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 0715633074, 9780715633076

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PHILOPONUS On Aristotle On the Soul 1.3-5

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PHILOPONUS On Aristotle On the Soul 1.3-5 Translated by Philip J. van der Eijk

Duckworth Ancient Commentators on Aristotle editor: LONGeneral DON  Þ  0 ' 9  &' . * +  Richard Þ  0 ' 9  YO4Sorabji -  Þ  SY DN ';

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in 2006 by

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First published in 2006 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. 3DSHUEDFNHGLWLRQÀUVWSXEOLVKHG

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored a der retrieval © 2006 by Philip J. in van Eijk system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, Philip J. van der Eijk has assertedphotocopying, his rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, mechanical, recording or otherwise, WREHLGHQWLÀHGDVWKH$XWKRURIWKLVZRUN without the prior permission of the publisher. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in A catalogue record for this book is available any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, from the British Library or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

ISBN 0 7156 3307 4

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Acknowledgements Academic or the author.

 

The present translations have been made possible by generous and British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data imaginative funding from the following sources: the National EnA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. dowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of978-0-7156-3307-6 the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the ISBN HB: British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society 3%  (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del H3') Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the and Humanities Research BoardData of the British Library ofArts Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Academy; the Esmée Charitable Trust; the of Henry Brown A catalog record for thisFairbairn book is available from the Library Congress. Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO/GW); Dr Victoria Solomonides, the CulAcknowledgements Attaché of thehave Greek in London. The and editor wishes Thetural present translations beenEmbassy made possible by generous imaginative to from thank Johansen, Inna Kupreeva, Russell, funding theThomas following sources: the National EndowmentDonald for the Humanities, Pamela Huby and Alan Lacey for their federal comments, Ian Crystal Division of Research Programs, an independent agency of the USA; for the Leverhulme Trust; the Britishfor Academy; Copyright the Royal preparing the volume press, the andJowett Deborah BlakeTrustees; at Duckworth, Society (UK); Beltrame difor Storia dello Spaziosince e del Tempo who hasCentro been Internazionale the publisherA. responsible every volume the (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the Arts first.

and Humanities Research Board of the British Academy; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Typeset by Ray Davies 2UJDQLVDWLRQIRU6FLHQWLÀF5HVHDUFK 1:2*: 'U9LFWRULD6RORPRQLGHV&XOWXUDO Printed and Great Britain Attaché of the Embassy of Greece in bound London.inThe editor wishesby to thank Alan Lacey, Biddles Ltd, King’s Lynn, Norfolk Ian Mueller, Christopher Taylor, and Rosemary Wright for their comments, Inna Kupreeva and John Sellars for preparing this volume for press, and Deborah Blake who has been Duckworth’s editor for all volumes in the series since the beginning. Typeset by Ray Davies Printed and bound in Great Britain

Contents Preface Acknowledgements

vii xi

Introduction

1

Deviations from the Text of M. Hayduck

5

Translation Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Notes Bibliography English-Greek Glossary Greek-English Index Index of Names Subject Index Index of Passages

7 9 63 95 129 147 163 179 209 211 215

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Preface Richard Sorabji This text by John Philoponus discusses whether the soul should be defined as producing motion, or cognition, or instead be defined in terms of the body’s composition. Chapter 3 considers Aristotle’s attack on the idea that the soul is in motion. This was an attack partly on his teacher, Plato, since, as Philoponus comments (96,10), Plato defines the soul in his Phaedrus 245C-246A and Laws 894D-896B as self-moving, and in his Timaeus makes the soul move the body by being in motion itself. The idea that the soul is in motion seems unmistakable at Timaeus 36C-D; 40A; 41D-42A; 43A-44B; 44D; 91E-92A and Laws 790D-791B. Nonetheless, Proclus (in Tim. 3, 330,9-331,1; 341,4-342,2) practically stands on his head to reinterpret Plato as not meaning real motion, as I have explained elsewhere.1 Ammonius was Proclus’ pupil and believed in harmonising Plato and Aristotle, and Philoponus’ commentary is taken from the seminars of Ammonius, with his own reflections added (1,1-4).2 So how is Aristotle’s controversy with Plato handled? Philoponus agrees at 96,31 with Aristotle’s attack on the idea that a thing must be in motion in order to cause motion. But at 116,21ff. he offers what may be Ammonius’ interpretation of Plato’s apparently physicalistic account of the soul in the Timaeus as symbolic, on the supposition that Iamblichus had popularised, that Plato is a Pythagorean (117,26). Plato did not regard the soul as extended (124,2-26); moreover Aristotle is treated as realising this and as attacking only a literalist misinterpretation of Plato (116,26; 122,19-26; 125,30). The subject of Chapter 4 is what would nowadays be called (dropping the word ‘soul’) the mind-body relation. Plato and Aristotle attacked a physicalistic theory of soul, first propounded in Plato’s Phaedo, which suggested that soul was the blend, ratio, or harmonious proportion of ingredients in the body. Philoponus attacks the theory too (141,22153,34), but we learn from him that Epicurus had defended it (143,4ff.). So, curiously enough, did the Aristotelian Dicaearchus, and later the Platonising doctor Galen.3 Philoponus next argues again against the view of the soul as something in motion, 154,1ff.. It is only the compound of soul and body that can be in motion.

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But does thinking belong to the soul or to the compound (155,4156,32)? Step-by-step thinking belongs to the compound, and is accompanied by changes in the brain and facial changes. Philoponus makes similar points about physiological effects at in DA 332,12-27 and in Phys 7, 771,21-772,3.4 But Aristotle distinguished in On the Soul 3.5 an active intellect separate from the body. Alexander is criticised for saying that this is God resident within us (159,9). It is, according to Philoponus and other Platonists and Neoplatonists from Themistius onwards, a matter-free human intellect. The discarded idea that the mind is a ratio might suggest that it is a number, a view taken by Xenocrates, Plato’s next successor but one (165,18). But Philoponus suggests other reasons for this view, which, like Aristotle, he also rejects. Chapter 5 continues the discussion. Philoponus endorses Aristotle’s rejection of the idea that the soul consists of particles (172,4). Empedocles’ verses are quoted suggesting that the soul must be made of all four elements in order to know everything that is made of the same elements (175,23ff.). Philoponus joins Aristotle in rejecting this too and further (184,1ff.) in rejecting definitions of the soul as moving or as cognitive for ignoring lower forms of life. He finally discusses the idea that the soul has parts (192,13ff.), and Aristotle’s rejection of the localisation of parts of the soul in parts of the body found in Plato’s Timaeus. But at 201,1ff. Philoponus reveals his interest in discoveries since Aristotle’s time about nerves and the brain, and asks if these do not require some kind of localisation. At 194,1, Philoponus tackles Aristotle’s unexpected remark at On the Soul 2.1, 413a8-9, that it is not yet clear whether the way in which the soul is the actuality of the body is like the way in which the sailor actualises the defining functions of the ship. This has caused surprise, because the comparison of the soul with a sailor might suggest Plato’s view, which Aristotle rejects, that the human soul can depart from the body intact. In the Aristotelian school, Alexander switches to discussing whether the art of navigation can be separated from the ship, to which his answer is ‘no’ (On the Soul 15,10). However, Themistius (in DA 43,30-5), pseudo-Simplicius (in DA 96,3-10) and Philoponus here at in DA 194,1ff. and at in DA 224,28-37, take it that Aristotle will allow the intellectual part of the soul to be separable from the body, like a sailor from the ship. But the discussion in Philoponus’ second passage is much more subtle. He there at 224,28-37 explains that the navigator, as one who is exercising the activities of a navigator, cannot exercise those activities in separation from the ship, but at the same time as a human, is something separate from the ship, and can separate himself from it.5 There is a subsidiary issue in Chapter 3, whether the heavens are driven round us by soul or by nature. Plato had suggested in the Timaeus that it was by the World Soul, and Philoponus adds ‘by its will’ (boulêsis, 138,7). But Aristotle at first in On the Heavens had suggested

Preface

ix

that the heavens were made of a fifth element to which it was natural to move round in a circle. It was only much later in Metaphysics Book 12 that he finally expressed the view that the transparent spheres which carry the heavenly bodies round us are inspired to move ‘as if by love’ (1072b3), thereby attributing their motion to soul. Philoponus had said in Chapter 2 of the present work (at 66,11), that circular movement is natural for the heavens, but in Chapter 3, he goes into much further detail. Although at 101,37-102,4 he criticises certain Peripatetics, and seems to include Alexander of Aphrodisias, for saying that the heavens are moved by soul, not by nature, the theory he goes on to give in 102,9-21 is in fact Alexander’s.6 For Alexander had said that although among animals on earth nature is distinct from soul, in the heavens nature and soul are the same (On the Cosmos 17-19, ed. and transl. from Arabic by Genequand, and ap. Simplicium in Cael. 380,29-381,2; 387,12-19; ap. Simplicium in Phys. 129,1-7). Simplicius disputes in the second passage that soul is nature, and in in Phys. 286,20-287,25, gives the reasons that the soul is not passive like nature, and does not stand like nature in a spatial relation to the body. Philoponus’ view changes in subsequent treatises.7 In Against Proclus, he denies Aristotle’s fifth element and treats the heaven as predominantly made of fire, adding that its rotation is above the nature of its body, but not of its soul, 492,26-493,5. In Against Aristotle, fr. 49 Wildberg (from Simplicius in Cael. 78,12-79,14), he suggests that the rotation of this body made predominantly of fire can be due to soul and nature as independent causes working in the same direction, as when a bird flies downwards exploiting its own weight. Finally, in his avowedly Christian work, On the Creation of the World 28,20-29,9, Philoponus extends his justly admired theory of impetus to the creation of the world, and says that God implanted a rotatory impetus into the celestial spheres at the time of creation, which gives them a kind of nature and eliminates the need for them to have soul. In the present volume, Philoponus sometimes (e.g. 121,10; 124,25) says that he is moving to talk of the lexis, Aristotle’s exact wording. Évrard has pointed out that this is the earliest commentary in which we get a contrast with the preliminary discussion of doctrine (protheôria), which appears in Book 2 at 424,4 and 13. For a typical shift between the two types of discussion, see e.g. 422,11.8 This contrast was later systematised by Olympiodorus, Elias, David and Stephanus. Notes 1. Sorabji (2004a) vol. 1, 197-9 and 217. 2. On the relationship between Ammonius and Philoponus see Sorabji’s Preface and van der Eijk’s Introduction to van der Eijk (2005b) ix and 1. 3. See Caston (1997) and Sorabji (2000) ch. 17. 4. Translated from Arabic by Paul Lettinck and discussed in Sorabji (2004a) vol. 1, 202-3.

x

Preface 5. Discussed in Sorabji (2004a) vol. 1, 263. 6. See Sorabji (2004a) vol. 2, Physics, 1(d) ‘Relation of nature to soul’. 7. This has been traced by Scholten (1996) 345-79. 8. Évrard (1957).

Acknowledgements Philip J. van der Eijk I am deeply grateful to the editor, Richard Sorabji, for his support, his advice on many points of translation and interpretation, and for his generous patience during the preparation of this volume. I am further indebted to the anonymous readers of the translation who provided many valuable suggestions for improvement; to Sarah Francis for her assistance with the preparation of the Index and Glossary and the correction of the proofs; to Ian Crystal, Inna Kupreeva and John Sellars for their assistance with the final preparation of the manuscript; and to my wife Arachne for her invaluable personal support. I should further like to express my gratitude to the Wellcome Trust for its financial support of the project from which this translation has arisen; to the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) for awarding me a fellowship at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS), where part of the work for this translation was done; and to the University of Newcastle upon Tyne for providing institutional support and a most stimulating working environment.

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Introduction Philip J. van der Eijk In the Introduction to my translation of Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2, I dealt with a number of more general issues related to this commentary and its place in Philoponus’ work.1 In what follows, I should like to highlight two aspects already touched on there but further developed in the present volume. One feature that singles out Philoponus from other Neoplatonist commentators is the extent to which he is aware of medical views (esp. Galenic) and his eagerness to bring these to bear on the interpretation of the Aristotelian text. This is less surprising when one considers Philoponus’ elsewhere attested interests in medical themes,2 in addition to the enormous influence of Galenic medical ideas in late antiquity also on authors who were not themselves practising physicians, such as Nemesius of Emesa, St Augustine or Stephanus of Alexandria.3 In the present commentary, Philoponus’ medical interests acquire particular relevance to the question of psycho-physical interaction, i.e. the anatomical, physiological and pathological aspects of mental processes like cognition and the emotions. We encountered a striking example of this in the first volume in the long section 50,16-52,25 commenting on Aristotle’s tentative claim (403a16) that all ‘affections’ (or experiences: pathêmata) of the soul appear to be ‘enmattered formulae’. Philoponus there staged a debate between two rival interpretations concerning the extent to which the ‘faculties of the soul follow the mixtures of the body’ – a claim he attributed there to ‘doctors’;4 and although Philoponus’ presentation of the debate in that earlier passage at least implied that his sympathy lay with those who deny a determinist, materialist dependence of the soul’s faculties on the bodily composition, it is striking that only in the present volume, at 183,27-34, does he definitively settle this issue – which he himself presents as ‘hitherto unresolved’ – by pointing out that the materialist claim is only valid in cases where an individual’s constitution is, or has become, ‘unnatural’ by bodily defect, disease or injury (e.g. brain damage or blockage of the nerves): ‘For when the intellect, whose natural activity is to rule, does not rule because the natural hierarchy is reversed, the faculties of the soul follow the mixtures of the body. But when the intellect does rule, then, when

2

Introduction

man is constituted in accordance with nature, the faculties of the soul no longer follow the mixtures of the body, but the body follows the soul’ (183,30-34). Interestingly, and perhaps remarkably for a Neoplatonist, Philoponus is prepared to allow bodily factors (such as the condition of the brain or the pneuma) a very considerable influence on the functioning of mental processes, including intellectual processes like discursive thinking (dianoia) and memory (mnêmê). In doing so, Philoponus sheds light on several points on which Aristotle himself had been notoriously ambiguous. Aristotle’s remarks on the role and identity of the bodily factors involved in sense-perception, memory and recollection, sleeping and dreaming, and even imagination and thinking, as well as on the precise kind of their involvement, are often vague, scattered over his works and they do not remotely add up to a complete and consistent picture.5 In two respects, Philoponus provides the clarification which is absent from the Aristotelian texts. First, he distinguishes, much more clearly and systematically than Aristotle had done, between ‘discursive thinking’ (dianoia) and ‘intellect’ (nous, 155,4ff. with n. 221; cf. 157,6-9), thus allowing the influence of the bodily composite to extend ‘even to the higher cognitive functions’ (cf. 51,4-7) and reserving the freedom from any bodily turbulence for the intellect only. In elaborating this distinction, and in presenting dianoia as an ‘imperfect intellect’ (atelês nous), Philoponus anticipates an interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology that was revived and vigorously debated in the late nineteenth century.6 Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, Philoponus makes it clear that the influence of bodily factors on the workings of dianoia is to be defined in terms of ‘interference’ or ‘disturbance’ only (enokhlein 162,34; empodizein 164,13, using Aristotelian terminology: cf. GA 776a15ff.; 767b10ff.; 772b30ff.; 737a25; 780b10; cf. DA 429a5-8; PA 653b5; 672b28ff.). In other words, bodily factors at best leave the rational part of the soul alone, but their ‘balance’ (summetria, eukrasia) does not in itself contribute in a positive sense to, let alone constitute, their functioning. In taking this view, Philoponus departs from the Galenic claim (alluded to at 51,7-8, and expounded by Galen in his work That the Faculties of the Soul follow the Mixtures of the Body) that one can enhance one’s intellectual performance by a particular regimen or life-style that would modify one’s ‘mixture’ (krasis). While Galen in that work had attacked the view, which he reported as Platonist, that the body can only hinder thought, not assist it (64,19-65,1, 4.805K), Philoponus returns to that view in claiming that the ideal circumstances for the rational part of the soul are those where the influence of the body is eliminated or neutralised rather than brought in to aid or assist or stimulate thinking (cf. Prooemium, 19,29-31). In taking this line of thought, Philoponus is also at odds with Aristotle’s own view, implied at PA 648a2ff., PA 650b19ff. and DA 421a22ff., that particular bodily variations, e.g. in the composition of the blood or the condition of the

Introduction

3

skin, can improve one’s intellectual performance. Aristotle says in the third of these passages that men are more intelligent than other animals, and some people more intelligent than other people, in accordance with the softness or hardness of their flesh. In his comments on this later passage (in DA 2.11, 388,16ff.), Philoponus points out that being soft-fleshed (malakosarkos) causes the ‘residues’ (perittômata) to be dispersed more quickly, thus contributing to greater purity of the pneuma, in which imagination resides, and thus eliminating the influence of disturbing agents; and building on the conclusions reached in the present volume, he specifies that although the flesh plays the role of material cause (hulikon aition), ‘it does not make intelligence (ou gar poiêtikê esti phronêseôs), unless as a contributory cause (sunaition, cf. Arist. DA 416a14). For because of the conjunction [of the soul and the body], the motions of the soul are disposed along with mixtures of the body; they are not generated by the mixture, but they do not act in this way or that way without such a mixture’ (tr. Charlton [2005b] 75). As in the previous volume,7 Philoponus displays awareness of Galen’s vivisectory experiments demonstrating the cognitive supremacy of the brain and the nervous system (201,3ff.) as against Aristotle’s (and Alexander’s) cardiocentrism (referred to at 195,10-11). However, a further respect in which Philoponus moves beyond Galenic medicine is his awareness of medical views on the location of various mental functions like memory, imagination and thinking in the different cavities of the brain (155,28-35). Where Galen had left the precise location of these faculties unspecified, Philoponus, following a medical view attested in the late fourth-century writer Posidonius of Byzantium and in Nemesius of Emesa’s work On the Nature of Man, locates memory in the posterior part of the brain, reasoning in the middle and imagination in the anterior part. A second feature of this commentary, which we already encountered in the previous volume, is its close connection to the Prooemium preceding it. This continuity becomes manifest in the numerous passages in the commentary where Philoponus takes for granted views he has established in the Prooemium, e.g. in his distinction between the solid, the pneumatic and the luminous body (138,9; 158,12; 161,21), his distinctions between the various rational and non-rational soul functions (104,10ff.), his notion of sumpatheia and the ‘relationship’ (skhesis) between body and soul (155,28; 196,24), his idea that the soul contains the formulae (logoi) of all things within itself (111,5), his belief in the varying extents to which different levels of being share in ‘illuminations’ (120,23), etc. This continuity is further confirmed by two explicit references by Philoponus in the commentary to the Prooemium (194,27; 200,2). The fact that these cross-references occur towards the end of the commentary on Book 1, which itself, for Aristotle, too, is preliminary to the actual exposition of his own psychological theory in Books 2 and 3, may lead one to think that this is just part of the preliminary discussion. However, also in Philoponus’ commentary on Books 2 and 3 (as far as

4

Introduction

the latter is extant), the connections with the Prooemium remain strongly noticeable. It reminds us that this text really is one continuous exposition, and that the exegesis of the Aristotelian text ultimately serves the exposition of Philoponus’, and/or his teacher Ammonius’, own doctrines. Text and translation This translation is based on the edition by Michael Hayduck in the CAG series (vol. 15, Berlin 1897). In his Preface, Hayduck discusses the main witnesses for the textual transmission of the work (the MSS D, R, A, Pal., and a lost manuscript that seems to have constituted the basis for Trincavelli’s edition of Venice 1535, indicated ‘t’). I have followed Hayduck in leaving out what appear to be explicative additions preserved in one or more of the MSS. Hayduck prints these in his apparatus, and I have printed corresponding translations in the notes. Apart from these, there are relatively few problems of textual constitution, and only on a few occasions, listed below, have I found reason to prefer a reading not favoured by Hayduck or to propose an emendation. In terms of presentation, I have sometimes printed as separate lemmas passages which are discussed by Philoponus as separate lemmas but not presented as such by Hayduck.8 In accordance with the conventions of this series, in the translation of the Aristotelian lemmata square brackets surround words that are not quoted by Philoponus but added to provide a continuous Aristotelian text. Words in angle brackets are explicative additions (not textual emendations, which are given in the notes). Notes 1. See van der Eijk (2005b). 2. See the discussion by Todd (1984); see also van der Eijk (2005b) 4-5; Strohmaier (2003); Adnouf (1995). 3. See Temkin (1962) and (1973). 4. See van der Eijk (2005b) 133 n. 369. 5. For a discussion of these passages and an attempt at reconstruction see van der Eijk (1997) and (2000). 6. See the discussion between Bäumker (1877) and Neuhäuser (1878), summarised in van der Eijk (1997) 256-7. 7. See Prooemium, 19,8ff. and in DA 1.2, 89,16-17. 8. German translations of short sections of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 can be found in Böhm (1967) and in Scholten (1996), as follows: 101,25-103,10: Scholten (1996) 355-6; 106,3-18: Böhm (1967) 245-6; 107,24-109,6: Böhm (1967) 246-7; 120,29-121,9: Böhm (1967) 244; 120,24-35: Scholten (1996) 366-7 n. 361; 123,1821: Scholten (1996) 357; 138,10-139,9: Scholten (1996) 354 n. 319; 138,19-23: Scholten (1996) 353; 156,22-32: Böhm (1967) 247; 158,15-22: Böhm (1967) 247; 200,7-201,32: Böhm (1967) 248-50. A French translation of 116,21-117,30 can be found in Saffrey (1968) 77-9.

Deviations from the text of M. Hayduck (CAG 15) 93,24: adopting Diels’ restoration kat’ ousian ara metabalei. 94,2: deleting aitian (following Hayduck’s suggestion in app.). 115,10: reading ti with acute accent. 145,14: reading dia ti pithanê hê doxa estin entithêsin. 149,16: reading atopon instead of aporon. 150,6: reading rhêsin instead of khrêsin. 153,26: reading legein pareinai (with t) instead of pareinai. 155,5: deleting te. 161,4: reading eipoi instead of eipe. 193,11: reading rhêseis instead of khrêseis. 195,10: reading pote instead of hopote.

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PHILOPONUS On Aristotle On the Soul 1.3-5 Translation

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Lecture notes of John of Alexandria on Aristotle’s On the Soul, based on the seminars of Ammonius, son of Hermias, with some additions of his own

405b31 First, we have to examine movement. Having listed the doctrines of his predecessors,1 i.e. both those who concentrated on the soul’s kinetic aspect and those who concentrated on its cognitive aspect, he takes this as his starting point for what is still left, i.e. the refutations of these doctrines. Indeed, he refutes their doctrines not because they were wrong in supposing that it moves the body, or that it knows things, or that it is incorporeal, but because they supposed that it causes movement by being moved,2 and that it knows things by having them within itself, and because in concentrating on the point of its incorporeality they believed that it was not incorporeal in the strict sense but a body consisting of more delicate particles than any of the others. First, then, he begins with those who concentrated on its kinetic aspect, since these were also the first he recorded. These people thought, as we have learned,3 that since the soul causes movement, and since everything that causes movement is itself also subject to movement, the soul itself, too, is subject to movement, yet it is subject to movement not by something else but in virtue of itself and it is self-moved. Against this he objects, first, that it is impossible for the soul to be subject to movement; so much do I refrain, he says, from saying that it is self-moved, that I even claim that it is impossible for it to be subject to any movement at all.4 He alludes particularly to Plato here. But before we broach what he says, we shall demonstrate briefly that on the basis of Aristotle’s own words it is absolutely necessary for the soul to be moved,5 and then we will deal with what is said, both in what way Aristotle says it is unmoved, and in what way Plato says it is always in motion. Now in the Lectures on Physics Aristotle defines movement, and he says that movement is the actuality of that which is potentially, qua such,6 i.e. the process of what is potentially to the subsequent actuality of that which was potentially.7 For this is what is indicated by the phrase ‘qua such’; for if it will cease its potentiality, it also ceases its movement. So it is the process from potentiality to actuality. Now if the process from potentiality to actuality is what movement is, and if Aristotle on another occasion in the present work8 says that the soul

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is potentially the intellect, and that it sometimes actually becomes the intellect (and indeed, he says,9 those who say that the soul constitutes a place for forms are right, except that it is not the whole soul but only the intellectual, and not the forms in actuality but the potential forms; and again he says that it resembles an uninscribed writing tablet,10 and that it is potentially the same thing as a writingtablet which at a certain moment in time actually gets written upon) – if, then, the process from potentiality to actuality is what movement is, and if the soul is potentially the intellect and at some point in time actually becomes the intellect when it receives the forms, it will therefore in proceeding from potentiality to actuality have been subjected to movement. But people object to this and say that in the third book he has spoken in broad terms about movement, and in saying that movement is the process from potentiality to actuality, he has given the definition of change instead of movement. Now they are wrong to say that Aristotle attempts to refute on the basis of this definition that has not been stated accurately, since in the fifth book he specifies these things more accurately when he says that change goes further than movement;11 for if something is a movement, this is also a change, but not vice versa. For change, , takes place according to four categories, substance, quantity, quality, place.12 Change of substance involves coming to be and perishing, change of quantity growth and decrease, change of quality alteration, change of place locomotion. Now the changes according to three of these categories, , are movements, i.e. quantity, quality and place, but change of substance is not, for what is subject to movement needs to persist in order to be moved, yet what comes to be and perishes does not persist. This is why in the same work he also gives another definition of movement which is different from the one given in the third book, which is a definition of change not movement; he says that movement is the change from one thing that has been given a form into another thing that has been given a form,13 which is identical to saying that it is the change from one substrate into another substrate. In the case of coming to be and perishing, the former is a change from what is without form into a form, whereas the latter is a change from what has been given a form into what is without form. What the state of these things is, has been accurately said in that work; for now, though, enough has been said on the subject. This is what these people say. We, however, say, when change is viewed according to these four categories, that if they deny that whenever the soul changes from the potential intellect to the actual intellect, it according to one of the three categories that are types of movement (for the definition of change suits the soul, too, as has been demonstrated),14 it , i.e. it will be coming to be and perishing.15 Thus whenever it learns something, we would say that it is coming into being, and when it does not know, that it perishes. But this is ridiculous. For the soul was soul also prior to learning. If, then, it does not change in respect of substance, its being changed will have to be in respect of some of the other categories.16 Now the changes in respect of these categories were movement; therefore, the soul is subject to movement. But if Aristotle, too, evidently says that the change of the soul from potentiality to actuality is coming to be rather than alteration .17 For when someone out of a state of ignorance becomes knowledgeable, he says,18 we say that such is a case of the coming into being of completeness,19 not simply of being; consequently, such a case is a specific kind of coming into being, not simply coming into being. Or to give another example: vice and virtue are contraries; for even though vice is said to be privation, as something undefined and without form, yet because it changes into virtue, it will be an opposite and not privation. ,20 as has been said in the Categories,21 does not change into disposition, as blindness into sight, but opposite changes to opposite, as black changes into white. If, then, the soul changes from vice into virtue and vice versa, and if these are opposites, (for the change from one opposite into the other is a movement; for they are brought under the category of quality), the soul is subject to movement. Besides, Aristotle himself, too, says that movement differs from actuality in this respect in that movement is an incomplete actuality, whereas actuality is complete;22 which is why he has called the divine beings actualities without potentiality.23 This is why in the Lectures on Physics he examined whether there are two movements in the moving agent and in what is being moved or just one, and he demonstrated that there was just one.24 Next he examined again what the movement belongs to, the moving agent or that which is subject to movement, and he demonstrated that it belongs to that which is subject to movement; for that is what proceeds from incomplete to complete, not the moving agent, as is the case with the subject that is being taught and the teacher, where there is one movement in both, starting from the teacher and ending with the pupil. It is not the teacher who is subject to movement, but the pupil: the former possesses the complete and collected disposition, he says, the latter is brought into this state part by part. If, then, according to him movement is the incomplete but the actuality is complete, we shall ask him how it is in the case of the soul. Is it subject to movement or not? If it is not subject to movement, it does not progress from what is incomplete to what is complete, and it is not moved from ignorance to knowledge nor from premisses to conclusions. If these things are perceived to obtain for the soul, and if it does not possess complete actuality, and if there is no actuality without potentiality,

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it is subject to movement; this is how he himself, too, defined this movement is the process from the imperfect to what is perfect. Besides, himself says that in those things in which there is earlier and later, in these there is on any account also time (for earlier and later arise from time, in those things to which they extend); now where there is time, there is on any account also movement; for they presuppose each other, and where there is movement, there is on any account also time, and conversely where there is time, there is on any account also movement.25 Now in the soul there is earlier and later; hence there is also movement in it. That there is earlier and later in the soul is evident: for it proceeds from premises to conclusions and it does not know all things simultaneously but one thing before the other,26 nor does it grasp all things it knows at the same time, but the one thing before the other,27 and in general it proceeds from virtue to vice and from ignorance to knowledge. These are the things that serve to show that even according to Aristotle himself the soul is subject to movement and that Plato was not wrong in assigning self-movement to it.28 And for an intelligent arbitrator of these arguments no contradiction will be found to inhere in these, except in the words alone. As is used to do in many places when he is refuting the apparent , he does so here, too. Since the real movements, which we have recognised, too, are only the natural ones and since the soul is not subject to any of these movement (for the soul does not grow or get smaller or change quality or place), therefore, lest anyone would think that since Plato says that the soul is always in motion, he means that it is subject to any of the natural movement we recognise, he himself29 demonstrates that it is wholly unmoved in respect of any of these movements. And this account is true, and it is the opinion of Plato, since Plato, too, thinks it is incorporeal, but according to Plato it can be subject to certain other types of movement, the intellectual and in particular the vital ones, in respect of which, Plato says,30 it is most of all always in motion; for it constantly causes life, even when the organism is in a state of sleep and sleeping, when it does not activate its intellectual powers. Now since Plato says that all actuality without further qualification is movement, whereas Aristotle says that only the natural movements are such, it seems that the account is right that says that according to Plato is subject to movement whereas according to Aristotle it is not subject to movement, but the disagreement is found to lie only in the verbal formulation. If dispositions and conditions are the types of alteration, and if the soul is subject to these kinds of movement when it undergoes change from ignorance to knowledge,31 how then will it escape being not only subject to movement but also being subject to natural

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movement? It seems that Aristotle only concentrates on the corporeal movements when he says that the soul is not subject to movement; this is clear from his own words. For if the soul, he says, is subject to movement and not just accidentally, he says, movement would belong to it by nature, and if that is the case, so would place; for all movements mentioned take place in space. Here you see that when he says that it is not subject to movement, he concentrates on the corporeal movements; for everything that is in a place is a body.32 405b31 First we have to examine movement; for perhaps it is not only false that its being is of the kind described by those who say that soul is what moves itself or what is able to move itself; but also that movement would be an attribute of it is an impossible thing to say. He has said that those who concentrated on the soul’s kinetic aspect thought that what exercises movement must under all circumstances also itself be subject to movement, because everything that causes movement in a corporeal manner exercises movement in this way, and they observed that the soul is the primary moving agent of the body; hence they took the view that it is moved in virtue of itself. So much do I refrain, he says, from saying that it is self-moved, that I claim that that movement would be an attribute of it is an impossible thing to say.33 What he says here is directed particularly at Plato; this is why he has added to saying ‘those who say that the soul moves itself’ the phrase ‘or what is able to move itself’. For evidently Plato in a certain respect says that all soul is self-moved, as he does in the Phaedrus,34 and again in Book 10 of the Laws he defines the soul as follows: ‘That which has the name of soul, what is its definition? Could we say anything else than what we have just said, i.e. that it is that which is able to move itself?’35 Furthermore, Democritus and his followers,36 as well as those who without further qualification say that the soul is the most kinetic body, even though they did not say that it is permanently in motion, still lodged in it the power to cause movement; because of these people, too, Aristotle says ‘what is able to move itself’. It is evident that Plato also thinks that what is subject to movement by itself is the cause of the things that are subject to movement; for he says that what is subject to movement by itself is the principle of the things that are subject to movement. But Aristotle has said that the other natural philosophers also held this view. Hence they maintained that the soul is subject to movement, because they observed that it causes movement. Now, Aristotle says, that this claim, i.e. that what causes movement is under all circumstances also itself subject to movement, is not necessarily true has been demonstrated in the eighth book of the Physics.37 For there he shows that the primary agent of movement

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must of necessity be unmoved; for if this were subject to movement as well, the things that are moved by being changed together with this cause would no longer be in motion.38 Besides, even if everything that causes movement, in so far as it causes movement, is itself also subject to movement, then that which causes growth will itself also grow, and that which teaches will itself undergo instruction,39 and that which causes whiteness will itself also become white; and this is absurd. Besides, the objects of desire which stimulate desire are themselves unmoved in the very act of causing movement; for the hay moves the donkey and the image moves the observer etc., and all these things themselves remain unmoved. He is right, therefore, to remove necessity from this argument first, since it is not necessarily the case that the soul by causing movement will itself also be subject to movement; in what follows, he will raise objections against its being subject to movement by itself, since it is downright impossible for it to cause itself to move or indeed to be subject to movement at all. 406a4 Each thing that is subject to movement is subject to movement in a twofold sense: it either is subject to movement in virtue of something else or in virtue of itself. [We say that things are subject to movement in virtue of something else when they are in something else that is moved, like sailors; for these are not in the same way in motion as is the ship, the latter being in motion in virtue of itself, the former in virtue of being in something that is in motion. This is evident in the case of their bodily parts: the proper movement of feet is walking, and so of men; but this is not a peculiar feature of sailors.] He is about to show that the soul is not subject to movement, and thus it is understandable that he first lists the different meanings of the movement, so that we know in what sense of the movement he says that the soul is not subject to movement. Of the things that are subject to movement, he says, some are moved in virtue of themselves, i.e. they possess movement in virtue of their essence, others are moved by something else, i.e. accidentally; here what he means is clearly movement by something else, as he makes clear by means of examples. Of the things that are moved accidentally, some are moved in such a way as is the case when they have their own proper movement too, as does the sailor (for he is moved accidentally by being on the ship that is in motion, although he has the power himself, too, to be moved by himself), whereas other things in such a way as is the case when they are immobile in themselves, such as the white in the body: for when the body is moved, the white is moved accidentally, yet it itself is immobile by its own nature.40 In this sense Aristotle himself, too, concedes that the

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soul is subject to movement; for because it moves the body, and because it itself, too, is within that which is moved, it moves itself accidentally, just as, if whiteness were to adopt a kinetic power, he would say that it moves itself accidentally, because it moves along with that which is subject to movement. Yet also the rowers that cause the vessel to move are moved along with it accidentally, so that accidentally they move themselves. In this way the soul, too, by moving the body also causes itself to be moved accidentally; for if it does not leave the body behind while this is subject to movement, and it is actualised in it, it will clearly be subject to movement along with accidentally, since it goes along with that which is being moved; yet it itself is immobile by itself, because it is incorporeal, and if it is that, it is not in a place; how, then, could that which is not at all by nature such that it is in a place be said to be subject to movement? For that which is subject to movement changes from one place to another; and everything that is in a place is a body. Yet he demonstrates with geometrical cogency that the soul is incorporeal. Hence it is absolutely necessary for it not to be subject to any of the natural movements. Having said that of the things that are subject to movement, some are moved in virtue of themselves, others in virtue of something else, he has added as an example of these the sailor. For the movement of the sailor in the ship is not in virtue of himself, but accidentally; for it is in virtue of the movement of the ship in which he finds himself that we say that he is moved, too. That this kind of movement is not his own is clear, says, from the fact that the bodily parts through which the sailor is moved when moved by himself are unmoved; these are the feet; for when he moves in virtue of himself, he is moved by his feet. Thus he has at the same time given an example of movement in virtue of itself, I mean the walking with the feet; and it is quite appropriate that he has used this kind of example in order that we should not believe that the movement of the whole body that takes place through the bodily parts is accidental. For even if the whole body is moved through parts, it is said to be moved in virtue of itself, because not even the feet will be moved without the joint breath and connectedness41 of the whole body. 406a10 Since there are two ways42 in which we can say that something is subject to movement, we will now examine whether the soul is moved in virtue of itself [and whether it partakes in movement]. He understandably has put the different senses of movement at the beginning: we are enquiring whether is moved by itself, i.e. whether the movement it has is in virtue of its essence; for even he would concede that it is subject to accidental movement. Now why

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has he added to saying ‘if it is moved in virtue of itself’ the phrase ‘and whether it partakes in movement’? Because among the things that are subject to movement in virtue of themselves some have their movement as a combination with, and therefore as complementary to their being, as is the case with the celestial beings, whereas others do not have the combined or complementary movement as part of their being, yet they do have the power to be moved in their own nature, so that they can partake of movement when there is something that causes movement, such as a lump; for this takes part in movement yet it itself does not have its essence in movement. Now we are enquiring concerning the soul, whether the movement it has is the result of a combination , as is argued by those who say that it is self-moved, or whether its movement, though not the result of combination, still has the capacity to participate in this in virtue of its essence. Indeed, he will show that it is simply impossible for movement to belong to the soul. 406a12 Since there are four kinds of movement, locomotion, alteration, waning and growth, it would have to be subject to one of these movement, or to more, or to all. In the fifth book of the Physics he has shown that change occurs according to four categories:43 either substantially, as is the case with coming to be and perishing, or in quantity, as with growth and decrease, or in quality, such as alteration, e.g. turning white or black, or according to the category of place, such as upwards or downwards, in the Lyceum, or in the market place. Of these changes, , those in the first three categories of quantity, or quality, or place, are movements, whereas substantial change is no longer movement but simply change; for change goes further than movement.44 For that which is subject to movement, he says, needs to exist in order to be moved, yet what comes to be or passes away does not remain what it was; also that what is subjected to movement has its change in the region of the same substrate without the movement contributing anything to the perfection of the essence of the substrate, yet what comes to be or passes away does not happen in a substrate, rather what comes into being as it were changes from matter into form, and what passes away vice versa. Now with movement being considered in relation to these three categories, how did he here manage to list four types of movement? My reply is that with the categories of place and quality he was well supplied with common terms by which he could signify all types of movement falling under these categories, both locomotion and alteration (for every movement in place is called locomotion, and every qualitative change alteration; for both the person turning white and the person turning black undergo alteration); yet with the category of quantity he did not have

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a common term at his disposal signifying growth and decrease; for if someone were to mention ‘change according to quantity’, he would be giving a definition not a name. This is why he divided quantitative movement into two, into growth and decrease; and as if it had been shown that substantial change is not movement, he accepted here as something that has been agreed that every movement occurs according to these three categories.

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406a14 If the soul45 is not subject to movement accidentally, movement belongs46 to it by nature; and if this is the case, place, too; for all types of movement that have been mentioned occur in a place. [And if it is the essence of the soul to cause itself to move, its being subject to movement will not be accidental, as does that which is white or three cubits long; for such things are subject to movement, too, but accidentally; for it is that to which they belong which is moved, the body. This is why they have no place; but the soul will, if indeed it partakes by nature in movement.]47 That is to say, since they say that movement belongs to the soul not accidentally (for they claim that its essence is to be moved by itself), it necessarily belongs to it in virtue of its nature, or rather it is its very nature.48 It was shown that all movement is completed under one of these categories; therefore it will be subject to one of the types of movement mentioned. If that is the case, and if on the other hand he showed in the Lectures on Physics that all things that are subject to movement and that undergo one of these movements occur in place,49 the soul will be in a place, too, and that is tantamount to saying that it will be a body. And that quantitative movement and spatial movement occur in place is evident, too; and that qualitative alteration occurs in place, too, he showed clearly in the Physics.50 He shows there that what is moved in virtue of itself must consist of parts; what consists of parts in virtue of itself is also in a place, since it is also a body. On the whole, what is moved changes from what it is into that in which it will be; for every change is from something into something. That which changes from something into something is a whole neither in that out of which it changes (for this would not yet have changed) nor is it a whole in that into which it changes; for it would already have changed and no longer be in the process of being changed. That which changes in whatever mode of change in virtue of itself and not accidentally must therefore in some respect of its own be in that from which it changes, but in some respect in that into which its change results; it is impossible for it to be a whole in both, for then it would be simultaneously in two opposites, i.e. both that out of which and that into which it changes, and the same thing would simultaneously be in a plurality of things in the same

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respect, which is impossible. Consequently, what remains is that some aspect of it is that out of which , another that into which . It thus consists of parts, and for this reason it is a body. For only the body can in virtue of itself be divided into parts. For even if the line and the surface are said to be divisible in virtue of themselves, this is verbally only, yet in existence and being the body is the only thing that is divisible into parts. Consequently, if the soul is subject to movement in virtue of itself, it will be divisible into parts and it will be a body. So far this may also be sufficient against Plato, who claims that the soul is incorporeal; for if a consequence of the hypothesis that says that it is subject to movement is that it is a body, and if this is false, it will not be subject to movement. But those who say that it is a body have not yet thereby been refuted to the effect that it is not subject to movement. What, then, is the absurdity arising from this in its being subject to movement if it is shown to be in a place and to be a body? Well, he infers the absurdity following from this shortly, which suits all communally. What, then, does he mean by saying that everything that is moved is in a place? Yet he himself shows that the fixed sphere is not in a place, even if place is, as he thinks, the boundary of what encompasses,51 in so far as it encompasses that which it encompasses, and he shows that beyond the fixed sphere there is nothing. Alternatively, he means that the parts of the fixed sphere are in some sort of way in a place, as he himself says in the Physics;52 for each sign of the Zodiac is encompassed by those on either side of it; or perhaps one should implicitly understand in addition that the movements of everything that is moved are in a place; for the discussion is about things that are moved here, which are themselves moved in their entirety, yet even those who said that the soul exercises movement by being moved clearly said that it changes through and through; and things that are moved in this way inevitably are in a place. Now perhaps someone might say: ‘What do you mean? Does the soul not change qualitatively? Is it not altered when it changes from vice to virtue and from ignorance to knowledge? And if it undergoes alteration, and if alteration is movement, the soul is subject to movement.’ Against this the Peripatetic interpreters, one of whom is Alexander,53 naturally respond that this is no alteration; for alteration is the change that occurs in the passive qualities, and all passive qualities are perceptible, and the perceptible qualities are in the body; therefore all that undergoes alteration is corporeal. Yet virtue and vice and knowledge and ignorance are dispositions and privations, and dispositions and privations are coming to be and perishing, not alterations. Just as blindness is perishing, whereas sight is coming into being, likewise virtue and vice and knowledge and ignorance are in a way coming to be and perishing. For each is known in its

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own perfection: and if a particular thing lacks something in respect of perfection, it tends to perishing; and knowledge and virtue are perfection of the soul. Just as we do not say that healing is an alteration but coming to be, since health is natural whereas disease is contrary to nature, likewise, since virtue is natural for the soul but vice contrary to nature, it will be plausible for us to say that the change from vice to virtue is not alteration but coming to be. For alteration, since it is to do with quality, is accidentally present in the body and will not contribute to the completion of the essence of its subject nor will it do any damage to it; for when the body turns white or black, this does not do any harm or benefit to its being a body. Yet health and disease and virtue and vice are not like this, but they do act upon the essence of the subject. In this way at least we have solved the much debated difficulty that was raised in the Introductions in the context of the definition of accidental:54 the question was how the accidental comes into being and disappears without the subject perishing. For fever that is accidental causes destruction. Our reply was that fever is not accidental nor is it an alteration of the subject, but it is an unnatural heating that dissolves the harmonious arrangement of a living being. And we already said concerning the dispositions of the soul in what sense they are said to be coming to be and perishing. ‘as does that which is white or three cubits long’: That is, if someone were to say that when white lead is moved, the white is being moved, it is obvious that he would be speaking of it being moved accidentally, since it is not by nature such as to be moved in virtue of itself. He has added ‘or three cubits long’, thereby not referring to the body that is three cubits long but simply to the very length without the body, such as a line or a surface, because he wants to show that no other distance is moved in virtue of itself except the body. These, he says, are moved accidentally, because the body to which they belong and in which they have their being is moved. That the movement is not theirs but the body’s, he says, is obvious from the fact that the place into which they are moved is not theirs but the body’s. For if all movement looks to some end, and the end of local movement is the place into which it is moved, and if this place, i.e. the end to which the movement was looking, belongs to the body and not to the white or the three-cubits-length, then the movement will also be of the body. That place belongs to the body is clear from the following: if the qualities are taken away, the body will be there in its proper place all the same; and similarly for the three-cubits-length, if it were taken away as a line or as a surface. 406a22 Furthermore, if it is moved naturally, it would also be subject to movement by force; and if it were moved by force, it

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Having shown that if the soul is subject to movement naturally and by itself, it will have a place proper to it, he now adds as a consequence of what has been said the following: if it is moved naturally, it would also be subject to movement by force,56 thereby indicating that it will also have a place that is unnatural for it. Indeed, that things that are moved by force are also subject to natural movement is clear enough; for what is moved by force is moved contrary to nature, and what is contrary to nature is a deviation of what is natural, and nothing is permanently in an unnatural state. But what does he mean by saying that what is moved naturally is also moved by force? Or is it the case that even bodies that are carried round in a circle, since they are moved naturally, could also sometimes be moved contrary to nature? Yet Aristotle himself, indeed, has shown that it is impossible for these to be moved unnaturally; for he says that these are exempt from all mortal discomfort.57 Now it is quite natural for the Peripatetic exegetes, to whom also Alexander belongs,58 to say that the celestial bodies are not moved by nature but by a more powerful force, I mean the soul that is in them,59 since they, as Aristotle himself also says,60 have this movement in virtue of their desire for the primary . For why, he says, are they moved in a circle?61 Then he inferred that they imitate the intellect. For just as the divine is everywhere, likewise the heavens, he says, that imitate the first , since they cannot be everywhere at the same time, are at least partially everywhere. Animals, too, that are subjected by the soul to movement that takes place sideways are evidently subject to this movement and not by nature. However, in the case of animals the movement according to the soul is different from the movement by nature; for in all animate beings that have a composite body their movement according to nature and that according to their soul are different. This is why the body is subject to its innate movement in accordance with the prevailing simple part62 when it is moved not as an animate being but just as a body. For when animals move or fly or swim, they are moved in virtue of their soul; yet when they are carried from a height by a downward tendency, they are moved in virtue of nature, since the earthy and heavy element prevails. Yet to the simple body that has the property of being an animate being,63 the soul is its nature because of this peculiarity, and movement in virtue of its soul is its natural movement. If it is not moved naturally but by soul, it will no longer fall under the theory64 which says that objects that are moved naturally are likely also to be moved by force. If in general we must also lodge natural movement in it, we say that the natural movement it will have is of the same kind as the one it has from soul, and we will say that the Aristotelian theory that everything that is moved natu-

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rally will also be moved by force does not apply in all cases but only in those things where the movement occurs in a straight line, which are also moved in their entirety. The philosopher himself has shown that movement along a straight line has an opposite and that only circular movement has no opposite.65 For upward movement has downward movement as its opposite, and forward movement backward movement, and movement to the right movement to the left, but there is no opposite to circular movement. Consequently, of the things that are moved naturally, the ones that are also subject to movement by force are those that are moved in a straight line and that during this movement change place in their entirety, and the opposite movement can be perceived, yet the celestial bodies are moved in a circle and no complete change of place throughout the whole occurs. It is clear that those who say that the soul changes place and by its own movement causes the body to move according to some sort of leverage66 endowed it with movement along a straight line; for all bodies of animals are moved in a straight line. Alexander correctly also adds that the doctrine about the movement of the celestial bodies, which says that it does not happen in place and cannot be moted contrary to nature, is not that of any of Aristotle’s precursors, but was introduced by himself. Thus we have rightly stated the consequences of these on the basis of what they say. Next, the phrase ‘if it is moved by nature, it is also moved by force’, he took as a possibility, i.e. that it is possible for some of the things that are moved by nature also to be moved by force. Of these things that are moved by nature, those that have opposite movements are moved by force. And the movements of the soul, too, can have opposite movements; for it is reasonable that it is itself also moved by the movements by which it moves the body, if indeed it moves the body by being moved; and all movements of the body are seen to have opposites, as we have already said.

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406a23 It is the same with rest; for that in the direction of which it is naturally moved, in this it also naturally rests; similarly, too, in the direction of which it is moved by force, in this it also rests by force. The account about movements is followed by that about rest. For since objects that are moved in a straight line and that change place entirely do not move indefinitely, they clearly have a place which they strive to occupy, since nature does nothing in vain. Consequently, when objects that are moved are moved according to nature and occupy the place to which they tend, they will rest there, unless the movement serves no purpose. For if they do not move indefinitely, they are carried to their proper place, and they are no longer moved by nature into their unnatural place; and the opposite is what is

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contrary to nature. They will therefore come to rest according to nature in their natural place, which nature made them strive to occupy; for it requires force for them to be moved to their opposites. Again, objects that are moved by force, unless they are moved indefinitely, also have their unnatural place where they get and come to rest by force. There is also another way in which he shows that every movement that takes place according to a straight line starts from a state of rest; for if the projectile which is cast upward does not come to rest into the upper sphere, it will never be brought downwards; but if it is moved in the opposite direction, the upward movement has to come to rest first, and then start its downward movement; for it is impossible for it to be moved according to these opposite movements. If it is necessary for the account about movement to be followed by that on rest, it will also be necessary for the soul when it is being moved, to be at rest, too; and if that is the case, it will no longer be permanently in motion. 406a26 Yet of what kind movements by force and rests of the soul will be is not easy to give an account of, not even for those who wish to use their imagination.

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From this passage it is clear that the argument above, from the point where he says ‘We must first examine movement’ is one argument. For look, he went on like this: he has shown that if the soul is moved by itself, i.e. by nature, it will also have place by nature; and again, he has shown that if it is moved by nature, it will also be moved by force and there will also be a forced place for it; and he has shown that what is being moved in this way is also subject to rest. He now concludes by saying: ‘Of what kind movements by force and rests of the soul will be }’ That it is not possible to divide these and to rehearse an argument to the effect that some of these movements and rests of the soul are according to nature and others contrary to nature, you can learn from the following. What seem to be most of all and primarily either movements or activities of the soul are judgement67 and desire, each of which is divided into the rational and the non-rational .68 Rational forms of judgement are intellect and understanding, a non-rational form is sense perception,69 and a rational form of desire is wish,70 while non-rational forms of it are appetite and spirit.71 But it is evidently unreasonable to say that some of these are in accordance with nature and others contrary to nature, seeing that all are naturally present in the living being. And if someone were to say that spirit or appetite are unnatural for the soul, he should know, first, that if this is the case at all, they are unnatural for the rational soul; as it is, however, the argument is about the soul as a whole, and spirit and appetite are parts of the non-rational soul. Furthermore, one would never use what is

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contrary to nature for what is according to nature; yet the fact is that we enjoy spirit and appetite for the survival of the living being,72 and we enjoy them frequently even for the soul’s benefit; therefore, they are not contrary to nature. The movements according to judgement are according to nature to an even greater extent. Indeed, these movements cannot even take place by force. It is by force that one agrees to an impious decree of tyrants, yet to concur dispositionally and to form an opinion by force is impossible for the soul. It might seem that appetite and spirit are subject to force, when they are aroused by external things; for one can observe some sort of conflict in the soul between the emotions and reason; but in reality there is no movement by force in such cases; for if reason does not assent to appetite, it will not be forced to any of them. For force, as he himself defined it, is that of which the starting point is external,73 and which the patient or the agent does not contribute anything to or acts on in any way, such as the upward movement of a stone; yet it is the soul itself which gives in to appetite and assents to it; this is clear from good people who do not yield to any stimulus. And surely no one would call the nutritive faculty contrary to nature. The local movements of the body that happen in accordance with the impulse of the soul would be opposed by those movements that occur contrary to the impulse of the soul; these are natural and not opposite, because the body could also be moved in accordance with that impulse towards these things, such as if someone were to pull it backward while it is moving it forward.74 For if the soul is capable of moving the body towards the same things, right as well as left and upward as well as downward, these movements will not be contrary to nature, even if one were to pull it with force. For movement according to nature never happens contrary to nature; and the upward movement of fire is never contrary to nature; consequently, if natural movement is followed on any account by unnatural movement, and if the soul is not moved contrary to nature, it will not be moved in accordance with nature either. It is clear, then, that we did a sound job in turning the argument on its head by means of opposition. 406a27 Again, if it is moved upward, it will be fire, but if downward, earth; for these are the movements of these bodies. [The same argument applies to intermediates.] Again, he shows another absurd consequence of their supposition. For if it is natural for the soul to be moved, and if the natural movement is upward, the soul will be fire or air, but if it is downward, it will be either earth or water; for these are the natural movements of these. He does not simply conclude that this is absurd; for indeed, some of them said the soul was fire, others that it was another one of the

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elements;75 yet what he does conclude is that, if the soul’s natural movement is the one upward and the same natural movement also applies to fire, all fire will be soul, and the same also applies to the other , which is absurd; for if the essence of fire and that of soul are both defined by having upward movement as their natural movement, and if things which have the same thing proper to them as natural are the same, then fire and soul will be the same. That this is absurd, he showed by saying ‘for these are the movements of these bodies’. Thus no one claimed outright that the soul is really fire or any other of the elements, but for those who held fire to be the element, it was made of fire, or of some of the other elements. Not even Democritus said that the soul was fire, but that it consisted of the atoms of which fire also consisted. Now for those who claim that the soul is incorporeal, it is very evident that this is an absurd consequence, whilst the same consequence follows generally for all those who say that it is a body. For they did not say that the soul is fire without qualification, but a fire constituted in a certain way and adopting certain powers; and this constitution would be the soul. Now if the movement is the same for soul and fire, all fire will be soul; but if this is absurd, the movement will not be the same; and likewise for the other elements. If it is not subject to any movement of the elements, and there will not be movement other than these, it will therefore not be subject to movement. Now it seems that the argument provides those who say that the soul is a body with an objection; for it is not that if it is subject to any movement of the elements, it will therefore necessarily be one of the elements. For flesh and bone and metals and virtually all composite forms that are subject to one movement of the simple elements in accordance with nature are not therefore themselves earth or water or some of the others, nor conversely are the elements flesh or bone, or some of the other things that are composed of the elements. Why then is it impossible for the soul, too, when it consists of one of the elements as its material cause, to be moved in respect of the same movement as these? And if someone were to say: ‘It is not matter that is soul, I mean the element, but the form that supervenes on this’, let this person know that saying this will fit everything: for flesh is the form of flesh and not the element, and likewise in other cases; nevertheless it is said, and rightly so, that it is natural for flesh to have a downward tendency, as is also the case with earth. Either, then, one has to say that the other bodies are immobile too, or that the soul too is subject to movement. 406a3076 Since it evidently causes the body to move, it is reasonable that it brings about the same movements by which it itself, too, is being moved. If this is the case, it is also true for those

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who turn this round to say that the movement by which the body is moved is also the movement by which is moved. Now the body is subject to local movement;77 consequently the soul, too, may change in accordance with the body,78 either in its entirety or changing in respect of parts. Here is another attempt to show that the soul is not subject to movement. Since they say that it moves the body by some sort of leverage, as if by being moved it pushes the body, – just as in games children make small membrane-like waxen hollow balls and catch flies and beetles in them, and then when these are moved, the wax is also moved, and just as when a wild animal is caught in a cage and then pushes causes the cage to move along with itself – since, then, they say that the soul by being moved in this way moves the body along with it, he examines the consequences of this doctrine in the following passage. If, he says, this is the way in which the soul moves the body, it follows that the body is subject to the same movement as the soul itself, and conversely, that the movement to which the body is subject is the same movement to which the soul, too, is subject. Of what kind this movement of these is, he teaches on the basis of what is clearer and more known to us, I mean the body. Since the body, he says, is moved spatially, it is necessary for the soul, too, to be moved spatially. Now it would have been more logical to draw conclusions from the movement of the soul about the movement of the body, as this would be a conclusion from the cause about that which is caused. Yet since the movement of the soul is unclear and unknown, for this reason he draws a conclusion from the body about the movement of the soul, grasping the cause as from a sign; for the movement of the body is known. One may query what he means when he says that the moving agent by being itself moved is moved by the same movement as that which is being moved. Look, the donkey pulls the wheel and the wheel is moved in a circle, yet the donkey moves in a straight line. Similarly, in a bronze sphere, the axle is moved by one type of movement, yet those set in motion by it are moved to positions opposite each other, of which the one is moved along with the axle by the same type of movement, while the other is moved into the opposite direction. The celestial bodies, too, while being moved in a circle, exercise movement on the things here but it is not the same type of movement as their own. The celestial bodies exercise movement on the things here not simply, by being moved, rather they exercise this movement as if they were not even moved; for they heat and cool by mixing and separation and thus act in our domain, yet not by being moved; their movement contributes only in so far as it causes the sun or the moon or any of the other stars to be nearer to us or farther away from us. Concerning the rest someone else may say that the wheel of the cart is drawn along a straight line, too, but it is its

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shape which is the cause of its circular movement, for the whole wheel is moved as a whole in a straight line changing one place for another, being positioned in a straight line, yet its parts are turned around in a circle and take each other’s place all the time. In the case of the axle, because of the so-called teethed being on the outside, which is proximately causing movement to the sphere that moves into opposite directions, this undergoes the same type of movement as it . Yet this argument is not sufficient, for the axle is the primary moving agent; and in the present case the argument is particularly concerned with the primary moving agent, the soul. Not even the shape of the wheel is sufficient for this defence. However, the solution to these things is this. He did not say that the species of movement by which the moving agent moves, e.g. straight or circular, is the same as that by which what is moved is moved, but only generically; if the agent of movement is moved spatially, what is moved is also moved spatially; this is why he has said ‘local movement’. Now it is true that this must perhaps be looked for in the case of local movement only; for it is not that the agent of movement will be moved quantitatively or qualitatively by the same type of movement, unless that which makes other things black turns black itself or what causes growth grows itself or the person who teaches is taught himself. Thus it is true only for local movement. Consequently, the soul itself, too, will be subject to local movement either as a whole or perhaps changing in parts, the soul as a whole causing the body to move as a whole, or moving partially a part of the body. He then draws the absurd consequence of this. 406b379 If this is possible, it would also be possible for it to go out and to enter it again; and a consequence of this would be that it would be possible for dead living beings to come to life again. If moves the body by some sort of leverage and by pushing, as we have already said, like an animal in a cage, it is possible, he says, when the soul left the body, for it to enter again into the same body and to move it again; and in this way, corpses of living beings would come to life again. For what would prevent this, if it is only by pushing and moving a lever that the soul moves the body? Again, people raise objections against this by saying that Aristotle was not correct when he said that if it is moved while causing movement, it would depart from the body and enter it again, and thus dead animals would come to life again. For look, they say, a pillar sustains a wall or something like that by some sort of movement of a lever and by pushing, and when it is pulled away from underneath it, the connection is destroyed and the wall collapses, yet it no longer can be put underneath again and sustain the wall or something like that. And

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one could find other examples of this too. In relation to this , they defend themselves by saying that in the present case there is a need not only for movement by means of a lever and pushing, but also for a suitability80 of that which is being sustained; and this is why, once this is destroyed, the pillar, once being taken out underneath, can no longer sustain again what it used to sustain before. The others, they say, said that movement occurs just as a result of movement by means of a lever, yet they did not provide the body with suitability or some sort of natural power of being moved. For we claim that through the presence of the soul some sort of life force is let into the body, and next that through the absence this disappears and the body collapses, and it is therefore reasonable that it cannot enter it again, since the suitability that was initially let into the body through has vanished. The others said that it is by pushing only that the soul moves the body, and it is therefore reasonable that when it has gone out of the body it will be able to enter again as a wild animal that goes in and out of its cage; and the consequence of this is that living beings that have died will be able to come to life again. Yet this solution is not that of those who preserve Aristotle’s intention; for what he wants to show through this passage is that the soul is not moved at all, nor that it moves the body by being moved. What difference, then, does it make with regard to its being moved while exercising movement, whether the body requires some sort of suitability or not? For what we are seeking was whether it is subject to movement or whether it is not subject to movement. For if the enquiry were concerned with the question whether the body requires some sort of suitability for being moved or not, their solution to the problem would have been correct; yet if the discussion is not about this and the question is whether the soul, in its causing movement to the body, is itself moved or not, why would he further show that it is not moved, if the body requires some sort of suitability for being moved when the soul is being moved? For in this way not even a stick moves the door by being moved itself, since the door requires some sort of suitability to be moved, and being like this it will be moved when the stick is pushing it; for it is not fixed by nails nor has the connection been released. Indeed, all things that are moved by something under any circumstances require a certain suitability that is appropriate to them; thus the problem has not been solved, and therefore it does not seem reasonable that Aristotle has come to this conclusion. Alternatively, someone will say to him: the soul would have entered the body again and living beings that have died would have come to life again, if it had had this nature of entering again; as it is, it does not enter again, since it does not have this nature. Why, then, apart from its being in the body previously, was it not moved? For it does not have the natural suitability to enter

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the same body twice, just as if a wild animal too did not have the nature to enter the same cage again. That it does not have this natural suitability is clear from induction. Even Democritus and each of the others might say that whereas we say that the soul moves the body while being moved, still we say that the body requires some sort of suitability to be able to receive the movements of the soul, such as this or that arrangement and position of the atoms, and likewise the others would say this or that connection of the elements, and when this is dissolved it is no longer capable of pushing the body, just as if this or that moulding or quality of the wax were to be dissolved, e.g. if it became soft or underwent some other change, the animal enclosed in it would no longer be able to move it. 406b5 It would also be subject to accidental movement by something else; [for the living being may be moved by force].

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Having shown that it is impossible for the soul to be subject to movement because of the absurd consequences of the hypothesis that says that it is subject to movement in virtue of itself, he now, by means of the following passage, intends to raise objections against its self-movement. Previously, he simply showed that it is not subject to movement, while now he shows that the on the basis of which one might most of all suppose it to be subject to movement, that on the basis of these it is not subject to movement by itself. It is necessary, he says, for what is moved in virtue of itself and what is the cause of its own movement, not to be moved by something else. For what is subject to accidental movement may itself also for itself be capable of being the cause of such movement, but it may also undergo this same movement as a result of a different cause. We say that when a living being is moved according to an impulse of the soul, the soul is accidentally moved by itself, and the rower who moves the ship is accidentally moved by himself. Yet if someone pulls the living being by force, its soul will accidentally be moved by something else. Someone might say that the sail that moves the ship is accidentally subjected by itself to the movement of the ship because it is present in what is being moved. Yet nothing can be subjected by something else to movement happening in virtue of itself; for the phrase ‘because of something else’ annihilates the ‘in virtue of itself’, as he shows in the sequel. In another respect, too, if movement in virtue of itself arises from very nature, while still requiring something else in order to be moved, what would happen by nature would be incomplete and not self-sufficient for itself, but inactivated and in vain; but by nature nothing happens in vain.81

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406b7 That for which being moved by itself is part of its essence requires not to be moved by something else, unless accidentally } That which is moved by itself, he says, and has this movement as part of its essence, will never be subjected to this movement by a different agent. For if it is subjected to this movement by a different agent, it will no longer be moved always and in virtue of itself; for things that share the same essence are always together. Now the soul, as he is about to argue in the sequel, is evidently moved by the perceptible objects; therefore it is not self-moved. The words ‘unless accidentally’ are to be understood either in the sense of ‘unless someone were to say that the soul is not moved in virtue of itself but accidentally’ (for in this way it will also be moved by something else; for it has been shown that what moves itself can accidentally also be subjected to that same movement by a different agent), or conversely the words ‘unless accidentally’ are to be understood as follows: whereas it cannot be subjected by something different to the movement it is subjected to by itself, it can be subjected accidentally to the movement it is subjected to by something different, just as wandering spheres are subjected accidentally by the fixed sphere to the movement arising from the East. One may raise the question in what way he says that movement in virtue of itself cannot happen as a result of a different agent. Is it not the case that a living being is moved spatially in virtue of itself and may also be spatially moved by something else? And a stone moves downward in virtue of itself but can also be moved spatially by something else that carries it downwards.82 What I am saying, then, is that a living being and a stone are not subjected to the same movement by something else and in virtue of itself. For a living being, movement taking place according to impulse through the appropriate instrumental parts is in virtue of itself, and this could never be exercised by anything else, neither by something else nor in any way accidentally; likewise a stone has a movement in virtue of itself which takes place according to its proper inclination; it would never be subjected to that movement accidentally. Now if what is moved in virtue of itself is not moved by something else, and the soul is evidently moved by the perceptible objects (for when it thinks about the universe it proceeds to a notion of the divine, and from individual objects and perceptible objects it is moved to knowledge of universals, and seeing the object of desire it is moved to a longing for this, and it moves the person who suffers pain to anger; surely, if a certain sense faculty is lacking from birth, the corresponding movement is also lacking, for if someone has no sight, he will never experience the movement exercised by visible objects; likewise, if someone is deprived from birth of hearing, he will never experience the movement by audible objects, and the same applies to the other senses) – if, then,

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the soul is subject to movement by perceptible objects, it is not moved in virtue of itself; and if this is the case, it is not self-moved. But against this we say that even if the soul is subject to movement by perceptible objects, it is still moved in such a way as a sleeping mathematician is moved by someone who wakes him up. Just, then, as the person waking him up only takes away the impeding factor, but has not given the mathematician the geometrical theorems, likewise the soul having the forms of things in itself and as it were because of sleep being inactivated as a result of coming to be, is stirred by perceptible objects or by teachers and grasps the accounts it holds in itself.83 For if perceptible objects were causes for its knowledge, why then do not also non-rational beings have knowledge? For most of them have keener perception . Furthermore, there is another way in which knows perceptible objects and not in the way they appear to sense perception. For although sense perception sees the sun as one foot across, the soul says that at the same time it is many times wider than the earth.84 Therefore it does not have knowledge as a result of perceptible objects; for if it held the views which sense perception suggests to it, whence then does it derive its critical judgement and does it pronounce on theories and things whether they are right or wrong, if not by relating them to the theories it holds within itself?85 Through all this, then, it is clear that it is not perceptible objects that move the soul to knowledge, unless, as we said, they do so in a secondary way and move potentially what is in actuality; for has this by disposition, even if it does not grasp its actuality.86 In another respect, too, we have already said that such movements belong to a living being, since when the soul is active in virtue of itself, it activates its intellect and does not require the senses in any way. This, then, is what is appropriate for us to say against Aristotle, if he were to say concerning the rational soul that if it is moved, it is not moved in virtue of itself but by perceptible objects. Yet since his account is concerned with the whole soul including the non-rational, the proofs he produces have their proper place; for the non-rational soul knows nothing apart from perceptible objects. But this has no bearing on Plato’s saying that the rational soul is self-moved. 406b8 } just as what is good in virtue of itself or because of itself, too, is good not because of something else or for the sake of something different. [One may say that the soul is most of all subject to movement by the perceptible objects, if it is indeed subject to movement.]

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different, likewise what is subject to movement in virtue of itself will not be moved by something else. Yet if the soul is moved by perceptible objects, as it obviously is moved, it is not subject to movement in virtue of itself; therefore it is not self-moved. He sets up a contrast between what is good in itself and what is good because of something different, and between what is good in virtue of itself and what is for the sake of something different. He has taken the first opposition from the difference between efficient causes, the second from the difference between final causes. For example, we are said to possess vision ‘in virtue of itself’: it is not that this sometimes happens to us because of something different; the efficient cause of sight is from our very nature. Yet wealth we do not possess ourselves but because of something else, because of trade or agriculture or something like that. Again, water or ice in a vessel has cold in virtue of itself, yet it possesses its particular shape because of something else, viz. because of the vessel. Similarly with ‘in virtue of itself’ and ‘for the sake of something different’; for we pursue virtue because of itself and not for the sake of something else. For even if there is no recompense for virtue, yet it is to be aspired to in its own right. Yet physical strength is something we do not possess in virtue of itself, but because of the body; for it is its perfection. For the soul, too, virtue is something choiceworthy in virtue of itself; for it is its perfection. The meaning, then, of ‘in virtue of itself’ and ‘because of something different’, and of ‘because of itself’ and ‘for the sake of something different’, has now been explained. Now if something is because of itself, it will on all accounts also be in virtue of itself; yet it is not also the case that if something is in virtue of itself,87 this will on all accounts also be because of itself. Thus virtue belongs to the soul because of itself; for that reason it does so also in virtue of itself, for the efficient cause of virtue is in the soul itself; it does not require something different from outside for the confirmation of virtue, but it holds in itself the efficient cause of this. Similarly for the body, too, health is a good because of itself, and for this reason health is also a good in virtue of itself: it has the efficient cause of health from within itself, for being healthy is natural for it. Yet what is in virtue of itself is not on all accounts also because of itself. Vision belongs to the soul in virtue of itself, yet not because of itself, but because of the virtue or the preservation . Similarly, if something is because of something else, it will under all circumstances also be for the sake of something different, yet it is not also the case that if something is for the sake of something different, it will under all circumstances be because of something else. Wealth is because of something else, trade or something like that; therefore it is also for the sake of something different, virtue. Yet vision or being healthy is for the sake of something

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different, yet it is not also the case that it is because of something else, but in virtue of itself. ‘In virtue of itself’ and ‘because of something else’ being opposites, just as ‘because of itself’ and ‘for the sake of something different’, it is possible for what is ‘in virtue of itself’ to be ‘because of something else’ accidentally. For a stone it is ‘in virtue of itself’ to move downwards, but it can accidentally also move downwards because of something else; for when things are sustained by a foundation underneath and this is pulled away, the things that were sustained by it move downward because of something else, viz. the agent pulling away the foundation underneath. Yet it was also carried accidentally by something else, for while the agent pulled away the foundation underneath, it found space and was carried in accordance with its nature, and one could say that it was moved accidentally by something else, the agent pulling away underneath. Similarly, being healthy belongs in itself to bodies, yet it can also happen accidentally because of something else, the healer who empties the ailing body or simply takes away what causes decay. For he prevents what is causing harm, while nature changes what causes discomfort and brings about natural health: for ‘natures are the healers of diseases’.88 Also that which is because of itself, which I mentioned, may accidentally also happen for the sake of something different. For virtue, being choiceworthy because of itself, may accidentally also occur for the sake of good reputation. For good reputation is a consequence of it, and someone might say that virtue is because of good reputation, yet not in virtue of itself but accidentally. Similarly one might say that health, while being choiceworthy for the body in virtue of itself, is accidentally also for the sake of something different, viz. doing this or that. It is not that being healthy is choiceworthy because of this, because it makes the body capable of acting, but this is a consequential characteristic of the body’s being healthy; accidentally, then, health is for the sake of something else, viz. acting. Things being thus, the soul, too, even if it is subject to movement in virtue of itself, will not be moved by something else, unless accidentally; and if it is moved by something else, I mean by perceptible objects, its movement will not be in virtue of itself, which is what those who postulate it to be self-moved suppose. 406b11 Yet even if it is to move89 itself, it will also itself be moved, and the consequence of this would be that, since90 all movement is a deviation of the object that is moved, in so far as it is moved, the soul, too, would deviate from its essence, if it is not moved91 accidentally but movement belongs to its essence. We have already said that throughout this passage he raises objections against the self-moving . The present argu-

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ment, too, is directed against this. What he says is the following. If the soul is self-moved, so that it itself is both the moving agent and what is subject to movement, and if it is not the case that it imparts movement in one respect and is subject to movement in another respect, but rather that it imparts movement in so far as it is soul, then it will also be subject to movement in so far as it is soul. Now everything that is moved, deviates from that in respect of which it is moved; therefore the soul, too, if92 it is moved in so far as it is soul, deviates from its being soul. For what is moved in space deviates from the place from which it was moved, and similarly also what is moved93 in respect of quantity or quality; each object deviates from that in respect of which it was moved. The soul, then, too, if it is moved in so far as it is soul and in respect of its substance, will deviate from its own substance and perish; for indeed it is inevitable according to those who say that the soul is incorporeal and self-moved that it admits of movement in respect of substance. Now since there are four types of change, as has often been said, in respect of substance, quantity, quality, and place, and if the soul were subject to movement in respect of place or quantity, it would obviously be a body; for quantity and place are the characteristics of bodies. And it is no less the case that qualitative change, too, is something that happens to bodies, as we have already said,94 if, that is, the change occurs in respect of the passive qualities, and if these are perceptible, and if what changes in some perceptible respect is a body. If, then, the change or the movement of the soul is neither quantitative nor qualitative nor spatially, because it is incorporeal, it remains that it should be in respect of substance, particularly also because they say that this very self-moving is its substance. Now what is subject to substantial movement – and this is the same thing as to say ‘subject to substantial change’ – perishes; therefore the soul, too, will perish in being subjected to movement. In other respects, too, the change and movement they are talking about have to be concerned with the soul’s substance. For if the soul imparts movement in respect of quality or in some other respect, but its substance lies neither in quality nor in quantity nor in space (for everything whose substance lies in these is a body), then it does not move itself; yet as it is, they say that it is self-moved. The words ‘if it is not moved accidentally’ mean: if it is not on account of something else exercising movement, I mean the body in which it is, it will itself be said to move itself; for that is what he himself also posits. If, then, this is not the case and the movement is perceived to lie in its very essence, it will deviate from itself. It is possible to understand the words ‘if it is not moved accidentally’ also in the following way, viz. as standing for ‘if it does not move itself in respect of some of its accidental properties’, e.g. in respect of place or quality or quantity. If it moves itself in some of these respects, this

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will be most impossible of all for those who say that the soul is incorporeal, and furthermore it will not be self-moved. For the soul is not a quantity or a quality; consequently, the soul exercises movement, but what is moved is its quantity or quality. For just as nature moves bodies quantitatively without itself being moved (for it is not a quantity), it also does not move the body in so far as it is a body, yet it only moved the quantity of the body (for the formal account of nature, as that of body, remains the same, yet it does not remain the same for quantity); in this way, then, even if the soul is subject to movement in any of these respects, it does not move itself, but within it is something that exercises movement and something that undergoes movement; therefore it is not self-moved. Yet if it is subject to movement in so far as it is soul, so that causing movement and being subjected to movement is the same thing, and if all movement is a deviation from that in respect of which it is subject to movement, it is therefore necessary that the soul, when it is moved, deviates from itself and perishes. As for the fact that they predicate the ‘self-moved’ of its very substance, so that the soul is subject to movement in that very respect in which it is a substance, Plato makes this very clear in the Phaedrus: he says there that all soul is immortal (for what is self-moved is immortal), and a little later he adds: ‘Since what is moved in virtue of itself is called immortal, one will not be put to shame when saying that this is the essence and the definition of the soul.’95 Thus it is evident that he says that self-movement is the essence and the definition of the soul. Therefore Aristotle was right to prove that if it is subject to movement in respect of substance, it will deviate from itself and perish.96 We have said many times97 that in calling all activity movement, Plato says the soul is self-moved in the sense of something self-activated, which is something we do not find in any of the natural things; for it is the nature or the faculty that causes movement, but what is being moved are the things underlying these. 406b15 Some people indeed say that the soul moves the body in which it is present,98 as it is moved itself, [as does Democritus, thereby saying virtually the same as the comic poet Philip: for the latter says that Daedalus made his wooden Aphrodite move by pouring in quicksilver. Democritus says something similar: for he says that the indivisible spheres are moved on account of the fact that it is in their nature never to stay the same, and that by doing so they drag the whole body along and cause it to move].99

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that if that is given, dead animals may come to life again. To prevent anyone from supposing that he criticises them for talking about some sort of pushing by which the soul would move the body, whereas they do not claim this, he now puts their doctrines side by side, since both those who talk about the atoms said so, i.e. the followers of Democritus, Leucippus and Epicurus, and indeed also Plato, as he will point out in the sequel. For they, he says, claimed that the spherical atoms, being easy to move, move the body together with themselves; ‘and in this’, he says, ‘they say the same thing as the comic poet Philip, who said that Daedalus made a wooden Aphrodite that moved’; for after making some hollows in the statue Daedalus poured quicksilver in, so that the quicksilver by its motion (for it is very easily moved and continuously rolling over and by its own pushing causes movement to the statue) made the statue of Aphrodite appear moving of its own accord.101 He now very concisely and cleverly challenges the followers of Democritus by saying:

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406b22 We shall ask them whether that same thing also causes rest. [How it will do this is difficult, if not impossible to say.] This is extremely to the point; for since living beings evidently not only move but are also at rest, what, he says, is the cause of their being at rest? For it is not possible even to grasp from the supposition of these what102 is the cause of rest. For if the soul both causes movement to a living being and leads it to rest, as is evidently the case, and if a living being is moved by the spherical atoms being moved and if according to him these atoms are always moved, what will then be the cause of its rest? 406b24 In general, it seems that the soul does not cause movement to a living being in this way, but through some sort of choice and thinking.

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A most powerful refutation. For what they say is contrary to the plain facts themselves. For we observe that the soul does not cause movement to bodies by some sort of force or pushing, but only by will. For it makes living beings move and rest simultaneously with will. 406b26 In the same way Timaeus, too, in his account of nature says that the soul moves the body. Having said that some people say that the soul causes movement to the body in so far as it is itself moved, and, further, having put the doctrine of Democritus next to this and refuted it concisely as flying in the face of the evidence and what is apparent, he next posits the

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doctrine of Plato in the Timaeus as being similar, to the effect that the movement by which the soul of the universe is moved, is also the movement by which it moves the body of the universe in which it is held. For this reason, then, because this doctrine has this in common with that of Democritus, he puts it immediately after it. For in so far as both say that the body is moved along with the movement of the soul, they have something in common; but they differ in that Democritus locks the soul as it were in a vessel, whereas Timaeus says that it is interwoven with the body as in the case of a chord.103 It is important first to expound Timaeus’ doctrine of the soul.104 He says in his account of the generation of the soul that the god took being and sameness and difference, which are the elements of all that is, and not just any being but one that is intermediate between undivided being, which is always the same and in the same condition and, on the other hand, being that is divided over bodies. This being, then, he mixed with sameness and difference, he says, and he stretched it and made it straight, and then he cut this straight line into consonant numbers, I mean into the monad, dyad, triad and tetrad105 and into nine, eighteen and twenty-seven; and this straight line, he says, he divided into two straight lines, then he connected these two straight lines with each other by crossing them, and he bent them and created two circles, a larger one and a smaller one, which touched each other in two points; and he set the outward circle in motion to right, and the inward to the left, and he gave the outward circle the name of ‘the same’, the inward circle that of ‘the other’; and the outward circle he left one and undivided, but the internal one he carved up into six, thus creating seven circles of unequal size exceeding each other by a ratio of two or indeed three. Three of these he made equal in the speed of their movement, the remaining four he made unequal in movement both to each other and to the three; and this, he says, is the soul of the universe. Then, he says, after this he enclosed the bodylike whole of the world within, and after fitting the soul together he wove it from the centre as far as the outer heaven and put it all round in a circle on the outside.106 This is what Timaeus says, and Aristotle attempts to contradict this by presenting him just as if one were to contradict poetic myths for not corresponding to the nature of things. For as Plato says,107 to those taking poetic myths at their face value nothing would appear more ridiculous, just as to those who seek the meaning hidden within them nothing is more inspiring. But here, too, Aristotle, as he always does, refutes only what appears at face value, so that someone who is unable to perceive what is being conveyed through these riddles would stay at the level of the apparent.108 For that the Pythagoreans taught through symbols is clear enough and we have said this many times.109 This is why their ethical precepts are the way they are: ‘Do

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not sit on the measure’, ‘do not cut wood on the way’, ‘do not poke in the fire with a sword’, ‘do not go beyond the yoke’, ‘when entering the sanctuary do not turn around’, which to them mean that those who are going up should not turn aside to things here. Not to go beyond the yoke means not to exceed what is right, ‘do not poke in the fire with a sword’ stands for ‘do not irritate the irascible person with argument’, ‘do not cut wood on the way’ for ‘while on the road of virtue and pursuing the separated life, do not loosen the physical bond of the soul and the body by destroying the living being’; and ‘do not sit on the measure’ stands for ‘do not knowingly hide or cover justice’.110 They did this because they felt they should not make their wisdom transparent to unworthy people. Hence they instructed their apprentices to remain silent for five years and first to get their character properly in order, and they did not allow them to share in the doctrine until throughout the period of five years they would have improved their characters and shown themselves worthy. Indeed, what has been said symbolically is by its apparent absurdity an incentive for us to seek the truth hidden within it. They thought one should neither tell mythical stories in the way of the poets because of the damage this would do to the young, who could not grasp the meaning, nor pass on the doctrines without cover. This is why they practised their teaching in symbolical form, thus by means of its very non-rational nature leading on to the investigation of the hidden truth. For, first of all, how can the straight line be cut when it is a length without width?111 How, in general, when it is divided into consonant numbers, as being one in length, is it either split or led round in circles?112 And how does a straight line become a circle? For a circle cannot become a straight line nor can a straight line become a circle, for their extensions are not of the same kind. Furthermore, how could one of the two circles, the outward,113 become greater without the straight line having any addition or reduction in length? And how, in general, if these circles are the soul, within which the bodylike universe is encompassed,114 would they be fitted together from the middle of the universe and be interwoven as far as the most extreme heaven and encompass it entirely from outside? For a circle cannot do this, viz. encompass a sphere from outside.115 Clearly, then, through these , and many others, they alluded symbolically to something different. For if the Pythagoreans, more than anyone else, cared for knowledge of the sciences (and Plato was a Pythagorean, in front of whose school it was written: ‘Someone without geometry should not enter’),116 and if no one who has at least a tiny bit of geometry would accept anything of this sort, who then would be so stupid as to believe that Plato meant this as it seems at face value? Perhaps it should not be too blunt if I explain briefly the meaning of a few symbols.117 The soul, then, is the life of the

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universe, indeed intelligent life. That all soul is life without further qualification, is clear from the fact that to those in which it occurs, it provides life by its very presence. For how would it give something it does not possess? And of the universe is also intelligent;118 for as the text says, he made the world into a living being endowed with soul and intellect. Now Timaeus meant to point out both its vital and its intelligent aspect, and thus he takes the straight line and the circle by way of illustration, the circle as a symbol of intellectual activity (for the circle is inclined to itself, it starts from itself and ends into itself, just as the intellect turns in on itself and contemplates itself), the straight line as a sign of life; for life is a sort of process and as it were a movement having a starting point and a destination, from a life-giving starting point to something that has been given life; and this is also the nature of the straight line, for this has the characteristic of a direction from somewhere to somewhere, from its starting point to its end.119 For this reason, then, he posits the straight line and the circle, thereby showing that life exists as well as intellectual life. Yet before this, why does he first make one straight line and then divide it into two? What prevented him from making two straight lines out of this mixture right from the start? I would say, again, that the things that are intelligible and divine and beyond the soul, as Plato said himself, are undivided and always the same and in the same condition, having a stable being, power and activity, and they have no relation to any bodily nature and are characterised by the monad, whereas the natural life, as he said, are scattered over bodies and changing in all respects, in being, power and activity, and are characterised by the dyad; for they are derived from plurality. The rational souls are on the one hand intellectual and unchangeable in substance, and the activities they have are separate from all body, and in this way they, too, keep to the monad, yet on the other hand they have adopted a relation to the body and its return, and exercise providence over it, and as such they are on the side of plurality and the dyad. For this reason, he posits it both as a monad and as a dyad, thus indicating both its activity that is free from a relation to the body, and its activities viewed in relation to the body. He divides it into specific numbers, not just arbitrary ones but numbers that have the ability to create a geometrical, consonant and arithmetical proportion. Of these, at the first division he takes those numbers which I expounded, which, put together in a sequence, are the even numbers two, four, eight, then subsequently the odd numbers one, three, nine and twenty-seven, which produce the geometrical proportion; for just as the first is related to the second, the second is to the third. According to a different division, he takes other numbers which have the ability to produce a musical and arithmetical proportion. Anyone wishing to know about this in more detail should avail himself of the commentary of Alexander.120

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For what purpose, then, does he divide the straight line into these? It is possible to understand this both as referring to the soul of the universe and to our soul, since the argument seems to be about the soul of the universe, yet it also suits our soul. In the case of the soul of the universe, it is in order that it should move harmoniously and move the universe in the same way; in the case of our soul, it is because that itself has an harmonised nature (for it has a certain harmony in relation to spirit and desire), and in order that it could have the ability to know the harmonised movement and agreement of the heavens, yet also its scientific harmony, I mean the musical one and that of the rest. Therefore here we take the power to be both productive of harmony, but at the same time also cognitive, yet here the power of the soul is cognitive only. He splits the straight line into two, and connecting them by crossing them he bends them into two circles and makes the external larger, the internal smaller, ‘being connected in two directions’. He sets the larger one in motion to the right and gives it the name of sameness, and he sets the other one in motion to the left and calls it difference. What he means by splitting the straight line into two, we have said before. He fits these together by crossing them; and indeed, the axes of the fixed and the wandering sphere are fitted together in this way: the fixed sphere is moved around the poles of the equinox, the wandering spheres around the poles of the Zodiac, and they cut through each other crosswise so that their axes are also positioned crosswise with regard to each other.121 That the wandering spheres and the fixed sphere do not move around the same poles is evident from the fact that planets are seen to move across the width and move north or south, which is the origin of winter and summer, which come about through the changing position of the sun towards the north or south. For if the wandering spheres moved around the same poles as the fixed sphere, they would not produce any distance in width. These two straight lines, then, he bent into circles. These two circles indicate for him the same meaning as the two straight lines. For the powers of the soul are twofold, those leading upward according to which it stretches to the divine, and those involved in the world of becoming according to which they return to the things here. This is the symbolic meaning of the two circles, which he has elsewhere called the superior horse and the inferior horse.122 The external circle indicates the power that leads upward, the internal the one that is directed to the world of becoming; the superior one he has called sameness, the inferior one difference, because the divine objects are with the unity and sameness, since they are close to the One, whereas those that are in a state of becoming are with the dissolution, since they are further removed from the first. These circles indicate even more forcefully for him the movements of the soul by which the celestial bodies

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move: the circle of sameness indicates the fixed sphere, that of difference the wandering spheres, which he connects in two points, thus indicating the Zodiac and the equinox; for they are connected in Aries and Libra. He says that the fixed sphere is moved to the right, since the right side is the origin of movement, and for the wandering spheres the starting point of the movement from the east is from there . This is why we carry heavy objects on our left shoulder, in order that the right parts that are leading the movement be free. They take the lead since they have greater active force; and they have greater active force because they are warmer; and they are warmer because the organ that produces the blood, the liver, is situated on the right side; hence it is clear that it is the first to benefit from the natural heat. He moves difference to the left, thereby indicating the movement of the wandering spheres from west . Thus also the poet says: ‘either they go left towards dawn and the sun, or to the right and to dusk’.123 He calls the fixed sphere sameness because it is one and uniform and always in the same condition, and the other one difference because it is not one but varied, nor uniform but uneven and non-uniform; indeed, the movements of the wandering spheres are uneven both in relation to each other and in relation to themselves. He divides the circle of difference into seven parts according to the same proportion in which the wandering spheres stand in relation to each other; indeed, he divides them according to the same proportions according to which the distances and their movements are in relation to each other. How, then, will this apply to our soul? Evidently according to the account we have also given for the consonant numbers. For the soul of the universe has powers that can produce these and that are exemplary, whereas our soul has powers that can know them and produce images of them.124 It has a cognitive power, in virtue of which it knows the ratios of movements and their agreements and differences. Some have described the ratio of these movements in relation to each other, in what kind of relation each movement stands to each of the others, and about their consonance125 and the periodic return, and also about that of all together, which they say happens with intervals of many myriads of years; they say that it happens in the tropic of Cancer or of Capricorn, where he says that also conflagration and cosmic flood take place. He separates within the whole corporeal part of the universe, and having fitted it there he weaves it from the centre to the extreme heaven which it encompasses in its entirety in a circle, indicating that there is nothing outside the heavens, but everything is encompassed within it, and there is nothing which has no share in life, but everything partakes of the illumination that is given by the soul of the universe, in a dimmer or clearer way, everything to its own extent.126 Indeed, even

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lifeless objects partake of some sort of life, in accordance with which they have powers of some sort, either heating or cooling or drying or moistening, as well as moving or activating according to certain other, marvellous powers, some of which can be experienced by many, whereas others are reported by those who write about these things.127 For example,128 the stone from Magnesia has the power to attract, another129 catches fire when wetted by water but quenched when one pours olive oil over it, another one has the power to retain embryos, and when one puts this stone near animals they do not give birth before it is removed, and there are numerous other things of this kind, on which it is now not the right moment to speak. Where would these powers come from if lifeless objects were completely devoid of life? And what does he mean by this interweaving of the soul with the corporeal part of the universe?130 My reply is that there are three kinds of mixture:131 juxtaposition, according to which the bricks of which a house is made are fitted together, blend, as in the case of wine and water, and interweaving as in the case of ropes. Now the type of mixture that comes about by juxtaposition does not have sympathy (for there is no kind of sympathy between the objects that lie next to each other); the type of mixture that works by blending produces a fusion of things mixed; the type of mixture that consists in interweaving occupies as it were a middle position and has neither the lack of sympathy of juxtaposition nor the confusion produced by blending: for the interwoven objects are connected to each other through several parts. It is reasonable, then, that when he wanted to explain the bond between the soul and the body, he did not say ‘he mixed’, or ‘he fused’, but ‘he wove together’, because it is not united with the body as moving objects, as is the case with the natural powers and forms,132 nor is it completely deprived of the sympathy and relationship with the body, as are the things above.133 This, then, to summarise the main points, is what is presented in the account of the origin of the soul by Timaeus. Let us now examine the text itself.

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406b26 In the same way Timaeus, too, in his account of nature says that the soul moves the body. [By being moved itself, it also causes the body to move because it is interwoven with it].134 ‘The same way’, i.e. as Democritus. Just as the latter claimed that when the spherical atoms of which the soul consists are moved, the body is moved along with them, likewise Timaeus twines the soul of the universe together with the body and says that in this way it pulls the universe along with itself. He says that it is similar to what happens to Ixion in the myth, who is bound to a wheel and moved along with the movement of the wheel. ‘Timaeus’ is the name he gives to the Timaeus written by Plato; for this is his usual way of referring to the writings of Plato.

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Translation 406b28 For it consists of the elements [and is divided according to harmonic numbers }]135

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That is, of being, sameness and difference. For these are the elements of things in Plato, as has been said above. By being he means the one that in the formation of the soul is intermediate between the undivided being that is always the same and in the same condition, and the one that is divided over bodies. Timaeus’ words are literally as follows: ‘Out of the undivided being that is always the same, and on the other hand the being that is divided over the bodies, he blended a third kind of being out of both which was intermediate between both of them, i.e. the nature of sameness and difference.’136 The intelligible mode of being he calls undivided and always being the same, but the enmattered form is divided over bodies because what is undivided by its own account gets divided and differentiated when it comes to be in matter; the definition of the human kind is one, but when it is in matter it is differentiated according to the differences between the parts. Now since the soul is capable of knowing everything, and since like must be known by like, they make the soul consist of the principles of things in order that by its being constituted from a mixture of both it could apprehend by one of them intelligible objects and by another perceptible objects; for even the knowledge of perceptible objects does not take place according to the material and corporeal aspect of things but in accordance with the form of each thing. In this way, then, it becomes able to grasp the essences; yet since apart from essence there are also things that accidentally accompany the essence, and since these are the kinds other than essence, they made the soul consist of sameness and difference. For in all these there is some opposition, one part being superior, the other inferior, for example in the case of quantity, proportionate and disproportionate, with proportionate being superior, or in the case of quality good and bad, or in the case of relation right and left, in the case of place up and down, in the case of time earlier and later, and so forth. Indeed, the Pythagoreans adopted for all things two elements or principles and made one of the two superior and definite, the other inferior, privative and indefinite, and since in all things the superior is simple and in agreement with itself, whereas the inferior is diverse and in disagreement with itself, they rank the superior under sameness and the inferior under difference, for example with good and bad the former is simple and in agreement with itself, the latter diverse and in disagreement with itself; and it is similar with what is straight and what is bent, what is rough and what is smooth, what is even and what is uneven, what is equal and what is unequal, health and disease, and so forth. This is why, since the soul obtains knowledge of these things, the Craftsman included into the mixture of the soul the nature of sameness and of difference. One should know, though,

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that if he says that the essence of the soul is intermediate between undivided being and the being that is not divided as such but divided in bodies, he confirms that it is between two incorporeal being; and what is in between two incorporeal and undivided modes of being is itself also incorporeal and undivided. All he says about the soul as if he were speaking about an extended entity is therefore symbolical. For if the soul that is divided in bodies is not a body (for he did not say that it was a body, but just that it is divided over bodies), it is evident that the soul that is above that is not a body either; and if it is not a body, it is not a magnitude at all; nor is it a surface or a line, for these do not have a separate being of their own, but have their being in a body. Clearly, then, he takes all this as applying symbolically to the soul, and Aristotle exerts himself against those who take the apparent meaning in the way that follows.137

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406b29 } in order that it adopts138 an innate sense of harmony, and the universe is moved round in consonant movements, [he bent the straight line into a circle. And after dividing the one circle into two, connected in two common points, he again divided one of these into seven circles }] Since what has been said about the soul of the universe also fits all rational soul, some people say that the words ‘in order that it adopts an innate sense of harmony’ should be taken to apply to our soul, since that is more productive of harmony than sensible of it, and that what follows is about the soul of the universe, ‘in order that it makes the universe move in consonant movements’. Yet this interpretation is somehow not at all in accordance with the purport of what is being said. For both have syntactically the same subject. Perhaps it should be understood as ‘in order that it adopts perception of the harmony of which it is the cause for the universe’ that is, in order that it does not do anything non-rationally as nature does, but with reason and consciousness. After all, is it not the case that the non-rational beings naturally also hear harmony? Are flocks of sheep not led by pipes? Do horses not turn their haughty attention to war at the sound of the trumpet? How, then, did he present this in his account of the origin of the soul as something peculiar to the rational soul – to our rational soul at any rate, if not to that of the universe? Well, I would respond that even if they have the natural capacity to hear, still they simply hear a voice of some kind, yet do not discriminate whether it is harmonious or not; the latter is peculiar to our soul; for it hears a tune, it pays attention and judges whether it is in harmony or not. Note that Timaeus first divides the straight line that emerges from this mixture, and then bends it into two circles, but Aristotle says conversely that he bent the straight line and then split it into two

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circles; this did not contribute anything to the subject, and thus he handled his report of the doctrine of the Timaeus loosely. 407a1 } as if the motions of the heavens were the movements from139 the soul.140

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On the face of it, Timaeus seems to be saying that the heavenly bodies move with the same movement as the soul, being carried round with it, not however that the movements of the heavens are the movements of the soul, but as I said the one being the cause of the others.141 Now if we add the preposition ‘in accordance with’ (kata), the sentence becomes clear: ‘as if the motions of the heavens were in accordance with the movements of the soul’. Besides, in the case of the celestial souls the bodies are fitted to them, and they are turned towards the souls, and these souls are not pulled down towards the bodies as ours are. Now since the psychic in these is more powerful than the corporeal and since they are the bodies of principles, he says that the motions of the heavens are the movements of the soul. Alternatively, it should be taken in accordance with the superficial meaning as saying that the movements of the heavens are movements of the soul (for it moves the heavens by being moved), just as if someone, in the case of the animal enclosed in wax and moving the wax by being moved itself, were to say that the movements of the wax are the movements of the animal enclosed within the wax. 407a2 First, it is not correct to say that the soul is an extended magnitude.

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Here he begins with his refutations of the doctrine of the Timaeus, and he uses very persistent arguments in order to show that the soul is not an extended magnitude. Now that Plato says everywhere that the soul is incorporeal and without extension, is clear enough; indeed, this can be found to be the case even from these very words here, although they are enigmatic. For if, as I said,142 he says that its being is intermediate between undivided being and being divided over bodies, it is absolutely inevitable that what is intermediate between two incorporeal entities, or what is made up of two incorporeal entities,143 is itself also incorporeal. Furthermore, if he said that the soul were a body, how could the same body both encompass within itself the body of the universe, and again, fitted together in the middle, be joined up with the ultimate heaven? Besides, by speaking of the corporeal nature of the universe by contradistinction, if indeed the soul, too, is part of the universe, he has shown that it is incorporeal. But, one may ask, did he refer to it as a line or a surface? That he would not have called it a line is clear enough from what he says about its encompassing all the heavens externally. Nor would he have

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called it a surface: for how would it be possible, being a surface, to be fitted together in the centre, and then to be joined up as far as the ultimate heaven and encompass everything from the outside? Therefore, he cannot call the soul either a line or a surface. That Timaeus was a supreme master of all mathematical science, geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy, can clearly be seen from the same passage, and consequently he would never had thought that if the soul were a line or a surface it would be able to do what he said. Consequently, if he says that the soul is neither a line nor a surface nor a body, it will not be an extended magnitude either; for extension is constituted by these things. That Aristotle’s criticism of them144 is an exegesis rather than a criticism, and that he himself, too, knew that they do not mean what the text says at face value, is clear from what Aristotle himself says; we will attend to this point in the text itself, so that we will not be forced to say the same thing twice.

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407a3 For it is clear that they claim145 the soul of the universe to be of the nature of what is called intellect [for it is not like the sensitive, nor like the appetitive soul, for their movement is not circular motion]. To claim that any ordinary soul is an extended magnitude is absurd, he says, and this is even more the case regarding the intellect. Indeed, that those people, in saying that those circles are the soul of the universe did not mean any ordinary soul, for instance, the nutritive soul or the spirited or the appetitive, but the rational and intelligent soul, is clear from the fact that they say it is moved in a circle, and being moved in a circle is proper to say only of the rational soul. For this is the soul that turns in on itself and so imitates a circle, but the sensitive soul or the spirited or the appetitive do not have movements that are circular; they are straight sorts of movement. For acts of vision are being emitted from the eyes according to a straight line and again they are turned around by reflection and bent back along the same straight line;146 and spirit and desire are some sort of processes imitating straight lines, and they are not moved around in a circle but project their activities in the region of the body from within themselves and keep them free from any return movement; they do not pause at what they are doing or perceiving, nor can they in general know themselves; consequently, their movement is straight, too. But the movement of the rational soul seems to be a kind of circle, and it pauses at what it is doing and it knows itself, since it searches for itself and finds itself. Indeed, it is the characteristic of a circle to return from the same point to the same point. Furthermore, sense perception and spirit and desire have been given for preservation to living beings in need of help, yet things that are divine do not require any help from outside. And he147 himself goes on to say that these

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faculties are mortal and have been added on by the secondary gods and subordinated to the immortal part of the soul which the first god himself has made. Furthermore, desire and appetite in general is a longing for what is lacking and not present, yet the world has all things within itself and since there is nothing outside it, it cannot desire, so there are no spirit and desire in it. Therefore those who say that the soul of the universe is intellect, and then suppose that it is an extended magnitude, will be making a most absurd claim. Indeed says explicitly that the god has made the world a living and intelligent being. Yet for the fact that they said it is moved around in a circle was enough evidence alone that they were speaking about the intellect. Our reply to him is: you know that you yourself have adopted circular motion for this reason, viz. that the activity of the intellect is also of this nature. Therefore they were not talking about an extended magnitude, but they alluded symbolically to the intellect by speaking of circles. For if in general you say that the activity of the soul involving non-rational faculties is straight movement, and that of the intellect a circle, speaking symbolically and by analogy, it is clear in the Timaeus, too, that we shall understand the circles and the other things by analogy and in symbolical language, and not in the sense that the soul is an extended magnitude. Clearly, then, he , too, knows in what sense he said these things, and his refutations are not directed to them but to those who interpret the apparent meaning wrongly. 407a6 The intellect is one and continuous, as is thinking; and thinking is the thoughts ; and these are one in the manner of a number in a series, but not in the manner of an extended magnitude. [Which is why the intellect, too, is not continuous in this way.]

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He now turns the doctrine round into the opposite. Just as earlier on, in his attack against the claim that the soul of all things is subject to movement he demonstrated that it not only is not moved in virtue of itself, but is not subject to movement at all, likewise here, too, he objects to the claim about extended magnitude (for it is clear that every magnitude is continuous) by saying ‘so much do I refrain from saying that the intellect is something continuous, that I would rather say it would be more reasonable to think that it is a something with defined limits. If one should call it continuous at all, it will be continuous in the way in which defined quantity, I mean number, has continuity. This has continuity in that numbers follow each other in a sequence and do not admit anything that is alien in between them; for one, two and the other numbers are in a consecutive sequence, so that nothing alien is in between, and therefore numbers are continuous with each other by being arranged in a sequence with each other.

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If, then, he says, one should call the intellect continuous, one should say it is so just as a number is, and not as an extended magnitude, as they say. He proves this on the basis of things that are naturally secondary but clearer to us: the intellect has continuity in the way thinking has, and thinking has continuity in the way in which thoughts do, and thoughts have continuity in the way in which number has by sequence. Sequence is that in which there is nothing cognate in between; and this is the case with number. After one follows two sequentially, then three and four, and there is nothing in between. Of this nature also are immediate premises: the one is first, the other follows immediately after that, and there is nothing in between. Continuity in these things exists in sequence, not in extended magnitudes. In this way, at least, continuity is present in the intellect as well. He takes this in the sense of the active, perfect intellect which is in the divine beings, not the potential intellect. Thinking is the activity of the intellect, and thinking is nothing but thoughts, just as active sense perception is the effects of sense. For being for thinking lies in thoughts; for thinking cannot apprehend anything without thoughts. Just, then, as thoughts have continuity (they have this by sequence, for being different from each other naturally, they have continuity by being thought sequentially; for one does not think all things at once, as the first and foremost intellect does, which transcends everything; rather, it thinks without time since its being is not in time either, but still sequentially as in a numerical sequence), in this way, then, the intellect, too, has continuity. Its activity does not extend externally but it sees everything within itself because all the formulae of all things are within it, those prior to it in image form, those that come after it in exemplary form.148 Since, then, it sees all things by seeing itself (for it is a fullness149 of forms), thoughts are a sort of a number (because they are plural anyway), and they, too, would be continuous in this sense, because they follow sequentially on each other. It is possible to understand ‘thoughts’ as meaning ‘the intelligible things themselves’,150 for just as ‘the intelligible things’ are continuous with each other (this is because of the arrangement and progression of things, which involves sequence), likewise the thinking about these things has continuity. Just as intelligible objects have continuity, likewise thinking does, and as thinking does, so also the intellect has continuity, by thinking one thing after another. You know yourself, Aristotle, that you call the intellect continuous and a number by analogy, not in the sense of being an extended magnitude. However, he might say: ‘I did not say it was a number, but that it was like a number, nor that is was simply continuous, but that it was as it were continuous; they however say it actually is a number and continuous.’ But it is obvious that their teaching in general is in symbolic language.

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Translation 407a9 But it is either undivided or continuous but not in the sense of an extended magnitude.

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For preference, he says, the intellect is undivided and incorporeal; but if one must attribute continuity to it at all, it will have continuity in the sense in which we have discussed this. 407a10 For how, indeed, will it think, being an extended magnitude, with any of its parts?

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Timaeus makes the soul move in a circle in order that through its circuit it may touch and apprehend the intelligible objects; at least he says in what condition the circle is when it touches the objects of perception or judgement or thinking and grasps them, and he states the symbolic causes of false judgements and true judgements, since as we have said before his argument is about the soul as a whole. It is this doctrine, then, which now is the object of Aristotle’s refutation. For why do I say, he says, that the intellect cannot be a circle? For it to be an extended magnitude at all is impossible; for something to be an extended magnitude and to think is impossible. The refutation continues by means of a division in the following way. If the intellect, he says, being a circle, touches the intelligible by being moved and thinks in this way (for being an extended magnitude, it will not know in any other way than by touching the intelligible), it will be absolutely necessary that it thinks by touching it at a point or in a part. And if it does so at a point, it will either think at one point or not at one point. If, then, it thinks at one point, the rest will be superfluous; for what need will there be for circular motion or indeed for extended magnitude at all? For if one point suffices for thinking, the assumption of extended magnitude will be superfluous, since extended magnitude does not contribute in any way to the intellect; for if the intellect is said to be intellect in virtue of thinking, and if it is the one point only that thinks, this will be what intellect is. But if it does not think at one point, it will think either at more points or at all. Now to think at more points is arbitrary, for at how many? And why that many and not more or less? And again the rest will be superfluous. But if it thinks at all points, either each of these points will think all intelligibles, and for each intelligible object the agreement of all is required and it will not think anything else unless all points touch the intelligible, or it will think one thing at one point, another at another, and so forth, just as we may say sight grasps visible objects, hearing audible things, and each other sense some other kind of perceptible objects. If, then, each point thinks everything, and if the points are infinite, he says, ‘it will think the same things many times, indeed an infinite number of times; but’ as it is, ‘it is evidently capable also of thinking just once’. For it is possible to think about something

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once and then no longer to think about it, either by forgetting it or by no longer having it in mind. If, then, it is possible to think of something once, and if, since each of the points thinks everything and the circle touches the intelligible objects each time by its circuit, it inevitably thinks the same thing an infinite number of times, this hypothesis will therefore be false. Besides, if the points are infinite, and if it is an impossible thing to encompass infinite things, the intellect will never think in virtue of the entirety of itself, but the same intelligible object will be thought by one part of the intellect, but not by another. And if for each intelligible object the intellect requires contact of all points, and if it cannot think of anything except when all points touch it, what, he says, did each of them do? For when touching, it is clear that each point does something; tell me, then, what is the individual apprehension? But if someone were to say that, as in the case of syllogisms, the one touches the one premise, the other the other, and if the circuit of all is the conclusion and as it were the whole intelligible , that is to say, a perfect act of intellection, we shall say to him what Aristotle says in the sequel about vision, when he shows that it is incorporeal, i.e. that if the one thinks this premise, the other the other, what will be the judging factor that says that the one is different from the other? For it is similar to me perceiving this and you perceiving that. What, then, is it that brings together this conclusion which is brought from all the premises? For it is necessary for the same faculty to know them all, so that it can say that in this way this follows from those; for what touches this premise will not know the other premise, which another point touched on, since the other supposition will prove correct and all things will apprehend all. Besides, since each of the premises is also a proposition, it is evident that when one thinks of the premise as a proposition, one will think of it as a whole that in no way requires contact with the other points. Besides, if points are infinite, and if for thinking anything one needs contact with the infinite things, and if it is impossible to go through infinite things in a finite time, one will never think; for it is not possible to think unless they all make contact with the object of thought; but for them all to touch it if they are infinite, is impossible; therefore the intellect will never think. It remains to examine whether the intellect, like sense perception, apprehends different intelligible objects at different points. But if this is the case, again it will not think everything by its whole self. Nor is this suggested by what experience evidently suggests: for it is not that when we want to think, for example, ‘soul’, we set this part of the intellect in motion, and when we want to think of ‘angel’ some different part, and so forth. How does the intellect, when regarding sense perception it pays attention to the fact that the eye grasps colours, hearing sounds and the other senses the other perceptibles, and that it never happens that the perceptibles that belong to one

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sense are grasped by another, how will it not pay attention to the that grasp the different intelligible objects? Besides, the that grasp differences must themselves essentially be different, too. Therefore the points must be essentially different, too. What the essential difference is between one point and another is not easy even to imagine, if you should want to. In this way, then, it is impossible for the intellect to think at points. But if thinking happens through parts, it will, again, either be the case that one of the parts suffices for thinking or that it will not suffice. If, then, there is just one part that thinks, the assumption of the others will be superfluous; for that will be the intellect. Besides, we shall be enquiring about this part, whether it touches the intelligible at a point or in part, and the earlier discussions will come in here. But let it be supposed that it thinks as a whole;151 what need would there then be for the others? But if thinking does not take place according to one part, since it is possible to divide every extended magnitude into finite parts and into infinite (for extended magnitudes are divided into finite parts, if they are divided into the identical and equal parts, such as finger-length or cubit-length; for every finite thing is measured through each finite thing; they are divided into an infinite number of parts, if they are divided into identical parts according to proportion, that is, if they are cut into two; for division into two goes on indefinitely because there is always a division into extended magnitudes, and each magnitude is continuous, and each thing that is continuous is divisible), if, then, the division is into finite parts, it will either be the case that each part will think of everything and will not think in any other way than by touching everything, or some parts will think of some things; and then we shall say what we said before. Similarly, if the assumption is that there are an infinite number of parts, we shall use the same arguments as we did in the case of the assumption about points. For Aristotle has split up the refutations which apply similarly to all these things, and we have made all of them suitable to all things. 407a11 } parts either in magnitude or in point, if that should be called a part as well. [Now if it is in the sense of a point, and these are infinite in number, it will never get through to the end.]

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Since extended magnitudes are homogeneous (for a magnitude is made up of magnitudes, not of points; for a point is not a magnitude but the starting point of a magnitude), this is why, after saying ‘parts either in magnitude or in point’, he has noted his use of the word in an unnatural sense by saying ‘if that should be called a part’.

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407a14 And if it is in the sense of magnitude, it will think the same thing many times or an infinite number of times. [But it is evidently possible to do it once.]

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Many times if it is divided into finite parts, infinite times if it is divided into infinite parts. 407a15 If it is sufficient to touch it by means of any of its parts, why then does it need to move in a circle or have magnitude at all? That is to say, if any part of the circle can apprehend the intelligible object by touching it, what use is there then for the circular movement? For even when it is at rest, it will apprehend. What, then does movement in a circle contribute to its apprehension? Nor does its extension contribute to understanding, if it thinks by means of any part. For if something remains undiminished when divided so as to remain unaffected after the division, it is something different from what is being divided, and it is both in itself without extension and undivided. For instance, while a surface is being repeatedly divided, the whiteness that is in each of the parts remains preserved as it is, and although the quantity is affected by the division and decreases (instead of, say, two cubits it becomes one cubit), the whiteness remains the same; for whiteness is something over and above what is being divided. Likewise, therefore, if similar knowledge comes about by any of the parts of the circle, both in the largest and in the smallest part, what is thinking will be distinct from the magnitude. The magnitude therefore does not contribute anything to understanding, if indeed both the larger and the smaller part think in the same way.

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407a17 And if it is necessary for thinking to make contact with the whole circle, what will then be the contact by means of the parts? The division involves that the circle thinks either by means of a part of itself or by the whole, a part either in the sense of magnitude or in the sense of a point. Having expounded the absurd consequences of the hypothesis that says that thinking occurs by part, he now expounds the one that is still left, namely thinking by means of the whole of the circle. For if one does not think until the circle has come round, what then does each of the parts do? For if the parts do not think while going round, whereas the contact of the whole circle happens part by part, the circle will not think; for it does not touch the intelligible object by anything other than its own parts. It remains then to say that each of the parts knows part of the intelligible object, and the whole circle the whole. The absurd consequence of this view

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he draws himself when he says ‘of what sort is the contact by means of the parts’, as if he takes this implicitly in the sense that they touch the parts of the intelligible object. He then adds: 407a18 Furthermore, how will it think what is divided by means of what is undivided or what is undivided by means of what is divided?

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If the parts are incapable of thinking the whole, and if without thinking the parts cannot think the whole (for the thinking of the whole is the accumulation of the thinking of the parts), it could not think of anything undivided. Therefore, it will not think the undivided intelligible object, since it is itself divided. Moreover, if it thinks of a part by means of an individual part, thought as a whole will be composite. How, then, will it think a simple thought? For in this way all thought will be composite. Yet when there is no simple thought, there will be no composite thought either, for all composite is made up of simples; consequently, there will be no thought. Thus it will not even think; therefore the intellect will be eliminated because there is no thought. He has added ‘or what is divided by means of what is undivided’ as if he wanted to reject the statement that thinking happens by means of contact. For if the intellect is undivided, how will it think what is divided? For in virtue of being undivided it will make contact with what is undivided, not with what is divided. Or ‘How will it think what is divided by means of what is undivided’, with the intention of supplying ‘by a point’? For if apprehension is in a point, how will it think of things that are divided? The sentence ‘how will it think what is divided by means of what is undivided or what is undivided by means of what is divided?’ is also interpreted as follows, as if from a different starting point. Since, they say, that the intellect is not an extended magnitude, he has added this in order that no-one might suppose that he said that the intellect is undivided in the same way as a point; for neither will it, if it is an extended magnitude, think undivided objects, nor will it, if it is a point, think divided objects. Another way he speaks of undividedness in connection with the intellect; for the undividedness of the intellect is a self-existing substance exempt from all extension; but a point has its being in a line and is the starting point of extension. In what way the intellect, while being undivided, thinks everything, he will say in book three. Another way one should understand this as pertaining to a different argument that jointly applies to all hypotheses mentioned. For since the circle thinks by contact and touches its object either in a point or in a part, how then, if it thinks by touching in a point, will it think the divided objects, I mean bodies? For a point does not suit

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extended magnitude. And so how will it think when it does not suit? For what it does not touch, it will not think either. But if it thinks by individual parts, how will it think the undivided objects? For what is divided does not suit what is undivided. On the other hand, he can no longer object to the true account, that ‘how does the intellect, being undivided, think everything, both what is divided and what is undivided?’ For in this context we confirm that what is undivided is the opposite of what is divided, I mean the point, but the undividedness of the intellect is something different and not the opposite of the body’s many-part nature. It thinks because it has the formulae of all things within itself.

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407a19 It must be the intellect which is that circle. For the movement of the intellect is thinking, and of the circle, circular movement. If, then, thinking is circular movement, the intellect will also be a circle, whose circular movement of this kind is thinking.

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To prevent anyone from saying that Timaeus did not call the soul a perceptible circle but the circle in general and the definition of the circle, which is without extension or body, he makes it suit every circle, small and great alike, and he provides the following demonstration. It is an unavoidable conclusion from what has been said, he says, that Timaeus says that one should suppose the intellect to be a perceptible circle. For the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ indicates for him the perceptible; this is what is being demonstrated. What is his basis for saying that it is this? The circle in general does not move, for it is a definition. The relation in which the intellect stands to thinking, is that in which the circle stands to circular movement. Both are movement, the former of the intellect, the latter of the circle. Therefore, alternatively, the relation in which thinking stands to circular movement, is also the relation in which the intellect stands to the circle. If, then, thinking is circular movement, the intellect will therefore be a circle. And if circular movement belongs to a perceptible circle (since the circle in general does not move around), the intellect, too, will therefore be a perceptible circle.

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407a22 Thus it will always be thinking something; for it has to, considering that the circular movement is eternal.

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What he means by this is either that it thinks the same thing many times, or that it must always think infinitely different things, since the circuit is what thinking is, and this is eternal. Yet this will appear not in any way to be necessary; they could also say, ‘Yes, for it is necessary that it always thinks something and goes back and forth from the same thing to the same thing.’ Since no soul is like the first

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intellect, whose thinking is concentrated and without time, and which does not think now this, now that, but thinks all things at once, still, since all soul, even if you talk about the soul of the universe, has a thinking activity that changes and moves from one intelligible object to another, it will because of the fact that it is always in motion always think something, yet because it is eternal it will of necessity, because of the infinity of time, bend backwards to the same thing and in this way imitate a circle; yet it is not that it will think indefinite entities, since intelligible objects are not indefinite. So perhaps he says that it will always think the same thing because it has never thought the whole; for the circular movement, which is homogeneous and always the same, will be concerned with the same individual thing. The object which is being thought will thus have to be like that, it will never be thought of. What does this mean? In the sequel he shows that no thinking is indefinite. 407a23 For there are limits to acts of practical thinking; for they are all for the purpose of something different.

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That acts of practical thinking are finite, he shows on the basis of actions. Every action takes place for some purpose; so when they have reached the purpose for which they took place, they cease their activity. For no action goes on indefinitely; all that is coveted is for some purpose. Actions also have beginnings. Therefore, just as actions are in this state, likewise it is for the thoughts about them. Practical thoughts are therefore finite, except that, as we have said elsewhere many times, thoughts stand in a reverse relationship to actions, the purpose of the action being the starting point of thought and vice versa. For example, the starting point of the action of building is the digging of the foundation or the preparation of the material, the end is the roof, i.e. the shelter against rain and burning heat. The theoretical study and this action have the same limits, though in reverse order. 407a24 Theoretical thoughts are defined in the same way as rational accounts, and each definition or demonstration is a verbal expression. [Demonstrations have a starting point and also, in a way, an end, namely the syllogism or conclusion.]

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He now shows that theoretical thoughts are not infinite either, on the basis of the verbal expressions relating to them, thus proving what is less clear on the basis of what is more clear. For words are messengers of thoughts,152 and they are clearer and better known to us than the dispositions which give rise to them. It is therefore absolutely inevitable that verbal expressions of theoretical thoughts and the thoughts themselves should be similar. If, then, I show that the verbal expressions of these thoughts are finite, it is absolutely neces-

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sary for these thoughts to be finite too. Verbal expressions of theoretical thoughts are definition and demonstration. That none of these is infinite is clear from the following. Every demonstration has a beginning and an end, the beginning being the common insights, the end the demonstration itself and its conclusion.153 Consequently, no demonstration is infinite. Likewise, definitions154 have a beginning and an end, the beginning being the most general kinds, the end the most specific species. Therefore definitions are not infinite either. Besides, since no essence is infinite but always finite, the verbal expressions that define them must of necessity also be finite. Besides, if the most general kinds of beings are ten, and the procedure155 based on these does not go until infinity but only as far as the indivisible species, after which there are the individuals, then what results from all things156 must also be finite. Now definitions are based on these; therefore every definition is finite. He has shown in his On Demonstration that it is impossible for demonstrations to go on indefinitely, for otherwise all knowledge and understanding would be made impossible.157 For if, in order to apprehend the definitions, one needs to take endless differentiae into consideration, whereas it is impossible to deal with what is indefinite in a limited amount of time, it will be impossible to give a definition of anything at all; and when the definition of something is not known, it is impossible to know the nature of something, and when something’s nature is not known, it is impossible to know a thing’s essential attributes, which is what demonstration is concerned with, and all knowledge will be rendered impossible. Definitions therefore cannot go on indefinitely. Consequently, if verbal expressions of theoretical thoughts are finite, these thoughts themselves must be finite too. ‘Syllogism’ is his word for conclusion; which is why, when mentioning the syllogism, he adds ‘or the conclusion’, as if he is using the one word instead of the other. That there are only two types of verbal expression of theoretical thoughts, I mean definition and demonstration, is clear from the following: all beings are either substances or attributes of substances. Now there is such a thing as the substance of the soul, and there is such a thing as the soul’s attributes, for example its being immortal or having a middle position in everything, or something like that; the apprehension of the substances is discovered through the definitions, that of its attributes through demonstration – its essential attributes, that is. 407a27 And even if they are not limited, they nonetheless do not bend back again to the beginning, but go straight on by ever taking in new middle terms and new extremes; [but circular movement always returns to the beginning. And all definitions are limited].

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If someone, he says, were to say that it is possible for demonstrations to go on indefinitely, he will, first, be wrong, as we shall show. Secondly, if they go do on indefinitely, they will be linear, and they will not return to the beginning. For example, if I were to say that man is capable of laughing, and that what is capable of laughing is rational, so that man will be rational, by adding to this demonstration one further term I will connect it with a different demonstration, making the additional element the end, the one that was previously an extreme, middle; this is what he himself shows by saying ‘taking in new middle terms and new extremes’. So I add ‘animal’ and say that every man is rational, every rational being is an animal, therefore man is an animal. Again, I connect with this ‘ensouled’ and again ‘body’. Such a procedure of demonstration proceeds in a linear way, for it does not go backwards to its origin, i.e. it no longer returns to the demonstration of the premise that says ‘man is capable of laughing’, for that had already been demonstrated. For if it had not been demonstrated, the demonstration would not even have got under way. Or simply that it does not go back to the common insight, which is the starting point of demonstrations, from which the first premise is put together; for this is self-evident and not in need of demonstration; the circle however returns to itself. That it is impossible for a demonstration to go on indefinitely is also clear from the following. It either starts from the most general kinds and stops at the most specific species, or conversely it starts from the latter and ends with the former. The phrase ‘taking in the middle term’ is interpreted wrongly by Alexander: he says it is the middle term of the premise, e.g. the middle of ‘man’ and ‘capable of laughing’ or ‘rational’. Thus he no longer preserves the demonstration, if it contains a premise requiring demonstration through some middle term. But as we said, the extreme is added from outside, the middle term is not an addition, rather the one that was the end before this one changes its position and becomes middle. Even if we understand that they take the term between the premise, as in cases where the premise is not immediate, even in this way they proceed in a linear fashion and do not imitate the circle. For the first term, which was underlying the conclusion, cannot be predicated, nor does the term predicated become the underlying subject, if the terms are not interchangeable, as in cases where the demonstration proceeds in a circular fashion and not through the method of demonstration but through the subject matter itself, as when I say ‘man is capable of laughing’, and ‘what is capable of laughing can receive intellect and scientific knowledge’, therefore man is capable of receiving intellect and scientific knowledge, and conversely, ‘what can receive intellect and scientific knowledge is capable of laughing, what is capable of laughing is man, therefore what can receive intellect and understanding is man’.

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407a31 Furthermore, if the same circular movement takes place many times, it will be necessary for to think the same thing many times. He has said that the infinite circular movement is accompanied by infinite thinking, with either the same object being present all the time in the act of thinking and never coming into being, or the same thing being revolved many times, and he has shown that the consequence of the earlier statement is absurd. Now he shows what follows from this: if the circular movement of the intellect is always the same, the object of thinking will also be the same, so that it will always think the same thing and never anything different; consequently, it will not think everything. 407a32 Furthermore, thinking resembles some sort of rest and standstill rather than movement; and in the same manner this also seems to be the case with the syllogism. He has added a nice finishing touch, for as a matter of fact the process of searching resembles movement. For someone who has a problem is in great confusion and movement, but the one who has made a discovery, which is the same as saying: the person who has had a thought, is and will remain in peace and calm, which is where the word epistêmê (‘knowledge’) comes from, for the soul comes to a standstill (epi-stasis). Also the person who draws a conclusion and discovers something through demonstration is henceforth at rest. If, then, people say that the very act of thinking and the conclusion of a syllogism is circular movement, it seems that it is rest rather than movement; but if they say that the way to thinking is circular movement, we will have arrived at what we said earlier. What does each of the parts do, either the indefinite ones or those that are defined? And what about that which connects the premises? For the one thinking this, the other that, unless there is something different that brings them together by comprehending everything, the conclusion will not be drawn either. It is similar to a situation in which I perceive one thing and you perceive another. If it is something, it is the soul, not the circle.

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407a34 Yet nor will what does not move easily but forced be blissful. This may be an argument in its own right but it may also be connected with the above. He has said that thinking looks like a state of rest rather than movement, and he has shown from this that rest is more in accordance with nature for the intellect, as if he concluded that therefore movement is contrary to nature (for if rest is according to

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nature, movement must of necessity be contrary to nature). If, then, the intellect is moved, it will be moved by force (for everything that is contrary to nature is forced), and this having been concluded from what has been said that the intellect is moved by force, he infers plausibly that ‘nor will what does not move easily but forced be blissful’; but the soul of the universe must be in a state of blissfulness. And if it is not moved according to nature, because thinking is a state of rest rather than movement, nor contrary to nature, so that it has no part in blissfulness, it does not move at all. Yet this argument may also be a remark in its own right: he has shown that the consequences of the view that said that the soul is naturally subject to movement are absurd, and now he tries to see what would follow if it were not naturally subject to movement. For if it is moved contrary to nature, it will be moved by force, and all that is forced is not blissful; yet the soul of the universe must be blissful. 407b1 If its movement is not essential, its movement is likely to be contrary to nature.

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This, too, can be connected with what has gone before, for having said that what is not easy but forced is not blissful, he infers by this how it will be forced. , he says, if the movement is not in the essence itself; and movement will not be in the essence, because thinking resembles rest rather than movement. But it is also possible to understand this as a separate point: if the intellect and the soul are subject to movement, and the intellect is analogous to rest rather than to movement, the movement it has will be contrary to nature. Yet nothing always belongs to the domain of the unnatural, but wherever there is the unnatural, there will under all circumstances follow also what is in accordance with nature, yet it is not also the case that what is in accordance with nature will under all circumstances be followed by what is contrary to nature. If, then, it is subject to movement in an unnatural way, it will also be subject to movement in accordance with nature. But it is not subject to natural movement, as has been shown; therefore it will not be subject to unnatural movement either. 407b2 It is also painful for it to be in a state of mixture with the body when it is incapable of being released.

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the heaven, the movement it has will be painful and not easy; and this is not blissful. 407b3 Furthermore, it must try to avoid159 this, since it is better for the intellect not to be with a body, as is commonly said and is agreed by many. He proves the absurdity here on the basis of what is normally said by Plato and also the opinion of most people. Plato holds that it is better for the soul to be separate from the body; for the life in the body is painful. He also thinks that the universe will never be dissolved, so that the soul of the universe will all the time be in an inferior lot and will not even have the same share as our souls, which at some point in time are released from our bodies; for it is eternally interwoven with the body. Aristotle concludes this well, if in fact, as Timaeus seems to say, its essence is interwoven with the body. Yet just as the soul, when it is in control of the body, has the body as its follower, without itself following the movements of the body,160 likewise so much the more when the heavenly body is released from all mortal discomfort and is moved only through the will of the soul,161 there is no discomfort arising from this for the soul, just as there is none for our soul arising from the luminous body.162 407b5 It is also obscure what the reason is why the heaven moves round in a circle; for it is not the essence of the soul that is the cause of circular movement, but it rather happens accidentally. [Nor is the body the cause of this, but rather the soul is cause for this.] As if he has shown that the soul is not subject to movement per se, since it has no extension and is incorporeal, but accidentally, he says plausibly that in what they say it is unclear what the efficient cause is of the circular movement of the universe.163 For if the soul imparts movement by being moved, yet it had been shown that by itself it is immobile, what then is the cause of the circular movement of the heavens? For what has been demonstrated makes clear that neither is the soul subject to movement by itself, nor is the body itself cause for its own movement. For according to Plato its circular movement is not natural, but is due to a soul. The cause of circular movement, then, is unclear according to him. For Aristotle grants also that the movement of the celestial body is natural, but he says that the movement that comes from the soul runs alongside and thus causes the natural movement by its very being.164

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Translation 407b9 And it is not even said to be superior. [However, the god should have caused the soul to move in a circle on account of this, for being in motion was better for it than to be at rest, and to move in this way better than in another way.]

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Not only, he says, are we ignorant about the efficient cause of the circular movement of the heavens, as far as we can tell from what Timaeus has said, but also of the final cause: for nowhere has he proven that for the heavens it is better to be in movement rather than in a state of rest, or to move round in a circle rather than with any other kind of motion. And yet all things that naturally come into being look to an end, which is the best of possible outcomes for them. He himself actually does state as the final cause both of movement and of circular movement, namely that circular movement is a proper type of movement for what is eternal, since it has neither beginning nor end, and that it is good for it to be in motion rather than to stand still, since activity is better than inactivity. Plotinus, too, states the final cause of circular movement when he says: ‘Why’, he says, ‘does it move in a circle? Because it imitates intellect.’165 Indeed, the activity of the intellect resembles a circle, as we have said before.166 Since the things that are relatively inferior turn to the things that are superior, likewise by moving in a circle themselves imitate the activity of the intellect. Besides, since the divine is everywhere at the same time, it imitates that which is everywhere by being everywhere by circular movement. Plato, too, has stated the cause of the spherical shape : ‘for he has given it a circular shape’, he says, ‘which is fitting and akin’;167 for he has given to that which will receive everything that shape which contains most space, and the thing that contains most space of all objects with equal circumference in planimetry is the circle, whereas in stereometry it is the sphere.168 407b12 Since such an enquiry is more appropriate to other discussions, let us leave it here. The enquiry as to the reason why the heavens move in this way, and why it is better this way, does not belong to the present project, but such an enquiry would be more appropriate to the treatment of the heavens and of movement. Yet the present enquiry is about the soul. So, having simply said that these questions were omitted by Timaeus, he brings the discussion back to its original topic. 407b13 Yet here we find a further absurdity both for this theory and for most theories about the soul. [For they connect the soul

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with and put it in a body without specifying on account of what cause and in what condition the body is. And yet this would seem to be necessary; for because of their community, the one acts and the other is acted upon, the one is subject to movement and the other imparts movement, yet none of these things is present in just any chance reciprocal relationship. They only undertake to say what the soul is like, yet about the body that is to receive it they make no further specifications, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, for any random soul to enter any random body. For each of these seems to have its own form and shape, yet they speak as if one said that the art of carpentry could enter oboes; for the art is in need of instruments for its practical use, and the soul of the body.] Having refuted individually each of the theories about the soul, he now raises one criticism, common virtually to all at once, against those who have spoken about the soul, viz. that while speaking about the soul they have said nothing about the body which receives it, what kind of soul uses what kind of body. And yet, when it comes to soul and body, the one acts and the other is acted upon; and things that act and are acted upon have a certain relationship and community. For it is not that anything is acted upon by anything; whiteness is not acted upon by what is sweet. Therefore it is also not the case that the same soul will act upon the same body, nor will any arbitrary body be acted upon by any random soul. For if animals differ from each other in form and the form of each of the ensouled beings is its soul (for this is what perfects the substrate) and the same form does not occur in different material (for each form has its own material: bronze has one form and stone has another, etc.), therefore it will not be the case for any random soul to occur in any random body. Just, then, as the student of nature, considering bronze, should not just talk about its form but also about its material, as himself does in the fourth book of the Meteorologica169 and elsewhere, likewise, then, the person who is speaking of the soul should also talk about the body that is to receive it and say of what nature it is and what potentiality it has, since the soul is the soul of a body. Those people, he says, who have talked about the soul have not made any specifications about the body, ‘as if’, he says, ‘as in the Pythagorean myths any random soul could enter any random body’, using the argument very strikingly. He says what they say is mythical and not worth any reasonable discussion, as for example the statement of Empedocles (for he was a Pythagorean too), ‘Indeed, I once was a boy and a girl and a bush and a bird and a wandering fish from the sea.’170

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This is absurd, for each of these things has its own individuating form. Consequently, if animals differ in form, and it is especially the soul which is the form, all animals will not have the same soul. For just as one skill uses some tools and another different ones, and architecture could never use oboes, likewise the physical tools, i.e. the bodies, are appropriate for the souls which use them. For in order to receive the impulse of the soul, the body needs to be suitable. Just as the skill stands to the tools, likewise the soul stands to the body. If, then, it is impossible for a skill to make use of just any random tools, neither will any random soul use any random body. When speaking about the soul, they should talk also about the body that is to receive the soul, as he himself has done in the treatise On the Parts of Animals; for each of the parts is characterised neither by the psychic activity only nor by its corporeal constitution only, but by both. For example, the eye is a part that consists not only of a particular number and kind of membranes, but it is accompanied by a psychic faculty of a certain kind. And something similar applies to the other parts. Here, too, he will not only talk about the senses but also about the sense organs that receive the sensitive faculties. It is correct that he has not said ‘all those who have spoken about the soul’, but ‘most’, making an exception for Plato; for he, when talking about the soul, has given an extensive account of the body that receives the soul both in the Timaeus and the Phaedrus.171 For this reason he says that the head rises above the whole body and is spherical, being particularly receptive of the leading faculty in the body, since also that which leads the universe, viz. the heaven, and the psychic life that is in it rises above the whole world and is spherical.172 He also says why the heart is conic in shape, since the spirited faculty resides in it, and this is fiery; for this reason, it, too, imitates the essence of fire by being conic in shape.173 Also about the liver and the other parts he similarly gives a physical account.174 As for the human body as a whole, he gives the following natural account, namely that the spherical part, namely the head, is at the top of the whole body, while the rest, which is upright, comes behind, thus demonstrating the mixed of human nature, I mean that which consists of reason and non-rationality, mortal and immortal life. All those forms of life that are only immortal, these also have only a spherical body, for to what is eternal the spherical shape is appropriate, having neither beginning nor end; all those forms of life that are only mortal, such as those of the non-rational living beings, have got only upright bodies (for the non-rational modes of life resemble a straight line, as we have said),175 and these are oblique and bending downwards, as things that have nothing akin to the celestial bodies. The combination is man, who has received an appropriate body, spherical above (for it is led by the rational and eternal), and upright at the lower end, because what is rational and immortal

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is accompanied by the mortal and non-rational life. In this way, then, he talks in the Phaedrus about the immortality of the soul and about the body that is shaped appropriately to it, as we said, and he says ‘for never having seen being, it will not come into this shape’,176 on the assumption that there is some part of the soul that has not seen being, I mean the non-rational soul, and that soul will never acquire a human shape, clearly in order to lead and rule the body, saying that very Aristotelian thing before Aristotle himself said it, that no random soul gets into a random body. What does he mean by ‘being’? We know that it is the intelligible, for that is really being since it is without matter, and having nothing potentially but being actuality without potentiality; all perceptible being is not being, because it is always in a state of potentiality, and that is identical to saying that it is in a state of not being; for it is only the rational soul, as something intelligent, that knows what is intelligible.

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407b27 There has been handed down yet another doctrine about the soul. Aristotle has just criticised collectively all those who have spoken about the soul for saying nothing about the body that is to receive it. They ought to have done so, since it is not that a random soul enters a random body, but rather that the body needs to possess a particular kind of suitability in order to receive a particular kind of soul. For the mixture and the composition177 of animals that are conspicuous for the spirited 178 differ from those of the animals that are conspicuous for the appetitive and from those of the cowardly animals;179 and, generally speaking, both the mixtures of the elements of the body and the arrangement of the organs correspond to their suitability to the activities of the soul.180 Having said these things, he now appropriately connects this with a doctrine of the soul that follows from this. For some people had the same thing in mind, viz. that while the body does not have a share in soul in whatever sort of state, it requires a mixture of a particular kind, just as harmony does not arise from strings that are in whatever sort of state, but requires a particular tension. Therefore they thought that the soul, too, is a harmony181 of the body, and that the different kinds of souls correspond to different harmonies of the body. It is this theory,182 then, which he expounds and refutes; and in the present passage he just reports the doctrine itself, but a little later he states also the arguments on the strength of which these people arrived at it. In a different context, he has already argued against this theory, namely in his dialogue Eudemus.183 Also before him, Plato in the

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Phaedo has used five arguments against the theory.184 The first is this: harmony comes in addition185 to what is fitted together;186 for there have to be strings, then they have to be stretched in a particular way, and in this way harmony comes in addition. Consequently, harmony is posterior to the parts that are fitted together. But the soul exists prior to the body that is fitted together, since acts of learning are acts of recollection.187 Therefore, the soul is not a harmony. This argument rests on the previous demonstration of the prior existence of the soul on the proof that acts of learning are recollection; so this argument applies only to the rational soul. As for the other arguments, some apply to the soul as a whole, others to the rational soul only. The first was the one we just mentioned, the second is as follows.188 Harmony, he says, is not in conflict with the parts fitted together but goes along with them, being in whatever state the parts fitted together are; but the soul is in conflict with the body and dominates it; therefore the soul is not a harmony. That harmony cannot be in conflict with the parts fitted together is evident, for it has its being in them; therefore it is impossible that it should oppose them, for nothing strives towards non-being. Yet the soul despises the body and opposes the impulses of the body, and it ought to have perished completely, since it does not have its being in it.189 Thirdly,190 harmony admits of more and less; for we say that this lyre is better tuned than that one. But the soul does not admit of more or less, for the soul does not become more soul or less soul than it already is; nor is one soul more soul than another. Therefore, the soul is not a harmony. Fourthly,191 the soul admits of virtue and vice, of which virtue is harmony (for it is a consonance of the powers of the soul), whereas vice is lack of harmony (for it is a conflict and a division between the powers of the soul), so that the soul admits of harmony and lack of harmony; for that is what virtue and vice are. But harmony does not admit of harmony and lack of harmony; for it is ridiculous to say that harmony admits of harmony or, conversely, that while remaining harmony it would admit of lack of harmony. Therefore the soul is not a harmony. Fifthly,192 if the soul is a harmony, it does not admit of lack of harmony; now vice is a lack of harmony of the soul. If, then, the soul does not admit of vice, all souls will be similarly good. But the second part is wrong, I mean the conclusion; and so therefore is the premise. Therefore, the soul is not a harmony. Against the third argument that says ‘harmony more and less harmony, but the soul is not more or less soul’ (this is the way in which Plato states the premises), an argument is adduced from Epicurus that is trying to refute it by means of similarities.193 Sweet, he says, admits of more and less, but honey does not admit of more or less, for it is a substance; therefore honey is not sweet; which is absurd. Each of the syllogisms in the second figure appear to be similarly constructed in a way which is not contrary to syllogistic

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reasoning. Consequently, they must either both be true, or if Epicurus’ argument is evidently false and contrary to syllogistic reasoning, something like that also obtains for Plato’s argument: for the analogy is similar in all respects. But that both are contrary to syllogistic reasoning you can learn if you state the middle term in each of the two syllogisms, starting with that of Plato. For you will not find the same middle term in both premises, for the syllogism is as follows: harmony is more or less harmony, soul is not more or less soul; consequently, what is being predicated in the major premise is that harmony is more or less, but in the minor premise that soul is not more or less. Consequently, the middle term is not one and the same; therefore the argument is not a proper syllogism. Likewise also with regard to the other syllogism, in the one case ‘more or less sweet’ has been stated as predicate, in the other ‘more or less honey’; consequently, the middle term is not one and the same. For if one seems to state one middle term in both by saying that honey does not admit of more or less whereas sweet does admit of more or less (for in both cases the predicate seems to be one and the same, viz. admitting of more and less), still in reality it is not one. For it is not the case that what is sweet without qualification admits of more or less, but in so far as it is sweet; not, therefore, in so far as it is a body. Likewise it is not without qualification that honey does not admit of more or less, but in so far as it is honey; however, in so far as it is sweet, it does admit . Likewise the soul, in so far as it is soul, does not admit of more or less, since it admits in respect of its attributes. Therefore one must include in the premises that in respect of which one of these does admit of more or less and the other does not. With these things added, the middle term becomes different. And if the middle term becomes different, the combination no longer is in accordance with syllogistic reasoning. One can see that the analogy is not similar and that while Plato is arguing syllogistically, Epicurus is not. Let me put it like this: ‘harmony is harmony to a greater or smaller extent, the soul is not a harmony to a greater or smaller extent’; in this way I make sure that the middle term is one. The reasoning becomes even clearer if we do not state the premises in the way Plato stated them, but if we adapt them a little. For he stated the premise as follows: ‘harmony is harmony to a greater or smaller extent’; let us state it as follows: ‘every harmony admits of more or less’. For if we put it like that, we do not need the addition ‘in so far as it is harmony’, for harmony is not a composite of two nor accompanied by an underlying substrate, as is the case with what is sweet, for this refers to the sweetened body, just like the fitted body, yet harmony194 is something simple, like sweetness: and that indicates only the quality. For if we state ‘the fitted body’, we require an addition: ‘everything that is fitted admits of more or less, in so far as it is fitted together’; but if we state

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‘harmony’, this is no longer the case. Harmony, then, admits of more or less, but the soul, in so far as it is soul, does not admit of being more or less; for one should add to soul ‘in so far as it is soul’, for the reasons stated. The soul, then, in so far as it is soul, is not a harmony. This, then, is how it is possible to show Plato arguing syllogistically. Epicurus, however, applies his argument to sweet, not sweetness; if he had , he would not have drawn any false conclusion, for it is true that honey is not sweetness. Since, then, what is sweet is a composite, it requires an addition, for otherwise the universal premise will not be true. All that is sweet, admits of more or less in so far as it is sweet, not without qualification, yet honey in so far as it is honey, does not admit of more or less. Nothing follows from this: for there is no common middle term. If, then, the ‘in so far as it is this’ is added to the items that are predicated, we will not get the common middle term, as has been said; yet if we add it to the underlying substrates, e.g. ‘what is sweet in so far as it is sweet admits of the more or the less’, and honey, in so far as it is honey, does not admit of more or less, the conclusion will be drawn that honey, in so far as it is honey, will not be sweet in so far as it is sweet; yet that is inconceivable.195 These, then, are the five arguments by Plato. Aristotle himself, too, has used two of them, as I already said, in his dialogue Eudemus, one in the following way. ‘The opposite of harmony’, he says, ‘is lack of harmony, yet there is no opposite to the soul, therefore the soul is not a harmony.’ One might say against this that there is no opposite of harmony in the strict sense, but rather an indeterminate privation; the soul, too, being a kind of form, has something indeterminate as its opposite. And just as we say in this case that a particular lack of harmony changes into harmony, likewise a particular privation changes into the soul. Secondly, he says: the opposite of the harmony of the body is the lack of harmony of the body, and lack of harmony of an ensouled body is disease and weakness and ugliness, the lack of proportion between their elements being disease, that between the homoeomerous parts weakness, that between the organic parts ugliness. If, then, lack of harmony is disease and weakness and ugliness, harmony will be health and strength and beauty. Now the soul is none of these things, I mean it is neither health nor strength nor beauty. For even Thersites, although he was the ugliest of people, had a soul.196 Therefore the soul is not a harmony. That is what he said there; in the present text he uses four arguments that disprove that theory, the third of which is the one mentioned as being the second in the Eudemus. What these are, we will learn as we broach the text. 407b27 } which to many people was no less plausible than the ones we have discussed }197

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That the opinion that says that the soul is a harmony of the body is plausible, he states here without qualification, though later after the objections against it he adds why this is a plausible opinion.198 Also Simmias in the Phaedo says that no opinion about the soul would seem to him to be so plausible as the one that says that it is a harmony.199

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407b28 } and which has its accounts200 audited, so to speak, in public discussions.201 Even if the doctrine is plausible, he says, it has given accounts as in an audit, i.e. when subjected to arguments it was corrected and refuted as false. Then he adds where these corrections were given, ‘in public discussions’. He could be speaking about either his own unwritten conversations with his friends or the exoteric writings, to which the dialogues belong, of which the Eudemus is one, which are called exoteric because they were not written for genuine pupils but for the public benefit of the many.

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407b30 [For they say that the soul is a kind of harmony]; for, , harmony is a mixture and a combination of opposites, and the body is made up of opposites. Having set out the doctrine of these people, namely that they said that the soul is a harmony, he also states the argument by which they tried to establish this point. The syllogism is as follows: harmony is made up of opposites; the ensouled body, too, is made up of opposites, namely the four elements, dry, wet, cold and hot; therefore the ensouled body is a harmony. Now that harmony is made up of opposites is true; for harmony is according to the Pythagoreans a union of things diverse and having opposite thoughts;202 yet that the ensouled body is made up of opposites is not universally true, for the celestial bodies are ensouled yet they are not made up of opposites, for they are simple. Besides, the combination the syllogism in the second figure is not in accordance with syllogistic reasoning, since it consists of two assertory statements. Moreover, even if it were in accordance with syllogistic reasoning, the conclusion is not that the soul is a harmony, but that the body is a harmony. He has called the harmony ‘a mixture and a combination’, i.e. a mixture of the elements; for we say that this or that particular mixture of water and wine is nicely mixed.203 We also speak of harmony in the case of juxtaposition, for we say that a door has been well put together; what he called combination I call juxtaposition, for when the planks are put together in such a way that they do not leave any room between them for anything of the same kind, we say that the door has been well put together.

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Translation 407b32 Yet harmony is a ratio or combination of things mixed, but it is impossible for the soul to be either of these.

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Here the refutations begin, and this is the first of the four arguments. It is the following syllogism: harmony is a ratio or combination of things mixed; the soul is neither a ratio nor a combination; therefore the soul is not a harmony. That the soul is neither a ratio nor a combination he takes for granted now (for it would be absurd to call the soul a combination or ratio, as if it were a ratio of two to one or three to two or some other, or again a combination, which is a juxtaposition of bodies; for the soul is a substance, but neither of these things is a substance); later however he also provides a demonstration for this as he proceeds. 407b34 Furthermore, movement does not belong to harmony, yet virtually all attribute this more than anything else to the soul.

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This is the second syllogism and again it is in the second figure. Harmony, he says, does not cause movement to the objects from which it comes to be; for the harmony does not move the strings, yet the soul moves the body of which it is the soul; therefore the soul is not a harmony. Harmony does not exercise any kind of movement on the things of which it is a harmony, for neither does harmony cause things fitted together to be moved in space (for it is the craftsman who exercises movement on these from outside), neither in a quantitative sense, nor indeed in the sense of alteration; for neither does harmony cause alteration to the strings, rather it comes into being when the strings have been moved or altered, yet its coming into being does not change the things in which it resides. 408a1 It is more fitting204 to speak of harmony in respect of health, and in general of the bodily virtues, than in respect of the soul.

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This is the third argument; it is the second of those used in the Eudemus. That health is a harmony he showed there by contrasting it to disease; we have discussed the conduct of the syllogistic reasoning above.205 408a3 This becomes most clear when one tries to attribute to a harmony of some sort the affections and activities of the soul. [For these fit206 the soul awkwardly.]

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The argument, he says, that says that the soul is a harmony will clearly turn out to be absurd if we try to attribute each of the activities or affections of the soul to a certain type of harmony. For if the soul

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is a harmony, then also its activities or affections will be a harmony, just as the parts or the kinds of unqualified harmony will themselves also be harmonies. What kind of harmony, then, is spirit or desire or perception or the others? Is it Lydian, or Phrygian, or Ionian, or some other? If none of these is a harmony, the soul from which these things arise will not be a harmony either. This, then, is the fourth argument. The syllogism is as follows: if the soul is a harmony, and the modes of harmony are Lydian, Phrygian etc., the soul will be some of these; but this is absurd; therefore, the soul is not a harmony. Yet, again, they could argue against this that we do not claim that the soul is the kind of harmony that resides in the strings, but a certain ratio, of a particular kind, of things that are put together or mixed; for the harmony of the body or of its elements in respect of their faculties or of its organic parts in respect of their composition is not a Lydian or Phrygian mode of harmony either. Perhaps, then, Aristotle does not reduce the argument to this, but the words ‘a harmony of some sort’ mean the harmony of things fitted together according to this or that ratio, not in the sense of a Lydian or a Phrygian harmony; but that is the interpreters. That it is impossible to attribute to some sort of harmony of the parts of the body the activities and affections of the soul is clear from the concluding comment itself: for to say that the intellect is, say, a ratio of things mixed of two to one, and perception, say, three to two, and some other faculty yet another ratio, is ridiculous and it is not easy even to imagine such a thing.

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408a5 Furthermore, since207 we use the word harmony by looking at two things, [in the most proper sense in relation to magnitudes in things that have movement and position, to refer to the combination of these, when they are fitted together in such a way as to allow nothing of the same kind to intervene, and hence also the ratio of things that have been mixed together }] In the first syllogism, he has said that harmony is a ratio of things mixed together or a combination of these, whereas the soul is neither of these. What, then, is the basis for his saying that the soul is none of these? He accepted this there without demonstration, but here he finally demonstrates it. We speak of harmony, he says, in a twofold sense: according to the first definition we use it in the sense of the combination of bodies, when these are put side by side in such a way that no body akin to them can be fitted in between, for example, when the stones of which a house is made up are put together so precisely that it is impossible to insert another stone or piece of wood or something of the same sort of the bodies that have weight, we say that the stones are harmonically put together, and their combination we

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call a harmony. He has added ‘of the same kind’, since it is possible for air to be present in between the things fitted together, or glue or something like that. We transfer the word harmony, he says, from these things, and apply it to the ratio of things mixed together, for example in things mixed or in music: the ratio of things mixed, which is three to two or four to three or something else, we call metaphorically a harmony based on the things that have been put together. Why, then, after saying ‘in the most proper sense in relation to magnitudes’, has he added ‘in things that have movement and position’? He has done so in contrast with mathematical objects. For these, too, are magnitudes, but they have neither movement nor position, for they do not even have existence: they have their being only in mental apprehension. ‘Movement’ he has mentioned in order to contradistinguish physical bodies from mathematical ones, ‘position’ in order to contradistinguish physical lines and surfaces from mathematical ones; for the physical ones have position, even if they do not have movement. Why, then, does he say that according to the first definition the harmony is to be viewed in the case of juxtaposition? My reply is: because it is more known to us, for in the Categories, too, he says that the most proper and primary and particular sense in which something is a substance is the individual,208 because it is more known to us. 408a9 } neither sense209 is reasonable; but the combination of parts of the body is most liable to critical scrutiny. He says that it is not plausible to posit that the soul is a combination, nor that it is a mixture, but least of all that it is a combination: that argument is most liable to refutation. For if it is the combination of the homogeneous parts that makes up the soul, then, since the combination of all individual homogeneous parts is made up of organic parts (for the hand is made up of bones and sinews and flesh etc., and so also is the foot, the head and all the rest) there would be soul in each individual part. For if combination, without further qualification, is what soul is, and each part is combined in a different way, each part would have soul. Indeed, each part would have many souls, for the hand as a whole is fitted together in one way, the parts of the hand in another way, fingers etc.; therefore in each individual part there would be many souls, which is contrary to reason. Therefore the soul is not a combination. For if no single part of the soul fits some sort of combination of the body (for from what kind of combination would the intellect come, or sense perception?), neither will the soul as a whole fit together with the whole combination. For the combination as a whole is made up of combinations of individual parts. It is difficult even to imagine, as he says himself, according to what kind of combination and of what kind of part each faculty of the soul comes into being.

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408a11 There210 are many combinations of parts and many ways . [Of what, then, and how should one conceive the intellect to be a combination, or the perceptive part, or the desiring part?]211 ‘Many’, because the limbs are many, ‘in many ways’ because the combination of the homogeneous parts is sometimes this, sometimes that.

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408a13 It is likewise absurd212 that the soul should be a ratio of mixtures. [For the mixture of the elements does not have the same ratio for flesh as it has for bone, with the consequence that it will have many souls all throughout the body, if indeed everything from the mixture of the elements, the ratio of the mixture being a harmony and soul.] Also according to the other meaning of harmony, he says, it is absurd213 to say that the soul is a harmony. Since there are many ratios of mixtures in the body on the level of the homogeneous parts (for although the elements are the same, the ratio of their mixture is different for bone, different for flesh, for blood and for the other homogeneous parts), there have to be many souls according to this theory, if indeed the mixture is a harmony, and if the harmony is soul, and if the mixtures of the parts of the body are many. And if someone were to say that they did not simply mean that any chance combination or harmony was soul or the combination of some particular part, but that the combination and harmony of the whole was soul, our reply is that what we have said applies most of all to the case in which they simply said that it is a harmony without further specification, and secondly that even if someone were to refute this argument, the others would still be irrefutable. Finally, we will state that if the soul is a harmony, they will be turning things upside down: beings without soul will be causes of souls, non-rational beings of reason, insensitive beings of sensation, which is absurd: saying that inferior beings are causes of superior ones. 408a18 One might also demand from Empedocles the following question. [For he says that each of the parts is in virtue of some sort of ratio; but is it then the soul that is this ratio, or is it rather something different that comes to be present in the parts? Furthermore, is Love the cause of any chance mixture or of the mixture based on a certain ratio, and is this the ratio, or is it something different over and above the ratio? Such, then, are the difficulties posed by these views.]

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Having refuted those who say that the soul is a harmony by demonstrating that whatever sort of harmony we assume, whether in the sense of a mixture or in the sense of a combination, many absurd consequences follow from this, he also in passing raises a problem against Empedocles which naturally follows from what has been said. For , too, said that the forms of the parts of living beings consist of a mixture of the elements, saying that the one ratio of the elements produces flesh, another bone, and others other . And in the sequel he will quote a statement214 of his which tries to say exactly this, viz. what the ratio of the elements is in each part of the mixture. Now since he said that the forms of the parts are a ratio of the mixture, and since the soul, too, is a form of the whole living being, he naturally raises the question whether is the ratio of the things that are mixed and which the whole living being , or whether it is something different over and above the ratio and comes into existence in the things that are mixed. For if the soul is the ratio of things that have been mixed, what then does he mean when he says ‘for we see earth by means of earth’?215 For the elements are not the ratio. Furthermore, as he already said, there are many souls in one living being, indeed in each part, since there are many ratios, too. If the soul is something different over and above the ratio and comes into existence within the things that are mixed, what is it and how does it come into existence in these? Again, what does he mean by saying ‘by means of earth we see earth’? If the soul is the elements, why is it that in the case of the other forms, bone, flesh and suchlike, he did not make the elements responsible but the ratio, whereas in the case of the soul he made the elements themselves responsible? For if the form is superior to the matter, and if the elements of the parts of the living being are the matter while the ratio is the form, the ratio of the elements will be superior to their mixture; with the result that the inferior forms, I mean bone and flesh and suchlike, will consist of superior things, I mean the ratio of the mixture, or rather they will be the ratio itself, while the superior form, the soul, will consist of inferior things, I mean matter; for these were the matter of the other forms. Thus the superior will be derived from the inferior, which is absurd. Furthermore, since Empedocles also says that Love is the cause of the mixture of the elements, consequently raises problems about this also. For Love is either identical to the mixture, so that the mixture would be love, or different from it; and if it is different, it will be the cause of the chance mixture or of the mixture in accordance with ratio. Now if it is identical to the mixture, what will be the cause of the mixture? For it is in all respects impossible that there should be coming to be without a cause, as Plato says.216 But if it is different, of what sort of mixture will it be the cause? If it

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is the cause of any chance mixture, it will follow that the forms consist of any chance mixture, not only those that have come into being but also the divine ones, which is absurd; for we do not observe that any chance mixture produces any chance form, but the ratio of the mixture has determined each form. Yet if they consist of the mixture that is in accordance with ratio, which is plausible, even if Empedocles did not say so nor is it to be inferred from what he says, he ought to say what this is and what nature it has; for it does not suffice to say that it is Love, one should also add what Love is. These are appropriate things to say against Empedocles; but Aristotle has not made the division in the way we have said; but this way it is better. Having said this, then, by way of aside against Empedocles, he returns to the theory about harmony.

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408a24 Yet if the soul is something different from the mixture, why then is the essence of flesh destroyed simultaneously with the essence of the other parts of the living being? While expounding the doctrine of those who say that the soul is a harmony, he has said that this theory has some plausibility. Having raised objections to it, therefore, he now states the reasons why this theory appears to be plausible; and to put it concisely, this is what he says. If the soul is not a harmony that comes into being in virtue of the ratio of the mixture, why then is it that when the harmony of the body is destroyed, the soul is destroyed as well? For if the soul is something different from the harmony, as the lyre player is from the lyre, then, just as when the harmony of the strings is disturbed, there is nothing that prevents the lyre player from still being present with the lyre, since he is different from the lyre and from the harmony, likewise the soul, too, if indeed it were not identical with the harmony, should still be present with the body even when the harmony is destroyed. This, then, is the meaning of the passage; but the actual wording is as follows. ‘If the soul is something different from the mixture’, that is to say, if the soul is not a harmony, and the harmony is one of mingling and mixture (for there is also a harmony in the sense of combination), ‘why then is being flesh destroyed simultaneously with being the other parts of the living being?’ This is equivalent to: why is it that when the harmony of one bodily part is destroyed, the harmony of the remaining parts is also destroyed? in order that we conclude on external grounds that ‘when the harmony of all bodily parts has been destroyed, the soul is destroyed as well’. He tries the argument out in the case of flesh because it is clearer: for if the form of flesh were to be taken away from the living being, the forms of the other bodily parts would be taken away, too, bones, sinews etc., and together with these also the soul; for it is not only when the flesh is destroyed that

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the destruction of the remaining parts follows, but when any of the other parts mentioned is destroyed. This is the way in which Alexander explains the passage,217 and he does so very appropriately, so that the problem is at the same time the solution also for the other things that have been said against the harmony view. Or rather, of the one that says that a consequence of saying that the soul is a harmony is that the living being has many souls. For if, he says, the soul were not a harmony but something different from the mixture, why is it that when the mixture of the flesh is destroyed, the mixture of the other parts is destroyed, too? For if that is the case, there would seem to be just one mixture of all parts and not many. For why would all be destroyed together with the one? In this way the soul will also be one and not many, which was the absurdity to which the view that the soul is the harmony was thought to lead. Yet it seemed absurd to reduce this to the view that says that the soul is a harmony. Therefore, if the living being is destroyed when one mixture is destroyed, the soul, being a harmony, will be one harmony as well. But also offers a different interpretation of this passage. If the soul is not a harmony, why then is it destroyed together with the flesh when that is destroyed? Then, as if from a different starting point, ‘is destroyed in a similar way to the other parts of the living being’ instead of ‘is destroyed together with other parts of the living being when each of these is being destroyed’. ‘Parts’ he takes in the sense of the homogeneous parts, bones, flesh, sinew, blood vessels etc.; for when any of these is destroyed, the living being is destroyed with it, yet not so with any of the organic parts. By ‘being destroyed’ he does not mean the substrate itself of the homogeneous parts, but its form; which is why he did not say ‘when the flesh is destroyed’ but ‘when the essence of flesh is destroyed’. 408a26 In addition to this, if indeed not every part has soul, unless soul is the ratio of the mixture, then what is it that perishes when the soul is taken away? He raises questions here about the same problem in a different way, or rather it is not in every respect that this problem is different from the previous one, but it is the reverse side of the same problem. For earlier he had raised the question why it is that when the combination and harmony of the body is destroyed, the soul ceases to exist too, unless the soul is a harmony, whereas now we have the reverse: ‘why is it that when the soul leaves the body, the harmony perishes as well?’ And in the earlier passage he started from the harmony and ended with the soul, whereas here he starts with the soul and ends with the harmony of the body. For if, he says, the harmony of the body is not soul, why then is it that when the soul leaves the body, the

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harmony immediately perishes? He does not put it explicitly, the fact that the harmony of the body is not soul, but the absurd consequence of such a theory, as he stated it previously: for from saying that the soul is a harmony it followed to say that each individual part was soul. If, then, it is not the case, he says, that there is soul in each individual part, i.e. if the soul is not a harmony – which is why, when he became aware of the unclarity, he repeated what he said by saying ‘if the ratio of the mixture is not soul’ – he then adds ‘what is it that perishes when the soul leaves the body?’ This is instead of saying ‘when the living being perishes at the departure of the soul, we see nothing perish except the mixture and the harmony of the body’. For the elements that have been mixed do not perish, but still exist. Therefore the soul is a harmony, if the perishing of the soul effected nothing else but the perishing of the harmony of the body. Now when raising the problem, Aristotle did not add the solution, as if this was clear and had in a way already been said in the preceding sections. The solution is as follows, as we have said elsewhere:218 the elements that have been combined and the ratio of their mixture, which is the same as saying the harmony, stand to the soul in a relation of a conditio sine qua non; for if they are not present, it is not possible for an organic body to exist, and if there is no organic body, it is impossible for the soul to be present in it; yet these things are not soul, just as, though there cannot be a house without bricks or wood, the house is not just bricks and wood; and just as light is not actualised if there is no transparency of air, yet light is not the same as the transparency of the air, it is like this with the soul and the harmony of the body. Why then is it that when the harmony is destroyed, the soul is destroyed as well, or rather the activity of the soul in relation to the body, just as when the transparency of the air is destroyed it is not the light that is destroyed but its activity in relation to the transparent? It is clear that the harmony stands to the activity of the soul in a relation of a conditio sine qua non. Again, when the soul departs , the harmony will also disappear immediately, because it is that which holds it together and which constantly replaces any part of its texture which may fail. That the soul is not a harmony has been demonstrated in many ways. To say219 that the lyre player is present with the lyre even if the harmony of the strings has dissolved is similar to saying that an unmusical person is present with it, or even an inanimate object; for he is not present with it in his capacity of a lyre-player and of having a relationship to the lyre, but as if a stone were present; for he never exercised any activity on it in the manner of a lyre player when it was not tuned, just as the soul exercises no activity in relation to the body that is not tuned. Therefore the example comes close to what happens in the case of the soul rather than being in conflict with it; for perhaps nothing prevents the soul to be occasionally with the body even after

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its departure from it, yet it is impossible for it to exercise activity on it, as it is impossible for a lyre player to do so in relation to an untuned lyre. 154,1

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408a30 [It is clear, then, from what has been said that it is impossible for the soul to be a harmony or for it to move round in a circle.] But it is possible for it to be moved accidentally, as we said, and to move itself, [for example, it is possible for that in which the soul is present to be moved by the soul; but in other respects it is not possible for the soul to be moved spatially]. Having rejected that the soul is by itself subject to movement, which is what Democritus and Timaeus had said, the one along a straight line, the other in a circle, by showing himself that the soul is by itself immobile, he now says that one can say that it moves itself accidentally, though only in the sense of locomotion. For since it moves the body, and is present in it while the body is moved, it will be moved along with it, so that it sets itself in motion accidentally because it moves the body in which it is present. But it is not moved by itself or by its nature nor is it in space, since it is without body. Thus one may say that the soul moves itself only in the sense of locomotion, but in no other sense; for it is not altered when the body undergoes alteration, nor does it grow or decrease. ‘to be moved accidentally, as we said’: He said this when he was reacting to Timaeus:220 ‘even the cause of the heaven’s circular movement is unclear; for neither the essence of the soul is cause of the circular movement of the heavens, but accidentally’. 408a34 One would raise a more reasonable question about its being moved if one were to look at the following. We say that the soul suffers pain, rejoices, is valiant and frightened, [and moreover that it gets angry and perceives and reasons; these all appear to be movements. Hence one might think that the soul is subject to movement].

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Having rejected that the soul is by itself subject to locomotion (for if it is subject to locomotion, he says, it will also occupy space; and if it does that, it is a body) having rejected this, then, he now, since it is most of all believed to be subject to qualitative changes (for it changes in accordance with fear, anger and other affections), he now takes issue with this latter view. Thus he argues that the soul appears to be subject to such movement in the following way: the soul suffers pain or is glad or afraid, etc.; these are movements; therefore the soul is subject to movement. He agrees with the major premise that says that fear, anger etc. are movements, but he does not also agree to the minor premise: he does not concede that the soul by itself

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experiences these affections, rather they belong to the composite; for these affections belong to the living being in virtue of its having a soul. He proves this on the basis of things that are clearer. Just as, he says, it would be unreasonable for us to say that weaving or building are functions of the soul, nor of the body, but of the living being by means of the body, likewise in the case of being angry or afraid etc. we say that these belong to the living being by means of the soul. For in the one case it is the living being that is the entity that weaves and builds in virtue of the body, and in the present case it is the living being that is angry or suffers pain in virtue of the soul. Therefore, even if we conceded that has movements, these do not belong to the soul by itself, but to the composite; yet our question is if the soul is by itself subject to movement. One may ask in what sense he says that even thinking belongs to the composite.221 For the other belong222 to the non-rational part of the soul, which cannot be separated from the body but is the form of the ensouled body which is in the body as in matter, being an inseparable form. If, then, it cannot exist by itself either, it is plausible to say that no single activity belongs to it alone, but to the composite; yet thinking belongs to the rational part of the soul, which is separable. How, then, does this also belong to the composite? Our answer is that the rational soul, when outside the body and separated from the relationship to it, does not use thinking (for it does not seek and find nor does it proceed through premises to conclusions), but being pure intellect it intuitively grasps things without seeking since it has the formal principles of everything within itself,223 and without being contaminated by the body it projects these without time, when it wishes; for the cause of its ignorance is the body, and for this reason seeking and finding. For since its bond with the body is not free from a relationship but based on sympathetic affection – at any rate traces proceed both from the movements of the soul in the direction of the body and from the body in the direction of the soul; and the form of that which thinks and that which suffers pain is different, and this applies also to the other – as I said, traces of the movement of the soul become manifest in the body. This is the basis for the physiognomists’ inferring the dispositions of the soul on the basis of the form of the body.224 That something proceeds from the affections of the body to the soul is also plain. For the soul feels pain when the body suffers, and pleasure when the body is content. Also the fact that the body, when it is in this or that condition, hinders the soul or does not hinder it, is known to everybody, whereas this hindering of the soul through the body would not happen unless some sort of sympathetic reaction proceeded from the soul’s relationship with the body to the soul in this way,225 just as memory is affected when a particular cavity at the back of the brain is affected, as is the

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reasoning faculty of the soul when some other cavity is affected, and when is in a certain state it is easy for the soul to exercise imagination, but when it is in a different state, it is very difficult for it to imagine.226 Also, the different predispositions of the souls and their proneness to this or that affection occur as a result of the soul’s relationship with the body and the sympathetic connection between the two. Hence some say that ‘the faculties of the soul follow the mixtures of the body’.227 For this reason, then, he says that thinking, too, being an imperfect intellect, belongs to the composite.228 408b5 Yet this is not necessarily the case; for however much suffering pain or rejoicing or thinking are movements, and each is being moved in some way, [and being moved is due to the soul, as for example being angry or frightened occurs when the heart is moved in this or that particular way, whereas thinking is either like this or perhaps something different }] It does not, he says, necessarily follow from what has been said that the soul is subject to movement . In what way this does not necessarily follow he proves in the sequel. He grants that the things mentioned are movements; he indicates this by means of the phrase ‘however much } ’, instead of ‘however much we agree that } ’, and further back by saying ‘all these are held to be movements’. The passage is unclear, since he has postponed the main clause expressing the idea over a very long distance by inserting a parenthesis. For the main clause expressing what is being said lies in the sentence ‘yet229 to say that the soul gets angry }’. The word ‘yet’ is syntactically superfluous, but because he uses this long insertion, he resumes the idea and uses the conjunction ‘yet’. The syntax of the sentence is as follows: ‘For however much suffering pain or rejoicing or thinking are movements, and each is being moved in some way, to say that the soul gets angry is like etc.’ For just as one cannot say, he says, that weaving or building a house belongs to the soul but to the man in virtue of his soul, likewise feelings of pity, or learning, or anger and similar things are functions of a man in virtue of his soul; therefore, even if these things are movements, they are not movements of the soul in and by itself, but of the composite through the medium of the soul; yet the question was whether the soul in and by itself is subject to movement. This, then, is the syntax of the sentence; the rest is said in parenthesis. For having said that even if suffering pain and rejoicing etc. are movements, he now explains in what way they are movements. For being angry, he says, or being frightened etc. are movements that happen by the agency of the soul. That they are movements is evident; for each of them happens when the heart is moved in this or that particular way. For in anger, the blood in the region of the heart is

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seething and spreads to the surface , whereas in fear it is contracted in the depth; and meanwhile the heart beats in this or that particular way. And it is not only these that happen in the form of some sort of movement through the agency of the soul, but even thinking itself does not happen without such a movement, when the brain or some other part undergoes some sort of movement.230 Hence the face of people who are thinking changes.

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408b9 } and some of these take place because things are moving in space, whereas others result from qualitative change [– what kind of things and in what way belongs to another discussion – yet, obviously, to say that the soul gets angry is like saying that the soul weaves or builds a house; but perhaps it is better to say that it is not the soul that feels pity or learns or thinks, but that it is the man who does so in virtue of his soul]. Of ‘these’, i.e. being angry, frightened, thinking etc., some happen because things are moved in a spatial sense, others by alteration, others again both by spatial movement and alteration. For getting angry happens because of both. The heart beats fast, which is a spatial movement, and the blood in the region of the heart undergoes alteration; for we say that it is a seething of the blood in the region of the heart, and seething is an alteration. Feeling pity or fear or joy are sorts of alterations, and perhaps even spatial movements, when some sort of spreading or contraction of the blood happens. Thinking is a sort of alteration of the brain as well as the rest of the body, especially the face; but the latter is a consequence, whereas the alteration of the brain is like a cause; hence a particular mixture of the brain causes people to have various qualities231 when it comes to rational activities. ‘Thinking’, he says, ‘is either like this or perhaps something different’ (408b9). Either like this, i.e. in the sense of spatial movement, for it was in virtue of that type of movement that he said the heart was beating fast in a state of anger; alternatively, if thinking is not that, but something similar, it is a qualitative change. ‘what kind of things and in what way belongs to another discussion’: i.e. of what kind the movements of each part or each function of the soul are, e.g. what kind of movements occur in case of anger, whether spatial or alterative, and likewise in the case of suffering pain or joy or thinking, or how these happen, i.e. which part is co-affected during an affection of the soul, e.g. in case of desire the liver, in case of anger the heart, and in other cases other parts, and in what way this is moved, i.e. what kind of affection it undergoes when it is moved by the affection of the soul, is more appropriate to a different discussion. This would be either On the Parts of Animals or On the Movement of Animals.

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Translation 408b15 That is not to suggest that this is because movement is present in the soul, but because sometimes it extends to the soul, sometimes it proceeds from it, [e.g. sense perception starts from particular objects, whereas recollection starts from the soul and proceeds to the movements or states of rest in the sense-organs.]

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Since he has said that one must say that it is the man who undergoes movement in virtue of his soul, I have not, he says, said this in the sense that this is because movement is present in the soul in and by itself, but because sometimes the movement extends to it, having started from the body, as is the case with perception. For this has its origin in the perceptible objects and then extends to the sense organs, and then, while these are widened or contracted and experience a corresponding affection as a result of the perceptible objects, the affection proceeds to the faculty, and thus to the soul itself, which both gets to know and judges the affection.232 Such a movement also happens to lifeless objects: smooth bodies that lie in a straight line with particular objects are illuminated by the colours that are present in the visible objects, as mirrors, but they do not perceive, because they do not have within themselves a soul that judges the affection. Perception occurs in all that has a soul, to which the affection that occurs in them is transmitted.233 In the case of the senses, then, it is in virtue of the affection being transmitted as far as the soul that we are said to be moved by the soul, for it is on account of the soul that a living being perceives, and it is as far as this that the affection proceeds. Recollection, on the other hand, starts from the soul and proceeds to the vivified body.234 For when we are reminded of something frightening that has happened to us we often become pale, and when we are reminded of a sea journey we become sea sick. In what way do we say that in the case of recollection, the movement has started from the soul? Not in the sense that it is the soul by itself which is reminded, but as in the case of the senses we said that the movement has started from the perceptible objects and has proceeded as far as that in which the judging and perceptive faculty is present, i.e. the pneuma,235 likewise in the case of recollection we say that from the pneuma, in which the soul is present, the starting point of the movement of recollection is the reverse of that in the case of perception; for where perception ends, recollection begins. For recollection is the discovery of an appearance, when this occurred in the pneuma;236 for it is in the pneuma that appearances come to be present, in which also the faculty of perception resides. So from these remnants in the pneuma, in which the soul resides, that we call appearances, which are remnants resulting from the perceptual apprehensions,237 in these, then, the recollective movement has its beginning. Apprehending again the appearance which one for-

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merly had, that is to say, the impression that came into being in the pneuma before, one remembers also through the medium of which sense organ one perceived it, and in this way the body is brought in a similar state to the sense organ.238 ‘e.g. sense perception starts from particular objects’: He gives examples. ‘starts from particular objects’, e.g. perceptible objects. ‘whereas recollection starts from the soul and proceeds to the movements or states of rest in the sense-organs’. He has added ‘or states of rest’, because whereas, when we perceive, it is necessary that the sense organs are moved and then the affection thus penetrates to the soul, it is not the case that, when we recollect something, the sense-organ through which we formerly had this movement should necessarily be moved: sometimes this happens (in the way we have set out in our examples), sometimes not; for the sense-organ is not always moved simultaneously with recollection, but we also recollect when these are in a state of rest, calling to mind only that this apprehension happened to us through this particular sense organ. 408b18 Yet the intellect seems to be a substance and not to perish; for otherwise it would have been particularly likely to perish as a result of the fading in old age. Having demonstrated that the soul is not by itself subject to local movement, and having next examined what are most likely to be the alternative movements of the soul, viz. anger and desire and fear and suchlike, and having next demonstrated that even if these were conceded to be movements, they would belong to the composite and not to the soul, he now consequently moves the discussion to the intellect, and he explicitly says that it is immortal. This is also why Alexander, unable to face what is stated so obviously by Aristotle, on the one hand agrees half-willingly that the intellect is immortal, since he cannot find a different interpretation that fits this passage and suits his own purpose, yet on the other hand in many places makes this statement with some hesitation. Indeed, here he agrees that Aristotle says that the intellect is immortal, but a little bit further down, but still in continuation of the present passage, when he encounters the passage that says ‘the intellect is perhaps something divine239 and unaffected’ (408b29), he says that the discussion is about the divine intellect.240 Yet if were talking about that, why then did he add ‘perhaps’? We shall see more accurately when we get to this passage. (The same Alexander has also written a work of his own On the Soul, in which he says that, since in the things that are there are present matter and form, each is characterised in accordance with its own form; for matter is the common thing that underlies all.

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Thus man is characterised in accordance with his own form, that is the rational soul. Yet each of the forms is perishable and inseparable from matter; therefore this applies to the rational soul as well.241 However, our answer is that some forms are inseparable from matter, whereas others are separable; and the rational soul, too, is separable. Hence Aristotle, too, when defining the soul, even though he does not specifically talk about the rational soul but about the soul in general, after saying that it is the actuality of a natural body with organs that has the potential to live, adds ‘it is unclear in what sense it is an actuality, whether as something inseparable or in the manner of a sailor of a ship’.242 Therefore he is aware of separable forms.) That here, too, is clearly speaking of the human intellect, you can see from the wording: ‘Yet the intellect seems to be a substance and not to perish.’ But who would want to think that the divine intellect comes to be present in us as a substance? Who would want to think that the divine intellect is perishable? ‘For it seems’, he says, ‘not to perish’. Then it is put even clearer: ‘for otherwise it would have been particularly likely to perish as a result of the fading in old age’. What could be more clearly than this that the discussion is about our intellect? And as he goes on a little further, he replaces the word ‘intellect’ by ‘soul’. ‘Therefore’, he says, ‘old age occurs not because the soul has been affected in some way, but that in which , as in cases of drunkenness and disease.’ It is clear, then, that all those who suspect that Aristotle says that the rational soul is mortal are making a false accusation. Quite rightly Alexander himself, when getting to this passage, considers how this accords with what has been said before. For in the preceding lines the discussion was about the whether the activities of the soul should be called movements, anger and fear and their counterparts, not about the whether they are imperishable or perishable. How, then, when examining this in relation to these , does he apply this also to the intellect when he says that ‘yet the intellect seems to be a substance and not to perish’? He solves the problem in a nice way; for he says that potentially243 he has demonstrated concerning these, too, that they are perishable, having demonstrated that those that seem to be their proper activities belong to the composite in virtue of the soul, just as weaving belongs to the composite in virtue of the body. Therefore he will have demonstrated potentially that they are perishable; for he has anticipated in what has gone before that if there is some sort of function or affection of the soul that is peculiar to it, it is possible for it to be separate, but if not, not. Now since these faculties do not have a single activity separate from the body, they will be likely to be inseparable from the body. This having been demonstrated, he now naturally examines how matters stand concerning the intellect. He says that the intellect appears to

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be not of this kind, but to be a substance and to come to be present and not to perish. Look at the actual wording. By saying ‘seems to be present in’, he has indicated particularly clearly that it does not sprout from the body or from the combination of the soul with the body, but enters from outside, as he says in the sequel; furthermore, since the attributes also appear to come to be present in the body, even if not from outside, he has added ‘to be a substance’. Yet since the forms, too, come to be present in matter and are substances, but still are perishable, he has added ‘and not to perish’. Next he has given a most accurate proof of this: ‘for it would be particularly likely to perish as a result of the fading in old age’. For if it were inseparable from the body, it ought to flourish and decline along with the body, if it had its existence in the body; of this kind, at any rate, are anger and desire and what results from these. But with the intellect the reverse is the case: when the body is flourishing, the intellect is dull, perhaps it is not even there at all, yet when the body is aging, the intellect grows.244 As Plato says: ‘As for intelligence and true, firm opinions, a man who activates these even in extreme old age should be very happy.’245 408b20 But as it is, it happens as in the case of the sense organs. For if an old man were to adopt an eye of this or that kind, he would be able to see like a young man. Aristotle resolves a difficulty here which has rightly been raised with regard to what has been said. For someone might246 say: ‘If the fact that the intellect does not wane along with old age demonstrates that it is imperishable, the fact that it does wane along with old age demonstrates that it is perishable. Now in extreme old age, in the nonsense people speak, it can be seen to be perishing; for those who are excessively old, speak nonsense. It undergoes the same in states of drunkenness and some other affections such as melancholy, and furthermore also in sleep. And if it is altered along with the changes of the body, it therefore seems to be perishable.’ He resolves this problem by saying that in the case of the affections mentioned the intellect experiences the same as the sensitive faculty when the sense organs are damaged. We may compare the fact that whereas we do not perceive when the sense organs have been damaged, the sense faculty has not actually been damaged, for the faculty using the organs of this solid body is not affected along with these; that the faculty is not affected along with the organs, but the sense organ has become exhausted, is evident from what we imagine would happen if an old man obtained an eye like that of a young man: the old man would activate his eyesight as the young man does, and this would not be the case if the faculty had been damaged. Even clearer is the example from blinding humours suffused over the eye:247 if we remove

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that humour, those who did not see before see. The reason is that the sensitive faculty does not have its being in this body, but in the pneuma.248 In the same way, when the eyes of old people become weak as a result of time, and the coats become thicker and as it were wrinkled and no longer transparent, and furthermore the internal moistures become dryer through time and almost solidified, so that they are no longer able to transmit the affections coming from the sensible objects to the optic pneuma, then the result is that old people see less, though not because the faculty of seeing is affected. If, then, this happens in the case of the senses, where it ought to happen less, so much more will this be the case with the intellect, so that the body, if it is affected in some way, only hinders the activities of the intellect, just as a babbling neighbour distracts his neighbour from a serious activity such as reading or thinking or praying.249 If, then, this man, being completely unrelated to the serious person, nevertheless by the proximity of place distracts him, how much more will the body, which is not related to the intellect, distract it because of the natural bond? For this bond is not completely without sympathetic reaction.250 Yet if someone said ‘How is it clear that the intellect does not, just like the senses, also have its being in something over and above this body, for example in the pneuma? For this much is not yet clear from what has been said, only that, like the senses, it does not have its being in this ’, my response to this is that the philosopher will demonstrate this very point in the sequel, namely that it is separate from all body, and not, like the senses, separate only from this one; but it is no trouble to anticipate some of the things he says. That the intellect does not have its being in something else in the way the senses do, is clear from the following. When the senses grasp the more powerful sense objects, they cannot grasp the weaker ones, e.g. hearing, when listening to loud noise does not hear the weaker sound,251 and when the tongue tastes a very strong flavour it does not perceive the weaker one, and the same applies to the other senses; this is because the organ and vehicle of the senses in the most proper sense, I mean the pneuma, is a body,252 but the intellect, since it thinks without involvement of the body and makes no use of any body for its thinking, in as much it grasps the larger objects of thinking, to this extent it grasps the smaller ones even better. Besides, no faculty that has its being in a body as its subject is capable of turning in on itself;253 for the body in which it is will also turn in on itself along with it, yet no body is capable of fitting itself to itself,254 nor indeed to another body, unless superficially; but the intellect itself turns in on itself and sees itself, it examines itself and finds itself; therefore it is separate in being from the body. Besides, nothing battles against itself or against its own substrate, yet the soul battles against the body and the affections: ‘Have courage, my heart.’255 Nothing destroys its own substrate; for everything yearns for being. But the soul causes

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the body to melt away by means of virtue. Therefore it does not have its being in it. And if it is sometimes activated separately, when it is in a state of contemplation of divine things, it is clear that it also has a separate being.256 408b22 Consequently, old age occurs not because the soul has been affected in some way, but that in which , as in cases of drunkenness and disease. As for ‘old age’, it is clear that we are not to understand this in the sense of that which he referred to when saying ‘for it would be particularly likely to perish as a result of the fading in old age’ (408b19-20); rather, what he was talking about earlier on is proportionate , whereas here he is talking about extreme high age and the end of life. For, as I said, since our intellect is not completely unrelated to the body, it requires the right proportion of the body so that, being in the right proportion, in no way poses an obstacle to it. It gets out of proportion with regard to its own activities both when it is at its peak on account of the burden of the affections and at extreme age, on account of its having died of and its being close to matter. The intellect experiences the same, he says, in old age as in drunkenness and disease. For just as in the latter case it is prevented in its activities by the bad mixture of the body (and this is evident from the fact that, when the body is released from such a state, it comes to itself again), likewise it happens in the case of old age. That after the release from drunkenness it is not a different intellect that emerges, so to speak, out of the right mixture, is clear from the fact that it is one and the same in number as before: for if it simply emerged from the mixture as whiteness does, it would not be one and the same in number, since the mixture would not be one and the same in number before and after drunkenness either; but if anything, in form. That the intellect is one and the same in number, is clear from the fact that even after drunkenness it remembers what has gone before; for if it were the same in form, as one might suspect, but not the same in number, it would not remember the things before but would have to learn them again. It is similar, Aristotle says (426b19), to when I perceive one thing and you perceive another; for it is not that, since our souls are the same in kind, what I know and what someone else knows are the same thing. Yet if it is one and the same in number before and after drunkenness, nothing other than that it was hindered in its activities by drunkenness. One should be aware that those who want the whole soul to be separable also seize upon this passage. ‘Look’, they say, ‘he has said that the soul is not affected in any way, but that in which it is present, the body.’ Our response is that the argument is not about the whole

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soul but about the intellect, and it is this which he here calls soul. This is clear both from what precedes this and from what follows; for he is still talking about the intellect. For since he has said that it is not the intellect itself that is affected but the body in which it is present, neither do thinking and contemplating perish, but they wither while something else is perishing. For without the intellect being affected, its activities, such as thinking and contemplating, would not be affected either. Therefore the discussion is not about the soul as a whole. For it would be ridiculous to want to believe that he is talking about the whole soul, considering that he himself has clearly given us the rules the essence that is separable from bodies and that which is inseparable.257 Note that after saying that the intellect is imperishable and enters the body from outside, he explicitly calls this ‘soul’, so that you can learn that he does not refer to some other intellect apart from the rational soul that enters us from outside, but it is the rational soul itself which he has called intellect. Therefore by these words, too, Aristotle very clearly states that our soul is immortal. The rational soul enters the body after the formation of the complete living being, while the other psychic faculties or the formulae of these are being put together in the seed.258 Yet if someone took the passage ‘Therefore old age occurs not because the soul has been affected in some way’, to apply to the whole soul, we shall take it, as Alexander thinks, too, in the sense that the whole soul is by itself unaffected, but the non-rational soul, since it cannot by nature exist by itself,259 perishes together with the pneuma, whereas the intellect, because it has a separable essence, is unaffected. 408b24 And thinking and contemplating are impaired when something else inside is perishing; [but the itself is not affected].

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By ‘something else inside’ he means the pneuma. For since it is the case that thinking is impaired not only when people talk nonsense, but also often, when one is at one’s peak in terms of age, mental derangements and dullings of thinking occur, he says that this happens when the pneumatic body, in which the psychic faculties primarily come to light, suffers some sort of decay and hinders and obstructs the activity of thinking because it is not in the right proportion. 408b25 Yet discursive thinking, loving, or hating are not affections of this , but of the particular which contains this, in so far as it contains it. [This is why, when the perishes, does not remember or

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love; for these belonged not to the latter but to the composite, which has perished.] That even discursive thinking does not by itself belong to the soul but to the composite, we have already said. For it is not, he says, that just as thinking and contemplating are affections peculiar to the intellect (for he calls the activities ‘affections’, as we have said many times), likewise this applies to discursive thinking and loving and hating, too, but rather they are affections ‘of the particular ’, i.e. the living being that possesses the soul; ‘in so far as it contains it’, i.e. in so far as it contains a soul.260 For just as weaving, as has been said many times, belongs to the living being in virtue of its body, likewise these things belong to the living being in virtue of its soul. Hence, he says, when the living being perishes, the soul will not have any of these things, since they resulted from the soul’s combination with the body. Understandably, he says that it does not even remember, for here its knowledge is in a state of flux and it requires memory in order to hold on to what was known, but beyond the body, since it has its knowledge stable and is in contact with the objects, it does not require memory; for memory is of things that were known in the past, but then knowledge no longer has earlier and later, unless for the handling of thoughts, but they are always stable and are being examined in the present. 408b29 The intellect is presumably something more divine and unaffected. [That it is impossible for the soul to be subject to movement, then, is clear from these things; and if it is not subject to any movement at all, it is clear that it is also not subject to movement by itself.] He has added ‘presumably’, not as if he were in doubt about this, but because he has not yet demonstrated it completely. And since both here and further above and even more in what follows he means that the intellect is immortal, i.e. the rational soul in and by itself, those who want to believe that he thinks the soul is mortal speak in vain. For it is clear that he is not speaking about the divine intellect but about our rational soul; for the former is not in a body and is not hindered by the things mentioned. For while he has spoken about it on the basis of things that we are aware of, the activities of the former are unknown. Besides, if the discussion were about the divine intellect, he would not have added ‘presumably’, as if it were ambivalent whether that was incapable of being affected and divine. Summarising his account on the basis of what he has demonstrated, he says that, it having been demonstrated that the soul is not

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subject to movement, it is abundantly clear that it will not be subject to self-movement either if it is not subject to any movement at all. 408b32 By far the most implausible of all the theories that have been discussed is the one that says that the soul is a number setting itself in motion. [For those who hold this are faced with impossible consequences, which follow first from the soul’s being subject to movement and more particularly from the claim that it is a number.]

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The next is to refute the doctrine about the soul of Xenocrates,261 Plato’s successor, who said that the soul is a number setting itself in motion. It is clear that if he said this when speaking at the level of what is manifest, the theory is easy to refute. But as I said above,262 even someone who has just tasted mathematics with the tip of his finger only, would not speak like that. He said, then, that the soul is a number because the soul is a fullness of forms263 and a formula based on formulae; for it has the formulae of all things within itself, as we have said.264 And they called the forms numbers, as has been said;265 and he himself, too, says in the sequel: ‘Those who say that the soul is a place for forms, are correct’ (429a279). For these reasons he calls it a number; and he says it is self-moving because of the autonomy of its life; for it does not derive its life from something else; it is an autonomous source of life.266 But Aristotle, as he is wont to, refutes the apparent meaning of the theory. Some things, then, he says this theory has in common with those that have been refuted; for all the absurd consequences that were inherent in those who say that the soul is subject to movement, these will also follow from the one that says it is a number moving itself; but the peculiar points are in virtue of the claim that the soul is a number, which he is now going to criticise. 409a1 For how ought one to think of a unit that is subject to movement, and by what, and how, being undivided and undifferentiated? [For if it is capable of causing movement and of being moved, it must be subject to differentiation.] He seems to say the same thing, the how, twice. Yet this is not the case, for he first asks about the manner of knowledge, that is, what is the manner of understanding that is able to make us know that a unit is being moved? For it is impossible to know this either by sense perception or by discursive thinking. As to the question ‘by what?’, this is whether it is itself the cause of its own movement or whether one unit is cause of movement for another. The second ‘how’ concerns the manner of movement, whether it is moved along a straight line or

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in a circle or in some other way, e.g. by qualitative change or growth and waning. ‘How, then, ought one to think of a unit that is subject to movement?’ For if each number is a plurality of units, it is necessary that when the number is moved, the units are moved. How, then, is a unit moved? For if it is moved by itself, then, since that which causes the movement, in so far as it causes movement, is different from what is being moved, it is necessary that the unit itself, too, is different from itself; for it is one thing in so far as it causes movement and a different thing in so far as it is moved. What sort of difference, then, is there within the unit itself, since it is undivided and undifferentiated? And if some of these cause movement, whereas others are moved, then what is the difference between one unit and another? For it is necessary that what causes movement, in so far as it causes movement, is different from what is being moved, if indeed by some sort of natural power the one has a predisposition to cause movement, the other to being moved. And besides, if some of the units caused movement, whereas others were being moved, those that cause movement would be the soul rather than those that were being moved. For just as in the living being that which causes movement is the soul, whereas what is being moved is the body, likewise if some units caused movement while others were being moved, those that caused movement would be the soul; but if this were the case, the soul would not be a number setting itself in motion, but just causing movement. 409a3 Furthermore, since they say that a line, when being moved, produces a plane, and a point produces a line, [the movements of the units will be lines; for the point is a unit having a certain position, and the number that constitutes the soul will be actually somewhere and have a position]. A further counter-argument. Here he is playing games with them. It is the opinion, he says, of the geometricians that the fleeting point produces a line, and this, when fleeting, a plane. If this is the case, the movements of the soul, anger, desire and the rest, being movements of units, will be lines. For a unit, he says, differs in nothing else from a point but in the fact that the point is situated somewhere (for it is part of a line), whereas a unit does not belong to the things that have position; therefore a unit is nothing other than a point without position, and a point is a unit having a position. Therefore by saying that the soul is a number they agree that it is in a body, so that the units of the number are situated somewhere; for they are in the body; therefore these units that have position are points; and by being moved, they will therefore produce lines.

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Translation 409a7 Furthermore, if one subtracts from a number a number or a unit, a different number remains. [Yet plants and many animals, when being divided , continue to live and appear to have the same kind of soul.]

The third counter-argument. If, he says, I subtract a unit from a number, for example from ten, I will produce a different number, nine, the one being even, the other odd; likewise if we subtract a number, the number that results will be different in kind. For if I subtract from sixteen, which is square, three, it is no longer square; yet if I subtract from the square an L-shape, for example seven from sixteen, there comes to be the square, nine, but it is not the same in species but in genus.267 Yet if, he says, you cut a branch from a plant, the same soul will remain in what is left behind and in the branch itself. Likewise this happens too in the case of insects: parts being cut off evidently have for some time the activity that arises from their soul, I mean sense perception and movement. Therefore the soul is not a number. The argument about plants is clear; and if you do not assume it for all parts, it is true also in the case of other animals; for when certain parts are cut off, the same soul remains. And even if the argument is not true in all animate beings, yet the fact that it is true in certain cases shows that the counterargument is valid. 409a10 It would seem that it makes no difference whether one speaks of units or of small bodies. [For even if from the spherical atoms of Democritus268 points arise, and only quantity remains, there will be in this something that causes movement and something that is being moved, as in what is continuous; for what I am saying follows not from the fact that they differ in size or smallness, but from the fact that they are quantitative; therefore it is necessary that there is something that causes the units to move. Yet if in living beings that which causes movement is the soul, it will be also in the case of number, so that the soul is not both that which causes movement and that which is moved, but only what causes movement.]

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He wishes to drive Xenocrates’269 and Democritus’ doctrines together.270 The latter said that the soul consists of spherical atoms. If, then, he says, one takes away from the atoms their size, they will be points, so that the same absurd consequences follow from both theories. No damage is done to Democritus’ supposition by removing continuity from the atoms; for he did not say that it is because they are continuous bodies that they are moved, but because of their plurality, by their colliding against each other. Likewise in the case of Xenocrates, too, it is not because he supposed the things of which the soul , I mean the units, to be undivided, that for that reason he said they were moved, but because that which results from them is quantitative, viz. the number. In this respect, then, they agree, in that they both say that movement takes place: the one says that the atoms , the other the number. But it follows necessarily from both to say that some atoms, or some numbers, are being moved, while others cause movement. has shown in books 6 and 7271 of the Physics that it is impossible for one and the same thing to cause movement and to be moved in the same respect, either in the case of a continuous quantity or a defined quantity.272 The consequence from these is this, that each of these makes the self-moved soul into a defined quantity; therefore, if among the atoms or numbers there are some that cause movement and some that are moved, the whole system will be self-moved, just as the whole living being is said to be self-moved, although one part of it is causing movement and another being moved; yet just as in the living being the soul is that which causes movement and not what is being moved, likewise in the case of the number that constitutes the soul not every number will be soul, but only the units that cause movement; and similarly in the case of the spherical atoms, too, those that cause movement will be soul. In this way, then, Democritus and Xenocrates are brought together under the same doctrine. And all the same absurd consequences he has demonstrated to follow from the doctrine of Democritus, will also follow from that of Xenocrates. Someone might say that it is not true that the doctrines of Democritus and Xenocrates are comparable in all respects; for Democritus did not simply posit the soul as a defined quantity as Xenocrates did; at any rate he supposed the soul to consist not just of arbitrary atoms, but of spherical ones, so that he could render the cause of their movement. is therefore not correct in reducing the two doctrines to the same.

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409a18 How, then, can the soul be a unit? For it must have some features that differentiate it from the others, [yet what differentiating feature would a unitary point have except its position?] He uses ‘unit’ for ‘that which is composed of units’. If, then, he says, the soul is a unit or something composed of units, it is clear that the units of which the soul is composed will have to differ from the other units that do not produce souls. For it is not simply all units or those of which the soul is composed that produce soul, but only those that cause movement. What sort of difference, then, there could be between the one unit and the other would be impossible to grasp, except that some have position whereas others do not. Yet all units of which the number, that is the soul, is composed, have position; for they are in a body; what, then, is the difference between them? The conse-

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quence is that if there has to be a difference in order that some cause movement whereas others are moved, and if this is impossible, it will not be possible for the soul to be a number or unit. He correctly says ‘unitary point’. For if the unit that has taken a position becomes a point and the units of which the soul is composed are in the body, they will be points. Since, then, they did not simply speak about points but about units, while he himself demonstrates that these are points, he has reasonably spoken of them as unitary points. 409a21 If, then, there is a difference between the units in the body and the points, the units will be in the same place ; for they will occupy273 the space of a point. The argument is still against Xenocrates. He has shown that the units of which the soul is composed are points, since the unit is a point without position, whereas the units of the soul have position; for they are in a body; therefore they are points. Likewise the points are units that have position. If, then, the units are points and the points units, and in each body there are points, will the units that make up the soul, or the points, be the same as those points or units that are in the body in which the soul is present, or will they be different? If the units of the soul are different from those of the body, when the soul enters the body, the points of the soul will be fitted to those of the body; and a point that is fitted to a point makes one point; for if one fits what is undivided together with what is undivided, one makes something undivided. And if one point, that of the soul, is fitted to another point, that of the body, and the result of both is not a plurality, what prevents a plurality of points of the soul from being fitted to the same point of the body? For innumerable indivisible things put together do not produce extension. Therefore it is possible for all points of the soul to fit onto one point of the body. And all points that fit together will produce one point; therefore the ensouled body will depend on a point of itself, onto which all points of the soul fit. And this supposition has nothing impossible; for if the soul is a number, and it amounts to the same thing to say a heap of defined points, and if it is possible that an infinite number of points fit onto one and the same point, just as onto the centre of a circle the ends of the straight lines that lead from the circumference to the centre, it would be possible for all points from which the soul is composed to fit onto one point of the body. And what is possible is that from which, while not being necessary, when it is posited to be the case, nothing impossible follows.274 Yet if the soul is a number, and this is tantamount to saying a plurality of points, it would be possible that all points fit onto one point of the body, even though in actual fact they are divided; and it follows from this that the body’s being ensouled would depend on one point, which is impossible; for it lives and is ensouled in its entirety. Therefore the

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soul is not a number; for this supposition leads to absurd consequences. Besides, another consequence will be that the soul is one point. And even if one did not suppose this, that all points of the soul are fitted to one point of the body but that one point of the soul is fitted to one bodily point, the argument will not escape from absurdity in this way; for in this way, too, it is necessary that the body is not ensouled in its entirety, but only at certain points within itself, and there would not be an entirely ensouled body. The points do not constitute a body in its entirety; and the consequence is that if the points of the soul come into being in the points of the body, and if the body is not the same as the points that are in it, just as it is not the same to speak of limit and limited, there will be no ensouled body. But if the points of the soul are the same as the points of the body, and every body has points, every body will be ensouled. ‘If, then, there is a difference between the units in the body and the points’ (he puts units and points on a par, I mean the points in the body; for he has said that the points, too, are units that have position), if, then, the units, he says, or the points that are in the body are different from the units or the points of the soul, ‘they will occupy the space of a point’, obviously the unit of the soul will occupy the space of the point of body. He has used ‘space of a point’ rather generally; for what is indivisible does not exist in a place. And it is possible to refer to the point in the body as the place of the point of the soul.

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409a23 Yet if there can be two, what prevents an infinite number from being in the same ? There is plausibility in this supposition; for if two points were forced together because the points of the soul that are in the body are under all circumstances fitted to the points of the body, what prevents a plurality of points, indeed all points, to come together in the same place? And the consequence is that either the living being’s being ensouled depends on one point of the body, if all points of the soul are fitted to one point of the body, or the living being will have soul in virtue of each of the points in the body. And if the points in the body are infinite, the points of the soul will either be fitted to all, and there will thus be an infinite number of souls in the living being (and in this way there will be actual infinity), or not to all, and the living body will not be ensouled in respect of the whole of itself nor will it be a wholly ensouled being, as has been said.

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409a24 For things whose place is indivisible are themselves indivisible too.275 Since he has said that nothing prevents an infinite number of soul

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points from being fitted in the same point of the body, so that the soul becomes one point, he now proves this. For if the place of the infinite number of points of the soul is the point of the body, and this is indivisible, the infinite number of points that fit onto the point of the soul will be indivisible as well; for just as it is with the place, likewise it is with the things that are in it; and the consequence is that the soul will be one point, and the body’s being ensouled will depend on one point. 409a25 Yet if the points in the body are the number that constitutes the soul, or276 the number made up of the points in the body is the soul, [why then do not all bodies have soul? For there appear to be points in all things, indeed an infinite number of them]. This is a different part of the division. We have said that the points of the soul are either the same as the points of the body or different. Having attempted the possibility that they are different, he now takes on the remaining one. Having said that the points in the body are the number of the soul, he now resumes the argument and makes it clearer: for they did not say that the points are the number of the soul, but that the number of points in the body is the soul, if they supposed the points of the soul to be the same as those of the body. 409a28 Furthermore, how is it possible for the points to be separated and released from the bodies, if the lines are not divided into points? Since Xenocrates was a pupil of Plato,277 he said that the soul is separable from the body, from which it is clear that he was not speaking about the number with which we are familiar (for how is it possible for a number to exist on its own?) but by analogy. But Aristotle is arguing against the apparent meaning when he says that if the soul is separable and if it is impossible for the points to be separated from the body, the soul is therefore not a number. For speaking of points was a consequence of speaking of number; for the number is made up of units, and these are points that take a position. It is impossible for the points in the body to be separated, since lines are not divided into points, just as planes are not divided into lines or bodies into surfaces; for a line is part of a line, and a point is the limit of a line; things that are divided are divided into parts, not into limits; for the limit is inseparable from that of which it is the limit.

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278 409a31 The consequence is, as we have said,279 that in one way one says the same thing as those who say that the soul is a body consisting of fine particles, and in another way one faces the same specific absurdity as Democritus’ claim about movement being caused by the soul. He says that in one way the same absurd consequences follow from the doctrine of Xenocrates as those who say that the soul consists of very fine particles,280 and in another way as from the doctrine of Democritus. For the former group said that the soul is a body consisting of very fine particles, so that it could penetrate the whole body and, by making it an entirely ensouled being throughout, cause it to move; with the consequence that, if according to them the soul, being a body, penetrates the body entirely and by making it an entirely ensouled being throughout causes it to move, there will be two bodies in the same , which is absurd. The same absurd consequence followed from those who say that it is a number. For if the units of the soul were different from the points of the body, the consequence would be that it is possible that all the points of the soul would be fitted to one point of the body. This, then, have in common. Besides, the units of which Xenocrates supposed the soul to be composed are either corporeal and countable, or they are neither corporeal nor countable but, rather, undivided and provide a count;281 for each corporeal number is under all circumstances countable, yet the number that provides a count is incorporeal; to put it simply, at any rate, the units of the soul are either corporeal or they are not, but undivided. So if they are corporeal, body will penetrate body, and the consequence will be the same as for those who say that the soul is a body consisting of very fine particles; but if they are undivided, it will lead to the same absurd consequences as the doctrine of Democritus, since he, too, moved the body by means of atoms, not because they have a particular mass or just any mass, but because they are a number. I have said282 that Democritus not only said that the soul is a number of atoms (for in this way any chance atoms would make up the soul), but with a mass that has been shaped in the form of a sphere; for a shape cannot exist without mass; for shape is the limit of mass. These things, then, follow if the points of the soul are not the same as those of the body. Yet if the points of the soul were the same as those of the body, the consequence would be that all body is ensouled. It is more plausible that they posit the first, considering that they did not say that the whole body was ensouled. This same absurd consequence,

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then, will follow for those who say that the soul is a body consisting of fine particles as for those who say that it is a number. There is also another absurd consequence that is common both to those who say that it is a number and to Democritus. For has shown above283 that there is no, or hardly any difference between saying that spherical by being moved draw the body with them, and a number. For it is not that movements came into being because some were magnitudes, others undivided units, but because of quantity;284 therefore the absurd consequence following from the one will also follow from the other. The doctrine of Xenocrates had many specific absurd consequences, which also followed from that of Democritus. Therefore, those following from the one also follow from the other. What these are, he has stated above. ‘The consequence is, as we have said, that in one way one says the same thing’: He has used the words ‘the same thing’ not by reference to the doctrine but to the absurd consequence that follows from it. For it is not that they said the same things about the soul, but they got caught in the same absurdities. ‘in another way one faces the same specific absurdity as Democritus’ claim about movement being caused by the soul’: The fact, he says, that Democritus said that the soul is moved is something he has in common with Xenocrates; for each of them said this, the latter saying that it is moving units that move the soul, the former the atoms. This point, then, they have in common, and thus a common consequence follows, which is absurd, as it relates to the doctrine of those who say that the soul is a body consisting of fine particles, which is peculiar to Democritus and Xenocrates. This point, then, they had in common, but they differed in that the one said was numbers, the other that it was bodies, the atoms. 409b2 For if the soul is present in the whole perceiving body, it is necessary that there are two bodies in the same , if the soul is some sort of body. [For those who say it is a number, the consequence is that in one point there are many points, and every body has soul, unless there is difference between the number that is present in the body and the points that are present in the bodies.]

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By means of these words he demonstrates what Xenocrates and those who say it is a body consisting of fine particles have in common. For a consequence, he says, of those who say that it is a body consisting of fine particles is that a body penetrates a body, since the soul has to penetrate the whole of the body in order that the body is as a whole ensouled and as a whole moved. Yet if someone were to say that the soul, by descending in the empty spaces of the body, is capable of exercising movement in the same way as the

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contents of containers do,285 especially then it cannot be present in the body; for it will be adjacent to it and not be in the whole . How, then, is the whole ensouled? Furthermore, if by being adjacent to it externally it does not make it ensouled, it will not do so internally either. 409b7 The consequence will be that the living being is moved by the number, in the same way as we said that Democritus it moves it. [For what difference does it make whether we speak of small spheres or large units or, in general, of units that are being moved? For in both ways it is necessary that they cause the living being to be moved because they are moved.] In this passage he compares the doctrines of Democritus and Xenocrates. The same absurd consequences, he says, will follow from both, since both said that the body was moved by the atoms’ being moved or the units’ being moved. The absurd consequences common to both he has not added explicitly here, since he has already mentioned them,286 such as that are either moved by themselves or by others; in what respect, then, does the unit differ either in relation to itself or to another? For the atoms of Democritus, too, are potentially units, since they exercised movement not in so far as they were continuous but in so far as they were a definite quantity, just as number is. Wishing to make these two doctrines congruous to each other, he has called spheres small, units large. For if you remove from spheres the continuous, what will remain are points or units deprived of magnitude, and if the points or units were to adopt magnitude, they will be just like the spheres of Democritus, e.g. large units. ‘or, in general, of units’: Since he wants to demonstrate that for the exercise of movement neither magnitude contributed anything to the atoms, nor the undivided to the units, he has called the atoms small, the units large, in order to demonstrate that this makes no difference; this is why he has added ‘or, in general, of units’. 409b11 Those, then, who have combined movement and number are faced with these same consequences, and many other similar ones.

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This is the conclusion of what has been said: he indicates that not only the absurdities mentioned but also many others follow from these; what these are, he now adds. 409b13 For not only is it impossible for there to be a definition of soul of this kind, but it is also impossible for it to be an

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Translation attribute. [This becomes clear if one tries on the basis of this theory to state the affections and the activities of the soul, such as reasonings, perceptions, pleasures, pains, and all that sort of thing; for as we have said before,287 it is not even easy to guess these on the basis of these.]

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Having said by way of refutation that the statement given by Xenocrates that the soul is a number that moves itself cannot be a definition of the essence of the soul, he next shows that neither can any of the things that accompany or belong to the soul, which are the affections and the activities, be a number that moves itself. For the affections of the soul are reasonings, distress, pleasure, fear etc. What it means to say that it is a number that moves itself nobody can guess, not even when using plausible reasoning, how a number set in motion can be thinking or how it can be sensation or how it can be distress, and similarly for the others. Besides, if the soul is a number that moves itself, since the parts and the faculties of the soul are different, it is necessary that not every faculty of the soul is the same number. What kind of number the rational part of the soul and its various faculties are, and what kind of number the thinking part, and what the opiniative, and in the case of the non-rational soul what kind of number the imaginative or the sensitive part of the soul or any of the others are, is really not easy even to imagine. So much, then, for the absurdities following from Xenocrates’ doctrine, in addition to what has already been said. 409b19 There have been handed down three ways in which people define the soul: [some said it is that which is most capable of causing movement by setting itself in motion, others that it is that which consists of the finest particles or which is least corporeal of all things. What difficulties and contradictions these contain we have now virtually covered. It remains to examine what is meant by the claim that it consists of the elements. For they say this in order that the soul perceives things and gets to know each thing, but inevitably this theory gives rise to many impossible consequences.]

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He draws conclusions from what has been discussed in order to add what still remains. For he has said that of those who have spoken about the soul, some have concentrated on its capacity to cause movement, others on its cognitive aspect, and yet others on its being constituted of very fine particles or being incorporeal. Having now refuted those who concentrated on its kinetic aspect and those who concentrated on its incorporeality, he now moves on to the one that is still left. For he himself also holds that it causes movement, and this is the way in which he understands those who concentrate on this , just

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like those who concentrate on its cognitive aspect and its incorporeality; but he criticises the former because they said it causes movement by being moved, and the latter because they fancied things around the incorporeal and did not keep their theory under control but said it was a body consisting of very fine particles. What difficulties and contradictions these contain, we have now virtually covered. For a consequence both for those who say that it is most capable of causing movement and for those who say that it consists of the finest particles was that a body would penetrate a body and that in this way the body would be moved by the soul in the manner of the wooden Aphrodite;288 and a consequence of this was that it could again enter corpses and cause them to move, and that the soul was not the cause of being stationary for the living being. The arguments raised against the self-moving aspect are self-evident. So what remains is to refute those who concentrate on its cognitive aspect, who say that it is composed of the elements of things, so that it gets to know what is like by means of what is like; a theory which, he says, has many impossible consequences.

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409b26 For they posit that like is known by like, just as if they were positing the soul to be the things. [But it is not just these things that exist, but also many others, or rather, perhaps the things that consist of them are infinite. Now let it be those things of which each particular of them is composed which the soul knows and perceives; but by means of what will it know or perceive the universal, e.g. god or man or flesh or something like that? And the same applies to any other composite; for it is not that each particular is the elements in whatever state, but in some ratio and combination, as Empedocles says about bone:] Since the soul, they say, has a faculty for getting to know forms, and they say that like is known by like, they virtually say that the soul is all things. But they try to avoid this because of its absurdity, and therefore they posit that the soul consists of the elements of things. But this theory has many impossible consequences. For if it knows like by like, it will know those things of which it is itself composed, I mean the elements and the principles of things. But as for things that exist, it is not only the principles and the elements, but there are many, indeed an infinite number of things over and above the principles and composed of them, which are different from each other and from the principles. How, then, will it know these? It will know those of which it is composed, I mean the elements, but no longer those things that are composed of the elements. For each of these exists with the aid of a particular combination, yet if the soul has no share in this combination it will not know these if like is known by like. He proves this by adding that each thing has its own ratio of combina-

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tion, and the verses of Empedocles that make this clear. Therefore, if the soul is to know these things, too, it must possess the ratios of its combinations; and if it does not have these, it will not know them. This is why Plato in the Timaeus did not want to posit that the soul consists of the elements, but also posits the soul’s combination according to consonant numbers.289 Yet if also the elements of which things are composed are present in the soul just as the ratios of the combinations according to which they are combined, it is in turn necessary that the soul is all things; for if the elements of man are present in the soul and the ratios of their combinations as well, the soul will be a human being, and the same will apply in the case of a stone and other objects; for each thing is nothing other than the elements in a certain combination. For if the ratios of the combination of the elements, such as one and a half or some other, naturally existed by themselves, then, even if there was some plausibility in the phantasy that the soul contains the elements and that it contains the ratios of things, in this way it knows composites; yet since the ratios of combinations are present in the combined elements, the one who says that the elements are in the soul and that the ratios of the combination of things are so, too, will be inevitably compelled to say nothing other than that these very things are in the soul, e.g. horse, stone etc. That this is absurd goes without saying. By ‘infinite’ he means things not by nature but in relation to us, or if not, infinite because they occur always. 410a4 ‘The charming earth in its well-bosomed vessels received the two parts out of eight that were of shining liquid and four from Hephaestus; and the white bones came into being.’290 [Therefore there is no advantage in the elements’ being in the soul unless the formulae and the combination are so too; for each will know its like, but nothing will know bone or man unless these will also be present. Yet there is no need to say that this is impossible, for who would ask whether a stone or a man is present in the soul?291 Likewise for the good and the non-good; and the same for other things.]

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Since he has quoted these verses in order to prove that they posit that things exist according to some sort of ratio of combination, if we wish to follow these verses, we need to say a little bit about them.292 Empedocles adopts eight parts for the generation of bones, of which four are made of fire, two of earth, and of air and water one each. Why do we say eight? We know that for the generation of things the Pythagoreans adopted the consonant numbers.293 For the generation of bones, then, he adopts the number eight, because eight is the first cubic number, and they assign the cubic shape to the earth, not

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because the shape of the earth is cubic, but because of its immobility; and since bones are earthy, it makes sense that he adopted the cube for their generation. The cube, then, is composed of consonant numbers; for it has twelve sides, eight angles and six planes; the twelve stand in a relation to eight of three to two, and to six in a relation of two to one, and eight stands to six in a relation of four to three. These numbers produce consonant ratios; for the ratio of the doubles produces the consonance called ‘through all’.294 It is called ‘through all’ because it consists of a ratio of three to two and four to three; for when the strings are in such a condition that the first stands to the second in a relation of three to two, and the second to the third in a relation of four to three, then the first will stand to the third in a relation of one to two, since it is twelve, eight, six; and this is ‘through all’, since it has all the consonant ratios.295 The consonance that consists in a ratio of one and a third is called a fourth.296 The sides in a given cube are those that start from A and go as far as M, the angles those that start from N to Y.297 And that in the case of surfaces it is six is obvious; for since there are three dimensions, each has two ends. That the cube has eight is obvious. For a cube is that which has its three dimensions equal, length, width, depth, and it is measured as follows: taking the side of the one dimension, and this multiplied by itself, for instance if one had each side being three cubits long, and this one multiplied by itself, for example, three times three makes nine, and again if we multiply the side with what it has become three times nine we say that the cube has a contents of twenty-seven cubits. This, then, applies to the number; for when three equal numbers are multiplied by themselves, what results from them will be a cube, e.g. two times two makes four and two times four makes eight. Hence they define this by saying that a cube is a number that is equal times equal times equal. And again, when the number that produces the square number is multiplied by the square number, it produces a cube; and every number multiplied by itself produces a square; for two times two makes four, and two times four eight. ‘the charming earth’: That is to say, well-fitted. It is well-fitted like a cube, because the cube consists of consonant numbers. ‘in well-bosomed vessels’ stands for widths; for the breast is wider than the other parts of living beings. As the poet supposes Hephaestus throwing the gold and the bronze and the rest into the smelting furnace, likewise himself supposes that the smelting furnace stands for ‘in the earth’. ‘received the two parts out of eight that were of shining liquid’: He says that of water and air two portions are thrown into the earth. By ‘liquid’ (nêstis), which is derived from ‘flowing’ (naein),298 he indicates the moisture of water and air, and by shining he means the transparent. ‘four’, he says, ‘of Hephaestus’: Therefore the two remaining will be of the earth, which are air and water, thrown into the earth as in

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the smelting furnace, and he separated these and mixed them. And since bones are dry and white, he took more of earth and fire, two portions of earth and four of fire; for to the fiery substance they attributed whiteness; and since each of the two substances was moist, I mean that of air and that of water, he took one portion each. Besides, if he had to divide the number eight into consonant numbers, it would not be possible for them to be divided into others than those into which he divided them. For it had to be divided into four, in order that each of the elements were given a portion, but it was not necessary to divide it into even portions for the reason mentioned; for it was left over either into two triads and two units, or as he divided it. But the two triads do not stand in a consonant relationship to each other, nor do the two units, yet here the consonant relationships are manifold; for the tetrad in relation to the dyad, and the latter to the units, preserves the consonant number.299 410a13 Furthermore, since the word being is used in many ways, sometimes signifying a substance, sometimes a quantity, sometimes a quality, [or any other of the categories that have been distinguished, will the soul consist of all of them or not? But there do not seem to be elements common to all. Will it then consist of elements of substances only? How will it then know any of the others? Or will they say that there are elements and principles peculiar to each category, of which the soul is composed? Then it will be a quality and a quantity and a substance. But it is impossible that there should be a substance, not a quantity, composed of quantitative elements. Those who say that it is composed of all are faced with these and other consequences of this kind.]

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If like is known by like, and for this reason the soul must consist of the elements of things, he says: ‘Since there are many things that are, and since these are divided into ten categories, and since the soul knows all things, it is necessary either that there are certain principles and elements that are common to the ten categories and of which the soul is composed so that it knows all things, or that there are no common principles but principles that are peculiar to each category, such as substance being of matter and form, quantity either of the continuous and definite quantity, or of the point and the unit (for the one is principle of continuous quantity, the other of defined quantity), and likewise also of each of the other principles that exist in some way (by ‘principles’ of the categories I mean here those that are like elements and arranged harmoniously, just as, for example, the essence of stone is a principle, and so, too, are the four elements), or, then, it will consist of all principles of the categories, or of those of substance. But if the soul is to consist of the principles of substance,

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how will it know quantity or quality or the other categories? And if the soul consists of the principles of quantity or some other one apart from substance, how will it become a substance on the basis of the principles of quantity? For the soul is a substance.300 And again, how will it know the remaining categories? Yet if it consists of all the principles of the categories, it will be both a substance and a quantity and a quality and each of the other categories; but this is impossible, because the elements of quantity produce quantity and those of quality quality, and similarly for the others, yet it is impossible for the soul, being a substance, to be also a quantity or a quality. But if someone said that some part of it is a substance, another part a quantity, and yet another part a quality, and yet another each of the others, let him say how from these one soul will come to be; for nothing that is composed of these becomes one. Furthermore, the soul will be of an origin different from itself. Moreover, what sort of part or faculty of the soul we shall connect with what sort of category is impossible to imagine. It remains, then, to say that the elements of which the soul is composed are common to the ten categories. But this is impossible; for there is no common genus of the ten categories, but they are separated from each other and not jointly connected to a common genus.301 For ‘being’ is predicated of these in name only. Yet if someone were to say the following: ‘But if there is something with a certain quantity and quality, then quantity and quality are substantially conjoined, therefore the soul, being a substance, was capable of grasping quantity and quality; for fire, being on the one hand a body, has as joint substance and specific feature the threedimensional, yet on the other hand fire has the qualities hot and dry’, our response to this will be that even if this were the case, how would the soul know things subsumed under the other categories? Furthermore, even if there is something quantitative and qualitative that specifies a substance, while the quantitative and qualitative would be something accidental, which comes to be and passes away, the soul will not know this, since it is not made up of the principles of quantity and quality. Those, therefore, he says, who assert that the soul consists of the principles of things, are faced with these absurd consequences; and furthermore, on the basis of the similarity with what has been said it is possible to find many other such things that follow from these. 410a23 It is further absurd to say that like is unaffected by like but that perception is a matter of like perceiving like. [Yet they posit that sense perception is a matter of being affected and moved in some way, and similarly also for thinking and knowing.]

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These people, too, he says, posit that like is not affected by like,302 as is true;303 for what is dry will not be affected by what is similarly dry nor will what is wet be affected by what is similarly wet, nor will any of the others. For if a lamp is affected by a large torch in that is extinguished, it is, however, not affected in being like it, but in being unlike it, viz. as something weaker is affected by something stronger. If, then, like is not affected by like, how then can they on the other hand say that like is known by like? For what knows is affected, since what is known acts on it. For the object of sense acts on the sense-organ, either by expansion or contraction, or simply by causing it to be moved, and that which knows is being moved by what is known, as they themselves think, too: for they say that perceiving is a matter of the soul being moved. Therefore, if like is not affected by like, yet what is known acts and what knows is acted upon, it will not be the case that like is known by like. Indeed, he himself says in On Coming to Be and Perishing that it is not the case that any chance thing is affected by any chance thing;304 for what is completely dissimilar cannot act upon what is dissimilar, nor can what is completely identical ; what is required is that what acts and what is acted upon are in some respect similar, in another dissimilar, and potentially similar but in actuality dissimilar. For what is hot acts on what is cold, which is potentially hot but in actuality cold. And even if what is excessively hot acts upon what is moderately hot, it does not, however, act upon it in so far as it is hot, but in so far as it is cold; for what is less hot partakes in coldness. He concludes from these things that those who say that the soul knows things on the basis of the principle that like is known by like contradict each other by saying both that and that what is like is unaffected by what is like. 410a27 There are many problems and difficulties involved in saying, as Empedocles does, [that each individual thing is known by means of corporeal elements and, moreover, by its like,305 as is testified by what is said now: for all things within the bodies of living beings that are simply made of earth, such as bones, sinews and hair, perceive nothing; therefore they do not even perceive things similar to them; and yet they should.]

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The claim that like is known by like, as Empedocles says, ‘for we have seen earth by means of earth’, and anyone else who says this, has already been refuted306 as involving many absurdities and difficulties. But it will be especially refuted by what is about to be said now. For ‘what is said now’ he says instead of ‘what is about to be said’.307 This is indicated by the addition of the particle ‘for’, which is explanatory: ‘for all things etc.’ For if it is for this reason, that ‘we have seen earth by means of earth’, because like is known by like, the things that are

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nearer the earth should know it better. As it is, however, the opposite is the case: those things in us that have a greater share in earth, such as hair, bone and nails, are completely without sensation; and because they are completely without sensation, it is obvious that they do not even perceive things similar to themselves. And yet they ought to be more perceptive and better capable of knowing earth, if like is known by like. Therefore this theory is not true. And if one were to listen to what is said now and what has already been said, one can also understand what immediately follows: the fact that it is not possible for like to be affected by like, and that perceiving, as others think, too, is a matter of being affected and being set in motion, is particularly suitable for refuting the theory that says that like is known by like. But, as I said, since he adds the particle ‘for’, it is more likely that the words ‘what is said now’ pertain to what follows. 410b2 Furthermore, each of the principles will have more ignorance than understanding; for each will have knowledge of one thing, but will be ignorant of many; for all are different. If we have seen earth by means of earth, water by water, then each of the principles knows one thing and will be ignorant of many. Therefore the elements are causes of ignorance rather than knowledge. This argument seems not to reduce the theory to absurdity, but only to state what follows from the doctrine; for what is absurd about it, if each one of them knows only one thing but will be ignorant of the others? For touch, too, knows what is tangible but is ignorant both of what is visible and what is audible and smellable and tastable, and the same goes for the other senses. This argument rather seems to demonstrate the absurdity that arises in the case of Love, which is the subject of the sequel, and for this reason the argument in relation to the other elements has been put first, so that what follows also adds the case of Love.308

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410b4 The consequence of Empedocles’ view is that God is most devoid of intelligence; for he is the only one not to know one of the elements, Strife, [yet mortals will know everything, for each consists of all the elements.] This, too, he says, is an absurd consequence of Empedocles’ doctrine, namely that for him God will be less intelligent than the mortal mixtures.309 For since all things are composed of the four elements, and in addition also of Strife and Love, and if for this reason they know everything because they contain the principles of all things, the sphere,310 which he calls God, does not have a share in Strife and will therefore not know this; for he comes into being according to him in virtue of his gaining mastery of Love, whereas mortal

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things, which are composed of all the elements, will know all things. This is why he says:311 ‘We have seen earth by means of earth’, and ‘Love by means of Love, and Strife by means of grievous Strife’. Some have understood ‘God’ to refer to Love, in that the God he is talking about (that is for him Love) will not know Strife, because this is the opposite of him. Therefore he will be least intelligent compared to those composite beings that also know Strife. And if someone were to say that he will not know the other elements either, the theory is even more absurd. Let it be the case, then, that Love knows the other elements, since it contains each of these within itself, so that it will also know these. But even if one were to concede this, and that the elements are present in each other, it will still not have Strife within itself; for the opposites will be present simultaneously, which is impossible. The interpretation as standing for the sphere seems to be more natural. Alexander has correctly commented that this argument is based on common opinion. For it is not the case that God is less intelligent than inferior beings since he has no grasp of them; for it is better that he grasps only the superior beings but has no thoughts about the inferior ones. 410b7 And in general,312 why do not all things have soul? [For all are either an element or consist of one element or more or all. For it is necessary that one, or some, or all have knowledge.]

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Indeed; for if the soul is the elements, and all things are composed of all elements, or some, or just one, such as ice which consists of one, namely water, all things ought to be ensouled and endowed with sense perception, and each of the composite bodies ought to know all things if it were composed of all the elements, or some, if it were composed of some, or just one, if it were not composite but consisted of one element, as ice does.

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410b10 One may further raise the question of what the unifying factor of these things actually is. For it seems that the elements are matter. But what is that which is in control of them and holds them together? [Yet it is impossible for there to be something superior to and ruling over the soul, and even more impossible that there is something superior to and ruling over the intellect.] They said that the soul is composed of the elements, and these are dissolved and have a ratio of matter; now since they said that the soul is not simply the elements but is composed of the elements, what is it that unifies these elements that are dissolved and that come together in order for the soul to come into being, if indeed the soul is one,

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composed of a plurality of elements? That, then, which is the cause of its union would be the soul. And in things where there is something that holds together and something that is being held together, it is that which holds together which is naturally primary and superior to what is being held together. Therefore, if in what is composite that which holds it together and which is in control is the soul (for if that leaves the composite, it collapses) and if what holds together is also by nature in control, the soul is in control but the elements that derive their unity from the soul will have their coherence at a later stage in the hierarchy. Therefore the soul is more like a ruler than the elements. For even in things that consist of form and matter, the form is the one that is more like a ruler and by nature primary. For the matter is because of the form, since the one is that for the sake of which, whereas the matter is for the sake of something, and it is in order to receive the form that the suitability of the matter is brought into the right condition. In ensouled beings it is the soul that is the form; therefore the soul is by nature primary. Yet they say that the elements are the principles of all things, and that the things which are held together, the elements, are principles and causes of what holds together, the soul. The counterargument would be as follows. That which is most in control holds together, and the soul is most in control; therefore it is the soul which holds together; now that which holds together is more like a ruler; therefore the soul is more like a ruler. Therefore the elements are not the principles of everything. ‘it is impossible for there to be something superior to and ruling over the soul’: This is because the soul is more precious than this body, and even than the pneuma,313 except that it is not of earlier descent than the intellect; the intellect is more precious than the soul and of earlier descent, for it has its being separate.314 Therefore the intellect is by nature most ruling of all. How then can they say that it is the elements? For it is reasonable that what is more precious by nature is also of earlier descent.

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410b14 For it is most reasonable that this is of earliest descent and in control by nature, [yet they say that the elements are the first of things.] Evidently, therefore, in this passage Aristotle means that the intellect is separate, since he says that it is of earlier descent even than the soul.315 By intellect he means the rational soul, by soul the rest . Here you have the solution to the problem which he did not resolve earlier on, when he said that the movements of the soul follow the mixtures of the body.316 For that is what happens when man is constituted unnaturally. For when the intellect, whose natural activity is to rule, does not rule because the hierarchy is re-

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versed,317 the faculties of the soul follow the mixtures of the body. But when the intellect does rule, then, when man is constituted in accordance with nature, the faculties of the soul no longer follow the mixtures of the body, but the body follows the soul. 184,1

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410b16 All of these, both those who have posited that the soul is the elements on account of its knowing and perceiving things, as well as those who posit that it is most of all causative of movement, do not discuss the soul as a whole. [For neither are those that perceive all capable of being moved – for it seems that some animals are stationary and cannot move from one place to another.] He divides those who have discussed the soul into three groups: those who have concentrated on its kinetic aspect, those who have concentrated on its perceptive aspect, and those who have concentrated on its incorporeality, and he has refuted each of these doctrines individually (for as I said, he accepts something of each of them, while he also criticises something in each of them; for he accepts that they have spoken of the soul as the cause of movement and as the faculty of perception, and that they believed that the soul had to be most of all incorporeal; yet he criticises some for thinking that in order to cause movement it has to be subject to movement, and others because they believed that the soul had to be composed of the principles because like is known by like, and again others because while correctly fancying the soul to be incorporeal they did not quite master this concept but reduced it to something consisting of very fine particles). Having refuted each of these theories individually and shown the absurd consequences of each of them, he now launches a refutation that applies commonly to all. For they all, he says, make the mistake of not discussing the soul as a whole. Those who say that the soul is the body that is most capable of causing movement or consisting of the finest particles, both using movement as its characteristic criterion, will be exposed as not having said anything about either the vegetative soul nor about that of zoophytes;318 for their soul is not characterised by movement, for none of them has locomotion. This is evident in the case of plants; but it would seem that zoophytes move, as sponges do. But this movement is not locomotion; for it does not change place but is like a kind of contraction and expansion. These thinkers assumed that movement is that which makes whole things change from one place to another; but of these things , the wholes are immobile.319 Those who have concentrated on the cognitive and perceptive aspect have also said nothing about the vegetative soul; for plants are ensouled but they are without perception and do not share in knowledge.

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410b20 And yet this seems to be the only type of movement which the soul causes in the living being. He has just said that those who have concentrated on its kinetic aspect do not discuss the whole soul (for they say nothing about the soul of plants nor of that of zoophytes, which do share in sense perception yet not in locomotion) in order that no-one will say that these things, too, are subject to movement (for even plants and zoophytes undergo alteration and grow). This is the reason why he has added that it is ‘the only type of movement’, I mean locomotion, in respect of which the soul exercises movement on the living being. If, then, the soul exercises this type of movement only, those who define the soul on the basis of its kinetic aspect will not be speaking about the soul as a whole. For that alteration and growth are not movements of the soul is clear from the fact that inanimate things such as stones also grow and undergo alteration, like all things that are subject to becoming, whereas it is only living beings that are subject to the spatial movement that has its origin from within and happens according to impulse. Furthermore, even if an ensouled thing sometimes undergoes each of these movements in so far as it is ensouled, still it does not do so because of the soul but because of something external (for it is moved either by the sense-objects or by the intelligible objects or by what is assimilated to it and grows, yet in virtue of the soul and in so far as it is ensouled), yet it undergoes movement according to impulse not only in so far as it is ensouled, but because it appears to be moved also by the soul.

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410b21 Something similar applies to all those who posit that the intellect and the faculty of perception consist of the elements. [For it seems that plants both live and at the same time do not partake in sense perception, and most animals have no share in discursive thought.] Having shown in what way those who define the soul on the basis of its capability of causing motion do not discuss the whole soul, he now shows that on the other hand those who define it on the basis of its capacity to know do not discuss the whole soul either. He has said this because those who define the soul on the basis of its capacity to know say that sense perception and intellect are the same soul and for that reason they claim that it is composed of the elements; for Democritus said so openly, and Anaxagoras seems to say the same thing, too.320 Therefore these thinkers do not discuss the whole soul either; for they do not speak about the soul that has no sense perception or intellect; for these are the two cognitive faculties of the soul, intellect and sense perception. Therefore they do not discuss the vegetative soul; for plants do not perceive. And this is common to those who

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speak about the kinetic aspect and those who speak about sense perception; for plants neither move nor perceive. Those who discuss sense perception seem to discuss more; for they also include zoophytes, which those who only look at the kinetic aspect do not include. One may present these people with the question why it is that, if the soul consists of the elements in order that it knows, some souls perceive and think, whereas others only perceive. It is appropriate to raise the same point against those who talk about its kinetic aspect; for why is it that, when their nature is the same, some change place and others do not? 410b24 And if one were to waive these things as well and posit that the intellect is a part of the soul, and similarly also for the faculty of sense perception, [they would still not thus be speaking universally about all soul nor about any complete soul.]

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That is to say, even if one were to concede that the intellect and sense perception are part of all soul, either in the sense that they are identical or in the sense that they accompany each other, to the effect that where there is sense perception, there is also intellect, as the Pythagoreans seemed to say when transferring the soul to all body, still those who define the essence of the soul on the basis of its cognitive aspect would not thus be speaking about all soul; for the nutritive soul does not by nature know or perceive. Therefore, they would neither be speaking about all soul nor about any complete soul. For especially if all soul has intellect and sense perception, still it also has the faculty of nutrition and growth and generation, which are different from the cognitive faculties and which are, of these faculties, most evidently present in all beings that have soul, yet about these they say nothing. But neither do they say anything about locomotion. Therefore, if these are present in every ensouled being, and yet they do not speak about these, they do not speak about any complete soul. For it is as if there is one soul in each of the atoms, which makes use of a plurality of faculties or parts; but they do not talk about all of these nor about one complete soul. If one were to resist this, a solution is perhaps this. For in order that one does not speak in defence of those who posit the soul’s cognitive aspect and say that their discussion is not about all soul but about the human soul only, which as a whole has knowledge as its peculiar feature, for this reason he says that they do not talk about one complete soul. For the human soul is not completely and wholly cognitive: for in it, too, are spirit, appetite and the vegetative faculty, which have no share in perception. Therefore they did not even talk about the complete human soul.

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410b27 The same thing is the case with the theory contained in the so-called Orphic poems. [For this says that the soul enters from the universe through breathing, carried by the winds; but this cannot happen to plants nor to some animals, since not all living beings breathe.] He says ‘so-called’,321 because it seems that these verses are not by Orpheus, as indeed himself says in On Philosophy;322 for it is the doctrines that are Orpheus’, and they say that it was Onomacritus who put them in verse.323 He says there that the soul is carried from the universe by the winds and is breathed in by animals. Consequently, this doctrine, too, does not speak about all soul; for not all ensouled beings breathe: neither insects nor plants do. They say that these verses speak in symbolic language and by ‘respiration’ refer to the suitability of the body that is to receive the soul, because respiration cools down the innate heat and makes for moderation, and they say that the winds signify certain powers through which the soul descends into the domain of becoming out of its universal activity, which it activates when it is set free from this individual body and the world of becoming.324 411a1 But this has escaped the attention of those who held this theory. And even if one has to posit that the soul is composed of the elements, it need not be composed of all. [For it is sufficient that one party of the two opposites discerns itself and its opposite. For by means of the straight we discern both it and the curved. The straight-edge discerns both, but the curved discerns neither itself nor the straight.] It has escaped the attention, he says, of those who posit that the soul is composed of the elements that in order for it to know, it is not at all necessary that it is composed of all, but it sufficed to posit that it was only composed of either of the opposites. For either of the two opposites suffices both for knowing itself by fitting on325 to it, and the opposite by privation and by not fitting on to it, just as, he says, is the case with the straight and the curved. For the straight is known by the straight by fitting on to it, and the curved is known by the straight by not fitting on to it. The curved does not fit on to itself (for the curved is indefinite and does not fit on to something at all because of the indefiniteness of curvedness) nor to the straight. Similarly, for us to know ignorance, we do not require ignorance, but knowledge knows both itself and ignorance; and the same applies to vision and blindness. But since in the present case the contrast is on the level of privation and disposition, it is plausible that only the disposition is required for the knowledge of both; for since privation is indefinite and is nothing else than the absence of the form, it is plausible that

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the knowledge of the form is knowledge both of it and of its privation; for privation is the absence of disposition. However, when in the case of opposites each of the two has been given a form and is in possession of a determined nature, it is not sufficient for knowledge of it to say what it is not. For if one knew the white, but did not know the black, and then someone would say that black is what is not white, imagination would obviously eliminate the white, but it would then be left in a state of indeterminacy, as in the case of privation it would not have anything to base itself on. Yet if there is to be knowledge of black, it is necessary to draw an outline of its nature by means of imagination.326 Perhaps, then, since also among the elements there are some that are active327 rather and formative, such as fire and air, whereas others rather are material and passive, such as earth and water, those that are ranked according to form, which are also active, were self-sufficient for the essence of the soul; for by means of these one knew the others as well, through absence. The argument here works on the basis of analogy. For if, where there is form and privation, it is through the form that we know both the form and the privation, yet the inferior in the opposites stands in a relation of matter and privation, it is through the other of the two opposites, which is analogous to the form, that we will know the other one, which is analogous to privation. Perhaps with regard to opposites either of the two is sufficient for the knowledge of both, if the knowledge of opposites is one. For when I say ‘opposite’ it is clear that I will know some qualitative opposites, so that if I knew of white that it is capable of widening vision,328 it would be clear through this that I would also know the opposite, black; for contraction is the opposite of widening. Therefore that which is the opposite of white will be contracting. Therefore, if I were to come across something that is contracting, even if I would not hit upon it knowingly, by knowing about white that it is widening, I know by this also any black I encounter because it is the opposite of white. In this way, then, it would be sufficient for the soul to consist of one element, e.g. fire. For if this is hot and dry, it is clear that, when I come across the other elements that produce conditions that are the opposite of these, I will know these, too, by their being the opposite of this one. Therefore, it would be sufficient to posit the soul to consist of one element; for in each element, each of the two opposites is present simultaneously as a part. 411a7 Some also say that it is mixed within the whole,329 which is perhaps the basis for Thales’ opinion that everything is full330 of gods. [But this raises some difficulties; for what is the reason that the soul does not produce a living being when it is in fire or air but only in beings that are mixed, and it

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does that when being present in these as something superior? And one may further ask why the soul in the air is superior to and more immortal than the soul in living beings.] He now sets out another doctrine about the soul. Some, he says, suspected that the soul was mixed within all body, in the sense that the universe was an ensouled body; and that such a doctrine provided also the basis for Thales’ opinion that everything is full of gods, since Thales supposed that the divine was everywhere in a spatial sense, either by supposing that the soul itself was God, or that it was part of a divine share.331 Similar to this is also Aratus’ ‘All the streets are full of Zeus, all the squares of people , full is the sea and the harbours’.332 They say that the Stoics were also of this opinion; for they thought that the divine was corporeal.333 Now to suppose that God is everywhere in a spatial sense is absurd and contrary to reason, since God is incapable of being corporeal, when even sense perception has been demonstrated to be incorporeal, and this is what Aristotle’s objection is directed against; but it is necessary for the activities to be everywhere, since it has been demonstrated that he is the cause of everything. This way, at any rate, we understand the words

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‘all is full of God, and throughout are his listenings, through rocks and above the earth and through man himself whatever thought is hidden in his heart’.334 With regard to this doctrine, then, that says that soul is in the universe he first raises the question how it is that, when soul is in all body, some bodies are living beings and others are not. On that assumption all ought to be living beings; yet none of the simple things335 is a living being. Yet all ought to be living beings; for being present in fire and in air, since it is present in bodies that are purer and consisting of finer particles, the soul would be superior in these to the composite beings, so that its activities ought to be manifest even more here. The latter he reports as something that has been said by them, that the soul is purer and more immortal in fire and air; therefore, too, it ought to be more manifest than composite beings. Yet even with regard to this, he raises the question what they mean when they say that the soul in the elements is more immortal and superior; for just like composites, simple bodies perish and undergo alteration and change. What, then, is the cause of souls’ being more immortal when being present in these? 411a13 Either way the consequences are absurd and contrary to reason. [For to say that fire or air is a living being is rather

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contrary to reason,336 and not calling things living beings when there is a soul in them is absurd.] 10

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Since he has said ‘for what reason is it that, when there is a soul in the elements, they are not living beings?’, he now says that whichever of these they state, the consequence is absurd and contrary to reason; for if they say that these are living beings, the theory is even more reckless, that is bold and dangerous, since it can easily be refuted on the basis of sense perception; but it is also absurd that when soul is present in them they are not living beings; for they said that what was present in them was a soul of the kind that living beings have. This is also made clear by what he adds. 411a16 They seem to think that the soul is present in these since the whole is of the same kind as the parts.

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What the basis is for their suggesting that the elements are ensouled he says now: for they argued that, if the elements are homogeneous and since therefore the whole is of the same kind as the parts, and if the parts of the whole elements are the ensouled in living beings, the wholes will necessarily also be ensouled. For if the part is ensouled, and the whole is similar to the part, the whole will therefore also be ensouled. For this reason living beings are ensouled by each having within itself a part of the whole body of air or fire or the other elements; and since these are ensouled, it is plausible that they, too, are ensouled. The absurd consequences of this theory he adds in what follows. 411a18 Therefore it is necessary for them to say also that the soul is uniform with the parts, if it is by shutting off something from the environment into animals that animals become ensouled beings.

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If it is on account of this, he says, that each is ensouled, viz. by shutting off within itself some part of the universe, and if all the parts of the universe are of the same kind as themselves and the whole, it is necessary that they, too, are likewise ensouled; consequently, the soul within them, too, is uniform with itself and homogeneous.337 For if the soul were not uniform with itself and homogeneous, as air is, not every soul would be present in each individual but this part of it will be present in this portion of air, for instance the spirited part, the other one in that, the appetitive, and yet another in another. And if that is the case, the parts of the air will no longer be of the same kind as themselves and the universe. Either, then, he means this in the sense that what they are saying is that the soul is homogeneous, or that because it is clear that the soul is not

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homogeneous, this brings the absurdity of the theory with it. For it is not the case that every ensouled being has all faculties of the soul, nor is it the case that those in which they are all present, as in humans, are uniform with each other. Against this, I mean the claim that it necessarily follows from this that the soul is uniform, the following also provides demonstration. Against this argument it is possible for those who wish to show its impossibility to use also a division like the following. It is necessary that the soul that is present in the whole of the air is either uniform with itself or of a different kind. Therefore, if it is uniform, since it is by shutting off within ensouled beings a portion of the air that they become ensouled, everything ought to have a share in the same soul. But the second part is clearly false; for the faculty of perception is not uniform with that of nutrition or the others; and so therefore the first is also wrong. But if the soul were not uniform, either all of its parts would penetrate the whole of the air, as in each part of the body there is both a faculty of nutrition and of growth, and likewise in the case of the branch of a tree – either, then, everything permeates everything, or each part of the soul comprises within itself a portion of the air. If all parts of the soul are in whatever part of the air, everything ought to be similarly ensouled and everything ought to share in reason, sense perception, spirit and desire; but the second part of the argument is false; and so therefore is also the first. If each part of the soul shuts off for itself a part of the air, every animal ought to share in a different soul, the one only in the appetitive soul, the other in the spirited soul, the other in the rational soul, and yet another in another, if, that is, it is by shutting off within itself a part from the air that living beings become ensouled. As it is, however, we see that some share in all psychic faculties, some in a majority, and none shares only in one faculty. Yet if one were to say that by shutting off within itself a plurality of portions of the air in living beings it happens that they have a share in a plurality of psychic faculties, let someone say what the distribution is in virtue of which some parts of the soul are present simply in all animals or are taken in by ensouled beings, whereas others are not; for the faculty of nutrition is present in all, and so is that of growth, but the others are not present in all cases; and again, what is the distribution by which touch is present in all those that share in sense perception, whereas others no longer are. Besides, if the air is homogeneous, what is the principle of distribution by which one portion of air received the rational part of the soul, one portion the the sensitive part, and other portions of air other parts; for it is not that any random form enters any random matter. Therefore, if it is necessary that one part of the division is true, if indeed the elements are ensouled, and if it is shown that each is impossible, it is therefore false to call ensouled.

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411a20 But if air, when scattered, is uniform, but the soul not homogeneous, some of it will obviously be present, but others will not be present. He proves by this passage that according to their supposition it is necessary that the soul in the universe, too, is homogeneous with itself. For if it were not homogeneous but heterogeneous, some of its parts would be present in this part of the air, but others would not be present there. And if that is the case, all parts of the air and of the other elements will not be of the same kind, which is exactly what they wanted to establish. So their reasoning leads them to the opposite result; for they tried to prove that the universe is ensouled on the basis of the assumption that the parts would all be uniform with themselves and with the whole, but he now proves the contrary on the basis of the assumption that the soul is not homogeneous. For even if the parts of the air are uniform with themselves because of air being uniform with itself, still they will not be uniform because it is not the same part of the soul that is present in each . For ensouled beings are most of all conspicuous by the soul that is peculiar to them,338 for the soul is the form and the actuality of each of them. Consequently, if it is impossible, as far as the assumption of these thinkers is concerned, that the soul is heterogeneous, it will necessarily be uniform. But this is clearly false; for the rational part of the soul is one kind, the spirited another, and so on.339 Consequently, if it is necessary for those who say that the universe is ensouled to say that the soul is uniform and homogeneous, and if this is false, it is therefore false to say that the universe is ensouled. 411a22 It is necessary, then, either that the soul is homogeneous or that it is not present in whatever part of the universe.

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That is to say, in as much as it belongs to these people’s supposition that says the soul is present in whatever part of the universe, which is why ensouled beings by sharing in the parts of the universe become ensouled, it is necessary that the soul is homogeneous; for if it is not homogeneous, it will not be the same soul in any part of the universe. That the soul is neither homogeneous nor present in all would be possible to show by the fact that some parts in the universe are obviously not ensouled, such as stones and wood and similar things, even though they share in air. And if they undertook to show that the elements are ensouled on the strength of the fact that they are homogeneous while their parts are ensouled, I mean those in living beings, one can prove the opposite by means of the same argument. For since the parts of the elements that are present in inanimate beings are uniform with the wholes, and these are inanimate, the wholes will also be inanimate.

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If you take the words ‘in whatever part of the universe’ as referring to all the air, by sharing in which they said ensouled beings are ensouled because of this very fact, the argument works, or if you take them as referring to the universe and the body of the cosmos, the absurdity is shown even more. 411a24 It is therefore clear from what has been said that neither does the soul’s capacity to know reside in its being composed of the elements, nor is it correctly or truly said that it is subject to movement.

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He now concludes what has been discussed, and that is that neither does the soul’s capacity to know reside in its being composed of the elements, nor is it the case that because it exercises movement it is subject to movement itself. Rather, it is capable of causing movement and of knowing, but not in the way in which these thinkers said. 411a26 Since knowing belongs to the soul as well as perceiving and judging [and also desire and wish and appetite in general, and also locomotion takes place in animals because of the soul, and furthermore growth and maturity and waning, the question is whether each of these belongs to the whole soul, and whether it is with the whole soul that we think and perceive and move and do or undergo each of the other things, or some with some parts and others with others.] Since he has just mentioned that the parts of the soul are nonuniform, he now sets out to examine this. For since the activities of the soul are manifold and different, the question is whether the soul is one undivided substance and whether these different faculties and activities proceed from this one substance, so that nutrition, growth, generation, reasoning, spirit and appetite340 and any other faculty of the soul are all one and the same in substance and in number, or whether the soul is divided and each of its activities comes into being in virtue of a different part. Furthermore, he also raises the question whether the faculty in virtue of which living beings are said to live resides in one of the activities and faculties mentioned before, e.g. in reasoning or perceiving or in some of the others, or in all of them, or in none but that there is something else over and above these which is the cause of living for living beings. These, then, are the problems which he examines in this passage. Although he does not declare this openly, it seems that here he wants the soul to be of one substance; from the fact that he raises questions against the theory that supposes that the soul is divided. He shows that it is not possible for it to use different parts in order to reason and to perceive and to desire and to activate the other activities; but he himself appears to add

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nothing from which it would be possible to conclude that there is one sort of soul which uses the different faculties mentioned. And that Aristotle was aware of a differentiation in the substance of the soul and was aware that only the rational soul is immortal whereas the rest is mortal, we have shown many times;341 and now, too, we will provide appropriate passages342 demonstrating this very point. The things that are said here are also seized upon by those who posit that all soul is immortal and those who posit that all soul is mortal.343 The first group says: ‘You see that Aristotle wants all soul to be separable and immortal. For look’, they say, ‘he wants all soul to be of one substance, but he says that the intellect, which is a part of the soul, is separable and immortal; and therefore he wants all soul to be separable and immortal, since all soul is of one substance.’ Again, those who want all soul to be mortal say that, if the whole soul is of one substance, and if he says that the spirited and the appetitive and the vegetative soul are inseparable, it is clear that he wants all soul to be mortal, since all is of one substance. However, as I said before,344 that the souls are not of one substance was already made clear before Aristotle by Plato on the basis of the disagreement and conflict between the affections and reason;345 for if reason and the affections are in conflict with each other, whereas what is one is not in conflict with itself, they will therefore not be of one substance. Aristotle himself, too, in the second book defines the soul as the definitive actuality of a natural body that has the potentiality to live,346 and a little later he says ‘that the soul or some of its parts (if it is divided into parts) are not separable from the body is by no means unclear; for the definitive actuality of some parts is of the parts themselves’.347 Consequently, he is aware that some parts of the soul are inseparable from it and for this reason mortal. Yet if some parts are inseparable, some others are clearly separable; that at least is what he adds by saying ‘but nothing prevents some because they have no body of which they are the definitive actuality’.348 Clearly, therefore, he says that some parts of the soul are intrinsically forms of the body, which is why they are inseparable (for this is what definitive actuality is, the form and the perfection of the body), but there are some that are separable because they have no body of which they are the definitive actuality. Again, he adds immediately: ‘Furthermore, it is unclear whether the soul is the definitive actuality of the body in the manner of a sailor of a ship.’349 Consequently, even if he says that all soul is definitive actuality, he is aware that there is a separable definitive actuality which orders and embellishes and perfects the substrate from outside, as does the sailor to the ship. But if the one is separable and the other inseparable, and the one is mortal, the other immortal, it is clear that their substance will be different as well. At any rate he states clearly in the second book not only that the intellect is of a different substance but of a

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different kind as well, so that the rational soul is not even one in kind with the non-rational soul. For after examining concerning the other faculties of the soul whether each of them is a soul or a part of soul, he says ‘concerning the intellect and the contemplative350 faculty this is not yet clear, but it seems to be a different kind of soul, and this alone is capable of being separated, like what is everlasting from what is perishable’.351 And that he is not speaking here of the divine intellect, as Alexander thinks,352 is clear too: for his examination is concerned with the parts of the soul and with the question whether they are separable from each other or not, and then he adds ‘Concerning the intellect’, suggesting that this, too, is a part of the soul; but he would not say that the divine intellect is a part of the soul. Besides, how could he say with regard to the divine intellect, which is completely separate from all bodies, that it is capable of being separated? How could he, in general, be asking about the divine intellect whether it is separable or not? And that he does not mean that another sort of intellect supervenes on us, which he calls contemplative, he himself again makes clear when he says that the contemplative intellect differs from the practical only in purpose, but in subject they are identical; for of the one the end is the good, of the contemplative it is the truth.353 For when it stretches itself to the higher things, it becomes contemplative by examining the nature of the universe, but when it turns to the lower things, it becomes practical. Thus, if the practical intellect is the human intellect (for actions belong to humans), and this differs only in purpose from the contemplative, the contemplative will therefore also be the human intellect. That what he is saying is that not all soul is of one substance is sufficiently clear, then, from what has been said; moreover, however, there is what we have set out in the proemium;354 and we will know even better when we go through the text itself. Here, however, he seems to be arguing against Timaeus, who says that the soul has been divided according to the parts of the body, and that the rational and perceptive parts reside in the brain, the spirited in the heart and the appetitive in the liver.355 So he is responding to this claim, and he believes that the soul is not divided up according to the parts of the body but that it constitutes one continuous whole pervading the whole body, even if it consists of a plurality of parts, and in this sense he says that it is one, since the living being, too, is one. But Plato, too, divides the soul according to the parts of the body not in the belief that the rational substance resides simply in the brain, spirit in the heart and the one in this and the other in that, but in the belief that each part of the body is suited to a part of the soul, the one to this, the other to that, in order to receive the appropriate illuminations.356 For just as not all eyes are equally worthy to receive the illuminations of the sun, and it is not in virtue of residing to a greater extent in this eye that the sun shines

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more in this eye rather than that, but because of the eye’s own suitability; and even in lifeless objects those that are transparent enjoy the activity of light because of their particular suitability; likewise, then, one has to believe that the soul is illuminated more in certain parts because of their suitability. Sometimes357 even Aristotle himself somehow evidently thinks that the ruling part of the soul resides in the heart.358 But from this another difficulty arises: for perhaps the soul is one in substance, but in relation to the different mixtures and suitabilities of the bodies it has different activities in different , vision in the eye, hearing in the ear, and so on, one in this, the other in that. But if this is the case, it is clear that the faculty of vision is given a form in the eye, hearing in the hearing part, and so on, the one in this, the other in that; and if that is the case, what is inferior will give form to what is superior, and matter will be the cause of the form, and the form will come to be on account of the matter. For the matter will be that for the sake of which (for vision will be for the sake of the eye), and the form will be that which is for the sake of something; but this is a reversal of the nature of things. If this is absurd and impossible, the differences in activities of the soul do not occur in the parts but in the substance. ‘Since knowing belongs to the soul, etc.’: Of the things listed, some belong to the rational soul, like knowledge, opinion and wish, others to the non-rational soul, like sense perception, desire and appetite and locomotion, while growth and maturity and waning belong to the vegetative soul. ‘Whether each of these belongs to the whole soul’: That is to say, whether there is one substance of the soul, which has many faculties and produces these different activities, or whether the soul is not one in substance but consisting of a plurality of parts, composed of different substances, and that each of its parts grasps one of the things mentioned. 411b3 And whether life is present in some one of these [or in a number of them or in all, or whether something else is the cause of this.]

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He naturally raises the question with regard to life, from which part of the soul this comes into being. He himself will say in the following book359 that it belongs to the most pedestrian and lowest part of the soul, I mean the vegetative faculty; for nothing that has no share in this is capable of living; which is why those that share in this only have life, I mean plants. 411b5 Some say that it is divided and that we think with one part, have appetite with another. [What is it then that holds the

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soul together, if it is naturally divided? For it is not the body; rather the reverse seems to be the case and it seems to be the soul that holds the body together; at any rate on departure of the soul the body is dispersed and wastes away. If, then, there is something different that makes the soul one, that would most likely be the soul. But it will again be necessary to ask whether that is one or consisting of a plurality of parts. For if it is one, why is not the soul itself one straight away? And if it is divided, the argument will again ask what it is that holds it together, and so on ad infinitum.] Here his response to the problems raised begins. For since the activities of the soul are different, as he has set out, it is quite natural for him to ask whether we perform all the activities with the whole soul or whether we perform one activity with this faculty, another with that one. But since it is contrary to reason to say that there would be different activities proceeding from the same faculty, it is necessary that the soul has many faculties.360 But if this is so, he quite naturally, in addition to these things, raises the question whether the soul is divided according to these faculties and has this faculty in this part and that faculty in that one, so that it would be divided in as many parts as there are faculties, or whether it is one and undivided while having these faculties, just like fire being one and the same in substance has a heating and drying and illuminating effect, having many faculties without being divided into many parts, just as an apple, being one in substance, has different faculties, having a nice fragrance, sweetness, fresh complexion, shape; and this can be seen in other objects too, virtually all. Against those, then, who say that the soul is divided into parts in a spatial sense (and he alludes here, as I said, to Timaeus in Plato’s dialogue),361 he now raises his objections. If the soul is divided into parts, it is necessary that these parts are either separated from each other or united. But if the parts of the soul are separated from each other, how then will the living being be one? But if the living being is one and continuous and in sympathetic relation with itself,362 it is necessary that the faculties of the soul, too, or the parts of the soul that give form to the living being, are themselves united too; for how can they be causes of the unity of the living being when they are themselves not united? But if the parts of the soul are united, what is then the cause of their unity? Will it be the body? But this is impossible; for on the contrary, the soul is the cause of the unity of the body. For the body is inferior to the soul, and it is necessary that the cause of unity is superior to it; and the soul is superior to the body and cause of its unity, which is why ‘on its departure’, he says, ‘the body is dispersed and wastes away’. Therefore the body is not the cause of the unity of the parts of the soul. Either, then, they are united

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by something different or by themselves. Now it is impossible for them to be united by themselves, since they are of a different substance; for there needs to be one thing that unites things of a different nature, and it needs to be different from the things that are being united, just as, for example, the moisture that is one and different from the bodies that are stuck together with each other. For it is in the unification of earth with water, while the bodies are adjacent to each other, some consisting of water and some of earth, and the moist quality permeating them completely and collating them by being itself the medium, that the unity of the underlying bodies comes into being. Those that have once been divided by nature and do not share in the same substance as they themselves had are not united by their own nature once this has been divided, but if they will be re-united, something different will have to be added to them through whose mediation they can be united with each other. It is therefore impossible that the parts of the soul, being different from each other, are united by themselves. And if they do not get their unity from within, but by something different, it is in turn necessary for this to be either one and undivided or consisting of a plurality of parts. And if it consists of a plurality of parts, we will again ask what the cause of their unity will be. For if the same things are not united, how can they be the cause of unity for others? And again, will that which unites them be one or many? And so on ad infinitum. But if that which unites the parts of the soul is one, it will be the soul. And why, he says, do they not posit the soul itself to be one by itself? For if the cause of unity for things that are separated has to be one, and the soul is seen to be the cause of the unity and coherence of the body, it is reasonable to suppose that the soul is one by itself, and that it does not require a different third entity to hold together the soul itself. And it is not by any means absurd that the soul, which is one in substrate and substance, uses different faculties, and that for this reason it has different activities, just like fire or the apple or indeed like virtually all bodies that are one in substrate and have different faculties. Aristotle says these things because he does not agree with the doctrine, as we have said, that the soul is of one substance, but he criticises Timaeus for dividing the soul according to the parts of the body. For he himself, too, does not want the soul’s substance to be one, but to consist of different substances, which are however united with each other and continuous in such a way that they are joined in a relation of sympathy.363 For something penetrates from reason into the affections and from these into reason; for it befits these as a result of their reception of reason that the affections are subordinated to and give way to reason, which comes from above, while when reason is being prevented from its proper activities, this happens as a result of its relationship to the affections. In this way, then, the soul is one

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substance, in the way in which we also say that man as a whole is of one substance, and generally that which consists of matter and form; for that not even the non-rational soul as a whole is of one substance is shown by the fact that the affections are often in conflict with each other, I mean spirit and desire; yet nothing is in conflict with itself. Often, at any rate, spirit associates more with reason, for it is more akin to it on account of its love of honour, while desire tends to resist. If someone were to ask what it is that unites all these different substances, our answer is that Aristotle himself has said elsewhere that in things where the one stands to the other in a relationship of form to matter,364 there is no need to ask what it is that unites these;365 for they have their unity from within. For it is in the nature of matter, when it becomes suitable to receive the form, to receive this spontaneously and without a more proximate cause, just as, for example, when iron that has been elaborated has become suitable to receive the shape of the axe or the saw, there is no need for anything else that unites such a form with the iron, but these grow together with each other spontaneously. Likewise also with natural things, for example the formation of a living being and all that sort of thing. For matter and form are relational things: the matter is the matter of a particular form, and vice versa. Relational things come into being simultaneously and perish simultaneously, and there is no need for them first to exist, and then to require something else that unites them; for the father and son must not first exist individually and next one would have to assume the relationship between them, but together with the concept of the one the concept of the other comes into being simultaneously, etc. In this way, then, it is also the case with the different parts of the soul. For the non-rational soul stands to the rational soul in a relationship of matter, and the latter to the former in a relation of form; likewise the vegetative soul stands to the non-rational soul in a relation of matter, just as the body does with regard to the vegetative soul. Therefore we will not have to look in these for that which unites them. For simultaneous with the matter that stands in a certain relationship to the form becoming suitable to receive it, the form supervenes without any need for anything external to unite them, but these have the unifying power within themselves and within their own nature. But this argument can work in the case of the human soul, since the rational soul is one, and by it all the rest are united, as in the case of the stone of Heracles366 and the iron tools that were attached to each other as a result of this. But what can one say in the case of the non-rational animals? For if the parts of the soul in them are of a different substance, I mean sense perception, spirit and desire, what then will there be that unites them as being superior to them? For they are the causes of unity in the body, but they need to be united by something

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at a much earlier stage; for how would they, if they have not been united, be causes of unity for those that come after them? We cannot say that the one is substrate for the other as matter; for they are all of the same rank in the hierarchy. We shall say the same things in the case of the vegetative soul. For even if one were to say that these unify the whole creation, one would still not have given the answer to the question. For by means of what does it unify? For we are seeking the formal cause of unity, not the productive cause. With what, then, has it bound them together, just as for example the body with nature or simply with some natural power? If in the case of the parts of the soul there were something different that unites them, as some sort of form of them will be, then this, too, will be the soul. But perhaps even in these cases it is not absurd that the inferior things stand to what is superior in a relation of matter, since also in lifeless forms we see this happening. For the forms of the elements, the qualities, stand in a relation of matter to the bodies that come into being out of these. 411b14 One might also raise a question about the parts of the soul, what faculty each of these has in the body. [For if the whole soul holds the whole body together, it is fitting that each of the parts holds together some part of the body . But this looks like an impossibility; for what sort of part would be held together by the intellect or in what way is difficult even to imagine.]

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This, too, is an entirely reasonable question to raise. For if the whole soul holds together the whole body (for he has said a little earlier: it seems on the contrary that it is the soul that holds the body together), if, then, the soul as a whole holds together the whole body, and if the soul is divided and split up into a plurality of parts, it is necessary that each part of it holds some part of the body together, just as also seems to be said by those who locate the rational soul and the sensitive one in the brain, the spirited in the heart, and other parts elsewhere. Each part of the soul, then, will hold together a part of the body in which it is; for a part of the soul that is in one part of the body cannot hold together a different part of the body; each part of the soul is capable of holding together the part of the body in which it is present. ‘This looks like an impossibility’, he says, that is to say: saying that each part of the soul holds together a part of the body. For if that is the case, ‘what sort of part would be held together by the intellect or in what way is difficult even to imagine’, he says; for the intellect is also a part of the soul. If, then, the soul holds the body together, and if it is divided, then its parts will plausibly also hold a part of the body together; now the intellect is a part of the soul; therefore it, too, must hold together a part of the body. Yet that is difficult even to imagine, he says. For since the other faculties of the soul cause the body as a whole or a part of it to be moved together with their activities, one

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might suppose that they are present in certain designated parts; but the intellect does not make use of the body in its activities, so how should one suppose it to be in a certain part? Therefore he clearly says in this passage that the intellect is separate from the body; and if that is the case, it will also be immortal, which he also says many times. We have set out the passages in our prooemium.367 At this passage Alexander is completely at a loss to say something that fits his own purpose, so he passes over the passage in silence. Indeed from what is said here it is evident that Aristotle says that the intellect is of a different substance and separate.

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411b19 It appears that plants that are cut into parts continue to live, [and also, among animals, some kinds of insects, which suggests that they have the same kind of soul, even if it is not numerically the same; for each of the parts has sensation and locomotion for a period of time. And even if they do not continue to do so, there is nothing absurd about that; for they do not have organs to preserve their nature. Nevertheless, in each part of the body all parts of the soul are present }] Having refuted logically those who say that the soul is divided into parts, he now shows with an appeal to the facts themselves that this theory is false. For if one were to cut up plants, he says, and also, among animals, insects, each one of the parts evidently has the same faculties of the soul without any change; for in each of the branches there still is the faculty of generation, nutrition and growth, and moreover the parts of insects that have been divided can each be seen to have sense perception and locomotion. Yet if the soul had been divisible into parts, this would not be the case, but sense perception would be in one part, locomotion in another. The faculty of generation is either destroyed directly in the case of insects together with their being cut up or it is potentially present in each, or it is not there at all; for many of them, indeed perhaps all of them, do not give birth. Consequently, in the case of insects, what was one and the same soul in number before being cut up, is after being cut up the same in kind, but no longer in number; for it is impossible for the souls that are present in the substrates that have been cut up to be one in number. The reason why the parts of insects do not live for a longer time, he says, is that they do not have parts that can serve as organs for the faculties of the soul, such as intestines, eyes, the mouth, through which the mass of the body that flows out is woven together again. 411b25 } and they are uniform with each other and with the whole: with each other because they are inseparable, with the whole soul because it is divisible.368

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The parts of the insect, and similarly those of plants are uniform with themselves because they do not have separable faculties of the soul, but all faculties are present in each particular individual. For this is what is meant by the words ‘with each other in being inseparable’. are also uniform with the whole soul as it was before the division of the animal. They are uniform with it for the following reason, that the whole soul can be divided into homogeneous parts; for of the parts that are divided into homogeneous parts, the parts are uniform with the whole. The division is accidental; for it is in virtue of that in which it is present being divided that the soul itself, too, is divided. Now Aristotle has applied his theory to some examples, I mean the examples of plants and insects, and in so doing has found it to run very smoothly. But someone might raise the question whether, perhaps, the theory is not true in all cases. For in the case of the other animals the brain appears to be the cause of locomotion and sense perception; for if one puts something onto the brain, one makes the animal incapable of sensation and locomotion.369 And if one cuts the nerve by which sensation and locomotion is provided from the brain to the rest of the body, the whole part above the division moves and perceives, while the part below the division is at once deprived of both. The same is the case when a blockage occurs in the nerve.370 Furthermore, one can see anger arising from the blood in the region of the heart, and desire brings the liver simultaneously in a certain condition or has its origin there. If, then, these faculties have their being in the body as in a substrate, and they are all seen not to go through the whole body (for neither does vision, nor hearing, nor smell, nor taste; also the faculty of digestion is assigned to certain areas, and spirit does not go through the whole body, and similarly for the others), there is every necessity that each faculty resides in that part in which it is activated. Now they say against this that these parts are the sources of these faculties and that the faculties are not all at once defined by these parts but wander away from them and to the rest of the body; at any rate the whole body is brought into a certain condition along with spirit and desire. Yet this is not self-evident; for the difficulty is this, that each of the faculties of the soul have been allotted a part of the body, which is primarily activated or affected according to the faculty of the soul that resides in it, and because of the continuity the rest of the body is also affected along with this. Perhaps, then, in the case of plants and insects the soul has its being in the manifest body, which is why it is divided along with its substrate, while in the case of the other animals, since it is present in some other sort of substrate, the pneuma, and illuminates371 according to a certain suitability, then, when this is deprived of this suitability when it is divided or affected by something of this kind, it is no longer capable of its activities. If, then, it requires suitability in

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order to be illuminated, it is plausible that each of the parts of it that has a greater suitability to a particular faculty of the soul is illuminated more, or indeed as the only one, and because of the continuity this is also sent from the pneuma to the rest of the body. However, the faculties of the soul have their being in the pneuma in such a way as the vegetative faculties have their being in the tree, going as a whole through the whole pneuma.372

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411b29 And this is separated from the sensitive principle, [but without it nothing has sensation.] By these words he means the following. The vegetative principle can exist without the sensitive, not the latter without the former. That is not to say that the soul has both faculties separable (for that is what he has just refuted), but that where there is the vegetative principle, there is not always the sensitive, yet in those where there is sense perception, there is always also the vegetative principle. If the sensitive principle cannot exist without the vegetative, it is clear that this itself is soul, too. He talks about it as a faculty of the soul, since above he asked in what part of the soul we have life. In what follows, he will say that it is in virtue of this faculty that life is present in ensouled beings.

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Notes 1. In Chapter 2, Aristotle divided earlier thinkers into two groups, those who believed that the soul was most of all concerned with the causation of (local) movement, and those who believed that its primary characteristic was cognition (403b25-7); a third characteristic attributed to the soul by earlier thinkers was its incorporeality – or at any rate its being least corporeal of all things (405b1112). In Chapters 3-5, Aristotle will be concerned most of all with the refutation of the claim that in causing movement the soul is itself subject to movement; this occupies him as far as Chapter 5, 409b18. He seems to regard the view of soul as a ‘harmony’, which he starts refuting at the beginning of Chapter 4, as another variant of the view of soul being subject to movement due to its connection with the body (cf. the use of koinônia in 407b18); and the Xenocratean view of soul as a self-moving number (408b32ff.) is likewise considered under this rubric of ‘the soul’s being subject to movement’. At the beginning of Chapter 5, he associates the Democritean view of soul as a material substance consisting of very fine particles (leptomerês, 409a32) with Xenocrates’ view, saying that it involves the same absurdities. Only at 409b23 does he consider the cognitive function of the soul, where he selects for criticism the view that in order to know things, the soul must consist of the elements of which the objects of its cognition are also composed. On Aristotle’s strategy in these chapters see Mansfeld (1986), Viano (1996), and Isnardi Parente (1996). On the question of the extent to which Aristotle’s criticism in DA 1 of Plato’s doctrine of the soul as subject to (self-)movement is compatible with Aristotle’s own, elsewhere (DA 3.9-11 and MA) attested views on animal locomotion and ‘movements’ of the mind see Furley (1994) 9-10. 2. Or ‘that in causing movement it is subject to movement’; the focus is clearly on the participle kinoumenên (cf. Hippoc. On Regimen 4.87 [6.642 L.]: dei de kai auton sullambanonta tous theous epikaleisthai: ‘while invoking the help of the gods one should also provide assistance oneself’). Cf. also Themistius, in DA 14,29: ‘that the soul is itself moved because it causes movement’ (tr. Todd [1996], 29). 3. See in DA 1.2, 66,19-21; 67,14-16; 71,7-14; 81,28-9; 83,2-3; 83,17-18; 84,14-19; 88,11. 4. Not a direct quotation from Aristotle, but an interpretive paraphrase of his position by Philoponus, repeated below at 96,9. For the expression ‘so much do I refrain from saying’ (tosouton apekhô tou legein), see Plato, Meno 71A5-7; it is also found below in 126,3 where, again, Philoponus does not provide a literal quotation but an interpretive summary of Aristotle’s views. 5. Wolff (1971) 73 argues that the main reason why Philoponus rejects Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s doctrine of the soul as being self-moved (autokinêtos) lies in Philoponus’ doctrine of free will (cf. in DA, Prooemium, 18,18): ‘Apparently, Philoponus regards his own conception of free will as incompatible

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with the Aristotelian view that the good is the primary moving cause of animate things and that will is dependent on it, not the good on will }. To Philoponus, the theory of the self-movement of the soul and the doctrine of free will belong together.’ Wolff suggests that the passage on which Philoponus’ claim here – that Aristotle himself must accept that the soul is subject to self-movement – is based is DA 430a15-17. 6. Phys. 201a10-11. 7. The text is corrupt here, and perhaps hodos needs to be supplied after energeian. 8. No literally matching statement is found, but several phrases in DA 3.4 come close to it, e.g. 429a27-8. 9. DA 429a27. 10. DA 430a1. 11. Phys. 225a34ff.; 229a31; 229b14. 12. cf. Metaph. 1069b9-14. 13. Phys. 225b2, 5; 229a31. 14. See in DA 1.1, 24,26. 15. As Hayduck notes (app.), the text is problematic, and I have added Diels’ emendation kat’ ousian ara metabalei. 16. Hayduck (app.) is probably right in suspecting that aitian has to be deleted, and I have translated accordingly. 17. Hayduck (app.) suspects that there is a lacuna here; alternatively, the sentence has to be treated as an anacoluthon. On Aristotle’s reservations concerning the question of whether activities of the soul really are ‘alterations’ (alloiôseis) see DA 417b5ff. (cf. also DA 415b24; 416b34; 418a1-3; 431a5; PA 641b6; MA 701b17-18 and Hamlyn [1959] 7). 18. cf. DA 417a22ff. 19. Or ‘perfection’, teleiotês. 20. Adopting Hayduck’s addition hê gar sterêsis. 21. Cat. 13a33. 22. On the distinction between kinêsis and energeia see Phys. 201b31-3 and Metaph. 1048b28-35. 23. Int. 23a23; Metaph. 1073a34ff.; cf. Philop. in DA 1.1, 34,16. 24. Phys. 3.3. 25. cf. Phys. 4.11, esp. 219a1-10; 8.1, 251b11ff. 26. cf. in DA, Prooemium, 2,2-4, and below in DA 1.4, 155,11-14. 27. As Hayduck notes in his corrigenda, in 95,5-6 read prokheirisis for prokheirêsis. 28. Phdr. 245C5-246A1. 29. i.e. Aristotle. 30. Phdr. 245C7. 31. See nn. 17 and 18 above. 32. See the discussion of this passage in Blumenthal (1996) 82-3. 33. cf. above, 92,25-6. 34. Phdr. 245C5. 35. Laws 895E10-896A4. 36. Democritus’ atomist theory had first been referred to by Aristotle in 1.2, 403b31ff., discussed by Philoponus in in DA 1.2, 67,5ff., where it is directly associated to the soul’s capacity to cause movement. 37. Phys. 8.5, esp. 257a14-25. 38. After all, because an infinite regress would be needed to get movement going; cf. Phys. 257a25-31. 39. cf. Phys. 256a9ff.

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40. cf. Philop. On the Intellect 4, 21,11-14. 41. sumpnoia kai harmonia: the first term also occurs below in 128,1, where it is used in a more metaphorical sense of ‘agreement’, ‘union’ (cf. Iambl. Myst. 5.26; Plot. 2.3.7). But here, the literal meaning makes sense with reference to the role of pneuma in the transmission of motor impulses through the body. Harmonia means ‘attunement’, ‘fitting together’; see n. 181 below. 42. Text: dissôs Philop. : dikhôs Arist. vulg. 43. Phys. 225a34ff. 44. See above, 93,15. 45. hê psukhê: not in Aristotle. 46. huparkhei Philop. : an huparkhoi Arist. 47. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a separate lemma. 48. Gk. autophusis. 49. Phys. 211a12-b5. 50. Phys. 234b10ff. 51. cf. Phys. 211b11-15, 212a2-7, 212a20-1. 52. Phys. 212b10. 53. On this passage see Moraux (2001) 329-30, who refers to the parallel discussion in Plotinus 3.6.1-3 and to Alexander’s discussion of Arist. DA 406b1115 in his Quaestiones 2.2, 46,22-47,27 Bruns (on which see Sharples [1992], 92-3). 54. Porphyry, Isagôge, p. 12,24-13,5 Busse. 55. A German translation of this passage (101,25-103,10) can be found in Scholten (1996) 355-6. 56. For a discussion of Philoponus’ views on ‘movement according to nature’, ‘unnatural movement’, and ‘movement by force’ in this section see Wolff (1971) ch. 4, and Scholten (1996) 355ff. As Wolff points out, the views stated by Philoponus here are similar to those he attributes to ‘the Platonists’ in his Commentary on Meteor. and at variance with the views he expounds in his commentary on Phys. (on the latter, and on their influence on later mechanical theory in early modern thinkers such as Zabarella, see McGuire [1994] esp. 320-1). 57. Cael. 284a14. 58. See Moraux (2001) 329-30. Although Philoponus appears to include Alexander in his criticism, he goes on in 102,9-21 to give a view identical to Alexander’s; see Sorabji’s Preface, p. ix above. 59. The MS A (Vaticanus 268; see Hayduck [1897] vi, and Charlton [2005a] 162) has an addition here (see app. Hayduck): ‘But a different argument might be raised against this to the effect that, even if this power, i.e. the soul, is superior to the material bodies that are in the domain of coming to be and perishing, still the superiority to these does not set it apart from the heavenly bodies as well, lest it be said that these too have both a soul and a nature.’ 60. Metaph. 1072a26ff. 61. Hayduck notes that it is Plotinus who makes this point (Enn. 2.2.1), not Aristotle. See also Scholten (1996) 355. 62. i.e. the prevailing element, or elementary quality. 63. The heavens. 64. i.e. Aristotle’s. 65. ‘Opposite’, i.e. in opposite direction. 66. i.e. mechanically. 67. Or ‘discernment’ (krisis). 68. On these distinctions see Philop. in DA, Prooemium, 1,10ff.; 5,34ff.

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69. cf. in DA, Prooemium, 2,21 and 5,35. 70. boulêsis: cf. in DA, Prooemium, 5,25. 71. epithumia and thumos; cf. in DA, Prooemium, 6,11. 72. i.e. through reproduction; see in DA, Prooemium, 7,19. 73. cf. EN 3.1, esp. 1110a1-3. 74. The thought seems to be: as long as movements of the body could happen in accordance with soul (soul could choose to move it up and down etc.), then the movements are not against nature. So ‘movements of body in accordance with the inclination of the soul’ and ‘movements of the body against the inclination of the soul’ are not opposite as contrary to or in accordance with nature (Communication from Richard Sorabji). 75. See Philop. in DA 1.2, 83,12ff. 76. A German translation of this passage (106,3-18) can be found in Böhm (1967) 245-6. 77. phoran kineitai Philop. : kineitai phorâi Arist. 78. kata to sôma Philop. : kata topon Arist. (sec. Bonitz) 79. A German translation of this passage (107,24-109,6) can be found in Böhm (1967) 246-7. 80. epitêdeiotês; see Philop., in DA, Prooemium, 14,5ff. and the discussions in Todd (1972) and (1980) 162-3 nn. 50 and 53. 81. On this passage see Wolff (1971) 71-2, who points to a parallel between Philoponus and Galen: ‘In conceiving of natural movement as absolutely spontaneous movement, the “Platonist” theory comes close to Galen’s. At in de An. 109,24ff., Philoponus, like Galen and unlike Aristotle or Alexander, identifies movement in virtue of itself (kath’ hauto kinêsis) with the movement that is based on a principle existing in the body, the essence itself (ex autês tês phuseôs). He claims that, if movement in virtue of itself needed something else in order to be moved, it would result from the essence of the thing moved only in an imperfect way, and at any rate would not be independent (autarkes auto heautôi).’ 82. cf. Philop. in Phys. 195,24-32 and 691,8-17, and the discussion by Scholten (1996) 298 n. 190. 83. cf. Verbeke (1966) l: ‘Thus the soul, having within itself the “formulae” of things, is as it were woken up from the sleep that is its earthly condition with its involvement in the domain of becoming; this may happen by the incitement either of sense perceptions of the teaching by a master; the combination of these external factors is sufficient for the soul to release the logoi it has within itself.’ 84. cf. Arist. DA 428b3; Insom. 458b28 and 460b18-20. 85. cf. Philop. in DA, Prooemium 5,7-14 and the discussion by Wolff (1971) 75. 86. Or, perhaps: ‘unless, as we said, they move the soul in potentiality in the secondary sense whatever they are in actuality.’ 87. ‘because of itself’ renders di’ hauto, ‘in virtue of itself’ kath’ hauto. 88. Hippoc. Epidemics 6.5.1 (5.314 L.). 89. kinêsei Philop. : kinei Arist. 90. epei Philop. : ei Arist. 91. kineitai Philop. : heautên kinei Arist. 92. Adding as in 113,14. (I am grateful to Han Baltussen for this suggestion.) 93. i.e. ‘changed’: the word kineisthai can mean both ‘movement’ and ‘change’. 94. Above, 100,16-101,8. 95. Phdr. 245E2-4.

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96. See Wolff (1971) 77-8: ‘Since Philoponus’ motivation for defending Plato’s doctrine of the soul’s self-movement lies in his doctrine of free will, it is understandable that Philoponus defends the soul’s self-movement only up to a point. In response to Aristotle’s objections (DA 1.3, 406b11ff.), he concedes that the soul is not self-moved in virtue of its essence (kat’ ousian). In this respect he distances himself explicitly from Plato (in DA 114,23 f.). But Philoponus insists that the soul is the absolute cause of movement for its own substrate (hupokeimenon, i.e. the body as “carrier” of the soul). Strictly speaking, Philoponus defends not so much the doctrine of the self-moved (autokinêtos) soul, but rather that of the self-activating, self-actualising (autoenergêtos) soul (in DA 114,24ff.).’ For a parallel, Wolff refers to Proclus, ET 17. 97. See 95,15; 95,23; 96,10ff. 98. enioi de phasi kai kinein to sôma en hôi estin Philop. : enioi de kai kinein phasi ten psukhên to sôma en hôi estin Arist. 99. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a separate lemma. 100. See 107,26ff. 101. As Ross notes, Philip was a son of Aristophanes (fr. 22 Koch). 102. Taking ti as interrogative not as indefinite (contra Hayduck); I owe this suggestion to Han Baltussen. 103. cf. Tim. 36A2-5. 104. cf. Tim. 35Aff. A medieval Latin translation of this section (115,31120,33), possibly by William of Moerbeke, is printed in Verbeke (1966) 121-31 (for a discussion of the status of the translation and the identity of the translator see his pp. lxxxix-xci). 105. Or: ‘unity, duality, threefoldness, fourfoldness’. 106. A French translation and discussion of the following passage (116,21117,30) can be found in Saffrey (1968) 77-9, reprinted in Saffrey (1990) 261-3. 107. Epist. 2, 314A2-5. 108. For a discussion of this passage see Verrycken (1991) 216ff. 109. Above, 69,28 and 73,22. 110. For the ‘symbolic’ language of Pythagorean teaching see DK 58 C 2, 3, 4. 111. Tim. 36B6-7. 112. Tim. 35B4-C2. 113. Tim. 36C4. 114. Tim. 36D9-E3. 115. cf. Proclus, in Tim. 2, 284,21-4. 116. On the history of this statement see Saffrey (1968), repr. in Saffrey (1990) 251-72. 117. For a discussion of this section see Verrycken (1991) 223ff., who refers to Proclus, in Tim. 2, 244,12-19. 118. See the discussion by Scholten (1996) 366. 119. cf. Philop. in DA, Prooemium 8,17-35, and 1.5, 198,23-5 (below). 120. See Moraux (2001) 330. Saffrey (1990) suspects that the whole passage 117,34-118,28 derives from Alexander’s commentary in DA. 121. See the discussion by Verrycken (1991) 220: ‘First, there is the crossing of the two straights in the form of a chi (Tim. 36B7-8). This, Philoponus says, alludes to the relationship between the axis of the sphere of the fixed stars and that of the spheres of the planets: the sphere of the fixed stars moves around the poles of the celestial equator, while the spheres of the planets turn on the poles of the Zodiac.’ 122. Phdr. 246Bff. 123. Iliad 12.239f.

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124. On this distinction between ‘exemplary’ (paradeigmatikos) and ‘representative’ (eikonikos) see below, 126,31 with n. 148. 125. sumphônia (see 118,35). 126. For these varying degrees of ‘illumination’ see Prooemium, 3,17. 127. cf. Nemesius of Emesa, Nature of Man 2, p. 34,5-11 Morani (quoted by Scholten [1996] 357 n. 325). 128. A German translation of this passage (120,29-121,9) can be found in Böhm (1967) 244. 129. Carbide. 130. See the discussion by Verrycken (1991) 222. A German translation of this passage (120,24-35) can be found in Scholten (1996) 366-7, n. 361. 131. For a discussion of this division see Verbeke (1966) xli-ii: ‘The third kind of mixture is referred to by the term diaplokê or interweaving } By means of this intermediate kind of mixture Philoponus tries to represent and explain the unity of the soul and the body as well as the unity between the rational soul and the lower faculties. There is no confusion between the soul and the body }. This is why the body is an obstacle for the soul.’ 132. Such as those contained in medicinal plants or drugs. 133. Böhm (1967) 244, refers to Iamblichus, de Myst. 5.20 and Proclus, in Parm. 139E (p. 927 Stallbaum [1848]). 134. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a separate lemma. 135. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a separate lemma. 136. Tim. 35A1-4 (with some minor textual variants). 137. i.e. at 407a2. 138. labêi Philop. : ekhêi Arist. 139. ek Philop. : not in Arist. 140. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a separate lemma. 141. For a German translation and discussion of this passage (123,18-21) see Scholten (1996) 357. 142. Above, 116,4; 121,21ff.; 122,17f. 143. A reader suggests to me that the words ‘or what is made up of two incorporeal entities’ might be gloss that needs to be deleted. 144. i.e. of Plato’s followers. 145. boulontai Philop. : bouletai Arist. (but considerable MS variation) 146. cf. Themistius, in DA 20,25-6. 147. i.e. Plato: Tim. 41D4ff. 148. cf. On the Intellect 6, 83,42-4: ‘But since the accounts of all things are in the soul, the accounts of the better things which are superior to it in the form of representations (eikonikê), the accounts of less good things which are posterior which are posterior to it as exemplars (exemplariter), when it actually produces the accounts which are in it, it actually becomes what they are either, as I said, in a representative or in an exemplary way, as we say the image of Socrates becomes what Socrates is, or that the accounts in the art of building become what the house is.’ (tr. Charlton [1991] 98). 149. Or ‘complete set’; see Philop. in DA 1.1, 56,28, where the same expression is found; see also below, 165,23, and On the Intellect 8, 111-112,67-8; cf. Proclus, Elem. Theol., 177 (p. 156,1 Dodds) with Beierwaltes (1979) 39-41. 150. Gk. Noêmata } noêta. 151. A reader suggests emending kath’ holon to kath’ hen or kath’ hen morion. 152. cf. Arist. Int. 16a4-5. 153. cf. Philop. in DA, Prooemium, 4,1-2 (with examples of such ‘common insights’, koinai ennoiai).

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154. Or ‘determining principles’ (horoi); cf. Philop. in DA, Prooemium, 4,2-4 (eskhata } perata). 155. i.e. the demonstrative procedure, as referred to below in 135,4-5. 156. Following Hayduck in deleting horismos. 157. An. Post. 72b7ff. 158. See above, p. 121,16. 159. pheukteon Philop. : pheukton Arist. 160. cf. in DA 1.1, 50,31ff. (with n. 371 in van der Eijk [2005b]) and below, 155,33ff. 161. On this passage see Wolff (1971) 72-3; see also Philop. in DA 1.2, 65,37-8. 162. cf. Philop. in DA, Prooemium, 18,27-31: ‘but after this there is yet another body eternally attached to it , which is celestial and therefore eternal, which is called luminous or astral. For as belongs to the cosmic entities, it must have a share assigned to it which it manages, being part of the cosmos; and if it is always in motion and always has to be active, it must have a body eternally attached to it which it will keep alive always; this is why they say the soul always has the luminous body, since this is eternal.’ (tr. van der Eijk [2005b] 34). See also Philop. On the Intellect 24,60-5: ‘For plainly the body that is always attached to it and which is of luminous form, [that is, of the same form as itself], being much better than this body here and everlasting, uses better and purer senses, and therefore does not drag down the intellect, being removed from all mortal troublesomeness but rather the reverse: it does not draw the intellect to itself but is drawn by it.’ (tr. Charlton [1991] 46; see also Charlton’s n. 93 on the reading augoeides instead of autoeides). 163. See Philop. in DA 1.2, 66,11-13. 164. On this see Scholten (1996) 352-3 with n. 315. 165. Plotinus, Enn. 2.2.1 166. Above, 102,5. 167. Tim. 33B. 168. For a German translation and discussion of the passage 138,10-139,9 (and 66,11-13 and 119,24-6) see Scholten (1996) 352-4 with n. 319. 169. Meteor. 387b25 and 389a7. 170. DK 31 B 117, attested also in Diogenes Laertius 8.77 and Hippolytus, Ref. 1.3. Empedocles’ four element theory had been referred to by Aristotle in DA 1.2, 404b11ff. Empedocles’ status as a Pythagorean was widely accepted in late antiquity; see Philoponus, in DA 1.2, 73,31 and below, 176,25ff.; for a modern discussion see Kingsley (1995). 171. Phdr. 246Bff. 172. Tim. 44Dff. 173. Tim. 70Aff. 174. Tim. 71Aff. 175. Above, 118,1-5. 176. Phdr. 249B. 177. i.e. of their bodies. Krasis refers to the physiological proportion between elementary qualities (see below 146,11 and also in DA 1.1, 50,24 with note 369 in van der Eijk [2005b] 133), sunthesis (presumably) to the composition of the constituent parts; see also below, 145,26. 178. to thumoeides, followed in the next line by to epithumêtikon. Philoponus uses the Platonic tripartition of soul into reason, spirit and appetite; cf. in DA, Prooemium, 6,11. 179. Perhaps Philoponus is thinking of animals (as in tables) with recognised qualities – brave lions, greedy goats, cowardly sheep, etc. – as these were held

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in physiognomic theory; cf. his reference to physiognomy in 155,22, and see note in van der Eijk (2005b) 134 n. 371. 180. Or, alternatively, (but perhaps less likely), supplementing a form of allos, to be understood from the previous part of the sentence, as complement to eisi: ‘and, in general, in relation to the suitability of the activities of the soul, both the mixtures of the elements of the body and the arrangement of the organs are ’. 181. The Greek harmonia refers not so much to the relationship between various notes sounding simultaneously (as in a chord) – although it can refer to this: cf. Philop. in DA 1.2, 70,8-10 – but to the ‘attunement’, i.e. the relationship between individual tones forming, e.g. an interval or a tune. 182. The physicalistic theory of the soul as the harmony, ratio or blend of ingredients in the body, raised by Simmias in the Phaedo, is rejected by Plato and Aristotle (and later by Alexander DA 24-5 and Plotinus 4.7.50-2), but endorsed by the Aristotelian Dicaearchus and by the Platonising Galen. On this theory see Charlton (1985); Gottschalk (1971); Caston (1998); Moraux (2001) 357-60 and Sorabji (2000) ch. 17. It has already been alluded to by Philoponus in in DA, Prooemium, 9,23, and 1.1, 35,25-6 and 50,31ff. 183. Aristotle’s lost dialogue on the soul, also quoted by Cicero and others; see the fragments collected by Gigon (1983), listed under the title ‘On the Soul’ (Peri psukhês); the present passage is fr. 59 Gigon (= fr. 45 Rose). 184. Phaed. 92A6ff. 185. Or ‘supervenes’: the Greek is epiginetai. On ‘supervenience’ see Caston (1998). 186. In Greek, harmonia is the noun related to the verb harmozô, ‘fit together’. 187. A reference to the Platonic doctrine of learning as ‘recollection’, mentioned in Phaed. 91E4, also alluded to by Philoponus earlier on in in DA, Prooemium, 5,5 and 1.1, 58,22. 188. Phaed. 94B3ff. 189. See above, in DA 1.1, 51,37. 190. Phaed. 93B1ff. 191. Phaed. 93C3ff. 192. Phaed. 93E2ff. 193. This passage is not included in the collections of the fragments of Epicurus by Usener or Arrighetti. An anonymous referee points to a similar argument found in Damascius, in Phaed. 2.2, 58-60 (p. 319 Westerink), which is not attributed to any source and uses a different example. See also Lucretius 3.98ff., which shows that Epicurus did consider a version of the harmonia theory. 194. Throughout this passage, the reader has to bear in mind that in Greek, the words translated ‘harmony’ and ‘fit together’ have the same etymological root (harmonia and harmozô). 195. At this point there is a textual addition in the MS A, which Hayduck prints in his apparatus: ‘Yet Epicurus’ argument is not hopeless; if instead of “what is sweet” (to gluku) we understand “sweetness” (glukutês), just as here “harmony” (harmonia) instead of “that which has been fitted together” (hêrmosmenon), no absurd consequence follows. For honey is not sweetness, even if it has that quality as part of its essential being. Therefore Epicurus’ argument does not cause Plato’s syllogism to waver.’ 196. cf. Homer Iliad 2.212-20. 197. hêttôn tôn eirêmenôn Philop. : hêtton tôn legomenôn Arist.

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198. Accepting Hayduck’s suggested emendation (in app.) dia ti pithanê hê doxa estin entithêsin. 199. Phaed. 85Eff. 200. logous Philop. : logon Arist OCT (conj. Bergk). 201. The reading and interpretation of the Aristotelian text are problematic here, and no proposed solution is free from difficulties; see Hicks (1907) and Ross (1961) ad loc. 202. cf. Philop. in DA 1.2, 70,7. 203. Again, the word translated ‘mixed’ (hêrmosthai) is related to harmonia. 204. Again, in Greek harmozô is used. 205. Above, 144,30ff. 206. Again, Aristotle relishes the use of harmozô. 207. epei Philop. : ei Arist. 208. Cat. 2a11. 209. oudeteron Philop. : oudeterôs Arist. 210. de Philop. : te gar Arist. 211. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a separate lemma. 212. I follow t (and most Aristotle MSS) in reading atopon instead of aporon (D R and Hayduck), as suggested by the occurrences of atopon in 149,18 and 149,31. 213. On atopon see previous note. 214. Reading rhêsin (with t) instead of khrêsin (D R, Hayduck). 215. DK 31 B 109. 216. Tim. 28A4-6. 217. On this passage see Moraux (2001) 331. 218. Above, 141,28-30. 219. Reading legein pareinai (with t) instead of pareinai (Hayduck). 220. Arist. DA 407b5. 221. This very interesting passage suggests that one of the differences between ‘discursive thinking’ (dianoia) and ‘intellect’ (nous) lies in the fact that the former can be impeded by bodily influence, the latter not. This is not incompatible with in DA 1.1, 48,20, where Philoponus says that discursive thinking (dianoia) does not require the body in order to operate: bodily factors seem to come in only in the role of agents that ‘interfere with’ or ‘disturb’ (enokhlein) the ‘right proportion’ (summetria) of the soul-body composite; cf. below 162,34 and 164,13 (and for the reverse possibility of mental activity influencing the state of the body 156,30-1). See also Philop. On the Intellect 4, 19,65-20,88, which refers to the present passage and where a distinction is made between ‘discursive thinking’ (dianoia) and ‘intellect’ (nous), with the former being ‘intellect impeded by the body’: ‘This is an appropriate point at which to enquire how it is that in an earlier passage [408b13-15] he claimed that dianoia } belongs not to the soul alone but to the two together }. The reply must be that dianoia is indeed intellect, but intellect impeded by the body (impeditus a corpore). It is not that dianoia is a product of body and intellect, but dianoia is intellect impeded by body; so dianoia does not occur without body, but it is not from body (non sine corpore quidem est dyania, non ex corpore tamen). For the body does not cooperate with the intellect, but rather hinders its natural operations, as ash does those of a burning coal } Just as if a burning coal is not functioning in accordance with its nature because it is buried in ash, and someone says that it is a burning coal in potentiality, that is, dispositionally, and that such a thing does not exist without ash, he says this not because such a burning coal is composed of burning coal and ash, but because it is only by ash that it is hindered from functioning perfectly; in the same way if dianoia should

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be said to be not without body, this is how we will interpret the saying.’ (tr. Charlton [1991] 43-4). On the distinction between nous and dianoia in Philoponus see also in DA 2.2, 229,29-32 and, in relation to the rational activities of the heavenly bodies, in DA 2.3, 258,36-259,2 and 260,18-25. For the distinction see also Plotinus 5.3.3,23-9 (and on dianoia itself see Plotinus 3.7.11,35-6); see also Blumenthal (1988) 110. The distinction has some basis in Aristotle’s works (cf. An. Post. 89b7), although it is never fully or consistently articulated there. On the ambivalent status, in Aristotle, of dianoia in between lower cognitive functions and the intellect see van der Eijk (1997) 256-7, with references to the older discussion by Bäumker (1877) and Neuhäuser (1878a) as to whether dianoia constitutes a separate ‘part’ of the soul; see also Block (1964). 222. I follow the referee’s suggestion to delete te (deviation from Hayduck). 223. ‘Thinking’ (dianoia) is a step by step process of discovery (cf. in DA, Prooemium, 2,2-3, and 1.2, 78,11-12), whereas ‘intellect’ (nous) already involves having understood. 224. On Philoponus’ awareness of physiognomical theory see van der Eijk (2005b) 134 and n. 372. See also below, 156,30-1. 225. See Todd (1984) 107 n. 46. 226. cf. Philop. in DA 1.1, 51,3-7; see also in DA, Prooemium, 19,7-15 with note 200 (in van der Eijk [2005b]), and 2.2, 238,29-35: ‘} all [sc. cognitive powers as well as desire and spirit] proceed from the brain, which is why if the brain is affected, the animal becomes completely unperceiving and immobile. For if a sliver of wood is inserted into the brain all sense and movement remains inactive’ (tr. Charlton [2005a] 40, modified). Philoponus’ belief in the location of cognitive functions like memory, imagination and reasoning in the brain represents an important departure from Aristotle’s view that the brain does not have cognitive significance, and is clearly informed by medical discoveries of the nervous system made by Alexandrian anatomists and further developed and demonstrated experimentally by Galen. However, the present view goes beyond Galen in that it localises imagination, memory and reasoning in specific parts of the brain, which is not found in Galen (see Rocca [2003] 196-8 and 245-7). A good parallel to the present passage is the view of the late fourth century AD medical writer Posidonius of Byzantium on the causes of the mental illness phrenitis as quoted by Aetius of Amida, Medical Books 6.2 (CMG VIII 2, p. 125 Olivieri): ‘Phrenitis is an inflammation of the membranes surrounding the brain during acute fever, causing insanity and loss of reason }. There are several different kinds of phrenitis, but the following three are most important. Either only imagination is affected and reasoning and memory are spared; or only reasoning is affected and imagination and memory are spared; or imagination and reasoning are affected and memory is spared. Furthermore, loss of memory due to febrile diseases usually destroys the faculties of reason and imagination as well. A disorder of the anterior part of the brain affects only the imagination; a disorder of the middle ventricle leads to aberration of reason; a disorder of the posterior part of the brain near the occiput destroys the faculty of memory, usually together with the other two.’ See also Nemesius On the Nature of Man 13, 69,17-71,4 Morani, on the disturbance suffered by several mental functions as a result of different parts of the brain being damaged, and St Augustine Literal Interpretation of Genesis 7.17(23)-18(24). (I am grateful to Gert-Jan Lokhorst for bringing some of these passages to my attention.) 227. For a discussion of this claim see Philop. in DA 1.1, 51,31-2 with van der Eijk (2005b) 133 n. 371. 228. See the discussion of this passage by Verbeke (1966) xlix. 229. OCT reads dê instead of de.

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230. See above, 155,28-9. For a German translation of this passage see Böhm (1967) 247. 231. i.e. intelligent or slow, with good or bad memory, etc. See above, 155,30-2 and in DA 1.1, 51,3-7. 232. On this process of movements ‘arriving at’ the soul, or at the ‘judging faculty’, see Arist., Insom. 461a25-b7. 233. See Todd (1984) 109 n. 62. 234. Recollection proceeds from the ‘states of rest’ or ‘remnants’ (monai) of sense impressions; see below, 158,25-6. 235. pneuma is the material aspect of the non-rational soul functions in Philoponus (following earlier, Stoic and medical ideas). Cf. in DA, Prooemium 10,8; 12,18; 15,12; 17,17ff. (with n. 183 in van der Eijk [2005b]); 18,37 236. Or, reading ho pote: ‘which once occurred in the pneuma’. 237. For the terminology cf. Arist. Insom. 461b19ff. and 462a29-30. 238. For a German translation of this passage (158,15-22) see Böhm (1966) 247-8. 239. theion Philop : theioteron OCT. 240. cf. Alexander DA 89,4-18; Philop. in DA, Prooemium, 10,1-3 and 1.5, 194,12-19; On the Intellect 4, 4,70-83 with the translation by Charlton (1991) 29-30 (where, however, ‘immortal’ in line 71 is a misprint for ‘mortal’). 241. Alexander DA 1.30, 15,26-16,4. 242. 413a8; see below, 194,1, and Preface (above), viii. 243. i.e. ‘implicitly’. 244. cf. Philop. On the Intellect 4, 13,95-9: ‘} the intellect is not in a body as its subject; if it were it ought to be at its best with the body and suffer impairment at the same time. But in fact it is the other way round. When the body is at its best its operations are weaker, and as the body becomes enfeebled it shines out more clearly. There is no way, then, in which it is mixed with the body: it is separate and not mixed’, tr. Charlton (1991) 37. 245. Laws 653A7-9. 246. Following a suggestion from a reader, I read eipoi here instead of eipe (deviation from Hayduck). 247. i.e. cataracts. 248. cf. in DA, Prooemium 10,8; 12,18; 15,12; 18,37; 2.2, 239,3ff. 249. cf. Proclus in Tim. 3, 349-50. 250. On sumpatheia see above, 155,18. 251. cf. Arist. DA 429a30-b2; Insom. 459b9-11 and b20-2; GA 780a8-14; Philop. On the Intellect 4, 17,11-16. 252. cf. Philop. in DA, Prooemium, 19,34-5. 253. See Philop. in DA, Prooemium, 14,31-2. 254. cf. Porphyry Sentences 41, and (Ps?)Simplicius in DA 3.1, 173,3-7; (Ps?)Philoponus in DA 3.2, 466,18-29. 255. Odyssey 20.18, also quoted in the Prooemium, 8,26. 256. See Todd (1984) 109 n. 63. 257. See 15,12ff. For what follows cf. Arist. GA 736b27; 744b21ff. 258. On this passage see Verbeke (1966) xxxix. 259. Following a suggestion from a reader, I delete alla in 164,4. 260. See 155,5-35. At this point, A (Vaticanus 268) has an addition (clearly a gloss), printed by Hayduck in his apparatus: ‘Because often Aristotle uses the term soul comprising with the rational soul also the non-rational and the vegetative, often also he uses it for the rational soul only, and sometimes he even calls the intellect in and of itself soul. Again, he is peculiar in giving the name soul also to the non-rational and vegetative soul. Since the word soul is taken

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in many meanings by Aristotle, one should make appropriate specifications and attributions for each meaning, and one should not, because of the polysemy of the word, confuse what is separate and distinct in the subject matter.’ 261. For the fragments of Xenocrates of Chalcedon, Plato’s successor but one in the Academy and contemporary of Aristotle, and for an overview of his doctrines see Isnardi Parente (1982; the present passage is fr. 197, with comments on 394-5); for an analysis of Aristotle’s polemics in DA 1 against his views of the soul as a self-moving number, referred to in 408b28-30 (and possibly earlier in 404b18-25) see Isnardi Parente (1996) with updated bibliography; see also the references in van der Eijk (2005b) n. 286. Philoponus had mentioned him before in in DA 1.1, 32,33 and 44,11, and 1.2, 71,13 and 81,25. 262. Above, 117,27. 263. ‘Fullness’, or ‘complete set’ (plêrôma); cf. DA 429a27. Isnardi Parente (1982, 394) points out that Philoponus’ interpretation of Xenocrates’ doctrine is based on a Platonising interpretation of this expression in Aristotle’s DA: ‘the soul, in virtue of its being a “fullness of forms”, is assimilated by Philoponus to a genuine and proper eidetic number’. In this respect, she argues, Philoponus reflects an interpretation of Xenocrates that is more in line with the early Academy than that of (Ps.?)Simplicius in his comments on this passage (in DA 1.4, 61,23ff.). 264. See above, 126,32 with note, and in DA 1.1, 56,28. A more plausible reason for Xenocrates to say that the soul is a number is that on the soul as harmony view, which has been under discussion, soul is a ratio (logos) of bodily ingredients. But Philoponus appeals to other ideas. First, he may have in mind that Aristotle in DA 432a2 says that intellect is a form (eidos) of (i.e. apprehending) forms, as well as his quoted remark from 429a27-9 that soul is the place of forms. And it is a Stoic view reflected in Philoponus that reason (logos) is a collection (here a full complement) of concepts (logoi) (communication from Richard Sorabji). 265. Philop. in DA 1.2, 76,2ff. and 80,15 (on DA 404b24). 266. In Greek, the words used are autozôn and autozôê, which were popular in Neoplatonism; Isnardi Parente (1982, 394-5) refers to parallels in Proclus (ET 189) and Damascius (On First Principles, p. 80 Ruelle); in in DA 1.2, 77,5ff., in his report on Plato’s unwritten doctrines, Philoponus uses autozôion. 267. Arranged as 9 pebbles, the number nine forms a square. If you cut off an L-shaped border, you get another square of 4 pebbles (communication from Richard Sorabji). 268. Democritus’ theory of soul as spherical atoms had been discussed in DA 1.2, 403b31ff. (DK 67 A 28). 269. Fr. 198 Isnardi Parente (1982) (with comments on 394-5). 270. This will become even more apparent in 409a32, where Aristotle says that similarly absurd consequences follow from both theories. 271. As Hayduck notes, this is actually (our) books 7 and 8. 272. Phys. 257b2. 273. Ross (OCT) adds hekastê, ‘each’, here (attested only in Themistius). 274. An. Pr. 32a18. 275. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a separate lemma. 276. ei Arist. : not in Philoponus. 277. Fr. 209 Isnardi Parente (1982) (with comments on 399-400). 278. The chapter division here is quite artifical, since Aristotle’s critical discussion of Xenocrates’ view of the soul as a self-moved number, which started in 408b32ff., continues here, though it is now interwoven with a discussion of

Notes to pages 95-103

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Democritus’ view of the soul as a body consisting of spherical atoms. The latter had already been discussed, though under a different rubric, in 1.2, 403b31ff. and 1.4, 406b15-25. 279. DA 408b33ff. 280. Apart from Democritus himself, whose view is singled out here for leading to specific absurdities, we may have to think in particular of Diogenes of Apollonia and Heraclitus (DA 405a21-9, with the comments by Philoponus at in DA 1.2, 87,2ff.). 281. For this distinction cf. Arist. Phys. 219b5-7: ‘The word number } is used in two ways, both of what is counted or countable, and also of that with which we count.’ 282. I follow Hayduck in reading eipon instead of the MSS reading eipôn (which produces an anacoluthon), and take it as a first person singular. The reference then may be to Philop. in DA 1.2, 67,12ff. 283. DA 409a10ff. 284. DA 409a15. 285. cf. Aristotle’s criticism of Democritus’ theory in DA 406b15-25. 286. DA 409a15f. 287. This could refer to DA 402b25-403a11 or to 406a26f. 288. See above, 114,38 and 115,3. 289. Tim. 35Bff. 290. DK 31 B 96, also quoted by Simplicius in Phys. 2.2, 300,21ff. 291. cf. DA 431b29. 292. According to O’Brien (1969, 203), ‘in general, Philoponus rarely shows any knowledge of Empedocles that could not have been derived from Aristotle’, and the present report, however expansive, seems no exception to this (cf. the much shorter account in (Ps.?)Simplicius, in DA 1.5, 68,5-14), though one may add, in connection to the present passage, that Philoponus’ representation of Empedocles as a Pythagorean was, of course, widespread in late antiquity (cf. Philop. in DA 1.2, 73,22 and Kingsley [1995] 317ff.), hence the interpretation of this fragment along the lines of (Neo-)Pythagorean number theory, for which see Philop. in DA 1.2, 76,2ff. with the note and references in van der Eijk (2005b) n. 495. 293. Consonant pairs of notes are ones which blend together when played simultaneously and which sound pleasantest to the ear. The Greek discovery was that the consonant notes are produced by pairs of strings of different lengths where these string lengths stand in simple arithmetical relationships of 2:1 (an octave apart), 4:3 (a fourth), 3:2 (a fifth), 3:1 (octave + fifth), 4:1 (double octave). 8:3 (octave + fourth) tends not to be mentioned (communication from Richard Sorabji). 294. dia pasôn, usually rendered in English ‘octave’. 295. The ratios mentioned here are of string lengths. 296. dia tessarôn, lit. ‘through four’. 297. This is according to the letters of the Greek alphabet. 298. The same etymology, considered dubious by modern scholars (see Hicks ad loc., and Kingsley [1995] 350), is found in (Ps.?)Simplicius, in DA 1.5, 68,13-4. 299. The consonant number is preserved because the relation of tetrad to dyad and of dyad to unit is 2:1 (communication from Richard Sorabji). 300. This will be established by Aristotle in DA 2.1, but has already been taken for granted by Philoponus in the Prooemium, 16,3ff. and in in DA 1.1, 33,8. 301. Hicks (ad DA 410a15) refers to Metaph. 992b18-993a10, 1070a21-b10 and 1088a22-34.

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Notes to pages 104-111

302. cf. the theory referred to by Aristotle in GC 323b1ff. 303. cf. DA 416a32. 304. 323b18 ff. 305. For the textual difficulties here see Hicks and Ross ad loc. 306. See DA 1.2, 404b13. 307. cf. (Ps.?)Simplicius, in DA 1.5, 70,8. 308. The present argument ignores the fact that Love and Strife are strictly speaking not elements in Empedocles, or at least not in the same sense in which earth, water, air and fire are, but rather cosmic forces determining the mixture and separation of the elements. The argument speculates on how Love and Strife would have to be accommodated within the theory discussed here. 309. See Ross (1961) 207: ‘The best commentary we have on these words [409b4-7] is that of Philoponus (181,23-184,14), who offers two interpretations: (1) that by the expression ton theon A. refers to Empedocles’ Sphairos or universe, which, being produced by the victory of Friendship [or ‘Love’, as translated here; PJvdE], contained no element of strife; (2) that ton theon refers to Friendship itself. Philop. rightly expresses approval of the first interpretation, and adds that Alexander described A.’s criticism as endoxos and unconvincing.’ 310. On sphairos, or ‘universe’ in Empedocles, see DK 31 B 27,4; 28,2; and 29,3. 311. DA 404b13. 312. Aristotle now moves away from the specific criticism of Empedocles and turns to other weaknesses common both to theories that think of the soul as being composed of elements and those that think of the soul as being the primary source of movement. 313. On Philoponus’ (and other Neoplatonists’) concept of the pneumatic body, which is distinct from the ‘solid body’ (pakhu sôma, here referred to as ‘this body’) and constitutes the material vehicle for the non-rational functions of the soul, see in DA, Prooemium 17,17ff. (with n. 183 in van der Eijk [2005b]). 314. Again, this has been established by Philoponus in his Prooemium, esp. 12,16ff. 315. This is Philoponus’ Neoplatonist interpretation, for while for Aristotle, progenestatos is only a metaphor for ‘senior’, ‘naturally having authority’, to a Neoplatonist mind it literally means (metaphysically) earlier descent. 316. This issue had first been raised by Philoponus, with reference to what ‘the doctors’ say, in in DA 1.1, 50,31-2ff. (with n. 371 in van der Eijk [2005b]), and it is striking to see how it continues to be of concern to him throughout this commentary. He had raised it again in in DA 1.4 (above, 155,33-4, with n. 226) in relation to the question to what extent thinking (dianoia) is affected by bodily factors; and in DA 1.3 (above, 138,5) and 1.4 (162,34 and 164,13) he had suggested that bodily factors may impede the functioning of the higher cognitive faculties of the soul. Here, the question is finally resolved in that the higher cognitive faculties of the soul follow the mixtures of the body only in those cases where the relationship between soul and body is out of balance; but if this is in a natural, good condition, there is no such dependence. 317. Or ‘strives against it’ (antistrapheisês). 318. Sponges, oysters, some testacea, some fishes; see Arist. HA 487b6-9, 588b12, 621b3; PA 681b34, 683b8. 319. i.e. as a whole they are immobile. 320. DK 61 A 101 and 59 A 99. This had already been observed in DA 404a25ff. 321. The MSS read legomenois here, although the Aristotelian text as quoted

Notes to pages 111-119

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by Philoponus reads kaloumenois. This need not be a problem, as Philoponus may just be paraphrasing. 322. Also quoted by Philoponus above, in DA 1.2, 75,34. The present fragment is fr. 26 Gigon. 323. Only fragments of these poems survive, testifying to the strong dualistic mind-body view (and theory of reincarnation) associated with Orphism. The fragments have been collected by Kern (1922); for this passage see esp. frs 223, 226, 228a; see also DK 1 B 11 and 2 A 5. Little is known about Onomacritus, their supposed writer; he is also mentioned in DK 1 A 1 and 3. 324. The exegesis given (or reported) by Philoponus here (and also in shorter form by (Ps.?)Simplicius, in DA 1.5, 72,10-16) strongly smells of Neoplatonist interpretation and is unlikely to be based on first hand knowledge of Orphic literature. 325. epharmozein (again, a word related to harmonia; see Chapter 4), i.e. ‘adjusting itself to it’, or ‘adapting itself to it’, or ‘suiting itself to it’. 326. On the use of imagination (phantasia) in conceptualisation see Philop. in DA 1.1, 58,10ff. 327. i.e. ‘productive’ or ‘efficient’ (poiêtikoi). 328. cf. Philop. in DA Prooemium, 1,16 with n. 10 in van der Eijk (2005b). The idea is that of a widening and narrowing visual ray (opsis). 329. en tôi holôi can be taken as referring to the ‘universe’, but also as referring to the body of the universe, as Philoponus seems to be doing here. 330. DK 11 A 22. Text: plêrê pantôn Philop. (D R) : pantôn plêrê t Arist. 331. Not in DK; cf. above, in DA 1.2, 86,30-31. 332. Aratus, the third-century BC astronomical poet; see Phaenomena 2ff. 333. cf. SVF 2.1027 and 1052. 334. The provenance of these hexametric verses is unknown. 335. i.e. the elemental bodies. 336. Philoponus’ exegetic paraphrase in the next section (189,11) suggests that his text of Aristotle had paraboloterôn instead of paralogon. 337. Throughout this passage, ‘uniform’ renders homoeidês while ‘homogeneous’ renders homoiomerês. 338. cf. above, in DA 1.4, 141,26-8. 339. This is the Platonic tripartition of the soul, also referred to in in DA 1.4, 141,26ff. and already established in the Prooemium, 6,11. 340. As Hayduck notes in his app., the MSS A and Pal. add a gloss here: ‘just as the essence of fire is one and the same, on which both the power and activity of burning, those of drying and those of lighting are based’. 341. This had been established by Philoponus in his Prooemium, esp. 12,16ff. 342. I read rhêseis here (deviation from Hayduck; cf. above, 150,6). 343. cf. the division in Philop., in DA, Prooemium, 9,3ff. 344. See Philop., in DA, Prooemium, 11,29ff.; 1.1, 51,35-52,4; and 1.3 (above), 104,24-30. 345. Phaed. 94Bff. 346. DA 412a27-8. 347. DA 413a4. 348. DA 413a6-7. 349. DA 413a8. See Philoponus’ explanation of this in in DA 2.1, 224,28-37, and Sorabji (2004a), vol. 1, 263. 350. Or ‘theoretical’ (theôrêtikos). 351. DA 413b24. 352. cf. Philop. in DA 1.4, 159,5ff.

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Notes to pages 119-126

353. DA 433a15. 354. Philop, in DA, Prooemium 8,16ff. For Philoponus’ own cross-referencing to the Prooemium as an indication of the continuity between it and the commentary see pp. 3-4 above. 355. Tim. 69Dff. 356. For this notion (ellampsis) see above, n. 126 and the Prooemium, 19,3. 357. I read pote here instead of hopote (deviation from Hayduck). 358. The terminology is anachronistic here, since Aristotle does not speak of a ‘ruling part’ and never locates nous in a specific place in the body; he does, however, locate the ‘principle of perception’ (arkhê tês aisthêseôs) in the heart in Iuv. 469a5ff. and Somn. 456a1ff. and 456b1; see also PA 2.3-4. See van der Eijk (2005a) ch. 4. On the role of the heart in Aristotle’s DA see Tracy (1983). 359. DA 2.4. 360. For a discussion of the relevance of this passage to the question of the unity of the soul see Verbeke (1966) xxxvii-xlii. 361. Tim. 68C; see also Rep. 434-41, 442C, 444B. 362. Philoponus often uses the term sumpatheia to refer to the interrelatedness between soul functions and bodily parts; see the Prooemium (8,22, 18,4ff.) with the note in van der Eijk (2005b) p. 120 n. 100; see also above, 155,28ff. 363. On sumpatheia see previous note. 364. Metaph. 1045a23ff. 365. cf. DA 2.1, 412b6. 366. i.e. the magnet. 367. See Prooemium, 10,9-11,29, where Philoponus cites a large number of passages intended to show that Aristotle ‘was aware’ of the immortality and separateness of the rational soul. This cross-reference is a good indication that Philoponus wishes the commentary to be read in continuity with the views set out in the Prooemium; on this continuity see Verbeke (1985) 451-5 and Introduction (above), pp. 3-4. 368. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a separate lemma. 369. These are the vivisectory experiments also referred to by Philoponus in in DA, Prooemium, 19,8ff.: ‘and when the brain is affected, the senses become numb, as is shown by doctors [Philoponus probably refers to Galen here]. For when what is called the membrane-protector is put upon the cerebral membrane, the animal becomes insensitive and immobile (the membrane is a kind of skin that protects the brain), and when the back part has been affected, the higher part of the person affected has the benefit of perception, while the lower parts become insensitive because the sensitive faculty is no longer supplied by the brain when the organ, I mean the nerve, has been affected; and if the nerve is bound, the lower part in turn becomes insensitive, whereas the upper part remains sensitive.’ See van der Eijk (2005b) 125 nn. 200-2. See also above, 155,28ff. 370. Once again, this reflects Philoponus’ awareness of post-Aristotelian developments in medicine (Aristotle was not aware of the role of the nerves in sense-perception, and probably thought the blood vessels were the carrier of sense information; see Solmsen [1961b] 171ff. and van der Eijk [1994] 81-7). Cf. Philoponus’ reference to ‘medical theory’ in in DA 1.2, 89,16-17: ‘Yet medical theory shows that nerves are either the only parts to be sensitive or to the highest degree, and not just all nerves but only some’, with the note in van der Eijk (2005b) n. 561. See also in DA 2.2, 238,29-35 (quoted in n. 226 to 155,28ff. above). 371. For this notion of ‘illumination’ (ellampsis) see Philop. in DA, Prooemium, 19,2-6: ‘For that illuminations of the non-rational soul proceed even

Notes to pages 126-127

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as far as this body, is clear. For spirit stirs up the blood in the region of the heart and causes there to be some sort of boiling, while desire brings the liver in this or that condition according to its own movements, and all senses illuminate the brain.’ 372. A German translation of this passage (200,7-201,32) can be found in Böhm (1967) 249-50. 373. Above, 200,10. 374. Above, 186,25ff.

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English-Greek Glossary ability: dunamis above, the things: huperkosmia, ta absence: apousia absurd: atopos absurdity: atopia accept: lambanein accidental attribute: sumbebêkos accidental(ly): (kata) sumbebêkos accidental, be: sumbebêkenai accompany: hepesthai, suntrekhein accordance, in: sumphônos account: logos accumulation: athroisis accurate: akribês act (on): poiein acted upon, be: paskhein acting, capable of: praktikos action: praxis activate: energein active force: drastêrion active/activated/actualised, be: energein active: poiêtikos activity, exercise/perform: energein activity: energeia, ergon actualise: energein actuality (definitive): entelekheia actuality: energeia adapt: metharmozein addition: prosthêkê admit of: epidekhesthai adopt: analambanein, paralambanein affected, be a. along with: sumpaskhein affected, be: paskhein affection: pathos, pathêma afraid, be: phobeisthai age: gêraskein agent: prattôn, ho agree: homologein, sumphônein, sundokein

agreement, in a. with itself: homologos, sumphônos agreement: sumphônia, sumpnoia agriculture: geôrgia ailing: lupoun aim at: teinein air: aêr akin: sungenês alien: allotrios all, ‘through all’: dia pasôn allot: klêroun allude (symbolically): ainittesthai alter: alloioun alteration, (cause to) undergo: alloiôtikos alteration: alloiôsis alterative: alloiôtikos analogous, be a. to: analogein analogy, by: kat’ analogian analogy: analogia, parabolê angel: angelos anger: orgê, thumos angry, be: orgizesthai animal: thêrion, zôion animate being: empsukhon, to annihilating: anairetikos anticipate: prolambanein apparent: phainomenos apparent meaning, the: phainomenon, to appearance: phantasma appetite: orexis appetitive: epithumêtikos apply to: harmozein apprehend: antilambanesthai, epinoein apprehension: antilêpsis, katalêpsis apprentice: mathêtês appropriate, be: harmozein appropriate: epitêdês, metrios, oikeios appropriately: oikeiôs

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arbitrary: apoklêrôtikos, tukhôn arbitrator: diaitêtês architect: tektonikê argue against: enistasthai argue syllogistically: sullogizesthai argument: epikheirêma, epikheirêsis, logos arithmetic: arithmêtikê arithmetical: arithmêtikos arouse: erethizein arrangement: diaskeuê, taxis ask: zêtein, epizêtein asleep, be: katheudein assertory: kataphatikos assign: aponemein assimilate: proskrinein assume: hupotithenai assumed, be: hupokeisthai assumption: hupothesis astronomy: astronomia atom: atomos attempt: epikheirêsis, peirasthai attend to: ephistanai attention: phronêma attracts, that: helktikos attribute, be a. of: huparkhein, sumbebêkenai attribute: pathos audible: akoustos autonomous source of life: autozôê autonomy of life: autozên axis: axôn axle: axôn

bend: anaklan, kamptein, neuein benefit: agathos bent, what is: kampulon, to bird: oiônos birth, from: ek geneseôs birth, give: tiktein birth: genetê blend (v.): sunkerannunai blend: krasis blending: krasis blindness: tuphlotês blissful: makarios blissfulness, state of: makariotês blood: haima blood vessel: phlebs blunt: akomphos body: sôma bodylike: sômatoeidês bond: (sun)desmos bone: ostoun book: biblion boundary: peras brain: enkephalos breathe: anapnein breathing/respiration: anapnoê bring about: ergazesthai bring into a similar condition: sundiatithenai bring under: anagein broad terms, in: holoskherês bronze: khalkos burden: okhlos burning heat: kauma

bad mixture: duskrasia ball: sphaira battle with: makhesthai be: einai beating of the heart: pallein beauty: kallos becoming (domain of): genesis becoming, involved in the world of: genesiourgos begin: arkhein beginning: arkhê being, coming into: genesis being, having come into: genêtos being, mode of: ousia being: to einai, to on, hupostasis, ousia beings: onta, ta believe: doxazein, nomizein belong to: huparkhein bend backwards: anakamptein

call to mind: ennoein Cancer: karkinos capable of knowing: gnôstikos Capricorn: aigokerôs carry downwards: bastazein carry round with: sumperiagein carve up: skhizein category: katêgoria cause of: aitios cause to be: poiein cause to live/cause life: zôiopoiein cause, the efficient: hê poiêtikê aitia /to poiêtikon aition cause, the final: telikê aitia cause, the productive: hê poiêtikê aitia /to poiêtikon aition cause: aitia, aition cause (v.): poiein caused, what is: aitiaton, to

English-Greek Glossary cavity: koilia celestial bodies: ta ourania sômata celestial: ouranios centre: kentron, mesos chance: tukhôn change (n.): metabolê change (v.): ameibein, apallassein, methistanai, metaballein, summetaballein change quality: alloioun changing position: metabasis character: êthos characterise: kharaktêrizein characteristic of: idios child: pais choice: proairesis choiceworthy: hairetos chord: seira circle: kuklos circuit: periagôgê, periodos, periphora circular movement: kuklophoria clear: katharos, saphês cleverly: prosphuôs coat: khitôn cogency: anankaios cognate: sungenês cognitive: gnôristikos coherence: sunokhê cold: psukhros collected: athroos collectively: koinôs colliding: antôthêsis colour: khrôma combination, in: sunousiômenos combination: sumplokê, sunthesis combined, be: sunkeisthai combined: sunousiômenos come into being: ginesthai coming to be: genesis commentary: hupomnêma common insight: koinê ennoia common term: koinon onoma common, have in c. with: koinônein common: koinos communally: koinôs community: koinônia compare: paraballein complementary: sumplêrôtikos complete (a.): athroos, teleios complete (v.): telein completeness: teleiotês composed of, be: suntithesthai composite (a.): sunthetos

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composite (n.): sunamphoteron comprehend: antilambanesthai concede: sunkhôrein concentrate on: apoblepein concentrated: athroos conclude: sullogizesthai, sumperainein, sunagein conclusion, bring to c. from: sunagein conclusion, come to the: sunagein conclusion, draw: sunagein, sullogizesthai conclusion: sumperasma, to hepomenon concur: suntithesthai condition sine qua non: aneu hôn ouk condition: diathesis conduct: agôgê confirmation: katorthôsis conflagration: purpolêsis conflict, be in: makhesthai conflict: makhê confusion: tarakhê, sunkekhumenon, to conic in shape: kônoeidês connect: (epi)sunaptein, suzeugnunai connected to: sunekhês connection: harmonia consciousness: sunaisthêsis consecutive sequence, in a: ephexês consequence, be a: hepesthai, sumbainein consequence: hepomenon, to consequences: ta akolouthounta, ta akoloutha consequently: akolouthôs consider: theôrein consist: sunistasthai, sunkeisthai consonance: harmonia, sumphônia consonant: harmonikos, sumphônos conspicuous, be: kharaktêrizein (pass) constituted, to be: diakeisthai constitution: diathesis, sunthesis construct: sumplekein contact with, be in: prosballein contact, make c. with: ephaptesthai contact: thixis contemplate: theôrein, theasthai contemplation: theôria contemplative: theôrêtikos continuity: sunekheia continuous whole: sunekheia continuous: sunekhês contract: sustellesthai

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contracting: sunkritikos contraction, undergo: sunkrinesthai contraction: sustolê contradiction: hupenantiôsis contradistinction: antidiastolê contradistinguish: antidiastellein contrast: antithesis contribute to the perfection of: suntelein contribute: sumballesthai, suntelein control, be in c. of: epikratein control, in: kurios conversation: sunousia cool: katapsukhein, psukhein corporeal: sômatikos corpse: nekros correct: euthunein correction: euthunê cosmic flood: epiklusmos cosmic: kosmikos count, provide: aparithmein countable: arithmêtos counter-argument: epikheirêma cover, without: aperikaluptôs cover: perikaluptein coveted: ephetos cowardly: deilos craftsman: tekhnitês; the: dêmiourgos create: poiein creation: dêmiourgia criticise: katêgorein, memphesthai criticism: antilogia, katêgoria crossing: khioeidôs crosswise: khioeidês cube: kubos cubic: kubikos cubit, a (in size): pêkhuaios cubit-length: pêkhuaios curved: kampulos cut into two: dikhotomein cut through: temnein cut: skhizein, temnein damage, do d. to: lumainesthai damage: blaptein decay: phthora decrease (n.): meiôsis decrease (v.): meioun decrease: phthisis decree: dogma defence: apologia define: diorizein, horizein defined quantity: diôrismenon poion

defined: peperasmenos defining: horistikos definite: peperasmenos definition, give a: horizein definition: horismos, logos delicate, composed/consisting of d. particles: leptomerês demonstrate: (apo)deiknunai demonstration, without: anapodeiktos demonstration: (apo)deixis demonstrative pronoun: deiktikon, to deprive: allotrioun, sterein depth: bathos descend: duein descent, of early: progenês describe: graphein designate: aphorizein desire (n.): epithumia, orexis desire (v.): epithumein, oregesthai desire, object of: orektos despise: kataphronein destroy together: sunanairein destroy: anairein, dialuein, phtheirein destruction, cause: phtheirein detail, in: akribês determine: horizein deviate: exhistasthai deviation: ekstasis, ektropê devoid of: amoiros dialogue: dialogos differ: diapherein difference: diaphora, heterotês, thateron different nature, of a: heterophuês different, be: diapherein different: diaphoros difficulty: aporia digest: pettein dimension: diastasis dimensional: diastatos disagreement, in d. with itself: asumphônos disagreement: diaphônia disappear, cause to: aphanizein disappear: apoginesthai discomfort, cause: okhloun discomfort, mortal: duskhereia thnêtê discomfort: duskhereia discovery: heuresis discriminate: krinein discursive thinking: dianoeisthai discussion: logos disease: nosos

English-Greek Glossary disposition: diathesis, hexis dispositionally: kath’ hexin disproportionate: asummetros disproving: anaskeuastikos dissolution: diakrisis dissolve: luein dissolved/separated, be: diakrinesthai distance: apostêma, diastasis, diastêma distress: lupê distribution: apoklêrôsis diverse: poikilos divide into: katatemnein divide: diairein, merizein, skhizein divided: meristos divine, the: to theion divine: theios divisible: diairetos, meristos division into two: dikhotomia division: diairesis, diastasis, tomê doctrine: doxa, dogma donkey: hêmionos, onos doubt, be in: amphisbêtein downward tendency: bareia rhopê downward: katôpherês drag along with: sunepispan draw an outline of: perigraphein drive around: sumperiagein drunkenness: methê dry (make): xêrainein dry: xêros dull: amudros dulling: amblunsis dusk: zophos dyad: duas earth: gê, gaia earthy: gêinos, geôdês easy: rhadios efficient: poiêtikos element: stoikheion eliminate: anairein embellish: kosmein embryo: embruon empty (n.): kenos empty (v.): kenoun enclose: enapolambanein encompass: apokleiein, apolambanein, periekhein, perikaluptein, perilambanein end (n.): akron, peras, telos end (v.): teleutan endless: apeiros

167

endure: hupomenein enigmatic: ainigma enmattered: enulos enquire: zêtein enquiry: zêtein, to ensoul: psukhoun ensouled being: empsukhon, to ensouled: empsukhos entirely throughout: hola di’ holôn entirety through an entirety: holon di’ holou entirety, in its: holos equal circumference, with: isoperimetros equal: isos equinox: isêmerinos escape notice: lanthanein escape: ekpheugein essence, have e. in: ousioun essence: einai, to essence: ousia essential attributes: kath’ hauto huparkhonta essential: kath’ hauto essential: ousiôdês essentially: kat’ ousian eternal: aidios ethical precepts: parangelmata êthika even number: artios even, what is: homalon, to everlasting: aidios evidence: enargeia, tekmêrion evident(ly): enargês examine: episkeptein, episkopein, zêtein example: hupodeigma, paradeigma exegesis: exêgêsis exemplary: paradeigmatikos exempt, be e. from: exêirêsthai exempt: exairein exercise: poiein exhausted, be: kamnein exist before: prouparkhein exist, to: einai, to existence: hupostasis exoteric: exôterikos expansion, undergo: diakrinesthai expansion: diastolê experience: enargeia explanatory: aitiologikos explicitly: antikrus expound: ektithenai extend: apoteinein

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extended entity: megethos extended magnitude: megethos extension, without: amegethês extension: megethos extent: metros extreme: akron eye: omma, ophthalmos face value, at: kata to phainomenon face: prosôpon faculties, having many (different): poludunamos faculty: dunamis fading: amaurôsis false (hood): pseudos false: pseudês fate: tropos fear: phobos fever: puretos fiery: purinos, purôdês figure: skhêma find: heuriskein finding: heuresis finite: peperasmenos fire: pur first and foremost: prôtistos first intellect, the: ho prôtos nous fish: ikhthus fit (on) to: epharmozein fit together: (sun)armozein fit: (sun)armozein fixed sphere: aplanês flavour: khumos fleet: rhein flesh: sarx flourish: akmazein follow, as follows: ephexês follow: akolouthein, hepesthai, parakolouthein, sumbainein, sunagesthai following from: akolouthos foot, one f. across: podiaios foot: pous for the sake of: heneka (heneken) force, be subjected to: biazesthai force: bia, dunamis forget: epilanthanesthai form, give a (specific): eidopoiein form, without: aneideos form: eidos, idea, logos formal account: logos formal principle: logos formal: eidikos

formation: diaplasis formative: eidikos formula: logos foundation: themelios four: tessares fourth: dia tessarôn from somewhere to somewhere: to pothen poi fullness: plêrôma function(ing): ergon fuse: sunkerannunai fusion: sunkhusis gain strength/flourish along with: sunakmazein general, in: haplôs, holôs, katholou general: genikos, koinos generally speaking: haplôs generation, concerned with: gennêtikos generically: kata to genos genuine: gnêsios genus: genos geometrical: geômetrikos, grammikos geometry, have: geômetrein geometry, without: ageômetrêtos geometry: geômetria girl: korê give birth: gennan god: theos good: agathos, spoudaios grasp (n.): antilêpsis grasp (v.): antilambanesthai, epinoein, prokheirizesthai, prokheirisin, poieisthai grasp intuitively: epiballein grasp, able to: antilêptikos grow: auxanein growth: auxêsis hand: kheir harm (cause): blaptein harmonious arrangement: harmonia harmonious: enarmonios harmoniously: harmoniôs harmonised: enarmonios harmony, in: enarmonios harmony, lack of: anarmostia harmony: harmonia head: kephalê healer: iatros healing: hugiansis health: hugieia/hugeia

English-Greek Glossary healthy, being: to hugiainein hearing (a.): akoustikos hearing (n.): akoê heart, in the region of the: perikardios heart: kardia heat, natural: emphutos thermotês, thermotês phusikê heat: thermainein heating: thermotês heaven: ouranos heavens, the: ouranos heavy: barus help: boêtheia, epikouria heterogeneous: anomoiomerês hide: skepein hierarchical position: taxis higher things: hupertera ta hinder: (par)empodizein hold together: sunekhein hollow: koilôma homogeneous: homoiomerês, homoios hot: thermos house: oikos human: anthrôpeios, anthrôpinos humour: khumos idea: noêma ignorance, in (a state of): anepistêmôn ignorance: agnoia, agnôsia ignorant, be i. of: agnoein illuminate: ellampein, phôtizein illumination: ellampsis image form, in: eikonikôs image: eikôn images, producing: eikonikos imagination, in a bad position to exercise: dusphantastos imagination, in a good position to exercise: euphantastos imagination, use: plattein imagination: phantasia imaginative: phantastikon imagine: plattein imitate: mimeisthai immediate: amesos immobile: akinêtos immortal: athanatos immortality: athanasia impaired, be: marainesthai impede: empodizein imperfect: atelês imperishable: aphthartos important: axios

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impression: tupos improve: katorthoun impulse: hormê inactivity: anenergêsia inanimate: apsukhos inclination: rhopê inclined to itself, be: sunneuein pros (eis) heauton incomplete: atelês incorporeal: asômatos indefinite: apeiros indefinitely: ep’ apeiron indefiniteness: aoristia indeterminate: aoristos indicate: endeiknunai, sêmainein individual: merikos individually: idiai (dative), kata meros individuate: idiazein indivisible: adiairetos, atomos induction: epagôgê inevitable: anankaios, anankê inevitably: ex anankês infer: epagein, sullogizesthai, tekmairesthai inferior: kheirôn infinite number of times: apeirakis infinite: apeiros infinity: apeiria innate: emphutos, sumphutos inquiry: skepsis insect: entomon insensitive: anaisthêtos inseparable: akhôristos instrumental parts: organon intellect: nous intellection, act of: noêsis intellectual: noeros, noêtikos intelligence: phronêsis intelligent: eugnômôn, noeros intelligible object: noêton, to intelligible: noêtos intention: dianoia interchange: antistrephein intermediate: mesos interpret: exêgeisthai interpretation: exêgêsis interpreter: exêgêtês interweave: sumplekein interweaving: diaplokê interwoven objects: sumplekomena, ta investigation: skepsis, zêtêsis irascible: orgilos irrational: paralogos

170

English-Greek Glossary

irritate: erethizein itself, because of: di’ hauto itself, by: kath’ hauto itself, in and by: auto kath’hauto itself, in virtue of: kath’ hauto itself, in: kath’ hauto join up (with): diaplekein joint breath: sumpnoia judge: krinein judgement: doxa, krisis judging: kritikos justice: dikaion, to juxtaposition: parathesis kind, of a particular: poios kind: eidos, ousia, genos kinetic aspect: kinêtikon, to kinetic: kinêtikos know: eidenai, ginôskein, gnôrizein knowledge, have: ginôskein knowledge: epistêmê, gnôsis knowledgeable: epistêmôn known: gnôrimos lack: endein lacking sympathy: asumpathês laughing, capable of: gelastikos lead: hêgemonein leading upward: anagôgos learning, act of: mathêsis lecture: akroasis lever(age): mokhleia life (concerned with): zôtikos life, come to l. again: anistasthai life, mode of: zôê life: bios, zôê, to zên lifeless: apsukhos light, come to: ellampein like: homoios limb: melos limit (n.): peras limit (v.): peratoun limited: peperasmenos line: grammê liquid: nêstis list: aparithmein live: zên liver: hêpar living being: zôion living: empsukhos local: topos locomotion: phora

logical, more: akolouthoteron logically: logôi longing: ephesis look for: zêtein loosen: dialuein lot: moira love: philia love: storgê L-shaped figure: gnômôn luminous: augoeidês lump: bôlos magnitude: megethos main clause: apodosis maintain: kataskeuazein major (premise): meizôn make contact with: thinganein make: poiein man: anthrôpos manifest, be: diaphainesthai manner: tropos marvellous: paradoxos mass: onkos mastery: epikrateia material (a.): hulikos material (n.): hulê mathematical: mathêmatikos mathematician: geômetrês mathematics: mathêmata, ta matter, without: aülos matter: hulê maturity: akmê mean: sêmainein meaning: sêmainomenon, dianoia measure: katametrein measure: metros melancholy: melankholia membrane: khitôn membrane-like: humenôdês memory, faculty of: mnêmoneutikon, to memory: mnêmê mental apprehension: epinoia mental derangement: paraphrosunê messenger: angelos metaphorically: kata metaphoran method: methodos middle term: mesos middle: mesos minor (premise): elattôn mirror: katoptron mix: harmozein, kerannunai, kirnan, meignunai mixed: miktos

English-Greek Glossary mixing: sunkrisis mixture, a state of: memikhthai, to mixture: krama, krasis, mixis, sunkrasis, sunkrima mode: eidos moderate: metrios moderation: summetria moist: hugros moisten: hugrainein moisture: hugron monad: monas moon: selênê mortal discomfort: duskhereia thnêtê mortal: thnêtos motion, always in: aeikinêtos motion, be in: kinein, kineisthai motion, permanently in: aeikinêtos motion: kinêsis moulding: plasis move, cause to: kinein move, easy to: eukinêtos move: kinein, kineisthai moved by itself: autokinêtos moved in virtue of itself: autokinêtos moved, always: aeikinêtos moved, be: kineisthai movement, be subject to: kineisthai movement, cause: kinein movement, exercise: kinein movement, impart: kinein movement, local: kinêsis kata topon, phora movement, not subject to: akinêtos movement, source of: kinoun, to movement, undergo: kineisthai movement: kinêsis, kinein, kineisthai, rhusis moving easily: eukinêtos moving parts: kinoumena, ta moving, incapable of: akinêtos music: mousikê musical: mousikos myth: muthos mythical stories, tell: muthologein mythical: muthôdês name, in n. only: homônumos name: onoma natural account, give a: phusiologein natural heat: thermotês phusikê natural philosopher: phusikos natural: phusikos, kata phusin, ek phuseôs, prosphuôs

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naturally: kata phusin, phusei nature, according to: kata phusin nature, by: pephukôs, kata phusin, phusei, hupo phuseôs nature, contrary to: para phusin nature, have a n. for: pephukenai nature, in accordance with (its): kata phusin nature, in virtue of: kata phusin nature, student of: phusiologôn, ho nature, very: autophusis nature: phusis necessar(il)y: anankê, ex anankês, anankaios necessity, of: ex anankês necessity: anankê nerve: neuron noise: psophos non-rational (living) beings: aloga, ta non-rational: alogos non-uniform: anômalos notion: ennoia number: arithmos nutrition, concerned with: threptikos nutritive: threptikos objection: antilogia, enstasis objections, raise o. against: enistasthai oblique: plagios obscure: adêlos observe: theôrein obstacle, pose an: enokhlein obstruct: empodizein obstruction: emphraxis odd (number): perittos old age: gêras old man: gerôn omit: paraleipein One, the: to hen openly: antikrus opiniative: doxastikos opinion, form an: doxazein opinion: doxa opposite: enantios opposites: antikeimena, ta opposition: antistrophê, antithesis optic (pneuma): optikos order: tattein ordinary: tukhôn organ: ergastêrion organ: organon organic: organikos organism: zôion

172

English-Greek Glossary

origin: arkhê original: prokeimenos outright: antikrus outside, from: thurathen own, in its o. right: kath’ hauto own, on its: kath’ hauto own: idios, oikeios parenthesis: metaxulogia part (bodily): morion part, having a many-p. nature: polumereia part, having no p. in: amoiros part: meros, moira partake in: metekhein participate in: metekhein particles, composed/consisting of fine/delicate p.: leptomerês parts, by individual: kata moria parts, consist of: meriston einai parts, consisting of many: polumerês parts, what consists of: to meriston pass away: phtheiresthai passage: rhêseidion passing away: phthora passion: epithumia, pathos passive: pathêtikos pause at: ephistanai pay attention to: ephistanai peace: êremia peak: akmê peculiar: idios peculiarity: idiotês penetrate: khôrein perceive: aisthanesthai, theôrein perceptible/sense object: aisthêton, to perceptible: aisthêtos perception, sense: aisthêsis perceptive: aisthêtikos perfect, make: telein perfect: teleios perfection, bring to: teleioun perfection: teleiotês periodic return: apokatastasis perish together with: sumphtheiresthai perish: phtheiresthai perishable: phthartos perishing: phthora persist: menein philosopher: philosophos philosophy: philosophia physical strength: iskhus

physiognomist: phusiognômôn pillar: kiôn pipe: surinx place: khôra, topos, to pou plane: epipedon planets, the: planômenoi, oi planimetry: ta epipeda plant: phuton plausible: pithanos pleasure: hêdonê plurality: plêthos pneuma: pneuma pneumatic: pneumatikos poet: poiêtês poetic myth: poiêtikos muthos point: sêmeion, stigmê poke in: skaleuein pole: polos portion: moira posit: hupotithenai posit: poiein, tithesthai position, without: athetos position: taxis, skhesis position: thesis possible: endekhomenon postulate: hupotithenai potential (a.): dunamei potential (n.): dunamis potentiality: dunamis potentially: dunamei power: dunamis practical thinking, acts of: praktikai noêseis practical thoughts: praktikai theôriai practical: praktikos precious: timios precise: akribês predicate: katêgorein predisposition: epitêdeiotês premise: protasis, hêgoumenon prepare: skeuazein preposition: prothesis presence: parousia present, be p. in: huparkhein present: prokeimenos preservation: sôtêria preserve: phulattein prevail: epikratein prevailing part: to epikratoun prevent: kôluein primarily: prôtôs principle: arkhê privation: sterêsis

English-Greek Glossary privative: sterêtikos problem: aporia, problêma procedure: proodos proceed in a linear fashion: euthuporeisthai proceed: diabainein, probainein process: hodos, proodos produce: poiein productive: poiêtikos progress: prokoptein progression: proodos project (n.): skopos project (v.): proballein projectile: bôlos prone to: epirrhepês proof: kataskeuê, pistis proper attribute: kath’ hauto, idion proper sense, in the: kuriôs proper, be: harmozein proper: idios, oikeios property, be a p. of: huparkhein proportion, lack of: asummetria proportion, out of: asummetros proportion: analogia, logos proportionate: summetros proposition: apophansis prove: deiknunai, kataskeuazein, pistousthai providence: pronoia proximate: prosekhês proximately: prosekhôs psychic element: psukhikon, to psychic: psukhikos pull along with: sunephelkein pull down: kataspan pupil: akroatês, mathêtês pure: katharos purport: skopos purpose: skopos purpose: telos purpose: to hou eneka pursue: epitêdeuein push: ôthein pushing, a: ôsis put together: sunkeisthai qualification, without (further): haplôs qualitative change: alloiôsis qualitative: pathêtikos, kata poion qualitatively: kata poion quality, in respect of: kata poion, kata poiotêta

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quality: poiotês, to poion quantitative: kata poson quantity, in respect of: kata poson quantity: to poson, posotês quench: sbennunai question/raise the question: zêtein question: zêtêsis quicksilver: hudrarguros rain: ombros random: tukhôn ratio: logos rational account: logos rational: logikos reality: alêtheia reason, contrary to: alogos, paralogos reason, the r. why: to hou eneka reason: aitia, aition, logos reason (v.): logizesthai reasoning (n.): logismos reasoning, faculty of: logistikon receive: dekhesthai receiving, capable of: dektikos reception: hupodokhê, sullêpsis receptive: dektikos recognise: sungignôskein recollection: anamnêsis recompense: ameipsis record: historein reduction: huphairesis reflection: anaklasis refutation: elenkhos refute: (ex)elenkhein regard: ephistanai reject: diaballein relate to: paraballein relation, free from a r. to: askhetos pros ti relation, having no r. to: askhetos pros ti relation: logos, pros ti, skhesis relationship: skhesis release: apoluein remain: menein remember: mnêmoneuein remind: anamimnêskein remnant: enkataleimma remove: aphairein replace: metalambanein report: historein report: historia responsible, make r. for: aitiasthai rest (n.): êremêsis

174

English-Greek Glossary

rest (v.): êremein rest, state of: êremêsis, êremia, monê return movement, free from any: anepistrophos return to: epistrephesthai return: epistrophê reverse: antistrephein revolve: anelittein riddle: ainigma right mixture: eukrasia right proportion, being in the: summetros right proportion: summetria right: alêthês right: isos road: hodos roof: orophê rope: skhoinos rule (n.): kanôn rule (v.): arkhein ruler, like a: arkhoeidês ruling part (of the soul): hêgemonikon ruling: arkhikos sailor: plôtêr sake, that for the sake of which: to hou eneka same sort, of the: sungenês sameness: tauto sameness: tautotês school: diatribê science: epistêmê scientific knowledge: epistêmê sea: hals search: zêtein searching, process of: zêtêsis secondary: husteron seed: sperma seek: zêtein seeking: zêtêsis seething: zesis self, by its: kath’ hauto self-activated: autenergêtos self-evident: autopistos self-existing: authupostatos self-moved: autokinêtos self-sufficient: autarkês sensation, lacking: anaisthêtos sensation: aisthêsis sense faculty: aisthêsis sense organ: aisthêtêrion sense perception, endowed with: aisthêtikos

sense, effect of: aisthêma sense: aisthêsis sensible: aisthêtikos sensitive: aisthêtikos sentence: lexis separable: khôristos separate (a.): khôristos separate (v.): khôrizein, apolambanein, apoluein separated: khôristos separation: diakrisis sequel, in the: ephexês sequence, in a: ephexês sequentially: ephexês series, in a: ephexês serving no purpose: matên shape (n.): skhêma shape (v.): skhêmatizein shape, give: skhêmatizein share in (have a): metekhein share the same essence: sunousiousthai share, having no: amoiros share, let s. in: metadidonai share: moira shelter: skepasma shining: aiglê ship: ploion shoulder: ômos show: deiknunai shut off within (itself): enapolambanein side: pleura sight: horan, to sight: opsis sign: tekmêrion, sumbolon signify: sêmainein similar: homoios simple: haplous simply: haplôs sinew: neuron size: megethos skilful: tekhnikos skill: tekhnê sleep (n.): hupnos sleep (state of): karos sleep (v.): hupnoun smell: osphrêsis smellable: osphrantos smelting furnace: khôneia smooth: leios soft: malakos solid (body) thick: pakhus

English-Greek Glossary solidify: pêgnunai solution: (epi)lusis solve: epiluein something: pragma soul, endowed with: empsukhos soul, of the: psukhikos soul, without: apsukhos soul: psukhê sound (a.): hugiês sound (n.): psophos south: notios space: khôra, topos spatial, in a sp. sense: topikos spatial: kata to pou speak in symbolical language: ainittesthai species: eidos specific feature, have as: eidopoiein specific: eidikos specifically: idiai (dative) specifications, make: prosdiorizesthai specify: diorizein speed: takhos sphere: sphaira, sphairos spherical: kuklikos, sphairikos, sphairios spirit: thumos spirited part/faculty: thumikon, to spirited: thumoeidês split up: merizein split/cut up: diairein split: skhizein square: tetragônos stable: hestôs standstill: epistasis, stasis start: arkhein starting point: arkhê statement: logos stationary, being: stasis statue: xoanon stay: menein stereometry: sterea, ta stick together: sunkollan stick: baktêria stir: erethizein straight, go s. on: euthuporeisthai straight: euthus, kath’ euthuôrian stretch: anateinesthai strict sense, in the: kuriôs strife: neikos string: khordos strive for: ephiesthai subject: hupokeimenon

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subordinate: hupotattein substance: ousia substantially conjoined, be: sunousiousthai substrate (underlying): hupokeimenon successor: diadokhos suffer pain: algein suffer pain: lupeisthai suffused humours: hupokhuma suit: (ep)harmozein suitability: epitêdeiotês summer: theros sun: hêlios superficial meaning: phainomenon, to superfluous: perittos superior: kreittôn supervene: epiginesthai supplying: proskeimenos suppose: hupolambanein, huponoein, hupotithenai supposed, be: hupokeisthai supposition: hupothesis surface: epipedon, epiphaneia survival: sôtêria sustain: anekhein sweet: glukus sweetness: glukutês swim: nêkhesthai sword: makhaira syllogism: sullogismos syllogistic reasoning, contrary to: asullogistos syllogistic reasoning, in accordance with: sullogistikos symbol: sumbolon symbolic form, in: sumbolikôs symbolic language, in a: ainigmatôdês symbolic meaning, have: ainittesthai symbolic: sumbolikos symbolical language, in: sumbolikôs symbolical: sumbolikôs symbolically, speaking: sumbolikôs symbolically: sumbolikôs sympathetic reaction, standing in: sumpathês sympathetic reaction: sumpatheia sympathy: sumpatheia syntax: suntaxis system: sustêma take issue with: enistasthai tangible: haptos taste: geusis

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English-Greek Glossary

tastible: geustos teach: didaskein teacher: didaskalos teaching: didaskalia teethed: odontôtos tension: tasis term: horos tetrad: tetras text: lexis theorem: theôrêma theoretical study: theôria theoretical thoughts: theôrêtikai noêseis theory: doxa, logos think: dianoeisthai, noein thinking (discursive): dianoia thinking (part): dianoêtikos thought, object of: noêton, to thought: noêma, theôria thoughts, without: anennoêtos three cubits (long): tripêkhus three, by: triplasios through and through: hola di’ holôn time, without: akhronos time: khronos, to pote tongue, paternal: patrikê glôtta tool: organon top, be at the t. of: anekhein touch (n.): haphê touch (v.): ephaptesthai, sunaptein, thinganein touch, concerned with: haptikos trace: ikhnos transfer: metapherein transmit: anapempein, diadidonai transparency: diaphaneia transparent: diaphanês, prophanês treatise: pragmateia treatment: logos triad: trias tropic: tropikos true, be: alêtheuein true: alêthês trumpet: salpinx truth: alêtheia tune: melos turn around: antiparakhôrein turn in on oneself: epistrephesthai turn round: antistrephein, palindromein turning around, without: anupostrepti two cubits: dipêkhus type: eidos

tyrant: turannos ugliness: aiskhos unactivated: anenergêtos unactualised: anenergêtos unaffected: apathês unchangeable: ametablêtos unclarity: asapheia unclear: adêlos, asaphês undefined: aoristos underlying: hupokeimenos understand: noein understanding: epistêmê undifferentiated: adiaphoros undivided: amerês, ameristos, askhistos undividedness: amereia unequal: anisos uneven: anisos, anômalos uniform: homalos, homoeidês unify: henopoioun, henoun uninscribed: agraphos unintelligent: aphrôn union: henôsis unit: monas unite, be united with: sunousiousthai unity: henôsis universal(ly): katholou universal: holikos universe, part of: enkosmios universe: kosmos, to pan unknown: agnostôs unlike: anomoios unmoved: akinêtos unnatural: para phusin unqualified: haplôs unrelated: askhetos pros ti untuned: anarmostos unworthy: anaxios unwritten: agraphos upright: orthios vain, in: matên vanish, cause to: aphanizein varied: poikilos vegetative: phutikos vehicle: okhêma verbal expression: logos verbal formulation: rhêma vessel: angeion, keramos vice: kakia view (n.): doxa view (v.): theôrein

English-Greek Glossary view, hold the: doxazein virtue: aretê visible: horatos vision: opsis, to horan vital aspect: zôtikon, to vital: zôtikos voice: phônê wake (x) up: exupnizein wall: toikhos wander: planasthai wandering sphere: planômenê wandering: emporos wane along with: summarainesthai wane: phthisis war: polemos warm: thermos water: hudôr wax: kêros way: hodos weakness: astheneia wealth: ploutos weave: diaplekein wet: brekhein wheel: trokhos whole (n.) holotês, to holon whole (as a): holos, holon di’ holou, kath’ holon, holôs widening, capable of: diakritikos

width, without: aplatês width: platos wild animal: thêrion will: boulêsis, to thelein wind: anemos winter: kheimôn wisdom: sophia wish: boulêsis wither: marainesthai without extension: adiastatos wood: xulon wooden: xulinos wording (actual): lexis work: ergazesthai work: pragmateia world: kosmos write: graphein writing: sungramma wrong, be: pseudesthai year: etos yearn for: ephiesthai yoke: zugos Zodiac, of the: zôdiakos Zodiac, sign of the: zôdion Zodiac, the: zôdiakos, to zoophyte: zôiophutos

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Greek-English Index adêlos, obscure, 138,10; unclear, 138,14.20 adiairetos, indivisible, 169,16; 170,14; 171,1 adiaphoros, undifferentiated, 166,15; loosely, 123,16 adiastatos, without extension, 130,13 aeikinêtos, always in motion, 92,30; 95,15.20; 133,1; always moved, 115,12; permanently in motion, 96,17; 103,31 aêr, air, 105,8; 148,13; 153,17; 176,32; 178,2; 187,25; 188,32ff.; 189,24; 190,4ff.; 192,5 agathos, good, 111,17.19.20; 112,7; 138,32; 142,35; 194,21; benefit, 104,19; kreittôn, superior, 149,32; 150,18; 195,18; 197,1; 199,9 ageômetrêtos, without geometry, 117,27 agnoein, be ignorant of, 138,26; 181,12ff.; not know, 93,35; 134,15 agnoia, ignorance, 94,29; 95,7; 100,18.24.27; 155,16; 187,11 agnôsia, ignorance, 95,7; 100,24.27; 181,12 agnostôs, unknown, 106,23 agôgê, conduct, 147,10 agora, market place, 98,26 agraphos, uninscribed, 93,6; unwritten, 145,22 aidios, eternal, 132,24.27; 133,1; 138,1.31; 141,3.9; everlasting, 194,11 aiglê, shining, 178,4 aigokerôs, Capricorn, 120,18 ainigma, enigmatic, 124,3; riddle, 116,28

ainigmatôdês, in a symbolic language, 127,5 ainittesthai, allude, 92,26; 125,25; 196,20; allude symbolically, 117,24; speak in symbolical language, 186,30; have symbolic meaning, 119,19 aiskhos, ugliness, 145,2ff. aisthanesthai, perceive, 125,7; 128,22; 136,17; 157,34ff.; 161,12; 162,12; 163,14; 180,30; 185,24ff.; 192,31; 193,6 aisthêma, effect of sense, 126,23 aisthêsis, sense, 111,11; 122,27.31; 128,4; 129,2.3; 140,24; 157,28ff.; 161,27ff.; 181,17; sense faculty, 110,22; (sense) perception, 104,11; 110,36; 111,1.4.11.13; 123,4; 125,11; 126,23; 128,34; 129,1; 147,18; 149,10; 166,5; 167,12; 185,16; 186,7; 186,20; 188,23; 190,26; 195,26; 198,33; 200,13; 201,3; 202,16; sensation, 149,31; 174,27 aisthêtêrion, sense organ, 140,24; 157,29; 158,22ff.; 161,11ff.; 180,3 aisthêtikos, endowed with sense perception, 182,19; 185,24ff.; having the faculty to perceive, 158,11; sensible, 122,32; sensitive, 124,35; 140,25; 161,11; 174,33; 191,5; perceptive, 180,30; 184,5; 194,31; 199,19 aisthêton, to, perceptible/sense object, 109,35; 110,19ff.; 111,3.6.15.22; 112,38; 121,33; 127,15; 128,4; 157,28ff.; 161,25; 162,10ff.; 180,3; 185,8; perceptible being, 141,19 aisthêtos, perceptible, 100,22.23;

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113,22.23; 129,3; 132,10.14.15.21.22 aitia, aition, cause, 96,19.26; 105,34; 106,22.24; 107,5; 109,14.16; 110,34; 115,9.10.13; 123,3.21; 127,16; 138,11.17.19.21.26ff.; 139,5; 149,30ff.; 150,25ff.; 151,11; 154,15; 155,16; 157,8; 166,7; 168,14; 175,19; 181,12; 183,1.13; 189,9; 193,1; 195,18; 196,26ff.; 197,18ff.; 198,35; 199,4; 200,22; reason, 138,11; 161,20 aitiasthai, make responsible for, 150,18 aitiaton, to, what is caused, 106,22 aitiologikos, explanatory, 180,25 aitios, cause of, 201,3 akhôristos, inseparable, 155,7ff.; 159,23ff.; 193,19 akhronos, without time, 126,27; 132,30; 155,15 akinêtos, immobile, 97,11.14.23; 138,16; 177,3; incapable of moving, 201,4; not subject to movement, 95,34; 97,27; unmoved, 92,29; 95,17; 96,25.29.30; 97,33; 106,2 akmazein, flourish, 160,33; 164,9 akmê, peak, 162,35; maturity, 195,27 akoê, hearing, 110,25; 128,3; 129,2; 162,11; 195,15; 201,12 akolouthein, follow, 106,16; 167,23ff.; 174,17; 183,33; akolouthounta, ta, consequences, 109,9 akolouthôs, consequently, 150,26; 159,7 akolouthos, following from, 141,30; 181,20; akoloutha, ta, the consequences, 106,14; akolouthoteron, more logical, 106,21 akomphos, blunt, 117,29 akoustikos, hearing, 195,15 akoustos, audible, 110,25; 128,3; 181,16 akribês, accurate, 93,13.14.29; 159,17; precise, 148,9; in detail, 118,27 akroasis, lecture, 92,31.18; 94,19 akroatês, pupil, 145,25

akron, end, 134,37; 135,19; extreme, 134,30; 135,1.2.18 alêtheia, reality, 104,25; 143,23; truth, 117,10.13; 179,30; 194,21 alêthês, right, 95,24, 105,38; true, 95,18; 106,5; 107,17; 127,16; 131,35; 143,8; 160,35; 167,14ff.; 180,31; 201,2 alêtheuein, be true, 107,20 algein, suffer pain, 155,24 alloiôsis, alteration, 93,19; 94,6; 95,27; 98,19; 99,3.4; 100,19.21.25.31.33.34; 101,5; 147,3f.; 156,36f.; 185,3; qualitative change, 166,9; kata alloiôsin metabolê, qualitative alteration, 99,22 alloiôtikos, (cause to) undergo alteration, 99,5; 100,18.23; 184,31; 189,6; alterative, 159,5 alloioun, alter, 100,17; 147,4.5; 154,11; change quality, 154,23 allotrios, alien, 126,7.9 allotrioun, deprive, 121,9 alogos, non-rational, 104,10ff.; 110,35; 111,14.15; 123,4; 125,26; 141,1.6.10.14; 155,5; 164,3; 174,33; 194,8; 195,26; 196,9; 198,4; aloga, ta, non-rational (living) beings, 123,5; 141,5; 149,31; contrary to reason, 149,9 amaurôsis, fading, 160,2; 162,31 amblunsis, dulling, 164,10 amegethês, having no extension, 138,13; without extension, 124,2; 132,11 ameibein, change, 97,25; 102,29.31; 103,15; 107,6 ameipsis, recompense, 111,33 amereia, undividedness, 132,3 amerês, undivided, 127,7.8; 130,13; 131,6ff.; 132,1.2; 166,15; 167,26; 169,13; 172,15; 173,2ff.; 196,15; 197,16 ameristos, undivided, 116,3; 118,9; 121,21.23.26.28; 122,16.18.19; 124,5; 192,23 amesos, immediate, 126,17; 135,21 ametablêtos, unchangeable, 118,14 amoiros, devoid of, 120,33; having no part in, 136,29; having no share, 120,22 amphisbêtein, be in doubt, 165,4

Greek-English Index amudros, dull, 120,24; 160,33 anagein, bring under, 94,15; rank, 122,10 anagôgos, leading upward, 119,17.20 anairein, destroy, 151,14ff.; 152,9ff.; 153,19ff.; eliminate, 131,15; 187,21; make impossible, 134,11; render impossible, 134,17; anairetikos, annihilating, 109,23 anaisthêtos, insensitive, 149,31; lacking sensation, 180,29; 184,25; 201,4 anakamptein, bend backwards, 133,2; 134,29; go back to, 135,8; go backwards to, 135,5 anaklan, bend, 116,9; 119,15 anaklasis, reflection, 125,3 analambanein, adopt, 118,16 analogein, be analogous to, 137,10; 187,31ff. analogia, analogy, 187,28; proportion, 118,22.24.27; 120,6; kat’ analogian, by analogy, 125,27.28; 127,2; 171,20 anamimnêskein, remind, 158,6ff. anamnêsis, recollection 142,10.12; 158,5ff. anankaios, cogency, 97,27; inevitable, 128,10; must be, 99,28; 132,6; 134,19; necessary, 96,23; 130,22; 132,27; 156,4; 169,26 anankê, necessar(il)y, 96,32; 97,27; 99,15; 103,29.30; 105,29; 106,20; 109,13; 114,16; 132,28; 167,30; 189,20; 178,22; necessity, 96,31; have to be/be forced to be, 94,2; 113,28; 170,19; inevitable, 113,16; must be, 129,5; 134,5; ex anankês, inevitably, 100,16; of necessity, 96,24; 133,1; 136,24; pasa anankê, absolutely necessary, 92,28; 127,23; 133,29; absolutely inevitable, 124,5; 133,27; an unavoidable conclusion, 132,13 anapempein, transmit, 158,2 anapnein, breathe, 186,2; 202,4 anapnoê, breathing/respiration, 186,30ff. anapodeiktos, without demonstration, 147,6

181

anarmostia, lack of harmony, 142,28ff.; 144,24.28; 145,1ff. anarmostos, untuned, 153,34 anaskeuastikos, disproving 145,8 anateinesthai, stretch, 119,17 anatellein, anatolê, east, 119,29; rising in the East, 110,9 anaxios, unworthy, 117,4 aneideos, without form, 93,27.28; 94,10 anekhein, be at the top of, 140,36; carry, 112,20; sustain, 107,33; 108,1.3.5; 112,19 anelittein, revolve, 135,34 anemos, wind, 186,27 anenergêsia, inactivity, 138,33 anenergêtos, unactivated, 110,33; unactualised, 109,27 anennoêtos, without thoughts, 182,14 anepistêmôn, in (a state of) ignorance, 94,6; 95,28 anepistrophos, free from any return movement, 125,6 aneu, hôn ouk a., condition sine qua non, 153,12.22 angeion, vessel, 115,29; 173,25 angelos, angel, 128,37; messenger, 133,26 anisos, unequal, 116,15.17; uneven, 120,4.5; anison, to, what is unequal, 122,13 anistasthai, come to life again, 107,25.28.31 anômalos, non-uniform, 120,4; anômalon, to, what is uneven, 122,12 anomoiomerês, heterogeneous, 190,20; 191,25 anomoios, unlike, 179,33; 180,9ff. anthrôpeios, human, 121,29; 140,35; 141,1.14; 194,24; 198,29 anthrôpinos, human, 159,30; 186,17.21; 194,26 anthrôpos, man, 134,35.36; 135,2.3.16.26.27.28.29; 141,7; 159,21; 176,12; 183,33; 198,2 antidiastellein, contradistinguish, 148,22 antidiastolê, contradistinction, 124,10; 148,19 antikeimena, ta, opposites, 99,32; 103,22; 112,14; 144,28; opposite

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direction, 106,30; 107,9; opposite positions, 106,29 antikeimenon, to, opposite, 132,2.3 antikeisthai, have as opposite, 102,26 antikrus, openly, 193,3; outright, 105,17; explicitly, 152,29; 159,8 antilambanesthai, apprehend, 121,33; 128,26.34; 130,7.9; comprehend, 136,16; grasp, 127,14; 128,4; 129,2.4.5; 162,10ff.; 179,17; 182,13; 195,32 antilêpsis, apprehension, 128,16; 130,9; 131,20; 158,19.33; grasp, 182,13 antilêptikos, able to grasp, 121,35 antilogia, criticism, 124,22.23; objection 145,13 antiparakhôrein, turn around, 107,7 antistrephein, interchange, 135,24; reverse, 183,31; turn round, 106,5 antistrophê, opposition, 105,3 antithesis, opposition, 122,1; contrast, 187,14 antôthêsis, colliding, 167,25 anupostreptai, do not turn around, 116,32 aoristia, indefiniteness, 187,10 aoristos, undefined, 94,10; indeterminate, 144,27 apallassein, change, 112,25 aparithmein, list, 92,13; 97,4; provide count, 172,15 apathês, unaffected, 130,11; 159,16; 164,3ff.; 165,12 apeirakis, infinite number of times, 128,5.10; 130,1.3 apeiria, infinity, 133,1 apeiros, endless, 134,12; indefinite, 122,7; 133,3.7; 134,13; 136,14; indefinitely, 103,16.19.23; infinite, 128,5.11.29.32; 129,15.18; 130,4; 133,24.31; 134,2.4; 135,32; 170,30; 175,31; 176,23f.; 197,20; infinite number of, 129,24; ep’ apeiron, indefinitely, 129,19; 133,12; 134,10.17.32.33; 135,11; infinitely, 132,27; until infinity, 134,7; apeira, ta, indefinite entities, 133,3; infinite things, 128,30

aperikaluptôs, without cover, 117,11 aphairein, remove, 120,32; take away, 101,22.23 aphanizein, cause to disappear, 108,9; cause to vanish, 108,11 aphorizein, designate, 199,31; 201,13 aphrôn, unintelligent, 181,24; 182,4 aphthartos, imperishable, 160,10; 161,5ff. aplanês, fixed sphere, 100,8.10; 110,8; 119,6.7.11.14.26.29; 120,2 aplatês, without width, 117,14 apoblepein, concentrate on, 92,14.18.20; 95,30.34; 96,5; 141,31; 175,6ff. apodeiknunai, demonstrate, 96,23; 97,27; 135,7; 165,5; 188,25 apodeixis, demonstration, 133,23.31.32; 134,1.2.10.16.22.32.36.37; 135,4.8.9.10.11.17.25; 136,10 apodosis, main clause, 156,9 apoginesthai, disappear, 101,3 apokatastasis, periodic return, 120,15 apokleiein, encompass, 117,20; lock, 115,30 apoklêrôsis, distribution, 190,35ff. apoklêrôtikos, arbitrary, 127,31 apolambanein, encompass, 124,8; separate, 120,19; shut off within, 190,16 apolimpanein, leave behind, 97,21 apologeisthai, in defence of, 108,2 apologia, defence, 107,12 apoluein, separate, 137,9; release, 137,17; 138,1 aponemein, assign, 95,9 apophansis, proposition, 128,27.28 aporein, have a problem, 136,7; query, 106,25; raise a problem/question/query, 110,8; 150,2.26; 152,21ff.; 153,9; 161,3; 183,28; 185,27; 189,5; 193,4; 199,14; 200,3; 201,1 aporia, difficulty, 101,2; 161,3; 175,13; 180,22; 195,12; 201,19; problem, 108,29; 151,32; 152,22; 160,13 apostêma, distance, 120,8 apoteinein, extend, 126,29 apoteinesthai, lodge self against, 122,26

Greek-English Index apothnêskhein, die; tethnekôs, dead, 108,31; tethneôs, dead, 107,32; 108,15; 114,31 apotithenai, lodge, 96,18 apousia, absence, 108,9; 187,16.28 apsukhos, lifeless, 120,25.33; 157,32; 195,8; without soul, 149,30; inanimate, 153,28; 185,4; 192,8.9 aretê, virtue, 94,9.10.14; 95,7; 100,18.24.27.30.32.33.38; 111,32.33.36; 112,3.4.5.10.13.29.31; 117,1; 142,27.30; 162,25 Aristotelikos, Aristotelian, 102,22; 141,16 arithmêtikê, arithmetic, 124,17 arithmêtikos, arithmetical, 118,21 arithmêtos, countable, 172,14 arithmos, number, 116,6.8; 117,15; 118,20.23.26; 120,10; 125,33; 126,6.9.11.15.16.33; 127,2.4.5; 165,19ff.; 171,10ff.; 173,1ff.; 174,5ff.; tôi arithmôi, in number, 163,7; 200,19ff.; hôs arithmos, as in a numerical sequence, 126,28 arkein, suffice, 127,27; 129,9; arkei, enough, 93,29 arkhê, beginning, 133,13.32; 134,2.3.30.34; 138,31; 141,4; origin, 119,29; 135,5; principle, 96,20; 121,32; 122,6; 123,26; 175,30; 178,23; 181,12; 183,13; 184,10; 201,15; starting point, 104,27; 118,4; 119,29; 129,31; 131,22.28; 133,17; 135,9; ex arkhês, from the start, 118,7; initially, 108,11 arkhein, start, 94,24; 103,25.28; 117,37; 135,12.13; begin, 92,20; rule, 141,15; 183,30 arkhikos, ruling, 183,20.31 arkhoeidês, like a ruler, 183,7ff. artios, even number, 118,23; 167,4 asapheia, unclarity, 153,2; 156,9 asaphês, less clear, 133,25; unclear, 106,22 asebês, impious, 104,22 askhetos pros ti, free from a relation to, 118,18; 155,17; unrelated, 161,31ff.; 162,33; having no relation to, 118,11 askhistos, undivided, 116,14

183

asômatos, incorporeal, 92,17.19.18; 97,24.26; 100,1; 105,20; 113,16,25; 114,6; 122,17.18.19; 124,2.6.11; 127,8; 128,20; 138,14; 162,15; 172,16; 175,6; 184,5; asômaton, to, incorporeality, 92,18; without body, 132,12; 154,10 astheneia, weakness 145,2ff. astron, star, 107,3 astronomia, astronomy, 124,18 asullogistos, contrary to syllogistic reasoning, 143,8.9.10.17; 146,8 asummetria, lack of proportion, 145,2 asummetros, disproportionate, 122,2; out of proportion, 162,34 asumpathês, lacking sympathy, 120,38; 121,3; 162,2 asumphônos, in disagreement with itself, 122,9.11 atelês, incomplete, 94,17.22.27.29; 109,26; imperfect, 94,33; 155,35 athanasia, immortality, 141,11 athanatos, immortal, 114,19.20; 125,14; 134,25; 141,2.9; 159,8ff.; 163,33; 165,6; 189,3ff.; 193,9ff.; 194,5ff.; 200,1 athetos, without position, 166,32; 169,5 athroisis, accumulation, 131,9 athroos, complete, 94,18.27.31; concentrated, 132,30; collected, 94,26 atomos, atom, 105,20; 109,1; 114,34.36; 115,12; 121,13; 167,21ff.; 168,7; 172,20; 173,12ff.; 186,12; indivisible, 134,7; individual, 148,28 atopia, absurdity, 180,22 atopos, absurd, 143,6; 147,13.22; 149,18ff.; 150,2.25; 152,30; 165,30; 167,23; 168,9; 172,4; 173,3ff.; 175,27; 179,25; 181,13; 181,23; 182,6; 184,14; 188,22; 189,10ff.; 189,25; 192,12; 195,21; 199,8 augoeidês, luminous, 138,9 aulos, oboe, 140,12 aülos, without matter, 141,18 autarkês, self-sufficient, 109,26; 187,27 autenergêtos, self-activated, 114,26

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authupostatos, self-existing, 131,26 autokinêtos, moved by itself, 99,15; moved in virtue of itself, 126,1; self-moved, 92,24.25; 96,9.13; 98,16; 109,35; 110,27; 111,16.23; 112,39; 113,7.17.32; 114,6.13.17.23.25; 168,2ff.; subject to movement by itself, 96,20.33; 109,13; 165,14; autokinêton, to self-movement, 95,9; 109,11; self-moving aspect, 113,6; 175,19; autokinêton einai, move in virtue of self, 96,6 autophusis, very nature, 99,16 autopistos, self-evident, 135,10 autozan, autonomy of life, 165,27 autozôê, autonomous source of life, 165,27 auxanein, grow, 95,14; 96,27; 107,19; 160,34; 184,31; ho auxôn, that which grows, 107,19 auxêsis, growth, 93,19; 98,20.24; 99,6.9; 166,9; 185,3; 195,27 auxêtikos, concerned with growth, 186,7; 190,22; 192,26; 200,12; 202,8 axios, important, 115,31; reasonable, 140,5; worthy, 117,7 axôn, axis, 119,6.9; axle, 106,28.30; 107,8.11 badizein, move, 102,13; walk, 97,36; 116,32 baktêria, stick, 108,25.27 barus, heavy, 102,15; barê, ta, heavy objects, 119,30; bareia rhopê, downward tendency, 102,14 bastazein, carry downwards, 110,12 bathos, depth 156,28; 177,20 bia, force, 101,25.29.30.31.33; 102,19.22.28; 103,5.6.13.22.23.24; 104,21.27.38; 109,20; 115,17; 136,24.26; 137,1; biai, forced, 137,18; forcefully, 104,3 biaios, forced, 136,19.25.27; 137,1.6; forceful, 103,32; 104,4.5.26 biazesthai, be subjected to force, 104,23 biblion, book, 93,11.14.24; 131,29; work, 93,2 bios, life, 137,29

blaptein, cause harm, 112,24; damage, 161,11ff.; harm, 100,37 boêtheia, help, 125,13 bôlos, lump, 98,14; projectile, 103,26 boreas, north, 119,12.13 boulêsis, will, 138,7; wish, 104,11; 195,25 brekhein, wet, 120,20 daktulos, finger, 149,7; daktuliaios, finger-length, 129,17 deiknunai, demonstrate, 92,28; 93,33; 94,20.21; 95,17; 126,1; 132,16; 138,19; 148,7; 149,34; 153,25; 159,4; 160,13ff.; 162,6; 174,10.13; 181,18; show, 95,8; 96,24; 97,3; 98,17; 99,9.16.18.22; 100,5.7.9; 101,12.27.36; 102,24; 103,24; 104,1; 105,6; 108,16.23; 109,9.12.24; 110,3; 114,30; 117,8; 128,20; 133,10.29; 134,9.33; 135,34; 136,22.31; 137,14; 138,13.16; 167,31; 168,4; 174,22; 185,14.15; 190,15; 191.7; 192,3ff.; 193,5ff.; 198,4; 200,9; prove, 142,12 deiktikon, to, demonstrative pronoun, 132,15 deilos, cowardly, 141,27 deixis, demonstration, 135,6.17.25 dekhesthai, receive, 141,23; 186,30; 195,4 dektikos, capable of receiving, 135,27.28.29; receptive, 140,30; that which receives, 139,21; 140,14 dêmiourgein, make, 125,15 dêmiourgia, creation, 199,3 dêmiourgos, craftsman, 122,14 desmos, bond, 117,2; 162,1 diabainein, proceed, 155,18.23.27; 157,31ff. diaballein, reject, 131,16 diadidonai, transmit, 158,3 diadokhos, successor, 165,18 diairein, divide, 99,8; 104,6.9; 129,15.16.18.19; 130,3.11.12.13.17; 169,29; 171,24; 178,11ff.; 179,14; 184,4; 196,11ff.; 197,11ff.; split/cut up, 199,17; 200,10ff.; 201,5 diairesis, division, 118,22.26;

Greek-English Index 127,21; 130,12.15.24; 151,3; 171,7; 190,14; 191,7; 200,30 diairetos, divisible, 129,21 diaitêtês, arbitrator, 95,10 diakeisthai, to be constituted, 105,23; be in a condition, 155,26.30 diakrinesthai, undergo expansion, 157,29; 180,4; be dissolved/separated, 182,26; 196,22; 197,12 diakrisis, dissolution, 119,23; separation, 107,1 diakritikos, capable of widening, 188,2 dialogos, dialogue, 142,4; 144,23 dialuein, destroy, 107,33; loosen, 117,1 dialutikos, that dissolves, 101,6 dianoeisthai, discursive thinking, 155,9; 156,30; 157,6.10.12; 164,19; think, 156,32ff.; 185,28; dianoeisthai, to discursive thought dianoêtikos, thinking (part), 174,32 dianoia, (discursive) thinking, 155,4ff.; 155,34; 166,6; 174,27; intention, 108,16; meaning, 116,26; 117,30; 119,16; 156,9; mind, 128,8 diaphainesthai, be manifest, 189,1ff. diaphaneia, transparency, 153,16ff. diaphanês, transparent, 161,23; 195,8 diapherein, be different, 126,25; differ, 94,17; 115,29; 139,27 diaphônia, disagreement, 95,26; 193,22 diaphora, difference, 111,25.26; 120,13; 121,30; 129,5.6; 174,2; 193,9; differentia, 134,12 diaphoros, different 97,3; 98,6; 129,4.5.6; 139,28; 140,9; 141,34; 166,13ff.; 174,29; 192,22; 193,5; 195,22; 196,10; 197,26ff. diaplasis, formation, 163,35; 198,16 diaplekein, join up (with), 124,11.14; weave, 120,20; diaplokê, interweaving, 120,34.37; 121,2 diaskeuê, arrangement, 141,29 diastasis, division, 142,29; distance,

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119,15; length, 101,12; dimension, 177,18 diastatos, dimensional, 179,18 diastêma, distance, 101,13 diastolê, expansion, 184,22 diathesis, condition, 95,27; 188,9; constitution, 105,23; disposition, 155,23 diatribê, school, 117,26 didaskalia, teaching, 117,12; 127,6 didaskalos, teacher, 94,23.24.25; 110,33; that which teaches, 96,26 didaskein, teach, 107,19; 116,29; ho didaskôn, teacher, 107,19 dikaios, dikaion, to, justice, 117,3 dikhotomein, cut into two, 129,19 dikhotomia, division into two, 129,19 diorizein, define, 126,6; 169,22; specify, 93,15; diôrismenon, defined limit, 126,4; diôrismenon poion, defined quantity, 167,33ff.; 168,12; 174,4; 178,26 diplasios, of two, 116,15 dogma, decree, 104,22; doctrine, 117,7.12 dokôn, opinion, 95,18 doxa, doctrine, 92,13.15; 103,1; 106,14; 114,33; 115,23.25.31; 123,17.34; 125,35; 127,17; 141,30; 142,1.3.6; 145,8.12.14; 151,10; 152,31; 165,19; 168,9ff.; 172,4; 173,4ff.; 181,23; 184,6; 188,14ff.; 195,25; judgement, 127,16; opinion, 160,35; theory, 139,19; view, 131,2; 136,31; doxasta, ta, objects of judgement, 127,15; doxastikos, opiniative, 174,32 doxazein, form an opinion, 104,22; hold the view, 111,3; believe, 92,19 drastêrion, active force, 119,32 duas, dyad, 116,7; 118,13.18; 178,16 duein, descend, 173,24 dunamis, ability, 118,34; faculty, 104,30; 114,27; 125,13.26; 140,23.25; 147,26; 147,1; 155,34; 157,31; 160,19; 161,11ff.; 174,30ff.; 175,25; 179,10; 183,32; 186,13.32; 190,11; 192,24; 193,8; 194,8ff.; 196,9ff.; 199,6.30; 200,11; 201,16ff.; 202,6ff.;

186

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202,19; force, 102,2; 108,8; potentiality, 92,35; 93,1.7.9.12; 94,4.18.31; 140,1; 141,18.19; power, 96,18; 97,16; 98,12; 105,23; 108,7; 118,10.13.37; 119,17.20.36; 120,11.12.24.27.29.31; 121,7; 142,28.29; 166,18; dunamei, potentially, 92,33.35; 93,3.6.8; 111,7; 141,18; 159,27; 160,13ff.; 180,11; 193,26; potential, 93,5.32; 126,21 dunasthai, be able, 96,3.12.15.18; 107,34; 108,13.14.38; 109,6; 116,28; 124,20; be capable, 109,16; be possible, 137,8; can, 98,13; 102,6; 108,4.10; 110,4; 117,11.22; 124,7; 125,7; 130,7; 131,10; 132,1; 137,5; have an ability, 118,21.26; have the capacity, 98.17; may, 136,20.31 duskhereia, discomfort, 138,8; duskhereia thnêtê, mortal discomfort, 101,37; 138,7 duskrasia, bad mixture, 163,2 dusphantastos, in a bad position to exercise imagination, 155,31 eidenai, know, 95,5; 97,4; 110,36; 111,15; 141,16; 188,5 eidikos, formative, 187,25; formal, 199,4; specific, 135,13 eidopoiein, have as specific feature, 179,18.21; give a (specific) form, 93,25.27; 187,18; 195,16; 196,25 eidos, form, 93,4.5.9.27; 98,33; 105,30.36.37; 121,8.28.35; 126,32; 139,27.28.29.32; 140,9.10; 144,28; 150,4ff.; 151,28f.; 152,17; 155,6.7.20; 159,19; 160,27; 163,10ff.; 165,23; 175,25; 178,25; 183,8ff.; 187,15.26; 195,18; 198,3ff.; 199,7ff.; mode, 147,21; kind, 121,25.29; 141,35; 147,17; 167,5; 200,20; 202,3; species, 107,14; 134,8; 135,13; 167,8; type, 95,27; 98,35; 99,2 eikôn, image, 96,30; stimulus, 104,30 eikonikos, that can produce images, 120,12; eikonikôs, in image form, 126,30 einai, be, 93,13.20.25; 94,5.18;

96,2.3.11.20.25; 97,33; 98,17.27; 99,15.32; 99,30.34; 100,1.2; 101,5.16.21; 104,7.8.15; 105,11; 107,8; 109,16.22; 111,19; 112,16; 112,31.33; 113,8.11.16.25.26; 114,14.22.26; 122,21.32; 123,27.33; 124,1.5.7.29.31; 126,28.30; 127,4.19; 129,5.21; 130,12; 132,6; 133,6; 134,6.19.25; 136,11.12.20.28.30; 137,2.5; 138,19; 140,29; to be, 124,27; 127,28; 133,30; 137,24.28; 140,14; einai, to, being, 101,15; 122,24; 126,23; 131,27; 138,23; 142,19.22; 162,3ff.; 201,23; essence, 105,14; to exist (have existence), 98,29; on, to, being, 141,12.13.17.19; state of being, 141,20; onta, ta, beings, 134,6.23; things, 121,32; 175,26ff.; 178,21ff.; 182,17; things that are, 159,19 eklambanein, take (to mean), 116,24; 122,30; 123,28; interpret, 125,31; 135,15; understand, 118,29; 124,24; 125,29; eklêpteon, to be understood, 110,1 ekpheugein, escape, 95,27 ekphlegein, (mid) catch fire, 120,29 ekstasis, deviation, 113,2; 114,15 ektithenai, expound, 116,1; 118,22; 130,25.27 ektropê, deviation, 101,32 elaion, olive oil, 120,30 elenkhein, refute, 92,15; 93,14; 95,12; 115,23; 116,27; 143,4; 149,2; 174,21; 175,6; 180,22; 184,6; 200,8 elenkhos, refutation, 92,15; 123,34; 125,30; 127,18.21; 129,25; 146,19; 189,13 ellampein, illuminate, 157,33; 201,25ff.; come to light, 164,12 ellampsis, illumination, 120,23; 195,5ff. emballein, broach, 92,27 embruon, embryo, 120,31 emphanês, clear, 133,26 emphraxis, obstruction, 201,8 emphutos, innate, 102,11; 186,31 empodizein, hinder, 155,25ff.;

Greek-English Index 163,17; 165,9; obstruct, 164,13; impede, 110.30; 198,1ff. emporia, trade, 111,29; 112,12 emporos, wandering, 140,8 empsukhon, to, animate being, 102,10.12.16; 167,16; ensouled being, 139,27; 172,7ff.; 173,23ff.; 182,11; 186,10.29; 202,20 empsukhos, endowed with soul, 117,34; ensouled, 135,4; 145,1; 155,6; 170,2; 170,22; 188,15; 189,21; 190,2ff.; 192,11; 202,9; living, 125,21 enantios, opposite, 144,24ff.; 147,9; 182,10; 187,5ff. enantiousthai, contradictory, 180,15; oppose, 142,20.21 enapokleiein, catch, 106,11 enapolambanein, enclose, 116,19; 123,30.31; shut off within itself, 189,30ff. enargeia, evidence, 115,24; experience, 128,36; hôs hê enargeia dêloi, as is evidently the case, 115,11; hê enargeia tôn pragmatôn, the plain facts, 115,16-17 enargês, evident, 143,9; 183,25; evidently, 114,22; (very) clear, 114,18; 160,1; 167,13; 190,9.18; 199,33 enarmonios, harmonious, 123,10; harmonised, 118,33.35; in harmony, 123,12 endeiknunai, indicate, 174,16 endein, lack, 125,16 endekhomenon, possible, 169,26 energeia, activity, 104,9; 114,25; 117,36; 118,10.13.15.19; 125,5.24.26; 126,21.30; 133,12; 138,1.3; 140,20; 141,28; 153,20; 155,8; 157,9; 160,9ff.; 161,29ff.; 162,35; 164,18; 167,12; 174,24ff.; 192,23ff.; 193,6; 195,9.22; 196,8; 197,27; 198,1ff.; actuality, 93,1.2.8.9.11; 94,5.17.18.31.32; 95,23; 111,7.8; 141,18; 186,33; 188,24; 189,2; 199,30ff.; energeiai (dative) actually, 93,3.7.9.32; 180,11; kat’ energeian, active, 126,20.22 energein, activate, 95,22; 111,10; 120,27; 161,16; 186,33; actualise,

187

97,22; be active/activated/actualised, 111,10; 153,17ff.; 162.26; 201,21; do, 125,7.9; exercise/perform activity, 153,30.33; 196,9; energein, to, activity, 138,33 enistasthai, argue against 142,6; 165,32; take issue with, 154,24; raise objections against, 196,21 enkataleimma, remnant, 158,18 enkephalos, brain, 155,28; 156,30; 157,7; 194,31; 199,19; 201,3 enkosmios, part of the universe, 124,11 ennoein, call to mind, 158,33 ennoia, notion, 110,20; sense, 125,30; koinê ennoia, common insight, 134,1; 135,8 ennous, endowed with intellect, 117,34; intelligent, 125,21 enokhlein, pose an obstacle, 162,34; hinder, 164,13 enstasis, objection, 105,27; 188,24 entelekheia, (definitive) actuality, 92,32; 93,5; 159,27ff.; 191,24; 193,26ff.; 194,1ff. enthousiazein, enthousiastikos, inspire, 116,26 entomon, insect, 167,11; 186,29; 200,10ff.; 201,23 enulos, enmattered, 121,28 êôs, dawn, 120,1 epagein, infer, 137,6 epagôgê, induction, 108,36 epallattein, presuppose, 94,36 epanakamptein, bend back, 125,4 epanatrekhein, return to, 134,34 ephaptesthai, make contact with, 131,18; touch, 127,15.22.23.24; 128,2.10.17.24; 129,12; 130,30; 131,4 epharmozein, fit (on) to, 149,9; 162,19ff.; 169,12ff.; 170,21ff.; 172,12; 187,7ff.; suit, 131,35; 132,12 ephesis, longing, 110,21; 125,15 ephetos, coveted, 133,13 ephexês, follows, 126,18; in a consecutive sequence, 125,8; in a sequence, 118,23; 125,10; 126,15.19.25.36; sequentially, 126,16.26.28; in the sequel, 109,34; 114,35; in a series,

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125,33; in what follows, 96,32; next, 115,24; subsequently, 118,22; ephexês einai, follow, 126,7; follow sequentially, 126,33 ephiesthai, strive for, 142,20; yearn for, 162,25 ephistanai, attend to, 124,25; pause at, 125,6.9; pay attention to, 129,4; regard, 129,1 epiballein, grasp intuitively, 155,14 epidekhesthai, admit of, 142,23ff; 143,5ff.; 144,5ff. epiginesthai, supervene, 105,36; come in addition, 142,6.8; emerge, 147,4 epikheirêma, argument, 103,34; 113,7; 131,29; 136,20.30; 142,5.13; 181,13; 146,19; 147,8.20; counter-argument, 166,26; 167,3; 183,14 epikheirêsis, attempt, 116,22; attempt to show that, 106,8; argument, 144,22.23; 145,8 epiklusmos, cosmic flood, 120,18 epikouria, help, 125,12 epikrateia, mastery, 181,28 epikratein, be in control of, 138,4; be more powerful than, 123,26; prevail, 102,15; to epikratoun, prevailing part, 102,12 epilanthanesthai, forget, 128,7 epiluein, solve, 160,12; 161,3 epilusis, solution, 108,15 epinoein, apprehend, 126,24; grasp, 115,10, 168,23; to epin., concept, 198,21 epinoia, mental apprehension, 148,21 epipedon, surface, 99,36; 101,24; 148,23; plane, 166,27; 171,25; 177,6 epipedos, planimetry, 139,8 epiphaneia, surface, 101,12; 122,23; 124,12.14.16.19.20; 130,14; 156,27; 162,20; 171,26; 177,17 epiponos, painful, 137,16.19.22.28 epirrhepos, prone to, 155,32 episkeptein, examine, 103,34; 106,15; 121,10 episkopein, examine 92,12; 96,1; 98,4 epistasis, standstill, 136,9 epistêmê, knowledge, 136,8; 187,12; science, 124,17; scientific knowledge, 135,26.27.28.29;

understanding, 95,28; 104,11; 134,11 epistêmôn, knowledgeable, 94,6 epistrephesthai, return to, 119,18; 125,11; turn aside, 116,33; turn in on oneself, 118,1; 124,35; 162,18ff.; turn to, 139,2; turn towards, 123,24 epistrophê, return, 118,16 episunaptein, connect, 134,37; 135,3 epitêdeios, having a predisposition, 166,18; suited, suitable, 140,14; 195,4; 198,11ff. epitêdeiotês, predisposition, 155,31; suitability, 108,3.6.11.18.20.24.26.28.38; 141,24.25.28; 183,10; 186,30; 195,7ff.; 201,25ff. epitêdês, appropriate, 97,36 epitêdeuein, pursue, 111,32; 117,1 epithumein, desire, 147,17; 193,6 epithumêtikos, appetitive, 124,32; 124,5; 141,27; 186,20; 190,5; 192,26; 194,32 epithumia, desire, 118,34; 125,4.11.15.18; 190,26; 195,26; 198,5ff.; 201,18; passion, 104,12.15.16.18.23 epizêtein, ask, 198, eponomazein, call, 119,21; give the name of, 119,3.4 êremein, be at rest, 103,12.13.18.31; 115,9; 136,10.21; be in a state of rest, 138,27; 158,32; come to rest, 103,21.24.26.27; rest, 115,19; subject to rest, 104,4 êremêsis, rest, 115,6; 136,4.12; 137,8.10; state of rest, 136,21.28 êremia, peace, 136,8; rest, 103,11.14.30.32; 104,6.7; 115,10.11.12; 136,22.23; state of rest, 101,26; 103,25 erethizein, arouse, 104,24; irritate, 116,35; stir, 110,33; (mid.) yield, 104,30 ergastêrion, organ, 119,33 ergazesthai, bring about, 112,26; work, 121,2 ergon, activity, 147,14ff.; function(ing), 154,32; 156,18; 160,17 êthikos, parangelmata êthika, ethical precepts, 116,30

Greek-English Index êthos, character, 117,6.7 etos, year, 120,17 eugnômôn, intelligent, 95,9 eukinêtos, easy to move, 114,36; moving easily, 115,1 eukleia, good reputation, 112,29.30 eukrasia, right mixture, 163,6 eulogos, reasonable, 103,8; 106,3; 108,10.12.29; 126,4 eulutos, free, 119,31 euphantastos, in a good position to exercise imagination, 155,30 euporein, be well supplied, 99,2 euthunê, correction, 145,21 euthunein, correct, 145,20 euthuôria, straight, 125,26; kat’ euthuôrian, in a straight line, 102,23 euthuporeisthai, go straight on, 134,31; proceed in a linear fashion, 135,21 euthus, straight, 107,14; 116,6; 125,1.8; 187,7ff.; eutheia, straight line, 102,24.29.30.34.35; 103,15.25; 106,28; 107,6.14; 116,6.8.9; 117,14.16.17.19.35; 118,1.4.5.6.8; 119,4.15.16; 123,13.15; 125,3.4; 141,5; 169,23; euthu, to, what is straight, 122,12; ep’ eutheias, linear (way), 134,34; 135,5; kat’ euthu, in a straight line, 107,6; kat’ eutheian, according to a straight line, 125,2; 154,4; 166,8 exairein, exempt, 131,27; transcending, 126,27; exêirêsthai, be exempt from, 101,36 exêgeisthai, interpret, 131,22 exêgêsis, exegesis, 124,22; interpretation, 123,2; 159,11; 182,10 exêgêtês, interpreter, 100,20; 102,1 exelenkhein, refute, 145,20 exhistanai, deviate, 113,3ff.; 114,2.16.24 exôterikos, exoteric, 145,23.24 exupnizein, wake (X) up, 110,29.30 gaia, earth, 150,12ff.; 180,21; 181,11 galênê, calm, 136,8 gê, earth, 105,5.8.32; 106,1; 111,2; 176,31ff.; 178,2; 187,26; 197,7ff.

189

gêinos, earthy, 177,3 gelastikos, capable of laughing, 134,35; 135,7.16.26.27 genesiourgos, directed to the world of becoming, 119,21; involved in the world of becoming, 119,18 genesis, becoming (domain of), 185,5; 186,33f.; coming into being, 94,7; 100,26; 182,29; coming to be, 93,18.27.34; 94,5; 98,23; 100,25.27.31.33; 101,7; 110,32; 150,30; formation, 121,21; generation,176,33; 177,4; state of becoming, 119,23; ek geneseôs, from birth, 110,24 genetê, birth, 110,22 genêtos, having come into being, 150,32 genikos, general, 134,3; 135,12 gennan, give birth, 200,18 gennêtikos, concerned with generation, 186,8; 192,26; 200,12; 202,8 genos, genus, 167,9; 179,13.14; kind, 121,37; 134,3.6; 194,7ff.; species, 135,12; kata to genos, generically, 107,15 geôdês, earthy, 102,15 geômetrein, have geometry, 117,27 geômetrês, mathematician, 110,29.31 geômetria, geometry, 124,17; 166,27 geômetrikos, geometrical, 110,31; 118,21.24 geôrgia, agriculture, 111,29 gêras, old age, 160,2ff.; 161,4ff.; 162,30ff. gêraskein, age, 160,34 gerôn, old man, 161,21 geusis, taste, 201,12 geustos, tastible, 181,17 ginesthai, be, 138,4; come into being, 101,3; 135,33 passim; to ginomenon, what comes to be, 93,22; 98,30.32.34 ginôskein, have knowledge, 114,35; know, 120,12; 128,23.25; 131,2; 134,14.15.16; 141,20; 176,3ff.; 178,22ff.; 180,2ff.; 182,20; heauton ginôskein, know oneself, 125,9 glôtta, tongue, 162,12 glukus, sweet, 139,25; 143,4ff.; 144,2ff.

190

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glukutês, sweetness, 144,3ff. gnêsios, genuine, 145,24 gnômôn, L-shaped figure, 167,7 gnôrimos, known, 106,19.25; 133,27 gnôristikos, cognitive, 185,21; 186,8; having the capacity to know, 192,16 gnôrizein, know, 100,28; 121,31; 175,21; 176,3ff.; 180,20; 185,15; 188,6 gnôsis, knowledge, 94,30; 95,7; 100,24.27.30; 110,21.35; 111,3.7; 117,25; 121,34; 122,14; 134,11.17; 164,25; 166,4ff.; 181,12; 187,14; 195,25 gnôstikos, capable of knowing, 121,30; 192,18; having the capacity to know, 175,25; cognitive, 118,37.38; 120,12; cognitive aspect, 92,14; 175,7; that can know, 118,34; 120,11 gônia, angle, 177,6 grammê, line, 99,36; 101,12.23; 122,23; 124,11.12.16.19.20; 131,27; 148,23; 166,27ff.; 171,25 grammikos, geometrical, 97,26 graphein, describe, 120,13; write, 120,28 gumnazein, try to see, 136,32 haima, blood, 119,33; 149,21; 157,4; 201,9 hairetos, choiceworthy, 111,36; 112,29.32.34 hals, sea, 140,8 haphê, touch, 181,15 haplôs, generally speaking, 141,28; in general, 125,16; 159,26; just, 102,13; only, 140,21; simple, 102,12.16; simply, 94,7; 95,23; 96,16; 98,28; 101,11; 105,9; 106,32; 109,11; 112,24; 123,9; 127,4; 135,8; 149,24.27; 163,7; 168,12; 168,21; 172,16; 180,4; 182,27; 195,1; 199,6; unqualified, 147,16; without (further) qualification, 105,22; 117,31; 143,23; 144,15; 145,13; 149,4 haplous, simple, 105,31; 122,8.11; 131,12ff.; 144,3; 146,8; 188,30ff. haptikos, concerned with touch, 191,2 haptos, tangible, 181,16

harmonia, connection, 107,34; 108,27; 109,3; connectedness, 98,3; harmonious arrangement, 101,6; harmony, 118,34.36.37; 122,27.31.32; 123,3.6; 141,32-45; 142,6ff.; 143,1ff.; 144,3ff.; 145,1ff.; 146,20ff.; 147,1ff.; 148,4ff.; 149,18ff.; 150,1ff.; 151,10ff.; 152,1ff.; 152,23ff.; consonance, 177,9 harmonikos, consonant, 116,6; 117,15; 118,21; 120,10; 176,9; 177,5ff. harmoniôs, harmoniously, 118,32 harmozein, apply to, 120,9; 129,26; 131,30; 142,14; be appropriate, 111,11; 151,3; 185,30; be proper, 124,34; fit, 122,29; fit together, 119,5.7; 142,7ff.; 144,3ff.; 146,15; 148,13; 149,6; 153,25.30f.; make suitable, 129,27; suit, 93,33; 100,6; 118,31; 131,33; 159,11; mix, 146,12 hêdonê, pleasure, 174,25 hêgemonein, lead, 140,30.31; 141,8.15 hêgemonikon, to, ruling part (of the soul), 195,11 hêgoumenon, premise, 142,36 heis, to hen, the One, 119,23 hêlios, sun, 107,3; 111,2; 119,13; 120,1; 195,5 helkein, pull, 104,36.38; 109,19 helktikos, that attracts, 120,29 hêmionos, donkey, 106,27.28 heneka (heneken), for the sake of, 111,18.21.24.32.33; 112,1.11ff.; 133,11; 195,20; to hou eneka, that for the sake of which, 183,9; 195,19; for which, 133.12; purpose, 118,28; 133,13; the reason why, 139,12 henopoioun, unify, 182,28 henôsis, union, 146,5; 183,1; unity, 119,22; 196,26; 198,10; 199,1ff. henoun, unify, 196,22; 198,10 hêpar, liver, 119,34; 140,34; 157,18; 194,32; 201,10 hepesthai, accompany, 141,9; 174,23; come behind, 140,37; follow, 137,12; 138,5; 168,9ff.; 172,4ff.; 181,14; 183,28ff.; be a consequence, 157,8; 165,30;

Greek-English Index 173,3ff.; 179,26; hepomenon, to, conclusion, 142,36; consequence, 136,31; 152,30; 175,22; 184,14; 189,11.25 heterophuês, of a different nature, 197,5 heterotês, difference, 116,2.5; 121,19 heuresis, finding 155,17; discovery, 158,15 heuriskein, find, 155,12; 162,21 hexis, disposition, 94,12.26; 95,27; 100,24.25; 101,7; 111,8; 133,27; 187,13f.; kath’ hexin, dispositionally, 104,22 hieron, sanctuary, 116,32 hippos, horse, 119,19; 123,7 hiptasthai, fly, 102,13 histanai, hestanai, stand still, 138,32; hestôs, stable, 118,10; 164,27 historein, report, 120,28; 189,2; record, 92,21; 141,2 historia, report, 123,16 hodos, process, 92,35; 93,1.8; 94,33; road, 117,1; way, 116,31.35; 136,12 holikos, universal, 186,33 holos, (as a) whole, 128,28.35; 149,11; 150,9; 168,4ff.; 172,6; 198,2; 199,3.14; 202,4; in its entirety, 100,14; 102,23.31; 102,29; 106,7; 128,12; 170,1; 173,22ff.; hola di’ holôn, entirely } throughout, 105,15; 172,7ff.; through and through, 100,15; as a whole, 194,34; entirety through entirety, 100,15; holon, to, whole, 99,27.31; 128,18; 130,22.27.29; 131,2.8.9.10.12; 133,4; 189,22ff.; 190,15; kath’ holon, as a whole, 129,13 holôs, as a whole, 107,6.21; at all, 96,34; in general, 115,14 holoskherês, in broad terms, 93,11 holotês, whole, 184,23 homalos, uniform, 120,2.4; homalon, to, what is even, 122,12 homoeidês, uniform, 189,19ff.; 191,16ff.; 191,8; 200,27ff. homoiomerês, homogeneous, 129,30; 145,3; 148,32ff.; 149,15ff.;

191

152,13; 189,19ff.; 191,13ff.; 192,1ff.; 200,31 homoios, like, 121,31; 175,21ff.; 178,20ff.; 179,29ff.; 180,20ff.; 184,11; similar, 115,25; 128,22; 130,18; 143,4; homogeneous, 133,5 homologein, agree, 99,10; 104,22 homologos, in agreement with itself, 122,8 homônumos, in name only, 179,15 horan, to, sight, 111,28; vision, 111,27; 112,10.13; 195,20; ho horôn, the observer, 96,30 horatos, visible, 181,16; to horaton, visible object, 110,24; 128,3; 157,34 horismos, definition, 93,11.13.33; 101,2; 114,22; 133,23.31; 134,2.4.9.12.14.18.22.26; 174,21 horistikos, that defines X, 134,5 horizein, define, 92,31; 93,23.24; 94,32; 96,14; 104,27; 105,14; 133,22; 159,25; 177,27; 185,14.15; 186,4; 193,25; determine, 150,33; give a definition, 134,14; hôrismenon, defined, 187,18; finite, 130,3 hormê, impulse, 104,32.33.34; 109,17; 140,13; 142,21; kath’ hormên, according to impulse, 110,14; 185,6 horos, term, 134,36; 135,14.15.17.20.22.24; 143,11.34 hudôr, water, 105,8; 111,30; 120,29.37; 176,32; 178,2; 181,11; 187,26; 197,7ff. hudrarguros, quicksilver, 115,1 hugiainein, to hugiainein, being healthy, 112,8.13.22.26.34.35 hugiansis, healing, 100,30 hugieia/hugeia, health, 100,31.36; 112,7.8.25.32.36; 122,13; 145,5; 147,9 hugiês, sound, 105,3 hugrainein, moisten, 120,26 hugron, moisture, 161,23 hugros, moist, 179,31; 197,9 hulê, material, 133,19; 139,29.32; matter, 98,33; 105,36; 121,28.30; 150,20; 155,7; 159,19ff.; 160,27; 178,25; 182,26; 183,8ff.; 195,18;

192

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198,3ff.; 199,10; subject matter, 135,25 hulikos, material, 105,34; 121,34; 187,25 humenôdês, membrane-like, 106,10 huparkhein, be attribute of, 96,4; belong to, 95,32; 99,12.14.16; 101,15; 112,22; be present in, 100,35; 104,14; 191,15; having the property of, 102,16; kath’ hauto huparkhonta, essential attributes, 134,16 hupenantiôsis, contradiction, 175,13 huperanekhein, rise above, 140,29.31 huperbainein, exceed, 116,34; go beyond, 116,32.33 huperekhein, exceed, 116,15 huperkosmia, ta, the things above, 121,9 hupertera, ta, higher things, 194,22 hupexairein, make an exception for, 140,26 huphairesis, reduction, 117,19 hupnos, sleep, 110,32; 161,8 hupnoun, sleep, 95,22 hupodeigma, example, 97,8.29.35.36; 153,31 hupodokhê, reception, 141,25; 183,10 hupokeimenon, subject, 100,36; 101,1.4.6; 162,17; 194,20; (underlying) substrate, 93,26; 98,31.32.33; 139,28; 144,1.18; 152,16; 162,25; 200,21; 201,11.24f. hupokeimenos, underlying, 114,27; 135,22.24 hupokeisthai, be assumed, 129,24; be supposed, 129,13 hupokhuma, suffused humours, 161,18 hupolambanein, suppose, 114,32; 131,23 hupomenein, endure, 137,20 hupomnêma, commentary, 118,28 huponoein, suppose, 109,12 hupospan, to pull away from under, 107,33; 112,18.19.20.21 hupostasis, being, 122,23; existence, 99,37; 148,21; 160,31 hupotattein, subordinate, 197,35 hupothesis, assumption, 127,27; 129,10.25; hypothesis, 100,2;

109,10; 128,11; 130,26; 131,30; supposition, 105,6; 115,10; 128,26; 167,23; 169,21ff.; 170,19; 191,12.33 hupotithenai, assume, 150,1; posit, 118,5; postulate, 112,39; suppose, 92,16; 125,19; 167,27; 171,12; 172,13; 197,24 hupsos, height, 102,14 husteron, secondary, 126,12 iatros, healer, 112,23; iêtros, healer (Hippocratic quote), 112,21 idea, form, 155,22 idiazein, individuate, 140,9 idios, characteristic of, 125,10; own, 97,14; 122,23; 139,29; 162,35; 200,3; peculiar, 123,7.11; 160,18; 164,18; 165,31; 178,25; proper, 97,9; 101,22; 105,15; idiai (dative), specifically, 159,26; individually, 184,6 idiotês, peculiarity, 102,16; 191,23 ikhnos, trace, 155,19.21 ikhthus, fish, 140,8 isêmerinos, equinox, 119,7.27 iskhus, physical strength, 111,34; 145,5 isoperimetros, with equal circumference, 139,8 isos, equal, 116,16; 129,16; 177,25; right, 116,34; ison, to, the same share, 137,30; what is equal, 122,13 kakia, vice, 94,8.9.14; 95,7; 100,18.24.27.33.38; 142,27.28.30; 34.35 kallos, beauty, 145,5ff. kamnein, be exhausted, 161,15 kamptein, bend, 119,1; 123,14.15 kampulos, curved, 187,7ff.; kampulon, to, what is bent, 122,12 kanôn, rule, 163,28 kardia, heart, 140,32; 156,26; 157,2ff.; 194,31; 199,19 karkinos, Cancer, 120,18 karos, (state of) sleep, 95,21 katagelastos, ridiculous, 93,35; 116,25 katalambanein, occupy, 103,16.18.22

Greek-English Index katalêpsis, apprehension, 134,26; tên katalepsin poiein, grasp, 106,24 katametrein, measure, 129,17 kataphatikos, assertory, 146,9 kataphronein, despise, 142,20 katapsukhoun, cool, 186,31 kataskeuazein, maintain, 96,22; prove, 114,23; 126,12; 132,13; 133,25; 137,27; 138,27; 154,24; 156,5; 170,31; 191,13.18; 192,7 kataskeuê, proof, 111,14 kataspan, pull down, 123,25 katatemnein, divide into, 117,15; 118,20.29; 178,10ff. katêgorein, criticise, 114,32; predicate, 114,17; 135,23; 143,15.18.22; 144,17 katêgoria, category, 93,17.20.30; 94,2; 98,23ff.; 99,1.3.11.17; 178,22; 179,3ff.; criticism, 139,20 kath’ hauto, by itself, 97,12; 98,7; 101,27; 104,2; 138,16.18; 154,3ff.; 154,28; 155,3ff.; by himself, 97,11.33; essential, 134,28; in itself, 130,13; in its own right, 111,34; 136,30; in virtue of itself, 97,2.28.30.34.35; 98,2.5.9.10; 99,23.29.35.36.38; 101,10.13; 109,10.14.23.24.25.33; 110,1.5.9.10.11.13.14.16.18.26; 111,10.17.19.21.23.24.26.30; 112,1.2.4.7.9.14.15.16.17.22.31.36. 38; on its own, 171,19; auto kath’hauto, in and by itself, 156,19-20; 157,26; 165,6 katharos, clear, 120,24; pure, 155,13; 188,32ff. kathektikos, that holds, 120,30 katheudein, be asleep, 110,29 katholou, at all, 92,26; in general, 95,6; 132,16.22; universal(ly), 110,21; 144,13; 146,6 katôpherês, downward, 106,1 katoptron, mirror, 157,34 katorthoun, improve, 117,7; katorthôsis, confirmation, 112,5 kauma, burning heat, 133,20 keisthai, be positioned in, 107,7 kenos, empty, 173,24 kenoun, empty, 112,23 kentron, centre, 169,23 kephalê, head, 140,29.37; 149,3

193

keramos, vessel, 111,30.31 kerannunai, mix, 116,5; 148,15; 153,6; 178,6; krathênai, mixture, 121,32 kêros, wax, 106,12; 109,4; 123,30.31; waxen, 106,10 khairein, be glad, 154,25; rejoice, 156,23 khalkos, bronze, 106,28; 139,29.31 kharaktêrizein, characterise, 118,11; 140,19; 159,20f.; 184,18ff.; (pass.) be conspicuous, 141,26; 191,24 kheimôn, winter, 119,12 kheir, hand, 149,2ff. kheirôn, inferior, 149,31; 150,21; 182,12; 187,30; 195,17 khioeidôs, crossing, 116,9; 119,1.5; crosswise, 119,8.9 khitôn, membrane, 140,22; coat, 161,22 khôneia, smelting furnace, 177,34ff. khôra, place, 111,14; space, 112,20; 170,12ff. khordos, string 141,33; 142,7; 146,30; 147,4.5.23; 151,16; 153,27; 177,11 khôrein, penetrate, 173,22; 175,15 khôristos, separable, 155,6ff.; 159,24ff.; 160,18ff.; 162,6ff.; 171,21; 193,14; 194,2.; 202,14; separate, 118,15; 162,27; 183,20ff.; 200,6; separated, 117,21 khôrizein, separate, 171,21ff. khortos, hay, 96,30 khrôma, colour, 129,2; 157,34 khronos, time, 94,34; 95,1; 126,28; 128,31; 133,2; 134,13; 137,30 khumos, humour, 161,19; flavour, 162,12 kinein, cause movement, 92,17.22; 96,18ff.; 97,18; 107,9.31; 114,15.27.29; 115,2.11.14.17.22; 138,16.23; 168,26ff.; 175,9; cause to move, 102,33; 106,3; 107,21; 180,4; exercise movement, 96,7; 100,15; 106,32.33; 108,18; 113,33; 114,7; 185,2; 192,17; impart movement, 113,9.29; 138,16; move, 92,16; 94,29; 96,4.12.15.27.29; 97,15.17.20; 101,29; 103,8; 104,36; 106,3; 107,26.28.30; 108,12.17.22.37;

194

Greek-English Index 109,19.21; 111,6; 113,1.32; 114,8.10.28; 115,8.19.21.26; 118,32; 119,10.11.14.35; 120,26; 121,12; 123,29.30; 127,13; 130,6; 132,16; 136,30; 138,7.28.34; 154,3ff.; set in motion, 106,29; 116,11; 119,2.3; 128,37; stimulate, 96,29; kineisthai move, 114,38; 115,3; 139,3.12; movement, 96,10; 130,9; 137,4; possess movement, 97,6; be exercised, 110,16; be in motion, 97,10; 138,32; be in movement, 138,27; be moved, 92,29; 93,22; 97,9ff.; 98,1ff.; 100,14.15; 101,8ff.; 102,2ff.; 103,2ff.; 104,2.3.21.32.34.35; 105,2.4.7.26.35; 106,4.ff.; 107,1.6.14.18.31; 108,7ff.; 109,14ff.; 110,2ff.; 111,21.22; 112,37.38; 113,2ff.; 114,7.ff.; 115,12.22.25; 119,8.28; 121,13; 123,29.30; 124,33; 125,5.22; 127,22; 136,24.26.28; 137,1; 181,4; be subject to movement, 92,17ff.; 93,10; 94,3.16.25.28.32; 95,8ff.; 96,6ff.; 97ff.; 98,4.8.10.20.29.30; 99,11.18.38; 100.2.3.4.5.19; 101,25.27.29.31; 102,7.8.15.28; 105,27.28; 106,2.6.8.16.17; 107,20; 108,19; 109,8ff.; 110,4.ff.; 111,21.23; 112,36; 113,9.10.28; 114,11ff.; 126,1.2; 136,31.32; 137,9.13.14.15; 138,13.18; 154,24; 156,4; undergo movement, 107,10; 109,17; 157,25; 159,4ff.; kinein, to, movement, 97,31; the act of causing movement, 96,29; ho kinôn, agent of movement, 107,17; the moving agent, 94,20.21.23; to kinoun, the moving agent, 106,26; 107,14.15; 113,8; that which exercises movement, 114,13; source of movement/that which moves/that which causes movement, 98,14; that which moves, 96,3; that what exercises movement, 96,6; kinein heauton, move itself, 96,12; 110,3; 114,1.4.5.12; 165,19ff.; 174,22ff.; kinôn

heauton, causing itself to move, 96,33; prôtôs kinoun, primary agent of movement, 96,7.24; 107,10.12; kineisthai topikôs, change place, 102,31; kinoumenon, to, object that is moved, 103,18.23; 113,2; that which undergoes movement, 114,13; what is moved, 99,23.24; 100,7.13; 101,30.31.33; 102,19.22.28; 103,6.15; 104,4; 106,26; 113,10.12.13; what is subject to movement, 93,21; 94,21.22; 99,19; 113,8.26; kinoumena, ta, moving parts, 121,7 kinêma, movement, 155,18 kinêsis, motion, 96,25; 125,24; 127,26; movement, 92,12.31.32.35; 93,11ff.; 94,3.15ff.; 95,1ff.; 96,1.4; 97,4ff.; 98,6ff.; 99,3ff.; 100,13.19; 101,16ff.; 102,4ff.; 103,1ff.; 104,1.5.7.9.20.32.38; 105,1ff.; 106,4ff.; 107,6.20; 108,6; 109,1.7.14.16.23.25.31.32; 110,4.6.9.14.16.23.24; 111,9; 112,38; 113,2.4.17.24.28; 114,2.15.25; 115,25.28; 116,16.17; 118,35; 119,25.29.31.36; 120,5.8.13.14; 121,17; 123,18ff.; 125,1.8; 130,8; 132,7.18; 136,5.6.7.12.21.23.29; 137,3ff.; 138,5ff.; 139,4.14; 147,1; 148,19; 154,26; 156,6; 156,19; 157,26ff.; 159,7; 160,9; 161,8 (bodily); 166,7ff.; 167,13 (local); 173,2ff.; 183,29; 200,13; 201,3; kinêsis kata topon, local movement, 101,18; 157,2; 184,30ff.; 186,10 kinêtikon, to, kinetic aspect, 92,13; 96,5; 184,5; 184,28; 185,23; capacity to cause movement, 175,6ff.; 192,18 kinêtikos, kinetic, 96,16; 97,15 kiôn, pillar, 107,32; 108,4 kirnan, mix, 121,2 klêroun, allot, 201,20 koilia, cavity, 155,28 koilôma, hollow, 114,28 koinônein, have in common with,

Greek-English Index 115,27.29; 172,13; 173,11ff.; 202,10 koinônia, community, 139,24 koinos, common, 139,20; 144,16; 159,20; 172,30; 174,1; 184,14; public, 145,21.25; 178,23; 179,12; 185,23; 202,6; general, 134,6; koinôs, collectively, 141,22; communally, 100,6; generally, 105,21; jointly, 131,29; koinai ennoiai, common insights, 134,1; koinon onoma, common term, 99,2.6 kôluein, prevent, 107,29; 112,25; 118,7; 163,3 kômikos, to, comic poet, 114,37 kônoeidês, conic in shape, 140,32; conic, 140,34 korê, girl, 140,7 korônis, korônida epitithenai, add a nice finishing touch, 136,6 kosmein, get properly in order, 117,6; embellish, 194,3 kosmikos, cosmic, 192,12 kosmos, universe, 110,19; 115,26; 120,19.35; 124,8.10; 137,29; 140,31; world, 116,19; 117,34; 125,17.20; 140,32 kouros, boy, 140,7 krama, mixture, 118,7; 122,14; 123,13 krasis, mixture, 141,26.29.32; 146,10ff.; 149,19ff.; 150,1ff.; 151,22; 153,5ff.; 155,34; 157,9; 163,7ff.; 183,29ff.; 195,13; blend, 120,36; blending, 121,1.3 krinein, derive critical judgement, 111,4; discriminate, 123,10; judge, 123,12; krinon, to, the judging factor, 128,21 krios, Aries, 119,28 krisis, judgement, 104,9.10.20 kritikos, judging, 158,11 kruptein, kekrummenos, hidden, 116,25; 117,9.13 krustallos, ice, 111,30 kubikos, cubic, 177,2 kubos, cube, 177,5; cubic number, 177,2 kuklikos, spherical, 141,4 kuklophoreisthai, be carried round in a circle, 101,34

195

kuklophoria, circular movement, 136,11.13 kuklos, circle, 102,4.30; 106,27.31; 107,7; 116,10.12.13.20; 117,16.17.18.20.23.36.37; 118,5; 119,1.15.16.19.20.25.26; 120,6.21; 123,14.15; 124,30.33.35; 125,5.8.10.22.25.27.28; 127,13.14.19.21; 128,9; 130,5.7.9.18.22.24.27.28.29; 131,2; 132,6.7.8.10.11.12.14.16.18.19.20. 21.22.23; 133,2; 135,10.22; 138,10.28.34; 139,1.3.9; circular, 107,5.14; 125,23; 127,26; 130,8; 135,24; 136,18; 138,15.17.20.25.30.31.34; 139,4; kata kuklon, circular, 102,25.27; 125,1; kuklôi (dative) pheresthai, circular movement, 138,11; 154,4; 166,8 kurios, in control, 183,4.14ff; kuriôs, in the proper sense, 148,18.27; 162,13; in the strict sense, 92,19; 144,26 lambanein, accept, 99,10; 148,6; admit of, 113,17; adopt, 97,17; 122,5.27.31; 123,4; have, 117,19; mean, 121,21; state, 143,3.18.19.35-7; 152,31; take, 103,5; 116,1; 118,22.26.37; 122,25; 126,20; 131,4 lanthanein, escape notice, 187,3 lêgein, end, 117,37; stop, 135,12.13 leios, smooth, 122,12; 157,32 leipesthai, remain, 99,34 lêpsis, apprehension, 134,12 leptomerês, composed/consisting of fine/delicate particles, 92,19; 172,5ff.; 173,14ff.; 175,6; 184,12; 188,32 leukainein, cause whiteness/cause to become white, 96,28; turn white, 100,36 leukansis, a turning white, 98,25; 99,5 leukos, white, 94,13; 97,12.13; 101,8.9.20; 178,6ff.; 187,19ff.; 188,1ff.; leukon, to, whiteness, 130,16.17; leukotês, whiteness, 97,16; 130,14; 139,25

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lexis, sentence, 123,22; text, 121,10; (actual) wording, 151,20; 159,30; 160,23 lithos, brick, 120,36; stone, 104,29; 110,11.13.16; 112,17; 139,30; hê Magnêtis lithos, the stone from Magnesia, 120,29 lôbê, damage, 117,11 logikos, rational, 104,10.11; 111,12.16; 118,14; 122,30; 123,8; 124,32.34; 125,8; 134,35.36; 135,3.16; 141,8.9.20; 142,12.14; 155,9; 157,9; 159,22; 163,31; 165,7; 183,27; 191,27; 193,10; 194,30; 195,25 logismos, reasoning, 174,25 logistikon, faculty of reasoning, 140,30; 155,30; 191,4; 192,26; 199,18 logizesthai, reasoning, 192,30; 193,5 logos, account, 95,18.24; 103,14.29; 110,34; 111,13; 120,10; 121,28; 132,1; 140,28; 145,19ff.; argument, 95,10; 96,31; 104,16; 105,28; 107,10.12; 116,35; 118,30; 124,1; 127,17; 129,24; 140,5; 142,2.15; 143,1; 147,13; 148,32; 187,28; 190,14; book, 98,21; definition, 96,14; 99,7; 114,21; 121,29; 132,11.17; 148,25; discussion, 100,14; 108,22; 129,13; 139,10.16; 140,6; form, 110,32; formal account, 114,11; formal principle, 155,14; formula, 126,31; 132,5; 165,23ff.; proportion, 120,7; 129,19; ratio, 116,15; 120,13.14; 146,20ff.; 147,19; 148,4ff.; 149,19ff.; 150,7ff.; 151,13; 153,11; 176,6ff.; 177,8ff.; 178,17; rational account, 133,22; reason, 104,25.26; 123,5; 141,1; 190,26; 193,23; 197,34; 198,5; relation, 120,15; 132,17.19; 153,12; statement, 174,22; theory, 102,18.22; 111,4.5; 139,18; 149,23; 151,6ff.; 200,9; 201,2; treatment, 139,13; verbal expression, 133,23.24.28.29.31; 134,5.18.22; what is said, 96,10; word, 133,26; tôi logôi, verbally, 99,36; logically, 200,8 luein, dissolve, 137,29

Lukeion, The Lyceum, 98,25 lumainesthai, do damage to, 100,26; 167,23; lumainomenon, to, that which causes decay, 112,24 lupê, distress, 174,25.28 lupein, lupoun, to, ailing, 112,23 lupeisthai, suffer pain, 110,22; 154,25ff.; 155,20; 156,23 lusis, solution, 107,13; 152,1; 153,9; 183,28 makarios, blissful, 136,19.26; 137,1.2.6.22 makariotês, state of blissfulness, 136,27.29 makhaira, sword, 116,31.34 makhê, conflict, 104,24; 142,28; 193,22; contradiction, 95,10 makhesthai, be in conflict, 142,15.17.19; 153,32; 193,23ff.; 198,4; battle with 162,22ff. malakos, soft, 109,4 manthanein, learn, 94,1 marainesthai, wither, 163,25; be impaired, 164,9 matên, in vain, 103,17; 109,27; serving no purpose, 103,18 mathêmata, ta, mathematics, 165,22; sciences, 117,25 mathêmatikos, mathematical, 124,17; 148,2; scientific, 118,36 mathêsis, act of learning, 142,9.12 mathêtês, apprentice, 117,5; pupil, 94,25; 171,17; subject that is being taught, 94,23 megas, meizôn, major (premise), 143,15; 154,27 megethos, extended entity, 122,19; extended magnitude, 123,33; 124,1.21.29; 125,19.24.29.34; 126,2.11.19; 127,3.7.11.19.20.22.26.27; 129,15.16.20.30; 131,22.24.33; extension, 124,21; 130,10; 131,27.28; magnitude, 117,18; 122,22; 126,3; 129,28.30.31.32; 130,1.6.19.20.25; 148,18; 173,2; 174,7; size, 167,22 meignunai, mix, 146,21; 148,5ff.; 150,11ff.; 188,15; memikhthai, to, a state of mixture, 137,16 meiôsis, decrease, 93,19; 98,24; 99,7

Greek-English Index meioun, decrease, 130,15; get smaller, 95,14 mêkos, length, 117,14.16; 177,20 melainein, turn black, 100,36; 107,18; ho melainôn, that which makes other things black, 107,18 melankholia, melancholy, 161,8 melansis, a turning black, 98,25; 99,5 melas, black, 94,13; 187,20 meli, honey, 143,6.19ff.; 144,12ff. melos, limb, 149,14 melos, tune, 123,11 memphesthai, criticise, 175,11 menein, persist, 93,22.23; remain, 96,31; 98,30; 114,10; 130,11; stay, 116,28 merikos, individual, 186,34 meristos, divided, 121,22.25.27.29; 122,16.17.20.21; 124,5; 131,6.7.11.18.20.21.25.32.35; 132,2; 192,27; 199,16; 200,8; divided into parts, 99,35; divisible, 99,36.37.38; meriston einai, consist of parts, 99,23; to meriston, what consists of parts, 99,23.34 merizein, divide, 121,29; 194,30; split up, 129,26 meros, part, 100,10; 107,22; 131,1.4.8.9.11; 155,5; 177,33; 189,22; 192,21; 196,13ff.; kata meros, individually, 139,19; part by part, 94,26 mesolabein, admit anything in between, 126,7 mesos, centre, 120,20; 124,14; intermediate, 116,3; 121,21.25; middle, 116,19; 117,21; 124,9; 134,25; 135,1.15.17.19; middle position, 121,2; middle term, 134,30; 135,2.14.18; 143.11ff.; 144,16ff. metabainein, move, 132,33 metaballein, (undergo) change, 93,27.31.32; 94,2.10.12.14; 95,14.28; 98,34; 99,26.27.28.29.30; 100,15.17; 106,5; 113,23; 144,29; 189,7; subject to movement, 113,19; subject to substantial change, 113,27 metabasis, changing position, 119,13

197

metabatikos, that changes, 132,32 metabolê, change, 93,11.15.16.17.18.20.24.26.33; 94,3; 98,22.26.28.31; 99,7.10.29.31; 113,18.21.22.23.28; kat’ alloiôsin metabolê, qualitative alteration, 99,22; metabolên autês einai, it being changed, 94,3 metadidonai, let share in, 117,6 metakuliesthai, roll over, 115,2 metalambanein, replace, 160,4 metallon, metal, 105,30 metapherein, transfer, 148,14 metaphora, kata, metaphorically, 148,17 metaxu, between, 122,18; 135,20; in between, 126,9.15.17.18; intermediate between, 122,15; 124,4.6 metaxulogia, parenthesis, 156,10.12.22 metekhein, (have a) share in, 141,32; 176,2; 184,30; 190,18ff.; 191,34; 196,3; partake in, 98,9.13; 120,23.25; participate in, 98,17 metharmozein, adapt, 143,36 methê, drunkenness, 160,5ff.; 161,7; 163,2ff. methektikos, taking part in, 98,14 methistanai, change, 99,25; 106,7; 107,21 methodos, method, 135,25 metrios, moderate, 180,13; appropriate, 193,11 metros, extent, 120,24; measure, 116,30; 117,3 mikros, elattôn, minor (premise), 143,16; 154,28 miktos, mixed, 141,1; mikton, to, combination, 141,7 mimeisthai, imitate, 102,5.6; 124,35; 125,4; 133,2; 135,22; 139,1.3.5; 140,33 mixis, mixture, 120,35; 150,27ff.; 151,14; 152,4ff.; 153,3ff. mnêmê, memory, 164,26ff. mnêmoneuein, remember, 163,11ff.; 164,24 mnêmoneutikon, to, faculty of memory, 155,29

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moira, lot, 137,30; part, 176,30ff.; share, 188,18; portion, 178,2.9.12 mokhleia, lever, 107,30.32; 108,3.5; leverage, 102,32; 106,8; 107,26; 114,30 monas, monad, 116,7; 118,11.16.18; unit, 166,5ff.; 168,7ff.; 168,18ff.; 171,23; 172,11ff.; 173,2ff.; 174,3ff.; 178,14.27 monê, state of rest, 158,26ff. morion, bodily part, 97,33.37; part, 98,1; 104,17; 107,7; 121,5.30; 127,11.24; 128,37; 129,8ff.; 129,24ff.; 130,3ff.; 130,11ff.; 131,3.11.31.34; 136,14; 140,19.22.23; 149,2ff.; 149,24ff.; 150,4ff.; 151,24ff.; 152,5ff.; 152,32ff.; 157,14; 167,14ff.; 174,29; 179,10; 186,13; 190,1ff.; 191,22.34ff.; 193,5; 194,9ff.; 195,34; 199,7.26; 200,8; 201,15; kata moria, by individual parts, 131,34; in respect of parts, 106,7; part by part, 130,29; partially, 102,7; 107,21.22 mousikê, music, 124,18; 148,16 mousikos, musical, 118,26.36 murias, myriad, 120,17 murios, numerous, 120,32 muthôdês, mythical, 140,5 muthologein, tell mythical stories, 117,10 muthos, myth, 121,16; 140,4; poiêtikos muthos, poetic myth, 116,22.24 neikos, strife, 181,25ff.; 182,2ff. nêkhesthai, swim, 102,13 nekros, corpse, 107,29; 175,18 nêstis, liquid, 178,3 neuein, bend, 141,6 neuron, nerve, 201,4.8; sinew, 149,2; 151,29; 152,14 noein, think, 95,15; 126,26; 127,1.11.20.22.24.25.28.29.30.31. 33; 128,1.2.5.6.7.8.9.10.12.13.14.20. 28.30.31.33.35.37; 129,8.10.12.13.22; 130,1.11.21.22.24.26.27.28.29.30; 131,6.9.10.11.12.15.17.19.20.21. 24.28.30.32.33.34; 132,1.4.24.26.29.31; 133,1.3.4.6;

135,31; 136,2.3.8.15; 162,15; 163,24; 164,17; understand, 114,3; 137,9; noein, to, thinking, 130,26.27; 131,8.17; 137,8; noeisthai, to, the act of thinking, 135,33; nooun, to, thinking, 130,19; nooumenon, to, meaning, 117,11; object of thinking, 136,2 noêma, thought, 125,33; 126,14.22.23.24.33.34; 131,12.13.15; 133,26; idea, 156,13 noeros, intellectual, 111,10; 117,36; 118,6.14; intelligent, 117,31.33; 124,33; 141,20; noeron, to, intelligent aspect, 117,35; what is intelligible, 141,20 noêsis, act of intellection, 128,19; thinking, 115,15; 125,32.33; 126,13.14.21.23.24.37.38; 129,9.14; 130,18; 131,9.10; 132,7.9.17.19.20.27.31.33; 133,7; 135,32; 136,4.10.12.29; 162,15; 164,11; thought, 133,29; understanding, 130,10.20; 166,4; praktikai noêseis, acts of practical thinking, 133,8.10; theôrêtikai noêseis, theoretical thoughts, 133,22.24.28.30; 134,18.21 noêtikos, intellectual, 93,4; 95,20; noêtika, ta, intellectual powers, 95,22 noêtos, intelligible, 118,8; 121,33; 127,22.23.33; 128,2; 129,12; intelligible mode, 121,27; noêton, to, intelligible object, 126,35; 128,1.13.14.18; 130,8.30; 131,2.5.11; object of thought, 128,32; 162,16; the intelligible, 141,17; noêta, ta, intelligible objects, 126,37; 127,14; 128,10.34; 129,4; 133,3; 185,9; objects of thinking, 127,15 nomizein, believe, 97,37; feel, 117,4; hold (this) view, 96,21; think, 92,21; 96,5; 124,19 nosos, disease, 100,32.38; 112,26; 122,13; 145,1ff.; 147,9; 160,5; 163,2ff. notios, south, 119,12.13 nous, intellect, 92,3.8.9; 93,32; 102,5; 104,10; 118,1; 124,30;

Greek-English Index 125,18.22.24.25.27.32; 126,4.10.13.20.21.26.27.29.38; 127,2.8.19.21.28.29; 128,12.13.33.34.37; 129,1.8.11; 131,15.17.23.25.26,28; 132,1.3.6.8.14.17.18.20.22.31; 135,26.27.28; 136,1.22.24.26; 137,9.10.23; 139,1.3; 149,10; 155,13.35; 159,8ff.; 160,3; 160,21ff.; 161,4ff.; 162,3ff.; 162,33ff.; 165,6ff.; 183,18ff.; 185,16; 185,34ff.; 193,15; 194,6; 199,26ff.; 200,5; ho prôtos nous, the first intellect, 132,30; nous ho theios, divine intellect, 165,8; meaning, 151,20 odontôtos, teethed, 107,8 oikeios, appropriate, 108,29; 110,14; 139,10.14; 140,12; 141,3.7.30; own, 97,32; 121,38; proper, 101,27; 103,19; 110,16; 160,14; oikeiôs, appropriately, 141,11 oikodomikos, building, 133,18 oikos, house, 120,36 oiônos, bird, 140,8 okhêma, vehicle, 162,14 okhlos, burden, 162,36 okhloun, cause discomfort, 112,25 ombros, rain, 133,20 omma, eye, 161,16ff.; 195,20 ômos, shoulder, 119,31 onkos, mass, 172,21ff. onoma, name, 96,14; 99,8; koinon onoma, common term, 99,2.6 onos, donkey, 96,30 ophthalmos, eye, 125,2; 129,1; 140,21; 195,5ff.; 200,23 opsis, vision, 128,20; 187,13; 201,12; sight, 94,12; 100,26; 110,23; 128,3; opseis, ai, acts of vision, 125,2 optikos, optic, 161,25 (pneuma); 161,26; of vision, 195,16 oregesthai, desire, 125,17 orektos, object of desire, 96,29; 110,21 orexis, appetite, 125,16; 195,26; desire, 96,29; 102,3; 104,9.12 organikos, organic 145,3; 147,26; 148,1ff.; 152,15; 153,13; 159,27; 193,26; 200,22 organon, instrumental parts,

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110,15; organ 141,29; 162,14; tool, 140,11.13.15.16 orgê, anger, 110,22; 156,26 orgilos, irascible, 116,35 orgizesthai, be angry, 154,33ff.; 156,18.24.35ff. orophê, roof, 133,19 orthios, upright, 140,37; 141,5.9 ôsis, a pushing, 107,33; 108,3.12; 114,32; 115,17 osphrantos, smellable, 181,17 osphrêsis, smell, 201,12 ostoun, bone, 105,30.33; 149,2.21; 150,5; 151,29ff.; 176,31ff.; 178,7 ôthein, push, 106,9.13; 107,26.29; 108,26; 109,3 ouranios, celestial, 138,21; celestial being, 98,11; celestial body, 102,30; 103,1; 106,31.32; 119,25; 123,23; 141,7; 146,6; heavenly, 138,6; heavenly body, 123,19; ta ourania sômata, celestial bodies, 102,2 ouranos, heaven, 117,22; 120,20; 124,9.13.15; 138,10; 140,31; the heavens, 102,6; 116,20; 118,35; 120,21; 123,17.20.22.27.28.29; 137,21; 138,15.17.21.25.27; 139,12.13 ousia, being, 94,7; 96,2; 98,11.12; 116,1.2.5; 118,10.13; 121,19.20.24.25.27; 162,22; 183,20; essence, 97,6; 99,15; 100,35; 101,1; 109,29.31; 113,3.4; 114,2.21.22; 121,35.36.37; 134,4; 137,7; 138,4.11; 140,34; 163,28; 174,21; 178,30; 186,4; essential, 137,3; kind, 98,19; 120,35; mode of being, 123,4; substance, 93,17.18.21; 98,32; 113,15.26.29.30; 114,17.18; 131,26; 134,23.24.26; 143,6; 148,27; 159,31; 160,22; 160,27; 178,8ff.; 178,31ff.; 192,24; 193,9; 194,5ff.; 195,13; 195,23; 196,16; 197,32; 198,3ff.; 200,5; en têi ousiai, substantially, 98,23; substantial, 98,28; kat’ ousian, essentially, 129,5.6; by its nature, 154,9; in substance, 118,14; in respect of substance, 94,1; 113,15.17.18.25; 114,24; substantial, 99,9; 113,26; in

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virtue of the essence, 98,7.17; têi ousiai, essentially ousiôdês, essential, 129,6; as a substance, 159,32 ousioun, having essence in, 98,15 oxus, keen, 110,36 pais, child, 106,10 pakhus, solid, 161,14 (body); thick, 161,22 palaioi, hoi palaioteroi, precursors, 92,13 palindromein, turn round, 125,3 pallein, beating of the heart, 156,28ff. pan, to, the universe, 115,25; 116,18; 117,21.30.31.33; 118,30.31.32; 120,10.23; 121,15; 122,27.29; 123,1.4.8; 124,27.31; 125,19; 132,32; 136,27; 137,2.30; 186,27; 190,1; 191,34; 192,12; 194,23 paraballein, compare, 173,30; relate to, 111,5 parabolê, analogy, 143,10.31 paradeigma, example, 108,2; 111,19; 200,34 paradeigmatikos, exemplary, 120,11; 126,31 paradoxos, marvellous, 120,27 parakeisthai, lie next to each other, 121,1 parakolouthein, follow, 176,29 paralambanein, adopt, 125,23; include, 122,14; take, 134,12; take by way of illustration, 117,35 paraleipein, omit, 139,15 paralogos, irrational, 117,13; contrary to reason, 188,22; 189,10 paraphrosunê, mental derangement, 164,10 parathesis, juxtaposition, 120,35.38; 121,3; 146,13ff.; 148,25 parempodizein, hinder, 161,28 parousia, presence, 108,8 pas, dia pasôn, ‘through all’, 177,9 paskhein, be acted upon, 139,23.24.26; be affected, 130,15; 160,5; 163,19ff.; 179,29ff.; 180,2ff.; 201,21ff.; to have happen to, 121,16; undergo change, 109,5; paskhôn, ho, patient, 104,28 pathêma, affection, 147,14; 160,17

pathêtikos, passive, 100,21; 113,22; 187,25; qualitative, 188,1 pathos, affection, 147,16; 154,23; 155,23; 157,30ff.; 161,8ff.; 162,35; 164,18; 174,24ff.; 193,23; 197,34; 198,1ff.; attribute, 143,27; passion, 104,25.26 pêgnunai, solidify, 161,24 peirasthai, attempt, 93,14 pêkhuaios, a cubit (in size), 130,16; cubit-length, 129,17; dipêkhus, two cubits, 130,15; tripêkhus, three cubits (long), 101,8.11.20.23 peperasmenos, defined, 136,14; definite, 122,7; finite, 128,30; 129,15.17.18.21; 133,10.15.29.30; 134,5.6.18.19; limited, 134,13 perainein, peperastai, is infinite, 134,9 peras, boundary, 100,9; end, 133,32; 134,1.3; limit, 118,4; 133,8.21; 170,5; 171,27; 172,25; 177,18 peratoun, limit, 134,29; 170,5 periagôgê, circuit, 127,13; 128,9 periekhein, encompass, 100,9.12 perigraphein, draw an outline of, 187,23 perikaluptein, cover, 117,3; encompass, 117,22.23; 120,21; 124,13.15; pull round, 116,20 perikardios, in the region of the heart, 156,27; 157,3; 201,9 perilambanein, encompass, 120,22 periodos, circuit, 128,18 periphora, circuit, 132,27; circular movement, 132,7.8.18.20.21.24; 135,30.32; 136,1 perittos, odd (number), 118,24; 167,5; superfluous, 127,26.27.32; 129,10 pettein, digest, 201,13 phainomenos, apparent, 95,11; 116,28; 117,8; phainomenon, to, superficial meaning, 123,28; the apparent, 122,25; the apparent meaning, 125,30; 171,20; what appears at face value, 116,27; 165,20; kata to phainomenon, at face value, 116,24; 117,29; 124,23; on the face of it, 123,18 phantasia, imagination, 187,21ff. phantasma, appearance, 158,15ff. phantastikon, imaginative, 174,33

Greek-English Index pherein, cast, 103,26; move, 103,16.19; 138,10 philia, love, 150,25ff.; 181,18.25ff. philosophia, philosophy, 186,15 philosophos, philosopher, 102,24 phlebs, blood vessel, 152,14 phobeisthai, be afraid, 154,33ff.; 156,24.27.35ff. phobos, fear, 154,23; 174,25 phônê, sound, 95,11; 129,2; voice, 123,10 phora, local movement, 106,6; locomotion, 93,20; 98,19; 99,3.4; motion, 123,17.22.27; movement, 104,29; 105,1; 122,28; 123,1; local (movement), 107,16; 156,36; sphere, 103,26; phoran kineisthai, be moved spatially, 106,20 phôtizein, illuminate, 196,16 phronêma, attention, 123,7 phronêsis, intelligence, 160,34 phthartos, perishable, 159,22.33ff.; 161,5ff.; 194,11 phtheirein, cause destruction, 101,5; destroy, 117,2; 152,4; 162,24 phtheiresthai, pass away, 93,35; perish, 113,15.27; 114,16.24; 142,22; 152,24.29; 153,4ff.; 159,31ff.; 161,6ff.; 162,31; 164,23; 189,6; to phtheiromenon, what passes away, 93,22; 98,30.32.34 phthisis, decrease, 99,9; wane, 98,20; 166,9; 195,27 phthora, decay, 164,12; passing away, 93,19.27.34; 98,23; 100,25ff.; 101,4.8; perishing 153,7.8 phuein, pephukos, by nature, 97,24; 101,10; pephukenai, have a nature for, 108,33.35; have a natural suitability for, 108,34.35; have a natural capacity to, 123,9 phulattein, preserve, 108,15; 130,14; 135,16 phusikos, natural, 97,27; 102,20; 114,26; 121,7; 138,21.22; 159,27; 162,1; 193,26; 198,16; 199,6; natural forms, 118,12; natural philosopher, 96,21; 201,34; physical, 95,13.16.24.29; 117,2;

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140,13; 148,22ff.; thermotês phusikê, natural heat, 119,34.35 phusiognômôn, physiognomist, 155,22 phusiologein, give a natural account, 140,36; give a physical account, 140,35; say in account of nature, 115,20; 121,11; phusiologôn, ho, student of nature, 139,31 phusis, nature, 97,14; 98,13; 99,12.16; 102,16; 103,17.21; 108,32; 109,25.26.27; 111,28; 112,25; 114,8.11.27; 116,23; 118,33; 121,26; 122,15; 123,4; 134,14.15; 140,1; 141,1; 151,1; 185,30; 187,18.23; 197,12; kata phusin, according to nature, 102,11; 103,18.21; 104,3.7.12.17.20.38; 136,23.28; 183,20; by nature, 104,2; in accordance with (its) nature, 104,2; 105,30; 112,20; 136,21; 137,12.13; 183,33; in virtue of nature, 102,15; natural, 100,31.32.34.35; 102,17; 103,21; 105,1.7.9.11.12.15; 106,1; 112,8.25; 137,14; naturally, 101,33; 102,28; 103,12; 104,13; 136,31.32; 138,19; para phusin, contrary to nature, 100,31.32; 101,32.35; 103,2.20; 104,7.13.17.31.37.39; 105,2; 136,23.24.25.29.32; 137,1.3.10.18; unnatural, 101,6.30.31.36; 103,20.24; 104,14; 105,1; 137,11.13.15.18; 183,30ff.; unnatural state, 101,33; phusei, naturally, 101,25.26.27.29; 102,18.19.22; 126,12.25; 138,28; 183,3; by nature, 95,32; 103,4.6; hupo phuseôs, by nature, 102,1.8.9; 103,20; (ek) phuseôs, natural, 108,7; 166,16; phusies, natures (Hippocratic quote), 112,26 phutikos, vegetative, 184,17; 185,22; 186,5.20; 193,20; 195,27; 196,2; 198,24; 201,32; 202,12ff. phuton, plant, 167,9; 184,20ff.; 196,4; 200,10; 202,2 pistis, proof, 176,28

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pistousthai, prove, 154,30; 176,4; 202,6 pithanos, plausible 145,12ff.; 151,11 plagios, oblique, 141,6; sideways, 102,8 planasthai, wander, 110,7; planômenê, wandering sphere, 119,6.8.10.14.26.30.36; 120,4.6; planômenoi, oi, the planets, 119,11 plasis, moulding, 109,4 platos, width, 119,11.14; 177,20.33 plattein, imagine, 129,7; use imagination, 103,32 plêktikôs, strikingly, 140,5 plêrôma, fullness, 126,32; 165,23 plêthos, plurality, 118,13.17; 166,10; 167,25; 169,28 pleura, side, 177,5 ploion, ship, 97,30.31; 109,19.21 plôtêr, sailor, 97,10.29.30.33; 159,29; 194,1 ploutos, wealth, 111,29; 112,12 pneuma, pneuma, 158,11ff.; 161,21ff.; 162,4.14; 164,4ff.; 183,18; 201,25.31.32 pneumatikos, pneumatic, 164,11 podiaios, one foot across, 111,1 poiein, act (on), 139,23; 180,2; do, 103,17; 117,4.23; 123,4; 124,20; 128,15; 130,28; 136,13; 139,33; 140,18; cause, 115,6; cause to be, 107,2; create, 116,10.14; 118,22; exercise, 118,17; make, 106,10; 112,34; 114,37.38; 115,3.19; 116,6.16; 117,4.33; 118,6.8; 119,1; 122,7; 123,1; 125,20; 134,37; posit, 118,18; 120,19; practise, 117,12; produce, 118,24.27; 119,15; poiein tên didaskalian, teach on the basis of, 106,18 poiêtês, poet, 117,10; 119,36; 177,34 poiêtikos, active, 187,24ff.; productive, 118,37; 122,32; 199,5; that can produce, 120,10; hê poiêtikê aitia /to poiêtikon aition, the efficient cause, 111,25.28; 112,6.8; 138,15.25; poiêtikos muthos, poetic myth, 116,22.24 poikilos, diverse, 122,9.11; varied, 120,3

poimnion, flock of sheep, 123,6 poios, kind, 103,32; 104,5; 120,14; 123,10; 139,22; way, 116,22; kata poion, in respect of quality, 113,13.18; 114,5; qualitative, 99,4; 113,21.24; qualitatively, 100,17; 107,18; poion, to, quality, 93,18.19.21; 98,24.26; 99,2; 114,7.8; 121,3; 178,33ff. poiotês, quality, 94,15; 95,14; 100,22.34; 101,22; 109,4; 113,22.30; 144,4; 179,19; 197,9; 199,10; kata poiotêta, in respect of quality, 113,29 polemos, war, 123,7 polos, pole, 119,7.8.10.14 poludunamos, having many (different) faculties, 195,29; 196,11ff. polukhôrêtos, containing much space, 139,7.8 polumereia, having a many-part nature, 132,4 polumerês, consisting of many parts, 195,30; 196,17ff.; 197,17 poluthrulêtos, much debated, 101,2 posos, to poson, quantity, 92,18.19.21; 98,24.27; 99,6.7.8; 113,20; 114,7.8.9.10.11; 122,2; 126,6; 130,15; 173,3; 178,25ff.; kata poson, in respect of quantity, 113,13.18.19; 114,5; quantitative, 99,21; 113,24; 167,28; quantitatively, 107,17; 114,8; 147,3 posotês, quantity, 113,30 pote, to, time, 122,4 pou, to, place, 93,18.20.21; 98,25.27; 99,1; 122,4; kata to pou, spatial, 99,21 pous, foot, 97,34.36; 98,2; 149,3 pragma, something, 134,14.15; thing, 92,16.18; 100,29; 110,32; 111,4; 116,23; 121,34; 140,9; 176,11 pragmateia, treatise, 140,19; work, 93,28 praktikos, capable of acting, 112,34; practical, 194,20; praktikai noêseis, acts of practical thinking, 133,8.10; praktikai theôriai, practical thoughts, 133,15

Greek-English Index prattôn, ho, agent, 104,28 praxis, action, 133,10ff.; 194,25 proairesis, choice, 115,15 probainein, proceed, 94,23 proballein, project, 125,5; 155,15 problêma, problem, 193,2; 196,7 prodêlos, clear enough, 101,31; 116,29; 124,3; evident, 99,21; 105,21; obvious, 113,19; 127,5 progenês, of early descent, 183,19ff. prokeimenos, original, 139,16; present, 139,13.14; present enquiry, 139,14; subject, 123,16 prokheirisis, poieisthai, grasp, 95,5 prokheirizesthai, grasp, 110,34; 111,8; have, 128,8 prokoptein, progress, 94,29 prolambanein, anticipated, 98,6 pronoia, providence, 117,3; 118,17 proodos, procedure, 134,7; process, 118,2; 125,4; progression, 126,35 prophanês, transparent, 117,4; obvious, 159,9 pros ti, relation, 122,3 prosballein, be in contact with, 164,27 prosdiorizesthai, make specifications, 140,2; 149,28 prosekhês, proximate, 198,12; prosekhôs, proximately, 107,9 prosektikôs, prosektikôtata, extremely, 115,8 proskeimenos, supplying, 131,19 proskrinein, assimilate, 185,9 prosôpon, face, 156,32; 157,7 prosphuês, prosphuôs, cleverly, 115,4; quite natural, 101,37; natural, 100,19; 182,11 prosthêkê, addition, 117,19; 143,38; 144,5.13 prosupakouein, implicitly understand, 100,12 protasis, premise, 94,30; 95,4; 126,17; 128,17.21.25ff.; 135,6.15.17.20.21; 136,15; 143,3.13.28.35; 144,13; 154,26; 155,12 proteron, proteron kai husteron, earlier and later, 94,34.35; 95,2.3; 122,4; one thing before the other, 95,6 prothesis, preposition, 123,21 prôtos, first (mover), 102,6; primary

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(mover), 102,3; 148,23; prôtistos, first and foremost, 126,27; ho prôtos nous, the first intellect, 132,30 prôtôs, primarily, 104,8; 201,20 prouparkhein, exist before, 142,9.11 pseudês, false, 127,16; 128,10; 143,9 pseudesthai, be wrong, 134,33 pseudos, false(hood), 96,2; 100,3; 144,11; 190,18.27; 191,8.26.29; 200,9 psimuthion, white lead, 101,9 psophos, noise, 162,11 psukhê, soul, passim; see logikê (ps.), rational soul (e.g. 104,15ff.); aisthêtikê (ps.), sensitive soul (e.g. 124,35); threptikê (ps.), nutritive soul (e.g. 124,32); epithumêtikê (ps.), appetitive soul (e.g. 125,1), thumoeidês (ps.), spirited soul (e.g. 125,1), gennêtikê (ps.), generative soul (e.g. 202,8), alogos (ps.), non-rational soul (e.g. 104,16ff.); tou pantos, of the universe, 118,30ff. psukhein, cool, 106,33; 120,26 psukhikos, of the soul, 106,21; 109,17; 193,9; 200,11; 201,21; 202,7; psychic, 140,20.23.31; psukhikon, to, psychic element, 123,25 psukhogonia, account of the generation of the soul, 116,1; account of the origin of the soul, 121,10; 123,8 psukhoun, ensoul, 169,30 psukhros, (the) cold, 111,31; 180,12 pur, fire, 104,39; 105,4.8.10.12.13.14.16.17.18.19. 20.23.24; 116,31.34; 176,31; 179,17; 187,25; 188,31ff. puretos, fever, 101,4.5 purinos, fiery, 140,34 purôdes, fiery, 140,33 purpolêsis, conflagration, 120,18 Puthagoreios, Pythagorean, 117,26; 140,6 Puthagorikos, Pythagorean, 140,3 rhadios, easy, 103,33; 129,7; 136,19.27; 137,6.18.22 rhein, fleet, 166,27

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rhêma, verbal formulation, 95,26 rhêseidion, passage, 163,18 rhêtos, what is said, 92,29 rhopê, inclination, 110,17; bareia rhopê, downward tendency, 102,14 rhusis, movement, 118,2 salpinx, trumpet, 123,6 saphês, clear, 99,22; 106,18; 123,22; 124,18; 126,12; 133,25; 160,2; 163,33; 171,11 sarx, flesh, 105,29.32.37; 106,1; 149,3.21; 150,5; 151,18ff.; 152,4ff. sbennunai, quench, 120,30 seira, chord, 115,31 selênê, moon, 107,3 sêmainein, indicate, 92,34; 119,16.20.27; 120,21; 132,15; 160,23; 180,24; mean, 116,32; 149,18; note, 123,12; point out, 117,35; signify, 99,3.6; 186,32; sêmainomena, meanings, 97,4; senses, 98,6; kata poion sêmainomenon, in what sense, 97,4; kath’ ho sêmainomenon, in this sense, 97,14 sêmeion, point, 116,11; 127,23.24.25.27.29.30.33; 128,2.5.9.11.25.29.34; 129,6.7.8.12.31; 131,19.20.22.31.33; 132,3; 166,27; 170,29; 178,26 siôpan, kata to siôpômenon labein, take implicitly, 131,4 skaleuein, poke in, 116,31.34 skepasma, shelter, 133,19 skepein, hide, 117,3 skepsis, inquiry, 139,14; investigation, 139,10 skeuazein, prepare, 133,19 skhêma, shape, 107,5.13; 111,31; 139,5.7; 141,4.13.15; 139,6; 172,24; 177,2; figure, 143,7; 146,8.29 skhêmatizein, give shape, 172,24; shape, 140,34; 141,12 skhesis, position, 135,19; relation, 118,16.19; relationship, 121,8; 139,24; 153,28; 155,12.27; 178,16; 198,1.21 skhizein, carve up, 116,14; cut, 116,31.35; 117,14; divide,

116,8.31.35; 118,7; 120,5.7; 123,13.15; split, 117,16; 118,38; 119,5 skhoinos, rope, 120,38 skopos, purpose, 200,3; project, 139,13; purport, 123,2 sôma, body, passim; pakhu s., solid body, 161,14; pneumatikon s., pneumatic body, 164,11; augoeides s., luminous body, 138,9; of the universe, 192,12; element, 102,15; sômatos phusis, bodily nature, 118,11; ta ourania sômata, celestial bodies, 102,2; corporeal, 100,23; 188,21 sômatikos, corporeal, 95,30.34; 96,6; 123,26; 140,20; 172,14 sômatoeidês, bodylike, 116,18; 117,20; sômatoeidês, to, the corporeal aspect, 121,34; the corporeal nature, 124,10; the corporeal part, 120,19.34 sophia, wisdom, 117,5 sôtêria, preservation, 125,12; survival, 104,18 sôizein, to sôizesthai, preservation, 112,10 sperma, seed, 163,36 sphaira, ball, 106,10; sphere, 106,28; 107,9; 110,7; 117,23; 139,9; 174,6ff. sphairikos, spherical, 114,36; 115,12; 121,13; 139,5; 140,29.32; 141,3.8; 167,21; 168,7; 172,24; sphairikon, to, spherical part, 140,36 sphairios, spherical, 173,1 sphairos, sphere, 181,27; 182,10 spoudaios, ho, good, 104,30 stasis, being stationary, 175,18; standstill, 136,9 sterein, deprive, 109,24 stereos, stereometry, 139,9 sterêsis, privation, 94,9.11; 100,24.25; 144,27.29; 187,6ff. sterêtikos, privative, 122,7 stigmê, point, 129,28.31.32.33; 130,25; 167,22ff.; 168,28; 169,5ff.; 170,19ff.; 171,25; 172,11ff.; 174,7 stoikheion, element, 105,11.18.26.29.31.32.33.34.36; 109,2; 116,2; 121,19; 122,6;

Greek-English Index 141,29; 147,25; 149,20; 150,3ff.; 175,21; 175,27ff.; 178,12.21ff.; 181,13; 182,17ff.; 185,18; 187,3.24; 188,7; 189,5ff.; 191,7; 192,8.17; 199,10 storgê, love, 182,2 sullêpsis, reception, 197,36 sullogismos, syllogism, 128,17; 134,19.20; 136,5.11; 143,7.11.13.17; 146,8.19; 147,10.20; 148,4ff. sullogistikos, in accordance with syllogistic reasoning, 146,9 sullogizesthai, argue syllogistically, 143,32; conclude, draw conclusions, 106,21.23; 136,9; 151,26; infer, 151,1 sumbainein, follow, 150,31; be a consequence, 152,2; 169,27; 173,31; 179,25; sumbebêkenai, (be) accidental (dist. from kata sumb.), 121,36; sumbebêkenai, (be an) attribute, 134,23.24.27; sumbebêkos, accidental, 101,4.5; 179,22; accidental property, 114,4; sumbebêkos, kata, accidental, 98,1.8; accidentally, 95,32; 97,7.8.10.13.16.17.19.20.22.30; 99,12.14.29; 100,34; 101,11.14; 109,7.15.18.19.20.21.30; 110,1.2.3.5.7.8.15.17; 112,16.17.19.21.23.28.29.31.33.35. 37; 113,4.32; 114,3; 138,12.14; 154,5ff.; sumbebêkos, to, the accidental, 101,2.3.9; attribute, 160,26 sumballesthai, contribute, 104,28; 107,2; 123,16; 130,9.20 sumbolikôs, in symbolic form, 117,12; in symbolical language, 125,29; speaking symbolically, 125,27; symbolical, 122,20; symbolically, 117,8; 122,24; 125,25 sumbolikos, symbolic, 127,16 sumbolon, sign, 118,2; symbol, 116,29; 117,30.36 summarainesthai, wane along with, 161,4.5 summetaballein, change, 96,26 summetria, right proportion, 162,33; moderation, 186,32

205

summetros, being in the right proportion, 162,34; proportionate, 122,2.3 sumpaskhein, be affected along with, 161,13; 201,22 sumpatheia, sympathetic reaction, 155,28; sympathy, 121,1.8; 197,34 sumpathês, based on/standing in sympathetic reaction, 155,18; 196,24 sumperainein, conclude, 104,5; 175,5; 192,16 sumperasma, conclusion, 94,30; 95,4; 128,18.23; 134,1.19.20; 135,23; 136,11.16; 155,13; 174,16 sumperiagein, carry round with, 123,19; drive around, 137,21 sumphônein, agree, 167,29 sumphônia, agreement, 118,35; 120,13; consonance, 120,16; 142,27 sumphônos, consonant, 122,28; 123,1; in accordance, 123,2; 159,12; in agreement with itself, 122,11 sumphtheiresthai, perish together with, 164,4 sumphutos, innate, 122,27.31 sumplekein, construct, 143,7; interweave, 115,30; 117,21; 137,19.21; 138,2.3; put together, 135,9; twine, 121,14; weave together, 121,6; sumplekomena, ta, interwoven objects, 121,4 sumplêrôtikos, complementary, 98,10.12 sumplokê, combination, 143,31; 146,8; 160,24; 164,24 sumpnoia, agreement, 128,1; joint breath, 98,2 sunagein, bring to conclusion from, 128,23; come to the conclusion, 108,30; conclude, 105,9; 136,22.25; 138,2; 146,10; 180,15; draw conclusion, 136,16; 144,12; sunagon, to, that which brings together, 128,22; 136,15 sunagesthai, follow, 128,24; 144,16ff. sunaisthêsis, consciousness, 123,5 sunakmazein, gain strength/flourish along with, 160,31 sunamphoteron, composite,

206

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144,1.13; 154,29; 155.3ff.; 155,35; 156,20; 159,7; 160,15; 164,17 sunanairein, destroy together, 152,13; 198,19 sunaptein, connect, 116,9; 119,27.28; 121,4; 136,20; 179,14; touch, 116,11; sunapton, to, that which connects, 136,14; sunêmmenos, being connected, 119,11; fitted together, 120,36 sunarmozein, fit, 120,20; fit together, 116,19; 117,21; 124,11.14 sundesmos, bond, 121,5 sundiatithenai, bring into a similar condition, 158,23; 201,18 sundokein, agree, 137,25 sunekheia, continuity, 127,9; 201,22; continuous whole, 194,34 sunekhein, hold together, 153,24; 183,2ff.; 197,25; 199,15ff. sunekhês, connected to, 137,5; continuous, 125,32; 126,3.5.7.9.10.11.13.14.15.34.35; 127,2.4.5.7; 129,21; 167,33; 174,4ff.; 178,26; 196,24; sunekhes, to, continuity, 126,13.14.15.20.25.26.29.37; 127,1.9; 167,24; sunekhôs, continuously, 115,2 sunephelkein, pull along with, 121,15 sunepispan, drag along with, 137,19 sungenês, akin, 141,7; 148,8; 198,7; cognate, 126,16; of the same sort, 148,11.13 sungignôskein, recognise, 95,12.16 sungramma, writing 145,23 sunistasthai, consist, 121,18.31.36 sunkeisthai, consist, 140,22; put together, 118,23; be combined, 149,5, 153,11 sunkerannunai, blend, 121,25; fuse, 121,6 sunkhein, sunkekhumenon, to, confusion, 121,4 sunkhôrein, concede, 97,14 sunkhusis, fusion, 121,2 sunkinein, also moved, 106,12.14; (cause to) move along with, 97,19; 106,13.30; 115,28; 121,14.16; 154,7; 158,31; 199,30; move together, 114,36

sunkollan, stick together, 197,6 sunkrasis, mixture, 150,26 sunkrima, mixture, 181,24 sunkrinesthai, undergo contraction, 157,29; 180,4 sunkrisis, mixing, 107,1 sunkritikos, contracting, 188,4 sunneuein pros (eis) heauton, incline to oneself, 117,37 sunokhê, coherence, 197,23 sunousia, conversation, 145,22 sunousiousthai, share the same essence, 109,33; be substantially conjoined, 179,18ff.; united with, 121,7; sunousiômenos, in combination, 98,10.15.16; combined, 98,11 suntaxis, syntax 156,12.13.21 suntelein, contribute, 100,35; 127,28; 130,10; contribute to the perfection of, 98,32 sunthesis, combination 141,26; 146,11.21; 147,5ff.; 148,32ff.; 149,25ff.; 150,2; 151,23; 152,23ff.; 176,2ff.; constitution, 140,20 sunthetos, composite, 102,10; 105,30; 131,12.13.14; 182,5.19.21; 183,4; 189,1ff. suntithesthai, be composed of, 179,9; concur, 104,22 suntomôs, briefly, 117,30; concisely, 115,4.23 suntrekhein, accompany, 186,1; run along side, 138,22 surinx, pipe, 123,6 sustellesthai, contract, 156,28 sustêma, system, 168,3 sustolê, contraction, 157,6; 184,21 suzeugnunai, connect, 119,1 takhos, speed, 116,16 tarakhê, confusion, 136,7 tasis, tension, 141,33 tattein, order, 194,3 tauto, sameness, 119,3.21.26; 120,2; 121,26.37; 122,9.15 tautologein, say the same thing, 166,3 tautotês, sameness, 116,2.5; 119,22; 121,19 taxis, arrangement, 109,1; 126,36; position, 134,25; hierarchical position, 183,7.31; 199,2

Greek-English Index teinein, aim at, 96,10; stretch, 142,7 tekhnê, skill, 140,11.14.16 tekhnitês, craftsman 147,2 tekmairesthai, infer, 155,22 tekmêrion, evidence, 125,21; sign, 106,24 tektonikê, architect, 140,12 telein, complete, 99,17; perfect, 139,29 teleios, complete, 94,22.26.29; 163,35; perfect, 94,33; 126,20; 128,19 teleiotês, perfection, 100,28.29; 111,35.36; 193,34; completeness, 94,7 teleioun, bring to perfection, 194,3 teleutan, end, 94,24 telikos, telikê aitia, final cause, 111,26; 138,26.31.33 telos, end, 101,18.19; 133,19; 134,3; 138,29.32; 141,4; purpose, 133,11.17; 194,20 temnein, cut, 167,9ff.; cut through, 119,9 tessares, four; dia tessarôn, fourth, 177,15 tetragônos, square, 167,6ff.; 177,28ff. tetras, tetrad, 116,7; 178,16 thamnos, bush, 140,8 thateron, difference, 119,4.22.26.35; 120,3.6; 121,26.37; 122,10.15 theasthai, contemplate, 118,1 theios, divine, 118,8; 159,33; 165,8; 194,12ff.; ta theia, the divine beings, 94,18; 126,21; 150,32; the divine objects, 119,22; 162,27; things that are divine, 125,12; to theion, the divine, 102,5; 110,20; 119,18; 138,4; 188,17 thelein, to, will, 115,18 themelios, foundation, 112,18; 133,18 theôrein, consider, 98,35; contemplate, 163,24; 164,17; observe, 104,24; perceive, 114,2; see, 103,10; view, 93,30; 118,19 theôrêma, theorem, 110,30 theôrêtikos, contemplative, 194,9ff.; theôretikai noêseis, theoretical thoughts, 133,22.24.28.30; 134,18.21 theôria, contemplation, 162,27; theoretical study, 133,20; thought, 133,15.16.17;

207

praktikai theôriai, practical thoughts, 133,15 theos, ho, god, 116,1; 125,14.15.20; 181,27; 182,12; 188,16 thêrion, animal, 107,27; wild animal, 106,13; 108,13 thermainein, heat, 106,33; 120,26; 196,16 thermos, hot, 179,19; 180,12; 188,7; warm, 119,33 thermotês, heating, 101,6; emphuton thermotêta, natural heat, 186,31; thermotês phusikê, natural heat, 119,34.35 theros, summer, 119,12 thesis, position, 109,2; 148,19ff.; 166,31ff.; 168,23ff.; 169,6ff.; 171,23 thinganein, make contact with, 128,32; 130,22; touch, 127,13; 128,15.32; 129,23; 130,5.7; 131,31.32.34 thixis, contact, 128,14.29.30; 130,23.29; 131,4.17.30 thnêtos, mortal, 101,37; 125,14; 141,2.5.10; 160,6; 165,7; 181,24; 193,10ff.; 194,5ff.; duskhereia thnêtê, mortal discomfort, 101,37; 138,7 threptikos, concerned with nutrition, 186,7; 190,19; 192,26; 200,12; 202,8; nutritive, 104,31; 124,32 thumikos, thumikon, to, spirited part/faculty, 140,33; 186,20; 190,6; 191,27; 192,26; 193,19; 194,31; 199,19 thumoeidês, spirited, 124,32.35; 141,26 thumos, anger, 154,23ff.; 157,18; spirit, 104,12.15.16.18.23; 118,34; 125,4.11.18; 147,17; 190,26; 198,5ff.; 198,34; 201,13 thura, door, 108,25 thurathen, from outside, 160,25; 163,30 tiktein, give birth, 120,31 timios, precious, 183,18 tithesthai, posit, 179,29 to pothen poi, the ‘from somewhere to somewhere’, 118,4 toikhos, wall, 107,33.34; 108,1 tomê, division, 129,20.22

208

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topikos, in a spatial sense, 188,16; 196,20 topos, place, 95,14.33.35; 97,24.25.26; 99,4.13.20.22.24; 100,5.7.8.11.13.16; 101,16.18.19.21.22.28.30; 102,29.31; 103,2.15.16.18.20.21.24; 104,3; 107,6.15; 113,12.20; 147,2; 165,26 (eidôn); 170,31; space, 113,31; kata topon, in respect of place, local, 113,19.31; 114,4; 159,4; 184,19ff.; kinêsis k.t., locomotion, 154,6.20; 184,30ff.; 185,31; 195,27; en topôi, in space, 113,12; 154,9.21; local, 104,32; 107,16.17.20; 110,10.11; 113,24 trepein, (mid) change in all respects, 118,13 trias, triad, 178,13ff. triplasios, threefold, 116,15 trokhos, wheel, 106,27; 107,4.6; 121,16.17 tropikos, tropic, 120,17 tropos, fate, 137,20; manner, 136,5; solution, 108,21; way, 97,20; 100,10.27; 115,20; 121,11.12; 127,21 tunkhanein, tukhôn, arbitrary, 139,26; 168,13; chance, 150,28; 172,23; 180,9; ordinary 124,31; random, 139,30.31; 140,4.16.17; 141,16; 191,6 tuphlotês, blindness, 94,12; 100,26; 187,13 tupos, impression, 158,22 turannos, tyrant, 104,21 xêrainein, (make) dry, 120,26; 196,16 xêros, dry, 161,24; 178,6; 179,19.30ff.; 188,8 xoanon, statue, 115,3 xulinos, wooden, 114,38 xulon, wood, 116,31.35

zên, live, 192,29ff.; zên, to, life, 202,19.20 zesis, seething, 157,4 zêtein, ask, 196,8; 202,18; enquire, 98,6.15; 129,11; examine, 94,19.20; 128,33; 162,21; 194,13; look for, 107,16; raise the question/question, 108,22; 195,34; 199,4; search, 125,9; seek, 108,19; 116,26; 117,9; 155,12.13; zêtein, to, enquiry, 139,12 zêtêsis, investigation, 117,13; question, 108,20; process of searching, 136,6; seeking, 155,16 zôdiakos, of the Zodiac, 119,8; zôdiakos, to, the Zodiac, 119,27 zôdion, sign of the Zodiac, 100,12 zôê, life, 117,1.31.32; 118,2.5.6.12; 120,22.25.33; 140,31; 141,2.4.10; 159,27; 193,26; mode of life, 141,6 zôion, animal, 102,7.9.13.34; 107,32; 109,5; 114,31; 125,12; 135,2.3; 139,27; 140,10.11; 167,15; 186,28; 200,10; living being, 101,7; 104,14.18; 107,25.29; 108,15.31; 109,18.20; 110,10.13.14; 111,9; 115,8.11.12.14.19; 117,2.34; 120,31; 123,30.31; 125,20; 150,4ff.; 151,28; 152,3ff.; 154,29ff.; 164,20ff.; 166,20; 168,5; 170,22; 175,18; 177,33; 185,6; 188,29ff.; 189,10ff.; 192,29; 198,32; 201,2; 202,7ff.; organism, 25,21; life-giving, 118,3 zôiophutos, zoophyte, 184,18ff.; 185,26 zôiopoiein, cause to live/cause life, 95,21 zophos, dusk, 120,1 zôtikos, (concerned with) life, 108,8; vital, 95,20; zôtikon, to, vital aspect, 117,35 zugos, Libra, 119,28; yoke, 116,31.33

Index of Names This Index lists occurrences of names (and treatises) mentioned in the Translation only (with page and line number of the CAG edition). Names occurring in the Preface, Introduction and Notes are listed in the Subject Index. Alexander of Aphrodisias: 100,20; 102,1; 103,1; 118,28; 135,14; 151,32; 159,9; 160,7; 164,2; 182,11; 194,12; 200,3; De Anima, 159,18 Anaxagoras: 185,19 Aphrodite: 114,38; 115,3; 175,17 Aratus: 188,18 Aristotle: 92,28.30.31; 93,2.14; 94,4.16; 95,8.23.26.29; 97,14; 101,35; 102,2; 103,3; 108,30; 111,11; 114,23; 116,22.26; 122,25; 123,14; 124,22.24; 127,2.18; 128,19; 129,26; 138,3.21; Categories, 94,11; 148,26; Eudemus, 142,5; 144,23; 145,9.24; 147,8; Meteorologica, 139,33; On Coming to Be and Perishing, 180,8; On Demonstration, 134,10; On the Movement of Animals, 157,21; On the Parts of Animals, 140,19; 157,21; On Philosophy, 186,25; Physics, 92,31; 94,19; 96,24; 98,21; 99,18.22; 100,11; 167,32; On Philosophy, 186,25 Daedalus: 114,37; 115,1 Democritus: 96,16; 105,19; 108,36; 114,34; 115,4.23.27.29; 121,12; 154,3.4; 167,20.23; 168,8.11; 172,5.31; 173,4.9.10.11.15.30; 185,19 Empedocles: 140,6; 150,2.25.35; 151,3.5; 176,5.31; 181,23.24 Epicurus: 114,35; 143,4.9.32; 144,10

Hephaestus: 176,26.27; 177,34; 178,4 Heracles, stone of: 198,31 Introductions (Porphyry): 101,2 Ionic (scale): 147,18 Ixion: 121,16; 137,20 Leucippus: 114,34 Lyceum: 98.25 Lydian (scale): 147,18.21.26.29 Magnes (stone): 120,29 Onomacritus: 186,26 Orpheus: 186,24; Orphic poems, 186,22.23 Peripatetics: 100,20; 101,37; 102,1 Philip (comic poet): 114,37 Phrygian (scale): 147,18.21.26.29 Plato: 92,27.30; 95,9.15.18.19.20.21.23.25; 96,10.12.19; 100,1; 111,15; 114,19.25.35; 115,24; 116,23; 117,26.28; 118,9; 121,17.18.20; 124,2; 137,26.27; 138,19; 139,5; 140,26; 143,3; 144,10.22; 165,18; Laws, 96,13; Phaedo, 142,5; 145,14; Phaedrus, 96,13; 114,19; 140,28; 141,10; Timaeus, 115,12.25; 121,11.14.17; 123,34; 125,28; 127,13; 139,15; 140,28; 176,7 Plotinus: 138,33 Pythagoreans: 116,29ff.; 117,25; 122,5; 140,6.7; 146,5; 176,33; 186,2

210

Index of Names

Simmias: 145,14.15 Stoics: 188,20 Thales: 188,16.17 Thersites: 145,6 Timaeus: 115,30.31; 116,21; 117,34; 121,10.23; 123,12.17.18; 124,17; 127,8; 132,10.14; 138,3.26; 139,15; 154,4.14; 194,29; 196,20; 197,30

Xenocrates: 165,18; 167,20.26; 168,8ff.; 168,11ff.; 169,4; 171,17; 172,4.13; 173,4.11.15.20; 174,22; 175,2 Zeus: 188,19

Subject Index This Index is complementary to the English-Greek Glossary and is restricted to the Preface, Introduction and Notes. It does not cover the Translation, which can be searched by using the English-Greek Glossary and the Greek-English Index in combination with one another; and it lists only those discussions in the Preface, Introduction and Notes that cannot be found through the Translation. References are to the page and note numbers in this volume. Academy, early: 140 n.263 Alexander of Aphrodisias: viii, ix, 131 nn.53.58, 132 n.81; cardiocentrism of: 3 Alexandrian anatomists: 138 n.226 alteration: 130 n.17 Ammonius: vii, 4 animals: 135 n.179 Aratus: 143 n.332 Aristotle, On Philosophy: 136 n.185; on bodily factors involved in cognitive processes: 2 atoms: 130 n.36, 140 n.268 balance: 142 n.316 blood: 145 n.371; quality of: 2 blood vessels: 144 n.370 body, influence on soul: 2, 137 n.221 brain: viii, 1-2, 138 n.226, 145 n.371; damage to: 1; cavities of: 3 carbide: 134 n.129 cardiocentrism: 3 cataracts: 139 n.247 Cicero: 136 n.183 consonance: 141 n.293 contributory cause: 3 cross-referencing: 144 nn.354.367 David: ix Democritus: 129 n.1, 130 n.36, 140 n.268; 141 nn.280.285 demonstration: 135 n.155 desire: 145 n.371

determinism: 1 dianoia: 2, 137 n.221; as distinct from nous: 137 n.221 Dicaearchus: vii, 136 n.182 Diogenes of Apollonia: 141 n.280 discursive thinking: 2 doctors: 1, 142 n.316 dyad: 141 n.299 elements: 129 n.1, 142 n.308 Elias: ix ellampsis: 144 n.356 Empedocles: 141 n.292, 242 nn.308ff.; four element theory: 135 n.170 Epicurus: vii, 136 n.193 etymology: 141 n.298 flesh: 3 force, movement by: 131 n.56 formulae (logoi) of things: 3, 132 n.83 Galen: vii, 2, 132 n.81, 136 n.182, 138 n.226, 144 n.369 Galenic medicine: 1-3 harmonia: 131 n.41, 136 nn.181.186 harmony, soul as: 140 n.264 heart: 144 n.358 heavenly bodies: 138 n.221 heavens: ix, 131 n.63 Heraclitus: 141 n.280 illumination: 3, 134 n.126, 144 n.371, 145 n.371

212

Subject Index

imagination: 3, 138 n.226; use in concept formation: 143 n.326 immortality, of rational soul: 144 n.367 intellect: 2; active: viii intellectual performance: 3 intelligence, degrees of: 139 n.231 krasis: 135 n.177 leptomerês: 129 n.1 liver: 145 n.371 localisation, of cognitive functions: viii, 3, 138 n.226, 144 n.358 Love (Emp.): 142 n.308 luminous body: 3, 135 n.162 magnet: 144 n.366 material cause: 3 materialism: 1 medical experiments: 138 n.226 medical theory: 144 n.370 medicinal plants: 134 n.132 medicine, Philoponus’ awareness of: 1ff. membrane-protector: 144 n.369 memory: 2-3, 138 n.226; quality of: 139 n.231 mixture, of the body: 1-3, 134 n.131 Moerbeke, William of: 133 n.104 movement, according/contrary to: 131 n.56, 132 n.74 nature, as distinct from soul: ix nature, movement according/contrary to: 131 n.56, 132 n.74 Nemesius of Emesa: 1, 3, 138 n.226 nerves: viii, 144 nn.369.370; blockage of: 1 nervous system: 3 non-rational soul: 139 n.235, 144 n.371 nous, as distinct from dianoia: 2, 137 n. 221 number, self-moving: 140 n.261 number theory: 141 n.292 octave: 141 n.294 Olympiodorus: ix Onomacritus: 143 n.323 Orphism: 143 n.323 particles: viii

Peripatetics: ix Philoponus, Against Proclus: ix; Against Aristotle: ix; On the Creation of the World: ix; On Arist. Physics: 131 n.56; On Arist. Meteor.: 131 n.56; Prooemium to in DA: 3 physiognomy: 136 n.179 planets: 133 n.121 Plato, on self-movement of the soul: vii, 129 n.5; Phaedo: 136 n.182; unwritten doctrines: 140 n.266 Platonism: 2, 131 n.56 Plotinus: 131 n.61 pneuma: 2-3, 131 n.41, 139 n.235 pneumatic body: 3, 152 n.313 Posidonius of Byzantium: 3, 138 n.226 Proclus: vii protheôria: ix Pythagoreans: vii, 133 n.110, 135 n.170, 141 n.292 rational soul: 139 n.260 reasoning: 3, 138 n.226 recollection: 139 n.234; learning as: 136 n.187 regimen: 2 reincarnation: 143 n.323 residues: 3 ruling part of the soul: 144 n.358 self-movement of the soul: vii, 129 n.1 senses: 145 n.371 Simmias: 136 n.182 Simplicius: ix; (pseudo-)Simplicius: viii skhesis: 3 skin, delicacy of: 3 Socrates: 134 n.148 solid body: 3, 152 n.313 spirit: 145 n.371 St Augustine: 1, 138 n.226 stars, fixed: 133 n.121 Stephanus of Alexandria: ix, 1 Stoicism: 140 n.264 Strife (Emp.): 142 n.308 summetria (right proportion): 137 n.221 sumpatheia: 3, 139 n.250, 144 n.362 supervenience: 136 n.185 symbolic, interpretation: vii; teaching: 133 n.110

Subject Index

213

Themistius: viii thumoeidês: 135 n.178 triad: 141 n.299 tripartition, of the soul: 143 n.339

vivisectory experiments: 3, 144 n.369

unity, of the soul, 144 n.360 universe: 143 n.329

Xenocrates: viii, 129 n.1, 140 nn.261.263

vegetative soul: 139 n.260 visual ray: 143 n.328

Zabarella: 131 n.56 Zodiac: 133 n.121

will, free: 129 n.5, 133 n.96 world soul: viii

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Index of Passages This Index lists the passages cited in the Preface, the Introduction and the Notes to the Translation (the lemmas of Aristotle’s DA as cited in the Translation itself are not included). References are to the page and note numbers of this volume. AETIUS OF AMIDA

Libri Medicinales 6.2 (CMG VIII 2, p. 125 Olivieri): 138 n.226

ALEXANDER

de Anima 15,10: viii; 15,26-16,4: 139 n.241; 24-5: 136 n.182; 89,4-18: 139 n.240 Quaestiones 46,22-47,27 Bruns: 131 n.53 de Mundo 17-19: ix

ANAXAGORAS

Fragmenta DK 59 A 99: 142 n.320; DK 61 A 101: 142 n.320

ARISTOTLE

Analytica Posteriora 72b7ff.: 135 n.157; 89b7: 138 n.221 Analytica Priora 32a18: 140 n.274 de Anima 1: 140 n.261; 402b25-403a11: 140 n.287; 403a16: 1; 403b25-7: 129 n.1; 403b31ff.: 130 n.36, 140 n.268, 141 n.278; 404a25ff.: 142 n.320; 404b11ff.: 135 n.170; 404b13: 142 n.306, 142 n.311; 404b18-25: 140 n.261; 404b24: 140 n.265; 405a21-9: 141 n.280; 405b11-12: 129 n.1; 406a26f.: 140 n.287; 406b11ff.: 133 n.96; 406b15-25: 141 n.278; 406b11-15: 131 n.53; 406b15-25: 140 n.285; 407a2: 134 n.137; 407b5: 137 n.220; 407b18: 129 n.1; 408b13-15: 137 n.221; 408b28-30: 140 n.261; 408b32ff.: 129 n.1, 140 n.278; 408b33ff.: 141 n.279; 409a10ff.: 140 n.283; 409a15: 140 n.284; 409a15f.: 140 n.286; 409a32: 129

n.1, 140 n.270; 409b4-7: 142 n.309; 409b18: 129 n.1; 409b23: 129 n.1; 410a15: 141 n.301; 2.1: 141 n.300; 412a27-8: 143 n.346; 412b6: 144 n.365; 413a4: 143 n.347; 413a6-7: 143 n.348; 413a8: 139 n.242, 143 n.349; 413a8-9: viii; 413b24: 143 n.351; 2.4: 144 n.359; 415b24: 130 n.17; 416a32: 142 n.303; 416b34: 130 n.17; 416a14: 3; 417a22ff.: 130 n.18; 417b5ff.: 130 n.17; 418a1-3: 130 n.17; 421a22ff.: 2; 428b3: 132 n.84; 429a5-8: 2; 3.4: 130 n.8; 429a27: 130 n.9, 140 n.263; 429a27-8: 130 n.8; 429a27-9: 140 n.264; 429a30-b2: 139 n.251; 430a1: 130 n.10; 3.5: viii; 430a15-17: 130 n.5; 431a5: 130 n.17; 431b29: 140 n.291; 432a2: 140 n.264; 3.9-11: 129 n.1; 433a15: 144 n.353 de Caelo 284a14: 131 n.57 Categoriae 2a11: 137 n.208; 13a33: 130 n.21 Ethica Nicomachea 1110a1-3: 132 n.73; 3.1: 132 n.73 de Generatione Animalium 736b27: 139 n.257; 737a25: 2; 744b21ff.: 139 n.257; 767b10ff.: 2; 772b30ff.: 2; 776a15ff.: 2; 780a8-14: 139 n.251; 780b10: 2 de Generatione et Corruptione 323b1ff.: 142 n.302; 323b18ff.: 142 n.304 Historia Animalium 487b6-9: 142

216

Index of Passages

n.318; 588b12: 142 n.318; 621b3: 142 n.318 de Insomniis 458b28: 132 n.84; 459b9-11: 139 n.251; 459b20-2: 139 n.251; 460b18-20: 132 n.84; 461a25-b7: 139 n.232; 461b19ff.: 139 n.237; 462a29-30: 139 n.237 de Interpretatione 16a4-5: 134 n.152; 23a23: 130 n.23 de Iuventute 469a5ff.: 144 n.358 de Motu Animalium 701b17-18: 130 n.17 Metaphysica 992b18-993a10: 141 n.301; 1045a23ff.: 144 n.364; 1048b28-35: 130 n.22; 1069b9-14: 130 n.12; 1070a21-b10: 141 n.301; 1072a26ff.: 131 n.60; 1072b3: ix; 1073a34ff.: 130 n.23; 1088a22-34: 141 n.301; 12: ix Meteorologica 387b25: 135 n.169; 389a7: 135 n.169 de Partibus Animalium 641b6: 130 n.17; 648a2ff.: 2; 2.3-4: 144 n.358; 650b19ff.: 2; 653b5: 2; 672b28ff.: 2; 681b34: 142 n.318; 683b8: 142 n.318 de Philosophia fr. 26 Gigon: 143 n.322 Physica 201a10-11: 130 n.6; 201b31-3: 130 n.22; 3.3: 130 n.24; 211a12-b5: 131 n.49; 211b11-15: 131 n.51; 212a2-7: 131 n.51; 212a20-1: 131 n.51; 212b10: 130 n.52; 4.11: 130 n.25; 219a1-10: 130 n.25; 219b5-7: 141 n.281; 225a34ff.: 130 n.11, 131 n.43; 225b2: 130 n.13; 229a31: 130 nn.11.13; 229b14: 130 n.11; 234b10ff.: 131 n.50; 251b11ff.: 130 n.25; 8.5: 130 n.37; 256a9ff.: 130 n.39; 257a14-25: 130 n.37; 257a25-31: 130 n.38; 257b2: 140 n.272 de Somno 456a1ff.: 144 n.358; 456b1: 144 n.358 AUGUSTINE

De Genesi ad litteram 7.17(23)-18(24): 138 n.226

DAMASCIUS

in Phaedonem Commentarius 2.2, 58-60 (p. 319 Westerink): 136 n.193

de Principiis p. 80 Ruelle: 140 n.266 DEMOCRITUS

Fragmenta DK 67 A 28: 140 n.268

DIOGENES LAERTIUS

8.77: 135 n.170

EMPEDOCLES

Fragmenta DK 31 B 27,4: 142 n.310; DK 31 B 28,2: 142 n.310; DK 31 B 29,3: 142 n.310; DK 31 B 96: 140 n.290; DK 31 B 109: 137 n.215; DK 31 B117: 135 n.170

GALENUS

Quod animi mores 64,19-65,1 (4.805 K.): 2

HIPPOCRATES

Epidemiae 6.5.1 (5.314 L.): 132 n.88 de Victu 4.87 (6.642 L.): 129 n.2

HIPPOLYTUS

Refutatio omnium heresium 1.3: 135 n.170

HOMER

Iliad 2.212-20: 136 n.196; 12.239f.: 133 n.123 Odyssey 20.18: 139 n.255

IAMBLICHUS

de Mysteriis 5.26: 131 n.41

NEMESIUS

de Natura Hominis (ed. Morani) 34,5-11: 134,127; 69,17-71,4: 138 n.226

ORPHICA

DK 1 B 11: 143 n.323; DK 2 A 5: 143 n.323; fr. 223 Kern: 143 n.323; fr. 226 Kern: 143 n.323; fr. 228a Kern: 143 n.323

PHILOPONUS

de Aeternitate Mundi contra Aristotelem fr. 49: ix de Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum 492,26-493,5: ix in Aristotelis de Anima commentaria 1,1-4: vii; 1,10ff.: 131 n.68; 1,16: 143 n.328; 2,2-3: 138 n.223; 2,2-4: 130 n.26; 2,21: 132 n.69; 4,1-2: 134 n.153; 4,2-4: 135 n.154; 5,5: 136 n.187; 5,7-14: 132 n.85; 5,25: 132 n.70; 5,34ff.: 131 n.68; 5,35: 132 n.69; 6,11: 132 n.71, 135 n.178; 7,19: 132 n.72; 8,16ff.: 144 n.354; 8,17-35: 133 n.119; 8,22: 144 n.362; 8,26:

Index of Passages 139 n.255; 9,3ff.: 143 n.343; 9,23: 136 n.182; 6,11: 143 n.339; 10,1-3: 139 n.240; 10,8: 139 n.235, 139 n.248; 10,19-11,29: 144 n.367; 11,29ff.: 143 n.344; 12,16ff.: 143 n.341; 12,18: 139 n.235, 139 n.248; 14,5ff.:132 n.80; 14,31-2: 139 n.253; 15,12: 139 n.235, 139 n.248; 15,12ff.: 139 n.257; 16,3ff.: 141 n.300; 17,17ff.: 139 n.235, 142 n.313; 18,4ff.: 144 n.362; 18,18: 129 n.5; 18,27-31: 135 n.162; 18,37: 139 n.235, 139 n.248; 19,2-6: 144 n.371; 19,3: 144 n.356; 19,7-15: 138 n.226; 19,8ff.: 4, 144 n.369; 19,29-31: 2; 19,34-5: 139 n.252; 24,26: 130 n.14; 32,33: 140 n.261; 33,8: 141 n.300; 34,16: 130 n.23; 35,25-6: 136 n.182; 44,11: 140 n.261; 48,20: 137 n.221; 50,3ff.: 135 n.160; 50,16-52,25: 1; 50,24: 135 n.177; 50,31ff.: 136 n.182; 50,31-2ff.: 142 n.316; 51,3-7: 138 n.226, 139 n.231; 51,4-7: 2; 51,7-8: 2; 51,31-2: 138 n.227; 51,35-52,4: 143 n.344; 51,37: 136 n.189; 56,28: 134 n.149, 140 n.264; 58,10ff.: 143 n.326; 58,22: 136 n.187; 1.2: 129 n.3; 65,37-8: 135 n.161; 66,11: ix; 66,11-13: 135 n.163, 135 n.168; 66,19-21: 129 n.3; 67,5ff.: 130 n.36; 67,12ff.: 141 n.282; 67,14-16: 129 n.3; 69,28: 133 n.109; 70,7: 137 n.202; 70,8-10: 136 n.181; 71,7-14: 129 n.3; 71,13: 140 n.261; 73,22: 133 n.109, 140 n.292; 73,31: 135 n.170; 75,34: 143 n.322; 76,2ff.: 140 n.265; 77,5ff.: 140 n.266; 78,11-12: 138 n.223; 80,15: 140 n.265; 81,25: 140 n.261; 81,28-9: 129 n.3; 83,2-3: 129 n.3; 83,12ff.: 132 n.75; 83,17-18: 129 n.3; 84,14-19: 129 n.3; 86,30-1: 143 n.331; 87,2ff.: 141 n.280; 88,11: 129 n.3; 89,16-17: 4, 144 n.370; 1.3: 142 n.316; 92,25-6: 130 n.33; 95,5-6: 130 n.27; 95,15: 133 n.97; 95,23: 133 n.97; 96,9: 129 n.4; 96,10: vii; 96,10ff.: 133 n.97; 96,31: vii;

217

100,16-101,8: 132 n.95; 101,25-103,10: 131 n.55; 101,37-102,4: ix; 102,5: 135 n.166; 102,9-21: ix, 131 n.58; 104,10ff.: 3; 104,24-30: 143 n.344; 106,3-18: 132 n.76; 107,24-109: 132 n.79; 107,26ff.: 133 n.100; 111,5: 3; 113,14: 132 n.92; 114,23f.: 133 n.96; 114,24ff.: 133 n.96; 114,38: 140 n.288; 115,3: 140 n.288; 115,31-120,33: 133 n.104; 116,4: 134 n.142; 116,21ff.: vii; 116,21-117,30: 133 n.106; 116,26: vii; 117,26: vii; 117,27: 140 n.262; 117,34-118,28: 133 n.120; 118,1-5: 135 n.175; 118,35: 134 n.125; 119,24-6: 135 n.168; 120,23: 3; 120,29-121,9: 134 n.128; 121,10: ix; 121,21ff.: 134 n.142; 122,17f.: 134 n.142; 122,19-26: vii; 123,18-21: 134 n.141; 124,2-26: vii; 124,25: ix; 125,30: vii; 126,3: 129 n.4; 126,31: 134 n.124; 126,32: 140 n.264; 128,1: 131 n.41; 135,4-5: 135 n.155; 138,5: 142 n.316; 138,7: viii; 138,9: 3; 138,10-139,9: 135 n.168; 141,22-153,34: vii; 141,26ff.: 143 n.339; 141,26-8: 143 n.338; 141,28-30: 137 n.218; 1.4: 142 n.316; 143,4ff.: vii; 144,30ff.: 137 n.205; 146,11: 135 n.177; 146,26: 135 n.177; 149,18: 137 n.212; 149,31: 137 n.212; 154,1ff.: vii; 155,4ff.: 2; 155,4-156,32: viii; 155,5-35: 139 n.260; 155,11-14: 130 n.26; 155,18: 139 n.250; 155,22: 136 n.179; 155,28: 3; 155,28ff.: 144 n.362, 144 n.369, 144 n.370; 155,28-9: 139 n.230; 155,28-35: 3; 155,30-2: 139 n.231; 155,33ff.: 135 n.160; 155,33-4: 142 n.316; 156,30-1: 137 n.221; 157,6-9: 2; 158,12: 3; 159,5ff.: 143 n.352; 159,9: viii; 161,21: 3; 162,34: 2, 137 n.221, 142 n.316; 164,4: 139 n.259; 164,13: 2, 137 n.221, 142 n.316; 165,18: viii; 165,23: 134 n.149; 172,4: viii; 175,23ff.: viii; 176,25ff.: 135 n.170;

218

Index of Passages 181,23-184,14: 142 n.309; 183,27-34: 1; 183,30-4: 2; 184,1ff.: viii; 186,25ff.: 144 n.374; 189,11: 143 n.336; 192,13ff.: viii; 194,1: viii; 194,1ff.: viii; 194,12-19: 139 n.240; 194,27: 3; 195,10-11: 3; 196,24: 3; 198,23-5: 133 n.119; 200,2: 3; 200,7-201,32: 145 n.372; 201,1ff.: viii; 201,3ff.: 3; 200,10: 145 n.373; 224,28-37: viii, 143 n.349; 229,29-32: 138 n.221; 238,29-35: 138 n.226, 144 n.370; 239,3ff.: 139 n.248; 258,36-259,2: 138 n.221; 260,18-25: 138 n.221; 332,12-27: viii; 338,16ff.: 3; 422,11: ix; 424,4: ix; 424,13: ix

(PS.?-) PHILOPONUS

in De Anima 3 466,18-29: 139 n.254 de Intellectu 4,70-83: 139 n.240; 13,95-9: 139 n.244; 17,11-16: 139 n.251; 19,65-20,88: 137 n.221; 21,11-14: 131 n.40; 24,60-5: 135 n.162; 83,42-4: 134 n.148; 111-112,67-8: 134 n.149 in Aristotelis Physica commentaria 195,24-32: 132 n.82; 691,8-17: 132 n.82; 771,21-772,3: viii de Opificio Mundi 28,20-29,9: ix

PLATO

Epistulae 2, 314A2-5: 133 n.107 Leges 653A7-9: 139 n.245; 790D-791B: vii; 894D-896B: vii; 895E10-896A4: 130 n.35 Meno 71A5-7: 129 n.4 Phaedrus 245C-246A: vii; 245C5: 130 n.34; 245C5-246A1: 130 n.28; 245C7: 130 n.30; 245E2-4: 132 n.95; 246Bff.: 133 n.122, 135 n.171; 249B: 135 n.176 Phaedo 85Eff.: 137 n.199; 91E4: 136 n.187; 92A6ff.: 136 n.184; 93B1ff.: 136 n.190; 93C3ff.: 136 n.191; 93E2ff.: 136 n.192; 94Bff.: 143 n.345; 94B3ff.: 136 n.188 Republic 434-41: 144 n.361; 442C: 144 n.361; 444B: 144 n.361 Timaeus 28A4-6: 137 n.216; 33B: 135 n.167; 35Aff.: 133 n.104; 35A1-4: 134 n.136; 35Bff.: 140 n.289; 35B4-C2: 133 n.112; 36A2-5: 133 n.103; 36B6-7: 133

n.111; 36B7-8: 133 n.121; 36C-D: vii; 36C4: 133 n.113; 36D9-E3: 133 n.114; 40A: vii; 41D4ff.: 134 n.147; 41D-42A: vii; 43A-44B: vii; 44D: vii; 44Dff.: 135 n.172; 68C: 144 n.361; 69Dff.: 144 n.355; 70Aff.: 135 n.173; 71Aff.: 135 n.174; 91E-92A: vii PLOTINUS

2.2.1: 131 n.61, 135 n.165; 2.3.7: 131 n.42; 3.6.1-3: 131 n.53; 3.7.11,35-6: 138 n.221; 4.7.50-2: 136 n.182; 5.5.3,23-9: 138 n.221

PORPHYRY

Isagoge p. 12,24-13,5 Busse: 131 n.54 Sententiae 41: 139 n.254

PROCLUS

Elementatio Theologiae 17: 133 n.96; 177: 134 n.149; 189: 140 n.266 in Timaeum 2, 244,12-19: 133 n.117; 2, 284,21-4: 133 n.115; 3, 330,9-331,1: vii; 3, 341,4-342,2: vii; 3, 349-50: 139 n.249

PYTHAGORAS

DK 58 C 2, 3, 4: 133 n.110

SIMPLICIUS

in Aristotelis de Caelo commentaria 78,12-79,14: ix; 380,29-381,2: ix; 387,12-19: ix in Aristotelis Physica commentaria 129,1-7: ix; 286,20-287,25: ix; 300,21ff.: 140 n.290

(PS.?-)SIMPLICIUS

in Aristotelis de Anima commentaria 61,23ff.: 140 n.263; 68,5-14: 140 n.292; 68,13-4: 140 n.298; 70,8: 142 n.307; 72,10-16: 143 n.324; 96,3-10: viii; 173,3-7: 139 n.254

STOICI

Fragmenta (SVF) 2.1027: 143 n.333; 2.1052: 143 n.333

THALES

DK 11 A 22: 143 n.330

THEMISTIUS

in Aristotelis de Anima paraphrasis 14,29: 129 n.2; 20,25-6: 134 n.146; 43,30-5: viii

XENOCRATES

Fragmenta (Isnardi Parente) 197: 140 n.261; 198: 140 n.269; 209: 140 n.277