On Aristotle Physics 2 9781472558039, 1472558030

Table of contents :
Introduction --
Translator's note --
Departures from Vitelli's Text --
Translation: On Aristotle Physics 2 --
Appendix: The commentators
English-Greek Glossary
Greek-English index
Subject index.

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Philoponus On Aristotle Physics 2

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Philoponus On Aristotle Physics 2 Translated by A. R. Lacey

B L O O M S

B U R Y

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www.bloomsbury.com Bloomsbury is a registered trade mark of Bloomsbury Publishing Pic First published in 1993 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. Paperback edition first published 2014 ©Arthur Madigan (Appendix, Richard Sorabji), 1993 Arthur Madigan has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN HB: 978-0-7156-2433-3 PB: 978-1-4725-5803-9 ePDF: 978-1-4725-0181-3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Ack now ledgements The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University. The general editor further wishes to thank W.E. Dooley and R. Sharpies for their comments on the translation and Dirk Baltzly Ian Crystal and P Opperman for their help in preparing the volume for press.

Typeset by Ray Davies Printed and bound in Great Britain

Contents Introduction

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Translator's Note

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Departures from Vitelli's Text

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Translation: On Aristotle Physics 2

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Notes

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Appendix: the commentators

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Bibliography

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Indexes English-Greek Glossary Greek-English Index Subject Index

201 201 221 229

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Introduction Richard Sorabji Book 2 of Aristotle's Physics is often regarded as offering the best introduction for a student to Aristotle's work. Reasonably so. The subject matter is gripping, and the book explains some of Aristotle's central concepts. It comprises the following topics: Ch. 1. What is nature and how does it differ from artifice? Ch. 2. How does the study of nature differ from mathematics? Chs 3 and 7. The four basic types of explanation: formal, final, efficient and material. Chs 4 to 6. Is chance something real? What is it? Ch. 8. Can nature be explained by chance, necessity and natural selection, or is it purposive? Ch. 9. What sort of necessity is found in nature? As a Neoplatonist, Philoponus does not hesitate to criticise Aristotle, for example over one of his proofs of the purposiveness of nature, or again on his objections, construed in one way, to Plato's treatment of the forms. He also introduces views of his own. He offers, for example, his own definition of nature, which is full of ideas that are Stoic (nature holds things together, sunekhein), or Neoplatonist (nature is a life, which descends into bodies, and moulds or manages). He further distinguishes universal nature (katholou, holos, holike), which allows no evil in the universe, from the particular (merikos) natures of particular things, which may indeed suffer, although this does not harm the universe as a whole. 1

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310,5. 225,4ff. 197,30-198,6; cf. 206,7, discussed by J . E . McGuire, Thiloponus on Physics 2.1, phusis, horme emphutos and the motion of simple bodies', Ancient Philosophy 5,1985, 241-67; E . M . Macierowski and R.F. Hassing, 'John Philoponus on Aristotle's definition of nature', Ancient Philosophy 8, 1988, 73-100. I do not see these ideas as particularly Christian, as I say below, nor as all Stoic. 201,10-19; 296,4-5, discussed by Michael Wolff, Fallgesetz und Massebegriff, Berlin, 1971. 1

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This is connected with his idea of the providence of nature. Aristotle had not much stressed the idea of providence, but in response to the Stoics who did, later Aristotelians had already had to insist that providence, divine providence, was allowed for in the Aristotelian system. Philoponus, like all Neoplatonists, takes the very un-Aristotelian view that the soul can survive death disembodied. He also tells us of two extra types of explanation recognised by Neoplatonists, besides Aristotle's four. There were the Platonic forms which served as paradigms for the creation of the world, and there was the matter which served as the instrument for that creation. (Elsewhere it is often the soul that serves as the Platonists' instrumental cause.) Although Aristotle leaves out two of the Platonic modes of explanation, Philoponus seeks to harmonise Aristotle with Plato by explaining the omission away. The Neoplatonist attempt to harmonise Plato and Aristotle was carried to great lengths by Philoponus' teacher Ammonius. But it may be a sign that Philoponus is already distancing himself from Ammonius, and indeed from Neoplatonism in general, when in another passage he recognises that Aristotle is actually attacking Plato for treating forms as separable from the physical world. Indeed, Philoponus goes further. He is willing to discuss whether it is Aristotle or the Platonists who are wrong, and his decision in the end seems to be that it is the Platonists, or 'those who postulate the Forms'. Although steeped in Neoplatonism, Philoponus broke away in AD 529, in a treatise directed against the great Neoplatonist Proclus, the teacher of Ammonius. There in Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World, Philoponus upholds against Proclus the Christian view that the universe had a beginning. He also rejects Aristotle's conception of prime matter, as the Neoplatonists had understood it, as something completely formless. Instead, he advocates the idea that it would be better to identify prime matter (the ultimate subject of properties in a body) with three-dimensional extension. And he makes three-dimensional extension into the essence of bodies, indeed into a substance. There is evidence that Philoponus' Physics commentary was being written much earlier, in AD 517. But in a brilliantly original 5

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312,26-313,27; 323,17-18.29-30. 297,26-8; cf. 336,5. 241,17ff. I thank Lucas Siorvanes for this observation. 241,19. Richard Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1990, 3-5. 225,5ff. Dated by the reference at 703,16-17. 5

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interpretation, Koenraad Verrycken has argued that the Physics commentary also incorporates a later revision representing the ideas characteristic of AD 529. Verrycken's interpretation may need further modification. For example, the Corollary on Place does not as a whole represent the later viewpoint, because three-dimension­ ality is still treated as a mere accident of substance (albeit an inseparable one), and yet more extensive modifications to the interpretation may be needed. None the less, Verrycken's work has thrown a flood of light on Philoponus. How does it affect Book 2 of the commentary? Verrycken does not find traces of the later viewpoint in Book 2. Philoponus here still gives the conventional interpretation of Aristotelian prime matter as completely formless, and does not substitute his own later conception that it would be better to identify prime matter with three-dimensional extension. Philopo­ nus also accepts, without demur, the Aristotelian and Neoplatonist belief in the eternity of the world, and does not insist on his later arguments for the view characteristic of Christianity, that the world had a beginning. I would add that I do not see Philoponus' definition of nature as containing any distinctively Christian elements. If there is any sign of Philoponus' mature views, then, I would see it in his open acknowledgment that Aristotle is attacking Plato, and in his maintaining that 'those who postulate the Forms' (Plato not exempted) may be wrong in their views on separation. 13

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Acknowledgements The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University. I further wish to thank Ian Crystal and Paul Opperman for their help in preparing the volume for press.

Koenraad Verrycken, T h e development of Philoponus' thought and its chronology' in Aristotle Transformed, Ch. 11. 561,10-12.19-23. Frans de Haas, Ph.D. dissertation on Philoponus, Leiden, in progress. Three-dimensional extension is not here prime matter, but a secondary (deuteron) level of matter, 225,14-15; 232,5-6.29-30; 244,8-9. 236,29-237,4; 298,6-12; 303,1-5.18-25. 1 3

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Translator's Note Faced with the usual translator's dilemma of a choice between accuracy and elegance, I have in general chosen the former. Normally I have tried to keep one or very few English expressions for one Greek expression, but this has not always been possible without gross artificiality, and in one case I have virtually abandoned the policy (logos, for which I have used nineteen translations - but this is exceptional). Where it seemed worth doing so, without unnecessarily cluttering the text, I have added the Greek expression in brackets. Despite being in his late twenties when he wrote the work, Philoponus often gives the impression of being a bumbling old professor. He writes in simple and straightforward Greek, but his sentences are often impossibly long and rambling, with immense parentheses, which the absence of brackets in Greek manuscripts must have made a nightmare for ancient readers, and may sometimes have caused the copyists to fall into error. I have not hesitated to break these up, and restructure them where necessary. Square brackets enclose my own additions to complete or clarify the sense. In my notes 'LSJ' stands for the standard Greek lexicon by Liddell, Scott and Jones ('LS' being used once for its pre-1940 editions). Two or three Latin translations of the present work were published in the mid-sixteenth century, but I know of no modern translations except for extracts. Bohm for instance (see bibliography for all references) has included some fourteen pages in his selection, mainly from the last quarter of the book. Seven people (besides the general editor, Professor Sorabji) have checked portions of the text and notes, as follows: 194-214: Dr Lindsay Judson. 214-34: Dr Catherine Osborne. 234-54: Dr Mark Edwards. 254-74: Mr Edward Hussey. 274-94: Dr Istvan Bodnar. 294-314: Professor George Kerferd. 314-34: Professor Donald Russell. To these eight people I owe an immense number of valuable suggestions both for correcting and improving the translation and for amending and supplementing the notes, and also for many of the bibliographical items and cross-references. I have only occasionally acknowledged this help in detail. The CAG editor Vitelli did an excellent job almost exactly a century ago, and many of my 4

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departures from his text are based upon suggestions of his own. He also provided a large number of cross-references, especially to this and the previous book by Philoponus and to Aristotle. I have also been helped in various ways by Dr Lucas Siorvanes, Dr Jill Kraye, Mr Ian Crystal, Mr Paul Opperman, Professor Tilly de la Mare, and above all by the unending encouragement and energy of Professor Richard Sorabji. And last but not least, I am grateful to Mrs Gertrud Watson for her patient and careful typings and retypings of my rather horrible manuscripts.

Departures from Vitelli's Text

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enteuthen for enthen. haute for aute. I n s e r t s before ges. Drop estin. tade for ta. ponerous forperous. tow for Make first and third esti paroxytone. phate for phasin. alV he for alVen. hautai for autes. engus pos for pos engus. d'oun for de. epheron for epheronto. hasper for haper. ektos for e& £es. hautou for autou. ou for oude. telos kai hou for telos hou. di'holou for diolou. Insert de before phuseos. Read alia as barytone, not paroxytone. epei esti for esti. Insert kai after gar. organikoi for organikon. oikeiotaton for oikeioteron. Correcting porrdi to porrd. bouloito for bouletai. labdmen for laboimen. energeidi for energeia. erotethenta for erotdnta. eti epi for eti. houtos exesti labein for houto exelabein. men ti for mentoi. men ti for mentoi. to hou heneka for tois heneka tou. ti for to, with eileptai proparoxytone and oxytone. onta for ousa. ti for to. 6

topdi for topd. Insert to ara before kai. eudaimonidi for eudaimonia. eudaimonidi for 286,9 eudaimonia. hautou for autou. 288,11 289,11 Correct prairesin to proairesin. phesei for pheseie. 291,14 eroimeth'an for eroimetha. 294,17 297,2 Insert estin horismos after hoti. apopimplamen for 297,9 apo pipldmen. mathematika for 300,12 mathemata. kinetikon for kineton. 304,8 306,9-10 mathematikdn for mathematdn. Correct oion to hoion. 307,17 308,29 e for kai. egeneto for egineto (twice). 310,6 Insert an before or after second egeneto. Delete ei. 310,16 Insert epideiknudn after 312,2 tauten. Insert an before or after 316,15 epoiei. tithenei tei gei for tei 317,8 tithenei. Correct elengei to 318,25 elenkhei. 320,18 Insert epi after hodou. eirmon for heirmon. 325,23 326,2 eirmon for heirmon. tei... elattoni for tes ... 327,31 elattonos. Insert kai after 332,18 ** koindnian. mathematika for 334,12 mathemata. Insert phthoras after 335,23 kolutikon. Insert to after kata. 336,3 275,9 283,23 285,17

Philoponus On Aristotle Physics 2 Translation

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John Philoponus on Book 2 of Aristotle's Treatise The Physics

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192b8: Of things which are, some are by nature and some through other causes. 1

The task proposed by Aristotle from the start was to expound the principles of natural things, and in the first book (logos) he discussed matter and form. To matter he devoted a lot of argument (logos), clearing up the false opinions on it of the older writers and expounding his own. He said that the first substrate for substances is matter, that [matter] is one in number but not one in definition, that we reach a conception of it by using the mode of analogy, and that it strives after the form as ugly strives after beautiful and female after male, but it is ugly and female not per se but per accidens. The form on the other hand he discussed briefly, [calling it] divine and desirable and without defect, and then without having said what form actually is, he added at the end that, while to delineate the separable and eternal form belongs to first philosophy, we shall speak about generable and perishable form in what follows. So it is his task in this book to delineate form, but since the form of each thing is the nature of each thing (for the nature of each thing is nothing other than the form of each thing and the form of each thing is nothing other than the nature of each thing), for this reason, wishing to teach [us] about form, he enquires what nature actually is; for if we find what nature is we shall have found what form is. So at the start he enquires what nature actually is. Then [he enquires] about the things named paronymously from nature: what is it that has a nature? What is it that is by nature? What is it that is according to nature? But since nature is not only a formal cause but also an efficient and a final one (he himself will tell us later that often the three come together: the form, the efficient, the final), for this reason he turns back to distinguishing the principles, saying how many they are, and gives us a threefold division of them. [He says] that some of the principles are proximate and others mediate, some per se and 2

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others per accidens, and some simple and others compound, and in all cases some are potential and others actual. Then he also brings in again the question (logos) of matter and discusses it; and he discusses here also all the rest of the causes, and chance and spontaneity, and he will tell [us] how they are causes of the things they are said to be causes of, since some things are also said to arise from spontaneity and chance. So to speak summarily the aim of the two books (biblion) is concerned with matter and form, but the former is concerned more with matter than with form, and the second more with form than with matter and with all those remaining natural causes which are called either per se causes or per accidens ones. And for a time at the start [the aim] concerns form. And since, as I said, the form of each thing is nothing other than the nature of each thing, he first discusses what nature is. So in order to find what nature is he takes [the question] in what way natural things differ from those that are not natural; for whatever the differentia [is] by which natural things differ from those that are not natural, in virtue of this would they be natural. Thus in the De Anima too, wishing to grasp what the soul is, he asked in what way animate things differ from inanimate ones, and said that that in respect of which they differ is soul. So in what way do natural things differ from those that are not natural? [They differ] because natural things clearly have in themselves the source of their own movement and rest. For animals when they move are not moved by something outside but have the mover in themselves, and so do inanimate things; e.g. stones on being released are not moved downwards by the releaser (for he h a | merely released them) but the natural inclination in them brings them down. In this way, too, fire when released from [being] below is borne upward by the nature in it; and then [stones and fire] rest after being borne to their own masses and their own places by the nature in them. And it is not only of change in place that natural things have the source in themselves, but also of change in the senses of qualitative change and growth. For that which increases [something] is inside, using the food as material, and [so is] that which alters [something] in quality, making [?] white from [being] black, or colder or hotter, or moistening or drying [them]. For it is obvious at the start that it is not by some outside cause but by nature, using the food as material, that we are qualitatively changed and grow; and turning the food into blood and altering [it] into each of the parts [of the body] it makes use of qualitative change. So in this way then all natural things have change in themselves, but things which are not natural, such as artificial things, have the cause of change outside. For the cause of the bed is outside - the 17

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carpenter; for the cause which made the bed is not in the wood but outside. And similarly that which brought the house into [the state of possessing] such a form is outside - the builder. Consequently, if 10 therefore natural things differ from things which are not natural in this way, that the former have in themselves the source of change and stability, while artifacts [have it] outside, nature seems to be this: a source of change and stability. (For nature is a source not only of change but also of stability; for it moves [things] in order to bring them into [the state of possessing] the form and halts them in order to preserve them in [the state of possessing] the form.) So from 15 here he gives the definition of nature, that nature is a source of change and rest [for that] 'in which it belongs primarily, per se and not per accidens'. By 'rest' I must be understood to mean now not only the [rest] which is contrasted with change, but stability as well, for nature is a cause not only of rest after change but also of things which are in any way at all without moving always stationary, as we shall say in the case of the centres [of the heavenly spheres] and the 20 standing still of [their] poles. Such then is the definition. But nature is a source not only of change but also of rest because nature pursues some end. For it does not move [things that are moved] simply on this very account, in order that they should move, but in order that they should reach some end and form. So since it pursues this, when it brings the moved to this it naturally halts it, having attained the end, in order 25 to preserve it in the [state] on account of which it moved it originally. He added 'primarily' because the rational soul too moves the animal and such a source of motion is not outside but in the moved itself; but the rational soul does not move primarily but through the irrational, and neither does this move the animal primarily but by moving [its] nature. So this is what primarily causes motion. For 30 perception moves [it] towards something, either sight or hearing or one of the others (for it is having seen something that we are moved towards it), but sight doesn't move the animal primarily (by 'primarily' I mean proximately) but sight moves desire and this moves the natural capacities and these move the animal. If then 197,1 not even the irrational soul moves the animal primarily, still less does the rational, so that even if the soul, both the rational and the irrational, moves [the animal], and this moving cause is in the moved, yet since it does not move [it] primarily, that is proximately, for this reason soul is not nature. A ship too has the mover in 5 itself, the steersman who moves it, but the steersman is not nature, for he does not move [it] primarily but through the rudder, and the rudder moves [it] from outside. Nor is the source of movement and the cause in the rudder, but in the steersman, and he moves the ship 29

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through the rudder as an instrument. But if nature too moves [things] through instruments, nevertheless it belongs in those things which it also primarily moves; but the steersman is not in the rudders but moves them from outside, and moves the ship too from outside, if through the rudder and this is outside. But perhaps it is possible to say that soul too is nature [in the case] of animals so far as they are animals. For if soul is the cause of the movement of animals qua animals primarily and not per accidens, and is in them, and not only inanimate things are natural but also animals and animate things tout court, then this too seems to be nature, unless we are to say that animate things qua animate are not natural; [I mean] not the rational soul but all the rest, for this it is which proximately moves natural things. And perhaps it is possible that it was because of this [i.e. the rest of the soul] that he said 'primarily', for thought too moves [by] being in the moved, but not primarily, but [it is] in the rational soul. He added 'per se and not per accidens' because a sick doctor could heal himself, but it is not qua sick that he has in himself the source of the movement towards health, but per accidens, in that the sick man [only] happened to be a doctor as well. For that it is not qua sick nor qua being healed that he has the source of healing in himself is clear from the fact that these things do not always coincide with each other; for not everyone being healed has in himself the source of healing, so that the doctor heals himself per accidens. The same applies if anyone else of those with special knowledge affects himself while himself discovering [the relevant] theoretical principles. So the definition of nature is this. But it is worth noting that this definition does not signify what nature is but the activity of nature, for we did not learn what nature is through learning that it is the source of movement and rest, but what it does. So in order to give also the definition of [its] essence itself we must say this, that nature is a life o r a power which has descended into bodies, and which moulds and manages them, being a source of change and rest [for that] 'in which it belongs primarily, per se and not per accidens'. And that nature manages not only animate things but also inanimate ones is clear (for each thing has a natural power holding together its being, for it would have perished and gone over into not being if there were nothing holding it together). But it is clear that as form is more manifest in the animate so also is the providence of nature. So it is clear from this too that the definition will also embrace the nature of the animate, which is the soul; for the life of animate things is nothing other than soul. Someone might wonder, regarding the definition of nature, how we [can] say it is a source of movement and rest. For if the heavenly 35

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bodies too are natural and they do not have in themselves a source of standing still (for they are in endless motion) this definition seems not to be common to all nature. Moreover the masses of the elements are unmoved. For fire does not move in its own place but only stands still, for its circular movement and moreover that of the proximate air are not natural but above [their] nature, through their being carried round by the rotation of the heavenly [spheres]. And in terms of their own definition the masses [of the elements] are unmoved, as is clear from the remaining two elements, I mean water and earth, which as wholes are unmoved. So that if the masses [of the elements] are unmoved how [can] we say [their] nature is a source of movement and rest? So we say to this that it is especially in the case of the heavenly [bodies] that the nature in them is the cause not only of movement but also of stability; for the [elemental] mass, the centres [of the spheres] and the poles, stand still and of this stability the nature of the heavenly [bodies] is [the] cause. And [this is so] particularly since nature moves [things] looking to some end-state, so that it may attain this, and on attaining it halts [them] therein, and the heavenly [bodies] are always in an end-state and always at an origin (for now is both an origin and a point of return for each [of those bodies]; for the sun being now in the Ram has both a point of return of the circuit from it to the same [place] and an origin for another circuit, and the same holds for each [zodiacal] sign; and this can be said both of the parts and of the whole spheres). So that if those things [(the heavenly bodies)] are always in an end-state and never leave this, they would be at rest in this respect (kata touto), so far as they never leave being in an end-state. So that the nature in them is the cause not only of movement for them but also of this sort of rest: being always in an end-state and being at rest in this. And in the case of the rest of the elements - I mean the mass of fire and earth and the rest - even if they are not changed in place as wholes by the nature in them, at any rate they are changed by a qualitative change, being heated or cooled, or in the case of the earth blossoming; for even if the masses do not undergo a single qualitative change [each] as a whole, still each mass alters as different parts of it are qualitatively changed in different ways. And if anyone should say, 'But the elements have the cause of qualitative change outside, I mean the sun', note that even animals could not undergo their natural movements without the sun, for they cannot even exist [without it]; but as with animals the cause is inside, even if it is helped by the turning of an outside cause, the sun, so too with the elements. For even if the inborn heat and the other natural movements become qualitatively different according to the turnings of the seasons, yet we claim nature [as the cause] of

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the animal's qualitative changes. And even if someone should not agree that the cause of the qualitative change of the elements is in them, the cause of change in place at least is obviously in them; for nature is not a cause of all the changes in each [object]. But it is possible to understand the definition also in this way, that [nature] is a source of movement and rest not at a l l [in the sense] that where it is a source of movement there it is also a source of rest or vice-versa, but that nature is a cause of both the movement and the rest in natural things, whether they are both in the same thing or [only] one is. And in another way we say that nature is a source of movement and rest even for the masses of the elements in respect of [their] parts, for all the parts of the elements are of a nature to move and rest, as we say that the whole heaven too moves in respect of [its] parts. And some say that the philosopher defined the nature of the things that come to be and perish, not every nature tout court, which to me at least does not seem reasonable; for the book (biblion) lying before us is about what attends in common upon all natural things. So what nature is has been said. 'Having a nature* he says [applies to] all things that have such a source in themselves, i.e. a source of movement and rest; and these things he says are substances, and evidently [he means] the bodily and material ones. And he establishes this in the following way. Things that have a nature underlie the nature (for the nature is in a substrate), but substrates cannot be accidents (for none of the accidents is a substrate) and what are not accidents are substances, so that things which have a nature are substances. 'According to nature' he says [applies to] what has a nature; for we say that fire is according to nature and not according to art, and similarly man and horse and all natural things. Also called 'according to nature', he says, are the per se natural and perfecting activities of the things which have a nature, such as motion upwards for fire and downwards for earth. For these things, he says, neither are nor have a nature. They are not a nature, because nature is a source of movement and rest, while these things are movements, not causes of movement; but neither do they have a nature, at least if things which do are substrates while these are in a substrate and are not substrates; so that 'according to nature' is wider than 'having a nature'. 'By nature', he says, is applied both to what is according to nature and to what has a nature; at any rate he says at the start that 'it is animals and their parts that we describe as being "by nature" \ Thus Aristotle then; but by this he equates 'by nature' and 'according to nature', at least if both are said of the same things. But one can speak more accurately, [saying] that 'according to nature' is 53

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Translation said only of perfecting activities, while 'by nature' is said both of perfecting activities (I mean those [arising] from nature), in whose case 'according to nature' [is also said], and also of substances, and [further] of the things tout court which have a nature and arise from nature and not from outside, even if they arise against the aim of nature - as we say death is 'natural' and a body is diseased 'by nature' and again we say old age is 'natural' and 'by nature'; these things do not arise according to the aim of nature, but through bodily weakness and against nature. [People] ask about what is against nature generally, e.g. in the case of monsters and light bodies borne downwards out of the universe against nature: should one call them 'by nature' or not? And if the things against nature are not 'by nature', are they by art or spontaneity or calculation or intellect or, to speak without qualification, by anything else against nature? And the majority and best-known of the interpreters of the philosopher say the things that are against nature too are by nature; for indeed art or calculation or intellect do not make the monsters, and so these too arise by nature alone. So for our part we say to this that since nature has as [its] end the good and looks to this, and on this account also keeps its products determinate (for it always likes to make two eyes for man and two hands and [so with] each of the other [bodily parts] as they in fact occur), while things against nature are indeterminate, then things against nature could not be by nature - if, at least, things by nature are determinate and things against nature indeterminate. Further since art always imitates nature let us see how things stand with 'by art' and 'against art' in the case of artifacts, and as we find things to be in the case of artifacts let us display them [as being] thus in the case of natural things too. So I say that we usually call art both the branch of knowledge itself, e.g. carpentry or some other, and the product of the art; for we often say when looking at a finely-wrought portrait that it contains much art. So since what is wrought according to art we call art it is clear that what is not wrought according to art but as it happened [and] not by an artist we call against art. Consequently, if what is against art has not arisen by art, and as things stand with art so they do with nature as well, then what is against nature too will not be by nature. So in this way what is against nature will reasonably be thought not to be by nature. But perhaps even these are not absolutely against nature, but in respect of [their] particular nature [they are] not by nature but against nature, while in respect of universal nature [they are] both by nature and according to nature. For the particular nature pursues one form and avoids one privation, but nature as a whole both pursues every form and avoids every privation. For this reason, 59

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in respect of the nature of man the monster is neither by nature nor according to nature; but in respect of the whole of nature, since nothing in the universe is against nature (for there is no evil in the universe), it is not against nature but by nature and according to nature - for even these things [(monsters)] arise because nature as a whole alters the underlying matter and makes it unsuitable for receiving the form of the particular nature. I mean something like this: suppose the surrounding atmosphere, mixed in such and such 20 a way by the rotation of the heavenly [spheres], did something to the matter of a man in the process of generation so that he became unfitted to receive the form which nature would naturally impose upon him: then human nature would fail of its aim through the unsuitability of the matter, but another form would arise, which would be against nature in respect of the particular nature, but according to nature and by nature as regards the whole of nature 25 for nothing therein is against nature, since not even destruction is against nature, at any rate if generation is according to nature; and since generation is according to nature, destruction too will out of necessity be according to nature, assuming the generation of one thing is the destruction of another. I will take an example from which it will be clear to us what happens in the case of things arising against nature. Suppose there is a lyre-player who has tuned his 30 lyre according to one of the scales, and suppose he then strikes up a tune, but someone outside tunes up some or all of the strings, or rather (to keep closer to our example) that the strings are retuned by suffering from dampness or dryness in the atmosphere; then suppose that the lyre-player moves the strings with his fingers in such a way that he would produce an artistic melody if the strings 202,1 were tuned according to the proper principle (logos). So as in this case the lyre-player strikes the lyre in the natural way, but the underlying matter of the strings produces not the melody which the lyre-player intended but some inartistic, unorganised and indeterminate noise, so it happens in the case of nature as well. For the underlying matter becomes unsuitable for 5 the human form or that of any other animal, because of the rotation and combining together of the heavenly [spheres], and so it happens that the actuality clothing it because of nature becomes distorted. And as we say that the noise arising from the untuned instrument [played] by the lyre-player did not arise by art nor even according to art (even though it arose because of an artist), so in the case of 10 nature we say [the monster] did not arise by nature, since it was not even born in accordance with the determinate recipe (logos) of nature; yet with regard to the nature of the universe we say [the monster] arose by nature, because [it is] according to nature in the universe [that nature] destroys some things in generating others. 15

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Translation So in this way [nature] destroyed the underlying balance of the mixture of the animal's matter, through the movement of the whole, but created another [balance], which owing to its own unsuitability did not receive the natural form but another one, unorganised and indeterminate, according as the matter happened to stand with respect to suitability. 'Of things which are, some are by nature and some through other causes': not straightforwardly of all the things that are, but either of those that arise and are destroyed or also of all natural things and all that arise in the sphere of natural things; for the results of art and spontaneity too exist in the sphere of natural things. He added 'through other causes', [meaning] such things as art, chance, choice, spontaneity, calculation, intellect. 192b9: And by nature, we say, them.

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He added 'the parts' because things do not stand with natural things as they do with artificial ones. For in the case of natural things in every case both the wholes and the parts are by nature — for indeed 25 the whole animal is by nature, and hands and feet similarly, and not only the heterogeneous parts but the homogeneous ones too, and not only these but also the elements from which these are put together, and, to speak without qualification, in every case whatever is either a part or an element of things that are by nature is itself by nature. But in the case of artifacts, even if the wholes are by art, like a house, a bed, or an abacus, still not just any parts or elements [are 203,1 by art]; for logs and stones, being parts of a house, or rather elements, are not by art but by nature. 'For each of these has in itself a source of movement and of stability.' Of natural things it is clear that [each has such a source] of movement towards the form to which it moves and of stability in 5 the form towards which it was moved. And animals obviously have the source of every change in themselves (for [they have the source] of generation and growth and of alteration of place), but plants, while they have the others, are deprived of translocation in place, just as those bodies that are simple have of themselves only translocation. And natural things have in themselves the cause not 10 only of movement but also of stability, except the heavenly [bodies]; for these have in themselves the source of motion but not of stability, except in the way indicated above. 66

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Translation being predicated of several things. So artifacts of all forms, like a house or an abacus, in so far as each of them is called something of such a kind, like a house or a bed (something which holds true of it from art and not from nature) 'have no inborn impulse for alteration'. For even these have a cause of alteration, but not an inborn one but one from outside - the artist who fashioned them and have in themselves no cause of change in accordance with [their] form. For the form imposed as a result of art is always at rest, and as each of these things happens to have as its substrate something natural, either stones or logs or suchlike, they have a source of change in them in accordance with this; for they might be borne downwards, or decay as a result of the natural cause in them. 70

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192bl9: And as it happens for them [to be] stony or earthy or blended from these. 71

He says 'blended' [meaning] from the simple [elements], fire, earth and the rest. And together with 'they have in accordance with the extent of [the blending]' we must understand 'an inborn impulse for alteration'. 196b26: Therefore they are sometimes separated from each other.

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He established briefly that it is per accidens that the sick doctor becomes the cause of his own health; for if the sick man healed himself per se, what is causing healing would never be separated from what is sick (for such is the per se). But as things are they are separated from each other, for not every sick man heals himself. 192b27: And similarly with each of the other things made. He says 'made' in place of'crafted by art'.

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192b32: And all things which have such a source [of motion within themselves] have a nature, and these are all substances. 72

Having told us what nature is he tells us what it is that has a nature and says that [it is] all those things that have in themselves a source such as we have spoken of, I mean of movement and rest, and he adds what these are, saying that [they are] substances. Whence [it is] that they are substances he noted in a n additional remark, saying that each of these things is a substrate of some sort, and none of the accidents is a substrate but only substance. Then he shows 73

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whence [it comes] that [each] is a substrate, saying that nature is in a substrate. Consequently, if nature is in a substrate, and what has a nature underlies, and the substrate is substance, then what has a nature is substance. And that nature is in a substrate he has shown from the definition; for [nature] is a source of movement and rest in what it belongs to primarily and per se. 25 But if that which is a source of both movement and rest belongs in something in every case, it is clearly in a substrate, but not as 205,1 accidents are said to be in a substrate but as a form is in matter, completing the composition of one substance with the substrate. 'And according to nature are these things and all that belong to them per se/ There remains [the question] what is it that is according to nature, [whose answer is:] what has the nature, namely substances, and all per se activities of the substances themselves, 5 such as the upward motion, heating, and shining of fire, and so in the other cases. 74

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192b36: For this is not nature, [nor does it have a nature], but it is by nature and according to nature.

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Having said what is that which is according to nature, in case 10 anyone should say, 'for why isn't this too nature?' he shows that it is neither nature nor [a thing] having a nature. That it is not nature is clear from this: nature is a source of movement and rest, but all these things are particular movements, not sources of movement nor of rest; therefore such things are not nature. But neither do they have a nature, for things which have a nature are substrates and 15 substances, but these things are in a substrate; therefore neither do they have a nature, but they are according to nature and by nature. [...] having shown that 'by nature' too is said also of what is according to nature, for we say fire shines by nature. That 'by nature' is said also of things which have a nature he showed at the start, saying: 'Of things which are, some are by nature', speaking of substantively existing things, which are the things which have a 20 nature; and again, 'we say animals and their parts are by nature'. And we said that strictly 'according to nature' is said of natural activities, and 'by nature' both of these and of things which have a nature. 80

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193a3: And that nature exists it would be ridiculous to try to show. He himself in the [books on] Demonstration said that there are four goals needing to be pursued regarding each subject-matter: whether it is, what it is, of what sort it is, and on account of what it 84

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is, and of all of them the main one is whether it is. So since he showed what nature is without first showing if it is at all, he defends this very point in this way, [saying] that to try to show that nature exists is ridiculous, the reality itself being so self-evident, and [that] in the case of things whose existence is obvious one ought not to try to show that they exist, but should devote one's discussions (logos) to what they are and the rest [of the questions]. Thus too it is manifest to all that time and place exist, but the task is to discover what these actually are. So as one who tries to demonstrate that fire burns shows lack of perception, so one who demonstrates that nature exists shows lack of reason. For it is obvious that the things managed by nature among the things which are are many, and one should not demonstrate the obvious nor at all seek a demonstration of everything, except of what is doubtful. For as he himself showed in the [books on] Demonstration it is impossible that there should be a demonstration of all things. For if there were a demonstration of all things there would be a demonstration of nothing, for if we always hasten to demonstrate the principles by means of which we demonstrate we shall go on to infinity, and since the infinite is untraversable nothing will have been demonstrated since the first of the principles will not have been demonstrated. Therefore one should not seek a demonstration of everything; for there are many things which provide from self-evidence an assurance stronger than any demonstration, such as colours and bodies, that they exist. What is according to nature is also like this, and anyone wishing to provide demonstrations of such things supplies a proof that his standard of reasoning is at fault, since he cannot distinguish between what is less clear and what is more clear, and what gains its assurance from within and what has demonstrations not from within but from further principles. For such a person necessarily establishes things that are clear through things that are unclear, like Antiphon who tried to show by demonstration that things equal to the same thing are also equal to each other (and he also got himself confused in connexion with the squaring of the circle). For things equal to the same thing, he says, occupy the same place, and things occupying the same place are also equal to each other; therefore things equal to the same thing are also equal to each other. For in this way he tried to show something clear by means of many less clear things; for what place actually is and what relation it has to the things in place requires many long demonstrations [if we are] to understand [it]. So these people, h e says, are like people blind from birth trying to demonstrate that colours exist. For these people, if they had seen, would not have needed demonstration through arguments, having the assurance given by perception, stronger than all demonstration 85

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Translation (for it is not by argument but by perception that one judges the existence of colours); and in this way too those who hasten to demonstrate the obvious, had they had their standard of reasoning in good order, would not have established the obvious through the obscure. And just as it is a feature of the blind that they state 207,1 statements but know nothing of the object (for never will their reasoning be in command of the nature of colours), so too if we should try to persuade by logical arguments those who are weak and distorted in the standard of their mental abilities we shall teach them arguments (logos) but in no way objects themselves. So 5 that following the nature of objects it behoves us to posit this, that nature exists, without argument but rather [treating it as] stronger than all argument. Tor it is obvious that things of this kind are many/ 'Of this kind': things that are by nature. 'And that it is possible for this to be experienced/ i.e. that it is possible for someone distorted in his senses or reason not to recognise which among things are self-evident and which need 10 demonstration. As an example of this he presents [the case of] someone blind from birth trying to demonstrate by arguments that colours exist. Such a person will discourse about words but will know nothing, for it is by perception, not by arguments, that colours are naturally recognised. 91

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193a9: And the nature and the substance of things that are by nature seem to some to be the first [thing] belonging in each thing, unorganised per se.

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Having said what nature actually is and having discussed the things named paronymously from nature (viz. what it is that has a nature, what it is that is by nature, what it is that is according to nature), he goes on to ask whether 'nature' is said in one way or in several. And he says that 'nature' is said in three ways. For the 20 first substrate for each thing is called 'nature', as in the opinion of Antiphon and his circle and the older natural philosophers, who said the matter of each thing was its nature. And the form of each thing is called 'nature', as Aristotle and correct opinion think. And in a third sense coming to be also and the road to form are called 25 'nature'. So to some, he says, matter seems rather to be nature; and Antiphon in particular established this in the following way, [saying] that the substrate in each thing and that which does not alter at different times into something different - this is the nature of each thing, while the other things, in respect of which it alters as they arise and perish, are attributes of this and not nature. So in 98

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this way the statue's nature is not the shape but the bronze and the bed's is the wood, because the shape is an attribute, arising and passing away, while the bronze and the wood always remain. Antiphon stated as a sign that the wood is the nature of the bed that, if you buried a bed and it decayed and the decay took on the generative power, it would not sprout into a bed but into wood, the shape of the bed being a particular attribute while [its] nature is the wood, which is the matter of the bed; for that in each thing which is generative and liable to change [it] - this is the nature of each thing. And what happens in the case of artifacts also happens in that of natural things, since art imitates nature. So as with artifacts we find that not the form but the matter of each thing is its nature, since the one (the matter) persists while the form does not, in this way presumably with natural things too the matter of each would be its nature and the form an attribute. So that if the matter of the bed too - I mean the wood - is not a simple thing but is composed of substrate and form and is subject to the same relation as the wood [has] to the b e d , the substrate and the matter of the wood would be its nature, be this water or earth or anything else, while the form of the wood would be an attribute [and one] of the things that arise and pass away, because the substrate [of the bed], the wood, could alter into another form, e.g. e a r t h . So that if the one thing [(the substrate)] persists while the forms alter into each other, and what persists would be nature rather than what alters, in the case of natural things too the matter rather than the form seems to be nature. For this reason at any rate, [Aristotle] says, whatever seemed to each [thinker] to be the material cause of things, 'whether one or more', this he posited as the nature of the things that are, [adding] that this persists while different forms supervene on it at different times. So if when the log is burnt the ash persists, which is earth, earth seems to be the nature of the logs, and water of melted metals, because water persists in the melting. And if water is not simple, but has, say, air as substrate, this would be its nature because this persists in the destruction of the water. So that all who have said that the material cause is one, whether air or water or anything else, also displayed this as the nature of the things that are, and all who [have said the material cause is] several [displayed] several [things as their nature]. Let this be taken as having shown that matter is nature. But that form is nature more than matter is he demonstrates through several arguments, and first from the example [seen] in the arts. There, he says, each of the artifacts is said to exist and to embody its own art when it is actually such as it is called and not when it is potentially [so]. For it is not the potential statue or the potential bed that is said to embody the art of the statue or of the bed, like the bronze which is 101

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matter of the statue or the wood which is matter of the bed. For it is not when the wood is potentially a bed that we say it embodies the art of the bed; but when it takes on the form of the bed, then it is 5 said to embody the art of the bed. In the same way the bronze too, when it takes on the form of the statue, embodies then the art of the statue, not when it is potentially a statue; and it is the actually, not the potentially, grammatical person who is said to have taken on the grammatical art. So as in the case of artifacts the art is 10 predicated not of the matter (for what is potential is matter for what is actual) but of the form, so too in the case of natural things nature will presumably be predicated not of the matter but of the form; for if we talk of a nature of man and a nature of horse, it is presumably not the potential man or the potential horse that would embody the nature of man or horse but the actual man, i.e. the one who has taken on the form of man; and similarly in the other cases. 15 And if this is so the form would be the nature of each thing. He posits a second argument somewhat as follows. It is then, he says, that each thing is said to be such and such, when it takes on its own nature, and one who has taken on the form of man is said to be a man; therefore the forms seem to be [the] nature of each thing. And the syllogism is in the third figure thus: eadti thing is said to be 20 when it has its own form; each thing is said to be when it has its own nature; therefore nature is a [kind of] f o r m . And here the particular is true not on its own account but because of the universal. One could also syllogise like this: that by whose presence things which are by nature a r e , is nature; it is by the presence of the form that things which are by nature are; therefore the form is nature. 25 This argument is the same as the first. For there too he said that as the artifact, when it takes on its own form, embodies its own art, so too the natural [object], when it takes on its own form, has the [relevant] nature; and here he says the same thing, that each thing is said to be such and such when it takes on its own form. But the commentators distinguish the arguments, though not even 30 Aristotle himself clearly distinguishes them, but he introduces them as one. The third argument which he posits is a rebuttal of the argument by which they s a y that matter is nature. For by the same considerations by which they established that matter is nature he establishes that form is nature. For, he says, as far as, in the case of the argument by which you showed that matter is nature, [anything 210,1 will be shown], it will be shown also that form is no less nature; for if, given that from a bed there arose not a bed but wood, which was the matter of a bed, - if for this reason, because the matter of the bed persists in what arises, you s a y that matter is nature, 106

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then since also a man arises from a man, and the form is the man, this would be nature. For if the fact that what arises from the bed is not a bed but the matter of the bed, wood, means that matter is nature, then the fact that what arises from a man is a man and not the matter of man clearly means that form is nature; for this is what arises, as the matter does in the case of the bed. So as far as these arguments go it turns out that either both are nature, form and matter, or neither is. So that they should either agree that we have shown form to be nature, or say that they themselves have not shown matter to be nature; for the argumentation relies on the same considerations in each case. Now to say both are nature is impossible, for it could not be that in some cases matter is nature and in others form. For nature must be [so] according to one and the same [principle] in all cases - for what would be the principle of selection by which in these cases matter is nature and in others form? So it seems that as far as these [considerations] go neither is nature; for neither is it possible for both to be so, because of what we have just said, nor one only, because of the [previously given] argumentation - for as far as that [argumentation] goes both would be, but that is impossible. Therefore neither of them is nature. But our own view is that in reality artificial form is not nature, and for this reason - since it is not nature - neither does a bed arise from the bed, but wood, being a natural form and not matter, produces wood, as one would expect. So that if from this they make out that matter is nature, from what arises being not form but matter, as happens with artifacts, [we answer that] since we too have shown that form is what arises from f o r m (for man and horse and all fruits are form, and man arises from man and grain from grain and similarly in the other cases), form would be nature and not matter; for this is what generates and what is generated. So that this alone would be nature even on the considerations by which they attempted to establish that matter is nature; for on this account even the bed generates not a bed but wood, since b e d is not a natural form but an artificial one, while wood is matter for the bed as artificial but in and of itself it is a natural form, like man and grain and the rest. The third sense of nature is that concerned with generation and the road to form (for we commonly call the sprouting and outgrowth of fruits nature); from this it is again shown that form is nature, not matter. For every process of generation gets its name paronymously from the form towards which it moves; for we call the road to whiteness whitening, naming the road from the end-state towards which the movement [is], and not blackening, from that from which it has moved; and similarly [we call] the road towards 117

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Translation heat heating. So in the case of the generation of plants too the generation will be called after the end-state. So since it strives after nature, but could not paronymously be called 'naturing' because that sounds cacophonous [in Greek], it was called 'nature', coinciding in name with the end-state. So it is clear from here too that form is nature, for if [nature] moves towards form, and movements are named from their end-states, and this movement is called nature, it is clear that since it travels towards nature, and travels towards form, form is therefore nature. For generally, as I said, everything in process of generation is called [after] that towards which it has [its] generation and not [after that] from which [it is generated]. For a bench, not wood, is said to come to be at the hands of the carpenter when [the wood] is shaped into a bench, and when water transforms into air we say air comes to be and not water, and such [a process] we call paronymously evaporation. So in this way if we call the process of generation of plants nature it is presumably clear that form is nature, if all the processes of generation are designated from the end-state. So 'nature' is said in three ways: the primary and strictest [nature] is form, according to a second account [it is] (the) matter, and thirdly the process of generation towards form, so that it is possible to give the definition of nature in the case of each of these [senses]. For even matter is a source of movement and rest in this way: form being indivisible according to its own definition (logos), matter becomes a cause of division and separation for it, and separation is a [kind of] movement, and since it separates the form but does not separate it to infinity but up to a certain point, for this reason it is also a source of stability. And form too is a source of change and rest. For since not all things change with the same changes, but different ones with different changes (for some change with all changes, others with [only] some, and some with one set of changes, others with another), and [since] matter is not [the] cause (for matter is common to them all), it is presumably very clear that form is [the] cause of the difference in the changes. And if form is [the] cause of change it clearly is so too of stability; for there is no infinite change one and the same in number. And the road to form can be called a source of change and rest, but a source not as a cause of change (for it is itself a change) but according to parts, as having in itself both the first portion of change - I mean the first sprouting itself - and the e n d of the change, in w h i c h the plant, having taken on its own perfect form, rests thereafter and no longer changes as [when] in the process of generation.

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unorganised according to its own definition (logos). For the matter underlying each thing, even if it be proximate , and informed, is still unorganised as regards the supervening form, as the logs are unorganised as regards the [form] of the abacus and that of the bed. It is worth asking why, having previously said that those things are said to have a nature 'which have such a source [of movement within themselves]', 'and these things are all substan­ ces' (for it is evidently on account of these that he says that the things underlying nature are substances while nature is not a substance but has its being in the substance as substrate) - why he now says 'and the nature and the substance of things that are by nature seem ...'as though equating the substance with the nature. So I assert that previously he called the self-standing body itself substance, but now [he calls substance] the form in accordance with which each of the particular substances has its being; for being does not belong to water in so far as it is body but in so far as it has such and such a pattern, i.e. nature. For Aristotle himself recognises the word 'substance' as having many senses. For he says [its meaning] is triple: one sense corresponds to matter, as if one called the logs [the] substance of a bed and bronze [that] of the statue; another corresponds to form, as when we say fire is substantialised in accordance with the hot and dry; [a third sense corresponds to] the combination, as when we say the substance of man is composed from soul and body. Here he called nature in the sense corresponding to form substance, in accordance with which each thing has its being, but earlier the self-standing, that is, the body that in an unqualified sense bears the description (logos) of matter with respect to the forms of the elements, or else also the informed and composite body; for in this nature is situated. 129

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He denies that the shape is nature, since the shape belongs per accidens and is an attribute of the substrate and the matter, arising and passing away, with different [shapes] belonging at different times; but the matter, [he says], is nature since it endures, always being the subject of these things and receiving different shapes and attributes at different times. But when he says 'since the one [thing] belongs per accidens', why, having said this, did he add 'the disposition according to prescription, and the art', I m e a n the form of bed? Because it is disposed as may seem good to the prescriptions of the art. There is also a reading: 'the disposition according to organisation'; for the form of bed is brought to completion by a certain symmetry of the mutual proportion of the 1 3 7

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Translation parts. But if [the correct reading] were 'the [disposition] according to prescription' it signifies the disposition by convention and not by nature. For the artist disposes the shapes of the artifacts as it seems good to him; they do not exist by nature but arise by the planning and prescription of rational choice. 140

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193al7: And if each of these in turn has this same relation to something else. The difficulty someone might raise against those saying that matter is nature he both raises and resolves. For someone might say: Tf you 15 say that that which endures throughout is matter, and for this reason the logs, as enduring throughout, are nature while the form, as perishing, is [so] no longer, then neither will the logs be [the] nature of the bed, nor the bronze of the statue; for the logs too on perishing are dissolved into earth, perhaps, and that endures throughout while the form of l o g disappears, as in burning, and ash is left behind, which is earth; and similarly the bronze on 20 perishing is dissolved into water, since when melted too it becomes fluid. So that not even the bronze is matter for the statue, nor the logs for the bed.' He replies that this is true. For wood or bronze are matter for the statue or the bed, but there is a further matter of these themselves. So that the wood and the bronze are nature for the bed and the statue, and some further thing is nature for these themselves in turn. This is why, he says, of the natural philosophers some thought earth to be nature for the things that are, others water, and others some other of the elements, either one or several, whichever they thought underlies as matter the things that come to be. 141

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193a26: And any of these is eternal, for there is no alteration in their case from [being] themselves.

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And whatever anyone thought to underlie the other things as matter, this also out of necessity he postulated to be eternal; for the first principle should be eternal and unalterable, and all the other things, coming from it, should be generable and perishable. And those too who postulate several material causes postulated that they were eternal: they alter both their attributes and their dispositions, [resulting] in the things composed from them, but they themselves cannot be altered into each other. For Empedocles said that none of the four elements which he postulated as first principles alters into another; for they are unalterable. 143

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Translation 193a28: In one way then nature is described like this: the first underlying matter for each of the things which have in themselves a source of movement and alteration. 15

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He rounds off what has been said [by saying] that in one way 'the first underlying matter for each' natural object is nature; for the [expression] 'of the things which have in themselves a source of movement and alteration' signifies natural objects, for these are what have in themselves a source of movement and alteration. He next posits the second thing signified as well, that which is in accordance with form, which in addition is in the strict sense nature. 193a31: For as what is in accordance with art and the artifact is called art... 145

The first argument, that as in the case of artifacts each thing is said to take on its own art when it takes on the artificial form, so in the case of natural things too each thing has its own nature when it takes on the natural form. For it is not the unorganised logs and the bronze which already have the form of statue or bed, [merely] because they are potentially a boat or a statue, but the shape or figure - for it is this that has come to be in accordance with art. So as things stand in this sphere they do too in the natural sphere. For it is not what is potentially flesh that has this - the nature of flesh - but what has become actually flesh, and if each thing takes its own nature at the same time it takes the form, the form would be flesh. 'Before it takes the form which accords with the formula (logos)' Since we describe as 'form' what concerns the figure, in accordance with which we call certain [people] 'ill-formed' or 'well-formed', for this reason he added [the words] 'accords with the formula', by defining in accordance with which we define [things] and give [an account of] what each thing i s . The figure a n d the form 'not being separable unless in formula'. This form, he says, which we say is nature, we say is not separable in reality but only in definitional formula (horistikos logos) and in thought. 'What results from these is not nature but by nature, like a man.' The composite from the matter and the form is no longer described as 'nature', like each of the simple [terms], but as 'by nature'. 146

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Translation 193b6: And this is nature more than the matter; for each thing is [so] called when it exists actually rather than when [it exists] potentially.

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The second argument. Each thing is said to exist when it takes on its own form; each thing is said to exist when it takes on its own nature; therefore what has taken on its own form has taken on its own nature. And this remark is continuous with what was said earlier, for having said that the figure and the form are nature he added 'and this', i.e. the figure, 'is nature more than the matter'. And the other things come in the middle: 'what results from these is not a nature but by nature, like a m a n . ' 155

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193b8: Again man arises from man but not bed from bed. The third argument. Through the [considerations] by which they established that matter is nature he himself establishes that form more than matter [is so], as we have s a i d . 'Again nature in the sense of coming to be is a process towards nature.s [He means] that from the third sense of'nature' too, that of 'outgrowth', form is shown to be more strictly nature than matter.

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193bl3: For [it is] not like doctoring, which is described as a process not towards medical art but towards health. The case of generation towards the form, he says, is not like that of doctoring which is a process towards health but is called not after the end but after the producer, the medical a r t ; rather, as healing is named after the end, so 'nature' [in the sense we are considering] has been named from its leading to nature; but it leads to form; therefore form is nature. But even the fact that healing is also called doctoring, from what produces it, implies nothing inconsistent with the things he says, but rather harmonises with them. For in the case of matters of the arts, since what brings to completion is one thing and what is brought to completion is another, it is reasonable that the generating and the process towards the form was called after each (as the process towards health was called both doctoring after what produces it and healing after the end); in the case of natural things on the other hand the producer is normally the same as what comes to be (as he himself will say soon, often the efficient, formal and final [causes] come together, 'for a man generates a man'), so it is reasonable that the generating had a single name. So whether [this process] was called after the producer or after what comes to be, since the

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producer is the same as what comes to be (except for the products of decay and such things as have a bastard birth by human planning, as happens with mules -and even in these cases what comes to be is in a way the same as the things producing i t ) , none the less it is shown that the name is more to be referred to the form than to the matter. 167

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What he means is something like this. Since the generatings and the processes are called [what they are] both after the ends and after what they arise from by way of efficient cause, we call doctoring a process from the medical art, not towards it; for it does not signify the process towards the starting-point but the process from it. So that doctoring too signifies a process from something towards something [but] called after what it is from, like nature. But it is not thus with nature in the sense of outgrowth; for that, though it too is a process from something towards something, got its name from that towards which it goes, not that from which it comes. 'But nature does not stand to nature like this.' Nature in the sense of outgrowth [or a process] does not stand to nature [in the other sense] as doctoring stands to the medical art. For doctoring signifies not the process towards the medical art but the [process] from i t , while nature [in this sense, i.e. of a process] signifies not the process from nature but that towards it. 169

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193bl6: But that which grows proceeds or grows (or: proceeds in so far as it grows) from something to something. So into what does it grow? 174

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The letter eta ['or'] may be disjunctive, so that [the sense] would be this: 'That which comes to be proceeds, or grows (for they are both the same) from something to something.' Or it may be an adverb, an iota being added to give the sense: 'in so far as it grows'; for in so far as it grows it proceeds to something. 'So into what does it grow?' He says 'not into that from which [it comes]', (i.e. the matter) 'but into that to which [it proceeds]' (i.e. the form). Consequently, if in so far as it grows it proceeds to a form, [the process] seems to have been named from the end-state, like healing and whitening; and if this [is so] then the form would be nature, and so [things stand here] just as the end-state of healing is health and that of whitening is whiteness. 175

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Translation 193bl8: The figure and nature are spoken of in two ways; for the privation too is form in a way. Having shown that form is more especially nature he wishes to say in how many ways form is spoken of, and he says it is in two ways. For contrariwise, he says, the privation too is called form in a way. He may mean that the weaker of a pair of opposites is called privation, for often in this treatise too he calls the stronger of the opposites form and the weaker privation; and for this reason he calls the alteration from black to white generation in an unqualified sense but a kind of destruction, while that from white to black he calls destruction in an unqualified sense but a kind of generation. Alternatively he called even privation in the strict sense form and figure through its being a kind of disposition of the substrate. For if not all the things that are are forms but there are some formless things too, it is clear that the privation is not a form. But if everything that exists in any way at all we call form, equating form with what i s , it is clear that the privation will be form in a way, since it is not among the things that in no way whatever exist but among those that do exist in a way; for the substrate is in a way arranged and given a figure in accordance with it - for even blindness in a way disposes the substrate and [so does] every privation. So since there are times when we call every disposition of the substrate a figure of it and a form, for this reason it came to indicate this very t h i n g .

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193b20: Whether or not the privation is also a sort of opposite in the case of absolute coming to be must be considered later. 180

He says 'in the case of absolute coming to be' instead of '[in that of] substantial [coming to be]'. For in the first book (logos) he showed that substantial coming to be [took place] from contraries. For he says that the composite substance comes from incompositeness and an absence of being fitted together, which is a privation, not an opposite. Consequently, whether the privations from which the substances come to be are opposite to the things that come to be we shall consider later. And he takes this further in the book On Coming to Be and Passing Away, where he shows that absolutely all coming to be is from opposites, and [shows] what and how many the opposites are from which the comings to be [take place]. So he takes this further in the book On Coming to Be and Passing Away, either because he had not shown in the present work that [coming to be took place] from opposites, as against merely from contraries, or because he had not shown it sufficiently. 181

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Translation 193b22: Now that we have specified in how many ways nature is spoken of, after this we must consider how the mathematician differs from the natural philosopher. 185

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He has said that nature is spoken of in three ways, [as] form and matter and the process of generation towards form, and that more strictly form is nature, while the other two, matter and the process of generation, have the property of being natures because of form, matter as being suitable to receive form, and the process of generation as leading to it. Now since the study of nature is a section of the theoretical part of philosophy, and the theoretical [part] is divided into the study of nature, mathematics and theology, he wants next to distinguish [what pertains to] the study of nature from [what pertains to] mathematics and [what pertains to] theology; for it belongs to the man with special knowledge to set apart, when delineating the matters which are relevant to him, those which seem to be relevant but are not really so. Now these branches of knowledge are higher sciences and the higher sciences are so of forms - for even if there is a higher science of formless things this too we know through the higher science of the [relevant] forms, since we know the formless either by analogy or by abstraction, as was said previously. So for this reason it is fitting that he makes the distinction between these branches of knowledge. But he does not distinguish [them] all from each other, but the rest from the study of nature alone without distinguishing the others among themselves. And first he distinguishes the math­ ematical branch of knowledge from the study of nature, and says that the latter is not distinguished from the former in the way that is generally thought. And from this he shows the need for the distinction between these branches of knowledge. For if the supposed distinction between them is, in fact, not a distinction it is presumably clear that the proper account of the distinction between them is needed. People think that the study of nature is distinguished from mathematics by the study of nature being about the substance of things while mathematics is about their attributes and shapes; but this, he says, is not true. For the students of nature as well evidently talk not only about substances but about attributes and shapes. He himself at all events in the De Caelo gave demonstrations not only concerning the substance of the heavens, that it is of some other [substance] beside the four elements, but that it has its shape spherical in accordance with nature, and moves in a circle, and concerning the elements he discussed not only [the question] of what substance each of them i s but [the fact] that they are all 186

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Translation spherical, in the course of which he demonstrates in a very neat geometrical way concerning b o t h water and earth that they are spherical. So that if students of nature too discuss not only substances but the accidents of substances it seems that the mathematician cannot be distinguished from the student of nature by this. So by what is he distinguished? I assert that it is not by discussing differentiae but by the mode of his teaching, in that the mathematician discusses the shapes and their accompanying features without further thinking of whatever sort of matter these belong in, but separating them in thought from all matter he studies in this way their accompanying features; the natural philosopher, however, thinking of the shape and the rest of the attributes studies them as being in matter; for they are either in the heaven or the sun or the earth or some other of the natural bodies. Theodosius at any rate in [his work] On Spheres when teaching [us] the attributes that hold true of a sphere does not add any calculations about matter, but separating the spherical shape from all substance considers in this way what holds true of it, [arguing] that if a sphere is cut by a plane it produces a circle, and so on. Autolycus, writing [his work] On the Moving Sphere and [writing about] what holds true of a sphere in motion, is more concerned with particular objects than Theodosius and approaches nearer to the natural philosopher (for [the idea of] movement is in a way close to [that of] substance); for even if he does not think of some substance in [the case of] the moving sphere he does at least take [into consideration] a combination of shape and movement and in this is close in a way to substance. Even more concerned with particulars than this is Euclid's Phaenomena and in general the whole of astronomy; for here the substance itself is thought of as well, since he calculates in addition the movement of the heaven and of the sun and the rest of the stars; for he does not consider simply the movement of a sphere but that of the sphere of the fixed stars or of Saturn or some other sphere, and the relation of these to each other. The highest part of mathematics is easy to distinguish and separated from the study of nature; examples are Theodosius' work On Spheres and Euclid's thirteen books on arithmetic; for in these there is absolutely no mention of matter. But the foothills of [mathematics] are in a way close to the study of nature; for the astronomer contemplates shape as [it appears] in the sun and movement as [it appears] in the sun, and their sizes, and so does the student of nature. So what is the difference? [It is this:] Even if they discourse on the same things and as properties of the same things, still the student of 197

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nature on the one hand [claims] that such-and-such shapes and such-and-such movements are proper and innate to such-and-such a substance - I mean the fifth, for it is because of this that [the shapes are] spherical and [the movements] circular, since [these properties result] neither from one nor from all the [four] elements but belong to something else, the fifth body, and [the student of 25 nature claims] that such-and-such a shape is better for t h e m , and [such-and-such a] movement too. The mathematician on the other hand simply studies the sun moving, without calculating in addition whether its movement or shape is fitted for [its] substance or not, so that the same things would follow whatever the substance of which the things thus shaped and moving were [composed]. Nor does he know whether such-and-such [a state of affairs] is better for them or not, but he studies the movements and 30 the shapes in them, and in this way, regardless of whether the moved objects were fiery or of some other substance, t h e y fit to these things [whose movements, etc. they are studying] what is shown in the more general mathematical branch of knowledge; for instance, that since it has been shown that every sphere cut in a certain way suffers these particular effects, therefore this same thing will apply to the sphere under consideration. Thus they look at [the shapes and movements] apart from matter, even if they 221,1 study them as arising in the heavens. And the natural philosopher considers only the quality of movement while the mathematician [considers] its quantity too. So, as also in the [work] On Demonstration, having shown that demonstration is of the universal and that nothing among particulars is demonstrable [Aristotle] was puzzled in case 5 astronomy is on that account not demonstrative; for everything that is said about eclipses of the sun and moon and the movement of the other stars is said about particular things, about the sun or moon or some other of the stars or of this [cosmic] sphere. So in solving the puzzle he says that even if the astronomer constructs his arguments about particulars, still [it is] not as about particulars but as [about] 10 certain universals [that] he examines the features that accompany them. For having shown, let us say, that the conjunction of sun and moon produces a solar eclipse, and that such-and-such a relation between them [produces] a lunar [eclipse], he does not demonstrate these things in this way, [namely] that since there is one sun and one moon these things happen thus, but [he means that] even had there been myriads of suns and moons the same things would have happened. So just as in these cases the astronomer produces his 15 argument about particulars and examines one sun and one moon, but produces his arguments not as about particulars but as about certain universals, so even if he examines a sphere or movement a? 205

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Translation being solar he does not examine it simply as being a property of the solar substance, but he examines simply the features that accompany a sphere in movement in such-and-such a way, separating in thought the shapes and movements from the substance. And these people, [Aristotle] says, do nothing absurd in separating the attributes from the substances in thought, for they are of a nature to be distinguished from the substrate in thought. For if in separating [them] they had bestowed reality on them, something false and impossible would have followed for them; but since they only make the distinction between them in thought, and they are of a nature to be separated in thought, nothing absurd will follow on such a distinction. These people then, he says, do nothing absurd. But those, he goes on, who separate the forms, which are not even of a nature to be separated in thought, and who not only separate them in thought but also provide them with a reality in themselves, these people especially go wrong in postulating impossibilities. For attributes [of things] contribute nothing to the definition of the substance but have their own proper definition of their own being and are separable in thought in this respect from substances, so there is nothing absurd if they are separated in thought, not in reality, by the mathematicians; whereas natural forms, like those of man, horse, stone and the rest, cannot even in thought be separated from the underlying matter. For whenever I think of the form of flesh I at once think of its moistness, sanguinity and softness along with the relevant kind of mixture of the elements, and so in other cases too. This is clear, he says, from definitions; for anyone who gives the definition of spherical shape or movement or some other attribute, like crookedness or straightness, will make no mention of the matter, but if anyone wishes to give the definition of flesh or bone or some other natural [substance] he will certainly mention the underlying matter, [saying] that it partakes to such-and-such degree in moistness or heat and softness and suchlike things, which show the mixture of the elements which underlies the form of flesh. So if it is impossible to take the substantial forms in thought apart from matter, presumably it is in vain to postulate them standing on their own in reality. 213

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193b24: For natural bodies too contain planes and solids and lengths and points, about which the mathematician enquires. 220

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Translation branches of knowledge seem to busy themselves about the same things. 'Again astronomy is a different [branch of knowledge] or else is a part of natural philosophy.' He says astrologia [for] what in our idiom we now call astronomia for the words were not distin­ guished by the ancients, but they applied both to the same things. And having made mention of mathematics generally he then more specifically mentioned astronomy, because it has much kinship with natural philosophy, for it is not thought to consider the properties of the things celestial absolutely without matter, as we have already said. 223

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What most people suppose [to be] the distinction between these branches of knowledge he shows to be not veridical, namely that natural philosophy concerns substances while mathematics con­ cerns per se properties. So to believe, he says, that it is in no way the job of a natural philosopher to discuss the per se properties of substances is in the first place absurd even on the face of it, if the natural philosopher is not to discuss weight and lightness, or infinity and finitude, and the shapes of t h e natural bodies. For if he is to discuss none of these things his discussion (logos) will turn out to be on mathematical body. And how will he recognise the essence of each thing and how they have been found to differ from each other? For in the case of simples it is not enough for recognising the nature of each to say they are composed of matter and form, nor in the case of composites to say simply that they are put together out of the four elements. [It is absurd] especially, he says, [because] all those who discuss nature clearly busy themselves also about the shape of the cosmos and of the particular [celestial bodies]. So that neither on grounds of reason nor on those of self-evidence is it reasonable to believe that it is not the job of a natural philosopher to discuss the per se properties of natural things but only about substances. Therefore this is not the distinguishing mark of the natural philosopher as against the mathematician. 229

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193b31: So then the mathematician too busies himself about these things but [treats] each of them not as the limit of a natural body. Here he himself presents the true distinction between these

Translation branches of knowledge, [saying] that even if they are both about the same things, still the natural philosopher contemplates such things as being properties in matter; but the mathematician separates them from [their] substrates and considers them standing on their own apart from all substance, paying no attention to whether for generated things the nature that underlies them is of the same substance or [comes] from anywhere else, nor whether or not the shape is natural to [its] substrates.

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193b34: For [the properties of things] are separable in thought from movement. The geometer does nothing impossible, he says, in separating such attributes and shapes from their substrates, for they are of a nature to be separated in thought; so what is properly of a nature [to be done] in their case, that he does. [Aristotle] says 'movement' instead of 'their natural matter', or substrate, for in this lies the cause of movement. For we said earlier how not only the natural body but also the matter is thought to be a cause of movement. 235

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193b35: Those too who assert [the existence] of the Forms do this unawares.

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What the mathematicians do when it is of a nature to be done (and what do they do? They separate attributes from substances in thought when these are of a nature to be so separated) this those too do who posit the Forms, forgetting that substantial forms are in no way of a nature to be separated from the substrate as shapes and attributes are; for [Aristotle writes in the sentence after the lemma] 'being less separable' meaning 'being in no way separable'. And they compound the absurdity even further in that they do not merely separate the forms in thought, as the mathematicians [separate] shapes and attributes, but give a subsistence to them standing on their own, though they are of a nature to be separated not even in thought. That the substantial forms are not even of a nature to be separated in thought from what underlies them and the matter, like shapes and attributes, he says is clear from the definitions of them both. For one can define a triangle or circle or sphere or anything like that without mentioning matter: for a circle is a plane figure bounded by a single line, and an even number divides by two, and all such things can be defined without any mention of matter, since they are of a nature to be separated by reason (logos) and in thought even if not in reality. But flesh and bone and sinew and every substantial form it is impossible to define without mentioning the underlying matter, since they are not even 238

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Translation of a nature to be separated by reason and in thought. For if flesh has its being by being, say, soft and moist and having such-and-such modes of behaviour, how is it possible that anyone should imagine or reason about such things, or give a definition of them, separating them all from matter all by themselves? For to speak of moist and hot is itself to speak of the mixture of the underlying ele­ ments, which is the matter of flesh. For I cannot think of the form of flesh or bone as I think of a shape without further thinking of what sort of matter such a [shape] is in; for I think at once of the dry and white of bone and whatever else further belongs to it. And if I do want to define flesh I shall say perhaps that it is a hot body and also moist, full of blood, soft, and having such-and-such modes of behaviour, and in stating this I have at once stated the underlying matter. Moreover one cannot even think of one of the simple [bodies] without matter; for immediately I think of water I think of its being moist, fluid and cold, and thinking of this I had in mind the composite, and it is not possible to think of something fluid or moist all by itself. How great then is the absurdity of separating in reality what is of a nature not even to be separated in thought? What comes from Aristotle then, and to what extent it is plausible, we have now stated, and it is clear that his intention is directed against Plato. But for my part I assert that if this was his objection to h i m , that he separated apart in reality the forms of natural things, then the objection was reasonable (for it is impossible that things which have their being in a substrate should ever be real standing on their own). But if he is saying this, that it is impossible to separate the form from the matter by reason or in thought, [that] does not seem reasonable to m e . For even if the substantial forms are hard to imagine standing on their own, still reason is of a nature to separate even these. We say at any rate that the form is different from the matter, and one and the same persisting matter receives different [forms] in turn, [which implies that] the forms are other things alongside it. And what do I mean by matter? Well, according to h i m the second substrate, i.e. that which is extended in three [dimensions], is other than flesh and bone and all the rest of the forms, being qualityless in itself. So how can he say that the forms cannot be separated from the substrate even in thought? He himself at any rate in [his work] On Generation says that flesh and bone and all natural things are spoken of in three ways, sometimes in the sense of the matter, sometimes in that of the form, and sometimes in that of the combination, implying that he separates the forms from the matter in thought. For it shows that he does this when he says that flesh and the rest are spoken of in three ways, the word 'flesh' being applied sometimes to the matter, sometimes to the form, and 240

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sometimes to the combination. And he himself a bit l a t e r postu­ lates forms separable from natural things, with which he says too that the theologian concerns himself. It would seem then that he does not speak well [in saying] that the forms are not separable by reason and in thought, unless by the forms he means substances - and if he means substances by the forms, and natural substances are composed from substrate and form, it will be impossible ever to think of such substances apart from matter. And this is what those who postulate the Forms are thought to do; for they talk of 'man-itself and 'horse-itself , but at the same time [on their view] as I think of man in reality I have in mind a form in matter and the composite of them both. So that since those who postulated the Forms were not simply postulating a definition of man or a definition of horse apart from matter, but man-itself and horse-itself, he was right to say that such forms, i.e. composite substances, one cannot separate from matter even in thought, whereas if someone should want to think of these and define them he must at once conceive of the matter as well. This then, as I said, is how we must understand him when he calls substances forms: this is not his own opinion but is inferred from those who postulate the Forms; for in talking of man-itself and horse-itself what else are they postulating but a substance of man and a substance of horse and the rest? And they say that such substances exist separately in reality, apart from matter - [substan­ ces] w h i c h not even in thought can be thought apart f r o m matter, as we have said. Therefore they separate from matter in reality what cannot be separated from matter even in thought, which is absurd. 249

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194a4: Again number and line and shape [will exist] without movement. 255

That is, without matter, for we s a i d that matter was a cause of movement; for the form, being [itself] unextended, is extended over it. 'But of flesh and bone and man [this] no longer [holds], but these are like snub nose.' In defining the straight or the crooked or the circular we do not use the matter in addition, but it is different in the case of flesh and bone and the rest: just as in defining snubness we take into account also the substrate, the nose (for we say that snubness is concaveness in a nose), so too in defining flesh and bone and the rest we additionally take the substrate into account in the definition. If we define not snubness but simply concaveness we do not mention matter at all, and similarly too in defining properties we shall not take the substrate into account in the definition. 256

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Translation 194a7: And the more natural of the mathematical sciences show [this].

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That it is impossible, he says, to think of or define the natural forms without matter is shown also by those of the sciences which in a way are close to the study of nature, I mean astronomy and optics and harmonics. For optics considers what holds true of visual phenomena, the emissions and reflexions and angles of rays and of the cones which are put together from them and emitted, and all the other things about them which it examines geometrically, but geometry thinks of such attributes apart from matter, while optics takes such lines [as] real with the attributes attendant upon them, [and] not without movement and matter. Similarly too astronomy studies with [their] matter the shapes in the heaven and all the other things which it shows mathematically in the case of their movement, since it takes these things as real in actuality. And then again geometry and arithmetic simply look at double and one-and-a-half and such [relations] separably, while the harmonicist, since he studies such formulas (logos) as actually being properties [of something], cannot even think of them without matter. So even if what one can separate by reason (logos) is not separated even by reason when one takes [it as] actually real, how much more must it presumably be not reasonable to separate in reality what cannot even be separated in thought? And these things are the substantial forms. The ancients used astrologia in a more general sense for what we now more specifically call astronomia [Aristotle] called these among the sciences 'more natural' because these [practitioners] study as in natural bodies things which are shown mathematically. 258

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strings, and the third of visual phenomena), it is vain [to think that] the natural forms (eidos) could ever be separated from [their] substrates, which is what those who postulate the Forms (idea) do.

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194al2: Since nature [can be taken] in two ways, as the form and as the matter, we must contemplate [it] in this way as if we were looking at snubness [and asking] what it is. He has distinguished the mathematician from the student of nature by saying that the mathematician considers the forms in natural things but as mathematical, not as natural, separating them from [their] substrates, while the natural philosopher looks at them as inseparable and along with the matter. Accordingly here he looks at whether it belongs to the natural philosopher to discuss both of them or not. For as it has been shown previously too that nature is spoken of both in respect of the matter and in respect of the form, he asks whether the natural philosopher will discuss both of them, and [whether] in giving the definitions of natural things he will give the definition from one of them or from both. And he says that [the natural philosopher] will characterise the being of things in respect of the form and will give the definition mainly from the form, but the matter too he will not neglect but will embrace this together as well. He enquired into this also in his treatise On the Soul. For definitions, he says, are given in three ways, either in terms of the form or of the matter or of the combination; e.g., in the case of anger, in terms of the matter, that it is a boiling of the blood around the heart, in terms of the form, that it is a desire for revenge, and in terms of the combination, [that it is] a boiling of the blood around the heart on account of a desire for revenge. So the definition is stated in three ways, he says, and the natural philosopher will define [things] neither in terms of the matter alone nor of the form alone but of the combination. But, as I said, he will give the being of things in accordance with the form but he will not neglect the matter. For as far as the study of nature goes among the ancients, he says, it would seem to belong to the natural philosopher to discuss only the matter. For all the ancients paid much attention to the matter, but of the form some gave no account while those who also mentioned a formal cause only paid scant attention to it, these being Democritus and Empedocles. For Democritus called the substrate of the atoms matter and the shapes of the atoms formative causes; for [he said] the spherical [atoms] formed fire, and the cubical ones perhaps water, and another t h i n g was formed from other shapes. Similarly Empedocles too said that strife and love were formative causes of the things that are. For even if he took strife and love [to 259

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be] efficient causes, still [he said that things] were formed through them, the sphere through love and this cosmos through strife. So that in speaking of an efficient cause they were not entirely unmindful of the form, for these things produce not the matter but the forms. [Aristotle] did not mention Anaxagoras though he too ascribed to [something], intellect, the formative causation of the things that are - no doubt because of what was said of him in the Phaedo, that even if he ascribed the generation of the universe to intellect, still he no longer used intellect in giving the generation of particular things but fell back onto material causes; for he ascribed flesh and bone and the rest to the homoeomeries, which he postulated as a material cause. So far then as the opinion of the early [thinkers] goes it would seem to be matter that the natural philosopher should discuss. But that [in fact] the natural philosopher should construct discussions (logos) on b o t h he shows through several arguments, and first from the analogy of a r t to nature, since art is an image of nature. Suppose, consequently, that we see that it belongs to the same art to know both the matter and the form, for the builder knows not only the form of house but also the matter which is suitable to receive the form of house, and the carpenter, knowing the forms of household articles, a bed, a chair and the rest, knows also what sort of matter is suitable for what sort of form - suppose that it belongs to the same craftsman to recognise both the form and the matter proper to the form: the consideration, therefore, of both the form and the matter belongs to the same natural philosopher. Second argument: it belongs to the same art, he says, to know the end and all that comes to be for the sake of the end. For the builder, knowing what sort of a thing the form of house is, which he makes the aim of the art and [his] end, knows also the route by which he will reach this end. And the doctor, knowing health, knows also the route to health; for if the craftsman knew the end but was ignorant of the route he would never reach the end. And if it belongs to the same person to know that for the sake of which (i.e. the end) and what is for the sake of this (i.e. the route to the end), and if the matter is for the sake of the form and the suitability of the matter is a route to the form, then the natural philosopher, too, will know both [of these], both the end and what is for the sake of this, i.e. the matter; so that it belongs to the natural philosopher to consider both. But there are two senses of'end', the Tend] of which' and the '[end] for which'. For instance the form of a door is the end in the 'of which' sense, for this is what the craftsman pursues, and people call this [his] aim. As for the 'for which' sense, a door does not come to be for 264

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its own sake, in order that such-and-such a form should come to be, but in order to satisfy the needs of man, so that the door comes to be for man, who in a way is the end, so that [the door] shall guard the house. So he who knows the end 'of which', i.e. the form of door, knows immediately the things [that are] for the sake of this as well, i.e. the matter; and he knows the end Tor which', and so knowing such an end as this he again knows the things that come to be for the sake of this (take for instance a man who knows that [the door] came to be for his o w n use - for this, usefulness to the man, is the most final e n d of the door). For he who knows that one must keep one's household possessions safely knows that to attain this one needs a solid and resistant body to hinder those who wish to threaten them. So that even if there are two senses of 'end' he who knows the end, in whichever sense, will also know what leads to the e n d , among which is the matter. Therefore it belongs to the natural philosopher, too, to recognise not only forms but also matter. S o on top of this [Aristotle] solves a sort of puzzle that threatens. For someone might have been puzzled because if you claim to assimilate natural things to artifacts then, since we see that some of the arts establish the matter while others impose the form on the matter, therefore in the case of natural things too it would belong to one branch of knowledge to recognise the matter of natural things and to another [to recognise] the form. For steersmanship knows the form of a rudder [and] what sort of thing [a rudder] should be, and prescribes to the shipwright as follows: T want an instrument constructed for turning a ship, and on this account it should be (perhaps) cylindrical, so that it can be turned easily, and it should (maybe) be broad at the lower end so that by coming into contact with more water it pushes the ship by its resistance thereto.' The steersman prescribes the form then, but what sort of wood the matter should consist of he no longer knows, but hands over the knowledge of this to the shipwright. But the shipwright too, who knows the sort of form a rudder [has], prescribes the fashioning of the matter to someone else. For to speak without qualification, the art of woodcut­ ting prepares the matter for the art of carpentry, the art of sawing makes this [matter] easy to work, and then the art of ship-building imposes the form. And for the builder one art, that of quarrying, prepares the matter tout court, while another makes it easy to work, as being that which renders the stones suitable for building, polishing them and rendering [the matter] easily placeable into position; and one art prepares bronze in advance, such as that which concerns itself with the fusing of the metal, while another imposes some form on the bronze, such as [the art] of the smith. So why in the case of natural philosophy too does it not belong to one art to discuss the matter and to another the form? 269

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So in solving this puzzle therefore he says that in the case of artifacts their matter does not belong within them, but we take it in addition from outside and we ourselves think of it. And since our own nature does not suffice to produce everything at once, one art 10 busies itself about the matter and another about the form. But in the case of nature the matter is not furnished to nature from outside, but [nature] itself both prepares the matter for itself and imposes the form. And by matter I mean proximate matter. For the nature of man, even if it does not produce the elements itself, at any rate mixes them itself without taking [anything] from outside, and this is 15 the proximate matter of the living creature. And this [applies] in the case of each of the particular natures. Consequently, if nature produces both the form and the proximate matter of the form, then he who considers the natural forms considers also the matter relevant to them. For since the art of the smith does not produce the matter (e.g. the metal itself), but what fashions this is a different 20 art, for this reason the smith does not even recognise it (for he does not know the nature of the metal, where and how it was constructed); it follows presumably that, since nature produces the proximate matter for itself and the form, the natural philosopher too knows both. So that the natural philosopher tout court considers the matter tout court and the form tout court, since nature tout court crafts the matter tout court and the form tout court; but the 25 particular natural philosopher [considers] the particular matter and the particular form, since the particular nature crafts the particular form and the particular matter. But what is now put forward might be thought the opposite to what has been said above. For if it is not the same art which produces both the matter and the form, how could we say above that it belongs to the same art to know both the matter and the form? 30 [For] look, the art of steersmanship knows the form of the rudder but the matter and from which woods i t [must be made that art] no longer [is the one that] knows. So I assert that both the first [claim] and the second are true. For there are several matters of one 232,1 object, some more proximate and some more remote. For instance of the human body the most proximate matter is the heterogeneous parts, as he says himself, while the matter prior to these is the homogeneous parts, for these in the order of matter underlie the organic parts; and prior to the homogeneous parts are the humours, 5 and prior to the humours are the elements, and prior to the elements is that which is extended in three [dimensions], and prior to this is prime matter. There is every need then for each craftsman to know the most proximate matter. For the carpenter knows the most proximate 273

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matter of household objects, and he himself crafts it in polishing the woods in such-and-such ways and cutting them into pieces and preparing those other things which are to receive the form which have the same relation (logos) to the form as the parts of an animal have to the form of animal, for the form supervenes on the combination of these. And the same thing happens with the other arts. For as the art of steersmanship knows the form of rudder, in that way it knows the matter too. For it knows tout court that this [rudder] must be made of woods, but of which woods it belongs to the shipwright to know, since it is his job to cause the form to appear; and so as one who causes the form to appear he knows what kind of matter will receive it. Every craftsman then knows the matter proximate to himself but not out of necessity that which is more remote. For this reason the smith knows the nature of iron and bronze, and what sort of bronze has been made for what sort of form, but he does not also know how it is mined, which is a more remote matter, but this belongs to the art which works on metal. Consequently, if every art knows the proximate matter, but not also the more remote matter, to know which belongs to a different art, then both the first things [we said] were true (that it belongs to the same art to discover both the form and the proximate matter) and the second things (that one art is active concerning the form and another concerning the matter - not the proximate but the remote). Because of this Aristotle himself too, in saying that 'it belongs to the same branch of knowledge to know both the form and the matter', added 'up to a point', for the doctor knows that bodies consist of the four elements and that these are their matter, but he will not qua doctor know that these are not the prime matter but there is prior to them a different matter of bodies, which is formless. After puzzling about these things Aristotle posits a third argument that it belongs to the same natural philosopher to recognise both [form and matter]. For he says that matter and form are relatives (for matter is matter of a form, and not just any matter of any form but some particular matter of some particular form); and if matter and form are relatives, and one who knows one of a pair of relatives knows the remaining one (for relatives are recognised together), then it is clear that it belongs to the same natural philosopher to delineate the matter and the form. Having said this he distinguishes the natural philosopher from the theologian. He compares the way a doctor considers visual rays and constructs [his] account of them. He will not discuss the whole actuality of them qua doctor, but considers it sufficient to learn that they are of a nature to be dispersed by such-and-such 280

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Translation colours and compressed by others, and [to learn of] any other mode 10 of behaviour they have, or attribute relevant to the doctor; and he will not consider anything else about them, such as how they are of a nature to come out from the eyes, and what their activity is in relation to visible things, why [people] see [things as] smaller from afar and larger [when looked] down at in water, what is their mode of behaviour in connexion with mirrors, and whether they are of a nature to be reflected or not, and [if so] whether at equal angles [of incidence and reflexion] or not, and all the other myriads of things 15 that students of optics consider concerning them. Similarly again the smith will consider the modes of behaviour of bronze up to a certain point, such as perhaps that one should select resonant bronze for the construction of cymbals, and that such-and-such a kind is resonant, and [he will consider the bronze which is] suited for each kind [of cymbals]; but he will not consider whether [the bronze] has any power for service when it is scorched or beaten thin, and whence, by partaking of spirit, it gets its resonance, and, to 20 speak without qualification, whatever does not contribute to the art which is laid down for him. So in this way, he says, the natural philosopher too, in giving the causes of natural things, will give those which it is proper for a natural philosopher to give. And these are all those which are not without matter. For even if he does not only give proximate causes but also primary ones and ones removed from the things that come to be, still not even these [does 25 he give] without matter. For he will give, say, as the cause of the coming to be of a man not only the father and the nature in him but also the rotation [round the earth] of the sun (and the sun is clearly not a thing separable from matter but has its being in matter). But if there are any other causes of natural things, separable from matter, be they formal or efficient or final, what these are and how many and how related to each other it no longer belongs to the natural 30 philosopher to consider but to the theologian. The theologian then differs from the natural philosopher in this, that the theologian discusses those forms that are totally separable from the matter, while the natural philosopher discusses only those things that have their being in matter. 234,1 'Since nature [can be taken] in two ways, as the form and as the matter.' He has passed over the further signification, that concerning coming to be, since [nature in] that [sense] is a process and an alteration towards nature [and is] called from it paronymously, as 'whitening' [is called] from 'whiteness'. Since nature then [can be taken] in two ways, he says, the natural 5 philosopher will define natural things in the way he defines the snub, giving the definition and being for snubness in terms of concavity, but mentioning the substrate, the nose, as well; for we 286

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Translation say [it is] concavity in a nose. Thus he will give the being of natural things not in terms of the matter but in terms of the form, just as for snubness [he gives] the being in terms of concavity; nor will he leave unmentioned the matter, just as he did not [leave unmentioned] the nose in the other case. 194al5: Moreover someone might be puzzled about t h i s .

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Since he said that the natural philosopher will discuss both he wants to show that it is necessary that he deals first with the argument (logos) about this because it contains [what it is] reasonable [to see as] puzzles. He added 'or on that [composite object] which [is composed] out of both [natures, the formal and the material]' by way of determination, meaning 'or obviously on that which [is composed] out of both'. And if the natural philosopher will discuss that which [is composed] out of both, it is obvious that [he will discuss] also each of the simple terms. Further, if the natural philosopher will discuss each, will one and the same natural philosopher discuss both, or one the matter and one the form? 291

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194al8: Anyone having regard to the early [thinkers] would think that it was matter [that the natural philosopher should discuss].

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So far as concerns the early [thinkers], he says, it would seem to belong to the natural branch of knowledge to discuss matter; for they devoted much discussion (logos) to this but paid little or no attention to the form. 295

194a21: And if art imitates nature. At this point his first argument [is taken] from the similarity of art 25 to nature. And he rightly added that the craftsman knows the matter not tout court but up to a certain point. For the doctor goes back to the elements and says that these are matter for bodies, 235,1 but he proceeds no further; and similarly with the other arts. 296

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194a27: Again that for the sake of which and the end belong to the same [art] as whatever is for the sake of these. The second argument. [He writes] 'that for the sake of which and the 5 end' in parallel meaning 'that for the sake of which, which just is [what] "end" [means]'. And in the case of natural things the form is that for the sake of which; for nature does everything for the sake 298

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of this, at the start in order to generate and after that in order to preserve [it], and for the sake of the end there is matter, [i.e.] organs and anything equivalent [to them]. Tor of those things where the change is continuous and there is an end, this is the last term and that for the sake of which.' One should transpose the wording a little: Tor of those things where the change is continuous and there is a last [term], this is the end and that for the sake of which.' The sense of what lies before [us] is this: since he said that that for the sake of which is [the] end, he intended to show just that. So, he says, whenever something changing continuously reaches a last term and stops its onward progress, this is [the] end of the change and the change has taken place for the sake of this. So that that for the sake of which is [the] end and the end is that for the sake of which. He has in mind, [it seems] to me, change which goes forward in an unhindered fashion and is limited by itself, with no outside cause bringing it to a halt. For if it is interrupted, that state of stability [which results] from its being interrupted is not an end of the change. I mean something like this: if a doctor prescribes a medicine and then in the middle [of this] some obstacle occurs and the condition gets worse, and then by prescribing another medicine he heals [the patient], you will not call the end of t h i s (I mean health) an end or that for the sake of which of the former change. But neither [will you call] the worsened disposition [of the patient] an end of the former change, [the prescription of] the medicine, for it did not have t h i s as an aim, and the worsened disposition arose not from it but from some external mischance. So whenever the change towards health takes place without interruption, the end of this change and [that point] to which as a last term it is brought to a halt - this is that for the sake of which the whole change took place, i.e. health. For if it is not interrupted the doctor's activity does not halt until it has first arrived at health. Since therefore the change too concerning coming to be, if no one hinders it, has as its end the form towards which it is leading, this will also be that for the sake of which [it takes place]. 299

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194a30: On which account, too, the poet was ridiculous who was induced to say 'He has met his end, for the sake of which he was born.' 304

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which, but he applies this common and general conception to particular cases in a ridiculous way. For since death is the end of something continuous, [namely] life, he believed this end was also that for the sake of which, whence he conjectured, since everything before the end is brought to the end, that man is born for this, that he should die. But things are not like this, says [Aristotle]. For not absolutely every end is also that for the sake of which, but while every that for the sake of which is an end the end is not in every case that for the sake of which, but the best end - this is that for the sake of which. Now to be is better than not to be; therefore death is not that for the sake of which. Moreover death is not even a last term and end of the change continuous since birth; but nature changes up until the perfect acme of the creature, and having brought it to this perfect [point] it halts [it there]. This then is the end of the change [which is] continuous as far as birth is concerned. But after this, since the matter is not of a nature to preserve the form throughout, the creature tends to weaken, not because of [its] nature but because the creature has been put together from opposites a n d [its] nature no longer has the strength to bring the opposites to a balance, and one of them becomes more dominant, so that little by little the balance is dissolved, with the result that death occurs. Tor it does not want every termination to be an end, but [only] the best one.' The subject of'want' is not the poet but the nature of the objects. So since this best thing is the end and that for the sake of which, therefore the end of birth too is the best. And the acme is the best, for having come to be therein the creature exercises all its natural activities, and especially its generative ones - and just this is strictly [its] nature's end: to bring the creature to this [point], so that it will generate another like itself. For since everything seeks the good, and to be is good for each thing, those things that cannot remain numerically one desire eternity in species. So since the best is this, nature changes the creature in a continuous fashion to such an extent, until it has brought it up to this point, so that it exercises such activities; but at this point and thereafter the first change stops, as having attained its aim, while [change] against nature and towards destruction takes its starting-point in the way we said.

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194a33: Since the arts too produce the matter, some tout court and some as easy to work, and we use [things] as though they all existed for our sakes. 314

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to each place what is proper to i t . The [passage] 'and we use [things] as though they all existed for our sakes' should be joined to what precedes like this: 'Again that for the sake of which and the end belong to the same [art] as whatever is for the sake of these. And nature is an end and that for the sake of which.' Then add on: 'and we use [things] as though they all existed for our sakes' up to 'as said in [our treatise] On Philosophy'. 20 So much for the sequence of this passage. Its sense [is as follows]: since there are two senses of 'end', that 'of which' and that 'for which', having spoken of the end in the 'of which' sense in saying 'nature is an end and that for the sake of which' he added the other signification (I mean 'that for which') in saying 'and we use [things] as though they all existed for our sakes'. At this point he made things clearer by adding 'For we too are in a sense an end. For "that 25 for the sake of which" is ambiguous.' He says that this division of 'that for the sake of which' has been stated also in [his treatise] On Philosophy, meaning the Ethics, which he called On Philosophy because the philosophical way of life is handed down therein So much for the sequence. Of the intermediate material, part aims at establishing that that for the sake of which is an end and part at the refutation of Euripides. To the [words] 'Since the arts too produce the matter, some tout court and some as easy to work' one 30 should add on the [words] 'and the arts too which govern and 238,1 discover the matter are two', and what follows. It is from here that the puzzle [arises] of which we spoke: of the arts some concern the matter and some the form, but it is not like this with the natural branch of knowledge, with one [part of it] discovering the form and 5 another the matter. That he does put this forward as a puzzle he shows next when he says, as though bringing forward a solution to the puzzle, 'In matters of art then we ourselves produce the matter for the sake of the function [of the object]', stating the cause of the difference, [namely of the fact that] in the case of art [it is] not entirely [true that] it concerns both [matter and form], whereas nature does concern both. So the thought as a whole of what is being 10 said goes like this: among the arts some produce the matter and some govern it, and of those which produce the matter one simply produces matter, such as the art of wood-cutting, while one [makes it] easy to work. Furthermore [let us take] those which govern the matter, namely all those arts which concern the form, for the shipwright prescribes to the wood-cutter what sort of woods he should prepare for him and [tells] the sawyer to make these easy to work for him, and how [they must be in order to be] easy to work. 15 Now of these arts which govern the matter - those of them which are also called architectonic - the art of shipbuilding imposes the form while the art of steersmanship uses it. And we were right to 315

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call steersmanship too architectonic; for this is more architectonic than shipbuilding, because it prescribes to shipbuilding what sort of thing it should make the form of rudder into. And the arts which concern the form itself - those of them which are also architectonic differ among themselves in that one of them, shipbuilding, constructs the form while the other only knows it without constructing it, and one uses it while the other does not. And so there are four [arts] concerning the same thing, of which two concern the matter and two the form. On saying this he did not apply it thereafter to the puzzle, which was [to explain the fact] that the following is not the case with natural objects as well [as artifacts], namely that it does not belong to the same natural branch of knowledge to be concerned with both the matter and the form, but rather belongs to one [to be concerned] with the form and another with the matter. So for this reason he injected an obscurity, because he expounded these things on account of the puzzle; but by adding the solution, as we said, he made his thought clear. And when he said steersmanship, too, is a governing [art] he said this with some further specification, calling [it] 'architectonic in a way\ He added 'in a way' because steersmanship does not fashion [things]; for it governs more than shipbuilding [does], but does not fashion [things]. The 'in a way' therefore refers to the fashioning, not to the governing.

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194b5: For the steersman discovers and prescribes what sort of thing the form of rudder is, while the other one [discovers and prescribes] from what sort of woods and what sort of changes [in them the form] will be [realised].

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Now both [arts] concern the form (though without being ignorant of the matter as well), but steersmanship knows the form more than the matter and prescribes this to the shipwright, while shipbuilding learns the form from the steersman but thinks of the matter from its own resources. So they take in turn from each other, shipbuilding [taking] from steersmanship the form while steersmanship takes from shipbuilding the matter. [Aristotle writes] 'from what sort of changes' meaning 'from what natural tendencies and capacities'; for not just any wood will be selected for the construction of the boat or the rudder. 328

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Translation 194b7: So in matters of art we ourselves produce the matter for the sake of the function, while in the case of natural things it exists already.

15 The solution of the puzzle: in the arts the craftsman selects the matter from outside and in this way imposes the form on it, and for this reason it belongs to one art to know the matter and to another to know the form; but in the case of natural things the matter is not given to nature from outside but exists in it and is crafted by it. If this is so, then one who becomes knowledgeable about such a nature will know both the form and the matter; for the nature is the creator 20 of both, and it is not possible to become knowledgeable about the nature without knowing both, if the nature is the creator of both. 194b8: Again matter belongs to [the category of] relatives. The third argument

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know both [form and matter]. 194b9: Up to what point must the natural philosopher know the form? 25 Hereupon he distinguishes the natural philosopher from the theologian. The natural philosopher, he says, will consider the matter in the way we have described, but up to what point will he consider the form? To explain: it is possible to take more than one form of the same thing. For Socrates, as a man, has for form both 240,1 mortal rational animal and, prior to this, perceptible besouled substance, and there are some forms separable from natural things. [These may be] numbers, following the Pythagoreans, or the things [that are] prior to the many, and these in turn may be either the things that are real all by themselves, following Plato (I mean 5 man-itself and animal-itself), or the definitions of things in [the mind of] the craftsman. [Aristotle] asks, then: Will the natural philosopher discourse on every form tout court, or will he carry forward his teaching [only] up to a certain point? So he says that it does not belong to the natural philosopher to discourse on every form, but the natural philosopher will advance up to a certain point. The smith will not consider all the modes of behaviour of bronze, such as whether it contributes to the art of 10 medicine, but [will note] that it is, say, soluble and ductile, and everything that furthers matters relevant to him; and the doctor, enquiring about a sinew, will look at [those of its] modes of behaviour which contribute for him to the art which is laid down for him, [and will note], e.g. that it is a cause of movement, but he will 330

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194bl6: These things having been specified we must consider the causes, of what sort and how many in number they are.

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Having discussed the contributory causes, namely the matter and the form, he now wishes to discuss the remaining two, the efficient and the final, which are causes in the strict sense. For since, he says, 5 it is our aim to know natural things, and we do not know anything until we know all its principles and causes, it is necessary that we know all the causes of natural things too, if we seek knowledge of them. So since he wishes to talk about the remaining causes, the efficient and final, he takes up generally the discussion (logos) of the 10 causes, and says that of every thing there are four causes, the matter, the form, the efficient cause and the final [cause]; for instance, the matter of a house is stones and bricks and timbers, its form is such-and-such a shape, its efficient cause is the builder, and its final cause is the human use for which it comes to be (I mean, to be a shelter protecting against rain and heat); and similarly in all 15 cases. And he calls the matter [that] out of which, the form [that] 340

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in accordance with which, the efficient cause [that] whence [arises] the source of change, and the final [cause that] on account of which. Actually there are two other causes of things that come to be, the instrumental and the paradigmatic, which Plato too enumerates among the causes, but Aristotle, as a natural philosopher, lays no claim to these. The paradigmatic [he lays no claim to] because this is superior to what is according to nature - for nature has no regard to a paradigm in producing things, for even i f it contains the definitions (logos) of the things that come to be, it does not have them by way of knowledge, like a carpenter, but only by way of life, in that [things] have been produced in accordance with them. The instrumental [cause] he embraces together with the material [cause]. For the inborn heat is a sort of instrument of nature, but this, as I said, he takes up together with the material [factors], since altogether he recognises the four elements, in which are the four qualities, as [the] material cause of the things that come to be. But what sort of an instrument of such a kind could one select for the very coming to be of the four elements? Plato, speaking as a theologian, calls the Craftsman the efficient cause, and says the matter is an instrument. Aristotle, however, speaking as a student of nature, naturally calls t h i s an efficient cause, but has no analogue to the instrumental [cause]; for he wants instruments to be in general separable from both the efficient [causes] and the completed products, whereas the inborn heat is not separate from the creative nature but is itself too one of the things underlying [that] nature, riding on which it crafts the animal. [As for the] paradigm, in the case of natural things one could say that the nature [of the thing in question] is itself one, if at least like is generative of like and the aim of the nature in the father or the mother is to produce [something] like itself - but it does not look to itself as towards a paradigm by way of knowledge, as I s a i d , [but he] wants the paradigm to be separate in substance from the efficient [cause]. Having said this he next hands down [to us] what follows on [this discussion of] the causes, and first [he says] that, there being many causes, it turns out that there is more than one cause per s e of the same thing, namely the four enumerated [above]. For they are all per se causes, but not in the same respect. For the matter is a cause in one way and the efficient [cause] in another, and so in the remaining cases. Again, he says, some things are causes of each other, as labours are causes of physical fitness, but also physical fitness [is] of labours - but not in the same way, but the labours are causes of physical fitness as efficient [causes] while physical fitness is a cause of labours as a final cause; for we undergo labours to attain physical 342

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fitness and health; for W h y are you walking?' On being asked I say 'So that I may be healthy.' Again, he says, the same thing can be a cause of opposite things. For the steersman becomes a cause of salvation for his ship by being present, but becomes a cause of destruction for it by being absent. [People] say too that the steersman does not become a cause per se of destruction for the ship by being absent, but per accidens, for the ship could have been saved even in the steersman's absence. For that reason they say a more proper example would be that concerning the sun, which becomes a cause of light by being present and of darkness by being absent, and in both cases [becomes a cause] per se; for if it became a cause per accidens of darkness by being absent, and not per se, there would be times when it would not become a cause of darkness even by being absent. For such are per accidens causes. But I assert that even if the absence of the steersman does not in every case (ou pantos) become a cause of destruction for the ship, one should not believe because of this (para touto) that it is a cause per accidens of destruction, since its presence too does not in every case (ou pantos) become a cause of salvation, but [it is] not [the case] because of this [that] when it does save [the ship] it saves [it] not per se but per accidens. So in this way even if the ship is sometimes saved in the absence of the steersman, we shall say the salvation occurred through chance, just as we say the destruction of the ship in the presence of the steersman occurred by force (for the arts are among things that [operate not invariably but] normally), but when the destruction [of the ship] occurs in the absence of the steersman his absence could still be a cause per se, so that the steersman becomes by his presence and absence a cause per se of opposites, I mean of salvation and destruction. 351

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[He writes] 'the reason why' meaning 'the causes concerning each thing, on account of which it exists'; for on being asked 'Why does a man exist?' we give the efficient or the final [cause], or one of the others, or all of them. 'It is clear that we must also do this concerning generation and destruction and every natural alteration,' i.e. [we must grasp] the 10 causes of generation and destruction and in general of every natural alteration. So that you have it from here too that the discussion (logos) is about the features that follow in common for things that come to be and are destroyed. 'In order that knowing their principles we can try to reduce to 353

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them each of the objects of enquiry/ For knowing that of all natural things the four causes are these we reduce each of the objects of enquiry to these principles; for instance, enquiring about a bed we say that the art of carpentry is its efficient [cause], such-and-such a shape is its form, the timbers are its material cause, and the purposes of man are its final [cause]. 356

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194b23: In one sense that from which, as immanent, something arises is called a cause. He means the material cause, for he calls this 'that from which'. For we say that the abacus comes from timbers, and things come from matter and form. And if we said in the former book (logos) that [the expression] 'that from which' is more proper to the privation while 'this' is [more proper] to the matter, we are not saying opposite things. For there we distinguished the privation from the matter in definition (logos) and applied 'this' to the latter because it persists, but now since we wish to assign an individual label to [each of] the four causes the [expression] 'from which' presumably fits the matter most properly of all; for this is what alters and is qualitatively changed but neither the efficient cause nor the final [cause] nor the form changes. He says 'immanent' instead of [saying that] in the very thing which is coming to be there is the material cause and element of it as it comes to b e - and i t is not, like the efficient cause, outside; for the craftsman is outside the artifact, the father outside the son, and the rotation of the heavens outside all generated things, while the matter is in them. 'And the genera of these.' Since he has given the proximate matters he therefore added 'and the genera of these', i.e. the things that are more general - or else he means by 'genera' the substrates. For the bronze is the proximate matter of the statue, but since something else underlies this, such as water, therefore water too will be matter for the statue, and so also will be that which is extended in three [dimensions], which underlies the water, and prime matter, which proximately underlies that which is extended in three [dimensions]. So whether anyone should think the source of the bronze is from water or from earth, of whatever thing bronze is the matter, of that thing too will the things underlying the bronze, whether proximately or through several intermediates, be matter. 357

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'paradigm' not in the way those who postulate the Forms do, nor as thinking that it belongs to a natural philosopher to give a paradigmatic cause - for nature does not look to a paradigm when it produces things, since it does not produce them with knowledge but possesses unconsciously the recipes (logos) of the things that come to be; but those who produce [things by looking] at a paradigm produce determinate results, neither going too far nor falling short of the paradigm in causing the completed product to appear, and those things too that come to be by nature are determinate, for the forms of man and ox and fig and vine and the rest are determinate, and nature changes the matter to just such an extent that it reaches the form. It is for this reason that he called the form a paradigm. 'And this is the formula of the essence and the genera of this.' For instance, of a statue the form is not the bronze (which is the matter) but the manlike figure, and the genus of this is image (for every statue is an image but not every image is a statue), and the genus of image might be artifact. And in the case of natural things the definitional formula of the thing would be the form, and the genera of this [would be] its parts, as he is just about to say. For rational animal will be a genus of the formula of man, and so will mortal animal, for each of these goes beyond the human formula. And it was said above that the genera are a sort of matter for definitions.

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194b27: For instance, [as the formula] of the octave the [ratio] two to one, and altogether number, and the parts in the formula. He posits as a paradigm of being formative causes not only the 5 proximate form but also the genera of this, both near and remoter. So the form of the interval [which is] the octave might be the [ratio] two to one, and the interval [which is] the octave [is that] in which the longest [string] is twice the shortest, i.e. it has a doubled sound. So the [ratio] two to one is the form of this, for the longest 10 [string] has to the shortest the same [ratio] as two has to one. But the genus of two to one would also be formative of the octave, and this is the double. For this extends further than two to one, for it applies in the case of all doubled numbers. But the genus of this again is number, for number [applies] more widely than double, for if anything is double it is a number but [it is] not [the case that] if 15 anything is a number it is double. 'And the parts in the formula' is an explanation of what is meant by the genera of the formula. So he means that 'the parts of the definition, these I call genera of it'. For since by way of an example of the proximate form and the genus of this he selected two to one as 370

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the form and number as the genus, he applied the argument (logos) to what lay before him by adding 'and the parts in the formula' (logos). 194b29: Again [that] whence the first source of alteration or coming to rest [comes is called a cause].

The efficient cause. For when we ask Who is the cause of the war?' we shall say that he who counselled it [is], and [to] 'Who is the cause 25 of the son?' [we shall say] that the father [is]. He said 'first' because instruments too are thought to change [things] but they do not change [them] as first [causes]. So these are not efficient causes, for the efficient [cause] is [that] whence [comes] the first source of change. And as the efficient [cause] is a source of change so also [it is 246,1 a source] of coming to rest; for he who recommends peace is a cause of such a coming to rest. 'And all that comes to be as an intermediate stage towards the end, when something else is changing [things primarily, is a cause].' All those things, he says, are for the sake of something, and have their being on account of the end, which [arise], when something is changing [things as an efficient cause], between this 5 changing cause and the final cause; i.e. everything that comes to be between the efficient cause and the final cause does so for the sake of the end, even if one intermediate comes to be from another. For instance, slimming [comes about] because of exercise, for not only is the exercise on account of health but also the slimming, so that health is the end of all these; but this too, perhaps, [is sought] on account of reading, for we wish to be healthy in order to read, but 10 this in turn for some further end, for [we wish for] happiness. And this is the most final cause of all, and all other things come about for the sake of this. 'They differ from each other as being some of them functions and others instruments.' Things that lead to the e n d , he says, differ by some being functions, like walking, slimming, purification, and others instruments, [like] drugs, lancets, etc. 371

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195a4: It happens, since causes are spoken of in many ways, that there are many causes too of the same thing. Having enumerated the causes he wishes thereafter to transmit [to us] all the things that follow on [the doctrine of] the causes. And first he says that there will be many causes of the same thing, per se and not per accidens, but not in the same sense (logos)', for instance, both the bronze and the sculptor will be causes of the statue, not in any respect other than that of being a statue, but one will be [so] as efficient cause and the other as material [cause].

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195al5: All the causes we have just spoken of fall into four most obvious types. He sums up in brief form what has been said, [saying] that the types of the enumerated causes are four: the material cause, the formal, the efficient, the final. Then he gives several examples of the material [cause], [saying] that the letters are causes as matter for the syllables, and the substrate is a cause as matter for artificial things, (e.g. incense and suchlike things, and all artifacts tout court), and the four elements are matter for composite bodies, and the parts are material causes of the whole, and the premises are causes, as matter, of the conclusion. 'And of these some [are causes] as substrate, such as the p a r t s / This is continuous with [what was said] above: 'All the causes [we have] just [spoken of] fall into four most obvious types', and then one must add on: 'and of these some [are causes] as substrate', and so on. What comes in between [the two passages] are examples of the material cause; but since he has furnished many examples, he therefore takes the discussion up again and enumerates again the four stated types of causes. While others [are causes] as the essence: the whole and the combination and the form.' [He says] 'as the essence' in place of 'as the form', for each thing has its being in accordance with this. So the form is called this, and so is the combination of the parts, and the totality of them is called [so] too, and the form imposed on them is also called this very thing.

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195a21: The seed and the counsellor and the doctor and all in all the producer - all are that from which [comes] the source of alteration or stability or movement.

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One [cause] is a cause, he says, as an end of the other things, and as a good and that for the sake of which everything comes to be. For the final cause means the best and the good, for everything that comes to be does so on account of the good. Then, since not 5 everything has for its end [something actually] good, he says: let it make no difference whether the end is really good or [only] apparently [so]. For this is quite plain, that everything comes to be for the sake of some good, even if when it comes to the selection of what is really good some deviation sometimes occurs - it is still true that (plen hoti) everything posits this as its aim and goal. 386

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195a26: Such then and so many in kind are the causes. The types of the causes are many in number, but these too are fewer when treated in summary.

He has now gone all through the account of the per se causes. But in giving the causes we are accustomed to give not only the per se causes but sometimes the per accidens ones too, for we say the bald 15 man has built [a house], or the snub-nosed man philosophises. For this reason, intending to transmit [to us] the per accidens [causes] too, he takes up the discussion of the causes generally and produces a general division of them. For of causes, he says, some are per se and some per accidens, some are proximate and some remote, and some are simple and 20 some compound. A per se cause of a statue is a sculptor, while a per accidens [cause] is a bald man or a cultured man. Similarly a proximate per se [cause] of this statue is a sculptor, while a remote one is a craftsman. And in the case of the per accidens a proximate [cause] is a white man, while a remote [cause] is a coloured m a n . Furthermore a simple [cause] is a craftsman or an image-maker or a 25 bald man, while a compound [cause] is a bald image-maker or an image-making craftsman; for in the former case I compounded a per se with a per accidens [cause], and in the latter a proximate with a remote one. So there are three contrasts, and six terms, obviously, and compounding with each of these the potential and the actual doubles 249,1 the number, so as [to make] the terms among the causes come altogether to twelve. For instance, a case of a per se actual [cause is given by] 'The sculptor is building', and a [per se] potential one by 'The sculptor will build'. Again a per accidens actual [example] is 'The bald man is building', and a per accidens potential one is 'The 5 bald man will build'; and similarly in the other cases. So since there 388

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turn out to be twelve segments in the case of each cause, and there are four kinds of causes, the efficient, the formal, the final, the material, if the twelve types of causes are compounded together with the four kinds of causes the total number of causes becomes forty-eight. Someone might be puzzled about the inferred number of the causes, [saying] that if we want to present the twelve types in the case of each of the causes we shall not find our account running easily. For let the enquiry be about the efficient [cause]. For in saying that the sculptor is a cause of the statue I have at once said [something which is a case of] per se and simple and proximate; so that it is not possible to produce three contrasts separated from each other and not associating one with another. Again if you select the simple and the compound solely according to the signification of the causes and not according to the compoundings of the sounds, it will be impossible for there to be any cause wholly simple in signification. For as soon as I say 'sculptor' I have said a cause which is per se and proximate; how then [can it be] simple? And similarly in the other cases. If on the other hand we take the simple and the composite according to the utterance of the sounds (and so as it seems right to Aristotle [to do], as he showed by his examples; for when compounding we say Tolyclitus [the] sculptor'), again no less in both the simple and the composite [cases] both the per se or per accidens and the proximate or remote are thought of together. In the case of the simple we have [already] shown this, but [we have in effect shown it] in the case of the composite too; for instance, suppose I say Tolyclitus [the] sculptor': in this there are observed at the same time the per se and the per accidens (for the sculptor is a per se cause of the statue and Polyclitus a per accidens one), and also the proximate. Indeed it is possible for all of them to be found together, as when, for instance, I say 'a man [who is] an image-maker'; for in 'man' we have the remote and the per accidens and in 'image-maker' the proximate and the per se. Therefore it is not possible to find these distinguished from each other. So we say in answer to the puzzle that Aristotle does not present the three contrasts of the types of the causes as though their number existed divided (which would in reality be impossible), but wished to present to us the peculiar features of the causes. For even if it is ten-thousandfold not possible to observe each of these individually, they are still separated from each other in definition. For when I say 'sculptor', even if I said one thing as underlying subject, still it is not one in definition, for to be a cause and a proximate cause are not the same thing for a sculptor - for if to say 'cause' and [to say] 'proximate' were the same thing, every cause 391

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would be proximate. And the simple and the compound, where we may compound either the per accidens with the per se or the remote with the proximate, these too, both of them, exist either per se or per accidens, so that he has handed down to us the peculiar features of the causes by these means, and not simply a number of causes which can be separated. Nor does it make any difference if we compound the potential and the actual with the other three 15 contrasts, or compound some other [contrast] among the rest with that of the potential and actual, for we are simply enquiring into their compoundings with respect to each other. So separating in definition therefore each peculiar feature from the rest - per se, per accidens, proximate, remote, simple, compound - he finds the differentiae of these, [which are] six, which when each 20 of these is compounded with potential and actual produces twelve [as the] number of causes. But if someone wished to contemplate these differentiae not in definition (logos) alone, but sought those which can be given [as existing] in reality, he would find as follows: since the per se causes are either proximate or more remote, and the per accidens ones similarly, the subjects turn out to be four simple terms: sculptor - per se proximate; craftsman - per se more 25 remote; the white [man] - per accidens proximate; the coloured [man] - per accidens more remote. And it is impossible for there to arise further simple [terms] than these. And if we wished to compound these with each other the total of compoundings of these according to the method handed down to us in the Introduction' would be six; for if we take the number three, one less than four, 30 and multiply three by four, and take half of the resulting twelve, i.e. 251,1 six, so many [and so many] only we shall find the compoundings of the causes turn out to be. The underlying [compoundings] are [as follows]: craftsman sculptor (this [compounding] is per se, proximate and at the same time remote), sculptor white (per se and at the same time per 5 accidens, and proximate), sculptor coloured (proximate and remote, and per se and per accidens), craftsman white (again proximate and remote, and per se and per accidens; so that the fourth and the third are the same, but they differ because in the third the per se [term] was the proximate one, the sculptor, and the per accidens [term] was the remote one, the coloured [man], while in the fourth on the 10 contrary the per se [term] is remote, the craftsman, and the per accidens [term] is proximate, the white [man]). The fifth compounding is coloured craftsman (per se and at the same time per accidens, and remote), and the sixth is coloured white (per accidens, proximate and at the same time remote). So when we divide into per se and per accidens and into proximate and remote we ought not to divide these further into the simple and the compound but 395

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straightaway into the potential and the actual, and in this way neither shall we take the same things twice a n d the number of the twelve types will be preserved. Perhaps someone may be further puzzled by the division, taking their starting-point from what has been said, [claiming] that, the proximate per se having been divided into the simple and the compound, there was no need (ouk edei) for the per se remote to be divided in the same way, at least if the proximate per se is compounded with either the per accidens or the remote. So I assert that in particular as the per se is compounded with the per accidens, so [should be] the remote per se with the per accidens, and hence this too had to be divided; and especially, when we say the per se proximate is compounded with the remote, we do not entirely (ou pantos) mean this, that it is compounded with the per se remote, but in particular [that it is compounded] with the per accidens, in order that in this way the proximate per se may be compounded with the per accidens. The per accidens is compounded with either the remote or the proximate, but when it is compounded with the proximate the compounding is not directed a t (pros) the proximate (for they are both one and the same in this respect) but at the per accidens only. So just as, when too the proximate per se is compounded with the remote per se the compounding is not directed at the per se but at the remote, so in this way the remote per se too, when we say it has been compounded either [in a way] directed at the per accidens or [in one] directed at the proximate, we say it has been compounded with the per accidens, be it proximate or remote (and again in this case the compounding directed at the per accidens remote is not directed at the remote but only at the per accidens), and even if it is also compounded with the per se proximate, it is as proximate, not as per se. Therefore it is reasonable that in the case of the proximate per se and in that of the remote we take the division into the simple and the compound, while the compound signifies jointly the compounding directed at the per accidens in each case, and separately [it signifies] in the case of the proximate the [compounding] directed at the remote (whether this remote should be per se or per accidens), and in the case of the remote the [compounding] directed at the proximate (again whether this should be per se or per accidens); for the division leaves off towards the more generic, not towards the most specific. Such in number then are the types of the causes. So in however many senses causes can be taken, in the same number of senses can things be caused. For in the case of things caused too you will find some are per se and some per accidens, some proximate and some

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remote, some simple and some compound, and of all of these some are potential and some actual. Things caused, he says, [include what is] material and [what is] formal, for it is obvious that there is neither an efficient nor a final caused, but the caused is formal, such as the statue, or material, such as the bronze. Or rather even the matter is not a caused thing but only the form, for everything which comes to be is some form or other and nothing comes to be as matter, for matter in the strict sense neither comes to be nor perishes at the hands of nature. But even if nothing comes to be as matter, still since the proximate matters are forms of some sort and come to be (many of t h e m and especially in the case of artifacts) not on account of those things themselves but in order that they should b e a matter of other things (for instance bronze and the rest of the metals), for this reason he said the matter too is something caused, though what comes to be persists not as matter but as form. Now since it has turned out that the proximate matter is form, for this reason he says the matter comes to b e , and so, he asserts, in the case of these too there exist all the types of the causes. For when I say an image of Socrates has come to be I talk of a per se and proximate caused thing, and when [I say] an image tout court or a likeness [has come to be I talk of] a per se and remote [caused thing]. And when I say a two-foot, or ten-foot, image [has come to be] I talk of per accidens and proximate [caused things], and when [I say this of] a small or large [image] I talk of [something] per accidens and remote, and when [I say this of] a ten-foot image or a large image, I talk of a compounded caused thing. And when [I say] an image will come to be [I talk of something] potential, and [when I say one] came to be, [of something] actual. And similarly in the case of matter, as when I say bronze or metal has come to be, or red bronze or resonant bronze, and so in all cases. And it is clear that we have taken the form in one way in the case of causes and in another in the case of caused things; for the form is called a cause when it is contemplated as filling out the composite, but as being an object completed by the efficient cause it is called a caused [object]. Taking in the manner described all the types of the causes he next transmits to us various conclusions attending upon the causes, and first this, that whereas there are actual causes and potential causes, and similarly actual caused things and potential caused things, it is not the case that potential causes relate to potential caused things as actual causes do to actual caused things. For actual causes and caused things exist or do not exist at the same time, for the man who is actually sawing exists at the same time as what is actually being sawn, and the man who is actually building [exists at the same time as] what is actually being built, and if the man building ceases 412

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his activity what is being built will immediately cease [being built]. But this is not so with the potential. For the house does not perish together with the builder, but exists after the perishing of the builder as well, and [then] the potential builder does not exist but that which is potentially being built does. One must realise that by 'potential' here he does not mean what is usually meant (I mean what has not yet been brought to actuality but is capable of being [so] brought), but what has ceased its activity and is no longer in [a state of] change, such as the house which has been built - he calls it potentially buildable from its not being in the course of being built at the moment. So since he realises himself that what is in the strict sense potential exists or does not exist simultaneously with its cause, and similarly in the case of what is actual, he immediately goes on to say that we must give 'the potentialities [as being] of the things that are potential, and the things that are being active as correlative to the things that are being acted upon'. Therefore in this way he recognises that as things stand with causes so they stand with things caused, in respect of both the potential and the actual. After this he says that one who is giving the causes of each thing should give the strictest and most proximate ones, and this is where the enquiry into the question 'On account of what?' stops. For instance, what is the cause of the house? One should not say the man or the craftsman, but the most proximate cause: that [it is] the builder, and the builder not insofar as he is anything else but insofar as he has the art of building; for it is not insofar as he is, say, bald or cultured or, all in all, a man. Again, he says, one should give genera [as causes] of genera and particulars of particulars. For instance, if I am asked what is the cause of the artifact I ought not to say that [it is] the builder or the geometer but should give the generic cause, [saying] that [it is] the craftsman. And [if asked] what is the cause of the house [I should say] that [it is] the builder, and of this house, this builder; and, to speak without qualification, if what is caused is [given as] most generic one should give the cause too as most generic, and if it is [given as] most specific and [as] particular, [one should give] the cause too in the same way. Again, he says of potential things caused one should give potential causes and of actual [things caused] actual [causes]; for instance, of the actual house [one should give as cause] the actual builder, and of the potential [house] the potential [builder]. These conclusions he has handed down [to us], and they are well sufficient for training the soul in [giving] the most natural and most rational accounts of the causes of things. And on the basis of these the puzzle too in the Categories about relatives is solved. The 422

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puzzle concerned how relatives are simultaneous by nature, if, e.g., the squaring of the circle is knowable but there is no knowledge of this. So you have the solution of this from here, that one should not give just any causes of just any caused things, but correlative ones. 20 For the squaring of the circle is knowable potentially but not actually; so there is potential knowledge of this too, and were it to become knowable actually there would certainly be knowledge of it actually. And the puzzle arose out of seeking actual knowledge of the potentially knowable. The types of the causes are many in number, but these too are 25 fewer when treated in summary.' Each of the causes, he says, occurs in accordance with many types, such a s the efficient and each of the others - I mean the material, formal and final. He says they are many in number, such as that which has the art of building or those of geometry or carpentry, and [so] in the case of the other particular 30 arts, but all these when treated in summary are reduced under the [notion of] per se cause. Again, we call the white a cause, or the bald, or the snub, and [so] in all such cases; but all these are reduced under the [notion of] per accidens cause. And similarly in the other cases. 427

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195a29: For causes are said in many ways, and even [causes] that are of the same kind are [spoken of as] prior and posterior [one to another]. 430

By [causes] 'of the same kind' he means, e.g. efficient or material. For each of these, he says, is said in many ways. He presents the 5 contrast between per se and per accidens, and that between proximate and remote compounded [with it]. For having presented the per se he at once compounds the proximate and the remote with it, and again having posited the per accidens he again compounds with it the proximate and the remote. 195a30: For instance, the doctor and the craftsman [are causes of] health, and of the octave the double and number. 431

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An example of the per se and of the proximate and the remote in this [case]. For the doctor is a remote and per se cause and the craftsman a proximate and remote one, and yet more remote is the man who has some characteristic; and of the octave interval (harmonia) the [ratio] two to one is a proximate [cause], the double a more remote one, and number a more remote one still. 15 'And always the inclusive with respect to the particular', that is, the [causes that] include the proximate [causes are themselves] causes. For by 'particular' he meant these, the proximate ones, since they cannot be divided into more specific ones. 432

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195a32: Again [causes are spoken of] as the per accidens and the genera of this. 434

Having shown the proximate and the remote in the case of the per se he wishes to show the same in the case of the per accidens, and before showing this he shows the difference between the per se and the per accidens. Tor instance [the cause] of a statue is in one way Polyclitus and in another a sculptor.' For the sculptor is a per se cause of the statue while Polyclitus [is] a per accidens one, for it happens that the sculptor was Polyclitus. And it is clear that [being] Polyclitus is being said here to hold true of the sculptor, in the same way as [being] a m a n [holds true] of the master in the Categories. 'And the things that include the per accidens [are causes].' Having stated the difference between the per se and per accidens he wishes thereafter to state [the application to them of] the proximate and the remote. For the man is a proximate per accidens cause of the statue, and the animal or the animate are remoter ones; for the man is a cause of the statue not per se but per accidens, because it holds t r u e of the sculptor that he is a man.

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195bl: And among the per accidens some things are more remote and [some] nearer than others, as for instance if the white [man] or the cultured [man] were called a cause of the statue. 441

This he added either to establish the former [position], that of the per accidens some is proximate and some remote, intending us to understand [the initial] 'and' as replacing 'for', or else he wishes to show through this that even among per accidens things of the same r a n k some are more appropriate rather to per se causes and others less so, intending us to understand 'more remote and nearer' as replacing 'more appropriate and more inappropriate' whence he posited such examples as the white [man] and the cultured [man], of which neither is more comprehensive but 'cultured' is more appropriate, [as being something] which holds true of nothing else than man, which [in turn] holds true per se of the cultured; but 'white' is less appropriate, for [that holds true] of many things besides man.

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195b3: And alongside all [those things], those described appropriately [and those described per accidens,]... [He means] that there is a third contrast in the type of the causes, that of potential and actual, which is different from that of per se

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and per accidens; for by 'described appropriately' he means 'per se'.

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195b6: And the things of which the causes are causes will be spoken of similarly to what has been said above.

All that we said about the causes, he says, we shall say about those things too of which the causes are causes, I mean what is caused. The [words] which come together are: 'similarly to what has been 257,1 said above' (will these things be spoken of). The sculptor is cause of the statue and the statue is a caused thing; it is considered to be a cause in the sense of form, except that having arisen from the sculptor as cause it is considered to be caused. And here in fact you will find the previously stated types (the per se, the per accidens, the remote, the proximate, the compounded, the simple) having their 5 place, and further in the case of the material causes you can grasp in this w a y [the things] of which the causes are causes. 'For instance [we shall speak] of this statue or of a statue or, all in all, of an image: [i.e. we shall speak] of an example of the form as caused. The most proximate cause is this statue (e.g. of Homer), more remote is statue tout court, and more remote than this 10 is image. The bronze he has posited as an example of the material cause as caused, but we s a i d that nothing comes to be as matter but the same thing in coming to be is form. 'And similarly in the case of accidents.' Since he has given examples of per se caused things, he says that we shall give the per accidens in the same manner in the case of things caused, as when I 15 say a three-foot image has come to be, or a large one, and so on. 447

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195bl0: Again both the former and the latter of as compounded.

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will be spoken

He now adds the other one of the contrasts, that of the simple and the compounded. So these [terms], he says, which have been spoken of simply will be spoken of as compounded - I mean the per se and per accidens; for these are compounded w i t h each other, and [each of] these with the proximate and the remote. 457

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He enumerates again what has been said, that the types for each of the causes in accordance with the stated three contrasts are six, and they are spoken of in two ways, according to the potential and the actual, so that the types turn out to be twelve for each of the causes. 'For [these terms are spoken of] either as the particular or as the

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genus or as the accident or as the genus of the accident/ In saying 'either as the particular or as the genus' he seems to mean the contrast between the proximate and the remote, and in adding 'or as the accident' he shows that the former contrast applied to the per se to which he opposed the accidental. But, as I said previously as well, he compounded the contrast of the proximate and the remote with each, I mean with both the per se and the per accidens, and next he adds both the [contrast] between the simple and the compounded and [that between] the potential and the actual. 459

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195bl6: But they differ to this extent, that what is actual and what is particular are and are not, together with what they are causes of. [He means] that actual causes and caused things behave similarly in every case (for they either are or are not, together), but potential ones do not in every case [behave similarly], but one can be while the other is not; we s a i d what kind of potentiality he is talking about. [A point about] the wording: the potential, he says, differs from the actual because causes which are actual and proximate - for this is what 'particular' means, the proximate - either are or are not, together with those things of which they are causes.

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195b21: One should always seek the highest cause of each thing. [He means] that in seeking the cause one should seek the highest, that is, the most proximate. For in giving the cause in a professional manner [one should] give not just any [cause] but the [cause] in the strictest sense, and the [cause] in the strictest sense is the most proximate [cause]. For instance, on being asked why the man is building we ought not to say: because he is a craftsman, but: because he is a builder. And why is the builder [a builder]? Because he has the building art. But it would be silly to go on further, for the building art is the first and most proximate cause of the house.

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195b25: Again [one should give] the genera [as causes] of the genera and the particulars [as causes] of the particulars. Another conclusion, and one itself very relevant to a professional approach. When it is demanded [that we give] the cause of something, if [that something] is [of] the most generic [kind] we must give the cause too as generic. For instance, what is the cause of this image? A certain painter. And of an image tout court? A painter - not a certain one but [a painter] tout court.

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'And [one should give] powers [as causes] of things that are potential, and things that are active [as causes] with respect to things that are being acted upon.' Another conclusion, that of things potentially caused one should give potential causes, e.g. of the house which is about to be built the builder who will be building; and of things actually caused [one should give] the actual causes, of that which is being built the man who is building. 462

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195b28: How many the causes are then, and in what manner they are causes, let it be [granted that] we have sufficiently specified. But chance and spontaneity are also said [to be] among the causes. 10

Having discussed the per se and per accidens causes, and having separated them from each other and gone accurately right through the discussion (logos) concerning them, since chance and spon­ taneity are among per accidens causes he wishes to discuss them too; for we say that many things are and come to be from chance and spontaneity. And he seeks concerning them that we should say in the reverse order to the order of enumeration of the problems, as he does himself, to which of the causes chance and spontaneity should be assigned, whether to the efficient or the formal or one of the others, and then how chance and spontaneity differ from each other, and altogether what chance and spontaneity actually are, and fourthly whether chance and spontaneity exist at all, which it was necessary to expound before the problems. At any rate in settling these problems he will start in the reverse order, and first he will enquire whether chance and spontaneity exist at all, then what they actually are, then how they differ from each other, and fourthly to which of the causes they should be assigned. So he will enquire first (proteron) whether chance and spontaneity exist at all. At least he will be puzzled by the opposite position, that perhaps chance and spontaneity do not exist at all, but that these are merely empty names in general usage not predicated of any real thing. For of the things said to arise from chance it is possible, he says, to find certain determinate causes of their arising. For instance, someone went to the market for some purpose, and then on arriving he caught up with his friend there who had returned from an absence, whom he wished to meet but did not think he would return from his absence at that time or be found in the market. This man is said to have fallen in with his friend by chance, but chance seems to be an empty sort of giving of the cause. For it is possible to reduce the cause (aitia) of this to a certain determinate cause (aition), the choice which moved [the man] to go to the market; for even if the journey to the market did not take place for this 463

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reason, still nothing else is a cause of the meeting with the friend than having wished to go to the market. Consequently, if even those who posit it call chance an indeterminate cause, but it is possible to give some determinate cause of the things said to arise by chance, chance seems to be merely an empty name. Similarly, too, in the case of spontaneity. For there was a horse who got thirsty in battle and threw his rider and ran to the water, and an engagement then taking place [his side] were defeated and destroyed; so the horse is said to have been saved 'spontaneously'. A stone fell down from above and breaking off its jagged edges became suitable for a seat - and it is said to have become [so] 'spontaneously'. But one can give as determinate causes of these things the natural impulse of the stone which moved it downwards, and the thirst of the horse through which it fled the line of battle. So that so-called chance and spontaneity are not causes of anything. Furthermore, he says, if chance and spontaneity were a cause of anything, why then did none of the ancient sages, in giving the causes of what comes to be, enumerate chance and spontaneity among the causes? The puzzles then which abolish chance from the causes are these, and Aristotle solves them, and, to start with, the earlier argument, on the basis of the very things which those who remove chance say. For the considerations put forward for the removal of chance establish, on the contrary, that chance is a cause of some things. For if it is always possible to reduce all the things that come to be to certain determinate causes, as those who are puzzled [about this] say and as is so in truth, and if at the same time according to common conception all men say that some things arise from chance and some not from chance, and yet find no puzzle in reducing even those things said to arise from chance to determinate causes, then it seems that chance too is a cause of some things alongside [their] determinate source. For in reality, if men did not reduce some things from a determinate source to the indeterminate cause, chance and spontaneity, those who are puzzled would have seemed to have a point. But if the determinate cause in the case of things said to arise by chance is quite plain, and if all men, as if compelled by truth itself and the common conceptions, ascribe [as the cause] of the things that arise in this way not the determinate cause but chance, how does the puzzle fail to establish the opposite of what it wished to? For this reason we all think worthy of pardon those who have committed from such a cause some act among those forbidden. For instance, someone throwing the discus threw it without wishing to towards a friend, who was struck and died, and the killer is thought worthy of pardon by all; for we say the killing arose from chance, not from choice. Yet it is possible to say even in these cases that the 466

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choice was the cause of the killing (for if he had not chosen to cast the discus the friend would not have been struck); still no one blames the choice, since [the thrower] would have paid the penalty of such a choice. But the choice was [the cause] of the casting, while of the killing [the cause was] not the choice but chance. Therefore chance then is a cause of some things. The answer then to the earlier puzzle is this. To the second puzzle he says that just because none of the ancients said chance was a cause of anything [we can] not [infer] from this that chance is removed, but since chance does exist it was bad of the earlier [thinkers] to pass over this cause and say nothing about it. And he objects to the earlier students of nature, too, that though they said some things arise from chance they never discussed chance, [asking] what it is and how it is a cause of the things that arise from it. Empedocles, for example, says that air has seized the upper region by chance; for when all the things which are were earlier compounded together in the sphere, each one was distinguished by strife and borne to the place in which it now is, not from any forethought but as it chanced. He says at any rate about the upward movement of air: 468

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'As it happened to come together thus in its course at that time, and often in other places.' 469

For now it is above the earth and the water, but at other times and in another world-ordering, as it may happen, when again a cosmos comes to be from the sphere, it takes on another station and place. And he says the parts of animals, most of them, came to be in this way in accordance with chance as though they had come to be from forethought, the front teeth sharp and suitable for tearing and the molars for grinding. So that they are worthy of accusation because they say that some things exist altogether by chance but have specified nothing concerning chance. But Empedocles ascribes [only] certain small-scale things to chance, and if he has given no discussion of it might be worthy of less accusation; but there are some, [Aristotle] says, meaning Democritus and his followers, who thought it to be a cause of this heaven and of the divinest among the things that are manifest, but did not discuss it even slightly. For Democritus postulated infinitely many cosmoi, and said that this cosmos came to be in this part of the void, which is infinite, in accordance with chance, and another one in another part. Moreover he says, too, that chance is the cause of this cosmic arrangement itself of the things that are; for the atoms, moving in accordance with chance, came together and made on the outside of the whole cosmos the 470

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heaven, and next, in the order in which they are, the rest of things, and the earth, too, was fixed in accordance with chance, for the vortex of the heaven carries round with it the air within. And this air, through being continuous with the earth, touches it on all sides, and with its swift vortical motion does not let it fall but keeps it unmoved, like those who whirl cups filled with water without spilling any of the water because of the swift whirling - for the movement and the whirling of t!he container is faster than the movement according to nature of the contents and comes round more quickly, before they can fall out of their proper position. Hence he blames Democritus [for this] too, that among particulars he says that nothing arises by chance (for not just any chance thing arises from anything), and in giving particular [causes], such as what distinguishes hot things or white things, or why honey is sweet, he ascribes [these things to] the position and order and shape of the atoms, but of the generation itself of the star-systems he says the cause is spontaneity. Yet on the contrary, [Aristotle] says, one ought to have said that among things celestial and the masses of the elements nothing exists by chance nor by spontaneity, and one should ascribe [things to] chance and spontaneity among particular phenomena, if at all. For nothing happens contingently among things celestial, nor do they exist at one time and not at another, but things celestial and the masses of the elements are in the same state always; but particular things do not contain necessity, for nature does not always make [men] five-fingered, but sometimes fails of the aim. Consequently, if chance and spontaneity [belong] not among things coming about out of necessity but among those coming about exceptionally, it is more reasonable to ascribe them [as causes] of particular things which do not contain necessity than of the masses [of the elements] in which there is always necessity. But yet he ascribes chance and necessity [as causes] of such great matters without laying down for us any discussion (logos) of chance and spontaneity. 475

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195b33: So in what manner chance and spontaneity are among these causes . . . . 'Among these': those enumerated, [i.e.] whether [they are among them] as efficient [cause] or [as] one of the remaining three. The problems are enumerated in the reverse order, as has been s a i d . 'The cause [was] his coming with the wish to marketeer.' Marketeer: i.e. to spend time in the market. Aristophanes: 'Where indeed will Cleisthenes and Strato marketeer?' 'Since if chance were something [real], then truly' there would be a puzzle getting its reasonableness from reputable personalities,

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because none of the sages, in giving the causes of the things that come to be, has listed chance and spontaneity with the causes, but rather strife and love or fire or m i n d or one of the other [candidates]. 486

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196all: But this too is extraordinary. 15

From here [we get] the solution of the things we have puzzled over, and to start with he solves the earlier puzzle. This very thing from which you establish the puzzle, he says, would be extraordinary, [namely] why ever [it is that], while it is possible to refer the things said to arise by chance to some determinate cause, yet men do not refer everything that arises to determinate causes, but say there are some things which arise from chance too. They would not have experienced this (I mean that they should ascribe chance [as the cause] of things which are such that they clearly have a determinate cause to which it is possible to refer these things that come from chance) if there were not besides the determinate cause something [called] chance, which got its evidence from the very nature of things — whence, as I said, we all think those who go wrong from such a cause worthy of pardon. '[For many things come to be and are from chance and spontaneity] of which [men] are not ignorant that they can each be referred back to some cause of the things that come to be.' [I.e.] all men are not ignorant that it is possible to refer the things said to come from chance to some determinate cause, as those too say who abolish chance, and yet they do not so refer them. 489

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The solution of the second puzzle, that those who discussed natural causes should have discussed them, at least in brief. For chance and spontaneity are not abolished by their not discussing these, but since according to common conception we all agree that these things exist, even the ancients should have discussed them, if only briefly. 'Moreover they did not think chance was one of those things either.' So, lest anyone should say that they did discuss chance and spontaneity (on the grounds that Empedocles thought these were love and strife, or Heraclitus fire, or Anaxagoras mind), he says: 'They did not conceive these to be chance and spontaneity', first because they did not specify precisely this, and then [because] the causes they did give were determinate and productive of determinate things (for the function of love was to bring together 495

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and of strife to distinguish, and the function of Anaxagoras' 'mind' was to plan to distinguish the homoeomeries), but chance and spontaneity are indeterminate and productive of indeterminate things. 'So it is absurd, whether they did not think [chance and spontaneity exist] or whether they did think so but left them aside'; for if they did not think chance existed they should have said just that, in view of the widespread belief concerning it in all men; and if they did think [it existed] but did not discuss it at all, they could not escape the charge. Yet, though they mention it in their arguments, they have not said what it actually is, nor what rank it holds among the causes. 500

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196a24: There are some who ascribe spontaneity [as the cause] even of this heaven and of all the cosmoi. 504

The 'this' is placed to express wonder, because they posited an irrational and indeterminate cause of the being of things of such a size and such a character and of the most divine of the things that are manifest. 'For they say that the vortex and the movement which distinguishes and sets up the universe (to pan) into its present order arose from spontaneity.' Each of the elements has its proper movement, which distinguishes it from the others - for as soon as fire forms below it goes to its appropriate place and is distinguished from [the elements] of a different kind, and similarly if water or air forms above it at once goes to its appropriate place; and water is of a nature to flow together into the hollows of the earth, and earth [is of a nature] to support the water and both of these [to support] the air. So such a movement on their part, by which they are distinguished from each other, arises for them according to chance, [these thinkers] say. And they say that similarly there arises from spontaneity and chance the vortex which set up the universe into such an order as exists at the moment, so that the air is carried round with the heaven and the earth is kept in the middle through the swift vortical motion. And this, he says, is 'worthy of wonder', how in the case of animals and plants and their parts they say that nothing arises from chance nor from spontaneity, though in these cases things do not even always happen in the same way, whereas 'the most divine of the things that are manifest', and things that happen always in the same way, they assigned to spontaneity, which is not even a cause of things which normally happen but only of those which happen exceptionally. It would be then a matter of great stupidity to ascribe spontaneity [as the cause] of the things that happen always, but some sort of 505

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forethought and not spontaneity [as the cause] of things that do not always happen in the same way but sometimes even fail of the natural aim, such as are the things in the process of generation unless someone offers a defence on their behalf on account of the senselessness of the argument by saying that they called the material 20 cause spontaneous, as we ourselves say that grass arises spon­ taneously, since there is no specific cause of its arising but it has its arising from the material cause. 509

196a35: Yet if things are like this, that itself is worthy of attention, and it is well for something to be said about i t . 510

25 If these things are like this, he says, that itself is worthy of attention because of the irrationality of the thing, and they ought not to have passed by in this way without examination, but [they ought to have] said something about this spontaneity, what it actually is that is the cause of such great things.

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By 'not from chance' he means things in the process of generation and destruction, for those people said these were not from chance. Where those people said, then, that there is nothing from chance, many things evidently [come] from chance and spontaneity, such as the things which are born against nature; for what [comes] from chance is exceptional, and such are the things against nature, but in 5 the heavens, which those people say [come] from chance, there is nothing exceptional.

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196b5: There are some by whom chance is considered to be something, but unclear to human thought as being something divine and rather supernatural. 512

Some other people, he says, say that chance is something, being a phenomenon which is something divine or supernatural, but that 10 this is obscure to our thought, and this they define from their own ignorance, saying that chance is what is obscure to human thought; but this is not to say what chance actually is, but what it is not. 'So that we must look at what each one is.' Since he has shown that they exist, he says, we must now go on to the rest of the problems and show what each one is and how they differ and to what 15 sort of things among the causes one should reduce them. 513

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196bl0: First, then, since we see that some things come to be always in the same way and others normally,... Having shown that chance exists by resolving the puzzles brought against it and having called to witness the nature of things and the common conceptions of all [men] he will go on to the problems put forward, and asks what chance and spontaneity actually are. First he teaches [us] what belongs to them in common, and then how they differ from each other, and since there is something which is called 'spontaneity' in a common sense, which is predicated both of chance and of what is properly called spontaneity, he discusses this too, and then next what is properly called spontaneity. So in order to find what chance and spontaneity actually are, since things caused are in many respects clearer than causes and we recognise causes from things caused, for this reason he first teaches [us] what things are said to come from chance and from spontaneity. For it is obvious that if we once recognise what these things actually are, from these we can be brought back to their efficient cause too. So in order to know what these are he takes several divisions among the things that come to be from which he infers what each [of them] is and gives the definition of them. For of the things that come to be, he says, some come to be always in the same way, some normally, and some exceptionally. For celestial things come to be always in the same way; for the sun always enters the Ram on a certain day and the Bull on another, and similarly in the case of all celestial things. And natural things come to be normally, for nature normally makes [men] five-fingered. And there are also things contrary to these, which come to be exceptionally. For since there are things which come to be very normally but are not such that their result is always necessary (and these include both natural things and artifacts, for both nature and art very normally attain their aim), there must out of necessity be some exceptional [circumstances] which interrupt their necessary coming to b e . Aristotle leaves aside the equally balanced, which has its being solely in the realm of our choice, it being already obvious that things that come from chance and spontaneity [belong] among those not in our power, while the equally balanced [belongs] among things which are in our power. So since what [comes to be] out of necessity and the normal and the exceptional are among what is not in our power, and things that come from chance too are not in our power, he asks what sort of classification here we should give of chance and spontaneity. And no one should be puzzled about why he has not mentioned the impossible, for it is obvious that he is making a division among the things that come to be, and the impossible could not come to be; so 515

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that it is reasonable that he has not mentioned the subject of the impossible. One would not then put chance and spontaneity among what comes to be out of necessity and always; for no one would say the sun enters the Ram according to chance, or the moon received illumination according to chance, nor [that these things happen! from spontaneity and not in accordance with some rational principle (logos). But nor should one put chance and spontaneity among the very normal, for who would say Socrates came to be five-fingered out of chance or spontaneity? So it remains to put chance and spontaneity among the exceptional. For what occurs by chance is rare or exceptional, and the rare and exceptional come from chance and from spontaneity. So we have from this division that chance and spontaneity are exceptional. Again among the things that come to b e some come to be for the sake of something (and such are all natural things and artifacts), and some for the sake of nothing, such as moving one's hand while discoursing or plucking hairs from one's head or beard, for these things take place by a sort of habit [and] for the sake of nothing. So one should put chance as the cause of these things among things that come to be for the sake of something, not among things that do so for the sake of nothing, and chance and spontaneity are among things for the sake of something, not as themselves producing [things] for the sake of something but as following on things that are for the sake of something. So we have [the result] that chance and spontaneity are both among things that are for the sake of something, on account of the second division, and among the exceptional, on account of the former one. And he divides that which is for the sake of something into things which are in accordance with choice and those which are not in accordance with choice. In accordance with choice are all the things that are in our power, while not in accordance with choice are natural things and artifacts. You will reduce chance then under what is in accordance with choice, and spontaneity under what is not in accordance with choice. For artifacts arise from reasoning but not from choice, for choice is a selection of this rather than that, and the craftsman does not select what he wishes but what the art demands, and even if sometimes he deliberates he does not deliberate qua craftsman; for deliberation, as he himself says, arises through lack of wisdom. So that if art is present there is no need for deliberation. So that neither is art among the things in our power, for the things in our power [are done] in accordance with choice, like bathing or not, and related matters. He has put to use a third division, or rather he further divides what is for the sake of something in another way. For of things 521

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which are for the sake of something, he says, some arise from reasoning and some by nature - by reasoning those which are in 20 accordance with choice and in accordance with art (for reasoning has a wider sphere than choice), and by nature natural things. But all [these things] are for the sake of something. For nature produces [things] for the sake of something (for it wants to attain the natural form), and reasoning similarly [does so]. For indeed both what is in accordance with art and what is in accordance with choice take place for the sake of something. For instance, I bathe in order to be healthy and read in order to become famous. 25 So you will reduce chance under what is in accordance with reasoning and spontaneity under what is in accordance with nature. For of things which arise for the sake of something, either in accordance with reasoning or in accordance with nature, when these things attain the appropriate aim nothing is said to have happened from chance or from spontaneity; but when these things either do not attain the aim, or, even though they attain it, something from outside follows per accidens on the choice-dependent and natural 30 impulse, [something] which had in no way been implicit in the aim of nature or of the choice, this is said to have happened in 269,1 accordance with chance (if it followed after the choice-dependent impulse) or in accordance with spontaneity (if [it followed after] the natural [impulse]). For instance, someone went out to bathe and then, before he bathed, [someone] he did not expect met him, and he intimated to h i m that some books were for sale which he had long sought to buy but had not hoped to find then, and not bothering 5 about the baths he went off to purchase the books. So the purchase of the books is said to have occurred in accordance with chance, for it followed after a choice-dependent impulse, the journey to the baths. Here the choice failed of the aim, but another end followed per accidens on an impulse of this kind. Again someone went out to bathe but was struck by a falling stone and so could no longer bathe. 10 And if someone went out to spend time in the market and on his way fell in there with a friend who had returned from an absence whom he would not have hoped to see, the chance result is said to have followed per accidens after the aim and the end of the choice. The situation is similar in the case of natural things too. For instance, a stone fell from on high, not having been securely perched, and was borne down by [its] natural impulse to the 15 appropriate and natural place, and having been borne down smashed against some solid bodies and had its projections broken off and became suitable for a seat. This is said to have happened out of spontaneity, having followed per accidens on the natural impulse and the aim of nature. And being born with six fingers, and, to speak without qualification, all monstrosities, [come] out of spontaneity 5 2 6

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through following after a natural impulse, but do not follow after the natural end, but it happens that these things arise when nature misses that [end]. So that from these cases too we have [the result] that chance and spontaneity are among per accidens causes. So collecting together what has been shown from all this he defines chance [by saying] that it is 'a cause per accidens among things which are exceptional in accordance with choice of things that are for the sake of something'. In order for the definition to become clearer we should transpose the wording in this way, [saying] that chance is among things that are for the sake of something in the sphere of what is in accordance with choice, a cause per accidens of things that come to be exceptionally. Similarly he will give the definition of spontaneity, saying t h a t spontaneity is among things that are for the sake of something in the sphere of what is in accordance with nature, a cause per accidens of things that come to be exceptionally. For as I s a i d , when in the sphere of things in accordance with choice other things confront [one], outside the original goal, the cause of the result of these cases is said to be chance, and when [this happens] in the sphere of things in accordance with nature, spontaneity. And among things for the sake of something [he says] that that for the sake of which follows per accidens on the nature and the choice. And if from these definitions you take away in the one case 'in the sphere of what is in accordance with choice' and in the other 'in the sphere of what is in accordance with nature' you will produce the definition of the common [sense of] 'spontaneity', which is predicated both of chance and of spontaneity properly so called. So how do chance and spontaneity differ from the other causes which are so called per accidens, such as the bald man or the white man? For the bald man or the white man is said to have built, or to be the cause of the son, if the father or the builder is of such a kind. [They differ] because with the other causes which are so called per accidens each of them is a different thing alongside the per se cause and holds true of it additionally, and one of them is a cause per se and the other per accidens of one and the same end - for of the house the carpenter is [a cause] per se and the bald man per accidens, and the bald man is other than the carpenter in definition (logos), and [being] the bald man happened to be a feature of the carpenter. But in the case of chance and spontaneity the reverse [holds], for one and the same cause is a cause of one end per se and of another per accidens. For the journey to the market is one and the same in both definition and number but is a cause per se of spending time in the market and per accidens of falling in with the friend; and the downward motion of the stone is a cause per se of its coming to be in its appropriate place and per accidens of the stone's striking the 527

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passer-by or becoming suitable for a seat. So that here the ends are 20 two and the cause one, but in the former case, contrariwise, the causes were two in their own nature but the end was one; for the definition of the bald man is one thing and that of the builder is another. So that you will say that chance [treated] more generically is a per accidens cause active about what it did not intend to be active about, while more specifically and proximately it is [a set of causes which are] myriad-fold and indeterminate; for the journey to the baths and 25 that to the temple and myriads of other things could be causes of the same thing. Similarly in the case of spontaneity too you will give its nature more generically as again being active about something which is not the aim and end of the natural principles, and more specifically similarly the causes will be myriad-fold and indeterminate. 'First, then, since we see that some things come to be always in the same way, ... .' The first division, into things that [come to be] out of 30 necessity and always, those that [come to be] normally, and those that [come to be] exceptionally. 532

196M3: But since there are some things that come to be besides these too. Besides what [comes to be] out of necessity and what [comes to be] normally; and these are the exceptional. 'For such things are from chance, and the things that are from 271,1 chance [we know to be] such as these.' Since the exceptional exists, he says, it is obviously what [comes to be] from chance and spontaneity. For these convert with each other, and the exceptional [comes to be] from spontaneity or from chance, while what [comes to be] from chance and spontaneity is exceptional. But one must realise that the exceptional is not in every case from 5 chance and spontaneity. For if someone eats meat sparingly through lack [of it] or through having no taste for i t , such a man would not eat the meat from chance, since he ate it after voluntarily himself buying it. Also very large pearls are among those found exceptionally, but still even these did not come to be spontaneously, but by nature, and the man who collected them did not collect them 10 by chance, for he went with this purpose, to find pearls. And many other cases are like this. 533

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196bl7: Of things that come to be some come to be for the sake of something and others not. And of these some [come to be] in accordance with choice and others not in accordance with choice; but both [belong] among things that are for the sake of something. 15

The second division, into things for the sake of something and things for the sake of nothing. And both, he says, [i.e.] chance and spontaneity, should be put among things that are for the sake of something. But note that, when he divided what is for the sake of something into what is in accordance with choice and what is not, he did not reduce chance and spontaneity under these [separately] but into the genus [of them]; for 'both [belong] among things that are for the sake of something', he says. O r by 'things that are for the sake of something' we are to understand what is in accordance with choice and what is not in accordance with choice, under which he says chance and spontaneity are reduced, the former into what is in accordance with choice and the latter into the other [category]. By [things] not in accordance with choice he means things that come to be by nature and by art. 535

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196bl9: So that it is clear that also among things that are outside the necessary and the normal there are some associated with which there can exist that which is for the sake of something.

Having got from the two divisions [the result] that choice and spontaneity are among both the exceptional and things which are for the sake of something, he wishes to conclude syllogistically what 272,1 comes to light from these [premises], and this is that some things that are exceptional are for the sake of something. The syllogism is in the third figure: chance and spontaneity are exceptional; chance and spontaneity are for the sake of something; therefore something exceptional is for the sake of something. So that one 5 should not be surprised if we say that chance and spontaneity are among things that are for the sake of something and also among exceptional things. The syllogism will be thought to conclude syllogistically the same things from the same things; for we have in the premises that the same thing is both for the sake of something and exceptional, so that it will seem superfluous to try and conclude that very thing which we have taken [as true] in the premises. So I assert [in answer to this] that in the premises there has not been 10 taken [as given] something [both] exceptional [and] for the sake of something, but chance and spontaneity, as being exceptional and for the sake of something, and this has been shown piecemeal; so the 537

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syllogism infers not that chance and spontaneity are among things that are for the sake of something and that are exceptional, but that something exceptional is for the sake of something. 196b21: For the sake of something are whatever could be done from reasoning and whatever [could come to be] from nature.

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The third division. Having divided what is for {he sake of something into what is in accordance with choice and what is not, he divides the same thing in accordance with another [and] further division, [which is] a more proximate one. For, of things which are for the sake of something, some are from reasoning and others from nature; [and] then you could divide what comes from reasoning in accordance with the first division, [saying] that, of the things that are from reasoning, some are in accordance with choice and others not in accordance with choice. 540

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itself saved, though its master died when an engagement took place; 15 for it is said to have been saved spontaneously, not because it had a natural end spontaneously but because [the result] followed on a natural impulse. 196b24: For as one thing is per se a thing which is and another [is so] per accidens . . . . That there are some per accidens causes he establishes as follows. 20 For if, he says, some of the things that are are things that are per accidens it is clear that the causes of these things too would be causes per accidens. For [the man in the example] proceeded to the market per s e but fell in per accidens with the friend who had returned from abroad. So if the things which are per accidens exist the per accidens causes of these obviously exist too, when even of the 25 things that are per se there are said to be per accidens causes too: of a house the builder is a cause per se and the bald man per accidens. Per accidens causes, he says, are indeterminate; for the white man and the snub-nosed man and the cultured man and a myriad of other things can be [causes of a given thing], but the per se cause is determinate, for always the builder is cause of the house and the 30 shipwright of the boat. So when per accidens causes follow on causes that are for the sake of something, he says, then it is chance and spontaneity that are being spoken of. So from here you have the conception in accordance with which a short while ago chance and spontaneity were said to be among things that are for the sake of 274,1 something, because they are said [to be] among things that are for the sake of something on account of their following o n things that are for the sake of something - I mean things in accordance with nature and things in accordance with reason. These features then belong to them in common: being among the exceptional, and among things that are for the sake of something, and [being] per accidens; but what their difference with respect to 5 each other is he will say a little later, though we have stated it in anticipation, that chance follows things that are in accordance with reason, or, better, things that are in accordance with choice, while spontaneity [follows] things that are in accordance with nature. 544

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196b33: He would have come to get back [his] money while [his debtor] was collecting the subscription, had he known; but he did not come for the sake of this but it happened that he came and did this [which might have been expected to be] for the sake of collecting [his debt]. 548

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for the sake of something without themselves being for the sake of something. Now, that chance and spontaneity are not for the sake of something is obvious. For when the debtor was collecting the subscription the creditor, had he known, would have come for this purpose, to get [his money] back; but he did not come for this purpose; therefore the cause of [his] getting [it] back, which we say is chance, is not one of the things that are for the sake of something, but one of the things that are per accidens. But since he set out for the sake of bathing but got the money back when he fell in with the debtor collecting the subscription, the journey to the baths is called a cause per accidens of the getting back [of the money]; but it was also one of the things for the sake of something (for the journey was for the sake of bathing); the per accidens cause therefore followed on that which was per se and for the sake of something. But this we call chance; therefore chance is among things which are for the sake of something while itself being a per accidens cause. The text has both 'was collecting' and 'in order to collect' (in the future tense, so that it would apply to the creditor); but rather the former [reading is correct]. The words 'it happened that he came and did this for the sake of collecting' are in place of'[...] as if for the sake of collecting'. 'And this [he did though] frequenting the locality neither normally nor out of necessity.' ([He writes] 'frequenting' [in the nominative] instead of'frequenting' [in the genitive]). For if it was habitual for the debtor to frequent either always or normally the locality where the creditor fell in with him and got [his] money back, the getting back is not said [to arise] from chance - unless after all by reference to the intention of the man who got [the money] back, because it was not with this intention, of getting [it] back, that he frequented that place; but strictly and especially we say chance is a cause of those things among which nothing as a rule [belongs in] what is normal. But if it was habitual for the debtor to frequent the locality it is not [in the realm] of what is beyond expectation that the creditor on coming there should get [his money] back, whereas chance is beyond expectation. The words 'frequenting normally' can also be understood as applying to the man who got back [his money]. For the man who fell in with the debtor should not normally frequent the locality where he fell in with him. For if the debtor fell in with him when he was accustomed normally to be found in a certain place it was presumably not beyond expectation that on coming there the debtor should restore [the money]; but chance should always be beyond expectation.

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197al: And the end, the collecting [of the money], is not one of the causes in h i m . 554

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That is, the collecting of the money is not something natural; for those things which have [their] cause in themselves are natural, but the collecting has [its] cause from outside, the reasoning which moved [the man] to the baths. And the whole [point is] that the collecting of the money is one of the things that [arise] from chance, not one of those that [arise] from spontaneity; for things that [arise] from spontaneity have [their] cause in themselves, but plainly in themselves per accidens, since even nature is a per accidens cause of what [arises] from spontaneity, as even reasoning is a per accidens cause of what [arises] from chance. So that things too that [arise] from chance, if they are said to be from reasoning, are plainly from reasoning per accidens, not per se. For what holds of the cause holds also of what is caused, and vice-versa. Having said this he next defines chance, assembling its definition out of what has been shown. 197a6: Wherefore reasoning and chance concern the same thing.

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the cultured and the young man, and myriads of other things, can be a per accidens cause of the house; and the journey to the baths and that to the temple and myriads of other things [can be a per accidens cause] of the man collecting the money when he had set out not on this account; and digging for planting and laying foundations and digging a well and myriads of other things [can be a per accidens cause] of finding a treasure on digging a hole. And for this very reason chance is called unclear too, because it is also indeterminate, and [it is] indeterminate because per accidens; for the per se cause of the house has been determined, the builder, but what is the per accidens cause of the house is unclear to man, and unclear because also indeter­ minate. And chance is reasonably [said to be] beyond expectation; for a rational account (logos) is of things that are static, and those are either what comes out of necessity or what is normal, whereas chance is in the sphere of the things that are exceptional. And for this very reason again it is also unstable; for the stable is either in the sphere of things which are always the same or in that of things which are normal, but the exceptional is not stable, and chance is in the sphere of the exceptional. Sometimes we say, too, that chance is a cause of nothing (for [we say] nothing comes to be from chance), and this [we say] consonantly with the rational account given concerning chance. For per se causes are causes strictly while per accidens causes are causes homonymously or pseudonymously, and chance is a per accidens cause, and therefore chance is not strictly a cause. And we say that chance is a cause of nothing because we say that chance happenings are uncaused, because they do not have a determinate per se cause, but if chance things are uncaused then chance is a cause of nothing - for if it is [a cause of anything] then it is a cause of chance things, and if it is not a cause of these it is not a cause of anything at all. It is necessary then that the causes from which what is from chance could arise should be indeterminate/ Since none of those things which happen from chance has a determinate cause, it is clear that chance, too, is indeterminate, and because of this is also unclear to man.

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197al4: But in an unqualified sense of nothing. In one sense, he says, chance is a cause of some things and in one sense of nothing; for in an unqualified sense, that is, strictly and per se, it is a cause of nothing, but per accidens it is a cause of the things that come to be exceptionally. 197al9: But chance [arises] in what comes to be besides these.

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Besides the necessary and the normal, and these things are the exceptional. So since the causes of what comes to be exceptionally are indeterminate, chance, too, is indeterminate. 197a21: Still one might be puzzled in some cases about whether it follows that just any things can be causes of chance.

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What he asks through these [words] is this: since chance is one of the per accidens causes, and we said that even among the per accidens causes there are more proximate and more remote ones, are all of them equally causes of the product? I mean something like this: a man set out for the market, and then before entering the market met someone and conversed with him and spent some time in the conversation, and then after this on going into the market he fell in with the man who had the money and has got it back. So the journey itself, the conversation in the middle (for had he not spent time [on this] he would have entered the market more quickly and doubtless not have fallen in with the debtor), and the entering the market itself, [each of these] is a cause per accidens of [his] falling in with the debtor; but entering the market was the proximate [cause], falling in with the friend [was] the middle one, and the journey itself [was] the more remote one. [Given this], then, do we say that any one of these is equally a cause of the things that happen by chance? So we say that with respect to being chance causes it makes no difference whether we say 'proximate' or 'remote', for all these are equally chance causes; but with respect to the result it makes all the difference, for the more proximate is more of a cause of the result. For even the journey itself is a cause per accidens of getting the money back (for had he not set out he would not have fallen in with [the debtor] and got it back); but the conversation with a friend in the middle is more of a cause (for if he had not conversed he would have gone away more quickly and not have found [the debtor]); and even more of a cause than this is the arrival at the market. So about this there is a puzzle, he says, about whether just any things should be given as causes of chance - and he calls 'chance' [here] the product that emerges from chance. 565

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197a23: For instance, [the cause] of health is either the wind or the heating, but not the cutting of [the man's] h a i r . 566

For in these cases either the wind or the heating (i.e. the warming by the sun) is a more proximate [cause], and the cutting of [the man's] hair is more remote. For a certain sick man had his hair cut, not for the sake of becoming healthy, but to get rid of the h a i r , and then the wind blew or he had his head warmed by the sun, not for the sake of becoming healthy, but having set out perhaps for some other purpose, and his head being dried by the heat of the sun or by the wind he perspired and became healthy, having done none of these things for his health. So the heating is more proximate to health, not the cutting of the hair. So with respect to the result the proximate [event] was more of a cause, but with respect to being from chance in an unqualified sense it will make no difference to speak of the proximate or remote.

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197a25: L u c k is called good when something good emerges and poor when something poor [emerges]. 570

When an end such as he would have chosen confronts someone who has not chosen it such an end is called good luck, and the opposite bad l u c k . [Someone is called] lucky or unlucky when an end [which is] either a major evil or a major good confronts [him] per accidens.

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197a27: Wherefore also almost to get a large good or evil is to be unlucky or lucky, because thought speaks [of the good or evil] as existing; for what is almost [there] is thought to be no distance away. When someone falls in with a big danger and comes near to being in danger of also falling into a great evil, such as a shipwreck or 280,1 something else, if he then escapes the danger with little to spare we call such a man lucky, because he escaped after nearly encountering the danger. And similarly [we call] unlucky one who almost obtained

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a great good; for such a one is so unlucky, we say, as to have come to the very [point of] attaining these or those fine things, but then missed them by a little. For since what almost [happens] is thought to be no distance away from the end, thought does not reckon in this small b i t but, as though these things had [actually] issued, calls the man who falls into them lucky or unlucky; for thought regards the man who almost encounters a great danger as having already fallen into the danger, through not reckoning in the small bit, and then when he escapes from the danger it calls [him] in this way lucky. And similarly [thought calls] unlucky the man who nearly attains great goods; for it regards him as having already attained the goods, and does not reckon in the small bit, and then when he misses these it calls [him] unlucky. For we usually call lucky not those who are wealthy and happy because of inheritance, but those who suddenly pass into happiness from being obscure and luckless, and similarly [we call] unlucky those especially who have fallen down from happiness. 572

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[is]

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[He means] that good luck is called unstable, in accordance with the formula of the definition of luck. For the secure is either among things that are necessary or among those that are normal, while luck is in the sphere of the exceptional; therefore luck is not stable. On account of this good luck, too, is unstable. 197a32: Both of these then are causes (chance spontaneity), as has been said, but per accidens.

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Having shown both that chance and spontaneity exist and what they are, and having fitted onto the definition given of chance the things which in accordance with common conception are thought to belong to it, he goes on to the rest of the problems. These are how chance and spontaneity differ from each other, and under which type of the causes they are classified. But before this he discusses the common [sense of] 'spontaneity', and shows that it extends more widely than chance, using a syllogism in the third figure as follows: in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things spontaneity exists; in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things chance does not exist; therefore some spontaneous thing is not chance. This then is the syllogism, and Aristotle establishes both of the premises, the affirmative one by induction. For we say that the stone was borne down spontaneously when it was borne down not by 575

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any intention; and the horse was saved spontaneously because it threw its master and fled from the column, being thirsty, and it happened that an engagement took place and its master died; so the horse is said to have been saved spontaneously. And children could be said to undergo something spontaneously in the same way as, say, they wander away from their nurse with no one leading them and return home without knowing where they were being borne; for they are said [then] to have returned spontaneously. In this way too in the case of accomplished [actions], when movement takes place without calculation holding it up, we say the feet moved spontaneously:

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'Swiftly he mounted the car with spontaneous feet.'

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The negative premise he establishes through a syllogism in the second figure, taking good luck as the middle term: in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things good luck does not exist; in cases where chance exists good luck also exists; therefore in the case of children and irrational and inanimate things chance does not exist. But where [does he get the premise] from that good luck exists for none of the children and the inanimate things and the irrational things? He shows this again in the second figure through happiness as a middle term: for children and inanimate and irrational things happiness does not exist; for things for which good luck exists happiness exists too; therefore for children and inanimate and irrational things good luck does not exist. But where [does he get the premise] from that for children and inanimate and irrational things happiness does not exist? He shows [this] in the second figure again, through well-doing as a middle term: in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things well-doing does not exist; for things for which happiness exists well-doing exists too; therefore in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things happiness does not exist. But again where [does he get the premise] from that in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things well-doing does not exist? He shows [this] by the same figure through action as the middle term: in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things action does not exist; in the case of things for which well-doing and ill-doing exist action exists; therefore in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things neither well-doing nor ill-doing exists. 582

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It is clear that for the sake of accuracy one should take the contraries of good luck and happiness too: in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things good luck and bad luck do not exist; for things for which chance exists good luck and bad luck exist; [therefore in the case of children and inanimate and irrational 586

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things chance does not exist.] Similarly, in the case of happiness too: in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things happiness or misery do not exist; for things for which good luck or 10 bad luck exist happiness or misery exist; therefore in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things good luck or bad luck do not exist. Similarly, in the case of well-doing too. And Aristotle stopped at action, taking it as agreed that in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things action does not exist; but you will establish this too through choice as the middle term: in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things 15 choice does not exist (for none of them selects this rather than that ); in cases where action exists choice exists too; therefore in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things action does not exist. So you will compose the whole syllogistic argument in this way: in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things choice does not exist; in cases where choice does not exist neither is there action; in cases where there is not action neither is there well-doing; in 20 cases where there is not well-doing neither is there happiness; in cases where there is not happiness neither is there good luck; in cases where there is not good luck neither is there chance; therefore in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things chance does not exist; in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things spontaneity does exist (as we showed through the induction); therefore some spontaneous thing is not chance, which was our task to show from the start. 25 Spontaneity is said [to occur] in the case of chancy things too, he says (for this finally he takes from [linguistic] usage, for things that result from chance too are said to arise out of spontaneity); therefore spontaneity is wider than chance. For if every [case of] chance is also [one of] spontaneity (as human usage shows), but not every [case of] spontaneity is also [one of] chance (as the syllogistic argument showed), then spontaneity is wider than chance. 30 But if anyone should seek a demonstration that chancy things too are said [to arise] out of spontaneity, let him recognise that he seeks 283,1 a proof not concerning the significance of the thing [itself] but concerning human usage - and there is no other demonstration of usage than the habit of men. However, usage is found not only applying 'spontaneity' to chance events (for we say that I fell in with my friend out of spontaneity) but also [applying] 'chance' to what 5 [arises] out of spontaneity, for we say the horse was saved in accordance with chance when it fled from the column for the sake of drinking, and that it 'chanced' that the stone in falling became suitable for a seat. But there is no point in extending [our enquiry] far concerning the usage of words, since the significance of the 587

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things [themselves] is not at all corrupted [by the omission]. After this he distinguishes spontaneity in the specific sense from chance, saying those things we have said many times, that chance follows those things that come to be in accordance with choice, while spontaneity properly so called [follows those that come to be] in accordance with nature. Then having distinguished them from each other he enquires into the still remaining problem, among what sort of causes they are to be classified, and he shows that [they are to be classified] among the efficient causes. For if chance and spontaneity are a cause of things which come to be per accidens either from nature or from reasoning, and reasoning and nature are efficient causes, then both chance and spontaneity would be [cases] of efficient causes. 'Both of these then are causes (both chance and spontaneity), as has been said, per accidens.' This, he says, belongs in common to chance and spontaneity, [namely] being causes per accidens of the things that come to be exceptionally - not all of them, but 'those that could have come to be for the sake of something'. For there are some exceptional things that come to be fruitlessly, as when someone might move the hair of his beard (not continuously). For this neither is for the sake of something (for it is fruitless) nor does it follow on things that come to be for the sake of something. Therefore the [words] 'and of these things those that could have come to be for the sake of something' have the sense: 'those things that could have followed on the things that come to be for the sake of something.' For things that come to be out of spontaneity do not come to be for the sake of something. For the collecting of the money is not for the sake of something, but, if anything, [it] is that for the sake of which, and this per accidens; for this followed after the journey, which took place for the sake of bathing; so that the collecting was per accidens an end for the journey and that for the sake of which [it took place], and the journey was per accidens for the sake of the collecting, and it is also called a spontaneous and per accidens cause of the collecting.

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197a36: They differ because spontaneity is wider. Having said what they have in common he says also how they differ. [In stating the] difference between them he states not [that] between chance and spontaneity properly so called, which is opposed to chance (for this he does next), but [that between chance and] the common [sense of] spontaneity, as though someone were to state the difference between animal and man as well [by saying] that animal differs from man by animal being predicated of more things. So he says this now too, that spontaneity differs from 604

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chance in this, that of whatever chance is predicated, of those things so is spontaneity too, but of those things that spontaneity [is predicated of it is] not in every case [true that] being from chance [is predicated of them]. So that it is clear that spontaneity is [predicated] more widely than chance. That spontaneity too, then, [is predicated] of those things that chance [is predicated of] he takes as having been agreed from usage (for the demonstration of this depended on usage, not on argument {logos)), but that not in every case is chance too [predicated] of those things that spontaneity [is predicated of] he establishes through a syllogistic argument, which we have already expounded pre­ viously. This is as follows: in the case of small children and inanimate and irrational things spontaneity is observed; in the case of small children and inanimate and irrational things chance is not observed; therefore something spontaneous is not chance. So of these two premises the affirmative one he puts last and bases on induction, as we shall note in its place, but the negative premise he first lays the foundation for, and then expounds. For first he establishes of what sort of things chance could be predicated, [i.e.] of things having what sort of nature, and then, finally, fits what has been said onto children and inanimate and irrational things, [saying] that chance does not exist in their case, because neither do the things in connexion with which chance is observed. 606

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197bl: For chance and [arising] from chance exist in those things in which being lucky, and action of every sort, could exist. Wherefore it is necessary that chance should concern things that should be done. 610

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If chance is divided into good luck and bad luck, then in those things in which neither good luck nor bad luck can exist chance cannot either. He himself only talked of one of the opposites, good luck, it being obvious at the start that where one of the opposites is of a nature to exist there too the remaining one [is of a nature to exist]. So that in those cases where it is impossible for good luck to exist it is impossible for bad luck to exist either. Now it is obvious at the start that where good luck applies so does chance, and it remains to learn in what cases good luck [applies]. So he says good luck is spoken of in those cases in which action is too; for good luck is a sort of well-doing. That in those cases where good luck [applies] so does action too he shows through happiness as a middle term. So he goes on like this: 'And it is a sign [of this] that [good luck] is thought to be either the same as or akin to happiness, and happiness is [a kind of] action; for it is well-doing/ It is a sign, he says, that chance concerns things 611

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that should be done, that good luck is thought either to differ not at all from happiness or to be akin to it, as though chance were a kind of action, good luck being well-doing and bad luck bad-doing; and happiness, he says, is a kind of action. Next, where [does he get it] from that [happiness is a kind of] action? He establishes it through well-doing. For happiness, he says, is a kind of well-doing, and well-doing is a kind of action; therefore happiness is a kind of action. If, consequently, good luck is the same as happiness, and happiness is a kind of action, then good luck too is a kind of action. And good luck is a kind of chance; therefore chance is a kind of action. And the syllogism is in the third figure: all good luck is chance; all good luck is a kind of action; therefore chance is a kind of action. If, consequently, chance is [a kind of] action, then in cases where there is no action neither could there be chance. And he himself, as I said earlier, carries the argument (logos) forward as far as action, and if you ask in what cases there is action I assert: in those cases where there is also choice. If, consequently, all chance is [a kind of] action, and there is action in those cases in which there is choice, then there is chance in those cases in which there is also choice; and if there is chance in those cases in which there is also choice, then in those cases where there is not choice neither is there chance. 613

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So having shown thus in what things there is chance, [namely] in those things in which there is also action, and that in those where 286,1 there is not action neither is there chance, finally he expounds the negative premise and says: T o r this reason neither does any inanimate thing nor any beast nor any small child do anything from chance', taking 'beast' to mean Irrational thing', because being tame and sociable is particularly a special property of reason (logos), so that the opposite (I mean, being wild) is [a special property] of 5 irrationality (alogia), which he characterised through 'beast'. Consequently, if neither an inanimate thing nor an irrational thing nor a beast does anything from chance, and spontaneity is predicated of these very things, as he will show next, then it seems that some spontaneous thing is not from chance. 'And it is a sign [of this] that [good luck] is thought to be either the same as or akin to happiness.' That happiness, which is agreed to 10 be a kind of well-doing, is either the same as or akin to good luck is a sign that chance concerns things that can be done. But happiness is [a kind of] action; therefore good luck too is [a kind of] action; and good luck is a kind of chance, so chance too is [a kind of] action. He says 'either the same as or akin to' because good luck is thought to concern external things. Consequently, if good luck concerns external things, and happiness too is thought by the many 15 to concern external things, then in this way happiness is the same 618

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as good luck. But since in reality happiness concerns the well-doing of the soul, if someone were to define happiness as concerning not only the well-doing of the soul but also well-doing [in respect] of external things, obviously good luck [would be] akin to happiness and not the same [as it]. But in reality good luck in the strict sense would be not in an unqualified sense that which involves well-doing [in respect] of external matters but that which [involves well-doing in respect] of the soul, and this comes to the same thing as happiness. 197b8: Nor do good luck and lucklessness exist at all for these, unless by way of similitude, as Protarchus says. 621

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Good luck is not spoken of, he says, in the case of children and inanimate and irrational things, unless by way of some similitude and analogy. The [words] 'as Protarchus says', do not refer to 'unless by way of similitude', for Protarchus did not say the stones were lucky by way of similitude but [that they were] lucky, in an unqualified sense. So one should read [the passage] as: 'nor, as Protarchus says, do good luck and bad luck exist for these', and then the [words] 'unless by way of similitude' is his own judgement, [saying] how it is possible to talk of good luck and bad luck in the case even of inanimate things. By 'Protarchus' he means either the one in [Plato's] Philebus or some other. 622

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197b 11: Being affected by chance exists in a way even for these things, whenever the agent acts in some way from chance concerning them, but otherwise it does not exist [for them]. Chance can be spoken of by analogy, he says, in the case even of inanimate things, not as Protarchus said [but] as, when the agent acts in some way concerning inanimate things from chance, those things too could then be said to have been affected from chance. For instance, [it can be so spoken of in such a case] as when someone throws a stone to hit someone, and does not hit him but makes the stone into a triangle without having wished to do that. For this man is said to have done this from chance, and because of him who was active the stone too is said to have become a triangle from chance. So only in this way, he says, is it possible for being from chance to be spoken of in the case of inanimate things. But how so? Does not [linguistic] habit recognise good luck in the case of infants? At any rate when someone who is not a member of the family dies and leaves his property to a new-born baby, we say this infant is lucky, and presumably we would not say the inheriting came to be for the infant out of spontaneity; for this did not follow on some natural impulse either of the infant or of him who left the money. 624

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197bl3: But spontaneity [applies] both to the other and to many of the inanimate things.

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animals

Here he has laid out the affirmative premise, that spontaneity exists both for inanimate things and for children and the irrational animals. And he persuades [us] by example, [saying] that we say the horse that fled from the line of battle, either being thirsty or being otherwise moved by some natural impulse, was saved spon­ taneously. Tor instance, the horse went spontaneously, we say, because on going it was saved, but it did not go for the sake of being saved.' One should read the wording in a transposed way: The horse on going was saved spontaneously, because it went but did not go for the sake of being saved.' For it went on account of something else, for the sake either of drinking or of something else, and it happened that on going it was saved. 'And the tripod fell spontaneously; for it stood [there] for the sake of sitting, but did not fall for the sake of sitting.' If the tripod was hanging and fell, and on falling took up such-and-such a position so that its position was suitable for a seat, it is said to have such a position spontaneously, since it fell and was borne by its natural impulse; but it did not fall for this purpose, to become a seat. For if a stone with a cubical shape fell it would not be said to be lying spontaneously for being sat on. For it was suitable in its nature [for] falling in this way in every case, if it fell [at a l l ] . For this reason neither is fire said to be borne upwards spontaneously; for this is the nature of fire. 628

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197bl8: So that it is clear that among things that come to be for the sake of something in an unqualified sense, whenever things whose cause is outside come to be not for the sake of the result, then we say they [come to be] from spontaneity. Definition of the common [sense of] 'spontaneity' in the sphere of things that are for the sake of something, both those that are in accordance with nature and those that are in accordance with choice. [He says] 'in an unqualified sense' (haplos) instead of 'in general' (katholou). So spontaneity is in the sphere of things that come to be for the sake of something, both those that are in accordance with nature and those that are in accordance with choice. 'Whenever [things whose cause is outside] come to be not for the sake of the result': for instance, the collection of the money. For he did not set out for this reason, to collect the money, nor did the stone fall for this reason, to become suitable for a seat.

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'[Things] whose cause is outside' [he says] instead of'things which come to be for the sake of something [where] the cause of the result is outside it'. And [he says] 'outside' instead of'not naturally tending 25 towards the end, but [where] the cause of the outcome is outside it, even though it is for the sake of something else'; for instance, the journey to the market was the cause per accidens of falling in with the friend, but this cause is also 'outside' the outcome in the sense that it does not naturally tend towards the outcome and is for the sake of something else, such as bathing. So the whole thought, to speak in summary, is this: spontaneity in 289,1 an unqualified sense is what follows on things that come to be for the sake of something, when they come to be not for the sake of this very result, and where the cause of the result is outside, because the cause of the result is not in these things per se. For in those things where the cause of what is produced is per se, the cause of the result is not 5 outside; for instance, the cause of the house is not outside the building [of it] but is in that, for the building naturally tends towards the house.

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197b20: Of these things those are from chance which are among things chosen and come to be spontaneously for those who have choice. 634

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Having defined the common [sense of] spontaneity he defines also 'from chance', [saying] that I call 'from chance' those of chosen things which come to be from spontaneity for those who have choice. For instance, demanding money belongs among chosen things, and when it follows on spontaneously for those having choice it is said to be from chance. [He says] 'which are chosen' meaning 'things coming to be in accordance with choice, or else things following on things coming to be in accordance with choice'. Now he talked of 'chosen things' because some things can come to be spontaneously for those who have choice without being among chosen things, as when, in eating, something being eaten falls into the windpipe, or when in walking one strikes one's foot (for [here] something followed spontaneously from outside after the natural impulse), or when something falls from above and an abscess is broken and cured; for these things happen to those who have choice, but do not follow after choice-dependent activities of theirs. 'For those who have choice' he added because even inanimate things are said to experience something 'from chance' 'when the agent acts from chance concerning them', but they experience it without having choice; therefore such things are not strictly said to be 'from chance', but things that happen in this way to those things that do have choice, these are strictly 'from chance'. 636

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197b22: A sign is [the word] 'fruitless', because it is said when what is for the sake of another thing does not [in fact] come to be for the sake of that thing. 639

The very etymology of the word too, he says, is a sign that the spontaneous is such as we have said, [namely] what follows on things that are for the sake of something when they did not come to be for the sake of that thing. For it is derived from 'fruitless' (for it is composed from 'itself and 'fruitless'), and those things are called fruitless which do not meet with the end for which they come to be. For when someone goes for a walk in order to empty his stomach and purge himself, and this does not happen, we say he has walked fruitlessly. If therefore this is fruitless: what 'is of a nature to' come to be 'for the sake of something else' but fails of the end, then 'spontaneity' has well been fashioned from 'itself fruitlessly'. For we say the stone became suitable for a seat spontaneously, as though spontaneity had become a cause of this for i t . So since the downward motion of the stone became a per accidens cause of its having such a shape, this is called 'spontaneous', having 'itself fruitlessly' come to be as regards the end resulting [from it] per accidens. For since the natural end of the downward motion was different, [namely] to come to be in its appropriate mass, and another end has followed after such an impulse per accidens, if you should observe the motion as [going] towards this end, and take [it] that this will be the end of it, but then learn that it did not move [down] for this end, you will recognise that it moved fruitlessly, not having taken place for this aim, which happened to be its end. So whether the natural or chosen end results or does not result, since it happened that such a movement had another end, but does not take place for this reason, it would be fruitless [considered] as taking place with regard to this. For instance, if the end of talking were to signify our purposes to each other, and someone talks inarticulately and without looking to this end, such a person talks fruitlessly. So in this way, since the movement on which follows that which is spontaneous (its per accidens end) does not take place for the sake of this end, it will be taking place fruitlessly as not intending just this, even if it is not fruitless with regard to something else.

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What is from spontaneity differs from the fruitless in the way that also the final [cause does] from the efficient, just as also what is from chance does from chance. For [taking it] all in all, suppose some end emerges such that it has its appropriate efficient causes but comes to be without [those] efficient causes pre-existing but with other ones [instead] which themselves also used [previously] to be followed by another appropriate end: then [these latter] pre-existing [efficient causes] are said to have come to be fruitlessly, because the

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end which lay before them did not come to be out of them, while the actual consequences [are said to have come to be] spontaneously, because they came to be without their appropriate source pre-existing. For instance, a stone fell and struck the passer-by: for 5 here we might say the striking was the end and the falling was the efficient cause. But the striking also had another appropriate source - not the falling but, let us say, being thrown by someone in order to strike; and the falling did not have the striking as an end, but being borne into its appropriate place. They became per accidens the one the cause and the other the end of each other. 10 You will ask whether one should also call monsters spontaneous, or not. For they too will be thought to be spontaneous. For the natural impulse, failing of the appropriate end, becomes a cause of these per accidens. But perhaps one should not call these spontaneous. For they have an appropriate prior cause in themselves - either cooling or defect or excess of the matter. But 15 someone will s a y that the falling stone too had its weight within, but that this was an efficient [cause] of its falling but not of its striking [the passer-by], unless per accidens. And certainly (alia gar) in the case of the stone, too, which became suitable for a seat there is in every case either some prominence or another stone, smashing against which it had its projections broken off and in this way acquired suitability for a seat; yet we still call this spontaneous 20 since there is no determinate efficient cause of such a pattern of the stone. So in this way I assert that in the case of monsters, too, the cold or the superfluity of the matter or its deficiency are material causes, and you could not find a determinate efficient cause of the monsters. So that these, too, are spontaneous. 644

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197b27: Since if someone said he bathed fruitlessly because the sun did not go into eclipse he would be ridiculous, for the former is not for the sake of the latter.

That that is fruitless which does not attain its appropriate end, he shows like this: for even if, he says, [something] does not attain other ends, which are not appropriate for it, it is [still] not called fruitless. For we did not bathe fruitlessly merely because when we bathed the sun did not go into eclipse, since the eclipse of the sun 292,1 was not the end of the bathing, but health or some such thing. So the bathing is not fruitless if the sun does not go into eclipse, but if it does not attain its appropriate end. So the spontaneous gets its etymology from this, from having come to be 'itself fruitlessly' and not attaining its proper end. So in this way we say the stone which 5 falls not for the sake of striking [someone] fell and struck [someone] spontaneously, since it did not from the start have as its aim the

Translation

end-state which [actually] resulted for it. So it fell fruitlessly as regards its end-state, since it does not naturally tend towards this. 650

197b32: [What comes to be from spontaneity] is especially separated from what [comes to be] from chance in things that come to be by nature. The distinguishing mark of the chancy from the spontaneous properly so called, that the spontaneous properly so called happens in things that come to be by nature, while what happens from chance belongs among things chosen. Tor whenever [something] comes to be against nature, then we say it has come to be not from chance but rather from spontaneity.' [He says] 'against nature' instead of 'against the nature', i.e. against the aim of the nature. So when something results against the aim of the nature then, since it follows after the natural impulse per accidens, not in accordance with a natural aim, such a thing is said [to result] spontaneously.

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197b35: And this too is different, for of one the cause is outside and of the other inside. Since he said the spontaneous is separated from chance by the 20 spontaneous being found in the things that come to be by nature, he wishes to separate the spontaneous from what is by nature, lest they should be thought to be the same. So he says that they are distinguished from each other by the cause of the natural end-state which emerges being in [the object] itself, while the cause of the spontaneous is outside. The cause of natural things is within, both 25 because the moving [principle] is in them and because it naturally tends towards the e n d , but in the case of the things that come to be spontaneously the cause is not in them, but outside, and it does not tend naturally towards them but towards other things. 653

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198a2: As for the types of the cause, [they are] in those things whence the source of movement is of each of them.

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He adds the remaining one of the problems, among what sort of causes to classify t h e m , and says, among the efficient causes. For they follow on efficient causes, [namely] nature and thought. But even if the things they are consequent on are determinate, [namely] nature and thought, still they themselves are indeterminate in amount, as we have often said. For there could be myriads of per accidens causes of the same thing. 656

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198a5: Since spontaneity and chance are causes of whatever things either mind or nature might have become a cause of. 10

Earlier, wishing to show that chance and spontaneity exist, he said that these exist to such an extent that 'some too say that spontaneity is the cause of this heaven and of all the cosmoi'; but now, because of this, he rebukes this impious doctrine of theirs from what has been shown. For if spontaneity and chance are per accidens causes (for they are seen among what is exceptional, as has been shown), and if per accidens causes are dependent on per se causes (for this indeed is why they were called per accidens, as being consequent on other things), then per se causes are prior to per accidens causes; therefore per se causes are prior to spontaneity and chance. But these are mind and nature, as has been shown. Therefore mind and nature are prior to chance and spontaneity of which the one [pair] are per se causes and other [pair] per accidens. For even if we agree therefore with those around Democritus and the others that the universe came to be spontaneously, it is necessary that the per se cause, mind and nature, should be prior. So that even if the heaven came to be spontaneously it would have come to be much earlier at the hands of mind and nature. But someone will say in answer to this that per se causes must exist prior to per accidens causes and for this reason mind and nature must exist prior to chance and spontaneity, which are consequent on these - however, [he will add,] it is not necessary for the per se causes, I mean mind and nature, to be causes of the same things as those of which chance and spontaneity might be [causes]. For mind is a cause per se of bathing, but mind is not also a cause per se of collecting the money, which took place by chance. And the horse's being thirsty is a cause per se for the horse of its withdrawal from the camp, but of its being saved on withdrawing, which took place spontaneously, the thirst or the withdrawal is no longer a cause per se but per accidens. So that it has been shown from these [considerations] that mind and nature must be causes per se of some other things, but [it has] not further [been shown] from them that if spontaneity is a cause of the heaven it is necessary that mind or nature are also causes [of it], unless per accidens; for mind is a cause per accidens of things in accordance with chance, and nature of things from spontaneity, but [they are] no longer [so] per se. So in answer to these [considerations] I myself assert: since those people used to say that all the cosmoi came to be spontaneously, each in a different part of the void, if it has been shown that before chance and spontaneity there must be the per se causes, I mean mind and nature, we could a s k them what mind and nature 657

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could be per se causes of - for if [they are causes] of all the cosmoi per accidens, what could they be [causes] of per se? For there is nothing else besides the infinite cosmoi. So that either mind and nature will not be per se causes of anything at all, which is impossible, or if they are, obviously they are [so] of the infinite cosmoi. Therefore it is well inferred that even according to their own postulates it is necessary to postulate mind and nature as a per se cause both of this cosmos and of them all. For if we have shown that chance and spontaneity are out of necessity dependent on the per se causes, mind and nature, and it is necessary that the per se causes exist before the per accidens causes, what could mind and nature be per se causes of if they were not causes of the cosmoi? So that both from what we have shown and from the postulates of those people it is inferred that mind and nature are per se causes of the universe, even if it were also agreed that spontaneity is a cause of it. 'Since spontaneity and chance are causes of whatever things either mind or nature might have become a cause of, whenever something becomes a cause of these same things per accidens.' Chance, he says, and spontaneity are said to be causes of those things of which mind and nature are causes per accidens. For chance is said to be a cause of the collecting of the money, but before chance mind, which moved [the collector] much earlier, is a cause per accidens; for if it had not moved him to the market or the baths the demanding of the money would never have happened. And the same thing [holds] in the case of nature and spontaneity. So that before chance and spontaneity mind and nature are causes of the same thing per accidens. But everywhere the per se is prior t o the per accidens. So that if mind [were] a cause of the cosmos per accidens it would also much earlier be a cause of it per se. For if it were not a per se cause of that, then of what else would it be [so]? But the wording contains an anomaly. For having said that mind and nature are per accidens causes of what chance and spontaneity are also causes of, he goes on: since per se causes are prior to per accidens causes, therefore mind and nature are prior to spontaneity and chance. Yet if he said that mind and nature are per accidens causes, and the same things are also per se causes, then they would be both prior and posterior to themselves, if, that is, they are both per se causes and per accidens [causes] of the same things. For if they are per se [causes] of some things and per accidens [causes] of others, nothing of what he wishes follows; for it will not follow that mind is a per se cause of the cosmos. But if we are to understand the [words] 'whenever something becomes a cause [of these same things] per accidens' [as referring] to chance and spontaneity, that is, [as saying]: 'whenever chance and spontaneity become a cause of these same things of which either mind or nature become per se 666

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causes', [it will be] no longer true that mind and nature are causes of these things of which chance and spontaneity are per accidens causes. For that chance and spontaneity follow the per se causes of other things, I mean [follow] mind and nature, we have as shown from what went before, but that mind is a per se cause of the same things of which chance and spontaneity [are causes we] no longer [have as established]. He is plainly talking of 'per accidens' with regard to chance and spontaneity. For having said that the per se is prior to the per accidens he added, 'therefore spontaneity and chance are posterior to mind and nature'; for if the per se is prior to the per accidens, and mind and nature are prior to chance and spontaneity, then chance and spontaneity are per accidens. But if someone should say that we shall not be offering mind and nature as per se causes of the same things as those of which chance and spontaneity [are causes], let him say of what other things [we shall be giving mind and nature as per se causes]; for there is nothing beyond the universe among natural things, about which both they and we are producing argument. '[Mind and nature are the cause] both of many other things and of this universe.' 'Many other things': i.e. particular things, for particular mind and nature [is the cause] of particular things and all-embracing mind and nature [is the cause] of universal things. 672

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198al4: That there are causes and that they are as many in number as we say is obvious.

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Having spoken both about per se and about per accidens causes and completely articulated the argument about them, he now expounds the usefulness of the argument about them, [showing] that he has not gone accurately right through the argument about them fruitlessly, but that the natural philosopher, when asked about the causes of natural things, will give all or some of those spoken of. So for this reason he takes up the argument about them, not as wishing to repeat himself but, as I said, to show that he produced the argument about them necessarily. For the natural philosopher, he says, on being asked the cause of each thing, will give the four [we have] spoken of, the matter, the form, the efficient, the end, or if in some cases he cannot [find] them all, at least he will give those it is possible to find, either one or more - just as of course the mathematicians too, when asked about each of the properties of the mathematical sciences give the cause by referring it to the form and the definition. For instance, why is this straight line equal to that straight line? Because they [radiate] from the centre. Why are [straight lines

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radiating] from the centre equal? Because this is the definition of the circle: a plane figure surrounded by a single line such that all the straight lines [radiating] from a single point within the circle which fall upon it, [i.e.] upon the circumference of the circle, are equal to each other. For this is a property of the circle alone: to have one point, i.e. the centre, such that the straight lines [radiating] from it and falling on the circumference are equal to each other. And stopping in this way at the last definition he thinks he has produced the sufficient [answer] to the question, which definition of the circle is the form of it. So that on being asked the reason why and giving the form he has produced the sufficient [answer] to the question. Again if he were asked why the three angles of the triangle are greater than the remaining one he will say [it is] because they are equal to the two supplementary angles, and the two supplementary angles are equal to two right angles. Again if asked why the two supplementary angles are equal to two right angles he will say that [it is a definition] that if a straight line stands on a straight line it produces either two right angles or angles equal to two right angles, and concluding on a definition he has produced the sufficient [answer] to the question - I do not mean this, that [he has concluded] on a definition of the very thing asked about (for he has not given a definition of 'angle' or 'angles'), but that, to speak without qualification, he reduces the [question] why [something] is to a definition. He said this for the sake of an example of [the fact] that when asked why something is we sometimes give the form, as in the case of all mathematical [objects]; for we do not satisfy one who asks why this [is so] until we reduce the reason why to a definition, and the definition is a form. But people in the mathematical sciences are satisfied to reduce even the reason why to the form alone, i.e. the definition, for the mathematician does not consider matter nor an efficient cause nor an end, but only the forms of mathematical [objects]; the natural philosopher on the other hand will give all the causes. For instance, why is Socrates a man? He will give the cause, reducing it both to the form (that [he is] a mortal, rational animal) and to the efficient cause, because like is a cause of like (for man comes from man). He will also give the matter. For instance, why does the knife cut? Because it is made of iron; or else [he will give an answer] from the form: that it is sharp; or else from the final cause: for the purposes of men. And in this way in the case of everything, if it is possible to give all the causes he will give them, but if it is not possible in the case of everything [to give] all of them, at any rate he will give some or one for it is not likely that one will find the proximate matter of each thing: what is the peculiar feature of the underlying mixture of the

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elements for Socrates or for Plato too? And similarly in the other cases. But in some cases it is possible to give all [the causes]. For instance, why does the m a n die? Because he is a mortal, rational animal - [an answer] from the form. [An answer] from the matter: because he has been put together out of opposites. [An answer] from the efficient [cause]: because what generated h i m approaches and withdraws. [An answer] from the end: because not being in a body is better for the soul than being in a body, because of the annoyances [which come] from the body. If, consequently, on being asked for causes the natural philosopher will reduce them to the causes stated, then it is well that we went accurately right through the argument about them, [saying] that there are only four: the form, the matter, the efficient, the end. And of these, he says, three often come to the same thing, [namely] the efficient, the form and the end - to the same thing, I mean, not in number but in formula (logos); for man [comes] from man and horse from horse, and the producing [cause] is the same as what comes to be, not in number but in form. And the efficient [cause] in the same way is other than the end in number but the form is the same. For as not yet existing but being an aim of nature (for [nature] pursues this) it is an end, but as something that has already come to be and is in the composite [object] it is a form. Of the efficient cause one [kind] is unmoved and the other moved, and of the moved one [kind] is eternally moved and the other comes to be and passes away, and hence it turns out that there come to be three areas of study as well. Wherefore, he says, three treatises have been written for u s about the efficient causes, the Metaphysics about the unmoved [cause], On the Heavens about the [cause] which is moved but eternally moved, and all the natural treatises about the [cause] which comes to be and passes away. 682

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198al5: For so many in number are the [kinds of] reason why which he has encompassed. By 'the reason why' he does not here mean the end but the cause generally. For there are four problems: whether [a given thing] is, what it is, of what sort it is, and why it i s ; and one of these problems, [the one which asks] why it is, he reduces to this many causes: the matter, the form, the efficient [cause], the end. For on being asked why each thing is we give these four causes. 688

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198al6: For the reason why is reduced either to the l a s t essence, among unmoved things ....

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of'to the definition which is the form of the substrate'. By 'unmoved things' he means the mathematical sciences, because natural things are observed [to be] in movement (for nature is the source of movement and rest), while mathematical things, which have their being in our thought, are unmoved; for they 25 are not qualitatively changed, nor do they alter at all, as not even being in matter. He said 'to [the] last' because when in the case of the mathematical sciences we are asked why this [given] thing is and then wish to give the cause, we do not satisfy the questioner sooner than we arrive at the last definition, which is the form. And things are like this in all the mathematical sciences. Why are the two 30 straight lines equal? Because [they radiate] from the centre [of a circle]. But why are [straight lines radiating] from the centre equal? Because this is the definition of [straight lines radiating] from the 299,1 centre of the circle, [namely] that all the [straight lines] which are drawn from the centre of the circle to the circumference are equal to each other. And if we understand the definition in this way we are satisfied. So what he is saying is this: on being asked for the reason why, either we reduce [it] to the essence, by which I mean the form, as holds true in the case of the mathematical sciences. For the giving of 5 the cause stops at the last definition in the mathematical sciences, and the definition is a form; for he speaks of the mathematical sciences by way of example. So the sequence of the wording is as follows: 'for the reason why is either, as with unmoved things, reduced to the last essence' - for we must understand [the] 'as' additionally from outside. 692

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198al7: For [the reason why is reduced] to a definition of the straight or commensurable.

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If I take any two points in a circle and then say that the points are distant from each other by, say, five fingers, and then you ask: how is this? I say that the straight line, too, which is drawn from one point to the other is of that size. If you again ask: and why, pray, do you not measure them according to the circumference or a 15 curve drawn from them? I say that the measure must be determinate, and the shortest is determinate, and the straight line is shortest; for a straight line is that which is the shortest of the lines which have the same end-points. And when we hear the definition we no longer go any further. Again we say that this side is commensurable with that one. Why are they commensurable? Because they have a ratio towards each 20 other which a [whole] number has to a [whole] number, as, say, two 698

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to eight. And what if they do have a ratio to each other which a [whole] number has to a [whole] number? I mean that this is the mark of commensurables; for those things are commensurable which are measured by the same measure. So just as two measures eight four times so the side [measures] the side [four times]. And in stating the definition I halted the puzzle. And in general every mathematical method refers the causes either to a last definition, or to the common conceptions. 700

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198al9: Or [the reason why is reduced] to the first moving [cause].

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Having stated the formal cause he went on to the efficient. For on being asked, he says, why the Thebans went to war with the Phocians we answer [by giving] the efficient cause, that the Phocians raided the dockyard. Or we answer [by giving] that for the sake of which, i.e. the end. For instance, why did the king [of Persia] make war on the Greeks? We say: in order to govern the Greeks. 198a20: Or among what is generated given as the reason why].

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the matter [is

Having spoken of the form, the efficient [cause] and the final [cause], he speaks of the matter as well. He said 'what is generated' as opposed to the divine and altogether unalterable things - 1 mean the bodiless things. For Plato, too, called these 'always being' but all bodily things [he called] not being but 'coming to be'. So in these things that are coming to be the natural philosopher will give the matter [as the reason why]. For those [other] things are matterless, and in their case it is the theologian's job to give only the form but not the matter. Alternatively [we can note that] he has posited as examples of the other causes things chosen and mathematical things, and none of these has its being in accordance with a process of generation. For mathematical things are unmoved, as [Aristotle] himself said (and for this reason not even generation is observed in their case, for where there is generation there is in every case change as well); while things in accordance with choice are not or are without generation, having their being in the state of choice. So since in these cases matter is not observed, since neither is generation, for this reason he says, as opposed to these, that among what comes to be one will give the matter [as the reason why], meaning by 'what comes to be' artifacts and natural things; for with these the matter should in every case be given [as the reason why]. 704

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198a22: Since [the] causes are four it belongs to the natural philosopher to know about them all.

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That he took up the argument about the causes for this reason he shows clearly here. For since the causes are four, he says, the natural philosopher will reduce the causes of what comes to be to these four, and in giving the reason why concerning each thing he will give these four. 'And in reducing [it] to all [these] he will give the reason why naturally.' In giving the cause of each thing naturally, he says, [the natural philosopher] will reduce [them] to these four causes. It is well that he said 'naturally', for it is possible to reduce to these causes not naturally. For to discuss the unmoved cause is no longer the job of the natural philosopher but of the theologian, and [to discuss] the natural separable forms does not [belong to] a natural philosopher. And if Aristotle, too, in his natural treatises sometimes discusses the unmoved cause, as in the eighth book of the Physics, and in On the Soul [discusses] the mind which is entirely separable from bodies, and in On Generation and Corruption again [discusses] the unmoved cause, we shall say that in reality the perfect natural philosopher at the height of his task will mention also the causes which are unmoved and above nature.

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198a24: The three [causes] often coincide.

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The form, the end, the efficient cause. It is well that he said 'often', for these do not always coincide. For not every producing agent is similar to what comes to be. For when the sun acts on the air it is not similar to the air; and all in all the changeless and divine causes act on us while being different from us in both substance and activity. But not even in the case of what comes to be is every producing agent similar to what comes to be. For movement heats without being a process of heating, and cooling fixes without being a process of fixing, and heat vaporises water and produces air (e.g. the [heat] of fire) without being air, and [so with] myriads of other things; and artifacts are obviously different from the things that produce them.

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198a25: For the essence is also that for the sake of which it is. That the form is the same as the end, and how, we s a i d . But since the end is twofold, as stated previously, that of which and that for which, the form is not the same as every end; for it is not the same as that for which but rather as that of which, and by this I mean [that] which nature pursues; and [nature] pursues [the goal of] leading 718

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each thing into the form which is perfect and in accordance with [its] nature. So that such an end is the same in number as the form, differing [from it] in relation alone, as has been s a i d , and in time; for when it is regarded as coming to be and not yet being it is an end, but when [it is regarded] as having already come to be [it is] a form. 'That from which movement first [arises] is the same in form as these/ [He writes] 'first' meaning 'proximate'. So the proximate efficient cause is the same as the end and the form, but I mean the same not in number but in form; for Sophroniscus is the same as Socrates in form (for they are both men) but not the same in number. 721

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198a27: And all in all [this applies to] whatever moves [other things] by being moved, and whatever is not [of this kind] no longer belongs to natural philosophy. Perhaps this remark should be joined to what comes next [above], so that he will be saying that the proximate efficient cause is the same as the form and the end, and in general, I would add, those efficient causes which are proximate and move by being moved are the same as the form and the end - for the soul, even if it moves the animal proximately, still does not move it by being moved, and for this reason is not the same as what is moved. But alternatively, and more probably, this remark would be continuous with what was said earlier: 'and in reducing [it] to all [these] he will give the reason why naturally, [i.e. to] the matter, the form, the moving [cause]', then next: 'and speaking generally [this applies to] whatever moves [other things] by being moved' - that is, the natural philosopher will give those causes which move by themselves being moved. And that this is true is clear from what he added: 'and whatever is not [of this kind] no longer belongs to natural philosophy', that is, 'whatever moves [other things] without being moved itself no longer belongs to a natural area of study' - if, at least, it is for the natural philosopher to delineate nature, and nature is a source of movement and rest [for that] in which it belongs primarily per se and not per accidens; so that whatever natural things move [other things] have in themselves a source of movement and rest. So then those things that do not have in themselves a source of movement and rest are not natural, and such is everything that moves [other things] in accordance with nature while being unmoved. If, consequently, it is for a natural philosopher to discuss natural principles, and such things are not natural, clearly the natural philosopher will not discuss them. Therefore he will discuss those principles alone which move [other things] by being moved. 724

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198a29: Therefore the areas of study are three. Since of things which move [other things] some are unmoved and others moved, he says, while of the moved some are eternally moved and others both are moved and perish, we have also made the treatises concerning them threefold, discussing in the Metaphysics the unmoved, in On the Heavens the eternally moved, and in all the rest of the natural treatises the things which are moved but come to be and perish. What comes next is a repetition of the causes by way of conclusion, and if he has passed over the final [cause], no matter; for immediately next it is enumerated before [them] all. 198a33: For concerning generation especially people look at the causes in this manner, [asking] what comes to be after what, and what first created [a given thing], or what was affected.

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Since he said that, on being asked the reason why, one should reduce [the answer] to the four causes, he gives the rational account (logos) of this. For people are especially accustomed to look in this manner at things which come to be, which especially belongs to the function of the natural philosopher, [namely] to have [his] area of study concerned with things that come to be. At any rate all the natural philosophers were especially busied about these and lay 15 down the majority of their arguments (logos) about them. So looking at these they seek these four causes, which he [here] enumerates again as well. 'What comes to be after what' [i.e.] that which is the form and that for the sake of which. For the natural philosopher looks at what nature causes to appear for the sake of what: does the nature of man in producing the seed produce it because of the man, so that a man 20 should come to be out of it? Or contrariwise does it produce the man because of the seed? And he gives [the answer] that the nature [of man] produces the seed and all that comes next for the sake of the human form, so that it shall endure, and [this nature] has as its end in all this to make the human form eternal for all things strive after being. So because things here [on earth] cannot be eternal, [nature] contrived eternity numerically by succession. 25 'And what first created [a given thing]?' The efficient cause. For he is asking what it is that proximately moves each of the natural things. 'And what was affected?' That is, what is the matter which is affected by the efficient cause and qualitatively changed and brought to the form? Is it the seed or the menses? And what is before 304,1 these, such as that the four elements [are], and whether there is 729

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before those that which is affected and is a substrate in common for them all, or not. 732

198a35: The principles which move [things] naturally are twofold, of which one is not natural. 5

He said that as the natural philosopher seeks, concerning generation, the other causes, so too [he seeks] the efficient cause (for he seeks what is the first producer), but it is not for the natural philosopher to seek for every efficient cause; for this reason he says that the moving principles are twofold, of which one is entirely unmoved while the other has in itself a source of movement and rest, and the entirely unmoved principle is not natural and the remaining one is natural. So that it would be for the natural philosopher to discourse on not every principle but only on a natural principle. But if they both move [things] naturally how is it that they are not both natural? But he did not say this, that the moving [principle] moves [things] in the way in which natural things are of a nature to move [things], but that what is moved by it is moved naturally; and it is not necessary that the mover should move [things] in the way in which what is moved is moved. At any rate the sun changes us qualitatively without itself being qualitatively changed, and movement heats without being a process of heating, and the whip produces a weal without being a weal. So in this way there is nothing impossible in moving [something] naturally without being natural, and such is our soul, which is moved with no movement but itself moves the animal, and [such] again is the divine, for it moves us without itself being moved. 'First of all things' he calls that which moves the sphere of the fixed stars; for he calls this 'first' also in Book 12 of the Metaphysics. But it is also possible to understand by 'first' everything that moves the heaven. For the heavenly [spheres] by [their] motion move the things here primarily; so then what moves the heaven would be the very first of the things that move [other things] without being moved. 733

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198b3: And the essence and the figure; and that for the sake of which.

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Having stated one of the movers, which he also called 'unmoved', he added the remaining one as well, which has a source of movement in itself and which is the natural form. For this is what moves the matter and changes [it] qualitatively and brings [it] into generation, and it moves [it] not only as an efficient cause but also as a final one; for it is desired, and nature wishes to attain this. Now it was 740

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s a i d that often the three [causes] coincide, so that the form, i.e. the figure, moves the matter both as efficient cause, by being in the father, and as final [cause] and desired. And in the remaining movements too, the per accidens ones, this is the mover, [namely] 5 that which has the source of movement in itself. For man grows to such-and-such a size on account of the form and is qualitatively changed in such-and-such ways. And similarly animals have distinctive spatial movements not on account of the matter (for this is common) but on account of the form. 741

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Since nature, he says, is [one] of the things that are for the sake of something, as will be shown, and the natural philosopher should know nature, it is wholly necessary that, on being asked concerning natural things the reason for this [case in front of us], we give the above-mentioned causes. For if nature did not produce everything for the sake of something the account (to which one must reduce 15 the causes of natural things) of the four causes would not have been needed, for it would have been sufficient to know only the efficient and material causes. He enumerates the causes again. That 'it is necessary that this comes out of that' [refers to] the efficient [cause], for man comes out of man. 'Either tout court or normally': one thing comes out of another tout court among eternal things (for the second follows the first out of necessity), and normally among things that come to be; 20 for man comes from man normally. (He says this on account of monsters.) 'And if there is to be this, as the conclusion [comes] out of the premises.' He means the material cause. For just as, if such-and-such a conclusion is to result there must be such-and-such premises, so if there is to be a man or a horse it is necessary that such-and-such matter pre-exist. 25 'And that this was the essence': he means the form. For on being asked why Socrates is rational we say that this is the form and mark of man: mortal, rational animal. And it has been said often 306,1 that this coincides with the e n d . 'And because it is better thus': for instance, because it is better for a man to use hands, as instruments of reason (logos), and for a horse to be four-legged. So, he says, one should give what is better for each thing, not [merely] in common, as that it is a fine thing to be rather than not be, but what is useful for the being of each thing. 5 In natural things then one should seek the four causes, but in the 743

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mathematical sciences, as already s a i d , only the formal [cause]. For [one should not seek] the matter or the efficient [cause] or the final [cause] - for it would be ridiculous to say that it is good for a circle to be such as to have the [straight lines radiating] from its centre equal. This is because there is not even a proper reality of mathematical objects, but they are [features] of other things and the soul abstracts them. So all the causes of these things should be sought in those things in which they exist naturally. 753

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198bl0: Now first we must say t h a t nature is among the causes [that cause] for the sake of something, and then [we must speak] about necessity, [and say] how it stands in natural things. 755

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Having said in the account of spontaneity and chance that nature produces [things] for the sake of something, and having taken this as agreed, he now wishes to demonstrate it. Now the problems proposed for the completion of the book are two, one [to show] that nature produces [things] for the sake of something, and the second [to show] how necessity exists in natural things: is it that since the first obtains it is necessary that the second exists, or contrariwise [is it that] since the second [exists] it is necessary that the first [does]? For instance, is it that since the matter is such-and-such it is necessary that such-and-such a form exists also, and the form follows out of necessity on the matter? Or on the contrary [is it that] since there is to be such-and-such a form there must also out of necessity be such-and-such a matter too, and out of necessity the matter exists as well because of the form? The problems then are these, and first he proves that nature produces [things] for the sake of something. And in order to show that such an enquiry is necessary he first tries to argue in the opposite direction and puzzles [about the idea] that perhaps nature produces nothing for the sake of anything. This he establishes by using an example. For Zeus sends rain, he says, not to increase this man's corn, nor to destroy that man's corn lying on the threshing-floor, but [the rain] is borne down out of necessity; for vapour borne up in the summer is cooled in the winter, on being cooled becomes water, and on becoming water is borne down, and this takes place out of necessity, while the increasing of this man's corn or the destruction of that on the threshing-floor happened to take place, without the rain being borne down for this reason. What then in the case of things too that come to be in the realm of nature stops the parts of animals coming to be for the sake of something without nature producing [them] for this reason? For instance, the front teeth [become] sharp and suitable for cutting while the molars 756

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[become] flat and suitable for grinding the food, all this coming about not from any aim on nature's part, that the front [teeth] should cut or the molars grind, but it all comes about as chance befalls because of the suitability of the matter; and it comes to pass that such a positioning of them is also such as [it would have been] if they had come to be for the sake of this, so that the front ones should be suitable for cutting and the molars for grinding. And similarly in the case of all the other parts that seem to come to be for the sake of something: for instance, the liver [comes to be] for the sake of digesting and altering the food, and the sinews for keeping [things] together, and the veins for channelling the blood in all directions, so that all the parts are nourished to the same degree - and similarly in all cases. Wherefore he says [that on this view] all things that come to be in this way, as though they had come to be for the sake of something, are preserved, and the other things, like monsters, that do not come to be in this way perish. To this extent, then, [he develops] the puzzle, but speaking in his own person he shows by several arguments that nature does produce [things] for the sake of something. And first he shows in the second figure that these things which those people talk about I mean rain and the parts of animals and things like that — are neither from chance nor from spontaneity. Then [he shows] through a hypothetical syllogism that these things are for the sake of something. And thirdly [he shows] in the third figure that some of the things that are by nature are for the sake of something, which had been his task to show. So the first syllogism goes like this: rain and all the parts of animals stand always or normally in the same way; chance and spontaneity, or, better, things that are from chance and spontaneity, neither always nor normally stand in the same way (for it has been shown that they [belong to] the exceptional); therefore rain and all the things that are by nature are neither from chance nor from spontaneity. That the rain and all the things that are by nature are for the sake of something he shows by a hypothetical and disjunctive syllogism, establishing the remaining alternative by the removal of one. For rain and all the things that are by nature are either somehow accidental (meaning by accident, chance and spontaneity) or are for the sake of something; but they are not accidental (for this has been shown through the former syllogism); therefore they are for the sake of something. That furthermore the things that are by nature are for the sake of something he shows in the third figure like this: rain and the parts of animals and all such things are by nature, as these people themselves would say (they allow that they are by nature but say

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that nature does not produce these things for the sake of something, and just this is the task before us for our enquiry, [to ask] whether what nature produces it produces for the sake of something). So rain and the parts of animals, at least, are by nature, and rain and the parts of animals are for the sake of something (for this was shown by the hypothetical syllogism); therefore some of the things that are by nature are for the sake of something. In this way then by the first approach he shows through three syllogisms that nature produces [things] for the sake of something; and he shows the same thing again by another approach as follows: he first takes two axioms. The first is that where there is an end against which the movement is bounded and as it goes forward continuously it ends up there, in these cases all the things before the end are done for the sake of the end. For instance, with house-building to build a house is the end, and all the things that are done before this end are done for the sake of this end, such as carving stones, sawing and planing wood, fashioning tiles, and all the rest. The second axiom is that the things that come to be by art, had they been of a nature to come to be by nature, would not have come to be in any different fashion. For instance, had nature been able to make a boat by descending into the logs, it would have composed and shaped them in the way in which as things are they come to be by art; for it is not possible to think of any cleverer way. Again if the things that come to be by nature could come to be by art as well, art would have produced them in the way that as things are they come to be by nature. For suppose either that art had produced the things that are by nature, but not in the way in which nature produces them (for instance, that art had produced man but not in the way that things now stand with him by nature), o r that nature had produced artifacts, but not in the way they now come to be by art: they would not have been real at a l l . These are the axioms, and from them he shows that nature produces [things] for the sake of something in this way: if artifacts came to be by nature they would come to be in the same way as they do now, and among artifacts all things before the end come to be for the sake of the end; also, therefore, if they came to be by nature, all the things before the end would have come to be by nature for the sake of the end. And again if natural things came to be by art they would come to be in the way they now come to be by nature, and art produces all things before the end for the sake of the end; therefore nature too, producing [things] now in the way that art would have produced them, produces all things before the end for the sake of the end. Therefore nature produces all things for the sake of something. T h u s Aristotle then; but this argument does not seem to me to be sound. For in the first place the first of his axioms he will be 765

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thought to have not well taken - the one which says, 'where there is an end, in these cases all the things before the end are done for the sake of the end'. For what sort of an end is he speaking of here? For if he means in an unqualified sense every termination and the conclusion the statement is false. For he himself said in the earlier [discussion] that ' i t does not want every termination to be an end, but [only] the best o n e , ° and because of this he blamed Euripides for saying, 'having met his end, for the sake of which he was born'. For it does not follow that because the movement through life is one and continuous up to death, and death is an end and termination of this, for this reason all the things before death are done for the sake of death. Nor when a fully loaded ship capsizes in a shipwreck was it loaded for this reason, that it should capsize in a shipwreck. And it does not follow that, because monsters are a termination and end of movement against nature, all the things before the end come to be for the sake of this end; for nature does not pursue the end against nature, nor have as its aim to produce the monster. And this is so in myriads of other cases. But if he means by the end not the termination in an unqualified sense, but the good and that for the sake of which, he has straightaway taken what is sought as agreed; for we are seeking whether in the case of things that are by nature there is such an end, which is that for the sake of which, and nature in pursuing it produces all the things before it. But perhaps this axiom is generally veridical in the case of the second thing signified (which is indeed an end in the strict sense), but has been fitted by Aristotle not to the things that are by nature, but to those that come to be by art, among which indeed it is veridical; for given that there is an end in artifacts which art pursues, art produces all the things before this end for the sake of the end. Let this then be decided in this way. But what comes next is no longer true. For given that if artifacts came to be by nature they would come to be by nature in the way that as things are [they come to be] by a r t , it is not for this reason somehow necessary straight-off that since art produces [them] for the sake of something nature too produces [them] for the sake of something. For if art produces a monster it certainly produces all the things before the end for the sake of the e n d , but it does not follow straight-off because of this that, since, as things are, a monster which art might have produced comes to be by nature, nature produces all the things before this for the sake of this. For it is not an aim for nature to produce the monster. For such a thing is against nature and a mistake of nature, whence it is neither that for the sake of which nor an end. Therefore it is not necessary, if art produces [something] for the sake of something, that the same thing, even if it had grown by nature, would have come to be for the sake of something. 768

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So much for that, then. Next he says again t h a t art imitates nature or is an accomplice and helper of it. For it imitates nature, as in sculpture, and is an accomplice of it, as in medicine; for when nature wishes, say, to get rid of waste matter but cannot, art collaborates with syringes and suchlike. Consequently, if the imit­ ation and the accomplice of nature produce [things] for the sake of something, much more so will the original and the paradigm -1 mean nature - produce things for the sake of something. Perhaps it is possible to say the same thing again here too; it does not follow, if art is to imitate a monster, and then is to produce all the things before the imitation for the sake of this, that straight-off somehow nature too has an aim and end to produce the monster and produces all the things before that for the sake of that. And all in all if there is some­ thing which comes to be by art and which nature, if it produces it, does not produce as that for the sake of which [it acts], what is so strange if when the art of medicine collaborates with nature and does every­ thing with this in view (pros touto), nature produces the same thing but not in the same way? As a final argument he lays out that which most obviously shows that nature produces everything for the sake of something. For we see in the case of some animals, he says, that they produce everything for the sake of something with neither art nor calculation but solely the natural impulse; for in reality 'the natures of animals are unteachable', as is also thought by Hippocrates. The spider produces its web not at random but for the sake of something, for catching its food and for a dwelling, and all the things before this it selects for the sake of this. And the swallow presumably does not fashion its nest at random but for the sake of something, for which purpose it binds the clay with stalks as securely as possible and fashions the most capacious and strongest shape. And the bee is in the same way marvellous, producing nothing of the combination of the hexagons at random. And how shall one not marvel at the nest of the kingfisher, which the water will minimally damage though it is right by the strand? And we could say the same about ants and many other things. And why am I talking about animals, he says, when even in the case of plants nature produces everything for the sake of something? For it produces leaves, he says, for the sake of sheltering the fruit, so that it is not damaged by winds or by heat, and producing roots for the sake of nourishment it produces these growing downwards and not upwards, so that they can draw nourishment from the earth as from a wet-nurse. Consequently, if these things that come to be by nature come to be not as chance befalls nor at random but for the sake of something, it is reasonable that the same should be the case for the whole of nature. Therefore nature produces [things] for the sake of 774

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something and not what chances to befall. 198bl2: For all [thinkers] refer [things] to this cause, [saying] that since the hot is of a nature to be of such-and-such a kind, and the cold....

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Let a second problem be proposed for us, he says: how things stand with necessity in natural things, whether the form follows the matter out of necessity or vice-versa. And it is natural that we ask this, he says, for the ancients all reduce necessity to the matter, not to the form. F o r having said that they refer [it] to this cause, by way of revealing what sort of [cause] this is he added the hot and the cold and suchlike, which are material causes. For 'since', they say, 'the hot is of a nature to be of such-and-such a kind, and the cold' of such-and-such a kind, this [thing we are studying] came to be because of this, or because it was put together from these atoms. And, to speak without qualification, whatever matter each [thinker] postulated, to this he assigned the causes of the things that come to be.

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198bl4: For if they speak of any other cause, having merely touched on it they let it go. Lest anyone should say that notwithstanding this Anaxagoras 10 postulated intellect as a cause of the things that come to be, and Empedocles strife and love, and they did not simply consign the universe to material causes, he says for this reason that even if they postulated efficient causes too, still they only mentioned these by way of touching on them, and did not go on to ascribe these [as the causes] for the coming to be of particular things, but each [thinker] had recourse to his own version of the matter, one ascribing 15 homoeomeries [as the cause], and another cold and hot. And even before Aristotle Plato made this objection to Anaxagoras, that although, like a man who had woken up while the other students of nature were sleeping, he ascribed intellect [as the cause] of the coming to be of the cosmos, for the production of objects he as it were forgot about intellect and ascribed [as the cause] the homoeomeries, which for him contained the formula (logos) of 20 matter. 779

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198bl6: There is a puzzle about what prevents nature ... .

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Haying presented the problems he thereupon puzzles about the former one, that perhaps nature does not produce [things] for the sake of something.

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'But as Zeus sends the rain not in order to increase the corn, but out of necessity/ So why do we say, 'the corn is increased per accidens, and the rain is not for the sake of anything but out of necessity, because what is borne up must be cooled, tout court?' And it is worth asking whether anything at a l l comes to be per accidens by providence, or whether anything at all is harmed by providence. So we say that with providence managing the universe nothing comes to be by chance or as it happens, but everything for the sake of some good, and providence does not produce anything per accidens. So the cosmic good exists in the rain too; for the movement in a circle of the elements comes about through the endurance and structure of the cosmos. For the self-sufficient bodies which possess endurance, these move in a circle - I mean the heavenly [spheres]. So in order that the elements, too, may endure they move in a circular movement, and because of this water [comes] out of earth, and out of water air, and out of these fire, and again air and water and earth; and the return is into the same thing out of which also they started, which is [the mark] of circular movement - the restoration out of the same thing into the same thing. And it is possible to observe good on the particular level, for because of the fitness of each [of them] the things outside are disposed in this way or that by providence. So that providence benefits everything per se, but it happens that we are affected in this way or that on account of our own fitness. So the per accidens [element] is in the things which are affected, not in the agents. And this is not impossible, that the agent should act per se but what is affected should be affected not per se but sometimes per accidens instead. For instance, suppose Plato is setting forth some beneficial arguments, in the Assembly perhaps, intending this to benefit all the hearers, and a passer-by comes in for some other purpose, not intending this [as his] aim but by chance, and having heard [the arguments] is benefited: such a one is benefited per accidens, though Plato benefited [him] per se; for the former is benefited not as the fulfilment of his aim but by chance, but Plato benefited [him] as the fulfilment of his aim - for he intended this, that all who might wish to hear him should be benefited. So in this way too when the sun rises to illuminate everyone, if someone enters the market-place not to be illuminated but for another purpose, he has been illuminated per accidens, though the sun illuminated [him] per se. So in this way there is nothing remarkable if providence too is something simple and wishes to do good to all men per se but not per accidens, but the corn is destroyed or increased per accidens; for [providence] did not intend this tout court, to increase the corn or destroy what was on the threshing-floor, but these things come 785

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about per accidens because of the fitness of the things that were done good to. 198b29: Where everything happens, then, as though it were coming about for the sake of something, these things are preserved, being suitably put together by spontaneity. If nature, he says, produced nothing for the sake of something but as 30 chance may befall, then when it happens that something so arises 314,1 from it as if it had produced the things on purpose for the sake of this, [namely] so as to have everything making for preservation and be preserved, these things are indeed preserved, he says, having become suitable for preservation spontaneously. 'And whatever does not so' happen to come to be, these are destroyed, namely the monsters. 792

198b31: As Empedocles speaks of man-prowed oxen-kind.

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Empedocles said that all the species were blended in the sphere, and at the first dividing up of the sphere and the start of the world-ordering, before the species were completely divided from each other, he said there arose animals blended together, such as the myths, too, postulated the centaurs [to be], having the other parts of a horse but the front parts (I mean the head area) of a man. In this way Empedocles too said that before strife had completely divided the species from each other there arose certain animals blended together, among which were also the 'man-prowed oxen-kind'. He called them 'man-prowed', that is, having the front parts (I mean those round the head) of a man - for a prow is the front part of a boat - and the remaining ones of an ox, since not only were the elements blended with each other in the sphere but also the parts of animals. So when they had all been divided the divided bits were carried around as it chanced, and often an ox's head came together with a human breast or the other parts too, and in all cases as chance befell. So those of the parts, he says, which came together as though they had done so for the sake of this (for instance, the presently existing parts of man, which have an affinity for each other, and similarly those of each of the animals) [formed] an amalgam [which] was preserved, since [those parts] did something to further each other's preservation, but those which came together in a way which did not contribute to each other's preservation these perished, such as the 'man-prowed oxen-kind', since such things did nothing to further each other's preservation. So this [thinker] said that the parts of animals were not ordered for the sake of something, but it happened that they were so 794

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related by chance as if they had come to be for the sake of this; and in this way, too, he says, those too [speak] who say that nature does not produce [things] for the sake of something, because all those things that it produces so as to be as if it had produced [them] for the sake of something - these are preserved, but all those that are not [so produced] - these perish, as Empedocles says 'the man-prowed oxen-kind' [do]. For these, since they did not come to be as if they had come to be for the sake of some good, because of this are not even preserved. So they take the examples of monsters given by Empe­ docles, because he himself says that the monsters which came to be in the original state of affairs are not preserved. 795

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198b34: For these, and all things that are by nature, come to be in this way always or normally. 796

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199a3: So if [something] is thought to be either by accident or for the sake of something . . . . The second, hypothetical and disjunctive, syllogism. For rain and the parts of animals are either by accident or for the sake of something; but they are not by accident (for that has been shown); therefore [they are] for the sake of something. By 'accident' he means that which is consequent on either spontaneity or chance, so that 'accident' applies in common to chance and spontaneity. 798

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199a5: But all such things are by nature, as they themselves would say. The third [syllogism] in the third figure. All these things are by nature, and all these things are for the sake of something; therefore some of the things that are by nature are for the sake of something. 799

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The second argument, and he takes first the [previously] stated axioms. In those of the things that come to be in which there is an end against which the movement is bounded and where, as it proceeds continuously, it terminates, in these cases all the things before the end are done for the sake of the end. 800

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199a9: Therefore as [each thing] is achieved, so it is of a nature [to be achieved], and as [each thing] is of a nature [to be achieved], so it is achieved. The second axiom, that if the artifact had come to be by nature it would have been of a nature [to come to be] in just the way it was in fact achieved by art. And contrariwise the things that come to be by nature, had they come to be by art, would have been achieved in just the same way as if they had been of a nature to come to be by nature. For had they not come to be in this way they would not have been preserved. He added 'unless anything prevents i t ' because of faults that are in both natural things and artifacts, [arising] either from the matter or from external accidents. So if art and nature are interchangeable, and art produces everything for the sake of something, so then nature also, if it did produce artifacts, would have produced them in this way. And again if art produced natural things it would clearly produce them all for the sake of something. For in general art produces everything for the sake of something. So since as things are nature produces these things in the way art would have produced them, it too will clearly produce everything for the sake of something. 'The one then for the sake of the other/ That is, the things before the end [are produced] for the sake of the end; for art fashions everything in this way.

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199al5: And altogether art finishes some of the things that nature cannot bring to completion and imitates others. Another argument. For medicine effects health and excretion and the growth of flesh when nature is too weakened to effect these, while modelling and drawing imitate nature. Consequently, if the accomplice of nature and its copy produces everything for the sake of something, much [more] presumably [will] the archetype [do so]. 805

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199a20: [This is] especially clear in the case of the other animals. Continuing he goes on to the more effective arguments. For why, he says, do I speak of the rational animals which act in accordance with art, and say that through them nature too acts for the sake of something? In the case of the other animals certainly nature obviously produces everything for the sake of something. And evidence of this are the spider, the swallow, and similar things, which fashion things from nature and not by calculation, and yet

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produce nothing at random, for which reason some people puzzle about whether in fact they fashion these things not by nature but by some sort of calculation (logismos). And why do I speak of animals, he says, when in the case of plants too we see nature producing everything for the sake of something? For it produces the roots below, for the sake of nourishment, attaching the mouth to the earth [as] a wet-nurse, and leaves for the protection and preservation of the fruit. So how is it not clear from all this that at nature's hands everything comes to be for the sake of something? 'And as we proceed gradually in this way.' For first he tried the argument out on the case of men, and then he went on to the irrational animals, proceeding thence step by step to the plants. 807

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Since he has shown that nature produces everything for the sake of something, he now wishes to show what it is for the sake of which it produces everything and what it is that it pursues, and he says that [this is] the natural form, which itself is also nature. And it was s a i d that the producing [cause], the form and the end often come to the same thing. So that the nature which produces [things] and produces [them] for the sake of something, produces [them] for the sake of nature in the sense of form, not that [nature] which is in accordance with the matter. For since he said previously that nature is twofold (for both the form and the matter are nature) he now indicates what nature his argument concerned, [namely] not that in accordance with the matter but the form and the figure. 811

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199a33: For mistakes occur also in matters concerning art; for a writing-teacher may spell not rightly and a doctor administer a drug not rightly. Having shown that nature produces everything for the sake of something, from nature being one of the things [that operate] normally, and from the imitations of nature producing everything for the sake of something, and from the rest [of the arguments], he now wishes to solve the puzzles brought against the proposed position. For people puzzle about why, if nature produces everything for the sake of something, it often fails and does not always succeed. So to this he says that we ought not, because nature goes wrong, to believe for this reason that it produces things as chance befalls and does not produce everything for the sake of something, when art too, which obviously produces everything for the sake of something, often goes wrong through the unsuitability of the underlying

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matter. For the scribe has the aim of writing well, but often fails of his aim because the papyrus is too thin or through an excess or unsuitability of the ink. And similarly the painter too may experience the same thing through the unsuitability either of the paints or of the canvas on which he is painting. And the doctor gives the purgative with the desire to benefit and for the sake of some good but sometimes fails, either because of the peculiar quality of the subject body, which it was impossible to see, or because by chance the surrounding [air] was of bad temperament; but he still gave [the purgative] for the sake of some good. In this way, therefore, if nature too sometimes goes astray from its aim, one should not on this account take away from it the [property of producing things] for the sake of something, but since it normally attains its aim and its mistakes are rare, for this reason one should believe in its producing [things] for the sake of something. For it is irrational, when art just like nature goes wrong, not to remove the [property of producing things] for the sake of something from the one while removing it from nature because of its mistakes; one should remove it from both or from neither. So if we do not remove the [property of producing things] for the sake of something from art, neither then [should we do so] from nature. Since those who removed the [property of producing things] for the sake of something from nature had used the example from Empedocles, where he said that in the original states of affairs 'man-prowed oxen-kind' came to be, he refutes their argument from these very same cases. For nature produces everything for the sake of something, he says, so that even when it goes astray from its aim, it does not fall far short of its own aim but [stays] as close to it as it can. At any rate we never see a plane tree or a stone or a fig tree come to be from a man, but always a man from a man. And if [nature] ever fails in its aim of producing a man through the unsuitability of the matter, at least it produces an animal and not a plant, as I said, or a stone, and if it cannot produce an animal, then at any rate the nearest thing to it, flesh. And again the fig tree produces a fig tree, and if it fails, a wild fig, not an oak or a pine; and the olive tree again [produces] an olive tree, and if it fails, a wild olive, not a pear tree or a white poplar. Everywhere then it is obvious at the start that nature does not fashion [things] as chance befalls, but with some most purposeful end in view, and if it fails it is wont to attain at least the nearest thing to it. For example, even if we are to agree, he says, with Empedocles' story that in the original state of affairs certain animals came to be 'oxen-kind' and 'man-prowed', they presumably came to be [so] from this reason (logos), for which now too monsters come to be, [namely] that their material principle, I mean the seed, 813

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had been corrupted; and so in this way he too recognised that nature produces [things] for the sake of something, so that, as I said just now, he said that even its mistakes do not fall far from its aim. For he did not say that 'olive-prowed oxen-kind* came to be but that 'man-prowed oxen-kind' did so; in this way he recognises himself that nature has some definite aim, such as to produce a man or an ox, and having failed of this is wont to produce the nearest thing, I mean an animal tout court. Then he objects to the opinion itself. For why ever should there not have come to be in the original states of affairs, he says, as in the case of animals 'man-prowed oxen-kind', so too in the case of plants 'olive-prowed vine-kind'? And yet it would have been more reasonable for this to occur in the case of plants rather than in that of animals; for being for the sake of something [applies] less among plants than among animals, because the form is more articulated in animals, and it is where being for the sake of something shows through less that the deviation should especially occur. But it did not happen among plants (for there is no evidence of his saying this); therefore neither then did it among animals. So that those who on these grounds take away the [property of being] for the sake of something from nature should recognise that they refute themselves rather than nature. Then he establishes the same thing by other arguments too. For if nature does not produce everything for the sake of something, why does it not produce a man immediately but first a seed and then flesh and then one thing after another, until it attains the most purposeful end? For why not first the embryo and then the seed? For order is one of the things that are for the sake of something, so that if [nature] selects one thing before another in order and never departs from the order until the thing which is coming to be perishes, it is clear that it produces everything for the sake of something. And, [Aristotle] says, Empedocles himself says that the 'whole-natured' came to be first, and this could signify nothing to him but the seed having in itself at the same time, collected together and whole, the formulae (logos) for what is growing; for the whole-natured is so called by him from its containing the nature of the whole. But if the 'whole-natured' comes to be first of the animals and plants, then it comes to be for the sake of the animals and plants, and in this case nature produces [things] for the sake of something; for the earlier things are for the sake of the later. So, as I said, even if we grant the truth of Empedocles' story that at the start certain 'man-prowed oxen-kind' formed, clearly they formed when this 'whole-natured' thing was destroyed, as now too monsters come to be when the seed is destroyed through either excess or 818

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defect, so that nature engineered the putting forth of the 'whole-natured' for the sake of the good, but it happened when it was destroyed that nature failed of its aim. Again, he says, those who take away from nature the [property of being] for the sake of something forget that they are much rather abolishing nature and natural things altogether. For we all by common conception believe all those things to be by nature which are moved continuously and in order by some source existing in themselves and reach some end, but not [what is moved] from a chance source to a chance end (for those things we usually attribute to chance and spontaneity); and things which are from nature take place always or normally from the same source by the same route to the same ends - for never does a dog or a horse come from human seed. Yet if nature did not produce [things] for an end chance things should come to be from chance things, but as things are they do not. So that if they say that nature produces [things] not for the sake of something but as it may chance to befall it is fruitlessly that they hum the name of nature, equating it with chance and spinning together the unspinnable. So that if chance and nature are not the same but these things are separated by a large interval, chance producing chance results from a chance source and nature [producing] determinate results from a determinate [source], it is impossible that nature should not produce everything for the sake of something, since in that way it would coincide with chance. At the end of all he puts the cause which moved [people] to believe that nature produces nothing for the sake of something. For not seeing nature deliberating in its crafting, he says, they seem for this reason to take away from it the [property of being] for the sake of something, on the grounds that things that produce [things] for the sake of something must in every case deliberate. But this, he says, would be ridiculous. For they ought to have seen at a glance that the arts do not deliberate either. For deliberation is a lack of wisdom, and when a craftsman deliberates he does so not as a craftsman but as falling short in his art (for he resorts to deliberating out of ignorance), and a craftsman does not need deliberation. At any rate the carpenter does not deliberate whether he should saw or plane the wood, nor the builder whether he should first lay down the foundations, nor again does the clerk deliberate how to write 'a' or 'b', nor when he writes the name 'Socrates' does he deliberate which of the letters to write first and which second and third. But with each art the end and the starting-point and the route from the starting-point to the end are determined, as are those of nature too, and determinate things do not need deliberation. For we deliberate either concerning the starting-point or concerning the end or concerning the route leading to the end when these are

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unclear and indeterminate. So that if they take away from nature the [property of being] for the sake of something because nature does not deliberate, then let them take it away from art too, and if they do not 15 for this reason take away from art the [property of being] for the sake of something, it is presumably reasonable not to take it away from nature either. And why do I speak of the arts when the divine Craftsman too does not deliberate but simply by being, whenever he wishes, brings everything about without needing deliberation, if indeed deliberation, as I said, comes about through lack of wisdom? So least of all should the [property of being] for the sake of something be taken away from nature because it does not deliberate, when [it is 20 taken away] from neither art nor the divine. Tor mistakes occur also in matters concerning art/ Taking the puzzle to be clear if left silent he starts from the resolution. 828

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The [property of being] for the sake of something exists among artifacts, he says, and in many cases we see the arts succeed [in reaching] the end and that for the sake of which, while [in aiming] towards some [ends] they try to produce [things] for the sake of something but fail of their aim, through whatever causes, but not because they themselves do not so intend as to finish up at some good end. So what prevents us believing that the same thing happens in the case of nature too, and that its mistakes arise not through its producing [things] as chance befalls but through its being struck aside from its original aim either on account of the matter or on account of external accidents? 199b5: And therefore in the original states of affairs the 'oxen-kind', if they were not able to come to some term and end

From these [considerations], therefore, it is clear, he says, that if the Empedoclean 'man-prowed oxen-kind' too, to go along with the 5 story, were not able to come to some term and end, that is, to some perfect form, so as to endure, it is obvious at the start that they became such because their principle, the seed, was corrupted, for which reason neither did they endure, which happens now too in the case of monsters. 831

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199b7: Again, it is necessary that the seed comes to be first, but not immediately the animals. If nature does not produce everything for the sake of something, why is its craftsmanship ordered, so that it selects some things before others? For it should have produced the animals immediately, even without seed. But if it first selects seed, then produces flesh out of it, and in this way [proceeds] in order up to the perfect form, and having come to the perfect form finally ceases from its movement, then it is obvious at the start that it selected all the things before the end for the sake of the end. Since why ever did it stop at, say, the human or equine form, and not, continuously moving [it], produce out of it something else, and this what chances to befall?

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199b9: Again the [property of being] for the sake of something occurs among plants too. At this point, as I s a i d , he objects to the opinion itself, [saying] that if being for the sake of something [applies] less among plants than among animals, and if where being for the sake of something [applies] less, there it should have been more [likely] that monsters would arise, why ever did not 'olive-prowed vine-kind* come to be among plants just as the 'man-prowed oxen-kind* did among animals? But if it did not happen among plants (for there is no evidence of his saying this), then neither did it among animals. And there is nothing remarkable if, just as certain monsters come to be among animals, so too they do among plants, though [their] being against nature shows through less among them than with animals because their forms have not been articulated and distinguished in the way they have among animals; for where the form is precise there even a small discrepancy is obvious at the start. And as he says elsewhere himself, one would no longer say that the hand of the dead man was a hand, except homonymously like a stone [hand] or a drawn one, since its form and activity have palpably been destroyed; whereas one might believe the flesh of the dead man was no less [flesh] than the living [flesh], since one does not palpably see its form and the advantage which it provided for the whole animal destroyed after death; this is because the homogeneous [parts] are more material and do not embody the form purely. In this way, since plants are nearer to matter than animals and for this reason have the form more indistinctly, the difference does not show through in the deviations, as it does not in cadaveric flesh, and for this reason monsters are not thought to arise among plants. This argument is not addressed to the matter in hand but in an ad 832

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hominem way to Empedocles and what he says, [arguing! that he is not consistent with himself, generating such monsters among animals, but not also among plants - though it would have been more reasonable to do this in the case of plants. If, then, this did happen among plants, why did he not say so? If he did not say so because it did not happen, it is absurd in the case of the purer forms and those where being for the sake of something and the providence of nature shows through more - to say in these cases that these things come to be as chance befalls, but not also in the case of plants, among which nature is less transparent in producing everything for the sake of something. The true account has it that what is against nature arises in both spheres, but this is rare and due to a falling away from being for the sake of something and according to nature, as what is against art arises in the arts. ^ 199bl7: Each [source] does not give the same result in each case, nor any chance result, but it does always tend towards the same result unless something prevents it.

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[He means] that neither does the same nature produce several ends, nor do several natures bring to completion one and the same form, but in the case of each [nature] the form is determinate, unless something external prevents it. For we often bring different animals together for intercourse, such as a horse and an ass for the generating of a mule, and we produce one form from two; but even here the providence of nature is remarkable in making such things barren in order that you should learn how all things that come to be from i t , with nothing external compelling or interrupting, attain the most purposeful end, which is the succession of species, while all things that do not come to be in this way are mutilated and do not endure at all, or if they do endure do not attain the most natural end. Yet in this case the coming together is of things that are neighbouring, not remote. 836

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199bl8: That for the sake of which and that which is for the sake of this can also come about from chance.

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Since he has shown that being for the sake of something [occurs] in nature and that [nature] has some end for the sake of which it does everything, is it only in nature, he asks, or also in [the realm of] chance that [we find things that are done] for the sake of something and that for the sake of which these things are done? And he says that itis in [the realm of] chance too, but not per se but per accidens. For a certain man coming from abroad bathed but did not come for this reason, in order to bathe, but his voyage still took place as 839

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though for the sake of this. So that being for the sake of something exists in [the realm of] chance per accidens, not per se, as was also said previously. 840

199b20: We say that the stranger came by chance and having bathed departed. A variant reading is 'having freed', in the sense of 'having ransomed'. For instance, suppose someone came to a city, found a captive there, and then ransomed him. For we s a y in such cases that he came in order to ransom him. Yet he did not come for the sake of this, but the issue came about in this way as though he had come for the sake of this which he has done. For [a certain man] going off to compete at the Olympic games found Plato bound in Aegina, and bought and released him, saying that he would not exchange many victories at Olympia for this action.

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199b28: And if shipbuilding had been in the wood it would have acted in the same way as nature.

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It is irrational, he says, to believe that nature does not produce [things] for the sake of something because we do not see it deliberating, when even art does not deliberate. Consequently, if you think of the shipbuilding art as being hidden in the wood, what 5 more would it have done than [act] as nature acts, without deliberating? For do not look at what art [is] in man but separate this [art] from man and put it into the wood, and you will see that it does nothing over and above the way it works now outside. So just as now, while being outside, it produces everything for the sake of something, so too, were it in the wood as nature is in natural things, 10 it would obviously have produced everything for the sake of something. So why even as things are should we not say nature produces [things] in this way, being immanent in natural things? 844

199b30: [This is] especially clear when someone doctors himself. Since he postulated that the art was immanent in the wood, in order to compare it with nature by bringing the image nearer, he used this example, as also previously. For the doctor who doctors himself resembles nature so far as [this is possible] among artifacts; for he has the principle of health in himself, but it [merely] happens that here the person doctored is also at the same time a doctor. 845

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199b34: Does what is 'out of necessity* exist hypothetically or, in fact,

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tout court?

Of the two problems which he put forward he has expounded one, namely that nature produces everything for the sake of something, and now goes on to the remaining one, which was how necessity exists in natural things: is it necessary tout court and in one single series that the second should follow the first, and the third [follow] this, and so on in order, as holds in the case of celestial things (for it is necessary that the sun come to be in the Bull after the Ram, and after this in the Twins, and so on in order, the second [terms] always following the first in one single and necessary series)? Or is it not in this way that necessity exists in natural things, but the second [terms] being postulated hypothetically the first follow out of necessity? I mean something like this: does the form follow the matter out of necessity, which would be [a case of] necessity tout court, for because the matter has such-and-such a capacity the form entirely and in every case has to follow? Or is it not thus, but if the form is to come to be, such-and-such a matter must be laid down previously? Now the natural philosophers postulated necessity tout court among things that come to be: for they all said the forms follow out of necessity on the capacities of the matter. [It is] as though they said that even a house is of such-and-such a nature because of this: the natural capacities of the matter out of which it is composed. For instance, because the stones are heavy and the bricks lighter than these and the wood lighter still, for this reason the house came to be with its foundations at the bottom and next to these the bricks and on top of all the wood, because it is lighter than the other things - in this quite ridiculous way they would be postulating that the house had such-and-such a shape through the capacities of the matter, not because the house was to be of such-and-such a kind and for this reason such-and-such matter was prepared; for if such-and-such a form followed tout court on the capacities of the matter there ought to have been a house spontaneously once there was the matter, and with no need of an orderer. In this way [it was] too [that] the natural philosophers said that necessity exists among the things that come to be. For [they say] it is because cold and hot are of such-and-such a kind that bone or flesh or any of the other things comes to be - i.e. [that it is] because the atoms are spherical that fire burns, or because it is made out of cubical atoms that water cools. And, to speak without qualification, each of them assigns the causes of the coming to be of the forms to the matter thought of by him. But necessity does not exist among natural things in this way; for there would be no need of nature to 849

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fashion things. For nature does not fashion the matter, but uses it already existing for the coming to be of the forms. For it takes the elements [already] existing and mixes them in such-and-such a way, and by doing so imposes one form after another [on them]. But if the forms followed straightforwardly on the capacity of the matter, what need was there for the efficient cause, I mean nature? So the necessity is hypothetical; for the matter is selected for this reason: because there is to be such-and-such a form. Of course, as I s a i d , even when the matter has been selected and worked up and preliminary forms have come to be in advance, the most purposeful form does not supervene in every case. Therefore in this way the forms do not follow out of necessity on the capacities of the matter, but [it is] the reverse, as I s a i d , and necessity is hypothetical: if there is to be such-and-such a form such-and-such a matter must be selected; for instance, so much must be hot and so much cold; and similarly in the case of the rest. So necessity in things that are by nature, he says, stands in a certain way as in mathematical arguments; for necessity is hypothetical in mathematical arguments too. By 'mathematical arguments' he means mathematical proofs which proceed syllogisti­ cally, so that it is possible in more general terms to say 'syllogisms' instead of'mathematical arguments', because as necessity stands in syllogisms so it does in natural things as well. For necessity is hypothetical in syllogisms too. For when [we] postulate the premises the conclusion follows out of necessity, as among natural things when a form is postulated the matter will exist out of necessity. Hypothetical necessity, then, [applies] similarly in both cases, but the order of the sequence is reversed. For in the case of syllogisms, if the premises [are given] so is the conclusion (that is, if the first [is given] so is the second), but it does not follow that if the conclusion [is given] so are the premises; for if the premises are true the conclusion is true out of necessity, but it does not follow that if the conclusion [is true] so are the premises. For it is possible to infer the same conclusion on different occasions from different premises, and not only from true ones, but [one can infer] also a truth from false [premises]; for if [we have] five and five [we have] in every case ten, but not if [we have] ten in every case five and five; for it is possible to have seven and three, and six and four; and in the case of syllogisms [we have] 'Man is a creature; a creature is a substance; therefore man is a substance', and you will infer the same from false [premises]: 'Man is a stone; a stone is a substance; therefore man is a substance'. So that in every case such-and-such a conclusion follows on such-and-such premises, but [it does] not [follow that] in every case such-and-such premises follow on such-and-such a conclusion.

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For someone might say that it is possible to derive a false conclusion from true premises; for instance: 'Man is a creature; a creature has two syllables; so man has two syllables.' But one should realise that such [a syllogism] does not preserve the premises; for the middle term is not common [to the two premises]. For the predicate in the minor [premise] is one [term] while the subject in the major [premise] is another. For in the minor [premise] the substantial creature is predicated, but in the major [premise] the sound itself, the word for the creature; so that these are not even premises of a syllogism (for they are not compounded by a common term) but they are merely two independent propositions. But in the case of 'Man is a stone; a stone is a substance' even if the minor premise is false, still the compounding is syllogistic, for the middle term is common and what is brought to completion from the compounding [of them] is a figure. Now in the case of syllogisms, as I s a i d , the second thing (I mean the conclusion) follows on the first (I mean the premises which have been postulated as matter for the syllogism), but the first does not thereby follow on the second. But in the case of natural things, and in general of all things made or done, whether artifacts or [actions] chosen, things are contrariwise, and when the posterior term, I mean the form, is postulated it is wholly necessary that the matter, which is the prior term, should follow, but it is not true that if the matter exists the form will follow in every case, as we said before. So then the difference between natural things (and in general things made or done) and mathematical things is this. But what is common is [firstly] that necessity is hypothetical in all cases, for when one thing is postulated the rest follows - with things made or done, when the form is postulated the matter follows, and in mathematical cases, when the matter is postulated the form follows; and [secondly] that in a way even with natural things the second [term] follows on the first, as also in mathematical cases - for the form, which is the end of action, is the starting-point for theorising. So if theorising starts from the form and stops at the matter, and the matter follows on the form, then with natural things too in a way the end follows out of necessity on the starting-point, as in mathematical cases too. And next he adds as well the reason for this, [namely,] he says, because in mathematical cases there is no action but only theorising. For if there were action in mathematical arguments, action would similarly stand inversely to theorising in them too, and the starting-point of action would be the end of theorising. But as things are, since there is theorising alone in mathematical arguments, and in them the premises are the starting-point and the conclusion follows out of necessity on these, 857

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and similarly in theorising about natural things too the form is the first [term] and the matter is the last, and the matter follows out of necessity on the form - for these reasons in natural things too the 30 posterior follows on the prior out of necessity. But even if the form does not follow on the matter in every case, still it is impossible for the form to come to be without the matter; just as also in the case of mathematical arguments, even if the premises do not in every case follow on the conclusion, still without the conclusion the premises would not exist - for it is impossible for 329,1 the premises to be true without the conclusion being true. Having said this he adds that both these principles are for the natural philosopher to state. For [the natural philosopher] will discuss both the form and the matter, but he will take the form from 5 the definition and draw conclusions about the matter from this, just as the craftsman will take the form of the house from its definition that it is a shelter warding off destruction by rain and heat - and will draw conclusions from this about the matter too, that not just any matter will do (there is no place for reeds or papyrus, perhaps), but solid matter which keeps out rain. So in this way the natural 10 philosopher too will take the form from the definition - for instance, man is a mortal rational animal - and will draw the conclusion from this that for anything that is going to be rational there must not be simply any chance matter, but since being borne upwards, perhaps, is appropriate for reason (logos), the body which is to receive it must not be bent but must be upright. So for such a body to come to be, there must be selected not just any chance matter but that in which 15 the hot has the smaller parts and is to a greater degree borne upwards, so that in this way perhaps it may keep the body upright by the upward tendency. And since the form of bronze i s fusible and resonant, its matter could not be earthy but rather watery and wind-like; for being fusible [resides] in these, and being sounding [resides] mainly in the air. And so in all cases. 20 863

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But perhaps if one grasps the complete definition of the thing in question one has grasped the matter too, straight off. For in the [books on] Demonstration, too, it was said that definition is threefold, one [kind being taken] from the matter, one from the form, and one from the combination - as happens in the case of anger; for we define it sometimes from the matter, [saying] that it is a boiling of the blood around the heart, sometimes from the form, [saying] that it is desire for revenge, and sometimes from the combination, [saying] that is a boiling of the blood around the heart because of desire for revenge. So, [the books on Demonstration continue], since definition is threefold the perfect definition and that especially suited to the natural philosopher is that from the combination. So, he says, one who has grasped such a definition will 865

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not need to draw conclusions about the matter from it, but has grasped the matter straight off in the definition. And in the case of [the definition of] man too the [term] 'mortar reveals the matter. And it is clear that no one but the natural philosopher himself will give the definition of natural things, using as his instrument the method of division and definition; and he will make a division of natural things taking in his formula (logos) the things that self-evidently belong to natural things, [namely] that some of them partake of life and some do not, and of those that do partake of life some partake of perception and some do not, and in this way [he will deal] with all the [features] that belong to them; and then compounding the [features] that belong in common or separately to each of the genera or species he will give the definition of each. 867

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199b35: For as things are [people] think that 'being out of necessity* applies in the process of generation. The natural philosophers, he says, all introduce necessity tout court in the process of generation, for they say that what comes to be does so through the capacities of the matter. But necessity tout court is what it is necessary that there should be apart from any postulate, as we say it is necessary that the sun should come to be in the Ram; while hypothetical [necessity] is when we postulate as being the case something that is not the case, and something else follows out of necessity on what has been postulated, as it follows in every case, if someone walks in light, that he will produce a shadow, but it does not follow tout court that a body produces a shadow. 'The earth [is borne] upwards because of [its] lightness.' By 'earth' he would, no doubt, mean what rests on the foundations. What he says is only by way of example and there is no need to be precise. 868

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200a5: But still [the house] did not come to be without these things, but not because of these, except in so far as [it did so] on account of matter.

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Without the matter, he says, the form could not come to be, but it does not come to be because of the matter; for the house does not come to be because there are stones and wood, but since a house is to come to be there must exist wood and stones. For without these it could not be, but these are not causes of it except as matter - for even the matter is one of the per se causes, but the form [does] not [exist] because of it, since the house would have to have been built without the builder, if, at least, the capacities of the matter had been its causes. But on the contrary the matter is selected because of the

Translation

form; for [it is selected] because of [its function of] 'concealing and preserving things' (which is the definition (logos) and form of the house) - and these things are our bodies and possessions, because of which we need the house. So since for this reason [there is] a need for the house, for this reason not just any matter must be selected, but this and that; therefore the matter is for the sake of the form. And since the matter contains the formula (logos) of things that are indispensable, if the matter does not exist it is natural that neither will the form.

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200a7: Similarly in all the other cases where being for the sake of something exists. 'In all the other cases': in artifacts and natural things. He added 'where being for the sake of something exists' because of monsters 10 among natural things, which have all entirely overstepped what is in accordance with nature, and because of the other things, which come to be not by nature but by thought, but fruitlessly and to no end. For the saw came to be, he says, not because there was iron but because it was necessary to saw stones and wood, and this could not happen unless the iron underlay the form of the saw as matter. At 15 any rate we mine iron for this reason, since we plan to produce a saw and a mattock and a plough; it is not because there is iron that for this reason we produce these things; but because there is need of these things, and these things cannot exist without iron, iron has to be mined. Therefore the matter exists because of the form, not the form because of the matter. Therefore necessity is hypothetical in natural things; for the same things which we say in the case of 20 artifacts we shall say in the case of natural things too. For it is not because there are seed and menses that for this reason there is a m a n , on the grounds that the man had always had to come to be from these things; but rather that because there is to be a man, and could not be one without these things, for this reason nature constructs these things too. 'Why is the saw of such-and-such a kind? In order that this [should occur] and for the sake of that? That is, why is it of iron and toothed? We say: so that it may saw. And for the sake of what 25 does it saw? So that a door should come to be. Therefore the saw exists for the sake of the door, not the door because of the saw. 870

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have been in natural things tout court (just as necessity is in celestial things tout court and not hypothetically, since moving in a circle follows on their essence in every case). But since in the realm of coming to be, there will not be a saw in every case where there is iron, nor a man where there are seed and menses, it is dear that natural things have necessity hypothetically and not tout court. The words Tor necessity is in the matter but that for the sake of which is in the formula' mean this, that the form does not have the [property of] 'being out of necessity' once the matter exists, but contrariwise if we hypothesise the form it is wholly necessary that the matter follows. So that following out of necessity [is a property] the matter has when the form is postulated, but the form is that for the sake of which and for this reason does not follow out of necessity on the matter. For that which is for the sake of something follows on that for the sake of which [it is], and not vice-versa. 200al5: Necessity exists in a way similarly in mathematical arguments and in the things that come to be in accordance with nature.

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[He means] that hypothetical necessity exists in mathematical arguments too as also in natural things, but not in every respect, but in one respect they are similar and in another they differ. After saying that 'necessity exists in a way similarly in mathematical arguments and in the things that come to be in accordance with nature', he first presents the difference between them, before saying what they have in common a n d in what respect necessity exists similarly among them. For they differ in that in the case of mathematical arguments once the starting-point is postulated the second things follow, while in the case of natural things once the end is postulated the earlier things follow. For the starting-point is the premises in the case of syllogisms and the matter in the case of the things that come to be, while the end is the conclusion in the former case and the form in the latter. But neither does the form follow on the matter in every case with natural things, nor do the premises on the conclusion in syllogisms; for as I s a i d , not only will a true conclusion be inferred from various different premises, but the same thing could be inferred from false [premises]. The difference then is this. And by 'mathematical arguments' he meant mathematical proofs, which amounts to saying syllogisms. And first he presents the difference between t h e m and then what they have in common. 872

20

25

873

874

875

139

Translation

200al6: For since the straight is [like] this it is necessary that the triangle have [its angles] equal to two right angles. 876

877

He says this for the sake of example. So he takes 'the straight' instead of the premises and 'having [its angles] equal to two right angles' as the conclusion. For through the definition of right angles it is shown that the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles. For we say: 'Since the three angles are equal to the two supplementary angles, and the two supplementary angles are equal to two right angles, for this reason the three angles are equal to two right angles.' And why are the two supplementary angles equal to two right angles? They are equal to two right angles for this reason, because the two supplementary angles are equal to the two angles that are supplementary and equal, and the two equal supplementary angles are two right angles. And why are the two equal supplementary angles right angles? Because this is the definition of a right angle, that if a straight line standing on another straight line makes the supplementary angles equal to each other, each of the angles is a right angle. So that for one who starts out from the definition of the right angle as from premises it will be possible to reach as a conclusion that the three angles are equal to two right angles. For since the definition of the right angle is as we have said, and the two supplementary angles are equal to the two equal supplementary angles, therefore the two supplementary angles are equal to two right angles; and the two supplementary angles are equal to the three angles of the triangle; therefore the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles.

333,1

5

878

10

879

200al8: But not if

8 8 0

15

the latter, the former.

For [it does] not [follow that] if the conclusion is so, it is necessary 20 that the premises are so. For we s a i d that it is possible to show the same thing by various [methods], both straightforwardly and by reductio ad impossibile and with true and false premises. 'But if the latter is not the case, neither is the straight [what it is].' If the conclusion is the case, he says, [it does] not [follow that] in every case so are the premises, as was said in the paragraph 334,1 before this; however, if the conclusion is refuted the premises are out of necessity refuted as well - for if the conclusion were not true, neither would the premises be true. For it is impossible that a falsehood should be inferred from true premises, as was shown before. For a truth might be inferred from false [premises], even if 5 not because of themselves at any rate because of the nature of the subject-matter; but it is impossible for a falsehood to be inferred from truths. 881

8 8 2

883

884

885

886

Translation

200al9: But among things that come to be for the sake of something the reverse holds. 10

Having said how things stand in mathematical arguments he says how they stand in natural things too, that the order of sequence is the reverse, as I s a i d , presenting the difference first. By 'among things that come to be for the sake of something' he meant 'among natural things', and also in general 'among all things made or done'; for mathematical objects neither come to be nor are for the sake of something. How the order of sequence is the reverse we said [above]. 'If the end will be or is, what comes first will be or is.' By 'end' he means the form, since [it is] also that for the sake of which, and [by] 'what comes first' [he means] the matter, for [it is] for the sake of something, and the first things are always for the sake of the later things. 'If not, just as there if the conclusion does not exist neither will the starting-point, so here the end and that for the sake of which [will not exist].' Having said that if the form exists so out of necessity does the matter, he wants to say how things stand with the contrapositive, that if the matter should not exist neither will the form. He could also have expressed the consequent as, 'If not the matter, then neither the end and that for the sake of which', but wishing to use as an example what happens in mathematical arguments he says that, 'If the matter should not exist, then just as there, in the case of mathematical arguments, if the conclusion did not exist neither did the premises, so too here if the matter does not exist neither will the form.' 887

888

889

890

15

891

20

25

200a22: For this, too, is a starting-point, not of action but of calculation (and there of calculation, for there is no action [there]). 892

893

335,1

Having stated their difference with respect to each other he says also what they have in common, [namely] that it is common to them that once the starting-point is given the rest follows. And he has said in the Ethics that action and theorising are oppositely related. For theorising has its starting-point from the end of action, while action has its starting-point from the end of theorising. For producing a shelter to ward off destruction by rain and heat is the end of the action of building, and this is the starting-point of theorising, while theorising concludes on the digging of earth, which is the starting-point of action; but we have spoken many times about these things. Things are like this not only in the case of artifacts but also in that 894

5

Translation

of natural things. For the natural philosopher studying natural things starts from the forms and then goes on to the matters of each thing, while nature starts its work from the matter and concludes on the form. So he says here [first] that the order of sequence is different in natural theorising and in mathematical arguments. For in natural things once the end is postulated the first thing and the starting-point follows, while in mathematical arguments once the starting-point is postulated the end follows. For in natural things the matter is the starting-point and the form is the end, while in mathematical arguments the premises are the starting-point and the conclusion is the end. But in the former case once the end is postulated (I mean the form) the matter follows and in this lies the order of sequence according to necessity, while in mathematical arguments once the starting-point is postulated (I mean the premises) there follows the end, which is the conclusion. But still, [he says], [secondly] in a certain respect in natural things too once the starting-point is postulated the end follows; for the form, which is the end of action - this is the starting-point of theorising. For the builder assumes that a house is to come to be, that is, a shelter to ward off destruction by rain and heat, proceeds on his way, as we have often said, and stops at the matter of the house. So that if the matter follows on the form, and with theorising the form is the starting-point and the matter is the end, then with natural things too the end follows on the starting-point, just as in mathematical arguments too. So in this respect they have [something] in common with each other. So in this respect the natural philosopher and the mathematician do not in fact take a different starting-point [from each other]. For in the case of natural things there is both action and theorising, and while it is not the case that with action what comes next (I mean the form) follows on the starting-point which has been postulated (this is the matter), with theorising on the other hand the matter does follow on the starting-point which has been postulated (this is the form). But in the case of mathematical arguments there is no practice but only theorising, and the postulate arises in accordance with the starting-point of the theorising, and this is the premises. So that if in both cases that which is in accordance with theorising is taken as starting-point, they would have in common with each other also the fact t h a t they take the starting-point of the same thing, I mean of theorising. That the premises are starting-points for the theorising [which consists] of the syllogism is clear. For if it were proposed to us [as a subject] for demonstration to show that the soul is immortal, we ought not to believe that this is the conclusion. For it was said in the logical works that conclusion, premise, problem, and proposition

10

895

896

15

20

897

25

30

898

899

336,1

900

901

902

5

142

10

15

20

Translation

are the same in what underlies them but differ in their role, so that when we look at how we might demonstrate that the soul is immortal we do not look at this as a conclusion but as a problem, and it only then becomes a conclusion when we have found the premises and it follows on them; so that our consideration and theorising first come about with respect to the premises, and then we find the conclusion consequent on these. And this is especially clear in what are called corollaries, which were not even put forward by us for demonstration, but often follow on certain premises given for some other purpose. Therefore in this way the premises are the starting-point for the theorising [which consists] of syllogisms. Tor this too is a starting-point, not of action but of calculation.' He had said how things stand regarding contrapositives, namely that just as in mathematical arguments unless the end exists neither does the starting-point (because a false conclusion can never be inferred from truths), so too in the case of natural things unless the matter exists neither does the form; he now wished to assimilate natural things to mathematical things and added the [words] Tor this too is a starting-point'; for the conjunction Tor' gives a cause. So he said This, too, is a starting-point', referring to the natural form, which is an end and that for the sake of which. And [it is] a starting-point 'not of action' (for action produces [its] starting-point from the matter), but of theorising; for this starts from the form and concludes on the starting-point of action. 903

25

200a24: so that if a house is going to exist it is necessary that these things should come to be or [already] exist or be, or, all in all, [the matter ...]. 904

337,1

He repeats what he has said. He said 'come to be' or 'exist' since some [arts] use matter that is [already there] while others craft the matter as well, for instance bronze and things like that; for it is we who construct the bronze. 905

200a30: It is indeed obvious that the necessary in natural things is what is spoken of as matter and the changes of this. 5

It is clear, he says, from all that has been said that it is not that the form follows out of necessity on the matter, but when the form has been postulated it is necessary that the matter follows. So that what necessarily follows is the matter, not the form. By 'changes' he means qualitative changes and alterations, which are routes towards the form, themselves coming to be for the sake of the form, just as the matter does too. 906

Translation

200a32: And both causes should be stated by the natural philosopher. [He means] that the natural philosopher will discuss both starting-points, the material and the formal, but more especially the formal, since each of the natural things gets its being too in accordance with this, and this is a cause of the matter, not the matter of the form. Therefore the form is more of a cause than the matter, since this is also a final cause, and all the things before the end are for the sake of the e n d .

10

15

907

200a34: And the end is that for the sake of which, and the starting-point [arises] from the definition and the formula (logos).

[He means] that one will grasp the form from the definition, and from this will draw the conclusions about the matter. So, he says, one will grasp the end, which is also that for the sake of which and a starting-point in the strictest sense, from the definition. 'And since health is of such-and-such a kind, these [things must come to be].' Since health is a balance of dry and moist [things], cold and hot [things], and in this man the hot is excessive, the cold must be applied; therefore this cold is matter for health. And similarly in all cases. 'And perhaps necessity also exists in the formula.' That is, the matter also comes to light in the definition; for this [matter] is what follows necessarily. For if I define the form of the saw, [saying] that it is a division of wood and stones, I have the matter as well, appearing together [with the definition], since this [division] could not occur otherwise than if what divides is iron fashioned in such-and-such a way. For no other matter can divide such things. So that if I am to give strictly the definition of sawing I shall mention the matter too, [saying] that [sawing] is a division of wood and stones by a toothed iron [thing].

20

908

909

910

200b7: For there are in the formula too certain parts serving as matter of the formula. One should read [this] in a transposed way: 'For there are in the formula (that is, the definition) certain parts of the formula, which serve as matter.' He means this, that there are certain parts of the definition which signify the matter, just as others [signify] the form. For in the definition of anger 'a boiling of the blood around the heart' signifies the matter, while 'because of desire for revenge' signifies the form; and in the definition of man 'mortal' reveals the matter. So

25 338,1

5

10

144

Translation

that in the complete definition the matter too is comprised together and grasped. So that in the case of some definitions, all those which give only the form, it is possible for one who looks at [them] in a natural way to find the matter from them by reflection, while in those cases where the definition is complete the matter is encompassed at once as well.

Notes

1. The title is variously given in different MSS. I have translated the version in the standard CAG text edited by Vitelli. 2. i.e.Phys. bk. 1. 3. For the general doctrine see Phys. 1.7, though the word for 'matter' (hule) is only mentioned there three times, one of them quite casual. 4. Macierowski and Hassing (n. 28; for full references see Bibliography) point out that at 190al5-16 Aristotle only says 'even if it [the substrate] is one in number not categorically that it is. But 190b23-4 does say categorically that it is. The point is that if, say, a man becomes cultured then the substrate of the change, the man himself, is one man, but he can be described in two ways, or has two properties, being uncultured before the change and cultured after it. Aristotle's view of basic substantial change, e.g. of fire to air, is much disputed. For opposing views see Charlton (Appendix) and Williams (pp. 211-19), and see also Robinson, Stahl and Waterlow (Nature ...). On the traditional interpretation, accepted by Philoponus, in such changes there is a substrate called 'prime (or first) matter' which is purely potential and has no qualities of its own. 'Prime' and 'first' represent the same Greek word (prdtos) but it is probably best to use 'prime' for the disputed concept and 'first' when translating Aristotle in this context, since whether or not he believed in prime matter he does not always mean it when talking of 'first matter'. It is not clear whether, or how, the prime matter underlying a change could be one in number, and it could be this thought that prompted the cautionary 'even i f at 190al5. See also n. 247 below. 5. See 191a8-12, with Philoponus' commentary at 187,18ff. For Aristotle anything known is known qua form and not qua matter. The wood which is matter for a table can only be known qua having a form of its own (as we might say, a chemical formula). The notion of matter in general therefore can be known only by analogy, as that which plays the same role with regard to form in general as wood plays with regard to the form of table. The doctrine can apply to either or both of prime matter (pure stuff, which has no 'chemical formula' of its own) and matter in general, which has no particular form, just as animal in general, as against cow or man, has no particular number of legs. 6. See 192al6-25, with Philoponus' commentary at 187,18ff. Male has been known to strive after female too, but the point is probably that what is ugly or female desires to become beautiful or male. Aristotle was not a woman and probably did not discuss these things with the women he knew. The last clause is difficult. The subject ('it') seems to be matter, which is feminine in Greek, while 'ugly' and 'female' here are neuter. Aristotle's point, which Philoponus is probably representing, albeit elliptically, seems to be that what does the striving is not ugliness itself, or anything which is essentially ugly, but an object which happens to be ugly but could in principle be or have been beautiful; such an object is the substrate or matter for ugliness, the contrast being between the object which has a property and the property which it has. It is important to realise that, whatever may be the force of 'first' at 194,8 (see n. 5 above), at this point it is an object, not prime matter, that is being referred to. 7. 'The form': Greek, like French, differs from English in its use of the definite

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Notes to page 9

article. In particular it very often, though not always, uses it when referring to an abstraction (cf. 'la beaut£' for 'beauty'). This makes life especially difficult for the translator in connexion with words like 'form', 'matter', 'nature': is Philoponus talking of form, etc., in general, or of some particular form, like the form of horse? The difficulty is compounded because Aristotle may (it is controversial) distinguish between the form of horse in general and the form of this horse in front of us. The present context pretty clearly Refers to form in general, and I have omitted 'the' before 'form' at its next occurrence just below, but often the Greek is quite ambiguous as to whether 'the' is needed in English or not. Sometimes indeed (e.g. 294,16-17) it is present and absent in the same sentence apparently casually, or as a matter of idiom, as we might say 'Man is an animal and so is the horse'. A mechanical policy of writing 'the' when and only when the definite article appears in Greek would be not only stylistically barbaric, even if limited to certain key terms, but sometimes, I think, misleading. I have therefore adopted a policy of translating or omitting the definite article as it seems natural to do so, since in general the issue about individual forms does not seem to occur. I have noted ad loc. a few places where something does seem to hang on the choice. Greek also differs from English in lacking an indefinite article except in certain emphatic contexts ('a certain ...' or 'a kind of...'), when it uses a word that can also be used by itself to mean 'someone' or 'something'. I have inserted the English article where the sense demands it. 8. As Macierowski and Hassing point out (n. 31) Aristotle does not mean that the form lacks nothing (as Philoponus' word anendees perhaps suggests) but that it does not lack itself and so could not desire itself. 9.192a34ff. 10. 'Separable': or 'separate'. The same ambiguity affects 'generable' and 'perishable' below. 'Separable' means able to exist without instances in the physical or perceptible world. Aristotle does not in fact mention separability at this point, but in the Metaphysics (6.1) he says that if there are any supersensible objects 'first philosophy' (his name for metaphysics) will study them, while otherwise natural philosophy will itself be first philosophy. Aristotle's actual view is that there is just one such supersensible object, his God, which he treats as a form somehow completely free from matter. Unlike Plato's Forms, however, it is not the sort of thing that could be imposed on matter, as the Form of Man is imposed on flesh to result in Socrates. Aristotle, too, has a form of man, but it cannot exist separately from actual men. (It is convenient to keep a capital F for Platonic Forms.) In one isolated chapter, however (Metaph. 12.8), Aristotle adds in a whole lot more supersensible objects to account for the movements of the heavenly bodies. 11. A typical instance of a twofold ambiguity. Each individual thing or each kind of thing? And is the form of an individual object the form of its species or its own private form (as we might talk of the form of Socrates)? For the most part Philoponus does not discuss such issues. 12. This categorical equation of nature and form ignores Phys. 193al8-31 where Aristotle says that in one sense (tropos) nature is matter and in another sense form. Macierowski and Hassing (pp. 74-6) see a divergence here between Philoponus and Aristotle, nature ending up as a transcendent principle, or at any rate a principle with a transcendent source, for Philoponus and an immanent one for Aristotle. 13. On this notion see Aristotle, Categories 1. A paronym of something with a name is what is named by a word (or, as here, a phrase) derived from that word, as 'by nature' is derived from nature. It is important to remember that for Aristotle paronyms, like homonyms and synonyms (also defined in Cat. 1), are things, not words or phrases e.g. the property or feature of being by nature, or else things picked out by their having that feature; here it is the things picked out, but at (e.g.) 205,18 it is the feature. 205,16-17 is a good example of the two uses in a single sentence. Homonyms are things named by the same name with different senses, while synonyms are things named by the same name with the same sense. Barclays Bank and the South Bank would be homonyms for Aristotle, while Barclays Bank and Lloyds Bank would be synonyms. 14. Greek has no inverted commas, but these questions could equally be translated

Notes to pages 9-11

147

as: 'What do "having a nature", "by nature", and "according to nature" mean?' The translation in the text seems to suit Philoponus' treatment better. 15.1 keep the standard term; literally, 'the making [cause]', a term used by the commentators, though not by Aristotle himself. 16. Phys. 198a24. These are three of Aristotle's so-called 'four causes' or types of explanation. They are roughly the denning characteristics, the productive agency and the purpose or function. The fourth cause is the matter. A l l four will be treated at length later (241ff.) 17. Literally: 'earlier', the comparative. Some MSS read the superlative proton, the proper word for 'first'. 18. A variant reading in one M S (K), also found in the version of Themistius (35,11 in CAG ed.), gives 'this would be nature' instead of 'in virtue of this would they be natural'. 19. 403b24ff. (Vitelli misprints 'a' for 'b'.) 20. The words for 'animate' and 'inanimate' are etymologically 'ensouled' and 'soulless'. 21. Or: 'when they are moved not from outside are moved by something b u t . . . . ' Cf. Macierowski and Hassing, p. 88. kinetai can equally mean 'move' (intransitive) or 'are moved' and ouk exothen can go either with what precedes or what follows. 22. Aristotle does give the releaser a role in causing the stone's downward movement, albeit only as a per accidens cause (Phys. 8.4,255b27). It has been claimed that without some such role for an external cause Aristotle would have no grounds for the role he gives his God or prime mover in moving the celestial bodies. It has also been claimed (by McGuire) that Philoponus wants to give an increased self-sufficiency to nature. See Sorabji (1988) pp. 241-3. 23. rhope, a key term partly anticipating the notion of 'impetus' developed by Philoponus in later works as an internal force bestowed upon agents by an outside agent, God, but it is limited to the upward or downward (quasi-levitational or -gravitational) tendencies of the four elements, fire, air, earth and water, and does not apply to the impetus in projectiles or the celestial bodies. See Sorabji (1987) ch. 1, and (1988) ch. 14, esp. p. 233. 24. i.e. the places where the main masses of earth and fire respectively are. Later Philoponus will argue against Aristotle that the places do not have any explanatory power. See 632,4-634,2; 581,18-31, translated and discussed in Sorabji (1988) pp. 211-13; the former comes from bk. 4 of Philoponus' commentary on the Physics and the latter from his Corollary on Place. 25. kinesis. This word and its associated verb kineo cover both change and movement, and I have used one or the other to translate it according to context or idiom, kinesis can also mean 'process' (a word I have usually used, along with 'route', 'road', and 'progress', to translate hodos). Aristotle sees four types of change, corresponding to four of his categories, substance (in particular, transformations of the four elements into each other), quantity (growth and shrinking, especially biological growth), quality (e.g. change in colour), and place (locomotion). (It is notable that he does not recognise change of change, i.e. acceleration.) Sometimes kinesis is confined to the last three types, while metabole and its associated verb metaballo, which I have translated 'alteration' and 'alter', are used for the genus including all four types, stasis ('stability') can be used as the opposite of kinesis in any of its senses. 26. arkhe. As well as 'source' I have used 'principle', 'start', 'starting-point', and 'origin' as translations of this very common word. It has connotations both of beginning (cf. 'archaeology', 'archaic') and of governing (cf. 'archangel', 'archbishop'). 27. The editor, Vitelli, suspects a lacuna. 'White', 'colder', 'hotter' are masculine plurals for which the context provides no obvious reference. 28. prodelon: but the 'pro-' may be no more than an intensifier. 29. Reading enteuthen with K for enthen at 196,15. 30. Phys. 192b22-3. 31. Or: 'by [its] nature moving [it]', i.e. the animal's nature moving the animal (cf.

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Notes to pages 11-12

Macierowski and Hassing, p. 89). In either case 'this' in the next sentence refers to the animal's nature. 32. Macierowski and Hassing (n. 57) claim that Aristotle does not, like Philoponus, use 'primarily' to mean 'immediately', but so that 'a cause or principle is in a thing primarily if it is in the thing not in virtue of a part of the thing'. But the difference is not all that great, for if a is in c through being in b which is a part of (and so in) c, then a is indeed not in c immediately. But what does distinguish Aristotle and Philoponus here is that Aristotle is talking of ways of being in something and Philoponus of ways of moving something. It is this, surely, that justifies their conclusion (loc. cit.) that 'For Aristotle, then, soul can be included among the natural causes and principles.' 33. Philoponus moves vertiginously between aorist and present in this sentence in a way that affects the translator more than the translation. The aorists seem to be used here for what is thought of as happening on some given occasion rather than generally. 34. Almost immediately (197,13) Philoponus goes on to say that perhaps soul is nature, at any rate in animals qua animals. Cf. 198,7. For brief discussions of soul and nature in Philoponus see Sorabji (1988) pp. 241; 246; Macierowski and Hassing nn. 57 and 58. 35. Reading haute for aute with L M t (but keeping kai) at 197,17. 'This' refers to soul. 36. A difficult sentence. Professor Sorabji has suggested to me (privately) that 'for thought too moves ...' explains '[I mean] not the rational soul', just above. This would explain why thought does not move things primarily but would surely leave it unexplained why the rational soul should not do so. We seem to need some further premise, such as that the rational soul only moves things by stimulating desire, which belongs to the rest of the soul. It is tempting to read tauta for tauten with L at 197,19 (though touto would be easier). 'This' would then refer to 'what I have just said' rather than to 'the rest of the soul'. For a different translation of this sentence (and also of the beginning of this paragraph at 197,13) see Macierowski and Hassing p. 89, with nn. 59-61. They refer 'this' at 197,19 to the rational soul, which seems syntactically difficult, and translate mepote differently; also eiresthai (perfect) at 197,19 seems difficult for them. 37. The various occurrences of this phrase involve different words for 'not', in ways which do not here affect the translation. 38. In Greek 'per accidens' and 'happened' are closely related in etymology. 39. horos and horismos seem to be used indifferently for 'definition' over the next page or so. 40. Professor Sorabji points out (privately) that this phrase [tes energeias tes phuseds] suggests the essence of nature. In that case it supports the translation 'essence' rather than Macierowski and Hassing's 'substance' for ousia at 197,33 (p. 90; the passage does not suggest 'a reification of nature foreign to the Aristotelian understanding*, as they say (p. 82)). energeia is notoriously ambiguous between 'activity* and 'actuality'. Here the former seems relevant. McGuire quotes this whole passage (pp. 246-7) and uses it to link Philoponus with the Stoic idea of the natures of things as active and self-sufficient causes; cf. pp. 262-3, and the discussion in Sorabji (1988) pp. 242-3. 41. Or: 'of its essence'; autis can mean 'its' or 'itself here. 42. In translating 'or' as inclusive (possibly both) rather than exclusive (not both) I am following Macierowski and Hassing (p. 90 with nn. 16 and 65) against McGuire (pp. 247ff.). 43. katadedukuia, an important term, whose translation is controversial. McGuire (p. 247 with n. 11) translates as 'diffused', following the Latin translation of Rasarius in 1558. But see the comments of Macierowski and Hassing, pp. 82 and 85 with n. 18. Diffusion suggests a Stoic notion, while descending suggests Philoponus' later idea of power as coming down from the Christian God. The notion of descending, however, rather goes beyond that of diffusion than being incompatible with it; cf. Macierowski and Hassing's gloss at p. 86: 'to descend through, and thus to pervade.' On the

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interpretation of this whole sentence see Macierowski and Hassing, pp. 81-7, who claim that Philoponus* concern was to reconcile Aristotle with the Bible, and that his terminology is Stoic, apart from katadedukuia. But this exception is significant, they think. For the Stoics nature is an immanent power which moulds the things it works in, while for the Neoplatonists (Plotinus and Proclus) it is similarly a moulding power, though seen as the product of the activity of the Craftsman. But the Bible has God creating matter itself, and Philoponus' revised definition is inconsistent, in Macierowski and Hassing's opinion, with Aristotle's view of nature as a formal cause, since form now becomes itself a product and effect of something external. However, I am assured (privately) by Dr L . Siorvanes that dunamis katadedukuia is perfectly acceptable as a Neoplatonic phrase, with katadedukuia being used to refer to the descent of souls into bodies. See also n. 342 below. The whole question how far Philoponus is influenced here and elsewhere in this work by his Christian beliefs, and how far what he says can always be interpreted in Neoplatonist terms, is open to dispute. Verrycken thinks the original Physics commentary of 517 was revised a dozen or more years later after Philoponus' conversion or return to Christianity, though the main passages he refers to as showing this revision do not include any in bk. 2 (see p. 249). 44. Phys. 192b22-3, slightly misquoted, cf. 196,16-17. 45. sunektikos, an important Stoic term. McGuire (pp. 262-3) claims that Philoponus uses it here in a different sense from that of the Stoics. 46. See n. 34 above. 47. For Aristotle the four elements, fire, air, water and earth, were arranged in four concentric spheres, with some intermingling, especially near the surface of the earth. The fire sphere rotated, as we can see from the rotation of the heavenly bodies, but the natural motion of fire was upwards until it reached its natural place beneath the outermost sphere of ether, whose own natural motion was rotatory. The fire sphere was carried round by this rotation, so that its own rotation was unnatural, being imposed from outside. But Aristotle faced a difficulty, because he also held that no unnatural or forced motion could be eternal. Philoponus here solves this problem, as do several other Neoplatonists, by making its rotation neither natural nor unnatural, but superna­ tural. Later, however, he abandoned this theory and made the rotation natural. See C. Wildberg in Sorabji (1987) pp. 205-8. 48. Inserting tes before ges with Mt at 198,33, though the translation is not really affected. 49. Dropping estin at 199,5, as Vitelli suggests. 50. i.e. the solstices. 51. The treatment of heat as a kinesis, if awkward to our ears, is Aristotelian. 'Process' would be an alternative translation. 52. kairos is wider than 'season', referring to significant times, but 'season' is suggested here by the reference to the solstices above. 53. alloidtikos, a rare word, etymologically suggests 'change-inducing', which would presumably need 'movement' as the translation of kinesis (rather than 'change'). But though Aristotle did indeed hold that qualitative change presupposed locomotion (Phys. 8.7) there seems to be no emphasis here on a doctrine that would surely require some comment from Philoponus. Cf. also the contrast of 'qualitative change' and 'change in place' just below. 54. aitia an abstract noun. The next occurrence of 'cause' just below translates aition, the neuter of an adjective aitios and the next occurrence after that translates aitia again. These two words for 'cause' are used indifferently by Philoponus, as indeed in Greek generally, including the MSS of Philoponus. 55. Or (with Macierowski and Hassing, p. 91): 'not entirely', ou pantos can be taken in either way, and it seems that we can only go by the general sense of the passage. 56. Here and elsewhere in book 2 'the philosopher', assuming it has a definite reference, as here, refers to Aristotle. 57. Reading de after ta with Mt at 199,27. 58. Phys. 192b9, slightly inaccurately quoted. These items belong to a longer list. Cf. t

t

150

Notes to pages 15-21

205,20-1. 59. 'Further' is not in the Greek but seems required by the ensuing examples of death and old age, which are not substances. 60. On the distinction in this paragraph see Wolff, pp. 53-67, esp. 60ff. 61. The reference seems to be to fiery meteors. 62. para, which I have so far translated as 'against', can also mean 'beyond', 'outside', 'alongside', as here; but the argument requires a single translation for it throughout this passage. 63. he katholou phusis, or just below (201,13) he holike phusis. This is an innovation, which is not found in Aristotle except in phrases like 'Nature does nothing in vain'. Philoponus seems to take it more seriously in connexion with providence and the problem of evil; see 197,30-198,6; 296,3-5; 312,26-30; and also Sambursky, pp. 93-8 and Wolff, pp. 53-67, esp. 62ff. 64. Presumably Philoponus means that there is no evil sub specie universi. He seems to imply that any evil would be devoid of any form at all, but he doesn't explain what such an evil would be. 65. 'We say' does not come in Aristotle. 66. i.e. those whose parts are like themselves - homogeneous stuffs, as we should say, as against structured objects. 67. Phys. 192bl3-14. 68.198,9-199,22. 69. cf. 25,12ff. of Philoponus' commentary on bk. 1 of the Physics. 70. Phys. 192bl8-19, with altered word order. 71. Philoponus omits 'to be' from Aristotle's text. 72. Aristotle's text has 'substance' (singular), as do (L) and t here, but the plural recurs at 212,12 below. 73. Literally: 'the' - but 'an' seems the required sense. 74. The word translated 'substrate' is the participle of the word translated 'underlies'. 75. A n unusual form of the perfect, perhaps with the sense: 'he now has it, having shown it.' 76. Phys. 192b35-6. 77. cf. the questions at 195,2, and also see 200,8-19. 78. If'the' is serious the reference is presumably to the other three elements. 79. These words are in Aristotle, and added therefrom in t. 80. Upward motion etc. 81. Vitelli marks a lacuna here. There is no connecting particle, and the grammar of the sentence as a whole seems anacoluthic as it stands. 82. cf. Phys. 192b9, and 200,9-10 above. 83. 200,12-16. 84. Aw. Post. 2.1 has the first two questions, replacing the third by whether something happens, the fourth then asking why it happens. 85. Greek has no separate word for 'exist', but it is sometimes a natural translation for einai, the verb 'to be'. I have also used 'exist' (along with 'be a property of, 'belong', 'obtain' (intransitive)) to translate huparkho. 86. Aristotle probably would wish to demonstrate that fire burns, unless he took it as axiomatic. But he would not rely on such a demonstration for his knowledge that it does burn, and would certainly agree that there must be undemonstrable axioms. 87. Or possibly: 'need not' (ou dei). 88. An. Post. 72b5ff., 84a29-b2. 89. Where Antiphon, a fifth-century BC sophist and general polymath, said this does not seem to be known. For his attempt to square the circle see 31,9-24 of Philoponus' commentary on the Physics, and also Ross, pp. 466-7. 90. Aristotle now, not Antiphon. 91. The word logos, which can mean 'argument' (as just above, and below) or 'statement', is etymologically connected with the verb lego, 'to state'. The Greek has the same word here and at 207,4, where the closely preceding reference to 'logical

Notes to pages 21-23

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arguments' seems to require the translation 'argument'. I use 'statement' here to keep the close connexion with the verb, but the point, though clear enough in itself, is hard to make succinctly in English. One might try 'way of speaking' (with 'engage in' for lego), though logos would not normally be so translated. 92. Literally: 'syllogisms', but not necessarily in the technical sense. The word is connected with logos (see n. 91 above). 93. Keeping ponerous as in all M S S at 207,3. Vitelli's conjecture perous ('maimed') is tempting but unnecessary (though Themistius 37,19 has it, as Vitelli points out). 94. Literally: 'soul' (psukhe). 95. Phys. 193a3-4. 96. Phys. 193a6. 97. According to Mt: 'not to recognise that some things are self-evident and do not need demonstration.' 98. See n. 14 above. 99. English demands inverted commas here. Not only does Greek lack these, but for Aristotle non-linguistic things can be 'said'. Cf. n. 13 above, and also Cat. 2. 100. The present lemma and the succeeding lines are our main evidence for attributing these doctrines to Antiphon the sophist (fifth century BC). Another source tells us they come in book 1 of a work called Truth. But there seems no reason to attribute to Antiphon anything beyond what is immediately entailed by the bed example, and certainly not a fully worked-out doctrine (of which we hear nothing elsewhere) of matter and form or substance and attributes. 101. The point is clear but the expression seems awkward. What the wood is subject to is having within it something (its matter) which has the same relation to the wood as the wood (considered as matter) has to the bed. 102. The argument is obscure, even if my supplementations are right, and earth appears awkwardly as a correlate to wood here when it has just been mentioned as a correlate of water, etc. in the role of possible substrate for wood. But the argument of the context as a whole is clear enough, and concerns a two-stage analysis whereby wood is a substrate for a bed (which could be changed into a table, etc.) but could also have its own substrate (one or more of the four elements) while it changed into something else - then earth, one of the four elements, is awkwardly given as an example of what wood might change into. 103. cf. Phys. 123a23-4. 104. xulon can mean 'wood' (or 'timber', a stuff), or 'log (a thing). 'Wood' has seemed the natural translation hitherto, but here the plural demands 'log'. 105. Actually water is simple for Aristotle and Philoponus. 106. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion ten tou at 209,7. The reading in the text could mean'... the art of a statue'. 107. A standard Aristotelian doctrine. The wood of a table, when considered in abstraction, is considered as that which could become a table, and so as potentially a table, even though the table in question actually exists. See, e.g. Metaph. 1048a35-b9. 108. Or: 'if nature is said of man and nature [is said] of horse.' The definite article doesn't occur with 'nature', 'man' and 'horse' here, though it does occur with these terms in the rest of the sentence below. 109. One of the few occasions where I have inserted the definite article rather than deleting it. As said in n. 7 above, I have primarily followed idiom, and though Philoponus does distinguish nature in general from particular natures (see n. 63 above) the context should prevent confusion and a mechanical following of the Greek would be of little reliability. I have, however, usually used brackets, as here, when inserting the definite article. (To use them for all insertions and deletions would lead to a hideously unreadable translation.) 110. Fully written out the syllogism would look like this: all cases of being said to be are cases of having one's own form; all cases of being said to be are cases of having one's own nature; therefore some cases of having one's own form are cases of having one's own nature. Following Philoponus I have written the minor premise first. 111. A n obscure sentence. Is the point that the real reason why some cases of 5

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Notes to pages 23-26

having one's own form are cases of having one's nature is that all are? Or (less likely perhaps) that in the premises what is said of 'each thing' is not true just because of something applying to that thing specifically? 112. Reading the first and third occurrences of esti at 209,24 as paroxytone. 113. It is not clear which commentators on the Physics are meant. 114. Antiphon, etc. Cf. 207,21-2, with note. 115. The general sense is clear, but the style (like that of several sentences in this area) is tortuous if not obscure. Perhaps insert deikhthesetai ti before deikhthesetai? 116. Readingphate for phasin with Mt at 210,4. 117. Reading all' he for all' en following t at 210,6. 118. The kai is awkward. It is not obvious who else has shown this. Perhaps Philoponus means that his opponents have implicitly shown it, in the way he has been explaining (209,31ff.). 119. Or: 'that what arises from form is form.' 120. Or: 'the bed.' Are we talking of bed in general or this bed here? I assume the former, and so omit the article, which in English distinguishes the views, while its appearance in the Greek is ambiguous between them. Cf. the second ambiguity in the n. 11 above, as well as n. 7 above. 121. ekphusis. Like 'outgrowth', and phusis itself, this is ambiguous between process and product. So, in fact, is blaste between 'sprouting' (as here) and 'sprout'. It is convenient to keep the translation 'nature' for phusis in this paragraph even though 'nature' is not ambiguous in this way in English. 122. Literally: 'ex-airation' (exaerdsis, derived from aer, which means 'air' (though it can also mean 'vapour')). In both Greek and English the term is odd, because air or vapour is the end-state, not the initial state, while 'e-' or 'ex- suggests that what follows it refers to an initial state. 123. auto ('itself) is neuter, though the words for 'source', 'cause' and 'change' are all feminine. Perhaps the feminine aute, coming where it would, could have misleadingly suggested 'for it is change itself. 124. Or: 'in accordance with parts', or 'part by part', the normal meaning of the phrase (kata mere). The phrase is difficult here, and it seems best to translate literally and leave Philoponus' gloss to speak for itself. 125. telos, which can mean either purpose or end-state (i.e. actual or normal result). I have translated it as 'end' where it means purpose or is ambiguous. 126. 'Which' is feminine, though one might expect neuter, referring to 'end'. The three obvious antecedents are 'source', 'change' and 'road'. 'Change' is the easiest syntactically, while 'road' is perhaps easiest in sense though syntactically very awkward because of the long gap between 'which' and its antecedent in that case. A possible, though linguistically not very probable, alternative would take en hei ('in which') as a variant of plain hei ('where'). 127. These words are part of Aristotle's text and the lemma at 207,16. Their omission here is presumably accidental. 128. Phys. 193a9-ll. 129. If a statue is made of bronze, which is made of copper and zinc, which in turn are made of the four elements, bronze is the proximate matter and the others more remote. The notion will become important later. 130. The word 'unorganised' is singular, suggesting that the logs are regarded as an unorganised element or feature. 131. Phys. 192b33, quoted in the lemma at 204,14 above. 132. The word I translate as 'substrate' (hupokeimenon) is the neuter, used as a noun, of the adjective I translate as 'underlying'. Cf. n. 74 above. 133. idea, the word Aristotle uses for Plato's Forms, though here evidently used more loosely. It is not obvious why Philoponus doesn't simply use eidos, the standard word for 'form', unless he wanted to avoid begging questions by treating it as synonymous with 'nature'. 134. 'Matter' here has the definite article, while 'form'just below does not. 135. This last sentence is difficult. It sounds as if Philoponus is referring to prime

Notes to pages 26-29

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matter (on which cf. n. 4 above), which is hardly 'self-standing' (authupostatos) and which Aristotle certainly doesn't call substance (unless in the subordinate sense of 'material substance': ousia huliki). Also Philoponus has not explicitly mentioned prime matter so far in bk. 2. Aristotle has just called ousia ('substance') three-way ambiguous, but this still leaves 'self-standing* as a difficulty as it seems to apply to the wrong term here. 136. This lemma belongs in the passage giving Antiphon's view. 137. 'He' seems to refer to Aristotle, but speaking on Antiphon's behalf. 138. It is tempting to read legon ('meaning') for lego (T mean') at 213,6 with an ancient scholiast; it seems natural that the subject of the verb should be Aristotle, not Philoponus. 139. Simplicius (Commentary on the Physics, 275,3-5) confirms this. 140. The opposition between nature (phusis) and convention (thesis) or prescription (law, custom: nomos) was part of the stock-in-trade of the sophists in the fifth century BC. The slight grammatical awkwardness ('were ... signifies') mirrors the Greek. 141. Or: 'of wood.' Cf. n. 104 above. There is the same ambiguity just below (213,23). 142. The Presocratics. See also n. 185 below. Thales of Miletus (early sixth century BC) allegedly chose water, but no one is known to have chosen earth. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 989a5ff. 143. 'Out of necessity' could qualify 'postulated' or 'be eternal'. The ensuing sentence, as well as the order of words, suggests it should be taken with 'postulated'. 144. Empedocles of Acragas, early to mid-fifth century BC, reacted to Parmenides' insistence that nothing could change by postulating four unchanging elements (fire, air, water, earth) which recombine under the influence of two forces, love and strife, to form ordinary objects and stuffs. He thus (in effect) agreed that nothing real or ultimate could change. Cf. also n. 264 below, and 314,6ff. 145. Aristotle's own text has 'artistic' (tekhnikon, not as Philoponus has, tekhneton). 146. cf. 208,31-209,16. 147. t emends this to 'bed', but it is more likely that Philoponus momentarily forgot his own example. 148. Or: 'For it is not this - what is potentially flesh - that has the nature of flesh.' 149. One might expect 'nature' rather than 'flesh', which Themistius in his summary of Aristotle supports (39,2 in CAG edition). But to seek to identify the nature of flesh might be thought equivalent to seeking to identify flesh itself. 150. Phys. 193bl-2. 151. The precise connexion between 'formula' (logos) and 'figure' (morphi) is not much clearer in Greek than it is in English, but perhaps the general point is clear enough: any kind of definition of what a thing is is more likely to be in terms of its form, shape or characteristics rather than in terms of its matter. I keep the slightly awkward 'figure' for morphe, having used 'form' for eidos and 'shape' for skhema; the three words are virtually synonymous. 152. The 'and', as often in Greek, probably means no more than 'or' or 'i.e.'; figure (morphi) and form (eidos) are not two different things but at most one thing seen from different points of view. 153. Phys. 193b3-4. 'Formula' translates logos, but there is no etymological connexion with 'form' (eidos). 154. Phys. 193b5-6. 155. cf. 209,16-31. 156. Some M S S read'... next to what was said earlier', which led Vitelli to propose: 'continuous with what was said earlier, not with what was said next above.' The point would be that the immediately preceding sentence in Aristotle (Phys. 193b5-6) refers to the composite, whereas now it is the form, not the composite, that is being said to be nature more than the matter. 157. cf. Phys. 193a30-l. 158. The composites, or possibly the words in which Aristotle refers to them.

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Notes to pages 29-31

159. Phys. 193b5-6, which Philoponus has just quoted at 215,11-12. Seen. 156 above. 160. cf. 209,31-210,9. 161. Phys. 193bl2-13. 162. ekphusis. See n. 121 above. 163. iatreusis (doctoring) and iatrike (medical art), and also iatros (doctor), are etymologically connected. 164. hugiansis, cognate with hugieia (health). 165. Literally: 'come to the same thing.' But the Greek does not, like the English, suggest synonymy. 166. Phys. 198a26-7. 167. A reference to the common view that spontaneous generation could occur from decaying organic matter; cf. Balme (pp. 86-7; 127-9) for Aristotle's views. 168. Probably the point is that a mule has some resemblance to its parent horse and donkey. The point could be that the form of mule exists in the breeder's mind, as the form of house exists in the builder's mind (cf. Metaph. 1032b22-3; cf. 1070b28-34) though this seems less likely, especially in view of the plural 'things producing it'. 169. Doctoring is 'like nature' only in being called after what it is from, not in being a process (which nature, in this sense, is not: see n. 121 above). 170. i.e. nature in the sense of a process again. 171. i.e. like doctoring, not like nature in the other sense (which is not a process). 172. Phys. 193bl6. 173. It is of course the same process, but the name reflects a view from one end, not from the other. 174. Aristotle's text has a word which can mean 'or' or 'in so far as' according to its exact spelling (e or hei), which differs in different MSS. Philoponus, evidently unsure which is correct, writes a neutral version and then proceeds to explain the ambiguity. 175. Phys. 193bl7-18. 176. The terms kreitton and kheirdn, which I translate 'stronger' and 'weaker', can also mean 'better' and 'worse', or 'dominant' and 'secondary'. Aristotle evidently thinks of'white' as somehow the positive term, with 'black' as a mere negation of it. 177. 'Form' and 'figure' come to the same thing. See n. 151 above. 178. This sentence and the previous one seem to be rather loosely written, though their point is clear. Philoponus is well aware that strictly not everything is either form or formless; the composite is neither of these. The issue is presumably whether or not there are any things beyond forms and informed composites. If not, the privation will be a kind of form and what possesses it will be a kind of informed composite. Also in the two alternatives he has just described (217,22ff.) he first talks of calling something privation and then talks (not of calling something else privation but) of calling privation something. The alternatives are: (1) Aristotle called white (etc.) form and black merely privation. (2) He called even a privation like black (despite its being a privation in the strict sense) form, as well as calling white form. 179. The point seems to be that since every disposition or condition of a thing, including those involving a privation like blindness, is treated as involving a form, the name of the privation is taken to name a form: blindness is an attribute which can mark out a group of people as such. 180.1 have translated in the way Philoponus evidently takes the passage. Others take the question to be whether in this case there is a privation or opposite, without distinguishing these terms; cf, e.g. Ross pp. 350; 506. 181. i.e. Phys. 1, esp. 188bl8ff. (misprinted as 'al8' by Vitelli). 182. The reference may be to Phys. 5.1, on which Philoponus' surviving commentary is fragmentary. See 787ff., with 790,2-4. 183. See esp. GC 2.1-3. 184. Things can be contraries (antikeimena) if they are merely inconsistent, like being a square and being a triangle. To be opposites (enantia) they must also be at opposite ends of a scale, like black and white. (The reader should, however, be warned that I have used 'opposite' where 'contrary' is usually used, and vice-versa, partly because of this passage.)

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185. phusikos. Literally: 'naturalist' or 'physicist', both of which are too narrow in English. 'Natural scientist' is a possible translation, though carrying misleading associations with white coats and test-tubes, but though Aristotle distinguishes the phusikos from the philosopher proper his phusikos studies many topics we would assign to philosophy. 186. Theology: another name for what Aristotle calls first philosophy, i.e. metaphysics. There is, however, a distinction between these names, since for Aristotle it is an open question whether first philosophy turns out to be theology, as he thinks it does; see Metaph. 6.1. 187. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion hautai for autes at 219,4. 188. gnosis, evidently used as a technical term here. 189. The word for 'know' (gignosko) is cognate with gnosis. 190.162,4ff.inbk. 1. 191. Or perhaps just: 'discussion.' The word is logos. 192. Presumably contemporaries of Aristotle, not of Philoponus, since it is Aristotle who goes on to disagree. Probably the ordinary educated layman is meant. 193. Cael. 269a2ff. 194. Cael. 2.4 195. Cael. 2.5-6. 196. The main discussion of the elements is in Cael. 3. 197. kai peri at 219,24 seems in effect to equal peri kai, unless we are to understand a second peri after the second kai. 198. Water, air and fire are thought of as basically having the form of spherical shells surrounding the spherical earth, the whole being surrounded, on Aristotle's mature view, by a shell of ether, the 'fifth essence'. The land-masses, the astronomical bodies, and also phenomena like rain, are deviations from this basic pattern. 199. Theodosius of Bithynia, mathematician and astronomer of second to first centuries BC. 200. Autolycus of Pitane, astronomer of the fourth century BC. He influenced Euclid's Phaenomena. 201. 'More concerned with particular objects': merikdteros, comparative of the word I have usually translated 'particular' but here used in a strange sense. Similarly at 220,9-10. 202. Euclid worked in Alexandria in about 300 BC. Mainly famous as a geometer, he also wrote (among other things) the Phaenomena on astronomy. 203. The Greeks didn't regard the sun and moon as stars, but Greek idiom writes 'the other stars' instead of 'the other things, namely the stars'. But it is awkward to stick pedantically to this when translating. 204. Reading engus pos for pos engus at 220,17. One M S (K) supports this, though with pos as perispomenon. 205. In addition to the four elements (fire, air, water, earth) Aristotle postulated a fifth, known as ether, whose natural motion was neither up nor down but rotation in a circle. The etherial outer sphere of the heavens moved the inner spheres by friction, accounting for the observed rotations of the heavenly bodies. The details are complex and not altogether clear. See Cael 1.2-12 and Metaph. 12.8. 206. As we shall see, Aristotle made much use of 'final causation'. In particular he argued (at Phys. 259al0-12; 260b22; cf. e.g. GA 717al5-16; 731bl8-31) that of two competing scientific hypotheses that one whose truth would mean the universe was a better place than if its rival were true should be preferred, other things being equal. 207. scil. the sun and presumably the other celestial bodies, and perhaps the masses of the five elements too. 208. ousia ('substance') can mean either a substance (whether an object or a stuff) or the substance of something. 209. The change to the plural (prosarmozousi) is abrupt and awkward but continued in skopousi ('look at') and theorosi ('study') below. Note the similar transition to the plural at 221,20. However, an alternative would be to take prosarmozousi as impersonal, with ta dedeigmena as subject, giving the sense: 'what

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Notes to pages 34-36

is shown in the more general mathematical branch of knowledge applies^to these things'; cf. the impersonal harmosei at 220,34. It is also possible that we should read a full stop rather than a comma after skhemata (220,30), in which case we should presumably also follow Vitelli's suggestion and read monon for men at 220,29, giving the sense: 'he studies only the movements and the shapes in them.' 210. e.g. the sphere which carries the sun round, or that which carries the fixed stars round. 21 l.cf. An. Post. 87b37ff. 212. Although the conclusion in an Aristotelian syllogism could be a particular proposition, as shown in the Prior Analytics, scientific demonstration was limited to the proving of true universal propositions. 213. i.e., presumably, even if its being solar is his reason for choosing the feature to examine. 214. i.e. astronomers. 'And' could also be taken more strongly as 'And ... too', scil. as well as the mathematicians; but this seems less likely, as the point has not already been made in connexion with the mathematicians. Cf. 221,31, where astronomers seem to be subsumed under mathematicians anyway, though Aristotle himself is just about to say, in a passage Philoponus quotes (Phys. 193b25-6), that astronomers are either a third group or fall under natural philosophers. 215.1 have kept the article with 'attributes' and 'substances', though it is not clear whether the reference is to these particular attributes and substances or to attributes and substances in general. The point would hold in the general case too so far as Aristotle is concerned. Cf. n. 7 above. 216. Plato and his followers. I keep a small f because the text has eidos, not idea (cf. n. 10 above), and Philoponus goes on to talk of Aristotelian forms just below (221,34). Aristotle claims (Phys. 193b35ff.) that the Platonists separate in reality (i.e. treat as independent substances) things not even separable in thought. He means physical attributes like manhood or horsehood, and his point is that one can think of circles and squares without thinking of any kind of matter, even though they cannot exist apart from circular objects, etc. But manhood, etc. not only cannot exist apart from matter but cannot exist apart from a particular kind of matter (flesh), which therefore enters into their definition, so that Aristotle holds that we cannot even think of manhood without thinking of flesh. He compares these cases, rather unhappily, to the property of snubness in the case of noses. 217. The point is of course that no separate reality is attributed to them. 218. Here as often in Greek the neuter of the adjective is used where it is natural to use abstract nouns in English. However, the point is of some importance here because for Aristotle just as a man cannot be made of just anything, as a circle can, so flesh cannot be made of just anything, but only of that which is moist, etc. English smudges this point by using 'moistness' instead of 'that which is moist', while 'moisture' goes too far from a word signifying the property itself (and has no analogue in the case of 'soft'). 219. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion d'oun for de at 222,9. 220. There is no need to limit these to surfaces (epiphaneiai) as Wicksteed's translation does. 221. Wicksteed translates as 'occupy spaces', but Philoponus evidently takes it as I have done; one can consider, say, the left-hand half of an object. 222. Philoponus substitutes semeia for Aristotle's stigmai at 222,14, but the words are synonymous here. 223. scil. from mathematics and natural philosophy. 224. This sentence from Aristotle is the only one separating the present lemma from the next one. 225. Both words mean 'astronomy' for their respective authors, but by Philoponus' time astrologia had gained its modern sense, irrelevant to the present discussion. 226. Keeping epheron for epheronto with K at 222,19. 227. The context seems to demand this translation ('not ... absolutely') of ou pantelds, though it can also mean 'absolutely not'.

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228. 219,15ff. 229. The Greek is slightly awkward and Vitelli suggests 'and attributes' may have dropped out after 'shapes'. 230. The Greek has the article, but it is not clear whether Philoponus is referring to natural bodies in general (e.g. animals, etc.) or specifically to the heavenly bodies. The reference to shapes perhaps suggests the latter. Cf. also n. 234 below. 231. Literally: 'have differed.' Possibly 'have come to differ' or 'have come to be different', but there is no emphasis on evolutionary development over time. 232. Again the perfect tense, as regularly in this usage of this verb. Perhaps the present would suggest 'are being put together', as Greek has no continuative present tense. 233. Philoponus is here more or less quoting Aristotle's text immediately after the above lemma, and drops Aristotle's 'because', presumably by a slip - though Philoponus' style at this point is so impossibly cumbrous that it is not surprising if he gets tied up in his own syntax. One could simplify the text by putting a full stop for the comma at 223,8 after the bracket, but the succeeding sentence would then have no connecting particle, which is unusual in Greek. 234. The Greek could also mean 'about', but Aristotle's text makes clear that 'of gives the intended sense, and also that only the celestial bodies, not particulars in general, are being referred to. 235. 211,23. 236. Vitelli's suggestion 'shape' (skhema) for 'body' (soma) is tempting. 237. Literally: '[They] escape notice doing this.' It is not obvious what 'this' is. Aristotle can hardly mean that the Platonists escape their own or anyone else's notice" in separating what they are talking about. Aristotle's immediately preceding sentence doesn't help here, but the point is clearly that what they are unaware of is separating the wrong things (natural rather than mathematical concepts) in the wrong way (postulating their real existence rather than merely abstracting them in thought). One M S of Philoponus (K) evidently sees the difficulty and has: '[They] do not escape notice ...'; but this would make a trivial point and is unnecessary. 238. The same word as that for 'do ... unawares' in the lemma. 239. Philoponus reverts to Aristotle's word for his own non-separable forms (eidos) from the word for Platonic transcendent Forms (idea, a word totally lacking its modern mentalistic connotation). 240. Taking logisthenai in an active sense, pace Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon. 241. The four elements, fire, air, water, earth. 242. pros, which could have the milder sense of'towards' or 'concerning'. See n. 342 below on the harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle. 243. Plato. 244. As Vitelli points out, 138,20-5 (in bk. 1) is inconsistent with this and says form cannot exist without matter even in thought (katf epinoian). 245. One M S (K) includes the word 'forms' explicitly. 246. Aristotle. 247. Here Philoponus is attributing to Aristotle the doctrine of prime matter. See n. 4 above. But he gives his own interpretation of Aristotle on prime matter more explicitly at 232,5 and 244,8, where he distinguishes that which has threedimensionality but lacks other properties from that which underlies threedimensionality itself. The latter he treats as prime matter properly speaking, while in the present context he refers only to the former. The implied 'first' substrate could either be the proximate matter (flesh, etc.) or (more likely) the really prime matter here left unmentioned. Later Philoponus changed his interpretation of Aristotle on this point, abandoning any substrate more ultimate than that which has three dimensions. For discussion of this and of Philoponus' relations to Simplicius on this issue see Sorabji (1988) chs 1-3. 248. cf. GC 321bl9ff., where Aristotle says they are spoken of in two ways, as matter and as form. 249. The reference is evidently to Phys. 194bl2, as Vitelli notes. But Philoponus

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distorts the passage in saying baldly that 'he postulated forms separable from natural things'. Aristotle says they are separable 'in form' (eidei), probably meaning 'in definition' (logoi) or 'in conception' (epinoiai) (cf. Charlton, top of p. 98), but then goes on to say it belongs to first philosophy to say 'how things stand with the separable and what it is', presumably now referring to things which are substantively separable (see n. 10 above). However, Philoponus seems to understand the passage correctly, to judge by his next two paragraphs, cf. also 233,27-33. 250. See note to 219,1, and again note to 194,14b. 251. autoanthropos and autoippos, two made-up words which Aristotle attributes to the Platonists, though they do not occur in Plato himself. 252. Alternative translation: '... but in thinking [on their view] of man in reality I at the same time have in mind ....' 253. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion hasper for haper at 226,9. 254. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion ektos for ek tes at 226,9. 255. i.e. they will be available for definition without bringing in movement, as opposed to things like flesh. 256. 211,23 (and cf. 223,28). 257. These words follow the lemma in Aristotle's text. 258. See n. 225 above. 259. Phys. 193a28-31. 260. cf.DA403a29-bl6. 261. For Empedocles see n. 144 above. Democritus of Abdera (mid- to late fifth century BC), along with his shadowy predecessor Leucippus of Miletus (a few years older), founded the philosophy of atomism, later developed by Epicurus. Like Empedocles they agreed with Parmenides that nothing real could come to be or perish, but the real for them consisted of fragments of bare solid matter, devoid of any properties except solidity and geometrical ones, which were in constant motion in an infinite void and by their recombinings gave rise to the world with its sensible properties as we know it. 262.1 have translated the agreed reading of the MSS; but alio (singular) at 229,2 should surely be alia (plural): 'various things were formed from various shapes.' 263. The M S S uniformly have elambanon ('they took') at 229,4, as though Philoponus were now drawing a general conclusion about both Empedocles and the atomists, as the plurals in the next sentence suggest. Vitelli's substitution of elambanen ('he took') seems necessary because the rest of this sentence mentions only doctrines of Empedocles. A n alternative interpretation would keep the M S S reading and interpret 'they' throughout as referring to Empedocles and some unnamed followers. This or the singular is supported because only Empedocles seems to have made any mention of an efficient cause, and, as Philoponus sees, his love and strife would more naturally be classified as efficient than as formal causes, whereas the atomic shapes are more naturally thought of as formal causes. But on this last point the words I have translated 'formative' (eidopoios) and 'form' (as a verb, eidopoieo) seem to be ambiguous here. The shapes cause fire to have a form, but do they cause it to have their form (sphericity) or its (fieriness)? In the former case the shapes would naturally be called a formal cause and in the latter an efficient cause. Of course Democritus himself, like Empedocles, never thought in these Aristotelian terms, and so would never consciously face such questions. A n alternative interpretation of the first clause would replace 'even' after 'For' by 'too' after 'causes'. 264. The details of Empedocles' system are too complex and controversial to go into here, but the 'sphere' refers to a cosmic episode when the four elements were somehow all mixed together into an undifferentiated spherical mass. cf. also 314,6ff. 265. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (mid-fifth century BC) agreed with Parmenides that nothing real or ultimate could come to be or perish, though like Empedocles and the atomists he allowed spatial movement. But the real for him was not just four elements, as for Empedocles, nor bits of matter having only geometrical properties, as for the atomists, but every kind of (homogeneous) stuff or quality (these were never properly distinguished until Aristotle's Categories). These stuffs, when unmixed with

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other stuffs, would be the same however small a part of them was taken (as against being compounds in the way we would say water is a compound of oxygen and hydrogen). For this reason Aristotle (though not Anaxagoras himself) called them homoeomeries (meaning like-parted'). However, they never did occur in isolation for Anaxagoras, but all mixed together, though in various and varying proportions. Another feature of Anaxagoras' thought is that he attributed the governance of the world to a guiding intellect (nous), a view which attracted both Plato and Aristotle, though they both complained that he did not stick to it (see Plato's Phaedo 97Bff. and Aristotle's Physics 198al4-16. See also 312,16ff. below). 266. scil. matter and form. 267. In the sense of crafts, like building. 268. cf. Phys. 194a21-2, and also 199a8ff., which Philoponus will discuss at length below. 269. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion hautou for autou at 230,13. 270. Presumably the point is that the immediate purpose of the door is to allow passage, but the purpose of passage in turn is to be of use to the man; hence this is the most final end. 271. Literally: 'the [things that are] towards the end', a phrase much used by Aristotle, and having the sense both of means to an end and of constituents of an end. See Wiggins. 272. It is tempting to read men oun for oun at 230,20, meaning something like 'furthermore'. 273. See n. 129 above. 274. Reading ou for oude with K at 231,20. 275. 229,14ff. 276. The rudder, not the matter. 277. i.e. structured parts like arms and legs, as opposed to homogeneous or homoeomerous stuffs like flesh; cf. n. 265 above. 278. GA, 715a9-ll. 279. cf. n. 247 above. 280. e.g. the legs and top of a table. 281. Presumably the point is, or should be, that the constituent metals of the bronze (copper and zinc) are mined, and these are the 'more remote' matter. It is hard to translate without awkwardness but 'matter' here (hule) must be taken literally, not in the sense of'affair' or 'topic'. 282. Phys. 194a22-3. 283. See n. 4 above. 284. In Cat. 7 Aristotle offers a preliminary and a revised criterion for belonging to the category of relatives. The revised one is that a relative cannot be known without knowing its correlative. One can know that something is a head without knowing whose head it is, but one cannot know that something is large without knowing something (an object or a standard) which is, by comparison, small. 285. The ensuing examples of the doctor and the smith go well beyond Aristotle's text, which contents itself with the bare remark that the doctor will study sinews, and the smith bronze, only up to a point (Phys. 194bl0-ll). Aristotle discusses sight at D A 2.7, and Sens. 2, where he rejects the visual ray theory, though one or two casual remarks in the Meteorologica seem to accept it (343al0-15; 19-20; 370al7-19), perhaps only for purposes of exposition, as at Cael. 290al8-24; cf. also the discussion in Sorabji (1987), pp. 26-30. Here in Philoponus 'visual rays' seems the best translation for opseis (plural), though in Aristotle opsis usually means just 'sight'. 286. Or: 'in each kind [of bronze he will consider the sub-kind] which is suited for the purpose in hand.' 287'. pneuma, a term with connotations of the breath of life and used, especially by the Stoics, for a subtle kind of matter. Here we might think of a type of bronze which was aerated. 288. Even Philoponus must end a sentence somewhere, and at this point he ends the one he began at the beginning of this paragraph.

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289. See n. 13 above. 290. Aristotle's text adds dikhos, 'in two ways', expressing the idea that two questions may arise: will the natural philosopher study form or matter? Will he study that which results from combining them? The import of Philoponus' comment is not clear. 'Both' seems to refer to form and matter, but 'this', which in Aristotle refers simply to the general topic, seems in Philoponus to refer to the point that the natural philosopher will study the composite. 291. Literally: '[as] containing reasonable puzzles.' 292. After the above lemma Aristotle goes on: 'Since the natures are two, on which does it belong to the natural philosopher to discourse - or [is it] on that which [is composed] out of both?' Philoponus is pointing to Aristotle's habit of raising questions in series where the last question gives a determination of the issue, i.e. Aristotle's own view. 293. i.e. the formal and material natures taken separately. This and the next sentence simply repeat in slightly expanded form the next two sentences in Aristotle. 294. This sentence follows immediately on the question Philoponus has just represented. The anacoluthon belongs to Aristotle himself. 295. Aristotle at this point mentions Empedocles and Democritus. 296. Aristotle adds this immediately after the lemma. 297. Aristotle's text suggests that the 'elements' here are not the four elements but such things as bile and phlegm, i.e. the 'humours' that underlie the natural tissues at 232,4, though the four elements underlie these in turn. 298. As a modern grammarian would say, kai at 235,5 is epexegetic. It has been suggested to me (by M . Edwards, referring to p. 235,19 of Simplicius' commentary on the Physics) that the text as it appears in Philoponus, with a comma after autes, suggests the interpretation: 'that for the sake of which and the end belong to the same art, and so does whatever is for the sake of these.' This would make the equivalence of 'that for the sake of which' and 'the end' non-trivial. However, I have kept the traditional interpretation, since this is the one Philoponus himself explicitly takes here, despite his apparently taking the other view at 237,28-9. 299. A n alternative interpretation would translate paraplesion at 235,9 as 'adjacent', i.e. in the hierarchy of proximate and remote, referring to the tissues and juices, etc. at 232,1-6. 300. Quoted from Phys. 194a29-30. 301. scil. the second medicine (or its application), whose end is health. This health is not the end of the first medicine, which failed to result in it; but neither is the worsened disposition the end of the first medicine, because though this disposition followed it, it was not its aim and did not result from it but from the 'obstacle'. Philoponus is evidently not thinking of cases where the wrong medicine was applied. Is the end the result, or the aim, or is there an end only when aim and result coincide? The worsened disposition was neither result nor aim of the first medicine. But the eventual health was the aim, even if not the result, of the first medicine, so why was it not its end? Philoponus seems to mean that an aim without its corresponding result does not count as an end (that a result not aimed at does not count as an end is clear from 236,5ff.). But this does not correspond to either his or Aristotle's usual way of talking; cf. the frequent references to nature doing everything for an end, even when she misses it. 302. scil. the medicine. 303. scil. the worsened disposition. But touto (235,24) is neuter because of an implicit reference to telos (235,23). 304. From a fragment of a lost play, but probably by a comic poet, not by Euripides (fifth century BC). See Bonitz, 607b26. 305. A Stoic term. See Plutarch, On Common Conceptions, 1084F-5A (=SVF 2,847, partly translated in Long and Sedley, vol. 1,238), and also Sandbach. 306. Reading telos kai hou for telos hou with Mt at 236,10, with Vitelli's approval. 307. Reading di' holou for diolou at 236,22, with Vitelli in his Addendum, though the translation is not affected.

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308. Reading de before phuseos at 236,24 at Vitelli's suggestion. 309. These words immediately follow the lemma in Aristotle's text. 310. poi&tis. This seems the most likely interpretation. Others include the parent or God, though God would be out of place in an Aristotelian context. I have translated bouleton as 'it does not want', to suit Philoponus' interpretation; the Greek is ambiguous between 'it' and 'he' (or 'she' for that matter). 311. The word for 'exercises' (energed) is the cognate verb for the word for 'activities' (energeiai). 312. kaf eidos. i.e. creatures cannot be individually eternal but they strive, through reproduction, to make their species eternal. 313. See n. 311 above. 314. Or: 'Since the arts produce the matter too.' But the contrast seems to be rather with the preceding discussion of nature. The sentence is awkward at best, and could be translated so that 'since' only governed the first half, which gave a reason for the second half, about how we use things - though the reasoning would be unclear and the sentence would lack the particle connecting it to what precedes that Greek sentences usually have. As I have translated it it rather loosely gives a reason for what has gone before, with 'since' governing the whole sentence; Wicksteed and Charlton appear to take it in this way too. 315. Anyone acquainted with Philoponus' own style, with its frequent and long interpolated parentheses, might think he had little to teach Aristotle about simplicity. But he is right enough in saying that Aristotle's thought is not at all clearly expressed here. The whole passage in Aristotle (Phys. 194a27-bl) reads as follows: 'Again that for the sake of which and the end belong to the same [art] as whatever is for the sake of these. And nature is an end and that for the sake of which. For of those things where the change is continuous and there is an end, this is the last term and that for the sake of which. On which account, too, the poet was ridiculous who was induced to say "he has met his end, for the sake of which he was born". For it does not want every last termination to be an end, but [only] the best one. Since the arts too produce the matter, some tout court and some as easy to work, and we use [things] as though they all existed for our sakes. For we too are in a sense an end. For "that for the sake of which" is ambiguous (as said in [our treatise] On Philosophy), and indeed the arts which govern and discover the matter are two,....' (Philoponus omits 'indeed' in the last clause and inserts 'too'; see 238,1.) 316. In fact On Philosophy was an early treatise of Aristotle, now lost, of whose existence Philoponus may not have known. *Way of life' translates Gthos, cognate to 'Ethics' (Ethika), though that fact is not really relevant here, as the emphasis is rather on the adjective 'philosophical'. The distinction comes at DA 415b2; 20, and at Metaph. 1072b2, while EE 1249bl5 mentions it but does not specify it. 317. 231,4-6. 318. The sense seems clear (cf. 238,24-9 for the puzzle and 239,12ff. for the solution), but it would emerge more clearly from the text if we supposed oukh has dropped out after mepote at 238,2. 319. Phys. 194b7-8. 320. Seen. 325below. 321. i.e. the one that only knows it (steersmanship). 322. The four are the arts of the wood-cutter and the sawyer (which concern the matter) and those of steersmanship and shipbuilding (which concern the form). To avoid confusion it is important to remember that the arts which concern the form can still govern the matter, without 'concerning' it. 323. Reading alia as barytone rather than paroxytone as with Vitelli, presumably by a misprint, at 238,27. 324. In the interests of accuracy I have kept some, though only some, of the contortions of Philoponus' style. The view he accepts from Aristotle is that with natural objects, but not with artifacts, form and matter do belong to the same branch of knowledge. Cf. 238,2-5 above; as there, so here, it would be easier if we could read

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ou after mepote at 238,25 - and indeed the M S S (except K) do have a rather superfluous oun after mepote, which could be a corruption of ou, especially if a scribe found himself entangled in Philoponus' syntax. (It must be added, however, that a similarly dangling oun occurs after mepote at 221,4, where it is certainly not a corruption oiou.) 325. The word for 'architectonic' (arkhitektonikos) is etymologically connected with the words for 'to govern' (arkho), 'governing' (arkhikos), and 'to fashion' (tektainomai). 326. scil. the shipbuilder. 327. Aristotle has 'wood' in the singular. 328. Changes are hardly the same thing as natural tendencies but they presumably depend on them. 329. 232,31ff. 330. logos. As Vitelli points out, the MSS have 'definitions' in the accusative rather than the nominative - probably a slip going back to Philoponus himself. 331. Either an ordinary craftsman or the divine Craftsman of Plato's Timaeus (often called the Demiurge after the Greek word for 'craftsman'), or possibly to the Christian God. 240,14 and 240,18 just below must presumably refer to one of these last too. Plato does not talk of definitions as having their existence by being in the Craftsman's mind, though later Platonists and Neoplatonists did; see on Forms just below, and Sorabji (1988), pp. 53-5. The main difference between Plato's Craftsman God and the Christian God is that Plato's Craftsman operates on pre-existing materials and by reference to transcendent Forms, neither of which he created. Later the question of priority as between Craftsman and Form was solved by putting the Forms into the mind of God. (Hence, since the Forms were also called Ideas from the Greek idea, the modern mentalistic meaning of'idea'.) 332. See n. 331 above. 333.1 follow Vitelli's suggestion in adding this word to the text at 240,18. 334. See again n. 331 above. 335. i.e. the form in the craftsman's (or Craftsman's) mind tends to reproduce itself in the material. A less likely, because less obviously relevant, interpretation would say that the form of man, in particular, is a form of something which itself is active and reproductive. 336. i.e. the form instantiated in front of us. 337. Quoted from Phys. 194bl3. 338. i.e. man and the sun, or (less probably) the parent and his offspring. 339. Possible sources for such a view include Timaeus 35Cff. (construction of the World Soul from Same, Other, and an intermediate being), Phaedo 78C-80C (soul akin to the invisible Forms but dragged down by the body to the visible realm). Plotinus (third century A D Neoplatonist) and Iamblichus (slightly later Neoplatonist) treat the soul as an intermediate entity, and for Plotinus in particular it ascends and descends. 340. On this term see n. 342 below. 341. See Phys. 194b23-6. Later (195al9-21) Aristotle briefly includes the form too under the 'out of which'. 342. In the Timaeus the Forms are treated as paradigms which the Craftsman looks to while creating things, while the properties of matter and the laws governing them are treated as contributory or instrumental causes (sunaitia). C f , e.g., Timaeus 46CD; 47E-8A; 68E-9A, as well as 241,27-9 just below. The present passage is significant as bringing in these two causes which the Neoplatonists added to Aristotle's four. The passage is also significant as illustrating the tendency of the Neoplatonists to try and harmonise Plato and Aristotle so far as possible, despite their seemingly obvious differences, and treat them as progenitors of the Neoplatonists themselves. Plato does not enumerate six causes explicitly, as this passage suggests, though the Platonic Form does indeed serve as a paradigm in the Timaeus. Similarly, Aristotle does not just 'lay no claim' to the paradigmatic cause, because as a natural philosopher he does not need it - he would have no truck with it so far as it is regarded as transcendent (cf. also 244,14-23). Again, Aristotle does not

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mention an instrumental (organikos) cause as such, and so Philoponus treats him as assimilating it to the matter. Plato did indeed in the Timaeus treat matter, or rather its properties and governing laws, as 'contributory causes' (sunaitia), but certainly does not have the full Neoplatonist doctrine of six causes, three being causes proper, and three being contributory causes. The causes proper are the paradigm or Form as it exists on the intelligible level (perhaps the Form of Forms), the efficient cause or God, and the final cause. The contributory causes are the form immanent in objects, the matter, and the instrument (as a carpenter might use a saw). A full list of the six, not distinguished as causes proper and contributory causes, but given applications in political philosophy, appears in the Neoplatonist Olympiodorus' commentary on Plato's Gorgias (see Westerink, 3-4). See also n. 43 above. However, the question just how far this harmonisation goes is a complex one and open to controversy. See, e.g., 224,1-226,11. 343. Reading ei gar kai for ei gar with Mt at 241,21. 344. Hot, cold, moist and dry. Each element contained one quality from the first pair and one from the second, the first pair being regarded as active and the second pair as passive, which may explain their instrumental nature. See GC 2.2-3. 345. i.e. the matter. Aristotle doesn't call matter an efficient cause, which would be inconsistent with the doctrine of four causes that Philoponus is discussing. Philoponus presumably wants to emphasise that Aristotle, as a 'student of nature', excludes any external efficient cause like Plato's Craftsman. Changes in a living thing are effected by its own inner properties or those of the materials it is made of, including its 'inborn heat' - though, of course, Aristotle thinks the efficient cause of the animal's existence is outside it, namely its father. 346. Reading organikoi for organikon with L at 241,30, as suggested by Vitelli. 347. 241,20-3. 348. The subject is probably Aristotle, not nature. The syntax of the passage is in any case defective, with its oute ... te at 242,5.7. The point seems to be that because the product (offspring) resembles the producer (parent) the parent could be said to have a paradigm within itself, but that Aristotle thinks of paradigms, in any sense worth the name, as being like Platonic Forms, and so outside the efficient cause (as they were for the Craftsman in the Timaeus). In that sense Aristotle would not accept paradigms in natural generation. However, he does use paradeigma as a presumably innocuous synonym for eidos ('form') at Phys. 194b26 (cf. Philoponus' comments at 244,14-23). 349. i.e. in the primary sense, not per accidens. Philoponus will explain this distinction shortly (see 248,12ff.). 350. cf. Phys. 195a8ff. 351. cf. Phys. 195allff. 352. As Vitelli points out, Simplicius says this (in Phys. 319,10-11). 353. Literally: 'the on account of what' or 'the why'. 354. The lemma is followed immediately by the words 'and this is to grasp the first cause', and then by this sentence. 355. cf. 199,19-22, where, however, Philoponus says that the present book is not limited to discussing things that come to be and perish; it also concerns the heavenly bodies and spheres, which are part of nature but eternal; cf. also (as Vitelli notes) in bk. 1,1,16-23; 2,13-15; 151,17-19. 356. These words follow immediately on the sentence last quoted from Aristotle. 357. See n. 341 above, but see also Metaph. 7.17, where Aristotle makes clear that form is not a constituent in an object. I use 'from' and 'out of indifferently for ex in this context. 358.145,2ff.inbk.l. 359. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion oikeiotaton for oikeioteron at 234,27. 360. The Greek could equally mean: '... the material cause and element which is itself coming to be', but this hardly seems to make sense here. 361. scil. the material cause and (in the sense of'i.e.') element. 362. Aristotle illustrates the lemma with the examples of bronze for a statue and

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silver for a cup and then adds 'and the genera of these'. 363. It is unlikely that Aristotle did mean this by 'genera' (gene), since he had the less misleading word 'substrates' (hupokeimena) to use instead, but he would agree with the doctrinal point Philoponus is making. 364. See n. 247 above. 365. These words follow immediately on the lemma. 366.1 have translated logos here as 'formula' rather than 'definition' because of the adjective 'definitional' (horistikos) applied to it here and the use of horismos for 'definition' at 245,2. Both 'definition' and 'formula' strike us as linguistic things and therefore of the wrong kind to equate with the form (and how can a formula or anything else both be of a form and be a form?) But Philoponus is no better than Aristotle himself at keeping a proper separation between linguistic and non-linguistic terms. See also next note. 367. What Aristotle does say is given by the present lemma, the sentence quoted at the beginning of this paragraph, and the next lemma, which form a connected passage, transcribed here for ease of reading it as a whole: 'But in another [sense] the form and paradigm [is called a cause]. And this is the formula of the essence and the genera of this [formula], for instance, [as the formula] of the octave the [ratio] two to one, and altogether number, and the parts in the formula.' The translation and interpretation of this is far from easy, and I have followed what seems to be Philoponus' way of taking it, where the words '[as the formula] of the octave the [ratio] two to one, and altogether number' illustrate 'the formula of the essence', while 'and the parts of the formula' explain 'and the genera of this'. Three contrasts are in play: form/matter, whole/part and species/genus, and it is not clear that either Aristotle or Philoponus always keeps them apart. Aristotle sees an analogy between them, but sometimes seems to conflate two or more of them. A n octave is the ratio two to one (as form) applied to sound (as matter), and number (probably in the sense of ratio) is the genus of two to one, so Philoponus concludes, interpreting Aristotle, that number too is formative of (eidopoioi) the octave (245,10-15). But this suggests that there is a single scale, number:two to one:octave, as one might talk of animal:mammal:lion. But in the former case the relation between the successive terms alters (number is the genus of two to one, which is the form of octave. The three contrasts may indeed be analogous, but they are not identical. Things are further muddied by the confusion noted in n. 366 above, between a formula and what it is of, and consequently between a formula and a form. Philoponus attributes to Aristotle the view that 'the parts of the definition, these I call the genera of it' (245,15-20). But if the formula of man is 'rational animal' the form or essence will be rationality, and animal will be a genus of man but not of the formula. 368. The complete formula will be 'mortal rational animal', to exclude superhuman beings, if any. 369. cf. bk. 1,130,5-25, which refers the point to Porphyry. 370. 'Longest' translates hupate (literally: 'highest' (in string length)), and 'shortest' translates neate (literally: 'lowest'), both of these being technical terms in Greek music. The early Pythagoreans discovered that pleasant-sounding musical intervals are associated with simple ratios between string-lengths on plucked instruments; e.g. the octave corresponds to the ratio two:one. 371. Phys. 194b35-6. Aristotle has in the meantime introduced the last of the four causes, the final cause. 972. EN 1.1. 373. Phys. 195a2-3. 374. See n. 271 above. 375. Another sentence where Philoponus switches between the two words for 'cause'; cf. n. 54 above. 376. Phys. 195al9-20. These' are the things that are 'that from which', which

Notes to pages 59-62

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Aristotle equated with the material cause at 194b23ff. but now widens to include the formal cause too; cf. next paragraph in Philoponus (247,19ff.). As Philoponus goes on to make clear, this quotation is continuous in sense but not in wording with the present lemma. 377. Philoponus omits the word for 'we have spoken of, presumably by a slip. 378. These words immediately follow the quotation at the beginning of the last paragraph, and are followed by the next lemma. 379. The same word einai ('to be', treated as a noun: 'beingO occurs both in the phrase for 'essence' (literally: 'the what it was to be') and as the word I have translated 'being' here. 380. scil. essence. 381. scil. essence again. 382. i.e. from the form to the menses. Aristotle thought the menses provided the matter for the embryo, and the father's seed the form. 383. It is not clear that this has been said explicitly in this book, but it frequently was in bk. 1, e.g. 114-15; 145-6 (but contrast 186,21-4). 384. Aristotle holds that change takes place in the object changed. See Phys. 3.3. 385. Philoponus has to de (singular) where Aristotle writes ta de (plural): 'Some things [act] as ... .'It is not clear whether one should supply 'cause' or 'thing* after 'One', but there is no emphasis in Aristotle here on there being one and the same good thing which everything strives for, despite the misleading nature of Philoponus' sentence. (The interpretation of EN 1.1 is another matter.) 386. Literally: 'wants to be.' 387. Phys. 195a25-6. As a later age would put it, every action aims for an end sub specie boni. 388. Correcting Vitelli's porrdi to porrd. 389. Not, of course, in the modern sense of non-white, but as having some colour or other. 390. As Vitelli points out, 'sculptor' in these two examples should be 'builder'. The slip goes back, if not to Philoponus himself, to very early in the M S tradition. 391. Philoponus does not seem to intend any particular distinction between the words I have here translated 'type' (tropos) and 'kind' igenos). At 246,25 he follows Aristotle in using tropos of the four causes. 392. i.e. if we insist that to be composite or compound (there is no difference between these) an expression must have more than one word we shall still find that both the simple and the compound in this sense are compound in the original sense mentioned just above. 393. see 249,9ff. 394. The general sense seems fairly clear but the Greek is awkward at best. It is tempting to read dieiremends ('in a divided fashion') for dieirimenou ('divided') at 250,1 with K, though this would be the lectio facilior. 395. Taking hina at 250,10 as 'where' is permissible especially in later Greek, and gives the best sense here, though the subjunctive sumplekdmen would suggest its normal use to mean 'in order that'. 396. The antecedent of 'which' is 'number', not 'causes', unless we follow t in reading dunamenon for dunamenon at 250,13. The intended sense is presumably unaffected. 397. meta ton loipon (250,15). scil. among the three other than the potential/actual contrast? Possibly the sense is 'alongside the rest', referring to any further contrast there may be alongside the three already mentioned (simple/compound, per se/per accidens, proximate/remote) - but the sense of the passage seems to demand the former interpretation, and cf. 250,26. 398. Adopting, as Vitelli suggests, (L)t's bouloito for bouletai at 250,21. 399.1 assume moria means 'terms' here rather than, as usually, 'parts'. The fourfold classification Philoponus wants is clear enough from the ensuing examples, namely that the cause can be described in four ways (as sculptor, etc.) by using the two distinctions of per se/per accidens and proximate/more remote.

166

Notes to pages 62-63

400. See the 'Introduction' (or Isagoge) to his commentary on Aristotle's Categories by the third-century A D Neoplatonist writer Porphyry, 17,14-18,9 in Prussian Academy edition (CAG), ed. Busse. (However, Vitelli, who refers to Porphyry at this point, later (in his Addenda et Corrigenda) decided, without explanation, that the reference was not to Porphyry's 'Introduction' but to Philoponus' own 'Introduction', i.e. presumably his commentary, now largely lost, on Porphyry's. (See item 10 in the bibliography on p. 252 of R. Sorabji (ed.), (1987).) In that case 'to us' at 250,28 should be replaced with 'by us' - as the Greek allows. In either case the original source is presumably Porphyry. 401. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion labomen for laboimen at 250,28. Given the above four simple terms (sculptor, craftsmen, white, coloured) each can be combined with each of the three others, giving twelve combinations. But six of these will be duplicates of the other six, differing merely in the order of the terms, which is irrelevant here, and so we have six combinations left. Porphyry gives a tortuous method for finding how many pairs can be selected from a group of objects, ignoring order. In modern terminology the combinations of two things out of n are Vz n(n-l). 402. In this and the ensuing five pairs I have for clarity translated the two terms in each case just as they stand, without trying to make usable phrases of them like 'a craftsman [who is] a sculptor'. As well as having no indefinite article Greek can represent 'white man' by simply writing 'white' in the masculine gender, while adjectives sometimes precede and sometimes follow their nouns. 403. Both the terms are per se, 'sculptor' is proximate and 'craftsman' remote (i.e. generic). 404. There is some play with genders which doesn't come across easily in English. 'The' before 'per se' is neuter, showing that the phrase refers to the thing which is per se, i.e. the per se term, which is here the term 'sculptor'; but 'the' before sculptor is masculine (as is 'sculptor' itself), as though the actual sculptor himself was being referred to - but he is neither per se nor proximate nor anything else in that area. I have translated accordingly, but Philoponus should have written to (neuter) andriantopoios (masculine)': 'the [term] "sculptor" '. Similarly with 'coloured'. Both Aristotle and Philoponus can use this device for getting over their lack of inverted commas when they want to, but this is another case of Philoponus' indifference to the use/mention distinction (see n. 366 above). (I have admittedly indulged in this confusion myself where it involves pedantic expatiation to avoid it.) 405. 'Neither ... and': the stylistic barbarism belongs to Philoponus, assuming the reading of all the MSS is correct. 406. scil. the above six taken now as potential and now as actual. The six cases can be summarised as follows: (1) both per se, one proximate, one remote, (2) both proximate, one per se, one per accidens, (3) one per se proximate, one per accidens remote, (4) one per se remote, one per accidens proximate, (5) both remote, one per se, one per accidens, (6) both per accidens, one proximate, one remote. The scheme is chiastic in that (1) and (6) cover both per se and both per accidens, (2) and (5) cover both proximate and both remote, (3) and (4) cover the two ways of taking one term from each contrast. Aristotle's own way of arriving at the figure twelve was to take the six terms (per se, per accidens, proximate, remote, simple, compound) and combine each of them with potential and actual, as Philoponus has explained at 250,17-20. Philoponus himself (250,20ff.) arrives at the same figure twelve by a different route, taking as his six terms not per se, per accidens, etc., but the six cases given earlier in this note and arrived at by using Porphyry's rule (nn. 400 and 401 above). 407. Both the puzzle and its answer (down to 252,14) are obscure, and I cannot pretend to understand the passage fully, but it may help to have in diagrammatic form the six cases mentioned in the last paragraph (using obvious abbreviations to keep the diagram compact): (

1

se rem craftsman

se prox sculptor

4

rem se craftsman

prox acc white

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Notes to pages 63-64 2

prox se sculptor

prox acc white

5

rem acc coloured

rem se craftsman

3

prox se sculptor

rem acc coloured

6

acc rem coloured

acc prox white

Where a term is repeated in the same line (as '(per) se' is in case 1) Philoponus writes that term first in each of its pairings. Philoponus has just said (251,13-16) that one should not try to compound the first four terms (per se, per accidens, proximate, remote) with the other two (simple and compound themselves), apparently in criticism of Aristotle, who had talked schematically of doing so, though without elaboration (see n. 406 above). Taking advantage of this the objector claims that since the proximate per se has appeared as simple (on the right of case 1 and the left of cases 2 and 3) and as compounded (with per accidens in 2 and 3, and with remote in 1 and 3), it shouldn't be necessary to make per se remote as well appear both as simple and as compounded. Philoponus' reply seems to amount to saying that we must indeed do this, but not as it were for its own sake - not because we are including simple and compound as further terms in the list with which the other four terms (per se, per accidens, proximate, remote) must be compounded, as Aristotle seemed to have implied, but because if we do not, our compounding of the four terms themselves will not be complete. He then tries to show this in some detail. The general point seems to be that per se proximate occurs in three cases (1,2,3), which overlap with the three in which per se remote occurs (1,4,5). When in case 1 per se proximate is combined with per se remote it is really with remote that it is being combined, i.e. with a whole composed of cases 1 and 3, a whole which is subdivided according as the remote term is either per se (case 1) or per accidens (case 3). Per se remote therefore only occurs as part of an implied whole per se-or-per accidens remote. But when we turn our attention to per se remote itself and its compoundings (cases 1, 4 and 5) we find that in case 1 it is compounded with per se proximate which now appears as part of a whole (per se-or-per accidens proximate: cases 1 and 4) where it is proximate that is the important notion. This is what the final sentence ('for the division leaves off towards the more generic, not towards the most specific': 252,13-14) seems to be saying. The most difficult sentence is 251,27-30. Some insertion seems needed at its start, and as I am uncertain about the whole passage I have played safe and kept Vitelli's suggestion 'The per accidens', which is certainly the most palaeographically plausible, as the previous sentence ends with the words 'per accidens', so that a scribe's eye could easily slip from their first occurrence to their second, as often happens. But the sentence would make much more sense if we read instead 'The proximate per se, then,' {to men oun prosekhes kath' hauto), summing up what has been said, a little repetitiously perhaps but not unduly so for Philoponus: the proximate per se is compounded with the remote (cases 1 and 3) or with the proximate (case 2), and in this case (case 2) it is the fact that the other term (white in the example) is per accidens, not that it is proximate (as sculptor itself is), that is important. If this is indeed the correct reading, however, I have no hypothesis about why the words should have dropped out, unless simply that the scribes were as befogged as I was myself when I first read the passage. 408. Or: 'in these respects' (dia tauta). 409. These words are Vitelli's suggested addition to the MSS at 251,27. 410. 'Directed at' translates pros with the accusative; 'with' translates the plain dative. 411. Or 'more specific', if we follow Vitelli's suggestion and read eidikdtera for eidikotata at 252,14. 412. It is not clear where Aristotle says this. Things caused are only briefly mentioned in this chapter at 195b6-10, where this point is not made, phesin could mean 'means' or 'implies', rather than 'says', but it is not obvious that Aristotle implies it either, unless ex silentio. 413. The point seems to be that an object caused is not itself its own producer nor the

168

Notes to pages 64-66

purpose for which it is produced - though this latter seems only to be true if we are thinking of an end external to the object itself, i.e. an end in the 'for which' rather than 'of which' sense (cf. 230,5ff.). 414. Possibly we should follow Vitelli's suggestion and read pollakis ('often') for polla ('many of them') at 252,25. 415. The forms they become, such as bronze. 416. Or: 'in order that there should be . . . . ' 417. A potentially misleading statement. Usually one talks of matter as persisting through a change, as when bronze is made into a statue without being destroyed in the process. (Aristotle insists that the statue is called brazen, not bronze (Metaph. 1033al8 and context), because its essence is to be a statue, not to be bronze; but this doesn't alter the fact that the bronze is still there.) Here, however, we are talking of the construction of the matter itself, e.g. bronze from its ingredients, and the point must be that what results, and then persists, is bronze, i.e. a certain kind of matter, or matter which has been informed, and not mere matter as such. There is a form of bronze just as there is a form of statue. 418. Or: 'he says [it is] for this reason [that] the matter comes to be', the point being in either case that only because there are stuff-forms as well as object-forms can we talk of matter coming to be. But the version in the text seems more likely, at any rate if the reference is to Phys. 195b6-10, where Aristotle does not give this as a reason explicitly. 419. scil. caused things. 420. cf. 247,14-18. 421. Correcting Vitelli's slip in writing energeia for energeiai at 253,16. 422. 'Activity' translates energeia (253,17), the word for 'actuality' and (in the dative) for 'actual'. The two notions are indistinguishably blended in the Greek word, and I have used both translations in the same line at 253,22. 423. Phys. 195b20. 424. Phys. 195b27-8. 425. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion erotethenta for erotonta at 254,4. 426. Cat. 7b27-33. 427. The sense in which it is potentially knowable is presumably that one can (apparently) understand the question (or perhaps that if it did have a solution we could understand it), and that it belongs to a wider sphere (geometry) of which there is actual knowledge. Aristotle does not say at Cat. 7b27ff. whether it is knowledge or not, but simply talks of what happens if it is. 428. This elaborates 'each', not 'many types'. 429. What the quotation says is that the types (tropoi) of causes are many, not that the particular causes of which Philoponus goes on to give examples are. But it is hard to make Aristotle's own text completely coherent here. On the face of it there are three sets of things that can be listed: causes, types (tropoi) of causes, and such types 'treated in summary'. It seems that the causes are the four causes (material, formal, efficient, final), the types of causes are the heterogeneous mass of causes that can be classified under the various types (per se, per accidens, proximate, remote, simple, compound, and also potential and actual, treated rather separately), and the third list is of these six (or eight) types themselves, so that the types are actually listed only when 'treated in summary'. What we are offered is not so much a reduction in number of either causes or types, but a systematisation of the heterogeneous mass of causes that appear in the second list. 430. The last three words are in Aristotle's text though omitted by Philoponus. 431. Aristotle says 'a' for 'the' in each case, but the difference is immaterial. 432.1 have translated the received text, though it makes no coherent sense as it stands. The words I have italicised should be replaced by 'proximate' and 'per se' respectively. The errors presumably go back to carelessness on Philoponus' part, though it is strange that the MSS apparently show no signs of being worried by them. 433. These words continue the lemma. Philoponus' interpretation of them is clearly correct, though the word I have translated 'with respect to' (pros) is the same as that

Notes to pages 67-70

169

which I translated 'directed at' at 251,28ff. Ross in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics (ad 195a32) followed by Cornford (Loeb note ad loc), says that 'inclusive' is used to denote both the relation of generic to specific and (just below: 255,26-256,1) that of universal to individual. 434. Aristotle says 'of these', which is unclear, though the general point is clear enough. 435. These words follow on the lenima. 436. sumbebeke, cognate with the word for '(per) accidens' (sumbebekos), as is the word for 'hold true' (sumbebekenai) just below. 437. Literally: 'the man'. One would expect 'the' to be in the neuter rather than, as it is, in the masculine; cf. n. 404 above, and also hi eikdn at 257,10. 438. Cat. 7a25-31. 439. Phys. 195a35-6. 440. sumbebeke. See n. 436 above. 441. Ross (note ad loc.) says Metaph. 1014a5 supports Simplicius' interpretation of this passage, whereby white and cultured are both remote because they apply to Polyclitus who is himself an accidental cause of the statue (where sculptor is the per se cause). 442. The masculine ton at 256,11 presumably refers to some word for 'term', such as horon. 443. 'White' would be proximate (as against 'coloured') while 'cultured' would be remote (as against 'grammatical'). But here the point seems to be that they are of the same rank in that they both hold true per accidens of the man qua cause of the statue (but see n. 446 below), yet that one of them ('cultured') is in one sense less per accidens than the other ('white') when considered as holding true of the man qua man. To specify this sense Philoponus introduces the appropriate/inappropriate distinction. 444.1 have preserved the awkwardness of the Greek, where 'less' is correlative to 'rather', not to 'more'; but in fact 'rather' seems simply to be intensifying 'more'. 445. But in inverse order. 446. Since not all men are white, there is no intrinsic reason for the class of white things to be bigger or smaller than that of cultured things. 447. In Aristotle's Greek the words I have put in quotes do not come together. Philoponus seems to have seen some ambiguity or awkwardness in the sentence. 448. Adopting Vitelli's epi at 257,6 but keeping eti. 449. Reading houtos exesti labein, mainly following Vitelli, at 257,6. 450. These words follow immediately on the lemma. 451. The sense seems fairly clear, though it would come more easily if we read paradeigma at 257,8 for paradeigmatos, perhaps a careless continuation by a scribe of the preceding genitives. 452. Unless aition ('cause') at 257,8 is a slip for aitiaton ('caused') the point must presumably be that here we have what would in other capacities be (formal) causes treated as themselves caused; 'this statue' would be a formal cause in so far as the word 'statue' is used in defining it. 453. 252,22. 454. i.e. bronze is matter with respect to a statue but when it comes to be (from its components) bronze is what it comes to be, i.e. the form. 455. Phys. 195b9-10. 456. The reference seems to be to the causes and the caused. 457. i.e. the 'types' (tropoi) we have been discussing. 458. The first 'with' translates the dative and the second translates pros with accusative, but they do not seem to differ here. See n. 410 above. 459. These words immediately follow the lemma. 460. 248,17ff. 461. 253,20-8. 462. Phys. 195b27-8. 463. Throughout the following discussion, as in the work as a whole, Philoponus

170

Notes to pages 70-73

uses variously the prepositions apo, ek and hupo, and the plain dative, with the words for 'chance' (tukhe) and 'spontaneity' {t'automaton). It does not seem necessary to distinguish these expressions when translating. 464. cf. 205,25ff. 465. The ambiguity as to whether 'in general usage' belongs with the words that precede, or those that follow, exists in the Greek. 466. Meeting the friend. 467. See n. 305 above. 468. The point is presumably that the thrower would have had to pay the penalty had the choice been regarded as responsible, which strikes us as unjust, so that we do not blame the choice. 469. Fr. 53 in Diels-Kranz, quoted (slightly inaccurately) by Aristotle at Phys. 196a22-3. On Empedocles see n. 144 above. 470. Literally: 'cosmos-making' - the word is connected with 'cosmos'. 471. Presumably Empedocles and those who think like him. 472. Literally: 'those about Democritus', a standard way of referring to a philosopher and his followers, or possibly just the philosopher himself. On Democritus see n. 261 above. 473. The sun and stars, etc. The 'things that are manifest' are presumably to be contrasted with atoms, which cannot be individually perceived. 474. A cosmos here is a system with an earthlike body at its centre and a sun, stars, etc., rotating round it. 'Cosmoi' is the plural of'cosmos'. 475. Possibly the other cosmoi, but more likely the parts of our own cosmos (because of 'order' - there was no detectable order among the different cosmoi for Democritus). 476. The general picture is of atoms flying at random through the void and every now and then getting caught up into a whirlpool which forms a system of sun and stars, etc. rotating round a central earthlike body, but the details of the language are less clear. At 262,7 kosmos seems to refer to our star-system, and in the plural at 262,3 to star-systems in general, ouranos for Aristotle means either the universe as a whole, conceived as a single star-system, or its supposed outer shell. Since the atomists believed in many star-systems, ouranos is used here both for our own star-system (at 262,1), and for an outer shell fixed round it, kosmos being used for the star-system itself. (For Aristotle the shell would count as part of the cosmos, while Philoponus talks of it as an outer covering to it, but this is a minor point.) That the atomists believed in a shell for this or any star-system is plausible enough, but if they did it was probably an initial fiery shell which broke up to form the stars. 477. It is not clear that Democritus used or needed any such argument, since the notion of 'down' should have no application for him outside a vortex (star-system), where it would mean 'towards the centre'. But well over a century later Epicurus still treats 'down' as an absolute direction, and it is in fact unclear how far Democritus really succeeded in emancipating himself from this notion (his treatment of weight is disputed), though Plato and Aristotle (who preceded Epicurus) both successfully did so. 478. Or perhaps: 'Why hot things, or white things, have a separating effect.' 479. Aristotle {Metaph. 985al7-19) illustrates difference in position of two atoms by pointing to the letters N and Z. Position, order and shape are the three properties Aristotle standardly attributes to Democritus' atoms. 480. Literally: 'of the wholes (or totalities).' 481. Literally: 'as in the case of less.' The phrase contrasts with 'always or for the most part' which Aristotle uses to mark out those events of which a scientific account can be given. I will use 'normal(ly)' instead of 'for the most part' (literally: 'as in the case of the much'). 482. 259,13ff. 483. Phys. 196a4-5, discussing the man who ran into his supposedly absent friend. 484. See Aristophanes (comic poet of late fifth century BC), Knights 11. 1373-4, where the word {agorazo, connected with agora: 'market') could mean 'haunt the

Notes to pages 73-77

171

market' in the sense of idle socialising. For Aristotle it means 'make purchases' or 'conduct market business', and had presumably become obsolete by Philoponus' time, at least in that sense. 485. Phys. 196a7-8. 486. Empedocles. 487. Heraclitus (early fifth century BC). 488. Anaxagoras. 489. cf. 260,20ff. 490. i.e. it would be so if chance is in no way a cause. 491. 261,1-3. 492. These words (as supplemented) immediately follow the lemma. 493. The ambiguity in these opening words belongs in the Greek. Philoponus probably does mean to be talking of all men, despite the apparent exception of those who abolish chance. 494. Chance and spontaneity. 495. cf. 261,12ff. 496. scil. chance and spontaneity. 497. See n. 305 above. 498. These words follow immediately on the lemma. 499. Not a further quotation but simply a gloss on that just given. 500. The details of Empedocles' system are disputed. 501. See nn. 66 and 265 above. 502. Phys. 196al9-20, quoted loosely. 503. They 'mention' it in the sense of using it, but without discussing it or giving it an explicit place in their system. 504. Or: 'both.' 505. On 'manifest' see n. 473 above. 506. The sentence following the lemma. 507. Immediately after the last quotation. 508. cf. n. 481 above. 509. 'Arises' rather than 'grows', because Philoponus is thinking not of the normal growth of grass, but of its appearing in places previously barren, attributed to the nature of the soil itself; cf. 213,4ff. 510.1 have translated literally, but Aristotle's point seems to be not to congratulate himself on the brief discussion he has given of the general topic, but to say it would have been well for Democritus, etc. to discuss it. 511. A n exaggeration, one might think, in view of things like comets and meteors, for which the Greeks had no explanation. 512. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion men ti for mentoi at 266,6 (and also at 266,8). Aristotle's own text has 'to be a cause (aitia)\ 513. Aristotle's text gives little justification for saying they equate it with, still less that they define it as, what is obscure to human thought. 514. The words following the lemma. 'Each one': i.e. chance and spontaneity. 515. See n. 305 above. 516. gignomena. The word, which I have translated variously in various places, is ambiguous between objects and events. 517. The Ram and the Bull are of course the constellations. 'Enters': literally: 'comes to be in.' 518. See n. 481 above. Philoponus substitutes 'as in the case of most' for the standard Aristotelian phrase 'as in the case of the much'. I have used the admittedly awkward phrase 'very normally' to bring out this connexion. 519. Philoponus seems to assume here that if a process is not necessary it must have exceptions, so that being without exception implies being necessary. This is an interpretation of Aristotle's modal logic that has been taken. See Hintikka, and Waterlow (Passage ..., passim), for some discussion. 520. i.e. that which comes to be, or to pass, about half the time. For another reason for Aristotle's leaving this aside see (with Vitelli) Simplicius, in Phys. 334,18-20.

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Notes to pages 78-82

521. Literally: 'the impossible matter', an odd phrase, even though huli, the normal word for 'matter', can also mean 'subject-matter'. 522. When contrasted with 'rare' the word I have translated 'exceptional' probably has the sense, 'anyway less than half the time'. See n. 481 above. 523. See n. 481 above. 524. As will become clear (280,23ff.; 284,3ff.) Aristotle distinguishes what he calls tukhe and automaton, which I have rather arbitrarily translated 'chance' and 'spontaneity' respectively. Roughly, chance involves human actions while spontaneity involves only events in the non-human world, though 'spontaneity' is also used as a generic term for the two. The distinction is in fact of minor importance in Aristotle's philosophy. See nn. 627,634 and 636 below. 525. See EN 1112a34ff., where Aristotle says we don't deliberate about branches of knowledge that are rigorous (akribeis) and self-sufficient (autarkeis). Neither Aristotle nor Philoponus is referring to the particular individual's lack of wisdom. 526.1 have translated in accordance with the presumably intended sense, that it was the friend, not the would-be bather, who did the intimating. The text as it stands is ambiguous and, short of emendation, is at best extremely awkward (the 'someone' I have inserted is not represented in the Greek). The story does not come in Aristotle. 527. Phys. 197a5-6, but 'exceptional' does not occur in the main MSS of Aristotle's text. 528. Not an exact quotation. I have tried to keep Philoponus' word-order here, since he is emphasising it, but have not always rigorously done so, as English often calls naturally for a different order. 529. 268,8ff. 530. Reading to hou heneka for tois heneka tou at 269,33. The text as it stands seems very awkward at best, meaning something like: 'And among things for the sake of something [he says] that [the results] follow on the things for the sake of something ([namely] nature and the choice) per accidens', or possibly:'... follow on the things per accidens for the sake of something ([namely] nature and the choice).' Perhaps tois heneka tou in the text as it stands is an accidental repetition from tois heneka de tou just previously (esp. if (L)t are right in reading tois heneka tou de). 531. i.e. 'wide'. I keep 'common' as the translation of koinou because of266,21.22. 532. i.e. those principles (logoi) which could be said to be operating in the situation in question in the natural course of things, e.g. that principle by which one sets out to go to the baths when one's course of life dictates that bathing is the relevant next step. 533. Phys. 196bl5. 534. Alternatively we could read deesthai autdn with K M and then emend autbn to autou with t at 271,7, to give: 'having no need of it.' 535. The first was that at 270,30. 536.1 am not clear whether e at 217,19 means 'or in other words' or 'or alternatively', but whether offered as a gloss or as an alternative the point is evidently that chance and spontaneity are indeed to be reduced under choice and non-choice, but respectively and not both under one of them as a further subdivision of it. Perhaps we should read e as perispomenon ('indeed') rather than barytone Cor'). 537. i.e. that in which the middle term (here 'chance or spontaneity') is subject in both the premises. For Aristotle's syllogistic see An. Pr., esp. 1.1-7. 538. A strange argument, since no independent reason -has been given for saying that that which is for the sake of something and the exceptional can overlap. (The criticism Philoponus goes on to make and answer concerns rather the syllogism itself than this inference from it.) 539. Reading ti for to at 272,9 (and also, following Vitelli, at 272,13). Something seems to be wrong with this sentence throughout; the word I have translated as 'as being' just below is in the wrong gender and number. We could read eisi for ousa with t at 272,11 and insert some word like hoti before he at 272,10, but it seems simplest just to replace ousa by onta at 272,11. The general sense is in any case clear. Philoponus is absolving the syllogism from the charge of begging the question and

Notes to pages 83-87

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therefore being useless, a charge often brought in later times; see, e.g. Mill, bk. 2, ch. 3. 540. Not that which was called first at 270,30, but the one at the beginning of this paragraph. 541. In his Addendum Vitelli suggests reading de for an at 272,23, which would have the effect of replacing 'would have' by 'has' and adding some word like 'indeed' after 'nature'. 542. Or possibly: 'not at all' (ou pantos). 543. cf. n. 510 above. 544. i.e. that was where he intended to go. 545. cf. 271,12ff. 546. 'Following on' in this context could have either an Aristotelian sense, meaning 'following necessarily on' or 'entailed by', or a Stoic sense, meaning 'following on as an incidental result' (see SVF 2,336 (§1170), reporting Chrysippus). The general sense seems to demand the latter interpretation (though L S J actually gives references for this only for the correlative nouns), but in either case the translation itself need not be affected. 547. Inch. 6. See 280,25ff. 548. Aristotle's Greek is awkward. The insertions seem necessary if one is to avoid having Aristotle say the very thing he is denying, that the man came intending to collect the debt. Also it would be less confusing if Aristotle had written apolabein rather than komisasthai at 274,9, in view of komizomenou at 274,7-8. See also Charlton's note to 19b35-6 on pp. 48-9, as well as Philoponus' comment at 274,23-5, and n. 460 above. 549. 'Among is a convenient translation for 'en', and they both normally imply that if A is among, or 'en', the B's A is itself a B. Here, however, this is explicitly denied, and so 'among' should be interpreted as 'within the sphere of. 550. Philoponus is pointing out that the MSS of Aristotle available to him show two readings, of which he prefers the first (and is followed by modern editors). The Greek words are komizomenou (for 'was collecting') and komisomenos (for 'in order to collect'). With the former, it is the debtor who is doing the collecting. With the latter the word would apply to the creditor himself and the passage would read: 'He would have come, had he known, in order to collect the subscription, for the sake of getting his money back.' 551. The next words after the lemma. 552. Philoponus' point is that it should be the debtor, not the creditor, who is doing the frequenting (though he considers the other possibility, that it is the creditor, at 275,6ff.) Aristotle's text has the nominative, which in the grammatical context suggests the creditor, so Philoponus says that the genitive is really needed - in which case the word could indeed refer to the debtor. Aristotle himself, however, is evidently talking of the creditor. 'For' in the next sentence refers back to the quotation itself, not to this sentence, which I have therefore enclosed in brackets. 553. Correcting Vitelli's misprint topo to topoi at 275,9. 554. Philoponus' ensuing argument may be thought to suggest he read hautoi ('itself) for autoi ('him') at 197al, but this is not essential. 555. See n. 305 above. 556. The verb horizo is used ambiguously in this passage. It is the word for 'define', but it is etymologically connected to horismenos ('determinate', its perfect passive participle) and aoristos ('indeterminate'), and I have therefore translated the perfect passive tense horistai as 'are (is) given determinately' at 276,12 and 21. Philoponus can hardly be absolved from writing confusingly in using the verb in these two different, albeit related, senses. 557. logos is etymologically connected to paralogos, the word I have translated as 'beyond expectation'. 558. For this notion see Aristotle's definition in Cat. 1, and also n. 13 above. 559. Or: 'if there is no cause of these', though this would require reading estin as paroxytone rather than barytone. 5

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Notes to pages 87-91

560. The first printed edition, t, substitutes for this rather otiose repetition of the lemma the next sentence in Aristotle: 'whence chance, too, is thought to be indeterminate and unclear to man, and in a sense it could be thought that nothing arises from chance.' But Philoponus does repeat lemmas on occasion; cf, e.g. 283,17. 561. The things discussed under the previous lemma seem to be mainly what is referred to, together with the quotation given in the last note. 562. eulogos, a different word from that used by Philoponus at 27,10.23, but with no significant difference in sense. 563. Philoponus may or may not be justified in taking the reference quite as widely as this. 564. See n. 305 above. 565. Interpreting, if not reading, hos men pros for hos pros men at 278,12; cf. 278,14, and also 279,6-7.12.14. 566. Aristotle's text, adjacent to both the preceding and the following lemma, and quoted here in a slightly but irrelevantly altered form, is an extremely elliptical example, elucidated by Philoponus plausibly enough. 567. Aristotle uses a single word, here translated 'heating , which may have become unfamiliar by Philoponus' time. 568. As was often done when mourning. (Note from Dr I. Bodnar.) 569. Philoponus is clearly using 'proximate' and 'near' as synonyms here. 570. tukhi, the same as the word for 'chance', but English does not talk easily of good or bad chance. I shall use 'chance' or 'luck' as context dictates. The single words eutukhia and dustukhia are also used for good and bad luck respectively. 571. According to Vitelli Philoponus did not have access to the only M S of Aristotle's text which says what Philoponus says here, and is therefore using, as he often does anyway, the paraphrase of the fourth-century A D commentator Themistius (see 53,24-5). 572. The phrase I have translated 'almost' (para mikron) means literally *by a small bit'. 573. This could refer to social obscurity (cf. the reference to wealth just above) or, perhaps more likely, to an uncertainty in one's position with respect to happiness. 574. Aristotle's own text, quoted accurately when repeated at 283,17-18, has a slightly different emphasis, without the second 'but', but with another word repeating 'both'. 575. See n. 305 above. 576. en poidi tropoi. Literally, 'in what sort of type', i.e. here in which of the four causes, material, formal, efficient, final; cf. 283,12-13; 293,3-4. 577. see n. 531 above. 578. see n. 537 above. 579. i.e. at least one case of spontaneity is not one of chance. 580. Literally: 'complete [things].' The reference seems to be to actions completed smoothly, and all at once rather than after thought or hesitation. Alternatively teleidn may simply mean 'adults', in which case me ephistanontos tou logismou could mean 'without calculation attending to it'. 581. Apollonius of Rhodes (third century BC), Argonautika 3,1152, slightly misquoted. 582. The figure in which the middle term (here 'good luck') is the predicate in each premise. 583. Or: 'luck.' See n. 570 above. 584. Literally: 'doing',praxis, cognate with eupraxia ('well-doing'). 585. Philoponus uses a variant (eupragia) of his usual term (eupraxia), presumably to go with duspragia ('ill-doing'); but the words are clearly synonymous. 586. It is not obvious where the lack of accuracy is supposed to lie, and Philoponus does not seem to bring it out very explicitly. The one weak point so far has been the premise that where luck (or chance) exists good luck exists (281,20) - perhaps only bad luck does. We are therefore now given the premise that where luck (or chance) exists both good and bad luck exist, but it is not until 285,2-5 that this is explicitly defended. 5

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587.1 have translated a sentence Vitelli suggests has fallen out at 282,7. Presumably, all the scribes, not unreasonably, got fed up at this point. 588. But cf. Phys. 197b6-8. 589. cf. EE 122b-8 and#JV1112al6-17. 590. 281,7-17. 591. cf. 281,6 (with note); 284,17-18. 592. cf. 281,2-4. 593. tukhaios, the adjective from tukhe, not previously used here. 594.1 have kept the same translations, though the point becomes implausible in English. We can hardly expect the two languages to run in parallel in every case. 595. tunkhano, the word I have usually translated 'attain', 'happen' or 'befall'. It is cognate with tukhe ('chance'). 596. The words here translated 'specific' (idikon) and 'properly' (idids) are etymologically connected. 597. Literally: 'among what sort of [causes] of the causes.' 598. Phys. 197a35. 599. maten, possibly cognate with automaton ('spontaneity'), though the connexion is not very obvious. See Charlton p. 110, and also 289,26ff. 600. Vitelli in his Addenda et Corrigenda suggested there is a lacuna after kinoie at 283,21, which should be filled by reference to 268,1-2, treating the present example as a fusion of the two there. 601. As the ensuing bracket shows, this must mean that it fulfils no actual end, whether or not it has an intended one. 602. Reading to ara before kai with L at 283,23 at Vitelli's suggestion. 603. scil. those that it is possible should come to be neither tout court nor normally; d.Phys. 197a34-5. 604. i.e. wide; cf. n. 531 above. 605. epi pleionon, cognate with epi pleon, translated 'more widely' at 284,11. 606. 281,3-6. 607. kategorikos, an alternative to the word kataphatikos used for 'affirmative' at 281,7-8. 608. cf. 287,21ff. 609. kataskeuazei, which normally means something like 'establish' or 'construct'. But one can hardly establish something before expounding it, and even 'construct' seems less apt here. 610. praktea. Aristotle has prakta ('things which can be done'), and Philoponus follows this at 286,10 though keeping praktea at 285,11. For the merging of the two ideas cf. the '-ble' in words like 'preferable', 'desirable'. 611. Or: 'luck.' See n. 570 above. 612. This sentence follows the lemma. The words 'a kind of represent the strong indefinite article (tis: see end of n. 7 above), which occurs in Aristotle's text but which Philoponus omits here, though he includes it at 285,14. 'Happiness' is only an approximation to Aristotle's eudaimonia, which normally involves acting or living well, not just a state of feeling; see EN 1, and 286,16ff. below. 613. kakopragia, effectively synonymous with duspragia, which I have translated 'ill-doing^. 614. Literally: 'a kind of doing.' But I keep the standard translation, 'action', of praxis. 615. Aristotle would not allow that it is in his serious discussions of happiness, whatever concessions he may make to popular thought in a non-ethical context like the present one; cf. 286,16ff. I have corrected Vitelli's misprint, eudaimonia, to eudaimonidi at 285,17. 616. 282,llff. 617. Philoponus is not entitled to this universal premise. His third figure syllogism at 285,19ff. has only shown the particular proposition that that bit of chance that is good luck is a kind of action. (Note from Dr I. Bodnar.) 618. Phys. 197b-8.

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Notes to pages 95-98

619. i.e. at least one case of spontaneity is not a case of chance; cf. 281,6. 620. Correcting Vitelli's misprint, eudaimonia, to eudaimonidi at 286,9. 621. Aristotle's text continues: '... as Protarchus said that the stones from which altars are made are lucky because they are honoured, while their fellow stones are trampled upon.' Both good luck and lucklessness can fail to hold of something not of the sort to be subject to luck at all, just as both movement and rest can be denied of something not of the sort to move at all (Phys. 226bl0-16). 622. It may be that 'and' here should be 'i.e.' 623. Protarchus appears as the main interlocutor with Socrates in the discussion of pleasure and other things in the Philebus. The remark here attributed to him does not occur there, and its source is apparently not known, though it may come from a speech made on a public occasion in someone's honour. See Ross ad Phys. 197b9-ll, and Hirzel. 624. Presumably because a bit is chipped off it. 625. Obviously for an English reader something depends on the precise words used for the translation here, but the point is clear enough. Note, however, that the reason Philoponus gives in the next clause takes 'spontaneity' in the narrow sense; cf. 283,11; 284,4-8. 626. In the sense of'physical'. 627. Presumably other than man, though the words could mean 'other things (than the inanimate), namely animals', which would include man; cf. n. 203 above. But this second view is unlikely, since the implication, at least, would then be that spontaneity applies to nearly everything, including man. Spontaneity in the narrow sense, which we now seem to be concerned with, is contrasted with chance, and involves only agents, animate or inanimate, that are incapable of choice. The beneficiaries on the other hand can include anything capable of being benefited. The horse benefited by its escape, and a man wanting to sit benefited from the fall of the tripod. For chance both agent and beneficiary must be capable of choice. See n. 524 and nn. 634 and 636 below. 628. cf. 284,15-20. 629. The sentence following the lemma, and itself followed by the next sentence quoted. 630. Imagine a tripod (three-legged stool) placed for sitting at the top of some steps, and then, on being accidentally knocked down them, happening to land on its feet. 631.1 have translated the received text as best I can, reading hautou for autou at 288,11. But probably one should follow Vitelli's suggestion and take the text of Themistius (which Philoponus is here taking as his guide). In that case 'suitable' would be replaced by 'suitably' and would go with 'lying* in the previous sentence, while the present sentence (keeping autou) would read: 'For it was in its nature to fall in this way in every case, if it fell [at all].' 632.1 have kept 'result' as the translation of sumbebikos here, the perfect participle of the verb whose aorist and present participles (sumban and sumbainon respectively). I have also translated 'result' above and below. It is the same word as appears in the phrase kata sumbebekos, which I standardly translate 'per accidens'. apoban, which I translate 'outcome', seems to be a mere synonym of sumban. 633. This sentence is a good example of Philoponus' switching between aitia and aition for 'cause'. See n. 54 above. 634. The intended sense seems reasonably clear, though the text is not all that easy, and might be easier with proaireta instead of tdn proairetdn (which tempts one to take it with toutdn, though not all the things just discussed were chosen). Chance events are a sub-class of spontaneous ones (in the wide sense), namely those where the result follows on a choice, and applies to those capable of choice. This last point seems to mean that both the agent and the beneficiary, if they differ, must be capable of choice, though this is not said explicitly. However, there are difficulties in Philoponus' discussion (see below). 635. Vitelli misprints proairesin as prairesin. 636. proairetos literally means 'choosable', though it seems in fact also to have the

Notes to pages 98-101

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sense of 'chosen'. But perhaps this is one reason why Philoponus feels it necessary to explain it. Another would be his view that it covers also what 'follows on' things chosen. This addition in fact creates a difficulty, for the ensuing examples seem to exclude such cases from the realm of chance. The choking and striking one's foot are things that 'follow on' the chosen activities of eating and walking, and what is affected by them is also something capable of choice (the man himself), so why do they not fall under chance? It cannot be because the results are not what one would choose, for this would exclude bad luck. Philoponus seems to have in mind a distinction between things which 'follow on' without external interference, like finding a treasure while digging for carrots, and cases where the natural activity of the external object is relevant, as when the stone resists one's foot or the windpipe constricts its contents (see 289,17-18 and 20). But it is not obvious that this distinction is really viable. 637. The words 'or else' (itoi) could separate two definitions rather than, as I have taken them, forming part of a single definition. The former seems less natural, and, indeed, might be thought to require etoi tou. 638. Phys. 197bl2-13, from the lemma at 287,6. 639. On matin ('fruitlessly)') cf. n. 599 above and n. 650 below. I am not clear why Charlton (p. 49) finds this sense (or one similar to it) 'hard to extract' from this text, though one must indeed supply insertions. There are a number of variants of the text both of Aristotle and of Philoponus. I have followed Vitelli's text of Philoponus. Philoponus follows Aristotle in deriving automaton ('spontaneity') from auto ('itself) and matin. 640. cf. Phys. 197b26. 641. Or possibly: 'as though this spontaneous cause had come to be for it.' 642. A reference to Aristotle's doctrine of natural places. See Cael. 1.8 643. Throughout this passage the official subject is the motion, as Greek idiom allows, though the real subject is, of course, often the stone. The same idiom applies to 'intending' at 290,24. 644. The passive of the verb used for 'intending' at 290,24. Cf. n. 643 above. 645. i.e. in this example the falling is fruitless and the striking spontaneous. 646. i.e. the striking would normally be caused in some such way as this. 647. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion phisei for phiseie at 291,14. 648. idea, effectively synonymous with skhema, shape. 649. This paragraph is awkward in structure, though its sense seems reasonably clear. The question is raised whether monsters (monstrous births, etc.) count as spontaneous, and Philoponus concludes that they do, because though you can find various material causes, which will variously account for any given monster, there is no determinate efficient cause with a natural tendency to produce monsters. The structural awkwardness arises because it is not clear where an objector is speaking and where Philoponus himself is. I assume that there is a single objection, given in the sentence beginning 'But perhaps one should not ...' (291,12), and that 'But someone will say ...' (291,14) is the beginning of Philoponus' answer, though these words suggest that an objector is speaking rather than Philoponus himself. I assume that the 'someone' is an ally of Philoponus, and that the scope of hoti at 291,15 does not end at baruteta but extends to sumbebikos (291,16). 650. Philoponus hardly succeeds in making sense of the etymological derivation, whether or not it is correct, or in defending his conclusion at 290,27-291,4, since the falling stone does also achieve its natural end of getting nearer to its appropriate place (the centre of the cosmos), whatever other ends it may happen to attain en route. (It is true that the stone might have got nearer to the centre had it not struck the man. But apart from not applying to the stone that became a seat (290,7ff.; 291,16ff.), this would make all falling fruitless, since the falling object would have got lower had the ground been lower at that point.) Cornford (see Wicksteed p. 260 n.b) sees an ambiguity in matin between failure of purpose and absence of purpose: the stone doesn't attain the purpose of striking the man because it never had that purpose to attain. This is perhaps about the best that can be done, and is what Philoponus seems to have in mind at 290,22-5 as well as here.

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Notes to pages 101-103

651. The sentence following the lemma. The word 'something* occurs in most of our M S S of Aristotle though evidently not in Philoponus'. 652. This distinction between nature in general and the specific nature of something is hard to keep in translation because Greek so often uses an article where English does not (see n. 7 above), and I have usually ignored the article when style demands, but I follow the Greek in the present context. One might try 'its nature', though this does not suit the next sentence. 653. exothen. Vitelli refers to Simplicius, in Phys. 352,28-30, who adds that this can also mean aphanes kai adMon (obscure and unclear). 654. Or perhaps: 'they naturally tend towards the end.' But neneukos at 292,27 suggests the translation I have given in the text. 655. The general sense is clear (that chance and spontaneity both fall under the efficient cause), but Aristotle's text is abrupt and elliptical, and (as Vitelli points out) Philoponus' text of Aristotle was probably corrupt at this point and hekaterou at 293,2 should be hekateron; the effect of this is to replace '[they arel' by 'each of them is' and delete the last four words. Also Aristotle's text starts tes d' aitias ton tropon, while Philoponus' text starts ton de tropon tes aitias, though this need not affect the translation. 'Things whence the source of movement is' is a standard Aristotelian phrase for the efficient cause. 656. i.e. chance and spontaneity. 657. Phys. 196a24-6, with minor verbal alterations; cf. 264,21ff. 658. cf. 267,19ff. 659. The words translated 'per accidens' and 'being consequent on' are etymologically connected. 660. cf. 268,18-25, where this seems to be at least implied. 661. i.e. mind and nature are per se, and chance and spontaneity are per accidens. 662. This sentence is presumably intended as a reductio ad absurdum, whether or not 'earlier' (proteron) has a logical rather than a temporal sense; cf. nn. 664 and 670 below. 663. Democritus and his followers. 664. Pro, which could be either temporal or conceptual; cf. n. 662 above. 665. Reading eroimeth' an for eroimetha at 294,17, following Vitelli's suggestion. 666. i.e. infinitely many, the view of Democritus. 667. This sentence requotes and continues the lemma with a slight variation at the start. I agree with Charlton (p. 49) in taking touton auton at 294,32 as objective genitive, not partitive genitive. On the alternative view the last clause would read: 'when one of these same things [i.e. mind or nature] becomes a cause per accidens.' 668. The Greek is as ambiguous as my translation: does 'per accidens' refer to chance and spontaneity, or to mind and nature? The run of the sentence suggests mind and nature, and the next sentence clearly makes mind a per accidens cause in the relevant example; cf. also 295,6 and 295,10-11. On the other hand the quotation, on the translation I have adopted, suggests chance and spontaneity, and so do 295,18-20 and 295,26-7. The issue, however, only concerns the interpretation of the sentence in question (294,32-295,1). Chance and spontaneity are always per accidens causes. Mind and nature can be per accidens causes, but only if they are also per se causes of something else (as mind might per accidens cause recovering a debt by per se causing going to the market). Philoponus is arguing that his opponents are incoherent because in the particular case of the universe as a whole there is nothing else for mind and nature to be per se causes of, and so the'y cannot be per accidens causes of it. i 669. proteron, the same word as that translated 'earlier' above (295,3, where it must be temporal), and the comparative ofpro; see n.' 664 above. 670. Again proteron, with the same temporal/conceptual ambiguity. 'Priorly' is not English. 671.1 have assumed that (pace the Greek lexicon) sunago can mean 'follow' or 'be inferred' rather than, as it usually does in this sort of context, 'infer'. Otherwise one could perhaps read sunaxei (future) for sunagei (present) on its first as well as its

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second occurrence at 295,17, giving the sense: 'he will [be able to] infer.' 672. Here ti seems to have stopped being the subject of genetai (and so translatable as 'something') and come to be in apposition to aition as an indefinite article (perhaps meaning 'a sort of cause'), now that genetai has got a new subject - unless Philoponus forgot to omit ti in these circumstances. I assume an at 295,21 is simply repeated from hotan at 295,20. 673. i.e. the sentence just put in inverted commas would be illegitimate, since there is no ground (Philoponus suggests) for saying they would be causes of the same things. Mind, e.g., might cause a man to go to the market and then chance, following on this, might cause him to collect the money. 674. Phys. 198a9-10. 675. i.e. Democritus, etc. 676. Phys. 198all-13. 677. cf. n. 63 above. 678.1 have translated the text as it stands. Possibly the point is this: take a triangle with one side produced, so as to give an external angle. Then the three angles of the triangle will be greater than this external angle (the 'remaining' one) because they will equal the external angle together with its adjacent internal angle, which in turn, being supplementary angles, equal 2R, and 2R is greater than any one internal or external angle. The point seems rather futile, as well as elliptically expressed, and the text is probably corrupt. Vitelli suspects a lacuna and suggests a text which could be translated as follows: 'If he were asked why the two sides of a triangle were greater than the remaining one, he will say [...{the reason has dropped out} and if he were asked why the three angles of a triangle equal 2R, he will say] [it is] because they equal two supplementary [angles] ' This could be explained if an early copyist's eye jumped from the first 'he will say' to the second, leaving out what comes between them (a very common type of error). Some later copyist will then have tried to restore some sort of coherence to the text by replacing 'the two sides' by 'the three angles', possibly having in mind the sort of interpretation I suggested above. 679. Inserting estin horismos, or similar words, after hoti at 297,2; cf. 333,11, which Vitelli refers to to defend the reading hos rather than hotan - but the grammatical context is different there and some supplementation seems needed here. 680. Following Vitelli's suggestion apopimplamen for apopipldmen at 297,9. 681. A typical example of ancient indifference to the distinction between a linguistic thing like a definition and what it is of. 682. Or just: 'man' - a case where the article in Greek does not carry the information it does in English. 683. i.e. the sun; as we should say, the ongoing processes inside him and those outside him which cause these. 684. The Neoplatonists, but not Aristotle, believed in a disembodied afterlife; cf. n. 731 below. 685. i.e. in the parent. 686. The word pragmateia is ambiguous between area of study and treatise written about that area. Both translations seem needed here, but Aristotle's own use of it at Phys. 198a30 need have no more than the general sense of area of study. Aristotle talks of the same three areas but does not refer explicitly in this way to his own treatises. In fact the main argument for the existence of an unmoved mover comes in the Physics itself, bk. 8, though the nature of that mover is indeed studied at Metaph. 12.6ff. The 'natural treatises' are the scientific works in general, including the Physics itself, though that is largely concerned with what we would now think of as metaphysical discussions of the concepts used in science, such as the notion of cause in the present book. cf. 301,lff. and 303,2ff. 687. Or possibly: 'by us' (i.e. Aristotle). The Greek is hemin. 688. Literally: 'the because of what.' 689. For these four problems cf. An. Post 2.1, though there the problems are listed as those of finding that something is the case, why it is the case, whether a given thing exists, and what the given thing is.

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Notes to pages 106-109

690. eskhaton (last') could apply instead to 'reason why\ or be an adverb ('in the end'). It seems to be the latter in Aristotle, but I have translated following Philoponus' interpretation below. 691. Literally: 'the what it is.' ti esti, like ti en einai, is standardly translated 'essence'. 692. mathemata. It is tempting to read mathematika ('mathematical objects') as at 298,24, though matMmata recurs at 298,26. 693. Or: 'are studied [as being] in movement.' 694. eis eskhaton. These words are widely separated in Aristotle's text. 695. Philoponus keeps Aristotle's 'either' at the expense of syntactic coherence. The other alternatives are the other three causes, as we shall see shortly (299,27ff). 696. Or:'... at a definition in the end.' 697. Or:'... is reduced to the essence in the end.' But see n. 690 above. 698. Perhaps the points are envisaged as on the circle, though the Greek at 299,11 says 'in'. Other interpretations include that of taking the arc between the ends on the circumference of their respective radii. 699. i.e. presumably any random curve. 700. i.e. a two-foot rule can be laid against an eight-foot rule four times. 701. Or:'... to a definition in the end.' 702. Seen. 305above. 703. Aristotle's text has 'what comes to be' (ginomenois) for 'what is generated' (genndmenois), but the point is immaterial. Philoponus hasgenndmena at 300,5-6 but ginomenois at 300,8-9.17, and Vitelli suggests a passage has fallen out where he explained the term genndmena. 704. At Timaeus 27D-8A. 705. Reading mathematika for mathemata at 300,12. Phys. 198al7, to which Vitelli refers for where Aristotle says this, does have mathemata, but the structure of the sentence is different. 706. en tei skhesei tes proaireseds, a difficult phrase, skhesis, here translated 'state', I have usually translated 'relation', though at 336,7 'role'. The general point seems to be that in cases of choice we look to the final cause for the reason why, not to the material cause, because something chosen doesn't, as such, have a material which explains how it is chosen; it either is chosen or it isn't, and it doesn't become so by going through a process of generation involving an underlying matter. But it must be admitted that the point is not a very clear one. One might think the chosen thing was itself the matter and acquired the property of being chosen in the way that any other property is acquired. Perhaps Philoponus would reply that becoming chosen is rather like becoming an uncle, and is really reducible to something else's acquisition of a property. 707. Or: 'studied.' 708. In the Greek this is the main verb in a single sentence starting with 'Alternatively' at 300,10; my insertion 'we can note that' replaces 'since' in the original. 709. The 'the' occurs in Aristotle's text, though Philoponus seems to have omitted it. 710. These words immediately follow the lemma. 711. i.e. God, and the other divine intellects, if any, which move the stars (cf. end of n. 10 above). 712. i.e. those on the natural sciences. 713. DA3.4ff. 714. cf. GC 1.3,317b33-318a6, where, however, it is only briefly mentioned. 715. Literally: 'come to one thing.' Philoponus himself usually says 'come to the same thing'; but the three causes are not synonymous, and so I have used 'coincide' for both expressions. 716. akinetos. I have usually translated this 'unmoved', but here there seems to be a reference to the sun, which does move but does not change in any other way. The alternative would be to confine the reference to the Unmoved Mover of Physics bk. 8,

180

Notes to pages 109-112

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or possibly to the plurality of such movers mentioned in (and only in) bk. 12, ch. 8 of the Metaphysics. 111. The Neoplatonists rejected the principle that the cause must be like the effect, since their supreme God, the One, is unlike anything it creates. 718. 297,30ff. 719. 230,5ff. 720. In the Greek text 'which' here is in the genitive, like 'of which'just above. 721. cf. 298,4-6. 722. i.e. the same as the essence and that for the sake of which. T h a t from which movement [arises]' is a standard Aristotelian expression for the efficient cause. This sentence immediately follows the lemma. 723. The father of Socrates. 724. prosekhes, the same word as that translated just above as 'what comes next [above]', but here evidently used in a different sense. 725. Phys. 198a23-4; cf. 300,25. Aristotle adds 'that for the sake of which' at the end of the quotation, though it doesn't appear in the list at 198a31-3; cf. 303,6-7. 726. Phys. 198a27. 727. cf. Phys. 192b20-3, and 196,15ff. 728. arkhai, plural of arkhe, translated 'source'just above. 729. kataballo can mean 'overthrow' as well as 'lay down'; here the context seems to demand the latter (cf. English 'put down'). 730. i.e. the stages of growth, etc. 731. i.e. immortality belongs to species, not to individuals. Verrycken (p. 265 n. 61) suggests transferring the comma at 303,24 to the end of the line. The translation would then read:'... eternal numerically, [nature] contrived eternity by succession.' 732. i.e. prime matter; cf. n. 4 above. 733. Reading kinetikon for kiniton with K at 304,2. With Vitelli's text we could translate:'... that the principles of movable things ... .' But there are more than two principles of movable things. 734. Here again (cf. 302,22) I have translated arkhi as both 'source' and 'principle' as idiom dictates. 735. See n. 717 above. 736. Phys. 198b2. 737. Metaph. 1072a23, where, however, it is the sphere itself (the ouranos) that is called 'first'. The heavenly bodies are thought of as carried round the earth daily on transparent spheres. The fixed stars, unlike the planets, keep the same spatial relations to each other as they revolve, and so require only one sphere. 738. The contrast intended in this paragraph is awkwardly expressed at best. The first alternative is clearly the prime mover of Metaph. 12.6ff. The second alternative seems to refer to the multiple unmoved movers, one for each sphere, of Metaph. 12.8, and the final sentence then seems to contrast these with the prime mover by calling that 'the very first' of the unmoved movers. But the intervening sentence says that what move things primarily are the heavenly spheres (literally: heavenly things), which, however, are not unmoved movers but are themselves moved. The train of thought is presumably this: the spheres are the first among things themselves moved that move other things. They are moved by the multiple unmoved movers of Metaph. 12.8 (not mentioned anywhere else in Aristotle), which therefore really deserve the title 'first movers'. But first among them, and so 'the very first', is the prime mover. A further awkwardness is that the multiple movers, if the reference is indeed to them, are introduced as 'everything that moves the heaven', though each of them only moves one sphere. Conceivably the reference is to the whole set of the unmoved movers taken collectively (the word I have translated 'everything' - pan - can also mean 'all' or 'the whole of). 739. morphe. See nn. 151 and 152 above. The second 'and' here means 'i.e.' or 'in other words'. 740. Aristotle thinks that the form from the father acts on the matter of the embryo as efficient cause, while this human form is also what the growing embryo aims at as its

182

Notes to pages 113-115

final cause, or goal. 741. cf. Phys. 198a24-5, quoted as lemma at 301,7. 742. Aristotle's own text is slightly different: 'So that since nature is for the sake of something one should know this [nature] too. A n d one must ... .' According to the most natural interpretation 'one should know this too' belongs to the protasis for Philoponus and the apodosis for Aristotle. 743. In Phys. 2.8; see 306,12ff. 744. A n exaggeration of course. Apart from the chance phenomena discussed previously Aristotle makes clear that some things, such as eye-colour, have no purpose (see GA 778,32-4). 745. Phys. 198b5-6. 746. Phys. 198b6; the words apply to the way in which one thing comes out of another. 747. As the comparison in the next paragraph suggests, the sense in which one thing 'comes out of another in the case of eternal things is probably that in which the conclusion of a valid syllogism 'comes out of the premises. 748. Phys. 198b7-8. 749. Phys. 198b8. 'Essence' here translates Aristotle's phrase ti en einai, literally: 'what it was to be.' 750. cf. 301,7ff.; 305,2-3, etc.; it is possible that Philoponus actually wrote 'said that this often coincides'; but the limitation to 'often' in that case is explained by Philoponus in terms rather of efficient causes (301,8ff.). 'Coincide' here represents an equivalent Greek word, 'suntrekheV. 751. Phys. 198b8-9. hoti, which I translated 'that' in the last quotation, can also mean 'because', and I have preferred that here, because Aristotle's own text has dioti, which more often means 'because'. (But see also n. 755 below.) 752. ousia, which I usually translate 'substance'; but it can also mean 'essence' or 'being', as here. It is Aristotle's main word for 'substance'. 753. 297,10. 754. Reading mathematikon for mathematon at 306,9-10. 755. Or: 'why', as both Wicksteed and Charlton interpret Aristotle's dioti; but not only does Philoponus immediately below use hoti, which normally means 'that', but both Aristotle and Philoponus are concerned to establish that nature is a final cause rather than why it should be one. (But see also n. 751 above, dioti can mean either 'why' or 'because', as well as 'that'.) 756. i.e. prima facie establishes. He goes on to reject it of course. 757. A confusing way of putting the point that the parts turn out to be suitable for some purpose as if they had come to be for the sake of it, though on the view under discussion, of course, they didn't. 758. Correcting Vitelli's oion to hoion. 759. See n. 582 above. 760. Proponents of the argument just discussed. 761. See n. 537 above. 762. cf. 262,27-8 with context, and 265,10-14; 266,3. 763. The syllogism is one only in an extended sense as compared to Aristotle's original doctrine. It has the form: 'All A's are either B or C; no A's are B; therefore all A's are C The first premise is therefore disjunctive, but we can also regard it as hypothetical by putting it in the (weaker) form: 'If no A's are B then all A's are C 764. kai at 308,6 (which L omits) is awkward since this conclusion seems already to have been shown. The point seems to be that the last paragraph really referred to examples of things that are by nature, while this next argument will apply the conclusion to things that are by nature, as such (i.e. will show that natural things as such, taken collectively, have the property that at least some of them have a purpose). The overall structure of this and the previous two paragraphs seems to go like this: Rain, etc. are not accidental (first paragraph); since they are not accidental they are for the sake of something (second paragraph); rain, etc. are by nature (assumed as agreed); so (since rain, etc. are by nature and for the sake of something) some things

Notes to pages 116-121

183

that are by nature are for the sake of something (this paragraph). The argument is a somewhat cumbrously expressed elaboration of Phys. 198b34-9a8. 765. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion e for kai at 308,29. 766. ouoV an holds hupestesan. Perhaps: 'they would not have existed at all.' The conclusion may seem abrupt and unsubstantiated, but we must remember that we are being given two axioms (axidmata: 308,15), and the second, like the first, is simply being illustrated, not being established. 767. On this paragraph and the next see Wolff, pp. 64-6. 768. cf. 308,15-18. 769. The nature of things, according to Philoponus. See 236,26ff. 770. Phys. 194a32-3, already quoted at 236,26. 771. Phys. 194a31-2, with 'he has' altered to 'having'. See the lemma at 236,5 and Philoponus' ensuing discussion. 772. Reading egeneto for egineto both times with L at 310,6 (admittedly the lectio facilior), and inserting an before or after the second egeneto. 773. If the argument is to hold water Philoponus must be envisaging a case where art produces a monster deliberately, not accidentally (cf. 310,23-4). Otherwise the craftsman would still be aiming at something, but not at a monster, so why shouldn't nature be aiming at something even when it produces a monster? Vitelli quotes a marginal note added at 311,1 by an ancient reader of M S L making a point to the same effect. It reads: 'But the products of the arts are those which ... [illegible]. But things not of such a kind, which you, O philosopher, call monsters, are the works of arts gone wrong (mataiotekhnidn), not of arts. Therefore the Stagirite is right to say that what came to be by art came to be in this way also by nature.' (Probably the writer omitted by a slip to insert an before or after thefinal'egeneto'', inserting it would turn the final 'came to be' into 'would have come to be'.) 774. Dropping ei ('if, before 'art') with M t at 310,16. Keeping the 'if makes the sentence anacoluthic, even if not impossibly so for Philoponus. Another MS, L, shows doubts about it, and it could have slipped in because of many similar sentences in the vicinity. 775. It is here that M S L has the marginal note referred to in the n. 773 above. 776. See the Hippocratic treatise On Nourishment (Peri Trophes) para. 39 (vol. 9 p. 112inLittre). 777. 'For' (gar) is inapposite here (at 312,2) and is perhaps a slip for 'and' (de). 778. Inserting epideiknuon before epegage at 312,3, it or something like it having perhaps slipped out because of its similar beginning. 779. See n. 265 above. 780. See n. 144 above. 781. Anaxagoras. See n. 265 above. 782. It is not clear which particular thinker is meant. 783. See Plato's Phaedo 97Bff. 784. i.e. what prevents nature from operating by chance, as Philoponus has explained at 306,23ff. 785. Phys. 198bl7-19. 786. holds (here and just below), which could also have the milder sense 'all in all'. 787. cf. n. 63 above. 788. The circle whereby, e.g., water evaporates and becomes air in the summer and turns back into rain in the winter. 789. axia. Here and at 313,10 and 313,26 the word seems primarily to mean suitability, but with connotations of merit. 790. ta exdthen. The phrase is a strange one in this context, but perhaps refers to the things outside or beyond the heavenly bodies and the elements that we have just been talking about, i.e. the particular objects or species on the earth. A n alternative interpretation would be: 'for the sake of (dia) the fitness of each of the particulars the things outside and beyond them are disposed . . . . ' 791. Or possibly just: 'in a meeting': epig* ekklesias. 792. The next words after the lemma.

184

Notes to pages 121-128

793. fr. 61 of Empedocles in Diels-Kranz; cf. n. 144 above. 794. Empedocles. 795. Aristotle. But Vitelli suggests phesi Che says') at 314,28 should be phasi Cthey say (or speak)'), making explicit the 'speak' which I have supplied. 796. In the sentence between the previous lemma and this one Aristotle has turned to what he sees as the true account. 'These' refers to the falling of rain and growth of animals in normal circumstances. 797. cf. 307,24-6; 29-33. 798. cf. 307,26-7; 307,33-308,5. 799. cf. 307,27-8; 308,6-12. 800. cf. 308,14-309,8. 801. cf. 308,21. 802. The sentence in the rubric ends with these words. 803. The sense seems to demand that we insert an before or after epoiei at 316,15, though without M S authority. However, an can be omitted in the apodosis of counterfactual conditionals in late Greek; see Westerink 311 for a list of such passages in Olympiodorus (reference from Prof. D.A. Russell). 804. Phys. 199al5. 805. cf. 310,16ff. 806. It is tempting to suppose that mallon has dropped out, though if it has, it has done so from all our MSS without any of them restoring it. L S (but not LSJ), s.v. mala II 3, mentions Sophocles' Ajax 966 for its omission in another context. It does appear in the parallel context at 310,22. 807. Aristotle has 'by intellect or something else' (noi e tint alldi): 199a22. 808. Reading tithenei tei gei for tei tithenei at 317,8, modifying Vitelli's suggestion; cf. 311,16. 809. Phys. 199a23-4. Scil. the presence of purpose in plants will become clear. 810. morphi i.e. form. See nn. 151 and 152 above. 811. Phys. 198a24-5; cf. 301,7ff., and also 297,30ff. 812. Phys. 193a28-31; cf. 214,llff., and also 207,15ff. 813. pleonexia. The word normally means greed (literally: having more), but the context seems to require a fault in the material rather than in the craftsman. Perhaps the ink is too thick, or too abundant. 814. cf. 'mal-aria' as a disease due to bad air. 815. A n asymmetry that Philoponus does not seem to notice is that whereas deficiencies in the matter may be outside the control of the craftsman it might be thought that they are not in the analogous case outside that of nature. 816. Correcting Vitelli's elengei, presumably a misprint, to elenkhei at 318,25. 817. Perhaps 'ultimate purpose'. I have translated literally the rare word skopimotaton. Similarly at 319,25. 818. cf. 318,25ff. 819. i.e. the opinion that 'man-prowed oxen-kind' did arise on the scale that Empedocles claimed. 820. The argument seems only to hold on Aristotle's own premise that nature does act for the sake of something, so that deviations will be minimal. 821. Or possibly: 'for he plainly does not say this.' 822. The sense is probably: 'before the animals and plants.' The 'whole-natured' are not here being regarded as one of them. 823. 319,4. 824. Altering the accent would give Philoponus' more usual type of phrase, 'for the sake of some good'. 825. See n. 305 above. 826. Inserting epi or some similar word after hodou at 320,18. 827. Literally: 'that', referring to the route; but presumably the reference is to the end-points too. 828. See nn. 331 and 333 above. 829. Bohm (p. 449 n. 116) calls this 'Ein stark christlich anmutender Satz\ y

Notes to pages 128-132

185

830. This paragraph, which expands a single sentence in Aristotle saying simply that art doesn't deliberate either (Phys. 199b28), doesn't show Philoponus at his best. In saying that deliberation shows an inadequacy in the deliberator and that God doesn't deliberate he may have a point, but his examples are decidedly selective. That we don't deliberate about already adopted ends, such as sawing wood, or over very easy things like spelling 'Socrates', does not imply we don't deliberate in more complex cases. Also to say that nature itself doesn't deliberate is irrelevant if the question is whether things in nature (birds, ants, etc.) deliberate. Maybe nature acts for a purpose, but does the bird? And what would be evidence that nature did deliberate, unless it makes mistakes - which according to Philoponus it does? Something here may depend on the distinction between universal nature and particular natures, which Philoponus (unlike Aristotle) makes (see n. 63 above), but does not advert to here. Aristotle himself discusses deliberation at EN 3.3, where he holds that it is never of ends but always of what is 'towards the end'; see n. 271 above. 831. The Greek could mean 'the seed of their principle was corrupted'; but apart from the difficulty of interpreting this cf. 319,6-7. 832. cf. 319,13ff. 833. See n. 821 above. 322,23-4 repeats 319,19-20 almost verbatim. 834. cf. Meteor. 389b31ff. (from the disputed bk. 4), and Metaph. 1035b24-5. 835. i.e. stuffs like flesh rather than structured parts like arms or legs. See n. 277 above with accompanying text. 836. In Aristotle's text the antecedent of 'each' is 'source' (arkhe), not 'nature', but the point is not affected. 837. This kind of case, where something exceptional occurs but is normal within a certain subset of cases (mules only result when horses are crossed with asses, but then they normally result), is something which has not yet been discussed, and there is no reason to think Aristotle has it in mind in the present context. The idea of sub-regularities within the exceptional is something Aristotle is aware of (cf. Metaph. 1027a22-7, as well as the case of mules, for which see references under hemionos in Bonitz); but he doesn't discuss it in Phys. 2, and doesn't do real justice to it anywhere. 838. The Greek is ambiguous over whether 'it' refers to providence or to nature. 839. See n. 841 below. 840. cf. 269,23ff.; 273,31ff.; 274,10ff. 841. The M S S of Aristotle vary between lousamenos ('having bathed') and lusamenos ('having freed'). Philoponus' main source evidently had the former, but the latter is probably the correct reading, as Philoponus himself seems to think. 842. i.e. prima facie we would say this. 843. Diogenes Laertius, in his Lives of the Philosophers (3,20), tells us that it was a certain Anniceris of Cyrene who performed this service after Plato had been taken prisoner in Aegina, a state hostile to Athens. See Riginos 86-92 (reference suggested to me by Prof. D.A. Russell). 844. nun can mean 'now' either in time or (as here) in the sense of 'as things are', which I use for it just below. I use either phrase, as style dictates, for the non-temporal occurrences. 845.1 have preserved the syntactical ambiguity as to whether this clause goes with what precedes it or what succeeds it. In sense it is best taken with what follows, i.e. as giving a reason for reintroducing the doctor example. 846. cf. Phys. 192b23-7, and 197,21-8. 847. A difficult sentence (my interpretation of which is due to Prof. D.A. Russell). 'Artefacts' (for tekhnitois) should perhaps be replaced here by the wider phrase 'products of art' (which would include becoming healthy). It is possible that some words have dropped out adjacent to hos en tekhnetois. 848. Philoponus seems (like Wicksteed but unlike Charlton) to take kai as 'in fact' rather than as 'also' here. This avoids the implication that on each of the two alternative views Aristotle's opponents accept hypothetical necessity, and so gives point to Aristotle's ensuing defence of it. See Cooper, p. 265, n. 24, and for Cooper's own interpretation p. 262.

186

Notes to pages 132-137

849. Phys. 198bl0ff; cf. 306,12ff. 850. Reading eirmon for heirmon with K at 325,23 (and also at 326,2). There appears to be no word heirmon, to judge from the standard Greek Lexicon. 851. These two questions are presented as assertions in the Greek; but only the punctuation need be altered to turn them into questions, and this should be altered anyway at 326,4. 852. e.g. 318,2ff. 853. Throughout this and the last two paragraphs. 854. The sentence is not quite grammatical, having an anacoluthon between anankaion and ei at 327,4. But the sense is clear enough to make it not worth while trying to emend it. 855. Presumably the reference is to the other two basic qualities, moist and dry, or perhaps to the larger list discussed at Aristotle's GC 2.2. 856. Patzig (ch. 2 §6) claims that, especially in his treatment of modal logic in An. Pr., Aristotle distinguishes clearly between absolute necessity and the relative necessity which even a contingent proposition may have when it follows logically from some other proposition, and that Aristotle keeps 'out of necessity' (ex anankes) for the former. Philoponus is not concerned to mark that distinction terminologically, nor the similar one treated here between absolute and hypothetical necessity. Hence he uses 'out of necessity' here at 327,18 for relative necessity, and for hypothetical necessity at 326,5 and elsewhere. 857. Following Vitelli's suggestion tei... elattoni for tes elattonos at 327,31. 858. Either the compounding of the two premises or perhaps that of the three terms (major, minor and middle). In either case the point is that we no longer have an ambiguous middle term. 859. In the paragraph before last. 860. Here Philoponus explicitly calls the premises the matter for the conclusion; cf. 328,16. It is not clear whether he is still thinking of them in this way at 328,23-329,2; 332,19-25; 334,20-4. 861. cf. 327,2-5, and in general 325,20ff. 862. i.e. the theorising, or planning, of the planner. 863. One might wonder why the hot should have to have small parts in order to be borne upwards (since for the Greeks as for us heat rises). The point is presumably that larger parts would be trapped lower down in the body by its more solid parts (bones, etc.) while hot stuff that was divided into small parts would be free to exercise its natural tendency to rise, escaping as it were the sieve created by various other parts of the body, though being stopped, no doubt, from escaping altogether by the solid bone of the skull. 864. i.e. it involves the bronze being these things. 865. An. Post. 2.10 introduces three types of definition, but they seem to have at best only a loose relationship to the three mentioned here. But cf. also DA 403a29-bl6, and 228,15ff. 866. 'Because' translates dia. One might think this suggests an efficient cause rather than a formal cause, and that something like 'constituting' or 'serving as the material basis of would express Aristotle's point better, even though one might expect a genitive (orexeos) then (but orexin might be used because of the following antilupeseos). Aristotle himself does not write out the third definition in full (see DA 403a30-bl). Elsewhere (Top. 156a32-3; Rhet. 1378a31-3) he uses 'because of with reference to the supposed slight that prompts the anger. 867. Or possibly: 'grasping by his reason' (lambanon toi logdi). 868. Presumably direct sunlight is meant. In Philoponus' Alexandria cloudy days were less common than in the U K ! 869. Phys. 200a4. Aristotle is describing the example of a wall (of a house) coming to be automatically, and says 'earth' where Philoponus says 'bricks' (326,12). 870. See n. 382 above. 871. Phys. 200al0-ll. Aristotle, as so often, uses 'this' and 'that' as schematic examples.

Notes to pages 138-141

187

872. Reading kai after koindnian with K at 332,18. 873. cf. 327,19ff. 874. mathemata, which I have translated according to context 'mathematical arguments' or 'mathematical sciences'. 875. scil. mathematical arguments and the sphere of natural things. 876. to euthu (neuter), i.e. straightness. 877. We must imagine that some definition of straightness is given, or possibly (as Prof. D.A. Russell suggests) a diagram something like that at Euclid 1.32. 878. i.e. the two angles formed by any straight line hitting a given straight line, when taken together, are equal to the angles formed by the perpendicular to the same given straight line. 879. cf. the similar argument at 297,1-4. 880. Aristotle's text has 'since' (epei) for 'if {ei). 881. cf. 327,19-20; 332,25-7. 882. Literally: 'through an impossible.' This presumably does refer to reductio ad absurdum arguments, though it is not clear that Philoponus has in fact introduced these explicitly. 327,20-6 simply showed that a true conclusion could follow from false premises. No doubt it is impossible that man should be a stone, but other premises, contingently false, could have been chosen. 883. These words follow the lemma immediately. 884. 327,26ff. 885. i.e. a syllogism like 'Men are stones; stones are animals; so men are animals' is valid, but the reference to stones is irrelevant to the truth of the conclusion, which is true because it is the particular conclusion that it is. 886. In this and the previous discussions 'inferred' must of course be taken in the sense 'validly inferred'. 887. cf. 332,12ff. 888. Reading matMmatika for mathemata at 334,12. Alternatively one should take mathimata to have this sense. 889. 332,19ff. 890. These words immediately follow the lemma. 891. These words immediately follow the last quotation above. 892. scil. the end and that for the sake of which. 893. scil. in mathematical arguments. 894. EE 1227b32-3. 895. Strictly Philoponus says that if it is different the conclusion at 335,20 still follows, but the 'if-clause is plainly being put forward as Philoponus' own view. I have, as on other similar occasions, reconstructed Philoponus' impossibly complex sentence at 335,11-21. 896. Readingp/itfioras after kolutikon at 335,23; cf. 335,5. 897. i.e. makes his calculations about what will be needed. 898. i.e. if one wants, say, to build a house, the form won't follow of necessity once the bricks are given, as explained above. 899. i.e. if one is planning, say, to build a house, then having started with the idea of a house one must necessarily, if one is to succeed, go on to talk about getting some bricks, etc. 900. Adopting Vitelli's suggestion to follow t in reading to after kata at 336,3. 901. proteind. The word for 'premise' {protasis) is the verbal noun from this. Prof. Sorabji writes as follows in a private communication (trivially amended), where he also refers to Owen, p. 106: 'A premise (protasis) is literally something stretched (proteinein) (by the questioner) before (the answerer) in a dialectical debate. The questioner's job was to put questions of the form "is this so?", in order to compel the answerer to contradict the thesis he had proposed to maintain. These questions therefore served in effect as premises designed to entail the contradictory of the thesis maintained. The word protasis thereby came to mean premise more generally, and more generally still any proposition. ... Top. 1.4 shows that a problem (problema), literally something thrown before (both parties for consideration), took

188

Notes to pages 141-143

the form of a question whether or not the thesis proposed for debate was true.... Here at 336,5 Philoponus uses the verb proteinein not for the questioner's presentation of a premise, but for the proposing of a thesis to be demonstrated. This interconnects the terms in yet another way.' See Owen, p. 106. 902. The nearest reference seems to be Top. 1.4, where this is said of problem and premise. 903. This bracket is rather misleadingly put. What action produces is the object, or the form considered as embodied in the matter. Philoponus' point is presumably that action takes the matter as its starting-point. 904. Bricks, etc. 905. metalleuomen; normally this would mean: 'we mine.' But the point must be of course that this is just what we don't do in the case of bronze, a synthetic metal. 906. kiniseis, which can mean either 'changes' or 'movements'; see n. 25 above. Philoponus presumably therefore sees the need to specify its meaning here. M y 'qualitative changes' translates a single, unconnected, Greek word (alloidseis). 907. This, of course, is not strictly accurate. Cf. 309,9ff. 908. Phys. 200b2-3. 909. Phys. 200b4-5. 910. It involves such a division rather than is one. But perhaps one should read priein at 337,26 ('sawing') for prionos ('saw'), or ergon ('function') for eidos ('form'), or both (cf. Themistius 66,14, as Vitelli points out).

Appendix The Commentators

The 15,000 pages of the Ancient Greek Commentaries on Aristotle are the largest corpus of Ancient Greek philosophy that has not been translated into English or other modern European languages. The standard edition (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, or CAG) was produced by Hermann Diels as general editor under the auspices of the Prussian Academy in Berlin. Arrangements have now been made to translate at least a large proportion of this corpus, along with some other Greek and Latin commentaries not included in the Berlin edition, and some closely related non-commentary works by the commentators. The works are not just commentaries on Aristotle, although they are invaluable in that capacity too. One of the ways of doing philosophy between A.D. 200 and 600, when the most important items were produced, was by writing commentaries. The works therefore represent the thought of the Peripatetic and Neoplatonist schools, as well as expounding Aristotle. Furthermore, they embed fragments from all periods of Ancient Greek philosophical thought: this is how many of the Presocratic fragments were assembled, for example. Thus they provide a panorama of every period of Ancient Greek philosophy. The philosophy of the period from A.D. 200 to 600 has not yet been intensively explored by philosophers in English-speaking countries, yet it is full of interest for physics, metaphysics, logic, psychology, ethics and religion. The contrast with the study of the Presocratics is striking. Initially the incomplete Presocratic fragments might well have seemed less promising, but their interest is now widely known, thanks to the philological and philosophical effort that has been concentrated upon them. The incomparably vaster corpus which preserved so many of those fragments offers at least as much interest, but is still relatively little known. The commentaries represent a missing link in the history of philosophy: the Latin-speaking Middle Ages obtained their knowledge of Aristotle at least partly through the medium of the commentaries. Without an appreciation of this, mediaeval interpretations of Aristotle will not be understood. Again, the ancient commentaries are the unsuspected source of ideas which have been thought, wrongly, to originate in the later mediaeval * Reprinted from the Editor's General Introduction to the series in Christian Wildberg, Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, London and Ithaca N.Y., 1987.

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Appendix

period. It has been supposed, for example, that Bonaventure in the thirteenth century invented the ingenious arguments based on the concept of infinity which attempt to prove the Christian view that the universe had a beginning. In fact, Bonaventure is merely repeating arguments devised by the commentator Philoponus 700 years earlier and preserved in the meantime by the Arabs. Bonaventure even uses Philoponus' original examples. Again, the introduction of impetus theory into dynamics, which has been called a scientific revolution, has been held to be an independent invention of the Latin West, even if it was earlier discovered by the Arabs or their predecessors. But recent work has traced a plausible route by which it could have passed from Philoponus, via the Arabs, to the West. The new availability of the commentaries in the sixteenth century, thanks to printing and to fresh Latin translations, helped to fuel the Renaissance break from Aristotelian science. For the commentators record not only Aristotle's theories, but also rival ones, while Philoponus as a Christian devises rival theories of his own and accordingly is mentioned in Galileo's early works more frequently than Plato. It is not only for their philosophy that the works are of interest. Historians will find information about the history of schools, their methods of teaching and writing and the practices of an oral tradition. Linguists will find the indexes and translations an aid for studying the development of word meanings, almost wholly uncharted in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, and for checking shifts in grammatical usage. Given the wide range of interests to which the volumes will appeal, the aim is to produce readable translations, and to avoid so far as possible presupposing any knowledge of Greek. Footnotes will explain points of meaning, give cross-references to other works, and suggest alternative interpretations of the text where the translator does not have a clear preference. The introduction to each volume will include an explanation why the work was chosen for translation: none will be chosen simply because it is there. Two of the Greek texts are currently being re-edited 1

2

See Fritz Zimmermann, 'Philoponus' impetus theory in the Arabic tradition'; Charles Schmitt, 'Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's Physics in the sixteenth century', and Richard Sorabji, 'John Philoponus', in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection ofAristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987). See e.g. Karl Praechter, 'Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare', Byzantinische Zeitschrift 18 (1909), 516-38 (translated into English in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1990)); M . Plezia, de Commentariis Isagogicis (Cracow 1947); M . Richard, Apo Phones', Byzantion 20 (1950), 191-222; t. Evrard, L'Ecole d'Olympiodore et la composition du commentaire a la physique de Jean Philopon, Diss. (Liege 1957); L . G . Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962) (new revised edition, translated into French, Collection Bude; part of the revised introduction, in English, is included in Aristotle Transformed); A.-J. Festugiere, 'Modes de composition des commentaires de Proclus', Museum Helveticum 20 (1963), 77-100, repr. in his Etudes (1971), 551-74; P. Hadot, 'Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l'antiquite', Museum Helveticum 36 (1979), 201-23; I. Hadot, 'La division neoplatonicienne des ecrits d'Aristote', in J . Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung (Paul Moraux gewidmet), vol. 2 (Berlin 1986); I. Hadot, 'Les introductions aux commentaires exegetiques chez les auteurs neoplatoniciens et les auteurs Chretiens', in M . Tardieu (ed.), Les regies de ^interpretation (Paris 1987), 99-119. These topics are treated, and a bibliography supplied, in Aristotle Transformed. 1

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those of Simplicius in Physica and in de Caelo - and new readings will be exploited by translators as they become available. Each volume will also contain a list of proposed emendations to the standard text. Indexes will be of more uniform extent as between volumes than is the case with the Berlin edition, and there will be three of them: an English-Greek glossary, a Greek-English index, and a subject index. The commentaries fall into three main groups. The first group is by authors in the Aristotelian tradition up to the fourth century A.D. This includes the earliest extant commentary, that by Aspasius in the first half of the second century A.D. on the Nieomachean Ethics. The anonymous commentary on Books 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Nieomachean Ethics, in CAG vol. 20, is derived from Adrastus, a generation later. The commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias (appointed to his chair between A.D. 198 and 209) represent the fullest flowering of the Aristotelian tradition. To his successors Alexander was The Commentator par excellence. To give but one example (not from a commentary) of his skill at defending and elaborating Aristotle's views, one might refer to his defence of Aristotle's claim that space is finite against the objection that an edge of space is conceptually problematic. Themistius (fl. late 340s to 384 or 385) saw himself as the inventor of paraphrase, wrongly thinking that the job of commentary was completed. In fact, the Neoplatonists were to introduce new dimensions into commentary. Themistius' own relation to the Neoplatonist as opposed to the Aristotelian tradition is a matter of controversy, but it would be agreed that his commentaries show far less bias than the full-blown Neoplatonist ones. They are also far more informative than the designation 'paraphrase' might suggest, and it has been estimated that Philoponus' Physics commentary draws silently on Themistius six hundred times. The pseudo-Alexandrian commentary on Metaphysics 6-14, of unknown authorship, has been placed by some in the same group of commentaries as being earlier than the fifth century. 3

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Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford 1978), 37, n.3; Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, vol. 2 (Berlin 1984), 323-30. Alexander, Quaestiones 3.12, discussed in my Matter, Space and Motion (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1988). For Alexander see R.W. Sharpies, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias: scholasticism and innovation', in W. Haase (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt, part 2 Principat, vol. 36.2, Philosophic und Wissenschaften (1987). Themistius in An. Post. 1,2-12. See H . J . Blumenthal, 'Photius on Themistius (Cod.74): did Themistius write commentaries on Aristotle?', Hermes 107 (1979), 168-82. For different views, see H . J . Blumenthal, 'Themistius, the last Peripatetic commentator on Aristotle?', in Glen W. Bowersock, Walter Burkert, Michael C . J . Putnam, Arktouros, Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M.W. Knox (Berlin and N.Y., 1979), 391-400; E.P. Mahoney, 'Themistius and the agent intellect in James of Viterbo and other thirteenth-century philosophers: (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant and Henry Bate)', Augustiniana 23 (1973), 422-67, at 428-31; id., 'Neoplatonism, the Greek commentators and Renaissance Aristotelianism', in D . J . O'Meara (ed.), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought (Albany N.Y. 1982), 169-77 and 264-82, esp. n. 1, 264-6; Robert Todd, introduction to translation of Themistius in DA 3.4-8, in Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect, trans. Frederick M . Schroeder and Robert B. Todd (Toronto 1990). H . Vitelli, CAG 17, p. 992, s.v. Themistius. The similarities to Syrianus (died c.437) have suggested to some that it predates Syrianus (most recently Leonardo Taran, review of Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus, 3

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By far the largest group of extant commentaries is that of the Neoplatonists up to the sixth century A.D. Nearly all the major Neoplatonists, apart from Plotinus (the founder of Neoplatonism), wrote commentaries on Aristotle, although those of Iamblichus (c. 250 - c. 325) survive only in fragments, and those of three Athenians, Plutarchus (died 432), his pupil Proclus (410 - 485) and the Athenian Damascius (c. 462 after 538), are lost. As a result of these losses, most of the extant Neoplatonist commentaries come from the late fifth and the sixth centuries and a good proportion from Alexandria. There are commentaries by Plotinus' disciple and editor Porphyry (232 - 309), by Iamblichus' pupil Dexippus (c. 330), by Proclus' teacher Syrianus (died c. 437), by Proclus' pupil Ammonius (435/445 - 517/526), by Ammonius' three pupils Philoponus (c. 490 to 570s), Simplicius (wrote after 532, probably after 538) and Asclepius (sixth century), by Ammonius' next but one successor Olympiodorus (495/505 - after 565), by Elias (fl. 541?), by David (second half of the sixth century, or beginning of the seventh) and by Stephanus (took the chair in Constantinople c. 610). Further, a commentary on the Nieomachean Ethics has been ascribed to Heliodorus of Prusa, an unknown pre-fourteenth-century figure, and there is a commentary by Simplicius' colleague Priscian of Lydia on Aristotle's successor Theophrastus. Of these commentators some of the last were Christians (Philoponus, Elias, David and Stephanus), but they were Christians writing in the Neoplatonist tradition, as was also Boethius who produced a number of commentaries in Latin before his death in 525 or 526. The third group comes from a much later period in Byzantium. The Berlin edition includes only three out of more than a dozen commentators described in Hunger's Byzantinisches Handbuch. The two most important are Eustratius (1050/1060 - c. 1120), and Michael of Ephesus. It has been suggested that these two belong to a circle organised by the princess Anna Comnena in the twelfth century, and accordingly the completion of Michael's commentaries has been redated from 1040 to 1138. His commentaries include areas where gaps had been left. Not all of these gap-fillers are extant, but we have commentaries on the neglected biological works, on the Sophistici Elenchi, and a small fragment of one on the Politics. The lost Rhetoric commentary had a few antecedents, but the Rhetoric too had been comparatively neglected. Another product of this 9

10

11

vol. 1, in Gnomon 46 (1981), 721-50 at 750), to others that it draws on him (most recently P. Thillet, in the Bude edition of Alexander de Fato, p. lvii). Praechter ascribed it to Michael of Ephesus (eleventh or twelfth century), in his review of CAG 22.2, in Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeiger 168 (1906), 861-907. The Iamblichus fragments are collected in Greek by Bent Dalsgaard Larsen, Jamblique de Chalcis, Exegete et Philosophe (Aarhus 1972), vol.2. Most are taken from Simplicius, and will accordingly be translated in due course. The evidence on Damascius' commentaries is given in L . G . Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, vol.2, Damascius (Amsterdam 1977), 11-12; on Proclus' in L . G . Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962), xii, n.22; on Plutarchus' in H . M . Blumenthal, 'Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries', Phronesis 21 (1976), 75. Herbert Hunger, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, vol.1 (-Byzantinisches Handbuch, part 5, vol.1) (Munich 1978), 25-41. See also B.N. Tatakis, La Philosophic Byzantine (Paris 1949). R. Browning, 'An unpublished funeral oration on Anna Comnena', Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society n.s. 8 (1962), 1-12, esp. 6-7. 9

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period may have been the composite commentary on the Nieomachean Ethics (CAG 20) by various hands, including Eustratius and Michael, along with some earlier commentators, and an improvisation for Book 7. Whereas Michael follows Alexander and the conventional Aristotelian tradition, Eustratius' commentary introduces Platonist, Christian and anti-Islamic elements. The composite commentary was to be translated into Latin in the next cen­ tury by Robert Grosseteste in England. But Latin translations of various logi­ cal commentaries were made from the Greek still earlier by James of Venice (fl. c. 1130), a contemporary of Michael of Ephesus, who may have known him in Constantinople. And later in that century other commentaries and works by commentators were being translated from Arabic versions by Gerard of Cremona (died 1187). So the twelfth century resumed the transmission which had been interrupted at Boethius' death in the sixth century. The Neoplatonist commentaries of the main group were initiated by Porphyry. His master Plotinus had discussed Aristotle, but in a very independent way, devoting three whole treatises (Enneads 6.1-3) to attacking Aristotle's classification of the things in the universe into categories. These categories took no account of Plato's world of Ideas, were inferior to Plato's classifications in the Sophist and could anyhow be collapsed, some of them into others. Porphyry replied that Aristotle's categories could apply perfectly well to the world of intelligibles and he took them as in general defensible. He wrote two commentaries on the Categories, one lost, and an introduction to it, the Isagoge, as well as commentaries, now lost, on a number of other Aristotelian works. This proved decisive in making Aristotle a necessary subject for Neoplatonist lectures and commentary. Proclus, who was an exceptionally quick student, is said to have taken two years over his Aristotle studies, which were called 12

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R. Browning, op. cit. H.D.P. Mercken, The Greek Commentaries of the Nieomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Grosseteste, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI 1 (Leiden 1973), ch.l, T h e compilation of Greek commentaries on Aristotle's Nieomachean Ethics'. Sten Ebbesen, 'Anonymi Aurelianensis I Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos', Cahiers de I'lnstitut Moyen Age Grecque et Latin 34 (1979), 'Boethius, Jacobus Veneticus, Michael Ephesius and "Alexander"', pp. v-xiii; id., Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, 3 parts, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, vol. 7 (Leiden 1981); A . Preus, Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus on the Movement and Progression of Animals (Hildesheim 1981), introduction. For Grosseteste, see Mercken as in n. 12. For James of Venice, see Ebbesen as in n. 12, and L. Minio-Paluello, 'Jacobus Veneticus Grecus', Traditio 8 (1952), 265-304; id., 'Giacomo Veneto e l'Aristotelismo Latino', in Pertusi (ed.), Venezia e TOriente fra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento (Florence 1966), 53-74, both reprinted in his Opuscula (1972). For Gerard of Cremona, see M . Steinschneider, Die europaischen tfbersetzungen aus dem arabischen bis Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts (repr. Graz 1956); E . Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London 1955), 235-6 and more generally 181-246. For the translators in general, see Bernard G. Dod, 'Aristoteles Latinus', in N . Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J . Pinborg (eds). The Cambridge History of Latin Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge 1982). See P. Hadot, 'L'harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Categories', in Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Rome 1974), 31-47; A . C . Lloyd, 'Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic', Phronesis 1 (1955-6), 58-79 and 146-60. 1 2

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Appendix

the Lesser Mysteries, and which preceded the Greater Mysteries of Plato. By the time of Ammonius, the commentaries reflect a teaching curriculum which begins with Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories, and is explicitly said to have as its final goal a (mystical) ascent to the supreme Neoplatonist deity, the O n e . The curriculum would have progressed from Aristotle to Plato, and would have culminated in Plato's Timaeus and Parmenides. The latter was read as being about the One, and both works were established in this place in the curriculum at least by the time of Iamblichus, if not earlier. Before Porphyry, it had been undecided how far a Platonist should accept Aristotle's scheme of categories. But now the proposition began to gain force that there was a harmony between Plato and Aristotle on most things. Not for the only time in the history of philosophy, a perfectly crazy proposition proved philosophically fruitful. The views of Plato and of Aristotle had both to be transmuted into a new Neoplatonist philosophy in order to exhibit the supposed harmony. Iamblichus denied that Aristotle contradicted Plato on the theory of Ideas. This was too much for Syrianus and his pupil Proclus. While accepting harmony in many areas, they could see that there was disagreement on this issue and also on the issue of whether God was causally responsible for the existence of the ordered physical cosmos, which Aristotle denied. But even on these issues, Proclus' pupil Ammonius was to claim harmony, and, though the debate was not clear cut, his claim was on the whole to prevail. Aristotle, he maintained, accepted Plato's Ideas, at least in the form of principles (logoi) in the divine intellect, and these principles were in turn causally responsible for the beginningless existence of the physical universe. Ammonius wrote a whole book to show that 15

16

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19

20

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22

Marinus, Life of Proclus ch.13,157,41 (Boissonade). The introductions to the Isagoge by Ammonius, Elias and David, and to the Categories by Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus and Elias are discussed by L . G . Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena and I. Hadot, 'Les Introductions', see n. 2 above. Proclus inAlcibiadem 1 p. 11 (Creuzer); Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena, ch. 26, 12f. For the Neoplatonist curriculum see Westerink, Festugiere, P. Hadot and I. Hadot in n. 2. See e.g. P. Hadot (1974), as in n. 14 above; H . J . Blumenthal, 'Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries', Phronesis 21 (1976), 64-87; H.A. Davidson, T h e principle that a finite body can contain only finite power', in S. Stein and R. Loewe (eds), Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History presented to A. Altmann (Alabama 1979), 75-92; Carlos Steel, 'Proclus et Aristote', Proceedings of the Congres Proclus held in Pans 1985, J . Pepin and H.D. Saffrey (eds), Proclus, lecteur et interprete des anciens (Paris 1987), 213-25; Koenraad Verrycken, God en Wereld in de Wijsbegeerte van Ioannes Philoponus, Ph.D. Diss. (Louvain 1985). Iamblichus ap. Elian in Cat. 123,1-3. Syrianus in Metaph. 80,4-7; Proclus in Tim. 1.6,21-7,16. Asclepius sometimes accepts Syranius' interpretation (in Metaph. 433,9-436,6); which is, however, qualified, since Syrianus thinks Aristotle is really committed willy-nilly to much of Plato's view (in Metaph. 117,25-118,11; ap. Asclepium in Metaph. 433,16; 450,22); Philoponus repents of his early claim that Plato is not the target of Aristotle's attack, and accepts that Plato is rightly attacked for treating ideas as independent entities outside the divine Intellect (in DA 37,18-31; in Phys. 225,4-226,11; contra Prod. 26,24-32,13; in An. Post. 242,14-243,25). Asclepius in Metaph. from the voice of (i.e. from the lectures of) Ammonius 69,17-21; 71,28; cf. Zacharias Ammonius, Patrologia Graeca vol. 85, col. 952 (Colonna). 1 5 1 6

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Aristotle's God was thus an efficient cause, and though the book is lost, some of its principal arguments are preserved by Simplicius. This tradition helped to make it possible for Aquinas to claim Aristotle's God as a Creator, albeit not in the sense of giving the universe a beginning, but in the sense of being causally responsible for its beginningless existence. Thus what started as a desire to harmonise Aristotle with Plato finished by making Aristotle safe for Christianity. In Simplicius, who goes further than anyone, it is a formally stated duty of the commentator to display the harmony of Plato and Aristotle in most things. Philoponus, who with his independent mind had thought better of his earlier belief in harmony, is castigated by Simplicius for neglecting this duty. The idea of harmony was extended beyond Plato and Aristotle to Plato and the Presocratics. Plato's pupils Speusippus and Xenocrates saw Plato as being in the Pythagorean tradition. From the third to first centuries B.C., pseudo-Pythagorean writings present Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines as if they were the ideas of Pythagoras and his pupils, and these forgeries were later taken by the Neoplatonists as genuine. Plotinus saw the Presocratics as precursors of his own views, but Iamblichus went far beyond him by writing ten volumes on Pythagorean philosophy. Thereafter Proclus sought to unify the whole of Greek philosophy by presenting it as a continuous clarification of divine revelation, and Simplicius argued for the same general unity in order to rebut Christian charges of contradictions in pagan philosophy. Later Neoplatonist commentaries tend to reflect their origin in a teaching curriculum: from the time of Philoponus, the discussion is often divided up into lectures, which are subdivided into studies of doctrine and of text. A general account of Aristotle's philosophy is prefixed to the Categories commentaries and divided, according to a formula of Proclus, into ten questions. It is here that commentators explain the eventual purpose of studying Aristotle (ascent to the One) and state (if they do) the requirement of displaying the harmony of Plato and Aristotle. After the ten-point introduction to Aristotle, the Categories is given a six-point introduction, whose antecedents go back earlier than Neoplatonism, and which requires 23

24

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26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

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Simplicius in Phys. 1361,11-1363,12. See H.A. Davidson; Carlos Steel; Koenraad Verrycken in n.18 above. See Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (London and Ithaca N.Y. 1988), ch. 15. See e.g. H . J . Blumenthal in n. 18 above. Simplicius in Cat. 7,23-32. Simplicius in Cael. 84,11-14; 159,2-9. On Philoponus' volte face see n. 21 above. See e.g. Walter Burkert, Weisheit und Wissenschaft (Ntirnberg 1962), translated as Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Cambridge Mass. 1972), 83-96. See Holger Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean writings of the Hellenistic Period (Abo 1961); Thomas Alexander Szlezak, Pseudo-Archytas ilber die Kategorien, Peripatoi vol. 4 (Berlin and New York 1972). Plotinus e.g. 4.8.1; 5.1.8 (10-27); 5.1.9. See Dominic O'Meara, Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in late Antiquity (Oxford 1989). See Christian Guerard, Tarmenide d'Elee selon les Neoplatoniciens', forthcoming. Simplicius in Phys. 28,32-29,5; 640,12-18. Such thinkers as Epicurus and the Sceptics, however, were not subject to harmonisation. See the literature in n. 2 above. ap. Elian in Cat. 107,24-6. 2 3

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Appendix

the commentator to find a unitary theme or scope (skopos) for the treatise. The arrangements for late commentaries on Plato are similar. Since the Plato commentaries form part of a single curriculum they should be studied alongside those on Aristotle. Here the situation is easier, not only because the extant corpus is very much smaller, but also because it has been comparatively well served by French and English translators. Given the theological motive of the curriculum and the pressure to harmonise Plato with Aristotle, it can be seen how these commentaries are a major source for Neoplatonist ideas. This in turn means that it is not safe to extract from them the fragments of the Presocratics, or of other authors, without making allowance for the Neoplatonist background against which the fragments were originally selected for discussion. For different reasons, analogous warnings apply to fragments preserved by the pre-Neoplatonist commentator Alexander It will be another advantage of the present translations that they will make it easier to check the distorting effect of a commentator's background. Although the Neoplatonist commentators conflate the views of Aristotle with those of Neoplatonism, Philoponus alludes to a certain convention when he quotes Plutarchus expressing disapproval of Alexander for expounding his own philosophical doctrines in a commentary on Aristotle. But this does not stop Philoponus from later inserting into his own commentaries on the Physics and Meteorology his arguments in favour of the Christian view of Creation. Of course, the commentators also wrote independent works of their own, in which their views are expressed independently of the exegesis of Aristotle. Some of these independent works will be included in the present series of translations. The distorting Neoplatonist context does not prevent the commentaries from being incomparable guides to Aristotle. The introductions to Aristotle's philosophy insist that commentators must have a minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus, and this they certainly have. Commentators are also enjoined neither to accept nor reject what Aristotle says too readily, but to consider it in depth and without partiality. The commentaries draw one's attention to hundreds of phrases, sentences and ideas in Aristotle, which one could easily have passed over, however often one read him. The scholar who makes the right allowance for the distorting context will learn far more about Aristotle than he would be likely to on his own. The relations of Neoplatonist commentators to the Christians were subtle. Porphyry wrote a treatise explicitly against the Christians in 15 books, but an order to burn it was issued in 448, and later Neoplatonists 36

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English: Calcidius in Tim. (parts by van Winden; den Boeft); Iamblichus fragments (Dillon); Proclus in Tim. (Thomas Taylor); Proclus in Parm. (Dillon); Proclus in Parm., end of 7th book, from the Latin (Klibansky, Labowsky, Anscombe); Proclus in Alcib. 1 (O'Neill); Olympiodorus and Damascius in Phaedonem (Westerink); Damascius in Philebum (Westerink); Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Westerink). See also extracts in Thomas Taylor, The Works of Plato, 5 vols. (1804). French: Proclus in Tim. and in Rempublicam (Festugiere); in Parm. (Chaignet); Anon, in Parm. (P. Hadot); Damascius in Parm. (Chaignet). For Alexander's treatment of the Stoics, see Robert B. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics (Leiden 1976), 24-9. Philoponus in DA 21,20-3. 3 6

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were more circumspect. Among the last commentators in the main group, we have noted several Christians. Of these the most important were Boethius and Philoponus. It was Boethius' programme to transmit Greek learning to Latin-speakers. By the time of his premature death by execution, he had provided Latin translations of Aristotle's logical works, together with commentaries in Latin but in the Neoplatonist style on Porphyry's Isagoge and on Aristotle's Categories and de Interpretation, and interpretations of the Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics and Sophistici Elenchi. The interruption of his work meant that knowledge of Aristotle among Latinspeakers was confined for many centuries to the logical works. Philoponus is important both for his proofs of the Creation and for his progressive replacement of Aristotelian science with rival theories, which were taken up at first by the Arabs and came fully into their own in the West only in the sixteenth century. Recent work has rejected the idea that in Alexandria the Neoplatonists compromised with Christian monotheism by collapsing the distinction between their two highest deities, the One and the Intellect. Simplicius (who left Alexandria for Athens) and the Alexandrians Ammonius and Asclepius appear to have acknowledged their beliefs quite openly, as later did the Alexandrian Olympiodorus, despite the presence of Christian students in their classes. The teaching of Simplicius in Athens and that of the whole pagan Neoplatonist school there was stopped by the Christian Emperor Justinian in 529. This was the very year in which the Christian Philoponus in Alexandria issued his proofs of Creation against the earlier Athenian Neoplatonist Proclus. Archaeological evidence has been offered that, after their temporary stay in Ctesiphon (in present-day Iraq), the Athenian Neoplatonists did not return to their house in Athens, and further evidence has been offered that Simplicius went to Harran (Carrhae), in present-day Turkey near the Iraq border. Wherever he went, his commentaries are a treasure house of information about the preceding thousand years of Greek philosophy, information which he painstakingly recorded after the closure in Athens, and which would otherwise have been lost. He had every reason to feel bitter about Christianity, and in fact he sees it and Philoponus, its representative, as irreverent. They deny the divinity of the heavens and prefer the physical relics of dead martyrs. His own commentaries by 39

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For Simplicius, see I. Hadot, Le Probleme du Neoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hierocles et Simplicius (Paris 1978); for Ammonius and Asclepius, Koenraad Verrycken, God en Wereld in de Wijsbegeerte van Ioannes Philoponus, Ph.D. Diss. (Louvain 1985); for Olympiodorus, L . G . Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962). Alison Frantz, 'Pagan philosophers in Christian Athens', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 119 (1975), 29-38; M . Tardieu, Temoins orientaux du Premier Alcibiade a Harran et a Nag 'Hammadi', Journal Asiatique 274 (1986); id., 'Les calendriers en usage a Harran d'apres les sources arabes et le commentaire de Simplicius a la Physique d'Aristote', in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin 1987), 40-57; id., Coutumes nautiques mesopotamiennes chez Simplicius, in preparation. The opposing view that Simplicius returned to Athens is most fully argued by Alan Cameron, 'The last days of the Academy at Athens', Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 195, n.s. 15 (1969), 7-29. Simplicius in Cael. 26,4-7; 70,16-18; 90,1-18; 370,29-371,4. See on his whole attitude Philippe Hoffmann, 'Simplicius' polemics', in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection ofAristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987). 3 9

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Appendix

contrast culminate in devout prayers. Two collections of articles by various hands have been published, to make the work of the commentators better known. The first is devoted to Philoponus; the second is about the commentators in general, and goes into greater detail on some of the issues briefly mentioned here. 42

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Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987). Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1990). The lists of texts and previous translations of the commentaries included in Wildberg, Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World (pp.l2ff.) are not included here. The list of translations should be augmented by: F.L.S. Bridgman, Heliodorus (?) in Ethica Nicomachea, London 1807. I am grateful for comments to Henry Blumenthal, Victor Caston, I. Hadot, Paul Mercken, Alain Segonds, Robert Sharpies, Robert Todd, L . G . Westerink and Christian Wildberg. 4 2

4 3

Bibliography

D. M . Balme, Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium and De Generatione Animalium. Translated with notes by D . M . Balme, Oxford 1972. W. Bohm, Johannes Philoponos, ausgewdhlte Schriften, Munich, Paderborn, Vienna 1967. H . Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, Graz 1955. W. Charlton, Aristotle's Physics, Books I and II. Translated with Introduction and Notes by W. Charlton, Oxford 1970. [All references to Charlton in the present book are to this work. But see also his 'Prime Matter: a Rejoinder', Phronesis 28, 1983,177-80.] J . M . Cooper, 'Hypothetical Necessity and Natural Teleology' in A. Gotthelf and J . G . Lennox (eds), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, 243-74, Oxford 1987. F. M . Cornford, [See P.H. Wicksteed.] H . Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, siebente Auflage herausgegeben von W. Kranz, Berlin 1954. [Virtual reprint of fifth edition, 1934-7.] J . Hintikka, Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality, Oxford 1973. [See esp. ch. 5 'Aristotle on the realisation of possibilities in time', with pp. 210-13 on Aristotle's reasons for holding the principle of plenitude.] R. Hirzel, 'Ein Rhetor Protarchos', Hermes 10,1876,254-5. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge 1987. E . M . Macierowski and R.F. Hassing, 'John Philoponus on Aristotle's Definition of Nature: A Translation from the Greek with Introduction and Notes', Ancient Philosophy 8,1988, 73-100. J . E . McGuire, 'Philoponus on Physics ii 1: and the Motion of the Simple Bodies', Ancient Philosophy 5,1985,241-67. J.S. Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1956 [1st ed. 1843]. G. E . L . Owen (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics, Oxford 1968. G. Patzig, Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism, translated by J . Barnes, Dordrecht 1969 [German original 1959]. A.S. Riginos, Platonica: the Anecdotes concerning the Life and Writings of Plato, Leiden 1976. H . M . Robinson, 'Prime Matter in Aristotle', Phronesis 19,1974,168-88. W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics: a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1936. S. Sambursky, The Physical World of Late Antiquity, London 1962. F. H . Sandbach, 'Ennoia and Prolepsis in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge' in A.A. Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicism, London 1971. R. Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection ofAristotelian Science, London 1987. R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel, London 1988. D . E . Stahl, 'Stripped Away: Some Contemporary Observations Surrounding Metaphysics Z 3 (1029al0-26)', Phronesis 26,1981,177-80. K Verrycken, T h e Development of Philoponus' Thought and its Chronology' in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London, Ithaca N.Y. 1990,233-74. S. Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's Physics: A Philosophical Study, Oxford 1982.

199

200

Bibliography

S. Waterlow, Passage and Possibility: A Study of Aristotle's Modal Concepts, Oxford 1982. P.H. Wicksteed and F . M . Cornford, Aristotle: The Physics, London and Cambridge (Ma.) 1957. D. Wiggins, 'Deliberation and Practical Reason' in A . O . Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1980,221-40. C. Wildberg, 'Prolegomena to the Study of Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem' in Sorabji 1987,197-209. L . G . Westerink (ed.), Olympiodorus, In Platonis Gorgiam commentaria, Leipzig 1970. C.J.F. Williams, Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione. Translated with notes by C.J.F. Williams, Oxford 1982. M . Wolff, Fallgesetz und Massbegriff, Berlin 1971. [See Erste Unternehmung, Kapitel III: 'Die Aufhebung des kosmologischen Gegensatzes zwischen "naturwidrig" und "naturgemass"', 53-67.]

English-Greek Glossary

absolute: haplous absolutely: haplds,pantelds abstract: aposulan abstraction: aphairesis absurd: atopos accident: sumbebekos, sumptdma accidental: ek sumptdmatos accompanying feature: sumbainon accomplice: sunerithos accomplished: teleios account: logos account of the causes: aitiologia accuracy: akribeia accurately: akribds act, action: praxis acted upon, be: energeisthai active: energos active, be: energein activity: energeia actual(ly): energeiai actual, be: energein actual consequence: episumban actuality: energeia addressed to the matter in hand: pragmateiddes advantage: khreia affinity, have an: sumpaskhein affirmative: kataphatikos agent: poidn aim: skopos all by itself; auto katK hauto all by themselves: auta kath'hauta all-embracing: epi pantos all in all: holds alter: metaballein alteration: metabole altogether: holds analogous: analogos analogy: analogia animal: zdion animal-itself: autozdion animate: empsukhos ancient: arkhaios,palaios anomaly: akatallelon apart: ididi

apparent: phainomenos appear together: sunemphainesthai apply (intr.): harmozein apply (trans.): metapherein,pherein, prosaptein prostithenai appropriate: oikeios area of study: pragmateia argue: epikheirein argument: epikheirema, logos argumentation: epikheiresis art: tekhne art, against: para tekhn&n art, by: apo tekhnes, tekhnei artifact: tekhneton artificial: apo tekhnes, skeuastos artist: tekhnites artistic: tekhnikos ask: apaitein, zetein Assembly: ekklesia assert: legein phanai associate: epikoindnein assurance; pistis at all: holds atmosphere: periekhon attain: tunkhanein attention: epistasis attention to, pay: phrontizein attribute: pathos axiom: axidma t

y

bad-doing: kakopragia balance: summetria become: ginesthai being: einai, ousia belief: doxa believe: nomizein belong: huparkhein belong to, further: prosuparkhein belong in: enuparkhein besouled; empsukhos birth: genesis blended: miktos blended together: summiktos bodiless: asdmatos bodily: sdmatikos

201

202

English-Greek Glossary

body: soma book: biblion, logos born, be; ginesthai branch of knowledge: episteme bring: agein, anapherein, kinein, pherein bring about: paragein bring down: katapherein bring in: pareiskuklein bring to completion: apergazesthai, apotelein calculate in addition, add calculation: proslogizesthai calculation: logismos call to witness; martureisthai capacity: dunamis cause: aitia, aition, aitios caused: aitiatos cause motion: kinein cause to appear: ergazesthai celestial: ouranios certainly: pantos chance (noun): tukhe chance (verb): tunkhanein chance things: ta kata tukhen change (noun): kinesis change (intr.): kineisthai changeless: akinitos change qualitatively: alloioun changing, liable to change: kinetikos characterise: kharakterizein choice, rational choice: proairesis choice-dependent: proairetikos chosen: proairetos circuit: periodos classify: katatattein coincide: sumpheresthai, suntrekhein coinciding in name: homonumos combination: sunthesis come about, come to be: ginesthai come to be in advance: proginesthai comes to be, thing that: ginomenos coming to be, realm of coming to be: genesis commensurable: summetros commentator: exegetes common: koinos compel: anankazein complete: teleios complete the composition of: sumplerein completion: sumplerdsis compose: suntithenai composed, be: sunkeisthai composite: sunkeimenos, sunthetos compound (verb): sumplekein compound, compounded: sumpeplegmenos, sunthetos

compounding: sumploke conceive of: hupolambanein conception: ennoia concern, be concerned with: kataginesthai conclude: sumperainesthai, teleutan conclusion: apoteleutesis, sumperasma, theorema conclusions, draw: sullogizein condition: pathos conjecture: huponoein conjunction: sundesmos consequent: akolouthos consequent on, be: episumbainein consider: episkeptesthai, episkopein, hegeisthai consideration: episkepsis consistent: akolouthos construct: kataskeuazein, poieisthai construction: kataskeue contingently: endekhomends continuity: sunekheia continuous: sunekhes continuous fashion, in a: kata sunekheian contrapositive: antistrophe contrariwise: empalin contrary: antikeimenon, enantion contrary, on the: anapalin contrast (noun): antithesis contrast (verb): antidiairein contribute: sumballesthai contributory cause: sunaitios convention: thesis convert: antistrephein corollary: porisma correct: orthos correlative: sustoikhos cosmic: kosmikos cosmic arrangement: diakosmesis cosmos: kosmos craft (verb): demiourgein craftsman: demiourgos, tekhnites create: poiein creator: ergatis custom: nomos define: diorizein, horizein definition: horismos, horos, logos definition, of, definitional: horistikos deliberate: bouleuein deliberating: bouleusis deliberation: boule demand: apaitein demiurge: demiourgos demonstrate: apodeiknunai demonstration: apodeixis

English-Greek Glossary demonstrations, on: apodeiktikos depend on: artasthai dependent on, be: paruphistasthai deprived of, be: stereisthai derive: paragein descend: kataduein description: logos designate: prosagoreuein desirable: ephetos desire: (noun): orexis desire (verb): agapan desired: orektos desire to, with the: thelein destroy: phtheirein destruction: phthora determinate, be: horisthai, horizesthai determination: epikrisis determine: horizein deviation: parektrope, plane difference, differentia: diaphora directed at: pros discourse about: dialegesthai discover: gnorizein, gnoristikos einai, heuriskein discuss: dialegesthai discussion: logos discriminate: diakrinein disjunctive: diairetikos disposition: diathesis distinction: diakrisis distinguish: diairein, diakrinein distinguishing: diairesis distinguishing mark: diakrisis divide: diairein, diakrinein divide further: epidiairein divine: theios division: diairesis doubtful: amphibolos draw: agein effective: drastikos efficient: poietikos element: stoikheion embody: energein encompass: perilambanein end: teleute, telos end, (leads) to the: pros to telos endless motion, in: aeikinetos end-state: telos endure throughout: epidiamenein engineer: poieisthai entirely: pantei equate: agein eis t'auta equivalent: paraplesios essence: ousia, ti en einai, ti esti establish: kataskeuazein establishing: kataskeue

203

eternal: aidios eternally moved: aeikinetos eternity: aidion, aidiotes every case, in: pantos evidence: marturia exceptionally: (hos) ep'elatton exercise: energein exist: einai, huparkhein existence: einai expectation, beyond: paralogos experience, be experienced: paskhein explanation: exegesis expound: ektithenai expound previously: proektithenai extend: diateinein, diistasthai extended: diastatos extraordinary: thaumastos fail: apotunkhanein family: genos fashion: ergazesthai, skhimatizein, tektainesthai fault: hamartia fault, be at: sphallesthai feature of, be a: sumbainein figure: morphe figure, give a: morphoun figure (of syllogism): skhema filling out: sumplerotikos final: telikos first: proteros, protos first, very: protistos fit: harmozein, prosarmozein fitness: axia fit onto: epharmozein fitted: prosphues fixed, be: histasthai follow: akolouthein, parepesthai follow after: epakolouthein follow on, be a feature that follows: parakolouthein forethought: pronoia form, be formative of: eidopoiein form (noun): eidos Form (Platonic): idea form (verb): sunistanai formal: eidikos formative causation: eidopoiia formless: aneideos formula: logos for the sake of something: heneka tou for the sake of which: hou heneka for which: hoi foundation for, lay the: kataskeuazein from which: ex hou fruitlessly: maten function: ergon

204

English-Greek Glossary

fusing: sunagoge generable, generated: genetos general: katholikos generally, in general: katholou general sense, in a more: koinoteron general usage: sunetheia generate: gennan generating, generation: genesis generation, in the process of: ginomenos generative: gennetikos generic: genikos genus: genos goal: prothesis go all through: epexerkhesthai good order, in: erromenos go on to: meterkhesthai go right through: diexerkhesthai govern: arkhein go wrong: hamartanein grow (intr.): phuesthai habit: sunetheia habitual: sunethes happen: tunkhanein happen, happen to be a feature of: sumbainein happiness: eudaimonia happy: eudaimon having small parts: leptomeres hear: akouein heaven: ouranos heavenly: ouranios heavens: ourania heterogeneous: anomoiomeris hidden in, be: kataduein higher sciences: gndsis hold true of: sumbainein hold true of additionally: episumbainein holding together: sunektikos holds true of, what: sumbainon homoeomery: homoiomereia homogeneous: homoiomeres homonymously: homonumos horse-itself: autoippos humour (med.): khumos hypothesise: enupotithenai hypothetical: hupothetikos hypothetical(ly): ex hupotheseds ignorance: agnoia ignorant, be: agnoein ill-doing: duspragia image: eikdn imitate: mimeisthai immanent: enuparkhdn implicit in, be: prokeisthai

impose: epitithenai imposed upon, be: epikeisthai impulse: horme in and of itself: auto hatKhauto inanimate: apsukhos inappropriate: anoikeios inartistic: atekhnos inborn: emphutos inclination: rhope inclusive: periekhon incompositeness: asunthesia inconsistent: enantion independent: apolelumenos indeterminate: abristos indicate: episemeiousthai indicate, come to: episemainesthai individual: idios individually: kat'idian induction: epagoge infer: sunagein infinite: apeiros informed: eidopepoiemenos in itself: kath'hauto innate: sumphues inseparable: akhoristos instrument: organon instrumental: organikos intellect: nous intend: mellein, protithenai intention: apotasis, pronoia intermediate: mesos inversely: anapalin irrational: alogos irrationality: alogia is to be: dei kind: eidos, genos kinship: sungeneia know: eidenai, ginoskein, gnostikos einai, noein knowable: epistetos knowledge: eidesis, episteme, gndsis knowledge, with special: epistemon laid down previously, be: proiipokeisthai last (term): eskhatos lead: agein learn: manthanein life: zoe life, by way of: zotikbs like (verb): thelein likely: eikos logical: logikos logical argument: sullogismos look at: skopein look at, we must: skepteon luck, bad: dustukhia

English-Greek Glossary luck, good: eutukhia luckless: atukhes lucky: eutukhes made or done: praktos make: poein make out: stokhazesthai manage: dioikein manifest: enarges, tranes man-itself: autoanthropos manner: tropos many ways, in, as having many senses: pollakhds marvel (verb): thaumazein marvellous: thaumastos mass: holotes material: enulos, hulikos mathematical, mathematician: mathematikos mathematical argument, mathematical science: mathema matter: hule matterless: aiilos mean: legein, phanai, thelein mediate: mesos medicine, art of: iatrike mental abilities: psukhe method: methodos middle term (of syllogism): mesos mind: nous mind, have in: noein mistake: hamartia mixed: kratheis mixture: krasis mode: tropos mode of behaviour: energeia more of a cause: aitioteros motion: phora moulding: diaplastikos move (intr.): kineisthai move (trans.): kinein movement: kinesis moving (trans.): kinetikos name: onoma natural: phusikos natural, be, be of a nature: phuein natural philosopher: phusikos natural philosophy: phusike naturally: eikotos naturally, in a natural way: phusikos naturally tend towards: neneukenai nature: phusis nature, according to: kata phusin nature, by: phusei nature, have a: phusin ekhein naturing: phusansis

205

necessary: anankaios necessary that, it is: ananke necessity: anankaion, ananke necessity, out of: ex anankes need: ananke, khreia needed: anankaios negative: apophatikos normal(ly): (hos) epi to polu not absolutely every: ou pan haplds not at all: ou pantos not entirely: ou pantos now (French 'or'): men oun obscure: aphanes obscurity: asapheia observe: katanoein, theorem obvious at the start: prodelon occupy: katekhein occur: ginesthai opinion: doxa, logos oppose: antidiastellein opposite: enantion oppositely: enantios order (noun): taxis order (verb): tattein ordering of sequence: akolouthesis organisation: rhuthmos origin: arkhe original: protos outcome: apoban outgrowth: ekphusis outline: morphe own: oikeios paradigm: paradeigma paronymously: paronumos partake: metekhein particular, concerned with particulars: merikos pass away: apoginesthai passing away: phthora pattern: idea peculiar feature, peculiar quality: idiotes per accidens: kata sumbebekos perception: aisthesis perceptible: aisthetikos perfect: teleios perfecting: teleidtikos perhaps: mepote, tukhon perish: phtheiresthai perishable: that perish: phthartos per se: kath' hauto persist: hupomenein person, personality: prosopon persuade: pistoun philosopher: philosophos philosophy: philosophia

206

English-Greek Glossary

place: topos place, in: topikos planning: epinoia plausible: pithanos posit: tithenai position, positioning: thesis possible: dunaton possible, be: enkhdrein posterior: husteros, husterds postulate (noun): hupothesis postulate (verb): hupotithenai potentiality, potential(ly): dunamis potential, thing that is: dunaton power: dunamis power, in our: eph'himin precise: akribes precise, be: akribologein predicate (verb): katigorein pre-exist: prouparkhein premise: protasis prescription: nomos presence: parousia present: ektithenai preserve: soizein, stegein presumably: depou primary: protos principle: arkhi, logos principle of selection: apoklirdsis prior (to): pro, proteros prior to, be, exist: proegeisthai privation: sterisis problem: problema process: hodos produce: poiein producing agent: poidn producer: poietis product: apotelesma productive: poietikos proof: deixis, elenkhos proper: oikeios proper account, proper principle: logos property: ousia, sumbebikos property in, of, be a: huparkhein property, special: idion proportion: analogia propose: proteinein proposed, be, be someone's task: prokeisthai proposition: apophansis provide: poieisthai providence: pronoia proximate: prosekhis pseudonymously: pseuddnumos pure: eilikrines purpose: khreia purposeful: skopimos purpose, on: exepitides

pursue: stokhazesthai, zitein put together: sunistanai puzzle: aporia puzzled, be: aporein puzzled, be further: prosaporein qua: hei qualitative: alloiotikos qualitative change: alloidsis qualitatively changed, be: alloiousthai qualitatively different: alloioteros quality: poion qualityless: apoios quantity: poson random, at: matin rank: taxis ratio: logos rational: logikos rational account: logos real, be: huphistasthai realise: eidenai reality: huparxis, hupostasis reality, in: tdi onti really: ontds reason: dianoia, logismos reasonable: eikotos, eulogos reasonably: eikotos, eulogds reason about: logizesthai reasoning: dianoia reason why: dia ti rebuttal: apantisis recipe: logos reckon in: logizesthai recognise: gindskein, eidenai recourse to, have: katapherein reduce: anagein refer: anagein, anapherein reflection: epilogismos refutation: elenkhos refute: anairein, elenkhein regard: theorem related: paraplisios relation: logos, skhesis relation to, have a: paskhein relevant: prosekhis remarkable: thaumastos remote: porro removal: anairesis repeat: analambanein reputable: endoxos rest: iremia rest, be at: iremein rest, coming to: iremisis result (noun): ekbasis, sumbainon, sumban, sumbebikos result (verb): ekbainein, ginesthai

English-Greek Glossary reverse of, the, in the reverse order: anapalin reverse, the: empalin reverse (verb): antistrephein rightly: kalds rotation: periphora same kind, of the: homoeidis seek: ephiesthai, thelein seem: dokein, eoikenai seem right: dokein select: eklambanein, hairein, paralambanein self-evidence: enargeia self-evident: autopistos, enarges self-standing: authupostatos self-sufficient: diarkis sense: logos senselessness: anoiton senses: nous separate (adj.): khoristos separate (trans.): diistanai, khorizein separation: diastasis sequence: akolouthia, suntaxis set apart: apokrinein set forth: exigeisthai set out: proerkhesthai set up: kathistanai shape (noun): skhima shape (verb): skhematizein show: deiknunai sign: semeion significance: semasia signification, thing signified: semainomenon signify: semainein, semantikos einai simply: haplos so: oun solution: epilusis soul: psukhe sound: hugies source: arkhi speak as a student of nature: phusiologein speak as a theologian: theologein speak without qualification, to: haplos species: eidos specific: eidikos, merikos specification, further: prosdidrismos specific sense, in the: idikos specify: didrizein sphere of the fixed stars: aplanis spirit: pneuma spontaneity: (t')automaton spontaneously: apo, ek, t'automatou stability: stasis stable: bebaios

207

standing on their own: auta katK hauta standing still: stasis starting-point: aphormai, arkhi state: legein statement: logos state of affairs: sustasis state of rest: stasis static, stationary: hestds straightforwardly: proigoumends strict: kurios strictly, in the strict sense: kurios strive after: ephiesthai stronger, superior: kreittdn structure: sustasis student of nature: phusiologos study: thedria study of nature: phusiologia style: lexis subject: hupokeimenos subject of, be the: paskhein subject to, be: peponthenai subsistence: huparxis substance: ousia substantial: ousiddes substantialise: ousioun substantively existing: enupostatos substrate: hupokeimenos succeed: katorthoun succession: diadokhe sufficient: autarkis sufficient, be: arkein suitable: epitideios suited: prepdn, prosekdn supernatural: daimonios supernatural, rather: daimonidteros supervene: epiginesthai supplementary: ephexis suppose: hupokeisthai surprised, be: thaumazein syllogise, conclude syllogistically: sullogizein syllogism, syllogistic argument: sullogismos symmetry: summetria take away: aphairein take in addition, take into account: paralambanein take place: ginesthai take up: analambanein take up together: sunanalambanein tendency: rhopi term: horos, morion termination: eskhaton theologian: theologos theorising: thedria

208

English-Greek Glossary

therefore: ara thing: pragma thing(s) which is (are): on, onta think of: epinoein think of as well, together: sunepinoein think of, further: prosepinoein thought: dianoia, epinoia thought, be: dokein totality: holotes tout court: haplos transfer: metabainein transform: metaballein translocation: metabatike kinesis treatise: akroasis, pragmateia true: alethes type: genos, tropos unalterable: ametabletos unclear: adelos underlying (subject), what underlies: hupokeimenos understand: akouein, exakouein, manthanein, noein^prosupakouein unextended: adiastatos universal: katholou universe: pan unlucky: dustukhes unlucky, be: atukhein unmoved: akinetos unorganised: arrhuthmistos unqualified sense, in an: haplos unstable: abebaios

unsuitable: anepitedeios usage: khresis useful: khresimos use, put to use: khresthai vain, in: skholei vice versa: empalin visual phenomenon: opsis vortical motion: peridinesis want: boulesthai, thelein way of life: ethos weaker: kheiron weakness: astheneia well-doing: eupragia, eupraxia which, from: ex hou which, in accordance with: katK ho, which, in respect of: katK ho, katho which, of: hou which, on account of: di' ho whole: holos whole, as a: holikos wisdom: phronesis wish: boulesthai, thelein with respect to: pros wonder: thaumazein wont, be: agapan word: onoma wording: lexis world-ordering: kosmopoiia wrought: eirgasmenos

Greek-English Index

References are to the page and line numbers of Vitelli's edition in volume 16 of the Berlin CAG. The purpose of this index is to show what English equivalents I have used for a given Greek term. It provides at least specimen references, but the degree of completeness varies, even when I have not used the word 'passim'. With rare exceptions, such as some prepositional phrases, only single terms are listed; to find, e.g., occurrences of koine ennoia the reader should consult those references common to koinos and ennoia. Comparatives and superlatives are only sometimes mentioned separately from their positives. abakion, abacus, 202,29; 212,9 abebaios, unstable, 276,8.25; 280,18.19.22 adelos, unclear, 266,6 adiairetos, indivisible, 211,24 adiakopos, without interruption, 235,26; 236,8 adiastatos, unextended, 226,4 aeikinetos, in endless motion, 198,11; eternally moved, 303,1.4 agapan, be wont to, 319,3.12; desire, 237,4 agein, bring, 196,4; 236,20; 303,8; 304,28; 320,23; draw, 299,2.13; lead, 216,8; 236,4; 321,12 agein eis t*auton, equate, 210,11; 212,15; 218,1; 320,23 agnoein, be ignorant of, 229,31; 263,25.26 agnoia, ignorance, 266,10 agorazein, buy, 269,4; 324,22; mar­ keteer, 263,7.9 agrios, wild, 286,5 aidios, eternal, 194,15; passim aidion eternity, 303,25 aidios, eternally, 298,7.11 aidiotes, eternity, 237,4 aiskhros, ugly, 194,11 aisthesis, perception, 196,30; 206,5.30.31; 207,9.14; 330,6 aisthetikos, perceptible, 240,1

aitia, cause, 194,3; 196,3.9.19; 197,8.14; passim aitias thai, ascribe, 229,8.10; 264,34; 312,14-19; blame, 261,8 aitiatos, caused, 252,16-262,19; 266,26; 275,21; 279,12; 312,19 aitiologia, account of the causes, 254,15 aitios, cause, 245,23 aition, cause, 195,3.11.12.16.17; passim aitidteros, more of a cause, 278,15.17.19; 279,7.14; 337,14 akatallelon, anomaly, 295,10 akhoristos, inseparable, 228,8 akinetos, changeless, 301,11; unmoved, 198,13-18; 262,11; 298,6-25; 299,8; 300,12.29; 301,2.5.6; 302,16.21; 303,3; 304,8.9.26 akinetos, without being moved, 304,24 akme, acme, 236,20.29 akoe, hearing, 196,31 akolouthein, follow, 207,5; 274,6; 283,11; 328,7; 335,14.19 akolouthesis, ordering of sequence, 334,10.13; 335,12.18 akolouthia, sequence, 327,14 akolouthos, consequent, 334,20; 336,12; consistent, 323,13 akolouthon, it follows that, 231,21 akolouthos, accordingly, 228,8 akouein, hear, 299,18; understand,

209

210

Greek-English Index

199,12; 256,11.15; passim akribes, precise, 322,27 akribesteron, more accurately, 200,12 akribos, accurately, 259,10; 296,10; 297,29 akribeia, accuracy, 282,4 akribologein, be precise, 330,20 akroasis, treatise, 194,2 akroazein, hear, 313,16.19 alethes, true, 327,17; passim aletheuein, be veridical, 222,26; 309,29; 310,2 alloidsis, qualitative change, 199,1; 195,33; 196,6; 247,29; 337,8 alloioteros, qualitatively different, 199,7 alloidtikos, qualitative, 198,34; 199,8.9 alloioun, change qualitatively, 304,28 alloiousthai, be qualitatively changed, 196,4; 243,28; 298,25; 303,28; 305,7 alios, besides, 247,26; in another way, 199,16; 242,11; in any different fashion, 308,22; in one way ... in another, 253,5-6; 255,22; in other places, 261,22; otherwise, 287,6; 338,1; variously, 199,2 allds te, especially, 223,8; 251,23; particularly, 198,22 alogia, irrationality, 286,5 alogos, irrational, 197,1.3; 264,24; 265,26; 281,4-282,22; 284,16287,24; 317,12; 318,18; 325,3 amelein, be unmindful of, 229,7 amelei, of course, 296,18; 326,31; regardless, 220,31 ametabletos, unalterable, 214,8.10; 300,6 amnemonein, leave unmentioned, 234,9 amphibolos, doubtful, 206,8 amudros, indistinct, 323,9 anagein, bring back, 266,29; classify, 281,2; reduce, 243,13.15; 254,29.32; 260,3; passim; refer, 263,17.19.21; 311,20; 312,2 anagindskein, read, 246,10; 287,1; 288,1; 338,6 anairein, abolish, 263,27; 260,20; 264,4; 320,13; refute, 334,1.2 anairesis, removal, 260,22; 308,2 anakampsis, return, 313,6 anakathairein, clear up, 194,7 anakephalaioun, sum up, 246,24 anaklasis, reflection, 227,2 anakrouein, strike up, 201,30 analambanein, repeat, 336,28; take up, 241,10; 247,12; 248,16; 296,12; 300,22

analogia, analogy, 194,10; 219,7; 229,17; 286,26; 287,8; proportion, 213,8 analogos, analogous, 241,30 analuein, start out, 333,13 anankaios, necessary, 262,26; 267,8.11; 280,20; 306,24; 326,2; passim; needed, 219,14; 305,4 anankaion, necessity, 262,29.30; 306,13.18; 311,22; 325,22; passim; need, 219,13 anankaios, necessarily, 234,13; 296,14; 337,7.25 anankazein, compel, 260,33 ananke, it is necessary that, 216,23; 276,1; 284,25; passim; necessity, 312,1; need, 232,6 ex anankes, out of necessity, 201,27; 214,4; 232,17; 262,28; 267,10.14.20; 270,30.33; passim anapalin, in the reverse order, 259,14.20; 263,6; inversely, 328,24; the reverse (of), 227,25; 334,8.10.13; on the contrary, 251,9 anaphainesthai, come to light, 272.1; 337,24 anapherein, bear up, 307,4; bring, 236,13; refer, 263,27.28; 296,19; 299,26 anatithenai, assign, 265,13; 312,17; 326,24 aneideos, formless, 217,18; 219,5; 232,30 anekhein keep, 329,16 anempodistos, in an unhindered fas­ hion, 235,17 anendees, without defect, 194,13 anepitedeios, unsuitable, 201,18 anepitedeiotes, unsuitability, 318,7.9.11 anexetastos, without examination, 265,26 anoeton, senselessness, 265,18 anoikeios, inappropriate, 256,18 anomoiomeres, heterogeneous, 202,26; 232,2 andphoros, borne upwards, 329,13.16 andtero, earlier, 293,10; 302,11 antallattein, exchange, 324,23 antidiairein, contrast, 196,18 antidiastellein, oppose, 258,2; 284,5 (pros) antidiastolen, as opposed to, 300,6.16 antikeimenon, contrary, 218,10.16; 267,7; 282,5 antilambanein, take in turn, 239,7 antistrephein, convert, 271,3; reverse,

Greek-English Index 327,15 antistrophe, contrapositive, 334,19; 336,17 antithesis, contrast, 248,27; 249,13; 250,2.14 adristos, indeterminate, 200,30.31; 202,3.16; 260,7; passim apaitein, ask, 297,28; demand, 258,25; 268,14; 289,11 apaitesis, demanding, 295,4 apantan, confront, 269,31; 279,17.20; meet with, 290,3 apantesis, answer, 261,11; rebuttal, 209,32 aparithmein, enumerate, 241,18; 242,10; passim aparithmesis, enumeration, 259,14 apeikazein, compare, 325,13 apeikonisma, copy, 316,24 apeiros, infinite, 211,33 apekhein, be a distance away, 279,23; 280,7 apergazesthai, bring to completion, 316,20; 323,26 aperkhesthai, depart, 324,16; go away, 278,18; go off, 269,5; 324,21; with­ draw, 297,26 aphairein, take away, 318,19-21; 319,19; 320,12.30; passim aphairesis, abstraction, 219,7 aphanes, obscure, 206,33; 280,15 aphienai, release, 195,27.30 aphikneisthai, reach, 229,29.31; 235,14; 320,15 aphoran, look to, 198,22; 200,28; 242,6 aphorizein, assign, 243,26 aphormai, starting-point, 251,18 aplanes, sphere of the fixed stars, 304,21 apobainein, emerge, 278,21; 279,15; 290,27; 292,23 apoban, outcome, 288,25.27 apoblepein, have regard to, 234,19; 241,21 apodeiknunai, demonstrate, 206,5-32; 207,11; 208,31; 219,24; 221,12; 336,8; give demonstrations, 219,20 apodeiktikos, on demonstrations, 206,9 apodeixis, demonstration, 206,9.30; 282,30; 336,5.13 apodidonai, consign, 312,12; give, 195,6; passim; restore, 275,10 apodosis, gives, 336,22; giving, 229,11; 248,13; 260,2; 282,17; 299,5 apoginesthai, pass away, 208,1; 213,2 apoios, qualityless, 225,16 apokatastasis, point of return,

211

198,24.25 apokathistanai, restore, 313,7 apoklerdsis, principle of selection, 210,15 apokrinein, get rid of, 310,19; set apart, 219,3 apokrinesthai, answer, 299,29 apolambanein, get back, 274,7; have back, 278,6; take on, 209,5-18; passim apolelumenos, independent, 328,2 apologeisthai, offer a defence, 265,19 apopauein, bring to a halt, 236,27 apophansis, proposition, 328,2; 336,7 apophatikos, negative, 281,18 apopimplan, satisfy, 297,9; 298,28; 299,3 apoptdsis, falling away, 323,21 aporein, be puzzled, 221,4; 230,20; find (a) puzzle in, 260,27 aporeitai, there is a puzzle, 278,19 aporia, puzzle, 221,8; 230,20 aposulan, abstract, 306,10 apotasis, intention, 225,5 apotelein, bring to completion, 213,8; 216,12; 328,5; produce, 201,34; 202,3; 273,10; 289,4 apotelesma, completed product, 242,1; 244,20; 253,8; product, 201,2; 278,3.21 apoteleutisis, conclusion, 209,13 apotithenai, assign, 259,15.22; get rid of, 279,2 apotUnkhanein, fail, 265,17; 269,8; 290,6; 291,12; 318,3.12.29.32; 319,1.3.12; 320,11; miss, 280,6.13 apsukhos, inanimate, 195,23.27.28; 281,4-282,22 ara, (in apodosis after 'if) then, 197,16; passim; (not in apodosis after 'if) therefore, 200,26; passim an ara, if at all, 262,22 ei ara, if anything, 283,26 ei me ara, after all, 275,1 aristos, best, 277,13 arkein, be sufficient, 240,19; 305,15 arkeisthai, be satisfied, 279,11 arkhaios, ancient, 228,24; 261,13; 264,6; early, 229,14; 234,19.21 arkhi, origin, 198,24.26; principle, 194,4; 195,5-7; 206,10.12.19; 214,9; 241,6; 242,13.15; 244,14; 302,22.24; 304,3-11; 319,7; 322,6; 325,16; 329,3; source, 195,25.33; 196,11.13; 203,3.11; 204,14-26; 205,12.13; 214,12-17; 241,16; 245,21-7; 247,20; 260,29; 291,4.6;

212

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293,1; 298,23; 302,18-20; 304,9.27; 305,6; 320,14-25; start, 194,4; 195,1.17; 205,17; 235,7. 282,24; 292,6; 314,8; 320,7; starting-point, 216,28; 237,7; 321,10-12; 328,19-27; 332,20.21; 334,17; 334,25-336,25 exarkhes, original, 269,31; 318,23; 319,5.13; 321,29; 322,1 kafarkhin, at the start, 320,7; origi­ nal, 315,6 arkhein, govern, 238,1.10-15.32.33; 300,3 arkheisthai, start, 321,22; 328,19; passim arkhomenos, at the start, 200,9 arkhikos, governing, 238,30 arkhitektonikos, architectonic, 238,1531 arrhen, male, 194,11 arrhuthmistos, unorganised, 202,3.16; 207,16; 212,6-10; 214,25 artasthai, depend on, 284,13 asapheia, obscurity, 238,28 asebes, impious, 293,13 asemos, inarticulate, 290,21 askholein, be busied about, 303,15 asdmatos, bodiless, 300,7 astheneia, weakness, 200,18 asunklostos, unspinnable, 320,23 asunthesia, incompositeness, 218,11 atekhnos, inartistic, 202,3 athroizein, assemble, 275,22 atopos, absurd, 264,15; passim atukhein, to be unlucky, 279,22 atukhes, luckless, 280,15 atukhia, lucklessness, 286,23 aiilos, matterless, 300,9 auta kath'hauta, all by themselves, 224,23; 240,3; standing on their own, 222,10; 223,20; 225,8.10 autarkes, sufficient, 233,7 authupostatos, self-standing, 212,15.25 autoanthrdpos, man-itself, 225,30; 240,4 autoippos, horse-itself, 225,30 automaton, tautomaton, spontaneity, 259,7; passim apo fautomatou (etc. See note to 259,13), from (by, out of) spon­ taneity, spontaneously, 259,13; passim autopistos, self-evident, 207,10 autozdion, animal-itself, 240,4 auxanesthai, grow (intr.), 196,4 auxein, increase (transitive), 196,1; 307,2.6; 312,24

auxesis, growth, 195,33; 203,7; 247,29 axia, fitness, 313,8.10.26 axioma, axiom, 308,15.21.30; 309,29; 315,25; 316,6 axioun, claim, 230,31; think worthy of, 261,1.4.28; 263,24 bebaios, stable, 276,25.26; 280,20.21 beltion, better, 297,26 biblion, book, 194,16; passim blaptein, corrupt, 283,8.9 blastanein, sprout, 273,3.6-9 blaste, sprouting, 211,1; 212,2 boethein, help, 199,5. boethos, helper, 310,17 boule, deliberation, 268,15.16; 321,2.5.11.17.18 boulesthai, want, 219,1; passim; wish, 194,20; passim bouleuein, counsel, 245,24; 247,19; deliberate, 268,14.15; 320,30.31; 321,2-19; 325,4.6; plan, 264,14; 331,15 bouleuma, purpose, 290,21 bouleusis, deliberating, 321,4 daimonios, supernatural, 266,9 daimonidteros, rather supernatural, 266,7 dei, is to be, 306,21; passim deiknunai, show, 204,24; 255,19-21 deina, a certain, 258,27; 259,1; such a one, 280,5 deisthai, need, 206,29; show lack of, 206,5.6 deixis, proof, 327,8; 332,27 dilos, clear, 197,26; 198,3 delotikos (einai), reveal, 330,1; 338,11 demiourgein, craft, 204,13; 231,24.26; 232,8; 239,18; 242,3; 320,30; 337,1 demiourgon, creative, 242,1 demiourgia, craftsmanship, 322,11 demiourgos, craftsman, 240,5.14.18; Demiurge, 241,28; 321,16 depou, presumably, 208,10; 209,11.13.31; 211,17.31; 219,19; 222,10; 275,9; 287,17; 311,6; 316,24; 319,6; 321,15 diadelos, transparent, 323,18 diadokhe, succession, 303,25; 342,2 diairein, distinguish, 195,6; 209,30.31; 243,24; divide, 251,13.14.18; passim dieremenos, divided, 250,1 diairesis, distinguishing, 195,5; division, 195,6; 211,25; 237,25;

Greek-English Index 248,17; 251,17.23; 252,9.14; 266,30; passim diairetikos, disjunctive, 308,1; of division, 330,3 diaitan, settle, 259,19;310,5 diakeisthai, be arranged, 218,3 diakoptein, interrupt, 235,18.19; 236,1; 267,11 diakosmesis, cosmic arrangement, 262,5 diakrinein, discriminate (between), 261,19; 322,27; distinguish, 219,1.8; divide, 314,9.12.17.18 diakrisis, distinction, 219,8.13-15; 221,23.25; 222,25; 223,17; distin­ guishing mark, 292,10; dividing up, 314,8 dialambanein peri, delineate, 194,15.17; 219,2; 233,4; 302,17 dialegesthai, discourse (about, on), 207,12; 222,13; 268,1; 304,11; dis­ cuss, 194,5.13; passim dialuein, dissolve, 236,25 diamartanein, go astray, 318,15; passim; miss, 269,21 diamenein, endure, 213,2; 303,22; 313,3; 322,5.7 diamone, endurance, 313,1 dianoia, reason, 274,2.5; reasoning, 206,17.32; 207,2; 268,12-23; passim; thought, 197,20; 238,9.29; 266,7.9.11; 279,22; passim diaphainesthai, show through, 319,19; 322,26; 323,10.17 diapherein, differ, 195,20-4; 196,11; 233,31; 332,16.19 diaphora, difference, 211,31; 220,19; 238,7; 323,9; 332,19.27.28; 334,10.27; differentia, 195,21; 219,28; 250,18.20 diaphoros, different, 335,12.27; distinct­ ive, 305,7 diaphtheirein, corrupt, 319,7; 322,6 diaplastikos, moulding, 197,35 diarkes, self-sufficient, 313,2 diarthroun, articulate, 296,9; 319,17; 322,26 diastasis, separation, 211,25 diastatos, extended, 225,15; 244,8 diastellein, separate, 259,10 diastrephein, distort, 207,3.9 diatattein, order, 314,27 diateinein, extend, 283,8 diathesis, disposition, 212,29; 213,9; 217,28; 218,5; 235,23.25 diatithenai, dispose, 213,10; 218,3; 313,9 didaskalia, teaching, 240,6

213

didaskein, teach, 194,17 didonai, bestow, 221,22; offer, 295,32 diexerkhesthai, go right through, 259,10; 296,10; 297,29 diistanai, separate (trans.), 211,16; 320,24 diistasthai, extend (intr.), 226,14 dioikein, manage, 206,7; 312,28 dioiketikos, managing, 197,35; 198,2 diorizein, define, 275,22; specify, £ 1 8 , 1 9 ; 241,1; 259,7; 261,29 dokein, be considered, 257,2.3; 266,6; be thought, 201,8; 219,12; 222,21; 223,29; 231,27; 245,25; 272,5; 279,23; 291,11; 309,10; 311,4; 315,13; 323,10; seem, 257,27; 260,31; seem right, 249,21 dokdn, being one's opinion, 226,5; sup­ posed, 219,13; 222,25; which are thought, 280,27 doxa, belief, 264,18; opinion, 194,7; 229,14; 319,13 dran, do, 201,20 drastikos, effective, 316,27 dunamis, capacity, 196,33; 239,10; 326,9-17.28; 327,2; 330,13; potentiality, 253,27; power, 197,34; 208,3; 233,18; 259,1 dunamei, potential, 195,9; 248,28; 259,3; potentially, 209,1; 259,2 dunaton, possible, 197,13; passim; thing that is potential, 253,27; 259,1 duspragia, ill-doing, 282,3 dustukhes, unlucky, 279,19 dustukhia, bad luck, 282,6 egoun, i.e., 212,18; 326,21; or, 217,10; 264,9; or, better, 274,6; 307,31 egoun, or rather, 201,31 eidenai, know, 230,30; passim; realise, 253,20.24; 271,5; 327,29; recog­ nise, 212,19; 282,30; 287,15; 319,7.10.22 eidisis, knowledge, 230,31 eidikos, formal, 195,3; 216,17; 228,27; 233,28; 240,30; 299,28; 337,12; specific, 222,19; 227,15; 252,14 eidopoiein, be formative of, 245,11; form, 229,1.2.5 eidopepoiemenos, informed eidopoiia, formative causation, 229,8 eidopoios, formative, 228,29; 229,3; 245,5 eidos, form, 194,6.11.12; 203,16; passim; kind, 233,17; species, 237,4; 314,7.9.12 eikdn, image, 229,17; 244,25.26;

214

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252,30.31; 253,2.3; 257,7.10.15; 258,27; 325,14; portrait, 201,3 eikos, likely, 297,20 eikotos, as one would expect, 210,22; it is fitting that, 219,8; it is natural that, 312,1; 331,6; naturally, 196,24:241,29; reasonable, 216,12.18; 267,19; reasonably, 267,10.23 eilikrines, pure, 323,16 eilikrines, purely, 323,7 einai, be, 236,17; 237,3; 285,3; being, 212,13.17.24; 225,8; 228,13; exist, 199,4; 243,6; existence, 206,31 eirmos, series, 325,23; 326,2 eisagein, introduce, 330,12 ekbainein, overstep, 331,11; result, 282,26; 290,11.17.18; 292,5.15 ekban, issue, 324,20 ekbasis, result, 267,8; 269,31; 272,28; 278,14.15; 279,7.14 ekhein, have, 195,2; 200,27; in fact occur, 200,29; keep, 200,28; stand, 200,33 ekhos, noise, 202,4 ekklesia, Assembly, 313,14 eklambanein, select, 249,16 ekpempein, emit, 227,2 ekphusis, outgrowth, 211,1; 216,1.30; 217,4 ekpiptein, fall short, 318,27 ekpompe, emission, 227,2 ektithenai, expound, 194,4.8; 238,28; 259,19; 296,10; 284,20; 286,1; present, 207,11; 223,17; 249,10; 250,2.4; passim ektrope, discrepancy, 323,1 elenkhein, refute, 318,25; 319,21 elenkhos, proof, 206,17; refutation, 237,29 elleipein, fall short, 321,3 ellogimos, famous, 268,25 empalin, contrariwise, 270,20; 303,20; 306,19; 316,7; 328,10; 332,7; the reverse, 270,13; 327,3; vice-versa, 199,14; 275,22; 311,23; 332,11 emperiekhein, encompass, 338,15 emphutos, inborn, 199,7; 203,18.19; 204,5; 241,24; 242,1 empodion, obstacle, 235,20 empodizein, hinder, 236,3 empsukhos, animate, 195,23; 256,4; besouled, 240,1 enantion, contrary, 260,23; 262,20; 306,21; 330,29; inconsistent, 216,10; opposite, 217,22.23; 218,7-16; 231,27; 236,23.24;

242,17; 243,20.24; 259,24; 260,34; 279,18; 285,2.3; 286,5; 297,25; 306,25 enantios, oppositely, 335,2 enargeia, self-evidence, 206,14; 223,11 ek tes enargeias, self-evidently, 330,5 enarges, manifest, 206,4; self-evident, 206,1 enargos, obviously, 310,30; palpably, 323,3.5 endekhomends, contingently, 262,23 endoxos, reputable, 263,23 energeia, activity, 200,2.13.14; 205,5; 233,11; 236,2.30; 237,6; 253,17.22; 289,20; 301,12; 323,4; actuality, 202,7; 233,7; 253,22; mode of behaviour, 224,22.30; 233,9.12.15; 240,9.12 energeidi, actual, 195,9; 248,28; actu­ ally, 208,33; 227,7.10.12 energein, be active (concerning), 232,24; 253,27; 259,2; 270,23; 287,13; be actual, 258,7; commit, 261,2; embody, 208,33; 209,2.13; passim; exercise, 236,30; 237,6; work on, 232,20 energeisthai, be acted upon, 253,27; 259,2 energos, active, 240,19 engus, akin, 285,10.14; 286,10.11.13; near, 245,6; passim enistanai, object, 319,13; 322,19 enkatalimpanein, leave behind, 273,5 enkatatithenai, put in, 325,7 enkhorein, be possible, 224,22; 239,20 enklema, charge, 264,19 enkuklios, circular, 198,14 ennoia, conception, 194,10; 236,9; 260,26.33; 264,5; 266,19; 273,31; 276,5; 277,14; 280,26; 299,26; 320,14 enokhlesis, annoyance, 297,27 enteuthen, at this point, 237,6; 323,19; from here, 196,15; from this, 198,6; 205,12; goes on to, 207,19; next, 219,1 entos, inside, 199,5 enulos, material, 199,25 enuparkhein, belong in, 197,9; 207,16; 231,7 enuparkhon, immanent, 243,20; 325,11.13 enupostatos, substantively existing, 205,19 enupotithenai, hypothesise, 332,7 eoikenai, be similar, 332,15; seem 197,16; 325,15

Greek-English Index epagein, add, 194,14; 238,29; 256,10; passim; go on, 285,9 epagoge, induction, 281,8; 282,23; 284,19 epakolouthein, follow after, 269,1.6.9; passim epallattein, be interchangeable, 316,12 epanapherein, refer back, 263,25 epanatrekhein, revert, 195,5 epekhein, contain, 312,20; 331,5 epereazein, threaten, 230,17 epexerkhesthai, go all through, 248,11 epharmozein, fit onto, 277,14; 280,25; 284,22 ephetos, desirable, 194,13 ephexes, in order, 319,24; 322,13; 325,24; 326,2; next, 214,18; 238,5; 242,8; 266,24; passim; soon, 216,16; supplementary, 297,1; 333,6; passim ephiesthai, seek, 237,2; strive after, 194,10; 303,24 ephistanein, hold up, 281,15 ephistasthai, be in command of, 207,2 epibole, approach, 308,13.14 epidiairein, divide further, 268,18 epidiairesis, further division, 272,17 epidiamenein, endure throughout, 213,16.19 epiginesthai, supervene, 208,22; 232,11; 327,2; supervening, 212,9 epikeisthai, be imposed on, 247,17 epikhaunein, tune up, 201,30 epikheirein, argue, 306,25; attempt, 210,29; try, 321,25; passim; try to argue, 326,25 epikheirima, argument, 208,31; 209,1634; 214,22; 215,26; 229,16.26; 232,31; passim epikheiresis, argumentation, 210,13.18 epikoindnein, associate, 249,14 epikrates, dominant, 236,24 epikrisis, determination, 234,14 epilogismos, reflection, 338,14 epiluesthai, solve, 221,7; 230,20; 254,16; 318,2 epilusis, solution, 238,28; 239,14; 254,18 epinoein, think of, 219,32; passim epinoia, planning, 213,11; 216,20; thought, 215,11; passim epipherein, bring forward, 238,6 epipheresthai, threaten, 230,20 epirrhapizein, rebuke, 293,12 episimainesthai, come to indicate, 218,6 episemeiousthai, indicate, 317,21 episkepsis, consideration, 229,5; 336,11

215

episkeptesthai, consider, 220,3; 297,12 episkhein, bring to a halt, 235,18 episkopein, consider, 220,12 epistasis, attention, 265,23.25; note, 197,30 episteme, branch of knowledge, 202,1; 219,4-13; 220,31; 222,16.25; 223,17; 227,28; 230,24; 232,26; 234,22; 238,4.26; knowledge, 254,17-23 en epistemei genesthai, become know­ ledgeable, 239,18.20 epistemon, with special knowledge, 197,28; 219,2 epistetos, knowable, 254,17-23 episumbainein, be consequent on, 293,5.17; passim; hold true of additionally, 270,9 episumban, actual consequence, 291,3 epitattein, prescribe, 230,25.29 epitedeios, suitable, 229,20.22 epitedeios, suitably, 313,29 epitedeiotes, suitability, 202,16; 230,3 epitelein, finish, 316,19 epitithenai, impose, 201,22; 203,22; 230,22.34; 231,4; 238,16; 239,15; 326,28 eponumia, name, 211,4 eremein, be at rest, 198,29; 203,21; rest, 195,32 iremesis, coming to rest, 245,21 eremia, rest, 195,25; 196,17; 298,24 ergatis, creator, 239,19.21 ergazesthai, cause to appear, 232,15; 303,18; effect, 316,22; fashion, 203,20; 244,19; 311,6.8; 316,18; 317,4.6; passim; work, 325,8 eirgasmenos, wrought, 201,3.4.5 ergon, function, 238,7; 239,13; 246,12.13; 264,13; 272,27; passim; work, 335,11 erkhesthai, go, 287,27 erkhesthai eis, come to, 195,4; passim; reach, 194,9; 196,23; resort to, 321,4 erotan, ask, 297,1; passim erromenos, in good order, 206,33 eskhaton, termination, 236,26; 309,1325 eskhatos, last (term), 235,10.12; 296,27; 298,19-299,8; 299,25; passim esothen, inside, 196,1 ethos, way of life, 237,27 eudaimon, happy, 280,15 eudaimonia, happiness, 246,10; 280,16; passim

216

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eudelos, very clear, 211,31 euekhos, resonant, 233,16.17; 253,5; 329,18 euergetein, do good to, 313,24.27 euergos, easy to work, 231,1; 237,10.30; 238,11 euethes, silly, 258,21 eulogos, reasonable, 199,20; 223,11; 324,13; 311,18; 319,14; 321,15; 323,14 eulogon, reasonableness, 263,11 eulogos, it is reasonable that, 252,7; reasonably, 201,8; 277,9.11; 280,18 euodein, run easily, 249,11 eupragia, well-doing, 282,4; passim eupraxia, well-doing, 281,27; passim eutheia, ray, 227,1 eutukhein, be lucky, 279,22 eutukhes, lucky, 279,18 eutukhia, good luck, 281,19 exaerosis, evaporation, 211,16 exairein, remove, 233,24 exakouein, understand, 275,6; 295,19 exegeisthai, set forth, 313,13 exegesis, explanation, 245,16 exegetes, commentator, 209,29 exepitedes, on purpose, 314,1 exetazein, examine, 221,10; 240,28; prove, 306,23 existasthai, leave, 198,28.30 exomoiein, assimilate, 230,21; 336,20 exothen, from outside, 197,7.11; 200,15; outside, 195,26; 196,3-12 genesis, arising, 259,27; 272,24; birth, 236,18.21.29; coming to be, 207,24; 213;23; 215,28; 218,8-17; 223,25; 226,3; 234,2; 241,27; generating, 216,13.18.25; gener­ ation, 201,26; 203,6; 210,34; 211,7.13; 216,9; 217,25.26; 229,10.11; 243,9; 300,13-16; 303,8; 304,5.28; process of gener­ ation, 211,3-21; 218,22; 265,18; 300,12; 330,10.12; realm of coming to be, 332,3 genetos, generable, 194,15; 214,5; gener­ ated, 244,3; that comes to be, 199,19; 298,8.11; 303,5; 305,20 genikos, generic, 215,13 gennan, generate, 216,18; 235,8; 237,2; 273,1; 323,13 genndmenos, what is generated, 210,28; 300,4.5 gennesis, generating, 323,28 gennetikos, generative, 208,3.6; 237,1;

what generated, 297,26; what generates, 210,27 genos, family, 287,17; genus, 244,3.5; 258,23; kind, 249,6; type, 203,15 geometres, geometer, 223,24 ginesthai, arise, 195,13; 200,15; 201,6; 208,28.30; 213,1; 216,26; 235,25; 257,3; 259,26; 260,8; 272,23; passim; be born, 236,6.14; 269,19; become, 211,25; 215,2; 242,18; be done, 224,3; come about, 246,11; 262,28; 307.11.13; 313,1.27.28; passim; come to be, 211,14.16; 215,2; 216,16.19; 218.12; 229,27; 230,8-15; 236,30; 241,14; 257,11.15; 259,13; 307,8.14; passim; occur, 236,26; 242,30.31; 243,1; 248,8; 317,24; result, 250,30; 305,23; take place, 235,16.26; 236,1; 260,5; 268,3; 283,27; 290,17; 294,5.7; 306,6.7; 320,18; turn out to be, 249,5; 250,23; 251,2 ginomenos, in the process of gener­ ation, 201,20; 211,13; 212,4; thing that comes to be, 218,13; 233,24; 241,17; 260,18 ginoskein, know, 241,5; passim; recog­ nise, 207,9.13; 223,5; 229,24; 230,19.23; 231,19; 232,32; 233,3; 266,27-30; 290,16 gnoristikos (einai), discover, 238,4 gnorizein, discover, 232,23; 238,1 gndsis, higher science, 219,4-6; know­ ledge, 241,8 gnostikos einai, know, 238,21 gnostikos, by way of knowledge, 241,22; 242,6 gonia, angle, 227,2 gonimos, reproductive, 240,19 grammatikos, writing-teacher, 317,25 grammatistes, clerk, 321,7 grammikds, in a geometrical way, 219,24 hairein, select 268,13 hairesis, selection, 248,7,268,13 hamartanein, do wrong, 263,24; fail, 318,9; go wrong, 221,28; 318,4.6; passim hemartimenos, distorted, 202,7 hamartia, fault, 316,11; mistake, 317,24; passim; mistakes, 318,19; 319,8 haplous, absolute, 218,7.9; simple, 195,8; 208,12.25; 215,13; 234,16; passim

Greek-English Index haplos, absolutely, 201,10; 236,15; in an unqualified sense, 212,25; 217,25; 277,15; 279,8; 286,21.28; 288,14.18.29; 309,13.25; simply, 196,22; 220,12.25; 238,11; 258,27; 259,1; 312,11; 329,12; straightforwardly, 202,18; 326,28; to speak without qualification, 200,23; 202,21; 230,33; 233,19; 254,7; 269,19; 297,6; 312,6; 326,23; tout court, 197,16; 199,20; 200,15; 220,10; 230,35; 231,33; 233,19; 234,26; 237,9; 240,5.15; 247,3; 257,9; 305,18; 312,25; 313,26; 319,12; 325,19.22; 326,5.8.17; 330,12.14.17; 331,29; 332,2.5 harmonia, balance, 202,13; 236,24.25; interval, 245,7.8; 255,13; scale, 201,30 harmonike, harmonics, 226,27; 227.24 harmonikos, harmonicist, 227,10 harmozein, apply (intr.), 220,34; 245,12; fit, 243,27; 277,11; 310,1; harmon­ ise (intr.), 216,11 hedra, position, 262,15 hegeisthai, consider, 233,7 heis arithmdi, one in number, 194,9; 211,33; 270,15 heis logdi, one in definition, 194,9; 270,15 hemeros, tame, 286,4 eph'hemin, in our power, 267,14-16 hou heneka, for the sake of which, 230,1; passim heneka tou, (being) for the sake of some­ thing, 319,13; passim heuriskein, discover, 197,29 hidrusthai, be situated, 212,27 hikanos, sufficient, 296,27.29; passim hikands, sufficiently, 218,17; 259,7 histanai, halt (trans.), 196,14; 299,24 hestds, static, 226,23; stationary, 196,20; histasthai, be fixed, 262,8; halt (intr.) 236,2; stand still, 198,14; stop, 282,12; 322,15 dVho, on account of which, 241,17 Mi, in that, 197,24; qua, 197,14 kath'ho, in accordance with which, 212,16; 215,6; 241,16; in respect of which, 195,23 hoi, for which, 230,6; 301,19; passim ho ti pote esti, whatever is, 202,28 (see also ti pote esti) hou, of which, 230,6; 301,19; passim hou heneka, for the sake of which, 230,1; passim

217

ex hou, from which, 241,15; 243,19-27 hodos, process, 215,28-217,5; 234,2; pro­ gress, 235,15; road, 211,33; route, 229,29-230,2 holikos, as a whole, 201,13.17 holos, whole, 201,15 holds, all in all, 247,19; 254,2; 257,2; 290,27; 301,11; 302,4; 310,26; 336,27; altogether, 241,25; 245,3; 259,17; 261,28; 316,19; 320,13; at all, 205,28; 206,8; 259,18-24; 273,6; 277,4; 294,20; 298,25; 308,29; 312,26.27; 324,3; of every sort, 284,26; wholly, 249,17 holotis, mass, 195,31; passim; totality, 247,17 homiloun, encounter, 280,9 homoeideSy of the same kind, 255,1.3 homoidma, likeness, 252,31 homoiomereia, homoeomery, 229,12; 312,15.19 homoiomeres, homogeneous, 202,26; 232,3; 323,7 homoids, similarly, 196,9; passim; the same applies, 197,28; the same thing happens, 232,12 kath' homoioteta, by way of similitude, 286,23-7; 287,2 homdnumds, coinciding in name, 207,9; homonymously, 276,30; 323,2 homotimds, to the same degree, 307,19 hoper, that which, 204,26; 303,17; what, 224,3; which, 205,20, 256,17; which just, 235,6 hopdsoun, in any way at all, 196,20 horan, see, 196,31 horismos, definition, 196,15.21; 197,30.33; 199,12; 234,5; 245,2.17; 267,1; 275,22; 280,19; 296,19-29; passim hdristikos, definitional, 215,11; 244,27; of definition, 330,3 hdrizein, determine, 276,11.12.21; define, 215,8; 234,4.5; 266,10; 276,11; 289,9; 337,25 hdrismenos, determinate, 200,28.21; 248,18; 259,27 hdristhai, be determinate, 293,5; passim horizesthai, be determinate, 244,20 horme, impulse, 203,18; 204,4; 260,15; 268,30; 269,1-18; 273,10.16; 287,19.26; 289,9.18; 290,13; 291.11; 292,16; 311,3 horos, definition, 197,30; 198,6; 288,17; mark, 299,22; 305,26; term,

218

Greek-English Index

281,19; 322,2.4; 327,29; 328,2 (hos) ep'elatton, exceptionally, 262,28, 265,14; 266,3.4; 272,13 hos epi topolu, normal(ly), 216,15; 242,32; 265,14; passim hotan, when, (in Philoponus); whenever, (in Aristotle) hugiainein, become healthy, 279,1.3.5 hugiansis, healing, 197,25.27 hugiazein, heal, 197,22; 235,21 hugieia (hugeia), health, 197,23; 229,30; 325,16 hugies, sound, 309,9 hule, matter, 194,5.6.8; 232,6.29; 244,8; passim hulikos, material, 229,12.13 hupantan, meet, 269,3; 278,4 huparkhein, be a property in, 223,19; be a property of, 220,20; belong, 266,21; 274,3; 280,27; 283,19; 289,12; exist, 237,10-18; 239,13.17; 250,11; 271,25; 279,22; 281,5-282,23; passim; obtain, 306,18 huparkhon, property, 296,18 huparxis, reality, 250,21; subsistence, 224,10 hupatos, longest, 245,18 huper, above, 198,15 huperbatos, in a transposed way, 288,1; 338,6 huperbibazein, transpose, 237,14; 269,26 huperpiptein, go too far, 244,19 hupertithesthai, take further, 218,13.16 huphistasthai, be real, 225,8; 227,4.7.12.28; 240,4; 308,30; sup­ port, 264,4 hupoballesthai, be relevant, 219,3; 231,17; 240,10 hupodeigma, example, 249,21 hupodekhesthai, receive, 329,13 hupokeisthai, be laid down, 233,20; 240,12; suppose, 201,29; underlie, 199,26; 331,14 hupokeimenos, subject, 250,23; 318,13; 327,31; substrate, 194,8; 199,27.28; 217,27; 298,22; under­ lying, 212,8; 221,33; 251,2; 297,22; 318,7; underlying subject, 250,6; what underlies, 336,7 hupolambanein, conceive of, 226,4; 264,10 hupomenein, persist, 208,9; 243,25 hupomnemein, note, 204,19; 284,19 huponoein, conjecture, 236,14 hupostasis, reality, 206,1; 215,10;

221,22.27.31; 222,10; 227,14; 309,6 hupostorennusthai, be spread beneath, 247,23.26 hupothesis, postulate, 294,22.28; 336,1 ex hupotheseos, hypothetical(ly), 325,18-332,14 hupothetikos, hypothetical, 307,27; 308,1.12 hupotithenai, postulate, 214,4-9; 221,28; 222,10; 294,23; 312,6.13; 314.10; 325,13; 326,3.9; passim husteros, posterior, 295,15.28; 328,10.30 husteros, posterior, 255,2 iatreuein, doctor, 325,12-17 iatrike, art of medicine, 240,9; 310,28 iatros, doctor, 197,22; 325,16.17 idea, (Platonic) Form, 224,1.5; 225,29.32; 226,6; 228,2; 244,15; pattern, 212,18; 291,20 idikos, in the specific sense, 283,9 idios, individual, 243,26; proper, 221,29; 240,28; 264,27; 306,9 ididi, apart, 225,6; separately, 226,9; 252,10; 330,8 kat'idian, individually, 250,5 idion, special property, 286,4 idiotes, peculiar feature, 250,3.12.17; 297,21; peculiar quality, 318,13 kaiein, scorch, 233,18 kakopragia, bad-doing, 285,13 kalliergein, work up, 327,1 kalos, beautiful, 194,11; fine, 280,5; 306,4 kalos, finely, 201,3; right, 226,1; 238,16; rightly, 234,26; 236,7; well, 225,25; 265,24; 290,6; passim kata, in accordance with, 203,21; passim kath' hauta, in themselves, 221,27 auta kath*hauta, all by themselves, 224,23; 240,3; standing on their own, 222,10; 223,20; 225,8.10 kath'hauto, in itself, 194,12; 195,8; passim; per se, 204,8; 248,12; passim auto kath' hauto, all by itself, 225,1; in and of itself, 210,31 kata to auto, in the same respect, 242,10 kath'hekaston, for each, 198,24.27; in the case of each, 249,5.10; with each, 248,28; particular, 254,3.4.9; passim kataballein, lay down, 303,15

Greek-English Index kataballesthai, lay down, 263,2; 321,6 katadekhesthai, receive, 201,18; 202,15; 229,30 kataduein, be hidden in, 325,5; descend, 197,34; 308,23; 235,5 kataginesthai, be about, 219,16; be con­ cerned with, 238,26; busy oneself with, 231,10; concern, 238,3.8.12.20; 239,4; concern one­ self with, 222,16; 225,24 katalambanein, seize, 261,18 kataleipein, leave, 287,17.20 katanoein, observe, 313,7 katantan, arrive at, 298,28 kataphatikos, affirmative, 281,7 katapherein, bring down, 195,29; have recourse to, 312,15 katarithmein, list, 263,12 kat arithmon, numerically, 237,3; 303,24 kataskeuazein, construct, 230,26; 231,20; 331,23; establish, 199,26; 320,22; passim; lay the founda­ tions for, 284,20 kataskeue, construction, 233,16; 239,11; establishing, 237,28; 256,10 katatattein, classify, 283,13 katateinein, devote, 194,6; 206,3 katigorein, predicate, 203,16; 209,10.12; passim kategoria, accusation, 261,28.31; Categories, 254,15; 255,26 katekhein, occupy, 206,23 kathistanai, set up, 264,26; 265,27 katho, in respect of which, 246,20; (in) so far as, 197,13; 198,29; 212,17; 217,11.14; 254,1.2; in that, 332,19 kath'ho, in accordance with which, 212,16; 215,6; 241,16; in respect of which, 195,23 katholikos, general, 220,31; 236,11; 244,5; 248,17; 327,9 katholou, in general, 241,31; 243,10; 288,18; 299,25; 302,7; 316.15; 328,9; 334,11; generally, 200,20; 211,12; 241,10; 248,16; 298,14; 309,29; universal, 201,11; 296,5 katorthoun, succeed, 321,24 katdthen, below, 195,30 keisthai, lie, 288,10 kentron, centre, 196,20; 198,21; passim kharaktirizein, characterise, 228,13; 286,5 kheirdn, weaker, 217,22.24 khorion, bit of ground, 273,7; locality, 274,25.27; 275,4.8 9

219

khoristos, separable, 194,14; 215,9; 233,27.28; 301,1 khoristos, separably, 227,9 khdrizein, separate, 204,6.9.10; 219,30; 240,16; 325,7 kekhoristhai, be separate, 242,1.6; 249,14 khreia, advantage, 323,6; need, 326,29; 331,3; purpose, 259,28; 279,4; 313,15.21; purposes, 243,18; 297,19 khrema, phenomenon, 266,9 khremata, possessions, 331,2 khresimos, useful, 306,5 khresis, usage, 282,25.28; 283,1-3; 284,13 khresthai, use, 194,10; 306,3; passim; put to use, 268,18 khumos, humour, 232,4 khutos, fusible, 329,17.19 kinein, bring, 196,10; cause motion, 196,30; move (trans.), 195,26; passim kineisthai, change (intr.), 235,14; 236,19; move (intr.), 290,16; passim kinesis, change, 195,32; 196,7.12; 197,15; 198,33.34; 235,9-236,4; 236,18.21; 237,7; 241,16; passim; movement, 195,25; 211,5; 220,7; passim kinetikos, changing (trans.), 246,4; liable to change (trans.), 208,6; moving (trans.), 197,3; 292,25; 304,8 kleinos, best known, 200,24 klironomein, inherit, 287,18 koinonein, have in common, 284,4; 335,27; 336,2 koinonia, what is in common, 328,14; 332,18.29; 334,27-335,1 koindnikos, sociable, 286,4 koinos, common, 226,9; 260,25.33; 264,5; 266,19.21; 270,2; 276,5; 277,14; 280,26; 281,2; 288,17; 299,26; 320,14; 327,30; 328,2 koinei, jointly, 252,9 koinos, in common, 199,21; 243,11; 266,22; 274,3; 306,4; 315,17 koinoteron, in a more general sense, 227,15 komidi, collecting, 275,12-15 komizein, collect, 274,7, passim kosmikos, cosmic, 212,30 kosmopoiia, world-ordering, 261,24; 314,8 kosmos, cosmos, 223,10; 240,7; passim

220

Greek—English Index

krasis, mixture, 202,14; 222,1.8; 297,21 kratheis, mixed, 201,19 kreittdn, stronger, 206,14.30; 207,6; 217,23; superior, 241,20 kubernetes, steersman, 197,5 kuklophoria, rotation, 201,20 kuklophorikos (esti), moves in a circle, 219,22 kurios, strict, 253,30 kurios, in the strict sense, 214,19; 241,5; 252,23; passim; strictly, 205,21; 211,20; 237,1; passim kurioteron, more strictly, 216,2 kuriotaton, in the strictest sense, 258,18 lalein, talk, 290,20 lambanein, assume, 335,22; get, 279,21; grasp, 195,22; 243,4; 257,6; 329,21.29.30; 337,18.19; 338,12; take, 195,20; passim legein, assert, 212,15; 224,1; call, 195,12; 226,5; 228,29; describe (as), 200,9; 256,20; mean, 216,24; passim; say, 196,21; 207,19; passim; say to, 195,13; speak of, 225,18; 229,6; 256,24; 257,1.1624; passim; state, 208,2; 284,5 legomenos, called, 195,17; named, 195,2; 207,18 ligein, finish up, 321,27 stop, 296,27; 328,20 leptomeres, having small parts, 329,15 leukansis, whitening, 211,4 lexis, style, 372,13; wording, 235,11; 258,12; 269,26; 288,1; 295,10; 299,7 lexeis, wording, 237,14 logikos, logical, 336,6; rational, 196,26; 240,1; 254,14; 297,15.24; 305,26; 306,1; 317,1; 329,11.12 logismos, calculation, 200,23.26; 202,21; 281,16; 311,2; 317,4.6; 334,25.26; reason, 206,6; 207,7 logizesthai, reason about, 224,23; reckon in, 280,7.10.13 logos, account, 211,11; 228,27; 236,6; 248,12; 249,11; 276,6.10; 305,15; 306,14; 323,20; argument, 194,6; 200,3.29.31; 207,4.6.11.13; 210,10; 221,8; 234,13; 245,20; 260,21; 265,19; 284,4; 285,23; 296,2.9.10.11.13.14; 297,29; 300,22; 303,6; 313,13; 317,12.22; 318,25; book, 194,5; 242,23; defi­ nition, 194,9; 198,6; 211,24; 212,7;

221,29.30; 225,32; 240,5; 241,21; 243,24; 250,5.7.17; 270,12.15.21; 331.1; description, 212,25; dis­ cussion, 218,10; 223,4; 229,16; 234,23; 241,10; 243,12; 247,12; 248,16; 259,11; 261,30; formula, 215,6.7.9.11; 227,11; 244,23.28.29; 245,1.4.16.20; 280,19; 298,1; 312,20; 320,2; 330,4; 331,28; 332,6; 337,17.24; 338,5.6.7; opinion, 207,23; proper account, 219,15; proper principle, 202,1; question, 195,10; ratio, 245,9.10; 299,20.21; rational account, 276,23.29; 303,12; rational principle, 267,23; 276,23; reason, 223,11; 224,17.20; 225,9.26; 227,11.12.23; 286,4; 306,3; 319,6; 329,13; recipe, 202,11; 244,17; 247,22.24; relation, 208,13; 232,10; sense, 246,19; statement, 2Q7,1; 309,13 loipon, finally, 282,25; 284.22; 286,1; 322,14; rest, 244,21;'252,26; thereafter, 212,4; 237,6; 238,25; 246,17; 256,2 luein, resolve, 266,18 lusis, resolution, 321,22 malista, especially, 198,19; 292,8; in particular, 251,21.25; mainly, 228,14 manthanein, learn, 197,32; 233,7; 239,6; 285,6; understand, 206,27 martureisthai, call to witness, 266,19 marturia, evidence, 263,22 maten, at random, 311,4.6.9.17; 317,5; fruitless(ly), 283,21; 289,29; passim mathema, mathematical argument, 327,7; 328,24-32; 332,12-27; 334,21.22; 335,12; passim; math­ ematical science, 226,24; 296,19; 306,6.9 mathematikos, mathematical(-ian), 222,13; passim meignusthai, blend, 314,7.16 mekhanasthai, contrive, 303,25 melansis, blackening, 211,6 mellein, be to, 197,17; 305,21; intend, 274,22 melos, melody, 201,30 memnesthai, make mention of, 222,4; mention, 222,6; 226,22; 264,19; 267,17.19; 301,6; passim men oun, now (French 'or'), 210,13; 274,11; passim; so, 197,30; 199,23;

Greek-English Index 201,8; then (inferential), 196,6.21; 200,10; 214,11; passim mepote, in case, 221,4; not, 238,2.25; perhaps, 197,13.19; 259,24; 291,12; passim merikos, concerned with particulars, 220,6.9; particular, 201,10; 209,27; 212,17; 262,16; 296,4; specific, 254,8; 257,17; 265,21 meros, part, 212,1 ana meros, piecemeal, 272,11 (ta) kata meros, particular cases, 236,11; particular (things), 229,11; 231,15; 254,29 mesos, intermediate, 240,25; 244,11; middle terms, 281,23 dia mesdn, mediate, 195,7 metabainein, transfer, 280,16 metaballein, alter (intr.), 199,13; 207,27; alter (trans.), 196,2.5; 201,17; 208,16; 214,7.9; 243,28; 198,25; 307,17; transform (intr.), 211,15 metabatike (kinesis), translocation, 203,8.9 metabole, alteration, 203,7.19; 200,4; 214,1; 217,24; 234,2; 243,10; 247,20; 337,8 metalleuein, construct, 337,2; mine, 331,15.17 metallon, metal, 252,26; source, 244,10 metapherein, apply (trans.), 245,19 metarrhuthmizein, transpose, 235,11 metekhein, partake, 233,19; 330,6 meterkhesthai, go on to, 266,13.20; 280,27; 299,28; 317,12; 335,21 metharmozein, retune, 201,322 methistanai, depart,319,27; go over, 198,4 methodos, method, 299,25 metrein, measure, 299,15 metron, measure, 299,15 para mikron, almost, 279,21.23 miktos, blended, 204,1 mimeisthai, imitate, 200,31 mneia, mention, 264,1 monakhds, in one way, 207,19 monds, only, 198,13; 287,14 morion, portion, 212,2; section, 218,25; terms, 248,27; 249,1 morphe, figure, 215,8.21.22; 217,19.27; 218,5; 317,14.23; outline, 304,25; 305,3 morphoun, give a figure, 218,3 naus, ship, 197,5 neatos, shortest, 245,8

221

neneukenai, naturally tend towards, 288,24.28; 292,7.25; 289,6 neuron, sinew, 224,18; 240,11; 307,18 noein, have in mind, 225,31; 235,17; know, 207,1.13; understand, 196,17 nomizein, believe, 222,27; 318,5; 320,14; passim nomos, custom, 273,4; prescription, 212,28; 213,5-11 nosein, be sick, 197,22 nosddes, diseased, 200,17 nous, intellect, 200,23.26; 202,21; 229,8-11; 312,10.18.19; mind, 263,13; 264,10.14; 293,9-296,5; 301,3; sense, 235,12; 237,20 oikeios, appropriate, 256,13-23; 265,3; 290,13.27; 291,1; 329,12; own 195,31; proper, 220,21; 229,23; 233,22; 237,14; 242,21; 243,23.27; 262,15 oikothen, from within, 206,19.20 okheisthai, ride, 242,3 onoma, name, 216,22; 259,25; 260,9; 320,22; 321,8; word, 207,12; 212,19; 222,18; 225,22; 283,8; 290,1; 327,32 onomazein, name, 211,5; 216,8 on, thing which is, 273,17 onto, things which are, 229,4; 261,19; passim toi onti, in reality, 250,3; 301,5 ontds, really, 248,5.7 ophelein, benefit, 313,15-20 ophelimos, beneficial, 313,14 opsis, sight, 196,31; visual phenomenon, 227,1; 228,1; 233,6 optikos, student of optics, 233,14 orektos, desired, 305,1.4 orexis, desire, 196,33 organikos, instrumental, 241,17 organon, instrument, 197,8; 241,24; 306,3; 330,3 orthos, correct, 207,23 orthds, correctly, 277,9.10; 321,23 oun, so, 194,16, passim (see also men oun) ouranios, celestial, 325,24; 332,1; heavenly, 198,15 ourania, heavenly things, 304,23; heavens, 219,20; things celestial, 222,21; 262,21.23; 332,1 ouranos, heaven, 219,33; 262,1; 293,24 ousia, being, 306,5; essence, 197,33; 223,5; 332,1; property, 287,17;

222

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substance, 194,8; 199,25.29; 203,15; 204,15-19; 205,2.5.15; 207,15; 212,5.12-24; 219,16.23.26; 220,3; 223,13.21; 227,14; 240,1; 242,7; 301,12; 327,23.24; 328,3 ousiodes, substantial, 218,9.10; 222,9; 327,31 ousioun, substantialise, 212,21 oxus, swift, 262,10 palaios, ancient, 222,18; 227,15; 228,26; 312,1 palaioteros, older, 194,7; 207,21 pan, universe, 201,15; 202,11.12; 229,10; 240,26; 246,27; 293,22; 296,1; 312,12 ou pan haplos, not absolutely every, 236,15 epi pantos, all-embracing, 296,5 pantei, entirely, 301,4; passim pantelos, absolutely, 220,16 ou pantelos, not absolutely, 222,21; not at all, 226,21 pantos, certainly, 222,6; 254,21; 310,8; in every case, 236,16; 288,11; 291,17; passim ou pantos, not at all, 199,13; not entirely, 251,24; not in every case, 236,16; 242,25.27; 258,10; 271,5; 273,4; 284,11.14; 327,1 paradeigma, example, 247,1; passim; paradigm, 244,13 paradeigmatikos, paradigmatic, 241,18 paradidonai, hand down, 237,27; 242,8; transmit, 248,15; 253,10 paragein, bring about, 321,17; derive, 290,1 parakolouthein, attend upon, 199,21; 253,10; be a feature that follows, 243,11; follow on, 242,8; 268,5.20; 273,10.16; passim paralambanein, take in addition, 231,7; take into account, 226,18.22; select, 233,16; 239,11.15; 245,18; 311,6; 319,27; 322,11-15; 326,31; 329,15; 330,29; 331,4 paraleipein, neglect, 228,14.23 paralimpanein, leave aside, 264,16 paralogizesthai, get (someone) con­ fused, 206,22 paralogos, beyond expectation, 275,5-11; 276,8.23 paraplesios, equivalent, 235,9; related, 268,18 paraplesids, similarly, 332,13.17.18 paraskeuazein, prepare, 326,17; render, 231,1.2

parataxis, line of battle, 287,25 paratithenai, furnish, 247,11 pareiskuklein, bring in, 195,9 parektrope, deviation, 319,19; 323,9 paremballein, insert, 237,12 parepesthai, follow, 269,33; 295,24 parerkhesthai, pass by, 265,26; 313,15 parienai, pass over, 234,1; 261,14; 303,6 pardnumos, paronymously, 195,1; 213,3.8.16; 234,3 parousia, presence, 209,23.24 paruphistasthai, be dependent on, 293,16; 294,24 pas, every, 201,13 {see also pan) paskhein, be affected, 287,5; 303,10.27; 304,2; 313,10; be experienced, 207,8; be the subject of, 213,3; experience, 263,20; 289,21.23; 318,10; have a relation to, 213,13; undergo, 281,12 peponthenai, be subject to, 208,12 pathos, attribute, 207,28.30; 208,4.11; 213,1; 219,17; passim; condition, 235,21 pauein, cease, 253,17.22; 322,14; stop, 235,14 pauesthai, stop, 237,6 pedalion, rudder, 197,7 peithein, persuade, 287,24 peratoun, limit, 235,17 periagein, turn, 230,26.27; whirl, 202,12 peridinisis, vortical motion, 262,10; 265,8 periekhdn, inclusive, 255,16 periekhon, atmosphere, 202,30; sur­ rounding atmosphere, 201,19 periektikos, comprehensive, 256,16 perilambanein, encompass, 298,13 periodos, circuit, 198,26 peripezion, foothills, 220,17 periphora, rotation, 198,15; 233,26; 244,2 perittos, superfluous, 272,8 phainesthai, (+ partic.) clearly, 195,25 phainomenos, apparent, 248,6 phalanx, column, 281,10; 283,6 phaneros, obviously, 203,4 phantazein, imagine, 224,23 phemi, I assert, 219,27; 225,5; 231,31; 242,25; 251,21; 272,9; 285,24; 291,21; 294,14; I call, 245,17; I mean, 200,14; 231,12; 243,3; 254,27; 257,19; 258,4; 274,2; 286,5; 297,4; 299,4.22; 301,21; 326,29; I say, 201,1; 299,13.15; 317,2; I would add, 302,8 phamen (hemeis), our own view is,

Greek-English Index 210,19; we say, 198,19; 200,26; 250,1; 278,12; 312,27; passim (in the passages noted Philoponus refers to himself; in the rest he refers to people in general) pherein, apply (trans.), 283,3; bear, 195,30.31; 203,24; 281,14; bring, 324,14; carry around, 314,18 pheresthai, be to be referred to, 216,22 philosophia, philosophy, 194,15 philosophos, philosopher, 199,20; 200,25 phoitan, frequent, 274,25-275,8 phonetikos, sounding, 329,19 phoneuein, kill, 261,4 phonos, killing, 261,5 phora, motion, 200,2; 290,9 phronesis, wisdom, 268,18; 321,2 phrontizein, pay attention to, 223,21; 228,26.28; 234,23 phthanein, arrive first, 236,2 phthartos, perishable, 194,15; 214,5; that perish, 199,19; 298,8.12; 303,5 phtheirein, destroy, 307,3 phtheiresthai, be destroyed, 307,7; 320,8-11; passim; perish, 198,3; 207,28; 213,17; 253,19; passim phthora, destruction, 201,25; 208,26; 217,25.26; 237,8; 243,9; 255,31; passing away, 218,14.18 phuein, be natural, 207,14; be of a nature, 221,21 phuesthai, grow, 320,2 phulattein, preserve, 196,15; 235,8; 237,13 phusansis, naturing, 211,8 phusikos, natural, 194,5; passim; natural philosopher, 213,26, passim phusike, natural philosophy, 222,17.20.26; 231,5; 302,4.16; Physics (of Aristotle), 301,3 phusikos, in a natural way, 338,14; naturally, 300,26.27.28; 302,12; 304,3-17; 306,11 phusiologein, speak as a student of nature, 241,29 phusiologia, study of nature, 218,25 phusiologos, student of nature; 312,17; passim phusis, nature, 194,17-195,3; 195,19.32; 196,13.14; 201,11; 296,4.5; passim phusin ekhein, have a nature, 195,2; 199,23.26; 200,15; 205,14-23; 207,18; passim kata phusin, in accordance with

223

nature, according to nature, 195,2; 199,29.30; 200,1.7-14; 201,11-27; 202,12; 205,9-21; 207,18; 219,21; 241,20; 262,14; 268,26.27; 269,29.32; 270,2; 274,2.6; 283,11; 288,17.19; 301,22; 302,21; 323,21; 331,11; 332,13; natural, 269,15 phusei, by nature, 194,3; 195,2; 200,8-30; 201,8-25; 202,17-28; 203,2; 205,9.26-22; 207,8.15.18; 209,23.24; 212,5.15; 215,12.14.23; 271,22; 292,21; 293,5; 307,8.28.33; 308,1-12.27; 309,3.27; 310,1; 311,17; 315,7.19-22; 317,5; 327,6 pinagoge, whirling, 262,13 pisteuein, believe in, 318,17 pistis, assurance, 206,9.19 pistoun, base, 284,19; persuade, 236,9 pithanos, plausible, 225,4 plane, deviation, 248,8 pleion, more, 230,28 pleiones, further, 250,26; majority, 303,5; more, 284,8; more than one, 239,28; 242,9; several, 203,16; 208,29.31; 213,28; 219,16; 244,12; 247,1; 323,25; various, 253,10; 333,21 plen, on the other hand, 283,2 pleonakhds, in several ways, 207,19 pleonexia, excess, 318,8 pneuma, spirit, 233,19 pneumatddes, wind-like, 329,19 poiein, act, 301,10.11; 313,12; 317.1.2; 325,2; construct, 229,16; create, 202,14; 303,9.25; do, 197,33; 323,15; 324,21; 325,6.8; make, 196,9; 204,12.13; 303,23; 323,30; 333,12; produce, 210,12; 216,6-21; passim poeisthai, construct, 221,8; engineer, 320,10; provide, 219,8 poidn, agent, 313,11.12; producing agent, 301,9.13 poietGs, producer, 236,27 poietikos, efficient, 195,3.5; 216,16.26; 229,4.6.; 233,28; 240,30; 241,4; passim; productive, 264,12.15 poion, quality, 221,1 pollakhos, as having many senses, 212,19; in many ways, 246,15; 255,1.4 polloi, majority, 200,24 polos, pole, 196,20; 198,21 poneros, weak, 207,3 porisma, corollary, 336,13 porrd, remote, 231,32-232,30; 248,18;

224

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passim porrdterd, remoter, 245,6 poson, quantity, 221,2 pragma, object, 207,1.5; something, 206,25; thing, 194,5; 195,20; 205,19; 207,10; 208,12.20; 216,15; passim oudenpragma, no point, 283,7 pragmateia, area of study, 298,8; 302,17.25; 303,14; treatise, 217,23; 228,16; 298,9.12; 301,2; 302,2.4 pragmateiodes, addressed to the matter in hand, 323,11 pragmateuesthai, busy oneself about, 223,10 praktos, made or done, 328,9.13.15 prattein, achieve, 316,4-8 praxis, act, 261,2; action, 282,1-3; 328,18; passim prepon, suited, 329,28 pro, before, 294,16.25; 295,2.5; prior to, 240,3 proagein, carry forward, 240,6; 285,23; induce, 236,5; introduce, 209,31 proairesis, choice, 202,21; 260,4; 261,5-9; 267,12; 268,7; passim; rational choice, 213,11 prodiretikos, choice-dependent, 268,30; 269,1.7; 289,20 prodiretos, chosen, 289,8-16; 290,18; 292,12; 300,11; 328,10 probainein, go on, 258,21; 316,27; pro­ ceed, 317,12 proballein, put forward, 231,27; 325,20 problema, problem, 259,14; 263,6; 298,15.16 proboli, putting forth, 320,10 prodUon, already obvious, 267,13; obvious at the start, 196,5; 285,2.5; 319,2; 322,5.14; 323,1 prodromos, preliminary, 327,1 proegeisthai, be prior to, 291,13; 293,1822; exist prior to, 293,27; 294,1 proegoumenos, straightforwardly, 272,24 proerkhesthai, proceed, 273,22; set out, 274,15; 276,16; passim proienai, go forward, 235,17; passim; proceed, 316,2; 317,11; 327,8 proektithenai, expound previously, 284,15 proginesthai, come to be in advance, 327,1 proion, later, 195,4; 316,27; 317,11 prokeisthai, be implicit in, 268,31; be proposed, 199,22; be (someone's)

task, 194,14.16; 282,24; 307,28; 308,9; be under consideration, 220,33; lie before, 199,22; 235,12; 245,19; 247,9; 291,2 prokheirizesthai, deal first, 234,13 prokoptein, advance, 240,8 prolambanein, go before, 295,24; take first, 315,25 pronoia, forethought, 261,20.26; 265,18; passim; intention, 281,19; pro­ vidence, 198,6; 312,2.6; passim proodos, journey, 269,7; 270,14 prophanes, quite plain, 248,6; 260,31 prophands, obviously, 199,11; 301,16; 317,3; 318,6 propherein, put forward, 238,5; 260,23 prophora, utterance, 249,20 pros, directed at, 251,28; 252,1-12; with respect to, 255,15 pros ti, relative, 232,33; 239,22; 254,16 prosagoreuein, designate, 211,18 prosaporein, be further puzzled, 251,17 prosaptein, apply (trans.), 243,25 prosarmozein, attach, 317,8; fit, 220,32 prosdiorismos, further specification, 238,30 prosekein, be near to, 287,16 prosekon, suited, 233,17 prosekhes, proximate, 195,7; 198,14; 212,8; 231,12.14.32; 232,1-30; 233,23; 244,4.6; 245,5; 248,18, 302,7.8; passim; relevant, 233,9; what comes next [above], 302,6 prosekhos, in the first place, 240,22; proximately, 196,33; 197,4.19; 244,11; 302,9.26 prosepinoein, further think of, 219,30; 224,26 proserkhomai, approach, 297,26 proskhresthai, use in addition, 226,11 proslogizesthai, add calculations, 220,2; calculate in addition, 220,12 prosomilein, encounter, 280,3 prosopon, person, 323,12; personality, 263,10 prosphues, fitted, 220,26 prospiptein, fall on, 296,23.26 prospoieisthai, lay claim to, 241,19 prosrhegnunai, dash against, 291,18 prosrhema, label, 243,26 prostithenai, add, 197,22; 234,26; 257,18; 293,3; passim; apply (trans.), 238,24 prosupakouein, understand, 204,4; understand in addition, 299,9 prosuparkhein, further belong to,

Greek-English Index 224,28 protasis, premise, 247,5; passim proteinein, propose, 336,5 proteros, earlier, 260,21; 261,11.14; 293,24; 295,3; 309,4; 315,24; 320,6; 322,21; first, 195,19; 259,23; 266,21; 284,20.21; 306,18.19.25; 308,15; 319,25; 325,23; 326,2.4; 332,19; former, 190,15; 312,22; prior, 295,7-30; 328,11 proteron, previously, 219,7; rather, 320,12; sooner, 298,27 proterds, prior, 255,2 prothesis, goal, 269,31 protithenai, intend, 202,2; 235,13; 270,23; 290,24; 313,10-25; 321,27; put forward, 266,20 protos, first, 194,8.15; original, 310,22; primary, 323,23; prime, 232,6.29; 244,8 protds, primarily, 196,16-32; 197,1-21; 198,1; 204,25; 302,18,304,22 prdtistos, very first, 304,24 proiiparkhein, pre-exist, 290,28; 291,1.3; 305,24 proiipokeisthai, be laid down pre­ viously, 326,8 pseudonumos, pseudonymously, 276,30 psukhe, mental abilities, 207,3; soul, 195,22.24 rheton, paragraph, 334,1; remark, 215,20; 302,6.11 rhope, inclination, 195,29; tendency, 239,10; 329,17 rhuthmos, organisation, 213,7 semainein, signify, 213,9; 214,16.18; 216,29; 290,20; 310,1; 320,1 semainomenon, sense, 207,24; 210,33; 216,1; signification, 234,2; 237,22; 249,15.17; thing signified, 274,18; 310,1 semantikos (einai), signify, 197,31; 338,8.10 semasia, significance, 283,1.8 simeion, point, 222,14; 296,22.25; 299,11-13; sign, 198,27; 208,1; 285,9.11; 286,9.10; 289,26.28 semeiousthai, note, 271,17 simos, snub, 226,15; 234,5 simotes, snubness, 229,16; 228,4; 234,6.9 skeuaria, household possessions, 230,15 skeuastos, artificial, 247,3 skeuos, household object, 232,7

225

skhema, figure (of syllogism), 209,20; passim; shape, 207,29.30; 208,4; 212,30; 213,1.3.10; 215,1; 219,17-32; 220,3-30; passim skhematizein, fashion, 290,7; 338,2; shape, 211,15; 308,24 skhesis, relation, 206,27; 220,13; 221,11; 240,29; 310,27; role, 336,7; state, 300,15 skhoUi, in vain, 222,10 skopein, enquire, 222,12; 240,11; look at, 220,34; 240,12; 303,9-16; 325,7; 336,8.9 skepteon, we must look at, 266,12 skopimos, purposeful, 309,3.25; 324,1 skopos, aim, 195,14; 200,16.18; 229,28; 230,7; 235,424; 237,7; 262,27; 298,4; 307,11; 309,24; 310,11; passim sdizein, preserve, 327,29 sdma, body, 197,34; 212,16-26 somatikos, bodily, 199,25; 300,8 sophos, clever, 308,24; sage, 263,11 speudein, strive, 211,8 sphaira, sphere, 198,28 sphallesthai, be at fault, 206,17 spoudazein, hasten, 206,11.32 stasis, stability, 196,12-18; 198,20.21; 203,4-11; 211,27,32; 247,20; standing still, 196,20; 198,11; state of rest, 235,19 stegein, preserve, 236,22 stereisthai, be deprived of, 203,8 sterisis, privation, 201,12; 217,19218,12; 243,23.25 stokhazesthai, make out, 210,22; pursue, 196,22.24; 201,12.13; 230,7; 298,5; 301,21; 309,23.27; 310,3; 317,16 stoikheion, element, 212,26; 213,28; 297,21; 326,27; letter, 247,1 sullabe, syllable, 247,2 sullogismos, logical argument, 207,4; syllogism, 209,19; 272,2-11; 281,3.6.18; 285,20; passim; syllo­ gistic argument, 282,17.29; 284,15 sullogistikos, syllogistic, 327,8; passim sullogizein, conclude syllogistically, 271,27; draw conclusions, 329,5.8.11.30; 337,18; syllogise, 209,23 sumbainein, arise, 254,22; be a feature of, 207,1; happen, 197,24; 201,23; 203,22; 204,1; 246,15; 255,24; passim; happen to be a feature of, 270,12; hold true of, 203,17; 220,1; 255,25; turn out, 210,9; 223,4;

226

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242,9; 252,28; 298,8; with the result that, 236,26 sumbainon, (accompanying) feature, 219,29.31; result, 289,4; what holds true of, 226,27 sumban, result, 288,15.20; 289,1-3 sumbebekos, accident, 199,27-9; 204,20; 219,26; property, 222,21.24; 226,23; result, 288,23 kata sumbebekos, per accidens, 194,12; passim sumballesthai, contribute, 233,19; 240,9.11; 314,23 sumbole, engagement, 260,8; 273,13 sumbouleuein, recommend, 246,1 summetria, balance, 337,21; symmetry, 213,7 summetros, commensurable, 299,10.19.22 summiktos, blended together, 314,9.13 sumparalambanein, take additionally into account, 226,20 sumpaskhein, have an affinity, 314,21 sumperainein, conclude, 272,9; round off, 214,14 sumperasma, conclusion, 247,6; passim sumperiagein, carry round, 198,15; 262,9; 265,7 sumperiekhein, comprise together, 338,12 sumperilambanein, embrace, 198,6; embrace together, 228,15; 241,23 sumpheresthai, coincide, 320,27 sumphonos, consonant, 276,5 sumphonos, consonantly, 276,9 sumphiheirein, perish together with, 253,18 sumphues, innate, 220,22 sumpiptein, come to pass, 307,13 sumplekein, compound, 248,26; 323,1; 330,8 sumpeplegmenos, complex, 195,8; compound, 248,9.24; 249,15; 250,9; 251,14.19; 252,9.18; com­ pounded, 253,2; 257,5.17.18; 258,5 sumplerein, complete the composition of, 205,2 sumplerosis, completion, 306,16 sumplerdtikos, filling out, 253,7 sumploke, compounding, 249,16; 250,16.27; 251,1.10.28; 252,1.4.10; 328,4 sumptoma, accident, 308,3; 315,13-18; 316,11; 321,30; mischance, 235,25 ek sumptomatos, accidental, 308,3.4 sunagein, bring together, 328,28; collect

together, 269,23; follow, 295,17; infer, 226,6; 249,9; 267,1; 272,12; passim sunagoge, fusing, 231,3 sunaitios, contributory cause, 241,3 sunamphoteron, combination, 212,22; 329,23.28 sunanalambanein, take up together, 241,24 sunaptein, add on, 237,18.30; 247,9 sundesmos, conjunction, 336,21 suneisagein, do (something) to further, 314,22.25 sunekheia, continuity, 237,3 kata sunekheian, in a continuous fas­ hion, 237,5 sunekhein, hold together, 198,4 sunekhes, continuous, 215,20; 235,9.11; 262,10; 302,11 sunekhos, continuously, 283,22; passim sunektikos, holding together (trans.), 198,3 sunelonti, in summary, 288,29 sunemphainesthai, appear together, 337,26 sunepinoein, think of as well, 220,11; think of together, 249,23 sunerithos, accomplice, 310,17.18.21; 316,23 sunerkhesthai, come together, 262,6; 314,18-27 sunetheia, general usage, 259,25; habit, 268,2; 283,2; 287,15 sunethes, habitual, 274,26; 275,4 sungeneia, kinship, 222,20 sunistanai, form, 265,1.2; 320,7.8; put together, 202,27; 227,1; 236,23; 240,14; 297,25; 312,6; 313,29 sunkeisthai, be composed, 208,12; 214,8; 290,2; 326,11 sunkeimenos, composite, 215,13 sunkhein, confound together, 261,18 sunkhdrein, agree, 199,9 sunklothein, spin, 320,23 sunkrima, amalgam, 314,23 sunkrinein, bring together, 264,13; com­ pare, 233,8 sunodos, coming together, 324,4 sunoran, see at a glance, 321,1 sunousia, intercourse, 323,28 suntakteon, should be joined, 237,16; 302,6 suntaxis, sequence, 237,12.19.28; 299,7 suntelein, contribute, 221,29; further, 240,10 sunthesis, combination, 220,8; 232,11;

Greek-English Index 247,14.16; 311,9 sunthetos, composed, 212,22; composite, 212,27; 225,1; 247,4; 249,20-5; 253,7; 298,5 suntithenai, compose, 282,17; 308,23 suntomos, brief form, 246,24 suntomos, summarily, 195,13 suntrekhein, coincide, 197,26; 306,1 suntukhia, conversation, 278,5 suntunkhanein, converse, 278,4 sustasis, state of affairs, 315,6; 318,24; 319,5.14; 322,1; structure, 313,1 sustoikhos, correlative, 254,19 sustrephein, collect together, 320,1 tattein, order, 322,10; 326,19 tautologein, repeat oneself, 296,13 ^automaton, spontaneity, 195,13; passim (see automaton) taxis, order, 232,3; 264,26; 319,26.27; passim; rank, 256,12; 264,20; station, 261,24 tekhne, art, 199,31; passim teknei, by art, 200,23.32; 201,6; 202,9.29; 203,2; 271,22; 310,2; with art, 311,2 apo tekhnes, artificial, 196,7; by art, 204,13; from art, 203,18; results of art, 202,20 kata tekhnen, according to (in accord­ ance with) art, 199,31; 201,4.5; 202,9; 214,20; 215,1; 268,21.23; 317,1; matters of (concerning) art (the arts), 216,11; 238,6; 239,12; 317,24; 321,23; the arts, 239,14 para tekhnen, against art, 200,22.32; 201,5.6; 323,22 teknetos, artificial, 210,20 tekhneton, artifact, 196,12; 200,32.33 tekhnikos, artistic, 201,34; in a profes­ sional manner, 258,17; relevant to a professional approach, 258,25 tekhnites, artist, 201,5; 202,9; 203,20; 213,10; craftsman, 229,23.30; 230,7; 232,7.17; 234,26; 239,14; 244,1; 248,22-5; 250,24; passim tekhnoun, train, 254,13 tektainesthai, fashion, 238,32.33 tektonike, carpentry, 243,16 teleios, accomplished, 281,15; complete, 329,20; 338,12.15; perfect, 212,3; 236,19; 301,5; 322,5 teleios, completely, 296,9; 314,8.12 teleidtikos, perfecting, 200,1.13 teleutan, conclude, 297,4; 335,11; 336,25; terminate, 316,2 teleute, end, 236,5; 309,16

227

telikos, final, 195,3.5; 216,17; 270,13; 233,29; 241,4; 290,26; 297,18; passim telikotatos, most final, 230,13; 246,11 telos, end, 196,22.25; 212,3; 216,6.14.26; 229,6-230,19; passim; end-state, 198,22-31; 211,5-18; 217,14.16; 292,5.6.23 pros to telos, [lead(s)] to the end, 230,18; 246,18 teds, for a time, 195,17; to start with, 260,21; 263,15 teras, monster, 200,20.25; passim thaumastikds, (placed) to express wonder, 264,23 thaumastos, extraordinary, 263,14.16; marvellous, 311,9; remarkable, 313,23; 322,24; 323,29 thaumazein, be surprised, 372,3; marvel, 311,10; wonder, 265,10 thews, divine, 194,13; 304,19 thelein, like, 200,28; mean, 248,4; want, 224,29; 226,3; 241,31; 242,7; 249,10; 263,23; 334,18; wish, 193,22; 222,5; 298,27; 321,17; with the desire to, 318,11 thelus, female, 194,11.12 theologein, speak as a theologian, 241,28 theologos, theologian, 300,10.29 theorem, contemplate, 350,20; observe, 249,26; 250,5; 284,16.17.24; 290,14; 300,13.16; regard, 280,9.12; 253,7; study, 219,31.33; 220,26.29; 221,1; 227,8.10.17; 335,9 thedrima, conclusion, 253,10; 254,13; 258,25; 259,2 thedria, theorising, 328,19-28; 335,2336,4; 336,11.15.24 therapeia, service, 233,18 therapeuein, cure, 289,19 thermansis, heating, 211,6 thesis, convention, 213,9; position, 262,18; 288,7.8; positioning, 307,14 thnetos, mortal, 240,1 thumiamata, incense, 247,3 thumos, anger, 228,18; 329,23 dia ti, on account of what, 205,27; reason why, 243,5.6; why, 247,3 ti in einai, essence, 244,34; 247,14.15; 305,25 (Philoponus uses this phrase in this book only when quoting Aristotle) ti esti, essence, 298,19.21; 299,4.8; 301,17; 304,25; what it is (what

228

Greek-English Index

they are), 205,26; 206,2 ti pote esti, what (it) actually is, 194,13.20; 195,1; 204,4.26; 207,17; 259,17.21; passim ho tipote esti, whatever is, 202,28 tithenai, lay, 276,18; lay out, 287,23; 310,30; posit, 207,6; 208,21; 209,16.31.32; 214,18; 232,31; 245,5; 248,8; passim; put, 267,20; passim tmema, segment, 249,5 toiosde, such, 196,10 toioutos, this sort of, 198,31 topikos, in place, 199,10 topos, place, 195,31.32 tranes, manifest, 198,5 trittos, threefold, 303,2; triple, 195,6; 202,19 tropos, manner, 253,9; 257,14; 259,6; 263,3; passim; mode, 194,10, 219,28; type, 246,22.25; 249,7.10; 256,21; 257,23.25; 281,2 tukhe, chance, 195,11.13; 213,18; 259,7; passim to kata tukhen, chance things, 277,2.3 tunkhanein, attain, 196,25; 198,23; 230,16; 237,7; 267,10; passim; chance, 261,21; 283,6; happen, 201,5

hoper etukhe, what chances to befall, 311,19; passim hopos etukhe, as befalls, 307,12; passim hopos an tukhei, as it may chance to befall, 320,22 hos etukhe, as chance befalls, 311,17; passim tukhon, just any, 203,1; 232,33; 233,1; 254,18.19; 258,17; 277,23; per­ haps, 213,18; 279,3; passim; say (parenthetical), 208,25; passim xulon, log, 208,22.23; 212,9.20; timber, 241,12; wood, 207,30-208,16 zetein, ask; 195,22; 200,20; 207,19; 212,10; 240,13; passim; enquire, 194,20.21; 228,15; 243,13-16; 250,6; passim; pursue, 205,26; seek, 206,8.13; 250,21; passim zetesis, enquiry, 249,12; 253,32; 306,24; 308,9 zoe, life, 197,34 zoion, animal, 195,26; 239,28; (living) creature, 231,14; 236,20; 327,23; passim zotikos, by way of life, 241,22

Subject Index

References are to the page and line numbers of Vitelli's edition in volume 16 of the Berlin CAG. I cannot claim exhaustive coverage even for the items entered, but I hope the important occurrences are covered. The main entries are alphabetical, but for the sub-headings and sub-sub-headings it seemed more sensible to group them roughly according to topics. absolute (or substantial) becoming, 218,9 abstraction, as giving knowledge of formless, 219,6-7 action contrasted with theorising re ordering of necessary sequence, 328,17-30, 335,2-7,336,23-5 relevant to natural philosophy but not to mathematics, 335,27-336,3 goes with choice, 285,23-5 linked through well-doing to happi­ ness, 285,9-11.14-17,286,9-13 does not apply to children, inanimate or irrational things, 282,14-17 actuality, see also: cause linked to form and nature, 208,32209,16; 215,3-5 alteration, generation, and destruction, 217.24- 6 Anaxagoras on causes, 229,8-14; 264,10.13-14; 312,10.16-7 ancients stressed matter rather than form, 228.25- 229,16; 234,21-3 (but cf. also 303,14-17) reduce necessity and causation to matter, 312,1-7 at best touch on the efficient cause, 312,10-20 ant as evidence of teleology, 311,11-12 Antiphon pushes demonstration too far, 206,21-7 on squaring the circle, 206,22-3

on matter as nature, 207,21-2; 207,25208,11 appropriateness, 256,12-19 of ends, vis-a-vis fruitlessness, 290,25291,9,291,26-292,2 equated to 'per se', 256,23 Aristophanes, 263,8 Aristotle criticised over abstraction,225,5-29 criticised over arguments for teleology, 309,9-310,15,310,23-9 Aristotle's works Categories, 254,15,255,26 DeAnima, 195,22, 228,16, 301,3 De Caelo, 219,19,298,1,303 3 De Generatione et Corruptione, 218,14.17, 225,17,301,4 De Philosophia, 237,19.26 'Ethics', 237,26 (see note ad loc.) Eudemian Ethics, 335,2 Metaphysics, 298,10,303,2-3; book 12, 304,21 Posterior Analytics, 205,25,206,9, 221,2,329,22 Physics book 8,301,3 logical works (Topics?), 336,6 scientific treatises, 298,12, 303,4 art divided into architectonic and produc­ tive, 238,9-22 of steersmanship as architectonic 'in a way', 238,29-33 fourfold division of, re form and matter, 238,9-24 as recognising both matter and form, 229,16-25

229

?

230

Subject Index

knows proximate but not remote matter, 231,27-232,20 disanalogy between art and nature because nature creates its own proximate matter, 230,20-231,26, 238.2- 9; 239,14-21 compared to nature, 214,22-215,5, 325.3- 11 as descending into material, 325,23 compared to nature re what is 'against' it, 200,31-201,9 'by art' contrasted with 'by nature' in application to parts, 202,23-203,2 imitates nature, 200,31,208,7-8, 229,17-18,234,25-6; see also: teleology knows both end and means, 229,26230,5 belongs to the normal rather than the necessary or the exceptional, 267,9-10 involves choice, 213,10-11, or rational choice, 271,22-3 does not imply deliberation, 268,12-16, 321.1- 13,325,3-6 goes wrong through unsuitability of substrate, 318,6-7 artifacts compared to natural things re hypo­ thetical necessity, 331,12-23 used in argument to show form is nature, 208,32-209,12 belong to the normal rather than the necessary or the exceptional, 267,7-10 depend on rational choice, 213,10-11 depend on reasoning but not choice, 268,12 not similar to what causes them, 301,16 astronomy, see: mathematics, geometry as branch of mathematics, 222,19-20 and natural philosophy, 222,16-17 and demonstration, 221,2-19 and astrology, 222,17-19 Autolycus, 220,4-9 bed Antiphon's argument re, 208,1-6, 210.2- 4.21.29-32 bee as evidence of teleology, 311,8-10 bodiless things matterless, 300,9-10 contrasted with what is generated, 300,5-8

four causes, listed, 241,10-12, 246,4247,1, 296,16, 297,30, 298,17; denned, 241,15-17; as principles of natural things, 243,12-18; all four are per se, 242,11 matter and form as contributory, effi­ cient and final as strict causes, 241,3-5 material, 208,20.26-9 material, as 'that from which', 243.21- 9; as associated with spon­ taneity, 265,18-22 matter and privation, 243,21-9 material cause internal, efficient cause external, 243,29-244,3 examples of material cause (including letters for syllable, premises for conclusion), 247,1-6, 305,21-5 formal studied by natural philosophy when involving matter, 233,20-33 form and essence, 247,14-18 formal largely neglected by the ancients, 228,25-229,15 paradigmatic, mentioned by Plato but not adopted by Aristotle, 241,1723,242,3-7; as name for formal cause, 244,14-23 instrumental, assimilated to material cause for Aristotle, but has no role in generating the elements, 241,23-242,7 efficient, as first cause of change and coming to rest, 245,23-246,1; divided into moved (eternal and perishable) and unmoved, 298,6-12,302,26; in Empedocles, 229,3-6; includes chance and spontaneity, 283,11-16 seed as efficient and material cause, 247.22- 9 final cause, deferred, 303,6-7; as good or apparent good, 248,2-8 intermediate final causes, 246,2-12 functions and instruments, 246,12-14 final and efficient related as spon­ taneity and fruitlessness, 290,25-6 coincidence, of formal, final, and effi­ cient causes, 195,4-5; 216,16-18; 305,2-3; 317,17-18; in form though not in number, 297,30-298,6; often but not always occurs, 301,8-16; of final and efficient causes, 304,26305,8 general classification of causes, 248,12-252,14

Subject Index proximate, and remote, 248,21-3; 255,11-17; 256,1-6; and remote, treated as particular and genus, 257,27-258,1; 258,13-14; as 'highest', or cause in strictest sense, 258,18; efficient cause coin­ cides in form (but not number) with end and form, 301,25-302,3 simple and compound, 248,23-7; 257,17-20 potential and actual, 248,27-249,5 per se and per accidens, 242,17-243,3; 248,17-20; 254,24-33; 255,19256,6; 293,10-296,5 total of forty-eight types of cause, 249,8 problem in classifying the causes, 249,9-32; solution to this problem, 250,1-16 the four simple terms to be com­ pounded (sculptor, craftsman, white, coloured), 250,22-6 compoundings of the four simple terms, 251,2-16 problem arising from the compounding of the simple terms, 251,17-21; solution to this problem, 251,21252,14 things caused, can be divided similarly to causes, 252,15-19; are material or formal, not efficient or final, 252,19-21 strictly only the formal is caused, but the material is derivatively so, 252,21-8 examples of how the classification of causes can apply to caused things, 252,28-253,5 form as taken in different ways when cause and when caused, 253,5-8 symmetry of causes and things caused preserved despite an apparent asymmetry between actuality and potentiality here, 253,11-29; 258,9-14 cause and what is caused as symmetri­ cal, 275,1-2 causes and things caused should be given correlatively, 254,2-12; 258,25-259,5; this solves a prob­ lem in the Categories, 254,13-23 mutual causation, 242,12-16 causes should be given in the most proximate form, 253,30-254,2; 258,16-22 appropriateness applied to causes, 256,12-19; equated to 'per se',

231

256,23 per se causes prior to per accidens ones, 293,13-18; 295,11-12 causes as determinate or indeter­ minate, 259,26-261,1; 263,1619.27; 264,11-15.24 per se causes determinate, per accidens ones indeterminate, 273,26-9; 276,10-22 per accidens causes, arguments for existence of, 273,19-26; homony­ mous or pseudonymous, 276,29-30 proximate chance cause is more a cause of the result than remote chance cause, 277,24-278,21; 279,11-14; further example of this, 278,24-279,8 same thing as cause of opposites, 242,17 causation by presence and by absence, 242,17-243,3 can move things naturally without itself being natural, 304,11-20 not always like what it acts on, even when natural, 301,8-16; 304,16-18 in mathematics equals last definition, 299,5-6 'Why does (a) man die?' answered in terms of each of the four causes, 297,24-8 chance and spontaneity, see also: teleo­ logy, fruitless, luck introduced, 195,10-13 are among per accidens causes, 259,11-12; 269,21-2; 276,30-1 as indeterminate, 260,6-7; 276,6.10; 277,5-8; 293,5-7 sometimes taken to be divine and supernatural, 266,8-11 main discussion, 259,9-296,5 programme for discussion: the four questions, 259,9-22 first question: do they exist?, 259,23261,10 arguments against their being causes, 259,23-260,19 not treated traditionally as causes, 260,17-19; 263,10-13 arguments in favour of their being causes, 260,20-263,2; 263,16-24 earlier thinkers criticised for not dis­ cussing, 261,14-17.28-9; 264,26.16-20; 265,25-8 as applying to particulars, not to cosmic phenomena, 262,20-263,2; 265,9-14 second question: What are they?,

232

Subject Index

266,18-270,28 wide and narrow senses of'spon­ taneity', 266,22-5; 284,4-8 spontaneity in wide sense denned, 270,1-4 to be discussed in terms of their effects, 266,25-9 associated with the material cause, 265,18-22 belong to the exceptional, 262,28; 265,14; 266,3; 267,25-9; 268,7-8; 276.24- 7; 293,14-15; 307,30-2; 315,10-11 don't exhaust the exceptional, 271,5-11 belong to what is for the sake of some­ thing, 267,29-268,8; 271,15-23; but are not themselves for the sake of something, 274,10-21 things in our power include the equally balanced, but not the unvarying, normal, exceptional, or chance, 267,11-17 things in our power include choice, 268.9- 10 third question: chance and spon­ taneity (narrow sense) distin­ guished, because only chance belongs to the realm of choice, 268.10- 11; 269,30-2; 271,19-23; 283,9-11; 292,10-12; because chance belongs to reasoning or choice, but spontaneity to nature, 268.25- 7; 268,31-269,2 chance and spontaneity, denned, 268.26- 269,2; 270,22-8; distin­ guished from other per accidens causes, 270,4-22 chance denned, 269,23-7; 276,3-4 spontaneity denned, 269,28-30; 288,28-289,6 examples of chance, 269,2-13 examples of spontaneity, 269,13-22 generic and specific definitions of chance and spontaneity, 270,22-8 vis-a-vis choice, 271,15-23; 289,9-25 occur when what normally arises from reason or nature, respectively, arises per accidens, 272,23-273,16 occur when per accidens causes follow on what is for the sake of some­ thing, 273,29-274,2 chance as beyond expectation, 275,56.10-11; 276,7-8.22-4 spontaneity (as against chance) has its cause inside, though per accidens, 275,16-19

spontaneity (as against nature) has its cause outside, 292,20-7 sense in which the cause in chance and spontaneity is 'outside', 288,22289,6 partial summary on second and third questions, 274,2-6 fourth question: chance and spon­ taneity classified among efficient causes, 283,11-16; 293,3-5 spontaneity lacks determinate effi­ cient causes, 291,19-23; 293,5-7 spontaneity (wide sense), wider than chance, 282,24-9; 284,4-12; 286,8; syllogistic argument for this, 281,2-282,24; inductive proof of its affirmative premise, 281,8-17; syl­ logistic chain proof of its negative premise, 281,18-282,4 chance, said to be unclear, unstable, and a cause of nothing, 276,6-8; a cause of nothing, 276,27-277,4; 277,16-18; unclear because indeterminate, and indeterminate because per accidens, 276,19-20; 277.7- 8; indeterminate because exceptional, 277,21 'chance' used for what emerges from chance, 278,21 proximate and remote chance causes are all equally chance, but prox­ imate are more of a cause of the result, 277,24-278,21; 279,11-14; further example of this, 278,24279,8 chance, linked to action, and thereby to choice, via good luck, well-doing and happiness, 284,28-285,27; 286,9-13; does not apply to child­ ren, inanimate, and irrational things (except by analogy, 287.8- 20), though spontaneity does, 281,6-282,24; 286,6-7; 287,23-4 chance and spontaneity as exhaustive alternatives to teleology, 308,3-4; 315,14-15 spontaneity does not apply to what happens suitably to a thing's nature, 288,9-13 not all spontaneous things (wide sense) happening to those with choice belong to chance, 289,14-20 etymology of'spontaneity', 289,28291,9; 291,26-292,2 change, see also: movement caused by form, 211,27-33

Subject Index has source but not cause in road to form, 211,33-212,4 caused internally for natural things, externally for artifacts, 195,4-6.15 children as subjects for spontaneity, 281,4282,24; 284,16; 286,7 not subjects for choice, action, well- or ill-doing, happiness, or chance, 281,18-282,24; 284,17; 286,6-7; 287,23-4; except by similitude or analogy, 286,25-287,4; 287,8-20 choice as cause, 260,4; 261,5-7.9 concerned with the equally balanced, 267.11- 14 covers things in our power, but not natural things and artifacts, 268,9-10 in art, 213,10-11 goes with action, 285,23-5 linked to chance, 285,22-7; 289,9-25 does not apply to children, inanimate, or irrational things, 282,14-15 choice-dependent impulse (proairetike horme), 269,1.6-7 colours existence of cannot be demonstrated, 206,27-31; 207,11-14 commensurability denned, 299,22-3 commentators, 209,29 composite of matter and form as substance, 212,15-18 as nature, 212,27 as 'by nature' rather than nature, 215.12- 14 recognising nature of, 223,7-8 composite substances Platonic Forms treated as, 225,31226,4 conclusion place in logical arguments, 336,3-15 related to premise, problem, and pro­ position, 336,6-8 contraries and opposites, 218,9-18 corollaries, 336,12-15 death not the end (i.e. 'that for the sake of which') of life, 236,7-237,8; 309,17-19 not 'against nature', 201,25-7 definition three kinds of, illustrated by anger, 228,16-24; 329,21-8 as prior to the many particulars,

233

240,2-5 last definition as the form, 298,26299,3 as involving matter, 337,23-338,4; 338,6-15 drawn from combination (of form and matter) best suited to natural philosopher, 329,27-8 source of knowledge of form, and also of matter, 329,4-330,2 should accord with common concep­ tions, 277,13-14; 299,25-6 deliberation depends on lack of wisdom, 268,15-16; 321,2 does not belong to artist (or craftsman) as such, 268,12-16; 321,1-13 absence of, no argument against nature being teleological, 320,28321,20; 235,3-4 Democritus on causes, 228,28 explanation of properties by atoms, 262,15-19 use of chance, 261,31-262,20; 293,22 refutation of his argument that cosmic phenomena depend on chance, 293,1-296,5 demonstration is of the universal, 221,3-4 limits of, 206,4-207,7 and astronomy, 221,2-19 descending of nature, 197,34 desire role of in causation, 305,1-4 divine craftsman does not deliberate, 321,16-20 doctor as healing himself, 197,21-9; 204,8-11; 325,13-17 double prescription of, as example of non-continuous change, 235,20-5 efficient cause, see: cause elements as material cause, 241,26 and four qualities, 241,25-6 as unmoved, 198,12-17 parts of them as movable, 199,16-19; 264,27-265,6 subject to qualitative change, 198,32199,9 subject to change of place, 199,9-12 cyclic process in, 313,3-7 as spherical, 219,22-5 Empedocles, 214,9; 229,3; 264,8-9; 322,3; 323,12

234

Subject Index

on causes, 228,28 on efficient cause, 312,11 use of chance, 261,17-31 on monsters and natural selection, 314,7-315,6; 318,22-219,22 limits deviations, 319,8-12 use of'whole-natured', 319,28-320,11 end, see: teleology two senses, 'of which' and 'for which', 230,5-19; 237,19-27; 301,18-19 equals 'that for the sake of which', 235,5-6; 337,19-20 wider than 'that for the sake of which', 236,14-18 end 'of which', but not 'for which', same in number (though not in relation) as the form, 298,4-6; 301,18-25 natural, 290,12 end 'of which' pursued by nature, 301,20-2 appropriate, in definition of'fruitless', 291,26-292,2 equals last term when change is conti­ nuous, 235,9-236,4 death not the last term of a change which is continuous, 236,18-26; even if it is, this does not matter, 309,17-19 death not the end ('that for the sake of which') of life, 236,7-237,8; 309,17-19 equally balanced, 267,11-12 belongs to realm of choice, 267,11-14 essence, see also: substance and form, 247,14-18; 299,4; 305,25 last essence equals definition, which is form of the substrate, 298,21-2 recognition of, 223,5 eternity of species as replacing that of individual, 237,3-4; 305,17-25; 324,1-2 Euclid, 220,9-14.16 Euripides, 236,7.9; 237,29; 309,15 evil none in the universe, 201,16 exceptional, see: chance distinguished from unvarying (or necessary) and normal, 267,1-11; 270,33-271,1 covers, but wider than, chance and spontaneity, 270,33-271,1 overlaps with what is for the sake of something, 271,26-272,13; 283,20-3 existence as a good, 236,17; 237,3; 306,4-5 extension in three dimensions and prime

matter, 232,5-6; 244,8-9 figure, form, and nature, 215,20-3 final cause, see: cause fire as among traditional causes, 263,13 as appealed to by Heraclitus, 264,9 fitness relevance of in recipient of action, 313,8-11.25-7 forethought, see also: providence wrong to ascribe as cause of the excep­ tional, 265,15-22 form formal cause, see: cause and essence, 247,14-18; 299,4; 305,25 as last definition, 298,26-299,3 and nature coincide, 194,18-19 and matter and necessity, 326,5-19; 326,31-327,5; 328,8-12; 332,5-11 and matter as correlative, 232,32233,4 more of a cause than matter, 337,14 rather than matter, provides name for processes, 216,21-2 of natural things involves matter in their definition, for Aristotle, 224,23-31; 226,14-20 and matter known by same branch of knowledge 'up to a point', 232,2130; 234,26-235,2 formless known by analogy and abstraction, 219,6-7 form/matter hierarchy, 208,11-19; 213,23-9; 304,1-2 as nature, 208,30-210,32; 209,16-31 of each nature is determinate, 323,26-7 less articulated in plants than in ani­ mals, 319,15-19; 322,26-7 of natural things separable in thought unless they are taken to be them­ selves substances, 225,5-226,11 of natural things cannot be separated in thought for Aristotle, but can for Philoponus, 225,5-29 as separable only in definition and thought, not in reality, 215,9-11 and figure, 215,5-11; 305,3 spoken of in two ways, 217,20-218,6 and privation, 217,20-218,6 as source of change and rest, 211,27-33 and generation, 210,33-211,19; 303,17-25 natural and artificial distinguished, 210,19-32 as that for the sake of which, 332,8-11;

Subject Index 334,14-15 as end for natural things, 235,6-9; 303,17-25 as desired, 305,1-4 natural form as both efficient and final cause, 304,26-305,8 as caused, 257,7-8 taken differently when cause and when caused, 253,5-8 separable and eternal belong to first philosophy, generable and perish­ able belong to natural philosophy, 194,14-16 Platonic Forms, 240,3-4; treated as composite substances, 225,31226,4; not even separable in thought, let alone in reality, 221,25-8; 222,9-10; 224,3-225,8; 225,25-226,11; cf. 228,2 intermediate, 240,25-6 fruitless nature of, 289,28-291,9; 291,26-292,2 fruitlessness: spontaneity: :final cause: efficient cause::what is from chance: chance, 290,25-291,9 gives etymology of'spontaneous', 289.28- 290,7; 292,2-7 generation implies change, 300,13-14 does not apply to mathematical things or things chosen, 300,10-15 and form and nature, 210,33-211,19 named from end-state, 211,3-9; con­ trast between art and nature in this respect, 216,5-22; 217,3-6 further discussion of naming from endstate and from original state, 216,25-217,17 is of like from like, 240,22-3; 242,4; 272.29- 273,1; 297,16; 298,1-2; 305,17-18.20-1; 318,27-8 deviations from regularity are minimal, 318,25-319,1 is for the sake of making the form eternal, 393,17-25 spontaneous, of grass, 273,2-9 genus as substrate, 244,5-6 as matter for definition, 244,27-245,2 genera as parts of definition, 245,5-20 geometrical entities, 222,13-16; 227,20-4 definable without mentioning matter, 224,13-18 geometry, see: mathematics and abstraction, 223,24-6 contrasted with astronomy, etc. as pre­

235

scinding from matter, 227,20228,2 good and apparent good both count as final cause, 248,2-8 cosmic, 312,30 particular, 313,7 hand of dead man only homonymously hand, but its flesh fully flesh, 323,2-7 happiness similar to good luck, 285,9-10; 286,11.13-22 and misery, do not apply to children, inanimate, or irrational things, 281,26-30; 282,9-10 linked through well-doing to action, 285,9-11.14-17; 286,9-13 concerned with the soul, 286,13-22 harmonics, see: mathematics, geometry heavenly bodies, see also: astronomy as studied by mathematics, 220,25221,2 features of them, 219,19-22 and movement, 196,18-21; 198,912.19-30; 203,10-12; 313,2-3 constant in behaviour and least suita­ ble for explaining by chance, 262,20-263,2; 267,3-5 nothing exceptional among them, 266,4-5; 267,21-3 and necessity, 325,24-326,3; 330,1315; 332,1-2 Heraclitus, 264,9 higher sciences are of forms, 219,4-7 Hippocrates, 311,3-4 homogeneous and heterogeneous parts, 202,26; 232,1-3 former more matter-like than latter, 323,7 homoeomeries in Anaxagoras, 264,14; 312,15.19 inanimate and irrational things as subjects for spontaneity, 281,4282,24 not subjects for choice, action, well- or ill-doing, happiness or misery, chance, 281,18-282,24; 284,17; 286,6-7; 287,23-4; except by simi­ litude or analogy, 286,25-287,4; 287,8-20 inborn heat, 199,6-7; 241,23-2 inborn impulse (emphutos horme) no such for alteration in artifacts,

236

Subject Index

203,16-25; 204,3-5 induction, 281,8-17 infinite regress of demonstrations, 206,8-13 infinity studied by natural philosophy, 223,2; 284,19 of worlds in Democritus, 262,2-5 intellect for Anaxagoras, 229,8-12 interbreeding of species, 323,27-324,5 intermediate forms, 240,25-6 kingfisher as evidence of teleology, 311,10-11 knowledge of natural things implies knowledge of their causes, 241,5-8 disanalogy between art and nature re knowledge of matter, 230,20231,26 of proximate but not remote matter belongs to art, 231,27-232,20 linguistic arguments their significance or lack of it, 282,29283,9; 284,12-14; 287,15-20 love and strife as among traditional causes, 263,13 as belonging to Empedocles, 229,3; 264,8-9 luck, see also: chance good and bad, introduced, 279,16-20; apply in same sphere, 285,2-5; as dependent on sudden reversals, 280,14-17; do not apply to child­ ren, inanimate, and irrational things, 281,21-6; 282,8-11; except by similitude or analogy, 286,25287,4 good, as unstable, 280,19-22; a sort of well-doing, 285,7.12; similar to happiness, 285,9-10; 286,11.13-23 almost getting a large good or evil as bad or good luck respectively, 279,24-280,17 lyre-player example, 201,28-202,4; 202,7-9 material causes see: cause mathematical objects are not in matter, 298,25-6 are not moved or changed, 298,22-6; 300,12-13 have not their own reality, 306,9-10 exist in our thought, 298,24 do not come to be, and are not for the

sake of something, 334,12-13 mathematics distinguished from natural philos­ ophy, 219,25-221,2; 222,25223,14; 335,8-20 as prescinding from matter, 219,27220,17 separates forms in thought but not in reality, 221,30-1; 224,3-4 distinguished by use of abstraction, 223,17-22; 306,9-10 gives formal causes, 296,17-297,13; 335,20-336,3 circle and triangle examples of mathe­ matician's search for definition, 296,20-297,6 cause in, equals last definition, 298,26-9; 299,5-6; illustrations of this, 299,11-26 does not study the other three causes, 297.11- 13 necessity in, is hypothetical, 327,7; 332,14 compared with nature re necessity, 327,6-329,2; 332,14-29; 334,20-4; 335,20-336,3 astronomy, optics, harmonics as show­ ing natural forms involve matter in their definitions, 226,25-227,14 matter material cause, see: cause as one of the per se causes, 330,26-7 first substrate for substances, 984,8 one in number but not in definition, 984,9 conception of it reached by analogy, 984,9-10 strives after form, 984,10-11 indispensable for the form, 330,23-4; 331,4-6 for the sake of the form, 331,4-6.18 as for the sake of something, 334,15 and form, as correlative, 232,32-233,4 as unorganised, 212,5-10 and privation, 243,21-9 matter/form hierarchy, 208,11-19 proximate, 212,8; distinguished, 231.12- 23; 244,4-12; is form (and so can come to be), 252,28-9 hierarchy of levels of matter, 231,32232,6; 244,3-12 as second substrate, which has three dimensions but no qualities, 225,14-16 prime matter, and extension, 232,5-6; 244,8-9; formless, 232,29-30; does it exist?, 304,1-2

Subject Index as what endures throughout, 213,15-16 as eternal and unalterable, 214,3-10 as source of movement and rest, 211,23-7; 223,26-9; 226,13 as nature, 207,25-208,29; 213,14-29 confined, in explanations, to natural things and artifacts, 300,8-19 in strict sense, does not come to be or perish at nature's hands, 252,23; 257,11-12 predominant interest of the ancients, 228.25- 229,15 meteors, 200,20 mind as per se cause which is prior to per accidens and therefore to chance and spontaneity, 293,10-296,5 as among traditional causes, 263,13 as appealed to by Anaxagoras, 229,8-14; 264,10.13-14 universal and particular, 296,3-5 monsters, 200,20; 201,14-27; 305,20-1; 307,22; 309,21-4; 314,4-5; 320,8-9; 322,7.21.25; 331,10 'against' particular nature but 'accord­ ing to' universal nature, 201,23-5; 202,7-16 exceptional, and belong to chance or spontaneity, 226,2-4; 269,18-21 spontaneous, as lacking determinate efficient cause, 291,10-23 as dependent on art and nature respectively, 310,8-13.23-6 do not arise among plants, 319,13-20; 322,19-323,1; 323,10-11; or rarely, 323,19-22 movement and rest, see also: change used in definition of nature, 195,24196,29 and elements, 198,12-17; 198,32199,19 as applied to animals, plants, and elements, 203,3-12 and heavenly bodies, 196,18-21; 198,912.19-30 moved and unmoved causes, 298,6-12; 302.26- 303,5 mover of the heaven as the first of movers, 304,20-4 moving principle internal to natural things, 292,24-7 natural impulse {phusike hormi), 269,12.15-20; 273,10.15-16; 288,8-9; 289,17-18; 290,13; 291,11; 311,3 natural inclination {phusike rhope),

237

195,19 natural philosophy (or philosopher), study (or student) of nature to be distinguished from mathematics and theology, 219,1-2 distinguished from mathematics, 219,25-221,2; 222,25-223,14 what it has in common with mathe­ matics, 220,17-19 contrasted and compared with mathe­ matics, 335,8-336,3 distinguished from theology, 233,4-33; 239,25-240,31 not confined to study of substances, 219,15-27; 222,25-223,14 should study both form and matter, 229.15- 230,19; 231,27-233,4; 329,3-5 concentrates mainly on form, but with­ out ignoring matter, 228,13-15 as taking account of the matter, 219,27-220,17; 234,4-10 studies causes and forms only in so far as they involve matter, 233,20-33; 240,6-31 contrast with art re knowledge of matter, 230,20-231,26 cannot give the proximate matter for each individual, 297,20-2 takes the form from the definition, and infers the requisite matter, 329,45.10-20 perfect definition for him is that taken from combination (of form and matter), 329,27-8 only he will define material things, and by method of division and definition, 330,2-9 will the same natural philosopher dis­ cuss both matter and form?, 234.16- 18 studies the four causes where possible, 296,8-17; 297,13-28 deals only with causes which move by being moved, 302,13-24 does not discuss the unmoved cause, or separate forms, 300,28-301,1; 302,20-4 will 'at the height of his task' mention too the unmoved causes and what is above nature, 301,1-6 traditional natural philosophers, dealt only with the four causes, 303,1417; believed in absolute necessity, 326,8-24; 330,11-12 natural things spoken of in three ways, 205,17-23

238

Subject Index

have their cause, or source of movement and rest, in them­ selves, 195,24-196,29; 275,13-14; 292,20-7; including sources of change in quality and quantity, 195,32-196,6 their moving principle tends towards the end naturally, 292,24-7 belong in what is normal rather than necessary or exceptional, 267,5-6 necessity in them is hypothetical, as in artifacts, 331,12-23 natural places doctrine of, 195,30-32; 198,13; 264,27165,6; 290,12-13; 291,8 nature what nature does: what nature is, 197,30-198,8 as a descending power, 197,34; 308,23 universal and particular nature, 201,10-202,16; 231,2-6; 296,3-5 existence of, self-evident, 205,29-206,1 said in three ways, 207,17-25; 211.20- 3; 218,21-6; 234,1-4 as matter, 207,25-208,29; 213,14-29; 214,14-17; 317,21 does not make the matter, 326,26 as form, 208,30-211,19; 214,18-19; 317,21 coincides with form, 194,18-19 as composite of matter and form, 212,27 argument that nature is matter in fact shows nature is form, 209,33210,9 linguistic evidence for nature as form, 217,13-17 apparent argument that neither matter nor form is nature, 210,9-19 Philoponus' own view: natural but not artificial form is nature, 210,19-32 and shape, 212,30-213,4 and actuality, 215,3-5 relations to substance, 212,10-27 as road to form, 207,23-5; 211,21-2; 218.21- 4; 234,1-4 as efficient cause, 326,29 as generation, 210,33-211,19 as source of movement and rest of parts, 199,12-19; 214,15-17 as cause of rest, 196,21-6; 198,9-32 and the inanimate, 198,1-4 its paronyms, 195,1-2 Tiaving a nature', 199,23-9; applies to substances, 204,16-25 'according to nature' wider than

'having a nature', 199,29-200,8; 205,3-7 'by nature', relations of, to 'according to nature' and 'having a nature', 200,8-19; 205,10-23 composite (of matter and form) as *by nature', 215,12-14.22-3 *by nature' and *by art' contrasted re application to parts, 202,23-203,2 'above nature', 301,6 'against nature' and 'by nature', 200,20-31 'against nature', as a relative term, 201,10-202,16 monsters as 'against nature', 310,12 things 'against nature' arise from chance, 266,2-4; or rather from spontaneity, 292,12-17 asteleological, 196,21; 198,22-3; 200,27; 268,22-3; 305,11-16; 306,23-325,17 aims at natural form, 317,15-23 sometimes fails of its aim, 262,26-7; 265,16-17; 316,10-12; 318,2-3 such failures are minimal, 318,25319,32; they depend on matter or external accidents, 328,28-30 compared to art, 325,3-11 per accidens cause of what arises from spontaneity, 275,18 as per se cause and prior to the per accidens, and therefore to chance and spontaneity, 293,10-296,5 works in determinate ways, as against chance, 320,23-7; 321,9-11 compared to mathematics re necessity, 327,6-329,2; 332,14-27; 334,9-13; 334,27-336,3 order of necessary sequence inversely related in nature and in syllo­ gisms, 327,13-328,12; 332,14-29 necessity problems re, 306,17-23; 311,22-312,1 main discussion 325,20-338,15 absolute and hypothetical contrasted, 330,13-18 is necessity absolute or hypothetical?, 325,22-326,8 as hypothetical, 326,24-31 as absolute in celestial things but hypothetical in natural things, 331,29-332,5 applies to cosmic rather than parti­ cular phenomena, 262,28-30 as alternative to teleology, 307,5-6 compared and contrasted in nature and in mathematics and logic,

Subject Index 327,6-329,2; 332,14-27; 334,9-13; 334,27-336,3 normal distinguished from unvarying and exceptional, 267,1-11; all of these not in our power, 267,14-16 numbers as separable for Pythagoreans from natural things, 240,2 octave as example of formal cause, 245,5-15; 255,13-15 opposites distinct from contraries, 218,16-17 involved in all coming to be, 218,14-15 weaker and stronger, 217,22-6 optics, see: mathematics, geometry problems in, 233,5-14 outside sense in which cause in chance and spontaneity is, 288,22-289,6 paradigm, see: cause paronymous predication, 195,1-2; 211.3- 19 perception and cause of motion, 196,30-197,1 can be stronger than demonstration, 206,27-33 per se and per accidens, see also: causation per se prior to per accidens, 295,29-30 per se implies inseparability, 204,7-11 role in definition of'nature', 197,21-9 and causation, 242,2-243,17; 293,10296,5 relations to chance and spontaneity, 270.4- 22; 293,10-296,5 per accidens causes, argument for, 273,19-26 per accidens causes homonymous or pseudonymous, 276,29-30 action can be per se while the corres­ ponding being affected is per accidens, 313,11-27 plants as evidence of teleology, 311,12-17 embody teleology less than animals because less articulated, 319,1720; 322,19-323,1 nearer to matter than animals, 323,8-9 do not give rise to monsters, 319,13-20; 322,19-323,1; 323,10-11; or rarely, 323,19-22 Plato, 225,5; 240,3; 241,18.28; 300,7;

239

312,16; 313,13.17.18; 324,22; his Philebus, 287,4 Platonists attacked, 221,25-222,10; 224,3-225,8; 225.25- 226,11 Porphyry his (or Philoponus' own?) 'Introduc­ tion', 250,28 his (or Philoponus' own?) method of mathematical combination, 250.28- 251,2 potentiality, see also: cause senses of, 253,20-4 asymmetrically related to nature re causation, though only when taken in special sense, 253,11-29 power, in our, see: chance and spontaneity primarily equated to 'proximately', 196,32-3; 197,4 needed for definition of nature, 196,16; 196.26- 197,21 principles divisions of them, 195,5-9 first, as eternal and unalterable, 214,4-5 privation and form, 217,20-218,6 as form in a way, 217,20-218,6 and matter, 243,21-9 Protarchus, 286,26-287,4; 289,9 providence, 312,26-30; 313,8.9.23; 323.29- 30; see also: forethought action of, can be reconciled with evil, 313,9-27 proximate, see: cause 'proximately' equated to 'primarily', 196,32-3; 197,4 Pythagoreans, 240,2 qualitative change, 195,30-196,6; 198,32-199,12 not always reciprocal, 304,15-16 as route to form, 337,7-9 rational account is of what is static, which is either necessary or normal, 276,23-4 rationality, as requiring upright stature, 329,1014 reasoning, per accidens cause of what comes from chance, 275,18-19 wider than choice, 268,21 what comes from, divided into chosen

240

Subject Index

and not, 272,19-20 implied by artifacts, 268,12 'reason why', one of four general problems, 298,1417 equals causes, 243,6; 298,14-18, 300.21- 7 reductio ad impossible, 333,21-2 relatives recognised together, 233,2-3 Categories problem re, solved, 254,1323 releaser role of, 195,27-9 remote, see: cause rest, see: movement and definition of nature, 196,21-6; 198.9- 32 sake of something, for the, see also: chance and spontaneity, teleology holds of natural things, artifacts, and chance, 267,29-268,6 divided into what depends on reason­ ing and what depends on nature, 268,19-22; 272,18 divided into what depends on choice and what does not, 268,8-9; 272,16-17 overlaps with the exceptional, 271,26272,13 belongs to realm of chance per accidens, 324,13-14 and chance, as exhaustive alternat­ ives, 308,3-4; 315,14-15 sake of which, that for the, 283,26; 332.10- 11 seed as efficient and material causes, 247.22- 9 self-evidence and demonstration, 205,29-206,8; 206,13-207,7 paired with reason, 223,10-11 separability in thought and in reality, 221,8222,10; 224,3-226,11 separation of form from matter, where possible and where not, 221,8-222,10; 225,5-226,11 shape as not nature, 212,30-213,4 ship-building relations to steersmanship, 238,9239,11

simples recognising nature of, 223,6-7 soul as mark of the animate, 195,22-4; 198,7 not equals nature, 197,4; but in a way does, 197,13-21 as ascending and descending, and as intermediate form, 240,25-7 as topic for theology, 240,25-7 as unmoved mover, 304,18-19 rational and irrational and their roles in moving, 196,26-197,5 not equals what it moves, and does not move by being moved, 302,9-11 abstracts mathematical objects, 306,9-10 relevance to happiness, 286,13-22 spider as evidence of teleology, 311,4-6; 317,3 spontaneity, see: chance and spontaneity spontaneous generation of grass, 273,2-9 steersmanship relations to ship-building, 238,9239,11 straight line defined, 299,16-17 study of nature, see: natural philosophy substance three senses of, 212,18-27 as having a nature, 199,23-9; 204,1625; 205,14-15 relations to nature, 212,10-27 as a type, 203,15-16 and substrate, 204,18-23 as unorganised, 212,5-10 not sole object of study of nature, 219,15-27 fifth (ether), 220,22-5 substantial (or absolute) coming to be implies contraries rather than opposites, 218,9-12; but this is contra­ dicted, 218,13-15 substrate, see: matter second, as matter, 225,14-16 called 'genus', 244,5-6 swallow as evidence of teleology, 311,6-8; 317,3 syllogism examples of, 209,19-22.23-5; 272,2-4; 281,4-6; 281,18-282,24; 284,16-18; 285,20-1; 307,29-34; 308,6-12; 327,24.28-9 hypothetical and disjunctive, 308,3-5 necessity in, is hypothetical, 327,11 compared with nature re necessity, 327,6-329,2

Subject Index order of necessary sequence inversely related in syllogisms and in nature, 327,13-328,12; 332,14-29; this contrast dis­ appears if we consider theorising re nature and mathematics, 328,17-30; 335,20-336,3 true conclusions can be validly infer­ red from false premises, 327,23-5; 334,3-7; but not vice-versa, with­ out relying on ambiguity, 327,26328,5 premises are starting-point in syllo­ gistic theorising, 336,3-15 teleology, 220,24-5.28-9 in nature, 305,11-16 in explanation, 306,2-5 main treatment of teleology in nature, 306,14-325,17 structure of Aristotle's argument in three syllogisms for teleology, 307.23- 8 sketch of target non-teleological view, 306.24- 307,22 first teleological axiom: where there is an end, things done before it are done for the sake of it, 308,15-21; 315.25- 316,3; 337,15 second teleological axiom: art and nature work in the same way, 308,21-30; 316,6-10 application of these axioms, 308,30309,8; 316,12-18 Philoponus' criticism of first axiom: either contradicts Aristotle's view elsewhere, or begs question, 309,9-28; second criticism: the axiom holds of art, but will not serve Aristotle's purpose, 309,29310,15 argument that if art is accomplice of nature and is teleological, so is nature, 310,16-22; 316,21-5 Philoponus' criticism of this, 310,23-9 Aristotle's final argument: the parts of nature (animals and plants) behave teleologically, so surely the whole of nature does so too, 310,30-311,19; 316,27-317,10; this argument called 'more effective', 316,27 art is teleological despite occasional failure, so why not nature?, 318,2-21

241

suggested by order of development, 319,22-8; 322,10-17 argument that to deny teleology is to deny nature itself, 320,11-27 Theodosius, 220,1-4.6.15 theology (or theologian) distinguished from natural philos­ ophy, 233,4-33; 239,25-240,31 studies what is totally free from matter, 233,27-33 deals with separate forms, 225,23-5; 233,30-3; 240,27-9 studies the unmoved mover and sepa­ rate forms, 300,28-301,1 gives form without matter of bodiless things, 300,9-10 theoretical philosophy divided into three, 218,26-219,1 theorising in natural philosophy and mathe­ matics, contrasted and compared, 335,8-336,3 contrasted with action re ordering of necessary sequence, 328,17-30; 335.2- 7; 336,22-5 triangle and two right angles example, 333.3- 18 unmoved cause studied by theology, but also by natural philosophy, 298,6; 300,28301,6; 302,26 not studied by natural philosophy, 302,20-4 studied in the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 298,10; 303,3 different from what it acts on, 301,1112 use/mention ambiguity pointed out, 327,26-328,5 visual rays problems re, 233,5-14 vortical motion in Democritus, 262,8-15; 265,6-9 well- and ill-doing do not apply to children, inanimate, or irrational things, 281,30-282,4; 282,11 'whether it is' as fundamental among the four ques­ tions for science, 205,27 relation of this question to the other three, 205,27-206,6