Oligarchy and Patronage in Late Medieval Spanish Urban Society 9782503523606

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Oligarchy and Patronage in Late Medieval Spanish Urban Society
 9782503523606

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OLIGARCHY AND PATRONAGE

SEUH XIX Studies in European Urban History (1100-1800)

Series Editor Marc Boone (Ghent University)

Oligarchy and Patronage in Late Medieval Spanish Urban Society

Edited by

María Asenjo-González

H

F

Cover illustration: Tapestry of “Jason and Medea” from the Museum of Seu Vella of Lleida (Spain). The original image was drawn by Jan van Roome (Brussels, 1500-1510). (© Museu de Lleida: diocesà i comarcal)

© 2009 – Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2009/0095/82 ISBN 978-2-503-52360-6 Printed in the E.U. on acid-free paper

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword MARÍA ASENJO-GONZÁLEZ……………………………………..VII FLOCEL SABATÉ I CURULL Oligarchies and Social Fractures in the Cities of Late Medieval Catalonia……………………………………………………

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MARIA ASENJO GONZÁLEZ Urban Systems as an Oligarchy Structuring Process in Fifteenth-Century Castilian Society………………………………… 29 YOLANDA GUERRERO-NAVARRETE Political and Financial Groups in Castilian Towns in the Fifteenth Century: Burgos, a Case-Study……………………………………… 51 ÁNGEL GALÁN SÁNCHEZ The Muslim Population of the Christian Kingdom of Granada: Urban Oligarchies and Rural Communities……………… 71 JOSÉ ANTONIO JARA FUENTE Attributing Social Fields and Satisfying Social Expectations: The Urban System as a Circuit of Power-Structuring Relations (Castile in the Fifteenth Century) ……………………………………. 91 ELOÍSA RAMÍREZ VAQUERO The First Urban Oligarchic Networks in Navarre: Pamplona, 1100-1328………………………………………………. 117 MARC BOONE Oligarchy and Patronage in the Late Mediaeval Iberian Peninsula: Some Comparative Perspectives………………………… 153 BIBLIOGRAPHY …………………………………………………………… 161 GLOSSARY …………………………………………………………………. 195

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Foreword The recent increase in historiographical studies on late medieval European urban society illustrates the interest this area currently enjoys among researchers. The analysis of medieval urban society and its development as a corporative, political, religious and social construction is not devoid of obstacles, in part, due to the idiosyncrasies of the numerous political and cultural regions that exist throughout the continent.1 The inevitable atomization of medieval urban studies, to a certain degree stemming from the limitations of working with local sources, can be compensated for by carrying out a simultaneous survey on different aspects of this phenomenon. This volume intends to fill certain gaps with respect to urban studies in the kingdoms of medieval Spain, each with their own specific historical development. We are aware of the difficulties involved in studying the social history of the lesser nobility and urban oligarchic groups, whose world was characterized by a myriad of social values, family ties, bonds of dependence, and other factors interwoven with social emulation and the quest for the accumulation of wealth. Here, we present a series of propositions that allow a certain conceptual and methodological convergence in medieval urban research. It is essential to begin by defining the dominant forms of urban social organization: urban nobility, oligarchy, the patrician elite, the powerful, etc. We are interested in the specific vocabulary, the words and terms utilized; how they name themselves, and how they are known to others based on contemporary sources.2 It may also be useful to note the differences found in expressions and vocabulary related to urban issues, be they collective, family-based, or individual.3 The sources of income, both patrimonial as well as collective, which form the building blocks of the social system must also be identified. This system became increasingly dependent on income and urban or monarchical goods managed in the context of town and country.4 Municipal and royal fiscal policy is designed with these objectives in mind, and they significantly increase the income obtained from their

Juan Carlos Martín Cea and Juan Antonio Bonachía Hernando 1998; Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete 1998; María Asenjo González 2005; Fermín Miranda García 2003; In Portugal: Rita Costa Gomes 1988; Luis.M. Duarte 2001, 91-108; Ana M. Rodrigues 1998. In Valencia: Enrique.Cruselles Gómez 1992; Rafael Narbona Vizcaíno, 1998. In Aragón see M. Isabel Falcón Pérez 1978 and in Cataluña: Flocel Sabaté i Curull, 1998b; Carmen Batlle and Joan J. Busqueta Riu 1988. 2 V. Ilardi 1987. 3 Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan 1997. She examines different historiographic approaches to the study of the urban elites, being centred in the difficulty to articulate a concept for elite and maintaining that the study of the oligarchies in Europe requires an international perspective; Michael Harsgor 1994 and Marc Boone 1997. 4 Stephan R. Epstein 2001; Alain Derville 1997, 119-135. He maintains that in this zone the social hierarchy was fluid because the urban societies were based on wealth more than on the traditional divisions in classes, and so does Gabriella Rossetti 1977, 57-60. 1

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own goods as well as from the decreasing availability of unexploited agricultural land.5 Another key conceptual objective is the description of the hierarchic social construction of client and councillor and their spheres of influence. Moreover, it is vital to determine the peculiar forms of their horizontally-constructed, associative structures, found in urban lineages, confraternities, guilds6 or other associations that are generally located close to the sources of political power.7 In order to fulfil this task, it is crucial to analyze family structure and follow the collective and lineage itinerary in their quest for power, and status consolidation. Prosopographical studies, a combination of statistics, anthropology, and genealogy provide interesting results in this area.8 The client network, composed of individuals, their ties, and the relationships of dependence created by their political framework, is another relevant feature of the urban phenomenon.9 This issue is directly connected to the political scope of the group and offers the possibility of a cross-referenced study from different fields of analysis.10 Firstly, we must recognize the family-based facet which focuses on the prospect of integration and exclusion. Secondly, we must consider the political role played by these individuals in the group structure, which could lead to rapprochement or, alternatively, to distancing from other members, largely on the basis of peripheral social factors. Lastly, it is important to examine how bestowing access to minor positions, trades, and privileges on close friends and clients offered the possibility to receive the rents and other benefits provided by urban patronage.11 The cohesive nature of the client-network model is essential since its influence can be detected in both the exercise of urban political power and in the prospect of access to that power12. This explains the client-network relationship’s role within the urban system, even in those cities divided into rival factions. Factional power became even more explicit in cases where access to political office was temporarily cut off to loyal members of the prospective group in a not always well-defined area which spread beyond the urban ramparts and reached into the outlying countryside.13 The nature of the political model – similar to the client-network power structure that oligarchic governments were based on – leads us to question its role in the development of certain civic values with far-reaching consequences. Among them, we find civic humanism and secular culture, essential pillars of Western

Mark W. Ormrod 1997; Antonio Collantes de Terán 2000. Gervase Rosser, 1977. 7 Paulino Iradiel 1991, 23-47; 1999; Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2001. 8 Rafael Narbona Vizcaíno 1999; Germán Navarro Espinach 2000. 9 Gervase Rosser 1993, 1127-43. 10 Cristina Jular Pérez-Alfaro 1993. 11 Giovanna Petti Balbi 1996; Michel Pauly 1993; Rafael G. Peinado Santaella and Enrique Soria Mesa 1994. 12 M.Concepción Quintanilla Raso 1987; Margaret Plant 1987, 177-99. 13 M.Concepción Quintanilla Raso, 1997; Giuliano Pinto 1980. 5 6

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civilization.14 Furthermore, we should not forget the Christian religious and spiritual legacy, and how it influenced these values throughout this period. Map 1: Cities of Spanish Medieval Kingdoms

Source: by the author. The articles in this volume have taken into consideration all of these concerns in a way that makes research on client-network societies in late-medieval cities in the Spanish Kingdoms more intelligible to the student or scholar who may not be specifically versed in this area. Finally, I want to make special mention of Ana Maria Rodrigues, Associate Professor at the University of Lisbon, to thank her for her contribution and enthusiasm for this project. I also thank very much Félix Sánchez for the technical support in the final form of the manuscript. Maria Asenjo González Complutense University of Madrid

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J.E Siegel 1966.

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OLIGARCHIES AND SOCIAL FRACTURES IN THE CITIES OF LATE MEDIEVAL CATALONIA Flocel Sabaté i Curull University of Lleida The power of the urban oligarchy in late medieval Catalonia was based on a range of investments and the inter-dependence with the region of influence, and gave rise to a self-serving political involvement. These dynamics that strengthened their position provoked glaring confrontations that spotlighted clear fractures with a double sense. Firstly, there was the forceful division that split each town or city into bands based on anthropological solidarity. Then there was an ever-growing fracture around the respective economic levels, clearly channelled through the confrontations between the three groups which the municipality was organised into, by economic position, namely the “mà major”, “mà mitjana” and “mà menor”, literally the major, middle and minor “hands”. One way or another, their aim was to reaffirm social positions centred on the pre-eminence of the powerful closed oligarchic groups that dominated municipal power. There would be disputes and pacts with the baronial power for control of income and jurisdictions and, thus, the representation of the country before a monarch who lacked the strength to reinforce his own position of pretended political pre-eminence. This dynamic led to a panorama dominated by urban elites, eager to visualise their high position while engaged in internal struggles for control of local institutions, in which they mixed, in line with their own mercenary motives, the invocation of the public good and the most private of interests. This conflict jeopardised the country’s progress as it moved towards the end of the Middle Ages. Our knowledge about this has also largely been conditioned by the fact that the historiography would remain secularly trapped in the web of justifications woven by the same municipal oligarchy. 1. Origin, Nature and Bases of the Urban Oligarchy The consolidation of urban centres in the twelfth century, both those, such as Barcelona or Girona, which had already grown in the previous century, and the capitals of the territories recently conquered from Al-Andalus (Lleida and Tortosa), clearly mark the emerging bourgeoisie as businessmen who were diversifying their investments. This trend was identical in both large towns and other areas. Everywhere, economic power was in the hands of a leading group whose members had enriched themselves by a variety of means. In some cases, this had been done through feudal activity (lineages who had participated in the conquest of Islamic territory),1 others, through commercial activity (such as the Espanyol family in Vic, who rose to a dominant position in the twelfth century 2 and consolidated this in the 1 2

Flocel Sabaté 1997b, 62-67. Paul H. Freedman 1980-1981, 2-3. 1

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thirteenth).3 They could also be the owners of the land on which the city had grown (very clear in the case of Barcelona)4 and who still had liquidity accumulated by the family through industrial activity (mills, textiles, tanneries, etc.).5 The possession of capital, their attitude to it, and the use they made of it generated homogenised groups. Individual prosopographies (such as Bords of Girona in twelfth-century Lleida,6 Andreu Codalet in the thirteenth in Perpignan7 or the Gronys in Barcelona at the beginning of the fourteenth century,8 among many others) allow old historiographical dichotomies between urban and rural income, or between bourgeois and feudal attitudes to be overcome. From the twelfth century on, leading urban figures talked of “lucro bono”.9 Although they sometimes expressed regrets when facing death, and in their wills disposed “quod omne lucrum quod accepi deddatur”, as Ramon Marimon from Lleida stated in 1214,10 the truth is that the economic power achieved thanks to this activity guaranteed that both he and his father before him were buried in the Cistercian monastery of Poblet,11 alongside prominent nobles and the king himself.12 However, beyond these last-minute repentances, they all spent their lives pursuing profit wherever it might be found, while simultaneously coveting the management of feudal and ecclesiastical incomes, the collection of royal levies, as well as lending, trade, the acquisition of feudal and public rights, with an accumulative dynamic similar to other areas of Europe.13 There was a very wide range of activities but, in all the cases, investment in rural and urban property was significant. And this property was accumulated. For example, in Barcelona at the turn of the twelfth century, Ricard Guillem14 had not only spent 10,000 gold coins (mancusos) on acquiring property during his life (the price of a hundred horses) but also had never sold any: Ricardo Guillermo solamente compra durante toda su vida.15 The rapid development of the emphyteutic system of property, in the same twelfth century, favoured and encouraged this trend.16 This immediately led to close links to the surrounding region. Each town began to establish an area of influence proportional in size to the vigour of the urban centre and whose influence transformed it in all aspects.17 Production in rural areas was conditioned by urban demand, but also came to depend on the urban elites through contracts for loans and work taken on by the population and, Arcadi Garcia 1968-1971, 168-170. Pierre Bonnassie 1979, 430-432. 5 Flocel Sabaté 2004, 208. 6 Flocel Sabaté 2003a, 356-357. 7 R.W. Emery 1966. 8 Carmen Batlle; Joan J. Busqueta and I. Navarro 1989, 308-309. 9 Arxiu de la Catedral de Lleida, in abbreviated form ACL, drawer 112, parchment 6846. 10 ACL, drawer 210, parchment. 4685. 11 ACL, drawer 132, packet 1, parchment 16. 12 Federico Marès 1998; Gener Gonzalvo 2001, 5-6. 13 Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan 1997, 15. 14 J. Enrique Ruiz-Domènec 2001. 15 “Ricardo Guillermo only bought throughout his life” J. Enrique Ruiz-Doménec 1972, 76-77. 16 Gaspar Feliu 1992, 221-222. 17 Flocel Sabaté 1997a, 167-172. 3 4

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especially by the changes in ownership, that converted the peasant into a tenant farmer, under leasehold, of land that increasingly belonged to urban investors. As early as the second half of the twelfth century, while 12.8% of the land in Lleida was owned by nobles and 32% was ecclesiastical property, 54.5% belonged to the bourgeoisie.18 The peasant working his own land thus became a testimonial exception. These data, also reflected in other towns, are a serious challenge to the traditional bibliography, which simply stated that all those who appeared as landowners or those who had received rural property during the twelfth and thirteenth-century feudal share-outs after episodes of conquest were peasants. However, the majority of the land around the towns was really in the hands of urban investors. At the most, the peasants were reduced to owners of the useful domain under the emphyteutic system. All these practices weakened rural society, which lost its own roots and became increasingly dependent on urban society. This would become dangerous when crisis struck in the fourteenth century. The rural world at that moment lacked its own resources and would suffer with a vengeance the difficulties that spread out from the town, as historiographical research into large cities, such as Girona, has shown.19 Meanwhile, a limited number of families rose to dominance in each urban nucleus, well seated on their respective investments. These lineages evolved continuously but from the early thirteenth century, they were all very clearly committed to the consolidation of the family, including the promotion of masculine agnation to concentrate inheritance in a single male heir. Their wills also often provided for the latter to inherit the fortunes of their childless siblings.20 The same dynamic also included the training of the heirs, with attention paid to schooling and learning, generally by means of an agreement with relatives, about how to manage business, investments and financial speculation.21 In the fourteenth century, this included the legal training that distinguished the rentiers who monopolised the social elite.22 These consolidated urban lineages wove specific links that they supported, shared and competed over in the urban context. The influence thus gained extended into all fields and they developed zeal for protecting their own that generated links of solidarity and that implied dealings between clienteles. Consequently, acquiring sufficient wealth implied strengthening their heritage, but also assuming a leading social position, not only to participate in the leadership of municipal government but also to lead specific factions that split municipal unity.

Flocel Sabaté 2003, 70. Fernández Trabal 1995, 179-192. 20 ACL, drawer 132, packet 1, parchment 40. 21 Sabaté 2003a, 358. 22 Sabaté 1999b, 171. 18 19

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2. The Fracture into Bands Until recently, the historiography failed to understand the split into bands that shook Catalan cities and towns throughout the late Middle Ages. These were often treated as the influence of the nobility, ignoring their deep anthropological and sociological roots. In fact, within the social structure of the Middle Ages, where the individual was always sheltered by a group23 in the bosom of the Catalan urban world, attempts were made to solve difficulties through cohesion in a faction or band. This would lead to the first and most obvious of the fractures in urban society: the bands.24 “Amici et parenti”25 was the basis of the band, while opponents are also easily recognisable: “amicus inimici inimicus est”.26 The link, thus, was “de consanguinetatum, affinitatum vel amicitia”.27 At the top, there was the “cap de bando” (head of the band), able to mobilise the auxiliaries by his own means. He was a powerful man in the urban context, which is why he could be either a citizen or a baron, proximity to whom defined the intensity of the link by being able to appreciate who is “amicus intrinsecus et multum familiaris”.28 The approximation between groups made it possible to link them together, ending up, in each town or municipality, with confrontations between two dominant bands,29 each of which contained all social levels, including clergy, nobles, “homes de paratge com ciutadans e hòmens de vila honrats com hòmens de peu de qualsevol condició o estament.”30 In fact, the involvement of barons who lived in towns and were also rural lords meant that any conflict could easily spread throughout the region,31 and they also increased the tensions in towns with the supply of men from the surroundings, as in Cervera in the second half of the fourteenth century.32 In fact, the region was always affected by the urban bands, in proportion to their strength but also in function of the socio-economic links that connected each town to its region. Thus, all the cases affected, one way or another, the “villa et eius convicino”.33 This extended the consequences and, at the same time, added ramifications and alliances in various contexts. Flocel Sabaté 1998a, 459-461. Flocel Sabaté 1995a, 339-365. 25 Arxiu Històric Comarcal de les Terres de l’Ebre (AHCTE), Paeria i vegueria I, 69, fol. 15r, among many others. 26 Arxiu Històric Municipal de Vic (AHM Vic), Llibre de Privilegis XXIV, parchment 424. 27 Arxiu de la Corona d’Aragó (ACA), Cancelleria, reg. 1944, sheet 77r. 28 AHMV, Llibre de Privilegis XXIX, parchment 424. 29 Sabaté 1997d, 418-419. 30 ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 1782, sheet. 32v. 31 The behaviour of Pere Alemany de Bellpuig, a prominent member of a band in Besalú and at the same time lord of a small territorial domain in Espinavessa, was a very clear example (Arxiu Històric Comarcal d’Olot, notarial sources, Besalú, reg. 275, sheets 41v42r, among others). 32 ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 1944, sheet 157r. 33 Arxiu Històric Comarcal d’Igualada (AHCI), Llibre de Privilegis, sheet 28r ; Cruz 1990, 308. 23 24

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The basis of the system was the protection for the members of the band itself. Thus, protection for members of the group became an alternative to ordinary justice. This help from “parents e acostats de sanch”34 inevitably generated a chain of aggression “interdum gradu parentele remotos”.35 The concatenation of revenge surfaced as intimidation, physical violence, assaults on houses and destruction of harvests. This behaviour laid the foundations for long-lasting, deeply-felt enmities. In 1384, in the town of Igualada, it was said that the so-called Ocellons and Castellolins had been fighting for “quasi a centum annis”.36 A weakening of a group did not lead to the extinction of the bonds within the band, because when these were exhausted they were replaced by other emerging ones. The exhaustion that affected the Mallas and the Mirs, the two main bands in Vic at the beginning of the fifteenth century, led to them being replaced by the Altarribas and the Vilalleons.37 The fact that conflicts between bands often flared up following the annual renewal of the magistratures shows how the local institutions could be discredited and how their attempts to define themselves as a common expression of the entire municipality could be in vain.38 In fact, in the fourteenth century, bands, such as the Aguilós in Tàrrega or the Pinyols in Tortosa, fought ostensibly to maintain their hold on municipal power. From this position, they also attempted to influence officials, whether these were the local batlle or the veguers, the royal district officials. The Catalan constitutions of 1292 and 1333 explicitly prohibited the veguers from being from the same vegueria (or district) where they were posted to avoid them participating in the local bands.39 However, the pressure by the latter in the most prominent cases managed to circumvent this prohibition through the figure of the regent of the vegueria,40 who could be from the same place theoretically occupying the post provisionally, or even directly breaking the law if the veguer was from the same place. This happened in the last decade of the fourteenth century with the Pinyols in Tortosa, something that the royal chancellery would justify, when correcting it, by stating that he had acted “per inadvertenciam”.41 This excuse did not, however, prevent this occurring again straight away, when the local power situation was once again favourable to the Pinyols.42 This situation was serious because the officials had to face the problems of public order generated by the differences between the bands. Revenge took the form of intimidation of the opponent, either through physical aggression or pillage, with attacks on the homes of some prominent members of the other side (trencament d’alberch [house breaking]). The concatenation of stimuli and responses fed a ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 2229, sheet 79v. AHMVic, Llibre de Privilegis XIX, sheet 49v-50r. 36 AHCI, Llibre de Privilegis, sheet 28r (Joan Cruz, Els Privilegis d’Igualada , p. 308). 37 AHM Vic, Llibre de Privilegis X, parchment 189. 38 Arxiu Històric Comarcal de Tortosa (AHCT), Provisions, 3, sheet 62r-67v; Junyent, 1971, 60-63; Valls i Taberner, 1928, 127 among other examples. 39 Constitucions 1995, I, 151-152. 40 AHCTE, Paeria i Vegueria II, 36, among many others. 41 ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 1915, sheet 32r. 42 Sabaté, 1997d, 149-150. 34 35

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growing climate of tension, with rixas, discordias et rancores43 that led to disorder in the streets, because each of the bands “van per la ciutat ab moltes companyes fort desordenadament”,44 especially around the leading members, often under cover of darkness and egging each other on with shouts of encouragement. The tension often overwhelmed the justice officials, although they did not explicitly belong to any band. When the royal batlle of Igualada was reproached in 1406, because açò no va bé, que tuyts no vaguen per un igual, the complaint was about an official who only applied the force of the law against the weak and, in contrast, feared getting tough with those who had the backing of the band.45 In 1422, in Tortosa, despite the evident violent acts, the royal official no gosa pendra algú out of pahor de lur resistència.46 In 1350, the inhibition of those who should have suppressed the violent acts was already clearly bemoaned in Manresa, given that these occurred presents e vehents los officials reyals de la dita ciutat, e no contrestants, com no.ls vuyllen per temor, segons que dien los dits officials, pendre-ne ab justícia.47 In fact, the increase in the tensions between bands at the end of the fourteenth century was the main reason why it was difficult to find anyone who wanted to take up the post of veguer. This was stated explicitly in Cervera in 1401, given the difficulties to find adequate candidates for the position atteses les bandositats que hic són.48 This situation implied unrest that was also negative for economic activity, that is, the basis of a town’s prosperity and stability. On the eves of markets and fairs, municipal governments were deeply worried about the dissuasive effect that the tensions could have.49 The greatest fear was depopulation, with inhabitants forced out by the pressure of the adversaries,50 but especially through the inhibiting effect of these tensions, which would reduce the power and vigour of the municipality and its capacity for political pressure.51 Thus, the diagnostic of the confrontation of bands in Torroella of Montgrí at the end of the fourteenth century is clear: “villa predicta populo diminuta et facultates exhausta”.52 This situation provoked the intervention of the municipal authorities, who tried to limit confrontations in the streets. This they did by means of night guards, limits on the carrying of arms, or even, in extreme cases, by dividing the respective influence in the town, as in Girona in 1394.53 They brokered agreements between Archives Départementales des Pyrénées-Orientales (ADP-O), 1B-156, sheet 19ter r. “They go round the town uncontrollably with many companions” (Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona (AHCB), B-VI, book 1, sheet 139r). 45 “Things don’t go well, that not everyone goes equally”: Segura 1907, 140. 46 The royal official “does not dare arrest anyone” for “fear of the resistance of the self same bands” (AHCTE, Paeria i Vegueria, I, 22, sheet 8r). 47 “Present and seeing it the royal officials of the before mentioned city, who do nothing against it because they do not want to take justice for fear, as the same officials say” (“Cortes de Catalunya”, Cortes de los antiguos Reinos. 1896, 440). 48 Arxiu Històric Comarcal de Cervera (AHCC), Llibre del consell 1401, sheet 101v-102r. 49 AHCI, Llibre de la Universitat de la Vila, 1405, sheet 57r-v. 50 Arxiu Municipal de Lleida (AML), Secció de Consells Generals, A-403, sheet 8r. 51 Arxiu Històric Municipal de Valls (AHM Valls), Llibre de Privilegis IV, parchment 67. 52 Arxiu Històric Municipal de Torroella de Montgrí (AHMTM), parchment 40. 53 Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Girona (AHCG), VII. 2.1, fold 1, sheet 3r. 43 44

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the parties to bring postures closer and reach truces. The reiterated breaking of these truces forced new mediation to rebuild the agreements, and, in serious cases, it led the local authorities to request the intervention of the corresponding lord, or the monarch in royal domains. The latter used this to assert his superior position, as in Vic in 1403: “nos circa pacificum et tranquillum prosperum et amenum ac bonum regimen rei publice Civitatis Vice sedule vigilantes”.54 From the conviction that “sia sobirana cosa al príncep posar sos sotmeses en pau e tranquillitat”.55 Arbitration aimed to bring the sides together. The expressed aim was usually ambitious: “sedare totaliter dictas bandositates”56 or, more literally, “agnos fecit de lupis, amicos de hostibus et de superbis devotos”.57 In line with these intentions, the negotiations sometimes culminated in the “pax finalem et perpetuam”. However, in reality this was never reached. In fact, beyond these immediate breaches of the peace, the municipal authorities never aimed to annul the bands, as these were perceived as an inherent part of human society. The real aim was to put an end to the negative consequences for urban development. There was no intention of doing away with the factions but rather that the rival bands no.s pusquen dampnejar ni injuriar, ans d’aquí avant sien bon amich.58 Thus, solutions were sought by regulating vengeance, leaving space for the intervention of the ordinary justice,59 or reaching an agreement on access to the organs of municipal power.60 At the same time, the authorities aimed to combine the presence of the bands with trust in, and the predominance of, the ordinary jurisdiction.61 In fact, the Romanist acceptation of sovereign power was in play, as indicated explicitly in Valls in 1357: car per ço són possats los senyors per la Ciutats per la viles e per els castells e.ls són dades les rendes, per tal que deffenen los lurs sotmesos e façen justícia dels mals faytós, car hivaç sseria espatgat lo món si los uns se podien pendre venjança dels altres que no sperasen senyor qui u fes.62 The exercise of justice, as a clear indication of jurisdiction, was claimed by the sovereign. The royal chancellery emphasised the perversity of the system of bands (car rahó no vol ne dicta que una persona sie punida o damnificada per excés que altre face), 63 as

AHMV, Llibre de Privilegis XX, parchment 189. “It’s a sovereign faculty of the prince to make peace and tranquillity between their subjects” (ACA, Cancelleria, Papers to be included, 1379, unnumbered). 56 ADP-O, 1B-173, sheet 40v-41r. 57 AHMV, Llibre de Privilegis VII, parchment 127. 58 “One cannot do bad or insult and from then on be good friends” (ADP-O 1B-161, sheet 35r). 59 AHCT, Llibre del Consell 2, sheet 44v; AHM Vic, Llibre de Privilegis XIX, sheet 49v50r; 63r-64r. 60 Arxiu Històric de Sabadell (AHS) D.11.30.3, justícia, cúria, notari Aiachs, sheet 56v; Salvador Galceran, 1983, 132. 61 Sabaté 1998, 457-472. 62 “Because that is why the lords are placed above the cities, the towns and the castles and are given the incomes, to defend their vassals and apply justice to the malefactors. Otherwise, the world would quickly break down if some come seek vengeance from the others instead of waiting for the lord to do so” (AHCV, parchment 84). 63“Because reason does not want nor understand that a person is punished or damnified for the evil that another may have committed” (ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 1782, sheet 32r). 54 55

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contrary to natural law – “necnon iuri naturali contrarium”64 – and the Christian obligation of equity. The Church supported the same principle of authority. Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the feeling of vengeance65 was combined with a notion of justice linked to the governant as a guarantor not of bias but rather of society’s common good.66 Similarly, the personal and intimate ethics that resulted from the spiritual and nominalist approaches that pleased the Franciscans meant an acceptance of divine will that included the established moral and social order.67 In 1345, the bishop of Vic warned that the solidarity through relationship or friendship within the bands went “contra Deum et iustitia”, because “hominem homini insidiari est nephas” and, correspondingly, all divergences had to be submitted to the “auctoritatem iuris vel iudicis”.68 Seen like this, the fragmentation into bands arose “diabolico spirito instigante”69 and was against the divine and royal will, as Peter the Ceremonious expressed it in 1379: “maligno ducti spiritu, Dei ac nostri timore postposito”.70 In line with this reasoning, destruction was a logical consequence for places that allowed themselves to be carried away by the tensions of the bands, as stated in Valls in 1382, considerant encara que aytant són conservades les universitats e les viles e lochs com en pau e tranquillitat en aquels e no divís, brega ni parcialitat, car lig-se en la Sancta Scriptura que tot regne, ciutat o vila o comunitat en si divís serà desolat, destrohit e consumat.71 Despite this, the solidarity of the band was seen popularly as more effective than lordly arbitrariness or royal partiality, while the apparent objectivity of the ordinary official – lo official usant de son offici no pusque injuriar ningú –72 was often affected not by his actions but rather by exemptions, redemptions, licences or changes of jurisdiction passed down from the royal court, where the monarch, always in need of money, often resorted to special dispensations and distorting elements in judicial questions.73 The increasing difficulties, the discredit of royal justice and baronial arbitrariness thus found their counterpoint in an affinity for the band that continued to grow throughout the last century of the medieval epoch. The economic and social difficulties of the second half of the fourteenth century AHMV, Llibre de Privilegis XIX, sheet 49v-50r. “We rise against those who injure others and want to seek vengeance, when, somehow or other, we consider ourselves supportive of those who suffer the damage, either through affinity, friendship or, in any case, because we participate in the same nature” Aquinas, 1992, 360; 1997], II, 366-367. 66 Teófilo Urdanoz 1943, 9-21. 67 José Gómez-Heras 1996, 112-118. 68 AHCT, parchment 1345. 69 ADP-O 1B-156, sheet 19ter r. 70 AHCT, Correspondence, Royal letters, 8. 71 Considering that the communities, towns and places still conserve their good state if they maintain peace and tranquillity and distance themselves from division, combat or partiality, because it is read in the Holy Scriptures that every kingdom, city, town or community that stays divided, would be desolated, destroyed and consumed (AHC Valls, parchment 154). 72 AHC Vic, Llibre de Privilegis II, parchment 54. 73 Flocel Sabaté 2000-2002, 266-267. 64 65

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certainly accentuated the tensions between bands and, with this, instability in the towns and cities. When first effects of the crisis made themselves felt, support was very clearly sought in the band, which was thus strengthened and increased its power.74 The evidence of this reaction imposes subtle distinctions on the ease with which it was believed historiographically that class solidarity had been found where what really happened was a search for the backing of the supportive group. However, solidarity resulting from the socio-economic situation was also taking shape at this time. 3. The Social Tension The historiography has had difficulties with two aspects of the social tensions that existed in the late medieval Catalan cities. On the one hand, it has been misled by interpreting conflicts between bands as a symptom of tension proceeding from class solidarity caused by sharing the same position under the pressure of the corresponding elite. On the other hand, however, it has limited these tensions to very late times, related to the idealised vision inherited from the nineteenth-century historians who imagined that urban society arose from a very egalitarian communal movement.75 Catalan historiography has been especially marked by Jaume Vicens Vives, who in his idealised way, in the mid-twentieth century, imagined, that during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the oligarchy were behind progress without splits or criticism because their interests were identified with those of the country.76 In fact, the urban situation in Catalonia tallies with what was happening all over Europe,77 and was described socially as a duality between “maiores et menores”.78 The movements towards municipal autonomy appeared not so much as a collective conviction but rather the interests of the higher group, as is clear in the pressure in Vic on the bishop and lord of the place by a notable group of “probi homines”.79 Clearly, in a new city like Lleida, conquered from the Muslims in 1149, only half a century before, not only did an elite of businessmen arise but also these same people managed to force the king to endow the economic and social control they exercised over the city with institutional and political content.80 In each urban centre, a specific social and economic elite, with members initially identified as prohoms but Flocel Sabaté 1997d, 454-455. A good correction can be seen at : Elisabeth Magnou-Nortier 1990, 143-162. 76 “The government of the patriarchs, like any good government, was that of an oligarchy the interests of which exactly coincided with those of the country. Their personal affairs went in accordance with those of Catalonia, without promoting animadversions or jealousies, because, in definitive, they worked for the common good. Nobody ever dreamed in the previously mentioned epoch of protesting against the exclusivity of the government by the patriarchs nor desired a change that extended the participation in the municipalities of the other citizen estates” : Jaume Vicens Vives 1988, 32. A study of the documentation conserved from this period allows this approach to be fully discarded despite the influence it has had on the historiography. 77 Flocel Sabaté 2002, 521-522. 78 AML, municipal sources, parchment 10. 79 Paul H. Freedman 1979, 482. 80 Flocel Sabaté 2003a, 355-366. 74 75

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also as burgenses, looked after the supposedly common interests,81 took their demands to the lord and naturally went on to claim a right to a framework of autonomous local government.82 Mutual agreements facilitated the establishment of specific municipal councils from the end of the twelfth century.83 In the concession and consolidation of municipal authorities, the monarch found the right interlocutors and local elites assumed a role that allowed them to mix their own interests with those of the people they represented. The royal demands in military and, especially, fiscal questions encouraged municipal organisation,84 because the monarch’s economic request had to be spread across the population. In the thirteenth century, this was usually done through systems proportional to individual wealth.85 That forced the establishment of a mechanism for tax declarations (manifest) and the application of proportional taxes (a sou i lliura), such as those the king approved for Tàrrega and Cervera in 1242 and 1272 respectively. The questioning of representativity meant repeatedly imposing reforms on the election system and working of the local magistrates. These happened in Lleida in 1197, 1213 and 1264, Perpignan in 1197, 1262 and 1273, and Barcelona in 1249, 1258, 1265, 1274 and 1284, among many examples that demonstrate the strong internal tensions within the government,86 which even included violence, such as that which cost Bernat Marquet his life in Barcelona in 1257.87 There were four aspects at the roots of the urban tensions at those times. These were the struggle between those who held the reins of local power and those who, on an immediately inferior social level, sought to enter it; the discussion about the equity of the decisions taken by the municipal authorities, especially about the distribution of the tax burden; problems with the consolidation of the system of emphyteutic ownership of urban property, culminating in the emblematic conflict in Barcelona between different sectors of the bourgeoisie and great landowners like the Church about the lluïsme (the tax paid for the transfer of feudal property); and the intersection with a political evolution that strengthened the power of the estates and undermined the monarch’s jurisdictional and tax-raising capacities. This latter aspect was especially sensitive when the monarch tried to impose a global tax.88 This was in addition to the problem caused by the intervention in Sicily in 1282, which meant the papal excommunication of the monarch and a French invasion in 1285, the latter defined as a crusade, and a global period of difficulties in grain supplies.89 This general tension90 led to an outburst in Barcelona, which catalysed the different elements involved. In 1285, Berenguer Oller, together with a large number of Flocel Sabaté 1998b, 134. Arcadi Garcia 1964-1967, 166. 83 Josep Maria Font Rius 1985, 477-490. 84 Max Turull 2000, 637-677. 85 Max Turull 1992, 71-72. 86 Flocel Sabaté 2004, 222-223. 87 Carme Batlle and Joan Josep Busqueta, 1986, 85. 88 Ferran Soldevila 1995, 117-137. 89 Antoni Riera 1991, 61. 90 Maria-Lluïsa Ramos 1993, 69-94. 81 82

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middle citizens (artisans, merchants, and notaries)91 confronted the prohoms in opposition to the rentier system of property. The fierce agitation generated meant that beyond the immediate fierce repression with the execution of eight ringleaders, the king agreed to reduce the lluïsme. This provoked tensions with large landowners, such as the Church, which were not solved until the arbitration of 1310,92 but which consolidated one of the bases for the economic rise of the emerging bourgeoisie.93 Similarly, the aspect of protest against the oligarchy by local groups situated just one rung below them94 also had its effect: many of the participants in the revolt managed to join the municipal government in the following decade.95 If the social, economic and political heights remained in the same hands right from the beginning, the existence of these tensions showed a very dynamic economic and social situation, and one that required a response in the access to the heights of local power. Thus, and far from the historiographical idealisations maintained until the last third of the twentieth century, the social apex was constantly besieged by the immediately inferior sectors in search of a bigger share of power, while the former reinforced their socio-economic position by seeking patrimonial stability and by matrimonial policy. The first was reached through a successful investment policy, and the latter was pursued through ties with prominent urban lineages at a local level and also by ceding daughters to the minor nobility. The family thus became a prominent pillar: urban leaderships were internally very closely related, as has been well studied in Girona.96 The family was situated not only at the base of the urban strategies but also of investments, in such a way that it was not until the fifteenth century that capital became a more important factor than parenthood for launching commercial enterprises.97 With economic power and prestige reinforced, it gradually penetrated into the hidden aspects of municipal power. The objective was to take over the apex of local power, resulting in the control of the municipal government and all the influence this supposed. Without establishing identical parallelisms, the pressure from the emerging urban sectors on their superiors occurred in a contemporary context, under the garb of different European scenarios.98 The first third of the fourteenth century showed a very restricted series of local elites that had to agree to open up to the lower levels, as in Cervera and Tàrrega99 or, slightly later, in 1344, in Girona.100 The social factor was assumed as a basic approach for generalising a tripartite representation, corresponding to the classification of the crafts into three groups, with what that implied for classification by capacity and social condition into the three “mans” (“hands”): the “major”, “mitjana” and “menor” (upper, middle and ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 56, sheet 51r-122v; 58, sheet 92v; 62, sheets 141r-v. Francesc Carreres Candi 1910, 145-153. 93 Gaspar Feliu 1992, 2, 254-256. 94 Philippe Wolff, 1969, 211. 95 Carme Batlle 1976, 26. 96 Christian Guilleré 1984, 82-84; 1995, II, 117-131 and 297-330. 97 Coral Cuadrada and María Dolores López 1991, 88-89. 98 Marc Boone 1997, 50-55. 99 Jaume Ribalta and Max Turull 1987, 51-58. 100 Santiago Sobrequès 1975, 80-81. 91 92

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lower). In reality, this representative system was disproportionately favourable to the most well-to-do sector. This is clear if we accept the calculations that show that the “mà major” only really represented between 2% and 5% of the urban population, the “mitjana” representing between 10% and 15%, with the “menor” corresponding to between 80% and 85%.101 The rising socio-economic difficulties in the second half of the fourteenth century were offset, with an accentuation of the fields of solidarity, in some cases organised by trade and social assistance, and in others, through the mechanism of the bands. Nevertheless, the situation led to common strategies being drawn up among those who felt themselves affected by a municipal government accused of controlling the destiny of the whole population to benefit a few. This appeared as a conflict between the “mans”, especially about how to assign the rising fiscal burdens. The financial demands of the crown or the respective lordship, as well as their own expenses and those derived from the construction of walls, meant a rise in taxation that the town authorities had to distribute internally. This led to arguments about whether to apply proportional measures or indirect taxation. The latter obviously benefited the powerful groups while the former was good for the most disfavoured.102 Here is where tensions between “mans” appeared clearly based on social position. One must not fall into the simplistic response of considering the “mans” as internally united, as fortune in the search for wealth led to very different family situations, or because disputes among peasants for reasons of money, lineage and bands were behind every skirmish, and also because the criteria for structuring the “mans” according to trades generated an extremely important internal stratification within each “mà”. This was evident in Barcelona with the notaries, followed by the apothecaries, at the head of the “mà menor” in the fourteenth century.103 Thus, the posture of the lower “mans” against the upper ones was not mimetic social movements of the oppressed against the powerful. At the same time, however, these disputes still channelled political claims for access to the leadership of the government and the interests that can be handled from positions of municipal power, with the corresponding social repercussions. This can be seen in the disorders in Lleida in 1380, clearly described as un avalot que.s féu per la mà menor e mijana against the “mà major” that controlled the reins of local power.104 The evolution of the economy towards the fifteenth century did not lead to a permanent crisis, as the historiographical stereotype suggests,105 but rather a worsening of problems provoked by the incidence of fiscal pressure on municipal indebtedness and the royal debt on the banking difficulties, the effects of the depreciation of the currency, the economic echo of the Mediterranean challenges and the jurisdictional model, and the results of a protectionist policy. The growing Carme Batlle 1988, 67. Flocel Sabaté 1997d, 448-455. 103 Carme Batlle and Joan J. Busqueta 1992, 3, 101. 104 ‘A revolt by the lower and middle hands’ (Arxiu de la Corona d’Aragó, Reial Patrimoni, Mestre Racional 373, sheet 26r). 105 Over too many decades the historiography believed that the period between 1333 and 1492 was a long spell of ‘Catalan decadence': Pierre Vilar 1986 , I, 197-245. 101 102

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concentration of money and management in the capital of the country contributed to placing the internal problems of the municipality of Barcelona at one of the axial points of the political, social and economic evolution. In the leading city in Catalonia, in this framework, there was confrontation between two well-defined parties with specific names, programmes and members. These were the Biga, oligarchic, conservative and concerned with retaining power with traditional contents, and the Busca, which wished to obtain power to implant a programme of reforms, extending access to municipal government and imposing a devaluation of the currency, restructuring and controlling public expenditure and protectionist measures. Beyond the specific evolution that led the buscaires to power between 1453 and 1462106 in the midst of a fierce confrontation and difficulties to apply the proposed measures, it is obvious that the clear positions on either side allow this to be interpreted in a social key, as reflected by Alfons de Palència when, commenting on the events from the distance of Castile, he identified the conservative Biga with the aristocracy and the reformist Busca with democracy: “populares democratiam optimantes aristocratiam en senatu praeferendam contendebant”.107 That said, however, it must be appreciated that the reformist and “democratic” Busca was led by very wealthy people, some considered honourable citizens, and merchants and businessmen from the high bourgeoisie, many of whom had already complained about the lack of access to the reins of a power held by a select group.108 It is true that this meant a struggle between, on the one hand, conservatives who aimed to limit reforms, fearing that these would affect their incomes because of the devaluation of the currency and, on the other hand, reformists who wanted to facilitate access to municipal government and impose radical reforms. Altogether, this led to the mobilisation of their respective supporters. However, it is also true that the key to interpreting this not only lies in the unequal distribution of wealth but also in the mutual fusing of economic capacity and political power, with a ruling class that wanted to turn in on itself, and emerging groups that claimed political weight proportional to their economic one. The confrontation developed within the parameters of the contemporary society. Thus, the social confrontation, including the petitions for a more participative reform of municipal government, was always mixed with the conflicts between bands, as was clear at the time in Girona,109 with the jurisdictional preoccupation that these could affect access to investment in rural property by a great part of the urban bourgeoisie and with the desire for influence over royal policy. In this context, the social conflict, more than a schematic confrontation of classes, marked the will of each town’s leadership to distinguish themselves from the rest of the urban sectors and retain power. In this struggle, more than common behaviour, there were coincident strategies that brought together the high bourgeoisie and minor nobility on one side and at that moment the “mà mitjana” and the “mà menor”, although the dispute about the access to power increased urban Carmen Batlle 1973. Alfonso de Palencia 1999, VI.1, 226. 108 See significant lists in: Carme Batlle 1955, 168-170. 109 Santiago Sobrequés, 1975, 97. 106 107

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stratification, while also excluding a large section of the population who were outside the dispute. Thus, the key lay in the control of municipal power, for what that meant for ostentation and access to the desired connections between the political and economic spheres. An analysis is thus needed of the progressive cohesion and the internal contradictions of selective and limited elites who wanted to reinforce their position within the municipality over other non-privileged groups they considered inferior. 4. Cohesion and Divergences within Selectively Reduced Elites A limited number of rentier families established themselves at the top of the urban pyramid. These were known by specific names: burgesos in Perpignan, ciutadans in Girona, ciutadans honrats in Barcelona and Lleida, etc. They stood out for their economic capacity, other factors, such as the rentier condition and legal studies by their sons, and their manoeuvres to protect themselves against the lower orders. The municipal government gradually fell into the hands of a more limited number of families, as was clear in the fifteenth century, with the corresponding tensions among the inhabitants of the city. The leadership not only became smaller but also centred around a few families, including a selective register, such as la matrícula de ciutadans i mercaders established in Barcelona in 1479.110 This powerful oligarchy felt itself privileged to the point of associating itself with the lesser nobility, and never ceased to distance itself from the lower levels of the urban bourgeoisie. That implied an assimilation between the high bourgeoisie and minor nobility, as the councillors of Barcelona proclaimed in 1447: En Cathalunya lo Stat militar, e dels Ciutadans Burgesos, y hòmens honrats de Viles, axí per Constitucions, com altrament són reputats en un mateix grau e stament, e axí en guerres en qualsevols parts, com en tots actes y armes que pertanyen a Cavalleria.111 The jurists of the time, like Tomàs Mieres, used this to conclude that “cives et burgenses aequiparari militibus”112 and, in the Estudi General in Lleida, the sons of the high bourgeoisie demanded to be treated with the barons. The high bourgeoisie’s admiration for, and identification with, the military estate was perceived in male fashion113 and in a taste for cavalry and heraldry. This was well reflected when Gabriel Turell, in his treatise “Arbre d’honor”, set the “gentilshomes” (cavaliers) and “honorables” (citizens) on the same level, convinced that the latter lived like the former.114 This evolution obviously generated serious tensions within the ruling elite, because limiting it to a few hands excluded many who aspired to enjoy the power, influence and profits Marie-Claude Gerbet 1994, 138. ‘In Catalonia the military estate and that of the Bourgeois Citizens, as well as that of the honourable men of the Town, both through Constitutions and for other motives, are considered in a same level and estate, whether in wars or in any other questions, such as are the acts and arms that belong to the Cavalry.’ : Rúbriques de Bruniquer 1916, V, 153. 112 Thomas Mieres 1621, I, 110. 113 Flocel Sabaté 1996a, 22. 114 Cecília Burganyà 1992, 19. 110 111

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associated with it. In the early sixteenth century, as a result of this tendency, Pere Miquel Carbonell forecast that those bourgeois groups in Barcelona immediately below this elite on the social scale, defined as merchants, artists and artisans would end up being totally excluded from access to power: “a poch a poch lo dit regiment tornarà son loch expellint-ne tots los dits tres estaments de mercaders, artistes e menestrals”.115 Since Vicens Vives, the rise to the condition of rentier and the retention of power by the citizen elite has been considered as one of the main causes of the decadence of Catalonia, seen as a betrayal of ideals. The bourgeoisie, with their activity, would have provided the country with wealth but, by switching to the condition of rentier, they acquired a parasitic and passive attitude, which would push the country, already seriously affected by the ravages of the fourteenth century, into ruin.116 This opinion has been passed down pigeon fashion to the present in published works and local histories with no documentary confirmation.117 The idea has been fuelled through the analysis of mentality and culture, in interpreting a mutation of values in Catalan merchants at the end of the Middle Ages because of their rentier facet.118 It is worth mentioning that the approach corresponding to “la trahison des bourgeois”, detailed in neighbouring lands by Bernat Chevalier, when the oligarchy lost interest in the market economy, preferring to retire to live off parasitic non-productive incomes.119 However, most surviving documentation in Catalonia allows us to make a very accurate and detailed examination of the activities of the social elite, both with reference to investments in property120 and commercial activity.121 From this, the continuity of diversified and varied investments stands out, intrinsic to a bourgeoisie who saw rentiers as a synonym for investors. It could be seen as a change in trajectory, in accordance with the reorientation of the contemporary bourgeoisie towards the land seen in other Mediterranean areas.122 Having an accurate global vision allows these extremes to be fully explained in the Catalan case. This means that, in fact, from the earliest times (the eleventh and twelfth centuries), the bourgeois entrepreneur was a businessman who wanted to make a profit from his capital through investment in the safe values of the time, specified in the census of urban and rural emphyteutic income, to which the rest of his investments were added. There was no rupture, but rather continuity through adding investment in property to the bases of growth. Consequently, although the high bourgeoisie distanced themselves from manual work, their function continued ‘Little by little the mentioned government was modified by the expulsion of all the members of the three estates of merchants, artists and artisans’: Pere Miquel Carbonell 1997, II, 204. 116 Jaume Vicens Vives 1954, 75-76. 117 There are still works that have appeared in the twenty-first century which state, without any documentary evidence, that Lleida entered into crisis from the fourteenth century to a great extent because of ‘the convenience of the ruling classes’: Joan J. Busqueta 2004, p. 333. 118 Jaume Aurell and Alfons Puigarnau 1998, 333-338; Jaume Aurell 2001, 216-217. 119 Bernard Chevalier 1982, chap. 6. 120 Josep Fernández Trabal 1995, 292-293. 121 Damien Coulon 2003, 254. 122 Duccio Bathetracci 1990. 115

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to be essential for the economy, because they injected and mobilised investment capital. At the same time, and very markedly, people dropping out of more productive tasks, such as trade, to concentrate on the merely rentier, did not imply any economic stoppage. The social ladder was in permanent movement, and there was always someone ready to fill the economic niche left by those who had ascended socially.123 The social dynamic favoured the concentration of wealth in few hands, who showed themselves to be very interested in their own benefit. Apart from the arguments invoked, there was an ever more blatant pursuit of self-profit. The struggles in the municipalities at the end of the fifteenth century clearly show a handful of competing families very concerned about sharing out the inherent and accessible sinecures through the privileges of municipal government, as was clear enough in Barcelona.124 The close relationship between economic capacity and political power was the key to the process. Access to local power allowed pressure to be placed on the corresponding lordship to obtain favourable privileges and also made it easier to make a profit from speculation on the needs of the population, as in moments of grain shortages or when awarding public credit. From these postures, the link with the future of the country is clear. That is why there was a close relation between social vigour and impact on political power, especially as a result of the jurisdictional evolution of the country. 5. Municipal Power and the Jurisdictional Mosaic of the Country The rise of the urban elites required access to municipal power. The first municipal governments were established at the end of the twelfth century in Lleida, Perpignan, Cervera and Girona, and they became generalised in the following century. In all cases, they took the form of annually elected magistratures. These were in charge of defending the individual and common interests of the townspeople and of securing and establishing new privileges, aimed at guaranteeing institutional recognition, a juridical, judicial and fiscal regime favourable to the inhabitants and economic (especially commercial) development. This included measures that guaranteed institutional stability and the consolidation of the capital status in the region. Given that to a great degree wealth resulted from investment in the hinterland, control over the region was basic. The regional capitals obtained privileges that gave them preferential access to local products to guarantee their own supplies (such as wood in Manresa)125 or to control the traffic of basic products, such as grain, as was the case of Puigcerdà and La Cerdanya, the region it

Flocel Sabaté 2004, 302-303. Carme Batlle 1987, 322-325. 125 Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Manresa, Arxiu Municipal (AHCM), Llibre Verd, sheet 118v ; Marc Torras 1996, 103. 123 124

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dominated.126 However, it was of special importance to protect the homogeneity of the jurisdiction. The continuity of contractual obligations taken on by the population of the surroundings and, thus, the protection of investments, could only be done if there was no jurisdictional rupture. Thus the urban leaderships, through the municipal governments, became the backers of jurisdictional homogeneity. The municipalities spent important sums to establish this unity of jurisdiction, not hesitating to pay the corresponding privileges of inalienability not only for their own population, but also of nearby places and even the whole demarcation, with the aim of keeping the capital linked to the region jurisdictionally. Camprodon did so with its district – vegueria –127 in 1338, as did the town of Girona for the whole bishopric that defined its area of influence in 1339.128 These acts have misled the historiography, which has often interpreted them as a preference by urban leaderships for royal jurisdiction. In fact, they were seeking their own stability. Towns such as Castellón in Ampurias or Balaguer in Urgell, that were well established as capitals of noble units, wished to maintain this domain that gave them jurisdictional stability and homogeneity. That is why they demanded privileges of inalienability from their respective lords, similar to those that the royal towns requested from the monarch.129 All these precautions derived from the specific evolution of power, because the discourse of royal pre-eminence, despite being backed by twelfth-century Romanist arguments, came up against the king’s incapacity to impose jurisdiction and collect taxes in the face of nobles strengthened by the feudalisation of the previous centuries. That explains the serious confrontation in the thirteenth century, where the nobles, with the aim of putting pressure on the king, withdrew their loyalty on five occasions (1259, 1276, 1278 and 1280).130 Despite Peter the Great’s armed victory over the nobility in 1280,131 the monarchy failed to strengthen its own bases for income and jurisdiction. Thus, only three years later, in 1283, the need for support in the Sicilian crisis led to the constitution of courts that sanctioned a framework of jurisdictional blockage.132 Those nobles who could allege possession through the exercise of justice, although only based on tradition, had their domain confirmed. The seriousness of this framework for urban interests became evident in the following century, when the monarchy, overwhelmed by financial needs, had to cede patrimony in exchange for economic assistance, thus converting the country into a mosaic of jurisdictions that did not collaborate with each other. The danger of the situation was soon perceived: when the burgers of the town went before the Arxiu Històric Comarcal de Puigcerdà AHCP), Llibre de Provisions Reials, sheets 3r, 9v, 26v-27r, 29r-v, 40v, 48r, 50v, 52r,-v, 60r, 69v-70r, 76v, 96r, 102v; Llibre de Saltèguel , sheet 255r-v. 127 Arxiu Històric Comarcal de Camprodon (AHCC), Privilegis de Camprodon, undated box, privilege 15; Privilegis de Camprodon, undated box, loose unnumbered pages; Llibre de Privilegis de Camprodon, sheet 37r; ACA, Cancelleria, 863, sheet 151r. 128 AHCG, Llibre Verd, sheet 65r (ed.: Christian Guilleré 2000, 292-294). 129 Flocel Sabaté 2003d, 439. 130 Flocel Sabaté 2005, 484-498. 131 Francesc Carreras Candi 1906, II, 37-56. 132 José Luis Martín 1983, 239-254. 126

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justice for the non-completion of contractual obligations in places in the socioeconomic orbit of the town, justice was seen to be inoperative because the case often came under different jurisdictions. The most immediate consequences were felt by the socio-economic leadership of the regional capitals, because jurisdictional diversity meant impunity for the inhabitants of the region who failed to fulfil their contractual obligations. Municipal governments, such as those of Girona or Manresa, protested vigorously to the monarch alleging that this situation was ruining prominent families in their respective cities.133 With the aim of overcoming this situation, the municipal power advocated, through its jurists, a concept of jurisdiction regia not identified with the caprice of the monarch’s will but rather with a unity of higher jurisdiction, under a common judicial framework, based on the Constitutions of Catalonia, the Usatges of Barcelona and local privileges.134 At the same time, with the same concern, the municipal governments pressed for and supported action by the royal officials in charge of the region when this was favourable to local interests, and, in the opposite case, corrected the same official. In fact, the main municipalities dared to correct the monarch when he tried to award nobles concessions that contradicted royal prerogatives or the above-mentioned notion of royal jurisdiction. 135 In this situation, the monarch’s jurisdiction was usually imposed in areas where a strong baronial fragmentation was counterbalanced by a strong royal municipality, as was clear in Roussillon, presided over by Perpignan.136 Everywhere, the municipal governments became the main guarantee of royal jurisdiction by accepting the nearby villages as if they were “carrers” (streets) and thus making them subject to the same privileges and protection as any neighbour.137 With precisely this formula, in the last two decades of the fourteenth century,138 the towns gave very firm backing to the reconstruction of the fragmented royal jurisdiction, although they did so with money supplied by their own population.139 The municipal authorities thus appeared as guarantors (or hijackers) of the royal jurisdiction, not through loyalty to the monarch but rather because this allowed them to enjoy a jurisdictional homogeneity equivalent to the territory of their interests and socio-economic influence. The paradoxical situation experienced on the death of the Count of Empúries in 1401 without a direct heir and the consequent return of the county to the crown is coherent with this. The principal city in the area, Girona, wanted the entity to be fully integrated under royal jurisdiction, while the monarch himself wanted to rule the county as a baron, that is, independently of royal laws and jurisdiction. 140

Flocel Sabaté 1998b, 150. Flocel Sabaté 1996b, 337-342. 135 Flocel Sabaté 2000-2002, 275. 136 Flocel Sabaté 2000a, 179. 137 Flocel Sabaté 2000b, 7-30. 138 Flocel Sabaté 1995, 119. 139 Flocel Sabaté 1997a, 203-207. 140 Flocel Sabaté, (2009) in press. 133 134

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It is not surprising that the municipalities tried hard to stop the sovereign. The ceremonious theatralisation of feelings when the municipalities commemorated victories, births, visits by the king141 and, especially funerals for members of the royal household, was a part of a double strategy aimed firstly to show the monarch that understanding and support were to be found among the municipalities and, in the second place, to involve the population, and thus bring the sovereign closer to the people. The king was often seen as very distant and, to a great extent, responsible for the problems they suffered. This was so both for the heavy tax burden imposed to pay for affairs which the municipalities often felt little involved in, and the failure of justice as a result of the exemptions and licences awarded and the jurisdictional fragmentation that led to a change in financial help.142 The sovereign’s weakness was the result of the fourteenth-century failure to establish the monarch’s own jurisdiction (in 1392 the vast majority of the country – 86.57% of the area and 77.83% of the population – fell outside royal jurisdiction)143 and obtain his own tax income. Lacking resources, the king had to face political challenges, especially external ones, with the help granted by the courts. The general courts of 1362-1363 and the Catalan courts of 1364-1365 sanctioned a fiscal system in the hands of the estates144 through territorial councils identified with each of the three Crown territories.145 This opened a triple door: that of a state tax system controlled, not by the king, but by the estates,146 the consolidation of permanent representation of the estates, given that each of the councils became established and acquired political content,147 and the settling of an institutionalised duality between the monarch and the estates standing as representatives of the country.148 The municipal powers, led by Barcelona, were at the head of the estates, convinced that they represented the country. That was why they identified themselves with Catalonia against the king. After all, the estates, namely barons, clergy and bourgeoisie, possessed most of the jurisdiction and tax revenues. This identification, however, led irremediably to conflict with the monarch over who really held sovereignty over the country. 6. The Control of the Country and the Rupture with the Sovereign In the fifteenth century, the jurist Tomàs Mieres defined Catalonia as a sum of ten cities.149 In fact, this portrayed the country as a collection of urban regions ruled by their respective elites through the municipal governments. The latter shared a notion of collective power clearly reflected in the epistolary exchanges between similar towns to standardise their postures on political affairs or protocol. Francesc Massip 1994, 63-80; Rafael Narbona 1996, I,-3, 409-410. Flocel Sabaté 2003c, 71-74. 143 Flocel Sabaté 1995b, 633. 144 José Ángel Sesma 1989, 453-463. 145 José Ángel Sesma 1983, 141-163. 146 Manuel Sánchez 1995, 129-134. 147 Tomàs de Montagut 1996, 103-119. 148 Flocel Sabaté 2005, 252-257. 149 Francesc Maspons 1930, 335. 141 142

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The 1368-1369 courts showed the estates addressing the monarch convinced that they were representing, and identifying with, the country.150 It was a duality: the king and the representatives of “the land”. The influential moralist, Francesc Eiximenis, justified his position against the monarch, with a relation that can only be agreed, because “jamés les comunitats no donaren la potestat absolutament a negun sobre si mateixes sinó ab certs pactes e lleis”. This was a logical approach because the collective interests took precedence: “la comunitat no elegí senyoria per amor del regidor, mas elegí regidor per amor de si mateixa”. The monopolising of this representation of the country by the urban power was also supported with naturalness by the same author in stating that “totes les senyories del món foren en llur fundació primera paccionades e posades in certs pactes e ab ses lleis municipals”.151 This theoretical justification was balanced by the capacity for political pressure by a municipal power led by the city of Barcelona. It was not only a question of putting pressure on the monarch to extract different privileges but rather of steering the country in what was considered the most favourable direction. It was Barcelona’s council which prevented John I’s daughter, Joana, from succeeding him on his death in 1396 and passed the throne to the dead king’s brother, Martin, alleging the law of male succession. Apart from existing juridical rights, the resolute actuation of the municipal government reflected a political capacity and power that were again evident in 1410, when, after Martin’s death, the Barcelona magistrates played a vital role in impeding the succession of his closest male relative, the Count of Urgell, and forcing a two-year interregnum.152 Unusually for Western Europe, this interregnum was formally ended through a meeting of the representatives of the estates, who, in the so-called Compromise of Casp of 1412, decided who had more right to the throne. As well as the arguable juridical backing of the chosen candidate, there is no doubt that the formula used illustrates that sovereignty belonged to the estates. These, representing “the land”, decided who would wear the crown.153 Thus, a specific model of state was imposed, centred on a pact between the monarch and the estates. The identification of the latter with the country conditioned the explanation of the origins of Catalonia, that had been born, according to contemporary narratives, through the acts of some barons, predecessors of Charlemagne, who reached pacts with the natives, thus prefiguring the noble and municipal estates of the fifteenth century.154 During the first third of the century, the courts put this theory into practice, with the king having to undertake tough negotiations with estates that denied him the subsidies he requested, as happened in 1419. This limited the action of high Tomàs de Montagut 1996, 102-103. “The communities have only given power over themselves with certain pacts and laws; the community does not elect the lord for love of the governor, but rather chooses the governor for love of itself; all the lordships of the world have been, in their initial foundation, agreed and placed under certain municipal pacts and laws”: Francesc Eiximenis 1983, CLVI, 191. 152 Próspero de Bofarull 1847, 209-212. 153 Flocel Sabaté 2005, 509-515. 154 Eulàlia Duran 1991, 14. 150 151

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royal auxiliaries, such as the governors,155 and established a concordant legislative framework. In 1413 the nullity of the privileges granted by the sovereign opposed to the “pacted” laws was established and a juridical sentence from the courts of Barcelona in 1431-1434 specified that the king had to submit to, and serve, the laws of the country, such as the Usatges and the constitutions.156 This “pactism”157 has traditionally been seen as the quintessence of the specific Catalan identity, identified with a “pactist mentality”,158 which in reality meant accepting the arguments supplied by contemporary jurists and those from the modern centuries.159 In reality, this pactism was common to all medieval monarchies160 in a Europe where the sovereign, already limited by the dictates of the Christian ethic,161 was obliged to coexist with powers with varied degrees of access to income and jurisdiction. Both found the justification for their respective position in the Romanism of the omnipresent jurists, just when collective identities were being consolidated around the concepts of nation, people and the mother country.162 It was not just chance that, at the same time as the leadership between the council and the papacy was passionately questioned,163 there were also fierce arguments about whether to place sovereignty in the king or the collectivity,164 specifying, according to the circumstances of the different countries, the aim that the kingdoms should not be ruled by royal arbitrariness but rather by the agreement of the estates gathered together in parliament.165 This ideological framework was widely shared in Catalonia, where jurists, such as Bartolo de Sassoferrato, who endorsed the power of the “universitas”, were well known.166 The Crown of Aragon became a fertile field because most of the jurisdiction and income was in the hands of the estates and not the king, and the latter even owed his throne to election by the same representatives of the collective will, as contemporary jurists recalled. They observed the limits of the monarch’s power167 and defined a political model from “pacted” laws, agreed between the sovereign and the estates.168 The estates, gathered in corts (assembly of the three Flocel Sabaté 1999a, 55-57. Josep Maria Gay 1984, 70. 157 Tomàs de Montagut 1989, 669-679. 158 Ferran Soldevila 1982, 226; Jaume Vicens Vives 1982, 107-120. 159 Antoni Simon 1998, 94-102. 160 Jesús Lalinde 1980, 185; Teófilo F. Ruiz 1984, 483. 161 Jean Dufournet 1990, 24. 162 Bernard Guenée 1973, 56-73. 163 Anthony Black 1996, 291-294. 164 Dieter Mertens 1999, 111-129. 165 Peter S. Lewis 1995, 119-120. 166 Antonio García 1974-1979, 443- 447. 167 The most explicit words are attributed to Gabriel Turell in Gabriel Turull 1950, 199, although its literal nature may correspond to later manipulations of the text . See Jaume Riera 1993, 461-462. 168 Thus forming part of the mesh of institutional working, this has been defined as ‘juridical pactism’ in contrast to what could be a ‘historical pactism’ in Aragon or even a ‘philosophical pactism’ in Castile. See Jesús Lalinde, 1999, 112. 155 156

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estates), in parliaments (partial assembly of the estates), in the Diputació del General (permanent representation of the Corts) or other commissions, represented “the land” before the king. Although nobles and high churchmen were very powerful and careful to safeguard their position through their respective incomes and access to jurisdiction, it was the municipal powers, with the magistrates of Barcelona at the head, who monopolised the representation of the estates. A series of factors contributed to this formally representative leadership, reached by the municipal powers under the guidance of the Barcelona oligarchy. These factors were their economic power, which implied high income and many interests interwoven into the territorial fabric and social and economic policy, both inside and outside the country; the cohesion of a limited but vigorous group against any other power, whether it was the king, the other estates or the emerging urban sectors; connivance and practical alliances not so much for reasons of the estates but rather social-economic interests, which related them strategically to the high sectors of the bourgeoisie, the nobility and the clergy; the jurists’ task of legitimisation, that supplied theoretically definition, practical justification and ideological references; the capacity for organisation and co-ordination in the internal working and the relation with the estates as a whole; and the assertive, uncompromising and passionate tone assumed. Under this municipal guidance, the relations between the estates and the king were terribly fraught between 1412 are 1462, with episodes of marked tension and distrust especially at the meeting of the courts.169 The evolution of the urban oligarchies towards a very limited number of people, or rather families,170 who mixed municipal interests with private ones, justified very conservative positions in questions relating to both the countryside and the city. The characteristics of bourgeois investment in property, and also all kinds of rights, pitted the urban government led by the restrictive oligarchies against the peasant movements struggling for the redemption of feudal rights and against reformist measures in monetary and economic policy. Caught in the middle, the monarch opted for postures that were more conciliatory. In 1448, the crown allowed the organisation of a peasant union to deal with and structure their claims, and in 1452 authorised Barcelona to create the union of the Tres Estaments, thus giving a voice to the members of the inferior “mans”. Both events were linked and confirmed the rupture between the urban oligarchy and the monarchy. By intervening, the monarch also aimed to consolidate his own power by imposing a capacity to arbitrate. Thus, in 1455, Alfons issued a provisional decree that suspended servitude until the lords agreed to appear at the king’s court.171 At the same time, royal support through the old governor allowed the reformist party (Busca) to gain power in Barcelona in 1453.172 The unrest in the oligarchy, which interpreted all these measures as directly harmful for their wealth, was added to their disagreement with Alfons’ Mediterranean policy. This policy did not take the interests of the Catalan Manuel Riu 2000, I, 657-664. Joan Lluís Palos 1994, 178-188. 171 Jaume Vicens Vives 1978, 56-59. 172 Carmen Batlle 1976, 72-90. 169 170

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bourgeoisie into account, not even when it affected the central point of the economy, namely trade with the East. In fact, having obtained money from Italian bankers and earnings from the new banking and financial mechanisms,173 the king did not need the financial help of the Catalan courts, and could thus set his own objectives even when these affected the bases of the Catalan oligarchy’s wealth by requisitioning ships or making enemies who impeded the activity of the Catalans in the East. 174 The absence of the sovereign, who lived in Italy from 1432 until his death in 1458,175 personalised the tension against his deputies, with Queen Mary, Galceran de Requesens (who rose from governor to deputy despite being only a cavalier) and the monarch’s brother, John, who represented the king from 1454 until he reached the throne, taking decisions clearly contrary to the municipal oligarchies, who retained the permanent representation of the Diputació and boycotted the reformist government installed in Barcelona.176 This accumulated high tension explains the force with which the estates intervened in the dispute between the sovereign and his son, Charles of Viana, in 1461.177 This was no more than a strategy to increase the power of the estates and minimise the king’s. A landmark was reached, in the same year, at the capitulation of Vilafranca, a consequence and culmination of a concept of sovereignty in the hands of the estates. The monarch not only had to negotiate with the representatives of the “lands” to designate his officials and permit their control, but could not even enter the country without permission from the estates.178 Thus, serious tension was incubated that burst out in 1462. When the conservatives of the Biga regained power in Barcelona, the countryside rose in revolt and the king entered the country without the mandatory permission of the representatives of the “land”. The monarch invoked his sovereign right to enter his royal dominion, which Pope Pius II recognised from Rome,179 while the estates, headed by Barcelona, accused him of having broken the laws that had been imposed on him by the guardians of sovereignty. This was the territorial legitimacy of the estates captained by the municipal power against the dynastic legitimacy invoked by the king. These two opposing discourses catalysed the rise in tensions and justified a civil war. Each side used its own discourse to endorse their legitimacy over the country. The estates dismissed the king and designated a successor, while, for his part, John II replied with military force. The pretended successor had to agree to occupy the position that the trustees of the sovereignty awarded him. It was an uncomfortable position. Peter of Portugal, (grandson of the Count of Urgell rejected at Casp), the second of the three candidates successively chosen by the estates, accused the representatives and especially the government of the city of David Igual 2001, 103-143. Damien Coulon 2000, 2, 1055-1080. 175 Alan Ryder 1992, 221-526. 176 Jaume Vicens Vives 2003, 186-197. 177 Georges Desdevises du Dezert 1999, 354-375. 178 Próspero de Bofarull 1859, 222-263. 179 Josep Maria Pou i Martí 1936, II, 379-380. 173 174

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Barcelona of leaving him powerless: “vos vullau tant arrogar e a vostres preeminències attribuir que sia vist ésser derogat a la nostra, e preiudicat a nostres regalies e al que sens vosaltres nos és permès”.180 The urban oligarchy, especially in the capital, bore the brunt of the war against John II through their control of the municipal authorities in Barcelona, whose directives were imposed on the other representative institutions. From the outside, the chroniclers talked about a “catalanorum seditio” led by the people of Barcelona.181 The war was long. It only ended ten years later when the country had been totally ruined, when even the possibilities of economic prosperity had vanished.182 The war had been favourable to old John II, more skilful in politics, diplomacy and military strategy. After the defeat, the socio-economic situation was irrecoverable,183 but, despite everything, the municipal powers maintained the same legitimist discourse in the name of the estates, who presented themselves as representatives of the land. Nor would they change their song against the king. Between 1473 and 1479, the courts firmly opposed the monarch’s economic petitions and agrarian policy, while the municipal government of Barcelona not only confronted the king but also made him change his views on different affairs. A significant example was the death of John II in 1479, when the municipal authorities argued with the members of the royal household about how to stage the funeral. The ceremony was finally not held according to court criteria but in line with the municipal ideas. The city government had taken over both the representation and the figure of the sovereign.184 In fact, the representativity invoked hid the desire to retain access to municipal institutions from where to benefit one’s lineage and group, which generalised serious instability in all the municipalities at the end of the Middle Ages, very significantly inflamed with the annual renovation of municipal positions. This situation was the excuse invoked by John II’s son and successor, Ferdinand II, to intervene in the municipal system, imposing a system of draws (insaculation) with the aim of avoiding, “malvolensas, discòrdias, gabellas, oppressions, remors e debats e altres inconvenients en dita universitat e singulars d’aquella”.185 The imposition of this system in different cities and towns around the country has been heralded in the historiography as one of the regenerative measures taken by Ferdinand the Catholic. There were really two aspects. On the one hand, the king was keen to take advantage of these divisions to promote his own jurisdictional and rentier capacity. On the bourgeois side, the establishment of a limited number of people with access to the bags from which lots for posts were drawn allowed the consolidation of a You wish to assume so much and attribute so much to your pre-eminence that you strictly limit ours, prejudicing our prerogatives and what is allowed us without you (AHCB, fons municipal, B-VIII, 5, letter 103: Jesús Ernesto Martínez-Ferrando 1936, 217. 181 Alfonso de Palencia 1999, II, 226-227. 182 Mario del Treppo 1976, 538-541. 183 Gaspar Feliu 2004, 464-466. 184 Flocel Sabaté 1994, 185-187. 185 Unrest, discords, plots, oppressions, rumours, debates and other inconveniences in the mentioned community and its inhabitants (Arxiu Històric Comarcal d’Olot (AHCO), fons municipal, Llibre de Privilegis, fol. 1v; ed.: Antoni Mayans and Xavier Puigvert 1995, 155. 180

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specific elite. This led to the rise of a leadership close to the king, because it was he, or his representative, who could sanction the names of those who could aspire to municipal positions, as the king’s deputy in Manresa in 1500 stated with regard to “totes aquelles personas que a nós han paregut ésser àbils e sufficients axí per ésser consellers com per ésser del consell com encara per a tenir e regir los altres officis de la dita ciutat”.186 In practice, royal intervention was toned down or distanced and the system allowed wider access to municipal power, balanced in function of wealth more than position,187 but, above all, the oligarchic patriarchy retained their predominance.188 Thus, the new scenario aimed to combine the raising of the monarch to the summit of society, the promotion of nobles close to the crown and the consolidation of local powers. In this sense, since the end of the war, jurists have struggled to combine the different vectors involved: the notion of community around the municipality, the overall vision of the territory and the concept of royal sovereignty.189 Nevertheless, the estates did not alter their self-justifying discourses. They continued to present themselves as the representatives of the country, and municipal power, with Barcelona in the lead, and fought to retain its representation. It does not matter that this attitude led to notable events during the fifteenth century, such as the Compromise of Casp and the civil war, whose consequences were unfavourable not only for the prosperity of the country but also for the personal interests of many of its promoters. Moreover, by emphasising the same discourse and asserting the interdependence between the notion of urban elite and the pactist claim to power, the ruling group was justifying its behaviour, its position and even its mission. Thus, it jeopardised the historical memory of the facts. 7. The Control of History and the Alteration of Memory The paradox is clear: the rise to power of the bourgeois leaderships that closed in on themselves, leading, in the fifteenth century, to very narrow groups concerned with using power for their self-interest. At the same time, given the incapacity of the monarchy to give cohesion to power founded on the pillars of jurisdiction and incomes, it was the estates that developed this representativity of the country, captained by municipal power led by the magistrates of Barcelona. It was an arrogant position. Alfonso de Palencia presents this clearly when commenting that in Catalonia, the citizens “illam suam inter omnes horum seculorum prudentiores summi consilii arrogantiam stolidius ostentarunt, divulgantes imprudenter atque impie quod si Deus consilio egeret nusquam preterquam Barchinonae id posset habere”.190 Of all those people who have seemed to us able and sufficient to be councillors, members of the council or the other posts of the city. Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Manresa (AHCM), Arxiu Municipal, Llibre Verd, sheet 189r; ed.: Marc Torras1996, 501. 187 Juan Mercader 1952, I, 343-344. 188 Josep Maria Torras 1983, 68-69. 189 Manuel J. Pelaez 1978 199-205. 190 Displayed with so much foolishness that arrogance that led them to believe themselves the smartest of the prudent men of these centuries, proclaiming imprudently and 186

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This expression reflects a very self-satisfied urban elite, occupying a very prominent position. The actions thus promoted, however, did not generate an overall view but rather continued setting very personal and immediate objectives. The adverse results of the policy in the fifteenth century not only did not lead to a rebuke but rather reinforced the same justification. Outstanding jurists like Narcís de Sant Dionís, Callís, Turell, Mieres or Marquilles paid specific attention to the citizens, praising their mission, highly exalted in terms that would be repeated by jurists in the later centuries. A specific official discourse appeared that blurred the reality for the people of the time and obstructed the task for later historians, because, as recent historiography has detected, it offered “una imatge del patriciat en el qual la idea del que se suposava que havien de ser els ciutadans ocultà completament el que eren en realitat”.191 The following centuries consolidated this tendency. The bourgeoisie led the constitutionalist discourse in the sixteenth century. This was aimed at sustaining the invocation of the origins of the country in the pact, supposedly effectuated in the Carolingian epoch, between the monarch and the representatives of the country, a starting point that would condition all later events.192 Thus, there was a struggle between a monarchy that evolved towards absolutism and an approach anchored in that constitutionalism that justified a pactist regime, fiscal immunity and an elective monarchy, one, that is, chosen and accepted by the estates, arguments that, in reality, fed the bourgeois leadership. The intense intellectual, juridical and political discussion that filled the third and fourth decades of the seventeenth century193 stretched on until a new war. This, lasting from 1642 to 1652, once again showed the bourgeoisie convinced that they, through the estates, represented the country. This once again led them to decide who the throne corresponded to, taking it from the Spanish king to offer it to the French sovereign.194 Once the conflagration had ended in a new defeat, the pactist constitutionalism was not only penalised politically and socially195 but also strongly challenged at an ideological level by absolutist postures that benefited from the new ideas based on the reason of state.196 The political model, with the local and regional institutions through which the bourgeoisie aimed to channel the pactist formula, was finally thrown out in 1716, as a result of the great defeat, two years previously, in the War of Succession.197 Similarly, the identification of the country with the bourgeoisie did not change. Beyond this political evolution, at the end of the seventeenth century (and even more so in the eighteenth) when there was a desire to regenerate the country, everyone remembered that it had been great when it had impiously that if God needed advice, this was only to be found in Barcelona: Alfonso de Palencia 1999, II, 226. 191 ‘An image of the patriarchy in which the idea of those who supposed what the citizens had to be completely hides what they were in reality’ : Joan Lluís Palos 1994, 201. 192 Jesús Villanueva 1994, 75-87. 193 Antoni Simon – Jesús Villanueva 1997, 40-53. 194 Aquilino Iglesia 1983, 401-450. 195 Josep Maria Torras 1994, 30-32. 196 Julián Viejo 1999, 233-244. 197 Josep Juan 2001, 119-133. 26

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been in the hands of citizens who loved work and had taken the leading role in a commercial enterprise that led the country to success as a maritime power.198 This was part of the European context where historical erudition took an interest in the past of the cities199 and rediscovered the roots of prosperity (and identity) of both the country and the bourgeoisie. Thus, in the nineteenth century, a range of authors also agreed on this, either from a romantic approach or positivist renovation. It must be said however, that the historians of that time were themselves part of the urban leadership, often with clear civic and political implications, and seemed to link their own reality with the historical roots, even feeling themselves heirs and successors to some idealised late medieval characters, just as happened widely in other parts of Europe.200 It was not until the mid-twentieth century that historians began to look for endogenous causes for the crisis in Catalonia at the end of the medieval period. The bourgeoisie thus came to be held responsible for the progress of the country, through their ideals and activities but also for provoking the later ruin, through their social positions and political attitudes.201 Only in the last few decades has the historiography dissected the period with the capacity to appreciate that everyone involved in the power game defended their own narrow interests, although the bourgeoisie had many of these in play, given their need to preserve and increase the fields of wealth, and to work to improve their position within the city. They also had to protect their investments in the region and needed to intervene in politics with enough power to mediate with the royal power. Thus, it can be said that the partisan interpretation established before the close of the Middle Ages with the aim of controlling power has evolved into real control over the memory of the events and the respective positions.

Narciso Feliu de la Peña 1975, 23; Antonio Capmany 1963, 814; Jaume Caresmar 1979, 61. 199 Jean Schneider 1990, 7. 200 Philippe Braunstein 1997, 30. 201 Jaume Vicens Vives1982, 75. 198

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URBAN SYSTEMS AS AN OLIGARCHY STRUCTURING PROCESS IN FIFTEENTH-CENTURY CASTILIAN SOCIETY* Maria Asenjo González Complutense University of Madrid The city as a social construct in Western Europe is one of the most interesting phenomena studied in historical research. A city is a response to a tacit or explicit desire on the part of its inhabitants to live together. Undoubtedly, urban life could not have arisen spontaneously; it required the willing participation of its inhabitants. Hence, political agreement has been a constant feature of urban society throughout history, including the Middle-Ages. However, this pact of urban coexistence was an especially fragile arrangement during towns’ initial years, and social consensus demanded constant reinforcement throughout the ensuing centuries.1 This consensus is at times reflected in the legal and institutional developments in urban life in the later Middle-Ages. It is well-known that the cities did not emanate spontaneously, nor did they grow without impetus from social and economic factors. However, urban historiography of the Crown of Castile has often presented its origin as a result of organized political action instigated by royal intervention in the context of the repopulation of conquered lands previously in the hands of Islam.2 This narrow viewpoint precludes a consideration of society’s relevant contribution in the process of urban construction. Furthermore, it reinforces a trickle-down concept of political power and its pervasive capacity to transform both the socio-economic reality and the general history of this period. The purpose of this study is to reveal the underpinnings of this pact, the basis of urban life in late-medieval Castile, in order to reconstruct the social contribution provided by economic, institutional and political processes throughout the period. Although the objective of this study is essentially centred on the period of oligarchic construction in the late Middle-Ages between the eleventh and the beginnings of the sixteenth centuries, another focus is on the social process derived from relations with other political forces such as the monarchy or the feudal nobility. The basic premise is that in a structured society, such as that of the MiddleAges, relations between political powers were not solely expressed in terms of authority and domination but also in tacit agreement and consensus of proposals.3 *This research was granted by the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and has been developed through two research projects. The first: ‘Las relaciones de conflicto y sus prácticas representativas (la Corona de Castilla en su contexto europeo, siglos XIII al XVI)’, (Ref. HUM200605233.) and the research leader is Jose Manuel Nieto Soria. The second: ‘Espacio político y demarcaciones socioeconómicas. Redes urbanas de villas y ciudades en la Castilla sudoriental (1450-1520)’ (Ref. HUM 2007-61076) of which I am the research leader. Both are getting in Complutense University of Madrid. This article was translated by Gonzalo Carrasco García. 1 Pierre Ansay and René Schoonbrodt 1989, 20. 2 Jean Gautier-Dalche, 1979; María Asenjo González 1990. 3 María Asenjo González 1997, 105-141. 29

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Socio-historical analysis of complex, weakly-structured societies involves some inherent difficulties. This is true of medieval Castilian society, which only gradually came to be conditioned by feudal norms. Important issues to consider are the means of production which ensured the subsistence of a population, and the stability afforded by an institutional framework which was the target of numerous disputes and differences. In addition, the reality of various social groups, subject to their respective hierarchies, interacting and intervening in society on different levels had important consequences politically. All this in a society founded on relationships and bonds that went beyond the limited family structure of kinship and extended to new forms of association and dependence in which loyalty and a willingness to serve prevailed over blood lineage in an increasingly complex world. In such a context, the primary agents in forging urban society between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries were the main political players – the monarchy and feudal nobility- and the religious values embedded in a feudalizing Christianity. In each historical period, the reasons behind the agreement that led to the creation of an urban framework varied since they originated in the need to guarantee survival, both physical and economic, and to settle daily issues to assure social coexistence. It is obvious that controlling the territory became essential for an agricultural society subjected to threats from Islamic razzias as well as from rival seigniorial incursions. The response to these challenges took the form of direct defensive military actions to protect their territory. Defence of the city largely fell to urban knights (caballeros villanos): armed horsemen organized in urban militia integrated into the royal army. However, the main political power charged with the protection of the city, be it the king or feudal lord, proved decisive to a wellorganized defence. This mutual need for support can be understood in light of the long relationship between monarchy and towns stretching back to the very beginnings of the urban phenomenon in Castile.4 In fact, an initial institutional agreement with the Castilian-Leonese Crown began to take shape as settlers of the civitas were granted privileges and charters in the tenth century which guaranteed them control over their territories, as well as recognition of local customs and practices. In exchange, they submitted to royal authority and agreed to cooperate first in military and repopulation campaigns against al-Andalus, and later against the Kingdom of Granada from the second half of the thirteenth century onwards. Social diversity, at the core of the medieval urban phenomenon, was the result of economic changes as well as social incentives such as exemption and privilege that kings and influential lords would bestow on the armed horsemen and those who stood out within the natural hierarchies. These changes and transformations gradually produced an urban power base which became increasingly removed from original kinship ties. This local authority became more receptive to the power of crown or lords, and more dependent on loyalties and services which would guarantee their survival. The new urban power bloc would have an oligarchic spirit from the end of the thirteenth century onwards, and despite it being rooted in 4

The monarchy’s predominant influence has been analyzed in the works of Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada 1994.

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the natural traditional hierarchies of the past, it would now have to compete with the ambition and energy of the urban-knights.5 Western European cities gradually appropriated the language of feudal predominance in that they were able to overcome obstacles and limitations imposed by the political structure of the dominant families. Consequently, they adapted the forms of government to the parameters of a vassalage-dominated society, sustained by loyalties and services in exchange for protection and help. In the urban environment, this exchange took place among a political clientele linked to groups or leaders that dominated the towns. This process, which began in the central Middle-Ages, connects gradually to the outset of the Modern Age with an incipient secularism and individualism, the two great bastions of contemporary urban experience that would prove especially useful to the interests of authoritarian monarchies in the modern world. However, the long path of social development in the West only began to unfold with the social disintegration of family structures and client or associative networks, to later continue and culminate in the individualism that is a distinctive feature of modern society. Humanism, as Foucault indicates, was an essential part of the process by occasioning the appearance of the individual as a sovereign agent subjected to the laws of nature or the rules of society: A person’s fundamental liberty (sovereign on the inside, consenting and “adapted to its destiny” on the outside) would come to the foreground. He presents humanism as the set of discourses in which Western man is told, …even if you do not exercise power, you can be sovereign. Furthermore, the more you renounce to exercise power and the further you are subjected to that which is imposed upon you, the more you will be sovereign. In short, humanism alone has obstructed the will to power in the West: forbidding the quest for power and excluding the possibility to attain it. Humanism itself already contains the theory of the subject whose responsibility and ambition could pose a threat to the social system. Hence, this same line of thinking favours formulas that allow for the channelling of behaviour and the subjection of its will to power. This is the reason why prohibitions and restrictions that reconstruct and redirect normative individuality become essential. From this perspective it becomes clear that the oligarchic societal model in Western towns constitutes a very important intermediate stage that helps explain the origins of modern society.6 This analysis of the oligarchy and oligarchic society essentially focuses on the political dimensions of the concept as it relates to the exercise of power in a given society. In the Middle-Ages, the oligarchy linked up with local authority in order to penetrate it and consolidate their own predominant position.7 This urban oligarchic process traditionally has been misunderstood by a school of historiography that has explained the appearance of oligarchic governments in María Asenjo González 1994. Michel Foucault 1971, 33-36. 7 Julio Valdeón Baruque 1990; José Mª Monsalvo Antón 1990; Juan Carlos Martín Cea and Juan A. Bonachía Hernando 1998, 17-40. 5 6

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towns as a perverse effect of a quasi-democratic participative system in the concilium period between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries. For these historians, the gradual deterioration of democracy was evidenced in the description of oligarchic government as a closed council, in contrast to the idea of a more democratic participative urban society expressed in the concilia, or open councils. According to this romantic idea of a triumphant bourgeoisie, an erroneous conception was arrived at of a supposed council democracy from the eleventh to the thirteenth century, which came to a close with the establishment of the regimiento.8 Nevertheless, it is wellknown that the council or concilium was the main body of governance in this town society of collective groupings and did not represent a unified political entity. Instead, they represented an aggregate of minor societies in which family structure played a dominant role. Once blood-lineage bonds became less important, the dominant framework emerged, composed of other forms of collective associations based on common trades, religion or other interests.9 Hence, the consolidation of a new hierarchy could only take place within the core of the groups that comprised the concilium and these would be responsible for political management and social integration. One cannot underestimate the role played by the family in the first feudal society and specifically in the origin and development of urban society from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries.10 Economic and social changes taking place in Castilian towns produced a fragmentation of representational groups which hindered urban governance. This was the excuse used to put an end to the mechanisms of representation and allow a new model which passed the reins of political power on to the oligarchy. The regimiento system would complete this slow process from the thirteenth to the fourteenth centuries. The original sources speak of a closed council when referring to the regimiento, a system of urban government established in 1345, although Andalusian towns would see it implemented a few decades after their conquest and repopulation by Christians.11 Thus, the widespread tendency towards the middle of the fifteenth century was for organization and political government to reflect the internal transformation of each town, stimulated by monarchical authority and the implication of different urban sectors.12 In this study, our purpose will be to explain the network of oligarchic power as a political dimension of city life. We will focus on four case studies of Castilian towns under royal jurisdiction: Segovia, Soria, Valladolid, and Toledo,

This perspective can be found in some institutionalist studies such as, Joaquín Salcedo Izu 1980, 223-242. A similar point of view can also be found in Adeline Rucquoi, 1987, in which she concludes that the implementation of the regimiento system promoted neither egalitarian urban values nor basic freedoms. See Paulino Iradiel 1999. 9 The same applies to the comune in Florence according to R. Fubini 1995, 109-118. 10 Jack Goody 1986; Robert Fossier 1988. Concerning the Iberian Peninsula, see Reina Pastor (ed.) 1990 and Jose Ignacio Iglesia Duarte (ed.) 2001. 11 Deborah Kirschenberg Schenck 1995. 12 Hilario Casado Alonso 1987; Denis Menjot 1988; José Mª Monsalvo Antón 1990; Juan Ignacio Ruiz de la Peña Solar 1969. 8

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whose evolution varies according to different factors such as political importance and size.13 1. Oligarchy and Oligarchic Groups In the heart of Castilian towns an important change had taken place from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries that culminated in increasing social diversification coupled with the recognition of a new dominant group composed of urban-knights. In Castilian towns, merchants and craftsmen were not able to become collective forces with political representation. Instead, they acted within the political framework dominated by the lower nobility and the knights. In order to reach a dominant position, the urban-knights were forced to forego dependence on kinship and hold their own against the incipient competition from rich craftsmen and merchants who were looking to rise socially by making their trade compatible with the maintenance of a horse and arms. Knights defended their position through the accumulation of riches and patrimony. This wealth was derived from their agricultural land, the spoils of war, and the favour of counts and Castilian kings, who, moreover, since the twelfth century, had included them in the Cortes (Parliament) as the Third Estate.14 The urban-knights had privileges recognized since 974 (the fuero or charter of Castrogeriz). They were committed to participating in the hueste, or local army, and in the fonsado, the offensive war in which all those found in proximity to the conflict were obliged to take part, as well as in the apellido, or defensive war. They were also required to fulfil the anubda, a service meant to guarantee the safety of herd-grazing routes (transhumancia). The knights could not leave the towns in summer, although they could do so in winter on the condition that they maintain an inhabited dwelling in town. They were committed to military service from the age of 18 to 60, and once or twice a year had to review their troops in their own town (alarde).15 While it is difficult to trace the evolution of society between the years 1000 and 1300, it seems clear that wealth and territorial power were crucial in the organization of the social order in Castile and Leon. These changes were inevitably linked to the political dominance of the nobility and came as a result of good economic times throughout the kingdom during the twelfth century. Social dynamism was the product of the wealth accumulated through agriculture and especially migrating livestock. In this context, the most significant political change in Castilian towns was the implementation of the regimiento: a new form of government that allowed for the consolidation of the dominant political force in towns. In many towns, knights had taken over key government responsibilities despite resistance from the traditional hierarchies of the patrician class that had managed urban life until then. Even though they were confronted by a common desire to control the disputed local authority, a complete division between the two hierarchies – urban María Asenjo González 1986, 1999 and 2000; Juan Ramón Palencia Herrejón 1999. Jose María Mínguez Fernández 1983. 15 Carmen Pescador del Hoyo 1961-1964. 13 14

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knights and señores – never took place due to underlying common interests. The validity of charters and consuetudinary law guaranteed social pacts between the dominant forces. Nonetheless, the existence of these natural hierarchies has been somewhat obscured by traditional historiography which attributed an important political role to the urban-knights. It is difficult to accept that the first urban society did not have hierarchies based on kinship or clans as they constantly appear in the records under the term señiores, boni homines or hombres buenos. Nevertheless, we have yet to determine whether they were the main force that ruled the local council and represented town-dwellers before the king or the Cortes during the first concilium or whether they shared this role with the urban knights.16 Thanks to royal protection, the knights managed to maintain a privileged social status guaranteeing them exemption from taxes and political privileges. As of the thirteenth century, they became coherent, well-integrated lineage groups, organized horizontally with a specific structure that allowed them to challenge the natural kinship hierarchies that had dominated the council until then. Essential to this was the support provided by King Alfonso X (1250-1284), due to their condition of horsemen warriors willing to take part in battle, in a legislative reform which promoted their political ambitions by involving them in this new model of management and government within the context of a process of increasing feudalization.17 The existence of consuetudinary norms did not prevent the rapid emergence of basic cooperation between councils and the monarchy with respect to legislative issues. Despite the fact that, as of the thirteenth century, kings intensified their efforts to confer and extend increasingly homogeneous local charters, they still required sufficient social backing to guarantee the implementation of legislative innovations. The urban knights were the group that could endorse the new legislative reform launched by Alfonso X, who as of 1260 sought considerable local rents in towns for royal purposes. Their condition as a group of social upstarts, eager to amass further privileges and pre-eminencies made them a perfect ally of the king despite the mistrust and overt rejection among the rest of the urban patricians in council, who mustered all their forces to defend their local charters and privileges. It was precisely this response that provoked the rejection of the legislative reform, which would have to wait almost a century before it would be implemented through the Ordenamiento of the Alcalá Cortes in 1348. Cities and towns opposed to these legislative reforms rebelled by organizing confraternaties (hermandades) that demanded greater political participation in the kingdom’s institutions. This demand would prove fruitful between 1282 and 1325, a convulsive period which coincided with the reigns of child monarchs. The fact is that the political developments of these years, in which the confraternities managed to make their voices heard, This point was clearly established in Mª Carmen Carlé 1964. In late Middle Ages in Murcia, they are found collecting taxes from 1349 on, and the council was ordered to select from each of the parishes two boni homines with sufficient credit to undertake this venture. Denis Menjot 1988, 135. 17 Antonio Ballesteros Beretta 1963; Robert I. Burns 1990; Joseph F. O’callaghan 1993; María Asenjo González 1987; Aquilino Iglesias Zamora 1983a. 16

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enabled towns to have a say in the main institutions of the kingdom, a feat which would become firmly established in the following centuries.18 The first references to urban lineages appeared during the turbulent period at the end of the thirteenth century. They consisted of groups of urban-knights whose affinity was not based predominantly on an agnative family structure, as was the case with the patrician nobility. The urban lineages took the shape of largely horizontal societies whose members shared the condition of horsemen and warriors, and often took the name of their founding member. The lineages mentioned in the conflicts at the end of the thirteenth century became organizations whose presence increased during the first half of the fourteenth century. In 1296, when Maria de Molina -the regent queen- discovered that Don Juan -the prince- had firm supporters in Segovia, she decided to travel there. Fearing she would not be welcome in Segovia, she beckoned three men to appear before her; these were Diego Gil, Día Sanz and Sancho Esteban, who went, according to Colmenares, as heads of the urban factions.19 Nevertheless, despite the apparent invincibility of the knights, their social ascent was halted in those towns whose strongest faction was made up of the lower aristocracy and the hombres buenos. This was the case in cities like Toledo and those of Lower Andalusia like Seville, Cordoba, as well as Murcia. The knights of these towns did not attain the predominance they had within their lineage groups and were forced to work under the auspices of the urban aristocratic association, which would end up monopolizing their leadership.20 2. Rise and Consolidation The rise of oligarchic power began at the close of the thirteenth century and would reach its peak in the mid-fourteenth century with the establishment of the regimiento system. During this period the slow ascent of the knights was severely restrained by the process of social construction that favoured infanzones and hidalgos, members of the lower nobility.21 Urban government became dependent on royal power when the office of councillor (regidor) became subject to royal prerogative. Councillorship fell primarily in the hands of the oligarchic families, although it was also conferred onto other city-dwellers who received these positions as payment in exchange for a service rendered to the crown. In effect, concession of this office, as a royal favour, became a means for social advancement. In general, those who José Mª Mínguez Fernández 1990. Diego Colmenares 1636/ 1982, 1, XXIII (XI), 439. 20 Toledo adopts the model of the cities of lower Andalucía, or the Burgos model with a prosperous commercial class which favoured a minority of merchants: Manuel González Jiménez 1985, 315-329; Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada 1987; Juan A. Bonachía Hernando, 1978; Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete 1986. 21 Concerning recognized natural hierarchies that fought against urban oligarchies in Aragón, see the following works, Enrique Mainé Burguete 1999. In the case of Castile, see M. Isabel Pérez de Tudela 1979. The behaviour of these hierarchies that achieved a predominant role in ecclesiastical institutions including local monasteries has been analyzed in Ignacio Álvarez Borge 1996. 18 19

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reached this office tended to be sufficiently wealthy and powerful within this urban context so that concession of the councillorship was a confirmation of their influence rather than a social promotion in itself.22 The regimiento system began to weaken the urban oligarchy since it unleashed a power shift favouring those who attained office, not always coinciding with the influential lineages or other groups. The monopolization of urban offices would reach a peak when the offices became hereditary, as documented during the reign of the Catholic Kings. However, this social tendency did not take place in the same way in all towns. Furthermore, the different response to this new phenomenon derived, among other reasons, from the structural difficulties in the internal balance of power of each town. Even though events favoured the consolidation of the oligarchic group that monopolized the office of councillor and exercised power to maintain and increase their patrimony, they also sought greater social rank which would allow them to mix with the nobility.23 It becomes clear that the incipient oligarchy did not rise independently of other social groups, rather it did so via different channels in which non-kinship bonds were fundamental. 3. Links to the Groups of Origin From the mid-fourteenth century the oligarchic group began a process of consolidating its power based on links with a clientele different from those bonds maintained by the groups of origin. It seems that this was quite common in many Castilian towns and cities. This favoured the gradual rise of a differentiated group of individuals that managed to develop a particular strategy to strengthen their position. The ties with groups of origin, of kinship and family structure, persisted for a long time. This was the case in the town of Soria where a later practice of the open council (concejo abierto) coexisted naturally alongside the regimiento system until the late fifteenth century.24 Members of the new oligarchy aspiring to join the elite essentially sprang from these groups of origin. However, it is important to recall that the regimiento system was sustained thanks to the support of the king and the nobility with whom they shared common cultural aristocratic values. Thus, the Castilian oligarchy of the fifteenth century was a multifaceted and complex social group. Several factors account for their rise, such as the experience gained in battle, where the lineage of knights played a prominent role. This allowed them to develop group cohesion and common interests essential for the purposes of urban political hegemony. The rules The regimiento system altered the balance of power within municipal politics allowing for the creation of an elite of the elite as advanced in José Mª Monsalvo Antón 1990. 23 Marie-Claude Gerbet 1989. 24 Archivo General de Simancas/Registro General del Sello (A.G.S./R.G.S.), IV-1497, fol. 133: Burgos, 18 April 1497: Sepades que a nos es fecha relaçion que en esta dicha çibdad e regimiento della se ha fecho e acostumbrado haser avierto por manera que todas las personas que querían an entrado en vuestros regimientos, e syn ser ofiçiales del conçejo desa dicha çibdad, e que dello ha venido mucho daño e prejuyzio a esa dicha çibdad e al bien e pro comun della. 22

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of the game, however, changed when the regimiento system was introduced. Even if the number of councillors was determined by lineage groups and other groups of origin, the social dynamic of the oligarchic mechanism favoured the promotion of those elected as councillors, at least until the end of the fifteenth century, when these offices became subject to inheritance. Nevertheless, in certain towns, such as Soria, the mechanisms that determined the election of councillors persisted well into the sixteenth century.25 Lineage groups played an important role in the urban context and its political controversies. They responded to a social reality and benefited from Alfonso XI’s decision to base his strategy on them to provide a viable municipal government from 1345 on.26 In fact, during the period of this first regimiento system, the groups of origin brought stability and the means to end conflicts and internal rivalries that stemmed from disputes related to accessibility to municipal offices. They decided that the election of councillors would take place from within the lineage groups on a rotational basis.27 This tutelage by the groups of origin over the first regimiento system was also characterized by the councillors having more than just an administrative role. They also profited from municipal rents as well as from being electors for other offices. Councillors’ municipal responsibilities were not well defined. This allowed them to transform their office into a political springboard as there was no clear limitation on their power: They assumed control of all types of areas of government within the confines of the town. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the contribution provided by the groups of origin was slowly reduced to support roles, municipal management, and social affirmation. Lineage groups would reinforce an ample client-network structure capable of seeking out the necessary social backing for the acceptance and smooth running of the council. On this basis, the councillor’s management capacity increased as urban life developed. As a The council of Soria continued designating councillors from a previous selection of members of the same lineage group responsible for the appointment of the office. The appointments can be traced in the records found in the A.G.S. /R.G.S. This procedure was reconfirmed in 1518, after a claim was issued: A.G.S./Consejo Real Leg. 41-13; August 1517 - September 1518. Juan Morales, councillor of Soria, sends a letter to the monarchs complaining about the naming of the comendador as city councillor. This citation can be found in María Asenjo González 1999, 512, note 59. 26 Amando Represa 1949, I a IX - XI, 294, Burgos, 5 May 1345: Sepan quantos esta carta vieren como nos don Alfonso, etc... Porque fallamos que es nuestro servicio que ayan en la villa de Segovia omes bonos dende que ayan poder para ver los fechos de la dicha villa, otrosí para fazer e ordenar todas las cosas que el Concejo faria e ordenaria estando ayuntados, porque en los concejos vienen muchos omes poner discordia e destorvo en las cosas que se deven faser e ordenar por nuestro servicio e por pro comunal de la dicha çiudat e su termino, E por esto tenemos por bien de fiar todos los fechos del Concejo destos que aqui diran dichos ... E que todos con el Juez quando y fuer de otra parte o con los alcalles e el alguasil de la villa e un escrivano dende con ellos, que se ayunten con ellos do es acostumbrado de fazer concejo dos dias en cada semana uno el lunes e el otro el viernes. 27 Amando Represa 1949, from I to IX-XI, 290-294; In Segovia the two lineage groups led by Día Sánchez and Ferrand García, elected ten councillors (five each), out of a total of fifteen. 25

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government institution, the council would gradually set limits to its scope of action, clearly differentiated from that of the groups of origin.28 In order to attain control of municipal governments, the Trastamara dynasty (1369-1517) increased considerably its normative, legal, fiscal and political scope in Castilian cities until it reached the point that they became virtual collective seigniorial estates. Councillors’ access to increased municipal power opened new horizons for them as they now participated in the collection of rents, the distributing of municipal offices and the creation of new bonds of loyalty and dependence that would allow for even greater social promotion. While these institutional changes took place, the lower urban nobility underwent an important transformation which reinforced their horizontal bonds of solidarity. This produced a compensation-effect of self-control on the part of the urban oligarchy. The factors which contributed to establishing these bonds of solidarity were directly or indirectly conditioned by the preservation and distribution of power in town and country. Hence, lineages and confraternities of knights appeared from within urban society and acted as patrician teams of the military aristocracy.29 It is undeniable that this social construction was the result of various interactions which included multiple bonds of kinship but which did not coincide with the social structure of the nobility. Therefore, it is revealing that the social structure of lineage groups was open, complex and focused initially on attaining and holding on to municipal power. This peculiar social structure persisted even once this objective had been reached since it subsequently became essential for successful governance in town and country.30 The council of the city of Segovia left records indicating the influence exerted by lineage groups upon the council with respect to all fundamental issues. This proves that it originated as a constrained institution. The designation of municipal offices soon became a delicate issue pitting councillors and lineage groups against one another. There is ample testimony of these confrontations at the start of the fifteenth century, coinciding with the establishment of important new responsibilities in the regimiento system. Hence, in 1433, the responsibilities of councillors and lineage groups are recorded in a revealing document which clearly

Amando Represa 1949, I a IX - XI, p. 296: E que partan ende estos sobredichos los oficios de la villa de cada anno en el tiempo que se suelen dar aquellos oficios que el concejo suelen dar entre si. E que non ayan y otros oficiales de los que el concejo suelen dar salvo los que estos sobredichos dieren. E que estos sobredichos que son nombrados para esto e los que.... 29The term lineage which designates the agnative family structures typical of the titled nobility is subject to problems of interpretation. In fact, this term has often been equated to the noble family model when it is impossible for lineage family-structures -vertical and very hierarchical- to be at the basis of the integration of those urban knights who considered themselves equal to one another. The knight lineages possess the names of certain families documented in this period. However, that supposedly unifying reference point is irrelevant as not even knights with the same surnames appear in considerable numbers in the following years. Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada 1991; José Mª Monsalvo Antón 1993. 30 María Asenjo González 1989. 28

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specifies which duties each of the two municipal groups were privy to.31 At the request of lineage groups, and due to the abuse of power by municipal councillors, the criteria for naming municipal officers were laid down in writing. However, first it was essential to resort to arbitrary ruling which would put an end to lawsuits between knights and squires of the town who were not councillors and who were grouped according to lineage. This ruling ordered that the position of magistrate (alcalde) and bailiff (alguacil), along with the representatives to the Cortes, the head of a military raid (carrera), and the leader of hunting expeditions (monterías) be distributed between councillors and lineage groups in the following way: i) Councillors, knights and squires of town and country would have an exclusive right to serve as town representatives to the Cortes and would receive the corresponding salary and privileges.32 ii) Knights and squires of the town who were not councillors would be conferred two fealties: municipal market and fair inspector. They could elect two fieles (pre-regimiento councillors) once a year, on St. Lazarus day. Should the election not take place, councillors would be obliged to designate two individuals to the office, but in no case could it be exercised by any of the councillors themselves.33 iii) With respect to the four magistrates which the town was to select (given there was no royal representative or king’s justice in town) two were to be filled by knights and squires that did not occupy a councillorship, and the other two were to be selected from among the councillors. In every case, these offices were to be conferred along with their corresponding rights and salaries.34 iv) In the case of the bailiffs, they were to be selected by knights and squires who were councillors during that year, and the following year by those who were not. They established a salary of 15 000 maravadies.35 v) The election of bailiff and magistrate had to be public according to custom and tradition, in the Church of the Trinity, where members of lineage groups, councillors and common folk were to congregate. They would separately elect the officials. Once elected, they were to inform the king of their choice for his confirmation. If the election did not take place, the councillors were free to select them independently and according to their own criteria.36 vi) With respect to urban emissaries, and the council’s right to appoint representatives (with the exception of the municipal representative in Parliament), they would be selected by councillors the first year, and the following year by

A.G.S./Consejo Real, Leg. 68, 3-III, fol. 8, Segovia, 28 April, 1433. Ibid., fol. 2 r.: E mandamos e hordenamos que los oficios de la dicha ciudad se ayan e rrepartan entre las dichas partes en esta manera que se sigue, primeramente que los dichos rregidores caballeros escuderos de la dicha çiudad e su tierra hayan para sy apartadamente... las procuraciones e ayuntamientos quel rrey fisier e mandare faser.... 33 Ibid., fols 2r. and 2v. 34 Ibid., fol. 2v. 35 Ibid., fol. 3v. 36 Ibid., fol. 4v. 31 32

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knights and squires of the lineage groups. These officials would also be prevented from holding any other office during that year.37 The ordinances in the arbitrary ruling of 1433 amount to a clear distribution of responsibilities and priorities in the naming of officials within the council. Knights and squires that did not hold councillorships (from both lineage groups) had their power and capability to name officials and receive their respective rents from the council fully recognized. This power could have been absolute, but they had slowly been losing ground to the councillors elected by them who would eventually claim total control and the election of their offices. The measures of 1433 allowed for a resolution of the problem by dividing -between lineage groups and councillors- the responsibility and client benefits of appointing officials. Moreover, this proved that lineage groups were not a over-arching force encompassing all of the urban oligarchy and capable of coordinating an oligarchic model in the framework of town and country. Undoubtedly, from 1345 onwards, and even prior to this date, lineage had played a key political role in urban affairs. In fact, lineage groups maintained an important and consolidated share of power and continued electing many officials in order to manage and govern the town along with the councillors. It continued to be an integrated body in political life, with a recognized hand in the election of collaborators which complemented the councillor’s administrative role. It is not surprising that the election process was full of intrigue in order to get supporters and partisan officials of the councillors elected even if it were only for a one-time single-year office. Certain records show petitions that solicited royal intervention to guarantee lineage group meetings and respect for the election process of officials in the municipal council. They complained the selection of candidates had been arranged previously and the necessary votes bought with bribes and presents.38 The balance of power established in 1345 had been fractured as a result of the political consolidation of the councillors. They began behaving as an oligarchic group, whose power increased with urban economic development and social backing from the new client networks. They eventually replaced the collective lineage group system developed by their clientele mechanisms. Hence, the Segovia agreements are not only proof of the existing rivalry between lineage groups and councillors in the election of council officials, but also of the political consequences of the hegemony of urban councillors in this city. This led to the renewal of responsibilities as a result of social transformation produced by the ever-increasing importance of the municipal councillors. The political and social influence of the lineage groups was undeniable, but we must not lose sight of the existence of boni homines and other local hierarchies that shared political and social control of the council via five councillorships that were assigned in town and country. The integration of these councillorships in the process of progressive distancing from the groups of origin would have been smoother had other organized social structures such as knight lineages not hindered the process. 37 38

40

Ibid., fol. 5v. Ibid., X, 1515, in Segovia, 8 October, 1515.

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4. Urban Power and Client Networks The power structure in Segovia was based on the existence of knight lineages that supported the first closed council (regimiento). A similar case is that of Valladolid, although here it is of enormous significance that the town was the place of residence of the Trastamara court during long periods of the year. In the end, the Catholic Kings chose this town to establish the Chancellery (supreme court of justice).39 The fact the city was the site of the court had an effect on its municipal development as the presence of prominent nobles and supporters of the different factions in the conflict altered the city’s course on several accounts. In parallel, part of urban society nourished factionalism and partisanship, favouring one side or the other in the rivalries between the noble factions in the conflict. Despite this political burden, Valladolid appears to have been a town structured on a model of stable government guaranteed by the Tovar and Reoyo lineages. Their function was to allow for the integration of a minority of knights and their participation in municipal life. The lineage groups were behind other forms of associative groups such as neighbourhood bands (cuadrillas), urban collectivities which included several parishes, or trade and religious confraternities. These associations seem to be tied to oligarchic groups interested in cooperating in municipal government actions.40 The vigorous action of these bands in moments of crisis or tension resulting from confrontation in the town continued until 1520 and demonstrated their commitment to governability and urban peace.41 In Toledo, however, we do not find lineage groups and, in a way, its development and political evolution seems to follow a pattern of adaptation of a deeply rooted patrician class. The patrimonial basis and social prestige of certain families not only provided governors for the city, but also, caught the attention of the monarchy. They were dominant hierarchies whose influence dated back to certain mozarabic families; they included knights, officials, and highly qualified men for the running of municipal affairs.42 Over time, this aristocracy presented no divisions in its fold but rather was a picture of unity and continuity, right up to the 1500s. The existence of this Toledan patrician class can be explained by the fact that as of 1085, the city was composed of a complex society organized in a decentralized manner on an urban economic basis. Its importance grew further when it became a border town after the Almoravid retreat in 1086. A deeply rooted urban aristocracy with a solid agricultural estate was apparent by the thirteenth century. It was Bartolomé Bennassar 1967; Adeline Rucquoi 1987, 1999. This can be observed in the records at the end of the fifteenth century: Fernando Pino Rebolledo, 1990. 41 We were able to confirm this in a previous work: María Asenjo González 1999, 49-115. Further proof is found in the oath sworn in Valladolid, on 11 December 1468. In it, we find unanimous consent amongst the inhabitants to defend the city along with the councillors as well as with the support of the king. At the same time, knights agreed not to support their lords if they initiated a rebellion: Adeline Rucquoi 1987, 536-537. 42 Salvador de Moxó 1981, 414. They state that royal preference was exercised "contando con su pericia personal y una preparación administrativa más depurada que la de la nobleza territorial, debido al entorno urbano en que se habían formado". 39 40

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possibly structured around town and country, but it was unable to prevent the consequences of the rise in status and social promotion tied to the economic growth of the fifteenth century.43 This urban aristocracy held the main municipal positions, and their importance, along with the nature of their estates, was based on landownership whose origins date back to old mozarabic society. Toledo did not receive a closedcouncil (regimiento) privilege in 1345 nor in the following half century. This can be explained by its urban social model and by the council’s stability, which did not require royal intervention to stabilize its oligarchic municipal model. Toledo was governed on the basis of an oligarchic structure that elected two loyal members from each group: knights and boni homines to manage urban affairs as magistrates (alcaldes), and the office of bailiff would be reserved for the most prominent members of the noble families.44 The fact that municipal offices in Toledo were filled without conflict demonstrates that there was a structured system whereby an elite minority had access to power within an oligarchic society not limited to the hegemony of the urban knights. As of 1333, the governmental council in Toledo consisted of knights and boni homines. This assembly remained active until the early fifteenth century when the regimiento system was introduced in two phases, one beginning in 1411 and another phase in 1422. The 1411 ordinance reduced the number of municipal officials to the most relevant posts. Two magistrates (alcaldes) and bailiffs, along with their deputies/lieutenants, were retained, as were representatives of the groups of knights and the lower nobility (hijosdalgo), who would name three loyal candidates, and the group of boni homines who would select another three. These six loyal representatives would be chosen from within their group of origin every two years.45 In 1422, Juan II conceded the regimiento system for Toledo. The municipal council was to be composed of sixteen councillors, eight from each group of origin to represent the city.46 The city of Toledo distrusted the king’s naming of councillors, and in 1476 they opposed the confirmation of Alfonso Carrillo for that office and did not permit him to take possession. However, the patrimonialization of councillorships quickly became an accepted norm. In 1501, the jurados -representatives of the different quarters and parishes of the city- denounced the commercialization of

Jean Pierre Molenat 1991. María Asenjo González 2001-2002. The pre-regimiento councillors (fieles mayores) were appointed by the council of Toledo to implement the ordinances for good government in the city. These ordinances stipulated that Toledo or its council select two knights as fieles mayores along with two boni homines. This appointment should last two years with the guarantee that they would not hold office in the ensuing ten years. They were obliged to present guarantors who were held accountable for their actions in case the fieles were to proceed irregularly. 45 Juan Ramón Palencia Herrejón 1999, 362. 46 Juan Ramón Palencia Herrejón 1999, 364. 43 44

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councillorships. Records from 1514 indicate a clear patrimonialization of the offices.47 A clientele network underlay the structure of the city of Toledo, but it is quite difficult to follow the trail of relationships and responsibilities it generated. A clientele arrangement implies both a relationship of dependence on the part of those whose work or business relies on the governor, as well as the protection and shelter provided by the powerful who seek their support. This urban phenomenon of the fifteenth century not only produced personal bonds and loyalties but also reinforced bonds of kinship and camaraderie. This process extended beyond the strict town limits to reach country dwellers in a complex and dense network of relationships. This network revolved around a group in the case of an urban lineage, or an individual and his kin in the case of councillors. 4.1. Municipal Posts and Offices As power gradually became concentrated in councillors’ hands, the risk of losing the capacity to appoint municipal officials, and with it the maintenance of the clientele structure, became increasingly palpable. Hence, in Segovia, councillors reserved for themselves half of the municipal posts to feed their own client network, distinct from the one which the lineage groups maintained. They were also conscious of the threat this posed to the lineage of urban knights, the backbone of urban stability, and from which many councillors originated. The threat of the new urban client-network relationships also had political repercussions since this network provided more than support, benefits and rents to the individual that acted as patron. Social relationships also became a means of keeping the peace in towns and integrating the different factions within the political framework.48 Henceforth, any modification of the pre-existing structure of clientelerelationships, and a displacement of lineage groups in their organizational process would have serious consequences for the municipal council. This was the situation in the majority of Castilian cities during the course of the fifteenth century, especially in the first half. In those years, structural instability provoked by the configuration of a new political oligarchy explains the need of municipal councillors for firm support to prop up their position. That support would be supplemented by a strategy of distributing offices and rents among themselves which would guarantee their majority in council.49 It seems clear that political backing obtained from the nobility and from the monarchy itself was essential for the purpose of peaceful municipal government. Juan Ramón Palencia Herrejón 1999, 125. The social hegemony of the knights became manifest in the salaries provided to the loyal members of each group: 1000 maravedies to the knight’s loyal members, and 500 to the “boni homines” loyal members. 48 Juan Ramón Palencia Herrejón 1999, 374-375. 49 Dale Kent 1987. This study takes into consideration the dynamics of power in its relationship between social structure – especially relations of kin and ties of fealty - and the way in which power was exerted. This tactic, which consisted in appointing the highest number of one’s supporters in government offices, was specifically used by the Medicis as of the 1420s and 1430s. 47

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4.2. Sources of Rent The course of political change in Toledo offers no additional insights and must be completed with the contribution of normative records such as the Old Ordinances of 1400.50 This document reveals the rights and obligations that the client network model imposed on the commercialization of wine in town. Not only was the production and sale of wine taken over by the urban oligarchy and some city-dwellers, but bonds of dependence were stretched to encompass vineyard tenants and producers. Access to this privilege was limited to a few select town residents who participated alongside knights, squires and landlords. Producers were obliged to rent their estate to this minority if they wished to sell their production. This condition became mandatory even for those who did not possess this privilege.51 Thus, the construction of a client-network that favoured urban knights was reinforced, and its influence extended all the way from the city to the countryside. On the basis of guaranteed profits, typical of a highly speculative product such as wine, the oligarchy could easily sustain its network. This network eventually became a complex web of dependencies with multiple ramifications which relied upon urban laws to safeguard and protect it by guaranteeing every step of production, from harvest to sale, including manufacturing, transport and storage.52 5. The Business of Services: Royal and Noble Power Urban intervention in the monarchy’s fiscal policy could be understood and justified within the framework of services provided for the king. The concept of service is founded on relationships of vassalage which sustained a feudal ideology derived from a set of late-medieval political values.53 Services went beyond traditional relations of vassalage and were compatible with a whole series of support mechanisms required by royal power. Service allowed nobles and the monarchy to extend their circle of benefactors, whose personal loyalty and commitment to a person and a cause became sacred. Numerous servants who were recorded among the entourage of the nobility would also fall into this category of minor vassals.54 The nature of the bonds that characterized client relationships can be regarded as a parallel to patron-client relations. Service becomes essential for the oligarchic group but at the same time produced uneven effects. Establishing a María Asenjo González 2000. Archivo Municipal de Toledo/ Ordenanzas Municipales, Alacena 2, leg. 6, num. 4, fol. 21v: Otrosy, qualquier que sea vesino de Toledo e non toviere arrendadas viñas de cavalleros o de escuderos o de duenas o de otro alguno que sea vesino de Toledo, de aquellos que su vino debe entrar en Toledo, que pierda el vino e lo que avolviere a ello e peche setenta e dos maravedis por cada ves, e que esta pena sea para los fieles del vino. 52 María Asenjo González 2001-2002, 135. 53 Rosemary Horrox 1989. 54 Marie-Claude Gerbet 1989. 50 51

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preference among members of the oligarchic group could lead to internal destabilization. Those most likely to maintain a relationship of service with nobles and monarchy were the members of the urban oligarchy and the councillors themselves. The members of the urban oligarchy were keen to provide these services because they sought personal and family fortune in the form of rents and juros (a specific type of national rent paid from royal incomes). The members of this group in cities under royal jurisdiction also sought access to royal and seigniorial administrative posts and even privanza, the right of admission to the king’s quarters. Relations with superior, more powerful entities often produced instability due to unequal rival forces that broke the balance of power of the oligarchic government. This threat loomed over the political dynamic of the council by accentuating ambition and rivalry among its members. That thirst for power could only be countered by respecting a behavioural pattern and a deontological code derived from chivalric values and the demands of running the republica. The term “republica” is part of the institutional language since the second half of the fifteenth century. It appears in the parliamentary sessions of the Cortes, as well as in correspondence records, and refers to cities as a collectivity imbued with political values which stem from a humanistic tradition.55 It is obvious that the changes in the social and political state of affairs of the town were related to the consolidation of an oligarchic government which placed its particular needs over new principles. The theoretical mechanisms explaining and justifying the republic were not made explicit, but the term was coopted by those in power in order to reinforce internal group cohesion. Such mechanisms became the guarantor of peace in the city, and preservation seemed fundamental for the elimination of violence from everyday life. Members of the oligarchy contributed to municipal governability by guaranteeing its client networks ran smoothly, garnering support and acquiescence in its management. This was achieved in exchange for compensation in the form of political favours: an office, some sort of economic profit or rents. The easiest way an urban client could be compensated was by allowing them access to one of many differentiated groups that sought power. In order to develop a model for a citizen’s republic, this mechanism was reproduced in different cities and it even spread to the countryside whose jurisdiction lay in municipal hands.56

Alan Deyermond 1988, 186. Some of these chronicles reveal a certain civic pride that can be compared to that found in Italian republics in the fifteenth century. A significant case in point is found in Seville’s resistance against the attack of the prince don Enrique in 1444, studied by Angus Mackay 1976, 163-171. The development of the term also appears in Aurelio Pretel Marín 1989. 56The dearth of Castilian records does not allow for a proper analysis of strategies of power of the urban oligarchy as described in the case of Florence: Dale Kent 1987. 55

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6. Social Promotion and the Closure of the Oligarchic Structure In the mid fourteenth century, the lower nobility (hidalgos), and the knights had become powerful forces within the urban oligarchy. Their estates had prospered and their family configuration evolved from an extended to a nuclear family structure.57 These families become predominantly agnative, this being fostered by a dedication towards military objectives, as well as by norms of law and ecclesiastical dispositions that spread amongst justice officials influenced by university teaching. Nevertheless, hidalgos and knights, lacking sufficient economic means, and distanced from the king and his favour, were not able to constitute a mayorazgo (an indivisible estate inherited totally and exclusively by the eldest son from one generation to the next) until the end of the fifteenth century. It was only in the sixteenth century that they were able to assert themselves as urban nobility with royal privileges that allowed them to establish mayorazgos with their assets.58 Until then, they resorted to intermediate means such as the use of the mejora: this procedure allowed them to reserve a third of the inheritance to the son of choice (prior to this they had been obliged to divide the goods equally among all the sons).59 The social context reflected in these records suggests that there had been a second social selection (linked with the inheritance of councillorships or the rotational nature of this privilege) that seems already limited to a single group of families. This division among members of the oligarchy is quite revealing of the difficulties of integrating all the members of the urban military aristocracy into the municipal government. Within a period of almost a hundred years, a huge social breach had been created. A social division of tremendous repercussion had taken place resulting in the emergence of an intermediate social group made up of members of the urban oligarchy who took part in the council. At the end of the fifteenth century these positions would serve as a springboard to achieve key posts previously held by the oligarchy of municipal councillors. In spite of this, a marginal role was reserved for the Día Sánchez and the Ferrand García lineages as of 1433, according to the records, and their presence within the council of Segovia was to be constant until the sixteenth century. The councillors maintained an affiliation with one of the two lineage groups, even if they did so symbolically without involving any clientele relationships with its members. It is important to recognize they held a key role in the social and political framework of the city. However, in no way can one observe that the councillors were dependent on the lineages, whose structure and coordination is not well-known, and such

In general, Castilian families in the late Middle Ages were subjected to judicial regulations which were heavily influenced by Roman law since the implementation of the Partidas code in 1348: Francisco Chacón Jiménez 1987; 1988. 58 The laws passed in the Toro Cortes of 1505 encouraged a procedure which had been used periodically in previous decades as recorded in numerous concessions found in the Archivo General de Simancas/ Registro General del Sello (A.G.S./R.G.S.). 59 Francisco Chacón Jiménez 1987. 57

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lineages did not coincide with that of the more prominent lineage groups.60 Had an initial structure been capable of encompassing the bulk of the urban military oligarchy, they might have turned into horizontal organizations of knights distinct and distanced socially and economically from the town’s common residents. 7. Integration and Exclusion in the Context of Town and Country. The Expression of a Political Conscience Castilian society was open and encouraged the promotion and upward mobility of all those providing military service, as all able-bodied men with the means to afford horse and arms were obliged to do. The ease with which they could reach a higher rank, along with their group’s weak internal hierarchy, allowed an elite class of knights to become predominant in the majority of councils and towns. However, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, social promotion reached craftsmen and merchant circles who sought socially relevant positions in order to satisfy their political aspirations.61 This internal mobility caused concern and distrust in the urban oligarchy who were not willing to share their power with the parvenus. The reaction of the dominant forces was to close off access to power on the one hand, and initiate a rapprochement with the monarchy on the other.62 In the case of cities under royal dominion and jurisdiction, the desire for a closer bond with the monarchy led them to cooperate in royal initiatives. It led the king to further the role of city representatives (procuradores) in the Royal Council in order to guarantee governability and engage the cooperation of cities for the sake of a more efficient fiscal policy. Even though the first steps were taken in the reign of Enrique III, it was Juan II (1406-1450) who reaffirmed stable city representation in the highest governmental institutions of the kingdom. These circumstances favoured the aristocratic ambitions of an urban oligarchy of knightly origin who in many ways had already assumed the social behaviour of the higher nobility of the land. At the same time, the urban oligarchy did all they could to stifle competition from the wealthy and prestigious citizens of their town.63 Even cities with more hierarchical social structures, such as Toledo, showed signs of instability, including attacks against Jewish-converts (conversos) over the course of the fifteenth century.64 This political and social reaction, also imbued with religious motives against the ascent of conversos and their political intervention, was a clear sign of weakness of the instruments of hierarchical integration in Castilian urban society.65 The Inquisition would henceforth also be used as a mechanism for filtering and excluding access to power in cities.66 Jacques Heers 1974; Marie-Claude Gerbet 1989, 203. This aspect was studied in the case of Seville in Antonio Collantes de Terán 2000, 13-39. 62 María Asenjo González 2002 and 2006. 63 Philippe Wolff 1971, 4-18; Angus Mackay 1972. 64 Eloy Benito Ruano 1957. 65 Marie-Claude Gerbet and Jeaninne Fayard 1985; José M. Monsalvo Antón 1994; Mª Pilar Rábade Obradó 1993. 66 Mª Pilar Rábade Obradó 1997. 60 61

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The modification of the balance of power among the different urban forces in a sense justified the need for an urban oligarchy as an integrating and pacifying force in the council. Its network of relations within an urban framework were comparable to those that took place among certain members of the nobility.67 This same structure meant they became involved in the urban affairs of their clients and their patrons, who assumed the behavioural patterns of the oligarchy. Furthermore, bonds of solidarity extended to other sectors of society that could contribute some form of support. This made running municipal politics a subtle game of gathering and balancing ideological and moral support from a myriad of players. This support came from both the Church and Christian morality and from the development of a civic consciousness based on the defence of the common good. 68 As this interesting political development was taking place, the growing dependence of the urban oligarchy on the collection and distribution of the monarchy’s rents also becomes manifest.69 They eventually sought the exemption of mandatory taxes such as the payment of services passed in the parliamentary sessions of the Cortes.70 Consequently, a new aristocratic-political behavioural model is adopted in the urban oligarchy throughout the fifteenth century. It becomes apparent that their desire for wealth and power clashes with their need to garnish support and favour from their clientele. At the same time, their patronage becomes ever more dependent on political and economic help provided by the monarchy. Conclusion Tracing the rise and development of an urban oligarchy in Castilian cities highlights the dynamics of the society’s development. This article explains how in the framework of this society, in both town and country, family bonds were not as manifested intrinsic forms of integration based on the distribution of economic, social and political benefits derived from urban goods. These goods belonged originally to citizens of the town, but were diverted to the oligarchy’s clientele. This process was also based on a carefully laid normative foundation that went beyond arbitrary judgements and the norms of non-written consuetudinary law. It was justified by ordinances and specific laws that regulated different economic issues, such as the productive process of crafts, the conservation of farming goods, measures that ensured the supply and provision of the city, and conditions for the access to urban common goods. This set of norms established by the oligarchy was then backed by royal intervention that sanctioned and ratified these municipal measures. Over a long period of time, the oligarchic government became increasingly dependent on the Crown, which played a fundamental role as its main patron.

Rafael G. Peinado Santaella and Enrique Soria Mesa 1994. Peter Blickle 1998. 69 Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete 1986; Antonio Collantes de Terán 1995; Denis Menjot 1998. 70 Marie Claude Gerbet and Jeaninne Fayard 1985. 67 68

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The oligarchy, however, appeared and developed as a group that shared both benefits and responsibilities of the exercise of power. Its political institutional nature made it necessary for it to develop the means to block the individual ambition of its members. This responsibility was assumed by the groups of origin starting in the fourteenth century: lineages, or patrician structures in the case of Toledo. However, from the beginning of the fifteenth century onwards, municipal councillors began displaying a greater degree of independence with respect to these groups. This was when internal vigilance mechanisms were deployed and legitimized by republican values rooted in the city. This republic ruled and governed on the basis of a collective seigniorial estate and was strengthened by its close relationship with royal power. However, any governmental model required the acquiescence and support of ample sectors of the population, both those that are co-opted with gifts and concessions, and those that harboured expectations of receiving them in the future. It even began to resort to propaganda in the firm belief that its own proposals were best, while simultaneously distancing government and decision-making power from the majority of inhabitants. From a social perspective, the oligarchic government created a hierarchic model of relations which tended to distance them from the common population, and to exemplify their privileged social status. It was in this context that sumptuary laws were enacted, reserving luxuries and manifestations of wealth for the dominant group. Urban life became ever more theatrical in its social representations, religious ceremonies and festivities. This change brought about new propaganda criteria that considered townsfolk as spectators who absorbed messages of domination which proved difficult to respond to, let alone criticize. It is not accurate to conclude that the first oligarchic government produced a democratic participatory setback with respect to the concilium assembly or opencouncil system, as it responded to a completely different social model. The type of society that underpinned the oligarchic process was freed of any family bonds and was made up of different forms of association and participation. The concilium disappeared in part because it stopped running efficiently, coinciding with the decline of family groups and their inability to enforce agreements in council. Thus, new, more complex associations began to connect with the general sentiment of the city: lineage groups, natural hierarchies and the urban aristocracy. These groups would fight for power until the regimiento system became institutionalized, at which time municipal councillors would make up the oligarchic group. As for the issue of reduced participation in urban oligarchic governments, it is not so much a question of the quantity, but rather the quality of those elected. Towns were transformed into increasingly complex organizations governed by councillors. They required the participation of secretaries, stewards and other officials well-versed in law and in the management of leases and urban rents. This professional group was independent but stood the most to gain in the middle-term. They also counted on numerous loyal clients and servants that would act in their favour when called upon. Lastly, they showed an interest in convincing the rest of the city-dwellers and those residing in the surrounding country-side, their actions were necessary and beneficial. They managed to attract corporations, as well as

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religious and other urban confraternities to their fold. Hence, municipal councils cannot be characterized as elitist and exclusive systems that governed with their back to the townsfolk. In times of conflict or when there was a need to rally the population for the sake of the common good, they even managed to attract the support of rival urban factions.

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POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL GROUPS IN CASTILIAN TOWNS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY: BURGOS, A CASE-STUDY* Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete University Autónoma of Madrid Research concerning fiscal policy in late medieval Castilian towns has progressed considerably in the last ten years. Although a description of the focus and breadth of recent investigations is beyond the scope of this article, it is these that have contributed not only to the clarification of traditional areas of interest (such as the analysis of municipal revenues and expenses, fiscal institutions and fiscal management), but, above all, to the opening up of new fields in the analysis of municipal taxation: the relationship between taxation and economic structure; the impact of taxation on the fabric of urban societies; the indisputable link between fiscal systems and urban power systems, and so on.1 Some of these issues have been explored over the past few years in monographs and other studies by Hispanic medievalists, while others still await investigation. Of the latter, one field in particular appears to hold great potential: the analysis of financial agents and other groups closely implicated in the politics and management of municipal taxation. Thanks to the application of a revised prosopographical methodology, this subject area combines an interest in urban elites (in the broadest sense of the term) on the one hand with the study of the instruments and resources of the urban power system on the other.2 The study of this field also highlights the existence of an area where the activities and interests of the urban power elite overlapped with those of the financial classes. The examination of this subject area, as well as the gradual development of new analytical strategies, are both central aims of the research project that I lead on municipal taxation in Castile in the late Middle Ages. In previous phases, the project has focused on the topic of municipal taxation, using various general approaches that have allowed the gradual definition of more specific lines of research, one of which is the subject of this paper. The present article therefore represents the initial results of our investigations regarding this specific topic; it should therefore be understood and judged as part of a project that is still in its infancy, and which is * This study has been carried out within the framework of the research project “Fiscalidad concejil en las ciudades de la Meseta durante el reinado de los Reyes Católicos” (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, BHA2002-025773). This was originally funded by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Ministry of Science and Technology) for three years, a period that was recently extended to six in order that the scope of the project might be broadened to include the reign of the ‘Catholic Kings’, that is to say, of Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon. 1 Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete; Jose Antonio Jara Fuente; Juan Carlos Padilla Rodríguez,; Jose Mª Sánchez Benito; Concepción Sánchez Pablos, 2001. 2 Colloque 1979; Françoise Autrand (ed.) 1986; Christophe Charle, Jean Nagle, Marc Perrichet, Michel Richard, and Denis Woronoff 1980; Jean Claude Cheynet and Jean François Vannier 1986. 51

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expected to expand over the next few years as its geographical and chronological scope are broadened. This paper is centred on the city of Burgos during a period which roughly coincides with the fifteenth century, ending in 1476, when Isabella and Ferdinand assumed the Castilian Crown. While the choice of Burgos as a case-study was not intended to rule out comparison with other towns, it was informed by specific characteristics that render it particularly suitable as the initial object of our analysis. In the first place, the Noble and Loyal City of Burgos, Head of Castile and Chamber of the King is one of the few Castilian towns that preserve a full range of serial records for the fifteenth century. Most of Burgos’ Books of Records from 1376 onwards have survived, something rarely found in other contemporary Castilian towns, and, although there are several gaps, these provide us with an impressively complete picture of town council sessions held during that century. In the second place, many years of research focused on this particular city have allowed me to undertake the detailed prosopographical analysis which underpins this study. The aims of this paper can be summarized as follows: a. To analyse Burgos’ financial agents in the context of the city’s social structure, with a specific focus on the social spectrum they represented and their collective social setting. b. To define them (or not) as a distinct urban group, on the basis of the manner in which they accessed and maintained urban offices, their behaviour, both as individuals and in a group, and the existence of specific patterns of behaviour that distinguished them in the context of Burgos society. c. To analyse the links between this group and the so-called ‘elite of power’ and, finally, the role played by its members within the town's urban system in the fifteenth century. I have applied this analytical framework to the study of several of Burgos’ fiscal agents, namely its town receivers, its farmers and collectors of urban and royal taxes and rents, and its wardens of urban and royal rents. In theory at least, this array of fiscal agents and their functions comprises an exhaustive list of those involved in the management of the town’s budget, and their fields of activity. It does not, however, cover those areas of the municipal administration of Burgos that were specifically related to decision-making concerning the urban fiscal regime and the supervision of budgetary management, fields that were reserved a priori for the elite of power. In recent studies, both those relating to municipal budgets in general and monographs dedicated to particular towns, historians of medieval Castile have credited urban offices concerned with fiscal management with limited importance, following the assumption that their function was strictly executive, since the real decision-making process, in this as in other fields of municipal government, was the preserve of regimental offices. According to this model, these fiscal agents represented an intermediate social sector situated below that of the decision-making offices and usually associated with regimental families which had long abandoned the administrative sphere of fiscal management in order to assume control of the

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political, economic and social decisions defining that sphere. This model needs to be both re-defined and extended. 1. Burgos’ Town Receivers in the Fifteenth Century In the closing decades of the fifteenth century, the municipal budget was administered in all Castilian towns by an official commonly known as the town receiver. Except for the town of Benavente, whose fifteenth century documentation records the simultaneous assignment of this office to three individuals, this office was as a rule held by a single person. It was governed by the regimiento, which generally also appointed its incumbents, although in some cases, including that of Burgos, the wards participated in the appointment of town receivers by presenting the regimiento with a shortlist of three nominees. The town receiver was usually the trustee of the maravedies that constituted ordinary annual municipal revenues and occasionally those representing extraordinary incomes (although the latter were generally entrusted to their farmers). He was also in charge of paying the municipality’s ordinary expenses in cash, and securing a receipt for each transaction this entailed. When town receivers paid extraordinary expenses, they did so exclusively under specific orders from the town authorities. The wages earned by receivers varied from town to town. These salaries were not paid in the form of libramientos (orders of payment made out by the municipal authorities) but were charged by the receivers themselves, who deducted them from the maravedíes which they held in trust from the town. Town receivers did assume real economic risks, however. Indeed, it was not unusual for municipal authorities to issue orders of payment that exceeded the sum of the maravedíes deposited in the receiver, in which case he could claim that the libramiento did not suit him and that it should therefore be charged to another trustee. That such appeals were not always successful is illustrated by various cases in which receivers paid off their debts to the town they had served years after their tenure of office. In 1426, the office of town receiver in Burgos became the subject of a specific regulation forming part of the Arbitral Sentence of the Earl of Castro, which ended a dispute between the town’s commons and its regimiento. Concerning the appointment of Burgos’ receivers, this sentence ruled that two of the city’s wards should alternate annually in proposing three candidates for receivership to the regimiento, of which one should then be appointed to the office. This office was of a markedly executive character: it was a priori non-hereditary and was partially controlled by the wards, whose right to draw up an annual shortlist of potential receivers significantly limited the regimiento’s power over it. Sources from Burgos also provide us with an interesting description of what the town considered to be a good receiver: the receivership of the town must be entrusted to an honest and wealthy man from the commons of the town and not bound to the aforesaid officials, since such a man would not dare to take for himself the town's maravedíes, as he certainly could do if he were entrusted by the mayors, ‘regidores’ and the town clerk.3 The extent to which this idealistic statement was reflected in reality will be analysed shortly. 3

Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete 1986, 211-214. 53

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An initial conclusion that emerges from the table of data in Table 3.1. (see the appendix at the end of this paper) is that few individuals served more than once in the office of town receiver. With few exceptions, the receivers of Burgos were elected annually, and only five out of forty receivers documented for our period were re-elected to the office. Of these, the first three were re-elected before the passing of the Arbitral Sentence of the Earl of Castro, after which the receivership became subject to a strict set of rules. These were Bartolomé Pérez Barragán, who was town receiver in 1388 and 1391 (there are no data for the intermediate years); Juan García el Rico, who held the office in 1410, 1411 and 1423 (Burgos council sessions are not well documented before 1424), and Juan Alonso de Formallaque, who was town receiver in 1420 and 1422. The significance of the uncharacteristic fact that the first two were simultaneously receivers and regidores will be analysed below. After formulation of the Arbitral Sentence, only two individuals held the receivership in Burgos for more than one year, and, of these, only one held the office for more than one consecutive year: Juan Sánchez de Miranda, in 1440, 1446 and 1456, and Diego García de Medina in 1444, 1459, 1460 and 1461. Although they were not themselves regidores, these men belonged to important regimental families and were intimately connected to the town’s elite of power. The second case is perhaps more striking: Diego García de Medina, nicknamed Barrero because he regularly farmed an urban rent known as the barra (which was Burgos’ most important source of ordinary income), was an archetypical member of the Burgos financial class at the end of the fifteenth century. Although there are no available data for the preceding years (though we do know he attended a council session at the request of the town authorities in 1429,4 and in his capacity as deputy mayor in 1431),5 his financial career within the urban fiscal system had certainly begun by 1444, when he was first appointed town receiver. He subsequently held the office again for three consecutive years (1459, 1460 and 1461), and was also nominated to the office in 1458 by the ward of Vieja Rúa. What is more, his company (the only one in Burgos to be clearly formalized during the period) was sold the rent of the barra in 1450, 1461, 1463, 1464 and 1465, and he himself was appointed warden of another urban rent, the sisa del vino blanco, in 1462. In the latter years, he also headed a currency exchange located in the Azogue quarter, behind the church of St. Nicholas and facing the Square of the Azogue.6 Diego García de Medina belonged to a family that had given the city several mayors and regidores during the first half of the century: Sancho García de Medina was regidor in 1391; another Diego García de Medina served in that office in 1398, 1411, and 1423; Diego González de Medina was also regidor in 1411; and Juan García de Medina held the same office between 1426 and 1436. In the light of these data, it seems that Diego García de Medina’s extended tenure of the receivership of Burgos reflected an attempt (which, while not the only one, was the most concerted) by a powerful Burgos family to use its power within the urban system to secure the office AMB, LLAA, 1429/30, fol. 25v. Ibid., 1431/32/33, fol. 37v. 6 Ibid., 1462, fol. 71v. 4 5

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POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL GROUPS IN BURGOS

of town receiver as a hereditary possession for one of its members. Although their efforts provoked the immediate opposition of the urban system itself and the town’s elite of power (i.e. its mayors and regidores), the ultimate failure of this venture was perhaps determined by the family’s dwindling fortunes; during the second half of the fifteenth century, the power of the García de Medina family lay to a certain extent in the realm of memory, and its members no longer occupied the exalted offices of regidor or mayor, but focused instead on so-called ‘minor urban offices’. By then, the golden age of the García de Medinas had passed, to be replaced by a period of decadence which, although it did not prevent the family from maintaining a certain position of privilege within the city well into the sixteenth century, certainly limited their influence over its elite of power. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the fundamental explanation of the failure of the García de Medinas’ manoeuvre lies in the collective opposition of the oligarchy of Burgos to the transformation of the elective office of town receiver into a hereditary possession in the hands of any one family, and its evident interest in preserving that office as an open field for its own expansion, either as an instrument for the promotion of some of its members, or as an award to be bestowed on some of its relatives. Opposition to such a manoeuvre was also reflected in the insistence of the town’s intermediate elite that the receivership be governed by the regulations to which it had officially been subject since the formulation of the Arbitral Sentence of the Earl of Castro at the beginning of the century. An examination of the social spectrum represented by Burgos’ receivers will shed further light on the significance of this office to the town’s elites. Several conclusions concerning the social position of the receivers of Burgos can be drawn from an analysis of the list of individuals shown in Table 3.1. Of the forty receivers who feature on the list, only four held this office at the same time as that of regidor or mayor. This was the case of Bartolomé Pérez Barragán, who served as regidor from 1379 until his death in 1398 (his tenure of this office is recorded for the years 1379, 1388, 1391 and 1398), and as town receiver in 1388 and 1391; Juan Sánchez de Vergara, who was a regidor in 1388 and 1391 and had become mayor by 1398, in which year he also served as receiver; Juan García el Rico, who held the office of regidor between 1423 and 1441, and whose service as town receiver is documented for the years 1410, 1411, and 1423 (as there is no documentation for the period 1412-1422, it is possible, though not demonstrable, that he in fact held this office continuously from 1410 to 1423); finally, Pedro González el Rico was regidor from 1423 to 1441 and receiver in 1424.7 We can conclude that for this specific period in the history of Burgos, some eleven percent of the town’s receivers were appointed from the highest ranks of the urban elite.

7

The partial nature of Burgos’ records for this period has meant that it has not been possible to attempt a full reconstruction of the career paths followed by the city’s officials. I have therefore adopted the convention of citing the first and last years for which an individual was documented in a particular office when referring to their tenure of that office. In some cases it is not possible to determine the date of an individual’s entry to or exit from the regimiento.

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That percentage increases if we consider those receivers who belonged to a regimental family, even if they were themselves never mayor or regidor. This was true of twelve individuals, who between them held the office of receiver for eighteen years (and who represent thirty-seven percent of the total number of receivers recorded in Burgos during this period). One of them was Juan Alonso de Formallaque, who served as receiver in 1420 and 1422, and whose relative of the same name sat on the regimiento in 1411. The decline experienced by this family after 1420 is illustrated by the fate of Pedro Alonso de Formallaque, who, in 1427, unable to pay off the debts he had inherited from his brother Juan, the receiver, became dependent on charity provided in general by the regimiento and in particular by Ruy García el Rico, who belonged to one of Burgos’ most influential fifteenth-century regimental lineages. Despite their eclipse, however, the Alonso de Formallaques’ credentials as members of the Burgos power elite were solid: they not only counted the aforementioned regidor among their number, but were also intimately connected to another regidor, Diego García de Medina, through the marriage of Pedro Alonso de Formallaque to Isabel García de Medina. The García el Rico family placed three of its members in the office of receiver: the aforementioned Juan García el Rico, who was simultaneously regidor and receiver in 1410, 1411 and 1423; Pedro González el Rico, who was both regidor and receiver in 1424; and Pedro García, who served as receiver in 1454. This family was one of the most prominent and best-represented families in the Burgos regimiento during the period covered by this paper: Juan García el Rico was regidor from 1411 to 1423; Pedro González el Rico held the office from 1423 to 1441; Jerónimo García el Rico’s tenure of a regiduría ran from 1423 to a point beyond the chronological scope of the present study; Juan García el Rico sat on the regimiento from 1439 to 1441; and Sancho García el Rico was appointed regidor in 1445 and still held the office at the end of the period that concerns us. Juan Rodríguez de Burgos, who served as town receiver in 1426 and as the city’s deputy mayor in 1429, shared his surname with illustrious families that provided Burgos with many of its mayors and regidores, such as the Alonso de Burgos family, which provided the city with various regidores from 1458 onwards and was linked by marriage to other important regimental families such as the Maluendas, the García de Burgos family (which began to serve the regimiento in 1436), and the Martínez de Burgos family (whose members gained access to the regimiento in 1431). Diego García de Santamaría, who held the office of town receiver in 1429, belonged to a family whose most illustrious member, Alvar García de Santamaría, was not only a regidor in Burgos from 1411 to 1445, but was also Royal Counsellor and chronicler to John II. The García de Santamarías, who were converts from Judaism to Christianity, represented one of the most powerful families in fifteenthcentury Burgos. From 1445 onwards, by which time the García de Santamarías had practically attained noble status and risen above the spheres of local and international finance, they maintained their influence in the Burgos regimiento thanks to the continued presence in that body of close relatives, such as members of the Cartagena family.

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The García de Medina family, which placed a significant number of its members on the regimiento during the first half of the fifteenth century, also saw several of them appointed to the town receivership. Diego García de Medina, whose receivership and participation in the fiscal administration of Burgos are not documented before the 1460’s, has already been mentioned. Diego González de Medina, a member of a collateral branch of this family, served as receiver in 1442. Juan Sánchez de Miranda, who has also already been mentioned, held the office of receiver in 1440, 1446 and 1456. Pedro Sánchez de Miranda, and subsequently his homonymous son, served as regidores from 1439 until after 1500. The career of Pedro Sánchez de Miranda senior, who occupied several minor urban offices and farmed a number of urban rents in the years immediately preceding his accession to the regimiento, will be examined in greater detail below, as it constitutes an outstanding example of individual promotion to Burgos’ elite of power. Lope González del Castillo, who held the office in 1445, was another of the town’s distinguished receivers. Although the González del Castillo family, Lope himself included, did not gain access to the regimiento until late in the century, Lope and his brother Pedro dominated the management of urban rents through their almost total monopoly of the pedido, moneda, alcabalas and tercias as farmers-major or collectors of these dues from the late 1450’s until the death of Henry IV. This family therefore included some of the most influential members of the Burgos financial class. The case of Martín de la Torre, who was receiver in 1458, is fairly similar. Like Lope González del Castillo, he belonged to a family that gained access to the Burgos regimiento late in the fifteenth century and enjoyed greater power under the ‘Catholic Kings’ than in the Trastamara period, their growing influence being based on their active participation in the farming of urban rents.8 Up to ten of the receivers on our list can be identified as members of Burgos’ financial class on the basis of their repeated and systematic involvement in the management of royal and urban rents (as rent-farmers, wardens or collectors), their activity as money-changers or merchants, and/or their membership of one of the families that dominated commercial life in fifteenth-century Burgos. Alonso de Ecija, Juan Alonso Sastre (who was a member of the company formed by the tax-farmer and town receiver Diego García de Medina, and whose case will be examined in greater detail below), Juan de Padrones, Juan Martínez (who is described on several occasions as a ‘money-changer’ and ‘merchant’ in Burgos’ Book of Records), Luis de Gumiel, and Martín Fernández de Guivejo, are examples of those who fit into this category. Some of these individuals represented families like the Ecija family that went on to gain access to the Burgos regimiento in the sixteenth century. Finally, our list also features a significant number of individuals (together representing approximately twenty-five percent of Burgos’ receivers during this period) about whom no biographical data have survived beyond the fact that they held the town’s receivership. It is possible that some of them were connected to members of the urban elite, but in their case the existence of this type of 8

Hilario Casado Alonso 1987, 334.

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relationship is difficult to prove. Indeed, Diego López de Mazuelo, who served as receiver in 1462, is the only one of these individuals whose ties to a regidor, Juan de Ayala (who stood bail for him in that same year), can be stated with any degree of confidence. In the light of the above findings concerning the number of receivers who either held the receivership at the same time as a regiduría, or belonged to regimental families, we can conclude that almost fifty percent of receivers in Burgos during this period were appointed from within the town’s elite of power. This percentage increases when we consider that a significant number of these individuals held the receivership more than once. However, it has also been demonstrated that most cases in which the office of receiver was invested in an individual who was simultaneously regidor or mayor occurred before the passing of the Arbitral Sentence of the Earl of Castro, a ruling that in fact represented a pact between the town’s elite of power and its ‘elite of participation’, and which defined their respective spheres of influence and fields of activity. As a result of this pact, certain offices within the Burgos urban power system were reserved for the town’s intermediate elite or, according to the definition proposed by Professor Jara Fuente, its ‘elite of participation’. These were offices that generally constituted the only lever for upward social mobility available to members of that social group, a fact that is well illustrated by the successful careers of Lope González del Castillo, Martín de la Torre, and Pedro Sánchez de Miranda, whose tenure of the Burgos receivership represented a rung on the ladder which eventually gave them, or members of their family, access to the regimiento. Further analysis of the sources reveals another aspect of the function of receivership within the Burgos social system. In general, receivers who belonged to regimental families were only appointed to the office during the time that their relative(s) sat on the regimiento (the García el Ricos provide an example of one such family which occupied more than one seat on the regimiento). These receivers did not, therefore, use their office as a lever for social promotion, either for themselves or their families. Their tenure of the receivership should instead be understood as the logical projection of the influence of the elite of power over the office, which in these cases it bestowed on one of its own, either as a straightforward award or as an opportunity for the recipient to serve an apprenticeship in the field of municipal politics. The persistence of such elite receivers in Burgos indicates that the urban oligarchy did not lose interest in the office during this period, in any case certainly not to the degree that has been implied until now. Indeed, their continued interest in this area is highlighted by the fact that a high proportion of the fifty percent or so of receivers who served in Burgos during this period who cannot be shown to have belonged to the elite of power themselves was represented by individuals, such as merchants and money-changers, whose proximity to that elite is demonstrable: in short, members of the town’s financial class who were more or less closely connected to the town’s elite of power. The little we know about the wealth of some of these receivers clearly reveals their high social status and significant economic power.

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Bartolomé Pérez Barragán, who was both regidor and receiver at the end of the fourteenth century, provides a good example of this type of receiver in Burgos. His relationship to the Camargo family, which also had members serving on the regimiento at the time, is demonstrated by the fact that Pedro Fernández de Camargo inherited Bartolomé’s patrimony on the death of the latter in 1398.9 Bartolomé lived in the street of San Llorente, where many of the casas palacio (palatial homes) of Burgos’ most important merchants were situated (for example, that of Juan Sánchez de Vergara, who also served as both regidor and receiver). We know that Bartolomé also owned a vineyard because after his death it was provisionally exploited by the city authorities until his heirs were able to resolve their differences and take possession of the property.10 What is more, Bartolomé’s father, whom we know only by his Christian name, Fernando, was a knight. Further evidence of the wealth of the receivers of Burgos is provided by the examples of Juan García el Rico, who owned two bolts of cloths valued at 6,500 maravedíes in 1426 (these were taken as security when he failed to pay the moneda forera of 1424);11 his relative, Pedro García el Rico, who was the owner of several plots of land in the street of Huerto del Rey in 1427, for which he paid a total annual ground rent to the city of one corona and four florins;12 and Pedro García el Rico, who also served as both regidor and receiver. He too surrendered a pair of bolts of cloths valued at 5,000 maravedíes by way of security on failing to meet the moneda forera of 1424. He also appears in the sources as the owner of two shops located in the quarter known as the Zapatería, close to the Market Gate.13 It is clear from the above that during this period Burgos' elites did not lose interest in the sphere of urban administration centred on the receivership: a high percentage of the city's receivers were appointed either from families belonging to the elite of power or from within the town’s financial class. The clearly intense interest displayed by the intermediate elite (or elite of participation) and elite of power in this office is further reflected in the inclusion of legislation concerning access to the receivership in the Arbitral Sentence of the Earl of Castro, a judgement that represented the formalization of a broad pact that determined the division of power between these two elites and defined their respective political spheres. To a certain extent, the interest shown in the town’s receivership by the Burgos elites derived from the economic gains with which that office was generally associated. Most of the time, management of the city’s ordinary rents was a profitable business, as is illustrated by the proliferation of specialists in this area of the urban economy (such as farmers, collectors, guarantors and rent wardens), some of whom also held the office of receiver. The significance of this fact should not be forgotten, especially with regards to an urban society such as that of Burgos, whose AMB, LLAA, 1398, fols 75v and 76r. At the end of the fourteenth century, the Barragans owned rural possessions within the municipal terminus of Burgos in Villariezo and Villalbilla: Hilario Casado Alonso 1987, 457. 10 AMB, LLAA, 1398, fol. 72. 11 Ibid., 1426, fols 3r-4r. 12 Ibid., 1427, fols 92v and 93r. 13 Ibid., 1426, fol. 4v. 9

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elites can be shown, even as early as the beginning of the fourteenth century, to have come from mercantile and financial backgrounds. Despite this fact, however, the profitability of the receivership should be measured in predominantly political terms. On the one hand, this office represented an important instrument for the social promotion of those citizens of Burgos who were materially well-endowed, and who used it in order to claim the social and political status that corresponded to their economic position: prosperous members of the intermediate elite who aspired to ascend to the elite of power found no more effective a way of proving their socio-political credentials than that of holding an office associated with a high degree of responsibility and closely connected to the decision-making sphere of Burgos’ urban power system. On the other hand, Burgos' regimental families perceived receivership as a natural field for the projection of their influence: they personally controlled the office before the passing of the Arbitral Sentence of the Earl of Castro, after which their influence over the receivership was reflected by the appointment to that office of numerous minor members of regimental families. The receivership of Burgos therefore represents an area over which the interests of the town’s intermediate elite and its elite of power converged, a fact which explains both the annually elective nature of this office and the effective opposition that was mobilized whenever any one family attempted to transform it into a hereditary possession. It is now time to turn our attention to a second category of fiscal agents, composed of farmers and collectors of royal and urban rents. 2. Farmers and Collectors of Royal and Urban Rents One hundred and six separate individuals were involved in the farming of rents for the king and the municipal authorities in Burgos during the period covered by this study (see Table 3. 2. in the appendix to this paper). As was the case with the town’s receivers, certain distinct characteristics defining these individuals as a group can be revealed from an analysis of their position within the city's social system. Firstly, we should note that only four regidores and one town clerk acted as farmers or collectors of rents in Burgos during this period, the implication being that less than five percent of the individuals who feature in Table 3. 2. belonged to the town’s elite of power. This limited group did, however, include members of some illustrious families. Pedro Fernández de Villegas junior, for example, served as senior clerk of the city in 1388 and 1391, and also as a farmer and collector of urban rents in 1388 and 1379 respectively. An entry in the Burgos Book of Records from the latter year records his status as a knight. His considerable wealth is also well documented: he lived in the street of San Esteban, in a quarter populated by several elite families, for example, the Arceos, and also owned land and mills in Requejo, a village close to Burgos.14 His family was well represented on the regimiento throughout the fifteenth century. From 1379 to 1391, a relative and namesake of his was both AccountantMajor to the king and merino mayor (the equivalent of High Sheriff in England) in Burgos. This Pedro Fernández de Villegas retained Gonzalo Ruiz de Villegas as his 14

60

Ibid., 1388, fol. 35r.

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lieutenant, and the latter entered the regimiento of Burgos in 1398. Another member of this family, Pedro Ruiz de Villegas, sat on the regimiento from 1388 almost until the beginning of the reign of the ‘Catholic Kings’.15 Juan Martín de Frías, who served as regidor between 1398 and 1411 and farmed the rent known as the barra in 1398, came from a renowned family of merchants and cattle-raisers which was also well represented on the regimiento: Fernando Martínez de Frías was regidor in 1379 and mayor from 1388 to 1411; Martín Pérez de Frías sat on the regimiento from 1379 to 1398; Martín González de Frías was mayor from 1388 to 1398; Juan Martínez de Frías was regidor in 1411; and Pedro Sánchez de Frías held the same office from 1423 to 1459. Another two members of this small group came from families that were less significant. They were Juan Alonso de Castrodovarco, who was a rent-farmer in 1388, and who served as regidor from 1379 to 1398, and Alonso García de Cuenca, who was a rent-farmer in 1388 and sat on the regimiento from 1398 until sometime before 1411. All of these regidores who farmed or collected royal or urban rents in Burgos did so before the start of the fifteenth century, when royal and urban legislation prohibiting the farming of these rents by members of the regimiento had not yet come into force. There is no record of any individual combining the farming of city rents with a seat on the regimiento in Burgos after 1411. Another subsection within this group of fiscal officials is composed of those who counted a member of the regimiento among their close family, before, during or after their tenure of office as farmer, collector or warden of royal or urban rents. Consideration of this subsection, which included up to thirty individuals, increases the proportion of the group connected to Burgos’ urban elite to some thirty-two percent. These thirty individuals included members of families that occupied central positions within both the town's elite of power and its financial class. Alonso García de Covarrubias, for example, served as a rent-farmer in 1388, and was closely connected to the Camargo family, especially Alvar García and Pedro Fernández de Camargo, who guaranteed his financial activity.16 His family went on to establish one of the biggest commercial companies in fifteenth-century Burgos and, by the mid-1400’s, was able to place a large number of its members on the regimiento. The first representative of this family to gain access to the regimiento was Alonso Díaz de Covarrubias, who became mayor in 1440; the second, Alonso de Covarrubias, only did so twenty-five years later in 1465. In the case of the Covarrubias family, involvement in the urban finances of Burgos preceded entry to the town’s elite of power. Alonso García de Burgos, who farmed the barra in 1458 and 1462, Pedro Alonso de Burgos, who farmed one-third of the rent known as haber de peso in 1463, and Fernando de Burgos, who farmed the sisa de la carne in 1458, were all connected to the García de Burgoses, one of the city’s most influential regimental families. The García de Burgos and Alonso de Burgos families (the latter were linked by marriage 15 16

Hilario Casado Alonso 1987, 80. AMB, LLAA, 1388, fol. 3v.

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to the Maluendas) represented powerful mercantile interests in fifteenth-century Burgos and also provided numerous members of the regimiento: Juan Martínez de Burgos was mayor from 1423 and his son, who was nicknamed ‘the commander’, served as regidor from 1461; García López de Burgos became mayor in 1458; and Diego Alonso de Burgos entered the regimiento in 1461. The García de Burgoses are an example of a family whose members’ involvement in the financial and fiscal spheres of the Burgos power system coincided with the apogee of their collective political power. The Frías family, which has already been mentioned, provided Burgos with three rent-farmers. Two of them were called Diego Fernández de Frías: one farmed the barra in 1388, and lived cheek-by-jowl with Burgos’ most important merchants in the street of San Llorente;17 the other, who was also town clerk, farmed the sisa of Burgos in 1432. Juan Martínez de Frías was a merchant who farmed the barra in 1398. As in the case of the García de Burgos family, the Frías’ tax-farming activities coincided with the presence of family members on the regimiento. The Castros provide another example of a family of important merchants and regidores which was also involved in the management of urban or royal rents in Burgos. Diego García de Castro farmed the alcabala del pan in 1439 and the sisa in 1441 (he was also related to the family of Sancho de Stúñiga, who was both marshal and bailiff of Burgos castle). Diego Martínez de Castro farmed both the sisa del vino and the haber de peso in 1458, the sisa del vino again in 1459, and the rent of the heredades in 1463. The Castros accumulated the wealth required to gain access to the regimiento as a result of the profitable international trade that they managed through a family company. Sancho Fernández de Castro, who became mayor in 1432, and Andres López de Castro, who replaced him in 1453, are just two of several members of this family who sat on the regimiento during this period. Ruy Diaz el Rico, who was a collector of royal rents in 1431, was the only member of the el Rico family, which provided Burgos with numerous receivers during this period, to participate at this secondary level of the town’s fiscal management. As has been outlined above, this family was well represented on the regimiento from the beginning of our period. Diego García de Medina, nicknamed Barrero, has already been examined with respect to his tenure of the receivership. He also farmed the barra in 1450, 1458, 1461, 1463 and 1464, and the sisa del vino blanco in 1465. He was accompanied in his rent-farming enterprises by other family members: Diego González de Medina farmed the moneda forea in 1432; Juan García de Medina farmed the sisa del vino blanco and the sisa del vino de Madrigal in 1462; Juan González de Medina farmed the sisa in 1440; Pedro Sánchez de Medina farmed the barra in 1458; and Juan Ruiz de Medina acted as collector of royal rents in 1429. As we already know, this family had enjoyed a prominent position within the regimiento well before these dates, a position it lost during the middle decades of the fifteenth century after its members’ involvement in Burgos’ fiscal administration peaked, and then recovered during the reign of the ‘Catholic Kings’. As a unique example of a family’s loss and subsequent recovery of socio-political fortune, the case of the García de Medinas provides a 17

62

Ibid., 1388, fol. 73.

POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL GROUPS IN BURGOS

valuable illustration of the predominantly mercantile and open nature of the town's elite of power. Diego de Soria, who was one of the most important merchants in Burgos during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, sat on the regimiento from the beginning of the reign of the ‘Catholic Kings’, and also played a central role in the economy of Burgos during the first half of the sixteenth century.18 Although his origins remain largely obscure, we do know that a certain García Sánchez de Soria farmed the royal alcabalas in 1398, and that a man called Fernando Sánchez de Soria is recorded as farming an unspecified rent in 1411 and the hierro y herrajes rent in 1463 (in 1462 he was also trading as both cattle-raiser and butcher).19 The Sorias constitute what is perhaps the best example of a merchant family branching out into the fields of local finance and supply in order to diversify their investment policy, which was predominantly focused on the European wool trade. In the case of the Soria family, it was profits made in the latter that facilitated the family’s political and social promotion in the long term. The Sánchez de Miranda family’s participation in the field of urban finance and taxation clearly constituted a means by which it consolidated its political and social ascent. Its most prominent member in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was Pedro Sánchez de Miranda, who became a regidor in 1439, before which he farmed the barra, in 1428, 1429 and 1430. In 1426 he is documented as owning four marcos de plata and two reales, valued at 1,934 maravedíes, and an inn in the suburban quarter of Vega. Another member of this family, Nuño Sánchez de Miranda, farmed the rents of Cellórigo, a village belonging to the lordship of Burgos, in 1432. Two farmers of urban rents in Burgos came from the Santamaría family, whose most illustrious member in the fifteenth century was the aforementioned regidor and royal chronicler, Alvar García de Santamaría.20 These were Francisco de Santamaría, who farmed two third shares of the haber de peso in 1463 and was appointed warden of the rent known as paños in 1462, and Lope Fernández de Santamaría, who was farmer of the sisa and warden of the peletería in 1398. Another regimental family that focused an important part of its activities on the sphere of municipal finances was the aforementioned González del Castillos. This family gained access to the regimiento at the end of the fifteenth century, during the course of which three of its members occupied prominent positions within Burgos’ financial class. These were: Gonzalo González del Castillo, who farmed a third part of the town’s royal rents in 1461; Pedro González del Castillo, who was a collector of royal rents in 1447; and Lope González del Castillo, without doubt the most important member of the family, who was farmer-major of the alcabalas y tercias and Betsabé Caunedo del Potro 1985, 163-172. AMB, LLAA, 1462, fol. 87. 20 It is not possible to identify a single family grouped under the surname Santamaría in Burgos during this period as this was a surname generally adopted by converts from Judaism, and there is no concrete evidence that the individuals mentioned in this study were blood relations. Keeping these reservations in mind, I have nevertheless considered it useful to treat them as members of one family. 18 19

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the pedido y moneda in 1458, 1462, 1463, 1465, 1471 and 1476. As already mentioned, the González del Castillos provide a clear example of a family that made significant political gains as a result of the dedication with which it financed the urban and royal fiscal systems. It is worth noting that although it was the González del Castillos who did so most often, Burgos’ most important families (for example the Villegas, Díaz el Rico and Embito families) regularly provided collectors of royal rents. Although similar to rent-farming, rent-collecting was associated with both greater potential profits and greater financial risks and required a higher initial investment. It was these factors that informed the domination of the field of rentcollecting in Burgos by a limited number of the city’s wealthiest families. There were other Burgos families that did not attain the economic status of those examined so far, even though they had access to the regimiento and participated in managing the town’s finances. One example is that of the Aguilar family. Juan González de Aguilar was mayor in 1411 and farmed the barra in 1395-1397; two different Juan Fernández de Aguilars farmed the barra in 1398 and 1404 respectively;21 and Lope Fernández de Aguilar is documented as farming an unspecified rent in 1404. Another family that occupied a more modest position within the town's urban power system was the Guevaras: a Juan Martínez de Guevara served as a regidor from 1423 to 1436 and his relative of the same name acted as a rent-farmer in 1388. An example from the early part of our period is provided by the Camargo family. Pedro García de Camargo was mayor from 1379 to 1398, and Juan García de Camargo served as mayor in 1379, in which year Alonso García de Camargo also held the office of regidor. In 1388, Pedro Martínez de Camargo farmed the barra and Pedro Fernández de Camargo farmed another unspecified rent. Although the prosperity of this family in the late fourteenth century is well documented (Pedro Fernández de Camargo, for example, lived in the street of Huerto del Rey, was related by marriage to the Barragán family and maintained commercial relations with the Covarrubias family, while Pedro Martínez de Camargo was a knight who lived in the street of San Llorente), it disappears from the sources after 1398.22 Many families belonging to Burgos’ financial class did not gain access to the regimiento during the fifteenth century, although some of them did achieve this aim in the first half of the sixteenth. This group is well represented by the Salamanca family, which was one of the most important merchant families in Burgos during this period. Diego García de Salamanca farmed the sisa del vino in 1457, 1458, and 1459, and in 1458 also farmed the rent of the heredades. Another example is the Embito family, which boasted two distinguished members in the first half of the fifteenth century: Diego García Embito, who farmed the barra in 1429 and 1432, and Juan González Embito, who farmed the rent of the paños in 1427 and the sisa in 1441, and was appointed royal collector in 1439. The latter owned a plot of land and several houses situated close to the residence of Fernando Sánchez de Miranda in As the first Juan Fernández de Aguilar was dead by 1398, we can conclude that these were two separate individuals. 22 AMB, LLAA, 1432, fol. 64r. 21

64

POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL GROUPS IN BURGOS

the prestigious street known as Cal de las Armas. By the end of the century, the Embito family had managed to place one of its members on the regimiento. Other Burgos families did not gain access to the town’s elite of power, despite their well-established mercantile status. A striking example of this phenomenon is that of the Garci Nieto family, which regularly participated in the management of urban taxation, either as farmers or wardens of rents, but was nevertheless never able to place any of its members on the regimiento. Garci Nieto and his brother Diego Nieto farmed the alcabala del pan in 1461, the sisa del vino blanco, de Madrigal y pardillo in 1461 and 1462, royal rents in 1462, the sisa del vino blanco in 1463, the barra in 1463, and the sisa de las entradas y las salidas del pan in 1463. The strength of the family’s economic position is illustrated by its ownership of a situado over the town's urban rents, which was valued at 5,000 maravedíes per annum.23 The cases of individuals like Juan Alonso Sastre and Ruy Sánchez de Alfaro are similar. Despite being active in the fields of rent-farming, rent sales and transfers and sureties during the first half of the 1460’s, the former never gained access to the regimiento, and his political career was limited to the sphere of urban finance, in which he appeared as farmer of the barra in 1461, the rents of joyas, peletería, and segunda venta de haber de peso in 1463 and of the sisa del vino blanco in 1465. The latter farmed the sisa del vino in 1457, 1458 and 1459, the sisa de las heredades in 1458 and the barra in 1461, in which year he also lent the city a substantial sum to cover the debts the city authorities had run up in pacifying the region after recent disturbances. However, he never made it onto the regimiento. We can conclude that a high percentage of Burgos’ rent-farmers during this period were members of the town’s financial class, for whom the management of urban or royal rents simply represented yet another sphere of investment and economic opportunities. The participation of many of these families in the town’s fiscal management long before gaining access to the regimiento goes a long way towards proving that economic power and a certain level of affluence were prerequisites for assumption of the office of regidor in Burgos. On the other hand, however, there were other families who did not manage to consolidate their social and political position within the core of the ruling elite, despite clearly belonging to the town’s financial elite. The third subsection (some forty percent) of this group was made up of individuals whose background remains obscure. A few of these individuals can be linked to the town's elites because they either systematically shared the farming of rents with, or guaranteed the economic activity of, prominent members of Burgos society. Alonso de Valladolid was thus connected to the García de Burgos family, and Alonso Fernández del Campo and Alonso García de Belmonte to Diego García de Medina, to mention three examples. If the sources contained more data, it is likely we would be able to trace many more such relationships, but these must remain as hypotheses, at least for the time being. In a similar way, it is possible in some cases to infer the existence of established companies from evidence of repeated and sustained mercantile associations between certain individuals. The 23

Ibid., 1462, fol. 9v.

65

YOLANDA GUERRERO-NAVARRETE

existence of two such companies can be detected in Burgos during the period studied here. In all probability, the first of these informed the stable association recorded between Diego García Embito and Pedro Sánchez de Miranda in 1429, 1431 and 1432. The existence of the second is reflected by evidence of a continuous flow of varied transactions concerning rent-transfers, co-farming, and sureties that took place between Diego García de Medina, Alonso Garía de Burgos, Diego Martínez de Castro, Juan Alonso Sastre, Ruy Sánchez de Alfaro and Diego García de Salamanca. An association between these individuals is also reflected by evidence of their economic co-operation beyond the sphere of this specific financial enterprise, since all of them were to a certain extent associated with the management of specific rents on various occasions between 1458 and 1465. It seems clear from the above that these individuals were involved in the establishment of a stable and enduring association whose aim was to dominate the farming and management of Burgos’ urban and royal rents. The group formed by the town’s rent-farmers was clearly distinct from the one represented by its receivers. Although both groups included a significant number of members of regimental lineages, it was generally the case that receivers, or their close relatives, already enjoyed access to the regimiento when they attained office, which should therefore be regarded as yet another instrument in the hands of the elites. On the other hand, apart from a few exceptions, which date from a quite specific, and, for the purposes of this paper, early period, those who farmed the royal and urban rents did so before (in some cases long before) their families gained access to the regimiento. This process indicates that the oligarchy in Burgos was recruited from those families within the town’s financial class that had achieved the necessary economic leverage to gain access to the elite of power. The management and farming of rents were without doubt prominent among the economic activities favoured by the town's financial elite, activities which also included the distribution of goods, the management of the urban market and international trade. As a rule, once a certain family had entered the elite of power, the participation of its members in the management of rents ceased. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the evidence concerning the town's rent wardens. A very limited number of regimental families were active in this field, and there is no record of any mayors or regidores acting as rent wardens in Burgos during this period. What is more, those regimental families that did provide wardens did so long before any of their members gained access to the regimiento: the de la Torre family did so in 1398; the Arceos in 1388; the Castros in 1398; the Embitos in 1388; and the García el Ricos in 1388, to mention just a few examples. In fact, the distance between rent wardens and the town’s elite of power increased significantly towards the end of the fifteenth century, by which time their family connections were limited to those linking them to money-changers, turners, shopkeepers, butchers and other similar figures. By the end of our period, if not before, the wardens of Burgos’ rents had come to occupy a truly minor executive urban office that represented both an award for those connected to the town’s elite and provided a natural environment for the peddling of political favours.

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POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL GROUPS IN BURGOS

Conclusions In the first place, we can conclude that not all the offices that made up Burgos’ fiscal administration were held by members of families of secondary rank, nor were they all simply minor executive offices that served as an open field for the promotion of members of the elite or the peddling of political favours. The presence of members of regimental families among town receivers and rent-farmers and collectors in Burgos during this period was significant enough to imply that the sphere occupied by these offices represented a natural field for the political and economic projection of the town’s elites. Nevertheless, there is an important distinction to be made between these two types of office: while those members of regimental families who held the town receivership during this period did so when their families were at the peak of their power, the collectors and farmers of Burgos’ rents usually held their office before their families had gained access to the elite of power. This distinction implies that while the receivership primarily constituted a field for the projection of the power of the town’s elites, the sphere occupied by Burgos’ rent-farmers and collectors was generally associated with the promotion of members of the town's financial class, who used these offices as a means of increasing their wealth through capital investment. Once again, our findings highlight the markedly mercantile character of Burgos’ elite. Only one of the fiscal offices considered, that of warden of royal or urban rents, can be considered a truly minor executive office. It represented a field for the promotion of members of Burgos’ intermediate elites and the peddling of political favours by its elite of power. Although Burgos represents an exceptional case in the urban history of late medieval Castile, I believe that data from many other Castilian towns, especially those of the region’s Northern Plateau, could confirm these conclusions. With this idea in mind, one of the aims of our research project is to broaden the geographical and chronological scope of the present study in order to cover cities and towns situated on Castile’s Northern and Southern Plateaus.

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Appendix Table 3.1. Burgos’ Town Receivers (1379-1476) Year 1388 1391 1398 1410 1411 1420 1422 1423 1424 1426 1427 1429 1430 1431 1432 1434 1436 1439 1440 1441

Reciever

Year

Bartolomé Pérez Barragán Bartolomé Pérez Barragán Juan Sánchez de Vergara Juan García el Rico Juan García el Rico Juan Alonso de Formallaque Juan Alonso de Formallaque Juan García el Rico Pedro González el Rico Juan Rodríguez de Burgos Pedro Fernández de Melgosa Diego García de Santamaria Pedro González el Rico Juan Martínez Juan García Serrano Lope Sánchez de San Martín Juan Alonso Fernando López de Yanguas Juan Sánchez de Miranda Ruy González de Villafría

Reciever

1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1449 1450 1454 1456 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1471 1476

Diego Gonzáez de Medina Pedro García de San Pedro Diego García de Medina Lope González del Castillo Juan Sánchez de Miranda Antonio Sánchez Campanero Luis de Gumiel Alfonso de Ecija Pedro García el Rico Juan Sánchez de Miranda Martín de La Torre Diego García de Medina Diego García de Medina Diego García de Medina Diego López de Mazuelo Juan Alonso Sastre Juan de San Esteban Ruy Sánchez de Gradilla Juan de Padrones Pedro García de Córdoba

Source: Archivo Municipal de Burgos/ Libros de Acuerdos Table 3.2. Farmers and Collectors of Urban Rents (1379-1475) Year

Farmers & Collectors

Rent

Year

Farmers & Collectors

1379

Pedro Martínez de Cendrera

1439

Diego García de Castro

1379 1388 1388 1388 1388

Pedro Fernández de Villegas Alfonso García de Covarrubias Pedro Fernández de Villegas Juan Alfonso de Castrodovarco Juan Martínez de Guevara

1439 1440 1441 1441 1445

1388

Pedro Sánchez de la Cadena

1447

1388

Pedro Fernández de Camargo

Juan González Embito Juan González de Medina Diego García de Castro Juan González Embito Luis de Gumiel Fernando López de Yanguas Pedro González del Castillo

1388

Juan Sánchez

1388 1388 1388 1388 1395-97 1395-97 1395-97 1395-97 1395-97 1395-97 1395-97 1396-97 1398

68

Juan Fernández de la Fromesta Diego Fernández de Frías Pedro Martínez de Camargo Juan Martínez de Galiciano Pedro Fernández de Masa Juan Alonso de Aguilar Alfonso Fernández de Martinícolas Hurtado Sánchez de Vega Ruy Sánchez de Sopuerta Diego Fernández de Carranza Gil González Juan Fernández de Cidoncha Pedro Sánchez de Córdoba

Barra

Barra Barra Barra Barra Barra Barra Barra Barra Barra Barra

Recaud. Arzobispo Toledo

1447 1447

Lope González del Castillo

1448 1450 1450 1450 1450 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457 1458

Juan González de Gamboa Diego García de Medina Rodrigo de León Juan González de Medina Fernando de Sanjuan Diego García de Madrid Rodrigo de Segovia Diego García de Salamanca Ruy Sánchez de Alfaro Juan de San Román Ruy Sánchez de Alfaro Juan García

1458

Ruy Sánchez de Alfaro

Rent Alcabala del pan ½ Alcabalas Sisa Sisa Sisa Sisa Sisa

Pedido y Moneda Barra Barra Sisa Sisa Sisa Rentas del rey Sisa del vino Sisa del vino Sisa del vino Rentas del rey Rentas del rey Cuatropea Sisa de heredades

POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL GROUPS IN BURGOS

Table 3.2. Farmers and Collectors of Urban Rents (1379-1475) (cont…) Year

Farmers & Collectors

Rent

Year

Farmers & Collectors

Rent

1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458

Diego Martínez de Castro Fernando de Burgos Rodrigo de Segovia Diego García de Salamanca Diego García de Medina Alonso García de Burgos Pedro Sánchez de Medina Diego García de Salamanca Diego Martínez de Castro

1458

Lope González del Castillo

1458-59 1458-59 1458-59 1458-59 1460 1461 1461

Ruy Sánchez de Alfaro Diego Martínez de Castro Juan García de Santiago Diego García de Salamanca Juan Sánchez de Andino Diego García de Medina Juan Alonso Sastre Gonzalo González del Castillo

Haber De Peso Sisa de Carne Sisa heredades Sisa heredades Barra Barra Barra Sisa del vino Sisa del vino Alcabalas y Tercias Sisa del vino Sisa del vino Sisa del vino Sisa del vino Renta del pan Barra Barra Rentas del rey y 1/3 Acabalas y 1/3 Rentas del rey

1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398

Fernando Gómez de Deza Alonso Fernández de Valdivielso Martín Fernández de Ciudad Pedro Sánchez Garci Sánchez de Soria Pedro Fernández Vasallo Pedro Fernández de Mazuelo Sancho Fernández de Villate Diego Fernández de Carranza

1398

Pedro Ruiz Froncel

1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398

Sancho García de Lalo Juan Martínez de Galiciano Alfonso Ruiz de Palenzuela Juan Alonso de Aguilar Sancho García Benducho Diego Ferandez de Carranza Lope Fernández de Santamaria

1398

Juan Ruiz

1461

1398

Alfonso García de Cuenca

1461

Lope González del Castillo

1398

Juan Martínez de Atienza

1462

Alonso García de Belmonte

1398

Juan Martínez de Frías

1404

Barra Alcabalas Barra

1462

Juan García de Medina

Juan Fernández de Aguilar

1462

García Nieto

1404

Lope Fernández de Aguilar

1462

Juan García de Medina

1411

Juan Gutiérrez de Carrión

1462

García Nieto

1411 1411

Fernando Sánchez de Soria Pedro de Griaño

1463 1463

Diego García de Medina García Nieto

1411

Pedro Martínez

1463

Juan Alonso Sastre

1423 1423

Sancho Díaz de Rosales Diego García Bendito

1463 1463

Pedro de Medina Diego Martínez de Castro

1427

Juan González Embito

Paños

1463

Fernando de Soria

1427

Diego González de Mahamud

Paños

1463

Juan Sánchez Colicherón

1427

Pedro González de Gruña

Paños

1463

Franciso de Santamaría

1428

Juan Sánchez de Estrada

Barra

1463

Pedro Alonso de Burgos

1464

Rodrigo Alonso de Quintanadueñas

1428

Pedro Sánchez de Miranda

Barra

Barra Rentas del concejo

Barra

Barra Sisa del vino blanco Sisa del vino blanco Sisa del vino blanco y Madrigal Sisa del vino blanco y Madrigal Barra Sisa del pan Joyería, pieles y Segunda Venta de Haber de Peso Heredades Heredades Hierro y Herrajes Segunda Venta de Pescaderias, Cabritos, Natas, etc. 2/3 Haber de Peso 1/3 Haber de Peso 1/4 Renta Barra

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YOLANDA GUERRERO-NAVARRETE

Table 3.2. Farmers and Collectors of Urban Rents (1379-1475) (cont…) Year

Farmer s & Collectors

Rent

Year 1464

Farmers & Collectors

1429

Diego García Embito

Barra

1429

Pedro Sánchez de Miranda

Barra

1464

Juan de Villamediana

1429 1430

Juan Ruiz de Medina Juan Sánchez de Estrada

Barra

1465 1465

Alonso García de Burgos Lope González del Castillo

1430

Aloso Fernández del Campo

Barra

1465

Diego García de Medina

1431

Ruy Díaz el Rico

1465

Juan Alonso Sastre

1432

Diego García Embito

Barra

1465

Juan García de Santiago

1432

Pedro Sánchez de Miranda

Barra

1471

Fernando de Cabia

1476

Alonso de Valladolid

Sisa

1476 1476 1476

Lope González del Castillo Rodrigo de Tamayo Juan de San Nicolás

Sisa Sisa Sisa

1432

Diego González de Medina

1432 1432

Diego Fernández Fernando García de Espinosa

Moneda Forera Sisa Sisa

Source: Archivo Municipal de Burgos/ Libros de Acuerdos

70

Diego García de Medina

Rent Renta Barra 1/4 Renta Barra Renta Barra Sisa del vino blanco Sisa del vino blanco Sisa del vino blanco Sisa del vino blanco

THE MUSLIM POPULATION OF THE CHRISTIAN KINGDOM OF GRANADA: URBAN OLIGARCHIES AND RURAL COMMUNITIES∗ Ángel Galán Sánchez University of Málaga 1. Some Preliminary Warnings The war of conquest for the last haven of Iberian Islam (1482-1491), the Kingdom of Granada, as it was called by the Castilian sources, had as its main consequence the formation of a religiously mixed society.1 In this sense, Granada shares a long tradition with other parts of the Mediterranean World of the Late Middle Ages, such as the Crusader States in the Latin East, Norman Sicily or the Kingdom of Valencia, to mention only the most significant.2 Unlike what occurred in these other territories, ten years after the war ended in Granada, the conquered Muslim population was forced to choose between conversion to Christianity or definitive expulsion.3 In response, after formal conversion Muslims continued living essentially in accordance with their traditions, at least to the extent they could while living under the threat of violence from This article has been elaborated with de financial support of the project research BHA 2003-02322, granted by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, named “Hacienda y fiscalidad en el Reino de Granada. 1485-1570” of which I am the leader. 1 The renewal of this subject began in the mid fifties with the magistral work of Julio Caro Baroja 1976. During the last thirty years has had a huge historiographical development of the research on the Kingdom, with, literally, hundreds of titles. Splendid reviews of its significance in Rafael G. Peinado Santaella 1991 and Manuel Barrios Aguilera 2004. See also the bibliographical revision of Antonio Luis Cortés Peña 1995. The best summary of this historiographical trend can be found in the two first volumes of the recent Historia del reino de Granada, published by the Granada University. Rafael G. Peinado Santaella (ed.) 2000 and M. Barrios Aguilera (eds) 2000. A good synthesis in English in Thomas F. Glick 1995, although sometimes superficial,. 2 It is almost impossible to summarize the bibliography on the subject. A good synthesis, although out of date, in James M. Powell (ed.) 1990. From the point of view of Muslims a brilliant study of the juristic discourse in Khaled A. Fadl 1994. 3 This fascinating episode, which has no precedent in European History, has been described many times by Spanish and foreign historians. See, for instance, a good synthesis in English in Roger Highfield 1978. Nevertheless the majority of these accounts have been distorted by ideological bias. For modern interpretations of the conversions see, from two different points of view, Miguel A. Ladero Quesada 1969a and 2003, and Ángel Galán Sánchez 2002. This last article contains a complete bibliography on the subject. We must remember that the general conversion was extended to the mudéjares of the rest of the Crown of Castile, but not to those of the Crown of Aragon, until 1525 under the reign of the Emperor Charles V. The history of the mudéjares in the family territories of King Fernando the Catholic in Marc D. Meyerson 1991. *

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ÁNGEL GALÁN-SÁNCHEZ

Christian residents. This mandatory conversion (1500-1501) was the first step in to the effort to “hispanicize” government institutions and obligatorily “Christianize” the social relationships of the conquered. However, society was transformed not by conversion to the Christianity but by changes taking place as a result of the conquest war and by the conditions under which the mudéjares chose to accept Christian domination.4 The population structure of the territory is an important aspect to consider. During the ninety years that this mixed society lasted (1485-1570), New Christians remained the majority but inexorably lost ground. By the time of the 1568 revolt, which led to the definitive expulsion of Muslims from the kingdom, the Old Christian and Morisco populations were nearly equal.5 In the twenty years after conquest, a third of the conquered population migrated, by legal and illegal means to the lands of Dar-al-Islam, mainly to states located in the north of Africa. This was followed by an illegal but more gradual migration during the rest of the period.6 The nazarí aristocracy’s abandonment of their lands, mostly during the first decade after the conquest, is especially significant. We must remember that the Crown encouraged from the very beginning the legal migration of these groups, with the intention of truncating the power base of the Mudéjar community. The aim of the Castilians was that only the taxpayer population should remain in Granada: the Castilian state pursued consciously a colonial policy in which the Muslims, subject to a heavy tax burden, were only permitted to be, in Crown Secretary’s Hernando de Zafra words, “farmers and artisans”.7 However, as we shall see, the Crown’s policies were only partially successful, since some of the aristocracy remained in the kingdom. The colonizing strategy had two main consequences. Firstly, urban oligarchies, whose origin was basically fuqaha8 and merchants, took the place of the aristocracy, especially from the point of view of representation. Secondly, the policies strengthened rather than diminished the sense of nation of the conquered. This was the term that the Moriscos used for themselves,9 as an affirmation of their evident separate ethnic and cultural identity and also in response to discriminatory treatment. The maximum expression in law of such discrimination was specific, and See Ángel Galán Sánchez 2000a. See Felipe Ruiz Martín 1968; Rafael G. Peinado Santaella 1997, 1576-1582 and Ángel Galán Sánchez and Rafael G. Peinado Santaella 1997, 37-74. 6 The great wave of emigration during the first thirty year after the conquest in Ángel Galán Sánchez and Rafael G. Peinado Santaella 1997, 85-108. The migratory movements of the rest of the century in the somehow old-fashioned work of Antonio Domínguez Ortiz and Bernard Vincent 1985, Chapter I. 7 CODOIN, 1846, XI, 503-504. 8 See for the importance of these men in Islam A. Kevin. Reinhart 1993, the transcendence of their role in the Kingdom of Granada in A.ndrew C. Hess 1978, 133-135 and Ángel Galán Sánchez 2004, 322-326. 9 See the memorial of don Francisco Nuñez Muley, where the term ‘nation’ is many times repeate on the memorial of this Morisco, designed to soften the discriminatory bills which caused the rebellion of 1568, was published by Keith Garrad 1954, although is well known from sixteenth century onwards. 4 5

72

THE MUSLIM POPULATION OF THE KINGDOM OF GRANADA

more onerous, taxation on the conquered, both before and after conversion to Christianity.10 Finally, I should point out that in this work, for the reasons mentioned above, I will not distinguish between Mudéjares (Muslim subjects of the Castilian Monarchs) and Moriscos (the same Muslims after conversion to Christianity). Conversion will only be mentioned with regard to how it altered relationships within the conquered communities and with the Castilians.11 2. A Non-Perfect Allotment of the Space Land tenure in Kingdom of Granada underwent a profound reorganization as conquered Muslims and the new Christian population began to share the space. The redistribution of territory has three main tenets: a) to set aside for the new Christian population the flattest and most productive areas for the cultivation of cereals; b) to restrict Muslims to mountain areas, where they were allowed to own land and maintain the structure of some military units; c) to keep the conquered away from the coasts – thus impeding easy flight to North Africa – and away from the cities, which were intended for Old Christians.12 This division was designed for economic (the functional division of the arable land), military (the control of the frontier with North African Islam), and political reasons (the occupation by the Castilians of the main Muslim cities). So, in 1504 the old nazarí population pattern of concentration around cities to changed to one concentrated and articulated around valleys in mountain regions.13 However, this transition was a gradual process that began with the war of conquest and its ensuing treaties and was not complete until the last readjustment that took place under the conversion treaties. The details of these treaties14 and the little known revolt of 1490 require a fuller explanation than can be provided in the space available here. Briefly, two years before the conquest war ended, the 1490 revolt expelled most of the Muslims from the cities of Almería, Guadix and Baza.15 Later, under the treaties, the spatial segregation was basically “colonial”, the expression Father Burns used to describe Valencia after conquest in the thirteenth century.16 With the Muslims now dispersed over a wide area in farms and small towns, the cities, now mainly Old Christian, became key elements in the control of the conquered masses. In fact, in many of See the considerations of Francisco Nuñez Muley in Keith Garrad 1954, 212. This distinction has been largely accepted by Spanish historians and has the advantage of distinguishing clearly that Muslim population subjected to the Christians in the Iberian Peninsula in two well-known periods. A brief history of the meaning of these words in Felipe Maíllo Salgado 1996, 159-162. 12 Rafael G. Peinado Santaella 1997, 1577-1578 and Ángel Galán Sánchez 1991, 36. 13 Ángel Galán Sánchez and Rafael G. Peinado Santaella 1997, 47. 14 These treaties, well known after the publishing of the work of Manuel Garrido Atienza 1910, have been analysed in different works of the modern historiography, which has found new texts as well. See Miguel Á. Ladero Quesada 1969a, 29-53; Ángel Galán Sánchez 1991, 81-91 and 2000a, 529-536. 15 Miguel Á. Ladero Quesada 1969a, 38. 16 See Robert I. Burns 1973. 10 11

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these cities, such as Ronda, Marbella, Vélez Málaga, Loja, Alhama or Almuñecar, the residents were exclusively Old Christians.17 However, this does not mean that the entire conquered population was located in rural areas. Firstly, because it was an exceptional case, Granada, the capital of the kingdom, retained the bulk of its conquered population. In the first years after the conquest, Muslims remained the majority. Later, the population was balanced by the influx of Castilians residents, although Christians never exceeded fifty percent of the total population.18 Secondly, in each of the large cities of the kingdom, maintaining a Muslim elite was essential to control and govern the conquered population. As previously mentioned, those authorized to remain in the cities were initially very few. In Málaga, the main city on the west side of the kingdom, the urban population of the Muslims consisted of the twenty families authorized to remain after the conquest of the city. However at the beginning of the sixteenth century the other large cities of the kingdom (Almería, Guadix and Baza) had a percentage of Morisco population greatly in excess of that allowed by the conquerors.19 The following table shows the urban populations of Moriscos in the Kingdom of Granada, its percentage in relation to the total of the population conquered in 1504, and a comparison of the Morisco and the Old Christian population. We must be aware that, in those years, there were approximately 30,000 Morisco families and 9,000 Old Christian families (vecinos) in the entire kingdom.20 Table 4.1. Christian and Moriscos “vecinos” in the cities in 1504 City

Old Christian % Old Christian Morisco % Morisco Population Population in the Kingdom Population in the Kingdom

Granada ? ? 4,300 13.87 Motril ? ? 420 1.35 Guadix 800 9.32 370 1.19 Baza 782 9.11 283 0.91 Almería 500 5.82 220 0.71 Málaga 2,499 29.10 21 0.07 Total 4,581 53.35 5,614 18.1 Source: Á. Galán Sánchez and R. G. Peinado Santaella 1997 and R. G. Peinado Santaella 1997.

The most representative nuclei of what we call Morisco collaborationism resided in these cities, where more than half of the conquering population lived, and where the institutional apparatus of the Castilian state was located. Although the city of Granada retained its huge Morisco population, the city of Motril, the second largest

See Rafael G. Peinado Santaella 1997. Felipe Ruiz Martín 1968 and Rafael G. Peinado Santaella 2000b, 324-326. 19 See Ángel Galán Sánchez and Rafael G. Peinado Santaella 1997, 70-71. 20 Each vecino stands for a head of family in the fiscal sense of the term. 17 18

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Morisco city, lost the majority of its Morisco population, which was reduced to only sixty families after a massive, illegal flight to North Africa in 1507. 3. The Segregated Fiscal System and the Urban Oligarchies To understand the making of the Morisco urban oligarchies we shall consider first the only clear line which divided the Morisco and Christian populations throughout their history, both before and after conversion to Christianity: the existence of a dual taxation system. This price of the faith, as I have called it in other articles, was the principal distinction between the two communities, regardless of level of integration, sincerity of faith of converts, social class, or indeed any other characteristics of the Morisco population. During the Mudéjar period, the line dividing the communities offers no doubt of their separate treatment, an inheritance of Medieval tradition with respect to the Muslim and Jewish communities.21 The surrender treaties ensured the continuity of the heavy taxation of the nazarí fiscal system, this time on behalf of the Christian conquerors. These taxes transformed the Kingdom of Granada into an important source of revenue for the Crown of Castile. We must consider not only the nazarí taxes, but also the new ones created especially for the conquered. Around 1495, a per-capita tax (only applicable to males older than sixteen) was created to maintain the system of coastal defences, the farda de la costa,22 and at least on two occasions, 1496 and 1499, the Muslims offered an extraordinary tax (servicio) with a value of more than seven million maravedíes each time,23 which was equal to the combined amount of the almaguana and the alacer of the kingdom.24 After the general conversion to Christianity (1499-1501), in theory the New Christian was required to pay exactly the same as the Old Christian who repopulated the kingdom. However, in practice this was not so. In other essays I have analysed the political regime that allowed the New Christians of Granada to be treated as “consented heretics”.25 Therefore, they suffered discriminatory treatment quite different from that of the Old Christians in various ways and for various reasons, as follows: i) It was expected that over time all the Moriscos would integrate themselves into the life of the kingdom as true “naturals”. King Ferdinand the Catholic is supposed to have said: “My vote and that of the Queen is in favour of Muslims’ baptism. It is certain that if these Muslims will be not true Christians, their sons and

A synthetic revision of Muslim communities inside Christian societies in André Vauchez 1993, 701-734. 22 After the general conversion this tax was maintained, although was extended to the Old Christian population. Javier Castillo Fernández 1992, 69-78. 23 Angel Galán Sánchez 1991, 125-128. 24 Almaguana: Tax on agricultural lands for an amount of 2,5%. Alacer: Tax on cereals and all kind of fruits levied at 10%. See Miguel A. Ladero Quesada 1973, 352-363. 25 See Angel Galán Sánchez 1984, 1997 and 2002b. 21

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grandsons will be true Christians”. Yet the political regime only granted such integration if they were to acquire the condition of a true Christian.26 ii) Meanwhile, the Crown of Castile used a different legal system to treat the Moriscos even though theoretically justice was equal for all. The Royal Justice, the true coercive instrument in the political regime, made them the object of discriminatory practices that have as yet not been systematically researched.27 iii) Further, research has shown that a complementary taxation system imposed a continuous penalty on Moriscos for their crimes and for their supposed collective disloyalty to the Kings. The fact that such crimes might be present or future, real or unreal, was irrelevant. iv) The inequities in the dual taxation system demanded a legal justification. For such purposes it was necessary to treat the Moriscos as if they were a single political entity, an entity quite different from the Old Christians and from the rest of the citizens of the Crown. This was regardless of whether or not they had genuinely converted to Christianity – they were simply not seen or judged at an individual level.28 v) Many of the general taxes affected Moriscos and old Christians alike but there existed a complementary tax system designed to exploit only the Moriscos. This system was neither feudal and nor was it the result of any individual initiatives coming from the isolated urban oligarchies. On the contrary, it was a system of methodical exploitation introduced by the new state, an official dual taxation system.29 vi) When finally put into practice in 1502, the exploitative system introduced a series of extraordinary taxes (los servicios de los Moriscos). These began with initial amounts ranging between 20,000 and 22,000 ducados, whose precedents were similar taxes in 1495 and 1499 offered by the Moriscos to the king. Over a period of time two more servicios were added, for a total additional value of 15,000 ducados per annum.30 vii) However, for this system to function it was dependent on the acceptance of two different political bodies in Granada, both vassals of the same king of Castile, in other words, “the consent” of the whole community.31

(Mi voto y el de la reina es que estos moros se baptisen, y si ellos no fuessen cristianos seranlo sus hijos o sus nietos) This opinion, is found in the thirteenth century theologian Duns Scotto. See Miguel A. Ladero Quesada 1999, 399. 27 Ángel Galán Sánchez and Rafael G. Peinado Santaella 2003, 185-189. 28 There is no doubt, as historiography has pointed out since the sixteenth century onwards, that the majority of the Moriscos kept the Islamic religion. That is the main contradiction between them and the Old Christian. A brief summary of these cripto-islamic practices in Don Cabanelas 1993 and Manuel Barrios Aguilera 2000, 357-435. Nevertheless recent historiography has demonstrated the existence of a wide minority, which accepted Christianity, at least in the city of Granada. See Amalia García Pedraza 2002. 29 Ángel Galán Sánchez 2000b, 252-265. 30 Javier Castillo Fernández and Antonio Muñoz Buendía 2000, 110-120. 31 Juan M. Carretero Zamora 2002, 236-245, has pointed out the working system of this legal consent for the Crown of Castile through the Cortes. 26

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viii) As a consequence, all individuals who exhibited some power in the conquered communities, and with such power recognized by the Crown, were obliged to participate in the acceptance, distribution and collection of these extraordinary taxes. In 1511, the servicios underwent an important modification. Their collection was regularized, and now the calculation of the taxable base depended not merely on where one lived. Instead the Moriscos were divided into four categories according to their wealth.32 At the same time it was decreed that officers and representatives in the parishes of the cities, and the alguaciles and priests in the Morisco villages, must carry out the census. In both cases the representatives had to take into account the advice of their communities, at least in Granada, in deciding how to distribute the burden.33 From this point on, the means of participation of the urban oligarchies acquired a definitive pattern. A complex mixed structure among the appointed representatives and also among those chosen by the Moriscos provided a double legitimisation: one for the Crown, in the context of the old Medieval “consents”, and the other for the Morisco communities, which took quite seriously the election of their representatives. The Moriscos appointed their representatives in solemn acts that were properly attested to before the Christian law and generally kept in notarial protocols. For example, in August 1513, by means of five notarial letters of power, we find the names of a long list of alguaciles of Morisco villages within the Bishopric of Málaga. On behalf of their neighbourhoods, these letters grant authorization to Fernando de Morales el Fistelí to distribute that year’s farad.34 Records from 1517 give a complete description of the representation and administration system used for the servicios. The first step was the “offer” made by the representatives of the Moriscos to the Crown. Generally this offer was made for a period of six years, after which it was then renewed. Then it was placed in the hands of the Count of Tendilla, Capitan General of the Kingdom, of the corregidor of Granada, Don Antonio de la Cueva, of Don Miguel de León el Zahorí and of Don Gonzalo Hernández el Zegri, all of whom were veinticuatros (councillors) of Granada, to carry out the collection of taxes among the Morisco community and thereby implement the servicio. Another Royal instruction then ordered the collection of 1,000 ducados “for the causes and business of those newly converted”, a monetary recompense that representatives of the Moriscos demanded. At the time of the final sharing out, all these veinticuatros were present, together with Domingo Pérez, representative of Granada (jurado) and accountant of the servicio, Pedro González of Herrera, Principal Mayor (Alcalde Mayor) of Granada and fifteen Moriscos from throughout the whole kingdom representing their communities. There were six who represented Granada (including the Alpujarras, the Vega and the coast), two from each one of the districts of Baza, Guadix, Almería and Málaga, and one from the district of Ronda. Finally there were also six representatives from each one of the

Javier Castillo Fernández 1992, 74-75. See Javier Castillo Fernández, 1992: 81 and Bernard Vincent 1985, 106-109. 34 AHPM, leg. 17, s.f. 32 33

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parishes of the capital. Recent historiography has shown that this system was fully operational during the emperor’s reign. The bulk of the 1,000 ducados was for the representatives of the whole of the kingdom but, as the 1517 Simancas payroll makes clear, the other representatives also received a reward, shown in the following table. Tabla 4.2. Representatives of the Moriscos and payment of their administration for the allotment of the servicio of 1517 Name

District

Ducados

Maravedies

Don Fernando de Fez el Raho Don Fernando de Fez el Muley Don Juan Zaybona Don Fernando Zaybona Don Juan Danon Alonso Fernández,jurado, cristiano nuevo Diego Lopez Abenajara Pedro de Mendoza Alonso de Belvis el Baho Diego Fernández de Castilla Diego Lopez el Cotrob Alonso Marín Fernando de Morales el Fisteli Alonso Serrano el Gazil Fernando de Zafra Alazeraque TOTAL

Granada Granada Granada Granada Granada

6 6 6 6 6

2,250 2,250 2,250 2,250 2,250

Granada

12

4,500

Guadix Guadix Almería and its Bishopric Almería and its Bishopric Baza and its fiscal district Baza and its fiscal district Málaga and its fiscal district Málaga and its fiscal district Ronda and its fiscal district

16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 186

6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 69,750

Source: AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, leg. 293.

The historical record offers a picture of most of the beneficiaries.35 In some cases they were old members of the nazarí aristocracy who were regidores in the Granada City Council, such as the Zegrí. Others were influential members of the community like the two members of the Muley Fez family, of whom one, the Raho, was geliz of the silk in 1506. Others were prominent members of the Granada oligarchies, whose history can be traced through the political conflicts that ended the Sultanate, such as, for example, the regidor of Almería, Diego Hernández de Castilla, who was an outstanding servant of the Zagal. Many astute merchants combined success in business with service in the new state, the clearest example being the Fistelí. Another is Alonso Serrano el Gazil, the representative of Málaga, who had begun his career as a customs officer and tax collector of the Royal Incomes in Ronda Mountains and possibly was the same cadi (Muslim judge) in the Ronda Mountains who received gifts at the time of the conversion, though perhaps this person was a relative. The complex personality Don Diego López Benajara,

See Enrique Soria Mesa 1992, 49-63; Ángel Galán Sánchez 1982, 273-325; 1989, 274-280; 1994, 371-379; Mª. Jesús Rubiera Mata 1996, 159-167; Jose E. López de Coca Castañer 1988, 610-611; Javier Castillo Fernández 1992.

35

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THE MUSLIM POPULATION OF THE KINGDOM OF GRANADA

regidor and a representative of the Bishopric in Guadix, appears in practically all the records on the bishopric’s dealings with the Moriscos. 4. The Morisco Government: a Separate Political Body in the Crown of Castile Relations between the conquerors and the conquered were regulated by a complex system that awarded political power to Morisco representatives on three subordinate levels: i) a select group of representatives of the Morisco Nation that acted on behalf of all of the conquered before the Crown; ii) a number of representatives of the different areas of the kingdom that mediated with the regional Castilian powers, especially the corregidors of the cities, and occasionally, when the communities of their respective areas were involved, before the Royal Chancery or the General Captain of the Kingdom (at this second level, the urban oligarchies of the Moriscos adapted themselves to the administrative divisions of the Christians, either the jurisdiction of the city or the bishopric); and finally, iii) the direct representatives of each one of the communities that implemented the decisions of the aljama. The first level was composed of a powerful Mudéjar oligarchy formed jointly by the remaining nazarí aristocracies, together with some fuqaha and a handful of merchants that acted, most of the time, on behalf of the entire Mudéjar community. Their fortune, like that of most of the members of the two other levels, came from having collaborated willingly with the Castilians during the war of conquest. In some cases this was because they believed in the inevitability of a Castilian victory, in others because the internal rivalries of the nazarí aristocracies often led them to seek the favour of the Catholic Kings, and in a few cases because of pure ambition for power and wealth. Whatever the cause, the end result was that they became the privileged voice of the conquered in all communications with the Crown. The biographies of the most prominent members of this first group detail their rise.36 Yaya Al-Nayar was a member of the Royal Dynasty of Granada and grandson of Yusuf I. His son converted early to Christianity as Don Alonso Venegas, while Yaya himself waited until the later mass conversions, and he did so as Don Pedro of Granada Venegas, founder of a house that would later gain the marquisate of Campotéjar in the seventeenth century.37 Other outstanding members of the nazarí aristocracy would occupy prominent places, including Francisco Fernández Zegrí, after 1500, in the city of Granada. A faqih coming from an illustrious family of jurists, Mahomad the Pequeñí, later Don Francisco Enriquez, follows him in this hierarchy. First as Almotacén of Granada and then as main cadi of the city and of the Alpujarras, his role was decisive at all times for the Mudéjares, who found in him a strong support for their claims, despite his main function, which was to persuade the Muslims to accept the will of the Catholic Kings. The For the biographies of these men see the researches cited in the preceding note. A good synthesis of these researches in Javier Castillo Fernández 1997 and 2000, 198-216 37 His descendants were anxious to identify themselves with the ancient Castilian nobility, for that reason they forged a visigothic genealogy equal to that of most illustrious Christians. See Enrique Soria Mesa 1995. 36

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brothers Abduladín, from the nazarí aristocracy, were governor (alguacil) and main cadi, respectively, to Vélez Rubio and Velez Blanco, the Valley of Almanzora, the Filabres Mountains and the Valley of Baza. Their loyalty to the Crown caused Alpujarran rebels to murder Ali, one of the two brothers, in 1500. The other brother, already converted as Don Luis Abduladín, reappeared as city councillor (regidor) of Vélez Blanco and Vélez Rubio. Within this select group, after the conquest, there was an exciting but very brief phenomenon which was the granting of the concession of jurisdictional dominions without the need for conversion to Christianity. This phenomenon serves as an example of the intention to assimilate the Muslim “nobility” to its Christian counterpart.38 The list would not be complete without Cidi Alí Dordux, a merchant famous for arguing for surrender during the terrible blockade of Málaga. Not only did he escape the fate of his fellow citizens, slavery, Dordux obtained high-level cadi employment from the bishopric and became the official representative of his compatriots before the Catholic Kings. Faced with conversion, he preferred exile. Death surprised him in Antequera, on his way to the north of Africa, but his son Mohammed, now Don Fernando de Málaga, inherited his father's privileges as spokesman and he became city councillor (regidor) in the council of Málaga.39 The first time that this group of representatives appeared in the sources, with this specific role, was regarding the offer the extraordinary tax (servicio) to the Catholics Kings in 1495. This extraordinary tax was, as already stated, the first precedent of a long series of similar taxes that survived until 1568. On behalf of all the Muslims of the kingdom they negotiated with the Christians the conditions of the quota to be divided among them, and the manner of collection of the tax. In the second group were persons with strong influence in their respective cities and among the conquered population of their districts. They enjoyed the favour of the Castilian administration from the beginning and they had fruitful careers in the service of their administration. Social mobility and “collaborationism” are clearly intertwined. There are two excellent examples of this. The first is Ayaya el Fistelí, surveyor of the waters of Granada, alguacil of that city, translator of Castilian for the Pequeñí and, from 1498, the point at which he settled in Málaga, the right hand of Dordux. After the conversions, now as Fernando de Morales el Fisteli, he was the true successor of Dordux in the defence of the Moriscos of the bishopric.40 The second example is a Mudejar merchant from Toledo, Yuça de Mora, who provided services during the war. After the conquest he received important sinecures in the city of Granada, the most prominent being his position as the most powerful customs officer (alamín of the alcaicería) of the capital.41 Only after the conversions would the system of political power of the Muslims be solidified in a coherent structure for both these levels. Conversion Ángel Galán Sánchez 1991, 276-282 and Rafael G Peinado Santaella 1989, who has corrected the date of the concession of the marquisate. 39 Ángel Galán Sánchez 1982, 313-316; 1989, 277-278; Carmen Pescador del Hoyo 1987, 491-500 and Jose E. López de Coca 1991, 41-44. 40 Ángel Galán Sánchez 1989, 278-280. 41 See the appointment in Mª Amparo Moreno Trujillo 2005. 38

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required the abolition and removal of all the distinctive characteristics of the Muslim religion and proclaimed a theoretical equality among Old and New Christians. The only way to recognize the power of such “collaborationism” was to integrate them into the Castilian town’s government and to promote them to a similar status to that of the urban oligarchies of Castile. The first part of this program was fulfilled by the concession of public employments that were to cover the whole kingdom. We have already seen some examples of Morisco town councillors (regidores). In fact, a Simancas document dated 1526 states that the Catholic Kings fixed the number of Morisco regidores at twenty-two, although that figure does not embrace all the concessions that were subsequently made after the conversions.42 What is important, however, is the certainty of the existence of a deliberate and coherent political program here for the whole of the kingdom. Thus, the conditions negotiated in the treaties of Baza and Motril included councillorships to be appointed by the converts in those cities.43 In Baza, one of them was the alguacil of the city, Alí Alhage Farax, now Pedro de Luna. In Motril, two residents were named, Yuçaf Zafarori, now Pedro Miranda, and Hamete Fotot, now Lorenzo Chacón.44 There was also the Alguacil Mayor of the city, now Don Hernando de Castilla, baptised as such in honour of the King. In Málaga, as we have seen, the son of Dordux, Mohammed, was named Don Fernando de Málaga in honour of the Catholic King as well. In Almería, Çalema el Buho, alguacil and “head” of the Muslims of the district, would be councillor (regidor) like Don Alonso de Belvis el Baho. In Guadix, an old secretary of the Zagal, one of the sultans of Granada, was regidor as Don Hernán de Valle Palacios.45 An old partner in arms in the Granada Civil Wars, Alí Benajara, was also named regidor of Guadix as Don Diego López Benajara. In Vera and Marbella, cities with exclusively Old Christian populations, there were also Morisco regidores, although these came from the third group, the officers of the small Muslim villages. In the district of Almería a councillorship was granted to Alí Abunduy, baptized as Diego López de Ayala, the alguacil of Tabernas, a village of the city’s territory. In the city of Vera the alguacil of the village of Portilla, Mahomad Ubeyde, baptized as Garcilaso Ubeyte, was granted a councillorship as well. Finally, in the city of Marbella, councillorship was granted to Fernando de la Reina, the alguacil of Ojén, a Morisco village of its district.46 These individuals were among the at least eight town councillors (regidores) appointed between 1500 and 1501 in the city of Granada, the kingdom’s capital and largest centre of Muslim urban population. Four of these councillors were old fuqaha.47 There were also a number of Muslims who had had a secondary role during AGS, Cámara de Castilla, leg. 221, fol. 2. The text of Baza in Antonio Gallego Burin and A. Gamir Sandoval 1996, 163-166. The text of Motril in Francisco Arcas Martín et al. 1983. 44 RGS IX-1500, s.f. and XI-1500, s.f. 45 See Jose E. López de Coca 1988 and Enrique Soria Mesa, 1992. 46 RGS 1500, s.f. 18 and 20/IX/1500; 12 and 26/XI/1500 respectively. 47 See the appointments in Amparo Moreno Trujillo 2005. Moreover there was a complete reorganisation in the town council of Granada to adjust for the coexistence inside the institution of the two communities, one Arabic-speaking and the other formed by the Spanish-speaking conquerors. See the royal bill in Mª. José Osorio Pérez 1991, doc. 29. 42 43

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the war and who later would play enormously important roles in the political system. Such is the case with Don Miguel de León el Zahorí and with Fernando de Morales el Fisteli, who became faithful allies and climbed the ranks to become “heads” of the kingdom.48 Fascinating indeed, although less well-known, is the story of the descendents of the meríni princes, the Muley Fez, who held enormous sway over the Moriscos. One was Don Francisco Núñez Muley, the author of the most famous surviving Morisco text.49 At the same time or immediately afterwards, most of these people received graces of nobility (hidalguias). In this way, they were assimilated into the lesser nobility of Castile, an important group in the city’s government, as shown in the records of the General Archive of Simancas.50 However, the concession of public employments was not limited to these regidores. Coming mainly from the same families, more than two dozen Moriscos in the main cities of the kingdom were awarded positions as public notaries. In some cases the appointees were children who were of course unable to perform this occupation. The research of Amalia García Pedraza on the city of Granada has demonstrated that the Moriscos preferred to refer their contracts and cases to notaries from their own community.51 In order for the government to function, these officials were forced to obtain the agreement (consentimiento) of the rest of the Muslims. It is at this point in the process where the third level or grouping played its key role. This level linked each community with their representatives in the cities of the Kingdom of Granada and represented them as one political body before the Crown of Castile. In nazarí Granada the power of the communities, as opposed to that of the state, was in hands of those whom the surrender treaties refer to as cadis, fuqaha, old and good men,52 and who comprised most of the signatories of the texts. The actions of the Christians meant that throughout the rural communities a lesser official (algualcil), basically a tax collector, became the representative. There is evidence of this in the testimonies after the conquest. All of them, together with the fuqaha, represented the communities before the monarchy, receiving the fiscal exemptions and most of the gifts of both groups. The system was intended to reward the richest families, and so naturally the representatives came mostly from the richest families in each aljama, whose position was significantly reinforced by this new role. Furthermore, such a system served the purposes of the Crown, as these officials were combination tax collector and middleman while at the same time theoretically representing the autonomy of these communities to the Castilians (a role that also existed before and after the general conversions, with the same name and The fascinating relationship between Miguel de León and the Fistelí with the moriscos is well known because of the more than 6,000 letters written by the Count of Tendilla, the first Captain General of the Kingdom, published in Enrique Meneses García 1973; Amparo Moreno Trujillo, Mª. José Osorio Pérez and José Szmolka Clares 1996 and Amparo Moreno Trujillo, Mª. José Osorio Pérez, Juan de la Obra Sierrra and Ángel Galán Sánchez 2005. 49 Keith Garrad 1954. A recent study on the Muley´s family in Mª Jesús Rubiera Mata 1996. 50 AGS, Dirección General de Títulos. 51 Amalia García Pedraza 2004, 356-360. 52 See, for instance, Miguel Garrido Atienza 1910, XVIII. 48

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functions).53 With the conversions, many of these alguaciles became regidores of the Morisco villages, without leaving their employment as alguaciles.54 This function of the middlemen, while influential, did not allow the alguaciles to possess any exclusive powers. In fact, it simply transformed the old custom into a model similar to that of the government of the Castilian villages. Indeed, the aljama continued meeting to decide on collective matters. A Morisco in Motril in 1527 summarized such continuity of government practices, before and after the conversion:55 “in the period of the Muslims and afterwards when this village belonged to New Christians, the way that they used to meet in town council was that the citizens, the old and honoured and rich and important of the village, met at the house of Don Hernando56 and there agreed and discussed what had to be done for the government of the said village”. These practices were followed in a similar way in other places. The notarial protocols of Guadix have shown how the Moriscos of the city followed this same pattern in the Church of Santa Ana, an old mosque, to decide, for example, on the lease of the communal ovens or about the division needed to distribute the coastal defence tax (farda), the extraordinary taxes (servicios) or to solve diverse offences by means of powers granted to Hernán Valle and Diego López Benajara, among others. There are two good examples of this. In 1513, Diego López Benajara met with some 115 neighbours of Guadix “as they used to do” (Como solyan hazer otras vezes) and on behalf of all those of Guadix and its district, they left the allotment from the taxes in hands of Hernán Valle (absent) and Pedro de Mendoza.57 Pedro de Mendoza was a Morisco and, together with Benajara and another regidor, Miguel de Palacios, was entrusted by some 50 neighbours to litigate in a number of matters affecting them, such as tax collection offences, the farda of the sea, and the extraordinary taxes of 1518, and so on.58 This explains the fierce battles concerning the employment of alguaciles, and the inevitable tensions between communal powers and a power appointed by the Crown. Besides the many individual conflicts to which I refer, there was an additional conflict between the Crown, who insisted on their direct appointment, and the communities, who wanted the office to be elective. In 1513, the Moriscos complained to Queen Juana about the offences committed by many of the officials when collecting the extraordinary taxes. They pleaded once again for their villages to elect alguaciles. The Queen granted their request in respect of all vacancies that arose from that time on, but she retained all of the existing appointments together with their lifelong privileges. Her grant was made with the condition that the elections be ratified by the corregidor of the city to which the village belonged. Although a Morisco victory, whether such arrangements were ever really put into practice is unknown.

Ángel Galán Sánchez 1991, 133-137 and 283-288. Enrique Pérez Boyero 1997, 457-459 And Ángel Galán Sánchez 2005a. 55 Antonio Malpica Cuello 1983, 193. 56 Don Hernando was the algualcil of Motril, appointed by the Kings. 57 AHPG, Papeles sueltos 4/IX/1513. 58 Ibid., Papeles sueltos 4/IX/1513. 53 54

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The reality is that in many cases the same families continued to hold power throughout the sixteenth century.59 5. Economics and Political Powers among the Moriscos of Granada There was a general increase in the economic might of these oligarchies partly due to the gains in political power that had been supported by the Castilians and to transformations in ownership as result of the conquest. Enrique Soria has created an impressive table that quantifies the fortune of some of the main members of this group at the end of this period.60 Table 4.3. Wealth of some Moriscos from the urban oligarchy c. 1570 Date

Name

1570 1570 1570 1570 1570 1570 1570

Don Hernando de Fez Muley Jerónimo de Palacios Pedro de Venegas Don Alonso Venegas de Alarcón Don Jerónimo Venegas Don Alonso de Granada Venegas Don Gonzalo Fernández Zegrí

Town

Ducados

Granada Granada Monachil-Granada Granada Granada Granada Granada

8,000 7,000 10,000 15,000 10,000 3,000(renta) 1,000(renta)

Source: AHMG, lib. 7.090, f. 513.

Agricultural lands, urban properties, lifelong incomes granted by the Crown, capital in public debt, commercial business and other sources of revenues were all common in an urban oligarchy that was comparable to that of the old Christians. To explain this wealth accumulation it is necessary to look at the first decades after the conquest and examine family and political networks that allowed such growth in their fortunes. We will now look at the social, economic and political power that these people accumulated. The favour of the Castilians after the conquest immediately resulted in salaries, donations of lands, and other grants. A few examples will suffice to illustrate a pattern common to all of them. In Almería, Zulema el Buho (afterwards Alonso Belvis el Baho), who was acting as “head” of his Moors, received 13,600 maravedies (400 reales) as an annual reward in his position as officer.61 The Allotment Book (Libro del Repartimiento) shows him as owner of several farm properties, a store and an oven in the city.62 Although available fragmentary information can not offer a complete picture, the fact that he and his family settled in the city as regidores in the first half of the sixteenth century indicates his properties really ought to have been much greater.63 In Almería, those who also received grants AHMG, lib. 7.090, fol. 513. Enrique Soria Mesa 1992, 56. 61 Miguel A. Ladero Quesada 1969a, 60. 62 Cristina Segura 1982, 86 and 528. 63 This family owned large properties in the villages of Alhadra and Pechina, although they were residents in the city of Almería, Nicolás Cabrillana 1982, 21-23. See more on the family 59 60

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in the form of lands included other important members of this oligarchy such as the Granada Venegas family64 and Gil Hoyre el Lorqui, (afterwards Don Diego Hernández de Castilla) citizen of Granada in 1499 and regidor of Almería up to the first years of the sixteen century.65 Similarly, the powerful Fernando de Castilla in Motril,66 the alguacil of Tabernas, after the conversion, consolidated his political and economic power,67 expressly increased by the conversion treaty.68 Morisco collaborators embarked upon intense economic activity. There are good examples of this in the Morisco quarters of Guadix and Málaga. The Dordux, receiver of an important number of real grants, must certainly have accumulated a large fortune.69 Before his death in Antequera, he put that fortune safely away, judging by a much later but reliable Simancas document.70 His son, Mohammed, afterwards Don Fernando de Málaga, Fernando de Morales el Fistelí and the remaining members of the Malaga oligarchy appear to have been equally active in business.71 The Muslim merchants’ companies after the conquest in Granada72 and in Málaga73 are best known for their trade with the north of Africa. However, often the prime beneficiaries of Morisco trade were Old Christians. A notable example is the companies formed by the Fistelí with prominent members of the Old Christian Malaga oligarchy, importing footwear and Moroccan leather from the dominions of Alí Barrax.74 In fact, a generous proportion of the inhabitants of the Morisco quarter of Málaga participated in such commercial activities.75 The dependence of these Moriscos upon the Genoese merchants or upon their association with powerful Christians shows a clearly subordinated position within the economy of the kingdom as a whole. In Guadix, the evolution of this oligarchy is similar to that of Malaga. The main actors were Don Hernán Valle de Zafra and Don Diego Lopez Benajara. The former played an outstanding role in the surrender of Guadix. He accompanied el Zagal to his exile and for some time he was travelling back and forth between North Africa and Granada as a spy for the Catholics Kings or in the service of the Zagal.76 Around the mid-1490’s, he appeared to have definitively settled as a resident in Guadix. From the very first moment there he received grants in the form of lands in the following article, although it presents some inaccuracies for the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries, Antonio Muñoz Buendía 1990. 64 Cristina Segura 1982, 256 and 506-507. 65 José E. López de Coca 1988, 610-611. See too Miguel A. Ladero Quesada 1969b, num. 157. He also was granted land in the district of Granada for a total amount of 20,000 maravedíes. 66 Antonio Malpica Cuello 1983, 192 and 202-203. 67 See the text of the capitulation in Miguel A. Ladero Quesada, 1969a, 274-277. 68 See those contained in AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg. 1.315, fol. 91. 69 Ángel Galán Sánchez 1989, 277-278. 70 José E. López de Coca 1991, 55-56. 71 See Ángel Galán Sánchez 1982, 318-322 and 1994, 371-379. 72 AGS Cédulas de la Cámara, lib. 2-2nd, fol. 52v. 73 AGS, RGS III-1491-228 and IX-1501, s.f. 20/IX/1501. 74 José E. López de Coca 1978, 298-300. 75 See Ángel Galán Sánchez 1982 and José E. López de Coca 1991. 76 José E. López de Coca 1988, 610-611. 85

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both within and outside the city.77 His possessions were not limited to Guadix, but extended across other parts of the kingdom.78 His family, belonging to the dominant lineage in Guadix, also received properties of the Moors expelled in 1490, and his father Azeyte Garci Valle and his brother were among those especially favoured.79 Abraen Abenzeyte, already Don Hernando Valle de Zafra, as well as having a house and farms in the city, is seen buying stores in the Morisco quarter from other Moriscos.80 His relatives also possessed properties of similar type.81 Without doubt, they exercised an uninterrupted leadership in this Morisco quarter until the rebellion of 1569.82 Alí Benajara was probably from a less illustrious family but rose to equal heights. His favours to the Christians also began with helping the conquerors of Fiñana. He too received various grants due to his role in the suppression of the revolt of 1490.83 As Don Diego Lopez Benajara, he was the most economically active of all the Morisco oligarchs and probably was originally a merchant.84 His businesses were much more diversified. He appears in the rescue of slaves from the rebellion of 1501,85 he was the owner of an irrigation ditch in the city,86 he had at least two stores (almaicerias)87 and he purchased caves, probably with the intention of leasing them.88 He also had large interests in the properties in nearby villages and in the cattle business.89 One topic studied for this article that has not been treated in the literature to date is the participation of members of these oligarchies as capital partners and middlemen with the largest Christian landowners. It should be understood that lease of lands by the Christians constituted a central element in the economic activity of the Moriscos. The Morisco tenant system appears clearly as one of the most widespread formulas of economic activities. As I have pointed out in other research, Miguel A. Ladero Quesada 1969b, num. 80, in Guadix in 1491 the value of them was 75,000 maravedíes. Miguel A. Ladero Quesada 1969a, 139-140, in 1490 his brother, his father and himself were granted with the total exemption of taxes and servicios by the Crown; Carlos Asenjo Sedano 1983, 157. 78 Miguel A. Ladero Quesada 1969b: num. 798. The Catholic Kings confirmed his over all the properties bought in the city of Granada and its district in 1497. 79 Carlos Asenjo Sedano (1983), 157 and Miguel A. Ladero Quesada 1969b, num. 79. 80 AHPG Leg. 1497, fols 8-9, 7/XII/1503 and fols 119-120, 30/VIII/1507. 81 We know one Don Diego Abduladín Abenzeyte, probably a son of Alí Abduladín, who sold a house located in the Moorish quarter of the city to another Morisco of Guadix. AHPG, fols 52v-53v, 31/XII/1507. 82 During the rebellion of 1568-1570, his descendant, called Don Hernán Valle Palacios, was a loyal ally of the Christians. Luis del Mármol Carvajal 1991: lib. IX, cap. I and II. 83 EnriqueSoria Mesa 1992, 54 and Carlos Asenjo Sedano 1983, 156. 84 AHPG Papeles sueltos, 1/IX/1513. The councillors of the city of Vera ordered to him to collect 11,740 maravedíes from two Genoese merchants. 85 AHPG Leg. 1497, 16/II/1507. 86 AHPG Cuad. 1498, 22/III/1498. 87 AHPG Papeles sueltos, 10/X/1513. 88 AHPG 11/X/1508. 89 He sold a bull to the village of Sabiote, on its way to a corrida, and four young bulls to two residents the city of Vera. AHPG Papeles sueltos, 1 and 4/IX/1513. 77

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its function was to compensate for the lands despoiled by the Christians and to continue the traditional nazarí exploitation of lands by big landowners.90 A sampling of over a hundred and fifty notarial protocols in Guadix will show this clearly. Out of the total of those identified between 1494 and 1513, fortyfour are leases of lands, and their analysis shows that the great majority are agricultural land leases signed by Mudéjares and Moriscos of the quarter with the Christian owners. The Christian owners were a diverse group, although predominantly they were important members of the oligarchy and receivers of Royal grants, such as the governor of the citadel of the city, Don Fernando de Mendoza,91 the Royal Secretary’s son Hernando de Zafra,92 the Royal Accountant Alvaro de Belmonte,93 the Royal Accountant Francisco Martínez,94 Francisco de Vera,95 the King’s confectioner, to name a few. The Church also frequently leased their lands and were accustomed to managing their properties in a similar way.96 It is much more interesting to look at the characteristics of the tenants. It seems that the majority of the Moriscos participated in this kind of land exploitation. Although in most of the contracts there was only one tenant, in quite a few there were two or more tenants. Not all the families of Guadix who leased lands exploited them directly. Some examples will be enough to clarify this. We refer to leases made by Hamete Sillero and Alí Benajara, the latter with at least three leases, where it can be seen that the lessees may have used employees or may even have sublet.97 This accumulation of wealth occurred in parallel to extensive family networks, little studied until now, and to an active participation in the political life of the cities. Regarding the family network, some such as the Granada Venegas and the Zegríes families opted for a marriage with the old Christian lesser nobility and, in so far as was possible, tried to hide their Muslim origin. However, the majority did not, and instead attempted to rely on strong relationships and ties with each other. As for their political participation, the Moriscos did not present a single, united front, as they might ally themselves with the old Christian oligarchs or remain within their traditional internal factions. The characteristic that distinguishes them is that the real source of their political power came from their capacity to represent the Moriscos. Exactly as with the Old Christians, within this group too there were different approaches and attitudes as to how to treat the defeated population, and these different approaches determined the key political alliances. Despite the importance of the religion and group, some chose the position that best assured their own Ángel Galán Sánchez 1991, 205 onwards. AHPG Cuad. 1499, fol. 1, 5/X/1499. 92 AHPG Cuad. 1499, fols 3v and 4v, 28 and 31/X/1499. 93 AHPG leg. 1497, fols 61v-62. 94 AHPG Cuad. 1497, fol. 5v. 95 AHPG Cuad. 1498, 18/III/1498. 96 AHPG Cuad. 1497, fol. 1v and Papeles sueltos 28/II/1499. 97 AHPG Papeles sueltos 4/XI/1497, Cuad. 1499, 13/XII/1499, Cuad. 1497, fol. 6v. 90 91

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economic interests, regardless of whether it might harm the overall interests of their community. A good example appears in a long court case brought by Fernando of Morales el Fisteli to obtain the right of voice and vote in the town council of Málaga. The councillors, the defenders of the Morisco, were divided. All of them were members of the first wave of oligarchs allied to King Fernando, who maintained such powerful “patrons” as the first corregidor of Málaga, Garcí Manrique, the Royal Secretary Hernando de Zafra or the Royal Treasurer Alonso de Morales, believed to be the godfather of Fernando de Morales himself. Furthermore, there were some merchants like Alonso de Cardona and Agostín Italián for whom el Fisteli, himself an active merchant as we have seen, posed an economic threat. Although much research is needed to continue advancing in this field, abundant information is available. Maybe the most valuable source is the correspondence between the first General Captain of Granada and the Count of Tendilla, Don Iñigo López de Mendoza. Almost six thousand letters leave extensive information of the conflicts and nobility factions in the city and of their allies in the Court. Through these letters we know that the Moriscos of the city were split into two factions. On one side are the Muley Fez, the Pequeñí, and others that participated of the Count's politics, and the first Corregidor of the Granada City Council. On the other, the most ambitious and least hard-line of the Moriscos, headed by Don Miguel de León and Fernando of Morales, allied with the Great Captain and the Count's enemies in the town council. 6. A Brief Conclusion Colonial society in Granada enjoyed a remarkable stability, mainly during the reign of Charles V of Austria. This stability depended on the system of subordinate political powers, built up by the Catholic Kings, which served two vital purposes: to maintain the Morisco nation allied to the Crown of Castile through a fiscal system orientated toward pardoning them for their condition as “consent heretics”; and to ease the harsher side of the conflicts between the Old Christian and the Moriscos. From that point of view, the fluid relationship between the rural communities and the urban oligarchies that assumed their representation was fully effective. There was little unanimity in the attitudes of these men in their relationships with the Castilian authorities. Many, such as the Muley Fez and the Pequeñí, accepted the new situation as the only possible way in which to defend their people. Others, such as the Fistelí, made a great business out of the new situation. Some, such as the Granada Venegas family, seem to genuinely accept conversion and aligned themselves with the Old Christian nobility. Then there were those, such as a son-in-law of the Pequeñí, an alguacil in the Alpujarras, who joined those fighting to avoid conversion or chose to emigrate. Some, such as the Dordux, accepted a “collaborationist” role only up until the mass conversions and then they reverted Finally, many maintained a difficult intermediate position which, although it brought them some benefits, made them suspicious in the eyes of their Castilians allies or

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traitors to their co-religionists: such extreme positions would produce an explosion of violence in the two rebellions in the sixteenth century. In spite of how much we know of the history after the conversions, the story of the conquered Muslims in the Kingdom of Granada remains a fascinating subject with many mysteries that remain to be solved.

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ATTRIBUTING SOCIAL FIELDS AND SATISFYING SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS: THE URBAN SYSTEM AS A CIRCUIT OF POWER-STRUCTURING RELATIONS (CASTILE IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY)* José Antonio Jara-Fuente University of Castilla-La Mancha 1. Introduction On 25 February 1467, Gonzalo Quijada submitted a written complaint to the Cuenca city council stating that when the city’s public offices were awarded in 1466, the office of mounted guard allotted to his collación (or ward) of Santa Cruz was given to Juan Álvarez de Toledo and that, since the latter had been promoted afterwards to an office in the regimiento, the mounted guard ought to have been resubmitted to balloting. He followed this declaration with a protest on his own behalf. Gonzalo declared that he was the only person residing in his collación who had maintained a war-horse and weapons throughout the year and that this justified his being assigned the office. Nevertheless, he went on, the mayors and regidores, resting more on their will than on justice, de facto and contra jure, had appointed to the office Juan Gutiérrez Vizcaíno, a resident of another collación. His claim continued with a request that the decision be overturned and that he be appointed to the office. On the thirteenth of March, the city council answered him, also in writing, declaring that while it was true that Juan Gutiérrez did not live in the collación of Santacruz, no resident of that collación, Gonzalo Quijada included, had maintained a war-horse and weapons throughout the previous year, and that they had done what they thought would best serve the king and the city. For that reason, the so called Gonzalo should restrain his speech and more courteously speak and not affirm that we acted on our will, adding that should he maintain a war-horse and weapons, they would recognize his rights, as they did with all citizens.1 In another case, on 25 November 1471, Sancho Rodríguez de Alcocer, a farmer and “collector major” of the alcabalas and tercias of Cuenca and its *This research has benefited from a grant given by the Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid (Regional Government of Madrid) and has been developed through two research projects. The first, Cultura, lenguaje y prácticas políticas en las sociedades medievales. Un estudio comparado sobre la construcción de valores compartidos y las formas de su contestación, was granted by the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Ministry of Science and Technology, Ref. BHA2002-03076). Its research leader was Dr. Isabel Alfonso Antón (Instituto de Historia, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas Madrid). The second, Identidad política urbana. La construcción de modelos de identidad en las ciudades de Aragón, Castilla y Navarra (1350-1480), has been financed by the Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (Ministry of Education and Culture, Ref. HUM2006-01371) for the period 2006-2009, and I am the research leader. I am indebted to Dr Aengus Ward (University of Birmingham) for having kindly accepted the burden of revising the style of the text. 1 Archivo Municipal de Cuenca (AMC), Libros de Actas (LLAA), legajo (leg) 198, expediente (exp) 1, folios (fols) 9r-v and 14r-v.

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jurisdictional hinterland for that year, ordered the alcabala for meat be put up for auction because the farmer in possession of the alcabala, Lope Ruiz de Belmonte, had not offered the required sureties. In turn, Lope Ruiz protested and committed himself to giving the appropriate sureties and declared that he had already paid most of the salvado and situado charged in the rent. His protest came to nothing and, when the rent came up for auction, Alonso López Monterde offered 40,000 maravedíes (mrs.), in spite of opposition from Lope, who said that he did not consent to it and asked for an affidavit of it for the keeping of his rights. On 28 November, Lope again requested the office of “farmer major”, declaring that he had been endowed with a rent for 50,000 mrs. (10,000 mrs. more than Monterde offered), of which he had already paid almost 30,000 mrs. of salvado and situado, and stated his commitment to ensure a rent for 25,000 mrs. or more if he were asked to. But, as the foresaid Lope Ruys neither wants to oblige him for the maravedíes of the foresaid rent nor give sureties, Sancho Rodríguez de Alcocer ordered the auction to continue, which Monterde won with the 40,000 mrs. bid. 2 The preceding accounts, though anecdotal, serve to introduce the subject of this paper, that is, the attribution of social fields of projection in the framework of social and power structures, in this case, urban structures. The requests of Gonzalo Quijada and Lope Ruiz de Belmonte were merely private claims pursuing satisfaction of a set of private and concrete claims related, in the first case, to service in urban public offices and, in the second case, to tax farming of royal rents. However, these requests can be analysed for what they reveal about the structure of the urban system and its significance in a city like Cuenca during the fifteenth century. Thus, the object of such requests was not really the administration of public offices or royal rent (or, at least, this was not their only or principal aim). Instead, the object was the recognition of the respective social positions reached by these persons within the urban system. Social position afforded them a reasonable expectation of satisfaction, not in terms of these specific and formalized claims or in any formalized way, but rather in terms of the benefits due to them according to their social position. In this sense, an understanding of the urban structure’s functioning as a system helps to clarify the breadth of the concept “social position”.3 This concept needs to be understood in the context of the procedural inter-relations developed For the process of farming the rent and the claim raised by Lope Ruiz de Belmonte, see AMC, LLAA, leg 140, exp 8, sf. 3 By system, I understand that a coherent field (of a multi-dimensional, multi-relational and inter-relational nature), integrated by mechanisms of diverse nature (economic, social, political, ideological, cultural, organizational…) and by relational processes, in which every constituent element interacts with the others, so that every variation in the configuration of any of those elements or in the form the relational processes are verified, affects the system’s configuration and development. Relational processes are those that, on the one hand, affect the building process of each mechanism (thus they can be understood as internal to it and, in this sense, as subsystems) and, on the other, emerge and operate from inside to outside, connecting it and its parts with the remaining elements of the system. For this notion and the use of the theory of systems in urban history, see Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2001. 2

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between the mechanisms participating in the construction of the lives of individuals and groups (organizations) in a system’s framework, as well as in the inter-relations affecting them over the course of their life trajectories. In this sense, social position is the result of two factors. Firstly, there is the specific development of the urban system as a whole, that is, of the whole set of norms that rule the functioning of the social field where individuals act. Secondly, social position is the result of the way that mechanisms of an economic, political, and cultural nature are articulated in every individual and of the relations established between individuals and between them and the system (and with other systems also).4 To illustrate these relations, the urban system that evolved in Cuenca during the fifteenth century serves as an excellent case study.5 2. Shaping and Acquiring Multi-Systemic Social Properties and Positions In general, medieval society has been seen as a highly hierarchical projecting field where the pursuit of private aims annuls, weakens or hides the exercise of relational mechanisms of a relatively coercive nature. According to this view, within this structure, vertical bonds represented, by far, the most efficient vehicle for social advancement and accessing the power fields reserved for a select minority. Although true, in some ways this contributes to obscuring other types of bonds that individuals developed on the horizontal level. The influence of these bonds extended beyond specific personal relations to affect the whole system, decisively contributing to its construction. In this sense, it should be borne in mind that in Cuenca, as in the rest of the Castilian cities and towns, the foundation of the late-medieval urban system, throughout the last third of the fourteenth century and the first third of the fifteenth century, was a government of a restrictive and exclusive nature. This was the On the usefulness of the notions of systemic and multi-systemic social positions see Peter Blau and Joseph Schwartz 1984, 1-13 and 113. As Pierre Bourdieu points out, social classes or class fractions can be defined not only by their position inside output relations but also by a certain sex-ratio, a specific distribution over the geographical field and by a whole set of auxiliary characteristics that can function as real norms of selection or exclusion. In this sense, we should keep in mind that classes are not built on just a single property (no matter how great its importance) or on a sum of properties but on the structure of the relations established between all the required properties. These relations and life trajectories are qualified, on the one hand, by the forces structuring the respective social field and, on the other, by the forces operating in that field. See Pierre Bourdieu 1979, 113-125. 5 Cuenca was one of the seventeen Castilian cities (eighteen after the conquest of Grenada) that enjoyed the right to be represented in Parliament in the Late Middle Ages. It was a middle-sized city, far smaller than cities like Burgos or Seville, but exceptionally important because of the exceptional development reached in the fifteenth century by its power subsystem and, in historiographic terms, by the ample treatment accorded to it by scholars, which allows us to understand it in significant detail. Among the most important studies are Paulino Iradiel Murugarren 1974; Mª Dolores Cabañas González 1980; Miguel Jiménez Monteserín 1992; Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete 1994; Jose Mª Sánchez Benito1994; Joaquín S. García Marchante 1997; Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2000; and Jorge Díaz Ibáñez 2003. 4

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regimiento, reserved for a minority of privileged lineages. Privileged, as much in the colloquial as in the strict sense, save for several exceptions who gradually lost stature over the course of the fifteenth century, members of the regimiento were selected from the urban lower nobility, that is to say, mainly from the hidalgos (a concept similar though not identical to the English gentry).6 In every Castilian city and town the tendency was for the potentes to consolidate their power in the regimiento, the superior power apparatus. The way this process developed was highly influenced, on the one hand, by power relations established inside every urban system, and, on the other hand, by the ability displayed by those lineages of potentes to project themselves inside other power subsystems or systems, in particular the monarchical system. However, the importance achieved by other systems, such as the ecclesiastical – especially in towns where the Church exercised its lordship – and the nobiliary – mainly its upper echelon, the kingdom’s high nobility – must not be underestimated. Life trajectories of the most important members of the urban system and its power subsystem in Cuenca clearly reflect this pattern of social projection and bondage to agents or agencies separate from the urban system. Thus, the construction of the ego, and his lineage, as potens, rests on his ability to project himself inside the urban system and to control the system’s basic power instruments and especially on his ability to project himself outside the system, towards those other systems that form the systemic framework “Crown of Castile”. In Cuenca, this pattern of social projection is best represented by the Álvarez de Toledo lineage, which can be taken as representative of this kind of social projection in Cuenca and in the rest of Castilian cities and towns.7 In the case of the Álvarez de Toledo lineage, its strength did not rest, in principle, on its more advantageous position inside the urban power apparatus but on its relations with the monarchical system, to which, in fact, it belonged. Indeed, the lineage originally established itself in the city with the support of a monarchy aspiring to exercise its 6The

setting up of the regimiento in the Castilian sector began in 1345, when it was documented in Segovia, León and Burgos; around 1345 in Astorga and Zamora; before 1346 in Avila and Plasencia; in Madrid, in 1346; in 1350 in Ciudad Rodrigo and Ledesma; around 1351 in Soria; in Palencia in 1352; and in Valladolid before 1360. In the Andalusian sector it appeared first in Arjona, in 1326; Seville, in 1327; Córdoba in 1328; Baeza in 1341, 1345 and 1347; Jerez, and perhaps Carmona and Ecija, in 1345; and Ubeda in 1347. Finally, it was established in Murcia in 1325. In the case of Cuenca, the establishment of the regimiento took place sometime between 1359 and 1362. See Juan A. Bonachía Hernando 1978; Máximo Diago Hernando 1988; Elisa Santos Canalejo 1981; Jose Antonio Martín Fuertes 1987; Ramón Carande 1969; Adeline Rucquoi 1987; Juan Torres Fontes 1987; and Jose Mª Sánchez Benito 1994. See also the following summaries, Jose Mª Monsalvo Antón 1989; and Manuel González Jiménez 1990. As regards the presence of non hidalgo regidores in the regimiento, these can be detected in such towns as Segovia, Cuéllar, Mérida, Sepúlveda, Palencia or Nájera See María Asenjo González 1986; Esteban Corral García 1981; Marie-Claude Gerbet 1979; Carlos Sáez 1972; Mª Jesús Fuente Pérez 1989; and Francisco J. Goicolea Julián 2000. 7 For an analysis of the basic social properties this type of lineage should acquire, see María Asenjo González 1986a; and Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete 1986a, 177-186. 94

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control over this region through agents who did not provoke opposition, that is, the dominant group’s opposition. Through these means, the Crown sought to build a reasonably coherent and sympathetic dialogue instrument between king and city. The strategy adopted in Cuenca by the Álvarez de Toledo was, in any case, brilliant. Rather than gaining their place inside the regimiento by pure force and through the imposition of royal authority, they were able to reach a pact with one of the regimental lineages, the de Valera lineage. When Juan Ferrández de Valera, regidor and head of his lineage, resigned, he transferred his office to Alfonso Álvarez de Toledo on 16 August 1422; this agreement was sealed by the marriage of Alfonso with Aldonza Ferrández, daughter of Juan Ferrández de Valera.8 The Álvarez de Toledo lineage had entered the city with the support of the king, a circumstance that could have raised the opposition of the lineages inside the regimiento. By coming to an agreement with the lineages of potentes through a pact with one of their representatives, the de Valera, they cleverly reduced avenues of protest against their regiduría. Equally important, in the pursuit of their strategy, the Álvarez de Toledo not only benefited from the great political ability displayed by their members but also from the organic development of the lineage. By the first third of the fifteenth century, the early split of the Álvarez de Toledo lineage into two lineage branches gave it a power advantage over the majority of lineages in Cuenca, an advantage that would last for the entire century. One of these branches was headed by Alfonso Álvarez de Toledo and, the other, by his brother Pero Álvarez de Toledo. Segmentation, rather than rupture into two parts, allowed the pursuit of the lineage’s objectives as a whole, based on multiple strategies, organized by and distributed among the two lineage branches and their heads. In this way, the lineage branch headed by Alfonso, while not resigning the regimiento in Cuenca, concentrated its main presence and political activity in the area defined by the monarchical system. Alfonso, who was Clerk of the Royal Chamber and Accountant of the Exchequer, would emerge in 1449 as Accountant Major of the Exchequer and as a member of the Royal Council, the superior agency of the monarchical bureaucratic and power apparatus.9 Pero Álvarez de Toledo, from his accession to the regimiento, in 1432, centred his strategy in the urban arena and served no offices for the king save a clerkship of the Royal Chamber that he still held in 1433.10 Moreover, Pero’s strategy in the urban framework was complemented, from 1449, by the admission into the regimiento of one of his nephews, Juan Álvarez de Toledo.11 Before discussing the lineage’s projection inside the urban system, it would be helpful to look at another field of action of particular interest in Cuenca, the nobiliary system. As in many other Castilian towns during the fifteenth century, Cuenca’s urban power subsystem was influenced by members of the regional AMC, LLAA, leg 186, exp 4, fols 2r-v. AMC, LLAA, leg 188, exp 6, fols 4r-6v; and leg 191, exp 6, fols 91v-92r. 10 AMC, LLAA, leg 188, exp 3, fol. 1; and leg 188, exp 4, fols 30r-31r. 11 In fact, Juan Álvarez de Toledo succeeded his brother, Pero Núñez de Toledo, in the office, while Pero kept himself in the king’s entourage, serving in the office of Accountant of the Exchequer (AMC, LLAA, leg 191, exp 6, fols 93r-v). 8 9

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nobility who, by manipulating the system, pursued the expansion of their patrimonies, principally through the seizure of ample areas of the city’s jurisdictional hinterland. Unlike in many other towns, in Cuenca this pressure was constant and, on various occasions, dangerously intense; the principal figures involved were the Marquises of Villena (the Pacheco, the most powerful noble lineage in the Castilian Crown), the Earls of Buendía (Acuñas) and the Lords and, by the end of the century, the Marquises of Cañete (Mendozas).12 The Álvarez de Toledo were able to project their presence in that nobiliary system by various means, beginning with the strategy displayed by the lineage branch headed by Pero Álvarez de Toledo. His connection to the Hurtado de Mendoza, Lords of Cañete and Wardens of the Town of Cuenca, was sanctioned, as in the case of Alfonso’s regimiento, by the marriage between Pero and a daughter of Diego Hurtado, María Álvarez de Mendoza.13 Therefore, the social position of the Álvarez de Toledo lineage inside Cuenca’s urban system was, to a great extent, the result of the multiple social positions reached by the lineage inside the monarchical and nobiliary systems, both of which had a powerful influence on the urban system. This was quite evident in the case of the monarchy, but it was no less true for the noble lineage Hurtado de Mendoza. The Mendoza were one of the most active lineages in the area, so intimately linked to the monarchy that they were able to obtain from the king, in 1419, the highest representative office in Cuenca, the Wardenship of the Town. This office did not exist in the majority of Castilian towns, which points to its great importance there.14 Nevertheless, from its very beginning, the lineage’s superior organization allowed the Álvarez de Toledo to act from within several systems due to the existence of its two branches, but always on the basis of a common strategy. The ability to intervene in two systems, such as the monarchical and nobiliary, with such great influence on urban systems in general and on Cuenca’s in particular, conferred them with the social condition of potentes. Consequently, the lineage was recognized by the urban system, into which not only the lineage but its two branches would be admitted. In this way, the urban system granted admission to the two lineage heads and their two succession lines (as the office of regidor was transferable, with no great difficulties, from father to son). This double representation of the lineage inside Cuenca’s major power apparatus had no equivalent among other lineages save, from the mid-fifteenth century onwards, the social position reached by the Alcalá lineage, which was closely tied to the Pacheco lineage, Masters of the Military Order of Santiago and Marquises of Villena.15

On this particular point see Mª Concepción Quintanilla Raso 1995, 1997a and 1997b; and Jose Mª Sánchez Benito 1994. 13 Archivo Diocesano de Cuenca (ADC), Inquisición (Inq), leg 680, exp 471. 14 AMC, LLAA, leg 185, exp 4, fol. 9r. 15 I am referring to Juan Pacheco and the brothers García Ferrández and Pero Suárez de Alcalá (AMC, LLAA, leg 198, exp 3, fols 47r-48r). 12

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An analysis of the Álvarez de Toledo case shows that social positions were built on the basis of two specific notions: firstly, the notion of acquisition of (appropriate) social properties; and subsequently, the notion of social recognition. In the first case, the location of the ego (considered either in individual terms or collectively organized and, in this case, in relation with the lineage agency) inside the social structure of a given system, rests on its ability to acquire those properties that, for each social segment in the social structure, the system demands and, therefore, is able to value. In this sense, access to the urban power core was determined precisely by what the power subsystem implied and by its inherent properties. The close bond of the Álvarez de Toledo to the monarchy was an important attribute but not necessarily determinant in terms of the recognition of their social positioning inside the upper segment of the urban social and power structures. Other lineages, during the fifteenth century, tried to force the recognition of an identical social position, based on the acquisition of similar properties. They failed in the face of opposition from the lineages located at the core of the domination apparatus. The reasons for their failure are clear. The construction of a dominant group (a social and power segment here referred to as the elite of power) and its preservation implied, on the one hand, a certain control over the definition of the appropriate properties needed for acquiring the corresponding social position. On the other hand, it also implied a certain control over the recognition of the social position, once those properties were acquired. This control was more or less rigid, depending on the elite of power’s potentiality and on the ability shown by other mechanisms of the system and other systems to project themselves over that field. To be considered as such, the elite of power had to control their own destiny, at least to some extent. In other words, they had to have some control over the mechanisms and processes that regulated access to their elite. The surprising success, then, of the Álvarez de Toledo lineage requires a fuller explanation. The Álvarez de Toledo benefited from the dysfunctional way in which the urban power subsystem operated in the first third of the fifteenth century and from the relaxation of the mechanisms that controlled access to the elite of power.16 For the period in question, this subsystem was still in a formative process in which the most powerful influence was that of the monarchy and nobility, specifically the lineage headed by the Warden of the Town Diego Hurtado de Mendoza. This influence did not operate from outside to inside as unwelcome interferences from other systems in the normal development of the urban system. Instead, they were instruments of arbitration called upon by the urban system to mediate in the reorganization of its power subsystem. It is evident that such dysfunctions weakened the ability of the elite of power to control its access. However, it is also true that, in the gradual process of constructing a cohesive elite, the importance of some properties was striking. The Álvarez de Toledo benefited from that weakness, but also entered the system equipped with attributes necessary for that time and place. They had a bond to the two systems on whose intervention the foundations of an urban power subsystem were intended to be laid, the monarchy and nobility (the Hurtado de Mendoza). In this sense, two circumstances 16

On these dysfunctions, see Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2000, 129-135. 97

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were of great significance. During the period of internal construction when the Álvarez de Toledo lineage arrived on the scene, the elite of power were unable to oppose, if that was their intention, the incorporation of new members (on the same day that Alfonso Álvarez de Toledo entered the regimiento, he was joined by another of John II’s intimates, his Officer of the Knife, Sancho de Jaraba). When the construction process was complete, in the early 1430s, the elite of power showed they could successfully oppose new accesses. The Álvarez de Toledo had been able to acquire the attributes and properties necessary to join Cuenca’s elite of power, thanks to their bonds with John II and Diego Hurtado de Mendoza. The dialectical relation between system and ego, as a function of the ego’s social position, helps to explain the relative ease of the lineage’s access. Not only had the Álvarez de Toledo acquired the required properties, they also performed vital roles in the urban system, its power subsystem, and the elite of power. That is to say, the aggregation of the Álvarez de Toledo to the urban system proved to be useful to it on the basis of the ability displayed by the lineage to link itself to other systems (monarchical and nobiliary). The urban system found the brothers Alfonso and Pero and their lineage to be invaluable spokesmen in the framework of the inter-systemic relations with which the city necessarily had to cope at that moment. Thus, their access to the urban system not only took place as a result of those circumstances (potentially conflictive), it also represented added value benefiting the development of the system, its power subsystem, and the elite of power itself. Therefore, the ability to provide the system with a certain amount of benefit must also be understood as a property ensuring social position and, in consequence, as a function of position. Such ability made it possible to reduce, or even eliminate, sources of conflict that threatened the system and its constituents and helped endow the system with greater cohesion.17 The recognition of social positions could be attained through coercive and highly conflictive means.18 In such cases, recognition is imposed from outside the

The survival of the social position acquired by any dominant group is based, to some extent, on its ability to provide some kind of service to the whole society, so that domination could be acceptable to and justified by the society as a whole, which finds those services useful and adequate, and reduces to tolerably acceptable levels social contestation. This is the classical, and still valuable, view of Gaetano Mosca and Wilfredo Pareto. See Ettore Albertoni 1987, 16-17, 52 and 110-111; Gaetano Mosca 1939a, 53 and 65-67, and 1939b; Wilfredo Pareto 1917-1919. 18 As the case of Alonso Téllez de Cabrera, brother of Andrés de Cabrera, Henry IV’s Steward, proves when he tried to enter Cuenca’s regimiento. In fact, it was Andrés de Cabrera himself who aspired to the regiduría in 1467, facing the radical opposition of the town. After a highly conflictive period, where both parties took reprisals against each other and suffered consequent exhaustion, in 1469 the would-be Marquis of Moya, the king and the town reached a compromise that implied the renunciation to some of their exigencies but at least satisfied the minimum objectives they pursued and brought back the situation towards stability: The Steward did not enter the regimiento, which satisfied Cuenca’s aim of not being controlled by such a powerful nobleman so closely connected to the king; and the lineage de Cabrera gained a place inside the regimiento, but it was assigned to Alonso 17

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system; outside power imposes itself to force recognition. To some extent, this implies a failure inside the system itself because it demonstrates the system’s inability to control the process of definition, acquisition and recognition of social properties. The system is forced to value social properties alien to it either because such properties do not form part of the system’s attributes or because they do not reach the level of development (definition) the system demands from them. This recognition could and should take effect from within the system whenever the acquisition of social position adjusts to the system’s expectations and, as a compensation for their recognition and as a function of this process, they contribute something to the system. This is why the recognition of the social position reached by the Álvarez de Toledo proved of enormous importance in two ways. Firstly, it sanctioned the lineage’s reception inside Cuenca’s society, while eliminating possible sources of internal conflict that could have set the regimental lineages against the Álvarez de Toledo. Such conflict never took place. Secondly, while they recognized the division of the lineage into two branches, they were deliberately recognizing not only the general interests of the lineage but also those particular to each branch. By avoiding conflict between the branches, they benefited the entire urban system. Therefore, recognition of social position gave the system and one of its mechanisms (the lineage agency, here represented by the Álvarez de Toledo) a high level of internal coherence. Possible areas of conflict diminished, and links of solidarity between the internal mechanisms involved in the formation of the urban system increased. By osmosis, the whole system profited. It seems clear the Álvarez de Toledo came to form part of Cuenca’s elite of power by virtue of their bonds with monarchy and nobility and with certain members of the urban system itself. However, does this mean they had the ability to act freely in that power and social field? That the lineage was linked to John II and Diego Hurtado de Mendoza is indisputable. It is no less true that some kind of link had emerged from its relation with Juan Ferrández de Valera and, since its access to the regimiento was not contested, with the other regimental lineages. What did the extension of this bond chain imply for the lineage? For the Álvarez de Toledo this would become an instrument of great relevance that continued to develop throughout the century. The multiple multi-systemic bonds, and their related multisystemic social positions, gave the lineage a permanent and relatively privileged contact with the most important centres of power in the overarching “Crown of Castile” system, the monarchy and nobility (high nobility). The lineage used the potentiality of its multi-systemic relations to its own benefit but it also transferred a part of that potentiality to the urban system to which it belonged, thereby sanctioning the normal development of one of the social properties that determined its recognition by the system. It was a property that, from that moment onwards, implied an obligation the lineage had to fulfil (in order not to create a contradiction within the system’s internal functioning which, on the basis of that specific property’s dysfunction, could have resulted in a no less dysfunctional conflict). This Téllez and not to Andrés (AMC, LLAA, leg 198, exp 1, fols 84v and 93v-94r; and leg 198, exp 3, fol. 48v). 99

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“speaker ability” of the lineage and its disposition to use it for the benefit of the system (and, therefore, to benefit all members of the elite of power) meant a relative breakdown of the balance between the social positions reached by the members of that elite inside the urban system. Therefore, inside the powers of urban domination a small segment of lineages emerged that stood out from their peers, shaping itself into a dominant core of that elite.19 This relative imbalance was accepted by the regimental lineages, and never disputed, because its recognition implied benefits for the group and the city that the majority of them were not able to achieve by other means. Also, such recognition did not affect negatively the norms ruling the system, and the Álvarez de Toledo did not alter either the contents of those norms nor their application. In any case, this multi-systemic positioning acted as a balance mechanism in the relations of the lineage with the several systems affected (in particular the urban system but also the monarchical and nobiliary relations). If, on the one hand, the extent and contents of the lineage’s “political debts” were extended, reaching the three systems, on the other hand, the multiple solidarities generated tended to reduce the strength and reach of those debts if not make them disappear altogether. In this way, the lineage had a more ample safety margin. Accessing the superior power apparatus with the support of only one of those systems could have jeopardized the lineage strategies of the Álvarez de Toledo because of their apparent bond to a specific system. Through the extension of its chain of bonds, what the lineage gains is not fundamentally a higher number of obligations but rather the loosening, though not destruction, of those bonds. This was something that happened regularly throughout the period. Indeed, the linkage of the lineage to the monarchy did not prevent the city council of Cuenca from opposing the king’s will on several occasions, as when Cuenca opposed Andrés de Cabrera’s entering the regimiento. In these circumstances, the Álvarez de Toledo fulfilled their obligations to the urban system, loosening the content of their obligations to the monarchy to a mere expectation. The same happened in the case of the nobility and the Hurtado de Mendoza. The seizure of lands from Cuenca’s jurisdictional hinterland by neighbouring noble lineages gave the city many occasions, during the fifteenth century, to resort not only to legal claims but also, in many cases, to the use of the urban militia to throw the “invaders” off Cuenca’s land. By consistently supporting these defensive actions, the Álvarez de Toledo also compensated for their difficult position as members of two opposing systems. They never offered directly or personally to participate in expelling the interlopers by leading the urban militia, nor did the urban system ask In time, other lineages would see an identical position recognized, as was the case with the Alcalá. In the second half of the fifteenth century, due to their close connection with Juan Pacheco, Master of Santiago and Marquis of Villena, the lineage acquired a prominent position in the city, the clearest expression of which was, as happened in the Álvarez de Toledo case, the service of two simultaneous offices of regidor by García Ferrández de Alcalá, between 1449-1480, and Alonso Álvarez de Alcalá, between 1476-1482 (AMC, LLAA, leg 191, exp 6, fol. 86r; leg 201, exp 4, fols 23r-v; leg 200, exp 2, fol. 45v; and leg 204, exp 1, fols 7r-13r).

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them to do so. Nevertheless, perhaps the most striking example can be found in 1465, when a part of the kingdom’s nobility rose in arms against the King Henry IV. In the region of Cuenca, the rebels found many partisans, led by the Pacheco and Acuña, and, among them were some lineages of Cuenca’s elite of power, such as the Alcalá. The Hurtado de Mendoza, their interests divided between their loyalty to the king and their relations with the rebels, decided to take a stand by taking no stand, that is, they provisionally decided to wait out the conflict and see what happened. With them, and taking the same decision, were the Álvarez de Toledo. Finally, both would take the king’s side, a wise move given the king’s ultimate victory over the rebels.20 3. Acquiring a Social Position inside the Urban System The dominant regimental lineages achieved pre-eminence and their privileged social position on the basis of superior access to resources of a social or economic nature. The relative superiority of some lineages to access service in either royal or nobiliary offices was the sign of their higher status. One of the distinctive characteristics of the projection of the Álvarez de Toledo lineage was its ability to place representatives in both systems, something other lineages could neither aspire to nor afford. In the struggle between minor urban lineages, the building process of the lineage spelled the difference between success and failure. Few regimental lineages had achieved a degree of development similar to the Álvarez de Toledo lineage, but by the first quarter of the fifteenth century the generative processes of some lineages positioned them above other lineages in construction, facilitating their superior social positioning within the urban system and their relatively uncontested recognition over time.21 This facilitated the normal evolution of the urban system procedural norm, guaranteeing proper satisfaction of the expectations generated by the social position of all lineages and not only the regimental ones, whose social position was recognized without difficulty. This was true because the need for social satisfaction inside a lineage in construction was not necessarily as great as that demanded by fully developed lineages articulated around a higher number and/or more developed set of social properties. On this point see Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2000, 123-127. Social properties were susceptible to both acquisition and loss, either because the lineage loses the attribute, or because, over time, the definition of the properties base of its social position changes, losing, consequently, its recognition. The former happened on different occasions within the elite of power, leading to the exit of some lineages and the access of others. An exit suffered by the Cañaveras, Carvajal, Dones, Gallego, Miranda, Ribagorda, Torralba, Verdejo and Zahorejas, in the first third of the century; by the Cañizares, Castillo and Torre, by the mid-century; and by the Jaraba in the transit to the decade of the seventies. As can be observed, as years pass and the century marches towards its final third, the rate of failure among regimental lineages decreases perceptibly, lessening the number of those unable to keep their places in the maximum institution of urban power. See Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2000, 108.

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Social positioning was a function of the particular way Cuenca’s urban system was constructed at the time. In other Castilian towns, access to the regimiento sanctioned the access of regimental lineages to a significant portion of the system’s resources, provoking in most cases the other lineages’ opposition and, therefore, causing conflict.22 In Cuenca, probably due to the initial weakness of the elite of power and to the extreme pressure the neighbouring nobility exerted over Cuenca’s jurisdictional hinterland throughout the period,23 the urban system developed on more participative and less conflictive bases. However, this did not translate into either the extinction of all sources of conflict or the development of politicalparticipative assemblies. While not a main focus of this article, it would be helpful to consider, synthetically, the extent of participatory political practices in Cuenca. The urban system, and specifically its power subsystem, was constructed in the first third of the fifteenth century on the basis of an unwritten pact, which governed the exercise of domination and the benefits it could provide.24 Once power subsystem dysfunctions were solved, the great majority of urban lineages were destined to recognize, tacitly, the difficulty or practical impossibility of entering the regimiento and being recognized as potens. This assumption implied the sanction of the social properties required to access the regimiento (social properties far beyond what those lineages could acquire). One solution occasionally proposed to open access to the majority of lineages was to redefine the required social properties and reduce the social attributes necessary. Such attempts always ended in failure.25 One successful solution that endured throughout the fifteenth century was to recognize the privileged position of regimental lineages while at the same time extending the benefits of domination to other lineages as well. In effect, it was a sort of quid pro quo whereby the elite of power obtained their recognition or, stated another way, the non-contested recognition of their position in the system. In exchange, the elite of power recognized many lineages, exclusively those possessing the social properties of “wealth” and “social status”, by transferring to the elite of participation a significant portion of the benefits derived from domination. These benefits included the construction of a lineage and its acquisition of a social position within the urban system, based on how the lineage was positioned within the different urban subsystems (and in other systems, in the case of lineages able to access them). This was the central topic of a never formalized debate on In this sense, the case of Segovia is archetypical. Among many other examples, in 1489 regimental lineages stirred up the co-ordinated opposition of dominance’s second echelon, integrated by the members of the Guild of Noble Lineages, in collaboration with the commoners. For Segovia, see María Asenjo González 1986, 285-292 and in general, Mª Isabel Val Valdivieso 1994. 23 This fact, the nobiliary pressure, is of a singular importance because the principal source of revenues for Cuenca’s lineages lay on livestock farming and, therefore, on the preservation of the vast areas of pasture in Cuenca’s jurisdictional hinterland. The nobility’s predatory hunger became a vehicle of union and solidarity within urban lineages as a whole. 24 I have considered this political model in Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2000, 2001 and 2004. 25 This was tried, with no success, in 1442, in 1465, in the unstable conditions in the kingdom, and again in the 1470s. See Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 1999. 22

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whether to guarantee such lineages access to the different subsystems and their benefits. In other words, it was accepted that the elite of power exercised control over access to those subsystems and their resources but they were not permitted a monopoly over those resources. The elite of power fulfilled satisfactorily its part of the bargain, to the extent that it granted the elite of participation access to those resources it did not reserve for itself. In this sense, Cuenca represented a striking exception among Castilian towns. In this way, a relational model of domination was built. Vertical relations, emerging inside the system’s social structure and among the different organizations integrated into the various social segments, were modified in a way similar to what had occurred with the social position of the Álvarez de Toledo lineage with respect to its relationship, firstly, with the monarchical and nobiliary systems and, secondly, with its equals inside the elite of power. The sanction by both elites of that model of domination implied, in turn, the sanction of vertically-shaded relationships, turning domination into a function that, to different degrees, was related to the social positions reached by the lineages forming those elites. Thus, an ample group of lineages joined and actively took part in domination and its effects, the price of which was to submit to domination of another kind. For the elite of power, this was a great achievement, for it guaranteed the peaceful enjoyment of its social position. Furthermore, the transfer of a portion of the benefits from domination to the elite of participation did not imply for the elite of power a perceptible loss either of power or of the incomes derived from the exploitation of the system’s resources. Lineages such as the Álvarez de Toledo did not need, in order to prosper, to reserve for themselves the profit of those urban resources, because they already based their power and social position on the profit of large-scale land properties in Cuenca’s jurisdictional hinterland, considerable livestock interests, relatively open access to benefit from centralized feudal rent (such as wages for the offices in the king’s service) and social and economic resources allowing them, whenever they so desired, to access the royal tax apparatus (through their participation in the tax farming of the alcabalas). For other lineages inside the elite of power, not as well endowed as the Álvarez de Toledo, access to some of those urban resources depended, paradoxical as it may seem, on the agreement reached with the rest of urban lineages, that is, with the lineages of the elite of participation. This was the case with urban rents, whose management, as in every Castilian town, was put up to auction and given to the highest bidder. Tolerating and even favouring the access of the elite of participation to these rents lessened their possible opposition to the access of some lineages of the elite of power to the same resource. This was very important because the farming of these rents by the regidores was forbidden under royal and urban laws.26 The kingdom’s parliaments received many complaints against this practice, but in Cuenca this kind of complaint scarcely appears and, in This was specifically forbidden in the Parliaments held in Guadalajara in 1390, Burgos in 1415, Madrid in 1433, Toledo in 1436, Guadalajara in 1437 and Burgos in 1453; the later Parliament also forbade standing security for the farmers. Cfrs. Cortes 1866, III.

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any case, had no repercussions, even if some regimental lineages participated regularly in these rents.27 Evidently, the mutual pact between the elites worked well and guaranteed everyone the enjoyment of a portion of the urban resources, eliminating the need to turn to means of contestation, which were highly conflictive and disruptive for the system. In the case of urban rents, the decline of a priori vertical relations is verified again since, if the control exercised by the elite of power over the farming process was never discussed, the elite of power’s access to these rents nonetheless depended on the approval or acquiescence of the elite of participation. Moreover, the regimental lineages, in order to benefit from the farming of urban rents, had to convert their relations of domination into cooperative relations between equals. In this sense, they tried to diminish the social impact implied in their access to those resources by farming them via non-formalized companies, in association with members of the elite of participation. Some of these companies operated for many years.28 Both elites participated in these companies on equal terms and therefore this practice cannot be viewed as an instrumental mechanism to manipulate those companies in favour of the elite of power. What did the elite of participation get from this system? On the one hand, social recognition by the elite of power of a set of social properties, even if the properties were not well-defined in many lineages. Through such recognition, they had non-contested access to the benefits of domination. On the other hand, they benefited from the construction of a non-formalized organization, the elite of participation itself. This group of lineages thus enjoyed high levels of internal coherence and the necessary strength to embed themselves in the system, inside the core of domination and as participants in domination’s non-formalized pact. As for the construction of the group, it is true that in Cuenca there were some formalized organizations, such as the Cabildo de Caballeros y Escuderos (Guild of Knights and Squires) and the Cabildo de Guisados de Caballo (Guild of Urban Cavaliers), grouping together several of those lineages that formed the elite of participation.29 But several factors reduced their effectiveness. In the first place, by For royal rents, we know that in 1475 the deputies of Cuenca’s jurisdictional hinterland protested before the queen and the king because the regidores, mayors, bailiff and the urban steward infringed the laws promulgated by John II in Guadalajara, in 1437. On 20 April 1475, the ‘Catholic Kings’, Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragón, reiterated to the town council the prohibition of such practices (AMC, LLAA, leg 198, exp 4, fols 10r-v). As for rents in general, including the urban ones, on 22 April 1460, the town council forbade the regidores from participating in their farming (AMC, LLAA, leg 195, exp 1, fols 29r-30v). This last prohibition scarcely had any consequence because, in practice, only two regimental lineages, Molina and de la Muela, participated regularly in these rents. Their position within the regimental institution was eccentric and their participation in the farming of those rents did not imply a real conflict with the non-regimental lineages. 28 On these problems of taxation and tax farming in Cuenca, see Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete 1994; Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2000, and 2004. 29 Concerning the Guild of Knights and Squires, there are several references in Jose Mª Sánchez Benito 1994. For the Guild of Urban Cavaliers see Mª Dolores Cabañas González 1980. 27

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their very nature, the guilds maintained exclusive criteria similar to those developed by the non-formalized organization of the regimental lineages. Though the Guild of Knights and Squires’ internal operation is not well-known, it is thought that in the fifteenth century membership was reserved to those that could prove their social and legal status as knights, which thereby excluded most urban lineages.30 As for the Guild of Urban Cavaliers, its constitutional norms stipulated its limitation to fortythree members, as defined by John II around 1420. John II’s central aim was to create, inside the urban system, a group of lineages attached and loyal to the Crown, benefiting from the fluidity of inter-systemic relations and guaranteeing, as far as possible, the city’s support for royal policies. These exclusive criteria made it impossible for the guilds to draw in, in any coherent way, the lineages that were located outside the regimental segment and separated from the rest of the social structure by the basic social properties they shared, in spite of the fact they occupied a position superior to the rest of the citizens. Evidently, these were the properties around which the elite of participation would be constructed. Within a hierarchical, status-based society, lineages belonging to the Guild of Knights and Squires occupied a superior position to those comprising the Guild of Urban Cavaliers, since the social properties of the former included one of great social value, the status of knight, while the latter group sprang from lineages whose origins lacked status dignity. The lineages of urban cavaliers did not enjoy the socioeconomic privileges that knighthood or hidalguía afforded. In the beginning, an ocean of hierarchical and vertical social relations effectively divided society and nullified any socially disintegrating activities related with lineages’ common interests and aims. Nevertheless, several circumstances led to the closing of this wide gap, balancing their relations and putting their social properties, and their social properties, on an equal footing. In the first place, one of the advantages granted to the Guild of Urban Cavaliers consisted in recognizing among its members certain benefits that brought them closer to attaining the privileges enjoyed by knights and hidalgos. Although these grants did not actually confer the status of knight or hidalgo, they provided urban cavalier lineages with the legal instruments that over the course of three generations allowed them to claim the status of hidalgo. Though a favourable outcome was far from certain, most of these claims were successful. The status of hidalgo put them on the same level as lineages in the Guild of Knights and Squires. In the second place, central to the development of privileged society in the fifteenth century was the gradual loss of interest in acquiring the status of knight coinciding with increased interest in the status of hidalgo. In principle, knighthood was not transmissible to the lineage as a whole and involved the fulfilment of certain obligations, service of arms being the most important. Conversely, hidalguía was indeed transmissible to the lineage as a whole and, in principle, did not imply a Throughout a progressively more conflictive fifteenth century and above all under Henry IV, royal need of men of arms in order to oppose nobiliary rebellions led the monarchy to offer knighthood to the urban cavaliers joining royal colours in the battlefield, thus expanding the cases allowed to grant it. On this topic, see Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2001.

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similar obligation to knighthood. This tendency helped to close the gap separating knights from urban cavaliers. In the third place, the very nature of the Guild of Knights and Squires allowed its infiltration by members of the regimental lineages, who did enjoy the status of hidalgo and, in many cases, knighthood. The possible use of the Guild as a political organization for controlling the ruling class (the regimental lineages) lost its raison d’être when regimental lineages joined the Guild and short-circuited its political objectives. Therefore, the only two formalized organizations of privileged individuals and lineages were fully integrated into both the urban system and the pact of domination on which the system itself was founded. These organizations were emptied of political meaning. Furthermore, the Guilds’ subjection to the system’s rules was important since the fulfilment by their members of their respective statutes was not only subject to the control of the Guilds but also, in the final analysis, to the elite of power through the regimiento. The regimiento used that capacity not only to control the Guilds and their members but, through them, to control the members’ lineages. For example, the regimento’s ability to temporarily suspend Guilds’ privileges, whenever they judged members had infringed the statutes and norms ruling the relations between Guilds and city, proved to be of great importance.31 Once the Guilds’ political character dissipated 32 and their membership became limited to a small group of lineages, the only avenue to political participation and to sharing in the inherent benefits of domination was through access to that non-formalized social group, the elite of participation. This process was essentially individual and affected the way that every lineage or individual alone acquired the appropriate social properties. Likewise, it made control by regimental lineages over the process of acquisition of social properties easier. This was because the process of acquisition of social properties did not depend on or imply the These conflicts extended throughout the period and, in March 1456, led to a process of arbitration and an agreement between city and the Guild of Urban Cavaliers. This pact, while recognizing the Guild’s nature and social positions acquired by its brothers, put a limit to its privileges and subjected the Guild more rigidly to the regimento by effectively allowing it to control the fulfilment of its statute. Shortly thereafter, in September of the same year, the city council made use of its powers to oppose Juan Lázaro’s admission into the Guild, threatening the Guild with the suspension of its privileges. See Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2000, 363-367. 32 Unlike Cuenca, in many other Castilian towns the urban system was built and developed on the basis of guilds of noble lineages that, at least at the beginning, excluded from power a large part of the society. In some towns, like Segovia, there emerged, in the long run, a drastic gap between lineages integrated into the regimiento and lineages just admitted to the membership of the town’s privileged club or guild. This was the case of cities and towns like Segovia, Valladolid, Alba de Tormes, Trujillo, Oviedo, Vitoria or Soria. Vid María Asenjo González 1986; Adeline Rucquoi 1987; Jose Mª Monsalvo Antón 1988; Carmen Fernández Daza-Alvear 1985; Margarita Cuartas Rivero 1983; Jose Ramón Díaz de Durana Ortiz de Urbina 1986 and Máximo Diago Hernando 1993. 31

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existence of links of solidarity between lineages. Such links might necessarily have involved initiating co-ordinated action when each lineage competed with the others. Nevertheless, this was neither an absolute nor an entirely discretionary control since the norms ruling the process of acquisition of social properties were a part of the system and had to be observed, at least generally. Refusing to recognize these properties could be accepted by all when used occasionally and when it affected just a small fraction of the participating lineages. On the other hand, wide and indiscriminate use meant every lineage was potentially vulnerable to the dangers of non-recognition. Consequently, this could provoke general opposition, putting at risk the normal development of the system, its rules, and the privileged position enjoyed by the elite of power within it. As in the case of Gonzalo Quijada, the elite of power exercised these attributions with prudence and never set off this chain reaction. Thus, the construction of a set of norms ruling domination, and the processes of recognition of social positions inside the system, turned into mechanisms to control and balance intra-system social and power relations. Its development guaranteed the elite of power’s privileged position but, at the same time, linked that surety to the observance of the system of rules and, by extension, to observance and recognition of the importance and meaning of the elite of participation. 4. Satisfying Social Expectations Satisfying social expectations turned into a system function and into a function of the process of acquisition of social properties. Therefore, it was directly related to the nature of those social properties, given that its content determined every lineage’s accession to some of the segments integrating the elite of participation (or the elite of power). Although the elite of participation was constructed on the basis of a set of common social properties, the extent of unifying properties was not necessarily homogenous in every lineage. Consequently, the system did not satisfy all lineages’ social expectations in equal measure. Perceptible differences in the mode of acquiring social properties turned into a relatively disintegrating factor for the elite of participation and stressed the importance of its recognition by the elite of power, who benefited because the system made it easier for them to exercise domination. Although all lineages within the elite of participation could develop solidarity attitudes in the framework of the norms ruling the processes of definition, acquisition, and recognition of their social properties, such solidarity did not necessarily emerge from the process of satisfaction of their social expectations since some lineages could consider themselves to possess a more genuine right to acquire a broader recognition than others.33 In fact, and in the framework of the decision-making process (located within the urban power subsystem), that was the aim pursued by the lineages integrated into the Guild of Knights and Squires and the Guild of Urban Cavaliers, though their manoeuvring did not meet with success. Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 1999.

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Returning to the case of the lineage Álvarez de Toledo, we will take this lineage as a model in order to compare it with the lineages inside the elite of participation. We already know that regimental lineages demonstrate a more organically developed lineage pattern, the early development of the Álvarez de Toledo in the first third of the fifteenth century being the best example. Inside the elite of participation, the level of evolution was, in general, not so accentuated and was more basic. Typically, a lineage head concentrated in his person the social properties of the lineage and, therefore, its expectations and social satisfactions. For the Álvarez de Toledo during the first third of the century, social properties acquired by the lineage have to be viewed as a whole (since, due to its high level of development, all members of the lineage participated in them). This is also true regarding its early division into two lineage branches, with two lineage heads; it would be improper to see these as two separately operating lineages or as dominated absolutely by their lineage heads. By mid-century, their development implied the satisfaction of the social expectations of at least five of its members. On the other hand, in a relatively important lineage, like the Anaya (linked to Diego de Anaya y Maldonado, Bishop of Cuenca between 1407 and 1418), which won the royal office of Porter Major,34 the weak organic construction of the lineage forced it to centre around just one of its members, lineage head Juan de Anaya. Most lineages inside the elite of participation evolved in a similar way. All this implied important differences in the degree to which lineages could position themselves inside the system. While not satisfying the social expectations of a member of an organically developed lineage could turn into a source of potential conflict, it would not endanger the lineage’s survival and its social position as a whole. However, an identical non-satisfaction in the case of the lineage head of a less organically developed lineage could turn into a source of potential conflict within the system. It could also imply the endangering of the lineage’s survival, since lineages were based on the recognition of the social properties of just one of its members. This possibility acted as a mechanism of control over the lineages inside the elite of participation because the elite of power operated as a non-formalized organization that influenced the elite of participation from within. The elite of participation’s twin aims were to protect the participation of these lineages in domination as a whole and participate with the elite of power in the distribution of such participation according to the extent of the social properties of its members. All this led to the development of obligations, internal to the elite of participation, that tended to rationalize the demands for the social benefits of each lineage if it wanted to count on the support of the system and its mechanisms (one of these being the elite of participation itself). The rationality of social demands was crucial to the level of construction of social expectations inside every lineage and to the lineage’s organic process of Concerning Bishop Diego de Anaya, see Jorge Díaz Ibáñez 1996, 171-176. The office of Porter Major is documented in AMC, LLAA, leg 197, exp 1, fols 11r-15v and 2r-6v.

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development. The lineage’s ability to be represented in the different social fields of the urban system, and even in other systems, rested mainly on its degree of development. In the case of the Álvarez de Toledo, we already know about their positioning inside the monarchic and nobiliary systems. No lineage within the elite of participation was able to be represented in both systems. In those rare cases where this seems to have happened, in fact, these lineages were only present on the periphery of those systems, not reaching the degree of development that those same properties acquired in the case of the Álvarez de Toledo. Within the urban system, the same process occurred. Study of the city’s spatial organization in collaciones or wards indicates that the members of the highly structured Álvarez de Toledo lineage mainly lived in just one collación, San Salvador. Hence, the two lineage heads and most of its members, living nearby each other, created a lineage-centred habitat. It is highly probable that the lineage’s urban land property was concentrated in this collación; hence, it is virtually certain that a high level of bondage attached the residents of the collación to the lineage, and this could help explain the survival of this lineage-centred habitat.35 The tendency of the rest of lineages (many of the elite of power included) was the opposite. Lineage members dispersed in different collaciones, and in more structured lineages this occurred to a greater extent. If we consider that certain resources of the system, such as the urban public offices, were linked to a habitat organized in collaciones, the dispersed habitats of most lineages could be explained by a lesser availability of resources in their own collación leading these lineages to optimize their positions within the system to access the resources linked to residence through their distribution throughout the city. Moreover, all this helps to explain the construction at the residential level of less developed bonds than in the Álvarez de Toledo lineage. It is true that the Álvarez de Toledo concentrated most of their residential bonds in just one collación but, due to the lineage’s high degree of development, it is also true that they were able to broaden the spectrum of their bonds to the whole urban grid. Regardless of their manipulation of the system from their regimental positions, they typically achieved their aim in two ways. In the first place, the Álvarez de Toledo strengthened residential bonds through their marriage strategies. In just one generation, that of the brothers Alfonso and Pero Álvarez de Toledo and one sister (whose name remains unknown), the lineage was able to bond itself in two systems and with three different lineages: the Hurtado de Mendoza, Lords of Cañete and Wardens of Cuenca (in the nobiliary system), and the Valera and Alcalá (prominent lineages inside the town). Over the next two generations they broadened the spectrum of marriage links across three more lineages (Madrid, Guadalajara and Sacedón), and there were still another three members of the lineage whose marriage relations are not known and may have broadened these links further. As for the Anaya, they On the distribution of lineages over the urban grid, see Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2000, 188-198. For an analysis of socio-economic patterns in each collación, see Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete 1994, 20-27.

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needed those three generations to bond themselves to just two urban lineages, although they were successful in linking with two regimental lineages.36 Most lineages inside the elite of participation followed this pattern. In the second place, they solidified bonds through patronage. We do not have enough data concerning patronage, but the available information is in itself highly significant. Patronage relations of certain import and, therefore, beyond the simple relation of domestic service that usually underlay the notion “servant”, were fundamentally the domain of regimental lineages and the regional nobility. Thus, of the forty undoubted patronage relations documented, twenty-three of them represent links established by the elite of power, fifteen by the regional nobility and only two by the elite of participation. More than half of the links achieved by the elite of power, fifteen of them, were established by the two most prominent lineages, the Álvarez de Toledo (seven bonds established with lineages of the elite of participation and three more in Cuenca’s jurisdictional hinterland) and the Alcalá (five links established with the elite of participation). In turn, just nine lineages in the elite of participation and six in the elite of power could establish links with the regional nobility, belying the greater strength of the Mendoza and the Álvarez de Toledo.37 Turning now in the hinterland area under the jurisdiction of Cuenca, we can see that things do not change greatly. Not many lineages were able to project their aspirations over Cuenca’s jurisdictional hinterland and, in fact, just three of them, all pertaining to the regimiento, were able to develop patterns of pre-seigniorial authority over areas in Cuenca’s hinterland. The term “pre-seigniorial authority” is used to describe how these lineages, although they exercised the most ample and exclusive rights of property in those places, could not separate them from Cuenca’s

Concerning the bonds established by the Álvarez de Toledo, cfrs. AMC, LLAA, leg 186, exp 3, fols 22r-v; leg 187, exp 4, fols 34r-v; leg 188, exp 7, fols 11r-v; leg 191, exp 6, fols 91v-92v; leg 198, exp 2, fols 29r-30r; leg 198, exp 3, fol 90r; and leg 198, exp 4, fols 31r and 32r-33v; Archivo Capitular de Cuenca (ACC), siglo XV, caja (c) 3, leg 14, número (nº.) 206, and c 3, leg 17, nº. 244 bis; ADC, Inq, leg 680, exp 471 and leg 698, exp 13; and Archivo Histórico Provincial de Cuenca (AHPC), Sección Judicial-Civil (Jud-Civ), leg 1, exp 40. Concerning the Anaya, cfr. AMC, LLAA, leg 196, exp 2, fol. 113v; leg 201, exp 1, fols 47v49r; and ACC, siglo XV, documentos sueltos, leg 33, nº. 657. 37 AMC, LLAA, leg 185, exp 5, fols 23r-24r; leg 186, exp 1, fols 1r-v; leg 186, exp 2, fols 9r10v; leg 186, exp 4, fols 23r-24r; leg 186, exp 4, fols 1r-v; leg 187, exp 4, fol 35r; leg 188, exp 1, fols 40v-44r; leg 188, exp 7, fols 13v-15v; leg 188, exp 5, fols 1r-13r; leg 189, exp 1, fols 11v-12r; leg 189, exp 1, fols 27v-28r; leg 190, exp 4, fols 12r-13r; leg 191, exp 3, fols 3v-5v; leg 192, exp 4, fol. 28v; leg 195, exp 1, fols 34v and 35v-36r; leg 195, exp 2, fol. 42v; leg 195, exp 4, fols 84v and 84r; leg 197, exp 3, fols 4r-5v; leg 197, exp 1, fol. 12r; leg 198, exp 1, fol. 36r; leg 198, exp 2, fol. 2v; leg 198, exp 2, fols 54r and 56v; leg 198, exp 3, fol. 50r; leg 198, exp 4, fols 46r and 48r-v; leg 198, exp 4, fol. 59v; leg 200, exp 2, fols 36r-v; leg 200, exp 2, fol. 38r; leg 200, exp 2, fols 7r-8r; leg 201, exp 1, fols 58r-v; leg 201, exp 2, fols 8v-10v; leg 201, exp 2, fols 142r-v; leg 201, exp 2, fols 152r-v; leg 201, exp 3, fols 19r-20r; and ADC, Inq, leg 1, exp 8. 36

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jurisdiction and build their own domains.38 Not a single lineage inside the elite of participation achieved this. The extended and various positionings in the urban system (and non-urban systems also) of lineages like the Álvarez de Toledo, provided significant access to resources not available to other lineages. Paradoxical as this may seem, it also lessened their need to benefit from specific urban resources in order to preserve their position in the system. The recognition of their supremacy by the other lineages sanctioned de iure what they had achieved de facto and guaranteed to those other lineages an open, non-opposed and privileged access to the urban resources subsystem, where regimental lineages only competed with them occasionally. Therefore, the process of satisfying everyone’s social expectations benefited from, and constituted a part of, their mutual and unwritten pact on domination. What follows is a necessarily brief summary of the participation of the lineages in the resources subsystem. A more lengthy description than can be presented here is found in the literature on this subject.39 The urban public offices of the city (granted in Cuenca’s charter of incorporation) were the most important resource for social projection.40 These offices were reserved to the lineages of cuantiosos, that is, to every lineage that could provide itself with a war-horse and warweapons and which actually did so (for not all these lineages wanted to invest a part of their fortunes in this way). Potentially, all regimental lineages enjoyed the status of cuantioso, as did most lineages inside the elite of participation. Thus, most of these lineages competed every year for the attribution of those offices. Significant differences emerged. While members of the regimental lineages usually served these offices once in their lifetime, lineage heads inside the elite of participation kept for themselves the service of the offices, not sharing it with other members of their lineages. For the lineages within the elite of power, their access to these offices functioned as a sort of cursus honorum or rite of passage and, consequently, they did not need to go through it more than once. On the other hand, for most lineages in In fact, this was the case of several depopulated villages over whose lands these lineages acquired rights of private property but never exercised over them rights of seigniorial nature. However, in practice, they enjoyed them, since their only inhabitants were their servants and tenants. This was the case of the rights acquired by the lineage de Valera over Villaverde, documented in 1419, and the lineage Álvarez de Toledo over Aldehuela, Piqueras and Colliguilla, documented in 1435 and 1437 (AMC, LLAA, leg 185, exp 4, fol. 21r; leg 188, exp 5, fols 1r-13r; and leg 189, exp 5, fols 21v-31v). In just one case the opposite was attempted when, in 1433, the lineage de Jaraba tried to segregate from Cuenca’s jurisdiction the populated village of Campillo de Altobuey, building over it a seigniorial domain, although they failed (AMC, LLAA, leg 188, exp 5, fols 5v-6r). 39 Jose Antonio Jara Fuente 2004. 40 The charter of incorporation (fuero), given to Cuenca sometime between 1359 and 1362, provided the city’s government with fourteen offices (four mayors or judges, one notary, one bailiff, one ward of weights and measures, one market-bailiff, four mounted guards of the town’s jurisdiction and two assistants to the mounted guards), each one assigned every year to a single collación and the object of an annual ballot among the cuantiosos living in it. 38

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the elite of participation serving in these offices was not a rite of passage. Accumulation of such offices in the long run represented and guaranteed the social position they occupied in the town. This was not the only observable effect of the service of charter offices. Each year, the selected officials had to give sureties guaranteeing their responsibility in case of the outrageous, abusive or illegal use of their offices. Although the nature of those sureties was economic, they were never given in money but rather by presenting guarantors that stood bail for the official and were obliged, with him, to economically compensate the city and individuals aggrieved by the misuse of the office. Thus, charter offices functioned as another social positioning field, articulating a system of solidarity links. In the execution of those sureties, the rule was to give as guarantors not only members of one’s own lineage but of other lineages as well, giving two, three or four guarantors. Those sureties, also given by members of the elite of power whenever they served a charter office, affected mainly members of the elite of participation, since most charter offices were served by them. Thus, through sureties, guarantors and their lineages were incorporated into the power subsystem, getting from them the tacit sanction of the process of distribution of public offices. This had the effect of sanctioning the power subsystem itself and broadening the number of lineages linked to the subsystem from the fourteen who served in the offices each year to another thirty-six lineages, on average, that acted as guarantors. Thus, one way or another, all lineages participated in the subsystem and system, and in the process of recognition of the social properties of its members. Moreover, sureties given by members of different lineages helped to establish solidarity links between lineages that, in most cases and due to their low degree of organic development, they could not achieve it on their own. The system operated as a catalytic instrument of bonds criss-crossing the two largest non-formalized organizations of domination and the different segments of the elite of participation, providing the latter with higher levels of cohesion. Participating in the economic organization of the city and, especially, in the management of urban rents, leads us to another type of resource. These rents were, in fact, taxes charged on the consumption of and trade in different goods, collected by a process of rent farming. Among the elite of power, just a minority of lineages participated in these resources and, whenever they did so, they established nonformalized companies with other members of the elite of participation and always on an equal basis. Most lineages within the elite of power did not need these resources to increase their own sources of wealth and, moreover, the unpopularity of tax farmers would not do much to bolster the reputation of the regidores, who cherished their role as protectors of the common good. This was also, as in the previous case, a privileged field for the projection of the elite of participation. Considering that most of this tax farming was made under the formula of non-formalized companies,41 the system helped the elite of participation establish bonds, some temporary, others much longer, that most lineages in this elite could Unlike what happens in other towns where the establishment of those companies proves to be true, as in Valencia or Carmona by the end of the century. On this point see Rafael Narbona Vizcaíno 1992; and Antonio Collantes de Terán Sánchez 1997.

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not reach through the usual means of marriage bonds and servant links. This effect was emphasized by restrictions on how to award the service of urban offices, that is, employing the requirement of giving sureties and the need for a variable number of guarantors (between two and four) to participate in the farming process. Although here sureties had an obvious economic meaning, evidently the selection of guarantors among lineages inside the elite of participation increased the horizontal and solidarity relations of the whole. This helped to broaden the social sanctioning of the recognition of these lineages’ social properties and also increased the number of participants in this area of the resources subsystem. Moreover, through the incorporation, on an equal basis, of members of the elite of power into these companies, vertically-shaded relations between the elites were at least ideologically modified, lessening again the bonds of domination and broadening solidarity to both elites and their lineages. Finally, the elites’ participated in the farming of meadows and pasture lands. This was a very important resource in an area where cattle raising and textile production were the most important sources of revenue and the access to pastures could potentially result in conflict, all the more so when Cuenca’s citizens had to protect the integrity of its territory from seizures by the regional nobility (either by the nobles themselves or by people living on seigniorial land). Nevertheless, since Cuenca owned large areas of pasture and several lineages of the elite of power owned meadows, this conflict never arose. Thus, this is one of the ways the elite of participation, and even the local elites of Cuenca’s jurisdiction, benefited from this source of wealth and were incorporated into the urban system and into domination. Conclusions When in 1467 Gonzalo Quijada protested before the city council over the service of an urban office, what really underlay the claim was neither the office itself, that is, the socio-economic utilities service could provide him, nor his right to serve it, as he was the only resident in the collación apt to be selected for its service. His claim spoke not about the office but about his social position inside the system. His acquisition of the appropriate social properties needed to be considered cuantioso, the inherent recognition associated with that position, and his right to see satisfied the social expectations that rationally derived from it were strong arguments in his favour. However, no Quijada appears as a participant either in the farming of urban rents or in the farming of meadows and pastures nor in any other field of the urban resources subsystem. The name appears only in the urban offices field and then just from 1467 onwards. We do not know too much about the lineage before 1467 and this is, in itself, quite relevant, allowing us to conclude that his access to the elite of participation was newly acquired. For Gonzalo Quijada, new to that elite, the recognition of his social position was embodied in a simple protest against the city council (a protest which was intended not to go beyond that point). Although the city council opposed it, in 1468 Gonzalo served the office of ward of weights and measures and, afterwards, he would participate in the system serving other noncharter offices inside the urban power apparatus. Sometimes, the recognition of a

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social position and its related process of satisfaction forced the individual to become highly visible, attracting the attention of the system and reminding it of the mutual unwritten pact of domination. Nevertheless, this was not the rule, at least between 1411 and 1480, since the mutual pact was generally observed and just two similar protests were formulated, also with similar results.42 The claim raised by Lope Ruiz de Belmonte in 1471 can be analysed in a similar way. Lope had scarcely participated in the urban offices subsystem, with the exception of the office of ward of weights and measures in 1451, centring his activity in the royal fiscal apparatus. In 1465 he was warden of royal rents in Cuenca (perhaps at the request of the city); in 1467 he was farmer of the diezmos y aduanas and collector of the diezmos y aduanas of Moya and Requena, and also collector of the servicio y montazgo of Cuenca; in 1468 he enjoyed similar offices. When, in 1471, he made his claim against the farmer of the alcabalas y tercias of Cuenca, he did so not only because of the potential benefits derived from the farming of the alcabala de la carne, but also because the survival of his social position inside the urban system rested exclusively on his participation in the fiscal apparatus of the Crown, managed in this case (the alcabalas y tercias of Cuenca and its province of 1471) by a citizen of Cuenca, Sancho Rodríguez de Alcocer, a member of the elite of participation. In the case of Gonzalo Quijada, the protest was satisfied, although not immediately. Lope was more successful and gained the recognition of that rent farming, though within the framework of a negotiated process where each party was obliged to renounce a portion of their demands. Sancho Rodríguez renounced some of his rights, while revoking the farming of the rent assigned to Alonso López Monterde and granting it to Lope Ruiz. The latter had to give sureties for the whole rent, as royal dispositions ruled, and, regardless of having already paid almost three fifths of the rent, he had to accept it as a sort of a gift and not because he was the highest bidder of the rent. Thus, after giving sureties on 8 January 1472, on the thirteenth of January, Alonso López Monterde, at the request of Sancho Rodríguez de Alcocer, renounced the rent in favour of Sancho and, in turn, Sancho transferred it to Lope Ruiz, who accepted it.43 Thus, the solution came in the form of a clever agreement where both parties obtained the recognition of their positions without contestation. Sancho Rodríguez did not revoke his disposition cancelling the sale of the rent to Lope Ruiz. Instead, he just transferred it to Lope, keeping intact his right to manage the rent. Lope Ruiz, although the sale of the rent to him was not specifically recognized, did obtain it implicitly through the transfer. The proper functioning of the urban system implied the active and coherent participation of all its members. This, in turn, implied the recognition of the right to On 1 October 1436, Rodrigo Cabeza de Vaca and Diego de Velasco, residents of the collación of Santa María la Mayor, protested against the appointment of Juan de Priego as mayor. On 24 October 1463, Alonso de la Muela did the same against the license given to Enrique de Salamanca for the transfer of his office of mounted guard of the jurisdictional hinterland. This last case is highly representative because the claim was put by a member of the elite of power and his demand was not satisfied (AMC, LLAA, leg 189, exp 1, fols 11rv; and leg 196, exp 1, fols 32v and 32r). 43 AMC, LLAA, leg 140, exp 8, sf. 42

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participate reached by the lineages on the basis of their acquisition of the appropriate social properties, defined and ruled by the system itself. A recognition that, in order to maximize its effects, had to imply the satisfaction of the social expectations that reasonably derived from the extent of the social properties acquired. In Cuenca, at least in the period studied, the system worked because it recognized those properties and gave them the appropriate satisfactions. The norms ruling the system led to the lessening of the most pernicious effects of domination, redefined rigid vertical relations, and helped to build a new organization, the elite of participation. The members of the elite of participation shared different status (some of them where knights, squires or hidalgos but most of them did not enjoy privileged status). They came from a large number of lineages defined by the acquisition of certain non-exclusive social properties where privilege (knighthood or hidalguía) could imply an easier development of the lineage but was never a criterion for inclusion. Naturally, the urban system was only one among many ways that medieval society arranged its social bonds, but the system itself provided the necessary instruments for building social networks by giving more cohesion to the elite of participation, and, at the same time, providing them with the necessary system of recognition.

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THE FIRST URBAN OLIGARCHIC NETWORKS IN NAVARRE: PAMPLONA, 1100-1328* Eloísa Ramírez-Vaquero Universidad Pública de Navarra Navarre is a small kingdom whose territorial definition took place over a relatively long period of time, from the start of the tenth century up to the end of the twelfth, with the odd adjustment later on. In order to understand its urban development, however, it should be remembered that the kingdom went through a number of expansion phases starting from the early twelfth century on. This means that this century is an essential period for assessing the social organisation of Navarre and the articulation of its social groups. There are two essential contexts to consider: the entry, movement and settlement of immigrants in relation to the communication routes that crossed the western Pyrenees; and the conquest and organisation of the Ebro valley. Regarding the first of these questions, the urban explosion that occurred is particularly important. Until that time there was only one ancient civitas episcopalis – Pamplona – and another small city incorporated from Muslim rule in the tenth century (Nájera, 920). The stimulus provided by the development of a “road network” behind the renovation begun in the eleventh century is very clear, although it is not the only factor to be considered when analysing the genesis of the urban structure of Navarre.1 The conquest and organisation of the Ebro valley, on the other hand – and ignoring the specific case of Tudela (a Muslim city incorporated in 1119) – did not generate urban development as such because the successive population centres organised or revitalised from that time onwards did not receive the required charters,2 despite the fact that some of them acquired considerable demographic weight and even obtained legal frameworks designed to favour population settlement.3 The history of the urban centres of Navarre has been approached from a number of angles, starting from the interest shown by J. M. Lacarra and Á. Martín Duque through the careful study and edition of the applicable regulatory * MAPS: Surnames related to saints, with very few and clear exceptions, have not been identified with any toponym (San Emeterio, San Pedro, Santa Engracia, etc.). Lascun or Sault have not been located because they are too far (in Ultrapuertos, on the other side of the Pyrenees). There is also one reference to “Iruña”, which most probably refers to Pamplona’s civitas. 1 See Eloísa Ramírez Vaquero 2003. 2 These are understood to be charters aimed at freeing the population from manorial charges, enabling and encouraging the more strictly urban functions and – this is an important point – the constitution of a real autonomous government. See Ángel Martín Duque 1994a, 144-145. 3 In particular Ángel Martín Duque 2002. 117

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documentation, both for authentically urban population centres and for the rest.4 Other fields of interest are urban morphology, closely related to the development of the different centres of population, or the study of the combination of urban jurisdictional powers.5 More directly related to the urban elites and the articulation of the social groups in the city, mention should be made, first of all, of a series of studies that focus on particular families of traders,6 generally referring to an epoch that began in the fourteenth century although with fleeting glances towards the thirteenth century. Furthermore, and given that the societies of the new population centres that emerged from the twelfth century onwards along the Pilgrim’s Way to Compostela had a strong mercantile element, the studies related to these commercial networks have led directly to the analysis of some of these elites.7 They appear regularly in the markets and in the abundant documentation of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. However, a specific prosopographic analysis of the urban population has not been made to date, despite having been strongly recommended on a number of occasions. This is not the right place to discuss the advisability of this type of analysis, which is well known in the historiography and essays have been written in Navarre, particularly on the nobility.8 A prosopographic study of the so-called “Frankish” population was already an urgent necessity.9 The objective of this study is to present an analysis based on a prosopographic study in search of the origins of the early oligarchic networks: who they were, what they did, and where they originated from. This last consideration has arisen in the wake of the data obtained in the prosopographic analysis and is of particular interest because our historiography usually purports that the elites of the boroughs of the kingdom of Pamplona – especially the first ones – were closely related to the recently arrived “Franks”. We will not dwell here on the welldocumented question of the powerful colonisation by the Franks of the new (or renewed) cities of the Spanish kingdoms, in particular those in the north and along It is not necessary to outline the different editions of fueros (charters) here. These are included in much of the bibliography referred to (that of Pamplona, specifically, in note 11). In any case, it is interesting to point out the intentions, proposals for research and orientations designed in works such as that of Jose Mª Lacarra 1950 and Ángel Martín Duque 1987. 5 Regarding the first, Juan José Martinena Ruiz 1975. For the second, see Ángel Martín Duque 1994b and Eloísa Ramírez Vaquero 1998. 6 Beatrice Leroy 1974 and Margarita Martín González 1998. 7 In particular, Juan Carrasco 2003. 8 Eloísa Ramírez Vaquero 1990. 9 The term “Frank” should be highlighted. It was given to people that received a “fuero de francos” (Franks’ charter) that basically guaranteed exemption from manorial charges and the right to organise their own communal government. The definition has often been related to the Franks’ status as foreigners – Frank is made equivalent to “French”, or at least to “ultrapirenaico” (the other side of the Pyrenees) – that should be considered very carefully, at least in Navarre. The most recent reflections on this question are those of Pascual Martínez Sopena 2004; I am particularly grateful for his generosity in giving me the article when it was still in preparation, and also for his interesting reflections on the information included here. 4

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the Pilgrims’ Way to Compostela, although also in some of the colonised lands.10 The idea fits in coherently with the supposed exclusivity and “watertightness” that arose from the privileges granted to the Franks, usually given to newly arrived people or foreigners. The prosopographic analysis focuses on the early period of this evident urban growth from the end of the eleventh century to the end of the thirteenth and casts light on all these questions, even though the information obtained is not always complete. A database was designed to take advantage of the documentation in the most comprehensive way possible, with particular attention to any data that identified the origin of each person, as well as dates, urban centre, neighbourhood, street, occupation, relatives, property, references and notes.11 Although the desire for an overview is considered essential to obtain a “photograph” of the urban society of the kingdom, certain limits were soon introduced. It does not seem reasonable to try and pin down the chronology too much, given that the objective was the analysis of what could be considered as the first step in the development of an “oligarchic” network which, like all social phenomena, is always a maturing process that takes a long time. The study therefore comes to a close in 1328, when the rule of the Capetians over Navarre ended. The whole phase of genesis and growth is covered up to the period in which the cities and other population centres in Navarre reached their highest level of population, almost definitive mediaeval physiognomy or morphology and began to figure prominently in the political and social disorders of the fourteenth century. This prominence indicates, among other things, a clear consolidation of the social fabric. The limitation is therefore not so much of time but of space. Not all the population centres of the kingdom are described, not even those along the Pilgrims’ Way, but only one, Pamplona. The city of Pamplona is, moreover, the most interesting case: a bishopric and jurisdictional domain of the bishop from at least the end of the tenth century until 1319, the city included the original civitas (the Navarrería), a new borough officially founded at the beginning of the twelfth century (and supposedly restricted to foreigners, the “Franks”), San Saturnino, and a second borough, accessible to both foreigners and natives, founded at the end of the same century (San Nicolás). We can practically speak of “three cities in one” (sometimes even four, due to the fleeting presence of another small borough next to the civitas, San Miguel).12 All developed separate communal institutions, with a considerable legal “gap” between the civitas (which paid tithes to the bishop and was subject to a number of restrictions), and the new boroughs, holders of exemption Pascual Martínez Sopena 2004, gives an essential historiographic framework to this question, in addition to many other interesting aspects, among them many specific examples. 11 The sources consulted, all published, will be referred by the following abbreviations, including the study that accompanies the edition of the charter of Pamplona. They can be identified in the Bibliography at the end: AMD, CSC AV; BL, Soc.; DAGN(1194-1234); DAGN(CAPI); AGN(CAPII); DAGN(CAPIII); AGN(CAPIV); DAGN(TI); DAGN(TIC); DAGN(TII); DAGN(TIIC); DAMP; DC; DSENG; FueroP; SGL, SC. 12 Its life was short because it disappeared in 1276 as a result of the so-called War of the Navarrería. In any case, it must have covered a very small area. 10

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charters that enjoyed a higher level of communal autonomy.13 The boroughs reached an agreement on partial administrative union towards the end of the twelfth century, through a single body of 20 councillors.14 Table 6.1. Data Base information: 1100-132815 Types of entries Persons identified with their jobs Councilmen (N, SS, SN, SM) Mayors (N, SS, SN) Entries for the civitas Entries for San Saturnino Entries for San Nicolás Entries for San Miguel Entries whose urban centre is unknown Total of entries:

Nº of entries 427 314 33 246 601 340 l8 310 1,383

As a result of the prosopographic analysis two essential aspects will be highlighted here, although the material collected provides scope for many other evaluations and considerations, to be covered by other studies. The first concerns the origin of this urban population and the relations between the newly arrived Franks and the higher social strata of the boroughs. The second, closely linked to the first, refers to the oligarchic networks that developed in these three parts of Pamplona. Some years ago Charles Higounet told of how, in 1222, three of the twelve councillors of the civitas of Pamplona (which supposedly did not have a “Frankish” population of any kind) did not have local names and, more surprisingly, four of the twelve councillors of San Saturnino (a supposedly very strict Frankish borough) had clearly “local” names.16 More recently, P. Martínez Sopena has returned to the subject, recalling the brief but suggestive study by Higounet, in a study on the Frankish presence in the urban renewal of the Iberian Peninsula. Among other things he points out that “Navarre poses questions” in this sense. It should be stressed that the term “Frank” has often been considered equivalent to “foreign” (“French”, ultrapirenaico – to the north of the Pyrenees) or that it excessively See Eloísa Ramírez Vaquero 1998, 232, among others. This most probably occurred in 1287, the date of the definitive agreement, but there had been an initial attempt covering the four boroughs in 1266, from which the Navarrería broke away (see FueroP, 35-36). It is likely that San Saturnino and San Nicolás maintained the agreement between them from the first date, because the data indicate the existence of its “council of the Twenty” from at least 1271. 15 Some entries from San Saturnino and San Nicolás may be duplicated, because they organized a common Council (20 members) from 1271 on. It is not always possible to separate people from one or another urban centre. 16 Charles Higounet 1985, 75-80; the author uses a document published by the best editor of Anelier’s poem: F. Michel, Histoire de la guerre en Navarre, specifically on page 375. However, the correct date of that document is 1266, as it is dated in the Spanish Era and, whether it is an erratum or an error, its reduction corresponds to 1266 and not to 1222. 13 14

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generalises different areas and contexts. Indeed, it is a case (and particularly starting from a certain time, as P. Martínez Sopena indicates) of a socio-legal denomination rather than an “ethnic one”.17 It is therefore tempting to reconsider the idea of a watertight “Frankish” society – and of an equally “Frankish” oligarchy in the sense of ‘foreign’ – for those new boroughs whose charters stipulated exclusivity. In San Saturnino, as in other cases, there is a specific clause on this question18 and it is known that the Franks of San Saturnino expelled the entire “local” population that had settled within its walls in 1180,19 with the exception of some (illis quos placuit eis retinere pro uicinis et sunt scripti in charter quam burgenses suprenominati tenent) whose urban rights and certain specific occupations were restricted. These people could only work as servants, farm workers, bakers and day labourers. A number of occupations clearly prohibited to them are expressly stated: shopkeepers, moneychangers, innkeepers, haberdashers, salesmen, butchers, smiths, shoemakers, furriers, weavers and a few others. This has often been considered as a test of the effective exclusivity of the first Frankish borough of Pamplona at a time when there was already evidence of a second borough with much more permissive laws in this sense, where local people could settle. It has also served to explain that the dominant groups of San Saturnino must have been of foreign origin, and also the use of the Occitan language by a part of this population.20 First of all, however, it should be said that this pronouncement, issued by the Royal Chancellery and confirmed by the bishop of Pamplona, was made per mandatum et consilium domini Sancii region Nauarre et Petri Pampilonensis episcopi, and not on the initiative of the borough itself. Secondly, the real situation of the borough was rather the opposite of that stipulated in the initial foral (chartered) conditions, i.e. exclusivity and watertightness.21 It is clear that immigrants from the countryside had settled in the Borough, despite the text of the charter granted fifty years before, although it is not clear whether the borough actually expelled all these nauarros settlers or not. In the prosopographic analysis put forward here there are only thirty three entries related to San Saturnino in the twelfth century, all of them in the first half of the century, and although there is no name related to local toponyms among them,22 there are two patronymics with clear local roots: Sanz and Garín. In the first Pascual Martínez Sopena 2004; Ángel Martín Duque expressly advanced similar reflections, indicating how the following terms appear as a synonym in contemporary studies: liber, francus et ingenuus, which define the individual within a perfectly differentiated social group from the nobility – infanzón – and the peasants. The foreigner (French) is referred to as francigenae in 1994b, 76 and note 54. 18 See Ángel Martín Duque 1994a, 147, and FueroP, 24. 19 FueroP, 13. 20 On occasions, the language aspect has been considered a distinctive element and, at the same time, a resource to accentuate the differentiation of the settlers, even up to very late dates (FueroP, 28). 21 Ángel Martín Duque refers to this in 1994b, 77. 22 The use of toponyms as identifiers of people is very common in Navarre at all levels of society, and in this case represents a highly useful instrument to identify people’s origins. This has been shown on the maps attached to this study. Logically, the analysis of first and 17

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half of the thirteenth century, however, there are sixty four entries, among which twelve local locatives appear in addition to another eleven local first names or surnames. It is clear that they do not represent a very high percentage, but a more interesting feature than the relative value of the figures is the occupations of some of these people. For 124423 there is a list of eleven of the twelve councillors of San Saturnino, i.e. the maximum political rank within the Borough, where three of them (25%) have local locatives or patronymics – Zabalza, Marra, Gaizco. There is even a fourth that could be Navarrese – Pedro Andrés (moneychanger) and another two whose names are considered neutral – Pedro de San Gil and Pascual Lorenzo (a furrier). The other five have names or locatives whose origin is probably from north of the Pyrenees or is unclassifiable – Guillermo Arnaldo de las Tablas, Grimalt de Mota, Raúl de San Gil, Mateo Rey, Juan Petit (butcher and scribe). At a earlier date (1229) we have the names of the members of a Confraternity related to the parish of the Borough, with half of the fourteen members having local names or locatives, three others of possible French origin and another four that are very difficult to classify. Indeed, the statutes of the Confraternity lay down that the members should be “of the Borough”, which does not necessarily mean “Franks” in the sense of “foreigners”.24 Both in the case of the list of councillors and the Confraternity members of San Saturnino there are people of certain political and social importance in the Borough, with a strong presence of immigrants from nearby towns and villages. The rest of the Navarrese population indicated in the documentation is shown on maps 2-6, which divide the information up into successive chronological sections.25 Obviously, this refers to the people whose personal indicators include a locative, a common feature in Navarre. It is also necessary to bear in mind the existence of people without a locative but whose first or family names reflect a local tradition, in this case impossible to map (see table 6.2.). It is important to stress that these nativos living in San Saturnino, the “most Frankish” borough, are not simple servants, furnace workers etc. as indicated in 1180. In addition to the posts of magistrates and dignitaries entered, among the twelve councillors of 126626 (where there are five Navarrese) it is stated, for example, that Pedro Jiménez is a smith.

family names is another essential element, especially when it is possible to identify those that are clearly local or foreign. Obviously, there are distorting elements, at least in the use of first names, such as fashionable names (on the one hand) and the possible interest of the foreigners to assimilate local customs and uses on the other. As regards anthroponymy, apart from the considerations of Pascual Martínez Sopena in the article referred to above, see his 1994 and, coordinated by him 1995. 23 AMD, CSC, 27 and 31. 24 Navarrese: Pedro Ibáñez, Pascual de Munárriz, Martín Jiménez, Miguel Pérez, Iñigo Sanz, Martín Martínez, Juan de Esáin. Possible French: Domingo Damen, Guillermo Arnaldo, Juan Arnaldo. Difficult to assign: Juan del Parar, Juan de Mombreda, Benedicto, Lorenzo. 25 1100-1199; 1200-1249; 1250-1299; 1300-1328. The fifth corresponds to the references without indicating the population centre. 26 FueroP, 45. The five Navarrese are Arnaldo de Eza, Pedro Jiménez, Miguel de Tajonar, Pedro de Olaiz and Pedro de Arciniegui; we should add García Arnaldo, with the proviso 122

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There are also some families from the surrounding area, usually the Pamplona basin and nearby valleys, who settled in the first borough of Pamplona and who were members of important professions. María Domínguez Gaizarin,27 who had a number of properties in Gaizarin, near Pamplona, appears in 1324 as married to Lope de Mendinueta (another local locative), a weaver of San Saturnino. Map 2: Local Placenames with no specifications about the bourg or civitas (11001328)

Source: by the author In this case we learn of a large number of relatives, none of them “foreign”, and we should note that the area of the weavers, known by a name of clear foreign origin – la Burellería – is probably the second sector of the Borough in terms of social importance after that of the moneychangers. Weavers were commonly found on the communal government (Borough Council). that, although he has a local first name, his patronymic seems to be from north of the Pyrenees. 27 SGL, SC, n. 13. 123

ELOISA RAMÍREZ-VAQUERO Table 6.2. Occurrences of patronymics used by foreigners Period

Used Patronymics

1100-1199: Tarbes (1), Conques (1), “Ursino” (1) Hita (“Fita”) (1), Jaca (3) San Gil (“Saint Gilles”?) (1) 1200-1249: Agen (1), Conques (1), Moissac (1), Quercy (4), Lombardy (1), Britany (“breton”) (2) Gaillard (1) Cataluña (1), Soria (1), Jaca (6), Vitoria (1), Aragón (1) San Gil (“Saint Gilles”?) (5) 1250-1299: Conques (2), Quercy (3), Gascony (2), La Rochelle (1), Lombardy (9), England (“the Englishman”)(1) Toledo (2), Jaca (9), Álava (“alavés”) (2) San Gil. Saint Gilles? (3), San Germán (“Saint Germain”?) (1), San Guinan (“Saint Guinan”?) (2) San Genaro ? (1) 1300-1328: Auvernia (1), San Germán (“Saint Germain”?) (1)

From 1266 on there are more lists of councillors, but these pose more problems for our purposes because the union between the boroughs of Pamplona was permanently established between the Councils of San Saturnino and San Nicolás28 in 1271. Although each one kept its own mayor, a body of twenty councillors was formed at the time – ten for each borough – although there is no indication of who comes from which borough.29 We know that San Nicolás had received a much more permissive charter than San Saturnino, clearly permitting the presence of local immigrants. The number of Navarrese can, therefore, increase because it is likely that their presence was greater in San Nicolás than in San Saturnino. This also leads to more important reflections: the fact that the charters granted in Navarre in the second half of the twelfth century (to San Nicolás in particular) removed the restrictive clauses regarding the origin of the population, plus the fact that a few years later (1189) the monarch extended the charter of San Saturnino to the old civitas of Pamplona,30 lead one to think that the demographic flows changed considerably over two generations. This makes sense if one considers that immigration had dropped considerably, precisely at a time when the monarchs became fully aware of the growth in the urban population.31 In the light of this information, it is possible that the reality of the situation ended up by imposing itself. The charter of the civitas refers to increasing depopulation, while all the signs showed – as we have seen – that not even San Saturnino had remained unaffected The agreement was signed in 1287 (13 June, 1287), although there are records of the Council of the Twenty Members from 1271 (see note 14). 29 Sometimes one has the impression that, in the records, the ten from San Saturnino are entered first, following by the other ten, but there is no firm evidence of this, apart from the problem posed by the fact that there are times when the twenty do not appear, just 18 or 19. 30 FueroP, n. 15. With some important differences, which effectively make it more similar to the legal framework of San Nicolás due to the lack of restrictions on origin – obviously – and through the payment of a censo (ground rent) for each plot occupied. 31 See Ángel Martín Duque 1994b, 78. 28

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by the arrival of the navarros. To stop the flow of ‘surplus’ population – regardless of whether they were nobility or peasantry – from the nearby basins and Pyrenean valleys to the new and expanding population centres was impossible.32 1. The “Foráneos” The foreign (outsider) origin of people is more evident in the documentation through the use of certain first names or patronymics. However, there are not many and none of them appear in the communal government, but names of regions or towns/cities to the north of the Pyrenees also appear among the inhabitants of San Saturnino, generally in the place of the patronymic. The incidence is, however, very low and in many cases the references are to members of a single family. Below the references corresponding to the four chronological sections are shown, with the number of occurrences of each one. It is clear, from this short table, where the ultrapirenaicos and Spanish are included, that in the first third of the fourteenth century foreign locative indicators practically disappeared. Explaining what happened to these immigrants is not easy, although the passage of time has naturally blended their specificity into urban society. It is clear that the families have not disappeared but may have adopted some kind of patronymic or even a local locative, perhaps due to family relations that are difficult to trace, and this makes the evaluation of the figures considerably more difficult. It would be of interest to check the increase in the number of nicknames or possible descriptive patronymics (see table 6.5.), because some of them may hide a foreigner who “forgot” his original patronymic or reference to his place or origin. Not surprisingly, this can also “hide” people who are natives of the kingdom itself. An interesting possibility regarding the fate of some of these immigrants is that they could have purchased rural properties around Pamplona and finally adopted the name of that place as a personal indicator. This would fit in with the Navarrese custom of the locative. The interest of foreigners in the property market had already been clearly seen in other, not very distant, areas.33 There are some possible examples of this: in 1199 and 1200 several people who may have lived in one of the boroughs, perhaps San Nicolás,34 rented land off the bishop in a locality near Pamplona (Acella). Moreover, a certain Hugo de Concoitz also had properties in Acella, and his locative seems to refer to Quercy in France. This person, whose businesses (house and shops) were located in the street that runs from the Puerta Real de San Saturnino (1266 and 1269) also owned other properties – vineyards – in

This phenomenon surely deserves deeper reflection, but it is interesting to bear in mind that Navarre saw its possibilities of territorial expansion end after 1135 and, although there were other ‘exit’ routes towards the reconquered Spanish and Aragonese lands, the surplus population from the phase of great demographic growth up to the start of the thirteenth century did not have many places to go. 33 Pascual Martínez Sopena 2004. 34 Two Gilbert, one Bonamic, one Orti Dopte (or d’Opte), one Alejandro, one Miguel de Jaca and one Bartolomé (DCP, n. 427 and 432). 32

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the nearby locality of Barañáin.35 Continuing with Acella, in 1217 there was also a reference to a certain Ortí Rosas, a resident of San Nicolás, who owned a vineyard there and another in an undefined place adjacent to one belonging to a certain Ponce Nigro.36 In 1269 a Frank from Pamplona called Nicolás el Inglés (“the Englishman”) also appears, without any indication of domicile but with a vineyard in Acella.37 These references have been highlighted here because in the second half of the thirteenth century information starts to appear on people that have the locative ‘Acella’ as a personal indicator, and this was not the case before.38 Map 3: Local Placenames in Pamplona (1100-1199)

Source: by the author. Further analysis needs to be made of other residents with property in the area around Pamplona. The list of entries is high (over one hundred) and its comprehensive analysis should be carried out in later studies, although it is worth commenting on certain specific and significant cases. In 1269 Juan Lombart (“from Lombardy”) and his family, residents of San Saturnino, donated a mill in Zumadia BL, Soc, 238-240. B. Leroy published the document, but considers that the wife of Hugo de Concoitz called Urraca de Belorado came from Belforat in the same place (Quercy), which is undoubtedly a very logical deduction. However, a Castilian origin seems much more probable (Belorado, on the Pilgrims’ Way to Compostela), because apart from the clearly Castilian name of the wife (Urraca), her brother also has a Spanish name and patronymic: García González. 36 DCP, n. 515. 37 BL, Soc, 238-240. 38 DSENG, n. 12 (occ); DSENG, n. 13(occ); AV1(2): 2670. No mention is made of the population centre. 35

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to a convent in the city (he also had more wealth that did not form part of the donation). Two years later the father of Esteban de la Rochelle possessed another mill in Miluce, also near Pamplona.39 The Baldovín family of San Saturnino also had a mill opposite the convent, to which he sold it in 1297.40 An equally interesting case is that of a moneychanger of San Saturnino who appears as the owner of three whole villages, probably related to an embargo on one of the two most important nobles in the kingdom.41 We do not know his origin because he has a strange patronymic – “Regue” (King) – and a very neutral name, Juan, although his brother is called García, a clearly local name. Another notable example, due to the diverse nature of her wealth and the clear local origin of the people involved, despite being residents of San Saturnino (1309), is that of María Pascual, the wife of Salvador de Beraiz and cousin of Jimeno Macua and of Lope. She had the primicias (an ecclesiastical tribute) of the church of the nearby locality of Barañáin, a house and its trousseau in La Rocha, just outside the Borough walls, and a vineyard in Pamplona in a place called Milla.42 This is not the place to go into too much depth on these considerations, basically centred around the Borough of San Saturnino, where supposedly there were residents and an oligarchy of a clearly foreign nature, and to a lesser extent in San Nicolás, of mixed origin. In this sense, the information from the old civitas does not seem to be of too much interest, although there are elements that are worthy of consideration, particularly in relation to the Jewry of Pamplona. The migratory movements of the Jewish community, in particular of local or foreign Jews who became converts, may be of great interest for our purposes. It is not easy to trace possible converts in any particular epoch because they usually hide specific evidence about conversion, but there are interesting indications in this sense. As usual, no Jews occupied the highest posts in the communal government, although there are a number of names and patronymics of more than likely Jewish origin and these figure very early on in the communal governments of the three parts of Pamplona. It is interesting to note that this type of patronymic completely disappeared from the Navarrería between 1250 and 1299, when the so-called “War of the Navarrería” and the destruction of the Jewry took place (1276).

DSENG, n. 5(occ) and DSENG, n. 8(occ). DSENG, n. 13(occ). 41 The text of the will of the interested party, whose villages “son mies y de la dita don Ysabel, ma muyller”. He is owed money by Juana, daughter of Fortún Almoravid, a “ricohombre” (highest nobility), and his wife, Teresa de Alagón, in exchange for these villages, valued at 1,000 pounds of sanchetes or torneses. These would be returned if the debt is paid. If not, the title would pass to his wife and his brother García Regue. (SGL, SC, n. 12). 42 SGL, SC, n. 3. It is the will, where he asks to be buried in the church of San Lorenzo, the second parish of the Borough. Apart from this, he indicates a number of outstanding debts and also some legacies for other relatives. 39 40

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Map 4: Local placenames in Pamplona (1200-1249)

Source: by the author. Above all, it is difficult to distinguish if the Jews are of local or foreign origin, although the converts that arrived from elsewhere surely went more unnoticed than those of such a nearby place as the Jewish quarter of Pamplona (see table 6.6.). It should be remembered that the population of the Jewish quarter was relatively recent and had been granted by royal decree in 1154. There are express references to Jews from lands belonging to the king that passed to the bishop’s jurisdiction.43 …illi qui erunt de mea terra, qui habebunt hereditates in mea terra unde solent seruire, dum ibierunt seruient mihi sicut solet; dum erunt in honore Sancte Marie, seruiant Deo et Sancta Maria et episocopo et canonicis… A document from the FueroP, n. 7. On this question and the possessions of the

43

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Map 5: Local Placenames in Pamplona (1250-1299)

Source: by the author. The origin of one sector of these possible converts seems to be fairly clear. A certain Elías de Conques, documented in 1207, although without any indication of his place of residence, is undoubtedly of French origin,44 and the daughter of one Elías David received certain assets in the will of Hugo de Concoitz, although we do not know the reason.45 The relations between the two families had existed for some time, however, because Elías de Conques acted on that date accompanied by one Elías David, resident of San Saturnino, in a case of arbitration before the bishop, representing one R. de Concoitz (sic). The relationship between the Conques and the Concoitz might even lead one to think (with a fair degree of accuracy) that the latter king in the Jewish quarter of Pamplona before coming under his jurisdiction, see Eloísa Ramírez Vaquero 1998, 236-237. Juan Carrasco 2002, considers, as do Jose Mª Lacarra and Ángel Martín Duque, that initially there was a shared domain for these Jews of Pamplona, which would partially continue until the handover to the monarch. 44 DCP, n. 480. 45 BL, Soc, 238-240. 129

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did not really come from the French Quercy at all but responded to a misspelling of “Conques”. A further reflection could be that the Concoitz family may have a Jewish origin. Map 6: Local Placenames in Pamplona (1300-1328)

Source: by the author. These families and some in particular, quickly reached high political posts, for example in San Saturnino. The first notable case is that of the Cruzat (“crusader”) family, whose first appearance in the documentation occurs in 1256, when “Aymar” and “Martín Cruzat” appear. They must have been fairly important because they appear as witnesses in the appointment by the bishop and the senescal regio (royal seneschal, or delegate) of the mayor and the almirante (admiral) of the borough, as well as the designation of bailiff of the king.46 The first names of these first Cruzat, all in San Saturnino, are always of French origin, but in 1279 there is an Aznar “called Cruzat”.47 This phrase means that the patronymic can be confirmed as a FueroP, 38. DAGN(CAP), 150. In this case, Aznar received a donation from the king “for his services” (20 pounds), that should be placed in the context of certain gratifications made by the monarch soon after the War of the Navarrería, both in San Saturnino and in San Nicolás.

46 47

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kind of nickname (and an intriguing one at that) as “Christianised” nicknames or patronymics usually are. This also leads one to think that the families had not lived very long in the Borough, perhaps just one generation (given that there is a reference to 1256). We have no knowledge of the occupations of the first Cruzat, although we do know that they rented vineyards48 on land belonging to the civitas, but in 1271 Aimar Cruzat was one of the councillors of the Borough.49 In 1315 another Cruzat acted as Lawyer of the Borough in a summons50 and towards the end of this period the references to the family always had to do with the communal government, although we still do not know the occupations they practised. The second case related to families with this type of indicators, i.e. of probable Jewish origin and high social standing, is that of the Caritat (“charity”) family. The entries give us an insight into their origins, which were not in San Saturnino – where they finally settled – but in the old civitas. The first known Caritat appears in 1193 in the Navarrería, as witness to a donation51 and there is no other indicator but “Caritat”. More interesting still, however, is that another witness and relative with a very local name accompanied him: Iñigo Caritat. In 1227 a certain Berenguer Caritat, married to Anglesa, appears in references linked to San Nicolás,52 and in 123653 there is also a “don” Caritat (i.e. indicated in a distinguished manner) as a councillor of the civitas. The first Caritat are, therefore, people from the civitas who soon acquired a good social position. However, the move to another borough occurred quite early on, accompanied by the total disappearance of the family in the references of the civitas. In 1266 the first reference appears to Caritat in San Saturnino, where they would live after that date. Juan Caritat (1266) must have reached a good financial position because on that date he lent 240 pounds to the king54 and was known to possess at least one vineyard near Pamplona,55 and by 1271 he was one of the councillors of the Borough.56 The rest of the Caritat family known at the time were always linked to the communal government, although there are some references where “Caritat” appears as a first name, followed by different locative indicators and, strangely, related to places in the surrounding area (Ibero)57

For example, in 1280 (AV2(3): 1532). DSENG, n. 8(occ). 50 DAMP, n. 108. 51 DCP, n. 405. 52 DCP, n. 560. He had two vineyards in Berichitos, near Pamplona. It is not completely clear that he was a resident of San Nicolás, in reality he appeared in the description of the boundaries of a vineyard that a resident of San Nicolás was selling, but the neighbouring vineyards did not necessarily belong to residents of the same borough. 53 FueroP, 20. He appeared in an agreement between the twelve councillors of the Navarrería and the 12 of San Nicolás. 54 AV1(2): 2673. 55 AV1(2): 2673 and BL, Soc, 238-240. In Barañáin. 56 DSENG, n. 1 (latinos). Another (or the same) Juan Caritat appears as almirante of the Borough in 1310 (SGL, SC, n. 6). 57 DAMP, n. 109. One of the 20 councillors, who could have been a resident of San Saturnino or San Nicolás. 48 49

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or to other nicknames already mentioned in other contexts (Rosas).58 As in the case of the Cruzat, there is no allusion to the occupations of the Caritat, who were nevertheless clearly well off. 2. The Oligarchy of Pamplona: Who they Were and the Activities they Dedicated Themselves to Knowing the occupations of the residents, in particular of those that carry out an important social or political function, is essential to be able to assess their relations with the oligarchic networks that developed in the boroughs of Pamplona. This is not always possible in the period analysed here (up to 1328) because most of the references obtained do not state this information. This information does, however, appear in 424 entries (30%) and at least some conclusions can be reached. In a city considered59 as mainly dedicated to loan and money changing operations, more specifically in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, i.e. an essentially commercial city, it is not surprising that even though there are not many registered moneychangers in absolute terms (forty three of 1,383) they account for the largest single group of known occupations in relative terms. Their presence is reflected from the first chronological references; in 1135 we are given the name of a moneychanger of San Saturnino that figured as a witness in a royal donation to the cathedral.60 In the first list of the twelve councillors of San Saturnino (1244) a moneychanger called Pedro Andrés appears61 and also in the case of another councillor of the civitas in 1266, Jimeno Ortiz.62 Indeed, eight of the forty-three moneychangers known at the time appear, sometimes as councillors, and another appears as the mayor of San Nicolás. It should be remembered that the main street of the Borough is the “Rúa Mayor de los Cambios” (main money changing street) although the occupation was also present in San Nicolás and the civitas. The second of the occupations in descending order is that of burellero or tejedor (weaver),63 with forty-one entries.64 As in the previous case, the trade was also indicated on maps of the area, there being an authentic “neighbourhood” of the DAMP, n. 78 and FueroP, 50 (in this case, one of the 20 councillors, who could have been a resident of San Saturnino or San Nicolás). 59 Juan Carrasco 2003, 256-265. 60 He was called Arnaldo, with no more details provided (DCP, n. 193) and reappeared, with the same function, in 1141 (DCP, n. 229). Twenty years later he was dead, but there is a reference to some mills that had belonged to him (DCP, n. 293). 61 AMD, CSC, 27. Another with the same name and trade also appears as a councillor in 1271: DSENG, n. 8(occ). 62 FueroP, 45. 63 “Burullero” or “burellero”, “weaver of cloth”; a word of French origin derived from bourrellere. The cloth of the “burelleros” was rougher than that of other weavers such as the later “tecenderos” (apparently documented from the mid-fourteenth century), whose products were more delicate. See Juan José Martinena 1975, 216 and 212-213. 64 Two cases are included in which the reference is specifically to a “tejedor” (sic) and not to a “burellero”. Strangely, these are the first two entries in chronological order, in 1200 and 1244 (DCP, n. 434 and AMD, Cuentas, 28). 58

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“burelleros” at the west end of the Borough.65 Not all the entries for burelleros correspond to San Saturnino, however, because there are also some in the civitas.66 In contrast, there are no specific entries relating to San Nicolás – there are on the Council of the Twenty but the reference may come, as in other cases, from one borough or another – although a street called “Tecendería” (i.e., of fine weavers) is later documented.67 An interesting characteristic of the burelleros is that their first names, patronymics and locatives are surprisingly local in nature, as can be clearly seen in the table below. With few exceptions they are residents of San Saturnino (SS), the “Frankish” borough par excellence and the one that had supposedly expelled or (failing that) restricted the trades of the Navarrese in 1180. It can also be seen that five councillors appear among the burelleros, apart from three lawyers of the council, both for the borough and for the civitas. Table 6.3. Weavers (For ordinary textiles – called ”burelleros” – and for fine textile weavers) Date 1200,04 1244 1262,11 1262,11 1266,06.20 1270,06.12 1273,10.13 1276,05.03 1285,12 1285,12 1285,12 1287,07.13 1293,10.04 1293,10.04 1309,02.06 1309,02.06 1309,02.06 1309,02.06 1309,02.06 1309,02.06 1309,03.25 1309,03.25 1316,11.07 1316,11.07 1317,05.17

Name

Position

Borough

Bartolomé SN? Lía, Martín de la SS Lanz, Pedro de SS Muru, Julián de SS Sanz, Pedro Councilman SN Elalia, García de SS Oláiz, Pedro de Sangüesa, Pelegrín de Ibero, Lope de Oláiz, Jimeno de Oressa, Lope de Izco, Pascual Councilman SS Jacobo, Jimeno don SS Zuriáin, Pedro Sánchez de SS Beráiz, Salvador de SS Guenduláin, Martín de SS Izco, Pedro de SS Alzuza, SS Juan Jiménez de Celigüeta, Pedro Íñiguez de SS Berrueza, Juan de la SS Ibiricu, Bartolomé de SS Olcoz, Pedro de SS Belzunce, Pedro Jiménez de SS Añorbe, Iñigo de SS López, Pedro Councilman 20 SS/SN

Reference DCP, n. 434 AMD, CSC, p.28 DSENG, n. 2(occ) Id. and FueroP, 45 DSENG, n. 6(occ) DAMP, n. 78 DSENG, n. 10(occ) DSENG, n. 11(occ) DSENG, n. 11(occ) DSENG, n. 11(occ) FueroP, 50 DAGN(CAPII), 139 DAGN(CAPII), 139 SGL,SC,n. 3 SGL,SC,n. 3 SGL,SC,n. 3 SGL,SC,n. 3 SGL,SC,n. 3 SGL,SC,n. 3 SGL,SC,n. 4 SGL,SC,n. 4 SGL,SC,n. 8 SGL,SC,n. 8 DAMP, n. 109

Juan José Martinena 1975, 216. Iñigo de Agorreta, Sancho de Sarriguren and Pedro Jiménez de Lizarraga, in the first third of the fourteenth century, the three being linked to the communal government (DAMP, n. 124 and 127). 67 Juan José Martinena 1975, 298. 65 66

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Table 6.3. Weavers (For ordinary textiles –called “burelleros”– and for fine textile weavers) (cont.) Date 1318,01.26 1321,03.15 1321,03.15 1323,09.15 1324,11.11 1324,11.11 1324,11.11 1324,11.11 1324,11.11 1324,11.11 1324,11.11 1324,11.11 1326,11.27 1326,11.27 1327,08.01 1328,06.17

Name Ochoa, Lope Belzunce, Pedro Jiménez de Berriozar, Pedro López de Nicolás Mendinueta, Lope de Apardúes, García de Navaz, Pedro García de Belzunce, Pedro Jiménez de Berrueza, Juan de Lezáun, Lope de Urbicáin, Iñigo de Larumbe, Martín Pérez de Agorreta, Iñigo de Sarriguren, Sancho de Osecuáin, Miguel Sanz de Lizarraga, Pedro Jiménez de

Position

Proc.C.

Borough

Reference

SS SS

DAGN(CAPII),n. 274 SGL,SC,n. 9

SS

SGL,SC,n. 9 DAMP, n. 117 SGL,SC,n. 13 SGL,SC,n. 13 SGL,SC,n. 13 SGL,SC,n. 13

SS SS SS SS

Councilman Proc Proc.C. Councilman

SS SS SS

SGL,SC,n. 13 SGL,SC,n. 13 SGL,SC,n. 13 SGL,SC,n. 1

Nav Nav SS/SN Nav.

DAMP, n. 124 DAMP, n. 124 DAMP, n. 126 DAMP, n. 127

The next largest group is the tenderos (shopkeepers), with twenty-nine entries for the three boroughs giving rise to three mayors, two rent collectors of the bishop of Pamplona and one councillor. Given that the trade refers to the possession of or work in a shop, this fits in with the profile of a city characterised by mercantile or commercial activity. Once again the Pamplona’s list of street names refer to a particular street, the Rúa Mayor de las Tiendas (main street of the shops) in San Nicolás, and also to the so-called “cap de les tendes”, one of the ends of the Rúa Mayor de los Cambios, in San Saturnino.68 The first references to shopkeepers, however – and the odd one of apparently foreign origin, Jimeno de Cataluña – correspond to the civitas.69 It is interesting to observe that one of the most influential families in San Nicolás, the Undiano – originally from a small village in the Pamplona basin – and always close to the centres of power in one way or another, is documented as a family of shopkeepers. When we have information about their occupation, in 1283,70 their existence is known for more than seventy years (since 1217) and they soon reached posts of responsibility within the communal government, as councillors.71 It is not possible to know what kind of shop or commercial activity they had, although there is a reference to Ochoa Martínez de Undiano as a smith72 in 1320, although this does not allow one to deduce if this was Juan José Martinena 1975, 292-293. DAGN(1194-1234), 94. This man, together with Pedro de Badostáin and Ramón Guillén, in 1213. 70 Pedro de Undiano, the shopkeeper, was almirante of San Nicolás (DAGN(CAPII), 85), i.e. the executive representative of the “señor” (Lord), in this case the bishop of Pamplona still, who appointed him annually. 71 Martín de Undiano is the first that we know as a councillor, in 1236 (FueroP, 20). 72 DSENG, n. 8 (rom). 68 69

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the general activity of the family, at least in the period of time analysed here. Also worthy of note are another eight entries for shopkeepers added as “mercaderes” (merchants)73 – and it could be debatable –, giving a total of therty-seven people dedicated to commerce in one form or another. As previously mentioned, Pamplona society was essentially commerce-based and merchants logically played an important role in the city. Of the eight merchants entered under this heading, two are clearly of foreign origin and both were resident in San Saturnino – Pedro de Auvernia (1324) and Juan Aimeric (1293)74 – and a third carried a Frankish name (Roldán) and probably lived in San Nicolás.75 The rest have local patronymics or locatives.76 It is interesting to note that at least one, Miguel de Olagüe, was part of the council of the Twenty. In fourth place in the sequence of occupations in terms of numbers come the shoemakers, with twenty-seven entries and eight councillors among them. Once more the Pamplona’s list of street names reflects the importance of this trade, with a specific street in San Nicolás,77 although the data presented here refer to the three boroughs. There are shoemakers who hold the post of councillor in each of the three boroughs, always bearing in mind that at the time there was a shared council between San Saturnino and San Nicolás.78 The fifth documented trade, in terms of size, is that of the butchers or “broters”, with twenty-one entries for the three boroughs and at least eight councillors. The first documented ‘butcher councillor’ is Juan Petit (1244) in San Saturnino,79 where he also worked as a scribe. Soon after there is a reference to a butcher councillor in San Nicolás (1251)80 and another in A merchant did not necessarily have to have a “tienda” (shop), nor work exclusively selling things; he could work from a small office, and his commercial activity was probably more related to the entry and exit of goods. 74 SGL, SC, n. 12 and DAGN(CAPII), 139. 75 In 1200; DCP, n. 433. 76 Pedro Julián (1258; DAMP, n. 70), of whom there is specific news of his journey, for business reasons, to Montpellier with other merchants of Pamplona, in particular with one Pedro Sanz, the son of a haberdasher, which gives an idea of the kind of goods traded (see Beatrice Leroy 2003, 235); Miguel de Olagüe (1287; FueroP, 50); Pedro Abarea (1310, with information on part of his family, holders of local patronymics; SGL, SC, n. 6) and Pedro Ortiz (1324; DAGN(CAPIV), n. 14). 77 Juan José Martinena 1975, 294-296. 78 Those from San Nicolás were: Pascual Guillén (1266; FueroP, 45, Juan Pérez Guillén (1287; FueroP, 50); From the Council of the Twenty from San Nicolás and San Saturnino: Miguel López (1273; DAMP, n. 78), Pedro de Badostáin (1271; DSENG, n. 8(occ)), Lope de Turrillas (DSENG, n. 8 (occ)); from the civitas: Juan Bon (1236; FueroP, 20), Miguel de Garaño, and Miguel Martínez de Guizurdiaga (1326; DAMP, n. 124). There is also a lawyer of the civitas (appointed by the council to represent it before the Council of the Twenty of San Saturnino and San Nicolás on a matter of surveillance of borders) who is called Pedro Jiménez de Gorraiz (DAMP, n. 125), and also two shoemakers, messengers or subordinates of the council, both in the same year (1297), one of San Saturnino (Don Pascual) and the other of San Nicolás (Pedro Ortiz de Idoy); see. DSENG, n. 13(occ). 79 AMD, Cuentas, 27 and 31. 80 García de Arce, in DAGN(TI), 146. 73

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the civitas81 in 1266. It is clear that butcher’s shops were an essential element in the city, and streets or neighbourhoods with this name are documented in the Navarrería, San Saturnino – in 1215 there was a vieja (old) and a nueva (new) butcher’s shop there – and in San Nicolás.82 Despite the fact that information has not been collected here, the specific nature of the Jewish butcher’s shops is also well known. After these five most represented trades, which have a clear role in the urban oligarchies, the other occupations of the population were carried out by fewer people. With more than ten entries there are furriers (17), masons (11) and smiths (11). However, it is noteworthy that among the first there are three councillors, one of them from San Miguel, that small Frankish community next to the civitas; it has just eight entries.83 Likewise, among the eleven smiths documented three are councillors in the same year, one from each borough;84 none of the masons, however, held a post in the communal government of any of the boroughs. Finally, regarding the major occupations in the city, there are forty-nine entries of notaries, although this information has been left out because this high number is relatively logical given the type of documents used here. It should also be remembered that the occupations indicated do not account for a very high percentage of the entries, as already mentioned. In reality, we do not know the occupations of 75% of the councillors or 86% of the mayors. Despite these limitations it is possible to distinguish a number of important families in the elite of Pamplona in this initial period of the city’s urban development. If one examines the important and well-known names for the midfourteenth century, the second half of that century and the early years of the next, the names of those who could be considered to be the commercial oligarchy (even in the absence of detailed prosopographic studies),85 it is possible to see that many of the important families at the time – not all – have been referred to previously in the period analysed here on the basis of a prosopographic methodology. By the third quarter of the fourteenth century, for example, the families linked to the communal government are Cruzat, Eza, Beltrán, Zalba, Jordán and Orosurgui, for San Saturnino; Undiano, Pollan, Motza and Palmer, for San Nicolás, and Berroeta

Pedro Gil, in FueroP, 45. Juan José Martinena 1975, 107-108; 215-217; 299. The use of the French term “broter” and “brotería” is common in Pamplona. 83 1266: it also bears evidence of an eminently local name, Sancho, without any further indicators (FueroP, 45). The other furrier councillors are from San Saturnino in 1244 (Pascual Lorenzo; AMD, Cuentas, 27) and from the Council of the Twenty in 1301 (Martín de Esáin, DAGN(CAPII), n. 178). 84 1266: Pedro Jiménez in San Saturnino, Domingo Arcaya in San Nicolás and Pascual in the Navarrería (FueroP, 45). 85 Above all with information obtained from studies on loan operations and general trading. See Alfredo Elía Munárriz 1995 and Juan Carrasco 1993. The conduct of the Pamplona elite – and that of Tudela - vis-à-vis the royal Treasury was dealt with by Javier Zabalo Zabalegui 1992 in a long article that provides information on particular people and their socioeconomic evolution. 81 82

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for the civitas.86 In 1366 the families considered the most important in the Borough, as the “haute bourgeoisie of business”, and even as a minor “urban patriarchy”, were the Cruzat, Eza, Foucault, Jordán, Pérez de Esparza, Roncesvalles, Undiano and Zalba; those of San Nicolás were the Motza, Roncesvalles, Rosas and Undiano, and there are no references to this type of lineage for the civitas.87 In any case it is clear – and given that the source here is the specific collection of a fiscal tax, a direct aid for the Crown – that some of these important people moved from San Nicolás to San Saturnino at the time. We also know that some of them had married within the families in the mid-fourteenth century. The people involved, in one way or another, in the will of Flandina Cruzat (1346), married to Miguel de Eza and with inlaws among the David and the Pollan families, for example, indicates a clear network of economic interests that had been previously woven within the bourgeoisie of San Saturnino and also with that of San Nicolás.88 Some of the above mentioned have already been referred to above. Enough has been said about the Cruzat of San Saturnino and the Undiano of San Nicolás or the Eza of San Saturnino (another local toponym, now in the Borough), whose entries start in 1254 although we have no evidence of their work in the communal government until 1266. They even had a canon in the cathedral in 1321.89 We have already mentioned the possible nickname of Rosas; there are nineteen related entries between 1217 and 1328 that are randomly distributed between the civitas and San Nicolás. In 1273 one Ortí de Rosas – a first name documented in the family since the first reference –, was the mayor of the Council of the Twenty,90 and another frequent name in the family is the already-mentioned Caritat, in this case as a first name.91 Furthermore, and together with this role of proximity to the communal government, the Rosas must have been related to local commerce because Esteban de Rosas appears as a shopkeeper in 1310 and as a moneychanger and mayor of San Nicolás in 1327.92 One has to suppose, therefore, that following a surely “locative” origin in the civitas they moved to San Nicolás, where they continued to rise on the commercial ladder of the second borough of Pamplona, following a trend that clearly continued well into the fourteenth century. It is still possible to put forward some further considerations on the rest of the names listed for later periods, in particular those that have not been mentioned See Juan Carrasco 2003, 258-259. Javier Zabalo Zabalegui 1992, 678-682. A brief biographical profile is added on the most important people in each borough at the time. The author, from whom the expression “urban patriarchy” is copied, nevertheless considers this a little excessive for Pamplona, although it does allude to certain elites that undoubtedly controlled the economic and political life of their boroughs (as well as “manipulating” their own contributions to the royal exchequer). 88 The will is in SGL, SC, n. 23. 89 DAMP, n. 31; FueroP, 45; DAMP, n. 113. 90 DAMP, n. 78. Supposedly from San Nicolás, given the history of the family. 91 A Caritat de Rosas appears as a councillor of the Twenty in 1287 (FueroP, 50) and 1297, in relation, moreover, to subversive meetings of noble juntas and urban “hermandades” (associations between cities) (DAGN(CAPII), n. 151). 92 SGL, SC, n. 6 and DAMP, n. 126. 86 87

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at all so far, either because there is no evidence of them or their importance was lesser. In the period analysed here there are no entries for anyone holding the patronymics (not even first names) of Beltrán, Zalba or Foucault. The second, moreover, is a Navarrese toponym.93 The surname Pérez de Esparza, on the other hand, does not appear among the references of the period that are of interest to us here, but Esparza is a toponym with more than one location in Navarre, one of them near Pamplona (Galar). Taking this into account, twelve people with this locative have been found in the three boroughs, although they seem to have a greater presence in San Saturnino. Esteban de Esparza was a delegate of the borough council who appeared before the king in 1244,94 and ten years later he (or someone else of that name) was appointed by the king as a judge to examine possible excesses committed by the previous monarch.95 Another of the same name was councillor of the Twenty in 127196. More suggestive is Pedro de Esparza who, in 1301, was a councillor of the Twenty, because his heirs would be able to combine the patronymic “Pérez” – son of Pedro – with the locative “Esparza”.97 With regards to the Jordán and the Orosurgui, to conclude with those of San Saturnino, there is evidence (although slight) with four entries for each one; the first are represented from very early on – 1158 – although with a rather doubtful reference.98 However, there is clearly a Simón Jordán, a councillor of the Twenty (apparently of San Saturnino) in 128799 and another Martín Jordán who acts as guarantor in the will of Catalina Navar in 1310.100 This family, therefore, reached prominence towards the end of the thirteenth century, with a low profile in communal affairs, and their occupation at the time is unknown. The Orosurgui, on the other hand – also a local toponym – come even later, as their four references appear from 1322 onwards and correspond to the same person, a notary public who, on three out of four occasions, records debts between Christians and Jews.101

Valle de Arriasgoiti (Linzoáin), 24 kilometres from Pamplona. The cathedral of Pamplona had possessions here, with their associated peasants, starting from the twelfth century. The case of the Foucault surely has to do, as pointed out by J. Zabalo (Ibid., p. 679), with the arrival in Pamplona of bishop Bernardo de Foucault (1364-1377). 94 AMD, CSC, 30. 95 FueroP, 26, 27, 28. One was appointed for each borough. 96 DSENG, n. 8(occ). 97 DAGN(CAPII), n. 178. 98 A certain Jordán de Estella appears as a witness in the confirmation of the Charter of San Saturnino, in the list of people that follow the king’s lieutenants, without any indication of his social status or where he lived (FueroP, 9). Given the reference to Estella and the fact that the Charter confirmed is very similar to that of Estella, it would not be unusual for a Jordán to be resident of the borough of that city and not of the one recently set up in San Saturnino. 99 FueroP, 50. 100 SGL, SC, n. 6. 101 DAGN(CAPIV), n. 5, 10 and 20; SGL, SC, n. 12. All kinds of references to the importance of the figure of the notary in the configuration of the urban oligarchy could be made but this is not the place for this. 93

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Going on to the names described for San Nicolás from the mid-fourteenth century, the surname of Pollan is a curious case of which, like Jordán and Orosurgui, there are few examples in the documentation. The Pollan that we know for this period appears in 1301 with a clearly local name, combined with a patronymic from the northern side of the Pyrenees, García Arnaldo; he was a councillor of the Twenty, and the tag “called Pollan” is added. By 1312 he was directly known as García Arnaldo Pollan102 (we know that he was a shopkeeper and guard of the royal seal in the city). The Motza surname is another of great interest; with twenty-nine entries for the family, the first in 1213, it is possible to put forward some reflections. It is difficult to find a clear origin for the patronymic, which is strangely close to the Islamic tradition (or maybe Jewish?), but the first one traced appears to come from a small locality of manorial dependence in the Pamplona basin: Ortí Motza de Cizur, a resident not of the boroughs but of the civitas, where he was also the mayor.103 There is another Motza from 1232 whose residence is not stated, and the next known Motza was called Martín and was also a mayor, this time in San Nicolás (1251).104 The rest of the personal entries always come from there, and among them eight councillors figure, plus another four mayors and an almirante. It is, therefore, a family that very possibly emigrated from the civitas – as the Caritat had done –, in this case in the first half of the thirteenth century, and reached a high position on the social ladder. The last urban lineage mentioned among the elites in later years is the Palmer family, whose patronymic has been referred to as a possible nickname. The first one of which we have knowledge also corresponds to the end of the thirteenth century (1280) and soon appeared as a councillor of the Twenty.105 This man, or another of the same name, appears in 1296 making a delivery of goods, perhaps as a cabezalero (executor of a will), to the convent of Santa Engracia, near Pamplona. Strangely, he was accompanied by his sons, one of whom (at least) had a local patronymic, Sanz.106 Another family described in San Nicolás in the second half of the fourteenth century, the Roncesvalles,107 is also worthy of mention. Its locative refers to another Frankish borough of the kingdom located next to the hospice and Collegiate Church of Roncesvalles, now called Burguete. Their presence in the period analysed here is almost non-existent, just two references that are very separated in time (1239 and 1327).108 In the first case there is no reference to the borough of Pamplona where Bartolomé de Roncesvalles lived; he is simply called a “bourgeois of Pamplona”, which seems to indicate San Saturnino. However, the reference alludes to a claim he made in England for some cloth that had been confiscated there. Part DAGN(CAPII), n. 178; DAGN(CAPII), n. 247. DAGN(1194-1234), 94. 104 DAGN(TI), 146. 105 Arnaldo Palmer, in 1287 (FueroP, 50). 106 DSENG, n. 12(occ). The goods delivered are appartently not his but are the result of a donation made by García, a tanner, and his wife Ochanda Zatico. It is not clear what relationship he has with them. 107 They were residents of San Nicolás and linked to the Palmer and Zalba families for work reasons (J. Zabalo 1992, 681). 108 DAGN(TIC) , 35/153 and DAMP, n. 125. 102 103

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ELOISA RAMÍREZ-VAQUERO

of the cloth was the property of a friend of his, Tomás Jordán. He was, therefore, a cloth trader, probably associated with other local traders who had bought or negotiated their cloth in England.109 In the second case we learn of a Miguel de Roncesvalles who was a councillor – not of the Borough but of the civitas –, which leads us to think that there was at least one family with the same locative in both boroughs. The connections of these people with the prominent figures of the Roncesvalles family in the mid-fourteenth century will have to wait for the prosopographic analyses to advance two or three generations more. This brief review of the urban lineages that were more or less known in later epochs cannot, obviously, be detailed or comprehensive, but it would clearly be of interest to analyse all the cases in which it is possible to see a trend towards greater social prestige. On the other hand, it is very difficult to make allusions to those that apparently disappear over the years, because detailed prosopographic analyses are lacking for later periods in which, as we have indicated, there is very interesting but incomplete information. Moreover, there is no accurate information on the relationships between these lineages and there are very few references to these in the documentation.110 3. Final Considerations As stated at the beginning, to look for the oligarchic networks woven in the urban society of Pamplona, in each of its urban centres and, to some extent, between its two “new” boroughs, is one of the most important elements of the analysis. One of the first conclusions that can be drawn from the prosopographic survey, in light of the names and patronymics and particularly in light of the maps that indicate the origins of a large part of the population of the three population centres, is that although Frankish immigration was very important in Pamplona (as the historiography has always shown) it is necessary to bear in mind that the new boroughs that arose on the road system that crossed the Spanish kingdoms from East to West were not as watertight as they seemed. Certainly not in terms of allowing people to settle, nor in the opportunities for social advancement to the highest levels of communal government and social consideration. It is clear that the passage of time may have “diluted” the specific nature of the foreign communities, and this was apparently very much the case in San Saturnino, but not even the Borough was able to maintain the watertight nature envisaged in its Charter. The charters of San Nicolás – just fifty years after the first text – and of the civitas – soon after – simply incorporated the real situation, one that had already been observed in San Saturnino. It is significant that all the charters granted in Navarre after 1150 go in the same direction. It is clear that both foreigners and natives co-existed normally within the communal institutions of San Saturnino, San Nicolás and the civitas. There is no The value of the cloth was 11 pounds; its return was not granted until ten years later. There are only four testimonies prior to 1328: in 1269 (Hugo of Concoitz; BL, Soc. 238240), 1309 (María Pascual; SGL, SC, n. 3), 1324 (Juan Regue; Ibid., n. 12), 1324 (María Domínguez de Gaizarin, Ibid., n. 13).

109 110

140

THE FIRST URBAN OLIGARCHIC NETWORKS IN NAVARRE

reason to discard the notion that, as must have happened in the rest of Western Europe in the period of major expansion from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, the new populations in Navarre would have welcomed an undetermined percentage of local (native) immigrants who took on key roles in urban society. This idea strengthens the notion of the city as “articulator” of the surrounding area in which a centre of major activity developed:111 the area around the new urban centre is all but detached to it. It will be necessary to go into more depth on the history and other aspects of rural society in Navarre, but migration towards the new boroughs would no doubt also come from quite considerable population surpluses that could not continue under an evidently manorial regime (at least in Navarre), in valleys with relatively low levels of production, and in a kingdom without prospects for expansion at the end of the first third of the twelfth century. Although the data available are not as comprehensive as one would have wished for the period under analysis, the urban society of Pamplona (as is clearly seen at later dates) worked in a very simple textile industry making cloth for local and regional use and a range of crafts related to the infrastructures of a city on the Pilgrims’ Way to Compostela: shoemakers, smiths, tinkers, butchers. The status of royal “capital” had not yet really affected Pamplona in terms of the development of this market, which undoubtedly occurred later.112 A jurisdictional domain of the bishop up to 1319, it was not usual for the monarchs to reside there or set up permanent administrative entities that were still very much linked to the royal Curia. It should also be remembered that the royal dynasty was of French origin from 1234 onwards and its residence in Navarre (apart from the fact that the monarchs spent little time there) is better documented in other cities such as Estella or Olite. In the Capetian period (1274-1328) just one of the monarchs made a fleeting visit to the kingdom on one occasion (1307). Together with this commercial activity, Pamplona was the scene of considerable money changing activity, also due to its location on a main commercial route. The importance of the moneychangers has already been highlighted and they were probably the seed of a major “banking” centre in the following decades, reinforced later by the increased presence of the royalty. To conclude, on the basis of the 1,283 entries included here there are many small clues that invite one to make a series of analyses related to the relationships between the families, the precedents to later relations, the situation of the first converts, the agricultural functions of the urban society. An Analysis, in fact, This notion prevailed, for example, in the papers of the XX Week of Mediaeval Studies (Estella, 1993, publ. Pamplona, 1994): “El Camino de Santiago y la articulación del espacio hispánico”, which was also recently dealt with in a more global manner by Pascual Martínez Sopena in a presentation titled “El Camino de Santiago y la articulación del espacio hispánico”, 2000, 65-74. This idea had previously been aired in a number of studies on societies before the granting of certain charters, for example in J. Á. García de Cortázar, La sociedad guipuzcoana antes del fuero de San Sebastián. 112 The status of “capital” brought about, in the words of Juan Carrasco, 2003, 254, certain mercantile activities that were unlikely to develop in other places in the kingdom, in addition to stimulating the development of “financial services linked to the activities and purposes of the State”, plus the needs of the Court. There is no doubt that this is a very logical and suitable context for later dates, up to the second half of the fourteenth century. 111

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ELOISA RAMÍREZ-VAQUERO

basically related to the initial structuring of the social elites. The aim here has been to provide an initial overview. Table 6.4. Names and Second Names of Local Origin SS

SN

Nav.



Garín Ortí Sanz

Garín



Gaizco,Iñigo García,Lope Garín,Marra Ibáñez, Sanz

Ezquer, Iñigo Fortín, Lope Gaizco, Ochoa García, Ortí/Ortiz Garín, Sancho/ez



Aguirre, Iñigo Andregalla, Jiméno/ez Arciniegui, Lope/ez Aznar,Ochoa Beatza,Ortí García, Sancho Garcés,Sanz Garín,Zuría Ibáñez Aizpurúa, Jimeno/ez Azaturday, Lope Aznárez,Macua Ezquerra, Navar Fortín, Ongania García, Oñaga Garcés,Oria Iñigo, Ortiz Iñiguez, Sancho/ez Iturriapurria, Toda

Aguirre, Jimeno Arciniegui, Jiménez Aznar, Lope Beatza,López García,Ortí/Ortiz Garcés,Sancho Garín, Sánchez Ibáñez,Sanz Iñigo,Zuría Aznárez García Iñigo Jimeno Ochoa Ortiz Sancho/ez Zandúa Zaviel

Aznar Fortuñones García Iñigo Irigoyen Jimeno Sancho Beatza, Jimeno Ederra , Lope Erdimiritz, Ochoa Fortín, Ortí/Ortiz Gaizco, Sancha García, Urraca ? Iñigo , Vela Arceiz, Jimeno Beatza Arza, Milia Gailla Beatza, Ochoa Sancho Beltza, Ortiz Eguertia Fortín, Sancha/o García, Zaviel Iñigo Íñiguez García Iñigo Íñiguez Jimeno/ez López Ochoa Sancho Zuri



S.Mg.

Table 6.5. Nicknames or Peculiar Names:113 Date 1100-1199 1200-1249

113

142

SS Mal Regart Baldovín Bec Bon Amic Bon Macip Ros, Rosas Tablas Bec

SN Bon Amic, Bos Bon Amic, Bos Cucullo Mocho Murde Nigro Rosas, Valiente

Italics for persons from the Council of the Twenty.

Nav. Murde Bon Cucullo Murde Palacio, de/del Regis Rollan Rosas

THE FIRST URBAN OLIGARCHIC NETWORKS IN NAVARRE

Table 6.5. Nicknames or Peculiar Names. (cont...) Date 1250-1299

1300-1328

SS

SN

Baldovín Bec Bon Amic Bon Macip Palmer Regue (Rey) Ros, Rosas Tablas Trossel (Rosel) Trullar, del Cucullo Fenes Hospital, del Macua Palmer Piedra, de la Pollan 114 Regue (Rey) Rosas Torres Zaviel

Bon Bon Macip Paniagua Regue Rollan Rosas

Nav. Cucullo Murde

Hospital del Palmer Piedra, de la Pollan Rosas

Table 6.6. Names of possible Jewish origin Date

SS

SN

1100-1199

David

Assalit

1200-1249

Assalit David Elías116 Marcholes Benayan117 Caritat118 Cruzat David Elías Caritat Cruzat David Elías

Assalit Caritat

1250-1299

1300-1328

Nav Assalit Belozel Caritat Caritat David115 Elías

Benayan Caritat

Doubtful urban centre. There are several cases of “Elías” used as a name or as a surname, and combined with “David”; also an Elías de Conques who obviously is a Frenchman. 116 Doubtful urban centre. 117 García Benayan, councilman. 118 Some of them are part of the Council of the Twenty, but at least one is clearly from San Saturnino. 114 115

143

ELOISA RAMÍREZ-VAQUERO

Table 6.7. Mayors from Pamplona’s Urban Centers119 UC. Nav. SN? SN? SN? SN? SN? SN? SN? SN? Nav. Nav. SN SN SS SS SS SN? SS SS SN SS SN SS SN Nav. Nav. SS SN SN SN SN SS SS SS SS SS Nav.12 Nav.12 Nav.12 Nav.12 Nav.12 Nav.12 Nav.12 Nav.12 Nav.12 Nav.12 Nav.12 Nav.12 SN.12 SN.12 SN.12 SN.12 SN.12

Date 1193,09.28 1200,04 1200,04 1200,04 1206,11-1/8 1206,11-1/8 1206,11-1/8 1206,11-1/8 1206,11-1/8 1213,12.14 1239,09.04 1251,07.12 1255,11.05 1256,02.22 1266,04.22 1269 1269 1270,06.12 1270,06.13 1271,18.06 1285,12 1285,12 1297,10 1297,10 1297,12.09 1297,12.09 1326,11.27 1327,07.22 1327,08.01 1327,08.01 1254,07 1255,11.10 1255,11.10 1253,07 1256,02.22 1321,10.19 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07 1236,07

Name Domingo Bonamic Bonamic Bonamic Bonamic Estella, Pedro de Estella, Aymar de Ponz, J. Aragón, R. de Cizur, Ortí Motza de Rumesa Motza, Martín Motza, Martín Mateo, Juan Baldovín, Ponz Baldovín, Ponce Esteillart, Juan Baldovín, Ponz Baldovín, Ponz Baldovín, Poncio Jaca, Ramón de Ortiz, Bartolomé Eza, Bernardo de Aldaba, Iñigo de Eza, Bernardo Aldaba, Iñigo de Ezcaba, Martín García Sarriguren, Sancho de Badostáin, Pascual de Rosas, Esteban de Motza, Martín Motza, Martín Motza, Martín Guarin, Arnaldo de Mateo, Juan Miguel, Juan Aldaba, Ortí de Artiga, Miguel de Bon, Juan Bretón, Juan Caritat, don Cucullo, Jimeno de Ederra, Iñigo Esparza, Gil de Murde, Jimeno Mutilva, Pedro de Santa Cecilia, Arnaldo de Zapater, Gil Bodín, Juan Echalaz, Pedro de Elcoaz, Lope de Ortí el Sabio Úcar, Sancho de

Job

shopkeeper shopkeeper

shopkeeper

moneychanger

mayor’s delegate shoemaker

Ref DCP, n. 405 DCP, n. 434 capsore? DCP, n. 432 capsore? DCP, n. 433 capsore? DCP, n. 477 DCP, n. 477 DCP, n. 477 DCP, n. 477 DCP, n. 477 DAGN(1194-1234) DCP, n. 601 DAGN(TI) 146 DAGN(TIIC), 15, 6 DAGN(TIIC), 30 DSENG, n. 3(occ) BL,Soc, p. 238-240 BL,Soc, p. 238-240 DSENG, n. 6(occ) DSENG, n. 7(occ) DSENG, n. 1 (latinos) DSENG, n. 11(occ) DSENG, n. 11(occ) DAGN(CAPII), n. 151 DAGN(CAPII), n. 151 DSENG, n. 13(occ) DSENG, n. 13(occ) DAMP, n. 124 DAMP, n. 125 DAMP, n. 126 DAMP, n. 126 FueroP, 29, 30 FueroP, 37 FueroP, 37 DSENG, n. 1(occ) FueroP, 38 SGL, SC, n. 10 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20 FueroP, 20

UC: Urban Center; C20: Council of the Twenty; Nav.12: Navarrería, the Council of Twelve; SS12: San Saturnino, the Council of Twelve; SN12: San Nicolás, the Council of Twelve.

119

144

THE FIRST URBAN OLIGARCHIC NETWORKS IN NAVARRE

Table 6.8. Councilmen from Pamplona’s Urban Centres UC.

Date

SN.12

1236,07

SN.12

1236,07

SS.12

1244

SS.12

1244

Gaizco, Martín

SS.12

1244

Lorenzo, Pascual

SS.12

1244

Marra, Juan de

SS.12

1244

Mota, Grimalt de la

SS.12

Name

Job

Undiano, Martín de

FueroP, 20

Zubielque, Lope de Andrés, Pedro

Ref

FueroP, 20 Moneychanger

AMD, CSC, p.27 AMD, CSC, p.27- 31

furrier

AMD, CSC, p.27 AMD, CSC, p.27 AMD, CSC, p.27

butcher & scribe

1244

Petit, Juan

AMD, CSC, p.27-31

SS.12

1244

Rey, Mateo

AMD, CSC, p.27

SS.12

1244

San Gil, Pedro Arnaldo de

AMD, CSC, p.27 AMD, CSC, p.27

SS.12

1244

San Gil, Raúl de

SS.12

1244

Tablas, Guillermo de las, el Mayor

AMD, CSC, p.27

SS.12

1244

Zabalza, Juan de

AMD, CSC, p.27

SN

1251,07.12

Aldava, Pedro de

SN

1251,07.12

Alfonso (don)

SN

1251,07.12

SN

1251,07.12

SN

1251,07.12

Eguía, García de

DAGN(TI), 146 shopkeeper

DAGN(TI), 146

Arcaya, Esteban

“galochero” 120

DAGN(TI), 146

Arce, García de

butcher

SN

1251,07.12

Elorz, Juan de

SN

1251,07.12

Jiménez, Pedro

DAGN(TI), 146 DAGN(TI), 146 DAGN(TI), 146

carpenter

DAGN(TI), 146

parador (sic)

DAGN(TI), 146

SN

1251,07.12

López, Pedro

SN

1251,07.12

Motza, Andrés

SN

1251,07.12

París (don)

SN

1251,07.12

Subiza, Martín de

SN

1251,07.12

Ubani, Domingo de

DAGN(TI), 146

SN

1255,11.05

Echalaz, Pedro de

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

Egozcue, Iñigo de

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

Ilundáin, Lope de

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

Lizoáin, Juan de

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

López, Pedro

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

Motza, Andrés

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

Motza, Pedro

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

Najurieta, Iñigo de

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

Ortiz, Jimeno

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

Pérez, Simón

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

Rollán, Gil

DAGN(TIIC), 17

SN

1255,11.05

Undiano, Miguel de

DAGN(TI), 146 boilermaker

DAGN(TI), 146 DAGN(TI), 146

DAGN(TIIC), 15,16

“galochero” should be the person who makes ‘galochas’ (galoshes - a word of French origin), which are a type of wooden overshoe.

120

145

ELOISA RAMÍREZ-VAQUERO

Table 6.8. Councilmen from Pamplona’s Urban Centres. (cont…) UC.

Date

Name

Job

Ref

SN

1255,11.10

Echalaz, Pedro de

SN

1255,11.10

Egozcue, Iñigo de

FueroP, 37

SN

1255,11.10

Ilundáin, Lope de

FueroP, 37 FueroP, 37

FueroP, 37

SN

1255,11.10

Lizoain, Juan de

SN

1255,11.10

López, Pedro

FueroP, 37

SN

1255,11.10

Motza, Arnaldo

FueroP, 37

SN

1255,11.10

Motza, Pedro

FueroP, 37

SN

1255,11.10

Najurieta, Iñigo de

FueroP, 37

SN

1255,11.10

Ortiz, Jimeno

FueroP, 37

SN

1255,11.10

Pérez, Jimeno

FueroP, 37

SN

1255,11.10

Rollán, Gil

FueroP, 37

SS

1255,11.19

Bon, Pedro

DAMP, n.59

SS

1255,11.19

Elías, Juan

DAMP, n.59

SS

1255,11.19

Marcholes, Juan

DAMP, n.59

SS

1255,11.19

Márquez, Sancho

DAMP, n.59

SS

1266,06.20

Arciniegui, Pedro de

FueroP, 45

SS

1266,06.20

Arnaldo, García

FueroP, 45 FueroP, 45

SS

1266,06.20

David, Elías

SS

1266,06.20

Eza, Arnaldo de

SS

1266,06.20

Jiménez, Pedro

SS

1266,06.20

Las Tablas, Pedro de

FueroP, 45 FueroP, 45

FueroP, 45 smith

FueroP, 45

SS

1266,06.20

Macip, Bon

SS

1266,06.20

Olaiz, Pedro de, el Mayor

FueroP, 45

SS

1266,06.20

Petit, Pedro Juan

FueroP, 45

SS

1266,06.20

Regue, Juan

FueroP, 45

SS

1266,06.20

San Gil,

FueroP, 45

SS

1266,06.20

Pedro Arnaldo de

FueroP, 45

SS

1266,06.20

Tajonar, Miguel de

FueroP, 45

Nav.

1266,06.20

Arza, Miguel

FueroP, 45

Nav.

1266,06.20

Eguerats, Domingo de

Nav.

1266,06.20

Gil, Pedro

Nav.

1266,06.20

Góngora, Sancho Pérez de

Nav.

1266,06.20

Ortiz, Jimeno

Nav.

1266,06.20

Pascual

Nav.

1266,06.20

Sada, Miguel de

Nav.

1266,06.20

Sanemeterio, Pedro Ochoa de

FueroP, 45

Nav.

1266,06.20

Toledo, Iñigo de

FueroP, 45

Nav.

1266,06.20

Tomás, Juan

FueroP, 45

Nav.

1266,06.20

Zabaldica, Miguel Pérez de

FueroP, 45

Nav.

1266,06.20

Zabaldica, Pedro Arceiz de

FueroP, 45

146

FueroP, 45 butcher

FueroP, 45

moneychanger

FueroP, 45

FueroP, 45 smith

FueroP, 45 FueroP, 45

THE FIRST URBAN OLIGARCHIC NETWORKS IN NAVARRE

Table 6.8. Councilmen from Pamplona’s Urban Centres. (cont…) UC.

Date

Name

Job

Ref

SN

1266,06.20

Arcaya, Domingo

smith

FueroP, 45

SN

1266,06.20

Guillén, Pascual

SN

1266,06.20

Larrángoz, Jimeno de

FueroP, 45

SN

1266,06.20

Larraya, Guillermo de

FueroP, 45

SN

1266,06.20

Meoz, Jimeno

FueroP, 45

SN

1266,06.20

Meoz, Miguel de, el joven

FueroP, 45

SN

1266,06.20

Motza, Juan Pérez

FueroP, 45

SN

1266,06.20

Motza, Martín

SN

1266,06.20

Sánchez, Pedro

SN

1266,06.20

Sanz, Pedro

SN

1266,06.20

Ulzama, Domingo de

FueroP, 45 FueroP, 45

shoemaker

FueroP, 45

FueroP, 45 carpenter

FueroP, 45

“burellero”

FueroP, 45

SN

1266,06.20

Undiano, Ochoa de

SMg

1266,06.20

Beatza, Pedro

FueroP, 45

SMg

1266,06.20

Benedicto, Pedro

FueroP, 45

SMg

1266,06.20

Calvo, Pedro

FueroP, 45

SMg

1266,06.20

Echeverría, Juan de

FueroP, 45

SMg

1266,06.20

Gailla, Miguel

SMg

1271,05

FueroP, 45

SanchoPeletero

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

C20

1271,05

Aimeric, Bernardo

C20

1271,05

Andrés, Pedro

turner

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

moneychanger

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

C20

1271,05

Badostáin, Andrés

C20

1271,05

Badostáin, Pedro de

C20

1271,05

Beatza, Pascual

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

C20

1271,05

Carloiz, Gil

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

C20

1271,05

Cruzat, Aimar

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

C20

1271,05

Esparza, Pedro de

C20

1271,05

Garín, Juan

DSENG, n. 8(occ) shoemaker

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

DSENG, n. 8(occ) turner

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

butcher (brot.)

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

C20

1271,05

Ibáñez, Pedro

C20

1271,05

Jiménez, Andrés

turner

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

C20

1271,05

Lizoain, Juan de

turner

DSENG, n. 8(occ)

C20

1271,05

Macip, Bon

C20

1271,05

Marcel, Guillén

turner

C20

1271,05

Noáin, Pedro Garcés de

turner

C20

1271,05

Pérez, Bernardo

C20

1271,05

Sanz, Ochoa

C20

1271,05

Torner, Miguel

C20

1271,05

Turrillas, Lope de

C20

1271,05

Undiano, Pedro de

SS

1271,18.06

Caritat, Juan

DSENG, n. 1 (lat)

SS

1271,18.06

Salvador, Bernando

DSENG, n. 1 (lat.)

DSENG, n. 8(occ) DSENG, n. 8(occ) DSENG, n. 8(occ) DSENG, n. 8(occ) DSENG, n. 8(occ) turner shoemaker

DSENG, n. 8(occ) DSENG, n. 8(occ) DSENG, n. 8(occ)

147

ELOISA RAMÍREZ-VAQUERO

Table 6.8. Councilmen from Pamplona’s Urban Centres. (cont…) UC.

Date

SS

1271,18.06

148

Name

Job

San Genaro, Guillermo Martínez de

Ref DSENG, n. 1 (lat.)

C20

1273,10.13

Adériz, Aznar de

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Arciniegui, Iñigo

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Badostáin, Juan de

C20

1273,10.13

Badostáin, Pedro de

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Beatza, Pedro

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Benayam, García

DAMP, n. 78 DAMP, n. 78

moneychanger

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Castellón, Pedro de

C20

1273,10.13

Chapitel, Sancho del

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Echauri, García de

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Elalia, García de

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Huarte, Pedro de

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Larraina, Miguel de

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

López, Miguel

C20

1273,10.13

Martín, Guillén

C20

1273,10.13

Masip, Bon

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Noáin, Pedro

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Garcés de

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Regue, Juan

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Rosas, Ortí de

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Salvador, Bernardo

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1273,10.13

Sanz Cosín, Juan

DAMP, n. 78

C20

1274,08.27

Sanz Zuría, Pedro

DAMP, n. 79

C20

1274,08.27

Echalaz, Pedro de

DAMP, n. 79

C20

1274,08.27

Galar, Gregorio de

DAMP, n. 79

C20

1274,08.27

Hurtado, Pedro

FueroP, 50 FueroP, 50

SS

1287,07.13

Arnaldo, García

SS

1287,07.13

Caritat, Bartolomé

SS

1287,07.13

Echalaz, García de

SS

1287,07.13

Izco, Pascual

SS

1287,07.13

Jaca, Ramón de

shoemaker moneychanger. from S. Germain?

DAMP, n. 78 DAMP, n. 78

FueroP, 50 butcher “burellero”

FueroP, 50 FueroP, 50 FueroP, 50

SS

1287,07.13

Jordán, Simón

FueroP, 50

SS

1287,07.13

Ochoa Granador

FueroP, 50

SS

1287,07.13

Palmer, Arnaldo

FueroP, 50

SS

1287,07.13

Petit, Juan Pérez lo

FueroP, 50

SN

1287,07.13

Zamel, Pedro

FueroP, 50

SN

1287,07.13

Aldava, Pedro de

SN

1287,07.13

Arre, Iñigo de

SN

1287,07.13

Echarri, Ped. Ortiz

FueroP, 50 butcher

FueroP, 50

dehaberdasher

FueroP, 50

THE FIRST URBAN OLIGARCHIC NETWORKS IN NAVARRE

Table 6.8. Councilmen from Pamplona’s Urban Centres. (cont…) UC.

Date

Name

Job

Ref

SN

1287,07.13

Ezquieta, Martín de

SN

1287,07.13

Guillén, Juan Pérez

shoemaker

FueroP, 50

SN

1287,07.13

Olagüe, Miguel de

merchant

FueroP, 50

FueroP, 50

SN

1287,07.13

Olóriz, Iñigo de

SN

1287,07.13

Rosas, Caritat de

FueroP, 50 FueroP, 50

SN

1287,07.13

Undiano, Martín de

FueroP, 50

SN

1287,07.13

C20

1297,10

Uriz, Iñigo de

FueroP, 50

C20

1297,10

Aimeric, Pedro (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Aldava, Pedro de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Anocíbar, Miguel de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Aoiz, Domingo de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Aritz, Miguel

DAGN(II), n. 151 DAGN(II), n. 151

Aguirre, Bartolomé de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Caritat, Bartolomé (don)

C20

1297,10

Galar, Juán Perez de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Ibero, Martín Pérez de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Jaca, Ramón de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Lacella, Aymat (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Lorenzo, Miguel (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Mezquíriz, García de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Orti (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Rollán, Miguel (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Rosas, Caritat de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Rosas, Caritat de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Salvador, Guillén (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151 DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Undiano Martín de (don), el Joven

C20

1297,10

Urdoz, Pedro de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151

C20

1297,10

Úriz, Iñigo de (don)

DAGN(II), n. 151 DAGN(II), n. 178

C20

1301,05.27

Aldava, Martín Pérez de

C20

1301,05.27

Aranguren, Pedro de

DAGN(II), n. 178

C20

1301,05.27

Arnaldo, García, llamado “Pollán”

DAGN(II), n. 178

C20

1301,05.27

Badostáin, Pascual de

C20

1301,05.27

Bartolomé

C20

1301,05.27

Beortegui, Pedro García de

C20

1301,05.27

Berenguer

C20

1301,05.27

Echauri, Martín de

C20

1301,05.27

Esáin, Martín de

C20

1301,05.27

Esparza, Pedro de

C20

1301,05.27

Estella, Juan de

C20

1301,05.27

Ezquieta, Martín de

DAGN(II), n. 178 apothecary

DAGN(II), n. 178

moneychanger

DAGN(II), n. 178

DAGN(II), n. 178 DAGN(II), n. 178 furrier

DAGN(II), n. 178 DAGN(II), n. 178

quartermaster

DAGN(II), n. 178 DAGN(II), n. 178

149

ELOISA RAMÍREZ-VAQUERO

Table 6.8. Councilmen from Pamplona’s Urban Centres. (cont…) UC.

Date

Name

C20

1301,05.27

Felipe

150

Job

Ref DAGN(II), n. 178

C20

1301,05.27

Martínez, Iñigo

C20

1301,05.27

Miguel, Pedro

DAGN(II), n. 178

C20

1301,05.27

Orcoyen, Martín Sánchez de

DAGN(II), n. 178

C20

1301,05.27

Ortiz, Martín

DAGN(II), n. 178

C20

1301,05.27

Sánchez Regue, Martín

DAGN(II), n. 178

C20

1301,05.27

Torres, Pedro de

DAGN(II), n. 178

C20

1301,05.27

Viscarret, Sancho de

SS

1309,10

Garcés, Martín

notary

SGL, SC, n. 5

SS

1310,11.03

Garcés, Martín

notary

SGL, SC, n. 6

SS

1316,11.07

Endériz, Juan Martín de

notary

SGL, SC, n. 8

butcher

DAGN(II), n. 178

DAGN(II), n. 178

C20

1317,05.17

Andrequiáin, Pedro de

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Belzunce, Lope de

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Egüés, Martín de

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Elcano, Sancho de

DAMP, n. 109 DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Eza, Miguel de

C20

1317,05.17

Ezquieta, Pedro Martín de

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Ibero, Caritat de

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Leache, Juan de

C20

1317,05.17

López, Pedro

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Martín, Iñigo

C20

1317,05.17

Martín, Pedro

C20

1317,05.17

Mezquíriz, Pascual de

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Nagailz, Pedro

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Ortiz de

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Ochovi, Sancho de

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Ortiz, Martín

DAMP, n. 109

“burellero”

DAMP, n. 109 DAMP, n. 109

moneychanger

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Palmer, Arnaldo

C20

1317,05.17

Piedra, Esteban Pz de la

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Tajonar, Pedro Jiménez de

DAMP, n. 109

C20

1317,05.17

Undiano, Ochoa Martínez de

DAMP, n. 109

moneychanger

DAMP, n. 109

SS

1321,03.15

Turrillas, García de

scribe

SGL, SC, n. 9

SS

1321,10.19

Orcoyen, Fortún

notary

SGL, SC, n. 10

SS

1322,11.13

Mg. de Amix, Juan

notary

SGL, SC, n. 11

SS

1323,12.02

Aldaz, Lope de Aparicio

SS

1323,12.02

Badostáin, García de

cutler

DAMP, n. 118

SS

1323,12.02

Badostáin, García de

DAMP, n. 118

SS

1323,12.02

Cruzat, Martín

DAMP, n. 118

SS

1323,12.02

Elcano, Sancho de

cutler

DAMP, n. 118

SS

1323,12.02

Galar, Miguel de

cutler

DAMP, n. 118

DAMP, n. 118

THE FIRST URBAN OLIGARCHIC NETWORKS IN NAVARRE

Table 6.8. Councilmen from Pamplona’s Urban Centres. (cont…)

121

UC.

Date

SS

1323,12.02

Name

Job

Marcel, Andrés

Ref DAMP, n. 118

SS

1323,12.02

Sangüesa, Jaime de

DAMP, n. 118

SS

1323,12.02

Venela, Martín de la

DAMP, n. 118

SS

1323,12.02

Zaviel, Francisco

Nav.

1323,12.02

Adarraga, Iñigo de

DAMP, n. 118

Nav.

1323,12.02

Agorreta, Iñigo de

“burellero”

DAMP, n. 124

Nav.

1323,12.02

Arraiza, Aparicio de

haberdasher

DAMP, n. 124

Nav.

1323,12.02

Echague, Jimeno

baker

DAMP, n. 124

Nav.

1326,11.27

Pérez de

DAMP, n. 124

Nav.

1326,11.27

Ezcaba, Sancho Miguel de

DAMP, n. 124

Nav.

1326,11.27

Garaño, Miguel de

Nav.

1326,11.27

Guizurdiaga, Miguel Martínez de

shoemaker

DAMP, n. 124

Nav.

1326,11.27

Navaz, Martín de

“bastero” 121

DAMP, n. 124

Nav.

1326,11.27

Olaiz, Pedro de

“bastero”

DAMP, n. 124

Nav.

1327,07.22

Beramendi, Juan de

DAMP, n. 125

Nav.

1327,07.22

Carlos, Miguel

DAMP, n. 125

Nav.

1327,07.22

Espoz, Iñigo López de

DAMP, n. 125

Nav.

1327,07.22

Ezcaba, Martín Garcés de

DAMP, n. 125

Nav.

1327,07.22

Guenduláin, García de

DAMP, n. 125

ropemaker

shoemaker

DAMP, n. 124

DAMP, n. 124

Nav.

1327,07.22

Navarro, García

DAMP, n. 125

Nav.

1327,07.22

Redín, Lope de

DAMP, n. 125

Nav.

1327,07.22

Roncesvalles,

DAMP, n. 125

Nav.

1327,07.22

Miguel de

DAMP, n. 125

Nav.

1327,07.22

Urrobi, Sancho de

DAMP, n. 125

Nav.

1327,07.22

Zuri, Pedro

DAMP, n. 125

C20

1327,08.01

Badostáin, García de

DAMP, n. 126

C20

1327,08.01

Echarri, Juan de

DAMP, n. 126

C20

1327,08.01

Gil, Jaime

DAMP, n. 126

C20

1327,08.01

Hospital, Martín Pérez del

DAMP, n. 126

C20

1327,08.01

Motza, Jimeno

DAMP, n. 126

C20

1327,08.01

Oate, Mateo de

DAMP, n. 126 DAMP, n. 126

C20

1327,08.01

Ororiuja, Juan de

C20

1327,08.01

Palmer, Martín

C20

1327,08.01

Pérez, Martín

C20

1327,08.01

Reta, Sancho de

DAMP, n. 126

C20

1327,08.01

Rosas, Juan de

DAMP, n. 126

DAMP, n. 126 butcher (broter)

DAMP, n. 126

C20

1327,08.01

Salinas, García

DAMP, n. 126

C20

1327,08.01

Miguel de

DAMP, n. 126

“bastero” is the person who makes packsaddles. 151

ELOISA RAMÍREZ-VAQUERO

Table 6.8. Councilmen from Pamplona’s Urban Centres. (cont…) UC.

Date

C20

1327,08.01

Name

Job

Sangüesa, Jaime de

Ref DAMP, n. 126

C20

1327,08.01

Villanueva, Simón Miguel de

Nav.

1328,06.17

Badostáin, Simón de

carpenter

DAMP, n. 127

Nav.

1328,06.17

Beortegui, Martín de

ropemaker

DAMP, n. 127

Nav.

1328,06.17

Eraso, Iñigo de

carpenter

Nav.

1328,06.17

Lerín, Miguel de

Nav.

1328,06.17

Lizarraga, Pedro Jiménez de

“burellero”

DAMP, n. 127

Nav.

1328,06.17

Oxavain, García de

ropemaker

DAMP, n. 127

Nav.

1328,06.17

Urrunza, Pedro de

cloth shearer

DAMP, n. 127

152

DAMP, n. 126

DAMP, n. 127 DAMP, n. 127

SOME COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES: OLIGARCHY AND PATRONAGE IN THE LATE MEDIAEVAL IBERIAN PENINSULA Marc Boone Ghent University All of the preceding essays were presented in a first, preliminary version at the meeting of the European Social Sciences History conference, held in Berlin on 24-27 March 2004. Originally, a more profound comparison between Spain and Portugal was intended, but finally it became obvious that this would have been too much of a back-projection of later political realities on a more diversified mediaeval reality. The kingdoms of Navarre, Aragon, Castile and Granada: these were the boundaries within which urban societies developed and sought to construct and preserve their own political identity. Comparative history is a much almost religiously confessed ideal: put into practice, it rather rarely leads to effective results. However, the collected essays on Iberian urban elites and on their formation and survival in a changing environment, if only one thinks of the effects of the “conquista” and of the growing impact of state/royal intervention, do argue for a comparative approach. Only then, the different outcomes, triggered by similar causes, may become comprehensible. As often when dealing with important historical problems, and the development of urban elites being bearers of “modernity” in a given society is undoubtedly one of them, it is important to take a retrospective look at how the problem was dealt with in the past, to dig, in other words, for its development in historiography. This inevitably leads us back to the period of the coming about of history, seen and practiced as an all-embracing human and social science, the end of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth centuries.1 In short, the days of, among others, the influential Belgian historian Henri Pirenne. It should indeed not be a wonder that one of the leading historians of that generation was the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (1862-1935), son of a successful entrepreneur in textiles in the booming industrial town of Verviers, and the incarnation of renewed urban history. He was the voice also of a generation of historians firmly believing in progress and liberal politics in the context of the nineteenth-century nation state. Working in the context of a relatively new state, Pirenne was conscious of dealing in the first place with the history of what he called himself “le point sensible de l’Europe” where the Germanic and Latin parts of the continent met and merged.2 In the second phase of his career during and after the Great War, which started at a I refer partly to the keynote lecture I gave at the opening of the 2007 Leeds international medieval congres (with thanks to my colleague and friend Ferdinand Opll of Vienna): Marc Boone, 2009. 2 Jan Tollebeek 1996, 429 (1996, 243). 1

153

MARC BOONE

moment when he had already achieved international recognition, he would personally realise at a great cost how deep this “sensibility” reached.3 In the meantime, several of Pirenne’s seminal publications set the tone for a renewed look at urban history. One of the most perspicuous analyses of the historian Pirenne and of his work and influence remains the essay published in 1966 by Jan Dhondt. It bears the significant title “Henri Pirenne, historien des institutions urbaines”.4 That attention is drawn to urban institutions may cause some bewilderment, when dealing with a historian, Pirenne, known above all else for his studies in the field of social and economic history. But Dhondt’s choice proved to be a correct one. If we look back on the urban studies by Pirenne, one can not but consider they withstood the inevitable erosion due to time much better than his other bold theses (the “Mahomet and Charlemagne” thesis, or the histories of both Europe and Belgium, for example). Most of his urban studies were brought together after his death in a collection of essays and studies published in 1939. Already during the years 1893-98 he had published in the leading French review, the “revue historique”, the review incorporating at its best the old positivist and optimistic paradigm dominating the end of the 19th and the first years of the twentieth century, a series of articles entitled “l’origine des constitutions urbaines au Moyen Age”.5 The same matter was discussed in what was going to become one of his most influential books ever (first edition 1910): “Les anciennes démocraties des Pays-Bas”, first published in English in 1915 bearing the wrong, but, given the specific circumstances of World War One, understandable title of “Belgian democracy” .6 If we now take a look at these studies, one is struck by the extent to which Pirenne indeed succeeds in combining and bridging the best elements of both dominating historiographies, the French and German schools. Having studied in his youth in Leipzig and Berlin on the one hand, in Paris on the other, he combined as no other contemporary scholar the best elements of both traditions. This combination resulted in an almost holistic view on the positive effects of urban life, through the action of the urban institutions and of the creative powers of generations of merchants and highly skilled artisans provoking an unprecedented boom in urban life in the two most urbanised parts of Europe: Northern and Central Italy on the one hand, the Low Countries on the other. For Pirenne as for almost all of his contemporaries, life and historical research were never to be the same again after the Great War. Indeed most of the intellectual certainties his generation had believed in lay scattered and ruined – just as some of the most appealing mediaeval monuments, the great drapery hall of Ypres, the old university library of Louvain, the cathedral of Reims were annihilated A testimony to the success and renown of Pirenne before the Great War is the booklet edited on the occasion of the birth of the Foundation Pirenne when he was honoured for 25 years of teaching in Ghent: Henri Pirenne 1912. 4 Jan Dhondt 1966, Reprinted in the collection of 1976, 119. 5 See the collection of essays: Henri Pirenne 1939a, 1-110, to be completed by 1939b, 110122, originally also published in 1895. 6 This first translation in English was afterwards repeatedly reedited under the more correct title. See Henri Pirenne 1915 and 1963. 3

154

SOME COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

and lay in ruins by the end of the conflict. “The end of a great illusion” as the Italian mediaevalist Cinzio Violante recently described the state of mind Pirenne and his fellow historians must have felt when finally from 11 November 1918 on the guns were silenced.7 Attempts to reconstruct and above all to renew the historical sciences were much needed, and desperately sought after. On the side of the western allies, dominated by France and England, the most longed-for renewal finally came through the new paradigm of the Annales school, named after the French review founded in 1929 for which not surprisingly its two famous founders, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, had in vain tried to have Pirenne accept to act as its first president. The Annales did not in the first place attach the same importance to urban history as had been the case in the preceding period of historicism. Gradually however, the emphasis put on economic and structural elements provoked a renewed interest also in urban phenomena and in the study of the meaning of space. The so-called second generation of Annales scholars, headed by Fernand Braudel, partly reoriented their research, for which the great regional monographs focusing on the demographic and socio-economic development of a given region were representative, towards the nodal function of cities. In his major and seminal work on “material civilisation’ (the first part of which was published in 1967) Braudel formulated the essential function of cities as such: “Pas de ville sans marché et pas de marchés régionaux ou nationaux sans villes (…) Enfin, pas de villes sans pouvoir à la fois protecteur et coercitif”.8 In other words: no city without [a] market and no city either without power to protect and to coerce. The market and the institutions: Pirenne could easily have signed this sentence. In close relation to all this, an even more important German tradition was at work. This line of thinking reached back to the 1880s with works by Tönnies, von Gierke, Schmoller and Lamprecht, the last being of utmost influence on Pirenne for one thing. It culminated in the years before and shortly after World War One in the works of the sociologist/historian Max Weber (1864-1920), whose ideal type of the western city – most perfectly realised in the late mediaeval North – was not only characterized in the first place, as in Pirenne’s view, by its market functions, but also by its corporative capacity to produce and execute its own laws and regulations. A central element in the coming about of the mediaeval city was the typical mediaeval coniuratio read as a symptom of what Weber labelled a “herrschaftsfremde Charisma”, a form of emotional community building based on a mutual contract. It is clear he elaborates in this vision von Gierke’s notion of free unity (Freie Einung). Weber’s example or the historical constellation he had in mind in conceiving his ideal type was the Italian commune in its most classical form dating back to the thirteenth century, the period of the so-called “popular” regimes. His search in the posthumously published and unfinished book “Die Stadt” (the city) was to look for a

This feeling is clearly brought to our attention in La fine della ‘grande illusione’: Cinzio Violante, 1997. A review of this book by Pierre Toubert, 2001. More recently a German version was published containing an important introduction on Violante by Giorgio Cracco, 2004. 8 Fernand Braudel, 1979, 423. 7

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clear holistic synthesis between power relations, law, economy and religion.9 Weber’s “the city” was published in August 1921 from the writings he had left behind in the journal “Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik” under the title “Die Stadt. Eine soziologische Untersuchung”. The criteria Weber used to define a city were: a defensive organisation, market, a proper justice and law, self-government. As is made clear in the recent overview of German-language mediaeval historiography in the twentieth century, the immediate aftermath of the Great War and the years of the Weimar period (not to mention the period of fascism) were not very prosperous for the acceptance of the legacy of both the tradition of historicism and of Max Weber.10 With regard to urban history one is entitled to expect similar intellectual effects and hindrances to have been effective in the Iberian peninsula where both in Spain and in Portugal late variations of fascist governments were influential concerning the agenda of research in both history and the social sciences in general. Focusing on urban elites, the notion of the “patrician city” so central to Weber’s views comes to the foreground.11 Also applied to the former Low Countries and the great cities of mediaeval Flanders, which had been so essential for the development of the theses of Henri Pirenne, the notion of “patriciate” has been crucial, with the influential study on the patriciate of Ghent by Frans Blockmans as the best known example.12 A similar need to define and elucidate essential historical notions has been brought to the foreground again in the context of what is now commonly known as the “linguistic turn”. Most influential in this and similar quests for clear definitions has been the so-called “Begriffsgeschichte” (“conceptual history”) as propagated by such authors as the late Reinhart Koselleck.13 A similar need to clarify and to avoid the semantic trap is reflected by the activities of the Dutch doctoral school named after another influential historian of the generation of Pirenne, Johan Huizinga.14 Its research agenda includes the effort to study the evolution of such crucial notions for the national Dutch history as “fatherland”, “republic”, “freedom” and also - and of great significance for the study of the particular development which has shaped the old Low Countries (present day Belgium and the Netherlands) – the notion of “burgher”. It is clear that with this peculiar and crucial notion also that of “patriciate” and the whole discussion concerning late mediaeval urban elite groups Klaus Schreiner 1986; Gerhard Dilcher 1998; more recent with abundant references to an equally abundant literature on Weber and his theories: Benjamin Scheller, 2005. 10 P. Moraw, R. Schieffer (eds.) 2005 and Otto.G. Oexle 2001, passim and 1992. 11 The basic study remains: Max Weber, 1921. A French author has abundantly glossed on the notion of ‘patriciate’ from a strongly sociological point of view: Yves Barel 1977, to be completed in the same intellectual tradition with Thierry Dutour 2003. 12 Frans Blockmans 1938. 13 Proof of this great attention for semantic realities: the notion itself of ‘Begriffsgeschichte’ has been retained in the very French lexicon Reinhart Koselleck 2004, 16-17. Several of Koselleck’s works have been translated into French: R. Kosseleck 1990, 1997. 14 I have elaborated both similarities and differences between the approaches by Pirenne and Huizinga: see the introductory chapter in my forthcoming book Marc Boone 2009 ; the first introductory chapter is entitled : ‘L’automne du moyen âge’ : Johan Huizinga et Henri Pirenne ou ‘plusieurs vérités pour la même chose’. 9

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come to the foreground.15 The effort to work with a clear definition is essential for any real comparative approach. An attempt to engage in such an undertaking, in the case of the much compared towns of both “Flanders” (here in the broad sense representing the Low Countries) and Northern and Central Italy (more on this comparison further on), has made one thing clear. Similar developments towards for instance a more “patrician” or a more “communal” organisation of the urban elite may have been the case in both geographical entities; they did not, however, occur within the same chronological boundaries. In the case of Flanders, for instance, one is still, albeit with some criticism, entitled to speak of a “patrician” period in the development of urban elites. At least this period held on till the effects of the battle of the Golden Spurs (1302) became clear, first and foremost in the context of the old county of Flanders. Among these effects does count the final break-through of representatives of the craft guilds and of middling groups in general, thus enlarging the ruling groups within the cities. Up till then the latter were in the grip of a much restricted social and economic elite. 16 Another important renewal of urban history has been induced in the course of the nineties of the twentieth century by the so-called “cultural and spatial turn” in itself a further development of the much commented upon linguistic turn, avoiding however the asphyxiating relativism that often accompanied the latter. One should not be too surprised to learn that again the much studied urban networks of both late mediaeval Italy and “Flanders” have inspired many new directions. The remarkable syntheses published between 1997 and 2007 by Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan of Italian urban history first focusing on Venice, and gradually enlarged in order to encompass the Italian city in general from the thirteenth century on, have enriched the dossier, by proposing what she herself calls “une lecture et relecture” of urban history. Space and the social practices engendered by the urban space and the urban contexts are put in the foreground so as to provide a meaning to the urban space itself. 17 This meaning remains subjected to evolution and change through the effects of the social practices that are supposed to underpin them, in her own words: “la ville de Vénise peut être saisie, on le verra, comme le code même de l’histoire vénitienne, puisqu’elle fut progressivement construite comme un espace produisant du temps, fabriquant et pensant donc l’imaginaire d’une durée transcendée”.18 Quite a similar analysis has been presented concerning, this time, the great cities of the former Low Countries, or of “Flanders” if one sticks to this denomination. Thanks to the initiative of a mixed AmericanBelgian research group, it led in 2002 to the publication of a thematic issue of the Journal of Interdisciplinary History, bearing the meaningful title Fertile Spaces: The Productivity of Urban Space in Northern Europe. 19 In these texts, again, urban space was “read” as a tool to produce meaning and significance for those involved or J. Kloek and Karin Tilmans 2002, passim. The criticisms were essentially the work of one author: Alain Derville 1997, 127. 17 Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan 2001, to be completed by its chronological follow-up: 2007. The former books on Venice include 1999 and 1997. 18 Ibid. 1999, 11. 19 Arnade, Peter; Howell, Marta and Simons Walter 2002, (contributions concerning the Low Countries’ cities were due to Marc Boone, L. Milis and H. Pleij). 15 16

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undergoing the process. Shortly before, the same questionnaire was guiding some of the sessions of one of the biennial conferences of the “European association of Urban Historians” held in Venice September 2-3, 1998. 20 In the line of this historiographic tradition a deliberately targeted comparative approach involving the cities of “Flanders” and of Italy was attempted during a similar meeting and session at the Athens conference of 2004. Specific elements were selected in order to be subjected to a deliberate comparative approach: urban demography, urban religion, collective memories, political power and the representation of urban space. In a follow-up conference, held in Florence early 2006, each of these topics treated in a first draft by an expert on Italian and Flemish urban history was in a second reading commented upon by a renowned specialist. These texts, the syntheses by the experts and the comments, finally constituted the back-bone of a joint publication. 21 Far from being the final and even less to be the exclusive possible model, this approach presents a possible outcome to attain the much-preached ideal but seldom realised comparative and interdisciplinary approach. At the very least it permits reformulating the questions that matter or in the words of one of the earliest and most sincere promoters of comparative history, Marc Bloch, “à poser des points d’interrogations nouveaux”. 22 Having read the preceding texts concerning the elites in the mediaeval cities of the Iberian peninsula, one can not yet expect the comparison to attain a similar level. However, several elements of a possible comparative approach are presented here, and they may constitute a starting point for further research. The fundamental basis of each of the articles, the often extremely rich fiscal and judicial sources produced both by town oligarchies and by the different royal powers involved, allows for optimism. One should, to start, make a clear distinction between several types of cities involved. Inland oriented towns, “condemned” to function in the first place as nodes of a regional (and mainly agriculturally based) economy, do offer more limited chances for the development of a combatant urban elite, dealing in and exchanging not only goods, but also fiscal products and hence political influence and power. The farmers of Burgos’ taxes seem to offer a different behaviour corresponding to a local variant on the theme of “the betrayal of the bourgeoisie” as Yolanda Guerrero Navarrete’s text seems to suggest, than their Barcelonese counterparts. For the latter the evident link to international commerce, and hence to another level of capital The texts of this particular session were published afterwards: Marc Boone and Peter Stabel (eds) 2000. A follow-up theme concentrating on the theories of the French geographer-urban planologist Henry Lefebvre will be at the core of a session during the congress of Lyon (August 2008, organised by C. Billen, M. Boone and M. Howell). 21 See the final publication: Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan, Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin (eds) 2008. 22 In the fundamental text in which Bloch pleads for a comparative history not confined to what he labelled ‘une chasse aux ressemblances’ , he refers not without coincidence to Henri Pirenne’s studies in urban history. See the reedition of his text 1928 in Marc Bloch (éd. A. Becker, E. Bloch) 2006, 347-380, (originally the text of a talk given at the ‘VIth International congress of historical sciences’, held in 1929 in Oslo). Comparative history involving the Italian cities is of course not confined to a comparison with cities of the former Low Countries: see for instance: Giorgio Chittolini Peter Johanek 2003. 20

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accumulation, financial techniques and international commercial networks, offered several windows of opportunity, not available to elites of smaller inland cities, confined also within the mountains surrounding their cities. Several models of how cities function in the context of a growing royal state – and all of the political constructions (Aragon, Navarra, Castile, Granada) tend to become such a construction – are available. The intensity with which the elite of a city aims at “independence” and at a bargaining position in relationship to royal power, a parameter which seems to apply best to the case of the Barcelonese elite, makes one think of Charles Tilly’s capital intensive path to state formation (in opposition to the coercion intensive path); the absence of internal conflicts and a dominant atmosphere of cohesion and peace bring Bertrand Chevalier’s “bonnes villes” in mind.23 Can we therefore reduce the development of the elites in the former mediaeval cities of the Iberian peninsula to a mere variation of well-known evolutions abundantly documented for other parts of mediaeval Europe? The excellent contribution by Angel Galan Sánchez on the position of the muslim populations in the context of the newly founded Christian kingdom of Granada is there to remind us of the possible and fundamental effects of the need to integrate non-believers in an urban and state organisation justified through Christianity. In short, an almost “colonial” experience of how fiscal and ideological identities confer status, but one that also suggest possible strategies and thus possible trajectories of societal development. It is clear that one did not have to wait for the return of Columbus’ ships to experiment with colonial strategies in the context of what was gradually becoming a Spanish monarchical state. Is this experience too exclusive, too original? Not necessarily: again comparisons with the fate of former Slav populations in the territories controlled by the German Order in the Baltic, or that of the Irish towns and suburbs assigned to the original Celtic population under English rule, may illustrate how similar causes do not necessarily lead to comparable outcomes, and thus allow processes to become visible. It is in this perspective refreshing that, in the margin of the real subject under scrutiny, several authors (Flocel Sabaté on Catalonian cities, María Asenjo González on the cities of Castile to name but two) do deconstruct former all too easily formulated general views based on a clearly nineteenth century optimistic Whig vision on social and political history. For dealing with mediaeval history implies taking on the burden of several decades of “scientific” research, often worthwhile (if only for the edition of sources) but as often marked by not always explicit ideological choices and hidden layers of meaning. That in several of the contributions Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu but also “older” celebrities such as Wilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca do lurk over the shoulders of the present contributors is comforting. Are we not all, as the mediaeval statement goes, “dwarfs on the shoulders of giants”? Saint-Beauzire in Auvergne, July 2008 Notions which can be found both in Charles Tilly 1990 and in Bernard Chevalier 1982a, and 1985, both reedited in his collection 1995.

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Glossary of Technical Terms Alacer [Tax on cereals and all kind of fruits levied at ten per cent in the Nazarí Sultanate of Granada] Alcabala/alcabala del pan [The most important royal rent. It was an indirect tax on trading activities and products like bread (pan)] Alcaide [Governor of the city’s citadel] Alcalde [Mayor] Alcalde mayor [Officer of the Town Council, appointed by the Crown, whose competences are not yet well known in the case of the city of Granada] Alguacil [Representative of the Muslims conquered communities before the Castilians conquerors] Aljama [Spanish version of the Arabic word to name the Muslim community placed in each city or rural village] Almaguana [Tax on agricultural lands for an amount of 2,5 per cent in the Nazarí Sultanate of Granada] Almaicería [Spanish version of the Arabic word to name the upper floor of a house with independent access] Almirante [The lord’s delegate in some Navarrese Frankish boroughs – those of Pamplona –; his duty is related with the putting of justice into practice, or the maintenance of public order. Its equivalent in the civitas is the ‘preboste’] Almotacén [Officer in charge of the surveillance of the market’s city in Muslim Spain] Arrendador Mayor [Farmer major] Arrendadores de rentas concejiles y reales [Farmers of urban and royal rents] Barra [Urban rent. It was the most important source of ordinary incomes for Burgos’ budget] Bastero [He is the person who makes packsaddles] Borough [Always refers to San Saturnino – Saint Sernin –, the first new borough officially founded near the civitas of Pamplona at the beginning of the twelfth century, and supposedly restricted for foreign population. The second borough, San Nicolás, is always mentioned as ‘La Población’] Broters [Butchers] Burellería: [From ‘burellero’, a kind of weaver, it’s the name of the district related with this occupation in the Borough (San Saturnino)] Burellero or ‘Burullero’ [‘weaver of cloth’; a word of French origin derived from bourrellere. The cloth of the ‘burelleros’ was rougher than that of other weavers such as the later ‘tecenderos’ (apparently documented from the mid-fourteenth century), whose products were more delicate] Cabezalero [Executor of a will] Cadí [Spanish version of the Arabic word to name a Muslim faqih appointed by the Sultan to act as judge. After the conquest of Granada, the Castilians Kings made the appointments] Cloths [Pieces of woollen cloth] 195

GLOSSARY

Collación [Urban district linked to a church parrish] Común de la ciudad [The city dwellers] Contador Mayor [Accountant major] Contador Real [Royal Accountant] Cornado [Coin. The fourth part of a blanca = 0,5 maravedies] Cuatropea [Urban rent in Burgos on cattle transactions] Corregidor [Governor of the city and its district with judicial, civil and military competences, appointed by the Crown] Council of the Twenty [The union between the boroughs of Pamplona was permanently established between the Councils of San Saturnino and San Nicolás in 1271; each one kept its own mayor, but a body of twenty councillors was formed] Councillors [Or ‘jurados’, the representative municipal government in the ‘Frankish’ bouroughs] Cortes [The legislative assembly as the Parliament] Ducados [Gold coin valued 375 maravedíes] Farda [Tax, originally imposed over the conquered Muslim population to afford the expenses of the coastline defence system. After the general conversions to Christianity of the Muslims in the Kingdom of Granada its payment was extended to the Old Christian Population] Fieles de las rentas concejiles y reales [Wardens of urban and royal rents] Florín [A gold coin from Aragon: 44 maravedies in 1400 and 265 maravedies in 1486] Franco: [People that enjoyed the benefits of a ‘fuero de francos’ (Franks’ charter). The definition has often been related to the Franks' status as foreigners – Frank is made equivalent to ‘French’ or at least to ‘ultrapirenaico’ (the other side of the Pyrenees) – that should be considered very carefully, at least in Navarre. The following terms appear as a synonym in contemporary sources: liber, francus, ingenuus, which define the individual within a perfectly differentiated social group from the nobility – infanzón – and the peasants; the foreigner (French) is referred to as francigenae. It is considered as a socio-legal denomination rather than an ethnic one] Fuero de Francos [(Franks’ charter) Charters aimed at freeing the population from manorial charges, enabling and encouraging the more strictly urban functions and the constitution of a real autonomous government. In Navarre, they are different from other charters or ‘fueros’ given in frontier lands, which do not grant the same benefits, and also different form other charters or ‘fueros’ given to peasant comunities in order to organize their manorial obligations] Fuqaha [Arabic plural of faqih, man devoted to the study of Koranic texts, Muslims laws and traditions] Galochero [Should be the person who makes ‘galochas’ (galoshes - a word of French origin), which are a type of wooden overshoe] Geliz [Coming from the Hispano-Muslim tradition the geliz was the Officer in charge of the control of the Silk Market Alcaicería, registering qualities of the silk,

196

GLOSARY

royal taxes, names of the producers and buyers and others functions. Appointed by the Corregidor they were always of Muslim origin (moriscos)] Haber de peso / segunda venta de haber de peso [Urban rent levied on goods sold by weight, even when the sale was made outside the urban market] Hidalguía [Noble condition and privilege conceded by the Crown to become member of the lesser Castilian nobility] Infanzón: [A generic word which in Navarre and Castile refers to the nobility, specifically to the lower nobility]. Jurado [Representative before the City Council of the common people of the town, without the right to vote the decisions of this institution] Libramiento [Order of payment made out by the town council] Libros de Repartimiento [Allotment Books made by the Christians conquerors that listed the properties conceded to Old Christian repopulators in the Kingdom of Granada] Maravedíes [Castilian money of remote Islamic origin what was used in Later Middle Ages mainly as accountancy unit]. Marcos de plata [It looks like a coin, but doesn’t work as it. As accountancy unit its value is unknown] Mayordomo [Town receiver and manager of urban rents] Merínies [Members of a Muslim Dynasty who ruled in Morocco during the XIVth and XVth Centuries] Moneda forera [A royal tax exacted from the kingdom every seven years] Morisco [Mudéjar in the spanish kingdoms after conversion to christianity] Mudéjar [Muslims submitted to the Spanish Medieval Kings] Navarrería (of Pamplona): [The original civitas of Pamplona, a bishopric and jurisdictional domain of the bishop from at least the end of the tenth century until 1319. In the thirteenth century it receives a Chart like that of San Nicolás] Navarros: [In Medieval Navarre it does not refer to the Kingdom’s people, as a Gentilic name, but to the peasants. They are a dependent population, obligated to several manorial charges and duties] Nazarí [Dynasty of the Sultans of Granada, who covered the whole life of the Kingdom between the XIIIth and the XVth Centuries] Pedido [Royal additional tax in Castile approuved by the ‘Cortes’ (see Cortes) Primicias: [Ecclesiastical tribute which is usually paid in the spring, with the first harvests] Procurador del concejo [Town clerk representing the city dwellers] Real/Reales [Silver coin valued 6 to 8 maravedíes in 1400, 31 maravedies in 1486 and 34 maravedíes at the beginning of the XVI Century] Receptores de rentas concejiles y reales [Collectors of urban and royal rents] Regidor [Town councillor] Regimiento [The urban closed council] Renta de la cuatropea [A royal tax on the sale of flocks] Renta de las joyas [A royal tax on the commercialization of jewellery]

197

GLOSSARY

Renta de las joyas, peletería y segunda venta de haber de peso [A royal tax on the commercialization of jewels and furs with a surtax charge on the renta de haber de peso] Renta de los paños [A royal tax on the commercialization of clothes] Renta de peletería: [A royal tax on the furrier’s fur shop] Renta del Haber de Peso [An urban rent taxing those commodities sold by weight, such as flour, rice etc.] Renta del hierro y herrajes [A royal tax on the commercialization of iron products] Renta del pan [A royal tax on the sale of bread grain] Rentas del Rey [Royal taxes] Repostero del Rey [King’s Confectioner] Ricohombre [From the higest nobility, traditionaly there are 12 ‘ricoshombres’, although the number may not be fulfilled] Secretario Real [Royal Secretary] Servicios [Extraordinary tax offered to the Castilians Kings by the conquered Muslims from 1496 onwards up to 1568] Sisa/sisas [Urban rents taxing products of sales] Sisa de la carne [An urban rent taxing the sale of meat] Sisa de las heredades [An urban rent taxing the sale of rural lands] Sisa del vino blanco [An urban rent on the trading of white wine] Sisa del vino blanco y de Madrigal [An urban rent taxing the sale of white wine from Burgos and wine from the town of Madrigal, which was Burgos’ most important wine supplier] Tecenderos [Weavers of fine cloths] Vecinos [Dwellers with full legal rights and head of family in the fiscal sense of the term] Veinticuatros/Regidores [Named in Granada ‘veinticuatros’ like in Seville and others Castilian cities. Town councillors]

198