in the governance processes can happen. What surfaces is disturbing, while there seem to be a myriad of approaches being explored, the issue of young people’s participation I the governance processes in Zimbabwe is still largely unresolved. This is turn has a marked influence on the mechanisms that the government can utilise to elicit the views of young people. Achieving meaningful participation of young people is not easy. Even in democratic countries, the barriers are significant. Young people are not generally viewed as citizens – and even for adults, opportunities for real engagement in active participatory democracy are limited. Creating space for young people to be genuinely 95

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involved in decisions that affect them, therefore, does necessarily involve a long and continued struggle. The challenges are multiple. The legitimacy of young people as social actors, entitled to be involved, has to be established. Attitudes towards recognition of young people’s capacities need to be reformed. New forms of, and opportunities for, democratic engagement have to be constructed, from the family, the school and the local community to the national political level. Entitlement to participate has to be embedded in legislation, policy and practice as the right of every young person. Most of the investment by the government of Zimbabwe should focus on making young people’s participation and seeking to render them visible in decision-making processes – involving them in projects and programmes, developing models of practice through which young people can begin to influence the issues that matter to them in their daily lives, and demanding a place for young people at national, regional and global events.

REFERENCES African Union Commission. (2006). African Youth Charter. Available at www.un.org Arnstein, S. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 35(4), 216–224. doi:10.1080/01944366908977225 Bellamy, C. (2002). The state of the world’s children 2003. New York, NY: United Nations Children’s Fund. Bessant, J., Sercombe, H., & Watts, R. (1998). Youth studies: an Australian perspective. Melbourne, Australia: Addison Wesley Longman. Bowen, D. (1998). Children’s competency and participation in decision making. Paper presented at the Third National Family Court Conference, Melbourne, Australia. Calvert, M., Zeldin, S., & Weisenbach, A. (2002). Youth involvement for community, organizational and youth development: Directions for research, evaluation and practice. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin-Madison and Innovation Centre for Community and Youth Development. Cornwall, A. (2003). Whose Voices? Whose Choices? Reflections on Gender and Participatory Development. World Development, 31(8), 1325–1342. doi:10.1016/ S0305-750X(03)00086-X Crane, P. (1999). Young people and public space: developing inclusive policy and practice. Paper presented at the Conference on young people and social exclusion, Glasgow, UK. 96

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DFID-CSO Youth Working Group. (2010). Youth Participation in Development. A Guide for Development Agencies and Policy Makers. Retrieved from www. ygproject.org DFID-CSO Youth Working Group. (2010). Youth Participation in Development. A Guide for Development Agencies and Policy Makers. London, UK: DFID–CSO Youth Working Group. DFID-CSO Youth Working Group. (2010). Youth Participation in Development: A Guide for Development Agencies and Policy Makers. Retrieved from www. youthpolicy.org FaCS. (2005a). The Source. Retrieved from www.thesource.gov.au Fergusson, R. (2004). Discourses of exclusion: Reconceptualising participation amongst young people. Journal of Social Policy, 33(2), 289–320. doi:10.1017/ S0047279403007451 Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York, NY: Harper Colophon. Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), The Foucault Effect. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. FYA. (2003). Mission and vision of the Australian Youth Foundation. Retrieved from www.youngaustralians.org Hacking, I. (1986). Making up people. In T. C. Heller, M. Sosner, & D. Wellbery (Eds.), Reconstructing individualism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hart, R. (1992). Children’s participation: From tokenism to citizenship. Innocenti Essays No. 4. Florence, Italy: UNICEF. Lansdown, G. (2001a). Promoting children’s participation in democratic decisionmaking. Florence, Italy: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. Pereznieto, P., & Harding, J. (2013). Youth and international development policy: the case for investing in young people. ODI Project Brief No. 80. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute. Pitkin, H. (2004). Representation and democracy: Uneasy alliance. Scandinavian Political Studies, 27(3), 335–342. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.2004.00109.x Plan, U. K. (2012). A Governance Learning Guide. London, UK: Plan.

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Prout, A. (2001). Representing children: Reflections on the children 5-16 programme. Children & Society, 15(3), 193–201. doi:10.1002/chi.667 Restless Development. (2012). Youth manifesto for the 2012 elections: what young people think about the elections, politics and the future of Sierra Leone. Retrieved from www.restlessdevelopment.org Rocha, E. (1997). A ladder of empowerment. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 17(1), 31–44. doi:10.1177/0739456X9701700104 Saggers, S., Palmer, D., Royce, P., Wilson, L., & Charlton, A. (2004). Alive and motivated: young people, participation and local government. Canberra, Australia: National Youth Affairs Research Scheme. Sercombe, H. (1992). Youth theory: Marx or Foucault - a response to Tait. Youth Studies Australia, 11(3), 51–54. United Nations (2013). A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development. The Report of the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Westhorp, G. (1987). Planning for youth participation: A resource kit. Adelaide, Australia: Youth Sector Training Council of South Australia. Wilson, S. (2000). Schooling for democracy. Youth Studies Australia, 19(2), 25–31. World Bank. (2006). World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Zeldion, S. (2004). Youth as agents of adult and community development: Mapping the processes and outcomes of youth engaged in organizational governance. Applied Developmental Science, 8(2), 75–90. doi:10.12071532480xads0802_2

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Accountability: The assumption of responsibility for actions by decision-makers, the engagement by civil society in holding these decision-makers to account for their actions, and decision-makers’ responsibility to respond constructively to those holding them to account. Governance: Refers to the processes through which a state exercises power and the relationships between the state and citizens. Participatory Approaches: Involve young people in determining the services that are delivered to them. 98

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Young People: Refer to older children, adolescents and youth under the age of 25. Young People’s Participation: Refers to the way in which they voice their views and concerns, exercise their rights, and engage in dialogue with and influence decision-makers – that is, the way they engage as active citizens.

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Chapter 6

Development and Distributive Politics:

Multiple Rationalities in Governance and the Youth Empowerment Factor in Zimbabwe Innocent Chirisa University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Emma Maphosa University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe

Wendy Wadzanayi Mandaza-Tsoriyo Great Zimbabwe University, Zimbabwe Abraham Rajab Matamanda https://orcid.org/0000-0001-52605560 University of the Free State, South Africa

ABSTRACT This chapter seeks to demonstrate how urban land has often been used by Zimbabwean politicians to trap the youth. In light of this, the chapter argues that the interplay of the factors of production (land, labor, capital, and enterprise) crystallizes into a matrix of persuasions, contradictions and thought that explain multiple rationalities behind the development and distributive politics. It engages document review and a case study approach in which various policies and programs and project initiatives have been started by the government since 1980, including the building brigades and cooperative housing production in the early 1980s, the institution of the national youth ministry and policy and the administration of the kurera/ukondla youth fund. The chapter suggests that the distributive arrangements for resources be based on innovativeness, acumen and skill by the youth, based on merit and credibility.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch006 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

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INTRODUCTION The youth (like women, children and the elderly) is a motley of a demographic segment of the population that is used as ‘bait’ in looking for opportunities and promises. Usually, this group lacks in financial and network ties that make the bulk of them have the capacity to ‘be on their own; and define their destiny’ (Okorie 2018). Politicians like the elite take advantage of this missing link in their self-definition and self-determination towards exploitation, abuse and creation of dependency syndrome. The ‘big man’ is created because the youth are disadvantaged hence making them apron-tied to the whims and tides deliberately created by the ‘big men’ (Chirisa, Mavhima and Matamanda 2018). The youth have also their reasons for being in this condition. It is underscored that youth as a state in life is a passing phenomenon subject to various interpretations. From an educational and vocational level, the bulk of university and college students are the youth, being ages 16-25 years. The volume of universities has increased and the technical, vocational education and training (TVET) thrust seem to be dwindling (African Union Commission 2015). The question of what effect that has on the long-term sustenance of economic activity remains unanswered. This may partly explain why, the country is said to be laden with people of high literacy yet without the relevant skills, based on recent National Skills Audit. Moreover, the economic challenges that Zimbabwe has undergone the past two decades or so, has had a debilitating effect on the youth, who have been denied access or paying jobs hence a lot of underemployment (Tibaijuka 2005; Biti 2014; Nyarota 2018). Even when funds are provided to allow for youth business start-ups, the generality of youth fails to access these. This is either because the application process is too cumbersome (or leaves them with a feeling of exclusion) or that the information is never conveyed to them. For instance, it is argued that each bank in the country has to avail up to five per cent of its income to youth projects. Quite a number end up as foot soldiers of politicians towards elections (Chirisa et al. 2018). A good number fall to sexual and drug abuse (UNICEF Zimbabwe 2016). The chapter demonstrates how urban land has often been used by Zimbabwean politicians to trap the youth. In light of this, the chapter argues that the interplay of the factors of production (land, labor, capital and enterprise) crystallizes into a matrix of persuasions, contradictions and thought that explain multiple rationalities behind the development and distributive politics. However, this situation raises many questions which this chapter explores: do the youth really want land? If they do, want it, how ready and prepared are they to develop it? Is the youth empowerment drive genuine? What are the ideologies behind youth empowerment? Can the youth really organize themselves and get empowered?

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BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENT AND DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS IN ZIMBABWE Zimbabwe gained independence from British colonial rule in 1980. Postindependence, the country adopted a socialist ideology which saw the government embracing a top-down approach to socio-economic development (Nyarota 2018). Considering that the majority of the populace was based in the rural areas, as well as the marginalization of the rural areas during the colonial era, the government sought to invest in the development of the rural areas in the country (Rambanapasi 1989; Wekwete 1989). In this regard, the focus on rural areas was also a means to incentivize the rural folks who had supported the ‘guerrillas during the liberation war. As a result, the ruling ZANU-PF party made efforts to develop rural areas through road development, schools and health facilities as well as land redistribution. However, following the droughts of the early 1980s and a collapsing economy, the government began to face some economic challenges in the early 1990s which resulted in the government shifting from a socialist ideology to the liberalization of the economy. In order to address the economic challenges which, the country was facing, the ruling party sought way to incentivize certain individuals as well as gain majority support. First, were the packages which were given to the war veterans in 1998 followed by the land reform program of 2000 which saw majority of white commercial farmers being dispossessed of their land (Marongwe et al. 2011). The youth who were actively involved in ZANU-PF affairs benefited much from these farm invasions. Such occurrences continued as Mugabe was losing popular support and he realized the significance of the youth in his political agenda. He eventually took it to heart to engage in clientism where ZANU-PF supporting youth benefitted from loans which they never repaid, residential stands, presidential scholarships to study in South Africa and abroad as well as farming inputs (Muroyi 2017).

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES The definition of the term youth is dynamic and complex, especially in the African context where demographics and socio-economic conditions are always changing. Persons aged between 15 and 35 represent the youth according to the African Youth Charter (African Union, 2006). The United Nations (2011) considers a youth to be any person aged 15-24. For the purpose of this study, a youth is that person aged 15-35 as stated by the African Youth Charter. On the whole, youth represent an economically-active age group which consists of university students and those in their early careers. In Africa and Zimbabwe included there have been instances

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when individuals aged at least 40 years have been identified as youth owing to the gains associated this age-group. Youth empowerment has no universal definition since it takes can be a goal, a process or an ideology (Liu et al. 2009). It encompasses building the capacity of individuals or communities to address their own development challenges through attaining greater autonomy. Provision of power to participate in policy making which is mainly availed through institutional frameworks is central to empowerment. The aim of youth empowerment is to encourage youth participation in development to benefit themselves and society at large (Checkoway and Gutierrez, 2006). Empowerment approaches include providing enabling institutions, participation, resource provisions, skills development through education and building of collective youth identity. Civic engagement and autonomy are some of the indicators of youth empowerment (Silbereisen and Lerner, 2007). Therefore, youth empowerment includes different facets such as economic, political and social empowerment (Seneviratne, 2017). For example, in the United States of America, community colleges were used to cater for the poor youth failing to enroll in tertiary education. Beyond academic and technical education, citizenship education is critical as a way of empowering the youth. Introduction of effective citizenship education programs resulted in American youth assuming a greater role in political demonstrations and in community development initiatives (Pickard and Bessant, 2017). In South Africa, challenges between schools to work transition led to the development of training institutions for the youth. Despite this initiative enrollment into post-secondary training remains lower despite the higher returns in the industry (Perold et al. 2012) Other than education initiative, youth empowerment is also driven by the need to reduce the economic inequalities of access to economic resources. Consequently, black economic empowerment initiatives under which the youth are beneficiaries. These include support of SMEs for employment creation and financing assistance from the government through the Empowerment Fund, (Gumede, 2015). Development may refer to the process of continuous change that occurs in different faculties of human society. According to the United Nations (1997) development is multidimensional and aims for sufficiency among members of society. Bellù (2011) observe that the development of one part of the system may have some negative impacts on the development of other parts which creates tensions and conflicts between different systems. In this regard, it emerges that the development of a city becomes a multidimensional activity that takes various forms depending on a number of factors. The human development theory emerged from the evolution of economic development theories after 1990 (Stewart et al. 2018). This saw the shift in indicators used to measure economic development from money and material assets to a central focus on human capability and human flourishing. The techniques adopted include the provision of basic needs for the poor, education 103

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and skills improvement, decent employment and respect for human rights (Stewart et al. 2017). The focus of the human development approach is also on eliminating inequality in terms of capabilities between different groups in society (Hartman, 2014). The youths in the United States of America (USA) are recognized as assets for development. As a result, various initiatives were taken to provide resources to the youth as a way of improving youth participation in socio-economic matters and address poverty. Attempts were also taken to address inequality of access to resources based on racial origin. Youth training and education are among the strategies. This is a responsibility of community colleges, tertiary education facilities. Challenges of youths’ employability were also prominent giving rise to the invention of careeroriented education. This mainly focuses on vocational and community development related skills. This led to growth in youths’ employability which has a potential in enhancing youths’ opportunities (Wilson and Carthy, 2010). Statist developmental is when the state takes an active role in promoting development (Goldin, 2018). The statist development paradigm emanates from market failure argument and the political reasoning where the state pursues multiple goals among which include its own rent-seeking ideologies (Fagan and Munck, 2018). In addition, statist development has a social welfare orientation whereby the government takes responsibility in ensuring access to basic needs for the betterment of human welfare. Powerful state institutions are used to effectively direct the deployment of capital and labor in an economy (Naseemullah, 2017). This form of development has been common in most post-colonial African countries following the attainment of independence where a socialist ideology to development has been adopted with the government adopting a top-down approach to development (Freund 2007; Meyers 2011; Nyarota 2018). The state is actively engaged in stimulating development through supportive development plans, subsidies and through investment on public projects. This is done mainly through cohesion since cohesive power is fundamental to the success of state-led development (Kyle, 2017). A strong relationship between the state and the business sectors is another important factor since it catalyzes the speed of economic development under statist development (Maxfield and Schneider, 1997). Governance is how different actors are organized to share ideas and collaborate towards the realization of collective goals. For such to happen the tenets of good governance – trust, rule of law, accountability, transparency – among others be the cornerstone of the youth empowerment trust. With critical enterprises, the youth can mobilize themselves and resources to define their future. Governance theories take different forms. Models of governance evolve over time. Some theories explore the roles of actors; some explore how the actors are organized, whilst others evaluate the governance systems (Ansell and Torfing, 2016). The evaluative model of governance is used. The evaluative model measures the performance of governance systems using indicators like the degree of participatory engagement, accountability, 104

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transparency, innovation and efficiency among other indicators (Ansell and Torfing, 2016). Different forms of institutions exist among which include social, political or economic institutions (Nabli and Nugent, 2014). Political institutions have the greatest influence in shaping the direction and success of development initiatives since they have an overall impact on resource allocation (Ahrens, 2002). Socio-economic development does not take place in a vacuum but occurs within an environment governed by different institutions. These institutions exist to support development initiatives though they have their distinct values and ways of operating (Hirai, 2017). Institutions facilitate or hinder development. On the positive side, institutions can provide conditions for nurturing development (Stewart, 2013; Bardhan, 2010). As a result, the impact of development initiatives like employment and innovations in technologies are mainly determined by the institutional setup (Evans, 2007). The different institutions are integrated via different methods of coordination among which include the state, the markets and community associations (Besely and Jayaraman, 2010). Each of the institutions plays a different role which had an implication on attainment of development. Lack of efficiency in interactions of institutions promotes inefficiency and corruption in resource allocation (Besley and Jayaraman, 2010). Distributive politics deals with how resources are allocated in an economy. The intention is to achieve justice in resource distribution for human welfare and civic betterment. These resources include funding, taxes, projects, land and priority areas for development planning. The basic argument is that resources are allocated for securing electoral support in polls (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2016). Through distributive politics, the youth may be empowered or marginalized by the decision-makers. It is through the distributive politics that the role of the youth in advancing the political interests is gauged and they end up being incentivized or sanctioned depending on their political stance (Chirisa et al. 2018). In the case of South Africa, political youth activism is high and this is common through student protests against unfavorable education policies (Ndlovu, 2017). Student-led protests on economic grievances led to a great appreciation of the needs for youth engagement for politico-economic stability. Effective laws on democracy and a strong youth identity have strengthened student participation in politics (Cele, 2009). However political activism by the urban youth is higher than participation by the rural counterparts (Ndlovu, 2017). Closely related to distributive politics is distributive justice which focuses on which groups get what and why in a society (Boisen and Murray, 2016). The major argument of the swing voter theory is that political parties distribute resources to secure political support of swing voters. Investment policies and investment projects are allocated in areas that capture the interests of swing voters. Therefore, politicians are tempted to invest more in particular goods and projects rather than investing in public goods (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2016). This is a common model of resources distributed across the globe (Golden and Min, 2013). This system of 105

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resource allocation is referred to as clientelistic distribution under which the benefits to swinging voters are greater compared to benefits to loyal party members (Stokes et al. 2013). Swing voters vary the decision on which party to vote for and lack a strong attachment to any party (Fair, 2011). The voting decisions are determined by perceptions of wellness under a specific government rather than shared party ideologies, hence getting the support of these voters is necessary for political success in elections hence swing voters get more benefits (Stokes et al. 2013). Opposing the swing voter model is the proposition that politicians allocate resources to loyal party members to maintain political legitimacy (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2016). The other theory is the broker-mediated distribution theory. Under this model, brokers act on behalf of the politicians through direct interaction with communities though interests of broker may not be aligned to that of politicians in winning polls brokers may be interested in securing resources from politicians. The broker is aware of voter preference and behavior and can easily influence it (Stokes et al. 2013). Brokers are a more powerful and influential individual over a certain group and as such, they can influence the political interests and vote of a certain group/cluster (Victor et al. 2018). The value of brokers to competing political candidates lie in the ability of brokers to mobilize voters for politicians) as they can sell a ‘block’ of votes to politicians in return for favors (Victor et al. 2018). Consequently, brokers are therefore big targets for politicians and take advantage of the density of their social networks and influence for securing personal resources from politicians (Stokes et al. 2013). The other theory explaining resource allocation is that of democracy. This is when politicians appeal for support from a wider audience. This is done through implementing investment projects in public goods that benefit the majority rather than a particular group (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2013). Under this model, resource distribution is done in a democratic manner to appeal to all citizens regardless of political orientation. Thus, under the democratic theory resource allocation seeks to satisfy public interest (Stokes et al. 2013). This model of distribution, therefore, implies higher chances of equality between different stakeholders. In addition, distributive politics theories also consider whether allocations made result in improving welfare to all citizens or the benefits are captured by a specific group. Distributive politics considers whether the timing of allocations is aligned to political cycles or not (Golden and Min, 2013). This gives an outline of whether the allocations are responsive to the needs of voters and whether politicians are accountable to citizens as voters or to brokers (Golden and Min, 2013). These theories are influential in assessing the responsiveness and accountability of the government towards youths’ needs. The private sectors have been influential particularity advocacy groups have taken a role in addressing the needs of marginalized youths (Fernandes and Gabe, 2009). Youth housing was another initiative initiated by the health department in 106

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the identification of how housing challenges would affect health and wellbeing. The homeless youth were an important target for the Housing First a regional housing initiative. The initiative sought to provide affordable housing to those who could not afford a home on the market (Levy, 2013). This had positive impacts on the human dignity of the homeless youth and their financial standing given that homeownership is a key form of equity in the United States.

RESULTS Results are organized two basic epochs in the evolution of the Zimbabwean state: 19802000 and 2001 to 2018. These two periods are critical to reflect what predominantly a socialistic state was, in the former period and what became a ‘hodge-podge’ of an economy in the latter.

Youth in Development 1980-2000 Youth Building brigades were formulated as a response to solve challenges of youth unemployment. These were engaged in the construction, repair of houses and production of building materials (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 2001; Sadomba, 2011). Building bridges were introduced by prominent war veteran figures aiming to create employment. They were made up of the military youth who were absorbed without any foundational skill though they then undergo an apprenticeship program in areas like bricklaying, construction and mechanical engineering. On a positive note, some beneficiaries managed to transform their skills developing large construction and engineering companies in cities (Sadomba, 2011). However, some youth companies in the construction material manufacturing sector could not compete with other private sector actors on the market (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 2001). Consequently, most of the firms were naturally eliminated from the construction industry. Youth training centers were also established for skills training. Some of these centers include Driefontein Mission in Masvingo established prior to independence (Kasambira, 1987). These training centers provided vocational skills in an area such as agricultural extension, carpentry, welding which were meant for boosting productivity in rural areas. Other than youth training centers, financial support for SMEs through the SEDCO was among the initiatives taken to benefit the youth. SEDCO financial program was initiated in the 1990s to provide financial assistance to small scale business by the youth through a partnership between the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and the government (Bond, 1998). As a result, there was inequality of access to funding for rural-based youth entrepreneurs. Land reform programs where one of the attempts 107

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taken towards youth empowerment. Access to land has important implications on the economic productivity of the use since land is a key resource necessary for production. Other than stimulating economic productivity landownership has positive implications on promoting good citizenship behavior since land ownership is associated with responsibilities and rights on the youths (Matika, 2014). Therefore, good citizenship transforms into social cohesion within a community and also foster environmental stewardship behavior. The youth have remained marginal beneficiaries of the land reform characterized by exclusion in land ownership from pre-independence to the post-independence era (Hamauswa and Manyeruke, 2012). This is against the background that the youths were agents for mobilizing groups for violent land grabs alongside war veterans from as early as the 1980s. War veterans, business people and politicians remain the visible beneficiaries of the program since independence (Magure, 2013). This shows that the distribution of land marginalizes the youth. The other critique against land reform in youth empowerment is that the initiative is irrational and mainly a political ideology to strengthen the political power of ZANU PF (Mlambo, 2015). In cases where land was availed to the youths, the major challenge of access to formal land tenure remains. This is disincentives investment (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2018). This thwarts further effort to stimulate the growth of agriculture-related enterprises by the Zimbabwean youths which is a target area for Zimbabwe’s youth funding program (Mubaiwa, 2014) and the 2013 indigenization policy.

Youth in Development 2001- 2019 Youth development initiatives post-2000 are enshrined in the Zimbabwe National Youth Policy of 2000 and the revised National Youth Policy of 2013 (Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation, 2000). These policy documents outline the major focus of youth empowerment initiatives and projects which have to be implemented by various instiitutions. The focus of such initiatives has been on youth education, employment, participation in socio-economic development, health and gender equality. Among these initiatives have been allocations of land to the youth during the land reform program as well as the provision of residential stands. However, the distribution of these stands and land has been largely based on a partisan basis where ZANU-PF supporters and sympathisers have benefitted (Chirisa et al. 2018). The Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013, National Youth Policy of 2013 and the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act chapter14:13 are the legal instruments guiding YE in Zimbabwe. Section 20 of the constitution provides main goals of youth empowerment which include education and training, employment, health, political participation and protections form of exploitation 108

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(Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). The constitution also gives the responsibility primarily to the government. The government works hand in glove with various other key institutions from the private sector. The private sector plays a critical role through the provision of funds which are disbursed to the youth to facilitate various socio-economic projects. Of particular interest have been institutions such as ECONET through scholarships to fund the education of the youth. The Ministry of Finance is another important ministry for budgeting for youth investment projects at the national level. This is done through the annual budget. Banks are also responsible for funding youth investment projects at individual capacity or in partnership with the government (Whena, 2015). They focus on funding different activities as defined by the bank portfolios and preferred funding areas. In executing this responsibility banks also cooperate with the National Youth Fund responsible for offering financial loans to prospective youth entrepreneurs (Mubaiwa, 2014). The MYEDI also administer activities of youth funding organizations where banks such as Central Africa Building Society (CABS), CBZ Holding and Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe (IDBZ) were engaged to provide youth empowerment facilities among their portfolios (Whena, 2015). However, there are a number of challenges which include defaulting beneficiaries and liquidity crisis in the country. Some of the beneficiaries have been reluctant to pay back the loans to the banks and such a situation makes it difficult for others to benefit since the fund has been a revolving fund. Some beneficiaries were just adamant to repay the loans which they considered to be packages from the rulig party to reward them for being loyal to the party, since most of the beneficiaries were ZANU-PF supporters (Chirisa et al. 2018). The youth funding policy promoted the rise of youth entrepreneurship in Plumtree and Harare which led to a growth in employment and taxation gains at the local level (Doro, 2014; Mubaiwa, 2014). However, the benefits at the national level were limited due to lack of education on payment of taxes (Doro, 2014). This represents a financial leakage to the economy. In addition, the benefits were short-lived as they were countered by poor skills of enterprise and financial management (Mubaiwa, 2014). The other challenges with this youth fund where the selectivity in approval of loan applications where banks availed funds corresponding to banks’ priority investment areas which were mainly the value addition sectors. For example, CABS only offered loans to youth specialization in agriculture and manufacturing (Mubaiwa, 2014). Though access to funding for agriculture projects increased, some sectors like mining suffered since their large capital investments requirements were above the maximum lending level (Mubaiwa, 2014). Community-based associations such as civic groups, research associations, lobby groups and church organizations play a role in youth development. For example, women youth associations are important for lobbying for gender equality. By 109

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providing moral education and moral values among the youth, church organizations contribute towards youth health and making the youth responsible citizens. Furthermore, community values are important in shaping the youths’ values. With a move towards participatory development, community organizations are claiming an increasing stake in youth empowerment. NGOs are another private stakeholder in youth empowerment (Ministry of Youth, Indigenization and Empowerment, 2013). NGOs’ roles include facilities provision and skills training services. A typical example is the Driefontein Christian Mission that provides vocational training for rural youth (Kasambira, 1987). In addition, NGOs have also contributed by offering financial services to youth agricultural entrepreneurs (Matika, 2014). Other points of interventions include youth public health awareness through Red Cross Society. NGOs also provide youth education in business entrepreneurship and leadership. Therefore, NGOs provide an indispensable contribution to youth empowerment. The indimidation of some community-based associations by politicians has somehow been stifling development initiatives as there have been instances of some organisations being harassed and labeled as agents of the West (Kubatana 2013). The indigenization policy was implemented with effect from 2008. The main intention of this policy was to improve ownership of economic resources by native Zimbabweans to remove inequalities in resource distribution (Warikandwa and Osode, 2017). Through community share-ownership schemes benefits from the use of local resources were shared with the local communities. This has an impact of reducing disparities in income between private companies and citizens among which include the youths. An example is Shurugwi where private mining companies developed educational infrastructure enhancing youths’ access to education. These companies also developed dams used for agricultural production (Masimbiti, 2014). However, these benefits largely depend on the efficiency of the administrative authorities and in cases where investors can secure licenses without complying with requirements of the indigenization act, the youth benefit less from such investment projects. A typical example is that of an ethanol fuel project in Chiredzi (Kambanje and Belete, 2017). The other challenge of indigenization emanates from poor law enforcement. This promotes unethical business practices (corruption). Rather than redistributing resources to the needy, the policy has rather redistributed resources to a few political and business elites due to the existence of incentives for corruption within business law (Warikandwa and Osode, 2015). Lack of transparency provided an incentive for corruption by those responsible for administering the policy particularly politicians (Magure, 2013). Other than the politicians, the military and business personals other elites (Shumba, 2018). This shows how potential youths’ gains from indigenization have been re-oriented to the elites due to inefficient administration. Another challenge pertainingto indigenization emanates from limited promotion and policy knowledge among the youth. For example, in Bulawayo, the youth majority 110

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lacked knowledge of the policy (Khumalo, 2016). Under such circumstances, the youth cannot tap the provisions for empowerment. Hence effective youth empowerment strategies have to be co-produced through effective youth engagement (Makanda et al. 2013). Business entrepreneurship, through SMEs, is among government initiatives to engage the youth in economic activity. SMEs not only boost economic activity but also increase youth employment. In addition, SMEs provide an important link in the value addition chain (Chikuhwa, 2013). SMEs have been initiated before independence and were managed by SEDCO (Small Enterprise Development Cooperation) (Kappor et al. 1997). After independence SMEs was brought under the Ministry of Small to Medium Enterprises responsible for financing and skills training. Corruption by local authorities promotes unequal access to resources provided by the state for youth entrepreneurship impeding the success of this initiative (Chimucheka, 2012). The rural youth who are unemployed and lack collateral security are further marginalized by the requirements for collateral on loans hence loans have been inaccessible. This bears negative impacts on entrepreneurship growth. With respect to politics, the youths are often exploited by politicians and their participation in political forums is associated with little advancement of youth ideologies (Hodzi, 2014). They often play apparatchik. Rather than acting as agencies for change, the youth political representative is forced to conform to existing systems hence participation is not genuine. The other challenge is that of lack of proper organization of youths to lobby for the advancement of collective ideologies in political forums since the youths pursue individual interests (Hodzi, 2014). As a result, youths have become week targets of politicians where they are used in organized political violence. This is prompted by unemployment where the youths can be easily manipulated by politicians (Chisvo, 2016). This negatively influences engagement of the youths for effective political contributions. Engagement of the unemployed youth in political violence movements goes against national youth policy provisions where the youth are recognized as a strong force in resolving conflicts (Ministry of Youth Indigenization and Empowerment, 2013). Political participation of the Zimbabwean youths is similar to some cases outside Zimbabwe where the participants can result in the betterment of opportunities or worsens youths’ vulnerability (Helve and Wallace, 2018). In Zimbabwe political activity by university students is constrained by an authoritarian environment (Chikwanha, 2009). Therefore, youths’ participation in politics has declined since independence. The credibility of youths’ participation can be questionable since legal regulations for participation are set by politicians, a group motivated by rent-seeking behavior (Ahrens, 2002). This shows the limitations of the political autonomy of youths as they remain under government control. Youth, housing and health Housing are among the challenges facing the youth across the globe due to exclusionary housing policies (Forrester and Yip, 2013). 111

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The youth find it hard to secure homes in the housing market hence resorting to poor housing which is cheaper or remain using parent’s home (Lieberg, 2013). Furthermore, the youth are among the most vulnerable groups in terms of access to decent housing (Grant, 2003). This compromises the social welfare of the youth. In Zimbabwe, both the 2000 and the 2013 national youth policies are silent on youth homeownership. As a result, cooperative associations are the common way through which youth cooperatives secure land for housing in cities (Muchadenyika, 2015). Under the cooperatives, land and homeownership are not secured. Securing land through cooperatives is difficult since allocations are mainly done along partisan lines. Politicians at the local level (the councilors) have the overall say in designing housing policy at council level since they have more power than technical persons (De Visser et al. 2010). Likewise, the Minister of Local Government has the discretionary power in terms of housing decisions at the national level (RTCP Act 20: 29 of 1996). By strongly aligning with these politicians, housing cooperatives sideline the formal housing delivery procedures. This compromise quality of housing provided in terms of services which further affects the youth since this has become the common way of securing affordable housing. This reflects weak institutional frameworks persisting interests of politicians rather than the rule of law in housing. Youth Health is a priority area for the National Youth Policy of 2013. The major dimensions of health are physical, social and mental wellbeing (African Union Commission, 2006). Pertaining health of the Zimbabwean youth, initiatives taken include the building and institutions of youth reproductive health services. Despite the attempts to make these services accessible spatially, challenges of access exist. For example, discriminatory access affects reproductive health service availability in Bulawayo (Mashamba and Robson, 2002). In addition, attempts to improve reproductive health knowledge through education and awareness through the ‘Regai Drive Shiri’ initiative has been taken (Cowan et al. 2010). Similar to the “Regai Dzive Shiri” program is the SHAZ- (Shaping the Health of Adolescents in Zimbabwe) to empower youth girls on health concerns (Dunbar and Mudekunye-Mahaka, 2016). Though there were improvements in knowledge about HIV prevention, non-acceptance of services by youths negatively affected service use (Mmari and Magnani, 2003). This is because health packages are not designed to meet the health concerns of different communities (Lavareck, 2016). Hence demand driven youth healthcare is likely to capture health values across different cultures. Education provides youth with the requisite knowledge and the relevant experience needed to transform livelihoods and contribute to industrial development hence the phrase education with production (Kasambira, 1987). It also stimulates innovation and by youths which is necessary for the transformation of economies (Chisvo, 2016). Education has a cross-cutting impact across sustainable development goals such as inclusivity, economic growth, empowerment of women and environmental 112

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conservation (Marco, 2017). Education can be academic, technical or citizenshiporiented. Education institutions should also sustain the relevant skills to address changes in the industry (Ramakrishma, 2002). The education system of Zimbabwe was designed according to British ideologies of what constitute the relevant and quality education systems for production of the high quality and relevant human skills by then (Shizha and Kariwo, 2011. Education has remained a priority policy area for the government since independence (Kasambira, 1987). Youth education is acquired through institutions such as polytechnics, vocational institutions and universities. Though vocational training centers existed before, the 1980s, they were emphasized soon after independence to equip youths with skills needed in industries (Nherera, 1994). Vocational training was stimulated by education with production movement (Nherera, 1994). This was spearheaded by a civil association group- Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production (Mashingaidze, 1997). On positive note employability of graduates from vocational institutions in self-employment is higher since demand for the service and skills in welding, carpentry, metal work is high and resources are readily available (Kasambira, 1987). For universities strategies taken to produce skills employable at the individual, national and global levels include a change of curriculums and provisions for an attachment (Garwe, 2014). Despite this, the contribution towards building capacitated youth citizens remain poor. Thus, there has been quantitative rather than qualitative improvement of education (Maravanyika, 1990). Other than education on skills for employment, tertiary education institutions in Zimbabwe implement citizenship education. Citizenship education is necessary for nurturing citizens who respect community values for development and can actively take part in assuming responsibility for developing society (Zembere, 2018). One form of citizenship-related programs implemented soon after independence is national youth service (commonly known as the Border Gezi schemes). This was started in the 1980 and revived in early 2000 with the aim of empowering youths’ capacity in civic engagement in natural resources conservation and disaster risk management (Butcher and Einolf, 2017). However, the program has been manipulated by ruling party members. Youths graduating from this program are abused as terrorists against opposition parties (O’Malley, 2010). Furthermore, democratic citizenship skills and values remain poor among most the youths hence limited willingness to contribute to the positive transformation of communities (Zembere, 2018). Against this background, education quality, therefore, falls short of the qualities of sustainable education which builds the values, skills, attitudes and knowledge that allow the youth as citizens to take informed decision and assume responsibility for not only economic development but environmental integrity and justice (Leicht et al. 2018). This affects youths’ competency in solving complex challenges for sustainable development. Politicization of education limits the successful collaboration between 113

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the government and education institutions. Academics from universities are critiqued by politicians for working against existing governments (Kappor, 2011). This negatively affects the consumption of academic research advisory services to benefit policymaking by political leaders.

The Employment Question Employment is basically a condition when one has a decent job. However, jobs can be salaried or paid in kind (Filmer and Fox, 2014). Formal employment is that work where youth take part in the traditional employment system that is regulated by the state whilst informal employment is undeclared work which lies outside the formalised sector (Pfau- Effinger et al. 2009). Beyond salary and improvement in living standards, other benefits include improved social status and identity (Filmer and Fox, 2014). Thus, youth employment is not only important for poverty alleviation but affects the dignity of youth citizens. Youth employment has an important impact on the growth of Zimbabwe’s economy especially given the background that youths form the bulk of the working population (ZIMSTATS, 2012). Channeling youth labor into vibrant sectors of Zimbabwe’s economy is of great importance. The employment challenges of Zimbabwe’s youth include both unemployment and underemployment (Jerie, 2015). Among the causes of youth unemployment in Gweru is education related unemployment where education acquired in universities is not oriented towards labor market needs. Consequently, graduates fail to secure trained jobs and end up in underpaid jobs which reflects underemployment (Jerie, 2015). The other cause is economic-performance related. Agriculture and manufacturing sector were the key youth employers in the pre-2000 era in Zimbabwe. However, decline in capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector, resulting in reduced labor requirement and consequently unemployment (ZimAsset, 2013). This is against the background of a bulge in youth graduates released annually from the training institutions. The ultimate result is a mismatch between labor supply and labor demand on the market (Bhebhe et al. 2015). From the basic economic principles, when supply exceeds demand, prices of labor fall. This promoted a drop of the rewards to labor and the youth are willing to take jobs that are poorly paid, offer poor working conditions and often without social security (Jerie, 2015). This resulted in underemployment and exploitation of the youths. The decline in manufacturing industries prompted the growth of self -employment has increased across all sectors. Self-employment is consistent with the SMEs policy. The intention of this policy was to stimulate the growth of small-scale economic activities to create employment. However, the academic orientation of youth education systems continues to affect the youths’ capacity to expand SMEs and create employment for themselves and other citizens.

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Poor self-employment skills negatively affect the competency of graduates entering the self- employment sector.

DISCUSSION AND SYNTHESIS There are differences in employment challenges between South Africa and Zimbabwe. In South Africa prospects for higher incomes and employment are high for students enrolling in tertiary education though tertiary education enrolment remains lower than secondary level. This reflects a better economic condition and low supply of labor on the market which is contrary to Zimbabwe’s case. Hence securing employment on domestic markets for South Africa’s youth is less of a challenge than it is to the Zimbabwean youth. All three countries regard education and education quality as a priority aspect in building the capacity of the youth. Hence promotion of careerrelated education across the global, regional and national contexts. Citizenship education is important in building youths’ participation in both the United States and South Africa. Though citizenship education in Zimbabwe had good intentions, its potential has been eroded by political capture. The youths are important in the government since they can positively contribute to development. Implementation of democratic laws promoted youth engagement. Political participation by youths is higher in the United States and South Africa. However, in Zimbabwe, the youth lack autonomy to democratically participate in politics as excess control is made on the youth education systems and citizenship education programs. Consequently, the identity of the Zimbabwean youth has been lost which facilitate exploitation. Besides empowering the youth, government spending on youth projects is also motivated by political interests. Under this circumstance, the swing voter model of resource allocation applies where the youths as swing voters form an important target for politicians (Stokes et al. 2013). The large effects of poor administration by the state through immature interventions for self-gain has resulted in the failure of youth empowerment initiatives. This is supported by the existing institutional weakness that perpetuates corruption tendencies within the distributive system. Since projects are mainly determined by rent-seeking behavior of politicians, the benefits are usually short term since most of the initiatives are initiated by ruling parties and are subject to change with political cycles (5 years) as new governments are voted into power. This has a negative bearing on long term sustainability of youth projects in Zimbabwe. Lack of technical competency in approval of youth loans a challenge given that credit assessment of youth loans is presided over by both the banks and the ministry of youth (Doro, 2014). This prompted lending to big political figures and politically associated networks despite consideration of capacity to repay loans. The end result has been huge loan defaults which negatively affected 115

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the integrity of financial institutions. Not only has defaulting affected banks but it has imposed a cost to the government (Bond, 1998). The overall implication has therefore been termination of the scheme due to the failure of the bank to continue lending (Murambiwa, 2014). Another implication is that youth-oriented projects, such as SMEs funding, have become a less priority area for banks. A typical example is how the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) terminated the project for funding SMEs over other priority areas (Murisa and Chikweche, 2015). Outside the youth fund, the politicization of the banking industry after independence has negative long-term effects and resulted in financial defaulting of most loans and collapse of financial lending institutions (Harvey, 1996). Poor provision for funding allocation is a challenge where loans were made available without regard for the educational competency of the borrower provided the applicant fell within the youth age range and the investment proposal was viable (Doro, 2014)). Poor competency affected the viability of investments made in different areas including agriculture and manufacturing enterprises despite the provision some form training to loan beneficiaries. Furthermore, youth entrepreneurship in agriculture has also been affected by poor property rights institutions where the youth are denied ownership to rural land. Weak legislative provisions and enforcement of law and corruption further affect the viability of youth empowerment initiatives.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES The chapter recommends for an in-depth understanding of the youth factor in terms of its transitionary nature, how youths’ empowerment must be measured and instruments and vehicles for sustainable empowerment. It also suggests that the distributive arrangements for resources be based on innovativeness, acumen and skill by the youth, based on merit and credibility. For such to happen the tenets of good governance – trust, rule of law, accountability, transparency – among others be the cornerstone of the youth empowerment trust. For example, once they borrow (say loans), they must be capable of paying back so that it is truly a revolving fund at play. That goes with a true sense of responsibility and patriotism. With critical enterprises, the youth can mobilize themselves and resources to direct their future.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Development: The improvement of human welfare which also translates to economic growth. Distributive Politics: How government goods and resources are allocated. Employment: A condition of being salaried in exchange for labor or skills, can be both formal and informal, where the payment and benefits is commensurate with skills and the work does not contravene human rights. Governance: How actors are organized. Rationality: Reasoning. Stakeholder Interests: Values of actors. Technical Training: Training on use of a particular technology. Vocational Training: Practical oriented education for example education in agriculture, carpentry, entrepreneurship. Youth Empowerment: A process of enhancing the capability of the individual youth. Zimbabwe: A country located in Sub- Saharan Africa.

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Chapter 7

Democracy, Habermasian Sphere, Social Media, and Youth Participation in Governance in Zimbabwe:

Youth in Governance Processes in Africa David Makwerere Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT This chapter focused on the opportunities and challenges presented by social media in the democratization process in Zimbabwe. The chapter contends that youth participation on various social media podiums is very vibrant. The youth use social media to communicate issues affecting them and in most cases to express their displeasure with governing authorities. The types of the youth on social media can be categorized into three; the protestors, the defensive and the moderates. The protestors are those who simply use the platforms created by social media to vent their frustrations in a less constructive way. The defensive are those youths who believe in the status quo and are willing to defend the ruling elites at all costs. The moderates are those who believe that social media can be a platform for dialogue and constructive engagement.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch007 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

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INTRODUCTION The advent of the World Wide Web has led to the birth of platforms of interaction that have drastically narrowed the gap between individuals in terms of communication (a concept that Marshall McLuhan has since termed “globalization”. This globalization has been largely aided by the birth of social media platforms such as the microblog known as Twitter, networking sites like Facebook, and Instagram, amongst others. Beyond shrinking social spaces, social media has created Habermasian spaces where important issues relating to governance and democratization can be discoursed upon. Participants in discourses over the World Wide Web have come to be known as netizens and their views have reached corridors of power to an extent where they are influential in government decision making. In the Zimbabwean context, the term “Twimbos” has since been invented to refer to Zimbabwean netizens active on Twitter. So great has been the adoption of such media that the sitting President of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa has created accounts on Facebook and Twitter where he has actively sought to engage with citizens and appraise them on developments in his government. This move can be seen to be in line with his pronouncements that he wants to be “a listening president” and that his government would be “an engaging government”. The youth demography of the population in Zimbabwe makes up 70% of the total citizenry and is the most active group when it comes to social media. Beyond the adoption of social media as a tool to police government by citizens, governments have themselves taken advantage of technology to create e-governance systems and Zimbabwe has been trying to adopt such (albeit with little success).

BACKGROUND The advent of social media has presented ordinary citizens with an opportunity to effectively participate in governance processes. The youth have emerged as the greatest consumers of the many social media products that are on the market (Valenzuela 2013). There has always been a concern in many developing countries about the lack of youth participation (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010; David, 2013; Yamamoto & Kushin, 2013) and social media has been viewed as a potential game changer. The 21st century has presented the world with many dynamic developments. The social media has arguably emerged as the most powerful social and technological force of the millennium. The social media presents the world with a vast array of cultural, social, technological and economic resources that are useful for the sustainable development of the global community. The internet is a powerful empowerment tool. However, social media also possess potential pitfalls that include the exclusion of minorities, cyberbullying, defamation of character and many other undesirable 128

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elements which affect the potential positive influences of the internet (van der Bank 2014). Social media and the internet, in general, are important in providing a platform for interaction, the sharing of ideas and the development of discourses that shape the developmental agendas in different contexts. The youth in Africa often termed the ‘demographic dividend’ in African Union corridors, have always been crucial change agents throughout different historical contexts across the world. The youth were influential during the decolonization agenda in Africa. Whether one is looking at the African Union in South Africa, the South West Africa People’s Organisation in Namibia, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique in Mozambique or the Zimbabwe African National Union and Zimbabwe African People’s Union nationalist movements in Zimbabwe, the youth have always been at the forefront of agitating for change. The struggles for individual and collective freedoms took a different formation at the turn of the century when the youth in the Arab-Maghreb region utilized the power of the internet to engineer political transitions in Tunisia and Egypt. The internet and the various social media platforms provide a platform where the youth discusses issues of common concern as well as deliberate on mobilization strategies. Social media is a major rallying point as the youth delivers the much-needed change in the two Arab countries. The youth have remained the majority consumers of the internet and social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, WeChat etc. Tuffle and Enghel (2009:9) found out that “different internet platforms like Facebook and YouTube and blogs have become rapidly growing virtual sites that give shape to new forms of social networking, communication, and mobilization, primarily among the youth.” The power and pervasiveness of the internet in providing the much-needed platform for interaction makes it a very important developmental tool worth interrogating. It is important to probe the ability of the youth, especially in developing countries, to put social media platforms to good use. This chapter interrogates the interaction between the theoretical and practical dynamics of social media as a public sphere to shape the governance agenda. The African Union and many of its affiliate member states on the continent have placed a premium on the potential role of the youth in Africa’s quest for sustainable development in the 21st century. The role of the youth in Africa’s development is brought into focus by the fact that the youth dominate the demographic charts in almost all of the countries on the continent. The youth, depending on how they are handled, has the potential to make or break the peace and developmental agendas on the continent. Against this background, the role of the social media in facilitating discourses around issues of political interest and decision making must be understood in the context of internet governance in general and the agenda-setting processes that are initiated and influenced by various social media platforms. The youth in Zimbabwe and Africa, in general, are faced with a plethora of social, economic, technological, economic and even 129

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environmental challenges all of which combine to make life unbearable for the young people on the continent. The youth who migrate from rural areas to urban areas in search of greener pastures are often faced with the stuck reality of poor housing and social amenities and lack of employment opportunities. Those who remain in the rural areas (and they constitute the majority according to Zimbabwe Census results of 2012), have to face the daily struggles of trying to survive on less than a dollar per day. A report on Youth and the Millennium Development Goals (2005) observed that “overall, current avenues for political participation are insufficient and consequently youth in many places are perceived as apathetic or disengaged.” However, the advent of social media in the new millennium has provided the youth with boundless opportunities to interact and shape governance discourses in a way that speaks to their aspirations. It is in this vein that the chapter engages with the question of whether social media platforms can be a tool for youth inclusion and participation in the various spheres of governance in Zimbabwe. This chapter interrogated the role that social media, as used by the youth demography in Zimbabwe, has been deployed as a platform for effective interface between the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) and the youth in the country. The chapter is coming at a time when Zimbabweans have since embraced the Second Republic. The Second Republic appears to be embracing wider participation from ordinary citizens in governance and policy issues. Using the lenses of Jurgen Habermas, the chapter engaged with the question of whether the active participation of the Government on social media platforms has created a platform through which the youth can effectively contribute to national governance processes. In discussing these dynamics, the authors are aware and alive to the contested democratic spaces that characterize political and governance participation in Zimbabwe. The political environment has always been polarised from the early days of independence to the present day. The polarity reached its peak in 2000 when the Movement for Democratic Change was formed. The ZANU PF government responded by consolidating its power through different means including the introduction of the Access to Information and Privacy Protection Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act which some analysts have said were aimed at curtailing independent media freedoms as well as the freedom of expression for individuals that are deemed intolerant to the ruling ZANU PF government. Even the ushering in of the so-called Second Republic after the military-led revolution of November 2017 has not done much to convince observers and analysts that indeed there is a new dawn in Zimbabwe. The fact that the revolution was led by the military raised many questions about the democratic ethos in Zimbabwe. From a governance perspective in Zimbabwe, there are competing narratives between the older generation and the younger generation. The older generation, many of whom participated in the liberation struggle from 1966-1980, appear to be 130

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obsessed with the old nationalist narratives which have often created contradictions specifically with the urban-based youths and to some extent the rural youth as well. On the other hand, the youth believe that the country must embrace change and start moving forward and embrace the needs and aspirations of the youthful generation. The high levels of unemployment among the youth in Zimbabwe have seen frustration levels increasing, with some youth movements often clashing with government officials. Public demonstrations by tertiary student movements, youth organizations such as #ThisFlag, Tajamuka, and many other groupings are a case in point. The opening up of the social media space by the sitting president has provided a real opportunity for constructive engagement between government and the citizens of Zimbabwe and more specifically the youth in the country. Scultz (1999) underscored the importance of the internet by observing that “the excitement surrounding the internet does not only lie in its potential to transcend geographical and political boundaries but in the fact that it is a new medium that could extent interactive options in public deliberations.” Diamond (2010) has hailed the internet as liberation democracy. Wales (2010) has argued that the internet is an important platform for democratic decision making that has the ability to accommodate as many citizen voices as is possible. The internet is a powerful democratizing tool. Social media platforms can create a virtual political and civic community that can easily discuss and explore issues of common interest with less fear of reprisal and retribution. Harrison (2006:86) observed that “users of the internet can bypass established centres of power and set up their own chat rooms, forming cyber spheres and discussing and challenging mediated news provided by mainstream news organizations.”

Drawing Some Conceptual Parameters This chapter is grounded in Jurgen Habermas’ Public Sphere, whose theoretical assumptions are important in putting the discussion into some context. Habermas argued that the public sphere is the arena in which social transformation is engineered through public discussions and consensus building. Kellner (2009:263) characterized the public sphere as “a space of institutions and practices between the private interests of everyday life in civil society and the realm of state power.” The public sphere is an arena defined by fluidity and dynamism as defined by the interests of society at any given moment and in a particular context. Steenkamp (2011) argued that the principal idea of the public sphere was the idea that the citizens engage in some public discussion aimed at influencing social change. The initial ideas by Habermas were to concentrate on what he termed the common good and that people were supposed to concentrate on those issues that would bring positive change. The 131

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discussions were supposed to be anchored on virtue and merit regardless of where the ideas were coming from. Objectivity should reign supreme in the public sphere. The advent of the internet has redefined the idea of the public sphere. The United Nations (2011) described the internet as an important developmental tool in the 21st century owing to its speed, worldwide reach, and anonymity. The internet has created a powerful social sphere were ideas are disseminated to a wider audience and using very limited resources. Howard (2010:132) put the power of information and communication technologies into context when he argued that “democracy and democratization can no longer be effectively studied without some attention paid to the role of information technologies.” In this regard, the original ideas by Habermas can be extended to refer to the internet and cyberspace as an expanded realm of the public sphere. Participation of the youth in governance processes in Zimbabwe must be analysed through the lenses of the liberal democratic values of participation, human rights, and liberal discourses. The post-Mugabe era has raised expectations of state reforms and an increase of the democratic space in the country. The youth, as the biggest consumers of the cyber products and the most active on social media platforms, have a greater role in defining the discourses. The internet provides citizens with an interactive platform that is relatively cheaper. The internet is also good as people can easily hide their identities in order to avoid reprisals. This relative anonymity provided by the internet is a good motivation for the participation of the citizens in governance processes. Van Rensburg (2012:93-94) contended that “for African states dealing with unique and increasingly complicated political and socio-economic issues, the internet provides a platform from which citizens can now address these issues themselves and in doing so, contribute to a public sphere that strengthens the democratic fibre of their countries.” In this regard, the internet can be viewed as a democratizing resource especially for those countries whose democratic platforms are restricted owing to repressive regimes. Scholars who have engaged with the role of the internet in governance all seem to agree that the internet and its by-products like social media spaces are important platforms upon which citizens can express the often difficult truths to tell (Joy-Webb 2011, Alsebaei 2013). Jorgensen (2001:13) referred to the cybersphere where there is stronger and wider interaction that goes beyond the limited physical geographical space as in the days of Habermas. The internet-aided cyber-sphere is a major building block for citizen participation. However, the sometimes faceless nature of the internet has at times led to its abuse by many actors. The fact that many countries are yet to develop effective internet governance ethics makes the cyber-sphere prone to abuse. Be that as it may, the internet and social media platforms have, in modern times, enhanced citizen participation. Citizen participation was aptly defined by Milakovich (2010:3) as; 132

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providing information to citizens, receiving information from or about citizens, improving public decision processes, programs, projects, and services, enhancing public acceptance of governmental activities; altering patterns of political power and allocations of public resources and deploying or awarding difficult public policy decisions. The public sphere, as expanded by the ICTs and the digital age, has strengthened platforms for citizenship participation. If accessibility to internet connectivity is good enough, participation through the internet and social media platforms can also significantly reduce issues of exclusion. Exclusion has been cited as a major threat to peace, security and sustainable development in developing countries (World Bank 2011). Haider (2009) and Kaul (2012) also underlined the importance of freedom of expression and equitable access to information as important cornerstones for democracy in a society. If the youth can harness the potential presented by social media, they can be able to influence discourses around good governance, sustainable and inclusive development as well as accountability. However, there are certain conditions that must be met if the public sphere is to be relevant. Freelon (2010) contended that the public sphere operates well when there are elements of reciprocity, cross-cutting debate, and rationality. Habermas succinctly summed up the essence of the public sphere as “the realm of debate and open discussion on common interest issues among citizens who are considered equal from a moral and political standpoint (Habermas 1989). These conditions may require a well-defined internet governance framework. The section below discusses the embryonic internet governance institutions in Zimbabwe.

The Agenda-Setting Capabilities of Social Media The Agenda-Setting Theory is one of the most influential frameworks of understanding opinion formulation, consensus generation and debate in society. In this discussion, there is complementarity between the Public sphere as characterized by Habermas and the Agenda setting theoretical assumptions. The virtual community which is created through the vast social media networks can serve as a platform for debates, dialogue on pertinent policy issues and the setting of developmental agendas by bringing them to the attention of the political elites. Social media platforms can also be a useful platform to explore accountability issues in public institutions and to apply pressure on the ruling elites. The Agenda-Setting media theory as propounded by McCombs and Shaw (1972) suggest that the media has the persuasive power to give people what to think about through choosing which issues to give much attention than others in their publications, articles, and programs. The more it focuses on a particular agenda, the more people 133

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think about that agenda. Social media can be viewed as an agenda-setting platform because of its wider reach and accessibility to people from all walks of life. The relatively impressive internet accessibility in most Zimbabwean areas is a good development for communication and information dissemination.

Internet and Social Media Regulatory Architecture in Zimbabwe The Postal and Telecommunications Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ) is the institution charged with regulating the use of the internet and its related products in Zimbabwe. The ministry with the oversight role of the operations of POTRAZ is the Ministry of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services. In 2017 there was the short-lived Ministry of Information and Communication Technology and Cyber Security. The regulation of social media in Zimbabwe is generally controlled by already existing laws like the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (Chapter 11:17) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (Chapter 10:27). Section 5 makes it a criminal offence to urge the setting up of an organization – to overthrow or attempt to overthrow the government and usurping its functions. It also illegalizes the publication of certain types of false information inside or outside Zimbabwe intending to cause or realizing that it may cause public disorder or violence or endanger public safety, affect defence or economic interest of Zimbabwe and undermine public confidence in a law enforcement agency. Section 16 illegalizes making false statements about or concerning the president especially knowing that there is a risk or possibility of engendering feelings of hostility, causing hatred, contempt or ridicule of the President or making any abusive, indecent and obscene statements towards the president. Although this Act was originally intended to regulate public order in terms of human interactions, it has generally been used to regulate internet use and social media interactions. The Government of Zimbabwe also came up with the National Information and Communication Technology Policy of 2016. The legal, institutional and policy regimes governing social media use in Zimbabwe is still evolving and the government is in the process of crafting legislation on computer crimes and cybercrime, data protection and electronic transactions. All these are expected to define parameters for internet and social media use in a manner that does not undermine state security in all its dimensions.

Methodological Prima The approach to this chapter was largely grounded in the constructivist research paradigm and the qualitative research methodology was deployed to collect 134

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information from participants. Interviews, document analysis and observations of social media interactions on issues relating to governance and participation were deployed in order to collect and correlate the data relating to the research objectives. The authors took a keen interest in the contents of the Facebook page for the incumbent president, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. Responses were enlisted from youth leaders of the prominent political parties in Zimbabwe since 2000, students in tertiary institutions as well as youth from civil society organizations. The data collected is discussed and analysed in broad thematic areas presented below.

CHARACTERISING YOUTH SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE IN GOVERNANCE PROCESSES IN ZIMBABWE The most popular social media platforms in Zimbabwe are; • • • •

Facebook WhatsApp Twitter Other

According to POTRAZ (2018), WhatsApp and Facebook account for 35.7% of internet traffic in Zimbabwe. Facebook is the most widely used social media according to GlobalStats (2018). Facebook is popular with both the urban and rural youth constituencies in the country. Facebook is easily accessible and many youths, especially those in urban areas who are politically active indicated that they sometimes use pseudo names to post politically sensitive messages. The reasons for using pseudo names were primarily for security considerations. An equally popular social media facility is WhatsApp. The majority of the youth in Zimbabwe are active on WhatsApp. Most youth, especially those in institutions of higher learning subscribe to WhatsApp groups that often discuss a wide range of issues from sport, leisure, politics, and governance. Others belong to other social groups like the church, family groups and even those groups interested in business opportunities like commodity procurement and broking. Twitter proved is relatively common among the elite youth constituencies in various parts of the country. twitter is not common among rural youth dwellers. Very few of them are active on Twitter. Nevertheless, a fair share of the youth in Zimbabwe use Twitter for various purposes including the dissemination of political messages and advocacy campaigns.

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The social media realm in Zimbabwe is an arena of conflict whose contribution to socio-economic dialogic processes is to a large extent affected by the polarised environment defining political and governance spaces in Zimbabwe. The youth who engage in political and governance debates in Zimbabwe can be categorized into three; 1. The Protesters 2. The Defensive and 3. The Moderate

The Protestors The protestors are those youth, especially the urban youth populace, who are disgruntled, disillusioned and disheartened by the country’s failing economic fortunes and apparent lack of opportunities for the youthful generation. As a result, these youths take to the media to vent out their frustrations against the political leadership in Zimbabwe. A good example is the content that is usually posted on the Facebook page for Emmerson Mnangagwa who is the current president of the country. There is nothing that is really constructive that is posted by many of the youth, including adults, who post on the page. In most cases, these youths are denigrating the office of the president or attacking the character of the president. The new president had initiated a major paradigm shift from his predecessor by launching a Facebook page where citizens can engage directly with the president to discuss pertinent issues relating to the development of the country. However, evidence from the interactions between the president and the citizens has shown an overwhelming exhibition of anger and resentment towards the governing authorities. The youth have used this social media platform to protest against the economic hardships that the country is going through. The youth have not really seized the opportunity to participate in governance processes in a much more constructive way. The following comments were extracted from Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa’s Facebook page posted on the 16th of November 2018 and they were in response to the official opening of the Zimbabwe Defense University. The names of the people who posted were removed owing to ethical considerations. Dictators will always invest in defence, staying in power. I’m conflicted. On one hand, is your total lack of prioritization when it comes to spending on this university. On the other, your army commanders don’t know what a 45’ angle looks like so maybe the university is a good idea. Pakaipa mdara.

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Wena mdala u such a joke... Into oyaziyo ngama piki, mdala ever since u came to power u hvnt achieved anything ubuzy uposter daily ku Facebook ama mega deals angekhoyo... Mxmmmm pfeee yo msuzo Eish, this clueless president of yours. A Defence University for what though? Khonapho people are dying on the roads traveling up and down to Musina for basic commodities that are affordable. They are even carrying gas and fuel in buses because we live in a crippled nation. God, please hear our prayers, these children of yours are hurting us. They bore me Lord. every day its: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

signed this and that deal delighted to meet so and so have just arrived in bla bla for this and that launched this or that towards our beloved zimbawe and believe me it’s all shit. we are getting nowhere with you ED

Earlier on, on the 24th of October 2018 when the president visited Zambia on the occasion of its 54th independence day celebrations, people who follow his Facebook page had this to say in response to his update on the Zambian visit; With all due respect sir, we dont need updates on your tours, we need solutions, we need a life!! musade kunyebedzera kunge musiri kuziva zvikuitika! Congratulations Zambia on the 54th independence anniversary, if only someone could free us from the harness of ZANU tyrants!!!! Baba Munangagwa, firstly, give a rest to the scarf then solve the economic crisis we are in. How would u feel if u hear the people who ‘voted’ for u are dying like flies due to hunger. You once said u listen to what the people say, THEY NO LONGER WANT THE BOND NOTE. Another important issue, have u ever heard what kind of life pensioners are experiencing or living, how much they are getting. It’s pathetic Emmerson let me tell you one thing you don’t know... A Ghanaian proverb says “an army of sheep led by a lion is stronger than an army of lions led by a sheep” essence is everything rises and falls on leadership. Right now despite your totem being murambwi but you are a sheep that’s why my beloved Zimbabwe is in a political and economic turmoil. You are a weak leader. We need service delivery and rescue

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from the crisis you helped to create for the past 4 decades. I personally call on you to step down. Head the call Emmerson Even the seemingly noble initiative of declaring the first Friday of each month a clean-up campaign day by the president has not attracted positive engagement from the youth. Some notable comments by the youth on the president of the Republic’s official Facebook page are presented below; The only cleaning with that definition is not on the streets but on our economy and zanu pf gvt. Stop misplacing priorities and diverting our concerns, pliz the streets are the council’s duty we expecting you to do something to the economy cant u see we heading for disaster If the councilors were getting all the funds needed for them to buy dust bins or have the gabbage collectors, there wouldn’t be all this rubbish all over the country. So are you going to make Zimbabwe clean by these mere cleanings? Why can’t you address the root of these problems? The responses by the people in general, and the youth in particular, who interact with the Facebook page of the president of the republic is a testimony of the level of anger and frustration among the people. The communicative potential of the social media platforms can be easily lost in emotions as people, instead of using that as a platform for dialogue are now using this as a platform to vent their frustration and disappointment. The protesters hardly set an agenda for discussion. They just fire salvos at the object of anger, in this case, the political leadership in Zimbabwe especially the president primarily because he is active on social media. Ideally, the use of social media in governance processes should be built around transformative advocacy strategies and lobbying for better policies and to address pertinent issues through engagement and sustained dialogue. However, from the evidence gathered above, the citizens in Zimbabwe have failed to harness this massive potential presented by social media. Whilst the media has been used to good effect during election campaigning and mobilization, the same cannot really be said about the effect in governance processes. Protesting is a good way of attracting the attention of the leadership at any level but this can be problematic is it becomes the norm. dialogue is the best way of getting optimal outcomes in any situation. The radical approach has a tendency to burn bridges and Zimbabwe is in desperate need of bridge builders and not those who burn them. The outpouring of emotions via social media platforms is understandable but at some point, this has to be managed is the true benefits of Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp are to be realized. Apart from those who are on the extreme end of their emotions, there is a section of the youths 138

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who are prepared to use social media to blindly defend the status quo. This group hears no evil and always speaks well of its leadership.

The Defensive The Defensive takes it upon them to defend the elite leaders. The president’s Facebook page has often witnessed fierce battles between those who support him and those who are against him. The defensive youth are those who do not necessarily believe that the president is doing a good job. They are those who defend him simply because they are sympathetic to the ruling ZANU PF party or probably they are subscribing members to the party. The defensive youth exhibit levels of intolerance and they are not willing to engage in constructive dialogue. They do not want to contribute to the policy debates or any other governance related policy because they believe their interests are being taken care of by the ruling party. Those who are in support of the establishment usually go on the page to defend and not to contribute any new ideas or to initiate reflective or appreciate dialogue or debates relating to political and governance dynamics in the country. the behaviour of these youth reflects a general challenge facing the country; that of lack of tolerance of divergent political views. The youth dominate the social media spaces and instead of using this dominance to advance issues affecting them, they have instead, used the spaces to denigrate the governing elites or to protect and defend them not based on merit but emotional judgment.

The Moderate The moderate social media users are the small constituency that has remained level-headed and objective albeit in a highly polarised environment where political extremism reigns. They are willing to pass constructive comments, to share new ideas and to provide an honest appraisal of the performance of the various arms of government. However, the youth who are in this category are often overshadowed by those who are on the extreme end of the continuum and thus rendering their contributions almost insignificant. The positive and constructive comments on the president’s Facebook page are very few to the extent that they are overshadowed and drowned by the abusive texts posted by the protesters and the defensive texts posted by the defensive. From within this constituency, there are some youths who have sought to participate in governance processes by engaging the government, and more specifically the president, through his twitter handle as well as his Facebook page.

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Cleaning is a daily chore and your encouragement and participation each month has given confidence in many citizens to shun dumping rubbish everywhere. Thank you Great job Mr President! We are rallying behind you. However, constructive comments are very few and hard to come by. It is, however, important to emphasise the need for more constructive and engaging comments as opposed to destructive responses.

When the Public Sphere Meets the Hegemonic Sphere The opening up of the public sphere (through various social media and internet spaces) can be hailed as a major milestone in the democratization process in Zimbabwe and beyond. However, social media space and the right to freedom of expression must be understood in some perspective. The Zimbabwe political terrain has always been defined by a towering and pervasive presence of the state. Antonio Gramsci offered important insights into how the state and the ruling classes maintain their hegemony as well as how the ordinary citizens coalesce to produce counterhegemonic forces. Through a raft of repressive laws, specifically the Access to Information and Privacy Protection Act (AIPPA), and to an extent the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) the state has continued to restrict the full enjoyment of rights relating to participation and association. The state, through its policing and intelligence arms, has continued to actively hunt down those citizens whose posts on various social media platforms are deemed subversive. A good number of citizens have often found themselves at the wrong end of the law and many have ended up in the courts. Citizens have been tried on allegations of insulting the person of the president or undermining the authority of the president. Some university students have had their WhatsApp chat groups infiltrated by security agents leading to harassment on graduation day. Several students acknowledged having been harassed on graduation day. This towering presence has not done enough to open up the cyberspace for effective public engagement on issues of common interest. If anything, the people in Zimbabwe live in constant fear of state security establishments to the extent that they do not have the confidence to freely express themselves. Fear of the security sector has emerged as Zimbabwe’s Achilles’ heel in the country’s march towards the attainment of sustainable democracy. In a country which suffers from a chronic culture of fear people often choose a politics of invisibility by disengaging from political activity. Fear pervades every aspect of people’s existence in the country. The fear is usually acute in the run-up to and during national political processes such as elections. Paine and Smith (2008) made an interesting observation when they said 140

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Bombarding the world with messages about new and renewed risks allows governments to capitalize on fears by governing through the beliefs, and assent of the neurotic citizens Many African governments have used fear and intimidation tactics to restrict internet and social media usage for political and governance discussions among citizens. Zimbabwe is no exception as its regime of legal and institutional frameworks has been used to shut down freedom of expression on matters relating to governance and politics. The political paralysis that has gripped the country can be attributed to the culture of fear that pervades the country. The people appear to be locked in false conformity. The incidence of violence that have been experienced across the country and the complicity of the security forces appear to have heightened the fears of ordinary citizens in Zimbabwe. A baseline survey on perception, attitudes, and understanding on human rights in Zimbabwe which was published by the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) in May 2015 revealed that Zimbabweans are scared to discuss human rights issues. Apart from the issue of fear, the governments in Africa and elsewhere in the world, who see the internet and more specifically, the social media as threats to their hegemony have continued to craft aggressive legislation to regulate and monitor the behaviour of consumers of the various internet products. Majama (2017) observed that the government of Zimbabwe has sought to control the freedom of expression through the platforms created by the internet through a combination of legislative regimes and overt and covert threats by the political elites. The Digital Rights in Africa Report (2018) put the threats into some context when it reported that; We are living in a rapidly changing world, and the digital rights landscape is not immune to that. There are many manifestations of this, but perhaps none is as evident as the ever-rising tide of nations claiming national sovereignty over the internet. The report further notes that countries like Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Benin, Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo as leading the onslaught of human rights freedoms by restricting internet and social media usage. The government in Zimbabwe has struggled to contain strong social movements dominated by the youth like #Tajamuka and #ThisFlag all of which caused shockwaves on the political and governance scenes in 2016 and 2017. Senior security officers in the army, the policy, and state security departments have all taken turns to issue out warnings to the ordinary citizens on the consequences of abusing the social media. Although the legal regime around internet governance is still evolving, early developments have underlined the intentions of government to effectively monitor the behaviour of people on the internet and to restrict freedom of expression via 141

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social media facilities like WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook etc. A National Information and Communication Technology policy was expeditiously adopted in 2016 in the aftermath of the extremely successful #Tajamuka and #This Flag campaigns that shook the government to its core. Majama (2017) found out that 27 arrests were made in 2017 alone. Most of the arrests are of people accused of either undermining the office of the president or peddling falsehoods. A good number of citizens have actually been arrested on the basis of abusing social media and spreading hate speech on social media. News24 (2018) quoted a senior Zimbabwe Republic Police Officer saying, “I want to warn those that abuse social media that we have mechanisms to catch them if they commit crimes.” Although the police can be seen to be doing their work, the statement in itself can also be seen as a veiled threat to those who want to express themselves freely via social media platforms. This hegemonic sphere has in essence, defeated the otherwise impressive potential provided by social media.

YOUTH, SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE JANUARY 2019 PROTESTS Developments in Zimbabwe in January 2019 underlined both the strengths and pitfalls of social media. The citizens in general and the youth, in particular, were able to harness the mobilizing potential of social media to successfully organize protests against the ever increasing cost of living in the country. A trigger factor was the announcement of the sharp fuel price increase by the President, E.D. Mnangagwa. Using social networking platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter, the citizens organized a hugely successful stay away. However, I some places like Chitungwiza, Harare and Bulawayo, the protests turned riotous, leading to the destruction of property and the looting of shops by the youth. The government responded by shutting down the Internet and all social media platforms. Although this move by the government attracted an International outcry, the government remained resolute. The general citizenry is now gripped with fear as most of the people accused of fanning unrest through social media have suffered persecution. The majority of those who were tried and convicted at the courts of law were given long custodial sentences averaging five years. The reaction by the government has instilled fear among the ordinary citizens and most of the people are now very cautious with what they post on social media. Most of the active participants now appear to shun sensitive discussions around political developments in the country. This development limits the effectiveness of social media in shaping governance agendas.

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CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA In spite of all this, social media has also been used in much more constructive ways within the realm of politics and governance discourses in the country. The live streaming of political and governance events has kept many citizens well-informed of developments within their country. Live streaming is good in that it does not distort information. A good example was the coverage of the commission of inquiry into the August 1, 2018, killings in the aftermath of the July 30 harmonized elections. This was an issue of national interest and for those citizens who could not physically attend the hearings or follow them on national television; the live streaming provided a significant number of them with an opportunity to follow the development. The increasingly popular 263Chat is a good illustration of how the immense potential of social media can be utilized to initiate policy dialogues, discussions around governance, accountability, transparency and other topical issues. 263Chat has proved to be very popular with the youth in the country and beyond. The platform has managed to create a media sphere where the citizens can debate topical issues in an objective and constructive way. The challenge is to create many such objective platforms that will allow for the participation of the citizens. 263Chat has emerged as a moderator of social media discussions around issues of public interest and the youth have been dominating the discussions. This development is highly commendable. There is a need for more objective social media discussion platforms where the citizens in general and the youth, in particular, can contribute to the development of the country as well as to the mending of the social fabric which has over the years suffered the effects of political polarization. The few success stories should be used to build a vibrant movement through civic activism via social media. The most interesting thing about the 263Chat example is that the movement is largely proactive rather than reactive. Being proactive is especially good as it allows you to contribute to the setting of the agenda for the discussion of pertinent issues affecting society.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS The undeniable reality in Zimbabwe is that social media has emerged as a strong digital sphere within which information is shared, discussed, and analyzed. It is also a fact that the youth in Zimbabwe are the biggest consumers of internet products and social media packages via their smartphones and sometimes through internet cafes. Although youth social media activism is high there is still a lot of ground to be covered in order to improve the effectiveness of the platform and thus positively influencing governance processes in the country and to ensure democratic and good governance values relating to transparency and accountability. 143

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Youth participation in governance discourses via social media platforms is characterized by emotional outbursts that border on assault and abuse. The majority of the youth who participate in these platforms use them as areas where they can vent their frustrations on the political elites than. These protestors have not done well to harness the virtual public sphere for their own benefit. The nature and character of the Zimbabwean state have also influenced the nature of civic interaction. The aspect of fear and intimidation as discussed in the chapter plays a big part in deciding the agenda, message packaging, and dissemination among the youth in Zimbabwe. There are a strong hegemonic influence and a strong towering shadow of the state that have seen Zimbabweans living in perpetual fear. As a result, there is heavy self-censorship among ordinary citizens in the country. Many of the citizens are not willing to freely express themselves because they have strong suspicions that the state, through its security apparatus is always watching over them. The fear is further compounded by constant arrests of those people who post comments and materials that are deemed prejudicial and in extreme cases subversive. Several arrests have been made since 2016. Consequently, this has affected the quality of interactions among the citizens on issues relating to governance. Apart from the several legislative restrictions, the citizens exercise self-censorship because they are not sure of who is following their posts on various media spaces as well as the consequences that follow in the aftermath. Another major conclusion is that some of the youth do not have the necessary skills to effectively advocate and lobby for good governance, transparency, and accountability via social media spaces. Most of the content generated via social media is either insulting or satirical. The problem is that the youths are not taken seriously in their quest to influence the dynamics of governance in the country. There is, therefore, the need to develop a sense of awareness and responsibility among the youth in terms of the opportunities presented by social media as well as the potential pitfalls. It is important to invest in advocacy and lobbying skills for social media so that there is some sense in relation to the manner in which the youth engage with the governing authorities via social media. Whilst others have done relatively well in this regard, it remains a fact that the majority have not used this in the interest of good governance and sustainable development. The youth in Zimbabwe still have a long way to go if they are tap into the massive opportunities presented by social media. The digital revolution has presented African countries with an opportunity to entrench democratic practices, enhance freedoms of expression and association and more importantly to hold the governing powers to account. Heavy restrictions by governments, issues of fear and intimidation must be addressed if Zimbabwe is to progressively move forward with the rest of the world.

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REFERENCES Access to Information and Privacy Protection Act. (2002). Harare, Zimbabwe: Government Printers. Alsebaei, M. O. (2013). Egyptian Diasporas, Social Media, and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: How Egyptians Living in Saudi Arabia used Social Media during the Revolution (Master’s Thesis). Grand Valley State University. Retrieved from https:// scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/53/ Baumgartner, J. C., & Morris, J. S. (2010). MyFaceTube Politics: Social Networking Websites and Political Engagement of Young Adults. Social Science Computer Review, 28(1), 24-44. doi:. doi:10.1177/0894439309334325 Chiyadzwa, I. F. (2014). Patterns of Social Media Usage Amongst the Marginalised Rural Zimbabwean Peasants: The Case of Bikita. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 19(8), 61–66. doi:10.9790/0837-19826166 David, C. C. (2013). ICTs in Political Engagement Among Youths in the Philippines. International Communication Gazette, 75(3), 322–337. doi:10.1177/1748048512472948 Diamond, L. (2010). Liberation Technology. Journal of Democracy, 21(3), 69–83. doi:10.1353/jod.0.0190 Digital Rights in Africa Report. (2018). Legislating Restrictions: How African Governments Use Repressive Laws, Paradigm Initiative. Retrieved from paradigmhq. org/paradigm-initiative-to-launch-digital-rights-in-africa-report-2018/ Freedom House. (2012). Freedom on the Net Report on Zimbabwe. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/zimbabwe Accessed 27/02/2019 Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Haider, A. (2009). Contribution of the Internet to a Democratic Society. Paper presented at ECIS 2009, Adelaide, Australia. Retrieved from http://aisel.aisnet.org/ ecis2009/299 Accessed 28/12/2018 Harrison, J. (2006). News. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Jensen, M. R. (2001). Policies and Strategies for Accelerating Africa’s Information Infrastructure Development. In G. Nulens, N. Hafkin, L. Van Audenhove, & B. Cammaerts (Eds.), The digital divide in developing countries: towards an information society in Africa. VUB. Brussels, Belgium: Brussels University Press. 145

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Jorgensen, R. K. (2001). Internet and Freedom of Expression (Master’s dissertation). Raoul Wallenberg Institute. Retrieved from https://repository.nwu.ac.za/bitstream/ handle/10394/24932/Muteeri_M.pdf Joy-Webb, C. P. (2011). The Role of Technology and Social Media in Strengthening Resistance Movements: A comparative analysis of the revolutions in Iran and Egypt, 2009-2011 (Doctoral dissertation). Simon Fraser University, Canada. Kaul, V. (2012). The Pros and Cons of New Media and Media Freedom. Journal of Mass Communication and Journalism, 2(5), 114. doi:10.4172/2165-7912.1000114 Kellner, D. (2000). Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention. In Perspectives on Habermas. Chicago: Open Court. La Rue, F. (2011). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. New York, NY: United Nations. Majama, K. (2017). Online Expression and Activism in Zimbabwe. Retrieved from http://koliwemajama.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Online-expressionactivism-in-Zimbabwe.pdf Mhiripiri, N. A., & Mutsvairo, B. (2013). Social Media, New ICTs and the challenges facing the Zimbabwe Democratic Process. Hershey, PA: IGI-Global. doi:10.4018/9781-4666-4197-6.ch023 Milakovich, M. E. (2010). The Internet and Increased Citizen Participation in Government. Journal of Democracy, 2(1), 1–9. News24. (2018, July 16). Zimbabwe Arrest 4 for ‘Hate Speech’ on Social Media. Retrieved from https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-police-arrest-4for-hate-speech-on-social-media-20180715 Accessed 12/10/2018 Paine, R., & Smith, S. J. (Eds.). (2008). Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Steenkamp, M. L. (2011). Assessing the role of social media in the South African political sphere (Master’s dissertation). University of Johannesburg. Retrieved from https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/dpir/Pages/PhD-and-MA-Graduates.aspx Accessed 18/12/2018 Valenzuela, S. (2013). Unpacking the Use of Social Media for Protest Behaviour. The Roles of Information, Opinion, Expression and Activism. American Behavioral Scientist, 57(7), 920-942. doi:10.1177/0002764213479375

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Van der Bank, M. (2014). The Impact of Social Media: Advantages and Disadvantages. African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure 4(2). Retrieved from http//: www.ajhtl.com Van Dijk, J. A. G. M. (2005). The Deepening Divide: Inequality in the Information Society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Yamamoto, M., & Kushin, M. (2013). More Harm than Good? Online Media Use and Political Disaffection Among College Students in the 2008 Election. Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication, 1(16). doi:10.1111/jcc4.12046

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Chapter 8

Critical Examination of the Implications of Youth Unemployment in Zimbabwe Tawanda Zinyama University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT The chapter examines youth unemployment and its dimensions and characteristics in relation to overall unemployment. Youth unemployment has become increasingly recognized as one of the more serious social problems confronting Africa. There are many reasons why the government of Zimbabwe and society feel increasingly concerned about this problem. At the human level, failure to secure satisfactory employment upon completion of schooling and training can cause intense frustration, despair and alienation. It may also be associated with such social ills as drunkenness, drug-taking, violence, robbery and prostitution. From a material point of view, youth unemployment represents a tragic waste of skills and talents, resulting in lower production, increase in dependency burden on the rest of the society, and in the longer run, a gradual deterioration in the quality of national human resources. The potential consequences of high levels of youth unemployment at personal, social and national levels are thus serious and warrant sustained efforts to find solutions to these problems.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch008 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Critical Examination of the Implications of Youth Unemployment in Zimbabwe

INTRODUCTION Throughout history, the period of youth has been associated with problems. As early as fifth century B.C., Socrates observed: Our youth now love luxury. They have bad manners, contempt for authority, they show disrespect for their elders and love chatter in place of exercise. They no longer rise when others enter the room. They contradict their parents, chatter before company, gobble up their food and tyrannise their teachers (Dacey, 1984:4). The contention is that not only do youths create problems for society but society also creates problems for youths and their socio-economic development. The majority of the people in Zimbabwe of which the youth are a disproportionate number getting through each day is a major victory. Thousands of young women and men are wasted as they idle away for lack of anything meaningful to occupy them. In fact, the failures in development have made many people believe that their situation is not likely to change. The question thus becomes how can the government of Zimbabwe meet people’s basic needs in such a way that the youths can have a meaningful life? What is needed is money, in combination with political support, appropriate advice, valid solutions and efficient management. Youth development is a task that no country can afford to ignore or attempt without the necessary resources, coordinated efforts and the seriousness that it deserves. Yet the Government of Zimbabwe’s efforts at youth socio-economic development are often hampered by misdirection, lack of resources, political expediency and lack of concrete or realistic policies among others, as opposed to socio-economic realism. What should Zimbabwe do, considering its bulging youth population, which needs the appropriate skills to graduate into good jobs? This was one of the many questions addressed at the 2018 African Transformation Forum (ATF2018), which was held in Accra, Ghana, and organised by the African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET). Youth unemployment is a serious national problem that Zimbabwe needs to resolve urgently. It has been a subject of increasing debate, analysis and definition. Unfortunately, the solution is still not in sight and the problem is becoming more serious. While unemployment increases with urbanisation, underemployment too is wide-spread and deep seated in Zimbabwe. The youth problem cannot be solved by the government alone. It requires the concerted efforts of the government, communities, individuals, academicians, international, local organisations and youths themselves. In line with Section 20 of the Zimbabwe Constitution and the Zimbabwe Youth Policy; young people should participate in political, social, economic and cultural development of the country. 149

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Additionally, in line with the Agenda 2063 of the Africa Union, youth inclusion and empowerment is at the center of African Union (AU) taking youth not only as beneficiaries but also as leaders and key stakeholders in national development processes. What motivated this chapter is the recognition of the vital importance of young people both in their ability to contribute to the socio-economic progress of humankind and their potential to approach afresh the problems of humankind. Time and again it is said that the youth represent the future. They do not only represent the future but they are also the embodiment of hope for the future. This chapter therefore seeks to discuss and analyse the youth situation in terms of opinions and ideas that might help the government of Zimbabwe to take a realistic look at the youth problem and its solution. This chapter also deals with the youth problem and its administrative and political implications, the law as it affects youth and their participation in society, unemployment, youth activities in the informal sector, community programmes and training of youth for development and self-reliance. The chapter further studies sociological aspects of the youth problem such as delinquency, crime and prostitution among others.

CONCEPTUALISING YOUTH AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT The crucial question of who the youth is needs to be tackled. The debate on who is a youth has not resolved the confusion surrounding the concept. Generally, the period between childhood and adulthood is called youth. Defining the concept youth is always a problem. The Commonwealth Secretariat (1973) recognises the fact that definitions are usually based on age and that youth programmes are usually limited to the age group 14-21 years. However, at times some programmes take into account the age group 10-14 years. For the purposes of the Commonwealth the age limit adopted was 12-25 years. According to United Nations, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (2010), for statistical purposes, defines youths as those persons between ages 15 and 24 years but without prejudice to other definitions by member states (UNDP, 2014). In this context, Zimbabwe adopted the African Youth Charter (2006), which defines youth as any person between the age of 15 and 35 years. Definition of youth flexibility allows for country specific policies and programming considering the heterogeneous nature of the youth population and recognising that different age groups within the younger population may have different needs in different contexts (UNDP, 2014). It should be mentioned that most young organisations in developing countries bearing the title youth include persons over thirty-five years old. For example, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Zimbabwe, seems 150

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to have no age limit and, therefore, it is not unusual to find members of the youth wing who are between forty and fifty years, especially businessmen and community leaders of all types. In defining youth as it relates to needs, many crucial variables and factors must be considered. These include among others age, level of education, level of maturity, marital status, place and nature of residence, character of one’s associates, general behaviour and attitudes about things (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1982:4). There have been several attempts to categorise the youth for planning purposes. For example, the following categories are often found in the literature: the educated youth, rural youth, urban youth, the unschooled youth, the drop outs, young single girls with babies, etc. (Chan, 1982:6). These categories assume that different approaches are required in dealing with their development and that policy and planning must focus on problems of each category. However, this is hardly so in any given policy area. In Zimbabwe, age is the primary criterion for defining youth. According to the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) Act 2013, Section 20, the youths are defined as people between the ages of 15-35 years. This is guided by Africa Youth Charter for which Zimbabwe is a signatory. It is estimated that in Zimbabwe, about 60 percent of the total population is in the youth group. In the whole of Africa about 50 percent of the population is in the youth group. The large number of youth in Africa makes them very important and relevant where national development is concerned. The number of the youth and their demands has serious consequences for education, production, consumption, property, employment and general opportunities in a nation.

Youth Demographic Trends According to the Zimbabwe 2012 population census, Zimbabwe has a generally youthful population. Of the total population of 13 061 239 at the time, 77 percent consisted of children and youth below 35 years of age. Youths aged 15-34 years constituted 36% of the national population and those aged between 15 -24 years were 20% (Zimbabwe Country Report (ZCR), 2014). Currently, as at 2018, the youths constitute 67.7% of the population (ZHRC, 2018). The 2012 population census data shows that the youth aged 15-34 years constituted 84% of the unemployed population and those aged 15-24 years constituted 55%. The statistics also indicated that the highest concentration of 31% of the unemployed was between the ages of 20 and 24 years. There was also a gender dimension to youth unemployment. There were higher levels of unemployment among female youths despite there being more females than males in the population. The content analysis of the various documents indicates that:

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• • • • •

Zimbabwe has a youthful population; Proportion of children aged 0 – 14 years: 41%; Proportion of youth aged 15-24 years: 20%; Proportion of youth aged 15-34 years: 36%; and Proportion of children and youth aged 0-34 years: 77%.

Regarding youth employment and entrepreneurship, Zimbabwe is characterised as follows: • • • • • •

Proportion of youth aged 15-34 years employed (broadly): 85%; Unemployed: 15% ; Proportion employed in the formal sectors: 9%; Proportion employed in the informal sectors: 87%; Proportion employed in unclassifiable employment: 4% ; and Youth aged 15-34 years constitute 56% of the economically active population.

These demographic trends are of great importance for the planning and the management of the economy. Since the youth are an important ingredient of this trend, failure to take into account in the management of the economy is likely to lead to unsatisfactory economic performance. The main source of livelihood for youth in Zimbabwe was agriculture. Over 60 percent of the youth depended on agriculture either in communal or resettled areas for those who benefitted from the land reform programme. Given the inadequate employment opportunities in the formal economy, most youths, like the adults, were compelled to make a living in the informal economy. In the informal economy, youths generally found themselves relegated to easy entry activities prone to lateral expansion, low returns and long hours of work. Thus, youths were found mainly in the vending, street type activities such as car washing and car watching, making and selling simple crafts and in menial forms of housework or other forms of service activities for which they were being viewed as children which were used as a pretext for paying them low wages or treating them paternalistically by embracing them as part of the family (when in fact they are very much like bonded servants). This latter phenomenon was particularly true of recruited youths from rural areas who were then employed by urban households.

Youth Instruments There are many instruments at international level that give direction on the implementation of youth strategies at national level. These instruments need to be domesticated and operationalised. Some of the key international laws and instruments 152

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include: Africa Youth Charter; African Union Agenda 2063; Africa Governance Architecture; United Nations (UN) Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security; and United Nations World Programme of Action for Youth (WPAY) among others. The meeting between Heads of States and Government for Africa Union (AU) and European Union (EU) held in November 2017 in which Zimbabwe attended came up with concrete resolutions that can be cascaded to the national level. Young people from AU and EU presented the Youth Agenda which zeroed in on six thematic areas namely: business and job creation; education; peace and security; environment and climate change; governance and political inclusion; and arts, sports and culture.

Unemployment This section seeks to consider the International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition of unemployment. Unemployment as defined in Zimbabwe is also considered.

ILO’s Unemployment Definition International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) definition of unemployment emanates from its Eighth International Conference of Labour Statisticians convened in Geneva in 1954. The definition rests on the ‘labour force framework’ which categorises the working age population into three categories: the employed, the unemployed and out of the labour force. According to ILO, the unemployed are persons not currently employed and who indicate by their behaviour that they want to work at prevailing wages and working conditions. Hence, for any person to qualify as being unemployed he/she has to satisfy the following three criteria: • • •

‘Not working’, that is, the person is not in paid employment or self-employment; ‘Currently available for work’, that is, the person was available for work during the reference period; and ‘Seeking work’, that is, the person has taken specific steps during the reference period to seek work.

The first criterion is straightforward. It simply distinguishes between the employed persons from the unemployed. The ‘availability for work’ criterion tests the individual’s readiness. The third criterion excludes non-searchers from the labour force. To be classified as unemployed the individual needs to have taken steps to look for a job during the reference period. Problems associated with the third criterion in Zimbabwe are that: a large number of the working age population is engaged in self-employment, labour market information on job search is limited 153

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and many unemployed do not search because they are either discouraged or face financial constraints. Hence, ‘availability’ and ‘willingness’ to work should be sufficient to define a person as unemployed in most developing countries. Thus, a suitable definition for many developing nations would be one that excludes the search criterion.

Zimbabwean Definition of Unemployment In Zimbabwe, official data on unemployment can be obtained from Labour Force Survey (LFS), the Census and other Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTATS) publications. Zimbabwe’s definition of unemployment also rests on the ‘labour force framework’. As defined earlier, Zimbabwe’s labour force comprises all those of working age (15 years and above) who either have a job or are looking for one (Mafusire and Zhou, 2007). The unemployed are defined according to one of the following two definitions: Unemployed persons (strict definition) – persons aged 15 years and above who, during the reference period (for example 7 days) were: • • •

Without Work: Were not in paid employment or self-employment; Currently available for work; and Actively seeking employment, that is, had taken steps (registered or checked at any employment agency, applied to employers, responded or placed advertisements, enquired at farms or worksites or asked friends or relatives about work) in a specified recent period to seek paid employment or self-employment.

Unemployed persons (broad definition) – persons aged 15 years and above who, during the reference period were without work; and currently available for work (Zimbabwe Labour Force Survey, 2004). It is clear from the above that Zimbabwe’s definition closely follows that of the ILO. Broad unemployment in Zimbabwe also excludes the search criterion. Also included as unemployed are persons not seeking work because they are on temporary layoff from a job to which they expect to be recalled or they have a new job to start within four weeks. People not employed and not seeking work, for example, students, housewives and retirees among others are considered out of the labour force. The reliability of Zimbabwe’s unemployment rates is contestable. Taking official unemployment rates estimates, one concludes that Zimbabwe is doing well on this indicator compared to other countries in the region. However, figures from elsewhere indicate the opposite. Press reports also give very high unemployment rates estimates for Zimbabwe. These are often disputed by government officials. 154

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The government of Zimbabwe and Confederation Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) as well as Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) do not agree on Zimbabwe’s unemployment figures. For example, ZIMSTATS (2015) puts Zimbabwe’s effective rate of unemployment for 2014 at a low 11.3 percent claiming land reform programme had created numerous job opportunities and many other people were employed in the informal sector. The labour unions and other independent bodies pegged unemployment rate in Zimbabwe at between 80% and 90% while the ZIMSTATs released figures showing that the unemployment rate for 2017 was 6,62%. ZIMSTATS methodology considers those in the informal sector and communal agriculture as employed, resulting in employment levels being high. According to ZIMSTATS methodology, persons who state ‘paid employee’, ‘employer’, ‘own account worker agriculture’, ‘own account worker other’ and ‘unpaid family worker’ as their own activity were regarded as employed. This is misleading and unreliable. However, what is encouraging despite these low unemployment rates is that the government of Zimbabwe continues to show concern over the unemployment problem.

Youth Unemployment Unemployment rate is a widely used indicator of the well-being of the labour market. It reflects the state of the economy. Ordinarily, youth unemployment is not different from the general unemployment situation of a country. Unemployment is, however, much more acute among the youth, especially, among the 16-35. For many youths, when the aspirations for a better life through employment are not met, they are prone to become disenchanted with society and life itself. A letter, written to the editor in one of the local dailies demonstrated the youth’s frustration: Many youths, especially school leavers are unwilling to register as voters because the party and its Government has done nothing to solve unemployment. People are sent to school so that after they have completed they can get jobs and look after their aging parents. What is happening now is the opposite. People are educated and then thrown into streets. When they sell cigarettes to earn a living they are castigated. What can one do apart from selling cigarettes? To get a job one has to know the boss. This is what is causing frustration among the youths – lack of jobs. It is clear from the letter that the youth feels hopeless and puts the blame on youth unemployment on the government which he/she thinks denies the youth the chance to enjoy the good life resulting from employment. In this chapter, youth unemployment is seen as a situation arising from the youths’ lack of any source of income and is actively looking for work. There are many factors driving youth unemployment in African countries such as: 155

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• • • • • •

The generalised lack of employment opportunities due to the underdevelopment of the economies; High rates of population growth; Sluggish or stagnant economies; Small private sector; Low literacy and numeracy rates; and Poor quality education and an education sector that equips young people with limited industrial skills (AFRODAD, 2004; ECA, 2002).

METHODOLOGY The study utilised the qualitative methodology that combines secondary and primary data. Secondary data were sourced from the Parliament of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Youth Council (ZYC) Ministry of Youth reports, and other media reports. National newspapers such as Sunday Mail, Newsday, Daily News, The Herald, the Zimbabwe Independent and the Financial Gazette were also useful sources of data. Primary data were gathered through in-depth interviews conducted with the following: 1 Chairperson of ZYC, 2 Women and Youth Committee Members of Parliament and 1 Senators and 2 Academics. They were interviewed on their perceptions regarding implications of youth unemployment in Zimbabwe, effectiveness of the extant mitigation strategies and what should be done.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION Constitutional and Institutional Framework The Zimbabwe Youth Policy is in line with the national constitution on the definition of youth. Section 20 is a component of Chapter 1 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20 on Founding Values. Section 20 sets the youth agenda for the rights of youths in Zimbabwe by stating that the State and its institutions and agencies at every level must take reasonable measures including affirmative action to ensure that youths: • • •

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Have access to education and training; Have opportunity to associate and to be represented and participate in political, social, economic and other spheres of life; Afforded opportunities for employment and over avenues to economic empowerment;

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• •

Have opportunities for recreational activities and access to recreational facilities; and Be free from harmful cultural practices and all forms of abuse or exploitation.

The section concludes by noting that all these measures must be inclusive, nonpartisan and national in character. The first policy which gives a clear direction is the Zimbabwe Youth Policy (2013) which has clear clusters and strategies on youth empowerment and participation, which cover economic, cultural, social, political, environmental and technological issues. However, the policy is limited by the Zimbabwe Youth Council Act which is in violation of the Constitution and requires serious review. In 2017, the youth civil society organisations (CSOs) launched a programme called Leave No Youth Behind in line with the African Union Agenda 2063, Africa Youth Charter and Africa Governance Architecture. The programme seeks to support youths to realise all their rights by providing information, capacities, resources and solidarity. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe is in the process of establishing a youth strategy that involves youth in terms of financial inclusion. The government of Zimbabwe’s commitment to work with and for youths is reflected through the new Constitution under Section 20 and the National Youth Policy framework that the government adopted. The National Youth Policy places emphasis on mainstreaming youth throughout all ministries. Its principle guidelines are derived from existing national and international frameworks, such as the African Youth Charter (AYC), the United Nations World Programme of Action for Youth (WPAY). Other youth policies include the Decent Work Country Programme for Zimbabwe (DWCP) launched in 2013 by the Ministry of Labour and Social Services and the social partners. It aims to combat the high levels of youth unemployment through initiatives such as the Skills for Youth Employment and Rural Programme. With respect to Education and Skills Development, the policy outlines the following key strategies among others (Zimbabwe National Youth Policy). •

• • •

Periodically review and revise the education and training curricula to place increased emphasis on practical/vocational training to prepare and empower the youth for their roles in society and contributions to both formal and informal sectors; Expand educational and skills development facilities and equipment to ensure equitable distribution in rural and urban areas in order to accommodate the ever-increasing number and changing needs of young people; Capacitate and increase career guidance and counselling services; Promote industrial exposure to students;

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•

•

Expand youth skills training centers paying special attention to entrepreneurship skills development, relevant farming and industrial incubation, and attachment options in every district along with information technology centers; and Identify and establish adequate and valid linkages between education and skills development, employment and entrepreneurship opportunities, culture, sport and recreation activities.

Whilst these and other policy frameworks and strategies have referenced youth, owing to poor implementation, the benefits of such frameworks have not cascaded down to improve the livelihoods and lived reality of youths across the country. The 2014 estimates of expenditure lists the budget for the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment as USD 44.5 million (figures given in USD only). However, there is no specific breakdown for youth expenditure. According to the World Bank, Zimbabwe spent 8.26% of its government expenditure and 2.50% of its GDP on education provision in 2010.

Youth Engagement The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has also opened up a channel on engagement with youth through the Financial Inclusion Strategy for youths. There are also some platforms at policy level that are open to engagement with youth such as Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Youth, and others in different ministries. However, for those in different Ministries, they are just on paper and not operationalised. The Zimbabwe Youth Council, a government body that has the mandate to spearhead youth rights and provide a conducive environment for the youths, has in the past been susceptible to manipulation by the ruling party, ZANU-PF due to its close alignment with the Government Ministry responsible for youths.

Economic Issues The statistical data for all socio-economic indicators demonstrate not only that Zimbabwe is facing a serious development crisis but that the gap between Zimbabwe and other countries in Africa has widened further and continues to widen at an ever increasing rate. This poor performance has also resulted in a very low rate of investment. Persistent de-industrialisation and informalisation of the economy were characteristic in Zimbabwe. De-industrialisation persisted in the economy with 4,610 firms closing between 2011 and 2014, resulting in 55,443 job losses. Informalisation deepened such that the level of informal employment, which had increased from

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80 percent in 2004 to 84.2 percent by 2011, rose sharply to 94.5 percent by 2014 (Zimbabwe Confederation Industries (CZI), 2017).

Towards an Attractive Investment Climate A number of issues can be done. Since an investor’s first consideration is to avoid the loss of both capital and management time and uncertainty, profitability as an inducement is critical. Other measures that reduce the size of investment, the cost of capital and the cost of production are more effective. In addition, when investors search for investment opportunities, they look for places having political, social and economic stability so as to ensure the security of their capital. There is a lot of what the Zimbabwe government can do to reduce the cost of an investment and create the right climate for investment within its borders. Investors are more deterred by remittance restrictions on dividends than taxation. This is because to the investor the earning of a profit which he/she can remit home is the fundamental value and attraction of any investment opportunity. Admittedly, the problem is not an easy one to resolve. Zimbabwe cannot be expected to eliminate all measures of exchange control but since investors are justified in preferring to invest in countries where they will be less affected by exchange control measures, reasonable provision should be made for foreign companies to transfer dividends abroad to their shareholders. This entails a realisation on the part of the government of Zimbabwe that although in the short term when money goes out of the country due to the easing of restrictions the country loses, in the long run it may benefit in that further investment will be forthcoming from the same source. At the same time measures designed to encourage investors to reinvest their profits should be considered. Such as allowing them to reinvest in the activities of their own company or in other activities, free of tax up to some percentage of their profits before tax with a maximum annual limit. This could reduce money available for export while at the same time promoting the development of new projects and ventures.

Political and Legal Climate The employment problem is deeply embedded in the political, social and economic system of Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, youth unemployment is assiciated with political violence. A study of youth unemployment and political violence in Zimbabwe (Mude, 2014) attributes the latter to high levels of youth unemployment, particularly among urban youth – over 80 percent of whom are inemployed.. youths out of employment have been the agents of political violence in the country. Unemployed youth are often recruited by political parties to operate as youth militia members.

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They have been and are responsible for torturing, intimidating and killing civilians who do not share their political affiliations. Mude (2014) adds that “it is not that urban unemployed youths are violent by nature but they are being made that way through the manipulation of political leaders. Youth militias have been seen as the major perpetrators of political violence. Power hungry political leaders have turned youth into political thugs for selfish political agendas (Newsday, November 2012). One criterion for an investment climate depends primarily on the political and legal security of the country. One of the major factors slowing down investments in Zimbabwe is that investors are suspicious of the government. They cannot be reasonably certain of the future and security of private investments as many political leaders make conflicting statements as to the security and future of investments in Zimbabwe. The situation was worsened by the naïve but frequent pronouncements by politicians equating any form of profit with exploitation. There is need to convince investors that there is little or no possibility of the creation unfavourable legal situation at the later date which will be harmful to their investments. The foreign investor is justified to react in this way in that no government should expect the respect of investors if it attempts to change agreements unilaterally and frequently interferes with the operations of enterprises through arbitrary and authoritarian administrative actions. The special responsibility of the state in those areas is to create a favourable political climate and create and perpetuate an atmosphere of trust between itself and investors. It can only do this by committing itself as to the future, to promise with reasonable credence that arbitrary measures are not going to be taken once an investor has established his enterprise that existing and agreements will continue to be respected or that should changes be desired, that principles of fair play and natural justice will be followed and that investors will be compensated for any loss due to changes in such measures. In short the government of Zimbabwe should ensure the following minimum arrangements: • • • •

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An efficient administration structure to negotiate with investors and implement decisions; A consistent, coherent and visible set of economic, legal and investments policies; A stable economic environment; and The existence of well-defined and serviced industrial zones.

Critical Examination of the Implications of Youth Unemployment in Zimbabwe

Youth Empowerment Measures Skills for Youth Empowerment and Rural Development The GoZ through the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (MYIEE) together with partners, formulated and implemented the Skills for Youth Employment and Rural Development Project in Zimbabwe with the technical assistance of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and with the financial assistance of the Government of Denmark. The project started in 2010 and targeted over 10 000 beneficiaries specifically young unemployed women and men. It comprised two main components designed to promote decent and productive employment and income generating opportunities for youth through skills development initiatives. These components were: quality improvements in informal apprenticeship (QIA); and training for rural economic empowerment (TREE). The main objectives of the programme were as follows; •

• •

Increased capacity of rural community groups to identify local economic opportunities, develop appropriate training programmes to access jobs and provide post-training support to community and private small-scale enterprises; Public and private training institutions are enabled to better deliver demand oriented services to rural and informal economies; and Strengthened systems of informal apprenticeship through upgrading the skills of master crafts persons and apprentices while facilitating access to new technologies.

Vocational Training and Training for Enterprise Programme The MYIEE provides vocational training using a model of ‘Training for Enterprise’ (TFE), which aims to capacitate young people with the requisite skills to start up their own business or for employment. This compliments the model followed by the Ministry for Higher and Tertiary Education (MHTE) where the focus is to supply high-level skills needed for strategic growth areas of the economy. MYIEE offers a range of courses which differ in duration and are designed for diverse learners. The key role for the MYIEE is to skill young people who are lacking post-primary qualifications providing them with market-oriented technical, vocational and entrepreneurial skills. The curricula of technical and vocational programmes include key life skills such as HIV and AIDS, business skills and developing business plans and the marketing of products which are intended to enhance the chances of survival of small businesses. 161

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Youth Development Fund (YDF) In 2006, the Government of Zimbabwe established a Youth Development Fund (YDF), a revolving micro finance facility for the youth. The YDF was merged with the Employment Creation Fund (ECF) that was established in the late 90s. The facility is known as the Youth Development and Employment Creation Fund and had a constitution approved by Treasury. The facility supports youth entrepreneurship development. It provides loans at the concessionary rate of 10 percent per annum for tenure of up to 36 months depending on the nature of the project. The facility was co-administered by the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment and the following financial institutions: • • • • •

Commerce Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) Bank Limited – Youth Empowerment Fund; Industrial Bank of Zimbabwe (IDBZ) – Youth Development Fund; Industrial Bank of Zimbabwe (IDBZ) – Meikles Out Grower Scheme Central African Building Society (CABS) – Kurera/Ukondla Youth Fund Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe – Youth Wealth Creation Fund.

This arrangement provided a link between the youth and the financial base for business growth and expansion for the youth (www.myiee.gov.zw). The government Zimbabwe launched a youth-centric bank called Empowerment Bank (EB) in July 2018.. The bank is a microbank whose essence is to provide social and financial solutions to the financially excluded population with greater focus on the youth. EB offers loans to youth-led businesses in agricultural projects, asset finance, guarantees, savings accounts, cutting across urban, peri-urban and rural Zimbabwe. The EB products and services include: • • • • • •

EmpowerBank account; EmpowerBank Savings Account; EmpowerBank School fees loan; EmpowerBank Special Accounts; Rimawo Savings Account - for farmers, agro traders such as input suppliers, middlemen, agro retailers; and Loans – micro-credit including agriculture, rural credit, cooperative credit, order financing, invoice discounting and consumer credit.

This is a positive development because it unlocks economic opportunities especially for women and youths by expanding access to savings, credit, insurance, capital markets and payment systems. The problem with this initiative is that the resources 162

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at the youth bank could be misappropriated by senior politicians. This follows a dismal failure of several youth empowerment projects after the brazen looting of 2012’s Kukura-Ukondla Youth Fund due to corruption and poor administration of funds. Giving oral evidence to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, Stanbic Bank revealed that the youth loan funds were looted with some beneficiaries misrepresenting their ages and addresses. Other policy measures and programmes that have been developed by the government to promote job creation especially for the youth include among others; the development of the Zimbabwe Youth Employment Network (ZIYEN), the formulation of the National Employment Policy Framework (ZNEPF), establishment of the Youth Development Fund, establishment of Youth Economic Zones, the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment programme and the formulation of the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIM-ASSET).

Unemployment The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (2015) states that the country’s unemployment rate stands at 11.3 percent, a figure that has been dismissed as baseless by independent economic commentators and labour unions. Labour unions believe that the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe is hovering at around 81%. The Zimbabwean economy has been in prolonged state of decline since the arrival of 21st century. As is well known, one of the major problems that has emerged since then is that of rising unemployment. While this has affected every unemployed person in Zimbabwe, it has bore most heavily upon the Zimbabwean youth. Undeniably, the worsening youth unemployment situation in recent years is a combination of factors, such as the general decline in the economic growth and the country’s unprecedented rapid growth of the labour force. This severe imbalance between the growth of the labour force and the decline in employment opportunities has serious implications for the overall socio-economic development and maintenance of social and political stability in the country. The basic reason for intensification of the employment problem is economic stagnation and decline especially in the manufacturing sector. This has been due principally to increasing debt burden, reduced net public resource inflows and decline in private foreign investment. The problem of youth unemployment has reached alarming proportions with 2 million young people out of jobs (Kanyenze, et al. 2017) and hence being forced into anti-social activities such as crime, black-marketeering, drug addiction and other vices. Lack of growth in the formal sector employment

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meant that the many school leavers at various levels and those from colleagues and the university have to compete for the relatively small number of jobs created each year. Again the youth do not constitute a homogenous group and when the unemployment problem is considered in relation to the different categories of youth, that is, male, female, rural, urban, school leavers, graduates and illiterates it becomes clear that some groups face more acute problems than others. For instance, only 30% of the male youth are unemployed compared to 61% of the female youth (ILO, 2016). As to the rural youth who constitute the large group in the youth population, it has been observed from International Labour Organisation (ILO) studies that they are characterised more specifically by the problem of underemployment than the open or visible unemployment of the urban youth. There are many toxic socio-economic implications of youth unemployment. The high unemployment rates among the youth in Zimbabwe thwart the youths’ attempts at achieving their basic needs, such as, food, shelter and clothing, which could exacerbate the restlessness, tension, despair, dissatisfaction and alienation of the youths. The above resultant factors of unemployment are expected because work is an economic phenomenon through which an individual strives to meet his/ her needs. The other obvious consequences of youth unemployment include such things as juvenile delinquency, prostitution, drug and alcohol abuse. There has also been an upward trend in rates of crime involving the youth. Among the major crimes reported include armed robbery, burglary, pick-pocketing, motor vehicles, indecent assault and threatening violence. Other activities include petty trading in cigarettes, paper bags, jewellery, watches, handicrafts and other petty jobs ranging from guarding cars to washing or dusting cars in return for small fees.

Informal Sector The root of the rise and growth of the informal sector in Zimbabwe is the nature of Zimbabwean political economy. The mushrooming of the marketing informal sector provides informal employment to the unemployed, especially the young unemployed. The government of Zimbabwe and policy makers have recognised the role of the informal sector in creating employment opportunities and in providing skill training for the urban youth. Even so, they have recognised this with the bias of the production of goods in the informal sector such as bicycle repair, carpentry, furniture and braziers, manufacture of soil-cement blocks, doors and other woodwork products. Employment opportunities from this secondary activity are critically important for urban areas and the youth, given the limited capacity of the industrial sector to absorb the expanding labour force.

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The informal sector is viewed as a strategy to rescue the unemployed. The informal sector in Zimbabwe has absorbed most of the unemployed, not because it has a limitless absorption capacity, but because in the absence of any social welfare system, the unemployed have to squeeze in regardless of how saturated the sector is. In 2017, for instance, 80 percent of Zimbabwe’s labour force was engaged in the informal sector (ILO, 2017). The formal sector in Zimbabwe appears to be declining every year and has become an insignificant player on the job market. In Zimbabwe, studies show that while the informal sector is creating employment, it is doing so by reducing participants to a life of penury. According to a 1998 study by Mupedziswa and Gumbo, close to two thirds of people in the informal sector in Zimbabwe make less profit than the minimum wage for domestic workers while 88 percent of all medium to small enterprises make profits below the average employee earnings in the formal sector. The low entry barriers and the low returns from the sector, mean that women and youth tend to dominate in the least paying activities in the informal sector.

Reproductive Health Youth as the potential parents of tomorrow have a responsibility to guide their sexual self expression towards the building up of physically and socially healthy families. It is important to provide for their reproductive health which in this case will include the ability to have sex safely, the ability to determine the appropriate time to produce offspring and to have healthy babies. The conclusion one can safely and reasonably draw for Zimbabwe is that sexuality among youths commonly starts early during schooling years. Sexuality among youths leads to: • •

Sexually transmitted diseases with both immediate and long term effects (human immune virus/ acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/ AIDS)); and Pregnancies which may be: ◦◦ Planned but starting too early; and ◦◦ Unplanned therefore unwanted.

Young people are particularly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS because of the physical, psychological, social and economic attributes of adolescence (Weisman, 1999). Many young people are economically dependent and socially inexperienced, have not been taught or have not otherwise learned how to protect themselves from infection. This disease has impoverished many households and created child-headed households, orphans and street children who are marginalised from many productive opportunities (Collins, 1997). 165

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Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Youth The priority that government of Zimbabwe accords to youth problems can be seen in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that have been approved. A content analysis of few PRSPs indicated that youths are a major target group in almost all the completed papers (Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy paper (I-PRSP) (20162018). Although youth are sometimes involved and participated in the drafting of the PRSPs, they do not seem to feature as prominently in the action plans as their plight deserves. This could be attributed to several reasons: • • • •

Youth is seen as a transitory phase from which everyone will move out of and therefore not deserving special attention; There is a perception, which may be justified, that by dealing with the broader issues affecting society, youth will also be covered; The concerns of the youth are usually not taken seriously by the adults who have the final say in the drafting of poverty reduction strategies, as youths are poorly represented; and The government tends to pander to the concerns of the more vocal constituencies that they deal with and the youths are not among these.

While it is true that youth is a transitory phase, it covers a relatively long period in a person’s life (in some cases up to 20 years, depending on the age limitation considered youth), so it is important to have specific programmes that address problems faced by the majority of a country’s population for almost a third of their lives. It does not always follow that the concerns of the youths are covered when those of the broader society are dealt with. For instance, whole youth unemployment rates typically fluctuate in line with overall unemployment rates, indicating a strong link to general economic trends, in times of recession the rise in youth unemployment tends to be more substantial than does the concurrent increase in adult unemployment. It has been estimated that a 1 percent in adult unemployment will be matched by a 2 percent rise in youth unemployment (Population Reference Bureau, 2000:24).

Main Challenges Faced by Young People in Zimbabwe Zimbabwe is a youthful country, with approximately 67.7 per cent of its 13 million total populations under the age of 35 as noted already. Annual population growth rate estimates range from 2.4 to 3 percent, and projections indicate a population of 23 million by 2030 (Human Development Report, 2014).

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According to the 2015 Youth Situation Analysis conducted by the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment under one of its arms the Zimbabwe Youth Council (ZYC) with support from UNICEF, Zimbabwean youth, like many young people in the region, face challenges such as: high unemployment rates, poor quality education and limited educational opportunities, limited civic engagement opportunities, high HIV prevalence rates, teenage pregnancy, and early marriage. Another survey conducted by Zimbabwe Youth Task Force and coordinated by National Association of Youth Organizations (NAYO) in 2017, in partnership with the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) for the AU-EU Heads of States Meeting in Abidjan noted the following key challenges faced by youths; high unemployment, exorbitant education of less quality, limited civic space for effective participation in economic and political spaces i.e. in parliament and political parties, drug abuse, exploitation by politicians for political violence especially during election time, youth migration, lack of clear frameworks for youth development (limited development channelled through partisan lines) and youths in rural areas do not have available opportunities and are side-lined, for example, in support of farming because they lack collateral security. A survey by the International Labour Organization (ILO) has revealed that youths in Zimbabwe are among the world’s poorest, as they are living in an extremely difficult environment. Titled “World Employment and Social Outlook 2016: Trends for Youth,” the survey places Zimbabwe in the 75 to 100 category, which relates to working youths experiencing extreme poverty. These are youths earning less than US$2 per capita per day. It is estimated that 20 percent of youths in the 18 to 24 age group are never able to secure employment in Zimbabwe (ILO, 2016). The survey also reveals that there are still huge gender imbalances at workplaces. The huge gap between young women and men seeking jobs has seen Zimbabwe scoring 11 points on a scale of one to 30, whereby smaller scores depict a favourable situation than higher scores. The survey states that 63 percent of young men compared to 52 percent of young women are likely to secure employment, comparatively. In terms of youth labour force-gender gap, young men are placed at 76 percent and young women at 66 percent, while the gender gap is pegged at 10 points. The Zimbabwe Youth Development Index is 0.46 with Zimbabwe being ranked 127 out of 170 countries (Commonwealth Youth Programme, 2013). Youths in Zimbabwe face challenges such as unemployment, unaffordable education, and lack of access to health care due to excessive poverty, forced mobility (migration) due to limited opportunities, child marriages and sexual abuse of young women among others. Youths in Zimbabwe are at the receiving end of poor governance, corruption and to some extent HIV and Aids and high drug uptake (drug 167

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abuse). Independent researchers have revealed that the general unemployment rate stands at more than 80% with many youth graduates resorting to vending and cross border trade activities to support livelihoods outside of the mainstream economy.

DISCUSSION OF AFRICAN AND GLOBAL EXPERIENCES The review of existing literature found that numerous reoprts and papers claim youth uneemployment is a factor in youth particiapation in violence (Idris, 2016). However, some research revelas a weak link between unemployment and criminality. One analysis identies corruption, injustice, discrimination, humiliation and experiemce of violence by young people as more imporntant driving factors (Mercey Corps, 2015:23). These findings would appear to be confirmed by the Arab Spring of 2011, in which there were several contributpory factors in addition to youth unemployment, including anger at corrupt regimes and weak governance. The Arab Spring was ignited in Tunisia, by grievances of young people over high unemployment and authoritarian rule. young people were also prominent in the mass occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo that precipitated the downfall of the regime in Egypt. lack of productive opportunities, coupled with aspirations for political freedom, social justice and a better economic future, were important factors that fuelled the protestes (ILO, 2012:2). but anger at corrupt regimes and weak governance were also causal factors in the Arab Spring. The clear political implication deduced from extant literature was that withiout jobs, young people are prone to violence. For instance, the literatire review found a numbert of reports relatonmg to youth unemployment and crime in Nigeria. These paint a picture of very high youth unemployment rates in Nigeria. Avarage youth unemploymemt in 2012 was 46.5 percent, up from 35.2 percent in 2010. Available fugures show high youth involvement in crime, for example, in 2008, 92.5 percent of convicted prisoner were aged 16-35 years(Idris, 2016). All the papers and reports reviewd attribute high and rising levels of criminality in Nigeria to high levels of youth unemployment,. however, they fail to provide hard data to back up these assertions. Elsewhere, the United Nations has stated that “large numbers of unemployed youth are a potential source of insecurity given their vulnerability to recruitment into criminal and violent activities” (House of Commons, 2015:61).An International Labour Organisation (ILO) report warns, “continuation or exacerbation of the current youth unempllooyment crisis...raises the spectre of pervasive social and political tensions that could reshape the entire social fabric and economic system in unpredicatable and unwelcomre ways (ILO: 2012, 3-4). A 2015 by Mercy Corps found, “an ‘economic terrorism’ narrative suggets that idle youth, lacking licit opportunities to earn a living, are a ready pool of recruits for the likes of the Islamic 168

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Emirate of Afghanstan, al Shabab or Colombia’s constellation of armed groups. Political violence is job seeking by another name” (Mercy Corps, 2015:16). The study found very little data on gender aspects of the links betwen youth unemployment and violence The reason could be that youth inemployment and violemce is eseentially a male issue. However, the styud found some evidence between econbomi crisis and social implications. It fpound some evidemnvcvre of increased vulnerability of women and girls to prostitutiosn and to traficking in times of economic hardship. A regional survey of victims of violence in the Caribbean, for example, found that 48 percent of adolescent girls’sexual initiation was ‘forced’ or ‘somewhat forced’ in nine Caribbean countries (Idris, 2016). one effect of rampant gang violence and drug turf wars seen in parts of Central America, notably El Salvador, Hondurras and Guatemala – is girls marrying or coupling with gang members and older men as a form of protection. The stufdy was unable to find data specifically on women’s particiapation in violence or criminality in the context of youth unemployment. However, there is evidence of young females joining armed groups both because of their economic situation and as a means of empowerment.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS In order to resolve youth problems, there is need to understand the close connection between social development and human development. Human development involves the drawing forth of special qualities inherent in humanness and the crafting of the person, morally, spiritually, intellectually and socially (Gil and Gil, 1981:268). Youth development must be conceived as part of existing overall national development strategy. Thus, for any youth development strategy to be effective, there must be a systematic reappraisal of all existing policies-economic, social, technological and political and their impact on the youth. The Zimbabwean youth should be assisted to lobby for concrete empowerment and inclusion mechanisms that enable them to utilise, develop their skills and have decent work. A Youth Development strategy that is in line with Zimbabwe economic policies should be developed in order to allow practical ways of dealing with youth challenges such as unemployment, lack of participation in policy and suppression of freedoms among other.

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Educational System An area that has a bearing on youth unemployment is that of education. Zimbabwe’s current education is in many ways inadequate in providing the youth with appropriate skills for employment. The paper qualification syndrome should be addressed. It is, therefore, necessary to strengthen human resources planning and the expansion of on-the-job training. Until the education system moves from theoretical to more practical orientation toward the provision of skills required in both formal and informal sectors, the problem of unemployed educated youth remains and will continue. The restructuring of the educational system should ensure the direction of the school leavers not only to the formal wage sector but also to participation in the informal economic sector. The current new curriculum being implemented by the Ministry of Primary and Secondary education is commendable. Resources alone are not enough to ensure Zimbabwe’s young people secure productive work amid a changing labour market. The key is ensuring that they gain the skills they need through the education system, while also ensuring that private sector and individuals generate jobs. Reformed curricula that are innovative enough to meet current and evolving labour demands and a deliberate government policy that increases spending and allocates resources to technical and vocational training needs immediate attention. Zimbabwe’s education sector has failed to respond to the demands for the skilled manpower required to drive economies in the new era of technologies. The ability of Zimbabwean institutions to respond to the needs of the increasingly knowledgebased global economy is limited creating a mismatch between the skills produced by the education sector and the skills needed by the labour market. Reforming the education sector to make it more responsive to the changing skills needs of the labour market is therefore of compelling importance. Therefore, member states need to craft appropriate education curriculum which is linked to employability skills as what the Government of Zimbabwe, through the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, is doing and the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) initiative. This initiative in Zimbabwe helps to train youths who are relevant in the world of work and is in line with the AU theme. Education per se which is not linked to employability skills is a dangerous luxury which Africa cannot afford.

Labour Market The government of Zimbabwe has adopted the remedial belt-tightening measures to cope with the economic crisis such as balance of payments, high levels of government expenditure, unsustainable fiscal deficits and bulging debts have brought about a decline in job opportunities not only for the youth, but the labour force in general. 170

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The civil service has been forced to cut down on the numbers of those already in employment and the freezing of a number of posts due to lack of funds. The downward trend of the economy has made an already desperate situation worse. The picture given above clearly shows the precarious employment prospects for the youth invariably tend to wish for jobs in the modern sector. Youth unemployment even though essentially an urban phenomenon should be seen to be deeply rooted in the rural areas. It is therefore imperative that the solution to the problem should be to increase the attractiveness of and the productive opportunities found in the rural areas. This, therefore, calls for balanced measures in resource distribution between the urban and rural areas. There is an urgent need to stimulate the informal sector, through investment and increased access to credit to enable it to absorb more of the unemployed youth. In addition, programmes have to be formulated to meet the problems of the informal sector such as low productivity and income, limited technologies and inadequate training in the keeping of accounts and product costing.

Legislative Reforms Despite the enactment of Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) Act 2013 Section 20, and the provisions of the Bill of Rights (Chapter 4 of the Constitution), a lot needs to be done to align or review the Zimbabwe Youth Council Act [Chapter 25:19]. As the constitution is clear on liberties and youth participation, there is need to remove or repeal laws that limit youth rights such as the Zimbabwe Youth Council Act, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) [Chapter 10:27) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA) [Chapter 11:17]. Youth Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are subject to further restrictions through the Zimbabwe Youth Council (ZYC) Act and Statutory Instrument 14/2013 (Zimbabwe Youth Council (General) Regulations, 2013). Under the statutory instrument, youth organisations are prohibited from receiving any foreign funding. The Parliamentary Legal Committee produced an adverse report on Statutory Instrument 14/2013, where it noted that it contains provisions that are ultra-vires the Enabling Act, the Zimbabwe Youth Council Act. Young people are also restricted in attaining their rights to political participation by the current age limit of 40 years for one to be President as sighted by the Abidjan Youth Summit Declaration (2017) of the Heads of State and Government Meeting in Ivory Coast. The age limit needs to be lowered mostly in African countries, including Zimbabwe to give young people equal opportunities in leadership.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS It is clear that the problem of youth unemployment in Zimbabwe has reached alarming, if not, fatal proportions. Factors that work against the youth include few vacancies in formal employment, inappropriate training, inadequate skills and lack of experience. Unemployment is one of the greatest socio-economic problems facing the Zimbabwean youth today. Youth unemployment in Zimbabwe is a reflection of poor economic performance. What has been presented in this chapter illustrates aspects of youth unemployment in Zimbabwe, the contributory factors, implications and efforts that are being carried out to redress the problem. Youth unemployment on the African continent is a ticking time bomb and if not tackled efficiently and effectively through appropriate policies and programmes. The chapter has shown that there is a mismatch between education and skills in demand in Zimbabwe. Even among the educated youth in Zimbabwe, unemployment is a growing phenomenon. There are two factors to explain this. One is that there is an inappropriate matching of university degrees with demand occupations. Degrees are often conferred in disciplines that are less expensive to teach such as social sciences. Areas such as engineering and the physical sciences, which require more sophisticated equipment and technology, are often too costly for many universities in Zimbabwe to provide. As a result, there is an over-abundance of students graduating with degrees in such disciplines as political science or education, but there is an insufficient number of jobs available in these areas. Conversely, engineering and high-tech jobs remain unfilled. The second factor is the overall lack of jobs in the formal economy. As most new job growth is in the informal sectors of the economy, there remain few opportunities for young graduates to find jobs that correspond to their level of education. Many of these highly educated workers end up migrating to neighbouring and developed countries to find better jobs. As mentioned earlier, youth unemployment is closely linked to the general economic performance of a country. To reduce youth unemployment, therefore, the government of Zimbabwe should get target unemployment in the general population. Strategies to achieve should include: • • • • •

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The pursuit of growth-oriented policies; Ensuring greater equity in resource distribution; Intervening in the economy to ensure the adoption of labour intensive development strategies; Creating an environment that attracts investment both local and foreign; and Designing strategies that target youth unemployment specifically.

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REFERENCES AFRODAD. (2004). Reality of AID: Africa Edition 2003/4: Focus on Governance and Human Rights. Harare, Zimbabwe: AFRODAD. Central Statistical Office (CSO). (2004). Main Results of the Labour Force Survey. Harare, Zimbabwe: CSO. Chan, S. (1982). Commonwealth African Ministries of Youth-Problems in Planning. Paper presented at the Africa Regional High Level Conference of Directors of Youth on Youth Development at the Commonwealth Africa Centre, Lusaka, Zambia. Collins, C. (1997, February). Dangerous Inhibitions: How America is letting AIDS become an epidemic of the young. San Francisco, CA: Centre for AIDS Prevention Studies, Harvard AIDS Institute. Cramer, C. (2010). Unemployment and Participation in Violence. Washington, DC: World Bank. Dacey, J. S. (1982). Adolescents Today (2nd ed.). Glenview, IL: Scott Forestman and Company. ECA. (2002). Youth and Employment in the ECA Region. Paper prepared for the Youth Employment Summit, Alexandra, Egypt. Fajana, S. (2000). Functioning of the Nigerian Labour Market. Lagos, Nigeria: Labofin and Company. Gil, D. G., & Gil, E. A. (Eds.). (1985). Towards Social and Economic Justice. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing. Green, F. (2005). Demanding Work: The Paradox of Job Quality in the Affluent Economy. Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. House of Commons. (2015). Jobs and Livelihoods. London, UK: House of Commons, International Development Committee. Idris, I. (2016). Youth Unemployment and Violence: Rapid Literature Review. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. International Labour Organisation (ILO). (2012). Global Employment Trends: Preventing a Deeper Job Crisis. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO.

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International Labour Organisation (ILO). (2012). The Youth Employment Crisis: Time for Action. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO. International Labour Organisation (ILO). (2016). World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2016. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO. Retrieved from www.ilo.org/ wcmsp5/groups/public...dgreports...public Kaane, H. (2014). How to Improve, Through Skills Development and Job Creation, Access of Africa’s Youth to the World of Work. Paper presented at the 2014 Ministerial Conference on Youth Employment, Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Kanyenze, G., Chitambara, P., & Tyson, J. (2017). The Outlook for the Zimbabwean Economy. SET. UKAID. Mafusire, A., & Zhou, H. (2007). Employment and Unemployment Trends in Zimbabwe. In F. Maphosa, K. Kujinga, & S. D. Chingarande (Eds.), Zimbabwe’s Development Experiences Since 1980: Challenges and Prospects for the Future. Harare, Zimbabwe: OSSREA-Zimbabwe. Mude, T. (2014). Political violence: Major Socio-political Consequences of Urban Youth Unemployment in Zimbabwe. Review of History and Political Science, 2(1), 107–139. National Association of Youth Organisations (NAYO). (2017). Zimbabwe Youth Road Map on Investment on Youth. Retrieved from www.nayoafrica.org O’Higgins, N. (2001). Youth Unemployment and Employment Policy: A Global Perspective. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO. Population Reference Bureau (PRB). (2000). The World’s Youth 2000. Washington, DC: PRB. Proctor, K. (2015). Youth and Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice and Violence. Seattle, WA: Mercy Corps International. Secretariat, C. (1981). Evaluation of Social Development Programme. London, UK: Commonwealth. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2014). Youth Strategy 20142017: Empowered Youth Sustainable Future. New York, NY: UNDP.

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Weisman, C., Plichta, S., Nathanson, C., Ensminger, M., & Robinson, J. (1991). Consistency of Condom Use for Disease Prevention Among Adolescent Users of Oral Contraceptives. Family Planning Perspectives, 23(2), 71-74. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTATS). (2015). 2014 Labour Force Survey. Harare, Zimbabwe: ZIMSTATS. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTATS). (2017). Inter-Censal Demographic Survey Report. Harare, Zimbabwe: ZIMSTATS. Zinhumwe, C. (2012, March 29). The Youth and Unemployment in Zimbabwe. In National Youth Conference, Rainbow Towers, Harare, Zimbabwe.

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Chapter 9

African Youth’s Democratic Rights Awareness and Participation in Continental Governance: A Case Study of Zimbabwe David Makwerere Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT This chapter explored the democratic rights awareness among the youth in Zimbabwe. The youth who live in urban and peri-urban spaces are relatively aware of their democratic rights and a significant number do participate in governance processes in the country, although their participation is largely defined by political party affiliation. There are those youths who are in rural and farming communities who have limited understanding of their democratic rights and responsibilities and most of them believe that participation in governance is simply about voting during national plebiscites and nothing more. The study also found that the development of rights awareness among the youths in Zimbabwe is state-centric and thus undermining the efforts towards effective youth participation. There are some civil society organizations in Zimbabwe that have worked to empower the youth in the country and to create awareness, but this has met with many challenges owing to the hegemonic influences of the ruling political elites and the general political polarization prevailing in the country.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch009 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

African Youth’s Democratic Rights Awareness and Participation in Continental Governance

INTRODUCTION The youth in Africa constitute a significant portion of over sixty per cent (60%) of the overall population on the continent (United Nations Development Programme 2017). The African continent is referred to as a growing population because of the high number of the youthful population. However, the UNDP (2017) noted that “the continent remains stubbornly inhospitable – politically, economically, and socially – to young people. The success of African governments’ efforts to address this will be the single most important factor determining whether the continent prospers or suffers in the coming decades.” The quest for democratic governance and participation involving all groups in society inspired the author to look critically into the discourse around youth participation in continental governance initiatives. A considerable number volume of literature has been generated on issues relating to the challenges facing the youths on the African continent, their role in conflict and violence and even their role in peacebuilding. However, there has been a limited discourse on the critical enablers of youth participation especially on issues relating to awareness of their own democratic rights. This chapter explored the awareness levels of the youths in Zimbabwe. The main objectives of the chapter were to; • • • •

To explore the concept of democratic rights and participation in governance processes in Zimbabwe and Africa in general. To examine the legal and institutional framework providing for youth democratic participation in Zimbabwe and the African continent. To analyse the extent to which the youths in Zimbabwe are aware of their democratic rights and how they have exercised them. To propose strategies for effective youth participation in governance processes in Zimbabwe and the African continent.

BACKGROUND The quest for youth participation and empowerment continues to be an enduring theme in many developing countries, especially on the African continent. Some progress has been made over the past few decades but there is still a continued outcry in terms of what is still lacking towards providing effective spaces for participation in the governance and development of the continent. The African Youth Charter of 2006 is evidence of how the continent has continued to seek sustainable ways of harnessing the youth resource. The African Union (2009) at its Assembly of Heads of State and Government declared the period 2009-2019 as the Decade of Youth Development in Africa. The overall objective of the document was to mainstream 177

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youth perspectives in all development initiatives on the continent. The African Union developmental theme for 2017 was aptly titled ‘Harnessing the Demographic Dividend through Investments in Youth.’ A total of 28 African countries have since ratified the African Youth Charter ever since its inception in 2006, which is evidence of the momentum gathered in the quest for youth participation in governance processes on the continent. Within the United Nations Organisation, the participation and inclusion of the youth in socio-economic development are coordinated by the Division of Inclusive Social Development (DISD) and the is a United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development which coordinates all youth-related activities by the related UN agencies. According to the population census in 2012 in Zimbabwe, the combined population of youth and children in the country stands at around 77% of the nearly 14 million people in the country (Zimbabwe Statistical Agency 2012). The African Economic Outlook (2012) and AfricaRenewal (2018) all raised concern about the lack of opportunities for the youth on the continent. In Zimbabwe, there are notable government initiated efforts as well as civil society-initiated efforts to promote the participation of youth in governance processes in the country. The government boasts of a fully-flagged Ministry of Women and Youth Affairs. Before that, it was known as the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment. There are a significant number of these youth organisations some of which are affiliated to the National Youth Council, which was created by an Act of Parliament in 1997 and others affiliated to the independent National Association of Youth Organisations (NAYO) and several others that operate independently of these umbrella bodies. There has been a gradual increase in youth strategic policies at a continental and country level ever since the proclamation of the African Youth Charter in 2006. In its foreword, the African Union Charter (2006) clearly states that; The African Youth Charter does not only provide the Governments, Youth, Civil Society and International Partners with a continental framework, which underlines to the rights, duties and freedoms of youth. It also paves the way for the development of national programmes and strategic plans for their empowerment. Against this backdrop, many programmes have been initiated across the African Continent with the African Union itself running the African Youth Volunteer Corps programme which is aimed at creating an awareness of governance and development issues among the youth on the continent and to create a platform for participation. The Charter also stresses on the need to engage the youths in constructive development discourses across the continent. More importantly, the Charter also stresses the issue of rights and responsibilities in relation to the youth on the continent. The United Nations (2010) characterised Africa as a young continent and the introduction of 178

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these policies both at a continental level and at country levels is quite commendable. The New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) actually has a youth desk where the youths are expected to contribute to policy discourses around developmental issues on the continent. However, in spite of the seemingly overwhelming efforts to promote the participation of the youth in governance and development processes in Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular, it appears a lot still needs to be done. This impressive legal and institutional regime to promote youth participation has not translated into tangible outcomes on the ground. Sigudhla (2014) observed that most of the policies relating to youth empowerment and participation in public spaces do not effectively comply with the World Program of Action set out in 2000. The World Program of Action is aimed at ensuring effective participation of the youths in governance (to include social, economic, political, environmental) processes. He further noted that there is a tendency by many government authorities to hire consultants with very limited knowledge of the social-political realities of countries in Africa to develop policies. This chapter engages with the question of democratic citizenship and rights awareness among the youths themselves and how this impacts on effective participation. Many discourses on youth empowerment have engaged on the strategies for youth empowerment as well as the factors limiting effective participation. This chapter will concentrate on the levels of awareness and how this has combined with the strategies to produce meaningful participation or a lack of it. The most popular way of exercising democratic rights in governance processes is through voting. However, the participation of youth in relation to elections has been on the decline (Afrobarometer 2011). The situation in Zimbabwe is no different as youth participation in elections is generally low. A case in point was the low participation during the June 2013 harmonised elections, (Research and Advocacy Unit (2013; Chitukutuku 2014). The determination shown by the continent and the African governments to create institutional and legal frameworks for the participation of the youths has not yielded the needed results. The decade for youths in Africa is coming to an end this year (2019) and again issues of marginalisation remain topical.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS The study was largely qualitative and focused more specifically on youth participation in Zimbabwe. The study used interviews and focus group discussions to explore patterns relating to youth participation in Zimbabwe. The researcher also relied on document analysis to understand participation trends in Zimbabwe. Most participants were drawn from Harare and Bindura. However, a few other key participants were drawn from across the country. 179

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CONCEPTUALISING YOUTH PARTICIPATION Youth participation entails the ability by the youth to showcase their expertise and to contribute to democratic and developmental processes, (Levine; 2008, Checkoway and Aldana; 2013). It also means involving the youth in decision making processes and respecting their rights to participation. Farthing (2012) argued that the participation of the youth is determined by the nature of the society in which they are brought up. He further illuminated the fact that youth participation is necessary as it promotes positive development among the youth. Participation also enables the youth to transition into adulthood and to adjust to the demands of life. Participation grooms responsible citizenship, (Arnot & Swartz; 2013; Flanagan & Levine; 2010). Participation of the youth is not only limited to political processes like voting. It should ideally extend to aspects like economic productivity, political representation, demanding accountability from public officials and more.

THE AFRICAN GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE AND YOUTH PARTICIPATION The African Governance Architecture (AGA) spells out the generic governance framework for the continent. Among the key objectives informing the AGA is the objective that seeks to “Enhance popular participation and citizen engagement in the attainment of democracy, governance and respect for human and peoples’ rights.” According to the African Union (2014), the AGA is anchored on a set of the following values; • • • • • • •

Effective participation Respect for democratic principles Regular, transparent, free and fair elections Separation of powers Gender equality and youth empowerment Transparency and fairness Condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption, related offences and impunity.

Of interest to this study were the values of effective participation and respect for democratic principles. The fact that the youth are the majority in Africa must also translate into effective participation. The African Governance Architecture (2018) came up with a five-year strategic plan (2016-2020) titled the African 180

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Governance Architecture-Youth Engagement Strategy. In this strategy, the emphasis is on creating effective synergies for youth participation as well as finding ways of sustaining initiatives aimed at realizing effective youth integration into the African governance processes. The strategy noted that the key challenges facing the youth in governance processes are the gaps in policies, implementation strategies and the resultant impact. The strategy also highlighted capacity gaps at national and regional levels. The strategy does not speak to the competence of the youth on the continent in relation to democratic rights awareness and participation in civic life. However, the African Governance Architecture is an important document that provides a basis for the inclusion of the youth in governance discourses on the continent.

THE AFRICAN YOUTH CHARTER A key instrument providing for the effective participation of the youths in political, economic and social developmental issues on the African continent is the African Youth Charter. The African Youth Charter was proclaimed in July 2006 in Banjul, the Gambia. The document was an outcome of a process involving consultations with related actors including youth leaders and government ministers across the continent. By 2019, a total of 28 African countries had ratified the charter. The charter aims at providing a platform for effective engagement with the youths across the continent and beyond and to provide spaces for youth participation. The charter also calls for relevant action to improve education, skills and training opportunities for the youths (African Youth Charter 2006). A total of 39 countries have so far signed the charter ever since it was entered into force in August 2009. There is a dearth in the literature regarding the qualitative evaluation of the progress made by those countries that have gone on to ratify the charter but it can be noted that in spite of these instruments, the youth in Africa still face a lot of obstacles.

The National Youth Policy in Zimbabwe The Zimbabwe National Youth Policy has been in place for close to two decades now. The policy was drafted in the year 2000 and seeks to; Empower the youth by creating an enabling environment and marshalling the resources necessary for undertaking programmes and projects to fully develop the youths’ mental, moral, social, economic, political, cultural, spiritual and physical potential in order to improve their quality of life.

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The National Youth Policy in Zimbabwe defines youth as young people between the ages of 15-35. This definition is consistent with the African Union definition which also places the youth in the same age range. The Government of Zimbabwe has a Ministry of Youth to promote the interests of the youth. The government also created the Zimbabwe Youth Council which was mandated with coordinating youth development issues. A revised youth policy for Zimbabwe coincided with the new constitution in 2013. The 2013 national youth policy maintained the definition of youth as persons between 15 and 35 years of age. This age range is stipulated in the new Constitution and is also in line with the continental definition of youth as defined in the African Youth Charter. The National Youth Council, which is a quasi-governmental organization, coordinates the activities of all affiliated youth organizations in the country.

CONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRATIC AND CRITICAL YOUTH CITIZENRY Youth participation has emerged as an important characteristic of democratic governance in the 21st century. Various scholars have discussed this from perspectives including social justice, human rights, active citizenry and nation-building and development (Zeldin, Krauss, Collura, Lucchesi, & Sulaiman, 2014). Democracy is a popular term that is used to refer to a system of government or governance processes across the world. This system is anchored on popular participation, the rule of law, transparency and accountability (United Nations Development Programme 2005, World Bank 2011). Democratic rights are entitlements given to a citizen of a country. As found out by WynSculley (2012) critical citizenship “…is a framework for finding strategies to develop awareness amongst individuals and groups to enable them to combat complacency, and go beyond simple obedient cosmopolitan ways of thinking-acting-and-being, in order to forge a way of living life that everyone who contends that they are free to pursue their happiness, can and must struggle with each day.” A country or a continent that boasts of citizens who are aware of their rights and responsibilities in the governance processes are most likely to enjoy better and stronger governance institutions. In a country or continent with a significant youth population, it is even better to have youths with an awareness of their roles in the socio-economic and political development of the country or continent.

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WHY A CRITICAL YOUTH CITIZENRY IN AFRICA? A critical youth citizenry on the African continent will provide the much-needed agency to propel the continent to the next levels of development and to demand accountability from the governing authorities. Youth agency is important in several ways. Harnessing the youth demographic dividend will provide the continent with a useful resource in its quest to challenge the rest of the world in areas of politics, economics, technological development and development in general. Another important factor is that a critical African youth citizenry would mean that the youth are less gullible to political manipulation which has often seen them being deployed as merchants of political violence in many parts of the continent. Most civil wars that have occurred or continue to occur in Africa are largely propelled by the youthful population on the continent who often finds themselves advancing the political interests of their elderly politicians through violent ways. Apart from providing agency, the existence of a critical youth citizenry can also lead to the development of common and shared values through increased interaction at local, regional and continental levels. Although there are some platforms where the youths have often meet to deliberate on issues, this is usually in support of ruling political elites who would have availed the resources for the youths to meet in the first place. As a result, most of what the youths deliberate on is in actual fact, a reinforcement of an already existing political status quo. Critical youth citizenry also leads people to self-introspection and reflection which can lead to increased awareness of rights and responsibilities as well as tolerance and commitment (Johnson and Morris 2010). Most of the violent conflicts that continue to afflict the African continent are, in part, a result of lack of awareness on the part of the youth. It is this lack of awareness that makes them willing legionnaires in the pre-dominantly armed conflicts across the continent. Critical youth citizenry can also promote the values of diversity, social justice, transformation and multiculturalism. The African continent is a multi-ethnic and multicultural establishment whose countries were founded on the faulty provisions of the Berlin colonial conference of 1884-1885. The scramble for Africa saw the arbitrary creation of colonial states that disrespected pre-colonial boundaries and relations. As a result, the borders created multi-ethnic states which have remained a major source of disharmony in post-independent Africa as most political leaders struggle to satisfy the needs of their multi-ethnic entities. It is in this vein that the need for a critical citizenry becomes even more germane. Critical citizenry also creates awareness of sustainable ways of living in a global environment. The youth in Africa need to up the tempo if they are to effectively integrate into the globalization processes as they continue to unfold. Africa has

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remained at the periphery of global developmental discourses and if the continent has hopes of challenging this existing world order, the youths must play a leading role. The concept of accountability is at the heart of both democratic, rights-based governance and equitable human development. A democratic and inclusive society is based on a social contract between a responsive and accountable state (continent) and responsible and active (critical) citizens. • • •

Accountability can either be ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’ Unlike other forms of vertical accountability, such as periodic elections, social accountability can be exercised on a continuous basis or catalyzed on demand. Based on ‘voice’ rather than votes, social accountability initiatives provide a channel for direct political participation (Norris, 2010).

YOUTH IN GOVERNANCE SPACES IN AFRICA Africa is characteristically a developing continent with a growing youth population. The African Union development theme for 2017 was aptly titled “Harnessing the youth demographic dividend” in acknowledgement of the vast youth population ion the continent. The African Union is alive to the potential that the youths have as a force for Africa’s development. However, the youth have not found effective expression in Africa’s governance as they struggle to find the spaces for participation. If anything, the youth have been more visible in times of riots, strikes and protests over poor social amenities and education provisions. The youth have ‘revolutionary’ tendencies that have often made the African continent chaotic and difficult to govern. This is because they have largely been deployed as merchants of violence during ethnic, tribal and political wars in different parts of the continent. According to the National Intelligence Council (2010), about 26 countries had population pyramids that depicted a youth bulge in 2005. The discourse around the youth bulge claim that those societies with a youth bulge are likely to have youth who are disaffected (if the majority are economically inactive) and are likely to engage in violent conflict. The theorists further argued that those countries are more likely to experience youth-bulge related violence. Hendrixson (2003:29) found out that “the concept specifically equates large percentages of the young man with an increased possibility of violence, particularly in the Global South where analysts argue that governments may not have the capacity to support them.” Lin (2012) writing on the World Bank blog site rightly observed that if the youths are given an opportunity to be productive, they become a dividend but if the youths

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fail to get meaningful and proactive activities, they become a demographic ticking bomb waiting to explode.

YOUTH AWARENESS OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN ZIMBABWE The responses from the participants can be classified into two broad categories. The participation of the youth in Zimbabwe must be understood from two contrasting paradigms all of which have not brought sustainable transformation to the youth in the country. These are; 1. State-led initiatives and 2. Civil Society-led initiatives. The state-led initiatives are seen as an extension of the hegemonic influences of the ruling ZANU-PF party whilst the Civil Society-led initiatives are often seen as offering counter-hegemonic resistance to ZANU-PF dominance. However, whether approaching it from civil society or state-led perspective, youth participation in Zimbabwe is problematic and has suffered from the political polarization that has characterized the Zimbabwean public, political and economic spaces since 2000.

STATE-INITIATED YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN ZIMBABWE The political hegemony that characterizes the Zimbabwean public spaces is instructive of how the youth are accommodated in political and public spaces. The Government, through the Ministry of Youth, has initiated many youth-oriented projects and programs with the aim of creating spaces for youth participation. The Government of Zimbabwe created the National Youth Council which coordinates all youth initiatives in the country through an Act of Parliament in 1997. Although the National Youth Council is purportedly independent of political influences, analysts who were interviewed are of the view that the NYC lacks the needed autonomy to clearly articulate and advance the needs of the youth in Zimbabwe. The majority of participants believe that the NYC, just like many other independent bodies in the country, is heavily influenced by the ruling ZANU-PF party. As a result, all initiatives that are not pro-government are given limited attention. The participation of the youth in Zimbabwe is largely manipulated by the elderly political elites. The political hegemony established by ZANU PF has created a scenario where the youths simply have to carry out activities that promote the interests of the establishment. Chitanana (2010:127) observed that; 185

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The participation of young people in politics remains peripheral and tokenistic. The complex regime that governs the perception of politics, power, leadership, governance and decision-making in Zimbabwe is woven into a thoroughly strong socio-cultural tradition that relates authority, power and leadership to age. Therefore, although the youth have the numbers and perhaps the educational qualifications, they still cannot really determine the way they want to participate in political and governance spaces in the country. Some of the interview participants observed that the youth, regardless of political affiliation, are only there to support what the elders would have set as their political agenda. The participants noted that political hegemony in Zimbabwe must be viewed in a much broader context than ZANU-PF dominance since independence. They cited the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which is the country’s biggest opposition political party in Zimbabwe as also restricting the innovativeness of their youth wing. Most of what the youth advocate for in political spaces in Zimbabwe is highly stage-managed. The youth do not always speak their ideas. In fact, it is the ideas of the elderly political elites that influence the youth. Apart from the covert manipulative hand of the political elites, the youths are also often regarded as inexperienced, naïve and lacking a practical appreciation of issues on the ground. An equally problematic issue is the lack of clarity on the meaning of participation. To the politicians, participation simply means doing what is right in the eyes of the status quo and more importantly supporting the establishment. That is why in Zimbabwe you will find the youth supporting decisions that are contrary to their own needs and aspirations. Zimbabwean political space has, since the year 2000, been characterized by solidarity marches, especially as organized by the ruling ZANU-PF party. Most of these marches are usually done as a show of solidarity with the elected leadership. For example, in 2018, the ZANU-PF Youth League was at the forefront of drumming up support for Emmerson Mnangagwa as the party’s presidential candidate for 2023. During the first decade of the 21st century, the development of youth democratic rights awareness and participation was, to a large extent, modelled along the radical National Youth Service. The National Youth Service in Zimbabwe has been criticized for being biased and designed to protect the interests of the ruling ZANU PF party through indoctrination of the youth (Chitanana 2010, Mhike 2017). From 2001 to 2003, the National Youth Service programme was allocated generous budgets compared to other relatively important service ministries like health and education. According to the Government of Zimbabwe (2001:2), the aim of the NYSZ was to “create united people who still identify with each other over and above party politics, perceptions and affiliations.” The National Youth Service is anchored on the defined core values of; 186

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• • • • •

National identity, Unity and oneness, Patriotism, Self-reliance and Discipline.

Although the objectives and values of the NYS resonate well with the idea of responsible citizenship, it must be observed that the ruling party deliberately wants to shape a Zimbabwean youth whose understanding of democratic rights is through the lenses of a certain value system. Some of the products of the National Youth Service have often been accused of perpetrating violence against perceived ZANU PF political opponents. Although the aim of the National Youth Service in Zimbabwe was to mould a Zimbabwean identity among the youth, the outputs have been different. The national identity that the National Youth Service in Zimbabwe has produced over the years is a radical youth, often violent and intolerant of divergent political perspectives and thus their (those who have gone through the training) understanding of democratic rights and citizenship is anchored on a warped understanding of patriotism. The official narrative of the Zimbabwean patriotism is limited to the heroics of the ZANU-PF during the colonial struggles as well as throughout the years of independence. The NYS has received a lot of criticism from the independent media as well as from the opposition political parties, especially the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which is the country’s biggest opposition political party.

CIVIL SOCIETY-INITIATED YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN ZIMBABWE There are several youth-oriented civil society organisations in Zimbabwe. Some of them are registered with the National Youth Council of Zimbabwe but others operate independently as Trusts or as Private Voluntary Organisations. It is important to note at this juncture that there are state-sponsored civil society organisations as well as those who get funding from the international community or carry out fund-raising activities (although this is very rare and difficult in the prevailing economic environment) for their operations. Masunungure (2014:12) found out that there are both governments initiated civil society organisations which are often created to neutralise the community-led civil society organisations. He gives a pertinent example of how the government created the Zimbabwe Federation of Non-Governmental Organisations to counter the National Association of NonGovernmental Organisations as well as the creation of the Zimbabwe Confederation 187

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of Students’ Union (ZICOSU) to challenge the influence of the Zimbabwe National Association of Students Union (ZINASU). Civil society-led youth participation initiatives are faced with many challenges, especially in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Post-2000 is a significant era in independent Zimbabwe because this is the period when the country experienced high levels of political polarization, election-related violence and a debilitating economic crisis. The first problem that the civil-society-led initiatives is the lack of buy-in from the government and the Ministry in charge of youth affairs. As noted by some of the participants in the study, the operating environment is difficult owing to the heavy presence of state security details. As a result, the many wonderful projects for the youth lack the much-needed support from the government and thus failing to realize their intended objectives. A second problem emanates from the troubled relationship between Zimbabwe and the western superpowers, mainly the United Kingdom and the United States of America and their other allies. The ZANU-PF led government has been reeling from targeted sanctions since 2003 when America passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act (ZIDERA), with the European Union also imposing targeted sanctions on the political elites in ZANU-PF. The move to impose sanctions on the ZANU-PF leaders was meant to apply diplomatic pressure which would lead to some democratic political reforms and respect for human rights. However, this was met with a lot of disdain by ZANU-PF and its supporters. Crucially, most of the funding for civil society organisations in Zimbabwe and many other parts of the developing world come from the countries in Western Europe and the USA. It is against this backdrop that most civil society organisations in Zimbabwe are viewed as agents of imperialism or regime change agents bound at effecting regime change in Zimbabwe. Participation relates to democratic citizenship rights like freedom of association, expression, and conscience, right to vote or to be voted into power. Most of these rights fall under the category of civil and political rights. This is a very difficult category of rights to promote especially in political contexts where the ruling party maintains a stranglehold in all spheres of citizen life. Therefore, the quest by the various civil society organizations to promote youth participation in governance processes in Zimbabwe has been, to a large extent, frustrated by a lack of buy-in from the political authorities who believe that they should always set the agenda for youth engagement and participation. The evidence gathered also indicates a serious lack of sustainability for the civil society-led initiatives. Most of the programs initiated by the civil society organisations are supported by grants availed by funding partners. Most of these grants are timebound and the scope of these grants is determined by the funders. As a result, most youth-oriented civil society organisations in Zimbabwe and in other parts of the developing world, implement projects not because they have identified a real need, 188

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but because that is what the funding partner is interested in. once the interests of the funder changes, then the activities of the receiving organisations have to cease at the end of the project cycle because most of these organisations can hardly sustain their own projects. It was also noted that the Civil Society sector, especially the Non-Governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe now offer a ready means for survival to many of the unemployed and yet well-educated citizens of the country. As a result, applying for grants has become an enterprise offering livelihoods to many people in the sector. However, the problem is that even after attracting the funding, some organisations do not expend all the grant money on the proposed project. Significant chunks of the grants are misappropriated. Another problematic factor was that the civil society-led initiatives are mainly concentrated in urban spaces and hardly in rural, mining and farming communities. As a result, awareness of democratic rights is mainly concentrated in urban spaces and yet the Zimbabwe Statistical Agency (2012) census report indicates that the majority of the Zimbabwean population (about 60%) stays in rural environments. The few organisations that implement activities outside urban spaces have been accused of not being sincere and only coming to the rural outposts to justify the spending of their grants with very limited activities being carried out. Even in urban areas, most civil society organisations have been accused of having the same set of participants over and over again. There is a general observation that some civil society organisations tend to identify with certain audiences and the same people get invitations to participate in workshops and seminars at the expense of those who are not necessarily a part of the network. it can be noted therefore that some civil society organisations in Zimbabwe have created ‘exclusive networks’ who always benefit from the initiatives that they are implementing.

FACTORS INHIBITING EFFECTIVE YOUTH PARTICIPATION Although there are numerous instruments aimed at promoting the participation of different categories of people on the African continent, a key question must be asked relating to the necessary conditions that provide for the effective participation on the people in governance processes. A central thesis in this paper is that the youth in Zimbabwe and in many other African countries are not ready, because of factors discussed below, to proactively engage in national, regional and continental governance processes.

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Limited Scope of Democratic Entitlements Beyond the rhetoric of democratic rights and civic participation as provided for in most African countries’ constitutions, most youths on the continent are less aware of how to enjoy the rights. The majority of them talk of these rights during election time and hardly anything about them after elections. It can be observed that the youth in Zimbabwe are good at talking about election-related democratic rights at the expense of those relating to governance processes. The youth tend to believe that once elections are over and done with, the responsibility now lies with the governing authorities. They do not believe that they have a critical role to play in demanding accountability as well as actively engaging with institutions of governance for their interests to be considered. The situation is even worse with the rural youth constituency in Zimbabwe. Exercising democratic rights in rural areas is largely controlled by the traditional institutions of governance as well as by elected political figures who always set the agenda for the youth. The youth in the rural areas, especially in farming communities have to be seen to be accountable to the political authorities in their area, mostly ZANU-PF as the party dominates rural constituencies compared to the MDC who dominate most of the urban political constituencies. There are persistent reports of the use of coercion and intimidation tactics by the ruling party, especially in rural areas which has often inhibited the expression of democratic rights by the youth in Zimbabwe.

The Gerontocracy Factor in Africa Governance is to a greater extent a political process. In Africa, the issue of hierarchy and respect are of significance in social and political establishments. The youths find it difficult to effectively engage with their elderly counterparts in national governance processes because the status quo places greater emphasis on age and seniority in national governance processes. Cabinet appointments in most African countries are dominated by the elderly and you hardly find any African country where the government is dominated by the youths. This applies to both the elected and appointed bureaucrats running governments in most of these countries. In Zimbabwe, for example, a section of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association was in 2018 busy pushing for a constitutional amendment to ensure that the minimum presidential age limit is raised from a reasonably good 40 years to 52 years. This is regardless of the fact that the current Constitution of Zimbabwe was only established and put into effect in July 2013. The war veterans are already pushing for an amendment because they feel anyone who is 40 will not be mature enough to lead the country to prosperity. 190

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The elderly politicians in Zimbabwe usually set the agenda for youth inclusion in governance and political processes and, albeit behind the scenes, usually direct the course of action to be taken and the goals to be achieved. What it simply means is that the activities of the youth are to a large extent a reflection of the elderly political leadership and thus, in essence, undermining the democratic citizenship entitlements of the youthful population in Zimbabwe.

The Scourge of Cybernetic Citizenship An interesting issue that came up was the fact that most of the youth in Zimbabwe, especially those in the urban spaces, are active political commentators on social media platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, WeChat etc., but are not visible when it comes to taking visible action. The participation of the youth in elections (especially the actual voting) has traditionally been low. Although the numbers rose slightly during the 2018 harmonised elections, it can still be noted that most of the youth shun the actual voting process although they are very active on social media platforms. The youth are good at creative jokes that are then circulated on social media but the majority hardly creates interactive platforms to discuss pertinent governance issues affecting their livelihoods. It appears the youth believe it’s smarter to express themselves on social media platforms than to engage with the actual institutions of governance and the authorities manning them. The youth can criticize government programs and policies via these platforms but the challenge is that they have limited reach with the office bearers. Although some ministers and ministries now run Twitter handles and other social media pages, the fact is these platforms are never really taken seriously by the authorities because some people who visit these pages tend to be abusive and use insulting language and gestures to express their frustrations at the failures of government. Social media and virtual citizenship can be a good platform to mobilise for real action. However, most youths in Zimbabwe appear not to have realized the massive potential provided by social media spaces in governance processes.

YOUTH DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS IN PRACTICE The application of rights among the youth in Zimbabwe has, to a large extent been affected by the political polarity defining the politics in the country especially since 2000. Participation in governance and politics is seen through political affiliation and not particularly through constitutional entitlements. It can be noted that the youth in Zimbabwe are generally alive to their democratic citizenship rights. However, if 191

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democratic rights awareness and citizenship is to be understood in its broader matrix, then the awareness is narrow for many youths in Zimbabwe or perhaps restricted because of the prevailing political and economic environment in the country. The conceptualization of democratic rights and citizenship has been defined by an emphasis on patriotism on the one hand (as emphasised by the government) and as a continuous struggle for space (as evident in the manner in which civil society organisations view the notion of youth participation in governance processes). The level of awareness has mainly been limited to demonstrations especially on the part of those who are anti-government and to solidarity marches and messages for those that are pro-government. The majority of the youth who believe that the government is not doing enough to satisfy their expectations believe in confrontation, mainly through demonstrations as the only democratic way to participate and to influence a reaction from the government. The behaviour of such youth groups as Tajamuka is a case in point in this regard. On the other hand, those pro-ZANU PF youth organisations appear to believe in solidarity marches as a way of showing their allegiance to the ruling elites. Many of those that participate are desperate to prove that they are firmly behind the status quo. They (youth) always take the opportunity to offer their solidarity messages at national or ZANU-PF gatherings. The ZICOSU, for example, is always visible at ZANU-PF and other national functions. There is nothing wrong with associating with whoever you want but the problem is lack of critical awareness and judgment. Democratic citizenship entails asking questions about right and wrong as well as participating beyond mere solidarity marches and messages. Rights awareness has thus been limited to defending the status quo through solidarity and challenging the establishment through demonstrations and protests. Participation of the youths in governance has also been affected by the damaging polarized political environment in the country to the extent that their (youth) understanding of democratic citizenship entitlements is also pretty much polarized. Participation in governance processes is either in support of the ruling government or in protest. There is very little space for collaboration among the youths themselves regardless of political party affiliation or belief. There is however a section of the youth population who has refused to be located in this limited definition of participation in governance processes in Zimbabwe. There are some few civil society organisations that have sought to influence policy formulation, others have sought to influence accountability but the efforts are still not significant enough.

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DEVELOPING A CRITICAL CITIZENRY: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE The youthful population in Zimbabwe must develop a sense of responsibility that goes beyond mere reactionary activism to protest poor learning facilities, high tuition fees, police and army brutality to a proactive engagement paradigm where they engage with governments and institutions of governance as well as to challenge for positions of authority in their respective countries. The youth, during and after the wars of independence in most African states are only politically active in times when the masses are rising against the status quo but you hardly notice them or see them making a meaningful contribution in relatively peaceful times. Besides, the youths seem to be all too happy to be the foot soldiers of the ruling political elites who are all too happy to manipulate them for their own (politicians) political mileage. The few youths who are active in governance and political spaces operate as appendages of their senior political counterparts. In Zimbabwe, for example, young people seem to believe that they cannot influence their elderly counterparts in both the ruling party and the opposition political parties. They play a very limited role in defining the political or governance agendas of their political parties and yet they are expected to support and actively enforce the agendas as set by the leadership. Leadership in this context is problematic because it is associated with age. Leaders are expected to be older and ‘mature’. That is why in Zimbabwe the veterans of the Liberation Struggle believe that the youthful Movement for Democratic Change Alliance Party leader, Nelson Chamisa is not deemed mature enough to contest for the national presidency. It is in the spirit of this perception that the Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association, which is an affiliate of the ruling ZANU PF party moved a motion in 2018 to push for an amendment of the constitution so that a presidential candidate can have a minimum of 52 years as opposed to the 40 as provided for in the new constitution of 2013. The 1999 Nziramasanga Commission of Inquiry into education and training in Zimbabwe had, as part of its recommendation, a suggestion to introduce citizenship education and to make it compulsory in all institutions of higher learning. Although a few tertiary institutions have adopted this recommendation, the majority have not. There is a need to revisit this recommendation as this will help to nature youth with a better appreciation of their democratic rights as well as an appreciation of how to exercise them in a manner that is responsible and constructive.

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS The youth in Africa constitute the majority percentage of the continent’s population. However, owing to a combination of factors, the youths have not been given effective space to participate in governance platforms in many countries on the continent. Key issues that are militating against the effective participation of the youth in Africa include issues of patriarchy and a relatively old leadership on the continent that believes that leadership is a preserve for the elderly in society and thus closing out the youths from effective participation. Instead of harnessing on this demographic dividend, the African continent can and should do more to make sure that the youths can contribute to the growth and development of the continent by providing spaces for the participation of these young people. It can be concluded that the majority of the youth in Zimbabwe are aware of their democratic rights and responsibilities although they find it difficult to exercise them because of the political system and culture that exists in the country. In most cases, the exercise of these rights is largely pre-determined by the elderly political leadership that has put in place, systems that ensure that their political interests are protected by subtly manipulating the youth voices and energies. There is a need to revisit the curriculum of the National Youth Service in Zimbabwe. The training program has received a lot of criticism, with relative justification as well, on the basis that it is a partisan project aimed at promoting the interests of the ruling political party rather than promoting patriotism and objectivity among the trainees. Parents, the youth themselves and civil society organizations have castigated the NYS training program as an indoctrination exercise that has produced radical and violent graduates. There is a need for training processes that emphasize tolerance, diversity and co-existence. The greatest challenge in most African countries is that political leadership believes they have the right to dictate issues on the youth.

REFERENCES African Governance Architecture. (2018). Youth Engagement Strategy 2016-2020. Retrieved from aga-platform.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/AGA-YES%20web%20 english-2.pdf African Union. (2014). Framework of the African Governance Architecture. Retrieved from http://www.iag-agi.org/IMG/pdf/aga-framewor9183.pdf African Union Commission. (2006). African youth charter. Retrieved from www. auc.org

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Checkoway, B., & Aldana, A. (2013). Four forms of youth civic engagement for a diverse democracy. Children and Youth Services Review, 35(11), 1894–1899. doi:10.1016/j.childyouth.2013.09.005 Chitanana, T. (2010). Shouting to No One in a Vacuum: Mechanisms of Exclusion, Disempowerment and the Missing Voices of the Youth in Zimbabwe’s Politics. In D. Kaulemu (Ed.), Political Participation in Zimbabwe. Harare, Zimbabwe: African Forum for Catholic Social Teachings. Chitukutuku, E. (2014). Things youth in Africa consider important or valuable and how they inform youth participation in electoral and governance processes. Paper discussed at Mandela Institute for Development Studies (MINDS) Annual Youth Dialogue in Elections and Governance, Johannesburg, South Africa. Farthing, R. (2012, September). Why Youth Participation? Some Justifications and Critiques of Youth Participation Using New Labour’s Youth Policies as a Case Study. Youth & Policy, (9): 71–97. Flanagan, C., & Levine, P. (2010). Civic Engagement and the Transition to Adulthood. The Future of Children, 20(1), 159–179. PMID:20364626 Government of Zimbabwe. (2013). National Youth Policy. Retrieved from http://www. youthpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2013_YouthPolicy_Zimbabwe_Eng.pdf Hendrixson, A. (2003). The “Youth Bulge”: Defining the Next Generation of Young Men as a Threat to the Future. A Publication of the Population and Development Programme, Hampshire College. Johnson, L., & Morris, P. (2010). Towards a Framework for Critical Citizenship Education. Curriculum Journal, 21(1), 77–96. doi:10.1080/09585170903560444 Levine, P. (2008). The Civic Engagement of Young Immigrants: Why does it Matter? Applied Developmental Science, 12(2), 102–104. doi:10.1080/10888690801997275 Lin, J. F. (2012). Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or a Demographic Bomb in Developing Countries? Retrieved from http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/ youth-bulge-a-demographic-dividend-or-a-demographic-bomb-in-developingcountries Accessed 12/11/2018 Masunungure, E. (2014). The Changing Role of Civil Society in Zimbabwe’s Democratic Processes: 2014 and Beyond. Academic Press.

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National Intelligence Council. (2004). Mapping the Global Future: Report of National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from http:// www.foia.cia Research and Advocacy Unit. (2013). Key statistics from the June 2013 voters’ roll. Harare, Zimbabwe: Research and Advocate Unit. Resnick, D., & Casale, D. (2011). The Political Participation of Africa’s Youth: Turnout, Partisanship, and Protest (Working paper). World Institute for Development Economics Research. Sigudhla, M. (2004). Perspectives on Youth and Governance in Africa. Academic Press. UNESCO. (2008). Zimbabwe Youth Policy. Retrieved from www.unesco.org/educ ation/.../6a282ededb1a68dc109f7cf4a91e488f87f833ed.pdf United Nations. (2010). World Programme of Action for Youth. Retrieved from www. un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/wpay2010.pdf United Nations Development Programme. (2014). UNDP Youth Strategy 20142017. Empowered Youth, Sustainable Future. Retrieved from http://www.undp. org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/youthstrategy.html United Nations Development Programme. (2017). Africa’s Defining Challenge. Retrieved from http://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/blog/2017/8/7/ africa_defining_challenge.html United Nations Development Report. (2005). A Time for Bold Ambition: Together We Can Cut Poverty in Half. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/ home/librarypage/corporate/undp_in_action_2005.pdf World Bank. (2011). World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. WynSculley, C. (2012). A Working Definition of Critical Citizenship. Retrieved from https://criticalcitizenship.wordpress.com/2012/01/17/hello-world/

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Zeldin, S., Krauss, S. E., Collura, J., Lucchesi, M., & Sulaiman, A. H. (2014). Conceptualizing and measuring youth-adult partnership in community programs: A cross national study. American Journal of Community Psychology, 54(3–4), 337–347. doi:10.100710464-014-9676-9 Zimbabwe Statistical Agency. (2012). Census Report 2012. Harare, Zimbabwe: Government Printers.

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Chapter 10

Activation of Student Politics and Activism Through #FeesMustFall Campaign in South African Universities Ndwakhulu Stephen Tshishonga University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

ABSTRACT This chapter critically analyses the FeesMustFall (FMF) campaign led by tertiary students between 2015 and 2017 academic years and its impact in (de)activating student politics and activism at South African universities. Students through their various formations and movements went on a rampage. Considering the decline of students’ activism compounded by the dominance of mainstream political parties on campuses, this chapter argues that the 2015-2017 FMF campaign revived the student movement and was fundamental in activating student politics and activism. The chapter argues that despite the sporadic activities led by students, the student movement’s activism is in decline. Since this is qualitative study, data from secondary sources (books, accredited journals) were utilized, supplemented by empirical data from selected interviews with individual students and student movements involved in the FMF campaign.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch010 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Activation of Student Politics and Activism Through #FeesMustFall Campaign

INTRODUCTION This chapter critically analyses the FeesMustFall (FMF) campaign led by tertiary students and student movements between 2015 and 2017 academic years and its impact in (de)activating student politics and activism at South African universities. Students through their various formations and movements went on the rampage demanding free, quality and decolonized education, thus challenging university management and the Higher Education Department to transform the higher education sector. The radical nature of the campaign made political and social commentators draw some seminaries between FMF and the 1976 Students Revolt as both did not only look at students related challenges, but also highlighted issues pertaining to the broader socio-economic and political transformation. Considering the decline of students’ activism compounded by the dominance of mainstream political parties on campuses, this chapter argues that the 2015-2016 FMF campaign revived the student movement. Students have endured harassment, detention and fatal death as part of the sacrifices for a transformed education. Their engagement in this campaign has also yielded some tangible victories. The establishment of the Heher Fees Commission (2017) and freezing tuition fees were some accounted victories won by the students. Of great importance to this chapter, is that the FMF campaign was fundamental in reviving and activating student politics and activism. The chapter argues that despite the sporadic activities led by students, the student movements’ activism is in decline. The persistent and radical involvement in the FMF campaign did not only activate student movements and associations, but has also seen the radical EFF affiliated EFFSC ascending into student governance structures in universities such as Zululand, DUT and TUT. Overall, strategies utilized by students in the campaign were interrogated including those used by respective student movements such as PYASASCO, EFFSC, DASMO and PASMA. In addition, the militarisation of campuses with the presence of police has added interesting dynamics in these deliberations. The fierce competition mainly between SASCO and EFFSC formations for student governance manifested itself through the struggle to lead the FMF campaign. Since this is a qualitative study, data from secondary sources (books, accredited journals) were utilised and supplemented by selected interviews with students and leaders of the student movements.

BACKGROUND: PROFILE OF STUDENT POLITICS AND ACTIVISM Student activism in Africa, including South Africa is attached to youth-student struggles pertaining to the broader socio-economic and political struggles as well 200

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as governance of higher education institutions (Garwe, 2017; Klemencic, Luescher & Mugume, 2016). Societal challenges and predicaments are interwoven with those encountered by both youth and students; hence the students’ solidarity with workers’ struggles. Institutions forged during colonialism and the apartheid era served to subject indigenous people to inferior education (Deepen, 2004). Thus, decades of colonialism and apartheid have had devastating effects on the minds of the colonised and as such, left fragmented and dysfunctional institutions, including institutions of higher learning. Precolonial formal higher education could be traced to Northern Africa, currently known as Arabic Africa (Lulat, 2003). By tracing the history of higher education in Africa, Lulat (2003) refuted the notion that the African development of higher education was linked to European colonialism. The formation of student politics was an integral component of ‘Africans’ agitation for independence and for increased higher education’ (Oanda, 2016, p. 63). In Africa, the oldest universities according to Teferra & Altbach (2003, p. 4), existed in Egypt’s Al-Azhhar, Ethiopia and the Kingdom of Timbuktu. Due to the dominance of colonialism and apartheid, almost all African universities ended up adopting the Western model of an academic organisation and scholarship (Lulat, 2003). For Connell (2016, p. 2) South-based universities’ role was governed by the enduring logics of coloniality. Such academic formations served to transmit racial discrimination and colonial oppressive knowledge systems foreign to Africans (Qunta, 2016). Despite the historical reality that Africa is politically free, her freedom has not fully transformed universities into academic institutions autonomous to discharge their responsibilities of upskilling and educating the people. Considering the interface of struggles for independence (Fongwa & Chifon, 2016) in Africa, student activism through protests inside and outside campuses became a focal point for many African nations. The political interference led to the absence of academic freedom, with persecutions and harassment of students and academics (Teferra & Altbach, 2003). Student activism was and is still used as a weapon by students to defend their interests in many African countries. Students have protested alleged social, economic, cultural, political and personal injustice, and they are vocal in defending their interests and benefits. Students have been the vanguard of academic freedom and autonomy and their bravery stood the might of repressive governments and hegemonic university management. Globalization, skewed government funding and resources are cited as threats to academic freedom (Chetty & Merrett, 2014, p. 40), stifling academic freedom where academics can freely expressed themselves, including questioning the government and academic institutions without being censored. On this score, UNESCO (1997) calls for a conducive environment with shared responsibility based on participation in decision-making processes. Student protests about poor student service, delays of stipends, and/or removal of prerequisites and benefits are dominant confrontational 201

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issues in many African countries today. As universities have been forced to cut budget and resources, rationalisation has become a reality but students have fought fiercely to maintain elements of the status quo. While students have been known to fight vigorously to ensure the continuation of their benefits or resist an increase in tuition fees, they have not been concerned much about issues of academic quality or the curriculum. This implies that self-interest seems to be the dominant force driving student unrest in Africa today. Universities’ protests have led to government instability and have played different roles in political power shifts. In a few cases, they have toppled governments (Teferra & Altbach, 2003). When such protest take place, officials, conscious of their possible consequences take them seriously often brutally crushing and subduing them. Hundreds of students have been killed during protests in Africa. Feredici and Caffentzis (2000) have conducted a study which reported 110 reported students’ protests in Africa between the years 1990 and 1998. Revelations from this study demonstrated that government responses to student protests were “inhumane”, “brutal” and “excessively cruel” (Teferra & Altbach, 2003, p. 13). Student protests are generally perceived as a reflection of the grievance of the wider community. As civil societies are slowly developed and opposition groups become legitimised and tolerated in Africa, it will be interesting to track how these protests are perceived and how they are going to evolve.

STUDENT MOVEMENT-DURING AND POST-APARTHEID ERA Student movement, activism and politics have a protracted history dating back to the colonial and apartheid era in South Africa (Garwe, 2017). The history of student and youth struggles is well documented and underpinned by the struggle for political liberation (Taylor, 1997). Based on the nature of the politics during the apartheid era, the student struggles were intertwined with that of the labour movements, women, and political parties. This section traces the genesis of social movement both during the colonial-apartheid epoch as well as the re-emergence of the student movement post-apartheid era.

STUDENT MOVEMENT-DURING COLONIAL-APARTHEID ERA The establishment of universities, especially during the colonial period was influenced by the colonial and apartheid decades. Higher education formations in particular, universities, student politics and governance were dominated by the formation of the National Union of Students Association abbreviated as NUSAS in 1926. As an apex student representative body, NUSAS was formed to cater for the needs of all 202

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the students, however, this body was predominately dominated by white students. Considering that universities were formed based on race, translating into black students being affiliated to NUSAS, hence they were not represented in the national structure. This dominance by white students in white only institutions of higher learning was in line with the discriminatory policies of apartheid. The institutional and deliberate exclusion of black students and their respective student bodies triggered critical and fierce debates around the ulterior motive for their membership within NUSAS. The mal-treatment of black students in the utilization of separate toilets, accommodation and canteens led to the formation of the South African Student Organization (SASO) under the umbrella of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the leadership of the late Steve Biko (Halisi, 1991). SASO was founded in 1968 as a result of the revolt and secession of black student members from the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) (Kneifel & Numberger, 1986, p. 106). Based on SASO, the integration of blacks students within the liberal white dominated structure was frowned upon. Biko (2002, p. 20) was critical of liberals whom he said were arrogant’ advocates of false artificial integration where blacks are expected to listen while the whites do all the talking. Central to the formation of SASO was its anti-stance on the doctrine of non-racialism as a token in the world of ‘colorlessness’ and ‘amorphous common humanity’ without engendering genuine freedom (Biko, 2002, p. 50). Badat (1999, p. 149) associates SASO with informal modes of work and what sets it aside from other student-youth formations was grounded in spontaneity and defiance as the basis for its militancy. For Emeaqwali (2017, p. 272), SASO emerged in response to the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Mainly formed by the young black intellectuals such as Steve Biko, Barney Pityana and Harry Nengwekhulu who regarded NUSAS as a forum for a liberal rhetoric characterised by few meaningful actions. With the growing discontentment with the discriminatory apartheid regime under the Nationalist Party, student movements such as SASO through political mobilisation, led the nation-wide 1976 student revolt, also commonly known as Soweto 1976 Uprising. Historically, the 1976 student revolt developed into a fully blown struggle led by both secondary and tertiary students under the influence of the Black Consciousness philosophy (Buthelezi, 1991). Fundamental to SASO’s emergence as powerful student movement, was to be recognized by the state as a threat to the apartheid regime. Bearing in mind the apartheid regime’s brutal repression and the appalling conditions black people were subjugated to live under, SASO began to organise independently of white-dominated liberal organisations (Kneifel & Numberger, 1986, p. 107). Students in this era challenged both the apartheid and its Bantu educations system which apart from developing universities based on race intended to impose the Afrikaans language as a medium of instruction at schools

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and tertiary institutions. Despite the 1976 Soweto Uprising having given studentyouths a political identity, Swilling (1988, p. 1) argues that: [t]he Soweto Uprising also terminated a long period of apparent black political quiescence that begin with the banning the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1960 and brutal repression of the movement represented by these organizations during the early 1960s. Thus political participation of students and youth alike was prompted by brutal encounter and experiences of the political exclusion experienced by in all sectors, be it in health, education, workplace, etc. (Hicks & Buccus, 2016). Broadly, the students were made aware of the injustices and violation of human rights by the apartheid system which attributed to black people marginalisation and exclusion. The adoption of Bantu education was challenged by students and society at large for denying black students and youth quality education. The legacies of the Bantu education system continue to be the determining factor towards entrenching intergenerational transmission of poverty and unemployment among students and youth. Such conscious students’ revolution was made possible by SASO and BCM political and community activism aimed at emancipating blacks from psychological slavery and servitude (Brown, 2016). It was Bantu Education that triggered the 1976 student uprising under the Black Conscientious Movement (BCM), where black students challenged the apartheid system in general and the inferior education perpetuated by the Bantu education system (Brown, 2016, Johnson & Jacobs, 2012; Taylor, 1997).

STUDENT MOVEMENT IN THE DEMOCRATIC ERA The post-apartheid era is characterized by a wave of transformation across all sectors including education at both basic and tertiary level. At the policy level, the enactment of various policy frameworks are aimed at transformed the South African education system. Unlike during the apartheid period where student movements were banned and their involvement in politics in general and university governance was restricted, the revival of old student movement’s such as SASCO and the formation of other student bodies was imperative. For the students, in the transformation and democratisation of society, the higher education sector in particular, meant freedom of the students to democratically form their representative structures such as movements, associations and unions. Although these formations were established to cater for the needs and aspirations of students across various interests and disciplines, they have unique attachments to the broader party political organisations. However, their affiliation to parties has a detrimental effect on students’ welfare, as they drift 204

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away from engaging with student related issues such as housing, funding, student governance, and quality education to broader issues which at times, have nothing to do with students specifically. Though carrying party political mandate gained them legitimacy, lose credibility among students who perceive students bodies as being politicized often scramble for student governance for personal gains.

EMERGENCE AND HISTORY OF FEESMUSTFALL CAMPAIGN Between 2015 and 2016, students across 26 universities in South Africa embarked on a national campaign which came to be known as the #FeesMustFall (FMF) campaign. FMF was a student initiated campaign staged to demand the decrease in university fees across South African institutions of higher learning (Gon, 2016). Since its emergence, the FMF campaign has received huge media attention and coverage and generated enormous writing and discourses in local, national and international newspapers and journals alike. Although that 2015 and 2016 were declared FMF, Ray (2016: 329) traced the discontent among university students way back in 1999, more radically in the University of North West, Mahikeng campus. SASCO was the vanguard of the campaign geared toward denouncing the lack of institutional transformation, the high fee structure and the university’s drift to ‘neo-apartheid’. The underpinning grievances of the students were succinctly captured by one student Madondo (in Ray, 2016: 330) who indicated that: We have been raising issues for years…five years of democracy had not changed the institutional and power structure of the campus. Issues of academic representivity and the democratisation of the council and the curriculum are much of the same. The protests regarding fees were also sported at universities such as Wits and the University of Johannesburg in late 2007 and some demonstrations at the Durban University of Technology (DUT), the Tshwane University of Technology (TUT) and the University of Limpopo (UL). Student activism in South Africa had waned but the emergence of FMF revived it. October 2015 has become a milestone for universities across campuses, particularly where student activism has garnered massive support among their fellow students’ nation-wide and workers in general (Ray, 2016: 368). The students’ alignment with university workers meant these cadres of students would necessitate the demand the scrapping of ‘outsourcing’ into their fees must fall demands. Generally, transformation if any took place under the guise of an institutional merger where ‘bush or Bantustan’ universities and technikons were forced into marriages of inconvenience with white and well-resourced universities (Yigezu, 205

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2013). Central to the FeesMustFall campaign was the demand by students for a free, quality and decolonized higher education system. The non-affordability of tuition fees was labeled as one of the contributory factors toward nurturing and maintaining class inequality in South Africa (Thakur, Tshidzumbe & Millham, (2018, p. 257). Apart from funding provided by the National Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS), student funding remains one of the barriers for students, especially those from poor and disadvantaged families to fulfil their academic dreams. For Munusamy (2015), insufficient funding through NSFAS is further complicated by its mismanagement. Students through their respective structures and movements internally engaged with university management with the hope of having fees abolished. Initially, the notion of free education from the students’ perspective meant affordable fees and later it was expanded to include meals, accommodation, books, study materials, travel and a stipend forgiving expenses (Mpofu-Walshe, 2016, p. 17). Considering the growing number of students, free education for 400 000 student would need R6bn student funding. Failure by individual university management structures to resolve issues raised by students and student movements led students to university-wide strikes and demonstrations. This entailed mobilization of students, student movements and workers across all campuses in the country in order to garner support (Chikane, 2018). For country-wide mobilisation, social media was instrumental in terms of marketization of the FMF campaign through SRC planning, liaising and galvanization of students (Thakur, et al, 2018, p. 257). Both politicians and political commenters hailed the campaign as one of the biggest student uprisings post 1994. The FMF campaign and later the movement were incrementally triggered by frustrated students, especially in predominantly black universities. The slow pace of transformation, funding issues and governance embedded challenges became the boiling point for students and their student bodies to stage protests and demonstrations disrupting the operation of universities. The FMF campaign was organised and led by students themselves advancing the needs and challenges faced by students in higher education institutions. FeesMustFall was centered on students and together with their movements’ demanded a zero percent increase as their agreement was based on university education being unaffordable for most of black students. Despite student movements’ having affiliations to their respective political parties such as the ANC, DA, EFF, IFP and NFP, students declined being infiltrated and influenced by political leaders for their political gains. While support from parents and academics was welcomed, political party leaders were told not to interfere in what students called a ‘student-led and student-only protest’ (Thakur et al, 2018, p. 257). As the FMF campaign remains purely student run and managed, EFF leader such as Shivambu was asked to leave while DA leader Mmusi Maimane was denied the opportunity to address the protesting students.

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Despite the mergers of most universities, the institutional culture remains stubbornly unchanged with white Afrikaners and English academics still dominating the teaching staff and councils. Structurally, although some changes have taken place, these changes pay lip service to deeply rooted transformationally inherited predicaments caused by racially and spatially segregated universities and tecknikons. Accordingly, restructuring the higher education system without addressing the socio-economic challenges of those living in poverty has become a mockery to the previously disadvantaged families and students. However, it should be noted that this campaign is overloaded with demands that transcends the increment of tuition fees to include the transformation of the entire higher education system. The FMF campaign should be understood as a microcosm of variousety unresolved issues and challenges in post-apartheid South Africa. Each university has its own story to tell from negotiating in good faith that their demands would be met to taking to the streets, universities council meetings and ultimately to Parliament. The march to Parliament was organised and joined by the students from Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT), University of the Western Cape (UWC) and the University of Cape Town (UCT). Through FMF, students regardless of race, gender and socioeconomic class demonstrated mobilisation skills and their resilience to survive confrontation and brutality at the hands of police and campus security guards’ harassment and intimidation. Sit-ins, diplomatic negotiations through their respective SRCs with university councils, broadly with the Department of Higher Education through the Student Unions, and demonstrations based on radical confrontation with police were some of the mechanisms utilised by student activists.

CASE STUDIES OF STUDENT MOVEMENTS The FeesMustFall (FMF) campaign was spearheaded by student movements such as South African Student Organization (SASCO), the Democratic Alliance Student Organization (DASMO), Economic Freedom Fighters’ Student Command (EFFSC) and the Pan-Africanist Student Movement of Azania (PASMA), a student wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). These student movements and associations are affiliated to national political parties. For example, SASCO is associated to the African National Congress (ANC); DASO is affiliated to the Democratic Alliance (DA), and the Economic Freedom Fighters Student Command is represented by the EFF. These affiliations according to Klemencic, Luescher & Mugume (2016, p. 25) have the detrimental effect on diverting student movements’ attention from students specific issues to broader political challenges. Political interference through political party student wings remains a perpetual challenge and has received harsh criticism from interviewed students who have blamed student bodies for not defending their 207

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interests. For legitimacy, depoliticisation of student bodies is vital and as such Klemencic et al. (2016) argue that: Autonomy from party interference is vital for internal and external legitimacy of student representatives and student associations. Students will be disincentivised to engage with their representatives and in the activities of student associations if these are perceived to lack legitimacy. Equally, university leaders and governments will dismiss student participation in decision-processes if these lack representatives are perceived to lack legitimacy (p. 25). At the forefront of the FMF campaign was key stakeholders such as student movements, namely PYA-SASCO, EFF affiliated EFFSC, and PAC attached PASM. Although the FMF campaign was not linearly organised, these movements played a pivotal role within their own capacity and resources at their disposal.

Progressive Youth Alliance (PYA) and the South African Student Congress (SASCO) As a coalition, the Progressive Youth Alliance (PYA) includes all student-youth aligned organisations such as South African Student Congress (SASCO), the Young Communist League, the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA), the Congress of South African Students and the African National Congress Youth League (Chikane, 2018). SASCO’s history can be traced way back to 1992 when it was formed out of the amalgamation of the white dominated National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and the South African National Student Congress (SANSCO), an offshoot of the Black Consciousness -South African Student Organisation (SASO). Over the decades SASCO enjoyed dominance in the SRC across all campuses which made in one way or another, the ruling party affiliated student movement become compliant, especially in representing the needs and aspirations of both card carrying members and other students. SASCO has a long and sustained history of student representation in higher education, universities included, hence its legitimacy in claiming student representation in the country (Klemencic, Luescher & Mugume, 2016).

Economic Freedom Fighters Student Command (EFFSC) Another key role player in the organisation of the FMF campaign was the Economic Freedom Fighters Student Command. Despite EFFSC being a relatively new student formation which was formed alongside its parent body in 2013, its impact in student politics across campuses and student activism in FMF cannot go unnoticed. At national election level, EFF managed to secure five seats in the National Assembly, 208

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which was considered a tremendous achievement considering that the party was only less than year old in 2014. Within campuses, EFFSC’s radicalism in tackling issues and mobilisation went unnoticed by students who sought to be part of this vibrant student movement. Though its self-proclaimed as the vanguard of the revolution against the class enemy (Chikane, 2018, p. 139), EFFSC’s clashes with SASCO were unavoidable for campus territorial control. Democratically, Letsoalo (2014) reported that at the University of Limpopo’s Turfloop campus, EFFSC won the SRC elections in 2014, thus taking 10 of 17 seats. Its victory spread to universities such as Venda and Vaal University of Technology with its presence felt in previously disadvantaged universities (Chikane, 2018, p. 139). Importantly, EFFSC competed against PYA stronghold institutions such as Tshwane University of Technology (Cele & Koen, 2003). FMF campaign has produced student revolutionaries whom through their individual involvement and via their respective structures united in the struggle to force the authority to address their concerns. The radical stance by EFFSC to overthrow the neo-liberal anti-black education system, the bourgeoisie within the system (Chikane, 2018, p. 140), made this new movement infamous. Consequently, in the historically white institutions, EFFSC performed dismally only with one seat at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, University of KwaZulu-Natal and the University of Pretoria. Failure to win any seat between 2014 and 2015 including appearing on the ballot before 2017 at the University of Cape Town (UCT) attests to its disapproval in those designated institutions. It was through an active involvement in the FMF that EFFSC gained popularity in both Black Historically and Historically White Institutions.

Pan-Africanist Student Movement of Azania (PASMA) Although PASMA was not new like the EFFSC, its involvement and role in the FMF campaign cannot go unnoticed. Pan-Africanist Student movement of Azania (PASMA), a student wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was formed in 1997 at the University of the Western Cape (UWC). Similarly to most student movements who not only established to advance the interest of students at universities, but also to ideologically socialized students in general and card carrying members. Split between the Pan-African Congress Student Organisation (PASO) and PASMA meant that PASO would focus on secondary education while PASMA is mandated to cater for the needs and challenges of tertiary students at universities (Cele & Koen, 2015). Within the institution of higher education, PASMA was the fierce and primary competitor of SASCO prior to the emergence of EFFSC, especially at Historically Black Institutions (HBLs). Despite its efforts to contest elections for student governance in universities such as Fort Fare, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan, Walter Sizulu, Limpopo and Tswane, securing one seat was its only victory. It was only at 209

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UWC that PASMA enjoyed support, thus competing with SASCO (Chikane, 2018, p. 140). Similarly to EFFSC, PASMA ascended to prominence within the student movements through #FMF politics and engaged activism across campuses.

STUDENT ACTIVISM THROUGH FEESMUSTFALL CAMPAIGN As part of higher education reformation, formal university governance structures have included students who are represented by student representative councils for the purposes of inclusive decision making for all stakeholders, (Klemencic, Luescher & Mugume, 2016). The role of these students’ democratically elected bodies are fundamental not only in terms of proving formal representation in senate, management, academic councils and other various committees, SRCs thus provide student services and other activities ranging from orientating students to catering for housing, tuition fees, food, and educational tutoring. Central to advocating for these students issues, student organisations, mobilisation and debates at national and local-university level is imperative. All these student mandates and activities could be aptly analysed under the notion of student politics or activism. Students’ unattended welfare and educational issues, under-representation in governance structures (Klemencic, Luescher & Mugume, 2016), taming or domesticating the student voice (Brooks et al. 2015) and militarised campuses. Within the context of university governance, student politics are attached to student activism as there is an interdependent influence. Luescher (2016, p. 35) differentiates between the two concepts by referring the former with all political activities of students in higher education while the latter has to do with oppositional and emancipatory student political protests. Through student activism and individual student’s involvement in group activities have enabled them to defend their interests and bring about changes in systems, policies, attitudes, knowledge, and behaviours regarding issues affecting university life or society at large (Altbach, 1998, Chambers, 1993 cited in Garwe, 2017, p. 191). This section explores the role played by students and student movements and associations in planning, organising, leading and sustaining the FMF movement. Central to the FMF struggle, were the movements and associations either affiliated to political, religious, social upliftment or welfare organisations and structures. The chapter argues that despite the sporadic activities led by students, student movements’ activism has decreased. The persistent and radical involvement in the FMF campaign did not only activate student movements and associations, but also saw radical EFFSC ascending into student governance structures in universities such as Zululand, DUT, MUT and TUT as well as the UKZN Westville Campus. A variety of strategies and tactics were utilised by students and student movements to 210

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force government and university management to adhere to their demands. Initially, students through their representative councils’ engaged university management, this included the student national structure such as the South African Union of Students (SAUS) in order to seek solutions to their challenges. These strategies are often categorised as formal channels for communication and representation in respective government and university structures dealing with higher education matters. This also includes the renaissance of the student movement such as PASMA whose membership was waning on most of the campuses. Overall strategies utilised by students in the campaign were interrogated including those used by respective student movements such as PYA-SASCO, EFFSC, DASMO and PASMA. In addition, the militarisation of campuses with the presence of police has added an interesting dynamic in these deliberations. The fierce competition mainly between SASCO and EFFSC for student governance manifested itself through the struggle to lead the FMF campaign.

FEESMUSTFALL CAMPAIGN: VICTORIES AND CAUSALTIES The FMF campaign which turned into a movement has attracted the attention of politicians, policy makers, parents, and scholars in social and political sciences as well as the social media. FMF, locally and internationally came to be known as the student created popular space not only for demanding freely accessible, quality and decolonized education (Mpofu-Walsh, 2017), but also as a platform for them to claim citizenship and democracy. Students made effective use of both traditional and alternative means of communication, mobilisation and engagement. The effective use of technologies such as e-mail, Twitter, WhatsApp, WeChat, YouTube and text messaging were instrumental in uniting students across religious and political party affiliation (Garwe, 2017, p. 191). Considering the geographic distance across universities, such mechanisms became instruments for communication, updating and providing feedback on the progress made and challenges encountered. From peaceful demands being fruitless, students adopted more radical strategies to force university management and the government to adhere to their demands. Radical strategies inter alia included strikes, demonstrations, marching to Parliament, ANCLuthuli House shutting down campuses, and verbal and physical confrontations with police, and the university hired security guards (Garwe, 2017, Thakur et al, 2018). Across race and socio-economic background, gender and age, students managed to unite students for educational transform unionsation. For example, when riot police demanded students who marched to parliament to disperse, white students formed a ‘human shield’ at the front of the group with their hands held up in surrender (Thakur et al, 2018, p. 257). Through student activism and mobilisation, students 211

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and student movements demonstrated their commitment and zeal to defend their educational interests. Students through this campaign, convinced South Africans and the world that unity in diversity is possible with concerted effort. Thus, student movements together with support from parents, unions and academics led to some of the greatest achievements ever won by students and student movements in the 21th century. Paramount among FMS’s achievements was the freezing of a fee increment by government for the 2016 academic year, which included financial support to public universities (Luescher & Klemencic, 2015, p. 113). Additionally, issues relating to changing the name of Rhodes University and management of Afrikaans dominated Pretoria and Stellenbosch universities conceded to replace Afrikaans with English as the official academic language. Considering that FMF was preceded by #RhodesMustFall at Rhodes and Cape Town universities, opening debates on removing Rhodes statues was fundamental towards students challenging the slow transformation of higher education institutions. At higher education, language is a sensitive subject due to the fact that during the apartheid era, Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in schools and universities triggered the 1976 Student Uprising. In a democratic order, language continues to be used as a barrier, especially for nonAfrikaans speakers; the majority being black students accessing those universities. Concessions made by most well-resourced and big universities such as Pretoria and Stellenbosch are worth celebrating by students and other stakeholders in the education fraternity. The setting of the Heher Commission (2017) to interrogate the feasibility of free education by the former President Zuma was hailed as the progressive step towards democratising education. One student said that: The FMF campaign managed to push the authority under the leadership of the ANC to establish the Heher commission to specifically look at feasibility of free education in South African higher education sector. Although President Zuma went ahead to announce the provision of free education before the Commission could release its final report, students were jubilant at such an announcement. Student interviewees highlighted that through the FMF campaign both university management and Department of Higher Education were able to enter into a dialogue with the outcome that higher education would be free for the poor and missing middle income for 2016 academic year. Any struggle has its own casualties, and the FMF struggle saw students turning into victims and casualties of their involvement in student protests under the FMF campaign. Consequently, some students were physically injured due to clashes amongst students themselves and between the students and security guards while other FMF activists such as Bonginkosi Khaynyile and Kanya Cekeshe ended up 212

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in jail. While Khayile is currently serving three years of house arrest, Cekeshe is serving a five year sentence for his involvement in the FMF movement (Bereamail, 2019, p. 5). However, positive aspects pertaining to the FMF movement were often tainted with much negativity, destruction, violence, vandalism and damage to property. This type of marketisation attracted negative publicity and consequently relegated students as thugs and irresponsible citizens who are more interested in causing chaos than resolving issues. This articulation implies the unwillingness of students to resolve their grievances through negotiation and peaceful means. It was only when negotiations failed that students applied alterative means to force authorities in both universities and government to listen and respond to their demands. MacGregor (2016) reported that student activism in South Africa was marred by violence, brutal clashes between student factions and with security personnel and police. Sadly, Hall (2016) highlighted that the destruction of property, statues and artwork was estimated to exceed R350 million. The implication of free education could lead to competing prioritisation of resources including infrastructure. The adoption of free education could see some lecturers moving into private institutions.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS Evidence from this chapter was that student politics and activism are part and parcel of students demand for inclusion in university governance. Students through their representative bodies used the #FeesMustFall campaign to challenge the inaccessibility and unaffordability of university education due to fee increment. Through FMF, students with various ideological and political affiliations, were united to put pressure on university governance and the Department of Higher Education to provide free, quality and decolonized education. FMF started with the demand by students for no fee increase and it later shifted to include free education and transformation of higher education sector. The call for free education was divisive among those in the education sector. The proponents of free education cited the Freedom Charter, ANC Conference resolutions and the Constitution (1996) to legitimate their argument. Contrary to pro-free education standpoint, the opponents stated the dire economic situation as one of the reasons why free education was not feasible. FMF campaign was regarded as one of the biggest student social movements, post-apartheid era which has seen students from all walks of life mobilizing and engaging for common course. Through student activism, resilience and radical demonstrations, student movements and organizations managed to create social and political awareness about issues and challenges affecting students in various South African institutions of higher learning.

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Since most of the studies on student politics and activism especially in relation to #FMF have focuses on genesis, causes and the outcome, there is a need for scholars to investigate strategies and mechanism used by students and their respective movements to mobilize students at various campuses. This includes the use of student protests as the mechanism to force relevant stakeholders to come to the negotiation table.

CONCLUSION This chapter was dedicated to unravel the student-led FeesMustFall (FMF) campaign and their demand for free, quality, decolonized and a transformed higher education system. Fundamental to this campaign was the students conclusion that tertiary education has become increasingly unaffordable, hence the majority of the students, especially those from poor and lower socio-economic backgrounds are unable to afford it. Uniquely, students were aware of the tendencies by political parties to interfere in the campaign for their political gain, hence party leaders were prevented from addressing and hijacking what students considered it to be their campaign. Most of the students interviewed highlighted that students’ activism has declined and some of the contributory factors were the dominance of mainstream party political parties on campuses and self-serviced student representative councils. The chapter therefore argued that the 2015-2017 FMF campaign was central to reviving and activating student politics and activism. Attesting to this revitalization is the contestation and the outcomes of the result of the student movement and associations for student governance through the student representative councils (SRCs). The fierce and radical competition among the old and newly formed student movements such as SASCO, DASM, and EFFSC for student governance manifested itself through the struggle and the role played by such movements in the FMF campaign. Based on the decisive leadership provided and strategies employed, EFFSC outperformed SASCO which over the decades has enjoyed victories with its dominance in most SRC governance structures. In 2018’s SRCs elections countrywide, the EFFSC took the student leadership of institutions such as UNIZULU, MUT, TUT, and some UKZN campuses. However, EFFSC victory has caused tension on campuses, especially with student movements such as SASCO which suffered a heavy defeat in the past SRC’s elections.

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Emeaqwali, G. (2017). Comparative Paradigms on Culture, Development and Democracy in the Writings of Wangari Maathai and Steve Biko. In A. Amtaika (Ed.), Culture, Democracy and Development in Africa (pp. 263–276). Austin, TX: Pan-African University Press. Feredici, S., & Caffentzis, G. (2000). Chronology of African University Students’ Struggles: 1985-1998. In S. Feredici, G. Caffentzis, & O. Alidou (Eds.), Thousand Flowers: Social Struggles against Structural Adjustment in African Universities (pp. 115–150). Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. Fongwa, S. N., & Chifon, G. N. (2016). Revisiting Student Participation in Higher Education Governance at the University of BUEA, Cameroon: 2004-2013. In T. M. Luescher, M. Klemencic, & J. O. Jowi (Eds.), Student Politics in Africa: Representation and Activism (pp. 109–129). Cape Town, South Africa: African Minds. Garman, A. (2018). When the Students are Revolting: The (Im)Possibilities of Listening in Academia Contexts in South Africa. In T. Drecher & A. A. Mondal (Eds.) Ethical Responsiveness and the Politics of Difference (pp. 93–115). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93958-2_6 Garwe, E. C. (2017). Student Voice: Embracing Student Activism as a Quality Improvement Tool in Higher Education. Global Voices in Higher Education. doi:10.5772/intechopen.68669 Gon, S. (2016). Fees Can Fall, But First…. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations (IRR). Halisi, C. R. D. (1991). Biko and Black Consciousness Philosophy: An Interpretation. In N. B. Pytyana, M. Ramphele, M. Mpumlwana, & L. Wilson (Eds.), Bounds of Possibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko & Black Consciousness (pp. 100–110). Cape Town, South Africa: Davids Philip & Zed Books. Hall, M. (2016). South African’s Student Protests Have Lessons for all Universities. Higher Education Network. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/highereducation- network/2016/mar/03/south-africans-student-protests-havelessons-forall-universities Johnson, K., & Jacobs, S. (2012). Encyclopedia of South Africa. Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Klemencic, M., Luescher, T.M., & Mugume, T. (2016). Student Organising in African Higher Education: Polity, Politics and Policies. In T.M. Luescher, M. Klemencic & J.O. Jowi (Eds.), Student Politics in Africa: Representation and Activism (pp. 9-26). Cape Town, South Africa: African Minds. 216

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Klemencic, M., Luescher, T. M., & Mugume, T. (2016). Student Organizing in African Higher Education: Polity, Politics and Policies. In T. M. Luescher, M. Klemencic, & J. O. Jowi (Eds.) Student Politics in Africa: Representation and Activism (pp. 9–26). Cape Town, South Africa: African Minds. Leatt, J., Kneifel, T., & Nurmberger, K. (Eds.). (1986). Contending Ideologies in South Africa. Cape Town, South Africa: David Phillip. Luescher, T. M. (2016). Student Representation in a Context of Democratization and Massification in Africa: Analytical Approaches, Theoretical Perspectives and #RhodesMustFall. In T. M. Luescher, M. Klemencic, & J. O. Jowi (Eds.) Student Politics in Africa: Representation and Activism (pp. 27–60). Cape Town, South Africa: African Minds. Lulat, Y. G. M. (2003). The Development of Higher Education in Africa: A Historical Survey. In D. Teferra, & P. C. Altbach (Eds.) African Higher Education: An International Reference Handbook (pp. 15–31). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. MacGregor, K. (2016). The Human Cost of Student Tumult: An Untold Story. University World News. Mpofu-Walsh, S. (2017). Democracy & Delusion: 10 Myths in South African Politics. Cape Town, South Africa: NB Publishers. Munene, I. (2003). Student Activism in African Higher Education. In D. Teferra & P. G. Altbach (Eds.) African Higher Education: An International Reference Handbook (pp. 117–142). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Munusamy, R. (2015). #FeesMustFall: South Africa Recreated, History Redefined, Zuma’s Moment of Reckoning. Daily Maverick. Retrieved from http://www. dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-23-feemustfall-south-africa- recreated-historyredefined-zumas-moment-of-reckoning/# Oanda, I. (2016). The Evolving Nature of Student Participation in University Governance in Africa: An Overview of Policies, Trends and Emerging Issues. In T. M. Luescher, M. Klemencic, & J. O. Jowi (Eds.) Student Politics in Africa: Representation and Activism (pp. 61–84). Cape Town, South Africa: African Minds. Quanta, C. (2016). Why We are Not a Nation. Cape Town, South Africa: Seriti sa Sechaba. Ray, M. (2016). Free Fall: Why South African Universities are in a Race Against Time. Johannesburg, South Africa: Bookstorm. 217

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Subotzky, G. (2003). South Africa. In D. Teferra, & P. C. Altbach (Eds.) African Higher Education: An International Reference Handbook (pp. 545–562). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Swilling, M. (1988). Introduction. In P. Frankel, N. Pines, & M. Swilling (Eds.) State, Resistance and Change in South Africa (pp. 1–18). London, UK: Croom Helm. Taylor, V. (1997). Social Mobilisation: Lessons from the Mass Democratic Movement. Bellville, South Africa: Southern African Development and Policy Programme. Teferra, D., & Altbach, P. C. (2003). Trends and Perspectives in African Higher Education. In D. Teferra & P. C. Altbach (Eds.) African Higher Education: An International Reference Handbook (pp. 3–14). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Thakur, S., Tshidzumbe, N., & Millham, R. (2018). E-Citizenship: A Panacea for Citizen- Driven Services. In G. Szell & D. Chetty (Eds.) Making Popular Participation Real: African and International Experiences (pp. 243–261). Berlin, Germany: Peter Lang Publishers. World Bank Group. (2018). An Incomplete Transition - Overcoming the Legacy of Exclusion in South Africa: South Africa Systematic Country Diagnostic. Claremont, South Africa: UCT Press. Yigezu, M. (2013). Funding Higher Education in Ethiopia: Modalities, Challenges, Opportunities and Prospects. In D. Teferra (Ed.) Funding Higher Education in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 38–71). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9781137345783_3

ADDITIONAL READING Habib, A. (2019). Rebel and Rage: Reflecting on #FeesMustFall. Johannesburg and Cape Town, South Africa: Jonathan Ball Publishers. Jansen, J. (2017). As By Fire: The End of the South African University. Cape Town, South Africa: NB Publishers. Luescher, T. M., Klemencic, M., & Jowie, J. O. (Eds.). (2015). Student Power in African Higher Education. Journal of Student Affairs in Africa. Ngcaweni, W., & Ngcaweni, B. (Eds.). (2018). We Are no Longer at Ease: The Struggle for #FeesMustFall. Johannesburg, South Africa: Jacana Media Ltd.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS #FeesMustFall Campaign: Is a nation-wide campaign started and led by South African university students staged to demand for free, quality and decolonized higher education. Student Activism: Entails a variety of oppositional and radical forms of public expression of student power such as negotiation and protests, the aim being to voice their grievances and express their preferences to university management or the department of education. Student Politics: These are politics which involve issues and challenges that affect student welfare, academic and student governance. Student Representation: Implies the formal structures and processes of elected or appointed student representatives who through democratic election have the authority to speak or act on behalf of the collective student body in higher education governance structures.

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A Youth Perspective to Participation and Local Governance in Zimbabwe’s Post-Fast Track Land Reform Farms Tom Tom Zimbabwe Open University, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT The chapter provides a youth perspective to participation and local governance in Zimbabwe’s post-Fast Track Land Reform farms. The chapter provides a sociology flare to youth participation by incorporating the ‘sociology of youth’ dimension. Factoring in the youth perspective is a major contribution in addressing the lacunae in understanding and improving land reforms in Zimbabwe. Broadly, scholarly debate and professional practice on Zimbabwe’s post-FTLRP have been informed by four ideological and empirical approaches namely, the neopatrimonial, human rights, livelihoods and political economy. However, in all four approaches, specific and deliberate focus on the youth is low. Based on the understanding that the youth are the future of societies, the central argument in the chapter is that the youth should be positively developed to practice their citizenship. This can be achieved through proactive incorporation of the youth in development and local governance. At a micro level, the ‘new’ farm communities and how they are locally governed should also be a turf for the youth, not only for the ‘gerontocrats’. The starting point for that noble departure is to understand the lived experiences and situated meanings pertaining to the achievements, opportunities, challenges and failures in youth participation in development and local governance of the farm communities. Beyond lip service articulation and application of a youth perspective in the farm communities, and broadly at the national level, are recommended. DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch011 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

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INTRODUCTION Youth are a vital group in any country hence, the central argument that youth bear the future of society. The continued existence and improvement of societies can be guaranteed through positive youth development. This can broadly be achieved through enhancing the participation of youth in development and governance at both micro and macro levels. The significance of youth participation is emphasised by various renowned scholars. These include but are not limited to Kurebwa (2017, 2015, 2013), Chipenda (2018) and Kwenje and Sichone (2017). Despite the nobility of youth participation, a plethora of latent and manifest obstacles have been documented. Emphasis is on adopting a youth perspective yet commitment and progress are constrained (Adesina and Favour, 2016; Kising’u, 2016; Food and Agriculture Organisation, Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation & International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2014). In this chapter, youth participation in development and local governance are contextualised in the ‘new’ farm communities of Zimbabwe that emerged due to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The FTLRP led to major reconfiguration of the rural landscape. Interest emerged at national, regional and international levels to understand the motives, outcomes and trajectories of the reform (Moyo, 2013). Such interest on the FTLRP arose due to its nature, scope and impact. Several scholars engaged the FTLRP from various standpoints and were initially polarised along various ideological and epistemological standpoints. Raftopolous (2009) argues that the FTLRP has created an academic rupture. This indicates the level of division among scholars focusing on the FTLRP. Scholars argue from livelihoods, political economy, human rights and neo-patrimonial approaches (Chibwana, 2016, p.33; Scoones, Marongwe, Mavedzenge, Mahenehene, Murimbarimba & Sukume, 2011). Contestations are common among the scholars due to diverse value systems, ideological persuasions and situated experiences. However, the limited vigour of a youth perspective to the FTLRP and their participation in its post phase is agonisingly a major lacuna. Overall, literature that emerged in post-FTLRP era mainly concentrated on the motives behind the land reform, the role of the state and war veterans, land allocation, land use and production patterns, social organisation and agency, social policy outcomes, farm level institutions, gender and so forth. However, interestingly, the youth perspective in terms of participation and governance in the post fast track farms is low and under-emphasised. Accordingly, lacunae exist pertaining to the participation of youth in agriculture as a central driver of development in Zimbabwe and generally, the local governance of the farm communities after the FTLRP. Such gaps in literature and policy practice cannot be left unaddressed. This chapter therefore, addresses the youth gap by engaging the lived experiences and situated 221

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meanings of the youth on participation in local governance of the post-FTLRP farm communities. Transforming the lives of the youth in these communities and improving national development and local governance through youth participation are the core goals of this chapter. In addition, the chapter provides a sociology flare to youth participation by incorporating the ‘sociology of youth’ dimension.

BACKGROUND Youth are and have always been an important cog of social reproduction and development. No economic, social and political development can be said to have occurred without youth’s contribution (Giddens, 2006). In the Youth 2030 Strategy, the United Nations argues that connected to each other like never before, young people want to and already contribute to the resilience of their communities, proposing innovative solutions, driving social progress and inspiring social change, in urban areas as well as rural contexts. Young people constitute a tremendous and essential asset worth investing in, opening the door to an unparalleled multiplier effect. However, acknowledging the centrality of youth does not necessarily imply that youth participation in development and governance has always been prioritised in all societies. Various social sciences disciplines focus on youth and young people in general. A synopsis of such focus is important but it should be noted that the scope of this section cannot exhaust all hitherto and contemporary focus on the importance and participation of youth and young people in general. For example, social anthropology reinforces the idea that childhood and youth-hood are important and advances the view that they differ across space and time. Despite such variations, the youth are and have always been important in all societies. A key contribution by social anthropology is Margaret Mead’s seminal work on young people in Samoa that was first published in 1928 (Giddens, 2006). In addition, the contribution of children and youth in development particularly in family life, kinship and political systems is emphasised by Hardman (1973), a British anthropologist. Central to Hardman’s (1973) argument is that children and youth are as worthy of study as any other section of society. A focus on these groups could reveal aspects of social life not found in conventional ethnographies on children (Montgomery, 2009). Another noteworthy contribution is that by American social anthropologist, Enid Schildkrout that was published in 1978 (Giddens, 2006). This work examined the roles and activities by children and youth in the town of Kano, northern Nigeria in terms of the differing activities undertaken by boys and girls and their involvement in a ‘children’s economy’. Furthermore,

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Stephens (1995) extended the disciplinary boundaries of focusing on children and youth by encouraging the development of a comprehensive agenda for children and childhood that encompasses environmental and political issues. The study of children and youth has to be essentially multi-disciplinary. Both physical and social scientists should consider what impact their work might have on children’s and youth’s worlds and, conversely, what youth’s and children’s rights might mean for their work (Stephens, 1995). The importance of children and youth is also an indelible mark in sociology, one of the central social science disciplines. However, until the 1980s, sociologists rarely thought about childhood apart from as a phase of the life course that simply involved socialisation that is, the process whereby children and youth became civilised and functioning adults. At this stage, the study of children was essentially left to psychologists. Instead, sociologists focused on families. Analysis from its earliest roots shows that sociology had relied upon a particular view of children and young people in general. Such a view was gerontocratic and obviously biased against young people (Alderson, 2000). This partly explains why children and youth are still in some cases, and were considered as secondary citizens whose interests and views should be understood through other people, especially parents and guardians (Alderson & Marrow, 2011). Downplaying young people is historical. For example, Emile Durkheim, the French thinker and (with Marx and Weber) one of the founders of sociology suggested that childhood is a period: …in which the individual, in both the physical and moral sense, does not yet exist, the period in which he (sic) is made, developed and is formed…. the educationist is presented with a becoming, an incipient being, a person in the process of formation (Durkheim, 1979, p.150). This powerful idea from a key sociologist - that a child was not really a person, but a ‘blank slate’ (tabula rasa) upon which culture could be ‘written’, dominated sociological and broadly social thought. Within that context, Waksler (1991) notes that to argue that children could be as fully social beings capable of acting in the social world, was quite radical. Key scholars on child and youth development (Prout & James, 1990; Qvorturp, 1987) note that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, sociologists began to increasingly acknowledge that research specifically related to children, childhood and youth stages was underdeveloped. In addition, feminists made similar points by attacking ‘male stream’ sociology which had focused on men’s lives and formal institutions, and had ignored the everyday, mundane lives of women. This was the case until the second wave of feminism in the 1970s brought attention

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to the structural position of women. An example of a feminist who contributed to that wave is Oakley (1974). In the mid-1980s, Jens Qvortrup, a Danish sociologist, was the first to break the emphasis on the sociology of the family. Qvortrup (1985) made remarkable contributions by noting that family sociology tended to be about parents, or as best parent- (usually mother-) child relationships and not about children (and progression to the youth stage) as a separate social group. There are plenty of ‘sociologically relevant discussions of children’s problems and problem children’, but few studies that were grounded in the children’s experiences of their daily lives were done (Qvortrup, 1987, p.3). This understanding resonates well with historical and current biases in youth participation in development and governance. In line with unearthing and attempting to address the exclusion of children and youth in mainstream development in the United Kingdom, James & Prout (1990) focused on what they termed construction and reconstruction of childhood. These sociologists initiated a wave of research that acknowledged children’s and youth’s agency. Such research viewed young people as social actors in their own right. They proposed a framework that saw childhood as, to a significant extent, socially constructed, in that children’s roles and activities are differentiated according to historical period and cultural context. Accordingly, based on this perspective, James & Prout (1997, p.8) argue that children and youth should be viewed as active social agents, who shape the structures and processes around them (at least the micro-level), and their ‘social relationship and cultures are worthy of study in their own right, independent of the perspectives and concerns of adults’. This argument supports young people’s participation in aspects that influence their lives such as development and governance. Within the same context of liberating young people and unleashing their full potential, Mayall (1994, p.2), arguing from and for a new field of sociology emphasises: …. how far we adults fall short of implementing children’s rights, what children’s own experiences and discourses tell us about their understandings of the rights and wrongs of their daily lives and what resistances children make to the childhoods proposed for them. A crosscutting line of argument in changing the focus of sociology to the ‘sociology of childhood’ and ‘sociology of youth’ involves moving beyond understandings of childhood as a period of socialisation that is, the study of what children are becoming and progressing to youth stage, to a sociology that is interested in how children and youth experience their lives in the here and now. The key point claimed for this new field is the following understanding:

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…. the child is conceived of a person, a status, a course of action, a set of needs, rights or differences in sum as a social actor…. this new phenomenon, the ‘being’ child, can be understood in its own right. It does not have to be approached from an assumed shortfall of competence, reason or significance’ (James, Jenks & Prout, 1998, p.207). The interest in childhood and youth-hood ‘as a social phenomenon’ was also growing in other European countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Alderson & Marrow, 2011). Jens Qvortrup contributed immensely to this discourse. For example, Qvortrup (1987), using a macro-sociological perspective, argues that the ‘professionalisation’ of childhood and young people in general that is, the ways in which children have become the focus of specific professions, and how an expertise has generated about childhood through, for example, psychological, psychiatric and pedagogic institutions, ought to be the subject of sociological enquiry: The postulate that childhood (as a structural element and a status position) changes in time and space in accordance with the dominant adult society’s needs and interests seems so evident, indeed almost trivial, that we may be surprised that it is almost impossible to find this perspective represented among sociologists (Qvortrup, 1987, p.6). The work of Qvortrup, Bardy, Sgritta & Wintersberger (1994) led to an important comparative study of childhood and progression to youth stages as a social phenomenon between 1987 and 1992. The study was done under the auspices of the European Centre for Social Welfare. However, it is important to understand that research about children was not confined to Europe. Thorne (1987) focused on the United States of America, and revealed the neglect of young people within sociology. Research ‘has either ignored children, seen them as objects of adults, primarily women’s labour, or confined them to questions of socialisation and development (Thorne, 1990, p.101). In 1993, Thorne concentrated on how young people’s interactions with their peers control behaviour in gender-specific ways. Thus, the selected scholars contributing to the background on how young people are viewed and ought to be viewed and given opportunities and support to participate are essential in the context of studies on youth participation in development and local governance. The progression of recognition of youth participation in development and governance can be noted beyond scholarly work. National, regional and international development frameworks also anchor on youth. The United Nations (UN), an apex international development and governance institution, has focused on youth in various ways. For example, the UN recognised youth by adopting the UN World Programme of Action for Youth (WPAY) in 1995 at its General Assembly. In addition, the UN 225

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developed a Youth 2030 Strategy. The strategy feeds into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), also termed the post 2015 development agenda through the youth dimensions of sustainable development. Building on its unique global convening role, the UN aims to serve the world’s people. As a partner and broker, the UN is uniquely placed as a source of protection and support for young people and a platform through which their needs can be addressed, their voice can be amplified, and their engagement can be advanced. The Strategy envisions a world in which the human rights of every young person are realised; that ensures every young person is empowered to achieve their full potential; and that recognises young people’s agency, resilience and their positive contributions as agents of change. At continental level, the African Union (AU) has a youth division. In 2006, the AU Heads of States and Governments in Banjul, Gambia endorsed the African Youth Charter (AYC). The Charter is a political and legal document which serves as the strategic framework that gives direction for youth empowerment and development at continental, and regional levels. The thirty-fifth Southern African Development Community (SADC) Heads of State and Government held on 18 August 2015 adopted the SADC Declaration on Youth Empowerment and Development. The thirty-eighth Summit of SADC Heads of States and Governments was held on 17 and 18 August 2018 under the theme, ‘Promoting infrastructure development and youth empowerment for sustainable development’. In Zimbabwe, the importance of youth in all spheres of life was pronounced by the introduction of the National Youth Policy in 2000 and a revised version in 2013 to provide an enabling framework for the development and empowerment of youth in a comprehensive, coordinated and multi-sectoral manner. The work at international, regional and national levels in terms of producing policy direction on youth is remarkable yet this is not tallying with the practical side. The FTLRP, which was motivated by land dispossession from the black masses by the British colonialists and dissatisfaction with post-independence government in addressing this colonial hegemony, has led to controversy within Zimbabwe and at international level. Despite the controversy, the FTLRP has led to widespread reconfiguration of the rural landscape and its impact is complex and still unfolding. Great work has been done on Zimbabwe’s FTLRP as evidenced by the number of scholars and quality of contributions (Chipenda, 2018, 2019; Tekwa & Adesina, 2018; Mkodzongi & Spiegel, 2018; Chibwana, 2016; James, 2015; Mkodzongi, 2013; Matondi, 2012; Dekker & Kinsey, 2011; Mutopo, 2011; Chiweshe, 2011; Scoones, Marongwe, Mavedzenge, Mahenehene, Murimbarimba & Sukume, 2011; Moyo, Chambati, Murisa, Siziba, Dangwa, Mujeyi & Nyoni, 2009; Murisa, 2009), among others. Focus on youth in the FTLRP context also characterise the contributions by Rwodzi (2017) and Scoones (2017a). They focus on youth and livelihoods opportunities, prospects for youth to take over plots in the event of their 226

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parents’ and grandparents’ passing on, imagined futures of rural school children in farm communities, livelihoods of families of former farm workers and so on. Each of these contributions is important in understanding the FTLRP. This chapter, however, transcends the debates on the FTLRP that revolve around livelihoods, neopatrimonial, human rights and political economy approaches and provides a specific focus on youth participation. However, there is no way this chapter can completely be detached from these debates because youth participation in agriculture, other related activities and local governance occurs within the same debated contexts.

MAIN FOCUS OF THE CHAPTER The thrust of the chapter is on youth participation in agriculture and related development activities, and governance in the post FTLRP communities. The chapter extends empirical contributions to the FTLRP by providing a youth perspective. Such focus is extremely important given the position of youth as the bearers of the future and agriculture as the backbone of the economy in Zimbabwe. Such a focus is even more important if it is situated in a transformative agenda – a deliberate approach to significantly change the situation and contribution of youth to agriculture, related development activities and governance in the post-FTLRP communities. This aim can be achieved through in-depth understanding of the achievements, issues, controversies and problems pertaining to the lived experiences and situated meanings of youth in specific study sites in relation to participation and local governance.

Issues, Controversies and Problems In this section, the issues, problematic and controversial facets of youth participation in agriculture, other development activities and governance of the post fast track land reform farm communities are scrutinised. These are informed by voices of youth and other groups residing in the farm communities; and are compared and contrasted with renowned scholarly work in other research sites.

Access to and Ownership of Prime Land Land is a key resource because of its economic, cultural and political significance. Youth in the two study sites upon which this chapter is based on – Zvimba and Hwedza reiterated the significance of owning land. Those who were at youth age during farm invasions partly attribute their participation to the importance of the land, especially prime land. The indelible importance of the land is supported by renowned scholars including Chibwana (2016), James (2015) Mkodzongi (2013), 227

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Chiweshe (2011), Murisa (2009), Moyo etal (2009) and so forth in studies of various post-FTLRP sites of Zimbabwe. The youth played a pivotal role in the ‘war’ of dispossessing the whites of prime land. This ‘war’ is locally commonly referred to as the Jambanja or Third Chimurenga, to depict occupation of white-owned largescale commercial farms before formalisation in 2000. It is important to note that war veterans spearheaded the Jambanja and the youth participated alongside the war veterans and traditional leadership. The role of the war veterans is articulated by Sadomba (2008). However, the participation of the youth in land invasions cannot be trivialised. The paradox however, lies in direct access to and ownership of prime land after the formalisation of land invasions in the name of FTLRP. Several issues arise in relation to the youth. Evidence from the two districts shows that a marginal number of youth own land in their own right regardless of the often emphasised view that they are the future of society. This imbalance contradicts their participation in the land invasions, role in farm activities and contribution to the livelihood of households. Land ownership in the context of this chapter is possession of an offer letter in one’s name. A land beneficiary formally owns land if he or she was issued an offer letter. However, important to understand is that some youth own land after the death of the parents or guardians. In other cases, some parents and guardians are ‘ceremonial owners’ of the farms. They own the farm on the basis of the offer letter but they informally transfer ownership to their children, especially male siblings. Tekwa & Adesina (2018) interrogate the various dimensions of gender inequality in Chiredzi in post-FTLRP phase. Such transfer is done on grounds of inheritance. Across all the study sites and in communal areas, land is one of the assets at the centre of inheritance. In addition, the youth have the physical capacity to utilise land therefore, from the perspective of parents, it is rational to transfer ownership. Interesting is that the youth who do not own land in their own right indicated that they have user rights to their parents’ and guardians’ pieces of land. Access to the A2 scheme, unlike A1, required one to have proof of financial capacity and assets to show that the land would be used productively and profitably. A2 farms are bigger than A1 farms. In some cases, these are 3000 to 10 000 hectares. The A1 scheme is often presented as ‘villagisation’ of the formerly white-owned commercial farms. The collateral requirement was and remains a stumbling block in accessing and functionally operating in the A2 scheme. This challenge is not experienced by the youth alone. Some beneficiaries who managed to get into the A2 scheme on the basis of political connections but did not have the requisite financial capacity and assets are not using the farms productively as was the set aim. In relation to youth participation in agriculture, Damar (2008) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation in collaboration with the Technical Centre for Agricultural (CTA)

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and Rural Cooperation and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2014) raised financial capacity and assets as major challenges inhibiting youth participation in agriculture. Yet another issue is that some youth do not want to own land in their right nor do they want to participate in agriculture because farming is not attractive. This raises generational and reproduction issues. For some youth the reasons are that they do not have the financial backbone and essential support to use the land productively. This reality is supported by Chipenda (2018) who focused on Dunstan, Glen Avon and Xanadu farms in Goromonzi district and communal areas in Rusike and Seke. Although these are different study sites to those used for this chapter, there are several similarities on youth’s perceptions on ownership of land for farming. These perceptions by the youth were revealed by Scoones (2017a) and Rwodzi (2017). Field evidence from three study sites, namely, Chikombedzi (Manicaland Province), Mvurwi (Mashonaland Central) and Wondedzo Extension (Masvingo Province) show that some children resident in the farm communities do not imagine themselves taking over from their parents. Below are extracts from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with the youth in Zvimba and Wedza to support this argument. Owning land? What for? Farming is not an economic activity for the young generation. I grew up farming. Rather, I would look for formal employment in the nearby cities or go to the Diaspora. Some youth want to own land in their own right and effectively utilise the land to enhance livelihoods. A simplistic approach to youth perceptions on owning prime land and participating in agriculture should be avoided. However, the youth bemoan lack of support from the government and other stakeholders, exploitative contract farming arrangements and prime land under-utilisation by some beneficiaries including some youth as highlighted in the extracts below. Faming is the core economic activity .... I would like to own a piece of land in my name....and to be fully supported by government. Agricultural land in this area is not being used productively....and that demotivates me from pursuing agriculture. Despite challenges, most of the people in this area who are taking farming as business are accumulating household assets, livestock and a stable income .... I will get into farming if the opportunity arises.

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Farm Activities The reproduction and improvement of farming activities is undoubtedly anchored on the participation of the youth and children. Youth participation in development is a core theme in contemporary social policy. An early anthropological study by Schildkrout (1978) showed that children and youth participate in critical roles and activities – what he termed a “young people’s economy”. Farm activities such as land clearing, land preparation, seeding, weeding, harvesting, selling of farm produce, general farm maintenance and so on are mainly done by the youth and children. This group performs these activities at their parents’ and guardians’ farms. They may also sell their labour outside their households for money (locally known as maricho) or in exchange for goods. In the case of Goromonzi district, Chipenda (2018) found a similar trend. These are core activities in any farming community and post fast track farms are not an exception. Youth participation is pivotal for the success of these activities. Overall, the chances of reproducing farm activities in the absence of the elders may be guaranteed although lack of commitment by some youth and challenges to agricultural activities are drawbacks. Sharing income generated through farming is however, a problematic in most cases mainly due to transactional relations and gerontocracy. The farm communities, as is the general traditional practice, are gerontocratic. The elders, especially the men, have an ‘upper hand’ and control children, youth and women. This control may spill into sharing of farm produce and income. Where banks are involved in the transactions, money is transferred into the person who formally owns the farm. These could be parents, guardians or youth. For example, in the case of tobacco sales, money is transferred into the person with a grower’s number. Conflicts emanating from unequal sharing of income from farm produce are rife. This dimension however, should not be over-generalised because some youth own the farm and sell farm produce in their own right. Some households share farm produce to the principal contributors, youth included. In such cases, youth may choose to keep or sell their share. Furthermore, private buyers, who are referred to as ‘poachers’ by the government or contractors, buy produce without considering the formal definition of a farmer (possession of offer letters or grower’s numbers). These buyers usually have better terms and prices and they have cash. In both study sites, some private buyers are trading using the much sought United States dollar. Those without formal documents for land ownership, and accordingly, direct ownership of the farm produce (some youth and land tenants) prefer private buyers. This trend is widespread even among the formally recognised farmers hence, increasing conflicts between government parastatals such as GMB and contractors on one side, and private buyers on the other.

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Protection and Control of Appended Natural Resources Youth play a central role in the protection of natural resources that are appended to the land. These include fauna and flora. Government agencies such as the Environmental Management Agency (EMA) are secondary when one considers the role of community members. The land beneficiaries in the study sites uphold the understanding that natural resources belong to them therefore, they have a natural right to utilise and protect the natural resources. This sense of ownership and the responsibility to protect are commendable. The ‘council of elders’ govern the land and appended natural resources. Youth and other household members utilise and have agency to protect the natural resources. Youth are entrusted with the responsibility to protect and safeguard the natural resources from ‘poachers’. These could be farmers and farm workers within or from other farms or those from nearby communal areas. Natural resources in the farms are a governance issue. Safeguarding the natural resources, for example, trees from over-exploitation is essentially a central dimension of youth participation in the governance structure of the post-FTLRP farm communities. Youth are an essential group in the farm level institutions that focus on the protection of natural resources. The youth and other members of the farm community are benefiting from the exploitation of minerals, mainly gold. Informal gold panning, known as chikorokoza, is a widespread economic activity by youth and other groups. Mkodzongi (2013) notes a similar trend in Mashonaland West Province. Some land beneficiaries have abandoned farming in favour of gold panning because it has immediate and at times, higher returns. The youth are also exploiting forests to collect firewood for sale to the communal areas, towns and cities. The consumption of firewood in Hwedza, Murombedzi, Seke and Harare is high due to sprouting urban settlements (emanating from uncontrolled urbanisation) that do not have electricity. In addition, even the electrified suburbs need firewood and gas as alternative energy sources due to load-shedding and high cost of electricity. Brick moulding for sale is yet another alternative to crop and animal production for the youth. Sustainability issues arise in relation to minerals and forests. A FTLRP baseline survey by Moyo etal (2009) showed similar trends and tendencies. High levels of unemployment, low returns from agricultural activities and deepening impoverishment are the key drivers of ruthless exploitation of the natural environment as a survival strategy. Controversy emerges between the responsibility to protect and over-exploitation of forests and minerals.

Access to Bank Credit FAO in collaboration with CTA and IFAD (2014), emphasise that the success of agricultural activities is partly determined by the availability and appropriate use of 231

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finance. In addition, those with formal documents pertaining to ownership of land and other key assets can access loans provided by financial institutions such as banks. The Government of Zimbabwe proclaimed that the 99-year leases are bankable. However, given that few youth own land in their own right, few have ownership documents and own key assets, few can access loans at banks and micro-finance institutions. These issues are occurring in a context where banks and other financial institutions are sceptical to provide financial resources and farm equipment to the ‘new’ farmers in general. In addition, previous schemes for example, Agriculture Mechanisation Programme and Inputs Schemes by the Government of Zimbabwe were widely misused and fraught with corruption. Goodwill has deteriorated. How then can the future of society (the youth) prosper and sustain the farm community and the nation at large in such a context? Failure to access bank credit is a real issue affecting most farmers.

Contract Farming Contract farming is an essential long-established model for linking farmers and producers (Will, 2013). In both A1 and A2 models, contract farming is a key feature in agriculture in both study sites especially in the production of tobacco. Controversy is rife on private actors’ contract farming as an inclusive business model for both smallholder and large scale farmers. The general concern raised by the farmers is that contracts are crafted on extreme asymmetrical arrangements that facilitate the contractor to exploit surplus value and alienate the farmers. Collateral security is a prerequisite for accessing inputs through contract farming. Benefits from contract farming are marginal and most farmers who entered into contract farming led by private actors, especially the A1 farmers, did so due to lack of alternative favourable sources of inputs and finance. However, state-led contract farming, known locally as Command Agriculture, is viewed to be flexible because the Government of Zimbabwe is considerate on the basis of output levels and natural adversaries such as drought. However, some farmers argue that such flexibility is a strategy by the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) to garner political mileage while simultaneously creating conditions for accumulation through agriculture in resettlements and communal areas. This argument was also extended to food handouts and the Presidential Inputs Scheme by the GoZ. Such voices from the field were also noted by Chipenda (2018) in the Goromonzi district case study. The majority of the current youth farmers in the study sites are affected by the general issues related to private actors’ contract farming raised by all the farmers. Aspiring youth farmers face challenges in entering into contract farming because most lack collateral security and do not own land in their own right. All the contract 232

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farmers only accessed operational finance without infrastructure and ‘patient’ finance to back up their agricultural production. The same sentiments were raised by Moyo (2014) in the Mazowe district case study. Moreover, gender issues are at play. Parents and guardians can get inputs from contractors mainly for the male child than the female child. The practice of accessing inputs from contractors through another farmer is termed kuberekwa in the study sites. In its entirety, the level of inclusiveness of contract farming to the youth and other farmers is controversial.

Technical Support for the Farmers In cases where individuals or groups are not viewed as farmers or are considered to be beneficiaries through others, the implication is that technical support provided to the farmers reaches them indirectly. In both study sites, state-led support is dominant. Much of the support is in the form of information and advice on appropriate farming practices. Such support is provided through the Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) officers in the districts. The officers are responsible for providing services to farmers in the wards and report to the district AGRITEX officer. The AGRITEX department falls within the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. Contractors are also complementing the government by providing information to the farmers. Such support is skewed against the majority of the youth who do not own pieces of land or those who have to get such information through parents and guardians. Targeted support to current youth farmers and prospects for the future are missing. In addition, generally, due to economic challenges, the AGRITEX department and all other government ministries and departments in Zimbabwe are under-performing therefore, are less effective.

Traditional Leadership Traditional leadership structures are an important dimension of governance in Zimbabwe. Such importance is pronounced by the existence and application of the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998, modified in 1999 and 2001. Tradition is not only prioritised in Zimbabwe. Roca (n.d), acknowledges the revival of traditional structures, rural values, arts and crafts in Europe. In the context of post fast track land reform in Zimbabwe, traditional leadership was not formally established by the government but was part of relocation of traditional structures and practices from the communal areas to the ‘new’ farm communities. As such, the lines of power and control are not clearly set. Traditional leadership structures are central in both study sites and such structures are playing significant governance roles especially in A1 settlements. Governance of the post-FTLRP is dominated by traditional leadership, Committee

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of Seven (Co7), the state, war veterans and the party (ZANU PF). However, the critical question is, ‘What is in it for the youth as the bearers of the future?’ Governance through traditional leadership structures is generally a turf for the elders, especially the men. A village head, locally known as sabhuku and chiefs in the post-FTLRP areas are accorded power to preside over leadership and development issues in such communities. They hold traditional courts pertaining to land conflicts and other issues. Issues pertaining to land disputes that they cannot address are referred to the District Land Committee. They convene meetings for community cohesion and development, inputs, contract farming and marketing of farm produce and so forth. In collaboration with District Administrators, they are playing central governance roles. In Chipenda’s study of post-FTLRP areas in Goromonzi, village heads indicated that A1 farms in that district fall within their traditional jurisdiction. The chiefs are able to deploy ancestral autochthony as a way of contesting state hegemony as noted by Mkodzongi (2013) in the Mhondoro-Ngezi study site (Mashonaland West Province). The chiefs also contest against each other for chiefly territory. Their role in land control and overall governance is complex and should be delved carefully. Chiefs who own land in the post-FTLRP areas also periodically go to the communal areas to preside over cases within their jurisdiction. In both cases, the chiefs are supported by a ‘council of elders’ thereby creating and sustaining leadership and general governance lacunae because the youth are a peripheral group. Important to note is that the youth are peripheral, not central actors in the operation of traditional leadership structures as governance machineries in the post FTLRP communities. However, in both study sites a new crop of young village heads is emerging. In addition, some village heads left their sons in the communal areas as acting village heads. Accordingly, caution has to be taken in debating and concluding on youth participation in traditional leadership. It is one thing to argue that the youth are totally excluded and that they are not at the core of traditional leadership. Youth are prioritised as security personnel for the chiefs and the farm communities in general. They are also physically energetic therefore, they are important in performing tasks that require physical mobility and strength such as moving around the communities to inform the public of important events (local and national) and meetings. These could be informing people of visits by the Ministry of Health and Child Care for immunisation or general health education and promotion exercises, and preparations for Independence Day celebrations. Youth are also important in summoning offenders to traditional courts and ensuring order at the courts and generally in the community in relation to the ‘commonly’ agreed values and norms. These are important supportive roles to the machinery dominated by the elders. However, an important dimension is that the elders recognise the need to actively

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incorporate the youth. The youth also have the agency to work with the elders in traditional leadership and improve its operation where necessary.

Social Cohesion The breadth and nature of the FTLRP led to a demographic reconfiguration of the former large scale farms by mixing people with diverse backgrounds and aspirations. The resettled families have wider diversity in terms of cultural, religious, ethnic, political and economic values and practices, thereby creating opportunities, challenges and problems for social cohesion (Moyo etal., 2009). Important dimensions of social cohesion such as consensus, existence of social conflict, the actors in social conflict, conflict management; and cohesive and peace building initiatives and the role of youth in the social cohesion matrix are important. Social cohesion is essential for nation building (Adesina, 2010). Conflicts and cohesion emanating from access to and ownership of land as a key resource, boundaries, farm infrastructure, farm equipment, ethno-regionalism, labour and natural resources are explored crucial in cohesion-conflict analyses. For example, ‘squatters’ and natural resources appended to the land are key sources of conflict. Former workers of white large commercial farmers who remained on allocated land and people from communal and urban areas who settled on the farms without approval are labelled as squatters. The politics of inclusion and exclusion are at play. These groups are not prioritised in use of land, water sources and natural resources leading to conflicts. In both conflict issues, youth are a central group. They may be among the ‘squatters and poachers’ or at the centre of conflicts with the EMA in the depletion of forests. However, the ‘squatter’ issue was dominant in early years of occupation. The youth perspective in the role of the land holders, traditional leadership, the judiciary, officials from the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement; Committee of Seven (Co7), Neighbourhood Watch Committee (NWC) and District Land Committees (DLCs) is an important consideration. The need for effective responses to conflict in the spirit of enhancing ‘peaceable’ communities is important yet the position and contribution of youth in social cohesion is lowly emphasised. Overall, the central argument is that social cohesion is not only an important consideration in assessing the outcomes of the fast tracked land reform; it is also an essential condition for effective achievement of the goals of the FTLRP and its centrality in addressing the social question and socioeconomic transformation. However, youth should be important stakeholders in pursuit of social cohesion.

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Farm Level Institutions Local formal and informal committees and associations are important components of farm level institutions that have significant bearing on participation in development and governance of the farm communities. Examples of critical committees and associations in the post fast track farms are the Co7, Neighbourhood Watch Committee (NWC), District Land Committees (DLCs), Funeral Associations and Inputs and Marketing Associations. These farm level institutions are important in various ways. The NWC is important for the security of the farm community. Burial associations help in times of death. Inputs and marketing associations assist members to access inputs, and in identifying and exploiting market opportunities. DLCs address land conflict and involve local farmers and their leadership structures therefore, have a local orientation. The Co7 is a resuscitation of war time Committee of Seven (Chipenda, 2018; Sadomba, 2008; Murisa, 2009). The committee works in collaboration with the village head, DLCs and government ministries. This committee is central in local governance and politics at A1 farm level but is mainly controlled by the war veterans. The farm level institutions are essential in land beneficiaries’ socioeconomic wellbeing, and directly or indirectly supporting the objectives of the land reform. In all these farm level institutions, youth are participating in various ways. However, they want to increase their share of participation and influence, particularly in farm level institutions that affect their lives. Chiweshe (2011), using the Mazowe case study (in Mashonaland Central), reiterates the importance of emergent farm level institutions. In the Mazowe district case, the farmers are organising in new ways to meet everyday challenges. The emergent institutions are important in microeconomics of survival.

Rural Politics and Authoritarian Populism Youth in the selected farms are vibrant agents for rural politics and authoritarian populism by both the ruling party ZANU (PF), the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) and other political parties. The main political parties in Zimbabwe - ZANU (PF) and MDC-A are at the apex of manipulating youth for political mileage. The youth played a role in land invasions and were very active in political campaigns and violence (in some cases) in the farm communities. They continue to be the target of the ideological apparatus of all political parties. Due to poverty and lack of productive occupation, some youth are easily manipulated yet alienated from development after political parties have achieved their goals. Accordingly, they are at the centre of rural politics and authoritarian populism. For example, Murisa (2018) argues that ZANU (PF) created cross-class and age rural support for the FTLRP that was mediated by state and military interests. However, 236

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the youth are not mere recipients of party ideologies and authoritarian politics. They are applying transactionalism in which innovative and manipulative strategies for maximising their gains are critical. For example, they ‘support all political parties’ to get goods and services from every political party but vote for candidates representing a political party of their choice.

Social Organisation and Sense of Citizenship Youth in the post fast track farms and in any community are undoubtedly part of the social organisation matrix. They are citizens just like everyone else and have the right to citizenship. Youth in the post fast track farms are essentially in a rural area and they have the right to be rural citizens. Citizenship and its importance in development and governance are explored by various scholars (Barraclough, 2013; Soja, 2010; Nash, 2009; Sommers, 2008; Broadie, 2002; Turner, 2001; Sommers, 1994). All the issues, problems and controversies considered in this chapter have bearing on youth as citizens and their contribution to enhanced social organisation. Social organisation and citizenship issues arise where, for example, youth are sidelined from participating in development and governance of the farm communities (and anywhere else) or are merely included to fulfil the youth promise. These issues were reported across the selected farms but they should not be overgeneralised due to differentiation of youth’ situations and diversity of trajectories of the post fast track land reform contexts.

SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS In the section above, several key issues, problems and controversies were explored. These are essential in designing, implementing and reviewing approaches and strategies that can be used to initiate or enhance the participation of youth in agriculture and other economic activities and governance in the post-FTLRP communities. What then should be done? In answering this question, important to understand is that addressing the youth gap is not simplistic therefore, defies a single approach to finding solutions. In line with case-based evidence included in this chapter, recommendations are two pronged. Some recommendations are based on the need to enhance current practices while others are informed by the need to introduce new thinking and practices. Recommendations that merely focus on youth while leaving out other critical stakeholders are self-defeating. Actions to be taken, by who, why, how, with what justification and outcome and so on are vital considerations.

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Table 1. Recommendations for addressing the youth gaps in post fast track farms Recommendation

Details

Actively adopting a youth approach

An urgent and beyond lip service adoption of a youth approach by the Government of Zimbabwe and other stakeholders is long overdue. Such an approach can be applied to development across the board and specifically, to land redistribution; access to inputs, appended natural resources agricultural support and so forth. Changes to the ideological orientation of the five key institutions of governance in the post fast track farms, namely, traditional leadership, Committee of Seven, the state, war veterans and political parties, mainly ZANU PF and MDC-A.

Investing in youth and desisting from manipulating youth as instruments of party politics

The urgency in applying a youth perspective should be backed by investment in positive youth development. Such investment could be formal and informal leadership training and unleashing youth contribution to development. In addition, political parties should consider youth as development and governance resources not agents of destructive politics

Revamping participation in local and national governance

Current systems of local governance in the farm communities and at national level should be reworked for flexibility and receptiveness of youth participation, leadership and governance. This is a primary recommendation because, without it, all the other desired changes are impossible

Land ownership and use

The youth who have interest in agriculture should own land in their own right. The land invasions were done and are long gone. However, the Government of Zimbabwe can rationalise farm sizes to accommodate the youth who were hitherto excluded from owning land. A land audit that targets those farmers who have large pieces of land, for example 3000 to 10 000 hectares, multiple farm ownership and land underutilisation should be carried out with the intention of reallocating some land to willing youth and appropriately supported youth and other groups

Support for the youth

Land reform is an appropriate but insufficient way of changing livelihoods. Sufficient support for the youth who would have been allocated land for productive use should also be a top priority. Closely monitored financial resources, farm equipment, technical support and so on are necessary. This recommendation extends to the generality of the land beneficiaries. Furthermore, support for the youth by the public, private and civil society organisations should stretch beyond agriculture

Initiating or enhancing complementary economic activities and value chains

Youth are participating in economic activities other than agriculture such as artisanal mining. Such activities should be formalised by the Government of Zimbabwe and supported by all relevant stakeholders. Moreover, value chains for agriculture and other economic activities should be monitored and changed if necessary, to accommodate or enhance the position of youth and other groups

Sustainability measures

Despite the lack of consensus on sustainability, its provisions are necessary. Local participation and governance in the farms occur within a context that demands sustainability of the physical and built environment, economic and social systems. Sustainability is everyone’s business, including those in the farm communities

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FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS Researchers can carry over the youth perspective to other post fast track land reform study sites in Zimbabwe to understand the youth’s situated meanings and lived experiences pertaining to participation in development and local governance of farm communities. Comparison can also be made between the post-FTLRP communities and communal areas. Moreover, the youth perspective can be adopted in other countries where land reforms were implemented. The post-FTLRP communities have several largely unexplored issues and trajectories pertaining to the youth or land beneficiaries of all ages in general that are of crucial importance to social scientists. These include land reforms as social policy instruments, social services, farmers’ agency and social organisation, farm level institutions, production patterns and levels, gender dynamics, transformative role of land reforms and so on.

CONCLUSION The chapter is a significant current contribution to knowledge on the youth, development and governance tier. Specific focus on youth’s participation in agriculture, other economic activities and governance in the post land reform era is important considering that youth bear the future of societies. Farm communities are not an exception because their entire existence, reproduction and change are possible through the young generation composed of youth and children. Basing on case evidence, youth are a vital cog of development and local governance. The elders in post fast track land reform farms recognise youth as central contributors to development and governance yet a conscious approach to youth development is low. Elders, traditional leaders, Committee of Seven, war veterans, the state and ZANU PF dominate in local governance. This status quo is both latent and manifest. Youth also recognise their importance and are willing to enhance their contribution. This goal must be developed and supported. Active multi-stakeholder and trans-disciplinary networking and collaboration are essential to enhance youth participation. Such responses should transcend from mere theory and promise to the practical level; and be inclusive. Political and financial will should be provided beyond ‘lip service’. Only then, will meaningful change be realised.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT The Sam Moyo African Institute for Agrarian Studies (SMAIAS) linked the author to focal persons in the farm communities created by the Fast Track Land Reform Programme and availed survey results of various districts in Zimbabwe. The focal persons were crucial in accessing the farm communities and in data collection. Professor J. Adesina, DST/NRF Chair, South African Research Chair Initiative (SARChI) -Chair in Social Policy, University of South Africa, provided a firm foundation for understanding land reform from a transformative social policy perspective. Ian Scoones of the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University, United Kingdom, an extraordinaire researcher on land and agrarian reforms, referred the author to his blog – Zimbabweland, where essential insights and debates on Zimbabwe’s land reforms are explored.

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Roca, M. de N. O. (n.d.). Youth and rural development in Europe-Policy issues and responses in the European community. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/docrep/ w9778e05.htm Rwodzi, F. (2017). Governance constraints to young people’s livelihoods in Zimbabwe (Unpublished Master’s Thesis). Sussex University, Brighton, UK. Sadomba, W. Z. (2008). War veterans in Zimbabwe: Complexities of a liberation movement in an African post-colonial settler society (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis). Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands. Schildkrout, E. (1978). Age and gender in Hausa society: Socio-economic roles of children in urban Kano. In J. La Fontaine (Ed.), Sex and age as principles of social differentiation (pp. 109-137). London, UK: Academic Press. Scoones, I. (2017a). How are the children of Zimbabwe’s land reform beneficiaries making a living? Retrieved from http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/04/childrenzimbabwe-land-reform-beneficiaries-making-living/ Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge, B., Mahenehene, J., Murimbarimba, F., & Sukume, C. (2011). Zimbabwe land reform: Myths and realities. Africa Today, 57(4), 125–129. Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge, B., & Murimbarimba, F. (2010). Zimbabwe’s land reform: Myths and realities. Oxford, UK: James and Currey Press. Soja, E. W. (2010). Seeking spatial justice. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. doi:10.5749/minnesota/9780816666676.001.0001 Somers, M. R. (2008). Genealogies of citizenship: Markets, statelessness, and the right to have rights. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Somers, M. R. (2008). Rights, relationality, and membership: Rethinking the making and meaning of citizenship. Law & Social Inquiry, 19(1), 63–112. doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.1994.tb00390.x Stephens, S. (1995). Children and the politics of culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Tekwa, N., & Adesina, J. (2018). Gender, poverty and inequality in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s land reform: A transformative social policy perspective. Journal of International Women’s Studies, 19(5), 45–62. Thorne, B. (1987). Re-visioning women and social change: Where are the children? Gender & Society, 1(1), 85–109. doi:10.1177/089124387001001005 Thorne, B. (1993). Gender play: Girls and boys in school. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Turner, B. S. (2001). The erosion of citizenship. The British Journal of Sociology, 52(2), 189–209. doi:10.1080/00071310120044944 PMID:11440053 United Nations. (2018). Youth 2030: Working with youth and for young people. New York, NY: United Nations. Walsler, F. C. (1991). Studying the social worlds of children: Sociological readings. London, UK: Falmer. Will, M. (2013). Contract farming handbook: A practical guide for linking smallscale producers and buyers through business model innovation. Berlin, Germany: German Agency for International Development Cooperation.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Agency: The capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. Agrarian Relations: Social relationships pertaining to land and agricultural production. Authoritarian Populism: Political structures and practices of seeking popularity through claims of representing the majority yet in real terms dominating and excluding them. Citizenship: The state of being vested with the rights, privileges and duties of a citizen. Fast Track Land Reform Programme: Quickest and most direct actions for changing land regulations, laws, customs, ownership, and so on. Gerontocracy: Rule of an entity by the elders. Human Rights: Moral principles or norms that describe standards of human life including rights and freedoms entitled to every human being.

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Positive Youth Development: Intentional actions for optimizing youth development and empowerment. Rural Politics: Actions or activities concerned with achieving goals through the use of power and control in a rural set-up. Social Cohesion: The degree to which members of a social system identify with it and feel bound to support its norms, beliefs, values, and so forth. Social Organization: The pattern of relationships between and among individuals and social groups. Social Policy: The social context of social wellbeing provided by the government in isolation or complemented by private and civil society organizations. Society: People who interact in such a way as to share a common culture. Society also have geographic meaning and may refer to people who share culture in a particular geographical location. Traditional Leadership: Leadership structures and practices where the legitimacy of authority comes from tradition and customs of a particular area.

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Chapter 12

Exploring the Concept of Youth Bulge From a Linguistic Perspective:

A Critical Discourse Approach Magret Jongore Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT The chapter tackles youth bulge according to a number of scholars. The analysis aims at bringing forth understanding of the concept from a linguistic perspective. In linguistics, any text can be analyzed using linguistic tools to unearth context, syntax, and semantics, pragmatic and socio-linguistic elements that inform it. Analysis of the likes of Callick, Hendrixson, Fantorpe, Collier, and others on youth bulge is done. Critical discourse analysis is used for analysis. CDA observes that texts are manifestations of politics. Texts are sites for struggle to maintain, influence, and persuade the general to respect the social order of the day. Thus, texts are replication of the society that reproduce them. Texts serve to maintain the powerful in their esteemed positions. Thus, texts are ideological and hegemonic in nature. Text reveals in language and visuals as signs, dress and artifacts. Thus, the chapter avails a number of standpoints of what youth bulge entails and institutes CDA to unravel politically and ideological permeated aspects of the concept.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch012 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Exploring the Concept of Youth Bulge From a Linguistic Perspective

INTRODUCTION Much talk is evident on and around Youth bulge as a concept. Remarkably is the fact that the West and the African voices on this issue are conflicting. The West in line with demographer’s discernment confer the concept as a curse. While African voices of the concept are inclined towards lamenting the exclusion of the youth in Governance and active participation in politics. Thus, from the incompatible analysis of the Youth bulge Concept, the chapter administers a linguistic scrutiny of this Concept. Moreover, little has been done in questing the language used in the critiquing of the Youth Bulge Concept. Or rather much of the literature laments the rapid increase in the youth without considering the socio-cultural traits of the African people. Therefore, a linguistic perspective quizzes the linguistic focus of the theory. The wording ‘Youth bulge’ literally speaks to the swelling of the youth population a phenomenon in most African countries. The swelling according to the youth bulge theory proponents is generally not desirable and a time bomb of some sort. This being the case, a linguistic perspective to the concept informs this Chapter in the sense that the wording and critiquing of a phenomenon is not neutral. The wording is loaded with ideological, hegemonic, manipulative and unequal power relations (Fairclough 2016). The linguistic analysis opinions concepts such as the “Waithood” Nader Kabbani (2019) closely linked to the Youth Bulge theory do not only speak to the situation on ground but act to provoke and set the agenda of the proponents of the theory. Thus, the theory much as it seeks to show the world over the glaring and imminent timebomb scenarios to befell Africa, the linguist come in with questioning the rationality, politics and ideological perspectives to the wording of the Youth Bulge Theory. The linguistic perspective here seeks to unravel politically permeated discourses imbedded in the crafting of the Youth Bulge Theory. The Chapter seeks to explore if it is Africa or the West that seeks to assert the Youth increase as problematic. Thus, in this disposition the chapter seeks as well to explain the discourse of Youth Bulge as a manifestation of unequal power relations, ideological and hegemonic tendencies of the West in propagating the popular reality of the day from their definition. It would be best at this juncture to give a brief background to the Critical Discourse Analysis a linguistic analytical tool instituted in the Youth Bulge Concepts in the Chapter.

Background of the CDA Approach Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a conceptual framework and a way of looking at text emerged in the early 1990s, following a small symposium in Amsterdam, in January 1991. Through the support of the University of Amsterdam, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak 248

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spent two days discussing theories and methods of Discourse Analysis, specifically CDA (Wodak, 2004). Jongore (2017) citing Wodak (2004) points out that, the meeting made it possible to confront the very distinct and different approaches, which have, of course, changed significantly since 1991 but remain relevant, in many respects. In this process of group formation, the differences and similarities were laid out: differences about other theories and methodologies in Discourse Analysis and sameness in a programmatic way, both of which frame the range of theoretical approaches (Wodak, 2004). From the symposium, CDA has been characterized by the shared interests in demystifying ideologies and power through the systematic and reproducible investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual). Critical Discourse Analysis researchers agree to attempt to make their positions and interests explicit while retaining their respective scientific methodologies and while remaining self-reflective of their research processes.

Critical Discourse Approach The choice of CDA as a theoretical framework stems from the thrust of the Chapters objectives, which seek to unravel unequal power relations and ideological inclinations in the Youth Bulge discourse. According to Wodak (1999: 8), the aim of CDA, unlike traditional forms of Discourse Analysis that are concerned with the forms and features of texts, is “to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language in use”. Ideology can be defined as an entire system of ideas, beliefs, and values, which provides a restricted view of the world. Ideology helps conceal social contradictions that lend legitimacy to those in power (Van Dijk, 1998). Van Dijk (1995: 17) remarks that “ideologies are typical, though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages, such as picture, photographs and movies.” Since every person has her or his ideologies, every person (demographers included) is affected by her or his ideological constraints as well as ideological constraints of the dominant players in society. What this translates to is that, the demographer/ youth bulge analyst can impose her or his ideologies on others in society through the propositions of what Youth bulge is said to influence and subsequently cause in society. This therefore, might be seen as skepticism prevalent of the youth bulge concept. This Chapter therefore, seeks to unravel the ideological inclinations, the subtle unequal power relations hidden in the Youth Bulge Discourse using CDA as both a theoretical framework and analytical tool.

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The Concept of Youth Bulge The Chapter observes the Youth bulge theory from a global view, regional and finally Zimbabwean perspective. Several proponents of the youth Bulge concept objectify that, the concept is closely linked to conflict, violence or crisis situation. The assumption is that when the expectations of young people are not met frustrations build, leading to mobilization or recruitment into armed movements Callick (1993). Youth, therefore is synonymous with trouble in this perspective. Thus, Youth Bulge has been used to explain the potential of conflict and some instances the concrete reasons behind conflict and crisis situations. According to Callick (1993) high population growth in Pacific Island countries are perceived as a developmental anomaly. Callick (1993) further, insists that limited sources and weak institutions, the social and economic costs of continuous population increase lead to doomsday. Daumerie (2008:2) opinions that, Demographers react to the disproportionate large numbers of youth in the demographic composition of any given country as the ‘Youth Bulge’ which is evidenced by a sudden change in the age structure of the population. The change shows a marked increase in the number of the young people.

What Are the Origins of This Youth Bulge Theory? According to Lionel Beehner (April 13, 2007) The term youth bulge was coined by German social scientist Gunnar Heinsohn in the mid-1990s but has gained greater currency in recent years. Credit is given to the work of American political scientists Gary Fuller and Jack A. Goldstone. These scholars argue that developing countries undergoing “demographic transition”—or those moving from high to low fertility and mortality rates—are especially vulnerable to civil conflict. “A large proportion of young adults and a rapid rate of growth in the working-age population tend to exacerbate unemployment, prolong dependency on parents, diminish self-esteem and fuel frustrations,” (Lionel Beehner, 2017). Lionel Beehner (2017) further insists that, while this kind of frustration and competition for jobs do not directly fuel violence, they do increase the likelihood these unemployed youths will seek social and economic advancement by alternative, extralegal means. On the same note, Heinsohn, (n/d) cited by Lionel Beehner (2017) points out that, this is especially the case among the youngest sons of a family, who are desperate for respectability and social advancement. “Envy against older, inheriting brothers is unleashed. So is ambition.

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Where Is Youth-Bulge Societies Most Prevalent Today? According to Lionel Beehner, (2017) populations mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Islands are most prevalent in the youth bulging reality. Lionel Beehner, (ibid) objectifies that, demographers say, sixty-two countries are considered “very young,” according to PAI, which means that two-thirds of their populations are under the age of thirty (and less than 6 percent are above the age of sixty). Countries that fit this profile include Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The Middle East, where 60 percent of the population is under twentyfive, is also susceptible to youth-bulge-related civil strife; as are countries with high HIV/AIDS rates. Lionel Beehner, (2017) further reveals that, “The pandemic,” according to this January 2006 CFR Task Force report on Africa, “has reversed a generation of gains in human development, hitting young and middle-aged adults of all socioeconomic classes and leaving a dangerous youth bulge.” In line with the crises of Youth Bulge is Hendrixson (2003), Kaplan (1994:46), Daumerie (2008:5) who concur in that, the speed of the population growth rate is responsible for creating both large youth bulge and increasing the risk for violence, conflict directly. These scholars further insist that, youth bulge contributes to disorder and lack of development. Kaplan (1994:46) further alludes to the fact that, “Youth bulge predictive analysts rely on various development indicators, high un-employment among youth as triggering mechanisms for involvement in conflict, violence or crisis situations. Youths are believed to see an opportunity cost for being violent less than that of being unemployed and rooming the streets (Daumerie 2008:5). Hendrixson, (2003) further proclaims that, the Youth Bulge Theory is a concept that identifies young men or women as a historically volatile and ever-increasing population. It explores the idea that the presence of more than 20% of young people raises the potential for rebellion and unrest. The concept specifically equates a large percentage of young men with an increased possibility of violence, particularly in the global South where youths often account for 60% of the population World Prospects: The 2010 Revision. Medium fertility scenario is used for the 2050 projections. In a country with a youth bulge, as the young adults enter the working age, the country’s dependency ratio-- that is the ratio of the non-working age population to the working age population—will decline. If the increase in the number of working age individuals can be fully employed in productive activities, other things being equal, the level of average income per capita should increase as a result. The youth bulge will become a demographic dividend. However, if a large cohort of young people cannot find employment and earn satisfactory income, the youth bulge will become a demographic bomb, because a large mass of frustrated youth is likely to become a potential source of social and political instability.

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Smaller families will improve our quality of life Solutions offered by the UN, African Development Bank and national governments to the youth bulge talk about how to return a ‘demographic dividend’ from this vast reserve of potential labour. One suggestion, from the World Bank and UN Development Programme, is that African youth should engage in agriculture. But it offers nothing on how young people will access land owned by elites. Minas Feseha (09 May 2018) assumes that, Youth in most developing countries are a demographically significant section of the population. Most ‘Youths’ see themselves as an outcast minority and they are treated that way, which has been a challenge to most developing countries. In the discourse on youth, the issue of the multifaceted exclusion of youth is routinely overshadowed by youth bulge concerns, which are illuminated by quantitative data and correlations, not the views of the youth. This has led to a tendency which views young people as an undifferentiated mass who lack the necessary conditions for transition from childhood to adulthood. The reality arguably is far more prosaic Minas (Feseha 09 May 2018).

Youth Bulge the South African Experience According to Tlou (2014) the Youth Bulge –Theory Assessing its implications for South Africa imparts that, the patriarchal mindset is not yet entirely eradicated from society. Political leaders continue to be treated as fathers, ruling through some sort of divine ordinance. In a patrimonial society, the participation of youths – as with women, the disabled and other vulnerable groups – has been reduced to that of children or servants, expected to serve and remain subordinate (World Bank, 2006). There are few youths in leadership positions. The reason why there is a correlation between a high youth population and a higher risk of violence is because the ageing leadership is reluctant to give opportunities to younger, educated people. Any gesture of self-determination is perceived as an act of rebellion, leading in some cases to incarceration, treason or worse. A contemporary example is that of the Economic Freedom Party’s (EFP) formation and financial restraints, which were arguably imposed by the Commission of Inquiry against Julias ‘JuJu’ Malema’s alleged corruption indictments and successive investigations after he castigated the African National Congress’s (ANC) failure to economically empower youth. Tlou (2014) retaliates that, under the dubious assumption that youths always make unrealistic demands, the security sector confronts youth with minimal remorse, especially when it is perceived that they are in disciplined and addicted to chronic violence. In South Africa recently, it has been reported that several youths have been killed in police shoot-outs in approximately 500 poor service delivery demonstrations which turned violent. In the words of Sachikonye (2011), in situations where the 252

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State has ceased to provide services to its citizens, its authority has to rely on the strength of the army and police. The disempowerment of youth is recipe enough for them to engage in violent demonstrations; a path which Southern Africa is recklessly treading.

Youth Bulge the Zimbabwean Situation According to Hillary Jephat Musarurwa (18 Feb 2018: 177-194) online Publication, whilst youth are energetic, willing to act and can be great change-makers, there are some hindrances to participation that they face. Chief amongst them is what Checkoway, (2011) in the article, ‘What is youth participation?’ terms ‘adultism’ or ‘mild ephebiphobia’. This is exhibited when adults take a position that they are better than youth and thus should prescribe solutions for them. This view is supported in McEvoy-Levy (2012)’s ‘Youth spaces in haunted places: Placemaking for peacebuilding in theory and practice.’ who also reports that adult idealism sees youth as lacking knowledge and experience thus leading adults to become unwilling to give youth any political space. Sometimes violence is employed to thwart youth participation. They are then seen as energetic and potentially dangerous elements that should be kept away from key decision-making processes. Resultantly, most, if not all, political parties across Africa are guilty of closing political space to youth. A few young people occupy positions within political party structures that are relevant in decision-making. However, they are relegated to youth wings or to less influential positions. Such tactics are common within the political systems of Zimbabwe too. The modus operandi is to socio-economically deprive the youth (Chitukutuku, 2014). Things youth in Africa consider important or valuable and how they inform youth participation in electoral and governance processes centers on youth exclusion from the limelight politics to peripheral issues which do not change youth’s status quo. Youth empowerment as a catalyst for peace, stability and national development is not in any way substantiated (Mercy Corps, 2011: 1-11). This renders them susceptible to exploitation and control by the ‘empowered’ few in the political hierarchy who have the political and financial muscle to ‘buy’ the energy of the youth. In some instances, when they do participate in these processes, their views are never taken seriously and are overridden by adults. This diminishes the desire by young people to take part in any discussions or events when they feel that they are just adding to the numbers (Chitukutuku, 2014). As a way to promote youth participation, Checkoway, (2011) in ‘What is youth participation?’ proposes that youth should be viewed as a vital source of information since they are ‘experts in being young’. This justifies the need for adults to give youth space and opportunities to meaningfully engage since the youth have the first-hand experience in current challenges they face. 253

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Aside from adultism, the youth themselves are to blame for the low participation levels due to lack of interest and their need to earn an income (Mercy Corps 2011). The youth fail to self-organise and rally together behind a few candidates from across the political divide who can champion for the prioritisation of youth empowerment in policies and initiatives – thus tackling youth exclusion and ensuring that their concerns are addressed in government. Other barriers hampering youth participation include: lack of financial resources, lack of capacity, lack of information, absence of a culture of positive engagement, uneven playing field for youth in political parties and security Agbiboa, (2015), Lührmann, (2013), Qasem, (2013), thus, young people are not being given equal opportunities to hold influential positions in political parties. Adults relegate the young politicians to youth wings in a bid to control them and at least be seen to be accommodating youth participation Chitukutuku, (2014). Another barrier to youth ascendance up the political hierarchy is the lack of the economic means to contest for positions given the low levels of participation by young people in economic activities. The security of young people in elections is not guaranteed and many elections have indeed been riddled by political violence. Resultantly, risk-averse youth will shun political participation in fear for their safety.

Zimbabwe and Youth Employment Issues According to an article by Veneranda Langa, Newsday August 10, 2016 ‘90% of Zim youths unemployed. The National Association of Youth Organisations (Nayo) says 90% of youths in the country are unemployed, with universities and colleges churning out graduates that fail to secure jobs. Nayo director, Misheck Gondo says the youth were concerned by the government’s failure to fulfil its 2013 electoral promise to provide 2,2 million jobs. “Youths currently face the brunt of unemployment in Zimbabwe, educated and qualified, yet without decent jobs,” he said in a statement. Newsday August 10, 2016 posits that, “Youth unemployment has reached catastrophic levels, with estimates at 90%, and owing to the youth bulge, youth have increasingly become disempowered and disengaged in national processes and are, thus, manipulated and exploited given their vulnerability.” Gondo said his organisation was worried that universities across the country continued to churn out graduates onto the streets with no prospects of decent employment. He said, with the ongoing social, political and economic unrest unfolding in Zimbabwe, the youths were mostly at the receiving end. “Nayo condemns in the strongest terms the recent wave of police brutality, gross violations of constitutional rights of citizens and the increasing intimidation targeted at activists, church leaders and citizens participating in various movements,” he said.

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Newsday August 10, 2016, insinuates that, Nayo-Africa is an umbrella body of 184 youth organisations in Zimbabwe. Gondo said youth organisations witnessed children being teargassed, massive selective application of the law and arbitrary mass targeting of youths in communities such as Epworth. He blasted partisan allocation of stands by the ruling party. “Nayo noted with sadness the recent events in which government property is being distributed along partisan lines. The recent allocation of stands to only Zanu PF youths (a section of youths) will not only act further to divide the already divided society, but it will also further reduce the level of confidence among young people in the body polity in charge of our political affairs, with selective application of development being exercised, a worrying phenomenon that needs to be condemned in totality,” Gondo said in (Newsday August 10, 2016). Newsday August 10, 2016 further points out that, “The youth group said this was against Section 20 of Zimbabwe’s Constitution, which points out the need for government youth programmes to be non-partisan and national in character.” In line with the Youth Bulge a Zimbabwean perspective, Reuters//Siphiwe Sibeko recuperates that, Zimbabwe’s youth are most affected by democratic processes, but they appear to be the least interested. For the most part, young people are apathetic when it comes to elections. While they’re the most affected by democratic processes, they appear to be the least interested in them. For example in Nigeria’s 2011 polls, only 52.6% of young people voted while in South Africa’s 2014 national elections, apathy was the reason for a registration level of just 33% for 18 and 19 year old’s. Reuters//Siphiwe Sibeko objectifies that, voter apathy of the youths is not unique to Africa. Across the world young voters are failing to turn up at the polls. Levels of youth participation are very low in the UK and Ireland and most of the southern European states like Italy, Greece and Portugal. In recent studies, effort has been made to set out the level of youth participation (as candidates, voters and activists) in Zimbabwe’s elections and governance processes, what restricts their participation and what can be done to support them. In these studies, youth has been defined as people aged between 15 and 35. Evidence showed that YOUTHS participation is low, hampered by restrictive political parties and a lack of three things – interest, information and funds Reuters//Siphiwe Sibeko. Reuters//Siphiwe Sibeko concludes by advising that, for youths to change this, there needs to be an effort to create political, structural and physical spaces that allow for their meaningful participation. This could, for example, include allocating quotas to young people and prioritising youth empowerment. South Africa’s two main opposition parties have done this well – young people lead the Democratic Alliance as well as the Economic Freedom Fighters

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Discussion of Youth Bulge Discourse Using CDA The analysis begins with the demographer’s perspective of the term Youth Bulge. The term was coined by German social scientist Gunnar Heinsohn in the mid-1990s but has gained greater currency in recent years, thanks to the work of American political scientists Gary Fuller and Jack A. Goldstone. They argue that developing countries undergoing “demographic transition”—or those moving from high to low fertility and mortality rates—are especially vulnerable to civil conflict. This observation is analyzed from the CDA perspective. Discourse as Social practice is perceived by Fairclough (2016) who constructed a useful framework for the analysis of discourse as social practice. This framework contains a range of different concepts that are interconnected in a complex three-dimensional model. The model observes that texts are a product of the society as much as the society is built around text functionality. The model also shows diagrammatically how interlinked text production and text consumption is in a society. In this model, discourse is not only seen as constructive but also as constituted. Central to Fairclough’s (2016) approach is that discourse is an essential form of social practice that both reproduces and changes knowledge, identities and social relations including power relations, and at the same time is shaped by other social practices and structures. Thus, discourse is in a dialectical relationship with other social dimensions. This projects the notion that discourse is not removed from what is seen to be obtained in a society. Discourse and social relations are typically in constant support. Fairclough (2016: 66) understands social structure as social relations both in society as a whole and in specific institutions, and as constituting of both discursive and non-discursive elements. What then are the implications of these observations? The implication is that the proponent of the youth bulge theory and the ones who empirically tested it are Westerners who happen to be very much perturbed about the developing counties time bomb in the face of low mortality and high fertility levels. What it means is the developing countries had to embarrass a cultural trend of the developed country of controlling births by controlling measures. The world observes a controlled population as the possible way of resolving the time bomb. The developing countries did not directly visualize a situation where the developed are to provide with solutions to their problem. This in a way is a means at creating a social order where the developing forever looks up to the developed for solutions, thus the developed create a situation conducive for them to land a hand. However, a hand being offered to determine the future of the developing countries, their sexual behavior and their proliferation patterns. The developing countries have to assimilate the developed cultural traits. A form of popular culture. The theory is not developed to explain the country of origin of the proponent’s population structure and implications for the structure. Why then the target is the developing countries, why not work on the demography 256

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of the developed and how best they can harness their leading position in socialeconomic realities. Thus, the theory can be viewed as a prescription for developing countries to desist from having a large number of children as it is detrimental and can contribute to social conflict and crisis. CDA postulates that, text is essential a form of social practice that both reproduces and changes knowledge, identities and social relations including power relations … here the proposition changes the perception of the developing countries especially of having more children for opulence and susceptibility. Therefore, the knowledge about the African and other developing countries about large families is changed. Their definition of a standard family and the identity of those who would be found wanting in terms of family size is as well changed. Thus, a proper family size would get its identity from the number of children it has. A family that would adhere to the prescribed number of children would be perceived as elite, modern and thus powerful. The more children the family has the inferior in terms of the societal position it would occupy. Therefore, the text in terms of this theory would work to create the kind of society that is acceptable within the western realities. In this vein, there are intensely available explanations why the society should trail the prescribed way as a way of avoiding the illustrious and imminent doomsday. Thus, the world is universalized in terms of procreation because of the proposed text in the form of the youth bulge theory. Unawares the western society is replicated in the third world societies. Thus, the theory helps in the reproduction of the kind of society familiar to the proponents and a must to every other society. The proponents of the Youth bulge theory/demographers thus, decided to have their perspective to life as a standard measure to proper living in both their countries and in the developing countries. The proponents pose as examples to reasonable and justifiable existence. Thus, they live as the role model of proper and just existence. This gives them an upper hand and would pose to influence the culture, ideology (worldview) of the developing countries such as Zimbabwe. Thus, the fewer the children the better position in the disarmed and cultural changed nation. There are unequal power relations in the copy cats and the real advocates of a practice. The copy cats’ losses their identity, knowledge and ideology and assumes that of the proponents. The universalization of the Western culture can also be substantiated by the target of the Youth Bulge especially where it says; Mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, southern Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Islands, demographers say. Sixty-two countries are considered “very young,” according to PAI, which means that two-thirds of their populations are under the age of thirty (and less than 6 percent are above the age of sixty). Countries that fit this profile include Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The Middle East, where 60 percent of the population is under twentyfive, is also susceptible to youth-bulge-related civil strife; as are countries with high HIV/AIDS rates. “The pandemic,” according to this January 2006 CFR Task Force 257

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report on Africa, “has reversed a generation of gains in human development, hitting young and middle-aged adults of all socioeconomic classes and leaving a dangerous youth bulge.” Look at the outcry which is articulating that the youths left of the Aids pandemic are dangerous. The vile talk exorcises the middle age and the old a phenomenon of the Southern Africa outcry on politics, youth participation and exclusion as central to the Youth Bulge phenomenon in these regions. Here the youth are seen as not the right people to have survived the enormous numbers of death as a result of AIDS. Instead of seeing this from the propensity point view, the theory sees it otherwise. A future generation marks the future of African nations. Instead of spreading an AIDS free future generation perspective, the analysis bemoans the survival of the young and energetic population. This therefore possess as an unbalanced projection of a futuristic perspective to Africa. Thus, more than depicting reality in the African nations provided, the theory sets an agenda of Africa without responsibility and Africa which is promiscuous as if the disease only manifests in Africa not in any of the First world nations. A tailor-made kind of reality designed to sell and glorify the Western thinking of the developing nations. The Youth Bulge theory observed from the South African and Zimbabwean perspectives laments not the size of the demography as such but participation of Youth in governance. It talks to the change in politics as the cause for violence. The voice of the many youths yearns for equity in the political space not in squashing birth to resolve scramble for the limited resources. According to Tlou (2014) the Youth Bulge –Theory Assessing its implications for South Africa imparts that, the patriarchal mindset is not yet entirely eradicated from society. Political leaders continue to be treated as fathers, ruling through some sort of divine ordinance. This perspective is coming from within and projects the looked-for of having a youth bulge in that it is the population with the contemporary trends and proficiency to resolve current trajectories. Therefore, from this perspective the theory is speaking not about the youth but for the youth. It is saying Africa should change her ways and usher in a new level-headed kind of political players who do not only see the many youths as annoyance but as a source for proper and opulence governance of the African Nations. This perspective is speaking to Africa to desist continuously looking up to old political leaders who are treated as fathers who are not dispensable. Thus, in this vein the Youth Bulge is used to crash the voices of youths in opposing the Political God Fathers. Thus, the leaders of Africa use the demographer’s expositions of what a young/youthful population is capable of doing in extending their tenue in office and close the political space for the youth participation in governance. Thus, the discourse of Youth Bulge in this vein is used for the continued existence of the Africa government and encompass dictatorship and oppression of the challenging Africa’s Youth Voice.

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This can also be substantiated by the militarization of institution as revealed by the News Day as it maps the political sphere of the youths in Zimbabwe. According to an article by Veneranda Langa, Newsday August 10, 2016 “Youth unemployment has reached catastrophic levels, with estimates at 90%, and owing to the youth bulge, youth have increasingly become disempowered and disengaged in national processes and are, thus, manipulated and exploited given their vulnerability.” Here the youth are vulnerable not revolting. The article further, articulates that the youths are being exploited by the old affluent and politically powerful to do dirty jobs for the old. Therefore, it is not the Youths that is the reason for violence neither is its large numbers of youths that is blamed for causing violence as in scrambling for the limited openings for employment. Rather the instinctive contention here is the fact that the government of the day being composed of mostly the old is failing to avail opportunities and create ventures that can consume the educated jobless youths. In Zimbabwe the youths up to this day have no documented evidence to the effect that the unemployed youth are taking to the streets to protest against unemployment. Rather like any other African nation the misgivings of the youth are exclusivity a phenomenon so rampant in the African governments. This observation is contrary to Lionel Beehner, (2017) cited above who alludes to the fact that, youth bulge related violence is caused by unprecedented rural –urban drift of the youth who are educated but do not have the necessary skills required in the job market. The source alludes to the mismatch between higher instructions and the industry as the cause for youth bulge despondence. These are just but assumptions of the proponents of the theory which is myopic in nature. A means to project a restricted reality to the African youth who do not fight in terms of numbers but in terms of participation and governance space which is not occupied by the youth but by the old chaperons. The rural-urban drift has been cited in the article is as if the rural areas in developing countries do offer opportunities to the youths. In developing countries, the young exempt the country side for greener pasture. The reason they go to school is to work in the industries which are only found in urban areas. Therefore, the critics of the Youth Bulge instead of addressing the root cause are only blaming the results. Today Zimbabwe is talking of Devolution by 2030, quite a visionary perspective but where are the youths, are the youths championing this devolution exercise such that the old are chaperoned by people who would be middle age then or it is a wishful perspective of the old taking the leading role as always? The text about the mismatch between the university graduates and the job market has been drafted to ostensibly talk about the youth yet it is attacking the governments of the developing countries that they are failing to carry out need’s analysis of the job market before designing courses to be offered especially in the Higher Education. Therefore, the youth bulge critics in this instance, are projected as unbiased, objective, authentic, powerful and informed to the extent of ruling out the credibility of the skills the youths get from 259

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their institutions. Thus, the discourse speaks of an ineffectual higher education system and ill-functioning governance that abound in developing nations. This therefore is in essence confirmation of how knowledgeable, powerful, esteemed the analysis is to poise as a factual observation yet it works to change the values, identity, ideology and the systems perspective of a people. The call is not for the youths to try and get home-grown solutions to their problems but rather a perceived anomaly from an outsider who then decides to offer his homegrown solutions. A degree offered in a county without sound economy cannot sale for there is no industries, institutions to render the skilled leant. Instead the youth bulge proponents should call the spade by its rightful name. Call upon African government to relinquish power to the young and informant rather than critic the demographic structures which on their own cannot address the economic crises African Nations and Zimbabwe in particular is in. Instead of having Youth Bulge discourse projecting reproachful discourse, where the description is focused on Africa’s demography, it is practical for the talk to engage Africa’s or rather the third world’s Youth Participation and Development Discourse. Participation of Youth in Developmental issues focus is on enhancing the youth’s potential for sustenance and taking the present status of the industry to greater heights for prosperity. The discourse of youth participation, sustainable development for the youth pave understanding rather than inciting violence. Therefore, the focus of the text producer in Youth Bulge discourse should endeavor to embrace youth inclusion in political involvement and closing the gap in adult and youth political space especially for the African Nations. The South African experience elucidated to earlier on is tackled by a Zimbabwean Tendaishe in an article posted on http://www.transconflict.com/category/southernafrica/ negates the Western or Demographers connotation in the youth bulge theory. The concern is more on the governance that should be extended to the youth. Just like the Zimbabwe Youth Development Report the writer laments exclusion of the youth in the executive positions. The imminent rebellion is of exclusion. The take from the bulge theory is the Eurocentric tendency of denigrating the cultural practices and embracing the modern and futuristic perspective. Thus, according to Tlou (2014) the patriarchal mindset is not yet entirely eradicated from society. Political leaders continue to be treated as fathers, ruling through some sort of divine ordinance. In a patrimonial society, the participation of youths – as with women, the disabled and other vulnerable groups – has been reduced to that of children or servants, expected to serve and remain subordinate (World Bank, 2006). There are few youths in leadership positions. The reason why there is a correlation between a high youth population and a higher risk of violence is because the ageing leadership is reluctant to give opportunities to younger, educated people. Any gesture of self-determination is perceived as an act of rebellion, leading in some cases to incarceration, treason or worse. 260

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Much as the youth laments exclusion in governance, the crude castigation of the elders in the form of the nation’s executives is not Afrocentric in nature but rather has Eurocentrism traits for example, where age is not respected but can be challenged at any point in time. The concern is equal rights in participation a concept difficult to infuse in an African philosophy. The text here fails to personify use of language and the relationship obtaining in the real African perspective and philosophy of respect or Ubuntu. This philosophy flows from a Nguni (isiZulu) aphorism: Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu which mean ‘a person is a person because of or through others’ (Tutu, 2004: 25-26; Moloketi, 2009:243). Ubuntu can be described as the capacity in African culture to express compassion, reciprocity, dignity, humanity and mutuality in the interests of building and maintaining healthy relationships. Ubuntu is integrated into all aspects of the day-to-day life of the African people. It talks to the core values upheld by Africans, especially the Black African people, values such as respect, peace, togetherness and responsibility. The application of the concept optimises the indigenous setting of an African. Contrary to the malicious allegation of naming African leaders as ‘Fathers’ who rule with divine powers. Therefore, much as the youth bulge theory in Africa relays concerns not similar to those projected by demographers, the issue of the Young being restless and volatile is observed in the discourse of the African youth bulge perspective. The discourse is informed by concepts such as equity, equality of participation, democracy which can be defined relatively. The definition of such words is determined by the context in which the word is used. Therefore, much as the African Youth Bulge concepts voice inconsistences in terms of focus, ideologically, the focus is the same. The African ‘Youth Participation in Governance is not Afrocentric for Africa much as it yells for freedom it does that from a collective voice perspective. That Africa should be free for the African perspective, today and the future. Not freedom targeting a sector of individuals but a cut-across-scenario which should have included youth not in the marginal but in the main organs of the government. Therefore, the language of the ‘Bulge Theory’ negates the sentimentality of an African discourse and assumes direct attack and cause and effect pattern of Western kind of discourse. Consequently, the limited resourcefulness of the African Bulge discourse to exhibit a true African discourse is further observed in the projected laments of ‘patriarchal society’. Especially where, Fantorpe (2001) argues that, these young people are neither recognized as valued citizens nor subjects, and that this process of exclusion starts long before the start of civil war. For the Zimbabwean context, however, the assertion can be contested for the government has the Ministry of Youth and there are Junior Parliamentarians, chancellors and even the junior President. The mainstream parliament has a number of legislators who are in their youthful stage according to the Zimbabwean youth policy which categorizes youth as 15-34 according to the Zimbabwe Youth Development Report (2015). Thus, much as there are glaring 261

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anomalies in the political landscape of Zimbabwe the discourse of replenishment and radicalism cannot be said to be part of the Zimbabwean discourse. Much as the politicians play around with hate speech to unseat their rivals, Zimbabwe as a nation is known to boost a peace loving and law-abiding citizenry. Tlou (2014) concretize his argument about Youth by further alluding to the fact that under the dubious assumption that youths always make unrealistic demands, the security sector confronts youth with minimal remorse, especially when it is perceived that they are in disciplined and addicted to chronic violence. In South Africa recently, it has been reported that several youths have been killed in police shoot-outs in approximately 500 poor service delivery demonstrations which turned violent More so, Tlou, claims that the proponents of the Youth Bulge Theory have used a kind of discourse in describing what they termed ‘unprecedented increase in youth’ as violent being dubious and is currently used to silence the peaceful demonstrations by the youth. Therefore, the Youth Bulge discourse in a way is being contested by Tlou in his (2014) article entitled The Youth Bulge –Theory assessing its implications for South Africa. An observation made by one Wangui Kimari 1 January (2018) is that, Africa is obsessed with talking about the ‘youth bulge’. Pundits and politicians are engaged in an endless conversation about the vast and growing population of young people on their continent, where there are set to be almost a billion under-18s by 2050. But the ‘youth bulge’ is not a neutral demographic discourse. It has become a highly suspect way of thinking about young people, inflected by long-standing preoccupations with African birth-rates and a dystopic image of ‘coming anarchy’. He further points out that this Youth bulge discourse is used to riddle African women for their fertility levels which are higher than that of their critics. In this vein, therefore, the youth bulge discourse is poised as ideological in the sense that it seeks to promote the world interpretation according to the Western lances. The discourse is as well hegemonic which alludes to the fact that forever the west in the formula of demographers are panacea for African problems therefore elite and powerful mind sets. Yet in actual fact the proponents of the theory are only but gambling with the one size -fit all description for Africans to propagate their agenda and their ideology. In Minas Feseha (09 May 2018) observations it is evident that the youth bulge is a sort of scape goat which is used by bad governance in justifying their exclusion of the youth in the mainstream governance institutions. Minas Feseha (09 May 2018) objectifies that, ‘Youth bulge’ discourse in the sphere of peace and conflict studies is often mistakenly understood as a cause-effect relationship, when it is better described as a correlation mediated by the impact of several intervening variables. In other

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words, it assumed that the youth bulge increases the risk of armed violence and such risk is mediated by the effect of two factors; structural conditions and social agency of young people. Structural conditions, similar to structural violence, refer to institutions or processes that create or assist in maintaining institutionalized and patterned systems of inequality and exclusion. This therefore, in the CDA perspective is a transcription assumed by developing nations governments for their continued existence. The Zimbabwean scenario would taking this line of argument reifies that, the violence projected in most public Media platforms such as National Broadcasters, be it TV, Radio or Newspaper blamed violence of any sort being in a way related to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a political party which has more in terms of supporters in the youthful age. In a nutshell, Minas Feseha (09 May 2018) contributions further remove the cause and effect relationship of the youth bulge and violence especially armed violence. The article insists that peace is not a result of low mortality but rather a matrix of variables which culminate to it. The same can be said of violence and youth bulge the two are not directly linked but rather there are some other variables that include exclusion and especially inequality and inequity in accessing resources and governing spaces that undoubtedly contribute to violence or provoke and exacerbate pending crisis.

CONCLUSION By and large the Chapter has made use of Youth Bulge theory as a transcript in appraising unequal power relations, ideological inclinations and hegemonic aspects of language in concreate use thus, discourse. The proponents of the youth bulge theory and the various interpretations of the theory have been forwarded and Critical Discourse Analysis instituted. The chapter reveals that, the youth Bulge Discourse is ideologically laden, hegemonic in nature and carries unequal power relations. The Developing Nations governments are understood to be backing the Youth Bulge theory in its raw state not for its contributions to the African array of problems rather for its ability to camouflage the issue of Youth exclusion in governance as solutions to the youth bulge fiascos in developing countries. Therefore, the analysts especially from the developing countries have proffered the imminent violence and war not as a direct link to the Youth Bulge as per ser, but rather as a result of the perpetual subdued political space of the Youth by adults. The chapter concludes by reacting to the fact that, violence and all other vices associated with youths come as a result of

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exclusion of the youths in strategic positions especially in governance, inequality to accessing resources and inequitable distribution of resources especially between the adults and the Youths age groups. Misappropriation of resources to youth has also been cited as emanating from disparities in allocation, accessing and utilization of the available resources as a scourge of partisan politics among youths who affiliate to different political parties.

REFERENCES Agbiboa, D. E. (2015). Youth as tactical agents of peacebuilding and development in the Sahel. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 10(3), 30–45. doi:10.1080 /15423166.2015.1082927 Beehner, L. (2007). The Effects of ‘youth bulge’ on Civil Conflicts. Council on Foreign Relations, 27, 1-5. Retrieved from https://mwi.usma.edu/staff/lionel-beehner/ Checkoway, B. (2011). What is youth participation? Children and Youth Services Review, 33(2), 340-345. doi:10.1016/j.childyouth.2010.09.017 Chitukutuku, E. (2014). Things youth in Africa consider important or valuable and how they inform youth participation in electoral and governance processes. In Mandela Institute for Development Studies (MINDS) annual youth dialogue in elections and governance (pp. 1–31). Johannesburg, South Africa: Mandela Institute for Development Studies. Collier, P. (2000). The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done about It. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Fairclough, N. (2016). Language and Power. London, UK: Longman. Hendrixson, P. (2003). The Youth Bulge: Defining the Next Generation of Young Men as a Threat to the Future. A Publication of the Population and Development Programme, Hampshire College. Jongore, M. (2017). An Exploration of Manipulative use of Language and Visuals in Selected TV Adverts. A Critical Discourse Approach (Unpublished PhD Thesis). UNISA. Kabbani, N. (2019, Feb. 26). Youth employment in the Middle East and North Africa: Revisiting and reframing the challenge. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/ research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-andreframing-the-challenge/

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Kaplan, R. (1994). The Coming Anarchy. The Atlantic Monthly, 275, 44–76. Lührmann, A. (2013). Enhancing youth political participation throughout the electoral cycle: A good practice guide. New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme. McEvoy-Levy, S. (2012). Youth spaces in haunted places: Placemaking for peacebuilding in theory and practice. International Journal of Peace Studies, 17(2), 1–32. Mercy Corps. (2011). Understanding political violence among youth: Evidence from Kenya. Retrieved from https://www.mercycorps.org.uk/sites/default/files/ research_brief_-_kenya_youth_and_conflict_study_0.pdf Musarurwa, H. J., Akande, O., Rukuni, T., & Musingafi, M. (2016). Strategies for non-violent action to address conflicts: A case of Zimbabwe. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, 6(18), 139–147. Retrieved from http://iiste.org/Journals/index. php/RHSS/article/view/33256/34155 Musarurwa, H. (2018, March 6). What’s stopping Zimbabwe’s young people from participating? Durban, South Africa: Durban University of Technology. Sachikonye, L. (2011). When A State Turns Against Its Citizens. Harare, Zimbabwe: Weaver Press. The Guardian. (2013). Zuma Booed at Mandela Funeral. The Guardian. The Zimbabwean. (2011, Nov. 16). Malema’s Woes Traced Back To His Links With ZANU-PF. The Zimbabwean. Tlou, T. (2014, Dec. 2). The Youth Bulge Theory - Assessing its implications for South Africa. TransConflict Southern Africa. Retrieved from http://t.co/eFkU0vyC6V Tutu, D. (2004). God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope for our Time. New York, NY: Doubleday. UNEP. (2012). Youth Involvement in Resource Wars is Cyclic. New York, NY: United Nations. van Dijk, T. A. (1998). Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach. London, UK: Sage. van Dijk, T.A. (1995). Text and Context: Explorations in the semantics and Pragmatics of Discourses. Linguistics Library, Longman. Veneranda, L. (2016, Aug. 10). 90% of Zim youths unemployed. Newsday.

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Wodak, R. (2004). Language, Power and Ideology. Language Arts & Disciplines-288. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing. World Bank. (2006). The Role of Youth in Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. Yifu, L. J. (2011, September). New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development. The World Bank Research Observer, 26(2), 193–221. doi:10.1093/wbro/lkr007 Yifu, L. J. (2012). New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development and Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Critical Discourse Analysis: A way of examining language not as grammatical tool but as how it is used in real life situation. The examination of language goes beyond a sentence construction to embraces meaning outside a sentence. It looks at the social aspect of utterances in terms of the political situation on ground. CDA observes that language is not neutral. Any language or wording is informed by the intention of the speaker who wants to influence the listen to see reality the way he sees it. The speaker also wants to be influential therefore have power to affect the way others think and handle themselves in everyday life. Discourse Analysis: In this chapter discourse refers to language in concreate use. That is language used by politician, demographers and any other speaker in describing a phenomenon. Therefore, the language which is in use has to be examined using language tools to examine the meaning of the wording. Hegemonic: A tendency of supporting the elitist perspective for continued existence of those in power. That is the executive fashions statutes instruments which will promote them and not threaten their occupation of their offices. The government of the day decides on what news to tell to the public that will make the public support them. Avoiding any talk that will pose problems or result in the public question the authorities that be. Banning all Media platforms that may result in threatening the elite. Ideological Inclination: A world view. The standard measure of what is proper and what is not proper what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. A subtle way of dictatorship. Dictating how reality should be observed and handled who should be influencing who and who is supposed to be politically powerful and supported all the times.

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Youth Bulge: The increase of the young people in an area as compared to the working class and the old age. The bulging of the young is because there is less infant dying of hygiene factors or ill health from malnutrition. Mothers are fertile such that they give birth to more children who survive. A pyramid kind of a population structure shows more under the age of 15-25. These are University and secondary school levers who are not being able to contribute meaningfully to the economy through either formal employment of political mileage.

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Chapter 13

Youth Participation and Representation in Community Governance at Cato Manor Township, Durban Ndwakhulu Stephen Tshishonga University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

ABSTRACT This chapter deliberates on youth participation and (mis)representation in community governance structures at South African townships. Youth participation entails active participation of youth in the policymaking procedures happening and problems disturbing their lives. Youth have the opportunity to influence their community governance structures. A study found that the current generation of youth are not aligned to the community governance structures. Youth participation and representation in community governance structures such as ward committees and community policing forums (CPFs) are essential as they could help youth fight issues such as teenage pregnancy, drug use, crime, unemployment, school dropout, etc. because they spend time in socially meaningful activities such as volunteering at different community structures.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-9388-1.ch013 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Youth Participation and Representation in Community Governance at Cato Manor Township

INTRODUCTION Youth participation entails actively participation of youth in the policymaking procedures happening and problems disturbing their lives (Farthing, 2012, p. 5). This chapter focuses on youth participation in community governance structures at Cato Manor Township. According to Shepherd (2010, p. 8), the government structures of communities in South Africa, show poor performance from youth generations especially when it comes to participating in the decision making of the local government. It is essential that youth participate in the decision making processes of the community structures, mainly because society remains supported once young people develop knowledgeable and considerate ideas in the community (Shepherd, 2010, p. 15). The assumption is that if youth at Cato Manor become full members of their community by fully participating in decision making, their community can perform better in terms of services and other factors that influence the development in rural areas (Chanza, 2014, p. 46). Youth engaging in community governance structures could influence the development of the environment within the community. Engagement helps cultivate the youth and youth associations that act as the core where peace can be promoted (Zeidin et al. 2007, p. 3). Youth are the partners and change operators in groups and associations, thus they pass on points of view, information and connections that prompt enhanced choices and more gainful activity. Young people in governance could be instrumental in promoting positive outcomes amongst young people. Participation in community governance provides youth with skills of active citizenship which include understanding how decisions are made and how to organise, plan and communicate (Navraciscis 2015, p. 5). Youth participation in community governance is essential since it helps youth fight issues such as teenage pregnancy, drug use, crime, unemployment and school dropout (Zeidine et al. 2007, p. 56). Youth affected by socio-economic challenges at Cato Manor made some of the young people not to want to participate in community governance structures (Mubau 2015, p. 55). Some youth have no time to be involved because they are privileged. The other challenge that is encountered by the youth is the communication barriers in semi-urban areas such as Cato Manor where useful information does not reach them. Most youth are not aware that they can take part in the decision making process, they believe that the decisions can only be taken by the traditional leader and councillors. They are often excluded by those who have authority. They still believe that ‘certain things are made for certain people’ (Kothari, 2009, p. 55). In most cases, young people’s participation in community governance structures is limited and one of the reasons given being that these structures are voluntary. The voluntary nature of community-based structures do not benefit them economically or financially unemployed and economically marginalised (Zeidine et al., 2007, 269

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p. 60). This chapter argues that without active participation and representation of young people in community governance structures, youth are unlikely to influence decisions for their own development. The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one grounds the chapter on the theoretical issues pertaining to community governance and youth participation. Second section profiles the background of Cato Manor and youth participation. Third section presents the finding and analsyis based on various sub-themes. The Fourth section points to the future research direction and lastly the concluding remarks.

BACKGROUND: COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE AND YOUTH PARTICIPATION Totikidis et al. (2005, p. 145) defines community governance as a community management and the decision making but it also implicates the broader aims of addressing the needs of the community and building community capacity and the wellbeing. Totikidis et al (2005, p. 145) states that the notion of community governance includes community participation, engagement and the decision making in public matters. The author adds that it is also related to the terms like local governance, social governance, network governance and participatory governance (Totikidis et al.2005, p. 145). Katsuri (2011, p. 324) adds that community governance is a community level management and decision making that is undertaken by, with or behalf of a community, by group of community stakeholders. For Halsall et al (2013, p. 113), community governance has a link to community development and it has been attempted in numerous nations as a method for poverty reduction. The authors define community governance to entail a blend of standards, procedures and structures in operation to secure request manages in perplexing and divided social orders, including assurance of key approach objectives, and the plan and conveyance of related arrangements, projects and administrations (Halsall et al, 2013, p. 113). Community governance plays an active role mostly in communities dedicated to cater for community needs (Jaffe and Dimitriadis, 2014, p. 15). Halsall et al (2013, p. 112) argue that community governance has both strengths and weaknesses especially to the emerging system of community governance. The real strength of community governance is seen more when judging the individual involvement in parts of the system. However the key challenge lies when one judges the overall system and each of the tasks. The other challenges of community governance is the fact that local change has been reduced and mainly driven by central government and the setting of national standards which contribute to delays response to local problems (Jaffe & Dimitriadis, 2014, p. 20). Halsall et al (2013, p. 15) argue that community governance could also be instrumental in a combination of rules, process 270

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and structures. Securing order which comprise rule, process and structures complex and fragmented societies, this includes the determination of the important policy goals and delivery of the important policies, programmes and service (Halsall et al, 2013, p. 15). McKinley (2013, p. 3) reports that in England community governance is not about the councillor only; in rural communities and market towns there are non-governmental organisations and traditional leaders who drive the communities Through community governance, there is a growing awareness to bring together the different influences affecting governance of the community ranging from the decisions made by central government agencies on how to deliver services, whose nature must be adopted to local circumstance to impact a range of other public bodies like community trust, energy trust, licensing trust and etc., to a situation that the effect which private sector services can have” (Walker et al, 2014, p. 27). Laibson and Sacerdote (2010, p. 35) point out that community governance has an important role to play in simulating communities. Bowles and Santa (2001, p. 223) see community governance as a key feature in the central and local governance because the approach can offer a strategic approach to individual communities. Furthermore Goodwin and Planter (1996, p.23) argue that the idea of governance within the context of British institutions is broader than that of government as it recognises that it is not just the formal agencies of elected local political institutions which exert influence over the pattern of life and economic make-up of local areas. McKinley (2013, p. 6) views community governance as a cooperative approach that defines community’s preferred futures and developing, implementing the means of realising them. Thus community governance may not involve one or more different tiers of government in practice, but may include civil society and private sectors’ interests. However, the key problem about community governance relates to the utility in the sense of improving understanding of how decisions that affects a community’s future are taken and implemented (McKinley, 2013, p. 6). Community governance could play a vital role and especially in creating a framework for securing success in a local area Halsall et al (2013, p. 117). This can be done by attracting funding from central governance. For example when there is economic crisis in a country, it could have an impact on community governance particularly at the local level. Furthermore community governance is seen as a concept which recognises the government as not always acting primarily in the interest of their communities or have the capability of achieving the outcomes of the community desires (Halsall et al 2013). It is also a concept which recognises that in today’s world the achievement of a number of what may be community priorities requiring collective action may lie well outside the proper role of central or local government (McKinley, 2002, p. 8). Participation is a learned activity in whatever context it takes place (Jeremy and Tucker, 1997, p. 81). Youth participation in modern society is associated with a social problem because young people are overly represented in juvenile offending, youth 271

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unemployment, and teenage pregnancy and drug issues in society. However youth participation could play a vital role in solving problems facing by young people and therefore bring young people back into the fold of society. It is important for young people to actively participate in activities aimed at empowering them and society in general (Jeremy and Tucker, 1997, p. 81). Youth engaging in the community governance structures could influence the development of the environment within the community. Such engagement could help cultivate the youth and youth association acting as the core where peace can be promoted (Zeidin et al. 2007, p. 3). Youth can become stakeholders and change agents in communities and organizations, by conveying perspectives, knowledge and relationships that lead to improved decisions and more productive action. Youth in governance promote positive outcomes amongst youth. It teaches the skills of active citizenship such as understanding how decisions are made and how to organise, plan and communicate (Navraciscis 2015, p. 5). Youth participation in the community governance is essential since it helps fight issues such as teenage pregnancy, drug usage, crime, unemployment, school dropout etc. because they spend time in socially meaningful activities such as volunteering at different community structures (Zeidine et al. 2007, p. 56). Imperatively, youth interests demand the inclusion of young people in organizations and choices that influence their lives (Checkoway and Guiterrez, 2006). Youth participation in governance implies that young people have reasonable admittance to and play vigorous role in making abandonments, setting policies and influence outcomes on matters relevance to their lives at the municipal, organisational, and program level (Checkoway and Guiterrez, 2006, p. 12). This implies that young people can become active and contributing members. Youth participation in community governance structures according to (Search Institute, 2005, p. 23) is not just a participation but it also have an impact on youth as they benefit from such engagement. Through their participation youth services could create opportunities for meaningful participation in their communities resulting in higher self-esteem which demonstrate greater commitment to friends and families. The Search Institute (2005) argues that youth participation entails that young people are active in the governance and can happens differently depending on the situation and the structure in which it occurs. Buck (2004, p. 6) argues that youth participation means youth are active in the decision making processes on issues that affect them, by promoting community development and play meaningful roles in addressing matters of relevance to them and influence real outcomes. They could also promote their own interests and have greater control over their lives. Youth participation in community governance structures could influence the development of the environment within the community. Participation helps cultivate the youth and youth association that act as the core where peace can be promoted (Zeidin et al. 2007, p. 3). As youth become stakeholders and change 272

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agents in communities and organizations, they convey perspectives, knowledge and relationships that lead to improved decisions and more productive action. Youth in governance promote positive outcomes amongst youth. It teaches the skills of active citizenship such as understanding how decisions are made and how to organise, plan and communicate (Navraciscis 2015, p. 5). Roche and Tucker (1997, p. 83) state that participation is the most important thing that adults must learn from young peoples as the unique contribution young people make. Participation amongst youth enables them raise many issues that affect them, it also enables them to see all the opportunities they have. Participation also builds confidence amongst young people, so it is important that they participate in their community governance structures because self-confidence is built on personal development and working within the group.

CATO MANOR AND YOUTH PARTICIPATION Cato Manor, a low-income township, seven kilometers west of Durban’s city centre, is also known as Umkhumbane (CMDA, 2002, p. 2; Walker, 2010; Lodge, 2011). The local residents of Cato Manor either walk or commute using the minibus transport (known colloquially as ‘taxis’, although they do not resemble meter cabs) to get to the city business districts. The close proximity to the city enables residents to find work more readily. Approximately 130 047 people reside in Cato Manor, which is about 1800 hectares in size (eThekwini IDP 2015/16). The population is wholly African, and made up of a diverse number of ethnic groups. The majority are Zulu, then Xhosa, Sotho and Ndebele, followed by groups from other African countries (Edwards, 1994). In the past, Cato Manor was the site of crime and violence, contestation, conflict resistance struggle (Desai, 2014, pp.35 & 37). However, it now serves as a site for formal and informal housing. It is worth noting that in the past Cato Manor was cleared by the apartheid government. Even though the land is being used for human settlement now, there is still an issue with safety in the area. The settlement tends to flood, creating landslides and unsanitary environmental situations (Edwards, 1994). Cato Manor was named after George Cato, the first mayor of the Durban district in 1865. Cato acquired the land to farm at the turn of the century, but it was subsequently divided into smaller farming plots and sold to landowners. Later, the Indian market gardeners either rented or bought this land for agricultural use (Maharaj & Makhatini, 2004). In the 1920s, Zulu-speaking Africans came to settle at Cato Manor and set up distilleries. They made and sold beer on the streets of Durban to create a living for themselves. This influx of people brought with it advantages, as well as some concerns for the municipality. The labour force was a 273

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welcome addition to the growing industry, but the growing numbers of Africans in the city became a worry to the authorities. According to Walker (2010), the Durban administrative system involving compulsory passes and permits for Africans was enforced so that they may stay in the city zones. This meant that Africans could only stay in designated areas if they held permits. It is said that from the 1870s until the mid-1960s, Cato Manor was one of the urban spaces that enabled a black presence in Durban outside the ‘archipelago’ of spaces created and managed by white authorities (Pithouse, 2016, p. 241). It was during the early 1990s that Cato Manor started to become re-populated and a growing demand for new infrastructure was needed. Cato Manor’s needs had been abandoned for some time at this point. The transition to the democratic dispensation necessitated three major interventions, which resulted in bringing underdeveloped Cato Manor within inner city governance (Walker, 2010, p. 259). The first intervention took place through a series of land invasions orchestrated by settlers with local backing from the ANC. This increased the number of shack dwellers to twenty-eight thousand (28 000) (CMDA, 2002, p. 3). Maharaj (2004, p. 36) notes that from the 1980s onwards immigration into Cato Manor increased. The Cato Manor Development Association (CMDA, 2002, p. 3) reports that the immigrants included the previously 50 per cent displaced from political violence in other townships and elsewhere and those seeking accommodation closer to employment centres. This, in turn, had led to further land invasions and overcrowding of the area (Makhathini, 1994, p. 57). The second intervention was through redevelopment initiated by the Transitional Metropolitan Council of Durban (now known as eThekwini Municipality) launched under the auspices of Cato Manor Development Association (CMDA) in 1993 (Walker, 2010, p. 260). The CMDA was created to develop new infrastructure for Cato Manor, and the “City within a City” scheme that was devised. This was new infrastructure for Cato Manor to make an efficient system to incorporate its lowincome population into the transition (CMDA, 2002, p. 4). The redevelopment of Cato Manor was designated a Presidential Lead Project in 1995 and it had substantial financial support from an international donor, the European Union (Walker, 2010, p. 260). Cato Manor has been described as a contested landscape, especially for those who had been dispossessed of their land in the 1960s, for the poor of the 1990s. This including refugees from the political violence that engulfed KwaZulu-Natal province in the early 1990s as well as the emerging elite who were eager to make a political mark in building a democratic South African society (Walker, 2010, p. 180). The history of Cato Manor left bitter memories with scars still visible through underdevelopment and a vicious cycle of deprivation compounded by land invasions. It is not surprising that the third intervention was anchored on land 274

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restitution as a strategy to redress the land issue. In pursuing their land claims, the claimants formed the Cato Manor Action Group (CMAG), aimed at expediting the negotiations for land restitution within the context of redevelopment. CMAG was formed in 1992. It is also reported that by 1993, a group of 419 dispossessed landowners lodged land claims for Cato Manor, However, the CMDA anticipated that land claims, especially by the wealthy and privileged section of society (for example, some middle class Indians and other middle classes), could be a stumbling block in the redevelopment of the area. Land claims for Cato Manor in the KZN Regional Land Claims Commissioner (RLCC) were dominant hence. Walker (2008, p. 157) reports that by May 1998, a total of 6,639 of the appropriately 7,000 claims lodged in KwaZulu-Natal were urban, of which 4,871 were for greater Durban and 3,412 for Cato Manor alone. The CMAG blamed the CMDA for cruelly pre-empting their prospects for land restoration, while the CMDA accused the CMAG of serving individual interests and retarding redevelopment in Cato Manor (Walker, 2010, p. 262). However, the CMDA affirmed restitution as a matter of public interest and, hence, committed to the possibilities for accommodation of claims for restoration within the development framework (CRLR, 1996, pp. 39 & 29). In this context, the dilemma was to balance the rights of the historically dispossessed and the imperatives of development (Walker, 2010, p. 265).

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS Youth Perceptions of Participation Given the background of Cato Manor it is to deduce that youth are the least problem in the area. Youth has been left out in many areas of decision making that affect their lives yet evidence shows that their participation plays a pivotal role in activating young people activism in sectors such as health, housing, education, economic, politics and environment. Sector-based participation by young people is fundamental in claiming their rights as active and responsible citizens, a segment of population who can be trusted not only to demands rights, but also take responsibility. Youth participation demands equal representation, empowerment and deliberation of issues pertaining to society in general and young people in particular. The following comments attest to the holistic conceptions of youth participation: •

Politically: In essence participation by youth involves the willingness of young people in taking part in decision making processes, either within the political parties, community based organisations or community-based

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Youth Participation and Representation in Community Governance at Cato Manor Township

•

•

structures such as Brach executive committees (BEC), ward committees, Sport or Community-policing Forums (CPFs) (Interview, 20 January 2019). Economically: Considering that Cato Manor like any other Townships in South Africa is rife with poverty, unemployment, income inequality, economic participation as one way for youth to get engaged in income generating projects, either formal or informal initiatives. To be honest these activities not only involved legal (Interview, 2 January 2019). Socially: With the advent of information technologies, your people make use of gargets such as Cell phones, Twitter, E-mails, Instagram, for interaction, mobilising and as a platform for sharing political, economic ideas locally and internationally Interview, 3 January 2019).

As demonstrated above, youth participation is not only confined to politics in the form of voting, but also encompasses their engagement in economic endeavours in the form of entrepreneurial activities as well as socially partaking on social media for interaction and expressing their issues and dissatisfactions. Diverse spaces available either those provided by the state also known as invited spaces or invented-popular spaces (Cornwall, 2002 & Gaventa, 2004) are key in promoting youth participation within community governance structures. Cornwall (2002, p.18) shows differences between three types of interaction space namely: invited, open and closed spaces. Closed spaces would be selective of membership for the purpose of decision making, and the public barred from entry. There are invited spaces set up by the state for citizens to participate via their various forums. Participation through these spaces is invited, especially by government and other development agencies (Cornwall, 2002, 2004; Gaventa, 2004, 2006). Within eThekwini municipality, which Cato Manor is one of the townships, these spaces involve structures such as ward committees, Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and Community-based Plans (CBPs). Most of the youth interviewed expressed their dissatisfaction about these government centred spaces and they mentioned that the agenda of the inviter and the processes followed are not often pro-young people. As said by one of the youth: Young people are painted and understood as troublesome and as such even if we attend community meetings, our views are always sidelined adults dominated community structures. This together with other challenges faced by young people further widens the intergenerational gap (Interview, 25 January 2019). Sinwell (2010) defines ‘invited’ spaces as formal channels of participatory democracy. Regularised interaction is a condition when the state engulfs the citizenry, according to Cornwall. Davids (2005) states that lack of effective ways to become 276

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part of the control infrastructure to ensure good service delivery causes dissention amongst the people less catered for as they become more frustrated. Dawson (2009) also states that the platform allows the government to consult the citizens directly. In this way, all the socio-economic and political functions are known amongst both parties. These three types of spaces according to Brock et al. (2001), cited in Cornwall (2004, pp. 1-2), characterise intermediary institutions that government provides, whether in response to popular demand, donor pressure or shifts in policy. According to Cornwall (2004, p. 2), invited, closed and open spaces are open for discussion or communication and more durable in providing regularised institutions. Invited and open spaces are state-created spaces that assume various roles and responsibilities such as regulating who participate; further, they deal with the question of accountability, legitimacy and representation. In addition, invited spaces offer the potential for reconfiguring relations of rule and extending the practice of democracy beyond the sporadic use of the ballot box (Cornwall, 2004, p. 2). This, according to Cornwall (2002), can be ‘empty spaces’ especially, in the context where a marginalised group fails to populate an official invited space. Ballard (2008, p. 180) argues that invited spaces of participation serve to demobilise, rather than mobilise and such spaces may assimilate poor people into the prevailing order and serve to maintain neo-liberal hegemony (Cornwall, 2002). Cornwall (2002, 2004) refers to them as ‘pseudo democratic’. Invited spaces are also criticised as sites for domesticating participation and, as such, can prevent excluded and marginalised people from participating meaningfully (Mohanty, 2007). Young people are at receiving end when it comes to benefit from the decisions made within community based structures. Thus, without both their representation and participation, youth voice dwindles and their issues are pushed to the periphery. The third set of spaces for participation is known as ‘claimed’, created or popular. They refer to arenas populated by less powerful citizens or actors, particularly by those who are against power holders (Gaventa, 2004, p. 35). These spaces in essence became platforms to inform and educate authorities on issues inadequately addressed (Cornwall, 2004; Gaventa, 2004). Gaventa (2004, p. 35) notes that participation platforms are also a means by which the population can stand for or against policies, or control foreign action influencing their lives. For example, at Cato Manor-Crest, young people in claiming housing citizenship, staged various protests, making use of popular spaces such barricading the roads, burning tyres and matches. Social relations become dynamic and energetic as different parties join, leave, hold forums and debate the various socio-economic issues and solution strategies. A ward committee member in charge of youth, Gender and Vulnerable Groups highlighted that:

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Youth participation in Cato Manor is complex and is often complicated by bread and butter issues. Young people are disengaged in productive activities that add value in their lives such attending schooling and get involved in projects that can generate money for their livelihood (Interview, 16 January 2019). Miraftab (2004, p. 1) defines invited spaces as the ones occupied by those grassroots and their allied non-governmental organizations that are legitimized by donors and government interventions and adds that they are spaces occupied by grassroots and claimed by their collective action, but directly confronting the authorities and the status quo. At Cato Manor, young people have been at the forefront in challenging local leadership particularly the alleged maladministration, corruption and nepotism relating to awarding tenders and jobs to friends and relatives. The failure of participatory democratic spaces to provide participation is associated with power and how such power is distributed, especially among the poor and marginalised (Arnstein, 1969, 2011; Michel, 2011). Cato Manor youth expressed their disempowerment, yet without skills to secure employment landed up in the periphery of mainstream economy and society. In particular, this entails power to influence decision-making processes and to determine redistributive power and control. People use participation to influence and control the decisions that affect and emanate from engagement. Saxena (2011, p. 31) argues that the essence of participation lies in exercising a voice in the midst of inequalities and injustices.

Youth Participation Through Elections Elections are counted among some of the pathways for youth participation and engagement in local and national politics. Young people are a critical factor in any society in a democratic transition hence efforts in mobilising and election campaigns form the core of the process towards demarcating societies. Levin, Kepe & van Lieres (2016) argue that a young democracy like South Africa depends on critical and conscientised citizens who are well aquatinted on political, social and economic issues and are further aware of their rights and their responsibilities. As highlighted by the Southern African Catholic Bishop’s Conference (2016), the interest in the youth’s electoral participation is informed by the growing interest of young people in the country’s politics and their role in it (SANGONe, 2014). Young people exercise their citizenship through voting at local government elections. In a democracy such as South Africa, an election plays a critical role as a preliminary mechanism for establishing formal political structures in a country more particularly at the local government level. Blondel (1995, p. 180) argues that “elections are the key mechanism … [of linking people and government and] … the only way in which the bulk of the population can express its support for a party 278

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rather than another. They are therefore perhaps the most fundamental and the most distinguishing features of modern governments”. Van der Waldt (in Van Niekerk, et al., 2001, p. 110) posits that “an election is the predominant formal mechanism of political participation in the modern world.” Local government elections are when citizens choose political leaders for local and administrative departments. Apart from the Constitution which guides subsequent pieces of legislation (e.g. Child Act, National Youth Policy, National Youth Commission and the Umsobomvu Fund) were promulgated as mechanism for youth development (Jamieson & Du Toit, 2015, p. 16). However, Maphunye and Tshishonga (2013) argue that such policies are either silent or say very little on the role of youth in the election although the information on this social group can be surmised on closer examination of such legislation. Pertaining to the youth role in a democracy and democratic citizenship (Maphunye et al, 2014), especially given South Africa’s local elections, the pertinent question to ask is: is an election a panacea or magic solution to the myriad problems facing the youth, as earlier outlined? This question cannot be answered in a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ binary – given the intricate dynamics of the youth role in a democracy and society generally. Youth are not homogenous group hence they can be classified into the following categories: rural-urban, race, gender, politically ‘active’ / ‘passive’ different socio-economic status, belief and belief systems. It is therefore apparent that for these binaries to be closed, citizen participation based on citizen power (Arnstein, 2011) with the distribution of power by young people to take initiatives aimed at improving their decision making capabilities. This implies the radical departure from a welfarist to developmental approach to youth development as espoused by The National Youth Policy (NYP) for 2015–2020. The strengths of the youth is found in virtually all the 20859 IEC voting stations in all the country’s municipalities, from 2000 to the 2016 elections. This prompted the IEC to challenge the global trend of a lack of participation of young people [in elections] by gearing their campaigns towards this group and working closely with youth organisations,” (IEC, nd, p.7). Accordingly, breaking the trend where young voters are often persuaded by traditional political divisions (Herzenberg, 2012, p. 95). IEC (2011) has registered 25,4 percent of young people between the ages of 18 to 29 years olds voted in the 2011 municipal elections. Despite the youth having the potential to bring dynamism in 2011 municipal elections, their participation in elections did not alter their socio-economic situation (Herzenberg, 2012, p. 95). Since the 2000 local elections, young people 18-35 have been showing increasing enthusiasm to vote though at times such enthusiasm was uneven throughout the last four local elections (2004, 2006 and 2009. Surprisingly, by February 2011, it was reported that 11.4% of the South Africans on the Voters’ Roll were young people … [and that] …About 53% of people aged between 20 and 29 [had] already registered [to vote in the 2011 local elections,” (SAPA, 02/02/11). Elsewhere in the world, 279

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as observers note, “Behind such big numbers lies a lot of power and influence in determining the political direction of in our countries. Today’s youth are leaders of tomorrow. Increasingly, the youth are looking for a voice in the way they are governed,” (IFES, 2011). In Canada for instance: the youth argue that: “elections are about deciding what’s important for us. It’s a chance for each of us to have a say in the direction our government should take and what the future of our province should look like,” (Students and Youth, 1/8/2011 www.elections.bc.ca). In South Africa, the youth have already demonstrated convincingly what a formidable force they can become at the national if they remain united; but such action must now be cascaded to their local authorities once elections are over. However, their political participation in different structures has not translated into implementable policies that transform their lives for the better. Young people through created social media demonstrated their willingness to vote, but were adamant on candidates worthy to represent their interests and needs. They blamed the politics of the stomach for the underdevelopment and deterioration of their residential areas. Lack of visionary, competent and corrupt leadership was cited as to be a fact in deactiving young people to vote and further actively engages in community activities post-elections. Almost a decade ago, Southall and Mattes (2003, pp. 81-104) in their study examined a paradox whereby “… surveys show that South Africans participate in politics in between elections at a much lower rate than many of their neighbours in Southern Africa”. Probably, the youth in South Africa might also be subject to this phenomenon and possibly choosing to ignore their ward committees, local councillors and the whole gamut of activities in their local areas such as the IDP processes in between major elections (Piper & Chanza, 2006, p. 19). This being the case, then the power of the youth to affect any meaningful and sustainable influence or impact at the local level would be effectively emasculated. One way through which the youth can meaningfully participate in elections and the overall democratic process is by knowing their local structures and leaders, engaging them continually, and by participating actively in local economic and other development initiatives of their areas. In this way, this may help them to (i) register their plight or concerns in local leadership and policy structures; and (ii) hold their local public representatives accountable; and (iii) register their ability as a formidable youthful force to undertake alternative actions show their concerns not be addressed in these formal structures. In this regard, Scott et al, (2012, p.21) argue that nurturing young people’s engagement as citizens and early political participation should also contribute to developing a constitutional connectedness within society, 280

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traditionally exemplified by the voting process. Youth citizenship is associated with forging youth identity with sense of belonging and such attributes could led the realisation of their full citizenship through exercising agency all sphere of life (Burns & Jobson, 2015). This requires nurturing through active citizen participation which is a cardinal principle of representative democracy. Among others, such participation requires commitment and patience. If one were to rely solely on numbers, youth participation in the elections (using the 18-35 age categories) as an indicator, the situation is not gloomy. For the 2011 local elections, by February this year 11.4% of South Africans on the voters’ roll were young people (SAPA, 02/02/2011). A comparative overview of the election register or voters roll for the 2000, 2006, 2011 and 2016 elections suggests that there was an overall improvement in the youth participation in elections. However, youth participation in elections and democracy is clearly beyond a numbers game and therefore the pertinent question to ask here is: what happens once the candidates have been elected and once they occupy their positions in the local or metropolitan councils. In South African, there is a trend of leaving everything to the public representatives without engaging with them only to participate vigorously in public demonstrations. Young people are equally implicated in this apathetic trend hence the need for youth to rethink their role beyond social demonstrations only when things are wrong. In this regard, Scott et al, (2012, p. 21) argue that nurturing young people’s engagement as citizens and early political participation should also contribute to developing a constitutional connectedness within society, traditionally exemplified by the voting process.

Youth Participation and Representation in Community Governance Structures There are various structures which youth could participate at Cato Manor such as ward committees, community policing forums, street committees, sports council, and business forums. These structures are created in order to enhance democratic participation and active citizenship within the respective ward communities. One of the important structures is ward committees which were created to serve as a bridge between the council and the people through ward councilor. According to Denters and Rose (2005, p. 79) ward committees are a formal mechanism to activate ‘interactive governance’, but evidence shows that there is always tension between the invited and invented spaces of participation. Zuern (2011, p. 142) argues that ward committees are meant to institutionalise the best of participatory democracy and community activism, in a manner similar to that achieved by civic associations during the anti-apartheid struggle. In this case, Zuern (2011) posits that while formal democracy exists in South Africa, it is the everyday experience 281

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of democracy that really matters to people. Importantly, Piper and Nadvi (2010) view the ward committee system as an ‘invited space’, in which government creates formal spaces for participation that legitimatise participatory processes and enable public participation to take place, while at the same time neutralising resistance. Both councilor and ward committee more particularly at Cato Crest (ward 101) have been used to suppress freedom of expression, thus targeting the informal dwellers under the auspices of Abahlali-baseMjondolo (ABM). Due to the lack of housing at eThekwini Municipality, young people at Cato Crest took upon themselves to invade vacant land to elect informal settlements (Pithouse, 2016). Attempts to evict them resulted in clashes involving shack dwellers and the law enforcement unit, elected councilor and ward committees. Young people in wards 29 and 101 were vocal in airing their grievances against the councilors whom they accused of being corrupt and giving jobs to those who are politically connected to the ANC. According to the Municipal Structures Act (1998), each ward is expected to elect 10 members from the community through democratic processes. Within all the ward committee structures, young people are mis and under- represented The ward committee’s main tasks are to communicate and liaise with the community in respect of development and service plans (Nyalunga, 2006). The ward committees are responsible structures in disseminating relevant information pertaining to municipal process, decision making and projects to all members of the community. For example, there are various ways of keeping citizens informed such as regular public meetings, radio, newspapers and informing other community based organizations. Putu (2006), states that ward committees are responsible for community mobilisation and lobbying public participation in identifying and prioritising their developmental needs. The ward committees use needs based approach to identify the needs, problems and resources within the community. This structure gives community members at grass roots level platform to gain power and control resources within their jurisdiction or local areas which enhance assets based community development. Youth participation in Cato Manor depends on their election into these institutionalised-community based structures. Table 1. Ward committees and youth representation No of Youth

Age

Gender

Ward 24

1

30

Ward 29

1

28

Ward 30

1

male

Ward 101

1

male

Source: Author’s analysis

282

male female

Portfolio

Youth Participation and Representation in Community Governance at Cato Manor Township

Other structures relevant for youth participation are the community policing forums (CPFs). CPFs are structures created by ward communities with the assistance of local police department, and their primary role is to work in partnership with police to curb crime. Considering that Cato Manor as a whole is crime ridden township, uprooting it remains a priority. Most of the people implicated in crime related cases are young people, with mugging, house breaking and car hijacking being among the key committed crimes. What makes the situation worse is that despite youth involvement in criminal activities, youth are under-represented in community policing forums across Greater Cato Manor. The widespread of poverty and unemployment attribute towards young people resorting illegal activities for their livelihoods. According to Twenty Year Review (1994-2014, p. 75), these young people are part of society and are vulnerable to social risks such as violence, crime and subsistence abuse. Social risks such as substance abuse have the potential to affect gains made in HIV prevention among young people. The endemic nature of poverty and unemployment do not only led to crime but also forced young people to assume reflective violence (Quanta, 2016, p. 76) as the preferred method of engagement. This situation is exacerbated by social dislocation young people suffer with erosion of values stemming in part from declining capacity of family to function.

CHALLENGES FOR YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY STRUCTURES There are various factors that prevent young people from participating in community governance structures. Young people are often subjected to a multitude of under representational processes which prevent them from engaging in a range of institutions, processes and settings. Some of the reasons are that youth from good backgrounds do not see the need to participate in the community governance (Mubau 2015, p. 55). Roche and Tucker (1997, p. 81) add that there is a minimum base of knowledge necessary for effective participation in the political process. The authors argue that participation in constitutional politics is more difficult for the new generation of young people because of lack of opportunities. The increase in the market-oriented of education system, the removal of social security and a punitive response to juvenile offending contribute in reducing choices of young people. Young people in modern societies do not have access to economic opportunities such as employment, hence the increasing number of unemployed graduates. The other challenge that is encountered by the youth is communication barriers. In semi-urban areas such as Cato Manor, vital information does not always reach youth. Most youth are not aware that they can take part in the decision making processes, they believe that the decisions can only be taken by the traditional leader and councillors. 283

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Without their involvement youth are excluded by those in authority. Young people have a belief that ‘certain things are made for certain people’ (Kothari, 2009, p. 55). In the case of Cato Manor, young people who are not affiliated to political parties are autracided from socio-economic opportunities within the wards. Furthermore Roche and Tucker (1997, p. 85) state that the process of helping young people to tap their own power and abilities is important in facilitating their participation. The problem is that the culture of young people’s participation in a society is not well developed particularly due to lack of structures for young people’s participation. Youth have the opportunity to influence their community governance structures. A study done by (Felts, 2013, p. 201) found that the current generation of youth are not aligned to the community governance structures. This is evidenced by the low level of participation in the community institutions, low voter turnout among youth. Furthermore, despite their lack of participation in the formal local government, it is youth that lead the protests over service delivery, jobs opportunities, crime etc. without taking part in the community decision making processes. There are community governance structures at Cato Manor such as ward committees, street committees, community policing forums, youth leagues of political organisation and business forums; however youth under-representation and participation remains a challenge. However, these structures are dominated by adults whom the youth accused them of marginalising them especially when it comes to decision-making. The problem is often exacerbated by the stigma attached to young people and their capacity to make rational decisions; hence the (UN Habitata 2012) argues that youth are regularly seen as issue or chance and as inconvenience (Ansell, 2005). Consistently this kind of speculation abridges youngsters’ potential for positive commitment in the community. At Cato Manor, young people are deprived of opportunities that could enhance their chances to engage in community governance structures as agents of their own development (Johnson, 2011). Additionally, at Cato Manor, the scepticism attached to young people push them to the periphery of decision making processes especially with regards to developmental service delivery. Often times, decisions are imposed on young people as opposed to engaging them as capable people, people with capacity to make informed decisions aimed at empowering themselves and communities alike. Without opportunities for youth to advance socially, economically and politically, young people continue to be underdevelopment with limited skills to play a meaningful role in a developmental society like South Africa. Thus, failure to elevate youth to be at the centre of the community governance structures translate to their demotivation and deactivation in getting involved in community governance issues. The youth at Cato Manor are particularly affected by unemployment, low levels of education, lack of proper housing and opportunities, leading to poverty and crime (Felts, 2013, p. 206). Although some youth have formal education they still lack 284

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specific technical skills that could enable them to secure their livelihood. Since the youths are underrepresented in their community governance structure, it is almost impossible for them to be able to have their voice heard particularly on issues that affect them. Other challenges that the youth are faced with are cultural barriers that stop them from taking active roles socially, economically and politically. Culture dictates that young people should listen rather than contribute to anything meaningful. At Cato Manor, young people do not get enough opportunities to allow them to engage in activities that allow them to be agents of their own and their community governance successes (Johnson, 2011). For youth to deal with these challenges, it is essential that young people participate in the decision making of the community structures, mainly because society remains supported once young people develop knowledgeable and considerate residents in the community (Shepherd, 2010, p. 15). Young people in Cato Manor Township compared to their urban counterparts are the victims of the legacy of apartheid, including the Bantu education compounded by limited job opportunities. These factors in one way or another hinder young people to become full members of their communities. Thus, youth engaging in the community governance structures could influence the development of the environment within the community. Engagement helps cultivate the youth and youth associations that act as the core where peace can be promoted (Zeidin et al. 2007, p. 3). Unengaged youth are likely to use popular spaces to highlight their demands. The interviewed youth revealed that young people are at the center of protests and demonstrations especially at local level. The lack of service delivery together with corruption and incompetent councilors trigger service delivery protests as mass demonstrations by the citizens highlight grievances related to lack of access to basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity to name a few (Twala, 2017).

ACTIVATING YOUTH PARTICIPATION THROUGH SOCIAL CAPITAL Social capital according to Jason and Jean (2009, p. 89) is a set of relationships and connections that is possible to be transformative; it is also shaped by different situation such as the type of community, location, interest, identity and faith. Social capital also includes power and economic resources. Furthermore social capital is also seen as a social resource that can give access to opportunities and education and also as a glue of the society for example the notion of social capital is community assets which influence new labour social policy and stresses community engagement as in the enrolment of neighbourhood legislative associations (Jason and Jean, 2009, p. 89). Andrian (2013, p. 4) characterises social capital by its capacity. The author adds that it is not a solitary element, but a wide range of substances, having two 285

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attributes in like manner: they all comprise of some part of a social structure, and they encourage certain activities of people who are inside the structure. Community governance structure is a place to socialise, but often young people do not feel that they belong to the community governance structures. They feel excluded hence their participation is low. Their actions have an impact on their life courses hence they have the resources to interact with different groups, such as other young people and adults (Jason and Jean, 2009, p. 91). Different networks could be used by young people to engage in various activities, mostly in schools, at the local areas, interest group or in the identity groups. There are diverse networks varying in nature and young people could engage in different activities with different choices on how to spend their free time (Jason and Jean, 2009, p. 91). Jason and Jean (2009, p. 91) emphasise that social capital could be helpful in understanding the social context within which youth transition occurs and how the agency of young people is bounded by the surrounding opportunity structure. Moreover, social capital is important because it plays an important role as a government policy for children and young people in building social capital aimed at uprooting poverty and crime. Social capital could also improve educational achievement by encouraging volunteering and civic participation. Young people are encouraged to get involved in their community by the government so that they can be able to make decisions. Moreover through engaging young people, the local government is trying to take young people out of the bonds with limited groups that can lead them to crime, drugs and alcohol abuse and teenage pregnancy which only lead to poverty and sickness (Jason and Jean, 2009, p. 95). Social capital includes several elements such as: network, trust, sense of belonging, diversity, reciprocity, participation, values, norms and outlook in life and citizen power/proactivity (Jason & Jean, 2009, p. 101). Jason and Jean (2009, p. 101) explain that the improvement of social capital must distance itself from the shortfall and blaming the victim approaches as It must be based on a commitment to young people having the right be heard, to define the issues facing them and to set the agenda for action and importantly to take action on their own. Participation and empowerment must be improved as a core element of social capital. Furthermore, by working with young people and adults volunteers and practitioners, evolution and practice has to be developed, in other words it is important for young people to adopt the social capital framework.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS Young people are a major human resource for development, often acting as key agents for social change, economic expansion and innovation. As stated by the National 286

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Youth Policy, 2015, p. 2), young people’s imagination, ideals, energy and vision are essential for the continuous development of society. The NYP (2015-2020), in recognition of the vital role young people play in building South Africa, seeks to ensure that there are processes and opportunities that allow young people to develop and realise their potential. For government and youth orientated institutions to capitalize on the abundance potential of young people, paradigm should is imperative which embraces the developmental approach to integrated development of youth in South Africa. Despite various policies and programmes designed for youth development, youth are accounted among the most disadvantaged, economically marginalized and socially excluded. To uproot youth embedded challenges, a multi-sectoral approach, involving stakeholders in the public sector, civil society and the private sector, with everyone working together to promote youth development and provide youth services. The consolidation of the developmental and multi-sectoral approach to youth development and empowerment, research on how youth’s capabilities and talents are being used for their own development is recommended. Such research should be influenced by the application of asset or strengths-based approaches to youth development (Kretzmann & Mcknight, 1993). Supporting youth intuitions and initiatives with both financial and capacity building especially in entrepreneurial skills and knowledge for economic emancipation is imperative. The outcomes of such research should be part of informing policies with long-term solutions to youth challenges while opening opportunities for youth empowerment through their active and responsible participation.

CONCLUSION This chapter explored the notions of youth participation and representation within community governance framework. The literature on community governance was reviewed in order to understand the opportunities available and challenges facing young people at Cato Manor Township towards participating in community governance structures and youth participation. It revealed that community governance is a fragile concept with no clear boundary or uniform definition. Community governance is commonly conceptualised as a community management and the decision making but it also implicates the broader aims of addressing the needs of the community and building community capacity and the wellbeing, this includes community participation. Thus many scholars shared their definitions of community governance. This chapter also discussed youth in community. Essentially, the chapter interrogated the underrepresentation and participation fatigue of youth in the community governance structures at Cato Manor and their consequential on effects effective and responsible youth citizenship. 287

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The politicisation of community governance structures contribute towards barring youth participation in local politics and community governance affairs. Assessment of youth embedded challenges revealed that despite socio-economic ills, youth are not apolitical and disengaged as the literature attest. Rampant unemployment and poverty more particularly the absence or limited job opportunities have relegated Township youth of Cato Manor to the poverty deprivation trap. Additionally, the depopulation of traditional spaces for participation and engagement implies that community leadership should start embracing new social media as an effective mechanism to reach and engage young population. The creation of Whatsup groups mainly in Ward 30 have proven to be effective in providing critical platform for engagement and deliberating issues affecting ward citizens. The information, ideas and suggestions generated through social media (such as Whatsup and others) are optimally utilised by the Ward Councillors to make informed decisions. Unlike the traditional platforms used such as public meetings, street meetings which are contact-based, virtual platforms are more representative and young people are free to engage without fear of being intimidated. Fundamentally, the chapter has presented the concept of social capital as a conceptual framework or mechanism for young people to bond among themselves, bridging through networking with relevant people and institutions outside their circles, and linking by expanding their network and engagement with other youth organisations and institutions with common interests. Lastly, the activation of youth participation through developmental approach to youth development and empowerment was advocated for taking into account an integral social, economic and political development.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Cato Manor Township: Is a black residential township named after Cato, the former Mayor of Durban, and it is located 25 km away from Durban Central Business District. Community Governance: Entails processes, institutions, rules and systems based on shared values and principles aimed at the smooth running and coordination of community matters. 294

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Social Capital: Is a resource that comprises of social networks and relationships based on societal or community shared values and norms. Youth: Are young people who are part of the population and often are defined in terms of the age category and known to be creative, energetic and resourceful with full of creative and innovative ideas. Youth Participation: Has to do with young people getting involved in decisionmaking processes, be it in socio-economic and political activities, events and functions aimed at increasing their voice and claim active citizenship. Youth Representation: Is a deliberate and formal representation by young people via their elected or nominated structures in community-based governance structures.

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Zeidin, S., Camino, L., & Calvert, M. (2007). Toward an understanding of youth community governance: Policy prior. Análise Psicológica, 1(25), 77–95. Zeldin, S., Krauss, S. E., Collura, J., Lucchesi, M., & Sulaiman, A. H. (2014). Conceptualizing and measuring youth-adult partnership in community programs: A cross national study. American Journal of Community Psychology, 54(3–4), 337–347. doi:10.100710464-014-9676-9 Zeldion, S. (2004). Youth as agents of adult and community development: Mapping the processes and outcomes of youth engaged in organizational governance. Applied Developmental Science, 8(2), 75–90. doi:10.12071532480xads0802_2 Zembere, M. (2018). Democratic Citizenship Education in Zimbabwe’s Higher and Tertiary Education System and its Implications for Teaching and Learning. Stellenbosch, South Africa: University of Stellenbosch. Zimbabwe Ministry of Youth Development. (2000). Gender and Employment Creation. National Youth Policy of Zimbabwe, 2000: United Nations Population Fund. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTATS). (2015). 2014 Labour Force Survey. Harare, Zimbabwe: ZIMSTATS. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTATS). (2017). Inter-Censal Demographic Survey Report. Harare, Zimbabwe: ZIMSTATS. Zimbabwe Statistical Agency. (2012). Census Report 2012. Harare, Zimbabwe: Government Printers. Zinhumwe, C. (2012, March 29). The Youth and Unemployment in Zimbabwe. In National Youth Conference, Rainbow Towers, Harare, Zimbabwe. Zuern, E. (2011). The Politics of Necessity: Community Organising and Democracy in South Africa. UKZN Press. Zulu, P. (2004). Poverty in Cato Manor: Perceived or actual? In P. Robinson, J. McCarthy, & C. Forster (Eds.), Urban reconstruction in the developing world: Learning through an international best practice (pp. 249-259). Sandown, South Africa: Heinemann Publishers (Pty) Ltd. Zuze, T. L. (2012). The Challenge of Youth-To-Work Transitions: An International Perspective. In H. Perold, N. Cloete, & J. Papier, (Eds.), Shaping the Future of South Africa’s Youth: Rethinking post-school education and skills training (pp. 41–59). Somerset West, South Africa: African Minds.

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About the Contributors

Jeffrey Kurebwa is a holder of a PHD in Public Administration. He is currently working as a Lecturer in the Department of Peace and Governance at Bindura University of Science Education in Zimbabwe. His research interests are in Gender Studies, Local governance and community development. Obediah Dodo holds a doctorate degree in Governance and Leadership. He lectures at Bindura University, Zimbabwe. He has published over 60 refereed journals, six full books and five book chapters in the areas of Conflict resolution and prevention, Youth violence and Election management. *** Innocent Chirisa: DPhil, MSc, BSc Hons. Rural & Urban Planning, (University of Zimbabwe), DipLMISR (IHS, Erasmus University), MZIRUP (Zimbabwe), Full Professor teaching Urban and Environmental Planning courses in the Department of Rural & Urban Planning, University of Zimbabwe. Currently serving as the Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Social Studies, University of Zimbabwe. Also, he is currently serving as the Acting Chairman of the Department of Rural & Urban Planning, University of Zimbabwe. Professor Chirisa was recently appointed as a Research Fellow, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, from 2016 to 2020. Magret Jongore is a holder of a PHD in Applied Linguistic from UNISA, South Africa. Currently, she is the Chairperson of the Department of Languages and Communication at Bindura University of Science Education in Zimbabwe. Mcdonald Makoni holds an Honours degree in Peace and Governance from Bindura University of Science Education.

About the Contributors

David Makwerere is a lecturer in the Department of Peace and Governance at the Bindura University of Science Education in Zimbabwe. He is also a Rotary Peace Fellow and is interested in social equality, citizen participation, and social justice. Sharon Thabo Mampane is an Associate Professor in the Department of Distance Education at the University of South Africa (UNISA). She teaches and supervises undergraduate and post graduate students in Education Leadership and Management, Policy and Law. She has presented and published articles and book chapters locally and internationally. Emma Maphosa is an urban and regional planner who graduated with a BSc Honors Degree in Rural and Urban Planning with the University of Zimbabwe in 2018. In 2017, Emma Maphosa got an internship with Gutu Rural District Council in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. Her research interests are in property management, urban management and transport planning. Abraham Matamanda is a Doctoral Fellow with the University of Free State, South Africa. He is a Town Planner with diversified skills in social ecology. His research interests are in urban environmental sustainability, property development and systems thinking. Sam Phiri is a media specialist with PhD (University of South Africa), MA (Leicester) and BA (UNZA) in Communication Sciences. He is currently working as a Lecturer at the University of Zambia. He is a former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services, Zambia, former media development expert for the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) in South Africa and the Nordic-SADC Journalism Centre, Maputo, Mozambique. He is also a former Journalist with the Times of Zambia. Tom Tom is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the South African Research Chair Initiative- Chair in Social Policy, College of Graduate Studies at the University of South Africa (UNISA). His research, publication and teaching focuses on sociology (specialising in social policy, development, youth and gender studies). His work is anchored on enhancing wellbeing. Ndwakhulu Tshishonga holds a BA (Honors) in Development Studies (UNISA); an MA in Applied Anthropology (Goldsmith College, University of London), MM in Public Development and Management (WITS) and MPA-Public Administration (UWC), Advanced Diploma (UWC-Adult Education) and Social Reconstruction and Development Certificate (SADEP-UWC). His interests are in citizenship and local 346

About the Contributors

government and local governance, Intergovernmental Relations, Social Movements and Protests, etc. His teaching interests range from Alternative Models of Development, Project Management and Development Planning to Micro Level Strategies in Economic Community Development, Co-operatives. His current research is on Intergenerational poverty, Inclusive and Exclusive Citizenship and Local Governance, Youth and Gender development as well as poverty issues and food security, politics of service delivery & social movements, Indigenous knowledge systems. His research output entails scholarly conference presentations and publication in journals such as Journal of Public Administration, Agenda, African Journal of Public Affairs, and Journal of African & Asian Local Government Studies. He has published more than 20 book chapters and journal papers nationally and internationally. Wendy Tsoriyo has lecturing experience in Zimbabwe in rural and urban planning as well as training experience in community capacity building and development in Zimbabwean marginalized communities. Wendy is currently studying for a PhD in Urban and Regional Planning. She holds an MSc in Rural and Urban Planning and a BSc in Rural and Urban Planning. Her research interests are in areas of urban design and management, spatial transformation of urban areas, and participatory planning. Tawanda Zinyama (PhD) is a Senior Lecturer of Public Administration in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. He has published books, book chapters and journal articles in the areas of public policy, local government management, public-private partnerships, contract management, democratic governance, and public finance, among others.

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348

Index

(mis)representation 268

A abuse 6-8, 15-16, 24, 28, 41, 47, 101, 132, 142, 144, 164, 167-168, 283, 286 accountability 37, 40, 80-81, 85-86, 88, 92, 98, 104, 106, 116, 133, 143-144, 180, 182-184, 190, 192, 277 active citizens 40, 44, 80-81, 84-85, 99 activism 55-57, 61-63, 66, 73-74, 105, 143, 193, 199-202, 204-205, 208, 210-211, 213-214, 219, 275, 281 Africa 1-6, 8, 12-13, 24, 30, 35-42, 46-47, 56-57, 59, 63, 66, 74, 78, 87, 102-103, 105, 109, 115, 126-127, 129, 141, 148, 150-151, 153, 157-158, 170, 177-181, 183-184, 190, 194, 200-202, 205-207, 213, 240, 248, 251-253, 255, 257-258, 260-262, 269, 278-281, 284, 287 Agency 2, 11, 15, 17, 36, 41-42, 58, 65, 134, 154, 163, 178, 183, 189, 221, 224, 226, 231, 235, 239, 245, 263, 281, 286 Agrarian Relations 245 Authoritarian Populism 236, 245

B Bantu education 6, 11, 13, 21, 204, 285 blogs 62, 64, 78, 129 born free 2

C Cato Manor Township 268-269, 285, 287, 294

Children’s Act 41 citizenship 44-46, 55, 72, 82-83, 91, 95, 103, 108, 113, 115, 133, 179-180, 182, 187-188, 191-193, 211, 220, 237, 245, 269, 272-273, 277-279, 281, 287, 295 community governance 268-273, 276, 281, 283-288, 294 Critical Discourse Analysis 247-249, 263, 266

D democracy 2, 4-5, 12, 43-44, 54-55, 59-61, 66-67, 72-74, 78, 86, 91, 95, 105-106, 127, 131-133, 140, 180, 182, 188, 205, 211, 261, 276-279, 281-282 deprivation trap 13-14, 288 Discourse Analysis 247-249, 263, 266 distributive politics 100-102, 105-106, 126 Durban 205, 268, 273-275, 294

E employment 5, 8, 11-17, 21, 27, 30, 71, 83, 87, 93, 103-105, 107-109, 111, 113-115, 126, 130, 148, 151-152, 155, 157-159, 161-165, 167, 170-172, 229, 251, 254, 259, 267, 274, 278, 283

F Fast Track Land Reform Programme 221, 240, 245 FeesMustFall campaign 13, 199, 205-206, 210-211, 213, 219

Index

G

P

Gerontocracy 190, 230, 245 good governance 66, 80-81, 85-86, 104, 116, 133, 143-144 governance processes 43, 81-82, 84-85, 87-90, 93, 95, 127-128, 130, 132, 135-136, 138-139, 143, 176, 178-179, 181-182, 188-192, 253, 255 government of Zimbabwe 81, 88, 94, 96, 109, 130, 134, 141, 148-150, 155, 157, 159-160, 162, 164, 166, 170, 172, 182, 185-186, 232

hegemonic 140, 142, 144, 176, 185, 201, 247-248, 262-263, 266 Heher Fees Commission 200 human rights 36, 39, 43, 46, 81, 87, 104, 126, 132, 141, 182, 188, 204, 220-221, 226-227, 245

Participatory Approaches 36, 85-87, 98 participatory governance 80-81, 84, 86, 88, 270 policy 1-4, 6-7, 11, 13, 21, 28, 36, 38-41, 43-45, 48, 54, 57, 60-61, 63, 67, 70, 72-73, 78, 81, 83, 85-86, 88-90, 94, 96, 100, 103, 108-114, 116, 130, 133134, 139, 141-143, 149, 151, 156-158, 163-164, 169-170, 179, 181-182, 192, 204, 211, 221, 226, 230, 239-240, 246, 261, 271, 277, 279-280, 285-287 politics 54-55, 66-67, 100-102, 105-106, 111, 115, 126, 135, 140-141, 143, 183, 186, 191, 199-202, 204, 208, 210, 213-214, 219, 235-237, 246-248, 253, 258, 264, 275-276, 278, 280, 283, 288 positive youth development 42, 221, 246 poverty 1-8, 11-17, 21, 27-28, 32, 49, 72, 87, 104, 114, 166-167, 204, 207, 236, 270, 283-284, 286, 288

I

R

Ideological Inclination 266 intergenerational poverty 1-3, 5-8, 14, 16-17, 21 Intergenerational Pover ty and Unemployment 1-3, 7-8, 17, 21 internet 55, 61-62, 68, 128-129, 131-135, 140-143

rationality 126, 133, 248 representation 43, 60, 64, 73-74, 78, 82, 86, 89-90, 94, 180, 208, 210-211, 219, 268, 270, 275, 277, 281, 287, 295 responsibility 3, 26, 45-47, 80-81, 83-84, 98, 104, 109, 113, 116, 144, 160, 165, 190, 193, 201, 231, 258, 261, 275 Rural Politics 236, 246

H

L linguistic 247-248

M manipulation 93, 158, 160, 183 marginalization 1, 21, 102

N National Youth Policy 2-4, 11, 21, 36, 63, 108, 111-112, 157, 181-182, 226, 279, 286

S social capital 285-286, 288, 295 social cohesion 2, 11, 43, 94, 108, 235, 246 social media 54-56, 61-62, 64, 68-70, 7274, 78, 127-136, 138-144, 191, 206, 211, 276, 280, 288 social organisation 221, 237, 239 Social Organization 246 social policy 221, 230, 239-240, 246, 285 socialisation 27, 29-30, 223-225 Stakeholder Interests 126 student activism 73, 200-201, 205, 208, 349

Index

210-211, 213, 219 student governance 200, 205, 209-211, 214, 219 student movements 131, 199-200, 203-204, 206-214 student politics 199-202, 208, 210, 213214, 219 Student Representation 208, 219 students 11-12, 21, 42, 47, 54-58, 62, 6467, 70, 72-73, 101-102, 111, 115, 135, 140, 154, 172, 188, 199-214, 219, 280

T Technical Training 126 Township 1, 3, 13, 15-16, 21, 268-269, 273, 283, 285, 287-288, 294 Township youth 1, 3, 16, 21, 288 townships 2-4, 7-8, 13-17, 65, 268, 274, 276 traditional leadership 228, 233-235, 246 transformation 112-113, 131, 149, 163, 183, 185, 200, 204-207, 212-213, 235

U underdevelopment 1-2, 11, 14, 274, 280, 284 unemployed graduates 12, 21, 283 unemployment 1-4, 6-8, 11-17, 21, 27, 30, 43, 107, 111, 114, 131, 148-151, 153-157, 159, 163-164, 166-172, 204, 231, 250, 254, 259, 268-269, 272, 283-284, 288

V violence 5, 12, 22-32, 74, 94, 111, 134, 141, 148, 159-160, 164, 167-169, 177, 183-184, 187-188, 213, 236, 250-254, 258-260, 262-263, 273-274, 283 vocational training 110, 113, 126, 161, 170

Y young people 1-8, 11, 13-17, 21, 36-40, 42-45, 48, 63, 66, 73, 80-96, 98-99, 130, 149-150, 153, 161, 163, 165-168, 350

170-171, 177, 182, 186, 193-194, 222-226, 230, 250-255, 261-263, 267, 269-273, 275-288, 295 young people’s participation 81-82, 84, 88-93, 95-96, 99, 224, 269, 284 youth 1-8, 11-17, 21-32, 35-49, 54-57, 6266, 71, 73-74, 81-88, 92-93, 99-116, 126-133, 135-136, 138-139, 141-144, 148-153, 155-172, 176-194, 201-202, 204, 208, 220-237, 239, 246-264, 267273, 275-288, 295 Youth Bulge 22-23, 25-26, 30, 88, 184, 247-263, 267 Youth Employment 111, 114, 152, 157, 161, 163, 254 youth empowerment 15-16, 100-101, 103104, 108-111, 115-116, 126, 157, 161, 163, 179, 226, 253-255, 287 youth engagement 2, 11, 105, 111, 115, 158, 188 youth entrepreneurship 3, 14-15, 21, 109, 111, 116, 162 youth participation 22-23, 25, 35-41, 4346, 48-49, 54, 66, 87-88, 92, 103-104, 127-128, 144, 171, 176-182, 185, 187-189, 192-193, 220-222, 224-225, 227-231, 234, 239, 253-255, 258, 260261, 268-273, 275-276, 278, 281-283, 285, 287-288, 295 Youth Poverty 4, 12, 21 Youth Representation 295

Z Zambia 54-59, 62-64, 66-70, 72-74, 78, 137 Zimbabwe 23, 25, 66, 81, 83, 88, 94-96, 100-102, 107-109, 111-116, 126-138, 140-144, 148-167, 169-172, 176-179, 181-182, 185-194, 220-221, 226-228, 232-233, 236, 239-240, 253-255, 257, 259-262