Order, Empiricism and Politics: Two Traditions of English Political Thought, 1500–1700 [Hardcover ed.]

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Order, Empiricism and Politics: Two Traditions of English Political Thought, 1500–1700 [Hardcover ed.]

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O R D E R , E M P IR IC IS M

AND

P O L IT IC S

T w o Traditions o f English Political Thought

1500-1700

U N I V E R S I T Y OF H U L L P U B L I C A T I O N S

O R D E R , EMPIRICISM AND POLITICS T w o Traditions o f English Political Thought D O 15 O O -I7 O O

W . H. G R E E N L E A F

Published for the u n i v e r s i t y of h u l l by the O XFO RD LONDON

U N IV E R S IT Y NEW YORK 1964

PRESS

TORONTO

Oxford University Press, Amen Hoitse, London E ,C ,4 GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI LAHORE DACCA CAPE TOWN SALISBURY NAIROBI IBADAN ACCRA KUALA LUMPUR HONG KONG

© University o f Hull 1964

Printed in Great Britain by Bntlcr & Tanner Ltd ., Fronie and London

PREFACE T he present volum e grew out o f research begun some years ago on methods o f political reasoning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It soon became apparent that a great deal o f the w o rk which had been done b y specialists in the history o f literature or, more generally, in the ‘history o f ideas’ (I have in mind, for instance, the writings o f Hardin Craig, E d w in Greenlaw, R . F. Jones, A . O. Lovejoy, E. M . W . Tillyard) was not only extrem ely enlightening when it came to looking at the political thought o f the time but also had been little used for this purpose. This applied in particular to the tradition o f ideas associated w ith the philosophy o f ‘order’ . And part o f the justification for this book is that it brings together and presents, in the context o f the history o f political theory, the conclusions o f scholars in these other fields as well, I hope, as throwing some fresh light on royalist doctrines and their cogency. In addition, this philosophy is placed in apposition to another style o f political thinking which I call ‘empiricism’ , and w ith which m any o f the anti-royalist notions were associated. This tradition o f political thought has not, I believe, been considered in this light before. I did not think it w orth w hile to append a long list o f all the books and articles I have consulted; m any are sufficiently w ellknow n and extensive bibliographies m ay be found in a number o f the recent commentaries mentioned in the footnotes. References in these notes are to editions I have used so that place and date o f publication given are not necessarily those o f a w o rk ’s first appearance. For purposes o f quotation from original sources I have drawn on modern editions where these existed and w ere to hand so that references m ight be more easily pursued. B u t where an early modern text is cited I have not modernized the spelling or punctuation but have reproduced the original as accurately as possible in these respects. I realize that this practice m ay not satisfy all tastes but I feel that these archaic forms m ay give some indication o f the contemporary idiom o f thought. For a similar

Preface

reason I have resorted to what, by some standards, m ight seem excessive quotation. But it is usually best to let original texts speak for themselves and it is, further, not easy in exercises o f this kind to show in any other w ay the pattern and wide acceptance o f the ideas under review. Indeed, in this respect, the documentation may be too slight. I should like to express m y gratitude to Professor M . Oakeshott for reading an earlier draft o f the text here presented. Some o f the material used in Chapters I-III has previously appeared in Political Studies, volum e v. A nd m y thanks are due to Miss Barbara Grice for typing most o f the final manuscript. Hull August 1g63

vi

CO NTENTS

i 11

PREFACE

V

INTRODUCTION: REASON IN POLITICS

I

ORDER AND POLITICS

14

in

JAMES I! THE DIVINE BASIS OF MONARCHY

58

IV

EDWARD FORSET: THE NATURAL BASIS

6S

OF

MONARCHY V

SIR ROBERT FILMER: THE PATERNAL BASIS OF

80

MONARCHY VI

DIDACTIC HISTORY AND THE IDEA OF ORDER

95

VII

JEAN BODIN: THE FUSION OF ORDER AND HISTORY

125

Vili

THE DECAY OF ORDER AND THE RISE OF EMPIRICISM

I4 2

EMPIRICISM AND POLITICS

157

FRANCIS BACON: THE EMPIRICAL SCIENCE OF

206

IX X

POLITICS XI

JAMES HARRINGTON: THE NATURAL PRINCIPLES OF

233

POLITICS XII

SIR WILLIAM PETTY: THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF

249

POLITICS XIII

CONCLUSION: RATIONALISM IN POLITICS a p p e n d ix

INDEX

: Ha r r i n g t o n ’s a g r a r i a n l a w

262 283 289

I IN T R O D U C T IO N :

REA SO N

IN

P O L IT IC S

I A theoretical w ork about politics m ay be regarded as a com bination o f three elements. First there is its purpose or conclusion, the ease it is trying to establish. The nature o f the proposition m ay vary considerably from , say, Film cr’s belief that absolute m onarchy is the best and most natural form o f government to Sidney’s conviction that men should live under a limited republican authority. B u t whatever its specific form there is always a central aim o f this general kind. Then, secondly, there is the technique o f argument used to plead this case, whatever it is, and to make it as persuasive as possible. It is likely that a number o f different strands o f discussion m ay be involved: reference to earlier writers w ho are for one reason or another regarded as authoritative; to personal or com m on experience; to the lessons o f natural science, religion, law or history; to what are taken as the logical implications o f a given set o f premisses; and so on. The type o f explanation offered w ill vary according to contemporary attitudes, and a w riter w ill use whatever combination o f arguments he personally finds satisfactory and which, perhaps more importantly, he thinks his audience w ill deem convincing. Thirdly, there is the set o f assumptions or beliefs, probably w idely held, which makes the purpose credible and the arguments cogent and which constitutes the philosophical basis o f the political views expounded. Such a foundation need not, o f course, be explicit but it can hardly be excluded. A n y mode o f reasoning necessarily presupposes certain criteria o f significance and relevance, and these standards depend on the ultimate picture an age forms o f the w orld, a w orld-view which is the fmal controlling factor in all branches o f the thought o f that age. For instance no attempt to show in terms o f biblical and similar authority that a king is G od’s vice-gcrcnt on earth

Order, Empiricism and Politics

could be made or would be likely to find acceptance without previous assumptions about man and the w orld derived from the Christian cosmology. Taken together these three elements—purpose, method and assumptions—constitute the general character or style o f a political theorist and his works. W here a style is common to a number o f writers there is a school and, i f the style persists for any length o f time, a tradition o f political ideas. It is the function o f the student o f political thinking to consider the various styles and traditions o f thought which have been current from time to time. Political texts arc examined and interpreted to determine the tradition or school to which a writer belongs. This means grasping an author’s ow n intention, understanding his mode o f argument and determining his assumptions. The purpose is not to moralize from the m odem point o f view about what was said in the past or to concentrate on works which are now regarded as important or vicious. It is sim ply to perceive and describe the original meaning in the fullest and most coherent fashion possible. This is to say, o f course, that the basic task is an historical one, historical not in the sense o f dealing w ith particular kinds o f problem or special fields ofinvestigation, but o f approaching whatever is being studied in a certain w ay. It is im portant, therefore, to determine what is involved in the process o f interpretation. T w o stages o f interpretative analysis must be distinguished. It is necessary first o f all to try to see the ideas o f a particular period o f the past on their own terms. This means looking at them as it were internally, as a living reality which can, historically speaking, be properly understood only by reference to their ow n standards o f what is reasonable and logical. T h ey have to be evaluated in the context o f contemporaneous notions o f rationality. Then these ideas must be seen externally, in a larger perspcctive o f historical development. ‫׳‬A nd this is not merely so that they m ay be judged and criticized with all the advantages o f a later prospect. N or is it in order that they m ay be pillaged for use in current controversy or for what they m ay say to us about our modern affairs. Rather the object is to sec as clearly as possible the 2

Introduction: Reason in Politics

continuous process by which different styles o f thought, even those apparently most opposed to one another, develop and m erge in intimate connexion. The first step is an attempt to recreate or re-experience the thought o f other men long since dead. The second is a genetic analysis o f the mode o f intellectual change which enables not only the reasons for the transition but also the essential thread o f continuity to be unravelled from an often tangled skein o f apparently opposing ideas. It follows that the first, and perhaps the main, snare to be avoided in the study o f a political text is, as I have implied, the use o f criteria o f interpretation which are historically inappropriatc. A n attempt m ay be made to assess a w ork in terms o f ideas and standards which have come into vogue since the time when it was written. T o do this is, as an eighteenth-century historian put it, ‘to read the Records, as W itches say their Prayers, Backwards’ and to make them ‘speak the quite contrary to what was intended’ .1 It is to start from the w rong end o f history and to use that ‘technique o f the backward look’2 which can so easily lead to one o f the most distorting forms o f anachronism. The study o f men’s ideas is the study o f m en’s consciousness, o f the w ay they looked at things, not o f the things themselves. In this sense it is a study o f events and books not as they actually were but as they were thought to be, not o f some objective reality but o f subjectively reconstructed experience. And /events m ay be reconstructed, interpreted and explained in different ways. In particular this is because the general definition and categories o f what is rational or true alter their meaning. ‘Reason’ is a term o f universal currency but its value changes and it is what the user gives it. A style o f argument m ay have been regarded as w holly logical and scientific when it was originally developed because it conformed to the then current criteria o f rationality which had grow n up w ithin the fram ew ork o f a contem porary w orld-view . Y et because subsequent conceptions o f these matters arc different this 1John Oldmixon, The Critical History of England (London, 1724), i.28. 2 I take this phrase from a most stimulating review o f Professor Butterfield’s The Origins of Modern Science in The Times Literary Supplement (1949), p. 762. Cf. M. Oakcshott, ‘The Activity o f Being an Historian’, in Rationalism in Politics and other Essays (London, 1962), pp. 153-4, ido.

3

Order, Empiricism and Politics

same argument—and, o f course, the purposedependingon it—m ay later seem unsound or even absurd. In this w ay an earlier manner o f thinking m ay be censured or dismissed b y a later critic as credulous, irrational and as unworthy o f serious attention merely because it does not conform to his and his contemporaries’ ideas o f how to sustain an argument. Whereas in historical terms rationality must often be attributed to what m ay seem preposterous. In the study o f the ideas o f the past, none should be negligible or regarded as merely erroneous. The sole object o f the analysis is to make the evidence (in this case political ideas) coherent and intelligible. And so explanation is not something which is absolute. It is a statement relative to a given time and place, consistent with a particular world-picture and expressed in terms o f contemporaneous needs, ideas, interests, prejudices and assumptions in a w ay that is somehow satisfying. This w ill o f course alter as the conditioning factors change. To stress the point again, it does not matter in this context that we think a writer was w rong empirically or otherwise, or that we feel his thought was disastrous in its ethical status or its practical effect. W hat is important is not the truth as w e understand it or as it really was, but what men believed was the truth and, historically speaking, to all such truths must be attributed the same authenticity. In interpreting the thought o f the past w e have initially to see it in terms o f its own style and not o f any other, and especially not o f our ow n, for this w ould be to commit the technical historical error, indeed sin, that Maitland called ‘retrogressive modernism’. T o understand historically a certain manner o f thinking it is necessary to reject all but the criteria which belong to that manner o f thinking. ‘W e . . . have to think aw ay distinctions which seem to us as clear as the sunshine; we must think ourselves back into a twilight. This we must do, not in a haphazard fashion but o f set purpose. . . .’3 O r at least we have to try to do this, for it is very difficult i f not impossible w holly to dispossess ourselves o f current assumptions. Nonetheless, whatever the tricks w e play unwittingly on the dead, in the study o f the political ideas o f the past the motto or 3 Maitland, quoted by C. H. McIIwain, ‘The Historian’s Part in a Changing World’, The American Historical Review, xlii, (1936-7), p. 212.

4

Introduction: Reason in Politics

ideal m ight be: first look at the text and know the context— know in particular the tradition o f the style o f thought in which the text is cast and, especially, the particular mode o f reasoning which it uses. Failure to appreciate these considerations m ay lead to very great misunderstanding. W e m ay misconceive words and phrases the meaning o f which has changed, we m ay ignore what seems to us trivial or unimportant but which once was vital, and w e m ay all too easily apply historically inappropriate standards o f ju dgement and interpretation. I suppose that o f all the fields o f intellcctual history these flaws have been most obvious in the study o f the grow th o f science. There has been a tendency to read back into the past modern scientific methods and criteria and to reject as irrelevant, irrational and unscientific, conceptions and analyses o f nature incompatible with or not contributing to our o w n ‫״‬ This has often been done, for instance, by regarding the period before 1500 as a dark age in which there was little scientific w ork o f value done and natural laws were quite ‘hid in night’ . Happily, there are indications that this misleading and unhistorical attitude is now being reversed and that a less narrow view o f man’s struggle to understand the w orld is emerging. The same anachronism m ay occur in dealing with the history o f law and for somewhat similar reasons. W hen interpreting a statute a law yer is concerned with what the courts have read into it since its enactment and he regards the latest judgem ent o f the highest court as its ‘m eaning’ , though naturally this m ay be rather different from what was originally intended or previously juridically prescribed. On the other hand the historian is likely to be trying to sec the statute in its original context and not as it has since been construed. B u t this general type o f error (if such it may be called) can also be seen in the study o f the history o f political thinking. I particularly have in mind the condemnations, which have sometimes been very severe, o f certain ideas and techniques o f argument which were once w idely accepted as quite rational but which have since largely been discarded: the ‘argument b y correspondcnce’ and the other conceptions associated with it. I discuss this style o f thought in some detail in the follow ing pages and show 5

Order, Empiricism and Politics

what I take to be its rational basis. Here I want only to refer briefly and by w ay o f example to some misunderstandings o f it which have been recorded in the pages o f works o f authority. Correspondences were analogies or similitudes drawn between things or events which to us m ay seem quite incomparable. Probably the most common parallel in the political field was that between the body natural o f a man and the body politic or society. H. O. Taylor, in his standard history o f the medieval world, dismissed this extrem ely important and w idely used correspondence as a ‘banal anthropomorphic comparison’ and added that its exploitation was simply ‘fancied analogy’ . Even Gierke referred to ‘anthropomorphic conceits and fallacies’ and Figgis to ‘grotesque’ or unreal metaphors. Another commonplace correspondence, between the microcosm and macrocosm, has been scorned as a ‘fantastic postulate’ , and others have been described as ‘pedantically jejune’. The usual attitude m ay be summed up in the phrase ‘elaborate and not very convincing analogy’ .4 These judgements, which are quite misleading, are the result o f a failure fully to appreciate in an imaginative w ay a most com plex form o f dialectic which modern standards w ould admittedly reject. Indeed it is not merely a method o f argument that m ay be misunderstood in this w ay but a whole style o f political thought. As I try to show below, the theory o f the divine right o f kings relied a great deal for its appeal on the method o f argument by correspondence and on the w orld-view o f order which made that mode o f discussion cogent. Because this w orld-outlook and this method are no longer persuasive the great authority they once had has often been ignored. This omission has in turn frequently led to the quite unfounded suggestion that, as one account put it, the doctrine o f divine right ‘docs not deserve to be taken seriously’ for it was always ‘an impossible theory’ .5 N o r is this an isolated 4 H. O. Taylor, The Medieval Mind (4th ed., London, 1927), ii-305; O. Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, tr. Maitland (Boston, 1958), p. 22; cf. ibid., pp. 24, 132 n.78; J. N. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1922), p. 160; J. B. Morrall, Political Thought in Medieval Times (2nd ed., London, i960), p. 101; G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (3rd ed., London, 1959), p. 335. 5 C. E. Vaughan, Studies in the History of Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau (New York, i960), i.130-1.

6

Introduction: Reason in Politics

view ; it is repeated m any times in the textbooks and commentaries on the political thought o f the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. M an y years ago Sir Frederick Pollock gave it as his opinion that ‘the doctrine o f divine right . . . was not rational, it was not ingenious, it was not even ancient’ . It was simply ‘absurd’.6 M ore recently it has been said that the ‘divine right o f kings . . . never received, and indeed was incapable o f receiving, a philosophical formulation. . . . O n the side o f intellectual construction it was hopelessly w eak ’ and ‘defied analysis or rational defence’ .7 Other estimates in the same vein could be set by the side o f these.8 The natural and usual consequence o f such an attitude is likely to be a misconstruction o f the w orks o f those writers w ho belonged to the divine-right school and who used the now outmoded style o f thought associated w ith it. It was in this fashion that even so perceptive and learned a critic as the late J . W . Allen held that few supporters o f the monarchist case felt the need to expound a philosophy. He wTent on to stigmatize the correspondence arguments used to defend royal pow er as ‘nonsense’ .9 Given this attitude it is hardly surprising that in his standard works on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century political thought, Professor Allen wTas led to misinterpret the rationale and so the authority o f the political ideas of, for instance, James I, and to misunderstand the basis o f the theory o f Edw ard Forset.101 For much the same reason, he tended to underestimate the extent and appeal o f royalist absolutism before the C ivil W a r.11 In a like fashion, when w riting about the parliamentary case Professor Allen, while notichig the frequent appeals to the ancient constitution, the 6 Sir F. Pollock, An Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics (London, 1925), pp. 69-70. 7 Sabine, op. cit., p. 335. Sabine’s further conclusion was the quite erroneous one that ‘the theory o f divine right had little importance in English political theory’, ibid., p. 338. 8 e.g. Figgis, op. cit., p. 93; P. Zagorin, A Hi'tory of Political Thought in the English Revolution (London, 1954), pp. 192, 200-1; R. H. S. Crossman, Government and the Governed (London, 1945), p. 38; C. H. Mcllwain, The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy (New Haven, 1910), pp. 3 4 7 8 ‫• ־‬ 9J. W . Allen, English Political Thought 1603-1660 (London, 1938), i.483, 488, cf. ibid., i.482-519 passim. 10 See below pp. 58-9, 68, 72. 11 See the comments in Allen, op. cit., e.g., i.n , 42-43, 66, 97-101, 185, 410, 482-3.

7

Order, Empiricism and Politics

fundamental law and supporting historical (or pseudo-historical) data, inclined to minimize their significance and to regard such argumentation as vague, confusing and not fully explained. His account consequently referred to such discussion in a b rief and somewhat disparaging w ay. T o take one instance only, his review o f Hunton’s A Treatise o f Monarchy failed to bring out properly the presence there o f this style o f thought.12 Again, reading modern prepossessions back into the past may well result in what is, from the historical point o f view , an unsatisfactory allocation o f attention. It is by no means without great interest and value to concentrate study on, for instance, the origins o f modern radical-democratic thought. But such an exercise is unlikely to result in an historically balanced picture. W ith respect to English political thought in the early modern period, it m ay lead to more space being given to consideration o f the Levellers and Diggers than their contemporary importance warranted. B y the same token, too little attention m ay be directed to analysis o f the royalist and other traditions o f thought which at the time were o f much greater impact but which have since ceased to be persuasive.13 It is hoped that what follows m ay help to redress the balance. II In the following chapters I describe two rather different traditions o f English political thinking which prevailed during the early modem period, by which I mean approxim ately 150 0-1700 . I first explain the w orld-view o f order which was fundamentally based on a Christian-inspired mctaphysic and the arguments o f which were characteristically elaborated by the process o f analogy called correspondence’. In England this style o f thought tended politically to be associated with the developing cult o f royal authority and with the idea o f absolute sovereignty. It thus provided a philosophical basis for the doctrine o f the divine right o f 12 e-g*j ibid,, i.387, 396, 437, 458. Hunton is discussed, ibid., i.449-55; and cf. pp. 190-2 below. 13 This seems to me to be true of so carefully documented a book as Zagorin, op. cit. 8

Introduction: Reason in Politics

kings. Because o f the metaphysical connexion this doctrine m ay be more specifically described as ‘the political theory o f order’ . I then discuss h ow certain aspects o f this w ay o f thinking were transmuted into a rather different manner o f thought, characteristically Baconian and empirical in emphasis. Its representative mode o f enquiry consisted in the inductive analysis o f collections o f what it regarded as facts. N aturally therefore it emphasized the importance o f history and experience as a source and support o f political ideas. It also stressed the need for what w e w ould call studies in comparative politics. Its political affiliations were usually w ith theories o f m ixed government and limited monarchy. This was a result o f the influence o f the classical authorities used, o f moderns like M achiavelli and o f the medieval constitutional tradition. The term ‘W higgism ’ is not really adequate to denote the pattern o f thought under review. N ot only might the use o f tliis description be somewhat premature and so historically inapposite, but also it m ight lead to confusion with the different manner o f discussion used b y Locke which was more abstract and rationalistic. The same sort o f difficulty applies to the term ‘constitutionalism’ . And neither word, nor any o f the usual cognate names, brings out all the various methodological tendencies involved. So I prefer to call this cluster o f ideas ‘the political theory o f empiricism’ . I illustrate each tradition o f thought by reference to the writings o f some o f its exponents although as the tw o systems described are idealized or abstracted entities, like any other picture o f the past built up b y an historian, no one writer necessarily conforms com pletely to their patterns. One danger with any enterprise o f this kind is that o f fitting men and their thoughts into ideological categories in too arbitrary a fashion. As Locke said when castigating Filmer for one o f the m any faults he thought he detected in him, this is ‘a w ay o f proceeding’ which fits ‘the W ords and Sense o f Authors’ into the commentator’s own purposes ‘just as Procrustes did with his guests, lop or stretch them, as m ay best fit into the size o f their Notions. . . .’14 Y et it is surely not too much to say that when great public issues exercise men’s minds, 14John Locke, Two Treatises o f Government, ed. Laslett (Cambridge, i960), p. 202 (§60).

9

Order, Empiricism and Politics

as was the case in England during this period o f considerable and often violent political change, then those w ho take the same side w ill share at least some ideas, methods and assumptions. These constitute a sort o f com m on ideological denominator and this is w hat I have tried to set forth. The tw o attitudes to be described were, I think, o f some im portance in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is not m erely that the constitutional doctrines associated w ith them w ere those most characteristic o f the time. M ore than this, the juxtaposition o f these two w orld-view s provides what is, in m y opinion, the best historical perspective o f the age. T h ey were crucial aspects o f the so-called conflict o f ‘ancients and moderns’ , o f the process b y w hich the idea o f decay was replaced b y that o f progress, o f the intellectual ferment surrounding the development o f the ‘new philosophy’ . T h ey embodied for m any men the grow in g antagonism between the traditional and the new in all spheres o f thought and activity. T h ey reflected the disharmonies which arose between an estabhshed style o f explanation and discussion, and the widening range o f human experience. Nonetheless, the links and continuity between these different points o f view must not be overlooked. The contrasts between them derived, at least in part, from the exaggerations o f their exponents. A fter all, both schools o f thought w ere responding to actual needs and interests, and so were bound to share a com m on basis in the practical position and necessities o f the time. T h ey shared, too, a com m on Christian heritage. And, indeed, the later ‘em pirical’ style o f thinking was in an im portant w a y derived from what Professor Oakcshott calls ‘ the pursuit o f intimations’ inherent in the other mode o f thought: the new existed as a sort o f potentiality in the old. It was these subtle connexions w hich made it possible for a w riter to em body aspects o f both w o rld view s mid to use the rational tools o f either as best suited his purpose: as did the ‘Janus-faced’ Sir Thom as B ro w n e w h o drew inspiration and ideas from each and combined them in w hat was to him a quite satisfactory consistency. Neither was a complete and finished system. T he sets o f ideas developed, too, at different speeds in different departments o f thought. The degree o f opposiIO

Introduction: Reason in Politics

tion the new attitudes encountered varied greatly, though they were never unopposed. T hey hardly affected some ways o f thinking and did not perhaps wreak so drastic an effect in others as is sometimes imagined. The process to be studied was rather, as has been said o f the development o f scientific thought, ‘the supersession o f a flow ing, or at least a gyrating, nucleus o f ideas by another o f the same sort but different in detail’ .15 An important part o f the w o rk o f the historian o f political thought is to trace the changes which transformed one manner o f political thinking into a rather different w ay o f looking at politics. A t the same time 1 am quite clear that these two patterns o f thought are neither exclusive nor necessarily fully described in themselves. There are so m any cross-currents; and it is only too obvious to me that very much m ay have been left out o f account and that I m ay m yself have fallen into errors o f interpretation o f the kind I have, earlier in this chapter, attributed to others. N o r can I claim that the sketch I give o f any particular w riter is anything like complete. M y object is different: not to describe each w ork or author mentioned with textbook fullness but to use them as evidence to illustrate some general trends o f thought, to exem plify certain salient ideas which seem to cohere. M y hope is that this m ay assist students o f political thinking by providing an historically credible fram ew ork in the context o f which original texts m ay be read. In particular, I want to give some appreciation o f notions and methods o f argument which, while vital at the time, m ight now be neglected either because o f their apparent strangeness or as a result o f their seeming more relevant to other aspects o f intellectual history than the political. Further, I must stress I by no means wish to suggest that this interpretation o f the main patterns o f English political thought at this time is the only possible picture, though I trust it is sufficiently cogent to be reckoned w ith in the formulation o f any other view . It remains to consider one other point concerning the general scope o f this study and the evidence used to illustrate these tw o styles o f political debate. O nly a few o f the authors to w hom I refer are com m only accepted ‘great names’ in the history o f 16 The Times Literary Supplement, ibid., p. 762. II

Order, Empiricism and Politics f

political thought, and many o f the so-called major writers o f the period (Hobbes and Locke, for instance) are mentioned only incidentally. This procedure m ay be thought to require some explanation. In the first place I realize, as I have said, that the picture here presented is not all-inclusive. I have not tried to write a complete history o f the English political thought o f these two centuries but simply to give an outline sketch o f some aspects o f it. It is hardly surprising that many books and authors do not fall clearly into the traditions I describe, either that o f order or o f empiricism. M oreover it does not necessarily follow that works nowadays acknowledged to be outstanding are those which were in their ow n time most characteristic o f widespread patterns o f ideas. It is true that Hobbes is norm ally associated with the doctrine o f absolute power and Locke with the theory o f constitutional government. But neither reflected the styles o f thinking then customarily associated with these political views. Hobbes’s method o f argument was different from Film er’s, as Filmer him self saw clearly enough, and Locke’s from Sidney’s. Their manner was not the same as those discussed here and so I thought it quite legitimate not to consider their works in the detailed w a y that I have looked at the writings of, say, Forset or Bacon. It m ay be that it is partly because Hobbes and Locke did not conform to the patterns o f thought I describe that they are now regarded as outstanding. Because they rejected modes o f thinking that were merely dominant, and dominant because traditional, they m ay therefore have had greater contact with the future. B u t this docs not mean that these customary styles o f thought were not at the time more characteristic. There are other considerations as well. Even were the writers now regarded as great really representative (which often they are not), to concentrate on them w ould be to tell only part o f the story, to provide an abridgement o f it. The great books o f an age, it m ay be suggested, are never fully iiitelligible without an acquaintance with their intellectual background, with what M r W inny has called ‘the great hinterland’ o f belief.16 T o understand these notions, which men often saw little need to explain because they were so obvious, means a familiarity with 16J. Winny (ed.), The Frame of Order (London, 1957), p. 10. 12

Introduction: Reason in Politics

more ordinary opinions whatever their coherence or logical status in modern eyes. Historically speaking there arc no byw ays and nothing is irrelevant. It is necessary to bring out the continuity o f the themes under review and to deal with the details, with the host o f the relatively obscure w ho ‘fill in the intervals between the men o f genius’ . W e must look therefore not only at the great diinkers but equally (or perhaps more) at the lesser men. W e should pay attention not m erely to the side which w e now know to have been victorious but equally to the views o f the losers. In the light o f these considerations Forset or Filmcr m ay have as much significance as Hobbes, and Harrington or Petty m ay be as important as Locke. The material used here is largely English but I have also drawn on foreign w orks which are know n to reflect or to have had an influence on the course o f English political thought at this time. It w ould be inexcusable for instance to discuss the royalist doctrines and the development o f ideas about historiography w ithout referring to the writings o f Jean Bodin.

13

II O RDER

AND

P O L IT IC S

D uring the medieval and early modern periods there prevailed a particularly widespread and influential conception o f the universe which m ay be called ‘the idea o f order’ . In association with this w orld-view and deriving therefrom its cogent appeal and rational validity was a certain method o f discussion, ‘the argument by correspondence’ . In this chapter I describe these and some related notions and indicate their political significance in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. W hile the political conclusions to which these ideas then led were not always the same, in general their outline was clear and uniform . A detailed explanation o f these beliefs is necessary because to our eyes the kind o f speculation involved m ay seem unusual or even absurd. It has long been recognized o f course that a manner o f thinking different from ours prevailed at this time. Scholars like Gierke and Figgis, to mention only two examples, noted the very frequent use by medieval writers o f analogy, allegory and the apparently related concepts o f unity and order. Y et I think it is not unfair to suggest that only in the last twenty or so years has the meaning o f these themes for the early modern period been adequately explained. Today, anyone wishing to investigate these matters must begin with Professor A. O. L o vejo y’s crucial essay The Great Chain o f Being which was first published in 1936, and w ith Hardin C raig’ s study o f the Elizabethan mind The Enchanted Glass which appeared in the same year. Since then there has been a great deal o f research, mostly o f a literary character, into various aspects o f this subject including its political side. The w ork o f E. M . W . Tillyard, Theodore Spencer and L. B . Campbell comes particularly to mind. Students o f the political ideas o f the time have, however, been rather slow to follow the lead given by this scholarship, partly perhaps because its relevance to political theory

14

Order and Politics

was not always apparent at first sight.1 In this chapter I apply the results o f this w ork specifically to the field o f political ideas to make explicit the royalist implications o f the notions considered. 1 1 shall treat this style o f thought as consisting o f four com ponents: the concepts o f order and the corresponding planes; the argument by correspondence; the idea o f disorder; and the political implications involved which I call ‘the political theory o f order’ . The related ideas o f order and disorder constituted,) to borrow G ierke’s words, the ‘supreme premisses’ o f this manner o f thinking, its ‘divinely revealed substratum’ ; correspondence argument was its special and characteristic mode o f discussion; and the ‘political theory o f order’ its conclusion, the political case that was in that w ay so frequently derived from the assumptions. I Professor L o vejo y has suggested that all the m any philosophical systems which have from time to time been elaborated may, despite their complexities and differences, be seen as variations on a few ‘unit-ideas’ . O f these, one o f the most significant for a study o f the intellectual history o f the period with which w e are here concerned was the conception o f a scale o f creation. This was a particular im age o f the pattern or order which was taken to underlie the great variety o f creatures and things in existence and which thus brought unity to apparent diversity. This conception itself L o vejo y resolved into a combination o f three principles which he called the principles o f plenitude, o f unilinear gradation and o f continuity.2 The first was the most important. It was a basic assumption o f m any philosophers— it was crucial, for example, to the thought o f Aquinas and H ooker— and is to be found explicit or implied in any thoughtful, serious writings em bodying the idea o f order. It was the conviction that God had wished to m ultiply as much as possible the expression o f His 1Though see F. D. Wormuth, The Royal Prerogative 1603-164Q (Ithaca, New York, 1939)» e.g. pp• 669-70 438.

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B efore going o n to discuss B acon’s great system and plan, I m u st describe w h a t I take to be the natu re and m ain assum ptions o f the em pirical attitude and outline the political tenets often associated w ith it. T ak en to g eth er, I call these the political th e o ry o f em piricism . O f course, any such survey m u st be to an im p o rtan t degree personal and even arb itrary . B u t it show s, I th in k , the basic u n ifo rm ity u nderlying ‘the com plex o f n o rm s’ and th e w o rk o f th e often very different m en w h o co n trib u ted to th e cluster o f em pirical ideas.

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AND

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em pirical tra d itio n w ith w h ich I am here co n cern ed m ay be considered as one aspect o f th at h ig h ly significant m o v e m e n t o f th o u g h t w h ich has been called the ‘C ounter-R enaissance’.1 As against th e m edieval m aim er o f th in k in g fro m w h ich th e early m o d e rn p hilosophy o f o rd er in large p a rt derived, th ere developed a set o f ideas w h ic h w as b o th sceptical o f such established view s and w ed d ed to the cause o f em piricism . Its exponents rejected th e all-em bracing w orld -sch em e em b o d ied in the great scholastic synthesis and h ig h ly com plex philosophies o f th e M id d le Ages, reg ard in g th em as in m an y respects excessively abstruse and re m o te fro m c o m m o n experience. T h e object o f this ch ap ter is to lo o k briefly at this n ew attitu d e in term s o f its u n d erly in g assum ptions and fro m the p o in t o f v iew o f th eir political application. T h e principles I take to be, first, a fideistic distinction b etw een th e spheres o f faith and secular th o u g h t co u p led w ith an an tiin tellectu alist^ attack o n th e reliability o f m a n ’s ratio n al faculty as a m eans o f u n d erstanding th e w o rld . Secondly, th ere was an em phasis on the em pirical w ay o f acqu irin g k n o w led g e and fo rm u la tin g generalizations ab o u t b o th n a tu re an d m an k in d . N e x t, th ere to o k place th e d e v elo p m en t o n this basis o f w h a t I call the ‘political th e o ry o f em piricism ’, a certain w a y o f go in g ab o u t the study o f politics th ro u g h th e acquisition an d use o f em pirical data. T his m e th o d cam e to be associated w ith a p a rticular set o f co n stitutional ideas cen trin g o n th e n o tio n o f lim ited m o n a rc h y or, m o re generally, o f m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t. Finally, ‫׳‬ to g e th e r w ith all this, there g re w u p a b e lie f in th e possibility o f progress and im p ro v e m e n t in h e re n t in th e app licatio n o f th e n e w em pirical, scientific techniques; also a so m ew h at u tilitarian scale o f values. In th e te rm in o lo g y I a d o p te d in th e in tro d u c tio n , the p o litical p u rp o se w as th e establishm ent o f a system o f m ix ed T he

1 Most notably by Hiram Hadyn,

T h e C o u n te r - R e n a is s a n c e

157

(New York, 1950).

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g o v ern m en t; the characteristic technique o f a rg u m e n t was a fo rm o f em pirical analysis; and the basic assum ptions rested on a fideistic and anti-rationalist epistem ology.

I D u rin g the early m o d ern perio d one o f the m ost noticeable differences b etw een the w orld-view s o f the em piricist and the theorist o f o rd er was the w a y in w hich they lo o k ed at the relatio n ship betw een G od and the w o rld H e h ad created. T h e o rd er p h ilosopher believed th at G od had m ade the cosm os in accordance w ith His reason and on a specific p attern the principles o f w h ich w ere fully k n o w n : the single, continuous scale o f creation co rresp o n dent in all its parts. H e also held th a t G o d ’s p o w e r and influence w ere im m an en t, in the sense th at H e co n tin u ally in te rvened in n atu re and the affairs o f m en to regulate and co n tro l th em , in particular as th ey show ed a distressing b u t inevitable ten d ency to degenerate fro m th eir original perfection. T h e a ttitu d e o f the n e w philosopher was, o f course, based o n the shared assum ption th at the universe derived fro m and depended o n G od, b u t b ey o n d this his p o in t o f v iew contrasted w ith the o th er. In the first place, the em piricist usually claim ed th a t he did n o t k n o w in advance o f investigation exactly on w h a t p a tte rn the w o rld h ad been form ed . O n the contrary , he th o u g h t th a t this was som ething w h ich rem ained to be fo u n d o u t after a detailed inspection o f n atu re itself, i f indeed it could be d eterm in ed at all. H e tended to th in k it an affront to the in fin ity o f G o d ’s creative p o w e r to im agine th a t this could be lim ited to a p articu lar fo rm envisaged b y the fallible h u m an m in d . T h e n , secondly, w h atev er its fram e he did n o t th in k o f the natu ral system as hav in g co n tinally to be sustained b y divine in terv en tio n , for he rejected the n o tio n th a t decay and alteration w ere in h eren t in n atu re. O n ce the w o rld h ad been created and its processes started b y G od as First Cause, it co n tin u ed in its established courses w ith o u t fu rth e r im m ed iate o p eratio n o f th e divine p o w er. These view s had im p o rta n t im plications. T h e y raised the status o f n ature h ig h er th an it h ad ever been in C h risten d o m . It w as n o t

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th a t the m aterial w o rld h ad never before been searched for g u id ance, b u t that it was n o lo n g er regarded as necessarily c o rru p t or M ephistophelian. It could be seen as d em on stratin g the p u rity o f G o d ’s w o rk s in a w a y th at w as im possible so lo n g as it was regard ed as the sphere in w h ich the disastrous consequences o f m a n ’s Fall w ere o n ly to o apparent. N a tu re becam e m ajestic and n o t sim ply evidence o f the effects o f sin; in B aco n ’s w o rd s it w as ‘a k in d o f second S crip tu re.’2 It acquired a positive value as a source o f practically useful, and n o lo n g er forbidden, k n o w led g e. Y et this change w as b ro u g h t ab o u t at a considerable price. For i f the results o f m a n ’s d ep rav ity w ere th o u g h t n o t to spread to th e w h o le o f n ature, there w as obviously im p lied a fu n d am en tal distinction b etw een m an and the w o rld he liv ed in, o r rath er b etw een the spiritual an d m aterial creation. A n d this separation w as reinforced b y th e co rollary o f the assum ption th a t G o d d id n o t need to in terv ene in n atu ral courses to sustain them ; th a t is, th a t th ey sh o u ld be u n d ersto o d in m aterial and n o t divine term s. In this sense, G o d w as elim inated fro m the scientific universe as an active prin ciple, and w as o n ly in v o k ed w h e n all o th e r m odes o f ex p lan atio n h ad failed to save the p h en o m en a: H e w as relegated to th e ro le o f ‘celestial p lu m b e r’. T h e attitu d e inv o lv ed , therefore, a distinction w h ich h elp ed to break up th e u n ity o f the trad itio n al w o rld -p ic tu re an d w h ich reflected the so-called ‘dissociation o f sensibility’ o f the tim e. T h e distin ction h ad fu rth er consequences. F or i f th e spiritual an d m a te rial spheres w ere separated in this w ay , th en the m o d e o f u n d e rstan d ing ap p ro p riate to one sphere w as n o t likely to be relev an t to the o th er. A nd, in fact, faith an d reason w ere severed fro m o ne an o th er. M atters o f religious b e lie f w ere held to d ep en d o n faith alone, and the scope o f sense and reason w ere co rresp o n d in g ly restricted, b ein g excluded (or alm ost w h o lly so) fro m th e c o n sideration o f spiritual affairs. T h e h u m a n u n d erstan d in g w ith all its defects w as co n fin ed to the in v estig atio n o f th e m aterial w o rld . Heaven is for thee too high To know w hat passes there. Be lowly wise. . . .3 2 Bacon, 3 P a r a d is e

W o rks, L o st,

ed. Spedding, Ellis and Heath (London, 1877-87), iv. 261. viii. 172-3.

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In the philosophical ja rg o n , m a n ’s reason w as concerned w ith the sphere n o t o f B eing b u t o f B ecom ing. A n d because o f the basic religious p a rt given to faith alone and the consequent n a rro w in g d o w n o f th e role o f h u m a n reason, this distinction m ay co n v en ien tly be labelled fideistic.4 T hose w h o perceived its force lived, in B ro w n e ’s fam ous phrase, in divided and distinguished w o rld s. N evertheless this division o f understanding becam e a basic feature o f th e em pirical philosophy. As its forem ost, apostle, B acon, p u t it in De Sapientia Veterum, ‘m en m ust soberly an d m odestly distin g u ish b etw een things divine and h u m an , b etw een th e oracles o f sense and o f faith. . . .’ H e added th a t this division was absolutely essential i f m en w ere to avoid b o th ‘a heretical religion and a fabulous p h ilo so p h y .’ 5 T his rem ark (made, significantly, in an in te rp re ta tio n o f the P ro m eth ea n legend) p o in te d to th e reasons w h ich w ere co m m o n ly advanced in defence o f th e fideistic segregation. In th e first place, it w as o n ly b y such a separation th at th e basis o f revealed tru th co u ld be k e p t in tact and free fro m co n trad ictio n b y th e advances o f n atu ral know ledge. I f th eo lo g y and m atters o f faith w ere o f an o rd er quite different fro m th a t o f em pirical science, th e n w h atev er progress th e latter m ad e could n o t affect, w ith in th eir p ro p e r sphere, th e essential principles o f religious belief. T his co u ld be m ost co m fo rtin g to those w h o w e re n o t on ly in tim ately fam iliar w ith th e progress o f th e sciences b u t w h o also w ish ed to m ain tain th eir spiritual convictions. L ike Sir T h o m as B ro w n e , th e y held th a t ‘M an y things are tru e in divinity, w h ic h are n eith er ind u cib le b y reason, n o r confirm able b y sense.’ 6 T h u s he co u ld lose h im self th e m o re h ap p ily in an ‘O altitudo/ ’ and fm d great satisfaction in accepting as a m atter o f faith w h a t he k n e w to be im possible as a 4 Fideism is a word which has been used in various ways. I always use it here in the sense defined in the text. The fideist attitude may, perhaps rather rashly, be characterized as Augustinian and Protestant, because the emphasis on the unique spiritual importance o f faith and the distinction between the religious and material spheres can be contrasted with the Catholic, Thomasian philosophy which asserted the fundamental unity of faith and reason, grace and nature. 5 Bacon, op. cit., vi.753. To some men this elimination o f the spiritual element led to a form of pantheism; see, e.g., G. Winstanlcy, T h e W o r k s , ed. Sabine (Ithaca, New York, 1941), pp. 564-6. 6 Sir Thomas Browne, T h e W o r k s , ed. Wilkin (London, 1852), ii. 394.

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m a tte r o f science. In such a w ay as this, spiritual abstractions w ere k ep t com patible w ith the m aterialistic nom inalism im plicit in the doctrines o f natural science. T h e n , in the second place, this fideistic separation freed natu ral en q u iry fro m the restrictive effects o f religious d o g m a and was calculated to allay attacks b y the C h u rch o n scientific research. This w as a great gain to B acon and his follow ers w h o felt th at the p ro p e r develo p m en t o f n atu ral p h ilo sophy had h ith erto been h in d ered b y its su b o rd in atio n to th eo lo g y , b y superstition an d excessive religious zeal. B u t once the distinction b etw een theology and em pirical science h ad been m ade, th en n o th in g fo u n d o u t b y a stu d y o f n a tu re n eeded to fear criticism and hostility as being incom patible w ith revealed tru th an d as likely to p ro m o te the cause o f Satan. It w as p ro b ab ly the freed o m fro m theological tram m els and ecclesiastical interference p ro m ised b y the fideistic separation th at led to B aco n ’s o w n ard e n t su p p o rt for the distinction. It did n o t m ake ev ery th in g m erely m aterial and secular b u t it established th a t th ere w as a sphere in w h ic h secondary causes w ere for certain purposes p rim a ry . As Galilei said, he d rew a h ue b etw een religion w h ich show ed the w a y to heaven and astro n o m y w h ich discovered th e w a y o f the heavens, and as a n atu ral philosopher he had n o th in g to say a b o u t the fo rm er. Y et th e distinction was n o t necessarily seen, at least at first, as in v o lv in g a double tru th . It w as rath er th a t th ere w as th o u g h t to be som ething like a double fo rm o f the sam e tru th , an d one w h ich w as ultim ately strong en o u g h to encom pass ap p aren t contradictions b etw een its different an d separate m an ifestations.7 T h u s th e few plain and indispensable points o f d o ctrin e necessary for salvation w ere revealed b y th e Scriptures u n a m big u o usly and directly to m a n ’s conscience; ev ery th in g else w as to be fo u n d out, on th e co n trary , b y the lig h t o f n atu re, a lth o u g h here n o th in g like the sam e certain ty co u ld be anticipated. II It w as thus obvious th a t the stu d y o f n atu re sh o u ld p ro ceed in its o w n w a y in d ep en d en tly o f theological considerations. B u t in 7 Bacon, op. cit., iii.221, 486, iv.89. And on the emergence of a new morality see below pp. 170, 178, 197-201 and n.86.

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w h a t m anner should the analysis be conducted? H ere the n e w school o f th o u g h t w as distinctly anti-rationalist in the sceptical trad itio n o f the Renaissance courantAibertin. This tre n d o f o p in io n to o k various form s, ranging fro m so-called ‘A cadem ic scepticism ’, an extrem e p o in t o f view w h ich dogm atically d enied th a t any k n o w led g e o f the w o rld was possible at all, to ‘P y rrh o n ia n scepticism ’, an attitu d e o f cautious d o u b t w h ic h h eld th at, as there was insufficient evidence to k n o w w h e th e r an y k n o w led g e was possible, ju d g e m e n t should be suspended. In the early m o d e m p erio d the latter fo rm generally prevailed .8 B u t th ere w as in any case c o m m o n g ro u n d in the distrust o f reason b y itself, all sceptics agreeing in reg ard in g it as being unable satisfactorily to investigate and u nderstand the w o rld . T h u s h.um an reason was n o t m erely expelled fideistically fro m the religious sphere, w h ere faith and b e lie f alone ruled, it w as even denied a d o m in a n t role in the study o f n ature. T h e considerations advanced included the fo llo w in g . R eason was lim ited in scope for there w as so m u ch o f w h ich m en w ere ig n o ra n t and w h ic h th ey w o u ld p ro b ab ly n ever be able to u n d e rstand at all. In the spirit o f M o n ta ig n e ’s ‘Q u e sais-je?’, the sceptic said, w ith Sir W illia m T em p le, th a t there w ere ‘m an y seem ing im possibilities . . . b ey o n d the fa th o m o f h u m a n reason o r c o m p reh en sio n .’ In a sense, o f course, this follo w ed fro m the separatio n o f the spheres o f reason and faith. B u t m o re th an this was im plied: T e m p le m ean t th a t even w ith in the secular sphere, a m a n ’s capacity for learning w as restricted, so th a t the m o re he k n e w o f one th in g the less he k n e w o f oth ers.9 T h e n , even w h ere the use o f reason was p o ten tially fruitful, its o p eratio n was all too freq u ently defective, a p o in t o f v ie w reflected b y B aco n ’s d o ctrin e o f the ‘Idols o f the M in d ’ and B ro w n e ’s sim ilar con cern w ith c o m m o n ‘causes o f e rro r’. B aco n contin u ally stressed th e m istakes in to w h ic h the h u m a n understanding, w ith its p ro p en sity to facile abstraction, w as easily led, and in this w ay he always em phasized 8 R. H. Popkin, T h e H i s t o r y o f S c e p tic is m f r o m E r a s m u s to D e s c a r te s (Assen, Holland, 1960), pp. ix, xii-xiii. 0 Sir William Temple, W o r k s (London, 1814), iii.473-6, 537; Temple’s T h e E a r l y E s s a y s a n d R o m a n c e s (Oxford, 1930), pp. 156-7; and cf. Locke, A n E s s a y c o n c e r n in g H u m a n U n d e r s ta n d in g (Everyman ed., London, 1961), i.6-9 (Li).

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the clangers o f any excessive reliance on reason. L ord H alifax, the trim m e r, n o te d th at a m a n ’s reason was o n ly to o likely to be c o rru p ted b y ‘P artiality and C o m m o n Prejudices’ and tw isted to serve his interests. M en believed n o t w h a t reason dictated b u t w h a t th ey w an ted to believe o r w h a t was easiest to accept. H e expressed the essence o f the attitu d e w ell b y saying th at m ost m en ‘p u t th eir R eason o u t to Service to their W ill’ and th at th eir un d erstan d in g was v ery easily ‘shoved o u t o f its Place b y w a rm T h o u g h ts o f an y k in d ’.10 In effect, the o rth o d o x psychological h ierarch y was usually, indeed naturally, in a state o f disorder, a consequence o f the Fall o f m an and the c o rru p tio n o f his faculties. This was the v iew expressed in different b u t related w ays b y M achiavelli, C alv in and o th e r ‘naturalists’ o f the C ounter-R enaissance. M o re th an this, the traditional belief, th a t reason was a gift given uniq u ely to m an am o n g the creatures o f m aterial creation, w as rejected. In De Rerum Natura (1565) Telesius (w ho h ad such a m ark ed influence o n B acon) h ad suggested th a t ‘the perceptive faculty, w h ich seems to be p ro p e r to the h u m a n soul an d is called rational, w e th in k has m anifestly been bestow ed u p o n the souls o f all o th er anim als’.11 In the sam e style, M on taig n e, in his essay o n The Apologie o f R a y m o n d Sebond, criticized as intellectual p re su m p tio n , the conventional o p in io n ab o u t th e central status o f m an and th e im p o rtan ce thereto o f his reason. H e denied th at m a n ’s intellect placed h im above th e anim als, saying ‘W e m u st n o te th e p a rity that is b etw eene us’. W h a te v e r m an m ig h t vainly like to im agine, h e h ad n o ‘essentiali pre-excellencie’ and i f the tru th w ere told, ignorance n o t w isdom was his m o st striking characteristic.12 T h e sin o f scholastic and h u m an ist rationalism h a d ‫׳‬ been its intellectual pride. Its ex p o n en t h ad tried to w rin g the system o f n atu re fro m his o w n fallible m in d an d so h ad arro g ated his defective reason above th e w orks o f G od. T h e sceptic should p ro ceed m o re h u m b ly in th e opposite w ay. As B acon w ro te, ‘th e w o rld is n o t to be n a rro w e d till it w ill go in to the u n d erstan d in g 10 T h e

C o m p le te W o r k s o f G e o r g e S a v i l e , F ir s t M a r q u e s s o f H a l i f a x , cd. Raleigh (Oxford, 1912), pp. 47- 48, 170- 2 4 6 , 254. 11 VIII.xv, quoted T. Spencer, S h a k e s p e a r e a n d th e N a t u r e o f M a n (2nd ed., N ew York, 1951), P• 33• 12 Montaigne, E s s a y s , tr. Florio (Everyman ed., London, 1948), ii.137-44, 15ifF.

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(w hich has been done h ith e rto ), b u t the u n d erstan d in g to be expanded and opened till it can take in the im ag e o f the w o rld , as it is in fact.’13 Such anti-rationalism w as no t, o f course, an en tirely n ew attitu d e. T h e doctrines o f Sextus E m piricu s w ere an im p o rta n t p a rt o f the classical legacy; C hristians h ad lo n g p o n d ered over biblical references to the v an ity o f th e m in d an d to the general co rru p tio n o f m a n ’s faculties consequent u p o n his orig in al sin; religious m ystics explicitly sought a n o n -ratio n al p ath to divine illu m ination; and m edieval nom inalists had fam iliarized p h ilo sophers w ith the argum ents against relying o n reason as the basis o f h u m a n k n o w led g e.14 In any event, b y the early m o d e rn p erio d a situation had been reached in w h ich to m an y thinkers it was o n ly too clear th a t understanding o f the actual w o rld o f n atu re and m an could n o t be based either o n faith o r o n unaided reason. It seem ed to follow th a t o n ly experience p ro v id e d an adequate p rim a ry source and crite rio n o f acceptable n atu ral learning. Zabarella, one o f the m ost im p o rta n t m ethodologists o f the em pirical school, w ro te th at ‘all o u r k n o w led g e takes its o rig in fro m sense, n o r can w e k n o w an y th in g w ith o u r m inds unless w e have k n o w n it first b y sense.’ 15 B u rto n , in his usual m any-sided w ay, reflected these view s, h o ld in g th a t there w as ‘ “ n o th in g in the u n derstanding w h ich w as n o t first in the sense’’ ’.16 A n d the idea th a t the m in d w as a tabula rasa o n w h ich sense im pressions registered their basic k n o w led g e becam e one o f the fu n d am en tal epistem ological principles o f the B ritish em pirical tra d itio n .17 O f course, th e extrem e sceptics denied th a t even this experiential 13 Bacon, op. cit., iv.255-6; cf. the numerous examples cited in Haydn, op. cit., pp. 76-S2. A good political instance occurs in John Hall's T h e G r o u n d s a n d R e a s o n s o f M o n a r c h y where royalists were criticized for asserting the supremacy of monarchy abstractly and out of ‘their own presuppos’d Speculation’ instead o f from concrete instances. Sec T h e O c e a n a O f J a m e s H a r r in g to n , E s q ; A n d H i s O th e r W o r k s , ed. Toland (Dublin, 1737), where Hall’s tract is reprinted, pp. 4-5. 14 These factors are discussed by L. I. Bred void, T h e I n te lle c tu a l M i li e u o f J o h n D r y den (Ann Arbor, 1959), ch. ii. 16 D e M e t h o d i s , lll.xix, quoted J. H. Randall Jr., ‘The Development of Scientific Method in the School o f Padua’, J o u r n a l o f th e H i s t o r y o f I d e a s , i (1940), p. 198. 16 R. Burton, T h e A n a t o m y o f M e la n c h o ly (Everyman cd., London, 1948-9), i. 165. 17 e.g. Bacon, op. cit., iv.47; Hobbes, L e v i a t h a n , ed. Oakeshott (Oxford, n.d.) p. 7; Locke, op. cit., i.77 (II.i.2), Hume, A T r e a tis e o f H u m a n N a t u r e (Everyman ed., London, 1940-9), i.13-14•

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basis was reliable and p o in ted o u t h o w deceptive the evidence o f the senses could be. B u t there was a substantial b o d y o f o p in io n w h ich u rg ed that alth o u g h it w as im possible to be d o g m atic ab o u t the conclusions reached, and alth o u g h these could say n o th in g ab o u t the real n atu re o f things, they w ere nevertheless a quite acceptable b o d y o f hypotheses and predictions ab o u t the relations b etw een things and the future course o f experience. This ‘co n structive o r m itigated scepticism ’ was a p rag m atic m iddle w a y .18 It was often called rational. B u t the reason in v o lv ed was n o t th e o rd er th eo rist’s elaboration o f correspondences o r the abstract logic o f th e schools w ith their unem pirical no tio n s o f real essences an d the like. It is best described, using Professor R. K . M e rto n ’s te rm , as ‘em pirico -ratio n alism ’, reason tied to an d d ependent on experience and experim ent. ‘ . . . jo in sense u n to reason, an d ex p erim en t u n to speculation’, w ro te Sir T ho m as B ro w n e, ‘and so give life u n to em b ry o n truths, and verities y et in their chaos.’19

I ll r

T h e m e th o d used to analyse experience as a basis for generalization to o k a n u m b e r o f form s as philosophers adapted the tech niques to their different styles and purposes, b u t th e c o m m o n ro o t fro m w h ich these variations derived w as the so-called resolutiv c-co m p o sid v c o r regress m eth o d . It was based m ain ly o n ideas deriv ed fro m A ristotle’s Posterior Analytics and G alen’s discussion o f the techniques o f m edical investigation, and was developed d u rin g the later M id d le Ages, in particular b y R o b e rt G rosseteste and his follow ers in the School o f O x fo rd and also in the U n iv e rsity o f Paris. Its later and p ro b a b ly m ost influential fo rm was associated w ith th e universities o f n o rth e rn Italy, in particu lar o f P adua, d u rin g the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.20 T his version 18 Popkin, op. cit., ch. vii, esp. pp. 132-3, 141-2, 150-3. 19 R. K. Merton, ‘Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England*, O siriSy iv (1938), p. 426 andn. 37, cf. pp. 451-4; Browne, op. cit., iii.m . As in so many things, Vives early reflected this same emphasis: see V iv e s o n E d u c a tio n , tr. Watson (Cambridge, 1913), pp. 20-22. 20 For my summary of the resolutive-compositive method I rely largely on Randall, art. cit., A. C. Crombie, A u g u s t i n e to G a lile o (2nd ed., London, 1961), ii. 12-28, and the

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was especially im p o rta n t because such a large n u m b e r o f the m edical m en and natu ral philosophers o f the early m o d e rn p erio d studied at P adua o r cam e u n d er its sw ay: Vesalius, Fabricius, Caius, H arvey, Telesius and Galilei am o n g m an y others spent som e tim e there and w e n t aw ay u nder the influence o f the fru itfu l techniques th e y learned. T h e central d octrine was the analysis o f causation. T h e rejection o f final causes as a categ o ry unsuitable for the explanation o f n atu ral p h en o m en a had lo n g been advocated, b y W illia m o f O c k h a m for instance in the fo u rteen th centu ry , and this follow ed o f course fro m the fideistic division. In B aco n ’s w ords, ‘the in quisition o f Final Causes is b arren, and like a v irg in consecrated to G od, produces n o th in g ’. T h e assum ption was m ade, therefore, th a t ‘G od w o rk e th n o th in g in n a tu re b u t b y second causes’.21 T h e stu d y o f n atu re thus becam e the study o f the relations b etw een im m ediate, m aterial causes and th eir effects. In a w ay, the chain o f necessary causes and effects to o k th e place o f the chain o f created being. A v e ry influential statem ent o f th e m eth o d , and one w h ich is particularly w ell docum ented, w as th at o f Jaco p o Z abarella w h o lived fro m 1533 to 1589. H e ta u g h t th a t an y necessary co n n ex io n b etw een things was causal, and th a t therefore u n d erstan d in g h ad to consist in reasoning either fro m cause to effect (a process variously called synthesis, com position o r d em o n stratio n ) o r fro m effect to cause (analysis o r resolution). H e explained th a t c o m p o sition w as syllogistic in fo rm and p ro d u ced n e w k n o w led g e fro m p ro p o sitions th at w ere ‘necessary, im m ed iate, b e tte r-k n o w n ’. T h e prem isses o f the syllogism w ere considered as the logical causes o f the conclusion. O n th e o th e r hand, resolutive m e th o d reversed the p ro ced u re. It started fro m effects, things w h ich w ere ‘p o ste rio r’, and w e n t o n to discover ‘p rio r tilings and causes’. In same author’s R o b e r t G r o s s e te s te a n d th e O r ig in s o f E x p e r i m e n t a l S c ie n c e 1 1 0 0 - 1 7 0 0 (Oxford, 1953), pp. 24-29, 52-90, 132-4 and ch. xi p a s s i m . Some instances of the application o f this method to political discussion were pointed out many years ago by E. Cassirer, T h e P h ilo s o p h y o f th e E n li g h t e n m e n t (Boston, i960), pp. 254-6, 270-3 (originally published in 1932), and by L. Strauss, T h e P o litic a l P h ilo s o p h y o f H o b b e s (Oxford, 1936), pp. 2, 151-5. a1 Bacon, op. cit., iii.267, iv.365.

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the study o f the em pirical w o rld it was necessary to set o u t fro m the facts th a t w ere k n o w n . So investigation first w e n t ‘fro m the k n o w n effect to the u n k n o w n cause’, and then retu rn ed ‘fro m the cause so k n o w n to the effect to be dem onstrated, th at w e m ay k n o w the reason w h y it is so.’ In o th e r w ords, the scientist started w ith th e observed p h en o m en a o r k n o w n effects, and proceeded to resolve these phenom ena, th a t is, to b reak th em d o w n to discover the o perative causes. T h en , having regressed in this w ay to the basic factors o r causal principles at w o rk , w hich in the A ristotelian m an n er w ere called ‘fo rm s’, he was then in a position to ‘co m pose’ o r b rin g th e m to g eth er in a general statem ent describing the necessary relations betw een th em . Such a statem ent o r law w o u ld necessarily cover the specific p henom ena fro m w h ich the analysis started. A nd, o f course, it should cover o th er sim ilar cases i f it w as accurate and i f it was to be useful.22 T h e em pirical basis o f this procedure is evident. E xperience was th e essential starting p o in t o f the resolutive process and so, u n d erlying the various form s taken b y this m eth o d , there was a c o m m o n insistence on th e necessity o f beg in n in g w ith a solid fo u n d atio n o f confirm ed em pirical data.23 O f course, th e em p iricists alw ays ad m itted th e value o f any tentative theories w hich w ere testable descriptions o f cause-effect relations betw een facts and guides to their collection, b u t they persistently refused to have an y th in g to do w ith abstract, unverifiable hypotheses. F or instance, th ey rejected com pletely and as logically im possible any n o tio n ab o u t fundam ental reality, th ereb y indicating the difference b etw een the n atu re o f th eir approach and the scholastic certainties th ey repudiated. In his histo ry o f the early years o f the R oyal Society, at the date 23 N o v e m b e r 1664, D r T h o m as B irch p u t the follow ing passage (the w o rk referred to is H o o k e ’s ‘m icroscopical b o o k ’): 22 Randall, art. cit., pp. 197, 200. The method was basically qualitative but could be combined with mathematics. Number was always regarded as an important ‘form* or *quality* so that numerical consideration o f phenomena was by no means incompatible with formal analysis of causation. The use o f mathematics was a refinement added to the *empirical* method, not necessarily something quite different. 23Though see N . W . Gilbert, R e n a is s a n c e C o n c e p ts o f M e t h o d (New York, i960), pp. 167-73, 178-9, where it is argued that the empirical element in Zabarella’s writings is not so characteristic as has usually been suggested.

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That M r. hooke give notice in the dedication o f [his] w ork to the society, that though they have hcensed it, yet they ow n no theory, nor will be thought to do so: and that the several hypotheses and theories laid dow n by him therein, are not delivered as certainties, but as conjectures; . . . Mr. iiooke accordingly, in his dedication to the Royal Society inserted the following passage: ‘The rules you have prescribed yourselves in your philosophical progress, do seem the best that have ever yet been practised; and particularly that o f avoiding dogmatizing, and the espousal o f any hypothesis not sufficiently grounded and confirmed by experiments. This way seems the most excellent, and may preserve both philosophy and natural history from its former corruptions.’21 N e w to n h im self expressed the same idea. In the fam ous ‘G eneral S ch o lium ’ at th e end o f the th ird b o o k o f his Principia, w h en discussing the n atu re o f g ravitation, he said: ‘h ith e rto I have n o t been able to discover the cause o f those prop erties o f g rav ity fro m p h en o m ena, and I fram e n o hypotheses: for w h atev er is n o t deduced fro m the p h en o m en a is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, w h e th e r m etaphysical or physical, w h e th e r o f o ccu lt qualities or m echanical have n o place in exp erim en tal p h ilosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are in ferred fro m the p h en o m ena, and afterw ards rendered general by in d u c tio n .’25 T h e re w ere thus firm ly established as basic principles o f the em pirical m eth o d the tw o notions th at the m e th o d itself w as to be distinguished fro m the general theories (necessarily tentative) w h ich w ere b u ilt up b y its use, and th a t e n q u iry had alw ays to begin w ith the system atic collection and analysis o f em pirical data. T h e re w ere differences o f o p in io n h o w far it w as necessary to carry this essential initial stage. S om e o f the theorists like Z abarella held th a t it w as feasible to begin the regress analysis w ith a lim ited range o f selected instances w h ich could be reg ard ed as k ey illustratio n s o f the general principle. T his m eth o d , he w ro te, ‘does 245 24 T. Birch, T h e H i s t o r y o f th e R o y a l S o c ie ty o f L o u d o n (London, 1756-7), i.491 and note a. 25 Newton, M a th e m a tic a l P r in c ip le s , cd. Cajori (Berkeley, 1934), p. 547; see also Newton’s O p t i c k s (4th ed., London, 1931), pp. 404-5. Cf. the antiquarians’ rejection o f ‘conjeeture’ and the similarity of their manner to that of the natural scientists, as described by F. S. Fussner, T h e H is to r ic a l R e v o l u t io n (London, 1962), pp. 97, 104-6.

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n o t take all the particulars into account, since after certain o f th em have been exam ined o u r m in d straig h tw ay notices the essential connection, and then disregarding the rem ain in g p a rticulars proceeds at once to brin g to g eth er the universal.’26 This, no d o u b t, was the m ost practical m anner o f proceed in g and th e technique w h ich w as show n, in tim e, to be the m ost feasible and useful. D u rin g the seventeenth century, h o w ev er, such a sh o rt cu t was n o t universally held to be desirable. T h e characteristic view , in E n g lan d at least, was B aconian. A n d B acon, alth o u g h he d id p ro v id e for som ething like this shorter process w ith his d o ctrin e o f ‘p rero g ativ e instances’, tended alm ost alw ays to press the superior virtues o f having th e w idest possible factual basis. H e th o u g h t this was essential, really, to successful in d u c tio n .27 So according to the tru e B aconian style, the initial task o f the em pirical scientist was to accum ulate as large a collection o f observations and experim ental data as possible. A n tiq u ity and the m edieval scholastics w ere blam ed, b y B ishop S prat for instance, for n o t assem bling ‘a vast pile o f experim ents’. T his ‘encyclopaedic ten d en cy ’, as Sir G eorge C lark called it, fo u n d expression in m an y fields: in the establishm ent o f m useum s, botanical gardens an d herbaria; in the historical collections o f docum ents co m p iled b y C am d en, D ugdale, C o tto n , M ad o x and R y m er; in the astonishing! curiosity a b o u t all sorts o f natural p h en o m en a sh o w n by the. virtuosi o f the R oyal Society, w h o w ere consciously stim ulated by, the B aconian idea o f an extensive collection o f n atu ral histories as the basis for all scientific understanding; and in m an y sim ilar w ays. T h e attitu d e m ay have fostered dilettantism an d have been p a tc h y . in its effectiveness, v arying in the degree o f its application fro m one d ep artm en t o f activity to another. B u t it was nonetheless an im p o rta n t intellectual characteristic o f the tim e, and w as applied to the sphere o f political as w ell as natural science. IV D o u b t ab o u t the transcendental o rd e r led, as I have explained, to the distinction b etw een th e spheres o f G o d an d n ature. M an 20 D e R e g r e s s u , ch. iv, quoted Randall, art. cit., p. 200. 27 See below pp. 213-15. M

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as a political anim al belonged to the latter realm , a v iew reinforced perhaps b y the traditional p ro cedure o f co m p arin g the b o d y politic to various aspects o f the m acrocosm . It was consequently im p lied th at the study o f m a n and society could be carried o n b y th e same em pirical m eth o d th at was being used so successfully to investigate the processes o f the m aterial w o rld . T h e facts o f m a n ’s n atu re and his history, as these w ere influenced b y the physical en v iro n m e n t in w hich he lived, could, it was th o u g h t, be analysed to reveal the p erm an en tly operating factors o f political and social life. Indeed, the great progress achieved b y n atu ral science helped to stim ulate the anticipation that a genuine, em pirically based political science was possible. A g o o d exam ple o f this optim istic expectation was p ro v id e d b y B ishop Sprat, w h o declared th a t alth o u g h n atu re alone was first to be considered b y th e em pirical m e th o d (because this was the easiest and least contentious field o f investigation), in the end all o th er areas o f en q u iry w o u ld be studied as w ell and reduced to o rd er in th e sam e w a y .28 Such a science o f pohtics, w h e n it was developed, w o u ld n o t necessarily reach the same conclusions as traditional m o ral an d pohtical th eo ry . These w ere based o n th eo lo g y w hich, in term s o f the fideistic distinction, h ad n o th in g to say ab o u t the sphere o f second causes. T h e law s o f the h u m a n w o rld could n o t be d eterm in ed in advance o f th e investigation w h ich w as supposed to elicit th e m . A n d the analysis o f experience w o u ld n o t be u n d ertak en m erely to show h o w traditional tenets m ig h t be m o re effectively applied, h o w m en m ig h t be directed in to the paths o f o rth o d o x conduct. It w o u ld , in the end, be a basis for ind ep en d en t generalization, and w o u ld p ro d u ce its o w n ideas ab o u t the best fo rm o f g o v ern m en t, m o ral criteria and so forth. T h e cluster o f ideas p ro d u ced I call the political th e o ry o f em piricism , for there was a certain degree o f u n ifo rm ity o f co n elusion a m o n g those w h o claim ed to be bu ild in g so m eth in g n e w o n the basis o f in ductively considered experience. N o t a co m p lete c o m m u n ity o f view s, naturally, b u t a sufficient m easure o f agreem e n t to be distinctive. O f course, w h a t w as d one was n o t w h o lly 28 T. Sprat, H i s t o r y o f th e R o y a l S o c ie ty , ed. Cope and Jones (London, 1959), p. 17; cf. Sprat’s own statement of the method, ibid., p. 31.

Empiricism and Politics

n ew at all; and despite all protestations o f scientific o b jectiv ity to the co n trary , the conclusions reached w ere n o d o u b t b o th influenced b y traditional n o rm s and p rem ed itated in d ep en d en tly o f the evidence— as w h a t political theories arc not? B u t this experience-based p rudence p ro v id e d the fou n d atio n o f the m o d erate, fairly conservative, trim m e r-ty p e political attitu d e o f m an y sev en teen th -cen tu ry E nglishm en. It w as concerned to free society fro m the m o re undesirable claim s o f absolute m o n arch y and to show h o w ‫־‬a‫־‬stable an d prosperous political system could be established; ju st as B aconian em piricism had.as its scientific objective the freeing o f m a n ’s m in d fro m th e cram p in g effects o f established intellectual a u th o rity and th e foundation o f sound, useful and progressive learning. It w as n o t really radical and m ade no appeal to n atu ral rights, conscience and such-like ‘n on-scientific’ co n ceptions. A nd so, like th e scientific m e th o d o lo g y o n w h ic h it was based, its politics w as rath er o u t o f touch w ith the future. W h ic h is w h y it is im p o rta n t to exam ine it carefully. W h a t, then, w ere th e tenets o f the political th e o ry o f em p iricism? It m ean t basically, as I have said, the collection o f ap^ p ro p riate facts as a basis fo r inductive generalization. I shall first rev iew th e types o f experience on w hich the political em piricist d re w in support o f his conclusions, and th en go on to indicate w h a t these conclusions w ere in th e field o f m orals and politics. T h en , as I did w ith the political th e o ry o f o rd er, I shall illustrate the d o ctrin e in m o re detail b y lo o k in g at som e o f the exponents o f the creed. E m pirical data w ere th e basis o f the inductiv e analysis and there w ere tw o m ain kinds o f h u m a n experience used for the purpose o f political and ethical generalizatio n : personal experience, and vicarious experience. ‘E xperience is either personal k n o w led g e gained by o u r o w n action, o r the k n o w led g e acquired b y w h a t w e have seen, read, h eard of, in o th ers.’29 T o this th ere had to be added the study o f those n atu ral factors w h ich influenced h u m a n affairs. 29 Vives, op. cit., p. 228. The division was an empirical commonplace and was expressed, e.g., in very similar terms over a century and a half later in R. Molesworth, A n A c c o u n t o f D e n m a r k (London, 1694), sig. a[1] verso. I7I

Order, Empiricism and Politics

Personal experience consists o f w h a t m ay be called ‘a u to b io g ra p h y ’ and ‘in tro sp ectio n ’, th at is to say, experience o f v ario us kinds, b o th external and psychological, w h ich is acquired d u rin g th e course o f an indiv id u al’s life. T h e w id er a m a n ’s external ex perience, th e b etter he is able to assess the co n d u ct o f others and to fo rm accurate generalizations ab o u t politics. For this reason, the literatu re o f th e tim e continually u rg e d a b ro ad en in g o f c o n tacts and suggested th at as m u ch as possible should be seen o f all sorts and conditions o f m en in different lands. In consequence, trav el w as considered an essential p art o f the train in g o f m en w hose d u ty it w as to be concerned w ith public affairs. As R o b e rt M olesw o rth p u t it, ‘ Travel seems as necessary to one w h o desires to be useful to his C o u n try , as practising u p o n o th er M e n ’s D istem pers is to m ake an able Physician. . . .’ H ence the g ro w in g fashion for the g ran d to u r as an essential p a rt o f th e edu catio n o f y o u n g m en o f quality. T h e a u th o rity o f A ristotle’s Rhetoric was in v o k ed , in w h ich it was stated th a t a sound political ed u catio n d ep en d ed o n the u n d erstanding o f different system s o f g o v e rn m e n t.30 T his co u ld be o b tain ed b y travelling in foreign countries an d m ak in g careful political observations, h i this spirit, too, books w ere w ritte n to guide and instruct the in ten d in g traveller a b o u t w h a t he should lo o k for and try to learn d u rin g his jo u rn e y so as to m ax im ize its value. For exam ple in 1598 P hilip Jones published his Certain briefe, and speciali Instructions, the object o f w h ich w as to train observers to n o te and analyse d u rin g th eir voyages ab ro ad a lo n g list o f topics covering every feature w h ich could c o n trib u te to th e ir k n o w led g e: th ey should lo o k especially at a c o u n try ’s geo g raphy, ‘n av ig atio n ’, agriculture, politics, religion, learn in g and so o n . A m o n g th e m an y o th er w o rk s o f the sam e k in d tw o typical and p opular exam ples w ere R o b e rt Jo h n so n ’s translation o f B o te ro ’s The Travellers Breuiat (1601) an d Sir R o b ert D allin g to n ’s A Method fo r Trauell (1605?). ‘In tro sp ectio n ’ o r personal psychological experience was, o f course, a particular aspect o f ‘a u to b io g ra p h y ’. B y ex am in in g his o w n feelings, m otives and thought-processes a m an could, it was 30 Aristotle, R h e to r ic , 1360a 30; the preceding quotation is from Molesworth, op. cit., sig. a2 verso. I 72

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th o u g h t, acquire valuable insight in to h u m a n n atu re generally. F or m en (at least those w ith a c o m m o n cu ltu re an d en v iro n m e n t) w ere n o t so different th a t th eir psychological attributes w ere n o t basically the sam e. ‘T h e h isto ry o f o ne m in d is the h isto ry o f m a n y .’ H ence th e im p o rta n c e a ttrib u te d to th e d ic tu m ‘k n o w th y se lf’; self-know ledge co u ld p ro v id e valuable data fo r political and ethical g eneralization.31 B u t, o f course, personal experience w as b o u n d to be lim ited . It w as especially im m ed iate in its im p act an d th e im pressions it m ade w ere likely to be deep and long-lastin g , b u t in the n atu re o f th in g s it co u ld n o t be as w id e as w as desirable, especially w h e n m easured against th e vast range o f possible experience. T im e, en erg y an d m o n e y w ere to o little. So w h ile valuable, personal experience w as to o n a rro w a basis for really adequate o r safe g eneralization, and it w as necessary to d ra w o n th e b a n k and capital o f vicarious experience o f all kinds. T h e re w ere tw o m ajo r sources o f such in fo rm a tio n p ro v id e d b y th e literatu re o f h isto ry an d o f travel. T h e b elief in the didactic value o f h isto ry w as im p o rta n t here. T h is has already been described,32 an d it need o n ly be ad d ed th at the same dev elo p m en ts w ere ta k in g place in h isto rio g ra p h y as in m a n y branches o f n a tu ra l science. T h e leg en d ary an d m iracu lo u s elem ents w ere b ein g critically exam in ed , a tte n tio n w as b ein g c o n cen trated o n detailed studies o f specific p ro b lem s rath er th a n o n the p ro d u c tio n o f universal conspectuses, au x iliary aids w ere b ein g d eveloped, an d direct inspection o f o rig in al m aterial w as b e c o m in g m o re c o m m o n . T h e result w as a m o re extensive an d reliable mass o f historical data as an em pirical basis fo r discussion an d as a source o f a u th o rita tiv e exam ples an d precedents. T h e literatu re o f travel also p ro v id e d an im p o rta n t source o f vicarious experience an d w as, in ad d itio n , v ital to the u n d erstan d in g o f th e effects o n m a n an d society o f ‘n a tu re ’ o r ‘c lim ate’. A 81 e.g. Montaigne, op. cit., iii.331, Hobbes, op. cit., p. 6; cf. Hobbes’s T h e E n g lis h W o r k s , ed. Molesworth (London, 1839-45), i 7 5 ‫־‬73‫ > ־‬a passage which also describes the *analytical’ and ‘synthetical’ (i.e. the resolutive-compositive) method. On the general importance o f ‘intense introspection’ cf. W . Haller, T h e R i s e o f P u r ita n is m (New York, 1947), PP* 90-100. 32 See above pp. 95-106.

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m a n could n o t travel in tim e, so he m ade up the deficiency by read in g h istory. I f he co u ld n o t trav el a b ro ad an d go to see for h im se lf the custom s, m anners and m ethods o f o th er countries, he read accounts o f jo u rn e y s w h ic h h a d been m ad e b y o th e r m en. T hese geographical h an d b o o k s often em b o d ied historical accounts o f the countries concerned, for in B o d in ian fashion the g eo p o h tical link b etw een history and g eo g rap h y w as reco g n ized to be v ery close. T o this m ix ed genre belongs the typ e o f b o o k represented b y the travelogue-histories o f R ichard H ak lu y t, Sam uel Purchas, T h o m as C o ry ate, Fynes M oriso n , P eter M u n d y an d so on. A g o o d representative exam ple fro m the p en o f B o tero was c o m m en d ed to the E nglish reader in term s w h ic h sho w ed w h a t was expected fro m such accounts: O u r A uthor deserves rather to bee num bred am ong the Polititians, than amongst the Historians or Geographers. Tis to his purpose sometimes to deliver you the situation o f the C ountry he discourses upon; so to shew you, first the Greatnesse o f each kingdom e. Secondly, how formidable or helpefulle each Prince is likely to prove to his next neighbour; out o f which tw o considerations, arise most o f these leagues, Alliances, and those other Tyes o f State, betw ixt Kingdom e and Kingdome. Thirdly, wee hence learne, how suddenly either Forces or Merchandizes may bee transported from one N ation to another. And all these helpe him [i.e. the author] to relate o f the Greatnesse and Riches o f each Kingdome; which to doe, bee tw o o f his maine purposes. The Historie that hee makes use o f is to shew you the valours o f people, the pow er o f taking opportunities, the advantages o f the use ofseverall weapons, &c. and that is also to his purpose. Both Geographic and History together (which bee the tw o favourite studies o f the times) doe serve finally for the delight o f the Reader; and doe altogether make up our A uthor into a complete and fine companion for Gentlemen, for Souldiers, for Schollers, and for all men to passe the time withall. . . .33 Like the histories o f the tim e, the travel books w ere intended, therefore, to serve a didactic purpose, and m an y o f th e m w ere politically orien ted in this w ay. D allin g to n ’s books o n France and T uscany w ere like this; so w ere the Elzevir an d o th er sim ilar series o f travel books, and to m en tio n b u t one specific exam ple o f 38 G. Botero,

T h e T r a v e lle r s B r e u ia t

(London, 1601), sigs. A2 verso-A3 verso.

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the same p erio d , Giles Fletcher’s O f the Russc Commonwealth (1589) w as a com plete account o f Russian g eography, laws, religion, m ilitary system , politics and society generally, intended to in struct the reader w h o w as unable to visit Russia him self. T h e result o f all this w as that b y the m iddle o f the seventeenth c e n r a ry it w as possible to b u y a reasonably g o o d account o f nearly ev ery im p o rtan t-E u ro p ean co u n try and o f m any outside E u ro p e.34 P articularly n u m ero u s w ere the descriptions o f states like Venice an d the U n ited Provinces, w h ich w ere supposed to be m odels o f stable g o v e rn m e n t in a free society. O n e m ost rem arkable feature w as the ‘sinom ania’ to w h ich travellers’ and m issionaries’ accounts gave rise. As a result o f their descriptions C hinese civilization acquired a great rep u tatio n , and its culture, institutions and ideas w ere m u ch in v o g u e as exam ples to be im itated .35 T his considerable b o d y o f literature, the p ro d u ctio n o f w h ich w as deliberately stim ulated b y the R oyal Society after the R estoratio n , had a n u m b e r o f im p o rta n t effects o n the discussion o f pohtical ideas. For one thing, it p ro v id e d a great deal o f detailed in fo rm a tio n a b o u t m an in th e state o f nature. M an y o f the n o tio n s ab o u t pre-social m an, like those o f H obbes an d Locke, w ere co n d itio n ed b y the state o f co n tem p o rary anthropological k n o w ledge. Sim ilarly, conceptions o f th e n oble savage w ere fo rm ed, at least in part, u n d er the influence o f accounts o f explorers.36 A n d w hile m an y m onarchists fo u n d evidence to su p p o rt th eir particular political view s, arb itrary kingship was n o t the system o f g o v e rn m e n t w h ich travellers m ost often n o ted a m o n g p rim itiv e m en, at least d u rin g the latter p a rt o f the early m o d e rn p e rio d .37 O n e early-eighteen th -ccn tu ry traveller, C ad w allader C old cn , held th a t the Indian nations o f N o rth A m erica, 34 G. N. Clark, S c ie n c e a n d S o c ia l W e lfa r e in th e A g e o f N e w t o n (2nd ed., Oxford, 1949), p. 129. 35 Sec A. O. Lovejoy, E s s a y s in th e H is to r y o f Id e a s (Baltimore, 1948), ch. vii, and W. W. Appleton, A C y c le o f C a th a y : th e C h in e s e V o g u e in E n g la n d in th e S e v e n te e n th a n d E ig h te e n th C e n tu r ie s (New York, 1951), where references will be found. A characteristic opinion was Temple’s high praise of Confucian philosophy and the Chinese system o f government in his essay ‘O f Heroic Virtue’ in W o r k s , ed. cit., iii.325-45. 36 J. L. Myres, ‘The Influence o f Anthropology on the Course o f Political Science’, U n iv e r s ity o f C a lifo r n ia P u b lic a tio n s in H i s t o r y , iv (1916), pp. 22-33. 37 R. W. Frantz, T h e E n g lis h T r a v e lle r a n d th e M o v e m e n t o f Id e a s 1 6 6 0 - 1 7 3 2 (Lincoln, Nebraska, !934)» P• 130.

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w h ich sh o w ed exactly th e m o st ancient an d o rig in al co n d itio n o f ev ery society, d em o n strated th e errors o f the p atriarch al th e o ry o f g o v e rn m e n t.38 A b o o k called C ivil Polity, w h ic h w as pub lish ed an o n y m o u sly in 1703, specifically defended th e L ockeian n o tio n s o f g o v e rn m e n t o n th e basis o f in fo rm a tio n p ro v id e d b y ‘the R ecords th at are left us b y th e A ncients; an d b y th e V oyages, T ravels, D iscoveries, and O bserv atio n s o f th e M o d e rn s.’3839 T h e n , this travel literatu re stim ulated th e co m p arativ e m e th o d o f stu d y in g m a n an d society in all their variations, in th e w a y th at, at a m u c h earlier tim e, A lex an d er’s collections m o v e d A ristotle and others to classify and system atize th e m in an a tte m p t to discover general principles. O f course, this appro ach w as n o t co nfined to th e political sphere. L o rd H e rb e rt o f C h e rb u ry , for instance, w as o n e o f those w h o searched th e religions o f th e w o rld fo r the essential tru th s o f ‘rational re lig io n ’ c o m m o n to all o f th e m . B u t in th e stu d y o f politics, th e essence o f this attitu d e w as reflected b y Sir W illia m T e m p le w h o , in his fam ous essay O f Heroic Virtue (1690), h ad w ritte n o f the invaluable things to be learn ed fro m such w id e -ra n g in g stu d y .40 H is o w n w ritin g s ab o u t law and g o v e rn m e n t w e re g o o d illustrations o f the em p irical ap p ro ach , especially as h e help ed to ex ten d its scope an d to b reak n e w g ro u n d b y w id e n in g th e basis o f analysis b e y o n d the fra m e w o rk o f co n v en tio n al scholarship, w h ic h ten d ed to co n cen trate o n the E u ro p e a n scene. A lth o u g h T e m p le th o u g h t th a t E u ro p e , and especially its classical perio d , w as im p o rta n t, it also seem ed to o n a rro w a basis for political and m o ra l generalization. H e th erefo re suggested th e system atic consideration as w ell, o f th e experience o f o th e r parts o f th e w o rld . H e said h e w as inclined to believe th at som e o u t-ly in g countries, w h ic h w e re u n k n o w n to the ancients an d often o v erlo o k ed b y m o d e rn scholars, could p ro v id e ‘as m u c h m a tte r o f action and speculation, as the o th er scene so m u c h celebrated in s to ry .’ H e w e n t o n to explain th a t he m ean t this n o t 38 Frantz, op. cit., p. 126, where passages are cited from Colden’s T h e H i s t o r y o f th e F iv e I n d ia n N a t i o n s (New York, 1727). 89 [Peter Paxton] C i v i l P o lity . A T r e a tis e C o n c e r n in g th e N a t u r e o f G o v e r n m e n t . IV lte r e in th e R e a s o n s o f th a t G r e a t D i v e r s i t y to he o b s e r v e d in th e C u s to m s , M a n n e r s , a n d U s a g e s o f N a t i o n s , are H is to r ic a lly E x p l a i n e d (London, 1703), p. 193. 40 Temple, op. cit., iii.3 2 1 2 ‫ ; ־‬cf. Molesworth, op. cit., sigs. [a5] recto-verso.

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on ly in respect o f th eir size and geographical diversity, b u t also in co n n ex io n w ith th eir political arran g em en ts.41 T e m p le h im se lf studied w ith great care a w id e variety o f c o n te m p o ra ry trav el literatu re in o rd e r to gain k n o w le d g e o f the political and legal system s and the m o ral ideas o f different and d istant lands. H e p aid particular atte n tio n to A rabia, C hina, Scythia an d P eru , n o t sim ply because these w ere the areas oversea a b o u t w h ich he h ad m o st in fo rm a tio n , b u t ra th e r because th ey w ere representative o f the fo u r corners o f the w o rld and so, he th o u g h t, a m ost adequate basis for indu ctiv e generalization. N o t th at T e m p le neglected the lessons th a t co u ld be learned fro m a co m p arativ e study o f the m ajo r E u ro p ean p o w ers o f the day. Because o f his dip lo m atic tra in in g an d experience, he was especially suited for the k in d o f analysis in v o lv ed and attem p ted an o u tlin e in his A Survey o f the Constitutions, p ro b a b ly w ritte n in 1671. A n y g o v e rn m e n t, he said, o u g h t to k n o w ab o u t an d reflect u p o n ‘the constitutions, forces, and co n ju n ctu res’ o f n eig h b o u rin g states, so th a t it w as aw are o f the interests an d p o w e r o f the various countries w h ic h m ig h t affect its o w n policy an d positio n .42 It is alm ost certain th a t he w ro te and published his Memoirs (1691) w ith the sam e sort o f p urpose in m in d . T his is also tru e o f liis Observations upon the United Provinces (1672), one o f his lo n g est w o rk s an d one in w h ic h the em pirical style o f analysis is p artic u la rly evident. In the resolutive fashion its m e th o d consisted in stu d y in g D u tc h h isto ry to see in ‘the glasse o f tim e and ex p erience’ the ‘n atu ral springs’ o f th e c o u n try ’s rise and decline.43 T h e to n e o f the discussion m ay be in dicated b y q u o tin g th e o u tlin e o f the heads o f analysis w ith w h ic h T e m p le ended his preface: . . . whereas the greatness o f their strength and revenues grew out o f the vastness o f their trade, into w hich their religion, their manners and dispositions, their situation and the form o f their governm ent, were the chief ingredients; . . . it will be necessary, for the survey o f this great frame, to give some account o f the rise and progress o f their State . . .; to discover the nature and constitutions o f their governm ent in its several parts, and the motions o f it, from the first and smallest wheels; to observe w hat is peculiar to them in their situations or dispositions, 41 Temple, op. cit., iii.322-4.

42 Ibid., ii.209.

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43 Ibid., i.41-42, 82.

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and w hat in their religion; to take a survey o f their trade, and the causes o f it; o f the forces and revenues which composed their greatness, and the circumstances and conjunctures w hich conspired to their fall.44 O f course, T e m p le ’s efforts in this co m p arativ e field w ere n o t u nique. M an y sim ilar collations had appeared earlier in the cen tu ry, for instance, P ierre d ’A v ity ’s The Estates, Empires, and Principalities o f the World, published in translation in 1615, and P eter H e y lin ’s Cosmographie, w hich appeared in 1652. T h ere w ere m an y others. Indeed the p ro d u c tio n o f such surveys o f the resources, defences, trade and o f th e geographical and o th er features o f foreign countries, m ust alw ays have been p a rt o f the w o rk o f civil servants and statesm en. In this sense th e idea o f a co m p arative study o f pohtics m ay be seen sim ply as an extension o f n o rm a l diplom atic and adm inistrative practice.45 It is n o surprise, therefore, to find the idea exem plified in the w ritin g s o f such m en o f affairs as M achiavelh, B acon, H ahfax, T em p le, P etty , and later o f B olingbroke. O ften th e general effect o f reading ab o u t such diversity o f m anners and institutions was to lead m en to question the validity o f those o f th eir o w n co u n try . I f o th er political systems th an absolute m o n arch y and i f o th er rehgions th an A nglicanism , o r even than C hristianity, seem ed to p ro v id e the necessary conditions o f civil o rd er and p ro sp erity , th en w h y should existing in stitutions o f C h u rc h and state be reg ard ed as the one and o n ly norm ? ‫ ן‬U n d erly in g these im plications w as freq u en tly a ty p e o f historical and natu ral determ inism or, b etter, co n d itio n in g : the b elief th at the fo rm taken b y law s and institutions w as m o u ld e d b y circum stances. This w as a d o ctrin e o f relativity. Political systems could v ary according to the history, situation, habits and needs o f the p eople concerned; and the actions o f m en w ere likew ise no lo n g er seen as being fo rm ed directly u n d er the u n ifo rm o rd er o f G o d ’s design, b u t as a fu n ctio n o f a n u m b e r o f em pirical variables. 44 Temple, op. cit., i.38-39. 46 See, e.g., ‘Mr, Faunt’s Discourse touching the office o f Principal Secretary of Estate, etc.’ (1592) in J. R. Tanner (ed.), C o n s titu tio n a l D o c u m e n ts o f th e R e ig n o f J a m e s I A . D . 1 6 0 3 - 1 6 2 5 (Cambridge, i960), pp. 120-3.

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T h u s the single and sim ple pictu re o f a w o rld o f u n ity and o rd er w as split up and diversified. If, beneath all this variatio n , there was an y u n ifo rm ity at all, it could only be perceived b y a careful and extensive collection o f all the factual data w ith a v iew to th eir com p arison and conflation) If, fo r instance, the p ictu re o f an ideal system o f laws and g o v ern m en t w as sought, then, in the w o rd s o f B o d in ’s Methodiis, there w as only o ne w a y to proceed: to ‘b rin g to g e th e r and com pare the legal fra m e w o rk o f all states, o r o f the m o re fam ous states, and fro m th e m to com pile the best k in d .’46

V W h e n the em piricist carried ou t such a co m p arativ e o r historical analysis o f diverse systems o f law and g o v ern m en t, he inv ariab ly concluded th at am id all the differences w h ich he observed, the best, because m ost stable, fo rm o f constitu tio n w as one in w h ich there was a m ix tu re o f m onarchy, aristocracy and dem ocracy. T h e co nnexion b etw een his style o f th in k in g and a b elief in m ix ed g o v ern m en t was often rem ark ed at th e tim e. H obbes and Film er w ere p articularly scathing ab o u t the seditious effect o f reading books o f classical histo ry and policy w here, as w e shall see, the claim s o f m ixed g o v ern m en t w ere often stro n g ly advanced.47 Sim ilarly, royalists w ere b y no m eans unaw are th a t the study o f E n g la n d ’s past could p ro v e fertile g ro u n d for th e cu ltu re o f h o stility to the th ro n e : such research did n o t necessarily lay stress on the im p o rtan ce o f obedience to the ruler, as w as th e case w ith th e T u d o r histories discussed in an earlier chapter. This was w h y in 1604 the g o v e rn m e n t dissolved the Society o f A ntiquaries, and w h y in 1629 its agents searched Sir R o b e rt C o tto n ’s lib rary o f m anuscripts for seditious m aterial and then sequestered th e collectio n and restricted access to it. F or this lib rary and the w o rk it 46 Bodin, M e t h o d f o r th e E a s y C o m p r e h e n s io n o f H i s t o r y , tr. Reynolds (New York, 1945), p. 2. This was the object outlined also in Bodin’sJ u r i s U n iv e r s i D is tr ib u tio (1580). 47Hobbes, L e v i a t h a n , ed. cit., pp. 140-1, 214; cf. T h e E n g lis h W o r k s , ed. cit, vi. 168, 192-3, 233, 362; Filmer, P a tr ia rc h a a n d o th e r P o litic a l W o r k s , ed. Laslett (Oxford, 1949)» pp. 277-8, cf. p. 188.

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m ade possible w as a p o te n t political w eap o n , b eing a m a jo r source o f th e precedents o n w h ic h the parliam entarians rested so m u ch o f th eir case against the C ro w n . T h e same so rt o f reason led to th e suppression o f Selden’s History o f Tythes.ie T h is idea o f m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t could, as B o d in show ed, hide certain am biguities. Indeed, the precise system o f institutions 'w h ic h th e te rm w as in te n d e d to describe could v ary co n sid e rably. F or one th in g , advocacy o f this system w as co m p atib le w ith republicanism , insofar as the m onarchical fu n ctio n d id n o t have to be carried o u t b y an h ered itary o r even an elected k in g . It co u ld be p e rfo rm e d b y a P ro te c to r, D o g e, C hancellor, C o n su l o r som e sim ilar n o m in a te d o r elected first m inister, o r even b y a c o m m ittee o r council. T h e n , in its sim plest fo rm , m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t m ean t a fusion o f the m ain features o f the three elem ents w ith o u t in ten d in g th eir equal p artic ip a tio n in co n tro l o f affairs. T h e g e rm o f such an a rra n g e m e n t m ay be seen in the A ristotelian ‘p o lity ’ w h ere o n e g ro u p played a d o m in a n t p a rt (th o u g h there was, it is true, a b len d o n ly o f the rule o f the few and o f the m an y ). T a k in g u p this idea, som e later w riters often suggested th a t one o f the three parts should be p re p o n d e ra n t. M achiavelli, for instance, seems to have believed th a t in a rep u b lic fo u n d ed for expansion, this m ajo r c o m p o n e n t should usually be the p o p u lar o n e.4849 B u t in a perhaps m o re sophisticated version, the in te n tio n w as th at th e three elem ents should balance one an o th er. P o ly b iu s w as p ro b a b ly the first to express this idea fully. H av in g said ‘it is ev id en t th a t w e m u st reg ard as the best c o n stitu tio n a co m b in atio n o f all . . . three varieties’ o f g o v e rn m e n t, he u rg ed th at the S p artan p reced en t should be follow ed. T h e re, the force o f each c o m p o n e n t w as ‘neutralized b y th a t o f the o th ers’, so th at n o n e could ‘prev ail and outbalance a n o th e r’. T h e o b ject o f this device w as th a t th e co n stitu tio n should rem ain for as lo n g as possible in 48 On this general question see, e.g., Fussner, op. cit., ch.5; H. Butterfield, T h e E n g lis h m a n a n d h is H i s t o r y (Cambridge, 1945), pp. 37-38, 63; R. F. Brinkley, A r t h u r i a n L e g e n d in th e S e v e n te e n th C e n tu r y (Baltimore, 1932), pp. 31-33. Cf. the comment about Selden’s H i s t o r y in T. Randolph, P o e tic a l a n d D r a m a tic W o r k s , ed. Hazlitt (London, 1875), 11*485. 40 T h e D is c o u r s e s o f N ic c o lo M a c h i a v e l l i , ed. Walker (London, 1950), i.220, 226-7; though he also thought that in a state which did not wish to expand, the aristocracy might with advantage play the major role, ibid., i.220-2.

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a state o f equilibrium ‘like a w e ll-trim m e d b o at, kingship being g u ard ed fro m arrogance by the fear o f th e co m m o n s, . . . and the co m m o n s o n the o th e r han d n o t v e n tu rin g to tre at the kings w ith co n te m p t fro m fear o f the elders. . . T h e o u tco m e was th at b y d raw in g up his co nstitution in this w ay , L ycurgus ‘preserved lib erty at Sparta for a lo n g er p erio d than is recorded elsew here.’50 F ro m this and o th er classical sources like C icero, D ionysius o f Halicarnassus, P lu tarch and Livy, the various n o tions a b o u t m ixed g o v e rn m e n t passed to A quinas, M achiavelli, Soderini, P aru ta and o th er m oderns.51 In E n g lan d d u rin g the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the term m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t w as v ery often, p ro b ab ly usually, equated w ith a lim ited o r constitutional m o n arch y . In this system the royal p o w e r w as restricted by the au th o rity o f P arliam en t w h ich , as it consisted o f b o th L ords and C o m m o n s, represented the aristocratic and p o p u lar elem ents. T here was also, h o w ev er, an im p o rta n t tre n d o f republican th o u g h t w h ich asserted the virtues o f the n o n -m o n arch ical fo rm and w as represented b y m en like H a rrin g to n , Sidney, Russell and M ilto n . I shall n o w go on to indicate the factors w h ich co n trib u ted to the d ev elo p m en t and prevalence o f the idea o f m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t in this co u n try d u rin g the early m o d ern perio d . This analysis w ill show in m o re detail the characteristic conn ex io n o f the idea w ith the em pirical style o f th in k in g , and w ill also lead in p articu lar to a rev iew o f the special p attern o f E nglish h isto ry w h ich supporters o f this k in d o f constitution form u lated for them selves. As the preceding paragraphs w ill have indicated, m any o f the argum ents used w ere a legacy o f th e classical revival, ancient au th o rity co n trib u tin g b o th a philosophical justification o f the m ix ed system and som e o f the m ost influential illustrations o f its virtues. T he theoretical assertion, such as it was, w as th a t n o ‘p u re ’ or ‘sim ple’ fo rm o f being could rem ain lo n g undecayed and th at stability and lo ngevity w ere the characteristics on ly o f ‘m ix e d ’ 50 Polybius, T h e H is to r ie s (Loeb ed., London, 1922ff.), Vi.iii.7-9, x.7-11. The idea of a Lycurgean ‘Legislator’ here expressed is found frequently in the writings of supporters o f mixed government, such as Machiavelli, Harrington, Milton, Temple and Nevile. 61 The general theme and the transmission of ideas involved is admirably described by Z. S. Fink, T h e C la s s ic a l R e p u b lic a n s (2nd ed., [Evanston], 1962), pp. 2-10.

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o r ‘co m p o site’ bodies w h ich contained elem ents o f m o re than one sim ple fo rm . So far as political organizatio n was concerned, the logical im plication o f this v ie w was th at no sim ple ty p e o f g o v e rn m e n t could exist for any length o f tim e. It was th o u g h t possible, indeed, to observe a continual process o f decline and ren ew al.‫ ׳‬O n ce again, th e clearest and m ost influential statem ent o f the them e b y a classical w rite r was p ro b ab ly th a t o f Polybius, w h o w ro te in The Histories th at ‘M o n arch y first changes in to its vicious allied fo rm , ty ra n n y ; and next, the abolishm ent o f b o th gives b irth to aristocracy. A ristocracy b y its v ery n a tu re d eg en erates in to oligarchy; and w h en the com m o n s inflam ed b y anger take vengeance o n this g o v e rn m e n t for its unjust rule, dem o cracy com es in to being; and in due course the licence and lawlessness o f this fo rm o f g o v e rn m e n t produces m o b -ru le to com plete the series.’52 Finally, o f course, the confusion o r anarchy thus created n eeded th e firm rule o f one m an to restore peace and o rd er; m o n arch y reappeared; and so, apparently, ad infinitum. Y et there was, perhaps, a w a y in w h ich this seem ingly u n en d in g co n stitu tio n al cycle m ig h t be in te rru p te d and a degree o f relatively lo n g lasting stability obtained. This was to com bine features o f each p u re fo rm o f g o v e rn m e n t to m ake a m ixed, an d th erefo re m o re stable, b o d y .'F o r exam ple, Sidney w ro te th a t ‘Flistory and daily E x p erience’ show ed all governm ents to be subject to co rru p tio n an d decay ‘b u t w ith this difference, th at A bsolute M o n arch y is b y principle led u n to , o r ro o te d in it; w hereas m ix ’d o r p o p u lar G o v ern m en ts are o n ly in a possibility o f falling in to it’.5s ! It w as n o t, h o w ev er, in any m etaphysical term s th at the claims o f th e com posite political b o d y w ere m ost w id ely argued. T h e m ain appeal, as S idney’s reference show s, was to the lessons o f experience; an d the h isto ry in p articular o f the ancient w o rld (th ro u g h the k ey exam ples o f Sparta and republican R o m e) was taken to sh o w in d u b itab ly th e superior virtues o f the m ix ed system . H a rrin g to n reflected a co m m o n th em e w h en he co n trasted ‘ancient Prudence’, w hich he linked w ith these virtues, and 62 Polybius, op. cit., VI.iv.8-11; cf. the more detailed account at VI.v-ix. 53 Sidney, D is c o u r s e s co n c e rn in g G o v e r n m c tit (2nd ed., London, 1705), pp. 131*2; cf. p. 96 and also Machiavelli^ D is c o u r s e s y ed. cit., i.211-16, 459-60.

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‘ modern Prudence , w ith w h ic h he associated a b elief in absolute m o n arch y o r aristocracy.54 , B u t m o d ern as w ell as classical experience w as nonetheless pray ed in su p p o rt o f m ix ed g o v ern m en t. Indeed, the lessons o f c o n tem p o rary experience w ere in m any respects crucial, the political system o f V enice being singled o u t as a k ey exam ple o f a m ixed p o lity w hich, because o f its adherence to this system , had en d u red for a v ery long tim e and enjoyed peace and p ro sp erity o n a g rand scale. H a rrin g to n ’s friend, M arvell, hailed its w isd o m : T o the serene Venetian state I’ll go, From her sage m outh famed principles to know . This ‘V enetian m y th ’, as Professor Fink has called it,55 w as spread b y p o p u lar native w riters like P aru ta and C o n tarin i, and it was firm ly established in E n g lan d b y the end o f the sixteenth century. T h e reasons for its p o p u larity are fairly obvious. V enice was adm ired n o t m erely for w h a t w as taken to be the h a rm o n y and stability o f its political life, b u t also in a n u m b e r o f o th er ways, ran g in g fro m praise for the beauty o f its location and its buildings to appreciation o f its role in guarding E u ro p e against the T u rk . Sim ilarly, the dependence o f V enice’s pro sp erity o n trade and sea-pow er p ro d u ced obvious parallels w ith this co u n try , as did its conflicts w ith papal auth o rity . C ertainly, reference to V enetian institutions and practices w as m uch in v ogu e a m o n g P arliam en tm en in th eir quarrels w ith the king, and, d u rin g the C o m m o n w ealth w h en co n stitu tio n -m ak in g w as a p o p u lar pastim e, the ‘m ost serene republic’ w as m u ch in v o k ed as an exam ple to be follow ed. T h e m y th only began to lose its h o ld after the R cstoration, th o u g h it w as still strikingly em ployed b y W h ig s h k c H e n ry N ev ile d u rin g the E xclusion crisis and was indeed still used in the m id -eig h teen th centu ry . In ad d itio n to the V enetian case, it is p ro b ab le th at the ideas ab o u t the ancient French co n stitu tio n , 54J a m e s H a r r in g to n s O c e a n a , ed. Liljegren (Heidelberg. 1924), pp. 12-13. Sir Leslie Stephen noticed the association between support o f mixed government and the appeal to experience and history, see H i s t o r y o f E n g lis h T h o u g h t in th e E ig h te e n th C e n tu r y (3rd ed., New York, 1949), ii.134. 55 On the importance o f the Venetian example, see Fink, op. cit., esp. chs. ii, v and vii, on which I have drawn for most o f this paragraph.

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lim ited m o n arch y and m ixed g o v e rn m e n t w h ich w ere p ro d u ced in France d u rin g the religious troubles, had som e effect o n the p ro p ag atio n o f these notions in E ngland, for exam ple th ro u g h the influence o f H o tm a n ’s Franco-Gallia, the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos and sim ilar w orks p ro d u ced b y b o th the H u g u en o ts and Ligeurs. F urther, the experience o f E ngland itself w as b y no m eans ig n o re d in p u ttin g the case against absolute m o n arch y . D u rin g the early m o d ern p erio d there w as, as w e have already seen, m u ch discussion o f this c o u n try ’s historical tra d itio n and fro m various points o f view . ,Innum erable references w ere m ade to the ancient co n stitution (w hich w as a m ixed constitutio n ) and to the fundam ental law w h ich w ere th o u g h t b y m an y scholars an d law yers to be em bodied in th at trad itio n . F ro m these categories opponents o f royalism derived b o th a constitutional d o ctrin e and a particular version o f E nglish history. T h e constitutional th e o ry had tw o aspects, b eing linked w ith m edieval notions o f political pluralism and also w ith the idea o f the k in g ’s tw o bodies w h ich sim ilarly flourished in E n g lan d d u ring th e later M iddle Ages. T raditionally, p riv ate persons and institutions h ad been recognized to have established rights in their ‘p ro p e rty ’. These privileges w ere p ro te cted b y the fundam ental law (as em bodied, for instance, in M ag n a C arta), b y parliam e n ta ry co n tro l o f taxation, and b y the diffusion o f political and social au th o rity . Such a u th o rity w as regard ed as n o t b elo n g in g to the k in g alone b u t to the n atio n , and as being distrib u ted am o n g a n u m b e r o f related b u t separate, alm ost ind ep en d en t, institutions representative o f different interests. T hus there w ere the co existent authorities o f king, council, P arliam en t, C h u rch , courts, chartered boroughs, universities, inns o f court, an d so fo rth . U n d e r the ancient constitution o f the realm each o f these bodies had its p ro p er place and its o w n distinct fu n ctio n and p o w e r and was n o t supposed to encroach on any o th er. T his view w as used b y those w h o opposed S tuart attem p ts to stren g th en the royal position, for instance d u rin g the controversies over ecclesiastical co u rts and royal proclam ations. T h e c o m m o n law yers led b y C o k e often based their case against the k in g o n such trad itio n al usages and distinctions. In term s o f the k ey political p ro b le m , 184

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th at is the p ro b le m o f the relations b etw een k in g an d P arliam ent, the solution sou g h t b y opponents o f absolute m o n arch y was, in large p art, the m aintenance o f this conventio n al balance o f a u th o rity. H ere th ere is an obvious link w ith the o th er factor, the m edieval d octrine o f the k in g ’s tw o bodies. This was a sort o f political N estorianism w h ich distinguished betw een the k in g ’s n atu ral person and w ill o n the one hand, and his being th e rep resentative o f the im m o rta l b o d y politic, o f the dignitas o f the im personal C ro w n , o n the other. T h e 'k in g ’ was n o t the same as the ‘K in g ’. H obbes disdainfully called this n o tio n ‘an university q u ib b le’, b u t it w as nevertheless quite co m m o n . Since the b eg in nin g o f the fifteenth cen tu ry at least and follo w in g the lead given b y this idea, m an y co m m en tato rs had taken to defining the b o d y politic in term s n o t o f the k in g or head alone, b u t o f the k in g co m b in ed w ith his council and Parliam ent, w h ich to g eth er co n stituted a m ix ed or com posite body. In 1559 J o h n A y lm er refleeted this view w h en he w ro te, in An Harborowe for Faithful and True Subjects, th a t the ‘reg im en t o f E n g la n d ’ was n o t ‘a m ere m o n a rc h y ’ n o r w as it ‘a m ere oligarchy, n o r dem ocracy, b u t a rule m ix ed o f all these’.56 T h e specifically dualist th eo ry was n aturally used as a coun ter to claim s m ade o n b e h a lf o f the k in g . In 1610, d u rin g the debate o n im positions w h e n th e k in g ’s rig h t to levy d u ty w ith o u t parliam en tary consent w as challenged, the H ouse o f C o m m o n s w as to ld th at The soveraigne pow er is agreed to be in the king: but in the king is a tw o-fold power; the one in parliament, as he is assisted w ith the consent o f the whole state; the other out o f parliament, as he is sole, and singular, guided merely by his ow n will. And if o f these tw o powers in the king, one is greater than the other, and can direct and controule the other; that is suprema potestas, the soveraigne power, and the other is subordinata. It will then be easily proved that the pow er o f the king in parliament is greater than his power out o f parliament; and doth rule and controule it. . . ,57 56 Quoted in G. R. Elton (ed.), T h e T u d o r C o n s titu tio n : D o c u m e n ts a n d C o m m e n ta r y (Cambridge, i960), p. 16; cf. Sir Thomas Smith, D e R e p u b lic a A n g lo r u m , ed. Alston (Cambridge, 1906), pp. 46-47, 48. 57 A C o m p le te C o lle c tio n o f S t a t e - T r i a l s (4th ed., London, 1776-81), xi.53. It has recently been suggested that this mixed-state theory, so common under the Tudors, was *to a N

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A t this particular stage o f th e constitution al co ntroversy, d u rin g th e early-seventecnth century, w h a t the p arlia m e n ta ry forces d em anded was their traditional share o f th e suprem e p o w e r. B u t as the quarrel intensified, th e m o re extrem e P uritans and law yers increasingly w h ittle d d o w n the sphere in w h ich th ey w ere p re p ared to acknow ledge th a t the k in g ’s w ill could rule b y itself. P arliam en t began to entrench o n p rero g ativ e m atters, to ten d er advice o n religious, econom ic and even foreign policy and, up to a p o in t, Jam es I and C harles I w ere forced to give w ay . O n th e eve o f th e C ivil W a r and in th e face o f g ro w in g p arlia m e n ta ry claims, Charles was even driven to concede th at the co n stitu tio n w as one in v o lv in g a balance o f th ree co -o rd in ate p ow ers. T his was a considerable m odification o f the argum ents d eployed b y his father and the less m oderate o f his o w n supporters. B u t it w as also a case w h ich h ad th e advantage o f being, perhaps, legally and trad itio n ally m o re correct. It also had the v irtu e o f co nfining the C o m m o n s to a m o re n a rro w com petence th an th a t w h ich th e y w ere co m in g to assert.58 W h e n in th e end hostilities began, the anti-royalist forces th e re b y clearly indicated th a t th e y w ere n o t p rep ared to leave to G od o r to chance th e responsibility for restraining the k in g w ith in traditional bounds. T h e y assum ed the divine p rero g ativ e them selves, saying th at th ey w ere defending th e ‘K in g ’ against th e ‘k in g ’. For th e k in g as a person h ad tried to usurp for h im se lf w h a t o n ly rig h tfu lly b elo n g ed to th e C ro w n represented b y the k in g in Parliam ent. T o say the m o n arch was significant degree in abeyance’ from roughly the accession of James I until 1642. See R. W . K. Hinton, ‘The Decline o f Parliamentary Government under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts’, T h e C a m b r id g e H is to r ic a l J o u r n a l , xiii (1957), pp. 121-2, 130, and also his ‘English Constitutional Theories from Sir John Fortescue to Sir John Eliot*, T h e E n g lis h H is to r ic a l R e v i e w , lxxv (i960), csp. pp. 423-4. Yet the idea of the fundamental law, which Mr Hinton suggests tended at the time in question to eclipse the theory of mixed government as a means o f limiting royal power, surely embodied the notion of the balanced, mixed constitution: it was argued that the king was breaking the fundamental law because he was trying to do out o f Parliament what could properly only be done in and with Parliament. 58 See Charles’s ‘Answer to the Nineteen Propositions’ in J. Rushworth, H is to r ic a l C o l le c tio n s (London, 1659-1701), Part III vol. i, pp. 725-35, esp. p. 731; also the discussions by C. C. Weston, ‘The Theory of Mixed Monarchy under Charles I and After’, T h e E n g lis h H is to r ic a l R e v i e w , lxxv (i960), pp. 427-30, 436-7, and by H. Hulmc, ‘Charles I and the Constitution’ in W. A. Aiken and 13. D. Henning (eds.), C o n flic t in S t u a r t E n g la n d (London, i960), pp. 120-3. 186

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u n d er the fu n d am en tal law w as n o t enou g h . T h e law h ad to be in te rp re te d and p ro te cted , and P arliam en t (or the People) w as to do this. U n d e r th e pressures o f w ar, it w as b u t a sh o rt step o p en ly to claim the suprem e p o w e r for P arliam en t itself w ith o u t the k in g , o r even fo r th e C o m m o n s alone. T his w as an absolutism as u n tra d itio n a l as th a t p u rsued b y th e Stuarts. A n d it was the h allo w ed, co n v en tio n al balance o r m ix tu re o f g o v ern m en tal authorities that, to a large degree, the R esto ratio n w as in ten d ed to achieve. T h o u g h the m an n er in w h ich Locke arg u ed th e case was ra th e r different, w h e n h e w ro te the Second Treatise he restated the essence o f the tra d itio n al p osition in clu d in g th e tw o -fo ld aspect o f the single executive.59 A n d it was, at least in p art, b y reference to n u m ero u s precedents d ra w n fro m E nglish and o th e r co n stitu tio n al h isto ry that, at the tim e o f th e E xclusion crisis, th e W h ig pam phleteers su p p o rted the case fo r keeping th e D u k e o f Y o rk o ff the th ro n e .60 T h e sam e is tru e o f the w ay in w h ich , in th e late-seventeenth and early -eig h teen th centuries, th e c o m m o n w ealth m en like A ttw o o d and Som ers u rg ed th a t th e p o w ers o f the m o n a rc h y should be lim ited. In such a fashion as this, th en , the o p p o n en ts o f royalism lo o k ed to the lessons o f the past, to the w isd o m o f the an cien t co n stitu tio n w h ic h the course o f E nglish h isto ry show ed to be a balance o f the rights and duties o f all concerned. C o n sequen tly , to th e supporters o f the tra d itio n al system o f lim ited m o n arch y , E n g lish h isto ry w as a m ajo r source o f arg u m e n t and evidence and, like th eir co n stitutional adversaries, th ey co n triv e d a characteristic v ersion o f its dev elo p m en t. O n e in te rp re ta tio n was th a t sustained b y C o k e and m an y o f the o th er c o m m o n law yers, w h o fo u n d evidence in the B ritish h isto ry itself o f the n ative and im m e m o ria l cu sto m em b o d ied in the c o m m o n law o f the land. T h e books and treatises o f th e c o m m o n law s o f th e ancient B ritons h ad all been lost, ‘an inestim able loss’ 60 See, e.g., Locke’s

T w o T r e a tis e s o f G o v e r n m e n t ,

ed. Laslett (Cambridge, i960), p. 386

(§!51)• 60 O. W . Furley, ‘The Whig Exclusionists: Pamphlet Literature in the Exclusion Campaign, 1679-81’, T h e C a m b r id g e H i s to r ic a l J o u r n a l , xiii (1957), pp. 25-27. On the importance o f the idea o f mixed monarchy at the same time see B. Behrens, ‘The Whig Theory o f the Constitution in the Reign o f Charles II’, ibid., vii (1941-3), pp. 50-55.

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C o k e called it. B u t this u n h a p p y p riv a tio n w as n o t allow ed to in h ib it reference to these old precedents. T h e y w ere often assum ed to establish the a n tiq u ity and in d ep en d en t a u th o rity o f P arliam ent, b y d em o n stratin g th at it h ad existed tim e o u t o f m in d an d th at it co u ld n o t, therefore, have o rig in ated in an y specific act o f the royal w ill. C onsiderable restrictions on the k in g ’s p o w e r could thus be suggested to have the blessing o f v ery ancient practice indeed. A t th e sam e tim e P arliam en t w as n o t left in possession o f an u nfettered a u th o rity cither, for it to o w as subject to the fu n d am ental law . T h e courts w o u ld alw ays in te rp re t statutes in accordance w ith th e accepted principles o f reason and justice w h ich th at ancient law em b o d ied and in this sense co n tro l legislation.61 Sim ilar to this attitu d e b u t distinct in im p o rta n t w ays, w as the so-called G othic view o f E nglish h istory, the m ost im p o rta n t o f the n o n -ro y alist variations. It w as being e x p o u n d ed b y p arliam entarians at least as early as th e m iddle o f the sixteenth cen tu ry , an d subsequently becam e w idespread. T h e term G o th ic (and the various synonym s so m ew h at loosely used in its place, such as Saxon, Jutish, G erm anic and so on) referred to an ancient culture said to have develo ped outside the classic, R o m an stream . Tacitus, w h o h ad been alm ost u n k n o w n in the M idd le Ages, w as g ro w in g in p o p u la rity and served to stim ulate and represent this tren d . B o d h i and others like R ichard V erstegan h ad elaborated the th e o ry that, because o f ‘clim atic’ influences, the n o rth e rn ers or G oths w ere n atu rally disposed to be h ard y , v ig o ro u s and lib e rty lo v in g . A n d antiquarian research was used to substantiate the sto ry th at the forbears o f this island’s inhabitants w ere G oths or Saxons w h o , w h e n th ey in vaded B ritain, b ro u g h t w ith th em their tra d itional racial characteristics and free institutions. T h e scholarship in v o lv ed w as som etim es loose in the extrem e. In m an y cases, often w h ere it suited the polem ical purpose in m ind, the G oths w ere confused w ith the B ritons th ey supplanted; and indeed the term G othic cam e often to be associated w ith any n o n -R o m a n o r n o n 61 See, e.g., T h e R e p o r ts o f S i r E d w a r d C o k e , K n t . (ed. Thomas and Fraser, London, 1826), The Third Part (vol. ii), *To The Reader’, pp. xiv-xxiii, and the prefaces to the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Parts, p a s s im .

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L atin people and influence. B u t o n the w h o le the specific political p o in t w as n o t b lu rred . It w as th at the old G othic co n stitu tio n w as a system o f m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t and th at P arliam en t h ad descended fro m th e tribal assemblies or fo lk -m o o ts o f the Saxons. M o re o v e r, the Saxon kings w ere n o t h ered itary rulers b u t elected leaders chosen originally for the purpose o f c o m m an d in g in a w ar, an d thus lim ited b y the te m p o ra ry and co nd itio n al n atu re o f th eir a u th o rity . T h e y w ere, therefore, b y n o m eans absolute an d th eir p o w e r derived fro m the people over w h o m th ey ru led an d b y w h o m th ey m ig h t be rem o v ed . D espite the D anish an d N o rm a n invasions and the attem p ts o f various kings to destroy p o p u lar assemblies and rights, these h ad a contin u o u s and u n b ro k e n histo ry ; P arliam en t could be traced back directly to the W ite n a g e m o t. T here are m an y exam ples o f these them es, w h ich becam e m o re c o m m o n as the seventeenth ce n tu ry w o re o n .62 H ere tw o illustrations m ust suffice to show the use m ade o f these G o th ic ideas b y anti-royalists: A lg ern o n S idney’s ch am p io n in g o f the th e o ry in his Discourses concerning Government and P hilip H u n to n ’s A Treatise o f Monarchy. Like L ocke, Sidney set o u t to destroy F ilm er’s th e o ry w h ich had becom e th e official defence o f the royalist case d u rin g th e E xclusion crisis. B u t unlike Locke, Sidney d id n o t p ro d u ce a d o c u m e n t th e essence o f w h ich w as rationalistic. H is b o o k w as m u ch m o re in the n o rm a l em pirical style, dep en d in g for its a rg u m ents on the evidence o f experience and o f h isto ry , ancient and m o d e rn , sacred an d profane. It was a mass o f detailed references to the B ible, books o f travel and th e story o f o th er countries. Sidney explained his preferences in respect o f system s o f g o v ern m en t in m an y passages, o f w h ich the follow in g m ay be taken as typical: If it be true, w hich perhaps may be doubted, that there have bin in the w orld simple Monarchys, Aristocracys or Democracys legally establish’d, ’tis certain that the most part o f the Governments o f the w orld (and I think all that are or have bin good) were m ix’d. Part o f the Pow er has bin confer’d upon the King, or the Magistrate that represented him, and part upon the Senat and People, as has bin prov’d in 62 See S. Kliger,

T h e G o t h s in E n g la n d

(Cambridge, Mass., 1952), chs. i, ii.

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relation to the Governments o f the Hebrews, Spartans, Romans, Venetians, Germans, and all those w ho live under that which is usually call’d the Gothic Polity.63 This p o lity he to o k to be traditionally established in E ngland, w hose liberties he traced as far back as the tim es o f ancient B ritain. B u t m o re em phasis was given to the heritage o f the Saxons ‘fro m w h o m w e chiefly derive o u r O rig in a l and M an n ers’. Sidney to o k fro m T acitus the v iew that the G erm ans ‘liv ’d free u n d er such M agistrats as th e y chose, regulated b y such Law s as th ey m ade, an d retain’d th e principal p ow ers o f the G o v ern m en t in th eir general o r p articular C ouncils. T h e ir K ings an d Princes h ad n o o th er p o w e r th an w h a t w as co n fer’d u p o n th e m b y these Assemblys, w h o having all in them selves could receive n o th in g fro m th em w h o had n o th in g to give.’64 A n d he th o u g h t th at i f th e Saxons w ere free in their o w n c o u n try ‘th ey m ust have b in so w h en they cam e h ith e r.’ O u r ‘later H istorys show , th at as soon as the Saxons cam e in to this C o u n try , th ey h ad their . . . general Assem blys o f the N o b le and Free m en, w h o h ad in them selves the P o w e r o f th e N a tio n ’. These assembhes ‘w ere ev idently th e sam e in p o w e r w ith o u r P arliam ents’.65 Sidney did n o t b o th e r to exam ine th e question w h e th e r the C o m m o n s h ad alw ays been p a rt o f these ancient assemblies, co n ten tin g h im self w ith the rem ark th at as suprem e p o w e r belo n g ed to these bodies th ey could have included the p o p u lar elem ent w h en ev er th ey w ished. In fact, he inclined to thin k th a t th e C o m m o n s h ad alw ays h ad a p a rt in th e g o v ern m en t. H e w as sure, h o w ev er, th at the balance should p ro p e rly h e w ith the aristocratic elem ent: ‘in all th e legal K in g dom s o f th e N o rth , the strength o f the G o v ern m en t has alw ays been p lac’d in the N o b ility ’. This was n o t the peerage o f his day, b u t a real n o b ility o f ‘strength and v e rtu e ’, rath er like H a rrin g to n ’s aristocracy o f a u th o rity .66 T h e o th er exam ple is H u n to n ’s A Treatise o f Monarchy, first 63 Sidney, op. cit., p. 321. 64 Ibid., p. 347. 66 Ibid., p. 348, cf. pp. 211, 270. Nor did the Conquest interrupt the Saxon tradition, ibid., pp. 271, 298-9. 66 Ibid., pp. 3 4 9 5 4‫• ־‬

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p ublished in 1643 and reissued in later years in clu d in g 1689. It was co n cerned to reject th e ro y ah st case, and to do this discussed th e v arious types o f kingship. ‘Sim ple’ form s o f g o v e rn m e n t w ere w h e n th e suprem e p o w e r rested in th e hands o f either o n e person, th e n o b ility o r th e c o m m u n ity . T h e w rite r th en w e n t o n to argue thus: N o w experience teaching people, that several inconveniencies are in each o f these, which is avoided by the other: as aptness to tyranny in simple m onarchy, aptness to destructive factions in an aristocracy, and aptness to confusion and tum ult in a democracy. As on the contrary, each o f them hath some good which the others want, viz. unity and strength in a monarchy; counsel and wisdom in an aristocracy; liberty and respect o f com m on good in a democracy. Hence the w isdom o f men deeply seen in state matters guided them to frame a m ixture o f all three, uniting them into one form; that so the good o f all m ight be enjoyed, and the evil o f them avoided. And this m ixture is either equal, w hen the highest com m and in a state, by the first constitution o f it, is equally seated in all three; and then . . . it can be called . . . but by the general style o f a ‘m ixed state’: or if there be priority o f order in one o f the three . . . it may take the name o f that which hath the precedency. T h e au th o r th o u g h t th a t stability co u ld o n ly em erg e fro m the latter, as in a so-called ‘m ix ed m o n a rc h y ’, w h ere, th o u g h all th ree p o w ers shared in g o v e rn m e n t and n o n e cou ld becom e ex o rb ita n t, th e k in g w as p re d o m in a n t.67 T h e n , discussing the n a tu re o f th e particu lar m o n a rc h y o f E n g lan d , it was stated th at, ‘as o u r histories re c o rd ’, th e Saxons, coming into the kingdom , drove out the Britons, and by degrees planted themselves under their commanders, and no doubt continued the freedom they had in Germany; unless we should think, that by conquering they lost their ow n liberties to the kings, for w hom they conquered, and expelled the Britons into Wales. Rather I conceive, the original o f the subject’s liberty was by those our fore-fathers brought out o f Germany: where, (as Tacitus reports,) . . . ‘their kings had no absolute, but limited pow er’; and all weighty matters were dispatched 67 Hunton,

A

T r e a tis e o f M o n a r c h y ,

H a r le ia n M is c e lla n y

quoted from the anonymous reprint of 1689 in (London, 1808-13), vi.335-6. I9 I

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by general meetings o f all the estates. W ho sets not here the antiquity o f our liberties, and frame o f government? So they were governed in Germany, and so here, to this day; for, by transplanting themselves, they changed their soil, not their manners and governm ent.68 A lth o u g h , as I have said, Saxon w as often confused w ith B rito n , b o th as enem ies o f R om e, this G othic in te rp re ta tio n was usually m ade to contrast w ith the royalist, o rd e r-d o m in a te d v iew o f history. T his had m ade m u ch o f th e B ritons and h ad seen the Saxons as barbarians o v erw h elm in g th e B ritain o f A rth u r. T h e G othicist, o n the o th er hand, was inclined to reg ard the old B ritish h isto ry as so m u ch legend and saw the invaders as the founders o f th e c o u n try ’s liberties, sim ple dem ocrats o v e rth ro w in g the sinful and autocratic B ritons. ‘G o d . . . abated the n o b ility o f the B ritons, w h o h ad recourse to force rather th an to law [and] delivered the k in g d o m to the hum blest and sim plest o f all the n eig h b o u rin g nations: to w it, th e Saxons, w h o cam e to conquer it fro m the parts o f A lm aine . . . A n d th e y . . . chose fro m a m o n g th e m selves a k in g to reig n o v er th e m . . . to m ain tain and defend their persons and goods b y th e rule o f rig h t.’69 T his rejection o f direct descent fro m the aboriginal B ritons m ay w ell have been associated, at least in part, w ith g ro w in g k n o w led g e o f p rim itiv e peoples. It seems quite likely, for instance, th a t the discovery o f the R ed Indians o f N o rth A m erica helped to persuade m an y people th a t the ancient B ritons m u st have been ju s t as p rim itiv e a n d savage.70 In any event, to ch am p io n th e Saxon h eritage obviously im p lied criticism o f the stories w h ich h ad g ro w n up a ro u n d the figure o f A rth u r, w hose place as th e p arag o n o f all the virtues w as taken b y A lfred. T h e rejection o f this pseu d o -h isto ry o f the B ritons could be conveniently and easily associated w ith attacks o n the T u d o r despotism w ith w h ich the A rth u ria n legend was linked, and so w ith an ti-royalist sentim en t in general. It was thus n o accidental association o f ideas w h ic h led M ilto n , w h en considering th e com position o f an historical epic, to sw itch his 08 Hunton, op. cit., T h e H a r le ia n M is c e lla n y (London, 1808-13), vi.340. 60 Horn’s T h e M ir r o r o f J u s tic e s , ed. Whittaker (Selden Society, London, 1895), vol. vii, p. 6. Originally written in the thirteenth century, this book was translated only in 1646 but had always been used by parliamentarian and non-royalist lawyers. 70 T. D. Kendrick, B r itis h A n t i q u i t y (London, 1930), pp. 120-5.

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interest fro m A rth u r to A lfred, a change paralleled b y his realizatio n th at he h ad p arliam en tary sym pathies. T h e co n tro v ersy b etw een these con trasting view s w as am usingly p aro d ied b y the au th o r o f the m id -sev en teen th -cen tu ry co m ed y Hey for Honesty, in w h ich one character claim ed ‘m y lice arc o f the n o b le breed, S p ru n g fro m the D anes, Saxons, and N o rm a n s’ b lo o d ’, w hile an o th er im p ro v e d on this boast b y evokin g a parasitic ancestry ‘ap B ru tu s, ap Sylvus, ap A eneas’ w h ich fo u g h t in the w ars o f T r o y .71 T h e G othic v iew also differed fro m th e C o k ean in th a t w h ile it accepted th e free co n stitu tio n as b eing o f venerable and p re -C o n q u e st origin, it did n o t regard it as b eing so ancient as C o k e had suggested. It was o f m o re definite and recent fo u n d atio n (in fact in the trad itio n al invasion year o f A .D . 449), th o u g h still o w in g n o th in g to royal initiative and p o w er. A n additional co n trast was th at the G othicist sou g h t the m ix ed system ’s o rig in in a fo reign and n o t a native source. A m ajo r difficulty, w h ich h ad to be faced b y b o th C ok ean and G o th ic schools o f th o u g h t, w as presented b y th e N o rm a n C o n quest, for it w as necessary to explain h o w this sh atterin g ev en t h ad n o t p rev en ted th e continuance o f th e im m em o rial— o r G o th ic— co n stitu tio n and its law s. O n e explanation p ro v id e d in v o lv ed, in effect, a denial th at there had been any real conquest o r basic change at all. It w as suggested th a t W illia m had agreed to accept the law s o f St E d w a rd the C onfessor and th a t his successors h ad fro m tim e to tim e co n firm ed their co n tin u an ce.72 A v ariation o f this th e o ry played up p articu larly the ‘M en o f K e n t’ w h o , because th e Jutes h ad originally landed in th a t co u n ty , w ere supposed to be especially lib erty -lo v in g . T h e y w ere nev er co n q u ered b y the N o rm a n s and o n ly yielded them selves o n the co n d itio n ‘th a t th ey m ig h t retaine th eir ancient custom es u n v io lated ’.73 M ag n a C arta (taken, in fact, as m an y o f the royalist historians like B rad y saw, quite anachronistically o u t o f its feudal 71 T. Randolph, op. cit., ii.431, 432. And see the general discussion o f the Trojan-Saxon controversy in R. F. Brinkley, A r t h u r i a n L e g e n d in th e S e v e n te e n th C e n tu r y (Baltimore, 1932), chs. ii and iii, a pioneer study. 72 See, e.g., Sidney, op. cit., pp. 298-9, 349, 371; and Hunton, op. cit., vi.341. 73 William Camden, B r i t a n n i a , tr. Holland (London, 1637), p. 325; and sec Kliger, op. cit., pp. 21-25.

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context) played an im p o rta n t role in the supposed co n tin u atio n o f ancient liberties. U n til 1688 th e coro n atio n o ath co ntained a p rom ise to ob ey the ancient law o f St E d w a rd — ‘th a t n o b le T ran script o f the O rig in a l C o n tra c t’ as A ttw o o d called it— and the assum ption b y the k in g o f this obligatio n h ad th e same effect as the original im position o f M agna C arta. J o h n P y m p ro v id e d one o f th e m ost w e ll-k n o w n expressions o f ‘the m y th o f the co nfirm ations’ in th e debate on the case o f M an w arin g in 1628: . . . there are plain footsteps o f those Laws in the Government o f the Saxons, they were o f that vigor and force as to overlive the Conquest, nay to give bounds and limits to the Conqueror . . . the assurance and possession o f the C row n he obtained by composition, in which he bound himself to observe these and the other antient Laws and Liberties o f the Kingdom, which afterwards he likewise confirmed by oath at his Coronation: from him the said Obligation descended to his Successors. It is true, they have been often broken, [yet] they have been often confirmed by Charters o f Kings, by Acts o f Parliaments; but the Petitions o f the Subjects, upon which those Charters and Acts were founded, were ever Petitions o f Right, demanding their antient and due Liberties, not suing for any new .74 In consequence, rem o te precedents w ere continually in v o k ed in th e political controversies w h ich led up to th e civil w ars, and indeed in the interm in ab le antiquarian exegesis w h ich accom p anied th e constitutional crises o f the later p a rt o f the century. T h e G othic b elief in the golden age o f A n g lo -S ax o n d o m had o th er than constitutional im plications. It had cu ltu ral and artistic aspects and was also associated w ith the defence o f P rotestantism . It was n o t sim ply th at it was v ery closely related to th e idea th at G erm an p u rity led to the triu m p h o f L uther over the decadence 74 Rushworth, op. cit., Part I, p. 596. Attvvood’s phrase is from T h e F u n d a m e n ta l C o n s titu tio n o f th e E n g lis h G o v e r n m e n t (London, 1690), p. iv. Other assertions of the myth can be seen in e.g. one o f Ircton’s contributions to the Putney Debates in 1647 m A. S. P. Woodhouse (ed.), P u r ita n is m a n d L i b e r t y (London, 1951), p. 52 (2ndpagination); Sir Matthew Hale, R e fle c tio n s o n A i r H o b b e s H i s D ia lo g u e o f th e L a w e (c. 1670-5?) reprinted in W . S. Holdsworth, A H i s t o r y o f E n g lis h L a w (London, 1903^), v.507, 511; W . Petyt, T h e A n t i e n t R i g h t o f th e C o m m o n s o f E n g la n d A s s e r te d (London, 1680), pp. 71-72; H. Ncvilc, P la to R e d i v i v u s (London, 1681), pp. 106-7; T h e C h a r a c te r o f a P o p is h S u c c e s so r (1681 )in S ta t e - T r a c t s (London, 1692-3), Part I, p. 163;and Lord Somers, T h e J u d g m e n t o f W h o le K in g d o m s a n d N a tio n s (London, 1713), pp. 6, 18, 22.

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o f the R o m an C h u rc h o r th a t this was the repetition, w h ich h ad been prophesied, o f the ancient G othic victo ry , the establishm ent o f the fifth, everlasting m o n arch y foretold in the B o o k o f D aniel. T h ere was also a specific E nglish version, albeit so m ew h at co n fused w ith the stories a b o u t the early ch u rch o f th e B ritons. T h e Society o f A ntiquaries, or rath er the g ro u p fom ided in 1572 b y A rchbishop P ark er to w h ich the origins o f th e Society m ay p e rhaps be traced, was established specifically to extend research in to A n g lo -S axon C h u rc h charters and to try to m aintain th e h isto ricity and rights o f the n ative C h u rc h against th at d o m in ated fro m R om e. T h e ‘E nglish Scholars’ sim ilarly believed th a t an in digenous fo rm o f C h ristianity h ad flourished before th e arrival o f A ugustine, after w h ich this p u re and u n c o rru p t fo rm o f w o rship and ecclesiastical p o lity w as o v erw h elm ed and fell u n d er foreign, R om ish d o m in atio n n o t to be finally freed u n til the R efo rm atio n .75 In fine, then, it m ay be suggested th at th e exponents o f m ixed g o v e rn m e n t o r lim ited m o n a rc h y frequently argued th eir case b y calling to their aid ap propriate classical au th o rity , th e experience o f states b o th old and new , and th e lessons o f history. A n d , in general, it m ay be seen h o w the political ideas associated w ith this em piricism stood in contrast to the political th e o ry o f o rd er and its o w n special style o f argum ent. M o n arch y w as reg ard ed n o t as the best and m ost natu ral fo rm o f g o v ern m en t, fo r it w as unstable and likely to degenerate in to ty ra n n y and disorder. H ere, o f course, there w as a certain superficial sim ilarity w ith th e o rd er th eo ry , b u t the rem edies prescribed for this instability differed m ark edly. T h e royalist u rg ed the re-establishm ent o n a firm er basis o f a u th o rity o f th e p u re fo rm o f absolute m o n arch y ; th e em piricist held th at the m onarchical elem ent in the co n stitu tio n should be m erg ed as one c o m p o n en t m erely o f a system o f shared sovereignty. T h e exponents o f m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t w ere p rep ared to concede th a t one o f the three elem ents m ig h t be p red o m in a n t, b u t it w as freq u en tly the aristocratic o r p o p u lar elem ent o f w h ich th ey spoke in this co nnexion and n o t th e m onarchical. M o reo v er, 75 D. C. Douglas, E n g lis h S c h o la r s 1 6 6 0 - 1 7 3 0 (2nd ed., London, 1951), pp. 19-20, 52-53, 197ff.; Kliger, op. cit., pp. 7 9 1 1 9 ,91‫• ־‬

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the m ixed th eo ry m ade it quite easy to argue th a t i f the k in g claim ed too m uch p o w e r he w as upsetting the trad itio n al balance and so m ig h t legitim ately be resisted b y the o th er g roups. F u rth er the th eo ry could be and w as used in an even m o re ex trem e fashion as an a rg u m e n t for republicanism . Finally, the idea th a t a system o f g o v e rn m e n t could be instituted, b y a legislator for exam ple, im plied th a t political o rganization w as n o t n atu ral o r G o d -g iv en b u t artificial, in th e sense th a t it w as m ade b y m an in the fo rm he considered appropriate. T his points to an o th er salient feature o f the political and social th e o ry o f th e em pirical school: its utilitarianism

VI O f course, a utilitarian p u rpose w as to som e ex ten t alw ays in v o lv ed in the traditional religious ethic. G o d h ad in ten d ed the w o rld n o t only for m a n ’s m o ral instructio n b u t also fo r his service, to enable h im to im p ro v e his estate. M ilto n sum m ed up this o rth o d o x C hristian attitu d e w h en , in Paradise Lost, he m ade A d am exclaim his realization th a t . . . apt the m ind or fancy is to rove Unchecked; and o f her roving is no end, Till, warned, or by experience taught, she leam That not to know at large o f things rem ote From use, obscure and subtle, but to know T hat which before us lies in daily life, Is the prime wisdom: w hat is m ore is fume, O r emptiness, or fond impertinence, And renders us in things that most concern Unpractised, unprepared, and still to seek. Therefore from this high pitch, let us descend A lower flight, and speak o f things at hand Useful; . . .76 This w as a v iew typical, in particular, o f the P uritans. R ichard B ax ter, for instance, w ro te in his Christian Directory th a t ‘T h o u g h G o d need n o n e o f o u r w orks, y et th a t w h ich is g o o d m aterially 76

P a ra d ise L o s t ,

viii. 188-200.

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pleaseth h im , as it ten d ed to his glory, and to o u r o w n and o th ers’ benefit, w h ich he delighteth in . . .’77 T hus public service was G o d ’s greatest service, and utilitarian standards m ig h t in this w ay be sanctioned in religious term s and on ecclesiastical au th o rity . N atu rally , em pirical data w ere at ,first .em ployed, to .illustrate an d co n firm the traditional, C hristian ethical norm s. Reference to actual exam ples show ed h o w these m oral standards, w h ich w ere often rath er general and even obscure, could be applied in practice and given specific content. Sim ilarly, exam ples could be used as a m eans to inculcate these n o rm s in the m inds o f those unaffected b y 'a b stra c t m o ral discussion b u t m o re likely to be persuaded b y concrete evidence. It was in this m an n er th at h isto ry and experience w ere used didactically b y o rd er theorists: the political th eo ry o f o rd e r em ployed em pirical data to reinforce and effectuate its tenets.78 B u t in due course, the use o f h isto ry and experience helped to evolve a rath er different set o f standards, n o t o f tra d itional m o ral goodness or badness b u t sim ply o f success o r failure, expediency o r inexpediency. These standards w ere im plicit in the use o f em pirical evidence b u t th eir indep en d en t assertion was som e tim e developing. O n e elem ent in this process was th a t the study o f historical exam ples was the study o f h o w som e kinds o f action enabled given goals to be achieved w hile o th er kinds did n o t. T h e objectives m ig h t o r m ig h t n o t be g o o d ones (in term s o f the traditional m orality) b u t there was inevitably a tendency to equate practical success and the p ro fit it b ro u g h t w ith virtue. E ven so o rth o d o x a w rite r as R ichard B raith w ait opened his discussion o f the ad v an tages to be derived fro m reading histories w ith these w o rd s: ‘T he greatest and m o vingest a rg u m en t ofpersw asio n to the undertak in g o f this o r that, is th e benefit w e expect red o u n d in g fro m o u r enterprise: I w ill succinctly expresse the severally-m oving effects o f p ro fit (the w o rld ly m ans A dam ant) fro m H istory. . . .’ T he ‘p ro fit’ h ere was conceived in o rth o d o x m o ral term s,79 b u t the 77 T h e P ra c tic a l W o r k s o f th e R e v . R ic h a r d B a x t e r , ed. Orme (London, 1830), ii.322. 78 See above, pp. 105ff. 79 R. Braithwait, A S u r v e y O f H i s t o r y (London, 1638), pp. 309-10, 330-7; cf. D. Wheare, T h e M e t h o d a n d O r d e r O f R e a d in g B o th C i v i l a n d E c c le sia stic a l H is to r ie s (London, 1685), p. 299•

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sen tim ent itself was quite com patible w ith a sim ple expediency, and m a n y accepted this assim ilation.'A s w ith the P u rita n d o ctrin e o f grace, th e fact o f success w as an indicatio n th at G o d h ad sm iled on th e w o rth y . M o reo v er, the style o f discussion involved in th e use o f h isto ry encouraged an em phasis w h ich departed fro m strictly trad itio n al criteria. I f the data w ere to be useful, even to illustrate th e usual m o ral precepts, th en it was as w ell i f th ey w ere as factually accurate as possible. T h e re developed, therefore, standards o f objective study w h ich in tim e cam e to be reg ard ed as ends in them selves, and historical description becam e, ideally, am oral. M u ch o f M achiavelli’s historical analysis was, in in ten tio n , o f this k in d . His review o f conspiracies in the Discourses, for instance, discussed w h ich factors led to th eir success and w h ich to th eir failure, and th e m axim s he deduced could, in the o u tco m e, be used b y th e forces o f either sedition o r o rd e r.80 F u rth er, it becam e obvious th at no n e o f th e rules w as absolutely rig id or invariable: th ey h ad always to be adapted to changing conditions lest th ey becam e n o t a guide b u t a hindrance to success. As L o rd H alifax p u t it, ‘C ircum stances m u st com e in, and . . . be m ade p a rt o f the M atter o f w h ich w e are to ju d g e ’.81 Em phasis o f this k in d w as n o t really conducive to strict adherence to unalterable m o ra l n o rm s. T h e voyages o f discovery had a sim ilar effect on m e n ’s attitudes, for th ey revealed num erous different systems o f m o rality in v o lv in g ethical rules often incom patible w ith o r c o n trary to those o f the C hristian w est. In th e w ords o f Vives, w h o early recognized the im plications o f travellers’ accounts, the records o f these previously u n h e a rd -o f nations ‘give us a ru d e shock’ b y describing ‘their differences fro m us in appearance, hab it and cu sto m .’ T h e im plication, to m an y m en like M o n taig n e, was th at to n o n e o f these custom s, so infinite in m a tte r and diversity, could ‘p e rm an ent a u th o ritie ’ be attrib u te d .82 T h e idea o f a universal m o ra l law w as, therefore, to tiffs extent on the w an e, and it becam e pari passu m o re credible to regard m oral rules as m erely cu sto m ary 80 Machiavelli, D is c o u r s e s , ed. cit., i.470-91. 81 Halifax, op. cit., p. 170. 82 Vives, op. cit., p. 3; Montaigne, op. cit., Il.xii.

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an d relative, as h a v in g g ro w n u p to m eet th e needs o f particular p eo p le in given places and tim es. O n this view , ‘in tere st’ w as w h at seem ed to u nderlie ethical standards, an attitu d e w h ic h readily le n t itself to som e sort o f hedonistic o r u tilitarian in terp retatio n . T h is process o f establishing criteria rath er different fro m those o f th e tra d itio n al C hristian m o ra lity w as also assisted b y the classical influences w h ic h w ere so im p o rta n t in th e d ev elo p m en t o f the em pirical attitude. H o w e v e r m u c h th ere m ig h t be a sim ilarity b etw een th e C hristian and certain classical m o ra l p h ilo sophics (the P latonic for instance), th e latter d id n o t co n tain th e essential scriptural and revelational elem ent o f th e fo rm er, and so d ep en ded o n a basically different fo u n d atio n . M o reo v er, classical ethical th e o ry cou ld be m ark ed ly different in its precepts fro m those o f C hristianity. It m ig h t be hedonistic and u tilitarian , in the style, for histance, o f th e E picureans and‫ ״‬Stoics. It w as this latter em phasis w h ic h becam e so d o m in a n t in th e th o u g h t o f the em pirical school, being- clearly reflected in th e w ritin g s o f m en like B acon and T em p le. In th e best em pirical m an n er T e m p le searched the religions and philosophies o f th e w o rld for th a t universal m o ra l w isd o m w h ic h he to o k to exist b en eath th eir superficial differences. In th e end, he conclu d ed th a t w isd o m w as sy n o n y m o u s w ith th e p ro d u c tio n o f things o r ideas ‘generally esteem ed th e m o st necessary, useful, o r pro fitab le to h u m a n life, either in p riv a te possessions o r p u b h c institu tio n s’.83 B u t in w h a t did u tility consist? In general, it m ean t m ax im izin g social and in d iv idual happiness, an d passing o n e ’s life ‘as w ell an d easily’ as possible, this goal being seen in refined E p icu rean term s. Ju st as T e m p le th o u g h t th a t in the political sphere co m p lete peace and stability w ere unattainable so, in th e ethical, happiness could n ev er be w h o lly achieved. ‘E v e ry m an w ill be h a p p y ’, he w ro te , ‘an d none, b y th e co n stitu tio n o f nature, is capable o f being so.’ Desires w ere best satisfied, therefore, w h ere th ey w ere tem p erately c o n tro lled . H appiness w as n o t a m ere sensualism or a spiritual subh m a tio n o f th e senses, b u t a m ean b etw een b o th . A n d g o o d thus varied for different individuals, d ependin g o n their needs and sensibihties, th o u g h all so u g h t ‘tra n q u illity o f m in d an d indolence 83 Temple, op. cit., iii.407.

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o f b o d y ’.84 So in T e m p le’s case, and it w as n o t u n ty p ical o f the em pirical p o in t o f view , the o u tco m e o f th e m o ral en q u iry was w h a t m ay best be described as a refined and urb an e hedonism . T h e fideistic separation (to w h ich reference w as m ade at th e b eg in ning o f this chapter) also tended to u n d erm in e th e trad itio n al m o rality. T his distinction b etw een the spheres o f G od and n atu re, b etw een the spiritual and secular, had been develo p in g apace at least since the tim e o f M arsilius and, as his w ritin g s indicated, was likely, and logically, to be accom panied b y a sim ilar distinction b etw een divine and h u m an laws, the latter acquiring an in d ep en d en t significance w ith standards o f th eir o w n . C h ristian m o rality to save m a n ’s soul w as one th in g ; w h a t it was necessary to do to secure a stable, society and live the g o o d life on earth w a s an o th er. M achiavelli’s v iew w as characteristic o f this tra d itio n : ‘it appears to m e m o re ap p ro p riate to follow up the real tru th o f a m a tte r th an the im ag in atio n o f it; for m any have p ictu re d republics and principalities w h ich in fact have n ever been k n o w n o r seen, because h o w one lives is so far distant fro m h o w one o u g h t to live, th a t he w h o neglects w h a t is done for w h a t o u g h t to be done, so o n er effects his ru in th an his preservation. . . .’85 T h e political existence o f m an w as in this w ay separated fro m his spiritual aspect, and seen n o t as p a rt o f a unified and universal o rd er b u t, in the m an n er also later m ade n otorious b y H obbes, as the o u tco m e o f m a n ’s o w n w ill and purpose, the result o f his sensual ch aracteristics and passions and his pursuit o f w o rld ly felicity. T h ere w as a shift o f interest in political discussion fro m m an in term s o f his u ltim ate spiritual destiny to m an and his purposes as they w ere in the m aterial w o rld . This m ade it all th e m o re easy, o f course, for classical and o th e r n o n -C h ristian elem ents to influence the fo rm atio n o f a secular, applicable m orality . So, to be successful in secular term s, to secure the conditions o f happiness here and n o w , becam e the objectives o f ethical study, an d these m ean t the study o f things as they w ere and as they practically m ig h t be. T h e n e w criteria w ere utilitarian, th e ideal 84 Temple, op. cit., iii.208-10, 524; and see the discussion in E. M. W . Tillyard, S o m e M y t h i c a l E le m e n ts in E n g lis h L ite r a tu r e (London, 1961), ch. v. 85 Machiavelli, T h e P r in c e , tr. Marriott (Everyman ed., London, 1944), P• 117-

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m an n er th a t o f an enlightened self-interest, and the goal hedonistic, the achievem ent o f secular happiness.86 T h e co n n ex io n betw een m o d ern experim ental science and practical p ro b lem s had been v e ry close since the genesis o f the fo rm er in the later M iddle Ages and was co n tin u ed in the in tim ate lin k b etw een the n e w p h ilo so p h y and the w o rk o f artisans. T his guaran teed a u tilitarian em phasis w h ic h w as clearly exem plified b y B acon o n m a n y occasions. T h e ‘tru e and law ful goal o f the sciences’, he w ro te, ‘is n one o th er th a n this: that h u m an life be en d o w ed w ith n e w discoveries and p o w e rs.’ A n d in the Valerius Terminus he anticipated M ilto n ’s sentim ents q u o ted at th e b eg in n in g o f this section: ‘th e tru e end, scope, o r office o f k n o w led g e [lies] n o t in an y plausible, delectable, reverend, o r adm ired discourse, o r an y satisfactory argum ents, b u t in effecting and w o rk in g , and in discovery o f particulars n o t revealed before for th e better en d o w m e n t an d help o f m a n ’s life. . . .’87 T his was, o f course, a sentim ent m ost app ro p riate to an expanding, com m ercial age. Inevitably, a spirit o f h o p e and o p tim ism w as engendered w ith the realization o f the great possibilities for im p ro v e m e n t to be derived fro m a g ro w in g understanding o f and m astery over the processes o f n atu re and society. T h e confidence thus b red p ro d u ced an assertion o f the superiority o f m o d e rn w it and experience over those o f the ancients, and th ereb y in v o lv ed the co n trad ictio n o f the idea o f th e gradual decline o f m an and o f nature. A diff eren t version o f the h u m a n d ram a was presented and again the m ajo r expo n en t o f the n e w v iew was B acon, w h o , expressed his oppo sitio n to the th e o ry o f decay because he th o u g h t 86 See, e.g., the valuable survey o f these matters In Strauss, op. cit., chs. vi-vii. More’ recently, and similarly in the course of a study of Hobbes’s political thought, Professor C. B. Macpherson has pointed out that the deduction o f right and obligation from fact involved the elimination o f moral criteria brought in from outside the realm of fact, and he drew a parallel between this, radically new, position and the new theory of impetus associated with Galilei: see his T h e P o litic a l T h e o r y o f P o s s e s s iv e I n d iv id u a lis m (Oxford, 1962) pp. 76-77. The parallel is apt but it is, I think, wrong to suggest that it was Hobbes who introduced the innovation in moral and political theory. As I have been trying to show above, it was a step implicit in the fideistic distinction and generally, in the utilitarian morality which, some time before Hobbes, had been cmerging from the ‘empirical’ tradition. 87 Bacon, op. cit., iii.233, iv. 79. Cf. Vives, op. cit., p. 283: ‘This then is the fruit of all studies; this is the g o a l. . . Having acquired our knowledge, we must turn it to usefulness, and employ it for the common good.’

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it led to an undue v eneration o f an tiq u ity an d p rev en ted scientific progress: ‘the old age o f the w o rld is to be acco u n ted the tru e an tiq u ity ; and this is the a ttrib u te o f o u r o w n tim es, n o t o f th at earlier age o f the w o rld in w hich the ancients lived; . . . o u r age . . . is a m o re advanced age o f the w o rld , and stored and stocked w ith infinite experim ents and observations. N o r m u st it go for n o th in g th a t b y the distant voyages and travels w h ich have beco m e freq u en t in o u r tim es, m an y things in n atu re h av e been laid o p en and discovered. . . .’ H e added to an o th er expression o f the sam e sentim ent, th e view th at ‘these tim es m ay ju stly bear in their m o tto . . . plus ultra— farther yet. . . .’88 P erhaps one o f th e m ost im p o rta n t political aspects o f this idea o f progress and d ev elo p m en t was, as B aco n ’s w o rd s im plied, a g ro w in g sense o f th e possibilities o f expansion oversea. P atrio tic E n glishm en w ere n o t slow to lin k this w ith a sense o f the p o ten tial greatness o f their co u n try , feeling, as M ilto n w o u ld say later, th at w h e n G od w a n te d som ething done h e w o u ld send for his E nglishm en w h o h ad inh erited the greatness o f their G o th ic forbears. S im ilarly stories o f th e various contin en tal adventures o f the P lan tagenets and Lancastrians assisted in the g ro w th o f im perial passions. B u t the im m ed iate ideological b a c k g ro u n d m ust be so u g h t in th e P ro testan t ferv o u r and th e classical revival. T h e P u ritans in E n g lan d regarded th e R efo rm atio n as b eing an especially E nglish m atter, b e g u n w ith W y clifte. O f all nations th e E nglish w ere the elect, for G od had chosen this co u n try in w h ich to co m m en ce and carry th ro u g h the refo rm o f His C h u rc h , and to this end H e assisted th e d ev elo p m en t o f b o th the n a tio n ’s spiritual p u rity and its tem p o ral p o w e r. G reatness aw aited it in all things, religious, cultural and political. As for the classical influence, M achiavelli, fascinated b y th e rise o f the R o m a n re public, had w ritte n m uch ab o u t a c o m m o n w ealth fo r increase, and he w as follow ed in this inspiration b y m any, including the E nglish em piricists. W ith M achiavelli quite obviously as his m odel, B acon discussed states that aim at greatness, m ak in g clear th at b y this he m eant an extension o f their do m in io n s. T his he 88 Bacon, op. cit., iv.82,311. There had, o f course, been earlier expressions o f such views, again as in Vives, op. cit., pp. 7-9.

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associated w ith the develo p m en t o f sea-pow er: the em p ire o f the sea, the com m erce arising fro m distant voyages and travels, was the key to expansion.89 Sim ilarly, H a rrin g to n described the state o f O ceana and ‘the E m p ire o f the W o rld ’ th a t w o u ld open u p before it. H aving, like M achiavelli, distinguished b etw een co m m o n w ealth s for preservation and for increase, h e m ade it clear th a t O ceana was o f the latter k in d and indeed o u tlined the colonial system it should follow .90 A n d P etty, T e m p le an d H alifax all described, in effect, the econom ic and naval basis o f oversea com m ercial expansion.91 I f m a n y w ere to ru n to and fro and k n o w led g e and trade w ere to be increased, th en there w ere m en w h o w ere in n o d o u b t th at th e E nglish should be to th e fore in setting o u t and conqu erin g these n ew w orlds. As one am o n g m a n y instances, it m a y be n o te d that in 1658 o n e au th o r w ro te th at i f the republic o f 1649 h ad lasted, it w o u ld easily have excelled Sparta, A thens, C arth ag e and V enice and could n o t have been assigned ‘less than the w h o le w o rld at last for its p o rtio n .’92 It w as fu rth er anticipated that, as B acon said, ‘this proficience in n av ig atio n and discovery m a y plan t also great expectation o f the fu rth er proficience and au g m en tatio n o f th e sciences. . . .’ H e held, therefore, th a t m an y ‘secrets o f excellent use’ still ‘laid u p in the w o m b o f n a tu re ’ w o u ld be revealed in th e n o t to o distant fu tu re.93 Sim ilarly, D ry d e n w ro te in 1668, in th e usual optim istic fashion, th at ‘in these last h u n d re d years . . . alm ost a n e w N a tu re has been revealed to us . . . m o re errors o f th e school have been detected, m o re useful experim ents in p h ilo so p h y have been m ade, m o re n o b le secrets in optics, m edicine, an ato m y , a stro n o m y [have been] discovered, th an in all those credulous an d d o tin g ages fro m A ristotle to us. . . .’94 F ro m this reco rd it w a s ,:b y th a t date, 80 Bacon, op. cit., vi.444-52, vii.47-64. See the discussion by H. B. White, ‘Bacon’s Imperialism’, T h e A m e r ic a n P o litic a l S c ie n c e R e v i e w , lii (1958), pp. 470-89. 00 Harrington, op. cit., pp. 133-9, 185-98. The importance o f naval power to England’s greatness was also emphasized by the Harringtonian, Walter Moyle, see T h e W h o l e W o r k s (London, 1727), pp. 188-9. 91 Temple, op. cit., ii.209-11, iii.49-51, 62-63; Halifax, op. cit., pp. 87-99; and on Petty see below, pp. 256-9. 92 Richard Hawkins, A D is c o u r s e o f th e N a t i o n a l l E x c e lle n c ie s o f E n g la n d (London, 1658), pp. 232-3. This little book also exemplifies many other aspects o f the Saxon mythology. 93Bacon, op. cit., iv.311. 94E s s a y s o f J o h n D r y d e n y ed. Ker (Oxford, 1926), i. 36-3 7.

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c o m m o n ly assum ed th a t y e t fu rth er progress_w ould be m ade in the understanding and co n tro l o f nature, and th at this w o u ld , in tim e, m ake possible the achievem ent o f m a n ’s destiny n o t in a celestial b u t in a tem p o ral heaven o n earth, one m ade b y m an him self. Tins d ream h ad its hum anistic co u n terp art in th e p ro ject for the d ev elo p m en t o f an em pirical science o f politics. T his in v o lv ed the realistic study o f m an and his passions to understand h o w he was m o tiv ated and to sec, given these p erm an en tly im p o rta n t psychological factors, w h a t w ere the essential conditions o f a peaceful and prosperous society, one in w h ich the p u rsu it o f m aterial progress w o u ld be m ade possible th ro u g h the advancem en t o f learning harnessed to the cause o f social w elfare. In a sense, it was a discussion o f the conditions o f political security an d econom ic g ro w th , o f com m ercial expansion and im perial greatness. N atu rally the w a y in w h ich these intentions w ere fulfilled was far fro m scientific in a m o d e rn sense. Professor C . B. M acpherson, w h o has exam ined in som e detail Sir W illia m T e m p le ’s a tte m p t to approach th e p roblem s o f politics scientifically, has suggested th a t the m e th o d T e m p le used m ay be described as the ‘in d o len t in d u ctiv e’. This term is m o st suitable and accurately depicts the general m an n er o f the sev enteenth-century em piricist. Y et after all, Professor M acpherson added, ‘it is the k in d o f questions T em p le asks and the w a y he believes they are to be answ ered, rath er th an the v ery im p erfect w ay he answers th em , th at places h im am o n g the political “ scientists” .’95 A gain, this is a v erd ict th at m ay w ith o u t hesitation o r unfairness be applied to the w h o le em pirical enterprise. Som e o f the aspects o f this style o f th o u g h t, in particu lar th e a tte m p t to study politics o n an em pirical basis, are exem plified in the fo llow ing chapters. A n d first lit is essential, because it is so ü5 C. B. Macpherson, 4Sir William Temple, Political Scientist?’, T h e C a n a d ia n J o u r n a l o f E c o n o m ic s a n d P o litic a l S c ie n c e y ix (1943), pp. 39-54; the passages quoted are at pp. 46 and 47. Professor Macpherson says little about the ideological basis o f Temple’s scheme save to argue that he failed to analyse the importance to political discussion of changes in the economic structure. 204

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w id e-ran g in g , to review in som e detail the great schem e exp o u n d ed b y B acon him self, the plan w h ich to a very large degree set the purpose and form ed the m an n er o f the em pirical tradition in sev enteenth-century E ngland.

20 5

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M a c h i a v e l l i represented w ell the early stages in the g ro w th o f an em pirical political d octrine and, w ith som e o f the o th er Florentine historians, h ad indicated th e m an n er o f discussion in v olved. B o d in , despite his basic acceptance o f the political th eo ry o f o rd er, h ad developed certain aspects o f the m e th o d b y his en q u iry in to histo rio g rap h y . These w ere acco m panied and follo w ed b y m an y o th er w riters w h o arg u ed th at politics should be treated in a m o re o r less em pirical and u tilitarian w a y an d that, in consequence, theories a b o u t g o v e rn m e n t should be deduced fro m h isto ry and experience. N o n e w as m o re im p o rta n t th an Francis B acon o f w h o m it could be urged, and w ith m u ch force, th at h e w as the m o st significant and influential E nglish th in k er o f the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. His w o rk was at the same tim e a form ative influence o n and a conspectus o f som e o f the m ost crucial and characteristic co n tem p o rary intellectual trends. It was n o t so m u ch th at he applied the ‘scientific’ approach in practice b u t that,_by_ p ro v id in g a reasoned philosophical expositio n o fits n ature and purposes, he at once explained, justified and im p ro v ed it. A nd it is n o t w ith o u t the greatest significance in this co n tex t that history, in its w idest and m ost com plete sense, was the fo un d atio n o f his schem e for the refo rm and ad v ancem ent o f learning. N aturally, despite the fundam ental difference o f style, B acon’s philosophy did n o t disdain the use o f ideas and expressions derived fro m the m etaphysic o f order: it could n o t be expected that even he should slough off all vestiges o f notions so em b edded in the consciousness o f the age. For instance, he used correspondence argum ents fro m tim e to tim e. N onetheless the contrast o f emphasis b etw een his m anner o f th in k in g and the o th er is vital and m ost m arked. In the field o f natural philosophy, his plan fo r a scientific renais206

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sance was avow edly utilitarian, the aim being to p ro d u ce a science o f n atu re w h ic h w o u ld b etter m a n ’s estate. Its m e th o d was em pirical and in v o lv ed the inductive analysis o f system atic collections o f n atural fact. These ‘natural histories’, as th ey w ere called, w ere to be the crucial basis o f the n ew science. B aco n ’s b elief in the possibility o f progress in the natural-scientific sphere is w ell-k n o w n . F or som e reason, h o w ev er, it is n o t o fte n appreciated th at he anticipated the same advances in th e sphere o f w h a t w e should now adays call the social sciences, and by the use o f an/ identical technique. In regard to the study o f m an, the renew al o f k n o w led g e to o k the fo rm o f an inductive analysis o f the facts o f p sy chology and civil h istory, that is to say, o f w h at I have above called a u to b io g ra p h y and vicarious experience. T h e m e th o d w as the same as in the realm o f nature. T h e purp o se w as as utilitarian: the d eterm in a tio n o f ap p ro p riate form s o f g o v ern m en t and th e m ax im izatio n o f w elfare. B acon w as indeed the first great political utilitarian, as he w as the first great philosopher o f science and politics in the m o d e rn fashion th a t this c o u n try p ro d u ced . B aco n ’s system was conceived, then, as one o f universal scope, in ten d ed to apply to all secular learning! It w as discussed m ost fully in relation to the n atu ral sciences in co n n ex io n w ith w h ich he p ro d u ced a sketch o f the m aster p lan he h ad in m in d . Less th an h a lf o f it, h o w ev er, w as elaborated at any length. B u t it is necessary to give som e account o f the general p ro ject so th at the discussion o f politics and ethics m ay be seen to fit in to the fra m e w o rk as a w h o le and to flow n atu rally fro m it.I

I Jam es I is rep o rted once to have said th at ‘m y L o rd C h an c ello r’s philosophy Is like the peace o f G od w h ich passeth all u n d e rstan d in g .’ T his m u st have been one o f Jam es’s w eak er m o m en ts for B ac o n ’s p h ilo so p h y w as, i f vast in scope, sim ple in conception. It to o k the fo rm o f a six-fold schem e for a ‘G reat Instau ra tio n ’, o r renew al, o f learning. It was in ten d ed to restore to m an th at m astery o v er th e w o rld w h ic h he h ad once had, w h ic h h ad been forfeited b y the Fall, and the regaining o f w hich, B acon th o u g h t, 207

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h ad latterly been p rev en ted b y the dom in an ce o f the false and a rro g an t philosophy o f the schools and th eir m aster, A ristotle. This inv o lv ed a full-scale assault o n th e citadels o f established learning, and B aco n ’s pro ject was a vital factor in th e conflict o f ancients and m oderns, helping to shape m ost influentially b o th its style and outcom e. T h e first p a rt o f the Instauration was called the ‘Divisions o f the Sciences’ , and w as to be a general survey o f the existing state o f k n o w ledge. T h e object o f this review was to ju stify B aco n ’s co n cen tration on the study o f natu re b y p o in tin g o u t the gaps and deficiencies w hich he detected in this p a rt o f co n tem p o rary learning. A n y obstacles there m ig h t be in the w ay o f the elim ination o f those defects w ere also to be rem ark ed and th eir rem o v al discussed. This p a rt o f the design was fulfilled b y the Descriptio Globi Intellectualis (c. 1612) and, m o re im p o rta n tly , by The Advancement o f Learning (1605) as extended b y th e Latin version o f 1623, De Augmentis Scientiarum, in w hich B acon outlin ed his w h o le p h ilo sophical schem e. A t its basis w as the fideistic division o f k n o w ledge in to tw o kinds. O n the one h an d there was divinity, k n o w ledge o f w hich was derived initially fro m supernatural revelation. O n the o th er h an d there was natural k now led g e, the foundations o f w h ich w ere laid in n atu re itself. B acon held th at this distinction was vital to the w hole enterprise. F or it envisaged th at final causes w ere considered o n ly in divinity; th ey h ad n o place in n atu ral p h ilo sophy w h ere o n ly im m ediate, m aterial causes w ere relevant. T h e re was established therefore a field o f investigation in w h ich research could proceed o n a w h o lly em pirical basis to the exclusion o f religious o r m etaphysical abstractions. T h e em pirical study o f n atu re could indeed be regarded as a fo rm o f divine w o rsh ip — approaching G od th ro u g h his W o rk s rath er than th ro u g h His W o rd ; nonetheless its basis was n o t faith b u t the rational inspectio n o f sense-experience. B acon considered these issues at le n g th 1 and th en, having cleared the g ro u n d and established the b o n a fides o f an independent scientific sphere o f enquiry, tu rn e d to his review o f n atural k now ledge and o f the causes o f h u m an erro r, th e latter 1 See, c.g., D e A u g m e n t i s S c ie n tia r u m , Book III, in (London, 1877-87), ÍV.336IL

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b ein g subsum ed u n d er his fam ous d octrin e o f the ‘Idols o f the M in d ’. T h e details o f this survey d o n o t m a tte r here. B u t B aco n ’s conclusion was th at m an y parts o f learning w ere deficient in clu d ing the tw o to w h ic h he attached m ost im p o rtan ce: n atu ral h isto ry and the science o f nature. It was w ith the rem ed y fo r these im perfections that the rest o f the Instauration w as especially concerned. T h e second p a rt o f B acon’s plan ou tlin ed his system o f in d u etive logic, the ‘n ew a r t’ o f in terp retin g nature. A sketch o f these ideas ab o u t m e th o d and the directions fo r its use w ere laid d o w n m ain ly in th e Novum Organum published in 1620. B acon repudiated the scholastic m ethods o f the universities as b ein g too m u ch concerned w ith abstract reason an d w ith co n cepts w h ic h w ere, in m ost co m p lex fashion, w eld ed in to a general system o f ideas th at h ad n o necessary fo u n d atio n in p atien t factual en q u iry . Sim ilarly, at the sam e tim e that he saw the virtues o f the alchem ists and o th e r em pirics w h o preached the necessity o f exp erim e n t, he n o te d that th ey erred in the opposite ex trem e to the schoolm en, try in g to understand all o f n atu re b y ex am in in g only a p a rt o f it and grasping to o quickly at im m ed iate practical results.2 In a fam ous letter to B u rg h ley he w ro te ab o u t these defects in the science o f his day: 1 confess that I have as vast contemplative ends, as I have moderate civil ends; for I have taken all knowledge to be m y province; and if I could purge it o f tw o sorts o f rovers, w hereof the one w ith frivolous disputations, confutations, and verbosities, the other w ith blind experiments and auricular traditions and impostures, hath committed so m any spoils, I hope I should bring in industrious observations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions and discoveries; the best state o f that province. H e w an ted to com bine th e virtues o f b o th approaches: \ . . fro m a closer and p u re r league b etw een these tw o faculties, the experim en tal and the rational, (such as has n ever y et been m ade) m u ch m a y be h o p e d .’3 2 Bacon, W o r k s , iii.284—7, iv.63-66. 3 T h e L e tte r s a n d T h e L i f e o f F r a n c is W o r k s , iv.93.

B acon,

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ed. Spedding (London, 1868-90), i.109;

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T h e general theory underly in g th e app ro ach w as a straig h tfo rw ard v ariation o n the resolutive-com positive m eth o d . N a tu re consisted o f an enorm ous n u m b e r o f different an d often v e ry com plex bodies. B u t this b ew ildering variety d id n o t p rev en t analysis, for ev erything was com posed o f a m o re lim ited range o f substances. In tu rn , each substance could be lo o k ed at as c o n sisting o f a still sm aller n u m b e r o f characteristics o r ‘sim ple natures’. So any particular object could be th o u g h t o f as a c o m bination o f these fundam ental qualities such as colour, w eig h t, heat and light. T o understand the w o rld , therefore, it w as necessary to understand the sim ple natures in to w h ic h its ap p aren t vastness and com plexity could be resolved. O nce these w ere com prehended all the p o w e r and resources o f n a tu re w o u ld be m a n ’s to co m m and. I f he k n e w the essence o f these basic qualities, he w o u ld be able to p roduce th e m in any co m b in atio n , in cluding m an y previously u n k n o w n . B acon h ad to show , therefore, h o w to d eterm ine the form al causes o r necessary conditions o f all the sim ple natures th at existed.4 T h e first stage B acon proposed in the investigation o f the ‘fo rm ’ o f a sim ple nature w as the listing o f all the k n o w n substances in w h ich the n ature occurred. T his he called ‘the Table o f Essence and Presence’. T h e n ‘the Table o f Deviation, or o f Absence in Proximity’ was com piled. T heoretically this should have included all substances in w h ich the given quality w as absent. B u t B acon th o u g h t th at this w o u ld be an endless task, so he said th at only those substances lacking the quality w h ic h w ere like those in the first T able need be included. Lastly, there was to be p ro d u ced ‘the Table o f Degrees or o f Comparison’ , that is, the cases in w h ich the given n atu re was present in varying p ro p o rtio n s in cither the same or in different subjects. B acon attem p ted by w ay o f exam ple to c o m pile such lists to help determ ine the sim ple n atu re o f heat, b u t they w ere incom plete. H e apologized for the partial n atu re o f these data b u t said that it show ed h o w little in fo rm atio n there w as ab o u t even such an im p o rta n t and c o m m o n p h e n o m en o n as this. 4

W o r k s , iii.355’ 6, iv.izoff. It should be noted that Bacon was a nominalist: he denied that the ‘forms’ had any independent existence and asserted that only individual bodies were real. To discuss the form of a simple quality was only a way o f describing these bodies and their interactions; e.g., ibid., iv.120, 254.

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T h e function o f these Tables w as w h a t he called ‘the P resen tatio n o f Instances to the U n d e rsta n d in g ’, and once th ey w ere to h an d B acon th o u g h t that a close and careful inspection o f th em , especially o f w h a t h e called the ‘S triking Instances’ in w h ich the fo rm concerned w as m ost apparent, w o u ld elicit a positive k n o w ledge o f the sim ple nature. T h e fo rm could n o t be absent in the first T able, present in the second o r constant in the th ird . O n the basis o f his in com p lete Tables ab o u t heat, for instance, B acon co n eluded th a t its fo rm w as a certain sort o f m o tio n .5 C learly the success o f the m e th o d w o u ld depend very largely o n th e accuracy and scope o f the Tables. So the th ird p a rt o f B aco n ’s p ro ject dealt w ith ‘Natural and Experimental History’ in w h ic h all the p h en o m en a o f the universe (b o th as th ey w ere in a n atu ral state and as th ey w ere affected b y m a n ’s experim ents an d the processes o f industry) w ere to be catalogued as the em pirical basis o f the n e w philosophy. T h e histories w ere to constitute, B acon said, ‘the p rim a ry m aterial o f p h ilo so p h y ’ and ‘the stu ff and subje c t m a tte r o f true . . . in d u c tio n ’.6 H e co m m en ced a specim en co llection o f data in the Sylva Sylvarum (1627), and the Parasceve (1620) was likew ise a p re p a ra to ry study o f this k in d . H e also began to com pile som e m o re detailed illustrations, o f w h ic h h a lf a dozen o r so are extant, as w ell as p ro d u cin g a list o f th e n atu ral histories he th o u g h t o u g h t to be assem bled. T h e fo u rth section w as called the ‘Ladder o f the Intellect’ , and was to consist o f som e fully w o rk e d -o u t exam ples o f th e n e w m e th o d applied to the facts contained in the n atu ral histories. O n ly a preface is ex tan t alth o u g h obviously the exam ple in th e second b o o k o f the Novum Organum, w h e re B aco n sketched the w a y in w h ich an in v estig ato r should set a b o u t analysing the fo rm o f the sim ple n a tu re o f heat, could be considered to b elo n g here. B u t it is n o t at all com plete o r satisfactory and no in d icatio n was given o f the results to w h ich it could lead. T h e n cam e the ‘Forerunners or Anticipations o f the N ew Philosophy , th at is, those results th at could be achieved b y the o ld m ethods o f en q u iry w o rk in g on the n e w n atu ral histories. T his itself w o u ld be m u ch b e tte r th an going o n in th e usual ineffective 6 Ibid., iv.127-50.

6 Ibid., v.507-8.

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w ay. B u t again ap art fro m one preface there is little else th at B acon p ro d u ced here. Finally, there was the last p a rt o f th e Instauration, th e ‘N ew Philosophy’ itself, o r ‘Active Science’ as B acon som etim es called it. This w o u ld be achieved w h e n the n atu ral histories w ere fully considered in term s o f the inductive m etho d . A gain B acon w ro te o n ly a preface and left the w o rk o f p ro d u c in g this com plete science o f n ature to his successors. H e had p ro v id e d the m achine, he said, b u t the stu ff h ad to be g athered fro m th e facts o f m an an d o f n a tu re and this w as th e w o rk o f the fu tu re.7 T his b rie f account is quite inadequate to co n v ey th e full scope an d g randeur o f B aco n ’s vision. It is b u t a m eagre su m m ary o f an enterprise w hich he described at som e len g th in m atchless language an d w ith m easured b u t contagious enthusiasm . N onetheless the plan rem ained unfulfilled and was n ever even w o rk e d o u t in all its details. O n ly one p a rt o f th e Instauration— th e first— was in an y sense com pleted. T h e rest was a collection o f unfinished co m p o sitions, prefaces and often m erely lists o f titles o f w h a t m ig h t be done. C riticism o f B acon’s schem e often rests o n an elaboration o f this p o in t. In particular, the m eth o d o lo g y has often been subject to attack. This topic m erits a little fu rth er atten tio n because it is relevant here, and it seems to m e th at there is still often m u ch m isu nderstanding o f the m atter. In his preface to the Novum Organum in th e standard ed itio n o f B acon’s Works, M r Ellis argued th at th e n e w m e th o d o f in d u ctio n was th e cardinal feature o f th e w h o le system , and I th in k it is tru e to say th a t th e o rth o d o x tre atm e n t o f B acon is, above all, as th e ex p o n en t o f an inductive logic.8 I f this em phasis w ere co rrect th en B aco n ’s failure to describe his m e th o d co m p letely and to give fully w o rk e d -o u t exam ples o f its use w o u ld indeed be an om ission o f the first m agnitude. As I have said, his exam ples o f th e Tables concerning heat w ere n o t finished; and o f o th er omissions, reference need o n ly be m ade to his failure to deal w ith all b u t one o f the nine aids to th e understanding w h ich he m en tio n ed . 7 W o r k s , iv.12. Bacon’s outline of the whole scheme is described at iv.22-33. 8 Ibid., i.88. Cf. F. H. Anderson, T h e P h ilo s o p h y o f F ra n c is B a c o n (Chicago, 1948), p. 33, and E. A. Abbott, F ra n c is B a c o n (London, 1885), pp. 343-8.

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F u rth er, it is d o u b tfu l w h e th e r the m eth o d , as he described it, could ever be fully elaborated. T h e technique B acon suggested was sim ilar to the P aduan regress: it depended o n the resolution o f an em pirical en tity (an ‘effect’) in to its c o m p o n en t form al causes and their com position to p ro d u ce useful results. T h e in te rp retatio n o f n atu re, he said, had tw o m ain divisions: ‘h o w to educe and fo rm axiom s fro m experience [and] h o w to deduce and derive new experim ents fro m axiom s.’9 B u t the B aconian ad d itio n to the m e th o d — the necessity fo r the co m plete and extensive p relim in ary T ables— m ade it im practicable. For it w o u ld be quite im possible to assemble these lists in any th in g like an exhaustive w ay. T h e y w o u ld all be far to o extensive to com plete and w o u ld ten d to becom e so heterogeneous and u n w ield y th a t th ey could n o t usefully be m anipulated. It_was n o t only B aco n ’s o th er pressin g concerns th a t led h im to leave the n e w o rg an o n unfinished; and it was n o accident th at n o t only did he never p ro d u ce any result w ith the m eth o d he proposed, b u t th a t it has b o rn e h ttle resem blance to the w ay in w h ich ideas ab o u t scientific techniques hav e subsequently developed. T h e re is, therefore, a basis for criticism o f B aco n ’s inductive m eth o d . Y et such criticism , alth o u g h sound, m ay m islead i f it is taken to be final in every sense, because in a w ay it raises issues w h ich o b stru ct the atte m p t to understand B acon’s m an n er and purpose and his effect on the seventeenth-century m ind. It is the tru th : yet it is n o t w h at was then th o u g h t to be the tru th . A nd so, despite the validity o f these criticism s th ey are, in this context, historically irrelevant. T w o points need to be b ro u g h t o u t. First o f all I am n o t at all co nvinced it is co rrect to say th a t the n e w logic alone was the m ost crucial p a rt o f the G reat Instauration. T h e Novum Organum was n ever com pleted because after w ritin g tw o books o f it BacQm deliberately left it and tu rn e d his atten tio n to the n ex t p a rt o f the plan, the n atu ral histories. H e w o u ld h ard ly have left the logic unfinished in this w ay i f he had n o t th o u g h t the task o f collecting masses o f em pirical data at least equally as vital. D ed icatin g his exam ples o f this w o rk to P rince Charles, he w ro te th a t ‘a sound 8 Works, iv.127.

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an d w ell-o rd ered N a tu ra l H isto ry is the key o f all k n o w led g e and o p e ra tio n ’ and that little progress could be expected u n til it h ad ‘been p rep ared and con stru cted ’. W ith o u t this g ro u n d in g o f ascertained fact, there w o u ld continue to be a p leth o ra o f u n reliable an d abstract theories; everyone w o u ld have his fav o u rite fancy and w o u ld philosophize ‘o u t o f th e cells o f his o w n im ag in atio n , as o u t o f P la to ’s cave’. T h e n ew o rg an o n by itself could do little w ith o u t th e n atu ral histories. B u t on the o th er h an d the histories w o u ld be fruitful even w ith the old w ays o f th in k in g ; this, indeed, w as w h a t th e fifth p a rt o f th e In stau ratio n — the ‘P ro d ro m i’ o r ‘anticipations o f the n e w p h ilo so p h y ’— was to co n sist of. T h e old w its w o u ld , he w e n t on, raise far m o re solid structures after they h ad o b tain ed ‘a tru e and copious history o f n atu re an d the arts’, and that too though they prefer to walk on in the old path and not by the way o f m y O rganum , which in m y estimation if not the only is at least the best source. It comes therefore to this; that m y O rganum , even if it were completed, w ould not w ithout the N atural History m uch advance the Instauration o f the Sciences, whereas the N atural History w ithout the O rganum w ould advance it not a little. And therefore, I have thought it better and wiser by all means and above all things to apply m yself to this w o rk .10 T his w as an u n am b ig u o u s expression o f an o rd er o f p rio rities th a t B acon co ntinually em phasized th ro u g h o u t his w ritin g s. As he p u t it in The Advancement oj Learning, ‘k n ow led g es are as pyram ides, w h e re o f h isto ry is th e basis. . . f 11 M o re o v e r—and this is th e second p o in t— it w as the co m p ilatio n o f the n atu ral histories, as th e essential task to w h ic h p rio rity h a d to be given, th a t becam e the m ain p u rp o se o f the n e w p h ilo sophers, th e m em bers o f th e R oyal Society, the virtu o si an d all th e others influenced by the B aconian ideal. T h e first co n cern , said Sprat, reflecting th e R oyal Society view , w as ‘to m ake faithful Records, o f all the W o rk s o f Nature, or Art’ ,12 and to the fulfilm ent o f this aim the o rg an izatio n dedicated itself as, I th in k , is sh o w n 10 W o r k s , v.127, 131-4, cf. T h e 11 W o r k s , iii.356. 12 T. Sprat, H i s t o r y o f th e R o y a l

L e tte r s a n d T h e L i f e , S o c ie ty ,

vii.130.

ed. Cope and Jones (London, 1959), P• 61.

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by even the m ost cursory review o f its proceedings (as recorded, for instance, in B irc h ’s History). This was w h y the Fellows o f the Society seem ed to be alm ost unconcerned ab o u t the develo p m en t ofsy stem s o f natu ral philo so p h y like those o fD cscartcs o r H obbes. T h e y ten d ed to lo o k askance at an y th in g o th er th an a steady effort to cum ulate facts, and regarded even the favoured ‘m echanical p h ilo so p h y ’ rath er as w h at w o u ld be called, in B aconian term s, an ‘A n ticip atio n ’, a convenient w o rk in g hypothesis, th an a final explanation o f inerrable accuracy.13 W h a t em erges, then, is a grand, th o u g h n o t a grandiose, vision o f the advancem ent o f science and the increase o f useful learning based o n a sound fo u n d atio n o f established fact.

II B acon did n o t th in k o f his Instauration as b eing concerned only w ith natural science. Its scope was w id er covering also the sphere o f m an and society. His b elief in w h a t he called ‘First P h ilo so p h y ’ has to be seen in this w ay. This em braced the rules w h ic h applied th ro u g h o u t the different realm s o f experience and represented the basic u n ity o f all k n o w ledge. It was, he said, ‘a receptacle for all such axiom s as are n o t peculiar to any o f the particular sciences, b u t b elo n g to several o f th em in c o m m o n .’14 It applied to all branches o f learning, including m orals and politics. In dedicating De Sapientia Veterum he w ro te th at ‘the art o f politics . . . springs fro m the same fo u n ta in ’ as philo so p h y ‘and is a great p a rt th ereo f.’15 In this spirit, to o , he co m pared certain rules o f m athem atics and physics w ith those o f ethics and politics.16 A nd ju st as he th o u g h t th at the usual logic could be used ‘in civil business’, so his n ew m e th o d could naturally be applied universally and em ployed m o re effectively th an the old to unravel the secrets o f the h u m an as w ell as o f the natural w o rld . H e stated this quite clearly in the Novum Organum: ‘It m ay . . . be asked . . . w h e th e r I speak o f n atu ral philosophy only, o r w h eth er I m ean th at the o th er sciences, logic, ethics, and politics, should be 13 See, e.g., the passage about Hooke quoted at p. 168 above. 14 W o r k s , iv.337. 16 Ibid., vi.689. 16 Ibid., iv.337-9.

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carried o n by this [inductive] m eth o d . N o w I certainly m ean w h a t I have said to be understood o f th e m all; and as the c o m m o n logic w h ich governs the syllogism , extends n o t on ly to n atu ral b u t to all sciences; so does m ine also, w h ich proceeds by in d u ctio n , em brace ev ery th in g .’17 T h e B aconian techniques w ere therefore th o u g h t to be applicable to questions relatin g fto individual and social m a n .18 So it was n o t surprising that B acon and his disciples lo o k ed to th e possibility o f a science o f h u m an n atu re and politics based o n the. in du ctive inspection o f appro p riate em pirical evidence, a schem e w h ich m ay be regarded as the hum anistic aspect o f th e G reat Instauration. T h e idea was n o t developed even as m u ch as th e project for the renew al o f n atu ral philosophy, or rather, it w as n o t w o rk e d o u t w ith any th in g like the same o rd erliness and consistency. H o w ev er, its outline w as clear. As m ig h t be expected, B acon first o f all stressed the im p o rtan ce o f experience as a basis o f political generalization. F or ju st as the neglect o f experim ental enquiry w as the g ravam en o f his charge against traditional scientific th o u g h t, so th e failure to m ake adequate use o f experience, b o th personal and vicarious, w as the essence o f his criticism o f scholastic civil philosophy. B acon accepted o f course the view th at general precep t was n o t sufficiently detailed o r specific, th a t exam ples, as he to ld Lancelot A ndrew es, gave ‘a quicker im pression’, and th at ‘ev ery th in g is subject to chance and e rro r w hich is n o t su p p o rted by exam ples and experience.’ His o w n custom , he said, w as always to su p p o rt a case b y use o f instances, ‘for precepts w o u ld n o t give a sufficient illu stra tio n .. . .’19 B u t he h ad in m in d m o re th an the use o fe x p e ricnce m erely to illustrate notions already conceived. H e w anted experience itself to be the source and basis o f generalizations ab o u t politics. For as he said, w h e n discussing M achiav clli-type observations o n history and exam ples, knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out o f particulars knows best the way back to particulars again; and it contributes much more to 17 W o r k s , iv.17-18, 112. 18 See also ibid., iii.230-1, 348-9, iv.79, 300-1, 373. 19 Ibid., iv.301, 458, vii.11; cf. iv.318.

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practice, w hen the discourse or discussion attends on the example, than w hen the example attends on the discourse. And this is n o t only a point o f order, but o f substance also. For when the example is laid dow n as the ground o f the discourse, it is set dow n w ith all the attendant circumstances, which may sometimes correct the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for im itation and practice; whereas examples alleged for the sake o f the discourse, are cited succinctly and w ithout particularity, and like slaves only w ait upon the demands o f the discourse.20 A n d , o f course, the m ain source o f the relevant experience was h isto ry. T h e im p o rtan ce w h ich B acon attached to h isto ry can be seen also in his analysis o f the faculties o f the h u m a n m in d . H e distinguished three such faculties, im ag in atio n , m e m o ry and reason, and saw these reflected in th e activities o f p o etry , h isto ry and philosophy. P o e try he called a ‘d ream o f learn in g ’; p h ilo so sophy w as useless unless based o n experience; in consequence p rid e o f place w e n t to history. So th a t ju st as n atu ral history, w h ich treated o f ‘the deeds and w orks o f n a tu re ’, should stand at the basis o f n atural philosophy, civil h istory, w h ich dealt w ith the w o rk s an d deeds o f m an, o u g h t to be th e fo u n d atio n o f civil p h ilo so p h y .21 B acon th o u g h t o f n o n -n atu ral o r civil h isto ry in general as b eing o f three kinds: sacred o r ecclesiastical history, the h isto ry o f learning and th e arts, and civil histo ry in th e p ro p er, m o re n a rro w sense. H is general rev iew o f the adequacy an d scope o f th e first tw o types need n o t detain us, save to n o te th at w h en he p o in ted to the need to com pile a ‘com plete and m iiversal H isto ry o f L earn in g ’ he gave reasons o f a utilitarian kind. H e th o u g h t an adequate survey o f intellectual and artistic d ev elo p m en t w o u ld give a valuable indication o f the characters o f the nations studied an d p o in t to the prerequisite conditions o f intellectual v ig o u r. B acon believed also th a t an observation o f these em pirical data w o u ld give som e indication o f ‘the best system o f g o v e rn m e n t’, b y w h ich, fro m th e con tex t, he seems to have m ean t the system m o st likely to foster the d ev elo p m en t o f learning an d to p ro m o te a flourishing and progressive society. M u ch m o re to the same 20 Ibid., v.56.

p

21 Ibid., iii.329ff., iv.336, v.503~5.

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purpose, h o w ev er, w as civil history in the strict sense, ‘w h e re o f the d ig n ity and a u th o rity are p re -e m in e n t a m o n g h u m a n w ritin g s’, for it recorded the ‘exam ples o f o u r ancestors, th e vicissitudes o f things, the foundations o f civil policy, and the n am e an d re p u ta tio n o f m e n .’22 B aco n ’s conspectus o f this civil h isto ry to o k the fo rm o f a survey o f the various kinds o f historical w ritin g an d the raw m aterial involved. H e m ade a general distinction b etw een ‘P u re ’ an d ‘M ix e d ’ civil history. T h e fo rm er w as su b-divided in to th ree categories. ‘Memorials’ included w h a t he called ‘Commentaries' and ‘Registers', th a t is, ‘the first ro u g h drafts’ o f civil h isto ry , the basic data, such as chronologies, annals, lists o f speeches, decrees, ju d icial proceedings and the like. ‘Antiquities' w ere ‘rem n an ts o f histories’ and covered w h a t w e w o u ld call archaeology and the usual an tiquarian study o f genealogies, titles, coins and so o n, as w ell as in v o lv in g a euhem eristic in te rp re ta tio n o f ancient legend. These tw o w ere obviously im p erfect form s an d m u ch in ferio r to th e th ird categ o ry w h ich B acon called ‘Perfect History’. T his co n sisted of, firstly, the ‘H isto ry o f T im es’, th a t is, general chronicles dealing either w ith w o rld histo ry as a w h o le o r the deeds o f som e p articular k in g d o m or people; secondly, th ere w as the h isto ry o f ‘Lives’ w h ich p ro v id e d great ‘p ro fit and exam ples’; an d th ird ly th ere w ere special ‘N arratio n s o r R elations’ o f specific actions, such as the history o f a p articular w ar. T h e o th er b ro a d division, ‘M ix e d ’ civil h istory, w as m ade up o f ‘R u m in ated H is to ry ’ and the ‘H isto ry o f C o sm o g ra p h y ’. T h e fo rm er consisted o f selections o f historical exam ples chosen b y the au th o r as a basis for ‘politic discourse and o b serv atio n ’. B acon greatly ap p ro v ed o f this p ro cedure for, as he said, any w ise h isto ry w as ‘p reg n an t . . . w ith political precepts and w a rn in g s’; th o u g h o f course it was n o t to be confused w ith ‘Perfect H is to ry ’ w h ere the ‘w rite r h im se lf should n o t play the m id w ife ’. T h e ‘H isto ry o f C o s m o g ra p h y ’ w as civil h isto ry m ixed w ith n atu ral h istory, an account n o t o n ly o f a c o u n try ’s custom s, g o v e rn m e n t and institutions b u t also o f its clim ate, n atu ral features, agriculture and so o n. In his discussion o f ‘M ix e d ’ civil histo ry B acon seems to have h ad in m in d w orks 22 Works, iv.293-4, 300-2.

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like those o f M achiavelli o n the one hand and the encyclopaedic g u id e-b o o k ty p e o f w o rk like th at p ro d u ced b y B o tcro and D ’A v ity o n the oth er. T o all this he added various ‘Appendices to History’ w h ich dealt n o t w ith m a n ’s actions b u t his w ords, such as collections o f ‘ Speeches, Letters and Apopthcgms’ including, one supposes, his o w n stock o f aphorism s. H e regarded these addenda as b eing v ery useful in developing the faculty o f ‘civil p ru d en ce’.23 Indeed, in th e usual w ay, B acon saw civil h isto ry as being m ost valuable in the understanding and fo rm atio n o f policy, especially i f it was w ritte n b y m en w h o had a direct acquaintance w ith the affairs concerned o r i f it was carefully based on first-hand m aterial. This was w h y he advised that above all books a m an should ‘be conversant in the H istories, for they w ill best in s tr u c t. . . in m atter m o ral, m ilitary, and politic’ and thus ‘ripen and settle’ the ju d g e m e n t.24 A ll these different aspects o f civil history, then, w o u ld , w h e n p ro p e rly developed, provide the em pirical basis for the fo rm u latio n o f rules o f civil conduct. As w ith the natural scientific side o f the G reat Instauration, B aco n’s project for the develo p m en t o f civil h isto ry was n o t co m p lem en ted b y m u ch finished w o rk o f the k in d envisaged. H e said a full an d reliable h isto ry o f G reat B ritain w o u ld be especially valuable b u t p ro d u ced on ly an account o f th e reign o f H e n ry V II (w hich itself depended a great deal on P oly d o re V ergil and o th er au th o rities and is, indeed, often quite unsound). A part fro m this, he co m piled o n ly a few prefaces and miscellaneous fragm ents. A nd so far as these are an adequate guide it is interesting and necessary to n o te th at B aco n ’s view s w ere in som e respects n o t dissimilar to the o rth o d o x o rd er p attern : he was m uch concerned w ith th e u n io n o f the Roses b y the T u d o rs and w ith the general story o f th eir reign as being a m ost sem inal source o f political p recep t.25 A t the same tim e he could be quite sceptical, rejecting m an y o f the fabulous elem ents still c o m m o n in the histories o f the tim e .2® O b v io u sly then, B acon’s excursions into the field o f civil h isto ry w ere at least as sparse, i f n o t m o re so, than his essays in natural 23 Bacon’s general survey of these various sorts of history is to be found ibid., iv.30314‫•־־‬ 24 T h e L e tte r s a n d T h e L i f e , ii.12. 25 Ibid., iii.250; W o r k s , iv.305-7, vi.32. 26 e.g. W o r k s , vi.43-44.

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history. A t the same tim e, his th e o ry o f civil h isto ry could expect to d raw on the resources o f the established tra d itio n o f didactic h isto rio g rap h y and thus to receive m o re easy acceptance th an was the case w ith his natural philosophy. In this sense, the n o t v ery th o ro u g h tre atm e n t o f the civil histo ry m ay be excused for the busy m an o f affairs th at B acon was. C ertain ly the general th em e was apparent: th a t ju s t as in natural philoso p h y a k n o w led g e o f ‘fo rm s’ had to be w ru n g fro m observation and experience, so civil philosophy should be founded o n objective and ‘P erfect’ civil history. It m ust be added th at B acon did enlarge on the usual trite com m onplaces about the didactic value o f h isto ry in a n u m b er o f ways. In the first place, he saw the role o f h isto ry n o t as som ething b y itself b u t in a general philosophical co n tex t, as a vital p a rt o f the schem e for the renew al o f all learning. T h e n , he held its purpose n o t to be theological o r subservient to som e spiritual end b u t to be strictly practical an d u tilitarian , d ev o ted to the m aterial im p ro v e m e n t o f life and o f society. A nd, unlike m an y o f those w h o insisted o n the didactic value o f history, he was fully aw are o f the defects o f co n tem p o rary h isto rio g rap h y , faults w hich he related to sim ilar deficiencies in n atu ral h istory. This was im p o rta n t, for a lth o u g ffh e praised in the usual w ay the value o f civil history to political understanding, he felt, w h a t was m ost unusual, th a t there was n o th in g m o re rare th an a co m p e te n t exam ple o f this sort o f w ritin g .27 F urther, it was his in te n tio n to indicate rem edies as he had done in the natu ral scientific field, and so he outlined his schem e o f study based on the tru e fo rm o f the subject, the pursuit o f w hich w o u ld , in his view , p ro d u ce useful political and other know ledge.

Ill T h e science o f h u m an n ature w h ich B acon th o u g h t could be established o n the basis o f history and experience he divided in to tw o parts: the ‘P hilosophy o f H u m a n ity ’ o r the stu d y o f in dividual m an, and ‘C ivil P h ilosophy’ o r the study o f social and political m an. 27 e.g.

W o rks,

iv.302. 220

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T h e ‘P h ilo so p h y o f H u m a n ity ’ co n stitu ted w h a t m ay be called B aco n ’s p sy ch o lo g y and m o ra l p h ilo so p h y . It w as th e ‘general science co n cern in g th e N a tu re and State o f M a n ’, in th e course o f discussing w h ic h B acon rev iew ed m an y problem s. In th e present co n te x t th e m ost im p o rta n t line o f th o u g h t h e d ev elo p ed w as th e attack o n tra d itio n al m o ra l philo so p h y , and th e con sid eratio n o f w h a t could be d o n e to rem ed y its defects, w h ic h in tu rn led h im to sketch a schem e for an em pirical analysis o f h u m a n p sy ch o lo g y . As expressed in th e D e Augmentis B aco n ’s criticism w as q u ite explicit. T h e m o ral p hilosopher, said B acon, w as lik e a m an w h o , professing to teach the art o f w riting, had exhibited only fair copies o f letters, single and joined, w ithout giving any direction for the carriage o f the pen and framing o f the characters. So have these writers set forth good and fair copies, and accurate draughts and portraitures o f good, virtue, duty, and felicity, as the true objects for the will and desires o f m an to aim at. B ut though the marks themselves be excellent and well placed, how a man may best take his aim at them ; that is, by w hat m ethod and course o f education the m ind m ay be trained and p u t in order for the attainm ent o f them, they pass over altogether, or slightly and unprofitably.28 T h e m oralists, th a t is, h ad o n ly discussed in abstract th eo retical term s w h a t m o ra lity was. T his th ey h ad do n e v e ry fully. B u t th e y h ad n o t sh o w n h o w ethical precepts could be applied, h o w in practice m en could b e m ade to act m o rally . In B ac o n ’s o w n te rm in o lo g y , th e philosophers h a d h ith e rto ad eq u ately studied th e ‘Exemplar o r Platform o f Good’ b u t h ad neglected th e ‘Regiment o r Culture o f the M ind’ . Sim ilarly B acon felt th a t th e ancients and o th e r philosophers had often praised to o h ig h ly subjective felicity and in d iv id u al g o o d and paid to o little a tte n tio n to th e g o o d o f the c o m m u n ity as a w hole. T his, he th o u g h t, w as u n fo rtu n ate, for in his v ie w a m a n ’s highest happiness w as alw ays to be fo u n d in society. A n d even w h e re m a n ’s social d u ty and in v o lv e m e n t h ad been lo o k ed at, th e realistic to u ch again w as lacking and th e discussion h ad larg ely been ‘e m p ty and u n p ro fitab le’. W h a t w as needed, therefore, in m o ra l p h ilo so p h y w as a sound k n o w led g e, based o n experience, o f m e n and things as th ey really w ere, an d 28 Ibid., iv.373, v.3-4.

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an u n derstanding o f h o w to apply m o ra l rules in practice and to see th e m in their social con tex t. B ac o n h ad here an o th e r w o rd o f praise for M achiavelli and w riters o f his k in d w h o described quite fran k ly w h a t m en w ere like and w h a t th ey actually did and n o t m erely w h a t th ey o u g h t to do. P rim arily, then, the p ro b le m was h o w to fashion the ‘ Georgies o f the M ind’ , and the aim was a realistic appreciation o f m o ral issues to show h o w m e n ’s wills m ig h t be tuto rially directed in to the paths o f v irtu e instead o f sim ply follow ing their ‘o w n p o w e r, glory , am plification [and] co n tin u an ce.’ W ith o u t this th e usual, theoretical k n o w led g e o f ethical precepts was ‘n o b e tte r th an a fair im age or statue, w h ich is b eautiful to contem plate b u t is w ith o u t life and m o tio n .’ T h e achievem ent o f this objective needed in the first instance a genuine understanding o f h u m a n nature, o f the various ch aracters, tem pers and dispositions o f m en, o f the springs o f action w h ich m o tiv ated th e m and o f the influences w h ich affected th em . T h e n , next, it w as necessary to study the diseases o f the m in d . A lth o u g h in B aco n ’s o p in io n largely neglected h ith erto , b o th o f these w ere as necessary as the o th er aspect, discussion o f the g o o d ends a m an o u g h t alw ays to have in v ie w .29 T h e m ain technique th at B acon w ished to see used to investigate the psychology o f m a n w as the c o u n te rp a rt o f th a t re c o m m en d ed for natu ral philosophy. Like the objects o f the n atu ral w o rld the characters o f m en could be considered as b eing m ade u p o f sim pler qualities, the ‘fo rm s’ o r law s o f o p eratio n o f w h ich could be elicited b y an indu ctiv e inspection o f the ap p ro p riate em pirical data. H u m a n affections and appetites could thus be disco v ered in precisely the same w a y as the ‘fo rm s’ o f physical qualities. In a crucial aphorism in the Novum Organum, B acon w ro te : ‘I fo rm a history a n d tables o f discovery for anger, fear, sham e, and the like; for m atters political; and again for the m en tal operations o f m e m o ry , com p o sitio n and division, ju d g m e n t and the rest; n o t less than for h eat and cold, o r lig h t, o r v eg etatio n , and th e lik e.’30 A nd in th e th ird p a rt o f th e Instauration, w h e n h e gave a catalogue o f particular histories he w o u ld like to see co m p iled , am o n g those dealing w ith m an w ere histories o f ‘the A ffections; 20 W o r k s , iii.229-30, 4!7ff., v.3-30, vii.77.

30 Ibid., iv.112.

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as A nger, L ove, Sham e, See.’ , and o f ‘the Intellectual Faculties; R eflexion, Im agin atio n , D iscourse, M em o ry , & c.’. B acon’s Essays m ust be seen in the co n tex t o f this inten tio n . It is tru e th at he declared on one occasion th a t the Essays w ere b u t the offspring o f his leisure hours, th e ‘recreation o f [his] o th er studies’.31 Y et it is h ig h ly probable, as M r C harles W illiam s has suggested, th at B acon really considered the Essays as p relim in ary studies o f m an and his actions w h ich w o u ld p ro v id e a basis for the investigation o f the law w h ich was the ‘fo rm ’ o f m a n ’s b ein g .32 C ertainly, in dedicating the Essays to B uckingham , B acon rated th e m rath er h ig h er th an m ere jeu x d’esprit, calling th em ‘the best fru it th a t b y th e g o o d encrease w h ich G od gives to m y pen and labours I could y ield .’ Sim ilarly, in the dedicatory letter w h ich he originally w ro te to P rince H en ry , he said o f th e m th a t ‘alth o u g h th ey handle those things w h erein b o th m en ’s lives and their pens are m ost c o n v ersant, y e t . . . I have endeavoured to m ake th e m n o t v ulgar, b u t o f a n a tu re w h e re o f a m an shall find m u ch in experience, and little in books; so as they are neither repetitions n o r fancies.’33 In co n sidering sentim ents such as these expressed in d ed icato ry epistles, allow ance m ust be m ade for a natu ral w ish to im press th e serious qualities o f the w o rk u p o n its intended recipient. B u t B acon, w h o in his y o u th h ad dedicated h im se lf to take all k n o w led g e for his p ro v in ce and to p ro m o te its advancem ent, was n o t th e m an to use even his leisure h ours idly. F urther, it m ust be n o te d th at in the discussion o f ‘the A rt o f . . . C iv il G o v e rn m e n t’ in th e D e Augmentis, one o f th e essays w as rep rin ted to rem ed y a deficiency in political k n o w le d g e .34 C learly, th e Essays w ere m o re th an m erely ‘p arerg a to his m ain labours’ as M r D . G. Jam es erroneously called th e m ,35 and m ust be accepted as p a rt o f B acon’s overall schem e. (T h e m ain source o f data he used for the psychological investigatio n w as in ev itab ly history: ‘. . . for the best p ro v isio n an d m aterial 31 Ibid., iv.269, vii.14. 32 C. Williams, B a c o n (London, 1933), pp. 305-7; cf. Abbott, op. cit., pp. 440, 446-7. 33 W o r k s , vi.373; T h e L e tte r s a n d T h e L i f e , iv.340; cf. Bacon’s reference to the E s s a y s as 4serious observations’ in W o r k s , vi.467. 34 W o r k s , v. 79 87 “‫•־‬ 36 D. G. James, T h e D r e a m o f L e a r n in g (Oxford, 1951), p. 123.

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for this treatise o f [h u m an nature] is to be gained fro m the w iser so rt o f h isto ria n s.. . T h e character studies and analyses presented in th eir histories b y w riters like L ivy, Tacitus, C o m m in es and G uicciardini w ere w h a t B acon h ad in m in d , along w ith the in fo rm a tio n w h ic h could be o b tain ed fro m o th er sources such as accounts o f papal conclaves and am bassadorial rep o rts on th e councillors o f a prince. H e w as sure that o u t o f such m aterials as this ‘a full and careful treatise’ m ig h t be co n stru cted em b o d y in g ‘a scientific and accurate dissection o f m inds an d characters’ and re vealing th e n a tu re o f m e n ’s ‘secret dispositions’. A ll the variables in v o lv ed, sex, age, reg io n lived in, health, b eauty, d e fo rm ity and th e o th er m ultitu d in o u s effects o f fo rtu n e should be analysed to fram e ‘b etter rules’ for th e u nderstanding o f th e m in d .36 A related subject it was necessary to study con cern ed ‘ the affections and perturbations’, o r diseases, o f the m in d , for these w ere w inds w h ic h tro u b led the m in d ’s sm o o th sea and a k n o w le d g e o f th e m w as essential to a consideration o f h o w m o ra lity an d p o licy could be applied. A gain, the o n ly w o rth w h ile m aterial to w o rk o n w as th a t p ro v id e d b y h isto ry and experience, th o u g h h ere B acon was p repared to concede som e value to w h a t he elsew here called th a t ‘d ream o f learn in g ’, p o e try :

. . . to speak the real truth, the poets and writers of history are the best doctors of this knowledge, where we may fmd painted forth with great life and dissected, how affections are kindled and excited, and how pacified and restrained, and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves, though repressed and concealed; how they work, how they vary; how they are enwrapped one within another; how they fight and encounter one with another; and many other particularities of tills kind; amongst which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters: how, I say, to set affection against affection, and to use the aid of one to master another; . . . upon which foundation is erected that excellent and general use in civil government of reward and punishment, whereon commonwealths lean; seeing those predominant affections of fear and hope suppress and bridle all the rest. For as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the internal government of the mind. 33

W o rks,

v.21-23, cf. iii.434ff.

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D espite the im p lied correspondence w ith w h ic h th e passage c o n eludes, this w as as utilitarian and as associationist a sentim ent as one could expect to find in B e n th a m ’s o w n day. Especially, B acon w e n t on, o u g h t m o ral philosophers to have studied those points relating to the appetite and the w ill, m an y o f w h ich w ere at o u r co m m a n d and so v ery easily able to influence o u r co n d u ct. Such factors, that is, as ‘the strength and energy o f cu sto m , exercise, h ab it, education, im itatio n , em ulation, co m p an y , friendship, praise, reproof, ex h o rtatio n , fam e, laws, books, studies, and th e like. For these are the things th at rule in m orals; these th e agents b y w h ich the m in d is affected and disposed. . . .’ H e m ade a few observations o n custom and hab it b y w ay o f exam ple, indicating the sort o f analysis req u ired .37 In all this B acon w as basically m aking a plea for w h a t he th o u g h t h ad been sadly neglected b y scholastics: an em pirical. stu d y o f h u m a n n atu re based on historical and o th e r ap p ro p riate em p irical data. Its purpose was to supplem ent and fill o u t the abstract ethical discussions o f an o th o d o x k in d so as to show h o w m o ral rules co u ld usefully be applied in the real w o rld . A b o v e all th e discussion h ad to be practicable. H e was, he said, in p u rsu it n o t o f b eau ty ‘b u t o f u tility and tru th ’. H e to ld th e sto ry fro m V irg il’s Aeneid o f the tw o gates o f sleep and said th a t he p referred th e gate o f h o rn w ith its real visions to th a t o f iv o ry w ith its delusive dream s: ‘G reat n o d o u b t is th e m agnificence o f th e iv o ry gate, b u t the tru e dream s pass th ro u g h the gate o f h o r n ’.38 K n o w led g e o f m an in civil society was the second p a rt o f B aco n ’s science o f h u m a n nature. M an did n o t live in isolation b iifa s a citizen. His co n d u ct h a d therefore to be considered in its social co n tex t. ‘C iv il K n o w le d g e ’ fell in to th ree parts: ‘conversatio n ’, ‘n e g o tia tio n ’ and ‘em p ire o r g o v e rn m e n t’, each o f w h ich was concerned in som e degree o r o th e r w ith politics but, o f course, this w as especially tru e o f th e last. T h e w isd o m o f ‘conversatio n ’ was im p o rta n t because m an n er and rh eto ric w ere often so crucial in the co n d u ct o f affairs o f state. B acon did n o m o re th an m en tio n this p a rt because he 37 Ibid., v.23-26. 38 Ibid., v.30. Cf. L. Strauss,

T h e P o litica l P h ilo so p h y o f H o b b es

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(Oxford, 1936), pp. 86-94.

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th o u g h t it had already been ‘elegantly h a n d le d ’ and w as n o t deficient.39 T h e ‘w isdom o f business’, o r ‘n e g o tiatio n ’, h ad on the o th e r h an d n o t received sufficient attention, and B acon o u tlin ed a schem e to rem ed y this deficiency. It was in tw o parts, b o th based o n h istory and exam ples. T h e first concerned ‘ Scattered Occasions’ an d w as to consist o f precepts in ten d ed to guide m en in th e general co n d u ct o f their personal relations w ith others. B aco n ’s survey o f th e exam ples he gave is n o th in g i f n o t rem iniscent o f Lipsius and D allin g to n and th eir discussion o f com m o n p lace axiom s, and it was in this co n tex t that he p aid trib u te to the value o f biographies an d o f discourses o r observations o n g o v e rn m e n t like those o f M achiavelli. T h e second p a rt called the ‘Architect o f Fortune’ or ‘Knowledge o f Advancement in Life’ was concerned w ith ‘such things as relate to th e im p ro v e m e n t o f a m a n ’s o w n fo rtu n e . . .’ and w as considered in m o re detail. M en w ere instructed to o btained ‘g o o d in fo rm a tio n ’ ab o u t others w ith w h o m they h ad to deal, the w ay th ey should in te rp re t m anners, tone o f voice, expressions and so on; also they should tu rn in w a rd and lo o k at them selves, to k n o w their o w n abilities and weaknesses. T h e w h o le w as a mass o f p recept, based o n B acon’s personal experience an d reading, and in ten d ed to be a guide to behaviour, a sort o f co n d u ct-b o o k for the social and political clim ber as w ell as for th e m an o f business an d affairs.40 T h e Commentarius Solutus obviously fell in to this categ o ry as w ell. B aco n ’s discussion o f ‘the A rt o f E m p ire o r C ivil G o v e rn m e n t’ (in w h ich he included ‘ (E conom ics’) show ed w ell the w ay in w h ich he saw the problem s o f la w and politics in the co n tex t o f his general scientific attitu d e and o f the em pirical approach. T h e discussion w as n o t as full as it m ig h t have been, h o w ev er; it was deliberately curtailed, he said, because it was ‘a p a rt o f k n o w led g e secret’.41 So, w h e th e r this was the reason o r n o t, like nearly all th e rest o f the schem e for the great renew al o f learning this p art was in co m plete. H o w ev er, the style o f th o u g h t can be seen fro m B a c o n ’s tre a tm e n t o f tw o particular them es: ju stice and the n atu re o f law , an d the need to base policy o n accurate em pirical k n o w led g e. 88

W o rks,

v.32-34.

40 Ibid., v. 35-36, 56-78.

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41 Ibid., iii.473, v.78.

Francis Bacon: The Empirical Science o f Politics

A deficiency w hich B acon perceived in th e study o f g o v e rn m e n t was the absence o f a p ro p e r survey o f ‘U niversal Justice’. O n e o f the m ain troubles w as th e same as in n atu ral science. T hose w h o dealt w ith the topic did so fro m cither too theoretical a p o in t o f v iew o r one th a t was so im m ersed in particulars th at no valid generalizations ever em erged. In this case the ‘tw o sorts o f ro v ers’ w ere the philosophers and th e law yers. In w h at was p ro b ab ly one o f his m ost w e ll-k n o w n passages he w ro te : ‘As for th e philosophers, they m ake im ag in ary law s fo r im ag in ary c o m m onw ealths, and th eir discourses are as th e stars, w h ich give little lig h t because th ey are so high. For the law yers, th ey w rite acco rd ing to th e states w h ere th ey live w h a t is received law , and n o t w h a t o u g h t to be law : for th e w isd o m o f a law m ak er is one, and o f a law y er is a n o th e r.’ It w as n o g o o d argu in g ab o u t the law o n ly on general theoretical grounds o r o n ly b y reference to specific cases w ith in a given legal system .42 W h a t was needed was, as in the n atu ral sciences, a fusion o f the tw o approaches: to p ro p o u n d ‘a character o f Justice, in a m iddle term , b etw een the speculative and rev eren d discourses o f philosophers, and the w ritings o f law yers w h ich are tied . . . to their particular law s.’4,3 B ac o n ’s v iew was sim ilar to th at o f B o d in ’s criticism o f the R o m an law yers w hose approach was too restricted and n a rro w . W h a t w as necessary was to reach ‘the fountains o f ju stice’ fro m w h ich all the various stream s o f law flow ed. I f this w ere understo o d th en it could act as a crite rio n ‘b y com parison w ith w h ich th e law s o f p articular states and k in g d o m s m ay be tested and a m en d ed .’ T h e w h o le in ten tio n w as b o th scientific and practical: scientific because the fo rm o f justice was to be determ ined b y die usual process o f em pirical analysis; practical because, once it w as discovered, the ‘fo rm ’ o f ju stice could be em b o d ied in th e law s o f a particular co u n try , ju st as the ‘fo rm ’ o f any sim ple n atu re could be ind uced o n any n atu ral m atter. T h e result w o u ld be a b o d y o f law s reflecting n o t o n ly ‘the p la tfo rm o f ju stice’ b u t capable o f application.44 42 Ibid., iii.270, 475-6, vii.320-1. 43 Ibiid., vii. 14-15. 44 Ibid., iii.475, v.88 (but see the correction in vi.524.

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vol. i., p. viii),

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B a c o n s o w n attem p ts to sh o w the w a y to an u n d erstan d in g o f the essence o f law to o k tw o form s. First, there w as the series o f sayings in the D e Augmentis: an ‘Example o f a Treatise on Universal Justice or the Fountains o f Equity\ T hese b rie f co m m en ts, w h ich co n stitu ted the heads o f a preface, and one ‘T itle ’ o f the T reatise o n th e certain ty o f laws, w ere ninety -sev en in n u m b e r. T h e y resem bled n o th in g so m u ch as th e aphorism s o f the Novum Organum, o f w h ic h th ey m ay, I th in k , be considered th e legal c o u n te rp a rt. T h e y w ere ab o u t the general n atu re o f law , its m eth o d s an d purposes, and th ey represented w h a t B acon called ‘ “ law s o f law s ” ’.45 Secondly, there w as his a tte m p t in various legal w o rk s to d ra w u p w h a t he th o u g h t o f as a n atu ral h isto ry o f laws. H e h eld this, as he d id his o th e r n atu ral histories, to be co n ceived fo r th e g o o d o f his fello w -m en ; the one in th eir m aterial w elfare ‘in th eir v e ry being, and the dow ries o f n a tu re ’, the o th er fo r ‘the general g o o d o f m en likew ise in society, an d the dow ries o f g o v e rn m e n t’.46 B acon believed th a t a co m p lete survey o f the law s o f E n g lan d w as a desirable first step for this pu rp o se, an d he d id so m eth in g to effect it. A b o u t 1597 he w ro te The Maxims o f the Law w h ic h w as v e ry likely p a rt o f the p lan for a co m p lete survey o f law a n d justice. H e said in the preface th a t he w as try in g to collect ‘th e rules and gro u n d s dispersed th ro u g h o u t the b o d y o f the . . . law s: for h e re b y n o sm all lig h t w ill be given . . .’ an d m u c h w o u ld be yielded o f great ‘use and p ro fit to the students an d p ro fessors o f o u r law s.’47 Such a general digest o f law s as B aco n h a d in m in d has, like his o th e r n atu ral histories, n ev er b een effected, th o u g h his ideas m ay have influenced som e co m p arativ e studies o f law u n d ertak en b y others in his o w n tim e an d since, such as those o f Spelm an and B en th am . B u t th e suggestion itself is im p o rta n t to the stu d en t o f his ideas because it show s th a t as early as 1597 (or perhaps even b efo re)48 lie w as th in k in g o f political !natters as he th o u g h t o f the p ro b le m s o f n atu ral p h ilo so p h y ; and he p ro p o sed to deal w ith law , and rem ed y its defects in the w ay jxe w as later to deal w ith n atu ral science. 46 W o r k s , v.88-109. 46Ibid., vii.14. 47 Ibid., vii.319-20, cf. v.105-6. k4BSee Bacon’s speech in the House of Commons on 19 February 1592/3 referred to by

Williams, op. cit., pp. 4 9 5 0 ‫ ־‬. 2 28

Francis Bacon: The Empirical Science o f Politics

T h e o th er th em e concerned the need to base policy on accurate em pirical know led g e, and evidence abounds th ro u g h o u t B acon’s w ritin g s as to his attitu d e. H e clearly believed in the value o f a com parative, em pirical analysis o f g o v ern m en t and adm inistratio n . W h e n discussing questions o f policy his m an n er was naturally th at o f th e statesm an: an atte m p t at objective analysis o f th e situatio n to d eterm in e the m ost expedient course to follow . Such w ere his occasional w ritings o n politics and foreign relatións like A Short View to be taken o f Great Britain and Spain, w ritten about 1619, w h ich was, in M r S pcdding’s w ords, a ‘paper on the co m parative resources’ o f the tw o countries.49 T h e same is tru e o f B ac o n ’s view s on the w ar w ith Spain, for he said specifically that he d re w o n ‘lo n g -c o n tin u ed experience in business o f estate, and m u c h conversation in books o f policy and h isto ry ’. H e d rew to o o n n u m ero u s exam ples.50 T his com parative m o d e o f analysis was exem plified also in his Certain Observations on a Libel (1592/3), an d in his letters o f advice to the E arl o f R u tlan d on th e use to m ak e o f his travels.51 T w o o f th e best exam ples o f this k in d o f political survey w ere O f the True Greatness o f the Kingdom of Britain and O f the True Greatness o f Kingdoms and Estates. T h e y sum m ed up th e em pirical approach v ery w ell in their emphasis o n the analysis o f actual political and m ilitary p o w er in term s o f p o p u latio n , state o f trade, general h ealth o f agriculture, th riv in g industries, firm currency, sound finances, and so on. A ll o f these m atters could be evaluated statistically, as B acon said in sim ilar term s in b o th essays: ‘T h e greatness o f an estate in b u lk and te rrito ry , d o th fall u n d er m easure; and the greatness o f finances and rev en ew d o th fall under co m p u tatio n . T h e p o p u latio n m ay appear b y m usters; and the n u m b e r and greatness o f cities and to w n s b y cards and m ap s.’52 T h e approach, then, w as w h o lly em pirical, and, o u t o f context, w h o lly am oral. T h e inference was that th e on ly sound fo u n d atio n for p o licy was a factual k n o w led g e o f a c o u n try ’s resources. H ence B aco n ’s em phasis o n th e necessity o f m akin g ‘a tru e survey and 49 Reprinted in T h e L e tte rs a n d T h e L i f e , vii.22-28. 60 Ibid., vii.469-505; the quotation in the text is at vii.469. 61 Ibid., i.146-208, ii.6-20. 62 W o r k s , vi.445.

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representation o f the greatness o f [the] k in g d o m o f B ritain , and o f analysing scientifically its resources and p o w er. Y et he w as sufficiently aw are o f the existence o f statistical im ponderables like national character, strategic situation, spiritual ideals, religion, laws, and the like. H e k n ew too th at it was possible to o v erestim ate th e im portance o f factors such as size o f territo ry , riches, soil fertility, strength o f tow ns and sim ilar things.53 N onetheless, the spirit o f these w ritings was sufficiently sim ilar to be connected w ith the w o rk o f P etty and the political arithm eticians w h o , later in the seventeenth century, pursued the inspiration w h ich th ey freely ad m itted to be B aconian. W h ile B acon never discussed at any len g th the question o f the best form o f g o v ern m en t (at least, there is n o th in g on this topic w hich is certainly fro m his pen), his o w n preference seems to have been for the traditional constitutional system o f lim ite d o r m ixed m onarchy, alth o u g h at tim es this was obscured b y som e o f the public statem ents he m ade in the service o f the C ro w n and in defence o f the k in g ’s prerogative. Y et there was n o co n trad ictio n involved. It was perfectly logical and, indeed, in co n fo rm ity w ith the best legal opinion, b o th to h o ld th a t the kin g w as n o t an absolute m onarch and, w ith in a certain sphere, to defend his p re ro g ative p o w e r fro m the attacks o f P arh am en t and th e courts. For in a quite o rth o d o x w a y ,.B aco n Jield th at th e k in g ’s a u th o rity was double, there being an ord in ary and absolute p rero g ativ e. In respect o f the latter, w hich covered such m atters as w ar and peace, vetoing bills, calling and dissolving parliam ents and so on, the king was above the law and his actions w ere n o t o pen to challenge in any co u rt.54 B u t he was, in contrast, lim ited in the use o f his o rd in ary p rerogative pow ers for they derived fro m and w ere controlled b y the law . This was certainly true, fo r instance, w ith regard to taxation and p ro p e rty rights, royal decisions ab o u t w h ich could be questioned in the courts and discussed in P arliam en t.55 M o reo ver it is likely th at B acon th o u g h t o f the law itself as determ ining the scope o f the absolute prero g ativ e.56 A n d w hile 53 W o r k s , vii.47-49. 64 Ibid., vii.776-8; T h e L e tte r s a n d T h e L i f e , iii.371-3. 55 T h e L e tte r s a n d T h e L i f e , iv.191-3; W o r k s , vii.547, 646. 50 W o r k s , vii.509, 511.

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Francis Bacon: The Empirical Science o f Politics

w ith in this sphere a k in g ’s a u th o rity w as u n tram m elled , B acon clearly believed th at a g o o d m o n arch w o u ld th ere act on ly for the c o m m o n g o o d and after taking counsel w ith his advisers in P arliam en t and the courts.57 In sum , B acon ’s constitutional view s w ere n o t unlike those o f m an y law yers o f th e tim e: th a t th ere was a balance o f p o w e r, divided b etw een kin g an d o th er bodies in accordance w ith th e law o f the ancient con stitu tio n . A t least, this seems to be th e n o tio n im plied b y his scattered legal w ritin g s and opinions.58 D u rin g th e seventeenth century and lo n g after, B aco n ’s influence was eno rm o u s.59 So far as natu ral p hilo so p h y w as concerned his im p o rtan ce w as second to n o n e in the d ev elo p m en t o f th e c o n te m p o ra ry idea o f science and scientific m eth o d . H is o w n ex p erim ental w o rk tu rn e d o u t to be o f little o r n o value, an d the m e th o d o f en q u iry he prop o sed has rig h tly co m e to be reg ard ed as im practicable. B u t his effect as p ro p ag an d ist w as im m ense. It was, as I have already rem arked, his spirit w h ich helped to stim u late the w o rk o f b o th the ‘v irtuosos’ and m o re serious scientists like B oyle and H o o k e, and w h ich w as reflected continually in the proceedings o f the R oyal Society, itself th e greatest m o n u m e n t to his ideas. In C o w le y ’s w ords, B acon w as th e ‘mighty Man o f the ce n tu ry w h o , like an o th er M oses, led m en to th e verge o f a n ew p ro m ised land. It was also B aco n ’s general ap p ro ach th a t these n atu ral philosophers tried to use: the ‘Mechanic way w h ich w o rk e d o n facts, o n the ‘Natural and Living Face’ o f things, and n o t o n abstract and w o rd y learning w h ich leaned m erely o n received a u th o rity .60 All this is also tru e o f B a c o n ’s effect on th e th eo ry an d study_of m an an d society. W h a t w as im p o rta n t w as n o t th e w o rk h e did, b u t-w h at he said could bc_done_and h o w , his im p act o n thejdea o f 67 Ibid., vi.423-4;

T h e L e tte r s a n d T h e L i f e ,

iv. 177-8, 196.

68H. Wheeler, *The Constitutional Ideas of Francis Bacon',

T h e W e s te r n P o litic a l Q u a r te r l y , ix (1956), pp. 927-36, which I have used for this paragraph. ‫׳‬ ^ 59 See especially R. F. Jones, A n c i e n t s a n d M o d e r n s (2nd ed., St Louis, 1961) and S. B. L. Penrose Jr., T h e R e p u t a ti o n a n d I n flu e n c e o f F r a n c is B a c o n in th e S e v e n te e n th C e n tu r y (New York, 1934)‫״‬ iQ See the poem by Cowley prefixed to Sprat, op. cit., sigs. B[1] recto-[B3] verso.

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an em pirically based science-of.politics and law . H e m ade o n ly a few essays in th e field h im self and k n e w th a t w h a t he did was inadequate and incom plete. B ut, as he once to ld L o rd Salisbury, he w as co n ten t to aw ake b etter spirits ‘like a b ell-rin g er w h ich is first up, to call others to ch u rc h .’ H e could o n ly p o in t the w ay ; and y et i f m en learned the lesson he had to teach, p o sterity could look to th e rest. I n o w tu rn to exam ine tw o exam ples o f the w a y in w h ich the em pirical spirit w hich B acon helped to aw aken w as applied— th o u g h w ith o u t the benefit o f B acon’s o w n philosophical scope and acum en— to the study o f politics and society in the second h a lf o f the seventeenth century.

232

XI JA M ES

H A RR IN G TO N :

TH E N A T U R A L PRIN CIPLES

OF P O L IT IC S

has perhaps been a greater diversity o f in terp retatio n o f H a rrin g to n th an o f m ost seventeenth-century political w riters. In tu rn he has been held up for inspection as, am o n g o ther things, th e au th o r o f a political rom ance, a p ro p h et o f B ritish im perial expansion, a constitutional W h ig , a precursor o f historical m aterialism, a survivalist concerned above all to ensure civic h arm o n y , and a c o m m e n ta to r o n the political effects o f the disappearance o f m ilitary tenure. L atterly his m ost notab le role has been as evidence, in v o k ed b y b o th sides, in the ‘storm over the g e n try ’.1 T h e tru th is, o f course, that H a rrin g to n m ay be m ade to play m an y o f th e parts ascribed to him , th o u g h he m ay n o t, I th in k , be characterized b y only one o f th em . M o reo v er, m an y o f these them es are related, being different aspects o f w h a t I have called the political th e o ry o f em piricism . A nd w h at I w ish to suggest is th at H arrin g to n ’s w ritings are to be seen m ost satisfactorily as reflecting in general this em pirical style o f political th o u g h t. I am n o t concerned here to enter in to the detail o f the controversies w h ich have been occasioned b y these conflicts o f in terp retatio n th o u g h the fo llo w in g survey w ill natu rally involve som e b rie f reference to th em . T

h e r e

I A t the o rd er o f the Parliam ent, H a rrin g to n becam e a m em b er o f Charles I ’s personal entourage and attended the kin g o n the scaffold in 1649. H e was greatly distressed b y the execution, and his b io g rap h er, J o h n T oland, described h o w H a rrin g to n afterw ards 1 See the review o f the various interpretations o f Harrington’s ideas by J. N. Shklar, ‘Ideology Hunting: The Case o f James Harrington’, T h e A m e r ic a n P o litic a l S c ie n c e R e v i e w , liii (1959), pp. 662-92. Q

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kep t m u ch to his library. W h e n his friends urged h im to lead a less herm it-lik e existence he used to reply that he th o u g h t he was d o in g very valuable w o rk and to show th e m the m an u scrip t o f Oceana on the com position o f w hich he had been engaged d u rin g his retirem ent. H e explained that he was dev o tin g h im self to ‘the study o f C ivil G o v ern m en t, as being o f the highest im p o rtan ce to the Peace and Felicity o f m a n k in d ’. H e w e n t o n to say th at he h ad becom e convinced th at ‘n o G o v ern m en t is o f so accidental o r arb itrary an Institution as people are w o n t to im ag in , there being in Societys natu ral causes p ro d u cin g th eir necessary effects, as w ell as in th e E a rth o r the A ir.’2 T h e im plication o f this sentim ent seems to be th at H a rrin g to n th o u g h t it possible to apply to the study o f m an in society the same techniques th a t w ere used to reduce the processes o f n atu re to the u n ifo rm o p eratio n o f a few basic causes o r principles. H e had been v ery m u ch im pressed b y the w o rk o fW illia m H arv ey — ‘famous H ervey— and his discovery o f the circulation o f the b lo o d , and it is pro b ab le th at he w an ted to em u late this great achievem ent and to m ake discoveries a b o u t the a n a to m y o f the b o d y politic w h ich w ere as fu n d am en tal and as practically useful. A nd alth o u g h his appro ach m ay n o t have been scientific in o u r sense, his in ten tio n w as to be so in the c o n te m p o ra ry m a n n e r.3 It follow ed that, like th e natu ral scientists o f his day, H a rrin g to n rejected a p u rely abstract m o d e o f political discussion; an d there was indeed little o f a philosophical tu rn in his w ritin g s. T hese w ere largely in th e stymie o f M achiavelli o r o f w h a t B acon called ‘R u m in ated H is to ry ’, th a t is, selections o f historical and sim ilar m aterial used as a basis fo r political c o m m e n t and generalization. H is fam ous criticism o f H obbes w as, in effect, censure o f the la tte r’s failure to deal w ith the p ro b le m o f political p o w e r in a sufficiently d o w n -to -e a rth w a y .4 In the usual em pirical m an n er, H a rrin g to n th o u g h t th a t political th e o ry h ad to be fo u n d ed o n , o r p resented in term s of, experience o f som e k in d . ‘N o m a n ’, he 2 T h e O c e a n a O f J a m e s H a r r in g to n , U sq ; A n d H i s O t h e r W o r k s (Dublin, 1737), p. xvii. (Hereafter in this chapter referred to as W o r k s .) 3 Cf. pp. 246-8 below. * J a m es H a r r i n g t o n 's O c e a n a , ed. Liljcgrcn (Heidelberg, 1924), p. 16. (Hereafter in this chapter referred to as O c e a n a .)

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w ro te in Oceana, ‘can be a P o lititian ’ (that is, a stu d en t o f politics) ‘except he be first an H isto rian o r a T raveller; fo r except he can sec w h a t M ust be, o r w h a t M ay be, lie is no P o lititian : N o w i f he have n o k n o w led g e in story, he can n o t tell w h a t h ath been; and i f he hath n o t been a T raveller, he can n o t tell w h a t is: b u t he th at n either k n o w e th w h a t h a th been, n o r w h a t is; can n ev er tell w h a t m ust be, o r w h a t m ay b e.’5 In c o n fo rm ity w ith these view s, H a rrin g to n ’s w ritin g s in v ariably contained historical and factual digressions o ften o f co n siderable le n g th .6 For exam ple, in Oceana w h en he discussed the need for a c o m m o n w e a lth to have recourse to a d ictato r in certain circum stances he referred for su p p o rt to the experience o f m an y lands. T o settle the question o f h o w the political functions o f p ro posing, resolving and executing should be d iv id ed he d re w o n evidence fro m the histo ry o f various to w n s an d states. Several pages w ere d evoted to historical illustration d raw n fro m R o m an experience in relation to the election o f the annual m agistrates o f the p o p u lar assem bly.7 These are b u t three instances taken at ran d o m b u t th ey arc typical o f the w h o le b o o k . E ach ‘o rd e r’ o r article o f th e constitution o f the co m m o n w e a lth o f O ceana was, in fact, illustrated in this w ay, for, as H a rrin g to n said, these things w ere ‘best shew n b y exemplification . Indeed, the C o u n cil o f Legislators o f O ceana in prep arin g its institutional plans w as to pursue this v ery m eth o d , as H a rrin g to n explained in a sh o rt section en titled ‘the Art o f making a C o m m o n w e a lth ’: ‘M y Lord Archon in o p ening the C ouncill o f Legislators, m ade it appear h o w unsafe a th in g it is to follow Phansie in th e Fabrick o f a Common-wealth; and h o w necessary th at the Archives o f ancient prudence should be ransackt, before any C ounscllour should presum e to offer any 5 Ibid., p. 175. Harrington’s friend Henry Nevile held similar views: see the letter prefixed to his P la to R e d i v i v u s y reprinted in W o r k s , p. 50‫צ‬. Nevile, whose interest in the empirical theory o f politics was clearly evidenced by his own writings and by his having translated the works o f ‘the Divine M a c h i a v i l \ was very likely involved in the composition o f O c e a n a ; as Hobbes said, Nevile almost certainly ‘had a finger in that Pye>6 The large number o f historical and similar works, both classical and modern, on which Harrington drew can be seen in Liljegren’s notes to O c e a n a ; cf. J. G. A. Pocock, T h e A n c i e n t C o n s titu tio n a n d th e F e u d a l L a w (Cambridge, 1957), ch. vi. 7 O c e a n a , pp. 26-29, ! ! 2129-33 !‫ ־‬1‫צ‬.

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o th e r m a tte r in o rd e r to the W o r k in hand , o r to w ard s the c o n sideration to be h ad b y th e CouncilI u p o n a Modell o f Government.’ T h e C o u n cil th en arran g ed for the analysis o f various c o m m o n w ealths, b o th ancient and m o d e rn , w h ic h b e tw e e n th e m w ere th o u g h t to co n tain ‘all those excellencies w h e re o f a Commonwealth is capable’. T h e states thus co m p arativ ely studied w ere Israel, A thens, L acedem on, C arth ag e, Achaea, A etolia, S w itzerland, H o llan d and the U n ite d Provinces, R o m e an d V enice. Aspects o f the g o v ern m en tal system o f each w ere th o ro u g h ly discussed b y all and th en p u t to g e th e r b y the C o u n cil so as to fit in perfect h a rm o n y . As a result o f this in ductiv e p ro ced u re, there w as m ade ‘a perfect, and (for o u g h t th a t in humane prudence can be foreseen) an immortal Commonwealth.’8 T h e re w as the sam e reg ard for h istory and c o n te m p o ra ry exam ple in all H a rrin g to n ’s o th er w o rk s. In The Prerogative o f Popular Government, fo r instance, th ere w as continual reference to such evidence, a g o o d exam ple b ein g the len g th y com p arativ e analyses o f the states o f Israel, V enice and A thens to d eterm in e w h e th e r a ro ta tio n w as necessary to a w ell-o rd ered c o m m o n w e a lth .9 H a rrin g to n ’s o w n experience o f o th e r countries w as a v e ry im p o rta n t factor in the fo rm a tio n o f his ideas. T h e significance o f his travels and observations in Sw itzerland, H o llan d and V enice has frequently been co m m en ted o n .10 H is u n d erstan d in g o f V enetian institutions w as indeed crucial. In the A driatic republic he saw a survival o f th e w isd o m o f the ancient w o rld an d the only w o rk in g exam ple o f w h a t he reg ard ed as the m o st perfect ty p e o f co n stitution, an equal co m m o n w e a lth . As he said in The Prerogative o f Popular Government, ‘I f I be w o rth y to give advice to a m an th at w o u ld study the Politicks, let h im u n d erstan d Venice; he th a t understands Venice rig h t, shall go nearest to ju d g e (n o t­ 8 O c e a n a , pp. 25, 59-61; cf. Nevile, op. cit., in W o r k s t pp. 575-6. The long title of Nevile’s book, which showed the style of his analysis, was \ . . Wherein, by Observations drawn from other Kingdoms and States both Antient and Modern, an Endeavour is used to discover the present Politick Distemper o f our Own, with the Causes, and Remedies/ Ibid., p. 547. 9 W o r k s , pp. 303ft". 10 e.g. G. P. Gooch, E n g lis h D e m o c r a tic Id e a s in th e S e v e n te e n th C e n tu r y (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1954), p. 242; C. Blitzer, A n I m m o r ta l C o m m o n w e a lth : th e P o litic a l T h o u g h t o f J a m e s H a r r in g to n (New Haven, i960), pp. 17-20, 102.

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w ith stan d in g the difference th at is in every P olicy) rig h t o f any G o v e rn m e n t in the W o r l d / 11 H e w as so im pressed b y V enetian in stitu tions th a t he believed a political system based o n this m o d el m ig h t last for ever,1112 and m a n y i f n o t m ost o f his proposals for political re fo rm can be traced to this source, for instance his ideas ab o u t h o w to choose m ilitary and judicial officers, a b o u t ‘ro ta tio n ’, the ballot and so on. In fact his view o f V enice w as quite inaccurate for b y his tim e it w as far fro m b eing the efficient and laudable system o f his im ag in atio n . B u t o f course w h a t m atters here is n o t w h a t V enice was then really like b u t w h a t H a rrin g to n and his contem poraries th o u g h t it w as like. T h e em pirical em phasis o f H a rrin g to n ’s style o f political discussion w as show n also b y the w ay in w h ich he described his idea o f a perfect co m m o n w ealth . In appearance Oceana w as a U to p ia, the p ictu re o f an ideal state, for it dealt w ith a society th at did n o t exist in fact b u t o n ly in the im agination o f its au th o r. Y et, in in ten tio n , it w as a far cry fro m the Republic o f Plato o r the Utopia o f Sir T h o m as M o re. For H a rrin g to n regard ed it as b eing n o t a m erely abstract criterion o r an ideal im possible o f achievem ent but, o n the co n trary , a practical p ro g ra m m e for im m ed iate application in E ngland, a b lu e p rin t for the o n ly co n stitu tio n possible in the circum stances o f his day. It w as a m eans to alleviate ‘the m isery o f the N a tio n ’ b y d em onstrating to the people and their leaders, as he th o u g h t it, scientifically, th e o n ly political system w h ich con fo rm ed to the forces at w o rk in co n te m p o ra ry society an d to the natu ral principles o f politics, and w h ich alone th erefo re co u ld elim inate the tu rm o il and unrest fro m w h ich the co u n try h ad suffered so m uch. It was because H a rrin g to n lo o k ed at his proposals in this w a y th at his suggestions w ere co m plete in ev ery p a rtic u la r.^ h u s , he m ade som e rem arks in The Art o f Lawgiving ab o u t the necessity o f n o t being vague and unpractical and ab o u t the need to describe a system o f g o v e rn m e n t in full, even i f this led to accusations o f o bscurity th ro u g h ov erlo ad in g the acco u n t w ith to o m u ch d etail.13 Sim ilarly, the ch ap ter headings o f this 11 W o r k s , p. 314. 12 e.g. W o r k s , p. xv, 18 W o r k s , p. 429.

O ceana,

pp. 185-6•

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w o rk stressed a concern w ith the actual applicability o f the suggestions m ade, each p a rt o f the m o d el o f a co m m o n w e a lth being ‘p ro p o s’d p racticab ly ’. A n d as the contents o f each chapter w ere sim p ly abstracts o f proposals in H a rrin g to n ’s o th er w orks, in clu d in g Oceana, he o b v iously in ten d ed the same em phasis th ro u g h o u t. Likew ise, in Oceana, he concerned h im self n o t o n ly w ith im p o rta n t co n stitu tio n al m atters like h o w the senate and p o p u lar assem bly should be elected b u t w ith m in o r detail as w ell, for exam ple, h o w big th e constituencies should be and w h a t w as the likely cost o f th e e q u ip m en t to be used for balloting. A gain, he discussed n o t o n ly th e functions o f the various councils o f state b u t also h o w m a n y doorkeepers an d m essengers should be attached to each. A t the tim e he w as w ritin g Oceana (that is, after th e ex ecution o f the k in g an d th e establishm ent o f the C o m m o n w e a lth ) co n stitu tio n m ak in g w as in th e air and H a rrin g to n w an ted to influence the decisions. T o do this he h ad to m ake o u t a case th a t w o u ld persuade th e h ard -h ead e d politicians w h o h ad com e o u t o n to p after the w ar, and so he d eterm in e d to d ra w up a schem e w o rk e d o u t to the last detail and w ith each proposal su p p o rted b y arg u m en ts in its fav o u r. T h e result, as M r Russell S m ith observed, is ‘alm ost m iscalled a U to p ia ’; and H u m e ’s estim ate o f Oceana as the m ost practical o f all ideal schemes o f g o v e rn m e n t w as surely the soundest o f co m m e n ts.II*14

II r

! In Oceana H a rrin g to n divided the ‘Principles o f G o v ern m en ts’ in to tw o kinds, w h ic h he called internal and external. T h e fo rm e r related to ‘the goods o f th e M ind’, n atural o r acquired characteristics such as w isd o m , prud en ce and courage, o n w h ich depended ‘Authority’ . T h e external principles concerned ‘the goods o f Fortune’ o r riches, and these w ere the source o f ‘Empire’ , th a t is, p o w e r. T his in tu rn h ad tw o aspects, dom estic o r n atio n al p o w er, an d ‘p ro v in c ia l’ o r colonial p o w e r. O n e m o st im p o rta n t p o in t to notice is th at H a rrin g to n th o u g h t th e o w nersh ip o f land o r o th er 14 H. F. R. Smith, H a r r in g to n a n d h is O c e a n a (Cambridge, 1914), p. 15; cf. p. 156. Hume E s s a y s , ed. Green and Grose (London, 1875), i.481.

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w ealth, ‘D o m in io n ’ as he called it, was the fo u n d atio n on ly o f 1Domestick Empire’ . O th e r factors w ere m o re crucial in respect o f ‘p ro v in cial’ p o w e r and o f ‘a u th o rity ’. A n d for the solution to the p ro b le m o f stable g o v ern m en t, w h a t was n eed ed was a political and social structure in w h ich goods o f b o th m in d an d fo rtu n e w ere p ro p e rly u n ite d .15 So th at the role o f ‘riches’ m ust n o t, as has often been the case, be given exclusive em phasis in the analysis o f H a rrin g to n ’s political prescriptions. It gave his theories a certain sociological air b u t at the same tim e the o th er elem ents o f H a rrin g to n ’s th o u g h t w ere m ost im p o rta n t aspects o f his version o f the political th e o ry o f em piricism . T h e sphere o f ‘Domestick Empire’ w h ich was d o m in ated b y the social distribution o f econom ic p o w e r m ay be ex am in ed first. T o la n d co m p ared H a rrin g to n ’s ‘n oble D isco v ery ’ th a t ‘Empire follows the Balance o f Property to all those o th er achievem ents w h ich w ere th en reg ard ed as being m ost characteristic o f the m o d ern advancem ent o f learning. It contained, he felt, a ‘plain T r u th ’ w h ich lay at ‘the fo u n d atio n o f all P olitics.’16 C ertain ly the n o tio n was one w h ich appeared n o t o n ly in Oceana b u t th ro u g h o u t H a rrin g to n ’s w ritings. H e held th at in any co u n try ‘Domestick Empire’ was fo u n d ed o n ‘Dominion , th at is, o n ‘P ro p rie ty reall o r personali, . . . in Lands, o r in m o n ey an d go o d s.’ In m ost places landed p ro p e rty w as m o re im p o rta n t, alth o u g h in countries or cities w h ere there was little land an d w h ere the greatest p a rt o f the revenue was derived fro m trad e (as in H o llan d o r G enoa) the significance o f real estate m ig h t be o u tw eig h ed b y ‘T reasu re’ d eriv ed fro m p u re ly com m ercial interests. B u t, in any case, in w h atev er p ro p o rtio n such ‘P ro p rie ty ’ w as distributed, th en ultim ately, in such p ro p o rtio n m ust also be the d istribution o f dom estic political p o w e r. T h e reason for this relationship was th a t in the last analysis political p o w e r d ep en d ed on m ilitary m ig h t, an d ow n ersh ip o f lan d enabled a rm e d forces to be m ain tained. H a rrin g to n su m m ed up the d o ctrin e b y saying th a t ‘such . . . as is the p ro p o rtio n o r ballance o f d o m in io n o r p ro p e rty in L and, such is the n atu re o f the Empire.’ 17 15 O c e a n a , pp. 14, 20-21. 16 W o r k s , p. xviii. 17 O c e a n a , pp. 14-16. See also ibid., p. 85, and Nevile, op. cit., in 239

W o rks,

p. 563. This

Order, Empiricism and Politics

So far as the fo rm o f political institutions was concerned, the principle w o rk e d in general term s as follow s. I f o n e m an held the ‘o v e rb a la n c e ’ o f p ro p e rty th en the political system w o u ld co n fo rm and be an absolute m o n arch y . I f a few m en , such as a n o b ility, had the greatest interest in landed p ro p e rty th en p o litically a m ixed o r regulated m o n arch y w o u ld prevail. Such w as the case u nder w h a t H a rrin g to n called the ‘ Gothick ballance’ o f the feudal system . W h ile i f b etw een th em the w h o le people o w n ed th e lan d then there w o u ld be a co m m o n w e a lth or p o p u lar g o v ern m en t. So the crucial question was alw ays: w h ich persons in the c o m m u n ity held the balance o f w ealth and therefore o f m ilitary and political pow er? T he analysis w as th en carried fu rth er. It was, at least for a lim ited tim e, possible for a fo rm o f g o v e rn m e n t to exist w h ich w as at variance w ith th at dictated b y the balance o f p ro p e rty . T hus, i f force was used to m ain tain the p o w e r o f one m an w h en th e balance o f p ro p e rty dictated, say, a co m m o n w ealth , th e n the result w o u ld be ty ra n n y ; i f a few m ain tain ed them selves in p o w e r against the balance the result w o u ld be oligarchy; i f m any, anarchy. H o w ev er, H a rrin g to n arg u ed that such a situation could only be transient: each o f such confusions, ‘the ballance standing otherw ise, is b u t o f short continuance; because against the natu re o f the ballance, w h ich n o t destroyed, destro yeth that w h ich opposeth it.’18 This analysis o f th e econom ic basis o f the classical form s o f g o v e rn m e n t was also given a dynam ic aspect. For it w as possible that at any given tim e the balance o f p ro p e rty m ig h t be in a state o f flux. *Economic p o w e r m ig h t be in the process o f being transferred fro m one social g ro u p to an o th er. In such a situation there w as likely to be a lag in the tran sfer o f political p o w e r and in the m odification o f th e existing fo rm o f g o v ern m en t to suit the n ew balance. A struggle for suprem acy w as likely to ensue. This H a rrin g to n to o k to be the case o f E n g lan d in his o w n day: the absolute suprem acy o f royal p o w er Harringtonian emphasis on the balance of property was also present in Walter Moyle’s E s s a y O n T h e L a c e d a e m o n ia n G o v e r n m e n t (1698) reprinted in T h e W h o l e W o r k s (London, 1727), pp. 50ff. (second pagination). 18 O c e a n a , p. 15. The above account is simplified: Harrington considered a number of situations in which property was owned in various proportions by the different classes’. An

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was quite im possible to m ain tain because o fth e shift in ‘D o m in io n ’ w h ich had taken place, th e m o v e m e n t o f econom ic p o w e r to those landed interests w h ich controlled the H ouse o f C o m m o n s.19 H a rrin g to n ’s discussion o f recent E nglish h isto ry provides n o t o n ly an exam ple o f the w a y in w h ic h he used his idea o f the balance o f p ro p e rty as a to o l o f political analysis b u t also a g o o d co n trast w ith the w a y in w h ich th e o rd er th eo rist v iew ed the sam e events. T h e latter saw the W ars o f the Roses in religiom o ra l term s, as a p u n ish m en t w reak ed b y G o d for violations o f His o rd er. H a rrin g to n saw th em as m anifestations o f a struggle for place b etw een th e barons w ith w h o m , as a g ro u p , the balance o f d o m in io n lay. T h e y w ere able to depose R ich ard II (w ho h ad no in d ep en d en t basis for his au th o rity ) and so ‘g o t th e trick o f it, an d n ever gave o v er setting up, and p ullin g d o w n o f their Kings according to th eir various interests’. This led to ‘th a t faction o f th e White and Red in to w h ich th e y h ad been th en cefo rth d iv id ed ’.20 A gain, to th e o rd er theorist H e n ry VII, H e n ry V ili and th e T u d o r line as a w hole, w ere the inheritors o f a peaceful u n io n o f p re viously w a rrin g houses, and so reg ard ed as the guarantors o f peace, security and o rd er. T o H a rrin g to n th ey w ere the authors o f the m isch ief w h ich led to th e civil w ars o f his o w n day. For b y their statutes th ey b ro k e up th e m ilitary p o w e r o f the n o b ility and diffused the o w nership o fla n d . H av in g thus d estro y ed th e fo u n d atio n o n w h ic h th eir o w n p o w e r ultim ately rested, th e y and their successors p aved th e w ay for the abolition o f th e m o n arch y itself b y n o t adapting their beh av io u r (save in th e case o f Q u e e n Elizab eth I) to the changed situation th ey h ad helped to create. F or w ith the end o f feudal c o n tro l o f retainers an d w ith th e transfer 19 O c e a n a , pp. 48-50. The precise nature of the movement detected by Harrington has been one o f the major points o f recent controversy. Professor Tawney suggested that Harrington perceived a shift in dominion to a gentry whose economic fortunes were prospering; Professor Trevor-Roper holds that Harrington reflected merely the desire to prosper and to rule o f a gentry which was, on the contrary, declining; Dr Pocock (with an ,assist’ from Professor Hexter) argues that Harrington’s comments on matters o f economic history centred on the effect ofthe disappearance o f feudal military tenures; while Professor Macpherson detects in Harrington elements o f an understanding of the developing bourgeois market economy. O f these various analyses it seems to me that Dr Pocock’s is the most satisfactory in terms o f the general tenor o f what Harrington actually wrote. 20 O c e a n a , p. 48.

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o f landed p ro p e rty , econom ic and m ilitary p o w e r had passed to different m en and th e locus o f political ‘E m p ire ’ h ad to follow . In these circum stances the S tuarts’ a u th o rity h ad no stable basis and their a tte m p t to m aintain their position in v o lv ed inevitably a reso rt to force, an expedient w h ich in the circum stances, could n ev er succeed. As H a rrin g to n concluded: ‘a Monarchy divested o f h er Nobility, h a th n o refuge u nder H eaven, b u t an A rm y . Wherefore the dissolution o f this Government caused the War, not the War the dissolution o f this Government.’21 T hus, the o rd er theorist attrib u ted civil unrest to p ro u d and u n ru ly subjects; in H a rrin g to n ’s v iew th e disturbances o f his o w n tim e w ere due to the k in g ’s try in g to sustain an untenable position. M o reo v er, th e traditional v iew alw ays w e n t o n to assert the need to re-establish G o d ’s o rd e r; H a rrin g to n stressed the necessity o f recognizing the realities an d consequences o f econom ic change. As a result m o n arch y was n o t to h im w h a t it w as to the order theorist, a divine and natural n o rm , b u t sim ply one fo rm o f g o v ern m en t dep en d en t fo r its long continuance o n a certain system o f p ro p e rty relations in society. In a sense H a rrin g to n ’s w h o le analysis o f dom estic em pire was designed to show th e im possibility o f restoring the old feudal m o n archy, th o u g h he did th in k it possible th a t som e n ew m o n archy m ig h t be set up b y th e a rm y .22 In any event, th e transfer o f p ro p e rty co n tro l to a w id er n u m b e r o f people th an ever before p o in te d to th e need to establish institutions th at w ere in co n fo rm ity w ith the n e w balance o f p ro p e rty and w o u ld help to sustain it. This included refo rm in g th e republic set up in 1649; hence H a rrin g to n ’s constitutional proposals in Oceana. B efore lo o k in g at these proposals a w o rd m ust be said ab o u t H a rrin g to n ’s discussion o f ‘p ro v in cial’ p o w e r and o f ‘a u th o rity ’. This was n o t len g th y b u t was very im p o rta n t, because he argued th at ‘D o m in io n ’ was n o t the key factor, alth o u g h the d o m in an t considerations w ere nonetheless o f an em pirical and utilitarian k ind. I f the balance o f p ro p e rty w ere the basis o f ‘em p ire’ in a colony th en political p o w e r w o u ld accrue to those o w n in g m ost o f the 21 O c e a n a , pp. 47-50; 22 O c e a n a , p. 50.

W o rks,

pp. 388-91, 432. Cf. Nevile, op. cit., in

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land there. This H a rrin g to n denied to be the case because, as a colony, co n tro l lay w ith the m o th e r-c o u n try an d n o t w ith the local inhabitants. M o reo v er, it was n o t sim ply th e superior econom ic resources o f the colonial p o w e r w h ich secured its d o m in an ce b u t advantages o f various kinds such as ‘th e vigour o f a m o re excellent [system of] G o v e rn m e n t’, a m o re courageous and efficient m ilitia, th e greater hardiness o f its people, o r a b etter g eo graphical situation. O f course, these factors m ig h t be reducible to econom ic term s. B u t H a rrin g to n m ade no atte m p t to do this and in d eed explicitly denied th at the sam e principles o p erated in the dom estic and provincial spheres o f p o w er: the balance o f the latter was, he said, ‘o f a c o n trary n a tu re ’ to the fo rm er. In colonies p ro p e rty follow ed p o w e r and n o t the reverse as in th e n atio n al balance.23 N o r did the balance o f p ro p e rty enter in to H a rrin g to n ’s discussion o f ‘the principles o f Authority’, w h ic h w ere in tern al and fo u n d ed o n the goods o f the m in d and n o t o f fo rtu n e. I f a m an h ad a u th o rity over others this was because they recognized h im to be a m an o f virtue, one w hose w ill w as ruled b y reason and n o t b y passion. T his was, o f course, a w h o lly co n v en tio n al v iew b u t H a rrin g to n gave it a utilitarian tw ist for he accepted th a t reason co u ld be reg ard ed as being, in fact, ‘n o th in g b u t interest’ . A n d ju st as there w ere different interests so there w ere different reasons. T h e re was the reason o r interest o f an individual m an ; reason o f state, th at is, o f the ruling faction; and the reason o r interest o f m an k in d o r o f the c o m m u n ity . H a rrin g to n considered this last ty p e o f reason to be the highest and, follow in g H o o k er, called it a law o f nature. So th e m an o f a u th o rity and v irtu e w as one d ev o ted to th e general interest. H a rrin g to n therefore deduced th a t a m o st im p o rta n t aspect o f the p ro b le m o f g o v ern m en t was to establish a political system in w h ich this w idest and highest k in d o f reason o r interest was perceived and pursued, despite the fact th at m ost m en tended to lo o k to th eir o w n rath er th an to the c o m m o n advantage. In oth er w ords, it was im p o rta n t to secure a p ro p er political place for m en o f au th o rity and v irtu e regardless o f w h eth er th ey held the balance o f p ro p e rty o r n o t.24 23 Ibid., pp. 18-20, 52-53.

24 Ibid., pp. 20-23.

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W h a t, then, w ere the constitutional arrangem ents H a rrin g to n h ad in m ind? O f course, th e superstructure o f g o v e rn m e n t an d the balance o f p ro p e rty h ad to co n fo rm to one an o th er. A n d as there h ad been a w idening distrib u tio n o f land th ro u g h th e Statutes o f P o p u latio n and A lienations and the dissolution o f the abbeys, this g ro w in g equality o f estates m ean t th ere h ad to be a sim ilar equality o f p o w e r and so, n o m o n a rc h y .25 G iven this situation, H a rrin g to n ’s preference was for a system o f m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t in its republican variatio n an d w ith the p o p u lar c o m p o n e n t d o m in an t, for a p o p u lar g o v e rn m e n t w as also m o st likely to reflect the rig h t reason o r c o m m o n interest o f m a n k in d .26 Legislation w as to be the fu n ctio n o f an assem bly an d a senate representing the d em ocratic an d aristocratic elem ents respectively. T h e execution o f the laws was to be carried o u t b y a m agistracy w h ich , alth o u g h non-m o n arch ical, constitu ted th e m onarchical elem ent in the system . T h e three aspects h ad to w o rk in h a rm o n y if dom estic peace and tra n q u illity w ere to be m ain tain ed an d the general g o o d achieved. This w as assured b y the use o f fo u r co n stitutional devices o f w h ich H a rrin g to n w as exceedingly p ro u d . T h e first was the distinction b etw een ‘dividing and choosing’ or d eb ating and resolving. O n e p a rt o f the legislature should discuss affairs an d m ake proposals for laws, an o th er p a rt should decide w h ic h a m o n g these suggestions should actually beco m e law as b eing in the p o p u lar interest. T h e fo rm er should have no p o w e r o f decision or the latter o f debating, for i f the tw o functions w ere u n ited too m uch p o w e r w o u ld be in the hands o f a few m en. O b v io u sly the attributes m ost necessary in the d eb atin g ch am b er o r Senate w ere w isd o m and v irtu e, an d so it should consist o f m en chosen for these qualities. H a rrin g to n th o u g h t th at there w as in an y c o m m u n ity a ‘naturali Aristocracy w h ich all citizens w o u ld recognize and choose for this function, n o t sim ply for their g reatness o f possessions (for this w o u ld overbalance p o p u lar g o v e rn m en t) o r for h ered itary distinction, b u t because, h av in g the leisure to be learned in public affairs, th e y could acquire ‘a u th o rity ’. 25 O c e a n a , pp. 48-49, 53; cf. Ncvile op. cit. in 20 O c e a n a , p. 23.

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T h e p o p u lar assem bly, o n the oth er hand, had above all to be representative and to reflect w h a t the c o m m u n ity regarded as its interest.27 This system was no t, o f course, dem ocratic in o u r sense o f the w o rd and w as n o t in ten d ed to be. H a rrin g to n u n d o u b ted ly assum ed th at in practice the aristocracy o f talent w o u ld b e id e n tifled w ith the w ealthier classes; and he h ad m u ch to say ab o u t the role o f gentlem en as the leaders o f society. In ad d itio n , the electorate, w h ich was to choose the various local and n ational assemblies and to constitute their m em bership, w as a restricted class. W o m e n w ere excluded and so w ere citizens u nder th irty years o f age, as w ere servants and w age-earners o r an y persons w h o w ere n o t able ‘to live o f them selves.’28 In im p o sin g such restrictions, H a rrin g to n w as n o t d oing an y th in g unusual. It has recently been show n, for instance, th a t even the Levellers th o u g h t in term s o f a franchise w h ich excluded all ‘servants’ and alm stakers.29 A n d H a rrin g to n clearly w as n o t concerned th at his system should reflect the interests o f the u n p ro p ertied classes. T h e general bias o f his proposals w as evidenced to o b y the p ro v isio n o f a greater role for th e richer freem en, defined as those w ith an annual incom e o f o v er £ 1 0 0 . In the national legislature, for exam ple, o n ly th e y could be elected to the Senate and th ey also com posed n early h a lf o f the p o p u lar cham b er, as w ell as h av in g a m o n o p o ly o f certain im p o rta n t offices including all those in th e n atio n al m agistracy.30 In the elections an o th er device, the ballot, was crucial, for it was o n ly i f m en could v o te freely th at all view s w o u ld secure a fair hearing. T h e n , it w as necessary to m ake sure th at those en tru sted w ith the m ak in g and execution o f the laws d id n o t becom e a sinister interest. T his w as the fu n ctio n o f the principle o f ‘Equal Rotation w h ich lim ited the legislature’s an d the m ag istracy ’s ten u re o f office and p ro v id e d for th eir freq u en t and free election. A th ird o f the legislature and the fo u r adm in istrativ e councils, 27 Ibid., pp. 23-25, 116-17, n8ff. 28 Ibid., pp. 34-35, 64, 118fF, W o r k s , pp. 436-7. 29 C. B. Macpherson, T h e P o litic a l T h e o r y o f P o s s e s s iv e ch. iii. L° O c e a n a , pp. 65, 80-81, 105-6.

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for instance, w ere to retire each year in c o n fo rm ity w ith this prin ciple.31 Finally it w as necessary to ensure th at th e balance o f p ro p e rty co n tin ued to lie as far as possible w ith th e ‘p e o p le ’ an d this w as to be done b y an ‘equal Agrarian o r ‘perpetuali L a w ’ w h ich was to g o v ern the distribution o f land b y lim itin g th e size o f p ro p e rty holdings (in general to an annual in co m e fro m lan d in O ceana o f ;£2,000) and contro llin g their purchase an d inheritance. In this w ay it w o u ld be im possible fo r the balance o f p ro p e rty ever to fall to o ne m an o r a few m en, and th e p o p u lar h e g e m o n y w o u ld be w ith o u t effective challenge.32 H a rrin g to n sum m ed up his w h o le system , w h ich h e called an ‘equal Common-wealth’ , in the follow ing passage: ‘a Government established upon an equall Agrarian, arising into the superstructures or three orders, the Senate debating and proposing, the people resolving, and the Magistracy executing by an equal Rotation through the suffrage o f the people given by the Ballot.’33 This m ixed co n stitu tio n , u n d e rp in n ed b y a com patible p ro p e rty system , had, H a rrin g to n th o u g h t, the sanction b o th o f G od and h u m a n experience. T h e fo rm er because its principles w ere em bodied ‘in the Fabrick o f the Common-wealth o f Israel’ , the latter because it w as the fo rm o f g o v e rn m e n t m ost nearly approached b y m an y o f th e m o re stable states o f th e ancient and the m o d ern w o rld . V enice w as th e m o st c o m plete exam ple so far o f the system o f an equal co m m o n w ealth , b u t Oceana p ro v id ed the first fully w o rk e d -o u t m o d el o f such a state. It w as the basis o f a w ritte n constitutional law to be laid d o w n for E ngland b y the Legislator, the L o rd A rch o n . A n d because it was perfect it w ould, for all one could tell, be u n ch an g ing.34 F urther it was a co m m o n w e a lth for increase w ith great possibilities o f im perial d ev elo p m en t.35 F ro m this b rie f survey, then, it m ay be concluded th at in its essentials H a rrin g to n ’s political th o u g h t co n fo rm ed to th e tra d i31 O c e a n a , pp. 32-33, 106, W o r k s , pp. 303-4, 314-15. 32 O c e a n a , pp. 32, 85-86. And see Appendix, ‘Harrington’s Agrarian Law’, pp. 283-7 below. 33 O c e a n a , p. 33. 31 Ibid., pp. 26, 58-59, 185-7. 35 Ibid., pp. 133-9, 185-98; and see above pp. 202-3.

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tio n u nder review . H e believed th a t political generalization should be based o n history and experience, th at the p ro b lem s o f politics should be seen in term s o f such factors as the balance o f p ro p erty , interest, geographical situation, m ilitary stren g th , and the like. T h e fo rm o f co n stitu tio n w h ich he ap p ro v ed for E n g lan d w as a m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t w hose purposes w ere d o m in ated b y a wise and careful utilitarianism and b y expansion oversea. O f course, H a rrin g to n w as n o t an objective social h istorian an d no d o u b t he had little real understanding o f the eco n o m ic life o f his tim e, th o u g h he did grasp th e fact th a t there w as a p ro b le m to be explained concerning the b re a k d o w n o f th e feudal system an d the political effects o f this d e v elo p m en t, and he d id detect th e changed social role o f the g e n try .36 B u t he w as h ard ly Professor T a w n e y ’s realist, carefully and objectively m easuring the o p eratio n o f im personal and constant forces, as it w ere in the m o d e rn scientific fashion.37 A n d y et his defects in this respect are n o t incom patible w ith his hav in g been a typical em piricist in the sense in w h ich I have used the w o rd here. For the em pirical ap p ro ach w as rarely, i f ever, em p lo y ed in th e m ost stringent fashion. As already n o ted its m an n er m ay be h ap p ily described as the ‘in d o len t in d u ctiv e’.38 Lip-service w as paid to the need to derive generalizations fro m carefully collated experience, abstract hypothesis w as condem ned, and a great show w as m ade w ith an often im pressive parade o f historical and o th er em pirical evidence. B u t the n o tio n o f w h a t co n stituted an em pirical fact frequently in v o lv ed acceptance o f m a tte r w e w o u ld reject; and n o d o u b t the conclusions, presented w ith m an y ‘scientific’ flourishes, as w ith the principle o f the balance, w ere derived in som e o th e r w ay an d the data m erely used to su p p o rt th em . In addition th e y w ere h ard ly as rig o ro u sly conceived as th ey m ig h t have been. A d istinction m ust, th a t is, be d ra w n b etw een th e claim s and 36 As Professor Macpherson points out (op. cit., pp. 172-4) this is what led to the apparent ambiguity in Harrington’s references to the gentry class: under a feudal monarch and nobility the gentry shared with the people a subordinate position, but in the post-feudal situation the gentry ‘had more in common with the nobility than with the people’. 37 R. H. Tawney, ‘Harrington’s Interpretation o f his Age’, P r o c e e d in g s o f th e B r itis h A c a d • e m y t xxvii (1940), p. 204. The remarks in Pocock, op. cit., pp. 128-9 and in Shklar, art. cit., pp. 668-70, 675-6, 677, are most apt. 38 The phrase is Professor Macpherson’s: see above p. 204.

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pretensions o f the em pirical school, and th e actual value as objective study w hich m ay be attached to their w o rk . B u t w h a t is significant is that a need was felt to present m aterial in this, as w e m ig h t sec it, pseudo-scientific w ay. A nd unless it is said th a t the em piricists w ere consciously deceiving them selves, it m ust be gran ted that, like H arrin g to n , they th o u g h t th ey w ere m ain tain ing the Highest standards o f im personal observation and scholastic in teg rity as they understood them .

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XII SIR

W ILLIAM

PETTY:

THE STA TISTIC A L A N A LYSIS OF P O L IT IC S T he phrase ‘reason o f state’ was coined in the later M id d le Ages to describe the lessons and expediencies o f practical politics as o p posed to d octrine derived in a m erely theoretical fashion fro m the p h ilosophy o f g o v ern m en t. T hence cam e the w o rd ‘statist’ to d enote som eone w h o h ad w id e personal experience o f political activity and, as a result, great acum en in affairs o f state. Sim ilarly, in its original m eaning, ‘statistics’ referred to an em pirical, c o m parative approach to th e study o f politics w ith o u t an y necessary or exclusive num erical em phasis, and even as late as 1885 it was p ro p o sed to define the term sim ply as ‘th e science w h ich treats o f th e stru ctu re o f h u m a n society’, th a t is, w ith o u t an y special reference to q uantitative analysis.1 H o w ev er, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did see a g ro w th in the use o f q u an titativ e m ethods to investigate problem s o f social and political policy: th a t is, statistical analysis began to assum e the m athem atical fo rm w e n o w exclusively associate w ith it. T his ty p e o f study was called ‘political a rith m etic’ b y Sir W illia m P etty , th e friend o f b o th H obbes and H a rrin g to n , and w h o w as in the w o rd s o f his cousin, Sir R o b e rt Southw ell, ‘R avished w ith the h a rm o n y and charm es o f R atio cin atio n ’ (i.e. reck o n in g b y n um bers). D av en an t, th e econom ist, later said th a t ‘I 3y Political A rithm etic, w e m ean the a rt o f reasoning b y figures, u p o n things relating to g o v e rn m e n t.’2

The development o f a numerical statistics at this period may be 1 E n c y c lo p a e d ia o f th e S o c ia l S c ie n c e s (London, 1930-5), xiv.356-7. 2 T h e P e t t y - S o u t h w e l l C o r r e s p o n d e n c e 1 6 7 6 - 1 6 8 7 , ed. Lansdowne (London, 1928), p. 287; Charles Davenant, T h e P o litic a l a n d C o m m e r c ia l W o r k s (London, 1771), i.128. Davenant attributed its modern development to Petty, ibid. R

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attrib u ted to th ree factors. A bove all, there was the effect o f the increasing use being m ade o f figures for purposes o f adm inistra tio n and in o rd in a ry com m ercial life. G o v ern m en ts m ust alw ays have h ad occasional need to com pile n u m erical data for certain purposes such as finding o u t m ilitary p o ten tial and tax able capacity. T h e D om esday B o o k , th e ‘T rib al H id a g e ’ and the A n g lo -S axon en u m eratio n o f families w ere early n ativ e instances. As tim e w e n t on and experience increased, the m ethods o f estim atio n used natu rally becam e m o re accurate, especially w h en g o v ern m en t began to assume m o re and m o re co n tro l o v er econom ic life. For exam ple, m ercantilist d o ctrin e stressed the im p o rtan ce o f n o t ru n n in g in to an adverse balance o f trade, and econom ic policy thus inv o lv ed m o re than ever before m aking accurate q uantitative estim ates o f exports and im p o rts (especially o f bullion), custom s statistics and so on. T h e great financial crises o f the sixteenth cen tu ry and th e increasing financial difficulties o f the C ro w n , reinforced the need to refo rm tax and b u d g e ta ry systems and therefore to com pile statistics o f econom ically and politically im p o rta n t data. T h e practice o f g o v ern m en ts (like th at o f W illia m III) o f raising w ar-loans for w h ich p a y m e n t w as m ade in the fo rm o f life-annuities led to interest in vital p o p u latio n statistics, m o rtality rates and the like. T h e fo u n d atio n o f the B o ard o f T rad e was also the o u tco m e o f a g ro w in g b elief in the value o f figures in g o v e rn m e n t.3 A t the same tim e, w ith th e d ev elo p m en t o f com m erce, accounting practices becam e m o re detailed and accurate, especially after the spread o f the d o u b le-en try system w h ich h ad becom e k n o w n in E ngland b y 1543. These advances in b o o k -k eep in g techniques helped the g ro w th o f trad e and co m m erce and this g ro w th , in tu rn , spread w h a t m ig h t be called the acco u nting idea. T h e n there w as th e influence o f those advances in n atural science w h ich w ere due to the use o f m athem atics, largely o f course in th e field o f physics and astro n o m y . T h e re was an alm ost inevitable w ish on the p a rt o f m an y to apply these successful m ethods to o th er spheres including th at o f politics. H o b b es’s, 8 G. N. Clark, S c ie n c e pp. 121-8, 136-40.

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Spinoza’s an d L eibniz’s attem pts to do this; th at o f Sam uel C raig, N e w to n ’s friend, to reduce th eo lo g y to m athem atics; an d the w o rk o f m in o r figures like L eichner and Foley in their p u rsu it o f ‘p a n to m e try ’, a system o f universal m easurem ent, w ere all aspects o f this w ide intellectual trend. P e tty ’s ideas w ere likew ise n o t u n affected b y this aim .4 H e h ad been a surveyor, and the developm e n t o f m ap -m a k in g w as closely allied to th at o f statistics. (In this con tex t, too, the n um erological propensities o f the tim e, deriv ed fro m the neoplatonic tra d itio n , m ust be m en tio n ed as a likely factor in directing interest to the num b ers in term s o f w h ich the w o rld w as th o u g h t to be ordered.) Finally, there was, as n early alw ays in these m atters in the seventeenth centu ry , a very strong, direct B aconian influence. It is som etim es said th at one o f B aco n ’s great errors w as th a t he ig n o re d the im p o rta n t p a rt th at m athem atics co u ld play in revealin g law s and processes o f nature. This charge has an elem ent o f tru th for, certainly, B acon did n o t go o u t o f his w a y to em phasize v e ry stro n g ly th e role o f m athem atics in the renew al o f learning: he w as alw ays concerned lest it becom e a rig id system o f in te rp re ta tio n and a bad exam ple o f the idols o f the theatre, instead o f b eing sim ply a useful to o l o f the u nderstand in g . B u t n eith er d id he neglect it; for n u m b e r w as o b viously o ne o f the co m m o n est an d therefore m o st significant o f form s.5 C onsequently, P e tty ’s b elief th a t politics could be reduced to n u m b e r w as n o t at all in c o m patible w ith th e em pirical, B aconian tre n d an d m ay, indeed, be reg ard ed as a reflection o f it. C ertainly, P e tty ’s attitu d e and appro ach h a d m an y o f th e em pirical features despite his use o f the idea o f a ‘scale o f creatures’, o f correspondences an d o f o th e r elem ents o f th e p h ilo so p h y o f o rd e r.6 O n e tra d itio n al n o tio n he rejected: he w o u ld have n o th in g to do w ith th e idea o f decay and talked instead in progressionist 4 Ibid., pp. 118-19, 126, 131-3. 5 Bacon, W o r k s , ed. Spedding, Ellis and Heath (London, 1877-87), iii.359-61,iv. 126, 259,

369-71• 6 Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, T h e L i f e o f S i r W i l l i a m P e t ty (London, 1895), pp. 116-17; and see the references above, p. 20 n. 12. In a letter to Southwell ( T h e P e t ty P a p e r s , ed. Lansdowne [London, 1927], ii.21) Petty said that he had never read anywhere of the idea o f a scale o f creation: this is quite incredible.

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fashion o f the great future o pening up before m a n k in d .7 A n d the o rth o d o x teachings o f the schools w ere scorned as ‘pu zlin g p o o r people w ith unintelligible N o tio n s’.8 H e criticized those w h o d id n o t see the need to unite th e o ry and practice, to give general ideas a concrete content. In a paper on ‘Exercises o f Sense an d R eason’ he w ro te th at Hindrance o f the advancement o f learning hath beene because thought, theory, and practice, hath beene always divided in severall persons; . . . whereas all writings ought to be descriptions o f things, they are now onely o f words, notions, opinions, theories—because the writers o f books know little o f things, and the practicall men have not language nor m ethod enough to describe [them] by w ords.9 This is exactly the sort o f language th a t B acon em p lo y ed w h en w ritin g ab o u t h o w useful it w o u ld be to un ite the lessons o f the m echanical arts w ith the theories o f the scholar. P e tty w e n t o n to say th at the w o rk o f m echanics and tradesm en w o u ld afford m an y useful ‘experiem ents and stufte . . . for active and philosophical heads.’ H e w a n te d to see a ‘C ollege o f T rad esm en ’ set up to p ro duce n e w inventions an d a p ro p er ‘h isto ry o f T rad es’.101Sim ilarly, P e tty p ro d u ced a n u m b e r o f n atu ral histories in the B aconian style, like those o n fire, m o tio n , and life an d death, w h ich have been p rin te d in his published w ritin g s.11 F urther, P etty w as a th o ro u g h g o in g B aconian in political m atters as his w o rk s o n political arith m etic clearly show ed. P e tty explained his m e th o d in the preface to the Political Arithmetick w h ich w as com p leted ab o u t 1676 (th o u g h n o t p u b lished un til 1690). T h e em pirical w ay he ad o p ted was, he th o u g h t, not yet very usual; for instead o f using only comparative and superlative W ords, and intellectual Arguments, I have taken the course (as a Specimen o f the Political Arithmetick I have long aimed at) to 7 P e tty P a p e r s , ii.24, 2 6 ; P e t t y - S o n t h w e l l C o r r e s p o n d e n c e , p. 46; Fitzmaurice, op. cit., pp. 11—12, 8 1 'he E c o n o m ic W r itin g s o f S i r W i ll i a m P e t t y , ed. Hull, (Cambridge, 1899), ii.396; cf. the stress on beginning with matters of ‘sense’ in P e t ty P a p e r s , i.103, h i . 9 P e t ty P a p e r s , ii.7-8. 10 Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 12. 11 P e tty P a p e r s , i. 187-9, ii.200, 207-10. 252

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express m y self in Terms o f Number, Weight, or Measure; to use only Arguments o f Sense, and to consider only such Causes, as have visible Foundations in N ature; leaving those that depend upon the mutable Minds, Opinions, Appetites, and Passions o f particular Men, to the Consideration o f others. . . .12 T his m ig h t be reg ard ed n o t o n ly as a rejection o f final causes, b u t also as th e social and political c o u n te rp a rt o f the distinction in th e n atu ral sciences betw een p rim a ry and secondary qualities. T h e red u ctio n o f em pirical causes to n u m b e r w as certainly th e a p p ro priate substitute for n atu ral ex p erim en t. T h e B aconian influence b eh in d the idea o f a political arith m etic em erg ed also in th e earlier Natural and Political Observations . . . upon the Bills o f Mortality w h ic h appeared in 1662.13 T h e le tte r dedicating this v o lu m e b o th to th e R oyal Society an d its president an d at the sam e tim e to L o rd R oberts, a m e m b e r o f th e P riv y C ou n cil, sho w ed th a t th e b o o k w as considered to be o f b o th scientific and political interest an d th at it w as in ten d ed to fall in w ith th e B aconian schem e fo r d eriv in g useful k n o w led g e fro m n atu ral and civil histories: The Observations which I happened to make . . . upon the Bills o f M ortality, have fain out to be both Political and N atural, some concerning Trade and Government, others concerning the Air, Countries, Seasons, Fruitfulness, Health, Diseases, Longevity, and the proportions between the Sex and Ages of Mankind. A ll which (because Sir Francis Bacon reckons his Discourses of Life and D eath to be N atural History; and because I understand your selves are also appointing means, how to measure the Degrees of Heat, Wetness, and Windiness in the several Parts of His Majesties Dominions) I am humbly bold to think N atural H istory also, and consequently that I am obliged to cast this small M ite into your great Treasury of that kind.u 12

E c o n o m ic W r itin g s , i.244; cf. Shelburne’s dedication, ibid., i.239-40. The biblical reference to number, weight and measure, which was then very commonly invoked, was to Wisd. o f Sol. xi. 20. 13John Graunt’s name appears as the author on the title-page o f this work, and the controversy whether he or Petty wrote it has still not been settled. It bears many marks o f Petty’s style, however, and, on the whole, the most reasonable conclusion seems to be that, at the least, Petty had a hand in its composition. This is why I refer to the book here. For a summary o f the dispute over the authorship and references to other discussion see E. Strauss, S i r W i l l i a m P e t ty (London, 1954), pp. 187-91, where the view expounded is the one I here express. 14 E c o n o m ic W r i t i n g s , ii.322-3.

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H o w ev er, alth o u g h th e b o o k ‘relates to N a tu ra l H isto ry ’ its subject m atter was at th e same tim e ‘G o v ern m en t and T ra d e ’ w ith the object o f finding th a t ‘universal measure’ in tra d e w h ich h ad h ith erto been lacking. In B aconian m an n er the ‘several g reat c o n fused Volumes' o f the Bills o f M o rta lity h a d been red u ced ‘in to a few perspicuous Tables' and these had been ab rid g ed in to ‘such Observations as n aturally flow ed fro m th em , in to a few succinct Paragraphs, w ith o u t any lo n g series o f multiloquious Deductions. . .' A nd, being concerned w ith ‘ luciferous Experiments' an d ‘ the substance and principles o f Useful Arts', the analysis dealt w ith practical questions o f concern to the g o v ern m en t: the p ro b le m o f beggars, p o ly g am y, the effects o f the great size o f L o n d o n , the size o f parishes, taxable capacity and so o n .15 T hus this w o rk was reg ard ed as a u nion o f ‘n atu ral’ and ‘political’ observations, as analysis in w h ich the m ethods o f the natural philosophers w ere applied to the study o f society and used to political purpose. T h e same em pirical, utilitarian em phasis w as evident in the b o d y o f th e b o o k , the general them e being that the basis o f g o o d g o v e rn m ent, the general w elfare and sound policy, w as an accurate statistical know led g e o f the econom ic foundations o n w h ich national prosperity should be based.16 P e tty ’s The Political Anatomy o f Ireland was an exercise in the sam e m ode. It h ad the purpose o f show ing h o w the trade and public cred it o f the co u n try could be increased, and attem p ted to do this o n th e basis o f a survey o f the land and its people. Such investigations p ro v id e d th e basis o f an ostensibly objective, em pirical science o f politics, politics w hich was, as P etty said in a letter to L o rd A nglesey in 1672, dealt w ith ‘w ith o u t passion o r interest, faction or p a rty ’ according to ‘the E ternal Law s and M easures o f T r u th .’17 N atu rally this w as n o t the w h o le tru th for, personal interests apart, a single great ideal o r objective lay b eh in d P e tty ’s w o rk . His purpose was to reb u t a p articular application o f the b e lie f in decay, to argue that E n g lan d ’s p o w e r and resources w ere n o t in decline, as som e pessimists had suggested, an d th at a fu tu re o f m agnificent com m ercial and political progress lay before h e r;18 15 E c o n o m ic W r itin g s , 16 .324 ,323 ,319-21.‫ ״‬Ibid., 393-7.‫ ; ״‬cf. ii.333-4. 15 Fitzinaurice, op. cit., p. 158. 18 E c o n o m ic W r i t i n g s , i.241-4.

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fu rth er, that this view could o n ly be justified an d the rig h t policies fo rm u lated i f the facts o f her position and th a t o f h er rivals w ere k n o w n and understo o d . Like m a n y o f th e em piricists, therefore, like H a rrin g to n and H alifax, P e tty represented th e p atrio tic u rg e to E n g la n d ’s im p erial greatness. T his m ean t in the first place stable g o v e rn m e n t at h o m e, and an efficient system o f adm in istratio n . T h e recent experience o f the civil w ars and his friendship w ith H obbes inclined P e tty to talk o f a stro ng sovereign p o w e r at th e centre o f affairs. H e th o u g h t in term s o f the p o w e rfu l executive g o v e rn m e n t o f one m an , lim ited, h o w ev er, b y the practical necessity o f consulting the people in P arliam ent. H e k n e w th a t th e kin g still h a d im m ense au th o rity , b u t he also realized th at the influence o f P arliam en t an d o f the interests it represented w as o n the increase, so th a t p o w e r w o u ld have to be shared b etw een th e m . T h e k in g o u g h t to retain his v eto an d th e rig h t to ap p o in t his m inisters b u t he an d th ey w o u ld have to d epend in m an y m atters o n th e su p p o rt o f th e p o p u lar elem ents.19 It w o u ld be unrealistic and to ig n o re p revailing political circum stances i f m o n a rc h y w ere n o t in this w a y m ix ed w ith dem ocracy. In any case, in the last resort civil p o w e r arose fro m the people and even th e spiritual p o w e r w h ich cam e fro m G o d was institu ted to reinforce this tem p o ra l sovereignty, n o t to be its rival. T h e detailed elaboration o f these view s was co n tain ed in som e proposals for th e re fo rm o f E nglish political institutions w h ich w ere p ro b a b ly drafted in 1679 as a schem e to rival T e m p le ’s. P e tty considered th ere should be a h ierarch y o f councils u n d er th e m o n arch . First a ‘C o m o n ’ council o f p o p u lar representatives chosen th ro u g h a refo rm ed electoral system ; th en a ‘chefe CouncilF representing the p o p u lar ch am b er as w ell as th e a rm y an d peerage; a ‘Privy CouncilF m ade u p o f m em bers o f th e c h ie f council; and finally a ‘ Cabinet CouncilF d ra w n fro m the p riv y council. T o each o f these bodies w o u ld be allotted functions co v erin g the w h o le field o f g o v e rn m e n t.20 T hese and the o th e r co n stitu tio n al suggestions w ere w o rk e d o u t in som e detail an d in ten d ed , tailored as P e tty th o u g h t th ey w ere to c o n te m p o ra ry conditions, to be w h o lly practical and realistic. T h e re was in this general w ay , as 19 P e t t y

P a p ers,

i.20-21.

20 Ibid., 1.5-8, 266.

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w ell as in m any particulars, a striking resem blance to H a rrin g to n ’s schem e o n the one hand, and to th e great p o w e r given b y H obbes to his L eviathan o n the o th e r—in one w ay, P etty envisaged in detailed practical term s the positive functions and o rg an izatio n o f th e H obbesian state. N o g o v e rn m e n t could be efficient if it did n o t have an adequate factual k n o w led g e o n w hich to base policy; and no society could be stable and prosperous i f policy w as n o t directed to the achievem e n t o f econom ic progress and general w ell-being. T h e ‘A rt o f G o v erning, and the tru e Politicks, is’, said the Observations, ‘h o w to preserve th e Subject in Peace and Plenty. . . .’ A n d this ‘honest harm less Policy’ could only be effectively based o n an accurate appreciation o f the natural resources o f the c o m m u n ity and the econom ic factors at w o rk . T his m ean t surveying all th e lands o f a k in g d o m to d eterm ine their size, shape, situation, features, fertility and so o n as in P e tty ’s o w n Down Survey. It w as also ‘n o less necessary to k n o w h o w m an y P eople there be o f each Sex, State, A ge, R eligion, T rade, R ank, or D egree, &c. b y th e K n o w ledge w hereof, T rad e and G o v ern m en t m ay be m ade m o re certain and R egular; . . .’ This k n o w led g e w o u ld enable forecasts to be m ade a b o u t th e value o f different areas as m arkets for traders, and w o u ld show , too, w h a t p ro p o rtio n o f the p o p u latio n was engaged in really p ro d u ctiv e w o rk . H ence P e tty ’s suggestions ab o u t h o w these data could be obtained, including for instance the establishm ent o f a ‘Register G enerali o f People, Plantations, & T rad e o f E n g la n d ’ so that the g o v ern m en t w o u ld at all tim es k n o w the true state o f th e nation. H e considered in detail various aspects o f the statistical problem s in v o lv ed .21 B u t above all he w as concerned w ith the statistical fo u n d atio n and adm inistrative details o f policy designed to secure th e in te rnational h eg em o n y o f E ngland. E choing H obbes, he th o u g h t o f nations as being in a state o f nature w ith one an o th er, th a t a w ar o f all against all prevailed in international politics. H e w an ted to show th a t E n g la n d ’s p o w e r was potentially so great th at h er suprem acy could end this anarchy. H e seems to have th o u g h t th at o th e r nations w o u ld agree, in a sort o f intern atio n al social co n 21 E c o n o m ic

W r itin g s ,

ii.3 9 5 7 ‫ ־‬,

P e tty P a p e r s ,

i. 17 1ff.

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tract, to th e rule o f one c o u n try and th a t E n g lan d ’s obvious stren g th m eant th a t d o m in io n o f the seas should thus be granted to h e r.22 T h e basis o f this conclusion was a review o f the relevant historical and other experience to answ er such questions as these: ‘H o w h ath the G lobe o f the E a rth been divided in to Soveraintyes for th e 30 last centuryes o f the W o rld , u n d er w h at form es & species o f g overnm ent? W h a t is the w eig h t and p o w er o f each at this day; in P eople, w ealth, territo ry , shipping, arm es, m o n y , rep u tatio n , d u ratio n , &c?’23 C o m p arativ e analysis o f the latter k in d w as to be the m ain type o f evidence and co n stitu ted the essence o f P e tty ’s approach. H e seems to have envisaged a general co m p arative survey, like th a t proposed b y B acon and H a rrin g to n before h im , o f ‘all the practised form es o f C ivill G o v e rn e m e n ts. . . A n d their R espective durations & atchievem ents’, th o u g h such a survey is n o t e x ta n t and m ay w ell never have been a tte m p te d .24 Sim ilar B aconian schemes he jo tte d d o w n included proposals to m ake ‘Politicall A natom yes’, com parative studies o f law , and geopolitical surveys o f frontiers.25 In his Political Arithmetick P e tty advanced the initial thesis that ‘a small Country and fe w People, by its S ituation, T rad e and Policy, may be equivalent in W e a lth and S trength, to a fa r greater People and Territory. . . .’26 H e com pared France and H o llan d to illustrate this in the first instance, and the discussion gives a g o o d exam ple o f his general style, w hich, in a w ay, is like an elaboration o f the factors im plicit in H a rrin g to n ’s conception o f ‘p ro v in cial’ p o w er. O n the figures available it seem ed to h im th at alth o u g h France h ad a p o p u latio n thirteen tim es larger than th at o f H olland, and eig h t tim es as m u ch land, it w as little m o re th an three tim es as stro n g . This was because H olland had advantages o f situation, trade and p olicy w hich o u tw eig h ed a m ere disparity in territo rial and d em o g rap h ic size. T he D u tc h soil was b etter; the p o p u latio n , alth o u g h m u ch sm aller, w as less scattered and, to g eth er w ith the p ro te c tio n offered b y the dykes, m ade defence m u ch easier in consequence; the level countryside and the d am p clim ate w ere favourable to the use o f w indm ills and irrig atio n ; living as they 22 P e t ty P a p e r s , i.219-42. 25 Ibid., i.144, 2 57 ‫ י‬Ü-4I26

23 Ibid., ii.40-41. ‫ ״‬E c o n o m ic W r i t i n g s , i.249.

257

24 Ibid., i.144.

Order, Empiricism and Politics

did at the p o in t w here three great rivers had th eir o u tlet to the sea, the D u tc h w ere able to develop the trad e and co m m erce w h ich was m o re profitable than m anufacturin g ; nearness to n av ig able w aters m ade for cheap com m erce; ships could be h arb o u red easily and at small expense; the facilities available for the fishing trade w ere great and the results lucrative; so w ere those o f the trad e in naval stores m ade possible by H o lla n d ’s shipping ad v an tages; and so on. Because o f factors such as these H olland had flourished in its trade o f shipping and th e D u tc h had becom e the ‘C arriers and Factors o f th e w h o le W o rld o f T ra d e .’ A nd P e tty th o u g h t th a t trade was o f im m ense value to th e p ro sp erity o f a co u n try for a n u m b e r o f reasons. O n his estim ate, one m an engaged in trade p ro d u ced m o re th an three hu sb an d m en . M o reo v er, trad e was alw ays prospering som ew here in the w o rld and so the shipping industry unlike others could never be totally depressed. T rad e also b ro u g h t in m u ch real w ealth in the fo rm o f bullion and jew els w hich, unlike w ine, co m , m eat and sim ilar products, w ere o f a p erpetual and h ig h value. In add itio n shipping services w ere a valuable invisible ex p o rt. T h e essence o f the m atter was th a t th e situation o f H olland had led the D u tc h to develop and depend o n a great shipping industry, and ‘. . . S hipping h a th given th e m in effect all o th er T rade, and . . . F oreign Traffick m ust give th e m as m uch M anufacture as they can m anage them selves, and as for the overplus, m ake the rest o f th e W o rld b u t as W o rk m e n to their Shops.’ A liberal political and econom ic policy h ad been o f w eig h t too in th e rise o f th e D u tc h fro m being a m ere apanage o f the Spanish em pire to the greatest sea-pow er in the w o rld and the m o st prosperous o f nations. O n all things a liberal and o p en han d ed policy had been th e key to w ealth and p rosperity: ‘L iberty o f C onscience, R egistry o f C onveyances, small C ustom s, Banks, L um bards, and L aw M erchant, rise all fro m th e sam e Spring, and ten d to the same Sea; as for low ness o f Interest, it is also a necessary effect o f all the premisses, and n o t the F ruit o f th eir co n triv an ce.’ A fter a len g th y survey o f this k in d P e tty found his thesis co n firm ed w ith th e additional conclusion th a t ‘S hipping and W a te r-c a rria g e ’ w ere o f vital im p o rtan ce; and France could never attain any great sea-pow er fo r she lacked adequate n o rth e rn 258

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ports, and could n ever p ro d u ce the requisite n u m b e r o f skilled seam en.27 T h e n , g o in g b e y o n d this conclusion to his m ain p o in t, P e tty was sure th a t E n g lan d h ad th e resources to challenge th e m aritim e and com m ercial suprem acy o f H olland and the p o w e r o f France i f the rig h t policy w ere follow ed. T h e figures and facts th at he ex am ined led h im to the opinion th a t E n g la n d ’s geographical situation w as superior and th a t in inhabitan ts and te rrito ry E n g land approached the w ealth and stren g th o f France. O v e r the p revious h alf-cen tu ry E n g la n d ’s econom ic progress had, m o re o v er, been eno rm o u s: she h ad added to an d im p ro v e d h er possessions, h e r p o p u latio n h ad been g ro w in g , and, vitally, h er shipping and foreign trad e had increased. T h e im p ed im en ts to still fu rth er d ev elo p m en t w ere ‘b u t c o n tin g e n t and rem o v ab le.’ H er ag ricu ltu ral p ro d u c tiv ity could be au g m en ted , so could h e r fo reig n trade. T h e tax system could be refo rm ed (as he also explained in his Treatise on Taxes) to defray m u ch m o re easily the expenses o f g o v e rn m e n t an d to m ain tain a large a rm y and n av y . T h e resources and advantages w ere there; th ey had o n ly to be used arig h t. T h e ap p ro p riate policies h ad o n ly to be follow ed, and E n g lan d w o u ld be able to surpass even H o llan d and to ‘drive the T rad e o f the w h o le C o m m erical W o r ld .’28 S o u th w ell shared his frien d ’s desire to see E n g lan d rule th e seas, and in 1675 he delivered an address to th e R oyal Society w h ich lo o k ed at this to p ic .29 T h e w ay in w h ich P e tty tackled th e co n v en tio n al p ro b le m s o f political th e o ry (and he did n o t alw ays consider th e m w o rth atten tio n ) m ay be indicated b y reference to his view s o n th e question o f to leratio n and lib erty o f conscience, in w h ic h he w as in fact m u ch interested. His tre a tm e n t was, as m ig h t be expected, alm ost w h o lly em pirical. H e show ed h a rd ly an y con cern at all w ith th e ethical aspects o f th e p ro b le m an d co n cen trated o n its practical, u tilitarian im plications, in p articu lar w ith w h a t he to o k to be the u n to w a rd effects o f intolerance. T h is ra th e r b efitted a 27 E c o n o m ic W r i t i n g s , i.258-84, the passage quoted is at p. 261. 28 Ibid., 268-78, 284-313; P e t ty P a p e r s , i.171ff. 29 T. Birch, T h e H i s t o r y o f th e R o y a l S o c ie ty (London, 1756-7), iii.204-6.

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m an w h o h ad p ro b ab ly been, in his y o u n g days a C ath o h c, later a P rotestant, and w h o m ay have died an atheist. H e m ade a basic p o int, derived perhaps fro m H obbes, th a t the sovereign co u ld n o t co n tro l a m a n ’s inn er convictions th o u g h he did have p o w e r o v er ‘all the externall circum stances o f w o rsh ip .’ A n d even in the latter case the wise ruler, he th o u g h t, w o u ld restrict the exercise o f his p o w e r because to use it excessively w o u ld be v ery h kely to cause disturbance and unrest. F reedom o f b elief and expression should be granted, therefore, o n ly so long as there w as no real d an g er to ‘the peace & W elfare o f the State.’ M o reo v er, he arg u ed o n the basis o f D u tc h experience th a t dissenters w ere usually industrious and so ber-m inded people w h o believed th a t lab o u r an d in d u stry w ere th eir d u ty to G od and th at their suppression w o u ld have a b ad effect o n the c o u n try ’s prosperity. H e even p u t th e m atter in to figures, saying th at lib erty o f w orsh ip co u ld increase a c o u n try ’s p ro d u c tiv ity tw o - o r th ree-fo ld (adding cynically th at the dissenters could be fined and g o v e rn m e n t revenue th ereb y increased). O n the o th e r hand, the exam ples o f France an d Spain show ed clearly th a t attem pts to enforce religious u n ifo rm ity w ere terrib ly expensive and perhaps m o re likely to increase th an to dim inish religious h etero d o x y . P e tty certainly p u t a case for religious to leratio n and freed o m o f conscience b u t it w as a case argued in term s o f practical effects an d n o t m o ral p rin ciples.30 T h e tone o f all this was far rem o v ed fro m th e discussions o f Forset and Film er; b u t it w as w h a t political analysis m ean t to a p atriotic, B aco n ian -m in d ed statist w ith a taste fo r ‘algebra’. D espite all P e tty ’s argum ents ab o u t the size o f hell, his calculation o f the date o f the w o rld ’s end fro m the rate o f p o p u latio n g ro w th , his b elief in a scale o f creation, despite sim ilar m anifestations o f the o th er, still p o p u la r and p o w erfu l tra d itio n o f ideas, P e tty ’s th o u g h t represents v ery clearly the em pirical con cern w ith the concrete and the m aterial, the useful and the practical in politics. 30

P e t ty P a p e r s , i. 139-41, 159; E c o n o m ic W r itin g s , 1 .2 6 2 - 4 ‫ ־‬Petty was not, of course, the first person to assert the commercial advantages o f religious toleration; these seem to have been suggested at least as early as 1614 by the Baptist Leonard Busher in his R e lig io u s P ea ce: see J. W Allen, E n g lis h P o litic a l T h o u g h t 1 6 0 3 - 1 6 6 0 (London, 1938), i.2 2 2 .

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H e believed in analysing political society em pirically as a means o f discovering the tru th ab o u t it and as a m eans o f learning to c o n tro l it to the m ost useful ends; and w ith his political arith m etic he tried to p ro v id e a m eans b y w hich this could be done.

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XI I I C O N C LU SIO N : IN

R A TIO N A LISM

PO LITIC S

T h e philosophies o f o rd er and em piricism w ere the fo u n d atio n o f im p o rta n t political attitudes in E ngland d u rin g the early m o d ern period. In tim e th ey ceased to be as persuasive an d w idespread, b u t th ey to o k a lo n g w hile to decline. Indeed, certain o f th eir co m p o n en t ideas have n o t been w h o lly superseded and have co n tin u ed to exert a decreasing b u t never entirely extinguished appeal. T h e political th eo ry o f o rd er b y n o m eans died o u t w ith the royalist débâcle in the 1640’s. It retained its cohesion and influence th ro u g h o u t th e seventeenth cen tu ry and to som e ex ten t after. In 1689 Locke said o f Film er th at ‘the Pulpit, o f late Years, publickly owned his Doctrine, and made it the Currant Divinity o f the Times’ , adding that a refutation o f his dead adversary ’s arg u m en ts was still necessary because o f the considerable n u m b e r o f m en w h o co n tin ued to cry up his books and espouse his teachings.1 Indeed the th e o ry w as a vital aspect o f the ideological controversies occasioned b y the Exclusion crisis, the R ye H ouse P lo t an d the R evolution o f 1688. B u t after this tim e the royalist fo u n d h im self in a dilem m a: he was faced w ith the need to choose b etw een obedience to that ruler w h o m G od had p ro v id en tially im posed and b elief in the divinity o f h ereditary rig h t. In th e end, m ost T ories reconciled them selves to the fo rm er course, w hile others becam e N o n -ju ro rs and Jacobites, ju stify in g th eir p o sitio n b y a ju d icious selection o f argum ents fro m the o ld royalist doctrines. C learly, the th eo ry o f divine rig h t m o re and m o re reflected n o th in g like the actual o r even p o ten tial position o f the m o n arch y b u t was o n ly ‘the expression o f regretfu l aspirations’: it had 1Locke,

T r e a tis e s o f G o v e r n m e n t , ed. Laslett (Cambridge, i960), p. 156 (Locke’s cf. J. Tyrrell, P a tr ia rc h a N o n M o n a r c h a (London, 1681), sig. [A3] recto. W . Attwood, T h e F u n d a m e n ta l C o n s titu tio n o f th e E n g lis h G o v e r n m e n t (London, 1690), devoted many pages to reviewing and rebutting the doctrine of passive resistance; see, e.g., pp. i-xxxiv (first pagination) and Appendix, pp. 1-19 (second pagination). Two

P re fa c e );

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reached w h a t Figgis called its ‘ro m a n tic ’ stage.2 In so m eth in g like a com plete fo rm it nonetheless co n tin u ed to appeal to m en like C harles Leslie and Soam c Jenyns. Figgis n o ted th a t as late as 1747 a p am p h leteer w as lam en tin g ‘its co n tin u ed p rev alen ce’; and B en th am described h o w as a y o u n g m an (he w as b o rn in 1748) he w as a d iv in e-rig h t T o ry .3 A b ro ad the force o f the o rd e r d octrine w as even m o re pervasive and long -lastin g .4 E ven after the decline o f the political th e o ry o f o rd er as a co h eren t ideo lo g y certain aspects o f it co n tin u ed to be v ery persuasive. T h e em phasis o n the absolute personal so v ereig n ty o f the kin g died aw ay b u t n o t th a t o n the naturalness and su p erio rity o f m o narchy. N o r w as it so easy to set aside the d octrine o f the org an ic n atu re o f society w ith its hierarch y o f unequal m en. Sim ilarly, the insistence o n th e m aintenance o f the status quo refleeted an abiding interest. A n d despite the great changes w ro u g h t b y th e advance o f n atu ral k n o w led g e, the cogen cy o f co rresp o n d ence argum ents co ntinued to be heeded. In fact, m a n y o f these view s becam e strands in th e d ev elo p m en t o f b o th th e R o m an tic m o v e m e n t and the philo so p h y o f m o d e rn conservatism . T h e y w ere also a m ajo r source o f those o th e r m o d e rn doctrines w h ich hav e been based o n th e o rganic th e o ry o f the state. M a n y aspects o f these them es m ay be discerned at the very end o f the n in eteen th ce n tu ry q u ain tly reflected in the legitim ist an d an ti-d em o cratic pages o f The Royalist periodical. As to the effect o f the political th e o ry o f em piricism , the idea it e m b o d ied o f a system o f politics based o n the facts o f n atu re an d h isto ry w as a c o n tin u in g enterprise d u rin g the eig h teen th c e n tu ry an d after. A b ro a d this w as evidenced b y the w o rk of, fo r instance, 2J. N . Figgis, T h e D i v i n e R i g h t o f K i n g s (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1922), pp. 166, 169. And see two recent and rather different discussions o f the nature o f monarchist theory at the end o f the seventeenth century: G. Straka, *The Final Phase o f Divine Right Theory in England, 1688-1702’, T h e E n g lis h H is to r ic a l R e v i e w , lxxvii (1962), pp. 638-58 and G. L. Cherry, 4The Legal and Philosophical Position o f the Jacobites, 1688-1689’, T h e J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n H i s t o r y , xxii (1950), pp. 309-21. 3 Figgis, op. cit., pp. 172-3; Bentham, A F r a g m e n t o n G o v e r n m e n t etc., ed. Harrison (Oxford, 1948), intro., p. 50n. 4 Filmer was invoked by the American Tories during the Revolution and, in the Southern states, as late as the mid-nineteenth century: see W. H. Nelson, T h e A m e r ic a n T o r y (London, 1962), pp. 186-7 and G. Fitzhugh C a n n ib a ls A U ! t ed. Woodward (Cambridge, Mass., i960), pp. xxxiv-xxxviii.

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V ico and M ontesquieu; at h o m e the sentim ents o f B o lin g b ro k e and H u m e are sufficient testim o n y to its persistence, th o u g h n eith er adopted the unsophisticated o p tim ism o f th eir p redeccssors.6 Also, B lackstone’s Commentaries m ay be seen as an atte m p t to e x p o u n d the general principles o f law b y an historical study o f E nglish law s. M o re specifically,‫ ׳‬it has been sh o w n 6 h o w the th eo ry o f balanced, m ixed institutions o f G o th ic origin, the appeal o f the V enetian constitution, the emphasis o n history, the study o f the econom ic foundations o f political p o w er, and m an y o f th e o th e r ideological accessories o f the em pirical school, w ere k ep t alive d u rin g th e A ge o f E n lig h ten m en t. These notions w ere p erp etu ated by the w ritings o f R o b e rt M o lesw o rth , W illiam M o ly n eu x , C harles Lucas, Francis H utch eso n , dissenters like Foster, W a tts and H ollis, and m an y o th er ‘Real W h ig s ’ and ‘C o m m o n w e a lth m e n ’. T h e ir survival was also assisted by the rep rin tin g o f the w o rk s o f such predecessors as H a rrin g to n , N e d h a m an d N evile, w h ich co n tin u ed to be b ro u g h t o u t th ro u g h o u t the eig h teen th ce n tu ry (th o u g h v ery rarely since), and b y th e issue o f collections o f tracts and records like those o fT h u rlo e , Som ers and H arley. T h e basic G othic them e, for instance, co n tin u ed to be used lo n g after its sev enteenth-century h ey -d ay . T hus, in 1739 an an o n y m ous article rep rin ted in The Gentleman s Magazine reflected in ra th e r B u rk eian term s th e p erp etu atio n o f the G o th ic idea: . . . there was something respectable in those old hospitable Go thick Halls, hung round w ith the Helmets, Breast-Plates, and Swords o f our Ancestors; I entered them w ith a Constitutional Sort o f Reverence, and look’d upon those Arms w ith Gratitude, as the T error o f form er Ministers, and the Check o f Kings. Nay, I even im agin’d that I here saw some o f those good Swords that had procur’d the Confirm ation o f Magna Charta . . . And when I see these throw n by, to make W ay for taw dry Gilding and Carving, I can’t help considering such an Alteration as ominous even to our . . . old Gothick Constitution. . . .7 6 For Hume's defence o f the didactic value o f history see E n q u ir ie s , ed. Selby-Bigge (2nd ed., Oxford, 1957), pp. 83-87 and, in lighter vein, the E s s a y s , ed. Green and Grose (London, 1875), ii. 388-91. 6 By Z. S. Fink, T h e C la s s ic a l R e p u b lic a n s (2nd ed., [Evanston], 1962), ch. vii and, more extensively, by C. Robbins, T h e E ig h t e e n th - C e n t u r y C o m m o n w e a l t h m a n (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p a s s im . 7 T h e G e n tle m a n s M a g a z i n e , ix (1739), p. 641.

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A gain, in 1775 R o b ert M o le sw o rth ’s original preface to a transiatio n o f H o tm a n ’s Franco-Gallia was republished, u nder the title The Principles o f a Real Whig, as a statem ent o f the view s and resolutions o f the L o n d o n A ssociation. This d o cu m en t contained m ost o f the elem ents o f the em pirical case including the b elief that the m ixed E nglish co n stitu tio n had been founded by the G oths: M y notion o f a Whig, I mean o f a real Whig (for the nominal are worse than any sort o f men) is, that he is one who is exactly for keeping up to the strictness o f the true old Gothic constitution, under the three estates o f king (or queen) lords and commons■ , the legislature being seated in all three together, the executive entrusted w ith the first, but accountable to the whole body o f the people, in case o f mal-administration.8 Sim ilarly, a few years later w h en a n u m b e r o f reform ers an n o u n ced proposals to organize a Society for C o n stitu tio n al In fo rm atio n , th ey said th a t am o n g their objectives was to co n serve th e records fro m w h ich could be learned ‘the ancient usage and cu sto m ’ o f ‘the venerable C o n stitu tio n ’ han d ed d o w n fro m o u r Saxon ancestors. Likew ise, in his attack o n a standing arm y, C a rtw rig h t praised ‘the sacred book o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n , first composed in the Saxon Tongue and the Saxon style. . . .’9 D u rin g the V icto rian period, the G othic idea becam e m erg ed w ith the th reefold ideal o f liberalism , protestantism and progress, and was reflected, for instance, in th e w ritings o f M acaulay, Freem an, Stubbs and m a n y others. T h e ideals o f G othic dem o cracy and P ro testan t religion w ere also preserved in the U n ite d States, w h ere the e m ig ra tio n o f the early colonists and their later struggle w ith E n g land w ere o fte n presented as attem pts to m aintain intact the tru e G othic or A nglo -S ax o n elem ents against th e co rru p tin g influences o f E ng h sh ‘R o m a n ’ ty ra n n y .10 8 R. Molesworth, T h e P r in c ip le s o f a R e a l W h i g (London, 1775), p. 6. 9 P r o p o s a ls to E s ta b lis h a S o c ie ty f o r C o n s titu tio n a l I n fo r m a tio n (London, 1780), pp. 2-3; J. Cartwright, E n g la n d 's A l g i s (3rd ed., London, 1806), vol. i, p. xvii. In 1822 the editor of de Lolme’s T h e C o n s titu tio n o f E n g la n d (p. 8n.) felt it necessary to qualify his author’s view that the constitution was largely based on Norman institutions. 10 S. Kliger, T h e G o t h s in E n g la n d (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 101-4, 106-11, 114-15. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, was profoundly influenced by the Saxon myth, ibid., pp. n o - 11, Robbins, op. cit., pp. 3 6 3 4 ‫ ־‬.

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H o w ev er, at the same tim e th a t the em pirical doctrines w ere thus perpetuated, o th e r currents w ere at w o rk often alongside and en tw in ed w ith th em . T h e re was in som e quarters a definite decline in the b e lie f in history and experience as a basis for political generalization. H ere a rather different style o f political th o u g h t was em erging. T h e constitutional ideas w ere n o t necessarily v e ry different, at least at first, b u t the m anner o f a rg u m e n t was. A nd in tim e the p o tential fo r a deeper radicalism in h e re n t in this n o n historical approach grew m o re p ro n o u n ced and so contrasted w ith the m o re m oderate em pirical and traditionalist appeal. T h e factors assisting in the d ev elo p m en t o f this different, radical m ode o f political th in k in g w ill be v ery briefly ex am ined in a m o m en t. This, ho w ev er, is a convenient p o in t to observe w h a t hap p en ed to the less ex trem e em pirical tra d itio n w h en faced w ith this challenge, a reaction exem plified b y E d m u n d B urke w h o , in fact, d rew on b o th the schools o f th o u g h t w h ich have been ex am ined here. B u rk e was, first o f all, a g o o d exam ple o f th e continuance o f som e o f the them es o f order in their later, m o re atten u ated fo rm . H e explicitly referred to ‘the order o f the universe’ and to the ‘g reat p rim ev al co n tract o f eternal society’ w h ich h arm o n io u sly linked all beings, h olding th e m ‘in their ap p o in ted place’ in the n atu ral and social hierarchy. This w as all p a rt o f G o d ’s suprem e plan o r ‘divine tactic’, so th a t m en w ere n o t equal o r free agents b u t h ad to act the p a rt assigned to th e m in ‘the predisposed o rd er o f th ings’. In this sense, obedience to the established authorities was a religious d u ty as w ell as th e course o f p ru d en ce and expediency. It follow ed th a t to m eddle w ith the existing state o f things was blasphem ous and im m o ra l as w ell as perilous, leading to sin as w ell as to disorder. It was o n ly to o likely to b rin g a b o u t first, an arch y and atheism , and then the rule o f an am bitious d em ag o g u e or m ilitary adv en tu rer, and thus a slavery far w orse than th e traditional dependence. H e th o u g h t th a t m en w ere liable to stray in this w ay because th ey w ere fallen creatures, the defects o f th eir n atu re being reflected, in particular, in the excessive p o w e r o f their w ill and appetite and in their p resu m p tu o u s v an ity a b o u t th e efficacy o f th eir reason. B u rk e accepted also th a t th ere w as a sim ilarity b etw een the o rd er o f the w o rld as a w h o le and th a t o f 26 6

Conclusion: Rationalism in Politics

society, and it was n o d o u b t in its technical sense th a t he used the w o rd ‘correspondence’: ‘O u r political system is placed in a ju st correspondence and sy m m etry w ith the o rd er o f the w o rld [and] b y p reserving the m eth o d o f n atu re in the co n d u ct o f the state . . . w e are guided . . . b y the spirit o f philosophic analogy. . . H u m a n reason could thus be fortified and restrained fro m e rro r i f m a n ’s artificial institutions w ere m ade to co n fo rm to u n errin g n atu re.11 Y et B u rk e ’s constitutional view s w ere n o t those o f the political theorist o f o rd er b u t o f a W h ig : he defended n o t absolute m o n arch y b u t that balance o f m ix ed institutions w ith w h ich h isto ry h ad en d o w ed his co u n try . H e specifically referred to ‘th at ancient constitution o f g o v e rn m e n t w h ich is o u r o n ly security for law and lib e rty ’ and the spirit o f w hich was o n ly to be discerned b y lo o k in g ‘in o u r histories, in o u r records, in o u r acts and jo u rn a ls o f p arlia m e n t’, b y proceeding, th a t is, u p o n ‘the principle o f reference to a n tiq u ity ’.1112 In som e m an n er, therefore, B u rk e added to certain aspects o f the idea o f ord er, elem ents once w id ely th o u g h t incom patible w ith th em . W h a t happened, I th in k , was th a t as the general cogency o f the philosoph y and political th eo ry o f o rd er declined, those w h o m ay be called n atu ral royalists o r au th o ritarian conservatives w ere, tem p o ra rily , w ith o u t an acceptable and persuasive ideology. B ut, being tem p eram en tally disposed to accept th e status quo, as tim e w e n t b y th ey w ere reconciled to the m ixed constitutional system . T h e y cam e to invest it w ith all the sanctity previously a ttrib u ted to absolute m o n arch y and dem anded th a t it should n o t be altered o r o v ertu rn ed . T h ereb y , th ey fo u n d them selves allied w ith a p o in t o f v iew th ey w o u ld previously have rejected. T hus, b y B u rk e ’s tim e it was n o t so difficult to associate o rd er and d iv in ity w ith established institutions. This u n io n was m ade easier by the fact th a t the em piricist, fo r all th a t in the seventeenth cen tu ry he was o f the p arliam en tary and 11 Burke, T h e W o r k s (World’s Classics ed., Oxford, 1906-7), iv.36-37, 38, 53, 75, 106-7, v. 9 3 9 4 ‫ ־‬. 12 Ibid., iv.33-34. Cf. the passages which follow on Magna Carta and the Petition and Declaration o f Right which Burke saw as embodying and reaffirming the ancient laws and liberties o f the kingdom, ibid., iv.34-35. See also, among many similar references to prescriptive institutions etc., ibid., ii.188, iii.2 8 3 4 ‫ ־‬, iv.63, 136 and vi.157.

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therefore o f the rev o lu tio n ary p arty , w as alw ays in an im p o rta n t sense a conservative him self. It was the ancient and traditional co n stitution to w hich he gave his allegiance and w h ich he w ished to sec restored. O n ce this had been done he was prepared to d o u b t w h eth er any im p ro v e m e n t o f the political system w as possible. Like D ry d e n ’s ‘honest m a n ’ (w ho, w ith the c o m m o n law yers and m an y P arliam en t-m en o f the seventeenth cen tu ry , anticipated in a rem arkable w ay the sentim ents w e associate w ith B u rk e) he felt he o u g h t to be co n ten ted w ith ‘th a t fo rm o f g o v e rn m e n t, and w ith those fundam ental constitutions o f it, w h ic h he received fro m his ancestors, and u n d er w h ic h h im se lf w as b o m .’13 M o reo v er, the em piricist h ad n ev er been a radical in eco n o m ic o r social m atters. So w h e n he fo u n d h im se lf co n fro n te d w ith a d o ctrin e based on the th e o ry o f p o p u la r so v ereig n ty an d n atu ral rights and envisaging n o t o n ly the re fo rm o f th e tra d itio n al co n stitu tio n b u t also the stru ctu re o f society itself, he easily assum ed the m an tle o f conservatism . S o m ew h at in this w ay, th en , th e n atu ral ex p o n en ts o f stability and o rd e r assim ilated them selves to the chan g ed co n d itio n s o f the eig h teen th ce n tu ry an d to the su rv iv in g em p irical tra d itio n . T h e n , b o th sto o d in o p p o sitio n to the real rev o lu tio n aries o f the day. W h a t w as th e n a tu re o f these re v o lu tio n a ry view s, h o w d id th e y differ fro m th e o rd e r and em pirical theories, and, in p a rticular, w h a t w ere the factors differentiating th e m fro m th e latter, th a t is, the m a jo r radical school o f th e sev en teen th cen tu ry ? In these co n clu d in g rem ark s o n ly a b r ie f s u m m a ry can be a tte m p te d , b u t a m o n g the relev an t considerations arc th e fo llo w in g . 13 E s s a y s o f J o h n D r y d e n , ed. Ker (Oxford, 1926), ii.171. In a most important article, Dr J. G. A. Pocock has conclusively shown that Burke’s traditionalism was linked with the common-law mode o f thought o f the seventeenth century and was reflected, for instance, in the writings o f Coke and Hale: see ‘Burke and the Ancient Constitution— A Problem in the History o f Tdeas\ T h e H is to r ic a l J o u r n a l , iii (i960), pp. 124-43. Or Pocock discussed briefly the organic conceptions present in Burke’s thought (ibid., pp. 130-1) but did not attribute to them the authority they undoubtedly had from being part o f the order tradition o f ideas, at one time independent o f the common law ‘cult o f the ancient constitution’. Consequently his attempt to assimilate these conceptions to that ‘cult’ was weakened by this omission. The affinity of Burke’s anti-rationalism and conservatism to the views o f Sir Matthew Hale (who typified the historical school o f law in the seventeenth century) had previously been noticed by W . S. Holdsworth, A H i s t o r y o f E n g li s h L a w (London, 1903ÍF.), v. 502, 504, 512.

26 8

Conclusion: Rationalism in Politics

D u rin g th e seventeenth ce n tu ry th e em piricist h ad u rg ed , against the royalist, th a t n o t th e k in g b u t the k in g in P arliam en t h eld the suprem e p o w e r, th a t u n d e r the ancient c o n stitu tio n and th e fu ndam ental law o f the realm , a u th o rity w as shared an d n o t co n cen trated in th e hands o f any one o rg a n o f the state. T his he d em o n strated b y reference to histo ry an d experience. B u t u n d er the stress o f political co n tro v ersy and th en o f w ar, th e case p u t fo rw ard b y the anti-royalists freq u en tly ten d ed to b eco m e m o re extrem e, cu lm in atin g in th e claim th a t P arliam en t alone an d th en th e elected ch am b er b y itself, o r even a p a rt o f it, should w ield th e sovereign p o w e r. W ith this tre n d th ere w as som etim es associated a yet m o re radical d em an d fo r th e reco g n itio n o f p o p u lar rights and the representation o f th e w ill o f th e people as a w h o le, w ith the im plication th a t people an d P arliam en t w ere n o t necessarily the same. F or no n e o f these m o re ex trem e claim s— for p arlia m e n ta ry sovereignty, for rule b y th e C o m m o n s H ouse, for p o p u lar d em ocracy o f som e k in d —n o r fo r th e existence o f the co n tract o n w h ich these claim s often rested, w as th ere an y historical w a rra n t w hatsoever; and th e royalist historians, as w ell as th e m o re conservative a m o n g th e em piricists, h a d little difficu lty in d em o n stratin g this. T h e result w as th a t as the dem ands o f the m o re radical forces ‘o u tra n p reced en t’ th e y fo u n d th a t it w as ex p ed ient to refer n o t to the usual h isto rico -em p irical categories at all, b u t to abstract general principles. T h e m o re ex trem e and rev o lu tio n ary the political p la tfo rm ado p ted , the m o re this becam e clear, as was illustrated, in p articu lar, b y th e chan g in g position o f the Levellers, b y th e d ev elo p m en t o f L ilb u rn e’s th o u g h t for instance. As he m o v ed o u t o f his early b e lie fin passive obedience, he began to appeal in the usual w a y to Saxon liberties, M ag n a C arta, old statutes and so forth, and th en , as he felt the constricting stren g th o f a p arlia m e n ta ry p o w e r based o n tra d itio n , he in v o k ed m o re and m o re the non-historical n o tio n o f the n atu ral rig h ts in h eren t in the people as a w hole. H o w e v e r, so strong w as the c o n te m p o ra ry pressure to find historical backing for political action and ideas th a t these e x tre m e r radicals first o f all p ro d u ced th eir o w n version o f E nglish h istory, o n e th a t w as b o th anti-royalist and an ti-p arliam en tary . It centred 26 9

Order, Empiricism and Politics

o n ‘a n ti-N o rm a n ism ’, specifically on w h a t was o ften called the ‘N o rm a n Y o k e’. In contrast w ith the usual em pirical v iew ab o u t th e continuation and confirm ation o f the G othic tra d itio n , the C o n q u est w as seen as a vital break w ith the Saxon past and as elim inating th e old liberties and free institutions b y the im position o f a hated feudal ty ra n n y o f king, barons and landlords. M agna C arta, regarded b y th e P arliam entarians as alm ost sacred, was held to represent o n ly m in o r concessions and these n o t to the people at large. T h e v au n ted C o m m o n L aw and its courts, even the ancient P arliam ent itself (at least as it w as th en constituted), w ere n o t th e guarantees o f the rights and liberties o f all E nglishm en, b u t rather, in Leveller opinion, th e instrum ents o f a despotism b y m eans o f w h ich the descendants o f ‘bastard W illia m and his b a n d itti’ k ep t co n tro l o f an exploited and oppressed populace. A n appeal to the E nglish past h ad o n ly led to the ty ra n n y o f a king being replaced b y the despotism o f a P arliam ent d o m in ated b y P resbyterianism in religion and socially b y th e m o re w ealth y classes. This was n a tu ra lly n o t congenial to th e sectaries o r to the ‘po o rest h e ’ for w h o m C olonel R ain b o ro u g h spoke. It w as in this m an n er, th erefore, th at the radical independents realized in due course th at the usual appeals to G othic h istory, to th e ancient co n stitu tio n and to th e precedents o f custom ary law w ere n o t ap p ro p riate evidence in th e case for p o p u lar rights and sovereignty. As W ild m a n said, th e chronicles rep o rted o n ly w h a t was in th e interests o f th e lo rd s.141So the appeal w as sw itched fro m the past to the future, fro m an attem p t to recover rights th at used to exist to th e pursuit o f rights th at o u g h t to be recognized; th at is to say, to the d o ctrin e o f n atu ral rights justified b y and derived fro m the law s o f n atu re and o f n a tu re ’s G od. Reason n o t facts ab o u t the past, G o d ’s w o rd in th e Scriptures n o t historical precedent, w ere the really radical criteria. T h e opening passage o f R ichard O v e rto n ’s An Appeale, From the Degenerate Representative Body o f the Commons (1647) was a g o o d instance o f this change fro m one k in d o f a u th o rity to an o th er: ‘It is confessed, that o u r English Histories and Records14 * 14 A. S. P. Woodhouse (cd.), P u r ita n is m a n d L i b e r t y (London, 1951), pp. 65-66 (second pagination). The best accounts o f ‘anti-Normanism’ are in Kliger, op. cit., App. B, and in C. Hill, P u r ita n is m a n d R e v o lu tio n (London, 1958), ch. iii.

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Conclusion: Rationalism in Politics

o f the Actions and Transactions o f o u r Predecessours, b o th o f antient and late tim es, . . . do n o t afford m e any exam ple o r president for any appeale fro m Parliam ents to people, n eith er is there any such lib erty p ro v id e d in th e Letter o f o u r law . . . . ’ H e w ill appeal instead, he w e n t on, to reason, w h ich ‘ is the fountaine o f all just presidents . . . th erefore w h ere th at is, there is a sufficient and justifiable presid en t.’ U p o n this principle o f ‘right Reason , all ju st law s and g overnm ents w ere established.15 This change o f em phasis and its im p o rt w ere seen at th e tim e, as em erged clearly d u rin g th e P u tn ey D ebates o v er th e franchise. In the course o f these discussions, Ireton, taking his stand o n the historic co n stitu tio n o f th e realm , to ld R a in b o ro u g h th at th e n a tu re o f the la tte r’s a rg u m en t was such th at he w o u ld have to ‘fly for refuge to an absolute n atural rig h t’ and to ‘den y all civil rig h t’ especially th a t o f p ro p e rty . It w as noticed, to o , b y T h o m as E dw ards, th e P resbyterian o p p o n e n t o f the Levellers an d sectaries, w h o w ro te o f th e m in Gangraena (1645-6) th at As they do in matters o f religion and conscience fly from the scriptures, and from supernaturall truths revealed there, that a m an may not be questioned for going against them, but only for errors against the light o f nature and right reason; so they do also in civill governm ent and things o f this world, they go from the lawes and constitutions o f kingdoms, and will be governed by rules according to nature and right reason; and though the lawes and customes o f a kingdom e be never so plain and cleer against their wayes, yet they will not submit, but cry out for naturali rights derived from Adam and right reason.16 E ven allow ing for E d w ard s’s polem ical ex ag g eratio n he here h it o n one o f the central features o f radical political th o u g h t. As M r C h risto p h er H ill p u t it, the n atu re o f the a rg u m en t was being altered ‘fro m historical m y th o lo g y to political p h ilo so p h y ’.17 T his 16 Cited from D. M. Wolfe (ed.), L e v e lle r M a n ife s to e s o f th e P u r ita n R e v o l u t io n (London, 1944), pp. 157-9. Cf. Overton’s A R e m o n s tr a n c e o f M a n y T h o u s a n d C i t i z e n s (1646) in W . Haller (ed.), T r a c ts o n L i b e r t y in th e P u r ita n R e v o lu tio n (New York, 1933-4), iii.354-5. 16 Woodhouse, op. cit., pp. 52-58 (second pagination) and p a s s i m . The passage from Edward’s G a n g r a e n a is in Part iii, p. 20, and is quoted from Firth’s introduction to T h e C la r k e P a p e r s (Camden Society, N.S. no. xlix, London, 1891), p. lx. 17 Hill, op. cit., p. 75. 27I

Order, Empiricism and Politics

exceedingly im p o rta n t transition was n o t to o difficult to m ake because o f the practice w h ich h ad g ro w n up o f eq u atin g th e c o m m o n o r fundam ental law w ith the law o f G o d an d o f reason.18 In a sense it was o n ly logical to appeal direct to the h ig h er categories. T h e basic difference b etw een these tw o approaches— th e e m pirical and the rationalist— did n o t em erge at once, except, as I have indicated, in the case o f the m o re extrem e radicals. So for qu ite a tim e, th e historical and rational appeals could be fo u n d linked to g eth er. T his was so w ith the w ritin g s o f the W h ig theorists d u rin g the crises o f the late 1670’s and the 1680’s,19 and w ith m u ch o f the w o rk o f th e so-called c o m m o n w e a lth m e n o f the eig h teen th cen tu ry . B u t as the rationalist sentim ents o f that p erio d becam e m o re p ro n o u n c e d th e em phasis becam e less e m pirical. T rad itio n al constitutionalism based on h isto ry was being replaced b y references to n atu ral law fou n d ed on reason. T his transition was observable in a m ost rem ark ab le w a y d u rin g the crisis in A m erica in th e th ird q u arter o f the cen tu ry . A t the N e w Y o rk co n v en tio n in 1765 the appeal was to the u n d o u b te d rights o f E nglishm en; in 1774 the D eclaratio n o f R ights o f the P h iladelphia C ongress in v o k ed n o t o n ly the cu sto m ary principles o f the E nglish co n stitu tio n b u t also the im m u tab le law s o f n atu re; tw o years later in th e D eclaration o f Independence the appeal to tra d itio n h ad given w ay com p letely to self-evident tru th s and unalienable rig h ts.20 T hus u n d er pressure o f events did m en in a h u rry sw itch their case fro m w h a t Paine called ‘m u sty records and m o u ld y p arch m en ts’ to a claim for the rights en graved in the hearts o f every living citizen.21 M o reo v er, as th e n atu re o f the arg u m e n t becam e m o re abstract, there was an associated ten d en cy 18 e.g. Christopher St German wrote in A D ia lo g u e b e t w i x t a D o c to r o f D i v i n i t y a n d a S tu d e n t in th e L a w s o f E n g la n d (1530) that ‘The law of man . . . is derived by reason as a thing which is . . . following of the law o f reason and of the law of God* (cap. 4), cited from G. R. Elton (ed.), T h e T ttd o r C o n s titu tio n : D o c u m e n ts a n d C o m m e n ta r y (Cambridge, i960), p. 237. 19 There is a most interesting account o f the conflict between the implications of the historical and rational arguments used by the Whigs during the Exclusion crisis in 13. Behrens, ‘The Whig Theory o f the Constitution in the Reign of Charles IE, T h e C a m b r id g e H is to r ic a l J o u r n a l, vii (1941-3), esp. pp. 45, 50, 61, 64-67. 20 D. G. Ritchie, N a t u r a l R ig h t s (London, 1924), pp. 10-11. 21 T. Paine, R ig h t s o f M a n , cd. Bonner (London, 1944), p. 8.

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to fo rw ard the claim s n o t o f m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t b u t o f sim ple d em o cracy based o n free election and universal suffrage. O n ly this m o re advanced system was co m patible w ith ‘th e rational c o n te m p latio n o f the rights o f m a n ’.22 This w as p articu larly tru e o f those w h o th o u g h t that the principles o f 1688 w ere still in co m p letely em b o d ied in the arrangem ents o f the E nglish c o n stitu tio n and w h o held th at, specifically, a refo rm o f P arliam en t and a substantial fu rth e r m easure o f religious to lera tio n w ere req u ired . Such tendencies n atu rally received considerable im petus fro m the success o f the A m erican an d French revolutions in each o f w h ich the m ain appeal finally cam e to rest o n abstract an d n o t ancient rights and liberties. It was reliance o n this so rt o f case w h ich called fo rth the p o w e rfu l traditionalism o f B u rk e ’s Reflections. In this change there w ere at w o rk , o f course, factors o th e r th an practical exigency. A n o th er reason for the sw itch o f em phasis was in h eren t in the em pirical tra d itio n itself. T h e system o f m ix ed g o v e rn m e n t was supposed to be em bodied in the ancient G othic co n stitu tio n b u t was also said to be fo u n d elsew here, in V enice, rep u b lican R o m e and so on. A n d such a w ide range o f evidence could be tak en to im p ly th a t the system was n o t so m eth in g u n iq u ely E nglish o r G othic or classical b u t rath er a feature fo unded o n n atu re itself. A passage in one o f S w ift’s w o rk s, w ritte n at the v ery beg in n in g o f the eig h teen th ce n tu ry w h e n he still h ad W h ig sym pathies, indicated the alteratio n th a t w as u n d er w ay. A ‘m ix t G o v e rn m e n t’, he w ro te , w h ich partakes ‘o f the k n o w n Form s received in the Schools, is, b y n o M eans, o f Gothick In v en tio n , b u t h ath Place in N a tu re and Reason. . . .’23 A fu rth er factor, w h ich was alm ost certainly n o t w ith o u t result, was the effect o f P y rrh o n ia n scepticism a b o u t the reliability o f h isto ry as a basis for political generalization. N o t even all the historians h ad shared the view th at their subject had great didactic im p o rtance, and m a n y o f those th at did tend ed to u n d erm in e the reliability o f their precepts b y giving m o re o r less w e ig h t to accident, fortm ie o r som e sim ilar im ponderab le, or b y p o in tin g 22 Ibid., p. 12. 23 Swift, T h e P ro se W o r k s , ed. Davis (Oxford, 1939ff.), i.199. The instances Swift used were almost entirely classical.

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o u t the difficulties w hich arose because historical circum stances n ever recurred in exactly the same fo rm . In this co u n try , these do u b ts w ere influentially expressed b y B o lin g b ro k e w h o , alth o u g h he explained in the usual w a y th e value o f h isto ry and experience as a basis for the im p ro v e m e n t o f public an d private v irtu e and for the d eterm in atio n o f the principles o f a general system o f ethics and politics, nonetheless arg u ed th a t v ery great care w as necessary in the application o f historical exam ples and precepts. In particular, he suggested that those derived fro m ancient history w h e th e r sacred o r profane had to be used v ery carefully indeed. H e w e n t so far as to express ‘a th o ro u g h co n te m p t’ for m uch historical and antiquarian research.24 N aturally, w o rk o f this k in d continued to be u n d ertak en , b u t it seems th at betw een 1730 and 1800 there was a failure to m ake any advance in m edieval and antiquarian scholarship com parable to th at o f the previous seventy years.25 Thus, the ro o ts fro m w h ich the em pirical tree w as nourished w ere w ith erin g aw ay. O n e reason was th a t the books o f th e antiquarians, stuffed w ith dull and le n g th y extracts fro m old docum ents and m edieval chronicles, m ade few concessions as to style and so fell short o f the literary requirem ents o f the tim e. B u t m o re th an this, th e o p in io n was gaining g ro u n d th at h isto ry depended o n records and authorities th at w ere on ly to o often inappropriate, m isleading o r w ro n g . O n ce it w as appreciated that each p erio d o f h isto ry had its o w n ethos in term s o f w h ich alone it could be u n d ersto o d — that, fo r instance, the laws and constitution o f Saxon or N o rm a n E n g lan d w ere quite different fro m those o f the eighteenth cen tu ry — then it w as realized th at a rg u m e n t fro m the past to the present was n eith er so easy n o r so useful as h ad been supposed. A n d because h isto ry o n ly described the past it said n o th in g really reliable ab o u t w h a t w o u ld be and, m o re im p o rtan tly , n o th in g ab o u t w h a t o u g h t to be. As H obbes w ro te in Behemoth, presciently anticipating the characteristic view o f the E n lig h ten m en t, ‘for th e records, seeing th ey are o f things done only, som etim es justly, som etim es unjustly, 24 See, e.g., Bolingbroke, T h e W o r k s (London, 1754), ii.287-90, 31S-19, 359-61. 25 E. N. Adams, O l d E n g lis h S c h o la r s h ip in E n g la n d f r o m 1 3 6 6 - 1 6 0 0 (New Haven, 1917), pp. 85, 104, 107-8; D. C. Douglas, E n g lis h S c h o la r s 1 6 6 0 - 1 7 3 0 (2nded., London, 1951), pp. 27-28 and ch. xiii p a s s im .

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y o u can never by th e m k n o w w h a t rig h t th ey had, b u t only w h at rig h t they p re te n d e d .’ F ro m histories, he added, it was possible o n ly to derive ‘exam ples o f fact’ and n o t ‘any a rg u m e n t o f rig h t’.26 In such term s as these, the study o f history w as held to be o f a rath er inferior o rd er and n o t to be com pared w ith m o re exact and rew ard in g form s o f speculation. It was n o t so m uch th at the characteristic p hilosophy o f the eighteenth cen tu ry was, in practice, w h o lly unhistorical (for it co ntinued to use th e past as a storehouse o f exam ples to illustrate its ideas) b u t th a t it did n o t p reten d to derive its basic conceptions and criteria fro m h isto ry or, indeed, any o th er em pirical evidence. In a w o rd it was rationalistic. T ru th was a m atter o f abstract ratiocination n o t o f historical learning o r even o f w id e experience: the appeal to the in n er lig h t o f reason m ade all o th er data secondary i f n o t red u n d an t. T h e com plete rationalist regards every th in g in th e m irro r o f ‘polished reason’ (as B cn th am called it) and view s sceptically any practice o r in stitu tio n th at can n o t be justified on p u rely ratio n al gro u n ds. H e w ill have, therefore, little or n o feeling for the com plexities o f g ro w th and develo p m en t and the differences b etw een m en and societies. F or reason is said to rise above circum stances to abstract, u n ifo rm rules. T h e rationalist is p ro n e, then, to question and perhaps despise the inh eritan ce o f the past and the slow ‘cu m u latio n o f experience’. These are likely to seem an irrelevance, a h indrance to freedom , som eth in g to be shrugged off. E xperience m ay co m e to be view ed n o t as the basis o f tru th b u t as a source o f erro r, a drag o n th e d ev elo p m en t o f ratio n al u n derstanding. P olitically V oltaire p u t th e im plications succinctly: ‘the only w ay to have g o o d laws is to b u rn all existing laws and to start afresh’.27 O r, in the E nglish radical tra d itio n , as expressed b y Shakespeare’s C ade: ‘A w ay ! b u rn all the records o f the realm : m y m o u th shall be the parliam ent o f E n g la n d .’28 26Hobbes, T h e E n g lis h W o r k s , ed. Molesworth (London, 1839-4$), vi.258-9. Significantly this opinion was expressed in the context o f a discussion of the Saxon origin of English government, a topic described not only as ‘an useless digression’ but as showing in any case that the authority of the king was basic, a wholly unusual view, ibid., vi.259-62. On the inadequacy o f political reasoning from precedents see also Paine, op. cit., pp. 171-3• 27 Quoted by M. Oakeshott, R a tio n a lis m in P o litic s a n d O t h e r E s s a y s (London, 1962), p. 5. 28 2 H e n . V I , IV.vii. 16-17.

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T h e rationalist style o f th o u g h t m ay, so m ew h at paradoxically perhaps, be traced in p a rt to developm en ts in th eo lo g y . T h e P ro testan t R efo rm atio n replaced the a u th o rity o f the C h u rc h b y th a t o f the B ible. B u t it becam e o n ly to o app aren t, at least to the m o re discerning R eform ers, th a t discovering the m eaning o f the Scriptures w as n o t the sim ple business th a t m an y h ad enthusiastically assum ed it w o u ld be. So m an y texts w ere in co m p lete o r c o rru p t, th e y appeared often to conflict, th e ir sense m ig h t be obscure and, indeed, various levels o f m eaning co u ld freq u en tly be fo u nd. A criterion p ro b le m arose therefore; an d the standard in v ariably in v o k ed by the P ro testan t for its solution w as th e in n er lig h t o f conscience and reason, w h a t C h ilh n g w o rth called th e ‘c o m m o n notions w ritte n b y G o d in the hearts o f all m e n ’. As W h ich co te said, ‘C lear principles o f tru th and lig h t’ w ere affirm ed b y ‘the n atu ral reason’ and only th en co n firm ed o u t o f the Gospels. In com parison w ith the h ig h er, G o d -g iv en faculty o f reason, conscientiously applied, all else, in clu d in g the lessons o f S cripture and experience and the dictates o f trad itio n al au th o rity , becam e secondary.29 O n this attitu d e the rationalist philosophers o f the tim e set th eir seal. T h e y shared m any features o f th o u g h t w ith the em pirical tra d itio n b u t basically th eir view s w ere c o n trary to its tenets. W h ile th e em piricist acknow ledged the im p o rtan ce o f the rational faculty and had great faith in its ability to u nderstand the reality o f things, he nonetheless placed p rim a ry em phasis on th e need to base the process o f reasoning o n a solid foun d atio n o f experience. Reliable sense-data w ere the first req u irem en t o f his in d u ctiv e m eth o d . O n the o th er hand, the rationalist tended to stress the u n iq u e significance o f reason alone and to argue th a t the o th e r faculties o f m e m o ry and im ag in atio n , far fro m being o f assistance in the com prehension o f reality, presented obstacles to its achieve20 See, e.g., B. Willey, T h e S e v e n te e n th C e n tu r y B a c k g r o u n d (London, 1962), pp. 71-72; Sir L. Stephen, H is to r y o f E n g lis h T h o u g h t in th e E ig h te e n th C e n tu r y (3rd ed., New York, 1949), i.76-79. The religious appeal to reason and conscience, to private judgement against authority, was coupled with the demand for free enquiry and a belief in the priesthood of all believers. With this was associated, too, a democratic theory of church government. These themes had vital and radical political implications. Still the best short account is C. Borgeaud, T h e R is e o f M o d e r n D e m o c r a c y in O l d a n d N e w E n g la n d (London, 1894).

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m en t. In fo rm atio n derived fro m th e senses was, therefore, obscure, unreliable and m isleading, and it was on ly b y transcending experience to the h ig h e r level o f reason th a t in d u b itab le c o n elusions could be reached. T his reason w as an in n ate faculty, an in n e r light, placed in every in d iv id u al by G od, w h ich g u aran teed its co m p atib ility w ith the reality o f His creation. It w as selfsufficient in th e sense th a t its intuitions alone p ro v id e d th e clear an d precise u n d erstanding characteristic o f an d basic to tru e k n o w ledge. Like th e em pirical reason, it analysed and resolved things in to basic ‘natu res’; h o w e v e r, these w ere n o t m ere nam es (as th ey w ere to th e em piricist) b u t real, absolute ideas. A n d the ideal m e th o d o f u nderstanding was th a t o f m athem atics because its conclusions w ere sure and unsullied b y reference to fallible experience. D escartes’ vision o f a ‘universal m ath em atical science’ was th e p ro to ty p e o f such p a n to m e tric notions. T h e characteristic ethical and political p h ilo so p h y o f th e ra tio n alists was o f the sam e o rd er as th e ir epistem ology and m etaphysics. It tried to slough o ff the incubus o f experience and o f th e past, and to educe b y p u re reason certain and absolute rules o f conduct. These w ere applicable ev ery w h ere and to everyone, because all m en could u nderstand th e m b y th e lig h t o f the n atu ral reason w h ich they possessed in c o m m o n . D escartes was o ne o f the m o st im p o rta n t representatives o f all these view s. H e criticized th e sceptics’ attacks o n reason and reasserted its claim to be the o n ly source o f real and certain k n o w ledge. H e distinguished it fro m th e c o rru p tin g influence o f th e im ag in atio n and contrasted th e n a tu re o f its conclusions w id i those based on experience. In p articular, he d o u b ted th a t a k n o w ledge o f th e past was a reliable guide to the present o r fu tu re and held, in effect, th a t it was n o t a fit subject for th e serious p h ilo sopher. Such a th in k e r should tu rn fro m all external a u th o rity to the clear and distinct ideas o f universal tru th fo u n d o u t b y the ‘in b o rn lig h t’ o f plain reason.30 Sim ilarly, H ob b es (despite th e stress he early laid on th e study o f h istory , for instance in the in tro d u c tio n to his translation o f T hucydides), held th a t m ere 30

T h e P h ilo s o p h ic a l W o r k s o f D e s c a r te s ,

tr. Haldane and Ross (Cambridge, 1911), i.44,

84-85, 105-6.

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historically based ‘P ru d en ce’ was an inferio r and insufficient fo u n d ation for th e study o f m an and politics w h ich should be based instead on ‘th e rules and infallibility o f reason’ itself, the reasoning process being analogous to geom etrical d em o n stratio n . ‘E xperience concludeth n o th in g universally’, w hereas rig h t reason o r p h ilo so p h y co u ld .31 It is, h o w ev er, to L ocke th at o n e m u st tu rn for th e m ajor em b o d im en t o f this rationalistic trend, at least so far as its effect o n E nglish political th o u g h t was concerned. T h o u g h to his influence in this respect there m u st be ad ded th at o f sim ilar w riters like H e n ry P arker, o f th e n ativ e Leveller, n atu ral rights tradition, and o f the co ntinental exponents o f political rationalism . T a k in g L ocke’s w o rk s as a w h o le there are m an y elem ents w h ich could be called em pirical. T h e re is his em phasis o n the p rim ac y o f experience, and his recog n itio n th at th e scope o f m a n ’s faculties was n o t unlim ited. W ith this m ust be associated his rejection o f innate ideas, to g e th e r w ith his n o m inalistic u n d e rstanding o f the dangers o f th e m etaphysical abuse o f w o rd s. H e said at the v e ry beg in n in g o f th e Essay th a t he w as d eterm in e d to consider th e h u m a n m in d in term s o f an ‘historical, p lain m e th o d ’. In ev itably he w as led to discuss the w id e v ariatio n to be observed in m e n ’s m o ra l view s. Indeed, h e ad o p ted a p o sitio n th a t w as at tim es close to a com p lete ethical relativism and th at w as o p en ly hedonistic. A n d there are passages fro m his pen, b o th in his p u b lished w o rk s and his jo u rn als, w h ich show he th o u g h t th at political m atters, as w ell as those affecting th e co n d u ct o f a m a n ’s p riv a te affairs, did n o t a d m it o f certain ty b u t o n ly o f a v ary in g degree o f ‘p ro b ab ility g ro u n d e d u p o n exp erience’ o f h isto ry and m a tte r o f fact.32 A t th e sam e tim e th ere w as an em phasis, especially obvious in th e Two Treatises (th o u g h n o t o n ly there), o n a rath er different set o f concepts w hich w ere n o t easily co m p atib le w ith the 31 Hobbes, T h e E le m e n ts o f L a w , ed. Tunnies (Cambridge, 1928), pp. xvii,12; L e v i a t h a n , ed. Oakeshott (Oxford, n.d.), pp. 29-30. 32Joiirnal entry for 26 June 1681, in R. I. Aaron and J. Gibb, A n E a r l y D r a f t o f L o c k e 's E s s a y (Oxford, 1936), pp. 116-1S; A n E s s a y c o n c e r n in g H u m a n U n d e r s ta n d itig (Everyman ed., London, 1961), ii.250-2 (IV.xv.2-6), 255-9 (IV.xvi.5-11), 305-6 (IV.xx.15).

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em pirical aspects o f his th o u g h t. T hese o th e r ideas cen tred o n th e n o tio n o f a law o f n atu re com p risin g unequ iv o cal rules o f co n d u ct th at w ere rationally o r perhaps in tu itiv ely d eterm in ed . It is, to adapt L ocke’s o w n phrase, beside m y presen t p urpose to en ter here in to the particulars o f these various conceptions o r th eir o p p u g n an cy , save to n o te th a t it seems h ig h ly likely th a t h e h im se lf w as aw are o f th e ap p aren t incong ru ities.33 It could n o t be easy, for instance, to com bine th e assertion o f absolutely certain an d universally applicable standards o f v irtu e an d rig h t co n d u ct w ith scepticism ab o u t the adequacy o f the language in w h ich such rules m u st be expressed, o r a stress on the careful defin itio n o f term s w ith a co m p lete failure to analyse the m ean in g o f so fu n dam ental an idea as n atu ral law . Sim ilarly, th ere w as the p ro b lem th at the principles o f th a t law w ere n o t sh o w n to be c o m patible w ith m oral criteria dep en d en t o n the variable m a tte r o f assessing pleasure and pain. T h e realization o f such difficulties m ay be one reason w h y , in the Essay, L ocke said relatively little a b o u t ethical m atters and m ade h a rd ly any specific reference to n atu ral law at all, and w h y , for a lo n g tim e, he was u n w illin g to ack n o w ledge authorship o f the Two Treatises o f Government, th e positive a rg u m e n t o f w hich depended basically on the idea o f a universal, rational law o f n atu re. It w o u ld explain, to o , w h y he refused th e pressing invitation's o f his friends to publish his early essays on th e law o f n ature and so to answ er criticism s o f his failure to deal w ith the m oral law fully in the Essay. H e possibly appreciated th at the largely rationalistic defence o f the law o f nature w h ich th e early w orks contained w o u ld sort ill w ith th e d o m in a n t tre n d o f v iew expressed in his m ajor philosophical treatise. Philosophically, then, Locke m ay be said to have lived in div id ed and distinguished w orlds, and his ideas have h ad an am b iv alent effect on th e subsequent develo p m en t o f th o u g h t. His ep istem ology reinforced the em pirical trad itio n , w hile his political th e o ry gave a p o w erfu l im petus to the dev elo p m en t o f ratio n alism in politics. For w h e n the Two Treatises are seen standing, so m ew hat in isolation, the rationalism o f th eir m an n er is apparent. 33 See, e.g., the most recent discussion in Mr Laslett’s introduction to his edition of the T w o T r e a tis e s o f G o v e r n m e n t , pp. 66, 79-91.

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Locke was w ritin g political p ropaganda, a tra ct to aid Shaftesb u ry ’s cause, and so he was concerned by any possible m eans to answ er Film er, posth u m o u sly resurrected as the m ajo r defender o f the royalist case. H e did this p artly b y ig n o rin g m an y o f his o p p o n e n t’s m ain argum ents, such as those derived fro m the political th e o ry o f order and fro m constitutional h isto ry (th o u g h it is possible th a t th e m issing sections o f the Two Treatises dealt w ith these m atters); and p a rtly b y p u ttin g a detailed case o f his o w n . T h e latter project was n o t undertak en in the usual em pirical fashion, w hich was reflected, for instance, in th e w ritings o f N evile, A ttw o o d , M o lesw o rth and M oyle. T h e ir w o rk s w ere replete w ith references to th e ancient constitution, G othic liberties o r sim ilar historical traditions, and w ith the usual massive an tiquarian paraphernalia. B u t Locke em phasized alm ost exclusively o th er conceptions, m o re characteristic o f th e radical, levelling p arty : th at is, th e rational law o fn a tu re and n atu ral rights d eriv in g fro m and d ependent on that law . A nd the w ay in w h ich he w ro te, deliberately excluding fro m his survey a detailed consideration o f this vital criterio n,34 rested ev erything on the possession b y m an o f reason, and o n his understanding o f th e details o f the law o f n atu re by th e use o f this faculty.35 T h e reb y , as D r P ocock has so ap tly observed, Locke rem o v ed the w h o le co ntroversy ‘fro m th e plane o f h isto ry alto g eth er.’36 H e did n o t, o f course, im m ediately destroy th e legal-historical m an n er o f th in k in g . M o reo v er, it could be u rg ed th at in fact Locke always w ro te w ith E nglish experience and constitutional practice constantly in m ind, th at he prod u ced , say, ‘a brilliant ab rid g em en t o f the political habits o f E n g lish m en ’.37 B u t in the Two Treatises his political argum ents w ere n o t couched in the term s n o rm a lly used in that co n tex t o r ap p ro p riate to th e cm pirical trad itio n . F ro m tim e to tim e he said he w o u ld leave a 34 T w o T r e a tis e s o f G o v e r n m e n t , ed. cit., p. 293 (§12). 35 Ibid., pp. 233 (§101), 289 (§6), 293 (§12), 325-7 (§§60-3), 369 (§124), and compare the tract o f Overton’s referred to above, in Wolfe, op. cit., esp. pp. 159-63. 86 J. G. A. Pocock, T h e A n c i e n t C o n s titu tio n a n d th e F e u d a l L a w (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 235-6, 237, cf. ibid., p. 188 and T w o T r e a tis e s o f G o v e r n m e n t, ed. cit., intro., pp. 75‫ ־‬78♦ 871 take this phrase from Oakeshott, op. cit., p. 121.

28 0

Conclusion: Rationalism in Politics

particular issue to b e d eterm in e d b y ‘im partial h isto ry ’, and he occasionally used historical exam ples, in particu lar in the ch apter o n th e beg in n in g o f political societies. JBut these references w ere largely in v ery general term s. Locke said th a t th ere w ere exam ples fro m h isto ry and experience w h ich substantiated his case m o re often than he actually q u o ted any. In any event, the characteristic ten o r or style o f the Second Treatise was far different fro m th at o f the em pirical school. It w as n o t o n the g ro u n d th at w h a t h ad long been established m ust, therefore, be sustained, th at Locke defended his principles. Indeed he explicitly stated th at ‘the fo llo w in g o f C u sto m , w h en Reason has left i t ’ leads to ‘gross absurdities’, and m ade it quite clear that in his view n o t ‘o ld cu sto m ’ b u t ‘tru e reason’ should regulate the principles o f civil society. In an o th er place, at the same tim e th a t he ad m itted th at historical evidence m ig h t have a certain efficacy in deciding m atters o f political co n troversy, he nonetheless u rg ed th at ‘at best an A rg u m e n t fro m w h a t has been, to w h a t should o f rig h t be, has n o great force . . .’38 W h a t L ocke did, in effect, was to isolate the essence o f the em pirical case, or p a rt o f it, and present it as an abstract ideo lo g y based o n the principles o f reason. It was because o f this co m p atib ility o f objective, i f n o t o f a rg u m en t, that the L ockeian rationalist influence ran for so lo n g in ta n d e m w ith the em pirical. Y et the categories Locke em p lo y ed could be and w ere, eventually, used to sustain goals he w o u ld h im self p ro b ab ly n o t have countenanced; as w h en th ey w ere em p lo y ed to su p p o rt the claim s o f the u n p ro p ertied o r transferred to the A m erican and E u ro p ean scene and so (at least in the latter case) clearly severed fro m th eir native historical b ack g ro u n d and source. In a great intellectual achievem ent he perfected a technique o f political contro versy th at was to d o m in ate the m in d o f the m o d ern w o rld . B u t b y pro p ag atin g , th ro u g h his enorm ous influence, th e p o w erfu l appeal to n atu ral law an d rights based o n reason, he helped to shunt political discussion fro m the sceptical and em pirical to th e certain and rationalistic, a m o v e w h ich co n servatives and em pirical ‘W h ig s’ jo in e d hands to oppose. T h e y tre m b led w ith Ireton at ‘the boundless and endless consequences’ 38

T w o T r e a tis e s o f G o v e r n m e n t,

T

ed. cit., pp. 353-4 (§§103-5), 390-1 (§§157-8).

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o f this kind o f appeal and likewise wanted to know where it would all end.39 The present account may fitly be concluded by quoting Locke’s words about the theory o f divine-right monarchy and applying them to the rationalistic style o f thought about politics which his incomparable authority did so much to disseminate. ‘By w hom this Doctrine came at first to be broach’d, and brought in fashion amongst us, and what sad Effects it gave rise to, I leave to Historians to relate. . . .’4° I have tried here to tell o f the rise and fall o f ‘this Doctrine’ and o f the empirical school which opposed it; but the development o f the political theory o f rationalism is another matter which has yet to be fully considered. 30 Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 27 (second pagination). The Exclusionist Whigs, as their actions showed, ‘had a greater regard for custom than they had for “reason” ,, see Behrens, art. cit., p. 67. To this extent, then, Locke’s manner of argument was basically different from that of the party he supported at the time when the T w o T r e a tis e s were written. It may be that it was when some o f the Whigs were finally moved to action in 1688 that a decisive step in the replacement o f ‘history’ by ‘reason’ was taken. With the exception of 1641 there was no precedent for revolution (a factor which had possibly restrained the Whigs in 1679-81) and so the most expedient justification was to be sought not in history and custom but in abstract ideology. 40 T w o T r e a tis e s o f G o v e r n m e n t, ed. cit., p. 161 (§5).

282

APPEND IX H A R R IN G TO N ’S AGRARIAN

LAW

T h e Agrarian Law was a vital piece of constitutional machinery as Harrington always stressed. In one place, for instance, he called it ‘the main point and Basis of perpetuity unto the Common-wealth.1‫ י‬Nonetheless its provisions and application are not as clear as they might be and there has been some discussion as to its effectiveness and purpose.2 The central issues arc whether the Agrarian would in fact have maintained a balance of property appropriate to a popular commonwealth, and whether the way in which Harrington interpreted the Law was compatible with the principle that empire follows the balance of property. The nature of the problems which arise can be seen from the extreme case, which Harrington admitted to be theoretically possible under the Agrarian Law, that the land in Oceana could fall into the hands of only 5,000 men.3 Such a situation looks like oligarchy of some kind rather than a popular commonwealth and would also seem to be unstable: why should not the landed minority use its power to overthrow the Agrarian and the popular constitution, and why should everyone else tolerate a situation in which they were excluded from the ownership of land? Yet on Harrington’s terms these difficulties are only apparent. For he defined popular government to mean rule by 5,000 or more people, so that this extreme situation (which he thought most unlikely to occur in practice anyway) was consistent with a commonwealth. The objective of the Agrarian was simply to prevent all the laud falling into less than 5,000 hands, for this would indeed have made impossible a popular government as he understood it. In fact the reason why the

ed. Liljegren (Heidelberg, 1924), p. 218. (Hereafter referred to as O c e a n a .) 2 See, e.g., C. B. Macpherson, T h e P o litic a l T h e o r y o f P o s s e s s iv e I n d iv id u a lis m (Oxford, 1962), ch. iv, and also his discussion with J. F. H. N ew in P a s t a n d P r e s e n t , April 1963, pp. 75-85, and July 1963, pp. 94-95. Professor Macpherson is clearly correct when he argues that the Agrarian was not intended generally to abolish primogeniture. The terms o f the Law made no such wide provision (O c e a n a t pp. 85-86) and comments which seem to imply the contrary have, in fact, only a restricted reference when seen in context: e.g. the passage about primogeniture being *a f l i n t y C u s to m e ' (ibid., p. 94) occurred in a debate dealing with men with an income above the £2,000 per annum limit and for whom testamentary freedom was indeed restricted by the Law. 3 O c e a n a , p. 92. 1J a m e s H a r r in g to n s O cea n a ,

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specific income limit o f -£2,000 per year was fixed was that, given the prevailing rate of interest and the total income from land, this was the amount that prevented the number of freeholders from falling below the crucial level into what, by definition, would have been aristocracy or monarchy of some kind.4 In any case, even where a minority of 5,000 owned all the land the actual citizen body would be much larger. While in England ownership of land was vital because it was the most stable source of riches, other sources of wealth were available through tenant husbandry, trade, industry and colonial ventures, to which could be added official payments for public service. Harrington said that where industry was not obstructed the revenue of the people was at least twice that of those who held the whole territory in freehold.5 And as long as a man could live of his own in some way (that is, so long as he was not a servant or wage-earner or otherwise economically dependent) he was eligible to take part in the government of Oceana. It followed, therefore, that even where the 5,000 owned all the land they would not by themselves constitute the entire citizenry and in this way the basis o f the commonwealth would be wider and more stable than might appear at fust sight. However, this question of stability remains to be explored. Why should not either the landowners or the other citizens try to alter the Agrarian and the commonwealth in their own interest? The passages in which Harrington dealt with this question are in some respects not as precise as one would wish but an interpretation may be hazarded on the following lines. The 5,000 would accept the Agrarian because of a common interest in so doing: as they owned all the land one of them could only gain more than he had by getting it from another of the group; and so to abolish the Law would be for them ‘to agree to rob one another . Similarly they would not use their wealth either to bring in a king (because they would have to maintain him) or to exclude the other, landless citizens from their constitutional rights (because this would lead to the breakdown of the civil and military administration if not worse.)6 The position in respect of the attitude of the landless citizens was more complicated. They undoubtedly had greater numbers on their side and so could use force to achieve any change they wished in the 4 T h e O c e a n a O f J a m e s H a r r in g to n , E s q ; A n d H i s O th e r W o r k s (Dublin, 1737), pp. 265, 392, 4$7, 478-9 (hereafter referred to as W o r k s ) ; O c e a n a , p. 93. 5 W o r k s , pp. 243-8, 265, 290; cf. O c e a n a , p. 156, where Harrington estimated the revenue o f the nation to be three or four times greater than that o f ‘meer rent*. 6 O c e a n a , pp. 92-93, W o r k s , p. 261.

284

A ppendix

distribution of land or in the constitution. Yet the people would not resort to arms because it was not in their interest to do so. The profits they derived from industry were substantially greater than those to be derived from land, and, as the use of force would lead to unrest or civil war and as this would upset trade, they stood to lose more than they might gam from such a course. But they also had votes and a constitutional position of which they could take advantage to achieve their aim. Yet Harrington thought that the people would not exploit their position here either, though his explanation of the reasons for this is somewhat obscure. An obvious point—though he did not mention it— is that the landed minority might be supposed to be strongly represented in the Senate and unlikely to propose any change detrimental to its own interests. (It will be recalled that under the Oceanian constitution only the Senate could propose legislation while the popular assembly decided which senatorial suggestions should become law.) However, it would theoretically be possible for the Senate to be ‘packed’ with ‘Elders’ who, while not landowners, had the necessary income qualification enabling them to sit there. But even with the constitutional path to reform open in this fashion, the people would still not attempt to redistribute the land because there was no advantage to be gained for the commonwealth or guaranteed to any individual. The commonwealth was already a popular one and would stay in this state so long as no fewer than 5,000 hands held all the land; and this the Agrarian, as already constituted, would ensure. As to the interest of individuals the point here was that no profit would necessarily result from a change in the Agrarian. If all the land were confiscated and a complete redistribution undertaken among all freemen (of whom there were 1,000,000 in Oceana) it would produce for each of them an income of .£10 per annum. This alone would not be enough to keep a servant at work on the land (a labourer costing some £20 a year) so that the freeholder would be faced with the choice of either working the land himself or subsidizing its cultivation from the profits of his industry. In either case he would make a loss so that levelling the distribution of land in this fashion was not a project on which the people would embark: estates of some size and profitability were necessary for optimum productivity and general prosperity. Nor was it likely that a lesser, partial redistribution of the land would be undertaken because only some would gain and there would be no guarantee for any individual that it would be he who would do so. Moreover, any confiscatory legislation of this kind would be bound to weaken 285

Order, Empiricism and Politics

the general sanctity of property rights and no citizen, even a landless one, could have an interest in this. And, in addition, it was not as if a citizen could not aspire in the normal course of things to become a landowner. He might be able to buy land with the accrued profits of his thrift and industry; and the usual course of profligacy among the freeholders would naturally ensure that estates would from time to time be available for purchase, frugal fathers being for the most part sueceeded by lavish sons.7 There remains the other issue, whether, in the case of the 5,000, Harrington envisaged a separation between the disposition of the balance of property and military and political power. For instance, he wrote that this group which owned all the land could have no effective power to overthrow the commonwealth, even if they had an interest in doing so, ‘the People being equally possest of the Government, of the Arms, and far superior in number.’8 Now, he was quite definite that in England money could never outweigh the ownership of land in determining the balance, so whatever the wealth of the rest of the people they could never, if the principle of the balance was to hold, overcome the influence and power of the landowning group.9 Yet this is precisely what he seemed to say could happen, so that, as one commentator has put it, ‘Political power still depends on military power, but military power is now divorced from ownership of property.’101However, this difficulty may be smoothed away. The problem arises in part from an erroneous conception of the principle of the balance, from regarding it as a unique and absolute determinant o f the centre of political power at all times. Whereas, in fact, Harrington never looked at it in quite this fight. As we have seen, it was to him only one of the two main principles of government (the other concerned ‘authority’) and it did not, in any case, apply in respect o f ‘provincial’ power.11 And Harrington always conceded that, at least in the short term, its effects might be defied or held at bay either by force or by guile.12 Further, the balance itself could be affected, either altered or stabilized, by political and legal action. Moreover such action did not necessarily proceed from those who held the balance: 7 W o r k s , pp. 260, 264-5, O c e a n a , pp. 85, 155-6, 219. Cf. Professor Macpherson’s rather different remarks on some o f these passages, op. cit., pp. 1S7-S. 8 W o r k s , p. 261, cf. p. 470. 0 Ibid., pp. 245-7. 10 Macpherson, op. cit., p. 189; and cf. New in P a s t a n d P r e s e n t , loc. cit., pp. 78-79. 11 See pp. 238-9, 242-3 above. 12 O c c a m , pp. 15» 49‫ י‬W o r k s , pp. 248, 390.

28 6

Appendix

as when Henry VII and his successor were able by statute to undermine the balance then lying in the nobility and clergy.13 Indeed, in some passages, Harrington seemed to think of the state as constituting a power in its own right, for after a time the public wealth could grow so great as to become a danger to the balance of the commonwealth in private fortunes.14 There should be no occasion for surprise, therefore, that Harrington considered a situation in which power and influence could be exerted against the balance. Indeed, with respect in particular to the physical power of the people, he admitted that this had always been a constant feature of the political scene. For, wherever the balance of property lay, the people must always have had the greater force: there were more of them and it was always they who bore the arms in the military organization of the state whether as subjects, servants or citizens. This was so when the dominion of the nation was with an absolute monarch; when it was with the few, a mere 300 men, the nobility and clergy; and it was still so in a commonwealth where the 5,000 held the balance.15 So there was no new situation in the latter case at all: in the strictest sense the balance of arms always lay with the people whatever the nature of the property system. Thus, for Harrington, the question was simply one of explaining why the people did not use the physical power they always had; and this, as we have just seen, was because they had no interest in doing so and were content to accept the existing distribution of land. In any event, as Harrington himself pointed out, he was not writing with the hypothetical case of the 5,000 in mind. He almost certainly envisaged a much wider spread of land ownership among the one million citizens of Oceana.16 13 W o r k s , pp. 290-1, 389, O c e a n a , pp. 48-49. 14 O c e a n a , p. 219. 15 W o r k s , p. 264. Harrington also thought that the people had a vote under the gothic balance so that the constitutional method o f reform was also open to them then, ibid. 16 In at least two places Harrington mentioned a total o f 300,000 ‘Elders’ (that is, citizens over thirty years old who had the right to vote) and the same number of ‘Youths’ (citizens between the ages o f eighteen and thirty who served in the militia), O c e a n a , pp. 153, 181. The same figures may also be calculated from other information he gave about the various electoral processes. And he thought that after forty-one years the population would have increased by nearly a third, ibid., p. 221.

287

INDEX Aconcio, Giacomo (Acontius), 103 Adam, 148, 196 political power derived from, 7, 42, 47, 54, 82-87, 89-90 Agrarian law, Harrington’s, 246, 283-7 Alchemists, 154 Alciati, Andrea, 136 Alexander the Great, 176 Alfred, King, 192-3 Alienations, Statute o f (1489), 244 Allen, J. W. misjudges parliamentary political ideas, 7-8 misjudges royalist political ideas, 6, 58, 68, 71-72, 76 Analogy, se e Correspondence, argument by Ancient constitution, doctrine of a misunderstanding of, 7-8 used to limit royal power, 81, 121, 184-7, 269 invoked by moderate royalists, 121, 186 criticized by royalists, 121-4 and Gothicism, 188-94, 270, 273, 280 in Burke, 267-8; used by Ireton, 271 rejected by radicals, 268, 270 Ancients and modems, battle of, 10, 28-29, 109, 149-51 , 153, 201‫ ־‬2, 207‫ ־‬8 Andrewes, Lancelot, 216 Anglesey, Lord, 254 Anjou, Duke of, 125 A n s w e r to th e N i n e t e e n P r o p o s itio n s (1642), 121, 186 Anthropology and political thought, 148-9 , 175 ‫ ־‬6 Anti-Normanism, 269-70 Appeals, Act o f (1533), 1°5 Appian, n o-11 Aquinas, St Thomas, 15, 96, 181 Arabia, 177 Arimathea, Joseph of, 115 Aristotle, 29, 87, 98,136,165,172, 176, 180, 203, 208 A r t e s h isto r ic a e , the, 103-5 Arthur, King, legend of, 100 political importance, 84, 105, 115-17, 119-20, 192‫ ־‬3 Arthur, Prince o f Wales, 1 1 6 Athens, classical, 127, 203, 236 t•

Attwood, William, 142, 147 11.7, 187, 194, 280 Aubrey, John, 89 Augustine, St (Bishop of Hippo), 29, 33 Augustine, St (first Archbishop o f Canterbury), 115, 195 Avity, Pierre d’, 178, 219 Aylmer, John, 185 Bacon, Francis, 9, 12, 40, 163, 205, 234 fideism, 160, 161, 208 scepticism about reason, 162-3, 163-4, 208- 9 the 4Great Instauration’,207-12,215,216, 219; role of E s s a y s in, 223, 229 inductive method, 103, 166, 169, 207, 209- 11, 212-14; applied to man and society, 215¢ 222-3 natural history, 169, 170, 207, 211, 212, 213-15, 217, 218, 219 science of human nature and politics, 207, 215; based on experience, 216-17, 223- 4 psychology and moral philosophy, 220-5 ‘civil philosophy*, 225-31 civil history, 2 1 7 2 2 3 - 4 ,20‫־‬ comparative studies o f law and politics, 178, 227-30, 256 preference for mixed government, 230231 utilitarianism, 199, 201, 207, 217, 220, 224- 5 idea o f progress, 201-2; commercial expansion, 202-3; scientific development, 203-4, 206-7, 231 influence, 153, 155, 206, 231-2, 251-4 Balance o f property, se e Harrington, James Bale, John, 31 Ballot, 245 Barckley, Sir Richard, 27 Baronius, Caesar, 97 Baudouin, François, 136 Baxter, Richard, 196-7 Bédé, Jean, 53 Bedingfield, Thomas, 45 Bellarmine, R., 88 Bentham, Jeremy, 225, 228, 263, 275

289

Index Bible, use in political debate, 1-2, 42, 51, 52 n.73, 59, 61-62, 82-87, 89-90, 113, 189, 270 Birch, Thomas, 167, 215 B is h o p o f C a r lis le 's S p e e c h . . . c o n c e r n in g th e d e p o s in g o f P rin c e s (1679), 52 n.73 Blackstone, Sir William, 75 n.20, 264 Blundeville, Thomas, 103-4, 10136 ‫יצ‬ Board of Trade, 250 Bodin, Jean method o f discussion, 1 2 6 7 ‫ ;־‬ambivalent, 139-4‫־‬L 153 great chain o f being, 19-20, 127 number and proportion, 128, 140 political theory of order, 126, 127-30, 134-5 correspondences: family-body politic, 23, 128-9; body-body politic, 23, 128, 140; macrocosm-body politic, 45,128, 140 distinction between state and government, 131-2 forms o f government, 128-34, 138 mixed state impossible, 88, 130-1, 180 supremacy of monarchy, 45, 127-8, 129-30, 135 prefers ‘royal monarchy*, 132, 138-9 concept o f sovereignty, 61, 79, 127, 129 3 5 ‫ ; ־‬not contradictory, 132-5 social hierarchy, 53, 54, 127-8 disorder, 127-8 rebellion, 52, 134-5 history, 103, 126-7, 136-8, 174, 206 comparative study of law and politics, 136, 137, 179, 227 theory o f climatic conditioning, 138-9, 174, 188 influence in England, 13, 125-6, 135 Bohun, Edmund, n o , 134 n.24 Bolingbroke, Henry St John, Viscount, 178, 264, 274 Bolton, Edmund, 105 Book-keeping, double entry, 250 Botero, Giovanni, 172, 174, 219 Boyle, Robert, 231 Brady, Robert, 95, 123, 124, 193-4 Brahe, Tycho, 144 Braithwait, Richard, 105, 197 Brcndc, John, 99-100, n o Browne, Sir Thomas, 162, 165 ambivalence of his ideas, 10, 141, 160-1 learn lessons from nature, 21, 23, 26 degeneration in man and nature, 28, 29

Brutus (or Brute) of Troy, 83-84, 105, 115-17, 120, 193 Burckhardt, J., 145 Burghley, William Cecil, Lord, 97, 209 Burke, Edmund, 78, 264, 273 political theory of order, 266, 268 n.13 argument by correspondence, 266-7 ancient constitution, 267-8 Burton, Robert, 25, 53, 164 Busher, Leonard, 260 n.30 Butler, Charles, 24, 46 Cade, Jack, 51-52, 275 Cadwallader, 116, 120 Caius, John, 166 Caliban, 17 Calvin, John, 97, 163 Camden, William, 103, 169 Campbell, L. B., 14, 118 Carion, John (or Johann), 90, 97-98, h i Cartwright, John, Major, 265 Casaubon, Isaac, 97 C a u s a D e i e t R e ip u b lic a e c o n tra N o v a to r e s

[1748], 52 n.73 Causes, final, rejection of, 166, 208 Caxton, William, 100, 116 Cecil, William, se e Burghley Chapman, George, 31 C h a r a c te r o f a n H o n e s t M a n (1683), 52 n.73, 56 Charles I, 121, 186, 233 descent from Adam, 82, 84, 86 Charles II, 120 Chillingworth, W ., 276 China, 175, 177 Chronicle plays, 112-13, 118 Cicero, 98, 181 C i v i l P o li t y (1703), 176 Clapham, John, 103 Clarendon, Edward Hyde, Earl of, 121 Clark, G. N ., 169 Classical sources admiration of, 28-29 influence interest in history, 98-100 mixed state, 179, 180-3, 273 utilitarianism, 199-200 a commonwealth for increase, 202-3 Climatic conditioning, Bodin’s theory of, 138-9, 174, 188 Coke, Sir Edward, 185, 187-8, 268 n.13 Colden, Cadwallader, 175-6 Cole, G. D. H., 94 Commines, Philippe de, 224

29O

Index Commons, House o f growing power of, 39-41 royalist attack on supposed traditional power of, 81, 122-4 Commonwealthmen, 123, 142, 187, 264, 272 Comparative study o f politics, 9, 136, 137, 174- 9, 198-9, 204, 227-30, 235-6, 256-7 Confirmations, myth o f the, 122, 189, 193‫ ־‬4 , 270 Conquest, Norman, 43, 122, 189, 193-4, 270 Conservatism political theory o f empiricism, 267-8 political theory o f order, 54, 263, 266 C o n s titu tio n s a n d C a n o n s E c c le sia stic a l (1604),

Counter-renaissance, the, 157, 163 C o u r a n t H b e rtin , /e, 162 Cowley, Abraham, 231 Craig, Hardin, v, 14 Craig, Sir John, 122 Craig, Samuel, 251 Cranfield, Sir Lionel, 40 Crown, concept of, 35, 185 Curtius, Quintus, 99 Dallington, Sir Robert, 112, 172, 174, 226 Daniel, Samuel, 113, 118 Davenant, Charles, 249 Decay o f nature, se e Disorder, idea o f Declaration of Independence (1776), 272 Defoe, Daniel, 142 Degree, se e Great Chain o f Being, the Descartes, René, 215, 277 Diggers, 8 Dionysius o f Halicarnassus, 181 Disorder, idea of, 15 described and illustrated, 26-32 and Fall of man, 26-27, 30, 109, 147, 150 corruption of man’s faculties, 2 6 3 0 ,27‫־‬, 31. 5 4 5 6 ‫־‬ reflected in decay of nature, 26-29, 147-8; decay of nature denied, 147-51, 158, 201-4, 251-2; decline in idea o f natural decay, 151 in body politic, 30-32, 51, 54-56, 64-67, 72, 73-74, 76-79, 88 reflected in history, 109-14, 117-20 in Bodin, 127-8; Filmer, 88, 92; Forset, 30-31, 72, 7379 ‫ ־‬74, 76‫ ; ־‬James I, 64-67 Dissociation of sensibility, 159

38 ‫י‬ Contarini, Gasparo, 136, 183 Continuity, principle of, 15 Contract, original, 36, 194, 269 rejected by royalists, 66, 92-93 Copernicus, N., 144 Coronation oath, 194 Correspondence, argument by, 14, 15, 109, 112, 206 described and illustrated, 21-26 misunderstanding of, 5-6, 59, 68, 71-72, 87 link with royalist political thought, 8, 142 God-king correspondence, 21, 24-25, 44-47, 48, 51-52, 60-62, 88, 90-91, 128 body politic-macrocosm correspondence, 21, 23-26, 30, 44- 47* 48, 7°, 128, 140, 170, 267 body politic-microcosm correspondence, 22, 23, 30‫ ־‬31*44*46, 49* 50, 61, 62-64 , 69‫ ־‬79, 128, 140, 146 body politic-family correspondence, 23, 54-55, 61, 62, 75, 86-87, 88-93, 128-9, 145-6 microcosm-macrocosm correspondence, 25, 27, 30, 144* 147-51 animal analogies with politics, 23-25, 44, 45 , 46, 47* 70, 128 scientific use, 25-26, 107-8 reasons for decline in cogency, 144, 146-51 persistence, 263, 266-7 Coryate, Thomas, 174 Cotton, Sir Robert, 169, 179-80

D iv in e

R ig h t

and

I r r e s is tib ility

o f K in g s

(1645), 49 Divine right of kings often misjudged, 6-7, 8, 41-42, 58-59, 60, 67 based on philosophy of order, 8-9, 142 decline after 1688, 262-3 se e a lso Order, political theory o f Domesday Book, 250 Donne, John, 145-6 Druids, 115 Dryden, John, 83, 203, 268 Dudley, Edmund, 18, 55, 109 Dugdale, Sir William, 169 Edward the Confessor, 193, 194 Edward IV, 119

29I

Index Edward VI, 38 Edwards, Thomas, 271 Elizabeth I, 38, 241 Ellis, R. L., 212 Elyot, Sir Thomas, 18, 24-25, 44, 53-54 Eminent domain, 43 Empiricism, philosophy o f replaces order philosophy, 10, 153 - 4, 157, 158 - 9, 166 factors in development of, 1546‫־‬ basic principles, 157-60 fideism and, 145, 157, 158-61, 169-70, 200, 208 anti-rationalism and, 157, 161-5, 276-8 attitude to nature, 158-9, 203-4; rejection o f decay theory, 158, 201-2 analysis of causation, 166-7, 208 resolutive-compositive method, 165-7, 170, 209-11, 2 1 2 1 4 ‫ ; ־‬and general hypotheses, 167-8, 215; and mathematics, 167 n.22, 251; empirical basis of, 167-9, 213-15 Empiricism, political theory o f derived from philosophy o f empiricism, 157-8, 170 stress on history and experience, 8, 9, 173, 269, 276 types of experience, 171-9; ‘autobiography’, 172; ‘introspection’, 172-3; history, 173; travel literature, 172-8 comparative study o f politics, 9, 136, 137, 174-9, 198-9, 204, 227-30, 235-6, 256-7 application o f empirical method to politics and society, 9, 170, 204, 207, 215ff, 222-5, 2 4 7 2 6 3 - 4 ,8‫־‬ society as artefact, 145, 196, 200, 246 mixed government, 9, 1 5 7 8 7 ‫ ־‬8, 1956, 264-5, 270 British history, 1 8 7 1 9 2 - 3 ,8‫־‬ Gothic history, 188-95, 264-5 utilitarian morality, 157, 170, 178-9, 196- 201 idea of progress, 201-4 conservative aspects of, 2678‫־‬ factors in decline of, 269-82; rejected by political radicals, 269-73; appeal to nature, 273; scepticism about history, 273-5; rise o f philosophical rationalism, 276-82 in Sidney, 189-90; Hunton, 8, 189, 190-2; Bacon, ch. x p a s s i m ; Harrington, ch. xi p a s s im ; Locke, 2 7 8 8 2 ‫ ; ־‬in

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 263-5, 267-8 Empiricus, Sextus, 164 Enderbie, Percy, 84 Epicureanism, 199 Exclusion crisis o f 1679, 52,113,122, 183, 187, 262 Experience, see Empiricism, political theory of

Fabrizio, Geronimo (Fabricius), 166 Fabyan, Robert, 100 Family, authority in, 88-89 Feudalism and kingship, 33, 35, 36, 43, 59, 121, 122‫ ־‬4 , 240-2 Fideism, se e Empiricism, philosophy o f Figgis, J. N., 6, 14, 263 Filmer, Sir Robert, 1, 9, 5 6 1 2 6 ,125 ,5 n.2, 129, 142, 179, 260, 280 style o f thought, 12-13, 80-81, 94 importance of father-king correspondence, 86-87, 90-92 distinction between patriarchal and quasi-patriarchal power, 84-86 family and body politic, 23, 86-92 derivation of political power from Adam, 82-87, 89-90 unity and monarchy, 88 all monarchy absolute, 91-92 rejects traditional parliamentary and legal limitations on king, 81-82, 121, 123 disorder, 88, 92 criticism o f contract theory, 9293‫־‬ use o f legal and historical data, 81, 95, 109-10, 123-4 influence, 262, 263 n.4 Fink, Z. S., 183 179‫ ־‬, Fletcher, Giles, 175 Foley, Samuel, 251 F o r m o f A p o l o g y a n d S a tis fa c tio n (1604), 40 Forset, Edward, 7, 12, 56-57, 67, 80, 125, 260 life and writings, 68-70; work not well known but important, 68, 79 use o f microcosm-body politic correspondence, 30-31, 68, 69-79 need for sovereign power, 71-72; its characteristics, 72-76 monarch’s absolute power always just,

292

52, 75‫ ־‬76 unconditional obedience necessary, 71,

73‫ ־‬7 ‫ יצ‬76‫ ־‬77 ordered social hierarchy, 70-71

Index Forset, Edward—co n td . causes o f political disorder, 30-31, 72, 73‫ ־‬74, 76-79 Fortescue, Sir John, 36, 44 Foster, James, 264 Foxe, John, 97 France, 257-9, 260, 273 Freeman, E. A., 265 Galen, 165 Galilei, Galileo, 161, 166 Genoa, 239 G e n tle m a n 's M a g a z i n e , T h e , cited, 264 Gerson, Jean, 63 Gierke, O., 6, 14, 15, 22, 44 Giraldus Cambrensis, i n Goodman, Godfrey, 28, 38, 149-50 G o r b o d u c , 31, 48, 67, 113 Goths (or Saxons), 115, 202, 269, 280 and mixed government, 188-94, 264-5, 273, 275 n.26 Gothic and British history contrasted, 192“ 3

Gothic constitution and Norman Conquest, 193- 4 , 270 and Protestantism, 194- 5, 265 Harrington and the * G o th ic k ballance*, 240-1 Grafton, Richard, 101 ‘Grand Tour’, the, 172 Graunt, John, 253 n.13 Great Chain o f Being, the described and illustrated, 16-20, 27 place of society in, 17, 53-54, 60, 65, 70-71, 127, 145-6, 263, 266 central position of man in, 17, 20, 27,

147-9 psychological order in man, 17, 26-27, 30-32, 54-56 and natural science, 107-8, 143-5 difficulties in idea of, 143-6, 147-9 Greenlaw, Edwin, v Gregory VII, Pope, 34 Grosse, Robert, 45 n.56, 49 n.66 Grosseteste, Robert, 165 Guevara, Antonio of, 46 Guicciardini, Francesco, 112, 224 Hake will, George, 149-51 Hakluyt, Richard, 174 Hale, Sir Matthew, 268 n.13 Halifax, George Savile, Marquess of, 163, 178, 198, 203, 255

Hall, Edward, C h r o n ic le of, 102, 103 n.16, 105, 117-20 Hardyng, John, 101-2 Harley, Robert (1st Earl Oxford), 264 Harrington, James, 13, 89 n.25, 120, 153, 1S1, 183, 264 scientific approach, 233-4, 235-6, 237, 247-8; practical manner of O c e a n a , 237-S use o f historical data, 234-6, 241-2 influence of travel on political ideas of, 235‫ י‬236-7 comparative studies, 235-6, 257 theory o f government, 244-6; republicanism, 244; prefers mixed system, 182-3, 244 constitutional devices: *dividing and choosing*, 244-5; ballot, 245; rotation in office, 236, 245-6; agrarian law, 246, 283-7 balance of property, 238-41, 283-7; *n English history, 241-2, 244; not the only factor in political analysis, 239, 242-3, 286-7 authority, 238, 239, 243, 286; aristocracy of authority, 190, 244-5 colonial or *provincial* power, 242-3 an expanding commonwealth, 203, 246, 255 Harvey, Gabriel, 125 Harvey, William, 166, 234 Hedonism, 199-201, 278, 279 Henry VI, Emperor, 34 Henry I, 123 Henry III, 81, 123 Henry IV (Bolingbroke), 118-19 Henry V, 119 Henry VI, 119 Henry VII, 67, 116, 219, 241 Henry Vili, 38, 105, 241 Herbert o f Cherbury, Lord, 176 Hexter, J. H., 241 n.19 H e y f o r H o n e s t y (1651), 193 Heylin, Peter, 178 Heywood, Thomas, 113 Higden, Ranulf, 101 Hill, Christopher, 271 Hinton, R. W . K., 186 n.57 History essential part of political theory of empiricism, 8, 9, 173 use by royalists, 43, 59, 81-87, 951 109-24, 126, 219

293

Index History—contd. royalist and empirical views contrasted, 120- 4, 192-3, 241-2 use of to sustain parliamentary power, 1214, 188-95, 264-5 and geography, 137-8, 174 appeal to rejected by radicals, 269-73 decline during eighteenth century o f research in, 274-5 History, didactic value of, 95-106, 173, 197-8, 267, 278 doctrine summarized, 105-6 and Church reform, 96-98; classical revival, 98-100; medieval literary tradition, 100-1; early modern historians, 101-3; the a rte s h isto r ic a e , 103-5 and political theory o f order, 110-20, 126-7, 197, 242-3 and evils o f rebellion, 110-14, 117-20 in Bodin, 126-7, 136-8; Bacon, 217-20, 223-4; Harrington, 234-6, 241-2; Machiavelli, 99, 112, 136, 216, 219, 226, 234 denied, 273-5, 277-8, 280-1 History, Gothic, se e Goths (or Saxons) History o f Britain, legendary, 115-17, 120, 187-8, 192-3 Hobbes, Thomas, 86, 93, 147, 179, 185, 200, 201 11.86, 235 n.5 significance in early modern political thought, 11-1 3, 68, 80 abstract mode o f discussion, 215, 234, 250-1 , 274-5 , 277‫ ־‬8 sovereignty, 48, 73, 75, 79, 255, 256, 206 state o f nature, 93, 175, 256 Holinshed, Raphael, C h r o n ic le s of, 46, 102-3, n i , 116 Hollis, Thomas, 264 Homily o f 1547, 38 n.45, 50-51, 118 ,7‫״‬ o f 1570, 45, 51, 55, 113, 117, 118 influence in eighteenth century, 52 n.73 Hooke, Robert, 167-8, 231 Hooker (or Vo well), John, h i Hooker, Richard, 21, 243 plenitude, 15 order and degree, 18-19 psychological order and disorder, 17, 26-27 , 30, 54‫ ־‬55 disorder in nature, 26-27 social hierarchy, 53 liberty and disorder, 55-56

use o f correspondences, 146 moral value o f history, 97 Hotman, François, 184, 265 Howell, J., 147 n.6 Hume, David, 238, 264 Hun ton, Philip political theory o f empiricism, 8 mixed government, 190-1 Gothicism, 189, 191-2 Hutcheson, Francis, 264 Ideas, political se e Thought, political 42-43 Impositions, debate on (1610), 185 Inductive method, se e Bacon, Francis; Empiricism, philosophy o f Innocent IV, Pope, 34 Ireton, Henry, 271, 281-2 Israel, 236, 246 Im p e r iu m ,

Jacobites, 52 n.73, 262 James, D. G., 223 James I, 7, 40, 56, 69, 72, 74, 80, 81, 119, 125, 186, 207 political theory o f order, 59, 67 unity, 60, 67 absolute monarchy, 41, 61-64 causes o f political disorder, 64-67 rejection o f equality and democracy, 60, 65-66; o f papal supremacy, 65 correspondence arguments, 60-64 historico-legal arguments, 59, 81, 95, 109 misleading criticism of, 58-59, 60, 66, 67 James II, 56, 187 Japhet, 83 Jefferson, Thomas, 265 Jenkins, Daniel, 95 Jenyns, Soame, 263 John, King, 114-15, 122 Johnson, Robert, 172 Johnson, Samuel, 147 n.7 Johnston, Nathaniel, 124 Jones, Philip, 172 Jones, R. F., v King God's vice-gerent, 1, 33, 38, 48 under feudal system, 33, 35, 36, 43, 59, I2I, I22-4, 24O-2 relationship to pope, 3 3 6 5 ,39‫ ־‬35, 69, 80, 93 n.42, 114-15 power said to be derived from people, 35‫ ־‬3