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On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle
 9789004083080, 9004083081

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ON INTUITION AND DISCURSIVE REASONING IN ARISTOTLE

PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA A SERIES OF STUDIES ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY EDITED BY

W. J. VERDENIUS

AND

J. C. M. VAN WIND EN

VOLUME XLVI

V ICTOR KAL

ON INTUITION AND DISCURSIVE REASONING IN ARISTOTLE

ON INTUITION AND DISCURSIVE REASONING IN ARISTOTLE BY

VICTOR KAL

E.J. BRILL

LEIDEN • NEW YORK • K0BENHAVN • KOLN 1988

The publication of this book has been made possible by a grant from the Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kal, Victor. On intuition and discursive reasoning in Aristotle. (Philosophia antiqua, ISSN 0079-1687; v. 46) Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. I. Aristotle- Views on reasoning. 2. Reasoning. 3. Intuition. I. Title. II. Series. B491.R4K35 1987 121 '.3 87-18309 ISBN 90-04-08308-1 (pbk.)

ISSN 0079-1687 ISBN 90 04 08308 1

© Copyright 1988 by E. ]. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publisher PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS BY E. j. BRILL

CONTENTS Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 9

Part One INTUITION AND DISCURSIVE REASONING IN ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL WORKS

I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X.

Syllogism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proposition and premiss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dialectic and demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forms of dialectic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The dialectical syllogism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . The demonstrative syllogism .. .... ..... ... ............. .... ... .. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Experience and intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Controversies about induction, experience, and intuition

17 18 21 22 23 27 31 35 44 54

Part Two ARISTOTLE'S EPISTEMOLOGY

I. Logic, epistemology, and psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. Epistemology in Aristotle's psychological work . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61 64

Part Three ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY OF COGNITION

I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII.

Cognition as the object of psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Psychology of sensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Psychology of the imagination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De anima I and II on the mind ...... ........ ... ..... ... ... ... ... The psychology of intellective cognition in De anima III 4 Problems concerning intellective cognition in De anima III 4 The mind in De anima III 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67 68 70 73 77 81 84

6

CONTENTS

VIII. The human soul and the divine mind. The mind in De generatione animalium II 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX. Controversies. The history of the interpretation of De anima III 4 and 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes to the text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

110 114 179 184

91

ABBREVIATIONS Note. If the bibliography contains only one work by a certain author, and

if a certain work in the bibliography is marked with an asterisk, the author is referred to in the notes by name only. In other cases additional information is given, usually a date. Aristotle's works are referred to by their titles only, these being abbreviated as follows: Cat. De int. An.Pr. An. Post. Top. S.E. De gen. et corr. Phys. De an. De sensu De mem. De part. an. De gen. an. Met. E.N. Pol. Rhet.

Categoriae De interpretatione Analytica Priora A nalytica Posteriora Topic a Sophistici Elenchi De generatione et corruptione Physica De anima De sensu et sensibilibus De memoria et reminiscentia De partibus animalium De generatione animalium Metaphysica Ethica Nicomachea Politica Rhetorica

INTRODUCTION Aristotle lived from 384 to 322 BC. The interpretation of his work, which starts with his pupil Theophrastus, is by no means concluded today, more than two millennia later. Scholars have failed to reach agreement on important issues. One of these is the question of what role Aristotle assigns to induction. 1 Moreover, some parts of Aristotle's work are still felt to be somewhat cryptical. The most famous and arguably most important example of these is his exposition on the mind in De anima III 5. 2 In the following study I shall attempt to arrive at a closer understanding of several widely discussed, but persistently difficult chapters in Aristotle's work. The subject of this study is intuition and discursive reasoning in Aristotle. We will be concerned with the distinction between intuition and discursive reasoning and with the relation which Aristotle establishes between both. It is not unusual to distinguish between intuition and discursive reasoning with regard to Aristotle. This distinction plays a role in wellknown studies by, for instance, Hamelin, Le Blond, Ross, Oehler, and Von Fritz. 3 The terms 'intuition' and 'discursive reasoning' are actually used in these studies. The term 'intuition' in this context has nothing to do with introspection or any such notion. Nor should intuition as it is discussed here be regarded as a kind of instinct or as an extraordinary type of intuitive faculty . The term 'intuition' serves here to translate a Greek word which also signifies 'mind'. 4 The term 'intuition' indicates an important function of the mind: the mind inasmuch as it can have insight or cognition. This is the knowing mind. On other occasions Aristotle uses the same Greek word in a less specific sense to indicate broadly the human mind in all its functions. 5 Besides intuition, these include the function of discursive activity. The discursive mind is the mind inasmuch as it reasons, argues, or orders; it is the thinking mind. Sometimes Aristotle uses a special Greek word to indicate the thinking mind, other times he does not. 6 By the distinction between intuition and discursive reasoning, therefore, we mean the distinction between knowing and thinking, between the view which the mind has cast upon the world and the reasoning, arguing activity of the mind. Our aim is to bring out in full relief the distinction which Aristotle makes between intuition and discursive reasoning and to draw in a consistent manner the line which separates one from the other in his work. Our main resource will be to

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INTRODUCTION

determine precisely what relation, in Aristotle's vtew, exists between both. We approach the subject of our enquiry by investigating the forms of argumentation and reasoning which Aristotle distinguishes. These forms of discursive reasoning can also be called procedures of thought; the works in which Aristotle discusses these procedures are regarded as his logical works. 7 Hence the first part of this study is entitled: 'Knowing and thinking in Aristotle's logical works'. Our enquiry into the forms of discursive reasoning distinguished by Aristotle begins where he himself begins his logical expositions, namely at the syllogism, i.e an argument or chain of reasoning consisting of a pair of premisses 18-20: cruHoyLcrfLo21-23; and esp. I 10, 104a8-11: Ea'tt oE 1tp61:oto-t