Organized Labour and Pressure Politics 9780773582866

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
1 Introduction: Legitimacy and Mandate
2 The Canadian Labour Congress: History, Structure, and Function
3 The Legitimacy of Organized Labour and the Mandate of the Canadian Labour Congress: The Views of the Congress, Government, and Business
4 The Protection of Legitimacy
5 The Protection of Mandate
6 The SIU Affair: A Case Study in the Protection of Legitimacy and Mandate
7 Relations with Government: The Exercise of Legitimacy and Mandate
8 Effectiveness of Demands upon Government: The Fruits of Legitimacy and Mandate
9 Organized Labour and Government
Appendix A: Code of Organizing Practices
Appendix B: The Web of Inter-Group Relations
Appendix C: An Extract from the Memorandum to the Government of Canada, March 1962
Notes
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
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P
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ORGANIZED LABOUR AND PRESSURE POLITICS

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DAVID KWAVNICK

ORGANIZED

LABOUR AND PRESSURE POLITICS

The Canadian Labour Congress 1956-1968

McGILL-QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY PRESS Montreal and London 1972

© McGill-Queen's University Press 1972 International Standard Book Number 0 7735 0089 8 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72 82247 Legal Deposit 4th quarter 1972 Design by Alan Harrison Printed in Canada by John Deyell Ltd. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social Science Research Council of Canada using funds provided by the Canada Council.

Acknowledgements

This work would not have been possible without the help and cooperation of a number of people. Foremost among these is Professor K. Z. Paltiel whose efforts on behalf of the dissertation on which this work is based went considerably beyond the call of duty. Thanks are also due to the officers of the Canadian Labour Congress for having made their files available, and to many members of the Congress staff for their cooperation at all stages of the research. Particular mention should be made of Senator Eugene A. Forsey, the late Mr. A. Andras, Mr. A. L. Hepworth, and Mrs. M. Carver. Special thanks are due to my wife whose patience rivalled that of Job as she spent the first two years of her married life with a husband whose mind was seldom off this work. Finally, it should be noted that I alone am responsible for any factual errors or defective interpretations.

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CONTENTS 1

Introduction: Legitimacy and Mandate

2

The Canadian Labour Congress: History, Structure, and Function

33

The Legitimacy of Organized Labour and the Mandate of the Canadian Labour Congress: The Views of the Congress, Government, and Business

63

4

The Protection of Legitimacy

75

5

The Protection of Mandate

101

6

The SIU Affair: A Case Study in the Protection of Legitimacy and Mandate

145

7

Relations with Government: The Exercise of Legitimacy and Mandate

167

8

Effectiveness of Demands upon Government: The Fruits of Legitimacy and Mandate

193

9

Organized Labour and Government

217

Appendix A

Code of Organizing Practices

223

Appendix B

The Web of Inter-Group Relations

225

3

Appendix C An Extract from the Memorandum to the Government of Canada, March 1962

1

241

Notes

247

Index

211

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: Legitimacy and Mandate

Students of interest-group activity have traditionally concerned themselves with the process by which the demands of interest groups are brought to the attention of the political decision makers, the manner in which the demands are articulated, and the extent to which government activity is influenced by the demands. Furthermore, the examination of interest-group demands has proceeded on the implicit assumption that the demands most deserving of attention are those which reflect the needs and aspirations of the group's membership; the more important any particular demand is in terms of the needs of the membership, the more deserving is that demand of the attention of the student of interest-group activity: "The emphasis has been on 'pressure polities': how influential are pressure groups? how do they exercise influence?"1 Every implicit assumption carries within itself certain implicit questions. Might it not be fruitful to question the hitherto accepted assumptions? Might it not be possible to develop an analytical framework which dispenses with those assumptions? Might it not be profitable to employ other assumptions? The present work is based upon the assumption that the aims of interestgroup leaders go beyond the mere articulation of the demands of their members and obtaining some measure of satisfaction for those demands. It is based upon the assumption that a valid understanding of the activities of these leaders can only be had by considering the environment in which they work. "Pressure groups can become a dangerous obsession if the focus is merely on their activities, while the operative factors which inhibit or compel change and the basic determinants which dictate the possibilities of conflict and adjustment are only dimly apprehended."2 The aim of this study is to develop and apply concepts which are useful in the examination of the "operative factors" and "basic determinants" of group politics. The thesis to be examined is that among the more important determinants of the activities of organized interest groups, on the same plane as the substantive demands of the group's membership and the ostensible goals of the group as outlined in its constitution, in its public manifestos, and in the statements of its leaders, are the organizational goals of the group's

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leadership. Further, that the most important of these organizational goals are the preservation and continued growth of the organization itself and the continuation of the leaders in their positions of leadership. As Banfield has noted about Chicago municipal politics: "Proposals arise, proximately if not ultimately, from the maintenance and enhancement needs of large formal organizations."3 The pursuit of organizational maintenance and enhancement induces group leaders to seek stability and predictability in their relations with the leaders of other groups, including those groups with which they are supposedly in bitter conflict. They also seek stability and predictability in their relations with political leaders and government officials as well as with members of their own group.4 But political leaders and government officials have goals of their own similar to those of the interest-group leaders. They too are members of organizations, they too wish to ensure the preservation and enhancement of their respective organizations, and they too wish to retain or advance their own positions within these organizations. This is especially true of the permanent members of the government bureaucracy.5 Thus, political leaders and government officials too will seek stability and predictability in their relations with other organizations. All participants in the political process are therefore faced with what is essentially the same problem: to tame their environment and make it safe. The solution of this problem gives rise to patterns of behaviour whose function is to protect the common interests of all participants. These patterns of behaviour place informal, but nonetheless effective, limitations upon the relationship between the participants in the process of group politics and serve to moderate the tone of the group "struggle" and confine it within acceptable limits. The participants adhere to these informal "rules of the game" because each is convinced that the rules work to his advantage, not necessarily in his capacity as the spokesman of an interest but in his capacity as the head of an organization. The rules enable political leaders, government officials, and group leaders to achieve their organizational goals more readily and more assuredly than would be possible in the absence of rules. Political leaders welcome the activities of interest-group leaders because they find these activities advantageous, if only because interest-group leaders represent an organized constituency and are able to articulate demands of which the political leaders might otherwise remain ignorant or whose importance they might not otherwise be able to gauge. Even if the interest-group leader is more concerned with his organizational goals than with the substantive demands of his group's members, he is nevertheless in a position to convince the members that the attainment of his organizational goals is, in fact, the attainment of their own goals as well. Government officials establish and maintain day-to-day working relations

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3

with interest-group leaders because they find that it is to their advantage to do so, if only because these leaders are the ones who make the demands which result in expanded programmes and larger budgets. Finally, interestgroup leaders cooperate among themselves because they find that such cooperation is to their advantage. Single-minded crusades can only be undertaken by those who have nothing to lose. Those who participate in the process of group politics at the head of great bureaucracies, either private or governmental, have much to lose and, therefore, much to protect. Group politics, far from being a bitter struggle, as some writers have assumed,6 is an exercise in mutual accommodation. The Hobbesian war gives way to a more limited type of competition whose sanction lies in the ubiquitous instinct of organizational self-preservation. It is within the context of this mutual accommodation, and subject to the recognition that there are some goals common to all participants, that the process of group politics is carried on. A major factor in the process of group politics is the pursuit of organizational goals by the participants. The strategy by which these goals are sought has two aspects: the pursuit and preservation of "legitimacy," that is, the protection of the status and position of the interest on whose behalf the group's leaders claim to speak; and the pursuit and protection of "mandate," that is, the protection of the position of the group as the recognized spokesman of the interest. This study will develop and apply the concepts of "legitimacy" and "mandate" in order to clarify the manner in which organizational goals affect the demands made upon government and upon other organized groups by interest-group leaders. THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY

The number of political commentators who have studied the concept of legitimacy is legion; it would not be an exaggeration to say that most of the literature of political philosophy consists of attempts to explore various aspects of it—attempts to locate the source of the "legitimacy" of the rulers and attempts to establish the "legitimate" boundaries of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. But the writings of the political philosophers were largely attempts at special pleading and were intended to justify the legitimacy of a particular form of rule. They were not attempts to examine analytically the nature of legitimacy itself. For such an analysis it is necessary to turn to comparatively recent scholars, in particular, Max Weber and other sociologists. Weber's classification of the types of legitimacy specifies three distinct grounds upon which it may be based,7 and while his classification is useful, its usefulness is mitigated by two factors. First, Weber's discussion of legitimacy in modern societies is circular: "To-day the most usual basis of

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legitimacy is the belief in legality, the readiness to conform with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedure."8 Weber has merely shifted the problem from the meaning of legitimacy to the meaning of legality, formally correct, and accepted procedure. According to one scholar this circularity was intentional.9 The second mitigating factor is that Weber discussed the concept within the context of the relationship of a superior and a subordinate. The function of legitimacy in such a relationship is to justify to the subordinate the position of the superior. Legitimacy, as the concept is used in this work, has a different function. The elucidation of the concept of legitimacy in a work concerned with the legitimacy of an organized interest as perceived by society, government, and other organized interests must therefore be pursued in the writings of scholars other than Max Weber. Talcott Parsons, discussing deviant groups, provides an insight which is useful. Speaking of mutual legitimation within a peer group, he says: in the delinquent gang the "partner in crime" is the focus of a partial legitimation. The gang has its own code and sanctions. Without the support of this partial legitimation the motivation to the pattern would be greatly weakened. The legitimation of a deviant pattern immediately shifts it from the status of an individual to that of a collective phenomenon. Those whose orientations reciprocally legitimate each other constitute a collectivity which is a subsystem of the social system.10

If the deviant group is legitimized by the wider society, it will then, by definition, cease to be deviant. Parsons' discussion is useful in that it focuses attention upon the phenomenon of mutual legitimation within a peer group and the problem is thus reduced to achieving legitimation of the sub-system within the wider social system. A partial explanation of the nature of such legitimation and an example of its operation over a period of time are provided by Dahl and Lindblom. Like Weber, they too are concerned primarily with the problems of legitimacy in a superior-subordinate relationship, but the nature of the concept as they describe it is applicable both to legitimation within a peer group and especially to the legitimation of a group or sectional interest by society at large. As an example they cite the gradual legitimation of political parties: In both England and the United States the legitimacy of political parties seems to have been publicly accepted about the same time—somewhere between 1800 and 1832. Since that time, parties have become both legitimized and institutionalized, and suppression of any party accepting the norms we have been discussing would be tantamount to revolution.11

That is, political parties are legitimized, not unconditionally, but if they accept the norms of the society in which they exist.

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5

The term legitimacy refers to that quality which is thought to inhere in those goals, activities, and modes of behaviour which conform to the system of values prevalent in any given society. These values are "the body of agreed principles that forms the consensus upon which the political community rests."12 Legitimacy involves evaluation13 in terms of the standards and values of society. Legitimacy also implies acceptance. That is, certain goals may be pursued and certain modes of behaviour practised without incurring censure, either formally or informally. By achieving and preserving legitimacy, an interest qualifies itself for entry into the political process; political leaders, government officials, and the spokesmen of other "legitimate" interests may undertake to deal with the representatives of that interest, without thereby running the risk of bringing down public opprobium upon themselves. Thus, one of the prizes of legitimacy is that it is not a violation of society's values for the representatives of a "legitimate" interest to meet with the prime minister, members of the cabinet, or administrative officials; or to attempt to influence policy making at the executive and legislative levels; or to have their views receive consideration by those who hold public office; or, in general, to participate in the political process. In contemporary Canada, interests such as manufacturing, agriculture, and labour are deemed to be legitimate. It is therefore possible for organizations recognized as being representative of these interests to meet with government, present their demands and, subject to the norms governing the legitimate limits of any relationship between government and private interests, receive favours from government without such action giving rise to protests by the general public. On the other hand, it does not require much imagination to predict what would happen if it became known that spokesmen for the Mafia were being received by members of the cabinet. If the imagination proves reluctant it may be aided by recalling actual events. In November 1964 it was alleged in the House of Commons that members of the Mafia, or of another group pursuing similar aims, had enjoyed access to officials in the office of the minister of justice. The result, a crisis which endangered the existence of the government, is indicative of the consequences that will follow when a government extends to an illegitimate interest the privileges which are reserved for legitimate interests. But the benefits conferred by legitimacy do not all accrue to the legitimized interest, and the process of legitimation is not simply the granting of a concession by government or society to an interest. Legitimacy, like the quality of mercy, ... is not strain'd, It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven ,N Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest: It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.

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In fact "legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society," and "groups regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit theirs."14 By conferring legitimacy upon an interest the system binds that interest to itself. In recognizing the new values created by social forces, economic developments, or historical circumstances a means is provided for the expression of those values within the existing governmental and social framework. While the spokesmen for an interest seek to attain and maintain the legitimacy of their particular interest, the political leaders seek to do the same for the political system. Again, as Lipset has pointed out, "easy access to the legitimate political institutions tends to win the loyalty of the new groups to the system. . . . if access to politics is denied to emerging groups at crucial periods, the system's legitimacy will remain in question."15 The benefits of legitimacy thus flow in both directions. The acceptance of new interests and new groups stabilizes the entire structure of society, including the existing political system. It does so by giving the new groups an interest in the existing social order and thereby winning them over to it or, at worst, winning them over to an only slightly modified version of the existing order. For example, a reason for the American Federation of Labor's laisserfaire stand on economic matters "may well be that during its history the American labor movement has had to resist attempts by single-taxers, anarchists, socialists, communists, and others to capture it. Sometimes results disastrous for labor came from such intrusions, and labor leaders adopted as protective coloration a fervent affirmation of the dominant ideologies of the society."16 The implication is that in order to protect its legitimacy the labour movement has had to take steps to dissociate itself from interests, activities, and goals which were not deemed, by "the dominant ideologies of the society," to be legitimate. This the leaders of labour did by demonstrating that they were prepared to accept the existing economic order or an only slightly modified version thereof. The extent to which an interest can expect to gain concessions from government is directly related to the light in which the public sees that interest. This, in turn, is dependent upon the extent to which the aims of the interest coincide with the values of the society and the extent to which the society views these aims as "respectable" and "legitimate." Assuming that the interest in question is not prepared to resort to violence, coercion, or coup d'etat, the group which speaks on its behalf will be obliged to seek this coincidence of aims and views either by currying public favour and moulding public opinion, or by altering its aims or tactics, or both. The possibility of molding public opinion to conform with business ideologies has its limits, and a concern with public attitudes may compel business

INTRODUCTION

7

groups to alter their policies so that they can be sold to the public. Selfrestraint, induced by anticipations of environmental reaction, may change the policy of the business group The pursuit of some business policies, it may come to be recognized, will result in disfavor.17 Shared attitudes and shared values peculiar to a limited number of members of society may have been the factor responsible for the establishment of an organized group to make "certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes,"18 but these shared values are normally subordinate, or at least closely linked, to the values which the group's members share with other members of the larger community. Formal organization . . . indicates the existence of significant values or attitudes within a group, at least at the time of its creation. . . . Some of these formative attitudes may be peculiar to the group. . . . Others, however, may be so widely held in the society of which the group is a part that they are in effect imposed on an organized group from without as well as demanded from within. Such widespread attitudes, in fact, are indicative of potential, or even actual, interest groups that may, or do exert claims for conformity upon other groups in the society. . . . . . . These, in fact, become elements without which an organization cannot achieve "respectability" and "legitimacy" in the community.19 If the organization is to survive, grow, and prosper it must satisfy the conditions set for it by the system of values of the society in which it is located. Having once entered the political process newly legitimized, the interest's spokesmen must ensure that their group's aims and their behaviour do not at some later date come into conflict with society's values, either through changes in the aims and patterns of behaviour of the interest or through changes in the value system of the society. Legitimacy does not maintain itself, it must be assiduously serviced. For example, in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s the National Association of Manufacturers did not remain attuned to the changing values of the society in which it operated. As a result, "the views of the NAM were so extreme that it probably had only a negative influence on legislation; its endorsement of a bill might be a kiss of death."20 But groups representative of business interests, as well as groups representative of other interests, even when they do not make the mistake of the National Association of Manufacturers and fall behind the changing value system of the society, must nevertheless service the legitimacy of their interest. Otherwise they will face a double-barrelled threat. First, there is the danger that the interest or the group representing it will be downgraded in the esteem of the public, with a corresponding decrease in its acceptability to government and to other interest-group leaders. Second, the violation of

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esteemed social values may alienate some members of the group as much as other citizens. This may result in members leaving the group, or in the establishment of a rival group to represent the same interest, or in the election of a new slate of officers for the group. But these are problems which relate to the question of "mandate" and discussion of them must be left until that concept is explored. The public "consensus" or value system places restrictions upon at least three important aspects of interest-group activity. First, it requires that certain standards be observed in the organization and internal government of the group. Second, it requires that the aims of the group do not look to the overthrow of patterns of behaviour or social relationships which are sanctioned by the societal value system and their replacement by patterns of behaviour and social relationships which run counter to that system of values. Third, it requires that the means by which the interest group pursues its goals accord with the prevailing notions of equity, justice, fair play; in short, that the modus operandi of the group conforms "to the 'rules of the game' that are widely espoused in the community."21 These requirements, though not necessarily in the order of importance suggested by their listing here, are imposed upon all political interest groups from the start. The degree to which these requirements are met will determine the degree to which the legitimacy of the interest will be safeguarded. The first requirement, that respecting organization and internal government, has been explored by Truman, who observed that the organizational structure of political interest groups in the United States has been molded in conformity with the "democratic" expectations of the community. The significance of the "democratic mold", which affects all associations and to some degree almost all organizations in our culture is of fundamental importance in the process of group politics. . . . Associations in our culture are expected to be "democratic".22

Leaders must be elected in what at least give the appearance of being free and competitive elections; the leaders must be accountable to the membership for their actions and for the policies of the organization; there must be some form of financial accounting; and so on. The second requirement, that respecting the aims of the group, is more complex. Changes within society are constantly throwing up new interests, and these interests can either result in the formation of new groups or they may be adopted by already existing groups. "Politics are dynamic. As political, social, and industrial conditions change, as new economic and moral ideas arise and take form, the rigid framework of government is either altered to fit the time or superseded."23 The alternative of superseding the framework of government—that is, the alternative of revolution or coup

INTRODUCTION

9

d'etat—lies outside the range of circumstances that will be considered here. The question, then, turns upon the manner in which the society's value system is altered to legitimize the goals of the new interest and, presumably, of the organized group which has undertaken to represent that interest. The dynamics of such an alteration of American social values have been described by Fainsod. Speaking of the rise of new interests during the period of rapid industrial expansion in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries he observed: While that society was in its period of dynamic expansion, economic organization, legal institutions, and prevailing ideologies were largely shaped by the needs of business men. . . . While the underlying conditions continued favorable to expansion and development, the theory of solidarity of interests remained tenable. It began to be effectively challenged when other groups in the community became convinced that the protection of their interests could not safely be entrusted to the uninhibited strategy of business enterprise. A harmonious society thus became less harmonious. The ascendancy of the business man was disputed. Other parties in interest in industry and agriculture became articulate and organized, and sought to reshape economic organization, legal institutions, and prevailing ideologies to serve their own needs.24

The "theory of solidarity of interests" is merely a statement of the elementary fact that at one time the values of the society and the values of the businessmen coincided. This "solidarity" broke down when other interests succeeded in winning legitimacy for themselves by altering society's value system. Key's discussion of organized labour's struggle for legitimacy illustrates the essentials of the problem: In the long history of attempts to unify the American working classes, time and again labor suffered reverses as it collided with the reigning ideologies and interests. . . . To carve out a place for itself in the politico-social order, a new group may have to fight for a reorientation of many of the values of the old order. Early unions were assailed as anarchist or socialist. . . . Nevertheless, during the past half-century organized labor established itself fairly securely as an element of the social system. Organized labor amounted to something less than an instrument for "all the toiling masses", but it came to exercise great influence on many public questions and to possess a veto, if not the affirmative power of decision, on others. 25

The third requirement, that respecting the means employed by organized groups in their relations with government and other organized groups, proscribes certain of the cruder means of obtaining concessions from government. Outright bribery, blackmail, and the use of threats other than the threat to withdraw or withhold political support, all lie outside the pale. In

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addition to proscriptions, the third requirement also prescribes certain of the more fundamental "rules of the game." Organized groups, as previously noted, are formed around shared values or attitudes. But these are normally subordinate to the values and attitudes held by the members of the group as members of the wider community. The attainment of legitimacy for the group's shared values strengthens the attachment of its leaders and members to the existing framework of government and the prevailing social values by removing or alleviating a potential source of disaffection. Once an interest and the group which represents it have been accepted as participants in the process of group politics, something more happens: relations between the group leaders and the political decision makers develop upon the basis of a different understanding. Spokesman groups tend to describe their relationship with the Government as though there were a 'social contract', under which their obligation to assist the government and to abet its decisions is reciprocated by an obligation on the part of the Government to protect their interests. . . . Recognition of the sovereignty of the Government entails disavowal of direct action against it. Very few groups of any kind challenge its authority.26 In short, attempts to overthrow the regime or other forms of direct challenge to its authority are beyond the pale as instruments of interest-group politics. The second requirement outlawed the overthrow of government as an end, the third outlaws it as a means. But even direct action of a less serious nature is frowned upon: the refusal to cooperate with government is also considered to be an infraction of the rules of the game. The recurrent threats of the BM A [British Medical Association] to sabotage the National Health Insurance scheme and the National Health Service, the ban imposed by the National Union of Teachers on the collection of savings in the schools during a dispute with the Government over the provisions of a Teachers (Superannuation) Bill in 1955-6, and the efforts of the British Iron and Steel Federation to sabotage the Government's arrangements as the industry underwent nationalization in 1950-51 by discouraging experienced men from assisting the Government and by withholding the services of its own organization are often cited as violations of the 'rules of the game'. But each was a very limited action Representative groups cannot carry direct action far before their members hesitate, the public disapproves, and the Government becomes stubborn.27 Social values oblige an organized group and its leaders to observe certain standards of behaviour. These standards are of two kinds. In addition to the basic standards which have been discussed above and which are applicable to all legitimate groups there are standards which apply only to certain groups, imposed upon the group by virtue of the public "image" of the interest and the special expectations aroused by this "image." For example:

INTRODUCTION

11

The A-M.A. [American Medical Association] . . . is a professional society peculiarly the object of widespread public expectations in such matters as ethical standards, dedication to improving the lot of all men, and loyalty to the "rules of the game" that are widely espoused in the community. Because it is associated with the strongly valued symbol of the "man in white", the group and its members are endowed with a prestige and authority out of proportion to their numbers in the community so long as the accompanying expectations are not sharply violated.28 Social values confer legitimacy upon an interest, but the very act of being legitimized places responsibilities upon its spokesmen. The greater the degree of legitimacy, the greater the authority of the group and the more effectively will the spokesmen be able to press their demands. But at the same time, a high degree of legitimacy carries with it high expectations from the public and this moderates the use which can be made of the authority which the group disposes. The authority of the group and the legitimacy upon which that authority rests must constantly be defended and the only sure way to defend them is to live up to the expectations which resulted in the conferral of the legitimacy and authority in the first place. Finally, there are varying degrees of legitimacy. The voice of an organized group representing an interest with low or marginal legitimacy will carry little weight, its pronouncements will have little effect upon public opinion, and the concessions which the group will be able to win will be very limited. For interest-group leaders, therefore, the problem is not simply one of retention or forfeiture of legitimacy; there is the constant concern to increase the degree of legitimacy and to prevent the diminution of the legitimacy which their interest already enjoys. The strategy of the New York Stock Exchange during the 1930s is illustrative: In the later years of depression it was important to continue emphasizing the unimportance of the stock market. The depression was an exceptionally disagreeable experience. Wall Street has not always been a cherished symbol in our national life. In some of the devout regions of the nation, those who speculate in stocks—the even more opprobrious term gamblers is used—are not counted the greatest moral adornments of our society. Any explanations of the depression which attributed importance to the market collapse would accordingly have been taken very seriously, and it would have meant serious trouble for Wall Street. Wall Street, no doubt, would have survived, but there would have been scars. We should be clear that no deliberate conspiracy existed to minimize the consequences of the Wall Street crash for the economy. Rather, it merely appeared to everyone with an instinct for conservative survival that Wall Street had better be kept out of it. It was vulnerable.29 The concern of all group leaders is that their interest is "vulnerable" and one of their primary aims is to avoid "scars."

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THE CONCEPT OF MANDATE

The legitimization of an interest does not confer rights or privileges upon any particular group. The achievement of legitimacy by an interest means only that the representatives of that interest are eligible to participate in the political process, but the question of who those representatives are still remains to be settled. Legitimization itself can create difficulties in the settlement of this question as new groups crowd in upon the original trailblazer and attempt to make a place for themselves and, incidentally, a place for their promoters and leaders. Winning legitimacy for the interest which it seeks to represent is only the first half of the problem that confronts the leaders of a group claiming to represent a new interest. Winning recognition for its mandate is the second half. By recognizing the mandate of a group the political leaders, government officials, and the leaders of other organized groups are not simply conferring a benefit upon the recognized group and its leaders. The benefits of mandate, like those of legitimacy, do not all flow in one direction. Political leaders and government officials also prize stability and predictability in their relations with the world outside government and recognition of the mandate of a group helps to order and stabilize relations between government and its environment. The importance of well-developed working relationships should not be underestimated. There are more or less clearly defined 'rules of the game', which if lacking the relatively formal precision of the constitutional system, are equally well understood by those who work them. On the part of the organized groups those who work the 'rules' are their leaders. They acknowledge that in the last resort the Government, as the 'general' organization of the community, must have the last word. The Government, in turn recognizes the legitimacy of the leadership of spokesmen and representative promotional groups.30

The writer, Allen Potter, is using legitimacy to describe what is referred to as mandate in this text. The essential point, however, is that the development of a working relationship between government and organized group leaders creates within government a vested interest in the continuation of that relationship. Briefly, the other four advantages Accruing to government are: First, the recognition of the mandate of a group binds that group to the government. This is not to say that the group is committed to support the party in power politically; the continued access of the Trades Union Congress to Conservative governments in the United Kingdom and of the Canadian Labour Congress to a Liberal government in Canada demonstrate that overt political support is not necessary to maintain good working relations. The group whose mandate has been recognized and which has been

INTRODUCTION

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called into consultation by the government thereby becomes associated with government policy in its area of interest. Having had a hand in the shaping of policy, the group leaders are under an obligation to support it and, what is more, to convince their members to accept the policy as reasonable.31 So long as the government's decisions do not actually fly in the face of the group's vital interests, this support will be forthcoming. In addition to the maintenance of a working relationship with government there is another reason for group leaders to exert themselves to "sell" government policy, once established, to their members. Once they have been accepted by government as spokesmen, once they have been taken into consultation and have had an opportunity to bargain with government and with other interests, the production of anything less than a "reasonable" policy decision will inevitably result in aspersions being cast upon their competence. Leaders are, understandably, reluctant to announce their own incompetence. And the political benefits to be reaped by having interest-group leaders sell government policy to their members are far more valuable than any overt political support that the leaders could offer. Second, the recognition of the mandate of a group is helpful to the practice of what has come to be called "broker politics." The essence of broker politics is mediation by government between many competing interests within the framework of a loosely defined and generally accepted concept of the public interest. Policy is decided, at least in part, by compromises between the various interests. For this type of politics to be practised successfully, it is necessary that all important interests in the community be able to take part in the policy-making process, that there be someone around who can claim to speak on behalf of each interest. The acceptance of a group as the spokesman for a particular interest provides the necessary voice; it serves as a restraint upon the demands of the competing groups and relieves the government of the necessity to present the case for an unrepresented interest. Furthermore, by representing an interest the group reduces the number of cleavages with which governments must deal, making the task of governing that much easier: differences are ironed out and the association can approach the public and the government with a united front. Reconciliation of differences within interest groups facilitates the work of legislatures and of Congress by reducing the number of conflicts with which they have to deal. . . . Government is then left with the task of ironing out conflicts between opposing groups.32 The last sentence is only partially true. Organized groups often iron out the differences between themselves and present government with an already agreed upon compromise. From the point of view of government, intergroup negotiation is important; not, as may be imagined, because it permits government to play off one interest against another, although that is a possibility, but because it enables the group leaders to reach compromises

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among themselves and relieves government of the necessity of imposing a compromise from above. In the United Kingdom the inter-group agreement "often becomes a requirement that the parties must be substantially in agreement among themselves before the Government acts,"33 while in the United States "legislators, rather than undertake the onerous task of negotiating a compromise or the painful responsibility of deciding between conflicting interests, may even postpone action until the groups concerned narrow their differences."34 Inter-group negotiation holds a multitude of advantages for government. When all interests are represented and the leaders negotiate settlements among themselves, the task of government in gaining acceptance for policy decisions is reduced even more than in the case where a group's leaders are merely called into consultation. The group leaders, having negotiated a settlement among themselves, must then "sell" that settlement to their members and to the general public. Even more than in the case where they were merely called into consultation, group leaders cannot afford to be critical of policy decisions based upon agreements negotiated by themselves. An unsatisfactory government decision may, in an extreme case, be blamed upon a hostile government, but unsuccessful negotiations with other group leaders can only be explained as the result of incompetent leadership. Thus, interest groups which were founded for the purpose of persuading the government and the public on behalf of a particular interest become instruments through which both the public and the parties in interest are propagandized on behalf of government policy. Governments, understandably, have no objection to the existence of such groups. Third, the recognition of the mandate of a group provides government with a source of information. This may be technical or statistical information which only the interest group has taken the trouble to gather. "In some functional areas government may be so inadequately staffed and the lobbyist so well backstopped by technicians that he comes to exert an influence based on a not disinterested competence."35 On the other hand, the information may be politically useful—the interest group takes the pulse of its members and reports to the political leaders forcefully enough, often enough, and in a voice that is loud enough to be heard. The greater the number of interests that are represented and the higher the quality of the representation, the less likely it is that any interest will be inadvertently neglected. Far from resenting the importunities of interest groups, the political leaders welcome them, they know that the leaders have as great an interest in keeping the members satisfied as they do: both have a mandate to protect. Finally, group leaders are not merely messengers transmitting demands from their members to the government—they often create the demands which are pressed upon government. Leaders must show results and those with experience have a reasonable idea of what they can or cannot get. Thus

INTRODUCTION

15

they may try to persuade members that an impossible demand is less attractive than an alternative, feasible, demand. There are several variations on this device and Key has pointed out one of them: One sometimes suspects that the staffs [of interest groups] thrive on attempts to panic the members by horrendous accounts of what is in prospect in the way of public regulation. The group bureaucracy prospers as it succeeds in arousing fears, but individuals are likely to be much less well informed on what the legislative trend holds in store for them than are their lobbyists.36 The "horrendous accounts" create a demand among the membership for effective counter-measures, and the failure of the threat to materialize is taken to be an indication of the successful manner in which the group and its leaders are protecting the interests of the membership. The creation of demands by group leaders is helpful to government because it tends to deflect unreasonable demands. In promoting demands of their own choosing to the membership, the group leaders are relieving government of the responsibility of having to deal with demands which cannot be conveniently met and are substituting demands which government can meet without embarrassment. In summary, the recognition of the mandate of a group by government is useful not only to the group's leaders but to government as well. The existence and operations of organized groups introduce an element of stability into the political process; they enable government to stay "on top" of the currents of opinion among the various interests in the country; they enable government to carry on a continuous process of "fence mending" by continually drawing attention to the fences which require mending; they relieve the government of a large part of the problem of marshalling support behind policy decisions; they often aid in the actual administration of legislation; and, finally, they sometimes relieve government of the necessity of making a decision by reaching a compromise among themselves. In the United Kingdom, "the practice of the Government now assumes that each substantial section has its organized group, which should be consulted when the interests of the section are affected and which can also be utilized if need be for some administrative purposes."37 Experience in that country has demonstrated the use to which organized groups can be put by government; they have proven so useful that "if an organized group does not exist, the Government helps invent it."38 The recognition of the mandate of a group also carries advantages for the leaders of the other organized interest groups in the community, including those of opposing interests. A point which will be discussed later and can only be stated now is that interest-group leaders are themselves an interest. They all share the same organizational goals and to this extent they are bound together by an important "shared attitude." If they oppose each other

16

CHAPTER ONE

in the pursuit of the ostensible aims of their respective groups, this opposition is secondary to their common cause as interest-group leaders, if only because the ostensible aims of their groups, the aims which divide them, are secondary to their organizational aims, the aims which unite them. One of the advantages accruing to the leaders of other groups as a result of the recognition of the mandate of a group is that the leaders of the established interest groups cease to be the opposition and instead become the peer and reference group.39 The newly accepted leaders thus become susceptible to socialization into the mores and modes of behaviour appropriate to interest-group leaders. The observance of these mores is vital to the welfare of all group leaders and has become a part of the "rules of the game." The following three benefits are among others accruing to leaders of other organized groups. First, the recognition of the mandate of a group enables the leaders of the other groups to achieve a degree of stability in their relations with that interest. This is especially true of the leaders of groups representing opposing interests. To leave a group outside the circle of accepted groups is to invite its leaders to adopt unorthodox tactics, to make exaggerated demands and, generally, to be a disruptive and uncertain element. There is no opportunity to bargain with the representatives of the interest or to present government with a mutually acceptable compromise. Recognition of the mandate of a group paves the way for cooperation, and inter-group cooperation is important to interest-group leaders. As Key has observed of the American Farm Bureau Federation: "Federation leaders at times come perilously close to converting their organization into a tool of business without much regard to the concern of farmers in the issues at stake. On the other hand, the Federation looks to business for support on farm issues and may feel obliged to reciprocate."40 And: "The big guns of big business do not go into action against Legion forays on the Treasury, a circumstance that gives plausibility to the hypothesis that a tacit alliance prevails between business and Legion leadership. For business the quid pro quo is the generally conservative position of the Legion."41 Second, the leaders of groups which have not been accorded recognition, like the parties to an interest which has not been accorded legitimacy, have little interest in maintaining the status quo of group politics. They have no interest in preventing a disruption of the intricate set of relationships between government and organized groups. The term lobbyist carries pejorative overtones, and the activities of the lobbyists, if not carefully restrained by the lobbyists themselves, can discredit the entire system. One of the concerns of interest-group leaders is to continue to make it profitable for political leaders and government officials to be receptive to them and to their activities. It is to their advantage to avoid a situation in which it is deemed preferable to forgo the advantages of dealing with group leaders than to face the consequences of dealing with them.

INTRODUCTION

17

Rash actions by one group can initiate a scandal, and one sensational scandal is sufficient to disrupt an entire set of intricate relationships by drawing attention to activities which, standing by themselves, would not be noticed. As one commentator observed about a series of political scandals: But for that shattering afternoon on which Nielsen shocked both Parliament and the nation with his well-briefed accusations of attempts to subvert justice, allegations that stretched into the office of the Minister of Justice himself, few of the other scandals would have seen the light of day. No newspaper would have dared to print, no reporter would have bothered to unearth, the sorry story of the cut-rate furniture deals, nor would the name of the Secretary of State for External Affairs have been linked to a supposed Mafia hoodlum. Even the Minister without Portfolio, Yvon Dupuis, might have been able to leave the Government, as other errant ministers have before him, quietly and without public notoriety.42

Not only does an unrecognized group have no stake in preserving established relationships, it has a definite interest in undermining them. The activities of organized groups are the means by which other groups gain advantages, often at the expense of the unrecognized group. Bringing the system into disrepute may not gain the unrecognized group any advantages, but would probably hurt opposing interests. A leader who achieved this could, even in the absence of any positive gains, secure his position within his own group. The recognition of the mandate of a group, on the other hand, gives the leaders of that group a definite stake in the preservation of the system and a positive reason to avoid doing anything which might disrupt it. Under some conditions, an extensive, powerful, and politically sophisticated group leadership structure may restrain the reflex actions of the rank and file against adverse circumstances. In the absence of an operating group structure and hierarchy, leaders of the moment may fan the flames of discontent of a disadvantaged class of persons. A long-established leadership, however, may take a more restrained position because of its estimate of what is feasible by way of remedial action, and perhaps because of a tendency of well-organized hierarchies to become somewhat conservative. . . . In a broad sense, the organizational apparatus of private groups may, under some circumstances, serve as an instrument to govern—to restrain—in quite as great a degree as it may be an instrument of agitation.43

The implication is clear. The stability of the system is served if the "leaders of the moment" become leaders of "well-organized hierarchies," and therefore it is in the interest of the leaders of other groups not to place obstacles in their path. Third, although the settlement of disputes by the groups concerned is advantageous to the political leaders, the acceptance of these settlements by government is no less advantageous to the leaders of those groups. By taking matters into their own hands they are able to introduce an element of stability

18

CHAPTER ONE

into then: environment. Events are made more predictable as the possibilities of unpleasant surprises are diminished. The settlement of disputes by the group leaders themselves requires a high degree of mutual confidence, especially among the leaders of groups which represent opposing interests. By recognizing the mandate of a group, the leaders of the other groups provide themselves with someone with whom they can bargain. At the same time they reduce the possibility of another group developing to represent the same interest. Such a group might attempt to consolidate its position among the membership by means of a radical or uncompromising stance or by the use of rash tactics, either of which could only hurt all interest-group leaders. The recognition of the mandate of the group and its leaders by those outside the group, by government and by the leaders of other interest groups, is advantageous for both sides since they are both interested in assuring that the equilibrium is not unduly disturbed. So great is the desire for stability that although "an organized alternative leadership is almost always absent," "when it appears, the Government usually refuses to deal with it anyway."44 The internal problems of mandate are two: preventing the rise of rival leaders within the group, and preventing the rise of rival groups.45 The first problem has been dealt with at length by other observers and there is little that can be added to what Truman has said on the subject. Barring intimidation and coercion, both of which are liable to be self-defeating since they violate prevailing values such as the "democratic mould," the major instrument available to the leadership in strengthening its position is the very factor which gave rise to the group in the first place: lack of satisfaction for certain shared attitudes of its members. The leaders can consolidate their positions by keeping alive some feelings of dissatisfaction while at the same time providing partial satisfaction. Keeping the membership satisfied with the quality of its leadership does not require that all of then: demands be satisfied—it is only necessary that a certain minimum of the demands be satisfied. What this minimum is will vary from time to time and with the circumstances; it will vary with the skill of the leaders in dealing with their members; and it will vary with the ability of the leaders, where necessary, to manufacture objectives which admit of progress being made and then substitute these for the more difficult objectives. Between the minimum which must be delivered to the membership and the maximum which the group leaders can obtain lies the margin that is available for the pursuit of organizational goals. Compromises can be entered into for the purpose of earning the good-will of the leaders of other groups and of government officials, demands can be dropped if they are embarrassing to political leaders, perquisites (such as appointments to government bodies made upon the nomination of the group leaders) can be obtained and offered to potential rivals for the leadership, thus tying them to the incumbent leadership. The leaders can take public positions which, though they may fly in

INTRODUCTION

19

the face of the interests of the group, happen to coincide with the prevailing notion of the public interest. Such actions elevate the leaders to the status of "statesmen" in the eyes of the public, a public which includes the group's members. Few things are as valuable to a leader attempting to maintain his position as the spokesman for an interest than to be accepted by the general public as the interest's spokesman. If the group leaders are prepared to abide by the "rules of the game," the other parties to the process of group politics have no objection to allowing them to consolidate their positions in this manner. The struggle for supremacy within a group or between groups within the same interest is roughly equivalent to a price war between competing merchants—the only real winners are those being served. In the case of an interest group, those being served are the members. A struggle of this nature means that the demands of the membership become more important relative to the organizational goals of the leaders. In this sense it is a threat to all group leaders and to the political leaders as well. The over-emphasis of membership objectives narrows the freedom of the group's leaders, restricts the area within which the leaders are free to manoeuvre and compromise, and can even force leaders to abandon the "rules of the game" in order to seek benefits for their members, with all of the consequences of such an abandonment. The existence of rival groups and of rival leaders within a group thus presents a threat not only to the leaders of the group concerned but also to all those with whom those leaders have developed stable relations. Rival groups and rival leaders are a potentially disruptive element in the system and as such they are looked upon with a jaundiced eye by all concerned. Civil wars, it has been observed, are the most bitterly contested of all wars. The reason may be that wars between states are normally fought for limited objectives while the objective in a civil war is the complete liquidation of the opposition. What is true of civil wars is true also of struggles between rival groups seeking to represent the same interest. "The philanthropic organization devoted to good works often regards other agencies in the same field with a venomous eye. Councils of social agencies in large cities are often notorious for the rancour with which the struggle for prestige and recognition ... is conducted one with the other."46 The leaders of groups representing opposing interests can easily compromise their differences, and the struggle between them, insofar as there is a struggle, can be conducted for limited objectives. The real struggle of group politics is between rival groups attempting to represent the same interest. It is here that one encounters the strongest denunciations and the most bitter epithets. Its movement in policy put the Grange, in 1961, in accord with the broad outlines of President Kennedy's farm program, which proposed a commodityby-commodity approach to production policy as well as a high degree of farmer participation in program formulation. Grange leaders had harsh

20

CHAPTER ONE words for the Farm Bureau's "falsehoods and distortions" in its "frantic efforts" to defeat "reasonable" farm legislation.47

One of the defects the American Farm Bureau Federation leadership saw in the proposed legislation was that it envisaged "a high degree of farmer participation." Such participation would undercut the mandate of the federation and endanger the pursuit of organizational goals by the leadership. It was therefore unacceptable. As Key has noted of the federation on another occasion: "It reacted with special vigour against direct federal consultative and service relations with groups of farmers, apparently on the basis of the doctrine that only it should speak for farmers."48 In a similar vein the executive of the Canadian Labour Congress characterized its relationship with the Conservative Government of 1957-63 as "the poorest of any between government and a national labour centre among the highly industrialized western nations."49 The reasons for the low state of the relationship were explained: Practices that had existed for many years with respect to consultation and appointment of Congress nominees to Agencies and Commissions were unilaterally changed or discontinued. This naturally led to a strained relationship particularly when . . . the Congress was completely bypassed and direct approaches regarding Labour appointments were made to affiliates or individuals. Under such circumstances it is not difficult to imagine what might have happened if organized labour in Canada was not in a position to speak and act as it did through one strong unified body. The Congress has maintained a forceful, consistent position in regard to its role as the official spokesman for labour at the national level.50

The rise of a rival organization within the same interest is a tragic development in the eyes of the leadership of the established and mandated group. Describing the attitude of the leadership of the American Federation of Labor with respect to the emerging Congress of Industrial Organizations, Truman uses such terms as "the dread borders of dualism"51 and describes dual unionism as "the equivalent of original sin."52 Such strong language is not unwarranted in the view of the threatened leadership, who feel that the rise of rival groups must be prevented at all costs. Thus: "The policy of the General Medical Services Committee of the B.M.A. . . . is 'to ensure that the Minister is given no opportunity of consulting bodies other than those represented on the Whitley Council on major issues'."53 Similarly, the American Legion, faced with the formation of rival veterans' groups after the Second World War did its "utmost to discredit and freeze out the upstart societies."54 The American Farm Bureau Federation has pursued the same policy: A feature of Federation policy has been its vigorous attempt to establish and maintain itself as the predominant, if not the sole, spokesman for the

INTRODUCTION

21

farmer. At least a color of truth pervades the cynical observation that the Federation fights for the Iowa corn grower and speaks for the southern cotton planter, but most of all it looks out for the American Farm Bureau Federation. Before the extensive development of agricultural administrative apparatus in the 1930's, the principal agencies dealing with farmers were the state extension services connected with the state land-grant colleges. Commonly the Federation and the state colleges were joined together in informal alliance to their mutual advantage. Administrative actions by the federal Department of Agriculture that by-passed the state colleges aroused the opposition of the Federation, which saw farm programs moving into the hands of organizations less susceptible to its influence. . . . The Federation has been impatient with the Soil Conservation Service which deals directly with local soil conservation districts. It has urged that the Service's functions be devolved upon the state extension services. . . . A system of county land-use planning committees by which the Department of Agriculture proposed to consult with farmers on the form and administration of agricultural programs met a quick death as the Federation moved in on the appropriations committee. Farm Bureau leaders, perhaps mindful of the Federation's origins in official stimulation, regarded these and other measures as designed to create new and competing organizations of farmers. We will, the president of the AFBF said, "crack down on any group that will do that."55 Speaking of the American Farm Bureau Federation, Truman has observed that: "Its Ohio affiliate . . . not only has refused to conform to this federation's policies from time to time, but has even sided with the rival Farmer's Union."56 The use of the word even is significant. To the layman the fact that a group of Ohio farmers had decided to back the policy of the Farmer's Union may not appear to warrant much attention. In fact, it is more unforgiveable than opposing the AFBF to side with the railroads or some other opposing interest. Although Truman does not state the conclusion, it is implicit in his use of the word even: the most bitter battles in group politics are those waged between rival groups within the same interest. Groups representing opposing interests may easily cooperate, but for groups representing the same interest cooperation is a dangerous path. The need to prevent the rise of rival groups causes group leaders to overemphasize the importance of unity. The "need to speak with one voice" is constantly impressed upon the members, if possible by pointing to disasters, specified or unspecified, which would have occurred in the past or which may occur in future if the one voice is replaced by several voices. The extract cited above from the 1960 Executive Report of the Canadian Labour Congress is one example; others abound. Thus, the statement by the chairman of the English Herring Catchers' Association that "it is more important now than ever before that the English Drifter Owners speak with one voice."57 And the president of the Association of Municipal Corporations warns that,

22

CHAPTER ONE

"From the extreme north to the extreme south, from the greatest municipality to the smallest, we have common public interests to defend and to advance. About those we need to speak with a common voice,"58 while the Traders' Road Transport Association claims that "recent political history in the field of transport surely illustrates the need for continued unity and steadfastness among *C licence holders."59 The leaders of federated organizations encounter the problem of unity on an additional plane—in the relations between the leaders of the central organization and the leaders of the affiliated units. Each leadership group at each level has an organization of its own and each group therefore has organizational goals of its own. A striking example of the manner in which the demands of the membership and the ostensible goals of the organization are subordinated to the oganizational goals of the leaders at both levels is provided by the history of the National Association of Retail Druggists in the United States during the 1930s: "The successful promotion of anti-chainstore legislation in the 1930s placed the director of the National Association of Retail Druggists in an almost invulnerable position with his constituents."60 The position of the director may have been "almost invulnerable" as far as the retail druggists themselves were concerned but this did not help him to deal with the state organizations in 1937 when an attempt was made to centralize certain functions: "Even a comparatively well-disciplined trade group like the National Association of Retail Druggists has experienced struggles of various types. A federated organization, its constituent State units threatened open rebellion when the national organization moved to absorb some of their functions."61 The major aims of a group's leadership are organizational, and among the most important of these is the preservation of its mandate. Regardless of what this may mean for the ostensible goals of the organization, leaders are rarely prepared to abandon their organizational goals. When they do so it is usually only to pursue another, more important, organizational goal. Thus, the leaders of the unions affiliated with the AFL and the CIO were faced with the choice of compromising the legitimacy of organized labour by tolerating "union gangsterism" and communist-dominated unions or agreeing to limit their own mandates by accepting the centralization of power within the labour centres, giving them the power to take action against "gangster" and communist unions. Indicative of constituent autonomy in the AFL was the consideration by its 1940 annual convention of the problem of cleansing some of its member unions of racketeers. The principle of "states' rights" limited the convention to a condemnation of racketeering union leaders and to a direction to the executive council to use its "influence" to bring about a house cleaning in the unions concerned. By 1953 AFL constitutional doctrine had moved a long distance and its convention took the "revolutionary" step, as some labor

INTRODUCTION

23

leaders termed it, of expelling the International Longshoremen's Association from the Federation.62 In 1940, the problem of union gangsterism was not serious in the sense that it was not being held before the public eye and resulting in public demands for reform. It was not, therefore, a threat to the legitimacy of the labour movement and the result was that no effective action was taken against delinquent union leaders. By 1953 the problem of union gangsterism was more serious. Congressional investigation had produced abundant evidence of the widespread nature of such activities and the matter had entered the realm of public discussion. Public demands for reform were being heard and labour racketeers were bringing the entire labour movement into disrepute. The question before the AFL in 1953 was whether to protect the legitimacy of the labour movement at the expense of the mandate of the leaders of the affiliated unions or whether to preserve intact the mandate of those leaders at the possible cost of endangering the legitimacy of the labour movement as a whole. A similar sequence occurred with communist-dominated unions in the CIO. In 1949, the CIO Executive Board revoked the charter of a union for alleged communist infiltration. At their convention that year "the United Automobile Workers, which would stand to gain from the dissolution of the Farm Equipment Workers Union, raised objections to endorsing the action of the CIO Executive Board which were based on the assertion that its decision violated union autonomy."63 By 1957 the United States had been through the McCarthy era, the Korean War, and the intensification of the Cold War, and the climate of public opinion was much more hostile to communist activity than it had been in 1949. Thus, "the CIO national leadership took strong action against several of its internationals which were dominated by communist factions. These unions were expelled, and the CIO financed organizing committees to recruit workers in the industries concerned into new unions with an untainted leadership."64 In both cases the questions at issue were the organizational objectives of the leadership, both local and central, rather than the ostensible goals of the group or the demands of the membership. And in both cases a changing environment resulted in a sacrifice of mandate on the part of the local leaders in an attempt to bring their organizations into line with prevailing values and thus protect the legitimacy of the interest which they represented. Second only to a direct assault upon the legitimacy of the interest which it represents, the most dreaded of all threats to the leadership of an interest group is the emergence of a rival group; it is far more dreadful than the rise of a rival leadership within the same organization. First, the rise of a rival group within the same interest is not only a rival for membership, it is also a rival for the favours which government can

24

CHAPTER ONE

dispense and which the interest can obtain. If there are no clashes of interest between the members of the group, as within the agricultural interest between dairy farmers and growers of feed grains, the benefits obtained by one group will usually be welcome and beneficial to the members of the rival group; legislation is rarely enacted to apply specifically to the members of the interest group which sought that legislation. There is, in such cases, no problem in reconciling intra-interest differences insofar as the goals of membership are concerned. The problem lies in the allocation of the organizational favours which can be claimed from government and from other interest-group leaders, precisely the sort of benefits that can be used to solidify the organization and improve its internal cohesion. The existence of a rival group within an interest means that there are now two groups competing for the same limited number of favours. Second, rival leaders within an organization must begin from scratch; they are unorganized, inexperienced, have no record to which they can point, and lack access to either the funds or the organs of the organization. Furthermore, in the case of malcontents within the organization it is often possible to reach some form of mutual accommodation; for example, by using the favours bestowed by government to win the loyalty of the rebels, they may be absorbed into the existing leadership structure. At any rate, the leaders have at their disposal all the advantages which normally accrue to an incumbent leadership and these are usually sufficient to tip the balance in their favour. The rival group suffers none of these disadvantages. It is organized, and "in business," and, if its leaders have not yet been socialized into the modes of behaviour appropriate to interest-group leaders, the chances are that the new group's policy line will be more radical and will stress ostensible goals to a far greater extent than the old-established organization. It will thus hold a great attraction for the members of the old organization. As well, the fact that it is often difficult to dislodge office holders in the old organization makes the rival group a greater threat than it would otherwise be. Usually the only alternative for disaffected elements is to leave the organization, and the existence of a rival organization provides the malcontents with a place to go. In effect, the existence of a rival organization converts the task of leadership into a continuous election campaign against permanent opposition candidates in the other organization. An established group may be able to count on government help in maintaining its position in the face of competition from a rival group. Such help would constitute an example of the use of political favours for the pursuit of organizational objectives. In 1944 a number of articulate spokesmen began to agitate the skilled workers [in the U AW]... and aroused considerable interest among tool and die workers. There was some possibility that carpenters, electricians, and other maintenance men would transfer to various AFL unions. The result

INTRODUCTION

25

was a 5-cent increase for all apprenticeable occupations in the automobile industry. . . . Convincing the National War Labor Board that it might legitimately order the increase under the stabilization rules was a spectacular political achievement in itself.65 INTEREST-GROUP LEADERS AS AN INTEREST

The idea of conflict has tended to be over-emphasized in the literature on political interest groups. An example is Latham's Group Basis of Politics,™ which has an introductory chapter entitled "Group Conflict and the Political Process." The content justifies the title. Latham uses the word struggle nine times in nine pages, and terms such as silent war and army of occupation abound. The results of the struggle are that groups "can be defeated," or "they can be routed," while on the other hand there are "the victories of the successful coalitions." The nature of the struggle is such that "if entirely uninhibited, [it] would produce violence and warfare."67 Latham has not been the only observer to use the military analogy. Truman carries it even further: "As in military conflict, so in the political process the organization, strategy, and tactics of one combatant in part determine the organization, strategy and tactics employed by the other."68 It was therefore with good reason that Zeigler observed that "group theory is unable to come to grips with problems of societal integration because of an excessive concern for conflict."69 And, he continues, "In stressing latent and actual conflict, group theory neglects values, customs, and agencies of socialization that cement society into a viable operating unit."70 Zeigler is attributing social stability to the fact that individuals are socialized into particular patterns of behaviour and this socialization is what "cementfs] society into a viable operating unit." This is no doubt true, but it does not explain why the conflict theory of group politics is inappropriate. The fact that the individual members of a society have been exposed to the "values, customs, and agencies of socialization of a society" is not a reason to expect this experience to be mirrored perfectly by the leaders of the interest groups to which they belong. The agencies of socialization and the values of the society will merely, as indicated above, provide the parameters which define the boundaries of the "legitimate" interests, but they tell nothing about the manner in which the leaders of the groups representing these interests may operate; they tell nothing about the intensity of the "struggle" except that it must be confined to "legitimate" means. This is not to say that the socialization of the members of a society has no effect upon the intensity of the group "struggle." It might well have, but this does not provide a complete explanation. The "struggle" is moderated because the interest-group leaders have been socialized into the appropriate behaviour patterns.

26

CHAPTER ONE The group experiences and affiliations of an individual are the primary, though not the exclusive, means by which the individual knows, interprets, and reacts to the society in which he exists. Their significance here is that they produce in their participants certain uniformities of behavior and attitude that must be achieved by the individual if he is to be a completely accepted member of the group. The process by which the individual reaches these uniformities is essentially what is meant by the term socialization.71

The individual must observe certain patterns and standards of behaviour if he is to be accepted by the other members of the class or category to which he belongs, or aspires to belong. Interest-group leaders are members of two classes which do not include the members of the groups they lead. First, they are members of the class composed of interest-group leaders. As such, they share certain attitudes with other interest-group leaders. Interest-group leaders are socialized into, and expected to conform to, the mores and behaviour patterns of this class. Second, they are members of the class composed of all those who are participants in the process of group politics, including political leaders and government officials. As such, they share certain attitudes with their counterparts in this class and are expected to abide by the informal rules of conduct developed within that class or category. It is the socialization of interest-group leaders into these classes or categories which moderates the intensity of the group "struggle." The customary patterns of behaviour developed within a group reflect the shared attitudes of the members of the group. The raison d'etre of these behaviour patterns is that they are necessary, or at least helpful, to the advancement of the shared attitudes and they aid in the protection of the common interests of the group members. Their sanction is that failure to observe them would be harmful to the members of the group, either by rendering the members vulnerable to attack from without or by increasing the perils which may result from the competition among the members themselves. In the former instance, the behaviour patterns enable the group to present a united front to the outside world in defence of their common interests; their function is essentially that of a defensive alliance. In the latter instance, the customary behaviour patterns place restrictions upon the extent and the methods of competition among the group members; their function is essentially that of a non-aggression treaty. Probably the best example of such a behaviour pattern is the "code of honour" of the professional soldier. Possibly because of the extent of the risks involved, this code developed early into a highly formalized set of rules and was eventually made a part of international law. Early in his career, every aspiring professional officer is socialized into the mores and modes of behaviour appropriate to "the honourable profession of arms." The military code of honour, whatever the romantic connotations attaching to its origins in chivalry, has developed as a result of the self-interest of the professional military itself.

INTRODUCTION

27

Under feudalism officers were gentlemen, not only because they came from aristocratic social backgrounds, but because they were concerned with the rules of chivalry. They hoped to keep the growing destructiveness of warfare in bounds, so that the pursuit of military honor would not become too costly and prohibitive.72 It is in the interest of the participants in warfare that limits be placed upon the means and methods of military conflict, and the customary patterns of behaviour assumed the form of a "non-aggression treaty" among the professional military. Describing the role of the military officers at disarmament conferences, Alfred Vagts, in his History of Militarism, said: The activity of the officers went beyond the usual role in which they are visualized at such conferences—that of shoemakers expected to agree on the suppression of shoes. In their zeal they often forgot their national divisions and like members of a professional Internationale or fraternity united in agreeing to yield as little as possible to the civilians.73 Here the customary behaviour patterns assumed the form of a "defensive alliance" based upon the shared attitudes of men in uniform. These attitudes apparently took precedence over those based upon nationality and shared with the civilian members of the same delegation. So long as war remained a well-ordered affair fought for limited objectives by small professional armies it mattered little that the statesmen had declared war or that the civilian population thirsted for blood. The professional military men had been socialized into patterns of behaviour which limited the intensity of the struggle and constituted, in effect, a "non-aggression treaty" between them. Thus, the shared attitudes of the professional military produced codes of behaviour which became mandatory for those who sought acceptance into the group, and those codes of behaviour had as their function the protection of the interests peculiar to the professional military of all countries; the interests which the professional military had apart from the interests of society and which they had because they were members of the military forces. The members of the professional military were themselves an interest. Interest-group leaders are themselves an interest and as such they share common interests and problems and cooperate to their mutual advantage in numerous joint endeavours. They have learned to settle many of their differences among themselves. The purpose of their cooperation is to further those interests which they share—their organizational interests which derive from their positions as interest-group leaders. These interests, as well as those of the other participants in the process of group politics, lead them to seek stability and predictability in their relations with each other and with the outside world.74 This cannot be attained if they are constantly engaged

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CHAPTER ONE

in bitter life-and-death struggles among themselves. Consequently, the lifeand-death struggle has been all but banished from the realm of group politics. In addition to the "non-aggression treaty" there are several other reasons which help to explain the absence of a bitter struggle. First, the leaders of legitimized interests are not seeking a fundamental realignment of society. The abandonment of any such aims is one of the conditions upon which legitimacy is accorded. Therefore, the group leaders are all in agreement about fundamentals; they only differ about relatively minor matters. This in itself is sufficient to exert a strong moderating influence upon group conflict. Second, the elimination of certain groups might well improve the positions of the leaders of the groups representing opposing interests, but the relief would only be temporary. Soon a new group would be established to represent that interest. The leaders of the existing group are a known quantity, relations have been established with them, and a modus vivendi has been achieved. The leaders of the group that would replace it are an unknown quantity, and unknown quantities are undesirable when one is seeking stability and predictability. Third, the elimination of a group runs counter to the organizational interests of the leaders of the groups representing opposing interests. These leaders enjoy their positions because there exists an organized group for them to oppose as well as one to promote. They are able to strengthen their positions within their own groups because the existence of a strong group representing an opposing interest is a threat. It is well known that groups which can maintain a high degree of internal cohesion in the face of an enemy easily develop internal schisms in the absence of an enemy. Interestgroup leaders have a definite interest in ensuring the continued survival of their opponents. They frequently employ the device of utilizing conflicts with outside groups, usually with the aid of internal propaganda, to increase cohesion and to strengthen the position of the active minority. . . . The threat may not be real or may be grossly exaggerated, of course. In observing competing groups one encounters with amusing regularity a tendency of leaders on both sides to inflate the strength, organization, and finances of the opposition.75

Reference has already been made above to Key's description of the manner in which interest-group staffs arouse fears among the group's membership by conjuring up devils. Furthermore, the existence of a strong group representing an opposing interest is helpful to group leaders in explaining to their members the compromises and delays which were necessary for organizational reasons. Finally, a sham battle in which all parties know that the worst that any of them will suffer is a few bruises is preferable to a real battle from which some of the parties will not emerge. The real battles and bitter conflicts,

INTRODUCTION

29

when they occur, occur between rival groups representing the same interest. Among opposing groups cooperation, or at least "live and let live," is deemed to be much safer and offers far greater security than unrestricted competition. THE LEVELS OF LEGITIMACY AND MANDATE

This study deals with the activities of a political interest group and the efforts of its leaders to protect and enhance the legitimacy of the interest which they represent, the mandate of their organization as the representative of that interest, and their own mandate within that organization. In order to avoid taking an overly narrow view of the subject, it is necessary to examine the manner in which the activities of political leaders, government officials, and interest-group leaders are meshed and the way the organizational goals of all of them are served by their cooperation within the framework of group politics. It is necessary to examine the aims of the participants in terms of the protection and enhancement of their own legitimacy and mandate. At the first, and highest, level there is the legitimacy of the political system and the mandate of the incumbent political leaders. The advantages which accrue to the system as a result of the recognition of the legitimacy of a new interest and its participation in the political process have already been discussed. The result is to tie the new interest to the existing system and thereby strengthen that system by reinforcing its legitimacy. This, of course, is one of the goals of the political leadership. The manner in which interest groups are helpful to political leaders has also been discussed. The effect of interest-group activity is to provide political leaders with some of the means which they require to retain power. That is, the mandate of the political leaders is strengthened and the possibilities of their continued possession of that mandate are increased. The second level of legitimacy and mandate involves the system of group politics itself. It has already been pointed out that lobbyists and their activities are not particularly esteemed by the public. To preserve the legitimacy of interest-group activity and continue to reap the benefits which it provides, group leaders must eschew the grosser forms of behaviour which could result in a public outcry. The political leaders and government officials, for their part, must refrain from assigning responsibility for any decision to the interest groups which sought that decision. A decision which later turns out to have been a mistake would, if responsibility for it were assigned to one or more interest groups, arouse public opinion and endanger, or at least inhibit, the entire system of group politics. The preservation of mandate at this level means that all participants are interested in maintaining their persona grata status with each other. Essentially, it involves observance of the "rules of the game" which have been developed by the participants for their mutual protection.

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CHAPTER ONE

The third level is that of the interest. Legitimacy here involves the recognition by the prevailing value system that it is an acceptable interest in the community; recognition that the interest is an honourable and respectable one. Mandate at this level is the ability of the group leadership to retain the confidence of the membership. Reference has already been made to the numerous ways in which this can be accomplished. The key point here is that it is not necessary for the leaders to obtain complete satisfaction for the demands of the membership, only to satisfy a certain minimum of these demands. Further, the satisfaction of this minimum is only one way among many the leaders can protect their position. Consideration must also be given to two sub-levels of legitimacy and mandate: one is found within the government hierarchy and involves the civil servants and officials who serve the political leaders, the other is found within the hierarchies of the organized groups and involves the officials of these groups. Government officials are all members of organizations; each official will normally have his own ambitions and these will normally be tied to the organization of which he is a member. A large organization increases the status of its head within the hierarchy; a large organization performing a vital task increases the status of its head even more. The members of the governmental hierarchy seek to increase the legitimacy of the work that is being performed by their organization. That is, they seek to gain recognition of its greater importance relative to the work being performed by other organizations within the hierarchy.76 In the pursuit of these objectives, the official's greatest ally can be the interest-group leaders with whom he deals. The latter are in a position to press upon the political leaders demands for the extension of a particular service, or they can leave that service and the organization performing it to stagnate by turning their attention elsewhere. Interest-group leaders know that there is a definite limit to the favours which they can obtain. Their "purchasing power" is limited and their intention is to make the most of what they have got. The government official must "sell" his wares to them and he does so by offering superior service and a higher degree of satisfaction than his competitors. In return, interest-group leaders will demand an extension of the services which his organization performs and either the institution of new services, or the transfer of services located elsewhere to his organization. The reverse is true as well. If government officials prove intractable or administer legislation in a manner that runs counter to the needs of the interest-group leaders, the latter may use what influence they have to seek the abolition of the service or the reduction of the services entrusted to the organization or, finally, the outright abolition of the official's organization. Thus, the American Farm Bureau Federation fought a successful campaign to kill the Farm Security Administration, a unit of the

INTRODUCTION

31

Department of Agriculture born in early New Deal days to rehabilitate low-income farmers. . . . it concerned itself with the wages and working conditions of farm workers upon whom farm proprietors with heavy seasonal labor requirements were especially dependent. Early in 1942 the Federation launched a barrage which was instrumental in the liquidation of the Farm Security Administration.77 The abolition of the functions of his organization, or of the organization itself, obviously runs counter to the organizational objectives of the government official—it can have a decidedly detrimental effect upon the progress of his career. Within the interest group itself, if it is an organization of any size, there will be a hierarchy and a number of sub-organizations. Each of the suborganization heads will have ambitions which are tied to his sub-organization, and hence organizational goals of his own. The official within the hierarchy of the interest group will attempt to increase the status and importance of the functions performed by his organization or sub-organization in much the same way as the government official. Government officials and interest-group officials who are at the head of organizations operating in the same functional field can, and often do, cooperate to their mutual advantage. Each urging upon his superiors steps that will enhance the importance of the function performed by both. The government official being supported by the demands of the group leaders upon his superiors, and the group leaders being encouraged in these demands by the cooperation which their official has received at the hands of the government official concerned. There still remains one level to consider. Thus far interest-group leaders and political leaders have been spoken of as though they constituted two monolithic blocs. This is, of course, not so. Each leader in both groups will have ambitions and policy objectives which place him in opposition to at least some of his colleagues. Furthermore, individual political leaders and individual interest-group leaders who are opposed by their colleagues may find it useful to enlist each other's aid. An interest group can press upon an unwilling cabinet a policy that is favoured by a friendly minister, and thus strengthen his hand within the cabinet. Again, a minister may suggest, possibly upon the advice of one of his officials, a compromise which is not particularly favoured by the majority of a group's leadership but which happens to fit in with the plans of one of them—one who happens to be on close terms with the advising official. Thus, the process of group politics involves a multitude of organizations and sub-organizations, and within each of these are individuals whose interests are bound up with the interests of the organizations and suborganizations they serve. Each of these individuals has organizational goals which are intended to advance his own interests within the organization and

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CHAPTER ONE

to advance the interests of his organization among the other organizations. The competition between organizations and individuals is regulated by certain informally developed standards of what constitutes acceptable behaviour. A final question remains to be answered: how does stable policy exist? The above discussion suggests an answer. Stable policy exists because the interest-group leaders and their political and administrative counterparts seek and prize stability; it exists because their organizational goals encourage them to tame the political environment in which they operate; and, it exists because the stakes for which the interest groups compete are limited by considerations of the mutual self-interest of all group leaders.

Chapter 2

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS: History, Structure, and Function

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the origins and development of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), analyse its function in the Canadian labour movement, and define the loci of power within the Congress as aids in understanding its operations, the attitudes of its leaders, and the factors underlying the demands which these leaders make upon government. /. History The Canadian Labour Congress was established in 1956 by the merger of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada (TLC) and the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). The TLC had originally been established as the Canadian Trades and Labor Congress in 1886 and, after two changes of name, emerged with its ultimate designation in 1892. The CCL was founded in 1940 by the merger of the All-Canadian Congress of Labour, for the most part made up of unions expelled from the TLC in 1902, and the Canadian CIO Committee, made up of unions expelled from the TLC in 1939. Implicit in the origins of the TLC was a major dilemma. It could accept the affiliation of the Canadian locals of American international unions and in so doing accept the trade union philosophy of the American parent unions as well as the obligation to respect their prerogatives and those of the recently established American trade union centre, the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Or, it could elect to stand independently by establishing Canadian unions and attempting to capture the Canadian membership of the American unions. Given the ill-starred attempts at previous union organization in Canada the decision to accept the affiliation of the international unions was inevitable if the new Canadian organization was to survive. Thereafter, the history of the TLC is the story of a slow evolution towards a very restricted autonomy. In 1902, as a result of American labour leaders' abhorrence of "dual unionism" and "after the AFL decided to lay down the law to its Canadian counterpart,"1 the TLC expelled the Knights of Labour and other

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CHAPTER TWO

purely Canadian unions which competed for members with American international unions. In 1939, the AFL again obliged the TLC to take a major decision which was deemed necessary to the organizational aims of the AFL leadership: The Trades and Labor Congress ... was most reluctant to expel the Canadian branches of the CIO unions. But, faced with a virtual ultimatum from the American Federation of Labor that it must either expel the CIO unions or lose the AFL unions (whose Canadian membership was then far larger), it had really no choice, and in 1939 the CIO unions were accordingly cast forth.2

Only in 1945, after having refused for thirty-five years, did the AFL recognize the right of the TLC to charter local trades and labour councils. It was not until the following year that the TLC felt able to refuse to expel a union at the behest of the AFL leadership. The ability of the TLC to withstand AFL demands in 1946 was an isolated instance rather than the omen of a new trend. In 1947 the AFL demanded that the Canadian Seamen's Union be converted into a branch of the Seafarers' International Union. "Although the leadership of the TLC was called before an Executive Council meeting of the AFL and told to institute such a change"3 the TLC leadership was able to withstand the pressure for two years, but in the end was obliged to capitulate. Between 1902 and the merger of 1956, the outstanding feature of the Canadian labour movement was the series of schisms induced and expulsions imposed from without in response to the organizational needs of the AFL leadership. The evolution of the Canadian labour movement was clearly governed by the needs and ambitions of American labour leaders rather than by the needs of Canadian labour. Almost immediately after the separation of 1939, both the TLC and the CCL began passing resolutions favouring unity. However, unity was impossible at that time: As long as the two American central bodies were at logger-heads, their Canadian counterparts could make little progress towards reunion, because of the provisions of the Trades and Labor Congress Constitution which in effect forbade it to affiliate any union 'dual' to an American Federation of Labor union.4

It was only when the two American labour centres agreed to discuss union that union became feasible in Canada. At the CLC founding convention in 1956, Donald MacDonald, speaking on behalf of the joint TLC-CCL Unity Committee, indicated those matters which had been uppermost in the minds of the representatives of the two centres: The TLC-CCL Unity Committee set down four basic principles for the

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS 35 Canadian Labour Congress. These were: Membership, Convention, Officers and Finance. . . . Under membership the new Congress is to accept as equals all affiliated and chartered unions and organizations which are now in either the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada or the Canadian Congress of Labour. It is to maintain and preserve the integrity of each affiliated union and it is to also recognize both the industrial and craft concepts of organization.5

Later that afternoon Mr. MacDonald spoke of "the basic principle of the integrity of the basic affiliations being protected in their fields."6 Mr. A. R. Mosher, president of the CCL, also stressed the importance of assuring the uninterrupted existence of the affiliated organizations. Speaking in reply to requests that sections of the proposed CLC constitution, based upon the original merger agreement, be referred back to the Unity Committee for revision, he said: "I would venture to say any attempt to change the terms of the merger agreement destroys the basis for the entire convention. . . . If you depart from it at all, it means that the terms of the merger agreement which guarantee the rights of each individual organization in here can also be violated."7 The merger is described in the following terms by the official historian of the labour movement in Canada: By the end of 1953 the two Canadian Congresses had appointed a joint Unity Committee, which first (1954) drew up a "No-raiding Agreement" . . . and in 1955 a "Merger Agreement". After ratification by the two Congress conventions, the Merger Agreement came into force, and the founding convention of the united Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) took place in April 1956.8

The order in which the two agreements were concluded is not insignificant. Neither is it insignificant that after having entered into a no-raiding agreement, the parties to that agreement thought it prudent to appoint Mr. H. Carl Goldenberg, Q.C. as "an impartial chairman to whom the Unity Committee could appeal in the event of a deadlock."9 The existence of rival trade union centres had given rise to a multitude of competing unions whose existence, although the result of divisions induced from without, had created a vested interest in continued division. A multiplicity of organizations had given rise to a multiplicity of leadership groups and each group had a vested interest in ensuring its own survival. In this instance, each of the rival trade union centres had affiliated unions whose jurisdictions conflicted with the jurisdictions of affiliates of the rival centre. Similar conflicting jurisdictions existed in the United States. Because of the dependence of the Canadian affiliates of the TLC upon their parent unions in the United States, unity in Canada had to await the establishment of labour peace in the United States. In the mid 1950s, in both

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CHAPTER TWO

the United States and Canada, unity became a possibility because "prior to the merger, many affiliated unions of the former Congresses signed a 'no raiding' pact."10 That is, a state of equilibrium had been reached and the leaders of the competing unions could see no distinct advantage in continuing the competition for members. The result was an agreement to forego competition in favour of mutual recognition and the working out of an acceptable modus vivendi.1* Only when this stage had been reached was it possible for the centres to merge. At the CLC founding convention in 1956, AFL-CIO President George Meany discussed the nature of the relationship that was henceforth to obtain between his organization and the new Canadian trade union centre. In a manner "not unlike a statesman granting independence to a former colony,"12 he said: So far as the AFL-CIO is concerned, we wish this trade union center every success. Let there be no misunderstanding as to the relationship between the AFL-CIO and the newly formed Canadian Labour Congress. This organization that you are forming is a free, independent trade union center for Canada, just as the AFL-CIO is a trade union center for the United States.15

The Proceedings of the convention record that some delegates were of the opinion that the recognition of the independence of the CLC by the AFLCIO was a move of sufficient consequence to merit applause. The grant of independence was not, however, as sweeping or as unconditional as Mr. Meany's words indicate. In December 1961, the AFL-CIO amended its constitutional provisions relating to one of the most vital of all trade union concerns: raiding. The revised procedures were to apply to the Canadian sections of American international unions. On 1 June 1962, CLC President Claude Jodoin addressed a lengthy letter to President Meany assuring him that the Congress had adequate provisions in its own constitution for dealing with raiding and that these provisions were being diligently applied: As you are no doubt aware, the Canadian Labour Congress has, since its foundation in 1956, taken a firm position on raiding. In cases where evidence of a raid has been indisputable, strong disciplinary measures have been applied. No less than five major affiliates of the Congress have been expelled from affiliation for raiding other affiliates. . . . The position the AFL-CIO is taking regarding the application of Article 21 is undermining this whole structure. Unions which have been found guilty by us feel they may be able to establish their innocence before one of your tribunals. Unions whose charges have been found insupportable by us are attempting to press the charges again through your procedure.14

The letter went on to remind Mr. Meany of his statements at the Congress' founding convention and closed with an implied threat:

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS 37 We have experienced considerable difficulty defending the principle of acceptance of the international movement in Canada and have consistently given our assistance without reservation to the international unions with membership in Canada where those affiliates subscribe to the Constitution, principles and policies of the Canadian Labour Congress. We shall continue to do so, but we must have the co-operation and understanding of the AFLCIO in this resolve. . . . I must seriously sound this note of warning—that any attempt of the AFLCIO to take over any area of constitutional activity in which the Canadian Labour Congress has heretofore exercised complete autonomy will have consequences for the international trade union movement that are likely to be disastrous. I urge your Executive Council . . . to exempt the Canadian locals of your affiliates from the provisions of Article 21 of your Constitution and to recognize the exclusive right of the Canadian Labour Congress to deal with all matters in inter-union relations in this country.15 After carefully examining the Congress' constitutional provisions on the subject of raiding, the AFL-CIO Executive Council agreed that, subject to certain conditions, the CLC could be permitted to settle inter-union disputes arising in Canada: The 1963 convention of the AFL-CIO passed a resolution authorizing the CLC to settle inter-union disputes in Canada, provided it adopted an internal disputes plan similar to that of the American organization. Despite some misgiving among the building and construction trades unions, this was agreed to at the 1964 CLC convention. Accordingly, its constitution was amended to provide for an Internal Disputes Plan almost identical to that in the AFL-CIO.16 The Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers (CBRT), a purely Canadian organization, objected to these conditions on the grounds that the Congress had been the recipient of a conditional grant of autonomy which could be rescinded at any time by the AFL-CIO. The misgivings among the construction unions did not stem from a desire to assert the autonomy of the Congress. On the contrary, they were most reluctant to see a separate Canadian plan introduced and went along with it only on the understanding that it would not affect disputes among themselves. They took this position because they were already allied with the National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes, an offspring of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, and certain national contractor organizations in the United States.17 The point which stands out thus far is the concern of American union leaders to protect the integrity of their organizations against other union leaders who might be tempted to expand their own organizations at the

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CHAPTER TWO

expense of someone else's. This concern has influenced the development of the labour movement in Canada by obliging the TLC, at the behest of the AFL, to expel those Canadian unions which competed with the parent unions of its affiliates. As the internal disputes plan demonstrates, in those matters which are important to the American labour leaders the autonomy of the CLC is far from complete. However, the CLC enjoys a stronger position vis-a-vis the AFL-CIO than the TLC ever enjoyed vis-a-vis the AFL. The CLC has been able to develop an independent base of purely Canadian unions which cannot be withdrawn by labour bosses in Washington. The TLC, not having been permitted to accept into affiliation any union "dual" to an AFL affiliate, was unable to develop such a base. In addition, divisions within the AFLCIO are far more serious than ever afflicted the AFL, and it is therefore unlikely that the American centre could present a united front in its dealings with the CLC. These factors influence the relationship between the AFLCIO and the CLC and enable the latter to enjoy a modicum of autonomy. II.

The Function of the Congress

The activities undertaken by a trade union centre are many and varied. Article II of the CLC constitution lists no less than twelve general purposes to which the Congress leadership is required to direct its attention.18 However, to list the manifold activities and the broadly stated purposes of the Congress is not the same as isolating its primary function, that function the absence of which would leave the very existence of the Congress in doubt. Upon examination, it is obvious that almost every function now performed by the Congress could be performed by the affiliates themselves. Many of the larger affiliates do in fact provide for themselves the services which the Congress performs for the smaller unions. Even in those areas in which the Congress can most plausibly claim to act on behalf of its affiliates and stake out a field for itself, it nevertheless finds itself in competition with them. An example is the claim to be "the voice of organized labour at the national level"19 which the Congress leadership continually attempts to impress upon government, upon its affiliates, and upon the general public. Despite complaints from the Congress, its affiliated unions, provincial labour federations, and local labour councils have on numerous occasions made representations directly to the federal government. Occasionally such action will be complained of within the Congress. Thus the Congress protested the action of the Quebec and District Labour Council which made direct representations to the postmaster-general in April 1959: This action by the Quebec & District Labour Council emphasizes once again, in my opinion, the problem which arises when the Labour Council takes it upon itself to make direct representations to a Federal Minister. We

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS

39

have recently had the same problem with the Vancouver Labour Council and there have been other cases as you and I undoubtedly know.20 Despite this protest there is no record of any disciplinary action being taken against the Quebec and District Labour Council. Similarly, the British Columbia Federation of Labour undertook to communicate directly with the prime minister of Canada on the subject of the Newfoundland labour legislation of 1959, with the minister of justice on the Combines Investigation Act, and with the minister of transport on sea rescue service and steamship service on the west coast, merely sending copies to the president of the CLC, Claude Jodoin. Mr. Jodoin sounded out the Congress director of legislation on the advisability of writing to the federation advising them of the procedures to be followed in approaching the federal government.21 The director's reply is indicative of the impotence of the Congress in claiming the sole right to deal with the federal government on behalf of its affiliates: It is clearly a matter of Congress policy that Federations should confine their activities to the province of their Charter and Labour Councils to the local or municipal area of their Charter. This is set out in the rules for Federations of Labour and Local Labour Councils adopted by the Executive Council in 1956 and included in a manual for the guidance of Councils. . . . I do not think that there is any wish in this office to gag either the Federations or the Councils but it seems pretty clear to me that it is a bad policy for these bodies to go directly to the Federal Government on matters of federal concern. I would like to suggest to you that at the next meeting of the Executive Council, the policy adopted in 1956 be reaffirmed and stated in reasonably strong terms. Once this was done and recorded in the minutes, Brother Ward could then quite properly write to each of the Federations and Councils and draw this to their attention. We would then be spared the necessity of singling out any Federation or Council for a reprimand.22 The Congress itself has not taken an unequivocal stand on the 1956 policy decision. This was demonstrated in November 1959, when the Victoria Labour Council wrote directly to the prime minister of Canada on the subject of unemployment, merely forwarding a copy of the letter to the Congress. In his acknowledgement, the CLC director of legislation concluded: "I might add that resolutions such as that sent in by your Council strengthen the hand of the Congress in pressing the issue."23 The lobbying which preceded the enactment of the Canada Labour (Standards) Code in 1965 also casts doubt upon the claim of the Congress to speak for organized labour at the national level. The statement made by the Congress to the Senate Committee on Banking and Commerce, which held public hearings on the bill, covered less than two pages and was couched in vague generalities.24 The explanation offered by the Congress director of

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CHAPTER TWO

legislation was: "We didn't have very much to say on it and what we had to say was better said by our affiliates. . . . We didn't want to appear, we were practically forced into it.'*25 If the Congress is prepared to leave to its affiliates the task of making representations to a parliamentary committee on a matter such as the Canada Labour (Standards) Code and must be "practically forced" into appearing at all, it may be concluded that it is not the primary function of the Congress to act as "the voice of labour at the national level." Its function must be sought elsewhere. One guide to the relative importance which the Congress attaches to its different activities might be the severity of the sanctions visited upon affiliates which disregard Congress policy in those fields of activity. The ultimate penalty is expulsion from the Congress, and since 1956 several affiliates have been expelled—in each case for engaging in "raiding." That is, for attempting to recruit members from among the membership of another Congress affiliate. It is here contended that the control of raiding is the true function of the CLC. Article III is the longest and most complex article in the Congress constitution: it consists of thirty sections, of which twenty deal with the machinery for the settlement of disputes among affiliates on the subject of disputed claims to membership. The special character of article III is also underlined by the fact that its twenty-fourth section provides a special amending procedure applicable to article III alone. Thus, of the twelve purposes set out for the Congress in article II of its constitution, the key purpose is the eighth: To recognize the integrity of each affiliated union in the Congress to the end that each affiliate shall respect the established bargaining relationships of every other affiliate and that each affiliate shall refrain from raiding the established bargaining relationship of any other affiliate and, at the same time, to encourage the elimination of conflicting and duplicating organizations and jurisdictions through the process of agreement, merger, or other means, by voluntary agreement in consultation with the appropriate officials of the Congress; to preserve, subject to the foregoing, the organizing, jurisdiction of each affiliate.

In addition to the elaborate constitutional machinery provided to regulate relationships between affiliates, the Congress Executive Council deemed it necessary, in 1962, to adopt a short but cogent Code of Organizing Practices.26 The purpose of this code was not to guide the activities of union organizers in their relations with workers, or employers, or the general public but, rather, to regulate the relations of rival union leaders with one another. The Canadian Labour Congress provides a mechanism for achieving agreement among union leaders to respect the integrity of each other's orga-

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS 41 nizations. The constitution of the Congress is a non-aggression pact among union leaders with the Congress machinery serving to implement and police that pact. The other stated functions of the Congress and the parts of its constitution not related to this pact may be considered expendable to a greater or lesser degree. The other services provided by the Congress are of course useful, and to the smaller affiliated unions and the directly chartered locals these services may be extremely important. But it is not the smaller affiliated unions and the directly chartered locals that provide the Congress with the bulk of its funds and its principal officers. The backbone of the Congress is provided by the larger unions which are able to, and often do, provide their own legislative, research, and other services of a quality equal or superior to that provided by the Congress. THE MINE-MILL INCIDENT

From time to time the Congress leadership will admit that one of the major benefits accruing from affiliation is the protection of the organizational integrity of the affiliates. For example, when discussing the question of union with the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour (CCCL) at the 1960 Congress convention, the Congress leadership pointed out that after affiliation the CCCL would "assume the same responsibilities and receive the same protection under the CLC Constitution as all other affiliates."27 Among the "responsibilities" which the CCCL would have assumed would have been that of recognizing "the established bargaining relationship" of the other Congress affiliates while the "protection" which it would have received in return would have been the recognition of its own "established bargaining relationships." The significance of such protection is illustrated by the history of the United Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers' Union in the early 1960s. MineMill had been expelled from the ranks of "respectable" Canadian labour in the late 1940s for its allegedly communist leadership. Prom time to time its officers sought re-admittance to those ranks. The Executive Report to the 1962 Congress convention carried the following item: A request from the National Officers of this organization for affiliation was rejected by the Executive Council of the Canadian Labour Congress because they could not meet the standards required for affiliates. The Executive officers and Board Members of Local 598, Sudbury, Ontario, met with officials of the CLC on numerous occasions to discuss the problem of gaining affiliation with the Congress. In 1961, the Congress informed the officers of Local 598 that affiliation could only be gained through the United Steelworkers of America. The Steelworkers shortly afterwards began an organizing campaign to take over bargaining rights, which is still in progress.

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CHAPTER TWO In Port Colborne, Ontario, officials of the same union met with representatives of the Canadian Labour Congress and the United Steelworkers of America and late in 1961 voted to go to the United Steelworkers Union.28

The national leadership of Mine-Mill sought affiliation with the Congress as a form of organizational protection. This was denied and their membership was thus left open to raids by Congress affiliates. The Sudbury leaders of Mine-Mill Local 598 then sought affiliation with the Congress for the same reasons and were offered it provided they agreed to become a local affiliate of the Steelworkers. When this offer was rejected, the wealthy and powerful Steelworkers proceeded to raid the membership of Local 598. The leaders of the Port Colborne local, profiting by the lesson of the Sudbury local, protected their status and that of their local organization by bringing it intact under the wing of the Steelworkers and thus under the protection of article III of the Congress constitution. THE JURISDICTION RESOLUTION

The difference between raiding and violation of jurisdiction is that raiding involves an attempt by one union to acquire members from among workers who have already been organized by another union. A violation of jurisdiction occurs when an attempt is made to recruit members among unorganized workers whose work lies within the recognized province of another union. The 1962 Congress convention saw the introduction of a resolution to amend the Congress constitution by empowering the Congress leadership to deal with violations of jurisdiction in the same manner that it is empowered to deal with raiding under the provisions of article III. The resolution was introduced by the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), an industrially organized union whose leadership took exception to the fact that public employees were also being organized by craft unions. Among the delegates supporting the resolution, a member of the United Automobile Workers offered the following reasons: I feel that this Constitutional amendment is really called for. We have a situation in the City of Windsor, where plants are constantly moving out from under the jurisdiction of the U AW.. . . This has happened to us recently, in one particular plant.... A year and a half ago, they moved to the Dunnville area in Ontario, and gradually moved equipment, machinery, and office personnel and technical personnel to the new area. In the area, the International Association of Machinists, an affiliate of ours in the CLC, moved in and ostensibly organized this plant in a legitimate fashion. In my opinion it was organized via the back door.29 A delegate from NUPE pointed out,

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS

43

If we are going to continue to encroach upon every other organization's jurisdiction, we are not going to have a Congress. We are eventually going to end up fighting amongst ourselves ... fighting other organizations in the Congress, rather than going out to organize the unorganized.30

And from a delegate of the Tunnel and Rock Workers Union: Now, we find, in the original resolution, that the intent was to provide the Congress with some kind of machinery, some apparatus whereby it could deal with one of the most pressing problems that are facing trade unionists here in Canada today. .. . ... And I say, Mr. Chairman, that there is no boss, no employer organization, including the Chamber of Commerce, that could do a better job of destroying the Canadian trade union movement, than some of the trade unions that are carrying on this shameful, disgraceful and unprincipled policy of raiding.31

Finally, from another NUPE delegate: At the moment, we are trying to merge two organizations, and I think this is desirable, where we have one organization in Canada. But what do we find? We find that International unions can amend their constitutions, and they can take up our jurisdiction. .. . Now, we are trying to prevent this.32

On the other side, the craft unions made it abundantly clear what their position would be if an attempt was made to take the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries out of their hands: There is no jurisdictional problem within this Congress that is going to be decided other than by the people themselves who have their respective jurisdictions. I think I am speaking for every craft organization that is represented in this Congress, and not only the building and construction trades. . . . I am proud of the jurisdiction that I represent as a plumber and pipefitter, and I am going to fight for it, if anybody wants to take it away from me. No independent organization and no independent officers, can solve a jurisdictional dispute. . . . you can expel the whole works, and you will still have that jurisdictional dispute.33 And, from an official of the Ontario Federation of Labour: I am simply amazed at what is going on in this Convention. We want to give the Congress Officers authority, without any power. We want to give the Congress Officers authority, or the Congress Executive Council authority to parcel out jurisdiction, and there isn't a trade union sitting here that is willing to accept that authority or those decisions when they are made. . . . They would sooner be expelled than give such power to the Congress officers. We know they would.34

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Finally, a delegate from the industrially organized Steelworkers, but sufficiently aware of the facts of life in the labour movement, pointed out those facts for all to see: The realities of the Congress which we belong to, are that you have a number of National unions which could very easily, if they wished, make mutual agreements among themselves in the area of jurisdiction, and a number of International unions which are constantly confronted with a very interesting choice. This is 'Shall we depend upon the support of our International union Brothers, or shall we depend upon the goodwill of our Brothers in the Canadian Labour Congress?5 The experience, of course, of most of these Brothers, when they are confronted with disputes, is that the solidarity of their International union produces considerably more funds than the sympathy of their Canadian Brothers. . . . The fact of the matter is that, at the present moment, the supreme penalty which can be invoked by this Convention is that the organization determined to be guilty shall be deprived of the responsibility of paying per capita tax to the Canadian Labour Congress, and in the minds of some people, this is not necessarily a fate worse than death. . . . Now, the fact is ... that you are not going to solve this problem by giving more authority or less authority to the Officers of the Canadian Labour Congress. We have a lot of overlapping jurisdictions. We are going to be able to solve them only if the organizations involved are prepared to make personal organizational sacrifices to avoid jurisdictional conflicts.35

The wisdom of these remarks was echoed by the secretary-treasurer of the Congress who understood that the one type of sacrifice that leaders of organizations are not prepared to make are "personal organizational sacrifices." Said Mr. MacDonald: "From my interpretation of it, and I believe it is the correct one, what this resolution asks the Congress to do is to preside over its own destruction. . . . Is that what this Convention wants? . . . We just do not have the right, even if we had the stupidity, to adopt such a resolution."36 The lengthy debate on this resolution demonstrated that the affiliated unions rather than the Congress are the real locus of power, and gave a clear warning that disagreements touching upon the integrity of the affiliated unions could destroy the Congress. In effect, this is an admission that in the opinion of the union leaders the continued existence and integrity of the Congress are subordinate to the continued existence and integrity of their own organizations. The Congress, in their view, is merely a means to the achievement of the latter end. The aim of the Congress leadership throughout the debate was to ensure that they were not given the authority to make decisions which they could not enforce because any attempt to enforce them would destroy the Congress. The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate that the primary

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS 45 function of the Canadian Labour Congress is to police its constitution which, in turn, is an agreement among union leaders to respect die integrity of each other's organizations. In the words of one delete to a Congress convention: "Raiding is the beginning of civil war."37 This point and the effective role of the Congress in policing its constitution will be examined in the case study later in the chapter. ///. The Structure of the Congress THE AFFILIATED UNIONS

The Canadian Labour Congress is a federated organization made up of affiliated national and international unions.38 Also affiliated to the Congress are provincial federations of labour and local labour councils which are themselves made up of affiliated national and international unions. As of April 1968, the membership of the Congress consisted of 93 international unions, 16 national unions, and 150 directly chartered locals. The net change from a decade earlier was an increase of 3 in the number of national unions and a decrease of 200 in the number of directly chartered locals. The distribution of mass membership as between national and international unions in 1956 and 1967 is given in Table 1. TABLE 1. CLC Mass Membership, 1956 and 1967 Distribution between National and International Unions.

International unions National unions and directly chartered locals Total

1956 thousands 821

% 79.7

209

20.3

1,030

1967 thousands 1,120 330 1,451*

% 77.2

22.8

*The discrepancy is due to rounding. SOURCE: All figures on union membership are taken from the appropriate annual editions of the Department of Labour publication Labour Organizations in Canada.

All of the increase in the relative strength of the national unions is due to the affiliation of the 92,800 member Public Service Alliance (PSA) in 1966. If the figures for the PS A were not included in the calculations, the national unions and directly chartered locals would represent only 17.5% of the total affiliated membership of the Congress. As in 1956, the overwhelming majority of the Congress' mass membership remains concentrated in the international unions. To the extent that the power within the Congress of the leaders of the affiliated unions is a function of the size of the membership of their unions,

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power obviously lies with the leaders of the international unions. How much this enables the American leaders of the international unions to influence Congress policy is dependent upon the influence they can exert on the actions of the leaders of their Canadian branches. On this subject, one student of international unionism has concluded: In general it has to be acknowledged that international unions are run by Americans primarily to suit their own needs. For the most part they are only incidentally oriented to Canadian requirements. While they can be very receptive to the requests of their Canadian membership, they can also choose to ignore them. At least in their central governing and policy-making bodies, they are bound to be preoccupied with their problems in the United States. Consequently, it is essential to focus on the arrangements international unions have made to permit their Canadian memberships to cope with their own problems.39

And, after having examined these arrangements, he concluded: On balance, it should be clear by now that only in a relatively small number of international unions does the Canadian membership have direct and full control over the selection of the senior executive and staff officers in Canada. . . . the view prevails in many quarters that one should not exercise too much independent judgment lest one rock the boat and lose favour in the eyes of the international.40

Although the American leaders of the international unions acting in unison would have it within their power ultimately to oblige the Congress to follow the policy line they have selected, it is highly unlikely, for reasons already stated, that they will ever use this power as openly or as blatantly as did the AFL in its relations with the TLC. The influence of the Canadian leaders of international unions, like that of the leaders of national unions, is derived from their positions as union leaders. It is therefore necessary to examine the position and influence of the affiliated unions within the Congress. In 1956 the only two national unions among the big ten were the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers (CBRT), and the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE); they occupied seventh and eighth places respectively. In 1967 the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) and the Public Service Alliance (PSA) occupied second and third places respectively while the CBRT was in tenth place. Also of importance is the fact that the international unions in first and fourth places, the United Steelworkers of America and the United Automobile Workers, are the internationals which permit their Canadian branches the greatest degree of autonomy.41 The Canadian branches of the International Woodworkers of America (IWA), in sixth place, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), in seventh place, also enjoy considerable local autonomy.42

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS 47 TABLE 2. CLC Mass Membership, 1956 and 1967 Concentration in the Five and Ten Largest Affiliates. 1956 Total Congress membership (in thousands) Membership of the ten largest unions (in thousands) Membership of the ten largest unions (as a percentage of total) Membership of the five largest unions (in thousands) Membership of the five largest unions (as a percentage of total)

1030 418

1967 1451 712

40.6 279

49.1

27.1

34.3

497

Two generalizations emerge from this discussion. First, to the extent that the influence within the Congress of the leaders of the affiliated unions is a function of the size of their unions, the influence of the leaders of the larger unions has been increasing rapidly. Almost half the total Congress membership is now concentrated in its ten largest affiliates (Table 2). Second, although seven of the ten largest affiliates are Canadian branches of international unions, in all but two cases their Canadian leadership is permitted a great deal of autonomy in dealing with day-to-day matters affecting the union's Canadian operations. Thus, except on matters which have important international implications, the manner in which the Canadian leaders of the international unions will use their influence in the Congress policy-making process will reflect the needs and problems of the labour movement in Canada. FINANCES The finances of the Congress are derived almost entirely from a per capita tax upon the membership of its affiliated unions and directly chartered locals.43 The Congress constitution establishes the per capita tax rate at 10 cents a month for each member of an affiliated union and $1.15 a month for each member of a directly chartered local. Thus, the importance of each affiliated union in terms of its contribution to the finances of the Congress is directly proportional to the size of that union's membership. An examination of the expenditures of the Congress reveals that three items—salaries, office and related expenses, and travel—account for almost all expenditure. These items are, for the most part, fixed and inelastic. With the possible exception of office and related expenses they do not rise or fall in direct relation to the size of the Congress' membership. This is to be expected because many of the activities undertaken by the Congress do not vary in cost with the size of the membership; such activities as participation in national conferences, sponsorship of "umbrella" groups,44 and publications.

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As well, most of the increase in membership has occurred in the larger unions, which normally provide their own legislative, research, and organizing services. The Congress services the smaller unions and the directly chartered locals. Thus, it is the larger unions which subsidize the services rendered to the smaller unions as well as the general activities undertaken by the Congress in its capacity as the representative of organized labour in Canada. The withdrawal from the Congress of any of the four largest unions would leave the Congress in straitened financial circumstances while the withdrawal of several of the larger unions would necessitate a curtailment of activities. Nor is the threat of withdrawal merely theoretical. In the dispute over the status of the Newfoundland loggers, to be examined later in this chapter, two of the big ten actually threatened withdrawal and one went so far as to stop payment on its per capita tax cheque. During the events leading up to the imposition of the maritime unions trusteeship in 1963, another of the big ten threatened withdrawal. As well, inter-union arrangements in certain industries, the construction industry in particular, mean that the withdrawal of one union would normally result in the withdrawal of the others in that industry. Thus, the withdrawal of the Carpenters or the Electrical Workers would normally mean the withdrawal of the other building trades unions. In assuring the preservation and enhancement of their organization, the Congress' leadership45 must ensure the uninterrupted flow of per capita tax cheques. This requires that the leaders of the affiliated unions, especially the leaders of the larger and wellconnected unions, be satisfied on those matters which are of vital concern to them. LEADERSHIP

Article V, section 1 of the Congress' constitution provides that: "The officers of the Congress shall consist of a President, a Secretary-Treasurer and two Executive Vice-Presidents, who shall be the Executive Officers, four General Vice-Presidents and thirteen Vice-Presidents."46 Article V, section 2 stipulates that the vice-presidencies are to be distributed on a regional basis, while section 3 requires that each vice-president be resident in the region he is elected to represent.47 Article IX establishes an Executive Council consisting of all the officers and authorizes it to be "the governing body of this Congress between Conventions." Article X establishes an Executive Committee consisting of the president, secretary-treasurer, executive vicepresidents, and general vice-presidents with "responsibility for the administration of the affairs and activities of the Congress." The executive officers—the president, secretary-treasurer, and the two executive vice-presidents—are the only full-time salaried officers of the Congress. Between 1956 and 1968 the four executive officer positions were

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS

49

held by a total of only six men; it is therefore possible to examine their backgrounds individually. Claude Jodoin, president of the Congress during the entire period under consideration, is a member of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union. In 1937 he was appointed an organizer for that union, subsequently becoming an official of the Montreal Joint Board of the Dressmakers' Union. He later served as an officer of the Montreal Trades and Labor Council and the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, being elected to the presidency of the latter organization in 1954. Donald MacDonald served as secretary-treasurer of the Congress during the entire period under examination and was elected to the presidency in 1968. He became active in the labour movement in 1926 when he joined a local of the United Mine Workers in Nova Scotia. Four years later he was elected to the presidency of the local. In 1940 he was blacklisted from his union and two years later joined the staff of the Canadian Congress of Labour as an organizer. He continued in that position until November 1951 when he became secretary-treasurer and chief executive officer of the CCL. In 1956 he was elected secretary-treasurer of the CLC. Gordon G. Gushing was elected executive vice-president by the 1956 Congress convention and served in that capacity until his appointment as an assistant deputy minister in the Canada Department of Labour in 1958. In 1938 he was a charter member of the Maltworkers' Union in Calgary and became secretary of his local the following year. He served as secretarytreasurer of the Calgary Labour Council from 1941 to 1949 and as secretarytreasurer of the TLC from 1949 to 1956. Stanley H. Knowles was a Congress executive vice-president from 1958 to 1962. His only previous connection with the labour movement was his membership in the International Typographical Union, acquired when he worked in the printing industry in Winnipeg. William Dodge was an executive vice-president of the Congress from 1958 until his election to the office of secretary-treasurer in 1968. He joined the CBRT in 1930 and was president of his local from 1933 until 1940. In 1949 he was appointed CBRT representative in Montreal and in 1955 was appointed general representative for Quebec. Joseph Morris was a regional vice-president for British Columbia from 1956 until his election as an executive vice-president in 1962. He joined the IWA in 1937, and was elected to the presidency of his local in 1948. He became president of the IWA Western Canadian Regional Council in 1953. With the exception of Joseph Morris, none of the six Congress executive officers has held any elective union position above the level of the local, none have been leaders of their respective unions, and none have held positions of power within their unions. Election to a full-time executive position in the Congress is thus not deemed to be a promotion or a logical next step for

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leading union officers. One reason for the longevity in office of the Congress executive officers may be that those who are in a position to challenge the incumbents successfully, the leaders of the larger affiliated unions, have no desire to give up the positions of leadership and power which they hold to accept a position of comparative impotence. The four general vice-president positions were created by a constitutional amendment approved at the 1958 Congress convention. Until 1958 the executive committee, the body responsible for the administration of the affairs of the Congress between biennial conventions, had been made up entirely of the full-time executive officers. In the decade following the creation of these positions they have been filled by six men. William Mahoney, national director in Canada of the United Steelworkers of America, and George Burt, regional director in Canada of the United Automobile Workers, have both been Congress general vice-presidents throughout the decade. The other two positions were apparently allocated to the building trades unions and the railway unions. William Jenoves, top-ranking Canadian official of the Bricklayers' Union, held a general vice-presidency from 1958 until 1964 when he was replaced by William Ladyman, vice-president in Canada of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Frank Hall, Canadian head of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, held a Congress general vice-presidency from 1958 until 1966 when he was replaced by A. R. Gibbons, Canadian head of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. The outstanding feature common to the general vice-presidents is that they are all men of power in their own unions and in the Canadian labour movement. When Burt and Mahoney were elected to general vice-presidencies they were the heads of the two largest Congress affiliates. The construction and railway unions are the two largest conglomerates of members within the Congress and in both cases they have vehicles for cooperation which lie outside the Congress.48 These men, along with the four full-time executive officers, are responsible for the administration of the affairs and activities of the Congress. Analysis of the regional vice-presidents is more difficult. Among those who have served in these positions have been leaders of large affiliates as well as others who disposed of little or no power in the labour movement. One explanation for this diversity may be the constitutional requirement for regional representation which limits Ontario to four out of thirteen regional vice-presidents while the headquarters of most of the larger unions are located in that province. Among the eight persons who have served as regional vice-presidents from Ontario between 1958 and 1968 were the Canadian head of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, the three different Canadian heads of the Textile Workers' Union of America, the national president

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS

51

of the CBRT, the director of District 6 of the United Steelworkers of America, the Canadian head of the International Association of Machinists and the president of the Canadian Union of Public Employees. The eighteen people who occupied the remaining nine regional vicepresidencies during the decade have included a district president of the IWA, the secretary of the British Columbia Government Employees Association, the regional director in Canada of the International Union of United Brewery Workers, the Canadian director of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers' International Union and the Canadian director of the United Textile Workers of America. Also included in this number have been six presidents of provincial federations of labour. In summary, it may be said that both the executive committee and the executive council, the bodies charged with responsibility for administration and policy making between Congress conventions, are heavily weighted with the representatives of the larger affiliated unions. When the constitutional requirement of regional representation permits, these representatives are either the heads of their unions or, in the case of international unions, the heads of the Canadian sections of their unions. It is through these organs that the heads of the larger affiliated unions maintain effective supervision of the policies and day-to-day activities of the Congress. IV. A Case Study in Structure and Function: The Carpenters and Woodworkers in Newfoundland The purpose of this case study is to examine in detail one inter-union organizational dispute to discover the value which union leaders place upon the integrity of their organizations, their view of the function of the CLC, and to illustrate certain aspects of the structure of the Congress. BACKGROUND

THE STRIKE

In May 1958, following a certification vote, the Newfoundland Labour Relations Board certified the International Woodworkers of America (I WA) as bargaining agent for loggers employed by the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company. In June that year the union began negotiations with the company and eventually, at the request of the union, the outstanding issues were referred to a conciliation board. In December the board submitted a unanimous report which was accepted by the union but rejected by the company. As a result, on the last day of 1958, the loggers went out on strike. In mid-February 1959, Premier Joseph Smallwood of Newfoundland intervened in the employers' behalf and attacked the IWA in a province-wide radio and television address. Shortly thereafter, two bills were introduced in the Newfoundland House of Assembly, passed, and given royal assent on

52 CHAPTER TWO 6 March. The first, the Labour Relations (Amendment) Act49 is not relevant to the present discussion. The second bill, the Trade Union (Emergency Provisions) Act,50 decertified the IWA locals certified by the NLRB the previous May and forbade them to apply for re-certification without the consent of the lieutenant-governor in council; that is, the IWA was banished from Newfoundland until such time as the provincial government asked the House of Assembly to repeal the legislation or granted permission to the union to apply to the board for re-certification. The loggers were re-organized by the Newfoundland Brotherhood of Woods Workers (NBWW), an organization established under thinly disguised government auspices. BACKGROUND

THE ORGANIZING

The events preceding the certification of the IWA in May 1958 are in dispute and there is no version that is acceptable to both the IWA and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners. The story from the point of view of the IWA is told in a booklet entitled Report on the Current Dispute in Newfoundland Between the International Woodworkers of America and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America51 issued under the auspices of the Newfoundland Federation of Labour (NFL) and dated 5 September 1961. The story from the point of view of the brotherhood is outlined in a detailed letter dated 16 October 1961, from its general treasurer to the president of the NFL. According to the Report, both the IWA and the brotherhood first entered Newfoundland in 1956 when one of the organizations then representing the loggers, the independent Newfoundland Lumbermen's Association (NLA), invited representatives of both unions to attend its convention and asked President H. Landon Ladd of the IWA to address the convention. The brotherhood claims that it had been in Newfoundland long before 1956 and had "pioneered organizing activities 20 years ago."52 According to the Report, representatives of both unions at the 1956 convention asked the NLA to affiliate with their respective organizations and the race to claim the loggers was on. The IWA sought to gain the loggers by appealing to them directly, going over the heads of their leaders. Accordingly, it conducted its campaign by sending organizers into the logging camps. The brotherhood, on the other hand, approached the leaders of the three independent loggers' unions in an effort to persuade the leadership of these organizations to affiliate with it. By May 1957, the IWA considered that it was ready for its first test of strength and applied to the Newfoundland Labour Relations Board for certification. The leaders of the independent unions, however, were not prepared to give up their memberships without a struggle and intervened before the board with the result that the IWA application was rejected. On 14 December 1957, the IWA again applied to the board seeking certification as the

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRES. 53 bargaining agent for the loggers employed by the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company. A vote was taken among the loggers the following April with the result that 86.4% were found to support the IWA. Certification was granted the following month. The strike against the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company presented the brotherhood with an opportunity to resume its attempts to recruit the loggers. The St. John's Daily News for 16 January carried a notice sponsored by locals 2564 and 2575 of the brotherhood: We are two of the oldest properly organized Unions in Newfoundland; in fact we are the oldest Loggers' Union. Our two Unions are part of an International Union, namely the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, with a membership of upwards of one million members in the United States and Canada and that Union has existed in Canada for the past 77 years. Our International has Agreements with the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company affiliates in other Canadian provinces. During the past two years many of the loggers were persuaded to leave the four Loggers' Unions which existed at that time. We now announce to the Loggers in particular and the Public in general that many of the Loggers remained with our Unions which we very much appreciate and others have signified their willingness to return and we shall welcome them back, we already have applications before the Board for certification of Loggers in certain areas and we are ready, willing and able and most anxious to welcome back all the Loggers as members of either one of our Unions. We have always had contractual relationships with the two paper companies from which the Loggers have received much benefit. Our Parent Organization, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, is an affiliate of the Newfoundland Federation of Labour and has not and will not support the International Woodworkers of America either financially or morally in this dispute.53

Congress intervened at this point and President Jodoin informed the officers of the two locals that "the Executive Council of the Canadian Labour Congress has instructed me to request that. . . your locals cease and desist from this activity, repudiate the appeal in the newspaper and thus comply with the policy and the Constitution of the Canadian Labour Congress."54 The repudiation of the advertisement soon became an academic question as Premier Smallwood moved to outlaw the IWA and substitute his own union. THE DISPUTE AFTER THE STRIKE

Following the legislative decertification of the IWA, neither that union nor the brotherhood ceased its organizing activities among the loggers. The IWA continued its previous policy of organizing the loggers directly and established a new local in Newfoundland. By the spring of 1961 it had undertaken

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a campaign to recruit the loggers of the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company prior to seeking certification. The brotherhood, according to the Report, continued its previous policy of attempting to gain the affiliation of existing organizations: They were meeting, frequently and furtively, with officials of the mock government union, the NBWW, and with provincial government officials. These meetings became more frequent starting in the fall of 1960, with the Carpenters' Canadian Director, A. V. Cooper, flying to Newfoundland every five to eight weeks for conferences with NBWW and government representatives.55

The Newfoundland government, apparently, was anxious to be rid of all responsibility for the loggers and the union which it had helped to establish. Working conditions and discontent among the loggers were such that the government-sponsored union, and with it the government, might shortly find itself in an embarrassing situation. Mr. Smallwood therefore wanted to get out from underneath as quickly as possible. According to the NFL Report: A Commission of Enquiry established by the provincial government to investigate the logging industry issued a report which disclosed that wage and working conditions in the woods were as bad as ever, and that the loggers were seething with discontent. The NBWW's methods of holding its members by threats and blacklisting were proving embarrassing to the government. Obviously, a change was essential, but Premier Smallwood was determined not to allow the IWA to make a comeback. The only alternative was to make some deal with some officials of another international union, also affiliated to the CLC, who would be willing to throw aside basic trade union principles, in return for another 12,000 members. Such officials, unfortunately, existed and were only too happy to pull Smallwood's chestnuts out of the fire.56

On 27 June 1961, the brotherhood's Canadian director announced to a press conference in St. John's that his organization would proceed to organize the loggers and that a secret ballot would be taken to determine their wishes. He denied that the brotherhood planned to take the NBWW into affiliation. The NFL Report, on the other hand, listed a number of alleged irregularities in the ballotting as well as in the conduct of the officers of the brotherhood. Among these charges were: (i) rigging the electorate by disqualifying approximately 10,000 IWA supporters and moving 500 Brotherhood supporters into the area to enable them to vote; (ii) cooperating with the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company in obtaining lists of employees and in collecting the ballots; (iii) irregularities in the counting of the ballots; (iv) cooperating with Mr. Smallwood's "leper" union, the NBWW.

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS

55

The brotherhood's letter of 16 October denied all the charges and expressed its opinion of the entire Report thus: "You have tortured and distorted the truth. You have endeavoured to clothe personal opinion and wishful thinking with an aura of fact. . . . Your opinion and the facts have very little in common." THE DISPUTE AND THE CLC

By the summer of 1961 the Congress could no longer ignore the dispute in the hope that it would be settled quietly by the leaders of the contending unions. Accordingly, the Congress invited representatives of both the IWA and the brotherhood to attend a meeting in Ottawa to work out a mutually acceptable solution. The IWA was represented at the meeting while the brotherhood was not. The nub of the Congress' decision was that all parties agree to a supervised ballot being conducted among the loggers to determine which organization they preferred to have organize them. The conditions under which the proposed vote would be held would be that an agreed elegibility list of the voters would be established by the Canadian Labour Congress, the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners and the International Woodworkers of America. The ballot boxes and ballots would be distributed and the votes cast at agreed times and places and the boxes would be sealed officially, collected and brought to a central place to be counted by an independent group agreed to in advance by the three parties with scrutineers representing each party present. A definite commitment would have to be furnished by each of the unions in advance that they would abide by the majority decision of the vote and the loser would discontinue its organizing efforts among the loggers employed by the A.N.D. and Bowaters Companies.57

A copy of the Executive Committee's decision was sent to the brotherhood and a reply was requested by 20 July. The brotherhood, replying through its general treasurer, said: It has never been our practice to delegate to any federation with which we might be affiliated authority to prescribe, ascribe, proscribe or circumscribe our jurisdiction, and we have no intention of changing that practice now. Furthermore, we have no intention—now or at any time in the future—of entering into any joint arrangements with the IWA regarding jurisdiction that clearly falls within our province.58

On 21 July, representatives of the IWA met with the Executive Committee of the Congress to present their case against the brotherhood. The IWA requested that the Congress "suspend from membership the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America for its current activities in respect to the logging operations in the Province of Newfoundland."59 The

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request was made under the terms of article III, section 4 and article IX, section 6 of the Congress constitution. The IWA argued that in spite of the legislation of the Province of Newfoundland, the union had never given up the rights it obtained upon certification in 1958. Therefore, any attempt by the brotherhood to recruit the loggers constituted raiding. Certain statements in the Presentation are interesting because they shed some light upon the role and function of the Congress as seen by the officers of one of its larger affiliates. Speaking of the first unsuccessful attempt to obtain certifications on behalf of loggers in Newfoundland, the I WA said: It should be noted here that the intervenors in the application were three Newfoundland unions, the Central Workers Protective Union, the Newfoundland Lumberman's Association and the Newfoundland Loggers Union, none of whom had affiliated to the Canadian Labour Congress. . . . The Congress therefore regarded the membership claimed by these unions as being unorganized, and the International Woodworkers of America therefore had the opportunity of bringing the loggers of the two paper companies within the organized Canadian labour movement.00

The implication, clearly, is that workers who are members of unaffiliated unions are regarded as unorganized and therefore fair game. This fact, taken in conjunction with the elaborate provisions of the Congress' constitution on the subject of raiding, is indicative of the Congress' primary function. A further definition of the role of the Congress was provided when the Presentation described the effect of the brotherhood's activities in Newfoundland: The Brotherhood knew, and there can be no question that it knew, that the IWA has every intention of again applying for certification on behalf of the loggers of the paper companies of Newfoundland. It is that knowledge that has spurred the Brotherhood, while there is still time, to once again undertake, in a more menacing fashion than ever before, a raid upon the IWA's collective bargaining relationship, and a subversion of the Canadian Labour Congress's role as the guardian of our trade union movement's very existence.^

While the IWA's attitude toward the brotherhood is instructive, so is its view of the benefits to be derived from affiliation with the Congress and the description of the manner in which the Congress' constitution serves to protect the organizational integrity of its affiliates: A united labour movement cannot exist in Canada if certain affiliates declare their defiance of the rules governing its operation. We bitterly resent the dual standard of the Carpenters, wherein that organization has attempted to obtain the benefits of the CLC Constitution, and yet has refused to accept the responsibilities imposed by it. In this regard, we would remind the Executive Council that over two years

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS 57 ago, a large segment of the Brotherhood's membership in Northern Ontario asked admission to the IWA. The Brotherhood immediately sought the protection of the Congress on the basis of the no-raiding clause in the Constitution. As a result, pressures were exercised by Congress officers on the IWA to refuse acceptance of the Brotherhood members in Northern Ontario. The IWA respected the wishes of the Congress in this matter.62 The IWA's Presentation concluded: The IWA submits that the Executive Council should suspend the Carpenter's Union. No union with the IWA's long tradition of self respect can accept these attacks on its rights. // the Congress does not agree with the IWA's request, then -we must carefully reconsider our position as an affiliate of the CLC.™ A further meeting of officers of the Congress and the IWA was held on 27 July and it was agreed that there should be a further meeting to discuss matters "relative to expelling the Carpenters' Union from the CLC."64 This, at any rate, was the impression which the IWA international president carried away with him. The Congress Executive Committee, however, postponed the meeting indefinitely. The IWA international president complained of this postponement in the following terms: "The decision by your Executives to postpone any action to some indefinite date is giving aid and comfort to the Carpenters' Union. It will give them time to complete their unholy alliance with the company and Premier Smallwood."65 In summary, two large international unions, both CLC affiliates, were locked in a bitter organizational dispute. Neither was willing to retreat and both had indicated willingness to withdraw from the Congress unless satisfaction was obtained on a problem that the Congress had clearly been established to deal with and for which the Congress constitution made such elaborate provision. The point at issue was no longer to be a simple matter of applying the terms of the Congress constitution since a strict application of its terms would inevitably have impaired the integrity of the Congress. The question had become a political one and there were henceforth to be three sets of leaders involved in the dispute: two sets of union leaders attempting to maintain the integrity of their organizations under the provisions of the Congress constitution, if possible, and outside that constitution, if necessary; and the leadership of the Congress attempting to maintain the integrity of their organization and threatened by the possibility of alienating one or both of the two large affiliates. Furthermore, the issue went far beyond the two affiliates directly involved in the dispute. The Carpenters, because of the structure of local labour councils, were in a position to carry the building and construction trades unions with them. The IWA, on the other hand, was gathering support among the industrial unions.

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Faced with this dilemma the Congress leadership stalled for time, especially as the plans for a new political party were coming to fruition at this time. The meeting scheduled for 28 July was postponed to 8 September. According to the IWA, the apparent postponement of action by the Executive Council may have been prompted by the fact that the founding convention of the New Party in Canada is uppermost in the minds of the leaders of the Canadian Labour Congress at this time. . . . they perhaps did not want an issue as hot as the IWA vs. the Carpenters to be aired immediately prior to the New Party meeting.66 Despite cries of "delay" and "stalling tactics"67 by the IWA, the meeting scheduled for 8 September was postponed to 22 September and then postponed again. By 20 October the Congress Executive Committee had managed to hold a preliminary hearing preparatory to another meeting scheduled for 1 November. A further meeting was then held on 16 November. The sole result of these meetings was an agreement to establish a committee under the chairmanship of Congress general vice-president Frank H. Hall to re-examine the dispute. All that this committee could do was recommend still another meeting.68 In reply to Hall's letter, the brotherhood's general treasurer wrote: It is no pleasure to meet with a Committee of the IWA. If you will recall at the last hearing, Mr. Hartung vigorously protested because we presented a resume of the IWA's raiding record against us over the past five years. He insisted that developments in the United States had no bearing on the strictly Canadian matter before the hearing. Yet, later in the hearing, he went out of his way to gratuitously take a slap at our General President regarding a United States matter having no connection whatsoever with the question before the Executive Council. I want you to know that my inclination was to challenge such a gratuitous insult, but out of respect for the members of the Council, I refrained from doing so because I did not want the hearing to wind up in a Donnybrook.69 The letter reiterated the threats to withdraw from the CLC: Each year, the United Brotherhood pays out better than three fourths of a million dollars in direct affiliations. If the cost of attending conventions and fulfilling committee obligations is added, it is obvious that our Brotherhood spends in excess of a million dollars a year to maintain affiliations with various federations and departments. . . . . . . we want to continue to be a part of the broad labor movement of the United States and Canada, but in return I think we should be entitled to fair and equal treatment in all situations.70 At a meeting on 15 March 1962, the investigating committee offered a variation on the proposal that had been made on 17 July 1961 and accepted

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS 59 by the IWA but rejected by the brotherhood. The result once again was acceptance by the IWA and rejection by the brotherhood. By this time the Congress policy of temporizing was running into severe problems. Negotiations were soon to begin between the brotherhood and the companies and the start of these negotiations would bring matters to a head. Accordingly, Chairman Hall of the investigating committee wrote to the brotherhood to ask that negotiations with the companies be postponed further until conclusions as to the merits of the dispute can be reached. Indeed, in the light of the seriousness of the situation, its impact, and implications to the labour movement in Canada, bearing in mind also that both unions involved are responsible long time affiliates of the Congress and its two predecessors, it is reasonable to ask that this suggestion be considered as a request.71

The brotherhood responded with a lengthy letter, five pages typewritten single-spaced, the essence of which was: "We are amazed that an experienced and knowledgeable committee of union officials should present so unrealistic a proposal. . . . The proposition you advance evades the issue completely and, in addition, it is both unrealistic and visionary."72 The Congress leadership was at the end of its tether and as a last resort turned to the AFL-CIO. Sending a complete set of the major documents on the issue to AFL-CIO President George Meany, President Jodoin asked that "if you deem it advisable, to speak to Brother M. A. Hutcheson of the Carpenters, suggesting, if possible, that his organization accept the proposition."73 Meanwhile, the Congress had scheduled still another meeting which, to the great annoyance of the brotherhood, was to be held in Corner Brook, Newfoundland. The breaking point was reached on 26 March, when the brotherhood's president informed President Jodoin that payment had been stopped on their last per capita tax cheque and that all further payments would be withheld. President Jodoin could do no more than protest that there was a "top level committee of Congress General Vice-Presidents still investigating situation with a view to proposing an honourable and equitable solution of the problem"74 and issue another appeal to AFL-CIO President Meany.75 Finally, the brotherhood tired of the seemingly endless succession of hearings and attempted to invoke the Congress constitution to put an end to them: I call to your attention the provisions in Article 3, Section 4, of the Congress Constitution. Among other things, it says, "Upon such report being submitted, the Executive Council shall consider the same, shall hear the appropriate officers of the affiliates involved, and shall make such decisions as it believes to be necessary and proper . . ." There is no mention of investigating committees, one man committees, additional hearings, or anything of that nature.76

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However, the matter had long since ceased to be a constitutional question, it had become a three-cornered struggle of leaders attempting to protect their organizations. In April 1962, the issue came before the Congress convention which considered the report of the investigating committee. The committee made the same proposal that had been rejected by the brotherhood in July 1961 and in March 1962, namely, that "the only fair way to settle the dispute is by a properly conducted vote of the workers concerned, this implying, of course, equal access to the workers by both unions."77 The leaders of the brotherhood deemed this proposal so injurious to their interests that they walked out of the convention to protest its consideration and the debate that followed took place in their absence. The discussion was lengthy and repetitious, covering a total of fifteen columns in the Convention Proceedings. In the end, the recommendations of the investigating Committee were approved, but this amounted to little more than scoring legal points in a dispute where legal points no longer counted. The dispute remained unsettled. The brotherhood later agreed to return to the Congress, and the Executive Report to the 1964 convention notes that: As of the time of preparation of this report, the union [the brotherhood] had paid per capita tax in full. The situation in Newfoundland has remained unchanged since the previous convention. The Executive Council will continue, through discussion with the parties to the dispute, to bring about a satisfactory settlement.78

The brotherhood maintained bargaining rights on behalf of the loggers, but the IWA has never formally recognized those rights and the dispute has never really been settled. In March 1967, a Congress official summed up the situation in the following words: "We put wallpaper on to smooth over the cracks."79 CONCLUSIONS

The case study of the dispute between the IWA and the Carpenters confirms that the primary function of the Congress is to police its constitution, which is an agreement among union leaders to respect the integrity of each other's organizations. Second, the leaders of the Congress, having an organization and organizational goals of their own apart from the organizational goals of the leaders of the affiliated unions, are prepared when necessary to disregard the purposes for which the Congress was established and devote themselves instead to the preservation of the integrity of their own organization. The procrastination of the Congress leadership in dealing with the

THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS 61 problem before it, the unwillingness to face the consequences of a firm decision, the interminable series of meetings, and the years of indecision all testify to the validity of this point. Finally, this study demonstrates that considerations of organizational integrity override such other supposedly vital considerations as freedom of association, the unity of the labour movement, and the ostensible aims of organized labour. The nub of the issue was perhaps best described by the Quebec representative of the brotherhood in his explanation of the brotherhood's walkout from the 1962 convention: Nous pretendons et nous avons toujours pretendu, et sur ce point la constitution de la Fraternite Unie des Charpentiers et Menuisiers est formelle, que notre juridiction est une chose sacree et qu'elle ne peut etre changee que par nos membres en convention de la Fraternite Unie des Charpentiers et Menuisiers d'Amerique et qu'elle ne peut etre le sujet d'intervention d'aucune tierce organisation quelle qu'elle soit.80

V. Conclusions The Canadian Labour Congress has a number of fundamental weaknesses inherent in its structure. First, all the "bread and butter" functions of trade unions are handled by the affiliated unions themselves. Second, in the case of many of the larger affiliates, certain of the functions normally associated with a trade union centre are not dealt with by the Congress but by the AFL-CIO in Washington: one example is the settlement of jurisdictional disputes in the building trades. Another weakness is that most of the larger affiliates of the Congress are international unions whose leaders look to the AFL-CIO as their trade union centre. Hence, the inability of the Canadian centres to merge before 1956 and the desperate move by President Jodoin of turning to the AFL-CIO when the dispute between the IWA and the Carpenters threatened to disrupt the Congress. Real power lies with the affiliated unions, and the constitution of the Congress reflects the fact that it was the product of many compromises. The balance between the compromising forces remains delicate and in some quarters the IWA-Carpenters dispute was interpreted as a clash between craft and industrial unionism. Should such a clash develop, it could destroy the Congress. The threats on the part of both the IWA and the Carpenters to leave the Congress if they did not obtain what they believed to be justice in the Newfoundland affair indicates that the Congress can hold no real threats over the heads of the larger affiliated unions to compel membership. In the eyes of the union leaders, the Congress is valuable only so long as it serves their purposes, the most important of which is to preserve the integrity of their organizations by maintaining peace among them.

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But even in its role as the policeman of its constitution the Congress cannot be completely effective in the face of a large and uncooperative affiliate. The Congress can act effectively when the major power centres are in agreement and is impotent when the major power centres are deadlocked.

Chapter 3

THE LEGITIMACY OF ORGANIZED LABOUR AND THE MANDATE OF THE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS The Views of the Congress, Government, and Business

The views which people hold of their place and rights in society influence their behaviour, the type of demands they make upon society, and the manner in which those demands are made. The views which other members of the society have of the rights and status of a particular group influence the manner in which the demands of that group are received and the response to them. The responses, in turn, condition the expectations of those who make demands for future demands and responses. This chapter will examine the status of the Canadian Labour Congress, and of organized labour in general, as seen by the Congress leadership, by government, and by other interests in society. 7. The View of the Congress Leadership In the view of the Congress leadership the existence of a labour movement free from government control is one of the defining characteristics of a democratic society: "Unions are a legitimate, indeed a desirable, element of our society. To the extent that they are provided with opportunities to exist and to carry on their functions, they are one of the distinguishing marks of a free society."1 The labour movement is an autonomous element within the community, enjoying inherent "trade union rights" which must be guarded "against legislative and other encroachments."2 The labour movement forms a veritable government of labour, conferring the benefits and imposing the obligations of citizenship: Unions have introduced constitutional government into industry. The collective agreement is the industrial constitution. All the workers benefit by thehe industrial citizenship it confers. Is there one single worker in this country wh has ever refused to accept the higher wages, the shorter hours, the holidays,

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CHAPTER THREE the pensions, the health and welfare plans the union has won for him? All of them should be willing to accept the obligations of their industrial citizenship.3

Although precise spheres of competence between government and the labour movement are not delineated, they are assumed to exist and any attempt on the part of government to restrict what are deemed to be the inherent rights of the labour movement is characterized as a "blatant abuse of the powers of government."4 The role of unions in society is "an important and necessary"5 one, and unions themselves are much more than economic devices for working people in their relations with employers they have added strength to the democratic structure, have expanded the area of freedom within our political democracy, and have made possible the avoidance of the violent social conflicts which are characteristic of countries where workers have not enjoyed freedom of association Free trade unions can exist only in a free society and to the extent that a society deprives unions of freedoms it deprives itself of freedom as well.6 Organized labour is "moving forward rapidly to occupy its proper role in the development of the nation,"7 while the status of Congress is that of "an accepted position in the economic, social and political life of Canada . . . [participating] in practically all legitimate spheres of activity as the recognized voice of the nation's workers."8 The mandate of the Congress, as seen by its leadership, has two aspects: the persons on whose behalf they claim the right to speak and the subject matter on which they claim the right to speak. The extent of the former aspect varies. At a minimum, the Congress leadership claims to speak on behalf of the members of their affiliated unions, but at times they claim a wider constituency. Thus: The Canadian Labour Congress represents about one million and fifty thousand workers in all parts of Canada. This is a substantial segment of the industrial work force of our country. With their families they are a large part of the population. Thus on the one hand we speak to you as the largest familymily of producers and on the other as the largest family of consumers.9 But the claims of the Congress leadership do not end with the members of affiliated unions and their families; they go on to claim standing "as the recognized voice of the nation's workers."10 We do not feel that we are presumptuous in venturing to speak for those beyond our ranks. There is a sufficient community of interest between those workers who belong to trade unions, and those who do not, for the Congress to feel that it is expressing a viewpoint held more widely than by its members.11

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From this point it is but a small step to the claim that the Congress is "the official spokesman for labour at the national level."12 The other aspect of the Congress' mandate, the subject matter on which its leadership claims the right to speak, has never been delineated and in practice is extremely broad. The subjects on which government is petitioned "are matters which are of concern to the workers of Canada or to the people of this country as a whole"13 and the Congress leadership attempts "to bring before the Government our views about what we consider to be the major issues confronting the Canadian people."14 The subjects deemed to fall within the purview of the Congress are virtually unlimited and include "a variety of issues both domestic and foreign."15 We feel . . . that the events of the last year [1965] would make this Memorandum timely even though we last appeared before you less than twelve months ago. Not the least of these events is the recent election. . . . Beyond that there is the quickening tempo of the economy and the question of how it can be made to continue not only at its present high level but brought to full employment. There are the questions of manpower policies, of immigration, of the expansion and improvement of our social security system and of the imperative need for far-reaching improvements in the condition of our Indian and Eskimo population. There is the Fowler Report on Broadcasting. There is your program to combat poverty. There is, and this is not the least of our concerns, the state of crisis in international affairs.16

According to its leaders "the Congress is concerned with every form of legislation which has significance for the worker whether as a trade unionist, citizen or consumer"17 and on one occasion they informed the government that: As a body representative of more than one million Canadian working men and women, we hold our collective views to be of some significance. The members of the Canadian Labour Congress who are represented here today are, in addition to being trade unionists, citizens of this country.18

The Congress has insisted time and again that it be given representation on a number of government-sponsored bodies. Membership on the Canada Council is claimed because "within the affiliated membership of the Congress there are many who will be directly affected by the activities of the Canada Council."19 And in December 1962, speaking on the appointment of members to the proposed National Economic Development Board, the Congress leadership said: We have noted with approval that the National Economic Development Board would be broadly representative.... There is room on any such Board for people of no special allegiance, such as economists and others drawn

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CHAPTER THREE from the universities and similar institutions. But, if the phrase "broadly representative" is to have significance, the Board must include among its members those who are able to speak not only for themselves but for those whom they profess to represent. Thus, if organized labour, agriculture, business and trade, and other such groups are to be represented on this Board, it follows that they should be invited to name representatives to speak on their behalf. . . . We are bound to assume that your government wishes to have the views of these organized groups and if so it seems only logical to us that they should go directly to them rather than give them token representation through individual appointments.20

This statement was intended as a protest to the Diefenbaker government against a practice of appointing labour representatives to government agencies without prior consultation with the Congress. Although the appointees were in every case bona-fide trade unionists and there was no question about their qualifications, the failure to consult beforehand with the Congress leadership was deemed to imply that the government did not recognize the Congress as the "official" spokesman for the labour interest at the national level.21 In the Memorandum of March 1962, the Congress had taken the government to task on a similar issue. Following the presentation of the Memorandum, Labour Minister Starr, on behalf of the government, questioned the premises upon which the Congress' demands were based. President Jodoin replied: That one section of our memorandum to which you refer deals with a question of principle. We are not questioning the individuals as members of missions or commissions. I may represent so many pounds when I represent myself, but we believe in representation by organization. . . . We feel that in nominations of this sort, no matter how competent they may be, the individuals do not count, it is necessarily what they represent.22

II. The View of Government The fact that the prime minister and most of the cabinet meet publicly with the leadership of the Canadian Labour Congress each year to receive their annual Memorandum indicates that the political leaders of Canada recognize the legitimacy of the labour interest. These annual meetings also indicate that the Congress is accepted as one of the more important spokesmen for that interest, thus recognizing at least a part of the mandate which the Congress leadership claims for its organization. In Mr. Diefenbaker's view organized labour was one of the major interests in the Canadian political system and he told the Congress leadership that "each year we receive from your organization as we do from organizations representing agriculture and business the viewpoint of a most important seg-

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ment of our population."23 With respect to the mandate claimed by the Congress, Mr. Diefenbaker oscillated between crediting the Congress leadership with representing only the members of its affiliated unions and representing the labour interest generally. In 1961 we welcomed the Congress leadership as representing "the views of the people in your organization and in other organizations which have done so much for the people of Canada."24 At the presentation of the Memorandum of March 1962, he took a different view: Again I express my very warmest welcome to you, representing as you do the greatness of labour within those fields in which you operate. I welcome you for the opportunity it provides my colleagues and me to hear expressed those views which are representative of the consensus of opinion of the organizations that you in turn represent and the unions that come under your jurisdiction.25

Mr. Pearson took a position similar to that of his predecessor in recognizing the position and importance of the labour interest. Speaking on the occasion of the presentation of the 1965 Memorandum he said: I also appreciate the constructive criticisms that you have offered us, and I am sure that we will benefit from them. I hope that when you appear before us next year . . . you will be able to say that we have not only given consideration to the memorandum, which it is our duty to do, but that we will have acted in respect of some of the proposals.26

There are numerous concrete and unpublicized actions which demonstrate that such statements are more than mere platitudes or political rhetoric. There was, for example, the invitation to the Congress leadership to attend a supper meeting with the Labour Relations and Unemployment Insurance Committee of the Federal Liberal Caucus.27 Or, the letter from a minister of finance which read, in part: If it is the intention of your organization to make representations to the Government on matters which are normally dealt with in the federal budget, may I take this opportunity to invite you to plan to submit your views to the Government sometime during the month of December . . . in order to afford ample opportunity for your proposals to be given full consideration.28

Communications of this nature are commonplace and are indicative of the legitimacy of the labour interest and the role of the Congress in representing that interest before federal government leaders. Another interesting indicator of the legitimacy of the labour interest is to be found in a letter which began: I am directed by the Secretary of State and Chairman of the Coronation Committee of Canada to ascertain as soon as possible whether you wish him

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CHAPTER THREE to recommend the name of a representative of your Association or Organization and the name of his wife for an invitation to be present in Westminster Abbey on the occasion of the Coronation of Her Majesty the Queen on Tuesday, June 2, 1953.29

It is difficult to be more legitimate than that. While the political leaders readily recognize the legitimacy of the labour interest and the role of the Congress is representing that interest, they have consistently denied the claims of the Congress leadership to speak on issues not directly related to the labour interest. Mr. Diefenbaker's government accorded the Congress so little recognition on such matters as health, taxation, broadcasting, and labour representation on the Canada Council that in 1962 the Congress leadership felt compelled to devote approximately one-sixth of its Memorandum to the "regrettable fact that so far as your government is concerned, the Canadian Labour Congress and organized labour in general are institutions frequently to be ignored when you are considering issues of national importance."30 Mr. Pearson also refused to credit the claim of the Congress leadership to speak on all aspects of government policy. Addressing the 1964 Congress convention he said: "I am told that your affiliates today represent some 1,175,000 Canadian workers. When you add their families and their dependents, you speak in labour policy and matters for some five million Canadians."31 In summary, it can be said that the political leaders of Canada, while recognizing the legitimacy of the labour interest, have by their words and actions refused to recognize the mandate, claimed by the Congress leadership, to speak in a representative capacity on issues outside the field of labour legislation and related matters. ///. The View of Business Congress publications never cease to comment upon the degree to which the Congress, and through it organized labour, have gained acceptance by the community at large. The following item from the Executive Report to the 1958 convention, describing the role of the Congress in the establishment of the Canadian Conference on Education, is typical: In accordance with the instructions of the Executive Committee, the Edu-ucation Committee discussed the problems of elementary and secondary edu-cation with representatives of Canadian schools, colleges and universities, with a view to initiating a National Campaign, designed to improve the unsatisfactory situation in our educational institutions. On November 8th, 1956, the Congress along with 18 other national organizations, participated in a Conference called by the Canadian Teachers'

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Federation, and considered ways and means of calling the crisis in Canadian education to the attention of the general public.32 The Executive Report to the 1960 convention carried similar items, among them: The National and Regional Directors [of the Congress Education Department] have been active in a number of organizations and have acted in various capacities on numerous committees, such as the Canadian Association for Adult Education, Canadian Citizenship Council, Canadian Institute on Public Affairs, Frontier College, Vocational Training and Advisory Council, Canadian Corrections Association, Curriculum Association, Provincial Education Associations of the Canadian Conference on Education, Canadian Film Institute and many others.33 Recognition of the status of the Congress by national organizations of recognized status is a form of credential which can be presented to the membership as indicative of the acknowledged status of the Congress. Such acceptance contrasts sharply with the acceptance which the Congress leadership believes, or pretends to believe, is accorded organized labour by business. A good deal of energy is devoted to warning the membership of dire plots being hatched on every side by the enemies of labour. The following statement, taken from President Jodoin's address to the 1958 Congress convention, is typical: "There is increasing evidence of a very deliberate attempt to discredit and weaken, if not destroy, the Labour movement. We have employers banding together for this purpose; we have a very definite pattern of editorial attacks on unions, using every possible excuse."34 The Executive Report to the same convention points out that: Within more recent months, Canadian union members have come under new attacks, and every indication is that these will not only continue but be intensified. . . . Moves are being made in an effort to deprive Canadian workers of their full rights of organization and collective bargaining. There are attempts to weaken the whole of this structure and operation, which is an integral part of our democratic system.35 These were not isolated instances. At the next convention, in 1960, President Jodoin told the assembled delegates: You know that the movement which we represent, and are a part of, has been made the target for the most vicious type of attacks. Behind many of these attacks has been a concentrated drive to have written on the statute books of the provinces and of this country laws which could make workers' organizations weak and ineffective and place workers at a disadvantage in their relationships with management. . . . Those who thought they would weaken us by this kind of action have merely succeeded in drawing us closer together. The Canadian Manufacturer's Association, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian

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CHAPTER THREE Construction Association, and other organizations of management may think they have been successful in having such legislation enacted. I want to tell them that they have merely created fresh tensions between management and unions and they have set back the course of Labour-management relations.36

The Executive Report to the same convention pointed out: The labour movement has been subjected to attacks unprecedented in recent years, if not in the history of our movement. The outstanding feature of these attacks has been an intensive, and to some degree successful, effort to impress upon the public an unfavourable picture of the labour movement. This campaign has been directed at all sections of the public, from school children to union members themselves. It is apparent that these efforts to discredit labour are continuing and are now being used as the basis for a campaign seeking anti-labour legislation and weakening of the efforts of the labour movement toward its broad objectives.37

Additional statements of this nature abound as the Congress leaders alternate between descriptions of the status of organized labour and the Congress in the Canadian community and warnings of the disasters that are being prepared for organized labour at every turn. On the other hand, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, in its submission to the minister of labour in response to his request for suggested amendments to the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, said: Today, trade unions are generally recognized not only as a part of our industrial society but also as an important segment of our whole social structure. Trade unions can and do perform a useful function not only in collective bargaining, but also in other fields such as social welfare and education. The Association recognizes the role of trade unions and accepts unquestioningly the principle of collective bargaining. We believe in the right of employees to organize in furtherance of their interests and the obligation of employers to bargain collectively with the freely chosen representatives of their employees, which is the basis of the present Act.38

The CMA proposed amendments to the act which would have strengthened the hand of employers in their relations with unions while the Congress proposed amendments which would have strengthened the hand of unions in their relations with employers. However, such proposals from both labour and management do not constitute persecution; they are merely an expected part of the interaction of groups speaking on behalf of conflicting interests. Such was not, however, the view of the Congress leadership. Speaking of the CM A's proposals in its annual Memorandum, the Congress accused the association of attempting "to undermine collective bargaining" and characterized its action as "a reflection on the integrity of the organized em-

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ployers of this country and no amount of professed acceptance by them of unions can dissuade us from this opinion."39 The leaders of organized labour cannot be dissuaded from this opinion because they refuse to be dissuaded. The alarums raised periodically by the Congress leadership are acts of obeisance to the history and traditions of organized labour. They are intended, in part, for internal consumption within the labour movement and, in part, to maintain the useful public image which presents labour as the persecuted underdog. It was this public image which led Prime Minister Pearson to tell the following story to the Congress' 1964 convention: I heard a story some time ago about the type of opposition that you faced in the past. It involved one of the bloodier strikes in the days before the trade union movement was so well organized, so well respected and accepted by all men of goodwill. A car careened through a picket line, fortunately injuring only two of the picketers, but both of them seriously. One of them was thrown some 80 yards into a ditch and the other was picked up and hurtled right through the windshield into the back seat of the car. The police were called, naturally. They investigated and laid two charges: the unconscious man in the ditch was charged with leaving the scene of an accident and the broken body in the back seat, with breaking and entering.40

This view of labour can be exploited in other respects. It can provide an explanation, and possibly an excuse, for behaviour which might otherwise appear inexplicable or inexcusable. In its submission to the Industrial Inquiry Commission on the Disruption of Shipping (the Norris Commission) the Congress fully accepted that it had been at fault, but attempted to defend its failure to act by pointing out "that decades of hostility from employers, from governments, from society generally, have bred into the labour movement an instinctive 'group loyalty'."41 Although the Congress leadership refuses to credit the professed acceptance of organized labour by the business community, there is a great deal of evidence which contradicts their view. The multitude of inter-group activities in which the Congress participates are indicative of the extent to which organized labour has been recognized and accepted by the community at large, including business. The Private Planning Association of Canada and the Duke of Edinburgh's Second Commonwealth Study Conference are two such examples. THE PRIVATE PLANNING ASSOCIATION

The Private Planning Association was established in 1958 as a private, non-profit organization to undertake studies of Canadian problems and policies, primarily in the field of economic affairs. The association is governed by an eight-man board of directors, and most of its work is carried out

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under the auspicies of two committees: the Canadian-American Committee, which was established in 1957 and thus ante-dates the association itself, and the Canadian Trade Committee, established in 1961. Among the eight members of the association's board of directors, as of February 1966, were the president of the Aluminum Company of Canada, the president of the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association, and the Hon. M. Wallace McCutcheon. Also on the Board was William Mahoney, Canadian director of the United Steelworkers of America and a general vice-president of the Congress. The Canadian Trade Committee, as of February 1966, had a membership of fifty-five, which included seven corporation chairmen and twenty-two corporation presidents.42 Also included in the committee's membership were the president of the Canadian Labour Congress as well as its secretarytreasurer, two executive vice-presidents, one general vice-president, and the associate director of research. The Canadian-American Committee, as of May 1966, had a membership of seventy-one of whom thirty-four were Canadians. The Canadian members of the committee included eight corporation chairmen and eight corporation presidents.43 Also on the committee were the president of the Canadian Labour Congress, its secretary-treasurer, two executive vice-presidents, and two general vice-presidents. THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH'S CONFERENCE

The first Commonwealth Study Conference was held at Oxford in 1956 under the presidency of the Duke of Edinburgh. The second conference was scheduled to be held in Canada in 1962 and was undertaken as a major community project by those who normally undertake the sponsorship of projects of this nature, namely, the community notables. An invitation to participate in such an undertaking is a measure of the status of the invitee. The governing body of the conference was the ninety-five member Conference Council made up of sixty-seven business representatives, five representatives from the universities, two from agriculture, and twenty-one from organized labour. Included among the labour representatives were the Congress president, secretary-treasurer, two executive vice-presidents, and four general vice-presidents. The membership of the council was a veritable Who's Who of the Canadian business community and included the chairman and president of the Canadian National Railway Company, the chairman and president of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, the chairman and chief executive officer of the Shawinigan Water and Power Company, and the chairman and chief executive officer of the Canadian International Paper Company. Board chairmen and corporation presidents were present in abundance.44

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The preparatory work of the conference was performed by several committees headed by a thirteen-member Steering Committee. It included among its members the president and secretary-treasurer of the Congress and the president of the Confederation of National Trade Unions. One of the duties of the members of the Steering Committee was to pass judgement on the acceptability of persons who were to be invited to join the Conference Council. On 30 November 1959, as the membership of the council was being drawn up, the conference executive director wrote to President Jodoin enclosing a list of names for his approval. The letter concluded: "With your permission, we will follow the same procedure as for the previous list. I will ask you to send any comments you may have by December 10th, or else to let me assume that you agree with the recommendations of the Nominations Committee."45 The list contained seventeen names on which President Jodoin was asked to pass judgement. Among them were the president and chairman of the Shawinigan Water and Power Company, the president of the Chrysler Corporation of Canada, the president of the Canadian International Paper Company, the president and general manager of Canada Steamship Lines, the president of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada, the president of International Business Machines Company, the presidents of Canada's two major airlines, and the chairman of the St. Lawrence Corporation, M. Wallace McCutcheon. The previous list, referred to in the letter of the executive director, had included K. C. Irving, Jules R. Timmins, and Hon. Hartland de M. Molson, as well as the chairman and president of the Royal Bank of Canada and presidents of the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation, the Aluminum Company of Canada, the Foundation Company of Canada, and the Imperial Tobacco Company. The spokesman for organized labour in Canada was not merely being asked to join with these men in a common community endeavour, he was being asked to pass judgement on their acceptability to participate in an undertaking under the sponsorship of the prince consort. IV. Conclusions Many of the characteristic features of the Congress and many of the demands which its leaders make upon government have their roots in the internal structure of the Congress itself. The weakness of the central organization, the limited role or raison d'etre of the Congress, and the fact that even this is subject to challenge by the larger affiliates and the AFL-CIO have resulted in an attempt by the Congress leadership to institutionalize the Congress as a recognized component of the Canadian political and social system. The ultimate aim of such institutionalization is to create a position for the Congress in the minds of trade unionists, government, and the public

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at large, in addition to the position which the Congress occupies within the trade union movement. The independent base chosen by the Congress leadership is that of "the official spokesman for labour at the national level" and the more extravagant claims are ideological rationalizations intended to secure for the Congress the trappings of recognition as an "official spokesman." But these more extravagant claims have made little impression upon the leaders of government. While the political leaders of Canada have recognized the legitimacy of the labour interest and the role of the Congress in representing that interest they have, by their words and actions, refused to recognize the claim of the Congress leadership to speak in a representative capacity on issues outside the field of labour legislations and related matters or to grant it recognition as an "official" spokesman. The participation of the Congress in the Private Planning Association, the Duke of Edinburgh's Commonwealth Study Conference, and a multitude of other inter-group activities indicate that organized labour has been accepted by the community and by business as a legitimate interest. The Congress has been accorded the recognition, in the form of social acceptability and invitations to participate in community activities, which normallyly accompanies such status.

Chapter 4

THE PROTECTION OF LEGITIMACY

Protecting the legitimacy of organized labour consists primarily of maintaining a favourable, and preventing the development of a hostile, climate of opinion with respect to the labour movement. The Congress pursues this objective by, on the one hand, participating in joint ventures and umbrella organizations which might enhance the standing of organized labour, and on the other, by combatting organizations and unfavourable public opinion which could undermine that standing. /. Joint Ventures and Umbrella Organizations A joint venture is any undertaking sponsored by two or more interest groups. Such undertakings usually take the form of a national conference convened for the ostensible purpose of drawing attention to a particular problem. An umbrella organization is one whose membership is made up of groups representing diverse interests. The ostensible purpose of an umbrella organization is to provide the means whereby a number of interest groups may cooperate in the pursuit of an objective which they all deem to be desirable, or at least inoffensive. Umbrella organizations are of several kinds. First, there are the private organizations, privately financed and drawing their membership from business, labour, agriculture, and other interests in the community; an example is the Private Planning Association of Canada. Second, there are organizations which, though private, are largely financed by government; examples are the Canadian Welfare Council and the Canadian Highway Safety Council. Still others are sponsored by umbrella organizations and operate as a division of the parent body, drawing their membership from among the members of the parent organization; an example is the Canadian Public Welfare Association which is a division of the Canadian Welfare Council. Finally, there are the umbrella organizations established to promote the aims of one of the sponsoring groups. These often come into being following a national conference and are little more than the planning committees of the conference supplemented

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by a full-time executive secretary. Such was the on-going organization established after the 1958 Canadian Conference on Education. The Congress is impelled to participate in joint ventures and umbrella organizations for a number of reasons. In some cases, such as the Canadian Broadcasting League, the concern of the Congress is related to its role as "the official spokesman for labour at the national level"; it is attempting to protect the interests of its affiliated unions in the broadcasting industry. The concern of the Congress is less obvious in the case of the Canadian Welfare Council and has little if any obvious or immediate concern with the activities of the Canadian Conference on Education. Participation in these two organizations is prompted by the desire of the Congress leadership to build and maintain a particular status for their organization among interest groups and in the community, the desire to gain acceptance for the interest which the Congress represents and to reinforce its legitimacy. These objectives were discussed in 1959 by the Congress director of legislation in a lengthy memorandum to Congress Executive Vice-President Stanley Knowles. The memorandum was occasioned by the revelations of the McClellan Sub-Committee of the United States Senate which had investigated the affairs of organized labour in the United States and had uncovered evidence of widespread corruption. The revelations had resulted in a crisis of legitimacy for organized labour in both the United States and Canada and the Congress director of legislation sought to alleviate this crisis by improving the public image of organized labour in Canada. I think we should be thinking in terms of a long range approach to the objective of obtaining sympathetic understanding of the labour movement outside its own ranks, more especially among those who are opinion-makers in our society.... ... What I have in mind is that we should develop a program over a period of time to cultivate friends among these people. I think this must be done tactfully and in an inconspicuous way.... Another way of making friends is by assisting legitimate organizations that are doing a useful job in the community.1

In a similar vein, when the president of the Sault Ste. Marie and District Labour Council wrote to the Congress in 1960 questioning the value of the local employment committees convened under the auspices of the Unemployment Insurance Commission, the Congress director of legislation replied: It is the job of these committees to keep in touch with the local labour situation and to see what can be done to help stimulate employment.... I am not sure as to how valuable the work of the committees is in terms of directly helping to solve the unemployment situation, but . . . if labour representatives are well chosen, they can do a very fine public relations job in showing

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the representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, the Veterans' Organization, and the others, that trade unions are sensible and responsible institutions.2

The Congress and its predecessor Congresses have long participated in a broad range of inter-group activities—the Executive Report to the 1958 convention pointed out that the Congress was participating in the activities of at least thirteen other private organizations.3 THE CANADIAN BROADCASTING LEAGUE

The Canadian Broadcasting League was established in 1930 as the Canadian Radio League. Its founders and most active members were Graham Spry and Alan Flaunt and its objective was the establishment of a publicly owned broadcasting network in Canada. In its early years the league was extremely active and played a major role in marshalling the public support needed to make the publicly owned network a reality.4 The death of Flaunt in 1941 and the departure of Spry for London in 1947 as agent-general of the Province of Saskatchewan deprived the league of its leadership. By the early 1950s it was little more than a semi-active group of individuals, largely academics and educators, led by historians Donald Creighton and Arthur Lower. In 1956 the league presented a brief to the Royal Commission on Broadcasting and in 1958, under its present name, organized a delegation to meet with the prime minister and present a submission on the then pending Broadcasting Act. Of the thirty-three organizations which participated in the delegation,5 fourteen represented interests in the field of education or related matters while twelve were either service or religious organizations. Organized labour was represented only through the two trade union centres. Following the enactment of the Broadcasting Act in 1958, the league again became semi-moribund, contenting itself with sending letters or telegrams to broadcasting policy makers or issuing public statements on such occasions as the cancellation of the Preview Commentary programme. A news release issued in June 1959 listed twenty-five organizations which were described as being "associated with the Canadian Broadcasting League." Of these, six were associations of educators (including the faculty associations of four universities), nine were religious or service organizations, and ten were economic interest groups including the Consumers' Association of Canada, the Co-operative Union of Canada, the Canadian Labour Congress, and five farm groups. There was one representative of organized labour in addition to the Congress and this was the Association of Radio and Television Employees of Canada (ARTEC). 6 In the spring of 1960 the House of Commons appointed a committee on

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broadcasting and, following a meeting of the league on 9 June 1960, the Congress director of legislation reported to Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald: It appears from the discussion that the C.B.L. is in a very weak position and those present seriously questioned its prospects as an authoritative spokesman on broadcasting matters. It was felt that there needed to be substantial increases in membership and in finances. There was agreement that a fulltime staff was required to maintain the necessary contacts and to work out the program.7

As a result of the meeting a committee was established to explore the question of reactivating the league and see what could be done to convene a meeting of interested organizations. The committee met in December 1960 and it included representatives of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, the Co-operative Union of Canada, ARTEC, and the Canadian Labour Congress. There were no representatives of educational or related organizations. Reporting to Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald on the proceedings of this meeting, the director of legislation said: The meeting discussed the question of a conference which could form the basis for a reorganized and reanimated CBL. . . . The meeting was taken up in very large measure in building up a list of organizations and of individuals who might be present at the conference and whose participation would enhance it. Apart from the organizations already participating in the CBL, it was decided that an effort should be made to attract the Canadian Association of Universities, church groups, the Canadian Council of Women and other national organizations. With respect to individuals, such people as Vincent Massey, Claude Bissell, Roby Kidd, Senator Cameron, Guy Henson, Frank McKinnon, and others were named. ... The meeting was hopeful that Massey might allow his name to be put forward as patron.8

By the middle of 1961, the reactivation of the league had become imperative. The parliamentary committee had reported in June, and all its major recommendations ran counter to the views of the Congress.9 In December 1961, the league committee decided that the proposed conference would have to be held as soon as possible in the new year, 3 March 1962 being the date selected. A sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Congress, ARTEC, and the Canadian Federation of Agriculture was established to make the necessary arrangements. Several resolutions were prepared for presentation at the conference, including one which would give the decisions of the conference the same effect as decisions of the annual meeting of the league.10 The work of the sub-committee was approved by the Executive Committee of the League in January 1962 and the stage was set for what amounted to a takeover. The league, which during the preceding decade had been the semi-

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moribund instrument of a few concerned academics, was about to become the instrument of groups having a direct economic interest in the broadcasting industry. Academics and educators were not being deliberately pushed out of the league, their presence provided the league with a respectability which it might not otherwise have enjoyed and their participation was actively solicited. However, the increased activities and more frequent meetings of the league and its committees meant that control was slipping from the hands of those to whom the league was a part-time activity and falling into the hands of those who had the time and money to concern themselves with the day-to-day activities of a much more active organization. Of the twenty-eight people who attended the meeting of 3 March 1962, five were there as individuals, three as representatives of religious or service groups, and twenty as representatives of economic interest groups. The broadcasting industry was represented by fourteen people from six organizations, including the Congress. The other interest groups represented were the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and two provincial agricultural groups, the Canadian Association of Consumers, and the Co-operative Union of Canada. At least two of the individuals present were educators, but no educational or related organizations were represented.11 The meeting itself was uneventful. The voting rules were amended to permit each organization two votes, the resolutions prepared by the sub-committee were adopted, and a draft constitution was approved. A temporary Executive Committee of twelve persons was chosen, of whom seven were representatives of economic interest groups, including the Congress and three unions in the broadcasting field. When the league wrote to Prime Minister Pearson in April 1965, its membership, in addition to several private individuals, consisted of nineteen organizations. Eight organizations represented organized labour: the Congress, the United Automobile Workers, and six unions in the broadcasting industry. There were four agricultural organizations: the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and three provincial organizations. The others were the Co-operative Union of Canada and three other organizations in the co-operative movement, the Canadian Association of Consumers, and the Federated Women's Institutes of Canada.12 Appearing before the Board of Broadcast Governors in February 1966, a spokesman for the league described it in these words: We appear before you on behalf of the Canadian Broadcasting League, an organization made up of both groups and individuals who are concerned about broadcasting in this country. ... We are not here to protect any vested interests of the broadcasting industry but rather the interest of the ordinary citizen. . . . We represent the consumer, the person who really has the biggest stake in broadcasting. . . . we are here to speak for the consumers of broadcasting.13

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This description of the league, though once valid, was no longer strictly accurate. The league now spoke on behalf of an important segment of broadcasting employees and they had a definite vested interest to protect. The activities of the league include meeting with the prime minister or members of the cabinet to present briefs. The utility of a brief is that it keeps government aware that there is an organized body of opinion on a matter and that decisions and policy are being closely watched by someone. The league executive met with the secretary of state in March 1964 to present a copy of its Statement of Principles and Policy. During the presentation, the vice-president of the league stressed the need for a standing committee of the House of Commons on broadcasting, and the advantages of statutory financing for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. She went on to express "deep concern regarding the effect of Community Antenna Television on the national broadcasting situation."14 The league also met with the prime minister and the Cabinet Committee on Broadcasting in April 1966 when it presented a brief supporting the recommendations of the Fowler Committee favouring a single broadcasting authority for Canada, the single national broadcasting system, and statutory financing for the CBC.15 In addition to numerous appearances at hearings before the Board of Broadcast Governors, the league submitted a brief to the Fowler Committee on Broadcasting and in April and September 1965 addressed an open letter to the prime minister. Finally, the league has resorted to the not uncommon device of sponsoring a national conference "to draw attention, and to attract as widespread publicity as possible to the importance of implementing the central recommendations of the Fowler Commission [sic] Report."16 The utility of the league for the Congress and the broadcasting unions is that, in the case of the CBC, labour-management relations can be taken out of the normal labour-management context and dealt with on the political plane. Matters in dispute may be taken directly to the political leaders and political pressure may be used as an aid to the devices usually available to unions in their relations with employers. One example is the series of attempts to abolish the International Service of the CBC. The International Service broadcasts Canadian programmes to foreign countries. It has no commercial value and its non-commercial value is doubtful. The service therefore stands low on any government's list of priorities and repeated attempts have been made to curtail or abolish it. One such attempt was made in late 1960 and the Executive Report to the 1962 Congress convention noted: "President Jodoin sent letters on January llth, 1961, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Howard Green and the Chairman of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Mr. Alphonse Ouimet, criticizing the curtailment of the International Service of the CBC and urging that the service be continued."17

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While its budget was reduced, the service was not abolished. Abolition was again attempted in 1963. The report of this attempt, in an ARTEC publication, said in part: The International Service was given a breathing spell when on Friday, January 24, the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that "the government had decided against reducing estimates for the International Service of the CBC." The decision concluded a long series of protests The coming 1967 World Fair, the Centenary Celebrations, the need for a source of propaganda for Canada abroad, increased by the recent cuts in its defence budget, were among the many valid reasons invoked by those we call our friends in a massive press campaign to alert the public and caution Canadians. . . . In acknowledging with a sense of profound gratitude the most valued support of the many true friends, let us urge all of them to keep a vigilant eye on the findings and recommendations of this government-appointed committee to study the preservation and survival of the I.S. Its gallant services will be even more indispensable in the near future and legislation—possibly an amendment to the Broadcasting Act—should be presented in order to protect its PERMANENCY.18 The reasons cited in favour of the retention of the IS are open to question, but another article in the same issue points out a more plausible reason for concern: "Thursday, January 16, 1964. A date that will live long, in the memory of the members of the International Service. . . . It was on this day that the majority of I.S. staff members learned for the first time, that their job security, indeed the existence of the service was threatened."19 A further attempt to curtail the service was made in late 1967. The announcement of the government's intention was followed by a barrage of petitions and pressure from interested groups and the curtailment went no further than the integration of the service's budget into the general CBC budget, as opposed to the previous practice of providing for the service from the estimates of the Department of External Affairs. In all these attempts to abolish or curtail the service, the Canadian Broadcasting League was among the groups which opposed any change in the status quo. The league is also useful to the Congress and its affiliates in the broadcasting industry because it adds another voice to those already active in pressing certain demands upon government. The Congress has opposed the establishment or expansion of privately owned broadcasting facilities in competition with the CBC and especially the establishment of privately owned networks.20 It has also opposed the importation of foreign television programs whether by airwave or by cable21 and has favoured statutory grants for the support of the CBC,22 the establishment of a parliamentary committee to deal with broadcasting matters,23 and the strict enforcement of the

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regulations made under the Broadcasting Act, especially those regulations dealing with program quality and Canadian content.24 The reason for the concern of the Congress and the broadcasting unions is that movies, panel shows, and imported programs mean fewer employment opportunities for the members of Canadian broadcasting unions. Thus, in 1962, the Congress told the government: The effects of the growth of private broadcasting are clearly evident in the programs presented. Canned music, imported films of ancient vintage and indifferent quality. . . . Canadian creative talent remains unused because it is cheaper and more profitable to import American productions.. . . We are opposed to any device which will weaken the still dominant role of the CBC, such as splitting of the network or cross-programming. To the extent, that private broadcasting is tolerated, it must play a secondary role, complementary to the CBC's role as the national system.25

In its submissions to government, to parliamentary committees, and to the broadcast governors the league has always urged a course of action consistent with that urged by the Congress. The effectiveness of the league is difficult to measure. One indication of its strength is the light in which it is seen by the association representing the private broadcasters. An article in Maclean's Magazine indicates that the executive vice-president of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters does see the league as a threat to the interests of his members; in the words of the article: "The whole thing depresses and distresses CAB's Jim Allard."26 THE CANADIAN CONFERENCE ON EDUCATION

The Canadian Conference on Education (CCE) is an example of a joint venture involving the Congress and a substantial number of other major national organizations. The CCE demonstrates that joint ventures involving a large number of organizations are successful in recruiting participants because participation is deemed to be helpful in developing a favourable image of the participating group and the interest which it represents. The organization and financing of the CCE will be examined in detail because they are typical of the methods employed in the launching of many joint ventures. The forerunner of the Conference, Canadian Education Week, was established in 1936 by the Canadian Teachers' Federation (CTF). The budget in 1956 was approximately $2500, of which the CTF contributed $500, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association $300, and the other sponsoring organizations $100 or less each.27 At the provincial level, Canadian Education Week was sponsored by committees under the leadership of the provincial teachers' federations, and was supported by the provincial units of the national sponsoring organizations as well as other local organizations. In late 1956 the secretary-treasurer of the CTF decided to embark upon

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a more ambitious undertaking so he wrote to the thirteen other organizations then sponsoring Canadian Education Week and to the Canadian Mental Health Association and the Canadian Council for Crippled Children and Adults: The Canadian Teachers' Federation believes that the time has come when all organizations interested in the problems of education in Canada should unite to plan a national conference of educators and laymen to consider all aspects of Canadian education. . . . At our Annual Conference in August, our executive officers were instructed to explore with other interested bodies the desirability and feasibility of holding such a national conference. It might be somewhat along the lines of the White House Conference on Education in the U.S.A.28

The letter also announced a time and place for a meeting of representatives of the organizations willing to participate in such a conference. All the invitees responded favourably and by June 1957 they had been joined by the Chemical Institute of Canada, the Engineering Institute of Canada, and the Industrial Foundation on Education.29 With sponsorship secured, the secretary-treasurer of the CTF in his capacity as director of the conference wrote to the ministers of education of the nine provinces other than Quebec and to the provincial secretary of Quebec asking them to participate in the conference as honorary co-chairmen. The letters read, in part: As you may observe from the enclosed copy of an introductory brochure and a reprint of an article that appeared in a newsletter of one of the sponsoring groups, the Conference is a combined effort of laymen and professional educators whose organizations have on their membership rolls over two million citizens representing all facets of Canadian society.30

The reprint was a copy of an article that had appeared in the newsletter of the CTF. With the exception of the provincial secretary of Quebec,31 all those invited to act as honorary co-chairmen agreed to do so. Letters were also sent to the deputy ministers of education, enclosing the brochure and the reprint, informing them that their minister had been invited to act as an honorary co-chairman and expressing the hope "that each provincial Department of Education will have a number of its senior personnel participate in the Conference."32 Attention was then turned to the matter of obtaining a conference chairman. A letter containing brochures and the reprint from the CTF News Letter was sent to Dr. Wilder Penfield informing him of the conference and asking him to accept the conference chairmanship. Dr. Penfield was flabbergasted at the invitation and replied that "I cannot imagine why you want me to be the Conference Chairman but if you really do, I feel that I cannot

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refuse."33 The reasons for the selection of Dr. Penfield were explained in a letter from a conference official to an individual who had contacted Dr. Penfield independently in an attempt to secure a favourable response: "Dr. Penfield's participation will be a most convincing symbol of the sincerity and importance of the Conference."34 The major work of the conference, the preparation of reports on eight broad topics for presentation to the plenary meeting, was confided to eight commissions. The recruitment of members to serve on the commissions followed what had by this time become standard procedure. Eminent Canadians were approached to accept positions as commission chairmen, and it then proved an easy matter to approach others and ask them to work alongside an eminent chairman. Further commission members were recruited through the connections which officials of the CTF had established with other interest groups. Thus, the secretary-treasurer of the CTF, who was also director of the conference, wrote to the manager of the Ontario division of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association: When we were at the CM A Annual Convention in June, Mr. Nason [a CTF official] and I had a short meeting with Mr. Evans [a CMA official]. From that discussion, we recruited Mr. Calder [vice-president and treasurer, Imperial Tobacco Company] and Mr. Needles [president, B.F. Goodrich Company of Canada] who are now serving on the Commission on "Financing Education" and "Buildings and Equipment". Mr. Evans offered to approach a Dr. Shipley of Dupont to serve on "Organization and Curriculum".35

Members were also solicited through officials of other interest groups: "When you were in Ottawa recently, I asked David Kirk [secretary-treasurer, Canadian Federation of Agriculture] to approach you with regard to serving on one of the eight commissions that are helping to plan the program for the forthcoming Canadian Conference on Education."36 This letter was addressed to the secretary of the Prince Edward Island Federation of Agriculture. By January 1958, the conference had acquired a momentum of its own and there were many unsolicited offers to participate from both individuals and organizations. To one such letter, asking for an invitation to attend the conference, the director replied in the affirmative and noted: "For our records we shall list you as a representative of the All-India Education Conference although you have not attended it since 1955."37 Other letters were received from groups or individuals attempting to use the conference to promote their particular interest in the field of education. Thus, the National Advisory Council on School Broadcasting sent mimeographed letters to all members of the conference steering committee urging that the conference discuss the place of television in education. A member of the Department of University Extension at the University of British Columbia, who was very

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active in the Canadian Association for Adult Education, wrote to urge the importance of giving attention to the problems of adult education. Invitations to attend the conference were also sent to the major American foundations, including the Ford Foundation, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller Foundation. Financial arrangements for the conference called for a budget of $50,000, and the vice-president of the Imperial Oil Company was given the responsibility of raising this sum. He exceeded his objective. Advertising and publicity for the conference were also easily obtained. During the 1950s the advertising industry was subject to much unfavourable publicity, and the term Madison Avenue came to denote dishonesty and hucksterism. In short, the advertising industry was facing a crisis of legitimacy. To meet this crisis, the Canadian advertising industry established the Canadian Advertising Advisory Board (CAAB) which, according to its letterhead, was a "private, non-profit organization, supported by all branches of the Canadian advertising industry, dedicated to the solution of national problems through the powers of advertising." The CAAB undertook to provide publicity for the conference as its first public-service advertising campaign. In the progress report of 30 June 1958 the CAAB reported: Some $60,000 to $70,000 worth of free production materials have been donated by advertising suppliers. I estimate that between $150,000 and $200,000 worth of advertising time and space has already been contributed or committed to the campaign. As a result, I anticipate no difficulty in reaching the goal of $1,000,000 worth of contributed advertising for the campaign. In fact, I am sure we will far exceed this figure.38 Following the conference in February 1958, hundreds of requests for copies of the proceedings and resolutions adopted were received. Most of these were from individuals, but requests were also received from the Alberta Royal Commission on Education, the legislative librarian of the Province of Saskatchewan, the chief of the Education Division of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, and a host of local school boards, local home and school groups, and other interested parties. Additional follow-up to the conference included the presentation of a brief to the prime minister and members of the cabinet. As often happens in the case of a joint venture such as the CCE, provision was made for the establishment of a permanent organization, a full-time secretariat, and future conferences. The preparations for the second Canadian Conference on Education, held in Montreal in March 1962, are beyond the scope of this work. The pattern had already been established by the activities preparatory to the 1958 conference. What is of interest is the further financing of the conference and its full-time secretariat. Responsibility for fund-raising was given to the executive director of the

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Industrial Foundation on Education. Support from industry continued at the high level established before the 1958 Conference, and in mid-1961 the Conference Reporter noted that, "In the past two and one-half years Canadian industry has contributed over $130,000 toward the C.C.E. program."39 Substantial additional support was forthcoming from other sources. The Conference Reporter noted that, "The Ford Foundation, which devotes most of its funds to support educational progress on this continent and throughout the world, has made grants totalling $100,000 to the Canadian Conference on Education."40 Another report noted that: The Canada Council has made a grant of $5,000 to the Conference.. . . This amount is designed to help meet the cost of bringing outstanding speakers from this continent and abroad. A number of government and educational leaders have already been invited and the Conference executive hopes to report further on these plans by September. . . . the Atkinson Charitable Foundation of Toronto has made a grant of $1,000 toward the general budget of the Conference.41

A news release, in September 1961, reported a grant of $10,000 from the International Nickel Company.42 The Canadian Conference on Education, having been established by respectable sponsors, having a list of prestigious names on its letterhead, and having made its name known, experienced no difficulty in raising substantial sums of money with which to carry on its activities. Furthermore, once established, the conference had no trouble finding additional sponsors: the published report of the 1962 conference carries a list of eighty-six sponsoring organizations.43 The conference's provincial affiliates were themselves sponsored by various provincial organizations.44 The cycle is maintained and expanded when sponsored organizations themselves become sponsors of other organizations. The Canadian Science Fairs Council, according to its letterhead, is sponsored by thirteen other organizations, and among these is the Canadian Conference on Education. Some conclusions may be drawn from this discussion. First, the conference was able to attract the support of a broad range of groups. Some groups, such as those representing people actually engaged in the field of education, were undoubtedly led to participate through a professional interest. But many others represent interests not even remotely related to education, and the reasons for their participation are of interest since they help to explain much of the joint activities of political interest groups. Education may be said to be a "motherhood cause" in the sense that it is difficult, if not impossible, to impugn it. Activities undertaken in support of education are therefore deemed to be respectable, while participation in such activities and acceptance of the would-be participant by others involved in the activity constitute forms of recognition. The very fact of participation can become a mark of status and respectability, as in the case of the Canadian Advertising Advisory Board.

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The organization of joint activities such as the conference do not present any great difficulties. Provided only that the cause is respectable and not the object of controversy, there are always a number of organizations whose leaders are prepared to participate. Once this minimum of support has been assured, the joint activity can partake of the status of the participants and easily acquires a momentum of its own. In the case of the CCE, the basic minimum of support was provided by the organizations which had previously sponsored Canadian Education Week, and additional support was obtained without difficulty; indeed, in many cases without any effort since some organizations asked to be permitted to participate. The ease with which sponsoring organizations are found may also be explained by the fact that constant intercourse among group leaders gives rise to behaviour akin to "keeping up with the Joneses." The leaders of some groups are undoubtedly led to participate because refusal to do so would make them conspicuous by their absence. If organizations representing businessmen are among the participants then the leaders of organizations representing labour feel that labour too must participate or be conspicuous by its absence. More important still, if labour is represented by the Canadian Labour Congress, the leaders of the Confederation of National Trade Unions must participate in support of their claim to be a representative of the labour interest—failure to participate would permit the leaders of the Congress to arrogate unto themselves the status of "the spokesman for labour at the national level." In another sense, interest-group leaders are driven to participate in joint activities for much the same reasons that many business firms encourage their executives to join service clubs, business clubs, and fashionable golf clubs. Although very little business may actually be transacted there they are valuable because they provide an opportunity to make and maintain contacts while operating as incomparable agencies of socialization. Participation in the joint activities of interest groups is also a valuable means of making and maintaining contacts, while the umbrella groups act as agencies of socialization into the mores and modes of behaviour appropriate to the respectable interest-group leader. Finally, there is simply the impulse to join and participate because there is no good reason not to do so. All these reasons can easily be exploited by anyone wishing to organize a joint venture provided only that he is able to identify himself with a suitable cause. The discussion of the financing of the Canadian Conference on Education suggests that no respectable organization which wants to promote a "motherhood cause" need be prevented from doing so because of lack of funds. If the pedigree of the joint venture is satisfactory, funds will be forthcoming from a number of sources. The results which flow from a joint venture of this nature are difficult to assess and there is very little that can be described as a direct result. The

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great increases in government spending on education since 1958 can far more credibly be traced to causes other than the conference. Certainly, in the most conspicuous Canadian example of increased educational expenditures, the Province of Quebec after 1960, it would be impossible, if not ridiculous, to attempt to trace a causal connection to the conference. The achievement of the conference, insofar as there were any achievements in the field of education itself, was that it added one more element to the many which already existed for the creation of a climate of opinion favourable to increased expenditures on education. Leaving education to one side and directing attention instead to the relations between interest groups and between interest-group leaders, one achievement of the conference was that it added still another strand to the complex web of inter-group relations. THE CANADIAN WELFARE COUNCIL

The Congress is deeply involved in the activities of the Canadian Welfare Council (CWC). The Executive Report to the 1968 Congress convention reported that an executive vice-president of the Congress sat on the council's Board of Governors. In addition, the Congress was represented on seven council committees including the National Committee on Public Welfare and the National Executive of the Community Chests and Councils Division.45 The absence of any detailed studies of the structure, function, and operation of the CWC is an important gap in the literature on Canadian interest groups, and the purpose of the present discussion is to emphasize certain aspects of its activities, in particular, the way the council acts as an umbrella under which groups having an interest in welfare can cooperate, coordinate their work, and sponsor joint ventures. The council is by far the largest of all Canadian umbrella organizations. The 1966 Annual Report speaks of "membership which covers the whole spectrum of Canadian society: 1,100 individuals, 480 public and private agencies, and over 300 national and regional corporations."46 The same document states that the finances of the council are "derived about equally, as a matter of policy, from three sources,"47 the three sources being government, community funds, and memberships. For the year ending 31 March 1966, the council's budget was $635,389, of which $119,119 was contributed by the three levels of government. In addition to providing one more very important locus of inter-group activity, the council serves other purposes. The groups participating in the formulation of policy statements may be able to have their views adopted by the council and then appear before government and other official bodies in support of a position taken by an established and prestigious organization. An example will illustrate this. Organized labour has always opposed "work-for-relief," the system where able-bodied recipients of welfare payments are required to perform services

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for the municipality which makes their relief payments. In addition to the usual argument that the sole criterion governing relief payments ought to be proof of need, the concern of organized labour is based upon the consequences of the work-for-relief principle. It would result in the creation of a pool of comparatively cheap labour for municipal governments, it could easily lead to the dismissal of employees engaged at the going wage rates, and, finally, unions representing municipal employees are among the affiliates of the Canadian Labour Congress. The work-for-relief problem usually arises during periods of high unemployment when relief rolls grow rapidly and the cost becomes a greater than usual burden to municipal treasuries. It occurred during the winter of 196061, and on 28 March 1961 the national director of the National Union of Public Employees wrote to the minister of national health and welfare to protest the use of federal assistance payments by certain municipalities for the purpose of paying relief workers. In January of the following year he informed the Congress director of legislation of the state of his union's campaign against the work-for-relief principle. Since we started this project less than a year ago there has been a considerable change in attitude on the provincial level. In Ontario it is especially evident that the provincial and municipal authorities reluctantly changed their policy when the decision we obtained from the federal government had the effect of cutting off payments for "work-for-relief projects which were then in progress.48

However, he pointed out that officials in other provinces, particularly British Columbia, had developed plans to circumvent the federal regulations. One of the side effects of the British Columbia program was that "in some cases municipalities do not participate [in federal winter works programs] because their collective agreements provide for rehiring of laid-off employees for whom they would receive no provincial subsidy."49 The problem was not confined to an occasional municipality or to attempts by a provincial government to find a way around federal grants regulations. At an inter-provincial conference in August 1962 several premiers gave their support to the work-for-relief principle and indicated that they hoped to negotiate a change in the position of the federal government.50 In May 1963, the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities adopted a resolution supporting the principle,51 and in June 1964 the Association of Ontario Reeves and Mayors reaffirmed its long-standing support.52 In its Memorandum to the Government of December 1962, the Congress devoted more than two pages to work-for-relief.53 Between the presentation of the Memorandum of December 1962 and that of December 1963, the Canadian Welfare Council received the report of a special committee established to examine the question. Certain details about the organization and

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operation of this special committee are unknown, as, for example, whether or not the committee was established at the instigation of the Congress. It is known, however, that an employee of the Congress was a member of the committee. In October 1963 the council issued a printed policy statement which stated that "on the basis of available evidence, work for relief does not emerge as a desirable or acceptable method."54 In its December 1963 Memorandum to the Government, the Congress could say of work-f or-relief that, It is unfair to the unemployed. It is contrary to good placement practices. It is inconsistent with good social welfare standards. It is a thoroughly improper way of relieving municipalities of the burden of welfare payments. It has been opposed by the Canadian Welfare Council and the Canadian Association of Social Workers.55 Nor was that the only purpose served by the council's policy statement. Two of the three news items cited above appeared after the council had issued its policy statement and both items made mention of the council's opposition. The statement provided the other point of view from a supposedly impartial and authoritative source and thus entered into the shaping of public opinion. The council is also useful in that it can be cited as the ostensible sponsor of joint ventures undertaken in support of objectives which one or more council members wish to promote. One example is the National Conference on Medicare in 1965, organized and promoted by the Canadian Labour Congress but ostensibly convened under the auspices of the council. Nor was the medicare conference an isolated example. The council's 1964 Annual Report notes: "As a national clearing house for social welfare, the Council initiates, or inevitably participates to varying degrees in, many national conferences, workshops, seminars or consultations. In 1963-1964 much of its attention was focussed on developments in at least six such national meetings."56 Among the examples cited was the Canadian Conference on Aging. The Board of Governors of the council had agreed to sponsor the conference "in response to a widespread and long-standing desire on the part of a great many people."57 The Report does not give any indication of who these many people were, but other documents dealing with the conference indicate that it was sponsored by the same organizations whose names are usually associated with such undertakings. NATIONAL CONFERENCES AND INTER-GROUP RELATIONS—GENERAL NOTES

The conferences discussed above and those listed in Appendix B are by no means an exhaustive list even of those conferences which included the Congress among their sponsors. In addition to the ad hoc conferences promoted by various groups, there are the conferences sponsored by the "ongoing" organizations established after earlier conferences. As well, there

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are the regularly scheduled conferences of certain major organizations; the biennial Canadian Conference on Social Welfare sponsored by the CWC and the sporadic Labour Conference on Social Security sponsored by the Congress are examples. These national conferences serve a number of purposes. In the case of on-going organizations left over from previous conferences, the later conferences may be little more than a full-time executive-secretary justifying his existence. In some cases, however, the purpose of a conference is to draw attention to a problem and mobilize public opinion in order to force government to act. The papers presented at a conference, often collected and published, are irrelevant and it is not expected that they will present radical new ideas or suggest solutions to problems. What occurs at a conference is not nearly as important as the fact of the conference itself. These points are evident in a memorandum on the subject of unemployment which the Congress director of legislation prepared for the consideration of Executive VicePresident Knowles: It has occurred to me that this situation [increasing winter unemployment] iss one which the Congress cannot afford to ignore and I am sure it would not in any case. What I have suggested to the Research Department is the advisability of a conference to discuss employment and possible measures to cope with it. Forsey and Bell suggest that there be convened initially a small and relatively private conference of economists as well as labour representatives. . . . I agree quite fully with Forsey and Bell about the value that such a conference would have. I suppose that it should be called fairly soon, that is, before unemployment starts soaring in the late fall. Beyond that, however, it seems to me that the Congress might give consideration to a well publicized national conference on unemployment for the purpose of placing pressure on the Government to deal with it. This is an entirely different matter and requires different treatment.58

In this case, the Congress attempted to go one step beyond convening a conference for the purpose of forcing the hand of government, an attempt was made to have government itself convene the conference. President Jodoin wrote to the prime minister: The Canadian Labour Congress has suggested on various occasions that a special conference be called to discuss unemployment. It has been our feeling that such a conference should be representative of the Government, of organized labour, organized business and other interested elements in the community. We feel now more justified than ever in urging you to summon such a conference and to do so forthwith.59

The letter had originally been drafted for President Jodoin by the director of legislation who pointed out:

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CHAPTER FOUR I wrote the letter in such a way as to preclude the inclusion of a copy of the Congress statement on economic policy. In thinking the matter over it seemed to me that we should avoid including any suggestions in our letter so as not to give the Prime Minister the opportunity of refusing to call a conference on the grounds that he already had our views as to what action should be taken.60

The prime minister's executive assistant was not taken in by this ploy. In his reply he said, You may be aware that some sources have suggested that rather than a programme of Conferences and conversations such as you suggest, consideration should be given instead to a programme of action. .. . Your letter indicates that you would like to make your own contribution in the light of your knowledge and experience. May I respectfully suggest that your representations in the form of a concise and confidential brief to the Prime Minister, or the Minister of Labour, would be gratefully received and carefully considered.61

The matter was dropped and there was no national conference on unemployment. The propensity to launch, and participate in, national conferences is so great that the number of conferences has tended to get out of hand. The 1964 Annual Report of the Canadian Welfare Council noted that its biennial Canadian Conference on Social Welfare was to be held "immediately after the C WC one-day meeting and just before the Canadian Conference on the Family."62 The same item notes: In view of the growing number of national conferences related to specific fields (family, aging, children, corrections and so on), there has been a growing feeling that there should be only one periodic (not necessarily annual) conference on general social welfare. At any rate it is likely that 1964-1965 will see many discussions aimed at an up-to-date approach to this question of streamlining conference activity.

Whatever the feelings that the number of conferences was getting out of hand, there is no evidence that anything was being done to control their numbers. On the contrary, existing conference machinery increasingly is not dismantled after a conference but is maintained as an on-going organization in much the same manner as the Canadian Conference on Education. This was the case with the Canadian Conference on the Family and the 1966 Annual Report of the CWC notes that "for the first time in its 38-year history, the Canadian Conference on Social Welfare is being conducted as an on-going project of the Canadian Welfare Council."63 Similarly, on the subject of aging: "The extraordinary interest and enthusiasm aroused by the Canadian Conference on Aging . . . are finding expression in follow-up activities across Canada. The provincial committees of the conference have formed themselves into or created new on-going groups."64 Sooner or later

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the names of the newly established groups will appear among the names of groups sponsoring other conferences or organizations. Relations between interest groups are not limited to the sponsorship of national conferences or membership in umbrella groups, but extend also to many day-to-day activities. Groups, even supposedly opposing groups such as organized labour and management, will join forces in attempts to influence government policy on matters on which they are in agreement. An example is the exchange of correspondence between the Canadian Labour Congress and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce on the subject of water pollution. In May 1966, the Congress director of legislation wrote to the general manager of the Chamber enclosing a copy of the Congress' policy statement on water pollution. In reply, the Chamber's general manager wrote: In reading through your Policy Statement I find there are many points of mutual interest and agreement in our present thinking, including the desirability of a national inventory of water resources, the formulation of a national water policy, a "go slow" approach before any more diversion of our water to the United States and the importance for a close look at the hazards of and solutions to the present pollution situation. . . . I do think it would be worthwhile, before too long, when our views are firmed up a bit more to chat over our mutual interest and mutual policies in this connection. Let's keep in touch.65

The reply from the Congress indicated a definite desire to "keep in touch."66 Another aspect of inter-group relations is the use of an established interest, such as organized labour, by other interests seeking to establish their own legitimacy. The chiropractors are an example. The Canadian Chiropractic Association has long and regularly been sending pamphlets, brochures, and letters to the CLC in an attempt to secure some form of endorsement or recognition. The provincial chiropractic associations have been directing similar correspondence at the provincial federations of labour. Upon receipt of one such letter from the Ontario Chiropractic Association the welfare director of the Ontario Federation of Labour wrote to the Congress for guidance. The reply which he received read, in part: We have been in receipt of communications from the Chiropractic Association for the last few years. . . . I do not see why any organization which considers itself to be a profession should have to come to a trade union convention and seek endorsation. I know of no other profession or a group that calls itself a profession that has made this kind of approach to the organized labour movement. . . . I suppose the issue is going to come up again at the next convention since the Chiropractors have absolutely no compunction about lobbying us. .. ,67

The Canadian Chiropractic Association is not among the sponsors or participants in any of the joint ventures listed in Appendix B nor is its absence voluntary since its name does not appear on any of the lists kept by the

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Congress of potential conference participants. One of the problems that the major, well-established interest groups must face is that they become the foci of pressure from other, less well-established, groups and interests seeking legitimacy. Still another aspect of inter-group relations is the recognition by the group leaders of each other's spheres of influence and a certain degree of noblesse oblige on their part in entering upon activities which clearly fall within the province of another group. An example is the correspondence between the CLC and the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities on the subject of an inter-governmental conference to examine municipal finances. In April 1960 the Toronto and District Labour Council adopted the report of its Municipal Committee which suggested, among other things, that the council "ask the Canadian Labour Congress to urge the Federal government to call a Dominion, Provincial, municipal tax conference with a view to overhauling the whole taxation structure as it applies to municipalities." The request was forwarded to the Congress for consideration. In June 1960 the Executive Council of the Congress approved the idea of asking the federal government to convene a Dominion-provincial-municipal tax conference. Congress Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald thereupon wrote to the executive director of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities to inform him of the decision: "Rather than proceed unilaterally on the matter, it was decided to contact the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities in order to determine whether our representations would be welcome, either directly to the Government or in concert with your Association."68 The great number of conferences and other inter-group undertakings has resulted in the establishment of a permanent inter-group council, the Joint Planning Commission of the Canadian Association for Adult Education. The commission, according to an information pamphlet, is "a central consultative body directly serving about one hundred Canadian national organizations, and operates as a standing committee of the Canadian Association for Adult Education."69 In fact, the commission does very little planning and it is largely ineffective, its meetings are usually taken up with receiving reports on the activities of member organizations. II. Moulding Public Opinion The acceptance of organized labour as a legitimate interest by Canadian society has imposed upon the leadership of organized labour the obligation of meeting the standards of respectable behaviour as defined by the community. The importance of the attitude of the public toward the Labour movement is becoming increasingly important. Public opinion has a marked effect on

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most of our negotiations and, in some instances, is a major factor. The success of our legislative objectives inevitably depends upon the support which they receive from the public.70

The Executive Report to the 1962 convention provided an insight into the type of behaviour which the Congress leadership believed was necessary to protect the institutional position of the Congress and the legitimacy of the labour interest: "The prestige and stature of the Congress has been enhanced by the responsible and consistent manner in which it has conducted itself as the national voice of organized labour in Canada."71 Another means by which the Congress maintains its respectability is by avoiding association with those who, for one reason or another, are themselves beyond the bounds of respectability. This was a prime consideration in determining the course of action adopted by the Congress with respect to the Seafarers' International Union. Another, and perhaps more typical example is provided by a memorandum dealing with a suggestion received from an Ottawa lawyer: Attached herewith is a letter from a Mr. , a local lawyer. The letter suggests that we may be interested in pushing a certain type of legislation in the interests of our members. I have discussed this matter with our legal counsel. . . and he agrees with me that the proposal makes sense. . . . I have not replied to the letter which, as you will see, is addressed to the Legislative Committee of the Canadian Labour Congress. You may want to reply to it but I suggest that you do not carry it beyond a mere formality in that regard. To the best of my knowledge Mr. was politically to the left and we might not want to get involved with him.72

This was not an isolated incident. Alleged communist leadership was the ostensible reason for the consistent refusal of the Congress leadership to accept the United Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers' Union into affiliation. Similarly, the two predecessor Congresses had, in the 1940s, expelled unions for alleged communist leadership. In addition to shunning association with those beyond the bounds of respectability and actively seeking association, through the web of intergroup relations, with causes or groups which are respectable, the Congress also attempts to mute criticism of organized labour by the more respected moulders of public opinion. In September 1962, former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Ivan C. Rand made a speech in which he was critical of certain labour practices. In particular, he was critical of open ballots in strike votes which he characterized as "the repudiation of a democratic principle . . . by men who will not tolerate dissent. It is an insult to the democratic order of things."73 Dean Rand also suggested that strikes be replaced by compulsory arbitration. Both

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strike votes held otherwise than under the supervision of union leaders and compulsory arbitration are anathema to the leaders of organized labour. The morning after the speech, President Jodoin received a memorandum from the director of legislation: In view of the fact that Mr. Rand is not known to be anti-labour and is generally considered to be a man of relatively liberal views, I thought his criticism should receive serious consideration. . . . I am inclined to feel that an opportunity should be found for an officer of the Congress to meet with him and to discuss the matter. My reason for doing so is that a statement from someone like Rand is likely to be taken much more seriously than if it comes from an employer spokesman or someone else who is more obviously identified with an interest that is likely to be hostile to organized labour.74

President Jodoin approved and correspondence was undertaken with Dean Rand. Still another means of moulding public opinion is the establishment of special links with other interests which may feel that they have a special grievance against organized labour. One such interest is agriculture. The Congress took the initiative in establishing the Farmer-Labour Co-ordinating Council made up of representatives of the Congress and various farm organizations. The council's title is a misnomer since it does no coordinating and merely serves as a forum which the Congress leadership hopes will mollify the resentment felt by farmers for organized labour and thus head off possible demands for restrictive legislation. The major topics of discussion at council meetings are wage settlements which result in increased costs to the farmer. For example, the question of grain handling on the west coast was discussed at one meeting. Grain handling is an especially touchy subject since all increases in costs automatically fall back on the grain grower. The minutes of the meeting record that "this problem came in for a lengthy discussion. There was a general consensus of opinion that situations such as this pointed up the necessity for better co-operation and communication between organized labour and organized farm groups."75 Needless to say, the Congress did not undertake to moderate the demands of the grain handlers. Among the other subjects discussed from time to time have been railroads and farm machinery. The proceedings of the council tend to resemble a statement made at one meeting in 1962 by Congress Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald: "Labour is not a selfish group Our approach must be one of co-operation. It is to the interest of both groups to have a prosperous labour and a prosperous farm community."76 Farmers may resent the increased costs which they must bear as a result of organized labour's bargaining power, but so long as farm leaders can be mollified by platitudes, organized agriculture is unlikely to join the ranks of the anti-labour forces or to demand restrictive labour legislation.

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Finally, the Congress must sometimes deal with the threat posed by organizations dedicated to undermining the standing of organized labour by attacking its respectability and its privileges. It should be noted that these organizations are not the usual and accepted spokesmen for the business interest such as the Canadian Manufacturers' Association or the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, but, rather, small organizations which come and go on the fringes of interest-group activity. In some cases such organizations have little purpose other than to obtain funds from frightened small businessmen and divert them to the pockets of the organization's promoters. THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

One example of a small anti-labour organization is the Committee on Economic Rights and Freedoms.77 In November 1957, the Toronto and District Labour Council noted that an attempt was being made to establish an organization under this name and that the organizers were seeking a charter from the secretary of state for Canada. The council thereupon unanimously adopted a resolution requesting "the CLC to make an immediate investigation into such anti-union activity and make any necessary representation to the Federal Government."78 This resolution was forwarded to President Jodoin by the secretary of the council. Several days later a similar communication was received from the Oshawa and District Labour Council.79 The letters found their way to the desk of Congress' director of legislation who reported to President Jodoin: I have checked on this with the Department of the Secretary of State. An application has been made for a charter to be granted. . . . You may want to give consideration to taking exception to granting a charter to the sponsors regardless of the name if, as is suspected, the purpose of the organization is to promote anti-labour organization. I might point out to you that under existing legislation the Secretary of State has complete discretion as to the granting of charters. So I am told by a senior officer of her Department.80

President Jodoin proved eager to seize upon the discretionary power of the secretary of state and bring to bear whatever political influence the Congress might be able to wield to effect the denial of the charter. Replying to the memorandum he said: Not only do I give consideration to taking exception to the granting of such a charter to the sponsors . . . but I believe that representations in the name of the Congress should be made to the Hon. Secretary of State, who, as you say has complete discretion as to the granting of charters, to oppose such a charter being issued.81

At this point the petition was temporarily stalled by a legal technicality unrelated to the Congress' representations. The problem was overcome by

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the following summer and the petition renewed. President Jodoin once again wrote to the secretary of state opposing the grant of a charter. The charter was, however, granted and the secretary of state replied to President Jodoin discussing the principles at issue: II est possible que certaines gens soient d'avis qu'un moyen efficace de defendre les droits civils et economiques des individus est de combattre les principes du syndicalisme, qu'elles jugeraient prejudiciables a ces libertes. Cependant, il me semble que nous n'avions aucune raison valable pour refuser Foctroi de ces lettres patentes et que, plus precisement, un refus n'aurait pu etre justifie par le fait que les fins proposees et les observations de M. MacDonald (qui ont ete prises en serieuse consideration) donnaient lieu de supposer que, peut-etre, la corporation projetee combattrait certains principes et certaines pratiques des syndicats ouvriers ou engagerait des polemiques avec ceux-ci.82

Other means have been contemplated in dealing with organizations attacking the legitimacy of trade unionism. In April 1963, an organization known as the Committee for Justice and Liberty Foundation obtained letters patent from the provincial secretary of Ontario. As its later activities revealed, the purpose of the organization was to oppose the principles of trade unionism— in particular, the closed shop and compulsory union membership.83 In early 1964 the Toronto and District Labour Council brought this organization to the attention of the Congress and recommended action to secure removal of the tax exemptions granted by the Department of National Revenue in respect of contributions and payment of dues to such organizations. The Congress director of legislation thereupon wrote to a high-ranking official in the Department of National Revenue to ascertain the criteria used by the department in determining tax-exemption privileges and whether objections could be made to the granting of such exemptions. The reply which he received stated, in effect, that reviews of the status of organizations enjoying tax-exempt status were very rare and that, while there was no established machinery for the processing of complaints, the department would be prepared to re-examine the status of an organization in the event that complaints were received.84 On the basis of this reply the director of legislation advised Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald: It would seem to me that consideration might be given to taking a more vigorous stand against such organizations . . . by compelling the Department of Revenue to review its favoured treatment of such organizations. We may either get a change in treatment or at least cause the Department to take a much harder look at such organizations when they ask for special status.85

In these cases the officers and officials of the Congress were able to deal directly with senior government officials and, in the first case, with a member of the cabinet. The case of the Committee for Justice and Liberty involved

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little more than obtaining information that is easily available to the public. However, the attempt to prevent the granting of a charter to the Committee on Economic Rights and Freedoms involved telephone calls to senior civil servants to ascertain procedures within the Department of the Secretary of State and to keep track of the progress of the charter petition. It also involved telephone contact between senior officers of the Congress and the secretary of state. While the Congress was unable to prevent the grant of the charter, it was able to exploit its access to the highest levels of government and to have its views taken into consideration. ///. Conclusions The primary conclusion of this chapter is that the leadership of the Canadian Labour Congress, having established a position in the Canadian political system for the interest which they claim to represent, seek to protect and enhance that position. One aspect of their task is the maintenance of the standing of their interest and of their organization in a complex set of relationships with other interest groups, voluntary associations, and semi-official bodies. This is done through participation in a complex network of intergroup activities. (Additional detail on the web of inter-group relations is provided in Appendix B.) Another essential element is the mode of behaviour to which the Congress leadership is obliged to conform. Having attained a position of respectability, the leaders of organized labour conduct themselves in a manner consonant with their status: they avoid involvement with those who are beyond the bounds of respectability, they shun behaviour which does not accord with current social mores, and, in general, they behave in "a responsible and consistent manner." The leaders of the Congress have developed intimate links with the existing political and social structure and these links are exploited for the protection of their interest, of their access to government, of their entry into the social circles associated with interest-group activity, and of the status of their organization. The links developed through participation in joint ventures and umbrella organizations are sometimes useful in the pursuit of specific political objectives, but their greatest contribution to interest-group activity is as agencies of socialization. It is through constant intercourse in such agencies that interest-group leaders develop the mores and modes of behaviour appropriate to respectable interest-group leaders, confer status and recognition upon each other, and develop a sense of group identity.

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Chapter 5

THE PROTECTION OF MANDATE

To protect the mandate of an organization is to maintain its position as the spokesman for a legitimate interest. This has two aspects. First, there is the mandate as seen by the membership of the group, by the potential membership, and by the public. Leaders attempt to win acceptance for their group as the spokesman for the interest since only this enables them to demand recognition from government. Second, there is the mandate as seen by government. The group leaders wish to be recognized as "official spokesmen" and they demand that government accord them the privileges and prerogatives which, in their opinion, ought to accompany such status. Recognition by government in the form of access, consultation on appointments to official bodies, and the formal presentation of memoranda are credentials which the group leaders can present to the public and to the membership to gain and retain acceptance by them. This acceptance in turn is a credential which can be presented to government in support of demands for further signs of recognition. This chapter will deal with the manner in which the Congress' leadership attempts to protect and enhance the recognition accorded their organization by government. For analytic purposes the discussion will be divided into five parts. First, a discussion of the problems of recognition and access. Included is a discussion of the means by which government can confer recognition upon a group and the manner in which groups compete for these signs of recognition. Second, an examination of the problem of recognition in the special case of representation on government boards, commissions and committees. Third, a discussion of the problem of appointments to government bodies and an examination of a case study illustrative of the principles involved and of the consequences for relations between groups and government of failure on the part of the latter to meet, at least in part, the expectations of group leaders. Fourth, an examination of an attempt by the Congress leadership to protect the integrity of their organization in the face of an attempt by the Confederation of National Trade Unions to alter the composition of the Canada Labour Relations Board. Finally, an examination of the manner in which interest group leaders, seeking organizational advantage, attempt to influence the distribution of power within government.

102 CHAPTER FIVE /. Recognition and Access One credential that government can bestow is a demonstrated willingness to meet with the leaders of interest groups to discuss those aspects of government policy which are of concern to them. Whether such a meeting is held in public, as in the case of the presentation of a formal annual memorandum, or whether the meeting itself is private but is later publicized, it is valuable as an indication of acceptance by government. Interest-group leaders are therefore zealous in defence of their right to meet with government and quick to protest when such privileges are extended to other groups attempting to speak on behalf of the interest which they claim to represent. REPRESENTATIVES WITHOUT STATUS

In March 1954 the presidents of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada and the Canadian Congress of Labour, the two leading and recognized spokesmen for organized labour at that time, sent a joint letter to Labour Minister Milton Gregg. Their letter read, in part: This joint letter is being addressed to you because we feel that certain developments and certain actions by your Government in recent weeks have not been in the best interests of Canada and certainly not in the best interests of those law-abiding and right thinking Canadians whom we have the privilege and honour to represent. When, on February 10th, the representatives of the United Automobile Workers, by appointment, met with you and certain other Ministers in connection with the serious situation in the farm implement industry, a few taxi loads of other people carrying banners also arrived. Although these "extras" had no appointment and no connection with the farm implement industry, and did not represent any significant body of workers either locally or in a wider field, they were received by yourself and other Ministers as if their representations were as important as those of the Auto Workers. At the time this seemed strange and unaccountable to us. However, as the time has gone by this type of thing seems to have fitted into a pattern of Ministerial action which is most alarming to us. On February llth, representations and recommendations in connection with unemployment were made jointly by ourselves and our associates of The Trades and Labor Congress of Canada and the Canadian Congress of Labour. Subsequently your Government have received representations from other labour groups without national status including the United Electrical Workers Union and the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union. Now we are amazed and, in fact, dismayed to find your Government giving recognition to these organizations. We cannot let it pass without drawing it to your attention that from the press reports of these representations we can only conclude that your Government placed as much importance and significance upon the representations of these Communist led organizations as upon

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our own which represented the views of almost all of the bona fide trade unionists and trade unions in Canada.1 The two "recognized" spokesmen for organized labour were protesting the extension of recognition to other organizations which claimed to speak on behalf of the same interest. Mr. Gregg's reply is interesting because it recognizes the existence of a hierarchy among interest groups and acknowledges the importance of government recognition of the status of such groups: I acknowledge receipt of your joint letter dated March 25th in which you made representations with regard to certain labour groups "without national status" being received by Ministers of the Crown I am glad to have the benefit of your views and to assure you that they will receive careful consideration. While as a matter of general practice, the Government considers that representations on labour matters should be made through the major labour congresses, it would be difficult to adopt a hardand-fast policy of individual Ministers refusing to receive representations on any subject from workers' representatives not affiliated with a major labour congress. As Minister of Labour I could not agree with such a policy. .. . You are aware, I am sure, that the only representatives of organized labour that the Prime Minister and his Cabinet have formally met as a government are the delegations from your two Congresses, the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour and the National Legislative Committee (Canada), International Railway Brotherhoods. These are the only labour bodies which have been recognized by the Government for representation purposes. Neither I nor those of my colleagues who heard representations of the labour groups referred to regarded this simple act as "recognition" in the sense suggested in your letter.2 THE ILO DELEGATE

General conferences of the International Labour Organization are held annually and each member country may send three delegates: a government delegate, an employers' delegate, and a workers' delegate. The labour and employer delegates, in accordance with the constitution of the organization, are chosen in agreement with the "most representative" organizations of employers and employees. As there can be only one workers' delegate from each country (although the delegate may have a number of advisers) the right of consultation on the appointment of the ILO delegate is one of the most important forms of recognition that government can bestow upon a labour organization. In June 1951, President A. R. Mosher of the Canadian Congress of Labour wrote to the prime minister and to the minister of labour to ask that the monopoly hitherto enjoyed by the Trades and Labor Congress in the appointment of the Canadian workers' delegate be broken and that the CCL

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also be permitted to advise on the appointment. The minister of labour replied on behalf of both the prime minister and himself and said, in part: The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1922 on a reference by the Netherlands Government. . . reaffirms the responsibility of the government to select the employers' and workers' delegates in agreement with the "most representative" employers' and workers' organizations. It states: "The Article throws upon the Government of the State the duty of deciding, on the data at its disposal, what organizations are, in point of fact, the most representative." The appeal from any such decision of a government in appointing an employers' delegate or a workers' delegate rests with the Credentials Committee of the annual International Labour Conference. Upon the basis of the evidence at its disposal up to the present time, the Government of Canada has decided each year that the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada is the "most representative" national labour organization in Canada, for the purpose of nominating the workers' delegate to the annual International Labour Conference. The latest figures available indicate that the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada has the allegiance of half the organized workers of Canada, with a comprehensive geographical and industrial coverage throughout the country.... You refer to the appointment of the workers' delegate for the 1952 International Labour Conference, and suggest that the General Consultative Committee of the four labour organizations be asked to nominate the workers' delegate for this Conference. The Government is not aware of the scope of the authority vested in this Committee by the constituent labour organizations. It would hardly be appropriate, therefore, for the Government to refer the matter to the Committee without confirmation that the labour organizations represented on the Committee concur in the proposal you have put forward. Perhaps, therefore, you would wish to discuss the proposal with the Trades and Labour Congress to determine whether it is acceptable to have the committee deal with this matter in the manner suggested. As has been pointed out to the Canadian Congress of Labour on a number of occasions throughout the last few years, the Government of Canada would be very glad to take into account, in appointing the Canadian workers' delegate to annual International Labour Conferences, any joint nominations made after agreement between the major national labour organizations.3

Matters as vital to the recognition of the status of an organization as consultation on the appointment of the ILO delegate never cease to be issues so long as rival groups are competing for status. In a Memorandum submitted to the government in February 1966, the Confederation of National Trade Unions said of the appointment of ILO delegates: By becoming a member of the International Labour Office [sic, translation from the French title, Bureau International du Travail], Canada agrees to send every year a delegation made up of representatives of the Government, the Employers and the Workers....

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For a long time now, the CNTU has been accepting the invitation of the Government and one of our members acts as technical adviser to the workers' delegate who has been until now a member of the CLC. We feel this situation is irregular and should be corrected by resorting to rotation.... We recognize that the CLC has more members than the CNTU. Thus, we think it would be appropriate if, every four years, the CNTU were invited by the Government to recommend one of its members to act as the workers' delegate instead of technical adviser to the workers' delegate.4

The CNTU Memorandum, furthermore, left no doubt that this demand was intended to establish that the difference between the CNTU and the CLC was quantitative and not qualitative, and that the CLC was not entitled to enjoy privileges as the sole official voice of labour at the national level. "In other countries where there are more than one labour organization it is accepted that each organization has its turn in recommending to the Government the workers' delegate. The same rule should apply in Canada where we have two main labour organizations."5 The use which the Congress leadership may make of the right of nomination to ILO delegations was demonstrated in July 1959 when SecretaryTreasurer MacDonald replied to a letter in which the managing director of Canadian Air Line Pilots' Association informed him that the pilots had voted against affiliation with the Congress. He said, in part: As you are perhaps aware, the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers has a small group of pilots in its membership, who are employed by Saskatchewan Airways. In the event that the Congress is called upon to nominate representatives to attend an ILO Conference dealing with aeronautical matters, it would have no alternative but to seek its representation from that source.6 COLOMBO PLAN STUDENTS

The protection of the mandate claimed by the Congress leadership require that, whenever possible, they prevent rival organizations from developing channels of communication with government which might entail the conferral of some form of official status upon them. In June 1963, after several years of negotiation, the Congress and the Confederation of National Trade Unions jointly established the Labour College of Canada in Montreal. Among the eighty-six students who attended classes during the college's first term was one student "from Malaya under the Colombo Plan."7 The 1964 term saw the number of Colombo Plan students increased to nineteen and in 1965 their number increased to fiftynine.8 Originally, the foreign students had been brought to Canada by the Congress and, although the primary purpose of their stay in this country was

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to attend the Labour College, it was the Congress rather than the college which dealt with the External Aid Office and administered the financial details of their stay. By 1966 the amount of money involved had become substantial. It was therefore decided that a separate fund be established to receive the payments from the External Aid Office and make payments on behalf of the students. Several possibilities were canvassed and among these was the possibility of turning the entire foreign student program over to the college. The Congress director of education discussed this alternative in a memorandum to Executive Vice-President Morris: "If we involve the College in this affair is there not a possibility that the C.N.T.U. will want some part of the program particularly for the French foreign students."9 As an alternative to involving the college, the director suggested the establishment of a trust fund outside the Congress. This alternative was adopted. The case of the Colombo Plan students is also interesting because it shows the ease with which groups of recognized status can have substantial sums of public money expended upon their own undertakings. In a memorandum to President Jodoin, the Congress director of education estimated that the college would receive approximately eighty foreign trade-union students under the Colombo Plan in 1966.10 Various documents issued by the External Aid Office indicate that the cost to the government of a class this size was approximately $200,000.1:t This and similar public expenditures in aid of interest-group activities constitute a form of patronage. Such patronage is easily available to any group that is recognized as having a mandate to speak on behalf of a legitimate interest, subject only to the proviso that the purpose for which the money will be used is not contrary to government policy.12 AFFILIATES AND FEDERAL MATTERS

One of the problems that the Congress leadership must face in gaining acceptance of its claim to be the voice of labour at the federal level is that this claim is often not recognized by the leaders of its affiliated unions. If the Congress is to be the spokesman for labour at the federal level it must act as the sole channel of communication between its affiliates and the federal government. It is therefore necessary that the affiliates refrain from bypassing the Congress by taking their grievances and demands directly to government. The larger affiliated unions, such as the Steelworkers and the Automobile Workers, have continued to deal directly with the federal government on matters of special concern to themselves and have, on occasion, been able to enforce a policy of virtual silence upon the leadership of the Congress. A case in point was the Canada-United States Automobile Trade Agreement. Several officers of the Congress are members of the Canadian Trade Committee of the Private Planning Association and in this capacity they were

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asked to approve a report dealing with Canada's international trade. The Congress associate director of research recommended that the report be approved subject to the inclusion of a statement of Congress reservations, including a declaration that "the Congress has reservations about the criticisms levied against the duty remission scheme in the automobile industry."13 At the end of the memorandum, the associate director said: "Actually I agree with most of [the] critique of the auto industry scheme, but I suspect that our hands are tied by the UAW's tentative support of it." The Congress has tried to defend its position as the voice of labour at the national level against the less powerful affiliates, such as the provincial federations of labour and the local labour councils. In 1956 the Congress Executive Council adopted rules for the guidance of councils and federations, setting out distinct terms of reference for each. Experience, such as the instances cited in Chapter 2, has shown that these rules are not very effective and that the councils and federations do not hesitate to write to the prime minister or to members of the cabinet, occasionally forwarding a carbon copy to the Congress. The Congress cannot discipline its affiliated unions, nor can it discipline the federations and councils in which decisive power also rests with the leaders of the affiliated unions. The Congress leadership can only gain de facto recognition of its claims by its affiliates if government itself is prepared to recognize those claims in some tangible manner. If the Congress is permitted to enjoy a greater degree of effectiveness in its relations with government than do its affiliates, if its access to political leaders and senior civil servants is better than theirs, if it has better sources of information, then the affiliates may take seriously its claim to be the spokesman for labour at the national level. 77. Representative Advisory Boards The Congress leadership has learned that one of the most profitable sources of government-conferred status lies in the recognition which goes with consultation by government on appointments to official bodies. Such recognition is extremely effective because it is overt and immediate; it is a positive act of recognition of the status of the Congress as spokesman for organized labour. Ultimately, many of the appointments go to officers and officials of affiliated unions but the appointment is made upon the nomination of the Congress leadership. The importance of having the government deal with the Congress rather than with the affiliated unions was stressed by the Congress leadership in its Report to the 1960 convention: The Congress encountered considerable difficulty in its relations with the Canadian Government. Practices that had existed for many years with respect to consultation and appointment of the Congress nominees to Agencies

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and Commissions were unilaterally changed or discontinued. This naturally led to a strained relationship particularly when contrary to all recognized precedents, and in one instance in contravention of governing legislation, the Congress was completely bypassed and direct approaches regarding Labour appointments were made to affiliates or individuals. Under such circumstances it is not difficult to imagine what might have happened if organized labour in Canada was not in a position to speak and act as it did through one strong unified body. The Congress has maintained a forceful, consistent position in regard to its role as the official spokesman for labour at the national level.14

The term "representative advisory board" refers to any government advisory body whose membership has been selected so as to provide representation for the interests which will be affected by its decisions or recommendations. There are a number of such boards within the framework of the government of Canada. The term is not limited to permanent bodies but includes royal commissions and committees of inquiry. The range of subjects on which the Congress has, at one time or another, asked government to establish a representative advisory board is very broad, and includes manpower,15 immigration,16 old age pensions,17 the rehabilitation of the disabled,18 technological change and automation,10 employment problems in the aircraft industry20 and similar problems in the textile industry,21 and fair employment practices.22 Following the announcement of the government's intention to establish the Canada Council, the Congress praised the intent and said: "The Canadian Labour Congress would like to remind the Government that within the affiliated membership of the Congress there are many who will be directly affected by the activities of the Canada Council. We suggest that representation from these areas of the population be considered when the members of the Council are named."23 Later in the year, following the appointment of the council members and a change in government, the Congress reiterated its demand in stronger terms: "We welcome . . . the setting up of the Canada Council, with a substantial endowment. We think Labour ought to be represented on the Council; management is amply represented."24 Although the phrase "representation from these areas of the population" would appear to ask only that the government select some person with a labour background for membership on the Council, the Congress leadership was in fact asking that it be given the right to nominate a member to the council. The Executive Report to the 1958 Congress convention speaks of "the Congress request for official membership on the Canada Council."25 By 1960, the Congress leadership was growing impatient and the absence of a Congress nominee among the members of the Canada Council was described as "an omission which should be remedied and without further delay."26 The Congress has also told the government that it welcomed the action of

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the Canada Council "in setting up a Canadian Commission to work with UNESCO, and the provision for Labour membership on that Commission."27 And about another international organization the Congress said: We welcomed in the past Canada's membership and participation in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. As many of the deliberations and decisions of that organization are of direct interest and concern to our Congress, we ask you to arrange for the inclusion as advisors of Canadian trade union representatives on Canadian delegations to the decisionmaking and deliberative meetings of the OECD.28 In October 1957, when the Congress suggested that the government appoint a royal commission to study methods of settling industrial disputes, it asked for "a carefully chosen, well balanced Commission, made up of people with some experience in labour-management relations."29 Requests for representation are not limited to inquiries on matters of such obvious interest to the Congress as the settlement of industrial disputes: In view of the appointment of a Royal Commission on Taxation, we refrain from making our views known here. . . . But we wish to express our disappointment at the failure of your government to appoint a labour representative to that Commission. We note that the Commission includes a representative of an agricultural organization, one from a women's organization, and at least one who might be assumed to represent a business viewpoint. We find it difficult to understand why the government should not have found it necessary to appoint a representative of wage and salary-earners. . . . We cannot help but feel that this is simply one more demonstration of what we believe is your determination to keep organized labour from being directly represented on most of the public bodies which you have appointed since coming into office.30 In a similar vein, objections were raised to the composition of the Royal Commission on Health Services.31 Another example of the scope of the demands for representation on, and for the creation of, representative advisory boards is the demand made by the Congress leadership following the creation of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the consequent diminution in the role of the Department of Labour: We are not convinced that nothing more remains to be done under the auspices of the Department of Labour. On the contrary, we believe that this Department is capable of playing a leading role in the interests of the working people of this country, given the opportunity to do so. We ask you therefore to give this Department early and full reappraisal, to review its programs as well as its potential. We would suggest also the establishment of a consultative committee on which organized labour would be represented to advise you on this matter.32

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The Congress has thus made numerous requests for the establishment of representative advisory boards and for some form of "official" labour membership on these boards. Furthermore, the Congress has made it quite clear to the government that "official representation" of labour means representatives nominated by the Congress leadership and not representatives chosen by government from among trade unionists. To the Congress leadership, the most important consequence of the establishment of the boards is not the recommendations they may make but the opportunities which their staffing provides for government recognition of the status of the Congress.33 TRADE MISSIONS

The trade missions of the Department of Trade and Commerce are among the government bodies on which the Congress seeks representation.34 The Executive Report to the 1964 convention carried the following item: "The CLC participated during 1962 in a number of trade missions organized by the Department of Trade and Commerce. The following is a list of CLC nominees. . . ,"35 A list of fifteen trade missions followed, together with the names of the Congress nominees on these missions. In September 1965 the Department of Trade and Commerce issued a news release in which it announced the despatch of an iron and steel mission to the United States; the mission did not include a labour representative. President Jodoin thereupon wrote to the minister, his letter containing what purported to be the rationale behind labour representation on trade missions: It was surprising to me that in planning such a mission you should not have considered adding trade union representatives to it. Both employers and employees very decidedly have a community of interest in the ability of theirheir industry to sell its products abroad. One obvious way of involving the employees in such a project is through their own chosen representatives, the officers of their trade unions. Assuming, as we must, that workers have a very real incentive in the prosperity of their employers, it seems reasonable to suppose that this interest can be stimulated by an awareness of what their employers are undertaking by way of an expansion of sales. I believe that thisis is sufficient justification for the addition of trade union representatives to any trade mission that your department may send abroad. I need hardly remind you that trade union representatives have formed part of previous trade missions. The precedent has already been established. But whether or not there is a precedent, I am fully convinced of the merit of our position as set out above.36

The Congress had been nominating members to trade missions since 1962 and clearly would not willingly give up what it now considered to be its accustomed prerogatives. To have done so would have been to accept a

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diminution in the status of the Congress. The minister replied saying that "representatives of trade unions were amongst the memberships of earlier missions. . . . I agree that the practice should be revived"37 and suggested a meeting between Mr. Jodoin and himself. The meeting was postponed until after the election of 1965 and was delayed again when a new minister of trade and commerce was appointed. President Jodoin finally met with the minister in March 1966 and after the meeting wrote a short memorandum to the Congress director of legislation: "I met today with Mr. Winters and we had a very amicable discussion. He told me he wants to have the closest co-operation between his department and the Congress. Anytime we have something to discuss, we should not hesitate and vice versa. He will let us know when there are trade missions."38 THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BOARD

In late 1962, the Speech from the Throne mentioned the government's intention to establish an economic advisory body to be known as the National Economic Development Board; under the succeeding government this body came into existence as the Economic Council of Canada. In the Memorandum presented in December 1962, the Congress leadership commended the government for its intentions and especially for the announced intention to make the NEDB a representative board. Their words of commendation provide one of the most comprehensive statements of the justification for representative advisory boards and the view that representatives on such boards ought to be nominated by interest groups: We have noted with approval that the National Economic Development Board would be broadly representative.... We hope it means what we believe it to mean. There is room on any such Board for people of no special allegiance, such as economists and others drawn from the universities and similar institutions. But, if the phrase "broadly representative" is to have significance, the Board must include among its members those who are able to speak not only for themselves but for those whom they profess to represent. Thus, if organized labour, agriculture, business and trade, and other such groups are to be represented on this Board, it follows that they should be invited to name representatives to speak on their behalf. Unless that is done, there can be no assurance that these representatives are able to achieve effective liaison between the government and these organized bodies. It is much more likely that representatives nominated by organizations will reflect the views of their organizations than if they are selected on some other basis. We are bound to assume that your government wishes to have the views of these various organized groups and if so it seems only logical to us that they should go directly to them rather than give them token representation through individual appointments. This is the position which our Congress has taken and continues to take with respect to representatives from organized labour.39

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///. Appointments to Government Bodies The jealousy with which the Congress guards its "accustomed rights" of nomination was demonstrated on a number of occasions when the leadership believed that government was refusing to recognize those rights. One case, in 1963, concerned the appointment of boards of referees under the Unemployment Insurance Act. Decisions relative to eligibility for benefits under the Act are decided by boards of referees; their decisions may be appealed to an umpire who is a judge of the Exchequer Court of Canada.40 The boards are composed of three members: one appointed by the chief commissioner who, in turn, is appointed by government as its representative on the commission; one appointed by the commissioner who represents employees and is himself appointed by government after consultation with employees' organizations; and one appointed by the employers' representative on the commission who is himself appointed by government after consultation with organizations of employers. By custom and usage, a procedure had evolved for the appointment of employees' members in consultation with the local labour council in the area served by the board to which the appointment is to be made. These councils are affiliates of the Congress. In early 1963 an appointment was made to the Board of Referees in the Ottawa area and neither the Congress nor the Ottawa and District Labour Council were consulted. Though this action by itself would have been sufficient to raise the ire of the Congress leadership, the appointee was an official of a union which had been expelled from the Congress for raiding. Upon learning of the appointment, President Jodoin despatched a letter of complaint to Commissioner MacArthur, the commissioner representing employees. The gravity with which the Congress viewed the appointment may be judged from the tone of the letter: It has recently been brought to my attention that you have appointed a representative of labour to the Board of Referees of the Unemployment Insurance Commission, at Ottawa, again without consultation with either the Ottawa and District Labour Council or the Canadian Labour Cbngress as such. As you know, this is not the first time that appointments have been made by you without prior consultation with our organizations. It may be that if the Congress or the Labour Council had been consulted before the appointment was made that your suggestion would have been accepted. For my information and that of my colleagues, I would like to know why such an appointment was made. In this case, I refer to the Business Agent of Local 793, of the Operating Engineers, an organization which has been expelled from the Congress for raiding activities under its Constitution. I may say that we in the Congress are very jealous of the prerogative of consultation and recommendation, and we certainly wish this procedure to be followed at all times and to have independent labour representation on any government institution or corporation.41

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Shortly after the accession of the Liberal government in 1963 Mr. MacArthur was replaced, although his replacement was probably less attributable to his actions as a commissioner than to the circumstances surrounding his appointment. THE MACARTHUR APPOINTMENT

The Unemployment Insurance Act provides that its administration is to be confided to a commission composed of a chief commissioner and two commissioners, one of whom is a representative of employees appointed after consultation with employee organizations. The controversy surrounding the appointment of Commissioner MacArthur was essentially a controversy over the meaning of the term "consultation." Was the statutory requirement for consultation violated, as the Congress claimed it was, if the government had already decided upon a nominee before consultation took place and then merely went through the formality of consulting? Or was the statutory requirement met, as the government claimed it was, by asking the Congress to submit names for the consideration of the cabinet? The early developments in this controversy cannot be documented. One of the points at issue was the failure of the government to communicate with the Congress before 5 February 1959. The most concise summary of the early developments is contained in a statement issued by President Jodoin after the appointment of Commissioner MacArthur: The labour nominee on the Commission has been Mr. Robert Tallon, a former Secretary-Treasurer of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, who was appointed following nomination by that organization. Mr. Tallon retired effective December 31, 1958. The Canadian Labour Congress first learned of this through newspaper reports. After some time had passed and no approach had been made to our organization I arranged an interview with the Minister of Labour on January 30, and called to his attention the requirements of the Act. He informed me that the government had a nominee in mind. He suggested that three names be submitted as nominees from the Congress and this was done, but it was made clear to us that the name of the government's choice would also be submitted to Cabinet.42

The earliest correspondence to pass between the Congress and the government on this matter was a letter from the minister of labour to President Jodoin in early February 1959 acknowledging the earlier discussions that had taken place between them and asking for the Congress' assistance in the selection of a replacement for Commissioner Tallon. Nine days later, on 18 February 1959, Jodoin acknowledged receipt of the minister's letter but did not forward any names until a second request was received three weeks later. Upon receipt of the names, the minister wrote to Jodoin:

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CHAPTER FIVE I appreciate receiving these nominations and the calibre of these nominees. I discussed with you prior to my letter to you of February 5th the qualifications of Mr. A. F. MacArthur of Toronto for this appointment. As I told you in this discussion I have been impressed with Mr. MacArthur's qualifications for the position in view of his wide background experience and the responsibilities which he has been required to handle in various capacities as a leader and administrator in the labour field. It is therefore my present intention to submit for the consideration of Cabinet in making this appointment not only the names of the three persons contained in your letter but also the name of Mr. MacArthur. Before doing so, however, I should be glad to have the benefit of any views you may wish to put forward on the suitability of Mr. MacArthur to fill the position.43

When he received the letter, President Jodoin despatched a telegram asking for a meeting with the minister and the prime minister. The telegram was followed by a lengthy letter in which Mr. Jodoin declared: You would realize from the telegram I sent you on March 24th, in which I requested a meeting with the Prime Minister and yourself to discuss this matter, that the contents of your letter of March 18th came to us as a distinct surprise. The Canadian Labour Congress is deeply concerned over the manner in which the Government is dealing with this appointment.... . . . the previous appointment was made after consultation with the then national labour centres, and this has been the practice of the federal government across the years in connection with similar appointments. The usual pattern has been for the Government to ask the Canadian Labour Congress either for a name or for a panel of names, and it has been acknowledged that where an appointment is to be made in recognition of the interests of labour, a name proposed by the Canadian Labour Congress has been accepted. This pattern has been violated on two or three occasions. We regard the breaking of it in this case as extremely serious, having in mind the importance of the functions of the Unemployment Insurance Commission so far as the workers of Canada are concerned. It appears that Mr. Tallon's retirement became effective as at December 31st, 1958. We learned of this, not by any word from you or from any governmental source, but through the press. We waited for some time, believing that the Government would get in touch with us as provided in the Act. When this did not happen, I sought and had an interview with you on January 30th, 1959, at which time I inquired as to when we were to be consulted concerning an appointment to replace Mr. Tallon. . . . You have now confirmed in writing what you told me on January 30th, which makes it quite clear that the Government had made up its mind on this appointment before consulting labour at all, indeed even before advising labour that there was a vacancy and that we could submit three names as nominees. You acknowledged that Mr. MacArthur was a member of your party, and you will recall that I stressed the point that in the view of the Congress this appointment should not be made on a political basis.

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... in your letter of February 5th, written after I had drawn the matter of Mr. Tallon's retirement to your attention, and after you had discussed with me the appointment of Mr. MacArthur, you asked us to submit the names of three persons for consideration as suitable for the appointment in question. In your letter of March 18th, you state that you are going to submit four names to Cabinet, namely our three nominees, but also the name of Mr. MacArthur. We submit that this is contrary to the practice in matters of this kind, and that it is utterly inappropriate for you to ask us to list three names but for you to submit four names to Cabinet. The outcome of such a course is obvious, and it is quite clear that no real attention is being paid to the statutory requirement that you consult with labour before making this appointment. In your letter of March 18th, you ask us for our views as to the suitability of Mr. MacArthur to fill the position in question. May I say, sir, that this question is completely irrelevant. Mr. MacArthur's suitability is not the issue. The whole issue is the manner in which the making of this appointment is being handled. What you seem determined to do has the earmarks of political patronage, to which the Canadian Labour Congress is unalterably opposed. We therefore urge you to reconsider the course you have been taking in connection with this matter, and that as provided in the statute you consult with labour before making this appointment.44 Mr. MacArthur's qualifications were never in question. At the time of the appointment he was an officer of the Office Employees' International Union. A former president of the Ontario Federation of Labour he had, in 1954, contested the presidency of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada with the successful candidate Claude Jodoin. The only criticisms were that the government had apparently made up its mind on the appointment before consultation had taken place and that Mr. MacArthur had not been nominated by the Congress. A month elapsed between the despatch of President Jodoin's lengthy letter and the next move by the government. On 28 April Mr. Starr informed President Jodoin that the government remained of the opinion that Mr. MacArthur was the most suitable person for the position and intended to appoint him within two days. He also said that the government "would be glad to have any further suggestions that you might wish to make."45 There is no indication of the nature of the suggestions the minister expected to receive, but clearly the matter had gone too far for either side to be willing to accept a compromise. For the government, having made known its intention to appoint Mr. MacArthur, any other course of action would have implied a surrender to the Congress. Similarly, for the Congress to have agreed to the appointment of Mr. MacArthur would have amounted to a surrender of its claim to the right of prior consultation on the appointment of labour members to official bodies.

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In reply to his letter of 28 April, the minister received a telegram expressing the "profound sense of shock" of the Congress Executive Council, repeating the request for a meeting with the prime minister together with a warning that the appointment of Mr. MacArthur would result in the resignation of the Congress representatives on the statutory Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee.46 (The purpose of the committee is to advise the government on the administration and amendment of the Unemployment Insurance Act through an annual report that is tabled in Parliament.) In addition, a telegram was sent to Mr. MacArthur by President Jodoin informing him that if he accepted the appointment he would not be recognized by the Congress as the representative of labour on the commission. The following day Mr. MacArthur's appointment was officially announced. The Congress issued a press release accusing the government of having violated the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act, and the two Congress representatives on the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee resigned. The representative of the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour, with which the Congress had consulted, also resigned. Summing up the dispute in a newspaper article entitled "Bitter Row Has Roots In Politics," columnist Charles Lynch of the Southam Newspapers wrote: Reliable informants say it indicates the government's intention to treat CLC leaders as officials of an opposition political party. The technique will be to bypass the CLC hierarchy and shoot directly for the support of union members, tens of thousands of whom voted Conservative in last year's election. It won't happen all at once. CLC President Claude Jodoin is still regarded by the government as primarily a labour leader. But as the new political party, to be formed by a marriage between the CCF and the CLC, emerges in the coming months, Mr. Jodoin can expect the government's attitude to be that he is turning into a political leader, and will be treated accordingly. According to this line of reasoning, the government would make it clear that its own Labour Minister Michael Starr, has as much right to address himself to union men across the country as has Mr. Jodoin.47

That the partisan political activities of the Congress leadership were an important factor in their relations with the government was confirmed by Mr. Starr: "The labour leaders," he said, "are losing their strength in their dealings with government because of that dual capacity of being labour leaders and politicians for the NDP."48 THE AFTERMATH OF THE MACARTHUR APPOINTMENT

The appointment of Commissioner MacArthur led to what might best be described as a severance of diplomatic relations between the Congress and

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the government. Circumstances obliged the government to make the first move in any attempted reconciliation. By law, the annual report of the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee must be submitted to the Governor-in-Council in July of each year and by law the committee must have equal numbers of members appointed after consultation with organizations representative of employers and organizations representative of employees. The resignation of the three labour members thus forced the government to go to the Congress. Two weeks after the announcement of the appointment, the minister of labour wrote to President Jodoin notifying him that there were two vacancies on the committee and asking him to suggest the names of possible appointees. A similar letter was sent to the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour which agreed with the Congress to fill its vacancy only if the Congress filled theirs. The way was thus open for the Congress to undertake negotiations with the government. The Congress Executive Committee met on 17 June and President Jodoin then addressed a lengthy letter to the prime minister. The first part of the letter consisted of the Congress' "case" against the government and the second part contained the Congress' terms for a restoration of friendly relations. President Jodoin's letter outlined the case against the government in the following terms: The Executive Committee of our Congress . . . made a complete review of the representations made by the Congress to your Government as well as the requests made by your Government to the Canadian Labour Congress in connection with the making of apointments to government agencies or functions in which organized labour had a legitimate interest. Following this review, outlined in detail below, the Executive Committee instructed me to request an appointment with you and your Minister of Labour to discuss principles and procedures pertaining to such appointments particularly as they affect this Congress. Before arriving at any conclusions, it is necessary at this time, at least so it seems to us, to list the following events: 1. The Canadian Labour Congress made numerous representations to the former as well as to your Government regarding the appointment of labour attaches and it was our impression that we had arrived at an understanding on this. We felt that for so important a function, concerning itself largely with trade union relations in the various international regions or countries, that trade unionists with proper qualifications should be appointed, and we were prepared to submit names for this purpose. Your Government decided otherwise and appointed someone without seeking recommendations from the Congress. 2. As to membership on the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee, initially the CLC had submitted the names of General Vice-President George Burt and CLC Director of the Legislative and Government Employees, Mr. A. Andras. Subsequently Mr. Andras tendered his resignation

118 CHAPTER FIVE at the request of the Congress for the purpose of making possible the appointment of CLC Executive Vice-President S. H. Knowles to the Committee. This was refused. 3. When the UNESCO Paris Conference occurred we thought once more that we had arrived at an understanding whereby both Executive Vice-President S. H. Knowles and the Director of our International Affairs Department, Mr. Kalmen Kaplansky would alternate in attending the conference, because notwithstanding its importance, we felt that it was too time consuming for one representative to attend throughout. Then we were notified after Director Kaplansky had reached Paris that there could be no alternates. 4. On the NATO Conference in London, I was approached indirectly to nominate individuals who would represent labour to attend this conference. The policy of the CLC is that such nominations should be officially requested by the Government. We are not the only national labour centre which follows this policy. The British Trades Union Congress and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations follow the same pattern. We therefore did not nominate anyone. The Government did not approach the Congress officially and appointed individuals not endorsed by the Congress and in particular one from an organization expelled from the CLC. 5. Regarding the Board of Broadcast Governors, the same procedure was followed in this case as in the NATO conference. I may say that the appointment of Dr. Eugene Forsey was in our estimation an excellent choice, but the Congress still feels that labour might have been consulted because of its intense interest in the CBC. 6. On the appointment of an Unemployment Insurance Commissioner representing labour, the CLC was requested to submit names only after your Government had already decided on an appointee, someone who was not on the list subsequently submitted by the Congress. 7. The CLC has made numerous representations to the former Government and your own to have representation on the Canada Council. These representations were ignored and an individual was appointed by the Government, a member of the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour, although that organization as such was ignored. 8. The nomination to the ILO Iron and Steel Committee of Mr. Larry Sefton, Regional Director of the United Steel Workers of America and VicePresident of our Congress and of Mr. Eamon Park, Assistant to the Canadian Director of the United Steel Workers of America, was questioned. 9. The Canadian Labour Congress was not consulted on the appointment of the labour representative to the Royal Commission on Energy. 10. On the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, initially the suggested nomination of Mr. Cleve Kidd, then President of the Ontario Federation of Labour and then as now Director of the Research Department of the United Steel Workers of America, was questioned. 11. On the appointment of a labour representative to the Board of Transport Commissioners, the CLC was ignored. 12. On the appointment of a labour representative to the Royal Commission on Transportation, the CLC was again ignored.49

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The government was being asked to concede four points. First, that organized labour had a right to representation, or to participate in the appointment of persons, in a number of specific areas, namely: labour attaches, NATO conferences, the Canada Council, the Board of Broadcast Governors, the Board of Transport Commissioners, and most royal commissions. More generally, the government was being asked to concede the right of representation or nomination "in connection with the making of appointments to government agencies or functions in which labour had a legitimate interest", labour itself was to determine the areas in which it had a legitimate interest. Second, the government was being asked to concede that all labour nominees, other than those sought from such established organizations as the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour or the railway brotherhoods, were to be obtained through the Congress upon a formal request by government. In effect this involved recognition of the mandate of the Congress leadership as the official spokesman for labour at the national level in Canada. Third, the government was being asked to concede that henceforth it would not only not refuse to accept nominations tendered by the Congress, but that such nominations would not be questioned. In effect, the right of consultation was to become the right of appointment. Finally, that the partisan political activities of the Congress and its leaders would not interfere with the perquisites enjoyed by the Congress in its capacity as an interest group. President Jodoin's letter concluded: It is in the light of these experiences that we must deal with the invitation from the Minister of Labour to propose nominations to the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee. The Executive Committee of the Congress has accordingly instructed me to ask for an appointment with you to ascertain if it is worthwhile for the Congress to make recommendations, only to have them ignored or questioned. You will agree, I am sure, that the Canadian Labour Congress is the most representative national labour centre in Canada. Its main functions are are. legislative representations and to act as labour's representative in the federaleral. field. We consider it both advisable and justifiable that where labour is con-on cerned, it should be represented through representatives of its own choosingng and not by government appointees appointed without prior consultation with organized labour. This is a democratic procedure in our opinion and we would welcome any expression of opinion from you to the contrary if you think we are wrong. The Canadian Labour Congress would like to know where it stands on the specific matter at issue as well as on future issues. Our decision as to whether or not we will make recommendations pertaining to the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee will be based largely on the outcome of our interview with you.50 This amounts to a declaration that, apart from ensuring peace among union leaders by policing raiding activities, the Congress' principal function

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is to act as the representative of labour in its relations with the federal government; hence the concern of the Congress leadership with attempts on the part of the government to bypass the Congress in its relations with organized labour. The requested meeting with the prime minister and the minister of labour took place on 3 July in the office of the former. While the major points sought by the Congress were not conceded, some assurances were nevertheless obtained. As interpreted later by the Congress leadership, the meeting resulted in agreement upon the following points: (1) That, in the final analysis, the government must decide upon the personnel to receive appointments, and the CLC clearly recognizes that right. (2) The Government representatives agreed that consultation in good faith requires that if the names of labour nominees submitted by the CLC for appointments should not be acceptable to the Government, that the CLC would be so informed and asked to submit other nominees.51

Shortly thereafter, President Jodoin replied to Mr. Starr's letter of 15 May asking for nominees to the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee: You will realize that we are not satisfied with the way in which the most recent appointment to the Unemployment Insurance Commission was made, and any action we may now take does not alter our view in connection therewith. However, in view of the assurance given by the Prime Minister at the time of our interview on July 3rd that steps would be taken to improve the pattern of consultation between the Federal Government and the Canadian Labour Congress on matters in which the Congress has a direct interest . . . I am submitting herewith on behalf of the Canadian Labour Congress, the names of two nominees whom we would wish to have appointed as representatives of labour on the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee.52

The two Congress representatives who had resigned from the Advisory Committee to protest the MacArthur appointment had been the Congress director of legislation and George Burt, Canadian director of the United Automobile Workers, who subsequently made it known that he did not wish to be re-appointed. The two names proposed to Mr. Starr were those of the Congress director of legislation and Congress Executive Vice-President Stanley H. Knowles. In view of the Congress' protests against the alleged political partisanship of MacArthur's appointment, the nomination of Mr. Knowles, a man with a long record of partisan political activity, can only be interpreted as an attempt to force the government into conceding that the Congress could engage in partisan political activity without forfeiting any of the privileges customarily enjoyed by non-partisan interest groups. The director of legislation was appointed to the Advisory Committee but Mr. Knowles was not, and

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Congress Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald issued a statement charging that the government had "broken faith with the Canadian Labour Congress."53 The reasons for the government's refusal to appoint Mr. Knowles indicate that the principle which the Congress was attempting to establish was clearly understood and definitely rejected. In the words of Mr. Starr: "Knowles was a politician. He wasn't acceptable because he was a political appointment fortheNDP."54 Commissioner MacArthur's term of office was marked by disputes and ill-feeling between himself and the Congress. Almost immediately after appointment he was faced with the problem of dealing with the Congress to fill labour vacancies on the panel of referees at Riviere-du-Loup, Quebec. The Congress ignored all communications from him and did not forward any names until a request was received from the chief commissioner. Shortly after the submission of the names to the chief commissioner, Commissioner MacArthur wrote to President Jodoin to thank him for his co-operation. In September 1959, Congress Honorary President A. R. Mosher resigned from the National Employment Committee, another advisory committee made up of representatives of employers and employees under the auspices of the Unemployment Insurance Commission. Commissioner MacArthur wrote to President Jodoin informing him of the resignation and asking him to nominate a replacement. The letter and the request were ignored. Three weeks later the secretary of the commission wrote to President Jodoin on the same matter and broached the subject as though no previous communication had taken place: You might have learned that the representative of Labour on the National Employment Committee, Mr. A. R. Mosher, has tendered his resignation on 22, August, 1959 I am now directed by the Commission to ask that you kindly recommend another person who could suitably replace Mr. Mosher as a representative of Labour on the Committee.55

This letter was answered within a few days and Executive Vice-President Dodge was nominated to replace Mr. Mosher. By the end of the year the Congress leadership concluded that the bypassing of Commissioner MacArthur had served its purpose as a means of protest. In part, this decision was prompted by the fear that continued refusal to cooperate with the commissioner's attempts to consult in good faith would provide him with a pretext to by-pass the Congress completely. Thus, in early 1960 the Congress responded to a request from Commissioner MacArthur that it submit nominations for a labour member on the panel of referees in Pembroke, Ontario. The pattern of previous consultation on this subject is inconclusive on the question of whether the Congress was to nominate one person who would then be appointed or whether the Congress was

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to submit a list of nominees one of whom would be chosen by the commission. In the Riviere-du-Loup case the Congress gave the chief commissioner a list of three names from which to fill one vacancy; there were other cases in which only one name was submitted. On 8 February 1960 Commissioner MacArthur wrote to President Jodoin asking for two additional names to make up a panel of three from which one could be chosen. President Jodoin took exception to this request and replied: We note that you request three nominations, so that the Commission can make a choice of one person to fill a specific vacancy. To the best of our knowledge, the practice, since the inception of these Boards of Referees, has been for the Commission to request Organized Labour to make one nomination for each vacancy, and it would appear that this procedure has worked quite satisfactorily all these years, and needless to say, we are quite concerned that without any consultation, a new procedure has been introduced. This suggested procedure seems to us to imply that Organized Labour may no longer be qualified to make a proper choice. . . . We feel that we are entitled to an explanation for this change of procedure. We have studied the Act and the Regulations, and can find no provisions that would call for a change in a procedure that apparently has functioned in such a satisfactory fashion for so many years.56 Commissioner MacArthur demonstrated that government officials could be as jealous of their prerogatives as interest-group leaders are of theirs. Explaining the purpose of the request for additional names, he wrote: This was done as it was recently brought to my attention that the Act places the responsibility on the Commission for the appointments of panel members and it is, therefore, improper for me to accept the nomination of a single individual on behalf of the Commission. In effect, the acceptance of such a nomination has the effect of delegating the authority and responsibility of the Commission to make a choice of the persons appointed. The procedure now being followed is similar in many respects to that which is being carried on by the representatives of employers. It has also been customary for the Canadian Catholic Confederation of Labour to frequently submit several nominations in order that the Commission could make its selection. It is therefore for the purpose of bringing the whole procedure into uniformity that we are now asking your organization to follow this method. This is no reflection on the valuable contribution which your organization has made in the past. . . . You will, however, on the other hand appreciate that the Commission cannot delegate any of its responsibilities under the Act.57 The whole period of Commissioner MacArthur's tenure was characterized by disputes of this nature between the commission and the Congress. The case of the appointment of an officer of an expelled union in the spring of 1963 has already been cited. The strained relations with the Unemployment Insurance Commission,

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and with the government on the matters outlined in President Jodoin's letter of 24 June to the prime minister, led the Congress, in March 1962, to include a lengthy statement in its annual Memorandum outlining once again its grievances and its views of what the state of relations between government and the Congress ought to be.58 The Congress leadership also characterized relations between itself and the Diefenbaker government as "the poorest of any between government and a national labour centre among the highly industrialized western nations."59 It was not the government's action, or lack of it, in the fields of labour legislation, social welfare legislation, or any other activity in which the Congress leadership claims to have a legitimate interest, which led to these harsh words, but the government's refusal to recognize in a tangible manner the institutional status which the Congress leadership claimed for their organization. IV. The CNTU and the Canada Labour Relations Board The dispute between the Canadian Labour Congress and the Confederation of National Trade Unions over representation on the Canada Labour Relations Board (CLRB) involved two crucial issues: the relative status of the two labour centres and the preservation and enhancement of their affiliated unions. One of the major objectives of the CNTU leadership has been to win acceptance for the view that any distinction between their organization and the Congress is purely quantitative. The other issue stems from the importance of labour relations boards in matters affecting the preservation and enhancement of the unions appearing before them. Originally intended to do away with the bitter, and often violent, confrontations between labour and management on the question of the recognition of unions as bargaining agents, labour relations boards decide questions about the appropriateness of bargaining units and whether or not a union seeking certification enjoys the support of a majority of the workers in a bargaining unit. The boards decide not only whether a group of workers is to be represented by a union, but also which union is to represent them. The composition of the boards is balanced between labour and management, with a neutral chairman appointed by government. However, the original balance between labour and management has become a matter of secondary importance. As the large masses of unorganized workers disappeared, union leaders tended to lose interest in organizing the unorganized. While some gains in union membership are due to the organization of hitherto unorganized workers, much of the recent expansion of the Congress' membership has been due to the affiliation of previously existing independent organizations,60 the expansion of already organized companies, and, finally, to convincing workers already organized to switch their allegiance; that is, by raiding. But

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the constitution of the Congress strictly prohibits all forms of raiding among affiliated unions. It follows, therefore, that if the unions affiliated with the Congress are to expand by means of raiding, they will raid unions not affiliated with the Congress. The same line of argument is valid for unions affiliated with the CNTU. Thus, an important element in the process of union growth consists of affiliates of these two labour centres conducting raids against each other and a successful raid requires that the raider be certified by a labour relations board as the exclusive bargaining agent on behalf of the newly acquired members. Jurisdiction over labour relations in Canada is divided between the provincial legislatures and Parliament. The former have jurisdiction over most industries while the latter has jurisdiction over broadcasting, inter-provincial transportation, federal crown corporations, and such other industries as may be declared by Parliament "to be for the general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of the Provinces" in accordance with the provisions of section 92(10) (c) of the British North America Act. The powers of the Canada Labour Relations Board are set out in sections 58 to 61, inclusive, of the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act,61 and include the certification of unions in those industries which come under the jurisdiction of Parliament. The board consists of ten members—a government-appointed chairman, a government-appointed vice-chairman who serves only in the absence of the chairman, and four members appointed by each of labour and management. Among the four labour members, the CNTU and the railway brotherhoods each have one appointee and the Congress has two. The crux of the CNTU's problem was that its affiliated unions wished to expand by raiding organizations in the broadcasting and railroad industries. Furthermore, they attempted to do so by practising a form of product differentiation, appealing to French-Canadian nationalism as an integral part of their raiding campaigns. Of necessity, therefore, the appeal of the CNTU was limited to particular regions of the country, and for these campaigns to culminate in the certification of the CNTU affiliate as the sole bargaining agent it was necessary that the prevailing concept of an appropriate bargaining unit in a nation-wide industry be changed from a Canada-wide basis to a regional or local basis. Early in 1966 a CNTU affiliate succeeded in organizing a group of CBC employees who were represented by CLC affiliates. The application for certification was refused by the Canada Labour Relations Board on the grounds that the appropriate bargaining unit in this case was Canada-wide. Hence, the problem as it appeared to the leadership of the CNTU was to have the CLRB alter its view of an appropriate bargaining unit and this, in turn, would require that the composition of the labour representation on the board be altered to do away with the greater representation enjoyed by the Congress.

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It is necessary at this point to introduce several related factors; namely, the political connections of the two labour centres. Although the Congress is an interest group, it is also deeply involved in partisan politics. The New Democratic Party (NDP), founded in 1961, was the result of a union of the forces which backed the old Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and the Congress. The Congress has openly exhorted union members to vote for NDP candidates and the NDP itself is financed largely by contributions from Congress affiliates. Although they are loathe to admit it, the politicians of the two traditional parties resent the partisan connections of the Congress and, in the case of the Diefenbaker administration, this resentment was manifested by repeated attempts to deny the Congress some of the privileges which it had enjoyed as a non-partisan interest group. The CNTU also has political connections. A comparatively minor connection is its shadowy and ill-defined relationship to the Quebec provincial Liberal Party. A major political connection has resulted from the attempt of the federal Liberal Party to attune itself to changing currents of opinion in Quebec. At the time of the 1965 general election the Liberal Party convinced the "three wise men of Quebec" to enter the party and accept nominations as representatives of the newly emerging interests in that province. The three were Gerard Pelletier, a journalist of reformist tendencies; Pierre E. Trudeau, an author and professor of law; and Jean Marchand, a trade union official and former president of the CNTU. All three were close personal friends of long standing and all three were elected to Parliament. Marchand was the first to attain cabinet rank and became minister of manpower and immigration; he was followed by Trudeau who became minister of justice in April 1967 and prime minister a year later; Pelletier was elevated to cabinet rank shortly after Trudeau became prime minister. Marchand was determined to obtain what he considered to be justice for the CNTU. It is within the context of these political connections that the drama began to unfold. The Congress presented its annual Memorandum to the government on 15 February 1966, making only the usual references to the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act.62 The CNTU Memorandum, presented the following day, asked for far-reaching reforms in the composition of the Canada Labour Relations Board. The precise nature of the proposed reforms was outlined in the Memorandum: The present Board comprises a President and eight members—an equal number representing employees and employers. On the employees' side, two members are appointed by the Canadian Labour Congress, one by the organizations of Railway employees affiliated to the CLC and one by our movement. .. . In conflicts involving both the CLC and the CNTU, the parties concerned are not on the same level since the CLC has three representatives and we have only one. It may be said that whatever their origin, decisions are not

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affected by this structure. If this theory prevails, why then appoint representatives of the various parties on this Board? We do not question the integrity or the competence of the union representatives on the Board. But we cannot accept to be unevenly represented especially in disputes involving the two organizations. The CNTU cannot accept a quarter representation when the CLC has a three-quarter one. This is certainly not the way to establish confidence in the Board. The Act must be amended in such a way that when the two organizations are in conflict over a question on which the Board must make a decision, the two unions be represented equally. . . . No one can deny that the CNTU is justified in making such a demand. It means that the Government must give equal chances and equal representation to all parties concerned.63

There was a time when the parties to a dispute before a labour relations board were labour and management. By its submission the CNTU was admitting that the opponents union leaders now face are as likely to be other union leaders as management. The government was reluctant to be caught in the middle of a dispute between rival organizations. However, inasmuch as this dispute involved matters for which the government could not disclaim responsibility it chose to mediate. Several weeks after the presentation of the two memoranda, the minister of labour wrote to President Jodoin: "Following our recent discussion concerning matters related to the application for certification of a number of employees in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Prime Minister has accepted my recommendation that several Ministers—to be named by the Prime Minister—meet separately with both groups of unions concerned."64 Since the purpose of the meeting was to consider the CNTU's demands for the reform of the Canada Labour Relations Board, President Jodoin attempted to limit its terms of reference as much as possible beforehand and uphold the position of the Board: It was my impression that any meeting that was to take place would concern the principle of national certifications and system-wide bargaining as related to the railway unions rather than unions in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. So far as certification of employees in the CBC is concerned, the Canada Labour Relations Board has already made its decision. I am sure you would not suggest that the Board is to be directed to make a decision different from the one it has already made or otherwise interfered with. My colleagues and I would be most reluctant to attend and participate in a meeting which would have as its subject an invasion of the jurisdiction of the Canada Labour Relations Board. ... I would like to suggest clarification on your part so that we may know more precisely what the meeting is likely to deal with.65

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President Jodoin's reluctance to discuss an invasion of the jurisdiction of the board and his expressed view that the decision of the board had closed the matter to further discussion were manifestations of his reluctance to see the government give any consideration at all to the confederation's grievances. The minister of labour, in his reply, clarified the position of the government and indicated that, whatever the feelings of the Congress might be, the government intended to give the confederation a hearing and its request consideration: As you know, the C.N.T.U. has made various representations to the government and to me, as Minister of Labour, on the subject of the Canada Labour Relations Board. General concern regarding the constitution of the Board has been expressed and, in particular, exception has been taken to the decision of the Board in regard to the application for certification of certain C.B.C. employees. I have advised the C.N.T.U. that any decision on this matter would have to be made by cabinet. As you know, the matter was also discussed with you personally and later at a meeting with the officials of the Railway Employees Associations and myself, which you and Mr. MacDonald attended. I advised those present at the meeting, as I had advised you, that the subject would be considered by cabinet before any decision could be taken by the government. Mr. Gibbons then asked for an opportunity to present the Railway Employees' case to the government. On that basis, I recommended to the Prime Minister that an ad hoc committee of cabinet be established to hear representations from the C.L.C., the C.N.T.U. and other organizations which may be interested. This recommendation has been acted upon and, as a result, I sent my letter of April 1 to you inviting the C.L.C. to put forward their position to the Committee.... I am sure you will agree that this is a fair and equitable way of proceeding with the objections which have been taken by the C.N.T.U. to the Canada Labour Relations Board. I feel that it is desirable that the various interested parties have an opportunity to fully present their position to the government before any decision is taken.66 The representatives of the CNTU met with the Cabinet Committee on Labour on 21 April and presented their case. The Congress met with the committee on 15 June, but prior to the meeting President Jodoin received a memorandum on strategy from the Congress director of legislation: It should be a matter of some concern to us that the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act is being considered for amendment at this time.... this may not be an opportune time to change the Act if the changes are going to reflect the political pressures which the CNTU may be able to exert through some of the federal Ministers. Broadly speaking, the CNTU has placed itself in the position where it seems to be saying, where it is convenient for it to do so, that it represents the language and cultural interests of the French-speaking workers of Quebec and elsewhere. This was in effect its position with regard to certification for

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CBC employees. It is also claiming, however, to be or about to become a national trade union centre in the very real sense of the term and has already begun to organize workers who are not necessarily French-speaking or residents of the Province of Quebec. I think this is a basic inconsistency with which the CNTU should be challenged. It can play one role or the other but not play both at the same time. To try and do both is to be guilty of the opportunism which it ascribes to the Canadian Labour Congress. Mr. Pepin seems to take a position on high moral grounds in support of his proposals and in his criticism of the Canada Labour Relations Board. But I venture to say that his own strategy, in recent CNTU organizing drives or in negotiations (as in the case in the building industry in Montreal) would demonstrate that his motives are not quite so unmarred by institutional selfinterest. The problem as a whole may be regarded by the Ministers as one of organizational rivalry and counter-pressures. The Ministers may want to take a position which will be expedient, which will satisfy neither side entirely but not dissatisfy them entirely either. Such a solution, assuming my analysis is correct, is bound to mean a net loss to us, since the status quo is to our advantage. On the other hand, the influence the CNTU may have in the Cabinet and its obvious successes in Quebec may cause the Ministers to feel that they must yield something of substance to the CNTU.67

Subsequent events demonstrated that "institutional self-interest" was not absent from the CLC's position. Appearing before the Cabinet Committee on Labour, the Congress argued against dividing workers on the basis of language, citing the dangers inherent for national unity, and attempted to discredit the idea of regional bargaining units on the grounds that these would result in undue inconvenience. The submission also expressed the annoyance of the Congress leadership at the recognition of the CNTU implicit in the very fact that a cabinet committee had been established to hold hearings and give consideration to its demands: "What fills us with apprehension is the thought that this very meeting is an indication that the government is willing to contemplate the destruction of a process of certification of bargaining units which has stood the test of time and is prepared also to consider the disintegration of national collective bargaining systems."68 In the discussion following the presentation of the submission, Labour Minister Nicholson pointed out that the meetings had been held because the railway brotherhoods had requested an opportunity to be heard. The discussion then proceeded: Mr. Nicholson: Mr. Jodoin:

There would not have been any meetings if there had not been such a request made in my office. Well, I do not think it is a misunderstanding, Sir. It is our opinion on the matter. We feel that the Government is considering it just by having a committee to discuss it. ... it is a position we are taking and expressing our regrets

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that you have decided to even consider and study it, that is all. Mr. Nicholson: Well, are you suggesting, Mr. Jodoin that we as the Government, if representations are made by an organization that represents in excess of 100,000 people, that we should ignore it? Mr. Jodoin: I did not say that you should ignore it but I do not think that you have to form a Cabinet Committee for it. I think you can listen to them yourself and so forth and report accordingly. But you are making an official Committee of the Cabinet to report to the Cabinet.69 The CNTU had based its case largely upon the premise that the failure of the board to recognize the appropriateness of other than nationwide bargaining units had denied, and would in future deny, many workers the freedom to exercise their right of association. President Jodoin replied: "Now, the right to association. I am getting sick and tired of the right of association, and quoting the Wagner Act. . . you know and we know, that the right of association has been modified by the doctrine of the exclusive bargaining agent."70 The Congress returned to the dispute in its Memorandum to the Government in February 1967 and once again revealed the nature of the forces at work: We wish to reiterate the position taken by us before the Cabinet committee that we do not propose to accede to any change in the composition of the Board which would reduce the number of Congress nominees and add to that of the Confederation. . . . We do not propose to subordinate ourselves to a minor organization merely to satisfy the aspirations of its leaders. . . . A supplementary issue is the question of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit under the same legislation. Here again we find the Confederation seeking to have the Board—and the government itself—subvert the Act and the jurisprudence developed under it in order to facilitate the kind of organizational efforts which have become characteristic of the Confederation. We cannot express too strongly our opposition to these efforts and our apprehension at the seeming disposition of some members of your government to accommodate the Confederation. . . . We cannot lightly accept appeasement of the Confederation. . . . We have no intention of submitting to any move in this direction.71 On 4 December 1967, in spite of the vigorous objections of the Congress, the minister of labour introduced in the House of Commons Bill C-186, "An Act to amend the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act." The bill sought to permit the board to declare other than nationwide units to be appropriate for bargaining purposes:

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Where the business or activities carried on by an employer are carried on by him in more than one self-contained establishment or in more than one local, regional or other distinct geographical area within Canada and an application is made by a trade union for certification under this Act as bargaining agent of a proposed unit consisting of employees of that employer in one or more but not all of those establishments or areas, the Board may, subject to this Act, determine the proposed unit to be a unit appropriate for collective bargaining.

More objectionable, from the point of view of the Congress, were the proposed amendments to sections 58, 60, and 61 of the act. The proposed new section 58B provided for the hearing of disputes by a panel of the board rather than by the full board. The consequences of the use of panels were clarified by Labour Minister Nicholson during the debate on the resolution: Mr. Chairman, may I ask the minister whether that means that if certification were applied for by the C.N.T.U. the two members who were representatives of the C.N.T.U. would be on that panel? Mr. Nicholson: This will become clearer when the bill itself is actually before the house, but I would hope that if there are three representatives from the C.L.C. as against one from the C.N.T.U. there might be a pattern established so there will be a balance in representation; in other words, that there would be one from each respective group, depending on the particular problem being discussed.72

Mr. Starr:

The proposed new section 61A sought to establish an appeal procedure from the decisions of the board or its panels, and for this purpose the membership of the board was to be increased by the appointment of "two other persons representative of the general public who shall be members of the Board for the hearing and determination of appeals." The appeal panel, in the words of the minister, would thus be made up of "the chairman or a vice-chairman who did not take part in the original panel . . . but not the other members of the board." Finally, according to Bill C-l 86, "any decision of a majority of the members of the appeal division of the Board on any such appeal is a decision of the Board and is final and conclusive and not open to question or review." Thus, although the government did not propose to tamper with the composition of the board itself, authority in conflicts between the Congress and the CNTU would henceforth be vested in panels on which both would enjoy equal representation. Furthermore, the authority of the appeal panel would be exercised in the absence of any representatives from either the employer or employee sides of the board. The net effect of these changes would be to nullify any advantage which might accrue to the Congress from

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its greater representation on the employees' side of the plenary board, precisely the end sought by the CNTU. The debate on the resolution is interesting for several reasons. First, the speech of the minister of labour, under whose aegis the bill was introduced, covered just over thirty-one column-inches. He was followed by spokesmen for the opposition parties and then the minister of manpower and immigration, a former CNTU president, rose to defend the bill. His speech covered just under thirty-five column-inches. Second, the minister of labour and the minister of manpower and immigration attempted to justify the bill on entirely different grounds. The minister of labour spoke of the increased workload of the board and what he considered to be compelling administrative reasons for reform. The Progressive Conservative labour critic Michael Starr, a former minister of labour, pointed out that the board itself had never requested the proposed administrative changes while David Lewis of the NDP pointed out that the board had no backlog of unfinished business and only sat an average of two days per month. The minister of manpower and immigration took a very different tack: There is at present, the main labour organization, the Canadian Labour Congress. On the other hand there is the C.N.T.U. which has only one representative. . . . I know full well that certain groups were defeated before the Canada Labour Relations Board strictly because they did not have representatives to fight for their interests. It is obvious. Everyone knows it.... As far as I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, I am sure of one thing, and it is that a body, like the Canada Labour Relations Board, or any other body set up to render justice in Canada, must provide guarantees of impartiality, and this board, just like any government department, must not belong to any particular organization. Nobody has the right to monopolize the labour relations boards or any other organization dealing with labour relations. Unfortunately at the present time, it is too often the case. This is the condition which we wanted to correct.73

The Congress launched its assault on Bill C-186 with the presentation of its annual Memorandum in February 1968: We cannot speak too plainly on this matter. Bill C-186 is nothing less than a concession to the Confederation of National Trade Unions. It is an answer to the request by that organization to enjoy special privileges and advantages which neither its numbers nor its status can justify. Because the Bill is a political expedient to appease the CNTU, it is an affront to whatever is positive and constructive about the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act. The Bill, and the reasons given in support of it, impugn the integrity of the members of the Canada Labour Relations Board. It creates a wholly false impression of the operation of the Act itself and of the burden of work which the Board must carry. It deceives the public as to the way in

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which the Board has exercised its functions and its probity in so doing. It is bad legislation because it is erroneous and irresponsible in its purpose. ... We do not for a moment dispute the fact that there is rivalry between the Canadian Labour Congress and the Confederation of National Trade Unions. We regret it but it remains a fact nonetheless. Assuming, as we are prepared to concede, that both organizations are entitled to representation on public tribunals such as the Canada Labour Relations Board, we are not prepared to agree that they should be treated as equals. . . . But it is not on institutional grounds alone that we object to Bill C-186. The implications to collective bargaining and to labour-management relations are far more serious, in our view, than the effect on the status of our Congress. The proposed legislation threatens very seriously to undermine the patterns of collective bargaining which have been established. The possibility of fragmentation of national bargaining units represents a very real menace to the orderly relationships which exist in various industries coming under the federal jurisdiction. It threatens to establish regional patterns of collective bargaining where country-wide bargaining has become the rule. It will aggravate differences in living standards, hamper mobility and deny promotional opportunities to workers who now enjoy them under country-wide collective agreements. It opens the door wide to an increase in industrial disputes because, if the legislation succeeds, there will be more bargaining agents and more opportunities for conflict. If industrial peace is one of your objectives as a government, surely Bill C-186 is not designed to achieve it. Legislation so ill conceived should never have been introduced and we urge you to withdraw it before it is able to do the damage of which it is capable.74

The Congress' submission to the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Labour and Employment, to which Bill C-186 had been referred for study, elaborated on these points. The Congress also opposed the bill through "a national campaign of unprecedented intensity."75 The campaign was conducted through a national committee, with sub-committees composed of groups of unions in the various sectors governed by federal legislation, i.e., railways, government, broadcasting, airlines and other transport. A special sub-committee was established composed of officers of the Quebec Federation of Labour. All sub-committees and the unions composing them worked efficiently and effectively. The response by affiliates, including many not directly affected by the legislation and their members, has been overwhelming. The Congress and many of the affiliates submitted briefs to the parliamentary committee studying the Bill and an avalanche of protests has been received by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Labour and all Members of Parliament. Labour Councils across Canada participated in the campaign by arranging meetings with local Members of Parliament to acquaint them with the dangers of the Bill. It is reported to the Executive Council that such meetings have been particularly effective in gaming support for the defeat of the Bill.76

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The campaign included letters from Congress Acting-President Donald MacDonald to all members of the House of Commons and the Senate. Following the presentation of the annual Memorandum in February, the trade unionists who had gathered in Ottawa for that occasion visited their local members of Parliament to lobby against the bill. Finally, the NDP badgered the government with questions on the bill and asked that it be dropped. In spite of the Congress' campaign, the government remained adamant and the bill only died when Parliament was dissolved on 23 April 1968. There are several points of interest in this episode. In defence of organizational self-interest the Congress launched a campaign of "unprecedented intensity," committed itself to the defence of the status quo, admitted that organizational self-interest and the aspirations of leaders have become the major points of dispute between the leaders of rival unions and, when faced with an irreconcilable clash between organizational self-interest and freedom of association, the Cabinet Committee on Labour were witnesses to the spectacle of seeing the Congress president declare that he was "getting sick and tired of the right of association." The CNTU leadership, for its part, clearly admitted that a fundamental change has taken place within the trade union movement since the 1930s and that the parties to a dispute before a labour relations board are as likely to be rival unions as they are to be labour and management. The CNTU leadership has also resorted to the use of French-Canadian nationalism as an aid in the recruitment of members of Congress affiliates although in earlier years this nationalism was often used to obstruct social progress and fight the very things for which the labour movement ostensibly stands. IV. Interest Groups and the Distribution of Power An important element in the preservation and enhancement of an interest group is the maintenance and development of its access to government. Access is valuable because it enables groups to make demands upon government which are realistic in the sense that it lies within the power of government to satisfy those demands. The less able a government is to act in the fields that are important to a particular interest the fewer are the demands that can realistically be made upon government in that field. This weakness will be reflected in the internal cohesion of the group and in the relative strength of the group's leaders vis-a-vis the leaders of its local branches and those of independent local organizations. In a federal system the division of powers between the two levels of government is therefore a matter of crucial importance to interest-group leaders. Truman has observed that one of the primary reasons for the internal weakness of the American Bar Association and the relative strength of the state bar associations is that "the matters of

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training and admission to the profession are the concern of the State governments rather than the national government."77 A strong federal government will strengthen the position of the national organization in relation to its provincial units and independent local organizations, while strong provincial governments will have the opposite effect. Interest-group leaders at all levels wish to strengthen their organizations and there is no reason to believe that they will remain passive observers in matters related to inter-governmental relations. On the contrary, it may be hypothesized that interest-group leaders will attempt to alter the intergovernmental balance of power in favour of the level of government to which they enjoy access. Furthermore, the same hypothesis may be developed with respect to government agencies at any particular level of government; namely that interest-group leaders will attempt to strengthen those agencies with which they have developed a close working relationship and to which they therefore enjoy access. The purpose of the present section is to examine these hypotheses. FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS

The competition between the Congress and the Quebec-based CNTU, as well as the unstable state of the distribution of power between the federal and provincial governments in Canada, provides an excellent opportunity to study the first hypothesis. For this purpose, the success of the interest groups in actually altering the distribution of powers is of less importance than the fact that such attempts may have been made. In January 1957, when federal power was at a peacetime peak, the Congress' annual Memorandum reviewed the state of Dominion-provincial relations: The Canadian Labour Congress believes that increasingly closer working relationships between the Government of Canada and the governments of the provinces are necessary.... Effective working relationships have been worked out in this field; in Old Age Assistance, Vocational Training and Technical Education, Apprenticeship, Hospital Grants, Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons; the latest agreements to be accomplished are in Unemployment Assistance.78

Cooperation in these cases had taken the form of a federal initiative supplemented by grants to encourage provincial participation in shared cost programmes. The Memorandum continued: "The successes attained should be a spur to additional efforts in this field. There are five broad areas in which we ask you to seek the co-operation of the provinces." The five areas were social security, transportation, taxation, education, and labour relations. Of the latter, the Congress said: "There are eleven labour jurisdictions in Canada with eleven sets of laws, and eleven sets of administrative procedures

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all differing in varying degrees. Uniformity in these laws and procedures would encourage the development of better industrial relations and harmony throughout the whole of Canada."79 The specific recommendations included legislation of a Vacation and Holidays Act and a Fair Wage Act, the establishment of minimum-wage rates and statutory provision for the forty-hour week and "that all of these rates and conditions be made uniform throughout Canada through federal-provincial co-operation."80 The recommendations calling for increased Dominion-provincial cooperation occupied four pages of the Memorandum, and in view of the nature of such cooperation, it would appear that the Congress leadership looked upon the provinces as little more than constitutional nuisances. In October of the same year, the Congress presented its first Memorandum to the newly elected Progressive Conservative government: "Uniform labour legislation is one of the goals of the Congress. Divided jurisdiction makes this difficult. But there are several things which can be done without any constitutional amendment, and which should be done promptly."81 After reviewing conditions of labour in industries under federal jurisdiction and suggesting that minimum standards be raised at least to the level of the minima established by the most advanced provincial governments, the Congress said: "But the Dominion should not confine itself to doing as well as the best of the provinces. It should give a lead . . . provide a spur to provincial laggards."82 With respect to laws governing labour organization, the Congress asked: Do for other industries of nation-wide scope and importance what was long ago done for the grain elevators: declare the enterprises in them works for the general advantage of Canada, and so bring them under the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament. At present, in the packinghouse industry, for example, an international union bargains with each of three nation-wide companies and concludes three nation-wide agreements; but the process must be carried on under at least six different Labour Relations Acts for one firm alone. . . . In such circumstances, a legal nation-wide strike becomes a problem in higher mathematics; and strikes are sometimes necessary and ought not to be hamstrung by legal technicalities.83

Another field in which the Congress has consistently sought an expansion of federal authority has been highway transportation. In the Memorandum of January 1957, the Congress said: "Water, rail and air services are within the federal jurisdiction. Interprovincial and international highway transportation is also federal. The legislation which transfers this responsibility to the provinces should be repealed."84 This request has been repeated regularly.85 Finally, the Congress has asked that the British North America Act be amended to empower Parliament to legislate on matters which now fall within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures. Thus, on the subject of the ratification of ILO conventions, the Congress urged

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the government to ratify those which fall within federal competence and then turned its attention to the others: Even as to those Conventions which are wholly or partly within provincial jurisdiction the Government need not simply forward them to the LieutenantGovernors for such action as their advisers may see fit. It can use its powers of persuasion upon provincial Governments. It can bring the matter up at the next Dominion-provincial Conference. It can seek to have the British North America Act amended to give Parliament power to implement I.L.O. Conventions.86

In all the instances cited above, the Congress, a national organization enjoying access at the federal level, was urging the federal government to expand the areas of its legislative competence; either by acting to occupy those areas, or by means of declarations under the provisions of section 92(10) of the BNA Act or, finally, by securing amendments to the BNA Act itself. The relationship between the relative power of the federal government vis-a-vis the provincial governments and the ability of the Congress to make demands upon the federal government is illustrated by the experience of the Congress in the field of education. In January 1957, the Congress' Memorandum dealt with problems of education in a section entitled "DominionProvincial Relations," the apparent implicit assumption being that education was no longer to be regarded as an exclusively provincial function but as a proper subject for cooperation between the two levels of government. This assumption was made explicit in the Congress' proposals: The situation in education in Canada at all levels from kindergarten to university has reached the proportions of a national emergency. The problems are acute. If the needs of a growing population requiring more and more education and training in an expanding economy are to be met adequately, the Government of Canada will have to share the responsibility with the provinces for marshaling the necessary resources. . . . We ask the Government of Canada to convene a Dominion-Provincial Conference on Education to consider the problem and possible ways in which federal assistance can be provided.87

The Memorandum of October 1957 devoted twice as much space to education as had that of the previous January and the proposals for federal initiative were both broader and more explicit. Specifically, the Memorandum asked the federal government to convene a Dominion-provincial conference which would: (a) Find out exactly what the needs are, for buildings, facilities, and teachers; (b) Find out just how much the municipalities and the provinces can do to

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meet the needs, and how much national aid is necessary, and recommend on what basis it should be provided; (c) Consider the extension of teacher-training programmes and recommend policies which will attract more men and women of the necessary calibre to the teaching profession.88 The next Memorandum, presented to the government in January 1959, went even further and urged that the federal government undertake programmes of its own in the field of education and: (1) Give sufficient financial assistance to the provinces for a high standard of education at all levels from grade school to university without regard to residence; (2) Convene a Dominion-provincial conference on education; (3) Introduce and assist in the financing of a wide program of scholarships for qualified students who otherwise may not be able to complete their education; (4) Establish advanced technical institutes in all major industrial centres; (5) Institute an extension of teacher-training programs, and establish policies, including adequate salary schedules for qualified personnel, which will attract more men and women of the necessary calibre to the teaching profession; and (6) Undertake a school construction program with federal financial assistance, to provide for sufficient classrooms.89 The Memorandum presented in January I960, the last year of undisputed federal predominance in Canada, repeated these requests.90 By February 1961, the Memorandum spoke only of federal grants to equalize educational opportunity and the Congress was obliged to note that "we are well aware of the entrenched rights of the provinces on the subject of education and we are not suggesting that these be tampered with."91 As federal power waned and provincial power waxed, the demands which the Congress could realistically make upon the federal government in the field of education decreased. After March 1962, the Congress' annual presentations to the government of Canada are, with two minor exceptions,92 devoid of any mention of education. The provincially based Confederation of National Trade Unions, on the other hand, sought to hasten the federal evacuation of this field: What about the projects of aid to education. Education is one field where Provincial jurisdiction is most evident. Yet it appears that in a single year, the Central Government has spent nearly $500 million dollars on education. ... The real question is not whether or not we approve of education but much more the fact that Federal grants to education disturb the power relationship between the Federal and Provincial Governments.93

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Another area in which the Congress and the confederation have competed, each on behalf of their own level of government, is medical-care insurance. In January 1957, the Congress told the government: A comprehensive programme should be initiated on a nation-wide basis either by the Government of Canada or jointly in co-operation with the provinces as a complete health insurance plan.... We strongly urge the Government of Canada to proceed now with the establishment of a comprehensive nation-wide health insurance plan.94

In October of the same year the Congress again looked to the federal government to initiate a medical-care plan and provide the provincial governments with the necessary leadership: "Constitutionally, health insurance is a provincial responsibility.... But the initiative must come from the national Government. The bulk of the cost must be borne by the national Government. The general framework must be set up by the national Government."95 Between 1957 and 1965 the relative strengths of the federal and provincial governments altered drastically and the Congress was no longer able to ask that the federal government act on its own, as it had in January 1957, or that it take the full initiative, as it had in October 1957. The Memorandum presented to the government in March 1965, said: "We support the Report of the Royal Commission [on Health Services] and we are pleased to observe that it enjoys the support of other major Canadian institutions. We cannot urge you too strongly to do all that is in the power of your Government to make the Health Charter a reality. We realize that in terms of jurisdiction the initiative lies with the provinces."96 The Memorandum merely recorded the fact that between 1957 and 1965 the initiative had passed from the federal government to the provincial governments. At the same time, the ability to apply pressure to government on such matters had passed from organizations which enjoy access at the federal level, organizations such as the Congress, to organizations which enjoy their greatest degree of access at the provincial level, organizations such as the Confederation of National Trade Unions. The confederation, in its Memorandum to the federal government, said: As workers we are very much interested in certain aspects of the legislative programme of your Government. Foremost in our view is the announcement of a medicare programme and of better allowances for workers who will undergo professional training. But in both cases we do not believe that the Federal Government enjoys the required jurisdiction.97

In general, the confederation has attempted to weaken the federal government in order to strengthen the provincial governments, the Quebec government in particular. The Congress, for its part, has not been laggard in attempting to spur the federal government on and cajole it into regaining the

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initiative. At the 1964 Congress convention, President Jodoin told the delegates: "It is time for those of us who believe in a strong and a united Canada to speak out. It is typical of some destructive minorities that they talk with loud voices. We must not let ourselves be fooled by this. It is time to put these narrow-minded pursuers of selfish objectives in their place."98 In its next Memorandum to the Government, submitted in March 1965, the Congress leadership tackled what it believed to be one of the causes of the declining position of the federal government, namely, the declining prestige of Parliament. The aims of the Congress were summed up in two sentences: "We are here concerned with Parliament as an institution. We wish to see it strong, effective and commanding the respect of the people."99 The Memorandum of February 1966 contained a section entitled "A United Canada" and in it the Congress leadership attempted to cajole the federal government into ceasing its retreat in the face of provincial demands: We are caught up in a paradox where, on the one hand, the needs of Canada as a whole can effectively be dealt with only by economic and social planning on a national scale but, on the other hand, there are growing pressures for regionalism and decentralization. . . . What we have so briefly described is true of more than one province and has expressed itself in more than one way: in the demand for provincial jurisdiction over off-shore mineral rights, in the right to opt out of federal social security programs, in the wish to establish provincial banks and in the desire to fragment the manpower service, to mention but a few of its manifestations.... If this trend is to continue then Canada as a state may remain identifiable as such in a geographical atlas but it will be very much less than that in terms of the kind of lives which its citizens will lead.100

The Memorandum then went on in an attempt to prod the federal government into exercising its powers and regaining the initiative from the provincial governments: We have never suggested nor do we do so now that Canada should be transformed into a unitary state. But we do subscribe to the proposition that certain and very important powers and obligations rest with the federal Government and that these must be exercised boldly and imaginatively in the interests of the Canadian people as a whole regardless of where they live, what language they speak and whatever their cultural or ethnic background may be.101

And finally, We call on you as the Government of Canada to use those powers which are legitimately yours and the exercise of which is essential for the well-being of Canada. We refer to the use of those fiscal and monetary policies without which economic planning is meaningless, to the development of comprehensive manpower policies, to the expansion and improvement of our system

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It is unlikely that either the Congress or the confederation were consciously involved in plots, the former to weaken the provincial governments and the latter to weaken the federal government. Both the Congress and the confederation, by the very dynamics of the situation in which they found themselves and as a result of their organizational needs, attempted to alter the inter-governmental balance of power. To the extent that they contributed to such an alteration, the competition for power and influence between nationally based and locally based organizations was reflected in the distribution of power between the levels of government. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR

The nature of the relationship which develops between the minister of labour and the Congress leadership makes him their spokesman in the cabinet and in relations with other ministers. He is "their man" and can be approached on many matters which do not fall within his jurisdiction. There are numerous examples; several should suffice to illustrate the point. In June 1961, a landed immigrant, a member of the International Hod Carriers', Building and Common Labourers' Union, was convicted of a minor breach of the Criminal Code, and under the terms of the Immigration Act was liable to deportation. The union, through the Congress, appealed to the minister of labour to intervene with the minister of citizenship and immigration on behalf of their member. The minister of labour wrote to his colleague and the concluding paragraph of the letter which he received in reply read: "The National Parole Board in Ottawa are being informed by my Immigration officials that we intend taking no action against Mr. ,"103 Government regulations on the subject of pension plans are of great concern to trade unions, particularly those regulations dealing with deducibility of pension plan contributions from taxable income. On 18 November 1960, the Congress director of legislation wrote to the minister of national revenue and asked for a meeting to discuss problems arising under the then existing regulations. The minister replied that the matter fell within the purview of other members of the cabinet, in particular the minister of finance. Shortly thereafter, the director of legislation wrote to the minister of labour: We are writing to obtain your assistance in arranging a meeting involving the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Revenue and yourself. . . . I have today written to the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of National Revenue in connection with this meeting. Anything that you can do to facilitate the holding of such a meeting in the near future will be very much appreciated.104

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The matter did not come within the scope of the minister of labour, yet it was to him that the Congress turned when it wished to arrange a meeting with other members of the cabinet, and his presence at the meeting was requested. On 17 February 1961, the minister of justice introduced for first reading in the House of Commons Bill C-70, the Corporation and Labour Statistics Bill. The Congress objected strongly to this legislation and President Jodoin wrote to the prime minister outlining these objections. Copies were sent to the minister of justice, the minister responsible for the bill, and to the minister of labour, although he had no more connection with the bill than any other member of the cabinet. A final example of the utility of having one's own minister concerns the Congress' participation in the Canadian Conference on Education. While preparations were being made for the 1962 conference, the conference executive decided to meet with the cabinet over dinner in the parliamentary restaurant to discuss educational matters. The Congress director of education, in his capacity as chairman of the conference Executive Committee, was responsible for arranging the meeting. He consulted with the minister of labour and later wrote to the minister: "Further to our request to meet informally with Cabinet Ministers regarding the Canadian Conference on Education. We have followed your advice and have written to all the ministers. . . . I would be very grateful if you would set a date that would be most convenient to you."105 The minister of labour made arrangements for the meeting and for the use of the parliamentary restaurant.106 Whether the problem at hand be intervention with the minister of citizenship and immigration to prevent a possible deportation, or intervention with the minister of finance on the subject of pension plan regulations, or intervention with the minister of justice about legislation falling within his jurisdiction, or arranging for a meeting with the cabinet and the use of the parliamentary restaurant, the minister of labour is the man to whom the Congress can turn for these and other favours. He is their man and the Department of Labour is their department. The informal working relationship which the Congress develops with the minister of labour and the officials in his department means that the Congress enjoys far greater and more effective access to the Department of Labour than to any other department of government. Thus, the Congress is able to exert a great deal of influence upon the day-to-day work of the Department of Labour. Influence, in such cases, is not the result of political pressure but is a consequence of familiarity. For the minister and his officials the limits of discretion are set by established government policy, and so long as the wishes of the Congress do not involve a transgression of those limits the wishes of the Congress are often deferred to.107 Under these circumstances, it is natural to expect that the Congress will attempt, whenever possible, to

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strengthen the Department of Labour vis-ci-vis other departments and agencies of government. The Congress has often asked that functions be transferred from other departments or agencies to the Department of Labour. Prior to the establishment of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, the Congress repeatedly asked that responsibility for immigration be transferred to the Department of Labour.108 In its Memorandum of March 1965, the Congress asked "that the Government take steps immediately to co-ordinate manpower programs under a single agency within the Department of Labour."109 Finally, the Congress asked that the National Employment Service be transferred from the Unemployment Insurance Commission to the Department of Labour.110 The most ambitious attempt to strengthen the Department of Labour occurred in February 1961. After having outlined several problems facing the Canadian economy, the Memorandum continued: We are also concerned about the highly decentralized administration of employment and welfare matters under federal jurisdiction. Immigrants . . . are under Citizenship and Immigration, which conducts its own recruiting and placement services. Job registrations and placements, as well as unemployment insurance benefits, are within the Department of Labour under a Commission; but registration with the National Employment Service is not mandatory. Other welfare programs are under the Department of Health and Welfare which also handles payments to the provinces for unemployment assistance. . . . Consideration should be given to strengthening the Department of Labour by concentrating more authority in its hands. The Department should take over the recruitment and placement functions of Citizenship and Immigration and place them under the National Employment Service. The Service itself should be strengthened in a number of ways.... By handling unemployment assistance payments, the Department would be in much closer touch with the provinces and be directly aware of the volume of unemployment for which assistance is being paid.111

In addition to undertaking responsibilities previously confided to other agencies, the Congress asked that the Department of Labour also be given responsibility for new undertakings : A Department, so strengthened, could be given the power to take effective action in planning for jobs, keeping the labour force at optimum efficiency, encouraging mobility of either workers or industry as the case might be, making industry and labour-market studies, and so on.112

In summing up its presentation, the Congress leadership stated the rationale behind the proposed strengthening of the Department of Labour: "A Minister could then go to his government and demand the necessary measures to carry out his terms of reference."113 The minister in this case would be the

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Minister of Labour and it is to him and to the senior officials in his department that the Congress leadership enjoys the greatest access. The degree of success attained by the Congress in its quest for a stronger Department of Labour is far greater than would be apparent at first glance. The Department of Labour was reorganized and a number of its functions removed; these along with the National Employment Service and the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration were combined in a new Department of Manpower and Immigration. The Congress was thus successful in subordinating immigration policy to the manpower needs of the economy. As well, many of the officials of the new department were transferred directly from the Department of Labour. The relationship which had been developed between them and the Congress has been maintained and similar relationships have been developed with other officials in the department. Below the ministerial level, frequent contact has resulted in the development of relationships similar to those which prevail between the Congress and officials of the Department of Labour. At the ministerial level, Bill C-186 and the fact that the former minister had been a president of the CNTU inhibited relations. However, his subsequent replacement by a former minister of labour who had enjoyed close relations with the Congress resulted in a change. Any future minister will find himself the object of the Congress' attentions in much the same manner as his colleague in the Department of Labour. V. Conclusions The maintenance and enhancement of the mandate of an organization involves the protection of its status, position, privileges, and prerogatives. These include the right to meet officially with the prime minister and members of the cabinet, the right to be consulted on such matters as the formulation of policy, and the right to make nominations for certain appointments. The preservation of the mandate of an organization in the eyes of government requires that the organization maintain a substantial membership among those who share the interest which the organization's leadership claims to represent. The organization's leadership must be able to make credible its claim to speak, preferably as an exclusive spokesman, on behalf of the interest. The preservation of the mandate of the organization in the eyes of the membership necessitates making credible to the membership the acceptance of the organization as an "official" spokesman by government. This, in turn, necessitates the acquisition of credentials from government; credentials such as access, the right of consultation on policy, and the right to make nominations for appointments to official bodies.

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Thus, to a considerable extent the maintenance of mandate involves obtaining credentials from the membership for presentation to government in order to obtain credentials from government for presentation to the membership in order to obtain further credentials, and so on.

Chapter 6

THE SIU AFFAIR

A Case Study in the Protection of Legitimacy and Mandate

The affairs of the Seafarers' International Union of Canada (SIU) and its former president, Harold C. Banks, were among the more newsworthy items in Canada during the early 1960s. It is not the purpose of the present chapter to rehearse the events of that period or to recount the activities of Banks. Both lie outside the scope of this work and the latter can be found in the Report of the Industrial Inquiry Commission on the Disruption of Shipping (the Norris Report).1 This chapter examines the role of the Canadian Labour Congress in these events, to determine the reasons which prompted the Congress leadership to act as it did, and to cast further light on the distribution of power between the Congress, its affiliated unions, and the AFL-CIO. In particular, attention is focussed on the activities and changing objectives of the Congress leadership in their relations with government, union leaders, and the AFL-CIO. 1. The Background In the years immediately following the Second World War, the major organization representing Canadian seamen was the Canadian Seamen's Union (CSU). In 1946 it became involved in a major work stoppage which was settled only after government intervention. Early in 1947, CSU President Pat Walsh resigned, alleging communist domination of the union, and organized a rival union, the Canadian Lake Seamen's Union (CLSU).Ina dispute in 1948, as a result of what Mr. Justice Norris later characterized as a "failure to respect basic principles and legal obligations"2 on the part of several shipping companies, the CLSU replaced the CSU as bargaining agent for the unlicensed seamen employed by those companies. During the dispute, a number of shipowners and union officials approached the president of the SIU of North America and asked that a representative be sent to Canada to take charge of the opposition to the allegedly communist-dominated CSU. It was in response to this request that Harold Banks, an SIU

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organizer and former inmate of San Quentin was brought to Canada. In September 1948, the CLSU merged with the SIU of North America and became the Canadian District of that union. Another dispute between the CSU and the shipping companies at the end of 1948 enabled the SIU to establish itself as the major seamen's union in Canada. When the CSU rejected the recommendations of a conciliation board, the SIU accepted the board's recommendations and concluded agreements with the companies. A similar result followed a dispute between the CSU and Canadian National Steamships in March 1949. Finally, in December 1950, the Canada Labour Relations Board, acting on the grounds of alleged communist domination, revoked the last certification of the CSU and that union thereafter ceased to be a factor in the Canadian shipping industry. There can be little doubt that the allegations of communist domination were a major factor in the joint decision of labour and management to seek the elimination of the CSU and the apparent collusion of the Canadian government in these activities.3 Between the expressed willingness of the Trades and Labor Congress leadership to support the CSU in its dispute with the ship-owners, in the spring of 1948, and the joint labour-management approach to the SIU in early 1949, had come recognition that, given the existing climate of opinion, communist labour leaders were a distinct liability in establishing the respectability of organized labour. The labour leaders who had been instrumental in bringing Banks to Canada soon became aware of the tactics he employed in dealing with opponents; in March 1951 Banks described those tactics in no uncertain terms.4 In 1964, following the establishment of the trusteeship, the Congress leadership admitted that even before the dispute which finally led to the expulsion of the SIU "the Congress was thoroughly disgusted with the sort of organization the SIU had become and, in particular, with its leadership."5 However, in the absence of a united front of the leaders of other major Congress affiliates remedial action had not been feasible. Banks' administration of the financial affairs of the SIU is described in detail in the Norris Report. The problem which eventually provoked a crisis and led to his downfall was the apparent insufficiency of the customary union dues to cover both the cost of administering the union and Banks' substantial personal expenses. To remedy this deficiency Banks resorted to the introduction of two classes of union membership, special assessments,6 and expansion of the SIU's membership. This proved fatal since virtually all potential members of the SIU were already members of other unions and could only be recruited by raiding. Among the unions which represented potential additions to the SIU's membership were the National Association of Marine Engineers (NAME), the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers (CBRT), the Canadian Merchant Service

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Guild (CMSG), the United Steelworkers of America representing seamen employed on several ore carriers, and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees. The earliest raid involved the NAME and was repulsed. Another raid against the same organization was attempted in 1958 and charges were laid against the SIU alleging violation of the Congress constitution. In June 1959, after hearings before the Congress Executive Council, the SIU was suspended from the Congress and, after failing to appear before the Congress convention in April 1960 to plead its case, was expelled. By the time of the convention the SIU's raiding activities had been extended to the CMSG and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees. The tactics employed by the SIU to obtain bargaining rights on behalf of the marine engineers paralleled closely the tactics used ten years earlier to oust the CSU. Attempts were made to conduct negotiations with employers without acquiring a membership among the employees or seeking prior certification from the Canadian Labour Relations Board and without regard for either existing certifications or existing contracts. Banks undertook to indemnify the shipping companies if successful actions for breach of contract were brought against them by the unions with which they had contracts. As a result of SIU pressures, the Association of Lake Carriers, representing the shipowners, signed an agreement with the SIU covering its licensed personnel. In October 1960, following receipt of advice from the Canada Labour Relations Board that the NAME was still the certified bargaining agent for marine engineers employed by its members, the Association of Lake Carriers concluded an agreement with that union as well. At the same time, in October 1960, the SIU concluded an agreement with the shippers respecting their unlicensed personnel. The SIU then struck a number of shippers in violation of this contract in an attempt to force them to ignore their contracts with the NAME and enter into agreements recognizing the SIU as bargaining agent on behalf of their licensed personnel. The shippers succumbed. The circumstances surrounding the termination of these strikes was described in the following terms by Mr. Justice Norris: The SIU advised its members and particularly the marine engineers that an "arrangement" had been worked out with the Minister of Labour and the Canadian Labour Relations Board whereby in consideration of the SIU discontinuing their unlawful strike tactics, the Canadian Labour Relations Board would certify the SIU Licensed Division for marine engineers. The existence of this alleged "arrangement" was denied by the Canada Labour Relations Board.7

Upon concluding agreements with the shippers, the SIU applied to the Canada Labour Relations Board for certification as the legally recognized bargaining agent. The board refused the application on the grounds of fraud

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but, despite the decision of the Supreme Court of Ontario upholding that ruling and despite the existing contract with the NAME, Banks was again able to force the shippers to conclude agreements with the SIU. By 1 June 1961, all the shipping companies had made their peace with Banks except Upper Lakes Shipping. In an attempt to bring Upper Lakes Shipping into line, the SIU withdrew its unlicensed members from that company's vessels in violation of an existing contract. The company thereupon concluded agreements with the CBRT and the Canadian Maritime Union, these unions being certified by the Canada Labour Relations Board as bargaining agents for the company's unlicensed employees. Banks responded with a campaign of terror and harassment which led directly to the appointment of an industrial inquiry commission and his eventual downfall. THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS

In September 1961, while Banks was trying to obtain bargaining rights on behalf of the licensed crew members, the president of Upper Lakes Shipping wrote to President Jodoin asking that the aid of the AFL-CIO be sought in an attempt to curb Banks. The request was prompted by the tactics employed by the SIU in American ports. Typical of these tactics were the events surrounding the arrival of the Northern Venture at Marquette, Michigan, and described by the president of Upper Lakes Shipping in his letter to President Jodoin: The most recent visit of the ship to Marquette caused a near riot, and the little town has not yet recovered. I am informed that ten or twelve thugs came to Marquette at about the same time as the 'Northern Venture'—several by air and the remainder by car. They proceeded to threaten all the employees and, in particular, the supervisors who were loading the ship. They threatened the wives of the supervisors, and informed them that their husbands would be hurt and, in some cases, informed their wives that their husbands had just been killed by being struck by large pieces of ore. The foremen have informed the management that they are now too frightened to handle the ship, and we are informed that a picket line will be set up if the ship approaches Marquette, and that no other ships will be handled by the dock as long as the 'Northern Venture' is lying alongside. We are also facing the fact in Ontario that our suppliers are being threatened for bringing supplies to the 'Northern Venture' and the 'Wheat King'. The cooks on ships organized by the S.I.U., have been told by the S.I.U., that they should start complaining about any of the food supplied by suppliers who also are bringing supplies to the 'Northern Venture' and the 'Wheat King'. In most cases, these suppliers will be frightened to testify before any Court, and I am informed that in Marquette those who have been threatened will probably also be frightened to testify.8

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On 19 September 1961, President Jodoin sought the intervention of AFLCIO President Meany to end the harassment of the Northern Venture. President Meany, however, was unable or unwilling to do anything to curb Banks, either then or in response to similar requests later. The relation of the AFL-CIO to its affiliates is roughly analogous to that of the Congress and its affiliates. Furthermore, the existence of various trade departments within the AFL-CIO and the web of support which Banks and Paul Hall, international president of the SIU, had built up in the Maritime Trades Department9 further weakened Mr. Meany's position. During the last week of September 1961, the president of Upper Lakes Shipping again asked President Jodoin to seek the intervention of the AFL-CIO. Shortly thereafter, the AFL-CIO resolved any doubts that may have existed with respect to its position in any dispute between the CLC and the SIU. The Executive Board of the AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Department adopted a resolution which read: Whereas the Seafarers' International Union of Canada and unemployed Canadian and American seamen are engaged in struggle with Canadian and British shipping companies which are resorting to the runaway-flag device to deprive Canadian seamen of their livelihood; and Whereas, this struggle is now symbolized by the strike of unemployed seamen against the SS Northern Venture; and Whereas, the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen [sic], is conspiring with the owners of the Northern Venture to undermine the rights of Canadian seamen to man Canadian-owned ships; and Whereas, the owners, the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen [sic], and the reactionary public authorities of Canada and the United States, including the United States State Department, the Department of Labor and the Department of Commerce, are resorting to every available forum including the Canadian Labor Board and American and Canadian courts, seeking orders and injunctions designed to deprive Canadian seamen of their rights; Now, therefore, be it resolved, that the Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO, and all of its affiliates, which have previously supported the Canadian Seafarers, hereby pledge their continuing support and allegiance to the end that the Canadian District will be victorious on this important international labor front; and that the Department and its affiliates demand that the United States State Department, the Department of Labor and the Department of Commerce cease and desist from intervening on the side of management in this labor dispute.10 The charges made against all parties opposing the SIU were merely intended to "confuse the issues"11 and had no basis in fact. The credibility that can be attached to statements by Banks, Hall, and the Maritime Trades Department may be appreciated by considering the charge, contained in a Maritime Trades Department bulletin of July 1961, that Canadian draft boards in Toronto were discriminating against SIU members.12

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In January 1962, President Jodoin again wrote to AFL-CIO President Meany in an attempt to correct the inaccurate picture presented by the text of the resolution and to warn against American intervention in Canadian matters: The Canadian Labour Congress has noted the article in the OctoberNovember 1961 issue of the Maritime Register entitled "MTD Pledges Canadian SIU Aid in Northern Venture Case." The action of the Maritime Trades Department reported in this article is entirely unwarranted by the facts of the case. Furthermore, any such action by the MTD without consultation with the Canadian Labour Congress could be regarded as interference in Canadian affairs. The report of the situation in the "Register" is false from start to finish. It is clearly based upon the fictitious verson of the incidents spread in the United States and Canada by representatives of the Seafarers International Union.

President Jodoin went on to correct eight mis-statements of fact contained in the article and concluded: "Any action by the Maritime Trades Department, as outlined in the resolved portion of the resolution adopted, will be vigorously protested by this Congress to the AFL-CIO, if necessary by retaliatory action in Canada, and by protest through the Canadian government to the U.S. government."13 The problem of American interference in Canadian labour problems directs attention to another major weakness in the structure of the Congress, one which could have dangerous repercussions in any dispute between purely Canadian unions such as the CMU or the CBRT and an international union such as the SIU. In such a dispute the international union will always enjoy a distinct advantage as a result of intervention on the part of the AFL-CIO because the influence of the parent union within the AFL-CIO will help to determine the nature of that body's intervention. The failure of the AFL-CIO to intervene and the continued harassment of the ships of Upper Lakes Shipping finally prompted President Jodoin to seek government intervention. On 23 May 1962, he wrote to the prime minister describing fourteen instances of harassment, intimidation, or violence within the preceding forty-two days with the caveat that "we do not suggest that the above recital of crime, violence, intimidation and outright violation of the law is by any means complete."14 The letter asked that representations be made to the president of the United States seeking adequate protection for the persons and property of Canadian citizens doing business in that country. He also asked that in addition to taking all possible steps to end violence, restore order and protect the safety of individuals involved, you cause to be undertaken a fullscale enquiry covering two aspects of this disgraceful situation: (A) The series of criminal acts that followed the decision of Canadian seamen to establish the Canadian Maritime Union and that have imperilled

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and continue to imperil the lives of members of this organization, their families, and others assisting them in exercising their legal rights; (B) The whole matter of the structure, policy, operation and finances of the organization known as the Seafarers' International Union of Canada or the Seafarers' International Union, Canadian District. As the tempo of violence increased, two further events occurred. First, the Congress' legal counsel wrote to President Jodoin informing him that the solicitor for the president of Upper Lakes Shipping had asked for concerted action in the form of a joint meeting with the prime minister to demand that action be taken against Banks, and also joint action to bring pressure to bear upon the American secretary of labor. President Jodoin replied that he had met with the minister of justice and had been assured that the government would soon review the situation. With respect to the joint approach to the American secretary of labor, he said: I presume that you are aware that, through External Affairs, the United States Government has received a note on the subject matter. I am recommending to some connections I have that the President of the AFL-CIO, Mr. George Meany, be approached by a high-ranking official of the U.S. Government, no less than Dean Rusk, Arthur Goldberg or President Kennedy himself to call a stop to this illogical attitude.15 The second event was the complete collapse of all hopes of dealing with Banks either through the AFL-CIO or through the Canadian or American governments. In June 1962, the director of District 4 of the United Steelworkers of America informed President Jodoin of Mr. Meany's latest move: IN RESPONSE TO AN INQUIRY FROM THE DULUTH AFL-CIO CENTRAL BODY AS TO WHETHER MEMBER UNIONS SHOULD LOAD CMU MANNED SHIPS, PRESIDENT GEORGE MEANY OF THE AFL-CIO SENT AN ASTOUNDING TELEGRAM WORDED AS FOLLOWS: "I SEE NO REASON WHY A NATIONAL POLICY DECISION IS NECESSARY TO POINT OUT THE SIMPLE FACT THAT THE SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION IS AN AFFILIATE IN GOOD STANDING WITH THE AFL-CIO WHILE THE CANADIAN MARITIME UNION IS NOT." SIGNED GEORGE MEANY. . . . WE FEEL IT OUR OBLIGATION TO POINT OUT TO YOU THAT PRESIDENT MEANY'S AMAZING TELEGRAM IN EFFECT LENDS HIS FULL SUPPORT TO THE SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION.16 President Meany had declined to place the future of his organization in the balance in an attempt to stop Banks. If the SIU had been forced to leave the AFL-CIO, it would have taken a number of other maritime unions with it and the SIU leadership had already considered the possibility of a federation including the Teamsters which, in the words of Banks, would be

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"the most powerful waterfront federation ever seen in history."17 A split in the AFL-CIO on the SIU issue might easily have led to the establishment of a gangster labour empire employing against the AFL-CIO the same methods that were being employed against the CMU and the CBRT. The prospects of assistance from either the Canadian or American governments or both came to naught in two stages. On 20 June 1962, President Jodoin wrote to the minister of justice repeating his request for an official investigation. The minister refused to act on the grounds that: the constitutional and legal position is clear that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and the protection of property rests with provincial authorities. The acts complained of are in the nature of offences against the Criminal Code and any investigations and prosecutions in respect thereof are matters to be undertaken by local police authorities and provincial Crown Attorneys.18

The hope that representations by the Department of External Affairs to the United States State Department would show results was dashed on 29 June 1962, when the secretary of state for external affairs informed President Jodoin that "these representations, both formal and informal, were sympathetically received by the United States authorities who made clear that they were very alert to the dangers inherent in the situation."19 The letter made no mention, however, of any action by the American authorities. Since neither the Canadian nor the American government was prepared to move against the SIU, the Congress and its affiliates resorted to retaliatory measures. On 5 July 1962, the Congress announced: A boycott of ships manned by crews from the Seafarers' International Union was undertaken in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River areas at 8 a.m. today. Simultaneous action was taken by unions affiliated with the Canadian Labour Congress at Welland, Cornwall and Beauharnois Canals and the St. Lambert-Cote Ste. Catherine Locks, and at Seven Islands, P.Q. Refusal to permit passage of SlU-manned ships through the Seaway was supplemented by an embargo on loading SlU-staffed iron ore ships at Seven Islands. ... Ships manned by members of the Canadian Maritime Union, the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers, the United Steelworkers and other bona-fide trade unions, as well as foreign ships, will be allowed unhindered passage.... Free access and conveyance through the St. Lawrence system will be made available to SlU-manned vessels once an assurance has been received that the reign of terror has been ended and that Canadian vessels tied up on Great Lakes' ports are being loaded and allowed to proceed to their destinations without unlawful hindrance, and that there will be no repetition of these incidents. Assurance is also required from the government that adequate measures

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will be taken to implement the request of CLC President Jodoin for a full inquiry into the affairs of the SIU and the criminal acts which have taken place.20 Fear of the consequences led the Canadian government to announce the appointment of an industrial inquiry commission. The possibilities opened up by such an inquiry caused some uneasiness among union leaders. Bernard Shane, a vice-president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, wrote to President Jodoin pointing out some of the dangers. Copies of the letter were sent to other union leaders and the replies indicated that the possible dangers had not been overlooked. The Canadian general vice-president of the International Association of Machinists, for example, commented: I fully appreciate and share your concern about the ramifications of any Government investigation of a trade union. There is just no telling where such an investigation would end if some information were uncovered that could be used for propaganda by the enemies of Labour. However, there are several pertinent things to consider from the other side of this particular case. When any union adopts a practice of violence and terror where innocent and decent union members are beaten up and hundreds of others live in fear of their lives, then such a union is a menace to the Trade Union movement as a whole. . . . . . . we can't just sit back and do nothing about it or the reputation of the whole movement will suffer.21 The advisability of an inquiry was also discussed at a meeting of the Congress Executive Council on 31 July 1962. According to the minutes of the meeting: The Officers were fully aware that there were serious implications in this inquiry but this was a calculated risk they had to take. The Officers, however, had made it plain to Labour Minister Starr that this request for an inquiry was not to be construed as opening the door for investigations such as the McClellan Commission [sic] in the United States and Mr. Starr had assured the Officers that it was not the intention of the Government to do this.22 Clearly, Banks could not be dealt with within the trade union movement, either in Canada or in the United States. However, it was equally clear that failure to deal with him endangered both the mandate of other union leaders, because he refused to leave their organizations alone, and the legitimacy of all unions, since his tactics must eventually bring organized labour into disrepute. Almost from the start, the proceedings of the commission became frontpage news and the headlines bore a marked resemblance to those which accompanied the proceedings of the McClellan Committee in the United

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States. During the 1950s, it had been the custom of Canadian labour leaders to maintain that the revelations of union gangsterism in the United States were not true of Canada. In the hearings of the Norris Commission the Canadian labour leaders found their worst fears being realized. Organized labour in Canada was faced with a crisis of legitimacy of the first order. II. The Aftermath of the Norris Inquiry The Industrial Inquiry Commission into the Disruption of Shipping quickly became an investigation of union gangsterism. The demonstrated complicity in, or knowledge of, Banks' activities on the part of the Congress leadership prior to the expulsion of the SIU, coupled with their failure to take effective action, necessitated a radical alteration in the Congress' strategy. The Congress' position ceased to be one of outraged indignation and instead became one of contrition and penitence. The Congress' submission to the commission noted: The labour movement bears and is most conscious of bearing a heavy burden of guilt in allowing so intolerable a situation to develop and to continue. It is a burden of guilt which rests also upon shipping companies and upon Government. . . . The fact that others are responsible equally does not lessen the guilt of the labour movement. The leadership of the labour movement should have known more than it did know. It should have done more than it did, earlier than it did, on the basis of what it did know. And it should have inquired more deeply into what it suspected and heard rumoured.23

In defence, it was explained that "decades of hostility from employers, from governments, from society generally, have bred into the labour movement an instinctive 'group loyalty'."24 The Congress' submission then made proposals about the recommendations which the commission ought to make to the minister of labour: "We ask your Lordship to find and to advise the Minister of Labour that the SIU is not a bona fide trade union and to recommend that such steps should be taken, as you may consider advisable, to ensure that legal and practical efficacy will be given to such a conclusion."25 The practical effect of declaring that the SIU was no longer a trade union would have been to provide grounds for the revocation of its certifications. Negotiations with the American government to ensure the peaceful use of American ports by Canadian ships were also recommended by the Congress in the hope of preventing the harassment of Canadian ships by the SIU and its allies in the United States. The Congress could not ask for anything more because to have done so would have meant asking for the dreaded government intervention in the internal affairs of the labour movement. In the event, the report of the commission was as unpleasant to the Con-

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gress leadership as the course taken by the inquiry itself. The major recommendation was that special Federal legislation be passed as an immediate interim measure putting the maritime transportation unions in Canada or the maritime transportation section of unions . . . under government trusteeship. . . . . . . [and] that the trustees be three in number and that none of them be representative of the labour organizations or the shipowners interested in the present dispute. . . . The interest of the public generally in the matter of Canadian trade and particularly in the St. Lawrence Seaway is so seriously involved that there should not be room for even a suspicion that any party having a special interest has contributed to the decisions of the trustees.26

The bulk of the report dealt with the activities of Banks and the SIU, but the recommendations dealt equally with all maritime unions—the Seafarers' International Union, the Canadian Maritime Union, the National Association of Marine Engineers, the Canadian Merchant Service Guild, and the maritime locals of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers. The Congress leadership, which had on many occasions in the past, and especially during the Newfoundland loggers' strike of 1959, denounced government control of unions, was caught on the horns of a dilemma. It could support the recommendations of the commission and thus put an end to the activities of Banks and the SIU, but this meant agreeing to direct government intervention in the internal affairs of several of its affiliated unions. On the other hand it could attempt to secure government action in accordance with the recommendations contained in its own brief to the commission. It was not until ten days after release of the report that the Congress was able to comment on the recommendations. The press release which was finally issued reiterated that the SIU was not a bona-fide trade union, but was critical of the proposal that all maritime unions be placed under government trusteeship: The conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Norris merit commendation; however, we have serious reservations with regard to certain of his recommendations. We are opposed in principle to the imposition of government control on a bona fide trade union. At the same time we recognize that the overwhelming weight of evidence shows that the SIU is not a bona fide union. We are, however, unable to reconcile the proposal that unions which have operated in an entirely democratic manner and have complied with every detail of the law should be treated in the same manner as the SIU. This is what the Commissioner does by proposing that government trusteeship be applied to all unions in the maritime transportation industry.27

The release then went on to damn the commission's major recommendations with faint praise and to take issue with the recommendations on subsidiary matters:

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CHAPTER SIX Some of the Commissioner's proposals will find approval in the established trade union movement—adequate control of welfare plans, protection of seamen's vacation pay, the requirement for certification of bargaining agencies in maritime transportation, and the assurance of full rights to trade union members. However, with regard to some of the other proposals we have serious reservations, as we have already indicated. Throughout the report there is repeated criticism of certain shipping companies; yet the recommendations are directed entirely at trade unions. ... The attitude taken toward hiring halls indicates a lack of appreciation of the place these institutions hold in many labour-management relations.... We are opposed to the suggestion that manning should be placed under exclusive government regulation. . . . We are disappointed with the recommendations of the report with regard to the harassment of Canadian crews in United States ports. . . . We are hopeful that the Government will act quickly in giving careful consideration to the findings of the Commission.

The Congress then undertook negotiations with the Department of Labour. The result was agreement that government trusteeship of unions ought not to be looked upon as a normal means of dealing with labour problems. Subsequent events indicate that the minister of labour or officials of his department also agreed to consult closely with the Congress on all aspects of the SIU problem. On 31 July, 1963, the deputy minister of labour wrote to President Jodoin informing him of the minister's intention to make a statement in the House of Commons the following day and enclosing a three paragraph draft statement in the "hope [that] these are acceptable to you."28 The third paragraph of the statement read: On the understanding that the trusteeship would be of temporary duration, and that the legislation providing for it would contain other safeguards including the progressive removal of the trusteeship, the Canadian Labour Congress has assured the government it will co-operate fully in carrying out the trusteeship. This was not acceptable to President Jodoin who re-wrote the paragraph to read: In view of the fact that all its affiliates concerned have accepted the recommendation for a trusteeship and on the understanding that the trusteeship would be of temporary duration, and that the legislation providing for it would contain other safeguards including the progressive removal of the trusteeship, the Canadian Labour Congress has now assured the government of its co-operation.29 The Congress leadership was anxious to avoid the onus of having agreed to a government trusteeship and sought to place it instead upon the shoulders of

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the leaders of the unions concerned. The change was accepted by the minister and the revised statement was read in the House of Commons the following day.30 The nature of the agreement between the Congress and the government and the reasons for agreeing to the trusteeship after having denounced this recommendation were explained by President Jodoin in a memorandum to the Congress Executive Committee and Executive Council: "Finding no alternative, I made the addition of "safeguards" as indicated in the statement, as well as ... the possibility of one of the trustees to be appointed having labour background and labour knowledge and a termination date [for the trusteeship]. This would have to be approved by me."31 The original recommendation for a disinterested trusteeship was thus abandoned by the government, as was the recommendation that the trustees' duties include taking "all steps possible to bring about integration of the unions under trusteeship."32 The subject of hiring halls, a matter on which the commission had recommended specific legislation, was not mentioned in the legislation establishing the trusteeship. The Congress' press release, cited above, had opposed the recommendation. Thus, curtailment of the powers of the trustees, the presence of a nominee of the Congress among the trustees, and various other safeguards to protect the status of the unions affiliated with the Congress constituted the price of the Congress' cooperation. Agreement within the Congress and among its affiliates still left one major problem unresolved. The statement by the minister of labour in the House of Commons had noted that four of the five unions directly involved had agreed to the trusteeship. The outstanding union was the SIU and this raised the spectre of continued harassment of Canadian ships in American ports. Early in August 1963, a delegation of officials from the Canadian Department of Labour met with the American secretary of labor in an attempt to secure the cooperation of the United States government in preventing further interference with Canadian shipping. Upon their return to Ottawa, the deputy minister and assistant deputy minister of labour visited President Jodoin to report on the results of their meeting. President Jodoin summed up these results in a memorandum to the other officers of the Congress: "Arising out of their comments, I do not believe much will be done from the American side re the Great Lakes situation."33 It was evident that the American government was reluctant to act against the AFL-CIO. This raised new problems for the Canadian government, which prompted it to attempt to throw the entire matter back into the lap of the Congress, as President Jodoin explained in his memorandum: Haythorne [deputy minister of labour] was wondering if it was possible that I contact Al Hayes of the Machinists, David MacDonald of Steel, Walter Reuther of Auto, and probably Harrison of B.R.C. [Brotherhood of Railway Clerks], to see what influence they could have on Meany to make another attempt in the labour movement to settle the Great Lakes situation.34

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At the same time that the deputy minister of labour was attempting to hand the problem back to the Congress, President Jodoin received a letter from the president of the National Maritime Union of America (NMU). The NMU had been the subject of SIU raids in the United States and had supported the Congress from the start. When the Norris Report was released, the NMU issued a press release suggesting that the affairs of the SIU be investigated by the AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Committee.35 For reasons of self-interest, therefore, the NMU was prepared to support the Congress against the SIU within the AFL-CIO. The NMU president also suggested seeking a solution within the ranks of organized labour. This letter, coming at the same time that the deputy minister of labour was suggesting a private trusteeship, helped to make the subject of a solution within the ranks of organized labour a matter of serious discussion once more. In late August 1963, Congress Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald met with the deputy minister of labour, who asked once again that the Congress press the heads of international unions to use their influence upon AFL-CIO President Meany who, in turn, might use his influence with the United States government to ensure cooperation with the Canadian government. SecretaryTreasurer MacDonald explained in a memorandum to President Jodoin: In the course of our discussion, I told him that Frank Hall [Railway Clerks] and George Burt [United Auto Workers] were keeping their respective International Presidents fully informed on everything in relation to the SIU-Great Lakes situation and that both their Presidents were in sympathy with our position. He seemed very anxious that someone should similarly brief Al Hayes [International Association of Machinists] in order to build up the greatest possible influence on George Meany. . . . I also advised him that in my view what was most needed was top level pressure from the Canadian Government on the American Government to correct the situation in the United States. He assured me that the Canadian Government was entirely serious about pressing the matter to the end and had made their very strong views known repeatedly to their United States counterparts, particularly the Secretary of Labor. Obviously, it is his feeling that we should bring more pressure to bear on the heads of our affiliates in the United States as well as on the AFL-CIO in order to have them, in turn, assert pressure on the American Government. However, as I pointed out to him, there are political considerations in this connection, and the American labour movement is a potent political force and next year is a presidential election year.36

Public reaction to the revelations of the inquiry played its part in pressing the Congress leadership to seek a quick resolution of the problem. On 30 August, President Jodoin received a memorandum from the Congress director of public relations on the reaction to the commission's recommendations:

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We have received through our clipping service some 96 editorials concerning the Norris Report. The sources range from Charlottetown to Victoria and represent almost all the daily papers in Canada; there are 100 dailies. We have probably never before had a labour subject that has aroused such widespread comment. . . . Editorial opinion is that the government should move effectively and as quickly as possible. Some writers are critical of the delay in government action, others say it is understandable. A number of editorial writers find the trusteeship idea distasteful but it is accepted as practically inevitable and there seems little outright editorial opposition. A number of editorials congratulate the Congress on taking a responsible position in eventually agreeing to go along with the trusteeship idea. . . . There is criticism of the CMU for its threat to again tie up the seaway.37 While organized labour has become accustomed to being pilloried in the press, the nature of the Norris Inquiry and its findings made the Congress leadership extremely sensitive to the possible consequences of such publicity. The general effect of public opinion was to commit the Congress leadership to the trusteeship idea regardless of any qualms which they may have felt. The situation was not helped by the renewed harassment of Canadian ships in American ports. After the dynamiting of a Canadian ship in Chicago President Jodoin turned once again to AFL-CIO President Meany and asked for the intervention of the AFL-CIO to prevent a recurrence. Mr. Meany replied: "Would appreciate information from you as to those responsible so that I can determine necessity for and possible nature of intervention."38 It was evident that the AFL-CIO remained as reluctant as ever to cooperate in any undertaking directed against the SIU. The Canadian Labour Congress was thus subject to a number of pressures. Foremost in the minds of the Congress leadership was the damage sustained by the reputation of organized labour as a result of the revelations of the inquiry. Under no circumstances could the Congress give the impression that it was obstructing any reasonable effort on the part of the government to bring about the necessary reforms. Whatever reservations the Congress might have on the recommendation for a blanket trusteeship of all maritime unions, it was clear that opinion in the country was prepared to support such a trusteeship as being reasonable under the circumstances. Within the Congress itself there was a pronounced division of opinion. On the one hand there were union leaders such as Bernard Shane of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union and George Burt of the United Automobile Workers who opposed any form of government intervention in the internal affairs of trade unions as a matter of principle. At the other extreme was the CBRT whose members had manned the ships which had

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been subject to harassment in American ports and which was a likely candidate for future raiding operations if Banks was not removed forthwith from the Canadian labour scene. The CBRT, a purely Canadian union, was particularly vehement in its opposition to any kind of private arrangement between the Congress and the AFL-CIO. The government of Canada was faced with the problem of securing access to American ports for Canadian ships after the imposition of the trusteeship. All efforts in this direction failed due to the intransigence of the AFL-CIO. The Congress, in accordance with its policy of cooperating with the Canadian government and in order to maintain the close working relationship which had enabled it to obtain various modifications in the application of the commission's original recommendations, was dutifully going through the motions of exploring the possibilities of a private trusteeship administered by itself and the AFL-CIO. These efforts brought a sharp rebuke from the national president of the CBRT: In view of recent press reports, apparently based on information emanating from a CLC Executive Committee source, I am forced to conclude that the Brotherhood's position on the subject of private as opposed to public trusteeship over maritime unions is still not clearly understood by the Congress. This letter is designed to clarify our position, which I assumed had already been explained sufficiently in the policy statement we issued on September 22. If you will read—or reread—this statement, you will note that we stated our conviction that there is no feasible or practicable alternative to government trusteeship. . . . Once again I reiterate the Brotherhood's unalterable opposition to a private trusteeship arrangement, and warn the Congress against making any decision that it will later bitterly regret. Should the Congress pursue such a course as is being reported, I feel that I am obliged to inform you that the officers of the Brotherhood will unfortunately be compelled to make an agonizing reappraisal of its policy of association with the Congress.39

Thus the national president of the CBRT, a regional vice-president of the Congress, had threatened to withdraw his union from the Congress in the event that the Congress leadership gave its approval to anything less than a government trusteeship. On the other hand, George Burt, Canadian regional director of the United Automobile Workers and a Congress general vice-president, had stated his unequivocal opposition to any form of government trusteeship. Faced with these conflicting demands, the policy of the Congress leadership was to temporize in the hope that the government would act to de-fuse the issue before it could explode within the Congress. One means of temporizing was simply to avoid holding meetings of the Congress executive. However, by mid-September the failure to hold meetings had itself become an issue and William Mahoney, Canadian national director of the United Steelworkers and a Congress general vice-president, wrote to Presi-

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dent Jodoin characterizing the conduct of the Congress leadership as "ill advised, improper and unconstitutional."40 Finally, the Maritime Trades Department of the AFL-CIO and its president, Paul Hall, were not standing idly by. At an Executive Board meeting of the department two resolutions were passed dealing with the Canadian maritime situation. The first resolution opened with the statement: WHEREAS, the so-called Industrial Inquiry Commission on the Disruption of Shipping ... was a union-busting program instigated by the Conservative Government of Canada for the purpose of destroying the Seafarers International Union of North America, Canadian District, at the behest of the Canadian shipowners unwilling to pay decent wages . . . and continued with the assertion that the Norris Inquiry "has not developed a scintilla of evidence indicating any wrongful conduct by any officer of the Canadian District."41 After seven "whereases," all in the same vein, the resolution condemned both the report and the officers of the CLC. The second resolution condemned the CBRT and asked that the question of USCanada trade union relations be placed on the agenda of the next General Board meeting of the AFL-CIO. These resolutions were undoubtedly intended to intimidate President Meany by threatening a showdown within the AFL-CIO if he weakened in the face of pressure from either the American government or the leaders of other international unions who may have been reached by the heads of their Canadian unions. Paul Hall then attempted to strengthen his hand still further by sending telegrams to the presidents of all international unions and President Jodoin was obliged to send telegrams advising the presidents that attempts by American union leaders to influence the course of Canadian legislation would be deeply resented in Canada and could prove detrimental to the future of international unionism. These, then, were the forces, pressures, and conflicts out of which the trusteeship was to come. ///. The Establishment of the Trusteeship Because the effectiveness of a maritime trusteeship imposed by the Parliament of Canada would depend upon the cooperation of the United States government in ensuring the peaceful use of American port facilities, the leadership of the AFL-CIO was able to use its influence with the United States government in an attempt to impose its will upon the government of Canada and the Canadian Labour Congress. On 27 September, 1963, the deputy minister of labour and President Jodoin drew up a draft Memorandum of Understanding setting out the principles of the proposed trusteeship. This document served as the basis for

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discussion at a meeting in Boston the following day. Present at the meeting were the Canadian minister and deputy minister of labour, the American secretary and assistant secretary of labor as well as Donald MacDonald, secretary-treasurer of the CLC, and Lane Kirkland, executive assistant of the president of the AFL-CIO. The meeting opened with the distribution of the draft Memorandum of Understanding, after which the Americans retired to discuss the document among themselves. When the meeting resumed, Wirtz [the US secretary of labor] . . . emphasized that it [the Memorandum of Understanding] raised the question of Government versus private trusteeship of the SIU in Canada, and that they favoured the latter and regarded the former with complete disfavour. . . . Wirtz noted that enumerated paragraphs 1, 10 and 11 under subheading "Steps Required to Achieve These Objectives" envisaged Government involvement, therefore he couldn't accept them in their present form.42

The United States secretary of labor thus condemned as unacceptable a trusteeship that was to be imposed by the Parliament of Canada upon a union representing Canadian seamen employed by Canadian companies upon ships of Canadian registry. The policy being pursued by the AFL-CIO was also clarified: "Kirkland also insisted at this point that there be a stipulation that the SIU membership in Canada would have to authorize their officers to agree to the imposition of the trusteeship on their union. This gave rise to a quite forceful discussion. MacDonald interpreted it as giving the right of veto to the SIU."43 The request for the inclusion of this stipulation raised the question of gaining the cooperation of Paul Hall who, in the past, had consistently supported Banks. However: "Wirtz and Kirkland gave definite assurances that they were confident it [the establishment of a private trusteeship] would be done without delay by Paul Hall. They appeared to have reasons for their confidence that were not evident to the Canadians."44 This assurance was repeated later in the meeting immediately following which Kirkland took strenuous exception to paragraph 5 on page 4 [of the Memorandum of Understanding] and was supported by Wirtz. Their position was that neither the US Government nor the AFL-CIO could be party to a document that provided for the imposition of a trusteeship on a union by the Canadian or any government. MacEachen indicated that the inclusion of this paragraph was not essential.45

On the subject of the raiding of other Canadian unions by the SIU and the harassment of Canadian shipping in American ports: Kirkland took issue with paragraph 2 at the top of page 4 [dealing with raiding] on the basis that it was impossible of implementation by either

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national labour centre as they did not possess authority over their affiliates— .. . when consideration was being given to paragraph 3 on page 4 [dealing with harassment], Kirkland objected on the grounds that picketing and boycotting were legitimate union activities. . . . After considerable debate, the following phrasing was proposed by Haythorne and Reynolds: "All possible steps will be taken by the CLC and AFL-CIO during the period of trusteeship to eliminate picketing, boycott or violence conducted in support of representation claims or the transfer of rights between unions."46

Inasmuch as the AFL-CIO had previously found it impossible to eliminate such harassment, the revised phrasing guaranteed nothing. Throughout the discussions, the attitude of the Americans was that the Norris Inquiry had been an unfortunate nuisance which had aroused Canadian public opinion to demand that something be done about the activities of the maritime unions and that, in response to this demand, the Canadian government had undertaken to establish a trusteeship. The Americans apparently believed that the trusteeship was to be a ritual, an act of obeisance to Canadian public opinion, and that the purpose of the meeting was to determine the means by which the trusteeship could be established with the least inconvenience to those concerned. The aim of the CLC and of the government of Canada was precisely the reverse. In summary, the United States government and the AFL-CIO had been made parties to the settlement of a Canadian problem in order to obtain freedom from harassment for Canadian ships hi American ports. As a result of their involvement, the US government and the AFL-CIO had been able to obtain concessions which implied acceptance of their major objective—that the trusteeship be non-governmental and, with respect to the SIU, voluntary. This meant that the success of the trusteeship would be dependent upon the cooperation of Paul Hall. In return, the government of Canada and the Congress received assurances that the AFL-CIO, which by its own admission was impotent, would take "all possible steps" to halt the harassment of Canadian shipping. The US government did not undertake any commitments in this respect and thus, again, a solution was dependent upon the cooperation of Paul Hall. The Canadians received nothing but the assurance that the problems could be solved if Paul Hall would cooperate; President Jodoin had said precisely the same thing two years earlier in a letter to President Meany.47 On the Monday following the meeting in Boston, the minister of labour met with officers of the Congress and advised them that the Americans had expressed further reservations with respect to the redrafted Memorandum of Understanding. The following day, 1 October, Kirkland, who had discussed the memorandum with Paul Hall, telephoned the officers of the Congress and offered further amendments to the memorandum which "in the opinion of the Congress Officers, would have rendered it useless."48 Paul Hall had

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demanded that two of the three trustees be appointed by the AFL-CIO which, in this case, meant appointment by himself. Majority control of the trusteeship was the means by which the Congress could make it effective; it was also the means by which Paul Hall could reduce it to a gesture. By this time it was clear to all concerned that the Canadian view of the trusteeship as an effective instrument for the solution of maritime labour problems and the American view of the trusteeship as an act of obeisance to public opinion had met in head-on collision. The possibility of a private trusteeship under the joint auspices of the CLC and the AFL-CIO had vanished and on 8 October the Congress Executive Council agreed to so advise the government of Canada. Two days later the government introduced the Maritime Transportation Unions Trustees Act49 in the House of Commons. The act received third reading the following day. The problem of harassment in American ports still remained unresolved. In the end, the policy of violence paid off for the SIU of North America. While the United States government, at the behest of the AFL-CIO, condoned the violence of the SIU, the SIU leadership was able to use this violence as a bargaining counter to protect their interests in negotiations with the Canadian authorities: In return for an undertaking on the part of the SIU to end the boycott of ships manned by Canadian Maritime Union crews in American ports, the trustees agreed to maintain the affiliation of the SIU of Canada with the SIU of North America and would further appear to have agreed to remove no other leading officers of the SIU of Canada except its president, whom they had already ousted. Because of the international ramifications of the dispute and the renewed disruption of shipping which could easily have occurred on the St. Lawrence Seaway, this may have been the only way out in view of the imminent opening of a new shipping season.50 CONCLUSIONS

The SIU affair is of special interest because the major crises in it touched upon the protection of the mandate of the Congress and the legitimacy of organized labour. Furthermore, the solution of the problems underlying these crises often required interaction between the Congress and government. The initial problem ante-dates the arrival in Canada of Hal Banks and was rooted in a potential crisis of legitimacy. At the urging of government and the shipping companies, and with one eye cocked on Canadian public opinion, the Trades and Labor Congress undertook to help in the destruction of the allegedly communist-dominated CSU. At the urging of the Canadian government, and possibly with its connivance, Hal Banks was brought to Canada to re-organize Canadian seamen. The arrival of Banks created a potential crisis of mandate. By its own admission, the Congress leadership had at least some idea of the manner in

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which Banks was conducting the affairs of the SIU, yet nothing was done. The Congress' submission to the Norris Commission pointed out that the Congress "is a labour-center' and not a union, and limited in its supervisory activities."51 However, the two predecessor Congresses had not claimed greater authority over the affairs of their affiliates but they nevertheless took effective action to eliminate communist influence from the Canadian maritime industry. The essential difference between the gangsterism of the SIU and the communism of the CSU was that the latter posed an immediate threat to the legitimacy of organized labour while the former, so long as it remained hidden from public view, posed no such threat. Any attempt on the part of the Congress leadership to discipline or remove Banks, in the absence of a compelling reason to act, would have endangered the internal cohesion of the Congress. Considerations of organizational preservation forbade action on the part of the Congress leadership until after the expulsion of the SIU. The expulsion of the SIU, necessary to preserve the mandate of the Congress, did not leave Banks with an isolated and weakened organization subject to raids by other unions. The SIU leadership had long since concluded alliances with the Teamsters and the Longshoremen while the Maritime Trades Department of the AFL-CIO and its port councils provided another means of circumventing the interdiction of the Congress. Expulsion only served to remove whatever restrictions Banks may have felt were still incumbent upon him under the Congress constitution. The result was a long series of acts of harassment and violence which led the Congress to seek the intervention of the Canadian government. Government intervention was sought because the activities of the SIU and its allies had rendered it impossible for the Congress affiliates in the maritime industry to carry on their activities. The Congress leadership clearly recognized the possibility that an inquiry might result in revelations similar to those made by the McQellan Committee in the United States and they attempted to avoid this by obtaining assurances from the minister of labour. The Congress leadership was caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand there was a potential crisis of legitimacy, and on the other hand there was an actual crisis of mandate. They decided to solve the actual crisis and hope that the potential crisis would not materialize. The potential crisis of legitimacy did, however, materialize and the strategy of the Congress leadership underwent a radical alteration. Prior to the revelations made at the Norris Commission hearings the primary concern of the Congress leadership had been to protect its mandate in the face of the illegal actions of the SIU and it therefore took the position of an aggrieved complainant. The revelations promoted the protection of the legitimacy of organized labour to a position of primary concern and the Congress thereafter took the position of a penitent willing to do all it could to set matters

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aright. The subsequent conduct of the Congress leadership was conditioned by the need to fulfil in a credible manner the role of the contrite penitent. Its cooperation with government in seeking a private trusteeship, although aware from previous experience that the AFL-CIO would not support effective action, and its cooperation with government in the establishment of a government trusteeship were the result. In private negotiations the Congress was able to soften the impact of some of the commission's subsidiary recommendations. In part this may have been because Banks had originally been brought to Canada at the behest of a Liberal government and, in spite of his criminal record in the United States, had been given the status of a landed immigrant by that government. The hands of the government were not, therefore, completely clean. In part, the concessions won by the Congress may simply have been intended to secure its cooperation in seeking a private trusteeship or in implementing the government trusteeship. Alongside the need to defend the legitimacy of organized labour, the Congress leadership was faced with the need to defend the mandate of the Congress in the face of serious discrepancies among the views of the leaders of its affiliated unions, one union leader going so far as to threaten the withdrawal of his organization from the Congress. The course of action adopted in this case was to temporize in the hope that a solution would emerge from another quarter, precisely the course adopted when the dispute between the IW A and the Carpenters threatened to split the Congress.

Chapter 7

RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT

The Exercise of Legitimacy and Mandate

Consultation with government leaders and officials is useful to interest-group leaders for two reasons. First, formal consultations with government are indicative of the legitimacy of the interest and the mandate of the group which claims to represent that interest. Second, consultation is useful in influencing the nature of the legislation to be presented to Parliament and the content of regulations made under the authority of existing legislation. Not all instances of consultation are qualitatively alike; there is an order of ritual importance. By far the most important form of consultation in terms of the prestige and recognition conferred is the public presentation of an annual memorandum to the prime minister and the cabinet. Second, of considerably lesser importance, is private consultation with one or more members of the cabinet for the purpose of presenting a brief on a specific matter. Although of lesser importance in terms of recognition, the private consultation is usually the more productive in terms of influencing government action. In third place are the private meetings with senior civil servants for the purpose of presenting a brief on a specific matter. Finally, there is the day-to-day consultation on routine matters between interest-group officials and middle-ranking civil servants. 7. The Political Leaders There can be no doubt that the political leaders of Canada are willing, and even anxious, to have the Congress leadership consult with them and that they will go to great lengths to maintain a friendly relationship. At a time when relations between the Congress and the government were at an extremely low ebb, an almost chronic condition during the years 1959-63, Labour Minister Michael Starr took the opportunity created by the presentation of the Memorandum of February 1961 to appeal for the Congress' cooperation. After presenting an extended description of the measures taken by the government to remedy the problems mentioned in the Memorandum, he continued:

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CHAPTER SEVEN We are doing everything we possibly can to remedy that situation [high unemployment]. We are not running away from it. We are not hiding. We are open to suggestions that may be made and your suggestions will be given careful study. But no single government is able to bring about an alleviation or solution of the problem of unemployment. It needs the co-operation of all three levels of government, industry and labour.1

Mr. Pearson, no doubt mindful of the fact that one of the major bones of contention between the Congress and the previous government had been the meaning of the term "consultation" as it applied to appointments to government bodies, took particular pains to give assurances on this point at the first formal meeting between his government and the Congress: As a government, we wish to maintain the closest possible association with organized labour and with the Congress. I think I can say that we have had that association, which has certainly been helpful to us and I hope helpful to you and to the workers since we have taken office. We wish to continue it. We wish, as we have already done, to consult with the Congress on labour representation on boards, councils and commissions and other governmental agencies where labour should be and is being represented.2

At the same meeting Mr. MacEachen, the minister of labour, commented upon the fact that this was the first formal meeting between the Congress and the new government and hastened to add: "That is not to say that we have not had since last April close and at times continuous consultation on many problems."3 Three years later, in 1966, after he had left the Department of Labour to become minister of national health and welfare, Mr. MacEachen looked out upon a large audience of labour leaders and Congress officers and said: I have had a very good, close and constructive relationship with the Canadian Labour Congress, with its officers. I think there is hardly an important person in the audience with whom I have not had some very close contact with respect to matters affecting government policy in the last two or three years and I want to thank all of you for the very constructive and productive collaboration that has existed between the Departments and also between the Congress and the Government as a whole.4

There are many instances of political leaders seeking the advice or cooperation of interest groups. Shortly after the Progressive Conservative government came to power in 1957, the new minister of labour, Michael Starr, was advised by his officials that the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act had not been amended in almost ten years and that amendments ought to be considered. On 12 August, 1957, Mr. Starr wrote to a number of organizations representative of labour and management advising

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that the provisions of the act were to be reviewed and asking for any suggestions which these organizations might wish to make. Consultation in this case was intended to find such common ground as might exist between labour and management organizations and so permit the government to act without unwittingly leaving itself open to criticism from either side. Similarly, after the change of government in 1963, the newly appointed minister of finance wrote to President Jodoin: If it is the intention of your organization to make representations to the Government on matters which are normally dealt with in the federal budget, may I take this opportunity to invite you to plan to submit your views to the Government sometime during the month of December. If this is not possible, the Government would appreciate receiving your submission not later than the 31st of January 1964, in order to afford ample opportunity for your proposals to be given full consideration.5 An examination of relations between the Congress and the political leaders of Canada demonstrates clearly that the principal officers of the Congress, and certainly its president, have access to any member of the cabinet including the prime minister at almost any time and for the discussion of virtually any aspect of government policy. The records of the Congress contain many requests to meet with members of the cabinet to discuss various matters; there is no record of any member of the cabinet ever having refused such a meeting. Furthermore, there are few things more easily arranged than a meeting between an officer of an affiliated union and a member of the cabinet to discuss a problem of particular concern to that union, and many such meetings have been arranged. The enjoyment of such access is invaluable in protecting the mandate of the Congress, for so long as the Congress leadership enjoys access to government they will be in a position to service their affiliated unions. Close as relations may be between the Congress and government, there are limits to the extent to which the Congress leadership can presume upon that relationship. Certain of these limitations, as they relate to appointments to government bodies, have akeady been discussed. Two further examples will illustrate other aspects of these limitations. In May 1961, after a winter of heavy unemployment, a number of unemployed workers from Vancouver participated in a demonstration in Ottawa for the purpose of bringing the problem to the attention of the government and the public. As a result of their participation in the demonstration, several of the demonstrators were unable to be at the Unemployment Insurance Commission offices in Vancouver on their appointed "call day" and, in accordance with the commission's regulations, were penalized. The Vancouver and District Labour Council wrote to Labour Minister Starr asking that the ruling of the commission be reversed:

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CHAPTER SEVEN This problem could have been resolved very easily by giving the people involved a different call day, and this can if continued, lead to intimidation of the unemployed workers in future demonstrations. We would respectfully request that your good office reverse this decision, and in future allow unemployed workers another call day if involved in a legitimate unemployed demonstration on their regular call day.6

The word "intimidation" may have been too strong to describe accurately the intentions of the government, but it is certain that the government had no desire to encourage demonstrations intended to focus public attention upon the problem of unemployment. It had expended a good deal of time and energy during the two preceding winters in attempting to convince the public that no problem in fact existed and the prime minister had taken to characterizing as "merchants of doom and gloom" those members of the opposition who suggested that there might be an unemployment problem. The letter from the Vancouver council availed nothing and it turned to the Congress for assistance. President Jodoin wrote to the minister of labour and asked in no uncertain terms that the decision of the commission be reversed: I do not propose to enter into a dispute with you as to the propriety, in a purely technical sense, of the action by the Unemployment Insurance Commission. My fellow officers and I, however, share the feeling that in every other respect this action was unnecessarily harsh and reflected an unduly narrow interpretation of the Unemployment Insurance Act. . . . Considering the nature of the problem which brought the claimants to Ottawa, it should have been possible for a more liberal application of the Act to have been made. We do not suggest for a moment that the Unemployment Insurance Act can be flouted at will and that benefits should be paid to those who do not observe its provisions. We merely submit that in the exceptional circumstances such as those dealt with in this letter, there is sufficient leeway within the Act for a different approach to have been taken. . . . We would urge you, as Minister responsible for the Unemployment Insurance Act, to remedy this situation and to restore a sense of justice not only to the persons directly concerned but to large numbers of other Canadians as well.7 The minister's reply was brief and to the point: You point out that you do not suggest "that the Unemployment Insurance Act can be flouted at will". I would point out to you that intervention by the Minister in this case, even if acceptable to the Commission, would fall squarely within the category of flouting the Act, since administration of the Act is specifically confided to the Unemployment Insurance Commission.8 The tone of the minister's letter indicates that he believed the Congress to have over-stepped the permissible limits of their relationship.

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The view that there are limits is a bipartisan one. During the 1965 election campaign the Liberal Party pledged itself to implement a universal medical care insurance plan by 1 July 1967. In October 1966, pleading fiscal pressures, the government decided to postpone implementation of the plan until 1 July 1968. When the postponement was announced President Jodoin addressed a lengthy and strongly worded letter to the prime minister: We need hardly remind you that as recently as September 1st, speaking in the House of Commons, you gave solemn assurance that this legislation as it then stood continued to hold a high priority position in the business of the present session. It is difficult to believe that circumstances could have changed to such an extent as to justify a reversal of this position just a week later. We speak not only for the trade union members in Canada when we say to you in the strongest possible terms that the introduction of a comprehensive medical plan is long overdue.... We suggest that the use of social measures, and particularly one so important as Medicare, as a fiscal tool is entirely unjustified and is contrary to basic humanitarian needs. The Executive Council has noted the decision of the National Liberal Federation to endorse a compromise approach to this question which, in our opinion, is really little improvement in the situation. It is clear that the Federation has endorsed the action of the Minister of Finance in arbitrarily postponing Medicare as a fiscal measure. As we have stated above, we are absolutely opposed to such a postponement under any circumstances and object even more strongly to the use of social measures as fiscal tools. These objectionable features of the Government's decision appear to have been ignored by the delegates present at the recent conference.9 Mr. Pearson replied in two short letters sent on successive days. They read, respectively: The government is fully conscious of its responsibilities and, after having received the best advice available and weighing carefully all the factors involved, came to the conclusion that, in the existing circumstances, which include budgetary and inflationary factors, this was the best course of action to adopt in the interest of the people of Canada. I cannot believe that we have erred in our judgement, and I am also confident that our Medicare Bill will soon be in effect.10 The government is fully conscious of its responsibilities to the people of Canada. It was in the discharge of these responsibilities, having received the best advice available, we made our decision. All factors—budgetary, inflationary, and social—were considered before our decision was made, and I am confident that in present circumstances, it was the best course of action to adopt in the interests of the people of Canada. I hope that our Medicare Bill will soon be passed in Parliament, and will provide the responsible flexibility which your letter so peremptorily rejects.11

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These two cases, however, are marginal. For the most part, relations between the Congress and political leaders stay well within the accepted limits. THE ANNUAL MEMORANDUM

The function of the Congress' annual Memorandum to the Government goes beyond merely providing a means of communicating demands to government. The Congress is not lacking in more effective channels of communication. In fact, most of the demands contained in the Memorandum are, in the view of the Congress leadership, relatively unimportant; their attainment would be desirable but the Congress leadership feels no sense of urgency in effecting their attainment. The primary function of the Memorandum is that its formal presentation to the prime minister and the assembled cabinet provides the Congress leadership with a regular reconfirmation of the status of their organization, and an opportunity to exhibit that status publicly. The formal presentation of the Memorandum before a large group of trade unionists from all parts of Canada gives the Congress leadership an opportunity to demonstrate the manner in which it performs its duties as the spokesman for organized labour in Canada. In the words of one senior civil servant: "It's just a ritual of course. They go up to the Hill and Jodoin reads the thing and then they all have a big party afterwards. . . . They're looking for a big noise to take back to the people they represent, they're looking for recognition."12 The Congress leadership thus goes through the "ritual" of presenting an annual Memorandum for the benefit of an audience other than the prime minister and his cabinet. This fact is generally recognized by the political leaders; it was certainly recognized by Mr. Diefenbaker. The Memorandum is presented in the Railway Committee Room of the House of Commons. The prime minister and cabinet sit at a table along one wall of the room while the president and principal officers of the Congress sit directly in front of the table facing the government. Behind the Congress leadership sit the press and trade union representatives from across the country. The Congress president stands to face the government when reading the Memorandum and thus stands with his back to the assembled unionists and reporters. At the presentation of the Memorandum of March 1962, when relations between the Congress and the government were at a very low point, Mr. Diefenbaker rose to greet the assemblage and, as President Jodoin rose to commence the reading, the prime minister returned to his feet and said: "Is that the usual place to stand? I was wondering whether we could not bring him up here. I have always found that it is difficult to speak when most of your audience are sitting behind you. Would you mind coming up here?"13 The ritual presentation enables the Congress leadership to make the usual ritual demands. The contents of a Memorandum fall, roughly, into three

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categories. Of the three categories of demands, two are ritual and are not seriously pursued by the Congress leadership. First, there are the demands which are typical of the labour movement and which its spokesman is therefore expected to make. These usually deal with labour law, the amendment of certain portions of the Criminal Code or of the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act to strengthen the hands of unions in their relations with employers. Demands such as these are ritual because the Congress is well aware that their demands will not be met; the opposition of labour and management organizations has produced a state of deadlock which government will not break except under the force of the most unusual circumstances. The Congress leadership is well aware that pursuit of demands in this area would be futile and so they are not followed up by private meetings with ministers or by any other form of lobbying. From one Memorandum to the next these matters are not discussed with government unless discussion is initiated by the government itself, as Mr. Starr did in 1957. In the second category are the perennial demands. These are usually found in the area of social welfare and are made because they are the kind of demands that labour is expected to make; they are perennial demands because no matter how far government goes in meeting them the Congress can always come back and ask for more. The old-age security payments constitute an interesting case study. When the Congress presented its first Memorandum, in January 1957, the old-age security payment was $40 per month; the Congress asked that it be increased to $65 per month. When the first Memorandum was presented to the newly elected Progressive Conservative government in October 1957, old-age security payments had been increased to $55 per month; the Congress repeated its demand for payments of $65 per month but, in its next Memorandum, presented in January 1959, the demand was raised to $75 per month. This demand was repeated in the Memorandum of January 1960. By the end of 1964, old-age security payments had been increased to $75 per month; the Memorandum of March 1965 asked that they be increased to $100 per month and this demand was repeated in the Memorandum of 1966. Between February 1966 and the presentation of the Memorandum of February 1967, the government had introduced the Canada Assistance Plan which, though it left old-age security payments at $75 monthly, provided a supplement for pensioners who lacked, or had inadequate, outside sources of income and thus assured every pensioner a minimum monthly income of $105. This was $5 more than the Congress had demanded. In the Memorandum of February 1967, the Congress attempted to regain the initiative: As you are aware, the Canadian Labour Congress has urged on you the payment of an old age security benefit of $100 a month as of right and immediately effective as of age 65. While your legislation will provide up to

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CHAPTER SEVEN $105 a month, it is not more but rather less than what the Congress has proposed . . . The adequacy of the maximum figure of $105 a month is open to question. This figure was apparently arrived at some three years ago. Even if we were to assume that the figure was adequate in 1963, it is no longer so by virtue of price changes which have occurred since then. The figure today would have to be about $ 115.14

Although the Congress, for various reasons, does participate in national conferences and other activities in support of its perennial demands, there is no record of it having asked for private meetings with the prime minister or members of the cabinet in support of those demands. In the third category are the serious demands, those which touch upon the mandate, privileges, prerogatives, and organizational integrity of the Congress or its affiliated unions. Examples are the demands, already discussed, respecting appointments to government bodies, and the demands in the Memorandum of February 1967 and that of February 1968 with respect to the reorganization of the Canada Labour Relations Board. On both of these issues the Congress leadership met privately with members of the cabinet. It has also met privately with cabinet members to discuss Canadian participation in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and consultation with organized labour in the appointment of Canadian representatives, to discuss the appointment of labour attaches and to discuss the appointment of representatives of organized labour to Canadian trade missions. The annual Memorandum is important less for its content than for the circumstances surrounding its presentation. It gives the Congress leadership an opportunity to permit trade unionists from all parts of Canada to watch as it gives the government "what for." In the circumstances, it is to be expected that the demands made upon government will be heavier than would be the case in a private meeting and that the criticism levelled against the government will be more severe than might appear justified to an impartial observer. To the extent that this is true, government plays the role of a "straight man" enabling the Congress leadership to demonstrate to the assembled audience its uncompromising devotion to the interests of organized labour. The importance of this aspect of the Memorandum was confirmed by the reaction of the Congress leadership when a cabinet member decided to cease being a straight man and decided instead to give the Congress "what for." By custom, advance copies of the Memorandum are sent to the government approximately one week before the formal presentation. Prior to the presentation of the Memorandum of December 1962, the Congress director of legislation, acting on the orders of Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald, delayed despatch of the advance copies until the day before the formal presentation.

RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT 175 Mr. MacDonald's order had been prompted by an unfortunate turn of events at the presentation of the previous Memorandum, the director of legislation explained: He [Labour Minister Starr] handed a copy to an assistant who provided him with detailed analysis for rebuttal purposes. He stood up and gave all sorts of facts and figures to show what the government was doing about problems where we said they weren't doing anything. We thought Starr had breached courtesy; we just weren't prepared for that sort of thing.15 CONSULTATION AND LEGISLATION

The Congress' annual Memorandum to the Government invariably closes by expressing the willingness and desire of the Congress leadership to discuss the matters raised therein in greater detail with individual ministers or with their departmental officials: "We have always been prepared to meet with you to discuss the contents of a Memorandum or of submissions made to other governmental bodies and we are still prepared to do so. We are strong advocates of consultation and the use of advisory bodies."16 Nor does the Congress leadership specify any particular form of consultation: We have drawn to your attention a considerable number of matters on which we have asked you to take effective action. . . . We are, as in the past, prepared to supplement whatever we have submitted here with additional material or to meet with you to discuss any of these matters fully. We are prepared to do so also on an ad hoc basis or through committees established for the purpose on a continuing basis.17

And following the announcement of the government's intention to establish a contributory pension plan: We welcome the announcement of proposed legislation which, if we understand it properly, would establish a system of contributory and presumably wage-related pensions. . . . we suggest that you establish consultative machinery whereby organized labour, management, agriculture and others likely to have a direct interest might discuss the principles on which this legislation might be based.18

In the matter of appointments to official bodies, as has been seen, consultation can be taken to mean anything from the right to suggest a slate of candidates to the right to dictate the appointment. With respect to the government's legislative programme, consultation can also have a wide range of meanings. On the subject of the Immigration Act, for example, the Congress advised the government: "We are awaiting with great interest and concern revisions in the Immigration Act.... We hope that legislation will be brought down soon and that it will be subjected to careful and critical review not only by Parliament but by the various groups in Canada which have an

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interest in it."19 And, on another occasion: "The present Immigration Act is thoroughly unsatisfactory. It was passed without giving anyone but a few Government Departments and the transportation companies any opportunities to be heard."20 Even when the Congress has little to add to what has already been said on a subject it will nevertheless ask for consultation or for some opportunity to be heard. It is not what the Congress leadership has to say that is important, but rather, the opportunity to say it. The legislative process, as described in an interview by the Deputy Minister of Labour, consists of five steps. First, an idea which falls within acceptable policy limits arises either within the department or in the cabinet; the seed of this idea may or may not have been planted by an interest group. At this point there is usually no consultation with interest groups. Second, there is a preliminary examination of the proposed idea within the department and the principles of the legislation that may result are drafted. At this point interest groups may be consulted, but not for the purpose of determining their attitude towards the proposed legislation: "We know what their attitude is going to be, we know their attitude from their annual briefs."21 If interest groups are consulted at this stage it is for another purpose: "Informally and formally labour organizations and employers' organizations are sometimes consulted. We simply pick up the phone and tell them what we are planning to do, if there are complications we haven't thought of we take another look."22 Third, a formal departmental memorandum outlining the proposed legislation, its aims and implications is sent to cabinet for approval. The concern of the cabinet is focussed on two matters: the policy implications of the proposed legislation, and the financial implications, if any. There is usually no contact with interest groups at this stage. Fourth, if the departmental memorandum is approved by cabinet, the Department of Justice is asked to draft the legislation. Up to this point the views of interest groups would have been sought only through formal or informal consultation for the purpose of discovering possible complications which the proposed legislation might raise. Further consultation is unnecessary because "you have done your work knowing the fears of labour and management. You know what these people have wanted and have said they wanted."23 Fifth, the bill is introduced in Parliament. Until it is introduced, the actual text of a draft bill is secret: "If the bill is to go to committee there is usually no contact with the interested groups before presentation in the House. If it is not planned to go to committee and a minister does not want to be accused of acting in the dark he will somehow get word to the interested parties, but not a copy of the bill."24 During the five stages of the legislative process the House committee stage will normally provide the only opportunity that a group will have to dispute the provisions of a bill or to attack the policy underlying a bill after that policy has been approved by cabinet. Between the development of the idea

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within the department and consideration of the bill by a committee, the most that any group will normally be able to do is point out complications which may arise as a result of the legislation. However, day-to-day contact with interest groups has forewarned the political leaders and civil servants by clarifying the attitudes of the major interest groups. If these attitudes are not inconsistent with government policy they will constantly be borne in mind during the preparation of legislation. Hearings before a parliamentary committee are important because of the opportunities which they provide for the Congress leadership to re-affirm its mandate by appearing before the committee as the spokesman for organized labour in Canada. It is not what the Congress has to say that is important but the opportunity to say it.25 The Congress therefore seeks, whenever possible, to ensure that public hearings are held on bills on which it feels organized labour ought to have a point of view. Thus, when Mr. Diefenbaker's Bill of Rights was before Parliament, the Congress sent a telegram to him which read, in part: GREATLY DISAPPOINTED IN RESTRICTED OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED TO ORGANIZATIONS LIKE CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS AND OTHERS CONCERNED ABOUT BILL OF RIGHTS TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS BEFORE SPECIAL COMMITTEE. . . . STRONGLY URGE EXTENDED SITTINGS OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO GIVE INTERESTED ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PUBLIC GENERALLY SUFFICIENT TIME TO PREPARE REPRESENTATIONS AND PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC HEARINGS.26

Similarly, on the subject of broadcasting, the Congress has suggested the establishment of "a standing committee on broadcasting of the House of Commons in place of the ad hoc committees which have hitherto been established from time to time."27 When the government announced its intention to establish a National Economic Development Board, the Congress asked "that a Committee of the House of Commons be established to hold hearings on the Bill under which the National Economic Development Board would be created, before its enactment."28 On occasion, however, the Congress has been prepared to forego public hearings in exchange for other forms of consultation. The Manpower Bill29 of 1962 is a case in point. When the minister of labour introduced this bill in the House of Commons for its first reading he did not intend that it would be sent to committee or that public hearings would be held.30 Four days after the introduction of the bill President Jodoin addressed a telegram to the minister asking that it be referred to a committee. He also advised that his views would be stated in greater detail in a letter to follow. The letter read, in part: The very practical implications of the Bill make it urgent also that those with the most direct experience with technological change be given an opportunity to advance their viewpoints on the efficacy of the Bill in its present

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A meeting was arranged with the minister and several of his officials. Congress Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald reported on the results of the meeting to the Congress Executive Committee and then wrote to the minister: The Congress representatives [at the meeting with the Minister] reported the discussion to the Executive Committee and Council. Serious consideration was given to your expressed view that if the bill was not referred to a parliamentary committee, Parliament could probably deal with it prior to the Christmas recess, but if it went to such a committee its passage might be delayed by two or three months. Your assurance that if it was enacted, you would convene a high level conference early in the new year for the purpose of obtaining the advice of interested Management and Labour representatives with respect to the effective implementation of the legislation prior to the promulgation of regulations was also noted. . . . In the light of the possibility of undue delay, and the significance that we attach to your commitment to convene the aforementioned conference, the Congress is prepared to withdraw its request that Bill C-83 be referred to a parliamentary committee.32

Consultation in the drafting of regulations under existing legislation follows a pattern very different from that followed in the preparation of new legislation. An examination of two instances will serve to illustrate the pattern. The Canada Labour (Standards) Code. It is often regarded as standard procedure to consult with interest groups in the preparation of regulations under existing legislation and the Canada Labour (Standards) Code was one such instance. Shortly after the enactment of the code in February 1965, officials of the Department of Labour began drafting the regulations. Early in May, copies of the draft regulations were sent "to those organizations which have asked to have an opportunity to consider the regulations before they are finally drafted and to express their views."33 In this case, consultation was available to any organization which chose to ask for it. The SUB Plans. Among the so-called fringe benefits negotiated by unions are the supplementary unemployment benefit (SUB) plans. Under such a plan employers contribute to a fund out of which benefits are paid to employees who subsequently become unemployed. These payments are in addition to whatever benefits the worker may receive under the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act. The plans are recognized by government in that section 79A of the Income Tax Act permits an employer to deduct contributions to such plans from his taxable income. The prolonged recession

RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT 179 which marked the years 1958-62 resulted in the depletion of the funds of the Unemployment Insurance Commission and as early as 1959 the government had sought some means of reducing the outflow. One of the fears of the Congress was that a means test might be added to the unemployment insurance scheme. A pamphlet published by the Congress in 1960 states: "There is a very real danger that the Unemployment Insurance Act is being changed from unemployment insurance to unemployment assistance; from benefit paid as a right to benefit on a means test basis. This must be prevented."34 In a memorandum to the Unemployment Insurance Commission on the subject of the amendment of certain of the regulations made under the act, the Congress pointed out that: "The Regulations are objectionable on a number of grounds: 1. They inject into the Act the principle of the means test. . . ,"35 The introduction of any form of means test would nullify the advantage of negotiated SUB plans. Hence the concern of the Congress with any attempt on the part of government to concern itself with the sources of income that may be available to an unemployed worker. In the Budget speech delivered on 29 March, 1966, the minister of finance introduced a number of resolutions proposing amendments to the Income Tax Act. Among them was resolution 13 which read: That Section 79A of the Act, dealing with supplementary unemployment benefit plans be amended to provide for the registration of such plans for the purposes of the said Act and to authorize the making of regulations governing the qualifications required of such plans for registration.36

The resolution came to the attention of the Congress director of legislation who made inquiries of the appropriate officials and then wrote to David Orlikow, an NDP Member of Parliament, outlining the concern of the Congress: The Income Tax Act so far has been concerned only with the tax aspects of the contribution made by the employer into the SUB fund and the flexibility of the benefit. The Resolution 13 goes considerably beyond that. I made an enquiry about this and was told that the purpose of the amendment is to eliminate some abuses which have crept in. There is nothing wrong with that but we would like to be assured that the government will not at the same time begin to regulate legitimate plans which have managed quite well without regulation so far. . . . it would be a good thing if you and other members of the Labour Committee of the NDP caucus ask some questions in the House when the matter is up for consideration.37

The following day President Jodoin wrote to the ministers of finance and national revenue expressing the concern of the Congress and asking for an opportunity to discuss the proposed regulations with them. The reply of the minister of finance confirmed the findings of the director

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of legislation: the intention of the government was "to ensure that this money does not unduly benefit the employer or persons who do not deal at arm's length with him."38 The minister did not describe the alleged abuses and his letter closed: I appreciate your offer to discuss this matter with me or my officials. During the preparation of the regulations, after the necessary authorizing legislation has been passed, it may be necessary to obtain information about the provisions of union negotiated plans. In this case, I hope that officials of the Department of Finance or National Revenue will be able to call upon you for assistance and information.

The reply of the minister of national revenue was equally reassuring: "I have instructed my officials to contact you when they are preparing regulations on the subject of supplementary unemployment benefit plans."39 The Congress leadership, having been reassured with respect to the intentions of the government and having received assurances of consultation in the preparation of the regulations, was satisfied. CONSULTATION—THE VIEW OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Consultation with interest groups in the preparation of regulations is not at all unusual in the Department of Labour. When questioned on the extent of such consultation, one senior official of the department replied: That's been our policy. The present regulations [under the Canada Labour (Standards) Code] were drafted in the spring of 1965 and circulated to all who had made submissions to us with respect to the code itself. We circulated draft copies to all interested parties who had been after us, we called them in and listened to what they had to say. It's a pretty firm policy on our part to always consult those interested.40

The success of a group's representations is dependent upon a number of factors. The source of the representation carries some weight but is not by itself decisive: "The sources from which it [a request for a change in regulations] comes are not too important. The important things are that there is a wide enough demand, that the suggestion be constructive and that it be in line with the intent of the legislation."41 The term "intent of the legislation" refers to the government policy which led to the enactment of the legislation in the first place. It will be recalled from the discussion of the five stages of the legislative process that considerations of government policy were deemed to be the decisive factors there as well; in the first stage, the idea must fall within acceptable policy lines and in the third stage the cabinet evaluates the departmental memorandum primarily with a view to the policy and financial implications. The over-all position is that government policy as set out by the "intent of the legislation" is the

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overriding consideration in the preparation of regulations. Interest groups are able to influence the application of this policy by means of "constructive" suggestions which fall within accepted policy limits. As one official in the Department of Labour summed it up: "We have to keep in mind just what they're aiming at. What you [meaning himself] should do is public policy."42 But policy is not developed by ministers working in a vacuum; a minister is subject to a variety of influences one of which is the advice of his officials. For the purposes of this work it will suffice to accept the "percolator theory" as an adequate description of the interaction between ministers and their officials; that policy, like coffee in a percolator, is made by the interaction of the elements above (the ministers) and the elements below (the civil servants) and the contributions of the two elements cannot be separated in the final product. The question then, is how and to what extent can the Congress influence the policy recommendations which officials will make to their ministers. In some instances the very fact that a change is requested widely enough is sufficient to ensure that changes will at least receive serious consideration. In the words of one official: If you get enough letters from the public and representations from organizations and resolutions from national conferences it reflects public opinion and may prompt government action. The national conference is a plus value in registering public opinion. Government doesn't lead, it follows, it reacts to public opinion.43

But of greater importance than resolutions from national conferences or random representations is the fact that the views of the various interest groups are already well known to the officials and it is recognized that any attempt to act in a particular direction will bring a deluge of protests into the minister's office. According to one official in the Department of Labour who asked to remain anonymous: They [the Congress] don't have to come up here every time we do anything and start making representations to let us get their view or make sure we don't forget about their view. We can't forget about their view; we know what it is and they don't have to come pounding on our door to make sure we don't forget. They're always here, a sort of brooding presence looking over your shoulder every time you touch something that you know is important to them and you don't want to go off on your own hook and start a fuss and complaints to the minister and all that so you keep them in mind.... Of course, if a policy decision comes down from upstairs [i.e. from the minister] that's different.

Or, in the view of another official: We are always very much concerned with the labour and management views in taking our policy decisions. We know what their position is on many

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The "angry representations" are not received because they are anticipated by the officials. Once the views of the interest groups are known the proverbial timidity inherent in bureaucratic organization is their most trustworthy ally. The anticipated representation is among the most powerful tools available to interest groups in influencing the policy advice that a minister will receive from his officials. The views of the Congress are made known to departmental officials through annual memoranda to the government, submissions to commissions and committees of inquiry, and the adoption of resolutions at national conferences. In addition to conferences initiated by interest groups for the purpose of developing public opinion, there are conferences initiated by government officials for the purpose of finding out what the interest groups want: We invite people in. One year we had a group of trade union women come in here; we got some things from the Research Branch and used that as the basis of discussion. We set up a programme with a speaker. We then produced a report for publication.... It [a conference] gives a chance to discuss government policy and it gives us a chance to get a reflection from the rank and file of the people. It's not like a pressure group that comes with a memorandum telling the government what to do.45

Or again, a conference may be initiated by government at the behest of private organizations seeking an opportunity to impress their views upon officials: There was some pressure on the government to hold a conference on this matter [fair employment practices]. We have done this through the Canadian Association of Administrators of Labour Legislation. The pressure to hold a national conference basically comes from sources outside government.. .. Through a conference you realize that others are doing more than you in your particular field, it acquaints everybody in Canada with the fact that there are problems, and it certainly has the effect of spurring on areas where legislation is backward or lagging. I think the resolutions that come out of this thing, that more ought to be done, is the most important result as far as we people are concerned. These are the views of people who are important, coming as they will from a conference organized by the private sector they will give government a better understanding of what the problem is.46

In addition to sponsored conferences, there is a certain amount of interaction between government officials and interest-group spokesmen since they are often working in the same field and will therefore meet professionally: "You spend a month with them in Geneva for the ILO meeting every year,

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someone from this Branch always goes; this inevitably influences your priorities quite a bit."47 Finally, interest-group officials and government officials often move in the same social circles, participate in the activities of the same "umbrella" organizations and, as a result, are well acquainted with each other. In the words of one official: "You're meeting with these people continuously, not only in the office but mostly socially. We call each other by first names and you know what they want so every recommendation you make is influenced."48 II. The Civil Servants Continuous contact with the civil service provides Congress officials with an opportunity to influence legislative policy and administrative decisions. For the most part, however, day-to-day relations between the Congress and the civil service are concerned with more mundane matters, such as the provision of mutual aid, rather than effecting changes in government policy. CIVIL SERVANTS AIDING THE CONGRESS

Access to government officials enables the Congress to serve its affiliated unions by providing access to essential information. This point may be illustrated by the experience of the prevailing-rate employees in the federal government service. Unlike the classified civil servants, whose salary levels and conditions of employment are uniform throughout Canada, prevailingrate employees are employed at the wage rates and under the conditions of employment prevalent in their trade in the locality in which they are employed. Rates of remuneration are established on the basis of surveys conducted by the Department of Labour and are subject to approval by the Treasury Board. Many prevailing-rate tradesmen are members of unions affiliated to the Congress and access to the appropriate government officials is useful to these unions. In September 1959, an official of the International Association of Machinists wrote to the superintendent of civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence to advise that recent contracts negotiated by the association with employers in the London area had resulted in increased wage levels, and he asked that the wage rate payable to machinists at a defence establishment in the same area be reviewed.49 A copy of this letter was sent to the Congress director of legislation who later commented: I thought I would let you know that I spoke to Mr. Anderson [superintendent of civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence] the other day and he has told me that your letter has been taken up by the Department which has in turn referred the request for a survey to the Labour Department. . . . this will take some time but if you keep in touch with me I will try and urge them on from time to time.50

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When a decision had not been reached by the end of December the official of the association turned to the Congress again. In reply he was told: I have made inquiry of the Department of National Defence concerning an application for a revision of wage rates for machinists at No. 27 Central Ordnance Depot in London. I am pleased to inform you that a recommendation for an increase effective January 1st has been received.... I presume that in due course the wage increase will take effect.51

The role of the Congress in a similar situation is illustrated by the problems which arose with respect to painters employed by the Department of National Defence at Calgary and Suffield, Alberta. The Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America had negotiated new contracts with civilian contractors in the area. Included in the contracts was provision for semi-annual increases, and when the first of these increases came due in October 1959 the brotherhood encountered some difficulties in respect of its members employed by the department. In desperation, the brotherhood turned to the Congress in March 1960: "We have written numerous letters since last October 1959 enquiring about the delay, but so far we have received no satisfaction other than 'It is being taken under advisement.' "52 The matter was looked into by the Congress director of legislation who was able to reply: I have taken up the subject matter of your letter with the Department of National Defence. I have been informed that with regard to painters in Calgary, a recommendation has gone from the Department of National Defence to the Treasury Board for a rate for painters of $2.20 an hour and for spray painters of $2.40 an hour. These rates to be effective as of October 1, 1959. With regard to painters at Suffield I am informed that a recommendation is going from the Department to Treasury Board as follows Judging from past experience I would say that it would take a few weeks before you will get final action from Treasury Board on this. . . . If there is any further difficulty in connection with the foregoing, would you be good enough to communicate with me again.53

Left to its own devices, the brotherhood had not been able to discover more than that the matter was "under advisement" because it is not departmental policy to indicate the particular stage in the bureaucratic process that a question has reached. The brotherhood would certainly never have been told the pay levels contained in the departmental recommendation to the Treasury Board: this could prove embarassing in the event that the Treasury Board did not see fit to approve the departmental recommendations. The arrangements under which routine adjustments of prevailing-rate pay scales were made is indicative of both the degree and the nature of the interaction between officials of government and officials of interest groups.

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Revisions in pay scales were approved by the Treasury Board upon the recommendation of the employing department if the recommendation was justified by a survey conducted by the Department of Labour. The two key points were the willingness of the Department of Labour to make surveys as often as requested and the willingness of the employing department to make recommendations as often as required. The Department of National Defence is the largest employer of prevailingrate labour. Before the establishment of the Public Service Alliance in 1966, the organizations representing these workers were the National Defence Employees' Association (NDEA), the Civil Service Association of Canada (CSAC), and the Congress acting on behalf of a number of its affiliated unions. Relations between the department and these groups included informal ad hoc committees made up of representatives of the three departments (National Defence, Labour, and the Treasury Board) and the three groups. In January 1959 a meeting of such a committee was called by the superintendent of civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence to examine the procedures which had been developed for the review of prevailing-rate pay scales. No minutes of this meeting were kept, but after the meeting the Congress representative prepared a summary of the proceedings for the information of his superiors. This document provides some interesting insights into the nature of relations between departments of government and interest groups. An arrangement had been made between the Department of National Defence, the Department of Labour, the NDEA, the CSAC and the Canadian Labour Congress with the tacit consent of the Treasury Board, concerning a basis for adjusting rates for "Prevailing Rate Employees", coming under the Department of National Defence. The arrangement provided for an automatic annual survey by the Department of Labour . . . it also provided for retroactivity to the dates the proposed rates were submitted by the Department of National Defence to the Treasury Board. This arrangement had been in effect for some four years. Recently, the Treasury Board questioned the large number of wage adjustments and the amount of retroactivity involved.... Though no definite statement was made by officials of any of the three Departments, it would appear that all three are interested in discontinuing the procedure.54

The procedure for reviewing the prevailing-rate pay scales had been arrived at through an "arrangement" between the departments concerned and the interest groups. A second point of interest is the manner in which the government officials set about altering the "arrangement" after a decision of the Treasury Board had rendered alteration necessary; the convening of a meeting to discuss possible changes, the reluctance on the part of the government officials to commit themselves by a "definite statement," and the elaborate

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sparring which evidently took place at the meeting. The way the problem of instituting changes was broached is of interest as well: Johnson of the Labour Department wants it discontinued because he feels the Department is overloaded. The NDEA and CSAC stated they could not prevent the cancellation of the arrangement, and were registering the fact that they were opposed to any change that did not replace existing arrangements with something concrete Wismer [of the NDEA] suggested that his organization would review the situation and make an official protest. Anderson [of the Department of National Defence] hastened to state that no decision had been arrived at yet, and possibly there would be future discussion before the decision is made. The matter was pretty well left in this position.55

Once the discussion was directed to changing the existing "arrangement," the demand on the part of the interest groups for "something concrete" and the threat of an "official protest" to the minister were sufficient to block further action for the time being. The representatives of the interest groups came away from the meeting with a virtual assurance that they would be consulted before changes in procedure were undertaken; they had had an opportunity to present their views and, barring a policy decision from above, they could rest assured that their views would receive serious attention in the development of new procedures. If there was any doubt about the acceptability of the revised procedures there would be further meetings and further deadlocks would ensue until the groups were either satisfied or overridden by a ministerial policy decision. The close relationship between government officials and interest groups, the established patterns of interaction between them, and the expectations which interest-group leaders have developed as a result of their experience in dealing with government are all illustrated by the job-evaluation program carried out by the Department of National Defence in 1959 among its prevailing-rate employees at four naval ammunition depots. In April 1959, the Congress director of legislation received a letter from the Congress' representative in Victoria, British Columbia, outlining the preparations that had been made in anticipation of the visit of the jobevaluation team and asking if any further information was available on the activities or objectives of the team.56 The reply of the director of legislation is indicative of the extent to which interest groups may be involved in the day-to-day work of a government department: I have already been acquainted with the job evaluation program undertaken by the Department. A meeting was held in Ottawa on this matter at which the Congress was represented. I have also received from the Department of National Defence copies of minutes of meetings of the job evaluation

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team held in Bedford and Renous. I presume I will also get minutes of meetings held on the West Coast. I anticipate that there will be further discussions at the Ottawa level before the job evaluation program is completed and a decision reached as to the program itself.57

The job evaluation program required more than a year for its completion and then the government officials, for reasons of their own, saw fit to reach a decision without first consulting the representatives of the interest groups concerned. It is not known whether they were acting as a result of a policy decision by the minister. However, the officials did deem it necessary to hold a meeting for the purpose of informing the interested parties of their decision. The view which the interested parties took of this means of proceeding may be seen from a letter written by the Congress director of legislation in reply to a further inquiry from the Congress' representative in Victoria: There was a meeting recently in Ottawa held under the joint auspices of the Department of National Defence and the Department of Labour in connection with this matter. Among those represented were the NDEA, the Civil Service Association of Canada and the Congress through myself. At this meeting we were presented with the finished job evaluation plan and were told that it was going to be implemented. In my opinion, calling us to the meeting was not much more than a courtesy and an opportunity for us to ask questions since it was quite obvious that a decision had already been reached to implement the plan.58

The two letters of the director of legislation demonstrate the expectations which interest-group officials, on the basis of their experience with government, have developed about such matters as being kept informed of government plans and receiving inside information on the work of government in their areas of interest, being given an opportunity to assess decisions made by government officials before those decisions are formally adopted, and, generally, the extent to which interest-group officials consider that they ought to be taken into the confidence of civil servants and have come to look upon their involvement in the government decision making process as both normal and natural. THE CONGRESS AIDING CIVIL SERVANTS

Relations between civil servants and interest groups are not one way streets in which all benefits flow to the interest groups. The flow is both ways and the benefits received by government officials can sometimes be invaluable to them. One official, when asked whether the interest groups with whom he dealt were a help or a hindrance replied: "Very, very definitely a help, almost a necessity. We couldn't operate without these people."59 This official was wearing a tie clip embossed with the Congress' crest which, he explained,

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"was presented to me a few years back in appreciation for my services." He could not recall any specific service which might have prompted the Congress to present him with a tie clip, but he did concede that he was, at the time, in almost continuous contact with the Congress or its affiliates on minor matters of day-to-day administration. Government officials may seek the help of the interest groups with which they deal, or with which they hope to deal, in a number of ways and for a number of reasons. Contacts may provide the official with an opportunity to promote the objectives which he is attempting to realize. The Women's Bureau of the Department of Labour and the equal pay for equal work issue is a case in point. One of the objectives of the bureau is acceptance of the equal pay principle by employers and the general public. One of the ways in which this acceptance may be promoted is through contract negotiations by organized labour. The director of the bureau therefore set out to make the equal-pay question an issue within the ranks of organized labour. In December 1954, she wrote to the secretary-treasurer of the Trades and Labor Congress to inquire into "the official current position" of the Congress on the equal-pay question. Her letter went on to ask: Would you be so good, also, to let me know for how long a period the principle has been endorsed by the Trades and Labour Congress. In this connection, I have been interested to discover that the American Federation of Labor announced its support of the principle as early as 1898. I should appreciate information, too, regarding the attitude of the Congress towards the manner of application of the principle at the present time in Canada.60

Similar letters were sent again from time to time. One of this stream of letters, written in July 1958, elicited an interesting reply from Congress Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald: The policy of our Congress on this matter is now so well known that we do not feel the need to pursue it vigorously, or perhaps not as vigorously as you might think necessary. ... The fact of the matter is, however, that equal pay for equal work has not in the last two years been an active issue with us. If, in your opinion, it should be, we would be very glad to know in what way we can make it so.ei

The director of the bureau considered that her relations with organized groups were "a two way channel... and you have to use rather imaginative ways to develop it."62 She was of the opinion that relations with organized labour had been helpful to her and when first appointed to the position "one of the first things I did was to go and see them [the provincial federations of labour] and see what resources they had." Good as relations are, the director can still see ways of improving them: "I would like to see the labour move-

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ment set up a Women's Bureau within their framework so there could be direct communication." Government officials' evaluation of their relations with interest groups may be coloured by the view that they have of their own role. Some officials see their role as being to provide a service to the public served by their department. This, in part, is the view of the director of the International Labour Affairs Branch of the Department of Labour who, when asked whether he considered the groups with whom he dealt to be a help or a hindrance, replied: "After all, this is a Labour Department. It's more a question of our helping them than of their helping or hindering us."63 If this attitude is prevalent, then cooperation with interest groups is important as one means by which the officials may discharge what they perceive to be their duty. Thus, when the director of the Economics and Research Branch of the Department of Labour was overhauling the tabulation of the results of wage surveys, one of the first things he did was to convene a meeting of those using the information: We wish to know whether our present program is meeting Labour's needs, whether any aspects of it could be reduced, and whether any new features should be added.... In order to make wage information available very much more promptly than at present, changes in the scope of our work may be necessary. We are therefore especially anxious to obtain the views of users of the information as to where our emphasis should be placed.64 A similar modus operandi was followed by the director of the Legislation Branch of the Department of Labour: Our publication Labour Standards in Canada added a section on provisions respecting termination of employment at the request of a union. ... I met with the Safety and Health Committee of the CLC to ask them specifically what they were concerned with that we didn't carry in our bulletin. They mentioned some subjects and these are now included in our workmen's compensation studies.65 In 1965 the Legislation Branch undertook a comparative study of labour legislation in Canada following a request to the minister by the Congress. The project became, to all intents and purposes, a joint venture of the department and the Congress. The director relates that when the study was begun "I invited Mr. Andras and Mr. Hepworth [the Congress director and assistant director of legislation] over to discuss how we would go about doing it." In July 1965, the director of the Legislation Branch wrote to the Congress director of legislation "to ask if we could have a meeting before too long about the comparative study of labour relations legislation. ... We will not be able to make much progress on it until the fall, but enough work has been done on one or two subjects that we could have a useful discussion."66 Written in by hand at the bottom of this letter was the notation: "I wish you would

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try to think of someone whom we could hire on a temporary basis to give us some help with this." The Congress director of legislation suggested the name of an employee of a union affiliated with the Congress. Asked whether the groups with whom she dealt were a help or a hindrance, the director of the Legislation Branch replied: "Oh, they're definitely a help." Asked whether anything might be done to improve relations, she replied: "One of our problems is that it's difficult for the groups to be representative enough. It would be nice to be able to go to one place and get the labour reaction and know that that is the labour reaction."67 The director of the International Labour Affairs Branch, who saw his function as being to help the organized groups with which he came into contact, had likewise given some thought to the means by which his ability to perform his functions might be improved: "I've had in mind for a long time the desirability of setting up a committee with labour and management representation to deal primarily with our ILO work. It's something I want to do that I think would be useful."68 Assisting in carrying out projects or in providing a sounding-board for new ideas are not the only ways in which interest groups may prove helpful to officials. Representations by interest groups may result in a policy decision to place a greater priority upon the work of a particular branch than has hitherto been the case. All of the officials interviewed disapproved strongly of any attempt by one of themselves to organize pressure behind an expansion of their function; several were shocked that such a thing might even be suggested. In the words of the director of the International Labour Affairs Branch of the Department of Labour: It's not as though a government agency sees its responsibility as mustering support for a programme and calling lobbyists together; such activity would not be appropriate in the Canadian system. I can't really conceive of trying to organize labour support for a staff increase or an expansion of our function. The fact that labour is interested in what we are doing is a fact that the powers that be will take into consideration.... He [the minister] knows the Congress wants this and he is thus receptive when the work is undertaken. It's a case of the labour representatives establishing a favourable climate.69

The relation between representations by interest groups and increased budgets for particular activities is illustrated by the case of the Fair Employment Practices Branch of the Department of Labour. According to the acting director of the branch: We are always being asked to step up our activities. I think the CLC has on more than one occasion approached our Minister and Deputy Minister to get us to take a more drastic approach. . . . Representations like this led to the Minister's statement in his speech to the CLC convention last spring about the expansion in the FEP Branch. This Branch is now under re-organization with a greatly increased budget for the coming fiscal year.70

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Regardless of whether or not the intervention of interest groups on behalf of a particular activity is actively sought, such intervention is undoubtedly helpful in upgrading the priority which the policy makers place on that activity. This fact is at least understood, even if not acted upon, by the officials concerned. Help rendered to government officials may also take the form of providing information or documents for officials in the Department of Labour and other agencies.71 An instance of government officials turning to interest groups for help in the performance of their day-to-day work may be found in the case of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, whose officials overseas were often questioned about Canadian unions by prospective immigrants. At the request of the department, a pamphlet was prepared by the Congress.72 Finally, government officials may use interest groups to make representations to government on a matter on which the officials find themselves in disagreement with their political chiefs. Although there is no evidence that officials have actively sought the intervention of the Congress in this manner, they have at least occasionally encouraged such action when the initiative came from the Congress. In December 1960, the Brantford Labour Council wrote to the Congress on the employment of census takers for the 1961 decennial census. The Congress director of legislation made some inquiries and reported: I was informed by a senior officer of NES [National Employment Service] that this body is most anxious to have the job of hiring census takers rather than seeing it done on the basis of patronage. I suggested to him that our Congress would write a letter to the proper authorities along these lines and he was very pleased with the suggestion.73

Shortly thereafter, an appropriate letter was sent to the minister of labour by President Jodoin. ///. Conclusions The Congress leadership enjoys virtually unlimited access to all levels of the federal government for the discussion of all aspects of government policies and activities. One of the primary uses of this access is to reinforce the status of the Congress and of organized labour in the eyes of the membership and the general public. However, the influence which this gives the Congress over government policy is very limited and will only indirectly affect the type of legislation that the government will introduce. Access is of much greater utility in influencing the nature of the regulations that will be made under existing legislation and its day-to-day administration. So long as the objectives of the

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Congress do not conflict with the intent of the legislation, that is, so long as the objectives of the Congress fall within the limits set by government policy, the Congress can influence the making and administration of subordinate legislation. Consultation is also sought by the political leaders. They want to know the practical effect of their policies and they do not want to leave themselves open to the charge of having acted in the dark. Prior consultation can point up potential points of future criticism which, if neutral in terms of their effect on the government's policy, may easily be avoided. Relations between officials of government and officials of a large bureaucratic interest group such as the Congress indicate that the members of both hierarchies are members of the same peer group and that they interact on this basis. Officials of the Congress call upon officials of government regularly, usually on routine matters. Officials of government frequently call upon officials of the Congress for help or advice or merely to keep the Congress aware of current developments. In some instances such consultation may result in the Congress becoming deeply involved in the day-to-day operations of a government agency. Consultation between interest groups and civil servants during the administrative process is so frequent that it has come to be looked upon as a matter of routine. Consultation and cooperation, rather than conflict and friction, govern the relations between the Congress and government officials. The popular notion of government officials having continually to fend off badgering, bullying, and bribing lobbyists is a long way from the truth.

Chapter 8

EFFECTIVENESS OF DEMANDS UPON GOVERNMENT

The Fruits of Legitimacy and Mandate

Access to government, at both the political and the civil service levels, enables the Congress leadership to keep abreast of new developments, to look after the interests of its affiliates insofar as those interests may be prejudiced through administrative action, and to exert an indirect influence upon the formulation of government policy. It must also, if it is to help maintain the mandate of the Congress in the eyes of the leadership of its affiliated unions, lead to the satisfaction of at least some of the specific demands which the affiliated unions may wish, from time to time, to make upon government. The purpose of this chapter is to delineate those factors which contribute to the success or failure of the demands which the Congress makes uponj government and to illustrate, by means of a case study, the manner in which the Congress may attempt to influence a major government policy decision. /. The Specific Demands THE INCOME TAX AMENDMENT

The Executive Report to the 1958 Congress convention carried the following item: Representations were made at various times to the Department of Finance to make deductible for income tax purposes, out-of-town allowances paid by employers to construction workers. Originally, the matter was satisfactorily arranged by working out an understanding with the Department of Finance. Subsequently, however, following an amendment to the Income Tax Act, this was no longer possible, and the Congress supported the unions in the construction industry in seeking a further amendment to the Act. This proved to be successful, the Act being amended on December 14, 1957.1

The "understanding" was a ruling made in 1942 by the then deputy minister of taxation that out-of-town living allowances paid to construction

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workers employed at construction sites away from their normal place of residence was not income within the meaning of section 3 of the Income War Tax Act. Section 3 of the Income War Tax Act subsequently became section 5 of the Income Tax Act, and the 1942 ruling remained in force until reversed by a Department of National Revenue bulletin in July 1956. In April 1957, the changes effected by the bulletin were incorporated into the Income Tax Act. On 4 December 1956, the Congress and its affiliated unions in the construction industry joined forces with two employers' organizations, the National Association of Master Plumbers and Heating Contractors and the Toronto Builders' Exchange, to present a joint brief to the ministers of national revenue, labour, and finance. A similar presentation was made later that month by the Canadian Construction Association. These efforts failed to effect any change in the government's position on out-of-town living allowances. In April 1957, the question of out-of-town living allowances was raised in the House of Commons. The government had introduced an amendment to the Income Tax Act which would make into law the ruling issued by the Department of National Revenue the previous July. This amendment was opposed by the opposition, and Mr. Green, on behalf of the Progressive Conservative Party, referred to the briefs submitted by the Congress and the Canadian Construction Association.2 Following the election of June 1957 and the change of government, the matter was re-opened. On 16 July, the general manager of the National Association of Master Plumbers and Heating Contractors sent the new minister of finance a copy of the brief that had been presented the previous December. On the same day, the general manager of the Canadian Construction Association, who had met with the minister of finance the previous week, wrote to him enclosing a copy of his association's previous brief and urging that the exemption be granted.3 Attempts were made to arrange a meeting of representatives of the Congress and the employers' organizations with members of the cabinet, but this was postponed pending presentation of the Congress' annual Memorandum to the Government. On 6 December 1957, President Jodoin wrote to the minister of finance on the matter, saying in part: As the end of the year is rapidly approaching, we are naturally becoming concerned about the very considerable number of our members who would be adversely affected if the current situation remained unchanged. Since your party, while in opposition, opposed the amendment referred to above, we are rather hopeful in thinking that a rectifying amendment will be introduced before long.4

Copies of this letter were sent to the prime minister and to the minister of national revenue.

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On 14 December 1957, the House of Commons approved an amendment to section 5 (2) of the Income Tax Act restoring the situation that had existed prior to the revocation of the 1942 ruling. THE UIC WASHROOMS

During the summer of 1959 the secretary of the Toronto and District Labour Council wrote to Congress Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald to complain about the lack of adequate washroom facilities in the Toronto offices of the Unemployment Insurance Commission. On 18 July 1959, Mr. MacDonald wrote to the minister of public works asking that adequate washroom facilities be provided and subsequently received a reply from the deputy minister: I note with interest the figures you have furnished regarding the number of visitors to the National Employment Services offices in Toronto, but can only reiterate that it is not our policy to provide toilet accommodation for all members of the public who may wish to use it. ... I do not feel the problem is of sufficient magnitude to warrant any deviation from our present policy.5

The matter was not permitted to stop there. The following March, following the appointment of a new minister of public works, the matter was reopened and the secretary-treasurer wrote to the new minister. In reply, the minister wrote: I think the position of the Department on this particular question will be clear from previous correspondence. When the representations you put forward last summer were received they were considered very carefully.... I should point out that this decision merely confirmed a general Departmental ruling on accommodation of this kind. It extends to all buildings occupied by the Government, regardless of the Departments or agencies concerned. I can of course appreciate your interest in these privileges, but unfortunately this is not a matter on which the Department is prepared to recommend an exception to established policy.6

The matter was not re-opened again. CHECK-OFF OF UNION DUES FROM PREVAILING-RATES TRADESMEN

Reference has already been made to the prevailing-rate employees of the federal government, and it was noted that a number of these tradesmen were members of unions affiliated with the Congress. Prior to 1966 the federal government had not concluded a "closed shop" agreement with any employees' organization, so that among the prevailing-rate tradesmen there were some who were not members of any organization, others who were members of the civil service associations affiliated with the National Joint Council of the Public Service of Canada, and, finally, others who were members of unions affiliated with the Congress. Rivalry in pursuit of members

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was intense, both between the competing civil service organizations, on the one hand, and between the civil service organizations and the Congress on the other. Moreover, since no party could be certified as an exclusive bargaining agent, the rivalry was continuous. The check-off privilege, the right of an organization of employees to have its dues deducted from the salary of its members by their employers and forwarded directly to the organization, was available only to organizations which were members of the National Joint Council of the Public Service, that is, only to civil service organizations. The government had consistently refused to extend this privilege to other organizations such as the unions affiliated with the Congress, and in its annual Memorandum submitted in January 1959, the Congress took the government to task for its refusal.7 By April 1959, the government had relented to the extent that the minister of finance was prepared to meet with Congress Executive Vice-President Knowles to discuss the matter. Following the meeting, Mr. Knowles, at the request of the minister, put the Congress' case in writing: There are, as you know, a number of government employees who hold membership in associations which do not consist exclusively of government employees. They are, generally speaking, unions most of whose members are to be found in private industry but whose jurisdiction extends over certain occupations regardless of the nature of the employer. . . . In any event, the members of these organizations have not been able to have their dues checked off directly by virtue of the fact that the check-off is now confined exclusively to organizations represented on the National Joint Council of the Public Service of Canada. While we certainly have no objection to the check-off being granted to members of organizations on the National Joint Council, we do not see why it should be confined to such organizations. Whatever the historical reasons for this, we are sure you will agree that the distinction which has been made is discriminatory and unjustifiable. After all, there is no difference in purpose or function so far as the two types of organization are concerned. They are employee organizations, and you will agree that if there is to be freedom to choose the employee organization of one's choice, there should be no difference in the facilities made available to such different organizations.8

The minister then placed the matter before the Treasury Board for its consideration.9 A further meeting with the minister took place on 4 September 1959, at which the Congress gave assurances about technical difficulties that had been discovered, and the matter was once again referred to the Treasury Board. The eventual disposition of the problem was described by the minister in a letter to an officer of one of the unions representing prevailing-rate employees: The [Treasury] Board gave extended consideration to the subject and to the representations made on behalf of the Canadian Labour Congress. It also

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took into consideration the views of the National Joint Council in opposition to the request. At its meeting on November 17 [1959] the Treasury Board reached a decision to decline the request for check-off privileges.10

The description of events related to an officer of another union by the Congress director of legislation was more pointed: The situation is quite a simple one. It amounts to this that the check-off has been refused in part at least because the government employees associations which are members of the National Joint Council of the Public Service of Canada have refused to agree that we should have it. Perhaps this was a convenient escape hatch for Fleming but the fact of the matter is that the dog in the manger attitude by the associations is the reason for the Government's refusal.11

Neither the Progressive Conservative government nor the succeeding Liberal government nor the civil service organizations were easily moved. In January 1964, the Congress leadership met with the minister of labour and the matter reached the point where the Congress, at the request of the minister, canvassed its affiliates with members in the public service for the purpose of discovering the most convenient administrative procedures that might be employed. The discussions again came to naught. In its annual Memorandum of February 1966, the Congress was still trying: We have repeatedly asked that the check-off be made available to prevailing rate employees who are members of trade unions. We cannot see why this request should have been denied. We assume that the check-off will be continued following the introduction of collective bargaining and we think it only reasonable that it should be made available to the trade unions which are asking for it through the Canadian Labour Congress even before legislation is put into effect.12

In spite of repeated attempts over a period of years with two governments, and although it nearly succeeded on at least two occasions, the Congress was unable to obtain check-off privileges for its affiliates because the organizations represented on the National Joint Council of the Public Service were unwilling to see a rival organization obtain this privilege. The objections of these organizations were sufficient to prevent action even when the government of the day was willing to act. A SUGGESTED HYPOTHESIS

The specific demands discussed above present an apparent paradox. On the one hand a particular interest group is able to obtain an amendment to the

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Income Tax Act but is unable either to make any headway on such an apparently simple matter as the use of washroom facilities or to obtain the check-off of union dues from tradesmen in the government service. These examples suggest that the determining factor in the success or failure of a particular demand is not the strength of the group making the demand but some characteristic of the demand itself. In the case of the Income Tax Act amendment, the Progressive Conservative Party had only a few months earlier opposed the amendment which it was being asked to repeal, the party had fought an election claiming that the country was over-taxed, it had promised tax relief and, finally, the previous government had left its successor with a budget which promised a surplus of revenues over expenditures and therefore tax reductions were a possibility. In short, the policy of the government was to reduce taxes and, under the circumstances, particular reductions which could be justified were assured sympathetic consideration. In the case of the UIC washroom facilities, there was no favourable policy upon which the Congress' request could be based. On the contrary, the deputy minister's reply to Secretary-Treasurer MacDonald had mentioned existing policy twice and pointed out that the Congress' request ran counter to the policy of the department. Similarly, the letter from the minister made reference to "a general Departmental ruling" and spoke of "established policy." As it was not government policy to provide washroom facilities for members of the general public using government office buildings, the Congress went away empty handed. These cases, and the great emphasis which the civil servants placed upon the role of government policy in determining the limits of pressure-group success, point to the tentative hypothesis that the major factor in the success or failure of a specific demand is the established policy of the government of the day. The case of the check-off adds a new dimension. Here there were no considerations of government policy in the way of the Congress' demands. Both Mr. Fleming and Mr. MacEachen were prepared to give the Congress what it asked; neither government was opposed to the check-off in principle since both allowed that privilege to the civil service staff associations. Yet the Congress failed. Both Mr. Fleming and the Congress director of legislation attributed at least a substantial share of the blame for governmental inaction to the objections of the civil service staff associations. The preliminary hypothesis suggested by this case is that if there is no established government policy on either side of a question, opposition to a demand by a group whose status is equal to that of the group making the demand will result in deadlock and the preservation of the status quo. The term "equal status" does not refer to the size of the membership but to the position of the group as the mandated spokesman for a legitimate interest.

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THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND DISPUTES INVESTIGATION ACT

It was seen in the previous chapter that in 1957, at the urging of officials in his department, Labour Minister Starr communicated with organizations of employers and employees in an attempt to find common ground upon which to base amendments to the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act. The act is, in effect, a constitution setting out the ground rules governing relations between labour and management in industries coming within the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament. The minister's request resulted in labour and management offering incompatible suggestions—there was virtually no common ground between them. In the words of Mr. Starr: "It was impossible. They didn't agree about anything."13 Since the amendment of the act had been suggested by officials in the Department of Labour and the government was not committed to making any changes, a confrontation was avoided by the simple expedient of dropping the entire matter. The act remained unchanged throughout the Conservative administration. THE POSTAL CONVENTION

In 1960, a new postal convention was negotiated to regulate the flow of mail between Canada and the United States. Among the provisions of the new convention, included at the insistence of the Canadian authorities, was a substantial increase in the postal rate for periodicals mailed in the United States for delivery in Canada. Among those who found the cost of distribution to their Canadian subscribers increased were the American international unions which distributed union publications to their Canadian members. The extent of the increase was described to the Congress director of public relations by the president of the International Labor Press Association (ILP A): The postal rate increase will boost the cost of mailing these non-profit type publications by at least 400 per cent. In some cases the new postal rate exceeds the total per issue subscription income of the publication.14

He went on to point out that representations would be made to the United States Post Office and asked that the Congress undertake similar action with respect to the Canadian postal authorities. The Congress director of public relations made the necessary inquiries and reported: This convention followed very extensive negotiations and we are told by the postal authorities here that there is no simple way of effecting a change that would exempt trade union or other non-profit publications. New negotiations will be required between the Canadian and American authorities. The report of our Legislative Department has been considered by the

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It was not long before the ILPA president could report results from the United States: "We now believe that the U.S. Post Office Department is ready and willing to review this matter."16 Problems on the Canadian side, however, were not so easily resolved. The postmaster-general advised President Jodoin that nothing could be done. He explained: In Canada we have just received within the past month the report of a Royal Commission on Publications, which sat for several months and undertook the most exhaustive study of this subject ever made in Canada and one of the most exhaustive ever undertaken anywhere in the world. In summary, that Commission found that the Canadian publishing industry generally, and particularly in the field of periodicals, is in an extremely precarious position. Existing publications are endangered and new publications have little hope of success. While the diversion of Canadian advertising into United States periodicals of one kind or another is responsible for a substantial part of this problem, it is also a very definite fact that competition in Canada from the "overflow" of United States publications circulating in this country is a substantially restrictive measure as well. The Commission was strongly of the opinion that United States publications, with their large circulation based in the United States, enjoyed a substantial competitive advantage in Canada and while they were opposed to any specific restrictions on the circulation of American publications in our country they put forward a number of suggestions to equalize or partially equalize the competitive position and various aspects of postal rates were included. To agree now to any course which would reduce postal rates on United States publications coming into Canada, even those of a special class, would be directly contrary to the suggestions of this Commission, a course of action I would not like to follow at this moment.17 Correspondence between President Jodoin and the postmaster-general continued for a little while longer. In his final letter on the subject the postmaster-general suggested ways in which the cost of distributing union publications might be reduced, among them the suggestion that the publications be shipped across the border in bulk and mailed in Canada. Commenting upon this suggestion, the Congress director of legislation wrote: My feeling is that the approach taken by the Postmaster General in his letter to you of August 10th is not satisfactory. . . . This is really not a matter of technical detail as to how printed matter is to be shipped. It is really a question of principle as to whether non-profit publications are to be treated in the same way as commercial publications.18

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It was a question of principle in the government's view as well, but a different principle applied. The government had come to power on the crest of a wave of Canadian nationalism, it had deliberately negotiated a postal convention intended to make it more difficult to distribute American periodicals in Canada, and it had appointed a royal commission to examine the Canadian publishing industry and report upon the ways and means by which it might be strengthened. The demands of the Congress in this instance ran directly counter to firmly established government policy, and so the Congress came away empty-handed. THE CORPORATIONS AND LABOUR UNIONS RETURNS ACT

The Speech from the Throne read at the opening of Parliament on 17 November 1960 noted the government's intention to introduce legislation requiring the disclosure of certain information by business and labour organizations operating in Canada but controlled from without. In its annual Memorandum to the Government submitted on 2 February 1961, the Congress took exception to the inclusion of international unions among those who would be required to furnish information: There are important distinctions to be made in the matter of disclosures as between business and labour organizations. . . . the financial and other affairs of foreign-owned subsidiaries in Canada remain very much matters known only to the foreign headquarters of these subsidiaries. Such subsidiaries, while physically located in Canada, may be so controlled from abroad and so manipulated as to operate contrary to rather than in the Canadian interest. . . . For international trade unions, the case is somewhat different and we are inclined to take exception to the coupling together of business and labour organizations since to our mind they cannot be so readily equated. But the record will indicate that there is far less secrecy about the operation of international unions in Canada than is the case with international corporations. . . . We are therefore not likely to accept readily any legislation which will interfere with the internal affairs of the trade unions by making mandatory what is already done voluntarily, or by imposing rules and regulations for the conduct of trade union affairs which more properly should be done by the unions themselves.19 Nevertheless, on 17 February 1961 the Corporations and Labour Unions Statistics Act received first reading in the House of Commons. The bill did not proceed beyond the first reading during that parliamentary session because it was found that there would be technical difficulties in the application of its provisions. On 22 January 1962, a revised bill was given first reading hi the House. The revisions were intended to remove the technical difficulties involved in determining which businesses or unions are foreign controlled and which are

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not. The difference between the two bills, as described by a legal journal, were: Unlike Bill C-70 of last Session . . . Bill C-38 is made applicable to all corporations, with certain exceptions listed in the Schedule, and to all labour unions, except very small ones, operating in Canada. This removes the obvious discrimination against foreign-owned companies in C-70 to which objection was taken. The elaborate and involved definitions, phrased in the negative, that were the most striking feature of C-70, are not present in C-38.2°

In March the Congress presented its annual Memorandum to the Government. It included a lengthy section on Bill C-38, the main point of which was that there are substantial differences between unions and corporations and that unions objected to being treated like corporations. Later that month there was an exchange of telegrams between President Jodoin and the minister of justice and on 30 March President Jodoin wrote to the minister of justice reiterating the Congress' objections. But the government remained adamant and Bill C-38 was enacted. The reason for the intransigence of the government was revealed by the minister of justice during the debate on second reading: This is an extremely important bill, and it forms an integral part of the government's national policy. Canadians are becoming increasingly aware of their nationhood and of the importance of developing to the full the cultural, social and economic resources of this country. This bill is directly related to the efforts the government has been making in such fields as the domiciling of our constitution in Canada, and also to the numerous steps the government has already taken, and is taking, to encourage the development of the nation's resources, their control by Canadians, and their use primarily for the benefit of Canada. This bill . . . represents the determination of the government to understand fully the operation of our economy, the extent of foreign control of various units operating within that economy; and our desire to see that the Canadian people are made aware, in general terms, of these facts and their implications.21

Once again, as in the case of the postal rates, the international orientation of the Congress and certain of its affiliates had come into conflict with the nationalist policies of the Canadian government. Once again the Congress went away empty-handed. THE ILO CONVENTIONS

Ever since the traumatic experience of the Privy Council decisions of 1937, Canadian governments have been wary of international conventions dealing with matters falling within provincial jurisdiction. This wariness has

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been manifested in the small number of ILO conventions ratified by Canada, and one of the demands consistently voiced by the Congress has been for a more positive approach to the conventions by the government of Canada. The most complete statement of the Congress' position with respect to the conventions was contained in its annual Memorandum to the Government submitted in October 1957: One specialized agency of the United Nations in which Canadian workers naturally have a special interest is the International Labour Organization. Canada's record of ratifications of ILO Conventions is far from impressive: 18 out of 90. . . . We recognize that the British North America Act gives Parliament only very limited jurisdiction in Labour matters, and the fate of three Conventions ratified by the last Conservative Government is a sad reminder of the perils of rushing in where judges refuse to let Parliament tread. . . . There are a number of other Conventions which we suggest the Government might well ratify insofar as they apply to industries within Dominion jurisdiction. Even as to those Conventions which are wholly or partly within provincial jurisdiction the Government need not simply forward them to the LieutenantGovernors for such action as their advisers may see fit. It can use its powers of persuasion upon provincial Governments. It can bring the matter up at the next Dominion-provincial Conference. It can seek to have the British North America Act amended to give Parliament power to implement ILO Conventions. This last, we know, is far from easy. But some changes from the almost complete passivity which has now lasted for close on forty years is long overdue.22 Similar requests were repeated regularly23 and in the discussion which followed the presentation of the Memorandum of March 1965 the minister of labour said: May I just add Mr. Jodoin, with reference to your emphasis on the necessity for ratifying international conventions, that we did at this past session pass a resolution authorizing the ratification of the ILO convention on discrimination in employment, which involved the adherence of all the provinces to the principles of that convention and which, in my view, established a pattern in which we can move in co-operation with the provinces for the ratification of future ILO conventions.24 In its next Memorandum, submitted in February 1966, the Congress said: We have for many years urged the Government of Canada to ratify the Conventions of the International Labour Organization, to bring about closer co-operation between the federal and provincial Governments in the field of implementing ILO Conventions, Recommendations and Resolutions, and to undertake a comparative study between ILO instruments and existing federal and provincial labour and social legislation. We were given to understand

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The government was preparing to move in the direction urged upon it by the Congress and it is necessary to inquire into the extent to which the representations of the Congress may have influenced the government's decision. Discussing the subject of the ILO conventions, the director of the International Labour Affairs Branch of the Department of Labour noted: "For many years the view was that you simply didn't try to implement those conventions [which fell within provincial jurisdiction]. In the last two or three years the atmosphere has changed considerably and there are meetings with the provincial deputy ministers of labour."26 Asked what factors had prompted this change of atmosphere, the director cited two: Personal factors: three or four civil servants who thought that this would be a hell of a good idea achieved sufficient rank in the department that their views could carry weight. External affairs was enthusiastic about it. Also, these conventions, coming as they do within federal and provincial jurisdiction, it was seen as something constructive in the field of federal-provincial relations, it could be put into the context of cooperative federalism. That's why the government was so enthusiastic about it. Concerning the effect of representations by interest groups: "I wouldn't say that representations from private groups had any influence. Labour representations may have focused attention on this matter but that wasn't why action was taken." The government was acting to meet the demands of the Congress, not because the Congress had requested action, but for other reasons of its own. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH

At the Commonwealth prime minister's meeting in 1961, Mr. Diefenbaker was instrumental in forcing South Africa out of the Commonwealth. This is another instance of a Congress demand being met, but again, as in the case of the ILO conventions, it would be difficult to maintain that the government acted in response to the demands of the Congress. Among the policies favoured by the Canadian Labour Congress is opposition to racial discrimination of all kinds, both at home and abroad. In its annual Memorandum to the Government submitted in January 1960 the Congress said: There can be no doubt about it that Canadians by and large condemn the inhuman apartheid policy. . . . We believe your Government should make its position clear at the United Nations and elsewhere in condemnation of

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South African apartheid. The abstention of the Canadian delegation at the United Nations on the vote on South Africa has hurt Canada's position. We do not think that Canada should ever equivocate on this matter. Since South Africa is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, Canada and other members of the Commonwealth should do everything within their power to bring pressure on the Government of South Africa to change its policy and live up to the accepted standards of elementary decency. To say the least, we feel extremely uncomfortable in the same company with the government of South Africa and would favour its exclusion from the councils of the Commonwealth of Nations.27 The extent to which Mr. Diefenbaker was swayed by this demand was demonstrated by his reply during the discussion following the presentation of the Memorandum: The general representations will be passed on to and considered by the departments. However, there is one reference to which I must make reference because it deals with international matters. I refer, of course, to the reference to South Africa. I would be less than frank if I did not say to you that the wording at the end of page 25 is not representative of the attitude that binds together the countries of the commonwealth. . . . It would not be facing facts were I not to say that that is one representation that will not receive the favourable consideration of this government. . . . this is one representation that I would not bring before the Prime Minister's conference in the month of May. I would be less than straightforward if I did not say that.28 In the end Mr. Diefenbaker did what the Congress had asked him to do, but it would be difficult to maintain that the Congress' request had caused him to act as he did. The Congress got what it wanted but only because the government of the day found reasons of its own for wanting the same thing. THE HEMISPHERIC MINISTERS' MEETING

The Executive Report to the 1964 Congress convention carried the following item: President Claude Jodoin wrote to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Paul Martin, on April 26, 1963, urging the Canadian Government to participate in the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labour which was held in Bogota, Columbia, May 5-14. Although the previous Government declined to participate in the Conference, the decision was reversed and a delegation representing Canada participated in the Conference as observers.29 This case does not require much analysis. It is well known that the Progressive Conservative government was unalterably opposed to Canadian

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membership in the Organization of American States and, possibly because President Kennedy had tried to promote it, also opposed Canadian involvement in hemispheric affairs. Mr. Martin, on the other hand, favoured Canadian membership in the organization and greater Canadian involvement in hemispheric affairs generally. He was therefore receptive to the Congress' request for Canadian participation in the Bogota meeting. THE NEWFOUNDLAND STRIKE

On 17 June 1958, the International Woodworkers of America (IWA) began negotiations with the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company on behalf of the company's loggers. Negotiations continued unsuccessfully until October 1958, at which time the union applied for the intervention of a provincial government conciliation board. The board, composed of an impartial chairman and representatives of both the company and the union, submitted a unanimous report which conceded most of the demands of the union. The report was rejected by the company. The union thereupon conducted a strike vote which resulted in overwhelming approval of strike action by the loggers. The strike began on 31 December 1958. Contrary to the instructions of the union leadership, a number of loggers became involved in incidents of violence. The premier of Newfoundland intervened on the side of the company and made these incidents the basis for a vigorous attack upon the union. In a radio and television address on 12 February 1959, he urged the loggers to resign from the IWA and said that he was prepared to organize a new union for the loggers and could guarantee a contract with the company. The premier's efforts proved unsuccessful and the strike continued. On 6 March 1959, the Newfoundland House of Assembly enacted two bills at the request of the provincial government. The first, the Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1959, was a general attack upon trade union practices. It provided for the dissolution by the lieutenant-governor in council of unions whose officers or agents had committed "any heinous crime"; it provided a number of grounds for the decertification of unions either by the Labour Relations Board or by the lieutenant-governor in council; it prohibited secondary boycotts, organizing strikes, and strikes in aid of parties to a jurisdictional dispute; and, finally, it made unions and their officers liable for any tortious act committed by or on behalf of the union. The second bill, the Trade Union (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1959, simply revoked the certifications of the IWA locals in Newfoundland. Upon the introduction of these bills in the Newfoundland House of Assembly the Congress issued a denunciatory statement and concluded: If legislation of this kind is to be allowed, then all talk of a Bill of Rights is just empty and meaningless. That is why the Canadian Labour Congress is asking the Government of Canada to exercise its powers under the British

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North America Act, sections 55 and 90, by instructing the LieutenantGovernor of Newfoundland to reserve this bill for the signification of the Governor-General's pleasure. . . . If the Lieutenant-Governor receives no instructions, and does not reserve the bill, the Congress will, of course, ask the Government of Canada to disallow the resulting Act. . . . The Government of Canada has the power to protect the workers and the people of Canada against legislation of the kind Mr. Smallwood is proposing. The Government of Canada must use that power, promptly and decisively. Past Governments have used it often to protect property rights. This Government should not hesitate to use it to protect human rights.30 Two days later, the bills not having been reserved by the lieutenant-governor, the Congress notified the government that it intended to petition the Governor-General-in-Council for disallowance. The petitions were presented on 10 March 1959. Although the government found the Newfoundland legislation repugnant, the governor-general was not advised to disallow the bills and the year during which disallowance might have taken place passed. During the supply debates of the following year, the prime minister was questioned on the reasons for the inaction of the government. He replied: In so far as the exercise of the power of disallowance is concerned, I think a reading of Canada's constitutional development indicates that the power of disallowance when it was originally provided in our constitution was believed by the fathers of confederation to constitute a means whereby any legislation passed by the legislatures might be disallowed almost without any limitation, and in the first few years after confederation, and by that I mean almost until 1896, there were a number of exercises of this power. However, in the present century the number of disallowances has gradually diminished. Indeed the power of disallowance has in general not been exercised for many years when the legislation passed by the legislatures was apparently within the competence of the legislature. The exercise of this extraordinary, sweeping and even arbitrary power has in the passing years been diminished. Whatever one's feelings with respect to legislation passed by provincial legislatures may be, however much one may dislike it, the gradual development has been that the federal government, through the governor general in council does not exercise that power where there is on the face of it an apparent conformity with the legislative authority of the legislature which passes it. . . . My feeling was, and I think it is soundly based on Canadian constitutional development, that the federal government, through the governor in council, ought not to exercise this power against the legislature of any province. The legislatures are elected by the people of the provinces and whatever one's views may be with regard to the legislation, to do otherwise would be to place the federal government in the position of a judge and jury over the legislation passed within the competence of the legislature, something that no longer is considered a proper and reasonable attitude for the federal government to take.31

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The attempt to appeal to the federal government against the action of a provincial legislature failed because of the policy of the federal government in the field of Dominion-provincial relations. Although the prime minister found the Newfoundland legislation repugnant, the overriding policy consideration meant that the Congress went away empty-handed. 77. A Major Policy Decision—Medicare In the spring of 1964, shortly after the Report of the Royal Commission on Health Service^2 (the Hall Report) was made public, William Mahoney, a Congress general vice-president and Canadian director of the United Steelworkers, circulated a memorandum among the officers of the Congress urging that action be undertaken to convene a national conference to consider the implications of the report. The memorandum also recommended that 1 July 1967 be made the target date for a complete medicare program for Canada and concluded with the observation that "the 'image' of the labour movement is never better than when it is engaged in a campaign with which the general public can easily identify itself." Each year, in February, the Congress sponsors "Citizenship Month" and attempts to direct the attention of the members of its affiliated unions to some topic of interest to the labour movement or the public at large. In August 1964, a meeting was held to decide upon the theme for Citizenship Month 1965. There were two contending themes—a war on poverty, and medicare—and after discussion it was agreed "that priority should be given to the Royal Commission on Health."33 It was also agreed that a national conference be held and that a continuing committee be established to carry on the work of the conference. These recommendations were approved by the officers of the Congress and the preliminary work for the conference was begun. It was recognized that once several organizations had agreed to participate there would be no problem in recruiting other sponsors. The problem was to make the correct approach to the first few. In March 1965, the Congress sponsored a conference on social security for members of its affiliated unions. To this conference the Congress also invited representatives of several national organizations; the Canadian Welfare Council, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, and the Canadian Catholic Conference accepted and sent representatives. Two of the major topics discussed at this conference were the Canada Pension Plan and the recommendations of the Hall Commission. During the course of the conference, the idea of a nationwide gathering to consider the recommendations of the Hall Commission was broached to the observers from the other organizations and their reaction was favourable. On 26 March 1965, the observers at the Congress' social security conference met with representatives of the Congress to pursue further the idea of

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a national medicare conference. A summary of the discussions, for the information of those present, was prepared by the Congress assistant director of legislation. The summary made no mention of establishing a lobby to press for implementation of the Hall Commission recommendations, but set out three objectives for the proposed conference: (1) Act as a focal point to re-direct the attention of the Canadian public to the importance of the Hall Report. (2) Act as a forum for discussion of the recommendations and their implications for all Canadians with the object of developing wider public understanding of them, and (3) Act as the initiator of an education-information program which would be carried on by organizations represented at the Conference and, conceivably, by other means.34

Consideration was also given to the problem of recruiting additional sponsors: Organizations that should first be involved as co-sponsors or co-convenors of such a conference would include the Canadian Welfare Council, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, an inter-faith group of the various religious denominations and the Canadian Labour Congress. Other organizations which might be drawn in at the initial stages of planning such a conference might include the Co-operative Union of Canada and, because of their role in public affairs education, the Canadian Association for Adult Education and the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs. Organizations referred to as possible sponsors or as being most likely to be interested in such a conference would include the following: Federated Women's Institutes of Canada Canadian Public Health Association Canadian Association of Social Workers National Farmers' Union. Assuming there is agreement to proceed with a conference, the suggestion is that a Conference Steering Committee be set up composed of representatives of the co-sponsoring organizations.35

A further meeting was held on 5 May 1965, and it was reported that the Co-operative Union of Canada, the Canadian Welfare Council, the Canadian Catholic Conference, the United Church, and the Anglican Church had agreed to act as co-sponsors. The question of recruiting additional sponsors was discussed again and the Congress assistant director of legislation, who was acting as secretary of the conference Steering Committee, was instructed to circularize other organizations. Before the end of the month he was able to report that another six organizations had agreed to act as sponsors and eleven others were being circularized. The first formal meeting of the Steering Committee was held on 16 June 1965, and was attended by representatives of twelve sponsoring organizations:

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CHAPTER EIGHT Anglican Church of Canada (Council for Social Service) Canadian Catholic Council (Social Action Department) Canadian Citizenship Council Canadian Federation of Agriculture Canadian Jewish Congress Canadian Labour Congress Canadian Lutheran Council (Division of Welfare) Canadian Welfare Council Co-operative Union of Canada National Farmers' Union Salvation Army in Canada United Church of Canada (Board of Evangelism and Social Service)

A representative of the cooperating, though not co-sponsoring, Canadian Association for Adult Education was also present. There were two major topics discussed at this meeting: the recruitment of additional sponsors and the aims of the conference. A number of possible sponsors was suggested, including: Canadian Union of Students Confederation of National Trade Unions Conseil Canadien de la Cooperation Federated Women's Institutes of Canada National Council of Women of Canada Canadian Association of Consumers Union Generate des Etudiants du Quebec Institut Canadian d'Education des Adultes Caisses Populaires Canadian Association of University Teachers Canadian Universities Foundation Of these, the first five were eventually to become co-sponsors. And for further sponsors: It was suggested that we look at the list of organizations involved in the Vanier Institute on the Family, with respect particularly to French organizations and in this connection it was suggested that where there is a provincial French organization whose interest would be served by the Conference, we should invite this organization even though it does not have a national status. ... It was suggested that the CBC should be invited to play a special role with respect to the educational possibilities of the Conference.36 Another aspect of the search for sponsors concerned the type of organization that would be eligible to participate: There was some discussion about organizations such as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Medical Association and this led to an

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attempt to define the kind of organization or association which is suitable as a co-sponsor. Generally, it was agreed that organizations should be those classified as "citizen-based".37

The Congress assistant director of legislation pointed out later that one rule of thumb used in determining eligibility had been "not to ask any organization to sponsor which might be on the production end of medical services; it was confined to broadly citizen based, broadly consumer groups."38 Although such organizations as the Chamber of Commerce are not involved in the production of medical services, there was a reluctance to permit their participation: "Those in the initial group [of sponsors] were committed to the Hall philosophy, there was a fear of the Chamber's conservatism. . . . the later members were brought in to force the development of the conference along certain lines."39 That support for the Hall recommendations became the criterion of eligibility was well-nigh inevitable; the organizations invited to send representatives to the Congress' social security conference in March had been specially selected to be "organizations whose submissions to the Hall Commission were close to the positions of the CLC or who had supported the Hall recommendations."40 The question of inviting the Canadian Chamber of Commerce was discussed at the second meeting of the conference Steering Committee and a motion to extend an invitation was approved. The committee also set 25 August as the deadline for notification by organizations of their desire to participate. The Steering Committee secretary therefore waited until 26 August before extending an invitation to the Chamber by telephone. The delay was of no avail. The Chamber accepted the invitation and the letter of acceptance provided confirmation of some of the fears that had been expressed with respect to the Chamber's conservatism. The Chamber suggested that consideration be given to having on the programme of the Conference a suitable speaker from the United States who would describe the way in which our Fellow North Americans have organized their medical services. It is noted in the material provided Mr. McNally [an official of the Chamber] that reference is made to Health Services in Australia, Sweden and the U.K. It is our view that consideration should be given to health services in the U.S.41

The reasons for the motion to invite the Chamber are not difficult to find and they indicate the extent of the interrelations between the multitude of groups in the Canadian political system. The invitation was sent to Dr. Harvey Cruikshank, a vice-president of the Bell Telephone Company and chairman of the Health and Welfare Committee of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber is one of the many organizations which are members of the Canadian Welfare Council and at the time that the conference was

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being planned Dr. Cruikshank was chairman of the council's Executive Committee. By the end of August the groundwork for the conference was completed and the preparations were well advanced. On 9 September 1965, form letters inviting participation were sent out to a multitude of voluntary organizations across Canada: to the provincial medical, dental, and other health associations; to the deans of Canadian medical schools; and to federal and provincial government departments. The letter to Miss Judy LaMarsh, the minister of national health and welfare, was sent the same day and this proved to be a most opportune time, only one day after the announcement of the dissolution of Parliament for a general election. The letter to Miss LaMarsh read, in part: As you may know, "Health Services in Canada: A Working Conference on the Implications of A Health Charter for Canadians" will take place in Ottawa, November 28—December 1, under the sponsorship of a number of national voluntary organizations that support the aspirations of the Health Charter as outlined by the Royal Commission on Health Services. A Statement on the Conference aims and organization (which includes a list of the co-sponsors and a summary of the agenda) is enclosed. . . . We are sure that you, as the Minister responsible for the planning and implementation of the government's proposals on national health services, will be as strongly convinced as we are of the value of federal participation and counsel in the deliberations of the very important citizens groups which this Conference represents. We shall look forward to hearing from you that this can be arranged.42 The letter also asked the minister to arrange for the attendance of twelve representatives of the federal government at a cost of $25 each, though not all of these need be from her department. She was also asked to bring the conference to the attention of those of her colleagues whose departments ought, in her opinion, to be represented. She saw fit to bring the conference to the attention of the minister of citizenship and immigration, the minister of veterans' affairs, and Mr. Tom Kent of the Prime Minister's Office.43 The desired federal government representation was obtained. To the extent that the planning of the conference influenced the course of future events, it did so purely by accident. The conference planners could not have known when they embarked upon their project that a general election would be announced on 8 September 1965. The preparations for the conference were reaching their climax at precisely the same time that the election campaigns were being opened, and on 21 September Prime Minister Pearson pledged his government to implement a national medicare plan by 1 July 1967. It is impossible to determine the precise influence which the forthcoming conference had upon the government's decision to commit itself to a medical-care plan, although it is certain that several members of the

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cabinet and, possibly of greater importance, Mr. Tom Kent were all aware of the conference, its sponsors, and their views. The conference was held in Ottawa from 28 November to 1 December 1965. On 17 January 1966, the Steering Committee met for the last time. One of the major items of discussion was a motion passed by the conference asking the executive to establish a continuing committee. But as the conference had run a deficit which necessitated contributions from the sponsoring organizations over and above the original commitment of $100 each the enthusiasm for a continuing committee was dampened. A means was found, however, to maintain communication among the sponsors: The Chairman expressed the view that the kind of minimal liaison suggested was well within the terms of reference of the Canadian Citizenship Council. He pointed out that the Canadian Citizenship Council had been established to provide this kind of general service and he estimated that 90% of the organizations concerned in the Conference were members of the Council. The Council could perform a "post office" function to maintain contact with and between the 21 co-sponsors. On occasion, one of the co-sponsors might wish to distribute appropriate material to the other sponsors or perhaps raise the question of collaborating on another public issue; the Council could assist on such occasions. The Chairman said it would be quite easy to include a section on Health Services in the Council's Library and Documentation Centre. If more than these services were required, or if a provincial structure was needed, then the question should probably be explored with the Canadian Association for Adult Education.44

Abundant means already existed to serve as "umbrellas." The council was asked to undertake the task of maintaining communication among the twenty-one co-sponsors of the medicare conference, and agreed to do so. ///. Conclusions The case studies of specific demands made by the Congress all45 appear to support the tentative hypothesis. The determining factor in the success or failure of any demand is established policy. If a demand is helpful in furthering government policy objectives then the chances that it will be met are high; the action of the federal government in undertaking talks with the provincial governments on the implementation of the ILO conventions is an example. Where a demand runs counter to the government's policy objectives there is little likelihood that it will be met, the Canada-United States Postal Convention, the Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act, and the original request for Canadian participation in the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labour all support this conclusion. If government policy changes, either as a result of a change in government or as a result of a reassessment of their political advantage by incumbent political leaders, then

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demands which had previously met with little or no success may be successful; the second request for Canadian participation in the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labour and the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth are examples in support of this conclusion. Where there is no established government policy on a particular matter, a demand which is not opposed by any other group of equal standing may be successful while the opposition of a group of equal standing will result in deadlock and the preservation of the status quo; the inability of the Congress to obtain the check-off for its affiliates representing prevailing-rate employees in the government service and the decision of the minister of labour to abandon his attempt to amend the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act are examples. The criteria set out above are not ironclad. There may be occasions when, for one reason or another, they may not hold true. An example is the decision of the Liberal government to revise the structure of the Canada Labour Relations Board at the request of the Confederation of National Trade Unions in spite of the vehement objections of the Congress. According to the criteria set out above, the result ought to have been deadlock and the preservation of the status quo. The most obvious explanation for the government's action is that a former president of the CNTU was a member of the cabinet. One outstanding feature of the relations between the Congress and government, at both the political and the civil service levels, is that they so seldom involve the presentation of specific demands or the application of what might be called "hard pressure." In fact, the Congress makes very few specific demands upon the government. Nevertheless, it is very concerned with the demands made upon government by other groups. The Congress functions as a veto group; it maintains a watching brief on government. The Congress is the "group of equal standing" representative of the labour interest and, in the absence of a government policy decision, its presence serves to deadlock those demands of other groups which may be prejudicial to the labour interest. The fact that for twenty years no government asked Parliament to amend the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act in a manner prejudicial to the interests of organized labour is indicative of the effectiveness of the Congress as a veto group. The fact that during the same period no government asked Parliament to amend the act in a manner beneficial to the interests of organized labour is indicative of the inability of the Congress to sway government in the face of the objections of opposing "groups of equal standing." In fulfilling its role as a veto group the Congress does not have to protest loudly each prejudicial demand as it is made. The fact that the Congress is there and its views are well known to government is sufficient to prevent action in the absence of a government policy decision. Turning to the problem of policy development, it is evident that the Congress by itself cannot alter government policy once a policy decision has

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been taken; representations to cabinet ministers, formal briefs to government, and appearances before parliamentary committees have all proved useless once a policy decision has been taken by the cabinet. Although by itself and in the short run the Congress is unable to alter government policy or have government adopt the policies which it wishes to promote, it can influence the formulation of policy indirectly and in the long run. The most obvious, and probably the most effective, means lies in the continuous contact between the Congress and the government's policy advisors in the civil service. The Congress need not lobby the civil servants or attempt to bring pressure to bear upon them. The influence of the Congress makes itself felt in a more subtle manner. After having worked closely with the officers and officials of the Congress over a long period of time civil servants find themselves accepting the validity of at least a part of the Congress' point of view. The policy recommendations which they make to their political chiefs are thus influenced. A second means of influencing the formulation of policy is open to the Congress with respect to those matters which, unlike the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, are not "parochial"; that is, those matters which are of interest to a substantial segment of the Canadian population besides organized labour. It is on such questions that joint ventures and the activities of the inter-group web prove useful. It is doubtful that even an alliance of interest groups could influence the formulation of government policy in a particular direction in the face of hostile public opinion. However, in such fields as social welfare legislation the underlying climate of public opinion has, since the 1930s, been favourable. The causes of this favourable climate of opinion are only indirectly related to the activities of the Congress or other interest groups: the Great Depression, with the consequent discrediting of rugged individualism and the legitimization of the view that government must assume some responsibility for the welfare of the people, is a far more important factor. Given this favourable climate, the task of the Congress and other groups interested in extending social welfare legislation is reduced to pointing out and popularizing specific applications of the welfare principle. Thus, over the years, the Congress, its predecessors, and others have successfully demanded the application of the welfare principle in such areas as universal hospitalization insurance, portable contributory pensions, and medicare. The question then is how the Congress and other groups go about promoting the application of the welfare principle in a particular area such as medicare. It is not necessary to "pressure" government into adopting the particular policy position desired, it is only necessary to make that policy position an acceptable alternative, to make its adoption a legitimate item of public discussion and debate. Then, given the prevailing bias in favour of welfare measures, it is only a matter of time until one or both of the major

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political parties adopt the desired policy line. It is in promoting debate on a particular application of the welfare principle that the inter-group web and the national conference device are useful; they provide the means by which the desired policy decision may be promoted to the level of an acceptable policy alternative. But the success of this operation is dependent upon the pre-existing favourable climate of opinion. The foregoing discussion raises the question of the extent to which the Congress, either alone or in concert with other interest groups, can shape the underlying climate of public opinion. The answer to this question must be speculative because for the past three decades the Congress and its predecessors have not had to face this problem; they have been able to ride the crest of a generally favourable climate of opinion on such matters as welfare legislation and recognition of the rights claimed by organized labour. Should there be a reversal of this climate for any reason, the Congress would probably be as helpless in the face of an unfavourable public opinion as were the interests which over the past three decades have opposed the various applications of the welfare principle or the recognition of the rights of organized labour.

Chapter 9

ORGANIZED LABOUR AND GOVERNMENT

/. The Canadian Labour Congress Two outstanding facts about the Canadian Labour Congress emerge from this study. First, the obsessive concern of the Congress leadership to secure recognition and acceptance of their organization as the voice of organized labour in Canada. Second, the extreme decentralization of power which characterizes the internal structure of the Congress. The Congress exercises little authority within the trade union movement and its function is to maintain peace among the union leaders who do exercise such authority. In their relations with union leaders the first concern of the Congress leadership has been to safeguard the unity of their organization; the result has been a tendency to temporize in the face of potentially divisive questions. Lacking authority or status within the labour movement, the leaders of the Congress look to government for the recognition they need to serve as the basis for the institutional position which they hope to build for their organization. For them the demand for institutional recognition is the most important demand that they make upon government. In their relations with government and other interest groups the Congress leadership has gained acceptance for the proposition that the Congress repreents organized labour, although not as an exclusive representative. In essence, such recognition means that inter-group activities in which the Congress is a participant can be said to include representatives of labour. To the extent that a broad representation of interests is deemed to be desirable in such activities, recognition of the Congress is useful to the other sponsoring and participating groups. Through participation in such activities the Congress leadership has acquired grounds upon which to claim recognition for their organization. A major portion of the political activity of the Congress consists of participation in conferences and other inter-group activities whose ostensible purpose is to influence government policy. In fact, these activities seldom do more than reconfirm the status of the participating in-groups. Government recognizes, at least in part, the mandate claimed by the Congress leadership. In recognition of this mandate, government confers privileges upon the Congress in the form of nominations to public bodies,

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consultation and access to political leaders and civil servants. The latter privileges enable the Congress to influence the day-to-day activities of government within the limits set by established government policy. Beyond the limits of established policy the Congress is impotent. By itself the Congress can do little to influence the shape of government policy and this little it can only do indirectly and in the long run. By comparison with the sweeping demands contained in its annual Memorandum, the day-to-day political activity of the Congress is concerned with very small stakes, and even then it is often unsuccessful. The Congress leadership has been socialized into, and identifies with, a group whose life style and Weltanschauung differ radically from those of the people whom the Congress claims to represent. This change was evident at the 1964 convention when the delegates were asked to approve a resolution increasing the salaries of the Congress' principal officers. Several interesting points emerged from that debate. The primary argument of those favouring the increase, as expressed by one of the delegates, was that Brother Jodoin and the rest of the executive officers have a job which—well, mine is bad enough, but I wouldn't trade mine with theirs for anything. They go all over the country dealing with problems of a magnitude that some of our Brothers cannot possibly realize. I say we should support this raise. $20,000 isn't too much when you compare it with the wages of the people that Brother Jodoin and the rest of the executive have to deal with.1

The arguments offered in opposition to the resolution reflected the fear that the Congress leadership was indeed coming to identify with those with whom they deal: This is a trade union movement. . . . I certainly disagree with one of the former speakers when he points out that in order for labour leaders to meet management they must be accepted. Well, if they want to be accepted on the basis of the salary they are getting or hope to get I think it is a very poor way of looking at things. ... of the one million, one hundred thousand members of the Labour Congress in Canada, ninety nine per cent or possibly one hundred per cent are not making that type of money. As a matter of fact the overwhelming majority are not making even half of that.2

And from another delegate, an unemployed plumber, I rise to oppose this motion, for various reasons. You have heard many arguments on this floor from other delegates that if you pay our leaders like bosses, they will begin to think like bosses.... Mr. Chairman, I believe that the leaders of the Canadian Labour Congress must keep their feet among the rank and file of the trade union movement across Canada, and I cannot justify to our membership such exorbitant increases.3

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Putting the Congress leadership on a footing of equality with those with whom they must deal does not, of course, mean putting them on a footing of equality with the employers of the Congress' membership; it is the leadership of the affiliated unions and not the leadership of the Congress that negotiates contracts. The leadership of the Congress was being put on a footing of equality with senior civil servants and the leaders of other large, bureaucratized interest groups. This is the group into which the Congress leadership has been socialized and whose life style they have adopted. The salary increases were approved.4 Acceptance of the Congress and its leadership by government and by other interests in the Canadian political system has resulted in the abandonment of whatever elements of radicalism the labour movement may once have possessed. Indicative of the ideological distance travelled by organized labour in Canada is the manner in which the leaders of organized labour view their own constituency. The twelve annual memoranda presented to the government between January 1957 and February 1968 contain 517 pages of political demands and political thought. Throughout these pages the Congress leadership refers to its constituency by a variety of terms: the workers of Canada, the working people, the wage earners, and so on; at no time does the Congress leadership refer to its constituency as the working class. Throughout the twelve memoranda the word class appears only twice, and in both instances it is used as an epithet.5 Organized labour has accommodated itself to the private enterprise economic system and seeks no fundamental alteration of that system by political means. Trade unionism has ceased to be a social movement and has become a business. Union leaders have become businessmen selling a service; they act as agents on behalf of employees in their relations with employers. These businessmen-union leaders have concluded agreements among themselves which have the effect of dividing the market for their services (jurisdiction agreements) and limiting competition within the allocated portions of the market (no-raiding agreements). In effect, they have cartellized the market for their services to the possible detriment of their clients, the union members.6 The leaders of organized labour, having established positions for themselves as middlemen in the relations between workers and employers, look with a jaundiced eye upon schemes which threaten to upset existing relationships or reduce the importance of the middleman. In defending their positions the leaders of organized labour have shown themselves to be extremely adept at assimilating and using the language of laissez-faire.7 II. Canadian Interest-Group Studies The published literature on interest-group activities at the federal level in Canada is small; a single monograph and a handful of articles make up its

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core.8 Despite the paucity of studies, however, certain features stand out in both the present study and the literature. Concern with the problems of legitimacy and mandate, although those terms are not used, stand out in most of the literature. The Canadian Federation of Agriculture, finding that its successes in maintaining farm prices were causing raised eyebrows among other sectors of the public, resorted to the use of the inter-group web in an attempt to refurbish the image of the agricultural interest.9 The requirements of respectability have also led the federation to eschew the grosser forms of political pressure such as organized marches and demonstrations. The Consumers' Association of Canada has faced somewhat different problems; its leadership has had to support the claim that there is in fact a distinct consumer interest. The inter-group web has been used by the association—a total of sixteen other women's organizations have been recruited as affiliates while the association itself has participated extensively in joint ventures and umbrella organizations. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association has suffered crises of legitimacy as well, largely the result of having employed heavy-handed and socially unacceptable tactics. The alleged complicity of the association in an attempt to still free-trade sentiment by withdrawing advertising from publications whose editorial policy supported free trade, a move easily interpreted as an attack upon freedom of the press, resulted in an uproar and "the Association paid dearly for the clumsy activities of its ex-secretary."10 In the two years preceding the general election of 1921 the association launched a protectionist campaign which was characterized by what contemporary terminology would call "over-kill." The result, again, was a crisis of legitimacy: The victory of the Liberal and Progressive forces at the polls marked, indeed, the end of a chapter in the history of the Manufacturers' Association. It was a chapter replete with frantic and abortive attempts to check the growth of free-trade sentiment, and it is perhaps not too much to say that it took the next decade to efface the damage which had been done to the Association's reputation. In some respects the Association has never recovered the position of influence it had held previously to 1919.11

In all cases, interest groups have had to adapt their activities to the expectations of the Canadian people or face the prospect of unpleasant consequences. The Canadian Labour Congress, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, and the Consumers' Association of Canada have all attempted to anticipate the points at which they might run afoul of public expectations. In the case of the Consumers' Association of Canada, anticipation has been carried to the point where the activities of the association on behalf of the consumer interest have been badly hamstrung. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association, on the other hand, had its hands burnt before learning the lesson.

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Problems of mandate have also occupied the attention of Canadian interest-group leaders. The watershed in the history of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture is the "Battle of London", at which the federation's mandate was recognized by the then minister of agriculture: Ever since then the Federation has been recognized by the Federal Department of Agriculture and by the entire Cabinet. It can hardly be accidental that it was first requested to submit a brief to the Cabinet two weeks after the "Battle of London". The change in attitude was quick. The Federation was almost immediately requested to nominate representatives for the various wartime advisory committees which dealt with subjects of interest to the farmers. In 1943 Dr. Hannam [the federation's president] was made chairman of the advisory committee on food and after the war he was frequently invited to be an adviser on the Canadian delegation to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.12 The leadership of the Consumers' Association of Canada refused to support an attempt by the Canadian Home Economists' Association to have government create a Canadian Bureau of Home Economics, allegedly because such a bureau "would remove one of CAC's main functions."13 Membership on representative advisory boards is an indicator of the legitimacy of the interest represented and of the mandate of the organization which nominates. The literature suggests that membership on such bodies is much sought after by interest-group leaders yet those studies in which the question is examined are unanimous in concluding that the influence of such boards upon government policy is negligible.14 The experience of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture suggests that membership on a representative advisory board merely serves to tie an interest group to government policy without giving the leaders of the group much opportunity to participate in the formulation of that policy. The literature also supports the conclusion that established government policy is the determining factor in the success or failure of the demands of any interest group and, furthermore, that the most effective means of influencing the formulation of policy is through informal day-to-day consultation with government officials.15 Also supported is the conclusion that the prime factor influencing the government policy-making process is public opinion. Thorburn's study of the revision of Canadian combines legislation may be interpreted as the history of an attempt on the part of a government to satisfy the demands of its campaign contributors and other supporters but being drawn up short at every turn by public opinion. In the end, despite the obvious deske of the government to reward its friends, those friends came away with very little.16 Likewise, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association found that public opinion set the parameters within which government policy would fall:

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CHAPTER NINE "In this revision of the tariff", W. K. McNaught [chairman, CM A Tariff Committee] said, in pointing out the need of such a programme, "the Government will go as far as public opinion will back them up and no farther."17

Thus, we return to the problem of public opinion and the extent to which interest groups may shape it. While the formation of public opinion in Canada is a subject of study in itself, several conclusions may be drawn from this study and the existing literature on Canadian interest groups. Although interest groups cannot mould public opinion in Canada as the potter moulds his clay, public opinion may be swayed within the limits of what may be called the underlying climate of opinion. For example, it was noted in the previous chapter that the underlying climate of opinion in the past three decades has favoured welfare legislation and recognition of the rights claimed by organized labour. Within the limits set by the underlying climate of opinion, interest groups may hawk their wares with some hope of success; beyond it they are doomed to failure. Interest-group activities in Canada are largely confined to attempts to influence government policy in a direction sanctioned by the underlying climate of opinion, and low-keyed attempts to obtain small favours which lie within the limits set by established government policy. The most effective means of influencing government policy are activities which purport to mobilize public opinion, particularly broadly representative inter-group activities such as national conferences. The most effective means of obtaining favours within the limits of government policy is the development of close day-to-day working relations with civil servants and ministers. Frantic pressure campaigns are rarely mounted, and then only as a last resort. After more than thirty years, Clark's evaluation of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association remains a not inaccurate description of the daily life of the large bureaucratized interest groups in the Canadian political system: In the end, the Association became something of a vested interest of its departmental officials. The sheer necessity of justifying their positions, combined with other factors, prompted them to take up various activities of a specialized sort. That urge to find work to do explains to some extent the extension of the departmental services. On the other hand, the desire of the officials, above all things, to keep the Association hi existence, created a tendency to caution, which led to the surrender of many functions to avoid internal dissension or public disfavour. Disaffections of large groups of its own members, or hostile movements within the community at large, presented problems which if unchecked would have wrecked the Association.19

APPENDIX A

THE CODE OF ORGANIZING PRACTICES

The present Constitution of the Canadian Labour Congress provides for orderly regulation of relationships among its affiliates. Public attacks by one affiliate upon another result in adverse publicity which causes grave injury to organized labour. More serious is the fact that jurisdictional disputes, boycotts, and the resulting unfavourable publicity give rise to regulatory legislation. A code governing relations among unions engaged in competitive organizing campaigns or involved in disputes resulting from jurisdictional conflicts has therefore been approved by the Executive Council for the guidance of affiliated unions and the Congress calls upon the officers and members of all affiliated unions to enforce this code at all times and to instruct all representatives, business agents and local officers to adhere to its provisions. 1. Where two or more affiliates of the Congress are seeking to organize the same employees, each affiliate shall conduct its organizing campaign in such a manner as to increase the respect of the workers involved for the trade union movement, and will not impugn or attack the motives or character of any competing affiliate, its officers or subordinate units. 2. Affiliates or their representatives shall not, either directly or indirectly, issue or cause the issuance of any propaganda which: (a) alleges or implies that any other affiliate is guilty of undemocratic practices, corruption, or any other improper conduct. (b ) attacks the principles of international, national, provincial and regional unionism. The Constitution recognizes all such types and such propaganda is therefore a public attack upon established Congress constitutional policy. (c) attacks the craft or industrial structure of other affiliates. Both structures are recognized by the Constitution of the Congress. (d) criticizes the benefits received from or the dues and initiation fees paid to another affiliate.

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3. Affiliates or their representatives shall not organize or conduct boycotts against products or services produced under a bona fide collective bargaining relationship of another affiliate. 4. Any complaint of a violation of this code shall be forwarded by an affiliate to the ranking official of the other affiliate involved, requesting that the spirit and intent of this code be observed. 5. If compliance is not promptly obtained, a complaint may be filed with the Canadian Labour Congress. The Congress shall, after investigation, endeavour to obtain compliance, and failing to do so, shall refer the complaint to the Executive Council of the Congress. The Executive Council shall make a report to the parties of its decision in the matter, and shall take such action as it deems advisable and appropriate to enforce compliance.

APPENDIX B

THE WEB OF INTER-GROUP RELATIONS

The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate the extent and pervasiveness of inter-group relations in the Canadian political system. The summary presented here is neither complete nor definitive since such a study, even if confined to the Canadian Labour Congress and the organizations with which it has established relations, would involve a study in depth of most of the Canadian political system. Neither does this appendix discuss relations of the usual day-to-day nature nor such matters as the submission of a joint brief to government on a matter of mutual concern to two or more groups. Four types of relations are discussed here. First, temporary relations for the purpose of staging a single event such as a national conference. The impetus usually comes from one or two groups which then invite others to act as co-sponsors. The entire operation may or may not be carried out under the ostensible auspices of an established umbrella group such as the Canadian Welfare Council. Second, permanent relations under the auspices of an umbrella group estabished by an interest group desirous of establishing a framework for cooperation with other groups. Examples are the Canadian Conference on Education, brought into existence on the initiative of the Canadian Teachers' Federation, and the Canadian Council on Urban and Regional Research, brought into existence on the initiative of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities. Third, permanent relations under the auspices of on-going groups which have carved out an area of competence for themselves and attained a status independent of that of their member groups. An example is the Canadian Welfare Council. Fourth, there are the permanent groups which are non-political in the sense that they have not been brought into existence for the purpose of urging a particular policy upon government. They do not present briefs to government nor do they necessarily concern themselves with matters which are of political importance. However, their activities can have political consequences and the studies which they prepare may influence opinion. Examples are the Private Planning Association of Canada and the Canadian Pension Conference.

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THE CANADIAN CONFERENCE ON AGING

The Canadian Conference on Aging is an example of inter-group cooperation for the purpose of staging a single event. It operated under the auspices of the Canadian Welfare Council and, like the Canadian Conference on the Family, was under the patronage of the governor-general. The sponsoring organizations were: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Canadian Labour Congress Canadian Medical Association Canadian Hospital Association Canadian Public Health Association Canadian Chamber of Commerce Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities National Council of Women Canadian Council of Churches Canadian Catholic Conference Canadian Association for Adult Education Although the conference was not held until January 1966, the organizing work was undertaken in early 1963 and a background paper dated 7 October of that year carries the following item, Consideration was given to the possibility of inviting the Department of National Health and Welfare to co-sponsor the conference, and a preliminary meeting was held in June with the Minister, the Honorable Judy LaMarsh. Although the Minister expressed wholehearted approval of the conference plan, she thought it was inappropriate for the Federal Department to cosponsor the conference. Miss LaMarsh was most enthusiastic, however, about the importance of the Canadian conference and she assured us that she would be prepared to support a formal request for a federal grant, if the Board of Governors [of the Canadian Welfare Council] approves the conference plan.1 Government financing of pressure group activities is not unusual and in August 1964 the chairman of the CWC Executive Committee wrote to the heads of the sponsoring organizations on the matter of finances, Naturally a conference of this size and scope costs money—$90,000 according to the Conference Executive Committee, which has now carefully reviewed the financial requirements.... After negotiations with several interested Federal Departments it was agreed that the Conference should be under private rather than governmental auspices. The advantages of this arrangement will be immediately obvious to you. At the same time it was understood that both the Federal and Provincial Governments would assist and participate in the Conference in various ways, including a financial grant. In line with these plans the Minister of National Health and Welfare has announced that her Department plans to make a grant of $20,000 to the Conference. During the course of the next few months we plan to request the ten provincial governments for grants which in aggregate will equal the $20,000 Federal contribution.2

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A financial statement presented to the members of the conference Executive Committee in March 1965 indicates that at the time the amount donated or pledged by the provincial governments was only $150 short of the objective. Another document prepared at the time lists, in addition to the twelve sponsoring organizations, a total of sixty participating organizations, among them, Canadian Nurses' Association Canadian Home Economics Association Canadian Psychiatric Association Canadian Health Insurance Association National Council of Jewish Women Canadian Arthritis and Rheumatism Society Canadian National Institute for the Blind Health League of Canada Canadian Heart Foundation Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association Canadian Association of Real Estate Boards Canadian Unitarian Council Catholic Women's League Baptist Federation of Canada Canadian Cardiovascular Society Canadian Rehabilitation Council for the Disabled Canadian Tuberculosis Association Canadian Dietetic Association Canadian Association of Optometrists Canadian Association of Social Workers Canadian Life Insurance Officers Association Canadian Federation of Agriculture Consumers' Association of Canada Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada Canadian Library Association Royal Canadian Legion Canadian Council on Urban and Regional Research Federated Women's Institutes of Canada Canadian Association of Occupational Therapists Canadian Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs Canadian Association of Podiatry Canadian Mental Health Association Co-operative Union of Canada Canadian Dental Association Canadian Federation of University Women CANADIAN CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN

This is one of the numerous conferences which became an "on-going" organization with a permanent full-time staff. Planning for a conference on

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children was begun in 1956 and a conference was held in 1960. A permanent organization was then established and a second conference was held in 1965. Among the sponsoring organizations of the 1960 conference were: Anglican Church of Canada Canadian Association for Adult Education Canadian Association of Physical Education, Health and Recreation Canadian Catholic Conference Canadian Conference on Education Canadian Council for Crippled Children and Adults Canadian Council of Churches Canadian Dental Association Canadian Home and School and Parent-Teacher Federation Canadian Home Economics Association Canadian Jewish Congress Canadian Medical Association Canadian Mental Health Association Canadian Nurses' Association Canadian Paediatric Society Canada Physiotherapy Society Canadian Psychiatric Association Canadian Public Health Association Canadian Welfare Council Catholic Women's League of Canada Community Planning Association of Canada National Council of Jewish Women of Canada National Council of Women of Canada Presbyterian Church in Canada United Church of Canada YMCA National Council YWCA National Council In addition, the sponsors of the 1965 conference included: Association Canadienne-Frangaise d'Education d'Ontario Canadian Association of Occupational Therapists Canadian Association for Retarded Children Canadian Council of Christians and Jews Canadian Dietetic Association Canadian Teachers' Federation Council for Exceptional Children Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada Vanier Institute on the Family Association Canadien des Educateurs de Langue Frangaise Canadian Arthritis and Rheumatism Society Canadian Citizenship Council Canadian School Trustees' Association An information pamphlet estimates the total budget for the second conference at $175,000 and notes that "the 1960 Conference was funded

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entirely from private sources. The Canadian Government and, we expect, most provincial governments are contributing generously to the expenses of the 1965 Conference." HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE

The Human Rights Conference was organized largely on the initiative of the Canadian Labour Congress to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Civil liberties has usually been one of the subjects included in the Congress' annual Memorandum to the Government, in part because the protection of such liberties as freedom of association is of crucial importance to organized labour and in part because civil liberties can safely be included in a brief since it is a noncontroversial subject which virtually everybody favours. Dr. H. L. Keenleyside, director-general of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, served as conference chairman. The sponsoring organizations were: National Council of Women of Canada Canadian Labour Congress Canadian Welfare Council Canadian Jewish Congress Canadian Library Association Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities YWCA of Canada YMCA National Council Canadian Association for Adult Education Canadian Association of Consumers Canadian Association of Social Workers Canadian Catholic Confederation of Labour Canadian Citizenship Council Canadian Council of Christians and Jews Canadian Council of Churches Canadian Federation of Business and Professional Women's dubs Canadian Institute on Public Affairs Co-operative Union of Canada Federated Women's Institutes of Canada LTnstitut Canadien d'Education des Adultes Jewish Labour Committee of Canada United Nations Association in Canada United Steelworkers of America MEDICARE CONFERENCE

This conference is discussed in detail in the body of this work and therefore only a list of sponsoring organizations will be given here. They were: Anglican Church of Canada (Council for Social Service)

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Baptist Federation of Canada Canadian Catholic Conference Canadian Chamber of Commerce Canadian Citizenship Council Canadian Federation of Agriculture Canadian Jewish Congress Canadian Labour Congress Canadian Lutheran Council Canadian Union of Students Canadian Welfare Council Churches of Christ (Disciples) Confederation of National Trade Unions Conseil Canadien de la Cooperation Co-operative Union of Canada Federated Women's Institutes of Canada National Council of Women of Canada National Farmers' Union Presbyterian Church in Canada (Board of Evangelism and Social Action) Salvation Army in Canada United Church of Canada (Board of Evangelism and Social Service) CANADIAN HIGHWAY SAFETY COUNCIL

The Annual Progress Report for 1963 lists the governor-general as the honorary patron and the ten lieutenant-governors as patrons. The minister of national health and welfare is listed as a vice-chairman. The Report describes the birth of the council thus: Responding to a strong, extensive program of information and publicity, 360 men and women from all parts of Canada met in Ottawa on May 24, 25 and 26, 1955, to attend the National Highway Safety Conference. They established the Canadian Highway Safety Conference which, in 1960, became the Canadian Highway Safety Council.3

The council is thus one of the on-going organizations which grew out of a national conference. While the budget of the council is not given in absolute figures, it is given as a percentage both of the sources of income and of the items of expenditure. Government provides forty per cent of the finances of the council, twenty per cent from the federal government and an equal amount from the provincial governments. The items of expenditure include "assistance to reactivation of National Safety League of Canada" which acounts for twelve per cent of the Council's budget. As well as being the product of a conference and having a membership made up of other organizations and corporations, the council is also engaged in the creation, or reactivation, of additional organizations.

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The members of the council include the following organizations : Automotive Industries Association of Canada Automotive Parts Manufacturers' Association Canadian Automobile Association Canadian Good Roads Association Canadian Motor Coach Association Canadian Trucking Association Federation of Automobile Dealer Associations Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association Railway Association of Canada Rubber Association of Canada Association of Canadian Distillers Brewers' Association of Canada Canadian Association of Optometrists Canadian Labour Congress Canadian Truck Trailer Manufacturers' Association The first ten named are among the charter members. In addition to the organizations listed above, the following are represented on the executive committee of the council: Canada Junior Chamber of Commerce Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire Catholic Women's League of Canada Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada National Council of Women Canadian Industrial Safety Association Ontario Safety League Outdoor Advertising Association of Canada Canadian Medical Association Finally, in addition to organizations, the membership of the council includes more than sixty major national corporations. OVERSEAS INSTITUTE OF CANADA

The origin, activities, and financing of the institute are described in a brochure published by it. The Overseas Institute of Canada (QIC) is a private voluntary organization interested in promoting and mobilizing Canadian efforts in international development. It is incorporated as a non-profit charitable organization under the Canada Corporations Act. The QIC has been in operation for five years [as of 1966] and has played a leading role in Canada's program for International Co-operation Year in 1965 (ICY) and in the Young World Mobilization Appeal of the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization (October 1965 to March 1966). It is now working closely with the Centennial International Development Program (CIDP) which has succeeded ICY. The QIC is currently operating on a grant from the Ford Foundation of

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APPENDIX B $150,000 received in January 1965, to extend over three years. The Department of External Affairs of the Canadian Government provides the office space and some equipment. The balance of supporting funds must be made up from membership fees (both individual and organizational) and from contributions by firms and individuals. Recently, as the result of two national conferences of Canadian organizations and agencies interested in international development—and at the request of such groups—the QIC has undertaken to become a representative body which will facilitate co-operation amongst the interested organizations and corporations in Canada, and provide for liaison between them and government.

The board of directors of the institute includes representatives of the following organizations: Canadian Welfare Council Canadian National Commission for UNESCO Canadian Council of Churches Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada Conference Catholique Canadienne Canadian Labour Congress Ontario Institute for Studies in Education Co-operative Union of Canada Auxiliares Feminines Internationales Catholiques Action Catholique Canadienne Association des Medecins de Langue Frangaise du Canada Association of Canadian Medical Colleges Canadian University Service Overseas Canadian Nurses' Association Canadian Teachers' Federation Canadian Medical Association Canadian Hunger Foundation In addition there are representatives of four federal government departments. CANADIAN NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

This is a semi-official body which according to its letterhead is "an agency of the Canada Council." Among the commission's member organizations are: Agricultural Institute of Canada Association Canadienne des Bibliothecaires de Langue Fran^aise Association Canadienne des Educateurs de Langue Frangaise Association Canadienne Frangaise pour 1'Avancement des Sciences Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada The Canada Foundation Canadian Association for Adult Education Canadian Association of Broadcasters Canadian Association of University Teachers

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Canadian Authors' Association Canadian Chamber of Commerce Canadian Citizenship Council Canadian Conference of the Arts Canadian Council for Research in Education Canadian Education Association Canadian Federation of Agriculture Canadian Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs Canadian Federation of University Women Canadian Home and School and Parent-Teacher Federation Canadian Hunger Foundation Canadian Institute of Communications Canadian Institute on Public Affairs Canadian Jewish Congress Canadian Labour Congress Canadian Library Association Canadian Museums Association Canadian School Trustees' Association Canadian Teachers' Federation Canadian Textbook Publishers' Institute Canadian Union of Students Canadian Weekly Newspapers' Association Confederation of National Trade Unions Cooperative Union of Canada Engineering Institute of Canada Federated Women's Institutes of Canada National Council of Jewish Women of Canada National Council of Women of Canada National Council of YMCAs of Canada Overseas Institute of Canada Periodical Press Association Royal Architectural Institute of Canada Town Planning Institute of Canada Union Canadienne des Journalistes de Langue Frangaise United Nations Association in Canada Voice of Women World Federalists of Canada In addition to these and other private organizations, the membership of the commission includes the following agencies and departments of the Government of Canada: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Dominion Bureau of Statistics Department of External Affairs External Aid Office Department of Mines and Technical Surveys National Film Board of Canada National Gallery of Canada

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National Library of Canada National Museum of Canada National Research Council Queen's Printer Department of the Secretary of State An additional point of interest is the not uncommon form of "organizational incest" that is evident here. The commission is one of the member organizations of the Overseas Institute of Canada while the institute is one of the members of the commission. CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP COUNCIL

Originally established in 1940 as the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship. According to an information pamphlet, published by the council, "since 1955 the Council has been a useful coordinating agency for the various Canadian organizations and associations that are dealing with Canadian problems." The membership of the council, according to the pamphlet, consists of "more than one hundred national, provincial and local organizations and agencies." Among these members are: Anglican Church of Canada, Council for Social Services Canadian Association for Adult Education Canadian Federation of Agriculture Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities Canadian Home and School and Parent-Teacher Federation Canadian Jewish Congress Canadian Labour Congress Canadian Library Association Canadian Nurses' Association Catholic Women's League of Canada Community Planning Association of Canada Federated Women's Institutes of Canada Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada National Council of Jewish Women of Canada Ontario Teachers' Federation Ontario Welfare Council Royal Canadian Legion United Church of Canada, Board of Home Missions YMCA National Council CANADIAN COUNCIL ON URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH

An example of an organization established for the purpose of enabling other groups and governments to associate in a formal and continuing manner with the work of the parent organization, in this case the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities. In addition to making possible the

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association of other groups and governments with the work of the federation, the establishment of an organization ostensibly devoted to research opens up sources of financial support which would not normally be available to an interest group such as the federation. The council was founded following a three-day national conference held in Ottawa in March 1962. The initiative for the conference came from the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities. In addition to the federation, the following organizations were represented on the Founding Committee of the Council: Conservation Council of Ontario Engineering Institute of Canada Community Planning Association of Canada Canadian Good Roads Association Royal Architectural Institute of Canada There were also representatives of federal government agencies as well as representatives of most of the provincial governments. The council's Annual Report for 1965 contains the following comments: We have convened small invitation conferences on particular topics or in particular regions, under Council auspices. . . . we have participated in planning of studies of poverty, so as to be sure that they included the special urban poverty aspects; we have taken part in conferences on aging, in order to introduce the claim for studies of the special problems of the aging people in large cities. Since the Council was founded, it has been officially represented at over one hundred meetings of these kinds; we are averaging attendance at some such meeting about every second week all year round.... The Council and its Board are watchful for every opportunity to widen the numbers of people informed and concerned about Canadian urban problems, and to enlist as many forces as possible toward the study and solution of urban and regional issues.4

On the subject of finances, the report noted: The Ford Foundation approved a grant of $500,000 U.S. to this council. .. . The Government of Canada has so far met the whole administrative cost of establishing and operating this Council; grants and commitments through the four years 1962 to 1965 inclusive come to a total of $265,000 For a number of reasons, it is our plan to make direct approaches to top management in a few dozen of the largest national corporations having some substantial stake in urban efficiency and development. Our methods will no doubt improve as we proceed, and in order to make plans realistically we have already made exploratory approaches to one or two large corporations. These have proved quite encouraging... .5

Unlike the on-going organizations usually established by national conferences, the activities of the council do go beyond the minimum required to justify the existence of a full-time executive-secretary and staff. The council

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has undertaken to support a substantial amount of original research by qualified researchers. THE JOINT PLANNING COMMISSION

This title is a misnomer. The commission does very little joint planning and it is largely ineffective. Its meetings are taken up with receiving reports on the activities of several of the member organizations. The meeting held on 10 April 1964, in the Railway Committee Room of the House of Commons, was intended to stress the fact that 1965 was to be International Co-operation Year. Several of the organizations which presented reports accordingly stressed those of their activities which could be related to the theme of international cooperation. According to an information pamphlet, the commission is "a central consultative body directly serving about one hundred Canadian national organizations, and operates as a standing committee of the Canadian Association for Adult Education."6 Reports at the 1964 meeting were presented by: Canadian Association for Adult Education Canadian Citizenship Council Canadian Home and School and Parent-Teacher Federation Canadian National Commission for UNESCO Federated Women's Institutes of Canada Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada National Council of Women of Canada United Nations Association in Canada National Council of the YMCA National Council of the YWCA Voice of Women Overseas Institute of Canada Canadian Centenary Council Citizenship Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration Dominion Bureau of Statistics Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism In addition to those who presented reports, the following were among those also represented at the meeting: Canadian Universities Foundation Canadian Union of Students Canadian Teachers' Federation The Canada Foundation Canadian Labour Congress Canadian Welfare Council Canadian Federation of Agriculture Co-operative Union of Canada Catholic Women's League National Council of Women of Canada Canadian Education Association

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Canadian Jewish Congress Canadian Catholic Conference National Film Board of Canada Department of External Affairs National Library of Canada External Aid Office CANADIAN CONFERENCE ON EDUCATION

The Canadian Conference on Education is discussed at length in the text and only a list of sponsors of the 1962 conference is included here: Agricultural Institute of Canada Association Canadienne des Bibliothecaires de Langue Frangaise Association Canadienne des Educateurs de Langue Frangaise Association Canadienne-Frangaise pour I'Avancement des Sciences Association Canadienne des Inspecteurs d'Ecoles et des Directeurs d'Education de Langue Franchise Association Canadienne des Jardinieres d'Enf ants Association des Commissaires d'Ecoles de Langue Franchise du Canada Association des Religieuses Enseignantes du Quebec Association of Headmasters of Canada Association of Headmistresses of Canada Boy Scouts of Canada Canadian Association for Adult Education Canadian Association of Broadcasters Canadian Association of Directors of Extension and Summer School Canadian Association of Health, Physical Education and Recreation Canadian Association of Professors of Education Canadian Association of School Superintendents and Inspectors Canadian Association of University Teachers Canadian Bar Association Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Canadian Catholic Education Council Canadian Catholic Trustees' Association Canadian Chamber of Commerce Canadian Citizenship Council Canadian Council of Churches Canadian Dental Association Canadian Education Association Canadian Federation of Agriculture Canadian Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities Canadian Federation of University Women Canadian Film Institute Canadian Home and School and Parent-Teacher Federation Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Canadian Institute on Public Affairs

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APPENDIX B Canadian Jewish Congress Canadian Labour Congress Canadian Library Association Canadian Life Insurance Officers' Association Canadian Manufacturers' Association Canadian Mathematical Congress Canadian Medical Association Canadian Mental Health Association Canadian Nurses' Association Canadian Public Relations Society Canadian School Trustees' Association Canadian Teachers' Federation Canadian Textbook Publishers' Institute Catholic Women's League of Canada Office Catholique National des Techniques de Diffusion Chambre de Commerce de la Province de Quebec Chemical Institute of Canada Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux Conseil Canadien des Associations d'Education de Langue Frangaise Conseil de la Vie Frangaise en Amerique Conseil National de la Jeunesse Canadienne-Frangaise Educational Reference Book Publishers' Association Engineering Institute of Canada Federated Women's Institutes of Canada Federation des Colleges Classiques Federation des Freres Educateurs du Canada Humanities Research Council of Canada IODE Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada Industrial Foundation on Education Institut Canadien d'Education des Adultes Mouvement Catholique des Parents et Maitres de Langue Frangaise du Canada National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges National Council of Jewish Women of Canada National Council of Women of Canada National Council of Young Men's Christian Association of Canada National Federation of Canadian University Students Royal Architectural Institute of Canada Royal Canadian Legion Social Science Research Council of Canada Young Women's Christian Association of Canada Alberta Education Council British Columbia Council on Education Manitoba Council on Education New Brunswick Conference on Education Newfoundland Advisory Committee on Education

WEB OF INTER-GROUP RELATIONS Nova Scotia Education Association Ontario Conference on Education Prince Edward Island Conference on Education Association d'Education du Quebec Saskatchewan Advisory Committee on Education

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APPENDIX. C

An Extract from the

MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, MARCH 1962

The Canadian Labour Congress and the Government We have given you our views in greater or less detail on a variety of subjects, domestic and foreign. For the most part, these are matters which, we feel, are of interest and concern not only to organized wage-earners but to most Canadians. We turn now to an issue which has the appearance of being only of concern to the Canadian Labour Congress itself but in reality is more pervasive in its effect. While it deals in large measure with the kind of relationship which exists between your government and our Congress, it represents in broader terms the attitude of governments towards voluntary associations. It is a regrettable fact that so far as your government is concerned, the Canadian Labour Congress and organized labour in general are institutions frequently to be ignored when you are considering issues of national importance. Time after time, on the question of appointments to royal commissions and to consultative and other bodies, organized labour has been either completely by-passed or the selection of trade union representatives has been such as to lead to no other conclusion than that it was based on political considerations. This statement could be amply documented but we will spare you a recital of what you already know. It is sufficient to say that where the organized wage-earners of this country are concerned, they are consistently deprived of the right to have their viewpoint represented even on issues where they are most directly and vitally concerned. We are at a loss to understand why this should be so. We would assume that in this day and age, with the trade unions an accepted institution, they would enjoy a greater degree of recognition from your government than you are obviously willing to give. We doubt furthermore that we are alone in that opinion or that it reflects merely self-interest. We have pointed out to you on a previous occasion that the trade unions are a basic element in a free society and that the measure of freedom which unions enjoy is a measure of freedom

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in that society itself. We could detail here the degree to which trade union freedom has been curtailed in various parts of Canada but this is not our purpose today. The point we would make here is that the acceptance of unions is not enough and that to ignore them as an institution is to accord them a status inferior to that enjoyed by other organized groups. The Congress does not pretend to be a body neutral in its outlook. It has views, strong views at times, on a whole range of issues which affect its members directly or indirectly or which are a matter of public interest. Quite obviously, the primary concern of the Congress is to look after the interests of its members and in this respect it is no different from the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the Canadian Medical Association or any other body representing an interest group. Its legitimacy as a spokesman cannot be questioned on that score. What may be questioned is whether and to what extent any such body acts against the public interest. Obviously what is good for any particular group is not necessarily good for the country as a whole and it is properly a function of government to see that the public interest is paramount. Our grievance—and we use the word "grievance" deliberately— is that, while you have shown every willingness to recognize and to call upon other interest groups, you have shown no such willingness where organized labour is concerned. It was remarkable to us, to cite one example, that you should have found it reasonable to appoint to the Royal Commission on Health Services representatives of the medical, dental and nursing professions, together with businessmen, a university teacher, and a judge as chairman, but no representative from either organized labour or agriculture. Presumably, in your opinion, the consumer interest in the question of health care did not require that the great mass of consumers should be represented by organizations which speak for consumers in this particular area of interest. Any illusions we still had concerning appropriate appointments were dispelled when you appointed the Committee of Inquiry into the Unemployment Insurance Act. Here is an Act which by its very nature is of direct and immediate concern to over four million Canadian wage and salary-earners. They and their employers contribute directly to the fund established under the Unemployment Insurance Act. The administration of the Act is through a tripartite Commission, including a commissioner representative of the employee interest. The Act further prescribes the appointment of an Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee, a National Employment Committee and regional and local employment committees on which organized labour is represented. Presumably here if anywhere organized labour should have been represented on the Committee of Inquiry. Yet there is not a single member of that Committee, however qualified in every other respect, who can claim to represent the employee interest. This act of omission on your part drove home to us better than anything else the fact that the opinions of

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the Canadian Labour Congress and of organized labour in general are of little or no significance to you in the determination of your policies. When we ventured to complain that there was no representative of organized labour on the Committee of Inquiry we were told in very peremptory language that there was no need for one and that to have included such a representative would have injected a sectional interest into the work of the Committee. Presumably there is no sectional interest involved when the medical, dental and nursing professions are represented on the Royal Commission on Health Services. We cannot help but conclude that the failure to consult the Congress for nominees to various commissions, boards and agencies and the appointments made without consultation (such as certain appointments to the National Productivity Council) indicate a deliberate policy of by-passing the Congress wherever possible. In all fairness to you, we point out one notable exception to this policy. We refer to the appointment of labour members to trade missions sent abroad under the aegis of the Department of Trade and Commerce. These have been appointed after consultation with the Canadian Labour Congress and they have, we are convinced, played a useful role on these missions. They have been able to determine at first hand the problems concerning foreign trade in their industry. They have been able to draw these problems to the attention of their own members, thus contributing to a better understanding of the industry. They have become better acquainted with the employers with whom they deal, thereby laying a foundation for improved labour-management relations. It is regrettable that an enlightened policy of this sort should be confined to a single department. In marked contrast to your own policy is that of the Government of the United Kingdom. Not only is labour represented on various consultative bodies established by the government but labour appointments are made after consultation with the Trades Union Congress, the British counterpart of the Canadian Labour Congress. There are thus TUC representatives on the Economic Planning Board, the National Production Advisory Council on Industry, the National Joint Advisory Council (on employment problems), the National Insurance Advisory Committee, and others. Even allowing for the fact that Great Britain has a unitary form of government and we a federal one, it is amply clear that it is the policy of the British Government to consult with labour and not to boycott or ignore it. It does not follow that what Great Britain does Canada must do. But we cite the British experience because it seems appropriate in this instance and is in any event not unique. It has occurred to us that this policy of indifference to the views of organized labour may spring from the fact that the Canadian Labour Congress has in the last few years been involved in the formation of a new political party. If this is so, it is hardly a plausible reason. The Congress has no apologies to make for actions which followed convention decisions. It has every right to

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take such action. In doing so, as you are undoubtedly aware, it has followed examples set long ago by the trade union movements of Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Holland and other countries of the free world. In Great Britain the Labour Party was actually established by the Trades Union Congress, yet this was not followed by punitive action on the part of the government against the Congress. On the contrary, the Trades Union Congress has enjoyed the recognition due to an organization which represents a large proportion of the wage and salary-earners of Great Britain. We wish to place clearly on the record the position of the Canadian Labour Congress with regard to political parties and to governments. The Congress is not, nor does it intend to become, an affiliate of any political party. In this respect also, its position is parallel to that of the British Trades Union Congress. With regard to its attitude to governments, it is no different from what that has been in the past. The Congress is prepared to co-operate with any government in the development of sound social and economic policies through advice and information, critical appraisal of proposed legislation, the appointment of representatives to consultative bodies, commissions and other agencies, and participation in the work of such bodies. Participation by the Congress in the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee, the National Emplpyment Committee, the National Productivity Council, the Advisory Committee on Technological Change, the National Research Council and others is proof of our willingness to co-operate. We are not disposed to accept with equanimity any suggestion that our nominees to any of these and similar bodies are lacking in integrity or otherwise unfit to exercise the duties required of them merely because the Congress has been identified in some way with a particular party. We have been confronted by the fact that your government has appointed trade union representatives to various bodies but that such appointments were made without consultation with the Congress itself. We wish to state emphatically that we object to this procedure. Appointments without consultation beforehand indicate that the Congress has been by-passed as the representative body of organized labour in Canada. The competence of the Congress to make appropriate nominations has been brought into question. The appointments themselves lead to the suspicion that they are made as much for reasons of political favour as for the purpose of appropriate representation. The Congress claims no monopoly on wisdom but it does believe that it is more familiar with its own policies than anyone else and that the public interest is better served when trade union representatives are selected by the trade unions themselves than by the government concerned. If it is advice the government wants and not merely concurrence in its actions, then the labour representatives on any body, and the others as well, must enjoy that independence of action without which consultation is meaningless. We have gone to some length to state our position and in doing so have run

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the risk of saying some things which may not be altogether palatable to you. We have done so because we feel strongly on this subject and because we consider it important to put our views on record for our own sake, for yours and as a matter of public knowledge. In a society like ours, with its abundance of voluntary associations, the public interest is best served when such associations are able to make representations and are not only free but encouraged to offer advice and to be consulted on matters of wide common interest. With government becoming ever more complex in its operations, it is essential that laymen should become familiar with the process because only to the extent that technical competence is spread throughout the community and not concentrated in the government is there the possibility of private groups participating effectively in the decision-making processes of the government. Organized labour has a vital stake in government by consent. It wishes to preserve it.

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NOTES Notes- to Chapter 1 1. Allen Potter, Organized Groups in British National Politics (London: Faber &Faber, 1961), p. 15. 2. Merle Fainsod, "Some Reflections on the Nature of the Regulatory Process," in C. J. Friedrich and Edward S. Mason (eds.), Public Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940), p. 298. S.Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1965), p. 308. 4. Potter, Organized Groups, pp. 28, 41. 5. See Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour (New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1965), pp. 117, 209. 6. One example is the introductory chapter of Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952). This question will be discussed in some detail later. 7. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1964), p. 328. S.Ibid.,p. 131. 9. Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 418-19. lO.Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1964), pp. 291, 292-93. 11. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper & Row, 1963 ), p. 296. 12. Latham, Group Basis of Politics, p. 35. 13. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 58. 14. Ibid., p. 64. 15. Ibid., p. 67. (Italics in the original.) 16. V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups (New York: Cromwell, 1964) (5thedition),p.96. ll.lbid.,p.92. 18. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 33. 19.1bid.,p.l29. 20. Key, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups, p. 87. 21. Truman, Governmental Process, p. 168. 22.1bid.,pp. 129,138. 23. E. Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1929), p. 1.

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24. Fainsod, "Reflections on the Regulatory Process," p. 300. 25. Key, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups, p. 48. 26. Potter, Organized Groups, pp. 230-31. 27. Ibid., pp. 231-32. 28. Truman, Governmental Process, pp. 168-69. 29. J. K. Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961),p. 112. 30. Potter, Organized Groups, p. 229. 3I.Helen Jones Dawson, "An Interest Group: The Canadian Federation of Agriculture," Canadian Public Administration (1960), 134-49 discusses this matter in some detail: "There are several broad general principles of the Federation which must be discussed before one can comprehend its ability to influence governments . . . a continuing attitude of co-operation and negotiation. . . . The Federation might urge or oppose certain policies vigorously but once adopted, then the farmers are asked to co-operate." (pp. 137-38) "They [certain Federation officials] feel that Federation representation on an advisory committee commits the Federation to the public announcements of the committee and indirectly to government policies based on these announcements. In some cases the Federation might prefer to be able to level unrestrained criticism at these announcements and policies, but being present when decisions were made restricts one's freedom to criticize." (p. 147) 32. Key, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups, p. 143. 33. Potter, Organized Groups, p. 233. 34. Key, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups, p. 147. 35. E. F. Cooke, "Research: An Instrument of Political Power," Political Science Quarterly (1961), 76. Quoted in Key, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups, p. 132. 36. Key, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups, p. 144. 37. Potter, Organized Groups, pp. 31-32. 38. Ibid., p. 32. 39. Robert Michels, Political Parties, trans, by Paul, Eden, and Cedar (New York: Macmillan, The Free Press), Part 3, Chapter 1, deals with this question. 40. Key, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups, p. 37. 41. Ibid., p. 110. 42. Richard Gwyn, The Shape of Scandal (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1965), pp. 17-18. 43. Key, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups, p. 35. 44. See, Potter, Organized Groups, p. 229. 45. It is necessary to distinguish between "opposing groups" and "rival groups." Opposing groups are those representing opposing interests, for example, labour and management or farmers and railroads. Rival groups are those which attempt to represent the same interest, for example, the Canadian Labour Congress and

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the Confederation of National Trade Unions or the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the National Farmers' Union. 46. Latham, Group Basis of Politics, p. 29. 47. Key, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups, p. 33. 48./«