Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Governance (Diplomatic Studies, 13) [Lam ed.] 9004326464, 9789004326460

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Contributors
Introduction: The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy in International Politics
Part 1 EU Context
Chapter 1 World Diplomacy of the European Parliament
Chapter 2 The Role of the European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy
Chapter 3 The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Standing Committees, Delegations and Assemblies: Insights from ACP–EU Inter-ParliamentaryCooperation
Chapter 4 The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Political Groups in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Chapter 5The International Role of the European Parliament’s Intergroups
Part 2 Wider Europe and EU Relations with the World
Chapter 6 The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey’s EU Accession Process
Chapter 7 The Impact of Parliamentary Diplomacy, Civil Society and Human Rights Advocacy on EU Strategic Partners: The Case of Mexico
Chapter 8 A Bridge with Russia? The Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and of the Council of Europe in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis
Chapter 9 The South-East European Cooperation Process and Its New Parliamentary Assembly: Regional Dialogue in Action
Chapter 10 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean and Its Contribution to Democracy Promotion and Crisis Management
Part 3 Global Context
Chapter 11 Parliamentary Diplomacy and the US Congress: The Case of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Chapter 12 Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in South and South-East Asia and Europe: A Practitioner’s Perspective
Chapter 13 Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution and Foreign Policy
Chapter 14 Parliamentary Diplomacy in Northeast Asia: Lessons from the Parliamentarians’ Unions in Japan and South Korea
Chapter 15 Australia’s Parliamentary Diplomacy: A Study of the Bilateral Relationship with South Korea
Chapter 16 Regional Integration and Parliamentary Diplomacy: Experiences of the MERCOSUR, Andean and Latin American Parliaments
Chapter 17 Understanding Success and Failure in the Quest for Peace: The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum
Chapter 18 South Africa’s Parliamentary Diplomacy and the ‘African Agenda’
Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon
Index

Citation preview

Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Governance

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Diplomatic Studies Series Editor Jan Melissen (Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’)

Volume 13

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/dist

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Governance Edited by

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jančić

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 17 were originally published in Volume 11 (2016) of Brill’s The Hague Journal of Diplomacy. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1872-8863 isbn 978-90-04-32646-0 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-33634-6 (e-book) Copyright 2017 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Contents List of Contributors  ix Introduction: The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy in International Politics 1 Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jančić

Part 1 EU Context 1 World Diplomacy of the European Parliament 19 Davor Jančić 2 The Role of the European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy 41 Luigi Gianniti and Nicola Lupo 3 The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Standing Committees, Delegations and Assemblies: Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation 57 Sarah Delputte, Cristina Fasone and Fabio Longo 4 The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Political Groups in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 76 Yoav Shemer-Kunz 5 The International Role of the European Parliament’s Intergroups 99 Laurent Dutoit

Part 2 Wider Europe and EU Relations with the World 6 The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey’s EU Accession Process 115 Valentina Rita Scotti

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

vi

Contents

7

The Impact of Parliamentary Diplomacy, Civil Society and Human Rights Advocacy on EU Strategic Partners: The Case of Mexico 134 Mónica Velasco Pufleau

8

A Bridge with Russia? The Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and of the Council of Europe in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis 156 Andrea Gawrich

9

The South-East European Cooperation Process and Its New Parliamentary Assembly: Regional Dialogue in Action 174 Franklin De Vrieze

10

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean and Its Contribution to Democracy Promotion and Crisis Management 193 Andrea Cofelice

Part 3 Global Context 11

Parliamentary Diplomacy and the US Congress: The Case of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly 213 Zlatko Šabič

12

Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in South and South-East Asia and Europe: A Practitioner’s Perspective 230 Xavier Nuttin

13

Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution and Foreign Policy 248 Liwan Wang

14

Parliamentary Diplomacy in Northeast Asia: Lessons from the Parliamentarians’ Unions in Japan and South Korea 269 Jiun Bang

15

Australia’s Parliamentary Diplomacy: A Study of the Bilateral Relationship with South Korea 290 Jeffrey Robertson

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

vii

Contents

16

Regional Integration and Parliamentary Diplomacy: Experiences of the MERCOSUR, Andean and Latin American Parliaments 309 Karina L. Pasquariello Mariano, Regiane Nitsch Bressan and Bruno Theodoro Luciano

17

Understanding Success and Failure in the Quest for Peace: The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum 327 Konstantinos Magliveras and Asteris Huliaras

18

South Africa’s Parliamentary Diplomacy and the ‘African Agenda’ 343 Lesley Masters and Fritz Nganje



Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon 368 Stelios Stavridis

Index 389

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

List of Contributors Jiun Bang is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Michigan, USA. Most of her research lies within the realms of international security, foreign policy, and comparative politics. She has formerly worked at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), a government-funded research institute located in Seoul, South Korea. During the same period, she was the Assistant Editor of the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (KJDA). She received her PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Southern California, USA, and her master’s degree from the Security Studies Program (SSP) at Georgetown University, USA. Andrea Cofelice (PhD in Political Science – Comparative and European Politics, University of Siena, 2015) is a research fellow at the Centre for Studies on Federalism (Turin, Italy). He has been a junior researcher at the University of Padua’s Human Rights Centre and a visiting researcher at the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) in Bruges, Belgium. He is also a member of the research teams on ‘International Democracy Watch’ and ‘Italian Yearbook of Human Rights’. His latest publications include (with S. Kingah) ‘The European Parliament and the Engagement with African Regional Parliaments’, in S. Stavridis and D. Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015); (with Stelios Stavridis) ‘The European Parliament as an international parliamentary institution (IPI)’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 19(2), 2014; ‘ACP-EU Partnership’, in L. Levi, G. Finizio, L. Vallinoto (eds.), The Democratization of International Organizations. First International Democracy Report (London: Routledge). Sarah Delputte is Postdoctoral Assistant at the Centre for EU Studies at Ghent University, Belgium. She obtained her PhD in EU Studies and Development Studies from Ghent University and the University of Antwerp respectively. Her doctoral dissertation focused on EU coordination in development cooperation and she conducted field research in Tanzania, Zambia, Burkina Faso and Senegal. Her research focuses on EU development and climate change policies and she has published in various edited volumes and international journals, including the European Journal of Development Research, Development Policy Review, European Foreign Affairs Review, and European Politics and Society. She gained practical experience in EU politics during an internship in the European Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

x

List Of Contributors

Commission (2009) and she has been a visiting scholar at the University of Ghana Business School in Accra (2015). Franklin De Vrieze works for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a consultant in parliamentary development. He also provides advisory services to European Commission Delegations and other institutions. De Vrieze has worked on governance issues for 20 years. As Program Manager of UNDP’s Global Programme for Parliamentary Strengthening (GPPS), and currently as an international consultant, he has been leading parliamentary identification, formulation and evaluation missions in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, Africa and the Caribbean. He has conducted functional review and institutional capacities assessments of parliaments. He has worked on policy issues relevant to the legislative, oversight and representative functions of parliaments. Prior to GPPS, he was the head of an international team working in the Assembly of Kosovo for 7 years, through the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. He is the author of recent European Commission studies on parliamentary cooperation and on indicators for political party programming. Laurent Dutoit is Assistant to the Vice-Rector and Head of Unit at the HES-SO University of Applied Sciences and Arts, Western Switzerland. He holds a PhD from the University of Geneva and his expertise covers the field of the European Parliament, intergroups, and civil society. He is the author of Parlement européen et société civile: vers de nouveaux aménagements institutionnels (Louvainla-Neuve: Bruylant-Academia, 2009). Cristina Fasone is Assistant Professor of Comparative Public Law, Department of Political Science, LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome, and Visiting Fellow at the Law Department, European University Institute, where she is also part of the EUI Law Research Team of the Horizon 2020 project on “A Dynamic Economic and Monetary Union” (ADEMU). She holds a PhD in Comparative Public Law from the University of Siena and she has been Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellow (2013–2015), Max Weber Programme and Law Department, European University Institute. She has been Visiting Researcher at the Georgetown University Law Center, Washington DC (USA) and Erasmus Mundus Visiting Scholar at Victoria University of Wellington (NZ). She has published on parliaments and constitutional courts in the EU and in the Eurozone crisis in international peer reviewed journals like European Law Journal, The Journal of Legislative Studies and German Law Journal. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

List Of Contributors

xi

Andrea Gawrich is Professor of political science and holds the Chair for International Integration at the Institute for Political Science, Justus Liebig University Gießen. She received her PhD from the Ruhr-University Bochum in 2002 and her post-doctoral degree (Dr. habilitata) from the University of Kiel in 2011. From 2003 to 2012 she was Assistant Professor at the University of Kiel. During that time, she worked as a Eurofaculty guest lecturer at the University of Tartu, Estonia, and worked as stand-in professor at the universities of Kiel and DuisburgEssen. During the period 2002–2003 she was Program Director of the Program Central East Europe at the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin. Her research focus and teaching experience lie in the field of European integration with regard to the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Her publications also cover topics of international parliamentary assemblies, regional security governance, and authoritarian foreign policies. Luigi Gianniti is Director of the Research Service of the Italian Senate. He has been the Head of the Cabinet of the Italian Minister of European Affairs. In addition to his professional activity, he has given courses and conducted research activities in constitutional law. Since 1998, he has given courses on public law at Roma Tre University (the 2002–2003 course dealt with the Convention on the Future of Europe) and has frequently given seminars on law interpretation theory at La Sapienza University. Currently, he is Professor of Italian and European parliamentary law at the Master in Management and Policies of Public Administration at the School of Government of the LUISS University of Rome. He is a frequent speaker at conferences on constitutional and European law organised by other Italian universities. He is the author of many books and articles and he has published several papers in Giurisprudenza costituzionale, Quaderni costituzionali and Astrid on line. His recent publications include Corso di diritto parlamentare (Il Mulino, Bologna, 2008). Asteris Huliaras is Professor of comparative politics and international relations in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of the Peloponnese, Corinth, Greece. Jean Monnet Professor on EU Relations with Less Developed Countries (2012–6). He specializes in North-South relations. His articles have appeared in African Affairs, Asia-Europe Journal, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Conflict, Security and Development Journal, European Foreign Affairs Review, Geopolitics, Global Society, International Journal, The Journal of Contemporary African Studies, The Journal of Modern African Studies, The Journal of Southern Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

xii

List Of Contributors

Europe and the Balkans, Orbis, Survival, The Round Table, The South African Journal of International Affairs, Southeastern Europe, The World Today etc. Davor Jančić is Lecturer in Law at Queen Mary University of London. He was previously Senior Researcher in EU Law at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague; British Academy Newton Fellow at the Department of Law of the London School of Economics and Political Science and Assistant Professor at Utrecht University Law School. He holds a PhD on national parliaments in the EU from Utrecht University. Dr Jančić has been a Visiting Scholar at Sciences Po Paris, LSE, University of Lisbon, and Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. In 2011, he won the Europe Award from the Montesquieu Institute, The Hague. His work has appeared in the European Law Journal, Common Market Law Review, Columbia Journal of European Law, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Journal of Common Market Studies and he is the editor of ‘National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis: Resilience or Resignation?’ (OUP, 2017). Fabio Longo is Assistant Professor of Comparative Public Law at the University of Turin (Italy) where he received his PhD in Public Law in 2007. He teaches Italian and Comparative Constitutional Law, European Legal Culture in Public Law, and Public Law. His doctoral thesis, Parlamento e politica estera: il ruolo delle commissioni, which was on parliamentary standing committees and foreign policy, was published in 2011 (Il Mulino, Bologna). His current areas of research are comparative government, parliamentary law and procedures, and constitutional preambles. Bruno Theodoro Luciano is Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. His research is focused on regionalism and regional integration, specifically the European Union and Latin America. His doctoral research analyses the parlamentarisation of regional integration, through case studies in Europe, South America and Africa. He is a member of the Research Network on Foreign Policy and Regionalism (REPRI), Brazil. Nicola Lupo is full Professor of Public Law at the Department of Political Science at the LUISS Guido Carli University of Rome. He is Director of the Master Program in Parliament and Public Policies, LUISS Summer School in Parliamentary Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

List Of Contributors

xiii

democracy in Europe, and EUPADRA (Erasmus+ Master in Parliamentary Procedures and Legislative Drafting). He is Deputy Director of the Centre for Parliamentary Studies. He served as Counsellor at the Italian Chamber of Deputies (1997–2005) and was Member of the Drafting Committee of the governmental advisory Commission for Constitutional Reform (2013). He recently edited books on Interparliamentary Cooperation in the European ‘Composite’ Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2016, with Cristina Fasone), Comparative Law in Legislative Drafting. The Increasing Importance of Dialogue amongst Parliaments (Eleven International Publishing, 2014, with Lucia Scaffardi) and Democracy and Subsidiarity in the EU (Il Mulino, 2013, with Marta Cartabia and Andrea Simoncini). Konstantinos D. Magliveras LL.M (Exon), D.Phil (Oxon), is Professor of the Law of International Organizations, Department of Mediterranean Studies, University of the Aegean (Rhodes). His teaching and research interests include African multilateral institutions, international criminal law, migration and trafficking in human beings. He has published extensively in these areas. He is also an attorney at law and a member of the Athens Bar Association. He has carried out postdoctoral research at Erasmus University Rotterdam (the Netherlands), and has been a visiting researcher at the School of Law, University of California at Berkeley (USA) and the Faculty of Law, Humboldt University Berlin (Germany). He also taught at the University of Aberdeen, the University of Sussex, and the University of East Anglia, as well as at a number of Greek universities (the University of Macedonia, the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, and the Athens University of Economics and Business). Lesley Masters is Senior Researcher/Lecturer at the SARChI Research Chair for African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg. Prior to this she was Senior Researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) responsible for the management of projects on foreign policy and natural resource governance in international affairs. She received her PhD in International Relations from the University of Leicester, UK. Recent publications cover the following issue areas: Africa and the UNFCCC; South Africa’s foreign policy; and South Africa’s parliamentary and science and technology diplomacy. Fritz Nganje is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the South African Research Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg. Prior to this Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

xiv

List Of Contributors

he was a researcher in the Africa Programme of the Pretoria-based Institute for Global Dialogue. Fritz holds a Bachelor’s degree in Journalism and Mass Communication from the University of Buea in Cameroon, a Master’s degree in Peace Studies and International Relations from the North West University in South Africa, and a doctorate in Political Studies from the University of Johannesburg. His doctoral thesis analysed the foreign relations of selected South African provinces. His research interest is in the areas of the diplomacy of subnational governments, decentralized cooperation, South Africa’s foreign policy and diplomacy in Africa, peacebuilding in Africa, and South-South cooperation. Regiane Nitsch Bressan is Professor of International Relations and Researcher at the Paulista School of Policy, Economics and Business (EPPEN) at the Federal University of São Paulo (UNIFESP). She is an International Relations graduate and holds PhD and Master degrees in Latin American Integration from Programa de PósGraduação em Integração da América Latina of the University of São Paulo (USP). She has experience in political science, international relations, regional integration and Latin American studies. Dr Nitsch Bressan is also a member of the Research Network on Foreign Policy and Regionalism (REPRI). Xavier Nuttin has worked as Senior Asia Analyst in the Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Parliament since June 2005. His main responsibility is to provide tailor-made political analysis of Asian countries and advice to the President of the European Parliament and to parliamentary bodies such as the Foreign Affairs Committee or the Development Committee. He also contributes to the work of the EP Sub-Committee on Human Rights. Prior to holding this position, he had a career in international development and foreign relations since 1978 for UNESCO, UNICEF, the World Bank, and the European Commission in Thailand, Vietnam and Brussels. He has participated in many international conferences and workshops on Asian affairs and on EU-Asia relations, particularly in China and the ASEAN (including in Myanmar), to share his institutional knowledge of EU institutions and EU policies towards Asia. He has written many papers for those events and contributed to two books, Myanmar: Prospect for Change (Select Publishing, Singapore, 2010) and EU-ASEAN Relations in the 21st Century, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

List Of Contributors

xv

Karina Lilia Pasquariello Mariano is Professor of Political Science at the São Paulo State University (UNESP) and coordinator of the Interdisciplinary Study Group on Culture and Development (GEICD). Her expertise lies in regional integration, specifically in Latin America integration cases and international parliamentary relations. She is one of the founders of the Research Network on Foreign Policy and Regionalism (REPRI), Brazil. Jeffrey Robertson is a Visiting Fellow at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy (APCD) at the Australian National University (ANU) and an Assistant Professor at Yonsei University. He worked for the Australian Government in the field of foreign policy, including as Senior Research Specialist (North Asia) in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security section at the Australian Parliament. He provided advice to Members, Senators and parliamentary committees on areas relating to Australian foreign policy, and East Asian economic, political and strategic affairs. While working for the Australian Parliament, he was also an adviser to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade for inquiries into Australia’s relations with the Republic of Korea and Japan, and advised Australian parliamentary delegations to the Republic of Korea and Japan. After leaving the Australian Parliament he worked as a Visiting Professor at the Korea Development Institute (KDI) School of Public Policy and Management. Zlatko Šabič is Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana. As a Member of the Strategic Council for Foreign Affairs (associated with the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), he has been engaged in discussing foreign policy for almost two decades. He has worked with the National Assembly in the field of international parliamentary relations. His bibliographical record includes over 200 entries. The most recent book project he has been involved in was on Regional and International Relations of Central Europe (Palgrave, 2012). He has co-ordinated or taken an active part in several EU projects. He currently takes part in the EU PADEMIA network, where he organised a workshop on international relations of the European Parliament (2015). Professor Šabič is also a lecturer and an appointed External Examiner for diplomatic courses conducted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, and has taken several senior management and advisory positions at the Faculty of Social Sciences and the Slovenian Research Agency.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

xvi

List Of Contributors

Yoav Shemer-Kunz is a PhD candidate at both the University of Strasbourg and the Free University of Amsterdam. He previously published a book chapter entitled “The ‘Back Door’ to National Politics: The French Greens and the 2009 European Parliament elections” in a volume edited by Ben Crum and John Erik Fossum, Practices of Inter-Parliamentary Coordination in International Politics: The European Union and Beyond (ECPR Press, 2013). His research interests include individual party membership in ‘political parties at the European level’, parliamentary control over international trade negotiations, and how the Israel/ Palestine issue is treated in international politics. Stelios Stavridis has been an ARAID Senior Research Fellow in the Research Unit on European and International Studies of the University of Zaragoza in Spain since December 2007. He holds a PhD in International Relations (London School of Economics and Political Science/LSE, University of London, 1991), and has previously worked at King’s College London and at the University of Reading. He has also held visiting posts at the Institut d’Études Européennes (Université Libre de Bruxelles/ULB), the European University Institute/EUI in Florence; ELIAMEP Athens, UAB Barcelona, University of Valencia, LUISS Guido Carli Università Rome, Sciences-Po Bordeaux, the United Nations UniversityInstitute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility in Barcelona, and the Institut d’études europénnes de Paris-8. His most recent publications include: as coeditor and contributor, The European Parliament and its International Relations (Routledge, 2015); and, as guest co-editor and co-contributor, Special Issue on ‘Crisis and De-Europeanization’, Études Hélleniques/Hellenic Studies 23(1): 7–192 (2015). Valentina Rita Scotti holds a PhD in Comparative Public Law and is Postdoctoral Fellow in Comparative Public Law at the Department of Political Science of the LUISS Guido Carli of Rome, where she is also fellow of the Center for Studies on Parliament – CESP. She publishes on the Turkish legal system, constitutional transitions and institution-building in the Mediterranean area, trans-­ judicialism in India, and constitutional cross-fertilization in Italian and international reviews and edited books. In 2014 she published her first monograph (Il Costituzionalismo in Turchia fra identità nazionale e circolazione dei modelli, Maggioli, 2014 – Constitutionalism in Turkey between national identity and cross-fertilization).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

List Of Contributors

xvii

Mónica Velasco Pufleau is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Luxembourg. She holds a PhD in Law – International Studies from the University of Barcelona. Her dissertation addressed the inter-parliamentary relations between the European Parliament and the Mexican Congress over the period 2005–2011. She has widely published on this topic, including the second part of the study The Modernisation of the European Union-Mexico ‘Global Agreement’ (2015) requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs. Her research on parliamentary diplomacy has been enriched with practical experience within the European Parliament, the Mission of Mexico to the European Union, and as an independent consultant. Her current research project is funded by the National Research Fund of Luxembourg and focuses on the participation of civil society in the European Union’s external relations and in development policy. She is the Editorial Manager of Regions & Cohesion, a peer-reviewed, scholarly journal published by Berghahn Journals. Liwan Wang is a PhD candidate at Renmin University in China, Visiting Scholar at the US–Asia Law Institute of New York University Law School (2014–2015) and a Research Assistant at the Constitutionalism Research Institute of China University of Political Science and Law. His research interests include constitutional law and foreign affairs, the Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR, basic human rights protection and constitutional interpretation. Mr. Wang has published several academic papers pertaining to these issues in Law and Social Development, Modern Law Science, World Economics and Politics and Renmin University Law Review. Mr. Wang has received numerous academic honors, including excellent visiting scholar of China Law Society and Youth Award of China Development Research.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Introduction: The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy in International Politics Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jančić Following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar world, intensified globalization of economics, finance, politics, and security caused the shape and contents of international affairs to change dramatically. The 9/11 attacks, the rise of the BRICS countries, and financial and other crises at the global and regional levels are testaments of this relentless process. All of this transforms traditional intergovernmental diplomacy.1 The role of a diplomat – consisting of communication, reporting, policy analysis, negotiation and representation – is now more complex because of: (a) the emergence of new tasks, such as acquiring expertise in specific policy areas such as global economic governance, climate change or terrorism; and (b) because of the presence and activity of new actors, such as non-state agencies, lobbies, parliamentary bodies, the civil society, academics, the media, cities, sub-state regions, celebrities, foundations and think tanks. As a result, new types of diplomacy have come into being in the form of economic diplomacy,2 cultural diplomacy,3 public diplomacy,4 paradiplomacy,5 celebrities’ diplomacy,6 sports diplomacy,7 and parliamentary diplomacy. In reaction, ‘parliaments simply had no choice but to engage in multilateral negotiations’.8 As underlined by the Speaker of the South African Parliament, Baleka Mbete, parliamentary diplomacy is a 1  Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (eds.), Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 2  Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock, The New Economic Diplomacy Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). 3  Helena K. Finn, ‘The Case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging Foreign Audiences’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 6 (2003), pp. 15–20. 4  Jan Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 5  Francisco Aldecoa Luzárraga and Michael Keating, Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments (London: Cass, 1999). 6  Asteris Huliaras and Nikolaos Tzifakis, ‘Celebrity Activism in International Relations: In Search of a Framework for Analysis’, Global Society, vol. 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 255–274. 7  See the Special Issue of The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 8, nos. 3&4 (2013). 8  Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in International Affairs’, Report to II World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments (New York, 7–9 September 2005), p. 2.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004336346_002 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

2

Stavridis and Jančić

‘­continuation of engagement on national issues’ and is inspired by domestic constitutional values.9 An important aspect of the transfer of policy making beyond the borders of a single state is the increased role of parliamentarians and parliamentary bodies in world affairs.10 Because these phenomena carry their own challenges and opportunities for their protagonists, there is a necessity of finding new forms of transnational representativeness.11 This necessity is rooted in the mismatch between the locus of democratic control (national level) and the locus of decision making on numerous questions of direct impact on the citizens, notably security and economic growth (global level).12 Increased interdependence between states and the corresponding transfer of certain policy-making processes beyond the state have prompted parliaments to globalize their own activities and this lies at the heart of modern-day parliamentary diplomacy.13 The proliferation of non-state entities as diplomatic actors is indeed one of the focal institutional corollaries of the new world order in the making.14 Of the various alternative normative models for such a new world order, one is based on Western liberal democracy and the international democratic tradition, dating back to Kantian peace and Russett’s democratic peace argument.15 These approaches have partly developed into studies on cosmopolitanism,16 9   Daily Maverick, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy: Sustainable Development beyond 2015’, 30 March 2015, www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-03-30-parliamentary-diplomacy -suistainable-development-beyond-2015/#.Vqf3EFK-ogV. 10  See generally: Lluís Maria de Puig, International Parliaments (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2008). 11  Davor Jančić, ‘Transnational Parliamentarism and Global Governance: The New Practice of Democracy’, in Elaine Fahey (ed.), The Actors of Postnational Rulemaking: Contemporary Challenges of European and International Law (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 113–132. 12  David Beetham, Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to Good Practice (Geneva: Interparliamentary Union, 2006), p. 156. 13  Davor Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy: The Emergence of Multilayered International Parliamentarism’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (2015), pp. 197–242. 14   Andrés Malamud and Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliaments and Parliamentarians as International Actors’, in Bob Reinalda (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 101–115; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 15  Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton University Press, 1993). 16  Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Raffaele Marchetti, ‘Global Governance or World Federalism? A Cosmopolitan Dispute on Institutional Models’, Global Society, vol. 20, no. 3 (2006), pp. 287–305.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Introduction: The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy

3

which underline the importance of parliaments in providing a democratic base to the political integration of the world and which have given rise to numerous calls for the establishment of a global parliamentary assembly.17 Focusing on geographically smaller areas, the study of regionalism also recognizes the transnational role of parliaments. However, while the ‘old’ regionalism accentuates the role of institutions in general, ‘new’ regionalism stresses the role of informal means of parliamentary influence that underpin the more formal ones.18 This informal diplomatic empowerment of parliamentary bodies refers not only to the European Parliament (EP) but also to domestic parliaments such as the United States (US) Congress,19 and to parliamentary institutions of non-European Union (EU) international organisations such as the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Furthermore, the phenomenon of parliamentary actors acting together within international parliamentary institutions (IPIs) across Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia is rapidly expanding.20 These parliamentary forums foster public debate on global diplomatic affairs and seek to have an impact in delicate situations where intergovernmental channels of international politics have been exhausted or cannot be used. In theory 17  See: Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, ‘On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty’, Stanford Journal of International Law, vol. 36, no. 2, 2000, pp. 191–220; Luis Cabrera, Strengthening Security, Justice, and Democracy Globally: The Case for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly – Background Paper, The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center, 2015. 18  See essays in: Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Bjorn Hettne, ‘Globalism, Regionalism and Interregionalism’, in Anthony McGrew and Nana K. Poku (eds.), Globalization, Development and Human Security (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), pp. 25–46; Jürgen Rüland, ‘Balancers, Multilateral Utilities or Identity Builders? International Relations and the Study of Interregionalism’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 17, no. 8 (2010), pp. 1268–1280. 19  Davor Jančić, ‘The Role of the European Parliament and the US Congress in Shaping Transatlantic Relations: TTIP, NSA Surveillance and CIA Renditions’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 54, no. 4 (2016), pp. 896–912. 20  Olivier Costa, Clarissa Dri and Stelios Stavridis (eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of Interparliamentary Institutions (London: Routledge, 2013); Robert Cutler, ‘The Emergence of International Parliamentary Institutions: New Networks of Influence in World Society’, in Gordon S. Smith and Daniel Wolfish (eds.), Who Is Afraid of the State? Canada in a World of Multiple Centres of Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), pp. 201–229; Zlatko Šabič, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2 (2008), pp. 255–271.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4

Stavridis and Jančić

and in practice alike, therefore, the democratic tradition lies at the foundation of the parliamentarisation of international affairs. Yet the literature on the international role of parliaments and other types of parliamentary institutions – such as assemblies, conferences, forums and ­associations – remains limited. Traditionally, the international role of parliaments has been approached as a component of a given polity’s foreign policy and as an aspect of democratic legitimacy and executive accountability,21 but not as an instance of independent actorness. Moreover, no systematic work has been carried out to date on what has been identified as particularly relevant for parliamentary diplomacy: A diplomat is an envoy of the executive branch and represents the positions of the State. Members of parliament, however, are politicians who hold political beliefs which may or may not coincide with their respective country’s official position on any given issue. This allows parliamentarians a margin of flexibility that is denied to the diplomat. They tend to bring a moral dimension to international politics that transcends narrow definitions of the national interest, particularly in their principled support for democracy and human rights. Time and again we have seen that this flexibility allows parliamentarians to debate more openly with their counterparts from other countries and to advance innovative solutions to what may seem to be intractable problems.22 For this reason, this volume views parliamentary bodies as autonomous foreign affairs actors that provide their own input into foreign policy making and have their own impact on it through parliamentary diplomacy. To provide a basis for the analyses carried out in this volume, the rest of this chapter maps the nature, definition, influence, functions and scope of parliamentary diplomacy, and explains why the European Parliament is at the forefront of the global parliamentary diplomacy movement.

21  For the EU context, see most recently: Special Issue ‘The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Quest for Democracy’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 8 (2011); Steven Van Hecke and Wouter Wolfs, ‘The European Parliament and European Foreign Policy’, in Knud Erik Jorgensen, Aasne Kalland Aarstad, Edith Drieskens, Katie Laatikainen, and Ben Tonra (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy (London: Sage, 2015), pp. 291–305. 22  David Beetham, Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to Good Practice (Le Grand-Saconnex: Interparliamentary Union, 2006), pp. 172–173.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Introduction: The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy



5

Nature, Definition and Influence of Parliamentary Diplomacy

Nature The nature of parliamentary diplomacy has significantly evolved in the second half of the 21st century. Back in the 1950s, when the phrase was coined, parliamentary diplomacy referred to the use of parliamentary procedures in intergovernmental negotiations in order to facilitate the conduct of classical diplomacy.23 Modern parliamentary diplomacy is an autonomous activity of parliaments worldwide. It has sprung out of the political praxis of parliamentarians and it remains largely uncodified in international and domestic law. Parliamentary diplomacy is therefore predominantly of a political and informal nature. It is also a relatively recent phenomenon in both theory and policy making. Not long ago, the very concept of parliamentary diplomacy was highly contested. However, though in its infancy, academic literature in this field is gradually developing.24 Simultaneously, most parliaments nowadays consider this type of diplomacy a routine business and an important element of their work.25 The President of the Netherlands Senate, Ankie Broekers-Knol, claims that ‘parliamentarians are ideally placed to build bridges between conflicting parties and that they are not bound by the positions taken by the government’.26 Similarly, the President of the Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas, Jacques Chagnon, points to parliamentarians’ ‘freedom of speech and independence’

23  Dean Rusk, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy–Debate vs. Negotiation’, World Affairs Interpreter, vol. 26, no. 2 (1955), pp. 121–138. See also: Noel Lateef, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy and the North-South Dialogue’, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 11, no. 1 (1981), pp. 1–44. 24  Daniel Fiott, ‘On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Madariaga Paper, vol. 4, no. 7 (2011), pp. 1–6; Stelios Stavridis, ‘ “Parliamentary Diplomacy”: Some Preliminary Findings’, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics of the University of Catania, no. 48, 2002; Gabriel Eloriagga, La Diplomacia Parlamentaria (Madrid: Imagine Ediciones, 2004). 25  Frans Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 1 (2007), pp. 93–99; Parliamentary Centre (Ottawa), ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Occasional Papers on Parliamentary Government, no. 16, 2003; French Senate, La Diplomatie Parlementaire (Actes du Colloque), 2001, www.senat.fr/colloques/diplomatie _parlementaire/diplomatie_parlementaire_mono.html. 26  Ankie Broekers-Knol, ‘The Senate of the Netherlands and Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Diplomat Magazine, vol. 1, no. 1 (2014), p. 17.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

6

Stavridis and Jančić

as an important dimension of their international activism.27 Effectively, parliamentarians acting abroad are ‘democratically mandated diplomats’.28 Definition In defining what parliamentary diplomacy is, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the oldest international parliamentary body in the world which was created in 1889, offers a useful categorisation. Parliamentary diplomacy comprises a large number of activities including: the conclusion of interparliamentary cooperation agreements to promote inter-country relations; the organisation of institutionalised and regular encounters and visits between parliamentarians aimed both at conflict resolution and confidence building as well as at the exchange of know-how; the establishment of friendship groups and ad hoc committees; receiving and sending parliamentary delegations; and participation in multilateral interparliamentary bodies and conferences, among which notably IPIs.29 An example of successful diplomatic interparliamentary cooperation is the recent upgrade in the relations between the UK Parliament and the Tajikistani Parliament (Supreme Assembly-Majlisi Oli) through mutual visits of the former’s British-Tajikistan All-Party Parliamentary Group and the latter’s Group of Friendship and Cooperation with the British Parliament. These exchanges were reported to have facilitated the ‘successful realization of the human rights reform and reform of the penal system’ in Tajikistan.30 Yet parliamentary diplomacy also extends to interaction with executive actors. Hence, in the broadest sense, parliamentary diplomacy could be defined as individual or collective action by parliamentarians aimed at ‘catalyzing, facilitating and strengthening the existing constitutional functions of parliaments through dialogues between peers on countless open policy questions across continents and levels of governance’.31

27  Jacques Chagnon, Speaking Notes, Round Table organized by the IPU Committee on UN Affairs at the 127th IPU Assembly, Québec City, 22 October 2012, p. 3. 28  Geert Jan Hamilton (Clerk of the Netherlands Senate), Communication to the Meeting of the Association of Secretaries-General of Parliaments, Québec City, 22–26 October 2012, p. 3. 29   I PU, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in International Affairs’, Report to II World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments (New York, 7–9 September 2005), p. 8. 30  London Post, ‘Tajikistan Boosts Parliamentary Diplomacy with the UK’, 22 October 2015, http://thelondonpost.net/tajikistan-boosts-parliamentary-diplomacy-with-the-uk/. 31  D. Jančić, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy in the European Union’, in Henk Kummeling et al. (eds.), De samengestelde Besselink: bruggen bouwen tussen nationaal, Europees en internationaal recht (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012), pp. 118–119.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Introduction: The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy

7

Influence The breadth and variety of the activities falling under parliamentary diplomacy, coupled with the large number of factors affecting diplomatic outcomes, make it difficult to measure the concrete influence of parliamentary diplomacy. This is well illustrated by the incumbent Lord Speaker, the Presiding Officer of the UK House of Lords, Baroness D’Souza. As the ambassador of this House in international relations, she singles out the sharing of best practices and participation in the wider inter-state diplomatic relations as the key benefits of parliamentary diplomacy, but rightly warns that: There is not always an immediate outcome to certain kinds of parliamentary dialogue. The impact of much parliamentary work is usually very difficult to assess. Such work is so often part of a movement or tide of influence rather than a single, measurable action.32 To fill the lacunas in the existing literature, this volume conducts in-depth analyses of salient empirical case studies in order to illustrate the theoretical and practical dimensions of parliamentary diplomacy as a core component of the growing role of parliamentary bodies in global affairs. While they may eschew the public eye, parliamentary diplomatic activities are very frequently conducted by parliamentarians in order to advance the political dialogue. For example, the Chinese National People’s Congress received and sent no less than 300 parliamentary delegations in the period 2003–2004 only.33 Such collaborative parliamentary efforts can indeed yield concrete results.34 For instance, the German Bundestag has launched the socalled ‘parliamentarians-protect-parliamentarians’ project, whereby its members intervene internationally on behalf of their counterparts in countries where parliamentary rights or human rights are under threat. Even more tangibly, the Jamaican Parliament’s participation in the 2000 World Conference of Presiding Officers of Parliaments helped establish the Office of the Political Ombudsman in Jamaica, which was instrumental in investigating breaches of agreements between political parties and has thus contributed to political stability. Possibly the most impactful recent diplomatic international 32   U K Parliament, Open Lecture by the Rt Hon Baroness D’Souza, 21 November 2012, www .parliament.uk/get-involved/outreach-and-training/resources-for-universities/ teaching-resources/open-lecture-series/open-lectures/the-lord-speaker-and -international-relations/. 33   I PU, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in International Affairs’, p. 25. 34   I PU, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in International Affairs’, p. 28.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

8

Stavridis and Jančić

­ arliamentary action was the release in October 2015 of Shaker Aamer, a Saudi p citizen resident in the UK, from the Guantanamo prison. The pressure put by British parliamentarians – who created an all-party group devoted to his case, visited Washington D.C. to demand his release, and wrote op-eds to this end in The New York Times – are reported by the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn to have ‘contributed to Aamer’s freedom’.35 Overall, as the Speaker of the Austrian National Council (Nationalrat), Barbara Prammer, underlines, despite causing absences that prevent constant personal contact with the constituents, which hamper electoral campaigning, an international approach to parliamentarism in the 21st century is ‘almost as indispensable as democracy itself’.36

Functions and Scope of Parliamentary Diplomacy

The activities encompassed by parliamentary diplomacy are very diverse. Their essence, however, can be subsumed under two main categories. On the one hand, in the diplomatic realm parliaments act as moral tribunes, providing numerous channels of deliberation in international politics that transcend the narrow margins of the national interest. As such, parliamentarians address ethical issues arising from global threats and look for novel ways of tackling them, such as effectuating the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), assessing the use of drones in military operations, and standing up for the protection of human rights. On the other hand, parliamentary diplomacy provides mechanisms for appraising the legitimacy of regional and global governance, thereby adding a layer of democratic representation to the operation of international organizations such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These two categories of diplomatic functions of parliaments build on their well-established functions of political accountability, scrutiny and control over foreign, security and defence policy making and enrich their performance. These goals are achieved through a variety of activities that include: increasing mutual understanding between countries; promoting democracy through electoral observation missions in countries transitioning to 35   The Guardian, ‘Shaker Aamer Lands Back in UK after 14 Years in Guantánamo Bay’, 30 October 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/30/shaker-aamer-lands-back -in-uk-14-years-in-guantanamo-bay. See also: https://news.vice.com/article/shaker -aamer-the-last-remaining-british-guantanamo-detainee-has-been-released. 36  See: www.barbara-prammer.at/?p=1204.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Introduction: The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy

9

d­ emocratic regimes or those with unstable democratic systems; contributing to international conflict resolution, including both inter-state and intra-state crises; supporting regional cooperation with the aim of greater integration or decentralization; and enhancing technical and administrative cooperation between parliaments. Examples hereof abound and we illustrate merely a few common ones. Observation or monitoring of elections or referendums is chiefly aimed at bolstering public confidence in national elections and preventing electoral fraud.37 At the global level, the IPU adopted a declaration in 1994 laying down an extensive set of criteria for free and fair elections.38 Electoral monitoring is furthermore one of the main activities of the African parliamentarians gathered within the Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace, also known as the Amani Forum.39 In the Americas, parliamentarians within the Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA) participated in a total of 13 election observation missions in 10 different countries during the period 2005–2012.40 In Europe, the OSCE agreed on framework criteria for democratic elections already in 1990.41 In practice, these are often tailored to specific cases and implemented by the OSCE and CoE Parliamentary Assemblies acting together with the EP as Parliamentary Troika. As an instrument of democratization, transnational parliamentary bodies often support decentralization and sub-state regionalization. Several IPIs possess such a multi-layered dimension, including the Nordic Council, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference,42 and the Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas. Such linkages also occur within the EU context. For example, in April 2013 the Euro-Mediterranean 37  See Stelios Stavridis, ‘Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation in Electoral Monitoring’, ReShape Online Paper No. 9/15, University of Catania, 2015, www.dsps.unict.it/sites/default/files/ files/repaper9%281%29.pdf. 38  See: www.ipu.org/Cnl-e/154-free.htm. 39  See Konstantinos Magliveras and Asteris Huliaras, ‘Understanding Success and Failure in the Quest for Peace: The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum’ in this volume. 40  Jacques Chagnon, Speaking Notes, 127th IPU Assembly, p. 5. 41   O SCE, Document on the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, www.oscepa.org/publications/all-documents/publications/ reports-1/special-reports/election-observation-reports/documents/1344-osce -copenhagen-document-1990-eng/file. 42  Cristina Fasone, ‘The Baltic Sea Region as a Laboratory for Interparliamentary “Dialogue” ’, in Olivier Costa et al. (eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 126–148.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

10

Stavridis and Jančić

Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM), which gathers local and regional authorities from the Mediterranean Basin, was granted observer status in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean.43 In a similar vein, parliamentary socialization and technical cooperation enables parliamentarians to discuss various benchmarks for the exercise of their powers and encourages them to exchange best practices of control over their respective executives in international affairs.44 In a more operative sense, parliamentary bodies provide material resources and expertise in order to safeguard democratic values and make parliamentary work as efficient and transparent as possible.45 These collaborative efforts have so far centred on the forming of an esprit de corps46 on ethical standards for parliamentarians,47 the role of women parliamentarians,48 norm entrepreneurship,49 or ways to mainstream topical issues such as gender equality in parliamentary processes. Nevertheless, all of these parliamentary roles differ in form and substance and they often overlap, complement and mutually reinforce each other not only within a given parliament but across various parliaments and IPIs.50 In doing so, parliaments and their members perform an important communicative function and act as ‘transmission belts’ between governments, the civil society, NGOs, the media and the citizens themselves. Particularly in the EU, which is fraught with democratic insufficiencies, parliamentary efforts in publicizing their activities through plenary debates or public hearings aids the creation of a wider public sphere, increases the legitimacy of legislative ­outputs, 43  See: http://cor.europa.eu/en/news/highlights/Pages/arlem-observateur-assemblee-union -mediterranee.aspx. See further: Roderick Pace and Stelios Stavridis, ‘The EuroMediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, 2004–2008: Assessing the First Years of the Parliamentary Dimension of the Barcelona Process’, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 2 (2010), pp. 90–113. 44  Jacques Chagnon, Speaking Notes, 127th IPU Assembly, p. 6. 45  Netherlands Senate, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Memorandum no. 16/11, 2010, p. 3. 46  Olivier Costa and Nathalie Brack, ‘The Role of the European Parliament in Europe’s Integration: A Critical Reassessment’, in Olivier Costa et al. (eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 45–69. 47   O SCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Background Study: Professional and Ethical Standards for Parliamentarians, 2012. 48  Julie Ballington and Azza Karam, Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers – A Revised Edition (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005). 49  Zlatko Šabič, ‘Democracy across Borders: Parliamentarians and International Public Spheres’, Javnost–The Public, vol. 15, no. 3 (2008), pp. 75–88. 50  Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Introduction: The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy

11

and improves the sense of ownership of the European integration among the citizens.51

The European Parliament at the Vanguard of Global Parliamentary Diplomacy

This volume begins with an analysis of the European Parliament as a diplomatic actor. As the most advanced transnational assembly in the world, the EP is rightly considered a primus inter pares thanks to its leadership in developing a strong diplomatic portfolio, conducting independent international relations, and making its voice heard on pressing global issues ranging from human rights protection and democracy promotion to conflict resolution and crisis management.52 This is why the EP serves as a benchmark for the evolution of parliamentary diplomacy around the world. The EU has indeed always been a keen promoter of regional integration within and beyond its own frontiers and has reinforced this by continuously reaffirming its commitment to multilateralism via strategic partnerships and inter-regional agreements. The EP strongly contributes to this. An example of it is the diplomatic visit of Socialist & Democrat MEPs to the Cuban Parliament (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular – the National Assembly of People’s Power) and Government, affirming their support for EU-Cuban negotiations on an agreement on political dialogue and cooperation.53 The EU has also systematically upheld robust parliamentary input in international affairs not only by continuously strengthening the EP’s external relations powers but also by expanding the EP’s web of inter-parliamentary assemblies, which now cover relations with ACP/African Caribbean countries, the EU’s southern and eastern neighbourhood, as well as Latin America. Moreover, together with the IPU, the EP was the founder of the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO.54 The coherence and efficiency of the external action 51  Evas Tatjana et al. (eds.), Multilayered Representation in the European Union: Parliaments, Courts and the Public Sphere (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012). 52  Andrea Cofelice and Stelios Stavridis, ‘The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI)’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 19, no. 2 (2014), pp. 145–178; Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015). 53  EurActiv, ‘Socialist MEPs Visit Cuba, Plead for Stronger Ties’, 6 January 2016, www.euractiv .com/sections/development-policy/socialist-meps-visit-cuba-plead-stronger-ties-320707. 54   Final Declaration of 18 February 2003, Geneva, www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/ conference_wto/2003_geneve/documents/fd_gva_en.pdf. See further: Hilmar Rommetvedt,

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

12

Stavridis and Jančić

of the EU, however, depends on its capabilities and the political will of EU institutions and the Member States to act.55 The EP portrays itself as a diplomatic actor also in other institutional or functional ways. In 2008, it established its own Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy in order to provide demand-driven support for parliamentary development in new and emerging democracies. In May 2012 the EP revamped its internal electoral monitoring body called Election Coordination Group, expanded its mandate and composition, and renamed it Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group.56 Moreover, whenever necessary and beyond the usual format of working groups, the EP forms special units for different purposes, such as the 2011 Monitoring Group on the Southern Mediterranean. The EP also produces an Annual Report on Human Rights in the World and awards a yearly Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Related to this is the EP’s frequent criticism of undemocratic political regimes. For example, the protest by the chairpersons of the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee and of the EP’s ASEAN Delegation against the travel ban imposed on the Thai Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, who had been deposed by the military junta but invited to appear in the EP to speak about the political situation in Thailand, was described as an ‘escalating war of words’.57 Furthermore, the EP has developed its own stance on many international conflicts, such as on the military intervention in Libya in 201158 or the recognition of Palestine statehood. In the latter case, MEPs decided to launch an initiative called ‘Parliamentarians for Peace’, aimed at bringing together European, Israeli and Palestinian parliamentarians ‘to help advance an agenda for peace and to complement EU diplomatic efforts’.59 This decision is yet to be implemented. In February 2015, MEPs hosted the Palestine President, ‘The Institutionalisation of a Parliamentary Dimension of the WTO’, in Ben Crum and John Erik Fossum (eds.), Practices of Interparliamentary Coordination in International Politics (Colchester: ECPR Press), pp. 213–232. 55  Anand Menon, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 3 (2011), pp. 75–90. But see: Stelios Stavridis, ‘ “EU Inconsistency and Incoherence over Libya”: Evidence to the Contrary’, Cahiers de la Mediterranée, vol. 89 (2014), pp. 159–179. 56  Decision of the Conference of Presidents of 13 September 2012. 57   EurActiv, ‘Foreign Affairs Committee Insist on Right to Hear from Deposed Thai PM’, 9 December 2015, www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/foreign-affairs -committee-insist-right-hear-deposed-thai-pm-320231. 58  Stelios Stavridis, ‘ “EU Inconsistency and Incoherence over Libya”: Evidence to the Contrary’. 59   E P Resolution of 17 December 2014 on Recognition of Palestine Statehood. See also Maria Gianniou, ‘The European Parliament and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, in Stelios

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Introduction: The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy

13

Mahmoud Abbas, to reiterate their support for the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For a more continuous contact, the EP has a Delegation for relations with Palestine. The EP is therefore an avid diplomatic actor and vividly participates in global affairs of its own right by liaising with both parliamentary and executive actors.60 Yet, national parliaments of the EU Member States can also play a significant role in attenuating diplomatic conflicts. Evidence of this is, for instance, the successful reconciliatory meeting in January 2016 between the Deputy Speakers of the Israeli Knesset and the Swedish Riksdag amid the diplomatic rift between Israel and Sweden over what the Swedish Prime Minister, Margot Walllstrom, qualified as extra-judicial killings of Palestinians.61

Objectives and Structure of the Volume

In light of the foregoing considerations, the objective of this volume is to build on the existing approaches in political science, law and international relations and concentrate, on the one hand, on the institutional setting for the international parliamentary affairs of the EU, and, on the other hand, on the correlation between this development and the burgeoning parliamentary diplomacy activities around the world. To accomplish this, one of the central inquiries of this volume is into the post-Lisbon institutional arrangements for parliamentary diplomacy within the EP and into the manner in which parliamentary diplomacy has developed in other regions of the world. Such an orientation stems from the diplomatic pre-eminence of the EP and its increased institutional profile following the 2014 EP election, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, and the concomitant evolution of regional, interregional and global diplomatic actorness of parliaments on virtually all continents. Both of these aspects remain unaccounted for in the existing literature. The latter has hitherto focused on the democratic deficit in EU internal and external affairs. Yet while there is a nascent debate on the EP’s international

Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 237–251. 60  See also Yoav Shemer-Kunz, ‘The Diplomatic Role of European Parliament’s Political Groups in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’ in this volume. 61   Al-Monitor, ‘Latest Spat with Sweden Highlights Israeli Diplomatic Shortcomings’, 15 January 2016, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/sweden-foreign-minister -margot-wallstrom-netanyahu-akunis.html#.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

14

Stavridis and Jančić

role62 and a rudimentary scholarly acknowledgment of the importance of the EP’s parliamentary diplomacy,63 there has so far been systematic analysis neither of the internal institutional aspects of the EP’s global actorness nor of the broader geo-political and legal framework within which it evolves. This volume seeks to fill these gaps and furnish a holistic assessment of the institutional and substantive aspects of the international and diplomatic affairs of parliamentary bodies, while also examining the more informal mechanisms for the diplomatic engagement of parliaments. Our contributors join forces to provide a wide geographical, structural and functional coverage of parliamentary diplomacy from an interdisciplinary angle. The volume is divided into three parts, which analyse the ‘European’, ‘the wider European’, and the ‘global’ perspectives on parliamentary diplomacy. The first part, on the ‘EU Context’, begins with a conceptualisation of the EP as an actor in world diplomacy (Jančić) and continues with an in-depth analysis of the internal institutional arrangements that the EP has crafted over the years in order to strengthen its international stature. The EP’s internal decision making on global affairs has evolved into a sophisticated network of internal bodies ranging from committees and delegations to more specific ones, such as inter-parliamentary assemblies (Delputte, Fasone and Longo). This part of the volume also analyses the position of other officials or entities within the EP that shape its international action, such as the EP President (Lupo and Gianniti), EP political groups (Shemer-Kunz) and EP intergroups (Dutoit). The second part, on ‘Wider Europe and EU Relations with the World’, includes contributions that explore parliamentary diplomacy at the EU’s borders, such as on Turkey’s EU aspirations (Scotti), or across the Atlantic, with Mexico (Velasco Pufleau). This part also covers other parliamentary assemblies in this wider European context: the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (Gawrich), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (Cofelice), as well as Europe’s ‘youngest’ IPI: the Parliamentary Assembly of the South East European Cooperation Process established in 2014 (De Vrieze). 62  Olivier Costa and Clarissa Dri, ‘How Does the European Parliament Contribute to the EU’s Interregional Dialogue?’, in Francis Baert et al. (eds.), Intersecting Interregionalism: Regions, Global Governance and the EU (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), pp. 129–150; Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015). 63   Daniel Thym, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in European International Relations’, in Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), p. 225.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Introduction: The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy

15

The third part, on the ‘Global Context’, broadens the analytical focus and examines parliamentary diplomacy practices in different parts of the world concerning salient and recent issues of international politics that pose ­important challenges for global governance and democracy. This part comprises contributions on the evolution of parliamentary diplomacy in the US and NATO (Šabič), South and South East Asia and Europe (Nuttin), China (Wang), Japan and South Korea (Bang), Australia (Robertson), Latin America (Mariano, Luciano, and Bressan), as well as two examples from Africa: South Africa (Masters and Nganje), and the Pan African Parliament and the Amani Forum (Magliveras and Huliaras). This volume studies how parliaments shape and conduct parliamentary diplomacy, what mechanisms and instruments are at their disposal, how they can be employed in practice, what functions parliaments perform when they engage in diplomatic affairs, and what the legal and political consequences of international parliamentary diplomacy are. To analyse these questions, the authors have selected a series of empirical case studies in different policy areas to demonstrate parliamentary diplomacy in action. They seek to unravel the underlying motive and political imagination that inspires the expansion of the prerogatives and institutional capacities of parliamentary bodies to act internationally in the fields traditionally associated with national sovereignty and intergovernmental cooperation. All of these facets of international parliamentary activity form an abundant pool of information on the diplomatic practices, usages and mechanisms of domestic, supranational and international parliamentary bodies. The research findings contribute to the literature on the external relations of the EP, on the foreign affairs of other regional and domestic parliaments, on the internal arrangements of parliaments in international affairs, on the international role of parliaments in general, and, importantly, on the wider issues of legitimacy, accountability and control over external affairs. Based on the empirical findings of the contributions and where relevant, the volume also presents several policy recommendations on how to improve parliaments’ internal decision-making systems and how to better organize the conduct of parliamentary diplomacy in various policy fields so as to maximize effectiveness and parliamentary resources. Finally, the aim is also to break new ground for further studies of international parliamentary actorness and set the parameters for evaluating the impact of parliamentary diplomacy on world affairs.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Part 1 EU Context

∵

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 1

World Diplomacy of the European Parliament Davor Jančić*

The European Union in Global Affairs and the Democracy Conundrum

It has become commonplace that the European Union (EU) has grown into an impactful actor in global affairs, a diplomatic conglomerate with sizeable influence on world diplomacy and on the laws and policies thus engendered.1 The Union stands at the forefront of international efforts to tackle numerous global challenges such as climate change and terrorism; it is a full member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as well as an observer in many others;2 it is the only non-state polity seeking accession to the European Convention on Human Rights;3 and it asserts its autonomy against the United Nations (UN) to the level of ‘direct confrontation’ with it,4 to name but a few examples of its legal and political stature in the global realm. Just as in domestic legal orders, the conduct of external relations in the EU is the province of institutions that are structurally or functionally executive in *  The author wishes to thank Christian Huber and Pietro Ducci from the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for External Policies for valuable first-hand information on the European Parliament’s democracy and election actions. 1  Jolyon Howorth, ‘The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 48, no. 3 (2010), p. 457. See various aspects thereof in Bart van Vooren et al. (eds.), The EU’s Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 2  Knud Erik Jørgensen and Ramses Wessel, ‘The Position of the European Union in (Other) International Organizations: Confronting Legal and Political Challenges’, in Panos Koutrakos (ed.), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), p. 268. 3  Such accession is subject to full respect for the EU as a legal order with its own set of institutions and with its own human rights catalogue; see Court of Justice of the EU, Opinion 2/13 (18 December 2014). 4  Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 51, no. 1 (2010), p. 5.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004336346_003 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

20

Jančić

nature – the Council,5 the Commission and the European Council.6 The multihatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), who is ex officio Vice-President of the Commission and presides over the Foreign Affairs Council and the European External Action Service (EEAS), provides a solution to Henry Kissinger’s notorious but apocryphal request for one single ‘telephone number’ to be dialled to call Europe.7 However, as Smith argues, while the EU’s global influence is well rooted in its economic power, civilian power, ethical power, power of attraction, as well as its light and heavy military power, the more that its external actions resemble those of a state, the more it runs into problems with legitimacy, transparency and accountability of such actions.8 In this respect, the EU’s only directly elected body, the European Parliament, has long been an outsider and has only been endowed with significant participatory rights by the Treaty of Lisbon, whereby a legislature was arguably ‘born’ at the EU level.9 This adds another collective view to be taken into account in the Union’s global diplomacy.10 Yet, as the following two sections demonstrate, the European Parliament still does not enjoy a prominent status in this field. The European Parliament remains in search of ways to make its voice heard internationally and this search is intrinsically linked to its endeavour to reconnect with the EU electorate and increase democratic participation in EU foreign policy. The reasons for these efforts lie in the fact that global action by the EU, alone or in concert with international and regional organizations 5  Although at the EU level the Council is part of the legislature together with the European Parliament, it also carries out important functions in EU external relations and is composed of officials who exercise executive powers domestically (heads of government or other government representatives). 6  For more on the structure and complexity of the EU executive, see Deirdre Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union: Law, Practices and the Living Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 7  See Bernd Halling, ‘A Telephone Number for Henry Kissinger’, EUobserver (25 April 2003), available online at https://euobserver.com/opinion/11011. 8  Michael E. Smith, ‘A Liberal Grand Strategy in a Realist World? Power, Purpose and the EU’s Changing Global Role’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 2 (2011), p. 147. 9  Wim Voermans, ‘The Birth of a Legislature: The EU Parliament after the Lisbon Treaty’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2 (2011), p. 174. 10  Marise Cremona, ‘Coherence in European Union Foreign Relations Law’, in Panos Koutrakos (ed.), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), p. 92; and Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Sophie Meunier, ‘Speaking with a Single Voice: Internal Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in Global Governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 21, no. 7 (2014), p. 965.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

1. World Diplomacy of the European Parliament

21

and third countries, often carries important implications for the fundamental rights of citizens, the financial interests of the business sector, as well as sociopolitical and economic interests of states in Europe and beyond. This is what justifies the European Parliament’s international engagement.11 Albeit with variable binding force and with many obstacles in its way,12 the European Parliament has a formal or informal say in many areas of EU external relations.13 Examples thereof include the enactment of EU legislation outlawing terrorism, approval of international agreements on trade and investment, as well as privacy and data protection, the imposition of sanctions on third countries, oversight over the development of EU strategic partnerships, the provision of development aid, promotion of democracy and the rule of law, exportation of norms and values, and, finally, scrutiny of a very wide range of matters, including those as sensitive as nuclear non-proliferation and major armed conflicts around the globe.14 In fact, the European Parliament has become a ‘formidable power’ in EU external relations.15 Parliamentary diplomacy sensu lato, encompassing both the European Parliament’s international relations per se and its intra-EU activity concerning world affairs, is a key way in which the European Parliament challenges the foreign policy-making monopoly of the aforesaid EU executive trio – that is, the Council, the Commission and the European Council.16 The Lisbon Treaty’s enhancement of the European Parliament’s prerogatives is a product of incremental steps that its members (the members of the European Parliament, 11  Christopher Lord, ‘The Political Theory and Practice of Parliamentary Participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 8 (2011), p. 1134. See, contra, Helene Sjursen, ‘Not So Intergovernmental After All? On Democracy and Integration in European Foreign and Security Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 8 (2011), p. 1092. 12  Ben Crum, ‘Parliamentarization of the CFSP through Informal Institution-Making? The Fifth European Parliament and the EU High Representative’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 3 (2006), p. 399. 13  Udo Diedrichs, ‘The European Parliament in CFSP: More than a Marginal Player?’, The International Spectator, vol. 39, no. 2 (2004), p. 45; and Daniel Thym, ‘Beyond Parliament’s Reach? The Role of the European Parliament in the CFSP’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 11, no. 1 (2006), p. 127. 14  See the essays in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015). 15  Bart van Vooren and Ramses Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 28. 16  Daniel Thym, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in European International Relations’, in Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), p. 225.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

22

Jančić

MEPs) and internal bodies have consistently taken throughout European integration in an attempt to make diverse popular interests a part of the bargaining process in the EU’s international affairs and thereby bring influence to bear on the global political agenda.17 In doing so, MEPs help to imprint the electorate’s preferences on EU diplomacy and contribute to legitimizing, or delegitimizing, the outcomes thereof. The European Parliament has hitherto been rather successful in this endeavour. It has appreciable human resources at its disposal and, as the following chapters on parliamentary diplomacy in this volume show, an increasingly specialized internal structure to deal with virtually all aspects of world affairs. Most parliaments, including those of the most developed Western countries, do not have such organizational capacity and political autonomy for global leadership in parliamentary diplomacy. Indeed, one of the key reasons why national governments are reluctant to empower the European Parliament in foreign affairs is that MEPs would exert stricter control over their action than national parliaments.18 However, it is important to underline that national parliaments also have a prominent role to play in EU foreign, security and defence policies, because, depending on domestic law and politics, they may have the power to debate or authorize the deployment of military troops abroad, vote on the recognition of states, or make pronouncements on the government’s dealings with other states and international organizations.19 In the case of mixed EU international agreements, national parliaments are invited to approve them. The system of checks and balances in EU external action is therefore ever more sophisticated and complex. Greater liaison between the European Parliament and national parliaments is beneficial to the strengthening of this multi-tier democratic

17  Berthold Rittberger, Building Europe’s Parliament: Democratic Representation beyond the Nation-State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See also Olivier Costa and Nathalie Brack, ‘The Role of the European Parliament in Europe’s Integration and Parliamentarization Process’, in Olivier Costa et al. (eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 46. 18  Esther Barbé, ‘The Evolution of CFSP Institutions: Where Does Democratic Accountability Stand?’, The International Spectator, vol. 39, no. 2 (2004), p. 55. 19  Recent examples of this include the role of the UK House of Commons in Britain’s proposed engagement in the Syrian crisis, the French Parliament’s vote on the recognition of Palestine, and the Hungarian Parliament’s adoption of legislation that made secret for 30 years a nuclear power contract between the Hungarian Government and Russia.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

1. World Diplomacy of the European Parliament

23

dimension of EU diplomacy.20 This may help to fill the long-standing ‘control vacuum’ in this area.21 This chapter endeavours to relaunch the debate on the European Parliament and EU global ‘actorness’ after the Lisbon Treaty.22 It argues that by ­conducting world diplomacy, the European Parliament generates critical mass for its institutional empowerment and contributes to the shaping of democratic participation in EU external action. The European Parliament does so by a crafty application of its treaty rights, by means of non-legislative instruments – such as inter-institutional agreements, resolutions, reports, debates, hearings, inquiries, fact-finding and election observation missions – and by establishing bilateral and multilateral diplomatic contacts with both parliamentary and executive bodies worldwide. These activities are carried out through value-oriented and region-oriented diplomacy, which form the thrust of the European Parliament’s world diplomacy. In this manner, the European Parliament tries to portray itself as an actor without which decisions cannot be made. It is therefore submitted here that the European Parliament’s worldwide diplomacy is the political basis on which it seeks to improve its legal position beyond the black-letter prescriptions of the founding treaties. In the following sections, the chapter sketches the limitations of the law of the European Parliament’s involvement in EU external relations, focusing on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) on the one hand, and on the European Parliament’s treaty-making rights on the other. The analysis proceeds with a survey of value-oriented and region-oriented channels of the European Parliament’s diplomatic action on the world stage, after which the impact thereof on the principles of constitutionalism and democracy is assessed.23

20  See Ben Crum and John Erik Fossum, ‘Multi-level Parliamentary Field: A Framework for Theorizing Representative Democracy in the EU’, European Political Science Review, vol. 1, no. 2 (2009), pp. 249–271. 21  Peter Bajtay, ‘Democratic and Efficient Foreign Policy? Parliamentary Diplomacy and Oversight in the 21st Century and the Post-Lisbon Role of the European Parliament in Shaping and Controlling EU Foreign Policy’, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2015/11 (2015), p. 19. 22  For more on parliamentary diplomacy, see Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jančić, ‘The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy in International Politics’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 105–120. 23  The aim, however, is not to measure this impact, but rather to discuss its potential implications.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

24

Jančić

The European Parliament and Foreign, Security and Defence Policies of the EU

As before the Lisbon Treaty, CFSP and CSDP remain essentially inter­ governmental.24 This leaves only marginal room for the input of the European Parliament, whose role is ‘very heavily circumscribed’.25 According to the treaties,26 MEPs only have the right to be regularly consulted by the HR/VP on the main aspects and the basic choices of these policies, as well as to be informed of the evolution of the policies that are pursued. The European Parliament’s views ought to be duly taken into consideration and special EU representatives may be involved in briefing MEPs. In addition, the European Parliament may put questions or make recommendations to the Council and the HR/VP and shall each year hold two progress debates on the implementation of CFSP and CSDP. The Inter-institutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 enabled the European Parliament’s president and a specially formed committee to have a degree of access to classified Council information.27 Access, however, is restricted to documents that are labelled ‘secret’ or ‘confidential’ and excludes those carrying the ‘top secret’ designation.28 Following up on this, the Inter-institutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 brought a modest further ­development.29 In the context of CFSP financing, this agreement lays down 24  Piet Eeckhout, ‘The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy after Lisbon: From Pillar Talk to Constitutionalism’, in Andrea Biondi et al. (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 265. Also see: Marianne Riddervold and Guri Rosén, ‘Beyond Intergovernmental Cooperation: The Influence of the European Parliament and the Commission on EU Foreign and Security Policies’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 20, no. 3 (2015), pp. 399–418. 25  Richard Whitman and Ana Juncos, ‘The Lisbon Treaty and the Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: Reforms, Implementation and the Consequences of (Non-)Ratification’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 14, no. 1 (2009), p. 30. 26  Art. 36, Treaty on European Union (TEU). 27  Guri Rosén, ‘EU Confidential: The European Parliament’s Involvement in EU Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of Comon Market Studies, vol. 53, no. 2 (2015), p. 384. 28  Art. 3.3, ‘Inter-institutional Agreement 2002/C 298/01 of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council Concerning Access by the European Parliament to Sensitive Information of the Council in the Field of Security and Defence Policy’ (OJ C 298/1 of 30 November 2002). 29  See in this respect Andreas Maurer et al., ‘Inter-institutional Agremeents in the CFSP: Parliamentarization through the Back Door?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 10, no. 2 (2005), pp. 175–195.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

1. World Diplomacy of the European Parliament

25

that the Council Presidency will consult the European Parliament on a forward-looking Council document on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP and will keep MEPs informed by holding joint consultation meetings with them at least five times a year within the framework of the regular political dialogue on CFSP.30 The minimal and predominantly posterior involvement of the European Parliament means that MEPs are effectively ‘kept at a distance from any particular CFSP measure’ and can only exert influence on EU foreign, security and defence policies indirectly through budgetary mechanisms.31 The case of the EEAS exhibits how the European Parliament was able to use the threat of rejecting this Service’s budget as a lever to extract certain concessions in the process of its establishment.32 However, these arrangements are insufficient for thorough democratic control because of the informal practical circumstances that eviscerate it. Namely, the Council Secretariat – and especially its Policy Unit – has grown from a purely administrative body to a policy entrepreneur that acts in the shadow of the Council Presidency and completely outside parliamentary scrutiny. One survey reveals that contacts between MEPs and Council Secretariat officials are ‘very limited’.33 The European Parliament hence continues to be excluded from the decision-making process proper, both formally and informally. To ameliorate this state of affairs, the Commission has made certain practical proposals to enhance the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of the EU in the world. These include improvement in the accountability of EU international action – specifically through more regular exchanges between the Commission and the competent bodies within the European Parliament – and

30  ‘Inter-institutional Agreement 2006/C 139/01 of 17 May 2006 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Budgetary Discipline and Sound Financial Management’ (OJ C 139/1 of 14 June 2006), para. 43. 31  Geert de Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 161–162. 32  Elisabeth Wisniewski, ‘The Influence of the European Parliament on the European External Action Service’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (2013), p. 88; and Kolja Raube, ‘The European External Action Service and the European Parliament’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 7, no. 1 (2012), pp. 65–80. 33  Ana Juncos and Karoline Pomorska, ‘Invisible and Unaccountable? National Representatives and Council Officials in EU Foreign Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 8 (2011), p. 1109. See also Hylke Dijkstra, ‘The Council Secretariat’s Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 13, no. 2 (2008), pp. 149–166.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

26

Jančić

the reinforcement of public diplomacy.34 However, the democratic element of decision-making in CFSP and CSDP remains lacking.35

The European Parliament and the EU’s International Agreements

When it comes to agreements that the EU concludes with third countries or international organizations, MEPs have gained a wide-ranging right of consent. Above all, this right enables them to approve or reject those agreements that cover fields in which the European Parliament’s consent is required internally, which is whenever the ordinary legislative procedure applies or whenever parliamentary consent is requisite in a special legislative procedure.36 The right of consent is essentially the right of veto and the threat of it being exercised is what may give the European Parliament a ‘global reach’.37 In other fields, the European Parliament is only consulted and its opinion is not legally binding on the Council, the Commission and the HR/VP. Furthermore, MEPs take part neither in the drafting and approval of negotiation mandates, nor in the negotiations as such, nor indeed in the signature and conclusion of EU international agreements. The European Parliament is solely informed at all stages of the procedure, albeit ‘immediately and fully’, as the treaties stipulate.38 Pertinently, while the decision on whether to grant consent must be made before an international agreement has been concluded, it is only due after the agreement has been signed. This means that the EU’s negotiating team may sign the agreement without the European Parliament 34  Panos Koutrakos, ‘Primary Law and Policy in EU External Relations: Moving away from the Big Picture’, European Law Review, vol. 33, no. 5 (2008), p. 677. 35  Hans Born and Heiner Hänggi (eds.), The ‘Double Democratic Deficit’: Parliamentary Accountability and the Use of Force under International Auspices (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); and Wolfgang Wagner, ‘The Democratic Control of Military Power Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), p. 201. 36  Art. 218(6)(1)(v), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Consent is also requisite for the conclusion of association agreements, the Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organizing cooperation procedures, and agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union. 37  Giacomo Benedetto, ‘The European Parliament’, in Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and David J. Bailey (eds.), The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 85. 38  Art. 218(10), TFEU.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

1. World Diplomacy of the European Parliament

27

pronouncing on it. What is more, the Council may authorize the provisional application of the agreement before it has entered into force – that is, before the European Parliament has exercised its right of consent.39 This poses an additional difficulty, because provisional application creates ‘a momentum in favour of the continued application of the treaty, thereby rendering parliamentary rejection more difficult’.40 Effectively, therefore, MEPs can be presented with a fait accompli. Worse still, the Council and the Commission often find ways to circumvent the European Parliament, especially regarding access to information, which is a vital condition for the exercise of democratic control.41 The Council continues to classify negotiating mandates as ‘restreint’ documents, which MEPs may only access in person on the Council’s premises. For practical reasons, this arrangement de facto denies access to such documents to many MEPs, especially when they are in session in Strasbourg.42 Conversely, acquiring information from the Commission has somewhat improved thanks to an inter-institutional agreement, which the European Parliament and the Commission concluded on 20 October 2010 in the form of the Framework Agreement.43 This allows MEPs access to all classified documents, including under certain conditions the ‘top secret’ ones. The European Parliament is henceforth entitled to receive information specifically on the definition of the negotiation directives (that is, mandates) and afforded sufficient time to express its point of view so that the Commission can take it into account as far as possible.44

39  Art. 218(5), TFEU. 40  Thym, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in European International Relations’, p. 212. 41  Deirdre Curtin, ‘Official Secrets and the Negotiation of International Agreements: Is the EU Executive Unbound?’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 50, no. 2 (2013), pp. 423–458; See also Giovanna Bono, ‘Challenges of Democratic Oversight of EU Security Policies’, European Security, vol. 15, no. 4 (2006), pp. 431–449. 42  Ricardo Passos, ‘The European Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon: A First Evaluation from the European Parliament’, in Panos Koutrakos (ed.), CLEER Working Papers 2011/3: The European Unon’s External Relations a Year After Lisbon, p. 52. 43  Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (OJ L 304/47 of 20 November 2010). 44  Points 23 and 24, Framework Agreement.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

28

Jančić

World Diplomacy of the European Parliament: Complementing Foreign Affairs

Parliamentary diplomacy is a salient facet of the European Parliament’s ‘actorness’ on the global stage,45 which it is keen to preserve and enhance. In its April 2014 discharge of the annual EU budget, MEPs expressed concern that the European Union’s thrift-oriented financial planning undermined their diplomatic profile and the security of the delegations and missions that they send abroad. In expressing their concerns, they revealed that the goals of the European Parliament’s parliamentary diplomacy are threefold: (1) to mirror the international visibility of the Commission and the Council in external relations; (2) to complement the activities of the Commission and the EEAS; and (3) to maintain the power and effectiveness of its inter-parliamentary dialogue with third countries, especially at times of political instability and dangers to democracy (for example, the Arab Spring and conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine).46 The European Parliament also regards parliamentary diplomacy as a device for enhancing EU relations with multilateral international organizations such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE).47 These diplomatic activities of the European Parliament can be subsumed under two broad categories. Functionally, the European Parliament seeks to promote cornerstone values that have inspired European integration.48 In doing so, the European Parliament acts as a ‘guarantor of values’ by ensuring that the EU political discourse matches the actual policies enacted and foreign policy pursued.49 This may help to convert rhetoric into credible com45  Lorinc Redei, Normative Parliamentarians: The European Parliament’s Role in the EU’s Foreign Policy Process, Ph.D. dissertation, Central European University (2013), p. 91. 46  European Parliament Resolution of 16 April 2014 with Observations Forming an Integral Part of its Decision on Discharge in Respect of the Implementation of the General Budget of the European Union for the Financial Year 2012, Section I (2014), OJ L 266/3, para. 65. 47  European Parliament Resolution of 14 April 2005 on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of CFSP, Including the Financial Implications for the General Budget of the European Communities – 2003 (2006), OJ C 33E/573, para. 42. 48  These include human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights, pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men. See Art. 2, TEU. For more, see Ester HerlinKarnell, ‘The EU as a Promoter of Values and the European Global Project’, German Law Journal, vol. 13, no. 11 (2012), pp. 1225–1246. 49  Laura Feliu and Francesc Serra, ‘The European Union as a “Normative Power” and the Normative Voice of the European Parliament’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

1. World Diplomacy of the European Parliament

29

mitments and increase the legitimacy of EU external action. Politically, the European Parliament aims to strengthen its institutional standing and clout by developing its own international presence in third countries and regions with which the EU has diplomatic, or otherwise strategically important, relations. The following sections illuminate these value-oriented and region-oriented categories of the European Parliament’s parliamentary diplomacy, which compensate for the aforesaid constraints of the European Parliament in EU external action.50 As the analysis shows, the functional and political dimensions of the European Parliament’s parliamentary diplomacy, albeit separate, often intertwine and reinforce each other. The European Parliament and Value-Oriented Diplomacy The European Parliament’s value-oriented diplomacy closely follows the broader EU external action agenda of promoting democracy, the rule of law and human rights throughout the world.51 MEPs play a significant role in implementing this agenda, not so much by ‘hard powers’ of decision as by ‘soft powers’ of pressure and advocacy through deliberative mechanisms, both towards other EU institutions and towards third countries and regions.52 The Commission accurately sums up the European Parliament’s accomplishments in this area: The full involvement of the European Parliament in the policies pursued in this area helps to ensure increased democratic legitimacy. The European Parliament is active in tabling questions, holding debates, and passing resolutions on human rights issues. It undertakes regular missions to third countries. Through its inter-parliamentary delegations, it has a significant role to play in encouraging the development of democratic parliamentary institutions in third countries. It maintains regular contact with human rights organizations and human rights defenders.53

50 

51 

52  53 

(eds.), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 22. Olivier Costa and Clarissa Dri, ‘How Does the European Parliament Contribute to the EU’s Interregional Dialogue?’, in Francies Baert et al. (eds.), Intersecting Interregionalism: Regions, Global Governance and the EU (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), p. 145. Art. 21, TEU. For more, see Marise Cremona, ‘Values in EU Foreign Policy’, in Malcolm Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds.), Beyond the Established Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 275–315. Olivier Costa and Clarissa Dri, ‘How Does the European Parliament Contribute to the EU’s Interregional Dialogue?’, pp. 131–132. European Commission, Communication: ‘The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries’, COM(2001) 252 of 8 May 2001, p. 5. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

30

Jančić

As a ‘civilian power’, the European Parliament is indeed a well-known defender and promoter of human rights worldwide. Its Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) regularly and earnestly monitors the state of play in this area via its resolutions, reports, hearings, analyses and studies, whereby MEPs pronounce their views on a vast range of human rights matters, such as the death penalty, torture and fundamental freedoms, as well as the rights of children, women and sexual minorities. The principal instruments of the European Parliament’s activism in this field are resolutions. Although non-binding, they have a degree of impact on countries that are identified as human rights violators, on the organizations and persons named in the resolutions, and on the causes and norms of international human rights protection regimes.54 Also influential are the European Parliament’s detailed resolutions on the EU’s Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World. The European Parliament has ­furthermore ­succeeded in having human rights clauses included in EU international agreements as a condition for the disbursement of aid to third countries. Nevertheless, the MEPs’ action is fraught with both the aforesaid limitations inherent in the governance setup of EU external relations, as well as with its own incoherencies and contradictions.55 The entrenchment – or improvement in the functioning – of the rule of law in new or nascent democracies is an important, albeit variably successful, segment of the European Parliament’s parliamentary diplomacy. This diplomatic strategy is particularly utilised towards countries aspiring to EU membership, such as those in the Western Balkans and Turkey,56 or those encompassed by the European Neighbourhood Policy.57 However, EU promotion of the rule of law stretches far beyond the regions adjacent to the EU and 54  European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratization, Beyond Activism. The Impact of the Resolutions and Other Activities of the European Parliament in the Field of Human Rights outside the European Union (October 2006), p. 89. 55  Laura Feliu and Francesc Serra, ‘The European Union as a “Normative Power” and the Normative Voice of the European Parliament’, p. 23. 56  Gergana Noutcheva and Senem Aydin-Düzgit, ‘Lost in Europeanization: The Western Balkans and Turkey’, West European Politics, vol. 35, no. 1 (2012), pp. 59–78; Lara Appicciafuoco, ‘The Promotion of the Rule of Law in the Western Balkans: The European Union’s Role’, German Law Journal, vol. 11, no. 8 (2010), pp. 741–768. 57  Päivi Leino and Roman Petrov, ‘Between “Common Values” and Competing Universals: The Promotion of the EU’s Common Values through the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Law Journal, vol. 15, no. 5 (2009), pp. 654–671; Olga Burlyuk, ‘Variation in EU External Policies as a Virtue: EU Rule of Law Promotion in the Neighbourhood’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 53, no. 3 (2015), pp. 509–523.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

1. World Diplomacy of the European Parliament

31

includes, for instance, Latin America,58 North Africa59 and even China.60 The key instruments used to implement this end range from conditionality in EU enlargement policy, to unilateral trade instruments, to technical and financial assistance instruments, and bilateral and regional agreements.61 Further, ‘softer’ instruments include the European Parliament’s condemnation of ­fallacies in the operation of the rule of law, such as, for instance, in Russia62 or Venezuela.63 An important part of the European Parliament’s agenda for democracy promotion also lies in the observation of elections in third countries that are undergoing or aspiring to democratic change.64 Since 1994, the EU has deployed no less than 177 election observation missions in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Once on the ground, the long-term missions, which are run by the European Commission and headed by an MEP, carry out comprehensive evaluations of all the components of the electoral process, including not only the voting arrangements (such as voter registration, e-voting, counting, aggregation and publication of results, and postelection complaints and appeals), but also the enjoyment of political rights (such as the freedom of association, assembly and the media). In addition, the European Parliament organizes short-term election observation missions, which are of a much smaller scale. These are usually led by a handful of MEPs, who visit a certain country on the polling day to oversee the conduct 58  Susanne Gratius, ‘EU Democracy Promotion in Latin America: More a Tradition than a Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 16, no. 5 (2011), p. 693. 59  Vera Van Hüllen, ‘Europeanization through Cooperation? EU Democracy Promotion in Morocco and Tunisia’, West European Politics, vol. 35, no. 1 (2012), pp. 117–134; Sarah Wolff, The Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union’s Internal Security (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), in particular chapter 6 on the EU’s promotion of the rule of law in Egypt. 60  Jiao Zhang, EU Rule of Law Promotion Abroad and its Cooperation with China in the Context of International Rule of Law, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Macau (2014), p. 210. 61  Laurent Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: On the EU’s Limited Contribution to the Shaping of an International Understanding of the Rule of Law’, in Dimitry Kochenov and Fabian Amtenbrink (eds.), The European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 112. 62  European Parliament Resolution of 13 June 2013 on the Rule of Law in Russia (2013), OJ C 253E/247. 63  European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2015 on the Situation in Venezuela (P8_TA(2015)0080), paras. 5 and 9. 64  European Parliament DG for External Policies, Briefing Paper titled ‘EU Election Observation: Achievements, Challenges’ (June 2008).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

32

Jančić

and regularity of a given election.65 By providing their members, expertise and experience, the European Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group and the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) are fundamental to the successful implementation of these missions. Their chief contribution is the issuance of recommendations to the country concerned, although more work needs to be done to provide assistance between elections and in assessing the politico-constitutional context in which a newly elected parliament operates so as to ensure that it exercises the competences intended.66 When it comes to parliamentary capacity-building in general, the European Parliament established an Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy in 2008, which was specifically devoted to the dissemination of best practices on law-making, oversight and representation to newly emerging democracies.67 In July 2014, this office was merged with the European Parliament’s Election Observation Unit in order to integrate all parliamentary capacity-building actions into a ‘Comprehensive Democracy Support Approach’. While election observation is not aimed at exporting EU democratic standards to third countries, the European Parliament’s engagement in regional democratization often is. The most notable example is the establishment of regional integration parliaments in Latin America, where the Mercosur Parliament has not only been directly inspired by the evolutional trajectory of the European Parliament, but even tries to mimic its structure, organization and empowerment.68 The European Parliament’s status as a model for

65  For more see Andrea Gawrich, ‘The European Parliament in International Election Observation Missions (IEOMs): Division of Labour or Decreased Influence?, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 121–142. 66  European Parliament Resolution of 8 May 2008 on EU Election Observation Missions: Objectives, Practices and Future Challenges (2009), OJ C 271E/31. 67  European Parliament Resolution of 22 October 2009 on Democracy Building in the EU’s External Relations (2010), OJ C 265E/3, paras. 22–23. 68  See different aspects thereof in Clarissa Dri, ‘Building the Mercosur Parliament: Integration on European Patterns?’, in Jivanta Schoettli (ed.), Democracy, Governance and Citizenship: A Comparative Perspective of Conceptual Flow, Heidelberg Working Paper no. 59 in South Asian and Comparative Politics (February 2011), pp. 155–170; and Clarissa Dri, ‘Limits of the Institutional Mimesis of the European Union: The Case of the Mercosur Parliament’, Latin American Policy, vol. 1, no. 1 (2010), pp. 52–74.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

1. World Diplomacy of the European Parliament

33

­ arliamentary institutionalization also applies, for instance, to the Pan-African p Parliament.69 The European Parliament and Region-oriented Diplomacy Endeavouring to disseminate European values worldwide, the European Parliament underlines ‘the important role that parliamentary diplomacy plays as a supplementary tool in the Union’s relations with third countries and regions’.70 To fulfil its international agenda and maintain relations with virtually all regions, countries and political entities of the world, the European Parliament has formed a large number of committees and delegations.71 Out of the ­current twenty standing committees, the most relevant for external relations are those on Foreign Affairs (AFET), Development and Cooperation (DEVE) and International Trade (INTA). Most of the other committees also deal with issues with international implications. Following the 2014 European Parliament elections, a total of 41 delegations were established: five delegations to interparliamentary assemblies; eight delegations to joint parliamentary committees; five delegations to parliamentary cooperation committees; and 23 delegations for relations with other third countries and entities. The European Parliament is thus crucial in the shaping of inter-parliamentary dialogue at all levels of regional cooperation.72

World-level Interactions

Inter-parliamentary assemblies of the European Parliament are a key tool for the EU’s global inter-parliamentary dialogue. There are four such assemblies: the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (involving the European Parliament 69  See more in the chapter by Konstantinos Magliveras and Asteris Huliaras, ‘Understanding Success and Failure in the Quest for Peace: The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum’ in this volume. 70  European Parliament Resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP in 2008 (2010), OJ C 349E/51, para. 36. 71  See further the chapter by Sarah Delputte, Cristina Fasone and Fabio Longo, ‘The Diplo­matic Role of the European Parliament’s Standing Committees, Delegations and Assemblies: Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation’ in this volume. 72  Andrea Cofelice and Stelios Stavridis, ‘The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI)’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 19, no. 2 (2014), p. 165.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

34

Jančić

and parliaments of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states); the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean (PA-UfM, involving the European Parliament and parliaments of some of the EU’s partners in the Western Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East); the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly (involving the European Parliament and parliaments of the EU’s eastern neighbours Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine); and the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat, involving the European Parliament, Latin American Parliament, Andean Parliament, Central American Parliament, Mercosur Parliament and representatives of the Chilean and Mexican Congresses). Their objective is to ‘bring together parliamentarians from around the world, thereby enhancing democratic legitimacy and providing valuable political forums for overall dialogue’.73 These assemblies perform primarily discursive, deliberative and communicative functions rather than those of a purely controlling and legislative nature.74 In some cases, however, the enactment of politically sensitive legislation can spark reactions across inter-parliamentary forums and create i­ncentives for paying greater attention to the external effects of policy-formulation processes. One such example is the case of the reaction of a number of Latin American domestic and regional integration parliaments to the EU’s Returns Directive.75 Even in the absence of direct accountability mechanisms, the role of legislative networks in global governance is indeed to provide counterweight to governmental actors and attenuate the ‘cries of “democratic deficit” ’.76 They serve as venues for public debate, for the formulation of interests, and agreement on joint decisions and strategies of action.77 As such, they may to a certain extent shape the legitimacy and effectiveness of the outputs of international and EU

73  European Parliament Resolution of 23 May 2007 on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of CFSP, including the Financial Implications for the General Budget of the European Union for 2005 (2008), OJ C 102E/309, para. 14. 74  Robert Cutler, ‘International Parliamentary Instutitions as Organizations’, Journal of International Organizations Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (2013), p. 104. 75  Davor Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy: The Emergence of Multi-layered International Parliamentarism’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (2015), pp. 197–242. 76  Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 127–128. 77  Zlatko Šabič, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2 (2008), p. 258. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

1. World Diplomacy of the European Parliament

35

affairs.78 Specifically, they do so by nurturing parliamentary socialization and exchange, policy-oriented intercultural dialogue on global public goods, and joint oversight over inter-regional partnerships.79 Furthermore, the European Parliament maintains relations with certain regional parliamentary institutions without creating an assembly to this end. Prominently, the European Parliament has since December 2001 had a tenstrong delegation for relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO-PA), which is an independent international parliamentary institution and not an organ of NATO.80 By participating in the sessions of the NATO-PA, the delegation members, who are drawn from the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence, endeavour to represent the EU’s position regarding zones of conflict or crisis where both the EU and NATO are engaged, such as in Afghanistan and Kosovo,81 as well as regarding piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. The European Parliament delegation’s status within the NATO-PA is sui generis, because it is more than an observer but less than an associate member. The delegation members can speak and table various documents, but may not vote and propose amendments.82 Another example of such interregional parliamentary diplomacy is the European Parliament’s delegation to the Pan-African Parliament,83 whose purpose is to oversee the implementation of the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Besides these multilateral forums, the European Parliament also has a rather developed web of bilateral international inter-parliamentary relations 78  Christiane Kraft-Kasack, ‘Transnational Parliamentary Assemblies: A Remedy for the Democratic Deficit of International Governance?’, West European Politics, vol. 31, no. 3 (2008), p. 552. 79  Andrea Cofelice, ‘Inter-regional Parliamentary Assemblies: A New Layer in the Multi-level Global Governance System’, in Léonce Bekemans (ed.), Intercultural Dialogue and Multilevel Goveranance in Europe: A Human Rights Based Approach (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012), pp. 291–292. 80  See more in the chapter by Zlatko Šabič, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy and the US Congress: The Case of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’ in this volume. 81  Lorinc Redei, ‘The European Parliament as a Diplomatic Precedent Setter: The Case of Parliamentary Relations with Kosovo’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 272–285. 82  See online at https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/1029485c-96da475a-86e9-fae4bc36afd5/att_20091023ATT63114–2992850082496707298.pdf. 83  Julien Navarro, ‘The Creation and Transformation of Regional Parliamentary Assemblies: Lessons from the Pan-African Parliament’, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 16, no. 2 (2010), pp. 195–214. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

36

Jančić

for different purposes. For example, delegations for relations with the United States, Canada, Russia, China, Japan, Brazil, Mexico, India, South Africa and South Korea84 are focused on the evolution of the EU’s formal or informal strategic partnerships with these countries. In the case of the United States, the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue has since 1999 provided a forum for meetings between EU and US parliamentarians on bilateral and global issues.85 Similarly, the European Parliament’s delegations for relations with Chile and Ukraine aim to monitor the application of the respective association agreements between these countries and the EU. Other delegations have different objectives. For instance, the European Parliament’s delegations for relations with individual Western Balkans countries focus on EU enlargement and strengthening the rule of law and ­democratic institutions.86 The delegation for relations with Afghanistan – with a degree of difficulty because of the delicate circumstances in Kabul – also concentrates on democratic transition. Conversely, the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with Iraq predominantly centres on the containment of terrorism, whereas that for relations with Iran focuses on nuclear non-proliferation. The European Parliament’s delegations for relations with the Israeli Knesset and the Palestinian Legislative Council, moreover, serve as venues for discussions on the Middle East peace process.87 The question as to how effective European Parliament delegations are in accomplishing palpable goals in international relations is salient. The 84  The relevant European Parliament delegation is for relations with the Korean peninsula, so it encompasses North Korea too. 85  Davor Jančić, ‘Transatlantic Regulatory Interdependence: The Evolving Roles of the EU and US Legislatures’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol. 17 (2015), pp. 334–359; Davor Jančić, ‘The Transatlantic Connection: Democratizing Euro-American Relations through Parliamentary Liaison’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 178–196; and Davor Jančić, ‘The European Parliament and EU-US Relations: Revamping Institutional Cooperation?’, in Elaine Fahey and Dierdre Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 35–68. 86  For more see Tamara Takács and Davor Jančić, ‘Fundamental Rights and Rule of Law Promotion in EU Enlargement Policy in the Western Balkans’, in Vesna Lazić et al. (eds.), Protecting Fundamental Rights in the International Arena: Public, Private and European Law Perspectives (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press/Springer, 2015). 87  Maria Gianniou, ‘The European Parliament and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 237–251.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

1. World Diplomacy of the European Parliament

37

European Parliament’s world diplomacy is based on dialogue and protagonism through personal meetings, as well as on non-binding political instruments such as resolutions, recommendations, statements and declarations. The European Parliament’s global influence is hence hardly quantifiable, because it is sought through contributions to political debates and processes, rather through legal enactments. EU-level Interactions Regarding the World In the multi-level EU, not only are foreign affairs competences divided between the Union and the member states;88 democratic representation and the legitimating mechanisms are too. The European Parliament’s international affairs evolve hand in hand with those of its domestic counterparts. From the viewpoint of the decentralized CFSP governance set-up,89 national parliaments represent a parallel network of diplomatic scrutineers. Namely, since the EU institutions that decide the Union’s foreign policy are composed of domestic executive officials – above all, foreign affairs ministers and prime ministers – the constitutional linkage between them and national parliaments becomes relevant for both the EU’s and the European Parliament’s global actorness.90 What determines the success of oversight in foreign affairs is not only the formal powers, but also the willingness of parliaments to conduct scrutiny systematically rather than sporadically.91 Cross-level inter-parliamentary dialogue aids this goal by informing the debates in the respective parliaments. Periodic discussions can yield substantive claims that national parliaments and the European Parliament can invoke against governments and therewith stand up to executive dominance. The European Parliament does well in establishing links with national parliaments to diversify the input legitimacy and

88  Ramses Wessel, ‘The Multi-level Constitution of European Foreign Relations’, in Nicholas Tsagorias (ed.), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 165. 89  Uwe Puetter, ‘The Latest Attempt at Institutional Engineering: The Treaty of Lisbon and Deliberative Integovernmentalism in EU Foreign and Security Policy Coordination’, in Paul James Cardwell (ed.), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012), p. 23. 90  Dirk Peters et al., ‘Parliaments and European Security Policy: Mapping the Parliamentary Field’, European Integration Online Papers, vol. 14, special issue no. 1 (2010). 91  Ariella Huff, ‘Executive Privilege Reaffirmed? Parliamentary Scrutiny of the CFSP and CSDP’, West European Politics, vol. 38, no. 2 (2015), p. 411.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

38

Jančić

accountability base of EU foreign policy-making.92 To this end, a plethora of inter-parliamentary forums have been created, of joint parliamentary and committee meetings, to gatherings of presiding officers from parliaments, and inter-parliamentary conferences.93 Crucial among them is the InterParliamentary Conference for CFSP and CSDP, which was established in 2012 to fill the gap left by the dismantlement of the Assembly of the Western European Union. This otherwise useful forum for communication among European and national parliamentarians, however, does not have the capacity to stem the numerous democratic deficits in EU foreign, security and defence policies.94 Forging alliances with national parliaments, however, is no easy task. Collaboration is sometimes marred by differences in views and by frictions caused by mutually exclusive claims to sovereignty.95 This is significant because national parliaments can indeed be a powerful and unpredictable factor in EU international relations. The opposition of the French senators and the Syrizaled Greek Parliament to the currently negotiated EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement exemplifies how domestic legislatures create important effects at the EU level, which the European Parliament ought to take into account when defining its own stances and policies.96

92  Jan Wouters and Kolja Raube, ‘Seeking CSDP Accountability through Iinter-parliamentary Scrutiny’, The International Spectator, vol. 47, no. 4 (2012), p. 162. 93  See the essays in Nicola Lupo and Cristina Fasone, Inter-parliamentary Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016). See also Davor Jančić, ‘Representative Democracy across Levels? National Parliaments and EU Constitutionalism’, Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, vol. 8 (2012), pp. 227–265. 94  Stelios Stavridis, ‘The New Inter-parliamentary Conference on the CFSP/CSDP’, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper, vol. 14, no. 12 (2014), p. 13. 95  Anna Herranz-Surrallés, ‘The EU’s Multi-level Parliamentary (Battle)Field: InterParliamentary Cooperation and Conflict in Foreign and Security Policy’, West European Politics, vol. 37, no. 5 (2014), p. 971. 96  See French Senate, Résolution européenne no. 57 sur le règlement des différences entre investisseurs et États dans les projets d’accords commerciaux entre l’Union européenne, le Canada et les États-Unis (3 February 2015); EurActiv, ‘Syriza-led Greek Parliament “Will Never Ratify TTIP” ’, available online at www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/syrizaled-greek-parliament-will-never-ratify-ttip-311719; Davor Jančić, ‘Towards a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): National Parliaments and EU-US Relations’, paper presented at ACCESS Europe and Academy of Finland Workshop on LegislativeExecutive Relations in Foreign and Security Policy, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (21–22 May 2015).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

1. World Diplomacy of the European Parliament



39

Conclusion: What Is the Impact of the European Parliament’s Diplomacy on Constitutionalism and Democracy?

The intensive foreign policy engagement of the European Parliament is to a great extent motivated by its desire for institutional prestige and portrayal as a player to be reckoned with, both in the EU constitutional setting and in the wider world.97 Its ever-expanding international portfolio testifies to the European Parliament’s ambition to position itself as the world leader in organizing democratic representation in external affairs. The European Parliament’s parliamentary diplomacy thereby ushers an additional layer of political pluralism into both EU external relations and global governance.98 However, notwithstanding its increasing constitutional competence, the European Parliament continues to lag behind the EU executive in terms of concrete policy influence. Its limited powers, the declining democratic base – rooted in low voter turnouts – and the preponderance of domestic politics in foreign affairs provide a strong incentive for the European Parliament to ‘externalize’ its quest for constitutional recognition and empowerment. Yet the European Parliament’s diplomatic efforts are rooted not only in the struggle for influence among EU institutions, but also in the fulfilment of the EU objective of promoting its foundational values around the globe. The European Parliament’s parliamentary diplomacy is hence a product of both antagonistic and altruistic motivations. The European Parliament’s diplomacy is further facilitated by its political autonomy. The fact that it is a supranational parliament, and a parliament that does not function according to the postulates of parliamentary democracy that dominate the constitutional systems of the majority of EU member states, greatly aids it in asserting its rights as an autonomous actor. Neither the Council, nor the European Council, nor the Commission have a tight political grip over MEPs. There are no UK-like ‘whipping’ practices, whereby the EU executive enforces party discipline in line with government policies. Not least by rejecting highly salient international agreements, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the first EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme Agreement (otherwise known as the SWIFT Agreement), the European Parliament has ‘put itself on the map of international relations’, 97  See also Christopher J. Bickerton, ‘Functionality in EU Foreign Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda?’, Journal of European Integration, vol. 32, no. 2 (2010), p. 217. 98  Flavia Zanon, ‘The European Parliament: An Autonomous Foreign Policy Identity?’, in Esther Barbé and Anna Herranz (eds.), The Role of Parliaments in European Foreign Policy (Barcelona: Office of the European Parliament, 2005), p. 118.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

40

Jančić

gained ‘exceptional visibility’ and became an ‘independent and influential political force’.99 As the practice shows, European Parliament resolutions can be politically effective,100 primarily by establishing conditions for consenting to international agreements and by providing incisive fact-based arguments and policy alternatives that are difficult for both EU and international actors to ignore without incurring criticism, which they are keen to avoid. Much of the European Parliament’s world diplomacy is thus aimed at influencing policymaking by exerting a response from target actors, and this has so far proven to be a viable vehicle of external action. One author goes so far as to claim that the European Parliament’s diplomatic action strengthens the EU’s claim to original sovereign rights.101 In any event, this type of action to some extent counterbalances the excesses of ­executive power at the EU level, thereby strengthening the principles of constitutionalism and democracy, which were conceived as safeguards for limited government and popular representation in the multi-level governance setting of the EU. It also helps to reinforce the link between the European Parliament and EU citizens, thus creating fertile conditions for enhancing legitimacy in EU external relations. This in turn leads to a slow, evolutionary amendment of the EU’s constitutional settlement and to its informal reshaping in and by the political process.

99  Christina Eckes, ‘How the European Parliament’s Participation in International Relations Affects the Deep Tissue of the EU’s Power Structures’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 12, no. 4 (2015), pp. 917 and 923. 100  Ricardo Passos, ‘The European Union’s External Relations a Year After Lisbon: A First Evaluation from the European Parliament’, pp. 54–55. 101  Eckes, ‘How the European Parliament’s Participation in International Relations Affects the Deep Tissue of the EU’s Power Structures’, p. 929.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 2

The Role of the European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy Luigi Gianniti and Nicola Lupo

Introduction: Internal and External Functions of the European Parliament’s President

The President of the European Parliament occupies a prominent position in the political leadership and institutional framework of the European Union (EU). The procedure for his/her election grants him/her strong political legitimacy, because it usually implies a bipartisan agreement among the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), or at least between the two largest political groups. In fact, in order to present a nomination, an initiative by a political group or by at least 40 MEPs is required (Rule 15 of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure). In order to be elected, an absolute majority of the votes is necessary in the first three ballots, while in the fourth ballot there is a ‘run-off’ between the two candidates who have obtained the highest number of votes in the third ballot (Rule 16). Beyond the wording of the Rules of Procedure, the election of the European Parliament’s President is the outcome of a political decision that usually involves at least a bipartisan majority of the MEPs and that takes into consideration numerous elements, not least the geopolitical equilibrium among the EU member states. This agreement is eased by the relative brevity of the European Parliament President’s mandate. Namely, since it lasts only half the legislative term – that is, two and a half years (Rule 19), the search for compromises between the two largest European parties on the handover of power becomes easier.1 Furthermore, this explains why the European Parliament President and the members of the European Parliament’s Bureau may be elected by acclamation ‘if the number of nominations does not exceed the number of seats to be filled’ (Rule 15). 1  For more on the tacit agreements between the two groups during the legislative term 1999– 2004, see David Judge and David Earnshaw, The European Parliament (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2nd edition 2008), p. 160; and Olivier Costa, ‘The President of the European Parliament’, in Vincenzo Lippolis and Nicola Lupo (eds.), Il Filangieri 2012–2013, special issue on Le trasformazioni del ruolo dei Presidenti delle Camere (Naples: Jovene, 2013), p. 143. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004336346_004 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

42

Gianniti and Lupo

Indeed, the election of Jerzy Buzek, the first European Parliament President after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, was the result of a political settlement at the level of heads of state and government of the EU member states, and was part of negotiations on the appointments of other major institutional posts introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, such as the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). The choice fell on a politician of prime ministerial rank and, as Jerzy Buzek had been the prime minister of Poland from 1997–2001, this was the first time a European Parliament President originated from the former Eastern Bloc. A similar political settlement was reached when Martin Schulz was re-elected in July 2014. This was the first re-election of a European Parliament President since 1979, and it took place after the European elections of May 2014, in which Martin Schulz was running as the Spitzenkandidat2 [leading candidate] for the Party of European Socialists.3 He was re-elected in order to provide a counterweight to new President of the Commission JeanClaude Juncker and President of the European Council Donald Tusk, both of whom are members of the European People’s Party. However, in spite of this wide political legitimacy, the European Parliament President enjoys a very limited margin of manoeuvre in internal parliamentary affairs. The political groups strongly condition his/her conduct in the European Parliament and he/she holds almost no power with regard to agenda-setting, except when acting as the Chairperson of the Conference of Presidents.4 Even as director of all the European Parliament’s activities and administration, the European Parliament President is greatly constrained by the political groups, which usually choose the European Parliament’s Secretary-General, who is elected by the Bureau.5 As well as electing the Secretary-General, it is the 2  Sara B. Hobolt, ‘A Vote for the President? The Role of Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament Election’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 21, no. 10 (2014), pp. 1528–1540; Joseph H. Weiler, ‘Editorial: Fateful Elections? Investing in the Future of Europe; Masthead Changes; In this Issue’, European Journal of International Law, vol. 25 no. 2 (2014), pp. 361– 367; and Nereo Peñalver García and Julian Priestley, The Making of a European President (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 99 ff. 3  See the view crediting President Schulz for it, online at http://europeandignitywatch.org/ it/day-to-day/detail/article/trading-away-european-democracy-the-european-parliamentand-commission-presidencies.html. 4  Andrea Scrimali, ‘Il ruolo del Presidente di Assemblea nella programmazione dei lavori, tra realizzazione del programma di governo e diritti delle minoranze’, in Emanuele Rossi (ed.), Studi pisani sul Parlamento (Pisa: Plus, 3rd edition 2009), pp. 49–58. 5  Olivier Costa and Florent Saint Martin, Le Parlement européen (Paris: La documentation Française, 2nd edition, 2011), p. 77.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

2. The European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy

43

Bureau that approves regulations to be implemented by the Secretariat (Rule 25(10) and Rule 222). The influence of the European Parliament President is much greater, however, when it comes to his/her ‘external functions’. In harmony with the legal provisions and common usage,6 these functions refer both to relationships with other EU institutions, including the European political parties (Rule 223), and to activities in the international sphere, including those with the institutions of the EU member states. This chapter deals with the role of the European Parliament President in EU external relations, particularly with parliaments of non-EU member states, parliamentary assemblies of international organizations, and generally in foreign affairs, as part of a broader sphere of activities commonly referred to as ‘parliamentary diplomacy’.7 The functions of the European Parliament President in the European Parliament’s parliamentary diplomacy are severely under studied in the literature.8 They deserve greater scholarly attention, especially since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, because the European Parliament President exercises strong powers in the field of foreign affairs and because these powers risk interfering with EU foreign policy, as conducted by the HR/VP in cooperation with the European External Action Service.9 In order to understand the effects of the new institutional framework put in place by the Lisbon Treaty, this chapter focuses on the presidencies of Jerzy Buzek and Martin Schulz, thereby encompassing the years 2012–2014 and the first year of the second Schulz Presidency, which started on 1 July 2014. Before doing so, the next section will analyse certain factors that particularly enhance the external role of the European Parliament President. These refer to the Lisbon Treaty provisions on the right of the European Parliament President to be present and speak at the opening of all European Council meetings. This allows him/her not only to express views on the topics included in the European Council’s agenda, but also to play a role in the reformed EU economic governance. As the analysis will show, the European Parliament 6  Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs and Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament (London: Harper, 8th edition, 2011), p. 131. 7  See more on parliamentary diplomacy, Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jančić, ‘The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy in International Politics’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 105–120. 8  Costa, ‘The President of the European Parliament’, p. 143. 9  Harmut Mayer, ‘The Challenge of Coherence and Consistency in EU Foreign Policy’, in Mario Telò and Frederik Ponjaert (eds.), The EU’s Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action? (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 105–117.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

44

Gianniti and Lupo

President’s increased political visibility and international presence seem to be directly linked with his/her engagement in parliamentary diplomacy, and, more generally, with his/her position in the public debate.

The Roles Assigned to the European Parliament President by the Lisbon Treaty and by the Fiscal Compact

Article 14 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) mentions the European Parliament President twice. In paragraph 4,10 it is provided that the European Parliament shall elect its President and officers from among its members. As regards the number of members of the European Parliament, paragraph 2 grants an autonomous status to its President. The latter provision was inserted during the European Council meeting held in Lisbon on 18–19 October 2007, after long and complicated negotiations aimed at overcoming the opposition of the Italian government to the number of representatives to be allocated to Italy.11 As a consequence, the number of representatives elected to the European Parliament was raised by one, according to the formula ‘seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the President’. Beyond the specific political context that led to the approval of Article 14(2) TEU, this provision seems to have paved the way for recognition of a more autonomous role for the European Parliament President. This was occurring regardless of the contingent political dynamics within the European Parliament, which are illustrated by the reaction of (then) European Parliament President Hans-Gert Pöttering. Namely, he claimed that his right to participate in the debate and vote in the plenary – the latter right is recognized by the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure if the chairmanship of the European Parliament is abandoned for the entire length of the plenary debate12 – was not abolished by the said Lisbon Treaty’s reform of the European Parliament’s composition.13 However, this possibility is typically not exercised in practice and, indeed, this provision seems to rely on an outdated idea of the European Parliament President’s role, according to which he/she is still able to act as 10  See formerly Article 197 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 11  Federico Fabbrini, ‘La composizione del Parlamento europeo dopo il Trattato di Lisbona’, Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, no. 3 (2011), pp. 787–802. 12  See the current Rule 22(3), which corresponds to the former Rule 20(3). 13  For more on this, see Cristina Fasone, ‘Quando i seggi. . . . non tornano: A proposito dei membri del Parlamento europeo spettanti all’Italia e del trattato di riforma’ (November 2007), p. 21, available online at www.amministrazioneincammino.luiss.it.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

2. The European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy

45

one of the members of the assembly – namely, in contemporary democracies, the role of a president of a parliamentary assembly, who is constantly exposed to the media, differs very much from that of other members of parliament. This position highlights the President’s work at the expense of that of collegial bodies, and makes it unnecessary – if not detrimental – for him/her to speak from the floor or vote in order to clarify his/her position and influence the political debate. The increased role of the European Parliament President is confirmed by another provision introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Namely, Article 235(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) formalized the practice according to which ‘the President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard by the European Council’. In practice, however, the participation of the European Parliament President in European Council meetings has been allowed since 1980. With the Lisbon Treaty, he/she acquired a formal right of attendance upon invitation, which includes the right to address the European Council prior to each of its meetings. In this context, the President states the European Parliament’s standpoints on the topics under discussion and engages in a debate with the heads of state and government. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament President regularly participates in all European Council meetings, although without attending the full meeting.14 Participation of the European Parliament President arguably strengthens the European Council’s role of defining the general political directions and priorities of the EU by democratically endorsing its decisions and thus facilitating their enactment. A similar right was conferred on the European Parliament President by Article 12(5) of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (Fiscal Compact), which was signed on 1 March 2012. This is a significant provision, because it recognizes the role of the European Parliament within a non-EU institutional framework, namely Eurozone Summit meetings, which gather the heads of state or government of the contracting parties whose currency is the euro. The European Parliament President thus has the opportunity to represent the Parliament’s position within the institutions that are charged with defining broad EU economic and monetary guidelines in a more frequent manner and on a greater number of topics than before. This activity may well be beyond the mandate that the political groups give to the European Parliament President. The latter also has the benefit of greater flexibility in presenting his/her own views and in 14  See Uwe Puetter, The European Council and the Council: New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 101.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

46

Gianniti and Lupo

putting a different emphasis on the topics on the European Council’s agenda. Moreover, the European Parliament President represents the Parliament as a whole, which means that he/she assumes the task of reconciling different positions and asymmetries in the EU. The powers of the European Parliament President are even stronger on the world stage. The President represents the European Parliament in its international relations and, in this capacity, he/she undertakes official visits within and outside the EU and receives visitors from other countries who are not necessarily fellow Speakers or parliamentarians. By doing so, the President enhances inter-parliamentary cooperation and is actively involved in establishing and improving relations with third countries, organizations and international partners.15 Martin Schulz was able to make the best use of these powers. His constant participation in the work of the European Council and Eurozone Summits, together with his experience as a former President of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, allowed him to acquire a significant political role both in the European political arena and on a global scale. Also, thanks to this type of activity, Schulz was able to present his candidacy for the European Commission Presidency at a very early stage, already since May 2013. This choice, which was endorsed by the European Socialist Party in November 2013, was followed by that of the European People’s Party and other European political families. As the European Parliament President and as a Spitzenkandidat,16 he participated in all of the political debates in the run-up to the European Parliament elections. Although his party did not win the election, the good results achieved, and the European People’s Party’s need to include socialists in a coalition, were a solid basis for the political agreement on the prospective leaders of EU institutions. The designation by the main political parties of Martin Schulz as President of the re-elected Parliament was thus the first among the appointments of the heads of EU institutions. The international dimension of the European Parliament President’s work was clearly highlighted in Martin Schulz’s acceptance speech after his re-­election. Outlining his priorities for the next few years, he emphasized the crises in Syria and Ukraine and recalled ‘the need for a proper debate on the international role of the EU’. In the following months, Schulz devoted 15  See the Speaker statements to this effect, Stavridis and Jančić, ‘The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy in International Politics’, pp. 105–120. 16  This overlap in roles has incurred criticism. See an insider’s view (one of the authors was a special adviser in Martin Schulz’s presidential campaign) that shows the challenges that this dual role poses: García and Priestley, The Making of a European President, p. 115 ff.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

2. The European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy

47

s­ ignificant energy and commitment to these two dossiers, defining the actions and strategies that the European Parliament ought to pursue.17 These processes seem to have significantly altered the position of the European Parliament President, by recognizing the fully political nature of his/her role and by transforming him/her into a strong player in the European political arena. The fact that Jean-Claude Juncker ‘won’ the electoral competition and was appointed Commission President as leader of the European People’s Party could have an influence on Martin Schulz’s role and actions, as he was the leader of the European Socialist Party in the last European elections. It will be, accordingly, extremely interesting to see whether, after the end of his two-and-a-half years’ mandate, Schulz will clear the way for a candidate from the European People’s Party, as has always happened in the past, or whether he will instead seek re-election as European Parliament President for the third time in a row, to counterbalance a more partisan role of the President of the Commission, who for the first time could be thought to derive legitimacy partly from European Parliament elections. In other words, it remains to be seen whether old constitutional conventions will continue, or whether new ones will take over.

The International Role of the European Parliament President

The European Parliament’s representation in EU external relations is one of its President’s key functions. According to Rule 22(4), ‘the Parliament shall be represented in international relations, on ceremonial occasions and in administrative, legal and financial matters by the President, who may delegate these powers’. As the representative of the only directly elected body of the EU in international relations, the European Parliament President tends to be seen also as the representative of the whole Union. In this latter capacity, however, the European Parliament President is not alone: the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the HR/VP are all allowed to speak in the name of the EU in the international sphere.

17  See the speech by European Parliament President Martin Schulz at the Informal Meeting of the heads of state and government in Brussels, 12 February 2015, available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/press/press_release_speeches/ speeches/speeches-2015/speeches-2015-february/html/informal-meeting-of-the-headsof-state-and-government---speech-by-martin-schulz--president-of-the-european-parlia ment;jsessionid=F95183724F2F9BFECB8BC36E44C8376A.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

48

Gianniti and Lupo

Usually, the European Parliament President frequently visits EU and nonEU countries, combining protocol (for example, meetings with heads of government, ministers of foreign affairs and national parliaments, etc.) with the role of expressing the voice of the European Parliament in European and international public debates. On these occasions, and as holder of the highest elective office of the European Union, the European Parliament President is legally entitled to receive the same treatment as heads of state.18 The European Parliament President can thus play a very strong role in EU external affairs, not only by developing relations with other EU bodies, member-state institutions and their parliaments, but also by conducting international activities autonomously, not only from the Parliament itself but also from the other EU institutions. While it is difficult to include all of those activities under the umbrella of parliamentary diplomacy, some of them correspond to traditional forms of parliamentary diplomacy, such as bilateral meetings, joint press conferences and so on. Regarding the possibility of delegating these functions, the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure contain a couple of partially conflicting provisions. While Rule 22(4) seems to leave full discretion to the European Parliament President to choose whether to delegate his/her representative powers, Rule 25(14) states that ‘the Bureau shall nominate two Vice-Presidents who shall be entrusted with the implementation of relations with national parliaments’. Therefore, the maintenance of European Parliament relations with national parliaments follows a specific regime: if the European Parliament President does not exercise this function himself/herself, the delegates are already predetermined by the Bureau in the personalities of the two Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament.19 In practice, this means that it is normally up to these two Vice-Presidents to participate in most of the events that take place within the framework of EU inter-parliamentary cooperation and carry out political oversight of the European Parliament Secretariat, which is in charge of ‘Relations with National Parliaments’ and operates under the Directorate-General for the Presidency. Certainly, the European Parliament President is free to decide when and where to attend meetings, especially those of the Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments20 and other inter-parliamen18  Olivier Costa, Le Parlement européen, assemblée délibérante (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2001), p. 336. 19  According to Rule 17 of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, there are currently fourteen European Parliament Vice-Presidents. 20  For more on the growth of the functions of the EU Speakers Conference, see Antonio Esposito, ‘La cooperazione interparlamentare: principi, strumenti e prospettive’,

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

2. The European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy

49

tary meetings that satisfy the composition criteria preferred by the European Parliament. The latter is an important consideration, because the European Parliament has been reluctant to be placed on an equal footing with national parliaments. It is not by chance that the European Parliament President tends to attend, and play a significant role in, the European Parliamentary Week, which is held in Brussels under the strict direction of the European Parliament.21 Conversely, the European Parliament President normally does not participate in Plenary meetings of Conference of Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC). Furthermore, the European Parliament President often invites heads of state and heads of government of the EU member states or third countries to give a speech in the plenary of the European Parliament. This is a pivotal tool that allows the European Parliament President directly to acquire first-hand information on sensitive topics, to intervene on major international events, and express his/her opinion on any matter that he/she considers important. Regarding other ‘diplomatic’ activities of the European Parliament President, they tend to vary according to the personality, background and preferences of each given President. To illustrate this, this chapter will examine, in a summary fashion, the record of the previous two European Parliament Presidents.

Jerzy Buzek’s Presidency of the European Parliament: Focusing on the EU’s East

The Presidency of Jerzy Buzek, the first European Parliament President after the Lisbon Treaty, is an excellent testing ground for the functioning of this post. Jerzy Buzek’s personality and skills led to his election on 14 July 2009 with 555 of the 644 votes cast: the largest majority any European Parliament President has received since the first direct elections in 1979. Since he was the first European Parliament President to originate from a ‘new’ EU member state, he paid particular attention to the EU’s East. in Andrea Manzella and Nicola Lupo (eds), Il sistema parlamentare euro-nazionale (Turin: Giappichelli, 2014), p. 155; and Cristina Fasone, ‘Ruling the (Dis-)Order of Interparliamentary Cooperation? The EU Speakers’ Conference’, in Nicola Lupo and Cristina Fasone (eds.), Interparliamentary Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016). 21  See Davor Jančić, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in the Economic and Monetary Union after the Euro Crisis’, in Nicola Lupo and Cristina Fasone (eds.), Interparliamentary Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

50

Gianniti and Lupo

Notably, regarding Ukraine, Buzek condemned the selective respect for the rule of law in the Tymoshenko case.22 Furthermore, he represented the European Parliament during the October 2012 elections in Ukraine, supporting the Orange Revolution, and appealed to the Ukrainian authorities, which stated their willingness to enhance relations with the EU and complement their public declarations with clear action, thus showing their commitment to democracy, freedom and the rule of law. He also made a direct appeal to the Ukranian people via YouTube.23 The Buzek Presidency’s attention towards Eastern European countries emerged also in the establishment of EuroNest, an Eastern partnership between the EU, on the one side, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, on the other. This partnership has a very significant parliamentary element in the form of an EU–Neighbourhood East Parliamentary Assembly (EuroNest PA), which is composed of 60 MEPs and ten members from each of the participating parliaments of the Eastern European partners. EuroNest PA plenary meetings are held once a year and Buzek opened its constituent meeting in May 2011.24 However, Jerzy Buzek’s focus on developing the EU’s relations with Eastern Europe did not impede his activity in other areas. For instance, if we examine his interventions, declarations and statements on the upheavals in the Southern Mediterranean region in 2011, known as the Arab Spring, we can observe that the voice of the European Parliament President has become rather strong and at times influential on the international stage, especially in areas where institutional transitions and transformations are taking place. Even more significantly, it was President Buzek who officially opened the European Parliament Liaison Office in Washington, DC, in April 2010 as the first overseas representation of the European Parliament. This Liaison Office is aimed at m ­ aintaining

22  See the press release in which, in December 2011, he declared himself ‘deeply disappointed by the Ukrainian Court of Appeal’s decision to uphold the sentence of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to 7 years in prison’, available online at http://www.europarl .europa.eu/former_ep_presidents/president-buzek/en/press/press_release/2011/2011December/press_release-2011-December-20.html. 23  See the video clip online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6y-vfzUtoH0. 24  See Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, The European Parliament, p. 186. For more on the EuroNest, see Hrant Kostanyan and Bruno Vandecasteele, ‘Socializing the Eastern Neighbourhood: The European Parliament and the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 220–233.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

2. The European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy

51

regular contact between the European Parliament and US lawmakers and legislative staffers on issues requiring political and institutional cooperation.25 In all circumstances, President Buzek was very careful to present himself as the voice of the European Parliament, as the only democratically elected institution of the EU. His commitment and skills have been recognized on many occasions. A former Solidarność activist and Polish prime minister (1997–2001), he led Poland on its EU accession path, standing up against considerable internal anti-EU opposition. This personal and professional experience allowed him to bring substantial added value to the role of European Parliament President.

Martin Schulz’s Presidency of the European Parliament: Focusing on the Mediterranean

Elected on 17 January 2012, with 387 votes in favour out of the 670 votes cast, Martin Schulz follows in the footsteps of his predecessor Jerzy Buzek, enhancing the role of the European Parliament in its relations with EU member states and international partners, while at the same time increasing the visibility and political status of the European Parliament Presidency. In his speech at the March 2012 European Council meeting, President Schulz highlighted the special role of the European Parliament in democratic transitions, especially with regard to the Arab Spring. Maintaining a consistent and open dialogue with the parliaments of Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen was seen as a priority, while highlighting the importance of the European Parliament as a partner ‘in transforming the Arab Spring’s promise of freedom into new constitutions’. In this way, Schulz tried to ‘renew what has been the role played by the European Parliament in the democratic transitions in Southern Europe, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s’.26 The European Parliament’s increased involvement in international affairs is thus to a great extent a consequence of the action of its President, who has proven able to enforce the new status granted to him by the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, Martin Schulz has developed a rather partisan approach to his mandate, which often upsets members of the ‘small’ political groups as well as those of the European People’s Party, which voted for him. These MEPs 25   See Davor Jančić, ‘The European Parliament and EU–US Relations: Revamping Institutional Cooperation?’, in Elaine Fahey and Deirdre Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationships between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 35–68, at 56. 26  Costa, ‘The President of the European Parliament’, p. 153.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

52

Gianniti and Lupo

do not appreciate the President’s tendency to speak on behalf of the European Parliament when criticizing EU or national leaders – sometimes in the wake of a national election – from a distinctly ‘socialist’ point of view.27 However, it was precisely this kind of approach that paved the way for Schulz’s candidacy for President of the European Commission in 2014 and, later, for his re-election as the European Parliament President. Since the beginning of his second term, Martin Schulz has confirmed his engagement in EU foreign policy. His bilateral meetings are never purely ceremonial and his agenda continues to show a high level of commitment, proving that the European Parliament President can be a key parliamentary diplomacy actor on the world stage. For instance, from July 2014 to January 2015, President Schulz met the Ukrainian government three times. He also met Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif and US VicePresident Joe Biden. Furthermore, he has worked within international parliamentary assemblies, including chairing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean during the European Parliament’s turn in office. Martin Schulz is therefore continuing to act as a parliamentary diplomat, fully using his status as well as the notoriety and legitimacy derived from the 2014 European Parliament electoral campaign. More recently, Schulz was the first EU official to welcome the potential participation of several EU member states in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), otherwise a very controversial initiative of the Chinese government. On 12 March 2015, the United Kingdom sent China a letter expressing its wish to join the AIIB, thus becoming the first large Western economy to apply for AIIB membership. Five days later, France confirmed its intention to become one of the founding members of the AIIB. On the same day, the Italian Economics and Finance Minister announced the same intention. The following day, President Schulz stated in Beijing that the participation of EU member states in the AIIB was important for future EU–China cooperation, but that such new organizations must comply with international standards.28 With such a balanced statement, Schulz took into account the views of some EU member states that have postponed their debates about joining the AIIB, which was prompted by the US administration’s warning that the AIIB could 27  Costa, ‘The President of the European Parliament’, p. 158. 28  See Martin Schulz’s speech of 18 March 2015, available online at http://www.europarl .europa.eu/the-president/en/press/press_release_speeches/speeches/speeches-2015/ speeches-2015-march/html/marking-the-40th-anniversary-of-the-eu-china-relations-what-next---speech-at-the-chinese-academy-of-social-sciences--beijing---by-martinschulz--president-of-the-european-parliament.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

2. The European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy

53

hamper the role of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This confirms Martin Schulz’s active engagement in international affairs.

Explaining the International Role of the European Parliament President

The level and intensity of the European Parliament President’s international engagement are influenced by his/her personality and aptitude. However, when observed in the long run, the European Parliament President’s international role is becoming increasingly important. Three reasons contribute to explaining this development. The first is based on the original features of the European Parliament as a non-sovereign body. The second refers to the European Parliament’s increased role in foreign policy following the Lisbon Treaty. The third concerns the more general trends and developments in parliamentary diplomacy. First, in order to appreciate fully the role of the European Parliament President, we should bear in mind that the European Parliament is ‘born to be open’, while national parliaments are ‘born to be alone’.29 The European Parliament was conceived as a parliament that had to co-exist with other parliaments since its very beginnings, while national parliaments were born as sovereign or at least quasi-sovereign bodies, not used to holding dialogues with different institutions other than a second chamber (where this existed) and the executive. In other words, the European Parliament has been a nonsovereign parliament since its inception, forced to develop relations with other institutions: the parliaments of the EU member states (especially before its direct election in 1979); the European Commission; the Council; the European Council; the executives of the member states; third countries; and international organizations and their parliamentary assemblies.30 Furthermore, the inter-institutional activities of the European Parliament are becoming more

29  On the process of transformation of parliaments, which can no longer be understood as purely domestic institutions that are immune from international integrative forces, see Davor Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy: The Emergence of Multilayered International Parliamentarism’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (2015), pp. 197–242. 30  See Olivier Costa, Clarissa Dri and Stelios Stavridis (eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

54

Gianniti and Lupo

and more important.31 Some structural features of the European Parliament further contribute to developing its ‘relationship-building activities’: its unicameral nature; the existence of parliamentary delegations; the pluri-national nature of the political groups; multilingualism; and, to a certain extent, even the plurality of its seats (Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg). The second reason is linked to the increased role of the European Parliament in foreign policy after the Lisbon Treaty. It is well documented that the European Parliament has been able to play a greater role in EU international relations since the abolition of the EU pillar structure.32 Accordingly, in his/her international activities, the European Parliament President is able to present himself/herself as the head of an institution that has a say on many issues that are otherwise of interest to the HR/VP, with whom he/she is in contact. As the question of the EU’s external representation has always been controversial, contacts between the European Parliament Presidency and the HR/VP should be further institutionalized. Indeed, the role of the European Parliament President in foreign policy proper can only be effective when it is intended as an expression of the European Parliament’s position and when it complements the HR/VP’s action.33 The Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), where the European Parliament ended up being represented by a large delegation after a long struggle with national parliaments,34 could be 31  Costa, ‘The President of the European Parliament’, p. 150. 32  See, for instance, Daniel Thym, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in European International Relations’, in Marise Cremona and Bruno De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relation Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), pp. 201–232; Marianne Dony, ‘The EU’s External Relations and their Evolving Legal Framework’, in M. Mario Telò (ed.), The European Union and Global Governance (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 131–155; Piet Eeckhout, ‘The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy after Lisbon: From Pillar Talk to Constitutionalism’, in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 265–291; and Robert Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 359–406. 33  For more on the evolution of the relationship between the European Parliament and the HR/VP, see Ben Crum, ‘The European Parliament as a Driving Force in Informal Institution-Building: The Hard Case of the European Parliament’s Relations with the High Representative for the CFSP’, in Thomas Christiansen and Christine Neuhold (eds.), International Handbook on Informal Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 354–373. 34  Anna Herranz Surálles, ‘The EU’s Multilevel Parliamentary (Battle)Field: Explaining InterParliamentary Cooperation and Conflict in the Area of Foreign and Security Policy’, West European Politics, vol. 37 (2014), pp. 957–975.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

2. The European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy

55

particularly useful for developing the European Parliament’s relations with the HR/VP. Indeed, the Conference, which takes place twice a year, provides for extensive exchanges of views between the European Parliament and the HR/VP on the main topics in EU foreign policy. The conclusions that this Conference adopts are normally mentioned by the HR/VP at the Council level. This helps relay the views of the European Parliament and national parliaments on the strategic lines of EU foreign policy, and therefore strengthens the democratic legitimacy of EU external action. Third, in the last 25 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there has been a major development in the international activities of national parliaments – that is to say, parliamentary diplomacy in general is being strengthened in Europe and elsewhere.35 Furthermore, opportunities arise for the European Parliament and its President to promote other forms of regional integration and support the creation of international parliamentary institutions, some of which follow the example of the European Parliament.36

Conclusion: Towards a Longer Mandate for the European Parliament President?

This chapter has shown that the most important functions exercised by the European Parliament President are the external roles, which are expressly provided for in Rule 22(4) of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. They allow him/her to engage in EU inter-institutional relations and express political positions on foreign policy rather freely and effectively. The European Parliament President’s diplomatic functions have been bolstered because of the ‘openness’ of the European Parliament and its developed international activities. Furthermore, we have argued that these functions are exercised differently according to the preferences of each European Parliament President and that they need to be better coordinated with those of other EU institutions that are in charge of EU foreign policy. One of the factors that weakens the European Parliament President’s role is the length of the mandate. Since this lasts only half of the five-year duration of the European Parliament and since none of the European Parliament 35  Melina Decaro and Nicola Lupo (eds.), Il ‘dialogo’ tra Parlamenti (Rome: Luiss University Press, 2009). See also Davor Jančić, ‘World Diplomacy of the European Parliament’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 121–143. 36  For more on the diffusion of this phenomenon, see Costa, Dri and Stavridis (eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

56

Gianniti and Lupo

Presidents – contrary to what usually happens with the committee chairs – has ever been re-elected after the end of this term, the scope of action of a European Parliament President tends to be strictly controlled by the main political groups. As we have seen, the re-election of Martin Schultz was an exception. His reelection was the result of wider negotiations by the EU’s institutional leaders. The choice of Schulz as the first Spitzenkandidat in the 2014 European elections demonstrates that the European Parliament President can capitalize on the political visibility acquired mainly thanks to his external functions by acting on behalf of the entire Parliament. It will be interesting to see whether the post-Lisbon EU form of government – with a more politicized European Commission – will affect the institutional strength of the European Parliament President. A longer-standing European Parliament President would be better placed to act, not only within the EU political system but also internationally.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 3

The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Standing Committees, Delegations and Assemblies: Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Sarah Delputte, Cristina Fasone and Fabio Longo Introduction Established as a ‘non-sovereign’ parliament from the beginning and originally provided with a limited set of powers,1 especially in the period between the first direct elections and the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Parliament tried to legitimize its role by creating a network of relations not only with the parliaments of the European Union (EU) member states, but also with parliaments and other institutions of third countries, as well as with international organizations.2 In other words, in order to have political weight within the EU’s inter-institutional balance, the European Parliament has pursued a strategy of involvement in a complex network of relations with foreign and international institutions.3 More recently, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the European Parliament’s veto powers regarding international agreements negotiated by the EU.4 For example, Article 218(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for the European Parliament’s mandatory 1  Olivier Costa and Nathalie Brack, ‘The Role of the European Parliament in Europe’s Integration and Parliamentarization Process’, in Olivier Costa, Clarissa Dri and Stelios Stavridis (eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 45–69. 2  Donatella M. Viola, European Foreign Policy and the European Parliament in the 1990s: An Investigation into the Role and Voting Behaviour of the European Parliament’s Political Groups (Farnham: Ashgate, 2000). 3  See more on this in Luigi Gianniti and Nicola Lupo, ‘The Role of the European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 144–160. 4  Jan Wouters, Dominic Coppens and Bart De Meester, ‘The European Union’s External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty’, in Stefan Griller and Jacques Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Vienna: Springer, 2008), pp. 143–203.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004336346_005 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

58

Delputte et al.

approval before the conclusion of all EU international agreements concerning matters to which the ordinary legislative procedure applies.5 Hence, in parallel with the growth of the European Parliament’s internal powers, the expansion of its international role has triggered its diplomatic action, which consists of its participation in bilateral or multilateral forms of cooperation with other parliaments, institutional actors, or organizations at supranational and international levels, with a range of objectives that can vary from soft diplomacy (in parallel with the hard diplomacy of the executives),6 the promotion of regional integration processes and the exchange of best practices, to support democratic transitions.7 Indeed, the activity of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) is only partially carried out in Brussels, or within their electoral constituencies; they also increasingly work outside the EU’s borders. The parliamentary bodies that are immediately called upon to sustain the growing external dimension of the European Parliament’s activities are standing committees and delegations, with the latter being simultaneously internal bodies of the European Parliament and institutional components of international parliamentary institutions, hence wearing a ‘double hat’. On the one hand, especially since the Treaty of Lisbon, some standing committees – including the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET), International Trade (INTA), Development (DEVE) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) – devote a considerable number of meetings to issues dealing with EU external action. On the other hand, the 44 parliamentary delegations play a crucial role outside the European Parliament: within inter-parliamentary assemblies set up at the level of international organizations (for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)); within joint parliamentary assemblies (JPAs) established between the EU and third regions (such as with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states); as well as within bilateral parliamentary bodies between the European Parliament and individual parliaments (such as with the US Congress or with the Mexican Congress of

5  Compare with the pre-Lisbon regime, where European Parliament approval was requested only for agreements dealing with EU commercial policy; see Stefan Krauss, ‘The European Parliament in EU External Relations: The Customs Union with Turkey’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 5, no. 2 (2000), pp. 223–235. 6  Davor Jančić, ‘The Soft Power of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Diplomat Magazine, vol. 2, no. 1 (June 2015), p. 67. 7  Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 104.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

3. Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation

59

the Union), or parliaments of a group of countries (for example, the countries of South Asia).8 Given the number of the European Parliament’s actors involved in EU external relations, coordination problems may arise, primarily between standing committees and delegations, hence potentially impeding the European Parliament from speaking with a single voice and affecting the development of its diplomatic role in a consistent way. Several standing committees are therefore empowered to coordinate the delegations and oversee their activities. Although there is no hierarchy between committees and delegations, committees tend to act as a trait d’union between the European Parliament’s internal proceedings and the work of delegations outside the parliament, in particular within inter-parliamentary assemblies. Thanks to European Parliament delegations, the political dimension of some of these assemblies has been reinforced in recent years, especially with respect to democracy promotion, which can be seen as one of the most important achievements of the European Parliament’s diplomatic action.9 In the framework of the ongoing debate on the rise of a multi-level and multi-stakeholder diplomatic system within the EU, where parliaments are also active players, this chapter aims to link the strengthened role of the European Parliament as a diplomatic actor with the ability of its bodies to cooperate and create synergies between what happens inside the European Parliament – that is, at committee level – and outside the European Parliament – that is, when delegations are on missions and work within inter-parliamentary assemblies. The chapter proceeds as follows. After an overview of the functions fulfilled by the European Parliament’s standing committees and delegations, both in international affairs and in their interactions within inter-parliamentary assemblies, the role of these bodies is analysed ‘in action’ by means of a case study of the parliamentary dimension of the ACP–EU strategic partnership. This case study was chosen because of the high degree of institutionalization of interparliamentary cooperation within the JPA, the activities and results achieved by the European Parliament delegation therein, and the tasks assigned to the DEVE Committee to coordinate inter-parliamentary activities in the field of development policy. The case of the ACP–EU partnership demonstrates the 8  The number refers to the 8th parliamentary term (2014–2019). For more, see Anna Herranz, ‘The Inter-Parliamentary Delegations of the European Parliament: National and European Priorities at Work’, in Esther Barbé and Anna Herranz (eds.), The Role of Parliaments in European Foreign Policy (Barcelona: Office of the European Parliament, 2005), pp. 77–106. 9  Paul James Cardwell, ‘Mapping out Democracy Promotion in the EU’s External Relations’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 16, no. 1 (2011), p. 36.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

60

Delputte et al.

nature of the European Parliament’s diplomatic role towards the ACP region and exposes its strengths and weaknesses on the basis of the work of the DEVE Committee, the competent European Parliament delegation and the outputs of the JPA’s meetings. No other inter-parliamentary assembly of which the European Parliament is a member sees comparable involvement by a standing committee in the scrutiny and oversight over its activities like the ACP–EU JPA does with the European Parliament’s DEVE Committee. Furthermore, the JPA is the oldest and most structured regional inter-parliamentary institution in which the European Parliament is represented. It aims to foster cooperation between the North and the South in many areas, such as trade and economic development, social affairs, the environment, and, in particular, the promotion of democracy and human rights. Indeed, the case study appears particularly relevant for examining the diplomatic role of the European Parliament as a strong supporter of the creation of a legal and political culture for democracy abroad.

European Parliament Bodies with an External Dimension and their Diplomatic Role

From an institutional point of view, the European Parliament’s standing committees and delegations, as well as its representation in inter-parliamentary assemblies, grant the parliament a wide range of opportunities to influence EU external relations. The main focus of the European Parliament for example when participating in the work of inter-parliamentary assemblies, is to promote the enforcement of democratic principles – that is, enhanced accountability and scrutiny of executives and the rule of law. This section gives an overview of the avenues that these bodies use to promote the European Parliament’s international ‘actorness’.

Internal Bodies that Deal with EU External Relations: Standing Committees The European Parliament’s twenty standing committees are competent for very specific matters, according to the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure.10 This may improve their ability to interact effectively with the EU’s executive bodies, or at least to ensure a reasonable level of continuity in dealing with a certain subject, based on their expertise. Moreover, as in national parliaments, 10  See Annex VI, ‘Powers and Responsibilities of Standing Committees’, in the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

3. Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation

61

European Parliament committees perform most of the actual parliamentary work. It is at the committee level that every decision, later to be ratified by the plenary, is first sealed, provided that agreement exists among the political groups. The empowerment of the European Parliament’s committees has made these parliamentary bodies a crucial subject of study for understanding the extent to which the European Parliament’s role has grown on the international scene. The committees also operate outside the committee rooms, and often enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy. They examine draft international agreements at length, receive foreign delegations and visit the institutions of foreign countries as informally acknowledged interlocutors representing the European Parliament, thus performing a diplomatic function. Most standing committees have an influence on EU foreign policy. This is obvious for committees such as AFET, DEVE and INTA in light of their mandate. For example, the AFET Committee is relatively weak in EU law-making on internal affairs, because the EU treaties prevent the adoption of legislative acts in the Common Foreign and Security Policy,11 but it enjoys significant oversight powers in the field of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP);12 in international cooperation and assistance programmes and other agreements with third countries;13 in the accession processes of new EU member states;14 and on matters concerning human rights, the protection of minorities and the promotion of democratic values in third countries.15 Moreover, following the 11  Article 24(1) TEU. 12  On parliamentary involvement in CSDP, see Christopher Lord, ‘The Political Theory and Practice of Parliamentary Participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 8 (2011), pp. 1133–1150. See also Robert Cutler and Alexander von Lingen, ‘The European Parliament and European Union Security and Defence Policy’, European Security, vol. 12, no. 2 (2003), pp. 1–20. 13  Sarah Delputte and Joren Verschaeve, ‘The Role of the European Parliament in EU Development Policy’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 35–51. 14  Thomas Winzen, ‘Technical or Political? An Exploration of the Work of Officials in the Committees of the European Parliament’, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (2011), p. 29. 15  Laura Feliu and Francesc Serra, ‘The European Union as a “Normative Power” and the Normative Voice of the European Parliament’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and its International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 17–34. On value-oriented parliamentary diplomacy, see Davor Jančić, ‘World Diplomacy of the European Parliament’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 121–143.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

62

Delputte et al.

entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the AFET Committee has also facilitated direct parliamentary interface with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with whom it often exchanges views and opinions. Finally, the AFET Committee also has an important coordinating role with respect to inter-parliamentary delegations. By contrast, the LIBE Committee – because of its focus on civil liberties, justice and home affairs – has not been traditionally linked to EU external relations. However, given the development of an area of freedom, security and justice that has been put under its remit and the fact that the e­ xternal dimension of this policy is becoming more and more visible,16 the LIBE Committee is now a key player in EU international affairs. Proof of this lies in the scrutiny and amendments of EU draft legislative acts concerning asylum and the integrated management of the common borders17 and, even more so, in the adoption of international agreements. Indeed, there is no doubt that by conditioning the conclusion of international agreements, the LIBE Committee has been able to influence the EU’s relations with the United States (US).18 The Committee has managed to overturn the positions of the European Commission and the Council, and has been cohesive enough to pursue its opposition in the plenary. For example, on 11 February 2010, the European Parliament plenary rejected the SWIFT Agreement between the EU and the United States on banking data transfers to the United States, based on the report produced by the LIBE Committee. It was only after US Vice-President Joe Biden delivered his speech on the importance of the SWIFT Agreement to the European Parliament’s plenary session on 6 May 2010, and the text was revised, that the agreement was finally approved by the LIBE Committee and then by the European Parliament in July 2010. By the same token, the saga of the EU–US Passenger Name Records (PNR) Agreement on the transmission 16  Philippe De Bruycker and Alexander Weyembergh, ‘The External Dimension of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, in M. Telò (ed.), The European Union and Global Governance (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 210–232. 17  Emilio De Capitani, ‘The Evolving Role of the European Parliament in the AFSJ’, in Jörg Monar (ed.), The Institutional Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 113–144. 18  On the relationship between the EU and US legislatures, see Davor Jančić, ‘Transatlantic Regulatory Interdependence: The Evolving Roles of the EU and US Legislatures’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol. 17 (2015), pp. 334–359; and Davor Jančić, ‘The European Parliament and EU–US Relations: Revamping Institutional Cooperation?’, in Elaine Fahey and Deirdre Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 35–68.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

3. Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation

63

of air passengers’ data was characterized by strenuous opposition from the LIBE Committee.19 Ultimately, following the presentation of a new version of the draft PNR Agreement – which after the Treaty of Lisbon required the approval of the European Parliament – that was more in line with the LIBE Committee’s concerns, on 27 March 2012 the LIBE Committee voted in favour, in spite of the negative advice of European Parliament Rapporteur Sophie in ’t Veld and the body’s internal divisions.20 Standing committees can hence make a difference in shaping the European Parliament’s involvement in EU external relations. The European Parliament’s ‘Embassies on the Move’: Delegations Within the European Parliament, a vast network of parliamentary delegations is entrusted with the task of interacting with the parliaments of third countries, to exchange information and develop closer international relations.21 These ‘embassies on the move’ greatly contribute to shaping the European Parliament’s diplomatic role. Over the years, the initial plethora of events and informal meetings22 has become more clearly structured and has acquired a more formal dimension. It has been noted that ‘as the role and number of delegations has increased, their functioning has had to be subject to greater forward planning and to more formalized rules’.23 The promotion of democracy and human rights, the role played in armed conflicts and development cooperation can all be regarded as long-term objectives of parliamentary delegations.24 Different types of delegations are currently in place: (a) joint parliamentary committees; (b) parliamentary cooperation committees; (c) delegations 19   Christina Eckes, ‘How the European Parliament’s Participation in International Relations Affects the Deep Tissue of the EU’s Power Structures’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 12, no. 4 (2015), pp. 913–914. 20  The European Parliament finally gave its consent on the revised version of the PNR Agreement on 19 April 2012. See European Parliament, ‘Legislative Resolution of 19 April 2012 on the Draft Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Use and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security’, [2013] OJ C 258E/132. 21  Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs and Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament (London: John Harper, 2011), pp. 176–188. 22  Nicolas Clinchamps, Parlement européen et droit parlementaire (Paris: LGDJ, 2006), p. 260. 23  Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, The European Parliament, p. 182. 24  Olivier Costa and Florent Saint Martin, Le Parlement européen (Paris: La documentation française, 2011), p. 84.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

64

Delputte et al.

to multilateral parliamentary assemblies; and (d) other inter-parliamentary delegations. Their size ranges from twelve to over 70 members. These delegations connect the European Parliament with: (a) the parliaments of states that have association agreements with the EU or states with which accession negotiations have been launched; (b) the parliaments of the states involved in the European Neighbourhood Policy and those that have signed a partnership agreement with the EU; (c) multilateral parliamentary assemblies (such as the ACP–EU JPA, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean, the Euro–Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly); and (d) with parliaments of states outside the EU, including those of EU candidate countries and other third countries. There are two important differences between delegations and standing committees. First, delegations are active essentially on the international scene, whereas standing committees – with the exception of AFET – are primarily focused on ordinary internal functions within the EU, although they may occasionally engage in international activities, establish relations with their foreign counterparts and take decisions that affect EU external activities. Second, delegations are arranged geographically and not by specialization. In fact, they are composed of MEPs coming from several different committees. Moreover, it has been noted that inter-parliamentary delegations to a certain degree reflect the national geopolitical interests of their MEPs.25 When their different tasks are considered, committees and delegations are not generally exposed to the risk of conflicting competences, but rather to their overlapping and duplication. This provides further evidence that, in spite of the coordinating role that some committees are invited to perform in the European Parliament’s external relations, it is still very complicated for the European Parliament to speak with a single voice.26

The European Parliament as a Member of Inter-Parliamentary Assemblies The fact that European Parliament delegations to inter-parliamentary assemblies wear a ‘double hat’ – as European Parliament bodies and as bodies of the assemblies of which the European Parliament is a member – can strengthen the constitutional and democratic role of the many inter-parliamentary institutions throughout the world. When working within those inter-parliamentary 25  Herranz, ‘The Inter-Parliamentary Delegations of the European Parliament’. 26  See also the chapter by Luigi Gianniti and Nicola Lupo, ‘The Role of the European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy’ in this volume.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

3. Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation

65

forums, these delegations can become ambassadors of the EU’s constitutional values, as entrenched in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), while monitoring and reporting back to the European Parliament on the state of democracy in other regions of the world and, based on exchanges of views between parliamentarians, on ways in which democracy can be enhanced.27 The European Parliament’s delegations also help with diffusion of the ­principles of constitutionalism as a legal and political theory of divided and limited power and as a theory of the protection of rights.28 It is well-known that inter-parliamentary assemblies are devoid of lawmaking powers, as well as the powers to undertake in-depth scrutiny of executives at the national, supranational or international levels and, based on the result of the scrutiny, to sanction their actions. Nevertheless, their constitutional role is performed by enhancing the visibility and public exposure of disputable decisions – particularly those affecting human rights and democratic institutions – that have been taken by one or more national authorities. These decisions might then be contested by the national parliaments and public opinions of third countries that are represented in the same interparliamentary assembly, or even in multiple assemblies devoted to the same region or subject matter.29 Inter-parliamentary assemblies can hence perform a sort of external audit of the respect for rule of law in the participating member states can hence perform a sort of external audit of the respect for the rule of law within international organizations and in the participating member 27  See, for instance, the case of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, described by Cofelice: Andrea Cofelice, ‘The Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean and Its Contribution to Democracy Promotion and Crisis Management’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 292–310. For a comprehensive overview on interparliamentary assemblies, see Olivier Costa, Clarissa Dri and Stelios Stavridis (eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of InterParliamentary Institutions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera, The European Parliament and its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), part II. 28  See Article 16 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789; and Stephen Holmes, ‘Constitutions and Constitutionalism’, in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 289–215. 29  For the example of the Brazilian National Congress’s protest against the EU’s Returns Directive within various international parliamentary forums in Latin America, see Davor Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy: The Emergence of Multilayered International Parliamentarism’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (2015), pp. 197–242.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

66

Delputte et al.

states that are represented in a specific inter-parliamentary forum. Moreover, regular meetings among parliamentarians within the assemblies’ internal bodies and during plenary sessions may foster their socialization and exchange of information and best practices regarding democratic principles and fundamental rights. These potential positive outcomes deriving from the establishment of inter-parliamentary assemblies can be further improved by the ‘double hattedness’ of the European Parliament’s delegations represented therein. First of all, and in light of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, European Parliament delegations can work with members of parliament (MPs) from third countries to check whether national governments and bodies of the international organizations adhere to principles such as pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality – as well as minority rights, which most EU countries have gradually learned to respect. Second, compared to the delegations of EU member states’ parliaments to these assemblies, which bring a nationally oriented view to the inter-parliamentary debate, European Parliament delegations have a truly European and transnational perspective. Third, upon return to Brussels when they report on the results of their external activities, European Parliament delegations can raise awareness within the European and national public spheres of the state of democracy and the respect for fundamental rights by the countries represented in the relevant inter-parliamentary assembly, and the effectiveness of the inter-parliamentary assembly itself as a democratic institution.

Case Study of ACP–EU Relations from a Parliamentary Perspective

The case study of the parliamentary dimension of ACP–EU relations seeks to demonstrate the interplay between European Parliament bodies – the DEVE Committee and the European Parliament delegation to the ACP–EU JPA – as diplomatic players in the EU’s development policy towards the ACP group of states. The following paragraphs will show how the European Parliament plays a complementary role in the broader diplomatic network between EU and ACP countries and how it contributes to the constitutional role played by the JPA.30 30  See more in Sarah Delputte, ‘The ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly Seen by its Members: Empowering the Voice of People’s Representatives?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 17, no. 2 (2012), pp. 241–260; and Sarah Delputte, ‘Talking Shop or Relevant Actor: The ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly’, in Olivier Costa, Clarissa Dri and Stelios Stavridis (eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization:

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

3. Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation

67

In doing so, the study follows the definition of Franz Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, who understand parliamentary diplomacy as ‘the full range of international activities undertaken by parliamentarians in order to increase mutual understanding between countries, to assist each other in improving the control of governments and the representation of the people and to increase the democratic legitimacy of intergovernmental institutions’.31 The DEVE Committee on ACP–EU Relations Within the European Parliament, the DEVE Committee is actively involved in monitoring developments occurring in the framework of the ACP–EU strategic partnership. The DEVE Committee is responsible for: (a) the political dialogue with developing countries, which can take the form of bilateral or multilateral relations, also within inter-parliamentary forums; (b) the authorization of financial aid to developing countries; and (c) the promotion of democracy. In this sense, one of the tasks of the DEVE Committee is to organize electionobservation missions, where appropriate, in cooperation with other committees and delegations. This means that this committee is engaged outside EU borders in monitoring compliance with the EU’s democratic values and the rule of law.32 Most importantly, the DEVE Committee has competence for the ACP– EU partnership agreement and the relationship with the partnership’s bodies. It provides a concrete example of the diplomatic role of the European Parliament. Indeed, this Committee ‘coordinates the work of the interparliamentary delegations and ad hoc delegations falling within its remit’33 and thus also the work of the European Parliament’s delegation to the ACP– EU JPA. The DEVE Committee oversees the work of the JPA and, in its reports, points to the JPA’s strengths and weaknesses. For example, the Committee has regretted that there was often an unequal participation by EU members and ACP members in the JPA and has voiced its concerns regarding the ‘declining participation of European Parliament members, particularly during the voting The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 189–210. 31  Franz W. Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 1 (2007), pp. 93–94. 32  See Andrea Gawrich, ‘The European Parliament in International Election Observation Missions (IEOMs): Division of Labour of Decreased Influence?’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 121–142. 33  Annex VI, no. II, of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

68

Delputte et al.

sessions’.34 Moreover, it has expressed its opinion that the two co-presidents of the JPA should be given an opportunity to participate in the sessions of the Joint ACP–EU Council of Ministers, as the European Parliament’s President does in the case of meetings of the European Council. Finally, the DEVE Committee has stressed ‘the added value of holding the JPA sessions in the EU Member States holding the EU Council Presidency by rotation’,35 as a way to strengthen the EU countries’ sense of responsibility towards the ACP region. By the same token, the DEVE Committee has commended ‘the increasingly parliamentary – and hence political – nature of the JPA, together with the ever more active role played by its members and the greater quality of its debates, which are helping it to make a vital contribution to the ACP–EU partnership’.36 It is therefore clear that the DEVE Committee carefully examines the contribution of the European Parliament’s delegation to the work of the ACP–EU JPA, provides guidance for its activities and makes the European Parliament as a whole knowledgeable about the outcomes of the parliamentary dimension of the ACP–EU partnership and its developments. The Case of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly in ACP–EU Relations This section examines the role of the EU’s Joint Parliamentary Assembly with the ACP group of 78 states that signed the Cotonou Agreement. The JPA, which is composed of an MP from each ACP participating state and 78 MEPs, constitutes an optimal case for exploring the diplomatic role of the European Parliament’s delegations and assemblies. Bringing together 105 countries from four different continents, and characterized by more than 45 years of continuous work and a high degree of institutionalization, the JPA is a unique institution in the EU’s network of parliamentary diplomacy, allowing for a permanent dialogue on topical economic, political, cultural, social and environmental questions. As one of the three joint institutions underpinning the Cotonou Agreement,37 it oversees development, trade and political cooperation between the ACP and EU countries.

34  European Parliament, DEVE Committee, Report on the Work of the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, (2014/2154(INI)), 27 January 2015, para. 4. 35  European Parliament, DEVE Committee, Report on the Work of the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, para. 3. 36  European Parliament, DEVE Committee, Report on the Work of the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, para. 13. 37  The other joint institutions are the ACP–EU Council of Ministers and the ACP–EU Committee of Ambassadors.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

3. Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation

69

This chapter argues that the diplomatic role of the JPA is twofold: first, it consists of promoting democratic principles among parliamentarians; and, second, of improving parliamentary scrutiny towards the executives of the partnership. Moreover, we distinguish between direct and indirect mechanisms of parliamentary involvement. Like most international or regional parliamentary assemblies,38 the JPA has no power to make binding decisions. The Cotonou Agreement does not provide for a real legislature, but limits the JPA’s competences to those of a consultation body. The JPA also cannot exercise control over the budgets or the executives. However, the JPA members can exploit this confined status and influence the executives, as well as each other: (a) directly, by promoting democratic principles among parliamentarians; and (b) indirectly, by improving scrutiny of the executives involved in the ACP–EU partnership. (a) Promoting Democratic Principles among Parliamentarians: Through a two-way flow of information, learning processes and diplomatic persuasion, debates in the JPA aim to contribute to the EU’s promotion of democracy and human rights. Several mechanisms are used to this end. A first mechanism is the adoption of resolutions. The JPA has a mandate to monitor respect for democratic processes, human rights and good governance through debates and by adopting resolutions for countries where one of these principles is violated. Thanks to the JPA’s advocacy during the first revision of the Cotonou Agreement in 2005, the JPA is now mentioned as a relevant actor in the overall political dialogue between the EU and ACP countries.39 The JPA is not, however, formally involved in the consultation procedures that can be launched in case of violations of the essential elements and fundamental principles of the Cotonou Agreement (Articles 2 and 9),40 but cases under the consultation procedure are debated in the JPA. Moreover, the JPA’s scope is broader than the countries involved in the said consultation procedure. The JPA tackles 38   Zlatko Šabič, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2 (2008), pp. 255–271; Julien Navarro, ‘The Creation and Transformation of Regional Parliamentary Assemblies: Lessons from the Pan-African Parliament’, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 16, no. 2 (2010); and Stelios Stavridis, ‘The Parliamentary Forum of the EuroMediterranean Partnership: An Assessment’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 7, no. 2 (2002), pp. 30–53. 39  See Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. 40  See Articles 96 and 97 of the Cotonou Agreement. Under this procedure, the ACP–EU Council of Ministers can decide to take appropriate measures, including, as a measure of last resort, the reduction of development cooperation.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

70

Delputte et al.

a wide range of subjects relating to good governance, transparency, corruption, government accountability, the role of local governments and human rights. In the case of an urgent situation in one of the member countries, the JPA tries to adopt a resolution. It can also decide to suspend the voting rights of the delegation concerned. Whereas the ACP members often in the beginning voted as a bloc to impede the adoption of resolutions on delicate issues, an evolution in the debating culture within the JPA has led to stronger resolutions over time. This development reflects the increasingly political dimension of the ACP–EU partnership and is facilitated by a number of factors, including: (1) the growth of trust between the parties; (2) the creation of standing committees and a reduction in the number of resolutions tabled per gathering; and (3) the fact that ­voting by separate houses fell into disuse.41 The quality of debates is relatively high, as opposed to the sterile meetings of the ACP–EU Council of Ministers, where discussions are more orchestrated. At the same time, the ACP members increasingly feel less targeted by their European counterparts. As said above, according to the European Parliament, the nature of the JPA is thus becoming more parliamentary, and hence political, and its members play an ever more active role.42 This evolution towards in-depth substantive debates and stronger resolutions may contribute to the credibility and legitimacy of the assembly. Other important direct instruments of the JPA in this area are participation in election-observation missions, the organization of fact-finding missions and institutionalized contacts with civil society. Through these practices, the JPA acts as a mechanism for political socialization. Second, the JPA also aims to contribute to the establishment of a solid culture of democracy, human rights and democratic governance through information-sharing and learning processes.43 In the absence of a formal framework that favours parliamentary involvement, the JPA has served as a central forum for raising the ACP parliamentarians’ awareness about their role in implementing the Cotonou Agreement. The assembly is one of the main 41  In the case of a request for a vote by separate houses, ‘the text in question shall be deemed to be adopted only if it secures a majority of the votes cast by both the members of the parliaments of the ACP States and the members of the European Parliament participating in the vote’ (Art. 16 of the ACP–EU JPA Rules of Procedure). 42  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 23 November 2010 on the Work of the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in 2009’, [2012] OJ C 99E/15. 43  ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly ‘Why a Joint Parliamentary Assembly?’, Brussels (1 December 2006), available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/ 20_01/default_en.htm.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

3. Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation

71

instruments for national parliaments to access EU institutions and information on the ACP–EU partnership. Through dialogue and debate, participants in the JPA exchange best practices and discuss a wide range of key issues, such as the impact of the financial crisis on the ACP states, the social consequences of child labour, or the exploitation of natural resources in ACP countries.44 It has been argued that these learning processes make parliamentarians aware of the most pertinent questions in complex dossiers and their responsibility to hold their governments accountable. According to Richard Youngs, the EU’s approach of stimulating socialization among parliamentarians ‘aims at constructing shared democratic identities’ and prompts ‘imitation and ­demonstration effects’.45 The JPA could arguably be seen in light of the EU ‘seeking influence over democratic trends through patterns of “deep” institutionalized cooperation, capable of locking third country political elites into relationships strong enough to impact positively on cognitive attitudes towards democratic norms’.46 Third, the JPA also supports formal recognition of national parliaments within the provisions of the ACP–EU partnership. As such, the JPA is not only an advocate for its own reinforcement, but strongly defends the key role that ACP national parliaments play under the Cotonou Agreement, particularly in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of actions and programmes in the field of development cooperation. In a 2005 report by its Committee on Political Affairs, the JPA mentioned five provisions in the Cotonou Agreement through which parliamentarians could be more involved and their role reinforced.47 The 2010 revision of the Cotonou Agreement partially met these concerns. National parliaments were recognized as actors in the cooperation framework, and the JPA was defined as ‘an advocate for institutional development and capacity building of national parliaments’ (Article 17). While these provisions do not foresee a parliamentary decision-making role, they have allowed the JPA to monitor the situation to ensure that national parliamentary control works effectively. The JPA can thus 44  See ‘Meeting Documents of ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly’, available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/organes/dacp/dacp_8leg_meeting list.htm. 45  Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 359. 46  Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy, p. 359. 47  See ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Political Affairs Committee, Report on the Role of National Parliaments in Implementing the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, doc. PR/578598EN.doc (31 August 2005), available online at http://www.europarl.europa .eu/intcoop/acp/90_01/pdf/pr_zani_en.pdf.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

72

Delputte et al.

call on ACP parliaments to insist that their governments and the European Commission involve them in the process of drafting and implementing cooperation strategies, as well as to ask them to report on their experiences. (b) Improving Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Partnership’s Executives: For the participating parliamentarians, the JPA serves as an opportunity to supervise implementation of the Cotonou Agreement so that the common objectives of economic, cultural and social development of the ACP states are met.48 By adopting resolutions, which are transmitted to the European Commission and the ACP–EU Council of Ministers, the JPA sends out political signals and aims to improve parliamentary scrutiny towards the executives of the partnership. For its part, the ACP–EU Council takes binding decisions, but must examine and take into consideration the resolutions and recommendations adopted by the JPA.49 As such, the JPA can try to exert pressure on the executives by setting certain norms and standards. For example, the JPA’s resolutions on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)50 have always underlined that these should not be seen as conventional free-trade negotiations, but should act as genuine development instruments. The resolutions are then forwarded to the Commission and the ACP–EU Council, which must report to the JPA on the follow-up to the adopted resolutions. This creates an opportunity for the JPA to scrutinize the institutions involved in the ACP–EU partnership, although the Commission’s follow-up is usually more elaborate than the ACP–EU Council’s reporting. Members of the JPA can ask the Commission and the ACP–EU Council for a written explanation of the steps taken and can use question time during the gatherings. Question time has become an important feature of the JPA. The attendance by commissioners and representatives of the ACP–EU Council presidents has given the JPA a higher political profile. However, the importance given to this type of scrutiny depends on the motivation of these officials. Commissioners for Development Poul Nielson and Louis Michel were loyal participants in the JPA. Michel did not miss one JPA session between 2004 and 2009. Karel De Gucht also attended the JPA during his short term as Commissioner for Development in 2009. To the annoyance of the JPA, however, commissioners for trade were more reluctant to attend the sessions. The attendance of Commissioner for Trade Catherine Ashton during the session in 48  Article 17 of the Cotonou Agreement. 49  Article 15 of the Cotonou Agreement. 50  EPAs have been introduced as a scheme to create a free-trade area between the EU and ACP regions in order to integrate ACP countries into the world economy.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

3. Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation

73

Prague in 2009 was thus perceived as a major success and an important sign of the changed stance of the Commission. In her speech, Ashton recognized ‘the need for greater flexibility in the negotiations and assured the ACP countries that their needs and concerns would be addressed’.51 The ACP–EU Council also invariably sends its delegates to each JPA session. Several EU and ACP presidents, state secretaries, prime ministers, and ministers for development and trade have been questioned by JPA parliamentarians. Other important guests who have addressed the JPA are former European Parliament’s Presidents Nicole Fontaine (in 2001), Josep Borrell Fontelles (in 2006) and Hans-Gert Pöttering (in 2007 and 2008). According to the European Parliament, the JPA, ‘through the quality of its work, has succeeded in establishing itself as a key player in North–South cooperation’.52 One of the main dossiers debated and monitored within the JPA refers to EPAs, which the EU and the ACP countries have been negotiating since 2002. One important controversy in the EPA negotiations was the different understanding of development between the EU and the ACP countries.53 During the negotiation process, the JPA became the most important forum where ACP and EU parliamentarians met with representatives from various non-governmental organizations to debate the possible impact of EPAs and to denounce the negotiating tactics of the EU. EPAs have been a topical issue at each JPA session, and several resolutions and declarations have been adopted on them. In its statements, the JPA has always defended a stronger focus on development as opposed to the hard line of the European Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Trade. In 2007, the Kigali Declaration on EPAs ‘urged the European Commission to acknowledge that more time is needed for ACP states to assess the implications of the agreements proposed’.54 This follows up on the Cape Town Declaration of 2002, which was issued at the start of the EPA negotiating process. The declaration expressed overall ­criticism 51   European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People (Eurostep), ‘Trade Commissioner Ashton Recognizes the Need for More Flexibility in EPA Negotiations’, Eurostep Weekly, no. 548 (2009), available online at http://www.eurostep.org/wcm/ archive-eurostep-weekly/584-trade-commissioner-ashton-recognises-the-need-formore-flexibility-in-epa-negotiation.html. 52  European Parliament, DEVE Committee, ‘Report on the Work of the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in 2009 (2010/2236(INI)) – Explanatory Statement’ (9 November 2010). 53  Ole Elgström, ‘Images of the EU in EPA Negotiations: Angel, Demon – or Just Human?’, European Integration Online Papers, vol. 12 (2008). 54  ACP–EU JPA, ‘Kigali Declaration for Development-friendly Economic Partnership Agreements’ (22 November 2007), doc. no. ACP–EU/100.084/07/fin.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

74

Delputte et al.

against the Commission for pressuring the ACP countries to sign an EPA, emphasized the cooperative spirit of the ACP–EU partnership, and defended the principle that all agreements reached – whether interim or full – must ensure that no country is worse off after expiration of the negotiation deadline. The activities of the JPA have contributed to applying pressure on the European Commission to moderate its stance. Moreover, the debates and resolutions in the JPA were continued in the European Parliament. Members of the European Parliament’s delegation have shared their experiences with other MEPs and have questioned the Commission on the EPAs during plenary sessions. In 2009, the European Parliament succeeded in adopting a resolution on the development impact of EPAs, which was based on a JPA report.55 Another implication of monitoring the EPAs within the JPA was that ACP parliamentarians became aware of the most critical issues in the EPAs, such as their impact on jobs, food security, fiscal revenue, regional integration, services, intellectual property rights and the so-called ‘Singapore issues’ – investment, government procurement, competition policy and trade facilitation.56 Since parliaments in several ACP countries had, or will have, to ratify the final agreements, this awareness-raising is highly relevant. Conclusion This chapter aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the changing nature of diplomacy and the emergence of a distinct multi-level and multistakeholder diplomatic system, by focusing on the European Parliament as an important democracy promoter in third countries and international organizations. It does so through its standing committees and delegations, and their participation in inter-parliamentary assemblies. The chapter argues that these European Parliament bodies, and the inter-parliamentary assemblies in which they are represented, work in complementary ways thanks to the coordination mechanism that is ensured by the ‘double hat’ worn by the MEPs. Although executives and intergovernmental cooperation remain dominant in EU external relations, the European Parliament’s committees and delegations participating in inter-parliamentary assemblies are able to perform an external democratic audit of adherence to fundamental rights and the rule of 55  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 5 February 2009 on the Development Impact of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)’ (2010), OJ C 67E/120. 56  The Singapore issues are the four issues introduced at the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization in Singapore in 1996.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

3. Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation

75

law. At the same time, by exchanging views and best practices, they can foster the socialization of MPs from third countries and support the development of a democratic political culture, as well as give visibility at the EU level to violations of national and international standards of democracy. Through a case study of the parliamentary dimension of the ACP–EU partnership, it became clear that the European Parliament’s DEVE Committee acts as a coordinating body for inter-parliamentary delegations and represents an indispensable link between the internal and external activities of the European Parliament. The ACP–EU JPA constitutes a tool that gives voice and resonance to the structured and continuous dialogue between the participating parliaments. More specifically, the study of the ACP–EU JPA indicates the importance of exchanging ideas between MEPs and ACP MPs on a multilateral level. The JPA’s diplomatic role consists of building consensus, raising awareness and sharing information among parliamentarians from EU and ACP countries. Although the JPA has no binding powers, it has a specific constitutional role within the wider diplomatic network between EU and ACP countries. This is performed in two key ways. First, through the socialization processes, the JPA supports the EU’s objective of democracy promotion by enhancing the position of parliamentary institutions in their respective constitutional systems and by increasing parliamentarians’ accountability to their citizens. These are key elements of the democratization processes. Second, the JPA improves parliamentary scrutiny of the executives in the ACP–EU partnership. By adopting resolutions, the JPA contributes to decision-making processes in the EU and ACP institutions and gives political directions to the development of the partnership. Within the European Parliament, it is the DEVE Committee that shows the significance of the JPA by providing input and information, inside and outside the EP, on how the partnership should evolve, how its institutions should function, and occasionally also how the European Parliament delegation is performing within the JPA. The European Parliament’s peculiar structure and its various ‘doublehatted’ bodies make it a flexible and distinctive partner in EU international affairs, particularly in the field of democracy promotion. The case of ACP–EU inter-parliamentary relations can be considered a strong benchmark in this context. As such, the ACP–EU partnership could inspire similar evolution in other regional partnerships.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 4

The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Political Groups in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Yoav Shemer-Kunz Introduction The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a highly salient and emblematic issue of international relations that regularly appears on the political agenda of the European Union (EU).1 The EU’s approach towards this question has remained fairly consistent during the past few decades: the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to fully exercise their right to self-determination; support for a negotiated peace settlement in the Middle East on the basis of relevant United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions, mainly nos. 242 and 338; and the creation of an independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign and viable state of Palestine through negotiations in the framework of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).2 However, there is a tension between the EU’s normative political stance on this issue and its close trade relations with the state of Israel.3

1  David Newman and Haim Yacobi, ‘The EU and the Israel-Palestine conflict’, in Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert and Stephan Stetter (eds), The European Union and Border Conflicts. The Power of Integration and Association (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 173–202; Rafaelle A. Del Sarto (Ed.) Fragmented Borders, Interdependence and External Relations: The Israel-Palestine-European Union Triangle (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Benedetta Voltolini, Lobbying in EU Foreign Policy-making: The Case of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2016). 2  See, for example, the Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980 of the nine member states of the European Community; the Berlin European Council conclusions of 25 March 1999; EU Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process of 15 June 2009; EU Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process of 20 July 2015. 3  David Cronin, Europe’s Alliance with Israel (London, PlutoPress: 2011); Neve Gordon and Sharon Pardo, ‘What Can Pro-Democracy Activists in Arab Countries Expect from the European Union? Lessons from the Union’s Relations with Israel’, Democracy and Security, vol. 9, no. 1–2. 2013, pp. 100–119.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi Stelios ��.��63/9789004336346_006 Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

77

As an international parliamentary institution,4 the European Parliament (EP) is trying to have its own say on the question of Israel-Palestine. While the EP fully endorses the EU’s general approach towards Palestinian statehood, it also pushes the Commission and the Council to play a more active role in the MEPP and take a more critical stance towards the Israeli Government’s policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).5 Furthermore, in the past, the EP called to suspend the EU-Israel Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement due to violations of human rights and international law by the state of Israel6 and delayed for two years the ratification of the EU-Israel Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance (ACAA) for industrial products.7 In addition, the EP called to implement the recommendations of the so-called ‘Goldstone report’ of the UN’s fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict of December 2008–January 2009,8 which was led by a former South African judge Richard Goldstone. These matters are regular subjects of debates in the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), its Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) and the Committee on Development (DEVE). The EP also has two related permanent delegations: the Delegation for Relations with Israel (D-IL) and the Delegation for Relations with Palestine (DPLC).9 In addition to the work done in the specialised committees, the situation in Israel-Palestine regularly arises as a subject of lively plenary debates and resolutions. For instance, during the years 2014 and 2015 alone, the EP adopted four resolutions on the topic.10 4  Andrea Cofelice and Stelios Stavridis, ‘The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI)’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 19, no. 2, 2014, pp. 145–178. 5  Maria Gianniou, ‘The European Parliament and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds) The European Parliament and its International Relations (New York, Routledge: 2015), pp. 237–251. 6  European Parliament resolution of 10 April 2002 on the Middle East (2002), OJ C 127E/584. 7  Stéphane Hessel and Véronique De Keyser, Palestine, la trahison européenne (Paris: Fayard, 2013), pp. 209–226. 8  European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on implementation of Goldstone recommendations of the Goldstone recommendations on Israel/Palestine (2010), OJ C 349E/34. 9  Previously called the Delegation for Relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council (DPLC), the delegation changed its name in 2015 as a symbolic step in the aftermath of the EP Resolution of 17 December 2014 on recognition of Palestine statehood. 10  See European Parliament resolutions of 17 July 2014 on the escalation of violence between Israel and Palestine (2014), OJ C 224/29; of 18 September 2014 on Israel-Palestine after the Gaza war and the role of the EU (2014), OJ C 234/35; of 17 December 2014 on recognition of Palestine statehood (2014), OJ C 294/9; of 10 September 2015 on the EU’s role in the Middle

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

78

Shemer-Kunz

The EP plenary debates on the issue often feature in statements of the EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini, who has invested a lot of work into the MEPP since she assumed office in November 2014. Scholars have shown that the European Commission’s position on IsraelPalestine was influenced by the pressure coming from Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who, in turn, were influenced by their national constituencies in the EU member states.11 For instance, the Commission’s guidelines on the labelling of products from the Israeli settlements, issued in 2013,12 were actually an initiative of the EP that was later adopted by the Commission. Hence, this conflict is a topic that is particularly well-suited for evaluating the nature of parliamentary diplomacy at the EU level and the role of the EP as a diplomatic actor. This chapter explores the distinctive nature of the European Parliament’s political groups (EP groups) as diplomatic actors. The lion’s share of the diplomatic activities conducted by EP groups is rather informal and is conducted through emails, telephone calls and meetings. Institutional procedures – such as producing minutes of meetings, follow-up or reporting – scarcely apply. Moreover, many of these activities are of an ad hoc nature, with limited continuity over time, and dependent on the personal contacts of a small number of individuals. The informal nature of the EP groups’ diplomacy poses two methodological challenges. First, collecting empirical data can be difficult, considering that many of these informal activities are ill-suited to traditional methods of analysis in diplomatic studies, often based on official documents and formal institutional procedures. The EP resolutions are only the last and the most visible stage in a long process of negotiations between EP groups as well as between delegations of national parties within EP groups. This entire process of negotiations is rather invisible to scholars of international relations. Second, it is difficult to disentangle the EP groups’ autonomous diplomatic activities from those conducted by formal EP institutional bodies, such

East peace process (2015). P8_TA-PROV(2015)0318. This most recent EP resolution has not been published yet in the OJ due to technical problems (updated October 2016). 11  Neve Gordon and Sharon Pardo, ‘Normative Power Europe and the Power of the Local’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 53, no. 2, 2015, pp. 416–427. 12  European Commission, Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards (2013), OJ C 205/05.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

79

as standing committees and delegations.13 Therefore, the chapter explores the nature of EP groups as diplomatic actors by relying on qualitative social science research methods, mainly in-depth interviews. The goal is to gather empirical evidence on the diplomacy of left-wing EP groups on the issue of Israel-Palestine: the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) and the far left Confederal Group of the European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). Left-wing EP groups have been selected because they are particularly engaged on this topic and because they do so in a way that challenges the conventional diplomatic channels of the EU. Between the years 2010 and 2015, I conducted 20 in-depth interviews and engaged in numerous discussions with a variety of actors from these three EP groups: MEPs, parliamentary assistants, the groups’ political advisors, as well as with officials of human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) based in Brussels and in Israel and the Palestinian territories. These sociological research methods were combined with the consultation of EP resolutions and EP groups’ motions for resolutions, press releases, conferences, hearings and visits to Israel and the Palestinian territories during this time period, in addition to activities of the relevant EP committees, delegations, and EP plenary debates on the topic. The chapter proceeds as follows. It first provides a short presentation of the relatively limited scholarly interest in the EP groups’ role in EU external policy. It then analyzes the distinctive nature of EP groups as diplomatic actors, highlighting their relatively high level of coordination with civil society actors in third countries as well as their often substantive internal divisions on foreign policy. An empirical section provides evidence of the diplomatic actorness of the EP groups selected on the issue of Israel-Palestine. This is followed by the conclusion that EP groups are emerging diplomatic actors that play a complementary role in EU external relations while maintaining close links with civil society actors beyond the EU.

The Significance of the European Parliament’s Political Groups in EU External Action

Over the past few decades, the EP has progressively been transformed from a consultative body into a powerful co-legislator in the EU’s political system.14 13  See the chapter by Sarah Delputte, Cristina Fasone and Fabio Longo in this volume. 14  Olivier Costa and Paul Magnette, ‘Ideologies et changement institutionnel dans l’Union Européenne. Pourquoi les governements ont-il contsamment renforcé le parlement

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

80

Shemer-Kunz

The EP has obtained new formal and informal powers, including in policy areas that used to be largely dominated by intergovernmental dynamics. This process was further and significantly facilitated by informal empowerment.15 The EP’s growing influence in EU external relations has also been documented, especially in the area of international trade.16 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has acted not only as a veto player,17 but also as an agenda setter and policy maker in EU external relations.18 However, scholars tend to analyze the EP as a monolithic actor and underestimate the dynamics of party politics, particularly transnational dynamics between different EP groups, which are outlined in Table 1.19 The EP is not a unitary actor. Instead, it is becoming a ‘real parliament’, internally divided into political groups with different ideological lines, primarily along the left/right cleavage, similar to political dynamics observed in national parliaments.20

européen?’ Politique européenne, vol. 9, 2003, pp. 49–75; Berthold Rittberger, Building Europe’s Parliament – Democratic Representation beyond the Nation-state. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Berthold Rittberger, ‘Institutionalizing Representative Democracy in the European Union: The Case of the European Parliament’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 50, no. 1, 2012, pp. 18–37. 15  Ben Crum, ‘Parliamentarisation of the CFSP through informal institution-making? The fifth European Parliament and the EU High Representative’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13 no. 3, 2006, pp. 383–401. 16  Lore Van den Putte, Ferdi De Ville and Jan Orbie, ‘The European Parliament as an International Actor in Trade: From Power to Impact’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds) The European Parliament and its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 52–69. 17  Jörg Monar, ‘The Rejection of the EU-US SWIFT Interim Agreement by the European Parliament: A Historic Vote and Its Implication’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 15, 2010, pp. 143–151. 18  Ariadna Ripoll Servent, ‘The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 21, no. 4, 2014, pp. 568–586. 19  Luciano Bardi, ‘Transnational Trends in European Parties and the 1994 Elections of the European Parliament’, Party Politics, vol. 2, no. 1, 1996: pp. 99–114; Tapio Raunio, The European Perspective: Transnational Party Groups in the 1989–1994 European Parliament, (Farnham: Ashgate, 1997); David S. Bell and Christopher Lord (eds) Transnational Parties in the European Union (Farnham: Ashgate, 1998); Edoardo Bressanelli, ‘Competitive and Coherent? Profiling the Europarties in the 2009 European Parliament Elections’, Journal of European Integration, vol. 35, no. 6, 2013, pp. 653–668. 20  Simon Hix, Abdul G. Noury and Gérard Roland, ‘Power to the parties: cohesion and competition in the European Parliament 1979–2001’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 35, no. 2, 2005, pp. 209–234.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

81

Table 1 European Parliament political groups by number of seats in the 2014–2019 legislature Political Group

No. of MEPs

Full name of the political group

EPP S&D ECR ALDE GUE/NGL

217 190 74 70 52

Greens/EFA EFDD ENF NI Total

50 45 39 14 751

European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats European Conservatives and Reformists Alliance of Liberals and Democrats Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left Greens/European Free Alliance Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Europe of Nations and Freedom Non-attached Members

Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu (accessed 18 February 2016).

Research on voting patterns in roll call votes in the plenary indicate that EP groups are rather coherent actors despite their heterogeneous composition and the EU enlargement in 2004.21 In fact, the level of EP groups’ incoherence in plenary votes is estimated at an average of only 5–10 per cent of all roll call votes.22 Some scholars even claim that EP groups are genuine European political parties in the making within an emerging transnational party system at the EU level.23 However, these groups are composed of delegations of national political parties, coming from various EU member states. The real scope for internal divisions within EP groups is not fully demonstrated by the studies of

21  Edoardo Bressanelli, ‘Necessary deepening? How political groups in the European Parliament adapt to enlargement, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 21, no. 5, 2014, pp. 776–792. 22  Simon Hix, ‘Why the 2014 European Elections Matter: Ten Key Votes in the 2009–2013 European Parliament’, European Policy Analysis, no. 15, September 2013. 23  Simon Hix, Amie Kreppel and Abdul Noury, ‘The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, 2003, pp. 309–331; European Parliament, Study ‘How to Create a Transnational Party System’ (by Luciano Bardi, Edoardo Bressanelli, Enrico Calossi, Wojciech Gagatek, Peter Mair and Eugenio Pizzimenti), July 2010.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

82

Shemer-Kunz

roll call votes,24 making it necessary to complement their results with those obtained through the use of other methods, such as detailed case studies and process tracing of specific policies.25 The bulk of the EP groups’ activity in the EU’s international affairs takes place through inter-group negotiations aimed at influencing the overall institutional position of the EP towards the Council and the Commission. However, EP groups are not solely a part of the EP institutional environment; they are also developing autonomous diplomatic actorness in their own right. So far, EP groups have seldom been studied as diplomatic actors,26 so studying them from this perspective helps uncover the manner in which the diplomatic role of EP groups differs from that played by the EP as a whole.

The European Parliament’s Political Groups as Diplomatic Actors

Reflecting the nature of parliamentary diplomacy in general,27 EP groups are new international actors with independent actorness, which benefit from much leeway to conduct their own diplomatic activities. Although they are components of the EP’s institutional environment, EP groups are bound ­neither by the positions taken by the EP nor by those taken by the EU executive – the European Council, the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the European Commission. A first characteristic of EP groups as diplomatic actors is the scarcity of resources. Unlike states, EP groups do not have embassies and political personnel around the world but only a small pool of staffers based in Brussels, who are kept extremely busy with the day-to-day work of scrutiny of EU legislation,

24  Julian Priestly, ‘European Political Parties: the missing link’, Notre Europe, Policy Paper no. 41, 2010. 25  Erol Külahci, ‘Europarties: Agenda-setter or Agenda-Follower? Social Democracy and the Disincentives for Tax Harmonization’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 48. no. 5, 2010, pp. 1283–1306. 26  See an exception to this in: Daniel Fiott, ‘The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Parliamentary Groups’, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), European Policy Analysis, no. 3, 2015. 27  Olivier Costa, Clarissa Dri and Stelios Stavridis (eds), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Davor Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy: The Emergence of Multilayered International Parliamentarism’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 38, no. 2, 2015, pp. 197–242.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

83

in addition to tasks related to the MEPs’ constituencies.28 Parliamentarians’ international activities require heavy investment of all kinds of resources, beginning with time, in order to obtain a sufficient level of expertise, information and knowledge.29 However, MEPs only have very few incentives to invest their already limited resources in costly diplomatic activities across borders, as these activities only marginally impact their chances of being re-elected or pursuing their political career at the national level.30 EP groups compensate their resource scarcity by a relatively high level of coordination with civil society actors in third countries, such as human rights NGOs, advocacy networks, think tanks, social movements, academics, artists, intellectuals, etc. Coordinating with NGOs in third countries allows EP groups to obtain accurate information and expert knowledge on the situation on the ground in these countries, which are vital resources for the conduct of any sort of diplomatic activity. The overall result seems to be that EP groups are to a large extent dependent on the information provided to them by their contacts in third countries. The EP groups’ dependence on information provided by third-country NGOs is similar to the overall dependence of the EU on NGOs as the primary sources of information for assessing the situation on the ground in third countries.31 Another resource that civil society actors in third countries may offer EP groups is close coordination of approaches to contentious issues, the sharing of first-hand information and knowledge, and mutual support for joint action on matters of common concern.32 When closely coordinated with civil society actors in third countries, EP groups may claim to be not only the representatives of EU citizens,33 but also those of a foreign country. EP groups transmit to 28  Amy Busby, ‘ “Normal Parliament”: Exploring the Organisation of Everyday Political Life in an MEP’s Office’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 9, no. 1, 2013, pp. 94–115. 29  Ben Crum and John Erik Fossum (eds), Practices of Inter-Parliamentary Coordination in International Politics: The European Union and beyond (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2013). 30  Karlheinz Neunreiter, ‘The European Parliament and national parliaments: conflict or cooperation?’, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 11, nos. 3–4, 2005, pp. 466–489. 31  Benedetta Voltolini, Lobbying in EU Foreign Policy-making: The Case of the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2016); Gerald M. Steinberg, ‘EU Foreign Policy and the Role of NGOs: The Arab-Israeli Conflict as a Case Study’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 21, no. 2, 2016, pp. 251–268. 32  See a discussion on political legitimacy in EU politics from a sociological perspective in: Niilo Kauppi, Democracy, social resources and political power in the European Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005). 33  Daniel Fiott, ‘On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Madariaga Paper, vol. 4, no. 7, 2011, pp. 1–6.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

84

Shemer-Kunz

the EU level claims from third-country civil society organisations, whereby the latter try to bypass their own national governments and challenge traditional state diplomacy.34 In fact, EP groups not only passively receive information from these civil society actors, they also actively provide them with resources of their own: international legitimacy and recognition, as well as information from Brussels on EU institutional developments, which is of utmost importance for NGOs’ efforts to lobby the EU more efficiently. The second characteristic of EP groups as diplomatic actors is their internal divisions. This relates to the fact that MEPs primarily render account to their national political parties35 and not to a pan-European party organisation. In the EU’s multilevel system of governance political will-formation still occurs mainly in the national political arena and not at the EU level.36 EP groups are composed of delegations of national political parties, which are deeply entrenched in domestic political spheres. Each national party tries to upload its policy preferences to its EP group with degrees of success varying mainly depending on the size of its delegation.37 In foreign affairs in particular, there are often substantive differences between national parties affiliated with the same political group in the EP. As an EP group’s policy advisor puts it, ‘foreign policy is national policy’.38 As a result of these divisions within EP groups, there is some incoherence in the groups’ diplomatic stances, reflecting internal compromises between different national delegations within these groups around the lowest common denominator. Also, informal EP delegations of national parties, as well as individual MEPs, tend to conduct their own diplomatic activities in parallel to those of their affiliated EP group, not necessarily following the EP group’s 34  Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and the Insider-Outsider Coalition’, in Donatella Della Porta and Sindney Tarrow (eds), Transnational Protest and Global Activism (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 151–173. 35  Julien Navarro, ‘Le travail parlementaire, un investissement payant? Les élections comme évaluation rétrospective du bilan des députés sortants’, Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée. vol. 17, no. 4, 2010, pp. 141–160. 36  Ben Crum, Learning from the EU Constitutional Treaty. Democratic constitutionalization beyond the nation-state (London: Routledge, 2012). 37  Heike Klüver and Toni Rodon, ‘Explaining Policy Position Choices of Europarties: The Effect of Legislative Resources’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 43, no. 3, 2013, pp. 629–650. 38  Eduard Gaudot, Greens/EFA Strategic Unit, interview, 27 October 2015, Strasbourg (French. Translated by the author).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

85

o­ fficial position. This may weaken the capacity of the EP group concerned to act as a coherent diplomatic actor. The EP groups’ internal divisions on international politics thus prevent these emerging diplomatic actors from fulfilling their full potential as democratically elected representatives. All of these dynamics are illustrated below with empirical examples of the left-wing EP political groups’ activism on the issue of Israel-Palestine.

Left-Wing European Parliament Groups’ Activism on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict There is a very intensive activity of pro-Palestinian NGOs in Brussels, working with the European Parliament [. . .]. Some Israeli NGOs, some Palestinian NGOs, some European NGOs, which work here directly, very intensively, especially with the left-wing parties here, and they always engage in activities in order to challenge Israel.39

This observation, made by an Israeli Embassy official, who spent a few years lobbying the EP, is an example of actors from third countries acknowledging the political divisions within the EP on international political issues. This Israeli diplomat did not simply complain about the intensive activities of proPalestinian NGOs in the EP in general; she clearly noticed the close ties of these NGOs with left-wing EP groups – S&D, Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL – which are particularly active on the issue of Israel-Palestine. For example, both Greens/ EFA and GUE/NGL are critical of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Yet while GUE/NGL’s position is that this agreement should be suspended, the Greens claim it should merely be ‘revisited’. The next section provides empirical data on the diplomatic role of left-wing EP groups on the question of Israel-Palestine by conducting four case studies: the first two cases are directly concerned with the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, while the other two cases deal with issues beyond these territories. It follows a chronological order: the aftermath of the Gaza war in the summer of 2014, the recognition of Palestinian statehood in December 2014, the status of the Palestinian minority in Israel in September and October 2015, and the Israeli Knesset’s ‘NGO Transparency Act’ of 11 July 2016.

39  Galit Peleg, Israeli Foreign Ministry official in charge of relations with the EP, interview, 18 January 2011, Strasbourg (Hebrew. Translated by the author).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

86

Shemer-Kunz

Case Study I: The Gaza War of Summer 2014

The Position of GUE/NGL After the Gaza war of July-August 2014, the EP expressed its condolences ‘to all victims of the armed conflict and to their families, strongly condemned the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and urged the EU to participate effectively in the urgent humanitarian aid effort and in the reconstruction of Gaza’.40 This resolution was adopted by a large majority of 447 MEPs with 143 voting against and 41 abstaining. The radical left EP group, GUE/NGL, which voted against the text, proposed its own resolution in which it called to establish a fact-finding mission to Gaza ‘to witness firsthand the dimensions of the destruction, the needs of the population as regard humanitarian aid, water and electricity, and the situation of the hospitals, schools and infrastructure’.41 However, the group’s motion for resolution was overwhelmingly defeated in the EP plenary with only 55 MEPs voting in favour, 512 against and 71 abstaining. The group’s separate amendment on the factfinding mission to Gaza was also rejected in the plenary, so the mission never took place. Instead, GUE/NGL sent its own fact-finding mission to Gaza on 4–7 September 2014 in the form of a relatively large delegation of 13 MEPs from six countries and eight national delegations. Since the Israeli Government refused to let the delegation enter the Gaza strip, they were unable to assess the situation on the ground for themselves. However, the delegation members travelled to the West Bank and met with the director of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), Salvatore Lombardo, and visited the Palestinian Red Crescent headquarters in Ramallah and the Makassed Islamic hospital in East Jerusalem. In addition to appraising the humanitarian situation in Gaza, GUE/NGL MEPs were received by the Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah and by Palestinian ministers and parliamentarians. These included Khalida Jarrar, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), who had refused to obey an Israeli expulsion order from Ramallah to Jericho and was later arrested by Israel. In East Jerusalem, the delegation also met with the family of the Palestinian 17-year-old Mohammed Abu Khdeir, who had been killed by Israeli

40  See European Parliament resolution of 18 September 2014 on Israel-Palestine after the Gaza war and the role of the EU, OJ C 234/35. 41   G UE/NGL, Amendment 9, Motion for a resolution of 18 September 2014 on Israel-Palestine after the Gaza war and the role of the EU.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

87

civilians. Finally, GUE/NGL also had a ‘hugely constructive meeting’42 with Omar Barghouti, the co-founder of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. GUE/NGL had relatively few meetings with Israeli parliamentarians. They met three MPs from three political parties: the Labour Party, currently the largest opposition party in the Knesset; Meretz, a small progressive party; and the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, which is an ArabJewish party. The delegation also sat down with representatives of several Israeli NGOs and activists: Rabbis for Human Rights, the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI), Combatants for Peace, and Amira Haas, a journalist for the Israeli main broadsheet newspaper Ha’aretz. The list of meetings reflects GUE/NGL’s straightforward pro-Palestinian political agenda. It is worth noting that the GUE/NGL delegation was not representative of the entire EP group. While the Irish Sinn Féin and the Spanish Podemos were over-represented with three MEPs each, the German Die Linke had no representative in the group’s delegation, arguably avoiding taking part in a delegation that has a clearly pro-Palestinian agenda. The visit also had a clear communication purpose: it was documented in press releases, a special booklet with numerous photos taken during the visit, as well as a special press conference in the EP on 9 September 2014, shortly after the delegation’s return to Brussels. GUE/NGL’s clear pro-Palestinian agenda and its emphasis on communication contrasts with the Greens’ visit to the Palestinian territories, which took place less than a year later. The Position of the Greens/EFA The Greens group in the EP sent a seven-member delegation to Israel and the Palestinian territories on 20–23 July 2015, a year after the war in Gaza. They planned this trip as an internal study tour designed to better understand the situation on the ground and to be better informed, with a view to working towards a more coherent common political position on the question of Israel-Palestine.43 The Greens in the EP are bitterly divided on the issue, and there have been some heated debates in the group’s meetings.44 The main dividing line is between the German delegation and the rest of the group. The latter are very critical towards Israel and call for the suspension of the EU-Israel 42  The group’s visit was publicly reported in a special booklet that included photographs. See: ‘Israel-Palestine after the 2014 war in Gaza, GUE/NGL Delegation visit to Palestine 4–7 September 2014’, http://www.guengl.eu/uploads/publications-documents/Palestine_ booklet_web.pdf (last accessed 25 April 2016). 43  Greens/EFA MEP, interview by phone, 13 July 2015. 44  Greens/EFA Parliamentary assistant, informal discussion, 5 October 2015, Strasbourg.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

88

Shemer-Kunz

Association Agreement,45 while the German Greens are very concerned with ensuring Israel’s security because of Germany’s history.46 In fact, the main idea behind the Greens’ visit was to try and bring German MEPs to the delegation as a way of convincing them to take a more critical stance towards the Israeli Government: We have many problems of political coherence on the Israeli-Palestinian question, to say the least. And to follow up on the debate we had on the question of the recognition of Palestine, we decided to bring a group delegation, especially with Germans, and to change the debate’s focus from security issues to ecological issues so that the Germans, who are the most complicated in the group on this question, can no longer use the argument of Israel’s right to defend itself.47 The Greens’ delegation started its visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories with a dinner with two former Israeli diplomats, Alon Liel, former Director General in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ilan Baruch, former Israeli ambassador to South Africa, who later became the Chair of the Policy Committee of the Israeli-Palestinian ‘Peace NGOs Forum’, a coalition of around 80 Israeli and Palestinian NGOs. The visit also included meetings with Palestinian Authority officials and with NGOs, such as Machsom Watch, Breaking the Silence, Peace Now, Mossawa Center, Al Haq, and Al-Shabaka– the Palestinian Policy Network. The Greens’ delegation also met with Israeli parliamentarians, notably from the Joint List, which is an electoral alliance of four parties in the Knesset which represent the Palestinian citizens of Israel, and the small progressive party Meretz. The Greens’ visit had a special focus on environmental issues in the OPT. They met with representatives of the NGO EWASH (Emergency, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene), visited the Jordan Valley in the West Bank to examine water issues, and exchanged views with members of the Arab Climate Youth Movement (ACYM) in Ramallah. Such a focus was not only because of the Greens’ inherent interest in environmental issues; it was considered conductive to convincing the German Greens, who usually refrain from openly criticising Israel’s policies in the West Bank on security grounds.48 Also due 45  Greens/EFA MEP, interview, 6 October 2015, Strasbourg. 46   M EP Helga Trüpel (Greens/EFA, Germany), interview, 7 October 2015, Strasbourg. 47  Parliamentary assistant of an MEP of the French Greens, 6 October 2015, Strasbourg. 48   M EP Tamas Meszerics (Greens/EFA, Hungary), Greens/EFA spokesperson on foreign affairs, interview, 7 October 2015, Strasbourg.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

89

to the Greens’ internal divisions on the issue, the group’s visit was considered an internal group activity and was not made public in any form. While some individual MEPs intensively reported on their visit to the Palestinian territories through their social media networks, others remained completely silent about it.49 At the level of the EP group, there was no public trace of the group’s visit. In general terms, the Greens in the EP work on the issue of Israel-Palestine in close contact with several Israeli NGOs, such as B’Tselem, Breaking the Silence, Peace Now, and Physicians for Human Rights–Israel (PHR-I); as well as with Palestinian NGOs such as Al-Haq, Addameer, and Al-Shabaka,50 which provide the EP group with detailed information on developments on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza, including human rights’ violations and the situation of Palestinian prisoners in Israel. For instance, in a motion for a resolution tabled by Greens/EFA, the group explicitly referred to reports by the Israeli NGO Peace Now on the Israeli Government’s decision to confiscate Palestinian land in the West Bank.51 Within the Greens/EFA, the European Free Alliance (EFA) is a small EP group of seven MEPs only. Despite its limited size, the EFA also sent its own small delegation of three MEPs to Israel and the Palestinian territories in June 2015.52 They met with representatives of Israeli NGOs, mainly Peace Now and Breaking the Silence. The trip also included a dinner with the two aforesaid former Israeli diplomats, Alon Liel and Ilan Baruch. However, the EFA as a diplomatic actor suffers from a severe lack of resources. The EFA staffer in charge of the organisation of the visit to the Palestinian territories was not an expert on the issue. Nevertheless, the EFA members invested in the communication aspect of the visit, mainly by producing a short documentary film reporting on it.53 According to EFA MEPs, their communication activities during the visit, above all through social media channels, were followed by numerous ­voters and sympathisers.

49   M EP Florent Marcellesi (Greens/EFA, Spain), interview, 5 October 2015, Strasbourg. 50  Greens/EFA policy advisor on human rights, interview, 5 October 2015, Strasbourg. 51  Greens/EFA Motion for a resolution of 16 September 2014 ‘on Israel-Palestine after the Gaza war and the role of the EU’, point P. 52  Email exchange with the EFA advisor on foreign affairs, civil liberties, justice and home affairs, Elisabet Nebreda Vila, 8 October 2015. 53  A joint interview with EFA MEPs Jill Evans (Wales, UK), Jordi Sebastià (Valencia, Spain) and Ernest Maragall (Catalunya, Spain), 7 October 2015, Strasbourg.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

90

Shemer-Kunz

The Position of the Socialists & Democrats The S&D group was somewhat silent and vague on the issue of Israel-Palestine in the aftermath of the Gaza war of summer 2014. In fact, during the negotiations between groups on the EP resolutions during the Gaza war in July 2014 and, immediately afterwards, in September 2014, the S&D group’s shadow rapporteur, MEP Victor Bostinaru (Romania), was reported straying from his group’s stance and aligning himself with the pro-Israeli position advocated by right-wing EP groups.54 At the same time, other S&D MEPs – notably MEPs of the UK Labour Party, including Richard Howitt, S&D coordinator in AFET – took part in a pro-Palestinian demonstration in front of the EP plenary session in Strasbourg on 16 July 2014, joining the MEPs from the GUE/NGL group and the Greens/EFA. It is thus very revealing that S&D press releases on this topic were co-signed by both MEPs Bostinaru and Howitt. The internal divisions within S&D therefore explain why the second largest EP group does not seem to be more engaged in diplomatic activities on this issue. These divisions within S&D were partly due to the presence of political parties from Central and East European countries. For instance, on 23 October 2012 the EP gave its consent to the EU-Israel ACAA, with 379 MEPs voting in favour, 230 MEPs against and 41 abstaining.55 Among S&D, the voting cohesion was as low as 58 per cent, since many of the group’s MEPs voted in favour of the agreement or abstained, thereby failing to align with the group’s decision to reject ACAA on human rights and political grounds related to the MEPP.56 In fact, out of the 190 members of S&D, 46 MEPs were ‘rebels’: with 33 votes in favour and 13 abstentions. The defection votes came from the delegations from Romania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria.

Case Study II: The Recognition of Palestinian Statehood

On 17 December 2014 the EP adopted a resolution on recognition of Palestinian statehood with a large majority of 498 in favour, 88 against and 111 abstentions. By doing so, the EP followed a few other national parliaments in the EU, which, following the decision to this effect by the Swedish Parliament and Government, adopted non-binding resolutions urging their governments 54  Email exchanges with the Greens/EFA policy advisor, 17 September 2014; informal discussion with a Brussels-based pro-Palestinian NGO representative, by telephone, July 2014. 55  Gianniou, ‘The European Parliament and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, p. 243. 56  Stéphane Hessel and Véronique De Keyser, Palestine, la trahison européenne (Paris: Fayard, 2013).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

91

to recognize the state of Palestine: the UK House of Commons did so on 13 October 2014; the Irish Senate on 22 October 2014; the Spanish Cortes Generales on 18 November 2014; the French National Assembly on 2 December 2014; and the Portuguese Assembly on 12 December 2014. The final text adopted by the EP contained a rather weak wording, which was similar to the Spanish resolution: the EP ‘supports in principle recognition of Palestinian statehood and the two state solution, and believes these should go hand in hand with the development of peace talks, which should be advanced’.57 While the official Israeli diplomats were strongly against the resolution, and tried to water it down as much as possible, a few former Israeli diplomats lobbied the EP in favour of an immediate and unconditional recognition of Palestinian statehood, working in close contact particularly with S&D and the Greens.58 In fact, the staff of the Greens/EFA group repeatedly exchanged emails with these former Israeli diplomats, informing their Israeli counterparts in the civil society on the exact deadlines for submitting the resolution and the timing of the plenary vote. In November 2014, three Israeli citizens – former diplomats Alon Liel and Ilan Baruch, together with Amiram Goldblum, a co-founder of the NGO Peace Now – had launched a public petition in favour of the recognition of Palestinian statehood, which was signed by 1,000 Israeli citizens, including former ministers and prominent Israeli intellectuals. The Israeli petition was handed over to the EP at the crucial moment of discussing the motion for the recognition of Palestinian statehood. Representing the Israeli-Palestinian ‘Peace NGO Forum’, former Israeli ambassador Ilan Baruch even conducted a special diplomatic mission to Brussels,59 where he met with MEPs and policy advisors, pushing for a strong motion for Palestinian statehood without any further conditions or linkages to peace negotiations. These lobbying efforts were accompanied by an email campaign targeting key MEPs who were directly involved in the decision-making process within their EP group and in the negotiations with other EP groups on the resolution. A special focus was put on S&D and ALDE, two EP groups that were considered as undecided and divided on the question. It is interesting to note that the lobbying efforts focused on MEPs according to their EP group’s affiliation instead of on nationality or national party affiliation. This shows that EP transnational 57  E P resolution of 17 December 2014 on recognition of Palestine statehood, point 1. OJ C 294/9. 58  Alon Liel, former Secretary-General of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, interview, 10 December 2014, Hod Hasharon (Hebrew). 59  Ilan Baruch and Alon Liel, email exchange, 23 November 2014 (Hebrew).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

92

Shemer-Kunz

political groups are considered key actors within the EP, including when it comes to EU international relations. While the Israeli Government was strongly against the EP resolution on the recognition of Palestinian statehood, a small but internationally active opposition to the Israeli Government within Israel’s civil society provided left-wing EP groups with political support, directly at odds with the lobbying efforts of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. In their justification of why the EP should recognise Palestine’s statehood without delay, the Greens/EFA explicitly referred to similar calls being made in the Israeli civil society, noting that ‘over 1,000 prominent Israeli public figures, including former ministers, parliamentarians and artists, have recently called on European parliamentarians to formally recognise the State of Palestine’60 and that ‘over 100 Israeli retired and reserve generals and senior security officials have signed a plea addressed to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu calling for a regional-based two-state diplomatic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’.61 These explicit references indicate the extent to which left-wing EP groups were coordinated with Israeli opposition NGOs on the issue of the recognition of Palestinian statehood.

Case Study III: The Situation of the Palestinian Minority in Israel

An interesting aspect of parliamentary diplomacy as parallel diplomacy is the opportunity for parliamentary actors to engage with representatives of national minorities in third countries, to receive direct information on their particular situation, and to provide these minority groups with international visibility and an access to politics at the international level bypassing their national government. During their visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories in July 2015, the EP Greens’ delegation met with Jafar Farah, the director of ‘Mossawa Center–the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel’, an NGO based in Haifa. Following this meeting, in September 2015, the Greens/ EFA included in their motion for a resolution on the EU’s role in the MEPP an appeal to ‘take note of the efforts of the Palestinian Israelis to coalesce under the Joint List and to secure a strong outcome at the last legislative elections’ and to ‘call on the EEAS and the European Commission to significantly step up

60  Greens/EFA, Motion for a resolution of 17 December 2014 on recognition of Palestinian statehood, point I. 61  Idem, point H.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

93

their support to and ­engagement with minorities in Israel and to support their efforts to achieve better political, economic and social participation’.62 S&D joined that position, stressing ‘the potential of Arab citizens of Israel to play an important role in achieving peace between Israelis and Palestinians, while noting the rise of the Joint Arab List as the third political force in the Knesset, with many votes also from Jewish Israeli citizens’.63 Nevertheless, the final EP resolution of 10 September 2015 on the role of the EU in the MEPP – which was adopted with a majority of 525 votes in favour, 70 against and 31 abstentions – did not make any reference to the Arab community in Israel or to the Joint List in the Knesset. On 14 October 2015, S&D and the Greens/EFA jointly invited Jafar Farah of the Mossawa Center to Brussels. The groups’ MEPs and policy advisors discussed with him the possibility of strengthening cooperation with members of the Palestinian minority in Israel. After that meeting, S&D issued a call for enhancing the dialogue with this minority, emphasising that ‘Arab citizens of Israel – with the Joint Arab List as the third political force in the Knesset – have a huge potential to play an important role in achieving peace in the Middle East’.64 In particular, S&D encouraged the EP Delegation for Relations with Israel (D-IL) to include meetings with representatives of the Joint List in the schedule of its upcoming visit to the country on 16–18 November 2015,65 and announced its intention to invite Joint List leaders to Brussels. Greens/EFA also issued a press release after the meeting with Farah, calling on the EU to reach out to the Arab minority in Israel, which is ‘critical for a peaceful and democratic future for Israel and Palestine’, and urging the EU, particularly High Representative Mogherini and the EU special envoy to the MEPP Fernando Gentilini, ‘to stop ignoring the Arab community in Israel and to engage with them, notably the Joint List in the Israeli Knesset’.66 Even though Farah mainly seeks to influence the position of the governments of the EU member states and the EEAS, and not particularly the EP, he nevertheless acknowledges that the EP is an important institution that the European Commission cannot

62  Greens/EFA, Motion for a resolution of 7 September 2015, point 21. 63  S&D, Motion for a resolution of 7 September 2015, point 12. 64  ‘S&D members aim to strengthen dialogue with the Palestinian Arab community in Israel, S&D press release, 13 October 2015. 65  The D-IL delegation indeed met with MP Aida Touma-Sliman (Joint List) on 17 November 2015 in Jerusalem. 66  ‘Greens/EFA group calls for greater EU engagement with the Arab Community in Israel’, press release, 21 October 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

94

Shemer-Kunz

­simply ignore.67 It seems that this NGO of the Arab minority in Israel is a trustful source of information for the Greens/EFA and S&D, while the latter two in turn represent important channels of international advocacy and an entry point to EU-level politics for this NGO.

Case Study IV: The Knesset’s ‘NGO Transparency Act’

On 11 July 2016 the Israeli Knesset adopted the ‘NGO Transparency Act’,68 which imposes particular transparency requirements on non-profit organisations that receive funding from foreign governments, while ignoring private donations coming from abroad. The act was heavily criticised as undemocratic since it discriminates against Israeli human rights and left-wing NGOs, which receive funding from foreign governments, whereas no such requirements apply to Israeli right-wing NGOs, which receive donations from private donors from outside Israel but not from foreign governments. According to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), the sole purpose of the law is to harass anyone who expresses strong opposition towards the government’s policy as it was especially designed to limit only those NGOs that the government dislikes.69 The controversial bill caused an international outcry,70 including from the United States71 and the EU.72 Left-wing EP groups closely followed the legislative process in the Knesset. In November 2015 GUE/NGL proposed discussing this Israeli bill during the

67  Jafar Farah, director of the Mossawa Center, interview, 4 January 2016, Haifa. 68  ‘The Disclosure Obligations of Recipients of Support from Foreign Government Entities Act’ (Amendment) (Increased Transparency by Recipients of Support, when the Majority of their Funding is from Donations from Foreign Government Entities). 69  See: http://www.acri.org.il/en/2015/12/28/eagerness-to-silence-criticism-is-greater-thansupport-for-democracy (accessed 5 April 2016); http://www.acri.org.il/en/2016/07/12/ acris-response-to-the-passing-of-the-ngo-law/ (accessed 13 July 2016). 70  See for instance: Editorial, ‘A Danger to Israeli democracy’, Washington Post, 2 January 2016. 71  See US Embassy in Israel’s press release of 11 January 2016, ‘Ambassador Shapiro’s Meeting with Justice Minister Shaked’, http://israel.usembassy.gov/press11012016.html (accessed 18 April 2016); Barak Ravid, ‘Ambassador Shapiro Tells Minister Shaked: U.S. Concerned by “NGO Transparency Bill” ’, Ha’aretz, 11 January 2016. 72  ‘Statement by the Spokesperson on the passage of the new NGO law in the Israeli Knesset’, EEAS press release, 12 July 2016.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

95

human rights debate in the plenary session held that month.73 However, the EP’s Conference of Presidents did not adopt this proposal and the ‘NGO Transparency Act’ was not officially placed on the EP’s agenda. Nevertheless, on 8 February 2016, on the very day when the bill was tabled for adoption in the Knesset in first reading,74 the S&D group issued a press release expressing its deep concern about the bill.75 These rather formal statements were not covered by the Israeli media and did not elicit any public reactions in the Knesset. However, on the same day, Julie Ward, an S&D MEP from the UK Labour Party, sent an open letter to all 120 Members of the Knesset (MKs), signed by 50 MEPs (21 MEPs from the Greens/EFA, 18 from GUE/NGL, and only 11 from S&D, including four from the UK Labour Party). The letter called upon them to reject the bill: ‘We urge the Israeli government and Members of the Knesset to refrain from legislative measures, or from support of campaigns of incitement that aim to stifle or silence civil society organisations, artists, and public discourse’.76 MEPs often sign open letters on various issues, including on that of Israel-Palestine, but these letters are mainly aimed at the European Commission for the purpose of influencing EU policy. Yet this one was sent directly to Israeli parliamentarians and hence can be seen as an informal diplomatic action. Interestingly, this open letter was reported on by several Israeli newspapers as well as by national television, making the general impression that the EP as a whole was against the proposed Knesset legislation,77 particularly thanks to comments that ‘European parliamentarians urge MKs to vote against measure’.78 The letter received harsh criticism in the Knesset. MP Nava Boker of the governing Likud Party, for instance, said: I was astonished to receive the letter. It seems that these parliamentarians are confused, or they got used to activating their foreign agents here, but I am committed only to the People of Israel. The state of Israel is a 73  ‘GUE/NGL criticises Parliament’s refusal to discuss Israeli ‘transparency law’, GUE/NGL press release, 19 November 2015. 74  The legislative process in the Knesset requires three readings. Any bill adopted at first reading still requires second and third reading to become an Act. 75  ‘S&D deeply concerned about the NGO bill discussed in the Israeli Knesset’, press release, 9 February 2016. 76  ‘MEPs send an open letter on Israeli government NGO bill’, www.juliewardmep.eu (accessed 14 February 2015). 77  Raphael Ahren, ‘50 European MPs slam NGO bill as ‘inherently discriminatory’, The Times of Israel, 9 February, 2015. 78  Lahav Harkov, ‘Controversial NGO transparency bill passes first vote, Jerusalem Post, 8 February 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

96

Shemer-Kunz

sovereign state and we will not tolerate this blatant and audacious foreign intervention. The NGO bill is an excellent bill and the Europeans [had] better understand the hint: leave the state of Israel alone.79 As we can see, MEPs’ informal diplomatic activities may receive media coverage in third countries and elicit strong reactions in their parliaments.80 After the final approval of the act, S&D deeply deplored the adoption of the bill and declared: ‘The European Socialists Democrats stand firm with the Israeli NGOs targeted by this bill’.81 Conclusions Political groups within parliaments are new international actors with a distinctive role. While these groups are a part of their parliaments’ institutional structures and take part in their parliaments’ various diplomatic activities,82 they also develop their own autonomous diplomatic channels. Parliamentary groups enjoy a great deal of autonomy when they act as diplomats in pursuit of their own political ideologies and policy preferences. Parliamentary groups are free to decide their own schedule for diplomatic visits and they can liaise directly with opposition parties in third countries and NGOs’ representatives instead of with official state diplomats, thus nurturing parallel diplomatic relations in the form of non-governmental and less traditional diplomacy. As this chapter illustrates, parliamentary groups foster a relatively high level of coordination with civil society actors in third countries, bypassing foreign governments as a way to compensate for the scarcity of the resources required to conduct autonomous foreign relations. Parliamentary actors’ contacts with civil society actors abroad are rather informal, developed through face-toface meetings and intensive email exchanges, often ad hoc, based on personal acquaintances and relationships of trust. Therefore, qualitative social science 79   M P Nava Boker (Likud), quoted in Gideon Alon, ‘The Knesset approved the NGO bill in first reading’, Israel Hayom, 9 February 2015 (Hebrew. Translated by the author). 80  Four parliamentarians of the German-Israeli parliamentary friendship group in the Bundestag had sent a similar letter to Israeli parliamentarians, which was also largely reported in the Israeli mainstream media. 81  ‘S&D condemns adoption of discriminatory NGO bill in Israeli Knesset’. S&D Press release, 12 July 2016. 82  See the introductory chapter by Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jančić in this volume.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

4. Parliament ’ s Political Groups in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

97

research methods, such as in-depth interviews, are necessary to understand the scope of these contacts, which constitute important sources of information and knowledge for parliamentary groups, which could have a bearing on the political legitimacy of the action taken pursuant to such newly acquired data, helping to justify parliaments’ policy positions against official governmental stances. Both state and non-state actors in third countries recognize the diplomatic role of political groups within parliaments and try to influence their positions. The former actors’ lobbying efforts towards parliaments and parliamentary actors needs to be analysed further, in particular the role of non-state actors in developing their own relations with foreign parliaments. Furthermore, parliamentary actors do not only passively receive information from civil society actors abroad, but they also actively provide the latter with information on the institutional developments in their polities, which is crucial for the latter actors to be able to lobby foreign parliaments and governments more efficiently. This aspect of the exchange of resources between parliamentary actors and foreign civil society organisations should be further explored in the future. The chapter also reveals the lack of influence of the parliamentary groups’ diplomacy on the parliament’s position, let alone on the government’s foreign policy. In light of this, further research on parliamentary diplomacy should strive to evaluate the actual influence of parliamentary actors’ diplomatic activities beyond symbolic politics and rhetoric. One assumption would be that such activities do have a certain influence on government positions, but a rather indirect one, which should be assessed from the perspective of a longer period of time, by pushing certain issues of international politics on the global agenda and by framing these issues in ways that correspond to the preferences of the parliamentary actors engaged in international politics. Finally, internal divisions within parliamentary groups on foreign policy issues prevent them from fulfilling their full potential as public diplomatic actors who can publicly express their criticism of the government’s foreign policy and propose alternatives, combining their diplomatic action with a communicative function. Nevertheless, individual parliamentarians do not necessarily need their affiliated political groups to be behind them in order to conduct diplomacy. The highly informal nature of parliamentary diplomacy gives individual parliamentarians much flexibility to launch their own diplomatic initiatives and engage directly with parliamentarians and NGOs in foreign countries. Future research is needed on individual parliamentarians as autonomous diplomats and how their activities may contribute to the responsiveness and accountability of parliamentary diplomacy.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

98

Shemer-Kunz

Acknowledgements This chapter received support from the Excellence Initiative of the University of Strasbourg, funded by the French Government’s Future Investments program. I would like to thank the book’s editors for their useful comments on previous versions of this chapter. I sincerely thank all the office holders in Brussels and in Israel and the Palestinian territories who provided me with valuable information.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 5

The International Role of the European Parliament’s Intergroups Laurent Dutoit Introduction In addition to its Committee on Foreign Affairs, the European Parliament utilizes other means to strengthen its international action with respect to current affairs. An international presence is part of the European Parliament’s identity, with its numerous delegations for relations with third countries or regions1 and the now well-established annual Sakharov Prize.2 At the same time, apart from its right of consent to international agreements, the European Parliament’s competences remain restricted because European Union (EU) foreign policy continues to be a quasi-exclusive prerogative of the EU member states. Nevertheless, the European Parliament is important on the international scene, given that its elected members include former foreign or prime ministers with significant experience in world affairs. This demonstrates that the personal dimension of the work of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) is essential when one wishes to analyse the external relations of the European Parliament.3 In any definition of parliamentary diplomacy, the role of individual parliamentarians is crucial, because their personal contacts are necessary to establish different channels, rather than in traditional diplomacy where any parliament has limited powers and resources. This is especially so in the context of the European Parliament.4 One way to analyse this personal dimension of parliamentarians’ work is to select prominent 1  See the chapter by Sarah Delputte, Cristina Fasone and Fabio Longo, ‘The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Standing Committees, Delegations and Assemblies: Insights from ACP-EU Interparliamentary Cooperation’ in this volume. 2  More information on the Sakharov Prize and a list of laureates are available online at http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/sakharovprize/en/home/the-prize.html. 3  See the chapter by Luigi Gianniti and Nicola Lupo, ‘The Role of the European Parliament President in Parliamentary Diplomacy’ in this volume. 4  Daniel Fiott, ‘The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Parliamentary Groups’, European Policy Analysis, 2015:3 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, March 2015), p. 2, available online at http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2015_3epa%20

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004336346_007 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

100

dutoit

personalities. Another way, which this chapter follows, is to examine intergroups in the European Parliament as separate actors in parliamentary diplomacy activities, such as ‘dialogue, mediation and persuasion’.5 Topics addressed by intergroups are typically more concretely defined than those of committees or delegations, and are less directly linked to the EU agenda. In addition, the requirement of an agreement between at least three political groups (which is necessary for the creation a European Parliament intergroup), as well as a general limitation on the total number of such structures, show that the themes chosen are important and must attract the actual interest of a large number of MEPs. The academic literature on intergroups and on the external dimension of their activities is rather limited.6 This chapter seeks to fill this gap and examines the official statements and intergroup documents to illustrate the role that they play in the European Parliament’s external action. First, this chapter defines what intergroups are and presents the historical development of their external functions. Second, it examines their role after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It then analyses intergroup activities conducted during the eighth term of the European Parliament, along with examples from previous legislatures. This chapter shows that intergroups complement the external dimension of EU action. This is done by analysing the involvement of individual MEPs and civil-society associations, and determining whether any influence is traceable to the formal work of the European Parliament through its reports, resolutions, or parliamentary questions. Finally, the analysis examines the extent to which intergroups participate in the European Parliament’s international affairs.

eng%20A4%20korr3.pdf; Daniel Fiott, ‘On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Madariaga Paper, vol. 4, no. 7 (April 2011). 5  Fiott, ‘The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Parliamentary Groups’, p. 2. 6  In general, the academic literature on intergroups is rather descriptive and focuses on the functions of intergroups, lobbying and their links to civil society. Recent literature analyses intergroups from the perspective of network theory. For example, see: Peter Nedergaard and Mads Dagnis Jensen, ‘The Anatomy of Intergroups: Network Governance in the Political Engine Room of the European Parliament’, Policy Studies, vol. 35, no. 2 (2014), pp. 192– 209; Nils Ringe and Jennifer N. Victor, Bridging the Information Gap: Legislative Member Organizations as Social Networks in the United States and the European Union (Ann Arbour, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013); and Nils Ringe and Jennifer N. Victor, ‘Legislative Member Organizations in a Comparative Perspective: Exploring the Bridging Nature of LMO Ties in Three Parliaments’, paper presented at the American Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting, Washington, DC (August 2014), available online at http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2483510. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

5. The Role of the European Parliament ’ s Intergroups



101

Definition of Intergroups

Based on the works of Peter Nedergaard and Mads Dagnis Jensen,7 and Laurent Dutoit,8 the main features of intergroups can be summarized in a few keywords: informal structure; cross-partisan; topic-oriented; and an interface with civil society. In a way, intergroups are comparable to parliamentary committees, although the former are structurally more flexible, because it is possible to merge, dissolve or create new intergroups quite easily. The cross-partisan feature is significant, as intergroup members meet to debate a particular issue area, and, regardless of their political affiliations, try to find common ground and reach compromises. For some MEPs, this is one of the key features of intergroups.9 Indeed, MEPs from all political groups discuss a specific issue in order to promote it. Cross-partisan action can be seen as a threat to the regular action of the European Parliament.10 However, in their discussion of whether intergroups are substitutes for the role of committees or political groups, Nils Ringe and Jennifer Victor find that European Parliament intergroups serve to complete the missing ties among parliamentarians and to bridge ‘structural holes in the legislative network to encourage the flow of novel and diverse information’.11 Yet highly salient topics often provoke political sensitivities. In 2000, the intergroups on ‘Antiracism’, ‘Capital Taxation’ and ‘Initiatives for Peace’ were supported by the following European Parliament political groups: Socialists & Democrats (S&D); the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA); and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). As for right-wing parties, the intergroups on ‘Friendship with the Hebrew State’ and ‘Hunting– Fishing Environment’ were supported by the European People’s Party (EPP) and former political groups of a similar ideological approach. Nevertheless, open access is a necessity for all intergroups. This stems from a desire to bring together as large a number of MEPs as possible to represent all of the movements that are competing in the European Parliament. The wider purpose is to garner a majority of votes necessary to adopt a certain piece of EU legislation, oppose a draft European Commission proposal, or pass a resolution. 7  Nedergaard and Jensen, ‘The Anatomy of Intergroups’, pp. 192–209. 8  Laurent Dutoit, Parlement européen et société civile: vers de nouveaux aménagements institutionnels (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Bruylant, 2009), pp. 253–256. 9  Ringe and Victor, Bridging the Information Gap, p. 117. 10  The emergence of rules on intergroups symbolizes the competition between the institutionalized parts of the European Parliament and informal action; see Laurent Dutoit, Parlement européen et société civile, pp. 230–241. 11  Ringe and Victor, Bridging the Information Gap, p. 39. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

102

dutoit

Often compared to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or associations, intergroups are also similar to lobbying groups because they receive external assistance in the form of financial and/or secretarial support. At the same time, because of their composition, intergroups can be confused with parliamentary committees, and could in certain respects challenge the authority of political groups. To avoid this situation, the European Parliament’s governing bodies decided to implement specific rules for intergroups. The Rules Governing the Establishment of Intergroups of 16 December 199912 (hereinafter Rules) defines what an intergroup is, lays down the conditions for its creation and establishes its scope. These Rules, decided by the Conference of Presidents, have an impact on the visibility of intergroups’ actions and allow for a clear differentiation between the formal and informal components of the European Parliament. The first key principle is contained in Article 1 of the Rules, which states that ‘intergroups are not organs of Parliament and may not, therefore, express the opinion thereof’. This position has been maintained since the establishment of the original Rules back in 1992. This principle is essential for the proper functioning of the European Parliament and to avoid any ambiguity as to which are the European Parliament’s bodies and which are the informal meetings of its members. Intergroups cannot under any circumstances take a binding decision that interferes with the activity of the European Parliament. To achieve the objective of this principle, any intergroups’ names and logos that might be confused with those of the European Parliament, its committees and delegations are banned. The sanction for non-compliance with this requirement is the inability to use the European Parliament’s facilities. According to Article 3 of the Rules, intergroups ‘may not undertake any ­activities [. . .] which are likely to have an adverse effect on relations with the other Institutions of the Union or relations with non-member countries’. This rule is very important for the European Parliament’s external action, because in previous legislatures, intergroups promoted their views in the form of ­‘friendship’ with third countries.13 The new Rules alter the previous policy. Earlier, the ban on action was limited to the requirement that intergroups should not prejudice or create confusion with the activities of official European Parliament organs, but there was no ban on any specific field of action. The 12  European Parliament, Rules Governing the Establishment of Intergroups, 16 December 1999 (rev. 12 April 2012), available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/ intergroupes/2012_Rules_EN.pdf. 13  Examples include the intergroups on ‘Friendship with the Hebrew State’, ‘Friendship with Taiwan’, and the ‘Pro-Arabian Intergroup’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

5. The Role of the European Parliament ’ s Intergroups

103

current Rules, however, place a new constraint on the activities of intergroups, in the form of prohibiting their interference with EU external relations. Two other rules must be mentioned. According to Article 4 of the Rules, as mentioned above, an intergroup must be supported by at least three political groups in order to be created. Each political group has a limited number of signatures available, according to the number of MEPs among its ranks. Finally, a public register laying out the interests of an intergroup must be open to the public. These elements are crucial in order to show the importance of the themes and the support that they can receive from political groups. It also appears that intergroups can complement the work of parliamentary committees and foster relationships with civil society. In their more general studies on legislative member organizations (LMOs), Nils Ringe and Jennifer Victor conclude that intergroups do not replicate existing institutional ties, such as those for political groups or parliamentary committees, but instead enhance information flows among MEPs by connecting them even more.14

The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on Intergroups

The Lisbon Treaty did not have a direct impact on the work of intergroups. There was no change in the procedure of establishing an intergroup and the subjects covered by intergroups have not changed since the end of 2009. Nevertheless, fewer intergroups are now focusing on external relations than in the early 1990s. The provision for a Vice-President of the European Commission who is also the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), and thus in charge of EU external affairs, also provides a new opportunity for MEPs to present their questions or resolutions on external affairs directly to this new HR/VP. In other words, some intergroups, such as those on ‘Extreme Poverty and Human Rights’ or any of those on economic affairs, have acquired a new channel for international action and can direct questions and resolutions to the HR/VP. It can be argued that the Lisbon Treaty may have more of an impact on the intergroups dealing with the EU’s soft power than on those dealing directly with foreign affairs concerning a specific country or region. Although a direct link between the EU’s external action and social issues is not always obvious, some intergroups engage in activities that go beyond the EU context. For instance, the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) rights 14  Ringe and Victor, Bridging the Information Gap, p. 113; Ringe and Victor, ‘Legislative Member Organizations in a Comparative Perspective’, p. 11.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

104

dutoit

intergroup is active all around the globe. Although LGBTI rights are not guaranteed in all European countries, it could be said that the right to non-discrimination is part of European values.15 As this group is the second largest intergroup in the European Parliament, MEPs from all political groups and almost all EU member states are represented. Particularly regarding external affairs, the LGBTI intergroup stated that it ‘also regularly reminds other countries of their duty to protect LGBTI people’s rights, such as in EU candidate countries, countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy, or third countries such as ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific] States’.16 The LGBTI intergroup is therefore a good example of a very active intergroup that focuses on a societal theme with an external dimension.

The Influence of Intergroups on the External Action of the European Parliament: An Extension of the Committee on Foreign Affairs?

The European Parliament currently has 28 registered intergroups, covering themes such as: Ageing; Social Economy; Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs); LGBTI Rights; Animal Welfare; and Sports.17 Since 2000, the intergroups’ international work has become more thematic18 and less focused on a certain country or region. Indeed, when compared with previous legislatures, especially those in the 1990s,19 intergroups with a geographical focus are the only ones whose number has been dramatically cut. One reason is the aforesaid Article 3 of the Rules, which limits the geographical scope that an intergroup may have. Geographical intergroups were previously often understood as friendship groups, but were subsequently supplanted by other European Parliament structures, such as delegations. Unlike some national parliaments

15  Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 16  See online at http://www.lgbt-ep.eu/work/. 17  The official list can be found online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/ en/00c9d93c87/Intergroups.html. 18  Nedergaard and Jensen classify the action of intergroups into four groups: country-specific and region-specific; policy-centred; sociably oriented; and horizontal. See Nedergaard and Jensen, ‘The Anatomy of Intergroups’, p. 200. 19  Laurent Dutoit, Les intergroupes au Parlement européen, Euryopa Etudes no. 12 (Geneva: Institut européen de l’Université de Genève, 2001), p. 86, available online at https://www .unige.ch/gsi/files/9614/0351/6356/Intergroupes.pdf.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

5. The Role of the European Parliament ’ s Intergroups

105

that have friendship groups and delegations that focus on the same area, this practice has not been followed by the European Parliament. Despite the fact that the majority of intergroups are theme-oriented, this chapter concentrates on two geographical intergroups, because they deal with sensitive matters of EU foreign policy and, as such, constitute examples of the European Parliament’s parliamentary diplomacy. Until 2014, the European Parliament had two intergroups with a regional focus: an intergroup on Western Sahara;20 and on Tibet (although this was dropped in December 2014). These two regions are not sovereign states and, in this sense, the two intergroups formally comply with the principle of non-interference with the EU’s foreign affairs, as laid down in Article 3 of the Rules. However, they do focus on issues that are of strategic importance to China and Morocco. The discussion on the external action of European Parliament intergroups will thus focus on these two cases and analyse three major features drawn from the definition of intergroups: cross-partisanship; contribution to the information flow among MEPs; and legislative action. The Tibet Intergroup The Tibet Intergroup was one of the oldest in the European Parliament and had 91 members in 2014. Its composition was mostly held by MEPs from the EPP (who constituted around 65 per cent of its membership). The second political group represented was the Green/EFA (around 15 per cent of the membership). Geographically, the MEPs mostly originated from Germany (around 30 per cent), the United Kingdom (ten members), and Hungary and Poland (nine members each). Founded in 1989, the Tibet Intergroup was dropped by the European Parliament during the 2014–2019 legislature. Despite a campaign promoting the intergroup and the intervention of famous people, including actor Richard Gere, the Tibet Intergroup failed to attract enough support among political groups. There has also been significant lobbying against the intergroup.

20  Administrated by Spain until 1976, Western Sahara is a territory claimed by different countries and an autonomous movement called POLISARIO. It was reintegrated by force into Morocco. The conflict has lasted several decades and its resolution is being hampered by lack of agreement on who should vote in a United Nations (UN) referendum on Western Sahara’s future status. Since 1985, the UN has also deployed a mission called MINURSO (Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara). For more information, see online at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/background.shtml.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

106

dutoit

According to European Voice, China sent a letter to all MEPs to express its concern regarding the renewal of the Tibet Intergroup.21 It is furthermore important to examine the other posts held by the members of this intergroup within the European Parliament’s committees or delegations. The main one, the Foreign Affairs Committee, gathers eight members from the Tibet Intergroup and eleven substitutes. More specifically, its Subcommittee on Human Rights had seven members and two substitutes from the Tibet Intergroup. The European Parliament Delegation for relations with China had five members and six substitutes from the intergroup and the South Asia Delegation (which includes Bhutan and Nepal) four members, including the vice-chair, and four substitutes. This means that close to a half of the Tibet Intergroup members were also involved in an official European Parliament committee or delegation that dealt with external affairs that are of relevance to Tibet. Although it is difficult to ascertain the influence of intergroups on the work of MEPs, analysing the activities of an intergroup provides useful information about intergroups’ input on highly sensitive foreign policy issues, such as on relations between Europe and China. Regarding the MEPs from the Tibet Intergroup, three deserve particular mention because of their other activities in the European Parliament: Thomas Mann (EPP, Germany), who chaired the Tibet Intergroup from 1999 to 2014 and who was also the vice-chair of the European Parliament Delegation for relations with South Asia; Hans-Gert Pöttering (EPP, Germany), a former president of the European Parliament; and Graham Watson (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), United Kingdom). The Tibet Intergroup’s actions included organizing conferences, as well as adopting resolutions and posing parliamentary questions. Notably, thanks to motions supported by some of the intergroup’s members, several resolutions on Tibet were passed by the European Parliament in 2010,22 201123 and 2012.24 This is important because, as the EU’s High Representative on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is also Vice-President of the European Commission, she 21  ‘Chinese lobbying’, European Voice (4 December 2014), available online at http://www .europeanvoice.com/entre-nous/chinese-lobbying/. 22  European Parliament Resolution of 25 November 2010 on Tibet – plans to make Chinese the main language of instruction, P7_TA(2010)0449. 23  European Parliament Resolution of 7 April 2011 on the ban of the elections for the Tibetan government in exile in Nepal, P7_TA(2011)0158; and European Parliament Resolution of 27 October 2011 on Tibet, in particular self-immolation by nuns and monks, P7_TA(2011)0474. 24  European Parliament Resolution of 14 June 2012 on the human rights situation in Tibet (2012/2685(RSP), P7_TA(2012)0257.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

5. The Role of the European Parliament ’ s Intergroups

107

must answer parliamentary questions.25 Moreover, the HR/VP must consult the European Parliament and take its views into account.26 Also, the European Parliament may address questions or recommendations and hold a debate twice a year on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament is thus better equipped to pose parliamentary questions on issues concerning foreign affairs. Indeed, the European Parliament’s official records show that at least one resolution or question about Tibet is adopted each year. Not surprisingly, the chairman of the Tibet Intergroup was one of the signatories of these texts. Through the organization of conferences on Tibet, the Tibet Intergroup raised awareness on specific issues, such as deforestation, which was raised at a conference in July 2013. However, its success was limited by the fact that foreign affairs, and relations with China in particular, are sensitive topics for the EU member states, thus reducing the European Parliament’s influence. Nevertheless, for no less than 25 years – between 1989 and 2014 – the Tibet Intergroup successfully kept the issue of Tibet on the political agendas of the European Parliament and EU institutions. The Western Sahara Intergroup Renewed in the 2014–2019 term of the European Parliament, the Western Sahara Intergroup is a long-standing and very active intergroup. No fewer than 108 MEPs are registered and a large majority come from Italy (23), Germany (23) and Spain (22).27 The geographical equilibrium is the exact opposite of that found in the now disbanded Tibet Intergroup, with a majority of members coming from Southern and Western European nations. Politically, the majority of the MEPs come from the S&D political grouping (58) and GUE/ NGL (27). Compared to the Tibet Intergroup, the Western Sahara Intergroup is more on the left of the political spectrum, whereas the Tibet Intergroup was more on the right. The importance of Italian MEPs in the Western Sahara Intergroup is quite intriguing. Historical reasons would plead for a more substantial presence of MEPs from Spain, as Western Sahara was a Spanish territory until 1975. Recently, 25  Article 230 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). For more on this, see Ben Crum, ‘Parliamentarization of the CFSP through Informal InstitutionMaking? The Fifth European Parliament and the EU High Representative’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 3 (2006), pp. 383–401. 26  Article 36 TEU. 27  See the current list of members online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/ intergroupes/VIII_LEG_26_Western_Sahara_20151026.pdf.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

108

dutoit

however, in June 2013, the Italian Parliament created its own intergroup on Western Sahara.28 The subject also needs to be analysed from the point of view of Italy’s relations with Morocco and Algeria in the Mediterranean region, both bilaterally and within the context of the Union for the Mediterranean (formerly the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). It could be argued that Italy, as a major player in the Mediterranean, has fewer commercial interests regarding Morocco – especially concerning fisheries – than the other two major players in the region: Spain and France.29 As with the Tibet Intergroup, the actions dedicated to Western Sahara include conferences, press conferences, parliamentary questions and motions for resolutions. Regarding European Parliament resolutions, one was adopted in 2010 on the situation in Western Sahara.30 Also, the intergroup’s members take part in visits to Western Sahara. The March 2013 visit received significant publicity, because four MEPs were expelled from Morocco and were unable to travel to Western Sahara.31 In June 2013, members of the intergroup addressed a parliamentary question to the HR/VP on access by European Parliament delegations to Western Sahara.32 The European Commission formally reacted on 31 July 2013, informing MEPs that the EU had raised this question with the Moroccan authorities and stressed the importance of upholding human rights. Heightened activity could furthermore be observed regarding the EU– Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA), with at least two motions for resolution being discussed in the European Parliament (but these were finally rejected). Also, the proposal for a one-year extension of the FPA was also rejected by the European Parliament in its first reading in December 2011. The report of the Committee on Fisheries on this matter includes an opinion of the Committee on Development drafted by Isabella Lövin (Greens/EFA, Sweden), a member of the Western Sahara Intergroup. In it, the question of 28  ‘Western Sahara: Italy – Installation of Parliamentary Intergroup for Solidarity with the Saharawi People’, AllAfrica.com, available online at http://allafrica.com/stories/ 201307040702.html. 29  The claim is based on the numbers from Nick Witney and Anthony Dworkin, A Power Audit of EU–North Africa Relations (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2012), pp. 41–44. 30  European Parliament Resolution of 25 November 2010 on the Situation in Western Sahara, P7_TA(2010)0443. 31  Andrew Gardner, ‘Morocco Bars Four MEPs’, European Voice (6 March 2013), available online at http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/march/morocco-bars-four-meps/ 76574.aspx. 32  European Parliamentary Question: EU Monitoring of Human Rights in Western Sahara (10 June 2013), E-006631–13.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

5. The Role of the European Parliament ’ s Intergroups

109

Western Sahara is clearly addressed, with the opinion stressing the failure of the European Commission’s proposal, because the rights and wishes of the people of Western Sahara are not respected in accordance with international law.33 At the same time, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the FPA and specified the issues to be addressed by the European Commission during negotiations with Morocco. Compliance with international law was underlined, in particular regarding the situation of the affected local population.34 Finally, after the last debate in the Council – that of 22 April 2013 – a decision on the FPA was pending until the end of 2013, when the Council decided to accept the FPA by a qualified majority, with some countries voting against.35 Although the objection of the European Parliament was not taken into account, progress had ‘been slow and [. . .] stalled especially on the issue of the financial counterpart from the EU and the issue of inserting a human rights clause’.36 One major finding here is that considerations related to human rights, in particular human rights in Western Sahara, were one reason for the failure to agree on the first one-year extension of the FPA in 2011 and to delay the Protocol to the EU–Morocco fisheries agreement. The Impact of the Geographical Intergroups These two geographically oriented intergroups raise some important questions. The two geographical areas – Tibet and Western Sahara – involve controversial, complex and sensitive issues of relevance for the EU’s relations with China and Morocco. At the same time, the promotion of these topics by these

33  Rapporteur Opinion on the Draft Council Decision on the Conclusion of a Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco Setting out the Fishing Opportunities and Financial Compensation Provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco (7 November 2011), DEVE_AD(2011)472277. 34  European Parliament Resolution of 14 December 2011 on the Future Protocol Setting out the Fishing Opportunities and Financial Compensation Provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, P7_TA(2011)0573. 35  Ivana Katsarova, ‘EU–Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement’, Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service (5 December 2013), available online at http://www.europarl .europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130703/LDM_BRI%282013%29130703_ REV1_EN.pdf. 36  This is the wording used by the Council in 2013, when the discussion on reaching an agreement was difficult. See Council of the European Union, ‘Press Release: 3234th Council Meeting Agriculture and Fisheries’, Luxembourg (22 April 2013), 8472/13.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

110

dutoit

intergroups had a bearing on the decision by the MEPs and political groups to discuss them in the foreign policy-making processes of the EU. With regard to the MEPs involved, some of them are members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs or, even more often, of the European Parliament’s delegations for relations with the countries concerned. While the intergroups’ means of intervention are limited, it is clear that keeping these two intergroups operational until 2014 ensured that the European Parliament maintained its focus on these two regions. Through an active use of parliamentary questions and resolutions, the MEPs involved in the work of intergroups succeeded in applying pressure on the European Commission on certain topics. Intergroups also organize a host of events – such as press conferences and seminars – within the European Parliament to give visibility to their focal themes.37 Intergroups tend to create a policy community or at least a policy network,38 which serves to exchange information and influence the policy-making process in the European Parliament. Yet measuring their concrete influence is difficult,39 because an intergroup is more a forum for MEPs with a common interest than a lobbying group. Nevertheless, the international dimension of intergroups’ work is tangible. Most notably, in the case of the FPA, the question of Western Sahara was one of the reasons not to accept the Protocol. Taking into account the fact that ­intergroups have no official role in the European Parliament, their international engagement is noticeable.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Although the European Parliament’s external action is generally conducted through official statements and interventions, it is also important to consider the informal work undertaken by individual MEPs within the framework of intergroups. Actions such as resolutions and parliamentary questions are part of the external component of the European Parliament’s work and may influence EU policies. Intergroups contribute to an increased level of information 37  For example, the Tibet Intergroup had organized annual conferences on subjects such as ‘Deforestation, Degradation, Depopulation: Tibet’s Environmental Problems’ in 2013, and the ‘Seminar on Self-Immolations in Tibet’ in 2012. 38  Nedergaard and Jensen, ‘The Anatomy of Intergroups’, pp. 199–200. 39  On the matter of influence, Ringe and Victor use the methodology of comparing the work of intergroups with the wording used in European Parliament resolutions and legislative amendments; see Ringe and Victor, Bridging the Information Gap, pp. 185–193.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

5. The Role of the European Parliament ’ s Intergroups

111

available to MEPs and provide for the missing institutional linkages between committees and delegations within the European Parliament.40 This chapter focused on geographical intergroups as examples of MEPs’ contributions to parliamentary diplomacy. The analysis has shown some of the benefits of the intergroups’ activities, especially their role in enhancing the exchange of information among MEPs. Instead of duplicating official European Parliament bodies, intergroups give new opportunities to MEPs to meet and discuss specific areas of EU action. Theme-oriented intergroups can also contribute to the external dimension of the EU on specific topics. The greater visibility of the HR/VP is likely to result in a higher number of parliamentary questions on EU external affairs, which provides a tribune for intergroups. This enables intergroups to have direct access to the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council. This new pattern flowing from the Lisbon Treaty holds added value for the MEPs and those intergroups that fully or partially act on the international stage. The contribution of intergroups to EU foreign affairs is very marginal, however, particularly taking into account the specific role of the European Parliament within a complex regional organization. Nevertheless, action through bodies for information exchange – such as intergroups – could enable the European Parliament to promote views that are more difficult to address through regular diplomacy and by official bodies. In other words, the intergroups’ influence could be marginal, but their activities are not futile. Finally, the external action of the European Parliament is complex and cannot be limited only to political groups, committees and delegations. In this respect, the general overview in this chapter draws attention to the unofficial network of intergroups in the European Parliament. Deeper analysis is needed, however, on the geographical, societal and economic dimensions of the intergroups’ activities.

40  Ringe and Victor, Bridging the Information Gap, p. 212.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Part 2 Wider Europe and EU Relations with the World

∵

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 6

The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey’s EU Accession Process Valentina Rita Scotti Introduction When studying Turkey’s accession process to the European Union (EU), scholars highlight the political parties’ positions, the governments’ declarations during intergovernmental meetings, and the European Commission’s annual reports. Less attention is paid to the European Parliament and its role in supporting the Turkish reform process that aims to meet the accession criteria. Furthermore, studies on the European Parliament generally analyse the attitude of political parties towards possible accession,1 but tend to disregard the effectiveness of the European Parliament’s parliamentary diplomacy and that of the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) in providing a ‘safe’ place for discussing sensitive issues and in supporting Turkey’s democratic transition. Based on the existing literature, minutes of JPC meetings and documents issued by the European Parliament, this chapter examines Turkey’s EU accession process, with a specific focus on the contribution of the European Parliament and the JPC to bilateral diplomatic relations between the EU and Turkey. Analysis of the JPC’s effectiveness is considered, with special reference to its interventions in protecting the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, the Cyprus dispute and the debates on the role of religion in Turkey. These case studies represent the main areas where the JPC has deployed its influence in debates on, and the approval of, reforms in Turkey. The concluding remarks discuss the role of the European Parliament and the JPC in the current deadlock in the accession negotiations, and propose possible changes to increase their influence.

1  See Eduard Soler i Lecha, ‘Debating Turkey’s Accession: National and Ideological Cleavages in the European Parliament’, in Esther Berbé and Anna Herranz (eds.), The Role of Parliaments in European Foreign Policy (Barcelona: Office of the European Parliament, 2005), pp. 77–102.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004336346_008 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

116

Scotti

The Protracted Turkish Accession Process

Turkey applied for association with the European Economic Community (EEC) on 31 July 1959, nineteen months after the entry into force of the Treaties of Rome. Yet after the Turkish military coup d’état of 27 May 1960, French President Charles de Gaulle proposed suspending the negotiations, a decision that was officially taken at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Community on 17 October 1960. On that occasion, the fundamental importance of the respect for democracy and human rights as prerequisites for Turkey’s involvement in the accession process was stressed. The negotiations were resumed only after the proclamation of a new Turkish Constitution in 1961 and the return of civilians to power on 24 July 1962. The result was the signature on 12 September 1963 of the Association Agreement,2 better known as the Ankara Agreement. This agreement stated that ‘the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community’ (Article 28) and – after the signature of Protocol no. 1 on 23 November 1970 – foresaw the completion of a customs union by 1995. The economic3 and ­political4 crises affecting Turkey during the 1970s, however, cooled relations down once again.5 Relations were restored at the first meeting of the EEC–Turkey Association Council on 17 February 1986, allowing Turkey to submit an accession application on 14 April 1987. The related ‘Opinion’ issued by the European Commission,6 which was approved by the Council on 5 February 1990, advised against the opening of accession negotiations. However, both institutions expressed the will to maintain economic relations with Turkey and the European Commission decided to support Turkey’s reforms in four specific fields: customs union; financial system; industrial and technological coopera2  Conceived as a sui generis international treaty, the Association Agreement binds Turkey and the European Union, but does not produce direct consequences for citizens and enterprises. Furthermore, it refers only to the EEC, thus having no effect on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). See Dominik Lasok, ‘The Ankara Agreement: Principles and Interpretation’, Avrupa Araștırmaları Dergisi, vol. 1, no. 1–2 (1991), pp. 24–47. 3  Notably the 1973 oil shock and the inflation crisis experienced by Turkey. 4  Consider the military intervention of Turkey in Cyprus in 1974, political instability in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and, finally, the military coup d’état in 1981. 5  In particular, in 1978 the Turkish government invoked Art. 60 of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement, asking for a five-year suspension of the Agreement. 6  ‘Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community’, 18 December 1989, SEC(89) 2290.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

6. The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey

117

tion; and the development of cultural links with the European Communities. Nevertheless, the ‘Opinion’ recalled the 1986 Single European Act’s commitment to strengthening the consolidation of the Community and affirmed that the high demographic density of Turkey and its level of development – which was considered lower than the EEC average – impeded its accession. Other obstacles included Turkey’s difficulties in maintaining a legal system that was respectful of the rule of law and rights of minorities, as well as the Cyprus dispute. Following the adoption of the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ in 1993 and the pre-accession strategy in 1994, the Luxembourg European Council of 1997 excluded Turkey from the group of states starting the EU accession process. Nevertheless, the Council asked the European Commission to continue supporting Turkey’s efforts and approved the European Strategy for Turkey. This contained a ‘Special Action for Turkey’, which provided for disbursement to Turkey of 375 million ECUs7 in order to support Turkey’s adoption of the acquis communautaire and to implement the customs union.8 At the Helsinki European Council of 1999, Turkey was recognized as an official candidate for EU membership,9 and its short-term priorities were defined in the ‘Accession Partnership Document’ of 18 November 2000. The Laeken European Council in 2001 then invited Turkey to attend the Convention on the Future of Europe under equal conditions as the other candidate ­countries.10 Finally, the pro-European approach of the Turkish government that was formed in 2002 by the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) allowed the Brussels European Council of 2004 to declare that Turkey ‘sufficiently’ respected the political criteria and to set the beginning of accession negotiations for 3 October 2005.11 Since then, however, the accession process has been facing the most severe difficulties. German Minister of the Economy Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, invoking the insufficient ‘Europeanness’ of Turkey, proposed the idea of a ‘privileged partnership’, which was strongly supported by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. At the same time, at least formally, EU institutions continued to affirm that Turkey’s accession remained a priority and, after the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, the European External Action 7   European Currency Unit, a precursor to the euro, which was a basket of European Community currencies. 8  ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Luxembourg European Council, 12–13 December 1997. 9  ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999. 10  ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Laeken European Council, 14–15 December 2001. 11  ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Brussels European Council, 16–17 December 2004.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

118

Scotti

Service (EEAS) was provided with a specific bureau for relations with Turkey. A strong commitment to concluding the negotiations was also demonstrated by the Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle, who launched the Positive Agenda on 17 May 2012. The goal was to convene eight working groups committed to increasing cooperation concerning Turkey’s legislative alignment with the EU’s acquis in the fields of counter-terrorism, visas and migration policies, the customs union, foreign policy, political reforms, energy and civil-society participation.12 The accession process has been in a deadlock since December 2006, however, because of Turkey’s refusal to apply the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement to the Republic of Cyprus, which makes it impossible to open negotiations on eight chapters13 and to provisionally close the already negotiated ones.14 In addition, public support for Turkey’s EU accession seems to be decreasing in Turkey, as well as in EU member states.15

The European Parliament and Turkey’s EU Accession Process

The European Parliament has played, and continues to play, a very relevant role in Turkey’s EU accession process, supporting implementation of the rule of law and the protection of human rights. In particular, the European Parliament strongly reacted to the 1980 military coup d’état, refusing to ratify the Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in 1987, despite Turkey’s adoption of the 1982 Constitution, which marked the Turkish army’s return to barracks and the restoration of civilian power. The European Parliament also expressed concern for human rights violations, with particular reference to the imprisonment of two politicians who had returned to Turkey in order to participate in the first free elections held after the coup. Furthermore, the European

12  On this attempt to restore a good environment for negotiations, see Cengiz Aktar, ‘The Positive Agenda and Beyond: A New Beginning for the EU–Turkey Relations?’, Insight Turkey, vol. 14, no. 3 (2012), pp. 35–43. 13  The chapters are: Free Movement of Goods; Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services; Financial Services; Agriculture and Rural Development; Fisheries; Transport Policy; Customs Union; and External Relations. 14  See online at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_ relations_en.htm. 15  Lauren M. McLaren, ‘Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU’, European Union Politics, vol. 8, no. 2 (2007), pp. 251–278.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

6. The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey

119

Parliament issued a resolution16 clearly pointing out the most critical issues for Turkey’s EU accession: recognition of minorities’ rights for Kurds; recognition of the Armenian genocide; an end to the Cyprus dispute; and the lack of true democracy. In 1994, the European Parliament condemned the trials against six Kurdish members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) in relation to their separatist activities, as well as the Turkish government’s decision to lift parliamentary immunity for thirteen other Kurdish parliamentarians in order to try them for the same crime.17 Demonstrating that positions on Turkey were controversial among EU institutions,18 the European Council proposed inserting a clause on respect for human rights into the Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which was subsequently included in the text thereof, but it did not suspend the negotiations. Furthermore, in 1995 the European Council asked the European Parliament to examine the final text. While approving the Agreement on 13 December 1995, the European Parliament issued a reminder that its assent was aimed at encouraging Turkey ‘to continue the process of democratization and improvement of the human rights situation’19 and that human rights violations were ‘too serious to allow the formation of the proposed customs union’.20 However, after the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, a strong division arose among Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who showed conflicting visions on Turkey’s possible accession.21 The Party of European Socialists considered Turkey to be part of Europe and affirmed that Turkey’s accession could demonstrate the universality of European values and speed up Turkey’s national reform process. According to the European People’s Party (EPP), however, accession before the conclusion of a consistent reform process could result in the Turkish authorities not fulfilling their promises, and thus

16  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 18 June 1987 on a Political Solution to the Armenian Question’, [1987] OJ C 190/119. 17  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 29 September 1994 on the Trial of the Members of the Turkish Great National Assembly’, [1994] C 305/95. 18  See Stefan Krauss, ‘The European Parliament in EU External Relations: The Customs Union with Turkey’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 5, no. 2 (2000), pp. 215–237. 19  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 13 December 1995 on the Human Rights Situation in Turkey’, [1996] OJ C 017/43. 20  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 16 February 1995 on the Draft Agreement on the Conclusion of a Customs Union between the EU and Turkey’, [1995] OJ C 56/99. 21  These difficulties also emerge in the minutes of the European Parliament’s debate on 6 November 1999 about the state of relations between Turkey and the European Union and on the resolutions B5–0120, 0124, 0129 and 0140/1999, which were approved the same day.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

120

Scotti

damaging the internal cohesion of the European Union.22 Furthermore, the Union’s capacity to absorb enlargement to Turkey continued to be a relevant point in the debate.23 When the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 put religion at the centre of the debate on the EU’s integration of a Muslim country, the European Parliament began focusing on Turkey’s compliance with the EU’s accession criteria. For instance, the so-called Oostlander Report stated that the European Parliament: Recognizes that the political values of the European Union are chiefly based on the Judaeo–Christian and humanist culture of Europe, but that no one has a monopoly on these universal values of democracy, the rule of law, human and minority rights and freedom of religion and conscience, which can perfectly well be accepted and defended by a country where the majority of the population is Islamic; believes, therefore, that there are no objections of principle to its EU membership.24 Ignoring any claim related to the different religious adherence of the Turkish population,25 the European Parliament continued to point out Turkey’s difficulties in addressing the Armenian, Kurdish and Cypriot questions, but marginalized the issue of religion. This was particularly evident when the European Parliament approved the so-called Eurling Report.26 This defined a threefold strategy towards Turkey, which consisted of supporting reforms, considering its internal characteristics and geo-strategic position, and implementing mutual political and cultural dialogue. Notwithstanding this approach, the positions of political groups within the European Parliament remain contro22  It is worth noting that the Christian Democrats within the EPP supported the ‘cultural objection’, which affirms that Turkey cannot be considered a part of Europe because of cultural differences (see the declarations after the EPP meeting of 23 March 1997 in Brussels). 23  European Parliament, ‘Report of 15 November 2000 regarding Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’, A5–0297/2000. 24  European Parliament, ‘Report of 20 May 2003 on Turkey’s Application for Membership of the European Union’, A5–0160/2003. 25  The minority opinion of the Oostlander Report, written by Gianfranco Dell’Alba on behalf of the Group of the European Radical Alliance, is contrary to this vision of the European Parliament’s approach and defines the report as ‘permeated with a moralistic, ideological attitude’. 26  European Parliament, ‘Report of 25 September 2006 on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’, 2006/2118(INI).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

6. The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey

121

versial, and the issue of the fundamental identity of both Europe and Turkey seems to be the key obstacle to be overcome.27

Effectiveness of the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee: Instituting a Forum for Parliamentary Diplomacy

The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee was established in 1965, as prescribed by Article 27 of the Ankara Agreement, to ensure dialogue and cooperation between the European Parliament and the GNAT in support of Turkey’s progress in EU accession negotiations through periodical meetings of delegations composed of MEPs and GNAT members.28 Nevertheless, because of the above-mentioned difficulties in EU–Turkey relations, the JPC’s contribution to the dialogue began to be effective only after its 44th meeting (17–19 February 1999). On that occasion, a specific procedure was established to monitor the protection of human rights in Turkey. This allowed for debates on the human rights violations that had been pointed out by the European Parliament’s Subcommittee for Human Rights to be organized during JPC meetings. The JPC is also entitled to issue recommendations to the European Parliament, the GNAT, the Turkish government, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.29 Composed of an equal number of members appointed by the European Parliament and by the GNAT, the JPC meets twice a year – alternately in Turkey and in one of the seats of the European Parliament – and its chair rotates between the two delegations. The JPC’s activities have focused on three main areas: the Kurdish issue and the protection of the rights of minorities; the Cyprus dispute; and the influence of religion in the EU–Turkey dialogue. In the background, the main debate continues to address the need to reform the Turkish legal system and enforce the rule of law.

27  On the identity issue and on the ‘otherness’ of Turkey, see Yurdusev A. Nuri, ‘Revisiting the European Identity Formation: The Turkish Other’, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 30, no. 3 (2007), pp. 62–73; and Aaretti Siitonen, ‘The European Parliament’s Debates on Turkey Reflecting Rising Cultural Protectionism in Europe’, in Çiǧdem Nas and Rana Izci (eds.), Changing Europe and Turkey: Current Debates (Istanbul: Marmara University, 2010), pp. 115–141. 28  Rule 2, ‘Rules of Procedure of the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee’. 29  The recommendations shall be considered adopted if approved by the majority of the members of the European Parliament’s delegation and by the majority of the members of the GNAT’s delegation; Rule 3 of the ‘Rules of Procedure of the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

122

Scotti

At each meeting, the Turkish delegates present Turkey’s latest reforms and the European Parliament’s delegates analyse their consistency with the accession criteria. Usually, the European Parliament’s reaction follows a ‘yes, but’ approach, welcoming the progress made, but stressing the need for implementing previous agreements and respecting political freedom in general. The effects of such an approach have been evident since the 54th meeting, when Turkey’s delegation strongly argued that the positions of the European Parliament’s delegation only aimed at delaying the accession, even when welcoming the beginning of the negotiations.30 Even though Turkey’s AKP governments had engaged in a massive constitutional and legislative amendment process since 2002 to reduce discrimination against minorities, the JPC continued to focus on the need to boost the ‘democratization’ of Turkey, while constantly inviting the GNAT to support the dialogue between European and national institutions and civil society.31 The Protection of Minorities’ Rights The Kurdish Minority The need to improve guarantees for minorities’ rights, particularly for the Kurds, represents a red thread throughout the JPC debates. Actually, the 44th meeting was held in February 1999 just a few hours after the imprisonment of the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan),32 Abdullah Öcalan. The MEPs reminded the Turkish delegates of the need to respect human rights and stressed that Turkey should ensure that Öcalan would have a fair trial and that he would not be sentenced to the death penalty. Since then, discussions have continued over the European Union’s ambiguous approach to the PKK, whereby the EU included the party on its list of terrorist groups, but meets with PKK officials as representatives of the Kurdish minority. One year later, in 2000, the Turkish authorities refused to allow the European Parliament’s delegation to visit Leyla Zana – the first Kurdish woman to sit in the GNAT. Upon her election in 1991, she delivered part of her oath in the Kurdish language, which led to her arrest in 1994 once her immunity 30  On the debates welcoming Turkey’s recognition as a candidate country, see EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 54th meeting, 13–14 June 2005’, available online at http://www .europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/pv/587/587650/587650en.pdf. 31  This topic appears for the first time during the 63rd meeting of the JPC, which was held in Brussels on 22–23 February 2010. 32  The PKK was founded at the end of the 1970s with the aim of supporting requests for the autonomy of Kurds. During the 1980s, the movement tried to achieve such autonomy by organizıng several terrorist attacks in Turkey.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

6. The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey

123

had been stripped. The European Parliament awarded her a Sakharov Prize in 1995, which she could only collect after her release from prison in 2004. In response to these events, the European delegation threatened not to attend the 45th JPC meeting in June 2000. The Turkish authorities considered the threat strong enough to allow the President of the European Parliament’s delegation, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, to visit Zana in prison. The JPC had questioned her imprisonment for a long time, and during the 52nd JPC meeting in 2004, her trial was assessed as detrimental to Turkey’s accession process. However, the European Parliament’s delegation lauded Turkey for having launched a project in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to allow Kurds who had been internally displaced during the long-lasting struggle between the Turkish army and the PKK to return to their villages. The European Parliament’s delegation also recalled the need for reforms to ensure the protection of cultural rights. During the 50th JPC meeting in 2003, the impossibility of educating children in their mother tongue was examined, implicitly referring to the limited use of the Kurdish language. In a severe reaction, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gül stated: ‘the official language of Turkey is Turkish. [ . . . ] In Turkey there are many languages and dialects spoken and Turkish is an umbrella language unifying these diverse languages’. However, this position slowly changed and Turkey’s AKP government supported important reforms enhancing the protection of Kurds’ cultural rights, which is referred to as the ‘Kurdish opening’.33 Nevertheless, this opening lasted only a few years. The emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State and the instability derived from the civil war in Syria have been used by the Turkish government to attack Kurdish villages again in order to disband PKK troops fighting at the Syrian borders, who were suspected of using the conflict to set the basis for a future independent Kurdish area in Turkey. The renewed affirmation of the AKP in Turkey’s November 2015 elections places Turkey at a crossroads, because President of the Republic Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that the approval of a new Turkish Constitution is the priority of the new legislature and that military intervention against the PKK would continue until the PKK is ­defeated.34 While it is evident that Kurds represent a relevant minority of Turkey and 33  This is an initiative of the Turkish government to negotiate with Kurds in order to end definitively the controversies in relation to the Kurdish minority. For more, see Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere, ‘Kurdish Opening: How Far, How Sincere?’, World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies, Barcelona, 19–24 July 2010, available online at http://www.guzeldere.eu. 34  See ‘Anti-PKK Operations to Continue without Break: Erdogan’, Turkish Weekly (4 November 2015).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

124

Scotti

that not all Kurds are PKK supporters, the question is whether Turkey’s new Constitution will be able to safeguard the minorities, including Kurds. The Orthodox Christian Minority The JPC also discussed the situation of Orthodox Christians in Turkey. At the 53rd meeting in February 2005, the European Parliament’s delegation asked about the reopening of the Heybeliada theological school, which had been closed in 1971 as a consequence of the abolishment of religious education in private higher-education institutions.35 The Turkish delegation replied by reassuring the European Parliament’s delegation about Turkey’s efforts to introduce legislation that would solve the problem of protecting the educational rights of non-Muslim minorities. Consequently, at the 56th meeting of the JPC in 2006, the JPC discussed the draft of the Law on Foundations that the GNAT was adopting at the time,36 paying specific attention to the property rights of Orthodox Christians. The Turkish delegates stressed that the controversial situation of the Heybeliada school was going to be solved, as the ­government would issue a decree allowing it to reopen as a branch of Istanbul University. However, the Orthodox Patriarchate refused to reopen the school as part of a public university, claiming that this would endanger its didactical autonomy. In early 2016 at the time of writing, the school is still closed, although its premises have been opened on some occasions for public activities. The negotiations between the Orthodox Patriarchate and the Turkish government continue. The Armenian Minority The JPC also debated the Armenian issue, which concerns not only the protection of minorities’ rights in Turkey, but also international relations between Turkey and Armenia. When the European Parliament recognized the Armenian genocide and asked Turkey to do the same,37 Turkish delegate Kürsat Eser affirmed that the European Parliament had ‘caused profound indignation in

35  See Turkey’s Law on Private Education Institution no. 625, 8 June 1965. 36  It is worth noting that, since 1935, all religious groups living in Turkey may own properties only through the establishment of religious foundations, whose activities are controlled by the General Directorate on Foundations. 37  See European Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’, COM(1999) 513–2000/2014(COS).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

6. The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey

125

Turkey’.38 Another Turkish delegate, Remzi Çetin, denied the genocide and recalled that those dramatic events had to be linked to the end of the Ottoman Empire and the First World War, when the Turkish Republic had not yet been established. The same reasoning was offered during the 53rd JPC meeting in February 2005, when Turkish delegate Şükrü Elekdag stated that during the First World War the Ottoman government decided to relocate Armenians who lived at the north-eastern border of the Ottoman Empire to territories that were far from the front, because it was feared that they would side with Russia, thereby causing the defeat of the Ottoman troops. Thus, according to him, it was because of the severe conditions suffered during the relocation that Armenians died and not because of a deliberate massacre. In response, European Parliament delegate Jacques Toubon explained that the European Parliament’s recognition of the genocide did not represent a hostile position against Turkey.39 However, European Parliament delegate Geoffrey van Orden underlined that the importance of the Armenian issue in the debates on Turkey’s EU accession was mainly because of pressure from the ‘powerful Armenian lobbies in the United States and in France’ for official recognition of the genocide, but he agreed with Turkish delegates that it is not a duty of legislative assemblies to decide on historical facts, particularly when the evidence is still controversial.40 The Cyprus Dispute The Cyprus dispute has a long history that dates back to problems emerging after Cyprus’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1960. This was aggravated by the Turkish military intervention in 1974,41 which resulted in the territorial division of the island between the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in the south42 and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The latter is 38  EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 46th meeting, 20–22 November 2000’, available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/jpc/turk/jpc_meeting/minutes/2000_11_ 22_en.pdf. 39  EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 53rd meeting, 23–24 February 2005’, available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/pv/568/ 568000/568000en.pdf. 40  See Geoffrey van Orden’s speech at the EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 53rd meeting, 23–24 February 2005’. 41  See Augusto Sinagra and Claudio Zanghì (eds.), La questione cipriota: La storia e il diritto (Milano: Giuffrè, 1999). 42  The RoC became an EU member state in 2004 and, at the time of the accession, it was considered to include the whole territory of the island. Nevertheless, Protocol no. 10 affirmed that ‘the application of the acquis shall be suspended in those areas of the Republic of

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

126

Scotti

subject to an EU embargo and officially recognized as an independent state only by Turkey. During the first meetings of the JPC, the European Parliament’s delegation often invited Turkey to find a solution to the dispute with Cyprus, because not doing so could delay the conclusion of Turkey’s accession negotiations. The Turkish delegation responded, however, that including a resolution on the Cyprus dispute as a discussion item in the negotiations contradicted the conclusions of the Helsinki summit, and thus argued that the Cyprus dispute had to be solved according to international law. At the 47th meeting of the JPC in 2001, Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem İpekçi deplored ‘the European Union’s attitude, which strengthened the Greek side and pushed it towards intransigence’.43 During the 49th meeting in 2002, the Turkish delegation maintained that accession to the EU by only the Greek (southern) part of the island would cause a permanent division and preclude an agreement on the dispute. One year later, the Turkish delegation asked for the embargo against northern Cyprus to be lifted, as a sign of goodwill to build mutual confidence between the two sides of the island.44 When the United Nations’ so-called ‘Annan Plan’ was proposed, which envisaged the creation of a Unified Republic of Cyprus and which would have allowed Cyprus to be reunited on 1 May 2004, the JPC engaged in a discussion on it. Both delegations expressed their wish for a positive result from the referendums that were held on the Annan Plan in the Greek and Turkish parts of the island.45 After the failure of the referendums on the Annan Plan,46 and the recognition of Turkey as an EU candidate country, the debate over the Cyprus issue seemed to shift. Although the European Parliament’s delegation continued Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control’ (Art. 1). 43  EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 47th meeting, 26–27 June 2001’, available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/jpc/turk/jpc_meeting/minutes/2001_06_ 27_en.pdf. 44  EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 50th Meeting, 16–17 June 2003’, available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/jpc/turk/jpc_meeting/minutes/2003_07_ 17_en.pdf. 45  EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 52th Meeting, 5–7 April 2004’, available online at http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/pv/535/535894/535894en .pdf. 46  Two separate simultaneous referendums were held on 24 April 2004. The majority GreekCypriot population voted against the Annan Plan (75.38%), whereas the minority Turkish Cypriot population voted in favour of the Annan Plan (64.91%).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

6. The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey

127

rhetorically to recall the need to reunite the island of Cyprus, it focused on the full implementation of the Protocol to the Ankara Agreement. This meant extending it to the RoC, and thus clearly rejecting the reservations evinced by Turkey at the moment of the Protocol’s ratification. For their part, the Turkish authorities affirmed that those reservations would be valid until the definitive lifting of the embargo against the TRNC.47 The persistence of the Cyprus dispute, and the difficulties arising from it, have strongly affected Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, blocking the opening of several negotiating chapters. Furthermore, even the organization of the 68th JPC meeting of 23–24 February 2012, which was held during the Cypriot EU Presidency, seemed to be at risk because Turkey did not recognize Cyprus as a state. Although the impasse was overcome, Cypriot delegates to the JPC constantly invoked the violations of fundamental rights in Turkey, as well as Turkish activities that continue to cause tensions in Cyprus.48 The EU–Turkey Dialogue and the Influence of Religion Although Turkey has been characterized as a secular state since the 1932 constitutional amendment, the religious adherence of the Turkish population to Islam has always been relevant in Turkey’s accession process to the EU. Yet at the JPC’s 45th meeting, which was held in Brussels from 5–6 June 2000, Turkish delegate Yasar Eryilmaz highlighted that this belonging may be a useful tool for the European Union to ‘influence the democratization process in neighbouring Muslim countries, in the same way the democratization of Spain had led to similar progress in South America’. After the above-mentioned Oostlander Report, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül emphasized that ‘the Turkish [EU] membership would be a sign that it was possible to have unity in diversity’.49 In reaction, European Parliament delegate Richard Balfe confirmed that the Union is not a Christian club closed to Turkey for religious reasons, and that the only clauses to be respected are those established in Copenhagen. Furthermore, at the 51st JPC meeting – held just a few days after the November

47  E U–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 56th Meeting, 3–5 May 2006’, available online at http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/jpc/d_tr/minutes/2006_05_05_en.pdf. 48  On these points, see the activities of the Cypriot MEPs Takis Hadjigeorgiou and Costas Mavrides, both European Parliament delegates in the JPC; see online at http://www .europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/96907/TAKIS_HADJIGEORGIOU_home.html; and http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/124691/COSTAS_MAVRIDES_home.html). 49  EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 50th Meeting, 16–17 June 2003’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

128

Scotti

2003 bombings in Istanbul50 – delegates discussed the issue of an automatic equation between Islam and terrorism. Alessandro Merola, speaking on behalf of the Italian Presidency, affirmed the importance of establishing a religious dialogue on the values common to the EU and Turkey.51 His speech was followed by that of Geoffrey van Orden, highlighting ‘that the condemnation of such terrorist attacks, if made by moderate Islamists, could play a crucial role in combating Islamic terror’. The presence during the 53rd JPC meeting of the Turkish Minister of State for Religious Affairs Mehmet Aydin caused the debate to focus on religion. Aydin invited the EU to improve its action in spreading a deeper and more accurate knowledge of Islam among European citizens, in order to avoid what he saw as a ‘useless’ debate on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. He further underlined that ‘the institutions of religion have supported the development of democracy in Turkey’.52 The participation of Turkey in the founding of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations in 2005 seems to confirm the Turkish AKP government’s adherence to a moderate vision of Islam and its will to mediate in conflicts where religion is used as a political tool.53 Such a will was confirmed by the presence of the former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu at the demonstration organized after the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. Although the European Parliament viewed the Alliance’s initiative positively,54 reaction to Davutoğlu’s attendance at the Paris demonstration has been colder, which shows that the issue of the compatibility of Islam with European values continues to be a hidden but present part of the debate on Turkey’s accession to the EU.55

50  On 15 November 2003, two bomb attacks destroyed the Bet Israel and Neve Shalom synagogues in Istanbul. Then, on 20 November 2003, new attacks hit the HSBC Bank headquarters and the British Consulate in Istanbul. 51  EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 51st Meeting, 2–3 December 2003’, available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/jpc/turk/jpc_meeting/minutes/2003_12_ 03_en.pdf. 52  EU-Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 53rd Meeting, 23–24 February 2003’. 53  The Alliance was initiated by the prime ministers of Spain and Turkey. 54  The High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations Jorge Sampaio was hosted by the European Parliament on 22 October 2008, delivering a speech in which she recalled the relevance of the Alliance and the role that the EU may play in supporting its aims; see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// TEXT+CRE+20081022+ITEM-005+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 55   See Serap Yazıcı, ‘Turkey in the Last Two Decades: From Democratization to Authoritarianism’, European Public Law, vol. 21, no. 4 (2015), pp. 635–656.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

6. The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey



129

The European Parliament as a Mediator in Turkey’s EU Accession Process?

The European Parliament’s strong focus on the protection of human rights in Turkey’s EU accession process has been criticized for having transformed the European Parliament into being an obstacle in this process rather than a facilitator.56 Some Turkish academics also underlined that the ‘language and style used [by the European Parliament delegates at the JPC] to convey the European Parliament’s point of view is not constructive and may lead to resentment’.57 While the role of the JPC is not to pave Turkey’s way into the European Union but instead to ease the cooperation between the European Parliament and Turkish institutions during the negotiations, these observations nonetheless highlight the difficulties faced by both JPC delegations in building a frank dialogue without prejudices. Beyond the academic debate, these difficulties have also been emphasized by Turkish JPC delegates, who, already in the years before Turkey was recognized as a candidate country, expressed their doubts as to whether ‘the criteria were being applied objectively and wondered why the timetable for accession was so long’.58 Demonstrating a dose of suspicion, and even though the European Parliament’s delegation confirmed the priority of Turkey’s accession, Turkey’s then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül stated that ‘if Turkey, after having completed all its undertakings, could not start the accession negotiations, there would be negative repercussions and the country would lose its belief in the process’.59 This was not the only case of mutual weariness. During the 45th meeting of the JPC, speaking on behalf of the Portuguese Presidency of the EU, João Pedro da Silva stated that ‘accession negotiations could not begin until measures have been taken by Turkey to safeguard democracy and human rights and to provide respect for the rights of minorities’. The Turkish delegate Yüksel Yalova rebutted this, urging the i­mplementation of reforms 56  See Clement Dodd, ‘Democracy and the European Union’, in Brian W. Beeley (ed.), Turkish Transformation: New Century, New Challenges (Huntington: Eothen Press, 2002), pp. 241–263. 57  See Çiǧdem Nas, ‘The Approach of the European Parliament to the Issue of Ethnic Minorities and Minority Rights in Turkey within the Context of the European Minority Rights Sub-Regime’, Jean Monnet Working Papers, no. 18 (1998), available online at http:// aei.pitt.edu/404/. 58  See the speech by Turkish delegate Sükrü Sina Gürel during the 49th meeting of the EU– Turkey JPC, available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/jpc/turk/ jpc_meeting/minutes/2002_06_18_en.pdf. 59  EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 50th Meeting, 16–17 June 2003’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

130

Scotti

in line with the accession criteria and confirming that Turkish delegates perceived a degree of discrimination against Turkey in its accession negotiations. She insisted that Turkey should be ‘treated in the same way as the other candidate countries and in a way that would permit Turkey to forget the injustices of the previous situation’.60 Despite this mistrust, Turkish delegates have used JPC meetings since the beginning to explain Turkey’s position on particular issues, to ask for more information about certain documents and declarations of EU institutions, notably the Commission’ annual reports,61 and to respond to them from the Turkish point of view. In such a controversial and long-lasting negotiation process, such an approach by the Turkish delegation demonstrates that – regardless of its limits – the JPC can be perceived as a place of diplomacy and dialogue, enabling better results with respect to supporting Turkey’s reforms than the harsh statements used in the European Commission’s reports.62 Indeed, over the years the JPC has emerged as the most well-functioning forum for dialogue between the EU and Turkey, not least because both the European Parliament and GNAT delegations became actively engaged in order to strengthen its effectiveness and avoid it becoming merely a venue for ‘cheap talk’.63 For instance, at the JPC meeting held in Brussels on 3 February 2005, delegates discussed the effects that the public character of meetings may have on their involvement. Supposing that this public nature could impede the frankness of the dialogue on sensitive issues, the JPC decided to hold future meetings behind closed doors, while ensuring transparency through the subsequent publication of minutes of their gatherings. Furthermore, the JPC proved not only to be a place for confrontation between the European Parliament and the members of the Turkish parliamentary majority; it also gave less influential groups a degree of lobbying capability. A concrete example was provided during the 73rd EU–Turkey JPC meeting, when the representatives of the main Turkish opposition party – the 60  EU–Turkey JPC, ‘Minutes of the 45th Meeting, 5–6 June 2000’, available online at http://www .europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/jpc/turk/jpc_meeting/minutes/2000_06_06_en.pdf. 61  As an example, during the 54th meeting, the JPC deeply analysed the Commission’s report on Turkey’s progress towards accession and debated the most controversial points. 62  See a broader analysis of the effects of dialogue and coercion in Katerina Dalacoura, Engagement or Coercion? Weighing Western Human Rights Policies towards Turkey, Iran and Egypt (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003). 63   Anna Herranz, ‘The Inter-Parliamentary Delegations of the European Parliament: National and European Priorities at Work’, in Esther Barbé and Anna Herranz (eds.), The Role of Parliaments in European Foreign Policy: Debating on Accountability and Legitimacy (Barcelona: Office of the European Parliament in Barcelona, 2005), pp. 77–102.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

6. The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey

131

Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) – boycotted the meeting as they wanted to highlight violations of the freedom of the press perpetrated by Turkey’s ruling AKP party. Their absence prompted a general discussion on the limits of the freedom of expression in Turkey. On the European side, the stumbling block is the Islamic religious adherence of the majority of Turkey’s population. Although citizens’ religious beliefs are not among the EU accession criteria, the EU follows the so-called ‘yes, but’ approach, according to which Turkey has been recognized as a candidate country that sufficiently (but not fully) respects the political criteria. This reflects the very different positions of EU member states towards Turkey’s accession. In effect, member states are divided between those that prefer a privileged partnership or reject the possibility of Turkey’s accession (including France, Germany, Greece and Cyprus) and those that support Turkey’s accession (Italy, Spain and the Scandinavian countries). The European Parliament’s political groups, however, are divided according to a different type of cleavage: those coming from centre–right-wing parties fear Turkey’s possible accession for social, economic and cultural reasons; while those coming from centre– left-wing parties instead consider the accession to be feasible, constantly recalling the need to strengthen Turkey’s respect for the rule of law and protection of human rights. On the Turkish side, of key relevance are the reforms that Turkey needs to implement in order to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. However, their relevance has now decreased, given that Turkish citizens have confirmed their support for the AKP government, despite the government’s failure to complete the EU accession process, which was identified as a priority in the 2002 electoral campaign, while EU accession was only a matter of secondary importance in the 2015 general election. Given the differences in approach and opinion, and the need to reconcile them in light of the accession negotiations, it can be argued that the JPC acts as a mediator in Turkey’s accession process. However, certain issues remain that the JPC finds difficult to address fully, because of the highly political nature of the negotiations, which do not allow the European Parliament and GNAT delegates to reveal all of the information of relevance to the negotiation process. Conclusion The European Parliament’s activism within the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee allows for some conclusions to be drawn on the European Parliament’s parliamentary diplomacy, both with regard to the European

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

132

Scotti

Parliament’s relations with other EU institutions and to its position in the EU institutional framework. In the course of Turkey’s accession process, the European Parliament has disproved the assumption that – as an actor in EU enlargement policy – it is ‘more a follower than an initiator in the policy-­ making process’.64 In the Turkish case, parliamentary diplomacy appears to have been a ‘“comfortable” tool in the European Parliament’s search for a legitimate role in foreign policy, enlargement, as well as in human rights’.65 When monitoring the respect for human rights in Turkey, the European Parliament proved to be independent enough from the other EU institutions to be able to define its own autonomous positions, based on the advice of its Subcommittee on Human Rights. Furthermore, the European Parliament’s diplomacy has been useful in developing EU foreign policy. Although this field is generally considered a domain réservé for the executives, with some issues being so sensitive that they need to be classified, members of the European Parliament’s delegation to the JPC act as ‘preparatory agents’, laying the groundwork for the executives’ decisions. EU–Turkey JPC meetings provide examples of this, as delegations are used to debating sensitive issues such as counter-terrorism and migration management. The JPC’s activity thus seems to ­confirm the assessment that parliamentary diplomacy represents a ‘full range of international activities undertaken by parliamentarians in order to increase mutual understanding between countries, to assist each other in improving the control of governments and the representation of a people, and to increase the democratic legitimacy of intergovernmental institutions’.66 Nevertheless, the effectiveness and usefulness of the EU–Turkey JPC could be further strengthened and this could also apply to other JPCs established by the EU. First, clear rules for appointing European Parliament delegates should be introduced, because the Rules of Procedure of the EU–Turkey JPC do not regulate this, so every MEP may ask to be appointed. This procedure, which is based on ‘volunteerism’, might endanger the fairness of the debates, because the European Parliament’s delegation may be composed of parliamentarians who are opposed to Turkey’s accession, thus reducing the effectiveness of the debates and transforming them into ‘dialogues among the deaf’. Second, as the JPC’s debates concern topics of great relevance for the definition of relations 64  Karen Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), p. 169. 65  Gamze Avci, ‘Putting Turkish Candidacy into Context’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 7, no. 1 (2002), pp. 91–110. 66  See Frans W. Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 1 (2007), pp. 93–99.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

6. The EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee and Turkey

133

between the European Parliament and the candidate country, a wider diffusion of their content should be provided. This would oblige delegates to be more actively engaged in all JPC activities, more informed on the candidate country, and more responsible towards citizens. This would help to overcome common prejudices and enable citizens to learn about their parliamentarians’ performances through increased transparency.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 7

The Impact of Parliamentary Diplomacy, Civil Society and Human Rights Advocacy on EU Strategic Partners: The Case of Mexico Mónica Velasco Pufleau1 Introduction The history of the international relations of the European Parliament (EP) has been intrinsically linked to that of the European Union (EU). The EP expanded its relations with third countries thanks to the EU’s practice of including interparliamentary contacts as part of its political dialogue with the wider world after the end of the Cold War and the adoption of the Treaty on European Union.2 At present, the EP maintains relations with almost all third countries in the world, including EU strategic partners.3 However, the EP’s influence on EU external relations remains unclear, especially when acting as a guardian of human rights. Whereas some observers state that the EP’s role has been limited to ‘little more than a “cleansing of the conscience” of the European institutions’,4 others have acknowledged the EP’s capacity to shape EU external relations.5 A major problem in the literature is

1  The author thanks the National Research Fund of Luxembourg for its financial support to the research project IMPACT on which this chapter is based. 2  Enrique González Sánchez, ‘El Diálogo Político de la Unión Europea con terceros países’, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, vol. 1, no. 1 (January–July 1997), pp. 71–74. 3  At present, the EU has ten strategic partners: the United States of America, Canada, Japan, China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and South Korea. 4  Laura Feliu and Francesc Serra, ‘The European Union as a “normative power” and the normative voice of the European Parliament’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p. 30. 5  Christopher Piening, ‘The European Parliament: Influencing the EU’s External Relations’, ECSA Conference, Seattle (29 May–1 June 1997), pp. 6–10; José Javier Fernández, ‘La contribución del Parlamento Europeo a la proyección exterior de la UE’, in María Esther Barbé and Anna Herranz (eds.), Política Exterior y Parlamento Europeo: hacia el equilibrio entre eficiencia y democracia (Barcelona: EP Office, 2007), pp. 145–146.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi Stelios ��.��63/9789004336346_009 Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

7. The Case of Mexico

135

the lack of empirical data6 and the fact that the EP delegations’ contribution to promoting human rights in third countries is under-researched.7 This defficiency becomes more serious regarding the literature on EU strategic partnerships, which is almost exclusively focused on inter-governmental ties,8 thus neglecting the fact that the EP has formalised inter-parliamentary relations with all EU strategic partners. In order to fill this gap, this chapter inquires whether the EP has influenced EU external relations towards strategic partners while fulfilling its role of promoting human rights worldwide, and if so, how EP delegations have contributed to such influence. The EP’s influence is measured against: (a) the reactions of other EU institutions (the European Commission [EC], the Council of the EU, and the European External Action Service [EEAS]) and of the strategic partner’s government to the EP’s work on human rights; and (b) more specifically, the change in the EU-Mexico relations9 resulting from 6  Since 1989 the literature has referred to the same examples about the EP’s influence on EU external relations based on human rights concerns. See: Richard Corbett, ‘Testing the New Procedures: The European Parliament’s First Experiences with its New ‘Single Act’ Powers’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 28, no. 4 (June 1989), p. 360; Anna Herranz, ‘The Interparliamentary Delegations of the European Parliament: National and European Priorities at Work’, in María Esther Barbé and Anna Herranz (eds.), The Role of Parliament in European Foreign Policy: Debating on Accountability and Legitimacy (Barcelona: EP Office, 2005), p. 86; Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs and Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament, 8th edition (London: John Harper, 2011), p. 180; Laura Feliu and Francesc Serra, ‘The European Union as a ‘normative power’ and the normative voice of the European Parliament’, p. 23. 7  See a few exceptions in: Reinhard Rack and Stefan Lausegger, ‘The Role of the European Parliament: Past and Future’, in Philip Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 822; EIUC (European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation), The impact of the resolutions and other activities of the European Parliament in the field of human rights outside the EU (Brussels: European Parliament, 2006), pp. 14–16, 105–117. 8  See among others: Bart Gaens, Juha Jokela and Eija Limnell (eds.), The Role of the European Union in Asia: China and India as Strategic Partners (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); Hiski Haukkala, The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership: The Limits of Post-Sovereignty in International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010); Antoine Sautenet, ‘The EU’s Strategic Partnerships with Emerging Powers: Institutional, Legal, Economic and Political Perspectives’, in Thomas Renard and Sven Biscop (eds.), The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century: How Europe Can Shape a New Global Order (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 123–145. 9  These relations are underpinned by an international agreement, the so-called Global Agreement, and the EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership. See EC, Communication Towards and EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership, 15 July 2008, COM (2008) 447.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

136

Velasco Pufleau

these authorities’ decisions.10 This approach is consistent with the literature analysing the impact of EP activities in the field of human rights in third countries. In a­ ddition, the chapter examines the contribution of civil society organisations (CSOs) to the shaping of the EP’s influence.11 To answer these questions, the chapter analyses above all primary sources (notably EP documents) and focuses on three major case studies of human rights abuse in Mexico. This country has been selected because it is an EU strategic partner12 and because the EP has strongly responded to these abuses through a wide range of means, including the consent procedure (known as the assent procedure until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009), resolutions, public hearings, the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, and parliamentary diplomacy. This makes the EU-Mexico strategic partnership (SP) conducive to yielding valuable insights on the diplomatic efforts of the EP. The three case studies are analysed individually and in chronological order so as to gain an in-depth understanding of the performance of the EP, its delegations and CSOs over time (1995–2016) as well as to compare this performance before and after the establishment of the SP. The first section examines the 1994 Chiapas conflict and the human rights violations against indigenous populations. The second section addresses feminicide (killings of women and girls) particularly in Ciudad Juárez (State of Chihuahua) over the 1990s and 2000s. The third section covers the disappearance of 43 Mexican students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers’ College (State of Guerrero) in 2014. The chapter then concludes that the EP has exerted influence on EU external relations. Its delegations as well as CSOs have contributed to this influence through different means, such as information provision and joint advocacy. These findings are particularly timely and relevant in light of the ongoing process of modernising the EU-Mexico international agreement known as the Global Agreement (GA),13 and the EP’s power of consent over the outcome of this modernisation.14

10  See EIUC, The impact of the resolutions and other activities of the European Parliament in the field of human rights outside the EU, pp. 72, 89. 11  See Stelios Stavridis, ‘Conclusions: The European Parliament as an International Actor’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations. 12  Council of the EU, 2896th General Affairs Council meeting, 13 October 2008, doc. no. 14136/08, pp. 10–12. 13  [2000] OJ L 276/45. See EC, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising to open negotiations and to negotiate with Mexico a modernised Global Agreement, 16 December 2015, SWD (2015) 289. 14  Article 218(6)(a)(v) of TFEU. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

137

7. The Case of Mexico



The Chiapas Conflict: Enforcing Human Rights through Binding Powers

On 1 January 1994, the Zapatista National Liberation Army, including several thousand indigenous peasants, rose up in the State of Chiapas demanding cultural and collective rights and calling for Mexico to withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force on the day of the uprising.15 The conflict quickly attracted worldwide attention. On 2 May 1995,16 with the conflict still ongoing, the EU and Mexico agreed to establish even closer relations and replace their 1991 Framework Agreement for Cooperation17 with a more comprehensive agreement – the so-called Global Agreement (GA) – which sought to include a human rights clause (sometimes also referred to as the democratic clause).18 Mexico agreed to negotiate the GA, but opposed the human rights clause as proposed by the Ec and the Council, because it was considered a unilateral imposition that contradicted Mexico’s foreign policy principle of non-intervention.19 However, the EP made the inclusion of the clause a condition sine qua non of its assent to the GA.20 In addition to­ 15  Shannan Mattiace, ‘Social and Indigenous movements in Mexico’s transition to democracy’, in Roderic Ai Camp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 400–401. 16   Déclaration conjointe solennelle entre le Conseil et la Commission d’une part, et le Mexique, d’autre part, 2 May 1995, point 1.4.104. 17  [1991] OJ L 340/2. 18  See on this clause: EC, Communication on the inclusion for respect of democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the community and third countries, 23 May 1995, COM(95)216; Council of the EU, 1847e session du Conseil Affaires Generales, 29 May 1995, doc. no. 95–152. See also: Lorand Bartels, Human rights conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 19  Judith Arrieta Munguía, ‘La Política Exterior de México hacia la Unión Europea, 1990–1995’, Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, no. 49 (Winter 1995–1996), pp. 141, 147; José Antonio Sanahuja, ‘Trade, Politics, and Democratization: The 1997 Global Agreement between the European Union and Mexico’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 49; Marcela Szymanski and Michael E. Smith, ‘Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU-Mexico Global Agreement’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 43, no. 1 (March 2005), pp. 181–183; Jaime Zabludovsky K. and Sergio Gómez Lora, The European Window: Challenges in the Negotiation of Mexico’s Free Trade Agreement with the EU, Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean and Integration, Trade and Hemispheric Issues Division of the Inter-American Development Bank, Working paper no. 9 (July 2005), pp. 15–16. 20   E P Committee on External Economic Relations, Recommendation on the proposal for a Council decision concerning the conclusion of the Economic Partnership, Political Co-ordination and Co-operation Agreement between the European Community and its Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

138

Velasco Pufleau

trying to exert its influence to ensure that Mexico completed its transition to full democracy,21 the EP was concerned about the Chiapas conflict and the human rights situation of the indigenous people living there and in other regions of Mexico. Around the time that the EC adopted the proposal on the GA,22 the EP had passed three urgent resolutions to condemn the human rights situation in Mexico and asked for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.23 The EP Committee on Foreign Affairs also included the Mexican Bishop Samuel Ruiz among the three nominees for the 1996 Sakharov Price for his role as a mediator in the conflict and defending the dignity of Mexican indigenous people.24 The then Delegation for Relations with the countries of Central America and Mexico (DCAM) played an important role in following the conflict in situ and informing the EP as its ‘eyes on the ground’. DCAM visited Mexico twice (1995 and 1997) during the GA assent procedure. In Chiapas and Mexico City, the delegation met with different parties involved in efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, such as government representatives and human rights CSOs.25 Importantly, Mexico opened doors to DCAM at a time when the country was closed to international scrutiny. Although it has not been recognised in the literature on the human rights situation in Mexico ­during that period,26 Member States, on the one part, and the United Mexican States, on the other part, 22 April 1999, [1999] OJ C 279/6, explanatory statement, para. 11; EP debates on the EC-Mexico Partnership Agreement, 5 May 1999, [1999] OJ C 279/169, annex 4–539/257, 259. 21   E P Committee on External Economic Relations, Recommendation on the proposal for a Council decision concerning the conclusion of the interim agreement on trade and traderelated matters between the European Community, on the one part, and the United Mexican States, on the other part, 27 April 1998, [1998] OJ C 167/3, explanatory statement, para. 5. 22   E C, Communication Towards closer relations between the EU and Mexico, 8 February 1995, COM (95) 3. 23   E P Resolution of 20 January 1994 on the peasant uprising in Chiapas, [1994] OJ C 44/158; EP Resolution of 19 January 1995 on the situation in the Mexican State of Chiapas, [1995] OJ C 43/87; EP Resolution of 16 February 1995 on the situation in Chiapas, [1995] OJ C 56/109. 24   M EPs of the Greens group had nominated him in 1994, but that year the Committee on Foreign Affairs did not retain him as a nominee. Although Samuel Ruiz was not the 1996 laureate, he has been the only Mexican ever to be nominated for the Sakharov Prize. EP Archive and Documentation Centre, 25 Years of the Sakharov Prize (Luxembourg: Publication Office of the EU, 2013), pp. 75, 88. 25   D CAM, Informe sobre la visita a México del 3–9 de diciembre de 1995, doc. no. PE215.699, pp. 4–5; DCAM, Report on the visit to Panama and Mexico on 22–29 November 1997, doc. no. PE225.396, p. 9. 26  See in particular: Ana Covarrubias Velasco, ‘El Problema de los Derechos Humanos y los Cambios en la Política Exterior’, Foro Internacional, vol. 39, no. 4 (October-December Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

7. The Case of Mexico

139

the 1995 DCAM visit to Chiapas to inquire about the human rights situation preceded international visits for the same purposes that were authorised by the Mexican Government as of 1996, including those of representatives of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the United Nations (UN) and Amnesty International. The human rights clause dominated the DCAM’s discussions on the GA and generated strong expectations from it in both Mexico and Europe due to the fact that the Mexican Government had already ignored such a provision in the 1991 Framework Agreement with the EU. Mexico was the only country in Latin America with this type of Framework Agreement that did not include a human rights clause.27 During the 1997 visit, the Chairman of DCAM, José Ignacio Salafranca (Group of the European People’s Party [EPP], Spain), explained that: From the moment we arrived in Mexico, the subject of human rights aroused the greatest interest in the press and the other media, with our visit at one point being compared to that of a Committee to verify respect for human rights in Mexico, in direct connection with the democratic clause in the new EU-Mexican agreement.28 In 1997, during its second visit to Mexico, DCAM even met with the Mexican President, Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000), expressing the EP’s concerns regarding Mexico’s respect for human rights and insisting on finding a negotiated settlement to the Chiapas conflict.29 During this visit, DCAM also initiated an institutionalised dialogue with the Mexican Congress and the situation in Chiapas continued to be discussed within the framework of this new dialogue during the period 1998–2003.30

1999), pp. 439–444; Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, El país bajo presión: debatiendo el papel del escrutinio internacional de derechos humanos sobre México (Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones y Docencia Económicas, 2012), pp. 58–59. 27   D CAM, Informe sobre la visita a México del 3–9 de diciembre de 1995, p. 4. 28   D CAM, Report on the visit to Panama and Mexico on 22–29 November 1997, p. 5. 29   D CAM, Report on the visit to Panama and Mexico on 22–29 November 1997, pp. 6, 20–21. DCAM was again received by President Ernesto Zedillo in 2000 and by President Vicente Fox (2000–2006) in 2003. However, this was the last time that an EP delegation has been received by a Mexican President. 30  Mónica Velasco Pufleau, La Diplomacia Parlamentaria Euro-mexicana: Trabajos de la Comisión Parlamentaria Mixta UE-México 2005–2011, PhD dissertation, University of Barcelona, 2012, pp. 264–276. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

140

Velasco Pufleau

Mexican, European and international CSOs were key to the internationalisation of the Mexican human rights situation in the mid-1990s.31 The EP invited CSO representatives and victims of human rights violations twice for a debriefing about this situation and the Chiapas conflict. A public hearing on the occasion of the EP’s assent to the GA and the so-called Interim Agreement32 was held in Brussels in March 1998,33 following the so-called Acteal massacre,34 which sparked international outrage and took place in Chiapas less than three weeks after the GA had been signed. This was the first time that CSOs participated alongside Mexican Government representatives as equal partners with the EP.35 For the CSOs, the hearing was an opportunity to be heard, challenge the position of the Mexican Government and put forward their own views before the conclusion of the GA.36 In this way the EP, in particular the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), began forging a collaborative relationship with CSOs,37 which remains valid today.38 By 1998, the EP had adopted two more urgent resolutions on the situation in Chiapas,39 the last one being on the Acteal massacre. This massacre, which 31  Ana Covarrubias Velasco, ‘El Problema de los Derechos Humanos y los Cambios en la Politica Exterior’; Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, El país bajo presión: debatiendo el papel del escrutinio internacional de derechos humanos sobre México, pp. 48–51. 32  [1998] OJ L 226/25. The conclusion of this Interim Agreement aimed at applying provisions on trade and trade-related matters during the GA’s ratification process by the EP and the parliaments of the EU Member States. Once the GA was ratified, the Interim Agreement would expire. Council of the EU, Signing of agreements between Mexico and the European Union, 8 December 1997, doc. no. 12891/97, pp. 3, 6. 33  Previously, the EP Subcommittee on Human Rights had invited the president of the Mexican Academy of Human Rights in September 1997 for a debriefing about the Mexican Government’s position towards CSOs in the country. Proceso, ‘Desde Europa, Fernando Mejía, de la FIDH: “Hay una verdadera degradación de la situación de los derechos humanos en México” ’, 27 September 1997. 34  See The Economist, ‘Massacre in Mexico’, 1 January 1998. 35   La Jornada, ‘Duró dos horas y media más de lo programado la audiencia con los legisladores, señalan’, 7 March 1998. 36   La Jornada, ‘Cita el Parlamento Europeo a Green y a ONG sobre Chiapas’, 3 March 1998; La Jornada, 7 March 1998; Ana Covarrubias Velasco, ‘El Problema de los Derechos Humanos y los Cambios en la Política Exterior’, p. 447. 37  Marcela Szymanski and Michael E. Smith, ‘Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU-Mexico Global Agreement’, p. 187. 38  See more on the diplomatic role of EP political groups in the chapter by Yoav ShemerKunz in this volume. 39   E P Resolution of 13 July 1995 on the situation in Mexico, [1995] OJ C 249/159; EP Resolution of 15 January 1998 on the murder of 45 indigenous peasants in the Mexican State of

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

7. The Case of Mexico

141

had also been condemned by the EU Presidency,40 marked a turning point in the Mexican Government’s attitude towards the EP. Before the massacre, the government was rather defensive, as it considered the situation to be an internal Mexican issue and the EP statements foreign interference. However, after the massacre, the government showed greater openness to the EP, being aware of the fact that the GA still needed the EP’s assent in order to be concluded.41 Although largest groups in the EP – the EPP and the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), supported the assent; MEPs from the Greens and the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) stood up for ‘freezing’ the ratification process in light of the Acteal massacre.42 Accordingly, as part of an official visit, the then Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rosario Green, appeared in the EP hearing of March 1998 to promote ratification of the GA.43 This Minister’s appearance was viewed as a decisive test for the Mexican Government to publicly recognise the human rights clause before the conclusion of the GA.44 After this hearing, the EP gave assent to the Interim Agreement, which already included the human rights clause. It has been argued that the EP was required to do so by the EC in order to put additional pressure on the Mexican Government to accept the clause.45 The human rights clause was then reproduced in Article 1 of the GA in the terms proposed by the EU, allowing the EP to give its assent in May 1999.46 Both the EP and the EC publicly acknowledged the EP’s influence on the final text of Chiapas, Mexico [1998] OJ C 34/161. A last urgent resolution related to Chiapas was passed by the EP in 2001, see EP Resolution of 5 April 2001 on the situation in Mexico, [2002] OJ C 21 E/356. 40   E U Presidency Declaration on the massacre of civilians in Mexico, 24 December 1997. 41   Inter Press Service, ‘Diplomacia da giro por Chiapas’, 16 January 1998. 42  Greens group, Motion for a resolution on the situation in Chiapas (Mexico), 12 January 1998, doc. no. B4-0095/98, point 12; GUE/NGL, Motion for a resolution on the situation in Chiapas (Mexico), 12 January 1998, doc. no. B4-0085/98, points 9–10. See also: Proceso, ‘El PE estará atento para que el gobierno mexicano cumpla con las recomendaciones de su resolución sobre Chiapas’, 17 January 1998. 43   La Jornada, 3 March 1998; Proceso, ‘En el PE, dos visiones encontradas de México’, 7 March 1998. 44  Ana Covarrubias Velasco, ‘El Problema de los Derechos Humanos y los Cambios en la Política Exterior’, p. 446. 45  Marcela Szymanski and Michael E. Smith, ‘Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU-Mexico Global Agreement’, p. 187. 46   E P, Decision on the proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the Economic Partnership, Political Co-ordination and Co-operation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, on the one part, and the United Mexican States, on the other part, 6 May 1999, [1999] OJ C 279/404.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

142

Velasco Pufleau

the GA.47 International CSOs that were very active in criticising the situation in Chiapas, such as the Human Rights Watch, also recognised the important role of the EP in using the GA to promote human rights in Mexico.48 In this case, the EP exercised its influence in cooperation with other EU institutions to pressure a third country to accept EU standards. It could do so thanks to the binding powers it possesses in the process of conclusion of EU international agreements. However, the EP may also take action independently from the other EU institutions when defending human rights – for instance, to influence the EU political agenda. This type of influence may affect EU relations towards a country or a whole region, which is exemplified in the following section.

Feminicides: Participating in EU Agenda Setting

As a deliberative assembly, the EP distinguishes itself by raising issues of specific concern within the context of EU relations with third countries regardless of whether the Council and the EC have agreed on the issue and on the appropriate time to address it.49 In other words, the EP ‘considers itself free to take an often independent line in exerting pressure directly on third countries while at the same time urging the other Community institutions to adopt policies that reflect its thinking’.50 Based on this practice, the EP expressed new concerns about human rights abuses in Mexico in October 2007 by passing a resolution on feminicide in Mexico and Central America, requesting all EU institutions, Member States and Mexican and Central American governments to take action in order to tackle violence and discrimination against women and promote gender equality.51 As with the Chiapas conflict, feminicide in Mexico has been the subject of wide international attention, particularly due to the killings of many 47   E P debates on the EC-Mexico Partnership Agreement. 48  Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999: Events of December 1997–November 1998 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), p. 136. 49  José Javier Fernández, ‘La contribución del Parlamento Europeo a la proyección exterior de la UE’, p. 148; Araceli Mangas Martín and Diego Liñán Noguera, Instituciones y derecho de la Unión Europea (Madrid: Tecnos, 2010), p. 246. 50  Christopher Piening, ‘The European Parliament: Influencing the EU’s External Relations’, p. 9. 51   E P, Resolution on the murder of women ( feminicide) in Mexico and Central America and the role of the EU in fighting the phenomenon, 11 October 2007, [2008] OJ C E 227/140.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

7. The Case of Mexico

143

women and girls in Ciudad Juárez, which started in the early 1990s. In fact, the EP followed in the footsteps of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which adopted a resolution on feminicide in Mexico in June 2005.52 Immediately after the PACE resolution, the Bureau of the EP delegation in the EU-Mexico Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), established in 2004,53 inquired about feminicide with Mexican representatives in Mexico54 and the JPC discussed the topic of feminicide during its 1st meeting (Strasbourg, September 2005). The rapporteur for the PACE resolution was invited to speak.55 Members of the EP delegation in the JPC also met with Mexico-based CSOs to exchange views on feminicide, taking advantage of the fact that the 2nd JPC meeting was held in Mexico (Mexico City and Monterrey, January 2006).56 During the plenary debate on the EP’s resolution on feminicide, two of the five MEPs speaking on behalf of their groups (one from S&D and the other from the Greens/EFA) expressly linked their statements to information obtained through their work in the EP delegations for relations with Mexico and with the countries of Central America, in particular through discussions with parliamentary counterparts and CSOs.57 In addition, the EP delegation in the EU-Mexico JPC supported the EP’s rapporteur, Raül Romeva (Greens/ EFA, Spain), in his work to follow up on the resolution. Romeva joined this delegation soon after being appointed rapporteur and spoke on the topics of human rights and gender equality at the JPC meeting that followed the adoption of the resolution (5th meeting, Brussels, November 2007). Furthermore, he visited Ciudad Juárez during the 7th JPC meeting (Mexico, October 2008) in order to meet with local CSOs, women’s networks and victims and ask the

52   PACE, Disappearance and murder of a great number of women and girls in Mexico, 21 June 2005, doc. no. 1454. 53   See Mónica Velasco Pufleau, ‘Parliamentary dialogue and the role of the Joint Parliamentary Committee’, in EU (ed.), The Modernisation of the European Union-Mexico ‘Global Agreement’ (Brussels: EU, 2015), pp. 37–38. 54   Proceso, ‘Condena PE los feminicidios en Juárez’, 16 July 2005. 55   E P Delegation to the EU-Mexico JPC, Report on the 1st meeting of the EU-Mexico JPC, 10 October 2005, doc. no. PE365.425, p. 4. 56   E P Delegation to the EU-Mexico JPC, Report on the 2nd meeting of the EU-Mexico JPC, 16 January 2006, doc. no. PE369.052, p. 13. 57   E P debates on the Murder of women in Mexico and Central America, 10 October 2007, [2008] OJ C E 227/1.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

144

Velasco Pufleau

EU and Mexico to commit to resolving the problem of feminicide within their then recently approved SP.58 Mexican and European-based CSOs also participated in a joint public hearing on feminicide in Mexico and Guatemala, organised by the EP Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI); and in two discussion sessions that followed the joint hearing, which were organised by MEPs Romeva and Elena Valenciano (S&D, Spain) on the EP’s premises in April 2006. This was the first time that a reference to feminicide was made in official EU documents.59 These events were used to denounce feminicide and discuss it with MEPs, Mexican and other Latin American parliamentarians and representatives, and officials of PACE and the UN, such as Yakin Ertürk, Special UN Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences. The gatherings ended with CSOs calling on MEPs to approve an urgent resolution on the issue.60 The resolution was the outcome of a report completed on FEMM’s own initiative, for which Romeva was appointed rapporteur in February 2007. At the beginning, not many MEPs supported Romeva’s proposal for a resolution on feminicide because the Mexican Government did not feel comfortable with addressing this problem and because of the strong pressure that Mexico’s Mission to the EU put on the EP.61 Indeed, this Mission intensely lobbied MEPs to affect the resolution’s content in support of Mexico and it managed to have its points of view endorsed by some of them.62 MEPs’ positions were divided between those seeking a more supportive approach towards the Mexican Government, which included highlighting Mexico’s progress on human rights (EPP and S&D), and those pressing the EC and the Council to adopt a more paternalistic approach, which even called for the suspension of 58  Mónica Velasco Pufleau, La Diplomacia Parlamentaria Euro-mexicana: Trabajos de la Comisión Parlamentaria Mixta UE-México 2005–2011, pp. 105–107. 59   U N Office on Drugs and Crime Expert Group on gender-related killing of women and girls, Information on gender-related killing of women and girls provided by civil society organisations and academia, 3 November 2014, point 7. 60   F EMM and DROI, Joint Public Hearing: Feminicide the case of Mexico and Guatemala, 19 April 2006; Greens/EFA, ‘Ni una muerta más’: Jornadas contra los feminicidios en Guatemala y México, 20 April 2006. 61   Proceso, ‘México-Europa: tensión por los derechos humanos’, 25 September 2010; Arsène van Nierop-Seipgens, Un grito de socorro desde Juárez: Crónica de un asesinato impune, (Mexico: Grijalbo, 2014), Annex. 62   Proceso, ‘ “Parches” para una resolución sobre los feminicidios en México’, 30 July 2007; Proceso, ‘Condena a la impunidad’, 16 September 2007; Proceso, ‘Condena formal contra México’, 14 October 2007.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

7. The Case of Mexico

145

the GA in accordance with the human rights clause until the murders stopped (Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL).63 Officials from the State of Chihuahua also came to Brussels to discuss the issue with FEMM ahead of the adoption of the resolution, while in Mexico, Chihuahua’s governor called on local businessmen, politicians, academics and media representatives to join the common effort to change the ‘bad image of Ciudad Juárez’.64 Immediate reactions from EU institutions to the EP resolution consisted of the then Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, attending the resolution’s plenary debate to explain the actions that the EC had taken to prevent violence against women and girls and promote gender equality in Mexico, and outlining the progress achieved. Ferrero-Waldner was of the idea that feminicide was a global problem and did not only affect the countries targeted by the resolution. However, she stated that she was most certainly on the EP’s side on the matter.65 For the EP rapporteur, the most important intended effect of the resolution was to place the topic of feminicide on the EU’s international political agenda and particularly on those concerning Mexico and the Central American countries.66 Although there were other factors,67 the resolution was successful in shaping EU-Mexico relations because the topic of gender, including gender-based violence, was addressed at the ministerial level immediately after the adoption of the resolution,68 where Mexican officials highlighted the measures already adopted, such as the 2007 General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence.69 Moreover, bilateral cooperation on eradicating gender-based violence in Mexico increased following the adoption of the 63   F EMM, Amendments 1–101 Draft report Räul Romeva, 16 July 2007, doc. no. PE392.138; EP debates on the Murder of women in Mexico and Central America, 10 October 2007, [2008] OJ C E 227/1. 64   F EMM, Minutes of Meeting of 25 June 2007, doc. no. PE391.980, p. 3; La Jornada, 8 September 2007, ‘Decide gobierno de Chihuahua dar a conocer cifras reales de feminicidios’. 65   E P debates on the Murder of women in Mexico and Central America, 10 October 2007, [2008] OJ C E 227/1. 66   Análisis a Fondo, ‘Insta Parlamento Europeo a luchar contra la impunidad que permite los feminicidios’, 12 October 2007. 67  Such as the adoption of EU guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them in December 2008, which provide in point 3.2.1. that: ‘The EU will regularly raise the issue of combating violence against women and girls and the types of discrimination from which such violence originates in its relations with third countries and regional organisations’. 68   E U-Mexico Joint Committee, 7th meeting of the Joint Committee, 27 November 2007, p. 3. 69   Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia (in Spanish).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

146

Velasco Pufleau

resolution70 and the topic is now a recurrent part of the bilateral human rights dialogue.71 For Romeva, the EC started to address issues that used to be taboo.72 However, it is worth saying that the fact that the EP raised at plenary level international awareness of the problem of feminicide in Mexico seemed to have had negative consequences for the bilateral EU-Mexico inter-parliamentary dialogue, because other human rights topics were left out from the agenda of the JPC for more than four years (from 2008–2012). The last time a human rights topic was discussed within this JPC was during the 5th meeting, which followed the adoption of the EP resolution. After this, human rights were not debated until the 14th JPC meeting (Strasbourg, May 2012). These topics were omitted despite the fact that the resolution on feminicide asked the JPC to continue discussing gender-based violence and that the EP’s rules on delegations provide that human rights issues should be addressed in their relations with third countries.73 Since 2006, the Greens/EFA group, led by Raül Romeva and supported by the Heinrich Böll Foundation,74 along with a group of CSOs – including those that have been closely working with the Greens/EFA since the 1990s –75 also mobilised in the EP for this topic to be addressed in the EU’s political agenda towards Latin America. In parallel, they started to monitor government action on the issue.76 The condemning sentence passed in November 2009 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights against Mexico on some cases of murdered women and girls in Ciudad Juárez crucially contributed to finally addressing feminicide at the bi-regional level.77 Following this judgment, the then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), Catherine Ashton, adopted a declaration on feminicide in June 2010 70  Council of the EU, 8th meeting of the EU-Mexico Joint Committee, 20 October 2008, doc. no. 14478/08, point 21. 71  See among others: EU, EU-Mexico Human Rights Dialogue, 3 March 2011, doc. no. 7236/11, p. 1. 72  Arsène van Nierop-Seipgens, Un grito de socorro desde Juárez: Crónica de un asesinato impune, Annex. 73   E P, Resolution on the murder of women ( feminicide) in Mexico and Central America and the role of the EU in fighting the phenomenon, point. 23. 74  A think tank closely affiliated to the German Green Party. 75  Such as the Copenhagen Initiative for Central America (CIFCA) and the Mexican Commission for the Defence and Promotion of Human Rights (CMDPDH according to its Spanish language acronym). 76  To this end, among other activities, they organised a set of conferences on feminicide under the heading ‘Ni una muerta más’ (No more killing of women). 77  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico, 16 November 2009.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

7. The Case of Mexico

147

to show the EU’s concern over the rise of gender-based violence in Latin America.78 From then on, the 2013 and 2015 EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summits committed to eradicate gender-based killings against women, agreeing to incorporate gender as a key area of their bi-annual action plans to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls. For this purpose, the heads of state and government began a bi-regional dialogue on gender issues and engaged in various cooperative initiatives.79 It is worth noting that by the time of the 2013 Summit, some EU Member States had adopted the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence as members of the Council of Europe, which is the first European instrument that paved a path for a legal framework on the protection of women against all forms of violence.80 As in the EU-Mexico case, executive developments in bi-regional relations on gender issues to eliminate violence against women and girls led to the strengthening of the political dialogue and cooperation between the parties. The Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly complemented the bi-regional executive work on gender issues by passing a resolution on feminicide in the EU and Latin America in 2014.81 Raül Romeva was the EP rapporteur for this resolution too. This second case study shows that the EP was influential in placing sensitive human rights issues on the EU’s and Member States’ political agendas both at bilateral and inter-regional levels. Mexico managed to influence the EP’s work on human rights as well. When not using binding powers, the EP is more likely to exert influence within the broader human rights initiatives undertaken by the EU, its Member States and other global and regional institutions and organisations. This influence seems also to be more effective when the human rights issue is widely supported by CSOs. Finally, the EP’s actorness on human rights resembles that of a moral tribune82 and aims to influence EU external relations in support of victims, as shown below. 78  Declaration by the HR Catherine Ashton on Feminicide, 30 June 2010. 79  Council of the EU, Santiago Declaration, 27 January 2013, doc. no 5747/13, point 38; Council of the EU, EU-CELAC Action Plan 2013–2015, 27 January 2013, doc. no. 5748/13, point 7; EU-CELAC Summit 2015, Brussels Declaration, 11 June 2015, point 71; EU-CELAC Summit 2015, EU-CELAC Action Plan, 11 June 2015, point 7. 80  See http://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/home (last accessed in February 2016). 81   E UROLAT, Urgent Resolution on Feminicide in the EU and Latin America, 29 March 2014, doc. no. AP101.579. 82  Andrés Malamud and Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliaments and Parliamentarians as International Actors’, in Bob Reinalda (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 105–106.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

148

Velasco Pufleau

The Ayotzinapa Crimes: Supporting Victims of Human Rights Violations

In September 2014, 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers’ College were abducted and appear to have been killed in Iguala by local police and gang members under orders from (the relatives of) local authorities.83 Together with German MPs, MEPs from the Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL political groups were the first to raise concerns about these crimes and ask the outgoing and incoming EU HRs and the President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, to take action, including notably the suspension of the ongoing negotiations to modernise the GA until the human rights situation in Mexico improved.84 Following this statement, the Delegation of the EU in Mexico, in agreement with the EU Member States’ embassies in Mexico, adopted a local statement but using a very different tone from that of the parliamentarians: it welcomed the actions undertaken by the Mexican Federal Government and expressed confidence that a detailed investigation and adequate punishment of the perpetrators would take place.85 Unlike in the case of the Acteal massacre and feminicides in Latin America, the HR had not issued any statement condemning the Ayotzinapa crimes.86 On the part of the EU, it was the EP that condemned the crimes by adopting an urgent resolution on 23 October 2014.87 The resolution was the result of negotiations between political groups divided again into two camps: on the one hand, supporters of the Mexican Government and of extending assistance to Mexico on human rights grounds (EPP, S&D, European Conservatives and Reformists [ECR], and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe [ALDE]);88 and on the other hand, the advocates 83   The Guardian, ‘One year ago, 43 Mexican students were killed. Still, there are no answers for their families’, 20 September 2015. 84  See the full text of the letter at http://www.dw.com/popups/pdf/39125580/141010-letter -def-es-meps-iguala-guerrero-students-2pdf.pdf (last accessed in March 2016). 85  Local statement of the EU concerning the events in Iguala and Tlatlaya, 12 October 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mexico/documents/news/2014/20141012com_ue _tlatlaya_iguala_en.pdf (last accessed in March 2016). A ‘local statement’ is adopted by the EU Delegation in a given country. This term is used to differentiate such statements from those made by the HR. 86  Only a statement on the work of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts was made by the EEAS in April 2016. See https://eeas.europa.eu/node/14226_en (last accessed in June 2016). 87   E P, Resolution on the disappearance of 43 teaching students in Mexico, 23 October 2014, [2015] OJ C 424/191. 88   E PP, ECR, S&D and ALDE, Joint motion for a resolution on the disappearance of 43 teaching students in Mexico, 22 October 2014, doc. no. RC-B8-0161/2014, points 4, 5, 7, 9. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

7. The Case of Mexico

149

of penalising the Mexican Government for human rights violations, including the suspension of the modernisation of the GA (Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL).89 Ultimately, the resolution did not demand the latter, but it still condemned the crimes and urged the Mexican Government fully to investigate and prevent this type of crime from occurring again.90 Compared to the other two case studies of human rights violations in Mexico analysed above, the case of the Ayotzinapa crimes occurred in a new political context – that of the full implementation of the EU-Mexico SP. Namely, the member of the EC who attended the plenary debate on the said resolution – Tonio Borg, the then European Commissioner for Health and Food Safety – used the SP, especially the results of the EU-Mexico High-Level Dialogue on Human Rights started in 2010 within the framework of the SP91 as the only argument to defend Mexico and strengthen EU relations with it: Mexico is a close and valued strategic partner of the EU. The EU and Mexico have a strong convergence of views on human rights issues, both in multilateral human rights forums and also bilaterally. Mexico, belonging to the same group of like-minded partners as the EU, has been a strong supporter of many EU initiatives and resolutions in Geneva and in New York. Our regular High-Level Dialogue on Human Rights has allowed for several open and frank discussions on core human rights issues, including the fight against organised crime and reform of criminal justice. The international community should join forces with Mexico to support it in facing this difficult and complex challenge: the fight against organised crime and impunity. It is in this spirit that the EU supports the efforts of the federal government.92 The EP’s resolution on the Ayotzinapa crimes highlighted Mexico’s status as a strategic partner of the EU. However, it also urged the Mexican Government to continue with its efforts to address structural problems that were at the root of these human rights violations.93 89   G UE/NGL, Proposition de résolution sur disparition de 43 étudiants enseignants au Mexique, 21 October 2014, doc. no. B8-0167/2014, point 7; Greens/EFA, Motion for a resolution on the abduction of 43 students in Guerrero/Mexico, 21 October 2014, doc. no. B8-0175/2014, points 9, 15. 90   E P, Resolution on the disappearance of 43 teaching students in Mexico, point 6. 91  See on the scope of this Dialogue: Council of the EU, Mexico-EU Strategic Partnership Joint Executive Plan, 16 May 2010, doc. no. 9820/10, point 3.4. 92   E P debates on the disappearance of 43 teaching students in Mexico, 23 October 2014, [2015] OJ C 424/188. 93   E P, Resolution on the disappearance of 43 teaching students in Mexico, points C, 8. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

150

Velasco Pufleau

In this case, victims have become the focal point of the EP’s activity following the adoption of the Ayotzinapa resolution. Among other activities,94 the parents and colleagues of the missing students were invited to the plenary session on the resolution and two parents met with members of DROI in Brussels in February 2015, which led DROI to ask for EU funding to carry out an independent investigation on the crimes.95 Moreover, the parents of the missing students visited various EU Member States thanks to the support of CSOs, which addressed letters to MEPs and EU officials to protest against the crimes.96 Members of the EP delegation to the EU-Mexico JPC meeting in Mexico met with the parents of the missing students, CSOs and Mexican officials to express support for victims and inquire about the matter before intensely discussing it during the human rights dialogue included on the agenda of its 18th JPC meeting (Mexico, February 2015). In this JPC meeting and the joint press conference afterwards, MEPs spoke on behalf of the victims inter alia asking the Mexican Government to continue with the investigation until it found and condemned the perpetrators.97 The parents of the missing students and CSO representatives told MEPs that the EP’s political messages and support were very important for them because, together with the international pressure, they influenced Mexican authorities.98 This also raised the hope and ‘boosted morale’99 among the victims. Indeed, one parent stated the following about the meeting with the EP delegation: [It] was successful because they told us [the MEPs] that our suffering is their suffering and we noticed that we have their support on human rights issues. It was agreed that they will request the Mexican government to clarify everything until finding the 43 (young people who have disappeared), because they are human beings and we must find them.100

94  See Proceso, ‘Los 43 de Ayotzinapa toman asiento en el PE’, 12 December 2014. 95   Deutsche Welle, ‘Parlamento Europeo: Apoyo para Ayotzinapa’, 5 February 2015. 96   C IFCA, ‘Organizaciones Internacionales de la sociedad civil reclaman a la UE una firme condena de los actos violentos ocurridos recientemente en Guerrero’, 14 October 2014, La Jornada, ‘Padres de normalistas de Ayotzinapa inician gira por 12 países de Europa’, 17 April 2015. 97   E U-Mexico JPC, Draft minutes 18th meeting of the JPC, 2015, doc. no. PE503.036, pp. 2–3, 8, 13–18. 98   E U-Mexico JPC, Draft minutes 18th meeting of the JPC, p. 2; La Jornada, ‘Parlamento Europeo ofrece apoyo a padres de normalistas de Ayotzinapa’, 18 February 2015. 99   E IUC, The impact of the resolutions and other activities of the European Parliament in the field of human rights outside the EU, pp. 98, 107. 100   La Jornada, 18 February 2015 (author’s translation). Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

7. The Case of Mexico

151

It is not a coincidence that the local and international media have reported on the EP’s work after the 18th JPC meeting, emphasising its role as a watchdog overseeing the Mexican Government’s activities and looking out for the victims.101 In the same vein, two MEPs from the Greens/EFA group visited the State of Oaxaca during their work in Mexico to follow up on the investigation of two other victims of human rights violations: Finnish citizen Jiri Jaakkola and Mexican activist Bety Cariño, who were murdered in that State in 2010.102 The JPC resumed discussion on the Ayotzinapa case in Mexico during its 20th meeting (Mexico City and San Miguel de Allende, February 2016), when the EP delegation again met with officials from the Mexican Government and Mexico-based CSOs.103 An ad hoc DROI delegation joined these EP delegation’s meetings with authorities and CSO representatives and met also with the missing students’ parents as part of a fact-finding mission sent to Mexico and Guatemala around the same dates as the 20th JPC meeting inter alia to follow up on the Ayotzinapa case. This latter delegation endorsed the content of the EP’s resolution, highlighting that Mexico is an important partner for the EU, calling on Mexico to implement reforms, and urging the EU and its Member States to continue their support.104 Reactions from the EC and the EEAS have been rather vague. When questioned by MEPs about the EU’s action pursuant to the Ayotzinapa resolution, HR Federica Mogherini, stated that such action had been principally undertaken within the 5th EU-Mexico High-Level Dialogue on Human Rights (Mexico City, April 2015).105 In the framework of this Dialogue, the EU Special 101  See, among others: Deutsche Welle, 5 February 2015; La Jornada, 18 February 2015; La Jornada, ‘Eurodiputados confrontan a legisladores del PRI por caso Ayotzinapa’, 19 February 2015; El Financiero, ‘Eurodiputados cuestionan a senadores por Ayotzinapa’, 19 February 2015. 102  The case has been particularly followed by ex-MEP Satu Hassi and MEPs Franziska Keller and Heidi Hantala. La Jornada, ‘Eurodiputadas exigen avance en caso Jaakkola’, 22 February 2015. A DROI delegation also visited Oaxaca in May 2011 to monitor the cases of Jaakkola and Cariño, following a hearing on the murders hosted by DROI in November 2010. 103   E P Delegation in the EU-Mexico JPC, Draft Agenda of the 20th JPC meeting and of the joint meeting with the DROI delegation and the Mexican authorities, 18 February 2016, doc. no. PE543.309v02–00, pp. 2–3. 104   D ROI, Presse Release on the Human Rights Delegation to Mexico and Guatemala, 12 February 2016, p. 2. 105  Enrico Gasbarra (S&D), Question for written answer to the Commission, 25 February 2015; EC, Answer given by Vice-President Mogherini on behalf of the Commission, 4 June 2015, doc. no. E-002914–15; Marietje Schaake et al. (ALDE), Question for written answer to the Commission, 17 September 2015; EC, Answer given by HR/Vice-President Mogherini, 24 November 2015, doc. no. E-012906–15. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

152

Velasco Pufleau

Representative for Human Rights (a position created in the EU in 2012), Stavros Lambrinidis, and officials from the EU Delegation in Mexico, met with the parents of the missing students and with human rights organisations, which supported them, as well as with members of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI, according to the Spanish language acronym) of the IACHR, to talk about the Ayotzinapa case.106 The Dialogue concluded with the EU and Mexico agreeing to work together on various projects aimed at capacity building in Mexico, but no reference to the missing students was made in the resulting joint communiqué.107 Mexico’s reaction to the EP’s Ayotzinapa resolution encompassed lobbying and providing MEPs with information about the case and measures taken to enhance human rights protection in the country.108 Yet Mexico’s Mission to the EU was more receptive of this resolution than of that on feminicide. The then Ambassador of Mexico to the EU, Juan José Gómez Camacho, traveled to Strasbourg twice109 for debriefings about the case with the EP delegation in the EU-Mexico JPC and other MEPs and acknowledged that the ‘Parliament’s initiative would encourage Mexico to keep working towards justice and safety for its citizens and chimed with the government’s determination to investigate the Iguala crimes and punish the culprits’.110 In the same vein, he invited DROI to visit Mexico.111 Ambassador Gómez Camacho also recognised that the EU partners had shown great solidarity with the Mexican Government regarding the Ayotzinapa crimes and supported the modernisation of the GA as a means to tackle the country’s challenges.112 The Ayotzinapa resolution also triggered further reactions from the Mexican Government at the federal level, which had also happened in the context of the EP assent procedure on the GA after the Acteal massacre, but not in the context of the EP resolution 106   La Jornada, ‘Padres de normalistas exigen facilitar el trabajo de la CIDH’, 16 April 2015; El Universal, ‘Piden crear plan global de búsqueda de desaparecidos’, 17 April 2015. The GIEI was created in November 2014 as a result of a technical assistance agreement concluded by the IACHR, the Mexico’s Government and representatives of the missing students. See http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/activities/giei.asp (last accessed in March 2016). 107  Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the EU, México y la UE fortalecen su cooperación en materia de derechos humanos, 16 April 2015. 108  Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 23 October 2014, press release no. 474; Proceso, ‘La diplomacia peñanietista infectó al Parlamento Europeo’, 26 October 2014; Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 27 November 2014, press release no. 544. 109  On the morning of the debate and vote on the resolution and on 27 November 2014. 110   E P Delegation in the EU-Mexico JPC, Minutes of meeting of 23 October 2014, doc. no. PE503.039, p. 2. 111  Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 8 December 2014, press release no. 568. 112   Deutsche Welle, ‘UE-México: Ayotzinapa, ¿nunca más?, 5 December 2014. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

7. The Case of Mexico

153

on feminicide. In this case, following the Ayotzinapa resolution, the Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued a press release welcoming it and thanking the EP for acknowledging the Mexican Government’s efforts to resolve the case.113 Moreover, the then Mexican Deputy Foreign Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, Juan Manuel Gómez Robledo, paid official visits to the EEAS and several EU Member States (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) in November and December 2014, where he met inter alia with government officials and parliamentarians.114 As in the case of the GA, along with the EP, national parliaments of Member States must ratify the yet to be modernised GA in order for it to enter into force. The latest EP engagement on the Ayotzinapa case includes DROI inviting members of the GIEI to present progress on their work in Brussels in March 2016 – again on the initiative of MEPs from the Greens/EFA group – and their final conclusions on the case in September 2016.115 In this third and last case study, the EP acted as a moral tribune rather than influencing other EU institutions in support of the victims of human rights abuses. The EP’s action was directed particularly towards the Mexican Government with the aim of pressuring it to uncover and prosecute the perpetrators of the crimes and prevent them from happening again. Conclusion This chapter covers two decades of EU-Mexico relations, from the start of the GA negotiations in 1995 up to 2016. It traces the action of the EP, its delegations and CSOs in the field of human rights protection concerning three major cases of human rights abuses in Mexico. The chapter confirms that the EP has influenced EU institutions and the Mexican Government regardless of whether it possessed binding powers and regardless of whether its demands were in line with those of other EU institutions. It may therefore be argued that the EP can act as an independent and influential international actor when human rights are at stake. However, such EP actorness is not free from influence from 113  Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 23 October 2014. 114  Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 13 November 2014, press release no. 514; Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 28 November 2014, press release no. 547; Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 4 December 2014, press release no. 554; Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 8 December 2014. 115   Proceso, ‘GIEI presentará al Parlamento Europeo reporte del caso Ayotzinapa’, 29 October 2015; Proceso, ‘Pide el GIEI a Eurocámara incluir derechos humanos en acuerdo comercial con México’, 26 September 2016. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

154

Velasco Pufleau

governments of third countries, such as strategic partners, either. In all three cases reviewed, EU institutions reacted to the EP’s work on human rights by strengthening the political dialogue and cooperation with Mexico instead of penalising these relations on the basis of the human rights clause. The establishment of the EU-Mexico SP reinforced this EU approach, which is also predominant among EP political groups other than the Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL. As with most EP initiatives on human rights,116 these two political groups have been dominant in raising concerns about human rights violations in Mexico. Indeed, EP delegations have positively contributed to the EP’s overall influence. First, they were particularly effective in gathering first-hand information on human rights violations from a wide range of government and non-government sources outside Europe, even in times when other international visits to scrutinise the human rights situation were not welcome. Second, they conveyed the EP’s concerns to local communities and representatives, including from the highest political level, and mediated between the EU and domestic authorities on behalf of the victims, who highly appreciated the support of MEPs. Third, they assisted EP committees and MEPs’ activities on human rights and engaged in discussions on human rights violations with their nonEU parliamentary counterparts, even though the EP’s work on human rights advocacy could have an impact on the ability of delegations to effectively carry out this dialogue since, in the case of the EU-Mexico JPC, the discussion of human rights topics was temporarily interrupted after the EP resolution on feminicide was passed in 2007. Fourth, they addressed human rights concerns raised by other global and regional human rights initiatives, such as the work of Special UN Rapporteurs and PACE resolutions, in their relations with other parliaments. These findings provide insights for parliamentary diplomacy in general. They show that diplomatic activities of parliaments can be more than merely langue du bois or parliamentary tourism, which are the two usual criticisms.117 In fact, these activities may support parliaments’ efforts to democratise international relations. These efforts include addressing sensitive issues that traditional 116  Laura Feliu and Francesc Serra, ‘The European Union as a ‘normative power’ and the normative voice of the European Parliament’, pp. 24–25. 117  See for example: Federico Trillo-Figueroa El País, ‘La diplomacia parlamentaria’, 2 April 1997; Michel Vauzelle, ‘Les parlementaires, la démocratie et les affaires internationales’, in French National Assembly and Senate (eds.), Colloque La diplomatie parlamentaire, (Paris: French National Assembly and Senate, 2001); Andrés Malamud and Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliaments and Parliamentarians as International Actors’, p. 106; Proceso, 8 February 2016.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

7. The Case of Mexico

155

diplomacy prefers to avoid, participating in conflict resolution and political agenda setting, and acting as watchdog institutions and moral tribunes. Finally, this chapter demonstrates that parliaments work together with CSOs to accomplish common goals in the field of human rights. The chapter therefore confirms that CSOs act as diplomatic actors in their own right in the international arena while performing roles of what has been called ‘modern diplomacy’.118 In particular, CSOs started reporting human rights violations to the EP in the mid-1990s and provided it with information about these violations in order to strengthen their claims domestically. They then moved to engage also in more complex political activities, such as advocating, lobbying and monitoring, especially in cooperation with the Greens/EFA political group; trying to influence the EP’s and other EU institutions’ work on human rights. CSOs and victims of human rights violations acknowledge that such work may have a real influence on governments beyond the EU.

118  Kathryn Hochstetler, ‘Civil Society’, in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 182.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 8

A Bridge with Russia? The Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and of the Council of Europe in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis Andrea Gawrich Introduction With the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014 and the hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine, Europe entered a severe security crisis. This was followed by a stark setback in relations between Russia and the Western countries and international organisations, among which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) are regarded as important bridges of communication with Russia. However, the literature focuses primarily on intergovernmental activities thus neglecting the role of international parliamentary institutions (IPIs).1 Also, academic research on the OSCE and the CoE in the Russia-Ukraine crisis tends to avoid focusing on the relations between the parliamentary assemblies of these international organisations (IOs) and Russia. However, it is important to examine whether these assemblies follow intergovernmental strategies or pursue their own approaches. This enables us to better understand whether, during a crisis, parliamentary assemblies explore new forms of action or follow previously existing paths. This chapter seeks to shed light on the parliamentary diplomacy strategies of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 1  See: Elena Kropatcheva, ‘The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 23, no. 1, 2015, pp. 6–24; Wolfgang Zellner, ‘Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 3, 2005, pp. 389–402; William Jackson, ‘Russia and the Council of Europe: The Perils of Premature Admission’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 51, no. 5, 2004, pp. 23–33; Andrea Gawrich, ‘Emerging from the Shadows–The Crisis in Ukraine and the OSCE’s Contribution to the European Security Architecture’, Die Friedens-Warte ( Journal of International Peace and Organization), vol. 89, no. 1–2, 2014, pp. 59–80; Andrea Gawrich, Demokratieförderung von Europarat und OSZE. Ein Beitrag zur europäischen Integration (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2014).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi Stelios ��.��63/9789004336346_010 Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

157

8. A Bridge with Russia ?

Europe (OSCE PA) and investigates their reaction to the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Have they acted as a link between Western parliamentarians, on the one side, and Russian parliamentarians and authorities, on the other? If so, what was their reaction? To what extent do their approaches towards Russia differ from the intergovernmental approaches? This chapter explains the difference between the strategies adopted, ranging from the PACE’s decision to suspend the voting rights of the Russian delegation to the OSCE PA’s strategy to focus instead on the Russia-Ukraine dialogue. The analysis proceeds as follows. First, the chapter conceptualises parliamentary diplomacy of IPIs in order to explain their potential activities according to a set of strategies. The following section examines the formal powers of the PACE and the OSCE PA so as to provide an understanding of their room for manoeuvre in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. This is followed by two sections that empirically examine the variance in the strategies of the PACE and the OSCE PA towards Russia. These sections elucidate how the PACE, in contrast to the intergovernmental level, suspended participation rights of the Russian delegation, whereas the OSCE PA, in congruence with the intergovernmental level, did not. The final section concludes that the variance in their respective strategies can be explained: first, by the different histories of the CoE and OSCE; second, by differences in the binding character of these organisations; and, third and to a lesser extent, by the previous experiences of the two parliamentary assemblies in suspending the participation rights of its delegations. Conceptualising IPIs’ Parliamentary Diplomacy The activities of the PACE and the OSCE PA towards Russia as a member country of both of these IOs have to be viewed in the international context of highly controversial discussions on Russian foreign policy strategies towards Ukraine. However, in contrast to the EU, no intergovernmental sanctions have been imposed on Russia within the frameworks of the CoE and the OSCE. Against this backdrop, this section conceptualises the main tools of parliamentary diplomacy of the PACE and OSCE PA in order to identify the similarities and differences in their strategies towards Russia. With regard to IPIs, there is no standard definition of parliamentary diplomacy.2 Even so, parliamentary diplomacy could be understood above 2  Robert M. Cutler, ‘The OSCE Parliamentary Diplomacy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus in Comparative Perspective’, Studia Diplomatica, vol. 59, no. 2, 2006, pp. 79–93; Andrea Cofelice and Stelios Stavridis, ‘The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

158

Gawrich

all as a consequence of the fact that more and more ‘issues that are put to parliament for consideration have their origins in international developments or structures’ and that ‘parliaments have also realised that they can no longer expect governments to take the sole lead and responsibility for action abroad’.3 Academic considerations about the functions, roles and configurations of international parliamentary assemblies often focus on increased legitimacy of international policy making,4 as well as on their role as catalysts and correctives in international relations.5 Šabič further points at the variety of soft strategies deployed by IPIs due to the lack of substantial powers of parliamentary control, primarily budgetary powers and political accountability, which results from the reluctance of governments to grant them such prerogatives. In order to compensate for the lack of formal power, IPIs focus either on control through communication (e.g. interpellative procedures, public debates, interparliamentary delegations, and election observation missions), or on dialogue on various policy issues.6 They attempt to increase their influence on the policy-making agendas set at the intergovernmental level and make a collective effort to reach out to the member states of IOs. In doing so, they focus predominantly on the promotion of human rights and democracy and conflict management. Šabič additionally argues that the increase in the number of international institutions and networks since the end of the Cold War has also given IPIs new opportunities to act as norm entrepreneurs, albeit dependent upon domestic constraints, financial limitations and individual engagement.7 Institution (IPI)’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 19, no. 2, 2014, pp. 145–178; Davor Jančić, ‘The European Parliament and EU-US Relations: Revamping Institutional Cooperation?’, in Elaine Fahey and Deidre Curtin (eds), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationships between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 35–68. 3  Frans W. Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 2, 2007, pp. 93–99, p. 4. 4  See an overview in: Davor Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy: The Emergence of Multilayered International Parliamentarianism’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 38, no. 2, 2015, pp. 197–242; Cofelice and Stavridis, ‘The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI)’. 5   This differentiation stems from Anne-Marie Slaughter, New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy’. 6  Jančić, ‘The European Parliament and EU-US Relations’. 7  Zlatko Šabič, ‘International Parliamentary Institutions: A Research Agenda’, in Olivier Costa, Clarissa Dri and Stelios Stavridis (eds), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

8. A Bridge with Russia ?

159

Based on these considerations, the subsequent analysis targets the following two IPI strategies:8 A. B.

Supervision of compliance with IO rules, comprising operational activities (i.e. monitoring reports on a country’s compliance with IO rules or election observation in member countries) and institutional pressure; and Communication, whereby parliamentary assemblies attempt to counterbalance the lack of formal power through soft communicative activities that seek to foster their IOs’ norms.

Though these strategies might overlap in practice, parliamentary supervision is likely to have the greatest impact, if, like in the case of the CoE, it is formally linked to accession and post-accession monitoring. This is followed by agenda setting and advocacy, then by communicative activities as the least influential strategy. This chapter hypothesises that the PACE and the OSCE PA seek to participate in the shaping of their IOs’ relations with Russia and that they are therefore prone to resort to instruments of parliamentary diplomacy. The reason for this lies in the fact that cooperation between Western countries and Russia currently poses one of the greatest challenges for European security and the future of European integration beyond the EU.9 As outlined below, there are

Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 20–42. 8  See especially: Robert M. Cutler, ‘International Parliamentary Institutions as Organizations’, Journal of International Organizations Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, 2013, pp. 104–126; Stefan Marschall, Transnationale Repräsentation in Parlamentarischen Versammlungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005); Joern Stegen, ‘Die Rolle der Parlamentarischen Versammlung als Motor des Europarats’, in Uwe Holtz (ed.), 50 Jahre Europarat (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), pp. 79–91; Šabič, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 255–271; Davor Jančić, ‘Transnational Parliamentarism and Global Governance: The New Practice of Democracy’, in Elaine Fahey (ed.), The Actors of Postnational Rule-Making: Contemporary Challenges of International and European Law (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 213–232. 9  Markus Kaim, Hanns W. Maull and Kirsten Westphal, ‘The Pan-European Order at the Crossroads: Three Principles for a New Beginning’, SWP Comments, no. 18, March 2015; Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) (ed.), ‘Strengthening Stability in Turbulent Times’, Second Report of the Deep Cuts Commission, Hamburg, April 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

160

Gawrich

three potential explanations as to why parliamentary assemblies might decide to deploy the two strategies introduced above. (1) Historical development of the IO. One potential explanation can be found in the distinctive histories and institutional settings of the two organisations. The CoE operated as a club of Western countries until 1990 and later established soft conditionality for applicant countries.10 Consequently, noncompliance among applicant states and new member states dominated the PACE’s agenda during the 1990s. In that period, the PACE often submitted detailed recommendations to the intergovernmental level to influence certain accession procedures. It also witnessed numerous heated debates, in particular on Russia’s accession to the CoE.11 By contrast, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE’s predecessor during the Cold War, was a forum for dialogue, established despite substantial disagreements between the Eastern and Western blocs. The OSCE thus has a history of being a bridge-builder. It is assumed that this core characteristic of the OSCE is one explanatory factor for the differences in the actions of the OSCE PA and the PACE. 2) Legally binding versus politically binding nature of the IO. The second explanatory variable refers to the fact that, as a result of such historical developments, the OSCE remains an organisation that is binding merely in a political sense, without imposing membership conditionality. Namely, the OSCE’s constitutive act – the Helsinki Final Act – is not a treaty but a political agreement of its signatories. Due to this, the OSCE does not possess international legal personality and cannot enforce the commitments undertaken by the participating states.12 This stands in contrast to the CoE, which has a legally binding character and is more institutionally equipped to deal with non-compliance, notably through judgements of the European Court of

10  Klaus Brummer, Der Europarat. Eine Einführung (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2008). 11  Andrea Gawrich, ‘Too Little, Too Late? Governance Transfer and the Eastern Enlargement of the Council of Europe’, in Tanja A. Börzel and Vera van Hüllen (eds), Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations: Patching Together a Global Script (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 211–226; Christine D. Althauser, Rußlands Weg in den Europarat (Münster: Lit, 1997). 12  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki 1975; Marianne von Grünigen and Hans-Jörg Renk, ‘Forty Years of the Helsinki Final Act – A Cause for Celebration’, in IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), pp. 41–52.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

161

8. A Bridge with Russia ?

Human Rights.13 Potentially, this makes it easier for PACE parliamentarians to sanction the participating national delegations than for the OSCE PA. (3) Path dependency of suspensions. A third explanatory variable refers to previous experience with suspension of delegations. If an assembly has a record of suspending their members in the past, it can be assumed that it is easier to do it again. As the OSCE PA is a comparatively young institution, only founded in 1990, there has been less opportunity to ‘practice’ sanctioning. However, even the PACE, founded as early as 1949, only started employing the tool of suspension after 1990, when it suspended Russia’s credentials during the second war in Chechnya (2000–2001), as well as Belarus’ special guest status in 1997.

Formal Powers of the OSCE PA and the PACE

From an institutional perspective, when compared to national parliaments or to the EP, both the OSCE PA and the PACE cover only a small range of parliamentary competences. In fact, despite certain evaluations that qualify the PACE as the ‘second most powerful’ IPI after the EP,14 neither parliamentary assembly is particularly powerful. Their institutional weakness is especially visible from the lack of budgetary control and the lack of control over the executives of both organisations. They are examined in turn. Unlike the OSCE PA, the PACE is among the oldest international parliamentary institutions and managed to expand its influence over the recent decades. It has established itself as Europe’s ‘moral conscience’ and is widely seen as a ‘school of democracy’ and human rights for parliamentarians from Central and Eastern European countries.15 It exerted a significant degree of influence during the CoE’s post-1990 enlargement monitoring, which highlighted democratic deficits in the accession countries, including Russia.16 The influence of the PACE has increased over the last 15 years. On the one hand, this is due to an increased adoption of recommendations and opinions, and, on the other, due to the PACE’s right of consultation regarding planned CoE treaties. Notably, the 13  See: Martyn Bond, The Council of Europe: Structure, History and Issues in European Politics (London: Routledge, 2012). 14   Šabič, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions’, p. 262. See also Cofelice and Stavridis, ‘The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI)’. 15  See e.g. Beat Habegger, Parlamentarismus in der internationalen Politik: Europarat, OSZE und Interparlamentarische Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005). 16  Gawrich ‘Demokratieförderung von Europarat und OSZE’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

162

Gawrich

PACE may adopt recommendations for action at the level of the Committee of Ministers, which are not binding, but have to be addressed by actors at the intergovernmental level. At least one fifth of the resolutions of the Committee of Ministers can indeed be traced back to the PACE.17 However, despite the PACE’s continuing efforts, there has been no expansion in its budgetary power. The PACE’s role is restricted to an informal exchange of opinions in this field, so the assembly is not formally consulted in the process of adopting the CoE budget. In contrast, the OSCE PA has less formal powers than the PACE. Although the OSCE PA was created explicitly to foster dialogue among parliamentarians of the participating states, it is characterised by a comparatively underdeveloped institutional infrastructure, which restricts its output. Its formal competences refer to: a) strengthening and consolidation of democratic institutions in the OSCE participating states; b) discussion of OSCE topics at the intergovernmental level; c) evaluation of the implementation of OSCE commitments; d) development of ideas for conflict management and conflict resolution; and e) examination of ways to improve the working practices of the OSCE.18 The OSCE PA also holds fewer plenary meetings than the PACE, given that there is only one full plenary session per year at which to adopt resolutions. In contrast, the PACE holds four plenary meetings a year, which leaves more room to discuss political developments and make decisions. Besides, the committee work in the PACE is far more intense, as there are nine committees to prepare resolutions and recommendations, whereas the OSCE PA only has two regular committees and a small number of ad hoc committees. Like at the national level, committees within IPIs are an important tool for the preparation of parliamentary decisions. Furthermore, the OSCE PA has to find compromise among representatives from 57 countries instead of 47 as in the CoE.19 However, as the OSCE has no legally binding status, there is no formal basis for any parliamentary control over other OSCE institutions and intergovernmental cooperation. Thus, there are no formal duties of consultation between the intergovernmental and parliamentary levels. The OSCE PA attempted to increase interaction with the intergovernmental level unilaterally; yet, compared to the PACE’s exchange with the intergovernmental level, such 17  Beat Habegger, ‘Democratic Accountability of International Organizations: Parliamentary Control within the Council of Europe and the OSCE and the Prospects for the United Nations’, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 45, no. 2, 2010, pp. 186–204. 18  Ibid. 19  Gawrich ‘Demokratieförderung von Europarat und OSZE’; Habegger, ‘Parlamentarismus in der internationalen Politik’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

163

8. A Bridge with Russia ?

i­nteraction remains limited due to lower level of formal integration into the OSCE structure.20

The Strategy of the PACE: Extended Suspension of Russia’s Participation Rights

During the spring of 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the PACE utilised both of the abovementioned strategies of parliamentary diplomacy. They are examined in turn below. Supervision Strategy One of the central PACE tools of supervision is to exclude members from the assembly by suspending the credentials of a specific national delegation. These credentials are granted annually and require the participating countries to meet certain democratic standards and comply with CoE commitments. The non-ratification of a delegation’s credentials is an instrument that is rarely used in order to exert institutional pressure on a non-compliant member state. Before the Russia-Ukraine crisis, suspension was used against Russia in 2000 because of its participation in the war in Chechnya. The attempt to suspend the participating rights of Russia and Georgia after the military clashes between the two countries in 2008 proved unsuccessful.21 However, as far as the Russia-Ukraine crisis is concerned, the PACE’s first reaction in a resolution of April 2014 was to suspend the voting rights of the Russian delegation, their right to be represented in the Assembly’s leading bodies, and their right to participate in election observation missions until the beginning of 2015.22 Russian parliamentarians can nevertheless be active in plenary and committee meetings. However, the PACE refrained from suspending the credentials of the Russian delegation, the most powerful sanction at its disposal. The assumption that parliamentary diplomacy within IPIs is 20  Ibid. 21  Klaus Brummer, Der Europarat. Eine Einführung (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2008); Beat Habegger, Parlamentarismus in der internationalen Politik: Europarat, OSZE und Interparlamentarische Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005); Andrea Gawrich, Demokratieförderung von Europarat und OSZE. Ein Beitrag zur europäischen Integration (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2014); Michaela Wittinger, Der Europarat: Die Entwicklung seines Rechts und der „europäischen Verfassungswerte“ (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2005). 22  Ibid.; PACE, Press Release ‘Citing Crimea, PACE Suspends Voting Rights of Russian Delegation and Excludes it from Leading Bodies’, 10 April 2014.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

164

Gawrich

not particularly powerful was effectively disproved by the Russian reaction to this suspension, as Russia threatened to pull out of the CoE as a ­consequence of this decision.23 In the event, however, Russia did not leave the CoE, and, as a result, the PACE renewed the abovementioned suspension of the participation rights of the Russian delegation in January 2015.24 The fact that the PACE refrained from suspending the credentials of the Russian delegation and limited its sanction to suspending the delegation’s participation rights, was framed by the PACE in a way that corresponds to both supervision and communication strategies. The relevant PACE Resolution states that ‘political dialogue should remain the preferred way to find a compromise, and there should be no return to the pattern of the Cold War’.25 It was for this reason that the PACE refrained from suspending the credentials of the Russian delegation. As PACE parliamentarians put it, this ‘would make such a dialogue impossible, while the Assembly constitutes a good platform for keeping the Russian delegation accountable on the basis of Council of Europe’s values and principles’.26 Even though the Assembly stated in April 2014 that it would eventually annul Russia’s credentials ‘if the Russian Federation does not de-escalate the situation and reverse the annexation of Crimea’, it has not yet done so, as shown by the resolution on Russia of January 2015. However, while it did not suspend the Russian delegation’s credentials, this resolution not only renewed the suspension of the rights carried out in 2014 but it also suspended other participation rights, such as the right to be a rapporteur, the right to be a member of an ad hoc committee or of an election observation mission, and the right to represent the Assembly in CoE bodies as well as externally.27 The 2015 23   The Guardian, ‘Ukraine Negotiators agree to Buffer Zone to Separate Warring Parties. Deal is intended to solidify the Ceasefire agreed two Weeks ago and give Civilians respite from Shelling’, 20 September 2014. 24   PACE, Press Release ‘Citing Ukraine, PACE Renews Sanctions against Russian Delegation’. 28 January 2015; PACE, Resolution 2034 (2015) ‘Challenge, on substantive Grounds, of the still unratified Credentials of the Delegation of the Russian Federation’, 26 January 2015. 25   PACE, Resolution ‘Reconsideration on substantive Grounds of the previously ratified Credentials of the Russian Delegation’, no. 1990, 10 April 2014. 26   PACE, Press Release ‘Citing Crimea, PACE Suspends Voting Rights of Russian Delegation and Excludes it from Leading Bodies’, 10 April 2014. 27   PACE, Press Release ‘Citing Ukraine, PACE Renews Sanctions against Russian Delegation’, 28 January 2015; PACE, Monitoring Committee (Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe), Report ‘Challenge, on substantive Grounds, of the still unratified Credentials of the Delegation of the Russian Federation’, Rapporteur Stefan Schennach, Doc. 13685, 27 January 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

8. A Bridge with Russia ?

165

Resolution consequently had the effect of suspending most of the Russian delegation’s participation rights. Furthermore, the PACE’s January 2015 Resolution is far more detailed in its urging of Russia to reverse the annexation of Crimea and to improve the situation of Tatars and Ukrainians on the peninsula. The Resolution also explicitly calls on the Russian authorities to withdraw its troops from Eastern Ukraine and support the implementation of the Minsk Protocol. However, the PACE’s achievements were limited. Firstly, in contrast to its dialogue with the Lower House of the Russian Parliament – the State Duma, an exchange of views with the Russian executive only took place to a limited extent in 2014 and stopped altogether in 2015. Secondly, in 2014 the PACE attempted to intensify cooperation with the Russian delegation through the setting up of a new sub-committee on ‘Russia’s Neighbourhood Policy with regard to other Council of Europe Member States’ within the PACE’s influential Monitoring Committee, which controls the fulfilment of member states’ obligations.28 This sub-committee included Russian representatives between September 2014 and January 2015, while parliamentary diplomacy between the PACE and the Duma was still ongoing. Even though the Duma initially sharply condemned the PACE Resolution of April 2014 as being ‘anti-Russian’ and discriminatory, it later entered into dialogue with the PACE, after which the Russian PACE delegation demonstrated the willingness to take part in the new sub-committee. The relations between the PACE and Russia deteriorated in 2015, when the Russian delegation decided not to attend the meetings of the sub-committee on ‘Conflicts between Council of Europe Member States’,29 which was created in 2015, as well as any PACE event following the January 2015 Resolution. Relations worsened when Russia denied on-the-ground visits to PACE rapporteurs in 2015, which in itself would provide sufficient grounds to suspend the credentials of the Russian delegation, something the PACE continues to refrain from doing. The PACE’s 2014 and 2015 Resolutions should be interpreted not only with regard to the arguments presented therein, but also with reference to what has been left out, and what one might indeed expect to have been mentioned. Despite its firm condemnation of the Russian aggression, the PACE refrains from urging CoE member states and the CoE Secretary General to initiate 28   PACE, Monitoring Committee, Decision on the establishment of an ad hoc Sub-Committee on Russia’s Neighbourhood Policy with regard to other Council of Europe Member States, AS/Mon (2014) 13 rev., 26 June 2014. 29   PACE, Monitoring Committee, Decision to establish an ad hoc Sub-Committee on Conflicts between Council of Europe Member States, AS/Mon (2015) 14, 21 April 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

166

Gawrich

further actions against Russia. There is also no recommendation in which the PACE urges the Committee of Ministers to impose sanctions on Russia at the intergovernmental level. In contrast to many other incidents of rule violations in CoE member states, especially in the field of human rights, where the PACE has called on the governments or the Committee of Ministers to react, this is not the case with Russia. This is contrary to the PACE’s otherwise more commonly used supervision strategy of urging the Committee of Ministers to condemn human rights violations in various CoE member states, such as in the Balkans countries during the 1990s or, in previous years, in Russia or Ukraine. This is a further indication that the PACE deployed the supervision strategy only toward Russian parliamentarians and refrained from doing so toward the Russian authorities. This could have been carried out by exerting institutional pressure on the CoE’s intergovernmental level, which the PACE did during various CoE accession processes and during first post-accession monitoring rounds. Communication Strategy In its 2014 Resolution, the PACE employed the communication strategy by offering dialogue to the Russian authorities. Yet this was done in a rather critical tone: The Parliamentary Assembly has the power and the opportunity in this veritable crisis to confront face-to-face one of its Member States – the Russian Federation – with questions and facts and to demand answers and accountability.30 This resolution shows that the PACE framed the Russia-Ukraine crisis first and foremost as an issue concerning ‘grave violations of international law’, while referring both to the UN Charter and to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.31 Consequently, the PACE justified its decision not only by portraying it as a response to the violation of CoE commitments, but also by referring to international commitments beyond the legal obligations of the CoE membership, arguing that Russia had ‘created a threat to stability and peace in Europe’.32 Besides condemning Russia’s ‘clear contradiction with the Statute of the Council of Europe’ and its violation of CoE accession commitments, the PACE 30   PACE, Resolution 1990 (2014) ‘Reconsideration on substantive Grounds of the previously ratified Credentials of the Russian Delegation’, 10 April 2014. 31  Ibid. 32  Ibid.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

8. A Bridge with Russia ?

167

also criticised Russia’s ‘crackdown on the independent media’ as well as ‘the biased coverage of the events in Ukraine’ and the ‘suppression of the public debate and any criticism’.33 Furthermore, the PACE highlighted Russia’s lack of compliance with PACE resolutions on the 2008 Georgia-Russia war. The PACE also accused Russia of failing to prevent incidents of discrimination against Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea. Concerning its argumentation, the PACE addressed the parliamentary dimension of the Russian aggression in the following way: The Assembly is particularly concerned by the position taken by the members of both chambers of the Russian Parliament at different stages of the process of annexation, including the unanimous vote in the Council of the Federation authorising the use of military force in Ukraine, the approval of constitutional amendments allowing for the annexation of Crimea, and the ratification of the illegal treaty on unification.34 This statement offers two important insights. First, the PACE aims to identify parliamentary responsibility in Russian foreign policy making towards Ukraine in order to indirectly justify its decision to suspend most of the Russian delegation’s rights of participation within the PACE. Secondly, the PACE remains vague on the responsibility of other institutions of the Russian political system for the aggression against Ukraine, because the relevant resolution refers either to the ‘Russian Federation’ or ‘Russian authorities’.35 The PACE seems to have been rather successful in performing the communication strategy in inter-parliamentary relations since the beginning of 2015, as there has been a certain degree of progress in its dialogue with the Russian Duma. Namely, the latter was rejecting the PACE’s offers of dialogue following the 2014 Resolution, but later sent ‘clear signals’ that it was ‘now willing to engage in such a constructive dialogue with the Assembly’.36 In its 2015 Resolution, the PACE called on Russia to show its political will to solve the Ukraine crisis ‘in a meaningful dialogue with the Assembly . . . in good faith and without preconditions, in a constructive and open dialogue with the Assembly, including on those issues where the views of the Assembly and Russia differ’.37 33  Ibid. 34  Ibid. 35  Ibid. 36   PACE, Resolution 2034 (2015) ‘Challenge, on substantive Grounds, of the still unratified Credentials of the Delegation of the Russian Federation’, 28 January 2015. 37  Ibid.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

168

Gawrich

The Strategy of the OSCE PA: Strengthening Political Dialogue with Russia

As explained in the previous sections, compared to the PACE, the OSCE PA is typically considered to be weaker, less influential, less institutionalised, and too diverse to act as a homogenous body, especially in moments of political crisis. Most importantly, unlike the PACE, the OSCE PA has no formal mechanism to reach the intergovernmental level through recommendations or to control non-compliance in the participating states through a monitoring procedure. Of the three strategies, the OSCE PA mainly deploys the communication strategy and to a lesser extent that of supervision. Supervision Strategy Concerning supervision, similar to the PACE, the OSCE PA condemned Russia’s violations of its OSCE commitments, especially its violations of the Helsinki Final Act through aggression in Ukraine.38 Despite clear differences between the official statements of the OSCE PA and the PACE, both the current and the former presidents of the OSCE PA have personally taken a stronger stance and repeatedly condemned the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine.39 The OSCE PA deployed the supervision strategy when it realised that Russia was attempting to exploit the OSCE PA to legitimise the annexation of Crimea internationally40 by designating a representative from Crimea as a new member of the Russian delegation in the OSCE PA. The leading body of the OSCE, the Bureau, unanimously rejected this designation, while hinting at the fact that the proposed person represented a territory considered by the ‘overwhelming majority of the OSCE participating states’ to have been illegally occupied by

38   O SCE-PA, Press Release ‘OSCE Parliamentarians approve Russia Resolution amid Debate on Ukraine’, Baku, 1 July 2014; OSCE-PA, Press Release ‘Ball clearly in Russia’s Court to resolve Ukraine crisis, says OSCE PA President at NATO PA’, Copenhagen, 24 November 2014. 39   O SCE-PA, Press Release ‘OSCE PA President meets Russian State Duma Chair in Moscow’, 5 September 2014; OSCE-PA, Press Release ‘In Moscow, OSCE PA President calls for Crimea Access, voting Rights for Ukrainians’, 1 April 2014. 40  See on the illegality of Crimea’s secession from the perspective of international law in: Simone F. van den Driest, ‘Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and (Remedial) Secession in International Law’, Netherlands International Law Review, 2015, vol. 62, pp. 329–363.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

8. A Bridge with Russia ?

169

Russia.41 This line of argument is rather different from what the PACE decided to do towards the entire Russian delegation, because, in contrast to the PACE, the OSCE PA’s refusal to grant credentials to this newly designated Russian delegate was not aimed at politically sanctioning the Russian delegation as a whole. The OSCE PA rejected the new delegate because Crimea was not considered to be a legal part of Russia. Consequently, a Crimean member of the OSCE PA could not be accepted as a member of the Russian delegation to the OSCE PA. Even though the OSCE PA sharply condemned the Russian aggression, the Resolutions of the OSCE PA Annual Sessions in Baku in 2014 and Helsinki 2015 did not refer to the suspension of rights of the Russian delegation as a whole.42 Communication Strategy The key characteristic of the OSCE PA’s activities since the start of the RussiaUkraine crisis is the use of communication tools. This was performed by conducting special dialogue meetings between the Russian and Ukrainian parliamentarians. The political will to foster dialogue was visible during the first special meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations within the OSCE PA in April 2014, which took place shortly after the annexation of Crimea. This OSCE PA initiative marks a clear contrast with the PACE’s decision to suspend the participation rights of the Russian delegation. In fact, this special meeting offered a rare opportunity for bilateral dialogue between representatives of the two countries within an international institution and is thus as an example of parliamentary diplomacy. This initiative was proposed by the OSCE PA Vice-President Doris Barnett (MP, Germany) and the meeting was hosted by the OSCE PA President Ranko Krivokapić (Montenegro). The initiative was named the ‘Vienna Process’ and it continued in 2015, when parliamentary dialogue with the Russian delegation in the PACE had already stopped. The 2015 meeting, hosted by Germany, followed the idea of providing Russian and Ukrainian parliamentarians with expert insights into the manner in which France and Germany overcame their traditional enmity. This can be evaluated as a far-reaching attempt to utilise 41   O SCE-PA, Press Release ‘Statement on the Rejection of Russia’s Designation of Olga Kovitidi as a Member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’, Vienna, 18 February 2015. 42   O SCE-PA, ‘Baku Declaration and Resolutions adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Twenty-Third Annual Session, 28 June to 2 July 2014’; OSCE-PA, ‘Helsinki Declaration and Resolutions adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly at the TwentyFourth Annual Session, 5 to 8 July 2015’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

170

Gawrich

parliamentary diplomacy by encouraging dispute settlement between the conflicting parties. From an outside perspective, the case of the Polish-German reconciliation since 1989 could have been more appropriate for indicating the lessons learned. However, opting for a Polish example would presumably not have been appreciated by the Russians, as Poland is one of the most Russosceptical countries in Europe. An additional instance of the use of communication tools is the OSCE PA’s decision to establish an ‘Interparliamentary Liaison Group on Ukraine’ during its Baku Annual Session in 2014. This is an activity beyond and supplementary to the bilateral meetings of the Vienna Process, since it involves not only parliamentarians from Russia and Ukraine, but also parliamentarians from other participating states and legal experts.43 The idea was to bring legal expertise into the debate. However, the actual establishment of the group is currently on hold. Furthermore, the OSCE-PA’s communication strategy has two targets. First, it organises the Russia-Ukraine interparliamentary dialogue, which is a part of its ‘internal’ communication strategy. Second, the OSCE PA continues to pursue direct communication with representatives of the Russian executive and legislature, which constitutes its ‘external’ communication strategy. Both of these dimensions of the OSCE PA’s communication strategy follow the logic of parliamentary diplomacy. In contrast to the PACE, which announced that it would pursue parliamentary diplomacy as a core strategy in 2014 and 2015 but failed to establish direct contacts with representatives from Russian state institutions, representatives of the OSCE PA engaged in direct discussions with: the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov; the Speaker of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament – Federation Council – Valentina Matviyenko; and the Speaker of the Russian Duma, Sergey Naryshkin. From an actor-centred institutionalist perspective, it is advantageous that the president of the OSCE PA, who had a leading role in advancing the relations between OSCE PA and the Duma in the 2014–2015 period, was from Finland, a country which traditionally maintains close relations with Russia.44 This factor gave the OSCE PA more room for parliamentary diplomacy than would have been the case had its president been from a country that has less amicable diplomatic relations with Russia – for instance, the US or Poland. 43   O SCE-PA, ‘Baku Declaration and Resolutions adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Twenty-Third Annual Session, 28 June to 2 July 2014’; OSCE-PA, Press Release ‘Russian and Ukrainian OSCE PA Delegations Pledge to Pursue Two-Track Dialogue’, Baku, 30 June 2014. 44   O SCE-PA, Press Releases, 4 September 2014; 5 September 2014, 24 November 2014.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

171

8. A Bridge with Russia ?

One can draw the conclusion that the OSCE PA’s primary strategy with regard to relations with Russia has been to strengthen dialogue both with the Russian authorities and between Russian and Ukrainian parliamentarians. In this respect, the OSCE PA provides a key institutional link to Russian representatives. This contrasts with the PACE’s approach, which placed supervision at the forefront of its activities through the imposition of sanctions on the Russian delegation, and which has not been able to foster dialogue with Russia.

Concluding Remarks on the PACE’s and the OSCE’s Strategies towards Russia

The OSCE PA and the PACE have deployed two contrasting supervision strategies towards Russia. The comparatively more powerful PACE decided to put institutional pressure on the Russian delegation by suspending its participation rights. The Russian government’s threat to leave the CoE as a result of this decision could be seen as evidence that this type of parliamentary diplomacy exerted some influence on the Russian executive. Contrarily, the OSCE PA did not adopt the rights suspension approach. Its rejection of a Crimean representative within the Russian delegation was due to legal reasons and not as a means of imposing political sanctions. With regard to the communication strategy, the PACE placed an intensified dialogue with Russia on its agenda, but failed to implement this. By contrast, the OSCE PA managed to establish a special dialogue between Ukrainian and Russian parliamentarians and additionally maintained dialogue with highlevel officials from the Russian Duma. Therefore, while both the OSCE-PA and the PACE focused, with differing degrees of success, on fostering external communication directly with the relevant national governments, only the OSCE-PA established new strategies of internal communication among Russian and Ukrainian parliamentarians. All in all, the PACE seemingly puts more emphasis on supervision than the OSCE PA, while the latter is very active in using communication instruments and does so both within the assembly and towards representatives of Russian state institutions. The PACE, in contrast, failed to enter into such a dialogue, while at the same time cutting most of its dialogue with Russian parliamentarians by suspending their participation rights. How can the differences between the two parliamentary assemblies’ strategies be explained? The three variables introduced in the second section of this chapter provide useful guidance.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

172

Gawrich

(1) Historical development as an explanatory variable. Even though the OSCE PA was only established after the end of the Cold War, it follows the OSCE’s tradition as a bridge builder by making decisions in a less conflictual manner than the PACE. Unlike the OSCE, the CoE drew lessons from allowing the accession of non-democratic post-Soviet countries during the 1990s by establishing a monitoring system and this caused the PACE to adopt a conflictual approach to parliamentary diplomacy. (2) Nature of an international organisation as an explanatory variable. This variable helps us to better understand the strategy of supervision – in this case, the imposition of membership sanctions against Russian parliamentarians in the PACE. This IPI has gained a significant degree of power towards the intergovernmental level through statements on accession procedures and evaluations of non-compliance with CoE accession conditions by candidate states and new member states. Thus, during the CoE enlargement in the 1990s, the PACE established a monitoring regime for new member states. Conversely, the OSCE PA is under less pressure to act as a supervisory actor, because it lacks monitoring power and exerts very limited influence at the intergovernmental level. (3) Path dependency as an explanatory variable. This variable focuses on an IPI’s previous experience with imposing sanctions and has a comparably low explanatory power. The PACE only started suspending credentials of its members after 1990, even though it could have done so before. One potential case of suspension could have been Switzerland, as it granted women the right to vote only in 1971, while having been a CoE member state since 1963. However, the most important previous cases of suspension by the PACE took place during the CoE enlargement in the 1990s, then during the second war in Chechnya in 2000–2001 against Russia, and in 1997 when the PACE suspended the special guest status of the candidate country Belarus. During the 1990s, the same strategy could have been applied by the OSCE PA as well. However, as the OSCE did not have experience with enlargement procedures, there were no similar approaches. These results indicate that IPIs’ parliamentary diplomacy is greatly influenced by the historical roots of a given IO, which define the activities undertaken by IPIs. Namely, if an IO is of a legally binding nature and if IPIs are partly involved in ensuring compliance of the member states with the IO’s membership rules, IPIs are more likely to pursue strategies of supervision and, hence, to go beyond communication strategies. Therefore, the more formalised an IO is, the more rational it is for the respective IPI to use its power to impose political costs for deviance from the IO’s rules by non-compliant countries.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

8. A Bridge with Russia ?

173

However, a less powerful IPI operating within a less formalised IO, which is not able to impose such costs, may prefer to focus on tools of communication and dialogue and refrain from excluding members from parliamentary procedures. Finally, it remains an open question for further research whether this kind of rationality is also valid for IPIs that do not belong to an IO, like the Interparliamentary Union. Nevertheless, it can be expected that, because of the absence of IO membership rules, communicative strategies in those cases would be their key instrument of influence.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 9

The South-East European Cooperation Process and Its New Parliamentary Assembly: Regional Dialogue in Action Franklin De Vrieze Introduction The institutional development of the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) Parliamentary Dimension and the establishment of the SEECP Parliamentary Assembly (SEECP PA) have affected inter-parliamentary relations among the participating countries, some of which have a long history of protracted conflicts. The SEECP PA engages in the type of parliamentary diplomacy that is aimed at reconciliation as a component of security policy, by seeking to maintain regional peace and stability. The SEECP emerged from the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe,1 which was created in 1999 as an answer to the wars related to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, with a view to strengthening cooperation and a European perspective for the entire region of South-East Europe. To understand the role of the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension, there is a need for a clear analytical framework that captures inter-parliamentary cooperation. Based on recent academic research on the nature of international parliamentary institutions (IPIs),2 one can analyse IPIs, including the Parliamentary Dimension of the SEECP, according to three dimensions: constitutional status; institutionalisation; and institutional authority.3 1  For more about the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, see online at http://ec.europa .eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/stability-pact_en.htm. 2  Jofre Rocabert, Frank Schimmelfennig and Thomas Winzen, ‘The Rise of International Parliamentary Institutions? Conceptualization and First Empirical Illustrations’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Salamanca (10–15 April 2014). 3  Davor Jančić, ‘Transnational Parliamentarism and Global Governance: The New Practice of Democracy’, in Elaine Fahey (ed.), The Actors of Postnational Rulemaking: Contemporary Challenges of European and International Law (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 113–132. See also Zlatko Šabič, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2 (2008), pp. 255–271.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi Stelios ��.��63/9789004336346_011 Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

9. South East European Regional Dialogue in Action

175

The first dimension – constitutional status – refers to the nature of the relationship between an IPI and an intergovernmental international organisation. This relationship can be structured in different ways: the IPI can be entirely independent; committed to and/or recognised by the international organisation; or formally a part of the international organisation. Examples are the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), which is independent from any intergovernmental international organisation; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) PA, which maintains a close relationship with NATO; the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which is an official organ of the Council of Europe; and the European Parliament, which is an institution of the European Union. Defining the IPI’s constitutional status includes enquiring whether the establishment of the IPI was an initiative of the executives, parliaments, or both. One also needs to examine the stated objectives of the IPI, which can include cooperation among the participating parliaments from the same region,4 contributing to the participating countries’ EU integration process,5 and political dialogue6 on contentious issues.7 The second dimension – the institutionalisation of IPIs8 – refers to the extent to which an IPI is capable of effective operation. A first indicator of institutionalisation is the structure of its membership. It needs to be enquired here whether the IPI distinguishes among full members, observers, affiliated members and guests, and what type of seat distribution it follows.9 A second indicator of institutionalisation concerns the internal governing structures. Questions examined here include whether the IPI is capable of electing its own president freely, or whether it is obliged to accept its president as the 4  For instance, the Parliamentary Dimension of the Adriatic–Ionian Initiative (AII). 5  For instance, COSAP – Conference of the European Integration/Affairs Committees of States Participating in the Stabilization and Association Process of South-East Europe. 6  For instance, the Conference of Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committees of the so-called Dayton countries (that is, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia). 7  Hrant Kostanyan and Bruno Vandecasteele, The EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly: The European Parliament as a Socializer of Its Counterparts in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood?, EU Diplomacy Papers 5/2013 (Bruges: College of Europe, 2013). 8  Clarissa Dri, ‘At What Point does a Legislature Become Institutionalized? The Mercosur Parliament’s Path’, Brazilian Political Science Review, no. 3 (2009), pp. 60–97; Gaye Gungor, ‘The Institutionalization of the European Parliament’, European University Institute Working Paper no. 2009/26 (Fiesole: Max Weber Programme at the European University Institute, 2009), p. 18. 9  Seat distribution can be according to: proportionality; degressive proportionality, which over-represents smaller parliaments and under-represents larger parliaments; or equality in the number of seats for all participating parliaments.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

176

De Vrieze

person appointed automatically by the parliament of the country holding the chairmanship of the intergovernmental international organisation (as is the case with the SEECP PA), and whether there is an autonomous bureau or a collective governing body of the IPI. A third indicator of institutionalisation is the type of secretariat of the IPI. Here we seek to determine whether the IPI has a fixed secretariat, or whether member parliaments host the secretariat on a rotating basis; whether the secretariat has permanent staff or not; and whether the secretariat has its own budget or not. A fourth indicator of institutionalisation is the frequency of plenary and committee meetings. In some IPIs, the plenary and committees meet once a year, while in other IPIs they meet up to four times a year (as is the case with PACE). The third dimension – institutional authority – refers to an IPI’s autonomy to set up its own operation, as well as to the scope of powers and ­competences that it possesses.10 The autonomy of an IPI’s operation refers to the level of influence that it has over its agenda, and to the level of freedom that it has to organise its proceedings and select its Secretary-General and permanent staff. It is worth noting that there may be causal links between an IPI’s constitutional status and institutional authority, because acquiring formal status within an international organisation is necessary as a rule for obtaining institutional competences, yet this may reduce the IPI’s autonomy. The powers and competences relate to the decision-making powers of IPIs within international organisations, including oversight over these organisations and the right to adopt their own budget.11 Based on this analytical framework, this chapter analyses how the institutional development of the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension and the establishment of the SEECP Parliamentary Assembly affect inter-parliamentary relations among the participating countries, some of which have a long history of protracted conflicts. The chapter analyses this with the example of two case studies: Kosovo’s participation in the SEECP PA; and the establishment of a Secretariat for the SEECP PA. These two case studies were selected because they gave rise to intensive regional dialogue and parliamentary diplomacy in South-East Europe.

10  Claudia Kissling, ‘The Legal and Political Status of International Parliamentary Institutions’, in Lucio Levi, Giovanni Finizio and Nicola Vallinoto (eds.), The Democratization of International Institutions (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 25–53. 11  Šabič, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

9. South East European Regional Dialogue in Action



177

The Constitutional Status of the SEECP PA

Taking into account the typology for the constitutional status of an IPI, the SEECP PA can be considered as an institution that is committed to and/or recognised by the intergovernmental organisation of the SEECP. The SEECP PA was established in Bucharest in May 2014, following an extensive process of consultation that was aimed at transforming and further institutionalising the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension.12 It was established in accordance with the Charter on Good Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe, which had been signed in 2000. Although formally separate from the governmental dimension of the SEECP, the SEECP PA is closely linked to it. The SEECP PA’s stated goals are: (1) initiating different forms of exchange of experiences in the field of legislation and the harmonisation thereof with the European Union (EU) acquis communautaire; (2) acting as an umbrella organisation for achieving the synergy of regional initiatives and forms of cooperation in the areas of economic and social development, infrastructure and energy, internal affairs and justice, security, and the development of human capital; (3) encouraging, following and monitoring the realisation of goals and priorities defined by the rotating SEECP Presidency and the Regional Cooperation Council; and (4) intensifying the parliamentary diplomatic activities and establishing links with regional, European and international organisations, institutions and foundations.13 This set of goals is specific to the SEECP PA, because it combines support for European integration by the participating countries with regional cooperation. Other IPIs – such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) PA or PACE – also foster regional cooperation, but are not focused specifically on supporting European integration.14 The SEECP PA’s goals could be 12  Franklin De Vrieze, Study on Parliamentary Cooperation: Mapping and Analysis of International Parliamentary Institutions and Parliamentary Networks in the Western Balkans and South-East Europe (Brussels: European Commission DG NEAR, February 2015), pp. 65–74, available online at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_ process/2015-02-17-mapping_and_analysis_report.pdf. 13  Final Declaration of the first plenary session of the SEECP PA, Bucharest (May 2014). 14  Andrea Gawrich, Could the Junior Learn from the Senior? Comparing Institutional Capacities of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, paper for the 8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, titled ‘One International Relations or Many? Multiple Worlds, Multiple Crises’, Warsaw, Poland (18–21 September 2013).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

178

De Vrieze

compared, to a certain extent, to those of the Parliamentary Dimension of the Adriatic–Ionian Initiative (AII), although emphasis in the AII is much more on regional cooperation among the EU member states and non-EU member states from the Adriatic–Ionian region, and considerably less on supporting the European integration of the non-EU member states. As already noted, supporting the EU integration of non-EU member states is an explicit objective of the SEECP PA. Contrary to the AII Parliamentary Dimension’s relationship with the AII, the objectives of the SEECP PA provide for a stronger link with the governmental dimension of the SEECP.

Institutionalisation of the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension

The SEECP’s parliamentary activities have been through a two-stage process of institutionalisation. The first phase covered the period of the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension, which was from the first to the last Conference of Speakers of SEECP Parliaments (1996–2013); and the second phase covers the period from the transformation of the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension into the Parliamentary Assembly of the SEECP until the present day (2014– 2016). There were seven founding parliaments of the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension: those of Albania; Bulgaria; Greece; the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Romania; the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (State Union of Serbia and Montenegro as of 2003); and Turkey. They were joined by the parliaments of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in 2001), Croatia (in 2005), Moldova (in 2006), Montenegro (in 2007 following its independence from the State Union) and Slovenia (in 2010). In 2014, the twelve participating parliaments jointly established the SEECP Parliamentary Assembly. Over a number of years, the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension took stepby-step decisions on its institutional organisation. In 1997, for the first time, the concept of ‘regular meetings at the highest parliamentary level’ emerged, with ‘meetings held on a rotation principle using the model of Speakers of Parliament meetings held by European Union Member States’.15 This is an important provision, as it excludes the concept of electing a president of the Parliamentary Dimension. Instead, it was decided that the country holding the rotating chairmanship of the SEECP Governmental Dimension should at the same time hold the chairmanship of the SEECP Parliamentary

15  Final Declaration of Conference of Speakers of Parliament of the SEECP, Athens (1997).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

9. South East European Regional Dialogue in Action

179

­ imension and coordinate South-East European parliamentary cooperation.16 D This reduced the autonomy of the Parliamentary Dimension of the SEECP. After the South-East European heads of state and prime ministers recommended stronger inter-parliamentary dialogue in 2000, the Conference of Speakers of the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension proposed the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly in 2002. This was the first time that the SEECP PA was mentioned as an objective, although it eventually took twelve more years to arrive at its actual establishment. At the 2007 Speakers’ Conference, in order to ensure continuity in parliamentary cooperation in view of the annual rotation of the presidency, the format of the Troika (composed of the former, current and next presidents) was introduced. At the same meeting in 2007, Bulgaria was designated to host the Regional Focal Point for Parliamentary Cooperation in South-East Europe, which was renamed the Regional Secretariat for Parliamentary Cooperation in South-East Europe in 2008. During the 2008 Speakers’ Conference, the Memorandum of Understanding on Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation was signed, with the aim of promoting further capacity-building and institutional strengthening of the South-East European parliaments. During the 2010 Speakers’ Conference, the idea of establishing a SEECP Parliamentary Assembly was discussed again, and, upon the proposal of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, a working group was established to develop guidelines and modalities for establishing the Parliamentary Assembly. The working group was composed of one member of parliament and one national coordinator from each participating parliament.17 It could be argued that the Conferences of Speakers of Parliament of the SEECP contributed to better understanding and sustained regional dialogue among the countries involved, but the declarations of political will to resolve specific issues or to achieve certain objectives often remained without any practical consequence. Often the Declarations of the Speakers were not followed up with action by parliamentary committees at the national level. The alignment of policies and initiatives of the governmental and 16  One of the guiding rules of the SEECP is that the official documents contain only the names of the capitals of the countries in the headline and the personal names of the participants. The countries are symbolized only by their national flags. The same is stipulated in the SEECP PA’s Rules of Procedure. The reason for this arrangement is the name dispute over ‘Macedonia’ between Athens and Skopje. 17  Development of the South-East European Cooperation Process: The Parliamentary Dimension, unofficial paper drafted by the Regional Secretariat for Parliamentary Cooperation in South-East Europe (RSPC SEE), Sofia, Bulgaria (2014).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

180

De Vrieze

­ arliamentary dimensions of the SEECP was incomplete and partial. In order p for the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension to remain meaningful and to be able to achieve tangible results, further institutionalisation through the creation of the Parliamentary Assembly was considered by the Speakers as the logical next step. When analysing the second phase of the institutionalisation of parliamentary activities within the SEECP – that is to say the period since the establishment of the SEECP PA – the first issue that needs attention is the Rules of Procedure (RoP).18 The RoP establish that members of the SEECP PA are national delegations of the parliaments of the SEECP’s participating states. This is significant, because it implies that the members of the SEECP PA are not individual parliamentarians with their individual rights to vote, as is the case, for instance, with PACE, but national delegations. These delegations are headed by the Speakers and comprise a total of three to five parliamentarians. Each delegation is to be composed of at least 30 per cent of the less represented gender. The RoP stipulate that the governmental dimension of the SEECP shall be invited to participate, through its Chair-in-Office, in the Sessions of the SEECP PA. There are also provisions for observers and special guests to attend plenary sessions of the SEECP PA, which is not the case with many other IPIs. The governing structures of the SEECP PA are: the President; the Bureau of the Assembly; and the Standing Committee. The SEECP PA President is the Speaker of the parliament of the country holding the SEECP chairmanship for a one-year term. The Bureau of the Assembly is established according to the principle of the Troika and has the role of coordinating the activities of the SEECP PA. The Standing Committee is composed of the members of the Troika, the chairpersons of the General Committees of the SEECP PA, and one member from each national delegation. The Standing Committee ensures the continuity of the work and efficient functioning of the SEECP PA between each session. To this end, the Standing Committee holds biannual meetings and adopts the draft programme, the draft agenda for the plenary sessions, and appoints rapporteurs. The SEECP PA has created three General Committees, which are in charge of: 1) Economy, Infrastructure and Energy; 2) Justice, Home Affairs and Security Cooperation; and 3) Social Development, Education, Research and Science. In the absence of a permanent Secretariat within the SEECP PA, each of the three General Committees is chaired by different participating p ­ arliaments 18  See online at http://rspcsee.org/en/pages/read/seecp-parliamentary-assembly/rules-ofprocedure.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

9. South East European Regional Dialogue in Action

181

on a rotating basis, based on an informal expression of interest, which is then formalised by a decision made by a majority of the votes in the Standing Committee. At the inaugural session in Bucharest in 2014, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted an annual work plan, which stated that there would be one meeting per year for each of the three General Committees.19 Compared with other IPIs, holding only one committee meeting a year seems far too limited to enable sufficient time for deliberations and to generate substantial contentbased reports and recommendations.20 In the RoP, the SEECP PA agreed on a clear set of decision-making rules.21 Each delegation has one vote. Political decisions of the SEECP Parliamentary Assembly are adopted by consensus, while decisions on the organisational, technical and procedural matters are made by simple majority. Beyond delegations, the SEECP PA does not foresee provisions for other internal bodies, such as political groups, as is the case with the PACE or the European Parliament.22 Subsequently, most opinions expressed by the delegations will thus be opinions guided by national interests rather than by opinions along ideological lines. When the Speakers of the SEECP’s participating parliaments decided to create an assembly, it was thought that such a level of institutionalisation would enable the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension to remain meaningful and to achieve tangible results. Institutionalisation has taken place over the past two years, but has not yet been completed. To a large extent, the new Parliamentary Assembly has concentrated on reaching consensus on its own institutionalisation. In the months prior to the establishment of the SEECP PA, it was clear that there were two difficult issues hampering further progress: the question of Kosovo’s participation; and the question of the Secretariat, as discussed later in this chapter. While the first issue has been resolved, this is not the case with the second issue. Although the Parliamentary Assembly has made important steps in its institutionalisation process, it is fair to say that the Parliamentary Assembly is not a high political priority for most of the 19   See online at http://www.cdep.ro/camera_deputatilor/delegatii_parlamentare/work_ programme_2014-2015.pdf. 20  De Vrieze, Study on Parliamentary Cooperation, pp. 65–74. 21   See online at http://www.cdep.ro/camera_deputatilor/delegatii_parlamentare/rules_­ procedure_SEECP.pdf. 22  Péter Bajtay, Democratic and Efficient Foreign Policy? Parliamentary Diplomacy and Oversight in the 21st Century and the Post-Lisbon Role of the European Parliament in Shaping and Controlling EU Foreign Policy, EUI Working Paper RSCAS no. 2015/11 (February 2015).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

182

De Vrieze

participating parliaments, which are almost entirely focused on defending their national ­interests. It has been observed that the interventions and positions of (almost) all of the delegations participating in the SEECP PA reflect national interests and perspectives, and that few delegations are focused on the interests and transformation of the region as a whole.23 This is different at the governmental level of the SEECP, where the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) operates as the executive arm of the SEECP and develops its work from a regional perspective, beyond the individual, national interests. The support that the RCC might potentially provide for the work of the SEECP PA, its Committees and Secretariat could add value by bringing regionally oriented analytical expertise to the deliberations of the SEECP PA.

Institutional Authority of the SEECP PA

The SEECP PA enjoys substantial autonomy vis-à-vis the SEECP Governmental Dimension. It is free to consider any issue, adopt its own RoP and budget, and select its Secretary-General and staff. The only exception to its institutional autonomy is the chairmanship, because the SEECP PA aligns itself with the rotating chairmanship of the SEECP. The SEECP PA’s powers are of a consultative nature. The SEECP PA provides a platform for discussion and exchange of experiences among the participating parliamentarians. Through the work of its committees, the Parliamentary Assembly has a strong potential to enhance its oversight over regional policies and programmes. It could, for instance, develop mechanisms to increase its potential for analysis and discussion on the European Union’s structural and pre-accession funds, and discuss annual reports and projects of various international organisations operating in the SEECP region. If the SEECP PA were to proceed in such a direction, it could build on the experience of the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, which exercises soft oversight over the use of funds provided by the European Development Fund and thus enhances transparency through debates, question time and ­resolutions.24 Moreover, such a policy would be in line with the SEECP June 23  Author’s personal observation of the proceedings of the 2014 and 2015 plenary sessions of the SEECP PA. 24  See online at http://www.acp.int/content/acp-eu-joint-parliamentary-assembly. See also Sarah Delputte, Cristina Fasone and Fabio Longo, ‘The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Standing Committees, Delegations and Assemblies: Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 161–181. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

9. South East European Regional Dialogue in Action

183

2014 Summit Declaration, in which the heads of state reaffirmed their ‘commitment for a sound use of EU funding, taking into account the regulations applicable to the status of SEECP participants (EU member states, candidates, potential candidates and associates) and insist on the importance of promoting meaningful projects taking advantage of the new IPA [Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance] and ENI [European Neighbourhood Instrument] 2014–2020 framework’.25

Case Studies: Regional Dialogue in the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension and the SEECP Parliamentary Assembly

This section assesses how the gradual process of the institutional development of the Parliamentary Dimension of the SEECP affected regional dialogue in the SEECP region. This is done through case studies of Kosovo’s participation in the SEECP PA and of the establishment of a Secretariat for the SEECP PA. Kosovo’s Participation in the SEECP Parliamentary Assembly The first case study examines the question of the Assembly of Kosovo’s inclusion in the Parliamentary Dimension of the SEECP. More specifically, it assesses whether, and if so how, the institutional development of the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension has positively affected the parliamentarians’ ability to find a pragmatic way forward on this question. Since their establishment in 2001, Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment (PISG) have regularly attended regional, European or international meetings organised under the umbrella of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).26 When permitted by the chair, the UNMIK representative would make introductory remarks and then pass the floor to the

25  Declaration of Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the SEECP, Bucharest (June 2014), p. 2, available online at http://www.mae.ro/sites/default/files/file/pdf/2014.06.25_ summit_declaration.pdf. 26  Between 2002 and 2008, it was established practice that an UNMIK delegation included a minister or senior civil servant of the PISG when issues within the competence of the PISG were discussed with the European Commission in Brussels or sometimes with other international organizations. In a similar way, members of the Assembly of Kosovo participated in regional parliamentary gatherings as part of a delegation of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, which is itself a part of UNMIK in charge of institution-building. See also Franklin De Vrieze, ‘OSCE Coordinates Parliamentary Support Programs’, Helsinki Monitor, no. 1 (March 2007), pp. 57–63. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

184

De Vrieze

­representative of the PISG.27 For several years, representatives of the government and the National Assembly of Serbia objected to PISG representatives speaking at international and regional gatherings, because Serbia does not recognise the independence of Kosovo. Therefore, when a PISG representative was invited to speak, the Serbian authorities would leave the meeting as a sign of protest, because they were opposed to treating Kosovo as an independent state and because they did not want their presence to be interpreted as an indirect recognition of Kosovo’s statehood.28 At some of the SEECP Speakers’ conferences, a small UNMIK-led delegation that included a member of the Assembly of Kosovo was present, and this enabled the latter to speak as a special guest of the Chair.29 This format of Kosovo’s presence at SEECP meetings became unsustainable following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008. First, the SEECP’s member states did not reach consensus on how to respond to this declaration: seven countries recognised it and five countries did not.30 In addition, Kosovo’s representatives found it increasingly difficult to accept that they would be participating in international organisations and regional meetings as part of an UNMIK delegation instead of their own delegation.31 Given Serbia’s opposition, Kosovo’s representatives were unable to participate in key SEECP

27  Lorinc Redei, ‘The European Parliament as a Diplomatic Precedent-Setter: The Case of Parliamentary Relations with Kosovo’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 272–285. 28  Franklin De Vrieze, ‘The Assembly of Kosovo during its Second Mandate (2004–2007). Analysis of the Functioning of a Young Parliament under International Supervision’, Studia Diplomatica, vol. 62, no. 1 (2009), pp. 75–116. 29  Representing UNMIK, the author participated at the 7th SEECP Speakers Conference in Sofia from 13–15 April 2008. After UNMIK’s remarks, the PISG/Assembly of Kosovo representative was given the floor. During the PISG speech, the representative of the National Assembly of Serbia left the room and returned once the PISG/Assembly of Kosovo speech was finished (author’s observations). See also online at http://sofiaecho .com/2008/05/21/660630_kosovo-the-macedonia-name-dispute-serbia-and-the-­ pomorie-summit. 30  The SEECP countries that have recognized Kosovo’s independence are: Slovenia; Croatia; Montenegro; Albania; (the former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia; Turkey; and Bulgaria. The SEECP countries that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence are: Bosnia and Herzegovina; Serbia; Romania; Moldova; and Greece. 31  Lowell West, Kosovo’s Path to the Council of Europe: Identifying Procedures, Obstacles and Solutions for Membership, Policy Report no. 06 (Pristina: Group for Legal and Political Studies, 2013), p. 28.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

9. South East European Regional Dialogue in Action

185

meetings, such as the summits in 2009 in Chisinau in Moldova, in 2010 in Istanbul in Turkey, and in 2011 in Budva in Montenegro. In 2012, the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, succeeded in mediating an agreement between the Serbian capital Belgrade and Kosovo’s capital Pristina on Kosovo’s participation in regional forums. The agreement foresaw Kosovo’s presence in regional gatherings under the name ‘Kosovo*’, accompanied by a footnote. The text of the footnote reads: ‘This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 1244/1999 and the ICJ [International Court of Justice] Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence’. It was agreed that Kosovo would participate in its own right and speak for itself at all regional meetings. The hosts of meetings were encouraged to avoid displaying national symbols except for their own and those of the EU, taking into account the statutes of relevant organisations.32 The EU High Representative drafted an initial list of organisations that were notified of the agreement, with a request for it to be applied. The agreement on Kosovo’s participation in regional forums applies to all regional organisations,33 although Serbia has been reluctant to accept Kosovo joining organisations that were not included in the initial list of organisations stated in the agreement.34 Despite this agreement, no solution was found for Kosovo’s possible participation in the SEECP Summit in June 2012, which took place under Serbia’s rotating chairmanship. As a consequence, Albania blocked the adoption of the summit’s draft Joint Declaration of the SEECP Heads of State and Government. The debate on Kosovo’s participation in SEECP meetings continued during the Macedonian chairmanship in 2013. Initially, the government of Macedonia invited Kosovo’s foreign minister to attend the meeting of the SEECP foreign 32  European External Action Service (EEAS), Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation (Brussels: EEAS, March 2012), p. 4. 33  Author’s interview with a member of EEAS senior staff (October 2014). 34  For instance, Kosovo has not been able to join the Adriatic–Ionian Initiative and its Parliamentary Dimension. Despite the 2012 Belgrade–Pristina agreement on regional forums, Kosovo could not become a member of the Conference of Committees for European Integration/Affairs of the Parliaments participating in the Stabilization and Association Process of South-East Europe (COSAP). The Assembly of Kosovo was invited as an observer to the COSAP meeting in Belgrade, Serbia (March 2015), but was not invited to the COSAP meeting in Podgorica, Montenegro (June 2014). Kosovo’s application for membership in COSAP has been pending since 2013. See also online at http://europeanwesternbalkans .com/2015/03/12/10th-conference-of-the-european-­integrationaffairs-committees-ofstates-participating-in-the-stabilisation-and-association-process-of-the-south-easteurope/.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

186

De Vrieze

ministers in May 2013 as a special guest. Kosovo participated through the deputy foreign minister and the ministers were able to issue a joint declaration. However, because of objections by Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo was not invited to the SEECP Summit of the Heads of State and Government in Ohrid, Macedonia, in June 2013. As a result, the Albanian and Croatian presidents cancelled their participation. Since Bulgaria and Greece had previously announced that their presidents would not participate either, the summit was cancelled altogether.35 During the Romanian chairmanship of the SEECP in 2014, the stakes were high to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s participation in SEECP meetings. There was considerable preoccupation that, if no solution was found and there were further boycotts and cancellations, the continued existence of the SEECP might be threatened.36 Following intensive consultations between the foreign ministers of Kosovo and Serbia, an agreement was reached. It enabled the Romanian chairmanship to include in the SEECP Final Declaration of June 2014 that the heads of state and government of the SEECP decided to ‘invite Kosovo* to participate on a permanent basis in the SEECP activities and meetings, at all levels and on equal terms’.37 Kosovo claimed that it had gained membership of the SEECP. For Serbia, however, membership had not been granted to Kosovo, as that would imply recognition of statehood. The middle-ground formula agreed upon was that of a ‘permanent and equal participant’. One can read this as a definition of membership without calling it such.

35  Agon Demjaha, ‘Kosovo’s Participation in Regional Organizations and Initiatives’, KIPRED Policy Paper no. 5/14 (Pristina: KIPRED, October 2014), pp. 39–40. 36  Author’s interview with senior staff of the EEAS, Brussels (September 2014). 37  The relevant section of the June 2014 Summit Declaration reads as follows: ‘3.3 Regarding the request of Kosovo to join SEECP, given the commitment to further enhance the role of SEECP on the basis of regional ownership and all-inclusiveness, and recognizing the historic agreements reached in the framework of the EU facilitated dialogue, namely the First Agreement on principles governing the normalization of relations and Arrangements regarding regional representation and cooperation, we welcomed the participation of Kosovo in SEECP activities over the last year and we decided to invite Kosovo to participate on a permanent basis in the SEECP activities and meetings, at all levels and on equal terms. The Annexe of the Charter of the South-East European Cooperation Process is to be interpreted and applied accordingly, in order to allow the participation of Kosovo in the SEECP activities and meetings, at all levels and on equal terms. We acknowledge that such participation greatly contributes to the strengthening of regional cooperation, stabilization and security in the region’; see online at http://www.mae.ro/sites/default/files/ file/pdf/2014.06.25_summit_declaration.pdf.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

9. South East European Regional Dialogue in Action

187

After the SEECP’s heads of state and government took this decision, it was expected that the issue of the Assembly of Kosovo’s participation in the newly established SEECP PA was settled. In early 2015, the Assembly of Kosovo was thus expected to join the SEECP PA at all levels and in all activities, including by appointing a delegation to the SEECP PA, a member to the Standing Committee, three General Committees, the Ad Hoc Working Group, and a coordinator for the SEECP PA. In this way, the SEECP PA was expected to become a fully inclusive regional parliamentary platform for the whole region of South-East Europe. However, things went differently. In February 2015, the parliamentary delegations of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania objected to the inclusion of members of the Assembly of Kosovo in the General Committees of the SEECP PA, arguing that they are not bound by the June 2014 decision of the heads of state and government and that decisions of the Governmental Dimension do not apply to the Parliamentary Dimension of the SEECP.38 The three delegations insisted that Kosovo should only remain a ‘special guest’ at the annual SEECP PA plenary session. Nevertheless, Turkey and Bulgaria did invite Kosovo to the General Committee, which they chaired and hosted, but only as a ‘special guest’ and not as a ‘permanent and equal participant’. Romania did not invite any representative of Kosovo to the General Committee that it hosted and chaired. With a gentle push from Brussels, the issue was resolved at the May 2015 plenary session of the SEECP PA, which adopted a decision to invite the Assembly of Kosovo to ‘participate on a permanent basis in the SEECP PA activities and meetings, at all levels and on equal terms’.39 The decision to welcome Kosovo as the thirteenth delegation to the SEECP PA was taken unanimously by the representatives of the twelve participating parliaments of the SEECP, including those of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other countries that do not recognise Kosovo. The normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is considered by the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament to be one of the requirements of Serbia’s EU integration process. The key to normalising relations rests with the governments in Belgrade and Pristina. The spill-over to the parliamentary level of the normalisation of these relations seems to be the result of the decisions made at the intergovernmental level. The June 2014 agreement on Kosovo’s inclusion in the SEECP at the 38  Author’s interview with national delegations of the SEECP PA (February 2015). 39  Final Declaration of the Second Plenary Session of SEECP PA, Tirana (22–23 May 2015), paragraph 16, available online at http://rspcsee.org/en/news/read/second-plenarysession-of-seecp-pa-22-23-may-2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

188

De Vrieze

e­ xecutive level could also have resolved the question of the participation of the Assembly of Kosovo in the SEECP PA. However, some leading parliamentarians decided to emphasise parliamentary autonomy vis-à-vis the executive, and this delayed applying to the SEECP PA the same formula for the inclusion of Kosovo that had already been agreed by the SEECP Summit. The May 2015 agreement to apply the same formula was the result of intensive consultations among the key interlocutors from the governments and parliaments of Serbia and Kosovo, as well as the European Commission and European Parliament.40 Serbia was prompted to accept Kosovo’s participation in the SEECP PA because this would contribute to normalising their relations and thus strengthen Serbia’s EU integration process.41 This shows the importance of the EU integration process as a diplomatic incentive for finding compromise solutions, more than proving the strength of inter-parliamentary cooperation as a stand-alone process. This example shows that inter-parliamentary initiatives have a limited but real effect in fostering regional cooperation, in particular when they go hand in hand with an external, gentle push in the form of EU incentives and pressure to foster such cooperation. Establishment of a Secretariat of the SEECP PA The second case study concerns regional parliamentary dialogue within the SEECP and assesses how the participating parliaments deal with one contentious aspect of the institutional development of the SEECP PA – its Secretariat.42 In 2007, as the region’s parliamentary cooperation activities intensified, the participating parliaments of the SEECP agreed on the need for a Secretariat to support the work of the rotating chairmanship. In 2008, all SEECP ­parliaments 40   Author’s correspondence with senior staff of the European Commission, Brussels (May 2015). 41  The ‘European Union Common Position on Serbia’s EU Accession Negotiations, chapter 35: Other issues – Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo*’ outlines the following requirements in the area of regional cooperation: (1) Serbia enables, from its side, Kosovo’s effective participation in remaining regional initiatives, in line with the jointly agreed terms; (2) Serbia supports the inclusion of Kosovo’s representatives in the management and administrative structures of regional organizations, provided that the merit principle, comparative analysis and the specific Terms of Reference are observed (Brussels, 30 November 2015). 42  All information in this section stems from the author’s interviews with the national coordinators from the SEECP PA’s participating parliaments (between May 2014 and June 2015) and the author’s participation at the plenary sessions of the SEECP PA in Bucharest, Romania (May 2014) and Tirana, Albania (May 2015).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

9. South East European Regional Dialogue in Action

189

signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation in South-East Europe, which established the Regional Secretariat for Parliamentary Cooperation (RSPC SEE) with a seat in Bulgaria’s capital, Sofia. The transformation of the SEECP Parliamentary Dimension into a Parliamentary Assembly necessitated the establishment of a permanent seat for the secretariat of the PA. The role, responsibility, location, staff and budget of the SEECP PA’s Secretariat are important aspects of the institutionalisation of the PA and they have been discussed by the participating parliaments over a long period of time. It was agreed in the 2014 RoP that the Secretariat would be headed by a Secretary-General who would in turn be elected by the SEECP PA. However, in 2014 it became clear that no consensus could be found among the participating parliaments on other issues, such as on the procedural aspects of the election of the Secretary-General and other officials, as well as on the venue, functions, composition and budget of the Secretariat. So far, Bulgaria and Turkey have expressed the most vocal positions on the Secretariat. For several years, both countries have been offering to host, and indeed insisting on hosting, the SEECP PA’s Secretariat. Bulgaria advocates transforming the RSPC in Sofia into the SEECP PA Secretariat, with all of the participating parliaments contributing to its budget. Turkey is campaigning to have the Secretariat established in Istanbul, in which case it offers to cover all of the costs for national staff and infrastructure over the first five years.43 Bulgaria suggests a smaller-scale Secretariat and hence a smaller budget than that proposed by Turkey. The Turkish offer seems very attractive to most parliaments of the Western Balkans, because they are reluctant to assume additional financial obligations to contribute to the Secretariat’s budget, which is implied if the Secretariat is established in Sofia. To address this issue, the participating parliaments established an ‘ad-hoc working group’ to discuss the Rules of the Secretariat, the Secretariat’s budget, national contributions to the budget and the Secretariat’s location. Until a fully functional Secretariat and an operational budget are in place, a set of transitional arrangements were agreed upon in 2014 and inserted in the RoP.44 43  Speech by the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey at the SEECP PA, Tirana, Albania (May 2015). 44  The transitional arrangements foresee that the national parliament holding the chairmanship of the SEECP PA shall serve, with the assistance of the RSPC SEE, as an adhoc Secretariat for the Plenary Session, the Standing Committee, the President and the Bureau of the Assembly, while the national parliament holding the chairmanship of a General Committee or of an ad-hoc Working Group shall also fulfil the tasks of an ad-hoc

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

190

De Vrieze

While the transitional arrangements might have provided temporary breathing space for the Ad-Hoc Working Group to build consensus among all of the delegations on the Secretariat’s development, the risk that these transitional arrangements would be maintained for longer than the initial year for which they were intended is rising. In the second year of the SEECP PA, the transitional arrangements are still in place. This undermines momentum to turn the SEECP PA into an effective body that can deliver quality outputs in terms of oversight, policy-making and political dialogue. Without a functioning Secretariat with permanent staff, expertise, resources for the General Committees and an operational budget for more regular meetings, it will be very hard for the SEECP PA to deliver on its objectives and go beyond its promising start. In 2015, the Albanian chairmanship conducted bilateral consultations with all of the parties involved and asked all the participating parliaments to respond to the proposals by Bulgaria and Turkey and on the related budget. Turkey has suggested that the position of Secretary-General be granted to a Bulgarian national as part of a consensus on establishing the Secretariat in Istanbul. At the SEECP PA plenary session in May 2015, eight countries expressed support for Turkey’s proposal, while three countries supported Bulgaria’s proposal and one country did not declare itself. Since decisions on non-technical issues are taken by consensus, the issue of the Secretariat’s permanent location remains unresolved and is now under the responsibility of the new SEECP chairmanship, which Bulgaria assumed in June 2015. The establishment of a functioning Secretariat is a clear indicator of the level of institutionalisation of an international organisation. Since this issue remains unresolved, the SEECP PA still has a long way to go before it becomes a fully institutionalised organisation that is capable of substantially supporting the regional parliamentary dialogue of its members. Conclusion While the SEECP PA is still in the process of institutional development, it has the potential to become the leading collective parliamentary platform in the South-East European region.45 There are several reasons for this assertion. First, the SEECP is a fully regionally-owned initiative, with a long history of Secretariat for the respective body of the Assembly. See Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the SEECP PA, Bucharest (May 2014). 45  Author’s interview with delegations present at the SEECP PA plenary session (May 20015).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

9. South East European Regional Dialogue in Action

191

s­ ustained interest in its development by the participating parliaments. Second, the SEECP PA’s objectives include both regional cooperation and European integration, which enable it to gain further traction in the region. Third, the SEECP PA covers the entire region of South-East Europe, including five EU member states, all of the EU candidate countries, as well as potential EU candidate countries. The real influence of this Parliamentary Assembly becomes visible when it manages to overcome long-standing policy issues. Although regional dialogue fostered within the SEECP PA is only at an initial stage, parliamentary diplomacy could be a powerful tool to enhance it, provided that a conscious effort is made to use it.46 In the case of Kosovo’s participation in the SEECP PA, parliamentary diplomacy played a supporting role in finding a solution that is acceptable to both Kosovo and Serbia, while, as expected, the decisive role was played by the governments and foreign ministries. Moreover, on the question of statehood, the foreign policy of the different countries involved was a key consideration for the parliamentary delegations of the SEECP PA. It can also be argued that parliamentary diplomacy performed within the framework of the SEECP PA is a rather recent phenomenon and that it is thus less developed than, for instance, that conducted within the framework of the OSCE PA.47 With respect to the question of the location of the SEECP PA’s Secretariat, it seems that the parliaments concerned had, and continue to have, the leading role, with the respective foreign ministries supporting the position of their national parliaments. This chapter therefore shows that the institutional development of the SEECP PA has facilitated the search for compromises to the benefit of the organisation as a whole and has intensified dialogue among the region’s parliaments. Furthermore, factors external to the SEECP PA – such as the EU-led process of normalising the relations between Kosovo and Serbia – can provide a favourable context in which the SEECP PA can confirm and apply an agreed settlement (as in this chapter’s first case study), or find interim solutions pending a more definitive settlement that reconciles conflicting national positions (as in the second case study). As demonstrated by the first case study, having 46  See, for instance, Stelios Stavridis and Roderick Pace, ‘Assessing the Impact of the EMPA’s Parliamentary Diplomacy in International Conflicts: Contribution or Obstacle?’, in Gregorio Garzón Clariana (ed.), La Asamblea Euromediterránea – The Euro-Mediterranean Assembly – L’assemblée euro-méditerranéenne (Madrid/Barcelona/Buenos Aires: Editorial Marcial Pons, 2011), pp. 59–105. 47  Robert Cutler, ‘The OSCE’s Parliamentary Diplomacy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus in Comparative Perspective’, Studia Diplomatica, vol. 59, no. 2 (2006), pp. 79–93.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

192

De Vrieze

a common ­objective in relation to European integration, having clarity regarding the steps to be taken, having incentives to find compromise solutions and accepting a mediator can all make a difference for conflict-resolution efforts to be successful in the parliamentary context. In the second case study, a common overarching objective and an accepted mediator were lacking, and this hampered the resolution of that particular issue. Nevertheless, the SEECP parliamentary meetings have become a useful opportunity to establish new channels of communication among elected representatives.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 10

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean and Its Contribution to Democracy Promotion and Crisis Management Andrea Cofelice Introduction It is widely recognized that the Mediterranean is one of the world’s least structured regions in terms of intergovernmental regional cooperation.1 Indeed, despite the growing number of initiatives launched since the mid-1970s by external political actors, such as the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Council of Europe and the United States (US), with a view to promoting economic, political and scientific cooperation, the level of intra-regional institution-building has remained rather low.2 One of the most ambitious projects in this area, namely the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership (since 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean),3 is generally regarded in the 1  Stephen C. Calleya, Security Challenges in the Euro–Med Area in the 21st Century: Mare Nostrum (London: Routledge, 2013); Zlatko Šabič and Ana Bojinovic, ‘Mapping a Regional Institutional Architecture: The Case of the Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 12, no. 3 (November 2007), pp. 317–337. 2  According to Šabič and Bojinovic, political actors/institutions are ‘external’ to the Mediterranean if, despite devoting a substantial part of their activities to the Mediterranean, their headquarters are not located in the Mediterranean and their membership is not composed exclusively of Mediterranean actors. In their study, which is one of the most comprehensive on this issue, the authors map more than 40 initiatives launched in the region by these actors between 1970 and 2006. See Šabič and Bojinovic, ‘Mapping a Regional Institutional Architecture’, pp. 322–323. 3  The Union for the Mediterranean is the successor to the Euro–Mediterranean partnership. On the relationship between the two projects, see, in particular: Roberto Aliboni, ‘The Union for the Mediterranean: Evolution and Prospects’, Documenti IAI, no. 09/39E (2009); Federica Bicchi and Richard Gillespie (eds.), The Union for the Mediterranean (London: Routledge, 2012); Paul James Cardwell, ‘EuroMed, European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean: Overlapping Policy Frames in the EU’s Governance of the Mediterranean’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 49, no. 2 (2011), pp. 219–241.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004336346_012 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

194

cofelice

literature as falling short of fulfilling its main objectives as originally set out in 1995 in Barcelona. Roberto Aliboni identifies three main factors accounting for this low level of institutional development.4 First, as already mentioned, the main political (and cultural) initiatives in the Mediterranean are taken by external actors; as a consequence, the Mediterranean basin remains a ‘border’ and not a ‘centre’ in itself. Second, the Mediterranean countries do not ­constitute a ‘security complex’;5 they have different security agendas, since the factors that affect South–South security have little to do with those affecting North–South security. Finally, great economic gaps exist between countries in the north and the south of the basin, because of very different political and institutional regimes. However, in contrast to this weak intra-regional intergovernmental institutional framework, non-governmental and less traditional forms of cooperation and diplomacy seem to be developing at a more robust pace. Already in 2007, Zlatko Šabič and Ana Bojinović identified particularly dynamic growth in Mediterranean cooperation initiatives carried out by non-governmental organizations and networks, local authorities, research institutes and think tanks.6 What is missing from this list is a clear reference to the role played by parliamentary actors. Especially since the end of the Cold War,7 the role of parliamentary institutions in international relations has grown to such an extent that some scholars now talk about a ‘parliamentarization of regionalization 4  Roberto Aliboni, ‘The Role of International Organizations in the Mediterranean’, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy Working Paper, no. 01/002 (2001), p. 2. 5  A security complex is defined as ‘a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’; see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 12. The idea of regional security complexes was originally developed by Buzan, and lately worked upon by Wæver, and is now part of the Copenhagen School’s collective theoretical approach to security. The theory aims at providing a conceptual framework that captures the emergent new structure of international security, drawing on the assumptions of the post-Cold War international relations’ take on a more regionalized character, and that insecurity is often associated with proximity, since most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones. In addition to the above-mentioned work, see also Barry Buzan, ‘New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century’, International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 3 (1991), pp. 431–451; Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 6  Šabič and Bojinovic, ‘Mapping a Regional Institutional Architecture’, pp. 329–331. 7  Nonetheless, the origins of international parliamentary institutions can be dated back to the establishment of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1889, with a wish to create a permanent institutional structure for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

10. the parliamentary assembly of the mediterranean

195

and globalization’.8 In particular, Andrés Malamud and Stelios Stavridis claim that parliamentary institutions generally engage in international affairs in three major ways: 1) by strengthening their oversight capacity vis-à-vis national governments’ foreign policy; 2) by conducting parallel diplomatic relations, known as parliamentary diplomacy, at the bilateral and multilateral levels; and 3) by establishing and empowering parliaments as representative bodies of international or regional organizations.9 In the Mediterranean, too, a ‘complex, multi-level and multi-actor parliamentary scene’10 has developed, consisting of a nested web of interactions among sub-state parliamentary actors, national parliaments and international parliamentary institutions. Yet unlike the intergovernmental track, in the parliamentary sphere a truly intra-regional pan-Mediterranean institution has actually emerged – the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM), established in 2005. Nevertheless, the literature has devoted little attention to this institution, while mainly focusing on the parliamentary dimension of the Euro– Mediterranean Partnership. As a consequence, this chapter aims to fill this gap and assess the role played by PAM in the fields of democracy promotion and crisis management, which represent the bulk of its mandate. Drawing on the growing academic literature on international parliamentary institutions,11 8  Olivier Costa, Clarissa Dri and Stelios Stavridis, ‘Introduction’, in Olivier Costa, Clarissa Dri and Stelios Stavridis (eds.), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 1. 9  Andrés Malamud and Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliaments and Parliamentarians as International Actors’, in Bob Reinalda (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 101–115. 10  Irene Fernández Molina, Paqui Santonja and Stelios Stavridis, ‘Post-Conflict Libya Reconstruction and Reconciliation’, EISA Conference, Warsaw (September 2013). 11  In addition to references quoted elsewhere in this text, see also Heinrich Klebes, Relations between National Parliaments and International Parliamentary Assemblies, report submitted to the Association of Secretaries General of Parliament (1989); Robert M. Cutler, ‘The Emergence of International Parliamentary Institutions: New Networks of Influence in World Society’, in Gordon S. Smith and Daniel Wolfish (eds.), Who Is Afraid of the State? Canada in a World of Multiple Centres of Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), pp. 201–229; Zlatko Šabič, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2 (2008), pp. 255–271; Lluís Maria de Puig, International Parliaments (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2008); Claudia Kissling, The Legal and Political Status of International Parliamentary Institutions (Berlin: Committee for a Democratic UN, 2011); Andrea Cofelice and Stelios Stavridis, ‘The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI)’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 19, no. 2 (2014),

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

196

cofelice

PAM’s diplomatic activities will be explored in order to identify the kind of tools adopted by the assembly to implement its mandate and to evaluate their real or potential impact. Accordingly, the chapter is structured as follows. The first section places PAM in its historical context and offers an overview of its composition, mandate and internal institutional structure. The second and third sections deal with PAM’s parliamentary diplomacy activities in the fields of democracy promotion and crisis management. Even though these two dimensions are often interconnected in operational terms, for the sake of clarity, they are treated here as analytically distinct. The concluding section summarizes the main findings and identifies the major challenges that constrain the efficacy of PAM’s activities. The timespan of the analysis ranges from PAM’s first session in 2006 to 2014.

Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean: Historical Overview, Composition, Mandate and Institutional Structure

PAM is the only Mediterranean institution where full membership is open exclusively to littoral countries. It is currently composed of 27 full member states12 and twelve international (and/or regional) organizations and institutions with observer status. Its establishment is the result of the institutionalization process of the InterParliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), set up by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 1992. Indeed, having already held seven Inter-Parliamentary Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe between 1973 and 1991, the IPU decided to establish a similar process for the Mediterranean, in order to respond to the main challenges existing in the region. Thus, the IPU parliamentarians from the Mediterranean region met in Malaga in 1992 to set up an inter-parliamentary CSCM. Over its thirteen-year history, the CSCM has held three more interparliamentary conferences: in Valetta (Malta, 1995); Marseilles (France, 2000); and Nafplio (Greece, 2005). The members of the CSCM also met twice a year pp. 145–178; Davor Jancic, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy: The Emergence of Multilayered International Parliamentarism’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (2015), pp. 197–242. 12  Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Syria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia and Turkey.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

10. the parliamentary assembly of the mediterranean

197

at IPU assemblies, to ensure regular dialogue on the most relevant issues for the region. At its fourth and final conference, the participating parliamentarians agreed to transform the CSCM process into a permanent Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean. The objective was threefold: to give more stature to parliamentary diplomacy in the Mediterranean; to provide the region with a unique parliamentary forum of its own, unattached to any intergovernmental process, where members can draw up their own agenda; and to enhance the widest possible participation of Mediterranean states in the parliamentary assembly with equal voting rights, enabling them to proceed to the drawing up of recommendations and opinions on questions of common concern to the Mediterranean.13 In particular, to use the words of Member of Parliament (MP) Cortajarena Iturrioz, the desire on the part of parliamentarians to establish an ad-hoc body for the Mediterranean reflected ‘their confidence in the capacity of parliamentary diplomacy to achieve progress on a number of issues which it has not yet been possible to resolve through official government policy’.14 However, this decision soon triggered an institutional conflict with the European Parliament, which did not take part in the CSCM process, but had been the primary driving force behind the establishment in 1998 of the Parliamentary Forum of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership, transformed in 2004 into the Euro–Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) and, in 2008, into the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM-PA). The European Parliament President Josep Borrell Fontelles addressed official letters to the presidents of national parliaments of the European Union, inviting them not to support the establishment of PAM, in order to avoid costly duplications in an area already covered by the EMPA.15 Nonetheless, after a few months of deliberation, all members attending the preparatory meeting of PAM’s inaugural session (Naples, Italy, June 2005) reaffirmed their national parliaments’ support for the decision to establish PAM as originally agreed.16 As a consequence, PAM could hold its first plenary session in Amman, Jordan, in September 2006. 13  Elsa Papadimitriou, Security and Stability in the Mediterranean Region, Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union Doc. 1939 (2006), para. 310. 14  Cortajarena Iturrioz, The Development of Interparliamentary Cooperation among the Mediterranean Countries, Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union Doc. 1875, para. 41. 15  Papadimitriou, Security and Stability in the Mediterranean Region, para. 311–312. 16  Inter-Parliamentary Union, Report on the Results of the Preparatory Meeting of the Inaugural Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, in Results of the

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

198

cofelice

The bulk of PAM’s mandate is twofold and consists, on the one hand, of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and crisis management through parliamentary diplomacy, and, on the other hand, in promoting human rights and democracy. As to the first dimension, Article 3 of its Statute states that PAM’s mission is to develop cooperation among its members by promoting political dialogue and understanding, notably by: fostering and building confidence among Mediterranean states; promoting regional security, stability and peace; and consolidating the endeavours of Mediterranean states. Even though democracy and human rights are not explicitly mentioned, they are extensively dealt with in plenary and committee resolutions and declarations. For instance, the Final Declaration of PAM’s inaugural session (Amman, 2006) expresses the hope that the creation of the assembly will assist in the consolidation and deepening of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Similarly, the ‘Charter of the Mediterranean’ – that is, PAM’s political manifesto, which was unanimously adopted at its third plenary session (Monaco, 2008) – mentions democracy and human rights as the core values that lay down ‘the foundation stones for the actions of PAM’. Each of PAM’s 27 national delegations can be represented by a maximum of five members, elected or appointed by, and from among, national parliaments, with equal voting and decision-making powers. In addition to the plenary assembly, which meets once a year, generally for a three-day session, the core of PAM’s work is conducted within three standing committees, which deal with: political and security-related cooperation; economic, social and environmental cooperation; and dialogue among civilizations and human rights.17 The continuity of PAM’s work is assured by the Bureau,18 composed of the assembly’s president, who is elected for a two-year term, four vice-presidents and the presidents of the three standing committees, as well as a permanent Secretariat,19 which was established in Malta in November 2007. The genesis of PAM, its strict link to the IPU and the CSCM process, and its twofold mandate, have affected its internal structure, composition and 113th Assembly and Related Meetings (Geneva: IPU, 17–19 October 2005), p. 69. A memorandum of understanding between PAM and UfM-PA was signed only in 2013. 17  Moreover, PAM has occasionally set up ad-hoc committees or special task forces to tackle a particular topic, such as the Middle East peace process, migration, free trade, terrorism, climate change, natural resources management, energy and gender issues. 18  Its main task is to inject policy guidance, and to prioritize and steer the activities of PAM. 19  The Secretariat assists the organs of PAM in the execution of their mandate and is responsible for the follow-up to the decisions taken by the assembly. Moreover, it interacts with national delegations, as well as with regional and international bodies that share an interest in the Mediterranean region.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

10. the parliamentary assembly of the mediterranean

199

f­unctioning in a variety of ways. First of all, the mandate of PAM’s standing committees reflects the tried and tested Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)/CSCM system of three different baskets.20 Moreover, as with the IPU, the composition of national delegations and the appointment, removal or substitution of individual members are decided at the sole discretion of national parliaments.21 PAM’s statutory rules simply invite members to include ‘male and female parliamentarians in their delegation’ (Article 11), but, for instance, contain no provision requiring delegations to guarantee a fair and balanced representation of the various political orientations existing in national assemblies. Put bluntly, the assembly seems to show no interest in ensuring the ‘input legitimacy’ of its members – that is, in evaluating whether they are MPs in the Western, liberal sense of the word, or whether they are ‘parliamentary arms of governing elites’, arriving at PAM to defend national positions in the same way that diplomats do at intergovernmental conferences.22 This practice is partially in contrast with the approach adopted by other IPIs, especially those inter-regional parliamentary assemblies where the European Parliament is represented, including the UfM-PA, but also the (ACP)–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (that is, between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states) or the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly (the European Parliament and eastern neighbours Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). In all these parliamentary forums, the European Parliament is increasingly invoking, although not always in a consistent way, the need to respect minimum legitimacy criteria for their counterparts to be accepted as members of these assemblies. Thus, for instance, in connection to the recent upheavals in the Arab world, the UfM-PA has suspended Syria’s membership, as well as Libya’s observer status. PAM has not endorsed a similar approach: not only has it never considered the suspension of any delegation, but when the Syrian delegation could not attend the ninth PAM session in Monaco in 2015 because of the French authorities’ refusal to issue transit visas, on the grounds that some of the Syrian members were the subject of EU sanctions, PAM President Francesco Amoruso (Italy), in his inaugural speech, openly 20  The three main chapters, or ‘baskets’, of the negotiations forming part of the CSCE process were: (I) political and security-related cooperation; (II) economic cooperation, including technology, science and environment-related issues; and (III) human rights, fundamental freedoms and humanitarian issues. The IPU’s CSCM activity drew on this model. 21  Article 2 of PAM’s ‘Rules of Procedure’. 22  Roderick Pace and Stelios Stavridis, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, 2004–2008: Assessing the First Years of the Parliamentary Dimension of the Barcelona Process’, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 2 (2010), p. 103.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

200

cofelice

blamed France for the absence of the Syrians.23 Undoubtedly, PAM’s approach may appear as rather inconsistent with its stated efforts aimed at promoting democracy and the rule of law in the region. However, it may be seen as functional to its ‘diplomatic mission’. Indeed, as observed by De Vrieze, the fact that PAM works with all of the parliaments of the region enables it to get involved in various initiatives of parliamentary diplomacy and mediation, including facilitating UN missions and conveying messages from the EU’s leadership to the representatives of the Syrian government and parliament.24 To use the words of former PAM President Rudy Salles (France), ‘the spirit of PAM is to create dialogue and respect differences of opinion, and [. . .] no single Member State will ever be condemned under the auspices of PAM’.25 What kinds of functions and tools have been adopted by PAM to implement its conflict resolution and democracy promotion mandates? To begin with, since PAM is an autonomous parliamentary institution and has no intergovernmental counterpart, it cannot exercise ‘core’ parliamentary functions, such as policy-making and oversight over the executive. In general terms, its powers are of a deliberative nature, consisting of the possibility to adopt non-legally binding reports, opinions, resolutions, recommendations and declarations, which are regularly transmitted to national parliaments and governments, regional organizations and international forums. These ‘soft diplomacy’ tools are in principle adopted by consensus or, if this cannot be mustered, by a fourfifths majority of the votes cast. Once again, this practice is consistent with PAM’s role as a ‘centre of excellence for regional parliamentary diplomacy’, where dialogue and consensus are preferred to confrontation and harsh debates. However, the literature on IPIs has identified several less conventional ­parliamentary functions that are related both to conflict prevention and 23  He stated: ‘It is with great regret that I must inform the Assembly of the absence of the Syrian delegation, who could not attend our meeting because of the refusal of the French authorities to issue transit visas. It is a very serious circumstance, considering the very nature of our Assembly as an instrument of parliamentary diplomacy at the service of peace and regional security. I personally notified the position of the Presidency of PAM to the ambassador of France in Italy’; address by H.E. Sen. Francesco Amoruso, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, 9th PAM Plenary Session, Principality of Monaco (2–4 February 2015), available online at www.pam.int/default .asp?m=news&id=586 (last accessed in February 2015). 24  Franklin De Vrieze, Study on Parliamentary Cooperation: Mapping and Analysis of International Parliamentary Institutions and Parliamentary Networks in the Western Balkans and South East Europe (Brussels: European Commission, 2015), p. 41. 25  Executive Report of PAM’s Fourth Plenary Session, Istanbul, Turkey (23–24 October 2009).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

10. the parliamentary assembly of the mediterranean

201

r­ esolution, and to the promotion and consolidation of democracy, human rights and rule of law.26 Space limitations mean that the next two sections of this chapter will assess PAM’s activities only in connection to four such functions: those of ‘norm entrepreneurship’ and technical assistance as far as democracy promotion is concerned; and those of a ‘moral tribune’ and parliamentary diplomacy per se with regard to conflict resolution and crisis management.

PAM’s Promotion of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: A Norm Entrepreneur ‘on Paper’?

Between 2006 and 2014, PAM held eight plenary sessions, during which 24 resolutions were adopted on a wide range of issues dealing with democracy, human rights and the rule of law, especially drawing on the work of the first and third standing committees. Some of the most debated issues include: religious freedom and dialogue among cultures; the fight against organized crime (including ‘Eco-Mafias’)27 in the Mediterranean; the definition and root causes of terrorism; forced migrations; gender and equality issues; education; job creation and unemployment in the Mediterranean; corruption; rights of persons with disabilities (the full list of adopted resolutions is reported in Table 1 below). However, what qualifies PAM’s role as a norm entrepreneur is the fact that some of these resolutions do not simply reaffirm the validity of universally 26  See, in particular, Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy: Any Lessons for Regional Parliaments?’, in Mario Kölling, Stelios Stavridis and Natividad Fernández Sola, The International Relations of the Regions: Subnational Actors, Para-diplomacy and Multilevel Governance (Zaragoza: University of Zaragoza, 2006), pp. 55–81; Zlatko Šabič, ‘Democracy across Borders: Parliamentarians and International Public Spheres’, Javnost– The Public, vol. 15, no. 3 (2008), pp. 75–88; Daniel Fiott, ‘On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Madariaga Paper, vol. 4, no. 7 (2011); Davor Jancic, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy in the European Union’, in Henk Kummeling et al. (eds.), De samengestelde Besselink: Bruggen bouwen tussen nationaal, Europees en international recht (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012), pp. 109–119; Stelios Stavridis, ‘Responsibility to Protect: What Role for Parliamentary Diplomacy?’, ReShape Online Papers Series, no. 2 (2013); Stelios Stavridis and Irene Fernández Molina, ‘El Parlamento Europeo y el conflicto de Libia (2011): una tribuna moral eficiente?’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, no. 101 (2013), pp. 153–176. 27  The report Eco-Mafias and Their Impact on the Mediterranean, which was unanimously adopted on 12 October 2012 during the seventh PAM Plenary Session (Malta), employs the term ‘eco-mafia’ to refer to ‘criminal organizations that commit crimes that damage the environment’ (para. 2).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

202

cofelice

Table 1  PAM’s resolutions on crisis management and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law (2006–2014) Plenary Session

First Committee: Political and Security-Related Cooperation

Third Committee: Dialogue among Civilizations and Human Rights

2nd Session Malta (2007) 3rd Session Monaco (2008)

– Regional issues: the Middle East – ‘Charter of the Mediterranean’ – The work of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Middle East in 2008 – The Middle East – The fight against organized crime – The definition of terrorism – The Middle East – Organized crime – The root causes of terrorism

– Dialogue and human rights

4th Session Turkey (2009)

5th Session Morocco (2010)

6th Session Italy (2011)

7th Session Malta (2012)

8th Session France (2014)

– The Middle East – Organized crime – New strategies in countering terrorism – Middle East peace process and events in the Arab world – Eco-Mafias and their impact on the Mediterranean – Political developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region – Strategies to combat public sector corruption

– Gender and equality issues – Migration – Religious freedom and dialogue of cultures – Building on dialogue – Forced migration – Women in political life in the Mediterranean – Inter-cultural and interreligious dialogue in the Western Balkans – Palestinian women refugees – Achieving gender equality – Migrations and revolutions – Domestic violence

– Education – Job creation and unemployment in the Mediterranean – The role of women in the Arab Spring – Access of people with disabilities to the labour market

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

10. the parliamentary assembly of the mediterranean

203

r­ ecognized human rights principles, but try to reinterpret them. On the one hand, there has been a clear attempt by PAM members to propose new international legal concepts and definitions. In this sense, the most prominent example is the resolution on the definition of terrorism, which was adopted in 2009 by the fourth PAM plenary session. This outcome is dubious because the subject remains one of the most vehemently debated issues in international bodies.28 The resolution defines terrorism as: [. . .] violence or the threat of violence, induced by political, ideological, religious or ethnic motives. Terrorist actions are carried out or designed to achieve maximum publicity, and to produce effects beyond the immediate damage to people, property and the environment. The methods used are extreme, destruction is ruthless, and the behaviour is not constrained by the rules of war. The nature of violence is such so as to provoke fear and intimidation.29 The resolution was adopted by a large majority of parliamentary delegations. Only France expressed its reservation about the legal implications of acts of terrorism committed by states (Preamble, paragraph 14 of the resolution), while Israel did not take part in voting. Further attempts have been made over time, less successfully, to define other crimes, such as ‘forced migrations’ (fourth plenary session, 2009) and ‘organized waste trafficking’ (seventh session, 2012). On the other hand, PAM has repeatedly sought to harmonize member states’ legislation. Even though it has not followed the example of other IPIs by

28  Because of complex political and legal problems, there is no universal agreement on a comprehensive definition of ‘terrorism’ in public international law. Since 2000, the United Nations General Assembly has been negotiating a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, including a definition of terrorism, but has been unable to finalize it so far. As a way of getting round the problem, the international community has either adopted a number of sectoral conventions, aimed at criminalizing specific types of terrorist activities (such as the taking of hostages in civil aviation and financing terrorism, etc.), or agreed upon non-binding definitions (see, in particular, the general definition contained in Security Council Resolution 1566 of October 2004). Moreover, other international organizations have their own official definitions of terrorism, including the 2002 EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. 29  PAM, ‘Resolution on the Definition of Terrorism’, Fourth Plenary Session, Istanbul, Turkey (23–24 October 2009), Art. 24.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

204

cofelice

adopting formal ‘model laws’,30 PAM has frequently called on the participating national parliaments to adapt their legal and institutional frameworks to international standards in a number of fields, including family law (fourth plenary session, 2009), electoral gender quotas (fifth plenary session, 2010), domestic violence (sixth plenary session, 2011), access of people with disabilities to the labour market, and strategies to combat public sector corruption (eighth session, 2014). However, the main limit of this strategy is that PAM has not set up a systematic follow-up mechanism to assess the level of implementation of its recommendations. Moreover, all of the informative reports produced by its rapporteurs are essentially of a thematic nature, and contain only general information regarding specific country situations. As a consequence, it is not possible to evaluate the extent to which the norms proposed by the assembly have been effectively accepted and internalized by Mediterranean national parliaments. PAM’s role as a norm entrepreneur is thus seriously hampered by this institutionalized deficit. Furthermore, PAM has made limited use of classical technical cooperation tools to promote democracy and the rule of law, such as election observation, technical assistance for constitutional and legal reforms, training seminars for parliamentarians and staff, study tours and civil society empowerment. During the period analysed for this chapter, PAM had not deployed any autonomous election observation missions, while it deployed only one technical cooperation mission – to Bosnia and Herzegovina between 2009 and 2011 – which sought to contribute to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional reform process.31 With the outbreak of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, PAM’s members are becoming increasingly aware of the need to strengthen the assembly’s work on the promotion of democracy. This perception is confirmed, for instance, by the words of MP Michel Vauzelle (France), who, during the seventh plenary session (2012), invoked the necessity to consolidate the work achieved by PAM during the five years of its existence, ‘especially as regards sustaining the democratic expectations of the countries to the South Mediterranean’.32

30  For instance, this is the case with the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community. 31  Information on the mission is contained in the report ‘Constitutional Changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, rapporteur: Hon. Miro Petek (Slovenia), discussed during the Sixth Plenary Session (2011). 32  Executive Report of PAM’s Seventh Plenary Session, Malta (2012), pp. 3–4.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

10. the parliamentary assembly of the mediterranean



205

Parliamentary Diplomacy at the Service of Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management

PAM’s parliamentary diplomacy activity that is aimed at conflict resolution and crisis management can be divided into two distinct phases. During its first four years of existence (2006–2010), PAM’s parliamentary diplomacy was almost totally absorbed by the Middle East conflict, while other conflicts in the region, such as Cyprus and the Western Sahara, did not appear at the top of its agenda. Much of PAM’s work was carried out by the first standing committee and its ad-hoc committee on the Middle East, which was established at the second plenary session (2007). In this respect, the assembly behaved first and foremost as a ‘moral tribune’, taking a clear stance on the need to find a ‘just and durable’ solution to the conflict. The resolutions that have been adopted at each plenary session since 2006, very often by consensus, clarify the assembly’s position on the conflict, which can be summed up by the following excerpts:

· favouring a two-state solution based on relevant UN resolutions; · condemnation of all acts of terrorism, whether perpetrated by individuals, organizations or a state; · condemnation, on the one side, of the Israeli military intervention in Gaza

in December 2008 and January 2009, as well as the blockade of the Gaza strip; on the other side, of the launching of rockets by Hamas militants into southern Israel; calling for the dismantling of the ‘wall of separation’; urging Israel to refrain from settlement-building activities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; calling for a credible and transparent international inquiry to assess the succession of events that led to the death of nine activists of the ‘Free Gaza’ movement on 31 May 2010; calling for intra-Palestinian reconciliation; calling for confidence-building measures by Israel and the Palestinians, such as prisoner releases; judging the Palestinians’ request for recognition of the State of Palestine by the UN as ‘legitimate, justified, merited, and long overdue’.

· · · · · ·

Over time, PAM has also sought to strengthen its visibility and ‘presence on the ground’, mainly by carrying out diplomatic, fact-finding and enquiry missions. The first fact-finding mission in Gaza was organized in May 2009 by PAM Bureau. The objective was to gain perspective on the consequences

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

206

cofelice

of the December 2008/January 2009 conflict, as well as to express solidarity with all innocent victims of the confrontation. Moreover, PAM ’s Bureau also sought to enhance the assembly’s visibility among the key actors in the region, through meetings with political leaders in Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Territories, and to present PAM as a serious and trustworthy partner for future peace negotiations.33 A second mission was organized in November 2013, when a high-level PAM delegation visited the Jordanian Parliament in Amman, the Palestinian Legislative Council in Ramallah and the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem, in order to discuss, among other things, the cross-border impact of the Syrian conflict and the Israeli–Palestinian peace process with the Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli authorities. Moreover, PAM has always supported, through its parliamentary diplomatic network, the efforts of the UN, the Quartet34 and the international community to relaunch direct and indirect talks among the parties, and to find solutions to the permanent status issues of the conflict. In this respect, in February 2010 in Malta PAM organized – together with the UN – an ‘International Meeting in Support of Israeli–Palestinian Peace’ in order to address the five permanent status issues: borders; Jerusalem; settlements; refugees; and water.35 The second phase of PAM’s work (2011–2014) corresponds with the outbreak of the Arab Spring, which opened a window of opportunity by allowing PAM to expand both the geographic scope and the objectives of its parliamentary diplomacy. PAM’s role was particularly crucial in three areas: providing financial support; assisting in constitutional reform processes; and facilitating political missions and humanitarian aid. First, when it comes to financial support, in 2012 PAM managed, through its ongoing cooperation with the major European financial institutions, to facilitate a number of investments and make available € 2.5 billion to finance pilot projects in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The long-term sustainability of these projects was ensured by a memorandum of understanding signed between the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and PAM in 2013. Second, PAM’s technical assistance in constitutional reforms mainly addressed Tunisia and, at least until December 2013, Libya. PAM was indeed 33  PAM, Report on the Mission to the Middle East by PAM Bureau (18–21 May 2009), Fourth Plenary Session (2009). 34  The Quartet includes the UN, US, EU and Russia, and was established in 2002 to mediate the peace process in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. 35  PAM, Report on the Joint PAM/UN Meeting in Support of Israeli–Palestinian Peace, Fifth Plenary Session (2010).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

10. the parliamentary assembly of the mediterranean

207

among the first parliamentary delegations to meet with the new Tunisian authorities. It assisted Tunisia in every phase of the constitutional reform process. As for Libya, in 2012 the IPU and PAM sent a joint mission to the country, endeavouring to help Libyan authorities to re-establish a fully functioning parliament. Moreover, in 2013 PAM organized parliamentary training sessions abroad for Libyan MPs. However, the highly volatile situation that emerged in Libya towards the end of 2013 forced PAM to suspend its assistance programme. Third, PAM’s engagement in Libya also aimed at mobilizing humanitarian aid and supporting the various UN missions in the country. In 2011, PAM assisted the UN envoy mission to Misrata, Libya, in securing a humanitarian corridor. Over time, however, the assembly’s attention turned to the Syrian conflict. PAM was among the regional actors invited to participate at the first Syria Humanitarian Forum, which was held in Geneva on 8 March 2012. On that occasion, PAM offered its full support, through its regional parliamentary network, to humanitarian efforts and political dialogue in Syria, in view of its previous collaboration with the UN system during the 2011 Libyan crisis. From 28 June to 2 July 2013, PAM fielded a mission to Syria and Lebanon in order to address the delicate issues of humanitarian assistance, humanitarian aid delivery and confidence-building measures. In Damascus, PAM delegates met with representatives of the UN as well as with Syrian MPs. The MPs were urged to help reduce the level of violence, scale up protection of the civilian population and enhance the conditions for humanitarian aid. One of the major problems observed by PAM was poor communication between humanitarian agencies and the Syrian government. As a consequence, PAM proposed that frequent meetings between humanitarian agencies and the Syrian National High Relief Committee could be a step towards addressing this problem. During consultations, issues related to the problematic supply of arms to the parties in conflict by outside actors, the sanctions against Syria (which pose an obstacle to an improvement of the humanitarian situation), attacks on UN convoys, as well as detentions and interrogations of political activists, were some of the central themes. Moreover, PAM’s delegation took the opportunity to strengthen communication between the key international actors by transmitting messages from the UN and the EU to the Syrian government.36 Finally, in 2014 PAM launched an initiative to establish a pool of MPs, who are ready to travel at short notice to critical areas, in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians, respect for human rights and the negotiation processes. The initiative received open support 36  PAM, Report on Political Developments in the Middle East and North Africa, Eighth Plenary Session (2014).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

208

cofelice

from several UN bodies, including the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the High Commissioner for Refugees and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Conclusions

The empirical analysis of PAM ’s work during its first eight years of existence allows one to conclude that the assembly’s activities have been much more focused on crisis management and conflict resolution than on ‘traditional’ democracy and human rights promotion. Indeed, the record of PAM’s activities in terms of the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law can be summarized as follows: one technical mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina between 2009 and 2011; an attempt to advance new international legal concepts and definitions; and various proposals aimed at harmonizing national legislation with international human rights standards. However, since PAM established no mechanism to follow up its recommendations, its role as a norm entrepreneur runs a high risk of remaining such merely on paper. This institutional deficit is not of secondary importance if one considers that, after all, one of the keys to the success of the CSCE has been its capacity to monitor the compliance of member states with agreed standards (through the so-called ‘dispositif de suivi’, or follow-up procedure).37 Establishing such an institutional oversight mechanism should thus be a priority for the policy-makers and diplomats involved. In this sense, PAM may benefit from the experience of other IPIs, such as the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Rose–Roth seminars, or the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The latter, for instance, established in the 1990s an ad-hoc Monitoring Committee, which is responsible for verifying the fulfilment of obligations assumed by member states under the Statute of the Council of Europe and the key European human rights conventions. On the other hand, a more proactive role has been played by PAM in terms of regional parliamentary diplomacy aimed at crisis management and conflict resolution. In a first phase (2006–2010), its commitment mainly took the form of a moral tribune addressing the Arab–Israeli conflict. Even though its diplomatic effort did not produce immediate practical results in terms of rap37  Victor-Yves Ghebali, Les conférences de l’Union Interparlamentaire sur la coopération et la sécurité européennes, 1973–1991: contribution de la diplomatie parlementaire à la détente Est–Ouest (Brussels: Bruylant, 1992).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

10. the parliamentary assembly of the mediterranean

209

prochement between the parties, PAM was able to present itself as a trustworthy partner for possible future peace negotiations. After all, PAM represents one of the few international forums where the Israeli and Palestinian parliamentary delegations can meet and engage in direct talks, even though the Israeli participation in PAM sessions has been rather irregular. The Arab Spring has subsequently created the conditions for a more direct parliamentary engagement on the ground, especially through the political activism of PAM’s Secretariat and Bureau. However, this diplomatic work essentially aimed either: (a) to increase PAM’s visibility, which is an understandable objective if one considers the fact that PAM is a relatively recent institution that is operating in a regional environment already densely populated by ‘concurrent’ intergovernmental and parliamentary initiatives; or (b) to support and facilitate initiatives launched by third parties, in particular the UN and the IPU. Only in 2014 did PAM launch a truly autonomous initiative, consisting of the establishment of parliamentary ‘standby units’ for rapid deployment in critical areas. Indeed, one of the main constraints that PAM faces is that many of the key actors for Mediterranean security and stability – including the United States, Russia and partially the EU – are external to the region and do not have full membership, or even observer status, in the assembly. One way to overcome this may be to strengthen gradually PAM’s role as a ‘hub’ providing much-needed coordination of the numerous multilateral initiatives on Mediterranean security. A first step towards this could consist of assessing the state of affairs of the main current initiatives affecting the Mediterranean, in order to identify their major strengths and pitfalls and to formulate useful policy recommendations, a function that after all is not very far from that exercised by parliamentary inquiry committees at the national level. Overall, if these endogenous and exogenous constraints are overcome, PAM can in the long term play a key role in the development of a truly Mediterranean region, by facilitating its coherence and the build-up of common values,38 and thus also laying the foundation for more solid intergovernmental cooperation.

38  Šabič and Bojinovic, ‘Mapping a Regional Institutional Architecture’, p. 317.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Part 3 Global Context

⸪

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 11

Parliamentary Diplomacy and the US Congress: The Case of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Zlatko Šabič Introduction American voters do not seem to imagine their directly elected representatives spending much time on international affairs. As recently as 2014, when asked about their issues of main concern, only 3 per cent of Americans interviewed for a Gallup Poll cited foreign policy.1 These preferences seem to be reflected in the priorities of the members of Congress of the United States. So far, only a few of them can be considered to be prominent figures in international affairs. One worth mentioning is a senator from Arkansas, James William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who held that post for fifteen years and who founded the Fulbright Program. The congressman who most recently captured global media attention was Jesse Helms, senator from North Carolina. His views of internationalism are entirely opposite to Fulbright’s cosmopolitanism, convincingly laid out in The Arrogance of Power.2 Helms has never hesitated to voice his strong scepticism against international institutions, notably the United Nations. The New York Times once portrayed him as ‘the symbol of right-wing hostility toward the United Nations’.3 Critics see the reason for such ‘arrogant’ positions on international issues4 in apparent isolationism from members of Congress, who are considered to be ‘homebound and uninterested in the world’, with reportedly only half of them 1  Andrew Kohut, ‘How Americans View an Unruly World’, Wall Street Journal (4 August 2014), available online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/andrew-kohut-how-americans-view-an -unruly-world-1407195747. 2  J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Random House, 1966). 3  Barbara Crossette, ‘Helms, in Visit to UN, Offers Harsh Message’, The New York Times (21 January 2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/21/world/helms-in-visit -to-un-offers-harsh-message.html?scp=1&sq=Helms,%20in%20Visit%20to%20U.N.,%20 Offers%20Harsh%20Message&st=cse. 4  Recall the infamous renaming of French fries into ‘Freedom fries’ on Capitol Hill, following France’s opposition to the US campaign in Iraq in 2003. See, for example, ‘House Restaurants Change Name of “French Fries” and “French Toast” ’, CNN International (11 March 2003),

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004336346_013 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

214

ŠabiČ

holding a passport.5 Similarly, a foreign minister of the Russian Federation allegedly claimed that ‘more than 80 per cent of [members of Congress] never left the United States’.6 However, none of that appears to be true.7 In fact, members of Congress seem to be quite avid travellers. According to the LegiStorm’s congressional travel database, there have been no fewer than ‘39,357 privately financed trips costing $91.8 million taken by Members of Congress and their staff since the beginning of 2000’.8 Part of the reason why stereotypes about ‘arrogant congressmen’ persist should be attributed to the lack of general knowledge about the nature of members of Congress’s involvement in international affairs and, particularly, about the inter-parliamentary activities of the US Congress. In this regard, a huge gap exists in the existing research that is yet to be filled. This gap is less evident in research about the role of the US Congress in international politics at large. One should not forget, after all, that Congress has the power to declare war.9 But when it comes to Congress’s involvement in inter-parliamentary relations, the scholarship is indeed scarce. The aim of this chapter is to stimulate further research in this area and, to this end, the chapter poses the following question: how has the US Congress been involved in inter-parliamentary cooperation and parliamentary diplomacy? The key dilemma relates to whether the importance of inter-parliamentary cooperation is recognized by Congress as a whole or merely by individual congressmen. The chapter is structured as follows. First, some general observations about the role of the US Congress in international affairs are provided. While the available online at http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/11/freedom.fries/index .html?iref=newssearch. 5  Eric Schmitt and Elisabeth Becker, ‘Insular Congress Appears to be Myth’, The New York Times (4 November 2000), available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/04/world/insular -congress-appears-to-be-myth.html. 6  Michelle Ye Hee Lee, ‘Russia’s Claim that 80 Percent of Congress Never Traveled Overseas’, The Washington Post (18 December 2014), available online at http://www.washingtonpost .com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/12/18/russias-claim-that-80-percent-of-congress-never -traveled-overseas/. 7  Schmitt and Becker, ‘Insular Congress Appears to Be Myth’. 8  See online at http://www.legistorm.com/trip/about.html. 9  Note, however, that this power often clashes with that of the US president, who is also the commander-in-chief, empowered to deploy troops to repel attacks against the United States. See Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Parliamentary Control of Military Missions: Accounting for Pluralism’, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper no. 12 (2006), p. 16, available online at: http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/ Parliamentary-Control-of-Military-Missions. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

11. parliamentary diplomacy and the us congress

215

c­ hapter does not seek to go into details about the literature that touches upon the Congress’s actions or reactions to foreign policy issues that are of concern to the United States, it is important to point out how influential this institution is in international affairs. This discussion sets the ground for analysis, in section two, of the inter-parliamentary activities of the US Congress, beginning with an introduction of the term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’. This section is important, because the chapter here makes a rare attempt to understand the role of the US Congress in parliamentary diplomacy. Furthermore, it reveals certain less-known facts about the inter-parliamentary activities of the US Congress. It is not widely known, for example, that members of Congress played an important part in the evolution of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the ‘United Nations of national parliaments’. The chapter will then, in section three, proceed with an analysis of the relationship between the US Congress and an international parliamentary institution (IPI)10 to which members of Congress pay particular attention: the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA). This case study is chosen to reflect the fact that the United States and Congress place transatlantic relations at the top of their strategic interests. The chapter concludes by stating that, as the historical record of activities of US members of Congress in IPIs indicates, and the case of the NATO PA clearly demonstrates, the involvement by members of the US Congress in parliamentary diplomacy deserves further research. Analysis in this chapter is based on the literature review, on a historical analysis of Congress’s international action, analysis of relevant primary documents, and personal interviews with (former) members of Congress and staff of the NATO PA. The US Congress as an Actor in the International Arena Scholars believe that ‘it is impossible to understand fully the foreign policymaking process in the United States today without accounting for Congress’.11 10  IPIs are organizations in which members of national parliaments from at least three countries or self-governing territories participate. Of course, not only parliamentarians can create IPIs; states can do that, too, for example by establishing parliamentary organs of international organizations (for example, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe). See Zlatko Šabič, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2 (2008), pp. 255–271. 11  Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, ‘Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: An Overview and Preview’, in Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (eds.), Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 3–17. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

216

ŠabiČ

One only needs to recall that Congress failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles in 1920 and, with it, buried the hope that the League of Nations could become an organization that would effectively maintain international peace and security.12 After the United States’ defeat in Vietnam, and the Watergate affair, Congress stepped up its presence in the international community.13 In the early 1980s, there was widespread opinion in Congress that the original US policy to assist Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion ‘did not go far enough’.14 In 1983, Congress launched a set of activities to increase the level of assistance to the rebels that stood against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which eventually resulted in ‘1985 and 1986 White House decisions to increase aid and provide Stinger missiles’ to the Afghan resistance.15 The League of Nations’ successor, the United Nations (UN), also felt the power of Congress. In 1984, Congress introduced a mechanism to monitor the voting patterns of UN member states that were receiving financial aid from the United States.16 In 1985, several amendments were adopted by Congress with a view to conditioning US payments of dues to the UN,17 which eventually forced the UN to adapt its budgetary decision-making, so that the countries that contribute most to the UN budget had more say in its adoption. The list of globally important political developments where Congress has left its footprint could go on: for example, ‘in 1993, Congress cut off funds for further military operations in Somalia, and in 1994 it prohibited US military action in Rwanda’.18 Nowadays, members of Congress routinely hold numerous hearings and are active on a variety of issues of international concern.19 12  Ralph Stone, Wilson and the League of Nations: Why America’s Rejection? (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967). 13  Douglas J. Bennet Jr, ‘Congress in Foreign Policy: Who Needs It?’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 57, no. 1 (1978), pp. 40–50. 14  James M. Scott, ‘In the Loop: Congressional Influence in American Foreign Policy’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 25, no. 1, 1997, pp. 47–75 at 50–51. 15  Scott, ‘In the Loop’, p. 51. 16  Charles W. Kegley Jr and Steven W. Hook, ‘US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: Did Reagan’s Linkage Strategy Buy Deference or Defiance?’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 3 (1991), pp. 295–312. 17  See, for example, Arthur Kilgore, ‘Kassebaum and Gramm-Rudman’, in Douglas Williams (ed.), The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: System in Crisis (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987), pp. 95–106. 18  Donald Ritchie, The US Congress: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 99. 19  The database of testimonies given to Congress by the Department of State shows that members of Congress are quick to require detailed information about all newly emerged

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

11. parliamentary diplomacy and the us congress

217

On the other hand, very little is known about Congressional experience with inter-parliamentary relations. An early work that to some extent touches upon the topic of parliamentary diplomacy of the US Congress is that by David A. Karns.20 Karns made an important observation that the relations between states encompass interactions among non-governmental actors as well as ‘direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments’.21 He focused on the effect of inter-parliamentary meetings on the foreign policy attitudes of US members of Congress. His analysis concludes that ‘foreign travel’ to inter-parliamentary meetings may lead to a change of the members’ worldviews. Meetings with fellow parliamentarians from other countries can provide an arena for establishing informal interpersonal linkages, but Karns was doubtful about whether these linkages have a significant impact domestically, in particular on the executive branch. Three decades later, Anne-Marie Slaughter revisited the discussion about the impact of inter-parliamentary relations, both domestically and internationally. She has argued that in contemporary international affairs, sub-units of states – regulators, judges, and legislators – do play an important role in the form of a variety of international networks ‘to govern their relations, instituting regular meetings, and even creating their own transgovernmental organizations’.22 When referring specifically to legislators, Slaughter has recognized that their activities can produce concrete results. She rightly mentions that the Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), a network formed in 1978, can serve as a good example in this regard.23 One should also agree with her argument

20 

21  22  23 

issues of significance for US foreign policy, such as recently Ukraine, sanctions against Iran, or the role of the so-called Islamic State; see online at http://www.state.gov/s/h/tst/. David A. Karns, ‘The Effect of Inter-parliamentary Meetings on the Foreign Policy Attitudes of United States Congressmen’, International Organization, vol. 31, no. 3 (1970), pp. 497–513. Karns, ‘The Effect of Inter-parliamentary Meetings on the Foreign Policy Attitudes of United States Congressmen’, p. 497. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 31. In 1986, in a major effort to prevent the United States and the Soviet Union from returning to nuclear testing, the PGA also played an important role. At that time, several members of Congress participated in the PGA, including Thomas J. Downey, a Democrat from New York, who chaired it. See Metta Spencer, ‘“Political” Scientists’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 51 (1995), p. 62; and ‘Six World Leaders Ask Halt in Nuclear Tests until Summit Meeting’, The New York Times (11 March 1986), available online at

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

218

ŠabiČ

that the IPU should have been given more credit for its work,24 because ‘much of the groundwork for the Dayton accord was initiated by Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian deputies at IPU meetings’.25 Overall, however, Slaughter has been rather sceptical about the role and impact of inter-parliamentary cooperation. The key issue seems to lie in the fact that it is very difficult to gauge the actual impact of consultation, deliberation, socialization and exchange of information. Yet, as the ongoing research in this field suggests, the activities of IPIs (‘legislative networks’) cannot be ignored. Any reference to them being ‘meaningless’ begs a counter-factual question. If these institutions were so unimportant, why would states and parliamentarians continuously show interest in them? This question also applies to the US Congress, as discussed below. The US Congress, International Parliamentary Institutions and Parliamentary Diplomacy Vera Squarcialupi uses the term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ to describe ‘both institutional links of a traditional kind as well as those formed spontaneously and then institutionalized, thus enabling parliamentarians, acting within their remit, to tackle major problems which transcend national borders’.26

http://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/11/world/6-world-leaders-ask-halt-in-nuclear-testsuntil-summit-meeting.html. 24  The IPU often finds coverage in the media for the wrong reasons, with parliamentarians being accused of unnecessary ‘junkets’ or because of lavish ceremonies that accompany IPU sessions. See, for example, ‘Taxpayers paid $200,000 for high-flying Cirque du Soleil Show at International Parliamentary Conference in Quebec’, National Post 5 December 2013, available online at http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/12/05/taxpayers -paid-200000-for-high-flying-cirque-du-soleil-show-at-international-parliamentary -conference-in-quebec/. 25  Slaughter, A New World Order, p. 116. Similarly, inter-parliamentary cooperation and the IPU itself were important in setting up the Kosovo Assembly. See Petra Roter and Ana Bojinović Fenko, ‘Parliamentarization in a Post-Conflict Context: The Kosovo Assembly Support Initiative’, Parliamentary Affairs, AOP (14 November 2014), available online at http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/recent. 26  Vera Squarcialupi, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy: The Role of International Assemblies’, report Submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations of the Assembly of the Western European Union, Document A/1685 (2000), p. 4.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

11. parliamentary diplomacy and the us congress

219

These traditional and spontaneous links27 materialize through both formal and ­informal interactions. Their objective is to ‘launch initiatives designed to influence political decisions by the executive and pave the way for practical solutions. Having recourse to more direct, less formal methods of communication in the form of exchanges of views among parliamentarians is one way of achieving this objective’.28 How much do we know about the role of the US Congress in parliamentary diplomacy? Arguably, relatively little. Unlike other national parliaments of comparatively large and powerful countries,29 the US Congress appears to be highly selective in establishing long-term cooperation with other national parliaments and IPIs. So far, members of Congress have institutionalized interparliamentary cooperation with parliaments from just five countries: Canada; Mexico; the Russian Federation; the United Kingdom; and China. The presence of Congress in IPIs is even more modest. Members of Congress meet regularly with members of the European Parliament.30 They regularly participate in

27  Traditional links are typically those that develop through regular interactions among national parliamentarians in bilateral exchanges (for example, bilateral interparliamentary groups), at formal inter-parliamentary meetings (such as the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union) and in international parliamentary organs (such as the European Parliament or the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe). Spontaneous links develop as a result of interpersonal relations between or among parliamentarians who ‘find each other’ because of similar views on a certain issue, which may lead them to develop new initiatives (see below on Rose–Roth seminars), or even create new institutions, such as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 28  Squarcialupi, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, p. 4. 29  For example, the State Duma has established inter-parliamentary groups with more or less all national parliaments in Europe and many others around the world. For the list of inter-parliamentary groups and IPIs in which members of the State Duma participate, see online at http://www.duma.gov.ru/international/. 30  Davor Jančić, ‘The Transatlantic Connection: Democratizing Euro-American Relations through Parliamentary Liaison’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 178–196; Davor Jančić, ‘The European Parliament and EU–US Relations: Revamping Institutional Cooperation’, in Elaine Fahey and Deirdre Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 35–68; and Davor Jančić, ‘Transatlantic Regulatory Interdependence, Law and Governance: The Evolving Roles of the EU and US Legislatures’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (2015), pp. 334–359.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

220

ŠabiČ

the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).31 Given such a modest record of inter-parliamentary activities in which Congress is involved, it may come as a surprise that the history of Congressional involvement in inter-parliamentary affairs is actually long, beginning with the creation of the IPU in 1889.32 Justin R. Whiting, a Democratic representative from Michigan, attended its first meeting.33 Another American member of Congress, a Republican representative from Missouri, Richard Bartholdt,34 was an important advocate of the United States’ presence in the IPU. He argued that, as a rising world power, the United States must be actively involved in matters of peace and security at all levels, including the inter-parliamentary level. He believed that the IPU was the right place for the United States and its Congress to strengthen the country’s international presence. Originally, Bartholdt’s thoughts were met with sympathies and enormous interest in the United States, as the meeting of the IPU in St Louis, Missouri, in 1904 clearly demonstrated.35 Later, however, enthusiasm and interest in the IPU gradually subsided. This was in part because of resistance in Congress, mostly from among the Republican ranks, which showed hardly any tolerance towards any ‘anti-Americanism’ displayed at IPU meetings,36 even though some Republican members of Congress tried to persuade both their colleagues and governmental officials that the IPU was a perfect venue for conducting p ­ arliamentary 31  Matthew Eric Glassman, Congressional Membership and Appointment Authority to Advisory Commissions, Boards, and Groups (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015). 32  Yefime Zarjevski, The People Have the Floor: A History of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1989). 33  Besides the American delegate, the first meeting was attended by 55 French, 30 British, five Italian and one representative each from Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Hungary and Liberia; See Georghe Sbârnâ, ‘The Inter-parliamentary Conferences: Elements of Participation to the Construction of the European Ideas’, in Ion Stanciu and Silviu Miloiu (eds.), Europe as Viewed from the Margins: An East–Central European Perspective during the Long 19th Century (Târgoviste: Cetatea de Scaun, 2006). 34  For a short biography of Bartholdt, see online at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/ biodisplay.pl?index=B000196. 35  Hayne Davis, Among the World’s Peacemakers: An Epitome of the Inter-Parliamentary Union; with Sketches of Eminent Members of this International House of Representatives and of Progressive People who are Promoting the Plan for Permanent Peace which this Union of Lawmakers Has Espoused (New York: The Progressive Publishing Co., 1907) p. 24. 36  For example, the Reagan administration strongly objected to members of Congress attending an IPU meeting in Havana in 1981; see ‘No Support for US Group; Administration Won’t Fly Legislators to Conference in Cuba’, Boston Globe (9 September 1981).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

11. parliamentary diplomacy and the us congress

221

diplomacy, especially during the Cold War.37 Judging by the views of the ­conservative observers in Washington DC, that scepticism against the IPU may well continue to persist.38 The other source of pressure on members of Congress to consider seriously travelling abroad, including to IPU meetings, has always come from the media, which for decades tended to brand Congressional trips to IPU meetings as junkets.39 Members of Congress who could voice plausible arguments for continuous participation in the IPU were difficult to find.40 The US Congress has de facto not participated in IPU meetings since 1994. In fact, just a few years later, Congress decided to end its membership in the IPU. According to a report: Congress [. . .] notified the IPU that, given the diminished congressional participation, [it] could no longer justify the annual US contribution of almost $1 million or 15% of the IPU annual budget and [. . .] proposed to make an annual donation of $500,000 to support the aims of the organization. The IPU Executive Committee did not accept the offer so, in 1998, the Congress passed legislation to end US participation on October 1, 1999.41 37  Referring to the same Cuban case, Edward J. Derwinsky, a Republican representative from Illinois, argued that he understood the position of Reagan’s government, but that it should be borne in mind that representatives of parliaments worldwide gather at those meetings, and that in such settings advocacy and persuasion matter: ‘it is important for the US delegation to attend both for the exchange of ideas and to defend against antiAmerican propaganda’; see Jim Davis, ‘US Delegation Plans Cuba Trip’, Boston Globe (10 September 1981). 38  Ted R. Bromund, ‘Why the United States Should Not Join the Inter-Parliamentary Union’, WebMemo, no. 2348 (2009), available online at http://www.heritage.org/research/ reports/2009/03/why-the-united-states-should-not-join-the-inter-parliamentary-union. 39  See, among many others, John Fisher, ‘Globalists End Session, Head for Free Load’, Chicago Daily Tribune (15 October 1953); Kelly Smith, ‘“Hill” Groups Flown Abroad Tire of Junket Designation’, The Washington Post Times Herald (1967); ‘Foreign Travel Spending by Congress’, Christian Science Monitor (1977); ‘Lawmakers Away on Foreign Trips’, The New York Times (14 April 1982). 40  For example, Senator Edward Zorinsky, a Democrat from Nebraska, defended his trip to an IPU meeting in Ottawa by saying that ‘the United States has not had strong representation at past conferences, attended by many officials who later become chiefs of state in developing countries. For that reason, it is important for the United States to be well represented by Foreign Relations Committee members’; see Omaha World Herald (4 August 1985). 41  Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino and Francis T. Miko, Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of US Foreign Policy? (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), p. 31.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

222

ŠabiČ

Transatlantic Parliamentary Cooperation and the US Congress: Creation of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

The increasing displeasure with the IPU did not mean the end of Congressional inter-parliamentary activities. Growing tensions between the two superpowers and the resulting Cold War prompted governments and members of NATO to seek ways to strengthen transatlantic ties between the United States and Europe. One way of doing so was to facilitate stronger transatlantic interparliamentary cooperation.42 The first initiative, aimed at creating an inter-parliamentary institution within NATO, came from Norway.43 The proposal was made during the 1951 Ottawa session of the North Atlantic Council. The initial reaction from the United States was favourable. US President Harry Truman said that the ‘setting up of a conference combining European with American parliamentarians could not be other than beneficial’.44 The US Congress also responded favourably to the idea of creating a parliamentary dimension of the Atlantic alliance. Senator Fulbright supported the idea of an Atlantic Assembly, a parliamentary body that could include members from NATO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – two key transatlantic institutions at the time.45 This new body would replace the informal character of meetings of parliamentarians from the NATO member states.46 Several other senators and prominent political figures supported the idea of a ‘super Atlantic Community to merge the economic, defence and foreign policies of the United States with other [Western European] countries [. . .] and establishment of an advisory Atlantic Assembly’.47 Some parliamentarians went as far as to suggest the

42  Incidentally, the idea of transatlantic parliamentary cooperation as such is not new. Little is it known that federalists from the mid-nineteenth century talked about an ‘Atlantic Federation’ with democratic representation; see Ira Straus, ‘Atlantic Federalism and the Expanding Atlantic Nucleus’, Peace & Change, vol. 24, no. 3 (1999), pp. 277 and 317. 43  Christian Brumter, The North Atlantic Assembly (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Press, 1986), p. 3. 44  Brumter, The North Atlantic Assembly, p. 6. 45  Joseph Harned, ‘Atlantic Assembly – a Genesis’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (1965), pp. 183–199, p. 185. 46  Richard Neff, ‘Fulbright: Strength in Unity’, The Christian Science Monitor (4 May 1963), p. 13. 47  Eugene Griffin, ‘Propose Super Nato Agency to Set Policy’, Chicago Daily Tribune (12 December 1954), p. 18.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

11. parliamentary diplomacy and the us congress

223

c­ reation of an Assembly as an additional organ of NATO.48 That would have been compatible with Article 2 of the NATO Treaty.49 However, none of these proposals received sufficient support from NATO member states. Although the governments accepted the idea that their parliaments should be actively involved in discussing issues of importance to NATO (in the light of the aforementioned Article 2), they were less enthusiastic about creating a parliamentary body as part of NATO’s institutional structure.50 They did not seem to see how the so-called democratic–federative culture of the NATO Assembly, as a weak body, could be compatible with the intergovernmental culture of the NATO Council.51 The US State Department, too, was sceptical about the possible development of a parliamentary wing of NATO, but at the same time it believed that ‘supplementary efforts outside the NATO organizational structure offer significant opportunities’ for parliamentary diplomacy. In particular: The Department welcomes the initiative which the Congress has taken in conjunction with other NATO parliamentary bodies to establish regular inter-parliamentary conferences. We believe that such conferences will help to foster closer personal contact and understanding among individual legislators, will stimulate greater public knowledge and support of the NATO relationship, and will provide unique opportunities for the mutual study and discussion of common Atlantic problems by outstanding political leaders in several NATO countries.52 The NATO PA was eventually established in 1955. The US Congress adopted a resolution enabling it to cooperate with the NATO PA in 1956,53 but NATO member 48  ‘Atlantic Assembly Urged to Aid NATO’, The Christian Science Monitor (24 May 1952), p. 5. 49  The article says, inter alia, that ‘the Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being’ (emphasis added). 50  David Hobbs, ‘The Assembly from 1955 to 1989’, in NATO Parliamentary Assembly 1955– 2005: 50 Years of Parliamentary Diplomacy (Brussels: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2005), pp. 31–43 at p. 33. 51  See Straus, ‘Atlantic Federalism and the Expanding Atlantic Nucleus’, p. 317. 52  Carl Marcy and Morella Hansen, ‘A Note on American Participation in Interparliamentary Meetings’, International Organization, vol. 13, no. 3 (1959), pp. 431–438 at pp. 437–438. 53  Section 5 of the ‘Joint Resolution to Authorize Participation by the United States in Parliamentary Conferences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’, approved on 11 July 1956 (22 U.S.C. 1928e).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

224

ŠabiČ

states were slow to recognize its importance for the functioning of the Alliance. Only in the 1974 Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations (paragraph 13) did NATO member states acknowledge ‘that the cohesion of the Alliance has found expression not only in cooperation among their governments, but also in the free exchange of views among the elected representatives of the peoples of the Alliance. Accordingly, they declare their support for the strengthening of links among Parliamentarians’.54 Yet the lack of formal links between NATO and the NATO PA left the assembly at the margins of the decision-making processes, essentially reducing it to a kind of ‘think tank’, with limited opportunities to interact directly with NATO governments, let alone with the power to have a meaningful impact on policies concerning transatlantic relations. Still, not everyone in the US Congress saw the NATO PA in that way. Jacob K. Javits, a senator from New York, implicitly recognized traces of parliamentary diplomacy taking place in the NATO PA. He pointed out that he and his fellow members of Congress who attended sessions of the NATO PA had often returned home as advocates of decisions and guidelines adopted in this IPI.55 Yet his impressions could not remove doubts about the NATO PA, given its complete lack of power. As put by Jeffrey Laurenti: Why should serious politicians invest serious time in it? True, the experience of existing efforts to place a parliamentary patina over international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Assembly, suggests that members of Congress and parliaments can be drawn to short, scripted gatherings if the time and especially the place are right. But it is fair to say that these meetings garner little substantive interest from the press, the public, or politicians themselves.56 Indeed, we have so far seen that sceptics do not see much value in interparliamentary activities of the US Congress, especially if tangible results from these meetings are expected. Yet we have also noted more optimistic views, 54  The declaration was approved at the North Atlantic Council Session in Ottawa on 19 June 1974, and signed by the Heads of NATO Governments in Brussels on 26 June 1974. See the full text of the document online at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_26901.htm? 55  J. Allan Hovey Jr, The Superparliaments: Interparliamentary Consultation and Atlantic Cooperation (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 94. 56  Jeffrey Laurenti, ‘An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come’, in Saul Mendlowitz and Barbara Walker (eds.), Reader on Second Assembly Parliamentary Proposals (Wayne, NJ: Center for UN Reform Education, 2003), pp. 119–129 at p. 122.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

11. parliamentary diplomacy and the us congress

225

where IPIs are seen not only as a useful venue for exchange of views and ­convergence between the opposing positions, but also as a place to create new ideas. The role played by the NATO PA in Europe after the end of the Cold War offers some good arguments in favour of optimists. The US Congress and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in the Post-Cold War Period As already pointed out, the NATO PA was a rather marginal actor for much of the Cold War period. When the context of international cooperation changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, the context for the development of a greater role for the NATO PA changed too. The enthusiasm of countries that used to be part of the Soviet bloc to change their political systems from autocracy to parliamentary democracy was enormous. Yet it was also obvious at that time that any fast transition was bound to create instability. On the other hand, the geopolitical map changed dramatically. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, a huge vacuum was left behind. NATO itself was faced with an identity crisis. As some authors argued, the question of whether NATO was still needed at the time, when its starkest adversary had disappeared, seemed quite relevant.57 For NATO, one thing seemed clear: it needed to revise its strategic orientation and allow no expansion to the east for the time being. The US Congress itself apparently showed very little interest in NATO’s future until as late as 1994, when the Partnership for Peace was created.58 Judging by the memories of senior politicians with ample experience both in Congress and in the NATO PA, however, there had been strong support in Congress for enlargement well before 1994, and members of Congress had exercised an early political pressure on the US government to begin the enlargement process. According to Douglas Bereuter, a former representative from Nebraska (1979–2004), chairman of the US House Delegation and former president of the NATO PA (2002–2004), ‘we made it clear to President [George H.W.] Bush that the Congress as a whole was very much in favor of continuing enlargement’, because membership in both NATO and the European Union ‘was a key factor in driving forward democratic and economic reforms and 57  John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, vol. 19, no. 3 (winter 1994–1995), pp. 5–49 at pp. 13–14. 58  Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 79.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

226

ŠabiČ

military reforms in these various countries that have been in the Warsaw Pact or in parts of Yugoslavia’.59 Such a proactive stance in Congress was welcomed among supporters of enlargement in the NATO PA, because of the power that Congress holds within the US political system of checks and balances. ‘Europeans and Canadians understood this so they frequently wanted to make sure that we could participate fully in the NATO PA activities.’60 Of course, according to John Tanner, a former representative from Tennessee (1988–2011) and former president of the NATO PA (2008–2010), one could not have expected too much from the NATO PA: ‘This is a parliamentary organization where views are exchanged; but decisions such as expansion have to be made by a consensus of governments in Brussels’.61 Still, according to Bereuter, the exchange of views and ideas in the NATO PA was very important, both for members of Congress, who could share their impressions with their colleagues back in Washington DC, but also for parliamentarians in Europe: ‘the American presence makes the Assembly more significant in the eyes of national parliaments than it would otherwise have been’.62 In sum, therefore, while one may agree that Congress did not play a decisive role in shifting the US government’s position towards NATO enlargement, it could be suggested that the presence of members of Congress in the NATO PA and their early communications with the political leadership in the United States to some extent played a role in the process of changing that position. Perhaps an even more important contribution of Congress to the NATO PA was to the process of ‘socialization’ in the form of the so-called Rose–Roth seminars, which are named after two already mentioned former presidents of the NATO PA: Congressman Charlie Rose and Senator William Roth. As much as former Soviet satellite states from Central and Eastern Europe wanted to join NATO as soon as possible, they were not fully prepared for a transition to parliamentary democracy. Moreover, fearful of a rash merger of the East and 59  60  61  62 

Personal interview (16 September 2006), San Francisco, CA. Personal interview (16 September 2006), San Francisco, CA. Personal interview (29 September 2006), Washington, DC. Personal interview (29 September 2006), Washington, DC. The presence that Bereuter refers to was indeed quite visible. When Eastern European countries began their political transformation to parliamentary democracy and the first discussions about NATO enlargement began, Charlie Rose, a congressman from North Carolina, was at the helm of the NATO PA (1990–1992). William Roth, a senator from Delaware, was the president of the NATO PA from 1996–1998. When studying Asmus’ comprehensive analysis of NATO enlargement (Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door), one can see that the debate about the enlargement was at a critical juncture precisely during Roth’s tenure.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

11. parliamentary diplomacy and the us congress

227

the West, some NATO PA members ‘were worried about a consequent loss of identity as a result of engagement with [Central and East European] countries, as the Assembly would cease to be a purely transatlantic forum’; whereas others also ‘questioned the wisdom in giving countries with questionable democratic credentials the legitimacy afforded by association with the Assembly’.63 When Eastern European countries began their political transformation to parliamentary democracy and when first discussions about NATO enlargement began, recalled Simon Lunn, then deputy secretary-general of the NATO PA, members of Congress began to travel to Eastern European countries. In the wake of one such visit (to Romania and then still existing Czechoslovakia in 1990), Congressman Rose witnessed the state of affairs in which these ‘new’ parliaments found themselves. Rose asked Lunn whether the NATO PA ‘could do something’ to bring them closer to their Western colleagues in the Assembly. Lunn suggested smaller meetings, in the form of seminars and training programmes, which would focus on the needs of parliamentarians. The idea was pursued and Congressman Rose and Senator Roth introduced the seminars, which were designed to ‘teach’ and promote parliamentary democracy in the former Soviet bloc.64 Yet those seminars were about much more than just ‘teaching’; they were about parliamentary diplomacy in the NATO PA. Namely, the seminars were designed also ‘to promote a sense of partnership and cooperation at the legislative level, and to improve mutual understanding among legislators of their various problems and perspectives’.65 In the meantime, at more than 90 seminars held until mid-2015, many links among parliamentarians from the East and the West have been created.66 The impact of these linkages is difficult to evaluate, but the seminars have been important for the NATO PA as a valuable contact point between parliamentarians from NATO member states and members from national parliaments in the (often volatile) NATO neighbourhood.

63  Trine Flockhart, ‘Masters and Novices: Socialization and Social Learning through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’, International Relations, vol. 18, no. 3 (2004), pp. 361–380 at pp. 371–372. 64  Personal interview (3 August 2006), Washington, DC. 65  Flockhart, ‘Masters and Novices’, p. 372. 66  For the list of seminars, see online at http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT= 3089.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

228

ŠabiČ

Conclusion Inter-parliamentary activities of the US Congress attract relatively little attention from scholars and practitioners. There are valid reasons for this: there are only a few existing links between Congress and national parliaments around the world, and even fewer with IPIs. Congress is one of the most powerful parliaments in the world and it arguably does not need IPIs to promote its views and interests abroad. Some scholars who write about inter-parliamentary activities in general, and about IPIs in particular, are also sceptical about those processes and institutions. In their view, IPIs are merely talking shops, with little, if any, impact on international affairs. Nevertheless, this chapter has demonstrated that members of Congress and the US Congress itself give some importance to inter-parliamentary cooperation and certainly see some potential in IPIs as a forum for parliamentary diplomacy. It is not commonly known that Congress has had a lengthy experience with IPIs. The members of Congress who took part in the development of the IPU successfully introduced it to the American domestic political scene. It is true that Congress gradually saw less and less value in the IPU as a ‘useful’ forum, mainly because of ideological differences among its members, and that it scaled down its participation and eventually discontinued its membership in the IPU, but that did not mean the end of Congressional cooperation with IPIs. Specifically, Congress recognized the NATO PA as an important institution to strengthen transatlantic partnership and a place for advocacy concerning NATO’s enlargement immediately at the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of the 1990s, views among Western states about NATO enlargement were anything but united. Such a discord seemed to have opened some room for parliamentary diplomacy, and, very importantly as it turned out later, to some fresh ideas that – with the support of several members of Congress – helped the NATO PA play a somewhat more visible role in the transatlantic institutional architecture. Although it was, of course, governments that determined the pace of the enlargement process, it would be fair to say that the NATO PA was not side-lined, and that Congress and its members were active in pursuing the idea of enlargement not only at home but also abroad, including within the NATO PA. Additionally, the NATO PA played an important complementary role in the enlargement process by introducing the Rose–Roth seminars. Such ‘socializing’ seminars continue to provide a space for creating informal links, which arguably make parliamentarians more informed, experienced and prepared to tackle domestic and international problems.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

11. parliamentary diplomacy and the us congress

229

To conclude, there is still the need to know more about Congressional participation in IPIs and inter-parliamentary groups, but there is evidence that the US Congress has been involved in inter-parliamentary relations, although it seems to have a very selective approach in choosing its inter-parliamentary activities. To some extent, Congress has shown interest in the work of the IPU, but in the 1990s it gradually discontinued its participation therein because of ‘ideological differences’. On the other hand, there were no such differences with regard to the NATO PA. Congress supported its creation in 1955. The importance of the NATO PA for the US Congress is symbolized by the fact that its status is regulated by law. Given the importance of transatlantic relations for the United States, it is unlikely that this cooperation will end in the foreseeable future. The personal interest of individual parliamentarians in interparliamentary cooperation is also studied too rarely, but, again, there is ample evidence that the interest of individual members of Congress should be taken into consideration when one discusses the US Congress’s inter-parliamentary activities. The early history of relations between Congress and the IPU is marked by personal initiatives by individual members of Congress. Several of them chaired the NATO PA or otherwise played a visible role in it. Individual members of Congress participate in other IPIs as well. The PGA, with which Congress has no formal relationship, profited from participation by prominent members of Congress at the time of a major global political crisis in the 1980s. It is hoped, therefore, that this chapter’s findings will help to stimulate further research in this relatively new field of study of parliamentary institutions in international relations. This will help us to understand both the potential for Congressional inter-parliamentary activities and involvement in parliamentary diplomacy, as well as the impact of such involvement.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 12

Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in South and South-East Asia and Europe: A Practitioner’s Perspective Xavier Nuttin* Introduction In the last 25 years, Asia emerged as the world’s fastest growing region. The continent accounts for more than a half of the world’s population and one quarter of the economic wealth generated every year. Actors such as China and India are transforming the world’s geopolitical landscape at a rapid pace. This ‘economic miracle’ took place despite huge challenges, ranging from abject poverty to ongoing conflicts, human rights violations, natural disasters and rising inequalities. At the centre of the East Asian regional integration architecture, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) launched in December 2015 the much-anticipated ASEAN Economic Community with the ambition of becoming a pivotal player in the region. Its integration process faces serious hurdles, however, because its member states – with wide demographic disparities, different levels of economic development and divergent political systems – are rather heterogeneous. The interdependence between Europe and Asia has reached very significant levels and is becoming critical for the future growth, prosperity and security prospects of both sides. Asia has become the main trading partner of the European Union (EU), accounting for one third of the EU’s total trade. More than 26 per cent of EU outward investment goes to Asia. By the end of 2012, euro-denominated assets accounted for around 25 per cent of the holdings of Asia’s major economies.1 Yet the partnership must develop beyond trade. Today’s threats have no borders and, in the twenty-first century, no solution * Disclaimer: The author was a European Union Visiting Fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School

of Public Policy (LKYSPP), National University of Singapore, during 2014–2015. The views expressed here are his personal views and do not reflect those of the European Union or the LKYSPP. 1  Nicola Casarini, The European ‘Pivot’, Alert no. 3 (Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 26 March 2013).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi Stelios 10.1163/9789004336346_014 Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

12. Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in Asia and Europe

231

can be found to any global challenge without the support of the Asian nations. The EU and the Asian countries can be allies and must work together to achieve common goals. Governments and regional institutions are actively trying to strengthen relations further, but foreign policy is no longer within the exclusive remit of diplomats. There are many more active forces at work in modern diplomacy, and parliaments are among those forces. Individual parliamentarians and local, national or inter-regional parliaments can all contribute, and they must all be engaged in ensuring public acceptance of the policies and international agreements that directly impact upon citizens’ lives. As the people’s representatives, parliamentarians – with fewer constraints and a larger degree of autonomy than executives – have a major role to play in defining policies and garnering public support for those policies.2 However, and despite the EU’s commitment to consolidating and supporting democracy worldwide, the parliamentary dimension of the Asia–Europe relationship remains largely absent. Naturally, for many in Europe, the priorities are elsewhere and are focused in particular on: the Eurozone debt crisis; economic recession and high unemployment levels; relations with Ukraine, Russia, the Balkans and the Middle East; and the problem of radical Islamism. These challenges are all pulling the EU’s attention away from Asia and this leaves little space, time and energy for developing strong parliamentary links with a far-away region. Asian issues risk being put once again far back on the European agenda. Generally speaking, the role of national parliaments in Asia has yet to be fully developed and it remains weak, if not marginal. With the notable exceptions of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) and the Asian–Pacific Parliamentarians’ Union (APPU), regional parliamentary assemblies simply do not figure on the map. Among the 40 institutions listed and analysed in a 2010 study by the Asian Development Bank on sub-regional cooperation, none of them covers parliaments.3 The existence of a parliament in a country is, of course, not sufficient to guarantee its democratic credentials. It is true that almost all countries in Asia have a parliament. Yet it is important to recognize that not all countries that have parliaments in this region can be regarded as

2  See a general discussion of these issues in Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jančić, ‘The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy in International Politics’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 105–120. 3  Asian Development Bank, Institutions for Asian Regional Integration (Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank), 2010.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

232

Nuttin

democracies.4 Indeed, and despite obvious advances in the region’s transition to democracy in the last two decades, democratization remains a fragile process. Very different political regimes coexist and there are varying parliamentary systems. Democracy is often reduced to elections, its main visible feature, and regional integration processes generally suffer from a democratic deficit. This chapter takes stock of the different parliamentary initiatives that were launched in South-East Asia and South Asia.5 It also reviews the initiatives of the European Parliament in these two regions. The analysis suggests that parliamentary diplomacy has not yet taken root and explores the reasons for that situation. The chapter argues that the current shortcomings in democratic governance in many Asian countries are the key obstacles to their greater engagement in parliamentary diplomacy.

The European Parliament’s Diplomacy towards Asia

The EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and it is committed to promoting democracy worldwide.6 Representative democracy is thus a cornerstone value and the role of parliamentarians is crucial. Parliamentary oversight, political support and guidance, and budgetary control are all essential elements of a democratic political environment. Exchanges and cooperation between parliaments enhance their role within their own societies and institutional frameworks, provide them with international recognition and contribute to the spread of democratic values. The European Parliament, which is the only directly elected EU institution, with its strong commitment to these EU values, is at the forefront of the promotion of democracy, including support to parliamentary systems worldwide. Despite gaining the right of consent to most EU international agreements following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament 4  Zheng Yongnian, Lye Liang Fook and Wilhelm Hofmeister (eds.), Parliaments in Asia: Institution Building and Political Development (London: Routledge, 2013). 5  For more on parliamentary diplomacy in China, see Liwan Wang, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution and Foreign Policy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 253–274. 6  Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that one of the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is ‘to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’. For more on the world diplomacy of the European Parliament, see Davor Jančić ‘World Diplomacy of the European Parliament’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 121–143.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

12. Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in Asia and Europe

233

continues to have few formal powers in foreign policy-making as such, where executive dominance is greater than in other EU policy fields.7 Yet the development of parliamentary institutions is synonymous with democratization and their sound functioning is a fundamental requirement of democracy.8 As the European Parliament itself pointed out in a 2011 resolution, strong and effective parliaments are vital for inclusive democracy.9 Accordingly, the European Parliament has established inter-parliamentary delegations at the bilateral level with more than 40 countries, entities or regions in the world.10 It has also established four inter-parliamentary assemblies, each covering a different continent or part of a continent: the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (that is, the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of countries with the EU); the Euro–Latin American Parliamentary Assembly; the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean;11 and the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly. A Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue with the United States (US) Congress has been evolving into a forum for EU–US inter-parliamentary discussions since its establishment in 1999.12

7   Jürgen Rüland and Astrid Carrapatoso, ‘Democratizing Inter-Regionalism: The EU Parliament and Its Asia Relations’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 197–219. 8  European Parliament, Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, Newsletter (June 2014). 9  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 7 July 2011 on EU External Policies in Favour of Democratization’, [2013] OJ C 33E/165. 10  For more on this, see Sarah Delputte, Cristina Fasone and Fabio Longo, ‘The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s Standing Committees, Delegations and Assemblies: Insights from ACP–EU Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 161–181. 11  For more on parliamentary diplomacy in the Mediterranean region, see Andrea Cofelice, ‘The Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean and Its Contribution to Democracy Promotion and Crisis Management’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 292–310. 12  Davor Jančić, ‘Transatlantic Regulatory Interdependence, Law and Governance: The Evolving Roles of the EU and US Legislatures’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol. 17 (2015), pp. 334–359; Davor Jančić, ‘The Transatlantic Connection: Democratizing Euro–American Relations through Parliamentary Liaison’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 178–196; and Davor Jančić, ‘The European Parliament and EU–US Relations: Revamping Institutional Cooperation?’, in Elaine Fahey and Deirdre Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

234

Nuttin

These joint parliamentary assemblies meet annually in plenary sessions and adopt resolutions in order to influence foreign policy. They also organize discussions in their standing committees or temporary working groups on political, social or economic issues – such as democratic transition, economic stability, or links between security, democracy and development. Results and impact thereof are not always visible, but regular conferences allow for a progressive deepening of mutual understanding and relations. The European Parliament’s relation­s with Asian countries take place at three different levels: first, at the bilateral level between European Parliament delegations for relations with Asian national parliaments; second, at the regional level with AIPA; and third, at the level of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) within the Asia–Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP). Concerning Asia, European Parliament delegations have been established for bilateral relations with the following countries and sub-regions: the People’s Republic of China; Japan; the Korean Peninsula; India; the South-East Asian countries and the ASEAN; South Asian countries; Afghanistan; Central Asia; and Mongolia.13 The main objective of these delegations is to establish, channel and promote parliamentary dialogue between the European Parliament and its counterpart parliaments in Asia. European Parliament delegations hold regular meetings to examine matters such as the socio-economic and political situation in the partner country and the overall state of bilateral relations. They receive delegations from partner parliaments and pay official visits to Asian countries on a regular basis, thus contributing to a better understanding of each other’s priorities and concerns. Issues such as human rights, rule of law, multi-party democracy, climate change and trade relations are usually high on the agenda. Despite those initiatives, and numerous European Parliament resolutions adopted on virtually every Asian country, the parliamentary dimension of EU–Asia relations remains weak. Only some of these partner countries have established a formal body similar to European Parliament standing delegations. Others have established informal friendship groups. These bodies, however, perform very limited activities outside inter-parliamentary meetings. As a consequence of this low level of formalization, the frequency and depth of parliamentary relations often varies with the level of initiative shown by the European Parliament delegations’ chairpersons and members. In many cases there is a high potential

between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 35–68. 13  See online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/home.html.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

12. Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in Asia and Europe

235

for the intensification of these relations, if and when the Asian side and the European Parliament decide to show greater interest. A case in point is Myanmar (Burma), which has embarked on a remarkable process of reform since March 2011. In its July 2013 Comprehensive Framework for the EU’s policy and support to Myanmar, the EU commits to strengthening the new Myanmar Parliament as an institution, through support from the European Parliament and national parliaments of the EU member states. This materialized through strong European Parliament participation at the EU–Myanmar Task Force in November 2013, where Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were able to share their experience of democratic reforms in transition countries. Follow-up continues to be provided by means of institutional capacity-building programmes that are organized and run by the European Parliament’s Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD).14 The only Asian countries with which inter-parliamentary relations are explicitly foreseen by an EU legal instrument are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. A Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC) is included in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) that were signed by the EU with each of these countries. For all other countries and organizations, the existence of delegations originates in an autonomous decision of the European Parliament, even though it could be argued that this is often inspired by the relevant provisions on political dialogue, which are usually foreseen in the respective agreements. It is interesting to note that – despite the EU treaties’ commitment to democracy promotion – the PCAs recently negotiated between the EU and certain countries in South-East Asia do not include provisions on parliamentary relations or on the establishment of a Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC).15 This appears to contradict the EU’s declared aim of promoting and supporting parliamentary democracy in its foreign relations. It is a missed opportunity to provide a legal basis for the development of more structured parliamentary relations.

14  OPPD was established in 2008 in Brussels to support parliamentary development in new and emerging democracies. It was merged with the European Parliament’s Election Observation Unit in July 2014 under the name Democracy and Elections Action Unit (DEAC). The Democracy Fellowship Programme is organized within this framework. 15  The EU has recently signed PCAs with: Indonesia (signed in November 2009); Vietnam (signed in June 2012); the Philippines (signed on 11 July 2012); and Singapore (initialled on 14 October 2013).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

236

Nuttin

As mentioned above, the European Parliament has also established a network of region-to-region joint parliamentary assemblies, but Asia remains the only continent where the European Parliament has yet to establish this type of assembly. The sheer size, complexity and diversity of Asia may explain this situation, as may the different views on the role of parliaments in Asia. There are, however, growing signs of a wider regional interest for increased legitimacy, which calls for a more proactive attitude towards the world’s most dynamic region. The European Parliament’s delegation for relations with South-East Asian countries and the ASEAN maintains regular contacts with the countries of the region and enjoys observer status within the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA).16 This provides the European Parliament with an opportunity to attend the annual AIPA General Assembly, engage in dialogue at the regional level and contribute to the consolidation of representative democracy in Asia. During these parliamentary exchanges, the European Parliament’s delegation provides information on the evolution of the EU, expresses support for Asian regional integration, presents the EU as a reliable partner and promotes enhancement of the parliamentary dimension of EU–ASEAN relations. These arrangements, however, are far from reflecting a strongly structured relationship and clearly do not amount to a joint parliamentary assembly of the sort that exists between the European Parliament and parliamentary bodies in other regions of the world. In the current situation, MEPs have little opportunity to feed their knowledge and analysis of the regional political situation abroad into EU foreign policy, or to issue joint statements with their counterparts. The European Parliament has regularly called for the ‘parliamentarization’ of ASEAN. Indeed, regional integration processes generally suffer from a democratic deficit. The empowerment of civil society represents another avenue for providing greater support to regional democracy. In its January 2014 resolution on EU–ASEAN relations, the European Parliament acknowledged shortcomings in the relations and recommended that: [. . .] establishing a formal Euro–ASEAN inter-parliamentary assembly would further upgrade relations between the EU and ASEAN Member States once the conditions were ripe and would also provide a forum for 16   See Jürgen Rüland, ‘Participation without Democratization: The ASEAN InterParliamentary Assembly (AIPA) and ASEAN’s Regional Corporatism’, in Olivier Costa et al. (eds), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 166–186.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

12. Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in Asia and Europe

237

multilateral exchange to address global issues in a more comprehensive way.17 An ad-hoc delegation is also set up every two years to enable the European Parliament to participate, together with national parliaments of the EU member states, in the meetings of ASEP. ASEP is the parliamentary arm of ASEM, but remains limited to a gathering without a permanent structure. The ASEM process was established in 1996 to support informal dialogue between Europe and Asia and involves all EU member states and a large number of Asian countries. The current 53 ASEM participating states represent a half of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), more than 60 per cent of the world’s population and about 60 per cent of global trade.18 The data speak for themselves: both sides are of strategic importance to each other. ASEM connects the two continents politically, economically and culturally. The leaders’ summit ­produces political statements rather than binding agreements. ASEM is neither an institution nor a decision-making body, but it has since 1996 developed into the main multilateral channel for communication between the two continents. ASEP meetings take place in principle every second year, prior to the ASEM summit. Their goals are to: provide parliamentary guidance to the ASEM process; examine the progresses achieved within the ASEM process; strengthen dialogue and mutual understanding at the parliamentary level within the context of this multilateral platform; help advance ASEM objectives; and draw the attention of ASEM leaders to a number of issues that parliamentarians consider to be priorities, as outlined in the respective final declarations. However, the results have so far been very poor. The most recent ASEP meeting – which took place in Rome, Italy, from 6–7 October 2014 – was no different. For many officials involved in the process,19 ASEP is a textbook example of a good intention becoming a low-key event with little substance. The sheer number and diversity of the participants, the absence of preparation and coordination among European delegations, the limited duration of the meeting, and the lack of a permanent secretariat, constitute a recipe for failure. Seen from a very optimistic angle, it can be considered an informal joint parliamentary assembly, but without any structure to ensure follow-up. 17  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 15 January 2014 on the Future of EU–ASEAN Relations’, point 10, [2014] OJ C 464/140. 18  European External Action Service, online at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/asem/about/ index_en.htm. 19  Internal note of the European Parliament.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

238

Nuttin

Parliamentary Diplomacy within Asia



Democratic and Parliamentary Deficits as Barriers to Parliamentary Diplomacy There is a wide diversity in the governance practices of Asian countries. Very different political regimes continue to coexist: authoritarian; communist; democratic; and monarchic. There are purely one-party states, predominantly one-party states, two-party states, or multi-party states. Despite the obvious dynamic of a transition to democracy and increasing voter empowerment during the last two decades, democratization in the region remains a fragile process, as illustrated by the current situations in Thailand, Cambodia and Bangladesh. In his annual policy address to the Legislative Council on 13 January 2015, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying was reported as saying that ‘the need for economic growth outweighs calls for greater democracy’ and that the city would ‘degenerate into anarchy’ if it gave in to demands for universal suffrage.20 As already mentioned, democracy in Asia is often reduced to elections – its main visible feature – and the role of national parliaments generally remains weak, if not marginal. Building up well-functioning parliaments requires sustained efforts. Even where they have been established, parliaments can take very different forms. There were none before decolonization, while some were later set up, mostly based on Western models, while incorporating diverse indigenous elements.21 While each ASEAN member state has an assembly, not all ASEAN regimes are multi-party parliamentary democracies as commonly understood in the EU. For example, Brunei has a 20-member Legislative Council that is fully appointed by the Sultan and only has consultative powers. Vietnam and Laos are one-party states with largely rubber-stamping national assemblies, although the Vietnamese National Assembly has in recent years become more assertive and is annually evaluating the performance of top leaders from both the government and the National Assembly. Singapore and Malaysia have each had one dominant political party ruling the country since independence and their electoral systems offer little space for parliamentary opposition. Myanmar recommenced holding elections only in 2010, the first since 1990, but those were largely dismissed by the international community as being neither free, nor fair, nor inclusive. Thailand is currently governed by a military regime, which has disbanded the elected National Assembly and 20  ‘Hong Kong’s CY Leung warns of “anarchy” in policy speech’, BBC News (14 January 2015), see online at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30808735. 21  Yongnian, Fook and Hofmeister (eds), Parliaments in Asia.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

12. Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in Asia and Europe

239

replaced it with an appointed National Legislative Assembly, unsurprisingly filled with military officials. Thailand’s draft Constitution, its twentieth since it became a constitutional monarchy in 1932, and drafted by a 36-member appointed committee, aims at reducing the powers of political parties, submitting elected politicians to control by non-elected bodies, and limiting the role of parliament. Indonesia and the Philippines probably have the most vibrant parliaments, but the reputation of many of their members is rather poor. The legislative, budgetary and oversight responsibilities of parliaments are well documented, but these roles can be performed in very different ways. They are typically determined based on the respective strengths of the executive and legislative branches of government. In Asia, the executive is in charge and wants to keep it that way. Most parliaments have limited powers, and those that try to expand them find it difficult. Moreover, very few parliaments have the power to oversee their country’s foreign policy, which remains firmly in the hands of the executive. In India, for example, the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the Lok Sabha, the lower chamber of parliament, does not discuss foreign policy options or strategies; its role is only to approve the budget of the Ministry of External Affairs and control the expenditure. There is no tradition in Asia of holding parliamentary debates on third countries’ policies, or of adopting resolutions criticizing them as the European Parliament does, for example, in its monthly human rights debates and resolutions. Actually, such an approach is sometimes considered as part and parcel of a colonial mindset.22 Reflecting on parliamentary diplomacy in South and South-East Asia is therefore an unusual exercise, since the role of national parliaments in the region remains very limited, which is a sign of democratic weaknesses prevalent in many Asian states. This is not to say that members of national parliaments do not meet and exchange views on a bilateral basis, but that their policy impact is not very significant. At the same time, Asia is in the process of building regional institutional frameworks to support the stability required for sustained prosperity and help the continent to fulfil its role in a globalized world. These regional groupings aim to coordinate action to tackle common issues such as economic development, freedom of movement, transport, energy security, environmental protection and the fight against climate change. Yet here, too, the parliamentary aspect is mostly absent from those regional frameworks and needs to be developed to answer the current democratic deficit. 22  Author’s interview with an ASEAN diplomat in February 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

240

Nuttin

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Founded in December 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) brings together the countries located on the Indian subcontinent – the Maldives, India, Bhutan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka – as well as Afghanistan. SAARC is dedicated to economic, technological, social and cultural development. The EU obtained observer status in 2006. SAARC does not have an established forum that brings together national parliaments at the regional level. The SAARC Charter, signed in 1985, does not provide for any role for parliaments. On the other hand, the SAARC Charter of Democracy, which was adopted in February 2011, supports representative democracy, at least on paper. Among other things, its member states undertake to: [. . .] uphold participatory democracy characterized by free, fair and credible elections, and elected legislatures and local bodies; promote democracy at all levels of the Government and the society at large; and continue to strengthen democratic institutions and reinforce democratic practices, including through effective coordination as well as checks and balances among the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary as reflected in the respective Constitutions.23 It has been reported that at the 16th SAARC Summit, which was held in June 2010: [. . .] the need for collective efforts by parliamentarians in South Asia was discussed and recognized by leaders, and the convening of a ‘Conclave of SAARC Parliamentarians’, in line with the SAARC Charter of Democracy, was recommended. The SAARC Secretariat was directed to convene a Working Group, comprised of nominees from the member states, to work out the modalities for the establishment of such a conclave.24 However, five years later, this conclave is not yet in place, and the issue was not mentioned during the 18th Summit held in Kathmandu, Nepal, in November 2014. 23  See online at http://saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Charter-of-Democracy/88/. 24  Raul Cordenillo and Karin Gardes (eds), Inclusive Political Participation and Representation: The Role of Regional Organizations (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2014).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

12. Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in Asia and Europe

241

Association of South-East Asian Nations The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 in the context of the Vietnam War for political and security reasons and, more specifically, to promote cooperation against the spread of communism. Since then, ASEAN has mostly developed in the economic field. ASEAN is an intergovernmental association that strongly adheres to the doctrines of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, and respect for sovereignty and independence. Decision-making is by consensus. ASEAN’s achievements in regional integration can be and are disputed. While ASEAN has been effective in bringing the region closer together, and avoiding interstate conflict, its willingness to put common interests ahead of domestic concerns has been questioned. For many analysts, it would be more correct to speak of cooperation than of regional integration.25 Indeed, regional integration remains a lower priority. Given that most countries became independent only after the Second World War, national identity and nation-building are the key priorities for ASEAN’s member states. As a regional organization, ASEAN has demonstrated few active roles in regional security issues, be they on preventive diplomacy or conflict resolution. The principle of non-interference remains the cornerstone of the association, as has been shown by the Thai–Cambodian border dispute around the Preah Vihear Temple.26 Some ASEAN member states (that is, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei) have played an important role in the negotiations on a Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro,27 which was signed between the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 2014, but ASEAN itself has not. During the years of the military junta in Myanmar, ASEAN pursued a policy of constructive engagement that fitted well the interests of its member states. The spring 2015 human trafficking crisis in the Andaman Sea further highlighted the lack of solidarity among ASEAN member states. While much blame can rightly be laid at the door of Myanmar, it was also a regional problem that required a regional response. Yet ASEAN was nowhere to be seen. All of the trafficking destination countries, including Malaysia, which chaired the 25  While enhanced regional integration is mentioned in the Preamble to the ASEAN Charter, it is not listed as one of its main purposes. 26  Jim Della-Giacoma, Preventive Diplomacy in South-East Asia: Redefining the ASEAN Way, Commentary (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 31 December 2011), available online at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/op-eds/2012/della-giacoma-redefining -asean-way.aspx. 27  This is a peace agreement, which is based on power-sharing and which aims to resolve the issue of the Moro insurrection in Mindanao.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

242

Nuttin

regional grouping in 2015, are member states of ASEAN. However, each of them has rejected the responsibility of looking after the migrants. The reason offered is that problems such as border disputes are either internal or bilateral in nature and, as such, are best managed by the respective parties rather than through ASEAN. It has been assessed that ASEAN’s greatest success was in establishing and maintaining relations with major external powers and international groupings.28 By forming a group, ASEAN countries feel more empowered and better heard in the Asia–Pacific region. However, increased rivalry among the major powers in the region – particularly China, Japan and the United States – and their ability to exert influence on the more vulnerable states undermine the efforts to agree on a common ASEAN view. National parliaments are involved in ASEAN affairs through the ratification of ASEAN agreements when their constitutions so require. This step adds to the legitimacy of those agreements, but can also cause delays and obstructions when national interests are involved. For example, it took the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, which was signed by the member states in June 2002, twelve years to be ratified by the Indonesian Parliament, which it did in September 2014.29 Building the Parliamentary Dimension of ASEAN In the early 1970s, encouraged by the progress made by ASEAN, the Indonesian House of Representatives came up with the idea of establishing an organization consisting of the parliaments of the then five ASEAN member states: Indonesia; Malaysia; the Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand. Consequently, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO) was created in 1977 to promote closer cooperation among the parliaments of the member states of ASEAN – an important and promising step. The idea of an ASEAN Parliament was first proposed by the Philippines in 1980, but met with resistance from several member states. It was agreed in 1982 that the establishment of an ASEAN Parliament, while desirable, would be a long-term goal. In the following years, several AIPO resolutions repeated that moving forward was not yet opportune and recommended that internal studies on an ASEAN Parliament be conducted. Moving towards the building of an ASEAN community by 2015, the aspiration of establishing an ASEAN Parliament resurfaced in 2003. However, there 28  Barry Desker, ‘ASEAN Integration Remains an Illusion’, lecture given at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (March 2015). 29  Indonesia is the largest haze producer in the region.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

12. Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in Asia and Europe

243

was again consensus in 2006 that the ASEAN Parliament would be a long-term goal and that it would be more appropriate to proceed first with transformation of the organization into a more effective and closely integrated institution that could work on the harmonization of legislation.30 Promoting the speedy ratification of ASEAN agreements was singled out as the other main activity. In other words, the consensus was to say ‘yes’ to an ASEAN Parliament, but not at that moment. This situation has not changed to date. As a first step in enhancing the parliamentary dimension of ASEAN, the organization’s name was changed from the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization to the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA). The Statutes were also amended to include an additional aim, which is ‘to promote the principles of human rights, democracy, peace, security and prosperity in ASEAN’.31 Unfortunately, this had no impact whatsoever on the mandate or effectiveness of AIPA. AIPA therefore did not become an organ of ASEAN, but remains an independent ‘associated entity’ of it. Like ASEAN, AIPA strictly abides by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states. Being entirely government-driven, ASEAN acknowledges the usefulness of the AIPA, but refuses to give it any power. ASEAN member states’ parliaments were involved neither individually, nor through AIPA in the writing of the ASEAN Charter, which was signed in November 2007. The Charter fails to make any reference to parliamentary activity, let alone to the establishment of an ASEAN Parliament. Instead of being an integral part of the institutional structure, AIPA is only listed in Annexe 2 as an ‘entity associated with ASEAN’, alongside business associations and civilsociety organizations. These are major gaps that contribute to ASEAN’s democratic deficit.32 At best, ASEAN member states see AIPA as a transmission belt for government-decided policies – that is, ‘[p]arliamentarians, as representatives of their constituent [sic], could disseminate the ASEAN vision, mission and development to their constituent in order to solidify the integration of ASEAN’.33 According to ASEAN diplomats,34 AIPA has had a very minimal policy input. It is indeed merely a consultative body. Its legislative and oversight powers are 30  See online at http://www.aipasecretariat.org/about/background-history. 31  See online at http://www.aipo.org/Statutes_of_AIPA.htm. 32  Xavier Nuttin, The Asia–Europe Parliamentary Partnership, Policy Briefing (Brussels: European Parliament, 2010). 33  Opening address of the 33rd AIPA General Assembly, by the Vice-President of Indonesia, September 2012, Lombok. 34  Interviews by the author in the period from January-March 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

244

Nuttin

almost non-existent.35 AIPA is surely not the only body to be blamed for this situation, because governments in the region, particularly those with authoritarian systems, face little parliamentary scrutiny at home and attach little importance to the views expressed by parliamentarians. The symbolic and short exchanges of views that do take place between regional political leaders and the AIPA chairperson during the biannual ASEAN summits are highly representative of that state of affairs.36 Moreover, the extremely small AIPA secretariat, both in terms of funding and staffing, has a rather limited capacity to support the initiatives of members of parliament. Nevertheless, the AIPA General Assembly does establish study committees and ad-hoc committees to discuss specific issues of common interest to the AIPA participating parliaments.37 This could form the basis for a more proactive parliamentary involvement. Some of the topics discussed within these committees include: common legislation on narcotics, drug abuse and rehabilitation; ASEAN cooperation on public health; ASEAN laws related to or having an impact on the implementation of the ASEAN Free-Trade Area (AFTA); ASEAN laws related to tourism and human resources development; and enhancement of the AIPA Permanent Secretariat.38 In 1998, the Women Parliamentarians of AIPA (WAIPA) was established as a branch of AIPA. WAIPA’s main aims are to increase the participation and representation of women within AIPA and in parliaments throughout ASEAN, while facilitating networking with other women’s associations within international organizations. WAIPA meets once a year on the margins of the General Assembly, but does not appear very proactive outside this annual meeting.39 Finally, in 2007, the AIPA General Assembly established a caucus to follow up on the implementation of AIPA resolutions and work towards the harmonization of legislation among ASEAN countries.40 Furthermore, the AIPA FactFinding Committee to Combat the Drug Menace (AIFOCOM) deals specifically with legislation on combating drugs. 35  Georgios Papanagnou, Stephen Kingah and Luk Van Langenhove, Democracy Building in the Regional Context: Insights from the European Parliament and Beyond, UNU–CRIS Policy Brief no. 4 (Bruges: Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies, September 2014). 36  The first of such exchanges took place at the summit held in Thailand in February 2009. 37  See online at http://www.aipasecretariat.org/about-us/organizational-structure. 38  See online at http://www.aipasecretariat.org/about-us/organizational-structure. 39  The author’s interview with AIPA Secretariat, 29 April 2015; see also online at http://www .aipasecretariat.org/about-us/organizational-structure. 40  Rüland, ‘Participation without Democratization’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

12. Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in Asia and Europe

245

Informal Parliamentary Initiatives in South and South-East Asia Besides the formal committees established by the AIPA General Assembly, certain initiatives have been taken by like-minded parliamentarians in their individual capacity under the ASEAN umbrella. Their aim is to influence ASEAN’s policies and agenda. The ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar (AIPCM) was very vocal against the military junta and opposed the official ASEAN position of constructive engagement with the regime. The ASEAN leaders have paid little attention to the AIPCM declarations and other press releases, but by promoting democracy and good governance, the AIPCM members demonstrated that fundamental freedoms are universal values and cannot be dismissed as being Western concepts. In June 2013, AIPCM was renamed the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR). APHR now contributes to the ASEAN People’s Forum, which coordinates civil society activities. The Asian Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Labour Migration (AIPCLM), which was initiated in 2007 and formalized in 2011, pursues common activities aimed at protecting and promoting the rights and welfare of migrant workers and members of their families beyond annual information exchanges. The scope of the Caucus was enlarged beyond ASEAN/AIPA to include parliamentarians from South Asia. The AIPCLM has three core objectives: i) to promote the cause of migrant workers in the respective national parliaments; ii) to engage collectively at regional and international levels to develop agreements and legislation; and iii) to acknowledge the need to consider national, economic and human security in the management of migration issues. AIPCLM is actively supported by Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, but unfortunately faces regular funding difficulties in carrying out its activities. These working groups and caucuses are rare, not always sanctioned by AIPA,41 and they bring together a very limited number of parliamentarians. Yet they cover issues of key importance for the region, and illustrate the potential for parliamentary diplomacy if they were to be taken seriously. More research should thus be conducted to see how these working groups and caucuses could increase their policy impact, and to develop exchanges and cooperation with the relevant bodies of the European Parliament.

41  Imelda Deinla, Giving the AIPA a Voice in the ASEAN Community (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2013).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

246

Nuttin

Conclusions The promotion of democracy, in which elected parliaments play an essential role, is a declared objective of the EU’s external action, including through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Unfortunately, this commitment does not always translate into concrete measures in the EU’s relations with its Asian partners, such as establishing legal instruments for parliamentary cooperation committees. Furthermore, within the EU, many other regions of the world have priority over Asia. The last two decades have seen undeniable progress towards democratic governance in South and South-East Asia, but important weaknesses remain and the executive branches of government are usually reluctant to accept control by, and to share power with, the legislative branches. Parliamentary institutions remain weak and their policy inputs very limited. If it is agreed that there is a positive causal relationship between a strong parliament and a more democratic outcome,42 then much work remains to be done in the regions covered in this study. It may also be the right time to capitalize on the general trend towards more participation and democracy in the region, by empowering the different national and regional parliamentary actors. Indeed, the trend towards stronger democratic mechanisms and increased participation of parliaments is most likely to continue. Some of the ASEAN nations’ national parliaments already have the right to ratify ASEAN agreements. Governments can no longer avoid engaging with parliaments. A better educated electorate also expects its representatives to have a greater say and be more involved in regional development and integration. This requires parliamentarians to develop enhanced trust in their commitment, expertise and integrity. The European Parliament has launched many initiatives and established several bodies with the aim of reinforcing parliaments and parliamentary relations worldwide. For example, it has proposed the establishment of an inter-parliamentary assembly with ASEAN and suggested providing capacity-building assistance to AIPA. As an observer within AIPA, the European Parliament has also repeatedly called for greater democratization of the ASEAN decision-making process. Furthermore, the European Parliament debates foreign affairs and international negotiations, trying to shape and influence policies as much as possible. Parliamentary diplomacy adds legitimacy and political weight to such

42  Yongnian, Fook and Hofmeister (eds), Parliaments in Asia. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

12. Challenges for Parliamentary Diplomacy in Asia and Europe

247

policies.43 However, this has not been matched by the same level of response on the Asian side. For example, in 2007 the European Parliament established a delegation for relations with India, prior to which India was covered by the South Asia delegation. Eight years later, several European Parliament working group visits have taken place in India, and in June 2015 the speaker of India’s Lok Sabha visited the European Parliament. However, there have been no meetings between the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with India and the Lok Sabha’s EU Friendship group, the bodies that represent the two assemblies in their bilateral relations. States are usually reluctant to give away powers, but – in order to achieve greater levels of legitimacy and respond to the many challenges posed by regional integration – representative assemblies must be empowered and their prerogatives expanded. The intergovernmental nature of regional cooperation in Asia and the non-participatory decision-making process create difficulties, but there is a general trend towards more democratic accountability. Despite these difficulties, timely and carefully planned development of parliamentary links between Asia and Europe would advance representative democracy in the region and open more doors for parliamentary diplomacy by ensuring additional international recognition of parliamentarians’ work. Exchanges between parliaments indeed enhance their domestic roles and contribute to the worldwide spread of democratic values. Contributing to democratic consolidation and empowering regional assemblies remain important objectives. Regional governance in ASEAN might become more democratic if legislators played a greater role in the integration process.44 For the time being, however, there are definitely significant limits to a further development of parliamentary diplomacy in Asia. The EU’s initiatives for democratizing regional governance in South and South-East Asia also still lack sufficient political support. A more proactive approach to democracy promotion in these regions of Asia would be desirable from the EU, especially given, for instance, that the European Parliament considers AIPA to be its privileged interlocutor in South Asia.45 On the other hand, greater acceptance is needed by Asian governments of parliamentary scrutiny and oversight, which would be a sign of evolving democratic maturity, as well as representing a key step towards increasing their democratic credentials. 43  Daniel Fiott, ‘On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Madariaga Paper, vol. 4, no. 7 (2011). 44  Fiott, ‘On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, p. 4. 45  Xavier Nuttin, ‘ASEAN and the EU: Time to Develop the Parliamentary Dimension of the Relationship’ (Singapore: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, unpublished research paper, 30 June 2015). Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 13

Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution and Foreign Policy* Liwan Wang Introduction As the supreme organ of Chinese state power, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee have been entrusted with extensive diplomatic powers,1 including jus bellum dicendi, treaty-making, appointing diplomatic agents, passing diplomatic legislation, approving the budget for diplomatic activities and conducting international exchanges. These powers can be divided into two broad categories. On the one hand, the NPC is committed to controlling and supervising the government’s diplomacy through legislation, appointments and fiscal policy. Under such circumstances, the NPC uses its diplomatic power indirectly, in order to ensure that governmental diplomacy is in accord with the Chinese constitution and the national interest. On the other hand, the NPC can also directly engage in foreign affairs, such as through high-level contacts and inter-parliamentary exchanges. In this case, the NPC has become a prominent diplomatic actor rather than a bystander and supervisor. This type of the NPC’s international engagement, in its broadest sense, could be considered as its parliamentary diplomacy.

* Research for this chapter was sponsored by the China Scholarship Council’s Programme for State-Funded Postgraduates’ Overseas Study (No. 201406360080). The opinions expressed here are those of the author alone. Parts of this chapter have been published in the Chinese academic journal World Economics and Politics, no. 11 (2015). The author gratefully acknowledges Professor Paul Chaleff and Dr Peng Chun for their kind help with language. 1  The concept of diplomatic power is not directly prescribed in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. However, Chinese jurists usually consider diplomatic power as a legal competence to make foreign policies or conduct foreign affairs on behalf of China, which often include the power and functions to deal with international relations, to make treaties, to recognize the legitimacy or legality of governments in other countries and to declare war, etc. See Han Dyuan, Lin Laifan and Zheng Xianjun, Monographic Study of the Constitution Issues (Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2004), pp. 207–228.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi Stelios 10.1163/9789004336346_015 Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

13. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution

249

The concept of parliamentary diplomacy was not accepted in Chinese official documents until the late 1980s,2 but the NPC had begun its foreign communications as early as when it was established in 1954. Speaking at the NPC’s conference in 1956, Premier Zhou Enlai (周恩来) said that ‘exchanges between congresses and congressmen among different countries have become an important diplomatic form’.3 In the early years of communist China, however, parliamentary diplomacy was largely confined to the Soviet Union and communist countries in Eastern Europe. Communist ideology then played an essential role in the formation of foreign policies in China.4 When Sino–Soviet relations changed from cooperation to confrontation in the 1960s, the NPC had to develop relations with the congresses from other developing countries and Western Europe. Mao Zedong (毛泽东) famously called those countries standing between the two opposing camps represented by the United States and the Soviet Union ‘intermediate zone countries’.5 During the Cultural Revolution in China from 1966 to 1976, the NPC and its standing committee almost collapsed, and China’s parliamentary diplomacy was reduced to hosting visiting delegations from foreign parliaments.6 After the reform and opening of China in 1978, China’s parliamentary diplomacy was gradually restored. The Asian Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (ACPPD) in 1981 and China’s accession to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 1984 represented the rise of Chinese parliamentary diplomacy on the world stage. Since then, Chinese parliamentary diplomacy has undergone rapid development, except for a short period of diplomatic isolation after the 1989 Beijing student movement. By March 2013, the NPC had a mechanism for regular inter-parliamentary exchanges with parliaments and congresses from fourteen countries and the European Parliament. It established 106 bilateral friendship groups, became a member of fifteen

2  See Zhang Jian, Research on Parliamentary Diplomacy of Chinese Characteristics, Master’s dissertation, Shandong Normal University (April 2010), p. 36. 3  Zhou Enlai, On the Current International Situation, Diplomatic Policy and Liberating Taiwan (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1956), p. 10. 4  Yu Xiangdong and Shi Zhan, ‘The Formalism and Mysticism of China’s Diplomatic Policy’, Beijing Culture Review, no. 3 (2014), pp. 18–20. 5  Chinese Foreign Ministry and Literature Research Centre of the CCP Central Committee (eds.), Mao Zedong on Diplomacy (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House, 1994), pp. 506–507. 6  Cai Dingjian, The System of People’s Congress in China (Beijing: Law Press, 1998), p. 67.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

250

wang

­ ultilateral parliamentary organizations and had observer status at five multim lateral parliamentary organizations.7 Although the practice of parliamentary diplomacy in China has a decadeslong history, scholarly research about it began in around 2000. The initial stage is epitomized by a group of officials in the foreign affairs offices of the NPC putting forward concrete proposals for improving China’s parliamentary diplomacy.8 At this stage, qualitative analyses and theoretical construction are lacking. In the later stage, scholars started to examine the constitutional basis for parliamentary diplomacy by combining normative analysis with positive analysis.9 The NPC’s independent diplomatic power is undoubtedly significant; correspondingly, parliamentary diplomacy was considered an independent diplomatic form that is distinct from governmental ministerial diplomacy. Since 2008, the third stage of research, focusing on the theoretical study of parliamentary diplomacy, has been emerging in China. It has been suggested that parliamentary diplomacy, by promoting multi-agent diplomacy and expanding the scope of official diplomacy, plays a vital role in the supervision of governmental diplomatic power and contributes to democratization and transparency in China’s foreign policy.10 However, the existing literature neglects the dual source of Chinese diplomacy, from both the written Chinese constitution and unwritten political rules that control and influence China’s foreign policy. Under this framework, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is central in foreign policy decisionmaking.11 The NPC and its Standing Committee, China’s president and the State Council are the main participants in foreign policy formulation and execution. Therefore, with the principles of power centralization and proper dispersion, a diplomatic power division system is formed among these subjects. It is this 7 

Wu Bangguo, Report on the Work of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, delivered at the first session of the 12th National People’s Congress (8 March 2013). 8  Zhong Ronglai, ‘How to Play the Unique Role of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, People’s Congress Studying, no. 2 (1998), pp. 30–33. 9  Wang Chunying, ‘On the Diplomatic Function of the National People’s Congress’, Foreign Affairs Review, no. 4 (2008), pp. 31–34. 10  See Xiong Wei, A Study of Parliamentary Diplomacy: An Analysis with the National People’s Congress of China as its Focus, doctoral dissertation, Renmin University of China (April 2008); Zhao Kejin, ‘On the Theory of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, People’s Congress Studying, nos. 5 & 6 (2012), pp. 41–43; Guo Shuyong, ‘On China-Style Parliamentary Diplomacy’, World Economics and Politics, no. 7 (2012), pp. 117–126. 11  Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010), pp. 4–5.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

13. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution

251

system that determines the boundaries of parliamentary diplomacy in China. In order to understand Chinese parliamentary diplomacy, an appreciation of the constitutional role of the NPC with respect to foreign policy mechanisms is essential. Although previous scholarship has touched upon the leadership of the CCP in the realm of foreign affairs, there is no research concerning how the CCP plans and manages parliamentary diplomacy, or how the NPC coordinates with the CCP in carrying out parliamentary diplomacy. It is therefore n ­ ecessary to study parliamentary diplomacy in the context of China’s distributional system of diplomatic power.12 This chapter focuses on the role of the NPC, as ascribed by the Chinese constitution, against the background of the diplomatic power structure. It also summarizes the historical process and the current situation of parliamentary diplomacy in China. The first part describes how China’s diplomatic power is divided between the CCP and the NPC, as well as how it is distributed within the NPC. The second part introduces and analyses different forms of parliamentary diplomacy in China. The third part and final part discuss the NPC’s activity in the IPU, before summarizing the institutional objectives of Chinese parliamentary diplomacy.

Diplomatic Power Division and the NPC

According to the Chinese constitution, diplomatic power is shared among the NPC and its Standing Committee, China’s president and the State Council. The NPC’s diplomatic power is mainly concentrated in legislation and supervision. With regard to the Chinese president, because China adopts a ‘nominal monarch’ system, the president’s diplomatic power is largely ceremonial and symbolic. After the revision of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 2004, the president was granted independent power to ‘conduct diplomatic activities and receive foreign diplomatic representatives’. The constitution approved the political authority of the president, who usually simultaneously holds the position of general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the Central Military Commission. These two positions also bear strong elements of foreign affairs.13 With regard to the State Council, the Chinese constitution stipulates that it has the power to administrate foreign affairs and conclude treaties and 12  Yet the often neglected perspective that requires attention in future research is that of foreign observers’ views of Chinese parliamentary diplomacy. 13  Ma Ling, ‘The Norm and Practice of China’s President System’, Legal Science, no. 4 (2014), pp. 3–11.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

252

wang

agreements with foreign states. The State Council shoulders the responsibility for initiating a treaty, while the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of sorting out the details of treaty negotiations. The Standing Committee of the NPC ratifies the treaty and the president, in pursuance of the decisions made by the NPC Standing Committee, must declare the validity of the ratified treaty.14 Therefore, as far as formal, written, constitutional rules are concerned, the NPC and its Standing Committee have supreme authority in terms of diplomatic power. The procedure for the conclusion of treaties, for instance, involves the NPC Standing Committee, the Chinese president, the State Council and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The State Council is responsible for concluding treaties with foreign states, while the NPC Standing Committee decides whether or not to approve these treaties. The resulting treaties are then enacted into law and sent to the president for signature. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the leadership of the State Council, is in charge of negotiating treaties with foreign states. In this treaty-making process, the different branches divide their functions, and they cooperate and check each other to ensure the constitutionality of a treaty in both content and procedure.15 Similarly, a power division structure was also established in the appointing of diplomatic personnel. Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary are dispatched and recalled by China’s president according to the decision of the NPC Standing Committee. In terms of representatives and vice-representatives, they should be dispatched by the State Council. Other diplomatic personnel are appointed by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These examples suggest that the NPC and its Standing Committee have been endowed with ultimate authority in the diplomatic power structure. Moreover, as the symbolization of popular sovereignty, the NPC and its Standing Committee are now typically considered to be the core of the Chinese political system.16 In practice, however, the political role of the NPC and its Standing Committee were once considered to be largely symbolic and marginalized. For instance, in the legislative process, by the time that a bill is placed before the NPC, the major content has already been decided and members are expected 14  See Article 3 to Article 5 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Procedure of Conclusion of Treaties, adopted at the 17th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 7th NPC (28 December 1990). 15  Shen Zihua, ‘China’s Treaty Ratification Operation Mechanisms: Based on the Constitution and the Procedural Law on Conclusion of Treaties’, Journal of China National School of Administration, no. 3 (2012), pp. 69–73. 16  Yang Guangbin and Yin Donghua, ‘Democratic Implications of the National People’s Congress in China’, Journal of Renmin University of China, no. 6 (2008), pp. 93–99. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

13. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution

253

simply to vote it through.17 The situation has gradually changed and the NPC Standing Committee has rejected several bills proposed by the government, but the power structure in general has retained its traditional way.18 The reasons for this have been thoroughly discussed in the literature.19 It should be noted that the tension between facts and norms for the NPC’s political role has directly affected its parliamentary diplomacy. It has been widely observed that – with very little exception – the NPC and its Standing Committee confirm and strengthen governmental ministerial diplomacy by way of legislation.20 As a result, they are seen as merely following whatever foreign policy decisions the government makes. The inconsistency between constitutional rules and social realities indicates that there is a set of unwritten norms hidden behind the written constitution.21 In Chinese diplomatic practice, it is the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CCP and its Standing Committee that hold the supreme authority in foreign affairs. As an agency for deliberation and coordination, the Foreign Affairs Leading Group (FALG) of the CCP Politburo makes the most important diplomatic decisions. In the FALG, the Chinese president serves as the group leader and the vice-president as the deputy leader. The remainder of the group consists of the minister from the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee, minister from the International Department of the CCP Central Committee, deputy premier or state councillor with the portfolio on diplomatic affairs, as well as the minister of foreign affairs, minister of national defence, minister of public security, minister of state security, minister of commerce, director of the Information Office of the State Council, director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, and director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. It is noteworthy that the chairman of the NPC Standing Committee is a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, but not a member of the FALG.

17  Rory Truex, ‘The Returns to Office in a Rubber Stamp Parliament’, American Political Science Review, vol. 108, no. 2 (2014), pp. 235–251. 18  Steven Saxonberg, Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism: Regime Survival in China, Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 90–91. 19  Cai Dingjian, ‘On the Reform and Perfection of the NPC System’, Tribune of Political Science and Law, vol. 22, no. 6 (2004), pp. 8–18. 20  Wang Chunying, ‘On the Diplomatic Function of the National People’s Congress’, pp. 31–34. 21  Jiang Shigong, ‘Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of Constitutional Government in China’, Open Times, no. 12 (2009), pp. 10–39. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

254

wang

The Foreign Affairs Office is the day-to-day office of the FALG, whose basic function is to coordinate foreign affairs activities among different departments of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council.22 Since its re-establishment in 1981, the Foreign Affairs Office has become the core institution of decision-making, planning, coordination and management of foreign policy.23 The concept of ‘overall diplomatic policy’ (总体外交) that is used in Chinese diplomatic narratives refers to the CCP’s general plan for foreign relations that is enforced by the FALG and its Foreign Affairs Office.24 This includes governmental diplomacy, parliamentary diplomacy, party diplomacy and military diplomacy.25 Based on the above analysis, the framework of foreign policy-making in China can be summarized as a ‘dual-source diplomatic power system’. It entails both the written constitutional aspect and the unwritten political aspect. The former refers to those institutions enjoying diplomatic power according to the Chinese constitution, which, as already mentioned, includes the NPC, the Chinese president and the State Council. The latter refers to entities that hold de facto diplomatic power and includes the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CCP and its Standing Committee, FALG and the Foreign Affairs Office. The NPC and its Standing Committee have extensive diplomatic power vested in them by the constitution, but are under the leadership of the CCP and ought to comply with the overall diplomatic policy of the CCP. The important foreign affairs carried out by the NPC, including the foreign affairs activities of its chairman and deputy chairman, visits by foreign speakers and deputy speakers, and parliamentary diplomacy with countries with which China has not established diplomatic relations, need approval by the Foreign Affairs Office in advance.26 As shown in Fig. 1, the NPC and its Standing Committee have a complex internal division of power concerning parliamentary diplomacy. Unicameralism is the guiding congressional principle of China’s legislature. Although it has been asserted that the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 22  Zhang Ji, ‘The Basic Decision-Making Process in China’s Diplomacy’, Eastern Daily (18 March 2013). 23  Gong Li, Men Honghua and Sun Dongfang, ‘China’s Diplomatic Decision-Making Mechanism: Changes and Evolution since 1949’, World Economics and Politics, no. 11 (2009), pp. 44–54. 24  Zhang Qingmin, ‘The Chinese Diplomatic Policy after the 18th National Congress of CCP’, Foreign Affairs Review, no. 2 (2014), pp. 1–20. 25  Zhong Lianyan, International Relations of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2007), p. 7. 26  Xiong Wei, A Study of Parliamentary Diplomacy, pp. 159–160.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

13. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution

255

Figure 1 The NPC’s internal organization system.

is an upper house in the Chinese legislature,27 the current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China clearly provides that the CPPCC is essentially ‘a broadly based representative organization of the united front’. Therefore, the CPPCC is not part of the Chinese legislature. Rather, it is a consultative body that helps to coordinate the political processes of various groups in China. The Work Report of the Standing Committee of the 11th CPPCC of 2010 made the first mention of the concept of public diplomacy, distinguishing it from parliamentary and governmental diplomacy.28 The NPC makes important policy decisions, both international and domestic, and the Standing Committee of the NPC assumes the majority of the responsibilities when the NPC is not in session. This system is designed to gather a group of professional and talented diplomats from the NPC and improve the efficiency of decision-making. The Standing Committee therefore undertakes the major work of ­parliamentary 27  Ann Florini, Hairong Lai, and Yeling Tan, China Experiments: From Local Innovations to National Reform (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p. 11. 28  Jia Qinglin, The Work Report of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, adopted at the 3rd session of the 11th National Committee of the CPPCC (3 March 2010).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

256

wang

diplomacy, which covers the plan design, checking, coordinating and regulating, as well as reporting to the Foreign Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee.29 In order to deal with foreign affairs more efficiently, the NPC established the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1983. The Foreign Affairs Committee is in charge of foreign affairs-related legislation, implementing regular exchanges with f­ oreign parliaments, and expressing official government opinions on diplomatic events. This committee is largely staffed by retired high-ranking diplomats.30 However, the position of the Foreign Affairs Committee seems more like a transitional arrangement for retired diplomats than a venue for genuine activism, which negatively affects the long-term development of parliamentary diplomacy. Meanwhile, the NPC recruits many staff members and translators from college, who are part of the bureaucracy.31 This bureaucratic component of the NPC’s diplomatic personnel has alleviated some of the aforesaid negative effects of the personal composition of the committee. Besides the Foreign Affairs Committee, the other special committees of the NPC also assume some diplomatic functions. For example, the Environmental and Resource Protection Committee visited New Zealand and Nepal in 2013 to learn about experiences on ocean resources development and wildlife protections.32 In addition, the Standing Committee set up a Foreign Affairs Bureau in 1983, which recognizes the apparent tendency towards specialization and professionalization in parliamentary diplomacy. The main function of the Foreign Affairs Bureau is to make plans for the Standing Committee to organize international conferences and visits.33 To coordinate parliamentary diplomacy in the NPC, the Standing Committee established a centralized management system in 1988. All the relevant departments submit their diplomatic plans for the coming year before December, 29  Zhang Jian, Research on Parliamentary Diplomacy of Chinese Characteristics, p. 22. 30  For instance, Fu Ying, the incumbent Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee, has served as a vice foreign minister. Her predecessors also had long careers as senior diplomats in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Department of the CCP Central Committee. 31  Zhao Quansheng, ‘Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 519 (1992), pp. 166–167. 32  Dou Shuhua (ed.), Annals of the National People’s Congress of 2013 (Beijing: China Democracy and Legal System Publishing House, 2014), pp. 799–828. 33  Liu Zheng and Cheng Xiangqing, The Practice of Democracy: Operating Process of the National People’s Congress and Its Standing Committee (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1999), pp. 309–310.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

13. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution

257

and the Foreign Affairs Bureau distributes tasks among the different departments. The chairman of the Standing Committee and the Foreign Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee then approves the most important plans. The plan of visits for the NPC’s leadership should be approved by the chairman and the competent vice-chairmen of the Standing Committee and reported to the FALG. Meanwhile, the concrete programmes of visits by NPC ­delegations and special committees should be permitted by the secretary-general of the Standing Committee and then reported to and approved by the FALG.34 In this way, the NPC can both harmonize its internal diplomatic plan and coordinate its parliamentary diplomacy with the CCP’s overall diplomatic policy. Moreover, the Standing Committee holds regular joint meetings concerning foreign affairs to discuss and arrange unified plans for diplomatic activity. This plays a key role in cooperation among the different groups that are responsible for parliamentary diplomacy.35 In this dual-source diplomatic power system, parliamentary diplomacy remains subordinate to the overall diplomatic policy of the CCP. Through its internal organization, the NPC and its Standing Committee have established an effective mechanism of dividing responsibilities and achieving coordination among all of the departments that are involved in parliamentary diplomacy.

Forms of Chinese Parliamentary Diplomacy

Summarizing the basic forms of Chinese parliamentary diplomacy, Deputy Secretary of the NPC Cao Weizhou (曹卫洲) lists the following: high-level contacts; mechanisms for regular inter-parliamentary exchanges; interparliamentary dialogue at the committee level; bilateral friendship groups; international exchanges of the working and administrative bodies of the NPC; and local people’s congresses.36 Additionally, many scholars argue that the CPPCC’s public diplomacy should be considered as an essential form of

34  Secretariat of the Seventh National People’s Congress, ‘Suggestions for Improving the Overall Planning about Foreign Affairs’ (November 1988), available online at http:// www.e-cpcs.org/newsinfo.asp?Newsid=9141. 35  Gong Lianghua, On Chinese Parliamentary Diplomacy, Master’s dissertation, China Foreign Affairs University (May 2009), p. 25. 36  Xu Yan, ‘Take a Way of Parliamentary Diplomacy with Chinese Features: Interview for Cao Weizhou, the Deputy-Secretary of the NPC’, The People’s Congress of China, no. 22 (2012), pp. 24–26.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

258

wang

­parliamentary diplomacy.37 By the end of 2008, the CPPCC had established and maintained stable bilateral relations with 211 government institutions in 121 countries, as well as twelve international and regional organizations. However, as mentioned above, the CPPCC is not the Chinese legislature and it does not assume legislative functions. It is therefore better to categorize the international communications of the CPPCC as independent semi-governmental diplomacy rather than parliamentary diplomacy.38 The basic forms of parliamentary diplomacy are detailed as follows: High-level Contacts In the early stage of Chinese parliamentary diplomacy, the leaders of the NPC seldom made overseas trips. Even the chairman of the NPC never made diplomatic trips to foreign countries between 1954 and 1982. After 1983, the chairman stepped up visits abroad, but China’s golden age of parliamentary diplomacy began when Qiao Shi (乔石) took over as chairman of the NPC’s Standing Committee in 1993.39 Among all the forms of parliamentary diplomacy, the diplomatic activities of the chairman are of the highest importance and also a major form of summit diplomacy (首脑外交). The deputy chairman’s diplomatic activities are also high-level contacts. Since the leaders of the democratic parties usually serve as deputy chairmen of the NPC,40 the NPC always considers their diplomatic efforts as opportunities to show the world that China has a system of multi-party cooperation. As a matter of routine, after a chairman’s overseas visit, the General Office of the NPC submits a special report to the Standing Committee. These reports usually contain basic information about the visit, the diplomatic work done during the visit and suggestions for how to develop better diplomatic relations with the visited country.41 The reporting system is aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of Chinese parliamentary diplomacy.

37  Chen Zonghai, ‘The History and Characteristics of Sino-India Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Contemporary World, no. 2 (2010), pp. 38–40. 38  Yang Suqun, ‘Analysis on the Role and Nature of CPPCC’s Diplomacy’, Journal of Shandong Normal University (Humanities and Social Sciences), no. 5 (2010), pp. 130–134. 39  Zhao Kejin, ‘On the Theory of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, pp. 41–43. 40  There are eight democratic parties in China: Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang; China Democratic League; China Democratic National Construction Association; China Association for Promoting Democracy; Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party; Zhigongdang of China; Jiusan Society; and Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League. 41  Liu Zheng and Cheng Xiangqing, The Practice of Democracy, pp. 274–275.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

13. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution

259

Regular Inter-parliamentary Exchanges The oldest mechanism for regular inter-parliamentary exchanges in China is the one that the NPC established with the European Parliament in 1981. Since then, mechanisms for regular inter-parliamentary exchanges have been established by memoranda of understanding. In 2006, the NPC built such mechanisms with six countries, including the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Australia, South Africa and Brazil. By February 2014, the NPC had established mechanisms with fourteen countries and the European Parliament,42 including both the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United States of America.43 Among all of these countries, the mechanism of regular interparliamentary exchanges between the NPC and the Russian State Duma is considered the most effective and active. It is also the exchange in which the chairman of the NPC’s Standing Committee serves as chairman of the Sino– Russian Parliamentary Cooperation Committee.44 The NPC attaches great importance to the mechanism of regular inter-parliamentary exchanges, and calls it the ‘breakthrough of parliamentary diplomacy’.45 Inter-parliamentary Dialogue at the Committee Level The NPC has nine special committees, including the Ethnic Affairs Committee, the Law Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee. Of these, the Foreign Affairs Committee plays a very important role in parliamentary diplomacy. From 2008 to 2013, the Foreign Affairs Committee hosted 88 parliamentary delegations from 41 countries and the European Parliament, and organized 48 delegations of NPC members and sixteen delegations of Foreign Affairs Committee members to visit 42 counties and the European Parliament. Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee attended 44 activities sponsored by international and regional parliamentary organizations.46 The Foreign Affairs Committee exercises the authority to express official opinions on international affairs. For example, in 2013, the 42  Liang Guodong, ‘Innovation and Evolution: Ten Years of NPC’s Foreign Affairs’, The People’s Congress of China, no. 3 (2013), pp. 13–15. 43  See Sunjian Guo and Baogang Guo, Thirty Years of China–US Relations: Analytical Approaches and Contemporary Issues (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 107–109. 44  Liang Guodong, ‘Write a New Chapter of NPC’s International Exchanges: The NPC’s Foreign Affairs in 2013’, The People’s Congress of China, no. 4 (2014), pp. 15–18. 45  Xu Song and Bai Xu, ‘New Breakthrough in China’s Parliamentary Diplomacy’, available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2007-03/15/content_5850218.htm. 46  Work Summary of Foreign Affairs Committee of the 11th National People’s Congress for the Past Five Years, adopted by the 55th meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee (27 December 2012).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

260

wang

Foreign Affairs Committee made two public statements on China’s air defence identification zone in the East China Sea and on the Japanese prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (靖國神社).47 Bilateral Friendship Group The NPC began to establish friendship groups in 1984. The earliest bilateral friendship groups were organized with Senegal, Zaire, Sudan, Turkey, Japan, Greece, Italy, France, the United Kingdom and the European Parliament. By 2013, the NPC had established 106 friendship groups. Each group has one chairman, one deputy chairman and several members. In general, the chairmanship of important friendship groups – such as those of the Sino–British friendship group and the Sino–French friendship group – are held by the deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The NPC highly values these friendship groups between China and members of foreign parliaments, since the latter always have a deep understanding of China. The NPC considers friendship with congress members from foreign countries an important way to promote understanding between people.48 Exchanges of Working and Administrative Bodies The main responsibility of the NPC’s working and administrative bodies is to serve administratively, provide legal drafts and investigate government budgets.49 There is an enormous difference between international exchanges by working and administrative bodies and those of other groups, in that the participants in the working and administrative bodies’ international exchanges are mainly the staff of the Standing Committee rather than congressmen themselves. The exchange topics are thus always closely related to the administrative work of the Standing Committee, such as legislative issues, budget examinations and interpretation of law. For example, the Legislative Affairs Commission visited the Israeli Parliament, Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice to learn how Israel upholds the uniformity of its legal system and how Israel’s legislature promotes sustainable development.50 47  Annual Work Summary of Foreign Affairs Committee of the 12nd National People’s Congress, adopted by the 14th meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee (23 December 2013). 48  Ye Ruicang, ‘The Exchanges between the National People’s Congress and Foreign Congresses’, available online at http://www.people.com.cn/zgrdxw/zhuanti/rdgzwtjd/ zs10.html. 49  Kan Ke, ‘The Establishment of the Working Committee in Local People’s Congresses’, Legal Daily (22 December 2014). 50  Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the State of Israel, ‘The Director of Legislative Affairs Commission Heads a Delegation to Visit Israel’, available online at http://il.china -embassy.org/chn/sgxw/t812116.htm. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

13. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution

261

Exchanges of Local People’s Congresses Parliamentary diplomacy has hierarchical divisions that take place on both the national and local levels.51 Local congresses have become indispensable participants in foreign affairs.52 Many local people’s congresses in China have established foreign affairs committees to promote their own international exchanges. The People’s Congress of Zhejiang Province set up its Foreign Affairs Committee in 1993, and its Standing Committee hosted 431 foreign delegations from 1980 to 2009.53 The NPC supports local congresses in carrying out international exchanges, helps them to build friendly relationships with foreign local congresses, and allows local congress members to join national visiting delegations.54 However, the NPC’s support also has negative influences – for example, local congresses have become heavily reliant on the NPC and have begun to lose their local flavour.55 The NPC and the Inter-Parliamentary Union The NPC has been placing much emphasis on multilateral parliamentary diplomacy. By 2011, the NPC had become a member of fifteen regional and international parliamentary organizations, including the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the Asia–Pacific Parliamentary Forum and the Association of Asian Parliaments for Peace. The NPC also joined five regional parliamentary organizations as an observer, such as Latin American Parliament (Parlatino) and the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Among the above-mentioned regional and international parliamentary organizations, the NPC attaches great importance to the IPU, as reflected in the delegations’ annual reports to the NPC Standing Committee after the IPU’s conferences. This is not only because of the long and tortuous process through which the NPC became a member of the IPU; it is also because 51  David M. Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 19–24. 52  Hong Zhimin, Role and Function of Local People’s Congress in Chinese Parliamentary Diplomacy: Focus on the Shanghai People’s Congress, Master’s dissertation, Fudan University (May 2011), pp. 11–12. 53  Ma Lan, ‘The Frequent Activities of Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Zhejiang People’s Congress, no. 12 (2009), p. 36. 54  Work Summary of Foreign Affairs committee, adopted by the 46th meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress (14 January 2008). 55  Cheng Zhe, On the Position and Characteristics of the International Exchanges of Local People’s Congress, Master’s dissertation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University (January 2012), p. 44. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

262

wang

the NPC ­considers the IPU to be the most important multilateral parliamentary organization.56 The history of the NPC’s entry into the IPU and its activity within that organization are detailed below. The NPC’s Circuitous Entry into the IPU After Communist China was established in 1949, Chinese leaders discussed the necessity and feasibility of joining the IPU. Opponents held that the IPU had very limited impact on improving international relations and might cause a misunderstanding of ‘two Chinas’ on diplomatic occasions.57 However, because China had not retaken its seat at the United Nations (UN) at that time, joining the IPU became an important opportunity to widen China’s diplomatic scope and channels. Liao Chengzhi (廖承志), deputy director of the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, supported China’s entry into the IPU. In his report to China’s Premier Zhou Enlai, Liao argued that with the increasing number of developing countries in the IPU, the United States had lost the ability to fence China out of the IPU.58 At its conference in 1955, the NPC passed a resolution to join the IPU and organized a special delegation to the IPU’s 44th conference in Helsinki, Finland. However, because of the adamant opposition of the United States and Thailand, the IPU’s Executive Committee voted to reject China’s application. The head of the Chinese delegation, Peng Zhen (彭真), wrote to the IPU’s president to express China’s strong protest at this rejection, pointing out that the rejection was the result of Cold War mentality, which could lead to suspicion and fragmentation in the international community.59 After the Helsinki Conference, the IPU discussed China’s possible IPU entry several times, but failed to reach any consensus. Since China’s re-entry into the United Nations in 1971, the IPU contacted China on numerous occasions, expecting the NPC to join. However, because of China’s foreign policy at the time and the politically partisan Cultural Revolution that was taking place within China, the NPC did not respond to these invitations. After the NPC established its Foreign Affairs Committee in 1983, entry into the IPU became a priority of the Foreign Affairs Committee. 56  See Xu Song, ‘Chairman Zhang Dejiang Holds Talks with IPU President Abdelwahad Radi’, People’s Daily (3 September 2013). 57  Xiong Wei, ‘The Story of NPC’s Entry into the Inter-Parliamentary Union’, The People’s Congress of China, no. 7 (2010), pp. 47–50. 58  Wang Junyan, Biography of Liao Chengzhi (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2006), pp. 440–441. 59  Peng Zhen, ‘Protest Letter of the Chairman of IPU’, Bulletin of the State Council of PRC, no. 14 (1955), pp. 483–484. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

13. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution

263

It drew up a report about entry into the IPU, which was submitted to the NPC Standing Committee.60 In December 1983, the NPC Standing Committee adopted a resolution to join the IPU and authorized Geng Biao (耿飚) to head a delegation to attend the IPU’s 71st conference in Geneva, Switzerland. The IPU’s Executive Committee finally accepted the People’s Republic of China as a formal member in April 1984. From 1954 to 1984, China completed a 30-year circuitous entry into the IPU. The reasons why it took such a long time are attributed to the conflicting ideologies of the international environment on the one hand, and China’s domestic affairs on the other. Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy in the IPU With China’s entry into the IPU, the latter has become an important arena for conducting multilateral parliamentary diplomacy. In September 1993, the Chinese delegation formally applied to host the IPU’s 96th conference. The application was approved by the Executive Committee of the IPU in 1994.61 The IPU’s 96th conference, which was sponsored by the NPC, was held in Beijing in September 1996. It was widely praised for its elaborate presentation.62 The NPC also held the Hong Kong Session of the Parliamentary Conference on the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005. By hosting the IPU’s conference, the NPC fulfilled its responsibility as an IPU member, and it also presented an opportunity for China’s ‘home-court diplomacy’ (主场外交).63 The chairmen of the NPC attended all three of the World Conferences of Speakers of Parliaments – in 2000, 2005 and 2010 – and were elected as presiding officers. During these conferences, the Chinese delegations used every opportunity to spread China’s official foreign policy of peace.64 The NPC made efforts to safeguard and explain the legitimacy of the Chinese political system at these conferences. At the 2000 Speakers’ Conference, the Chinese delegations submitted amendments to the secretary about the draft declaration three times, and finally some important principles were inserted into the conference declaration, including those on sovereign equality, non-interference in 60  Yuan Nansheng, ‘The Diplomatic Career of Geng Biao’, Hunan Tide, no. 9 (2006), pp. 32–37. 61  Cao Zhi, Report on the Preparations for the IPU’s 96th conference, delivered at the 20th Session of the 8th National People’s Congress (3 July 1996). 62  Xiong Wei, ‘Unforgettable Moments of the NPC to Attend IPU’s Conferences’, The People’s Congress of China, no. 19 (2011), pp. 47–51. 63  Chen Dongxiao, ‘China’s Host Diplomacy: Opportunities, Challenges and Tasks’, China International Studies, no. 5 (2014), pp. 4–16. 64  General Office of the NPC Standing Committee, ‘Report on the Chairman Wu Bangguo’s Attendance to the 2005 Speakers Conference and Visit to Morocco’, Bulletin of the NPC Standing Committee, no. 7 (2005), pp. 746–749. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

264

wang

i­nternal affairs, and respect for people choosing their own social system and path of development.65 In addition, the NPC has been involved in competition for membership in the Executive Committee of the IPU. Chinese congressmen were active members of the Executive Committee from 1987 to 1991. However, members of the Chinese delegation did not participate in the Executive Committee for the next ten years. In 2000, the Chinese delegations posited that China’s role in the IPU did not match its international status, the reason being that there were not any Chinese congress members in the governing bodies of the IPU.66 The NPC thus recommended and supported Lui Congmin (吕聪敏), the deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Committee, to run for a seat on the Asia–Pacific Group of the IPU in 2003. With cooperation from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese embassies abroad, the NPC secured support from the IPU’s leadership and foreign congresses, which finally resulted in Lui’s successful election.67 The NPC has also been aiming at building trust and removing misgivings through better communication within the IPU. In order to deal with the Western countries’ condemnation of China’s human rights record in Tibet, the NPS responded with a more proactive strategy in the IPU. At the 100th IPU conference in 1998, which coincided with the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Chinese delegation distributed a Chinese government white paper on human rights and the Tibetan issue. In the white paper, China pointed out that there had been great improvements in the protection of human rights in China.68 Since China’s accession to the WTO, international economic issues have become important topics for the Chinese delegation. At the 110th IPU conference, a draft resolution involved criticism of China’s agricultural subsidies policy, but this was deleted after clarification by the Chinese delegation.69 Overall, the NPC has been trying to use the IPU as a platform for multilateral diplomacy. It has been working on increasing the importance of China in the 65  General Office of the NPC Standing Committee, ‘Report on the Chairman Li Peng’s Attendance to the 2000 Speakers Conference’, Bulletin of the NPC Standing Committee, no. 6 (2000), pp. 703–707. 66  Delegation of the NPC, ‘Report on the IPU’s 103rd Conference’, Bulletin of the NPC Standing Committee, no. 4 (2000), pp. 472–476. 67  Delegation of the NPC, ‘Report on the IPU’s 109th Conference and Visit to Belgium and Luxembourg’, Bulletin of the NPC Standing Committee, no. 1 (2004), pp. 99–103. 68  Delegation of the NPC, ‘Report on the IPU’s 100th Conference’, Bulletin of the NPC Standing Committee, no. 5 (1998), pp. 584–588. 69  Delegation of the NPC, ‘Report on the IPU’s 110th Conference’, Bulletin of the NPC Standing Committee, no. 5 (2004), pp. 409–413.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

13. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution

265

IPU’s decision-making process. These activities have been aimed at improving China’s policy of using soft power to boost its global status through parliamentary diplomacy,70 and are intended to ‘build confidence and clear doubt’, to promote understanding of the Chinese political system and to ease some of the so-called ‘China-phobia’.71 However, these multilateral parliamentary activities lay much stress on pragmatic methods and skills, but lack mid-term and long-term development strategies.72 In fact, this problem is also a side effect of the excessive dependence in parliamentary diplomacy on the overall diplomatic policy and governmental diplomacy.

Goals of Chinese Parliamentary Diplomacy

Under China’s system of diplomatic power division, parliamentary diplomacy has its own institutional objectives and political identity. Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), the former chairman of the NPC, has set the goals of Chinese parliamentary diplomacy as being focused on serving the strategy of China’s overall diplomacy, development of the domestic economy and improving the NPC’s own work.73 In other words, the goals of Chinese parliamentary diplomacy include three levels: first, the relationship between parliamentary diplomacy and overall diplomacy; second, the relationship between parliamentary diplomacy and economic development; and third, the relationship between parliamentary diplomacy and the exercise of the NPC’s authority. First, parliamentary diplomacy is subordinate to the overall diplomacy. As mentioned above, overall diplomacy reflects the CCP’s leadership, which decides the boundaries of China’s parliamentary diplomacy. From an institutional perspective, the Foreign Affairs Office of the CCP has the authority to approve all important diplomatic activities. The CCP clearly stipulates that diplomatic power should be centralized in the CCP Central Committee, and should form a diplomatic administrative system that is based on the p ­ rinciples 70  Zhang Taohua, ‘On the Alternatives and Development of China’s Multilateral Diplomacy since China’s Reform and Opening-up’, Journal of South–Central University for Nationalities (Humanities and Social Sciences), no. 6 (2008), pp. 33–36. 71  Lui Hong, Wang Li and Niu Ruifei, ‘International Exchange of the NPC to Promote Allround Development of China’s International Relations’, People’s Daily (31 March 2011). 72  Jin Xin, ‘Some Thoughts on How to Broker New Ground for Multilateral Diplomacy in New Century’, World Economics and Politics, no. 10 (2001), p. 39. 73  Liang Guodong, ‘Making the Congress as the Constructive Forces to Development of International Relations: Review of the Diplomatic Work of the NPC in 2009’, The People’s Congress of China, no. 4 (2010), pp. 46–51.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

266

wang

of unified leadership, centralized administration, level-to-level responsibility and multi-level coordination.74 The concept of overall diplomacy does not therefore mean plurality in diplomatic power, but puts more emphasis on strengthening the party’s leadership on foreign affairs. Second, parliamentary diplomacy is also expected to promote the development of the domestic economy. The Chinese constitution states that the basic task of the nation in the years to come is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization. This means that the NPC’s parliamentary diplomacy should also serve to promote economic growth, which is the central task of modernization. Briefly, there are two ways in which parliamentary diplomacy can serve the development of the domestic economy. On the one hand, parliamentary diplomacy provides a peaceful international environment for economic development and helps to establish more equitable rules of international trade. On the other hand, the NPC can also explore opportunities for economic cooperation in parliamentary diplomacy. For example, after visiting Chile and Uruguay in 2002, the NPC delegation analysed the effects of the economic crisis in the two countries and advised the Chinese government to promote trade with them.75 The latest example took place in June 2014, when an NPC delegation attended the Chinese NPC–US Senate inter-parliamentary conference and gave the US Senate a list of issues of concern regarding trade for Chinese enterprises. The NPC urged the US side to heed the concerns of Chinese businesses. This inter-parliamentary exchange has been described as a successful attempt to solve practical problems in Sino–US economic cooperation.76 Finally, parliamentary diplomacy can improve the NPC’s own legislation and supervisory abilities. At the 2006 Sino–Russian Parliamentary Presidential Meeting, Chairman Wu Bangguo said that the main functions of the NPC in the diplomatic sphere are concentrated on legislation concerning diplomatic relations and on supervision by reviewing the implementation of international treaties.77 Parliamentary diplomacy, especially in the form of international 74  CCP Central Committee and State Council, The Notice on the Leadership and Supervisory Work on Foreign Affairs (31 October 1991), available online at http://www.51wf.com/ law/1194707.html. 75  Delegation of NPC, ‘Report on Visit to Chile and Uruguay’, Bulletin of the NPC Standing Committee, no. 1 (2003), pp. 134–137. 76  Cao Weizhou, ‘The International Exchange of the National People’s Congress: Lecture on the Twelfth session of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress’ (29 April 2015), available online at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-04/29/ content_1934984.htm. 77  Liang Guodong, ‘Innovation and Evolution’, pp. 13–15.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

13. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Chinese Constitution

267

exchanges of working and administrative bodies of the NPC, can provide valuable experiences and lessons for China’s legislation.

Conclusion: Trends in Chinese Parliamentary Diplomacy

To meet these goals, the dual-source diplomatic power system established in the People’s Republic of China enables the making of unified foreign policy decisions to coordinate diversified diplomatic solutions. The NPC has also built a complex parliamentary diplomacy system that includes varied forms and interior coordinating mechanisms. The NPC has successfully carried out multilateral diplomacy, such as within the IPU, to increase China’s international influence. Based on these achievements, parliamentary diplomacy is already an important part of China’s overall diplomacy. In this process, the NPC is gradually breaking away from the stereotype of a ‘rubber stamp’ and has partially restored its constitutional authority. However, a further development of China’s parliamentary diplomacy is restricted by the system of the division of diplomatic power. After taking over the CCP leadership at the end of 2012, Xi Jinping further emphasized the concentration of power. At the Foreign Affairs Work Conference (FAWC) in 2014, Xi pointed out that ‘China must enhance the central and unified leadership of the Party, reform and improve institutions and mechanisms concerning foreign affairs, step up their coordination among different sectors, government bodies and localities’.78 This means that the CCP will enhance its leadership in China’s foreign policy process.79 Meanwhile, Xi Jinping’s government also established a new National Security Commission (NSC) in 2014. The NSC has two important characteristics. First, as a policy-making and coordinating institution, the NSC has broad and substantial powers in both domestic and foreign affairs. Second, the NSC adopts a mechanism of collective decision-making, and it can establish standing or interim agencies within its midst.80 From an institutional perspective, the centralization of diplomatic powers and the establishment of 78  Xinhua News Agency, ‘Xi Eyes More Enabling International Environment for China’s Peaceful Development’ (30 November 2014), available online at http://news.xinhuanet .com/english/china/2014-11/30/c_133822694.htm. 79  Michael D. Swaine, ‘Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major-Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics’, China Leadership Monitor, no. 46 (2015), p. 5. 80  Liu Hui (ed.), Annual Report on China’s National Security Studies, 2014 (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2014), pp. 148–149.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

268

wang

the NSC provided an opportunity to redefine the diplomatic power relations between the NPC and the CCP. In particular, the chairman of the NPC Standing Committee was appointed as vice-chairman of the NSC, which means that the NPC’s political position has tacitly risen within the system of the division of diplomatic power, because the chairman is not a member of the FALG. However, the NSC is merely an affiliate body under the Central Committee of the CCP, rather than a constitutional organ of China’s central government. Some scholars have suggested that the NSC should be written into the Chinese constitution and have its authority and responsibility clearly defined.81 That would narrow the gap between the constitutional diplomatic power system and the unwritten political practices, regulate the CCP’s leadership on foreign affairs, and provide more institutional space for further development of China’s parliamentary diplomacy.

81  Ma Ling, ‘On the Legal Status of National Security Commission in China’, Journal of Shanghai University of Political Science & Law, vol. 29, no. 6 (2014), pp. 1–8.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 14

Parliamentary Diplomacy in Northeast Asia: Lessons from the Parliamentarians’ Unions in Japan and South Korea Jiun Bang Introduction Despite expectations that macro forces such as globalization would make state sovereignty less relevant for the conduct of international relations, some regions in the world have resisted this push towards supranationalism, relying instead on predominantly bilateral inter-state channels of diplomacy: Northeast Asia is a classic example. The main argument of this chapter is that Northeast Asia does not conform to parliamentary diplomacy, understood in its most orthodox form as negotiations or dialogue that are typically embedded in a multilateral, conference-style setting. By analyzing the cases of Japan and South Korea, this chapter shows that the practice of parliamentary diplomacy in this region is closer to that of bilateral envoy diplomacy than multilateral conference diplomacy, which tends to reinforce the agency of the state. Subsequently, the channels through which parliamentarians as individuals interact with foreign policy actors resemble that of a hub-and-spoke model: a series of compartmentalized bilateral alliances rather than a more networked holistic system.1 Subsequently, the theme of bilateralism in parliamentary diplomacy closely resembles this hub-and-spoke model, which was initially implemented in the region as the security architecture for organizing and managing formal treaty alliances. The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate one example of this interparliamentary channel by examining the evidence surrounding the operation 1  The idea of the hub-and-spoke system can be traced back to John Foster Dulles, former United States Secretary of State under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who saw this model as a more viable alternative for U.S. (security) approach to East Asia than duplicating U.S.’ efforts in Europe at creating the multilateral institution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). See more in: Geunwook Lee, ‘Between Multilateralism and Bilateralism,’ in Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Architecture and Beyond, T.J. Pempel and Chung-Min Lee (eds.), (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 65–86.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004336346_016 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

270

Bang

of the existing parliamentarians’ unions in Japan and South Korea. These represent the most enduring, institutionalized, and representative cases of bilateral parliamentary engagement in the region. Given the lack of literature on this subject, the evidence here relies on a mix of primary sources as well as works in the Korean and Japanese languages. The qualitative data surrounding the engagement between Japan and South Korea highlights the importance of embedding parliamentary diplomacy in regional contexts. In the case of these two states, the increasing politicization of the inter-parliamentary channel shows just how much pressure there is for parliamentarians to work as an extension of the executive rather than as relatively autonomous actors. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The first section embeds the main argument in the extant discourse of ‘mainstream’ definitions of parliamentary diplomacy. The second section then traces the history and status of the parliamentarians’ unions in Japan and South Korea, including the evolving trends. The third section outlines some potential challenges to the inter-­parliamentary mechanism, while the last section offers a few policy recommendations on how the respective parliamentarians’ unions in Japan and South Korea may better interact domestically with their executives, as well as with each other.

Definitional Ambiguity

To argue that something is a permutation first warrants a clear examination of the initial point of reference to which that comparison is made. As a useful primer, the following constitute common encyclopedic entries on ‘parliamentary diplomacy’: Form of conference diplomacy imitative of some national legislative processes in which majorities are formed to promote agreements. Found in ongoing international conferences, such as the UN [United Nations] General Assembly . . .2 Multilateral diplomacy which takes place in public in the organs of an international organization . . . [or] dialogue between the parliamentarians of different states. This is fostered by regional inter-parliamentary organizations and the Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU].3 2  ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy,’ in Dictionary of Conflict Resolution, Wiley, Douglas H. Yarn (ed.), (Hoboken: Jossey-Bass, 2002). 3  ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy,’ in The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy, G.R. Berridge and Lorna Lloyd (eds.), (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

14. The Parliamentarians ’ Unions in Japan and South Korea

271

Early theoretical discourse on parliamentary diplomacy echoes these classic definitions regarding the format of multilateralism, by treating parliamentary diplomacy as a ‘process which involves nations with widely differing goals in activity formally organized as a continuing system of regulated debate’.4 More contemporary studies such as that by Götz have recognized the potential for severe misunderstandings amid the definitional ambiguity, noting that there is a divergence in its usage to either mean parliamentary methods or parliamentary agents.5 The former approximates the aforementioned classic definition, but it is the latter that describes the current practice in Northeast Asia. Put simply, parliamentary diplomacy predominantly refers to the institutional background of the actor involved (parliamentarians cum diplomats). Furthermore, the diplomacy that these parliamentarians engage in typically takes the form of bilateral meetings or engagements, thereby constituting an extension of state diplomacy within the framework of a hub-and-spoke model. There are several reasons or basic criteria for assessment in arriving at such a conclusion regarding the hub-and-spoke model of parliamentary diplomacy in Northeast Asia. The first is the state-centricity of parliamentary diplomacy. There have been claims that parliamentary diplomacy has become an ‘­important middle ground between the traditional level of interstate diplomacy and the new level of transnational cooperation amongst grassroots nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)’.6 Nevertheless, parliamentary diplomacy in Northeast Asia has remained predominantly state-driven, which means a weak emphasis on international parliamentary institutions or supranational forums involving transgovernmental units. This may explain why the region is often conspicuously missing from the list of international assemblies or ­supranational parliaments.7 A further evidence for the state-centricity argument is the lack of scrutiny of the executive – an element that scholars have already noted as representing one important aspect of international

4  Naomi Rosenbaum, ‘Cyprus and the United Nations: An Appreciation of Parliamentary Diplomacy,’ The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 33, no. 2 (1967), pp. 218–231 (p. 218). 5  Norbert Götz, ‘On the Origins of ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’: Scandinavian ‘Bloc Politics’ and Delegation Policy in the League of Nations,’ Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 40, no. 3 (2005), pp. 263–279 (p. 264). 6  Robert M. Cutler, ‘The OSCE’s Parliamentary Diplomacy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus in Comparative Perspective,’ Studia Diplomatica, vol. 59, no. 2 (2006), pp. 79–93 (pp. 82–83). 7   See Andrés Malamud and Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliaments and Parliamentarians as International Actors,’ in Bob Reinalda (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-state Actors (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 101–115 (pp. 106–107). Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

272

Bang

­parliamentary work.8 The next section shows just how much influence statelevel diplomacy has on parliamentary diplomacy, as the former has increasingly hijacked progress in the latter. In sum, the evidence further reinforces the claim that parliamentary diplomacy is predominantly an extension of the state that complements formal inter-state diplomacy.

Parliamentarians’ Unions in Japan and South Korea

The main rationale for selecting the parliamentarians’ unions in Japan and South Korea, in order to demonstrate the argument concerning the huband-spoke model of inter-parliamentary diplomacy, is that these unions are a representative case of a highly institutionalized and long-running mode of engagement, or ‘channel’, between lawmakers in both countries. The term ‘parliamentarians’ unions’ is used to refer to two distinct groups, which operate separately in each country but come together to form the main conduit for parliamentary diplomacy. While the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union is composed of legislators from the Japanese Diet who work on issues related to South Korea, the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union is constituted by those in the Korean National Assembly who are committed to furthering bilateral relations with Japan. Technically, the sequence in which the country is listed in the title of the union is an indication of the home affiliation of its members. As the history of inter-parliamentary engagement between the two groups will show, the initial interaction was born out of the mood of the Cold War, which tended to strengthen the incentives for cooperation. Japan and South Korea were part of the anti-communist alignment, and particularly for South Korea, which was locked into a rivalry with its Northern neighbor, rapprochement and pragmatic engagement with Japan was imperative. The beginning of their inter-parliamentary cooperation was strongly informed by geopolitics, which tended to treat parliamentary diplomacy as a tool to achieve interdependent state priorities such as that of better political and economic relations. Origins To understand the development of parliamentary diplomacy in Northeast Asia, it is first necessary to lay out the historical context in which the existing inter-parliamentary channel between Japan and South Korea was born out. North Korea is an important factor to the extent that it acted as a ­competitive 8  Frans W. Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy,’ The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 1 (2007), pp. 93–99 (p. 94).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

14. The Parliamentarians ’ Unions in Japan and South Korea

273

catalyst for South Korea’s own engagement with Japan. Amid anxiety of greater rapprochement between its ‘brethren’ China and an ‘imperialist’ U.S., North Korea managed to supersede the South in its institutionalization of an interparliamentary mechanism with Japan, by establishing a Korea (Joseon)-Japan Friendship-Promotion Parliamentary Association on 16 November 1971.9 Despite ongoing Red Cross-sponsored inter-Korean Talks, relations between the two Koreas were far from cordial, as demonstrated by incidents such as the North Korean hijacking of the South’s Korean Air Lines in December 1969. Meanwhile, the end of the 1960s was marked by growing entanglement of the U.S. in Vietnam and the promulgation of the Nixon doctrine, which placed greater responsibilities for states under the U.S. umbrella to take care of their own security. There was definitely general momentum, therefore, for the two Koreas to be strategically courting Japan and making sporadic efforts to strengthen their respective bilateral ties with Tokyo. Upon formalization of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965, Seoul was able not only to facilitate greater intergovernmental bilateral cooperation, but also to pave the way for informal inter-parliamentary talks. For instance, there was a meeting of nine Japanese and 22 Korean parliamentarians on 6 June 1968 in Seoul to discuss issues ranging from trade and commerce, the treatment of Korean residents in Japan, to mutual security assurance.10 Eventually, an official friendship association was launched in 1972, which evolved into the parliamentarians’ league in July 1975, and finally took the name of the parliamentarians’ union that is used until the present day. In several ways, 1975 was a pivotal year for Japan and South Korea, as the inter-parliamentary network sought to reinforce the Cold War anti-­ communist alignment and also push relations forward in economic cooperation beyond that of war reparations, caused by Japan’s colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945. A year later, in 1976, Japan inaugurated the national JapanKorea Friendship Association headed by Shiina Etsusaburō, the then deputy ­chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which unified all the domestic associations of a similar nature under an overarching structure. Meanwhile, Japan’s relations with North Korea were shaky at best, with a repeated cycle of what seemed like progress followed by periods of stalemate. North Korea may have managed to initiate its inter-parliamentary mechanism with Japan ahead 9  Yonhap News Agency & Monterey Interpretation and Translation Services, North Korea Handbook (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 960. 10   ‘Korean-Japanese Parliamentarians’ Meeting: Agenda includes Security Issues,’ [in Korean] Maeil Kyungjae, 6 June 1968.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

274

Bang

of South Korea, but the Cold War had quickly strengthened the impetus for Tokyo to engage Seoul over Pyongyang. Current Status As of 2015, there are five main committees in charge of five thematic areas that constitute the operational backbone of the parliamentarians’ unions of Japan and South Korea: security and diplomacy, economy and science, society and culture, law, and one geared towards future-oriented agendas. The sixth committee – the women’s committee – was institutionalized relatively recently, in 2014, and is actually the result of greater internal diversification in thematic areas that has expanded the agenda for inter-parliamentary diplomacy. Traditionally, both Japan and South Korea have gained a rather negative reputation with regard to the status of women in the respective societies. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the male median earnings were 36.3 percent higher than those of females in South Korea, while Japanese males were earning 26.5 percent more than their female counterparts (the OECD average difference is roughly 15 percent).11 With this in mind, the inter-parliamentary mechanism increasingly began including issues such as female empowerment on their agendas, reflecting some of the two countries’ key priorities. The two most representative functions that the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union and the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union engage in are the annual general assembly and the executive committee meeting. The general assembly typically occurs every year and rotates between Seoul and Tokyo in terms of location. The most recent general assembly was held on 11 July 2015 in Tokyo and it marked the 38th such meeting since 1972 (see figure 1 in appendix). There is often asymmetry in participation due to the rotating venue, so that participation is highly correlated with where the meeting is held. Although the guidelines stipulate that the general assembly is to be held every year, the following years were passed over: 1976, 1980, 1995, 2000, 2008, 2009, and 2012. Even though the executive committee meeting may take place in lieu of the general assembly, cancelling a general assembly meeting may indicate not only domestic turmoil (cabinet reshuffling etc.) but also a particularly low point in interstate relations (especially in the consecutive gap from 2008 to 2009). ­Diplomatic tensions were particularly high in 2012 after the August visit by 11  The gender pay gap is measured as the difference between male and female earnings as a percentage of male earnings. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘Gender Wage Gap,’ online at https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/gender-wage-gap .htm.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

14. The Parliamentarians ’ Unions in Japan and South Korea

275

South Korea’s President Lee Myung-bak to Dokdo (Takeshima in Japanese), a cluster of disputed islets with competing claims to its territorial sovereignty by both Seoul and Tokyo. This partially explains why the annual general assembly of the parliamentarians’ unions did not take place in 2012. Although there were still parliamentary exchanges in 2012 despite the lack of a general assembly – given that a Japanese delegation visited Seoul in October and a Korean delegation made a trip to Tokyo in November12 – the fact that even scheduled meetings become hostage to political tensions reinforces the state-centric nature of parliamentary diplomacy. So what is the strength then of these parliamentary unions in their respective political systems, particularly if they are devoid of powers to scrutinize the executive? In so far as they are visible supplements to formal inter-state communication, these unions serve as key pieces in the overall framework of formal inter-state diplomacy. The annual general assembly typically produces a joint declaration on pressing substantive issues. For example, the most recent annual assembly, held in Tokyo on 10 July 2015,13 culminated in a joint declaration that reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to uphold the Murayama and Kono Statements,14 which had been a point of contention especially after Japanese Prime Minister Abe had ordered a review of the Kono Statement in 2014. Another example involves Nukaga Fukushirō, a senior lawmaker in the LDP and the current head of the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union, attending the state funeral for former South Korean President Kim Young-sam on 26 November 2015, as Japan’s special representative appointed by Prime Minister Abe. In this sense, the parliamentarians’ union contributes to envoy diplomacy. In the same vein, the 1998 joint declaration between South Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung and Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō, specifically cited the channel established by the two parliamentarians’ unions as a key

12  Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic White Paper, 2012, p. 62. 13  For details on the joint declaration of 10 July 2015, see Sewon Lee, ‘Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union: General Assembly Involving Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union was Constructive,’ [in Korean] Yonhap News, 11 July 2015. 14  The Murayama Statement is a 1995 statement issued on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II by the former Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, which expresses remorse for Japan’s former aggression and colonialism. The Kono Statement was released in 1993 by the then Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kono Yohei, and outlines the results of the study conducted by the Japanese government on the issue of ‘comfort women’/sex slaves. The results of this study confirm that the victims were indeed coaxed and coerced against their will into sexual servitude for the Japanese military during Japan’s rule.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

276

Bang

piece in fostering bilateral dialogue.15 Therefore, the inter-parliamentary channel is an integral part of intergovernmental diplomacy, but one that mostly serves to complement the foreign policy agenda of the executive rather than undermine it. Evolving Trends There have been three noticeable trends in the parliamentarians’ unions since its institutionalization in the mid-1970s. The first is the increasing politicization of the inter-parliamentary channel, causing bilateral tensions at the executive level to impede meaningful collaboration at the parliamentary level. The second is greater overlap in the membership of the parliamentarians’ unions and of the different thematic groups existing within the Japanese Diet and the South Korean Parliament (e.g. soccer organizations). The third is the thinning of personal networks of the members of the respective parliamentarians’ unions. Regarding the first trend, there has indeed been a noticeable downturn in the post-2000s in the number of lawmakers that participate in the annual general assembly of the parliamentarians’ unions. Specifically, there has been a reduction over the years in the registration rate for the parliamentarians’ unions as a proportion of total number of lawmakers in each country: in 2000, 56.96 percent of Japanese lawmakers were part of the Japan-Korea parliamentarians’ union, while Korea registered at 70.32 percent; in 2004, Japan’s number fell to 51 percent and Korea’s at 70 percent, and by 2007, it was 43 percent in Japan and 61.9 percent in Korea.16 Overall, Japan and Korea witnessed a fall in registration by 32 and 13.6 percent, respectively, over a relatively short period of seven years. This explains why there may be lower participation rates at the annual general assembly, but it also indicates a potential waning in the salience of, and parliamentarians’ interest in, the mechanism in both states. As further evidence of the politicization of the inter-parliamentary channel, the absence of bilateral summits between Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and South Korea’s President Park Geun hye until November 2015 (the first time since the two took office in late 2012 and early 2013 respectively) have also 15  ‘Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century,’ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 8 October 1998, online at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html. 16  Kyung-min Park, ‘Lawmakers’ Role in Korean-Japanese Relations: The Case of the KoreaJapan Parliamentarians’ Union,’ [in Korean] Master’s Thesis, Kookmin University, 2009, p. 84.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

14. The Parliamentarians ’ Unions in Japan and South Korea

277

resulted in the reduced engagement of the parliamentarians’ unions. Thus, the fallout of political tensions between governments has contributed to relegating the parliamentarians’ unions to low politics rather than turning them into vehicles for arbitration or conflict resolution. Although it would be a generalization to treat all interactions between the two parliamentarians’ unions as lacking substantive content, there has been a tendency in recent years to use the inter-parliamentary channel to signal a thawing in inter-state relations and treat their interaction as merely symbolic gesture. A case in point is the media coverage of the friendly soccer match between Japanese and Korean lawmakers in June,17 and another similar match a few months later on the Hiyoshi campus of Keio University in Yokohama, Japan, in November 2015.18 These events essentially became spectacles to highlight the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations, but they had no substantive impact on alleviating political tensions between the two states. As scholars like Zhang Qingmin have noted, sports can either become a ‘diplomatic means of confrontation’ or a ‘diplomatic facilitator’.19 The friendly sports matches between Japan and South Korea were mostly conducted to the latter, but had limited effect given the political tensions at the executive level. The friendly soccer matches actually illustrate the second trend in the bilateral relations between the parliamentarians’ unions: greater horizontal collaboration and overlapping membership among different groups within the legislative body. As a form of soccer diplomacy, these soccer matches bring together other thematically-driven associations existing within Japan’s National Diet or South Korea’s Parliament that involve lawmakers. As of 2015, the president of the Association of Parliamentarians for the Promotion of Football Diplomacy on the South Korean side is Chung Byung-kuk from the ruling Saenuri Party, while the Japanese side is led by Etō Seishirō, who is a member of the LDP and has served as the president of at least eleven other friendship associations that involve countries other than South Korea.20 In fact, soccer diplomacy has been slowly gaining steam under the larger rubric of 17  Toru Higashioka, ‘Japan, S. Korea Lawmakers Clash on the Soccer Pitch to Mend Diplomatic Ties,’ The Asahi Shimbun, 14 June 2015. 18  ‘Lawmakers from Korea and Japan Hold Soccer Game in Yokohama,’ The Dong-A Ilbo, 9 November 2015. 19  See Zhang Qingmin, ‘Sports Diplomacy: The Chinese Experience and Perspective,’ The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 8, no. 3–4, 2011, pp. 215 and 220. 20  Etō Seishirō, Official Website, online at http://www.seishiro.jp/profile/ryakureki_yakus yoku/giinrenmei.html.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

278

Bang

sports diplomacy in Japan, as its engagement of North Korea through ­‘wrestling diplomacy’ demonstrates.21 However, some have noted that the ‘links established by means of football were too weak to cope with newly arising tensions’ between Japan and South Korea,22 even citing Etō Seishirō and his dual role as having contributed to the initial founding of the football association and yet, also serving as a board member of the Association for the Joint Visit of All Parliamentarians to the Yasukuni Shrine.23 This particular temple has been an ongoing point of contention for Seoul and Tokyo, as the former equates any official tribute to the place by the latter as inappropriate, because this monument houses the spirits of former Japanese war criminals. This, of course, reinforces the trend of politics taking inter-parliamentary diplomacy hostage. There has also been horizontal expansion in the parliamentarians’ unions themselves. As an example, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) joined the inter-parliamentary network and started participating in the general assembly for the first time in 2010. The JCP also joined the Japan-Korea friendly soccer match in November 2015.24 More importantly, Shii Kazuo, the chairperson of JCP, attended the inauguration ceremony for South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye in February 2013, which marked the first such attendance by a JCP head.25 Shii was also invited to a luncheon hosted by the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union to meet with members of the group including the then Korean representative, Hwang Woo-yeo.26 Finally, the third trend has been a thinning of personal networks across the respective parliamentarians’ unions. The implication here is that if the salience of the unions themselves has somewhat decreased, it is plausible that their corresponding access to the executive to influence policy and overall leverage may also have deteriorated. One way to shed some light on this matter would be 21   Julian Ryall, ‘Japanese Politician Takes Wrestling Diplomacy to North Korea,’ The Telegraph, 21 August 2014. 22  Wolfram Manzenreiter, Sport and Body Politics in Japan (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 205. 23  Manzenreiter, Sport and Body Politics in Japan, p. 206. 24  Japanese Communist Party (JCP), ‘Sports is the Engine of Peace: Japan-Korea InterParliamentary Exchange through Soccer,’ [in Japanese] 8 November 2015, online at http:// www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik15/2015-11-08/2015110813_01_1.html. 25   J CP, ‘Chairperson SHII Kazuo Participates in Inauguration Ceremony of President Park Geun-hye,’ [in Japanese] 26 February 2013, Official Website of the JCP, online at http:// www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik12/2013-02-26/2013022601_01_1.html. 26   J CP, ‘Chairperson SHII Kazuo Participates in Inauguration Ceremony of President Park Geun-hye.’

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

14. The Parliamentarians ’ Unions in Japan and South Korea

279

to trace all past heads/presidents of the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union and the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union and their influence within their respective political scenes. The logic is that the position or authority of the heads of each union should roughly correspond with or translate into the perceived importance of the parliamentary group. As of 2015, there have been a total of nine presidents on the Japanese side since the inauguration of the parliamentary group in 1975 against Korea’s fourteen (see Table 1 in appendix). This is a curious finding especially when we consider how low the retention rate of Japanese Prime Ministers has been in the post-Koizumi period of the mid-2000s – there have been seven PMs within the span of a decade in contrast to three presidents for the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union. Thus, despite the reshuffling at the very top in terms of Prime Ministers, the turnover rate for the head of the parliamentary group has not been high, which is a slightly different case for South Korea. In fact, the average term for an individual appointed as the head of the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union has been roughly three years, whereas the figure on the Japanese side is on average five years. At the individual level, there are a few noticeable figures that deserve mention. There are two individuals who managed to serve decade-terms as presidents of the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union: Mori Yoshirō (2001– 2010) and Takeshita Noboru (1990–2000). The former also held the posts of Minister of Education, Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Minister of Construction, and Japan’s 55th Prime Minister, although his presence as PM was very short-lived and he was quickly succeeded by Koizumi Junichirō. The latter was the supreme advisor to the LDP upon appointment as the head of the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union, but also played the role of Japan’s 74th Prime Minister from November 1987 to June 1989. From the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union, two individuals stand out: Lee Sang-deuk, who holds the longest consecutive term as chair of the Parliamentarians’ Union from 2008 to 2012; and Park Tae-joon, who was the head on three separate occasions in the early 1980s, the late 1980s, and the late 1990s. Lee Sang-deuk was a wellknown politician under the Saenuri Party, but also a controversial figure as the older brother of the former South Korean president Lee Myung-bak, who was president from 2008 to 2013. Park Tae-joon’s background is interesting, because he had attended Waseda University in Japan and later founded POSCO – a renowned multinational steel company headquartered in Pohang – under the full approval of President Park Chung-hee. This shows that Park Tae-joon had personal first-hand experience of studying at a university in Japan as well as close access to and ties with the President of South Korea.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

280

Bang

There are some caveats to equating the importance or influence of a particular president of a parliamentarians’ union with the significance of the union as a whole. First, the position of secretary-general of each of the parliamentarians’ unions, not just the president, is also an important position. Moreover, it is unclear whether the historical placement of political heavyweights as chairs for the parliamentarians’ unions captures the perceived significance of the group as a whole, or whether it represents more of an intent to reward an individual with a title for their relationship with the ruling party. The real danger is that personal politics might be affecting who gets the post, as currently shown by the case of Seo Chung-won. He heads the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union and is a longtime confidant of South Korean President Park Geunhye, but has no obvious expertise or deep personal networks in Japan. Meanwhile, Nukaga Fukushirō, who heads the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union, is an experienced politician being not only a member of the House of Representatives but also a former Minister of Finance. Yet it is unclear how deep his understanding of South Korea is and how large his personal network of Korean specialists and experts is. There is a risk that not enough lawmakers within these parliamentarians’ unions have the expertise and the personal ties in each other’s countries to facilitate greater understanding and bilateral collaboration. It is increasingly difficult to identify country experts and, whatever available political capital there is, it is not being adequately mobilized towards bolstering inter-parliamentary diplomacy. Despite the high degree of institutionalization of the inter-parliamentary network between Japan and South Korea and the strong historical roots to inter-parliamentary diplomacy, the three trends of politicization, horizontal expansion, and thinning personal ties all point to potential challenges for substantive collaboration between the two parliamentarians’ unions, to which we will now turn.

Potential Challenges

This section argues that there are two major challenges that the inter-­ parliamentary channel between Japan and South Korea will need to tackle in the upcoming years in order to improve bilateral relations. The first challenge is to mitigate the increasing politicization of parliamentary relations so as to prevent the channel from becoming entirely consumed by intergovernmental politics. The second challenge concerns a better coordination of the activities of the parliamentarians’ unions with the diplomatic efforts at the sub-state level (e.g. at the level of provinces and/or prefectures), so that ­diplomacy undertaken by different actors within the same state does not become fragmented. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

14. The Parliamentarians ’ Unions in Japan and South Korea

281

Concerning the first challenge, the protracted issues – such as Japanese Prime Minister’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine or the disputed territory of Dokdo/Takeshima – have led to a worsening of bilateral relations. As one way to measure the extent to which Japan-related issues resonate within South Korea’s legislature, we can take a quick glance at how many Japan-related resolutions have been put forward within the national assembly’s foreign affairs and unification committee during the first half of South Korea’s 19th assembly from 2012 to 2014 (see Figure 2). There are 17 such resolutions that have involved at one point or another (co-)sponsorship from a cumulative total of 197 legislators – that figure is more than half of the entire national assembly of 300 seats. There is mostly bipartisan support for the resolutions, with 85 legislators from the ruling Saenuri Party and 107 from its main opposition, New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD) (see Figure 3). The proportion of female lawmakers (32 or 18 percent) out of the 176 total is impressive, as the average statistic for South Korea in the World Bank’s database on the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments is at around 13 percent (from 2001 to 2015) or 16 percent for 2015 only.27 In this context, 32 percent signifies that an incredibly high number of female South Korean legislators have signed on to resolutions targeting Japan. The statistics on South Korean female legislators supporting resolutions on Japan underscores how much traction Japan-related issues have within the South Korean Parliament. The implication that there is a relatively large bi-partisan support for resolutions targeting Japan is a challenge for parliamentary diplomacy, because the loyalty of the lawmakers tends to pull them in opposite directions. On the one hand, they must respond to the needs of their domestic constituencies, which may mean adopting provocative rhetoric against Japan to satisfy the public sentiment. On the other hand, such rhetoric tends to undermine the spirit of the Parliamentarians’ Union by making bilateral collaboration that much harder. In other words, short-term incentives may push lawmakers to satisfy their domestic audience while longer-term dynamics reinforce the need to make progress at the bilateral level. Regarding the second challenge, the need to reconcile sub-state and parliamentary diplomatic efforts with those of the central government is well illustrated by the fact that the parliamentary network connecting Japan and South Korea is not the only representative mechanism, given that other similar efforts are made at the sub-state level. Amid growing concerns of statism and the overwhelming emphasis placed on the centralization of power by the

27  The World Bank Database, ‘Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments (%),’ online at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

282

Bang

state in terms of foreign policy,28 we have seen a corresponding interest in the phenomenon of paradiplomacy (also called sub-state/sub-national/city or multilayered diplomacy).29 Local-level activities that work for the betterment of Japan and South Korea relations are no exception to this. Even for a rather centralized unitary system of government such as that in Japan, there has been a noticeable upsurge in the visibility of sub-national governments within the supranational sphere. In the case of Japan, all prefectures and large cities have launched international affairs departments or sections (kokusai-bu or ka) and third-sector organizations (kyōkai) that are charged with administering policies that spill over into the international sphere.30 Moreover, the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) was established in 1988 in Japan to serve as the organizational hub for all its local governments and to support their activities abroad. CLAIR has over 1500 affiliations between the local authorities in Japan and their foreign counterparts. There is also an award that was set up in conjunction with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), to acknowledge the efforts of the local authorities and non-profit organizations for their contributions to ‘regional internationalization’.31 In fact, the 2014 recipient of the award was Asahikawa City (in Hokkaido Prefecture) that forged the status of an affiliate city with Suwon in South Korea. Specifically, there are quite a few sub-state networks in Japan that actively engage with South Korea. For instance, the Kansai/Kinki region in the southcentral part of Japan – which includes the prefectures of Mie, Nara, Wakayama, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyōgo, and Shiga – is a good example here. The Kansai region has historically generated a vibrant commercial center – particularly during the Edo period (1600–1868) and the early 20th century – which still lingers into the contemporary period with the emphasis on international trade and mega

28  Simon Curtis (ed.), The Power of Cities in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2014). 29  Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (eds.), Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments (London: Frank Cass, 1999); Andre Lecours, ‘Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Policy and International Relations of Regions,’ International Negotiation, vol. 7, no. 1 (2002), pp. 91–114; David Criekemans, ‘Regional Substate Diplomacy from a Comparative Perspective: Quebec, Scotland, Bavaria, Catalonia, Wallonia, and Flanders,’ The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 5, no. 1–2 (2010), pp. 37–64. 30  Purnendra Jain, Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Affairs (London: Routledge, 2005), 8. 31  Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR), Official Website, online at http://www.clair.or.jp/e/index.html.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

14. The Parliamentarians ’ Unions in Japan and South Korea

283

public-works projects.32 This outward orientation may have similarly stimulated its political interaction with South Korea. Table 2 gives a sense of what the ongoing parliamentary networks look like in the Kansai region. There are four representative channels that engage lawmakers from across different political spectrums. As the date of establishment from Table 2 shows, these groups have been in existence from the late 1970s, early 1980s, and early 1990s, which demonstrate that these are not simply provisional attempts at bilateral interaction. The challenge, however, is to make sure that initiatives at the local level initiatives become well-coordinated with those at the national level. At present, it is hard to say whether the national and sub-state activities are sufficiently complementary so that there is no unnecessary overlap in efforts or costs.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The main argument of this chapter is that parliamentary diplomacy in Northeast Asia has been relatively unaffected by supranational or transnational dynamics. The analysis focused on the empirical case of the interparliamentary channel between Japan and South Korea as embodied by two groups of lawmakers: the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union headquartered in Tokyo, and the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union located in Seoul. The practice of parliamentary relations between Japan and South Korea showed that parliamentary diplomacy in Northeast Asia follows the hub-and-spoke model insofar as it is composed of a series of bilateral alliances rather than being a holistic multilateral network. In this sense, it closely resembles the security alliance structure in the region, which is also thickly bilateral. The evolution of the bilateral collaboration between the respective parliamentarians’ unions has shown that there is a solid history of interaction involving members of the Japanese and South Korean legislatures, dating back to the mid 1970s. Along the way, the inter-parliamentary mechanism has witnessed several developments concerning politicization, horizontal expansion/integration, and a decrease in personal ties between the members of the parliamentarians’ unions. Tracing the origins, current status, and trends of the inter-parliamentary channel has highlighted the strong tendency for ­parliamentary diplomacy to be bilateral (hub-and-spoke) and in envoy style (rather than in a conference-type format). There are certainly challenges that the parliamentarians’ unions will have to confront in order to substantially improve bilateral relations. On the one hand, there is the task of coordinating 32  Jain, Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Affairs, pp. 117–118.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

284

Bang

national efforts at parliamentary diplomacy with those at the sub-state level. On the other hand, lawmakers will need to reconcile the short-term incentives of satisfying the demands of their domestic constituents with the longterm goal of transnational engagement. Yet it is important not to forget how much progress the two parliamentarians’ unions have made over the past four decades. In fact, there are context-specific variables that work in favor of greater inter-parliamentary diplomacy and encourage the parliamentarians’ unions to cooperate. As Weisglas and de Boer have noted in the case of the Netherlands, general public disinterest in global politics could constrain parliamentary diplomacy: ‘International affairs are – in the Netherlands – hardly a vote winner. Recent years especially have seen a quick subsiding of public attention for global politics, and the time that members of parliament spend away from the Dutch political arena is quickly seen as wasted and interpreted as an expression of disinterest in national issues’.33 In contrast, while traditional issues, such as the economy, are still a high priority for the respective publics in Japan and South Korea, both are also relatively engaged in foreign affairs, if only because of the necessity to be aware of the regional dynamics as shaped by their neighbors China and North Korea. It would therefore be worthwhile for the respective parliamentarians’ unions to re-evaluate their role and analyze what it means for them to be so tightly coupled with the ruling administration or cabinet. The temptation to relegate these parliamentarians’ unions mostly to the realm of ‘low’ politics and view them as symbolic forums rather than a space for substantive problem-solving, highlights the lack of one particular feature of ideal parliamentary diplomacy – scrutinizing the executive and influencing foreign policy. Instead of representing an active counterbalance, parliamentarians’ unions have become too comfortable with implementing or supplementing governmentally agreed policies. If there was actual contestation and constructive debate within either the national assembly or Diet about issues of foreign policy instead of a singular dogmatic position, there is a greater chance for the inter-parliamentary channel to truly serve as a problem-solving apparatus rather than a representative mouthpiece for the government. As a result, the public will be privy to a more balanced debate on foreign policy, which may facilitate greater understanding and prevent narrow-mindedness. Finally, if legislators within the parliamentarians’ unions are de facto parttime diplomats, we need to provide them with the tools to actually do their job. We should keep in mind that parliamentary diplomacy is not simply an 33  Weisglas and de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, pp. 97–98.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

14. The Parliamentarians ’ Unions in Japan and South Korea

285

e­ xtension of domestic politics, but that it also involves international d­ iplomacy. Therefore, although it would be a stretch to compare lawmakers to professionally trained diplomats, legislators still need the appropriate skills to undertake effective diplomacy. While there is no formal training to become a politician, there is rigorous training involved in becoming a diplomat. It would seem then to be useful for there to be close interaction between lawmakers and full-time diplomats, such as those working in foreign ministries. Sharing best practices or even a rudimentary knowledge of the geopolitics of the region would be a good start. Their collaboration is even more imperative when we consider the shrinking personal ties that bind the respective parliamentarians’ unions, which means that there may be greater reliance on professionalism rather than special camaraderie. Appendix

Figure 1

Longitudinal Trend in Participation in Annual General Assembly of Parliamentarians’ Union of Japan & South Korea (1972–2015)34

34  Updated from Kyung-min Park, ‘ “Lawmakers” Role in Korean-Japanese Relations: The Case of the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union,’ [Korean] Master’s Thesis, Kookmin University, 2009, pp. 85–86.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Aug. 1986

Apr. 1990

FUKUDA Takeo (supreme advisor to the Liberal Democratic Party)

TAKESHITA Noboru (supreme advisor to the Liberal Democratic Party)

ITO Soichiro (chairperson of the Japanese House of Representatives)

Sep. 2000

WATANABE Kōzō (supreme advisor to the Democratic Party of Japan)

Jun. 2010

MORI Yoshirō (former Prime Minister)

NUKAGA Fukushirō (member of the Liberal Democratic Party)

Jan. 2013–ongoing

Nov. 2001

Name & Title (at time of appointment)

Japan Name & Title (at time of appointment)

South Korea

Oct. 2014–­ongoing SEO Chung-won (chairperson of Saenuri Party Supreme Council) Nov. 2012 HWANG Woo-yeo (chairperson of the Saenuri Party) Nov. 2008 LEE Sang-deuk (vice-speaker of the national assembly) Jul. 2004 MOON Hee-sang (executive advisor of the Uri Party) Jul. 2000 KIM Jong-pil (honorary president of the United Liberal Democrats party) Dec. 1998 PARK Tae-joon (president of the United Liberal Democrats party) Apr. 1993 KIM Yun-hwan (secretary-general of the Democratic Liberal Party) Feb. 1993 KIM Jae-soon (executive advisor of the Democratic Liberal Party) Sep. 1988 PARK Tae-joon (member of the Democratic Justice Party)

Appointed

Past Heads of Each Parliamentarians’ Union in Japan and South Koreaa

Appointed

Table 1

286 Bang

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Aug. 1976

Feb. 1980

Nov. 1980

Apr. 1981

Apr. 1985

Appointed

KWON Ik-hyun (executive advisor of the Democratic Justice Party) LEE Jae-hyung (executive advisor of the Democratic Justice Party) PARK Tae-joon (director of the finance committee in the National Assembly) CHUNG Il-kwon (executive advisor to the head of the Democratic Republican Party) KIM Jong-pil (chairperson of the Democratic Republic Party)

Name & Title (at time of appointment)

South Korea

a  Updated and revised from Jung-hwan Seo and Jong-pil Park, ‘At Times as Envoys, At Others as Distant Cousins . . . Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union Utilized at Every Crucial Moment in Korea-Japan Relations,’ [Korean] Hankook Kyungjae Shinmun, 10 July 2015.

May 1975

FUNADA Naka (advisor to the Liberal Democratic Party)

KASUGA Ikko (advisor to the Democratic Socialist Party)

YASUI Ken (supreme advisor to the Liberal Democratic Party)

Jun. 1981

May 1975

Name & Title (at time of appointment)

Appointed

Japan

14. The Parliamentarians ’ Unions in Japan and South Korea

287

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

288

Figure 2

Bang

Thematic Break-down of Resolutions Targeting Japan in the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee (South Korea), 2012–201435

Figure 3 Bi-Partisan Support for Resolutions Targeting Japan in South Korea’s 19th Assembly, 2012–201436

35  Compiled from the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, Official Website. The legend indicates the following issue-items: 1) Military (Constitution) refers to the Japanese Abe government’s efforts to revise the constitution to end the ban on the deployment of Japan’s military overseas and allow for collective self-defense; 2) History (Kono Statement) relates to the statement made by Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei in 1993, which spoke to the effect of recognizing the Japanese military’s role in recruiting women as ‘comfort women/sex slaves’ during World War II (in early 2014, there were reports that the Abe administration may revise the Kono statement, inviting backlash from Korea); 3) Yasukuni Shrine is a Japanese Shinto shrine in Tokyo that enshrines the souls of the war dead (that happens to include war criminals), which tends to always attract controversy upon annual tributes to the shrine by notable Japanese officials; 4) History (Textbooks) concerns South Korea’s protests against the approval by the Japanese government of history textbooks (typically for middle school or high school) that allegedly ‘whitewash’ history, and; 5) Comfort Women/Sex Slaves involves recognition and compensation for women (in this case, Korean) that were forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army before and during World War II. 36  Compiled from the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee and Naver Search Engine’s People Database (Korean).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

14. The Parliamentarians ’ Unions in Japan and South Korea Table 2

289

Status of Japan-Korea Friendship Lawmakers’ Leagues in the Kansai Region ( Japan) (as of April 2015)a

Name

Date of Establishment

Osaka Prefectural 22 Feb. 1992 Assembly Japan-Korea Friendship and Goodwill Lawmakers’ League (大阪府議会日韓友好親 善議員連盟) Kyoto Prefectural Assembly Japan-Korea Friendship Lawmakers’ League (日韓親善京都府議 会議員連盟) Nara Prefectural Assembly Lawmakers for Japan-Korea Friendship (日韓親善奈良県議 会議員連盟) Wakayama Prefectural Assembly Lawmakers for Japan-Korea Friendship (日韓親善和歌山県 議会議員連盟)

13 Dec. 1984

Current President

Membership Composition

Nakagawa Takahiro Osaka Restoration (Osaka Restoration Association: 31 LDP: 26 Association) New Kōmeitō: 15 JCP: 1 DPJ: 1 Total: 74 Watanabe Kuniko LDP: 22 (LDP) DPJ: 11 New Kōmeitō: 5 Total: 38

9 Apr. 1982

Yoneda Tadanori (LDP)

LDP: 11 New Kōmeitō: 3 Other: 11 Total: 26

21 Dec. 1976

Ujita Eizo (LDP)

LDP: 23 JCP: 3 Other: 4 Total: 30

a Compiled based on information from the Republic of Korea (ROK) Consulate General in Osaka (Japan), Personal Correspondence on 20 November 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 15

Australia’s Parliamentary Diplomacy: A Study of the Bilateral Relationship with South Korea Jeffrey Robertson Introduction Academic and benchmarking studies characterize South Korean administrative culture as ‘hierarchical, authoritative, paternal, emotional, irrational and familial’.1 For the diplomatic corps in Seoul, this can present challenges.2 South Korea does not have a strong party political system and the political environment centres on individuals and personal networks, which can be fluid and dynamic. Diplomatic officers at early stages of their careers can find it difficult to secure access to more senior decision makers – including social, business, and political leaders. In this respect, parliamentary diplomacy theoretically facilitates more direct interaction between diplomats and those leaders. Since industrialisation in the 1970s, Australia and South Korea enjoyed a stable economic relationship. Australia exports raw materials, such as coal and iron ore, and it imports elaborately transformed manufactures, such as cars, machinery and electronics. South Korea recovered rapidly from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and its position in regional and global affairs grew quickly. Since this time, Australian efforts to expand the relationship with South Korea have enjoyed strong bipartisan support. The period 1996–2015 can thus be considered as a formative one in the modern bilateral relationship, marked by economic stability and growth in the political and security fields. It could be assumed that parliamentary diplomacy played a particularly important role in building Australia’s relations with South Korea. The Australian Government’s narrative describing the importance and relevance of Australia’s relationship with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) during this formative period consists of three core stories. The first story conveys 1  Im Tobin, ‘Bureaucratic Power and the NPM Reforms in Korea’, International Review of Public Administration, vol. 8, no. 1 (July 2003), p. 91. 2  Jeffrey Robertson, Diplomatic Style and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of South Korea (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), pp. 163–173.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi Stelios 10.1163/9789004336346_017 Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

15. Australia ’ s Bilateral Relationship with South Korea

291

how Australian missionaries made early contact with Korea in the nineteenth century. This gives the bilateral relationship historical authority. The second story conveys Australia’s contribution to the defence of South Korea during the Korean War (1950–1953). This imbues a sense of shared sacrifice and reciprocity. The third story relates to mutual benefit, shared interests and similarity. Since South Korea’s industrialization in the 1970s, the two states have shared a mutually beneficial economic relationship; and since the post Cold War era they have shared similar views on a liberal democratic, rules-based global order, the role of the United States (US) in the Asia-Pacific, and their own status as globally active, innovative middle powers. These stories are retold on occasions when Australians and South Koreans gather, including at academic forums, business seminars, and state visits. They are also routinely reiterated by Australian parliamentarians on outward delegation visits to South Korea. On such occasions, Australian parliamentarians act as instruments of the executive, reiterating and reinforcing the Australian Government’s narrative. Yet parliamentarians theoretically also play a secondary role. In diplomatic representation, they can act both as instruments of the executive and as independent international actors. In international affairs, parliamentarians can therefore theoretically sustain multiple narratives.3 This raises the following question: to what extent do the narratives of Australian parliamentarians differ from the official narratives of the Australian Government on the relationship with South Korea? To answer this question, this chapter seeks not only to investigate the role of parliamentary diplomacy in building Australia’s relationship with South Korea, but also to examine the balance between executive authority and parliamentary prerogative in the exercise of Australia’s parliamentary diplomacy. To this end, I first examine Australia’s institutional structures for parliamentary diplomacy. I then briefly explore the Australian Government’s narrative on the relationship with South Korea through ministerial speeches, before contrasting these with Parliament’s narrative on the relationship with South Korea through official delegation reports and speeches. The chapter finds that the administrative structures underpinning Australian parliamentary diplomacy can limit parliamentary prerogative. However, when parliamentary interests coalesce with the executive, Parliament reinforces and enhances the executive’s capacity, with parliamentary diplomacy providing the means to communicate political 3   See a broader development of this phenomenon in: Davor Jančić, ‘Transnational Parliamentarism and Global Governance: The New Practice of Democracy’, in Elaine Fahey (ed.), The Actors of Postnational Rulemaking: Contemporary Challenges of European and International Law (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 113–132.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

292

Robertson

support for an initiative at the highest level, in this case study, of South Korea’s political system.

The Australian Parliament and Diplomacy

The external political environment has always been an important consideration to Australian parliamentarians. The Australian Federation brought the six separately governed colonies together based largely upon a growing fear of the changes underway beyond Australia’s shores.4 In the early 20th century, as a thinly populated, predominantly ethnic European society on the edge of a more densely populated Asian region, the external political environment was on the top of the minds of the first parliamentarians. The first piece of legislation passed in the new federal parliament was an act to restrict immigration. The importance of the external political environment was also enshrined in the Constitution. Section 51 of the Australian Constitution grants the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia – which is composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate – the power to make laws concerning external relations, defence and international trade. Yet, in convention and political practice, the capacity of the Australian Parliament to influence the creation and implementation of foreign policy is curtailed by the dominance of the executive.5 The Australian Parliament has only a limited capacity to influence the creation of foreign policy. This is rooted in the fact that, by convention, the executive controls the House of Representatives, which, in combination with a tradition of tight party discipline, means that Parliament cannot influence foreign policy through legislation. Its powers are restricted to accountability, oversight, review, and limited information gathering. It scrutinizes government expenditure, including the operations of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and other departments with external responsibilities through the Senate Estimates process; reviews and provides advice on matters arising from treaties through the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT); and reports on issues referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (SSCFADT), or the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade (JSCFADT). The Australian 4  Alison Broinowski (ed.), Double Vision: Asian Accounts of Australia (Canberra: ANU Press, 2011), pp. 23–26. 5  Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 145–149.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

15. Australia ’ s Bilateral Relationship with South Korea

293

Constitution does not accord treaty-making powers to a specific branch of government.6 However, by convention treaty making has been considered an executive power under Section 61 of the Constitution and, accordingly, the executive rather than Parliament assumes this responsibility.7 Parliament’s role is limited to the examination of all proposed treaty-related actions of the executive and to passing legislation to put the treaty into effect. The competent minister and their counterpart in the Senate table the treaty for at least 15 sitting days prior to any binding treaty action being undertaken, which means that a treaty is tabled after it has been signed, but before any action is taken to bind Australia under international law. It is important to note that Australia has to date strictly adhered to a policy of not becoming a signatory unless it has the intention and capacity to ratify the treaty.8 During the period 2014–2015, JSCOT held 24 meetings, resulting in ten completed reports and had four ongoing inquiries at the end of the reporting period; while JSCFADT held 142 meetings, resulting in two completed reports and four ongoing inquiries.9 The inquiries relevant to the Australia-Korea relationship are explained in more detail below. Through the Senate Estimates process, SSCFADT maintains a consistent level of engagement throughout this entire period. The Senate Estimates process provides for reviews of the government’s annual reports in May (budgetary estimates), October or November (supplemental estimates), and February (additional estimates). The Australian Parliament’s committee system is an important link between the domestic and international political and legal spheres. SSFADT and JSCFADT play important roles in the review of government policy, bringing international issues to the attention of domestic constituencies. Yet, in discussing JSCFADT, Gyngell and Wesley noted that ‘it is hard to find evidence of any compelling influence . . . on the foreign policy process’.10 It is tempting to argue that JSCOT plays an important role. JSCOT was established in 1996 during a period of increasing international influence on Australian legislation with the hope of allowing the public, 6   Stephen Tully and Law Society of New South Wales, The Practitioner’s Guide to International Law (Sydney: Law Society of New South Wales, 2010), p. 7. 7  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Treaty Making Process’, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 30 May 2016, http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/treaties/treaty -making-process/Pages/treaty-making-process.aspx. 8  Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, ‘Trick or Treaty? Commonwealth Power to Make and Implement Treaties’, Parliamentary Inquiry (Canberra, Australia: Parliament of Australia, 1995), p. 33. 9  Parliament of Australia, ‘Department of the House of Representatives – Annual Report 2014–15’ (Canberra, Australia: Parliament of Australia, October 2015), p. 124. 10  Gyngell and Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.147.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

294

Robertson

through Parliament, a greater say in foreign policy. The end result however was that JSCOT became ‘a tool of political management, often openly manipulated by the very members of the Australian parliament who, when they were in opposition, had been so keen to introduce these reforms’.11 In the same way, the Australian Parliament has only a limited capacity to influence the implementation of foreign policy, which it does through the passage of legislation to bring domestic law in line with international treaties. However, in a stable Westminster parliamentary system like that of Australia, executive grip over the House of Representatives means that parliamentary passage is ultimately assured. Although foreign policy attracts a high degree of bipartisanship, the majority party rarely faces significant opposition in areas of core national interest.12 Furthermore, unlike the US Congress, the Australian Parliament has no oversight over the appointment of ambassadors or establishment of embassies. Its influence is limited to the maintenance of an international program whose aim is to promote understanding, share knowledge and encourage democratic development. The Australian Parliament maintains a dual focus in international relations. It both works closely with traditional Australian partners, including Western European and North American states, and at the same time maintains close ties with partners closer to home, including in the East Asian region and the South Pacific. After restructuring in 2014, the international program is coordinated by two divisions within the Department of the House of Representatives – the International and Parliamentary Relations Office (IPRO) and the Parliamentary Skills Centre (PSC). IPRO connects parliamentarians to their peers overseas by: coordinating bilateral visits; providing secretariat support for their participation in international parliamentary associations, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum (APPF); and, generally, acting as a contact point for international partners. During 2014–2015, IPRO coordinated 20 official delegations.13 This included bilateral visits to China, Indonesia, Thailand, Canada, Japan and South Korea; attendance at seven assemblies, 11  Ann Capling and Kim Richard Nossal, ‘Parliament and the Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Case of Australia’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties’, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique, vol. 36, no. 4 (September 2003), p. 838. 12  Stewart Firth, Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1999), pp. 81–82. 13  Parliament of Australia, ‘Department of the House of Representatives – Annual Report 2014–15’, p. 36.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

15. Australia ’ s Bilateral Relationship with South Korea

295

conferences, workshops and seminars, including meetings of the IPU and the United Nations (UN) General Assembly; and 11 other visits, including visits by presiding officers (called ‘speakers’ in some other systems) and annual committee visits.14 Like DFAT, IPRO provides only limited support for unofficial delegations, which are arranged by parliamentarians themselves. In 2014–2015, the Australian Parliament commenced a new initiative in the outgoing delegations program – the parliamentary field visit.15 Field visits are chosen based on a specific policy issue, rather than geography. Parliamentarians are thus able to broaden their knowledge and understanding and report back to Parliament on key emerging issues. The change reflects administrative trends in foreign ministry structures, away from geographic compartmentalization to thematic compartmentalization, and in the same way prepares Parliament to be more responsive to global and regional affairs. In November 2014, two parliamentarians undertook the initial field visit to Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon in order to report on the ongoing refugee crisis in the Middle East.16 For its part, PSC maintains parliamentary strengthening and capacity-­ building programs largely focused on the Southeast Asian and South Pacific regions. The PSC coordinates activities under the Pacific Parliamentary Partnerships program and the Pacific Women’s Parliamentary Partnerships Project. In 2014–2015, the former program was implemented in cooperation with the Parliament of the Australian state of Victoria and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to support capacity building in the Fijian Parliament; and with the Parliament of the Australian state of Queensland to support the development of the Papua New Guinea Parliament. The latter project coordinated exchanges for female members between the Australian and Pacific parliaments, and coordinated the annual Pacific Women’s Parliamentary Partnerships Forum held in Suva, Fiji in April 2015. PSC also provides support for regional capacity-building programs. In March 2015, it coordinated the Inter-Parliamentary Study Program, which involved senior staff from the national parliaments of Brazil, China, Federated States of Micronesia, Germany, Kiribati, Mongolia, Myanmar, Thailand and Zimbabwe. Despite these initiatives, academics are in broad agreement regarding the overwhelming dominance of the executive in both the creation and implementation of Australia’s foreign policy.17 There is thus an expectation that 14  Ibid., p. 137. 15  Ibid., pp. 36–37. 16  Ibid., p. 37. 17  Gyngell and Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy; Firth, Australia in International Politics; Derek McDougall, Australian Foreign Relations: Contemporary Perspectives

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

296

Robertson

Australian parliamentary diplomacy serves the interests of the executive. However, Hugh Smith goes even further, noting that the dominance of the executive in Australian foreign policy makes a discussion of Parliament’s role ‘an exercise in the obscure and the futile’.18 Following this, it could be assumed that a discussion of Australia’s parliamentary diplomacy would be an exercise beyond the obscure and inherently more futile. Yet, similar to other national parliaments, the Australian Parliament’s attention to foreign policy is broadening and expanding.19 Globalization has brought the international into the everyday lives of members of the electorate.20 This was recognized at an early stage with the establishment of the JSCOT in 1997 to address the ‘democratic deficit’ from the increasing inroads of international treaties into the lives of citizens.21 Parliamentarians are becoming more responsive to constituent demands on international issues. We could therefore expect to observe an increasing divergence between the official narratives of the Australian Government and the narratives of Australian parliamentarians. To determine whether these narratives do differ, I analyse two sets of documents on the shaping of the Australia-Korea bilateral relationship during the period 1996–2015. The first set are speeches of the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the second set are Parliament’s delegation reports and individual parliamentarians’ speeches in the plenary. During this period, there were 12 speeches specifically related to South Korea.22 While South Korea is (South Melbourne, Australia: Longman, 1998); James Cotton, The Australian School of International Relations, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Gareth J. Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, 2 edn (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 1995). 18  Hugh Smith, ‘Politics of Foreign Policy’, in Fedor Mediansky (ed.), Australian Foreign Policy: Into the New Millenium (Melbourne: MacMillan, 1997), pp. 13–32. 19  Bruce Doern, Brian Tomlin, and Leslie Pal, ‘The Internationalization of Canadian Public Policy’, in Bruce Doern, Brian Tomlin, and Leslie Pal (eds), Border Crossings: The Internationalization of Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996); McDougall, Australian Foreign Relations, 30; Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore, ‘Globalization, Four Paths of Internationalization and Domestic Policy Change: The Case of EcoForestry in British Columbia, Canada’, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique vol. 33, no. 1 (March 2000), pp. 67–99; Gyngell and Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, pp. 296–298. 20  Gyngell and Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p. 298. 21  Capling and Nossal, ‘Parliament and the Democratization of Foreign Policy’, pp. 847–850. 22  These speeches include seven by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, including ‘The ROK – An Emerging Economic and Strategic Power’ (1 July 1996, Seoul), ‘Australia and the Two Koreas: A New Context for Relations’ (11 December 2000, Sydney), ‘Australia, Korea and the Region: Building our relationships’ (8 February 2001, Sydney), ‘Australia

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

15. Australia ’ s Bilateral Relationship with South Korea

297

mentioned in other speeches, this was either in direct relation to North Korea or in the context of and alongside other Northeast Asian states. The content and structure of the speeches specifically relating to Australia-Korea bilateral relations change subtly over the period, from an emphasis on economic affairs during the first half to an emphasis on security in the second half. The speeches were predominantly undertaken during high-level visits, usually contain reference to initiatives launched during the visit, and can be thought of as marking significant turning points in the relationship. During the period 1996–2015, there were five Australian parliamentary delegations to South Korea, as well as an additional delegation to the 6th Annual Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum, an SSCFADT delegation investigating Australia’s naval shipbuilding and repair industry, and several presiding officer visits.23 Each of these five delegations resulted in reports tabled in Parliament and the accompanying speeches, which are representative of individual parliamentarians’ interests. The applicable procedures aim for the tabling of a report to both Houses of Parliament within three months after the return of the delegation. The report is usually compiled and written by the secretary to the delegation. The delegation secretary is a parliamentary officer, rotated from the Department of the Senate, the Department of the House of Representatives – in particular IPRO, and on occasions the Parliamentary Library, Parliamentary Budget Office, Hansard, and the Parliamentary Education Office. The delegation secretary ensures that the report has the support of each delegation member and reflects their specific concerns. On and the Republic of Korea: Strong and Reliable Partners in the Region’ (31 May 2001, Seoul), ‘The Inter-Korean Relationship in the Post September 11 Environment: An AsiaPacific Regional Perspective’ (12 June 2002, Sydney), ‘Speech at the Korea Re-examined Conference Dinner’ (13 February 2003, Sydney), ‘Australia and Korea: Shared Interests, Shared Future’ (14 November 2005, Seoul); and one by Foreign Minister Stephen Smith, ‘Australia and Korea – A Partnership for the Future’ (7 May 2008, Seoul); one by Foreign Minister Rudd, ‘Australia and the Republic of Korea: Natural partners and True Friends’ (12 October 2011, Canberra); and three speeches by Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, including ‘Address to the Seoul Cyberspace Conference’ (17 October 2013), ‘Address to AustCham Business Breakfast’ (18 October 2013, Seoul), and ‘Speech to Sungkyunkwan University’ (18 October 2013, Seoul). 23  Delegation visits included an official parliamentary delegation visit to South Korea and Malaysia (4–19 July 1998); an official parliamentary delegation visit to South Korea and Indonesia (1–14 July 2001); an official parliamentary delegation visit to South Korea and Japan (8–19 December 2003); an official parliamentary delegation visit to South Korea (28 February–4 March 2010); and a JSCFADT Trade Sub-Committee visit to South Korea and Japan (15–27 July 2012).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

298

Robertson

certain occasions, delegation reports carry recommendations, which attract a government response. When tabled in Parliament, they are often accompanied by a delegation member’s speech. This sometimes allows further insight into individual parliamentarians’ insights and opinions. Additionally, during the same period, there were two parliamentary inquiries on Korea. Parliamentary inquiries are an important point of interaction between the executive and Parliament. The executive, through DFAT submits evidence and provides responses on its completion. For JSCFADT’s Inquiry into Australia’s Relations with the Republic of Korea; and Developments on the Korean Peninsula, DFAT made a first submission in June 2005 and a second one in September 2005 in response to a request for further information.24 The first submission included an introduction to contemporary Korea, the bilateral trade and investment relationship, and North Korea. The second submission provided information on the Australia-Korea Foundation (AKF), Austrade Korea (Australian Trade and Investment Commission’s Sector on South Korea), and sister-city relationships. For JSCFADT’s Inquiry into Australia’s Trade and Investment Relationship with Japan and the Republic of Korea, DFAT provided a single submission detailing current trade relations, trade barriers, the impact of free trade agreements (FTAs), emerging opportunities, and the role of government in identification and development of opportunities.25

The Australian Government’s Narrative on the Relationship with South Korea

The Australian Government’s communication on the relationship with South Korea consists of a well-structured narrative divided into three core stories that rely on appeals to ethos (morality), pathos (emotion), and logos (logic). The stories invoke ethos with a claim to historical authority; pathos with claims of an Australian commitment to Korea and a sense of shared sacrifice;

24  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Departmental Submission to Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee Inquiry into Australia’s Relationship with the Republic of Korea: And Developments on the Korean Peninsula’, Inquiry Submission (Canberra: DFAT, June 2005). 25  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Departmental Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) Inquiry into Australia’s Trade and Investment Relationship with Japan and the Republic of Korea’, Inquiry Submission (Canberra: DFAT, July 2011).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

15. Australia ’ s Bilateral Relationship with South Korea

299

and logos with claims of mutual benefit, shared interests and similarity as middle-powers. The first story concerns early historical contact. As noted by the former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in February 2001, ‘the first important contacts between Australia and Korea occurred in the 1880s, when Australian missionaries began working in Pusan, leaving an important legacy in areas such as religion, public education and health’.26 These early ties, which are often rehearsed in foreign minister speeches, give the bilateral relationship historical foundation, imbuing it with significance, authenticity and authority. The second story relates to Australia’s commitment to the security of South Korea. As former Foreign Minister Downer noted in July 1996, Australia’s links with South Korea ‘deepened significantly during the Korean War when some 18,000 Australian troops served under United Nations Command’ and 339 Australians died during that conflict.27 Australia aided South Korea from beginning to end. It started as one of nine states in the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, created to supervise elections in both North and South Korea, and served in the Korean War until the July 1953 armistice with a smaller number serving with the multinational peacekeeping force until 1957.28 The historical Australian commitment segues into a modern commitment to South Korean security as a strong supporter of nuclear non-proliferation and the rule of law. This invokes emotion and engenders a sense of reciprocity and indebtedness. Again, similar stories appear in all foreign minister speeches. The third story relates to the mutual economic benefit of the AustraliaKorea relationship and shared political and economic interests. As noted by incumbent Foreign Minister Julie Bishop: ‘Australia and Korea – two middle powers – are natural partners economically, politically and strategically. We are both strong allies of the United States. We are both deeply integrated into the regional economy. What Korea has, we want to buy. Be it flat-screen TVs or fuel-efficient cars, or Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) bulk carriers. What Australia has, Korea wants, from iron ore and LNG, to beef products and an education experience’. Increasingly, Australia and South Korea take similar positions on international issues, ranging from terrorism and nuclear security to global 26  Alexander Downer, Speech ‘Australia, Korea and the Region: Building Our Relationships’ (1st Biennial Korea-Australasia Research Centre [KAREC] International Symposium, Sydney, 8 February 2001). 27  Alexander Downer, Speech ‘The Republic of Korea: An Emerging Economic and Strategic Power’ (Seoul Foreign Correspondents’ Club, Seoul, 1 July 1996). 28   David Dutton, ‘An Alternate Course in Australian Foreign Policy: Korea 1943–50’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, vol. 43, no. 2 (June 2008), pp. 153–154.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

300

Robertson

governance and economic reform. This invokes a sense of community, which encourages compliance and cooperation. Once again, similar stories appear in all foreign minister speeches.

The Australian Parliament’s Narrative on the Relationship with South Korea

The first point of similarity in parliamentary reports on South Korea is their introductory chapters, which are standardized and reflect the Australian Government’s narrative. For non-specialist delegation secretaries, writing a report on Australia’s relationship with South Korea there are few sources to turn to. Unlike the Australia-China or Australia-Japan relationships, there are no academic texts or scholarly textbooks on the Australia-Korea relationship. The few scholarly articles that there are focus on the economic relationship or security, with a heavy emphasis on North Korea.29 Thus, the most authoritative materials to turn to include parliamentary publications, such as previous delegation reports, committee reports, parliamentary library publications, or the DFAT website. In most cases, the former three are already influenced by the DFAT website. Accordingly, from the very beginning, the Australian Government’s narrative is highly influential. The second point of similarity is the parliamentarians’ itinerary. Successive delegations have undertaken visits to the South Korean National Assembly, the Hyundai or Daewoo car manufacturing plants, the POSCO steel works, the UN Memorial Cemetery in Korea (UNMCK) in Busan, and the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ). Such an itinerary reflects two of the three core stories of the official narratives of the Australian Government – those on the mutual economic benefits and security. There are only few instances in which delegations visit locations outside of the key political and economic actors, and this is often carried out 29  See for instance: Charles Harvie, ‘The Australia-Korea Economic Relationship and Prospects for an FTA’, Working Paper 04–19, Department of Economics, University of Wollongong, November 2004; Hwa-Seon Lee, ‘Outstanding Issues in Bilateral Economic Relations between Australia and South Korea’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 58, no. 1 (March 1, 2004), pp. 69–87; Emma Campbell, ‘Changing South Korea: Issues of Identity and Reunification in Formulating the Australia-Korea Security Policy, Foreign Policy, and Wider Relationship’, Korea Observer, vol. 42, no. 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 117–43; David Hundt, ‘Middle Powers and the Building of Regional Order: Australia and South Korea Compared’, Korea Observer, vol. 42, no. 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 69–94; William Tow and Ajin Choi, ‘Facing the Crucible: Australia, the ROK, and Cooperation in Asia’, Korea Observer, vol. 42, no. 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 1–19.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

15. Australia ’ s Bilateral Relationship with South Korea

301

in an individual capacity. For example, on the official parliamentary delegation visit to South Korea from 28 February to 4 March 2010, one parliamentarian – a Member of Parliament (MP) – visited a non-governmental organization with links to his electorate, while another – a Senator – undertook a repeat visit to an organization visited during a previous delegation visit. These visits were undertaken outside of the delegation program during an official rest day. However, for individual MPs and senators, such visits have a greater impact than could be expected. For example, the said visit included members and senators from regions and states with a high reliance on mining and natural resource exports. For them, the visits to the Pohang POSCO Steelworks were very important. As noted by Shayne Neumann MP on tabling the delegation’s report to the House of Representatives: ‘Representatives from . . . the mining states – Queensland and Western Australia – were particularly interested in Australia’s contribution, through the supply of iron ore and coal, to the second largest steelmaker in the world’.30 The third point of similarity is the reports’ conclusions, which are all of a similar non-committal nature. The only report to conclude with specific recommendations is that on the JSCFADT Trade Sub-Committee’s visit to South Korea and Japan from 15–27 July 2012. This indicates that delegation reports are as a rule closely in line with the official government narrative. They do not aim to ensure accountability, oversight, review, or information gathering; rather, they simply reinforce the stance of DFAT and, by extension, the executive. Accordingly, one would expect there to be no distinction between the Government’s and Parliament’s narratives on Australia’s relationship with South Korea. This is reiterated in certain speeches delivered during the tabling of the report. In a speech concerning the visit to South Korea and Japan from 8–19 December 2003, Brendan O’Connor MP noted: As the report indicates, the main objectives were to review the bilateral relationships and prospects for further development in respect of trade and security, project an image of Australia as an advanced economy with a strong interest in the region, identify both countries’ views on the North Korean threat and encourage South Korea’s continued dialogue with North Korea.31

30  Shayne Neumann, Speech ‘Australian Parliamentary Delegation to the Republic of Korea’ (Delegation Reports, Parliament of Australia, House of Representatives, 18 October 2010). 31  Brendan O’Connor, Speech ‘Australian Parliamentary Delegation to the Republic of Korea’ (Delegation Reports, Parliament of Australia, House of Representatives, 8 March 2004).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

302

Robertson

This closely reflects the Government’s policy objectives as regularly expressed in ministerial speeches.32 The ‘main objectives’ thus reflect not individual parliamentary interests but rather standard foreign policy aims of the Government. Yet, certain speeches presented during the tabling of reports, and the behaviour of parliamentarians during delegation visits, show that parliamentary interests can sometimes be quite distinct from the Government’s narrative. Harry Jenkins MP notes the need to learn about the country beyond the standard itinerary provided: ‘I believe that when Australian parliamentary delegations visit countries they should endeavour to meet with the widest range of people from the host nation’.33 Jenkins also highlighted the difficulties of the delegation, specifying the different positions held by the members of the delegation and those making the arrangements for the visits: ‘From time to time, the performance of those people who assist us is patchy, but we acknowledge that we have had the ability to comment about those things and are satisfied that they are aware of our desires in that regard’.34 He thus notes the challenges presented by the structures of delegation administration. This highlights an important point: regardless of the desire for greater parliamentary independence, the administrative structures for this do not exist.

Administrative Structures versus Parliamentary Prerogative

There is clearly a high degree of consistency in the narratives of Australian parliamentarians and the Australian Government on the relationship with South Korea. Both their narratives have at their core stories promoting historical authority, shared sacrifice, mutual benefit, and similarity. The only difference is between delegation reports and parliamentary speeches tabling the report. Delegation reports adhere to strict conventions regarding style, formatting and content. They are written by the secretary to the delegation and approved by the members of the delegation. In contrast, parliamentary speeches tabling the report are impromptu, and allow a greater degree of freedom and subjectivity in their recount of delegation activities. This allows parliamentarians more readily to express their frustrations as well as satisfaction with the 32  Kevin Rudd, Speech ‘Australia and the Republic of Korea: Natural Partners and True Friends’ (Australia-Korea Year of Friendship Dinner, Canberra, 12 October 2011). 33  Harry Jenkins, Speech ‘Australian Parliamentary Delegation to the Republic of Korea’ (Delegation Reports, Parliament of Australia, House of Representatives, 7 December 1998). 34  Ibid.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

15. Australia ’ s Bilateral Relationship with South Korea

303

a­ chievements of these activities. This difference can partly be explained by the administrative process of parliamentary diplomacy. The first step in this process is delegation scheduling. The presiding officers in consultation with the executive, including the prime minister’s office and DFAT, arrange the annual schedule of delegation visits. The presiding officers consider the parliamentary sitting schedule, reciprocal parliamentary relations, budgetary allocations, and individual parliamentary interests, while the executive and DFAT consider political concerns and policy aims. With the presiding officer of the House of Representatives most often a member of the majority party, parliamentary diplomacy often reflects the political concerns and policy aims of the executive. The next step in the process is delegation itinerary planning. The IPRO provides administrative support, assigns and gives guidance to a delegation secretary, and arranges initial delegation meetings. Itinerary planning for the visit is made through consultation between the delegation members, the Parliamentary Library, and DFAT. Often, the delegation members contact the Parliamentary Library for background information and potential subjects of interest. The delegation secretary collects these and coordinates with DFAT to arrange the itinerary. DFAT, like any efficiency-seeking bureaucracy, seeks to fit members’ interests within the context of pre-existing schedules and policy agendas. As the coordinator of in-country administration, DFAT is the final authority. It can effectively disapprove of visit plans or reject specific items on visit plans. The final step in the process is in-country administration. Prior to departure, DFAT provides a final briefing pack to the delegation members, and on some occasions provides an oral briefing at the final pre-departure meeting. On arrival in the destination country, DFAT again briefs the incoming delegation. It then provides protocol assistance from the beginning to the end of the visit. Delegation secretaries, except when seconded from the Parliamentary Library or the Committees Office, are rarely experts and do not have the required knowledge or expertise to adequately provide assistance to a delegation incountry. Hence, in most circumstances, DFAT’s influence is felt from the first step to the last. Indeed, delegation reporting reflects the influence of DFAT’s scheduling, itinerary planning and administration. Reporting is the responsibility of the delegation secretary. Except when seconded from the Parliamentary Library or the Committees Office, the delegation secretary relies upon DFAT for information to write the report. Parliamentarians rarely make an effort to add their own account of the delegation, leaving parliamentary staffers to ensure that specific details of importance to their constituents are included. As a result,

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

304

Robertson

delegation reports are often standardized, repetitive, and reveal little of relevance. As noted by an academic investigating delegation reports on the Australia-China relationship: In fulfilling their reporting obligations, some parliamentarians risk reinventing themselves as B-grade travel writers, modern-day Marco Polos, regurgitating hackneyed statistics about economic growth, providing potted and arcane histories of tourist sites and even describing the views afforded from the upper terraces of hotels.35 The role of DFAT means that delegation visits to South Korea are inherently influenced by the aims and objectives of the executive, and have been somewhat standardized. First, as a line-department controlled by the executive, DFAT promotes the Government’s policy aims and recognizes that parliamentary visits can be a powerful diplomatic tool to reinforce them. As noted, in the context of bilateral relations with a state such as South Korea, parliamentary diplomacy allows policy aims to be communicated directly at a high political level that is often inaccessible to DFAT officers, and not routinely available to ambassadors. Second, bureaucratic efficiency necessitates that an organization minimize the inputs into repeated procedures, such as delegation visits. Depending on the destination country, at least one delegation visit will occur during a parliamentary term. In most circumstances, there are only minimal changes in a bilateral relationship over a parliamentary term. This means that parliamentary delegations become standardized. In the case of South Korea, there was indeed very little ‘new’ added to delegation schedules between 1996 and 2015. While this could be considered conducive to the development of parliamentary expertise on issues relevant to the bilateral relationship, it could also be indicative of bureaucratic efficiency and the minimization of inputs into repetitive activities. Through this, the administrative structures of parliamentary delegations reinforce the dominance of the executive.

When Executive and Parliamentary Interests Coalesce

In certain circumstances, parliamentary interest coalesces with or even pushes for executive action. Australian efforts to broaden the relationship with South Korea in the second half of the formative period from 2007 to 2015, focused on 35  Timothy Kendall, Within China’s Orbit? China Through the Eyes of the Australian Parliament (Canberra, Australia: Parliament of Australia, 2008), p. 130.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

15. Australia ’ s Bilateral Relationship with South Korea

305

securing a bilateral FTA. US President George W. Bush announced in February 2006 that FTA negotiations with South Korea would commence. For Australia, this was alarming, because it had already seen its position in the global market affected by South Korea’s FTA with Chile, which had entered into force in April 2004. Within one year, the US, a much larger competitor for a number of key export items – including wine, beef, dairy, sugar, as well as education, travel, legal and financial services – would have privileged access to the South Korean market. The Australian Government made securing an agreement to start FTA negotiations with South Korea a priority.36 As a first step, the Australian and South Korean governments sponsored a feasibility study, which was concluded in April 2008. The feasibility study showed that a comprehensive bilateral FTA would ‘deliver gains to both countries through closer economic integration’.37 One month after the release of the study, the Australian Foreign Minister on a visit to Seoul noted that ‘on the economic front, completing a free trade agreement with Korea is among Australia’s highest priorities’.38 While the study provided the basis for both states to justify the commencement of FTA negotiations, a political decision on it eluded Australia until August 2008, when the Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, met with his South Korean counterpart, President Lee Myung-Bak, to announce the commencement of preparatory talks on FTA negotiations. On 10 March 2009, the Australian Trade Minister, Simon Crean, announced in a ministerial statement to the Australian Parliament that FTA negotiations would begin.39 The first round of negotiations were held 18–22 May 2009 in Melbourne and Canberra. The KoreaAustralia Free Trade Agreement finally entered into force on 12 December 2014. Australian parliamentary interest in a bilateral FTA with South Korea matched the enthusiasm of the Australian Government. Requests for information on market access, competition, and negotiation status from the Parliamentary Library began soon after South Korea’s first FTA with Chile went in to effect in April 2004. In particular, individual parliamentarians in constituencies with high concentrations in the beef, wine and dairy sectors 36  Yoav Cerralbo, ‘New Australian Envoy Looking Ahead to FTA Deal’, Korea Herald, 26 January 2006. 37  Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and ITS Global, ‘Australia – Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement Feasibility Study’, (Canberra, April 2008), p. 5. 38  Stephen Smith, Speech ‘Australia and Korea – A Partnership for the Future’ (Korea Press Foundation, Seoul, 7 May 2008). 39  Simon Crean, Ministerial Statement ‘Australia – Korea Free Trade Agreement’ (House of Representatives, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 10 March 2009).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

306

Robertson

sought information on emerging market risks. In April 2005, JSCFADT started an inquiry into Australia’s relations with South Korea and developments on the Korean peninsula in order to ‘review political, strategic, economic (including trade and investment), social and cultural issues; and consider both the current situation and opportunities for the future’.40 The report recommended that the Australian Government pursue FTA negotiations taking into consideration an early resolution of issues relating to agriculture.41 A May 2006 Parliamentary Library research note examined the feasibility of FTA negotiations with South Korea. Parliamentary Library publications are written with the intent of anticipating or reducing parliamentarians’ demand for information and research, which the Library supplies in a tailored fashion. Such publications serve as an important resource for the opposition, smaller parties, and independents, as well for government party parliamentarians seeking data independent of the public service. This Parliamentary Library publication signifies parliamentarians’ growing interest in the Australian Government negotiating an FTA with South Korea. The Government’s and Parliament’s interests therefore converged. After the announcement that FTA negotiations would commence, subsequent delegations acted on the interest already demonstrated by Parliament. The official parliamentary delegation visit to South Korea from 28 February to 4 March 2010 included discussions with Macquarie Investment Management, POSCO, Hyundai, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and with members of South Korea’s Parliamentary Friendship Group with Australia. On each occasion, the FTA was raised and support for a speedy conclusion of negotiations reiterated. The clear support expressed by delegation members highlighted to the South Korean side the importance accorded to the issue by the Australian Government and Parliament. Similarly, the JSCFADT Trade Sub-Committee visit to South Korea and Japan from 15–27 July 2012 included calls for an early completion of negotiations. By this time, negotiations had been stalled. The delegation visiting South Korea as part of the JSCFADT Inquiry into Australia’s Trade and Investment Relationship with Japan and the Republic of Korea thoroughly investigated the status of FTA negotiations and made representations in South Korea at the highest level. The report issued after the inquiry exhibited the Australian Parliament’s interest in concluding the negotiations: ‘The FTA 40   David Jull and Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Relationship with the Republic of Korea; and Developments on the Korean Peninsula’ (Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2006), p. xvii. 41  Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Australia’s Relationship with the Republic of Korea; and Developments on the Korean Peninsula (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2005), p. 59.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

15. Australia ’ s Bilateral Relationship with South Korea

307

under negotiation between Australia and the ROK received considerable attention throughout this inquiry . . .(the Committee) considers that such negotiations should continue to be prioritised by the Government, including at the Ministerial and Prime Ministerial level with their Korean counterparts’.42 One of the recommendations from the report urges the Australian Government to complete stalled FTA negotiations ‘as a matter of urgency’.43 Increased competition as a result of South Korea’s FTAs with Chile, the US, and the EU, directly threatened export industries in Australian parliamentarians’ constituencies. In this circumstance, parliamentary and executive interests coalesced. Parliament pushed and prodded the executive to commence, continue and conclude negotiations on an FTA. At the same time, the executive was able to utilise parliamentary diplomacy to communicate to its South Korean partners the high level of political support for an FTA. Thus, similarity in the narratives of the Australian Parliament and Government on the relationship with South Korea is a natural result. A narrative that engenders historical authority, shared sacrifice, mutual benefit, and similarity serves both executive and parliamentary interests. Conclusion This chapter shows that the narratives of Australian parliamentarians do not greatly differ from the official narratives of the Australian Government on the relationship with South Korea. The administrative structures ensure that the executive is able to influence parliamentary diplomacy from beginning to end. Parliament does not have the ability to independently plan, schedule or administer official delegations without the assistance of DFAT. At the moment, there remains a healthy level of cooperation, with tacit control ceded to DFAT. This means that on occasions when parliamentarians wish to undertake study tours or investigations on matters outside of executive interest, parliamentarians must push harder for cooperation and assistance, as occurred with a June-July 2009 non-official delegation of six Australian parliamentarians who visited Dharamsala, the Indian exile-base of the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. Without a complete and prohibitively expensive reformulation of 42  Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on Foreign Affairs, Joel Fitzgibbon, and Michael Danby, Australia’s Trade and Investment Relationship with Japan and the Republic of Korea: Inquiry of the Trade Sub-Committee (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2013), pp. 98 and 158. 43  Ibid., p. xvii.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

308

Robertson

administrative structures, Australian parliamentary diplomacy will always be dominated by the executive. Yet, it is not beyond the imagination to see Parliament playing a larger role in the future. As noted, it is by convention that treaty-making power is considered an executive power under Section 61 of the Constitution. In 1997, public pressure pushed Parliament with the support of the executive to establish the JSCOT to address the ‘democratic deficit’ resulting from international treaties and their effect on the lives of citizens.44 Public pressure could again push Parliament and the executive to reform administrative structures and parliamentary processes to address dissatisfaction regarding the domestic impact of international affairs. This could be as simple as reversal in the secondment structure, with parliamentary officers seconded to DFAT rather than vice versa; or could be more extensive, including the broadening and strengthening of the IPRO to give it a consistent and well-informed team of delegation secretaries rather than relying on less well-informed parliamentary staff seconded from other sections of Parliament. Until this occurs, the balance between executive authority and parliamentary prerogative in the exercise of Australia’s parliamentary diplomacy leans heavily to the former. However, as demonstrated with Australia’s efforts to secure a bilateral FTA, on occasions parliamentary interest and executive interest coalesce. Parliament supported and encouraged the executive’s efforts to strengthen and broaden the relationship with South Korea. Australian parliamentarians acted on personal and their constituents’ interests, which is reflected in the growth in demand for information and research on emerging market risks. Through parliamentary diplomacy, parliamentarians played an integral and active role in the Government’s efforts to mobilize South Korean support for a bilateral FTA. On outward delegations parliamentarians reiterated Australian Government narratives of historical authority, shared sacrifice, and mutual benefit and similarity at the highest levels, including in meetings with senior South Korean parliamentarians, South Korean parliamentary interest groups, South Korean government executives, and senior members of South Korean corporate and civic groups. This allowed the Australian Government narrative to reach an elite and hard-to-access audience. In Australia’s relations with South Korea, parliamentary diplomacy reinforced and enhanced the executive’s capacity, providing the means to communicate political support for initiatives undertaken at the highest levels of interstate diplomacy.

44  Capling and Nossal, ‘Parliament and the Democratization of Foreign Policy’, pp. 847–850.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 16

Regional Integration and Parliamentary Diplomacy: Experiences of the MERCOSUR, Andean and Latin American Parliaments Karina L. Pasquariello Mariano, Regiane Nitsch Bressan and Bruno Theodoro Luciano Introduction The increasing role of parliaments in international relations and the growing attention given to parliamentary diplomacy is a phenomenon observed ­worldwide.1 Parliamentarians are becoming more interested and more engaged in foreign affairs, a domain typically reserved for national executives and traditional diplomacy. Not only is parliamentary diplomacy a complement to the existing diplomatic channels, it also exhibits specific characteristics that derive from the particularities of parliamentary composition and organisation. It is a means to intensify the development of dialogue between parliamentarians and political groups of the same political opinion and affinity. Contrary to national executives, parliaments and parliamentarians represent a variety of political positions, thus ensuring both national and regional political pluralism. As a result, some parliamentary discourses will diverge from those of their national governments. In addition, parliaments can act as ‘moral tribunes’ when it comes to international and regional politics. Different from executive positions, they have a strong and assertive posture in the defence of values shared among them, such as the respect for human rights and ­democracy.2 Finally, ‘the greatest contribution of parliaments to ­democracy 1  Frans W. Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 1, 2007, pp. 93–99; Andrea Cofelice and Stelios Stavridis, ‘The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI), European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 19, no. 2, 2014, pp. 145–178. 2   Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy: any lessons for regional parliaments?’, In M. Kölling, S. Stavridis, and N. Fernández Sola (Eds.), The International Relations of the Regions: Subnational Actors, Para-diplomacy and Multi-level governance (Zaragoza, 2006); Stelios Stavridis, Roderick Pace and Paqui Santonja, ‘The Role of Parliamentary Bodies, SubState Regions, and Cities in the Democratization of the Southern Mediterranean Rim’, In Stefania Panebianco and Rosa Rossi, Winds of Democratic Change in the Mediterranean?

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004336346_018 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

310

Pasquariello Mariano, Nitsch Bressan and Luciano

is to ­facilitate the public exposure of contested decisions’,3 which guarantees political oversight over the making of national and regional policies. This chapter reflects on the performance and role of parliamentary diplomacy in Latin American integration projects, which serve as examples of polities that give rise to the establishment of international parliamentary institutions (IPIs).4 In doing so, several aspects will be addressed: parliaments’ contributions to democratisation in the respective regions, their reactions to important facts and subjects in the region and, finally, the challenges and obstacles that MPs face in becoming more independent actors in Latin American integration, such as direct parliamentary elections and influence on regional decision making. We will analyse three different experiences of parliamentary diplomacy in Latin America. Two of them are part of regional integration projects – the Andean Parliament (Parlandino) and the MERCOSUR Parliament (Parlasur) – and one interparliamentary institution that is not associated with any international or regional organisation – the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino). The objective is to demonstrate the difficulties that Latin American regional parliaments face in becoming stronger instruments of parliamentary diplomacy. In the next section of this chapter, we present an overview of the three said parliaments and their contribution to democratisation in the region and to the development of stronger linkages among Latin American parliamentarians, as necessary ingredients for the conduct of parliamentary diplomacy. Next, we discuss their role in some of the region’s main political developments in the last decade to show the importance in political practice of these institutions as forums for parliamentary diplomacy. Finally, we analyse the efforts to strengthen these institutions through direct election of their members and reflect on the actual behaviour of these IPIs in diplomatic affairs.

(Rubettino, 2012), pp. 171–200. See on value-oriented parliamentary diplomacy the chapter by Davor Jančić in this volume. 3  Davor Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy: The Emergence of Multilayered International Parliamentarism’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 38, no. 2, 2015, pp. 197–242. 4   Zlatko Šabič, ‘Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2, 2008, pp. 255–271; Andrés Malamud and Stelios Stavridis ‘Parliaments and parliamentarians as international actors’, in Bob Reinalda, (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 101–15.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

16. Regional Democracy and Integration



311

Institutionalisation of Latin American Regional Parliaments as Venues for Parliamentary Diplomacy

The fact that regional parliaments in Latin America have emerged in different political contexts over the last 50 years means that each case exhibits their own particularities. In general, their creation is rooted in the desire to enhance the democratic legitimacy of regional integration processes and facilitate the domestic incorporation of regional norms and regulations.5 All Latin American attempts at integration have to some extent been influenced by the European experience. In this respect, the European Union (EU) and the European Parliament (EP) have served as an example of a successful supranational project, and its institutional structure is widely recognised as a model.6 As such, the experience of European integration has generated certain expectations in Latin American integration, particularly with regard to the formation of adequate institutional structures. Even though there is not much political will to transfer sovereignty to supranational structures in any Latin American country, the democratisation of regional integration and public participation in them remains a concern.7 Below we examine the three regional integration parliaments selected – Parlatino (a), Parlandino (b) and Parlasur (c) – in order to demonstrate that the political context in which these parliaments were created is an important variable in their institutional development. (a) Parlatino is the oldest supranational institution in Latin America as it predates all other attempts at integration in the region. Created in December 1964 in the Peruvian capital Lima, it has no association with any regional integration process. Its creation coincided with the founding of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), and though it was intended to become a parliament of this organisation, a formal link between the two was never established. The importance of Parlatino is rooted in the historical context in which it 5  Karina Lilia Pasquariello Mariano. Parlamento do Mercosul: mudança ou continuidade? Research report funded by CNPq (Araraquara: Faculdade de Ciências e Letras – UNESP, 2011). 6  Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Term?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235–258; Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism The EU as a Model of Regional Integration.’ KFG Working Paper Series, no. 7, 2009, pp. 2–26; Tobias Lenz. ‘EU normative power and regionalism: Ideational diffusion and its limits’. Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 48, no. 2, 2013, pp. 211–228; Clarissa Dri, ‘Limits of Institutional Mimesis of the European Union: The case of the Mercosur Parliament’, Latin American Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, 2010, pp. 52–74. 7  Karina Mariano, Marcelo F. de Oliveria and Tullo Vigevani, ‘Democracia e atores políticos no Mercosul’, in Gerónimo de Sierra (ed.), Los rostros políticos del Mercosur: El camino dificil de lo comercial a lo societal (CLACSO Buenos Aires, 2001).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

312

Pasquariello Mariano, Nitsch Bressan and Luciano

was created. During the serious disruptions of democratic institutions suffered by many countries in Latin America, Parlatino served as a strong advocate for representative democracy and political pluralism. Parlatino positioned itself as a ‘moral tribune’8 for the Latin American regimes that violated human rights and democratic principles in this period. Nowadays, proposals have been put forward to designate Parlatino as the legislative assembly of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC),9 the most recent proposal for integration in the Latin American region. The anti-democratic context in which Parlatino was founded has strongly inhibited its institutionalisation and capacity to transform into a relevant political platform for its members. Although Parlatino began its activities in the mid-1960s, it was only formally institutionalised in 1987 and has had its seat in São Paulo, Brazil, since 1993. Despite this modest institutionalisation, many of its members remain sceptical about its efficacy.10 In 2005, its seat was transferred from São Paulo to Panama City, and despite the logistical problems associated with the move, plenary sessions have taken place without interruptions. Parlatino’s new building was inaugurated in 2013, and the institution can now rely on a team of exclusively dedicated secretarial staff.11 This bureaucratic consolidation was, however, not accompanied with an increase in the parliament’s political relevance. The relationship between Parlatino and national parliaments is marked by detachment and the results obtained in the Parlatino context are not generally enforced by national parliaments. According to Mergulhão,12 this link fully depends on the individual 8  Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, pp. 55–81. 9  Francisco Aravena, ‘Potencialidades y desafios de la CELAC en el contexto de un nuevo regionalismo’, Pensamiento Proprio, vol. 33, no. 16, 2011; José Antonio Sanahuja, ‘Enfoques diferenciados y marcos comunes en el regionalismo latinoamericano: Alcance y perspectivas de UNASUR y CELAC’. Pensamiento propio, vol. 39, 2014, pp.75–108. 10  Karina Lilia Pasquariello Mariano, Integração regional do Cone Sul: os partidos políticos e as centrais sindicais do Brasil, PhD thesis (Campinas: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de Campinas, 2001). 11  ‘Presidente del PARLASUR participó de la Sesión inaugural de la Sede del Parlamento Latinoamericano’, available online at: http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/innova portal/v/7859/1/parlasur/presidente_del_parlasur_participo_de_la_sesion_inaugural_de _la_sede_del_parlamento_latinoamericano.html (accessed 19 March 2015). 12  Silvia Valéria Lima Mergulhão, ‘O Parlamento Latino-Americano e a sua Evolução institucional em Perspectiva Comparada com a Assembleia Parlamentar do Conselho da Europa’. PhD Thesis, University of Lisbon, 2014, available online at: http:// repositorio.ul.pt/bitstream/10451/15499/1/ulsd069388_td_Silvia_Mergulhao.pdf (accessed 29 December 2004).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

16. Regional Democracy and Integration

313

approaches of MPs, and how they apply the feedback from Parlatino’s permanent commissions to their respective national legislative environments. Parlatino has maintained a regular political dialogue with the EP since 1974, as a parliamentary dimension of the interregional ties between Europe and Latin America. This cooperation was formalised in 2006, when the EuropeanLatin American Parliamentary Assembly (EUROLAT) was constituted. This framework has contributed to the structuring not only of the relations between Parlatino and the EP, but also of the relations between the latter and other regional (Parlandino, Parlasur and the Central American Parliament) and national (Chilean and Mexican) parliaments.13 According to Malamud and de Sousa,14 Parlatino has lost much relevance after the establishment of democratic regimes in the region during the 1980s and 1990s and the rise of parliaments that are a part of specific integration projects, such as Parlasur and Parlandino. They stress that the main weakness of Parlatino is the fact that its existence, mission and functioning are not integrated into a regional organisation.15 In light of these circumstances, there does appear to have been an evolution in the proceedings and institutionalisation of Parlatino over time. However, the peculiarities of this institution, which involve parliamentary organisation through international treaties rather than through association to a regional integration project, render it fragile and put it in a difficult position to implement its decisions and develop its activities. As argued by Cofelice, ‘only parliamentary organs of regional or subregional organizations may be endowed with some degree of oversight, co-legislative, budgetary and consultative powers at the same time’.16 With the creation of CELAC in 2010, members of Parlatino expressed a strong interest in inserting their parliament into this new Latin American integration framework. This was emphasized by Parlatino representatives at the first CELAC summit in Caracas, where it was observed that Parlatino was willing to alter its legal foundation in order to become integrated into this new 13  Stelios Stavridis and Natalia Ajenjo, ‘EU-Latin American Parliamentary Relations: some Preliminary Comments on the EUROLAT’, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, vol. 10, no. 3, 2010. 14  Andrés Malamud and Luís de Sousa, ‘Parlamentos Supranacionais na Europa e na América Latina: entre o Fortalecimento e a Irrelevância’, Contexto Internacional, vol. 27, no. 2, 2005, pp. 369–409. 15  Idem, p. 390. 16  Andrea Cofelice, ‘International Parliamentary Institutions: Some Preliminary Findings and Setting a Research Agenda’. UNU-CRIS Working Paper no. 2012/3.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

314

Pasquariello Mariano, Nitsch Bressan and Luciano

organisation as well as to offer its seat in Panama City as an operational basis for CELAC’s activities.17 (b) Parlandino was created in 1979 as a deliberative and consultative organ of the Andean Community (AC),18 and is responsible for providing normative suggestions aimed at harmonising national legislation. In addition, it has the function to maintain relations with national parliaments in order to stimulate their involvement in Andean integration.19 The case of Parlandino demonstrates that a higher degree of institutionalisation does not guarantee a stronger parliament. The main difference between the AC and other Latin American attempts at regional integration lies in the fact that, inspired by European integration, a principle of supranationality was adopted from the start. However, the AC has suffered some retrogression in this field, which is underlined by the persistently intergovernmental character of its decision-making processes. During the last decade, national governments have opted for retaining and strengthening the principle of intergovernmentalism, where member states, rather than AC institutions, take the lead in decision making. This change of direction directly affected Parlandino, which was sought to support the evolution of supranational institutions within the AC. For instance, the governments of Colombia and Peru proposed the dissolution of Parlandino at a meeting in Lima in 2013 and suggested that its structures be integrated into the South American Parliament, which is planned as an organ of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Politicians and media outlets in Colombia, where Parlandino is seated, expressed strong support for this proposal. Parlandino representatives and its Secretariat staff, on the other hand, fiercely criticised it,20 pointing out that this suggestion contradicted the findings of an earlier study by the Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) and the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), which assessed the problems and obstacles that Andean integration faces. 17  Latin American Parliament, ‘Propuesta del Parlamento Latinoamericano para ser considerada en la Cumbre de Jefes de Estado y Gobierno de América Latina y Caribe a efectuarse en la República Bolivariana de Venezuela’, available online at: http://www.parlatino.org/ images/stories/inicio/celac/propuesta-aprobada-2-7-11.pdf (accessed 21 January 2015). 18  Ana Bustamante, ‘Desarrollo Institucional de la Comunidad Andina’, Aldea Mundo, vol. 8, no. 16, 2006, pp. 16–28. 19  Gabriel Sánchez Avendaño, ‘Treinta años de integración andina’, Nueva Sociedad, vol. 162, no. 1, 1999, pp. 79–91. 20  Bruno Theodoro Luciano, Karina Lilia Pasquariello Mariano and Regiane Nitsch Bressan, ‘Entraves e perspectivas atuais à democratização da integração Andina: o caso do Parlamento Andino’, Anuario de la Integración Regional de América Latina y el Caribe, Vol. 10, 2014. Available online at: http://www.cries.org/?p=2320.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

16. Regional Democracy and Integration

315

The report concluded that the institutional reform of the AC is a necessity and that the position of Parlandino needs to be enhanced, and its competences, thematic focus, and parliamentary activities, more clearly defined.21 This clash between those who believe that Parlandino should be dissolved and its defenders demonstrates the lack of political will among governments to fortify the structures of democratic representation in the system of regional integration. This is particularly evident in the case of Parlandino, whose resolutions have not been applied and have instead been systematically ignored by the AC member states. In addition, these conflicting views confirmed that national actors hold very different views on the role of Parlandino in the advancement of Andean integration. Following the decision by government leaders to dissolve Parlandino and the polemics that this position created in the public opinion in the Andean countries, Parlandino resisted its dissolution and continues to pursue its institutional agenda and maintain its regular activities. Even without the backing of national governments, members of Parlandino have sought their empowerment by adopting positions on international and regional issues, which indicates that Parlandino continues to serve as a standard for parliamentary diplomacy in the Andean context. In the next section, some of its activities and their repercussions will be further assessed. (c) Parlasur, like Parlandino, originates from the desire to strengthen the legitimacy of regional cooperation through the reconstruction of democratic institutions and establishment of new social representation mechanisms against the broader background of Latin American redemocratisation processes in the 1980s. MERCOSUR has had an organ of parliamentary representation from the start, but it was not until the Ouro Preto Protocol (1994) that the Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC) was awarded a formal status as a MERCOSUR institution, aimed at facilitating the incorporation of MERCOSUR norms and regulations into national legal systems.22 Despite its formal status, the JPC did not carry much political weight in the negotiations regarding MERCOSUR integration and the incorporation of common standards, nor was

21  Carlos Chacon Monsalve, ‘Sacar al Parlamento Andino de la CAN es sacar a los pueblos del proceso de integración’, Perspectiva, 2013, available at: http://www.revistaperspectiva .com/perspectivas-de-la-semana/parlamento-andino-cronica-de-un-final-anunciado (accessed on 24/10/2015). 22  Maria Claudia Drummond, ‘A opção intergovernamental do Mercosul e a reforma do Protocolo de Ouro Preto’, Universitas: Relações Internacionais, Brasília, vol. 9, no. 1, 2011, pp. 273–295.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

316

Pasquariello Mariano, Nitsch Bressan and Luciano

it able to relay MERCOSUR debates to national parliaments.23 Nonetheless, it provoked the development of an internal discussion among parliamentarians about the necessity to increase its competences by transforming the JPC into a MERCOSUR parliament. These discussions gained momentum after 2003, when the newly elected governments of Brazil and Argentina24 pledged to increase the scope of MERCOSUR and include civil society in the process.25 A key point in understanding the functioning of Parlasur is its place in the institutionalization of MERCOSUR as a whole. From its creation onwards, the parliament has met strong resistance from national governments, as have all other organs with a supranational character. MERCOSUR’s decision-­making processes remain firmly based on intergovernmental negotiations in the absence of supranational institutions that can overrule national governments. This principle is fundamental to governments’ strategies with regard to MERCOSUR and it is also in good measure shared by Brazilian and Argentinian parliamentary representatives. In their defence of intergovernmentalism, they underline the risks of investing too much power in supranational institutions, which they fear could turn them into independent actors, able to develop their own strategies. The creation of Parlasur is, however, a necessary element in the democratisation of MERCOSUR, but it is in itself insufficient. Democracy presupposes balanced and regulated mechanisms for resolving conflicts of interest and political disputes between citizens and social groups. In MERCOSUR, this does not happen because the balance of power is heavily skewed towards national executives. Despite all the differences concerning the origins and contexts of the three regional integration projects, they reveal an important commonality: an emphasis on intergovernmental institutions decreases the interest in the functioning and efficiency of parliaments as relevant means of parliamentary diplomacy and democratisation of integration. The persistent predominance of an intergovernmental approach reinforces the bureaucratic nature of regional parliaments, which function merely as instruments for implementing regional norms rather than serve as a platform for political dialogue and interaction between different national parliaments. The lack of powers and their loose relations with national executives have significantly reduced the capacity of these institutions to become influential mechanisms of p ­ arliamentary 23  Karina Mariano, ‘Integração regional do Cone Sul’, Karina Mariano. ‘Parlamento do Mercosul’. 24  Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, respectively. 25  Buenos Aires Consensus, signed between Brazil and Argentina on 16 October 2003, available online at: http://www2.mre.gov.br/dai/b_argt_385_5167.htm.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

16. Regional Democracy and Integration

317

diplomacy in Latin America. Although parliamentarians use these forums to take positions on relevant international and regional issues, the low profile and visibility of these parliaments led to a reduced impact on regional as well as national politics and public opinion.

Parliamentary Diplomacy in Latin America: Examining the Political Practice

International parliamentary action has generated interesting results that are not always recognised by national parliaments or supported by member-state governments. Many of these activities remain invisible to society, creating an impression that these organs are irrelevant or unnecessary. In this section, we explore one case from each of the regional parliaments analysed (Parlatino, Parlandino and Parlasur) with the aim of exposing their intent to position themselves, and engage on, key contemporary issues of Latin American politics. The three illustrative cases selected refer to the thawing of US-Cuban relations, the recent frictions between Colombia and Venezuela, and the impeachment of the Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo. These cases demonstrate why these parliaments can be considered as mechanisms of parliamentary diplomacy on a regional scale, despite the institutional limitations to their influence on regional decision making, which is dominated by intergovernmental relations. A) Parlatino and the Thawing of US-Cuban Relations In 2015, Parlatino supported the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States (US) and Cuba.26 Parlatino’s position regarding the thawing of US-Cuba relations was expressed since the beginning of their negotiations in December of 2014, and this was performed through a political declaration signed in Panamá City.27 Parliamentary representatives had an

26  Latin American Parliament, ‘Iniciativas para integración latinoamericana se han intensificado, Elías Castillo’, 15 May 2015, available at: http://www.parlatino.org/es/cdn/ item/1301-iniciativas-para-integracion-latinoamericana-se-han-intensificado-elias -­castillo (accessed 21 September 2015). 27  Latin American Parliament, ‘Declaración del Parlamento Latinoamericano sobre las Relaciones Diplomáticas de Cuba y los Estados Unidos de América’, 17 Dec 2014, available online at: http://www.parlatino.org/pdf/presidencia/declaracion-resolucion/declaracion -restablecimiento-diplomaticas-cuba-estados-unidos.pdf (accessed 8 November 2015).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

318

Pasquariello Mariano, Nitsch Bressan and Luciano

opportunity to discuss joint projects with the Cuban government in several Parlatino structures.28 Parlatino was thus a strong advocate of the normalisation of relations between the two countries, expressing support for the decision by the US President to remove Cuba from the list of terrorism-sponsoring countries and end the financial, economic and commercial blockade, which was believed to improve relations and mutual understanding between the US and the Latin American and Caribbean community.29 One month after the 7th Summit of the Americas, the first meeting to host a Cuban delegation (led by Raul Castro), Parlatino held a meeting of its parliamentary committees in Cuba, where this parliamentary forum again applauded the initiative of President Obama and reaffirmed its historical commitment to the Cuban political and economic reassertion in the region. However, it is important to note that Cuban engagement within Parlatino predates the normalisation of its relations with the US. Despite a Cuban delegation not being involved in the Constitutive Declaration of Parlatino, signed in Lima (1964), the country was active in this parliamentary organisation since the 1980s, being one of the national parliamentary representations that signed Parlatino’s Institutionalisation Treaty (1987). A particularly noticeable involvement of Cuban parliamentarians is observed at Parlatino’s Permanent Committee of Health, which is traditionally chaired by a Cuban representative. Therefore, during the last decades, most of the meetings of this committee were held in Havana. With Cuba’s absence from the dialogue between the Americas and due to its historical suspension from the Organisation of American States (OAS), other regional forums – such as Parlatino – were relevant frameworks for increasing Cuba’s dialogue with Latin American countries and for avoiding its isolation from regional and multilateral initiatives with the neighbouring states. B) Parlandino’s Struggle for Political Prominence Apart from being the parliamentary dimension of the AC, Parlandino has constituted an instrument of parliamentary diplomacy in the Andean integration 28  Latin American Parliament, ‘Fortalecen lazos de amistad y cooperación en Cuba’, 08 Jun 2015, available online at: http://www.parlatino.org/es/cdn/item/1318-fortalecen-lazos-de -amistad-y-cooperacion-en-cuba (accessed 20 September 2015). 29  Latin American Parliament, ‘Parlamento Latinoamericano reitera su beneplácito al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica’, 3 June 2015, available online at: http:// www.parlatino.org/es/cdn/item/1312-parlamento-latinoamericano-reitera-su-beneplacito -al-gobierno-de-los-estados-unidos-de-norteamerica (accessed 20 September 2015).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

16. Regional Democracy and Integration

319

process. Not only has it facilitated the international engagement of its members, both formally through institutionalised dialogues and informally through meetings and friendship groups, it has also fostered the interaction between parliamentarians of national congresses and other extra-regional parliamentary institutions regarding international and regional issues and forums.30 While the AC as a whole currently faces an uncertain future due to shifts in national governments’ priorities,31 Parlandino is investing in cooperation with former member states like Chile and Venezuela. For instance, in 2014 Parlandino reassigned full voting rights to the Chilean delegation, which had held observer status since Chile left the AC during Pinochet’s dictatorship. The reincorporation of the Chilean delegation was more than just a symbolic act, as it illustrates the fact that Parlandino is gaining in strength and widening its scope beyond the Andean integration process. This loosening of the link between the parliament and the AC means that Parlandino could continue to exist and be a relevant institution, even if the AC substantially loses its relevance in the following years. Parlandino’s change of course is also evident in its ambitions to become a new platform for negotiating solutions for conflicts between the Andean countries, in particular tensions in the border regions. In a dispute between Colombia and Venezuela, for instance, Parlandino adopted a political declaration, condemning the actions that led to the humanitarian crisis that resulted from the expulsion of Colombians from the Venezuelan territory, which was done under the pretence of halting the proliferation of Colombian paramilitary groups in Venezuela.32 The President of Parlandino, Wimer Bendezú, formally asked for a significant intervention of regional organisations, such as UNASUR and the AC, in order to reduce tensions between the two countries.33

30  Juliana Erthal and Juan Albarracín, ‘Candidate Selection, Direct Elections and Democracy in Integration Parliaments: The Case of Colombia’s First Andean Elections’, Paper presented at the Conference of the Latin American Studies Association, 6–9 October 2010, Toronto, Canada. 31  Colombia and Peru have prioritised the project of the Pacific Alliance, while Bolivia and Ecuador are members of the Bollivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA). Besides, Bolivia is in process of accession to Mercosur. 32  Andean Parliament, ‘Declaración del Parlamento Andino sobre la Situación en la Frontera Colombo Venezolana’, 2015, available at: http://blogparlandino.com/wp -content/uploads/2015/08/declaracionparlamentoandino_venezuela.pdf. Access: 15 Sep 2015. 33  Andina, ‘Parlamento Andino pide intervención de Unasur y la CAN en crisis ColombiaVenezuela’, 13 July 2015, available at: http://www.andina.com.pe/agencia/noticia-parla

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

320

Pasquariello Mariano, Nitsch Bressan and Luciano

The preservation of peace and democratic stability in the region has been the main focus of Parlandino in recent years, and it has sought to portray itself as an intermediary between governments. As such, it has attempted to contribute to the Colombian pacification process and expressed support for governments of the countries that suffer from political instability, like Ecuador and Venezuela. However, it should be noted that Parlandino’s effort to mediate between national governments on issues of common interest is not an isolated initiative; similar strategies have been developed by other Latin American parliaments. An example of this is the position taken by members of Parlasur promoting a mediated solution to the Uruguay river pulp mill dispute, which affected the relations between Argentina and Uruguay from 2005 to 2010.34 C) Parlasur and the Question of Paraguay’s Suspension The impeachment of the Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo in 2012 led to the paralysis of Parlasur activities. Initially, a direct response from the latter was expected in the form of a political declaration. However, polarization over this subject among parliamentarians prevented the opening of Parlasur’s plenary session. The Brazilian and Uruguayan delegations took a more cautious stance, although they were critical of the way the impeachment process had been conducted. Within Parlasur, the Brazilian delegation pointed to the necessity of hearing the opinions of their Paraguayan colleagues and have a debate about President Lugo’s deposition with the delegations of the other member states.35 The Uruguayan delegation was split between the members of the national opposition, who supported the opening of the session, and the representatives of Uruguayan government, who rejected discussing the Paraguayan case and favoured the political suspension of this country. However, the swift involvement of the heads of state of the countries involved made parliamentary deliberations impossible. The Argentinian delegation adopted the position of its government and suggested that the mento-andino-pide-intervencion-unasur-y-can-crisis-colombiavenezuela-307806.aspx (accessed 02 October 2015). 34  Parlamentario, ‘Lozano instó a resolver el conflicto por las pasteras en el ámbito del Parlasur’, 7 April 2014, available at: http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-70881.html (accessed 13 November 2015). 35  Agência Senado. ‘Dividida, Representação Brasileira no Parlasul não vota declaração contra deposição de Lugo’, 2012, available online at: http://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/ materias/2012/06/26/dividida-representacao-brasileira-no-parlasul-nao-vota-declaracao -contra-deposicao-de-lugo (accessed 20 September 2015).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

16. Regional Democracy and Integration

321

Paraguayan delegation be suspended from Parlasur. In reaction to this, the Paraguayan delegation argued that it did not have a direct link with the government and could not therefore be suspended. In accordance with the internal regulations of Parlasur, the absence of a delegation automatically suspends plenary sessions. This aspect and the formal autonomy of the Paraguayan delegation were strong arguments against the suspension. In response, Argentina chose to withhold its own representatives, which paralysed Parlasur for a period of almost three years. Between 2011 and 2013, only two meetings took place: one preparatory meeting at the end of 2011 and the first plenary session following the interruption in December 2013.36 Even though this plenary session was not formally opened, the parliamentarians of MERCOSUR, through their national delegations, took their own positions on President Lugo’s impeachment and on the suspension of Paraguay from MERCOSUR. Despite these problems, Parlasur has become an important forum for parliamentary diplomacy at the regional level. Notable in this sense has been the establishment of dialogue and cooperation with the EP since its creation,37 as well as the meetings and visits to other Latin American IPIs – such as Parlandino and Parlatino. Although these inter-parliamentary meetings are not regular and depend on parliamentary agendas and interests, they constitute an institutional framework that is adequate for furthering parliamentary dialogue on regional issues. As an example, one of the most prominent political discussions of the last meeting of EuroLat resulted in a political resolution pressuring European and Latin American governments to adopt a joint position in the next UN climate negotiations to be held in Paris in late November and early December 2015.38 The three cases analysed above show that regional integration parliaments in Latin America have had an imprint on some of the salient political events in the region. Although the degree of influence of these parliamentary forums on major regional and international issues remains low, the impact of these parliamentary bodies is manifested in seeking to build common positions on 36  Representação Brasileira no Parlamento do Mercosul – CPCMS, ‘Parlasul ouvirá Paraguai sobre impeachment de Lugo’, 2012, available at: http://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade -legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-mistas/cpcms/noticias/parlasul-ouvira-paraguai-sobre -impeachment-de-lugo (accessed 20 Septemper 2015). 37  Clarissa Dri, ‘Limits of Institutional Mimesis of the European Union’, pp. 52–74. 38  EuroLat, ‘Urgent Resolution on the Europe-Latin America position on issues related to climate and climate change in the context of the Summit of 2015 in Paris (COP 21)’, Brussels, 5 June 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

322

Pasquariello Mariano, Nitsch Bressan and Luciano

the region’s key political matters. These parliamentary institutions try to be ­characterised as regional ‘moral tribunes’, particularly regarding the maintenance of democratic stability and the search for peaceful solutions of regional conflicts. These parliaments represent important loci of parliamentary diplomacy, inasmuch as they offer an adequate political context for dialogue among parliamentarians and political parties from Latin America. Besides, the relations among these Latin American parliaments, as well as their relations with counterpart institutions elsewhere, such as the EP, facilitates the establishment of linkages between parliamentarians from different countries and political affiliations.

Conclusions: Challenges and Limits to Parliamentary Diplomacy in Latin America

In order to increase the legitimacy of regional policies, Latin American integration projects possess, or are discussing the creation of, parliaments, while some countries have provided for direct elections of their representatives to these regional integration parliaments.39 However, roadmaps towards increasing the competences of these parliaments and the establishment of a supranational logic that would provide common institutions with more autonomy have not been established. Comments by negotiators suggest that governments are primarily concerned with keeping integration issues at an intergovernmental rather than supranational level.40 This hinders the development of a stronger culture of parliamentary diplomacy. Yet the last decade has witnessed a growing concern about the necessity of including parliaments in regional decision-making processes and strengthening them through direct elections. Simultaneously, there has been an intensification of parliamentary diplomacy in Latin America through the creation of several parliamentary institutions. However, the increase in international parliamentary action has not been accompanied with an actual transfer of powers to these institutions, neither in matters of collective interest nor within the institutional structures of the respective integration processes. Despite 39  Silvana Cera, ‘Las elecciones directas en el Parlamento Andino: un camiño para fortalecer su papel como institución promotora de la integración’, Revista de Derecho, vol. 32, no. 2, 2009, pp. 308–333. 40  Bruno T. Luciano, Karina L.P. Mariano and Regiane N. Bressan, ‘Los parlamentos Regionales en la Integración de América del Sur: análisis de la percepción popular’, Revista Trimestral de Estudios Economía Latinoamericanos, vol. 17, no. 1, 2014, pp. 1–15.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

16. Regional Democracy and Integration

323

constant declarations by MPs that parliamentary action is an increasingly ­important element of democratisation in the region, they have so far been unable to put regional themes on the domestic agendas in their respective countries. Their work thus remains distant from the daily life of the citizens they represent, and, therefore, undervalued. A number of strategies have been formulated to change this situation, such as the direct election of MPs, which is expected to boost their democratic legitimacy. For this to enhance regional parliamentary diplomacy, parliamentarians ought to dedicate themselves exclusively to the regional parliament they are part of, without holding representative posts at the national level. This could strengthen regional parliaments by allowing for the formulation of a regionwide agenda and the formation of regional parliamentary fractions. As long as MPs are appointed by national parliaments, they are intrinsically linked to domestic political agendas and elections, and therefore restricted in their autonomy to pursue common interests. Low levels of commitment of Parlasur members resulting from their double mandates (national and regional) were already problematic during the negotiations on its founding. For this reason, it was decided that this situation would only be kept during a transitional period, during which negotiations on proportionality rules for the size of national delegations and the realisation of direct elections were to take place. A directly elected MP cannot simultaneously serve as member of a national parliament, a rule that also applies to other functions in MERCOSUR institutions.41 The Constitutive Protocol also calls for the direct elections of parliamentarians who will represent the populations of the MERCOSUR countries. At present, Paraguay has complied, electing its representatives on two occasions (2008 and 2013), while Argentina held its first elections in October 2015. In Brazil, negotiations in the National Congress about the rules that will govern Parlasur elections have come to a standstill, and in Uruguay there has been little progress too.42 However, as the Paraguayan case demonstrates, the results of exclusive Parlasur membership are below expectations. In some cases, only one member of the delegation was present in Parlasur sessions. Furthermore, most Paraguayan representatives possess little or no parliamentary experience and lack the skills needed to exercise their functions in an efficient manner. Another point of interest is the distance between Parlasur delegations and the 41  Parlasur Constitutive Protocol, December 2005. 42  Bruno T. Luciano, ‘Eleições na Integração Regional: Desenvolvimento das Proposições Nacionais para as Eleições Diretas do Parlamento do Mercosul’, E-legis, vol. 7, no. 13, 2014.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

324

Pasquariello Mariano, Nitsch Bressan and Luciano

work of national parliaments, considering that in most cases that link runs through intra-party channels, rather than the official ones. The involvement of MPs in regional decision-making processes is encumbered by various factors. In the first place, MERCOSUR countries lack a tradition of parliamentary intervention in foreign policy, which is normally the domain of the executive branch. Secondly, the formation of supranational party fractions in Parlasur is a difficult process, because, with the exception of centre-left parties, political parties in MERCOSUR countries tend to be characterised by a low degree of political identity.43 Representatives of Parlandino were initially appointed by national parliaments, but a directive was issued in the 1990s that MPs should be directly elected. It was hoped that this would increase the democratic content of the AC, as well as the citizens’ involvement in the Andean integration.44 Even though Parlandino is an important pillar of the AC, its role as a decision maker is often marginalised by the leaders of the member states. However, it is important to observe a significant degree of politicisation in the debates and deliberations in this parliament. In contrast with these two cases, Parlatino’s members are MPs drawn from the national parliaments of the member states.45 Furthermore, Parlatino’s constitutional act imposes some limits on its consolidation.46 Its first weakness is its non-association with any actual integration project. Secondly, the parliament is not divided into political party fractions, and parliamentarians merely make loose informal alliances based on ideological affinity. Thirdly, the electoral connection is quite weak. With the exceptions of Venezuela47 and Bolivia, which hold direct elections for their representatives, member states send delegations appointed by national parliaments. The introduction of direct elections for regional parliaments forces the incorporation of this debate into national electoral campaigns, as well as the establishment of formal channels for informing national electorates about the integration processes and regional issues. With time, these changes have 43  Andrés Malamud and Clarissa Dri, ‘Spillover Effects and Supranational Parliaments: The Case of Mercosur’. Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research, vol. 19, no. 2, 2013, pp. 224–238. 44  Andean Parliament, available online at: http://www.parlamentoandino.org/ (accessed 5 January 2015). 45  Latin American Parliament Institutionalisation Treaty, November 1987. 46   Mergulhão, ‘O Parlamento Latino-Americano e a sua Evolução institucional em Perspectiva Comparada com a Assembleia Parlamentar do Conselho da Europa’, pp. 1–179. 47  Venezuelan Parliamentary Group in Parlatino, available online at: http://www.parlatino .org.ve/ (accessed 2 January 2015).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

16. Regional Democracy and Integration

325

the potential to strengthen regional parliaments, but there are still a number of difficulties to be overcome. The establishment of regional parliaments is aimed at the realisation of certain objectives, such as democratic development, increased control over regional policies, and achieving greater structural autonomy for supranational institutions. However, as the analysed cases show, these efforts are hampered by the restrictions that their own institutional structures impose on them and by the actual behaviour of parliamentarians in regional integration matters. The institutional limitations identified in Latin America have reduced the capacity of these bodies to become stronger mechanisms of parliamentary diplomacy. Even though the IPIs analysed have different organisational characteristics, all of them could become important vehicles of parliamentary diplomacy in Latin America, favouring dialogue among regional and extra-regional IPIs and contributing to the interaction with national legislatures. These regional parliamentary platforms can also contribute to guaranteeing that political parties and parliamentarians from Latin America achieve a stronger presence in global and regional issues. Although some authors have presented the overlapping of regional institutions as a sign of failure of Latin American regionalism,48 one could consider that the issuance of political declarations by different regional integration parliaments on the same regional matter is an attempt to increase the political and public impact of the position adopted, and thus an indicator of the development of multilayered international parliamentarism.49 The strengthening of parliamentary diplomacy in Latin America through the establishment of the regional parliaments analysed has not brought about the desired effects in consolidating democratic representation in the respective regional blocs. Initially, it was thought that the founding of directly elected parliaments would mobilise popular support for regional integration and increase the democratic content of these projects. However, the creation of parliaments has not fundamentally changed the distribution of power, which remains firmly in the hands of national governments and is exercised almost exclusively in the context of intergovernmental and interpresidential exchanges, with low degrees of transparency and accountability. Regional parliaments were created by governments as a response to national parliaments’ demands for more participation and in order to show their commitment to democracy, thus introducing parliamentary diplomacy 48  Andrés Malamud and Gian Luca Gardini, ‘Has Regionalism Peaked? The Latin American Quagmire and its Lessons’, The International Spectator, vol. 47, no. 1, 2012, pp. 116–133. 49  Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy’, pp. 197–242.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

326

Pasquariello Mariano, Nitsch Bressan and Luciano

as a complement to traditional diplomacy at the regional level. Yet governments systematically ignore parliamentary resolutions. Although such behaviour is not a breach of regional regulations, it does weaken the functionality of regional parliaments and cause parliamentary deliberations to produce few concrete results for the integration process. This situation fuels the perception of their uselessness in regional integration projects. The development of parliamentary diplomacy and regional parliaments in Latin America has not substantially reduced the distance between these parliaments and the civil society. There is still a large gap between them, which hinders the participation and influence of social movements and interest groups in the agenda-setting activities of parliaments. The fact that none of the assessed parliaments are decisive bodies in regional integration has not favoured the increase of the citizens’ attention to these institutions. Moreover, social movements have preferred to engage in other institutional dimensions of Latin American integration processes, such as the MERCOSUR Social Summits and Specialised Working Groups of MERCOSUR, where they believe their demands are better and more directly addressed. Therefore, direct elections of regional integration parliaments would contribute to greater visibility of Latin American parliamentary diplomacy in the eyes of the general public. However, elections held in the cases of the Andean Parliament and in Paraguay concerning Parlasur have not generated sufficient social acknowledgement for the elected parliamentarians or parliaments themselves. Only a strong information campaign and the engagement of candidates and political parties in public debates directly related to regional integration issues and the empowerment of these parliamentary dimensions could reduce the structural lack of public interest in regional policies. Nevertheless, Latin American governments have yet to make these matters political priorities. As long as the publics’ and the executives’ neglect of regional parliaments persists, the latter’s potential to become effective instruments of parliamentary diplomacy will remain limited.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 17

Understanding Success and Failure in the Quest for Peace: The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum Konstantinos Magliveras and Asteris Huliaras Introduction After the end of colonialism, most national assemblies in Africa were mere appendages to the executive branches of government.1 Their role was at best that of rubber-stumping institutions, especially in foreign policy. However, much has changed in the last 25 years.2 Several African legislatures in countries such as Cape Verde, Namibia, Senegal and Tanzania have become more autonomous3 and increasingly influential in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.4 Some parliaments have also developed their own ­international linkages, leading to the rise of an African transnational parliamentary diplomacy.5 Two factors explain this development. 1  See, for example, Victor Le Vine, ‘Parliaments in Francophone Africa: Some Lessons from the Decolonization Process’, in Joel Smith and Lloyd D. Musolf (eds.), Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979), pp. 125–154. 2  M.A. Mohammed Salih (ed.), African Parliaments: Between Governance and Government (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 3  Lia Nijzink, Shaheen Mozaffar and Elisabete Azevedo, ‘Parliaments and the Enhancement of Democracy on the African Continent: An Analysis of Institutional Capacity and Public Perceptions’, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 12, no. 3 (2006), pp. 311–335. 4  Peter J. Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 95. 5  See Denis Kadima and Susan Booysen (eds), Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa 1989– 2009: 20 Years of Multiparty Democracy (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, 2009). For more, generally, on transnational parliamentary diplomacy, see Davor Jančić, ‘Transnational Parliamentarism and Global Governance: The New Practice of Democracy’, in Elaine Fahey (ed.), The Actors of Post-National Rule-making: Contemporary Challenges of European and International Law (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 113–132. See also a conceptual discussion of parliamentary diplomacy in Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jančić, ‘The Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy in International Politics’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 11, nos. 2–3 (2016), pp. 105–120.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004336346_019 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

328

Magliveras and Huliaras

A first factor is that African regimes have become more democratic and accountable. In the 1980s, only 36 elections were held throughout the entire continent. The number increased to 65 in the 1990s, while 41 elections took place between 2000 and 2005.6 According to Freedom House,7 in 1983 only 6 per cent of sub-Saharan countries could be categorized as being ‘free’ (in terms of political rights and civil liberties), with 59 per cent as ‘not free’. In 2003, the figure for ‘free’ countries rose to 23 per cent, while that for countries classified as ‘not free’ declined to 35 per cent. However, the region has experienced democratic backsliding during the last decade, and by 2015 it had returned to the same levels of freedom as in 2001. Africa’s democratization has led to the emergence of a new set of increasingly independent legislatures with the potential to alter the ways in which foreign policies are made and implemented. Several parliaments became actively involved in foreign policy-making through regular hearings and drafting reports on key issues. Some succeeded in being regularly informed by ministers, others created or joined transnational and transcontinental networks, and a few of them questioned and influenced government policies. Sometimes, the interplay of domestic and external factors played a crucial role. For example, in 1993, the national assembly of Côte d’Ivoire decided that all measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund through the Structural Adjustment Programmes should be discussed by the national assembly before any further implementation.8 International forums, such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association,9 encouraged the involvement of African parliamentarians in international affairs. However, there is great variation in parliamentary autonomy and influence across Africa, largely depending on the regime type and the more general political context. A second factor for the development of African parliamentary diplomacy is that Africa has undergone a process of soul-searching during the last fifteen years, leading to significant changes in the way it confronts its problems. In particular, the role of regional and sub-regional organizations has increased. In the 1990s, some proxy wars that resulted in considerable loss of life ended (for example, in Angola and Mozambique), but several new conflicts emerged, 6  Michelle Sieff, ‘Africa: Many Hills to Climb’, World Policy Journal, vol. 25, no. 3 (2008), p. 186. 7  See online at https://freedomhouse.org/resource/democratic-trends-sub-saharan-africa. 8  Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, The Dynamics of Economic and Political Relations Between Africa and Foreign Powers: A Study in International Relations (London: Praeger, 1999), p. 23. 9  See generally Stephen Gardbaum, ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’, American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 49, no. 1 (2001), p. 707.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

17. The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum

329

crossing international boundaries and threatening to destabilize wider regions. The Great Lakes conflict (1997–2003) is one such example. Post-Cold War conflicts in West Africa (Liberia and Sierra Leone) and civil wars in East Africa (Sudan and Somalia) also cost thousands of lives and sent millions of refugees to neighbouring countries. The disengagement of international actors from the African continent (first Russia and then the United States after the fiasco in Somalia) encouraged Africans to seek ‘African solutions to African problems’.10 For the first time since most countries on the continent acquired independence, African leaders are questioning the norm of non-interference in internal affairs, which goes back to the era of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002 was a significant step in efforts to promote a more proactive regionalism.11 The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) undertook important initiatives to address electoral disputes, resolve armed conflicts and promote peace, stability and democracy. On many an occasion, the PSC imposed sanctions and sponsored military interventions. The first large-scale African peacekeeping mission was deployed in the region of Darfur in Sudan, and AU forces were sent to Somalia. Africa’s sub-regional organizations, collectively known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), have been increasingly willing to play a leading role in peace and security ­operations – namely, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in Liberia and the Ivory Coast, while the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployed forces in Lesotho. More recently, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) deployed, after gaining the UN Security Council’s approval,12 three battalions of peacekeeping forces in South Sudan. In contrast to the past, this new African regionalism has focused not only on promoting cooperation between governments, but also on engaging members of parliaments and civil-society groups, which indicates a clear effort to promote democratic consultation and strengthen legitimacy. Regional 10  The principle of Africa owning its own problems and finding its own solutions rather than these international actors was expressed in the Declaration marking the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity. See Assembly of the African Union, ‘Solemn Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the OAU/AU’, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Decl. 3 (XXI) (26 May 2013). See generally Bjørn Møller, The African Union as a Security Actor: African Solutions to African Problems?, Working Paper no. 57 (London: London School of Economics Development Studies Institute, Crisis States Research Centre, August 2009). 11  As explained further below, the AU is the successor to the OAU. 12  UNSC Resolution no. 2155/2014 of 27 May 2014.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

330

Magliveras and Huliaras

and sub-regional parliamentary networks, forums and assemblies were formed with a view to undertaking important initiatives, preparing conflict-­ resolution conferences, and organizing election-monitoring missions. These parliamentary forums include: the Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF), which was formed in 1997; the Economic Community of West African States Parliament (ECOWAS-P), formed in March 2000; the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), established in July 2000; and the Inter-Parliamentary Union of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IPU-IGAD), which was set up in 2007.13 This chapter studies this trend by comparing the establishment of two transnational African parliamentary institutions: the Pan-African Parliament, a formal institution covering the whole of the African continent, with a wideranging agenda; and the Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace, which is better known as the Amani Forum, a sub-regional network with a specific agenda. The analysis focuses on the role of these two institutions, both in maintaining peace and security as well as in conflict prevention. It examines the constraints faced and the opportunities offered by parliamentary diplomacy in Africa.

The Pan-African Parliament

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was inaugurated on 18 March 2004 as the parliamentary organ of the AU. It claims to represent the single voice of the African continent on the international plane.14 However, there are a number of fallacies surrounding the PAP. The first is that – even after being in operation for eleven years – it still cannot claim to be ‘pan-African’. Indeed, there are at present seven out of the total of 54 AU member states that have not joined the PAP. 13  See Nijzink, Mozaffar and Azevedo, ‘Parliaments and the Enhancement of Democracy on the African Continent’; and Ufiem Maurice Ogbonnaya and Kanayo Ogujiuba, ‘Regional Parliamentary Assemblies in Africa: Challenges of Legitimacy of Authority and Status of Operation’, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 21, no. 4 (2015), pp. 553–573. 14  See an analysis of the PAP in Baleka Mbete, ‘The Pan-African Parliament: Progress and Prospects’, in John Akokpari et al. (eds), The African Union and its Institutions (Auckland Park, South Africa: Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2008), pp. 307–316; Jakkie Cilliers and Prince Mashele, ‘The Pan-African Parliament: A Plenary of Parliamentarians’, African Security Review, vol. 13, no. 4 (2004), p. 74; and Konstantinos Magliveras and Gino Naldi, ‘The Pan-African Parliament of the African Union: An Overview’, South African Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 3, no. 2 (2003), pp. 222–233.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

17. The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum

331

The second fallacy is that the PAP, despite being listed in the AU’s Constitutive Act as one of its principal organs, is in reality an organ of the African Economic Community (AEC), an ill-fated attempt by the OAU to promote regional economic integration in the 1990s.15 The third fallacy is that the PAP is not a proper parliamentary organ of an intergovernmental organization. The AU’s founders may have wanted to ­emulate the institutional structure of the European Union (EU), but the fact remains that the PAP at present does not resemble even the European Parliament of the early 1990s. At that time, the accession of new EU member states was subject to the European Parliament’s assent, its approval was required before the member states could appoint members of the European Commission, and it could institute proceedings before the Court of Justice in cases of alleged violation of the founding treaties by another EU institution. The fourth fallacy is that the existence of parliamentary organs in international organizations presupposes that all participating countries are able to be fully involved in the parliamentary diplomacy activities pursued at the level of the respective organization. However, as there are a number of AU member states with no parliament at all, or with a non-operating or dysfunctional assembly, the PAP’s inability to act as the collective voice of all African populations persists. The fifth fallacy is linked to the fourth and concerns parliamentary representation – namely whether members of national parliaments have been elected by universal, free and fair suffrage. Africa continues to witness general elections that do not comply with international standards, while disputed electoral outcomes often spark violence.16 This is vividly demonstrated by the events following elections in Kenya in 2007–2008, when the death toll reached almost 1,300 individuals and up to 600,000 people were displaced.17

15  For institutional reasons, when the PAP Protocol was concluded in March 2001, it could not be adopted as an AU instrument and, for this reason, it was attached to the AEC, which had envisaged a parliamentary organ. See ‘Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament of 2 March 2001’, available online at http://www.au.int/en/treaties/protocol-treaty-establishing-african-economic -community-relating-pan-african-parliament. 16  See African Development Bank Group, Democratic Elections in Africa: Opportunities and Risks, available online at http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusivegrowth-across-africa/post/democratic-elections-in-africa-opportunities-and-risks-9117/. 17  Odhiambo Owour, ‘The 2007 General Elections in Kenya: Electoral Laws and Processes’, Journal of African Elections, vol. 7, no. 2 (2009), pp. 113–123.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

332

Magliveras and Huliaras

Some of these inadequacies may be overcome in the future. In June 2014, the Assembly, as the principal AU organ,18 adopted a new Protocol to replace the existing protocol of 2001,19 but it is not certain whether and when this will come into force. According to the official status lists of AU treaties, it has at the time of writing not been signed by any member state,20 while the Protocol of Amendments to the Constitutive Act, which was concluded in 2003,21 still lingers unratified. Before examining the salient features of the PAP, it is instructive to note that Africa had a remarkable experience with transnational parliamentary diplomacy in the late 1960s, pursued in the context of the REC.22 This was continued in the following decades, despite the fact that authoritarian regimes became the norm. Today, most of the RECs feature parliamentary organs, a fact that is largely neglected in the literature.23 Two things ought to be highlighted in this regard. The first is that transnational parliamentary diplomacy in Africa has developed from the bottom–up. By the time the PAP commenced operation, there was already considerable experience with this at the level of the RECs, from which the PAP benefited greatly. The second is that most RECs, despite focusing on economic cooperation, also have parliamentary and peace and security dimensions, just like the AU. As stipulated in Article 17(1) of the AU Constitutive Act, the PAP’s principal purpose is to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and economic integration of the African continent. This is explained by 18  The Assembly is ‘[c]omposed of Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives’; see online at www.au.int/en/organs/assembly. 19  ‘Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African Union Relating to the Pan-African Parliament, adopted on 27 June 2014 by the 23rd Ordinary Assembly Session’, available online at http://blog.pan-africanparliament.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/ PAP-PROTOCOL-JUNE-2014_en.pdf. 20  See online at http://www.au.int/en/treaties. 21   See online at www.au.int/en/content/protocol-amendments-constitutive-act-africanunion. 22  See generally M.A. Mohamed Salih, ‘African Regional Legislatures: Legislatures without Legislative Powers’, in Olivier Costa et al. (eds), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 149–165. 23  These include the East African Legislative Assembly, the Community Parliament of the ECOWAS, the Network of Parliamentarians of Central Africa (REPAC) operating in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Inter-Parliamentary Committee of the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) and the Parliamentary Forum of the SADC.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

17. The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum

333

the aforementioned inclusion of the PAP in the AEC. Each member state that has chosen to ratify the 2001 PAP Protocol24 participates with five delegates, who are elected or designated by national legislatures from among their members. At least one of the delegates must be a woman, a most welcomed stipulation, and the size of the participating states’ population is not reflected in its number of delegates, in the sense that a large population does not entitle a state to more delegates, an arrangement usually followed in other transnational parliamentary bodies. At present, the PAP seems to be powerless to address situations where a national parliament is the outcome of rigged elections or where national delegates are sent by non-democratic regimes, because it has not been given any powers to that effect. Although national legislatures should by definition represent the diversity of political opinions, dictatorial regimes are not constrained from manipulating the process by nominating representatives to the PAP. This violates the AU principles of respect for the rule of law, democratic principles, good governance and the rejection of unconstitutional changes of government. This chapter therefore recommends that parliamentarians elected by means of fraudulent, violent or highly undemocratic elections, or appointed following a coup d’état, should be excluded from the PAP. In the aforementioned Protocol of June 2014, the member states failed to include a provision enabling the PAP to tackle these problems. This could bring into question the PAP’s legitimacy to promote human rights, democratic institutions and popular participation, principles on which the whole AU architecture is based. To address these issues, the AU could look for guidance in the governance of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly. Rule 8 of its Rules of Procedure stipulates that a national delegation’s credentials may be challenged if the organization’s principles – namely the rule of law and the enjoyment by all people of human rights and fundamental freedoms – are deemed to have been seriously violated in the respective member state.25 These considerations are closely linked with the PAP’s principal aims, which are to provide a forum for African peoples and their grass-roots organizations to become more involved in deliberations and decision-making processes regarding African problems and challenges. This is a manifestation of the 24  See online at http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/africa-pan-african-parliament -to-become-continent-wide-legislative-body. 25  Adopted by virtue of Resolution no. 1202 (1999) in November 1999, as amended by Resolution no. 1911 (2012), available online at www.assembly.coe.int/RulesofProcedure/ PDF/Rules2013.A5.pdf.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

334

Magliveras and Huliaras

­ rinciple enshrined in Article 4c of the AU Constitutive Act, which directs the p AU to promote people’s participation in its activities. The areas covered by the PAP’s mandate are quite diverse. They include: facilitating the implementation of AU policies; promoting human rights and democracy; encouraging good ­governance, transparency and accountability in member states; promoting peace, security, stability and economic recovery; as well as harmonizing the laws of member states. It follows that the PAP, like the parliamentary bodies in other intergovernmental organizations, should operate as a conduit between the AU and ­member states’ citizens and transfer the citizens’ views and aspirations to the AU. At the same time, the PAP should ensure that the AU’s aims, principles and objectives are disseminated so that citizens can take full advantage of them. On the basis of this exchange, not only should the life of the people be improved, but Africa as a whole should reach new heights of prosperity and success. In fulfilling its goals, the PAP faces considerable obstacles and impediments, which are not faced by other transnational parliamentary bodies. For example, with regard to its budget, the PAP can only draft and discuss the budget, but not adopt it. As long as the PAP has no legislative powers, approval of its budget remains in the hands of the AU’s Assembly. Although the 2014 Protocol expressly designates the PAP as the AU’s legislative organ,26 since it is unknown when the Protocol will enter into force, the PAP will not have any influence over its own budget for the foreseeable future. However, as the PAP is composed of the African peoples’ representatives, it could arguably invoke its legitimacy vis-à-vis the Assembly and demand a de facto increase of its powers. This would probably strain relations between the two AU organs, but this is not an unusual situation. It happened in the past with the former European Economic Community (EEC), when the European Parliament confronted the Council of Ministers during the 1980s and the 1990s, a fight that was brought before the European Court of Justice and that was instrumental in cementing the European Parliament’s role in the EEC’s institutional ­architecture.27 Projecting this experience to the AU, which some authors have done by

26   See Saki Mpanyane, The Transformation of the Pan-African Parliament: A Path to Legislative Body?, Working Paper no. 181 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute of Security Studies, March 2009); and Ogochukwu Nzewi, ‘Influence and Legitimacy in African Regional Parliamentary Assemblies: The Case of the Pan-African Parliament’s Search for Legislative Powers’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 49, no. 4 (2014), pp. 488–507. 27  See also Tsegaye Demeke, ‘The New Pan-African Parliament: Prospects and Challenges in View of the Experience of the European Parliament’, African Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 4, no. 1 (2004), pp. 53–73. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

17. The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum

335

applying the theory of mimetic institutionalism,28 the PAP cannot count on ­favourable rulings by the African Court of Justice, for the simple reason that the latter has never become operative.29 Of similarly restricted value is the PAP’s function to deliberate upon the AU budget, because it can only make recommendations to the Assembly. Even though this power puts the PAP in an advantageous position, since the other AU organs cannot submit comments, the PAP is still a long way from exercising real control over the AU’s budget. Further, the AU is the sole international organization where more than half of budgetary funds are secured through contributions from other international organizations and non-member states, which are euphemistically referred to as ‘international partners’ in AU documents. In particular, for the 2015 financial year, the Assembly adopted an AU budget of US$ 522 million, of which US$ 131.4 million is to be provided by the AU member states, US$ 225.5 million by the international partners, with a further US$ 149.2 million still to be solicited from international partners.30 The amount earmarked for the PAP is US$ 29.5 million, divided into operating costs (US$ 11.8 million) and programmes (US$ 17.7 million). The latter is to be secured solely from international partners. Arguably, this state of affairs questions the PAP’s as well as the AU’s independence, especially at a time when the AU claims to be the victim of a campaign orchestrated by Western countries and international institutions (such as the International Criminal Court) to discredit it for not observing the rule of law, not fighting impunity, and not demanding accountability for gross violations of human rights allegedly perpetrated by certain African heads of state.31 These are all issues that concern Africa as a whole. The PAP should discuss them in earnest and recommend specific action, especially

28  See Julian Navarro, ‘The Creation and Transformation of Regional Parliamentary Assemblies: Lessons from the Pan-African Parliament’, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 16, no. 2 (2010), pp. 195–214. See more generally Lorenzo Fioramonti and Frank Mattheis, ‘Is Africa Really Following Europe? An Integrated Framework for Comparative Regionalism’, Journal of Common Market Studies (forthcoming 2016). 29  See Gino J. Naldi and Konstantinos D. Magliveras, ‘The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Judicial Curate’s Egg’, International Organizations Law Review, vol. 9, no. 2 (2012), pp. 383–449, at p. 386. 30  AU Assembly, ‘Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2015 Financial Year’, Assembly/AU/Dec. 544(XXIII), 27 June 2014, available online at http://au.int/en/content/ malabo-26-27-june-2014-decisions-declarations-and-resolution-assembly-union-twentythird-ord. 31  See Peter Fabricius, ‘The AU Starts to Put its Money (Closer to) Where its Mouth Is’, ISS Today (12 February 2015), available online at https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/ the-au-starts-to-put-its-money-closer-to-where-its-mouth-is. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

336

Magliveras and Huliaras

since the AU heads of state have demonstrated denialism in addressing these chronic and endemic problems.32 Like any other transnational parliamentary organ, the PAP relies on the work of its ten permanent committees. Peace and security falls within the domain of the committee dealing with the resolution of African conflicts – the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution. Unlike other areas of the PAP’s activities, where the relevant committees are much more closely linked (for example, health, labour and social affairs), conflict resolution has been grouped together with cooperation and international relations. On the whole, the work of this committee has not been very impressive. For example, in 2011 and in the midst of the North African popular uprisings, the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution acknowledged the PAP’s overall role of promoting peace and security and resolved to send a fact-finding mission to Tripoli and Benghazi to study the extent of the violent conflict in Libya, as well as a goodwill mission to Tunisia and Egypt to collect information.33 Useful though such missions might be, and the PAP has so far ordered the deployment of a large number of them,34 the most that they can do is to report back. Any meaningful liaison with the citizens of the affected countries is clearly missing. In many African countries, recent years have witnessed a backsliding in civil liberties, ranging from limitations to the freedom of expression to the intimidation of voters, but also to more significant human rights abuses. This chapter contends that African democracies continue to be superficial, ‘illiberal’ or ‘shallow’, and that respect for civil liberties and the rule of law should be strengthened. If these tendencies continue, the belated and timid rise of transnational parliamentary diplomacy in Africa could be in danger. On the other hand, however, the rise of regionalism in Africa seems irreversible. Promoted by outsiders such as the EU, but also by globalization and powerful worldwide economic forces, the need for non-traditional forms of diplomacy will continue to grow. 32  See Konstantinos Magliveras, ‘International Organizations and Denialism: The Case of the African Union’, in Maastricht Centre for Human Rights (ed.), Denialism and Human Rights (Cambridge: Intersentia, forthcoming in 2016). 33   See ‘Resolution on Issues of Peace and Security in Africa, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Permanent Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution’, PAP(2)/P/CCIRCR/RECOMS(IV), May 2011. 34  On previous fact-finding missions, see University of Pretoria Centre for Human Rights, The Role of the Pan-African Parliament in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa (20 September 2008), available online at www.chr.up.ac.za.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

17. The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum

337

The trend towards democratization and constitutionalism, and the undertakings assumed by AU member states in this respect, have been primarily expressed in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2010,35 which came into force in February 2012.36 It is notable that the PAP has found a way to be involved in this process of democratization: it resolved to exercise its oversight mandate to ensure that the texts implementing the African Charter into domestic legal orders actually comply with it.37 This proactive role is all the more important because the Charter does not entrust any specific powers to the PAP. In this particular instance, it follows that the PAP saw a window of opportunity and promptly took advantage of it to cement its position further.

The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace: The Amani Forum

The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace, or the Amani38 Forum, was created in 1999 in Kampala, Uganda, as an independent, voluntary and actionbased organization of African parliamentarians, the majority of whom are from Commonwealth countries. It had been conceived one year earlier at a conference on ‘the role of parliamentarians in peace-building’, which the nongovernmental organization (NGO) International Alert organized in Kigali, Rwanda. Over the years, the Amani Forum has grown into a wider network of parliamentarians from the Great Lakes region. In 2003, it established a Regional Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya, which is responsible for designing, implementing and monitoring activities and projects, while the national groups or clusters (officially ‘chapters’) provided venues for members of parliament (MPs) to discuss issues and develop initiatives at the national level. The Amani Forum thus remains rooted in the work of the national parliaments of its participating states – Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia – as well as in the East 35  See the text of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance online at http://www.au.int/en/content/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance. See also Konstantinos Magliveras and Gino Naldi, The African Union (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2013), pp. 354–357. 36  The Charter has not found much favour among AU member states, as only 23 participate in it currently, a fact that could be explained by the persisting lack of democratic legitimacy. 37   See ‘Sixth Ordinary Session of the Pan-African Parliament’, PAP(2)/RECOMS/(VI), 16–20 January 2012. 38  Amani is the Kiswahili word for peace.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

338

Magliveras and Huliaras

African Legislative Assembly. It has also expanded its geographical scope to eleven countries, thus bringing together MPs from Sudan, the Republic of Congo, Angola and the Central African Republic together with parliamentarians from the entire Great Lakes region. By 2010, the last year for which figures are available, it had connected over 800 parliamentarians from the participating countries. Since its inception, the Amani Forum’s aim has been to promote peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region. The year 1998 was crucial, because it marked the beginning of the African continent’s great war, a ravaging conflict in the DRC, which involved a large number of African states, including Angola, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The war lasted until 2002, leaving millions of people dead and sending hundreds of thousands of refugees to neighbouring countries. The Amani Forum has tried to identify the roots and dynamics of the conflict, which continued to affect the wider region until very recently, and has tried to engage with leaders of the countries involved in the quest for peace. It has organized fact-finding missions, issued reports, and organized conferences and public hearings. Furthermore, the Amani Forum sent fact-finding missions to southern and northern Sudan in order to assess the causes of the North–South conflict and to advise parliamentarians ‘so they could undertake targeted advocacy and provide momentum to peacefully resolve the conflict’.39 Another fact-finding mission to northern Uganda helped design projects responding to the causes of friction and the return of refugees and displaced persons.40 Finally, the Amani Forum organized a fact-finding mission to Kenya in order to study the causes of post-election violence in 2007–2008 and to make recommendations for a peaceful transition.41 Peace talks have been initiated under the Amani Forum’s supervision. In September 2005, the Amani Forum started collecting all of the agreements on conflict resolution that had been signed by governments of the region in an 39  Niall Johnston, ‘Regional Parliamentary Peacebuilding and Engagement with International Organizations’, in Mitchell O’Brien, Rick Stapenhurst and Niall Johnston (eds.), Parliaments as Peacebuilders in Conflict-Affected Countries (Washington, DC: The World Bank Institute, 2008), p. 206. 40  Johnston, ‘Regional Parliamentary Peacebuilding and Engagement with International Organizations’. 41  Amani Forum, Regional Parliamentarians Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya on the PostElection Violence, 13–21 January 2008, available online at www.responsibilitytoprotect .org/files/Fact-Finding%20Mission%20Report%20by%20Great%20Lakes%20 Parliamentarians%20on%20Kenyan%20Post-Election%20Violence.pdf.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

17. The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum

339

effort to make them accountable for their implementation and for observance of their terms. With the involvement of Amani Forum parliamentarians, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in December 2006 adopted a binding Pact on Security, Stability and Development for the region, which was amended in December 2012. Its purpose was to serve as a legal framework for creating the necessary conditions for durable peace and economic development. To that end, the Pact provided for the creation of a Special Fund for the reconstruction and development of the Great Lakes region.42 The Pact was the outcome of a large number of influences and the Amani Forum was one of the many different actors involved, which included the United Nations, African Union, international donors (such as Norway) and NGOs. However, Amani Forum parliamentarians acted less as representatives of specific state interests than as mediators for the parties involved in the conflict. They helped to achieve a level of dialogue that made the signing of the Pact possible, although it was later shown that the impact of the Pact and of the ICGLR as a whole had been limited.43 The Amani Forum has also sent election observers to presidential and legislative elections in Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Amani Forum parliamentarians have also helped to establish communication channels among warring parties so as to overcome misunderstandings and restore trust. In addition, the Amani Forum has promoted inter-parliamentary dialogue, thus helping MPs from Burundi and Tanzania to rise above deep-seated prejudices. In Uganda, it helped President Yoweri Museveni and his challenger Kizza Begigye to talk to each other. Mediation was a focal point for the Amani Forum and, in the case of the post-election violence in Kenya, the Forum’s SecretaryGeneral proudly claimed that the compromise achieved by the chief mediator, Kofi Annan, was largely based on the Amani Forum’s efforts.44 However, the fact that the Great Lakes region has in recent years become more peaceful has caused the Amani Forum to lose its original raison d’être. Its vision of a region free of conflict was largely realized. As a result, its initiatives have become rarer and even its website has been abandoned. While workshops and meetings have continued, it is rather clear that it has become less 42  Available online at www.icglr.org/images/Pact%20ICGLR%20Amended%2020122.pdf. 43  Rigobert Minani Bihuzo, ‘Unfinished Business: A Framework for Peace in the Great Lakes’, Africa Security Brief, no. 12 (July 2012), p. 12. 44  Juliana Kantengwa, ‘Elections and Stability in the Great Lakes Region: Evaluating 2006 and 2007 Electoral Processes in the Region’, Peace and Conflict Management Review, vol. 1, no. 2 (2008), p. 2.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

340

Magliveras and Huliaras

active. The gradual progress achieved by the Great Lakes region’s parliamentarians was made apparent during the 2009 Amani Forum, which was hosted by the Kenya chapter. The final communiqué was a clear endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P),45 a principle that would be unthinkable for many African leaders or diplomats to support: States have a collective responsibility to protect people from gross human rights violations, and where a state is shown to have committed or acquiesced in the commission of human rights violations, the international community ought to intervene [ . . . ] Parliamentarians have a vital role to play to understand and popularize the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and to hold governments accountable.46 The words of an observer, who had argued a year earlier that the Amani Forum was ‘an excellent example of what parliamentarians can achieve for the purpose of peace’, seemed to have been proved correct.47

Comparison and Conclusions

From an institutional perspective, a great deal has been achieved at both regional and sub-regional levels in Africa during the last fifteen years. It is impressive how African states have left behind the scleroses of recent decades and have embarked on a process of establishing continental and transnational parliamentary bodies in an attempt to consolidate democratic principles and promote the involvement of citizens in the ‘African renaissance’, a term coined

45  According to this principle, the duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities lies first and foremost with states. However, the international community also has a role to play that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty. See ‘Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit’, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, paras 138–140; and UN Secretary-General, ‘Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, UN Doc. A/63/677 (2009). 46  See the ‘Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum (Amani Forum) Issues Communiqué Endorsing R2P’, Great Amani Forum 2009, General Assembly, Nairobi, Kenya, 15–17 June 2009, available online at www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/­ content/ article/35-r2pcs-topics/2458-great-lakes-parliamentary-forum-amani-forum-issues-communique-endorsing-rtop-. 47  Johnston, ‘Regional Parliamentary Peacebuilding and Engagement with International Organizations’, p. 206.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

17. The Pan-African Parliament and the Amani Forum

341

by former President of the Republic of South Africa Thabo Mbeki.48 Within their respective mandates, both the PAP and the Amani Forum are important examples of this process, and reveal that African leaders have grasped the advantages of multilateralism and the importance of actors other than the executives. Although the PAP still struggles in the maze of the AU’s institutional architecture,49 the Amani Forum was not constrained by such considerations. Moreover, the fact that the Amani Forum’s mandate had a clear focus (peace and security) was a major factor in its success. In addition, the Amani Forum’s work has not been curtailed by geographical distance. This is a very important element when one analyses the PAP. The PAP’s seat is in South Africa, a distance of almost 5,000 kilometres from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the seat of the other principal AU organs. Informality was another advantage of the Amani Forum, as it guaranteed the necessary flexibility for undertaking initiatives, facilitating mediation and helping to solve complex problems. Finally, the fact that the Amani Forum to a large extent included Commonwealth countries and cooperated with international NGOs contributed to its successful initiatives. Institutions such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association greatly facilitated parliamentary networking and cooperation. However, the Amani Forum had its own limitations. It largely relied on the support of external actors and its activities were largely funded by international NGOs. Although it was finally institutionalized, it continued to have limited autonomy and largely remained a vehicle for externally driven conflictresolution efforts. It thus complemented the initiatives of others rather than developing its own independent, transnational parliamentary diplomacy. Not unexpectedly, its activities lost momentum once the Great Lakes region’s conflict was removed from the international agenda. The PAP’s terms of reference are much broader than those of the Amani Forum and go beyond peace-building and conflict resolution, areas in which the AU’s PSC has primary responsibility. Indeed, there is no good reason why all of these bodies should not work together and coordinate their activities. For example, the fact that these three bodies have organized different fact-finding missions seems to be a luxury and not the best use of their limited resources. Considering that the PSC has devised a mechanism to interact with civil society organizations under the so-called ‘Livingstone Formula’,50 cooperating 48  Thabo Mbeki, ‘Statement on African Renaissance’, 13 August 1998. 49  Note that even today not all AU organs have been set up or begun functioning. 50  See Peace and Security Council, Conclusions on a Mechanism for Interaction between the Peace and Security Council and Civil Society Organizations in the Promotion of Peace,

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

342

Magliveras and Huliaras

with parliamentary forums should not pose any great problems. Moreover, advantage could be taken of the PAP’s Rules of Procedure, which allow for various types of caucuses to be established to deal with issues of common interest. Alignment with the work of the Amani Forum, and indeed any other similar institutions in the future, could thus be achieved on the basis of such caucuses. Nevertheless, cooperation also has its own limitations. The two bodies largely represent two different types of parliamentary diplomacy. Members of the PAP usually act as representatives of specific state interests. In the case of the Amani Forum, parliamentarians acted more as mediators between state representatives. Closer cooperation could undermine this second type of parliamentary diplomacy. Certainly, reducing overlap in the work of a growing number of organizations in which parliamentarians discuss international issues is important.51 Yet the nature of the relationship between governmental and parliamentary diplomacy – namely, the question of ‘whether these can in fact act complementarily or whether in some cases this would endanger the role or effectiveness of either’52 – also remains crucial. To overcome its problems and challenges, Africa is in need of combined efforts from all the relevant actors. Governments certainly have a major role to play, but one should not underestimate the contribution that parliaments and civil society can make, especially in conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation, areas where the protection of the African peoples should be the primary consideration. In this constellation, the work of transnational parliamentary bodies should be at the forefront. As was mentioned above, the African continent had an important experience with parliamentary diplomacy in the 1960s, notwithstanding the fact that this has not attracted much attention in the literature. The PAP should take full advantage of parliamentary diplomacy and should engage in successful experiments – such as the Amani Forum – in its future activities. Security and Stability in Africa, 4–5 December 2008, Livingstone, Zambia, PSC/PR/ (CLX), available online at http://pages.au.int/cido/documents/conclusions-mechanisminteraction-between-peace-and-security-council-and-civil-society. 51  See, however, the benefits of parliamentary overlap in different circumstances: Davor Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy: The Emergence of Multilayered International Parliamentarism’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (2015), pp. 197–242. 52   Frans Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 1 (2007), pp. 93–98.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Chapter 18

South Africa’s Parliamentary Diplomacy and the ‘African Agenda’ Lesley Masters and Fritz Nganje Introduction With the practice of parliamentary diplomacy developing internationally,1 there is a growing understanding of the concept in developed countries. For many developing countries, however, the discourse on parliamentary diplomacy is still fairly limited, especially because many of these legislative structures may be new and still developing their role in the context of limited capacity and resources. The historical context of apartheid saw participation in the South African legislature limited to only white representatives from 1968. Although Indian and Coloured groups were granted a segregated form of participation in 1984, through the establishment of the House of Delegates (Indians) and House of Representatives (Coloureds), black people remained excluded.2 Following the negotiated political transition in 1994 South Africa’s first truly democratic and inclusive Parliament was established, comprising the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), the latter being South Africa’s upper house of Parliament. The result is that the ‘new democratic’ South African Parliament is a relatively new actor internationally, with just over twenty years since the country’s political transformation. Parliament has been slow to develop its position in international affairs, in part due to its historical context, given South Africa’s international isolation during apartheid. The diplomatic role of Parliament has also been constrained by a dominant executive.3 Although there were numerous calls for Parliament to adopt an active role internationally following the democratic transition, domestic 1  See the introductory chapter by Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jančić in this volume. 2  See more on the history of the South African Parliament in: South African History Online, available online at http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/parliament-republic-south-africa (last accessed 22 April 2016). 3  Lesley Masters, ‘South Africa’s Emerging Parliamentary Diplomacy and Soft Power’, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 37, no. 2, 2015, pp. 74–93.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004336346_020 Stelios Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

344

Masters and Nganje

imperatives in support of the transition saw a legislature that was primarily inward looking.4 Parliamentary diplomacy has, however, gradually become an element of the South African legislature’s core business. This includes an international relations programme of action with four identified areas: 1) developing and strengthening partnerships in Africa, 2) advancing multilateralism, 3) bilateralism through friendship societies and strategic groups, and 4) providing for public input into South Africa’s international relations.5 Parliament’s international focus also mirrors South African foreign policy priorities, where Africa is given a particular emphasis given the need to address the role that the country played in the past in destabilizing the region, and where South Africa has found itself as the de facto representative of the continent in multilateral forums such as the G20 and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).6 It is not surprising, therefore, that the official discourse considers South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy, particularly its multilateral dimension, as an expression of Pretoria’s foreign policy priority of supporting the socio-political and economic development of Africa. Otherwise referred to as the ‘African Agenda’, this policy priority was first articulated during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki from 1999–2008, and speaks to a commitment by the South African government to assume a leading role in Africa’s regeneration. Through analysis of the South African Parliament’s international relations and its foreign policy focus on the African Agenda, this chapter demonstrates that just as the country has faced challenges in reconciling foreign policy rhetoric with practice, so has Parliament faced its own challenges when it comes to aligning its guiding values and principles with parliamentary diplomacy in practice. This impacts on the efficacy and the value of South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy, an area where there is still significant opportunity for development.

4  Masters, ‘South Africa’s Emerging Parliamentary Diplomacy and Soft Power’, pp. 78–80. 5  Parliament of South Africa, ‘International Participation’, 2016, available online at http://www .parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category_ID=22 (last accessed 01 April 2016). 6  Although included within the emerging powers grouping of the BRICS, the South African economy is considerably smaller with a population of over just over 50 million and a GDP of approximately USD350 billion.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy



345

Parliamentary Diplomacy in South Africa’s Multi-stakeholder Diplomacy

South Africa’s 1996 Constitution gives the national executive, in particular the President, supreme authority over the country’s foreign affairs. According to Section 231 (1) of the Constitution, the President is responsible for appointing ambassadors and other consular representatives, as well as accrediting foreign emissaries assigned to South Africa. He or she is also responsible for negotiating and signing all international agreements on behalf of the republic, although Section 231 (2) of the Constitution stipulates that agreements that are not of a technical, administrative or executive nature, and those requiring ratification or accession, must be approved by Parliament before they become enforceable in South Africa.7 Consistent with these constitutional stipulations, diplomatic activities in the different post-apartheid administrations in South Africa have been dominated by the country’s presidency, albeit with the assistance of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), formerly the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).8 For example, during the first part of his presidency from 1994 to 1999, Nelson Mandela was essentially the face of the newly democratising South Africa’s diplomacy, capitalising on his colossal moral authority to champion his ideals of respect for human rights, reconciliation, and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Similarly, from 1999 to 2008, South Africa’s international relations were almost synonymous with Thabo Mbeki’s transformational diplomacy,9 premised on the aspirations for an African Renaissance. During Mbeki’s presidency, South Africa assumed a prominent role in, and advocated for, the transformation of major global multilateral forums, while also spearheading socio-political and economic development in Africa under the banner of the African Agenda. The focus on the African Agenda as a key part of South Africa’s foreign policy priorities, aims to consolidate South Africa’s African identity, 7  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 8  See more on the diplomatic role of South Africa’s presidents in: Lesley Masters, ‘Opening the “black box”: South African foreign policy-making’, in Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk (eds.), South African Foreign Policy Review Vol. 1 (Pretoria: AISA and IGD, 2012), pp. 20–41. See also Chris Landsberg, The Diplomacy of Transformation: South African Foreign Policy and Statecraft (Johannesburg: Pan Macmillan, 2010). 9  Transformational diplomacy in this context refers to the ambitious efforts of Thabo Mbeki to use South Africa’s international relations to transform the rules of the Western-dominated multilateral system in a bid to create a favourable environment for socio-economic development in Africa and the Global South generally. For more on this, see Landsberg, The Diplomacy of Transformation.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

346

Masters and Nganje

engaging in promoting peace, security and development, strengthening diplomatic relations with countries across the continent, and playing a role in enhancing African governance architecture.10 When Jacob Zuma became the president of South Africa in 2009, initial perceptions were that he would not be active in the diplomatic domain, given that his electoral campaign was premised on refocusing the government’s energy on addressing the socio-economic needs of the majority of South Africa’s people. However, halfway into his second term, Zuma proved to be the dominant figure in Pretoria’s diplomacy as his predecessors were, playing a key role in consolidating the re-orientation of South Africa’s foreign policy towards relations with historical allies in the geo-political South, and most recently attempting to re-assert the country’s influence in intra-African diplomacy.11 However, the predominance of the South African presidency in the country’s international relations, in conjunction with DIRCO, is only one dimension of what has increasingly become a multilayered and multi-stakeholder diplomatic environment. With South Africa assuming an active role both on the continent and globally, and consistent with global trends, every single national government department today engages in some form of international activity, while departments such as those of finance, trade and industry, and environmental affairs have become central actors in Pretoria’s bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. For example, South Africa’s participation in the UN climate change negotiations has for the most part been led by the Minister of Environmental Affairs, while the department of finance, and that of trade and industry are often the lead actors in the country’s economic diplomacy, trade negotiations, and development cooperation.12 In addition to the traditional diplomatic actors identified above, Pretoria has also increasingly relied on the capacities of a host of sub-state and nonstate actors to implement its transformational foreign policy. The dismantling of apartheid era restrictions and the subsequent re-admission of South Africa into the global community in the 1990s encouraged many domestic actors, including city and provincial governments, non-governmental organisations, the private sector, state-owned enterprises, trade unions, and think tanks to 10  See Chris Landsberg and Kwandi Kondlo, ‘South Africa and the ‘African Agenda’’, Policy: Issues and Actors, vol. 20, no. 13. Centre for Policy Studies. April 2007, pp. 1–10. 11  See for instance: Masters, ‘Opening the “Black Box” ’; Landsberg, ‘The Diplomacy of Transformation: South African Foreign Policy and Statecraft’; Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk (eds), South African Foreign Policy Review: Volume 1 (Pretoria: AISA, 2012). 12  Masters, ‘Opening the “Black Box” ’.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

347

develop an active international agency and join what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have aptly described as the global process of transnational interdependence.13 The foreign activities of these domestic actors, including those of territorial sub-state actors, are defined first and foremost by specific interests and priorities, and have largely been conducted independently from South Africa’s mainstream diplomatic processes. However, consistent with Brian Hocking’s notion of catalytic diplomacy,14 Pretoria has increasingly sought to tap into the capacities and agency of these actors to further its foreign policy objectives, especially when it comes to its engagement on the African continent. For example, the South African Women in Dialogue (SAWID), a civic interest group that seeks to represent the voices of women in decision-making platforms, was quite supportive of the government’s peacemaking efforts in Burundi in the mid-2000s. South African think tanks with a Pan-African outlook – such as the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), and the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) – also have a good track record of complementing Pretoria’s peace diplomacy in countries like Burundi, Sudan and South Sudan, Lesotho, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).15 An increasingly important dimension of South Africa’s multilayered and multi-stakeholder diplomacy are the foreign relations of the country’s municipal and provincial governments. Big cities such as Durban and Johannesburg have sometimes used their international relations and twinning partnerships to provide technical assistance and mentorship to their counterparts in Africa. Johannesburg, in particular, has also increasingly assumed an assertive role in global policy debates and initiatives on climate change and sustainable development, using its high profile as a prominent African city to represent the interests and priorities of the continent’s cities in these processes. However, for the most part, the sub-state diplomacy of provincial and local governments has served as a mechanism for promoting domestic socio-economic development. All South Africa’s nine provinces and many of the country’s 262 municipalities have developed international relations programmes focused primarily on promoting their economic interests and attracting development assistance. 13  Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1977). 14  Brian Hocking, ‘Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond “Newness” and “Decline” ’, in Jan Melissen (ed.) Innovation in Diplomatic Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 21–42. 15  See Karen Smith, ‘Soft Power: The Essence of South Africa’s Foreign Policy’, in Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk (eds.), South African Foreign Policy Review Vol. 1 (Pretoria: AISA and IGD, 2012), p. 79.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

348

Masters and Nganje

This trend reflects the thinking of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party, which is convinced that the transformative objectives of South Africa’s foreign policy cannot be achieved solely through the traditional diplomatic efforts of the national government. The ANC has encourages sub-state actors – such as provinces and cities, parastatals, the national parliament, provincial legislatures and even its own party structures – to engage in transnational linkages that complement Pretoria’s government-to-government diplomatic efforts.16

Institutionalisation of South Africa’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

With international relations increasingly conducted by a range of actors in South Africa, Parliament too has sought to define its role. The South African Parliament’s International Relations Strategy (2012) defines this activity as ‘a continuation of a national political process and dialogue among legislatures at international level that has been brought about by significant changes in the world’. It goes on to set out that the ‘purpose of parliamentary international relations is to complement, strengthen and positively influence traditional government diplomacy and to enhance it’.17 Recognising the role of Parliament as a diplomatic actor only really came to the fore during the third Parliament, from 2004 to 2009, during which ‘engaging and participating in international relations’ was included among the other identified objectives such as passing laws, oversight of the executive, and facilitating cooperative governance.18 For the first decade following South Africa’s democratic transition, Parliament’s international relations were guided by the International Relations Sub-Committee, itself a sub-committee of the Joint Rules Committee (JRC). In 2004, following an assessment of the work of the International Relations SubCommittee, it was found that there was too much focus on logistics rather than on providing guidance in terms of policy and implementation.19 Parliament was essentially without any structures or policy in directing its international 16  See Fritz Nganje, ‘The Developmental Paradiplomacy of South African Provinces: Context, Scope, and the Challenge of Coordination’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 9, no. 2 (2014), pp. 119–149; and his ‘Sub-state Diplomacy and the Foreign Policy-Development Nexus in South Africa’, South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 1 (2016), pp.1–20. 17  Parliament of South Africa, International Relations Strategy. International Relations and Protocol Division, Cape Town, 2012, p. 4. 18  Masters, ‘South Africa’s Emerging Parliamentary Diplomacy and Soft Power’, p. 82. 19  Parliament of South Africa, International Relations Policy Discussion Document: Identifying the Core Values that Inform Parliament’s Approach to International Relations, 2005, Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

349

relations. For example, with Parliament’s transformation post-1994 there was considerable enthusiasm by legislatures across the world to engage in establishing parliament-to-parliament relations, so much so that a request was sent to the Speaker of the NA suggesting the ‘establishment of a South African Parliamentary Group to formalise relations’.20 However, with the legislature still addressing transformation, it was argued that Parliament should not be put under pressure to establish relations as there was a need to re-evaluate these relations first. Following a decision by the JRC in 2005, the South African Parliament set out to develop an understanding of parliamentary diplomacy and to establish a core set of values that would shape international engagement. The result was the 2005 International Relations Policy Discussion Document, which was drawn from Parliament’s own mission and vision, documented practice, the Constitution, foreign policy documents, international law and International Relations Theory.21 By 2006 a task team had agreed on the Policy Perspectives and Operational Guidelines for Parliament’s Involvement and Engagement in International Relations, setting out the key objectives of Parliament’s international relations as follows:

• Prioritising Africa • Strengthening South-South cooperation • Advancing multilateralism • Initiating and strengthening of North-South dialogue • Establishing bilateral relations for strategic reasons • Ensuring a follow up at parliament-to-parliament bilateral relations • Facilitating public participation and education • Promotion and protection of human rights • Reinforcing democratic values and ideals • Upholding international law and justice • Promoting gender justice • Initiating contact with other parliaments.22 a­ vailable online at http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/050603relations.doc (last accessed 03 November 2014). 20  Ibid. 21   Parliament of South Africa, ‘International Relations Policy Discussion Document: Identifying the Core Values that Inform Parliament’s Approach to International Relations’. 22  Parliament of South Africa, Policy Perspectives and Operational Guidelines for Parliaments Involvement and Engagement in International Relations, PMG, 2006, available online at http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2006/060322irpolicy.htm (last accessed 25 November 2014); Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

350

Masters and Nganje

The Multi-Party Task Team on International Relations, which was entrusted with developing these policy perspectives and operational guidelines, also sought to improve and expand Parliament’s international role through the creation in 2009 of the Parliamentary Group on International Relations (PGIR) and Focus Groups.23 Given the growing importance attributed to Parliament’s international relations, in 2010 the internal bodies dealing with Parliament’s international relations were consolidated and elevated to the International Relations and Protocol Division (IRPD). The IRPD consists of 5 sections: policy analysis, bilateral relations, multilateral relations, protocol and ceremonial, and operations management.24 This replaced the two smaller entities within the Office of the Secretary that had been primarily engaged with logistics and administration of Parliament’s international relations.25 The IRPD is responsible for developing content, acting in an advisory capacity, as well as supporting the formulation and implementation of international relations strategies and tactics.26 It is also responsible for coordinating the work of the PGIR and the implementation of Parliament’s bilateral and multilateral relations.27 With the establishment of these more formal structures, the focus turned to the finalisation of Parliament’s International Relations Strategy (2012), which clearly outlines the rationale, role, functions and structure of the IRPD within the context of the growing role of parliaments internationally. Today, international relations are included in the key programme areas of the South African Parliament. The sections below consider the focus, achievements and constraints of South Africa’s emerging parliamentary diplomacy, against the backdrop of the professed prioritisation of Africa’s socio-political and economic renewal through the ‘African Agenda’. Indeed, Parliament holds the view that ‘South Africa’s destiny is inextricably linked to that of the African continent and the developing world’.28 It also sets out that, within the norms and values of the South African Constitution, its actions are to ‘consistently ANC Parliamentary Caucus. ‘Debate on Budget Vote: Parliament by Ms Fatima Hajaig’, ANC MP – House Chairperson International Relations, 29 May 2012, available online at http://www.anc.org.za/caucus/show.php?ID=2676 (last accessed 17 March 2016). 23  Parliament of South Africa, International Relations Strategy, International Relations and Protocol Division, Cape Town, 2012, p. 6. 24  Parliament of South Africa, International Relations Strategy, p. 7. 25  Ibid, p. 3. 26  Ibid. 27  Ibid, pp. 3 and 5. 28   A NC Parliamentary Caucus, Debate on Budget Vote: Parliament by Ms Fatima Hajaig, available online at http://www.anc.org.za/caucus/show.php?ID=2676accessed (last accessed 17 March 2016). Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

351

[provide] leadership on matters that seek to entrench democratic values, social justice, rule of law, fundamental human rights, and gender equality and women development, trade, economic, and political developments, at home and abroad’.29 The problem is that the pursuit of these principles is not always apparent in South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy. Effective parliamentary diplomacy has also been hindered by resource constraints as well as the structure and nature of Parliament itself. While the interest and awareness of Parliament’s international role is rising, the budget remains relatively small. Indeed, after a steady increase in the budget for Public and International Participation (which has the smallest allocation of the 5 programmatic areas), it subsequently decreased from close to ZAR 99 million (ca. EUR 6 million) in 2009/2012 to about ZAR 79.5 million (ca. EUR 5 million) in 2010/2011, a decrease of 19.6 per cent.30 The budget for Parliament’s ‘Public and International Participation’ once again increased in the 2011/12 financial year by 31.7 per cent, as it rose to close to ZAR 109 million (ca. EUR 6.3 million).31 In addition, issues of international relations cut across a number of committees. As in other countries, MPs are members of more than one committee, dividing their time and focus across a range of policy areas while at the same time needing to engage with their constituencies.32 Sharing information with other MPs, and even the executive, has been raised as a challenge, with the 2005 Discussion Document highlighting the shortfall in documenting international engagements, which ‘consists primarily of reports, submitted by Members or staff, who have attended a particular conference’.33 This has given rise to the criticism that MPs are essentially ‘diplomatic tourists’.34 In other words, while these engagements demonstrate an enthusiasm for parliamentary diplomacy, the lack of institutional memory and analysis of these international interactions means that Parliament has yet to capitalise on the potential presented by parliamentary diplomacy.

29  Parliament of South Africa, Annual Report of Parliamentary International Relations 2012– 2013, Submitted by Mr Kaya Somgqeza. Report Prepared by the Division of International Relations and Protocol: 28 February 2014, available online at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17047/ (last accessed 4 April 2016). 30  Parliament of South Africa, Annual Plan 2010/2011, Cape Town, p. 72. 31  Parliament of South Africa. Annual Report 2011–2012, Cape Town, p. 60. 32  Masters, ‘South Africa’s Emerging Parliamentary Diplomacy and Soft Power’, p. 80. 33  Parliament of South Africa, International Relations Policy Discussion Document: Identifying the Core Values that Inform Parliament’s Approach to International Relations. 34  Masters, ‘South Africa’s Emerging Parliamentary Diplomacy and Soft Power’, p. 81. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

352

Masters and Nganje

South Africa’s Parliamentary Diplomacy in Practice

Given that the South African Parliament’s initial focus was on the country’s democratic transition, international relations only began to gather pace towards the end of the Third Parliament (2004–2009). The Policy Perspectives and Operational Guidelines highlights a number of means by which Parliament pursues its international relations, including strengthening ties with other parliaments, establishing friendship groups, undertaking focused and coordinated initiatives, promoting the country and its culture, promoting democracy, peace, justice and prosperity internationally, and the participation of MPs in the governing structures of international organisations.35 There have also been calls for Parliament to engage ‘proactively with some of the legislative assemblies of countries where the South African government has been involved in peace-building efforts’, and for it to design ‘an international policy framework in which it undertakes to engage, on a parliament-to-parliament basis, with its counterparts from African countries which are coming out of conflict in general, and those where the government of South Africa has been involved in particular’.36 This is the focus of this second section of the chapter, which unpacks Parliament’s bilateral and multilateral relations, with a view to highlighting their significance for South Africa’s commitment to support peace and socio-economic development in Africa. Bilateral Parliamentary Diplomacy and the ‘African Agenda’ For the South African Parliament bilateral relations ‘are aimed at developing strategic partnerships with other parliaments so as to share experiences, strengthen inter-parliamentary cooperation and provide the necessary support for the achievement of South African foreign policy objectives’.37 Bilateral relations are also seen as a means of ‘promoting Parliament’s interests and values and promoting South Africa’s national priorities’.38 This is to be performed particularly by supporting policies in the areas of health, education, decent work, and the fight against crime and by enhancing Parliament’s pursuit of good governance, accountability, and effective oversight.39 35  Parliament of South Africa, Policy Perspectives and Operational Guidelines for Parliament’s involvement and Engagement in International Relations. 36  Ibid. 37  Parliament of South Africa, International Relations Strategy, p. 5. 38  Ibid, p. 8. 39  Parliament of South Africa, Annual Report of Parliamentary International Relations 2012– 2013, available online at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17047/ (last accessed 4 April 2016). Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

353

In support of these objectives, the Bilateral Relations Section of the IRPD is tasked with carrying out a diverse range of activities such as research and analysis, producing strategic briefing documents, advising MPs, and compiling reports and country profiles on social, political and economic bilateral relations. It is also responsible for supporting inter-parliamentary cooperation through the drafting of speaking notes on bilateral engagements; supporting the formation of strategic partnerships, friendship and network groups; building relations with strategic partners in the global North and South; facilitating negotiations and Election Observation Missions in Africa; as well as drafting and scrutinizing bilateral agreements and promoting ‘the positive image of the African continent’.40 In addition, the Bilateral Relations Section performs logistical tasks such as coordination, communication, financial management, and liaising with relevant stakeholders, while also ensuring the implementation of bilateral cooperation agreements.41 Parliament’s bilateral relations have been conducted primarily through official visits, courtesy call meetings, study visits by Committees of Parliament, briefings, and friendship groups, ‘lobbying’ for support of the South African government’s positions, and building like-minded networks within international forums.42 Given South Africa’s soft power attraction following its political transformation,43 Parliament has received numerous requests for establishing bilateral partnerships from countries which have identified it as ‘a strategic partner or a model of best practices in relation to setting the benchmarks against parliamentary rules of procedure, parliamentary committee systems and administrative procedures’.44 Indeed, the soft power potential of the South African Parliament’s bilateral diplomacy has been pointed out by Beetham, when he noted the role of South African MPs in ‘[sharing] their experience in conflict situations and reconciliation in several countries in the Middle East region’.45 In practice, the South African Parliament has interacted with representatives from a diverse range of developed and developing states during the 3rd and 4th Parliament (2004–2014), including the former French President Nicolas 40  Parliament of South Africa, International Relations Strategy, p. 11. 41  Ibid, pp. 10–11. 42  Parliament of South Africa, International Relations Strategy, p. 10. 43  Masters, ‘South Africa’s Emerging Parliamentary Diplomacy and Soft Power’, pp. 74–92. 44  Parliament of South Africa, Annual Report of Parliamentary International Relations 2012– 2013, available online at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17047/ (last accessed 04 April 2016). 45  David Beetham. Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to Good Practice. (Switzerland: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2006), p. 175. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

354

Masters and Nganje

Sarkozy and representatives from Qatar, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Mauritania, China’s National People’s Congress, Kenya, Botswana, Slovakia, Argentina, Syria, Indonesia, Russia, Japan, Iran, India, South Korea, Mozambique, Lesotho, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.46 While the number and diversity of states engaging with the South African Parliament through exchange visits, study tours, staff exchanges and courtesy calls is significant, these engagements remain largely at the level of parliamentary cooperation rather than supporting parliamentary diplomacy in pursuit of priorities such as the ‘African Agenda’. For example, although Parliament has a formal bilateral agreement with the Chinese Congress, there is little to suggest that this has been used to facilitate further discussion on issues such as human rights or democracy, or to address the low level of engagement between China and other legislatures across Africa.47 Formal engagement with the South African Parliament was initially dominated by relations with developed countries. For example, as part of the EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) focused on economic cooperation, which entered into force in 2004, support was provided for inter-parliamentary meetings aimed at exchanging information but also in developing a collective position between the two legislatures on ‘regional integration, nuclear energy, human rights, peace, international trade agreements, economic, political and social developments’.48 This follows the European Commission’s financial and diplomatic support for the NA and all nine provincial legislatures, provided since 1996 as part of the Parliamentary Support Programme, which was later renamed the Legislature Support Programme.49 This commitment was renewed for the period 2009–2013 with the aim of strengthening ‘parliamentary democracy through advancing participatory democracy as envisioned in the Constitution of South Africa’.50 Although this example is an EU initiative, it does demonstrate the importance that the EU attributes to the South African Parliament. Koos Richelle, 46  Parliament of South Africa, ‘Some of the International Visitors Hosted by Parliament’, InSession. July 2008, p. 23; Abel Mputing, Elijah Moholola, Sakhile Mokoena, Rajaa Azzakani and Yoliswa Landu, ‘Legacy of the fourth Parliament’, InSession, 2014, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 30–32; Parliament of South Africa, The Annual Report 2011/12, Cape Town, p. 25. 47  Sakhile Mokoena, ‘Giant Hopes for SA Ally’. InSession, May 2011, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 11. 48  Parliament of South Africa, Annual Report of Parliamentary International Relations 2012– 2013, available online at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17047/ (last accessed 06 April 2016). 49  Abel Mputing, ‘Euro Aid Boosts Democracy’, InSession, April 2009, vol. 9, no. 4, p. 11. 50  Abel Mputing, ‘Going Global: EU Backs SA Model’. InSession, May 2010, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 12–13.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

355

Director General for European Aid Cooperation in the European Commission assesses South Africa’s legislative sector in the following way: ‘Your approach in putting the legislatures as a strong, self-standing sector next to the executive and the justice sector is commendable. [. . .] We also look forward to extending the partnership with South African legislative sector beyond South Africa, to allow other Parliaments to benefit from this sector’s experience and good practice’.51 This opens up the opportunity for considering the establishment of trilateral cooperation to allow the South African Parliament and the European Parliament to provide support and share their experiences with other legislatures in Africa. With the South African Parliament’s confidence in international relations growing, there are examples of bilateral relations that have been used to promote South African priorities. For example, Parliament made use of a reciprocal visit to Palestine (2014), and being present at the annual conference of the Sahrawi Women and Solidarity Conference in Algeria, to demonstrate South Africa’s foreign policy position of solidarity with the people of the Western Sahara52 and Palestine.53 Parliament also made use of a visit by the incumbent Speaker of the UK House of Commons, John Bercow, to review its own rules and orders, drawing on the UK Parliament’s experience in establishing a special committee for the modernisation of parliamentary processes.54 Engagement with the EU has also been used to raise awareness of the implications of the EU Raw Materials Initiative and the impact that this has had on South Africa and Africa’s extractive industry.55 There has been an increased focus on building South-South relations during the 4th Parliament. For the first time in South Africa, the joint leadership of the Presiding Officers of Parliament – Speakers of the National Assembly, Max Sisulu, and of the National Council of Provinces, Mninwa Mahlangu – formed part of an eight member multiparty delegation that visited India in July 2012. This aimed to facilitate engagement on national budgets, training and development for MPs, strengthening and enhancing the work of the two

51  Mputing, ‘Going global: EU Backs SA Model’, p 15. 52  See the chapter by Laurent Dutoit in this volume. 53  See the chapter by Yoav Shemer-Kunz in this volume. 54  ‘Sharing Views: UK Speaker Visits Parliament’, InSession, vol. 12, no. 7, August 2012, p. 24. 55  Parliament of South Africa, Annual Report of Parliamentary International Relations 2012– 2013, available online at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17047/ (last accessed 06 April 2016).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

356

Masters and Nganje

legislatures.56 There have also been exchange visits between the legislatures of Iran and South Africa. As noted by the Speaker of the NA, the experience of the Iranian legislature showed that it is possible to have a functioning parliament even in difficult circumstances.57 While these activities support formal South-South cooperation as central to South Africa’s foreign policy, beyond multilateral engagement with Southern African Development CommunityParliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) there is little evidence to demonstrate the importance of formal bilateral relations with other African legislatures and how this might be strategically used to support peacebuilding, human rights, and democracy in Africa. When it comes to the more informal ways of international involvement, Parliament’s policy guidelines state that it should ‘focus on building bilateral relations with other legislative bodies through proactively forming ‘friendship groups’, as this seems to be a flexible way of building towards formal and established relations’.58 There are numerous international parliamentary friendship groups with South Africa, demonstrating the country’s soft power. For example, the Czech Parliament’s group with South Africa has nine members, which portrays the latter as a ‘regional power’.59 Even relatively small states – such as Serbia (6 members), Bulgaria (7 members), Georgia (12 members), and Romania (19 members) – have a considerable interest in South Africa. The National Assembly of Pakistan lists no less than 114 parliamentarians as members of the friendship group with South Africa, while New Zealand has only one friendship group with an African country and that is South Africa.60 While each of these countries provides a clear list of members and focus areas of their parliament’s friendship groups, South Africa does not. This not only raises questions about the implementation of bilateral relations, but 56  Luzuko Jacobs, ‘Passage to India: Visit Strengthens Links’, InSession, vol. 12, no. 6, July 2012, p. 14. 57  ‘Global Spotlight on Iran and SA: Parliament Hosts Solidarity Visit’, In Session, February/ March 2014, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 25. 58  Parliament of South Africa, Policy Perspectives and Operational Guidelines for Parliament’s involvement and Engagement in International Relations. 59  Ondřej Horky, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa in the Czech Foreign Policy’, in M. Kořan (ed.), Czech Foreign Policy in 2007–2009: Analysis (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2010), p. 293. 60  Parliament of Pakistan, Friendship Group with South Africa, available at http://www .na.gov.pk/en/friendship_memberlist.php?comm=NDU; Parliament of New Zealand, Friendship Groups, available at: http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/about-parliament/ how-parliament-works/relationships/00HOOOCMPPMPsFriendshipGroups1/parliamen tary-friendship-groups (both last accessed 12 May 2016).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

357

also points to issues of coordination and efficacy in building relations that promote Parliament’s principles and values. The value of friendship groups is that while they may be informal, they offer a means to foster a deeper understanding between two countries, which is useful where tensions arise.61 This has been a path pursued by the Israeli legislature in their engagement with South Africa.62 Namely, a visit by an Israeli Member of the Knesset (MK), Dov Lipman, was organised in 2014 after a five-year gap in order to rebuild what had been a largely non-functional parliamentary friendship group. However, while the meetings were cordial, there was no significant impetus towards building parliament-to-parliament relations. Quite to the contrary, a South African MP from the ANC took particular offence at Lipman’s use of the term ‘terrorist group’ in reference to Hamas.63 What is evident is that while there are a number of friendship groups with South Africa in countries from the West (including Japan), there is still only limited engagement with legislatures in Africa. Therefore, beyond indications that friendship groups should be established with Mozambique64 and the mooted engagement in 2010 with the Angolan Parliament,65 there is considerable room for this form of informal relations to develop. Following South Africa’s transition, Parliament received 14 requests for establishing formal bilateral links through an agreement.66 However, by 2005 61  Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy: Any Lessons for Regional Parliaments?’, in Mario Kölling, Stelios Stavridis and Natividad Fernández Sola (eds), Las relaciones internacionales de las regiones: actores sub-nacionales, para-diplomacia y gobernanza multinivel / The international relations of the regions: sub-national actors, para-diplomacy and multi-level governance (Actas de Congreso/Conference Proceedings), (Zaragoza: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Zaragoza, 2006), pp. 59–60. 62  See more on the Israeli Knesset in the chapter by Yoav Shemer-Kunz in this volume. 63  Raphael Ahren, ‘An MK Visits South African Parliament for First Time in 5 Years’. Times of Israel. 21 September 2014, available online at http://www.timesofisrael.com/an-mk-visits -south-african-parliament-for-first-time-in-5-years/ (last accessed 15 March 2016). 64  Parliament of South Africa, Annual Report of Parliamentary International Relations 2012– 2013, available online at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17047/ (last accessed 06 April 2016). 65   ‘Angola, South Africa Eye Creation of Parliamentary Friendship Group’. Luanda. Agência Angola Press, 2007, available online at http://www.portalangop.co.ao/angola/ en_us/­noticias/politica/2007/9/40/Angola-South-Africa-Eye-Creation-Parliamentary -Friendship-Group,55a6dffe-d037–4f97-aabe-5afa54e1a436.html (last accessed 15 March 2016). 66  K. Ahmed, Towards a Structured Parliamentary Diplomacy Model. Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2005, available online at https://pmg.org.za/docs/2005/050204ahmed .ppt (last accessed 15 March 2016).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

358

Masters and Nganje

only one such document was signed: the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the National People’s Congress of China.67 Since then, MOUs were signed with Mozambique and Vietnam. Uganda too has proposed the conclusion of an MOU, which has yet to be finalised through further discussion within the South African Parliament.68 Finally, in 2014 an MOU was signed between the Russian and South African legislatures, alongside discussions for the establishment of a BRICS parliamentary forum.69 Parliament’s bilateral relations have, however, provided useful lessons. In the case of the multiparty visit to India in July 2012, concerns were raised about the lack of follow up and implementation, on the one hand, of twinning arrangements between provinces, cities and even individuals; and on the other, of offers of training and development. It was concluded that there was a need for auditing inter-parliamentary agreements as part of Parliament’s oversight function.70 Bilateral exchanges have also seen Parliament take a more active position on particular issues. For instance, the parliamentary visit to Palestine and the hosting of a high-level Palestinian delegation allowed South African MPs an opportunity to relay their experiences of engagement in international relations.71 As a result of inter-parliamentary discussions with Palestinian parliamentarians, South African MPs subsequently raised their dissatisfaction with the situation in Palestine with the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation during the budget vote, where the Chairperson of the NA’s Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, Siphosezwe Masango, argued that the South African government should use international platforms to address the ongoing conflict and loss of life in Palestine.72 A former Speaker of the NA, Max Sisulu, argued that it ‘is especially important for Parliament to be involved in the strategic relationships our country has with international partners’, noting that this is an area ‘that is no longer the

67  See: International Participation, available online at http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/ content.php?Category_ID=22 (last accessed 11 May 2016). 68   A NC Parliamentary Caucus. Debate on Budget Vote: Parliament by Ms Fatima Hajaig (ANC MP – House Chairperson International Relations) available online at http://www.anc.org .za/caucus/show.php?ID=2676accessed (last accessed 17 March 2016). 69  Government of South Africa, ‘Parliament Signs Historic Bilateral Agreement with Russian Counterparts’. 2 December 2014, available online at http://www.gov.za/parliament -historic-bilateral-agreement-russian-counterparts (last accessed 15 March 2016). 70  Jacobs, ‘Passage to India: Visit Strengthens Links’, p. 15. 71  Sibongile Maputi, ‘End This Violation of Human Rights, Say MPs’, InSession, August 2014, vol. 14, no. 7, August 2014, p. 24–25. 72  Maputi, ‘End This Violation of Human Rights, Say MPs’, p. 24.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

359

preserve of the Executive’.73 However, in practice there have been a number of challenges, such as suboptimal coordination between the different sections of Parliament that deal with international relations, including the PGIR, the NA’s Portfolio Committee on International Relations, and other committees with an international focus. It has also been pointed out that there is a need to develop policies on relations with strategic partners and friendship groups, including the drawing up of guidelines on how to establish and participate in these groups.74 Multilateral parliamentary diplomacy and the ‘African Agenda’ Consistent with Pretoria’s foreign policy principles and beliefs, multilateralism has been a major feature of parliamentary diplomacy in South Africa. The South African Parliament currently holds membership of various regional and global inter-parliamentary forums, including the aforesaid SADC-PF and the PAP,75 as well as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU); the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA); the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific-European Union Joint Parliamentary Assembly (ACP-EU JPA);76 the India, Brazil, South Africa Parliamentary Forum (IBSA-PF); and the Brazil, Russia, India, China77 and South Africa Parliamentary Forum (BRICS-PF). It also frequently participates in international conferences. These multilateral engagements are informed by three broad objectives that are related to the mandate of Parliament as a people-centred institution: to uphold the universal values and principles of democracy, promote respect for human rights and international law, and support the attainment of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives.78 Similar to its bilateral engagements, the multilateral diplomacy of South Africa’s Parliament also rhetorically prioritises the promotion of the ‘African Agenda’, defined in terms of championing peace, socio-economic development, and democratic governance on the continent, while enhancing Africa’s voice and promoting the continent’s interests in global processes. Against this

73  Jacobs, ‘Passage to India: Visit Strengthens Links’, p. 15. 74   A NC Parliamentary Caucus. Debate on Budget Vote: Parliament by Ms Fatima Hajaig (ANC MP – House Chairperson International Relations) available online at http://www.anc.org .za/caucus/show.php?ID=2676 (last accessed 17 March 2016). 75  See the chapter by Konstantinos Magliveras and Asteris Huliaras in this volume. 76  See the chapter by Sarah Delputte, Cristina Fasone, and Fabio Longo in this volume. 77  See the chapter by Liwan Wang in this volume. 78  Baleka Mbete, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy: Sustainable Development beyond 2015’, Daily Maverick, 30 March 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

360

Masters and Nganje

backdrop, Parliament’s relations with the SADC-PF and the PAP occupy a central place in the Parliament’s multilateral diplomacy. The SADC-PF was established in 1997 by the SADC Summit of heads of state and government as a regional inter-parliamentary body. The Forum is composed of parliamentarians from the national parliaments of SADC member states, and maintains an autonomous status vis-à-vis the rest of the institutional structure of SADC. Currently, the SADC-PF has only deliberative and consultative powers, and serves as a mechanism for facilitating parliamentary and popular participation in the regional integration and cooperation processes of southern Africa. However, it is envisaged that the Forum will evolve into a fully functional and influential SADC Parliament.79 For its part, the PanAfrican Parliament (PAP) was launched in 2004 as one of the institutions of the African Union (AU), with a mandate to strengthen and bring greater legitimacy to intra-African cooperation, solidarity, and integration. Although the 1991 Abuja Treaty designates the PAP as one of the key institutions of the envisaged African Economic Community, the continental parliament currently functions only as an advisory and consultative body of the AU. However, Article 2(3) of the 2001 PAP Protocol makes provision for the institution to evolve into a legislative body of the AU, with its members directly elected by universal suffrage as is the case with the European Parliament80 and the Mercosur Parliament.81 South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy in the the SADC-PF and the PAP over the past two decades was aimed at their speedy transformation from merely advisory and consultative forums to full-fledged legislative parliaments. The strategy deployed to achieve this goal has been a combination of advocacy and capacity building of these institutions with a view to demonstrating their potential for making a meaningful contribution to the development and integration agenda of the continent. In this regard, the South African Parliament has been engaged in the programmes of both the SADC-PF and the PAP, while also striving to increase their effectiveness. The Parliament has supported and participated in the election observation missions of the SADC-PF, in line with its declared commitment to the promotion of democratic governance in Africa. The efforts of the SADC-PF in promoting democratic principles in southern Africa have been pioneering: in 2001 the organisation developed the Norms 79  See Takawira Musavengana, ‘The Proposed SADC Parliament: Old Wine in New Bottles or an Ideal Whose Time Has Come?’, Institute for Security Studies Monograph 181, July 2011, p.32. 80  Musavengana, ‘The Proposed SADC Parliament’, p. 8. 81  See the chapter by Karina Pasquariello Mariano, Regiane Nitsch Bressan and Bruno Theodoro Luciano in this volume.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

361

and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, which was the first instrument for democratic elections developed in Africa.82 The South African Parliament has also deployed its own election observation missions in the region, as was the case during Zimbabwe’s 2002 elections and the DRC’s 2006 transitional elections. Interestingly, the decision by the South African Parliament’s observer mission to endorse the Zimbabwean elections83 did not only contradict the conclusion reached by the observer mission of the SADC-PF, but it was also not shared by representatives of the opposition parties that participated in the South African Parliament’s mission. This experience raised questions about Parliament’s commitment to the promotion of democratic values in Africa.84 It also highlighted the limits of multilateral parliamentary diplomacy as a mechanism for promoting democratic norms in a region where the executive is excessively dominant and respect for national sovereignty is the single most important political value. Following its criticism of the 2002 electoral process in Zimbabwe, the SADC-PF was not invited to observe the country’s 2005 and 2008 elections in an independent capacity. Instead, until 2013, the Zimbabwean government invited the SADC-PF to carry out its observation activities only under the leadership of the overall SADC observer mission. While the SADC-PF rejected this offer, Zimbabwe’s position was endorsed by the South African government, which argued that the Forum did not have the same entitlement as the sovereign national parliaments of SADC member states, which were still independently invited by the Zimbabwean government to observe elections in that country.85 This example highlights the fact that inter-parliamentary organisations in Africa have very limited political space to influence the processes of regional or continental integration. Similar instances of national sovereignty trumping regional parliamentary diplomacy can be observed with regard to the support of the South African 82  Abel Mputing, ‘Promoting Democracy in Africa: SADC-PF Election Observation and Monitoring Workshop’, InSession, vol. 15, no. 7 (2015), pp. 30–31. 83  Since 2000, presidential and parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe have been marked by controversy. The outcomes of these elections have generally been endorsed by the observer missions of African governments and intergovernmental organisations such as South Africa, the AU, and SADC, while being rejected by Western election observation missions. See, for example, S. Badza, ‘Zimbabwe’s 2008 Harmonized Elections – Regional and International Reaction’ in E.V. Masunungure (ed.), Defying the Wind of Change: Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections (Harare: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009). 84   See Gillian Kettaneh, ‘The 2002 Zimbabwe Presidential Election: Analysing the Observations’, SAIIA Report No. 28 (2002), pp.16–17. 85  Takawira Musavengana, ‘The Proposed SADC Parliament’, p. 51.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

362

Masters and Nganje

Parliament to other programmes of the SADC-PF, including those seeking to promote gender equality, the empowerment of women, regional integration and socio-economic development. The SADC-PF has been credited with playing a critical role in advocating gender equality and women empowerment in the region, including influencing SADC to raise the bar for women in political decision-making positions from 30% to 50%, and adopting a gender protocol in 2008. The Forum’s gender programme has also been quite active in creating awareness about issues such as gender budgeting and mainstreaming, while also conducting training for regional parliamentarians in gender advocacy and analysis skills. Despite its limited role and powers, the SADC-PF has also sought to influence the direction and pace of regional integration and development by strengthening the capacity of parliamentarians to engage in the SADC processes through their national parliaments.86 The South African Parliament has supported these initiatives, among other interventions, by seconding a parliamentary gender programme officer to the SADC-PF for a period of two years to boost the Forum’s capacity to formulate and implement its gender equality and women empowerment programmes. The South African Parliament also hosted the 37th plenary assembly of the SADC-PF in July 2015 under the theme Industrialisation and Regional Integration: The Role of Parliaments, through which it sought to put the spotlight on the important role that regional legislatures should play in the implementation of the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap.87 Ironically, South Africa is yet to sign the SADC Trade Protocol, which is crucial to efforts towards greater industrialisation and economic development in the region. It has also played a leading role in thwarting a regional labour migration governance system that SADC has tried to institute since the mid-1990s, instead resorting to bilateral migration arrangements with its regional counterparts.88 The engagement of the South African Parliament with the PAP also reflects a strong rhetorical commitment to the ideal of Pan-Africanism, combined with support for the PAP’s programmes and institutional capacity, albeit with 86  Barney Karuuombe, ‘The Role of Parliament in Regional Integration – Missing Link’, Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 2008, pp. 15–16. 87  Gengezi Mgidlana, ‘SADC-PF Regional Parliament Roadmap’, InSession, vol. 15, no. 5 (June 2015), p. 9. 88  See Lorenzo Fioramonti, ‘Is It Time to Take Free Movement of People in Southern Africa Seriously?’, African Development Bank Group, 7 June 2013; Owen Gagare and Everson Mushava, ‘Mugabe Snipes at Zuma over SADC Trade Protocol’, Mail and Guardian, 18 August 2014.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

363

­ inimal impact on efforts towards socio-economic development and regional m integration in Africa, as well as on efforts to transform the PAP into a fullfledged continental parliament. Parliament has participated in the PAP’s factfinding missions intended to contribute to the resolution of conflicts in Africa. For example, it took part in the PAP’s fact-finding mission to Sudan’s Darfur region in 2004, following which the PAP called on the AU to assume a proactive role in resolving the Darfur conflict and urged it to extend the mandate of peacekeepers to protect civilians.89 However, the extent to which such PAP recommendations have been heeded by the AU remains unclear. South Africa has arguably exerted most influence in strengthening the institutional capacity of the PAP, because the South African Parliament was instrumental in drafting the PAP’s code of conduct and its guidelines for oversight and accountability.90 In addition to placing some of its staff at the disposal of the PAP, Parliament has also actively supported the PAP’s initiatives aimed at enabling African parliamentarians to effectively execute their electoral mandates in their respective countries. In this regard, the NA and the PAP collaborated in hosting the first plenary of the African Parliamentary Knowledge Network (APKN) in October 2010. Founded in Egypt in 2008, the APKN supports national parliaments by providing a platform for African parliamentarians to share information, knowledge, experiences and resources.91 The significance of South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy within the PAP should, however, be understood against the backdrop of the broader political and ideological challenges to the Pan-African project, which have worked against the role of the PAP as a continental legislative and oversight mechanism. Over the past 12 years of its existence, the PAP has generally remained subordinate to the executive structures of the AU. Even its election observation activities are currently undertaken under the leadership of the AU Commission. Furthermore, although the AU Commission recently started tabling its annual budget before the PAP, parliamentarians only get to debate the budget after it has been adopted by the AU Assembly.92 The subordinate status of the PAP 89  South African Parliament, ‘SA Plays Key Role in the Pan-African Parliament’, InSession (July 2005), p. 6. 90  South African Parliament, ‘SA Plays Key Role’. 91  Max Sisulu and Mninwa Mahlangu, ‘Binary Plenary Pulls African Parliaments’, InSession, vol. 10. No. 8 (September 2010), p. 6. 92  Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, ‘PAP Rejects Motion on Pulling out of Election Observer Missions’, available online at www.parliament.go.ug. (last accessed 7 April 2016). See also Elijah Moholola, ‘Third Ordinary Session of Pan-African Parliament’, InSession, vol. 13, no. 10 (November/December 2014), pp. 28–29.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

364

Masters and Nganje

vis-à-vis the other AU organs reflects a general reluctance of African leaders to cede part of their sovereignty in order to create a supranational organization. Thus, although the protocol establishing the PAP was revised in 2014 to grant it legislative powers – and countries such as South Africa have been lobbying African governments to ratify the amended protocol – it is unimaginable that the PAP will assume a more proactive role in promoting the ‘African Agenda’ any time soon. Even if the revised protocol were to come into force today, the PAP would still have to overcome the impact of a weak culture of parliamentary democracy in many African states. Presently, the legitimacy and effectiveness of the PAP, as an institution that is supposed to give voice to the African people in continental governance, is compromised by the fact that many of the national parliaments that are represented within it are accustomed to deferring to the authority of their respective executives – while in the case of Swaziland and Eritrea, parliamentarians are not even democratically elected.93 The seminal judgment of South Africa’s Constitutional Court rendered in March 2016, which castigated the country’s NA for abdicating its responsibility to hold the executive to account, brings into sharp focus the weakness of national parliaments in Africa, and the limitation that this imposes for parliamentary diplomacy as a mechanism for deepening and democratizing the African integration ­project.94 In fact, it has been observed that some parliamentarians bring to the PAP the same perfunctory attitude that has contributed to reducing the role of many African parliaments to rubberstamping the decisions of the executive. For example, absenteeism from PAP sessions has been identified as one of the major challenges facing the institution as it struggles to define its role in the emerging Pan-African governance architecture.95 South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy within the PAP has not been immune from this tendency. A 2014 report by South African Parliament’s IRPD noted that ‘the South African delegation to the PAP has not been consistent in attending PAP plenaries’, arguing that ‘considering South Africa’s vast experience in democracy, good governance and the rule of law, the abovementioned inconsistency and sometimes 93  Musavengana, ‘The Proposed SADC Parliament’, p. 43. 94  See: Constitutional Court of South Africa, Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (The Applications were heard jointly and a single judgement was handed down); Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016] ZACC 11. 95  Prince Mashele, ‘The Pan African Parliament: Utility or Futility?’, African Security Review, vol. 14, no. 2 (2005), p.108. See also: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Annual Report of Parliamentary International Relations 2012–2013, February 2014, para. 43.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

365

non-attendance of some members of the South African delegation . . . disadvantaged the PAP in general and southern African region in particular’.96 The rhetoric and practice suggest that South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy in other forums – such as the IPU, the CPA, and the IBSA-PF – also privileges the promotion of the ‘African Agenda’ as defined by Pretoria. For example, Mninwa Mahlangu, the then chairperson of the NCOP, argued that South Africa’s hosting of the CPA annual conference in 2013 sought to ‘showcase Africa amongst the Commonwealth countries; place the “African Agenda” in a public domain and deal with issues affecting African countries’.97 Indeed, in its participation in the CPA, the South African Parliament has sought to promote the interest of the continent. It has provided leadership within the CPA-Africa Region, seeking to influence the direction of the CPA and make it relevant to the needs and aspirations of African parliamentarians. In this regard, the South African delegation to the CPA has consistently supported the transformation of the CPA from a UK-based charity organisation into an international organisation with diplomatic status, in harmony with the growing discourse calling for Africa to break from its historical paternalistic relations with the West.98 Mobilising support for Africa’s development priorities – as articulated in regional and continental blueprints such as SADC’s RISDP, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the AU’s Agenda 2063 – has also been a key feature of South Africa’s participation in global inter-parliamentary forums. For example, the incumbent Speaker of the NA, Baleka Mbete, used her address at the 132nd Assembly of the IPU, convened in March 2015 under the theme ‘The Sustainable Development Goals: Turning Words into Action’, to advocate for Africa’s right to contribute to the creation of the rules of global trade, finance, and investment. She also reminded developed countries to honour their promise of financing African development to the tune of 0.7% of their gross national income.99 Similarly, during his tenure as Speaker of the NA from 2009 to 2014, Max Sisulu used different global platforms, including the IPU 96  Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Annual Report, para. 44. 97  Abel Mputing, ‘The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association’, InSession, vol. 13, no. 6 (July/August 2013), p. 18. 98  Mputing, ‘The Commonwealth’, p. 19. See also: Elijah Moholola and Abel Mputing, ‘Pursuing Common Goals: CPA Africa Region Prospects and Problems in Focus’ InSession, vol. 12 no. 6 (July 2012), pp. 10–11. 99   South African government, Speech of Speaker Baleka Mbete, MP, on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): Turning Words into Action, 132nd Session of the InterParliamentary Union (IPU ), Hanoi, 28 March 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

366

Masters and Nganje

and the Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE), to advocate support for the African Common Position on Climate Change.100 South African parliamentarians attending sessions of the ACP-EU JPA have also sought to influence negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPas) between the EU and African countries to ensure that the EPas are sensitive to the development needs and aspirations of the African people.101 The extent to which this global parliamentary advocacy has made any substantive contributions to Africa’s socio-political and economic development remains a subject of debate. However, according to a recent internal review of the foreign relations of South Africa’s Parliament, the opportunities that come with participation in multilateral forums have not been fully utilised, not least because of institutional weaknesses in parliamentary diplomacy. The PGIR, which manages and provides strategic guidance to Parliament’s international relations, has not been functioning properly because MPs often fail to attend its meetings. As a result, reports on parliament’s participation in inter-parliamentary forums are often not discussed, and international relations activities are rarely followed up.102

Conclusion: South Africa’s Emerging Parliamentary Diplomacy

South Africa’s parliamentary diplomacy displays a disjuncture between what the aims and ambitions are on paper and what occurs in practice. There have been frequent requests for the South African Parliament to engage more actively in bilateral relations. Initially, these relations were fairly limited and maintained primarily with countries of the West. They have, however, increasingly turned to engage with other emerging economies in support of strengthening relations with the geo-political South. The challenge is that although Parliament acknowledges the potential of bilateral engagement, these relations have been primarily ad hoc, with little indication or discussion of their strategic value in promoting the ‘African Agenda’. There is also a gap in b­ ilateral 100  See, for example: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Speaking Notes by Speaker Max Sisulu MP, on the Occasion of the Globe Legislative Forum Conference on Climate Change, Cape Town, December 2011. 101   A.K. Ahmed, ‘The Role of Parliament in South Africa’s Foreign Policy Development Process – Lessons from the United States’ Congress’, South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 16, no. 3 (December 2009), pp. 305–305. 102  Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Annual Report of Parliamentary International Relations 2012–2013, February 2014, para. 138.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

18. South Africa ’ s Parliamentary Diplomacy

367

r­ elations with legislatures across Africa, where South Africa’s own parliamentary diplomacy could offer experiences and exchange knowledge and best practice. With regard to the participation of South Africa’s Parliament in inter-parliamentary forums, available evidence suggests a growing attempt to use these platforms not only to contribute to important global policy debates, but also to support Pretoria’s leadership role in southern Africa and the wider continent. However, parliamentary diplomacy in this context has been constrained by national interest calculations and a regional environment that prioritises respect for national sovereignty over any other interest. Moreover, the weak state of parliamentary democracy in many African countries, including South Africa itself, has made it difficult for multilateral parliamentary diplomacy to serve as a mechanism to promote the ‘African Agenda’. By assessing the successes and weaknesses of Parliament’s international engagements in support of the ‘African Agenda’, the analysis demonstrates a shortfall in the understanding of what the strategic value of parliamentary diplomacy is. Therefore, although Parliament has the potential to promote South Africa’s ‘African Agenda’, this has not been effectively pursued because of the limited strategic focus and little support from MPs for this approach. The question then is whether the Parliament of South Africa has gone beyond merely engaging in cooperation and moved towards developing its own parliamentary diplomacy.103 While there is evidence that there is a move towards strengthening parliamentary diplomacy, the Parliament still needs to build its own diplomatic portfolio, assessing and learning from experience, and building an institutional memory. This will support effective learning for future practice. There is also further opportunity to build an esprit de corps for parliamentarians as diplomats as they engage internationally, providing a South African voice in the increasing number of bilateral and multilateral parliamentary relations.

103  Vera Squarcialupi, cited in Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy: Any Lessons for Regional Parliaments’, p. 58.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon Stelios Stavridis This volume has offered a number of important empirical contributions to the literature on parliamentary diplomacy. The plethora of the case studies conducted confirm the existence of parliamentary diplomacy throughout the world and produce a series of implications for International Relations (IR) theory in general. There is now ample evidence of parliamentary assemblies and parliamentarians acting in international affairs as autonomous actors, prime movers, path breakers, agenda setters, and actors on their own initiative.1 For example,2 as Mónica Velasco Pufleau shows in her study, as far back as in 1995, the European Parliament (EP) Delegation’s visit to Mexico to discuss human rights violations in that country was the first that the Mexican government has ever authorized, thus allowing for later similar visits by other international organizations, for instance by the United Nations, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, or Amnesty International. Also an EP resolution on feminicide3 was the first time that a European Union (EU) document referred to this issue. Thus, this development confirms a shift away from diplomacy as only a matter of states to one that involves numerous actors, including parliamentary actors.4 This has implications for all existing theories of international relations,

1  See also essays in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015). In particular, Feliu and Serra have talked of a normative role for the EP in international affairs, see Laura Feliu and Francesc Serra ‘The European Union as a “normative power” and the normative voice of the European Parliament’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 17–34. 2  All names in brackets in this text refer to the chapters in this volume. 3  On feminicide, see: https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/feminicide_eng.pdf. 4  Brian Hocking, ‘Non-State Actors and the Transformation of Diplomacy’, in Bob Reinalda (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 225–236. See also Andrés Malamud and Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliaments and Parliamentarians as International Actors’, in Bob Reinalda (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 101–115. For a ‘classic’ in the study of diplomacy, see Adam Watson, Diplomacy – The Dialogue Between States (London: Methuen, 1982).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi Stelios 10.1163/9789004336346_021 Stavridis and Davor

Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon

369

from Realism to Liberalism and Constructivism. If no reference is made to parliamentary diplomacy, these general approaches simply fail to reflect the reality. What follows sums up those main findings: first, what are the main characteristics of parliamentary diplomacy? That is to say, what makes it different from traditional state diplomacy? Then, what are its main functions? The chapter continues with a number of other general findings and proposes a number of avenues for further research, before it offers a general conclusion.

The Characteristics of Parliamentary Diplomacy

This volume identifies the main characteristics of parliamentary diplomacy as being: flexibility; informality; multiple levels (from the local to the global) and multiple actors (parliamentarians engage not only with their counterparts but also with other individuals and entities in world affairs); and, whether parliamentary diplomacy is complementary or alternative to traditional state diplomacy. Starting with the multiplicity of levels and actors, it is often with non-parliamentary bodies and individuals that parliamentary diplomacy is most visible, especially in countries with less open societies – where the ‘national’ media tend to overplay the visits by foreign parliamentarians in an effort to ‘legitimize’ their own country’s illegitimate regime. Thus the ‘diplomacy’ dimension of parliamentary diplomacy dominates in those cases, where as the ‘parliamentary’ one is more visible when it occurs between two democratic states or with/in a ‘club of democracies’: for instance, when members of the European Parliament/EP (MEPs) or its President visit other democratic states like India or Australia, or meet with their EU counterparts (Luigi Gianniti and Nicola Lupo). Other examples would include US Vice-President Joe Biden’s visit to the EP over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations (Sarah Delputte, Cristina Fasone and Fabio Longo);5 the extensive lists of foreign representatives visiting the South African Parliament between 2004 and 2014 (Lesley Masters and Fritz Nganje); or, Mexico’s foreign minister contributing to an EP hearing in 1998 (Mónica Velasco Pufleau). 5  See also Davor Jančić, ‘The Role of the European Parliament and the US Congress in Shaping Transatlantic Relations: TTIP, NSA Surveillance and CIA Renditions’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 54, no. 4 (2016), pp. 896–912. See also Marie-Cécile Cadhilac, ‘Négociations du TTIP: le mécanisme de règlement des différends investisseurs-États soulève un ‘vent de panique’ au Parlement européen’, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, no. 3 (2015), pp. 613–615.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

370

Stavridis

As Andrea Cofelice points out in the case of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM) during its numerous visits to various Arab Spring countries, especially in Syria, its parliamentarians also engaged with members of the various regimes in place, and not only with so-called ‘elected’ members of those parliaments. This observation about parliamentary diplomacy not being solely directed at parliamentarians was put forward by practitioners and academics alike in the past6 and further reinforced by more recent work by Jürgen Rüland and Astrid Carrapatoso in the case of the EP’s relations with Asian countries, and by Lorinc Redei in the case of its role in Kosovo7. There is now plenty of compelling evidence to that effect. On flexibility, as argued by two Dutch practitioners in what is probably the most cited article on parliamentary diplomacy, parliamentarians ‘are representatives of a people, which perhaps gives them more political weight than NGOs, but at the same time their actions do not necessarily commit a government, which can make it easier for them to operate in particularly sensitive situations’.8 This is a particularly important dimension of parliamentary diplomacy. The book offers numerous examples of such a behaviour, for instance when Kosovo was included in the Parliamentary Assembly of the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP PA) in spite of objections by Serbia, but also as a sign of trying to facilitate an eventual solution to that problem.9 Another example would be the push for establishing institutionalized relations between blocs of countries even before their respective governments would

6  Vera Squarcialupi, Parliamentary diplomacy: the role of international assemblies, WEU Parliamentary Assembly Report Document A/1685, 6 June 2000; Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’: some preliminary findings, Jean Monnet Working Paper in Comparative & International Politics No. 48, Political Studies Department, University of Catania, 2002; Gabriel Eloriagga, La diplomacia parlamentaria (Madrid: Imagine Ediciones, 2004). Frans Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 1, 2007, pp. 93–99. 7  Jürgen Rüland and Astrid Carrapatoso, ‘Democratizing inter-regionalism?: the EU Parliament and its Asia Relations’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 197–219; Lorinc Redei, ‘The European Parliament as a Diplomatic Precedent Setter: The Case of Parliamentary Relations with Kosovo’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 272–285. 8  Frans Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 1 (2007), p. 96. 9  The so-called ‘Kosovo*’ solution, see de Vreeze in this volume.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon

371

consider such a possibility: this is clear between the EU and Latin America,10 but also among Arctic states.11 This flexibility sometimes leads to . . . inflexibility, as it can also allow for some occasionally strange topic linkages during parliamentary debates. For instance, during the 2014 Athens Plenary of the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) such a case occurred as a result of rightwing Baltic and East European MEPs criticizing Russia over Ukraine and the response that followed from left-wing Latin American parliamentarians who ‘in return’ condemned Western interference in Venezuela’s domestic politics. This not only prevented the adoption of a joint EuroLat declaration, but it also blocked the simple reproduction in writing of the two opposing stances.12 Another way to look at the question of flexibility is to argue that parliamentary diplomacy explores alternatives to traditional diplomacy. Not only because it may do so as often those parliamentarians engaged in it may or may not be in agreement with their own government’s policies (personal or ideological differences), but also because as a senior adviser to the President of the French Sénat put it: ‘we do things that the Executive could not do, otherwise what would be the whole point of our international activities?’.13 For instance, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean ‘has a flexible structure: alongside the three Standing Committees, in fact, PAM, when appropriate, establishes Ad Hoc Committees or Special Working Groups in order to tackle particular topics (such as the Middle East, Economy, Trade, Terrorism, Climate Change, Integrated resources management, Energy, Gender Equality), allowing its own delegates to tackle the most critical topics in a more detailed way.’14 On informality, numerous chapters in this volume demonstrate the contribution of informal means of parliamentary diplomacy, which is not the same as flexibility, although it is linked to it. Often, too much emphasis is given to 10  See Pasquariello Mariano, Nitsch Bressan and Theodoro Luciano “Regional Integration and Parliamentary Diplomacy: Experiences of the MERCOSUR, Andean and Latin American Parliaments” in this volume. 11  As EP Secretariat senior official Fernando Garcés de los Fayos Tournán said in his lecture (in Spanish) on ‘The EU’s Northern Dimension Policy’ in Zaragoza on 6 May 2015. 12  Author’s participation in the event as an academic observer. See also www.infotalam .com, Carlos Malamud, 7 June 2015, who reports a similar situation a year later during the 2015 Plenary in Brussels. 13  Informal interview with the author, Paris (16 February 2016). All translations are author’s. 14  Contribution by Ambassador Sergio Piazzi, Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM) on the occasion of the conference: South East European Cooperation Process Parliamentary Assembly – Regional Synergies, Strategic Cooperation and Parliamentary Diplomacy (Sofia, Bulgaria, 6 November 2015).

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

372

Stavridis

the lack of formal arrangements as evidence of a lack of impact. But, as this book shows, informal means count at least as much, if not more, than formal, ­institutionalized mechanisms or instruments on many an occasion.15 This is not to say that the institutionalization of practice does not matter, especially if one takes a long-term perspective. But it equally means that one should not exclusively focus on them, be it in Europe or elsewhere in the world. Contributions from other theoretical approaches than parliamentary diplomacy, such as globalization or new regionalism, also show that informality has been neglected as a significant dimension in world politics in general.16 Various chapters also address the question of whether parliamentary diplomacy should complement or be independent from traditional state diplomacy. For instance, in 2015 MP Elisabeth Guigou, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Assemblée nationale, argued that ‘Parliament could play a positive role in the definition of French foreign policy. Yet, it would not be desirable for it to turn into a veto player, nor for that matter to develop its own parallel diplomacy’.17 In this respect, Jeffrey Robertson shows in his chapter on Australia that the diplomatic activity of its Parliament continues to follow rather closely that of its Government, at least in his case study of relations with South Korea. Similarly, but within a different context, the view that parliamentary diplomacy reflects that of the official position of the state has led to the exclusion of Russia from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) following the recent violent developments, including military conflict, in Ukraine (Andrea Gawrich). However, Gawrich also demonstrates in her chapter that this was not the only strategy available, as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE-PA) reasoned differently in response to the same problem. As she explains, the two different strategies confirm that, as with traditional diplomacy, in the case of parliamentary diplomacy, there are many means for influencing the behaviour of a third party. This comparative study of how the PACE and the OSCE-PA have behaved regarding the Ukraine crisis offers insight for further comparisons with the way other IPIs have reacted. For instance, it 15  See also Laurent Dutoit, ‘L’influence au sein du Parlement européen: les intergroupes’, Politique Européenne, no. 9 (2003), pp. 123–142. 16  For New Regionalism, see Frederik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003); Bjorn Hettne, ‘Globalism, Regionalism and Interregionalism’, in A. McGrew A. & N.K. Poku (eds.), Globalization, Development and Human Security Polity Press (2007), pp. 25–46. On informal politics, see Thomas Christiansen and Christine Neuhold, ‘Informal Politics in the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 51, no. 6 (2013), pp. 1196–1206. 17  Taken from a document prepared for a lecture by MP Guigou to the École Nationale d’Administration. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon

373

would be insightful to study how the NATO PA (the Parliamentary Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty) has reacted to it, but also the EP, let alone national parliaments: in the first case in order to assess the role of the US Congress, and in the last two in order to identify if there are any discrepancies or if there is clear socialization (Europeanization) within the EP. Thus, this volume reflects wider IR concerns about how to deal with less democratic states in general and with military interventions in third countries in particular. Whether to use sanctions or to continue with ‘constructive’ engagement is a constant dilemma in international affairs. Parliamentary diplomacy faces them too. This book also shows how there are some peculiarities due to the political systems involved in the analysis of their parliamentary diplomacy that make them quite unique and worthy of attention even if a priori there should be no specific difference to be expected between official diplomacy and parliamentary diplomacy. This is the case with China (Liwan Wang) and even South and Southeast Asia (Xavier Nuttin), where earlier literature findings are confirmed: a lack of democratic culture hinders the development of parliamentary input not only in domestic but also in world politics.18 This phenomenon is of course not limited to Asia.19 Yet, even where Liwan Wang argues that the parliamentary diplomacy of China’s National People’s Congress is ‘part of the overall Chinese diplomacy’, it is still possible to qualify this view by adding that what some authors regard as the upper house of the Chinese legislature (the People’s Political Consultative Conference/CPPCC) does sometimes diverge from the Chinese government’s position, although the CPPCC only possesses a consultative role. In addition, as Xavier Nuttin shows, there is a lack of parliamentary culture in Asia. This means in practice that, often, MEPs and other parliamentarians do not have ‘equal’ partners to engage with. Indeed, it is the lack of a parliamentary tradition among South and South-East Asian states that hinders the development of parliamentary diplomacy in this region. It is therefore necessary to further develop the complementary link that exists between 18  See for instance Jürgen Rüland, ‘The Limits of Democratizing Interest Representation: ASEAN’s Regional Corporatism and Normative Challenges’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 20, no. 1, 2012, pp. 237–261; Jürgen Rüland and Astrid Carrapatoso, ‘Democratizing inter-regionalism?: the EU Parliament and its Asia Relations’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 197–219. 19  On the Southern shores of the Mediterranean see Stelios Stavridis, ‘The Parliamentary Forum of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: an assessment’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 7, no. 2 (2002), pp. 30–53. Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

374

Stavridis

democratic tradition and parliamentary diplomacy in that region of the world, both for the sake of democratization and that of parliamentary diplomacy. As examples from Latin America (Karina Pasquariello Mariano, Regiane Nitsch Bressan, and Bruno Theodoro Luciano) explain, the preponderant intergovernmental institutionalism that exists due to presidential forms of government in the countries involved in regional integration has reduced the overall interest and efficiency of parliamentary assemblies in that region and its sub-regions (e.g. the Andean or the South American ones). This limits the impact of parliamentary diplomacy on the democratization of the countries involved and of other democratic promotion efforts by extra-regional actors such as the EU, including the EP. However, the authors differentiate between various levels of institutionalization of the regional integration parliaments (e.g. the Andean Parliament, the Mercosur Parliament, and the Latin American Parliament) and agree with the existing literature on IPIs (International Parliamentary Institutions) that argues that IPos (International Parliamentary Organizations) seem to have more impact than IPIs (International Parliamentary Associations).20 However, it has also been claimed that a higher degree of independence from an international organization can also give the IPI in question more authority in the world, because there is no organizational link to governments as is the case with PAM.21 Several chapters also show the complexity of the parliamentary structures that exist worldwide – be it at a regional, inter-regional or transregional level – which Davor Jančić has called this the ‘emergence of multilayered international parliamentarism’.22 This is clearly so in the Mediterranean or in Latin America, with a proliferation of IPIs, which raises the question of the complementarity or competitiveness of these institutions within their respective ‘regions’. This question relates not only to their contribution to their ‘parent’ international organization (in case there is one), but also the latter’s own effectiveness.

20  On IPIs, see Olivier Costa, Clarissa Dri and Stelios Stavridis (eds), Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). See also Introduction in this volume. 21  Contribution by Sergio Piazzi. 22  Davor Jančić, ‘Globalizing Representative Democracy: The Emergence of Multilayered International Parliamentarism’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (2015), pp. 197–242.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon



375

The Functions of Parliamentary Diplomacy

This volume illustrates several, often overlapping, functions of parliamentary diplomacy, such as: parliamentary control of foreign policy; legitimization role in global and (inter-)regional processes; international moral tribunes; contribution to international conflict resolution; novel channels for facing new international challenges; and, link with democracy promotion worldwide. First, the link between parliamentary diplomacy and the traditional role of parliaments in the political accountability for foreign and security policies is characterised by what Lorinc Redei has called the ‘[t]he mutual reinforcement of parliamentary oversight and parliamentary diplomacy’.23 The more extended the control, the more efficient the parliamentary diplomacy of any given parliament and vice versa. There are of course varying degrees of accountability and control in democratic states.24 Moreover, as Hans Born and Heiner Hänggi stressed in 2005, there is a difference also between actual authority (i.e. powers), ability (i.e. resources, including material and personnel), and attitude (intention).25 But the mere existence of diverse practical arrangements among democratic states contradicts the so-called ‘democratic incompatibility t­ hesis’. In fact, the growth of parliamentary diplomacy totally disqualifies it by showing that parliaments can and do act in foreign affairs. Furthermore, the socalled democratic incompatibility thesis argues that a democratic system is on the whole ill-suited for international relations. In this view, irrespective of its merits domestically, democratic ideals cannot and should not be extended to foreign policy.26 Therefore, this does not reflect an anti-democracy approach as such. In other words, this view argues that what is considered a virtue domestically speaking should be regarded as a ‘vice’ at the international level.27

23  Lorinc Redei, ‘The European Parliament as a diplomatic precedent setter: the case of parliamentary relations with Kosovo’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 279. 24  See Wolfgang Wagner, ‘The democratic control of military power Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no.2 (2006), pp. 200–216. 25  As quoted in Ariella Huff, Problems and Patterns in Parliamentary Scrutiny of the CFSP and CSDP, OPAL Online Paper Series 14/2013, http://www.pademia.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2014/02/14.pdf. 26  see K. Goldmann, S. Berglund, G. Sjostedt, Democracy and Foreign Policy: the case of Sweden (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), pp. 1–9; S. Smith: ‘Reasons of State’, in D. Held, C. Pollit (eds): New Forms of Democracy (London: Sage, 1986), pp. 192–217. 27  Spanier, J. & E. Uslaner: American foreign policy making and the democratic dilemmas (Holt Reinhart and Winston, New York, 4th ed., 1985), pp. 260–261.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

376

Stavridis

Richards similarly wonders whether ‘democracy may be incompatible with continuity of foreign policy’.28 As for the specific role of parliaments and in particular of the EP, referring to work by Esther Barbé in 2004, Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux list the reasons “[w]hy for many EU governments, the EP’s limited role is a good thing: –

Too much parliamentary involvement would damage the need for secrecy, speed, coherence and efficiency in foreign policy. – It would mean that the EP’s strong emphasis on human rights and democracy would interfere in their foreign policy goals. – And ministers feel primarily politically accountable to their national parliaments”.29 Parliamentary diplomacy studies analyzed in this volume empirically challenge the democratic incompatibility thesis. They subscribe to the International Democratic Theory that presents a different view to the incompatibility claim. As Beitz has argued in more general terms, ‘international moral skepticism [is] a position that one cannot consistently maintain without being pushed back into a more general skepticism about all morality’.30 The same logic applies to dividing democracy internally and externally, especially at a time of globalization. In his earlier work, Waltz also dismisses the fear of inconsistency in the foreign policy of democracies because ‘only when policy is divorced from the people’s support are abrupt reversals easily possible. Only when policy is 28  P. Richards, Parliament and Foreign Affairs (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1967), p.159. 29  Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union – 2nd edition (Basingstoke and New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), p. 8 (emphasis added). In addition, although this question falls beyond the scope of this contribution, there is no consensus as to whether national or EU-wide assemblies should be responsible for parliamentary scrutiny especially over security and defence matters; see Jan Wouters and Kolje Raube, ‘Seeking CSDP accountability through interparliamentary scrutiny’, The International Spectator, vol. 47, no. 4 (2012), pp. 149–163. Since 2012, there exists an InterParliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP that tries to reconcile both approaches, See Stelios Stavridis, The new Inter-Parliamentary Conference on the CFSP/CSDP, European Union Center Paper Vol. 14, No. 12, Miami-Florida European Union Center of Excellence, July 2014; Graham Butler, ‘The Interparliamentary Conference on the CFSP/CSDP: A new forum for the Oireachtas in Irish and EU foreign policy?’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 26 (2015), pp. 163–186. For the wider question of EU foreign policy accountability, see references to the literature in the Introduction to this Volume. 30  Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 179.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon

377

widely approved can the nation’s resources be fully deployed’.31 The same could be argued nowadays about regional, inter-regional and global arrangements, be it at the theoretical or the empirical level. Moreover, Waltz refutes the claim that consistency can only be achieved through a single centre of decision: ‘in totalitarian states rather than in democracies are found the paranoid men of power surrounded by their bizarre coteries. The closed quality of rulership is itself a disability of authoritarian rule’.32 Empirically speaking, the historical examples of Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Gaddafi or Assad confirm this. The theoretical implications of how parliamentary assemblies act in international affairs therefore represents a clear dismissal of the democratic incompatibility thesis by showing that parliamentarians do play a role in the world that is more or less consistent with other forms of diplomacy. Therefore, in terms of democracy and foreign policy, this volume’s findings on parliamentary diplomacy could also draw lessons from the so-called chain of democratic legitimization (or ‘democratic chain’) from German constitutional law literature. Namely, to ensure the legitimacy of public authority, the democratic chain has to be uninterrupted. This means that each individual government official and action must be connected according to the order of the chain eventually leading back to the citizenry as the bearer of sovereignty.33 This conceptualization is also particularly reminiscent of the so-called ‘transmission belt’ (see below). Also, the democratic dimension of foreign policy also goes back to earlier political works on the subject such as the creation of the UDC/Union for Democratic Control by MP Arthur Ponsonby in 1916 to try and add a democratic dimension to question of war and peace following the beginning of World War One.34 This dimension also concerns the question of the role of domestic politics in parliamentary diplomacy. This element still remains understudied, although there are constant references to it in the literature, including in this volume. For instance, this is well illustrated by Jeffrey Richardson when he mentions Australian MPs going on visits to South Korean cities seeking domestic votes 31  Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Principles: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 308–310. 32  Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Principles, pp. 308–310. 33  I owe this point to Anne Pintz from the University of Aarhus, thanks to our exchange at the LUISS School of Government’s 4th Summer School on Parliamentary Democracy in Europe on ‘Parliaments of Europe: foreign policy and democracy promotion’, which was held from 13–24 July 2015 in Rome. 34  Ponsonby was one of the few MPs who opposed Britain’s participation in that war, see https://www.britishonlinearchives.co.uk/group.php?pid=73006b.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

378

Stavridis

because of their extensive economic and trade links with their own constituencies. The same could be said of parliamentary debates on the countering of terrorism for instance in France, where the opposition parties often try to score ‘domestic’ points on what is supposed to be a state issue.35 Second, the function of political accountability expands also to the legitimization of (inter-)regional and global integration processes,36 a role that is further reinforced through the setting up of IPIs (for instance on Latin America, see Pasquariello Mariano et al.). The mere setting up of a new IPI is also in part an expression of parliamentary diplomacy as Franklin de Vrieze explains with the case of the SEECP PA in this volume. But the development of this IPI also represents parliamentary diplomacy in action and this diplomacy facilitates the further development of the IPI in question and also legitimizes its institutionalization. Third, this volume offers several examples of parliamentary diplomacy casting parliaments as moral tribunes (see Jiun Bang on South Korea-Japan relations, Jeffrey Robertson on Australia-South Korea relations). In greater detail, Davor Jančić stresses the EP’s global diplomacy and the promotion of EU values worldwide, whereas in the case of the Mediterranean, Andrea Cofelice highlights the importance of parliaments as moral tribunes. Mónica Velasco Pufleau does the same concerning the EP’s role in support of victims of human rights abuses in general and in particular in the case of Mexico. Thus, the ‘moral tribunes’ argument reinforces the literature on the subject that has identified conflict prevention, management and resolution, as particularly promising for studies on parliamentary diplomacy – in part because of the difficulties in carrying out these activities in the first place and also because of its more ‘flexible’ nature in principle. These findings provide empirical evidence for what has often been mentioned in the literature but without offering sufficient illustrations of it.37 35  See Stelios Stavridis, ‘The French Parliament and the conflicts in Libya and Syria’, in ‘Parliamentary diplomacy in the Mediterranean’ (Special issue edited by Stelios Stavridis & Maria Gianniou), Mediterranean Quarterly (forthcoming). 36  On legitimization and IPIs, see Dirk Peters, Rethinking the Legitimacy of Global Governance – On the Need for Sociological Research and Philosophical Foundations – With commentaries by Frank Gandinger and Daniel Gaus, Global Cooperation Research Paper No.2, Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research, Duisburg, 2013. 37  For exceptions, see Laura Feliu and Francesc Serra ‘The European Union as a “normative power” and the normative voice of the European Parliament’; Stelios Stavridis, Maria Gianniou, and Andrea Cofelice, ‘EU national Parliaments and the recognition of Palestine: “Really” breaking new ground or “just” adding further support?’, Comillas Journal of International Relations, no. 6 (2016), pp. 40–60.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon

379

Fourth, there are plenty of examples of parliamentary diplomacy as a contribution to conflict resolution: the two cases (Amani Forum and the Pan-African Parliament) presented by Konstantinos Magliveras and Asteris Huliarias on Africa, by De Vrieze on Kosovo, by Dutoit on Tibet and the Western Sahara, and by Gawrich on Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Similarly, De Vrieze, writing on South East European Cooperation, shows how regional reconciliation is also ‘parliamentary diplomacy in action’. He does so through two specific examples: one being the setting up of the SEEC Parliamentary Assembly’s Secretariat, and the other being the inclusion of Kosovo in this process in spite of not being recognized as an independent state by a number of states, including 5 EU Member States. These findings also bring closer two diverging views about the role of IPIs: one that says that these institutions are mainly interested in legitimizing processes of regional integration and the other that says that they offer alternative routes for diplomacy. In fact, there seems to be more overlap between these two approaches than might have been initially considered.38 That is to say that democracy building or conflict resolution may occur in different ways and through different means and that IPIs have a role to play in both of them.39 Both the contributions by Cofelice and by Magliveras and Huliaras present a number of examples of whether parliamentary diplomacy has been useful or not in attaining those objectives. Thus, as Cofelice shows with the case of the PAM in the Mediterranean, initial efforts focused on the Middle Eastern conflict but the Arab Spring has allowed for a more diversified effort at conflict resolution, which includes ‘technical assistance for constitutional and reforms’ in Tunisia, or ‘mobilising humanitarian aid and supporting the various UN missions’ in Libya. Finally, Cofelice reports that in 2014 PAM launched an initiative to establish a pool of MPs who would be ready to travel at short notice to critical areas in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians, the respect of human rights, and any negotiation process. Thus, as PAM Secretary-General Piazzi has argued: ‘in the framework of 38  Malamud and de Sousa distinguish between ‘integration parliaments’ and the rest (Andrés Malamud and Luís de Sousa (2007), ‘Regional Parliaments in Europe and Latin America: Between Empowerment and Irrelevance’, in Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann and Anna van der Vleuten (eds), Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration Organizations (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 85–102). For an effort in this direction, see Péter Bajtay, ‘Democratic and efficient foreign policy? Parliamentary diplomacy and oversight in the 21st century and the post-Lisbon role of the European Parliament in shaping and controlling EU foreign policy’, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2015/11. 39  See Georgios Papanagnou, Stephen Kingah and Luk Van Langenhove, ‘Democracy Building in the Regional Context: Insights from the European Parliament and Beyond’, UNU-CRIS Policy Brief no. 4, Bruges, 2014.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

380

Stavridis

two parallel cooperation projects with the UN and the Council of Europe, PAM has also created highly specialised teams of Parliamentarians in the fields of protection of civilians, promotion of human rights and facilitation of humanitarian assistance. These teams can be deployed, even at very short notice, to the field, in particularly critical situations, where the presence of our MPs is considered essential to support international operations, such as in Syria’.40 It is equally important to note that there often are combined parliamentary and non-parliamentary attempts at conflict resolution, be it by active or retired individuals as was the case for instance in Ukraine with the joint mission by former EP President Pat Cox and former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski.41 Fifth, parliamentary diplomacy also acts as another channel for facing new international challenges, such as terrorism as Cofelice explains with the PAM in the Mediterranean. In that respect, the PAM has been developing its role in collaboration with the United Nations and a number of events have been jointly organized in recent months.42 The same approach could apply to new international concepts such as R2P (responsibility to protect),43 an area specifically identified as promising for the involvement of regional and other IPIs.44 Sixth, special emphasis should be made of the link between parliamentary diplomacy and the promotion of democracy worldwide. Be it through traditional ‘technical cooperation’ about how parliamentary democracy works, exportation of ‘best practices’, ‘socialization processes’, electoral monitoring, or acting as ‘transmission belts’ with civil society actors (or help developing them where they do not exist). Various chapters offer a multitude of examples, for instance in the implementation of EU-ACP agreements among ACP countries (Delputte, Fasone and Longo in this volume), or in Turkey on the controversial question of its EU accession process (Scotti). As for the ‘transmission belt’, a term used in the literature on parliamentary diplomacy, this approach argues that parliaments 40  Contribution by Sergio Piazzi, p. 3. 41  See Pat Cox, The Ukrainian Crisis and Geopolitics – An echo from the past or the shape of things to come?, Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin 2014. 42  Contribution by Sergio Piazzi, p. 5. 43  See Stelios Stavridis and Stephen Kingah, ‘The European Parliament and Interregional Dialogue: the Case of Responsibility to Protect’, in Mario Telò, Louise Fawcett, Frederik Ponjaert (eds), Interregionalism and the European Union – A Post-Revisionist Approach to Europe’s Place in a Changing World (London: Ashgate, 2015), pp 285–304. 44  See UNSG Report (2011), UNGA, UNSC, Report of the Secretary General: The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, A/65/877-S/2011/393, 27 June 2011.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon

381

act as a necessary link between the executives and public opinions and/or civil societies. But particularly relevant for both are the connections between (and among) IPIs and national parliaments, and those between them and civil society actors or/and sub-state institutions, including parliamentary institutions (parliamentary paradiplomacy).45 Thus, there are plenty of overlapping multiactor institutions such as in the case of the international dimension of the ARLEM in the Mediterranean.46 Velasco Pufleau offers the example of an InterAmerican Court of Human Rights sentence condemning Mexico for feminicide in Ciudad Juárez as resulting partly from European pressure to that effect via various levels and through several actors, including parliamentarians and civil society actors. In that particular case it involved a German NGO and an EP political group. In another case which Pufleau also mentions in her chapter, it was again MEPs but this time in collaboration with MPs from the German Bundestag. Furthermore, there is also the link between the international exchange of best parliamentary practices and democracy promotion. This is noted by a number of chapters in this volume, but can be best summed up by the Delputte, Fasone and Longo study of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA), where MEPs from the Development Committee (DEVE) contribute to the continuity and synergy of the bilateral parliamentary relationship firstly by acting as members of the EP delegation to this JPA. Yet these same MEPs also contribute to electoral observation, and via their links with the civil society actors of third countries/regions, to the development and strengthening of a democratic culture in those countries/regions in part thanks to their institutionalized relationship with their non-EU JPA counterparts. This arrangement could be expanded to the EU’s other inter-parliamentary assemblies: the UfM PA, the EuroLat, and the EuroNest.47 45  For a detailed list of the situation in the Mediterranean, see Stelios Stavridis, Roderick Pace, Paqui Santonja, ‘The Role of Parliamentary Bodies, Sub-State Regions, and Cities in the Democratization of the Southern Mediterranean Rim’, in Stefania Panebianco, Rosa Rossi (eds.), Winds of Democratic Change in the Mediterranean? Processes, Actors and Possible Outcomes (Rubbettino Editore: Soveria Mannelli, 2012), pp. 171–199, especially pp. 177–185; Stelios Stavridis, ‘Mapping the parliamentary field in the Mediterranean: how many actors?’, in ‘Parliamentary diplomacy in the Mediterranean’ (Special issue edited by Stelios Stavridis & Maria Gianniou), Mediterranean Quarterly (forthcoming). 46  See for instance the ‘Mediterranean Citizens’ Assembly’: http:/acimedit.net. 47  On the UfM-PA predecessor, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), see Roderick Pace and Stelios Stavridis (2010), ‘The EMPA, 2004–2008: Assessing the First Years of the Parliamentary Dimension of the Barcelona Process’, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 90–113. On the UfM-PA, there is simply no literature. On the EuroLat,

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

382

Stavridis

Further Findings and Avenues for Future Research

This collection of essays also disproves a number of existing idées reçues, or other counter-intuitive assumptions, that are often made in the academic literature and in other fora – but, usually, without either questioning them or offering empirical evidence to the contrary. Thus, Zlatko Šabič on North American parliamentary diplomacy shows that many US Congress members are important international actors and not the disinterested parliamentarians they are often accused of being. He does so by showing the positive role that US Congress members have played in the development of the early designs of IPIs as frameworks for parliamentary diplomacy in general, and in the case of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in particular. Šabič also illustrates how important parliamentary diplomacy can be for domestic politics: the Congress uses it, whenever possible, to increase its influence vis-à-vis the executive in Washington D.C. Also, contrary to usual expectations about socialization within inter-parliamentary bodies, the chapter by Valentina Scotti brings evidence about the lack of socialization in favour of Turkey’s EU accession and other aspirations among the MEPs who belong to the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) with Turkey. This is particularly relevant for future research as the Turkish case may be distinct from other examples as shown by the existing literature on Cyprus or on Israel and Palestine.48 This new finding by Scotti might be a pointer see Javier Javier Fernández Fernández, ‘La dimensión parlamentaria de la Asociación Estratégica Birregional UE-ALC: la Asamblea Parlamentaria Euro-Latinoamericana (EUROLAT)’, in Stelios Stavridis and Celso Cancela and Carolina Ponce de León and Georgina Guardatti (eds), Gobernanza Global Multi-Nivel y Multi-Actor – Ejemplos de Europa, el Mediterráneo y América Latina (Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2011), pp. 367–383. On the EuroNest, see Hrant Kostanyan and Bruno Vandecasteele, ‘Socializing the Eastern neighbourhood – The European Parliament and the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 220–233; Irina Petrova and Kolja Raube (2016), ‘Euronest: What Drives Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation in the Eastern Partnership?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 35–56. 48  On the former, see Stelios Stavridis, La Unión Europea y el conflicto chipriota (1974–2006) (Barcelona: Icaria, 2008), pp. 119–137; Stelios Stavridis and Charalambos Tsardanidis (2009), ‘The Cyprus Problem in the European Parliament: a case of successful or superficial Europeanisation?’ European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 14, vo.1, pp. 129–156; and on the latter, see Maria Gianniou, ‘The European Parliament and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 237–251.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon

383

towards a more sophisticated reflection on the wider EP stance on Turkey’s EU integration effort. It might also provide more insight about future EU-Turkey relations as any new accession to the EU needs to obtain the consent of the EP, and therefore there is a still a long way for Turkey to convince EU actors of its EU aspirations. Both the Scotti and the Shemer-Kunz contributions to this volume should be read jointly, because they show that even within the EP there are differences according to ideological preferences without necessarily producing Europeanized stances. However, many chapters on the EP also confirm findings of the existing literature, such as the ‘geographical’ (i.e. national) origins of parliamentarians in their membership of EP committees, delegations and other ‘internal’ bodies, including in EU inter-parliamentary assemblies. There seems to be more interest among South European MEPs for the Mediterranean (Delputte, Fasone and Longo; and Scotti)49 just like there is more interest among Central and East European MEPs for the Eastern Partnership countries.50 More research is needed on this question of who joins which parliamentary body (and why they do so) in order to identify whether socialisation (in this case, Europeanisation) is actually occurring or not. Similar research should be carried out in other (sub)-regional integration processes as is the case with the South East European Cooperation Process Parliamentary Assembly (De Vrieze). The socialisation role of the parliamentarization of international politics is identified in the literature as one of its key features and as part of its wider contribution to democratization.51 As for other studies on the subject, they also point in the same direction.52 49  A similar bias can be found in the EuroLat, see Clarissa Dri, ‘The European Parliament and regional cooperation – The case of Latin America’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 161–177. 50  See also Hrant Kostanyan and Bruno Vandecasteele, ‘Socializing the Eastern neighbourhood – The European Parliament and the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 220–233. 51  For more examples, see Stelios Stavridis, ‘Conclusions: The international role and impact of the European Parliament’, in Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 295. 52  Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Who’s Coming? Attendance Patterns in the Parliamentary Assemblies of NATO and WEU’, in Ben Crum and John Erik Fossum (eds.), Practices of InterParliamentary Coordination in International Politics. The European Union and beyond (ECPR Press, 2013), pp. 195–211; Stelios Stavridis, Sophia Chani and Zacharoula Georgiou, ‘Greek parliamentary diplomacy’, paper presented to the Workshop on Security & Stability

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

384

Stavridis

All of the above shows the versatility of parliamentary diplomacy and the role it could potentially play in international politics. Many contributions to this volume confirm that a lot still needs to be done. For instance, there is still a lack of follow up and implementation of findings that come out of parliamentary visits abroad: Masters and Nganje refer to such an example after a South African parliamentary visit to India in 2012. Another interesting finding can be found in the chapter on Australia where Jeffrey Robertson points at a new initiative to organise field visits according to policy issues rather than according to geography. This would give parliamentarians a more global view of international affairs thus preparing ‘parliament to be more responsive to global, inter-regional affairs’. Yet another area for future research could be to cover all EP bodies involved in one study. In that respect, the role of the Conference of Presidents seems to need special attention, as pointed out by an EP official recently.53 It would also require more work on the diplomatic role of the EP’s parliamentary groups as well,54 something that Yoav Shemer-Kunz has begun developing in this volume. Such a specific study on the ‘institutions within the institution’ could also consider the ‘impact’ that the EP may have on civil society actors as parliaments play, as already noted, a ‘transmission belt’ role between the executive and other civil society actors. There is also another constant in this volume: the importance of the role of individual parliamentarians in developing parliamentary diplomacy (see Giannniti and Lupo; Dutoit; Gawrich; and Šabič) or in their contributions to friendship and other similar groupings within national and international parliamentary assemblies (see Wang on the role of national parliaments within the IPU or the role of friendship groups within the Chinese Congress) or within informal or semi-structured bodies (for instance the Asia-Pacific Group in the IPU, as noted by Wang; or the unofficial work of intergroups in the EP as noted by Dutoit). This volume therefore offers numerous examples of this particular role of individual parliamentarians, a function mentioned en passant in the

in the Mediterranean and the Middle East at the Institute of International Economic Relations Athens on 26–28 May 2016. 53  Peter Bajtay, ‘Shaping and controlling EU foreign policy: the parliamentary actors and tools’, Panel on Le Parlement européen, acteur international et institution parlementaire internationale (IPI): exemples et comparaisons avec d’autres IPIs, 13ème Congrès de l’Association Française de Science Politique, Aix en Provence, 22–24 June 2015. 54  See Daniel Fiott, The diplomatic role of the European Parliament’s parliamentary groups, European Policy Analysis, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, March 2015.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon

385

literature by practitioners and academics.55 Does this amount to a ‘return of the individual’ in IR, as, for instance, ‘celebrity diplomacy’ seems to indicate?56 This particular question confirms that institutions as such do not suffice, but not going as far as invalidating the famous Jean Monnet’s dictum that les gens meurent, les institutions demeurent. Individual engagement is necessary but not sufficient as parliamentary networks also need to exist, as many contributions to this volume have clearly emphasized. Yet, one should stress the importance of the personal commitment of a given parliamentarian for the success of parliamentary diplomacy.57 In this volume, particular attention was paid to two EP Presidents who have been active in international affairs: Jerzy Buzek and Martin Schulz (Gianniti and Lupo). At a recent summer school, two former EP Presidents, Pat Cox and Enrique Barón Crespo were specifically asked about the importance of the personal role of parliamentarians. They both agreed that this was clearly the case: personal interest, involvement and dedication were all vital for parliamentary diplomacy, and that parliamentary assembly Presidents had a particular role to play in it.58 Mónica Velasco Pufleau further mentions Spanish MEPs José Ignacio Salafranca and Raül Romeva in her chapter on EU-Mexico parliamentary relations as being particularly internationally active. It is worth noting that Salafranca is now the Head of the EU Delegation in Buenos Aires 55  For exceptions, see Frans Weisglas and Gonnie de Boer, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 1, 2007, pp. 93–99. See also Stelios Stavridis, ‘Conclusions’, in Stavridis and Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and Its International Relations, pp. 286–300. For previous examples in the same vein, this time on French parliamentarians and senators during the Cold War, see ‘La Diplomatie Parlementaire en France après 1945’, Parlement[s], Revue d’Histoire Politique, vol. 17, no. 1 (2012). 56  See for instance Asteris Huliaras and Nikolaos Tzifakis, ‘Celebrity Activism in International Relations: In Search of a Framework for Analysis’, Global Society, vol. 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 255–274. See also historically the role of famous intellectuals/writers who also acted as influential MPs: for instance Lord Byron’s and Greek Independence in the late 19th century (see Roderick Beaton, Byron’s War – Romantic Rebellion, Greek Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). I owe this point to Asteris Huliaras of the University of the Peloponnese, thanks to our talk during the Workshop on Security & Stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East at the Institute of International Economic Relations Athens on 26–28 May 2016. 57  The question of personal friendship developing as well is not discussed here but is mentioned by parliamentarians sometimes, see author‘s 12 February 2016 informal interview in Paris with a former (during the 1980s) Chair of the French Assemblée Nationale Foreign Affairs Committee. 58   LUISS School of Government, 4th Summer School on Parliamentary Democracy in Europe, 13–24 July 2015, Rome.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

386

Stavridis

and Romeva is now Minister of Foreign Affairs, Institutional Relations, and Transparency in the Catalan Government under President Carles Puigdemont. In addition, as Gawrich shows, the nationality of the parliamentarians involved in parliamentary diplomacy can also be significant. She mentions the example of the OSCE PA President who being Finnish meant that he had good relations with his counterpart from the Russian Duma as a result of Finland’s post-war history. Moreover, the volume has also identified a number of other promising research areas for the future. We will briefly mention two of them. One has to do with ‘mediation’, which to a large extent means coming back full circle to the initial use of parliamentary procedures (i.e. assembly-type means and instruments) in international negotiations for instance in the IPU in 1889, during the peaceful division of Sweden from Norway in 1905, or the early years of the League of Nations. Nowadays, the EP has set up a small mediation unit and although it is too early to assess its impact, it is interesting to note that it is developing this function. The second issue is that of the proliferation of parliamentary actors, especially overlapping IPIs. This may require some serious thought about rationalization. Perhaps regional parliamentary cooperation should be promoted not only between parliamentary actors but also on a sectoral basis – as is illustrated in Europe by the strong collaboration between the EP, the PACE and the OSCE PA regarding electoral monitoring (the socalled ‘Troika’ approach). Or, as Mónica Velasco Pufleau signals in this volume regarding the issuance of parliamentary resolutions condemning feminicide in Mexico, when the EP followed the footsteps of the PACE, inviting the PACE rapporteur on that subject to speak to the EP’s own delegation to the JPC. Another example she mentions is when MEPs from several political groups raise concerns about other human rights violations together with their German counterparts. Thus, collaboration between existing parliamentary bodies appears to be more productive (especially if it becomes routine for instance when facilitating cooperation through the extension of ‘best practice’) than any continuation of creating new parliamentary institutions in the future. Conclusions All chapters have illustrated with specific case studies how parliamentary diplomacy operates throughout the world. The overall conclusion is that there exists a multi-function, multi-faceted, multi-layered and multi-actor, parliamentary complex in a still emerging Global Governance system. Thus, parlia-

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Conclusions: Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Global Phenomenon

387

mentary diplomacy is here to stay and it deserves more academic attention than it has been given to date. Parliamentary diplomacy is in part a reaction to a changing world system and the increasing role of non-governmental actors in world affairs. As such, parliamentary diplomacy fundamentally challenges the classic definition of diplomacy, which focused so tightly on the international role of governments, ministries and other executive agencies. Yet, even if it still remains a highly contested concept among practitioners and theorists alike, parliamentary diplomacy, as shown repeatedly in this volume, has become a reality – alongside a number of other new types and forms of diplomacy. This volume has presented numerous examples thereof ranging: from Europe, to Africa, the Americas and Asia; from internal EP arrangements for its diplomatic role worldwide to less known IPIs such as the PAM or the SEECP PA; from issues such as democracy promotion to conflict resolution; from the role of parliamentary diplomacy in general to its link to processes of regional integration. It is therefore high time for academia to respond to the challenge that parliamentary diplomacy poses to the study and practice of International Relations, both conceptually and empirically. It is also hoped that academic work will also help parliamentarians to use parliamentary diplomacy to its full potential, something that evidence from this volume seems to indicate is not the case right now. We have come a long way from the time when parliamentary diplomacy was only used to describe conference-type diplomacy,59 that is to say a form of intergovernmental negotiations within multilateral fora that uses parliamentary procedures of public deliberation. Nowadays, parliamentary diplomacy corresponds to a new form of diplomacy and therefore it requires further systematic research because it is yet another global phenomenon to be taken into consideration in IR.

59   See Dean Rusk, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy – Debate v. Negotiation,’ World Affairs Interpreter, vol. XXVI (Summer 1955), pp. 123–138; Phillip Jessup, ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’, Recueil Des Cours, No. 89 (1956), pp. 181–320.

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Index ACP 11, 58, 60, 66–75, 99, 104, 182, 199, 208, 233, 359, 366, 380–381 ACP-EU 33, 57, 59–60, 64, 66–75, 182, 208, 233 ACP-EU JPA 33, 60, 64, 66–68, 70, 73, 75 ACP-EU partnership 59, 68–75 acquis communautaire 117, 177 ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) 39 Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) 175, 178, 185 AFET, Committee on Foreign Affairs (of the European Parliament) 33, 58, 61–62, 64,   77, 90 Afghanistan 35–36, 216, 234, 240 Africa 3, 15, 31, 34–36, 88, 108, 134, 202, 207, 259, 327–336, 339–367, 379, 387 African Agenda 343–346, 350, 352, 354, 359, 364–367 African Economic Community (AEC) 331 African Union (AU) 329, 360 AIPA (ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly) 231, 234, 236, 243–247 Alliance of Civilizations 128 Amani Forum or Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace 9, 15, 33, 327, 330,   337–342, 379 Amoruso, Francesco 199–200 Annan Plan 126 APPU (Asian-Pacific Parliamentarians’ Union) 231 Arab Spring 28, 50–51, 202, 204, 206, 209, 370, 379 ARLEM (French acronym for: EuroMediterranean Regional and Local Assembly) 10, 381 Armenia 34, 50, 124, 199 Armenian minority 124 ASEM 234, 237 ASEP 234, 237 Asia 3, 15, 31, 59, 106, 135, 157, 191, 230–243, 245–247, 261, 264, 269, 271–272, 283, 285, 291, 294, 297, 300, 373, 385, 387, 370 n. 7, 373 n. 18 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 230, 241, 261

Australia 15, 259, 290–308, 369, 372, 378, 384 Azerbaijan 34, 50, 199 Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference 9 Belarus 50, 161, 172 Berlin Wall 55, 225 bilateral diplomacy 353 bilateral parliamentary diplomacy 23, 48, 352 Borrell Fontelles, Josep 73, 197 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) 1, 344, 358 Bulgaria 90, 178–179, 184, 186–189, 190, 356, 371 n. 14 Burma, see also Myanmar 235 Buzek, Jerzy 42–43, 49–51, 385 Central and Eastern Europe 51, 226 CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) 23–25, 54, 61, 107, 232, 246 China 15, 31, 36, 52, 105–107, 109, 134–135, 219, 230, 232, 234, 242, 248–265, 267–268, 273, 284, 294–295, 300, 304, 344, 354, 358–359, 373 China, National People’s Congress (NPC) 248–268 Chinese Communist Party 250 civil society 1, 10, 70, 79, 83–84, 91–92, 95–97, 100–101, 103, 122, 136, 144, 204, 236, 316, 326, 341–342, 380–381, 384 civil society organisations 84, 95, 97, 136, 144 Cohn-Bendit, Daniel 123 Cold War 1, 134, 158, 160, 164, 172, 194, 221–222, 225, 228, 262, 272–274, 291, 329, 385 n. 56 Commission (European Commission) 27, 29, 31, 46–47, 52–53, 56, 62, 72–74, 78, 82, 92–93, 95, 101, 103, 107–110, 115–117, 121, 124, 130, 135, 177, 183, 187–188, 200, 331, 354–355 Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 9, 328, 341, 359, 365 conflict resolution 6, 9, 11, 155, 162, 198, 200–201, 205, 208, 241, 277, 336, 338, 341, 375, 379–380, 387

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

390 Congress, (United States) 3, 35, 58, 213–219, 221–225, 228–229, 294, 373, 369 n. 5, 382 COSAC (Conference of Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union) 49 Cotonou Agreement 68–72 Council of Europe 3, 28, 147, 156, 160–162, 164–166, 175, 184, 193, 208, 333, 380 crisis management 11, 195–196, 198, 201–202, 205, 208 CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) 9, 199, 208 CSCM (Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean) 196–199 CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) 23–24, 26, 37–38, 54, 61, 375 n. 25,   376, 376 n. 29 Cultural Revolution (in China) 249 Cyprus, also Republic of Cyprus 115–119, 121, 125–127, 131, 196, 205, 271, 383 Davutoğlu, Ahmet 128 De Gucht, Karel 72 democracy 2, 4, 8, 11, 15, 19, 21, 23, 28–29, 31, 39–40, 42, 50, 59–60, 63, 65–67, 69–70, 74–75, 94, 116, 119–120, 128–129, 137–138, 158, 161, 195–196, 198, 200–202, 204, 208, 225–227, 231–236, 238, 240, 243, 245–247, 309, 312, 325, 329, 334, 337, 352, 354, 356, 359, 364, 367, 375–377, 379–381, 387 democracy promotion 11, 31, 59, 75, 195–196, 200–201, 235, 247, 375, 377 n. 33, 381, 387 DEVE, Committee on Development (of the European Parliament) 33, 58–61, 66–68,   73, 75, 77, 109, 381 diplomatic power 248, 250–252, 254, 257, 265–268 Eastern Europe 50–51, 132, 174, 177, 226, 249 EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 19 EEAS (European External Action Service)  20, 25, 28, 82, 92–94, 118, 135, 151, 153, 185–186 Egypt 31, 51, 130, 196, 206, 336, 363

Index EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements)  72–74, 366 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 123 EU accession process 115, 117–118, 129, 131, 380 EU enlargement 31, 36, 81, 132 EU external action 22–23, 29, 55–58 EU external relations 20–21, 23, 30, 39–40, 43, 47, 59–60, 62–63, 74, 79–80, 103, 134–136, 147 EU foreign policy 20, 38, 43, 52, 55, 61, 105, 132, 236, 376, 379 n. 38, 384 n. 54 EuroLat (Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly) 34, 64, 147, 233, 371, 382 n. 47 Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (see also ARLEM) 9 European Council 20–21, 39, 42–47, 51, 53, 68, 76, 82, 108, 117, 119, 187 European elections 42, 47, 56 European Parliament delegations 35–36, 59–60, 64, 66, 75, 106, 108, 234 European Parliament (EP) 3, 77, 134, 311, 368 European Parliament President 41–57, 64, 99, 197 European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure  41, 44, 48, 55, 60, 67 European Parliament standing committees  234 European People’s Party 42, 46–47, 51, 81, 101, 119, 139 European Socialist Party 46–47 European Union (EU) 3, 19, 41, 57, 76, 99, 115, 134, 177, 193, 230, 311, 331, 368 EU strategic partners 134–135 EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee  115, 121, 131 FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization) 19 Fiscal Compact (Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union) 44–45 Fontaine, Nicole 73 foreign policy 4, 20–21, 28, 37–39, 43, 52–55, 61, 79, 84, 97, 99, 105–106, 110, 118, 132, 137, 157, 167, 191, 195, 213, 215, 217, 231, 233–234, 236, 239, 250–251, 253–254, 262–263, 267, 269, 276, 282, 284, 292–296, 302, 324, 327–328, 344–349,

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

Index 352, 355–356, 359, 372, 375, 375 n. 27, 376–377, 379, 384 n. 54 Francophonie 9 freedom of expression 131, 336 friendship groups 6, 104–105, 234, 249, 257, 260, 319, 352–353, 356–357, 359, 385 Fulbright, James William 213, 222 Georgia 34, 50, 163, 167, 199, 356 Global governance 2–3, 8, 14–15, 19–20, 26, 29, 34–35, 39, 54, 62, 69, 159, 161, 174, 176, 195, 215, 291, 299, 310, 327, 378 n. 36, 387 Globalization 3, 9–10, 22, 53, 55, 57, 65–66, 82, 159, 195, 236, 296, 332, 372 n. 16, 374 n. 20 GNAT (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) 119, 121–122, 124, 130–131 Gül, Abdullah 123, 127, 129 Helms, Jesse 213 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) 20,  42, 103 hub-and-spoke model 269, 271–272, 283, 285 Human rights advocacy 134, 154 India 36, 134–135, 230, 234, 239–240, 247, 258, 344, 354–356, 358–359, 369, 384 informal influence 3 INTA, Committee on International Trade (of the European Parliament) 33, 58, 61 intergroups 14, 100–106, 109–111, 385 international parliamentary institutions (IPIs) 3, 6, 9–11, 14, 33, 77, 156–159,   161–163, 172–177, 180–181, 195, 199–200, 203, 208, 215, 218–219, 224–225, 228–229, 309–310, 321, 325, 372, 374, 378–382, 384, 386–387 inter-parliamentary assemblies 11, 14, 33, 58–60, 64–66, 74, 233, 381, 383 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 6, 175, 196, 215, 249, 261, 294, 359, 365 Islam 127–128 Israel 13, 76–79, 85–96, 98, 128, 196, 203, 205–206, 260, 357, 383 Israel-Palestine 76–79, 85–87, 89–90, 95 Japan 15, 36, 134, 234, 242, 259–260, 269–270, 272–289, 294, 297–298, 300–301, 306–307, 354, 357, 378

391 Jerusalem 86, 93, 95, 205–206 JPAs (Joint Parliamentary Assemblies) 58, 234, 236 Juncker, Jean-Claude 42, 47 Korea (South Korea) 290 Kosovo 35, 176, 181, 183–188, 191, 218, 370, 375, 379 Kurds, Kurdish 119–124 Latin America 3, 11, 15, 31–32, 51, 65, 137, 139, 146–148, 310–314, 317, 321–322, 325–326, 371, 374, 378, 379 n. 38, 383 n. 50 League of Nations 216, 271, 386 LGBTI intergroup (of the European Parliament) 103–104 LIBE, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (of the European Parliament) 58, 62–63 Libya 12, 195–196, 199, 206–207, 336, 379, 378 n. 35 Lisbon Treaty (or Treaty of Lisbon) 13, 20–24, 42–45, 49, 51, 53–54, 57, 62, 80, 100, 103, 107, 111, 117, 136, 232 Maastricht Treaty (or Treaty of Maastricht) 57 Mercosur 32, 34, 175, 311, 319, 324, 360, 374 Mexico 14, 36, 134–154, 219, 368–369, 378, 381, 386 Michel, Louis 72 Middle East 28, 31, 34, 36, 76–78, 93, 198, 202, 205–207, 231, 295, 353, 371, 384 n. 53, 385 n. 57 minorities’ rights 119, 122, 124 modern diplomacy 155, 231 Moldova 34, 50, 178, 184–185, 199 Morocco 31, 105, 108–109, 196, 202, 206, 263 MPs 66, 75, 87, 95, 148, 199, 207, 301, 310, 313, 323–324, 337–339, 351–353, 358, 366–367, 377, 379–381, 385 n. 57 Myanmar, see also Burma 235, 238, 241, 245, 295 NATO 15, 35, 58, 64, 168, 175, 193, 208, 213, 215, 219–220, 222–229, 269, 372, 382, 384 n. 53 NATO enlargement 226–228 NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA)  215 Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

392 NGOs 10, 79, 83–85, 87–89, 92, 94, 96–97, 102, 271, 339, 341, 370 Nielson, Poul 72 Nordic Council 9 North Africa 31, 34, 108, 202, 207 Northeast Asia 269, 271–272, 283, 285 ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) 10, 32 OPPD (Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Diplomacy) 235 Orthodox Christians 124 OSCE 3, 9–10, 14, 28, 32, 156–157, 160, 162–163, 168–169, 171–172, 177, 183, 191, 193, 220, 271 OSCE PA 157, 159–162, 168–169, 170–172, 191, 372, 386 PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) 14, 143–144, 154, 156–157,   159–172, 175–177, 180–181, 208, 215, 372, 386 Palestine 12–13, 22, 76–79, 85–93, 95, 196, 205, 355, 358, 378 n. 37, 383 PAP (Pan-African Parliament) 9, 33, 35, 69, 327, 330–337, 341–342, 356, 359–360, 362–365, 379 parliamentarians’ unions 270, 272, 274–278, 280, 283–285 parliamentarization 194, 236, 383 Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie 9 Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM) 10, 52, 195, 370, 371 n. 14 Parliamentary Assembly / parliamentary assemblies 3, 14, 43, 45 Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA) 9 parliamentary diplomacy 1, 2, 4–8, 11, 13–15, 22–23, 28–30, 33, 35, 39, 43–44, 48, 52–53, 55, 61, 67–68, 78, 82, 92, 97, 99–100, 105, 111, 115, 131–132, 136, 154, 156–157, 159, 163, 165, 169, 170–172, 174, 176, 191, 195–198, 200–201, 205–206, 208, 214–215, 217–220, 223–224, 227–229, 232–233, 239, 245, 247–251, 253–259, 261, 263, 265–272, 274–275, 278, 280–281, 283–285, 290–291, 296,

Index 303–304, 307–310, 315–318, 321–323, 325–328, 330–332, 336, 341–344, 349–351, 354, 359–361, 363–375, 377, 378–380, 382, 384, 385–387 Parliamentary Troika 9 peace and security 216, 220, 329–330, 332, 336, 341 PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) 122 political parties 7, 43, 46, 81, 84, 87, 90, 115, 239, 322, 324–326 regional dialogue 147, 176, 179, 183, 191 regional integration 11, 32, 34, 55, 58, 74, 232, 236, 241, 247, 310–311, 313–316, 321–322, 325–326, 354, 360, 362–363, 374, 379, 383, 387 regionalism 3, 311, 325, 329, 336, 370 n. 7, 372, 373 n. 18 regions 1, 13, 29–30, 33, 58, 65, 72, 99, 105, 110, 138, 193, 232–234, 236, 241, 246–247, 269, 295, 301, 310, 319, 329, 357, 374, 381 Rules of Procedure (RoP) 180 Russia-Ukraine crisis 156–157, 163, 166, 169 Sakharov Prize 12, 99, 123, 136, 138 SEECP Parliamentary Dimension 174, 176–183, 189 Serbia 175, 178, 184–188, 191, 196, 356, 370 South Africa 15, 36, 88, 134, 259, 330, 334, 341, 343, 344–367 South African Parliament 1, 343–344, 348–349, 350, 352–355, 357–366, 369 South America 127 South Asia 59, 106, 232, 240, 245, 247 South-East Asia 230, 232, 235, 239, 241, 245–247 South-East Europe 174, 176–177, 179, 185, 187, 189, 191 South Korea 15, 36, 134, 259, 269–270, 272–292, 294, 296–302, 304–308, 354, 372, 378 Spitzenkandidat 42, 46, 56 state-centricity 271 Syria 46, 123, 196, 199, 207, 354, 370, 378 n. 35, 380 Terrorism 203, 371 Tibet 105–110, 264, 379

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University

393

Index Treaty of Versailles 216 Tunisia 31, 51, 196, 206–207, 336, 379 Turkey 14, 30, 58, 115–132, 178–179, 184–185, 187, 189–190, 196, 200, 202–203, 260, 295, 380, 382–383 Tymoshenko case 50 Ukraine 28, 34, 36, 46, 50, 156–157, 163–170, 199, 217, 231, 371–372, 380 US Congress 3, 35, 58, 213–219, 221–225, 228–229, 294, 369 n. 5, 373, 382 US, or USA 3, 15, 35–36, 38–39, 51–52, 58, 62, 80, 94, 158, 170, 193, 206, 213–226, 228–229, 233–234, 259, 266, 291, 294, 305, 307, 317–318, 369, 373, 382 values 2, 10, 21, 28, 33, 39, 61, 65–67, 104, 119–120, 128, 164, 198, 209, 232, 245, 247,

260, 309, 344, 349–352, 357, 359, 361, 378 Vauzelle, Michel 154, 204 WAIPA (Women Parliamentarians of AIPA) 244 Western Balkans 30, 34, 36, 177, 189, 200, 202 Western Sahara  108–109 Western Sahara intergroup (of the European Parliament) 107, 109 White House 216 World Trade Organization (WTO) 19, 263 Yemen 51 Zana, Leyla 122–123

Stelios Stavridis and Davor Jancic - 978-90-04-33634-6 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:56AM via Western University