NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017. [(2017 Edition)] 9780455500492, 0455500495

Citation preview

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited 19 Harris Street PYRMONT NSW 2009 Tel: (02) 8587 7000 Fax: (02) 8587 7100 [email protected] www.thomsonreuters.com.au For all customer inquiries please ring 1300 304 195 (for calls within Australia only) INTERNATIONAL AGENTS & DISTRIBUTORS NORTH AMERICA Thomson Reuters Eagan United States of America

ASIA PACIFIC Thomson Reuters Sydney Australia

LATIN AMERICA Thomson Reuters São Paulo Brazil

EUROPE Thomson Reuters London United Kingdom

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017 General Editors

The Hon John P HAMILTON QC Former Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and

The Hon Justice Geoff LINDSAY Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and

Michael MORAHAN OAM Acting Local Court Magistrate and

Carol WEBSTER SC Senior Counsel, New South Wales Bar

Lawbook Co. 2017

Published in Sydney by Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited Level 6, 19 Harris Street, Pyrmont, NSW 2009 First edition ...........................................................................................2011 Second edition ......................................................................................2012 Third edition .........................................................................................2013 Fourth edition .......................................................................................2014 Fifth edition ..........................................................................................2015 Sixth edition .........................................................................................2016 Seventh edition .....................................................................................2017 National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry New South Wales Civil Procedure Handbook 2017 John P. Hamilton, Geoff Lindsay, Michael Morahan and Carol Webster Seventh edition ISBN: 978-0-455-50049-2 Civil procedure--New South Wales. 2. Court rules--New South Wales. 3. Civil law--New South Wales

© 2017 Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited This publication is copyright. Other than for the purposes of and subject to the conditions prescribed under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Copyright of NSW legislative material: Copyright continues to reside in the State of NSW. Project Editors: Ariel Galapo, Vanessa Schlenert Editorial and Production Team: Angela Bandiera, Patrick Harper, Catherine Yan Product Developer: Catherine Fitzgerald Index: Puddingburn

PEFC/21-31-17

This book has been printed on paper certified by the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). PEFC is committed to sustainable forest management through third party forest certification of responsibly managed forests.

PREFACE This is the seventh edition of the New South Wales Civil Procedure Handbook, published annually since 2011. The fifth edition in 2015 provided an opportunity to reflect on not only the tenth anniversary of the Civil Procedure legislation, but also the twentieth anniversary of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 15 August 2015 marked the tenth anniversary of the commencement of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (CPA) and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, which was a landmark in the history of civil procedure in New South Wales. The CPA and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) each marked a substantial change in approach to the laws vitally important to the conduct of litigation in NSW Courts. The intention of the Civil Procedure legislation was to provide a common set of procedures for those State courts hearing civil proceedings. At the time of its enactment, there was seen to be a need for courts to reassert control over the litigation process, in the interests of a due administration of justice, conscious of access to justice, costs and efficiency issues. Court administration embraced “case management” philosophy at about the same time as everybody became increasingly aware of a need to adapt to a society preoccupied with computers and their derivatives. The regime now applies not only to the Supreme Court, District Court and Local Courts (the initial participating courts) but also the Dust Diseases Tribunal of NSW, civil proceedings in certain classes in the Land and Environment Court, and all civil proceedings in the Industrial Relations Commission. All of those courts are exhorted to consider the overriding purpose found in s 56 of the CPA to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the dispute or proceedings. Access to justice, particularly in regional areas, is enhanced by the options now available through modern technology, including video recording facilities, online registry capabilities and virtual courtrooms.1 Amendments during the last year to Part 3 of the UCPR2 reflect the extension of the electronic case management system Online Registry to the Land and Environment Court. One of the Editors has described the single most important feature of the civil procedure reforms of 2005 as: Elevation of the concept of purpose into prominence by its enactment as section 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). This legislative statement of an “overriding purpose” provides a constant challenge to all participants in civil proceedings, across jurisdictions, to test what is done, or not done, against the perennial questions: “Why do this?” “How can we do it better?” A purposive approach to case management, authoritatively sanctioned, is calculated to save us all (lawyers and litigants) from the natural, but sometimes stifling, appeal of rule-based technicality.3 Any success attending the Civil Procedure legislation is due, in large part, to the preparedness of judges, lawyers and litigants to use it, constructively, to recast expectations about the way civil disputes are dealt with. In managing civil proceedings the importance of active judicial case management informed by the overriding purpose cannot be understated. It is frequently the subject of extra-judicial writing.4 In addition, the civil procedure jurisprudence is replete with examples of decisions in which the courts emphasise as well the duties on parties to civil proceedings and their legal representatives to assist the court to further the overriding purpose. This was strongly emphasised by the High Court in Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 46 (2013) 250 CLR 303. In the search for an understanding of how the dynamics of civil litigation operate, there remains much to explore.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

v

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

With the abolition of civil jury trials, processes of curial determination by judges sitting alone, the embrace of case management attitudes of mind, and the ubiquity of directions hearings in all courts, the very concept of a “trial” (a once and for all hearing on a particular day) has been displaced by incremental steps, unheralded and often unnoticed.5 Just as we have re-fashioned the concept of a “trial”, so there have been other accommodations in the litigation process. There have been substantial changes in the approach to discovery. With the practical abolition of “general discovery”, courts have been, perhaps, more liberal in allowing the use of subpoenas and notices to produce in lieu of Equity’s traditional processes for the discovery of documents (“discovery”) and discovery of facts (interrogatories). Supreme Court Practice Note SC Eq 11 was introduced in June 2013 with the expressed intention of ensuring the proportionality of the costs of discovery, generally deferring discovery until after parties have served their evidence. The manner in which expert evidence is now given frequently involves experts giving evidence concurrently, with active judicial case management to restrict the expert evidence to that which will assist the court in determination of the real issues in the proceedings. We may expect case management increasingly to involve judicial scrutiny of the need for particular expert evidence.6 Much of what we do in the conduct of civil litigation, especially under a regime of “case management” is about managing expectations in a variety of approaches to problem-solving. In a legal community, of which we all form part, this is an ongoing conversation.

The Hon John P Hamilton QC Former Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales The Hon Justice Geoff Lindsay Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales Michael Morahan OAM Acting Local Court Magistrate Carol Webster SC Senior Counsel, New South Wales Bar 20 March 2017 1 As noted by Chief Justice Bathurst in a speech at Newcastle: TF Bathurst, Access to justice in regional New South Wales (Newcastle Business Club Monthly Luncheon, 19 April 2016) available at http:// www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/SCO2_publications/SCO2_judicialspeeches/sco2_speeches_ chiefjustice.aspx (accessed 13 March 2017). 2 Uniform Civil Procedure Rule (Amendment No 76) 2016 (255), commencing 20 May 2016. (255) 3 See Kumar M and Legg M (eds), Ten years of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW): a decade of insights and guide to future litigation, (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2015), Ch 3 para [3.10]. 4 For recent examples, the speech given by Chief Justice Bathurst: Bathurst TF, Three contemporary issues in Civil Litigation: Expert evidence, Discovery and alternative dispute resolution (NSW Bar Association 2016 Personal Injury and Common Law Conference, 5 March 2016), available at http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/SCO2_ publications/SCO2_judicialspeeches/sco2_speeches_chiefjustice.aspx (accessed 14 March 2016); Kumar M and Legg M (eds), Ten years of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW): a decade of insights and guide to future litigation, (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2015), various chapters. 5 Spigelman JJ, Truth and the Law (2011) 85 Australian Law Journal 746 at 751–752. 6 See for example, Bathurst TF, above n2 at [34]–[35].

vi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ................................................................................................................................................ v About this Publication ......................................................................................................................... xi Table of Recent Amendments ........................................................................................................... xix Table of Cases ................................................................................................................................. xxiii CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT 2005........................................................................................................... 1 CIVIL PROCEDURE REGULATION 2012....................................................................................... 155 DELEGATIONS.................................................................................................................................173 UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 2005................................................................................ 193 Part 1 – Preliminary ........................................................................................................................ 227 Part 2 – Case management generally ............................................................................................ 247 Part 3 – Electronic case management ........................................................................................... 249 Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents ................................................................................. 258 Part 5 – Preliminary discovery and inspection ............................................................................... 279 Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance ..................................................................... 287 Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation ...................................................................... 338 Part 8 – Venue ................................................................................................................................ 383 Part 9 – Cross-claims ..................................................................................................................... 386 Part 10 – Service of documents generally ..................................................................................... 396 Part 11 – Service of documents outside Australia and service of external process ...................... 423 Part 11A – Service under the Hague Convention .......................................................................... 437 Part 12 – Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process ........... 451 Part 13 – Summary disposal .......................................................................................................... 467 Part 14 – Pleadings ........................................................................................................................ 478 Part 15 – Particulars ....................................................................................................................... 508 Part 16 – Default judgment ............................................................................................................. 527 Part 17 – Admissions ...................................................................................................................... 543 Part 18 – Motions ............................................................................................................................ 552 Part 19 – Amendment ..................................................................................................................... 563 Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing .................................................................... 567 Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents ............................................... 599 Part 22 – Interrogatories .................................................................................................................. Part 23 – Medical examinations and inspection of property .......................................................... 6 Part 24 – Taking evidence otherwise than at trial .......................................................................... 639 Part 25 – Interim preservation ........................................................................................................ 649 Part 26 – Receivers ........................................................................................................................ 664

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

vii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 27 – Disposal of land .............................................................................................................. 674 Part 28 – Separate decision of questions and consolidation ......................................................... 677 Part 29 – Trials ................................................................................................................................ 683 Part 30 – Assessment of damages and value of goods ................................................................ 691 Part 31 – Evidence ......................................................................................................................... 695 Part 32 – Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Commonwealth) ................................................ 778 Part 33 – Subpoenas ...................................................................................................................... 788 Part 34 – Notices to produce at hearing ........................................................................................ 808 Part 35 – Affidavits .......................................................................................................................... 813 Part 36 – Judgments and orders .................................................................................................... 828 Part 37 – Time to pay and payment by instalments ....................................................................... 857 Part 38 – Examination of judgment debtor etc ............................................................................... 868 Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments .............................................................................................. 879 Part 40 – Additional measures for enforcing judgments and orders of the Supreme Court and District Court ........................................................................................................................................... 928 Part 41 – Funds in court ................................................................................................................. 937 Part 42 – Costs ............................................................................................................................... 950 Part 43 – Interpleader proceedings .............................................................................................. 1016 Part 44 – Transfer of proceedings ................................................................................................ 1028 Part 45 – Specialist lists ............................................................................................................... 1035 Part 46 – Accounts and inquiries .................................................................................................. 1048 Part 47 – Matters arising under the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 ......................................... 1058 Part 48 – Matters arising under Commonwealth intellectual property legislation ........................ 1064 Part 49 – Reference and removal of proceedings, and appeals and reviews, within the court ... 1072 Part 50 – Appeals to the court ...................................................................................................... 1091 Part 51 – Court of Appeal ............................................................................................................. 1117 Part 52 – Taking evidence for foreign and Australian courts and tribunals .................................. 1144 Part 53 – Matters arising under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 of the Commonwealth .......... 1151 Part 54 – Administration of estates and execution of trusts ......................................................... 1170 Part 55 – Matters arising under the Trustee Act 1925 ................................................................. 1174 Part 56 – Matters arising under the Adoption Act 2000 ............................................................... 1181 Part 56A – Matters arising under the Surrogacy Act 2010 ........................................................... 1193 Part 57 – Matters arising under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 or Guardianship Act 1987 ................................................................................................................................... 1197 Part 58 – Representative proceedings ......................................................................................... 1209 Part 59 – Judicial Review Proceedings ........................................................................................ 1210 Schedule 1 – Application of rules ................................................................................................. 1213 Schedule 2 – Local rules that prevail over these rules ................................................................ 1216 Schedule 3 – Fees and other prescribed amounts ...................................................................... 1217 Schedule 6 – Service outside of Australia without leave ............................................................. 1218 Schedule 7 – Expert witness code of conduct ............................................................................. 1220 Schedule 8 – Assignment of business in the Supreme Court ..................................................... 1222 Schedule 9 – Assignment of business in the District Court ......................................................... 1230 Schedule 10 – Provisions regarding procedure under particular legislation ................................ 1231 viii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Schedule 11 – Provisions regarding procedure in certain lists in the District Court .................... 1242 Schedule 12 – Savings and Transitional Provisions .................................................................... 1257 Dictionary ...................................................................................................................................... 1258 EVIDENCE ACT 1995 (ANNOTATED)...........................................................................................1263 EVIDENCE REGULATION 2015.................................................................................................... 1369 EVIDENCE (AUDIO AND AUDIO VISUAL LINKS) ACT 1998..................................................... 1377 EVIDENCE (AUDIO AND AUDIO VISUAL LINKS) REGULATION 2015..................................... 1395 EVIDENCE ON COMMISSION ACT 1995.....................................................................................1399 SUPREME COURT ACT 1970 [EXTRACTS]................................................................................1415 SUPREME COURT RULES 1970.................................................................................................. 1473 SUPREME COURT (CORPORATIONS) RULES 1999................................................................. 1687 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE NOTES....................................................................................... 1691 DISTRICT COURT ACT 1973 [EXTRACTS]................................................................................. 1871 DISTRICT COURT RULES 1973................................................................................................... 1977 DISTRICT COURT PRACTICE NOTES.........................................................................................2031 LOCAL COURT ACT 2007 [EXTRACTS]..................................................................................... 2055 LOCAL COURT RULES 2009 [EXTRACTS]................................................................................ 2065 LOCAL COURT PRACTICE NOTES.............................................................................................2073 Index .............................................................................................................................................. 2091

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

ix

ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION SCOPE OF THIS WORK NSW Civil Procedure Handbook provides the convenience of a single volume work that can be taken to court, is easy to navigate and can be used to access multiple points of reference simultaneously. It includes core practice legislation and rules as well as guidance and interpretation in the form of annotations specifically designed to communicate the most relevant interpretation and guidance to the UCPR regime. LEGISLATION NSW Civil Procedure Handbook contains the following legislation: • Civil Procedure Act 2005; • Civil Procedure Regulation 2012; • District Court Act 1973 [Extracts]; • District Court Rules 1973; • Evidence Act 1995; • Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998; • Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Regulation 2015; • Evidence on Commission Act 1995; • Evidence Regulation 2015; • Local Court Act 2007 [Extracts]; • Local Court Rules 2009 [Extracts]; • Supreme Court Act 1970 [Extracts]; • Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999 (excluding Sch 1); • Supreme Court Rules 1970 (excluding Schs F–G1); and • Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. CURRENCY The Acts, regulations and rules have been updated to include all available amendments to 20 March 2017. For the full amendment history of each of the Acts, regulations and rules reproduced in this work, please refer to the relevant Table of Amending Legislation that accompanies each piece of legislation. For those Acts that contain extracts only, the Table of Amending Legislation lists the most recent amendment to that Act with the date of gazettal/assent/registration and commencement details. LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS IN THIS EDITION NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017 takes account of the amendments listed below. Civil Procedure Act 2005 • Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 – Act 50 of 2015 • Industrial Relations Amendment (Industrial Court) Act 2016 – Act 48 of 2016 Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 • Civil Procedure Amendment (Fees) Regulation 2016 – Reg 395 of 2016 • Industrial Relations Amendment (Industrial Court) Act 2016 – Act 48 of 2016 District Court Act 1973 • Courts Legislation Amendment (Disrespectful Behaviour) Act 2016 – Act 26 of 2016 • Justice Portfolio Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2016 – Act 54 of 2016 • Regulatory and Other Legislation (Amendments and Repeals) Act 2016 – Act 60 of 2016

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Regulation 2015 • Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Amendment (Bail Matters) Regulation 2016 – Reg 769 of 2016 Evidence on Commission Act 1995 • Industrial Relations Amendment (Industrial Court) Act 2016 – Act 48 of 2016 Local Court Act 2007 • Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 – Act 50 of 2015 Local Court Rules 2009 • Local Court (Amendment No 7) Rule 2016 – Rule 619 of 2016 Supreme Court Act 1970 • Industrial Relations Amendment (Industrial Court) Act 2016 – Act 48 of 2016 • Justice Portfolio Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2016 – Act 54 of 2016 • Regulatory and Other Legislation (Amendments and Repeals) Act 2016 – Act 60 of 2016 Supreme Court Rules 1970 • Supreme Court (Amendment No 429) Rule 2016 – Rule 534 of 2016 • Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2016 – Act 55 of 2016 • Supreme Court (Amendment No 430) Rule 2016 – Rule 714 of 2016 Uniform • • • • • • • •

Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment

No No No No No No No No

76) 77) 78) 79) 80) 81) 82) 83)

Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule

2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016

– – – – – – – –

Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule

255 578 621 622 715 753 754 755

of of of of of of of of

2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016

HISTORY NOTES The history notes have been entered into an abbreviated form using the number and year of the amending Act or regulation and a descriptor (eg. “insrt”) to show the effect of the amending Act or regulation. The abbreviations used in the historical notes are as follows: • insrt – inserted • am – amended • subst – substituted • rep – repealed • exp – expired • reinsrt – reinserted • renum – renumbered • reloc – relocated Example: History note under subsection 18(3C) of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW): [Subs (3C) insrt Act 54 of 2016, Sch 1.8[2]] This note indicates that subsection (3C) was inserted in section 18 by Act 54 of 2016, Schedule 1.8[2]. Details of the short title of the amending Act, assent/gazettal/registration and commencement dates are located in the Table of Amending Legislation following the Table of Provisions.

xii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

About this Publication

FUTURE COMMENCEMENTS Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Amending legislation

Number

Court Information Act Act 24 of 2010 2010

Date of gazettal/assent/ Date of commencement registration 26 May 2010 Sch 2.3: to be proclaimed.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS Civil Procedure Act 2005 • Motor Accident Injuries Bill 2017 – passed Legislative Assembly 29 Mar 2017; passed Legislative Council 29 Mar 2017 (awaiting asent). Sch 5.2 commences on a date to be proclaimed. ANNOTATIONS Annotations in this book have been taken from the Thomson Reuters subscription services, NSW Civil Procedure and NSW Civil Practice & Procedure – Local Courts Practice, as follows: Table 1. Annotations source Annotated Legislation Civil Procedure Act 2005 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Supreme Court Act 1970 [Extracts]

Source of Annotations NSW Civil Procedure NSW Civil Procedure

Contributors Various; see table below Various; see table below

NSW Civil Procedure

James Lemaire, Mark Walsh, Carol Webster and EJ O’Grady Supreme Court Rules 1970 NSW Civil Procedure James Lemaire and EJ O’Grady District Court Act 1973 [Extracts] NSW Civil Procedure E J O’Grady District Court Rules 1973 NSW Civil Procedure E J O’Grady Local Court Act 2007 NSW Civil Practice & Procedure – Michael Morahan Local Courts Practice Local Court Rules 2009 [Extracts] NSW Civil Practice & Procedure – Michael Morahan Local Courts Practice Table 2. Table of Contributors CPA Part 1 6

3

NSW Civil Procedure UCPR Part UCPR Title 1 Preliminary 2 Case management generally 3 Electronic case management 4 5 6 7 8 9

Preparation and filing of documents Preliminary discovery and inspection Commencing proceedings and appearance Parties to proceedings and representation Venue Cross-claims

10

Service of Documents Generally

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Author Carol Webster Michael McHugh Richard Macready and Jo Shepard Carol Webster Michael McHugh Carol Webster Carol Webster Ed Cox and Carol Webster Adrian Diethelm and Greg Sarginson Deborah Robinson and Josephine Kelly xiii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

CPA Part

NSW Civil Procedure UCPR Part UCPR Title 11 Service of Documents Outside Australia and Service of External Process 11A Service Under the Hague Convention 12

5

13 14 15 16

Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process Summary disposal Pleadings Particulars Default judgment

17

Admissions

18 19 20(1)

Motions Amendment Mediation

20(2)

Arbitration

20(3) 20(4) 20(6) 21 22 23

References to referees Compromise Acknowledgment of liquidated claim Discovery Interrogatories Medical examinations and inspection of property Taking Evidence Otherwise Interim preservation

24 25 26 27 28

2

xiv

Author Deborah Robinson and Josephine Kelly Sigrid Neumeuller and Mary-Ann de Mestre Carol Webster Carol Webster Michael McHugh Michael McHugh Steven Jupp and Mandy Tibbey Adrian Diethelm and Mandy Tibbey Melissa Fisher Michael McHugh Deborah Robinson and Mary-Ann de Mestre Peter Johnstone and Greg Sarginson Michelle Sanson Michael McHugh Michelle Sanson Michael McHugh Michael McHugh Melissa Fisher

29 30

Receivers Disposal of land Separate decision of questions and consolidation Trials Assessment of damages and value of goods

31 32 33

Evidence Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) Subpoenas

34

Notices to produce at hearing

35

Affıdavits

Greg Sarginson Adrian Diethelm and Mandy Tibbey Joanne Shepard Joanne Shepard Carol Webster Carol Webster Steven Jupp and Mandy Tibbey Mark Walsh Michelle Sanson Deborah Robinson and Josephine Kelly Hamish Stitt, Geoff Lindsay and Greg Sarginson Geoff Lindsay, Steven Jupp and Greg Sarginson

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

About this Publication

CPA Part 7

8

9 10

NSW Civil Procedure UCPR Part UCPR Title 36 Judgments and orders 37

Time to pay and payment by instalments

38

Examination of judgment debtor etc

39

Enforcement of judgments

40

41

Additional measures for enforcing judgments and orders of the Supreme Court and District Court Funds in court

42

Costs

43

Interpleader proceedings

44 45 46 47

Transfer of proceedings Specialist Lists Accounts and Inquiries Matters arising under the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 Matters arising under Commonwealth Intellectual Property Legislation Reference and removal of proceedings, and appeals and reviews, within the court Appeals to the court

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 56A 57

58 59

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Court of Appeal Taking Evidence for foreign and Australian courts and tribunals Matters arising under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 of the Commonwealth Administration of estates and execution of trusts Matters arising under the Trustee Act 1925 Matters arising under the Adoption Act 2000 Matters arising under the Surrogacy Act 2010 Matters arising under the NSW Trustee and Guardianship Act 2009 or Guardianship Act 1987 Representative proceedings Judicial review proceedings

Steven Walsh Steven Ash Steven Ash Steven Ash Steven Ash

Author Jupp and Mark Jupp and David Jupp and David Jupp and David Jupp and David

Anthony Cheshire and David Ash Peter Johnstone and Janet McDonald Anthony Cheshire and David Ash Carol Webster Carol Webster Mandy Tibbey Greg Sarginson Joanne Shepard Steven Jupp and Greg Sarginson Steven Jupp and Greg Sarginson Carol Webster Sigrid Neumeuller and Mary-Ann de Mestre Sigrid Neumeuller and Mary-Ann de Mestre Mandy Tibbey Mandy Tibbey Sigrid Neumeuller and Mary-Ann de Mestre Mandy Tibbey Mandy Tibbey

Carol Webster Carol Webster

xv

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

NSW Civil Procedure CPA Part UCPR Part UCPR Title Author Comparison material for all other Parts prepared by Susan Jackson and edited by The Hon John P Hamilton QC. INDEX The Index includes entries for the key legislation in this volume. RELATED PUBLICATIONS NSW Civil Procedure General Editors: The Hon John P Hamilton QC, The Hon Justice Geoff Lindsay and Carol Webster SC NSW Civil Procedure is the recently relaunched, authoritative, flexible, easy to use guide to civil practice and procedure in the Supreme, District and Local Courts. The Hon John P Hamilton QC, The Hon Justice Geoff Lindsay and Carol Webster SC bring you a service which offers legislation annotated by highly-regarded practitioners, and is regularly and reliably updated in customers’ choice of looseleaf, online Westlaw AU and/or ProView eSub formats. Featuring comprehensive annotations to the core Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 and Civil Procedure Act 2005, annotated evidence legislation and court rules as well as all the relevant Practice Notes, it’s everything you need, all in one place. In court, meetings, or researching a point of procedure, with NSW Civil Procedure, practitioners are covered: • Online, use NSW Civil Procedure on Westlaw AU for rapid research, with integrated access (subject to separate subscription) to FirstPoint and leading authorised reports including New South Wales Law Reports, Commonwealth Law Reports and Federal Court Reports for complete case research. • For Looseleaf users, Volume 1 — Court contains annotated core legislation (CPA and UCPR), NEW Local Court core legislation and Practice Notes for Supreme, District and Local Court use. Volume 2 contains essential related materials to the Supreme and District Court. Reference tables and index assist easy reference, complementing easy navigation through design features like detailed page headings and clear use of shading on legislation. • Add the ProView eSub version for a print-like edition at hand, whether or not you’re connected to the internet, and without the burden of filing and carrying around looseleaf binders. Other related Thomson Reuters subscription titles include: • New South Wales Law Reports Online; • Criminal Law NSW; • NSW Civil Practice & Procedure – Local Courts; • Lawbook Co’s District Court Law Reports (NSW); • Land & Environment Court Law & Practice (NSW); • Corporations Legislation; • Dust Diseases & Compensation Reports; and • Uniform Evidence Law. Related Thomson Reuters book titles include: • New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017; • Corporations Legislation 2017; • Corporations – Court Rules and Related Legislation 2017; and • Uniform Evidence Law 12th edition.

xvi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

About this Publication

ENQUIRIES Considerable care has been taken in this compilation, but the interpretation and consolidation of the legislation is complex. The Publisher invites feedback on this edition. Correspondence may be addressed to: Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited Level 6 19 Harris Street Pyrmont NSW 2009 Australia Or emailed to: [email protected]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xvii

TABLE OF RECENT AMENDMENTS The following table summarises amendments to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 which have commenced since 16 March 2016. Full details are available in the main text. Key to abbreviations am........................................................................................... insrt ........................................................................................ rep .......................................................................................... subst .......................................................................................

amended inserted repealed substituted

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Amendment type Commencement

Rule

Title

3.1 (Definitions)

Definition of “applicable ECM system” Definition of “e-Court” Definition of “registered user” Definition of “upload” Registration of users of Online Registry Registration of users Filing documents using Online Registry Electronic filing of documents

rep

20 May 2016

rep

20 May 2016

am

20 May 2016

am

20 May 2016

am

20 May 2016

am

20 May 2016

sub

20 May 2016

am

20 May 2016

Uploading documents Electronic issuing of a document Electronic service of a document

am

20 May 2016

am

20 May 2016

am

20 May 2016

3.1 (Definitions) 3.1 (Definitions) 3.1 (Definitions) Part 3, Division 2

3.3 Part 3, Division 3

3.4

3.5 3.6 3.7

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Amending provision Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[1] Rule 255 Sch 1[1] Rule 255 Sch 1[2] Rule 255 Sch 1[3] Rule 255 Sch 1[4]

of 2016, of 2016, of 2016, of 2016,

Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[5] and [6] Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[7] Rule 255 Sch 1[4], [9] Rule 255 Sch 1[4] Rule 255 Sch 1[4] Rule 255 Sch 1[4]

of 2016, [8] and of 2016, of 2016, of 2016,

xix

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Amendment type Commencement

Rule

Title

3.8

am Use of Online Registry in business conducted in absence of public rep Filing documents using Online Registry Filing generally am

Part 3, Division 4

4.10 4.12

6.3 6.4 10.1 10.8 11.1 11.2

Part 11, Division 1A

11.3

11.4 11.5 11.6

xx

20 May 2016

Amending provision Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]

20 May 2016

Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[10]

14 Oct 2016

Rule 621 of 2016, r 3(1) and (2)] Rule 621 of 2016, r 3(3)

Lodgment of additional copies of originating process for service Where statement of claim required Where summons required Service of filed documents Service of defence by court Application of Part

am

14 Oct 2016

insrt

8 Dec 2016

am

8 Dec 2016

am

20 May 2016

am

14 Oct 2016

sub

9 Dec 2016

Operation of Commonwealth laws and Hague Convention Service outside of Australia in accordance with harmonised rules Division does not apply to service in New Zealand of documents for or in certain transTasman proceedings Cases for service of originating process When allowed with leave Court’s discretion whether to assume jurisdiction

sub

9 Dec 2016

insrt

9 Dec 2016

Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]

sub

9 Dec 2016

Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]

sub

9 Dec 2016

sub

9 Dec 2016

sub

9 Dec 2016

Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2] Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2] Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]

Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[1] Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[2] Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[11] Rule 621 of 2016, r 3(4) Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[1] Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[1]

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of Recent Amendments

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Amendment type Commencement

Rule

Title

11.7

Notice to person served outside Australia Time for filing appearance Leave to proceed where no appearance by person Service of other documents outside Australia Mode of service

sub

9 Dec 2016

sub

9 Dec 2016

insrt

9 Dec 2016

insrt

9 Dec 2016

Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]

insrt

9 Dec 2016

Conciliation

insrt

8 Dec 2016

Application of Division Referral of recovery proceedings for conciliation Certificate of result of conciliation of recovery proceedings Resolution of recovery proceedings after certificate issued Filing of cost assessors’ certificates Application of Division to application for garnishee order by owners corporation relating to unpaid contributions

insrt

8 Dec 2016

insrt

8 Dec 2016

Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2] Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[3] Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[3] Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[3]

insrt

8 Dec 2016

Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[3]

insrt

8 Dec 2016

Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[3]

sub

14 Oct 2016

Rule 622 of 2016, r 3(1) and (2)

insrt

9 Dec 2016

Reg 753 of 2016, cl 3

11.8 11.8AA

11.8AB

11.8AC Part 20, Division 3A 20.24A 20.24B

20.24C

20.24D

36.10

39.43A

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Amending provision Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2] Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2] Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]

xxi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Amendment type Commencement

Rule

Title

42.34

Costs order not to be made in proceedings in Supreme Court unless Court satisfied proceedings in appropriate court Notice to be given to Secretary Registration of adoption plans Review of adoption plans Documents relating to proceedings in the Land and Environment Court Service outside of Australia without leave Expert witness code of conduct

56.10 56.13 56.14 Schedule 4

Schedule 6

Schedule 7

xxii

Amending provision Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[4]

sub

8 Dec 2016

am

9 Sep 2016

insrt

9 Sep 2016

insrt

9 Sep 2016

rep

20 May 2016

sub

9 Dec 2016

Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[3]

sub

9 Dec 2016

Reg 754 of 2016, Sch 1

Reg 578 of 2016, Sch 1[1] Reg 578 of 2016, Sch 1[2] Reg 578 of 2016, Sch 1[2] Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[12]

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES A A v A [2015] NSWSC 1778 ........................................................................................................................ r 7.14.50, r 57.5.10 A v A [2016] NSWCA 17 ............................................................................................................................................. r 57.5.10 A v Hayden (No ) (1984) 59 ALJR 1 ..................................................................................................................... SCA 66.120 A v Mental Health Review Tribunal (No 4) [2014] NSWSC 31 .............................................................. r Pt57.20, r Pt57.40 A, Re (2003) 30 Fam LR 387; [2003] NSWSC 595 ................................................................................................. r 31.28.80 A & M Short Pty Ltd v Prestige Residential Marketing Pty Ltd (2005) 194 FLR 32; 54 ACSR 760; [2005] NSWSC 872 ..................................................................................................... CPA Pt7.Div2.60, CPA 65.400 A & N Holding NSW Pty Ltd v Andell Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 55 ...................................................................... CPA 59.20 A Company, Re [1980] 1 All ER 284 ...................................................................................................................... SCR 1.8.60 A Company (No 0012209 of 1991), Re [1992] 2 All ER 797; [1992] 1 WLR 351 .................................................. r 42.5.40 A Goninan & Co Ltd v Atlas Steels (Australia) Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 956 ......................................... r 28.5.40, r 28.5.60 A Goninan & Co Ltd v Gill (2001) 51 NSWLR 441; (2001) 21 NSWCCR 552; [2001] NSWCA 77 .............................................................................................................................................................................. r 42.1.62 A Hudson Pty Ltd v Legal & General Life of Australia Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 701 .............................................. r 41.3.120 A Martin French v Kingswood Hill Ltd [1961] 1 QB 96; [1960] 2 All ER 251 ..................................................... r 42.22.40 A Solicitor v Council of Law Society (NSW) (2004) 216 CLR 253; 78 ALJR 310; [2004] HCA 1 .............. SCR 65A.3.20 AAA, Re [2016] NSWSC 805 .................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.180 AAA Financial Intelligence Ltd (in liq) ACN 093 616 445 [2014] NSWSC 1004 ................................................... r 26.4.40 AB v EF [2013] NSWSC 866 ................................................................................................................................... r Pt56A.20 ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 665 ........................... r 20.24.160 ACD Tridon Inc v Tridon Australia Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 896 ............................................................................ r 20.14.80 ACD Tridon Inc v Tridon Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 357 ............................................................................ r 20.18.60 ACN 008 664 257 Pty Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (in liq) [2005] NSWSC 881 ..................... r 33.4.120 ACP Magazines Pty Ltd v Southdown Publications Pty Ltd (2002) 56 IPR 504; [2002] NSWSC 715 ....................................................................................................................................................................... SCA 66.120 ACQ Pty Ltd v Cook (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 306 ................................................................................................... r 42.1.100 AEW v BW [2016] NSWSC 905 .............................................................................................................. r.7.13.60, r Pt57.100 AG v AP-G [2013] NSWSC 272 .................................................................................................................................. r 57.3.10 AGC (Advances) Ltd v West (1984) 5 NSWLR 301 ............................................................ r 42.1.300, r 42.5.40, r 42.25.40 AH, Re (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 68 ................................................................................................................................ r 57.3.40 AMC Caterers Pty Ltd v Stavropoulos [2005] NSWCA 79 ........................................................................................ r 42.1.62 AMP Fire & General Insurance Co Ltd v Dixon [1982] VR 833 ................................................................................. r 9.8.40 ANS Nominees Pty Ltd v Beverly Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 875 ............................ r 40.6.80, r 40.7.40 ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Greig [1980] 1 NSWLR 112 ...................................................................................... CPA 102.20 ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Mio Amico Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 716 .................................................................... CPA 57.20 AP v RD [2011] NSWSC 1389 ................................................................................................................................. r Pt56A.20 ASA Constructions Pty Ltd v Iwanov [1975] 1 NSWLR 512 ................................................................ r 30.3.40, SCA 68.20 ASIC v Lawrenson Light Metal Die Casting Pty Ltd (1999) 33 ACSR 288 ............................................................. r 26.4.20 ASIC v Letten (No 23 ) [2014] FCA 985 .................................................................................................................... r 26.4.40 AVS Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Police (2010) 78 NSWLR 302; [2010] NSWCA 81 ............................................................................................................................................................ r 50.3.240 AW & LM Forrest Pty Ltd v Beamish (1998) 146 FLR 450 ...................................................................................... r 7.24.80 AWA Ltd v Daniels (unreported, NSWSC, Rolfe J, 8 March 1992) ........................................................................ CPA 30.20 AWA Ltd v Exicom Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 19 NSWLR 705 ............................................ r Pt9.40, CPA 21.40, CPA 22.60 AWB Ltd v Cole (No 6) (2006) 235 ALR 307; [2006] FCA 1274 .......................................................................... r 42.1.120 AZ v DQ [2003] NSWSC 1108 .................................................................................................................................... r 22.1.80 Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 .......................................................... r 50.16.60, SCA 75A.80

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xxiii

TABLE OF CASES Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v ABB Service Pty Ltd (2005) 21 BCL 12; [2004] NSWCA 181 .................... SCR 51.0.200 Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Sydney Catchment Authority [2007] NSWSC 220 ............................................. r 20.24.160 Abigroup Ltd v Abignano (1992) 39 FCR 74 ............................................................................................................ r 39.49.40 Ability One Financial Management Pty Ltd v JB (2014) 11 ASTLR 155; [2014] NSWSC 245 ........................... r Pt57.100 Ability One Financial Management Pty Ltd v JB by his tutor AB [2014] NSWSC 245 .......................................... r 57.3.30 Aboriginal Affairs, Minister for v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40 ................................ CPA 58.40 Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd v Batemans Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 494 ............................................................................................................... SCA 65.40, SCR 54.0.100 Aboriginal Housing Co Ltd v Munro [2015] NSWSC 1155 .................................................................................. CPA 135.45 Abouloff v Oppenheimer & Co (1882) 10 QBD 295 ................................................................................................ r 53.7.180 Abraham v St Mark’s Orthodox Coptic College (No 3) [2008] NSWSC 1027 ....................................................... r 36.4.100 Access Services Group Pty Ltd v McLoughlin (2006) 201 FLR 16; 57 ACSR 725; [2006] NSWSC 532 ............................................................................................................................................................... r 7.1.60 Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 .................................. r 21.3.160, r 22.2.140 Accom Finance Pty Ltd v Kowalczuk [2006] NSWSC 730 ......................................................................................... r 9.1.60 Ace-Semi Trailer Sales Pty Ltd v Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd [2009] NSWCA 381 ........................................... r 42.1.55 Acimall Australia v Cong Bui Buu t/a Austcraft Furnitures [2004] NSWLC 4 ....................................................... r 16.3.140 Ackland v Paynter (1820) 8 Price 95; 146 ER 1142 ................................................................................................. r 39.30.60 Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd (2006) 155 FCR 181; 236 ALR 143; [2006] FCA 1279 ............... r 42.21.110, r 42.21.200 Across Australia Finance v Bassenger [2008] NSWSC 799 ....................................................................................... r 18.1.60 Ada Evans Chambers Pty Ltd v Santisi [2014] NSWSC 538 ................................................................................... r 42.4.120 Adams v Dickeson [1974] VR 77 ............................................................................................................... r 22.3.60, r Pt22.20 Adams v Kennick Trading (International) Ltd [1986] 4 NSWLR 503 ....................................................................... r Pt31.40 Adamson v Liu (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 864 ................................................................................................................ r 42.1.62 Adelphi Hotel (Brighton) Ltd, Re [1953] 2 All ER 498; [1953] 1 WLR 955 ...................... r 42.1.300, r 42.5.40, r 42.25.40 Adhesives Pty Ltd v Aktieselskabet Dansk Gaerings-Industri (1935) 55 CLR 523 ................................................. r 31.54.40 Administrative & Clerical Officers Assn, Commonwealth Public Service v Commonwealth (1979) 53 ALJR 588; 26 ALR 497 ................................................................................................................................ SCA 66.120 Administrative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel v Director-General, Department of Commerce [2008] NSWCA 140 .............................................................................................................. r 6.35.60, r 6.35.80, r 6.39.40 Adoption of MSAT [2014] NSWSC 1950 .................................................................................................................. SC Eq 13 Advanced Timber & Hardware (Superstore) Pty Ltd v Kovacevic [2011] NSWSC 366 ........................................... r 35.7.60 Aerospatiale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Elspan International Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 321 ................................ r 20.14.80 Afro Continental Nigeria v Meridian Shipping Co SA [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 241 ................................................... r Pt11.60 Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; 74 ALJR 1219; 173 ALR 665; [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-569; [2000] HCA 41 .................................................................................. r 11.4.60, r 12.11.60, r 12.11.80, r 13.4.120 Age Co Ltd v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; [2013] NSWCA 26 .................................................................................. r 5.2.40 Agius v New South Wales [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-656; [2001] NSWCA 371 ............................. r 13.4.80, r 13.4.120 Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Kirk [2010] NSWCA 132 ....................................................................... r 12.11.160 Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Kirk (2011) 82 ACSR 390; [2011] NSWCA 67 ... r 1.12.50, r 6.2.100, CPA 14.60 Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield (2003) 7 VR 63; 174 FLR 395; [2003] VSCA 6 ................................................ CPA 65.20 Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield (2005) 223 CLR 251; [2005] HCA 38 ................................................................ CPA 65.20 Agusta Pty Ltd v Provident Capital Ltd (2012) 16 BPR 30397; [2012] NSWCA 26 ............................................. r 39.20.60 Ahmed v Ahmed [2013] NSWSC 1814 ....................................................................................................................... r 34.2.40 Ahmed v Chowdhury (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 954 .................................................................................................. r 20.15.100 Ainslie v Ainslie (1927) 39 CLR 381; 27 SR (NSW) 524 ..................................................................... r 53.1.180, r 53.7.200 Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 ........................................................................... SCA 75.20 Ainsworth v Hanrahan (1991) 25 NSWLR 155 ....................................................................................... r 33.9.160, r Pt22.40 Ainsworth v Redd (1990) 19 NSWLR 78 .................................................................................................................. r 10.21.40 Ainsworth v Wilding [1896] 1 Ch 673 .................................................................................................. r 36.16.200, r 36.17.60 Ainsworth Nominees Pty Ltd t/as Aristocrat Leisure Industries v Crouch (1995) 11 NSWCCR 640 ....... SCA 106.40, SCA 108.60, SCR 51.0.200, SCR 51.0.300 Air Express Ltd v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1981) 146 CLR 249; 55 ALJR 107; 33 ALR 578 .................................................................................................................... r 25.8.80, SCA 66.220 Air Link Pty Ltd v Paterson (2005) 223 CLR 283; [2005] HCA 39 ....................................................................... CPA 65.20 Air Link Pty Ltd v Paterson (No 2) (2003) 58 NSWLR 388; [2003] NSWCA 251 ............................. r Pt19.20, CPA 65.20 Airservices Australia v Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 200; [1999] FCA 886 ....................................................... r 5.3.60 Airtourer Co-op Ltd v Millicer Aircraft Industries Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1400 ......................................................... r 42.21.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xxiv

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 153 FLR 236; [1999] NSWSC 996 ..................................... CPA 27.10 Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 ............................................................................................................ r 31.4.80 Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 .................................................................................. SCA 75A.140 Al Amanah College Inc v Minister for Education & Training (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 254 ................................. r 20.14.60 Al Mousawy (by his tutor Khamis) v JA Byatt Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 264 ...................................................... CPA 28.100 Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] ANZ ConvR 351; [2004] NSWSC 487 .................................................................................................................................... r 20.24.140 Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1073 ................... CPA 64.20 Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 7 .......................... r 42.1.120 Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (2001) 10 BPR 18593; [2001] NSWSC 154 ..................................................... r 14.14.200 Alesco Corp Ltd v Te Maari [2015] NSWSC 469 ..................................................................................................... r 16.3.105 Alexander v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd [1956] VLR 436; [1956] ALR 1077; (1956) 30 ALJ 398 ................................. r 6.3.60 Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd [1985] 2 NSWLR 685; (1985) 10 ACLR 42 .... r 49.10.40, r 50.7.40, r 50.7.1000 Alexander v Crawford [2003] NSWSC 426 ............................................................................................................... r 40.6.120 Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404; 58 ALJR 97 ....................................................................... r 21.3.200, r 22.2.180 All Class Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd (in liq), Re [2014] NSWSC 475 ...................................................................... r Pt55.40 Allan Robinson Textiles Pty Ltd v Pappas [1983] 1 VR 345 ................................................................................ SCA 49.120 Allandale Blue Metal Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services [2013] NSWCA 103; (2013) 195 LGERA 182 ............................................................................................................................................................. r 28.2.40 Allen v Jambo Holdings Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 1252; [1980] 2 All ER 502 ................ SCA 66.160, SCA 66.220, SCA 66.240 Allen v Kerr [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-354 ........................................................................................................ r 50.3.260 Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172; [2000] HCA 40 ........................................... r 50.16.60, SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Alliance & Leicester Building Society v Ghahremani [1992] TLR 129 ................................................................ SCR 1.8.40 Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Bluescope Steel Ltd [2012] NSWCA 240 ............................................. r 9.1.60, r 9.10.60 Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v National Jet Systems Pty Ltd (2004) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-648; [2004] SASC 438 ......................................................................................................................................... r 9.8.40 Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Newcastle Formwork Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 144 ......................................................................................................................................................... r 15.1.60, r 15.12.40 Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Vitale [2015] NSWSC 352 .................................................................................. r 25.14.20 Allied Constructions Pty Ltd v Hyder Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 808 ........................................ r 20.24.160 Allplastics Engineering Pty Ltd v Dornoch Ltd [2006] NSWCA 33 ...................................................... r 42.1.60, CPA 98.20 Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 57 FCR 360 ...... r 14.14.120, r Pt22.40 Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 19) (1995) 134 ALR 187 ............................................................................................................................................................... r 42.21.400 Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79 .............................................................................................................................................................................. r 6.43.60 Alltrans Express Ltd v CVA Holdings Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 685; [1984] 1 WLR 394 .............................................. r 42.1.62 Alstom Ltd v Sirakas [2010] NSWSC 669 ................................................................................................................ r 12.11.40 Alstom Ltd v Sirakas [2012] NSWSC 1064 ................................................................................................................ r 16.2.40 Altarama Ltd v Forsyth [1981] 1 NSWLR 188 ........................................................................................ r 16.7.45, r 16.10.40 Althouse, Re; Ex parte Fontaine (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 396; 44 WN (NSW) 144 .............................................. DCA 18G.20 Amaca Pty Ltd v Hicks (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 360 ................................................................................................ r 42.15.70 Amaca Pty Ltd v Mathwin [2005] NSWCA 364 ....................................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Amaca Pty Ltd v Novek (2009) 9 DDCR 199; [2009] NSWCA 50 ......................................................................... r 42.15.70 Amalgamated Mining Services Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd (1988) 19 FCR 324; 88 ALR 63 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r 42.21.110 Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 313 ............................................................ r 18.1.160 Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (No 2) (2003) 57 NSWLR 338; [2003] NSWCA 186 ................................................................................................................................. CPA 26.120, SCA 106.20 Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (in liq) v Continental Venture Capital Ltd [2005] NSWCA 154 .................................. SCA 121.20 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 ......................................................................................... SCA 66.120 American Flange & Manufacturing Co Inc v Rheem (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1965] NSWR 193 ........ r 22.1.60, r 22.1.80, r 22.2.60 American Home Assurance Co v Ampol Refineries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 13 .................................. r 28.2.100, r 28.2.140 Amos Removals & Storage Pty Ltd v Small [1981] 2 NSWLR 525 ....................................................................... r 10.14.60 Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 218 ............................................................. r 21.7.40 Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 405 ..................................... r 21.3.140, r 22.2.120

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xxv

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES An Allegation of Contempt of Court made by The Honourable Mr Justice Maxwell, Re (unreported, NSWCA, 10 April 1985) ............................................................................................................ SCR 55.0.120 An Allegation of Contempt of Court made by her Honour Judge Matthews, Re (unreported, NSWCA, 7 March 1984) ................................................................................................................................ SCR 55.0.120 An Alleged Incapable Person, Re (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 477 .................................................................................... r 57.3.40 An Alleged Incapable Person, Re (1959) 77 WN (NSW) 156 .................................................................................... r Pt57.60 An Alleged Incapable Person, Re (1990) 19 NSWLR 541 ......................................................................................... r 57.2.20 An Application Under Sections 32 and 33, Evidence on Commission Act 1995, Re; Ex Parte Attorney General (NSW) [2007] NSWSC 1501 ............................................................................... r 52.1.180, r 52.1.220 Anderson obh Numbahjing Clan within the Bundjalung Nation v NSW Minister for Planning (No 2) (2008) 163 LGERA 132; [2008] NSWLEC 272 ............................................................................................. r 42.1.260 Andersons Solicitors v Schigulski [2004] SASC 21; (2004) 88 SASR 1 .............................................................. CPA 102.20 Andrew v Andrew (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 286 ......................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Andrew v Baradom Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (1995) 36 NSWLR 700 ................................................................... CPA 91.20 Andrew v Barnes (1888) 39 Ch D 133 ........................................................................................................................ r 42.5.40 Andrews v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1982) 60 FLR 261; 40 ALR 305 ............................................................... r 42.21.140 Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 184 .............................................................................. SCR 51.0.260 Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225 ................................................................... r 15.8.40, r 15.32.40 Andrews Advertising Pty Ltd v Andrews [2011] NSWSC 244 ...................................................................... r 5.6.40, r 5.8.40 Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-955; [2008] NSWCA 130 ......... r 31.10.60, r 31.10.1000 Angliss v Urquhart [2001] NSWCA 441 ...................................................................................................................... r 23.4.60 Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 873 ...... r 42.1.50, r 42.1.60, r 42.1.62, CPA 98.20 Anon, Re 16 Jur 995 ................................................................................................................................................. DCA 13.20 Anpor Holdings Pty Ltd v Swaab [2008] NSWSC 208 ........................................... r 1.16.40, r 1.16.60, r 45.2.40, r 45.6.80 Anpor Holdings Pty Ltd v Swaab [2011] NSWSC 1591 ............................................................................................ r 1.12.40 Ansett Australia Ground Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd v Ansett Australia Ltd (2003) 176 FLR 393; [2003] VSCA 117 .............................................................................................................................. SCA 75.140 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Halton (1979) 25 ALR 639 ............................ SCA 66.220, SCA 75.160 Anthoness v Bland Shire Council (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 659; 77 WN (NSW) 506 ............................................. DCA 126.20 Anthony v Chris Savage Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 698 .............................................................................................. r 50.3.120 Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 55 ................... r 21.3.60, r 23.8.100, r Pt21.120, SC Gen 13 Antoniadis v TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Levine J, 5 December 1997) ............................... SCR 55.0.80 Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 ........................... r 31.4.60, r Pt14.140, r Pt31.40, CPA Pt6.20, CPA 14.40, CPA 57.20, CPA 58.40, CPA 64.20 Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Western Power Corp (1998) 19 WAR 350 ................................................................... r 34.2.40 Apand Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (1999) 88 FCR 568 ....................................................................... r 46.8.20 Apple Computer Inc v Popiolek [1984] VR 156 .................................................................................................... SCA 66.100 Appleton Papers Inc v Tomasetti Paper Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 208 ............................................................... SCA 66.120 Application by Cottee, Re [2013] NSWSC 47 ............................................................................................................ r Pt55.40 Application by MGH and CJH, The; Re HCH [2015] NSWSC 1364 ..................................................................... r Pt56A.20 Application by the Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic), Re (2005) 79 ALJR 881; 214 ALR 422; [2005] HCA 18 ........................................................................................................................................................ r 4.2.100 Application for Partial Management Orders, Re [2014] NSWSC 1468 .................................................. r 57.3.30, r Pt57.100 Application of Central Commodities Services Pty Ltd, Re [1984] 1 NSWLR 25 ..................................................... r 26.4.80 Application of Harnett and Cutts [2016] NSWSC 427 ................................................................................................ r 54.3.20 Application of J and K, Re [2009] NSWSC 1453 ..................................................................................................... r 57.11.20 Application of Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc, Re [2006] NSWSC 392 .......................... r Pt55.40 Application of Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd, Re [2003] NSWSC 1185 .......................................................................... r Pt55.40 Applications by Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic), Re (2004) 9 VR 275; [2004] VSCA 3 ................................. r 4.2.100 April Fine Paper Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd v Moore Business Systems Australia Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 619; [2009] NSWSC 867 .................................................................................................... r 42.21.110 Arabian Horse Assn Inc (NSW) v Olympic Co-ordination Authority [2005] NSWCA 210 .............................. SCA 101.140 Arabic Community Business Directory Pty Ltd v Arabic Australian Business Directory Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 21 March 1996) ............................................................................................. SCR 55.0.20 Araf Capital Funding Pty Ltd v Megaloudis [2006] NSWSC 1255 .......................................................... r 18.1.40, r 42.1.65 Arakella Pty Ltd v Paton (2004) 60 NSWLR 334; [2004] NSWSC 13 ....................................................................... r 7.6.40 Arhill Pty Ltd v General Terminal Co Pty Ltd (1990) 23 NSWLR 545 ................................................... r 11.5.40, r 33.5.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xxvi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Arian v Nguyen (2001) 33 MVR 37; [2001] NSWCA 5 ........................................................................... r 42.1.60, r 42.5.40 Aristoc Industries Pty Ltd v RA Wenham (Builders) Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 581 .................................................. CPA 93.40 Ark Hire Pty Ltd v Barwick Event Hire Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 488 ...................................................................... r 42.7.80 Armidale Dumaresq Council v Vorhauer (No 3) (2014) 205 LGERA 155; [2014] NSWLEC 50 ............................ r 40.8.60 Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd (2012) 295 ALR 348; [2012] NSWCA 430 ............................................................... r 21.2.100, r 21.3.240, r 21.5.40 Arnautovic v Cvitanovic (2011) 199 FCR 1; [2011] FCA 809 ............................................................................... r 31.13.120 Arnold v Forsythe [2012] NSWCA 18 ...................................................................................................... r 16.3.140, r 16.6.40 Arnott v Choy (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 336 ............................................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Arons v McInerney (1899) 25 VLR 148 ...................................................................................................................... r 46.5.20 Aroona Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Killen (2004) 50 ACSR 668; [2004] NSWCA 363 ................. SCA 101.140, SCA 101.160, SCR 51.0.100 Arthur Andersen Corp Finance Pty Ltd v Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 104 ................ r 1.12.40, r 1.12.50, r 6.2.100, CPA 59.20 Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 47 ATR 1; 179 ALR 406; [2001] HCA 26 ....................................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Aryzta Australia Pty Ltd v Jakimovski (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 48 ............................................................................ r 25.8.80 As New Printing Machinery Co Pty Ltd v Hymans Asset Management Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 222 ........................................................................................................................................................................ r 36.16.230 Ash Street Properties Pty Ltd v Pollnow (1987) 9 NSWLR 80; 18 ATR 935; 87 ATC 4609 ............................... r 31.14.100 Ashmere Cove Pty Ltd v Beekink (No 2) (2007) 244 ALR 534; [2007] FCA 1421 ................................................. r 6.19.40 Ashmore v Corp of Lloyds [1992] 1 WLR 446 ....................................................................................... r Pt2.20, CPA Pt6.20 Ashtiani v Kashi [1987] QB 888; [1986] 3 WLR 647; [1986] 2 All ER 970 ....................................................... SCA 66.240 Asia Pacific Glass Pty Ltd v Sindea Trading Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (2003) 47 ACSR 737; [2003] NSWSC 845 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 39.50.30 Asia Pacific Telecommunications Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 550 ............................................ r 7.25.40 Asia Strategic Investment Alliances Pty Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Ltd [1999] NSWSC 601 ... r 42.5.40, r 42.21.200, r 42.21.400, r 42.21.410 Asian Investments Corp Ltd v Symons (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 10 April 1996) .......................... SCA 75A.160 Aspar Autobarn Co-op Society v Dovola Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 284; 74 ALR 550 ............................................... r 22.3.40 Aspinall v Sterling Mansell [1981] 3 All ER 866 ....................................................................................................... r 23.9.60 Assaf v Skalkos [2000] NSWSC 935 ...................................................................................................... r 42.15.40, r 42.15.80 Asset Risk Management Ltd v Hyndes [1998] AILR 5-160 ................................................................................. SCR 49.0.20 Asset Risk Management Ltd v Hyndes [1999] NSWCA 201 ............................................................................... SCR 49.0.20 Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 250 ............................................................................................................................................ r 33.2.60, r 33.4.120 Astronaut Travel Service Pty Ltd v Premier-Premal Pty Ltd (1973) 3 DCR (NSW) 225 ....................................... r 14.12.40 Asuzu v Bar Assn Council (NSW) [2012] NSWCA 406 .......................................................................................... r 13.4.130 Atanaskovic t/as Hartnell v Robey [2014] NSWSC 150 ........................................................................................... r 16.3.120 Atkinson v Zey [2008] NSWCA 30 ........................................................................................................................... r 42.15.40 Atlas v Miller (1898) 67 LJQB 301 ........................................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 Attard v James Legal Pty Ltd (2010) 80 ACSR 585; [2010] NSWCA 311 ............................................................. r 20.18.80 Attenborough v London and St Katherine’s Dock Co [1878] 3 CPD 450 ................................................................. r Pt43.40 Attorney-General v Able [1984] QB 795; [1983] 3 WLR 845; [1984] 1 All ER 277 .......................................... SCA 75.180 Attorney-General v Albany Hotel Co [1896] 2 Ch 696 ......................................................................................... SCA 66.220 Attorney-General v BBC [1979] 3 WLR 312; [1979] 3 All ER 45 ............................................ SCR 55.0.40, SCR 55.0.160 Attorney-General v Bar-Mordecai [2005] NSWSC 142 ............................................................................................ r 4.10.100 Attorney-General v Dyer [1947] Ch 67 ................................................................................................... r 21.3.220, r 22.2.200 Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 ........................................................ SCR 55.0.40, SCR 55.0.160 Attorney-General v Permewan Wright Consolidated Ltd (unreported, NSWCA, 11 December 1978) ................................................................................................................................................................... SCA 66.100 Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 ................................................................................. SCR 55.0.40 Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 ........................................................................................... r 4.10.100 Attorney-General (Cth) v T & G Mutual Life Society Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161; 52 ALJR 573; 19 ALR 385 ............................................................................................................................................ r 6.27.60, SCA 75.200 Attorney-General (NSW) v Beck [1980] 2 NSWLR 77 ......................................................................................... SCA 66.320 Attorney-General (NSW) v Chidgey (2008) 182 A Crim R 536; [2008] NSWCCA 65 ............................................ r 34.2.40 Attorney-General (NSW) v Hayden (1994) 34 NSWLR 638 ............................................................................... SCR 55.0.80

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xxvii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Attorney-General (NSW) v Homeland Community Ltd [2013] NSWSC 723 ........................................................... r Pt55.40 Attorney-General (NSW) v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 318 .......................................... SCR 55.0.40 Attorney-General (NSW) v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 729 ......................................... r 6.27.60 Attorney-General (NSW) v Mundey [1972] 2 NSWLR 887 ................................................................................. SCR 55.0.40 Attorney-General (NSW) v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2007) 73 NSWLR 635; [2007] NSWCCA 307 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 4.2.100 Attorney-General (NSW) v S ( unreported, Powell J, 15.11.84) ................................................................................. r 57.5.10 Attorney-General (NSW) v Whiley (1993) 31 NSWLR 314 .............................................................................. SCR 55.0.120 Attorney-General (NSW) v X (2000) 49 NSWLR 653; [2000] NSWCA 19 .............................. SCR 55.0.40, SCR 55.0.120 Attorney-General (NSW), Re [2011] NSWSC 773 .................................................................................................... r 52.1.220 Attorney-General (NSW) (Ex rel Clark) v Publishing & Broadcasting Ltd [1977] 2 NSWLR 813 .................... SCA 75.200 Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 ........................................................................ r 21.3.240, r 22.2.220 Attorney-General (Qld) v Holland (1912) 15 CLR 46; [1912] ALR 480 ................................................................... r 6.27.60 Attorney-General (Qld) v T (1983) 57 ALJR 285 .................................................................................................. SCA 66.320 Attorney-General (Vic) v Brighton City [1964] VR 59; (1962) 18 LGRA 82 ........................................................... r 7.4.120 Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] AC 1 ........................................................................................... r 53.1.160 Aughen v Poynter [2013] NSWSC 1052 .................................................................................................................... r 25.14.20 Augustus v Permanent Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 245 ........................................... r 54.3.20, SCR 68.2.20 Aus Steel Pty Ltd v Marco Properties Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 550 ............................................................................ r 5.3.60 Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd [1995] ATPR 41-444 ................................................................ r 42.21.110 Aussie Ideas Pty Ltd v Tunwind Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 286 .................................................................................. r 42.1.60 Austar Finance Group Pty Ltd v Campbel (2007) 215 FLR 464; [2007] NSWSC 1493 ............................................ r 3.7.80 Australasian Oil Exploration Ltd v Lachberg (1958) 101 CLR 119 ........................................................................ SCA 75.80 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Limited v S [2014] NSWSC 1094 ..................................................... CPA 117.50 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Donnelly [2012] NSWSC 1615 .................................................... r 27.1.40 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Larcos (1987) 13 NSWLR 286 .................................................. CPA 65.20 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Law Society (NSW) [1976] 1 NSWLR 686 .............................. r 14.19.60 Australia Freyssinet Pty Ltd v Marlin International Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 892 ................................................... r 49.12.60 Australian Airport Services Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 10 ALR 167 ......................................................... SCA 75.220 Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v Evans & Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 374; [2007] NSWCA 57 ...................................................................................................................... CPA 135.30 Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; 76 ALJR 1; 185 ALR 1; 54 IPR 161; [2001] Aust Torts Reports 81-627; [2001] HCA 63 ........ r Pt25.20, SCA 66.120, SCA 66.340 Australian Broadcasting Corp v Reading [2004] NSWCA 411 ................................................... DCA 76B.20, SCR 51.0.180 Australian Coarse Grain Pool Ltd v Barley Marketing Board (Qld) (1982) 57 ALJR 425 .................................. SCA 66.120 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) FCR 547; [2009] FCAFC 32 ........................................................................................................................................... r 31.4.80 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Giraffe World Australia Pty Ltd (1998) 84 FCR 512 .............................................................................................................................................................. SCA 66.220 Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493 ............................................... SCA 75.160 Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Bond (1982) 61 FLR 91 ................................................................................. r Pt21.120 Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483 .......................................................... r 40.3.60, r 40.6.60 Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1966) 117 CLR 185; [1966] HCA 37 .................................................. r 53.1.160 Australian Customer Target Information Co Pty Ltd v Cabool Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 753 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 43.2.80, r Pt43.40 Australian Development Corp Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 280 ........................................................................................................................................................ CPA 101.50 Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Lanmar Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 549 .......................................... r 16.3.140, r 36.16.240 Australian Federal Police, Commissioner of v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 .......... r 21.3.140, r 22.2.120 Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 568; [1991] ATPR 41-114 ....................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd [2011] NSWSC 595 ............................. r 42.34.40 Australian Gas Light Co v Valuer-General (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126; 57 WN (NSW) 53; 14 LGR (NSW) 149 ............................................................................................................................................................. r 50.3.260 Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Peeru (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 7 November 1990) .................. r 23.8.40, r 23.8.60 Australian Hardboards Ltd v Hudson Investment Group Ltd (2007) 70 NSWLR 201; [2007] NSWCA 104 ............................................................................................................................................................ r 18.1.60 Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Greenwood (1962) 107 CLR 308 .......................................................................... DCA 126.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xxviii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Buck [1982] 2 NSWLR 889 ............................................................................ SCA 66.240 Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Jumbo Scheepvaart Maatschappij (Curacao) NV (1988) 14 NSWLR 507 ............................................................................................................................................................. r 11.2.80 Australian Joint Stock Bank v Meldrum (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 233 ......................................................................... r 21.3.50 Australian Medical Imaging Pty Ltd v Marconi Medical Systems Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 1; [2001] NSWSC 651 ........................................................................................................................... r 31.3.120 Australian National Airlines Commission v Commonwealth (1975) 132 CLR 582; 6 ALR 433 ......................... SCR 1.8.40 Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 26 NSWLR 411; 9 ACSR 309 ................................................................................................................................................................ r 28.2.60 Australian Property & Management Pty Ltd v Devefi Pty L (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 7 April 1997) ........................................................................................................................................................... r 31.13.120 Australian Secuirties & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; [2004] NSWSC 467 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 24.4.40 Australian Secuirties & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 50 ACSR 357; [2004] NSWSC 750 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 24.4.40 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Australian Investors Forum (2003) 44 ACSR 503; [2003] NSWSC 130 ........................................................................................................................................ r 26.7.40 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Carey (No 12) (2007) 60 ACSR 597; [2007] FCA 35 ................................................................................................................................................................... r 26.4.100 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Enterprise Solutions 2000 Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 082 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 26.4.40 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Farley (2001) 51 NSWLR 494; [2001] NSWSC 32 .................................................................................................................................. SCA 69.40, SCR 54.0.120 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v GDK Financial Solutions Pty Ltd (2006) 60 ACSR 447; 236 ALR 699; [2006] FCA 1415 ........................................................................................................ r 26.1.80 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Hobbs [2012] NSWSC 1276 .................................................... r Pt35.40 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; 22 ACLC 1125; [2004] NSWSC 467 ................................................................. r 31.3.120, r 31.3.1000, r 31.6.40, r 31.7.1000, r 32.13.60 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; 53 ACSR 110; [2005] 3 ABC(NS) 390; [2005] NSWSC 149 ................................................................................. r 20.23.60, r 31.23.140 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; 54 ACSR 326; 23 ACLC 1111; [2005] NSWCA 152 ........................................ r 31.18.1000, r 31.29.1000, r 31.30.1000, r Pt31.Div2.1000 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 489 ........... CPA 26.60, CPA 26.80, CPA 26.160, CPA 27.10 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 706 ......................................................... r 31.4.60 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2006) 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 ................................................................................................................................................... r 31.13.160, r 31.14.180 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229 ...................... r 15.1.60 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sigalla (No 2) (2010) 240 FLR 327; [2010] NSWSC 792 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 25.11.20 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sweeney [2000] NSWSC 1249 ............................................ r 10.14.100 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sweeney (No 2) [2000] NSWSC 1211 ................................ r 12.11.140 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sweeney (No 2) (2001) 38 ACSR 743; [2001] NSWSC 477 ................................................................................................................... r 10.14.60, r 10.14.100, r 11.3.100 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sydney Investment House Equities Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 796 ................................................................................................................................................. r 29.9.40 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sydney Investment House Equities Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 814 ............................................................................................................................ r 29.10.40, r 29.10.60 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Yandal Gold Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 542 ..................................... r 18.1.60 Australian Securities Commission v Ampolex Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 504; 85 A Crim R 240 ........... r 21.7.40, r Pt21.140, SCA 75.20 Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194 ............................................ r 42.1.52 Australian Securities Commission v Macleod (1994) 54 FCR 309; 130 ALR 717 ................................................... r 17.7.80 Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 .................................... SCA 45.40 Australian Specialised Meat Products Pty Ltd v Turner (1995) 11 NSWCCR 614 ..................... SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Australiawide Airlines Ltd v Aspirion Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 365 .................................... r 42.1.52, r 42.19.40, r 42.20.40 Austress Freyssinet Pty Ltd v Kowalski [2007] NSWSC 1105 ........................................... r 38.2.60, r Pt38.80, CPA 108.25 Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 ........................................................................ r 36.16.120, r 36.16.160

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xxix

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Ayoub v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [2011] NSWSC 606 ......................................................................................... r 14.28.140 Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) Pty Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 147; [2004] NSWSC 967 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 14.26.60 Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 1; [2005] NSWCA 319 .......................................................................................................................................................... r 14.26.60 Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) Pty Ltd (2008) 187 A Crim R 245; [2008] NSWSC 908 .............................................................................................................................................. CPA 26.60 Azzi v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 140; [2007] NSWSC 375 ............................................... CPA 30.40 Azzopardi v Smart (1992) 27 NSWLR 232 ......................................................................................................... SCR 78.0.100 Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd [1985] 4 NSWLR 139 ............................................................................. r 50.3.260

B B v Medical Superintendent of Macquarie Hospital (1987) 10 NSWLR 440 ............................................................ r Pt57.80 B v N (1994) 35 NSWLR 140 ........................................................................... r 21.3.200, r 22.2.180, r 33.9.120, r 33.13.40 B v Protective Commissioner [2000] NSWSC 718 ................................................................................................. r 31.23.160 B(TA), Re [1970] 2 WLR 835 .............................................................................................................................. SCA 75A.160 BB v DD [2015] NSWSC 1095 ................................................................................................................................ r Pt56A.20 BB v DD; Re AA and the Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1825 .......................................... r Pt56A.20 BCD v XYZ [2013] NSWSC 405 ................................................................................................................................ r Pt57.20 BGP Properties Pty Ltd v Lake Macquarie City Council (2004) 138 LGERA 237; [2004] NSWLEC 399 ........................................................................................................................................................ r 31.35.80 BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400; [2004] HCA 61 .......................................................... r 44.3.40, r 44.5.60 BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd v Oil Basins Ltd [1985] VR 756 .......................................................... SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 BIS Cleanaway (t/as CHEP) v Tatale [2007] NSWSC 378 ..................................................................................... r 31.13.140 BNY Trust Co of Australia Pty Ltd v Banksia Finance & Leasing Co Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1776 ........................................................................................................................................................................ r 16.3.120 BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt [1980] 1 NSWLR 496; (1980) 47 FLR 317 .......... r 6.43.60, r 6.43.80, r 11.6.40, r 14.10.40 BPTC Ltd (in liq) (No 2), Re (1992) 29 NSWLR 713; 10 ACLC 1431; 8 ACSR 533 .......................................... r 33.3.100 BTPC Ltd (in liq), Re (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, McLelland CJ in Eq, 4 April 1996) ..................................... SCR 68.2.20 Baby D (No 2), Re (2011) 258 FLR 290; 45 Fam LR 313; [2011] FamCA 176 ...................................................... r Pt57.20 Bagley v Pinebelt Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 830 ........................................................................................................... r 42.7.80 Bailey v Department of Land & Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 .................. r 21.3.40, r 21.3.120, r 21.3.140, r 22.2.40 Bailey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 136 CLR 214; 51 ALJR 429 ................ r 15.1.40, r 15.10.60, r Pt15.20 Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; 45 ALJR 598 ..................................................... r 20.27.80, r 36.11.62, r 36.16.100 Baillieu Knight Frank (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ted Manny Real Estate Pty Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 359; 10 ACSR 537 .................................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40, SCR 80.0.20 Baines v State Bank of New South Wales [1985] 2 NSWLR 729 ........................................................................ SCA 121.20 Bajramovic v Calubaquid (2015) 71 MVR 15; [2015] NSWCA 139 ....................................................................... r 18.1.160 Baker v Australian Asbestos Insulations Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 595 ........................................................... SCA 75A.140 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; [1983] HCA 39 .................................................... r 21.3.140, r 21.3.180, r 22.2.120 Baker v Towle (2008) 39 Fam LR 323; [2008] NSWCA 73 ................................................................... r 42.1.50, r 42.1.200 Baldry v Jackson [1976] 1 NSWLR 19 .................................................................................................................... r 14.28.200 Baldry v Jackson [1976] 2 NSWLR 415 ............................................................. r 6.28.40, r 14.17.40, r Pt43.20, CPA 64.40 Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226 ........................................................................................................... DCA 126.20 Ballabil Holdings Pty Ltd v Hospital Products Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 155; [1985] 3 ACLC 220 ... r Pt21.120, SCA 66.240 Ballard v Brookfield Australia Investments Ltd [2013] NSWCA 82 ................................................... r 18.1.160, r 42.21.600 Ballas v Theophilos (1957) 97 CLR 186 .............................................................................................................. SCA 101.140 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1; [1991] ASC 56-039 ................................................................... r 42.5.40 Banabelle Electrical Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 714 ................................................................... r 20.24.60 Banfield v Wells-Eicke [1970] VR 481 ........................................................................................................................ r 7.4.120 Bank Polska Kasa Opieki Spolka Akcyjna v Opara (2010) 238 FLR 309; (2010) 238 FLR 309 .......... r 53.1.180, r 53.7.60 Bank Polska Kasa Opieki Spolka Akcyjna v Zbigniew Opara [2010] QSC 93 ....................................................... r 53.1.140 Bank Polska SA v Opara [2007] QSC 1 .................................................................................................................... r 53.7.220 Bank of New South Wales v Barlex Investments Pty Ltd (1964) 64 SR (NSW) 274 .......................................... CPA 117.40 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth Steel Co Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 69 .................................................... r 11.2.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xxx

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Bank of New South Wales v Withers (1981) 52 FLR 207; 35 ALR 21 ................................................................. r 14.28.180 Bank of New Zealand v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 27 NSWLR 91 ................................................. SCA 75A.80 Bank of Queensland v Jensen [2011] NSWSC 1566 ..................................................................................................... r 9.1.60 Bank of Queensland Ltd v Grant [1984] 1 NSWLR 409 ....................................................................................... SCA 66.240 Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Coppola [2011] NSWSC 1326 ............................................................................... r 17.2.60 Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Daleport Pty Ltd (in liq) [2010] NSWSC 1207 ................................................. r 42.21.300 Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Tannous (No 4) [2013] NSWSC 182 ................................................................... r 18.1.160 Bankinvest Attorney-General v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711; 92 FLR 153; 90 ALR 407 ............. r 8.2.60, r 44.5.60, r 44.5.120, r 44.6.60 Banks v Alphatise Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1437 ........................................................................................................ r 15.4.40 Bankstown Football Club Ltd v CIC Insurance Ltd (1998) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-406 ............................. r 14.14.200 Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279; 64 ALJR 244; 92 ALR 53 ................................................................................................................................................. r 14.14.80, r Pt14.20 Bans Pty Ltd v Ling (1995) 36 NSWLR 435 ......................................................................................................... CPA 100.40 Baptist, Re (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 268 ...................................................................................................................... r 18.3.100 Bar Assn (NSW) v Muirhead (1988) 14 NSWLR 173 .......................................................................................... SCR 55.0.60 Bar Assn (NSW) v Stevens (2003) 52 ATR 602; [2003] NSWCA 95 ........................................................................ r 50.7.40 Barach v University of New South Wales (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 185 ................................................................. r 12.11.140 Barack v WTH Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 649 ........................................................................................................... r 31.23.100 Barakat v Goritsas [2012] NSWCA 8 ........................................................................................................................... r 50.7.40 Barbarian Motor Cycle Inc v Koithan (1984) 35 SASR 481 ...................................................................................... r 22.1.80 Barclay Mowlem Construction v Tesrol Walsh Bay [2005] NSWSC 944 ............................................... r 33.2.60, r 38.5.100 Barclays Bank Ltd v Piacun [1984] 2 Qd R 476 .................................................................................... r 53.7.120, r 53.7.140 Barclays Bank Ltd v Tom [1923] 1 KB 221 ............................................................................................................. CPA 22.80 Barescape Pty Ltd v Bacchus Holdings Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 345; [2011] NSWSC 1002 .... r 31.26.40, r 31.26.1000 Baresic v Slingshot Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 160 ......................................................................... r 42.15.80 Barker v Allanson [1937] 1 KB 463; [1937] 1 All ER 75 .......................................................................................... r 7.4.120 Barker & Taylor Pty Ltd v Cablemakers (ACT) Pty Ltd [1982] 1 NSWLR 719 .................................. r 9.8.60, SCA 49.120 Barnes v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 67 ATR 284; 242 ALR 601; [2007] FCAFC 88 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 21.3.140 Barnett v Brown (1890) 6 TLR 463 ............................................................................................................................. r 43.2.60 Barnett v Rogers [1914] SALR 138 ........................................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Barneys Blu-Crete Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (1979) 43 FLR 463 ....................................................... SCA 66.60 Barns and Smith’s Case, Re (1589) 74 ER 325 ...................................................................................................... CPA 117.10 Barp Nominees Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 990 .............................................................................................................. r Pt55.40 Barrell Insurances Pty Ltd v Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd (1983) 58 ALJR 51; 9 ALR 384 ........................ r 36.17.60 Barrett Property Group Ltd v Metricon Homes Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1823 ................................................... r 42.5.40 Barry, Re [1971] VR 395 ........................................................................................................................................ SCR 68.0.60 Bartlett v Coomber (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 282 ....................................................................................................... r 42.15.80 Barton v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 729; [1970] 3 NSWR 141 ............................... r 23.8.40 Barton v Berman [1980] 1 NSWLR 63 ............................................................................ r 1.21.40, SCA 75A.40, SCA 51.20 Barton v Minister for Foreign Affairs (1984) 2 FCR 463; 54 ALR 586 ........................................... r 42.21.100, r 42.21.120 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; 73 ALJR 522; [1999] HCA 9 ... r 28.2.40, r 28.2.60, SCA 75.140 Batchelor v Burke (1981) 148 CLR 448; 55 ALJR 494; 35 ALR 15 ......................................................................... r 36.7.40 Bateman’s Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 247; 54 ALD 609; [1998] HCA 49 .......................................... SCA 65.40, SCA 75.160, SCR 54.0.100 Bathurst Regional Council as Trustee for the Bathurst City Council Crown Reserves Reserve Trust v Thompson (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 420 ................................................................................................... r 42.15.70 Batistatos v Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27 .......................................... r 13.4.120 Batterham v Makeig (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 314 .............................................................................. r 42.21.110, r 42.21.310 Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2006] NSWSC 583 ............ r 42.1.100, r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2008) 15 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-780; [2008] NSWCA 243 .......................................................................................................................... r 9.4.80 Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd (No 2) (2009) 15 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-795; [2009] NSWCA 12 ................................................................... r 42.5.40, r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd v HBO & DC Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 821 ...................................................... CPA 15.40 Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd v Queensland Investment Corp [2011] NSWSC 127 .................. r 20.24.100, r 20.24.160

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xxxi

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Bax Global (Australia) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538 ................................................... SCA 66.240, SCA 66.260 Bay Marine Pty Ltd v Clayton Country Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 8 NSWLR 104 .................................................... r 7.1.60 Bayne v Blake (No 3) (1909) 9 CLR 366; [1909] HCA 60 ........................................................................................ r 42.5.40 Bazem Pty Ltd v Bureau of Urban Architecture [2010] NSWSC 978 ....................................................................... r 6.19.40 Be Financial Pty Ltd v Das [2012] NSWCA 164 ..................................................................................................... CPA 60.40 Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy (1999) 48 NSWLR 1; [1999] NSWCA 408 .......................................................... r 7.25.40 Beattie v Osman (No 3) [2009] NSWSC 824 ............................................................................................. r 31.1.90, r 31.2.40 Beaufort Air-Sea Equipment Pty Ltd v Emhart Australia Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Master Malpass, 18 December 1992) ............................................................................................ r 49.20.120, r 49.20.140 Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (No 1) (unreported, NSWCA, 9 October 1990) .......................................................................................................................................... SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Bechara v Bates (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1588 ........................................................................................................... r 16.3.110 Beck v Tuckey Pty Ltd (2004) 49 ACSR 555; 22 ACLC 633; [2004] NSWSC 357 ............................................. CPA 32.40 Beddoe, Re [1893] 1 Ch 547 ...................................................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Beecham (Aust) Pty Ltd v Roque Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 1; 89 FLR 238 ........................................ r 4.10.60, r 18.2.80 Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol-Myers Co [1979] VR 273 ........................................................................................... r 21.4.40 Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 ........................................................... SCA 66.120 Belan v Casey [2002] NSWSC 58 ................................................................................................................................ r 7.25.40 Belgian Grain Produce Co v Cox & Co [1919] WN 317 ............................................................................................ r 36.4.60 Bell v David Jones Ltd (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 223; 66 WN (NSW) 62 ............................................................... DCA 126.20 Bell, Re; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141; 54 ALJR 412 ............................................................................... SCR 1.13.20 Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp (1998) 86 FCR 215; 166 ALR 699; 28 ACSR 343; [1998] FCA 849 ............................................................................................................................................. r 33.9.160 Bellamy v Bennett [1999] NSWSC 912 ..................................................................................................................... r 15.10.60 Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd (2011) 12 DCLR (NSW) 304; [2011] NSWDC 55 .............................................................................................................................................................. r 42.5.30 Bellgrove v Marine & General Insurance Services Pty Ltd (1996) 5 Tas R 409 ................................................... r 42.21.120 Bellingen Shire Council v Colavon Pty Ltd (2012) 188 LGERA 169; [2012] NSWCA 34 ............... r 14.7.80, r 14.14.40, r 14.14.80, CPA 14.40, CPA 14.1000, CPA 59.20 Bellissimo v JCL Investments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1260 ................................................................................. r 31.13.120 Belmont Finance Corp Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd [1979] Ch 250 .................................................................... r 14.14.120 Benana Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (unreported, NSWCA, 26 April 1990) ............................... SCA 51.20 Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd v Chowdhury [2012] NSWSC 592 ............................................................................ r 16.2.40 Bendir v Anson [1936] 3 All ER 326 ........................................................................................................................... r 6.19.40 Benefit Strategies Group Inc v Prider [2004] SASC 365 ............................................................................................ r 53.3.40 Benefit Strategies Group Inc v Prider (2005) 91 SASR 544; [2005] SASC 194 ............... r 53.1.160, r 53.7.180, r 53.7.220 Benefit Strategies Group Inc v Prider (2007) 211 FLR 113; [2007] SASC 250 ................................... r 53.1.180, r 53.7.200 Benjamin v Currie [1958] VR 259 ........................................................................................................................... r 14.14.180 Benjamin v Downs [1976] 2 NSWLR 199 ............................................................................................ r 7.23.40, SCA 75.160 Bennette v Cohen (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 162 ...................................................................................... r 42.15.45, r 42.15.50 Benpen Pty Ltd v Dyne (unreported, NSWSC, Master McLaughlin, 20 February 1998) ................................. SCR 55.0.220 Bentley v Nelson [1963] WAR 89 .............................................................................................................................. r 21.3.220 Benton v Scott’s Refrigerated Freightways [2008] NSWCA 143 ............................................................................. r 14.19.40 Beoco Ltd v Alfa Laval Co Ltd [1995] QB 137; [1994] 3 WLR 1179; [1994] 4 All ER 464 .............. r 42.1.62, CPA 98.20 Beran v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 107 ............... SCA 101.120, SCA 102.20, SCR 51.0.120, SCR 51.0.180 Berjaya Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ariff [2007] NSWSC 174 ..................................................................................... CPA 26.20 Berrico Estate Pty Ltd v Andersen [2003] NSWCA 23 ............................................................................................... r 42.1.62 BestCare Foods v Origin Energy [2012] NSWSC 574 ...................................................... r 20.20.60, r 20.24.60, r 20.24.160 BestCare Foods Ltd v Origin Energy LPG Ltd [2011] NSWSC 908 ....................................................................... r 20.14.60 Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 .............................................................................................................................. r 39.49.60 Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales (No 5) [2009] FCA 1011 ...................................................................... r 34.2.60 Bevillesta Pty Ltd v D Tannous 2 Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 277 ................................................................................ r 42.7.80 Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] NSWCA 160 .......................................................................................... SCR 55.0.40 Bhagat v Murphy [2000] NSWSC 892 .................................................................................................. r 42.21.90, r 42.21.110 Bhushan Steel Ltd v Severstal Export GmbH [2012] NSWSC 583 ......................................................................... r 25.14.20 Bi v Mourad [2010] NSWCA 17 ................................................................................................................ r 2.1.40, CPA 59.20 Biba Ltd v Stratford Investments Ltd [1973] Ch 281 ................................................................................................ r 40.6.120

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xxxii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Bideena Pty Ltd, Re [2016] NSWSC 735 .................................................................................................................... r Pt55.40 Bik v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 679 ............................................................................................. r 14.28.180 Bilbao v Farquhar [1974] 1 NSWLR 377 ........................................................................................ SCA 65.40, SCR 54.0.100 Bilous v Mudaliar (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 239 ........................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Bilyak v Pesor [2012] NSWSC 193 ............................................................................................................................. r Pt46.20 Binks v North Sydney Council [2001] NSWSC 27 .................................................................................. r 21.8.40, r 21.12.40 Bio Transplant Inc v Bell Potter Securities Ltd [2008] NSWSC 694 ......................................................................... r 42.1.62 Birch v Birch [1902] P 130 ......................................................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 Birchall v Bullough [1896] 1 QB 325 ................................................................................................. r 31.13.160, r 31.14.180 Birkai Pty Ltd v Permanent Custodians Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 178 ....................................................................... r 20.18.60 Birkett v James [1978] AC 297 .................................................................................................... SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Birmingham v London [1913] 3 KB 850 ..................................................................................................................... r 21.4.40 Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 1 FCR 526 .................................................................... r 21.3.160 Bishop v Bridgelands Securities (1990) 25 FCR 311; [1990] 41-060 ........................................................................ r 6.19.40 Bissicks v Bath Colliery Co Ltd (1878) 3 Ex D 174 ............................................................................................. CPA 106.60 Bisyk (No 2), Re (1980) 32 OR (2d) 281 .................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Bitannia Pty Ltd v Parkline Constructions Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 32 ................................................ r 42.19.40, r 42.20.40 Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438; 81 ALJR 1338; [2007] HCA 31 ....................................... CPA 112.20, CPA 113.30 Blacker v Parnell [1978] 1 NSWLR 616 ............................................................................................................... SCA 75A.40 Blagojevch v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 98 FCR 45; 98 IR 32; 172 ALR 611; [2000] FCA 483 .......................................................................................................................... r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 .......................................................................................................................... r 14.14.200 Blake v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 885 ............................................................................. CPA 26.60 Blake v Norris (1990) 20 NSWLR 300 ...................................................................................................................... r 44.5.100 Blake, Re (1885) 29 Ch D 913 ..................................................................................................................................... r Pt54.20 Blanchfield v Johnston [2007] NSWSC 143 .............................................................................................................. r 42.4.100 Bloeman v Atkinson [1977] Qd R 291 ......................................................................................................................... r 14.9.60 Blohn v Desser [1962] 2 QB 116 ................................................................................................................................. r 53.3.40 Blue Wedges Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage & the Arts (2008) 165 FCR 211; 245 ALR 584; [2008] FCA 8 ....................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.300 Blueseas Investments Pty Ltd v Mitchell (1999) 151 FLR 298; 25 Fam LR 65; [1999] FLC 92-856; [1999] FamCA 745 .................................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253 ...................................................................................... r 21.3.160, r 22.2.140 Boardman v Boardman (2012) 10 ASTLR 138; [2012] NSWSC 1257 ................................................................... CPA 30.25 Bobolas v Waverley Council (2012) 187 LGERA 63; [2012] NSWCA 126 .............................................................. r 7.18.60 Bogeta Pty Ltd v Wales [1977] 1 NSWLR 139 .................................................................................................... SCR 1.13.20 Boian, Re (2014) 17 BPR 33005; [2014] NSWSC 800 .............................................................................................. r Pt55.40 Boileau v Rutlin (1848) 2 Ex 665; 154 ER 657 ........................................................................................................ r Pt17.180 Bolckow Vaughan & Co v Fisher (1882) 10 QBD 161 .............................................................................. r 22.3.40, r 22.3.60 Boles v Esanda Finance Corp Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 666 .................................................................................... r 14.14.220 Bolger v McDermott (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1330 ..................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222; [1999] 2 WLR 215; [1999] 1 All ER 517 ....................................................... r 7.25.40 Bolwell Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Foley [1984] VR 97 ...................................................................................................... r 28.5.60 Bomanite Pty Ltd v Slatex Corp Aust Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 379; 104 ALR 165 .................................................. r 31.4.60 Bon Appetit Family Restaurant Pty Ltd v Mongey [2009] NSWCA 14 ..................................................................... r 42.5.40 Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1990) 1 ACSR 445 .................................................. r 26.1.100 Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1991] 1 VR 386; [1990] 1 ACSR 445 ......................................................................................................................................................... r 26.1.60, r 26.1.100 Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82 ............................................... r Pt17.145, r Pt17.150 Booksan Pty Ltd v Wehbe (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 103 ............................................................................................ r 42.1.120 Booth v Kendall [2009] QSC 237 ................................................................................................................................ r 23.9.60 Boral Recycling Pty Ltd v Wake [2009] NSWSC 712 ......................................................................... r 31.13.60, r 31.13.120 Boronia Park Preservation Group v MSMG Developments Pty Ltd (2015) 209 LGERA 259; [2015] NSWLEC 112 .............................................................................................................................................. r 25.8.60 Borowiak v Hobbs [2006] NSWSC 1089 ................................................................................................................... r 16.3.140 Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 304 .......................................................... r 42.1.100, r 42.1.120 Boswell v Coaks (No 2) (1894) 6 R 167; 86 LT 365 ................................................................................................ r 53.7.180

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xxxiii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Botany Bay Instrumentation & Control Pty Ltd v Stewart [1984] 3 NSWLR 98 ............ r 33.4.60, r 33.4.100, r 33.4.120, r 34.1.40 Bott v Carter [2012] NSWCA 89 ............................................................................................................ r 13.4.130, CPA 56.40 Bouras v Grandelis (2005) 65 NSWLR 214; [2005] NSWCA 463 ....................................... r 42.2.50, r 42.5.30, CPA 98.30 Bourke v Hamilton [1977] 1 NSWLR 470 ............................................................................................................. SCA 75.280 Bouton v Labiche (1994) 33 NSWLR 225 ................................................................................................................. r 53.7.220 Bowditch v NSW Trustee & Guardian [2012] NSWSC 702 ..................................................................................... r 42.1.200 Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCAFC 107 .................................................. r 42.1.120 Boyes v Colins (2000) 23 WAR 123; [2000] WASCA 344 ............................................................... r 21.3.140, r 31.10.1000 Boyle v Downs [1979] 1 NSWLR 192 ........................................................................................................................ r 22.1.80 Boyle v Victoria Yukon Trading Co (1902) 9 BCR 213 ........................................................................ r 53.1.180, r 53.7.200 Boyton v Clancy (unreported, NSWSC, Master McLaughlin, 3 October 1997) ..................................................... SCA 75.20 Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557 .................................................................................................... SCA 75.260 Branson v Tucker [2012] NSWCA 310 ........................................................................................................................ r 17.7.60 Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 ...................................................................................................................................... DCA 126.20 Braybrook, Re [1916] WN (Eng) 74 .............................................................................................................................. r 7.4.40 Brayley v Wilton [1976] 2 NSWLR 495 ................................................................................................. r 21.3.180, r 22.2.160 Breakout Barrier Release Systems Pty Ltd v Breakout Barrier Release Systems Australasia Ltd (Costs) [2013] NSWSC 1955 .................................................................................................................................. r Pt46.20 Breen v Doyle (1920) 37 WN (NSW) 258 .............................................................................................................. CPA 117.40 Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; 43 ALD 481 ................................................................................................ r Pt21.120 Breheny v Cairncross [2002] NSWCA 69 ................................................................................................. r 13.4.100, r 29.9.80 Bremner v Sinclair (No 2) [1999] NSWCA 407 ........................................................................... SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Brew v Whitlock (No 3) [1968] VR 504 ................................................................................................................... r 36.17.80 Bridge Shipping Pty Ltd v Grand Shipping SA (1991) 173 CLR 231; 66 ALJR 76 ..................... CPA 65.400, DCA 161.60 Bridgetown/Greenbushes Friends of the Forest Inc v Department of Conservation & Land Management (1997) 18 WAR 102; 93 LGERA 436 ......................................................................................... SCA 66.120 Briffa v Rail Corporation (NSW)(No 2) [2014] NSWDC 225 .................................................................................. r 42.18.40 Bright v Sampson & Duncan Enterprises Pty Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 346 ....... r 14.14.80, r 14.14.100, SCA 75A.160, SCA 106.20 Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 .............................................................................. r 18.1.160 Brimelow v Sharpe [2012] NSWCA 345 ................................................................................................................... r 50.3.160 Brimson v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 937 .................................................................. r 13.4.80, r 13.4.120 Brincat v Kilsby [1983] 1 VR 625 ........................................................................................................... r 6.18.40, CPA 24.40 Brisbane City Council v Valuer-General (Qld) (1978) 140 CLR 41; 52 ALJR 768; 21 ALR 607 .......... r 6.36.60, r 6.39.40 Brisbane Land Pty Ltd v Pine Rivers Shire Council [2000] 1 Qd R 493; [1998] QCA 25 ...................................... r 53.2.60 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 ............................................................. CPA 65.20 British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Gordon [2006] NSWSC 1473 ............................................................... r 21.10.40 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Blanch [2004] NSWSC 70 ....................................................... r 7.25.40 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (2002) 7 VR 524; [2002] VSCA 197 ...................... r 14.28.180 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158 ..... r 21.7.40, r 31.6.40, r 31.6.1000, r 52.1.100, r 52.1.120, r 52.1.160, r 52.1.220, r 52.6.20, r Pt21.140, r Pt52.60 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Sharon Y Eubanks for the United States of America (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158 ........................................................................................ r Pt52.20 British Franco Electric Pty Ltd v Dowling Plastics Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 448 ............................................ SCA 66.360 British Thomson Houston Co Ltd v British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd [1924] 2 Ch 160 ................................ r 17.6.60 Brittain v Commonwealth [2004] NSWCA 83 .................................................................................................... SCA 75A.180 Brockley Cabinet Co Ltd v Pears (1972) 20 FLR 333 ........................................................................... r 53.7.120, r 53.7.140 Bromhead v Graham (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 710 ....................................................................................................... r 42.7.80 Bromley v Housing Commission (NSW) [1985] 3 NSWLR 407 ............................................................................ SCA 49.20 Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027 .......................................................................................... r 15.8.40, r 53.1.160 Brown v Bluestone Property Services Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 869 .......................................................................... r Pt25.20 Brown v Brown (1993) 31 NSWLR 582 ....................................................................................... SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Brown v Dean [1910] AC 373 ....................................................................................................... DCA 126.20, SCA 75A.100 Brown, In the marriage of (1991) 105 FLR 329; 15 Fam LR 69 ............................................................................. r 42.21.60 Brown, Janson & Co v Hutchinson & Co [1895] 1 QB 737 .................................................................................... r 39.48.30 Browne v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 21 ......................................................................... SCR 1.13.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xxxiv

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Browning v Bitupave Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 81 ............................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Browning v Crowley [2004] DFC 95-292; [2004] NSWSC 128 ............................................................................. CPA 26.60 Brundza v Robbie & Co (No 2) (1952) 88 CLR 171; 27 ALJ 422 ........................................................................ r 42.21.400 Brunskill v Sovereign Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 842 ................... SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 51 FCR 529; 123 ALR 642 .................................................. r 14.14.220 Bryant v Hawkesbury Radio Communication Co-op Society Ltd [2014] NSWSC 848 ......................................... CPA 28.40 Brych v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd [1978] VR 727 .......................................................................................... SCR 55.0.40 Brydon v Australian Rail Track Corp Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1560 .................................................................................. r 5.2.40 Brymount Pty Ltd (t/a Watson Toyota) v Cummins [2005] NSWCA 69 .................................................................. r 42.15.80 Buckingham Gate International Pty Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 411; [2000] NSWSC 946 ............................................................................................................................. r 42.5.40 Buckley v Bennell Design & Constructions Pty Ltd [1974] 1 ACLR 301 ............................................................. r 42.21.110 Buckman v Rose-Rapmund [2015] NSWSC 311 ......................................................................................................... r 18.1.60 Buckmaster v Meiklejohn (1853) 8 Ex 634; 155 ER 1506 ....................................................................................... r Pt17.180 Budniak (No 2), Re [2015] NSWSC 1317 .............................................................................................. r 42.23.40, r 42.25.40 Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616 ...................................... r 50.16.60 Bullock v Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 2) (1985) 5 FCR 464; 10 IR 18 ................. SCA 66.120 Bullock v London General Omnibus Co [1907] 1 KB 264; [1904-7] All ER Rep 44; 76 LJKB 127; 95 LT 905; 23 TLR 62 ................................................................................................................. r 6.21.40, r 42.1.100 Bunting v Venville [1980] VR 633 ........................................................................................................................ SCR 1A.2.40 Burchett v Kane [1980] 2 NSWLR 266 .................................................................................................................. SCA 106.20 Burell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218; [2008] HCA 34 ...................................................................................... r 20.27.80 Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090; [1979] 3 WLR 722; [1979] 3 All ER 700 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r 21.3.200 Burnett v Burnett [1903] 3 SR (NSW) 513 ......................................................................................................... SCR 55.0.220 Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218; [2008] HCA 34 ........................................ r 36.16.100, r 36.16.140, r 36.16.200 Burstall v Beyfus (1884) 26 Ch D 35 ........................................................................................................................ r Pt21.120 Bushby v Dixon Homes du Pont Pty Ltd (2010) 78 NSWLR 111; [2010] NSWSC 234 .................................... DCA 134.80 Bushwall Properties Ltd v Vortex Properties Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1659; [1975] 2 All ER 214 ........................... CPA 100.100 Business Acquisitions Australia Pty Ltd v Renshall [2006] NSWSC 1399 ................................................................ r 42.5.40 Business Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) [2006] NSWCA 383 ..................... r 49.8.100, DCA 18FB.40 Business in Focus (Aust) Pty Ltd v Begun Property Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 264 ......................................................... r 42.1.65 Buxton & Lysaught Pty Ltd v Buxton [1977] 1 NSWLR 285 ................................................. r 9.8.60, r 22.2.60, r Pt21.120 Buzera Pty Ltd v Mezan Enterprises Pty Ltd [1998] NSW ConvR 55-851 ......................................................... SCR 1.13.20 Buzrio Pty Ltd v Consumer, Trader & Tenancy Tribunal (NSW) (No 4) [2010] NSWSC 41 .................................. r 42.1.57 Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 74 NSWLR 469; [2009] NSWSC 225 .............................................................................................................................................. r 1.9.60, r 31.4.80 Byrne v Byrne [2011] NSWSC 1437 ...................................................................................................... r 20.14.60, r 20.22.40 Byrne Lewis Group Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2014] NSWSC 172 ........................................................................................................................................................................ r 42.21.110

C C v B [2013] NSWSC 254 ........................................................................................................................................ r Pt56A.20 C v L [2002] Fam CA 163 .......................................................................................................................................... r 31.16.80 C v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 598 ................................................................................................................................ SCR 69.0.100 C v W [2015] NSWSC 1774 ........................................................................................................................................ r Pt57.40 C v W (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 945 ............................................................................................................................ r Pt57.160 C, Re [2012] NSWSC 1097 .......................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 C & L Cameron Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 676 .................................................................................... r 25.3.60, r 55.11.20 C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Hutton-Potts [2006] NSWCA 136 ...................................................................................... r 42.18.40 C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Noon [2011] NSWCA 397 ................................................................................................ r 14.14.220 C7 Pty Ltd v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1189 ....................................................................................... r 5.3.60 CAC v Department of Family & Community Services [2014] NSWSC 1855 ....................................... r Pt57.20, r Pt57.200 CAC v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 344 .......................... r Pt57.200 CBA Investments Ltd v Northern Star Ltd (No 2) [2002] NSWCA 146 ................................................................. r 42.15.80 CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O’Neill [1985] 1 NSWLR 601 .................................................................... r 28.2.60, r 28.2.140 CBX2 Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1555 .................................................. r 42.21.110

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xxxv

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES CBX2 Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltimited (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1555 ................................................ r 42.21.110 CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 1; 109 ALR 673 ........................................................................... r Pt34.20 CCR v Ps (No 2) (1986) NSWLR 622 ...................................................................................................................... r Pt57.200 CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172; [1998] HCA 67 ............................................................................................. SCA 75A.140 CG Maloney Pty Ltd v Noon [2011] NSWCA 397 ................................................................................................. r 14.14.220 CGI Information Systems & Management Consultants Pty Ltd v APRA Consulting Pty Ltd (2003) 47 ACSR 100; [2003] NSWSC 728 ....................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 CGU Insurance Ltd v Bazem Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 81 .......................................................................................... r 6.19.40 CGU Insurance Ltd v Malaysia International Shipping Corp Berhad (2001) 187 ALR 279; [2001] FCA 1223 .................................................................................................................................................... r 5.2.40, r 5.3.60 CJ v AKJ [2015] NSWSC 498 ................................................................................................. r 7.14.50, r Pt57.20, r Pt57.100 CSI International Co Ltd v Archway Personnel (Middle East) Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 1069; [1980] 3 All ER 215 ................................................................................................................................................................. r 9.1.60 CSR v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1; (2005) 222 ALR 1; (2005) 80 ALJR 59; [2005] HCA 64 .................................... r 42.1.62 CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345; 71 ALJR 1143; 146 ALR 402 ......... r 13.4.200, r Pt25.20 Cabassi v Ferrando (1940) 64 CLR 130 ..................................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 Cadbury Pty Ltd v Amcor Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 663 .............................................................................................. r 34.2.60 Cadence Australia Pty Ltd v Chew [2008] NSWSC 1074 .......................................................................................... r 23.8.40 Cadence Australia Pty Ltd v Chew [2008] NSWSC 1076 ......................................................................... r 23.8.40, r 23.8.60 Caine v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 109 ....................................................................... r 42.15.50 Cains v Wadiwel [2007] NSWSC 207 ................................................................................................... CPA 26.20, CPA 28.20 Cairns v Cairns [2006] NSWSC 364 ............................................................................................................................ r 35.2.40 Cairns v Unicomb [2005] NSWSC 1279 ....................................................................................................................... r 5.3.60 Calandra v Murden [2015] NSWCA 231 ................................................................................................................ CPA 133.60 Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333; [1975] 3 WLR 586; [1976] Fam 93 ................... r 42.15.80, Pt 20.Div4.20 Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 WLR 586 ...................................................................................... r 42.13.40, r 42.13A.20 Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93; [1975] 3 All ER 333; [1975] 3 WLR 586 .............................................. r 42.5.40 Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33 ......................... SCA 106.20, SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Callen v Partridge (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 211; [1962] NSWR 1052 ......................................................................... r 24.3.40 Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270; 11 ALR 227 ................................................................................................................................................................. r 10.19.40 Cambridge v Anastasopoulos [2012] NSWCA 405 .................................. r 31.29.80, r 31.29.1000, r 31.30.80, r 31.30.1000 Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd v Surfers’ Paradise Forests Ltd [1977] Qd R 261 .................................................... SCA 66.220 Camera Care Ltd v Victor Hasselblad Aktiebolag [1986] 1 FTLR 348 ..................................................................... r Pt11.60 Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571 ............................................................................. r 36.15.40, r 36.16.220, SCR 1.13.20 Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358; [1934] VLR 280 ..................................................................................... SCA 75.300 Cameron v Ofria [2007] NSWCA 37 ........................................................................................................................... r 42.7.80 Cameron’s Unit Services Pty Ltd v Kevin R Whelpton & Assocs (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 13 FCR 46; 11 ACLR 43 .................................................................................................................................................. r 42.21.100 Campbell v Crane (2013) 17 BPR 32483; [2013] NSWCA 43 ................................................................................. r 20.14.60 Campbell v Metway Leasing Ltd [1998] ATPR 41-630 .............................................................................................. r 15.1.60 Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; 80 ALJR 1441; [2006] HCA 41 ...................................................................................................................................................................... r 7.4.60 Canada Bay Council v F & D Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] NSWCA 57 ...................................................... r 42.1.120 Canas Pty Co v KL Television Ltd [1970] 2 QB 433 .............................................................................................. CPA 20.20 Candler v South Australian Institute of Technology (1973) 6 SASR 162 ................................................................ r 14.26.80 Candy v GIO General Ltd [2013] NSWSC 810 .......................................................................................................... r 17.2.60 Cann v Gray (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 239 ............................................................................................................... DCA 156.20 Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Schaerer [1998] NSWSC 473 ........................................................................................ r 11.10.120 Capaan v Joss, Managing Director, Westpac (No 2) (unreported, NSWCA, 6 June 1994) ................................. SCR 55.0.80 Capitalcorp Finance & Leasing Pty Ltd v Aussie Car Loans Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCA 992 .............................. r 42.15.60 Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151 ........................................................................... r 1.9.40, r 1.9.60 Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 540 ...................................................................................... r 20.20.120 Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380; 162 ALR 294; [1999] HCA 18 ............ r 25.11.20, r 25.14.20, CPA 129.20, SCA 66.240, SCA 66.260, SC Gen 14 Carey v Robson (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1199 ........................................................................................................... r 42.1.200 Carlson v King (1947) 64 WN (NSW) 65 ................................................................................................................... r 36.2.60 Carlton Cricket & Football Social Club v Joseph [1970] VR 487; (1969) 65 QJP 8 ................................................ r 7.4.120

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xxxvi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Carnie v Esanda Finance Corp Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398; 69 ALJR 206; 127 ALR 76; [1995] ASC 56-296 ................................................................................................................................................ r 7.4.40, r 7.4.80 Carolan v AMF Bowling Pty Ltd [1995] NSWCA 69 ......................................................................................... SCA 101.140 Carpenter v Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 186 FLR 104; 51 ACSR 245; [2004] NSWSC 973 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 6.24.40 Carr v Finance Corp of Australia Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 246; [1981] HCA 20 ......................................................... r 41.3.120 Carr v Neill [1999] NSWSC 1263 .............................................................................................................................. r 50.3.260 Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 72 ........................................................... SCA 102.20, SCR 51.0.180 Carson v Legal Services Commissioner [2000] NSWCA 308 ................................................................. r 6.27.60, r 13.4.160 Carter v Carroll (1967) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 17; [1968] 3 NSWR 542 ................................................................. r 16.4.100 Carter v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 109 FCR 215; 47 ATR 133; [2001] ATC 4260; [2001] FCA 575 ....................................................................................................................................................... r 6.19.40 Casey v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1981] 1 NSWLR 305 .................................................. r 14.28.140, r Pt14.80 Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 241 ......................................................................... r Pt22.20 Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (in Liq) [2015] NSWSC 851 ....................................................... r 20.24.100 Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) [2012] NSWCA 435 ............................................................ r 50.7.40 Cassis v Kalfus (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 315 ....................................................................................................... SCR 51.0.220 Castagna v Concercia Pell Mec SpA (unreported, NSWCA (FC), Mahoney P, Handley JA and Waddell AJA, 15 March 1996) ................................................................................................................................ r 11.4.80 Castanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd [1981] AC 57 ................................................................................................. r 12.1.120 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 ........................................................................ SCA 66.120 Cat Media Pty Ltd v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2006] NSWSC 790 ............................................................. r 42.15.80 Catalano v Managing Australian Destinations Pty Ltd (No 3) (2013) 306 ALR 449; [2013] FCA 1194 ..................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 117.40 Cavasinni v Cavasinni [2007] NSWSC 619 ................................................................................................................. r 46.4.20 Cave v Allen Jack & Cottier Pry Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1365 .................................................................. r 20.14.60, r 20.15.60 Cawley v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 225 ..................................................................... r 14.14.100 Caxton Street Agencies Pty Ltd v Korkidas [2002] QSC 210 ................................................................................ r 31.13.100 Ceil Comfort Insulation Pty Ltd v ARM Equipment Finance Pty Ltd (2001) 159 FLR 310; [2001] NSWSC 28 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 42.21.120 Ceil Comfort Insulation Pty Ltd v ARM Equipment Finance Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 619 ................................... r 50.16.40 Celermajer Holdings Pty Ltd v Kopas (2011) 16 BPR 30735; [2011] NSWSC 40 ................................................... r Pt35.40 Celestino v Celestino [1990] FCA 299 ......................................................................................................................... r 12.6.80 Celtic Resources Holdings plc v Arduina Holding BV (2006) 32 WAR 276; [2006] WASC 68 .............................. r 53.3.80 Cemac Modular Constructions Pty Ltd, Re; Ex parte Sadler [1973] 1 NSWLR 263 ........................................... CPA 140.40 Cement Linings Ltd v Rocla Ltd (1939) 40 SR (NSW) 491 ................................................................. r 31.49.40, r 31.54.40 Chaff & Hay Acquisition Committee v JA Hemphill & Sons Pty Ltd (1947) 74 CLR 375; 47 SR (NSW) 465; 64 WN (NSW) 187; 21 ALJ 158; [1947] ALR 330 ........................................................................... r 7.1.40 Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2009) 73 ACSR 252; [2009] NSWSC 805 ................................................................ r 42.6.40 Chaina v Alvaro Homes Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 353 .............................................................. r 9.5.80, r 42.5.40, r 42.15.80 Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No 10) [2013] NSWSC 499 ............................................ CPA 26.140 Challenge Bank Ltd v Raine & Horne Commercial Pty Ltd (1989) 17 NSWLR 297 ......... r 1.16.40, r 45.2.40, r 45.6.40, r 45.6.80, SCA 49.40 Challenger Group Holdings Ltd v Concept Equity Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 374 .................................................... r 13.4.220 Chamma v Solima [2008] NSWSC 382 ..................................................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski (2010) 75 NSWLR 245; [2010] NSWCA 33 .............................................. r 14.14.220 Champion Homes Sales Pty Limited v Coghlan [2012] NSWDC 244 ..................................................................... r 42.35.40 Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Mahommed (No 2) (2011) 80 NSWLR 210; (2011) 80 NSWLR 210 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.120 Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Mahommed (No 2) (2011) 80 NSWLR 210; 278 ALR 129; [2011] NSWCA 6 .................................................................................................................................................. r 42.16.40 Chapman v Chapman [2007] NSWSC 1109 .............................................................................................................. r 31.19.40 Chappell v Coyle [1985] 2 NSWLR 73 ..................................................................................................................... r 10.14.60 Chappell v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 153 .......................................................................... SCA 66.340 Chappuis v Filo (1990) 19 NSWLR 490 ...................................................................................................................... r 6.24.40 Charara v Integrex Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 342 ..................................................................................................... r 42.21.310 Charles v Jones (1886) 33 Ch D 80 ........................................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Charlie Carter Pty Ltd v Shop Distributive & Allied Employees Assn (WA) (1987) 13 FCR 413 ...................... r 14.28.120

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xxxvii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Charlwood Industries Pty Ltd v Brent [2002] NSWCA 201 ......................................................... SCA 108.20, SCR 51.0.240 Chartered Bank v Daklouche [1980] 1 WLR 107; [1980] 1 All ER 205 .............................................................. SCA 66.240 Chartspike Pty Ltd v Chahoud [2001] NSWSC 585 ............................................................................................... r 42.21.140 Chateau Constructions (Aust) Ltd v Zepinic [2013] NSWSC 1326 ....................................................................... CPA 126.40 Chelva Holdings Pty Ltd v Brodyn Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 701 ............................................................................ r 20.20.60 Chen v Chan (2009) VSCA 233 ................................................................................................................................. r 42.1.100 Chen v Karandonis [2002] NSWCA 412 ..................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Chen v Keddie [2009] NSWSC 762 ......................................................................................................................... r 42.21.110 Cheng XI Shipyard v The Ship “Falcon Trident” [2006] FCA 759 ........................................................................ r 42.21.110 Chick v Grosfeld (No 4) [2013] NSWSC 509 ........................................................................................................... r 42.1.200 China Shipping (Australia) Agency Co Pty Ltd v D V Kelly Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1557 ....................... r 42.1.57 Chocolate Factory Apartments Pty Ltd v Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 547 ............. r 20.20.60, r 20.24.60, r 20.24.100, r 20.24.180 Chocolate Factory Apartments Pty Ltd v Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 441 .................................. r 20.24.160 Chong v Chanell [2009] NSWSC 765 ......................................................................................................................... r Pt46.20 Chong v Super Equity Invests Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 27 ....................................................................................... r 55.11.20 Chorlton v Dickie (1879) 13 Ch D 160 ....................................................................................................................... r 6.32.40 Chotiputhsilpa v Waterhouse [2005] NSWCA 342 .................................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Christie v Ford [1957] 2 FLR 202 ................................................................................................................................ r 33.4.60 Chua v Archiworks Architects Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 411 ........................................................................................ r Pt9.40 Chulcough v Holley (1968) 41 ALJR 336 ..................................................................................... SCA 102.20, SCR 51.0.180 Church v Barnett (1871) LR 6 CP 116 ........................................................................................................................... r 8.2.60 Church of Scientology of California Inc v Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 344 ....................................................................................................................................................................... SCA 66.340 Churnin v Pilot Developments Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1459 .................................................................................... r 25.8.80 Churnin v Pilot Developments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 831 ...................................................................................... r 25.8.80 Cirillo v Consolidated Press Property Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 179 ........................................................................... r 42.5.40 Citrus Qld Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 5) [2006] FCA 1672 ...................................... r 42.21.110, r 42.21.400 City Convenience Leasing Pty Limited v Boo [2015] NSWSC 1271 ...................................................................... r 42.15.50 Civil Aviation Authority v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1995) 39 NSWLR 540; 126 FLR 26 ....................... SCR 55.0.40 Clancy v Santoro [1999] 3 VR 783 .......................................................................................................................... r 14.14.200 Clarence Street Pty Ltd v ISIS Projects Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 380 ................................................................... r 42.21.410 Clark v Auspicious Yacht Sales Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 37 ....................................................................................... r 11.7.40 Clark v Faldan Pty Ltd (unreported, McLelland CJ in Eq, 20 May 1996) ............................................................. SCA 75.40 Clark v NSW [2012] NSWCA 139 ........................................................................................................................... r 14.28.140 Clark v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 139 ....................................................................................................... CPA 56.40 Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486; 34 ALJR 118; [1960] ALR 524 ...................................................................... r 31.18.40 Clark v University of Melbourne [1978] VR 457 .................................................................................................. SCA 75.300 Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 .................................. r 25.11.20 Clarke v Martlew [1973] QB 58 .................................................................................................................. r 23.2.80, r 23.4.90 Clarkson v Mandarin Club Ltd (1998) 90 FCR 354 ............................................................................................. SCR 55.0.20 Clarkson v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd - Costs [2006] NSWSC 1275 ...................................................... r 42.15.80 Classic Ceramic Importers Pty Ltd v Ceramica Antiga SA (1994) 12 ACLC 334; 13 ACSR 263 ....................... r 42.21.300 Cleary v Jeans (2006) 65 NSWLR 355; [2006] NSWCA ....................................................................................... r 14.28.140 Clench v Dooley (1886) 56 LT 122 ............................................................................................................................. r Pt43.60 Cleveland Investments Global Ltd v Ficaro Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 473 .............................................. r 25.8.60, r 25.14.20 Close v Arnot (unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, Matter 10107/96, 21 November 1997 .................................. r 53.7.180 Clough v Tameside & Glassop Health Authority [1998] 3 FCR 133; [1998] 1 WLR 1478; [1998] 2 All ER 971 .......................................................................................................................................................... r 31.49.40 Clyne v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 154 CLR 589; [1984] HCA 44 .................................... r Pt38.60 Clyne v Law Society (NSW) (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 4 September 1987) ............................................ r 35.2.40 Co-ownership Land Development Pty Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 519; [1973] 1 ALR 201 ................................................................................................................................................. r 13.4.240 Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v CE Heath Insurance Brooking (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 703 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 22.1.60, r 22.1.80 Cocker v Tempest (1841) 151 ER 864; 7 M & W 502 ......................................................................................... DCA 199.20 Codd v Dunlap [1906] WN 57 ..................................................................................................................................... r 22.1.60 Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd v Gujarat NRE Coke Limited (No 2) [2015] FCA 809 ................................................... r 26.1.130

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xxxviii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Coffee v Scanlon (1992) 26 NSWLR 485; (1992) 41 IR 65 ...................................................................... r 42.1.52, r 42.1.60 Cohen v McWilliam (1995) 38 NSWLR 476; 128 FLR 263 ............................................................... r 16.3.140, r 36.16.240 Cojuanco v Routley [1983] 1 NSWLR 723 ................................................................................................................... r 9.8.60 Colavon Pty Ltd v Bellingen Shire Council (2008) 51 MVR 549; [2008] NSWCA 355 .......................................... r 14.7.60 Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25 .................................................................... SCA 66.440 Cole v Austin Distributors Ltd [1953] VLR 155; [1953] ALR 287 .......................................................................... r 42.22.40 Cole v Commonwealth (1961) 106 CLR 653 ....................................................................................................... SCA 101.140 Coles v Burke (1987) 10 NSWLR 429 .................................................................................................................... r 36.15.120 Coles v Wood [1981] 1 NSWLR 723 .......................................................................................... SCA 101.100, SCR 51.0.100 Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225; 118 ALR 248 .......................................................... r 42.5.40 Colmax Electric Pty Ltd (in liq) v Industrial Equity Ltd [1979] VR 577 ............................................................. SCA 49.120 Colorado v Hayden Engineering Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, 6 November 1995) ................ SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Colorado Products Pty Ltd (in prov liq), Re [2013] NSWSC 392 ............................................................. r 34.1.40, r 34.2.40 Colorado Products Pty Ltd (in prov liq), Re [2013] NSWSC 611 .......................................................................... r 42.21.110 Colquhoun v Graffione (2000) 97 FCR 376; [2000] FCA 325 ................................................................................... r 7.10.40 Comet Products UK Ltd v Hawkex Plastics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 67 .............................................................................. r 35.2.40 Commercial Bureau (Aust) Pty Ltd v Allen; Ex parte Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1984] 1 FCR 202; (1984) 15 ATR 468; 52 ALR 703; 84 ATC 4198 ........................................................................... SCR 55.0.20 Commonwealth v Anderson (1960) 105 CLR 303; 34 ALJR 323; [1961] ALR 354 .............................................. CPA 20.20 Commonwealth v Cable Water Skiing (Aust) Ltd (1994) 116 FLR 153; 14 ACSR 760 ....................................... r 42.21.110 Commonwealth v Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd (2003) 1 DDCR 1; [2003] NSWCA 192 ....................................... r 13.4.180 Commonwealth v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117 ......................................................................................................... r 42.15.80 Commonwealth v Griffiths (2007) 70 NSWLR 268; [2007] NSWCA 370 .............................................................. r 13.4.130 Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 39; 55 ALJR 45 ....... SCA 66.120, SCA 66.220, SCA 66.320 Commonwealth v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 26 June 1995) ....................................................................................................................................................................... r 21.3.200 Commonwealth v McCormack (1984) 155 CLR 273 ................................................................................................ r 36.17.60 Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604 .............................................................................. r 21.3.200 Commonwealth v Sterling Nicholas Duty Free Pty Ltd (1972) 126 CLR 297 ..................................................... SCA 75.180 Commonwealth, Re; Ex parte Jurd (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 22; [1966] 1 NSWR 301 ............................... CPA 140.20 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Clune [2008] NSWSC 1125 .............................................................................. r 28.2.60 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Estate of the Late Mahmoud Slieman [2010] NSWSC 661 ......... r 41.3.80, r 55.11.20 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Hadfield (2001) 53 NSWLR 614; [2001] NSWCA 440 ............................ DCA 134.80 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v MacDonald [2000] NSWSC 791 ...................................................................... r 16.4.60 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v McConnell (unreported, NSWSC, Rolfe J, 24 July 1997) ........................... CPA 29.20 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade (1993) 178 CLR 134 ..................................................................... SCA 75A.140 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Saleh [2007] NSWSC 990 ................................................................................ r 42.5.40 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Susan Hannaford Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 574 ................................ CPA 64.20 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Xiong [2010] NSWSC 1518 ............................................................................. r 17.2.60 Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd v Windermere Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 421 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 16.4.100 Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2002] NSWSC 980 ............................... r 31.23.100 Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311; 48 ALJR 196; 3 ALR 19 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 4.10.100 Commonwealth of Australia v Ryan (No 2) [2002] NSWCA 386 .............................................................................. r 42.5.40 Community Services, Department of v Boehm (unreported, NSWSC, Santow J, 13 August 1997, revised 14 August 1997) ................................................................................................................................... SCR 1.13.20 Community Services, Department of v D (2006) 66 NSWLR 582; [2006] NSWSC 827 ..................................... CPA Pt6.20 Community Services & Health, Minister for v Thoo (1988) 8 AAR 245; 78 ALR 307 ........................ r 21.8.40, r 21.12.40 Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD 55 ............ r 21.2.60, r Pt21.20 Compensation Court (NSW), Re (unreported, NSWCA, 1985) .......................................................................... SCR 55.0.120 Compsyd Pty Ltd v Streamline Travel Service Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 648 ....................................................... r 33.4.60 Computershare Ltd v Perpetual Registrars Ltd [2000] 1 VR 626 ............................................................................. r Pt21.120 Concrete Systems Pty Ltd v Devon Symonds Holdings Ltd (1978) 20 SASR 79; 20 ALR 677 ........................ SCR 48.0.60 Conde v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 221 ..................................................................... r 15.10.60, r 22.2.60 Conder v Silkbard Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 459 ......................................................................................................... r 42.1.70 Conlon v Divis [1967] 2 NSWR 6 ......................................................................................................................... DCA 126.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xxxix

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Connectland Pty Ltd v Porthaven Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 616 .................................................................... r 7.1.60, r 7.1.70 Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254 ............................................................................... SCR 1.13.20 Connop v Varena Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 71 ...................................................................................................... r 42.21.120 Connor v Hatgis (No 2) (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, 7 December 1995) ........................................................ r 42.15.50 Connor v Sankey [1976] 2 NSWLR 570 ......................................................................................... SCA 75A.40, SCA 75.280 Construction Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd v Tambel (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 274 ...................... SCA 66.240 Contour Building & Construction Pty Ltd v Kerr [2008] NSWSC 883 ....................................................................... r 5.3.60 Coogee Sports Club Ltd, In the matter of [2016] NSWSC 817 ................................................................................ r 26.1.100 Cook v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 14 September 1994) ................ r 10.14.120, r 11.10.120 Cook v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, McLelland CJ in Eq, 16 June 1995) ............................... r Pt43.80 Cook v Hawes [2002] NSWCA 120 ........................................................................................................ r 42.15.60, r 42.15.80 Cook v Taing [2014] VSC 428 ..................................................................................................................................... r 20.7.40 Cooke v Australian National Railways Commission (1985) 39 SASR 146 ............................................................... r 21.6.40 Cooke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2002) 51 ATR 223; [2002] FCA 1315 .................................. r 31.23.140 Coolgardie Goldfields Ltd, Re [1900] 1 Ch 475 ..................................................................................... r 31.14.40, r 31.14.80 Coombes v Registrar of Aboriginal Corps (No 2) [2008] FCA 1078 ....................................................................... r 42.1.300 Coombes v Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 70 .......................................... r 42.1.100, r 42.15.80 Coon v Cox (1993) 116 FLR 166; [1994] FLC 92-464 ............................................................................................ r 31.16.80 Cooper v Kinsella (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 140 ......................................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Cooper v McCormack [2013] NSWSC 1207 ............................................................................................................... r Pt55.40 Cooper v McCormack (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1588 .................................................................................................. r Pt55.40 Cooper v Mulcahy [2012] NSWSC 373 ........................................................................................................................ r Pt9.60 Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738 .................... r 12.6.60, r 17.2.60, r Pt2.20, CPA Pt6.20 Corbett v Nguyen (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 673 ............................................................................................................ r 42.1.55 Corbett Court Pty Ltd v Quasar Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd (2009) 25 BCL 29; [2008] NSWSC 1163 ...................................................................................................................................................................... r 20.24.100 Corby v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 245 ................................................................................ r 42.21.110 Cordwell v Austral Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Pty Ltd (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 247; [1962] NSWR 571 .......................................................................................................................................... r 23.4.60, r 23.9.1000 Corporate Affairs (WA), Commissioner for v Sansom [1981] WAR 32; [1981] 4 ACLR 874; [1980] CLC 40-640 ............................................................................................................................................ SCA 75.180 Corporate Affairs Commission v Bradley; Commonwealth (Intervener) [1974] 1 NSWLR 391; (1974) 24 FLR 44 .................................................................................................................................................... r 6.27.60 Corporate Affairs Commission v David Jones Finance Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 710 ............................................. SCA 75.180 Corporate Affairs Commission v Drysdale (1979) 53 ALJR 144 ........................................................................... SCR 1.8.60 Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Transphere Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 596 .......................................... SCA 75.20 Corrective Services, Commissioner of v Walker (2007) 166 IR 126; [2007] NSWCA 213 ...................................... SC CA 1 Corvisy v Corvisy [1982] 2 NSWLR 557 ............................................................................................................... SCA 66.320 Coshott v Barry [2014] NSWSC 238 ......................................................................................................................... r 42.1.120 Coshott v Learoyd [1999] FCA 276 ........................................................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Coshott v Woollahra Municipal Council [2007] NSWSC 1315 ................................................................................ r 42.15.80 Cosmos E-C Commerce Pty Ltd v Bidwell Associates Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 81 ................................................. r 13.1.60 Costain Australia Ltd v Superior Pipe Installations Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 491; [1975] 1 ACLR 209 ................................................................................................................................................................ r 43.2.60 Cotogno v Lamb (No 2) [1985] 3 NSWLR 221 ............................................................................. SCA 101.20, SCR 51.0.20 Cotterell v Stratton (1872) LR 8 Ch App 295 ........................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 ....................................................................................... SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 273 ............................. r 42.15.80 Couriers Pty Ltd (NSW) v Newman [2002] NSWSC 1172 ................................................................ CPA 26.60, CPA 26.100 Courtenay v Proprietors Strata Plan 12125 (unreported, NSWCA, 23 September 1998, 30 October 1998) ...................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 44.20 Covell Matthews v French Wools Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 876; [1977] 2 All ER 591 ................................................... r 12.1.120 Cowan v Lai [2014] NSWSC 1143 .............................................................................................................................. r Pt55.40 Coward v Stapleton (1953) 90 CLR 573 ............................................................................................................... SCR 55.0.80 Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 Ch D 34 .......................................................................................................................... r 42.21.60 Cox Bros (Aust) Ltd v Cox (1934) 50 CLR 314; [1934] ALR 193; 8 ALJ 107 ..................................................... r 12.7.120 Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023 ...................... r 31.37.40, r 31.37.1000, r 31.38.1000, r 31.39.1000, r 31.40.1000, r 31.41.1000, r 31.44.20, r 31.44.1000, r Pt31.Div2.Sdiv4.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xl

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Craig v Kanssen [1943] KB 256 ................................................................................................................................. DCA 8.40 Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; [1995] HCA 58 .................................................................... SC CL 3 Craigcare Group Pty Ltd v Superkite Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 467 ............................................................. r 42.16.40 Craven, Re (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 243 ........................................................................................................................ r 57.3.40 Crawley v Vero Insurance Ltd (2012) 17 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-946; [2012] NSWSC 593 ................................ r 28.2.60 Crayford Freight Services Ltd v Coral Seatel Navigation Co (1998) 82 FCR 328; 162 ALR 119 ........................... r 9.10.60 Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR ....................................................................................................................... r 42.1.120 Croker v Ewen [2000] NSWCA 186 .............................................................................................................................. r 4.5.40 Cross v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 120 .................................................................... r 42.1.120 Crothers v Grant [1934] VLR 120; [1934] ALR 127 ................................................................................................ r 43.2.100 Crowder v Long (1828) 8 B & C 598; 108 ER 1164 ................................................................................................ r 39.30.60 Crowder v Moore [1997] 1 Qd R 24 ............................................................................................................................ r 53.2.60 Crowley v Murphy (1979) 38 FLR 371; 28 ACTR 1 ............................................................................. r 21.3.180, r 22.2.160 (1981) 52 FLR 123; 34 ALR 496 ............................................................................................................ r 21.3.180, r 22.2.160 Crowther v Wheat (1724) 88 ER 174; 8 Modern 243 ............................................................................................... DCA 8.80 Crump v Equine Nutrition Systems Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1080 ............................................................................ r 42.5.40 Crump v Equine Nutrition Systems Pty Ltd t/as Horsepower (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 25 ...................................... r 42.15.80 Crypta Fuels Pty Ltd v Svelte Corp Pty Ltd (1995) 14 ACLC 393; 19 ACSR 68 ........................... r 42.21.110, r 42.21.410 Csalar v Circosta (2002) 55 NSWLR 212; [2002] NSWSC 482 ............................................................................. CPA 43.20 Csidei v Anderson [1977] 1 NSWLR 747 .............................................................................................................. SCA 75.280 Cullen v Knowles [1898] 2 QB 380 ............................................................................................................ r 6.20.40, r 6.25.40 Culpo v Arena [1975] Qd R 376 ............................................................................................................................ SCR 48.0.20 Cuming v Hennesy [2005] NSWSC 1219 .................................................................................................................. r 26.1.110 Cumming v Sands [2001] NSWSC 706 ..................................................................................................................... r 42.15.80 Cumming v Tradebanc International Ltd [2002] NSWSC 70 ..................................................................................... r 36.3.80 Cummings v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 246; (1981) 51 FLR 121 ............................... r 23.8.20, r Pt5.20 Cummins v Australian Jockey Club Ltd [2009] NSWSC 254 .................................................................................. r 42.19.40 Cunningham v Oliver (unreported, Fed Ct of Appeal, Burchett J, 21 November 1994) ....................................... r 42.21.140 Curley v Duff [1985] 2 NSWLR 716 ........................................................................................................................... r 35.2.40 Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232 ........................................ r 42.1.100 Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd [2000] NSWSC 232 ....... r 42.1.40, r 50.3.120, CPA 98.20 Currabubula and Paola v State Bank NSW [2000] NSWSC 232 ............................................................................. r 42.1.100 Curwen v James [1963] 1 WLR 748; [1963] 2 All ER 619 ............................................................................... SCA 75A.160 Cusick v Savage [2008] NSWSC 212 .......................................................................................................................... r 27.1.60 Cyril Smith & Associates Pty Ltd v Owners-Strata Plan No 64970 (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 245 ....................... CPA 133.40

D D, Re [2012] NSWSC 1006 ....................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.180 D Protected Estates Act, Re (1992) 28 NSWLR 728 ................................................................................................ r Pt57.160 D and Protected Estates Act, Re (1992) 28 NSWLR 728 ......................................................................................... r Pt57.160 D’Angola v Rio Pioneer Gravel Co Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 495 ....................................................................... CPA 95.20 DB Mahaffy & Assoc Pty Ltd v Mahaffy [2011] NSWSC 673 .................................................................................... r 7.1.70 DB Mahaffy & Assoc Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 776 ............................................................................................... r 7.1.70 DB Mahaffy & Co Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 1286 .................................................................................................. r 7.1.70 DCL Constructions Pty Ltd v Di Lizio [2007] NSWSC 653 ................................................................. r 50.3.120, r 50.3.140 DJ Colburt & Sons Pty Ltd v Ansen (1967) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 64; [1966] 2 NSWR 289 ............................... r 39.35.60 DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226; [2000] HCA 17 ................................................................................ r 41.3.40 DL & JE Graetz Pty Ltd v NTHG Pty Ltd (2002) 140 NTR 1; [2002] NTSC 40 ............................................... SCA 66.160 DM & BP Wiskich Pty Ltd v Saadi (NSWSC, Bryson J, 16 February 1996, unreported) ...................................... r 26.1.130 DW v CB (unreported, NSW Supreme Court ............................................................................................................ r Pt57.120 Dae Boong International Co Pty Ltd v Gray [2009] NSWCA 11 ........................................................ r 42.21.110, r 49.20.80 Dafaalla v Concord Repatriation General Hospital [2007] NSWSC 602 .................................................. r 7.36.40, r 7.37.40 Dagi v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1996] 2 VR 567 ....................................................................................................... r 21.7.40 Dagnell v JL Freedman & Co [1993] 1 WLR 388; [1993] 2 All ER 161 .................................................................. r 6.2.100 Dailhou v Kelly (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1220 ........................................................................................................... r 20.26.40 Dairy Farmers Co-op Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458 ................................................................. DCA 126.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xli

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Dalgety Futures Pty Ltd v Poretsky [1980] 2 NSWLR 646 .......................................................................................... r 6.3.60 Dallaway, Re [1982] 3 All ER 118; 1 WLR 756 ....................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Dalswinton Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Cole [2006] NSWSC 570 ................................................................................... r 14.11.40 Dalton v Paull (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 803 ............................................................................................................... r 42.4.100 Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492; [2001] NSWCA 87 ........................................................... r 6.43.80, r 17.7.60 Damjanovic v Maley (2002) 55 NSWLR 149; 195 ALR 256; [2002] NSWCA 230 ................................................. r 7.1.100 Damjanovic v Sharpe Hume & Co (Services) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 130 ....................................................... DCA 127.60 Danieletto v Khera (1995) 35 NSWLR 684 ......................................................................................... r 33.11.40, SCA 66.240 Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; 77 ALJR 40; [2002] HCA 49 .................................................................................... r 21.3.140, r 22.2.120 Danihel v Manning [2012] NSWSC 556 .................................................................................................................... r 21.2.100 Danny Kidron &Andrew Spaile Architects Pty Ltd v Garrett (1994) 35 NSWLR 572 ........................................... r 50.3.140 Darcy v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 413 ........................................................................................................ r 42.1.300 Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; 57 ALJR 80; 44 ALR 117 ......................... r 15.12.40, r 36.1.40, r Pt14.20, r Pt15.20 Darelvale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v. Wajerjet Designs Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 863 ............................................ r 42.21.400 Darling, Re (1988) 39 ChD 208 ................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; 277 ALR 611; [2011] HCA 21 .................... r 31.29.80, r 31.29.1000, r 31.30.80, r 31.30.1000, r Pt31.Div2.1000 Davey v Donnelly (NSWSC, M McLelland J, 16 May 1991, unreported) ............................................................... r 26.1.110 David v David (1993) 30 NSWLR 417 .................................................................................................. r Pt57.160, r Pt57.200 David v Vamiso Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 326 ......................................................................................................... r 20.20.120 David Jones Ltd v Federated Storemen & Packers Union of Australia (NSW) (1985) 14 IR 75 ........................ SCA 66.120 David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors-Holden’s Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294 .................................................. SCA 66.360 Davies v Alliance Acceptance Co Ltd (1993) 110 FLR 153 ....................................................................................... r 10.5.40 Davies v Nyland (1975) 10 SASR 76 ........................................................................................................................ r 21.3.220 Davies, Re; Ex parte Williams (1872) 7 Ch App 314; [1861–1873] All ER Rep 960 .......................................... CPA 109.20 Davis v Halliday Financial Management Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1371 .................................................................... r 15.4.40 Davys v Richardson (1888) 21 QBD 202 .................................................................................................................. r 14.25.40 Dawson v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 542 .......................................................................................... r 20.27.80 Dawson v Hall (1994) 10 NSWCCR 388 ................................................................................................................ r 31.28.100 Daya v CNA Reinsurance Co Ltd [2004] NSWSC 795 ........................................................................................... CPA 26.80 Daykin v SAS Trustee Corp (2001) 51 NSWLR 328; [2001] NSWSC 58 ......................... r 50.3.240, SC CA 1, SCA 49.20 De L v Department of Community Services (NSW) (1997) 190 CLR 207; [1997] HCA 14 ............................... r 36.16.180 De La Rue v Hernu, Peron & Stockwell Ltd [1936] 2 KB 164 ................................................................................. r Pt43.40 De Mora v Concha (No 2) (1886) 32 Ch D 133 ......................................................................................................... r 46.4.20 De Santis v Russo (2001) 27 Fam LR 414; [2001] QSC 65 .................................................................. r 53.7.180, r 53.7.220 Deacon v Australian Capital Territory (2001) 172 FLR 123; [2001] ACTSC 8 ................ r 23.2.80, r 23.4.90, SCR 55.0.20 Deadman, Re [1971] 1 WLR 426; [1971] 2 All ER 101 ...................................................................................... SCR 68.0.40 Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 141 .......... r 20.26.40, r 42.13A.20, r 42.15.50, r 42.15.60 Dean-Willcocks v Air Transit International Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 64; 42 ACSR 328; 20 ACLC 1464; [2002] NSWSC 525 .......................................................................................................................... r 6.19.40 Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549; 9 SR (NSW) 376 ..................................................................................... r 50.16.60 Debtor (No 2176 of 1938), Re [1939] Ch 601 ............................................................................................................ r 53.8.20 Degmam Pty Ltd (in liq) v Wright (No 2) [1983] 2 NSWLR 354 ............................................................................. r 42.5.40 Dehn v Honeman [2015] NSWSC 773 ....................................................................................................................... r 42.32.40 Delaforce, Ex parte (1888) 4 WN (NSW) 165; 9 LR (NSW) 133 ........................................................................... CPA 24.60 Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc (2010) 176 LGERA 424; [2010] NSWCA 263 .......................................................................................................................................................... r 42.4.100 Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc [2010] NSWCA 263 .............................................. CPA 60.20 Demasi v Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, McClelland CJ in Eq, 14 June 1995) ............................................................................................................................................. r 12.6.60, r 14.23.40 Demobuild Pty Ltd v Erect Safe Scaffolding Pty Ltd (unreported, Young J, 25 May 1994) ............................... SCA 66.380 Dempsey, Re; Ex parte Currie (1968) 88 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 193; 70 SR (NSW) 1; [1968] 2 NSWR 378 ......................................................................................................................................................... SCA 75A.60 Dennis v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2008] NSWCA 37 ............................................... r Pt31.40, CPA 58.40, CPA 64.20 Dennis v Watt (1942) 59 WN (NSW) 204 ................................................................................................................... r 6.36.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xlii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Dent v Moore (1919) 26 CLR 316; 19 SR (NSW) 344; 36 WN (NSW) 46; 25 ALR 437; [1919] HCA 11 ............... r 31.13.60, r 31.13.80, r 31.13.160, r 31.13.1000, r 31.14.40, r 31.14.100, r 31.14.180, r 31.14.1000 Deposit & Investment Co Ltd v Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co (1996) 39 NSWLR 267 ........................................ r 33.11.40 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 9) [1991] 1 WLR 652; [1991] 2 All ER 901 ...................................................... SCR 1.8.40 Derham v Amev Life Insurance Co Ltd (1978) 20 ACTR 23 ..................................................................................... r 22.3.80 Develtor Property Group Pty Ltd v Newcastle City Council [2001] NSWLEC 47 ................................................... r 42.1.57 Devenish v Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd (1990) 64 ALJR 533; 94 ALR 664 .......................................................... r 42.21.110 Deves v Porter [2003] NSWSC 878 ........................................................................................................................... r 42.30.40 Devlin v Conpress Printing Ltd (1960) 62 SR (NSW) 20; 78 WN (NSW) 1011 ................................................ DCA 126.20 Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 ..................................... r 50.3.260, SCA 75A.80 Dewes v Riley (1851) 20 LJ CP 264 ........................................................................................................................ DCA 81.20 Dews v Riley (1851) 138 ER 542; 11 CB 434 ..................................................................................................... DCA 18G.20 Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62; 23 ALJ 48; [1949] ALR 333 ............ r 7.14.40, r 13.1.100, r 13.4.120, r 16.2.40 Di Donato, Re [2015] NSWSC 1923 ....................................................................................................................... CPA 117.55 Di Pietro v Hamilton (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, 6 September 1990) ....... SCA 75A.80, SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Dialog Pty Ltd v Addease Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1359 ................................................................................................. r Pt35.40 Diamond v Simpson (No 4) [2004] NSWCA 57 ....................................................................................................... r 42.18.40 Dickinson v Perrignon [1973] 1 NSWLR 72 ... SCA 65.40, SCA 69.20, SCA 69.40, SCA 69.60, SCA 75.20, SCR 54.0.20, SCR 54.0.100, SCR 54.0.140 Dikschei v Epworth Foundation [2010] VSC 435 ....................................................................................................... r 23.9.60 Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd v Steel Mains Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 323; 49 ALJR 233; 6 ALR 171 ................................................................................................................................................................ CPA 22.80 Dillon v Gosford City Council (2011) 184 LGERA 179; 284 ALR 619; [2011] NSWCA 328 .............................. r 42.1.260 Dimento v Dimento [2007] NSWSC 420 ........................................................................ CPA 26.40, CPA 26.60, CPA 26.100 Dimmock v Whymark (1965) 65 SR (NSW) 194; 82 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 29; [1964-1965] NSWR 1557 ................................................................................................................................................. r 31.14.80, r 31.14.1000 Dinnen v Terrill [2007] NSWSC 1405 ....................................................................................................................... r 42.4.100 Direct Acceptance Corp Ltd (rec & mgr apptd) (in liq) v Lord (unreported, NSWSC, Giles J, 3 September 1993) .................................................................................................................................................... r 21.3.220 Director of Public Prosecutions v Geraghty [2000] NSWSC 228 ........................................................................... r 36.16.210 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Sexton [2008] NSWSC 352 ....................................................................... r 42.1.300 Ditfort v Brown (1990) 19 NSWLR 49 ................................................................................................................. SCR 55.0.20 Ditfort v Temby (1990) 26 FCR 72; 97 ALR 409 ....................................................................................................... r 10.6.40 Diver v Neal [2009] 2 ASTLR 89; [2009] NSWCA 54 ............................................................................................ r 42.1.200 Dixon v Clark (1848) 136 ER 919; 5 CB 365 ........................................................................................................... r 14.25.40 Dixon v Williams (1875) 13 SCR (NSW) Eq 7 ......................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 409 .................................................................................. r 49.4.60 Dodd v Arnold (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 19 ............................................................................................. r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261 ................................................. r 42.1.120 Doherty v Liverpool District Hospital (1991) 22 NSWLR 284 ............................................................................. SCA 106.20 Dominello v Nominal Defendant (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 257 ................................................................................. r 42.1.100 Donald Campbell & Co v Pollak [1927] AC 732 ........................................................................................................ r 42.1.40 Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 ............................................................................. r 42.1.60, CPA 98.20 Donaldson v Harris [1973] 4 SASR 299 ...................................................................................................................... r 21.6.40 Donnelly v Ross Mining NL [1999] NSWSC 960 .................................................................................................. r 50.2.1000 Dooly v Oldman [1949] ALR (CN) 1053 .................................................................................................................... r 22.3.60 Dooney v Henry (2000) 74 ALJR 1289; 174 ALR 41; 45 ATR 113; 35 ACSR 155; [2000] HCA 44 .............................................................................................................................................................................. r 42.5.40 Dooney, Re [1993] 2 Qd R 362 ............................................................................................................... r 53.7.120, r 53.7.140 Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) v Beresfield Aluminium Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 416; [2002] NSWCA 95 ......................................................................................................................................... SCR 72A.5.20 Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) v Beresfield Aluminium Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 68 ..................... DCA 81.20 Dormer v Solo Investments Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 428 .................................................................................. SCA 75.140 Douglas v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 126 ................................................................ r 15.10.40, r 36.16.210 Douglas v Land & Housing Corp (NSW) [2008] NSWCA 315 ................................................................................. r 7.36.40 Doulaveras v Daher (2009) 253 ALR 627; [2009] NSWCA 58 ............................................... r 7.13.40, r 7.24.60, r 7.24.80 Doulton Potteries Ltd v Bronotte [1971] 1 NSWLR 591 ......................................................................................... CPA 93.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xliii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317; 77 ALJR 1706; 201 ALR 139; [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-712; [2003] HCA 51 .......................................................................................................................... r Pt17.160 Dow v Attorney-General [1980] Qd R 58 .................................................................................... SCR 55.0.60, SCR 55.0.160 Dow Corning Australia Pty Ltd v Paton [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-485 ............................................................ r 14.23.40 Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575; 77 ALJR 255; [2002] HCA 56 ....................................... r 14.14.200 Downey v Acting District Court Judge Boulton (No 5) (2010) 78 NSWLR 499; (2010) 78 NSWLR 499 ......................................................................................................................................................... DCA 18.60 Downs v Civil & Civic Pty Ltd (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 152; [1964] NSWR 523 ........................................ r 23.4.100 Dr Douglass v Lawton Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 90 ....................................................................... r 42.1.60, r 42.1.62 Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Santow J, 16 October 1996) ........................................................................................................................................................ r 12.6.60, r 17.2.60 Drew v H [1999] NSWSC 610 ................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.120 Driat Pty Ltd v Thomas [2012] NSWSC 71 .............................................................................................................. r 16.3.140 Drivetime Radio Australia Pty Ltd v Pivotal Creative Solutions Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 763 ................................ r 34.2.60 Drumdurno Pty Ltd v Braham (1982) 64 FLR 227; 42 ALR 563; [1982] 1 ACLC 397 ....................................... r 42.21.110 Drummond v Drummond [1999] NSWSC 923 .......................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Drummoyne Municipal Council v Lewis [1974] 1 NSWLR 655 ............................................................................... r 40.7.50 Du Maurier v Wechsler (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 240 .................................................................................................. r Pt55.40 Dubbo City Council v Barrett [2003] NSWCA 267 .................................................................................................... r 31.4.80 Dubbo Stock & Station Agents Pty Ltd v Laws [2004] NSWCA 336 .............................................................. DCA 76A.100 Duchman v Oakland Diary Co Ltd [1930] 4 DLR 989 ............................................................................................. r 42.1.100 Duffy v Super Centre Development Corp Ltd [1967] 1 NSWR 328 .......................................................................... r 26.1.20 Duke of Bedford v Ellis [1901] AC 1 ............................................................................................................................ r 7.4.40 Dumas Hotels Pty Ltd v York Motors (Sales) Pty Ltd [1970] 1 NSWR 115 ....................................................... SCA 49.120 Dunbar v Perc [1956] VLR 583 ................................................................................................................................... r 22.1.60 Duncan v Cashin (1875) LR 10 CP 554 ...................................................................................................................... r Pt43.30 Duncan v National Australia Bank Ltd (2006) 95 SASR 208; 235 ALR 385; [2006] SASC 239 .......... r Pt41.80, r Pt43.40 Duncan, Re [1939] VLR 355; ALR 405 .................................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Duncan-Strelec v Tate [2009] NSWSC 112 ................................................................................................................. r 40.3.80 Dunn v KAZ Group Ltd [2006] NSWSC 8 ............................................................................................................... r 33.4.140 Dunn v Ross Lamb Motors [1978] 1 NSWLR 26 ................................................................................................. DCA 127.80 Dunstan v Rickwood (No 2) (2007) 38 Fam LR 491; [2007] NSWCA 266 ............................................................ r 42.1.200 Dunwoodie v Teachers Mutual Bank Ltd (2014) 9 BFRA 433; [2014] NSWCA 24 ............................................... r 16.3.140 Durham v Collins [1999] SASC 163 ......................................................................................................................... CPA 98.20 Dusmanovic Ex parte Dusmanovic, Re [1967] 2 NSWR 125; (1967) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 642 ....................... CPA 140.20 Dwyer v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 31 ATR 48 ......................................................................... SCR 51.44.20 Dymocks Book Arcade Pty Ltd v Capral Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1423 ................................................... CPA 64.20, CPA 65.20 Dyno Wesfarmers Ltd v Knuckey [2003] NSWCA 375 ....................................................... r 6.43.60, r 14.10.40, CPA 65.20

E E v R [2013] NSWSC 835 ......................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.180 EB v Guardianship Tribunal [2011] NSWSC 767 ....................................................................................................... r Pt57.40 EInduct Systems Pty Ltd v 3D Safety Services Pty Ltd (2015) 90 NSWLR 451; [2015] NSWCA 284 ......................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 60.20 EK v Magistrate J Culver [2008] NSWADTAP 19 ..................................................................................................... r Pt57.40 EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1982] 2 All ER 980 ......................................................................... r 42.5.30 EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59; [1982] 2 All ER 980; [1982] 3 WLR 245 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 42.5.30 ERS Engines Pty Ltd v Wilson (1994) 35 NSWLR 193 ........................................................................................ SCA 66.160 ES, Re (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 23 ............................................................................................. r 57.3.40, r 57.8.20, r 57.11.20 Earl of Inchcape, Re [1942] Ch 394; [1942] 2 All ER 157 .................................................................................... DCA 81.20 Earp v Lloyd (1858) 70 ER 24; 4 K & J 58 ................................................................................................................ r 22.3.40 Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority NSW [1992] NSWCA 62 .................................................. r 25.11.20 East West Airlines Ltd v Turner (2010) 78 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCA 53 .................... r Pt19.20, CPA 64.40, CPA 65.400 East West Airlines Ltd v Turner (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 159 .................................................................................. r 42.15.50 Eastmark Holdings Pty Ltd v Kabraji (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1255 ....................................................... r 42.7.80, r 42.7.100 Eaton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2006] NSWCA 283 ........................................................................... DCA 44.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xliv

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Eckford v SA Butler Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 143 ............................................................................................... DCA 126.20 Ecrosteel Pty Ltd v Perfor Printing Pty Ltd (1996) 37 IPR 22; [1997] AIPC 91-314 ............................................... r 42.5.40 Ecroyd v Coulthard [1897] 2 Ch 554 ........................................................................................................................... r 36.4.60 Edmeades v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1969] 2 QB 67; [1969] 2 WLR 668; [1969] 2 All ER 127 ........................ r 23.9.20 Edson v Roads & Traffic Authority (2006) 65 NSWLR 453; 45 MVR 183; [2006] NSWCA 68 .......................... r 42.1.100 Edwards v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 291 ...................................................................................................................... r 39.1.60 Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296 .................................................................................................................. SCA 75A.60 Edwards Madigan Torzillo Briggs Pty Ltd v Stack [2003] NSWCA 302 .................................................................. r 42.1.52 Edyp v Brazbuild Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 218 ......................................................................................................... r 50.3.160 Egan v Minister for Transport (1976) 14 SASR 445 ............................................................................................... r 14.28.200 Egan v Minister for Transport (No 2) (1976) 15 SASR 408 .......................................................... SCA 66.280, SCR 55.0.40 Eko Investments Pty Ltd v Austruc Constructions Ltd [2009] NSWSC 208 .................................... r 20.24.100, r 20.24.160 Eko Investments Pty Ltd v Austruc Constructions Ltd [2009] NSWSC 371 ............................................................. r 42.1.62 El-Saeidy v Land & Housing Corp (NSW) [2014] NSWCA 172 ............................................................................... r 18.1.60 El Ali v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1988) 15 NSWLR 303 .................................................................... r Pt31.40 El Hayek v Vasic [2010] NSWSC 1498 ....................................................................................................................... r 22.1.40 Elcham v Darling Island Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 448 .............................................................................. r 10.14.120 Elders Trustee & Executor Co Ltd v Eastoe [1963] WAR 36 .............................................................................. SCR 68.0.60 Elders Trustees & Executor Co Ltd v Eagle Star Nominees Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9205; [1987] ANZ ConvR 14; NSW ConvR 55-333 ........................................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Electrical Equipment Ltd v Sibmark Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 732 ................................................................. SCR 80.0.20 Electricity Commission (NSW) v Yates (1993) 30 NSWLR 351 ................................................. SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Electronic Industries Imports Pty Ltd v Public Curator (Qld) [1960] VR 10 ............................................................ r 6.29.40 Elias, In the Marriage of (1977) 29 FLR 393; [1977] 3 Fam LR 11 ......................................................................... r 46.8.20 Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322 .......................................................................... r 42.15.50 Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373 .......................... r 42.1.60, r 42.1.120, r 42.15.80 Ellis v Dariush-Far (2007) 242 ALR 635; [2007] QCA 398 ..................................................... r 53.2.60, r 53.3.60, r 53.3.80 Ellis v McHenry (1871) LR 6 CP 228 ....................................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 Elphick v Westfield Shopping Centre Management Co Pty Ltd (2011) 216 IR 41; [2011] NSWCA 356 ............................................................................................................................................................... r 7.1.50, r 7.4.80 Elsmore Resources Ltd, Re [2014] NSWSC 1390 ....................................................................................................... r 42.7.80 Emanuele v Australian Securities Commission (1997) 188 CLR 114; 71 ALJR 717 ............................................. CPA 14.60 Emery v Wilson (1974) 48 ALJR 131 .................................................................. SCA 75A.180, SCA 107.20, SCR 51.0.220 Emmerton v University of Sydney [1970] 2 NSWR 633 ............................................................................................ r 15.1.40 Employers Reinsurance Corp v Ashmere Cove Pty Ltd (2008) 166 FCR 398; [2008] FCAFC 28 .......................... r 6.19.40 Encyclopaedia Britannica Australia Ltd v Campbell (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 335 .................................................. r 42.13.40 Enders v Erbas [2014] Aust Torts Reports 82-161; [2014] NSWCA 70 .................................................................. r 15.30.40 Energy Drilling Inc v Petroz NL [1989] ATPR 40-954 ........................................................................................... r 42.21.110 Engelback v Nixon (1875) LR 10 CP 645 ................................................................................................................... r Pt43.30 Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477; 68 ALJR 127; 82 LGERA 51 ............................................................................................................................. r 21.3.160, r 22.2.140 Epitoma Pty Ltd v The Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (1984) ATPR 45,490 ............................ SCA 66.120 Epping Plaza Fresh Fruit & Vegetables Pty Ltd v Bevendale Pty Ltd [1999] 2 VR 191; [1999] VSCA 43 .............................................................................................................................................................. r 42.21.200 Equity 8 Pty Ltd v Shaw Stockbroking Ltd [2007] NSWSC 503 .......................................................... r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Equity Access Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp [1989] ATPR 40-972 ................................................... r 42.21.110, r 42.21.410 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth, Field Warne (A Firm) [2006] VSCA 123 ................................................................. r Pt41.80 Erhard v Bhatia [2002] NSWCA 388 ........................................................................................... SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 74 ALJR 339; [1999] HCA 67 ......................................................................................... r 21.1.40, r 21.3.140, r 22.2.120, r 31.4.80 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10; 69 ALJR 404 ................ r 21.3.200, r 21.7.40, r 22.2.180, r 33.9.160 Esso China Inc v Chan [1999] VSC 294 .............................................................................. r 53.7.120, r 53.7.140, r 53.7.160 Estate Cockell; Cole v Paisley [2016] NSWSC 349 ................................................................................................... r Pt54.20 Estate Ford, Re; Application for Executor’s Commission [2016] NSWSC 6 ............................................................ r Pt54.20 Estate of Cho-Poon, Re (2013) 10 ASTLR 251; [2013] NSWSC 844 ...................................................... r 55.2.20, r Pt55.40 Estate of Chow Cho-Poon, Re [2013] NSWSC 844 ................................................................................................... r Pt54.20 Estate of Grounds, Re [2005] NSWSC 1311 ............................................................................................................. r 42.1.200

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xlv

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Estate of Rosalind Allwood v Benjafield [2009] NSWSC 1383 ............................................................................... r 42.23.40 Estate of Virgona v De Lautour (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 323 ................................................................................... r 42.15.70 Estate of the Late M T Mutton [2007] NSWCA 340 .................................................................................................. r 42.1.55 Estates Property Investment Corp Ltd v Pooley [1975] 3 ACLR 256 .................................................................... r 42.21.400 Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 404 ........................................................... r 20.26.60 Eurobodalla Shire Council v Gerondal (No 3) [2012] NSWLEC 46 .......................................................................... r 40.8.60 Eurobodalla Shire Council v Wells [2006] NSWCA 5 ............................................................................................. CPA 99.40 European Asian Bank Attorney-General v Wentworth (1986) 5 NSWLR 445 ................................................... SCR 55.0.120 European Bank Ltd v Evans (2010) 240 CLR 432; [2010] HCA 6 ............................................................................ r 25.8.80 Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 ............................................................................................................................... r 36.16.240 Evans v Morgan [1928] 2 KB 527 ............................................................................................................................. DCA 8.40 Evans Construction Co Ltd v Charrington & Co Ltd [1983] QB 810; [1983] 2 WLR 117; [1983] 1 All ER 310 ....................................................................................................................................................... CPA 65.400 Evans Shire Council v Richardson (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 61 ................................................................................ r 42.15.80 Evatt v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) NSW 384; [1970] 1 NSWR 97 ........................... r 23.8.60 Eve, Re (1986) 31 DLR (4th) 1; [1986] 2 SCR 388 ................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 Evenco Pty Ltd v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters etc Union of Employees (Qld) [1999] QSC 53 .............................................................................................................................................................................. r 42.5.40 Everett v Ribbands (1946) 175 LT 143 ...................................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 Evergreen Tours Pty Ltd v McLaren [2010] NSWSC 1362 ........................................................................................ r 12.5.40 Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 .... r 2.1.40, r 21.2.100, r 21.3.240, r 21.7.40, r Pt21.140, CPA 56.40, CPA 59.20, CPA 64.20 Ezystay Systems Pty Ltd v Link 2 Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 180 ............................................................................... r Pt25.20

F F v West Berkshire HA [1990] 2 AC 1 ....................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 F, Re [2013] NSWSC 54 .............................................................................................................................................. r Pt57.40 F Hoffmann-La Roche & Co Attorney-General v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 ............................................................................................................................................... r 7.23.40, SCA 66.220 FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Burns (1996) 9 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-384 ....................................................... r 42.5.40 FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268; 62 ALJR 216 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 1.12.60, r 9.10.60 FM, Re [2012] NSWSC 445 ...................................................................................................................................... r Pt56A.20 Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52; 263 FLR 211; [2012] NSWCCA 125 .............................................................................................................................................. r 4.2.100 Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd, Re [2011] NSWSC 223 .......................................................................................... r 52.1.140 Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87; 57 ALJR 621; 48 ALR 1 ................................ r 13.1.60, r 13.1.100 Farr v Queensland [2009] NSWSC 906 ....................................................................................................................... r 7.14.50 Fastlink Calling Pty Ltd v Macquarie Telecom Pty Ltd (2008) 217 FLR 366; 26 ACLC 374; [2008] NSWSC 299 ................................................................................................................................................ r Pt35.20 Fay v Moramba Services Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 725 ............................................................................................... r 42.1.62 Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96; 72 ALJR 1442; [1998] HCA 58 ................................................. SCA 66.120 Fellow, Re; Ex parte Stewart [1972] 2 NSWLR 317 ............................................................................................ SCR 55.0.60 Fenato v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2010) 78 NSWLR 20; [2010] NSWCA 80 .............. r 16.3.140, r 16.6.40 Fenton v Fenton (1966) 85 WN (NSW) (Pt 1) 430; 9 FLR 224; [1966] 2 NSWR 605 ........................................... r Pt14.80 Ferguson v Hyndman [2006] NSWSC 538 .................................................................................................................. r 42.1.52 Fernance v Nominal Defendant (1989) 17 NSWLR 710 ............................................................................ r 6.28.40, r 19.3.40 Ferrari v Beccaris [1979] 2 NSWLR 181 ..................................................................................................................... r 25.4.40 Ferraro v Woodward (1978) 143 CLR 102; 52 ALJR 528; 19 ALR 188 ........................................................... SCR 55.0.100 Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) (1998) 29 ACSR 290 ........................................................... r 36.16.180 Fexuto Pty Ltd v Lombe [2006] NSWSC 981 ......................................................................................................... CPA Pt6.20 Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 1; [2002] NSWSC 432 ................... r 42.7.40, r 42.7.80 Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2004) 208 ALR 564; [2004] NSWSC 664 .......... r 42.21.80, r 42.21.110, r 42.21.140, r 42.21.400, r 42.21.410 Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 432 ......................................................................... r 22.1.80 Field v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285; 32 ALJR 110 ................................. r 21.3.220, CPA 30.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xlvi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Fineglow Pty Ltd v Anastasopoulos (2002) 57 NSWLR 39; [2002] NSWSC 1181 .............................................. r 31.13.140 Finlayson v Carr [1978] 1 NSWLR 657 ................................................................................................................. SCA 75.300 Finn v Carelli [2007] NSWSC 261 ............................................................................................................................. r 25.11.20 Finnie v Dalglish [1982] 1 NSWLR 400 ................................................................................................................... r 33.4.100 Fire Containment Pty Ltd v Robins (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 547 ............................................................................... r 42.1.52 Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (2014) 289 FLR 373; [2014] NSWSC 1358 ..................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 124.60 Firedam Civil Engineering Pty Ltd v Shoalhaven City Council [2010] NSWCA 59 .............................................. r 20.20.60 First American Corp v Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan [1999] 1 WLR 1154; [1998] 4 All ER 439 ......... r 52.1.100, r 52.1.120, r 52.6.20 First Capital Partners Pty Ltd v Sylvatech Ltd (2004) 186 FLR 266; [2004] NSWSC 846 ................................... r 33.9.120 Firth v Mowlem & Co Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 1184; [1978] 3 All ER 331 ..................................................................... r 12.5.40 Fitter v Public Trustee [2007] NSWSC 1487 .............................................................................................. r 6.11.60, r 12.5.40 Fitts v Froome [2001] NSWSC 965 ....................................................................................................................... SCR 55.0.80 Fitzgerald v National Bank Ltd [1929] 1 KB 394 ....................................................................................................... r 54.3.20 Fitzpatrick v Waterstreet (1995) 18 ACSR 694 ........................................................................................................ r 42.21.120 Five D Pty Ltd v Impact Building Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 993 ............................................................................ r 14.28.140 Fleming v Marshall [2010] NSWCA 356 ................................................................................................................. r 42.21.310 Fleming v Marshall (2011) 279 ALR 737; [2011] NSWCA 86 ................................................................................ r 6.43.100 Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250; 73 ALJR 1; 103 A Crim R 121; 158 ALR 379; [1998] HCA 68 .................................................................................................................................................. SCA 75A.60 Fletcher v Besser [2010] NSWCA 30 .......................................................................................................................... r Pt25.20 Fletcher v Seddon Atkinson Australia Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 169 ................................................................... DCA 44.20 Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Lines MacFarlane & Marshall Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 28; [2001] VSCA 167 .................................................................................................................................................... r 36.2.60 Flinders Trading Co Pty Ltd, Re (1977) 20 SASR 14 ........................................................................................... SCA 75A.60 Florida Investments Pty Ltd v Milstern (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1972] WAR 148 ................................... r 14.28.60, r 14.28.200 Foley v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd [2008] NSWSC 778 .................................................................... r 42.1.52 Fookes v Slaytor [1978] 1 WLR 1293; [1979] 1 All ER 137 ................................................................................. r 14.14.180 Foots v Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd (2007) 234 CLR 52; 82 ALJR 173; 241 ALR 32; [2007] HCA 56 .................................................................................................................................................. r 42.1.40 Forbes Services Memorial Club Ltd v Hodge (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, 8 March 1995) ........................... r 42.15.80 Ford v Nagle [2004] NSWCA 33 ............................................................................................................................. r 14.28.140 Fordham v Fordyce (2007) 154 LGERA 49; [2007] NSWCA 129 ............................................................................. r 42.1.65 Fordyce v Fordham (2006) 67 NSWLR 497; [2006] NSWCA 274 ......................................................... r 42.1.40, r 42.20.40 Forestview Nominees Pty Ltd v Perron Investments Pty Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 117; 162 ALR 482; [1999] FCA 405 ................................................................................................................................................. SCR 55.0.20 Forster v Farquhar [1893] 1 QB 564 .......................................................................................................................... r 42.1.120 Forsyth v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 231 CLR 531; 81 ALJR 662; [2007] HCA 8 ..................... DCA 44.20 Forsyth, Re [1984] 2 NSWLR 327 ............................................................................................................................. r 52.1.100 Fortuna Holdings Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1978] VR 83; (1976) 6 ATR 620 ................... SCA 66.400 Foster v Mountford (1976) 29 FLR 233 ................................................................................................................. SCA 66.360 Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2006) 63 NSWLR 203; [2005] NSWCA 83 ......... r 7.4.80, r 7.4.100, r 13.4.160 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251; [1980] 3 WLR 209; [1980] 2 All ER 696 ............................ SCR 1.8.20 Foukkare v Angreb Pty Limited [2006] NSWCA 335 ............................................................................................... r 42.20.40 Foukkare v Angreb Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 335 ...................................................................................................... r 42.19.40 Foundation Enterprises Ltd v ML & C Heritage Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 575 ................................................ SCR 1.8.60 Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 ................................................................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 452 Green Lane, Ilford, Re [1971] 1 WLR 138; [1971] 1 All ER 315 ................................................................ SCR 68.0.40 Fowdh v Fowdh (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, 4 November 1993) ................................................................ SCA 75A.40 Fox v H Wood (Harrow) Ltd [1963] 2 QB 601 ........................................................................................................... r 15.4.40 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; 77 ALJR 989; [2003] HCA 22 ................................ r 31.1.120, r 50.16.60, SCA 75A.80 Foyster v Foyster Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 881 ...................................................................... r 33.4.140, r 33.11.40 Franklins Ltd v Burns [2005] NSWCA 54 ............................................................................................................... DCA 44.60 Franklins Pty Ltd v Endeavour Holdings Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1204 ................................................................. r 42.33.40 Franks v Berem Constructions Pty Ltd [1998] NSWSC 692 ................................................................. r 20.23.60, r 20.24.80

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xlvii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Franks v Warringah Council [2010] NSWSC 1318 ..................................................................................................... r 21.3.40 Fraser v The Queen [1984] 3 NSWLR 212; (1984) 15 A Crim R 58 ................................................................ SCR 55.0.120 Fraser v The Queen (No 2) [1985] 1 NSWLR 680; (1985) 19 A Crim R 248 .................................................. SCR 55.0.120 Fraser Henleins Pty Ltd v Cody (1945) 70 CLR 100 ............................................................................................... r Pt17.145 FremantleMedia Ltd v Yu [2016] NSWSC 1167 ....................................................................................................... r 25.11.20 French v Chapple [2000] NSWSC 1240 ...................................................................................................................... r 25.8.80 French Consulting Pty Ltd v Donald [2011] NSWSC 584 .......................................................................................... r 30.1.80 Freres v Jenssen (1970) 44 ALJR 191 .......................................................................................................................... r 17.7.40 Frey, Re; Ex parte McIntosh (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 519 ....................................................................................... CPA 140.20 Frieda and Geoffrey, Re [2009] NSW 133; 40 Fam LR 608 ...................................................................................... r Pt57.20 Friend v Brien (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 614 .............................................................................................. r 42.1.200, r 42.5.30 Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88 .................................................................................. r 25.11.20, r 25.14.20, SCA 66.260 Frigo v Culhaci (1998) NSWSC 393 .......................................................................................................................... r 25.11.20 Frippery Pty Ltd v Booth [2008] FCA 514 .................................................................................................................. r 42.5.40 Fruehauf Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 359 .................................... r 21.4.40 Frumar v The Owners of Strata Plan 36957 [2010] NSWCA 172 ......................................................................... CPA 133.60 Fubilan Catering Services Ltd v Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1497 ......................................... r 42.1.55 Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242 ......................................................................................... r 42.1.40, r 42.1.55, r 42.1.60 Furness, Re [1943] Ch 415 ..................................................................................................................................... SCR 68.8.20

G G v Day [1982] 1 NSWLR 24 ................................................................................................................................ SCA 66.360 G v G [2016] NSWSC 511 ......................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.200 GAU v GAV [2014] QCA 308 ..................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 GDR v EKR [2012] NSWSC 1543 ............................................................................................................. r 57.3.30, r Pt57.60 GE Capital Asset Services & Trading Asia Pacific Pty Ltd v Rocks Excavations & Plant Hire Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21253; [2003] NSWSC 99 .................................................................................................. CPA 93.40 GHI, Re (2005) 221 ALR 589; [2005] NSWSC 581 ................................................................................................... r 7.13.40 GIO General Ltd v ABB Installation & Service Pty Ltd (2000) 19 NSWCCR 720; [2000] NSWCA 118 .......................................................................................................................................................... r 42.15.80 GIO General Ltd v ABB Installation and Service Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 118 ..................................................... r 42.15.50 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Yuill (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 6 August 1997) ............................................. SCA 75.20 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd (in liq) v Yuill (1997) 42 NSWLR 225 ................................................................................. r 21.3.220 GR Vaughan (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Vogt [2006] NSWCA 263 .................................................................................... r 42.1.60 Gaba Formwork Contractors Pty Ltd v Turner Corp Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 175 ................................................. CPA 93.60 Gabrielle and Frank, Re [2011] NSWSC 944 ............................................................................................................ r 50.17.40 Gaggin v Lemari (2000) 10 BPR 18381; [2000] NSWSC 856 .............................................................. r 10.6.40, r 10.14.120 Gain v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) 42 NSWLR 252 ......................................................................... CPA 29.20 Galbally & O’Bryan v Easton [2016] NSWSC 77 ............................................................................ CPA 106.11, CPA 126.22 Galong Investments Pty Ltd v Biddulph [1980] 2 NSWLR 677 ........................................................................... SCA 49.120 Gamble v Killingsworth [1970] VR 161 ............................................................................................................... SCR 1A.2.40 Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; 51 ALJR 315 ............................................. r 36.16.100, SCA 75A.100 Gangemi Holdings Pty Ltd v Salter [1999] NSWSC 1004 ....................................................................................... r 50.3.260 Gardner v Dairy Industry Authority (NSW) (1977) 52 ALJR 180; 18 ALR 55 ................................................... SCA 75.160 Garnock v Black (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 1218 ....................................................................................................... CPA 112.20 Garrard (t/as Arthur Anderson & Co) v Email Furniture Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 662 ................................. SCR 1.13.20 Garsec v His Majesty Sultan of Brunei (2007) 213 FLR 331; [2007] NSWSC 882 ................................................. r 12.5.40 Garth Barnett Interior Design Pty Ltd v Ellis [2009] NSWCA 193 ............................................................................. r 5.3.60 Gate Gourmet Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Gate Gourmet Attorney-General [2002] NSWSC 727 ....................... r 10.14.100 Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 78 ALJR 394; 204 ALR 258; [2004] HCA 6 .................. r 14.10.40, r 14.14.80 Gattelleri v Meagher [1999] NSWSC 1279 ................................................................................................................. r 42.7.80 Gatti v Calvary Health Care Riverina Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1077 .......................................................................... CPA 146.20 Ge v River Island Clothing Pty Limited [2001] NSWSC 935 ............................................................................... CPA 146.20 Geeveekay Pty Ltd v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria (No 2) [2008] VSC 152 ........................................... r 42.1.300 Geftlic v Merhi [2010] NSWCA 256 ...................................................................................................................... DCA 127.30 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; 38 ALJR 253; [1965] ALR 636 ........................................................................................................ r 13.4.120, r 14.28.80, r 16.2.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xlviii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

General of Berne Insurance Co Ltd v Jardine Reinsurance Management Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 301; [1998] 1 WLR 1231 ................................................................................................................................... CPA Pt7.Div2.40 Gentry Bros Pty Ltd v Wilson Brown & Assocs Pty Ltd (1992) 8 ACSR 405; 10 ACLC 1394; [1992] ATPR 41-184 ............................................................................................................................................ r 42.21.200 George v The Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [2003] NSWCA 365 ...................................................... SCA 101.100, SCR 51.0.100 George Pearse Pty Ltd v O’Flynn (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 400; 79 WN (NSW) 328; [1963] NSWR 102 ....................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 140.20 Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd v Claude Cassegrain [2012] NSWSC 285 ........................................................... r 46.11.20 Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478; 76 ALJR 828; 188 ALR 353; [2002] HCA 22 .................................................... r 28.2.140, DCA 76A.100, DCA 127.60, SCA 101.120, SCA 106.20, SCR 51.0.120 Gertsch v Roberts (1995) 35 NSWLR 631 ............................................................................................................ SCR 78.0.40 Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504; [2009] NSWCA 76 ............................................................................................ r 20.26.80 Ghazal v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 ............................................................... r 14.14.120 Ghose v CX Reinsurance Company Ltd [2010] NSWSC 110 .................................................................................... r 28.5.40 Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543 ................................................................................................................. SC Gen 5 Gibson v Parkes District Hospital (1991) 26 NSWLR 9; [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-140 ................................. r 13.4.140 Gigi Entertainment Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2010] NSWSC 906 ................................................................................... r 20.24.160 Gilchrist v R Wallace Mitchell Pty Ltd [1972] VR 481 .............................................................................................. r 22.3.80 Gilgandra Marketing Co-Op Ltd v Australian Commodity Merchandise Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2011] NSWSC 69 ................................................................................................................................................... r 25.4.30 Gill v Woodfin (1884) 25 Ch D 707 ............................................................................................................................ r 16.2.40 Gillard v Hunter Wire Products Pty Ltd t/as Hunter Screen Products (No 2) [2001] NSWCA 450 ......... DCA 127.80, SCA 101.100, SCR 51.0.100 Giorgi v European Asian Bank Aktiengesellschaft BC8601212 (Supreme Court ...................................................... r 45.2.40 Giorgi v European Asian Bank Aktiengesellschaft BC8601212 (Supreme Court; McClelland CJ in Eq; 3 March 1986), .................................................................................................................................................. r 1.16.40 Gladio Pty Ltd v Buckworth (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1462 ...................................................................................... r 42.34.40 Glandon Pty Ltd v Strata Consolidated Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 543 ...................................................................... r 18.1.40 Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Men’s Health Pty Ltd (NSWSC, Young J, 30 April 1998, unreported) ............................................................................................................................................................... r 26.1.20 Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Mens Health Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 6 ........................................... r 46.4.20 Gleeson v Harness Racing Authority (NSW) (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 7 December 1995) ............. SCA 65.20, SCR 54.0.80 Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd v Arthur Andersen [2002] 1 Qd R 233; (2001) 47 ATR 11; [2001] QCA 115 ................................................................................................................................................................ r 21.3.140 Glenwood Management Group Pty Ltd v Mayo [1991] 2 VR 49 ............................................................................. r 25.11.20 Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd [1990] 3 ACSR 183 .................................... r 26.1.60 Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Rooney (1994) 36 NSWLR 122 ...................... r 21.3.140, r 22.2.120, SCA 75.60 Global Medical Solutions Australia Pty Ltd v Axiom Molecular Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1517 ........................... r 25.19.20 Global Medical Solutions Australia Pty Ltd v Axiom Molecular Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 86 ................................. r Pt25.20 Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 80 .................... r 14.14.60, r 14.14.120, SCA 75A.140 Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 503 ................................................................. r 14.23.40 Glover v MacDougall [1976] 2 NSWLR 359 .............................................................................................................. r 6.36.60 Gnitekram Marketing Pty Ltd, Re [2010] NSWSC 1328 ............................................................................................ r Pt55.40 Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139 ......................................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 Goding v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 170; 39 ALJR 121 ...................................................... r 22.4.40 Godwin v Cashion (1878) 1 SCR (NSW) 165 ......................................................................................................... DCA 44.20 Golden Harvest (Aust) Pty Ltd v Paing Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 85 ................................................................. SCA 75A.100 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 76 ALJR 1024; 190 ALR 370; [2002] HCA 31 ...................................................... r Pt14.20 Gollin Holdings Ltd v Adcock [1981] 1 NSWLR 691 ........................................................................................... SCA 49.120 Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (No 2) [1993] Ch 171 .............................................................. r 42.5.40 Gonzales v Claridades (2003) 58 NSWLR 211; [2003] NSWCA 227 ................................................ r 54.3.20, SCR 68.2.20 Gonzales v The Owners of Strata Plan 74146 (Costs) [2010] NSWDC 50 ............................................................. r 42.15.45 Goodwin v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 239 .................................................................... DCA 142N.20 Goold & Porter Pty Ltd v Housing Commission [1974] VR 102 ............................................... r 6.19.40, r 6.20.40, r 7.4.80 Gorcynski v Perera [2003] NSWCA 211 ..................................................................................... SCA 101.100, SCR 51.0.100 Gordon v The Queen (1982) 41 ALR 64 ............................................................................................ r 31.29.100, r 31.30.100 Gordon Pacific Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Conlon [1993] 3 NZLR 760 ........................................................ r 53.7.100

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xlix

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Gorey v Griffin [1978] 1 NSWLR 739 .................................................................................................................. SCR 69.0.80 Gorman v Health Care Complaints Commission (NSW) [2012] NSWCA 251 ......................................................... r 18.1.40 Gosford City Council v Timbs [2000] NSWCA 31 ..................................................................... SCA 101.100, SCR 51.0.100 Gould v Mount Oxide Mines Ltd (in liq) (1916) 22 CLR 490 ................................................................................... r 36.1.40 Gould v Purtle [2014] NSWSC 493 ............................................................................................................ r 18.1.60, r 18.7.40 Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215; 60 ALJR 49; 62 ALR 527 .................................... r 6.21.40, r 36.17.60, r 42.1.100 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435; [1977] 3 WLR 300; [1977] 3 All ER 70; (1977) 121 SJ 543 ............................................................. r 7.23.40, SCA 66.320, SCA 75.20, SCA 75.160, SCA 75.200 Gourlay v Casey (1927) 38 CLR 586; [1927] VLR 177 ............................................................................................. r 7.36.80 Gove v Black [2006] WASC 298 ............................................................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Government Insurance Office (NSW) v Evans (1990) 21 NSWLR 564 ...................................... SCA 107.20, SCR 51.0.220 Government Insurance Office (NSW) v Healey (No 2) (1991) 22 NSWLR 380 ................................... r 36.4.60, SCA 46.20 Government Insurance Office (NSW) v Johnson [1981] 2 NSWLR 617 ................................................................... r 7.10.40 Government Tram & Omnibus Services, Commissioner for v Vickery (1952) 85 CLR 635 .............................. DCA 126.20 Govers v Luff (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 5 November 1997) ........................................................................... r 23.4.60 Gowing, Re; Ex parte Preen and Shepherd (2014) 17 BPR 32763; [2014] NSWSC 247 ....................... r Pt46.20, r Pt54.20 Grace v Thomas Street Café Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 72 .......................................................... r 42.15.70, r 42.15.80 Graczyk v Graczyk [1955] ALR (CN) 1077 .............................................................................................................. r 10.21.40 Graham v Powell (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 185 ............................................................................................................. r 16.7.45 Graham v Proudfoot (1894) 11 WN (NSW) 91 ..................................................................................................... DCA 127.80 Graham v Seal (1919) 88 LJ Ch 31 ........................................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Grant v Brewarrina Shire Council [No 3] (2003) 125 LGERA 348 ........................................................................... r 42.1.50 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; 51 ALJR 198 ........................................................... r 21.3.120, r 21.3.140, r 22.2.120 Grant v Easton (1883) 13 QBD 302 ........................................................................................................ r 53.1.180, r 53.1.200 Grant v Southwestern & County Properties Ltd [1975] Ch 185; [1974] 3 WLR 221; [1974] 2 All ER 465 ................................................................................................................................................................. SCR 1.8.40 Grasso v Love [1980] VR 163; (1979) 39 LGRA 101 ............................................................................................. SCA 66.80 Grave v Blazevic Holdings Pty Ltd (2010) 79 NSWLR 132; [2010] NSWCA 324 ................................................ r 16.3.140 Gray v BNY Trust Co of Australia Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 586; [2009] NSWSC 789 ............................................ r 46.7.20 Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 45; [1998] HCA 70 .......................................... r 15.7.40 Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp Berhad (1998) 196 CLR 161; [1998] HCA 65 ...................................................................................................................................... r Pt52.60 Great Eastern Cleaning Service Pty Ltd, Re [1978] 2 NSWLR 278 .......................................................................... r 6.27.60 Greater Taree City Council v Murowski Investments Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 258 ............................................. r 14.26.40 Greatorex v Shackle [1895] 2 QB 249 ......................................................................................................................... r 43.2.60 Greaves v CGU Insurance Ltd [2004] NSWSC 912 ................................................................................................. r 12.1.120 Gredd v Busson [2003] EWHC 3001 ........................................................................................................ r 52.1.100, r Pt52.20 Green v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 235 ............................................................................. r 42.21.200 Green v CGU Insurance Ltd (2008) 67 ACSR 105; [2008] NSWCA 148 .................. r 42.21.90, r 42.21.110, r 42.21.140, r 42.21.200 Green v Jones [1979] 2 NSWLR 812; (1979) 39 FLR 428 ........................................................................................ r 1.22.40 Greenhouse v Heatherington (1978) 122 Sol Jo 47 ..................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Greenwood v Papademetri [2007] NSWCA 221 ................................................................................. CPA 65.20, CPA 65.400 Gregory’s Transport Pty Ltd v Ray’s Haulage Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 333 ......................................... r 16.3.110, r 16.6.40 Grey Smith, Re [1978] VR 596 .............................................................................................................................. SCR 78.0.80 Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Deluxe Coachlines Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 592; 67 ALR 93 ................................. r 33.2.80 Gribbon v Lutton [2002] QB 902 ................................................................................................................................. r Pt43.40 Griffin v Sogelease Australia Ltd [2002] NSWCA 421 ............................................................................................. DCA 9.60 Griffin v Sogelease Australia Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 257; [2003] NSWCA 158 .................................................... r 22.2.140 Griffith v Blake (1884) 27 Ch D 474 ...................................................................................................................... SCA 66.440 Griffith v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 300 ....................................................................... DCA 76B.20 Griffith v Ystradyfodwg School Board (1890) 24 QBD 307 ..................................................................................... r 14.25.40 Grimthorpe, Re [1958] Ch 615; 1 WLR 381 ............................................................................................................. r 42.25.40 Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321; 74 ALJR 1247; [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-570; 173 AJR 564; [2000] HCA 42 ................................................................................................................................... CPA 100.30 Grizonic v Suttor [2006] NSWSC 1359 ................................................................................................ r 42.21.140, r 42.25.40 Grogan v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1101 .................................................................................. CPA 101.50 Grose, Re [1949] SASR 55 ........................................................................................................................................... r 55.1.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] l

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Grygiel v Blaine [2004] NSWCA 377 ................................................................................................................. SCR 51.0.100 Grynberg v Muller [2002] NSWSC 350 .................................................................................................... r 42.1.200, r 42.5.40 Guardian Co-op Housing Society v Pritchard [2002] NSWSC 1002 ........................................................................ r 16.3.160 Guerin v Watts [2002] NSWSC 692 ................................................................................................ r 31.24.1000, r 31.26.1000 Guerinoni v Castino [2008] NSWSC 175 .................................................................................................................... r 43.2.60 Guest v Ibbitson (1922) 91 LJKB 558 ................................................................................................................... DCA 126.20 Guides Australia Inc v McMartin [2006] NSWCA 20 ............................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Gujarat NRE Australia Pty Ltd v Williams [2006] NSWSC 1131 .......................................................................... r 42.21.400 Gujarat NRE Australia Pty Ltd v Williams [2006] NSWSC 992 ............................................................................ r 42.21.110 Guo v Bank of China Ltd [2008] NSWCA 89 ............................................................................................................. r 40.8.40 Guthrie v Spence (2009) 78 NSWLR 225; [2009] NSWCA 369 .......................................................................... DCA 127.50 Guthrie v Spence [2009] NSWCA 369; 78 NSWLR 225 .......................................................................... r 7.13.40, r 7.14.50 Guy v Ambrose (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 136 .................................................................................................................. r 43.3.40

H H v H [1984] 1 NSWLR 694 .................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20, r Pt57.140 H v H [2015] NSWSC 837 ........................................................................................................................ r 57.3.30, r Pt57.100 H, Re [2013] NSWSC 1384 ........................................................................................................................ r Pt57.40, r Pt57.60 H 1976 Nominees Pty Ltd v Galli (1979) 40 FLR 242; 30 ALR 181 ........................................................................ r 14.7.60 H Cousins & Co v D&C Carriers [1971] 2 QB 230 .............................................................................................. CPA 100.30 H Stevenson & Son Ltd v Brownell (1912) 2 Ch 344 ................................................................................................ r 43.2.60 HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; 160 ALR 554 ................... r 31.18.80, r 31.18.1000, r 31.29.1000, r 31.30.1000, r Pt31.Div2.1000 HR Turner & Sons Pty Ltd v Rhodes [1970] 1 NSWR 305 ................................................................................... r 36.16.260 HS v AS [2014] NSWSC 1498 .................................................................................................................................. r Pt57.100 HSBC Bank Australia Ltd v Chang [2008] NSWSC 948 ........................................................................................... r 7.18.40 Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 70 FCR 403 ........................................................................................... r 5.3.60 Hadid v Redpath (2001) 35 MVR 152; [2001] NSWCA 416 ....................................................... DCA 127.100, SCA 106.20 Hagan v Waterhouse [1983] 2 NSWLR 395 ........................................................................ r 46.5.20, r Pt46.20, SCA 121.20 Hagan v Waterhouse (No 2) (1992) 34 NSWLR 400 ................................................................................................ r 42.25.40 Haines v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1995) 43 NSWLR 404 .............................................................................. r 13.4.160 Hall v Foster [2012] NSWSC 974 ........................................................................................................ r 26.1.130, CPA 103.20 Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423; 40 ALJR 102; [1966] ALR 705 ........... r 12.7.120, r 13.1.140, r 13.4.260 Hall v Swan [2013] NSWSC 1758 ............................................................................................................................... r 42.7.80 Hall, Ex parte (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 374 ..................................................................................................................... r 42.1.62 Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 67 ALJR 678; 113 ALR 637 ............... r 7.24.60, r 7.24.80 Halloran v Minister Administering National Parks & Wildlife Act 1974 (2006) 229 CLR 545; 80 ALJR 519; [2006] HCA 3 ........................................................................................... r 31.13.60, r 31.14.40, r 31.14.1000 Hally v Dennis (1955) 95 CLR 661; 29 ALJR 374; 62 ALR(CN) 7 ....................................................................... CPA 98.20 Hally v Dennis (1955) 95 CLR 661; 29 ALJR 374; 62 ALR (CN) 7 ........................................................................ r 42.1.60 Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 588; [2009] NSWSC 644 ............................................. r 35.9.160 Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372 .......... r 2.1.40, r 2.3.40, r 31.1.140, r 31.1.1000, r 31.10.1000, r 31.17.60, r 35.9.160, r Pt31.40, CPA Pt6.20, CPA 56.20 Hamilton v New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1437 .................................................................................................. r 23.4.40 Hamilton-Smith v George [2006] FCA 1551 ............................................................................................................... r 35.1.40 Hammond v Hammond [2012] NSWSC 1326 ........................................................................................................... r 42.4.100 Hammond v New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1930 ............................................................................................ CPA 13.160 Hammond v Scheinberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 49; [2001] NSWSC 568 .................................................. r 31.11.60, r 33.9.160 Hamod v NSW (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCA 424; FCAFC 97 ....................................................................... r 42.10.40 Hamod v NSW [2007] NSWSC 707 ............................................................................................................................ r 42.7.80 Hamod v New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCA 424; [2002] FCAFC 97 ......................................... r 42.5.40 Hamod v New South Wales (No 6) [2007] NSWSC 1366 ........................................................................................ r 23.8.180 Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367; 31 ALJR 158; 64 ALR (CN) 1201; [1957] HCA 28 .................................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.70 Hancock v Arnold (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 19 ........................................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Hancock v Rinehart [2015] NSWSC 1640 ................................................................................................................... r 42.7.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

li

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Hancock, Re; Ex parte Australian General Disinfectant Co Pty Ltd (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 176; [1968] 2 NSWR 772 .................................................................................................................................. CPA 140.40 Hanjin Shipping Co Ltd v Procter & Gamble (Philippines) Inc [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 341 ..................................... r 43.2.80 Hann v Nield (unreported, NSWSC, James J, 14 October 1993) ......................................................... r 20.10.40, CPA 49.20 Hanna Investment Group 4 Pty Ltd v Tellavari Pty Ltd4 [2015] NSWSC 84 ....................................................... r 42.21.600 Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230 .... r 12.6.60, r Pt31.40, CPA 57.20, CPA 58.40, CPA 61.20, CPA 64.20 Hansen v Border Morning Mail Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 44 ................................................................. r 22.1.60, r 22.1.80 Hansen v Monterey (Coolah) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1383 .................................................................. r 42.1.50, CPA 46.20 Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447 .......................................................... CPA 100.30 Harden Shire Council v Richardson (2012) 188 LGERA 200; [2012] NSWSC 622 ................................................. r 27.2.20 Harding v Bourke (2000) 48 NSWLR 598; [2000] NSWCA 60 ................................. r 31.28.1000, r Pt31.40, CPA 14.1000 Hardoon v. Belilios [1901] AC 118 ............................................................................................................................ r 42.1.200 Hardy Bros (Earthmoving) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Hardy Bros Civil Constructions Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1220 ......................................................................................................................................................... r 42.15.60 Hargood v OHTL Public Company Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 511 ......................................................................... r 42.7.80 Hargrave v Slater (2002) 113 A Crim R 371; [2000] NSWSC 387 ................................................. SCA 65.20, SCR 54.0.80 Hargreaves, Re (1890) 44 Ch D 236 ............................................................................................................................ r 54.3.20 Harkianakis v Skalkos (1997) 42 NSWLR 22 ....................................................................................................... SCR 55.0.40 Harmer v Bean (1853) 175 ER 566; 3 Car & K 307 ................................................................................................ DCA 8.40 Harmer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 264; 66 ALJR 89 ................................... r Pt41.70, r Pt43.40 Harold v Smith (1860) 157 ER 1229; 5 H & N 381 ...................................................................................... CPA Pt7.Div2.40 Harpas v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 2002 ATC 4741; [2002] NSWCA 198 ................................. SCA 75.20 Harper v Whitby [1978] 1 NSWLR 35 ................................................................................................................... SCA 66.340 Harpur v Ariadne Australia Ltd [1984] 2 Qd 523; (1984) 8 ACLR 835; [1984] 2 ACLC 356 ............................. r 42.21.200 Harrington v North London Polytechnic [1984] 1 WLR 1293; [1984] 3 All ER 666 ............................................. r Pt21.120 Harris v Harris [1979] 2 NSWLR 252; (1980) 5 Fam LR 392 ............................................................................ SCR 69.0.20 Harris v Leaney (unreported, NSWCA, 26 June 1991) .......................................................................................... SCA 106.20 Harris v Slater (1888) 21 QBD 359 ..................................................................................................................... SCR 55.0.100 Harrison v Schipp [1999] NSWCA 443 ................................................................................................................. SCR 55.0.40 Harrison v Schipp [2001] NSWCA 13 ......................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 612; [2002] NSWCA 78 ............................................... SCA 75A.140, SCA 75A.160 Harrison v Schipp [2002] NSWCA 27 .................................................................................................. CPA 26.80, CPA 28.20 Harrison Partners Construction Pty Ltd v Jevena Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 317 ...................................................... r 25.11.20 Harry S Bagg’s Liquidation Warehouse Pty Ltd v Whittaker (1982) 44 NSWLR 421 ............................................. r 7.24.80 Harry Smith Car Sales Pty Ltd v Claycom Vegetable Supply Co Pty Ltd (1978) 29 ACTR 21 .............................. r 13.1.60 Hart v Nominal Defendant [1971] 1 NSWLR 147 .................................................................................................... r 14.11.40 Hartigan v International Krishna Consciousness Inc [1999] NSWSC 139 ............. r 49.12.60, SCA 75A.100, SCA 75A.120 Harvey v McWatters (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 173; 66 WN (NSW) 72 ......................................................................... r Pt41.20 Hastings v Hastings [2009] NSWCA 294 ................................................................................................................ r 42.21.110 Hastings Point Progress Assn Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39 ............................................................................................................................................................ r 42.1.300 Hatfield v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2010) 77 NSWLR 506; [2010] NSWCA 69 ................................................. r 5.3.60 Hawke v Limbo (unreported, NT Sup Ct, Kearney J, 9 August 1990) ....................................................................... r 42.5.40 Hawke v Tamworth Newspaper Co Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 699 ................................................................................. r 22.4.40 Hawkesbury District Health Service Ltd v Chaker (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 30 ....................................................... r 42.1.120 Hawksford v Hawksford (2005) 191 FLR 173; [2005] NSWSC 463 ........................................................ r 7.24.60, r 7.24.80 Hawthorn Cuppaidge & Badgery v Channell [1992] 2 Qd R 488 ................................................................. CPA Pt7.Div2.40 Hayes v Development Assessment Commission (No 4) (1997) 95 LGERA 7 ....................................................... r 14.14.220 Healy v Askin [1974] 1 NSWLR 436 ..................................................................................................................... SCA 66.340 Heaps v Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pty Ltd [2000] NSW ConvR 55-945; [2000] NSWSC 542 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.300 Heaps v Longman [2000] NSW ConvR 55-945; [2000] NSWSC 542 ....................................................................... r 42.5.40 Heerey, Re; Ex parte Heinrich (2001) 185 ALR 106; [2001] HCA 74 .......................................... SCA 69.60, SCR 54.0.140 Heiliger, Ex parte (1897) 13 WN (NSW) 170 ........................................................................................................ CPA 140.40 Helensburgh Workers Club v Marshall [1984] 2 NSWLR 566 ............................................................................... DCA 44.60 Helicopter Sales (Aust) Pty Ltd v Rotor-Work Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 1; 48 ALJR 390; 4 ALR 77 ................................................................................................................................................................................ r 9.5.80

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Heller Factors Pty Ltd v John Arnold’s Surf Shop Pty Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 20; 4 ACLR 492; [1979] CLC 40-571 .............................................................................................................................................. r 42.21.110 Heller Factors Pty Ltd v John Arnold’s Surf Shop Pty Ltd (in liq) (1979) 4 ACLR 492; CLC 40-571 ................................................................................................................................................................... r 42.21.110 Hellier Capital Pty Litd v Albarran [2009] NSWSC 403 .......................................................................................... r 37.4.100 Hemburrow, Re [1969] VR 764 .............................................................................................................................. SCR 78.0.60 Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1341 ......................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313; [1843] All ER Rep 378 ......................................................................... r 6.12.40 Hendriks v McGeoch (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 103 .................................................................................................... r 42.15.80 Henley, Re (2013) 17 BPR 32435; [2013] NSWSC 975 ............................................................................................ r Pt55.40 Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571; 70 ALJR 480 ................................................................................ r 11.7.60, r 13.4.180 Henry v Stewart (NSWSC, Cohen J, 9 June 1995, unreported) ................................................................................ r 26.1.120 Heperu Pty Ltd v Morgan Brooks Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 80 ...................................................................... r 42.1.62 Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Hawked [1984] VR 587 ............................................................................................. r 22.1.80 Herbert v O’Neill (unreported, Roden J, 15 February 1980) ..................................................................... r 23.4.60, r 23.7.60 Herbert v Tamworth City Council (No 4) (2004) 60 NSWLR 476; [2004] NSWSC 394 ............ r 42.7.80, r 42.15.80, CPA 98.100 Herning v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 375 ............................................................................ r 42.15.80 Hertslet, Re [2016] NSWSC 1240 ................................................................................................................................ r Pt55.40 Hession v Century 21 South Pacific Ltd (in liq) (1992) 28 NSWLR 120 ................................................................ r 42.21.60 Hetherington-Gregory v All Vehicle Services (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 257 ............................................................... r 7.36.40 Hewins v Formica Plastics Pty Ltd (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 469; [1968] 3 NSWR 793 ...... CPA 140.20, CPA 140.40, DCA 18G.20, DCA 76.20 Heydon v Gell (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 181; 21 LR (NSW) Eq 265 ........................................................................... r Pt54.20 Heydon v NRMA (2001) 53 NSWLR 600; [2001] NSWCA 445 ..................................................... r 36.7.40, SCA 75A.200 Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd (in liq) v Yahaya [2013] NSWSC 853 ............................................................................... r Pt25.20 Hickie v Land Enviro Corp Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 706 ................................................................ CPA 135.20, CPA 135.30 Hicks, Re; Ex parte HJK Enterprises Pty Ltd (1969) 71 SR (NSW) 353; 89 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 182 ...................................................................................................................................................................... DCA 156.20 Hicks (No 2), Re (1895) 17 ALT 91; [1895] 1 ALR 96 ....................................................................................... SCR 68.0.60 Higgins v Higgins [2002] NSWSC 455 ............................................................................. CPA 26.20, CPA 26.40, CPA 26.60 Highland v Labraga (No 3) [2006] NSWSC 871 ......................................................................................................... r 42.1.57 Hill v Cooke (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 49; 75 WN (NSW) 82 .................................................................................. DCA 126.20 Hill v W&F Lechner Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 440 ....................................................................................................... r 3.8.80 Hill End Gold Ltd v First Tiffany Resource Corp [2008] NSWSC 1412 ................................................................... r 14.9.60 Hillebrand v Penrith Council [2000] NSWSC 1058 .................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Hillier v Sheather (1995) 36 NSWLR 414 ........................................................ r 20.26.40, r 42.13.40, r 42.15.45, r 42.15.50 Hillig v Darkinjung Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 409 ..................................................................................................... CPA 26.20 Hillig v Darkinjung Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 147 .......................................................................... r 7.24.80, r 42.1.57 Hilliger v Hilliger (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 105; 69 WN (NSW) 109 ......................................................................... CPA 98.20 Hillston v Bar-Mordecai [2002] NSWSC 477 .......................................................................................................... r 36.16.210 Hilton v Gidley [2014] NSWSC 874 ............................................................................................................................ r 12.5.40 Hintze v Hintze; claimant (1899) 24 VLR 939 ............................................................................................................ r 43.6.60 Hip Foong Hong v Neotia & Co [1918] AC 888 .................................................................................................. DCA 126.20 His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand v Macedonian Orthodox Community Church of St Petka Inc [2007] NSWCA 150 ................................................................................................................................................ r Pt55.40 His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142 ................................................................... r 42.1.65, r 42.7.40, r 42.7.80, r 42.7.100, CPA 15.40 Hlentzos, Re; Ex parte Collins (1935) 52 WN (NSW) 65 .................................................................................... DCA 199.20 Hoban v Davey [1972] 1 NSWLR 59 ........................................................................................................................ DCA 9.20 Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 358 ............... r 42.5.40, r 42.15.50, Pt 20.Div4.20 Hobler v Francis [1911] St R Qd 17 .............................................................................................................................. r 8.2.60 Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430; 46 SR (NSW) 251; 63 WN (NSW) 123 .... DCA 126.20, SCA 102.20, SCR 51.0.180 Hodder v Australian Workers’ Union [1985] 4 FCR 541; (1985) 11 IR 42 ................................................................. r 8.2.60 Hodder Rook & Assocs Pty Ltd v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 279 ................................................. r 31.23.80, r 31.23.100, r 31.23.1000, r Pt31.40, CPA 14.40, CPA 14.1000

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

liii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; 267 ALR 12; [2010] HCA 21 ................................. r 4.2.100 Hogan v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 74 ............................................................................................................................................................. r 42.1.120 Holcombe v Coulton (1988) 17 NSWLR 71 ................................................................................. SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Holden v Cronulla Golf Club Ltd (Young J, 24 June 1986, unreported) ................................................................... r 42.1.62 Hole v Chard Union [1894] 1 Ch 293 .......................................................................................................................... r 30.3.40 Holland Stolte Pty Ltd, Re [1993] 2 Qd R 247 ......................................................................................................... r 42.21.80 Hollis v Marshall (1858) 2 H & N 755 ...................................................................................................................... r 14.11.40 Holloway v Chairperson of the Residential Tribunal (2001) 51 NSWLR 716; 10 BPR 18905; [2001] NSWCA 209 ................................................................................................................................................ r 6.11.60 Holovinsky v Commissioner of Police (No 3) (2006) 4 DDCR 154; [2006] NSWDC 88 ............................... DCA 142K.20 Holt v Protective Commissioner (1993) 31 NSWLR 227 ................ r 57.3.30, r 57.11.20, r Pt57.20, r Pt57.100, r Pt57.140 Holt v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128; [2000] NSWCA 143 ................................................................. r 42.1.65, CPA 65.20 Holtby v Hodgson (1889) 24 QBD 103 .................................................................................................................. CPA 117.40 Home Office v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280; [1982] 1 All ER 532; [1982] 2 WLR 338 ........................... r 21.7.40, r 33.9.160 Homebush Abattoir Corp v Bermria Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 605 ................................................ r 20.24.60, r 20.24.100 Hon JRT Wood v Galea (1996) 84 A Crim R 274; (1997) 92 A Crim R 287 ................................................... SCR 55.0.120 Hooker v Gilling (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 214 ........................................................................... r 42.1.40, r 42.1.50, r 42.1.70 Hooper v Gorman [1976] 2 NSWLR 431 .............................................................................................................. SCA 75A.40 Horley v Sector 7G Architecture Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWSC 827 .................................................................... r 50.16.60 Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 216; 52 ALJR 392 .............................................................................................................................. SCA 66.120 Hornsby Shire Council v Valuer General (NSW) [2008] NSWSC 1281 .................................................................... r 42.1.57 Horseshoe Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Murray Smith t/as South Coast Tile & Slate Co (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, 7 November 1995) ................................................................................................................. r 42.5.40 Horsnell v Allworth Constructions Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 844 ................................................................................ r 22.1.60 Hortico (Aust) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Co (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 545 ............... SCA 66.120, SCA 66.240 Hoskins v Van Den-Braak (1998) 43 NSWLR 290 .............................................................................. r 36.15.60, r 36.15.100 Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia v Hunt (1982) 44 ALR 365 .................................................. r 13.4.140, r 53.7.180 Houatchanthara v Bednarczyk [1996] NSWSC 486 ............................................................................... r 42.15.45, r 42.15.50 Houlden v Smith (1850) 14 QB 841 ........................................................................................................................ DCA 13.20 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; 9 ABC 117 ........................................ r 14.14.220, r 20.24.60, r 49.4.60, r 49.20.80 Housing Commission (NSW) v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378; (1983) 53 LGRA 325 ....................................................................................................................................... r 36.2.60, DCA 127.100 Howard v Telstra Corp Ltd [2003] NSWCA 188 ..................................................................................... r 42.1.62, CPA 46.20 Howey & Co Pty Ltd v Creative Projects International Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 898 ........................................... r 18.4.60 Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie (1996) 41 NSWLR 542; 133 FLR 303; 21 ACSR 440; 14 ACLC 1549 .............................................................................................................................................................. r 10.5.40 Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool City Council [2014] NSWSC 372 ....................................... r 21.9.40 Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1934; [2003] HCA 61 ........................................................................... SCA 75A.80 Hrybynyuk v Mazur [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-774; [2004] NSWCA 374 ..................................................... SCA 75.300 Hu v Northern Sydney Area Health Service (2002) 1 DCLR (NSW) 19 ................................................................. r 14.11.60 Hu v PS Securities Pty Ltd (2011) 82 ASCR 234; [2011] NSWSC 98 .................................................................... r 25.11.20 Hubbard Assn of Scientologists International v Anderson [1972] VR 340 ................................................................ r 7.1.100 Hubbard Assn of Scientologists International v Anderson (No 2) [1972] VR 577 ...................................................... r 7.1.60 Hubbard Assoc of Scientologists International v Attorney-General (Vic) [1976] VR 119 ...................................... CPA 65.20 Hudson v South Sydney Municipal Council [1981] 46 LGRA 128 .......................................................................... DCA 9.20 Hudson, Re; Ex parte GE Crane & Sons Ltd (1990) 25 FCR 318 ........................................................................... r 10.21.40 Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Assn Inc (1986) 66 ALR 541; [1986] ATPR 40-725 ..................................... r 22.1.60 Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association Inc (1986) ATPR 40-748; [1986] FCA 382 .............................. r 42.1.120 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Civil Aviation Authority (1995) 217 ALR 303 ............................................ r 5.2.40 Hughes Motor Service Pty Ltd v Wang Computer Pty Ltd (1978) 35 FLR 346 ..................................................... r 13.4.180 Hui v Commonwealth [2001] FCA 69 ......................................................................................................................... r 7.36.40 Human Services, Department of; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369 ..................................................................................... r 35.2.40 Hume v Council of the Kings School [2010] NSWSC 186 ........................................................................................ r 4.2.100 Hume Coal Pty Ltd v Alexander (No 4) [2013] NSWLEC 106 ............................................................................... r 42.1.260 Humphries v Newport Quays Stage 2A Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 699 .............................................................................. r 28.5.40 Hunt v BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 565; [1980] HCA 7 .......................................................... r 53.2.80

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] liv

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Hunt v Watkins (2000) 49 NSWLR 508; [2000] NSWCA 229 ................................................................................ r 29.10.60 Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1982] AC 529 ........................................................................... r 14.28.140 Hunter v Hanson [2014] NSWCA 263 ......................................................................................................................... r 1.12.50 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88; [2009] NSWSC 761 ........................... r Pt57.20 Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478 ............................................................................. r 4.10.100 Huntington v Attrill [1893] AC 150 ........................................................................................................................... r 53.1.160 Huntsman Chemical Co Aust Ltd v International Pools Aust Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242; 125 FLR 151; [1995] ATPR 41-403 ............................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Hurstville Municipal Council v Connor (1991) 24 NSWLR 724 ............................................................................... r 42.5.40 Hutchinson v Nominal Defendant [1972] 1 NSWLR 443 ....................................................................................... r 36.16.210 Huxley v West London Extension Railway Co (1889) 14 App Cas 26 ................................................................... CPA 98.20 Hyland v AGC (Wholesale) Pty Ltd [1983] 1 VR 222 ............................................................................................. r 25.3.120 Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2) (1987) VR 309 ..................................................................... r 24.13.40

I ICAP Australia Pty Ltd v Moebes [2010] NSWSC 738 .............................................................................................. r 34.2.60 ICAP Pty Ltd v Moebes [2009] NSWSC 306 .............................................................................................................. r 34.2.40 IMG of America Pty Ltd v Townsend (unreported, NSWSC, Allen M, 25 July 1983) ........................................... r 16.3.120 IOL Petroleum Ltd v O’Neill (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 9 October 1995) .................................. r 21.3.120, r 21.11.60 IR v AR [2015] NSWSC 1187 .................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20, r Pt57.40 Iacullo v Iacullo [2012] NSWSC 189 ...................................................................................................... r 20.15.120, r 46.4.20 Iacullo v Iacullo [2013] NSWSC 1517 ....................................................................................................................... r 20.24.60 Iacullo v Iacullo (No 3) [2012] NSWSC 274 ......................................................................................... r 20.14.60, r 20.22.40 Iacullo v Iacullo (No 4) [2012] NSWSC 331 ............................................................................................................ r 20.22.40 IceTV Pty Ltd v Ross [2009] NSWSC 832 ................................................................................................................. r 34.2.40 IceTV Pty Ltd v Ross [2011] NSWSC 1211 ................................................................................................................ r 50.7.40 Ide v Ide (2004) ACSR 324 .......................................................................................................................................... r 26.4.40 Idoport v National Australia Bank [2002] NSWCA 271 ......................................................................................... r 42.21.600 Idoport v National Australia Bank [2002] NSWSC 18 ............................................................................................ r 42.21.600 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 49 NSWLR 51; [2000] NSWSC 338 .............................. CPA Pt6.20 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 599 ......................................................................... r 15.4.40 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1024 ....................................................................... r 34.2.60 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 427 ................................................... CPA 26.80, CPA 27.10 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 744 ..... r 42.21.60, r 42.21.100, r 42.21.110, r 42.21.120, r 42.21.140, r 42.21.200, r 42.21.400, r 42.21.410 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 838 ................................................ r 31.6.1000, r 31.7.1000 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2002] NSWCA 271 ................................................ r 42.21.200, r 42.21.600 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2002] NSWSC 18 ....................................................................... r 42.21.600 Illawarra Hotel Co Pty Ltd v Walton Construction Pty Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 410; [2013] NSWCA 6 .............................................................................................................................................................. r 20.24.60 Imbree v McNeilly (No 2) (2008) 236 CLR 567; 82 ALJR 1501; 249 ALR 441; [2008] HCA 47 ....................... r 42.15.50 Imperial Leatherware Co Pty Ltd v Macri & Marcellino Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 653 ............................. SCR 72A.5.20 Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Attorney-General [1981] AC 718; [1980] 2 WLR 466; [1980] 1 All ER 866 ....................................................................................................................................................................... SCA 75.180 Independent Commission against Corruption v Cripps (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Sully J, 27 August 1996) ......................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.62, r 42.1.300 Independent Contractor Services (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 106 .............................................. r 26.4.40 Indochina Medical Co Pty Ltd v Nicolai [2013] NSWCA 436 .............................................................. r 31.6.40, r 31.6.1000 Indyk v Wiernik [2006] NSWSC 868 ........................................................................................................................... r 42.1.52 Ingham v Walker (1887) 3 TLR 448 ............................................................................................................................ r 43.2.60 Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Smith [1975] 1 NSWLR 76 .................................................................................. SCA 75.100 Inglis v Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council [2009] NSWLEC 189 .............................................................................. r 21.11.40 Inglis v Moore (1979) 46 FLR 3; 24 ALR 411 ...................................................................................................... SCA 75.180 Inglis v Moore (No 2) (1979) 46 FLR 470; 25 ALR 453 .......................................................................... r 7.24.60, r 7.24.80 Ingot Capital Investment v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets (No 7) [2008] NSWSC 199 .................................... r 42.5.40 Ingot Capital Investment Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2008) 73 NSWLR 653; [2008] NSWCA 206 ...................................................................................................................................... r 14.14.80

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lv

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1102 ........................ r 42.5.40 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1091 ........... CPA 30.40, CPA 30.60 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1219 ........................ r 31.4.60 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd No 7 (2008) 65 ACSR 324; [2008] NSWSC 199 ........................................................................................................................................ r 42.5.40 Innovative Agricultural Products Pty Ltd v Cranshaw [1996] FCA 758 ................................................................. CPA 28.40 Insurance Australia Ltd t/a NRMA Insurance v Milton (No 2) [2016] NSWCA 173 ................................................ SC CL 3 Insurance Exchange of Australasia v Dooley (2000) 50 NSWLR 222; [2000] NSWCA 159 ................. r 9.5.80, CPA 22.80 Insurance Ministerial Corp (NSW) v Abualfoul (1999) 94 FCR 247; 162 ALR 417; [1999] FCA 433 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 7.14.60 Insurance Ministerial Corp (NSW) v Reeve (1993) 42 NSWLR 100 .................................................... r 42.15.45, r 42.15.50 Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd v Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1464 .................................... r 28.2.40 Integrated Asset Management Pty Ltd v Trans Communication Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1690 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r 17.3.30 International Advisor Systems Pty Ltd v XYYX Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 312 ......................................................... r 42.5.40 International Advisor Systems Pty Ltd v XYYX Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] NSWSC 430 ............................................... r 9.1.60 Interwest Ltd v Tricontinental Corp Ltd (1991) 5 ACSR 621; 9 ACLC 1218 .................................. r 42.21.110, r 42.21.300 Investa Listed Funds Management Ltd, Re [2016] NSWSC 341 ............................................................................... r Pt55.40 Investa Listed Funds Management Ltd, Re [2016] NSWSC 344 ............................................................................... r Pt55.40 Investec Bank (Aust) Ltd v Burge (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1557 ............................................................................... r 17.2.60 Inzaurralde v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, 28 October 1992) ................................................................................................................................................................ SCA 75A.140 Ion v Danutz [2012] NSWSC 941 ............................................................................................................. r 14.28.80, r 16.6.40 Ireland v Retallack (2012) 8 ASTLR 431; (2012) 8 ASTLR 431 .............................................................................. r Pt55.40 Ireland v Retallack (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1096 ...................................................................................................... r 42.1.200 Irving v Askew (1870) LR 5 QB 208 ....................................................................................................................... DCA 81.20 Irwin v Burton (1945) 63 WN (NSW) 78 ................................................................................................................ DCA 48.60 Isaacs & Sons v Salbstein [1916] 2 KB 139 ................................................................................................................ r 6.12.40 Isbester, Ex parte (1894) 11 WN (NSW) 53 ............................................................................................................ DCA 48.60 Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of Islamic Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 26.1.130 Island Records Ltd v Corkindale [1978] Ch 122 .................................................................................................... SCA 75.180 Israel Discount Bank of New York v Hadjipateras [1984] 1 WLR 137; [1983] 3 All ER 129 ............................... r 53.7.220 Italform Pty Ltd v Sangain Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 427 ....................................................................................... r 20.24.180 Italian Forum Ltd v The Owners - Strata Plan 60919 (2012) 16 BPR 31685; [2012] NSWSC 895 ........................ r 18.1.60 Itek Graphix Pty Ltd v Elliott (2002) 54 NSWLR 207; [2002] NSWCA 104 ........ CPA 64.20, DCA 127.60, SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Ivanhoe Gold Corp Ltd v Symonds (1906) 4 CLR 642 .................................................. r 36.16.200, r 36.17.60, DCA 81.20 Ivanovski v Perdacher [2009] NSWSC 913 ................................................................................................................. r 7.10.40 Ivkovic v Australian Iron & Steel Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 598; 80 WN (NSW) 999 ...................................... DCA 126.20

J J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 10 ................................................................................................ r 4.2.100 J v Lieschke (1987) 162 CLR 447; 61 ALJR 143 ................................................................................................... r 36.16.220 J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458; 46 IR 242 ............................................................................................................................... r 29.9.80 J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) (No 2) (1993) 46 IR 301 ..................................................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 J & E Hall Ltd v Barclay [1937] 3 All ER 620 ........................................................................................................ CPA 93.60 J & E Holdings Pty Ltd, Re (1995) 36 NSWLR 541; 125 FLR 467 ...................................................................... SCA 45.40 J & M O’Brien Enterprises Pty Ltd v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (No 2) (1983) 70 FLR 261; 7 ACLR 790; [1983] 1 ACLC 924 ........................................................................................................................ r 42.21.110 J (No 2), Re [2011] NSWSC 1224 ............................................................................................................................... r Pt57.40 J Aron Corp v Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 996 .............................................................. r 33.11.40 J Aron Corp v Newmont Yandel Operations Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 996 .............................................................. r 42.27.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lvi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

J Robertson & Co Ltd (in liq) v Ferguson Transformers Pty Ltd (1970) 44 ALJR 441; [1971] ALR 377 ................................................................................................................................................................... r 6.23.40 J T Stratford and Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 ........................................................................... r 42.7.60 JBK Engineering Pty Ltd v Brick & Block Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 163 ............................................................... r 18.1.160 JJK v APK [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-042 ............................................................................................................. r Pt57.20 JKB Holdings Pty Ltd v de la Vega [2013] NSWSC 501 ............. r 41.3.30, r 41.3.120, r 41.11.40, r 55.11.20, r Pt41.70, r Pt41.80 JMK v RDC [2013] NSWSC 1362 ........................................................................................................... r 57.3.30, r Pt57.120 JMK v RDC and PTO v WDO [2013] NSWSC 1362 .............................................................................................. r 26.1.130 JN Taylor Holdings Ltd (In Liq) v Bond (1993) 59 SASR 432 ................................................................................. r 6.19.40 JP Morgan Trust Australia Ltd v Kapetanovic [2007] NSWSC 1423 ....................................................................... r 42.27.40 JPT v DST [2014] NSWSC 1735 ............................................................................................................................... r Pt57.180 JRP Plastics Ltd v Gordon Rossall Plastics Ltd (Hexa Pen Co Ltd, Claimants) [1950] WN 77; [1950] 1 All ER 241 ................................................................................................................................................ r 43.8.40 JSBG Developments Pty Ltd v Kozlowski (2009) 75 NSWLR 745; [2009] NSWSC 1128 ....................................... r 7.1.70 JSC, Re [2013] NSWSC 440 ..................................................................................................................................... r Pt56A.20 JWH Turner & Co Ltd v O’Riordan (1923) 40 WN (NSW) 64 ............................................................................. r 42.21.400 Jackamarra (an infant) v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516; 72 ALJR 819; [1998] HCA 27 .................................... CPA 59.20 Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612; 61 ALJR 332; 71 ALR 457 ....................... r 25.11.20, SCA 66.240 Jackson, Re [2016] NSWSC 419 .................................................................................................................................. r Pt57.20 Jacobs v Claudius Enterprises Pty Ltd [1985] ATPR 40-511 ........................................................................................ r 8.2.60 Jae Kyung Lee v Bob Chae-Sang Cha [2008] NSWCA 13 ........................................................................................ r 7.36.40 Jaksic v Yim [2011] NSWSC 962 .............................................................................................................................. r 50.16.60 James v. Nolmont Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1604 ........................................................................................................... r 42.21.400 James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 37 FCR 445; 109 ALR 334; 8 ACSR 444 ............................. CPA 21.40 James v Cowan (1929) 42 CLR 305; [1928] 3 ALJR 170 ........................................................................................ r 33.12.40 James v Ricknell (1887) 20 QBD 164 ......................................................................................................................... r Pt43.40 James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 296 ......................................................................... r 42.1.120 James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Barry (2000) 50 NSWLR 357; [2000] NSWCA 353 ............................... r 44.5.60, r 44.6.60 James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Wyong Shire Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 679; [2000] NSWCA 107 ...................... r 42.1.55 James Hardie Industries Pty Ltd v Grigor (1998) 45 NSWLR 20; 16 NSWCCR 434 ........................... r 6.43.100, r 11.7.60 Jameson v Professional Investment Services Pty Ltd (2009) 72 NSWLR 281; [2009] NSWCA 28 .......................... r 7.4.40 Jamieson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 574; 67 A Crim R 150 .............................................................................. r 14.23.40 Jarrett v Seymour (1993) 46 FCR 557; 71 A Crim R 245 ..................................................................................... SCA 66.300 Jasarevic v Brennan (unreported decision of his Honour Judge Cooper, 5.9.79) ................................................... DCA 51.20 Jax Franchising Systems Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 1115 ....................................................................................... r Pt55.40 Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad (2007) 65 ACSR 276; [2007] NSWCA 291 .............................................. r 42.21.60, r 42.21.200 Jazairy v Najjar (1998) 27 MVR 498; [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-476 ............................................................. r 14.14.120 Jeans v Bruce [2004] NSWSC 758 ............................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Jeans v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2003) 204 ALR 327; [2003] FCAFC 309 ..................... r 12.6.60, r 17.2.60 Jeans West (Distributors) Pty Ltd v Toivola Pty Ltd (1990) 20 ATR 1858; 90 ATC 4151 ................................... r 31.14.120 Jeffery v Lintipal Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 138 ........................................................................................................... r 42.1.70 Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; 83 ALJR 1180; [2009] HCA 43 ..................................................................................................................................................... CPA 14.40 Jelbarts Pty Ltd v McDonald [1919] VLR 478; (1919) 25 ALR 252 ......................................................................... r 42.1.50 Jenkins v Richard Thomas & Baldwins Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 476; [1966] 2 All ER 15 ........................................ SCA 106.20 Jensen v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2011] NSWCA 36 .............................................................................................. r 16.3.140 Jensen v Pearce [2013] DFC 93-431; [2013] NSWCA 247 ................................................................................... CPA 133.40 Jensen v Ray [2011] NSWCA 247 ...................................................................................................... r 42.1.200, DCA 127.80 Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd v Townsing (2008) 21 VR 241; 221 FLR 398; [2008] VSC 470 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r 53.7.220 Jermen v Shell Co of Australia Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1106 ...................................................................................... r 31.23.100 Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 ................................................................................................................................... r 7.36.80 Ji v Firth (t/as Firths the Compensation Lawyers) [2013] NSWSC 186 .................................................................. r 42.34.40 Jianshe Southern Pty Ltd v Get Motor Cycles Pty Ltd (No 3) [2007] FCA 1078 ................................................. r 42.21.400 Jireh International Pty Ltd v Western Export Services Inc (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 294 ........................................ CPA 30.30 Jiwira Pty Ltd v Primary Industry Bank of Australia Ltd (Supreme Court of NSW; McLaughlin M; 17/02/95) BC9504254 .......................................................................................................................................... r 7.1.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lvii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Jodast Pty Ltd v A & J Blattner Pty Ltd (1991) 104 ALR 248 ................................................................................ r 42.21.60 Joel, Re [2013] NSWSC 1299 ...................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 Johanson v Dixon (1979) 143 CLR 376; 25 ALR 65 .................................................................................................. r 6.39.40 John v Rees [1970] Ch 345; [1969] 2 All ER 274; [1969] 2 WLR 1294; (1969) 113 SJ 487 ................................... r 7.4.80 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Australian Telecommunication Commission [1977] 2 NSWLR 400 ........................ SCA 75.260 John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court (NSW) (1991) 26 NSWLR 131; 59 A Crim R 68 ..... SCA 65.40, SCR 1.13.20, SCR 54.0.100 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) (2000) 158 FLR 81; 181 ALR 694; [2000] NSWCA 198 ........................................................................................................................................ SCR 55.0.120 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344; [2004] NSWCA 324 ...................................................................................................................................................... DCA 166.80 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin (2003) 77 ALJR 1657; [2003] HCA 50 ................. SCA 102.20, SCR 51.0.180 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) 62 NSWLR 512; [2005] NSWCA 101 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 4.2.100 John Holland Services Pty Ltd v Terranora Group Management Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 679 ........................................ r 5.3.60 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503; 74 ALJR 1109; [2000] HCA 36 ....................................... r 44.6.60 Johnco Nominees Pty Ltd v Albury-Wodonga (New South Wales) Corp [1977] 1 NSWLR 43 ........................... SCA 75.20 Johnsen v Duks (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 272; [1963] NSWR 730 ........................................................................... r 36.16.260 Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 .............................................................................................................................. SCA 68.20 Johnson v Clancy [2010] NSWSC 1301 .................................................................................................................... r 42.19.40 Johnson v Diprose [1893] 1 QB 512 ....................................................................................................................... CPA 110.25 Johnson v Director-General of Social Welfare (Vic) (1976) 135 CLR 92; 50 ALJR 562; 9 ALR 343 ...................................................................................................................................................................... SCR 69.0.40 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; 74 ALJR 1380; 174 ALR 655; 26 Fam LR 627; [2000] HCA 48 .................................................................................................................................................................... r 28.2.60 Johnson v Lake Macquarie City Council (1995) 87 LGERA 22 ............................................................................ r 42.21.140 Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; 63 ALJR 51; 82 ALR 587; [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-224 ....................................................................................................................................................................... r 30.3.40 Johnson v Pickering [1908] 1 KB 1 ........................................................................................................................ CPA 106.60 Johnson v Tobacco Leaf Marketing Board [1967] VR 427 ...................................................................... r 25.3.80, r 25.3.100 Johnson Corp Ltd, Re (1984) 2 ACLC 625 ................................................................................................................. r 22.3.80 Johnston v Johnston [2004] NSWSC 497 ................................................................................................................. CPA 26.60 Johnston v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 309; [2005] NSWCA 17 ................... DCA 203.40, SCR 55.0.60 Johnstone v New South Wales [2006] NSWCA 105 ........................................................................ CPA 140.20, CPA 140.60 Jojoenu Investments Pty Ltd v Mosman Municipal Council (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 208 ...................................... r 20.26.40 Jones v Bradley (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 258 ................................................................. r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80, Pt 20.Div4.20 Jones v Brown (1848) 154 ER 519; 2 Ex 329 ....................................................................................................... DCA 196.20 Jones v Curling (1884) 13 QBD 262 ......................................................................................................................... CPA 98.20 Jones v Dapto Leagues Club Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 111 .............................................................. r 42.14.40, r 42.15.50 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; 32 ALJR 395 ............................................................................................ DCA 126.20 Jones v Jones (2001) 27 Fam LR 632; [2001] FamCA 460 .................................................................................... r 42.21.310 Jones v Skyring (1992) 66 ALJR 810; 109 ALR 303 ............................................................................................... r 4.10.100 Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206; (1979) 40 LGRA 323 .................................................. SCA 75.60 Jones v Sutton (2004) 61 NSWLR 614; [2004] NSWCA 439 .................................................................................. r 15.30.40 Jonesco v Beard [1930] AC 298 .......................................................................................................... r 53.7.180, DCA 126.20 Joskovitz v Bonnick [1964] VR 654 ........................................................................................................................ CPA 135.35 Juliex Pty Limited v Shoalhaven City Council [2015] NSWSC 618 ........................................................................ r 17.7.100 Jupiters Ltd v UAERJ Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1469 ................................................................................................. r 17.7.60 Juric-Kacunic v Vaupotic (2013) 18 BPR 35131; [2013] NSWSC 41 ...................................................................... r 31.13.40 Just, Re [1938] St R Qd 93 ......................................................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Juul v Northey [2010] NSWCA 211 ............................................................................................................. r 9.1.60, r Pt46.20

K K v K [2000] NSWSC 1052 ......................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.40 K, Re [2014] NSWSC 1286 ....................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.100 KBRV Resort Operations Pty Ltd v Chilcott (2001) 51 NSWLR 516; [2001] NSWCA 116 ............................... CPA 140.20 KDL Building Pty Ltd v Mount [2006] NSWSC 474 ............................................................................................. r 42.21.410

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lviii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

KF v Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children [2010] NSWSC 891 ............................................................................ r 23.4.40 KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189; 13 ACLC 437 ................ r 42.21.110, r 42.21.200 Kadic v Thiess Bros Pty Ltd (1967) 67 SR (NSW) 411; 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 270; [1967] 2 NSWR 257 .......................................................................................................................................................... CPA 140.40 Kain v Mobbs (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 599 ................................................................................................................ r 42.15.80 Kaiser v George Laurens (NSW) Pty Ltd [1982] 1 NSWLR 294 .............................................................................. r 22.1.80 Kaisha v Karageorgis [1975] 1 WLR 1093; [1975] 3 All ER 282 ........................................................................ SCA 66.240 Kalls Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baloglow [2006] NSWSC 1021 ....................................... r 42.1.55, r 42.2.50, r 42.5.30 Kalokerinos v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 312 ....................................................................... r 50.3.160 Kalyk v Whelan (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 31 July 1985) ...................................................................... r 36.1A.80 Kardynal v Dodek [1978] VR 414 ............................................................................................................................ r 42.21.110 Karkoulas v Newmans of Kogarah Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 305 ........................................................................ DCA 76A.80 Karl Suleman Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Pham [2010] NSWSC 886 ................................................................ r 42.21.110 Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (in liq) v David [2007] NSWSC 401 ............................................................... CPA Pt6.20 Kassem v Colonial Mutual General Insurance Co Ltd [2001] NSWCA 38 ............................... SCA 101.140, SCR 51.0.140 Katerson Pty Ltd v Thambipillay [2016] NSWSC 1226 ............................................................................................. r Pt25.20 Katsilis v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1977) 52 ALJR 189 ............................................................................................ r Pt15.20 Kay v Archbold [2008] NSWSC 254 ......................................................................................................................... r 42.4.100 Kazacos v Shuangling International Development Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 835 ..................................................... r 25.14.20 Keddy v Foxall [1955] VLR 320; [1955] ALR 835 .................................................................................................... r 42.1.60 Keele v Findley (1990) 21 NSWLR 444 .................................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 CLR 162; 53 ALJR 526 ...................................................................................... SCR 55.0.80 Keith Bray Pty Ltd v Hamburg-Amerikanische [1970] 3 NSWR 226 ...................................................................... r 42.1.120 Kelen v Vitaman Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 328 .............................................................................................................. r 9.4.80 Kelly v Mawson [1981] 1 NSWLR 184; (1981) 5 ACLR 500 .............................................................. r 17.7.120, r Pt17.150 Kelly v Mosman Municipal Council (2010) 178 LGERA 136; [2010] NSWCA 370 ............................................... r 7.36.40 Kelly v Public Trustee [2007] NSWSC 1485 ............................................................................................................... r 18.1.60 Kemp v Neville (1861) 142 ER 556; 10 CB (NS) 523 ........................................................................................... DCA 13.20 Kendall v Hamilton (1879) 4 App Cas 504 ............................................................................................................... CPA 95.20 Kendell v Carnegie (2006) 68 NSWLR 193; (2006) 68 NSWLR 193 ................................................................... r 36.15.120 Kenneally v Pouras (2007) 250 LSJS 248; [2007] SASC 303 .................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Kennedy v Guthrie (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 376; [1966] 1 DCR (NSW) 239 ............................................ DCA 156.20 Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; 213 ALR 108; [2004] FCAFC 337 ....................................................... r 22.2.120 Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424; [2004] FCA 332 ..................................................................................... r 21.3.140 Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd v Lancken (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Sperling J, 1 August 1997) ......................................................................................................................................................................... r 6.27.60 Kennett v Charlton [2007] NSWSC 190 .................................................................................................... r Pt41.20, r Pt43.60 Kenoss Pty Ltd v Palerang Council [2013] NSWCA 174 ............................................................................................. r 7.1.60 Kent v Cavanagh (1973) 1 ACTR 43 ......................................................................................................................... r 42.1.300 Keramianakis v Regional Publishers Pty Ltd (2009) 237 CLR 268; 83 ALJR 680; [2009] HCA 18 ................. DCA 127.50 Kerr v Commissioner of Police [1977] 2 NSWLR 721 .................................................................... SCA 69.20, SCR 54.0.40 Kerr v Sheriff (NSW) (1996) 9 BPR 16215 ................................................................................................ r 6.8.60, r 16.4.100 Kerrisk v North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 398 ......................................................................... r 22.4.40 Kessey v Golledge (1999) 30 MVR 95; [1999] NSWCA 424 .... SCA 101.120, SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.120, SCR 51.0.200 Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1987] AC 189 ..................................................................................... r 6.28.40, r 31.4.60 Keystone Knitting Mills’ Trademark, Re [1929] 1 Ch 92 ........................................................................ r 14.17.40, r 36.4.60 Khatz Capital Ltd v Wilding [2003] NSWSC 173 .................................................................................... r 32.5.80, r 32.5.120 Kimberley Mineral Holdings Ltd (in liq) v McEwan [1980] 1 NSWLR 210; (1980) 4 ACLR 851 ..... r 21.7.40, r 31.1.140, r 33.9.120, r 34.2.60, r Pt21.140 Kimberley Securities Ltd v Byrne [2008] NSWSC 1214 .............................................................................................. r 5.4.40 King v Flowers [2014] NSWSC 1266 ........................................................................................................................ r 42.19.40 King & Co’s Trademark, Re [1892] 2 Ch 462 ............................................................................................................ r 18.2.60 King Investment Solutions Pty Ltd v Hussain (2005) 64 NSWLR 441; [2005] NSWSC 1076 ......... r 13.4.260, r 27.1.20, r 27.1.40 King Network Group Pty Ltd v Club of the Clubs Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 204 .................... r 42.1.100, r 42.15.80 Kings Cross Whisper Pty Ltd v O’Neil [1968] 2 NSWR 289 ...................................................................................... r 8.2.60 Kirby v Sanderson Motors Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 135; [2002] NSWCA 44 ................. r 14.7.60, r 14.7.80, r 14.14.40 Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485 .............................. r 31.18.80, r 31.23.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lix

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Kirk v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1988) 19 FCR 530 ................................................................ r 39.51.100 Kirkup v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1165; [1983] 3 All ER 147 .................................................. r 22.2.60 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349; [1998] 4 All ER 513; [1998] 3 WLR 1095 .............................................................................................................................................................. r 20.28.40 Klewer v Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children [2010] NSWSC 18 ..................................................................... r 31.36.60 Knight v Burgess [1972] ALR 628 ............................................................................................................................. r 20.28.40 Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700; [1971] 2 All ER 378; [1971] 2 WLR 564 ......................................... r 42.1.60, CPA 98.20 Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 ; 66 ALJR 560; 107 ALR 585; [1992] HCA 28 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 42.27.40 Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; 66 ALJR 560; 107 ALR 585; [1992] HCA 28 .......................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.40, CPA 98.40 Knight v Ponsonby [1925] 1 KB 545 ....................................................................................................................... r 42.21.120 Knight’s Will, Re (1884) 26 Ch D 82 ........................................................................................................................ r 42.25.40 Kohn v Rinson & Stafford (Brod) Ltd [1948] 1 KB 327; [1947] 2 All ER 839 ................................................... r 42.21.120 Kolavo v Pitsikas [2003] NSWCA 59 .................................................................................................................... DCA 134.80 Konings v Naylor [1964] Qd R 235 ............................................................................................................................. r 22.2.40 Konneh v New South Wales (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 390 .............................................................................. r 7.1.50, r 7.4.80 Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 85 ................ r 20.26.40, r 42.15.50 Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v KLALC Property & Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 169 ................................................................................................................................................... r 3.8.80 Kosciusko Thredbo Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 96 ........................................................................ r 28.2.60 Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; 270 ALR 228; [2010] HCA 32 ......................... r 50.3.160 Kotulski v Attard [1981] 1 NSWLR 115 ...................................................................................................................... r 7.13.40 Kowalski v Trustee, Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd Staff Superannuation Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 18 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r 14.14.200 Kraft v Kupferwasser (1991) 23 NSWLR 236 ..................................................................................... r 26.5.40, SCR 48.0.20 Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council v Bonnici [2002] NSWCA 313 ............................................................................... r 18.1.60 Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council v Suburban Centres Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 335; (1971) 25 LGRA 228 .................................................................................................................................... SCA 75.140, SCA 75.240 Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363; 78 ALJR 1031; [2004] HCA 34 .................................... r 53.1.180, r Pt14.20 Kurnell Passenger & Transport Service Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council (2009) 230 FLR 336; [2009] NSWCA 59 .................................................................................................................................................. r 23.1.80 Kurt Keller Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 353 ....................................................................... SCA 66.120 Kwan v Kang [2003] NSWCA 336 .............................................................................................................................. r 28.2.60 Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray [2005] NSWCA 87 ...................................................................... r 42.5.40

L L & W Developments Pty Ltd v Della (2003) 135 IR 118; [2003] NSWCA 140 ................................................... r 13.4.220 L Shaddock & Assoc Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590; 56 ALJR 875; 43 ALR 473 ................................................................. r 6.12.80, r 36.16.200, r 36.17.60, r 36.17.80, SCR 51.0.260 LJ Hooker Ltd v Dominion Factors Pty Ltd (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 146; 80 WN (NSW) 126; [1963] NSWR 573 ................................................................................................................................................... r 43.2.60 LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688 ............................................................................................................................................ r 31.4.40, r 35.1.40 LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 74 ................................. r 42.5.40, r 42.15.80 La Trobe Capital, Re [2009] NSWSC 1118 ............................................................................................................... r 55.11.20 Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 198; [2015] NSWCA 130 ..................................................... r 1.12.40 Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489; [1954] 3 All ER 745 ............................................................................. SCA 75A.140 Lagos v Grunwaldt [1910] 1 KB 41 ............................................................................................................................... r 6.3.60 Laguillo v Haden Engineering Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 306 ................................................................................... r 42.1.40 Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWSC 126 ........................................................................................................................ r 42.5.40 Lahoud v Lahoud (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 55 .............................................................................................................. r 30.1.40 Lake Burrendong State Park Trust v Thompson [2011] NSWSC 1554 ...................................................................... r 42.1.52 Lall v 53-55 Hall Street Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 310 ......................................................................................... r 42.21.110 Lambidis v Commissioner of Police (1995) 37 NSWLR 320; 12 NSWCCR 225 ................................................. r 14.14.200 Lamerand v Lamerand (No 1) (1960) 80 WN (NSW) 198; [1962] NSWR 246 ........................................................ r 26.3.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lx

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Lane v Jurd (No 2) (1995) 40 NSWLR 708 ............................................................................................... r 31.4.60, r Pt31.40 Lane v Registrar of Supreme Court (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 245; 55 ALJR 529 .................................. r 33.4.140, r 34.2.60 Lane v Wills [1972] 1 All ER 430; [1972] 1 WLR 326 .............................................................................................. r 23.9.20 Lane Cove Council v Davies [2012] NSWSC 727 .................................................................................................... r 20.14.60 Lang v Australian Coastal Shipping Commission [1974] 2 NSWLR 70 .................................................................... r 22.2.40 Lang v Simon (1952) 53 SR (NSW) 508; 70 WN (NSW) 117 ............................................................................ SCR 48.0.20 Langbourne v State Rail Authority [2003] NSWSC 537 ......................................................................................... r 31.23.100 Langdale v Danby [1982] 1 WLR 1123; [1982] 3 All ER 129 ................................................. SCA 75A.120, SCA 75A.140 Laporte Group Australia Ltd v Vatselias (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 15 November 1991) .............................. r 32.13.60 Latec Finance Pty Ltd v Jury (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 674; [1960] NSWR 321 ......................................................... r 21.3.50 Latham v Hubbard, Re; Estate of Ross [2014] NSWSC 805 ...................................................................................... r 42.2.40 Latham v Hubbard; Estate of Ross [2014] NSWSC 805 ........................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; 50 A Crim R 287; 7 ALR 45 [1990] HCA 59 ................ r 42.1.40, r 42.1.62, CPA Pt7.Div2.40 Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; 65 ALJR 151; 50 A Crim R 287; 7 ALR 45 ........................................... r 42.1.300 Laundry Coin-Wash Nominees Pty Ltd v Dunlop Olympic Ltd (1985) ATPR 40-584 .......................................... r 42.21.140 Laurie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR 310; 32 ALJR 7 .................................................................................. r 10.14.100, r 12.5.40 Lawrance v Hodges [2005] NSWCA 70 ................................................................................................................ SCR 51.0.80 Lawrence Waterhouse Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council [2008] NSWCA 235 ....................................................... r 42.21.600 Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70; 64 ALJR 412; 93 ALR 435; 5 BR 109 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r Pt17.180 Laws v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 53; [2007] NSWSC 316 ...................................... r 31.19.50, r 31.26.100 Lawteal Pty Ltd v Ofo [2005] NSWSC 984 ......................................................................................... r 49.20.80, r 49.20.120 Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts (No 2) [2009] FCA 466 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.300 Le Meilleur Pty Ltd v Jin Heung Mutual Savings Bank Co Ltd (2011) 256 FLR 240; 6 BFRA 361; [2011] NSWSC 1115 ....................................................................................................................................... r 17.2.60 Leach v Nominal Defendant (QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd) (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 391 ........... r 20.26.40, r 42.13.40, r 42.13A.20, r 42.15.45, r 42.15.50 Leading Edge Events Australia Pty Ltd v Kiri Te Kanawa (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 568 ...................................... CPA Pt6.20 Leda Manorstead Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2012) 89 ATR 102; [2012] NSWSC 913 ........................................................................................................................................................... r 21.2.100 Lee v Abbes [2003] NSWCA 24 ................................................................................................................................ r 31.28.80 Lee v Mallam (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 876; 27 WN (NSW) 203 ............................................................ DCA 8.40, DCA 81.20 Lee v Surry Hills Mutual Loan Club [2007] NSWSC 650 ......................................................................................... r 7.4.120 Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; 72 ALJR 1484; 102 A Crim R 289; 157 ALR 394; [1998] HCA 60 .............................................................................................................................................................. r 31.35.1000 Leetham v Leetham [2011] NSWSC 201 ................................................................................................................ CPA 135.20 Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins [2006] LPT 012 ........................................................................................ CPA 27.40 Leghaei v Director-General of Security (No 2) [2006] FCA 114 ............................................................................. r 42.1.300 Lehtonen v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1963] NSWR 323 .................................................................................. r 8.2.60 Leicester v Walton [1995] NSWCA 258 ...................................................................................................................... r 7.29.40 Leicester v Walton (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, Priestley, Sheller, Cole JJ, 22 November 1995) ......................................................................................................................................................................... r 7.29.40 Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green [2004] NSWCA 341 ............................................... r 42.5.40, r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Hossco Marble & Granite Manufacturing Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWCA, 18 April 1994) ........................................................................................................ SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Leighton International v Hodges [2012] NSWSC 458 .............................................................................................. r 21.2.100 Leighton’s Conveyance, Re [1937] Ch 149 ............................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153 ................ r 4.2.140, r 6.26.40, CPA 99.40 Lenark Pty Ltd v TheChairmen1 Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 415 ...................................................................... r 34.2.60 Lend Lease Developments Pty Ltd v Zemlicka [1985] 3 NSWLR 207 ............................................................... SCA 75A.80 Lennox v Krantz (1978) 19 SASR 272 ................................................................................................................... SCA 66.340 Levy v Bablis [2012] NSWCA 77 .............................................................................................................................. r 18.1.160 Levy v Moylan (1850) 138 ER 78; 10 CB 189 ......................................................................................................... DCA 8.40 Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579; 71 ALJR 837; 146 ALR 248 ......................................................................... r 6.27.60 Lewis v Combell Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 528 ............................................................................. r 20.28.60 Lewis v Eliades (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 692; [2004] 1 All ER 1196 ........................................................................ r 53.1.160

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxi

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Lewis v Hance (1848) 11 QB 921; 116 ER 718 .................................................................................................... DCA 196.20 Lewis v Kation Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1127 .......................................................................................................... CPA 26.80 Lewis v Kation Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 480 .......................................................................................... r 42.1.120, r 42.25.40 Lewis v Lamb [2011] NSWSC 873 ............................................................... CPA 30.10, CPA 31.40, CPA 33.20, CPA 34.20 Lewis v Lamb [2012] FMCA 392 .............................................................................................................................. r 39.51.60 Lewis v Lamb [2012] NSWSC 244 ......................................................................................................................... CPA 124.40 Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (In liq) [2004] NSWSC 64 .................................................................................................. r 25.11.20 Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1193 ..................................... r 31.8.1000, r 31.9.40, r 31.9.60, r 31.9.1000 Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] NSWSC 480 .................................................................................................. r 42.1.55 Lewis v Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682; 58 ALJR 342 ............................................................................................ SCR 55.0.20 Li v State of New South Wales [2013] NSWCA 165 ......................................................................... r 42.21.110, r 42.21.120 Liang, Re [2012] NSWSC 365 ..................................................................................................................................... r 57.3.10 Liberty Grove (Concord) Pty Ltd v Mirvac Projects Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 48 ................................................. r 42.21.110 Lidoframe Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1262 ............................................................ CPA 26.20, CPA 26.60 Liff v Peasley [1980] 1 WLR 781; [1980] 1 All ER 623 ......................................................................................... CPA 64.40 Lightning Ridge Mining NL v Jacombe [1978] 1 NSWLR 253 ................................................................................. r 14.7.40 Lill v Merchant Capital (WA) Ltd (1996) 15 WAR 536; 96 ATC 4331 ................................................................. r 31.14.140 Lin v Borrowdale [2011] NSWCA 65 .................................................................................................. r 39.34.60, CPA 117.05 Lincoln Hunt (Aust) Pty Ltd v Willessee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457 .......................................................................... SCA 66.120 Linda, Re [2011] NSWSC 1596 ................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 Ling v Commonwealth (1996) 68 FCR 180; 139 ALR 159 .................................................................................... r 14.14.220 Linsley v Petrie [1998] 1 VR 427; (1998) 9 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-349 .......................................................... r 14.14.200 Liprini v Liprini [2008] NSWSC 423 ......................................................................................................................... r 40.6.100 Liquor National Wholesale Pty Ltd v Redrock Co Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 392 ............ r 26.1.60, r 26.1.110, r 26.1.120, r 26.1.160 Liristis v Gadelrabb [2009] NSWSC 441 .................................................................................................... r 21.1.60, r 21.2.80 Lisec Australia Pty Ltd v Lisec Australia [2015] NSWSC 365 .................................................................................. r 25.3.60 Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 ....................................... r 31.10.60 Litmus Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Canty (2007) 25 ACLC 1141; [2007] NSWSC 670 ....................................... r 42.21.110 Liu v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1256 ........................................................................... r 42.21.600 Liverpool City Council v Estephan [2009] NSWCA 161 ......................................................................... r 42.5.40, r 42.10.40 Liverpool City Council v Turano (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 176 .............................................................. r 42.1.100, r 42.15.80 Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners (2008) 20 VR 377; 66 ACSR 455; 26 ACLC 467; [2008] VSCA 93 .............................................................................................................................................................. r 42.21.110 Lllawarra Hotel Co Pty Ltd v Walton Construction Pty Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 410; [2013] NSWCA 6 ............................................................................................................................................................ r 20.24.180 Lloyd Steel Co (Aust) Pty Ltd v Jade Shipping SA (1985) 1 NSWLR 212 ........................................................... CPA 65.20 Lohar Corp Pty Ltd v Dibu Pty Ltd (1978) 52 ALJ 643 ....................................................................................... SCA 75.320 Lohar Corp Pty Ltd v Dibu Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWCA, 11 May 1976) .......................................................... SCA 75.320 Lollis v Loulatzis [2008] VSC 35 ................................................................................................................................. r 42.1.62 Lollis v Loulatzis (No 2) [2008] VSC 35 .................................................................................................................... r 42.1.60 London & County Banking Co v Dover (1879) 11 Ch D 204 .................................................................................... r 27.1.20 London Chatham & Dover Railway Co v South Eastern Railway Co [1893] AC 429 ........................................ CPA 100.20 London Welsh Estates Ltd v Phillip (1931) 144 LT 693 .......................................................................................... CPA 98.20 London Welsh Estates Ltd v Phillip [1931] WN 44 .................................................................................................... r 42.1.60 Lonergan v Lewis [2011] NSWSC 1133 .................................................................................................................... r 52.1.220 Long v Specifier Publications Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 545 .................................................................................. r 21.3.60 Longhurst v Hunt (2004) 42 MVR 267; [2004] NSWCA 91 ...................................................................................... r 31.4.60 Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 1) [1980] 1 WLR 627 ........................................................ r 21.3.100, r 21.11.40 Loose v Williamson [1978] 1 WLR 639; [1978] 3 All ER 89 ................................................................................. r Pt21.120 Lopresto v Golding (1957) 31 ALJ 851 ................................................................................................................... r 31.12.100 Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469 ................................................................................................................ SCA 66.360 Lord’s Estate, Re (1866) LR 2 Eq 605 ........................................................................................................................ r 46.5.20 Loucks v Standard Oil Co of New York (1918) 224 NY 99 ..................................................................................... r 53.7.220 Lucantonio v Kleinert [2009] NSWSC 929 ............................................................................................................... r 31.26.70 Lucas v Montgomery (2008) 7 DCLR(NSW) 295; [2008] NSWDC 207 ............................................................... CPA 95.20 Lucas v Yorke (1983) 58 ALJR 28; 50 ALR 228 .................................................................................................... r 42.21.100 Lujans v Yarrabee Coal Co Pty Ltd (2008) 83 ALJR 34; 249 ALR 663; [2008] HCA 51 ............... r 31.10.60, r 31.10.1000

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Lukies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283 .................................................................................... r 21.3.220, r 22.2.200 Lustre Hosiery Ltd v York (1935) 54 CLR 134 ........................................................................................................ r Pt17.150 Lutwyche v Jiweni Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWCA, 30 July 1998) ............................................... SCA 108.40, SCR 51.0.280 Lyell v Kennedy (No 3) (1884) 50 LT 730; (1884) 27 Ch D 1; [1881–1885] All ER Rep 814 .............. r 22.3.40, r 22.4.40 Lyford v Kingsburg Pty Ltd [1998] WASC 151 .......................................................................................................... r 43.7.70 Lynnebry Pty Ltd v Farquhar Enterprises Pty Ltd (1977) 3 ACLR 133 ................................................................. r 42.21.110 Lyons v Kern Konstructions (Townsville) Pty Ltd (1983) 70 FLR 135; 47 ALR 114 ........................... r 15.4.40, r 15.10.60 Lyster v Camberwell City Council (1989) 69 LGRA 250 ......................................................................................... r 42.1.300

M M v Director General, Department of Family & Community Services [2013] NSWCA 118 ................................... r 7.36.40 M v M [2013] NSWSC 1495 ............................................................................................... r 57.11.20, r Pt57.100, r Pt57.140 M v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 1876 ....................................................................................... r 17.3.30 M v Mental Health Review Tribunal (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 572 ........................................................................... r Pt57.160 M, Re [1903] 3 SR (NSW) 552; (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 124 ..................................................................................... r Pt57.20 M & L Watson Pty Limited t/as BBR Designs v Rilsung Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 36 ............ SCA 101.100, SCR 51.0.100 MA Productions Pty Ltd v Austarama Television Pty Ltd (1982) 7 ACLR 97; 1 ACLC 404 ............................... r 42.21.110 MAW v Western Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 49 NSWLR 231; [2000] NSWSC 358 ................................. r Pt57.20 MB v Protective Commissioner (2000) 50 NSWLR 24; [2000] NSWSC 717 ......................................................... r 57.11.20 MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203; 98 ALR 193 ....................................................... r 36.7.40 MG Charley Pty Ltd v FH Wells Pty Ltd (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 754; [1963] NSWR 22 ..................................... r 39.41.40 MGICA (1992) Pty Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 70 FCR 236; 140 ALR 707 .......... r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 MKH v JBH (No 1) [2016] NSWSC 1031 ................................................................................................................ r Pt57.100 MKH v JBH (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1103 ................................................................................................................ r Pt57.100 ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigrem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577; [2007] NSWSC 859 ....................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 117.60 MLW Investments v Tacsum [2006] NSWSC 1256 .................................................................................................... r Pt46.20 MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 242 ................................... CPA 26.100 MNM and EA v EM; Re ENA and the Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 1813 .................................. r Pt56A.20 MPB (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 5 ALJR 203; 98 ALR 193; 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-037; [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-082 ............................................................................................. CPA 100.30 MS v ES [1983] 3 NSWLR 199 ................................................................................................................................... r 57.5.10 Mabbett v Watson Wyatt Superannuation Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 460 ..................................................................... r 42.5.40 Mabrouk Pty Ltd, Re (unreported, NSWSC, McLelland CJ in Eq, 18 March 1996) .................. SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 MacCarthy v Agard [1933] 2 KB 417 ...................................................................................................................... DCA 81.20 MacDonald v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2007) 73 NSWLR 612; [2007] NSWCA 304 ....................................................................................................................................... r 14.14.120, r 15.1.60 MacDougall v Curlevski (1996) 40 NSWLR 430 ............................................. r 42.1.62, r 42.12.40, CPA 44.20, CPA 46.20 MacIntosh v Lobel (1993) 30 NSWLR 441 ......................................................................................................... SCA 75A.200 Macartney (No 2), Re [1921] 1 Ch 522 ..................................................................................................................... r 53.7.220 Macatangay v New South Wales (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 272 .............................................................. r 12.7.120, r 13.4.260 Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand (2006) 66 NSWLR 112; [2006] NSWCA 160 ....................... r Pt55.40 Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar The Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Diocese of Australia and New Zealand (2008) 237 CLR 66; [2008] HCA 42 ................................................................................................................................ r Pt54.20, r Pt55.40 Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v Metropolitan Petar [2013] NSWCA 223 ..... r 55.4.20, r Pt55.40 Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc, Re [2004] NSWSC 388 ................................................... r Pt55.40 Mack v Elvy (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 313; 33 WN (NSW) 99 .................................................................................. DCA 80.20 Mackinnon v BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 229 ............................................................. r 42.15.50 Macklin v Miller [1973] 2 NSWLR 262 .................................................................. SCA 75A.40, SCA 69.40, SCR 54.0.120 Maclaine Watson & Co Private Ltd v Chen [1983] 1 NSWLR 163 ........................................................................... r 11.2.60 Macquarie Bank Ltd v National Mutual Life Assn of Australasia Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 543 ...... r 14.14.200, r 14.14.220 Macquarie Developments Pty Ltd v Forrester [2005] NSWSC 674 ........................................................................... r Pt35.40 Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 171 ............................................................................................................................. r 42.1.62, r 42.1.120

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxiii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 1139 ............................................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Macrae v St Margaret’s Hospital (1999) 19 NSWCCR 1; [1999] NSWCA 381 ....................................................... r 10.5.40 Madalaine Textile Mfg Co Pty Ltd v Merrylands Bus Co Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 573 ..................................... DCA 76.40 Madden v Kevereski [1983] 1 NSWLR 305 ............................................................................................ r 30.3.40, SCA 68.20 Madden v New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corp [1999] NSWSC 196 ......................................................... r 42.5.30 Madden v Owners-Strata Plan No 64970 (2013) 17 BPR 32525; [2013] NSWSC 469 .......................................... r 50.3.120 Maddison v Goldrick [1975] 1 NSWLR 557 .......................................................................................................... SCA 75.280 Magafras v Carantinos [2009] NSWSC 1124 .............................................................................................................. r 46.7.20 Magenta Nominees Pty Ltd v Richard Ellis (WA) Pty Ltd (unreported, Fed Ct of Appeal (FC), 29 August 1995) .......................................................................................................................................................... r 42.15.80 Magenta Nominees Pty Ltd v Richard Ellis (WA) Pty Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Spender, French and Lee JJ, 29 August 1995) ..................................................................................................... r 42.15.40 Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffey [1981] VR 23 .................................................................................. SCA 66.120 Mahaffy v Mahaffy [2013] NSWSC 245 ........................................................................................... CPA 106.35, CPA 131.20 Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority (NSW) (No 2) (2008) 72 NSWLR 273; [2008] NSWCA 201 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 42.1.57 Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2) (2008) 72 NSWLR 273; [2008] NSWCA 201 ................................................................................................................................................ r 42.1.62 Maher v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) (2004) 211 ALR 656; [2004] FCA 1398 .................................. r 39.1.60 Maher v Network Finance Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 503 .............................................................................................. r 42.25.40 Maile v Rafiq [2005] NSWCA 410 .............................................................................................................................. r 12.6.60 Mailman v Ellison [1993] NSWCA 169 ..................................................................................................................... r 29.10.60 Mainteck Services Pty Ltd v Stein Heurtey SA (2014) 310 ALR 113; [2014] NSWCA 184 .......... r 20.24.100, r 20.24.180 Maitland v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 155 ..................................................................................... r 50.3.140 Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721 ............................. r 42.13.40, r 42.15.45, r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Makin v Gallagher [1974] 2 NSWLR 559 .......................................................................................... SCA 75.20, SCA 75.300 Makins v Ibotson [1891] 1 Ch 133 ............................................................................................................................... r 26.3.40 Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305 ................. r 31.18.120, r 31.18.1000, r 31.23.60, r 31.23.160, r 31.23.1000, r 31.29.80, r 31.29.1000, r 31.30.80, r 31.30.1000, r 31.35.1000, r 31.49.40, r Pt31.Div2.1000 Maksimovic v Walsh [1983] 2 NSWLR 656 ..................................... SCA 65.40, SCA 69.40, SCR 54.0.100, SCR 54.0.120 Maksimovic v Walsh (1984) 58 ALJ 674 ................................................................................................................. SCA 69.40 Malak v Pepsico Australia Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 85 ........................................................................ r 16.3.140, r 36.16.240 Maleski v Hampson [2013] NSWSC 1794 ................................................................................................................. r 16.3.110 Malleys Ltd v Horton Investments Ltd (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 1128; [1961] NSWR 1064 ................................. SCA 49.120 Mallik v McGeown [2008] NSWSC 1107 .............................................................................................................. CPA 26.140 Maloney v Kull (unreported, NSWCA, 21 February 2003) ........................................................................................ r 18.3.80 Malouf v Malouf [1999] FCA 710 ................................................................................................................................. r 5.3.60 Malouf v Malouf (2006) 65 NSWLR 449; [2006] NSWCA 83 ................................................................. r 7.1.100, r 7.27.80 Malvina Park Pty Ltd (t/as Firths the Superannuation Lawyers) v Pollard [2015] NSWSC 578 ............................ r 25.11.20 Managed Estates Remuneration Orders, Re [2014] NSWSC 383 ............................................................................... r 57.3.30 Managed Estates Remuneration Report, Re [2014] NSWSC 1652 ........................................................................... r Pt57.100 Managed Estates Remuneration Report, Re [2015] NSWSC 1463 ............................................................................. r 57.3.30 Mandarin International Developments Pty Ltd v Growthcorp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1998) 143 FLR 408 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 42.5.40 Manefield v Child Care NSW (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 104 ....................................................................................... r 42.15.40 Manitowoc Crane Group Asia Pte Ltd v Preston Erection Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1141 ......................... r 7.1.60, r 7.1.100 Manly Council v Byrne (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 227 ................................................................................................ r 42.15.80 Mann v Capital Territory Health Commission (1982) 148 CLR 97; 56 ALJR 261; 42 ALR 46; [1982] HCA 10 ........................................................................................................................................................ r 30.3.40 Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 74 ALJR 378; [1999] HCA 6 ................. r 21.3.140, r 21.3.240, r 22.2.120, r 22.2.220 Manning v Thompson [1976] 2 NSWLR 380 ................................................................................. SCA 69.60, SCR 54.0.140 Mao v AMP Superannuation Ltd [2015] NSWCA 252 ............................................................................................... r 7.18.40 Maple v David Syme & Co Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 97 ............................................................................................. r 13.4.180 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA [1980] 1 All ER 213; [1975] 2 Lloyds Rep 509 .............................................................................................................................. SCA 66.240, SC Gen 14 Margan v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 196 .................................................................... r 7.36.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxiv

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Marginson v Ian Potter & Co (1976) 136 CLR 161; 50 ALJR 735; 11 ALR 64 ....................................................... r 14.7.60 Maric v The Queen [1981] 2 NSWLR 100; [1981] 4 A Crim R 150 ............................................ SCA 101.80, SCR 51.0.80 Mariconte v Batiste (2000) 48 NSWLR 724; [2000] NSWSC 288 ............................................................................ r 26.1.60 Maritime Services Board (NSW) v Australian Chamber of Shipping [1977] 1 NSWLR 648 ....... SCA 75.140, SCA 75.300 Maritime Services Board (NSW) v Citizens Airport Environment Assn Inc (1992) 83 LGERA 107 ................... r 42.21.110 Markisic v Commonwealth (2007) 69 NSWLR 737; [2007] NSWCA 92 ................................................................. r 31.4.80 Markisic v Commonwealth [2010] NSWSC 24 ........................................................................................................ CPA 58.40 Markisic v Keelty [2005] NSWSC 1124 .................................................................................................................... r 33.12.40 Markisic v United States of America [2006] NSWSC 839 .................................................................. r 31.3.120, r 31.3.1000 Markisic v Vizza [2002] NSWCA 384 ............................................................................................... SCA 69.20, SCR 54.0.20 Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128; 137 ALR 579 ..................................................... r 42.5.40 Marks v Government Insurance Office Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128; 137 ALR 579 ................................................................................................................................................................. r 21.3.220 Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021 ................................................................................. r 7.4.60 Markus v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd (1983) 25 NSWCCR 1 ......................................................... r 31.1.140, r 31.10.1000 Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 36; [2000] NSWSC 507 ..... r 11.7.40, r 12.11.40, r 12.11.120 Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd (2000) 18 ACLC 609; [2000] NSWSC 138 ....................... r 33.9.120 Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd [2000] NSWSC 520 ............................................................... r 21.4.40 Marotta v The Queen (1999) 73 ALJR 265; 160 ALR 525; [1999] HCA 4 ............................................................ r 31.28.80 Marshall v DG Sundin & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 463 ................................................................................ CPA 65.20 Marshall v Fleming [2012] NSWSC 698 ................................................................................................................. r 14.28.140 Marshall v Fleming [2013] NSWSC 566 .............................................................................................................. r Pt6.Div9.20 Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64 ...................... r 6.43.40, r 6.43.60, r 6.44.40, r 20.14.60, r 20.15.80, r 20.15.100, r Pt6.Div9.20 Marshall v Prescott [2012] NSWSC 515 ...................................................................................................................... r 22.1.80 Marshall v Prescott (No 1) [2013] NSWSC 1108 ........................................................................................................ r 31.9.60 Marsham v Silbermann [1913] VLR 187 ..................................................................................................................... r 43.6.80 Marsland v Andjelic (No 2) (1993) 32 NSWLR 649; 18 MVR 379 ........................................................................ r 42.15.50 Martin v Abbott Australasia Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 430 ......... r 49.12.60, SCA 75A.100, SCA 75A.120, SCA 75A.140 Martin v Carlisle [2008] NSWSC 1276 ....................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Martin v Trustrum (No 2) [2003] TASSC 50 ........................................................................................................ SCR 55.0.20 Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corp Ltd [1980] 2 WLR 905; [1980] 1 All ER 420 .......................... SCR 1.13.20 Maschmann v Wenzel [2007] NSWSC 850 ............................................................................................................... r 53.7.140 Masha Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] VSC 56 ..................................................... r 42.5.40 Mason v Telstra Corp Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1334 .................................................................................................... CPA 140.60 Masterman-Lister v Jewell [2003] 1 WLR 1511; [2003] 3 All ER 162 ..................................................................... r 7.14.50 Mathews, Re [1905] 2 Ch 460 ...................................................................................................................................... r 12.1.80 Matter of An Appeal by Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 ..................................................................................................... r 13.4.260 Matter of An Appeal by Luck (2003) 78 ALJR 177 .................................................................................................. r 12.7.120 Maule v Liporoni (No 2) (2002) 122 LGERA 216; [2002] NSWLEC 140 ............................................................... r 42.5.40 Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2001) 51 NSWLR 673; 47 ATR 346; 114 LGERA 376; [2001] NSWCA 78 ..................................................................................................................... SCA 75A.20 Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261; 57 SR (NSW) 420; 73 WN (NSW) 310 .............................................. DCR 1.2.40 May v Christodoulou [2011] NSWCA 75; 80 NSWLR 462 ......................................................................................... r 7.2.40 May v Perpetual Trustees Queensland [2000] NSWCA 354 ....................................................................................... r 6.30.40 Mazzei v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) (2000) 97 IR 457; [2000] NSWCA 104 ............................... r 42.21.310 McAuliffe v Commonwealth [2007] NSWSC 178 ....................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 McBain, Re; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 CLR 372; 76 ALJR 694; 188 ALR 1; [2002] HCA 16 ........................................................................................................................... r 7.23.40 McBeatty v Gorman [1976] 2 NSWLR 560 ............................................................... SCA 75A.40, SCA 65.20, SCR 54.0.80 McCabe, Re; Ex parte Palmer (1967) 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 232; 69 SR (NSW) 140 ................... DCA 76.20, DCA 186.40 McCallum v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWCA 218 ............................................................................. r 31.13.120 McCausland v Surfing Hardware International Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 590 .............................. r 42.1.100 McClymont v The Owners-Strata Plan No 12139 (2009) 74 NSWLR 404; [2009] NSWSC 276 ........... r 36.2.40, r 36.3.80 McCormac v Gardner [1937] NZLR 517 ................................................................................................................... r 53.7.100 McCormack v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 143 CLR 284; 53 ALJR 436 ............ SCA 108.40, SCR 51.0.280 McCormack v National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 303 ............................................................................... r 38.5.80

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxv

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES McCusker v Rutter (2010) 7 ASTLR 137; [2010] NSWCA 318 ............................................................. r 42.1.60, r 42.1.200 McD v McD [1983] 3 NSWLR 81 ............................................................................................................. r 57.5.10, r Pt57.60 McDermott v McDermott [2014] FamCA 615 ............................................................................................................. r 26.1.60 McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529; 39 ALJR 179 .......................................................... r 53.7.180, SCA 75A.180 McDonald v Price [2011] NSWSC 70 ........................................................................................................................................ McDonnell & East Ltd v McGregor (1936) 56 CLR 50; [1936] ALR 324 ................................................................. r Pt9.60 McDowell v Fox [2003] NSWSC 324 ..................................................................................................................... r 49.20.100 McEvoy, Ex parte (1868) 8 SCR (NSW) 16 ............................................................................................................ DCA 48.60 McGarrigle v Public Service Board [1979] 1 NSWLR 292 .................. SCA 75.20, SCA 75.100, SCA 75.140, SCA 75.240 McGee v Yeomans [1977] 1 NSWLR 273 ............................................................................................... r 6.28.40, CPA 65.20 McGilvray, Re; Ex parte Foreign Commerce Bank Inc (1986) 66 ALR 181 ............................................................. r 53.8.20 McGowan v Nominal Defendant (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 256; 78 WN (NSW) 1016 ............................................ DCA 126.20 McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424 ........................................................................ r 14.28.120 McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 104 ............................................................ r 2.1.40, CPA 61.20 McHarg v Woods Radio Pty Ltd [1948] VLR 496 .................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 McHenry v Lewis (1882) 22 Ch D 397 ..................................................................................................................... r 13.4.180 McI v McI (1987) 10 NSWLR 243 .............................................................................................................................. r Pt57.20 McIlraith v Grady [1968] 1 QB 468; [1967] 3 WLR 1331; [1967] 3 All ER 625 ............................................ SCR 55.0.100 McIlraith v Ilkin [2008] NSWCA 11 ........................................................................................................... r 42.1.65, r 42.5.40 McIntosh v Williams [1976] 2 NSWLR 237 .............................................................................. SCA 75A.140, SCA 75A.180 McIntyre v Perkes (1988) 15 NSWLR 417 ...................................................... r 26.3.40, r 26.3.60, r 42.5.40, SCR 55.0.120 McKensey v Hewitt (2004) 61 NSWLR 54; [2004] NSWSC 636 ................................. r 31.13.40, r 31.13.120, r 31.14.160 McKenzie v Red Hill Station Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Master Allen, 12 March 1982) ................... SCR 1A.2.40 McKeown v Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 303 ................................................................................ CPA 93.40 McKewins Hairdressing & Beauty Supplies Pty Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 74 ALJR 1000; 171 ALR 335; [2000] HCA 27 ..................................................................... r 42.5.40, CPA 99.40 McLean v Burns Philp Trustee Co Pty Ltd (195) 9 ACLR 926; [1985] 2 NSWLR 623 .......................................... r 54.6.20 McLean v Burns Philp Trustee Co Pty Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 926; [1985] 2 NSWLR 623 .......... r 1.4.40, r 54.7.20, r Pt5.20 McLean v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Sperling J, 22 August 1996) .............................................. r 42.15.60 McLean v McKinlay [2004] WASC 2 ........................................................................................................................ r 26.1.130 McLeary v Swift [2013] NSWSC 1674 .................................................................................................. r 39.44.45, r 39.49.60 McLeary v Swift [2014] NSWSC 1414 ................................................................................................................... CPA 135.30 McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95; 35 ALJR 157 ....................................................................................... DCA 126.20 McLennan v Sukh [2011] NSWSC 26 ....................................................................................................................... r 50.3.260 McLeod v Butterwick [1996] 1 WLR 995; [1996] 3 All ER 236 ............................................................................... r 43.3.40 [1998] 1 WLR 1603 ...................................................................................................................................................... r 43.3.40 McM v C (No 2) [1980] 1 NSWLR 27 .......................................................................................... SCR 69.0.40, SCR 69.0.60 McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 7) (2013) 277 FLR 418; [2013] NSWSC 933 ...................... r 15.32.40 McMahon v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2013] NSWCA 201 .................................................................................... r Pt25.20 McManus v Clouter [1980] 1 NSWLR 1; (1980) 5 Fam LR 650 ...................................................................... SCR 54.0.200 McMurtrie v Commonwealth [2006] NSWCA 148 ..................................................................................................... r 7.36.40 McNamara v Bao San [2010] NSWSC 809 ............................................................................................................... r 42.20.40 McPherson v Australasian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Grove J, 22 October 1985) ................................................................................................................................................................ SCA 75A.140 McPherson v Lawless [1960] VR 363 .......................................................................................................................... r 1.12.40 McPherson, Re [1929] VLR 295 .................................................................................................................................. r Pt43.60 McQuarrie v Jaques (1954) 92 CLR 262; [1954] HCA 76 .................................................................................... CPA 106.80 McWhirter v Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] QB 629 ...................................................... r 7.23.40, SCA 75.160 Meacham v Cooper (1873) LR 16 Eq 102 ................................................................................................................... r 46.5.20 Mead v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 500 .................................................................................. CPA 28.40 Mead v Watson (2005) 23 ACLC 718; [2005] NSWCA 133 ...................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Medical Defence Union Ltd (NSW) v Crawford (1993) 31 NSWLR 469; 11 ACSR 406 ........................................ r 42.5.40 Medical Defence Union Ltd (NSW) v Crawford (No 2) (1994) 8 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-226 ...................... SCA 75A.80 Medulla v Abdel Hameed [2003] NSWSC 747 ........................................................................................................ CPA 28.40 Meehan v Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 146; [2002] NSWCA 22 ............................ r 20.27.80, r 36.16.100 Megna v Marshall [2005] NSWSC 1326 ..................................................................................................................... r 42.7.80 Melouhowee Pty Ltd v Steenbohm (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Waddell J, 6 February 1992) .................................. r 42.5.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxvi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Melville v Craig Nowlan & Assocs Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 82; 119 LGERA 186; [2002] NSWCA 32 ............................................................................................................................................................ r 42.21.60 Melwood Units Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads [1979] AC 426; (1978) 52 ALJR 593 ............................. r 6.36.60 Mempoll Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 1057 ................................................................................................................ r 34.2.40 Menon, Re [2014] NSWSC 1888 ................................................................................................................................. r Pt55.40 Menulog Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 440 ...................................................................... r 18.1.160 Meridien BIAO Bank GmbH v Bank of New York [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437 ........................................................ r 43.2.60 Merrag Pty Ltd v Khoury [2008] NSWSC 1286 ..................................................................................................... r 42.21.200 Merribee Pastoral Industries Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 502; 72 ALJR 1055; 155 ALR 1; 28 ACSR 103; 16 ACLC 1302; [1998] HCA 41 ........................................... r 42.21.100, r 42.21.110 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, Ex parte [1899] 1 QB 546 .................................................................................. r 43.2.60 Messiter v Hutchinson (1987) 10 NSWLR 525; 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-802 ................................................... r 42.15.80 Metal Storm Ltd, Re (2014) 100 ACSR 637; [2014] NSWSC 813 ............................................................................ r 26.1.80 Metlife Insurance Ltd v Visy Board Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 111 ............................................................. r 42.1.65, r 42.7.60 Metro Hotel Sydney Pty Ltd v Kol Tov Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1195 ................................................................... r 42.20.40 Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski [2001] NSWSC 976 ..................................................................................................... r 7.23.40 Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski [2006] NSWSC 336 ................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski [2006] NSWSC 626 ................................................................................................... r 42.1.120 Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski [2010] NSWSC 1186 ................................................................................................... r 34.2.40 Metropolitan Railway Co v Wright (1886) 11 App Cas 152 ................................................................................. DCA 126.20 Metropolitan Theatres Ltd v Harris (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 228; 52 WN (NSW) 68 .................................................. r 14.9.60 Metsikas v Quirk [2010] NSWSC 756 ......................................................................................................................... r 42.1.62 Meyer v Meyer [1978] 2 NSWLR 36; (1978) 35 FLR 192 .................................................................................. SCR 69.0.40 Meyer, Re [1971] P 298 .............................................................................................................................................. r 53.7.220 Micallef v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 274 ...................... DCA 127.60, SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Micar Group Pty Ltd v Insul-Trade LLC (2010) 244 FLR 403; [2010] NSWSC 1391 ............................................ r Pt35.20 Michael Edgley International Pty Ltd v Ashton’s Nominess Pty Ltd (1979) 38 FLR 135; 26 ALR 419 ....................................................................................................................................................................... SCA 66.120 Michael Wilson and Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2009] NSWSC 669 ............................................................................. r 42.5.40 Michelin Australia Pty Ltd v NTI Ltd [2010] NSWCA 223 ..................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Mid-City Skin Cancer & Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak [2006] NSWSC 1149 .......................................... r 42.1.62 Midas Management Pty Ltd v Equator Communications Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 759 ............................................ r Pt41.20 Middleton v Erwin (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 200 ........................................................................................................ r 42.1.100 Middleton v O’Neill (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 178; 60 WN (NSW) 101 ..................................................................... CPA 64.40 Mifsud v Campbell (1991) 21 NSWLR 725; 13 MVR 243 ................................................................................ DCA 127.100 Mike Gaffikin Marine Pty Ltd v Princes Street Marina Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 15 July 1996) ..................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd (1976) AC 443 ........................................................................................... r 30.3.40 Milich v The Council of the City of Canterbury (No 3) [2012] NSWSC 1280 ....................................................... r 42.34.40 Milillo v Konnecke (2009) 2 ASTLR 235; [2009] NSWCA 109 .......................................................... r 42.1.100, r 42.1.200 Miller v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572; 10 ALJR 35; [1936] ALR 301; HCA 13 ................................ r 42.1.200, r 42.25.40 Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269; 53 ALJR 59; 22 ALR 119; 4 Fam LR 474; [1978] FLC 90-506; [1978] HCA 44 ........................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.70 Miller v University of New South Wales (2003) 132 FCR 147; [2003] FCAFC 180 ........................................... r 14.14.200 Mills v Futhem Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 538; [2011] NSWCA 252 ................................................................ CPA 133.40 Millstream Pty Ltd v Schultz [1980] 1 NSWLR 547 ............................................................................................... SCA 68.20 Milltec Australia Pty Ltd v Burnes [2006] NSWCA 13 ....................................................................................... SCA 101.140 Milosevic v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1993) 31 NSWLR 323 .............................................................. r 42.5.40 Minchin v Adamson (1975) 10 SASR 119 ............................................................................................................... r 14.28.220 MindShare Communications Ltd v Orleans Investments Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 637 ............................................. r 12.6.80 Minero Pty Ltd v Redero Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Santow J, 29 July 1998) ......................... r 14.14.200, r 14.14.220 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, Re; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622; 71 ALJR 533 ......................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 28.80 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, Re; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622; 71 ALJR 533; 143 ALR 1; [1997] HCA 6 .......................................................................................................... r 42.1.52, r 42.19.40 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (Aust) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253; 54 ALJR 254 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r 31.49.40 Mirror Group Newspapers Plc v Maxwell & Ors (No 2) [1998] 1 BCLC 638 ......................................................... r 26.5.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxvii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Waller (1985) 1 NSWLR 1 .................................................................... SCA 65.40, SCR 54.0.100 Mitchell v Harris Engineering Co Ltd [1967] 2 QB 703 ...................................................................................... DCA 161.60 Mitry v Business Australia Capital Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) [2010] NSWCA 360 ............................................... CPA 65.400 Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 344 ................................................................ r 42.15.50 Moage Ltd (in liq), Re (1997) 77 FCR 81; 25 ACSR 53; 15 ACLC 1034 ................................................................ r Pt34.20 Moage Ltd (in liq), Re; Sheahan v Pitterino (1998) 82 FCR 10; 26 ACSR 726 ..................................................... r 21.3.140 Mohamed v Farah [2004] NSWSC 482 ..................................................................................................................... r 20.28.60 Mok v Crime Commission (NSW) [2002] NSWCA 53 ......................................................................... r 21.3.180, r 22.2.160 Moller v Roy (1975) 132 CLR 622; 49 ALJR 311 .............................................................................................. SCA 101.160 Mona, Re [1894] P 265 ............................................................................................................................................... r 14.25.40 Monaghan v Monaghan [2016] NSWSC 1316 ............................................................................................................ r Pt55.40 Mondial Trading Pty Ltd v Interocean Marine Transport Inc (1985) 60 ALJR 277; 65 ALR 155 ........................... r 10.6.40 Monie v Commonwealth (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 15 .......................................................... r 42.1.120, r 42.15.70, r 42.15.80 Monier Inc, Re (2009) 76 NSWLR 158; [2009] NSWSC 986 ................................................................................. r 52.1.140 Monkton v Stephenson [2011] NSWSC 67 .................................................................................................................. r 16.7.45 Monroe Schneider Assocs (Inc) v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 37 FCR 234 ..................... r 14.14.120, r 53.7.180 Monte v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 663 ............................................................................................ r 14.6.40 Moon v Mun [2012] NSWSC 973 ................................................................................................................................ r 16.6.40 Moon v Mun [2013] NSWCA 217 ............................................................................................................ r 16.6.40, r 17.7.100 Moore v Gannon (1915) 32 WN (NSW) 60 ................................................................................................................ r 18.1.40 Moore (No 2), Re (1902) 19 WN (NSW) 277 ......................................................................... r 57.3.40, r 57.8.20, r 57.11.20 Moraitis Fresh Packaging New South Wales Pty Ltd v Fresh Express Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 704 ............................................................................................................................................................. r 25.8.80 Moran v McMahon [1985] 3 NSWLR 700 ............................................................................................................ SCA 75A.80 Morawski v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1988) 14 NSWLR 374 ......................... SCA 106.20, SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Morf-Zinggeler v Morf [1999] WASC 96 .................................................................................................................... r 53.1.20 Morgan v Johnson (1998) 44 NSWLR 578 .................................... r 20.8.40, r 42.15.45, r 42.15.50, CPA 38.20, CPA 46.20 Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239; [1971] 2 All ER 1156 .................................................................... r 15.19.40 Morkaya v Parkinson [2008] NSWSC 1050 .............................................................................................................. r 26.1.110 Morris v Hanley [2000] NSWSC 957 ..................................................................................................... r 42.21.60, r 42.21.90 Morris v Hanley [2001] NSWCA 374 ................................................................................................. r 42.21.100, r 42.21.110 Morrison, Re; Ex parte Clark (1968) 88 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 22; 69 SR (NSW) 339 ............................................. DCA 76.20 Morrow v Chinadotcom Corp [2001] ANZ ConvR 341; [2001] NSWSC 209 .................................... CPA 26.40, CPA 26.60 Mortimer v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 450 ................................................................................... r 14.14.220 Morton v Nylex Ltd [2007] NSWSC 562 ...................................................................................................................... r 5.3.60 Motakov Ltd v Commercial Hardware Suppliers Pty Ltd (1952) 70 WN (NSW) 64 ............................................ r 42.21.300 Moussa v Moussa [2006] NSWSC 509 ...................................................................................................................... r 42.1.200 Moy v Warringah Council (2004) 142 A Crim R 577; 133 LGERA 49; [2004] NSWCCA 77 ............................ r 14.14.200 Moy Shing, Ex parte (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 480; 21 WN (NSW) 189 ....................................................................... DCA 8.80 Mt Gambier Co-op Milling Society Ltd v Williams [1921] SASR 185 ................................................................... r 42.1.100 Muhibbah Engineering (M) BHD v Trust Co Ltd [2009] NSWCA 205 ..................................................................... r 42.1.52 Muilwyk v Victims Compensation Fund [2005] NSWSC 153 .................................................................................. r 50.23.40 Mulholland v Mitchell [1971] AC 666 .................................................................................................................... SCA 106.20 Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341; 33 ALJR 168 ............................................................................ r 22.1.80, r 22.4.40 Mulric Pty Ltd v SD Myers Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 121 ........................................................................................ r 16.3.120 Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corp (1996) 138 ALR 425 ...................................... r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corp (1997) 47 NSWLR 631 ........................ SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Mundine v Brown (No 7) [2011] NSWSC 170 ...................................................................................................... CPA 30.100 Murakami v Wiryadi (2010) 268 ALR 377; [2010] NSWCA 7 ............................................................... r 6.43.80, r 6.43.100 Murietta v South American & Co (Ltd) (1893) 62 LJ QB 396 ................................................................................ r 43.2.100 Muriniti v Lyons [2004] NSWSC 135 ........................................................................................................................ r 50.3.140 Murphy v Abi-Saab (1995) 37 NSWLR 280 ...................................................................................... r 14.14.200, r 14.14.220 Murphy v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51; [2003] NSWSC 249 ................................................................ r 7.13.40, r 7.14.60 Murray v Commissioner of Police (2004) 2 DDCR 31; [2004] NSWCA 365 .................................... r 31.8.80, SCA 75A.20 Murray v Kirkpatrick (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 162 ....................................................................................................... r 7.14.40 Murray v Wheeler [2013] NSWSC 137 ......................................................................................................................... r 5.3.60 Murray v Williams [2010] NSWSC 1243 .................................................................................................................... r 7.14.50 Murray, Re; Ex parte Hillman (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 726; [1961] NSWR 573 ................................................... CPA 140.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxviii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Murtagh v Barry (1890) 24 QBD 632 .................................................................................................................... DCA 126.20 Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Balfours Pty Ltd (1979) 23 SASR 82 .......................................... SCA 66.120 My Distributors Pty Ltd v Omaq Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 578 ................................................................................... r 17.7.80 MyPet Brands Pty Ltd v Beonic Technologies Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1628 .......................................................... r 21.9.40 Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282; [1939] 4 All ER 484 ............................................................................................. CPA 99.40

N N v N (1980) 16 NSWLR 525 ..................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 NAB Ltd v Thirup [2011] NSWSC 911 ...................................................................................................... r 13.1.90, r 16.4.40 NAK Australia Pty Ltd v Starkey Consulting Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1136 ............................................................ r 34.2.60 NCR Australia Pty Ltd v The Credit Connection Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1118 ....................................................... r 40.7.50 NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2010] NSWSC 969 ............................................................... r 12.6.60 NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1561 ............................................................... r 2.3.40 NMFM Property Pty Limited v Citibank Limited (No 11) (2001) 109 FCR 77; [2001] FCA 480 .......................... r 42.5.40 NRMA Insurance Ltd v B & B Shipping & Marine Co Pty Ltd (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 273; 64 WN (NSW) 58 ......................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.70 NRMA Insurance Ltd v Flanagan [1982] 1 NSWLR 585 .................................................... r 45.6.40, r 45.6.80, SCA 49.120 NRP v NSW Trustee [2015] NSWSC 250 ................................................................................................................... r 55.9.20 NSW Medical Defence Union Ltd v Crawford (1993) 31 NSWLR 469; 11 ACSR 406; 11 ACLC 1114; 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-192 .................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 NSW Trustee & Guardian, Re [2014] NSWSC 423 ................................................................................... r 55.2.20, r Pt55.40 NSW Trustee & Guardian (Estate of Peter Ursu) [2013] NSWSC 903 ...................................................................... r 54.3.20 NSW Trustee & Guardian (Estate of the late Petter Czmil), Re [2013] NSWSC 1683 ............................................. r 54.3.20 Nader v Ronca [2013] NSWSC 542 ............................................................................................................................. r 25.8.80 Naiman Clarke Pty Ltd v Tuccia [2012] NSWSC 314 .............................................................................................. r 21.2.100 Najdanovic v Brown (unreported, NSWSC, 22 September 1992) ........................................................................... CPA 44.20 Najjar v Haines (1991) 25 NSWLR 224 ............................................................................................. r 20.20.100, r 20.20.120 Nangus Pty Ltd v Charles Donovan Pty Ltd (in liq) [1989] VR 184 ......................................................................... r 7.25.40 Nassif v Fahd [2007] NSWCA 308 .............................................................................................................................. r 42.1.70 Natalie, Re [2012] NSWSC 1109 ................................................................................................................................. r Pt57.20 National Australia Bank v Cavill Proteas Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 703 .............................................. r 16.3.140, r 36.16.240 National Australia Bank Ltd v Amed [2011] NSWSC 988 ....................................................................................... r 16.3.140 National Australia Bank Ltd v Chen-Conway (2008) 2 BFRA 637; (2008) 2 BFRA 637 ....................... r 42.5.30, r 42.5.40 National Australia Bank Ltd v Convy [2007] NSWSC 1039 ...................................................................................... r Pt41.20 National Australia Bank Ltd v Hokit Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 377 ...................................................................... r 6.27.60 National Australia Bank Ltd v Idoport Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 8 ............................................................................. r 21.2.60 National Australia Bank Ltd v Juric [2001] VSC 375 ........................................................................................... SCR 55.0.80 National Australia Bank Ltd v Nguyen [2014] NSWSC 1114 .......................................................... CPA 117.50, CPA 124.40 National Australia Bank Ltd v Saunders (1988) 12 NSWLR 623 ......................................................... r 21.3.200, r 22.2.180 National Commercial Bank v Wimborne (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 12 March 1992) .......................... r 14.14.220 National Commercial Banking Corp of Australia Ltd v MRM Holdings Pty Ltd (1983) 3 BPR 9339 ......................................................................................................................................................... r 6.8.60, r 16.4.100 National Employers’ Mutual General Assn Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 ............... r 1.9.40, r 33.4.100, r 33.4.120, r 34.2.40, r 34.2.60, r Pt33.40 National Employers Mutual General Insurance Assoc Ltd v Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Ltd (1989) 17 NSWLR 223 ........................................................................................................... SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1993) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 ........................ r 31.23.60 National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1989) 22 FCR 209 ...................................................................... r 6.43.60 National Mutual Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1988) 19 FCR 155; 83 ALR 434 ................................................................. r 8.2.60 National Parks & Wildlife Service v Pierson (2002) 55 NSWLR 315; [2002] NSWCA 273 ................................. r 18.1.160 National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v Barnes (1941) 64 CLR 268; [1941] HCA 3 ........................................................................................................................................................ r 42.25.40 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (1996) 40 NSWLR 486; 90 A Crim R 435 ................. SCA 65.40, SCR 54.0.100 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377 ................................................. r 42.15.80 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 71 ................................................................................ r 42.1.100 Nationwide Publishing Pty Ltd v Furber (1984) 3 FCR 19 ................................................................................... SCA 66.120

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxix

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Neale v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2015] NSWCA 136 ........................................................................ r 7.36.40 Neate, Re; Ex parte Pegasus Leasing Ltd [1996] FCA 1206 ................................................................................... CPA 95.20 Neely v Attorney-General [1984] 2 NZLR 636 ....................................................................................................... r 42.21.120 Neeta (Epping) Pty Ltd v Phillips (1974) 131 CLR 286; 48 ALJR 204 ............................................................... SCA 75.100 Neilson v Overseas Projects Corp of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331; 79 ALJR 1736; [2005] HCA 54 ................................................................................................................................................... r 6.43.60, r 6.43.80 Nelson v Wyong Shire Council (1989) 68 LGRA 164 .................................................................................................. r Pt9.60 Nemet v Australian Litigation Funders Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 679 ........................................................... r 42.13.40 Nepean Engineering Pty Ltd v Total Process Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (2005) 64 NSWLR 462; [2005] NSWCA 409 .............................................................................................................................................. r 12.7.120 Neville v London Express Newspapers Ltd [1917] 2 KB 564 .............................................................................. DCA 126.20 Neville, Ex parte (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 362 ................................................................................ DCA 18G.20, DCA 195.20 New, Re [1901] 2 Ch 534 ............................................................................................................................................. r 54.3.20 New Beach Apartments Pty Ltd v Epic Hotels Pty Ltd [2007] 2 BFRA 257; (2007) 14 BPR 26317; [2007] NSWSC 474 ................................................................................................................... r 27.1.40, r 27.2.20 New Brunswick Railway Co Ltd v British & French Trust Corp Ltd [1939] AC 1 .......................................... SCA 75A.160 New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Daya [2008] NSWSC 763 ..................................................................... r 21.10.40 New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 ................................ r 31.4.80 New Price Retail Services Pty Ltd v Hanna [2014] NSWSC 1051 .......................................................................... r 20.18.60 New Price Retail Services Pty Ltd v Hanna [2014] NSWSC 553 .......................................................................... r 20.20.120 New South Wales v Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-917; [2007] NSWSC 1045 ...................................................................................................................................................................... r 20.24.100 New South Wales v Gevaux [2011] NSWSC 758 ....................................................................................................... r 42.7.60 New South Wales v Harlum [2007] NSWCA 120 ....................................................................................................... r 7.13.40 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; 195 ALR 412; [2003] HCA 4 ............................ r 28.2.80 New South Wales v Mastronardi [2003] NSWCA 72 ................................................................................. r 15.7.60, r 15.8.60 New South Wales v McKittrick [2009] NSWCA 63 ................................................................................................. r 15.12.40 New South Wales v Mulcahy [2006] NSWCA 303 ............................................................................. CPA Pt6.20, CPA 58.40 New South Wales v Public Transport Ticketing Corp [2011] NSWCA 60 ............................................ r 21.3.200, r 22.2.180 New South Wales v Scharer (2003) 131 LGERA 208; [2003] NSWCA 328 ......................................................... r 14.14.240 New South Wales v Stanley [2007] NSWCA 330 ....................................................................................................... r 42.1.60 New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Reeve (1993) 42 NSWLR 100 .......................................... r 42.15.50 Newcastle City Council v Caverstock Group Pty Ltd (2008) 163 LGERA 83; [2008] NSWCA 249 ...................... r 25.3.60 Newcastle City Council v Wieland (2009) 74 NSWLR 173; [2009] NSWCA 113 ................................................ CPA 28.40 Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulation (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 .................... SCA 75.120 Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) (2006) 153 IR 386; [2006] NSWCA 129 ........................................................................................................................................ r 42.1.52 Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW (2006) 153 IR 386; [2006] NSWCA 129 ........................................................................................................................................ r 42.1.52 Newcom Holdings Pty Ltd v Funge Systems Inc [2006] SASC 284 ......................................................................... r 53.3.40 Newdigate Colliery Ltd, Re [1912] 1 Ch 468 .............................................................................................................. r 26.1.20 Newmont Pty Ltd v Laverton Nickel NL (No 2) [1981] 1 NSWLR 221 ................................................................... r 12.3.40 Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd v The J Aron Corp (2007) 70 NSWLR 411; [2007] NSWCA 195 ........................................................................................................................................................................ r 36.16.140 News Corp Ltd v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 40 NSWLR 250; 21 ACSR 403 .................... r 12.11.140, r Pt34.20 News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410; 139 ALR 193 ....................... r 6.24.40, r 52.1.220 Newsam v Archibald (1920) 38 WN (NSW) 2 ..................................................................................................... DCA 18G.20 Newtown Management Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 67219 [2009] NSWSC 150 ............................................ r 14.11.60 NexusMinerals NL v Brutus Constructions Pty Ltd (unreported, Fed Ct of Appeal (FC), 10 September 1997) ...................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.62 Ng v Chong [2005] NSWSC 385 ............................................................................................. r 42.1.62, r 42.5.40, r 42.15.80 Nicholls v Carpenter [1974] 1 NSWLR 369 ............................................................................... SCA 75A.140, SCA 75A.180 Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd (2010) 243 FLR 177; [2010] NSWCA 222 ........................................... r 6.43.60 Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2010] NSWCA 100 ............................................................................... r 34.2.40 Nicholls, Ex parte (1889) 5 WN (NSW) 161 ........................................................................................................... DCA 44.20 Nichols v Patrick Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 457; [1979] WCR (NSW) 179 .............................. DCA 76.40 Nicholson v Nicholson (1994) 35 NSWLR 308 .......................................................................................................... r 36.4.80 Nicholson (otherwise McDonald) v McDonald [1936] VLR 233 ............................................................................... r 40.2.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxx

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Nieborak v Barker [1963] NSWR 965 ................................................................................................................... DCA 126.20 Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431 .................................................................. SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Nika Management Services Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (1996) 14 ACLC 326 ................................................. r 21.3.140, r 22.2.120 Nikolay Malakhov Shipping Co Ltd v Seas Sapfor Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 371 ................................................. CPA 65.400 Nine Network Pty Ltd v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd [1994] NSWCA 235 .............................................. r 20.24.180 Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave GmbH and Co KG (The Niedersachsen) [1983] 1 WLR 1412; [1984] 1 All ER 398 .............................................................................................................................................. r 25.11.20 Nixon v Howes (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 156 ................................................................................................................. r 42.7.60 Nobrega v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (No 2) [1999] NSWCA 133 .......................................................................................................................................................... r 42.15.80 Noel v Becker [1971] 1 WLR 355; 2 All ER 1186 .................................................................................................. r 36.1A.80 Nominal Defendant v Hawkins (2011) 58 MVR 362; [2011] NSWCA 93 .............................................................. r 42.15.50 Nominal Defendant v Hook (1962) 113 CLR 641; 36 ALJR 190 ........................................................................ DCA 126.20 Nominal Defendant v Manning (2000) 50 NSWLR 139; 31 MVR 524; [2000] NSWCA 80 .......... r 18.1.160, r 49.12.60, r Pt25.20, SCA 75A.120 Nominal Defendant v Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer [2010] NSWCA 376 ............................................... r 31.1.40 Non-Drip Measure Co Ltd v Strangers Ltd (1960) RPC 135 ................................................................................... r 31.49.40 Noon v Bondi Beach Astra Retirement Village Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 285 ............................................. r 42.15.50 Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Ireland (1994) 12 WAR 485 ......................................................................... r 25.17.20, r 42.5.40 Norman v Norman (No 2) (1968) 12 FLR 39 ........................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 Norris v Hamberger [2008] NSWSC 785 ................................................................................................................... r 42.19.40 Norris v Kandiah [2007] NSWSC 1296 ....................................................................................................................... r 34.2.40 Norris v Routley [2016] NSWSC 147 ........................................................................................................................ r 42.15.45 Norsemeter Holding AS v Pieter Boele (No 1) [2002] NSWSC 370 .................................................... r 53.7.120, r 53.7.180 North v Holroyd (1868) LR 3 Ex 9 ........................................................................................................................ DCA 127.80 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (No 2) [2002] FCA 564 ......................................... r 42.1.300 North South Construction Services Pty Ltd v Construction Pacific Management Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 286 ............................................................................................................................................................. r 42.7.80 Northam v Favelle Favco Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 7 March 1995) ............................... r 14.28.40 Northam v Favelle Favco Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 7 March 1995, 6301 of 1992) ................................................................................................................................................................ r 14.28.120 Northern Star Agriculture Pty Ltd v Morgan & Banks Developments Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 98 ....................... r 18.1.160 Northern Territory Housing Commission v Territory Bricks Pty Ltd (1983) 71 FLR 273 ...................................... r 14.18.40 Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 549; [2000] NSWSC 1241 ........................ r Pt57.20 Northumbrian Ice Cream Co Ltd v Breakaway Vending Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1216 ......................................... r 16.3.120 Norway’s Application, Re [1987] QB 433 ................................................................................................................. r 52.1.120 Norway’s Application (No 2), Re [1990] 1 AC 723 .................................................................................................. r 52.1.100 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133; [1973] 3 WLR 164; [1973] 2 All ER 943 ...................................................................................................................... r 1.4.40, r Pt21.120 Noun v Pavey [2014] NSWSC 429 ......................................................................................................................... CPA 26.100 Nouvion v Freeman (1889) 15 App Cas 1 ................................................................................................................. r 53.1.180 Nowlan v Marson Transport Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 116; [2001] NSWCA 346 .... r 9.4.80, r 14.14.60, r 42.1.65, SCA 75A.140 Noxequin Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] NSWSC 87 ............................................ r 17.3.30, r 42.8.40 Nudd v Mannix [2009] NSWCA 327 ......................................................................................................................... r 42.4.100 Nuhan Ltd v Jewel Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 304 ............................................................ SCA 66.120 Nutech Wall & Ceiling Systems Pty Ltd v VMF Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 737 ....... r 20.18.60, r 20.22.60 Nyerlucz v Dei Rocini [1995] NSWCA 340 ........................................................................................................ SCA 75A.140

O O’Born v Commissioner for Government Transport (1959) 77 WN (NSW) 81 ................................... r 33.3.120, r 33.12.40 O’Brien v Bank of Western Australia Ltd (2013) 16 BPR 31705; [2013] NSWCA 71 ............................................. r 16.2.40 O’Brien v Little [2007] NSWSC 282 ........................................................................................................................... r 22.2.60 O’Brien v McCormick [2005] NSWSC 619 .............................................................................................................. r 42.25.40 O’Brien v McKean (1968) 118 CLR 540; 42 ALJR 223; [1969] ALR 65 ................................................................. r 30.3.40 OCS Australia Pty Ltd v Cho [2010] NSWCA 85 ................................................................................................. DCA 127.80 O’Donnell v Abbott [2001] NSWCA 184 ............................................................................................................... SCA 121.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxxi

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES O’Donnell (FTS) & Co Ltd v Celebrity Circuit Ltd (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 490 ................................................. SCA 49.120 O’Driscoll v Manchester Insurance Committee [1915] 3 KB 499 ......................................................................... CPA 117.40 O’Keefe v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1559 ...................................................................... r 42.5.40, CPA 98.60 O’Neill v Foster (2004) 61 NSWLR 499; [2004] NSWSC 906 ................................................................................... r Pt9.60 O’Reilly v Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria (1983) 153 CLR 1; 57 ALJR 342 .............. r 21.3.180, r 22.2.160 O’Shane v Burwood Local Court (NSW) (2007) 178 A Crim R 392; [2007] NSWSC 1300 ................................... r 4.2.100 O’Sullivan v Challenger Managed Investments Ltd (2007) 214 FLR 1; [2007] NSWSC 383 .................... r 7.4.40, r 7.4.60 OXC Bidco Pty Ltd v Dickson [2016] NSWSC 968 ................................................................................................. r 25.14.20 Oasis Fund Management Ltd v ABN Amro Bank NV [2009] NSWSC 967 ..................................... CPA 26.100, CPA 32.40 Obeita v Consumer, Trader & Tenancy Tribunal (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 249 ...................................................... DCA 44.20 Oberlechner v Watson Wyatt Superannuation Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1435 .......................................................... r 42.20.40 Oblescak v Oblescak (unreported, NSWCA, 8 April 1968) .................................................................................... DCA 76.20 Oceanic Life Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (1999) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-438; [1999] NSWSC 292 ................................................................................................................................... r 7.25.40 Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197; 62 ALJR 389 ........................................ r 13.4.200 Oddie, In the Will of [1976] 1 NSWLR 371 ....................................................................................................... SCR 78.0.160 Oertel v Crocker (1947) 75 CLR 261 ................................................................................................................... SCA 101.140 Offe v Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW) (unreported, NSWCA, 29 October 1997) ............... SCA 65.20, SCR 54.0.80 Official Receiver of the State of Israel v Raveh (2001) 24 WAR 53; 159 FLR 471; [2001] WASC 72 ........................................................................................................................................................ r 53.8.20, SCA 66.240 Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v D’Jamirze (1999) 48 NSWLR 416; 43 ATR 456; [1999] NSWSC 1249 .................................................................................................................................. r 31.13.40, r 31.13.60, r 31.14.40 Ofria v Cameron (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 242 ........................................................................................ r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Ohn v Walton (1995) 36 NSWLR 77 ....................................................................................................... r 42.1.60, CPA 98.20 Old v Hodgkinson [2008] NSWSC 697 ..................................................................................................................... r 20.20.80 Old v McInnes [2011] NSWCA 410 .................................................................................................................... Pt 20.Div4.20 Old v McInnes & Hodgkinson [2011] NSWCA 410 .............................................................................................. r 42.13A.20 Oldfields Pty Ltd v Alfar (1996) 187 CLR 703; 70 ALJR 560 .................................................. SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Oliver v Rheem (Aust) Pty Ltd (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 59; [1965] NSWR 1321 ........................................... r 23.4.60 Olsen v Second East Auction Holdings Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1840 ................................................... r 42.5.40, r 42.19.40 Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365; 43 ALJR 77; [1969] ALR 443 ..................................................... r 43.2.60, r Pt43.30 One Tel Ltd (in liq) v Rich (2003) 45 ACSR 466; [2003] NSWSC 522 ................................................................... r 14.7.60 Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One Tel Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1320 ................................................................................ r 1.12.50 Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One Tel Ltd [2009] NSWSC 821 ................................................................................ r 35.9.180 Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One Tel Ltd (in liq) [2010] NSWSC 586 ..................................................................... r 1.21.40 Onus v Alcoa of Aust Ltd (1981) 149 CLR 27; 55 ALJR 631 ....................................................... SCA 65.40, SCR 54.0.100 Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd (2008) 169 FCR 435; [2008] FCAFC 133 .................................. r 5.3.60 Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Boroondara City [1997] 2 VR 318 ............................................................................. SCA 66.220 Oriental Carpet Department Store Pty Ltd v Supacenta Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21235; [2003] NSWSC 783 .......................................................................................................................................................... CPA 26.20 Origin Energy LPG Ltd v BestCare Foods Ltd [2013] NSWCA 90 .................................................. r 20.24.140, r 20.24.180 Orr v Lusute Pty Ltd (1987) 72 ALR 617; [1987] ATPR (Digest) 46-024 ............................................................ r 42.21.110 Orwell Steel (Erection and Fabrication) Ltd v Asphalt & Tarmac (UK) Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 1097 ..................... SCA 66.240 Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; 72 ALJR 578; [1998] HCA 11 ...... CPA Pt7.Div2.40, CPA 98.20 Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; 72 ALJR 578; 152 ALR 83; [1998] HCA 11 ..................................................................... r 42.1.40, r 42.1.120, r 42.1.300, r 42.5.40, r 42.21.60, r 42.21.100 Ossmun Pty Ltd v Smith (1990) 21 ATR 1052; 90 ATC 4867 ............................................................................... r 31.14.120 Overseers of Christchurch, Ex parte (1851) 2 LM & P 660 .......................................................... DCA 18G.20, DCA 195.20 Overton v Loukides [1970] VR 462 ....................................................................................................................... SCR 1.13.20 Owners Corp Strata Plan 62285 v Betona Corp (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 216 ....................... CPA 29.20, CPA 30.30 Owners Strata Plan 57504 v Building Insurers’ Guarantee Corp (2008) 15 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-792; [2008] NSWSC 1022 .......................................................................................................... r 20.20.60, r 20.24.140 Owners Strata Plan 58577 v Banmor Developments Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 174 ................ r 31.52.20, r 31.52.40 Owners Strata Plan 62930 v Kell & Rigby Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 612 ............................................... CPA 65.20 Owners Strata Plan No 13218 v Woollahra Municipal Council (2002) 121 LGERA 117; [2002] NSWCA 92 ....................................................................................................... SCA 75A.160, SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Owners Strata Plan No 61162 v Lipman Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 622 ................................................................... CPA 28.40 Owners Strata Plan No 72381 v Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 442 ............................................... r 20.24.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxxii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Owners Strata Plan SP 69567 v Baseline Constructions Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 502 ........... r 21.9.40, r 34.2.40, r Pt21.60 Owners of Strata Plan 58577 v Banmore Developments Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 325 ......... r 31.17.60, r 31.52.60 Owners of Strata Plan 60693 v Anneliese Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] NSWSC 210 ....................................................... r 42.1.65 Owners of Strata Plan 64415 v Vero Insurance Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1500 ....................................... r 20.24.100, r 20.24.120 Owners of Strata Plan 64622 v Australand Corp Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 614 ....................................................... r 20.21.80 Owners of Strata Plan No 51487 v Broadsand Pty Ltd (2001) 132 IR 361; [2001] NSWSC 813 ......................... r 13.4.200 Owners of Strata Plan No 68372 v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1807 .................................. r 20.24.100 Oxley v Link [1914] 2 KB 734 ................................................................................................................................ DCA 81.20 Oyston v St Patrick’s College [2011] NSWSC 826 ................................................................................................... r 42.16.40 Ozpinar v Assaily [2001] NSWCA 23 .................................................................. DCA 127.80, SCA 101.140, SCR 51.0.140

P P v D1 [2011] NSWSC 257 .......................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.40 P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579 ............................. r 7.13.40, r 7.14.50, r 7.14.70, r Pt57.20, r Pt57.40 P v P [1982] 2 NSWLR 508 ......................................................................................................................................... r 57.6.20 P v R [2003] NSWSC 819 ............................................................................................................................................ r Pt57.60 P v T Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1309; [1997] 4 All ER 200 .............................................................................................. r Pt21.120 P, Re [2006] NSWSC 1082 ........................................................................................................................................... r 7.18.60 PAO v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney [2011] NSWSC 1216 ........................................................................................................................................................................ r 13.4.100 PB v BB [2013] NSWSC 1223 ................................................................................................................. r Pt57.20, r Pt57.140 PCRZ Investments Pty Ltd v National Golf Holdings Ltd [2002] VSCA 24 ............................................................. r 42.5.40 PF v HK [2016] NSWSC 590 .................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.180 PM Sulcs and Assoc Pty Ltd v Daihatsu Aust Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 826 ......................................................... r 42.21.110 PM Sulcs and Assoc Pty Ltd v Daihatsu Aust Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 798 ........................................................... r 36.17.40 PMSI Group Pty Ltd v Wilson [2003] NSWSC 263 ................................................................................................... r 21.3.60 PRD La Costa Management Pty Ltd v Proprietors “Beachpoint” Building Units Plan No 3149 [1985] 2 Qd R 227 ............................................................................................................................................. SCA 66.120 PS Chellaram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co (1991) 65 ALJR 642; 102 ALR 321; 9 ACLC 1603 ..................................................................................................................................... r 42.21.110, r 42.21.120 PSL Industries Ltd v Simplot Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 7 VR 106; 174 FLR 111; [2003] VSCA 7 ...................... CPA 65.20 Pacific Acceptance Corp Ltd v Forsyth (No 2) (1967) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 715; [1967] 2 NSWR 402 ........................................................................................................................................................................ r 42.21.200 Pacific Basin Exploration Pty Ltd v XLX (NL) [1985] WAR 11; (1984) 2 IPR 489 ................................................ r 21.7.40 Pacific General Securities Ltd v Soliman & Sons Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 724 ..................................................... r 42.1.120 Pacific Resources International Pty Ltd v UTI (Aust) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1083 ............................................. r Pt17.145 Packer v Meagher [1984] 3 NSWLR 486 ................................................................................................. r 12.1.120, r 42.5.40 Paino v Paino [2005] NSWSC 1313 ......................................................................................................................... r 31.23.140 Paino v Paino (2008) 40 Fam LR 96; [2008] NSWCA 276 ............................................................ r 31.23.140, r 31.23.1000 Paint Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Hanson; Housing Commission (NSW) Garnishee (1955) 72 WN(NSW) 127 .................................................................................................................................................... CPA 117.15 Palace Films Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1136 ................................................. r 15.19.40 Palavi v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 264 ................................. r 21.3.40, r Pt21.20, r Pt21.100, CPA 56.40 Palmbay Nominees Pty Ltd v Fowler [2003] WASCA 217 .................................................................................... r 14.14.200 Palmer v Clarke (1989) 19 NSWLR 158 ........................................................................... r 36.2.60, r 36.3.80, DCA 127.100 Pambula District Hospital v Herriman (1988) 14 NSWLR 387 ......................................................................... DCA 76A.100 Pampris v Thanos (1968) 69 SR (NSW) 226; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 261 ............................................................. DCA 44.20 Pan v Bo (2008) 220 FLR 271; [2008] NSWSC 961 ................................................................................................ r 16.3.140 Panasonic Australia Pty Ltd v Ngage Pty Ltd (2006) 69 IPR 595; [2006] NSWSC 399 ............................................ r 5.3.60 Papaconstuntinos v Holmes ′a Court [2011] NSWCA 59 ......................................................................................... r 15.30.40 Papaconstuntinos v Holmes a Court [2006] NSWSC 945 ............................................................................................. r 5.3.60 Parbery v Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust [2013] NSWSC 489 ............................................................................. r 55.11.20 Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85 ......... r 31.29.80, r 31.30.80, r 31.35.1000 Parisi v Nigro [2006] NSWCA 121 .............................................................................................................................. r 42.5.40 Parist Holdings Pty Ltd v Perpetual Nominees Ltd [2006] NSWSC 599 .................................................................. r Pt41.20 Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219 ............................................................................................... r 31.3.120 Park Rail Developments Pty Ltd v RJ Pearce Assocs Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 123 ............................................ r 20.14.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxxiii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Parker v Camden London Borough Council [1986] 1 Ch 162 .................................................................................. r 26.1.130 Parker v Galloway (unreported, NSW Dist Ct, Staunton DCJ, 18 April 1983) ...................................................... DCA 44.60 Parker v Wells (1881) 18 Ch D 477 ............................................................................................................................. r 22.3.40 Parkesbourne Mummel Landscape Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning (2009) 170 LGERA 118; [2009] NSWLEC 101 ...................................................................................................................................... r 17.3.30 Parramatta City Council v Sandell [1973] 1 NSWLR 151; (1973) 29 LGRA 101 ................................................. CPA 22.80 Parramatta City Council v Stewart [2013] NSWCA 163 .......................................................................................... CPA 61.20 Parry v Crooks (1981) 27 SASR 1; 6 Fam LR 824 ............................................................................................... SCA 66.320 Parry v WGE Engineering Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 337 ........................................................................................ CPA 140.20 Parsons v Doukas (2001) 52 NSWLR 162; [2001] NSWCA 128 ............................................................................ CPA 65.20 Pascoe v Divisional Security Group Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 197; [2007] NSWSC 211 ......................................... r 14.2.40 Pascoe v Edsome Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 544 .............................................................................. r 42.1.65, r 42.7.60 Pater, Re (1864) 122 ER 842; 5 B & S 299 .......................................................................................................... DCA 199.20 Patey-Denis v MUT Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 497 ................................................................. r 50.16.60 Patonga Beach Holdings Pty Ltd v Lyons [2009] NSWSC 869 ................................................................ r 34.1.40, r 34.2.40 Patrick Stevedores No 1 Pty Ltd v Kilkelly [2004] NSWCA 237 ............................................................................ r 36.15.60 Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) (1998) 195 CLR 1; 72 ALJR 873 ......................................................................................................................................... SCA 66.120 Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319 ..................................................... r 25.11.20, SCA 66.240 Patterson v Cohen [2006] NSWSC 424 ............................................................................. r 36.10.40, r 39.44.80, CPA 126.30 Pattison v Bell [2007] FCA 137 ................................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Paul v Girgis [2013] NSWSC 1725 .............................................................................................................................. r 25.3.60 Paul Michael Pty Ltd v Urban Traders Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1246 ......................... r 39.44.80, CPA 126.25, CPA 126.40 Pawlowski v Mike Boylan Real Estate [1975] 3 QL 335 ......................................................................................... r 15.10.60 Payne v Young (1980) 145 CLR 609 ........................................................................................................................... r 6.19.40 Peakhurst Inn Pty Ltd v Fox [2004] NSWCA 74 .......................................................................... SCA 75A.180, SCA 106.20 Pearson v Naydler [1977] 3 All ER 531; [1977] 1 WLR 899 ............................................................. r 42.21.60, r 42.21.200 Pecar v National Australia Trustees Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Bryson J, 27 November 1996) ............................ r 23.8.160 Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435; 73 ALJR 687; 162 ALR 336; [1999] HCA 19 ......................................................................................................................... r 25.11.20, DCA 46.20 Penang Mining Co v Sam [1969] 2 MLJ 52 ................................................................................................................ r 6.24.40 Pennington, Re [1972] VR 869 .............................................................................................................................. SCR 68.0.60 Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd t/a Cardiff Panthers v Elliot (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 356 ................................... r 42.13.40 Penthouse Publications Ltd v McWilliam (unreported, NSW Ct CA, Priestley and Meagher JJA and Waddell AJA, 15 March 1991) ...................................................................................................................... r 13.4.120 Pepper Finance Corp Ltd v Maloney [2013] NSWSC 890 ....................................................................................... r 55.11.20 Percy v General Motors-Holden’s Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 289 .......................................................... r 21.2.60, r Pt21.100 Perisher Blue Pty Ltd v Nair-Smith (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 268 .......................................................................... r 42.13A.20 Permanent Custodians Ltd v King [2010] NSWSC 509 ................................................................................................ r 9.4.80 Permanent Custodians Ltd v Tong (2012) 228 A Crim R 149; [2012] NSWSC 1373 .......................................... CPA 112.25 Permanent Custodians Ltd, Re [2013] NSWSC 1030 .................................................................................................. r 55.9.20 Permanent Trustee Co v Redman (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 353 .................................................................................... r 42.1.200 Permanent Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Stocks & Holdings (Canberra) Pty Ltd (1976) 15 ACTR 45; 28 FLR 195 ..................................................................................................................................................... r 36.15.80 Permewan Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Attorney General (unreported, NSWCA, 11 December 1978) ................................................................................................................................................................ SCR 55.0.220 Perpetual Executors and Trustees Assn Australia Ltd v Wright (1917) 23 CLR 185; 23 ALR 177; [1917] VLR 372; HCA 27 ..................................................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Perpetual Ltd, Re (2010) 15 BPR 29007; [2010] NSWSC 1340 .............................................................................. r 55.11.20 Perpetual Nominees Limited v Storehouse Managed Investments Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1994 ................................. r 42.25.40 Perpetual Trustee Co v McAndrew [2008] NSWSC 790 ........................................................................ r 42.7.80, CPA 26.40 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Baker [1999] NSWCA 244 ............................................................................................ r 42.1.200 Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd, Re [2016] NSWSC 159 .......................................................................................... r Pt55.40 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Heperu Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 78 NSWLR 190; [2009] NSWCA 387 ........................................................................................................................................................ r 36.15.120 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; 164 ALR 606; [1999] HCA 36 ................................ r 28.2.80 Perry v Jackson [1998] 4 VR 463 ............................................................................................................................ r 42.21.140 Perry v Meddowcroft (1846) 50 ER 529; 10 Beav 122 ............................................................................................ r 53.7.180

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxxiv

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Persson v Heathwoods Pty Ltd (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 27; 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 285 ............................. r 23.8.40, r 23.8.60 Pertsinidis v Australian Central Credit Union Ltd (2001) 80 SASR 76; [2001] SASC 244 ................................. r 14.14.220 Petar v Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc [2006] NSWCA 277 ........................................... r 42.25.40 Peter Vitek v Estate Homes Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1948 ........................................................................ r 42.8.40, r 42.9.40 Peters v Lithgow Force Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1616 .................................................................................. r 25.11.20 Peters v Peters (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 398; 24 WN (NSW) 87 ................................................................. r 42.1.60, CPA 98.20 Peterson v Spartalis (unreported, Hodgson J, 7 April 1995) ............................................................................... SCR 78.71.20 Petronaitis v Rowles [2012] NSWCA 236 ...................................................... r 18.2.40, r 18.2.50, CPA 14.40, CPA 14.1000 Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376 ............................................................................................. r 36.2.60, DCA 127.100 Pheeney v Doolan [1977] 1 NSWLR 601 .................................................................................................................... r Pt14.20 Phelan v Ambridge Corp Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 136; [2005] NSWSC 875 ...................................................... r 10.14.120 Philipps v Philipps (1878) 4 QBD 12 ........................................................................................................................... r 14.7.60 Philips Electronics Australia Pty Ltd v Matthews (2002) 54 NSWLR 598; [2002] NSWCA 157 ... r 42.21.40, r 42.21.80, r 42.21.90, DCA 156.20 Phillips v MacMahon (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 206 .................................................................................................. CPA 117.40 Phillips v Walsh (1990) 20 NSWLR 206 ........................................................................... r 18.1.40, r 18.1.60, Pt 20.Div4.20 Phu v Department of Education & Training (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 119 ................................................................. r 7.36.40 Pickles v Gratzon (2002) 55 NSWLR 533; [2002] NSWSC 688 ............................................................................... r Pt52.40 Pico Holdings Inc v Voss [2002] VSC 319 .......................................................................................................... SCR 55.0.120 Pierce v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 [2012] NSWLEC 33 ................................. CPA 149B.60 Pilmer v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (No 2) (2004) 90 SASR 465; 187 FLR 315; 212 ALR 636; [2004] SASC 389 .................................................................................................................................. r Pt41.80 Pinebelt Pty Ltd v Bagley [2000] NSWSC 655 ........................................................................................................ CPA 99.40 Pink, Re [1927] 1 Ch 237 ............................................................................................................................................. r 54.3.20 Pino v Prosser [1967] VR 835 ...................................................................................................................................... r 10.5.40 Pinson v Lloyds & National Provincial Foreign Bank Ltd [1941] 2 KB 72 .......................... r 14.7.60, r 14.7.100, r Pt15.20 Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd v Webb (1995) 18 ACSR 418; 13 ACLC 1749 ............................... r 21.3.140, r 22.2.120 Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd v L Grollo & Co Pty Ltd [1973] VR 473 ......................................... CPA 24.40, CPA 24.60 Pioneer Energy Holdings v Seth [2014] NSWSC 492 ................................................................................................... r 5.3.60 Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2007] 2 BFRA 753; (2007) 65 ACSR 383; 25 ACLC 1707; [2007] NSWCA 344 ........................................................................................................ r 42.21.200 Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1176 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.62 Pittalis v Sherefettin [1986] QB 868 ........................................................................................................................ r 36.16.180 Pittorino v Yates [2009] NSWCA 87 ....................................................................................................... r 20.26.40, r 42.15.50 Pitts v Adney (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 886 ............................................................................................... r 21.3.220, r 22.2.200 Pizzey Properties Pty Ltd v Edelstein [1977] VR 161 ................................................................................................ r 25.3.60 Plant, Re [1926] P 139 ................................................................................................................................................ r 42.25.40 Plato Films Ltd v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 ............................................................................................. r 14.7.60, r 14.14.100 Plaza West Pty Ltd v Simon’s Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 556 .............................................. r 42.7.80 Pledge v Roads & Traffic Authority (2004) 78 ALJR 572; [2004] HCA 13 ........................................................ SCA 75A.80 Plowman v Sisters of St John of God Inc [2014] NSWSC 333 ................................................................................. r 23.4.40 Plunkett v Barclays Bank Ltd [1936] 2 KB 107; [1936] 1 All ER 653 ................................................................... r 39.41.40 Poforo Pty Ltd v Allman [1984] 3 NSWLR 429 .................................................................................................... SCA 49.120 Pohlner v Elder’s Trustee & Executors Co Ltd (1964) 112 CLR 52; 37 ALJR 461 ........................................... SCR 68.0.60 Polaroid Australia Pty Ltd v Minicomp Pty Ltd (1997) 16 ACLC 529 ...................................................................... r 42.5.40 Police (NSW), Commissioner of v Tuxford [2002] NSWCA 139 ........................................................... r 33.4.140, r 33.9.80 Pollack, Re; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 32 FCR 40; 22 ATR 670 ................................... r 37.4.120 Pollard v Photographic Co (1888) 40 Ch D 345 .................................................................................................... SCA 66.360 Pollnow v Armstrong [2000] NSWCA 245 .............................................................................................................. r 14.14.200 Pope v Aberdeen Transport Co Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 1550 ................................................................................... r 16.3.120 Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (NSW) (No 2) (2014) 88 NSWLR 471; [2014] NSWIC 3 ........................................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Port Line Ltd v Lacey (unreported, NSWCA, 26 July 1996) ..................................................... SCA 101.100, SCR 51.0.100 Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; 55 ALJR 621; 36 ALR 3 ..... r 6.12.40, r 14.14.220, CPA 22.80, CPA 24.40 Portal Software International Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1115 ................. r 33.4.120, r 33.9.120, r 34.2.40, r 34.2.60 Portal Software International Pty Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1228 ................... r 31.23.80, r 31.23.120, r 31.23.1000

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxxv

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Porter v Gordian Runoff Ltd (No 3) [2005] NSWCA 377 ...................................................................................... r 42.21.600 Porter v John Fairfax Publications [2001] NSWSC 680 ............................................................................................. r 42.5.30 Porter v Lachlan Shire Council [2006] NSWCA 252 ................................................................................................ r 42.15.50 Porzelack KG v Porzelack (UK) Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 1074; [1987] 1 WLR 420; [1987] FSR 353 .................... r 42.21.110 Potter’s Sulphide Ore Treatment Ltd v Sulphide Corp Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 101; 28 WN (NSW) 118 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 22.1.80 Potts v Dennis Jones & Co Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 61; 17 ACSR 770; 13 ACLC 1096 ................................................ r Pt34.20 Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21385; [2003] NSWSC 600 ............................................... r 14.14.200 Powers v Stoikos [2007] NSWSC 675 ............................................................ r 20.20.80, r 20.23.60, r 20.24.60, r 20.24.140 Powers, Re (1885) 30 Ch D 291 .................................................................................................................................. r 54.3.20 Pracdes Pty Ltd v Stanilite Electronics Pty Ltd (1995) 35 IPR 277 ......................................................................... r 42.29.40 Pratten v Warringah Shire Council (1969) 90 WN (NSW) 134 .................................................................................. r 42.1.62 Praznovsky v Sablyack [1977] VR 114 ................................................................................................................... SCA 66.240 Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir (1975) 132 CLR 362; 49 ALJR 281 .................................... SCA 107.20, SCR 51.0.220 Precision Products (NSW) Pty Ltd v Hawkesbury City Council (2008) 74 NSWLR 102; [2008] NSWCA 278 .......................................................................................................................................................... r 42.15.80 Premier Travel Pty Ltd v Satellite Centres of Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 864 ............................................ r 33.9.160 Prentice v Constantinidis (No.2) [2015] FCCA 904 ............................................................................................... CPA 104.20 Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd (in receivership) (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 797 ..................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.65 Prestige Residential Marketing Pty Ltd v Depune Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 341 ........................................ r 42.15.80 Preston v Green (1944) 61 WN (NSW) 204 .......................................................................................................... DCA 126.20 Preston v Nikolaidis [2011] NSWSC 1074 .................................................................................................................. r 17.2.60 Preston v Preston [1982] Fam 17; [1981] 3 WLR 619; [1982] 1 All ER 41 ............................................................. r 42.5.40 Price v Ferris (1994) 34 NSWLR 704; 74 A Crim R 127 ...................................................................................... CPA 65.400 PricewaterhouseCoopers Legal v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2007] ANZ ConvR 645; [2008] NSW ConvR 56-197; [2007] NSWCA 271 .......................................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Priest v New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 12 ............................................................................................................ r 22.1.40 Prime City Investments Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 1287 .................................................................... r 31.9.40, r 31.9.1000 Principal Registrar, Supreme Court (NSW) v Jando (2001) 53 NSWLR 527; 125 A Crim R 473; [2001] NSWSC 969 ......................................................................................................................................... SCR 55.0.120 Print Management Australia Pty Ltd v Pasupati [2008] NSWSC 342 ...................................................................... r 25.11.20 Prior, Re; Ex parte Bellanto (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 616; 63 SR (NSW) 190 ...................................................... DCA 199.20 Prisoners A-XX Inclusive v New South Wales (1995) 38 NSWLR 622; 79 A Crim R 377 ............................. SCR 54.0.200 Prisoners A to XX Inclusive v New South Wales (1994) 75 A Crim R 205 ...................................................... SCR 54.0.200 Pro-Campo Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax (NSW) (1981) 12 ATR 26; 81 ATC 4270 ...................................... r 16.4.100 Process Engineering Pty Ltd v Derby Meat Processing Co Ltd [1977] WAR 145 ................................................ r 42.21.200 Proctor v Jetway Aviation Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 264 .......................................................................................... r Pt14.60 Proctor v Jetway Aviation Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 166 ................................................. r 6.28.40, r 14.14.140, CPA 65.20 Production Spray Painting & Panel Beating Pty Ltd v Newnham (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 659; 45 IR 425 ......................................................................................................................................................... SCA 75A.200 Project Development Co Ltd SA v KMK Securities Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 1470; [1983] 1 All ER 465 ......................................................................................................................................................... r 25.17.20, r 42.5.40 Prosperity Advisers Pty Ltd v Secure Enterprises Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 192 ..................................................... r 42.15.50 Prothonotary v Collins [1984] 2 NSWLR 549; (1984) 15 A Crim R 148 ........................................................... SCR 55.0.20 Prothonotary of Supreme Court (NSW) v Milios [2004] NSWCA 180 ............................................................ SCR 65A.3.20 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1981] Ch 229; [1980] 2 WLR 239; [1979] 3 All ER 507 .................................................................................................................................................. r 7.4.60 Prynew Pty Ltd v Nemeth (2010) 28 ACLC 10-026; [2010] NSWCA 94 ............................................................. r 42.21.310 Pty Ltd v Cuzeno RVM Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 27 ................................................................................................ r 42.25.40 Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 20 ............................................................ r 36.2.60 Public Transport Ticketing Corp v Integrated Transit Solutions Ltd [2009] NSWSC 54 ........................................ r 42.21.90 Public Trustee v Gittoes [2005] NSWSC 373 ............................................................................................................ r 4.10.100 Public Trustee v Nash (1920) 38 WN (NSW) 142 ...................................................................................................... r 42.6.40 Pucci v Humes Ltd [1970] 2 NSWR 139 ..................................................................................................................... r 23.4.60 Puttick v Tenon Ltd (2008) 238 CLR 265; 83 ALJR 93; [2008] HCA 54 ............................................................... r 6.43.100 Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328; 57 ALJR 236 ..................... r 21.3.160, r 22.2.140

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxxvi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

TABLE OF CASES

QBE Workers Compensation (NSW) Pty Ltd v Sports Pit Pty Ltd (in liq) (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 12 October 1995) ........................................................................................................................... r 49.20.120 Qantas Airways Ltd v AF Little Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 34 ............................... r 6.19.40, r 6.20.40, r 6.21.40, r 6.24.40 Qantas Airways Ltd v Dillingham Corp (unreported, SCNSW, Rogers J, 14 May 1987) ......................................... r 42.5.40 Quach v Mustafa (unreported, NSWCA, 15 June 1995) ....................................................................... r 42.15.45, CPA 46.20 Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley & Assoc Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 86 .............................................. r 22.2.200 Quadunion Builders Pte Ltd v Aircraft Support Industries Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1857 ....................... CPA 108.35 Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Computer Management Services Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 536; [2000] FCA 969 ....................................................................................................................................... r 5.3.60 Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146; 71 ALJR 294 ... r Pt31.40, CPA 64.20, SCA 101.120, SC Gen 5, SCR 51.0.120 Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson (1976) CLC 40-266 .............................................................................................. r 33.9.140 Quest Rose Hill Pty Ltd v The Owners Strata Plan No 64025 [2016] NSWSC 978 .............................................. r 20.24.60 Qureshi v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1605 ........................................................................... r 15.3.40

R R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13; 54 ALJR 314 .... r 6.11.60, r 6.35.80, SCA 65.20, SCR 54.0.80 R v Bahsa (2002) 138 A Crim R 245; [2003] NSWCCA 36 .................................................................................... r 31.28.80 R v Baines [1909] 1 KB 258 ...................................................................................................................................... r 33.4.120 R v Barnardo (1889) 23 QBD 305 ......................................................................................................................... SCR 55.0.20 R v Barton [1981] 2 NSWLR 414 ............................................................................................................................ r 14.28.180 R v Burns (No 4) [1999] SASC 559 ............................................................................................................................ r 31.7.40 R v Cattell (1967) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 391; [1968] 1 NSWR 156 ........................................................................... r 8.2.60 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd (1949) 78 CLR 389 ..................................................................................................................... SCA 69.60, SCR 54.0.140 R v Court of Petty Sessions (Tas); Ex Parte Davies Brothers Ltd (1998) 8 Tas R 283 ...................................... SCR 55.0.40 R v Davies [1906] 1 KB 32 .................................................................................................................................... DCA 199.20 R v Giri (No 2) [2001] NSWCCA 234 .................................................................................................................... r 36.16.120 R v Goia (1988) 19 FCR 212; 35 A Crim R 473; 81 ALR 656 ............................................................................... r 42.1.300 R v Hay (1860) 175 ER 933; 2 F & F 4 ................................................................................................ r 21.3.180, r 22.2.160 R v Hove Justices; Ex parte Donne [1967] 2 All ER 1253; (1967) 131 JP 460 ...................................................... r 33.4.120 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1980] AC 952; [1980] 2 WLR 1; [1980] 1 All ER 80 ............................... SCA 75.40 R v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 31 .................................................................................................... r 15.8.40 R v Judge; Ex parte Justices of the Isle of Ely [1931] 2 KB 442 ...................................................................... SCR 55.0.160 R v Kwok (2005) 64 NSWLR 335; 158 A Crim R 160; [2005] NSWCCA 245 ....................................................... r 4.2.100 R v Lefroy (1873) LR 8 QB 134 ............................................................................................................................ DCA 199.20 R v Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 619; [2001] VSCA 140 .................................................................. r 14.14.220 R v Manos; Ex parte Samuels (1981) 28 SASR 262 ................................................................................................... r 15.1.60 R v Matthews (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 45; [1887] 3 WN (NSW) 89 ...................................................................... SCR 55.0.160 R v Mosely (1992) 28 NSWLR 735; 65 A Crim R 452 ..................................................................... DCA 6.20, DCA 166.60 R v Ngo (2001) 124 A Crim R 151; [2001] NSWSC 339 ........................................................................................ r 31.3.120 R v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 ............................................................................................. r 31.3.120 R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 ............................................................................................. SCA 66.360 R v Rail Corp (NSW) [2012] NSWSC 832 ............................................................................................................. r 31.3.1000 R v Rigby (1956) 100 CLR 146; [1957] St R Qd 266 ................................................................................................ r 6.39.40 R v Rushbrook [1974] 1 NSWLR 699 .................................................................................................. SCA 49.60, SCA 49.80 R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14; 39 A Crim R 406 ................................................................................................ r 33.9.80 R v St Pancras Assessment Committee (1877) 2 QBD 581 .......................................................................................... r 6.8.60 R v Takai (2004) 149 A Crim R 593; 42 MVR 473; [2004] NSWCCA 392 ........................................................... r 31.28.80 R v Tastan (1994) 75 A Crim R 498 ......................................................................................................... r 33.4.120, r 33.9.80 R v Taylor (2007) 169 A Crim R 543; [2007] NSWCCA 104 .................................................................................. r 18.1.160 R v Tyrone Justices [1917] 2 IR 437 .......................................................................................................................... DCA 8.40 R v West Australian Newspapers Ltd; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (1996) 16 WAR 518 ........................................................................................................................................................... SCR 55.0.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxxvii

Table of Cases

Q

TABLE OF CASES R v Wilkie (2005) 193 FLR 291; [2005] NSWSC 794 ............................................................................................. r 31.3.120 R v Yanner [1998] 2 Qd R 208; (1997) 98 A Crim R 51 ............................................................................................. r 8.2.60 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681; [1999] NSWCCA 166 ................................................................... r 21.3.200, r 22.2.180 R, Re [2000] NSWSC 886 ........................................................................................................................ r Pt57.40, r Pt57.140 R, Re [2014] NSWSC 1810 .......................................................................................................................................... r 7.13.40 RB, Re [2015] NSWSC 70 ......................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.200 RH v CAH [1984] 1 NSWLR 694 ............................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 RL v NSW Trustee and Guardian (2012) 84 NSWLR 263; [2012] NSWCA 39 ..................................................... r Pt57.100 RL v NSW Trustee and Guardian (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 78 .................................................................................... r 6.30.40 RL & D Investments Pty Ltd v Bisby (2002) 37 MVR 479; [2002] NSWSC 1082 ............................................... r 50.3.260 RMG, Re [2014] NSWSC 845 .................................................................................................................................. r Pt56A.20 RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 152 ............................................................ r Pt17.150 Rabin v Mendoza & Co [1954] 1 WLR 271; [1954] 1 All ER 247 ...................................................... r 21.3.220, r 22.2.200 Radakovic v RG Cram & Sons Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 751 ................................................... SCA 107.20, SCR 51.0.220 Radio Corp of America (RCA) v Rauland Corp (No 2) [1956] 1 QB 618 .............................................................. r 52.1.100 Rahisi Pty Ltd v Banzato [1996] ASC 56-346 ......................................................................................................... r 14.14.120 Rahman v Bimson [2010] NSWSC 338 .................................................................................................................... CPA 61.20 Rahman v Dubs [2012] NSWSC 1065 ..................................................................................................................... r 14.28.140 Rail Corp (NSW) v Leduva Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 800 ........................................................................................ r 42.1.300 Rail Corp (NSW) v Vero Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 926 ................................................................ Pt 20.Div3.20 Rail Corp NSW v Leduva Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 800 ............................................................................................. r 42.5.40 Railways, Commissioner for v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 ............. r 33.4.60, r 33.4.100, r 33.4.140, r Pt33.40, DCA 126.20 Raja v Rubin [2000] Ch 274; [1999] 3 All ER 73; [1999] 3 WLR 606 .................................................................... r 42.5.40 Rajski v Carson (1988) 15 NSWLR 84 ...................................................................................................................... r 28.2.100 Rajski v Computer Manufacture & Design Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 443 ........................................ r 42.21.90, r 42.21.110 [1983] 2 NSWLR 122 ............................................................................................................................ r 42.21.90, r 42.21.120 Rajski v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 476 ................................................................................................. CPA 27.20 Rajski v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 478 .................. r 20.6.40, CPA 26.40, CPA 26.140, CPA 30.40, CPA 31.20 Ralston v Bell & Smith (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 913 ................................................................................................ r 42.1.100 Ramsay v Featherston Resources Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1923 ...................................................................... r 26.1.60, r 26.1.80 Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; 42 ALJR 89 ................................................................................................ r Pt14.20 Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642; 35 ALJR 301; [1963] ALR 134 ........................................ r 31.29.100, r 31.30.100 Ramsey v Hartley [1977] 2 All ER 673; [1977] 1 WLR 686 ................................................................................. r 42.21.140 Ramton v Cassin (1995) 38 NSWLR 88; 22 MVR 536 ............................................................. SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Ramton v Cassin (1996) 187 CLR 704; 70 ALJR 558 ............................................................... SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450; 159 FLR 132; [2000] SASC 83 .................................................. r 21.3.200, r 22.2.180 Rapid Metal Developments (Aust) Pty Ltd v Rildean Pty Ltd (2009) 27 ACLC 1058; [2009] NSWSC 571 ............................................................................................................................................................. r 43.2.60 Rapid Metal Developments (Australia) Pty Ltd v Rosato [1971] Qd R 82 ......................................................... SCR 48.0.20 Rappard v Williams [2013] NSWSC 1279 ................................................................................. r 7.13.40, r 7.14.50, r 7.14.60 Raulin v Fischer [1911] 2 KB 93 ............................................................................................................................... r 53.1.160 Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Jones (1985) 2 NSWLR 47 ............................................................................................. r 4.2.100 Read v McEwen (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 862 ......................................................................................................... CPA 146.20 Reading v London School Board (1886) 16 QBD 686 ............................................................................................... r 43.2.60 Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1999) 217 ALR 495; [1999] FCA 718 ................................................................................................................................................................... r 28.2.60 Reale Bros Pty Ltd v Reale (2003) 179 FLR 427; [2003] NSWSC 666 .................................................................... r 17.6.60 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1959 and the High Court of Borneo, Re (unreported, SC (Qld), Derrington J, 7 January 1984) ............................................................................................................... r 53.2.60 Red Lea Chickens v Tansey (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, 17 July 1995) ....................................................... CPA 136.20 Redden v Chapman (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 24 .............................................................................................................. r 42.1.62 Redditch Benefit Building Society v Roberts [1940] Ch 415; [1940] 1 All ER 342 ............................................... r 16.3.120 Rederiv Rolimpex [1974] QB 233 .................................................................................................................................. r Pt9.60 Rediffusion (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1970] AC 1136 .............................................. SCA 75.20 Redmond v Uebergang [1984] 1 NSWLR 311 ............................................................................................................ r 22.2.40 Reed Constructions Australia Pty Ltd v Eire Contractors Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 678 ............................................. r 3.7.80 Refco Capital Markets Ltd v Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1733 .......................................... r 52.1.100

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxxviii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Regency Media v AAV Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 368 ................................................................................ r 42.15.70 Regency Media Pty Ltd v AAV Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 368 ............................................... r 42.15.50, r 42.15.70 Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491; 76 ALJR 551; 187 ALR 1; 35 MVR 1; [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-646; [2002] AIPC 91-786; 23 NSWCCR 207; [2002] HCA 10 .............................................................................. r 6.43.60, r 11.7.60, r 14.14.100, r 44.6.60, CPA 65.20 Registrar of Court of Appeal v Collins [1982] 1 NSWLR 682 ............................................................................. DCA 199.20 Registrar of Court of Appeal v Maniam (No 1) (1991) 25 NSWLR 459 ............................................................. DCA 203.40 Registrar of Court of Appeal v Willesee [1984] 2 NSWLR 378 ........................................................................ SCR 55.0.120 Registrar of Supreme Court, Equity Division v McPherson [1980] 1 NSWLR 688 ............................... r 33.12.40, r 34.2.60 Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665 ............................................................................................................. r 14.28.180 Reliable Roof Treatments Pty Ltd v Citra Constructions Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 285 ....................................... r 14.12.40 Reliance Financial Services New South Wales Pty Ltd v Griffiths [2010] NSWSC 1490 ...................................... r 35.9.200 Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd v Baddock [2002] NSWSC 857 ............................ r 31.13.80, r 31.13.100, r 31.13.120 Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd v Lemery Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1417 ......................... r 41.3.40, r Pt41.20 Remington v Scoles [1897] 2 Ch 1 ............................................................................................................................ r 14.28.80 Remm Construction (SA) Pty Ltd v Allco Newsteel Pty Ltd (1992) 57 SASR 180 ............................................... r 42.21.60 Remuneration Planning Corp Pty Ltd v Fitton [2001] NSWSC 1208 ..................................................................... CPA 26.20 Render v Gleeson [1999] NSWCA 154 .......................................... r 12.7.120, r 12.11.160, r 13.1.140, r 13.4.260, r 45.2.60 Reserve Rifle Club Inc v NSW Rifle Association Inc [2010] NSWSC 351 ............................................................... r 42.7.80 Residents Against Improper Development Inc v Chase Property Investments Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 623 ............................................................................................................................................................. r 42.5.40 Resort Hotels Management Pty Ltd v Resort Hotels of Australia Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 730 .................... SCA 66.200 Rexam Australia Pty Ltd v Optimum Metallising Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 916 ...................................................... r 13.4.220 Reynette-James, Re [1976] 1 WLR 161; [1975] 3 All ER 1037 .......................................................................... SCR 78.0.60 Reynolds v Hall (1908) 25 WN (NSW) 85 .............................................................................................................. DCA 44.20 Rhodes v Christine Elizabeth Fletcher & Quasar Professionals Act Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 797 .... r 20.14.60, r 20.24.140 Riabkoff v Abernergy Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 724 ................................................................................... r Pt43.60 Rich v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129; 78 ALJR 1354; [2004] HCA 42 ............................................................................................................. r 21.3.160, r 22.2.140, SCA 75.180 Rich v Long [2008] NSWSC 487 ................................................................................................................ r 1.12.50, r 6.2.100 Richard v Branson [1914] 1 Ch 968 ............................................................................................................ r 7.24.60, r 7.24.80 Richards v Cornford (2010) 76 NSWLR 572; [2010] NSWCA 99 ................................ CPA 23.60, DCA 51.40, DCA 51.60 Richards v Cornford (No 3) [2010] NSWCA 134 ....................................................................................................... r 1.12.40 Richards v Kadian [2005] NSWCA 373 ....................................................................................................................... r 42.7.80 Richards v Withers [2010] NSWSC 1158 .................................................................................................................... r 27.1.60 Richardson Pacific Ltd v Fielding (1990) 26 FCR 188 ................................................................................................. r 5.4.40 Richerson (No 2), Re [1893] 3 Ch 146 ........................................................................................................................ r 7.10.40 Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2006] SGCA 39; [2007] 3 LRC 223 ........................... r 6.43.100 Rigato Farms Pty Ltd v Ridolfi [2001] 2 Qd R 455; [2000] QCA 292 ...................................................................... r 12.6.60 Riley v Lysaught [1983] 3 NSWLR 368; (1983) 13 A Crim R 54 ....................................................................... SCA 75A.40 Riley v Riley [1975] 1 NSWLR 244 ................................................................................................. DCA 76.20, DCA 186.40 Riley McKay Pty Ltd v McKay [1982] 1 NSWLR 264 .................................................................... DCA 46.20, SCA 66.240 Rinehart v Welker [2011] NSWCA 403 ....................................................................................................................... r 4.2.100 Ring-Grip (Australasia) Pty Ltd v HPM Industries Pty Ltd [1971] 1 NSWLR 798; (1971) 19 FLR 369 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 22.2.40 Riot Nominees Pty Ltd v Suzuki Australia Pty Ltd (1981) 52 FLR 265; 34 ALR 653 .................... r 42.21.120, r 42.21.140 Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198; [2001] NSWCA 142 ............................................................. r 13.4.160 Ritchie v Gumley (1953) 55 SR (NSW) 334; 72 WN (NSW) 298; 50 QJP 31 .............................. CPA 140.20, CPA 140.40 Ritchie-Lowe v Australian Conference Association Ltd [2001] NSWCA 447 ...................................................... SCA 106.20 Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 ............................................................................................ r 42.1.60, r 42.1.62, CPA 98.20 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 8) (1987) 12 IPR 75 ....................................... r 12.1.40, r 12.1.60, r 12.1.120 Riz v Perpetual Trustee Australia Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1488 .................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Roach v B & W Steel Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 110 .......................................................................................... r 36.15.120 Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Australian National Car Parks Pty Ltd (2007) 47 MVR 502; [2007] NSWCA 114 .................................................................................................................................................. r 5.2.40 Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Care Park Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 35 ................................................ r 5.2.40, r Pt5.40 Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Comerford [2000] NSWSC 163 ......................................... SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Comerford [2001] NSWSC 293 ..................................................................... r 20.14.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxxix

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v McGregor (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 453 ......................................... r 42.1.55, r 42.1.120 Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Palmer (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 140 ............................................................... r 42.1.100 Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Welling [2000] NSWCA 360 ........................................................................ r 20.24.120 Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Welling (2003) 37 MVR 309; [2003] NSWCA 14 ........... SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 336 .................... r 42.15.50 Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 238 ALR 761; [2007] HCA 42 .............................................................................................................................................. r 42.1.100 Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Turner (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 241 ........................................................... r 42.15.70 Roadshow Entertainment Pty Ltd v (ACN 053 006 269) Pty Ltd (formerly CEL Home Video Pty Ltd) (1997) 42 NSWLR 462 ................................................................................................................................ CPA 21.40 Robb Evans v European Bank Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 170 .............................................................................. r 42.15.50 Roberts, Re; Ex parte Metropolitan Water, Sewerage & Drainage Board (1932) 33 SR ( NSW) 142; 50 WN (NSW) 75 ....................................................................................................................................... DCA 44.20 Robinson v Campbell (No 2) (1992) 30 NSWLR 503 .................................................................. SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Robowash Pty Ltd v Robowash Finance Pty Ltd (2000) 158 FLR 338; 19 ACLC 393; [2000] WASCA 409 ............................................................................................................................................................. r 35.6.40 Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 153 CLR 134; 57 ALJR 31; 43 ALR 659; [1982] ATPR 40-322; [1982] HCA 66 .......................................................................................................... r 33.3.100, r 33.3.120 Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 39 .............................................. r 17.7.60, r 42.1.70 Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 205 ............................................... r 42.15.80 Rockdale City Council v Micro Developments Pty Ltd [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-954; [2008] NSWCA 128 .......................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.120 Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608; 38 ALJR 27 ............................................................................................ r 21.3.220 Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251; 74 A Crim R 462 ............................................................................... r 14.14.200 Rogers, Re; Ex Parte Sheriff [1911] 1 KB 641 ............................................................................................................ r 43.6.60 Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 626; [2001] NSWCA 461 ................................................................................................................... r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Romeo v Papalia [2012] NSWCA 221 ......................................................................................................................... r 18.1.60 Ronald v Harper (1913) 19 ALR 263; [1913] VLR 311 .......................................................................... r 42.5.40, r 53.7.180 Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1 QB 443 ......................................................................................................................... r 14.28.200 Ronowska v Kus (No 2) (2012) 221 A Crim R 261; [2012] NSWSC 817 ............................................... r 40.7.40, r 40.7.50 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 ........................................................................................................... r 15.8.40, r 53.1.160 Rose v Boxing NSW Inc [2007] NSWSC 256 ............................................................................................................ r 42.1.62 Rosebanner Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (2009) 223 FLR 406; [2009] NSWSC 43 .................................................. r Pt35.40 Rosebanner Pty Ltd v EnergyAustralia (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 150 ..................................................... r 42.15.70, r 42.15.80 Rosenfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bain & Co (1988) 14 ACLR 467 ......................................................................... r 42.21.110 Rosenthal v Rosenthal [1911] VLR 277; (1910) 11 CLR 87; 16 ALR 455; [1910] HCA 47 ................................. r 42.25.40 Rosewood Research Pty Ltd, Re [2014] NSWSC 449 ................................................................................................ r Pt55.40 Rosniak v Government Insurance Office (1997) 41 NSWLR 608; 26 MVR 204; [1997] Aust Torts Reports 81-440 ...................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.120, r 42.5.40 Rosseau Pty Ltd (in liq) v Jay-O-Bees Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 50 ACSR 565; [2004] NSWSC 818 ....................... r 18.1.40 Rothmans of Pall Mall (Overseas) v Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp [1981] 1 QB 368; [1980] 3 WLR 642; [1980] 3 All ER 359 ............................................................................................................................. r 12.5.40 Rouse v Shepherd (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 277 ...................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Rowland v Portus (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 74 ................................................................................................................... r 42.1.62 Rowlands v MacDonald [2002] NSWSC 282 ............................................................................................................ r 26.1.110 Rowlands v New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 715; [2009] NSWCA 136 ........................ r 23.4.40, r 23.7.60, r 23.9.20 Roy v Roy [2004] NSWSC 463 ............................................................................................................................... CPA 26.100 Royal Automobile Club of Victoria v Paterson [1968] VR 508 ............................................................................ SCA 66.340 Royal Guardian Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen [2015] NSWCA 148 ............................................. r 42.21.110, r 42.21.400 Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229; 188 ALR 143; [2001] FCA 1865 ................................................ r 42.1.62 Ruffino v Grace Bros Pty Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 732 .............................................................................................. CPA 95.20 Rufo v Hosking (2004) 61 NSWLR 678; [2004] NSWCA 391 ................................................................................ r 20.26.80 Rugby Union Players Assn v Byron Shire Council (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Giles J, 30 July 1997) ................................................................................................................................................ r 42.21.140, r 42.21.200 Rumble v Liverpool Plains Shire Council [2015] NSWCA 125 ................................................................................. r 17.3.30 Rushcutters Bay Smash Repairs Pty Ltd v H McKenna Netmakers Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 670 ......................... r 42.1.100 Russell v Edwards (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 52 ....................................................................................... r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxxx

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Russell v Russell (1891) 17 VLR 729 .......................................................................................................................... r 46.4.20 Russo v Acebond Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 300 ....................................................................................................... r 50.2.1000 Russo v Russo (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 449 ............................................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Ryan v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 101 FLR 396 ................................................................... r Pt22.20 Ryan v Hansen (2000) 49 NSWLR 184; [2000] NSWSC 354 ............................................................................... r 14.14.220 Ryan v Ryan [2012] NSWSC 636 ........................................................................................................... r 25.11.20, r 55.11.20 Ryan v South Sydney Junior Rugby League Club Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 660 ........................................................ r 42.1.100 Ryan v Triguboff [1976] 1 NSWLR 588; [1976] 1 ACLR 337; [1976] CLC 28476 ............ SCA 65.20, SCR 54.0.60, SCR 54.0.80, SCR 54.0.120 Ryde City Council v Tourtouras [2007] NSWCA 218 ............................................................................................. r 20.24.180

S S v South Eastern Sydney & Illawarra Area Health Service [2010] NSWSC 178 .................................................... r Pt57.40 “S” v Victims Compensation Fund Corp [2009] NSWDC 109 ................................................................................. r 50.23.40 S, Re [1984] 3 NSWLR 341 ......................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 S & M Motor Repairs Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 358; 91 FLR 175; 11 IPR 97 ............................................................................................................................................................. r 20.20.120 SA Consortium General Textiles v Sun & Sand Agencies [1978] 1 QB 279 .......................................... r 53.1.160, r 53.3.80 SA Cryonic Medical, Re [2002] VSC 338 ................................................................................................................... r 53.2.20 SCA Properties Pty (in liq), Re (1999) 17 ACLC 1611; [1999] QSC 180 ................................................................. r 42.5.40 SCF Finance Co Ltd v Masri [1985] 1 WLR 876; [1985] 2 All ER 747 ............................................................. SCA 66.240 SDW v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (2008) 222 FLR 86; [2008] NSWSC 1249 ............................ r 42.1.62 SLE Worldwide Australia Pty Ltd v Wyatt Gallagher Bassett Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 816 .................................... r 12.6.60 SMEC Testing Services Pty Ltd v Campbelltown City Council [2000] NSWCA 323 ............................................ r 42.15.80 Saad v TWT Ltd (1995) 38 AILR 5-038 ...................................................................................................................... r 22.6.40 Sabah Yazgi v Permanent Custodians Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 306 ................................................................... r 42.1.120 Sagacious Procurement Ltd v Mayne Group Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1238 ................................................................. CPA 65.20 Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd [2007] NSWCA 205 ....................................................... r 42.21.310 Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd v Registrar General (2009) 75 NSWLR 629; [2009] NSWSC 1143 .................................. r 6.11.60 St George Bank Ltd v Rabo Australia Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 147; [2004] FCA 1360 .................................................. r 5.3.60 St George Commercial Credit Corp Ltd v Wallis [2001] NSWSC 23 ....................................................... r 18.1.40, r 18.1.60 Sakr v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (2000) 32 MVR 427; [2000] NSWCA 266 .................................................. DCA 81.20 Salfa Pty Ltd (in liq), Re [2014] NSWSC 1493 .......................................................................................................... r 16.1.40 Salvation Army v Rundle [2008] NSWCA 347 ........................................................................................................... r 42.1.65 Salzke v Khoury (2009) 74 NSWLR 580; [2009] NSWCA 195 ............ r 31.19.120, r 31.19.1000, r 31.36.40, r 31.36.80, r 31.36.100, r 31.36.120, r 31.36.1000, CPA 14.1000 Samad v District Court (NSW) (2002) 209 CLR 140; 76 ALJR 871; [2002] HCA 24 ................ SCA 69.40, SCR 54.0.120 Samimi v Seyedabadi [2013] NSWCA 279 ............................................................................................................... r 25.14.20 Samootin v Shea [2004] NSWCA 115 ......................................................................................................................... r 33.2.40 San v Rumble (No 2) (2007) 48 MVR 492; [2007] NSWCA 259 ........................................................................... r 42.13.40 Sanders v Constantine [2006] NSWSC 534 .............................................................................................................. CPA 28.80 Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533 ...................................................................................... r 6.21.40, r 42.1.100 Sanderson Motors Pty Ltd v Kirby [2000] NSWSC 924 ....................................................................................... CPA 140.20 Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 5 ....................................................... r 9.5.80, r 14.14.220, CPA 22.80 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; 53 ALJR 11; 21 ALR 505 ........... r 21.3.200, r 22.2.180, SCA 75.180, SCA 75.280 Saravinovska v Saravinovski (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 64 ............................................................................................ r 7.14.50 Saravinovska v Saravinovski (No 5) [2015] NSWSC 128 .......................................................................................... r 7.16.40 Sarelius v Tao (unreported, NSWCA, 20 August 1991) ........................................................................................ SCA 75A.80 Sarikaya v Victorian WorkCover Authority (1997) 80 FCR 262 .................................................................................. r 4.5.40 Sarkis v Moussa [2011] NSWSC 1172 ....................................................................................................................... r 50.3.260 Sarkis v Moussa [2012] NSWCA 357 ........................................................................................................................ r 50.3.260 Sarkis, Re [2015] NSWSC 1369 .................................................................................................................................. r Pt55.40 Sasterawan v Morris (2007) 69 NSWLR 547; 174 A Crim R 514; [2007] NSWCCA 185 ...................................... r 6.39.40 Saxton, Re [1962] 1 WLR 859; [1962] 2 All ER 618 ............................................................................................... r 23.8.140 Saxton, Re [1962] 1 WLR 968; [1962] 3 All ER 92 ................................................................................................. r 31.46.40 Sayseng v Kellogg Superannuation Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1009 ........................................................................... r 42.1.100

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxxxi

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Scanlon v Director-General Department of the Arts Sport & Recreation (2007) 70 NSWLR 1; [2007] NSWCA 204 ........................................................................................................................................... CPA 13.160 Scanruby Pty Ltd v Caltex Petroleum Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 411 ........................................................................ r 20.28.40 Schenck Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Coal Technology Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 211 ........................................ CPA 56.20 Schepis v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] NSWCA 354 .................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Schibaia v Elias [2013] NSWSC 1485 ..................................................................................................................... r 31.13.120 Schlam v WA Trustee Executor & Agency Co Ltd [1964] WAR 178 ........................................................................ r 21.3.50 Schmidt v Won [1998] 3 VR 435 ................................................................................................................ r 44.2.60, r 44.5.60 Schmierer v Keong [2005] NSWSC 1081 ............................................................................................... r 14.18.40, r 31.26.60 Schnabel v Lui (2002) 56 NSWLR 119; [2002] NSWSC 1184 .......................................................................... SCR 55.0.120 Schnabel v Lui [2002] NSWSC 15 ....................................................................................... r 53.1.160, r 53.1.180, r 53.7.200 Schwartz, Re [2015] NSWSC 1484 ............................................................................................................................. r Pt54.20 Scope Data Systems Pty Ltd v Agostini Jarrett Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 971 ......................................................... r 42.19.40 Scott v O’Riley [2007] NSWSC 192 ............................................................................................................................ r 42.5.40 Scott v Pedler (2003) 74 ALD 424; [2003] FCA 650 ............................................................................................ SCA 75.140 Scott v Scott (2012) 7 ASTLR 299; [2012] NSWSC 1541 ........................................................................................ r Pt57.60 Scott v Stansfield (1868) LR 3 Ex 220 .................................................................................................................... DCA 13.20 Scott v Tuff-Kote (Aust) Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 537; [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 103 ............................................... r 6.20.40 Scott MacRae Investments Pty Ltd v Baylily Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 82 ................................................................ r 17.7.40 Screenco Pty Ltd v RL Dew Pty Ltd (2003) 58 NSWLR 720; [2003] NSWCA 319 ........................................... CPA 100.30 Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Carr [1901] 1 QB 7 .......................................................................................................... SCA 49.120 Seamez v McLaughlin [1999] NSWSC 9 .................................................................................................................... r Pt35.40 Seary v White (No 5 - Costs) [2008] NSWDC 21 .................................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Seas Sapfor Ltd v Far Eastern Shipping Co (1995) 39 NSWLR 435 .................................................................... CPA 65.400 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v B (1992) 175 CLR 218; [1992] HCA 15 .............................................................................................................................................................................. r Pt57.20 Secure Funding Pty Limited v StarkSecure Funding Pty Limited v Conway [2013] NSWSC 1536 ........................ r 42.5.40 Securities Exchanges Guarantee Corporation Ltd, Re [2016] NSWSC 76 ................................................................. r Pt55.40 Sedgwick Group Plc v Johns-Manville Fibreboard Corp [1985] 1 WLR 331; [1985] 1 All ER 716 ..................... r 52.1.140 Sedrak v Starr [2009] NSWSC 996 .............................................................................................................................. r 31.1.90 See v Hardman [2002] NSWSC 287 .......................................................................................................................... r 26.1.130 See v Lee (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 240 ...................................................................................................................... DCA 81.20 Segboer v AJ Richardson Properties Pty Ltd (2012) 16 BPR 31235; [2012] NSWCA 253 ........................................ r 9.5.80 Selke v Ray [1973] 2 NSWLR 282 ........................................................................................................................ SCR 69.0.40 Seltsam Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (1999) 17 NSWCCR 720; [1999] NSWCA 89 .................................. r 9.1.60, r 9.10.60 Seminars Australia Pty Ltd v ABN Amro Morgans Ltd [2006] ACTSC 101 ......................................................... r 42.21.140 Semler v Murphy [1968] Ch 183 .............................................................................................................................. r 42.21.140 Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News Ltd [1976] QB 23; [1975] 2 WLR 987; [1975] 2 All ER 1009 ............................................................................................. r 33.2.120, r 33.4.60, SCR 1.8.40 Sent v Jet Corp of Australia Pty Ltd [1984] 2 FCR 201; (1984) 54 ALR 237; 8 ACLR 979; 4 IPR 145; [1984] 3 ACLC 397 .................................................................................................................................... r 42.21.200 Serobian v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2010] NSWSC 1165 ......................................................................... r 7.36.80 Servcorp (Aust) Pty Ltd v Abgarus Pty Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 281 ..................................................................... r 14.28.200 Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Fitzgerald [2016] NSWSC 420 ........................................................................... r 25.3.80 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 1630 ..................................................................................................... r 42.7.80 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] ATPR (Digest) 46-274; [2007] FCA 1062 ................................................ r Pt21.100 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] FCA 1489; (2007) 244 ALR 374 .............................................................. r 42.15.50 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 5) (2005) 216 ALR 147; [2005] FCA 510 ...................................................... r 34.2.40 Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 902 ........................................................... r 20.24.60 789TEN Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp [2004] NSWSC 594 ......................................................... CPA 30.20, CPA 30.60 Severstal Export GmbH v Bhushan Steel Ltd [2013] NSWCA 102; (2013) 84 NSWLR 141 ................................ r 25.11.20 Shackles v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1996] 2 VR 427 ........................................................................ r 42.21.110, r 42.21.120 Shang v Zhang (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 1355 ............................................................................................................ r 42.1.100 Shannon v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2) [1994] 2 Qd R 563 ......................................... r 42.21.110 Shao Chun Bi v Mourad [2010] NSWCA 17 ....................................................................................... r Pt14.140, CPA Pt6.20 Shapowloff v Dunn [1973] 2 NSWLR 468 .................................................................. SCA 49.40, SCA 75.140, SCA 75.280 Sharjade Pty Ltd v RAAF (Landings) Ex-Servicemen Charitable Fund Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1347 ...................................................................................................................................................... r 20.7.40, CPA 30.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxxxii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Sharkawy v Toman [2007] NSWSC 621 ................................................................................................. r 31.18.80, r 31.23.40 Sharpe v Hargraves Secured Investments Ltd [2013] NSWCA 288 ........................................................................... r 7.36.40 Sharpe v Smail (1975) 49 ALJR 130 ......................................................................................... r 22.2.40, r 22.3.60, r 22.3.80 Shaw v Kirby (1888) 4 TLR 314 ............................................................................................................................... r 39.30.60 Shaw v New South Wales (2012) 219 IR 87; [2012] NSWCA 102 ...................................................... r 13.4.120, r 13.4.130 Shaw v Shaw [1954] 2 QB 429 .................................................................................................................................... r 14.7.80 Shedden v Patrick (1854) 1 Macq 535 ....................................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 Sheedy v State Asphalt Services Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1532 ............................................................................ CPA 146.20 Sheen v Burke [1993] 1 VR 584 .................................................................................................................................... r 4.5.40 Shehata v Montague L Meyer Pty Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 681; 51 ALJR 77 ................................. SCA 107.20, SCR 51.0.220 Sheil v Doneley (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 60; 20 WN (NSW) 21 ..................................................................................... r 54.3.20 Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (2011) 189 LGERA 348; [2011] NSWCA 195 ...................... r 31.19.40 Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359; 37 ALR 194; 5 ALJ 110; [1931] HCA 359 ....................................................... r 31.13.40, r 31.13.60, r 31.13.120, r 31.13.1000, r 31.14.40, r 31.14.1000 Sheppard, In the Will of [1972] 2 NSWLR 714 .................................................................................................. SCR 78.0.160 Sherbourne Estate (No 2), Re (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003 ................. r 42.1.200, r 42.4.100, CPA 98.80 Sherry v Australasian Conference Assn t/as Sydney Adventist Hospital [2006] NSWSC 1242 .............................. r 42.14.40 Shield Mercantile Pty Ltd v Citigroup Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 287 ....................................................................... r 42.34.40 Shop Distributive & Allied Employees Assn v Minister for Industrial Affairs (SA) (1995) 183 CLR 552; 69 ALJR 558 .............................................................................................................. SCA 65.40, SCR 54.0.100 Short v Burn [2012] NSWSC 695 ................................................................................................................................ r Pt35.20 Short v Crawley [2004] NSWSC 1031 ......................................................................................................................... r 33.4.40 Showtime Touring Group Pty Ltd v Mosley Touring Inc (2013) 296 ALR 597; [2013] NSWCA 53 ...................... r 42.7.80 Sidney Raper Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1975] 2 NSWLR 227; (1975) 25 FLR 217 ................................................................................................................................................................ r Pt9.60 Silver v Dome Resources NL [2005] NSWSC 265 ..................................................................................................... r 12.6.60 Simmons v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 455 .................................................................................. r 13.4.130 Sims v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317 ................................................................... r 14.14.100, r 15.1.40, r 15.10.60, r Pt15.20 SingTel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston [2010] NSWSC 1491 .............................................................................................. r 34.2.40 SingTel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston (2011) 81 NSWLR 526; [2011] NSWSC 1083 ..................................................... r 34.2.40 Singer v Berghouse (1993) 67 ALJR 708; 114 ALR 521 ..................................................................... r 42.1.200, r 42.21.110 Singh v Singh [2002] NSWSC 852 .................................................................................... CPA 26.20, CPA 26.60, CPA 28.60 Singleton v Ffrench (1986) 5 NSWLR 425 ............................................................................................................ SCA 106.20 Singleton v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 722 ................................................................................. r 14.14.100 Singleton v Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 103 ............................................................. r 42.5.40 Sinopharm Jiangsu Co Pty Ltd v Bank of China [2007] NSWSC 484 ........................................................................ r 5.3.60 Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Settlement Trusts, Re [1965] 1 WLR 372; [1965] 1 All ER 609 ......................... SCR 68.0.40 Sirius Shipping Corp v The Ship Sunrise [2006] NSWSC 1393 ...................................... r 36.11.50, r 36.16.80, r 36.16.200 Sirius Shipping Corp v The Ship Sunrise [2007] NSWSC 766 .............................................................................. r 36.16.200 Sirtes v Pryer [2006] NSWSC 438 ............................................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Siskina v Distos Compania Naviera SA [1979] AC 210 ......................................................................................... SC Gen 14 Siskina (Cargo Owners) v Distos Compania Naviera SA [1979] AC 210 ............................................................ SCA 66.240 Sivakumar v Pattison [1984] 2 NSWLR 78 ............................................................................................. r 1.21.40, SCA 51.20 Skalkos v Assaf (No 2) [2002] NSWCA 236 ....................................................................... r 42.15.40, r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Skalkos v T & S Recoveries Pty Ltd (2004) 65 NSWLR 151; [2004] NSWCA 281 .................................. CPA Pt7.Div2.60 Skouvakis v Skouvakis [1976] 2 NSWLR 29 ........................................................................................................ SCR 55.0.80 Slater Walker Superannuation Pty Ltd v Great Boulder Gold Mines Ltd [1979] VR 107 ................................... SCA 66.120 Slaveski v Victoria (2009) 25 VR 160; [2009] VSC 596 ............................................................................................ r 7.14.50 Slim v Kabra [2006] NSWSC 837 ............................................................................................................................. r 42.1.300 Slocomb Investments Pty Ltd v JH & EJ Williams Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 918 ................................................ CPA 107.45 Smail v Burton; Re Insurance Associates Pty Ltd (in liq) (1975) 1 ACLR 74 ...................................................... r 42.21.400 Smallacombe v Lockyer Investment Co Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 97; 114 ALR 568 ............................................... r 42.15.80 Smilevska v Smilevska [2015] NSWSC 1794 ............................................................................................................. r 7.14.50 Smith v Harris [1939] 3 All ER 960 ........................................................................................................................ DCA 81.20 Smith v Nixon (1885) 7 ALT 74 ................................................................................................................................. r 43.2.100 Smith v Pattison (1934) 51 WN (NSW) 137 ........................................................................................................... DCA 48.60 Smith v Yusen Daly Smith International Pty Ltd (in liq) (2001) 53 NSWLR 385; [2001] NSWCA 458 .................................................................................................. SCA 101.20, SCA 101.80, SCR 51.0.20, SCR 51.0.80

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxxxiii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Sneddon v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 351 ..................................................................................................... r 16.7.45 Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority v Cicic (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 232; [1965] NSWR 23 ........................................................................................................................................................... DCA 126.20 Social Security, Department of v Hodgson (1992) 37 FCR 32; 27 ALD 309; 108 ALR 322 ................ r 21.8.40, r 21.12.40 Society of Lloyd’s v Marich (2004) 139 FCR 560; [2004] FCA 1502 ..................................................... r 53.3.80, r 53.8.20 Soh v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 425; [2006] FCA 575 .............................................................................. r 42.21.110 Soil Conservation Authority v Read [1979] VR 557 .............................................................................................. SCA 66.220 Solicitor’s Bill of Costs, Re (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132 ........................................................................................... r 42.1.300 Solicitor’s Bill of Costs, Re; Re Shanahan (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132 ..................................................................... r 42.5.40 Solution 6 Holdings Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) (2004) 60 NSWLR 558; 137 IR 213; [2004] NSWCA 200 ............................................................................................................................... SCA 69.40 Somportex Ltd v Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp [1968] 3 All ER 26 ................................................................... r 12.5.40 Sonda v Signorelli [2004] NSWCA 134 ................................................................. DCA 126.40, SCA 102.20, SCR 51.0.180 Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2006) 232 ALR 119; [2006] FCAFC 92 ........................................................... r 42.25.40 Sood v Christianos (2008) 14 BPR 26101; [2008] NSWSC 1087 .............................................................................. r 27.2.20 Sophron v Nominal Defendant (1957) 96 CLR 469; 31 ALJ 395 .......................................... r 49.3.40, r 49.7.40, r 49.18.40 Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 ............................................................................. r 36.2.60 South v Northern Sydney Area Health Service [2003] NSWSC 479 ......................................................................... r 7.18.40 South Eastern Sydney Area Health Service v King [2006] NSWCA 2 ................................................. r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 South Eastern Sydney Area Health Service v King (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 73 ...................................................... r 42.15.80 South Sydney Council v Walsh (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 111 .................................................................................... r 20.26.60 Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 114 ........ r 42.21.100, r 42.21.110 Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1985] 2 NSWLR 340 ............... r 15.1.60, r Pt15.20 Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [1986] 4 NSWLR 491 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 12.7.40 Southern Pacific Hotel Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corp Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 710; [1984] 2 ACLC 483 ...................................................................................... r 33.3.100, r 33.4.100, r 33.4.120, r 33.4.140 Southern Textile Converters Pty Ltd v Stehar Knitting Mills Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 692 ............................... CPA 22.40 Southwell v Bennett [2010] NSWSC 1372 .................................................................................................................. r 28.2.60 Sovereignton Pty Ltd v Public Transport Commission (NSW) [1980] 1 NSWLR 243 ............................................. r 6.23.40 Spain v Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd (1923) 32 CLR 138; 29 ALR 311 ............................................... r 6.3.60 Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8) [2006] FCA 1537 .............................................................................. r 42.5.40 Spedding v Nobles (No 2) (2007) 69 NSWLR 100; [2007] NSWCA 87 ........................................... r 36.4.100, CPA 101.50 Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 ............................................................................................. r 40.8.60 Spellson v George (1987) 11 NSWLR 300 .................................................................................................................. r 7.14.60 Spellson v George (1992) 26 NSWLR 666 ............................................................................................... r 13.4.40, r 13.4.120 Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; 84 ALJR 612; [2010] HCA 28 ................................ r 13.4.120, r 13.4.130 Spencer Motors Pty Ltd v LNC Industries Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 921 ............. r 33.4.100, r 33.4.120, r 33.4.140, r 34.2.40 Sperling v Sperling [2015] NSWSC 286 ...................................................................................................................... r 7.14.40 Spies v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 24 NSWLR 691 ...................................................... r 14.14.120, r 18.1.60 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460; [1986] 3 WLR 972; [1986] 3 All ER 843 ........................ r 8.2.60 Spinoccia Compressor & Air Tools Sales & Services Pty Ltd v Challenger Managed Investments Ltd (2010) 78 ATR 185; [2010] NSWSC 1310 ..................................................................................................... r Pt35.20 Spring v Sydney South West Area Health Services [2009] NSWSC 420 ................................................................. r 20.26.80 Spurling’s Will Trusts, Re; Philpot v Philpot [1966] 1 All ER 745; 1WLR 920 ..................................................... r 42.25.40 Squire v Pardoe (1891) 40 WR 100; 66 LT 243 ........................................................................................................ r 42.25.40 Squire v Rogers (1979) 39 FLR 106; 27 ALR 330 ............................................................................................... SCR 48.0.40 Squire v Squire [1972] Ch 391 ................................................................................................................................... r 14.23.40 Sroka v Gorbal (1980) 25 SASR 356 ........................................................................................................................... r 22.2.60 Stace v Commonwealth (1988) 49 SASR 492 ............................................................................................................. r 23.9.60 Stace v Commonwealth (1989) 51 SASR 391 ............................................................................................................. r 23.4.60 Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2005] FCA 1643 ............................................ r 42.21.110 Stanbridge’s Application, Re (1996) 70 ALJR 640 ............................................................................................. SCR 54.0.200 Standard Chartered Bank of Australia v Antico (1993) 36 NSWLR 87 ................................................................... r 21.3.140 Standard Commodities Pty Ltd v Societe Socintar Department Centragel (2005) 54 ACSR 489; [2005] NSWSC 294 ............................................................................................................................................... r 53.1.100 Stanilite Pacific Ltd v Seaton (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 412 .................................................................................... CPA 100.30 Stanley-Hill v Kool [1982] 1 NSWLR 460 ................................................................................................. r 35.2.40, r 45.6.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxxxiv

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 75 ALJR 454; 118 A Crim R 247; 177 ALR 285; [2001] HCA 4 .......................................................................................................................................................... r 31.5.60 Stanton v The Owners - Strata Plan No 60724 [2010] NSWSC 175 ........................................................................... r Pt9.60 Star v National Australia Bank Ltd (1999) 150 FLR 119; [1999] NSWSC 305 ..................................................... CPA 65.20 Starceavich v Swart & Associates Pty Ltd (2006) 12 BPR 98204; [2006] NSWSC 960 .......................................... r Pt41.20 Starr v National Coal Board [1977] 1 All ER 243; [1977] 1 WLR 63 ...................................................................... r 23.9.20 State Advances Recovery Office of Republic of South Africa v Fine (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 445; [1968] 1 NSWR 702 ......................................................................................................................................... r 6.3.60 State Bank of New South Wales v Brown (2001) 38 ACSR 715; [2001] NSWCA 223 ..................................... SCA 75A.80 State Bank of New South Wales v Freeman (unreported, NSWSC, Badgery-Parker J, 31 January 1996) ...................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 29.20 State Bank of New South Wales v Stenhouse Ltd [1997] Aust Torts Reports 81-423 .......................................... r 14.28.140 State Bank of New South Wales v White (1995) 36 NSWLR 622 ...................................................................... SCA 75A.60 State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Chia [2000] NSWSC 552; (2000) 50 NSWLR 587 .................................... r 26.1.20 State Pollution Control Commission v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 29 NSWLR 487 ........................................................................................................................................................ r Pt2.20, CPA Pt6.20 State Rail Authority (NSW) v Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 29; 56 ALJR 800 ....................... r 36.16.120 State Rail Authority (NSW) v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 73 ALJR 306; 160 ALR 588; [1999] HCA 3 .......................................................................................... r 31.1.1000, r 50.3.260, SCA 75A.80 State Rail Authority (NSW) v Smith [2000] NSWSC 334 ........................................................................................ r 50.3.260 State Revenue, Commissioner of v Uniqema Pty Ltd (2004) 9 VR 523; [2004] VSCA 82 ................................. CPA 102.80 State of Minnesota v Philip Morris Inc (unreported, EWCA (Civ)) ......................................................................... r 52.1.100 State of New South Wales v Quirk [2012] NSWCA 216 .......................................................................................... r 42.34.40 State of Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291; 72 ALJR 1386 .............................................................................. r 52.1.220 Stateliner Pty Ltd v Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 16 ................................................... r 22.6.40 Statewide Developments Realty Pty Ltd v The Owners Corporation SP77457 [2014] NSWSC 330 ................... r 42.21.600 Statham v Shephard (No 2) (1974) 23 FLR 244 ............................................................... r 7.12.40, r 42.1.100, SCR 68.0.60 Stedman v O’Hearn [2006] NSWSC 1122 ................................................................................................................... r 7.10.40 Steedman v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (No 2) (1993) 31 NSWLR 562 ...................................................... SCA 75A.180 Steele v Marshan [2012] HCASL 198 ........................................................................................................................ r 50.3.260 Steele v Marshan [2012] NSWCA 141 ....................................................................................................................... r 50.3.260 Steele v Marshan [2012] NSWSC 32 ......................................................................................................................... r 50.3.260 Steffen v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2009] NSWSC 883 ............................................................................................ r 21.7.40 Stehar Knitting Mills Pty Ltd v Southern Textile Converters Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 514 ................ r Pt9.40, CPA 21.20 Stephens v Giovenco (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 144 .................................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v The Boots Co (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 287 ....................... r 13.4.180, r 13.4.220 Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] FCA 1421 ............................................................................................ r 53.7.220 Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 192; [2000] FCA 294 ......................................................... r 53.7.220 Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee v Gibson [2000] NSWCA 179 ................................................................ r 42.1.100 Stevens v Young [1973] 2 NSWLR 750 ...................................................................................................................... r 39.6.60 Stewart v Miller [1979] 2 NSWLR 128 ......................................................................................................................... r 5.2.20 Stewart v North Metropolitan Tramways Co (1886) 16 QBD 556 ............................................................................. r 42.6.40 Stewart v Ronalds [2009] NSWSC 455 ....................................................................................................................... r 28.2.40 Stewart v Sydney County Council [1973] 1 NSWLR 444 ............................................ r 9.9.60, SCA 108.20, SCR 51.0.240 Stitt v Richards (1897) 18 LR (NSW) Eq 1; 13 WN (NSW) 145 ....................................................................... SCR 1A.2.40 Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 333 ............................................... r 20.14.60 Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 894 ........................ r 20.24.140, r 20.24.160 Stoker v Adecco Gemvale Constructions Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 449 ............................................................. DCA 127.100 Stokes v McCourt [2014] NSWSC 61 ........................................................................................ r 7.13.40, r 7.14.40, r 7.14.50 Stokes (by a tutor) v McCourt [2013] NSWSC 1014 .................................................................................................. r 42.7.80 Stolfa v Owners Strata Plan 4366 (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 531 ................... r 31.17.40, r 31.20.40, r 31.44.20, r 31.44.1000 Stollznow v Calvert [1980] 2 NSWLR 749 ................................................................................................................. r 12.7.40 Stoltenberg v Doring [1983] 1 NSWLR 121 .......................................................................................................... SCA 66.420 Storey & Keers Pty Ltd v Johnstone (1987) 9 NSWLR 446 ............................................ r 36.17.60, r 36.17.80, DCA 81.20 Stott v West Yorkshire Road Car Co Ltd [1971] 2 QB 651 .......................................................................................... r 9.1.60 Stoy v Rees (1890) 24 QBD 748 .................................................................................................................................... r 4.5.40 Strata Plan 61287 v Brookfield Multiplex Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1302 ......................................................................... r 28.5.60 Street v Hearne (2007) 70 NSWLR 231; [2007] NSWCA 113 .................................................................................. r 21.7.40

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxxxv

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Street v Luna Park Sydney Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1144 ...................................................................................... r 42.21.410 Streets, In the Marriage of (1994) 122 FLR 103; 18 Fam LR 275; [1994] FLC 92-509 ........................................ r 31.16.80 Streetscape Projects (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sydney City [2012] NSWCA 63 ............................................................. r 50.7.40 Stuart, Re; Johnson v Williams [1940] 4 All ER 80 .................................................................................................. r 42.25.40 Stubbs v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 550 .......................................................................................... SCA 75.20 Stumm v Dixon & Co (1889) 22 QBD 529 ............................................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Styles v Clayton Utz (No 3) (2011) 255 FLR 364; [2011] NSWSC 1452 ............................................................... r 15.12.40 Subway Systems Australia v Ireland (No 2) [2013] VSC 693 ................................................................................. CPA 28.40 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp v Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 496 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 40.8.60 Sundararajah v Teachers Federation Health Ltd (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 471 .......................................................... r 18.1.160 Sunday Times Newspaper Co Ltd v Sun Newspaper Co Ltd (1919) 36 WN (NSW) 72 .......................................... r 21.3.50 Super 1000 Pty Ltd v Pacific General Securities Ltd [2007] NSWSC 171 ................................................................ r 7.29.40 Super Pty Ltd v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 549 ............................................................... r 20.24.160 Surfside Palms Motel Pty Ltd, Re (1984) 9 ACLR 179 .............................................................................................. r 26.1.40 Sutherland, Re [2014] NSWSC 821 ........................................................................................................................... r 55.11.20 Suvaal v Cessnock City Council (2003) 77 ALJR 1449; [2003] HCA 41 ............................................................... r 14.18.40 Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517; 79 ALJR 565; [2005] HCA 4 ...... SCA 102.20, SCR 51.0.180 Swain Investments Ltd v Danumet Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Cole J, 5 May 1989) ............................. r 42.21.120 Swimsure (Laboratories) Pty Ltd v McDonald [1979] 2 NSWLR 796 ................................................................. SCA 66.340 Swire, Re (1882) 21 Ch D 647 ................................................................................................................................. DCA 81.20 Sydmar Pty Ltd v Statewise Developments Pty Ltd (1987) 73 ALR 289; 11 ACLR 616; 5 ACLC 480 ......................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 21.20 Sydney Airports Corp Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 ................................................................... r 31.4.80 Sydney City v Streetscape Projects (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 452 ......................................................... CPA 15.40 Sydney City Council v Geftlick [2006] NSWCA 280 ............................................................................. r 42.5.40, CPA 46.20 Sydney City Council v Geftlick (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 374 ................................................................................... r 42.1.120 Sydney City Councilv Goldspar Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 769 ............................................................................................ r 5.4.40 Sydney Ferries v Morton (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 238 .............................................................................................. r 42.1.120 Sydney South West Area Health Service v MD (2009) 260 ALR 702; [2009] NSWCA 343 ................ r 9.4.80, r 14.14.100 Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 ................. r 31.18.80, r 31.18.1000, CPA 14.40 Sykes v Sykes (1869) LR 4 CP 645 ......................................................................................................................... r 42.21.140 Symonds v Egan National Valuers (NSW) Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWCA, 26 February 1996) ............... SCA 101.120, SCR 51.0.120 Symons, Re (1882) 21 Ch D 757 ................................................................................................................................. r 46.4.20 Synnott v Woods (1891) 8 WN (NSW) 4 ................................................................................................................ CPA 117.40 Szanto v Melville [2011] VSC 574 ............................................................................................................................. r 15.30.40 Szylowicz, In the Estate of (1978) 19 SASR 263 ............................................................................................... SCR 78.0.120

T TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd v Antoniadis (No 2) (1999) 48 NSWLR 381; [1999] NSWCA 104 .......................... SCA 75A.200 TCS ACES Pty Ltd v Mikohn Gaming Australasia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1139 ................................................... r 14.9.60 TDK Tape Distributors (UK) Ltd v Videochoice Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 141; [1985] 3 All ER 345 ........................ SCA 66.240 TNT Building Trades Pty Ltd v Benelong Developments Pty Ltd (admins apptd) (2012) 91 ACSR 17; (2012) 91 ACSR 17 ....................................................................................................................................... r 31.13.120 TNT Management Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 47 ALR 693 ........................................................ r 21.6.40 TQM Design & Construct Pty Ltd v Golden Plantation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 500 .......................................... r 31.13.160 TS v Sydney Children’s Hospital Network [2012] NSWSC 1609 ............................................................................. r Pt57.20 TSF Engineering Pty Ltd v Hill [1980] 2 NSWLR 105 ...................................................... r 45.6.40, r 45.6.80, SCA 49.120 Tagget v McLean Austquip Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1310 ......................................................................................... r 14.2.40 Tagget v Sexton (2009) 255 ALR 522; [2009] NSWCA 91 ..................................................................... r 42.1.70, DCA 8.50 Taheri v Vitek (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 344 ............................................................................................................... r 42.15.50 Tallglen Pty Ltd v Pay TV Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 130 .......................................................................... r 28.2.60 Tampion v Anderson (1973) 48 ALJR 11; 3 ALR 414 ........................................................................... r 12.7.120, r 13.4.260 Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 266 ................................................................... r 7.1.70 Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 383 ................................................................... r 7.1.70 Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1519 .................................................................. r 7.1.70

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxxxvi

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 23 ..................................................................... r 7.1.70 Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 42 ..................................................................... r 7.1.70 Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Bradshaw [2013] NSWSC 1276 ............................................................... r 17.7.60, r 17.7.100 Tapoohi v Lewenberg (No 2) [2003] VSC 410 ......................................................................................................... CPA 33.20 Tate v Barry (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 380 ...................................................................................................................... r 26.1.110 Tatlers.com.au Pty Ltd v Davis (2006) 203 FLR 473; [2006] NSWSC 1055 ...................................... r 37.3.20, CPA 107.45 Tatlers.com.au Pty Ltd v Davis (2007) 213 FLR 109; [2007] NSWSC 835 .............................................................. r 35.6.40 Tatterson v Wirtanan [1998] VSC 88 ........................................................................................................................... r 6.19.40 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Abberwood Pty Ltd (1990) 19 NSWLR 530; 20 ATR 1868; 90 ATC 4255; 8 ACLC 528; [1990] 2 ACSR 91 ................................................................................................. r 10.22.60 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Levick (1999) 43 ATR 621; 168 ALR 383; [1999] FCA 1580 ....................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 99.40 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Meakes [2014] NSWSC 1001 .................................................................... CPA 107.30 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Meredith (No 2) (2008) 75 NSWLR 462; [2008] NSWCA 133 ..................................................................................................................................................... r 36.11.100, r 36.16.80 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v P (1987) 11 NSWLR 200 ............................................................... r 7.14.40, r 7.17.40 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Thai (1993) 26 ATR 108; 93 ATC 4530 ....................................................... r 14.28.40 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 499; 53 ALJR 336 ....................................................................................................................................................... r 21.3.180, r 22.2.160 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Baker [2013] NSWSC 1826 .......................................................................... r 16.3.110 Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1 ..................................................................................... r 6.24.40, r 36.16.220, r 36.16.240 Tebbs, Re [1976] 1 WLR 924; [1976] 2 All ER 858 .................................................................................................. r 46.4.20 Tedeschi v Legal Services Commission (1997) 43 NSWLR 20 ............................................................................. r 14.14.200 Telecomputing PCS Pty Ltd v Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Aust) Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 513; 8 BCL 286 ..................................................................................................................................................... r 20.20.60 Telfer v Telfer (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 1614 ............................................................................................................. r Pt57.180 Tempe Recreation Reserve Trust v Sydney Water Corporation (No 2) [2014] NSWLEC 23 .............................. CPA 106.12 Templeton v ASIC (2015) 108 ACSR 545 ................................................................................................................... r 26.4.40 Templeton v Leviathan Pty Ltd (1921) 30 CLR 34; [1922] VLR 90 .................................................. r 54.3.20, SCR 68.2.20 Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19 .................................. r 28.2.60, r 28.2.80 Termijtelen v Van Arkel [1974] 1 NSWLR 525 ..................................................................................... r 16.10.40, r 17.7.100 Tesoriero v Ferrarao (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Powell J, 21 August 1984) ........................................................ CPA 140.40 Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd (unreported, Fed Ct of Appeal, French J, 3 May 1991) ................................................................................................................................................................ r 42.5.40 Thalanga Copper Mines Pty Ltd v Brandrill Ltd [2004] NSWSC 349 .............................................. r 42.21.110, r 42.21.200 Thaler v Amzalak (No 4) [2013] NSWSC 1345 ........................................................................................................ r 25.11.20 The Estate of Roberts, Re (1983) 20 NTR 13; 70 FLR 158 ..................................................................................... r 42.25.40 The Trade Marks Act 1955-1958 and the Registered Trade Marks “Certina” and “Certina DS”, Re (1970) 44 ALJR 191 .............................................................................................................................................. r 17.7.100 The Trust Company (Re Services) Ltd, Re [2016] NSWSC 117 ................................................................................ r Pt55.40 Thermasorb Pty Ltd v Rockdale Beef Pty Ltd (2005) 190 FLR 71; [2005] NSWSC 361 ................................... CPA 140.40 Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 2) [1992] 1 Qd R 237 ............................................................................ r 25.3.120 Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 3) [1992] 1 Qd R 587 .............................................................................. r 22.2.60 Thiess Bros Pty Ltd, Re; Ex parte Delponte [1965] NSWR 1468 ......................................................................... CPA 140.20 Thiess Watkins White Construction Ltd (in liq) v Witan Nominees (1985) Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 452 .......................................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Thomas v Jones [1928] P 162 ..................................................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Thomas v New South Wales (2005) 66 NSWLR 44; [2005] NSWSC 1061 ....................................... r 49.20.80, r 49.20.100 Thomas v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 160 .................................................................................. r 31.9.80, r 31.9.1000 Thomas v Yates [2008] NSWSC 282 .......................................................................................................... r 20.2.40, r 20.6.40 Thomas A Edison Ltd v Bullock (1912) 15 CLR 679 ......................................................................... r 41.3.100, SCA 66.160 Thompson v Dal Cin [2006] NSWSC 1249 ................................................................................................................. r 31.4.50 Thompson v NSW Land and Housing Corp (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 1658 .............................................................. r 20.18.80 Thompson v Pacific Acceptance Corp Ltd (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 773 ................................................................... CPA 64.40 Thompson v Thompson [1980] 1 NSWLR 180; (1980) 42 FLR 383 .................................................................. SCR 69.0.40 Thompson v White [2008] NSWSC 1 ........................................................................................................................ r 20.14.60 Thompson v Wright (1884) 13 QBD 632 ................................................................................................................... r 43.2.100

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxxxvii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Thompson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150; 55 ALJR 614; 37 ALR 66 ....................................................................................................................................... SCA 66.460 Thorpe v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1989] 1 WLR 665; [1989] 2 All ER 827 ..... r 21.1.60, r 21.2.80, r 21.10.40 Thrasivoulou, Ex parte [1978] VR 369 .................................................................................................................. SCR 69.0.40 363 Military Road Mosman Pty Ltd v The Owners Strata Plan 72814 [2012] NSWSC 263 ............................ CPA 149B.60 Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd (1990) 25 NSWLR 353 ......................................................................... r 42.15.50, Pt 20.Div4.20 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598; [2009] NSWSC 769 ............ r 31.4.60, r 31.6.1000, r 31.8.1000 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 380; [2009] NSWSC 49 ................................. r 31.23.80 Timber Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Anderson [1980] 2 NSWLR 488 ................................................... r 46.4.20, SCR 49.0.20 Timms v Clift [1998] 2 Qd R 100 .............................................................................................................................. r 42.15.40 Tinyow v Lee [2006] NSWCA 247 ............................................................................................................................ r 42.15.80 Tiufino v Warland (2000) 50 NSWLR 104; [2000] NSWCA 110 .......................................................................... r 14.14.200 Tobin v Ezekiel [2009] NSWSC 1209 ......................................................................................................................... r 31.5.60 Todd v Jones [1969] VR 169 ........................................................................................................................................ r 28.5.60 Todorovic v Moussa (2001) 53 NSWLR 463; [2001] NSWCA 419 .................................................................. DCA 127.100 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corp Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 86 ACSR 119; [2011] NSWCA 256 .......................................................................................................................................................... r 42.1.120 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 86 ACSR 119; [2011] NSWCA 256 ............................................................................................................................................................ r 42.1.60 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 256 ...................................... r 42.1.120 Tomasetti v Brailey [2012] NSWCA 6 ...................................................................................................... r 25.9.10, r 25.14.20 Tomko v Palasty (No 2) (2007) 71 NSWLR 61; [2007] NSWCA 369 .................................................................... r 49.20.80 Tomko v Tomko [2007] NSWSC 1486 ............................................................... r 31.37.40, r 31.41.20, r Pt31.Div2.Sdiv4.20 Tomsimmat & Assocs Pty Ltd v G & R Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 25 1PR 545 .............................................. CPA 65.400 Tomson v Boitano [2011] NSWSC 527 .................................................................................................................... r 42.21.110 Tony Azzi (Automobiles) Pty Ltd v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 249 ......................................... CPA 64.20 Tony Azzi (Automobiles) Pty Ltd v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 283 ............................................ r 34.2.40 Tory v Megna [2012] NSWCA 41 ................................................................................................................................ r 12.5.40 Total & Universal Pty Ltd v Kingsway Property Investments (No 2) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 581 ...................... r 42.15.80 Total Real Estate Training Pty Ltd v Howard [2011] NSWSC 735 ............................................................................ r 23.8.40 Townsend v Townsend (No 2) [2001] NSWCA 145 .............................................................................. r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Trad v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 41 ..................................................................................................... r 50.7.40 Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 2) (1989) 21 FCR 306; 88 ALR 90 ............................................... r 33.6.80 Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 109 ............................................. r 14.28.120 Trade Practices Commission v IMB Group Pty Ltd [1994] ATPR 41-348 ........................................... r 21.3.160, r 22.2.140 Trade Practices Commission v Manfal Pty Ltd (No 3) (1991) 33 FCR 382 ............................................................ r 12.1.120 Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 42 FLR 213; 28 ALR 201 ......................................................................................................................................................................... CPA 98.20 Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) ATPR 45–531 ................................................... r 21.3.160 Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd [1985] ATPR 46,270 .................................................... r 42.1.120 Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (No 2) (1981) 55 FLR 212; [1982] ATPR 40-280 ....................................................................................................................................... r 21.3.100, r 21.11.40 Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 16) [2013] NSWSC 418 ............................................. r 21.3.120 Tradestock Pty Ltd v TNT (Management) Pty Ltd (1983) 81 FLR 91; 50 ALR 461; [1983] ATPR 40-402 ....................................................................................................................................................................... r 34.2.60 Tradestock Pty Ltd v TNT (Management) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1977) 30 FLR 343; 14 ALR 52 ................................ r 42.21.110 Trainor Asia Ltd v Calverley (2007) 53 SR (WA) 277; [2007] WADC 124 ...................... r 53.1.180, r 53.1.200, r 53.7.180 Trans Realties Pty Ltd v Grbac [1975] 1 NSWLR 170 ......................................................................................... SCA 75.100 Transglobal Capital Pty Ltd v Yolarno Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 143; [2004] NSWCA 136 ............................ SCA 46.20 Transocean Capital Pty Ltd v AFSIG Pty Ltd (2006) 202 FLR 270; [2006] NSWSC 806 ................................... r 14.28.200 Transport Action Group Against Motorways Inc v Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) (1998) 103 LGERA 338 ..................................................................................................................... r 15.10.60, r 21.3.200, r 22.2.180 Transport Construction Authority v Parramatta City Council [2010] NSWSC 1168 .......................................... CPA 149B.60 Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 326 .......................................... r 31.1.120 Trendlen Pty Ltd v Mobile Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 741 ........................................................................ r 7.4.80

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] lxxxviii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Tricorp Pty Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (WA) (1992) 6 ACSR 706; 10 ACLC 474 ........................................................................................................................................................................ r 42.21.200 Triden Properties Ltd v Capita Financial Group Ltd (unreported, NSWCA, 26 November 1993) ......................... r 13.1.140 Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497; 51 SR (NSW) 173; 68 WN (NSW) 187 .................................................. r 15.32.40 Tringali v Stewardson Stubbs & Collett Pty Ltd (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 335; 83 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 393; [1966] 1 NSWR 354 .................................................................................................................................. CPA 135.35 Trubenised Ltd v Dobrinski (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 492 ........................................................................................ SCA 49.120 Trust Co of Australia Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 654 ...................................................... r 6.11.60 Trustee and Guardian (NSW) v Schneider [2011] NSWSC 424 ............................................................................ CPA 104.40 Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker (2007) 14 BPR 26,867; [2007] NSWCA ................................................................................................................................................................. r 42.1.200 Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 194 ...... r 42.15.60, r 42.15.80, Pt 20.Div4.20 Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565; 63 ACSR 346; [2007] NSWCA 117 ............................................................................................................................................. r 7.4.80, r 7.4.120 Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Sydney v Hogan (2001) 53 NSWLR 343; [2001] NSWCA 381 ................................................................................... SCA 106.20, SCA 107.20, SCR 51.0.220 Truth about Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591; 74 ALJR 604; [2000] HCA 11 ........................................................................... SCA 65.40, SCR 54.0.100 Tryhaz Pty Ltd v Fielder Engineers Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 906 .............................. r 20.24.80, r 20.24.120, Pt 20.Div3.40 Tsu v Nemeth [2012] NSWCA 29 ............................................................................................................................ r 20.24.120 Tudor Furnishers Ltd v Montague & Co [1950] Ch 113 ............................................................................................ r Pt43.70 Turkmani v Visvalingham (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 279 ............................................................................................ r 42.1.120 Turnbull v Gorgievski [1999] NSWSC 871 ................................................................................................ r 31.5.40, r 31.5.60 Turner v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 228 ............................................................................................. r 15.1.40 Turner v Davies [1981] 2 NSWLR 324 .............................................. r 5.7.40, r 21.3.100, r 21.3.120, r 21.11.40, r 21.11.60 Turner v Hancock (1882) LR 20 Ch D 303 ............................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Turner v London & Southwestern Railway Co (1874) LR 17 Eq 561 ....................................................................... r 36.4.60 Turner v Sylvester [1981] 2 NSWLR 295 ......................................................................................... DCA 46.20, SCA 66.240 Turner v The Bulletin Newspaper Co Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 69; [1974] 3 ALR 491; [1974] HCA 25 ................................................................................................................................................................ r 14.28.200 Twenty-First Australia Inc v Shade Matter No 2428/98 [1998] NSWSC 380 ........................................................ r 36.16.180 Tyne Improvement Commissioners v Armement Anversois SA (The Brabo) (No 2) [1949] AC 326 ...................... r 11.2.60 Tyrrell v The Owners Corp Strata Scheme 40022 [2007] NSWCA 8 ....................................................... r 28.2.40, r 28.2.80 Tyson v Brisbane Market Freight Brokers Pty Ltd (1994) 68 ALJR 304 .................................... SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Tzavellas v Canterbury City Council (1999) 105 LGERA 262 ................................................................................... r 42.1.62

U Ugly Tribe Co Pty Ltd v Sikola [2001] VSC 189 ....................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Unconventional Conventions Pty Ltd v Accent Oz Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] NSWSC 1050 .................................. CPA 26.140 Unioil International Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (No 2) (1997) 18 WAR 190 ............................................ r 42.5.40 United Development Corporation Pty Ltd v Coffs Harbour Rutile NL (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 218 ................... SCA 49.120 United Group Rail Services Ltd v Rail Corp (NSW) (2009) 74 NSWLR 618; [2009] NSWCA 177 .......... CPA 27.10, CPA 27.20 United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 870 ....................................... r 31.23.80, r 31.23.100 United States Surgical Corp v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 766 ............ r 6.43.60, r 33.9.160 United States of America v Inkley [1989] 1 QB 255 ................................................................................................ r 53.1.160 United Telecasters Sydney Ltd v Hardy (1991) 23 NSWLR 323 ............... DCA 199.20, SCR 55.0.60, SCR 55.0.160, SCR 55.0.200 Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) v Takacs (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 172 ............. r 42.15.50, r 42.15.70, r 42.15.80 Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) t/as Northaven Retirement Village v Takacs (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 172 .................................................................................................................................. r 42.15.50 Universal City Studios Inc v Hubbard [1983] 2 WLR 882; [1983] 3 All E.R. 596; ............................................ SCA 66.360 University of New South Wales v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1; 49 ALJR 267 ................................................ SCA 75.140 Uptown Sydney Development Corp Pty Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (No 1) (1993) 11 ACSR 300; 11 ACLC 862 .............................................................................................................................................. r 42.21.310

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

lxxxix

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124; [1966] HCA 40 ................. r 15.7.40, r 53.1.160

V V V v District Court (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 469 ...................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 Vadala v Lawes (1890) 25 QBD 310 ......................................................................................................................... r 53.7.180 Vale v Eggins (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 12 ............................................................................................... r 42.15.50, r 42.15.80 Van Der Lee v NSW [2002] NSWCA 286 ............................................................................. r 13.4.160, r 21.3.220, r 31.4.80 Van Sandan, Ex parte (1846) De G 303 ..................................................................................................................... DCA 8.80 Vandervell’s Trusts (No 1), Re [1971] AC 912 ............................................................................................................ r 6.24.40 Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2), Re [1974] Ch 269 ............................................................................................................ r 14.7.80 Vanvalen v Neaves (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003 ......................................................................... r 42.15.80 Vapormatic Co Ltd v Sparex Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 939 ............................................................................................ SCA 66.220 Varley v Varley [2007] NSWSC 125 .......................................................................................................................... r 20.21.60 Vasil v National Australian Bank Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 207 .............................................................................. SCA 66.260 Vasilijev v Public Trustee [1974] 2 NSWLR 497 ................................................................................................ SCA 75A.100 Vella v Wah Lai Investment (Australia) Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 17 June 1998) ...................... SCA 66.120 Vella v Wai Lai Investment (Australia) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 583 ........................................................................ r 35.2.40 Venacom Pty Ltd v Morgan Brooks Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 46 .............................................................. r 21.6.40, r 22.2.40 Venetian Nominees Pty Ltd v Conlan (1998) 20 WAR 96 .......................................................................................... r 26.4.20 Venquelin v Bouard (1863) 15 CB (NS) 341 .......................................................................................... r 53.1.180, r 53.7.200 Ventura v Sustek (1976) 14 SASR 395 ................................................................................................................ SCA 75A.140 Vereker v Choi (1985) 4 NSWLR 277 .................................................................................................................... SCA 66.240 Vertical Australia Pty Ltd v Air Company Vertical-T LLC [2012] NSWSC 719 ...................................................... r Pt43.60 Vetreria Etrusca SRL v Elitepack Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 496 ............................................................... r 53.1.180, r 53.8.20 Victims Compensation Fund Corp v Ainsworth (2001) 51 NSWLR 466 ................................................................. r 50.23.40 Victims Compensation Fund Corp v Nguyen (2001) 52 NSWLR 213 ..................................................................... r 50.23.40 Victoria v Horvath (No 2) [2003] VSCA 24 .............................................................................................................. r 42.1.100 Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291; 72 ALJR 1386 ......................................................................... r 31.36.60, r 52.1.220 Victoria, Re [2002] NSWSC 647; 29 Fam LR 157 ..................................................................................................... r Pt57.20 Victorian Broadcasting Network Ltd v Whitlam (1980) 42 FLR 256; 31 ALR 184 ........................................... SCR 1.13.20 Victorian Securities Corporation Ltd v Icehot Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) [2010] NSWSC 1413 .................. CPA 135.35 Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73; 38 ALR 22; 5 ALJ 241 .................................................................................................................................................... SCA 75A.60 Vigilant Finance (NSW) Pty Ltd, Ex parte; Cameron Smith, Re [1964] NSWR 1282 ......................................... CPA 140.20 Villanueva v New South Wales [1999] NSWCA 105 .................................................................................................. r 31.5.60 Vintage Marine Art Pty Ltd v Henderson [2015] NSWSC 1439 ............................................................................ r 42.21.110 Vintage Marine Art Pty Ltd v Robert Craig Henderson [2015] NSWSC 1439 ...................................................... r 42.21.110 Violi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] NSWCA 152 ................................................................................. r 16.6.40 Visnic v Sywak [2008] NSWSC 427 ............................................................................................................................ r 46.4.20 Visy Board Pty Ltd v Attorney General (Cth) (1984) 2 FCR 113 ............................................................................ r 12.1.120 Vitoros v Raindera Pty Limited [2014] NSWSC 99 .................................................................................................... r 42.7.80 Vlasic v Federal Capital Press (1976) 9 ACTR 1 ........................................................................................................ r Pt15.20 Voss v Ipkendanz [2009] NSWSC 562 ......................................................................................................................... r 30.1.40 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; 65 ALJR 83 ............................ r 11.7.60, r 13.4.180, r 13.4.200 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; 65 ALJR 83; 97 ALR 124 ......................................... r 6.43.100

W W v H [2014] NSWSC 1696 ...................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.200 W v M [2009] NSWSC 1084 ....................................................................................................................................... r 4.2.100 W, Re [2014] NSWSC 1106 .................................................................................................... r Pt57.20, r Pt57.60, r Pt57.100 W & F [2003] Fam CA 173 ........................................................................................................................................ r 31.16.80 W (an infant), Re [1978] Qd R 406 ....................................................................................................................... SCR 69.0.40 W and L (Parameters of Protected Estate Management Orders), Re [2014] NSWSC 1106 .................................... r Pt57.100 WFM Motors Pty Ltd v Maydwell (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 23 April 1993) ............................................ r 10.14.120 WM, Re (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 352 ................................................................................................................................ r 57.5.10 Wagner v Laubscher Bros [1970] 2 QB 313 ................................................................................................................ r 53.8.20 Waikato (Proprietary) Ltd v Kaplan [2002] VSC 310 ............................................................................................ SCA 66.120

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xc

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Wakim, Re; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511; 73 ALJR 839; [1999] HCA 27 ............................. r 44.2.60, r 44.5.80 Walkabout II Pty Ltd v Jabulani Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1569 ............................................................................... r 20.15.60 Walker v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1985) 3 NSWLR 496 ............................................................ r 6.24.40 Walker v University of Sydney [2013] NSWSC 104 ................................................................................................ r 13.4.130 Walker v WA Pickles Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 281 ............................................................................................... r 14.10.40 Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; 11 ALJ 201 ..................................................................................................... r Pt34.40 Walker Corp Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (2004) 134 LGERA 195; [2004] NSWLEC 315 ........................................................................................................................................................ r 31.35.80 Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373; [1975] 1 All ER 849 ...................................................................... CPA 100.20 Walsh v Walsh (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1281 ............................................................................................................. r 42.1.200 Walshe v Prest [2004] NSWCA 94 ............................................................................................................................. r 20.11.40 Walter v Nicholson (1838) 6 Dowl 517 ....................................................................................................................... r 43.2.60 Walter Rau Nuesser Und Fett AG v Cross Pacific Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 955 ..................................................... r Pt25.20 Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; 112 ALR 289 ........................................................................................... r 25.11.20 Walton v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440 .................................................................................................................. r 42.5.40 Wang v New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 909 ......................................................................................... r 7.14.40, r 7.18.40 Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273 ............................................................................................................................ SCA 101.120 Wardle v Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] NSWCA 207 ........................................................ CPA 56.40 Wardle v Kick [2006] NSWSC 327 ............................................................................................................................ r 42.12.40 Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544; [1995] HCA 18 .............................................................. r 46.4.20 Warr v Santos [1973] 1 NSWLR 432 ......................................................................................... SCA 75A.100, SCA 75A.160 Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; 53 ALJR 293 ....................................................................... r 14.14.220, r 49.4.60 Warren Mitchell Pty Ltd v Australian Maritime Officers’ Union (1993) 12 ACSR 1; 11 ACLC 1,238 ..................................................................................................................................................................... r 42.21.110 Warringah Transport Co Pty Ltd v AM Kapral (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 586 ........................................................... CPA 129.20 Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491 ........................................................................... SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Water Lily Sales Pty Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd [1976] 2 NSWLR 402 ............................................ SCA 49.120 Waterhouse v Perkins [2001] NSWSC 13 ................................................................................................................. CPA 27.20 Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 1111 ................................. r 42.1.60, r 42.1.62 Waters v Commonwealth [2012] NSWSC 790 .......................................................................................................... r 14.28.40 Waters v P C Henderson (Aust) Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal, 6 July 1994, unreported) ............................................. r 42.1.120 Waterways Authority (NSW) v Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 183 ........................................ r 42.1.120 Watkins v Public Trustee [2007] NSWSC 370 .......................................................................................................... CPA 26.60 Watson v Park Royal (Caterers) Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 727 ........................................................................... r 43.2.60, r Pt43.80 Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15; 67 ALJR 961; 117 ALR 321 ......................... r 14.14.240 Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886; 116 ALR 545; [1993] Aust Torts Reports 62,435 (81-236) .................................................................................................. r 13.1.100, r 13.4.120, r 14.28.80 Webster v Lampard (1993) 67 ALJR 393; 112 ALR 174 ........................................................................................ r 42.21.110 Webster v Zervos (unreported, NSWSC, Master Harrison, 2 October 1997) ......................................................... r 31.14.140 Webster, Re (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 229 ................................................................................... r 57.3.40, r 57.8.20, r 57.11.20 Webuildem Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 708 ......................................................................................... r 18.1.60, CPA 135.35 Wedderburn v Wedderburn (1853) 17 Beav 158 .......................................................................... r 6.19.40, r 6.20.40, r 7.4.80 Wei Fan v South Eastern Sydney and Illawarra Area Health Service [2010] NSWSC 123 ........... r 31.36.40, r 31.36.120, r 31.36.1000 Wei Fan v South Eastern Sydney and Illawarra Area Health Service (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 343 .................. r 31.36.140, r 31.36.1000 Weily’s Quarries v Devine Shipping Pty Ltd (1994) 14 ACSR 186 .................................................. r 42.21.110, r 42.21.300 Weldon v Neal (1887) 19 QBD 394 .......................................................................................................................... CPA 65.20 Welker v Rinehart (No 6) [2012] NSWSC 160 ......................................................................................................... r 18.1.160 Welker v Rinehart (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 839 ................................................................................. CPA 17.60, CPA 17.1000 Wells v Glasscock (1893) 19 VLR 116; 14 ALT 250 .................................................................................................. r 43.2.60 Welzel v Francis (2010) 77 NSWLR 92; [2010] NSWSC 75 .......................................................... CPA 15.40, CPA 15.1000 Wende v Giles Finney t/as CBD Law [2005] NSWSC 927 .................................................................................... r 49.20.100 Wende v Horwath (NSW) Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 550 ........................................................................................... r 42.4.100 Wende v Horwath (NSW) Pty Ltd (2014) 86 NSWLR 674; [2014] NSWCA 170 ............................... r 42.7.100, r 42.12.40 Wentworth v Graham (2002) 55 NSWLR 638; [2002] NSWCA 397 ..................................................................... SCA 46.20 Wentworth v Graham (2003) 57 NSWLR 741; [2003] NSWCA 229 ....................................................................... r 4.10.100 Wentworth v Rogers [1999] NSWCA 403 ........................................................................... r 7.27.80, r 7.41.40, SCR 55.0.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xci

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Wentworth Wentworth Wentworth Wentworth Wentworth Wentworth Wentworth Wentworth Wentworth Wentworth

v v v v v v v v v v

Rogers Rogers Rogers Rogers Rogers Rogers Rogers Rogers Rogers Rogers

[2003] NSWSC 472 ............................................................................................ r 39.41.40, CPA 117.40 [2003] NSWSC 944 .................................................................................................................... r 42.1.62 [2004] NSWCA 109 ................................................................................................................ CPA 29.20 [2004] NSWSC 1176 ............................................................................................................. CPA 126.40 [2004] NSWSC 1192 ................................................................................................................ r 39.44.80 (2006) 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145 .......................................................................... r 7.41.40 [2009] NSWSC 1038 .................................................... r Pt38.60, r Pt38.80, CPA 103.35, CPA 108.30 (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 19 June 1986) ................................................................. r 4.15.40 (No 12) (1987) 9 NSWLR 400 ............................................................ r 31.9.40, r 31.9.60, r 31.9.1000 (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 ................ r 4.15.40, r 14.14.120, r 14.28.100, r 15.3.40, r 36.15.120, r 42.5.40, r 53.7.180 Wentworth v Rogers (No 8) (1986) 7 NSWLR 207 .................................................................................................... r 25.3.60 Wentworth v Rogers (No 9) (1987) 8 NSWLR 388 ................................................................................................ r 36.16.160 Wentworth v Wentworth (1994) 35 NSWLR 726 ..................................................................................................... SCA 46.20 Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350 ............................................................... CPA 13.160 Wentworth v Wentworth (2001) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350 ............................................................... SCA 121.40 Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672 ................................ r 36.16.120, r 36.16.160, SCA 68.20 Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (1983) 57 ALJ 493 ............................................................................. SCA 68.20 West v Public Trustee [1942] SASR 109 ................................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 West Rand Central Gold Mining Co Ltd v The King [1905] 2 KB 391 .................................................................. r 14.7.120 Westacre Investments Inc v The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR (also known as) [2009] 2 SLR (R) 166 ...................................................................................................................................... r Pt6.Div9.20 Westacre Investments Inc v Yugoimport SDPR [2008] EWHC 801 ................................................................... r Pt6.Div9.20 Westbrook v Jacobs [2008] NSWDC 246 .................................................................................................................. r 42.30.40 Westeels Industries Ltd v Browne (unreported, NSW Dist Ct, Cameron Smith DCJ, 19 June 1967) .................. DCA 44.20 Western Australia v Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) (1996) 142 ALR 597 ....................................................... r 21.3.220 Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; 191 ALR 1; [2002] HCA 28 ............................... SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Western Bulk Carriers (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd [2002] FCA 1520 ............................................. r 5.3.60 Western National Plant Pty Ltd v Smith Broughton Pty Ltd (unreported, WASC, 26 June 1998) ......................... r 43.2.100 Western Retirement Village Management Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2007] FCAFC 75 .............................................................................................................................. r 26.1.80 Westfield Queensland No 1 Pty Ltd v Lend Lease Real Estate Investments Ltd [2008] NSWSC 516 ............................................................................................................................................................................ r 54.3.20 Westgate Finance v May [2012] NSWSC 806 ............................................................................................................. r 34.2.60 Westinghouse Electric Corp Uranium Contract Litigation MDL Docket 235 (No 2), Re [1978] AC 547 ....................................................................................................................................................... r 52.1.100, r 52.1.140 Weston v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd [2009] NSWSC 321 ............................................................................... r 1.12.50 Weston v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd [2011] NSWSC 433 ................................................................................. r Pt9.60 Weston v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd (2012) 88 ACSR 80; [2012] NSWCA 79 .... r 12.11.40, CPA 14.60, CPA 59.20 Weston v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd [2012] NSWCA 79; (2012) 88 ACSR 80 .............................................. r 1.12.40 Weston (liquidator of One.Tel Ltd (in liq)) v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd (now known as Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd) [2011] NSWSC 433 ..................................................................................... r 12.11.40 Weston and Cussen as liquidators of Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd v Metro Apartments Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 682 ................................................................................................................... r 31.13.80, r 31.13.120 Westpac Banking Corp v Gilio [2011] NSWSC 1309 ............................................................................................... r 16.3.140 Westpac Banking Corp v Hilliard [2001] VSC 198 ..................................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Westpac Banking Corp v ITS Taxation Services (2004) 183 FLR 273; [2004] NSWSC 50 ..................................... r 26.4.20 Westpac Banking Corp v McArthur [2007] NSWSC 1347 ....................................................................................... r 25.11.20 Westpac Banking Corp v Morris (unreported, NSWSC, Hodgson CJ in Eq, 2 December 1998) .......... r Pt43.60, r Pt43.100 Westpac Banking Corp v Ollis [2007] NSWSC 1008 ................................................................................................. r 42.5.40 Westpac Banking Corp oration Ltd v Kekatos [2015] NSWSC 1629 ........................................................................ r 16.2.40 Westpac Banking Corporatio v Mahabat [2016] NSWSC 102 .................................................................................... r 17.3.30 Westpac Banking Corporation v Mason [2011] NSWSC 1241 ................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Westpac Banking Corporation v Morris [2014] NSWSC 332 ................................................................................... r 55.11.20 Wheatley v Bell [1982] 1 NSWLR 544 .................................................................................................................. SCA 66.360 Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48 .............................................. SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.200 Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (No 2) (2004) 78 ALJR 321 .................................................................................... SCA 75A.200 Whitbread v Rail Corporation NSW [2011] NSWCA 130 ........................................................................................ r 42.1.100

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xcii

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

White v Local Health Authority [2015] NSWSC 417 ................................................................................................. r Pt57.40 White v Overland (2001) 67 ALD 731; [2001] FCA 1333 ....................................................................................... r 14.14.60 White v Ridley (1977) 140 CLR 342; 27 ALR 661 .................................................................................................... r 6.39.40 White v Viewden Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 196 ...................................................................................................... CPA 140.60 White & Co v Credit Reform Association and Credit Index Ltd [1905] 1 KB 653 .................................................. r 22.1.80 White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) v G B White [2004] NSWSC 303 ....................................................... r 42.5.40 Whitehouse Properties Pty Ltd v Bond Brewing (NSW) Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 17 ..................... r 42.15.40, r 42.15.50, Pt 20.Div4.20 Whiterod v Taylor (2006) FLC 93-266; [2006] FamCA 433 ...................................................................................... r 42.5.40 Whitlam v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1985) 73 FLR 414; 60 ACTR 7 ..................................................... r 22.2.180 Whitley, Re [1962] 3 All ER 45; 1 WLR 922 ........................................................................................................... r 42.25.40 Whitney v Dream Developments Pty Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 311; [2013] NSWCA .............................................. r 42.13.40 Whitney v Dream Developments Pty Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 311; [2013] NSWCA 188 ............. r 20.26.40, r 42.13A.20, r 42.15.60 Whyked Pty Ltd v Yahoo Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1236 .......................................... r 42.21.200 Whyte v Brosch (1998) 45 NSWLR 354 .......................................................................................... SC Gen 5, SCR 51.44.20 Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 ............. r 12.7.120, r 13.4.100, r 13.4.260, r 29.9.80, r 49.12.60, SCA 75A.100 Wigley, Re; Ex parte Mullen [1970] 2 NSWLR 297; (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 497 .............................................. SCA 75A.40 Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 174 .............................................. DCA 127.100, SCA 75A.80 Wilcox v Kogarah Golf Club Ltd (1995) 14 ACLC 421 ......................................................................................... SCA 75.20 Wilcox v Poole [1974] 2 NSWLR 693 .................................................................................................................. SCR 68.2.20 Wilcox, Re; Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR 151; 141 ALR 727; [1997] ATPR 41-557 ................................................................................................................................................ r 42.5.40 Wilesmith v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints [2006] NSWSC 936 ...................................................... r 31.2.100 Wilkinson v Campton [2003] NSWCA 325 ........................................................................................................... SCA 75A.60 Wilkinson v Wilkinson (1901) 1 SR (NSW) Eq 285 ................................................................................................... r 33.4.60 Wilks v Bradford Kendall Ltd (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 850 ................................................................................... DCA 126.20 Wilkshire and Coffey v Commonwealth of Australia (1976) 9 ALR 325 ............................................................... r 36.16.210 Williams v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] NSWCA 345 ....................................................................... CPA 27.40 Williams v Lewer [1974] 2 NSWLR 91 ................................................................................................... r 42.1.60, CPA 98.20 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431; 107 ALR 635; 34 AILR 373 .......................................................................................................................................... r 13.4.160, r 14.28.140 Williams v Stanley Jones & Co Ltd [1926] 2 KB 37 .................................................................................................. r 42.1.50 Williams, Re; Ex parte Weston (1922) 39 WN (NSW) 222 .................................................................................. DCA 199.20 Williamson v Spelleken [1977] Qd R 152 ........................................................................................................... SCR 78.0.140 Willis v David Jones Ltd (1934) 34 SR 303 .......................................................................................................... DCA 126.20 Willis v Health Communications Network Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 2 ............................................................... r 42.15.80 Willis v Trotter (1897) LR 18 NSW (Eq) 155 ........................................................................................................... r 42.1.100 Willoughby City Council, Re [2016] NSWSC 127 ..................................................................................................... r Pt55.40 Wilson v Carter [2006] NSWSC 88 ............................................................................................................................. r 42.1.55 Wilson v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 21; 23 ALJ 19 ......................................................................... r 43.2.80 Wilson v Tetley [2003] NSWCA 124 ........................................................................................... SCA 101.100, SCR 51.0.100 Wily v King [2010] NSWSC 352 ................................................................................................................ r 16.1.40, r 16.6.40 Wily v Lo Presti (1997) 16 ACLC 82 .......................................................................................................................... r 17.6.60 Wily v Terra Cresta Business Solutions Pty Ltd (in liq) [2009] NSWSC 1324 ......................................................... r 7.36.80 Windsurf Holdings Pty Ltd v Leonard [2009] NSWCA 6 .......................................................................................... r 19.3.40 Wine National Pty Limited [2016] NSWSC 4 ............................................................................................ r 26.4.20, r 26.4.40 Wine National Pty Ltd, Re [2014] NSWSC 1516 ....................................................................................................... r 26.4.80 Wine National Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 4 ................................................................................................... r 26.4.40, r 26.5.20 Winter v Marac Australia Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 11 .................................................................................................. r 25.11.20 Winterbottom v Vardon & Sons Ltd [1921] SASR 364 .............................................................................................. r 22.3.60 Wisconsin v The Pelican Insurance Co 127 US 265 ................................................................................................. r 53.1.160 Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 ............................................................................................................. SCR 55.0.80 Witness v Marsden (2000) 49 NSWLR 429; [2000] NSWCA 52 .............................................................................. r 4.2.100 Wollongong City Council v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435 .................................................................................... SCA 75A.140 Wollongong City Council v Falamaki (No 3) [2009] NSWLEC 80 ........................................................................... r 40.8.60 Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 204 ALR 722; 81 ALD 109; [2004] FCA 51 .............................................................................................................................. r 14.14.220

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xciii

Table of Cases

TABLE OF CASES

TABLE OF CASES Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 255; 73 ALJR 1427; [1999] HCA 48 ...................................................... r 7.4.60 Wood v Crawford [No 2] [2010] NSWSC 252 ............................................................................................................ r 42.1.62 Wood v Stanton (No 5) (1996) 86 A Crim R 183 ............................................................................................... SCR 55.0.120 Woodcroft v Director of Public Prosecutions (2000) 174 ALR 60 ....................................................................... SCA 75A.20 Woodland v Fuller (1840) 11 Ad & El 859; 113 ER 641 ....................................................................................... CPA 109.20 Woods v Harwin (CA(NSW), Mahoney AP, Clarke and Meagher JJA, 5 November 1993, unreported) ............................................................................................................................................................... SC CA 1 Woodward Pty Ltd v Kelleher (unreported, 30 May 1989) ..................................................................................... DCA 51.20 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; 205 ALR 522; [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-742; [2004] HCA 16 .......................................................................... SCA 45.60 Woolf v 52 Birriga Road Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 921 ....................................................... r 20.20.60, r 20.23.60, r 20.24.60 Woollahra Council v Sved (unreported, Mason P and Sheller JA, 18 May 1998, 24 July 1998) ............................. SC CA 1 Woollahra Municipal Council v Sved (unreported, NSWCA, 24 July 1998) ...................................................... SCA 101.140 Woollahra Municipal Council v Westpac Banking Corp (1994) 33 NSWLR 529 ................................................... r 21.3.140 Woollahra Municipality Council v Sved (unreported, NSWCA, 24 July 1998) .... SCA 101.80, SCA 101.100, SCA 106.40, SCR 51.0.80, SCR 51.0.100, SCR 51.0.200 Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189 ..................................................................................................... SCA 45.20 Woolworths Ltd v Wills [2013] NSWSC 1417 ............................................................................................................ r 16.6.40 Workers’ Compensation Commission (NSW) v FAI Insurances Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 362 .................................. r 21.3.200 World Series Cricket Pty Ltd v Parish (1977) 16 ALR 181 ................................................................................... SCA 66.120 Worth Recycling Pty Ltd v Waste Recycling and Processing Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 354 .................................. CPA 30.80 Worth Recycling Pty Ltd v Waste Recycling and Processing Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 356 .................................. CPA 30.80 Wright v Optus Administration Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1709 ..................................................................... r 18.1.160 Wrightson, Re [1908] 1 Ch 789 .................................................................................................................................... r 46.4.20 Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd (2009) 73 NSWLR 302; [2009] NSWSC 120 ............ r 31.37.1000, r 31.38.1000, r 31.39.1000, r 31.40.1000, r 31.41.20, r 31.41.1000, r 31.44.20 Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 587 ......................................... r 31.37.40, r 31.44.20, r 31.44.1000 Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 65 .......................................................................................... SCA 106.20 Wyong-Gosford Progressive Community Radio Inc v ACMA (No 2) [2006] FCA 1043 ..................................... r 42.21.200 Wyszynski v Bill [2005] NSWSC 110 ........................................................................................................ r 36.5.40, r 40.7.40

X X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network [2013] NSWCA 320 ............................................................................... r Pt57.20 X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Specialty Network (No 5) [2011] NSWSC 1351 ......................... r 31.26.1000, r 31.28.40 X, Re [2016] NSWSC 275 ......................................................................................................................................... r Pt57.100 XAG v A Bank [1983] 2 All ER 464 ...................................................................................................................... SCA 66.360 Xenos v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 973 ........................................................................................ r 41.3.30 Xstrata Qld Ltd v Santos Ltd [2005] QSC 358 ......................................................................................................... r 42.1.120 Xuereb v Viola (1989) 18 NSWLR 453 ........................................................................... r 20.20.100, r 20.20.120, r 20.24.60

Y Y v S [1982] 2 NSWLR 700 ..................................................................................................................... r 7.13.40, r Pt57.180 Yacoub v Pilkington (Aust) Ltd [2007] NSWCA 290 ................................................. r 31.28.80, r 31.28.1000, r 31.30.1000 Yakmor v Hamdoush (No 2) (2009) 76 NSWLR 148; [2009] NSWCA 284 ............................................................. r 7.14.40 Yandil Holdings Pty Ltd v Insurance Co of North America (1985) 3 ACLC 542 ....... r 42.21.100, r 42.21.110, r 42.21.140 Yango Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 410; 53 ALJR 1; 21 ALR 585; [1978] HCA 42 ..................................................................................................................................... r 31.36.60 Yarrabee Coal Co Pty Ltd v Lujans (2009) 53 MVR 187; [2009] NSWCA 85 ................................ r 31.10.60, r 31.10.1000 Yarrangah Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1999) 9 BPR 17,061; [1999] NSWSC 97 ................................. r 27.1.40 Yazgi v Permanent Custodians Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 306 ............................................................. r 42.1.40, r 42.15.80 Yeshiva Properties No 1 Pty Ltd v Joan Marshall [2005] NSWCA 23 .................................................................. r 14.14.120 Yoon v Song (2000) 158 FLR 295; [2000] NSWSC 1147 ....................................................................... r 53.1.20, r 53.7.180 Yoseph v Mammo [2002] NSWSC 585 ..................................................................................................................... CPA 26.60 Younes v QIC Ltd (t/as Westpoint Blacktown) [2012] NSWSC 451 ..................................................................... CPA 140.20 Young v Jackman (1986) 7 NSWLR 97 .............................................................................................................. SCR 55.0.220 Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 2) (1993) 71 A Crim R 121 ............................................................... SCR 55.0.140 Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 3) (1993) 32 NSWLR 262 ........................................ SCR 54.0.200, SCR 55.0.140

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] xciv

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

TABLE OF CASES

Z Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWCA 373 .......................................................................................... r Pt57.40 Z Ltd v A-Z [1982] QB 558 .................................................................................................................................... SCA 66.240 ZN v Australian Red Cross Society [2002] NSWSC 697 ................................................................ r 31.36.120, r 31.36.1000 ZS Projects Pty Ltd v G & R Investments Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 686; 89 FLR 335; 8 IPR 460; [1987] AIPC 37,522 (90-392) ....................................................................................................................... r 13.1.100 Zafiropoulos v Registrar-General (1980) 24 SASR 133 ........................................................................................... SCA 66.60 Zalai v Col Crawford (Retail) Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 438 ................................................................................ DCA 44.20 Zandata Pty Ltd v Riley [2013] NSWSC 49 .............................................................................................................. r 42.34.40 Zeaiter v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 929 ......................................................................... r 15.10.80 Zhu v Yingle Culture Exchange (Aust) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1339 ...................................................................... r 16.2.40 Zhu v Yingle Culture Exchange (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2009] NSWSC 897 ............................................................ r 21.7.40 Zimitat v Douglas [1979] Qd R 454 ....................................................................................................................... SCA 66.320 Zimmerman Holdings Pty Ltd v Wales [2002] NSWSC 447 ...................................................................................... r 7.24.80 Zippoz Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2011] NSWCA 164 ....................................................................... r 16.3.140 Zisti v Bartter Enterprises Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 146 ........................................................................................... r 42.7.100 Zorbas v Sidiropoulous (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 197 .................................................................................................. r Pt35.20 Zorbas v Titan Properties (Aust) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 486 ............................................................................... r 10.14.120 Zuvela v Cosmarnan Concrete Pty Ltd (1996) 71 ALJR 29 ................................................................................. SCA 75A.80

[All references are to paragraph numbers.] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

xcv

Table of Cases

Youngs, Re (1885) 30 Ch D 421 .................................................................................................................................. r 46.4.20

Part 1 – Preliminary 1 Name of Act....................................................................................................................................... 11 2 Commencement.................................................................................................................................11 3 Definitions.......................................................................................................................................... 11 4 Application of Parts 3–10.................................................................................................................. 13 5 Jurisdiction of courts......................................................................................................................... 14 6 Repeals, amendments and savings provisions.................................................................................15 7 Review of Act.................................................................................................................................... 15 Part 2 – Administrative matters Division 1 – Rules, practice notes and forms 8 Uniform Rules Committee................................................................................................................. 16 9 Uniform rules..................................................................................................................................... 16 10 Rules of court taken to include uniform rules................................................................................... 17 11 Relationship between uniform rules and local rules......................................................................... 17 12 Officers of the court may exercise functions conferred by uniform rules......................................... 17 13 Officers of the court may be authorised to exercise court’s functions............................................. 17 14 Court may dispense with rules in particular cases........................................................................... 20 15 Practice notes....................................................................................................................................22 16 Court may give directions in circumstances not covered by rules................................................... 23 17 Forms................................................................................................................................................ 23 Division 2 – Fees 18 Fees...................................................................................................................................................24 Part 3 – Commencing and carrying on proceedings generally 19 Commencing and carrying on proceedings...................................................................................... 26 20 Claims for possession of land........................................................................................................... 26 21 Defendant’s right to set-off................................................................................................................ 27 22 Defendant’s right to cross-claim........................................................................................................29 23 Effect of abandoning excess claim................................................................................................... 31 24 Effect of splitting cause of action...................................................................................................... 32 Part 4 – Mediation of proceedings 25 Definitions.......................................................................................................................................... 34 26 Referral by court................................................................................................................................34 27 Duty of parties to participate............................................................................................................. 37 28 Costs of mediation............................................................................................................................ 38 29 Agreements and arrangements arising from mediation sessions.....................................................40 30 Privilege............................................................................................................................................. 40 31 Confidentiality.................................................................................................................................... 43 32 Directions by mediator...................................................................................................................... 43 33 Protection from liability for mediator..................................................................................................44 34 Mediation otherwise than under this Part......................................................................................... 44 Part 5 – Arbitration of proceedings Division 1 – Preliminary 35 Definitions.......................................................................................................................................... 46 36 Appointment to office as arbitrator.................................................................................................... 47 37 Jurisdiction of arbitrator..................................................................................................................... 47 Division 2 – Arbitration 38 Referral to arbitration........................................................................................................................ 48 39 Determination by arbitrator................................................................................................................49 40 Award taken to be judgment of court................................................................................................49 41 Judicial supervision of arbitrator........................................................................................................49 Division 3 – Rehearings 42 Application for rehearing................................................................................................................... 50 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

1

Civil Procedure Leg

CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT 2005 – (ANNOTATED)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) 43 44 45 46 47

Order for rehearing............................................................................................................................50 Rehearing.......................................................................................................................................... 51 Discontinuance of rehearing............................................................................................................. 52 Costs of rehearing............................................................................................................................. 52 Subpoena at rehearing against arbitrator......................................................................................... 53

Division 4 – Miscellaneous 48 Appearances..................................................................................................................................... 53 49 Procedure.......................................................................................................................................... 53 50 Issue of subpoenas........................................................................................................................... 54 51 Evidence............................................................................................................................................54 52 Refusal or failure to take oath etc.....................................................................................................54 53 Contempt........................................................................................................................................... 55 54 Costs................................................................................................................................................. 55 55 Protection from liability for arbitrator................................................................................................. 55 Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 1 – Guiding principles 56 Overriding purpose............................................................................................................................ 57 57 Objects of case management........................................................................................................... 58 58 Court to follow dictates of justice...................................................................................................... 59 59 Elimination of delay........................................................................................................................... 60 60 Proportionality of costs...................................................................................................................... 61 Division 2 – Powers of court to give directions 61 Directions as to practice and procedure generally........................................................................... 61 62 Directions as to conduct of hearing.................................................................................................. 62 63 Directions with respect to procedural irregularities........................................................................... 63 Division 3 – Other powers of court 64 Amendment of documents generally.................................................................................................64 65 Amendment of originating process after expiry of limitation period..................................................65 66 Adjournment of proceedings............................................................................................................. 67 67 Stay of proceedings.......................................................................................................................... 67 68 Attendance at court and production of documents and things to court............................................67 69 Affidavits and witness statements may be read in advance of hearing........................................... 68 70 Informal proof and admissions.......................................................................................................... 68 71 Business in the absence of the public.............................................................................................. 68 73 Power of court to determine questions about compromises and settlements..................................68 Division 4 – Persons under legal incapacity 74 Definitions and application................................................................................................................ 69 75 Settlement of claim made on behalf of, or against, person under legal incapacity......................... 69 76 Settlement of proceedings commenced by or on behalf of, or against, person under legal incapacity...........................................................................................................................................69 77 Payment of money recovered on behalf of person under legal incapacity...................................... 70 78 Application of money by NSW Trustee and Guardian...................................................................... 70 79 Application of money by manager of protected person’s estate...................................................... 71 80 Directions to tutor of person under legal incapacity......................................................................... 71 Division 5 – Interim payments 81 Definitions and application................................................................................................................ 71 82 Court may order interim payments....................................................................................................71 83 Interim payment not admission of liability......................................................................................... 72 84 Adjustments on final judgment etc.................................................................................................... 72 Division 6 – Miscellaneous 85 Examination on oath......................................................................................................................... 72 86 Orders................................................................................................................................................73 87 Protection against self-incrimination in relation to interlocutory matters.......................................... 73 88 Fresh trial.......................................................................................................................................... 74 89 Procedure on fresh trial.....................................................................................................................75 2

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions

Division 1 – Judgments and orders generally 90 Judgments generally......................................................................................................................... 76 91 Effect of dismissal of proceedings.................................................................................................... 76 92 Judgments for possession of land.................................................................................................... 77 93 Judgments for detention of goods.................................................................................................... 77 94 Failure to comply with order to execute instrument..........................................................................78 95 Joint liability....................................................................................................................................... 79 96 Set-off of judgments.......................................................................................................................... 79 97 Arrest warrants.................................................................................................................................. 80 Division 2 – Costs in proceedings 98 Courts powers as to costs................................................................................................................ 82 99 Liability of legal practitioner for unnecessary costs.......................................................................... 85 Division 3 – Payment of interest 100 Interest up to judgment..................................................................................................................... 87 101 Interest after judgment...................................................................................................................... 89 Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 1 – Preliminary 102 Definitions.......................................................................................................................................... 91 103 Enforcement of judgments generally.................................................................................................92 104 Judgments for possession of land.................................................................................................... 94 105 Judgments for delivery of goods....................................................................................................... 94 106 Judgments for payment of money.....................................................................................................95 107 Deferred payment and payment by instalments............................................................................... 97 108 Order for examination....................................................................................................................... 98 Division 2 – Writs for the levy of property Subdivision 1 – Enforcement against goods and securities 109 Effect of writ of execution on goods................................................................................................100 110 How goods subject to conditional bill of sale to be dealt with........................................................100 111 How securities to be dealt with....................................................................................................... 101 Subdivision 2 – Enforcement against land 112 Effect of judgment and writ of execution on land........................................................................... 101 113 Sale or mortgage by judgment debtor of land affected by order....................................................102 114 Entry onto land for purposes of sale by auction............................................................................. 104 Subdivision 3 – General 115 Effect of sale of property................................................................................................................. 104 116 Effect of expiry of writ......................................................................................................................105 Division 3 – Garnishee orders Subdivision 1 – Enforcement against debts 117 Operation of garnishee order in relation to debts........................................................................... 105 118 Time within which payment to be made......................................................................................... 107 Subdivision 2 – Enforcement against wages or salary 119 Operation of garnishee order in relation to income........................................................................ 108 120 Time within which payment to be made......................................................................................... 109 121 Maximum payment under one of several concurrent garnishee orders......................................... 109 122 Maximum total payment under all garnishee orders.......................................................................109 Subdivision 2A – Enforcement by owners corporations against rent 122A Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 110 122B Application of Subdivision................................................................................................................111 122C Operation of garnishee order in relation to rental income.............................................................. 111 122D Time within which payment to be made.......................................................................................... 111 122E Minimum income of judgment debtor.............................................................................................. 111 Subdivision 3 – General 123 Payments by garnishee................................................................................................................... 111 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

3

Civil Procedure Leg

Part 7 – Judgments and orders

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) 124 125

Procedure where garnishee order not complied with..................................................................... 112 Repayment of excess amounts....................................................................................................... 113

Division 4 – Charging orders 126 Operation of charging order in relation to specified security interests........................................... 114 127 Unauthorised transfer or disposal of security interest under charging order..................................115 128 Disposal of security interest by judgment debtor invalid.................................................................115 Division 5 – Miscellaneous 129 No arrest on mesne process........................................................................................................... 116 130 Judgments not enforceable by certain means................................................................................ 116 131 Committal for contempt................................................................................................................... 116 132 Sheriff may appoint custodian for goods.........................................................................................116 133 Judgments and orders unenforceable until entered........................................................................117 134 Stale judgments and orders enforceable only by leave..................................................................118 135 Directions as to enforcement...........................................................................................................119 136 Appropriation of payments towards judgment debt........................................................................ 120 137 Execution of judgments and orders for costs................................................................................. 121 138 Other methods of enforcing judgments...........................................................................................121 Part 9 – Transfer of proceedings between courts Division 1 – Transfer of proceedings from lower to higher court 139 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 123 140 Transfer of proceedings to higher court..........................................................................................123 141 Transfer orders................................................................................................................................ 125 142 Stay of proceedings in lower court..................................................................................................125 143 Proceedings after transfer............................................................................................................... 125 144 Transfer of certain proceedings from District Court to Supreme Court.......................................... 126 Division 2 – Transfer of proceedings from higher to lower court 145 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 127 146 Transfer of proceedings to lower court........................................................................................... 127 147 Transfer orders................................................................................................................................ 128 148 Proceedings after transfer............................................................................................................... 128 149 Jurisdiction of lower court................................................................................................................128 Division 2A Court 149A 149B 149C 149D 149E Division 3

– Transfer of proceedings between Supreme Court and Land and Environment Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 129 Transfer of proceedings between Supreme Court and Land and Environment Court................... 129 Transfer orders................................................................................................................................ 130 Proceedings after transfer............................................................................................................... 130 Jurisdiction of transferee court........................................................................................................ 131 Transfer of proceedings between Supreme Court and Industrial Court [Repealed]...................... 131

Part 10 – Representative proceedings in Supreme Court Division 1 – Preliminary 155 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 132 156 Application....................................................................................................................................... 132 Division 2 – Commencement of representative proceedings 157 Commencement of representative proceedings............................................................................. 132 158 Standing.......................................................................................................................................... 133 159 Is consent required to be a group member?.................................................................................. 133 160 Persons under legal incapacity....................................................................................................... 133 161 Originating process......................................................................................................................... 133 162 Right of group member to opt out...................................................................................................134 163 Causes of action accruing after commencement of representative proceedings...........................134 164 Situation where fewer than 7 group members................................................................................134 165 Distribution costs excessive............................................................................................................ 134 166 Court may order discontinuance of proceedings in certain circumstances.................................... 135 4

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions Effect of discontinuance order under this Part................................................................................135 Determination of questions where not all common.........................................................................135 Individual questions......................................................................................................................... 136 Directions relating to commencement of further proceedings........................................................ 136 Adequacy of representation............................................................................................................ 136 Stay of execution in certain circumstances.....................................................................................136 Approval of Court required for settlement and discontinuance...................................................... 136 Settlement of individual claim of representative party.................................................................... 137

Division 3 – Notices 175 Notice to be given of certain matters.............................................................................................. 137 176 Notices under section 175.............................................................................................................. 137 Division 4 – Powers of the Court 177 Judgment—powers of the Court..................................................................................................... 138 178 Constitution etc of fund................................................................................................................... 139 179 Effect of judgment........................................................................................................................... 139 Division 5 – Appeals 180 Appeals............................................................................................................................................139 Division 6 – Miscellaneous 181 Costs............................................................................................................................................... 140 182 Suspension of limitation periods..................................................................................................... 140 183 General power of Court to make orders......................................................................................... 140 184 Reimbursement of representative party’s costs..............................................................................141

SCHEDULE 1 – APPLICATION OF ACT................................................................................................... 142 SCHEDULE 2 – CONSTITUTION AND PROCEDURE OF UNIFORM RULES COMMITTEE....... 143 Part 1 – Constitution 1 2 3 3A

Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 143 Term of office...................................................................................................................................143 Vacancy in office............................................................................................................................. 143 Deputies for members..................................................................................................................... 143

Part 2 – Procedure 4 5 6 7 8 9

General procedure.......................................................................................................................... 144 Quorum............................................................................................................................................144 Presiding member........................................................................................................................... 144 Decisions......................................................................................................................................... 144 Transaction of business outside meetings or by telephone........................................................... 144 First meeting....................................................................................................................................145

SCHEDULE 3 – RULE-MAKING POWERS.............................................................................................. 146 SCHEDULE 4 – REPEALS........................................................................................................................... 149 SCHEDULE 6 – SAVINGS, TRANSITIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS.........................................150 Part 1 – General 1

Regulations......................................................................................................................................150

Part 2 – Provisions consequent on enactment of this Act 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Definition..........................................................................................................................................150 Rules under the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970................................................................... 150 Regulations......................................................................................................................................150 Pending proceedings.......................................................................................................................151 Right to claim set-off....................................................................................................................... 151 Amendment of originating process after expiry of limitation period................................................151 Delegations......................................................................................................................................151 Construction of references.............................................................................................................. 151 General saving................................................................................................................................ 151 Motor accident claims..................................................................................................................... 151

Part 3 – Provisions relating to dismissal of proceedings 12

Dismissal of proceedings................................................................................................................ 152

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

5

Civil Procedure Leg

167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) Part 4 – Provisions consequent on enactment of the Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2007 13 14 15 16 17

Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 152 Regulation....................................................................................................................................... 152 Pending proceedings.......................................................................................................................152 Construction of references.............................................................................................................. 152 General saving................................................................................................................................ 153

Part 5 – Provisions consequent on enactment of Schedule 6.1 to Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010 18

Effect of enactment of Part 10 on existing proceedings.................................................................153

Part 6 – Provisions consequent on enactment of Schedule 6.2 to Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010 [Repealed] Part 7 – Provision consequent on enactment of the Courts and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012 20

Validation of exercise of court’s functions.......................................................................................153

Part 8 – Provisions consequent on enactment of Courts and Other Justice Portfolio Legislation Amendment Act 2015 21

6

Pending proceedings.......................................................................................................................154

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of Amending Legislation

Principal legislation

Number

Civil Procedure Act 2005

28 of 2005

This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 1 Jun 2005

Date of commencement Ss 8, 17 and Sch 2: 24 Jun 2005; remainder (except 5.3[1]-[3], 5.15[4], 5.17[3] and 5.30[8]): 15 Aug 2005; Sch 5.3[1]-[3], 5.15[4], 5.17[3] and 5.30[8]: 1 Oct 2005

Date of commencement Sch 3: 1 Jun 2005

Dust Diseases Tribunal Amendment (Claims Resolution) Act 2005 Civil Procedure Amendment (Application of Act) Regulation 2005 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2005 Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2006

22 of 2005

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 26 May 2005

Reg 409 of 2005

10 Aug 2005

15 Aug 2005

98 of 2005

24 Nov 2005

23 of 2006

17 May 2006

Courts Legislation Further Amendment Act 2006 Crimes and Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2006 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2006 Mental Health Act 2007

56 of 2006

20 Jun 2006

Sch 2.10: 24 Nov 2005 Sch 1: 17 May 2006 Sch 1: 20 Jun 2006

107 of 2006

29 Nov 2006

120 of 2006

4 Dec 2006

8 of 2007

15 Jun 2007

Evidence Amendment Act 2007

46 of 2007

1 Nov 2007

Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2007 56 of 2007

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

15 Nov 2007

Sch 1.6: 29 Nov 2006 Schs 3.3 and 4: 4 Dec 2006 Sch 7.2: 16 Nov 2007 (Gaz 169, 16 Nov 2007, p 8465) Sch 2.1: 1 Jan 2009: (Gaz 158, 19 Dec 2008, p 12305) Sch 2 items [3] and [4]: 14 Dec 2007; items [1], [2] and [5]–[14]: 28 Jan 2008: (Gaz 182, 14 Dec 2007, p 9537)

7

Civil Procedure Leg

Table of Amending Legislation

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated)

Principal legislation

Number

Civil Procedure Act 2005

28 of 2005

This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 1 Jun 2005

Date of commencement Ss 8, 17 and Sch 2: 24 Jun 2005; remainder (except 5.3[1]-[3], 5.15[4], 5.17[3] and 5.30[8]): 15 Aug 2005; Sch 5.3[1]-[3], 5.15[4], 5.17[3] and 5.30[8]: 1 Oct 2005

Date of commencement Sch 2.1: 25 May 2009 (Proc 179 of 2009, 22 May 2009) Schs 1.12, 2 and 7: 6 Jul 2009 (Proc 314 of 2009, 3 Jul 2009) Sch 2.1: 1 Oct 2008: (Gaz 92, 25 Jul 2008, p 7281) Sch 3: 1 Jul 2008

Community Justice Centres Amendment Act 2007

70 of 2007

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 7 Dec 2007

Miscellaneous Acts (Local Court) Amendment Act 2007

94 of 2007

13 Dec 2007

Motor Accidents Compensation Amendment (Claims and Dispute Resolution) Act 2007

95 of 2007

13 Dec 2007

Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2008 Mental Health Legislation Amendment (Forensic Provisions) Act 2008

53 of 2008

1 Jul 2008

79 of 2008

5 Nov 2008

Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2008

107 of 2008

8 Dec 2008

Civil Procedure Amendment (Transfer of 30 of 2009 Proceedings) Act 2009 Courts and Other Legislation 37 of 2009 Amendment Act 2009 NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 49 of 2009

9 Jun 2009

Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009

1 Jul 2009

8

56 of 2009

19 Jun 2009 26 Jun 2009

Sch 3.2: 1 Mar 2009 (Gaz 44, 27 Feb 2009, p 1229) Sch 29.1: 7 Apr 2009 (Proc 112 of 2009, 3 Apr 2009) Sch 1: 9 Jun 2009 Sch 1.4: 19 Jun 2009 Sch 2.9: 1 Jul 2009 (Proc 305 of 2009, 1 Jul 2009) Sch 4.11: 17 Jul 2009

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Principal legislation

Number

Civil Procedure Act 2005

28 of 2005

This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2009

77 of 2009

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 1 Jun 2005

Date of commencement Ss 8, 17 and Sch 2: 24 Jun 2005; remainder (except 5.3[1]-[3], 5.15[4], 5.17[3] and 5.30[8]): 15 Aug 2005; Sch 5.3[1]-[3], 5.15[4], 5.17[3] and 5.30[8]: 1 Oct 2005

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 3 Nov 2009

Date of commencement Sch 2.6[1], [2] and [4]–[6]: 3 Nov 2009; Sch 2.6[3]: 1 Feb 2010 (Proc 9 of 2010, 22 Jan 2010) Sch 2.2: 8 Jan 2010

Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 106 of 2009 Act (No 2) 2009 Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2010 63 of 2010

14 Dec 2009

Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010

106 of 2010

29 Nov 2010

Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2010 Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010

119 of 2010

29 Nov 2010

135 of 2010

7 Dec 2010

Courts and Other Legislation Further Amendment Act 2011 Courts and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012 Courts and Other Legislation Further Amendment Act 2013 Courts and Other Miscellaneous Legislation Amendment Act 2013

38 of 2011

13 Sep 2011

Sch 1.7: 28 Jun 2010 Sch 2.1: 1 Jul 2011 (Proc 296 of 2011, 24 Jun 2011) Sch 2.10: 7 Jan 2011 Sch 6.3: 7 Dec 2010; Sch 6.1: 4 Mar 2011 (Proc 118 of 2011, 3 Mar 2011); Sch 6.2: 1 Apr 2011 (Proc 119 of 2011, 3 Mar 2011) Sch 1: 13 Sep 2011

60 of 2012

10 Sep 2012

Sch 3: 10 Sep 2012

1 of 2013

28 Feb 2013

38 of 2013

21 Jun 2013

Sch 1.6: 28 Feb 2013 Sch 1.2: 21 Jun 2013

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

28 Jun 2010

9

Civil Procedure Leg

Table of Amending Legislation

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated)

Principal legislation

Number

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 1 Jun 2005

Date of commencement Ss 8, 17 and Sch 2: 24 Jun 2005; remainder (except 5.3[1]-[3], 5.15[4], 5.17[3] and 5.30[8]): 15 Aug 2005; Sch 5.3[1]-[3], 5.15[4], 5.17[3] and 5.30[8]: 1 Oct 2005

Civil Procedure Act 2005

28 of 2005

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration

Date of commencement Cl 3: 21 Jun 2013

7 of 2015

9 Jun 2015

Sch 2.3: 1 Jul 2015 (Proc 299 of 2015, 19 Jun 2015) Sch 4.3: 30 Nov 2016 (Proc 492 of 2016, 12 Aug 2016) Sch 1.2: 24 Nov 2015 Sch 2.6: 8 Dec 2016 (Proc 674 of 2016, 15 Nov 2016)

This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Civil Procedure Amendment (Local Court Special Jurisdiction) Regulation 2013 Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Legislation Amendment Act 2015 Strata Schemes Management Act 2015

Reg 296 of 2013

50 of 2015

5 Nov 2015

Courts and Other Justice Portfolio Legislation Amendment Act 2015 Industrial Relations Amendment (Industrial Court) Act 2016

67 of 2015

24 Nov 2015

48 of 2016

18 Oct 2016

10

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 1 – Preliminary [CPA 2.20]

s3

PART 1 – PRELIMINARY Commentary by Carol Webster SC. 1

Name of Act This Act is the Civil Procedure Act 2005.

2

Commencement Civil Procedure Leg

(1) This Act commences on a day or days to be appointed by proclamation, subject to this section. (2) Schedule 5.3[1], [2] and [3], 5.15[4], 5.17[3] and 5.30[8] commence on the commencement of section 3, or on the commencement of Part 3.2 of the Legal Profession Act 2004, whichever is the later. (3) Schedule 5.3[4] commences on the commencement of section 9. (4) Schedule 5.43 and 5.44 commence on the commencement of section 18. (5) Different days may be appointed for the commencement of a single provision of Schedule 4 or 5 for the purpose of commencing the repeals or amendments effected by the provision on different days.

SECTION 2 COMMENTARY [CPA 2.20]

Legislative history

Assent was given to the CPA on 1 June 2005. The majority of its provisions commenced on 15 August 2005, by ss 2(1), (3) and (4) and Government Gazette No 100 of 10 August 2005, p 4205. Sections 8 and 17, and Sch 2 commenced on 24 June 2005 by s 2(1) and Government Gazette No 77 of 24 June 2005, p 2952. Schedule 5.3[1]–[3], 5.15[4], 5.17[3] and 5.30[8] commenced on 1 October 2005, by s 2(2) and Government Gazette No 105 of 19 August 2005, p 4570. The CPA has been amended by Sch 5.3 to the Act as set out in the Table of Amending Legislation. 3

Definitions (1) In this Act: civil dispute [Repealed]

[Def rep Act 1 of 2013, Sch 1.6[1]; insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[1]]

civil proceedings means any proceedings other than criminal proceedings. claim for relief includes: (a) a claim for possession of land, and (b) a claim for delivery of goods, and (c) a claim for the recovery of damages or other money, and (d) a claim for a declaration of right, and (e) a claim for the determination of any question or matter that may be determined by the court, and (f) any other claim (whether legal, equitable or otherwise) that is justiciable in the court. costs, in relation to proceedings, means costs payable in or in relation to the proceedings, and includes fees, disbursements, expenses and remuneration. court includes tribunal. criminal proceedings means proceedings against a person for an offence (whether summary or indictable), and includes the following: (a) committal proceedings, (b) proceedings relating to bail, (c) proceedings relating to sentence, © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

11

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s3 (d)

proceedings on an appeal against conviction or sentence.

cross-claim means a claim by a defendant for the grant of relief under section 22. defendant means a person against whom proceedings are commenced, and includes a person against whom a cross-claim is made. exercise a function includes perform a duty. function includes power, authority and duty. hearing includes both trial and interlocutory hearing. judgment includes any order for the payment of money, including any order for the payment of costs. judgment creditor means the person to whom a judgment debt is payable. judgment debt includes: (a) any amount payable under a judgment, and (b) any interest after judgment that is payable on that amount under section 101, and (c) any other amount payable under rules of court without the need for a judgment. judgment debtor means the person by whom a judgment debt is payable. judicial officer has the same meaning as it has in the Judicial Offıcers Act 1986. jurisdictional limit means: (a) in relation to the District Court, the jurisdictional limit of that Court within the meaning of the District Court Act 1973, and (b) in relation to the Local Court sitting in its General Division, the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court when sitting in that Division within the meaning of the Local Court Act 2007, and (c) in relation to the Local Court sitting in its Small Claims Division, the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court when sitting in that Division within the meaning of the Local Court Act 2007. [Def am Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 7; Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2]

local rules means rules of court other than uniform rules. minor means a person who is under the age of 18 years. motor accident claim has the same meaning as claim has in the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999. officer, in relation to a court, includes any registrar or other member of staff employed in the administration of the business of the court, and includes the Judicial Registrar of the District Court. ordinary basis, in relation to the assessment of legal costs that a court has ordered to be paid, means the basis of assessing costs in accordance with Division 3 of Part 7 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014. [Def subst Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.3[1]; am Act 28 of 2005, s 6 and Sch 5.3[1]]

originating process means the process by which proceedings are commenced, and includes the process by which a cross-claim is made. person under legal incapacity means any person who is under a legal incapacity in relation to the conduct of legal proceedings (other than an incapacity arising under section 4 of the Felons (Civil Proceedings) Act 1981) and, in particular, includes: (a) a child under the age of 18 years, and (b) an involuntary patient, a forensic patient or a correctional patient within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2007, and (c) a person under guardianship within the meaning of the Guardianship Act 1987, and 12

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 1 – Preliminary [CPA 3.20]

s4 (d)

a protected person within the meaning of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009, and (e) an incommunicate person, being a person who has such a physical or mental disability that he or she is unable to receive communications, or express his or her will, with respect to his or her property or affairs.

[Def am Act 49 of 2009, Sch 2.9[1]; Act 79 of 2008, s 4 and Sch 3.2; Act 8 of 2007, s 199 and Sch 7.2]

Civil Procedure Leg

plaintiff means a person by whom proceedings are commenced, or on whose behalf proceedings are commenced by a tutor, and includes a person by whom a cross-claim is made or on whose behalf a cross-claim is made by a tutor. possession, otherwise than of land, includes custody and power. trial means any hearing that is not an interlocutory hearing. tutor, in relation to a person under legal incapacity, means a tutor appointed to represent the person (whether by the court or otherwise) in accordance with the uniform rules. uniform rules means rules made, or taken to have been made, under section 9. Uniform Rules Committee means the Uniform Rules Committee established under section 8. workplace injury damages claim means a claim for an award of damages to which Division 3 of Part 5 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 applies. Note: Other words and expressions (for example, rules of court) are defined in the Interpretation Act 1987. (2) Notes included in this Act do not form part of this Act. Note: In the notes to this Act, DCR means the District Court Rules 1973, LCR means the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Rules 1988 and SCR means the Supreme Court Rules 1970. [S 3 am Act 7 of 2015; Act 1 of 2013; Act 135 of 2010; Act 49 of 2009; Act 79 of 2008; Act 94 of 2007; Act 8 of 2007; Act 28 of 2005]

SECTION 3 COMMENTARY [CPA 3.20]

Dictionary

The UCPR contains a Dictionary: r 1.2(1). It is found at the end of the UCPR, after the Schedules. In addition, some Parts, Divisions or rules contain definitions which relate only to the particular Part, Divisions or rule. A note at the end of the Dictionary sets out the words and expressions defined in the CPA, which consequently have the same meaning in the UCPR. 4

Application of Parts 3–10

(1) Subject to this section, Parts 3–9 apply to each court referred to in Schedule 1 in relation to civil proceedings of a kind referred to in that Schedule in respect of that court. (1A) Part 10 applies in relation to civil proceedings in the Supreme Court. [Subs (1A) insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[1]]

(2) The uniform rules may exclude any class of civil proceedings from the operation of all or any of the provisions of Parts 3–9. (3) The Governor may, by regulation, amend or substitute Schedule 1. (4) A regulation under this section may contain provisions consequent on the amendment or substitution of Schedule 1, including: (a) provisions excluding any class of civil proceedings from the operation of all or any of the provisions of Parts 3–9, and (b) provisions modifying any specified provision of Parts 3–9, or of any other Act or law, in its application to any class of civil proceedings. (5) Subject to any such regulation, this Act does not limit the operation of any other Act with respect to the conduct of civil proceedings. [S 4 am Act 135 of 2010] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

13

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s4

[CPA 4.20]

SECTION 4 COMMENTARY [CPA 4.20]

Application of the Act

By amendments to Schedule 1 of the CPA, the CPA now applies to: • all civil proceedings in the Supreme Court, District Court and Dust Diseases Tribunal; • in the Local Court, all civil proceedings under Pt 3 of the Local Court Act 2007 (under which the Local Court has jurisdiction to deal with money claims, claims for the detention of goods and review of contracts), and all civil proceedings under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984; • all civil proceedings in Class 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the Land and Environment Court and from 7 April 2009, Class 8 (mining matters transferred to the Land and Environment Court on abolition of Wardens’ Courts); • from 1 February 2010, all civil proceedings in the Industrial Relations Commission (including, until 8 December 2016 the Commission in Court Session (the Industrial Court)); • from 21 June 2013, all civil proceedings for which the Local Court has jurisdiction under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 s 91. However, Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 cl 15A excludes those proceedings from the operation of CPA ss 19–86 and ss 88–154, so that only CPA s 87 regarding self incrimination applies. Civil proceedings are defined in s 3 of the CPA as meaning proceedings other than criminal proceedings. Criminal proceedings are defined to mean proceedings against a person for an offence, whether summary or indictable, and include committal proceedings, proceedings relating to bail, sentence and an appeal against conviction or sentence. Individual court Acts should still be consulted for any exceptions: for example, Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 s 14(5) states that CPA Pt 8 (regarding enforcement of judgments and orders) does not apply to authorise the Tribunal to exercise any function of a court under that Part, however, DDT Act s 10(5) provides that, subject to DDT Act s 13(6) (as to reconsideration of previous decisions) and s 14, a decision of the Tribunal has the same effect as and may be enforced in the same way as a decision of the Supreme Court. UCPR rr 1.5 and 1.6 specify proceedings which are excluded from the operation of Pts 3 to 9 of the CPA: see [r 1.5.40] and [r 1.6.40]. UCPR r 1.6 sets out proceedings wholly excluded from the operation of the CPA to the extent that they are civil proceedings, being proceedings under the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1900, the Habitual Criminals Act 1957, the Bail Act 1978, Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, Pt 15A and Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996, Pt 4. UCPR r 1.7 provides for local rules that prevail over the UCPR: see [r 1.7.40]. 5

Jurisdiction of courts (1) Nothing in this Act or the uniform rules limits the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

(2) Nothing in the uniform rules extends the jurisdiction of any court except to the extent to which this Act expressly so provides.

SECTION 5 COMMENTARY [CPA 5.20]

Existing jurisdiction preserved

Claims in excess of the jurisdictional limit of the District Court and Local Court may be dealt with by express or deemed consent of the parties. The District Court may give judgment for a maximum amount equivalent to 150% of the jurisdictional limit of the court in the circumstances discussed in [CPA 23.60], pursuant to DCA s 51(1) and (4). Similarly the Local Court in its General Division may determine proceedings on a money claim for amount equivalent to 120% of the jurisdictional limit, pursuant to Local Court Act 2007 s 31(1) and (2).

14

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 1 – Preliminary [CPA 7.20]

6

s7

Repeals, amendments and savings provisions (1) Each Act and instrument referred to in Schedule 4 is repealed. (2) [Repealed]

[Subs (2) rep Act 120 of 2006, s 4 and Sch 4]

(3) Schedule 6 has effect. Civil Procedure Leg

[S 6 am Act 120 of 2006]

SECTION 6 COMMENTARY [CPA 6.20] The Acts • • • • •

Act repealed by the CPA

dealing with civil procedure replaced by the CPA include: Administration of Justice Act 1924, Arbitration (Civil Actions) Act 1983, Damages (Infants and Persons of Unsound Mind) Act 1929, Foreign Judgments Act 1973, Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901.

Relevant provisions of the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 are now found in the Local Court Act 2007. Schedule 6 of the CPA contains savings and transitional provisions consequent on the enactment of the CPA and subsequent amendments to it. 7

Review of Act

(1) The Minister is to review this Act to determine whether the policy objectives of the Act remain valid and whether the terms of the Act remain appropriate for securing those objectives. (2) The review is to be undertaken as soon as possible after the period of 5 years from the date of assent to this Act. (3) A report on the outcome of the review is to be tabled in each House of Parliament within 12 months after the end of the period of 5 years.

SECTION 7 COMMENTARY [CPA 7.20]

Development of the CPA

The background to the development of common civil procedure rules for the Supreme, District and Local Courts is discussed in the Attorney General’s Department, An Introduction to Civil Procedure Act 2005 and Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 by Atkinson J and Olischlager S in Lindsay G (ed), The Handbook: Thomson’s Guide to Civil Procedure in NSW (Thomson, 2005), Ch 10, available at http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/spu/ll_ucpr.nsf/pages/ucpr_publications. See also The Hon Mr Justice Hamilton, “The New Procedure – Nuts and Bolts for Judicial Officers” (2006) 7 TJR 449. Since the commencement of the CPA, further provisions of the former SCR and DCR have been transferred into the UCPR, including the new Pt 51 dealing with the Court of Appeal, commencing 1 January 2008.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

15

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s8

PART 2 – ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS Commentary by Mark Walsh, Barrister.

DIVISION 1 – RULES, PRACTICE NOTES AND FORMS 8

Uniform Rules Committee (1) There is to be a Uniform Rules Committee comprising 11 members, of whom: (a) one is to be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or a Judge of the Supreme Court nominated for the time being by the Chief Justice, and (b) one is to be the President of the Court of Appeal or a Judge of Appeal nominated for the time being by the President, and (c) two are to be Judges of the Supreme Court appointed by the Chief Justice, and (c1) one is to be the Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court or a Judge nominated for the time being by the Chief Judge, and (c2) [Repealed] (d) one is to be the Chief Judge of the District Court or a Judge of the District Court nominated for the time being by the Chief Judge, and (e) one is to be a Judge of the District Court appointed by the Chief Judge, and (f) one is to be the Chief Magistrate or a Magistrate nominated for the time being by the Chief Magistrate, and (g) one is to be a Magistrate appointed by the Chief Magistrate, and (h) one is to be a barrister appointed by the Bar Council, and (i) one is to be a solicitor appointed by the Law Society Council.

[Subs (1) am Act 48 of 2016, Sch 2.6[1] and [2]; Act 77 of 2009, Sch 2.6[1] and [2]; Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[1] and [2]; Act 120 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 3.3]

(2) Schedule 2 has effect with respect to the constitution and procedure of the Uniform Rules Committee. [S 8 am Act 48 of 2016; Act 77 of 2009; Act 56 of 2007; Act 120 of 2006]

9

Uniform rules

(1) The Uniform Rules Committee may make rules, not inconsistent with this Act, for or with respect to any matter that by this Act is required or permitted to be prescribed by rules or that is necessary or convenient to be prescribed by rules for carrying out or giving effect to this Act. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), rules under this section may make provision, in relation to all civil proceedings in respect of which a court has jurisdiction (however arising), for or with respect to the matters specified in Schedule 3. (3) On the commencement of this section, the rules set out in Schedule 7 are taken to have been made under this section, and may be amended and repealed accordingly. (4) The rules made under this section may authorise or require the use of an electronic case management system established under clause 2 of Schedule 1 to the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 in relation to any proceedings in a court in respect of which the use of such a system is authorised by an order in force under clause 3 of Schedule 1 to that Act. [Subs (4) am Act 119 of 2010, Sch 2.10[1] and [2]]

(5) This section does not give power to make rules with respect to: (a) any matter relating to costs that is regulated by the legal profession legislation (as defined in section 3A of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014), or (b) any matter for which Admission Rules may be made under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW). [Subs (5) subst Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.3[2]; Act 28 of 2005, s 6 and Sch 5.3[2]]

(6) This section does not limit the operation of section 78 of the Interpretation Act 1987. [S 9 am Act 7 of 2015; Act 119 of 2010; Act 28 of 2005] 16

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 2 – Administrative matters Division 1 – Rules, practice notes and forms

[CPA 13.40] 10

s 13

Rules of court taken to include uniform rules

(1) Rules of court are taken to include the uniform rules to the extent to which they are applicable in that court. (2) Subsection (1) does not authorise the person or body having power to make local rules to amend or repeal a uniform rule in its application to that court. 11

Relationship between uniform rules and local rules Civil Procedure Leg

(1) The uniform rules prevail over any provision of any local rules unless the uniform rules expressly provide that the provision of the local rules is to prevail. (2) One rule prevails over another, as referred to in subsection (1), to the extent only of any inconsistency between them. 12

Officers of the court may exercise functions conferred by uniform rules

Without limiting any other functions he or she may exercise, a registrar or other officer of any court may exercise any function conferred on such an officer by the uniform rules. 13

Officers of the court may be authorised to exercise court’s functions (1) The senior judicial officer of any court may, by instrument in writing: (a) direct that any function of the court under this Act or any other Act or law in respect of which the court has jurisdiction (including any rules of court) may be exercised by such registrars or other officers of the court, and in such circumstances and subject to such conditions, as are specified in the instrument, and (b) vary or revoke any such instrument.

[Subs (1) am Act 60 of 2012, Sch 3[1]]

(2) This section does not limit any provision of the Act by which the court is constituted with respect to the exercise of the court’s functions. [S 13 am Act 60 of 2012]

SECTION 13 COMMENTARY Operation ............................................................................................................................................... [CPA 13.20] Delegation of Supreme Court’s functions to Registrars ........................................................................ [CPA 13.40] Delegation of Supreme Court’s functions to Court of Appeal Registrar ............................................... [CPA 13.60] Delegation of Supreme Court’s functions to a Chief Clerk ................................................................... [CPA 13.80] Delegation of Land and Environment Court’s functions to Registrars ................................................ [CPA 13.100] Delegation of District Court’s functions to registrars ........................................................................... [CPA 13.120] Delegation of Local Court’s functions to registrars ............................................................................. [CPA 13.140] Performance of delegated judicial function and judicial immunity ...................................................... [CPA 13.160] References ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 13.1000]

[CPA 13.20]

Operation

This sections permits the senior judicial officer of a court to delegate certain functions to registrars, deputy registrars, or other officers of the court such as the chief clerk, that might otherwise be undertaken by a judge or associate judge. [CPA 13.40]

Delegation of Supreme Court’s functions to Registrars

On 26 November 2012 pursuant to CPA s 13 the Chief Justice directed that a registrar of the court (including a person acting as the registrar or as a deputy to the registrar) may exercise the functions of the court as stated in Pts 1 to 3 of the schedule to that direction. Part 1 of the schedule to the direction is in the form of a table containing three columns, with the delegated functions of the court pursuant to the CPA or UCPR stated in Column 1, but subject to any restriction stated in Column 3. Column 2 is inserted for convenience of reference to identify the nature of the provision in Column 1. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

17

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 13

[CPA 13.40]

Part 2 of the schedule to the direction is in the form of a table containing three columns, with the delegated functions of the court pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules 1970 stated in Column 1, but subject to any restriction stated in Column 3. Column 2 is inserted for convenience of reference to identify the nature of the matters in Column 1. Part 3 of the schedule to the direction contains 11 clauses. The first clause is in regard to Orders under various Commonwealth and State Acts and is set out in a table containing three columns. Column 1 is described as “Part and/or rule” and sets out the various Acts and the relevant provisions delegated pursuant to CPA s 13, with the restriction stated in Column 3. Column 2 is headed “Description (for information only)” and identifies the nature of the provisions stated in Column 1. The other 10 clauses contained in Pt 3 of the schedule are specific functions of the court delegated to a Registrar. They include: any judgment by consent and any order by consent; an order for costs provided it is unlikely in the opinion of the registrar that the costs will exceed $20,000; any matter which a Judge or an Associate Judge may conduct or deal with and is referred to a registrar by order of a Judge or Associate, Judge and issuing a subpoena. The content of the direction for the delegation of the Supreme Court’s functions to Registrars can be found in the Delegations section of this service. [CPA 13.60]

Delegation of Supreme Court’s functions to Court of Appeal Registrar

On 2 January 2008 pursuant to CPA s 13 the Chief Justice directed that a Registrar of the Court of Appeal (including a person acting as the registrar) may exercise the functions of the court as stated in the schedule to that direction. The schedule to the direction is in the form of a table containing three columns, with the delegated functions of the court pursuant to the UCPR stated in Column 1, but subject to any restriction stated in Column 3. Column 2 is headed “Description” and identifies the nature of the provisions stated in Column 1. The current schedule contains delegations for: UCPR r 13.4, frivolous and vexatious proceedings, but restricted to incompetent proceedings and failure to prosecute; and also rules in UCPR Pt 51 Court of Appeal, each of which are set out in Column 1 of the schedule. The content of the direction for the delegation of the Supreme Court’s functions to a Court of Appeal Registrar can be found in the Delegations section of this service. [CPA 13.80]

Delegation of Supreme Court’s functions to a Chief Clerk

On 4 October 2007 pursuant to CPA s 13 the Chief Justice directed that a chief clerk of the court (including a person acting as a chief clerk) may exercise the functions of the court as stated in Pts 1 and 2 of the schedule to that direction. Part 1 of the schedule to the direction is in the form of a table containing three columns, with the delegated functions of the court pursuant to the CPA or UCPR stated in Column 1, but subject to any restriction stated in Column 3. Column 2 is inserted for convenience of reference only and does not affect the operation of the direction. The functions delegated stated in Pt 1 are in regard to CPA s 98 costs and CPA s 100 interest up to judgment in respect to judgment given by default pursuant to UCPR Pt 16. Further delegations of functions pursuant to the UCPR are set out in Pt 1 as follow: UCPR Pt 16 default judgment restricted to judgment for possession of land under UCPR r 16.4, judgment for a liquidated demand under UCPR r 16.6, or judgment for a mixed claim under UCPR r 16.8 but only if the claims are for possession of land and a liquidated demand. It also delegates functions under UCPR rr 36.10 and 36.11 for the filing of certificates plus entry of judgments and orders, and the issue of a writ for possession in respect of a judgment given by default under Pt 16 of the Rules, pursuant to UCPR r 39.1(d). Part 2 of the schedule to the direction delegates other functions to a chief clerk, being in respect of certifying a copy of a judgment, order or document to be a true copy, sealing a judgment or order that has been given or entered in proceedings, or sealing and signing a document that accurately sets out the terms of the judgment or order given or entered in proceedings where the registrar, or other proper officer of the court, is authorised under any Act or Commonwealth Act or under the rules to issue or furnish a certificate, sealed copy or office copy of the document. 18

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[CPA 13.160]

Part 2 – Administrative matters Division 1 – Rules, practice notes and forms

s 13

[CPA 13.100] Delegation of Land and Environment Court’s functions to Registrars On 24 October 2013 pursuant to CPA s 13 the Chief Judge, Land and Environment Court, directed that a registrar of that court (including a person acting as the registrar or as a deputy to the registrar) may exercise the functions of the Land and Environment Court as stated in Pts 1 to 3 of the schedule to the direction. By that direction the Chief Judge also revoked all earlier instruments made pursuant to CPA s 13. Part 1 of the schedule is in the form of a table with three columns. The delegated functions of the court pursuant to the CPA and the UCPR are stated in Column 1 but subject to any restriction mentioned in Column 3. The matter in Column 2 is inserted for convenience of reference only, it describes the section or rule number in Column 1, and does not affect the operation of the direction. Part 2 of the schedule also is in the form of a table with three columns. The delegated functions of the court pursuant to the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 and the Land and Environment Court Rules 2007 are stated in Column 1 but subject to any restriction mentioned in Column 3. The matter in Column 2 is inserted for convenience of reference only, it describes the section or rule number in Column 1, and does not affect the operation of the direction. Part 3 of the schedule to the direction sets out in 10 clauses delegations in regard to Orders under various Commonwealth and State Acts, also procedural matters for the administration of court, and a delegation of functions regarding the exercise of the registrar’s powers, including under the direction. [CPA 13.120] Delegation of District Court’s functions to registrars CPA delegations: On 13 March 2006 pursuant to CPA s 13 the Chief Judge of the District Court directed that the Principal Registrar, registrars for proclaimed places and assistant registrars may exercise the powers conferred by the CPA provisions listed in Column 1 and described in Column 2, but subject to any restriction listed in Column 3. Column 1 contains various CPA provisions including CPA s 26 referral of parties to mediation, but with the restriction of by the consent of the parties, and also CPA ss 140 and 146 being the transfer of proceedings from and to the Local Court, without restriction. UCPR delegations: On 13 March 2006 pursuant to CPA s 13 the Chief Judge directed that the Principal Registrar, registrars for proclaimed places and assistant registrars may exercise the powers conferred by the UCPR legislation listed in Column 1 and described in Column 2, but subject to any restriction listed in Column 3. Column 1 contains delegations of a significant number of UCPR rules. Examples include: UCPR r 1.12 extension and abridgment of time; UCPR r 28.5 orders that matters be consolidated or heard together; UCPR r 42.7 orders that costs in interlocutory applications by payable before the conclusion of the proceedings. [CPA 13.140] Delegation of Local Court’s functions to registrars On 12 August 2005 pursuant to CPA s 13 the Chief Magistrate directed that a Registrar of the Local Court may exercise the powers of a court conferred by the legislation listed in Column 1 of the table forming part of that direction, and described in Column 2, but subject to any restrictions listed in Column 3. The Chief Magistrate also directed that a Registrar of the Local Court may exercise the powers of the court conferred by a number of CPA provisions set out in Pt 1 of the table to the direction, and also the provisions of the UCPR as set out in Pt 2 of the table to the direction in respect of civil proceedings. [CPA 13.160] Performance of delegated judicial function and judicial immunity The performance of any function of the court by a Registrar pursuant to a direction made under CPA s 13 is the exercise of judicial function of the court’s jurisdiction and powers, which comes within the ambit of the doctrine of judicial immunity, see Judicial Offıcers Act 1986 s 44C; Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350 at 609 (NSWLR) per Fitzgerald JA; Scanlon v Director-General Department of the Arts Sport & Recreation (2007) 70 NSWLR 1; [2007] NSWCA 204 at 25 (NSWLR). Any proceedings instituted against a Registrar in regard to a decision in the performance of such delegated judicial function in the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction and powers comes within the ambit of the doctrine of judicial immunity, are an abuse of process and ought be summarily dismissed. This includes the performance of an administrative function intimately associated with judicial duties, see Hammond v New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1930. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

19

Civil Procedure Leg

The content of the direction for the delegation of the Supreme Court’s functions to a chief clerk can be found in the Delegations section of this service.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 14

[CPA 13.1000]

[CPA 13.1000]

References

Supreme Court’s CPA s 13 delegation of functions to Registrars can be found in the Delegations section of this service; see also online at: http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_ delegationsofcourtfunctions/delegation_to_registrars.html Supreme Court’s CPA s 13 delegation to Court of Appeal Registrar can be found in the Delegations section of this service Supreme Court’s CPA s 13 delegation of functions to Chief Clerks is in can be found in the Delegations section of this service; see also online at: http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_ delegationsofcourtfunctions/sco2_delegation_chiefclerks.html Land and Environment Court’s CPA s 13 delegation of functions to Registrars is available online at: http://www.lec.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lec/legislation.html District Court’s CPA s 13 delegation of functions to Registrars is available online at: http:// www.districtcourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/districtcourt/delegated_powers/civ_proc_act.html (CPA delegations) http://www.districtcourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/districtcourt/delegated_powers/civ_proc_rules.html (UCPR delegations) Local Court’s CPA s 13 delegation of functions to registrars is available online at: http:// www.localcourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/localcourts/powers_registrars.html 14

Court may dispense with rules in particular cases

In relation to particular civil proceedings, the court may, by order, dispense with any requirement of rules of court if satisfied that it is appropriate to do so in the circumstances of the case.

SECTION 14 COMMENTARY Operation ............................................................................................................................................... [CPA 14.20] Considerations for the exercise of the discretion to dispense with the rules ....................................... [CPA 14.40] Time, the uniform rules and the common law ....................................................................................... [CPA 14.60] Power of registrars to dispense with rules in certain cases .................................................................. [CPA 14.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 14.1000]

[CPA 14.20]

Operation

This section confers on a court in civil proceedings a broad discretion to order that the requirements of the rules of court not apply if it is satisfied that such an order is appropriate. The section is an express statement of the power incidental to the jurisdiction of a court of justice to control its own processes. A similar power was formerly conferred on individual courts by rules such as SCR Pt 1 r 12 (repealed on commencement of CPA s 14 from 15 August 2005). [CPA 14.40]

Considerations for the exercise of the discretion to dispense with the rules

In determining whether or not to make such an order a court will be concerned with matters of substance insofar as non-compliance with the rules of court is concerned. By way of examples: Pleadings: a failure to comply with pleading rules is not necessarily fatal to a party’s right to rely upon the unpleaded matter, s 14 confers power on a court to dispense with its rules, see Bellingen Shire Council v Colavon Pty Ltd (2012) 188 LGERA 169; [2012] NSWCA 34 per Beazley JA at [24]; Expert evidence: a court may dispense with the provisions of UCPR r 31.36 in the circumstances of a particular case and is unlikely to be churlish such as no notice of motion having been filed under UCPR r 31.36(5), see Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 per Beazley JA at [11]; Service of notice of motion: a court may dispense with rules requiring service of a sealed copy of a notice of motion pursuant to UCPR r 18.1 or compliance with time requirements in rr 18.4 and 18.5 in respect of service, see Petronaitis v Rowles [2012] NSWCA 236. Considerations by the court will include the matters in CPA Pt 6, and particularly s 56(1), “to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings” and also ss 57 to 60, see also Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27. A relevant matter is whether objection is taken by the opposing party, or if any prejudice is likely to be suffered due to a failure to comply with the rules. The exercise of the discretion is predicated upon fairness to the parties, see Bellingen Shire Council at [24]. 20

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 2 – Administrative matters Division 1 – Rules, practice notes and forms

[CPA 14.1000]

s 14

The content of CPA s 14 arguably limits its application to rules imposing duties on the parties to litigation. This provision may not extend to a rule imposing limitations on the power of the court, eg orders as to costs pursuant to UCPR r 42.3, see Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; 83 ALJR 1180; [2009] HCA 43 at 91 (CLR).

[CPA 14.60]

Time, the uniform rules and the common law

Further dispensing power is conferred on a court by CPA s 63, which provides that a court may make directions with respect to procedural irregularities where there has been a failure to comply with any requirement of the CPA or the rules of court. The application of s 63 by a court is constrained. It applies by its terms to setting aside the proceedings, any step taken in the proceedings or any document, judgment or order in the proceedings, either wholly or in part. The court may not by order take such action unless the application is made by the party within a reasonable time and, in any case, before the party takes any fresh step in the proceedings after becoming aware of the failure. The uniform rules also provide a discretion for a court to make an order to extend or abridge any time fixed by the rules or by any judgment or order of the court, see UCPR r 1.12. Under that rule the court may extend time either before or after the time expires, ie even if an application for extension is made after the time expires, see Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Kirk (2011) 82 ACSR 390; [2011] NSWCA 67; Weston v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd (2012) 88 ACSR 80; [2012] NSWCA 79 at [20]. At common law a court may make an order nunc pro tunc, which means “now instead of then”, to cure a procedural defect or an irregularity such as a failure to seek leave to proceed. By such order a judgment is entered so as to have the same legal force and effect as if it had been entered on an earlier day, see reasons of Toohey J for the origin and extent of such orders in Emanuele v Australian Securities Commission (1997) 188 CLR 114; 71 ALJR 717 at 131–132. That decision is authority for the proposition that the failure to obtain the leave of the court before proceeding to apply for the making of a winding-up order is an irregularity that may be cured by the grant of leave nunc pro tunc. Such an order also may be sought to cure procedural irregularities due to failure to comply with the rules, other than where the uniform rules be clear words preclude its application, see for example UCPR r 36.16(3C). [CPA 14.80]

Power of registrars to dispense with rules in certain cases

Pursuant to CPA s 13 the senior judicial officer of each of the Supreme Court, the Land and Environment Court, the District Court and the Local Court has directed that a registrar of the court may dispense with the rules pursuant to CPA s 14 in particular cases, being restricted to those matters with which a registrar may deal. Necessarily such matters will include other functions of each court in respect of which the court has jurisdiction, which also have been delegated to a registrar pursuant to CPA s 13. [CPA 14.1000]

References

Petronaitis v Rowles [2012] NSWCA 236 Harding v Bourke (2000) 48 NSWLR 598; [2000] NSWCA 60 at [26] Hodder Rook & Assocs Pty Ltd v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 279 at [38] Bellingen Shire Council v Colavon Pty Ltd (2012) 188 LGERA 169; [2012] NSWCA 34 Salzke v Khoury (2009) 74 NSWLR 580; [2009] NSWCA 195 Civil Procedure Act 2005, Pt 6

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

21

Civil Procedure Leg

A guiding principle is that the rules of the court are to be the servant of justice, not its master. Further, “No matter how inconvenient it may be, a judge must never lose sight of his or her primary duty and that is to ensure a fair trial”, see Hodder Rook & Assocs Pty Ltd v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 279 per Young JA at [38] (agreed in by Beazley JA and Handley AJA).

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 15

15

[CPA 15.20]

Practice notes

(1) Subject to rules of court, the senior judicial officer of the court may issue practice notes for that court in relation to civil proceedings to which this Act applies. (2) A practice note must be published in the Gazette. [Subs (2) subst Act 56 of 2009, Sch 4.11]

(3) Sections 40 and 41 of the Interpretation Act 1987 apply to a practice note in the same way as they apply to a statutory rule. [Subs (3) insrt Act 56 of 2009, Sch 4.11] [S 15 am Act 56 of 2009]

SECTION 15 COMMENTARY Operation ............................................................................................................................................... [CPA 15.20] Relationship between practice notes and rules ..................................................................................... [CPA 15.40] Sections 40 and 41 of the Interpretation Act 1987 ................................................................................ [CPA 15.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 15.1000]

[CPA 15.20]

Operation

This section confers a power on the senior judicial officer of each court, and subject to issue practice notes in regard to civil proceedings. It requires that such practice Gazette and also makes provision for the disallowance of a practice note by either applying the processes prescribed by ss 40 and 41 of the Interpretation Act 1987 statutory rules, to practice notes. [CPA 15.40]

to the rules of that court, note be published in the House of Parliament, by in regard to disallowing

Relationship between practice notes and rules

The Supreme Court website states that the Court’s Practice Notes provide practitioners and litigants with detailed guidance on how the court manages its cases; and that the Practice Notes complement legislative and regulatory provisions to specifically set out the steps practitioners and litigants are expected to take to prepare a case for hearing. A practice note guides the way in which the proceedings are expected to be administered. It needs to be read in conjunction with the rules and not elevated to a status that it does not have; per Bergin J in Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd v HBO & DC Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 821 at [14]. A contest between the content of a practice note and a provision of the uniform rules, unless able to be made consistent, results in the primacy of the rule; see Welzel v Francis (2010) 77 NSWLR 92; [2010] NSWSC 75 at [12] (contest between SC PN Eq 3 which provides that unless otherwise ordered, a party in whose favour an order for costs is made may proceed to assessment of such costs forthwith, as opposed to UCPR r 42.7(2) which provides that costs of any application or other step in proceedings are not payable until the conclusion of the proceedings. See further in respect of costs of interlocutory proceedings not being immediately enforceable, and that a specific order that costs be immediately enforceable must be made to displace the operation of UCPR r 42.7: His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142 at [49]). However, the court will take into account both the individual circumstances of the case and the purpose and the intent of the practice note in the exercise of its discretion to make any relevant order: Sydney City v Streetscape Projects (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 452 at [14]. [CPA 15.60] Sections 40 and 41 of the Interpretation Act 1987 CPA s 15(3) makes these provisions in regard to statutory rules applicable to a practice note issued by a court. Section 40 of the Interpretation Act 1987 provides that written notice of the making of a statutory rule must be laid before each House of Parliament within 14 sitting days of that House after the day on which it is 22

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 2 – Administrative matters Division 1 – Rules, practice notes and forms

[CPA 15.1000]

s 17

published on the NSW legislation website. It also states the content of that notice and the process by which it is laid before each House. Failure to lay a written notice before each House of Parliament in accordance with this section does not affect the validity of a statutory rule, but such a notice must nevertheless be laid before each House.

Thus CPA s 15(3) empowers either House of Parliament, subject to the written notice and time provisions of s 41 in regard to a rule being laid before either House, to pass a resolution disallowing that practice note. [CPA 15.1000]

References

Welzel v Francis (2010) 77 NSWLR 92; [2010] NSWSC 75 Supreme Court Practice Notes can be found in the Practice Notes section of this service; see also online at: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/Web%20Version%20Notes?OpenView&Start= 1&Count=50&Collapse=1#1 Land and Environment Court Practice Notes are available online at: http://www.lec.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lec/ practice_notes.html District Court Practice Notes can be found in the Practice Notes section of this service; see also online at: http://www.districtcourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/districtcourt/practice_notes.html Dust Diseases Tribunal Practice Nots are available www.dustdiseasestribunal.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ddt/ddt_practice_procedure.html

online

at:

http://

Local Court Practice Notes can be found in the Practice Notes section of this service; see also online at: http://www.localcourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/localcourts/practice_notes.html 16

Court may give directions in circumstances not covered by rules

(1) In relation to particular civil proceedings, the court may give directions with respect to any aspect of practice or procedure for which rules of court or practice notes do not provide. (2) Anything done in accordance with such a direction (including the commencing of proceedings and the taking of any step in proceedings) is taken to have been validly done. 17

Forms (1) Subject to the uniform rules, the Uniform Rules Committee: (a) may approve forms for documents to be used in connection with civil proceedings, and (b) in the case of documents filed with a court, or issued by a court, by means of an ECM system within the meaning of the Electronic Transactions Act 2000, may approve the format in which such documents are to be filed or issued.

(2) Copies of the approved forms are to be made available for public inspection at each registry of the court concerned and on the court’s internet website. (3) If a form is approved in relation to a document to be used in connection with proceedings in a court, a document that is filed with or issued by the court is to be in that form. Note: See section 80 of the Interpretation Act 1987 with respect to compliance with approved forms.

SECTION 17 COMMENTARY Operation ............................................................................................................................................... [CPA 17.20] Online versions of forms ........................................................................................................................ [CPA 17.40] Substantial or strict compliance with forms? ......................................................................................... [CPA 17.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 17.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

23

Civil Procedure Leg

Section 41 of the Interpretation Act 1987 provides for the disallowance of statutory rules by either House of Parliament. On the passing of a resolution disallowing a statutory rule, the rule ceases to have effect and the resolution has the same effect as a repeal of the rule. The disallowance of the rule has the effect of restoring or reviving any other Act or statutory rule, as it was immediately before it was amended or repealed, as if the rule had not been made.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 18

[CPA 17.20]

[CPA 17.20]

Operation

This section confers a power on the Uniform Rules Committee (see CPA s 8 above) to approve forms for documents for civil proceedings, including for filing with a court by ECM. [CPA 17.40]

Online versions of forms

Links to online sources for copies in PDF and Word versions of approved Uniform Civil Procedure Forms are found at [FSC.20], [FDC.20] and [FLC.20]. In addition, links to prescribed Corporations Law forms and general forms specific to the District Court and Local Court may be found at that source. [CPA 17.60]

Substantial or strict compliance with forms?

Substantial compliance with approved forms is required, other than when strict compliance is specified. The Interpretation Act 1987 s 80(1) provides that strict compliance with an approved form is not necessary, but substantial compliance is sufficient. In regards to notice to produce: see Welker v Rinehart (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 839 at [7] (wrong UCP Form used for notice to produce, however substantial requirements met and the fact that a reasonable recipient could not have been misled as to the power that was invoked did not invalidate a notice by the use of an incorrect form nor deprive the notice of the quality of substantial compliance with the proper rule.) However, strict compliance is necessary if an Act or instrument states that a form is to be completed in a specified manner, or that specified information is to be included in or is to accompany a form. Thus such a form will not be duly completed unless it is completed in the specified manner, and with the specified information; s 80(2). [CPA 17.1000]

References

Approved Uniform Civil Procedure Forms: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/spu/ll_ucpr.nsf/pages/ucpr_ forms A helpful guide to completing and also filing online approved Uniform Civil Procedure forms may be found at: http://www.ucprforms.justice.nsw.gov.au/ Interpretation Act 1987 s 80 Welker v Rinehart (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 839 at [7]

DIVISION 2 – FEES 18

Fees (1) The Governor may make regulations for or with respect to the following matters: (a) the fees payable to a court in relation to the conduct of civil proceedings in the court, including fees for the following: (i) the filing or registration of any document in the court, (ii) the allocation of hearing dates, (iii) the conduct of hearings, (iv) the retention of juries, (v) the sealing or other authentication of any document that has been filed in the court, (vi) the issue of any document out of the court, (b) the fees payable in relation to proceedings referred to mediation under Part 4, (c) the fees payable in relation to proceedings referred to arbitration under Part 5, (d) the fees payable in relation to the examination of a judgment debtor by a registrar or other officer of the court under Part 8, (e) the fees payable in relation to the functions exercised by the Sheriff, whether under this Act or otherwise, (f) the fees payable for administrative services provided by a registrar or other officer of the court, whether in connection with the administration of this Act or otherwise,

24

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 2 – Administrative matters Division 2 – Fees (g)

s 18

the waiver, postponement and remittal of fees.

Civil Procedure Leg

(2) Fees of the kind referred to in subsection (1)(a) or (d) are not payable by the Crown, or by any person acting on behalf of the Crown, with respect to any civil proceedings to which any of the following persons or bodies is a party: (a) the Crown, (b) any Minister of the Crown, (c) any person or body prescribed by the regulations or belonging to a class of persons or bodies so prescribed. [Subs (2) am Act 56 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]

(3) Subsection (2) does not prevent the recovery by the Crown or any such person or body of any fees that would, had they been paid by the Crown or any such person or body, have been so recoverable. (4) Unpaid fees may be recovered by the person to whom they are payable, as a debt, in any court of competent jurisdiction. [S 18 am Act 56 of 2006]

Editor’s note: Part 2A is repealed and has not been reproduced.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

25

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 19

[CPA 19.20]

PART 3 – COMMENCING AND CARRYING ON PROCEEDINGS GENERALLY Commentary by Carol Webster SC. 19 Commencing and carrying on proceedings (cf Act No 9 1973, sections 53 and 56; Act No 11 1970, section 22)

(1) Subject to this Act, proceedings are to be commenced and carried on in the manner prescribed by rules of court. (2) For the purposes of this Act and the uniform rules, carry on proceedings includes defend proceedings.

SECTION 19 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [CPA 19.20] How proceedings are to be commenced and carried on ...................................................................... [CPA 19.40] Defending proceedings .......................................................................................................................... [CPA 19.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 19.1000]

[CPA 19.20]

Comparison

This section adopts DCA s 53 and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 22, although simplifying the wording. DCA s 56 made specific provision, in similar terms, for defending proceedings. The definition in CPA s 19(2) of “carry on proceedings” means no separate provision about defending proceedings is necessary. The substantive effect of DCA ss 53 and 56 and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 22 is unchanged. [CPA 19.40]

How proceedings are to be commenced and carried on

Part 6 of the UCPR deals with the way in which proceedings are to be commenced and carried on. There are only two forms of “originating process” (defined in CPA s 3 as the process by which proceedings are commenced), either a statement of claim or summons: see rr 6.2–6.4. Under the UCPR, there is no longer any provision for a statement of liquidated claim. See [r 6.2.40], [r 6.3.40], [r 6.4.40]. [CPA 19.60]

Defending proceedings

A defendant may enter an appearance in proceedings by filing a notice of appearance, or by filing a defence: see [r 6.9.40]. The time within which an appearance must be entered, whether by filing a notice of appearance or a defence is set out in r 6.10. The consequences of failing to enter an appearance are discussed in [r 6.10.40]. [CPA 19.1000]

References

See UCPR Pt 6 generally as to how proceedings are to be commenced and carried on. Definition of “originating process” – CPA s 3 and UCPR Dictionary. 20

Claims for possession of land

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 79)

A claim for judgment for possession of land takes the place of a claim in an action for ejectment that could have been brought under the practice of the Supreme Court as it was immediately before 1 July 1972. Note: 1 July 1972 was the date of commencement of the Supreme Court Act 1970.

26

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 3 – Commencing and carrying on proceedings generally [CPA 20.60]

s 21

SECTION 20 COMMENTARY Proceedings for possession ................................................................................................................... [CPA 20.20] Procedure in the Supreme Court ........................................................................................................... [CPA 20.40] District Court jurisdiction in possession proceedings ............................................................................ [CPA 20.60]

Proceedings for possession

This section adopts former SCA s 79, although the wording has been simplified. A reference to an action of ejectment is to be construed as a reference to proceedings for possession of land: SCA s 8(1)(h) and DCA s 190(2). Proceedings for possession of land take the place of the former action for ejectment. A judgment for possession of land takes the place of a judgment for the claimant in ejectment. under the practice of the Supreme Court before 1 July 1972: see [CPA 92.20], carrying forward former SCA s 92. “Land” is broadly defined in SCA s 19. To seek possession of land the plaintiff must have an immediate right to possession at the time the proceedings are commenced: see [r 16.4.40]. The history of actions in ejectment is discussed in Commonwealth v Anderson (1960) 105 CLR 303; 34 ALJR 323; [1961] ALR 354. Service of originating process seeking possession of land is the equivalent of formal re-entry by the landlord and hence forfeiture of the lease: Canas Pty Co v KL Television Ltd [1970] 2 QB 433 at 442C. Mesne profits, ie damages for wrongful occupation of the land, may be claimed from the defendant for the period after service of the originating process, and such a claim may be included in the originating process: see Canas Pty Co v KL Television Ltd [1970] 2 QB 433 at 442D–G. UCPR r 6.8 sets out the specific requirements for service of originating process seeking possession of land: see [r 6.8.40]. Specific legislation may provide a defence to an action for possession, Residential Tenancies Act 2010 s 119, Landlord and Tenant Act 1899 s 2A or Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act 1948 s 69(1): see [r 16.4.60]. Special rules apply to the giving or entry of judgment for possession of land: see [r 36.8.40], and to obtaining default judgment on a claim for possession of land: see [r 16.4.40]. A judgment for possession of land may be enforced by issuing a writ of execution, which requires leave of the court under r 39.1(1)(d): see [r 39.1.40] and, as to enforcement of judgments generally: [r Pt36.40]. [CPA 20.40]

Procedure in the Supreme Court

The procedure for proceedings for possession in the Supreme Court is found in r 45.4. [Practice Note SC CL 6, “Supreme Court Common Law Division – Possession List”: reproduced in the Practice Note section of this service and the procedure for the initial directions hearing before a judge in defended matters in the Possession List, (applying from February 2009)], set out in the document “Procedure in defended Possession List matters” published on the Supreme Court web-site [Lawlink > Supreme Court > Practice and Procedure]. [CPA 20.60]

District Court jurisdiction in possession proceedings

The District Court has jurisdiction in proceedings for possession of land the value of which does not exceed $20,000: DCA s 133(1). See [DCA133.20]–[DCA133.40]. As to the venue for proceedings under DCA s 133, see UCPR Pt 8. The practice and procedure of the District Court is, so far as practicable, to be the same as that in the Supreme Court in proceedings for possession: DCA s 137(c): see [DCA 137.60]. 21 Defendant’s right to set-off (1) If there are mutual debts between a plaintiff and a defendant in any proceedings, the defendant may, by way of defence, set off against the plaintiff’s claim any debt that is owed by the plaintiff to the defendant and that was due and payable at the time the defence of set-off was filed, whether or not the mutual debts are different in nature. (2) This section extends to civil proceedings in which one or more of the mutual debts is owed by or to a deceased person who is represented by a legal personal representative. (3) This section does not apply to the extent to which the plaintiff and defendant have agreed that debts (whether generally or as to specific debts) may not be set off against each other. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

27

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 20.20]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 21

[CPA 21.20]

(4) This section does not affect any other rights or obligations of a debtor or creditor in respect of mutual debts, whether arising in equity or otherwise. (5) This section is subject to section 120 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996. (6) In this section, debt means any liquidated claim. Note: The application of this provision to existing debts is dealt with in clause 6 of Schedule 6 (Savings, transitional and other provisions).

SECTION 21 COMMENTARY Reintroduction of set-off ......................................................................................................................... [CPA 21.20] Equitable set-off ..................................................................................................................................... [CPA 21.40] Transitional provisions ........................................................................................................................... [CPA 21.60] Industrial Relations Act 1996 s 120 – proceedings to recover remuneration ....................................... [CPA 21.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 21.1000]

[CPA 21.20]

Reintroduction of set-off

The major substantive change made in Pt 3 of the CPA is the reintroduction of set off. This was recommended by the Law Reform Commission in Report No 94. CPA s 21(1)–(4) and (6). The transitional provisions in CPA Sch 6 cl 6 carry into effect the recommendation for statutory reintroduction of set-off made by the Law Reform Commission in Report No 94. Before the commencement of Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 s 8, the former United Kingdom Statutes of Set-off of 1729 and 1735 provided for statutory set-off in New South Wales. They were repealed by Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 s 8. From 1 July 1972, SCR Pt 15 r 25 provided for legal set-off (see Stehar Knitting Mills Pty Ltd v Southern Textile Converters Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 514), but Pt 15 r 25 was repealed in 1984. Thereafter only set-off in insolvency and the equitable right of set-off remained: Sydmar Pty Ltd v Statewise Developments Pty Ltd (1987) 73 ALR 289; 11 ACLR 616; 5 ACLC 480. The history of the distinction between set-off and cross-claim is discussed at [r Pt9.40]. Between 1984 and 2005, what may have been a form of set-off has been pleaded by way of cross-claim, requiring separate formal process and exposing the defendant to potential cost consequences in meeting both the plaintiff’s claim and separately prosecuting a cross-claim. The reintroduction of statutory set-off in CPA s 21 was intended to overcome these difficulties. It should be noted that the definitions of “plaintiff” and “defendant” in CPA s 3 include a person by whom and a person against whom a cross-claim is made, so the availability of set-off is not limited to the parties to the original claim made by a plaintiff. As the Law Reform Commission noted in its report, a cross-claim is not a “defence” to a plaintiff’s claim. Set-off, where available, allows the defendant to apply the debt owed by the plaintiff to discharge all or part of the plaintiff’s claim. It can be used by a defendant to avoid entry of a summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff. Local Court judgments may be set-off under CPA s 96: see [CPA 96.20]. [CPA 21.40]

Equitable set-off

Equitable set-off is available where the defendant can show a recognised equitable ground for being protected from the plaintiff’s demand, that is, that it would be unjust or inequitable for the plaintiff to proceed with the claim made; the mere existence of cross-demands is not sufficient: James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 37 FCR 445; 109 ALR 334; 8 ACSR 444; AWA Ltd v Exicom Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 19 NSWLR 705 at 712, 714. Unliquidated damages may be set-off in equity, between the original parties, and, as against an assignee, where arising out of and inseparably connected with the dealings and transactions giving rise to the assignment: Roadshow Entertainment Pty Ltd v (ACN 053 006 269) Pty Ltd (formerly CEL Home Video Pty Ltd) (1997) 42 NSWLR 462 at 481E–482F. Equitable set-off may be available for liquidated cross-demands which are payable in the future: Roadshow Entertainment Pty Ltd v (ACN 053 006 269) Pty Ltd (formerly CEL Home Video Pty Ltd) (1997) 42 NSWLR 462 at 488D–489E. 28

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 3 – Commencing and carrying on proceedings generally [CPA 21.1000] [CPA 21.60]

s 22

Transitional provisions

As noted above, this was in accordance with the recommendation made by the Law Reform Commission. As recommended by the Law Reform Commission, cl 6(2) allows the court to order that CPA s 21 does not apply to a debt arising under an agreement entered into before the commencement of the section if satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice to so order. The parties may contract out of set-off, under CPA s 21(3). [CPA 21.80]

Industrial Relations Act 1996 s 120 – proceedings to recover remuneration

The Industrial Relations Act 1996 s 120 provides: (1) In any proceedings by an employee against the employer to recover any amount due as remuneration, the employer is not entitled to any set-off or reduction of the claim in respect of: (a) any goods or services supplied to the employee as, or as part of, remuneration, or (b) any goods sold or supplied at any shop or other premises of the employer or in the profits of which the employer has any share or interest, or (c) any goods supplied to the employee by any person under the direction of the employer or the employer’s agent. (2) An employer is not entitled to maintain any action in any court or tribunal against an employee for or in respect of any goods sold or supplied to the employee by the employer while in the employer’s employment as or as part of the employee’s remuneration. The effect of CPA s 21(5) is to ensure that in proceedings brought by an employee against the employer to recover amounts due as remuneration, there can be no set-off pursuant to CPA s 21 in respect of goods or services supplied to the employee by the employer in the circumstances set out in the Industrial Relations Act 1996 s 120(1). [CPA 21.1000]

References

New South Wales Law Reform Commission Report No 94 – Set Off (February 2000). See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [7.180]–[7.370]. Related provisions: CPA ss 22, 96; UCPR Pt 9. 22

Defendant’s right to cross-claim

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 78; Act No 11 1970, section 15; DCR Part 20, rule 1)

(1) Subject to subsection (2), the court may grant to the defendant in any proceedings (the first proceedings) such relief against any person (whether or not a plaintiff in the proceedings) as the court might grant against that person in separate proceedings commenced by the defendant for that purpose. (2) Relief may not be granted under this section against a person who is not a plaintiff in the first proceedings unless the relief relates to, or is connected with, the subject of the first proceedings. (3) A person against whom a defendant makes a claim for relief under this section: (a) has the same rights in respect of his or her defence against the claim as he or she would have in separate proceedings commenced against the person by the defendant, and (b) if not already a party to the first proceedings: (i) becomes a party to the first proceedings, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

29

Civil Procedure Leg

The transitional provisions in CPA Sch 6 cl 6 provide: (1) Subject to subclause (2), section 21 extends to: (a) any debt arising under an agreement entered into before the commencement of that section, and (b) any other debt arising before the commencement of that section. (2) The court may order that section 21 does not apply to a debt referred to in subclause (1)(a) if it is satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice to make such an order.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 22

[CPA 22.20] (ii)

unless the court otherwise orders, is bound by any judgment (including a judgment by consent or by default) or decision (including a decision by consent) on any claim for relief in the proceedings (including a claim for relief in any cross-claim in the proceedings).

SECTION 22 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [CPA 22.20] Section procedural and does not confer substantive rights .................................................................. [CPA 22.40] Relationship of cross-claim to plaintiff’s claim ....................................................................................... [CPA 22.60] Cross-claim against third party .............................................................................................................. [CPA 22.80] Procedure ............................................................................................................................................. [CPA 22.100] References ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 22.1000]

[CPA 22.20]

Comparison

The section is substantially based on SCA s 78. SCA s 78(2) specifically provided that the relief which could be granted under the section included relief in respect of any equitable or legal estate or right. “Claim for relief” is now defined in CPA s 3 in broad terms: see CPA s 3(1). The substantive effect of SCA s 78 is unchanged. The bringing of a cross-claim was provided for in the District Court by Pt 20 r 1, and in the Local Court by Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 15. Those provisions were considerably less detailed than SCA s 78 and dealt also with questions of abandoning part of cross-claims in excess of the court’s jurisdictional limit. That issue is now dealt with in CPA s 23 in relation to abandoning excess claims generally: see [CPA 23.20]. [CPA 22.40]

Section procedural and does not confer substantive rights

It had been held that SCA s 78 is procedural only and does not confer substantive rights whether the defendant is seeking to establish a right against a third party to the proceedings or making a cross-claim against the plaintiff: Southern Textile Converters Pty Ltd v Stehar Knitting Mills Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 692. [CPA 22.60]

Relationship of cross-claim to plaintiff’s claim

There are differences where a cross-claim is brought by the defendant against the plaintiff or against a third party. A cross-claim brought by the defendant against the plaintiff need not relate to or be connected with the plaintiff’s claim, or arise out of the same transaction. All that is necessary is that the cross-claim is between the same parties as the original claim and is within the jurisdiction of the court. An equitable set-off may be raised by way of cross-claim: AWA Ltd v Exicom Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 19 NSWLR 705 at 712. [CPA 22.80]

Cross-claim against third party

Relief claimed by a defendant, as a cross-claimant, against a third party must relate to or be connected with the subject of the action by the plaintiff against the defendant: Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd v Steel Mains Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 323; 49 ALJR 233; 6 ALR 171. A third party against whom a cross-claim is brought becomes a party to the proceedings and is bound by the decision between the plaintiff and the defendant. The “cross-defendant” does not, without further order, become a defendant as against the plaintiff who commenced the proceedings and will not be permitted to intrude on the conduct of the proceedings as between the plaintiff and defendant. As the cross-defendant is bound by the result of the proceedings, under the Anshun principle (Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; 55 ALJR 621; 36 ALR 3), the cross-defendant may be estopped in subsequent proceedings from raising a claim which could have been but was not raised in proceedings to which the cross-defendant is joined: see [r 14.14.220] and specifically in relation to cross-claims: Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 5 at 8-9 and Insurance Exchange of Australasia v Dooley (2000) 50 NSWLR 222; [2000] NSWCA 159 at 228–229 (NSWLR). As between the defendant joining the cross-claimant and the cross-defendant, the cross-defendant may raise a defence which the cross-claimant had declined to raise as against the plaintiff: Barclays Bank Ltd v Tom [1923] 1 KB 221 at 30

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 3 – Commencing and carrying on proceedings generally [CPA 23.20]

s 23

223; provided raising the issue is of advantage to the cross-defendant: Parramatta City Council v Sandell [1973] 1 NSWLR 151; (1973) 29 LGRA 101 at 174 (NSWLR). It is also open to a plaintiff to join as a defendant a “third-party” brought into proceedings as a cross-defendant, in appropriate circumstances: see [r 6.19.40], [r 6.20.40], [r 6.21.40]. Procedure

The procedure regarding cross-claims generally is set out in UCPR Pt 9. If the cross-claim cannot conveniently be tried in the same proceedings, the court may order separate trials or make other appropriate orders: see [r 9.8.40]. A cross-claim may be separately prosecuted: see [r 9.10.60]. The court has power generally to order separate trials if the joinder of a party or cause of action is inconvenient: see [r 6.22.40]. Under the UCPR, a cross-claim must be contained in a separate document: UCPR r 4.8 (this is to meet the future requirements of CourtLink). Consequently, a cross-claim brought by the defendant against the plaintiff can no longer be combined with the defence. [CPA 22.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [7.240]–[7.370]. UCPR Pt 9 regarding cross-claims generally and UCPR r 6.22 re inconvenient joinder. Approved forms: Form 9 Statement of cross-claim and Form 10 Cross-summons; UCPR r 4.8. 23

Effect of abandoning excess claim

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 50; Act No 11 1970, section 14)

(1) If, in any proceedings on a claim, the cause of action giving rise to the claim is for more than the court’s jurisdictional limit: (a) the person may abandon the excess by a statement to that effect in the originating process, and (b) in that event, the person’s claim is taken to be reduced by the amount of the excess. (2) If a person’s claim is successful in respect of a cause of action: (a) the amount recoverable by the person (exclusive of costs and interest) is not to exceed the court’s jurisdictional limit, and (b) the judgment in the proceedings is in full discharge of all of the person’s demands in respect of that cause of action, and (c) entry of the judgment in the records of the court is to be made accordingly. (3) This section is subject to section 51 of the District Court Act 1973 and section 31 of the Local Court Act 2007. Note: Under those sections, claims in the District Court or the Local Court for amounts in excess of the court’s jurisdictional limit can, in some cases, be dealt with by consent of parties. [Subs (3) am Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2; Act 94 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1.12[1]] [S 23 am Act 94 of 2007]

SECTION 23 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [CPA 23.20] Abandoning excess ................................................................................................................................ [CPA 23.40] Extended jurisdiction – deemed consent ............................................................................................... [CPA 23.60]

[CPA 23.20]

Comparison

The section adopted DCA s 50 and former Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 14. The substantive effects of those sections are unchanged, although the wording has been simplified. This section deals both with claims and cross-claims. They had been the subject of separate provisions in DCR Pt 20 and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 15. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

31

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 22.100]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 24

[CPA 23.20]

[CPA 23.40]

Abandoning excess

A specific statement must be made in the originating process that the claim in excess of the court’s jurisdictional limit is abandoned. [CPA 23.60]

Extended jurisdiction – deemed consent

Section 23(3) expressly states that the section is subject to DCA s 51 and Local Court Act 2007 s 31 (formerly Local Courts Act 1982 s 66). As the note to the subsection indicates, those sections permit the claims in excess of the court’s jurisdictional limit to be dealt with by the consent of the parties. DCA s 51 and the former Local Courts Act 1982 s 66 were amended by the CPA (Sch 5.12 item [18] and Sch 5.30 item [7]). DCA s 51 provides that the court has jurisdiction with respect to a claim exceeding the jurisdictional limit of the court as at the time the action was commenced and may give judgment for a maximum amount equivalent to 150% of the jurisdictional limit of the court when the action was commenced: DCA s 51(1) and (4). The court has jurisdiction in two circumstances: first, if a memorandum of consent signed by all of the parties is filed: DCA s 51(2)(a) and (7); second and importantly, if no objection to the court’s jurisdiction has been raised by any of the parties prior to three months before trial of the action commences: DCA s 51(2)(b). Under Local Court Act 2007 s 31, the Local Court in its General Division has jurisdiction to hear and determine proceedings on a money claim for an amount equivalent to 120% of the jurisdictional limit of the court when sitting in the General Division in two circumstances: first, if a memorandum of consent signed by all of the parties is filed: Local Court Act 2007 s 31(1)(a) and (2); second if no objection to the court’s jurisdiction has been raised by any of the parties prior to one month before trial of the action commences: Local Court Act 2007 s 31(1)(b). “Money claim” is defined in Local Court Act 2007 s 29A. Practitioners need to be astute to the implications of deemed consent to extended jurisdiction under DCA s 51(2)(b) and Local Court Act 2007 s 31(1)(b). A defendant can have “notice” of a claim in excess of the jurisdictional limit and so the need to object (if that be the case) without the statement of claim stating the specific amount claimed, as occurs in a claim for unliquidated damages. The plaintiff can rely upon the details of “the amount claimed” set out in a statement of particulars: Richards v Cornford (2010) 76 NSWLR 572; [2010] NSWCA 99 at [31]. 24

Effect of splitting cause of action

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 49; Act No 11 1970, section 13)

(1) If: (a) a person (the first person) splits any cause of action against another person (the other person) so as to commence proceedings, or make a cross-claim, for part only of the amount for which proceedings may be commenced on that cause, and (b) judgment is given or entered, or a final order is made, on the proceedings or cross-claim, the other person is entitled to judgment in any other proceedings, whether in that or any other court, with respect to the same cause of action. (2) Despite subsection (1), if the other person has given a number of securities in respect of a claim made by the first person, the first person: (a) may commence proceedings in any court in respect of each of those securities, or (b) may make a cross-claim in proceedings in any court in respect of each of those securities, as if each of those securities gave rise to a distinct cause of action, and may do so whether or not the claim made by the first person is for an amount that is more than the court’s jurisdictional limit.

SECTION 24 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [CPA 24.20] Effect of splitting cause of action ........................................................................................................... [CPA 24.40] Running account .................................................................................................................................... [CPA 24.60] Separate securities ................................................................................................................................ [CPA 24.80] 32

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 3 – Commencing and carrying on proceedings generally [CPA 24.80] [CPA 24.20]

s 24 Comparison

The section adopts the wording of DCA s 49 and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 13, although the wording has been simplified. The substantive effect of those sections is unchanged. [CPA 24.40]

Effect of splitting cause of action

While there is no rule of law prohibiting a plaintiff in the Supreme Court (where there is no relevant jurisdictional limit) from dividing a cause of action: Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd v L Grollo & Co Pty Ltd [1973] VR 473; bringing multiple proceedings may give rise to an Anshun estoppel (Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; 55 ALJR 621; 36 ALR 3) or a defence of res judicata if part of the split action were determined first: see [r 14.14.200] and [r 14.14.220]. Where CPA s 24(1) applies, on the plaintiff obtaining judgment or a final order on the first of the proceedings or cross-claims, the other party may enter judgment in its favour in any other proceedings in any other court with respect to the same cause of action. [CPA 24.60]

Running account

Generally, a running account will give rise to one cause of action only, so that although the transactions giving rise to the account may have been separate and occurring at different times, they cannot be divided and made the subject of separate proceedings: Ex parte Delaforce (1888) 4 WN (NSW) 165; 9 LR (NSW) 133; Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd v L Grollo & Co Pty Ltd [1973] VR 473. [CPA 24.80]

Separate securities

CPA s 24 is concerned with unsecured claims. Separate securities are specifically excluded from the operation the rule by CPA s 24(2).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

33

Civil Procedure Leg

CPA s 24 re-enacts the common law rule against splitting a cause of action in order to bring a series of actions within the restricted jurisdiction of an inferior court: Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd v L Grollo & Co Pty Ltd [1973] VR 473; Brincat v Kilsby [1983] 1 VR 625.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 25

[CPA Pt4.20]

PART 4 – MEDIATION OF PROCEEDINGS Commentary by Deborah Robinson, Barrister. Updated by Mary-Ann de Mestre, Solicitor of NSW, Adjunct Fellow of Western Sydney University.

PART 4 COMMENTARY [CPA Pt4.20]

Comparison

The previous DCA provisions were closely modelled on the SCA provisions. Part 4 largely incorporates the old provisions from the SCA and DCA, with two significant changes, being ss 29(2) and 32; refer to the annotations underneath. The old rules were contained in Pt 72C of SCR; there were no rules under the DCR. The new mediation rules are contained in UCPR Pt 20. 25 Definitions (cf Act No 52 1970, sections 110I and 110J; Act No 9 1973, sections 163 and 164; Act No 11 1970, sections 21J and 21K)

In this Part: mediation means a structured negotiation process in which the mediator, as a neutral and independent party, assists the parties to a dispute to achieve their own resolution of the dispute. mediation session means a meeting arranged for the mediation of a matter. mediator means a person to whom the court has referred a matter for mediation.

SECTION 25 COMMENTARY [CPA 25.20]

Application

Part 4 does not apply to proceedings in the Small Claims Division of the Local Court: see Sch 1 of the UCPR. 26 Referral by court (cf Act No 52 1970, section 110K; Act No 9 1973, section 164A; Act No 11 1970, section 21L)

(1) If it considers the circumstances appropriate, the court may, by order, refer any proceedings before it, or part of any such proceedings, for mediation by a mediator, and may do so either with or without the consent of the parties to the proceedings concerned. (2) The mediation is to be undertaken by a mediator agreed to by the parties or appointed by the court, who may (but need not be) a listed mediator. (2A) Without limiting subsections (1) and (2), the court may refer proceedings or part of proceedings for mediation under the Community Justice Centres Act 1983. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 70 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2.1[1]]

(3) In this section, listed mediator means a mediator appointed in accordance with a practice note with respect to the nomination and appointment of persons to be mediators for the purposes of this Part. [S 26 am Act 70 of 2007]

SECTION 26 COMMENTARY Court may order mediation over opposition .......................................................................................... [CPA 26.20] The discretion to order mediation .......................................................................................................... [CPA 26.40] Subject matter of proceedings referred to mediation ............................................................................ [CPA 26.60] Complex proceedings and the burden of legal costs ............................................................................ [CPA 26.80] When to consider a referral to mediation ............................................................................................ [CPA 26.100] Duty to consider mediation .................................................................................................................. [CPA 26.120] 34

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Mediation of proceedings [CPA 26.60]

s 26

Further mediation order after unsuccessful mediation ........................................................................ [CPA 26.140] Mediator appointed by the court .......................................................................................................... [CPA 26.160]

Court may order mediation over opposition

Since 1 August 2000 the court has had the jurisdiction to refer proceedings to mediation without the consent of the parties to the proceedings. After some initial reluctance to foist mediation upon unwilling parties, the court’s attitude evolved to embrace the jurisdiction with the notable result that mediations ordered over opposition may be successful and result in settlement: see comments of Hamilton J in Remuneration Planning Corp Pty Ltd v Fitton [2001] NSWSC 1208. Early cases in which mediation has been ordered over opposition include Remuneration Planning Corp Pty Ltd v Fitton [2001] NSWSC 1208; Higgins v Higgins [2002] NSWSC 455; Singh v Singh [2002] NSWSC 852; Cains v Wadiwel [2007] NSWSC 207; Lidoframe Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1262. Where all parties to the proceedings indicate that mediation is unlikely to resolve the dispute, the court must satisfy itself that that view is correct: Oriental Carpet Department Store Pty Ltd v Supacenta Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21235; [2003] NSWSC 783. Where the underlying problems are not particularly complex and prima facie the positions of both parties may be reasonably accommodated, mediation may be ordered by the court of its own motion notwithstanding entrenched and bitter attitudes adopted by the parties: Berjaya Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ariff [2007] NSWSC 174. An entrenched position is not of itself a reason to refuse to order mediation as the aim of mediation is to break down entrenched positions: Hillig v Darkinjung Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 409. [CPA 26.40]

The discretion to order mediation

The discretion to order mediation is very wide and all relevant circumstances going to the exercise of the discretion may properly be taken into account: Higgins v Higgins [2002] NSWSC 455. The court will pay regard to the circumstances which exist at the time of the application for mediation, rather than at the time the parties entered into the relations now forming the subject of the litigation: Morrow v Chinadotcom Corp [2001] ANZ ConvR 341; [2001] NSWSC 209. The court may order mediation subject to conditions: Rajski v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 478 (order conditional upon the giving of undertakings not to commence or continue any legal proceeding or complaint to a disciplinary body or authority arising out of the conduct of prior mediations). The question of whether proceedings should be referred to mediation involves a weighing of the costs and procedural consequences which might be incurred by a mandatory mediation, the costs which may be avoided by a successful mediation, the prospects of success of mediation and the availability of alternative means to progress negotiations between the parties, as well as the existence of a ‘level playing field’ between the parties: Dimento v Dimento [2007] NSWSC 420. A party’s conduct of the proceedings and the fact that credit is seriously in issue are factors which may dispose the court to decline to order mediation: Perpetual Trustee Co v McAndrew [2008] NSWSC 790. [CPA 26.60]

Subject matter of proceedings referred to mediation

Where the parties are commercial parties possessing business sophistication and acumen and aware of the potential benefits of mediation, and yet a party declines to consent to mediation, a compulsory referral may be considered an exercise in futility attended by delay and expense: Morrow v Chinadotcom Corp [2001] ANZ ConvR 341; [2001] NSWSC 209. Nevertheless, where parties have a continuing business relationship a “commercial solution” which does not impose legal principle on every aspect of the outcome may be appropriate: Couriers Pty Ltd (NSW) v Newman [2002] NSWSC 1172 (in the context of the Commercial List). The fact that the proceedings involve the construction of a deed does not preclude a mediation being ordered over opposition: Lidoframe Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1262. In defamation proceedings, where the plaintiff had the advantage of a fixed hearing date and where the award of damages would constitute a public vindication for the plaintiff, the court regarded a proposal to attend mediation as a disproportionate diversion of resources: Blake v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 885. The penal character of civil penalty proceedings does not preclude the court from ordering mediation: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 489. Proceedings involving an application for contempt, with an underlying dispute as to the enforceability of injunctive relief, have been referred to mediation: Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) Pty Ltd (2008) 187 A Crim R 245; [2008] NSWSC 908. At the other end of the scale are family disputes, in which respect and affection once prevailed, and where there is an expectation that mediation may be beneficial: Johnston v Johnston [2004] NSWSC 497; and cases arising out of long-standing personal relationships: Browning v Crowley [2004] DFC 95-292; [2004] NSWSC 128. See © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

35

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 26.20]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 26

[CPA 26.60]

also Higgins v Higgins [2002] NSWSC 455 (family property dispute, frail elderly plaintiff, mediation ordered notwithstanding expedited trial date fixed); Singh v Singh [2002] NSWSC 852 (former friends, registrar mediator appointed to save costs); Yoseph v Mammo [2002] NSWSC 585 (family property dispute, first day of hearing, adjournment granted over objection, family members had maintained dignified relations); Family Provision Act matters are “eminently suitable” for mediation: Watkins v Public Trustee [2007] NSWSC 370 (see now s 98 of the Succession Act 2006, which mandates referral of family provision proceedings to mediation prior to trial). Cf Dimento v Dimento [2007] NSWSC 420: the characterisation of a dispute as a family dispute or commercial dispute does not inform the decision to order mediation. [CPA 26.80]

Complex proceedings and the burden of legal costs

The complexity of the proceedings or the estimated length of the trial (and therefore the burden of legal costs) may be factors which dispose a court to view mediation in a favourable light, notwithstanding the possibility that a relatively smaller amount of costs may be thrown away in an unsuccessful mediation: Browning v Crowley; and despite strong opposition to the order: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 427. However, where a party may not succeed in recovering costs from the opponent a requirement to incur further costs by participating in a mediation may be considered oppressive: Harrison v Schipp [2002] NSWCA 27. The court may decline to order mediation in a matter which is otherwise suitable for mediation, if the mediation would be neither “ordinary or cheap” (vast amount of evidentiary material, considerable argument expected regarding how mediation was to be funded): Lewis v Kation Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1127. Where the original estimate of hearing time has proved incorrect, the combination of consumption of time, escalating costs and strain on the court’s resources provides an ample basis for the court to exercise its power of mandatory mediation: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 489. Where a lengthy case is placing strain on the court’s resources, the public interest may be invoked as a factor favouring an order for mediation: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich. Where mediation had already been ordered in proceedings described as “massive”, mediation was ordered in related proceedings raising cognate issues, even though the related proceedings were at an early stage of preparation: Daya v CNA Reinsurance Co Ltd [2004] NSWSC 795 (related proceedings for indemnification with respect to claim in primary proceedings). [CPA 26.100]

When to consider a referral to mediation

The court can require a party to state its position on mediation on any occasion the proceedings are before the court: refer to UCPR r 20.3. The matter should be “ripe” for mediation, in that the factual basis for arriving at a settlement at mediation must be available in evidentiary form: Roy v Roy [2004] NSWSC 463; the court may decline to order mediation where one party has not yet committed its version of events to affidavits, as this does not provide a “level playing field” at the mediation: Dimento v Dimento [2007] NSWSC 420. However, at least in the Commercial List, mediation should be considered prior to expending the considerable costs required to fully prepare a matter for hearing and the proper discharge of a practitioner’s obligations to a client requires consideration to be given to negotiation and mediation prior to incurring significant costs: Couriers Pty Ltd (NSW) v Newman [2002] NSWSC 1172. In circumstances where substantial costs will be expended in an extensive discovery regime (the extent of which had been revealed in Notices to Produce and Subpoenas already issued) the court may exercise a discretion to order mediation after completion of affidavit evidence in reply but prior to discovery, this course being noted as less unusual than it was once: Noun v Pavey [2014] NSWSC 429 (Equity Division). For a discussion of the considerations involved in picking the right time for a mediation in a case which “fully exemplifies the extent of that difficulty” see Oasis Fund Management Ltd v ABN Amro Bank NV [2009] NSWSC 967 at [20]. In Oasis it was suggested that difficulties associated with early mediations may be mitigated by appropriate directions from the mediator, including directions to provide position statements and take other steps. A matter may be referred to mediation when it is part heard, for an example of this, see MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 242. [CPA 26.120]

Duty to consider mediation

Reference should be made to CPA Pt 6, in particular s 56 which provides that the overriding purpose of civil procedure is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings: Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (No 2) (2003) 57 NSWLR 338; [2003] NSWCA 186; and s 57 which provides for the efficient and timely disposal of the court’s business. It might be assumed that s 60, which requires consideration of the proportionality of costs to the subject matter in dispute, will be invoked in 36

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Mediation of proceedings [CPA 27.10]

s 27

applications for compulsory mediation in proceedings involving relatively small claims. Reference should also be made to Rule 38 of the of the NSW Barrister’s Rules 2011 and Advocacy Rule 17A, which is incorporated under s 23 of the Solicitors’ Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995, which provides that a party should be informed about all reasonably available alternatives to fully contested adjudication. Further mediation order after unsuccessful mediation

A second compulsory mediation may be ordered where circumstances have materially changed subsequent to the failure of the first mediation: Unconventional Conventions Pty Ltd v Accent Oz Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] NSWSC 1050; applied in Mallik v McGeown [2008] NSWSC 1107. In Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No 10) [2013] NSWSC 499 the court declined to order a further mediation, noting that the court had undoubted power to do so (citing Mallik) but would not do so lightly (citing Unconventional Conventions); the court noted that the fact that new solicitors and barristers had come into the matter was a matter which told against the need for an independent person to exercise a new mind so as to facilitate settlement of the matter. Of interest in relation to the Chaina case was that the application for a further mediation was sought mid trial, after extensive cross-examination of the Plaintiffs, and was considered to be a “distraction” from essential preparation on the continuation of the hearing. A third compulsory mediation was ordered, on conditions, in the circumstances where there was multiple litigation spanning some 22 years: Rajski v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 478. [CPA 26.160]

Mediator appointed by the court

Where the parties do not agree on the choice of mediator, the court may select the mediator or appoint the mediator pursuant to the Joint Protocol set out in Supreme Court Practice Note Gen 6 – Mediation. The terms of the Joint Protocol are not mandatory: para 9 PN SC Gen 6; parties may be directed to negotiate with a view to agreeing on the identity of the mediator: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 489. 27

Duty of parties to participate

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 110L; Act No 9 1973, section 164B; Act No 11 1970, section 21M)

It is the duty of each party to proceedings that have been referred for mediation to participate, in good faith, in the mediation.

SECTION 27 COMMENTARY Content of the duty of good faith ........................................................................................................... [CPA 27.10] Consequence of breach of duty ............................................................................................................ [CPA 27.20] Obligations of legal practitioners ........................................................................................................... [CPA 27.40]

[CPA 27.10]

Content of the duty of good faith

There has been judicial exposition of the content of a duty of good faith: see United Group Rail Services Ltd v Rail Corp (NSW) (2009) 74 NSWLR 618; [2009] NSWCA 177 particularly at [56 ]–[82]. In respect of the construction of an agreement to undertake “genuine and good faith negotiations” in a commercial dispute resolution clause, the Court of Appeal stated that the words “genuine and good faith negotiations” have content and meaning and should be enforced: United Group Rail Services Ltd at [80] and [81]. The content of that duty may include factors such as an honest and genuine attempt to resolve a disagreement, a preparedness to compromise when that is appropriate, faithfulness and fidelity to an original bargain made between the parties and an honest and genuine assessment of the rights and obligations of each party. A good faith negotiation is not open-ended; it involves a “discussion of rights, entitlements and obligations said by the parties to arise from a finite and fixed legal framework”: United Group Rail Services Ltd at [70]. See also Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 153 FLR 236; [1999] NSWSC 996, cited in Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 427 and Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 489 for an earlier consideration of the concept of “good faith”. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

37

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 26.140]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 28

[CPA 27.0]

[CPA 27.20]

Consequence of breach of duty

Except as provided for in s 30, evidence of statements or admissions made in a mediation and documents prepared in connection with a mediation are not admissible. Consequently, any party seeking to prove that there has been a failure to participate in the mediation process in good faith will be thwarted in their attempt to lead the necessary evidence: Rajski v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 476 at [20]. There is a suggestion in Waterhouse v Perkins [2001] NSWSC 13 at [95] that one of the sanctions for failing to act in good faith may well be contempt of court, however there is no remedy under the CPA for breach of the duty nor authority deciding the point. Further, the policy behind the mediation provisions is to facilitate settlement rather than provide parties with yet another battleground: refer to Rajski. While there are no decisions in which a costs sanction has applied to a party for breach of duty, in United Group Rail Services Ltd v Rail Corp (NSW) (2009) 74 NSWLR 618; [2009] NSWCA 177 (at [78]) the Court of Appeal noted that costs sanctions may attend the duty to participate in good faith. [CPA 27.40]

Obligations of legal practitioners

Legal practitioners have a duty of candour in a mediation: a barrister who relied on expert reports at a mediation where the assumptions forming the basis of those reports had become false to the barrister’s knowledge was found guilty of professional misconduct: Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins [2006] LPT 012. Reliance at mediation on an unsigned witness statement when, to the knowledge of the solicitor for the party advancing the statement, the witness had refused to sign it and regarded it as inaccurate, may constitute a misrepresentation or fraud which will result in a Deed of Settlement concluded at a mediation being set aside: Williams v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] NSWCA 345. 28

Costs of mediation

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 110M; Act No 9 1973, section 164C; Act No 11 1970, section 21N)

The costs of mediation, including the costs payable to the mediator, are payable: (a) if the court makes an order as to the payment of those costs, by one or more of the parties in such manner as the order may specify, or (b) in any other case, by the parties in such proportions as they may agree among themselves.

SECTION 28 COMMENTARY Apportionment of costs .......................................................................................................................... [CPA 28.20] Whether costs of mediation included in costs of proceedings .............................................................. [CPA 28.40] Costs of mediation under the Joint Protocol and court annexed mediations ....................................... [CPA 28.60] Failure to deal with costs in settlement terms ....................................................................................... [CPA 28.80] Costs thrown away by vacation of mediation date .............................................................................. [CPA 28.100]

[CPA 28.20]

Apportionment of costs

In the absence of an agreement between the parties the court may determine the apportionment of costs. Under Supreme Court Practice Note Gen 6, the court may request that a mediation be provided on a reduced or no fee basis: see further the annotations under [CPA 28.60]. A party cannot buy the right to mediation and equally, an opponent cannot block a mediation in a proper case by insisting on payment of her or his costs: Harrison v Schipp [2002] NSWCA 27. The court may order that the mediator determine by whom the costs of the mediation shall be borne: Cains v Wadiwel [2007] NSWSC 207. [CPA 28.40]

Whether costs of mediation included in costs of proceedings

Subject to any order made by the court pursuant to s 28(a) or any agreement made by the parties pursuant to s 28(b), the “costs of the proceedings” include the costs of a mediation, and any agreement between the parties as to payment of the “costs of the proceedings” will be so construed: Newcastle City Council v Wieland (2009) 74 NSWLR 173; [2009] NSWCA 113. However, if a pre-existing agreement between the parties strongly conveys that the costs of the mediation are to be treated entirely separately from the other costs of the proceedings the court may so construe the agreement and further, if it is intended that an order for costs of 38

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Mediation of proceedings s 28

proceedings is not to extend to include the mediation costs, this should be made clear in any order: see comments of Hodgson JA in Wieland at [4] and [5]. Where the terms of a mediation agreement recorded an intention that the costs of the mediation should be treated separately from the costs of the proceedings (by reserving to the Plaintiff a right to apply for an order for costs of the mediation) and subsequently an offer of compromise was accepted by the Defendant that provided for the payment of costs by the Defendant, the court has declined to order, on the Plaintiff’s application, that the costs of the proceedings encompassed in the Offer included the costs of the mediation, on the basis that the parties had treated the mediation costs as separate to the costs of the proceedings, that any right to make a separate application for costs of the mediation was subsumed into or waived by the agreement that was reached in the offer of compromise and that public policy considerations weighed against adding to the parties’ bargain: Mead v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 500; for a discussion of the ratio of Mead see Owners Strata Plan No 61162 v Lipman Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 622. Prior to Wieland, if it was sought to recover the costs of a mediation from another party, a specific application for those costs was often required in order to clarify the position in the event of a costs assessment. The ordinary position was that the costs of a mediation were not included in the general costs, in circumstances where there had been no court order for mediation (see Medulla v Abdel Hameed [2003] NSWSC 747) or in the absence of unusual circumstances (see Innovative Agricultural Products Pty Ltd v Cranshaw [1996] FCA 758, cited in Mead v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 500). Notwithstanding the prima facie position is now that mediation costs are included in the costs of the proceedings, any prior agreements between the parties or separate contractual arrangements with the mediator may give scope to challenge the prima facie position in a construction suit, so it is prudent to specifically deal with mediation costs in any final costs orders. It may also be prudent to carefully consider the wording used in the initial consent orders for mediation; an order that ‘subject to further order, the costs of the mediation be paid in the first instance by the parties in equal shares’ was readily found not to preclude the court from ordering that the costs of the proceedings included the costs of the mediation: Subway Systems Australia v Ireland (No 2) [2013] VSC 693. It is further noted that in Wieland the mediation had been conducted pursuant to a court order; a distinction may be made between the circumstances in Wieland and a case in which the parties merely volunteer to go to mediation without a court order. However, the fact that the referral to mediation is expressed to be made by a direction of the court, rather than an order of the court, and that it is a consent direction, does not preclude the court from dealing with the costs of a mediation as part of the costs of the proceedings in the usual way (unless the parties have agreed otherwise): Owners Strata Plan No 61162 (supra). The circumstance where a mediation is undertaken by consent agreement between the parties without any direction or order from the court, or where the court merely notes the agreement of the parties to attend mediation, does not appear to have arisen for consideration by the court on an application for an order for the costs of a mediation. On the question of the costs of the proceedings generally, the fact that a party refuses to mediate or negotiate may be considered a relevant factor in disallowing their costs: Bryant v Hawkesbury Radio Communication Co-op Society Ltd [2014] NSWSC 848 at [93]. [CPA 28.60]

Costs of mediation under the Joint Protocol and court annexed mediations

Where the costs of the mediation are burdensome to a party, and the Joint Protocol under Supreme Court Practice Note Gen 6 – Mediation has been invoked to obtain the appointment of a mediator, the court may request that the mediation be provided on a reduced or no fee basis: para 25 PN SC Gen 6. Currently, if a matter is referred to a registrar mediator there are no costs payable to the mediator, however CPA s 18(1)(b) provides that the Regulations may fix a fee for proceedings referred to mediation. Over the objection of a party who wanted to go to trial, and in default of that, desired the appointment of a mediator who was a former judge, the court ordered the mediation be conducted by a registrar in the circumstances where there was a dispute over which party would, and could afford to, bear the costs of mediation: Singh v Singh [2002] NSWSC 852. [CPA 28.80]

Failure to deal with costs in settlement terms

Practitioners should make every endeavour to resolve the issue of costs at the mediation. The court is likely to take a prima facie position that it will make no order as to the costs of the proceedings where the issues have otherwise been resolved at mediation, given that to do otherwise would require the parties to go to the expense © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

39

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 28.80]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 29

[CPA 28.80]

of trying an issue on the merits when there is no longer a need to do so: Sanders v Constantine [2006] NSWSC 534, citing Re Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622; 71 ALJR 533. [CPA 28.100]

Costs thrown away by vacation of mediation date

A party who cancels the mediation at the eleventh hour may be liable for the costs of the other parties thrown away by reason of that vacation: Al Mousawy (by his tutor Khamis) v JA Byatt Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 264. Correspondence exchanged between the parties in relation to arrangements for the mediation may be characterised as merely collateral or incidental to the mediation session; those documents do not attract the privilege conferred by s 30(4) and may be led as evidence to demonstrate the fault of a party for the late vacation. 29

Agreements and arrangements arising from mediation sessions

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 110N; Act No 9 1973, section 164D; Act No 11 1970, section 21O)

(1) The court may make orders to give effect to any agreement or arrangement arising out of a mediation session. (2) On any application for an order under this section, any party may call evidence, including evidence from the mediator and any other person engaged in the mediation, as to the fact that an agreement or arrangement has been reached and as to the substance of the agreement or arrangement. (3) This Part does not affect the enforceability of any other agreement or arrangement that may be made, whether or not arising out of a mediation session, in relation to the matters the subject of a mediation session.

SECTION 29 COMMENTARY [CPA 29.20]

Admissibility of agreements

Terms of settlement executed subsequent to a mediation are admissible: State Bank of New South Wales v Freeman (unreported, NSWSC, Badgery-Parker J, 31 January 1996); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v McConnell (unreported, NSWSC, Rolfe J, 24 July 1997). However (under the forerunner to s 30 (SCA s 110P(5))) difficulties would arise if objection was taken to the admission of a document purporting to set out terms of settlement on the ground that the document was prepared in the course of, or as a result of, a mediation and was therefore privileged and inadmissible. Unless the document itself contained an express or implied consent to allow the agreement to be admitted into evidence in proceedings taken to enforce the agreement it would not be admissible: Wentworth v Rogers [2004] NSWCA 109, citing Gain v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) 42 NSWLR 252. The addition of s 29(2) to the mediation provisions alleviates this difficulty, by allowing evidence to be given as to an agreement reached at mediation for the purpose of enforcement proceedings: Owners Corp Strata Plan 62285 v Betona Corp (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 216. See further the annotations under s 30 regarding admissibility of documents prepared for or at mediation. Refer also to s 73 of the CPA – the Power of the court to determine questions about compromises and settlements. 30 Privilege (cf Act No 52 1970, section 110P; Act No 9 1973, section 164F; Act No 11 1970, section 21Q)

(1) In this section, mediation session includes any steps taken in the course of making arrangements for the session or in the course of the follow-up of a session. (2) The same privilege with respect to defamation as exists with respect to judicial proceedings and a document produced in judicial proceedings exists with respect to: (a) a mediation session, or 40

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Mediation of proceedings [CPA 30.20] (b)

s 30 a document or other material sent to or produced to a mediator, or sent to or produced at the court or the registry of the court, for the purpose of enabling a mediation session to be arranged.

Civil Procedure Leg

(3) The privilege conferred by subsection (2) extends only to a publication made: (a) at a mediation session, or (b) in a document or other material sent to or produced to a mediator, or sent to or produced at the court or the registry of the court, for the purpose of enabling a mediation session to be arranged, or (c) in circumstances referred to in section 31. (4) Subject to section 29(2): (a) evidence of anything said or of any admission made in a mediation session is not admissible in any proceedings before any court or other body, and (b) a document prepared for the purposes of, or in the course of, or as a result of, a mediation session, or any copy of such a document, is not admissible in evidence in any proceedings before any court or other body. (5) Subsection (4) does not apply with respect to any evidence or document: (a) if the persons in attendance at, or identified during, the mediation session and, in the case of a document, all persons specified in the document, consent to the admission of the evidence or document, or (b) in proceedings commenced with respect to any act or omission in connection with which a disclosure has been made as referred to in section 31(c).

SECTION 30 COMMENTARY Section only applies to court ordered mediations ................................................................................. [CPA 30.10] Exceptions to the privilege ..................................................................................................................... [CPA 30.20] Admissibility of discussions and instructions ......................................................................................... [CPA 30.25] Scope of “mediation session” ................................................................................................................ [CPA 30.30] Evidence Act 1995 ................................................................................................................................. [CPA 30.40] Contractual protection ............................................................................................................................ [CPA 30.60] Confidentiality ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 30.80] Practical Considerations ...................................................................................................................... [CPA 30.100]

[CPA 30.10]

Section only applies to court ordered mediations

The protections afforded by s 30 only apply to a court ordered mediation under Pt 4 of the CPA and other mediations (such as those arranged pursuant to s 34(a)) do not attract the mediation privilege conferred by this section: Lewis v Lamb [2011] NSWSC 873. However, the provisions regarding privilege set out in s 131 of the Evidence Act 1995 may continue to apply to a non court ordered mediation: Lewis v Lamb [2011] NSWSC 873 at [16]. While there is no authority directly on point, the rationale for Lewis indicates that the protections afforded by s 31 (confidentiality) and s 33 (protection from liability for mediators) also could not be invoked by a party who had voluntarily engaged in a mediation without a court order for mediation. [CPA 30.20]

Exceptions to the privilege

Admissions or statements made in the course of a mediation are not admissible, however, unless the mediation agreement otherwise provides, information gleaned at a mediation by voluntary disclosure may be incorporated into pleadings and proved by other objective admissible evidence in the proceedings: 789TEN Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp [2004] NSWSC 594 citing AWA Ltd v Daniels (unreported, NSWSC, Rolfe J, 8 March 1992); see also Field v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285; 32 ALJR 110. The privilege protecting statements and admissions made in, and documents prepared for, a mediation session from admission into evidence is now subject to s 29(2), which allows the admission of evidence of agreements reached at a mediation for the purpose of enforcement proceedings. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

41

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 30 [CPA 30.25]

[CPA 30.2] Admissibility of discussions and instructions

In Boardman v Boardman (2012) 10 ASTLR 138; [2012] NSWSC 1257, on an application by a Defendant to enforce Heads of Agreement against a Plaintiff, evidence was given by the former solicitors for the Plaintiff to the effect that the Plaintiff had freely and voluntarily executed Heads of Agreement after a regular process of mediation that had included precautionary measures to ensure the Agreement was understood by the Plaintiff and he had given his instructions to enter into it; however, the (self represented) Plaintiff did not object to this evidence being given and himself traversed topics which would otherwise have been privileged. He was therefore taken to have waived privilege. [CPA 30.30]

Scope of “mediation session”

Under s 30(1) the privilege extends to the “follow-up” of a mediation session. The court should not take a narrow approach to considering what is a discussion “in a mediation session” or “within the mediation” for the purposes of s 30, as the underlying public policy is to encourage full and frank settlement discussions: Jireh International Pty Ltd v Western Export Services Inc (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 294. For a discussion of the scope of “follow-up” (in a context in which reliance on s 29(2) was queried), see Owners Corp Strata Plan 62285 v Betona Corp (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 216. [CPA 30.40]

Evidence Act 1995

With respect to a mediation which is conducted under this Part, admissibility is determined by reference to s 30 of the Civil Procedure Act, not by reference to s 131 of the Evidence Act 1995: see Sharjade Pty Ltd v RAAF (Landings) Ex-Servicemen Charitable Fund Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1347, although s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 may additionally be invoked to support a discretion to exclude evidence: see Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1091; Rajski v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 478; cf Azzi v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 140; [2007] NSWSC 375 – s 135 discretion does not arise. For a useful discussion of the relationship between s 131(2)(h) of the Evidence Act 1995 and s 30(4) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, see Azzi v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 140; [2007] NSWSC 375. [CPA 30.60]

Contractual protection

Further to the protections offered by s 30 parties may separately contract, by way of the mediation agreement, not to cause any subpoena or other compulsory process to issue requiring production of “without prejudice” statements prepared for the purpose of a mediation or any document recording such statements: Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1091; see also 789TEN Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp [2004] NSWSC 594 (consideration of terms of a mediation agreement). [CPA 30.80]

Confidentiality

Section 30 provides protection against the admissibility in court of evidence of matters occurring in the course of a mediation. However, it does not regulate the confidentiality of those matters outside the court. If confidentiality is required, consideration must be given to including a confidentiality provision in the mediation agreement or otherwise entering into a separate confidentiality agreement. Section 31 deals with the mediator’s obligation of confidentiality. For a discussion of the authorities in relation to a solicitor’s obligations of confidentiality arising out of a mediation, and the restraints that can be placed upon solicitors continuing to act for a client when they possess information obtained by them in a prior mediation in related litigation see Worth Recycling Pty Ltd v Waste Recycling and Processing Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 356, affirmed on appeal Worth Recycling Pty Ltd v Waste Recycling and Processing Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 354. [CPA 30.100]

Practical Considerations

Disputes have arisen in relation to the construction of the scope of a “mediation session” as defined under s 30(1) when parties later seek to rely upon offers made in the course of a mediation for the purpose of a costs argument. It is prudent to follow up any offer made at a mediation with a later written offer of settlement that is not subject to an argument that its disclosure should be restrained. Refer to the discussion of this principle, 42

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Mediation of proceedings [CPA 32.20]

s 32

and a failed attempt to argue that it was contrary to the interests of justice to allow one party to rely upon a written offer without allowing another party to rely on an offer made in the course of the mediation in Mundine v Brown (No 7) [2011] NSWSC 170. 31

Confidentiality

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 110Q; Act No 9 1973, section 164G; Act No 11 1970, section 21R)

Civil Procedure Leg

A mediator may disclose information obtained in connection with the administration or execution of this Part only in one or more of the following circumstances: (a) with the consent of the person from whom the information was obtained, (b) in connection with the administration or execution of this Part, including section 29(2), (c) if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure is necessary to prevent or minimise the danger of injury to any person or damage to any property, (d) if the disclosure is reasonably required for the purpose of referring any party or parties to a mediation session to any person, agency, organisation or other body and the disclosure is made with the consent of the parties to the mediation session for the purpose of aiding in the resolution of a dispute between those parties or assisting the parties in any other manner, (e) in accordance with a requirement imposed by or under a law of the State (other than a requirement imposed by a subpoena or other compulsory process) or the Commonwealth.

SECTION 31 COMMENTARY Report by mediator ................................................................................................................................ [CPA 31.20] Application of section ............................................................................................................................. [CPA 31.40]

[CPA 31.20]

Report by mediator

A Report to the court prepared by a mediator pursuant to s 31(b) is prima facie admissible in proceedings relating to the administration and supervision of the mediation provisions of the Act. The Report is not limited only to a statement as to whether the mediation has concluded and a mediator may state her or his views on the utility of continuing a mediation: see discussion in Rajski v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 478. [CPA 31.40]

Application of section

In Lewis v Lamb [2011] NSWSC 873 the court determined that the protections in relation to privilege afforded by s 30 only apply to court ordered mediations under Pt 4 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. By analogy, it may be anticipated that the protections afforded under s 31 also only apply to court ordered mediations. See further the annotations at [CPA 30.10]. 32 Directions by mediator (cf SCR Part 72C, rule 3)

Subject to the uniform rules and any relevant practice notes, a mediator may, by order, give directions as to the preparation for, and conduct of, the mediation.

SECTION 32 COMMENTARY Liability of mediator ................................................................................................................................ [CPA 32.20] Types of directions ................................................................................................................................. [CPA 32.40]

[CPA 32.20]

Liability of mediator

This provision has been transferred from the SCR to the CPA and now provides a statutory basis for the mediator’s jurisdiction to make directions binding upon the parties to a mediation. Early exposure drafts of the CPA gave the mediator a jurisdiction to award costs against a party for failure to complete specified steps in accordance with directions given by the mediator; that jurisdiction has been removed and it may have been © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

43

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 33

[CPA 32.20]

considered that such a power would have undermined the neutrality of the mediator, to the detriment of the process. Nevertheless, a failure to comply with directions may render a party vulnerable to an order for costs pursuant to UCPR r 42.10 and an application can presumably be made to the court for costs with respect to such a failure, as long as that failure is ascertainable outside the confidential process of the mediation itself. [CPA 32.40]

Types of directions

It might be anticipated that a mediator will make directions to ensure that the real issues in the dispute are exposed and that there has been sufficient exchange of evidence to facilitate settlement. Directions may be made to provide for the exchange of position papers, statements of issues, document bundles, schedules, valuations, reports and the like. In the circumstances where a party objected to mediation on the basis that she had been denied access to information, the court noted that the confidentiality of the mediation process may of itself assist in facilitating the exchange of information: Beck v Tuckey Pty Ltd (2004) 49 ACSR 555; 22 ACLC 633; [2004] NSWSC 357. In Oasis Fund Management Ltd v ABN Amro Bank NV [2009] NSWSC 967 at [20] the court considered that the difficulties that can be associated with referring a matter to an early mediation, prior to the matter being “ripe” for mediation, may be mitigated by appropriate directions from the mediator, including directions to the parties to provide position statements and take other appropriate steps. 33

Protection from liability for mediator

A mediator to whom the court refers proceedings has, in the exercise of his or her functions as a mediator in relation to those proceedings, the same protection and immunity as a judicial officer of the court has in the exercise of his or her functions as a judicial officer.

SECTION 33 COMMENTARY [CPA 33.20]

Liability of mediator

A question arises as to whether a mediator obtains the statutory protection offered by this part when the mediation is conducted, not pursuant to a court order, but pursuant only to the private contractual arrangements between the parties and the mediator. In Lewis v Lamb [2011] NSWSC 873 the court determined that the protections in relation to privilege afforded by s 30 only apply to court ordered mediations under Pt 4 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. By analogy, it may be anticipated that the protections afforded under s 33 also only apply to court ordered mediations. See further the annotations at [CPA 30.10]. For a consideration of whether a mediator may be joined as a defendant in an action for negligence or breach of contract in such circumstances see: Tapoohi v Lewenberg (No 2) [2003] VSC 410. 34

Mediation otherwise than under this Part

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 110H(2); Act No 9 1973, section 162(2))

This Part does not prevent: (a) the parties to proceedings from agreeing to and arranging for mediation of any matter otherwise than as referred to in this Part, or (b) a matter arising in proceedings from being dealt with under the provisions of the Community Justice Centres Act 1983 without having been referred under section 26. [Para (b) am Act 106 of 2009, Sch 2.2; Act 70 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2.1[2]] [S 34 am Act 106 of 2009; Act 70 of 2007]

SECTION 34 COMMENTARY [CPA 34.20]

Protections not afforded to voluntary mediations

The protection afforded by s 30 (privilege) only applies to mediations ordered by the court pursuant to s 26 of the CPA: see Lewis v Lamb [2011] NSWSC 873. Refer further to the annotations under [CPA 30.10]. By analogy, it may be anticipated that the protections afforded under ss 31 and 33 also only apply to court ordered 44

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Mediation of proceedings [CPA 34.20]

s 34

Civil Procedure Leg

mediations. Consequently, even if the parties have settled between themselves the arrangements they wish to make for a mediation, consideration should be given to formalising the arrangements by entering into consent orders.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

45

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 35

[CPA Pt5.20]

PART 5 – ARBITRATION OF PROCEEDINGS Commentary by Peter Johnstone, President of the Children’s Court of New South Wales. Updated by Greg Sarginson, Barrister.

PART 5 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 5 ............................................................................................................... [CPA Pt5.20] Historical note ....................................................................................................................................... [CPA Pt5.40]

[CPA Pt5.20]

General comments on Part 5

The Arbitration (Civil Actions) Act 1983 was repealed by the Civil Procedure Act 2005, which in turn incorporates the relevant provisions of the former Act into Pt 5. The court may order that proceedings before it be referred for determination by an arbitrator. A panel of arbitrators appointed by the senior judicial officer may be maintained by each court. Arbitrators have all of the functions of the referring court, subject to certain limitations. This type of court-annexed civil arbitration is to be distinguished from commercial arbitration under the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010. [CPA Pt5.40]

Historical note

Court-annexed arbitration was introduced into NSW on 1 July 1983 with the commencement of the Arbitration (Civil Actions) Act 1983. As an outcome of a collaborative effort between the Law Society of NSW and the Attorney General’s department a scheme based on experience in the United States, adapted for local conditions, commenced in designated Local Courts. The objective of the scheme was to provide an inexpensive, speedy and streamlined method for the resolution of less complicated civil disputes. Unlike commercial arbitration, which depends upon the prior agreement between the parties, civil arbitration operates within the court system, by delegation of the court’s jurisdiction, with the safeguard of an absolute right of rehearing by the court available to a dissatisfied party. Initially individual arbitrations were carried out by the arbitrator in chambers or the arbitrator’s office. With the success of the scheme it was broadened from the Local Court to the District Court and then ultimately to the Supreme Court. Increasingly, the courts provided facilities in the courts for the conduct of the arbitrations, and in some courts a Philadelphia scheme has been implemented where rostered arbitrators sit for a full day and hear and determine a list of cases allocated for that day. The scheme has been very effective, with low rates of rehearing and high levels of case disposal. It has been a significant contributing factor to reductions in delays in the NSW court system since its inception. In recent years the incidence of referral of civil disputes to arbitrators has reduced significantly due to a number of factors including separate statutory schemes for compulsory claims assessment and mediation before the commencement of court proceedings under Pt 4.4 and 4.5 of the Motor Accident Compensation Act 1999 and Pt 6 Div 4 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; and an emphasis on alternative dispute resolution by way of mediation.

DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY 35 Definitions (cf Act No 43 1983, section 3)

In this Part: arbitrator means an arbitrator appointed under section 36. award means an arbitrator’s award under section 39. referred proceedings means proceedings the subject of an unrevoked reference to an arbitrator under section 38. referring court, in relation to referred proceedings, means the court by which the proceedings have been referred. 46

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 5 – Arbitration of proceedings Division 1 – Preliminary

[CPA 37.40] 36

s 37

Appointment to office as arbitrator

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 5)

(1) The senior judicial officer of the court may appoint suitable persons to be arbitrators to hear and determine referred proceedings. (2) A person is not eligible to be appointed as an arbitrator unless the person is a former judicial officer, a barrister nominated by the Bar Council or a solicitor nominated by the Law Society Council. Civil Procedure Leg

(3) The senior judicial officer concerned may, and if the nominating body so requests in writing must, revoke an appointment under this section. (4) An appointment, or revocation of appointment, of an arbitrator is to be made by instrument in writing signed by the senior judicial officer. (5) An arbitrator may resign office by instrument in writing delivered to the senior judicial officer. (6) An arbitrator is entitled to such remuneration as the Minister may from time to time determine. (7) An arbitrator’s remuneration is to be paid out of money provided by Parliament. 37

Jurisdiction of arbitrator

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 7)

(1) The jurisdiction conferred on an arbitrator by this Part in relation to referred proceedings is part of the jurisdiction of the court by which the proceedings were referred. (2) Subject to this Part, but without limiting the specific powers and authorities of an arbitrator under this Part, an arbitrator has and may exercise, in relation to referred proceedings, all of the functions of the court by which the proceedings were referred. (3) Subsection (2) does not confer on an arbitrator functions of the court which are the same as, or similar to, the functions conferred by sections 52 and 53 or any other functions in respect of contempt. (4) The functions conferred on an arbitrator may be exercised only: (a) for the purpose of determining the issues in dispute in referred proceedings, and (b) for the purpose of making an award in referred proceedings, and (c) for related purposes. (5) Subject to this Part, a tribunal (other than the arbitrator to whom proceedings have been referred for determination) has no jurisdiction in respect of any issue in dispute in the proceedings while those proceedings are before the arbitrator. (6) In subsection (5), tribunal means any court, tribunal, board or other body, or any person, empowered by an Act or by agreement of parties to determine by litigation, arbitration, conciliation or otherwise any issue that is in dispute.

SECTION 37 COMMENTARY [CPA 37.40]

Jurisdiction of arbitrator

The arbitrator in effect exercises the jurisdiction of the referring court, with modifications as to procedure: see CPA s 49. However, the arbitrator does not have powers to compel witnesses, issue subpoenas or to punish for contempt. If conduct giving rise to such issues occurs in the arbitration, this must be referred back to the court: see CPA ss 50, 52 and 54.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

47

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 38

[CPA 38.20]

DIVISION 2 – ARBITRATION 38

Referral to arbitration

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 76B; Act No 9 1973, section 63A; Act No 11 1970, section 21H)

(1) The court may order that proceedings before it: (a) in respect of a claim for the recovery of damages or other money, or (b) in respect of a claim for any equitable or other relief ancillary to a claim for the recovery of damages or other money, be referred for determination by an arbitrator. (2) Before making such an order in relation to any proceedings, the referring court: (a) is to consider the preparations made by the parties for the hearing of the proceedings, and (b) is, as far as possible, to deal with all matters that may be dealt with by the court on application to the court before the hearing of the proceedings, and (c) is to give such directions for the conduct of the proceedings before the arbitrator as appear best adapted for the just, quick and cheap disposal of the proceedings. (3) The referring court may not make such an order in relation to any proceedings if: (a) no issue in the proceedings is contested or judgment in the proceedings has been given or entered and has not been set aside, or (b) rules of court provide that such an order may not be made in relation to proceedings of that kind, or (c) cause is otherwise shown why the proceedings should not be so referred. (4) At any time before the making of an award in relation to referred proceedings, the referring court may revoke an order under this section and give directions for the subsequent conduct of the proceedings and directions as to any costs incurred before the revocation of the order. (5) This section does not limit any other power of the court to refer a matter to arbitration.

SECTION 38 COMMENTARY [CPA 38.20]

Referral to arbitration

The section defines which proceedings may be referred for determination by an arbitrator: s 38(1), and which proceedings may not: s 38(3). Before referring proceedings for arbitration, the court must consider the preparations for hearing made by the parties, deal with any applications that should be dealt with before hearing, and give directions for the conduct of the proceedings before the arbitrator: s 38(2). Those proceedings which may not be referred include proceedings where there is no dispute, where judgment has been given or entered, where cause is shown why the proceedings should not be referred, and proceedings of a kind prescribed by the rules. UCPR r 20.8 provides for other classes of proceedings which may not be referred for arbitration. They are proceedings involving an allegation of fraud and proceedings in the Small Claims Division of the Local Court. See also Morgan v Johnson (1998) 44 NSWLR 578 at 585, 599. The provisions of CPA s 56 are relevant to the decision of the court as to whether or not to refer proceedings for arbitration. Relevant factors include the complexity of the issues; the length of the likely hearing; the amount likely to be expended in costs by the parties; and whether there is a real likelihood that the arbitration will lead to a final resolution of the proceedings.

48

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 5 – Arbitration of proceedings Division 2 – Arbitration

[CPA 39.20]

39

s 41

Determination by arbitrator

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 15)

(2) The arbitrator must record the arbitrator’s determination of the proceedings, and the reasons for the determination, by an award in writing signed by the arbitrator. (3) The arbitrator must immediately send the award to the referring court. (4) An arbitrator may not make a determination that could not have been made had the proceedings been heard and determined by the referring court. (5) Despite subsection (4), an award does not fail to have full effect, and may not be called in question, by reason only that the amount awarded exceeds the amount claimed in the proceedings to which the award relates.

SECTION 39 COMMENTARY [CPA 39.20]

Determination by arbitrator

The arbitrator determines the dispute on the evidence in the same way as the court would, subject to modifications as to procedure consistent with the more informal and streamlined nature of the proceedings. The arbitrator may determine the procedure for the arbitration: s 49, but is bound by the rules of evidence: s 49(2). A determination by an arbitrator must be recorded, with reasons, in a signed award, which is sent forthwith to the court. 40 Award taken to be judgment of court (cf Act No 43 1983, section 16A; Act No 52 1970, section 76B(5); Act No 9 1973, section 63A(5); Act No 11 1970, section 21H(5))

Subject to section 41 and Division 3, an award is final and conclusive, and is taken to be a judgment of the referring court: (a) if it is expressed to be made by consent of all the parties, on the date on which it is received by the referring court, or (b) in any other case, at the expiry of 28 days after it is sent to all of the parties. 41

Judicial supervision of arbitrator

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 17)

(1) No relief lies: (a) under section 69 or 101 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, or (b) by way of declaratory judgment or order, or (c) by way of injunction, or (d) under section 126, 127 or 128 of the District Court Act 1973, or (e) under section 39 or 40 of the Local Court Act 2007, in relation to proceedings under this Act on referred proceedings. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1.12[2]]

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the relief is sought on the ground of a lack of jurisdiction or a denial of natural justice. [S 41 am Act 94 of 2007] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

49

Civil Procedure Leg

(1) The issues in dispute in referred proceedings are to be determined by the arbitrator on the evidence adduced before the arbitrator.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 41

[CPA 42.20]

DIVISION 3 – REHEARINGS 42

Application for rehearing

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 18)

(1) A person aggrieved by an award may apply to the referring court for a rehearing of the proceedings concerned. (2) The application may (but need not) request that the rehearing be a full rehearing or limited rehearing. (3) The award is suspended from the time the application is made until an order for rehearing is made.

SECTION 42 COMMENTARY [CPA 42.20]

Application for rehearing

Each party in the proceedings has an unqualified right to apply for a rehearing if dissatisfied with an arbitrator’s award. The application for a rehearing under s 42 is made by notice of motion: UCPR r 20.12(1). Before the record of any proceedings is brought before the court for a rehearing, the registrar must seal within the record, or separate from the record, both the application for rehearing and all information as to the nature and quantum of the arbitrator’s award: UCPR r 20.12(3). The rehearing may be a full rehearing or limited rehearing: ss 42(2), 43(4) and 43(6); UCPR r 20.12(2). The only qualification is that there may be costs penalties if the rehearing produces an outcome that is not significantly better than under the award. The application for a rehearing must be made within prescribed time limits. The application has the effect of suspending the award pending consideration by the court under s 43. 43 Order for rehearing (cf Act No 43 1983, section 18A)

(1) The referring court must order a rehearing of proceedings the subject of an award if an application for rehearing is made before the award takes effect. (2) An order for rehearing may not be made unless the amount claimed in the proceedings, or the value of the property to which the proceedings relate, exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court when sitting in its Small Claims Division. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2]

(3) An order for rehearing need not be made if it appears to the court that the applicant failed to attend a hearing before an arbitrator without good reason. (4) In an order for rehearing, the referring court may direct that the rehearing be a full rehearing or a limited rehearing, as the court thinks appropriate, and may do so regardless of whether the applicant requested a full rehearing or a limited rehearing or made no such request. (5) In the absence of a direction under subsection (4), the rehearing is to be a full rehearing. (6) An order for a limited rehearing must specify the aspects that are to be the subject of the rehearing, whether by reference to specific issues in dispute, specific parties to the dispute or otherwise. (7) The referring court may amend an order for rehearing at any time before or during a rehearing. [S 43 am Act 94 of 2007]

50

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 5 – Arbitration of proceedings Division 3 – Rehearings

[CPA 44.20]

s 44

SECTION 43 COMMENTARY [CPA 43.20]

Order for rehearing

An order for rehearing cannot be made unless the amount claimed in the proceedings, or the value of the property to which the proceedings relate, exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court when sitting in its Small Claims Division. The current jurisdictional limit of the Local Court when sitting in its Small Claims Division is $10,000.00: Local Court Act 2007 s 29(1)(b). In respect of any change of the jurisdictional limit, the relevant limit is that which applies at the time of the application for rehearing rather than the date the proceedings were commenced: Csalar v Circosta (2002) 55 NSWLR 212; [2002] NSWSC 482. Further, there are public policy reasons for matters which fall within the jurisdictional limit of the Small Claims Division of the Local Court to be dealt with in the Small Claims Division: Csalar v Circosta (2002) 55 NSWLR 212; [2002] NSWSC 482 at 218. 44 Rehearing (cf Act No 43 1983, section 18B)

(1) If an order is made for a full rehearing, the award ceases to have effect and the proceedings are to be heard and determined in the referring court as if they had never been referred to an arbitrator. (2) If an order is made for a limited rehearing: (a) the award is suspended from the time the order is made until the proceedings are determined, and (b) the aspects ordered to be dealt with at the limited rehearing are to be heard and determined in the court concerned as if they had not been dealt with in the arbitration, and (c) following the rehearing, the court may reinstate the award with such modifications (if any) as the court thinks appropriate, and (d) the award, as reinstated, is final and conclusive, and is taken to be a judgment of the referring court. (3) Subject to this Division, this Act and the uniform rules apply to proceedings on a rehearing in the same way as they apply to any other civil proceedings.

SECTION 44 COMMENTARY [CPA 44.20] Rehearing If a full rehearing is ordered under s 43, the arbitrator’s award ceases to have effect, and the dispute is referred back to the court for a full, fresh hearing. However, if the order under s 43 is for a limited rehearing, the award continues to be suspended only, pending determination of the issues referred for rehearing. Upon determination of the rehearing, the court may reinstate the arbitrator’s award, with modifications if appropriate. Rehearings are conducted as if the arbitration never occurred. Oral evidence given in the arbitration is not admissible: Najdanovic v Brown (unreported, NSWSC, 22 September 1992) affirmed in MacDougall v Curlevski (1996) 40 NSWLR 430 and Courtenay v Proprietors Strata Plan 12125 (unreported, NSWCA, 23 September 1998, 30 October 1998). Thus, a witness at the rehearing cannot be questioned about evidence given before an arbitrator even if it is inconsistent. Any documentary evidence from the arbitration is not on the record and must be re-tendered. The only relevance of the arbitration is as to costs. The reinstated award takes effect from the date of reinstatement. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

51

Civil Procedure Leg

Once an application for a rehearing has been filed within time, the court is required to order a rehearing in all but the limited exceptional circumstances set out in the section, where a discretion is conferred. The court also has a discretion to order a rehearing on a limited basis only, in which event the matters for rehearing are to be specified. The suspension of the award is automatically continued unless a full rehearing is ordered, in which case the award ceases to have any effect: s 44.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 45

45

[CPA 45.20]

Discontinuance of rehearing

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 18D)

(1) A rehearing may be discontinued, but only with the consent of all parties or by leave of the court. (2) If a rehearing is discontinued, the court is to reinstate the award from which the rehearing has arisen. (3) An (a) (b) (c)

Note:

award that is reinstated under this section: is final and conclusive, and is taken to be a judgment of the referring court, and unless the court otherwise orders, is taken to have had effect as such a judgment as from the date on which it would have taken effect under section 40(b) had no application for a rehearing been made under this Division.

Under section 40(b), the award would have taken effect at the expiry of 28 days after it was sent to all of the

parties.

SECTION 45 COMMENTARY [CPA 45.20]

Discontinuance of rehearing

If the court has ordered a rehearing under s 43, it cannot be unilaterally discontinued by a party. Consent or an order of the court is required. The court is to reinstate the award, which has effect as a judgment from the date from which it would originally have taken effect, unless the court orders otherwise. 46 Costs of rehearing (cf Act No 43 1983, section 18C)

(1) A court that hears and determines proceedings on a full rehearing: (a) may make an order for costs in respect of the rehearing, and (b) may, in addition, make an order for costs in respect of the hearing under Division 2. (2) A court that hears and determines any aspect of proceedings on a limited rehearing: (a) may make an order for costs in respect of the rehearing as to that aspect, and (b) may, in addition, make an order for costs in respect of the hearing as to that aspect under Division 2. (3) This section applies to proceedings in respect of which a rehearing is discontinued under section 45 in the same way as it applies to proceedings that are heard and determined on a rehearing.

SECTION 46 COMMENTARY [CPA 46.20] Discretion as to costs of hearing and rehearing Where a defendant elects not to call at the arbitration evidence which at the rehearing may significantly alter the result in the defendant’s favour, it is within the court’s discretion to award costs against the defendant despite its success at the rehearing, and those costs may be on an indemnity basis. This is so even where the defendant might have a legitimate fear that to tip its hand at the arbitration could result in an unscrupulous plaintiff presenting a different case at the rehearing. In Quach v Mustafa (unreported, NSWCA, 15 June 1995) the defendant had elected not to disclose at the arbitration that it had cogent adverse film of the plaintiff, applied for a rehearing at which the award for the plaintiff was substantially reduced, but suffered an indemnity costs order, which the Court of Appeal found to be within discretion. The defendant’s forensic needs were said to be overridden by the necessity to make the arbitration system work as an alternative, not as a mere preliminary, to a court hearing. Quach was followed 52

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[CPA 46.20]

Part 5 – Arbitration of proceedings Division 4 – Miscellaneous

s 49

In Howard v Telstra Corp Ltd [2003] NSWCA 188 an order that the plaintiff, although successful on the rehearing, pay the defendant’s costs of the arbitration and rehearing was set aside on appeal as being too harsh in the circumstances, and the plaintiff recovered his costs other than those of the arbitration (which he was ordered to pay). The Court of Appeal distinguished MacDougall v Curlevski on the basis that in Howard the plaintiff’s failure to call evidence in corroboration at the arbitration – which led to an award in favour of the defendant – was due to a mistaken belief that it would not be necessary, not to a decision for forensic purposes to withhold the evidence until the rehearing. In Morgan v Johnson (1998) 44 NSWLR 578 the Court of Appeal thought it appropriate that the parties bear their own costs of the rehearing, but that the defendant bear the cost of the arbitration as the party responsible for its failure. In that matter it was the plaintiff who sought the rehearing, at which the plaintiff’s fabrication of evidence was first exposed. The Court considered that one function of a fully contested arbitration is to promote informed decision-making as regards settlement, and a defendant who decides not to adduce compelling evidence at the arbitration can have no complain if costs discretions are exercised against the defendant. Quach, Howard and Morgan were discussed in some detail by the Court of Appeal in Sydney City Council v Geftlick [2006] NSWCA 280 where the Court of Appeal held that a successful defendant who had failed to call a critical witness on the issue of liability at the arbitration should pay the costs of the plaintiff and cross defendants on an ordinary basis from the date of the arbitration. At a rehearing, when the issue of costs of the proceedings is being determined, a party is entitled to tender the evidence it relies upon on the issue of costs, including offers of compromise, Calderbank offers, and matters relevant to the construction and effect of such offers, including relevant parts of the arbitrator’s reasons: Hansen v Monterey (Coolah) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1383 at [48 ]–[49]. 47

Subpoena at rehearing against arbitrator

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 18E)

A subpoena for the giving of evidence or the production of documents at a rehearing is not to be issued against the arbitrator to whom the proceedings concerned were referred just because the evidence or documents relate to the arbitration.

DIVISION 4 – MISCELLANEOUS 48

Appearances

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 8)

A party to referred proceedings before an arbitrator has the same rights as to: (a) representation by a barrister or solicitor, or otherwise, and (b) examination and cross-examination of witnesses, as the party would have in relation to proceedings before the referring court. 49

Procedure

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 10)

(1) Subject to this Act and any directions given by the referring court, the procedure at an arbitration is to be determined by the arbitrator. (2) Subject to the rules of evidence, an arbitrator must act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard for technicalities or legal forms.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

53

Civil Procedure Leg

by the Court of Appeal in MacDougall v Curlevski (1996) 40 NSWLR 430, in which the defendant elected to call no evidence at the arbitration (on which the plaintiff succeeded) but produced at the rehearing an eyewitness whose evidence resulted in a verdict for the defendant; again the trial judge’s indemnity costs order against the defendant was held to be within discretion.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 50

[CPA 49.20]

SECTION 49 COMMENTARY [CPA 49.20]

Procedure

The arbitrator may, subject to the Act or any directions given by the court, determine the procedure for the arbitration. The rules of evidence do however apply but, subject to that, the arbitrator is only required to act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard for technicalities or legal forms. In arbitrations the presumption is that the expert medical evidence will be by way of written report rather than oral evidence: UCPR r 20.10. In the absence of consent of the parties, oral evidence cannot be introduced unless the court or the arbitrator so directs: see Hann v Nield (unreported, NSWSC, James J, 14 October 1993). The medical reports must be served to make them admissible. The evidence need not be recorded: s 51(2). 50 Issue of subpoenas (cf Act No 43 1983, section 11)

A referring court has the same powers with respect to: (a) ordering persons to attend as witnesses at referred proceedings or to attend and produce documents at referred proceedings, and (b) enforcing compliance with any such orders, as it would have had in respect of the proceedings had they been heard and determined by the court. 51 Evidence (cf Act No 43 1983, section 13)

(1) Subject to the uniform rules, evidence in referred proceedings before an arbitrator is to be given and received in the same way as it would be given and received before the referring court. (2) Subsection (1) does not require any such evidence to be recorded. (3) An arbitrator may administer an oath or take an affidavit for the purposes of referred proceedings. (4) Referred proceedings are taken to be judicial proceedings for the purposes of section 327 (Offence of perjury) of the Crimes Act 1900. 52 Refusal or failure to take oath etc (cf Act No 43 1983, section 12)

(1) If, at any hearing of referred proceedings, a witness: (a) refuses or fails to take an oath when required by the arbitrator to do so, or (b) refuses or fails to answer a question that the witness is required by the arbitrator to answer, the arbitrator or a party to the proceedings may apply to the referring court for an order that the witness attend before the court for examination. (2) Unless satisfied that there was a reasonable excuse for the refusal or failure of the witness to take the oath or answer the question, the referring court must make the order applied for. (3) A court before which a witness attends and gives evidence pursuant to such an order may order the transmission to the arbitrator of the transcript of evidence. (4) Any such evidence is taken to have been given at the hearing before the arbitrator. (5) Failure to comply with an order under this section constitutes a contempt of the referring court, committed in the face of the court.

54

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 5 – Arbitration of proceedings Division 4 – Miscellaneous 53

s 55

Contempt

(1) A person must not: (a) wilfully insult an arbitrator while the arbitrator is hearing referred proceedings or proceeding to or from such a hearing, or (b) wilfully insult a person in attendance at such a hearing or proceeding to or from such a hearing, or (c) wilfully misbehave during the hearing of referred proceedings, or (d) wilfully and without lawful excuse interrupt the hearing of referred proceedings, or (e) assault or wilfully obstruct an arbitrator or other person during the hearing of referred proceedings, or (f) without lawful excuse, disobey a lawful direction given to the person by an arbitrator during the hearing of referred proceedings. (2) An arbitrator may direct a person who contravenes subsection (1) to leave the sitting of the arbitrator at which the contravention occurs and the person to whom the direction is given must immediately comply with the direction. (3) Failure to comply with such a direction constitutes a contempt of the referring court, committed in the face of the court. 54

Costs

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 16)

(1) An arbitrator may make orders with respect to the payment, as between the parties, of the costs of referred proceedings. (2) An arbitrator has the same powers in relation to an order for costs under subsection (1) as the referring court would have had if the hearing before the arbitrator had been a hearing before the court. (3) This section does not limit the power of the referring court to make orders under section 98 with respect to the costs of referred proceedings. 55

Protection from liability for arbitrator

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 6)

An arbitrator to whom the court refers proceedings has, in the exercise of his or her functions as an arbitrator in relation to those proceedings, the same protection and immunity as a judicial officer of the court has in the exercise of his or her functions as a judicial officer.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

55

Civil Procedure Leg

(cf Act No 43 1983, section 14)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) [CPA Pt6.20]

PART 6 – CASE MANAGEMENT AND INTERLOCUTORY MATTERS Commentary by Michael McHugh SC.

PART 6 COMMENTARY [CPA Pt6.20]

General comments on Part 6

Rules of court not uncommonly now provide a general statement of an overriding purpose and a general statement of case management powers: Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014), Ch 2. Part 6 of the CPA builds upon and gives statutory supremacy to these rules and reinforces recent judicial pronouncements concerning case management and the duties of practitioners to give effect to the overriding purpose of facilitating the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings: State Pollution Control Commission v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 29 NSWLR 487 at 493–494; Ashmore v Corp of Lloyds [1992] 1 WLR 446; Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738 at 744. The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) introduced reforms to case management not dissimilar to those set out in Pt 6 and their history is set out in Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 49 NSWLR 51; [2000] NSWSC 338. The NSW Attorney General in the Second Reading speech, inter alia, outlined Pt 6 of the CPA: Part 6 of the Bill introduces a number of new provisions relating to the conduct of court proceedings. The provisions recognise the importance of case management as a tool for increasing the efficiency of the court system and for reducing the cost of litigation. They seek to strike a balance between protecting the interests of justice in an individual case and protecting the interests of justice for other litigants and the courts … It is important to note that the dictates of justice will not be limited to the dictates of justice only as between the parties, which has been argued to be the effect of the majority judgment in one of the leading cases on case management – Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146. The approach to amendments which the judgments in JL Holdings treated as appropriate is significantly altered by Pt 6: New South Wales v Mulcahy [2006] NSWCA 303; Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 has effectively overturned JL Holdings. The CPA has given courts a power to give greater weight than previously to considerations of case management: Fexuto Pty Ltd v Lombe [2006] NSWSC 981; Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372. In any event, each case must be considered on its own facts and in the context of the current statutory regime. The prominence given in Pt 6 to the court’s overriding objective affects the dynamics of case management decisions, both in particular cases and generally. Parties need to bear that truth in mind in formulating submissions about the “dictates of justice” in particular cases. These provisions emphasise that, while the dictates of justice are to be obeyed, courts should manage cases and interlocutory procedures so that attention is focused on resolution of the real issues: Department of Community Services v D (2006) 66 NSWLR 582; [2006] NSWSC 827; Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (in liq) v David [2007] NSWSC 401. Part 6 of the CPA has the effect of reinforcing two points: (a) the courts and not the parties, are in charge of the proceedings; and (b) practitioners are bound to help the court to get to the real point of a case as quickly as possible. Parties can no longer seek “to advance a multitude of ingenious arguments in the hope that out of 10 bad points the judge will be capable of fashioning a winner”: Ashmore v Corp of Lloyds [1992] 1 WLR 446; Leading Edge Events Australia Pty Ltd v Kiri Te Kanawa (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 568. The principles that underpin these new statutory provisions were explained by the Court of Appeal in Shao Chun Bi v Mourad [2010] NSWCA 17. Allsop P stated “The reforms that have taken place under the Civil Procedure Act and the evident attempt by courts to ensure efficiency can be seen not merely to reflect worthy efforts for efficiency but also to be steps vital for the provision of timely individual justice” at [47]. Young JA said at [31] that the regime in ss 56–60 of the CPA “requires the court to turn away reluctant gladiators and to ensure that they either prosecute their claims in due time or get sent away from the court”.

56

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 1 – Guiding principles

[CPA 56.20]

s 56

DIVISION 1 – GUIDING PRINCIPLES Commentary by Michael McHugh SC. 56

Overriding purpose

(1) The overriding purpose of this Act and of rules of court, in their application to civil proceedings, is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. [Subs (1) am Act 1 of 2013, Sch 1.6[3] and [4]; Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[3]]

(2) The court must seek to give effect to the overriding purpose when it exercises any power given to it by this Act or by rules of court and when it interprets any provision of this Act or of any such rule. (3) A party to civil proceedings is under a duty to assist the court to further the overriding purpose and, to that effect, to participate in the processes of the court and to comply with directions and orders of the court. (3A) [Repealed] [Subs (3A) rep Act 1 of 2013, Sch 1.6[5]; insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[4]]

(4) Each of the following persons must not, by their conduct, cause a party to civil proceedings to be put in breach of a duty identified in subsection (3): (a) any solicitor or barrister representing the party in the proceedings, (b) any person with a relevant interest in the proceedings commenced by the party. [Subs (4) am Act 1 of 2013, Sch 1.6[3], [6] and [7]; subst Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[5]]

(5) The court may take into account any failure to comply with subsection (3) or (4) in exercising a discretion with respect to costs. [Subs (5) am Act 1 of 2013, Sch 1.6[8]; Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[6]]

(6) For the purposes of this section, a person has a relevant interest in civil proceedings if the person: (a) provides financial assistance or other assistance to any party to the proceedings, and (b) exercises any direct or indirect control, or any influence, over the conduct of the proceedings or the conduct of a party in respect of the proceedings. Note: Examples of persons who may have a relevant interest are insurers and persons who fund litigation. [Subs (6) insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[7]]

(7) [Repealed] [Subs (7) rep Act 1 of 2013, Sch 1.6[5]; insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[7]] [S 56 am Act 1 of 2013; Act 135 of 2010]

SECTION 56 COMMENTARY Section 56 .............................................................................................................................................. [CPA 56.20] Recent cases ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 56.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 56.1000]

[CPA 56.20]

Section 56

Courts are required to give effect to the overriding purpose, and litigants are under a duty to assist the courts in furthering that purpose. Any failure to do so can be taken into account on costs questions. The phrase “just, quick and cheap” was, with its infamous comma, introduced to the SCR in 2000 in Pt 1 r 3. The just, quick and cheap disposition of the matter still requires full and proper consideration: Schenck Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Coal Technology Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 211. The legislation is entirely consistent with, and reflective of, its historical models – in particular, Pt 1 r 3 and Pt 26 r 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) and s 76A of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), enacted © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

57

Civil Procedure Leg

(cf SCR Part 1, rule 3)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 57

[CPA 56.20]

in the mid-1980s to strengthen the powers of the Supreme Court to give directions for the conduct of civil proceedings. When making orders or directions for the management of proceedings the court must give effect to s 56: s 58. The requirements that parties and practitioners assist the court in furthering the overriding purpose includes the pre-litigation steps found in Pt 2A of the CPA (ss 18A to 18O). See s 56(3A) of the CPA and Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372. [CPA 56.40]

Recent cases

Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 – application of overriding purpose: avoidance of “unduly technical and costly disputes about non-essential issues”. Wardle v Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] NSWCA 207 (It would not give effect to the overriding purpose if the slip rule power could not be exercised by a reconstituted bench in circumstances where it is not possible to reconvene the original court); Bott v Carter [2012] NSWCA 89 (s 56, might not reduce the conditions for the engagement of the power to dismiss proceedings generally under UCPR r 13.4, but limits the circumstances in which the court, satisfied that the power is available, might be inclined to refuse relief on discretionary grounds); Palavi v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 264 (destruction of documents – failure to comply with directions); distinguished by Clark v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 139; [CPA 56.1000]

References

The liability of legal practitioners for unnecessary costs is dealt with under s 99 of the CPA, and further in s 348 of the Legal Profession Act 2004. Complementary UCPR to note are the powers to make directions under rr 2.1 and 2.3, the limiting of issues under r 14.2 and the fixing of maximum recoverable costs contained in r 42.4. 57

Objects of case management

(1) For the purpose of furthering the overriding purpose referred to in section 56(1), proceedings in any court are to be managed having regard to the following objects: (a) the just determination of the proceedings, (b) the efficient disposal of the business of the court, (c) the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources, (d) the timely disposal of the proceedings, and all other proceedings in the court, at a cost affordable by the respective parties. (2) This Act and any rules of court are to be so construed and applied, and the practice and procedure of the courts are to be so regulated, as best to ensure the attainment of the objects referred to in subsection (1).

SECTION 57 COMMENTARY [CPA 57.20]

Section 57

Section 57 requires court proceedings to be managed having regard to the listed criteria: the just determination of the proceedings, the efficient disposal of the business of the court, the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources and the timely disposal of the proceedings, and all other proceedings in the court, at a cost affordable by the respective parties. Section 57 ostensibly gives primacy to “the just determination” of proceedings, but it is subject to the “overriding purpose” of the legislation (identified in s 56) requiring the facilitation of “the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues” in proceedings. See Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230 and Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 at [25 ]–[27] regarding public interest in the efficient use of court resources. An adjournment necessitating a further appointment of a hearing date will 58

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[CPA 58.20]

Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 1 – Guiding principles

s 58

inevitably delay other parties from obtaining a hearing. It is partly to that end that s 57 is directed: ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Mio Amico Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 716. When making orders or directions for the management of proceedings the court must have regard to s 57: s 58(2). 58

Court to follow dictates of justice

Civil Procedure Leg

(1) In deciding: (a) whether to make any order or direction for the management of proceedings, including: (i) any order for the amendment of a document, and (ii) any order granting an adjournment or stay of proceedings, and (iii) any other order of a procedural nature, and (iv) any direction under Division 2, and (b) the terms in which any such order or direction is to be made, the court must seek to act in accordance with the dictates of justice. (2) For the purpose of determining what are the dictates of justice in a particular case, the court: (a) must have regard to the provisions of sections 56 and 57, and (b) may have regard to the following matters to the extent to which it considers them relevant: (i) the degree of difficulty or complexity to which the issues in the proceedings give rise, (ii) the degree of expedition with which the respective parties have approached the proceedings, including the degree to which they have been timely in their interlocutory activities, (iii) the degree to which any lack of expedition in approaching the proceedings has arisen from circumstances beyond the control of the respective parties, (iv) the degree to which the respective parties have fulfilled their duties under section 56(3), (v) the use that any party has made, or could have made, of any opportunity that has been available to the party in the course of the proceedings, whether under rules of court, the practice of the court or any direction of a procedural nature given in the proceedings, (vi) the degree of injustice that would be suffered by the respective parties as a consequence of any order or direction, (vii) such other matters as the court considers relevant in the circumstances of the case.

SECTION 58 COMMENTARY Section 58 .............................................................................................................................................. [CPA 58.20] Dictates of justice ................................................................................................................................... [CPA 58.40]

[CPA 58.20]

Section 58

Section 58 requires the court to act in accordance with the dictates of justice set out in s 58(2) in deciding whether to make orders or directions for the management of proceedings and in what terms any such order or direction should be made. The section also sets out the matters in which a court must have regard to ss 56 and 57, and the matters to which a court may have regard, for the purpose of determining what are the dictates of justice in a particular case. Parties might not be well-placed to know with precision administrative constraints within which courts might be required to make particular decisions. Accordingly, care needs to be taken to neither make assumptions about such constraints, nor to ignore the possibility that they exist. Advocates should endeavour to address statutory criterion bearing in mind that they need to be applied with flexibility, not pedantry: see also s 14 (Court may dispense with rules in particular cases). Regard should also be had to provisions in the CPA and UCPR referencing specific case management powers, including delay (s 59), amendments (ss 64, 65, UCPR Pt 19), adjournments (s 66), case management (UCPR © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

59

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 59

[CPA 58.20]

rr 2.1–2.3), discontinuance, withdrawal and dismissal (UCPR Pt 12), summary disposal (UCPR Pt 13), witness statements (UCPR r 31.4) and experts (UCPR r 31.20). [CPA 58.40]

Dictates of justice

A novel feature of the legislation – which might provide an illusion of administrative law formality – is the checklist of factors set out in s 58(2) as a charter for a requirement that courts “must seek to act in accordance with the dictates of justice”. The degree of injustice that might be suffered by the respective parties as a consequence of any order or direction is only one of the matters that may be taken into account in s 58(2)(b). None of those matters are to be given precedence over any other, each case turning on its own facts: New South Wales v Mulcahy [2006] NSWCA 303 at [29]; Dennis v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2008] NSWCA 37 at [28]. Note however, that in Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230, it was observed that what is vital to appreciate is that the regard to both ss 56 and 57 is statutorily compulsory: 58(2)(a). They are considerations that are relevant in the sense that the statute requires them to be taken into account: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40. The factors in s 58(2)(b) may be taken into account but whether they are is a matter for the tribunal. Hence, parties should, consistent with and to the extent necessary to discharge their duty to assist the court (s 56) and eliminate delay (s 59), address each matter relevant to the advancement of their case. In Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 at [43] it was held “it cannot... be said that a just resolution requires that a party be permitted to raise any arguable case at any point in the proceedings, on payment of costs” per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. The dictates of justice are not just to deny hearings in exceptional cases, as it must be remembered that “what may be just, when amendment is sought, requires account to be taken of other litigants, not just the parties to the proceedings in question”: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd at [42] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. This has been applied more specifically to the NSW legislation in Markisic v Commonwealth [2010] NSWSC 24. 59

Elimination of delay

(cf Western Australia Supreme Court Rules, Order 1, rule 4A)

In any proceedings, the practice and procedure of the court should be implemented with the object of eliminating any lapse of time between the commencement of the proceedings and their final determination beyond that reasonably required for the interlocutory activities necessary for the fair and just determination of the issues in dispute between the parties and the preparation of the case for trial.

SECTION 59 COMMENTARY [CPA 59.20]

Section 59

Sections 59 and 60 complement s 56: Bellingen Shire Council v Colavon Pty Ltd (2012) 188 LGERA 169; [2012] NSWCA 34. Section 59 requires the practices and procedures of a court to be implemented in such a way as to minimise delay. However, that is subject to what is reasonably necessary by way of interlocutory activities for the fair and just determination of the issues in dispute and the preparation of the case for trial. Relevant considerations may include the length of any relevant delay and the nature of any procedural non-compliance; the delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the commencement of the action; any relevant change in circumstances since the cause of action accrued; the prior attitude and conduct of the relevant party; the nature and extent of prejudice to both parties; explanation for any delay; the degree of personal fault for the delay and the degree to which the non-defaulting party has been informed of the cause of the delay: A & N Holding NSW Pty Ltd v Andell Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 55. As Allsop P observed in Bi v Mourad [2010] NSWCA 17 at [47]: Delay is a feature of litigation intended to be eliminated as far as possible by the statutory enactment of the regime in the Civil Procedure Act. It cannot always be done. This purpose is not through some parliamentary authoritarian or over-prescriptive view of how people should lead their lives; rather, it is through the keen recognition of the conduct of the courts, in particular in the 20th century, of the need to deal with cases expeditiously if they are to be dealt with justly. Delay and case backlog are not merely 60

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[CPA 60.40]

Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 2 – Powers of court to give directions

s 61

factors affecting the costs of delivering justice; they corrode the ability of the courts to provide individual justice. The reforms that have taken place under the Civil Procedure Act and the evident attempt by courts to ensure efficiency can be seen not merely to reflect worthy efforts for efficiency but also to be steps vital for the provision of timely individual justice. Views may differ of justice in any particular case; that is the nature of the term and the value-laden task of a decision-maker to do justice.

Recent cases: Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 – avoidance of “unduly technical and costly disputes about non-essential issues”. Weston v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd (2012) 88 ACSR 80; [2012] NSWCA 79 – six successive extensions of time for service pursuant to UCPR r 1.12; Arthur Andersen Corp Finance Pty Ltd v Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 104. 60

Proportionality of costs

In any proceedings, the practice and procedure of the court should be implemented with the object of resolving the issues between the parties in such a way that the cost to the parties is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject-matter in dispute.

SECTION 60 COMMENTARY Section 60 .............................................................................................................................................. [CPA 60.20] Leave to appeal ..................................................................................................................................... [CPA 60.40]

[CPA 60.20]

Section 60

Section 60 requires court procedures to be implemented with the object of resolving the issues between the parties in such a way that the cost to the parties is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject-matter in dispute. The section taken literally imposes an impossible task upon the court to determine what “costs”, in its view, might be allowed to be expended by the parties in bringing the matter to a conclusion. What is “important” must be objectively assessed by the court having regard to the subjective importance attached to the proceedings by one or more of the parties. The section is likely to be used in conjunction with ss 61 and 62. The obligation applies to the conduct of the proceedings, not to the assessment of costs – eInduct Systems Pty Ltd v 3D Safety Services Pty Ltd (2015) 90 NSWLR 451; [2015] NSWCA 284 at [8]. For guidance on the interrelationship between s 60 and the discretion conferred by r 42.4 (maximum costs order) see Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc [2010] NSWCA 263. [CPA 60.40]

Leave to appeal

The direction in s 60 has an important operation in respect of leave applications involving amounts below the statutory threshold. Where the costs of the trial are disproportionate to the amount in dispute, the incurring of additional costs, for a potentially uncertain return, will be a factor weighing heavily against a grant of leave: Be Financial Pty Ltd v Das [2012] NSWCA 164.

DIVISION 2 – POWERS OF COURT TO GIVE DIRECTIONS 61

Directions as to practice and procedure generally

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 4; Act No 9 1973, section 68A)

(1) The court may, by order, give such directions as it thinks fit (whether or not inconsistent with rules of court) for the speedy determination of the real issues between the parties to the proceedings. (2) In particular, the court may, by order, do any one or more of the following: (a) it may direct any party to proceedings to take specified steps in relation to the proceedings, © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

61

Civil Procedure Leg

See also Jackamarra (an infant) v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516; 72 ALJR 819; [1998] HCA 27 at 526 Hayne and Gummow JJ outlined the various ways in which avoidable delay can detract from the attainment of justice.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 61

[CPA 61.20] (b)

it may direct the parties to proceedings as to the time within which specified steps in the proceedings must be completed, (c) it may give such other directions with respect to the conduct of proceedings as it considers appropriate.

(3) If a party to whom such a direction has been given fails to comply with the direction, the court may, by order, do any one or more of the following: (a) it may dismiss the proceedings, whether generally, in relation to a particular cause of action or in relation to the whole or part of a particular claim, (b) it may strike out or limit any claim made by a plaintiff, (c) it may strike out any defence filed by a defendant, and give judgment accordingly, (d) it may strike out or amend any document filed by the party, either in whole or in part, (e) it may strike out, disallow or reject any evidence that the party has adduced or seeks to adduce, (f) it may direct the party to pay the whole or part of the costs of another party, (g) it may make such other order or give such other direction as it considers appropriate. (4) Subsection (3) does not limit any other power the court may have to take action of the kind referred to in that subsection or to take any other action that the court is empowered to take in relation to a failure to comply with a direction given by the court.

SECTION 61 COMMENTARY [CPA 61.20]

Section 61

This section must be exercised in accordance with the overriding purpose and objectives of case management in ss 56–60; Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230. Under s 61(3)(f), if a party to whom a direction has been given fails to comply with the direction, the court may, amongst other things, direct the party to pay the whole or part of the costs of another party: Parramatta City Council v Stewart [2013] NSWCA 163. See also McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 104 where s 61(2)(c) was applied in directing the plaintiff to stop serving certain documents on the opposing party; and Rahman v Bimson [2010] NSWSC 338 for potential dismissal of proceedings. 62 Directions as to conduct of hearing (cf Act No 52 1970, section 87; Act No 9 1973, section 77(4); SCR Part 34, rules 6 and 6AA)

(1) The court may, by order, give directions as to the conduct of any hearing, including directions as to the order in which evidence is to be given and addresses made. (2) The court may, by order, give directions as to the order in which questions of fact are to be tried. (3) Without limiting subsections (1) and (2), the court may, by order, give any of the following directions at any time before or during a hearing: (a) a direction limiting the time that may be taken in the examination, cross-examination or re-examination of a witness, (b) a direction limiting the number of witnesses (including expert witnesses) that a party may call, (c) a direction limiting the number of documents that a party may tender in evidence, (d) a direction limiting the time that may be taken in making any oral submissions, (e) a direction that all or any part of any submissions be in writing, (f) a direction limiting the time that may be taken by a party in presenting his or her case, (g) a direction limiting the time that may be taken by the hearing. (4) A direction under this section must not detract from the principle that each party is entitled to a fair hearing, and must be given a reasonable opportunity: (a) to lead evidence, and 62

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 2 – Powers of court to give directions (b) (c) (d)

s 63

to make submissions, and to present a case, and at trial, other than a trial before the Local Court sitting in its Small Claims Division, to cross-examine witnesses.

[Subs (4) am Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2]

deciding whether to make a direction under this section, the court may have regard to the matters in addition to any other matters that the court considers relevant: the subject-matter, and the complexity or simplicity, of the case, the number of witnesses to be called, the volume and character of the evidence to be led, the need to place a reasonable limit on the time allowed for any hearing, the efficient administration of the court lists, the interests of parties to other proceedings before the court, the costs that are likely to be incurred by the parties compared with the quantum of the subject-matter in dispute, (h) the court’s estimate of the length of the hearing.

Civil Procedure Leg

(5) In following (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

(6) At any time, the court may, by order, direct a solicitor or barrister for a party to give to the party a memorandum stating: (a) the estimated length of the trial, and the estimated costs and disbursements of the solicitor or barrister, and (b) the estimated costs that, if the party were unsuccessful at trial, would be payable by the party to any other party. [S 62 am Act 94 of 2007]

63

Directions with respect to procedural irregularities

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 81; Act No 9 1973, section 159; Act No 11 1970, section 75A)

(1) This section applies to proceedings in connection with which there is, by reason of anything done or omitted to be done, a failure to comply with any requirement of this Act or of rules of court, whether in respect of time, place, manner, form or content or in any other respect. (2) Such a failure: (a) is to be treated as an irregularity, and (b) subject to subsection (3), does not invalidate the proceedings, any step taken in the proceedings or any document, judgment or order in the proceedings. (3) The court may do either or both of the following in respect of proceedings the subject of a failure referred to in subsection (1): (a) it may, by order, set aside the proceedings, any step taken in the proceedings or any document, judgment or order in the proceedings, either wholly or in part, (b) it may exercise its powers to allow amendments and to make orders dealing with the proceedings generally. (4) The court may not take action of the kind referred to in subsection (3)(a) on the application of any party unless the application is made within a reasonable time and, in any case, before the party takes any fresh step in the proceedings after becoming aware of the failure.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

63

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 64

[CPA 64.20]

DIVISION 3 – OTHER POWERS OF COURT 64

Amendment of documents generally

(cf SCR Part 20, rules 1 and 4; DCR Part 17, rules 1 and 4)

(1) At any stage of proceedings, the court may order: (a) that any document in the proceedings be amended, or (b) that leave be granted to a party to amend any document in the proceedings. (2) Subject to section 58, all necessary amendments are to be made for the purpose of determining the real questions raised by or otherwise depending on the proceedings, correcting any defect or error in the proceedings and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings. (3) An order under this section may be made even if the amendment would have the effect of adding or substituting a cause of action that has arisen after the commencement of the proceedings but, in that case, the date of commencement of the proceedings, in relation to that cause of action, is, subject to section 65, taken to be the date on which the amendment is made. (4) If there has been a mistake in the name of a party, this section applies to the person intended to be made a party as if he or she were a party. [Subs (4) am Act 23 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]

(5) This section does not apply to the amendment of a judgment, order or certificate. [S 64 am Act 23 of 2006]

SECTION 64 COMMENTARY Leave to amend ..................................................................................................................................... [CPA 64.20] Effective date of amendment ................................................................................................................. [CPA 64.40]

[CPA 64.20]

Leave to amend

Consistently with the position before the CPA, the power to grant leave to amend may be exercised at any stage of the proceedings, and is to be exercised subject to s 58, as the court considers necessary in the interests of justice, and not to punish a party for its pleadings: Tony Azzi (Automobiles) Pty Ltd v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 249. The power is also subject to the overriding purpose referred to in s 56, and some of the relevant considerations are set out in CPA, ss 57 and 58. Those matters will generally require consideration of the nature and degree of any prejudice that may be suffered by the grant or refusal of the application: Itek Graphix Pty Ltd v Elliott (2002) 54 NSWLR 207; [2002] NSWCA 104. Justice to the applicant in permitting amendment, is always to be balanced against injustice to the respondent, and also requires regard to the overriding purpose and to the efficient and timely disposal of the proceedings. In some circumstances prejudice occasioned by amendment may be outweighed by the public interest for the real issues in proceedings to be ventilated: Dymocks Book Arcade Pty Ltd v Capral Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1423. Each case must turn on its own facts, but there can be a significant brake on the exercise of the power: McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 308. The High Court’s decision in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 changed the landscape in relation to the approach to applications for amendment of pleadings. The Court of Appeal in Dennis v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2008] NSWCA 37 had said, that the previous governing authority, Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146; 71 ALJR 294, must be understood as operating subject to the statutory duty imposed under the CPA and particularly s 56, noting at [29] “That duty constitutes a significant qualification of the power to grant leave to amend a pleading under s 64 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005”. Similar sentiments were expressed by a differently constituted bench in Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230 at [36 ]–[41]. See also Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46. Aon Risk made it clear that the earlier approach of seeing costs as a sufficient compensation for the amendment was no longer a proper approach. In the same way an absence of any particular prejudice to the other side, 64

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[CPA 64.40]

Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 3 – Other powers of court

s 65

Futile amendments will not be allowed: Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1073; Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 at [42 ]–[45]. [CPA 64.40]

Effective date of amendment

Generally, an amendment duly made takes effect not from the date when the amendment is made, but from the date of the original document which it amends: Baldry v Jackson [1976] 2 NSWLR 415 at 419. Where, however, an amendment is made to introduce a new defendant, or a new plaintiff, or a new cause of action, the position is different: see Liff v Peasley [1980] 1 WLR 781; [1980] 1 All ER 623; s 64(3) of the CPA. Thus, where a party is added in accordance with UCPR r 6.24, the date of commencement of proceedings, so far as concerns her or him, is the date of the amendment, or the filing of the amendment, and there is no retrospective effect: s 64(3) and UCPR r 6.28. Conversely, under s 64(4) the words “as if” implied that the party had been there all the time and accordingly the amendment takes effect from the date of the filing of the Statement of Claim: East West Airlines Ltd v Turner (2010) 78 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCA 53. Where a statute of limitation is involved, the court has a discretion to order that the amendment take effect from the date on which the amendment is made: Middleton v O’Neill (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 178; 60 WN (NSW) 101 at 186; Thompson v Pacific Acceptance Corp Ltd (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 773 at 778; see also s 65 of the CPA. 65

Amendment of originating process after expiry of limitation period

(cf SCR Part 20, rule 4; DCR Part 17, rule 4)

(1) This section applies to any proceedings commenced before the expiration of any relevant limitation period for the commencement of the proceedings. (2) At any time after the expiration of the relevant limitation period, the plaintiff in any such proceedings may, with the leave of the court under section 64(1)(b), amend the originating process so as: (a) to enable the plaintiff to maintain the proceedings in a capacity in which he or she has, since the proceedings were commenced, become entitled to bring and maintain the proceedings, or (b) to correct a mistake in the name of a party to the proceedings, whether or not the effect of the amendment is to substitute a new party, being a mistake that, in the court’s opinion, is neither misleading nor such as to cause reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person intended to be made a party, or (c) to add or substitute a new cause of action, together with a claim for relief on the new cause of action, being a new cause of action that, in the court’s opinion, arises from the same (or substantially the same) facts as those giving rise to an existing cause of action and claim for relief set out in the originating process. (3) Unless the court otherwise orders, an amendment made under this section is taken to have had effect as from the date on which the proceedings were commenced. (4) This section does not limit the powers of the court under section 64. (5) This section has effect despite anything to the contrary in the Limitation Act 1969. (6) In this section, originating process, in relation to any proceedings, includes any pleading subsequently filed in the proceedings.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

65

Civil Procedure Leg

beyond the obvious delay caused by the proposed amendments, may not be sufficient to mean that the amendment will be allowed: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Susan Hannaford Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 574. A further significant point that emerges from Aon Risk is the need for an explanation for the delay in raising the matter in respect of which amendment is sought. The joint judgment said at [103]: Not only will [the parties seeking the leave] need to show that their application is brought in good faith, but they will also need to bring the circumstances giving rise to the amendment to the court’s attention, so that they may be weighed against the effects of any delay and the objectives of the Rules.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 65

[CPA 65.20]

SECTION 65 COMMENTARY Power to amend after expiry of limitation period ................................................................................... [CPA 65.20] Mistake in the name of a party ............................................................................................................ [CPA 65.400]

[CPA 65.20]

Power to amend after expiry of limitation period

Section 65 permits amendments to be made to a statement of claim notwithstanding the expiry of any relevant limitation period. The settled rule of practice laid down in Weldon v Neal (1887) 19 QBD 394 was that the courts would not allow a plaintiff an amendment for the purpose of raising a claim which was, in fact, statute barred at the time of the application to amend: see (1980) 54 ALJ 643. However, the Court of Appeal in McGee v Yeomans [1977] 1 NSWLR 273 held that the provisions there applicable and from which s 65 is based, have displaced this rule of practice and have substituted a general discretion (unfettered by any rules of practice) to allow an amendment, notwithstanding that it raises a statute-barred cause of action, whenever justice so requires. The decision of McGee is applicable to applications under ss 64 and 65 of the CPA to amend a statute barred cause of action: Sagacious Procurement Ltd v Mayne Group Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1238. The Court of Appeal held in Proctor v Jetway Aviation Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 166 that the binding precedent decided by McGee was that SCR Pt 20 r 4, the former provision, together with SCA s 6 (Inconsistency with rules) operated to confer a power of amendment in respect of an expired period of limitation provided for in the Limitation Act 1969 or any other earlier Act. See further the discussion in Owners Strata Plan 62930 v Kell & Rigby Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 612. The applicant for an order under s 65 has the positive burden of demonstrating that it is required by the justice of the case and the question of prejudice to the defendant may be a relevant consideration in determining whether that onus has been discharged: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 554–556; Holt v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128; [2000] NSWCA 143; Parsons v Doukas (2001) 52 NSWLR 162; [2001] NSWCA 128 ; Greenwood v Papademetri [2007] NSWCA 221 at [35]. Where the proposed amendment satisfies the express criteria in s 65(2) of the Act, it has been suggested that it will be unlikely that a person opposing the grant of leave will be able to demonstrate material prejudice: Dymocks Book Arcade Pty Ltd v Capral Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1423. The statutes of limitation in Proctor v Jetway Aviation Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 166 were State and not Commonwealth legislation and were enacted before the rule under consideration in that case. However, in Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Larcos (1987) 13 NSWLR 286 the rule was applied to a claim otherwise extinguished by Commonwealth legislation. In Air Link Pty Ltd v Paterson (No 2) (2003) 58 NSWLR 388; [2003] NSWCA 251, the majority upheld the validity of DCR Pt 17 r 4 and, following Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield (2003) 7 VR 63; 174 FLR 395; [2003] VSCA 6, applied it to grant leave to amend the statement of claim where the proposed amendment was made after the expiration of the limitation period of a Commonwealth statute which granted the right of action (special leave application to the High Court granted). Both Air Link Pty Ltd v Paterson (No 2) (2003) 58 NSWLR 388; [2003] NSWCA 251 and Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield (2003) 7 VR 63; 174 FLR 395; [2003] VSCA 6 were upheld in the High Court: Air Link Pty Ltd v Paterson (2005) 223 CLR 283; [2005] HCA 39 and Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield (2005) 223 CLR 251; [2005] HCA 38. The former SCR and upon which s 65 is based was not confined to “procedural” limitation statutes of the forum and extends to contractual time bans if they are applicable and a foreign limitation statute that is recognisable in the forum as part of the lesu causae under the choice of law principles in Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491; 76 ALJR 551; 187 ALR 1; 35 MVR 1; [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-646; [2002] AIPC 91-786; 23 NSWCCR 207; [2002] HCA 10; see Dyno Wesfarmers Ltd v Knuckey [2003] NSWCA 375 at [36]. In Lloyd Steel Co (Aust) Pty Ltd v Jade Shipping SA (1985) 1 NSWLR 212, the former SCR were held not to be confined to limitation periods prescribed by statute, but to include a contractual limitation period. A liquidator who has applied within the limitation period to set aside voidable transactions may have leave to amend that application outside the limitation period to set aside further voidable transactions notwithstanding s 588FF(3) of the Corporations Law; see Star v National Australia Bank Ltd (1999) 150 FLR 119; [1999] NSWSC 305; and PSL Industries Ltd v Simplot Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 7 VR 106; 174 FLR 111; [2003] VSCA 7. For a discussion of the considerations raised in an application to substitute a party, where a statute of limitations is involved, see Hubbard Assoc of Scientologists International v Attorney-General (Vic) [1976] VR 119 at 126–127. 66

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[CPA 65.400]

Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 3 – Other powers of court

s 68

It is considered that the powers of amendment under s 65 may not be invoked to save an action that is a nullity. Thus where the plaintiff died before the issue of a statement of claim and her or his executrix brought an action before the expiration of the limitation period but before probate was granted, and probate was not granted until the limitation period had expired, both actions were a nullity, because in NSW the title of an executor does not relate back to the death of the deceased for the purpose of bringing it within the limitation period: Marshall v DG Sundin & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 463. Mistake in the name of a party

Under subs (2) the court’s power to allow the name of a party to be corrected is not confined to the correction of misspellings in the name of a party or the addition of words which have been omitted from the name but extends to permitting a plaintiff who had intended to sue one person but who had named another as the defendant to substitute the name of the one for that of the other if (a) the plaintiff has made a genuine mistake, (b) the mistake is not misleading or such as to cause any reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person intended to be sued, and (c) it would be just to make the amendment: Evans Construction Co Ltd v Charrington & Co Ltd [1983] QB 810; [1983] 2 WLR 117; [1983] 1 All ER 310. See also East West Airlines Ltd v Turner (2010) 78 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCA 53. Further, another person, along with the original defendant, can be substituted for the original defendant where such a mistake has been made: Greenwood v Papademetri [2007] NSWCA 221 at [69], Mitry v Business Australia Capital Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) [2010] NSWCA 360. A mistake of law as to the proper defendant is not a mistake as to the name of a party: Bridge Shipping Pty Ltd v Grand Shipping SA (1991) 173 CLR 231; 66 ALJR 76. See also Price v Ferris (1994) 34 NSWLR 704; 74 A Crim R 127; Tomsimmat & Assocs Pty Ltd v G & R Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 25 1PR 545; Seas Sapfor Ltd v Far Eastern Shipping Co (1995) 39 NSWLR 435; Nikolay Malakhov Shipping Co Ltd v Seas Sapfor Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 371. A thorough review of the authorities by Young CJ in Eq can be found in A & M Short Pty Ltd v Prestige Residential Marketing Pty Ltd (2005) 194 FLR 32; 54 ACSR 760; [2005] NSWSC 872. As to the correction of the name of a party prior to the expiration of a limitation period, see UCPR r 6.23 (Misjoinder or non-joinder of parties) and CPA s 64(4). 66

Adjournment of proceedings

(cf Act No 11 1970, section 75)

(1) Subject to rules of court, the court may at any time and from time to time, by order, adjourn to a specified day any proceedings before it or any aspect of any such proceedings. (2) If a judicial officer is not available at the time appointed for the hearing of any proceedings, a registrar may adjourn, to a later time on the same day or to a later specified day, any matters listed for hearing by the judicial officer at the appointed time. 67

Stay of proceedings

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 156)

Subject to rules of court, the court may at any time and from time to time, by order, stay any proceedings before it, either permanently or until a specified day. 68

Attendance at court and production of documents and things to court

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 64; Act No 11 1970, section 72; SCR Part 36, rule 12)

Subject to rules of court, the court may, by subpoena or otherwise, order any person to do either or both of the following: (a) to attend court to be examined as a witness, (b) to produce any document or thing to the court. Note: See also section 77 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 and section 42 of the Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987 with respect to the attendance of persons detained in custody.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

67

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 65.400]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 69 69

Affidavits and witness statements may be read in advance of hearing

Proceedings are not to be challenged, reviewed, quashed or called into question by reason only that the judicial officer or other person before whom the proceedings are being conducted has, prior to hearing, read any affidavit or witness statement that has been filed or lodged in the proceedings. 70

Informal proof and admissions

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 82)

(1) At any stage of the proceedings, the court: (a) may, by order, dispense with the rules of evidence for proving any matter that is not bona fide in dispute, also with such rules of evidence as may give rise to expense or delay, and (b) without limiting the generality of paragraph (a), may, by order, dispense with the proof of handwriting, documents, the identity of parties or parcels of land, or of authority, and (c) may, by order, require any party (not being a person under legal incapacity) to make admissions with respect to any document or to any question of fact, and (d) in the case of a party’s refusal or neglect to make any admission required under paragraph (c), may, unless of the opinion that the refusal or neglect is reasonable, order that the costs of proof occasioned by the refusal or neglect are to be paid by the party. (2) An (a) (b) (c)

admission made under subsection (1)(c): is to be for the purpose of the proceedings in which it is made and for no other purpose, and is to be subject to all just exceptions, and may, with the leave of the court, be amended or withdrawn.

71 Business in the absence of the public (cf Act No 52 1970, section 80)

Subject absence of (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

to any Act, the business of a court in relation to any proceedings may be conducted in the the public in any of the following circumstances: on the hearing of an interlocutory application, except while a witness is giving oral evidence, if the presence of the public would defeat the ends of justice, if the business concerns the guardianship, custody or maintenance of a minor, if the proceedings are not before a jury and are formal or non-contentious, if the business does not involve the appearance before the court of any person, if, in proceedings in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court, the court thinks fit, if the uniform rules so provide.

Editor’s note: Section 72 is repealed and has not been reproduced.

73 Power of court to determine questions about compromises and settlements (1) In any proceedings, the court: (a) has and may exercise jurisdiction to determine any question in dispute between the parties to the proceedings as to whether, and on what terms, the proceedings have been compromised or settled between them, and (b) may make such orders as it considers appropriate to give effect to any such determination. (2) This section does not limit the jurisdiction that the court may otherwise have in relation to the determination of any such question.

68

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 4 – Persons under legal incapacity

s 76

DIVISION 4 – PERSONS UNDER LEGAL INCAPACITY 74

Definitions and application

(cf Act No 25 1929, sections 2 and 3)

(1) In this Division: manager, in relation to a protected person’s estate, means the person having the management of the estate under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009. Civil Procedure Leg

[Def am Act 49 of 2009, Sch 2.9[2]]

protected person has the same meaning as it has in the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009. [Def am Act 49 of 2009, Sch 2.9[2]]

(2) This Division does not apply to claims made or compensation awarded under any of the following Acts: (a) the Workers Compensation Act 1987, (b) the Workers Compensation (Bush Fire, Emergency and Rescue Services) Act 1987, (c) the Workers’ Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 1942, (d) the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998. (3) This Division does not limit the operation of the Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 or section 16 of the Infants’ Custody and Settlements Act 1899. [S 74 am Act 49 of 2009]

75

Settlement of claim made on behalf of, or against, person under legal incapacity

(cf SCR Part 63, rule 13)

(1) This section applies to any claim, enforceable by proceedings in the court, that is made by or on behalf of, or against, a person under legal incapacity. (2) If, before proceedings are commenced with respect to any such claim, an agreement for the compromise or settlement of the claim is made by or on behalf of the person under legal incapacity, the court may approve or disapprove the agreement. (3) An agreement disapproved by the court does not bind the person under legal incapacity. (4) An agreement approved by the court binds the person under legal incapacity as if he or she were of full capacity and (if it was made by some other person on his or her behalf) as if that other person had made the agreement as his or her agent. 76 Settlement of proceedings commenced by or on behalf of, or against, person under legal incapacity (cf Act No 25 1929, section 4)

(1) This section applies to proceedings commenced by or on behalf of, or against, any of the following persons: (a) a person under legal incapacity, (b) a person who, during the course of the proceedings, becomes a person under legal incapacity, (c) a person whom the court finds, during the course of the proceedings, to be incapable of managing his or her own affairs. [Subs (1) am Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[3]]

(2) The court may make a finding referred to in subsection (1)(c) only on the basis of evidence given in the proceedings in which it is made, and such a finding has effect for the purpose only of those proceedings. (3) Except with the approval of the court, there may not be: (a) any compromise or settlement of any proceedings to which this section applies, or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

69

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 76 (b) any acceptance of money paid into court in any such proceedings, as regards a claim made by or on behalf of, or against, a person referred to in subsection (1). [Subs (3) am Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[4]]

(3A) However, the approval of the court is not required in relation to any agreement for the compromise or settlement of any matter in dispute in proceedings commenced by, or on behalf of, or against, a person under legal incapacity if, on the day the agreement for the compromise or settlement is made, that person has attained the age of 18 years and is not otherwise a person referred to in subsection (1). Accordingly, subsections (4) – (6) do not apply in relation to any such agreement. [Subs (3A) insrt Act 67 of 2015, Sch 1.2[1]]

(4) If an agreement for the compromise or settlement of any matter in dispute in any such proceedings is made by or on behalf of a person referred to in subsection (1), the court may approve or disapprove the agreement. (5) An agreement disapproved by the court does not bind the person by whom or on whose behalf it was made. (6) An agreement approved by the court binds the person by whom or on whose behalf it was made as if he or she were of full capacity and (if it was made by some other person on his or her behalf) as if that other person had made the agreement as his or her agent. [S 76 am Act 67 of 2015; Act 56 of 2007]

77

Payment of money recovered on behalf of person under legal incapacity

(cf Act No 25 1929, section 4)

(1) This section applies to money recovered in any proceedings on behalf of any of the following persons: (a) a person under legal incapacity, (b) a person who, during the course of the proceedings, becomes a person under legal incapacity, (c) a person whom the court has found, under section 76(1)(c), to be incapable of managing his or her own affairs, pursuant to a compromise, settlement, judgment or order in any proceedings. (2) All money recovered on behalf of a person referred to in subsection (1) is to be paid into court. (3) Despite subsection (2), the court may order that the whole or any part of such money not be paid into court but be paid instead to such person as the court may direct, including: (a) if the person is a minor, to the NSW Trustee and Guardian, or (b) if the person is a protected person, to the manager of the protected person’s estate. [Subs (3) am Act 49 of 2009, Sch 2.9[3]; subst Act 56 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]

(4) Money paid into court under subsection (2) is to be paid to such person as the court may direct, including: (a) if the person is a minor, to the NSW Trustee and Guardian, or (b) if the person is a protected person, to the manager of the protected person’s estate. [Subs (4) am Act 49 of 2009, Sch 2.9[3]; subst Act 56 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[2]] [S 77 am Act 49 of 2009; Act 56 of 2006]

78

Application of money by NSW Trustee and Guardian

(cf Act No 25 1929, section 5(1), (2) and (3))

(1) Subject to any order of the court, money paid under this Division to the NSW Trustee and Guardian on behalf of a minor is to be held and applied by the NSW Trustee and Guardian for the maintenance and education of, or otherwise for the benefit of, the minor. [Subs (1) am Act 49 of 2009, Sch 2.9[3]]

(2) On the application of the NSW Trustee and Guardian, the Supreme Court may give directions to the NSW Trustee and Guardian as to the administration of any such money. [Subs (2) am Act 49 of 2009, Sch 2.9[3]] 70

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 5 – Interim payments

s 82

(3) If given effect to by the NSW Trustee and Guardian, any such direction exonerates the NSW Trustee and Guardian from any claim or demand by any other person. [Subs (3) am Act 49 of 2009, Sch 2.9[3]] [S 78 am Act 49 of 2009, Sch 2.9[3]]

79

Application of money by manager of protected person’s estate

(cf Act No 25 1929, section 5(4))

80

Civil Procedure Leg

Subject to any order of the court, money paid under this Division to the manager of a protected person’s estate is to be held and applied by the manager as part of that estate. Directions to tutor of person under legal incapacity

On the application of the tutor for a person under legal incapacity, the Supreme Court may give directions with respect to the tutor’s conduct of proceedings, whether before the Supreme Court or any other court, on behalf of that person.

DIVISION 5 – INTERIM PAYMENTS 81

Definitions and application

(cf Act No 52 1970, sections 76D and 76H; Act No 9 1973, sections 57 and 61)

(1) In this Division: interim payment, in relation to proceedings for the recovery of damages, means a payment of any of those damages by a defendant before the completion of the proceedings, either voluntarily or in accordance with an order of the court under this Division. public authority means a public or local authority constituted by or under an Act, a Government Department or a statutory body representing the Crown, and includes a person exercising functions on behalf of any such authority, Department or body. (2) This Division does not apply to an award of damages to which Chapter 5 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 applies except as specifically provided by section 82(7). Note: Clause 11 of Schedule 6 to this Act provides that the reference in subsection (2) to an award of damages to which Chapter 5 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 applies includes a reference to an award of damages to which Part 6 of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 applies. [Subs (2) am Act 95 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2.1[1]; Act 56 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[3]] [S 81 am Act 95 of 2007; Act 56 of 2006]

82

Court may order interim payments

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 76E; Act No 9 1973, section 58)

(1) In any proceedings for the recovery of damages, the court may order a defendant in the proceedings to make one or more payments to the plaintiff of part of the damages sought to be recovered in the proceedings. (2) The court may make such an order against a defendant on the application of the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings. (3) The court may not make such an order unless: (a) the defendant has admitted liability, or (b) the plaintiff has obtained judgment against the defendant for damages to be assessed, or (c) the court is satisfied that, if the proceedings went to trial, the plaintiff would obtain judgment for substantial damages against the defendant. (4) The court may not make such an order if the defendant satisfies the court that: (a) the defendant is not insured in respect of the risk giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim for the recovery of damages, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

71

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 82 (b) (c)

the defendant is not a public authority, and the defendant would, having regard to the defendant’s means and resources, suffer undue hardship if such a payment were to be made.

(5) The court may order a defendant to make one or more payments of such amounts as it thinks just, but not exceeding a reasonable proportion of the damages that, in the court’s opinion, are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff. (6) In estimating those damages, the court is to take into account any relevant contributory negligence, and any cross-claims, on which the defendant may be entitled to rely. (7) The court may make an order under this section in proceedings for the recovery of damages to which Chapter 5 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 applies, but only an order for one or more payments to be made to the plaintiff of part of the damages for economic loss sought to be recovered in the proceedings and only if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff would suffer financial hardship if such a payment were not made. [Subs (7) insrt Act 95 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2.1[2]] [S 82 am Act 95 of 2007]

83

Interim payment not admission of liability

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 76F; Act No 9 1973, section 59)

(1) The fact that a defendant makes one or more interim payments is not of itself an admission of liability by the defendant. (2) The making of, or refusal to make, an order under this Division is not a finding as to liability in respect of the proceedings. 84

Adjustments on final judgment etc

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 76G; Act No 9 1973, section 60)

(1) This section applies to proceedings in which a defendant makes one or more interim payments. (2) The court may make such orders with respect to the interim payments as may be just and, in particular, may order one or more of the following: (a) the variation or discontinuance of interim payments, (b) the repayment by the plaintiff of all or part of any interim payment, with or without interest, (c) the payment by another party of all or part of any interim payment that the defendant is entitled to recover from that other party. (3) The court may make an order under this section: (a) when making a final judgment or order, or (b) when granting the plaintiff leave to discontinue proceedings or to withdraw a claim, or (c) on the application of any party, at any other stage of the proceedings.

DIVISION 6 – MISCELLANEOUS 85

Examination on oath

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 83; Act No 9 1973, section 70)

If a person is authorised by this Act or by rules of court, or by an order of the court, to take the examination of any person: (a) the examination is to be taken on oath, and (b) the oath may be administered by the person taking the examination or by a judicial officer of the court.

72

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 6 – Miscellaneous 86

s 87

Orders

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 21; Act No 9 1973, section 6; SCR Part 1, rule 11A)

(2) The power of the court to make orders on terms is taken to be a power to make orders on such terms and conditions as the court thinks fit. (3) Subject to this Act and to rules of court, the court may make any order that it has power to make either of its own motion or on the application of a party or any other person entitled to make such an application. (4) Nothing in this Act limits the operation of section 43 of the Interpretation Act 1987. 87

Protection against self-incrimination in relation to interlocutory matters

(cf Act No 25 1995, sections 128 and 133)

(1) In this section: civil penalty has the same meaning as it has in the Evidence Act 1995. conduct includes both act and omission. culpable conduct means conduct that, under: (a) the laws of New South Wales, or (b) the laws of any other State or Territory, or (c) the laws of the Commonwealth, or (d) the laws of a foreign country, constitutes an offence or renders a person liable to a civil penalty. order for production means an interlocutory order requiring a person (other than a body corporate) to provide evidence to the court or to a party to a proceeding before the court. provide evidence (a) (b) (c) (d)

means: to provide an answer to a question or to produce a document or thing, or to swear an affidavit, or to file and serve an affidavit or a witness statement, or to permit possession to be taken of a document or thing.

(2) This section applies in circumstances in which: (a) an application is made for, or the court makes, an order for production against a person, and (b) the person objects to the making of such an order, or applies for the revocation of such an order, on the ground that the evidence required by the order may tend to prove that the person has engaged in culpable conduct. (2A) This section does not apply in circumstances in which section 128A of the Evidence Act 1995 applies. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2.1]

(3) If the court finds that there are reasonable grounds for the objection or application referred to in subsection (2)(b), the court is to inform the person, or the person’s legal representative: (a) that the person need not provide the evidence, and (b) that, if the person provides the evidence, the court will give a certificate under this section, and (c) of the effect of such a certificate. (4) If the person informs the court that he or she will provide the evidence, the court is to cause the person to be given a certificate under this section in respect of the evidence. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

73

Civil Procedure Leg

(1) The power of the court to make orders in relation to proceedings, whether under this or any other Act or otherwise, includes the power: (a) to make orders by way of leave or direction, and (b) to make all or any orders on terms.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 87 (5) The court is also to cause a person to be given a certificate under this section if the court overrules an objection to the making of an order for production, or refuses an application for the revocation of such an order, but, after the evidence is provided, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection or application. (6) Despite anything in this section, the court may make an order for production if it is satisfied of the following: (a) that the evidence required by the order may tend to prove that the person has engaged in culpable conduct, (b) that the culpable conduct does not comprise conduct that, under: (i) the laws of any State or Territory (other than New South Wales), or (ii) the laws of the Commonwealth, or (iii) the laws of a foreign country, constitutes an offence or renders a person liable to a civil penalty, (c) that the interests of justice require that the person provide the evidence. (7) If the court makes an order for production under subsection (6), it is to cause the person to be given a certificate under this section in respect of the evidence required by the order. (8) In any proceedings: (a) evidence provided by a person in respect of which a certificate under this section has been given, and (b) evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having provided such evidence, cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence. (9) If a question arises under this section relating to a document, the court may order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for the purpose of determining the question. [S 87 am Act 46 of 2007]

88

Fresh trial

(1) If a trial of proceedings has commenced before a judicial officer and he or she is unable to continue the trial or give judgment in the proceedings, by reason of death, resignation or incapacity, the senior judicial officer of the relevant court may nominate some other judicial officer of that court as the judicial officer before whom the proceedings are to be listed for trial. (2) In this section, a reference to a trial of proceedings includes a reference to a trial of one or more questions in the proceedings.

74

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters Division 6 – Miscellaneous 89

s 89

Procedure on fresh trial

(2) In particular, the court may give either or both of the following directions: (a) a direction that all or any part of the evidence given at the previous trial is to be taken to be evidence in the fresh trial without the need for the witnesses to be recalled, (b) a direction that all or any of the witnesses are to be recalled for examination or cross-examination, or both, either generally or as to a particular question or questions in the proceedings. (3) In subsection (1), a reference to a trial of proceedings includes a reference to a trial of one or more questions in the proceedings.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

75

Civil Procedure Leg

(1) If: (a) any proceedings have been listed for trial pursuant to section 88, or (b) an appellate court has made an order for a fresh trial generally (being an order given on an appeal after a trial of any proceedings), or (c) a judicial officer before whom a trial of any proceedings has commenced has discharged himself or herself from the trial without having given judgment in the proceedings, the court may give such directions as it thinks fit as to the evidence to be used in the fresh trial.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 90

[CPA 90.20]

PART 7 – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS DIVISION 1 – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS GENERALLY Commentary by Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court. Updated by Mark Walsh, Barrister. 90 Judgments generally (cf Act No 52 1970, section 91; Act No 9 1973, section 81)

(1) The court is, at or after trial or otherwise as the nature of the case requires, to give such judgment or make such order as the nature of the case requires. (2) If there is a claim by a plaintiff and a cross-claim by a defendant, the court: (a) may give judgment for the balance only of the sums of money awarded on the respective claims, or (b) may give judgment in respect of each claim, and may give judgment similarly where several claims arise between plaintiffs, defendants and other parties.

SECTION 90 COMMENTARY [CPA 90.20]

Judgments generally

This section is derived from SCA s 91. It deals with judgments and orders that finalise the proceedings. The court can enter one judgment or order in the proceedings, which reconciles any cross-claims in the proceedings, and can do so whether after a trial or as a result of the proceedings being compromised or settled. See also s 96, which deals with set-offs between different judgments. 91 Effect of dismissal of proceedings (cf SCR Part 40, rule 8)

(1) Dismissal of: (a) any proceedings, either generally or in relation to any cause of action, or (b) the whole or any part of a claim for relief in any proceedings, does not, subject to the terms on which any order for dismissal was made, prevent the plaintiff from bringing fresh proceedings or claiming the same relief in fresh proceedings. (2) Despite subsection (1), if, following a determination on the merits in any proceedings, the court dismisses the proceedings, or any claim for relief in the proceedings, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any relief in respect of the same cause of action in any subsequent proceedings commenced in that or any other court.

SECTION 91 COMMENTARY [CPA 91.20]

Effect of dismissal of proceedings

This section is based on SCR Pt 40 r 8. The section allows a plaintiff to bring fresh proceedings where the proceedings have been dismissed other than after a hearing on the merits (ie where the proceedings have been dismissed for want of prosecution or for a failure to comply with the rules). The principal concern for the plaintiff will be to ensure that the limitation period has not expired since the original proceedings were filed. If original proceedings are dismissed for failure to comply with orders then subsequent proceedings are liable to be struck out as an abuse of process unless the plaintiff can provide an adequate explanation for the prior default: Andrew v Baradom Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (1995) 36 NSWLR 700.

76

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Judgments and orders Division 1 – Judgments and orders generally

[CPA 93.20]

92

s 93

Judgments for possession of land

Judgment for possession of land takes the place of, and, subject to the uniform rules, has the same effect as, a judgment for the claimant in ejectment given under the practice of the Supreme Court as it was immediately before 1 July 1972. Note: 1 July 1972 was the date of commencement of the Supreme Court Act 1970.

SECTION 92 COMMENTARY [CPA 92.20]

Judgments for possession of land

This section carries forward SCA s 92 and clarifies that the types of judgment which were, before the Supreme Court Act 1970, referred to as judgments for ejectment are now dealt with as judgments for the possession of land. 93 Judgments for detention of goods (cf Act No 52 1970, section 93; Act No 9 1973, section 83; Act No 11 1970, section 28A)

(1) In proceedings for the detention of goods, the court may (whether or not their value has yet been assessed) give judgment: (a) for their delivery to the plaintiff, or (b) for payment to the plaintiff of an amount equivalent to their assessed value, or (c) for their delivery to the plaintiff or for payment to the plaintiff of their assessed value, at the defendant’s option, and, in addition to any judgment referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c), may also give judgment for payment to the plaintiff of damages for their detention. (2) The court may, in an order for delivery of goods or in a subsequent order, specify the date by which delivery of the goods must be effected. (3) If judgment has been given as referred to in subsection (1)(a), but the goods are subsequently damaged, destroyed or otherwise rendered unavailable for delivery, the court may, on application by the plaintiff, make an order for the payment to the plaintiff of an amount equivalent to their assessed value, as referred to in subsection (1)(b). (4) If judgment has been given as referred to in subsection (1)(c) and the plaintiff subsequently applies for an order under this subsection, the court may make an order for the delivery of the goods to the plaintiff without the option for any payment of the kind referred to in subsection (1)(b). (5) In this section, the assessed value of goods is their value as assessed by, or in accordance with the directions of, the court.

SECTION 93 COMMENTARY Judgment for detention of goods ........................................................................................................... Specific restitution .................................................................................................................................. Damages for conversion ........................................................................................................................ Related rules ..........................................................................................................................................

[CPA 93.20]

[CPA 93.20] [CPA 93.40] [CPA 93.60] [CPA 93.80]

Judgment for detention of goods

This section derives from the following provisions: SCA s 93, DCA s 83 and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 28A. This section gives the court powers to give judgment for the detention of goods including for their delivery or payment of their value. If a judgment is given for the delivery of goods and the goods are © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

77

Civil Procedure Leg

(cf Act No 52 1970, sections 92 and 96(3))

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 94

[CPA 93.20]

subsequently unavailable or destroyed the court may make further orders for the payment of the value of the goods. The court may also award damages for the detention of the goods and specify a date for the delivery of goods. A judgment for delivery of goods can be enforced by a writ of delivery: s 105. [CPA 93.40]

Specific restitution

This section gives the court a discretion to order specific restitution of goods. The exercise of that discretion will be appropriate where the chattel has special value or attributes and where the awarding of damages would not be an adequate remedy: Aristoc Industries Pty Ltd v RA Wenham (Builders) Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 581 587-590; Doulton Potteries Ltd v Bronotte [1971] 1 NSWLR 591; GE Capital Asset Services & Trading Asia Pacific Pty Ltd v Rocks Excavations & Plant Hire Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21253; [2003] NSWSC 99. But not where it might be unjust to do so or where to do so might give the plaintiff some benefit more than they were entitled or deserved or where there has been unreasonable delay: McKeown v Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 303. [CPA 93.60]

Damages for conversion

The appropriate damages in conversion are the value of the goods at the date of conversion. The measure of those damages where there is a market in the goods is the price at which replacement goods can be bought in that market; only where it is established that there is no such market can the plaintiff go to some other method of establishing value, for example, the price at which a manufacturer would manufacture and supply replacement goods: J & E Hall Ltd v Barclay [1937] 3 All ER 620; Gaba Formwork Contractors Pty Ltd v Turner Corp Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 175. [CPA 93.80]

Related rules

Applications for default judgment: UCPR r 16.5. Assessment of value of goods: UCPR rr 30.1, 30.2. 94

Failure to comply with order to execute instrument

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 100)

(1) If any person does not comply with a judgment or order directing the person: (a) to execute any conveyance, contract or other document, or (b) to endorse any negotiable instrument, the court may order that the conveyance, contract or other document be executed, or the negotiable instrument endorsed, by such person as the court may nominate for that purpose. (2) A conveyance, contract, document or instrument that is executed or endorsed pursuant to an order under subsection (1) operates, and is for all purposes available, as if it had been executed or endorsed by the person originally directed to execute or endorse it.

SECTION 94 COMMENTARY Failure to comply with order to execute instrument .............................................................................. [CPA 94.20] Related Rules ........................................................................................................................................ [CPA 94.40]

[CPA 94.20]

Failure to comply with order to execute instrument

This section derives from, and is to the same effect as SCA s 100. The usual person nominated is the registrar. [CPA 94.40]

Related Rules

Substituted performance: UCPR r 40.8.

78

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Judgments and orders Division 1 – Judgments and orders generally

[CPA 95.20]

95

s 96

Joint liability

(1) If two or more persons have a joint liability and, in any proceedings, judgment on the liability is given against one or more but not all of them: (a) the liability of the other or others of them is not discharged by the judgment or by any step taken for the enforcement of the judgment, and (b) after the judgment takes effect, those of them against whom the judgment is given and the other or others of them become liable, as between those of them against whom the judgment is given on the one hand and the other or the others of them on the other hand, severally but not jointly, and (c) if there are two or more such persons against whom the judgment is not given, they remain, after the judgment takes effect, jointly liable amongst themselves, and (d) if the judgment is satisfied wholly or in part by payment or by recovery under execution, the liability of the persons against whom the judgment is not given is taken also to have been satisfied in the amount of the payment or recovery. (2) This section does not affect a person’s right to contribution or indemnity in respect of the person’s satisfaction, wholly or in part, of a liability that the person has (whether jointly or severally or jointly and severally) with any other person. (3) This section does not apply to a judgment to which section 5(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 applies. (4) In this section, liability includes liability in contract, liability in tort and liability under a statute.

SECTION 95 COMMENTARY [CPA 95.20]

Joint liability

This section is based on and is to the same effect as SCA s 97. At common law, a judgment entered against one defendant who was jointly, as opposed to alternatively, liable to the plaintiff prevented judgment being entered against another person for the same breach: Kendall v Hamilton (1879) 4 App Cas 504. This section provides that the entry of judgment against one person who is jointly liable to the plaintiff does not discharge other persons who are jointly liable to the plaintiff, nor are they discharged by the plaintiff taking steps to enforce the judgment. The plaintiff cannot however recover more than the amount of the judgment. Full payment by one person will prevent recovery from other defendants: Ruffıno v Grace Bros Pty Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 732. Where two defendants are sued on a claim on which the plaintiff has a right of action alternatively but not jointly, a judgment against one of them is equivalent to an election to sue that one, and a bar to further proceedings against the other: D’Angola v Rio Pioneer Gravel Co Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 495. If different defendants are found liable pursuant to different agreements or contracts, for instance where a guarantee is provided in relation to a mortgage or lease, then judgment should be entered against the defendants severally rather than jointly based on the agreement under which the liability arose. If this is not done there may be problems when taking bankruptcy or winding-up proceedings to enforce the judgment: Re Neate; Ex parte Pegasus Leasing Ltd [1996] FCA 1206; Lucas v Montgomery (2008) 7 DCLR(NSW) 295; [2008] NSWDC 207. 96

Set-off of judgments

(cf DCR Part 31, rule 23; Act No 11 1970, section 64)

(1) This section applies if, in relation to any two or more judgments of the same court, the judgment creditor and judgment debtor under one or more of the judgments are the judgment debtor and judgment creditor, respectively, under the other judgments. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

79

Civil Procedure Leg

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 97)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 96

[CPA 96.20]

(2) The judgment debtor under any such judgment (the first judgment) may apply to the court for an order that the judgment be set off against any other such judgment (the second judgment) in respect of which he or she is the judgment creditor. (3) An order under this section has the following effect: (a) if the amount of the first judgment is less than the amount of the second judgment, the first judgment is taken to have been satisfied and the amount of the second judgment is taken to have been reduced by the amount of the first judgment, (b) if the amount of the first judgment is equal to the amount of the second judgment, both judgments are taken to have been satisfied, (c) if the amount of the first judgment is greater than the amount of the second judgment, the second judgment is taken to have been satisfied and the amount of the first judgment is taken to have been reduced by the amount of the second judgment. (4) [Repealed] [Subs (4) rep Act 94 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1.12[3]]

(5) This section does not apply to judgments of the Supreme Court. [S 96 am Act 94 of 2007]

SECTION 96 COMMENTARY [CPA 96.20]

Set-off of judgments in different proceedings

This section is based on Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 64 and DCR Pt 31 r 23, which provided that judgments in different proceedings in those courts could be set-off against each other. There was no equivalent provision in the SCA or SCR, and this section provides expressly that it does not apply to the Supreme Court. The section does not specifically refer to the judgments being set-off as being in separate proceedings, so separate judgments in the same proceedings (on cross-claims) could be set-off under this section, however s 90(2)(a), which does apply in the Supreme Court, provides that the court may give judgment for the balance of the money on respective claims in a case. Section 90(2)(b) provides that within the one case the court may give separate judgments in relation to respective claims. This will be relatively rare and would normally only happen if there has been a separate hearing of a cross-claim; in these circumstances an application pursuant to this section might be appropriate. 97

Arrest warrants

(cf SCR Part 42, rule 7)

(1) Subject to rules of court: (a) if, by subpoena or otherwise, the court makes an order, whether under this Act or any other law: (i) for a person to attend court for any purpose, or (ii) for a person to produce any document or thing to the court, and (b) the person fails to comply with the order, the court may issue, or make an order for the issue of, a warrant for the person’s arrest. [Subs (1) am Act 56 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]

(2) Subject to rules of court, an arrest warrant may be issued without notice to the person. (3) The court from which an arrest warrant has been issued may revoke the warrant. (4) An arrest warrant is sufficient authority for any person to whom it is addressed, with the assistance of such police officers as may be necessary, to arrest the person named in the warrant, to convey the person to the place specified in the warrant and to deliver the person into the custody of the court sitting at that place. [S 97 am Act 56 of 2006]

80

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Judgments and orders Division 2 – Costs in proceedings

[CPA Pt7.Div2.40]

s 97

SECTION 97 COMMENTARY Arrest warrants

This section empowers a court to issue an arrest warrant against any person who fails to comply with an order of the court, including a subpoena, for that person’s attendance at court or for production to the court by that person of any document or thing. It is based on SCR Pt 42 r 7. See the following rules: UCPR r 36.9, an arrest warrant issued by order of the court must be signed by a judicial officer or by a registrar; r 38.6, re an arrest warrant in respect of a person who fails to attend in examination in aid of enforcement – may not be issued earlier than 14 days, nor later than three months, after service of notice that failure to attend for examination may result in the person’s arrest. A notice of motion to issue an arrest warrant need not be served on the person to be arrested. This section now also clearly applies (after an amendment in 2006) to a failure to comply with an order to produce or attend under other legislation such as the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 596A and 597. The approved form for an arrest warrant is Form 58.

DIVISION 2 – COSTS IN PROCEEDINGS Commentary by Peter Johnstone, President of the Children’s Court of New South Wales.

DIVISION 2 COMMENTARY General comments on Division 2 ................................................................................................. [CPA Pt7.Div2.20] The indemnity rule ........................................................................................................................ [CPA Pt7.Div2.40] Proportionality ............................................................................................................................... [CPA Pt7.Div2.60] References ............................................................................................................................... [CPA Pt7.Div2.1000]

[CPA Pt7.Div2.20]

General comments on Division 2

Whilst in equity the power of the courts to award costs has been recognised from the time of the development of the Court of Chancery, the power under the common law finds its origins in statute. GE Dal Pont discusses the historical background in detail in his book Law of Costs (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) from p 190. He notes that the foundation for the common law jurisdiction is the Statute of Gloucester of 1278 and quotes the following from Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law of England Vol 3 (1st ed, Sweet Maxwell & Stevens, 1768) p 399: In reality costs were always considered and included in the quantum of damages, in such actions where damages are given; and, even now, costs for the plaintiff are always entered on the roll as increase of damages by the court. But, because those damages were frequently inadequate to the plaintiff’s expenses, the Statute of Gloucester orders costs to be also added; and farther directs, that the same rule shall hold place in all cases where the party is to recover damages. And therefore in such actions where no damages were then recoverable … no costs are allowed; unless they have been expressly given by some subsequent statute. [CPA Pt7.Div2.40]

The indemnity rule

The object of party/party costs is to compensate the successful party for the expense of having been required to pursue or defend their rights in court proceedings: Harold v Smith (1860) 157 ER 1229; 5 H & N 381; Hawthorn Cuppaidge & Badgery v Channell [1992] 2 Qd R 488 at 492. Party/party costs operate as an indemnity in respect of the solicitor/client costs incurred by the party who has the benefit of the costs order, albeit that usually it will only be a partial indemnity: General of Berne Insurance Co Ltd v Jardine Reinsurance Management Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 301; [1998] 1 WLR 1231 at 308 (All ER). The rationale for the rule was discussed in Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; 50 A Crim R 287; 7 ALR 45 [1990] HCA 59 at 566–567 (CLR) by Justice McHugh where he said: The rationale of the order is that it is just and reasonable that the party who has caused the other party to incur the costs of litigation should reimburse that party for the liability incurred. The order is not made to punish the unsuccessful party. Its function is compensatory. Thus, in civil proceedings an order may, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

81

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 97.20]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 98

[CPA Pt7.Div2.40]

usually will, be made even though the unsuccessful party has nearly succeeded or has acted reasonably in commencing the proceedings. It may, and usually will, be made even though the action has failed through no fault of the unsuccessful party. In Cilli v Abbott (1981) 53 FLR 108, Keely, Toohey and Fisher JJ pointed out (at 111) that “the object of costs is not to penalize; it is to indemnify the successful party in regard to expense to which he has been put by reason of legal proceedings”: see also Anstee v Jennings (1935) VLR 144 at 148. Some of the objectives of the costs indemnity rule were identified by the Australian Law Reform Commission in Issues Paper 13 (October 1994), in Ch 5, as the following: 1. The compensation of successful litigants. 2. The facilitation of litigation, ie enabling the pursuit or defence of rights. 3. The deterrence of unmeritorious litigation. 4. The encouragement of settlement. 5. The enforcement of court control of proceedings. 6. The disciplining of the profession. See also Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; 72 ALJR 578; [1998] HCA 11 at 97 (CLR). The discretion to award costs provided under s 98 is to be exercised having regard to CPA Pt 6 and in particular ss 56–59 as to the overriding purpose of the Act, and the provisions as to the dictates of justice and the elimination of delay. The principle of proportionality under s 60 will also have an influence in particular cases where issues as to importance and complexity of the subject matter may dictate that special costs orders should be made. [CPA Pt7.Div2.60]

Proportionality

The concept of proportionality of costs is not an innovation effected by the new legislation, and had explicit recognition in case law pre-dating the Civil Procedure Act 2005: Skalkos v T & S Recoveries Pty Ltd (2004) 65 NSWLR 151; [2004] NSWCA 281 at [8]. Justice Ipp there said that it is relevant to consider whether the costs incurred bear a reasonable relationship to the value and importance of the subject matter in issue. Section 60 now gives the concept legislative force. The section was considered and applied almost immediately upon its introduction in A & M Short Pty Ltd v Prestige Residential Marketing Pty Ltd (2005) 194 FLR 32; 54 ACSR 760; [2005] NSWSC 872 at [38] in circumstances where a defendant resisted “far too strongly” an application to amend on technical grounds in a dispute involving a relatively small amount of money. [CPA Pt7.Div2.1000]

References

See the article by Brabazon M, “Proportionality of legal costs”, Law Society Journal, February 2006, pp 68–69. 98

Courts powers as to costs

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 76; SCR Part 52A, rules 5, 6, 7 and 8; Act No 9 1973, section 148B; Act No 11 1970, section 34)

(1) Subject to rules of court and to this or any other Act: (a) costs are in the discretion of the court, and (b) the court has full power to determine by whom, to whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and (c) the court may order that costs are to be awarded on the ordinary basis or on an indemnity basis. (2) Subject to rules of court and to this or any other Act, a party to proceedings may not recover costs from any other party otherwise than pursuant to an order of the court. (3) An order as to costs may be made by the court at any stage of the proceedings or after the conclusion of the proceedings. (4) In particular, at any time before costs are referred for assessment, the court may make an order to 82

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[CPA 98.20] the effect (a) (b) (c) (d)

Part 7 – Judgments and orders Division 2 – Costs in proceedings

s 98

that the party to whom costs are to be paid is to be entitled to: costs up to, or from, a specified stage of the proceedings, or a specified proportion of the assessed costs, or a specified gross sum instead of assessed costs, or such proportion of the assessed costs as does not exceed a specified amount.

(6) In (a) (b) (c)

this section, costs include: the costs of the administration of any estate or trust, and in the case of an appeal to the court, the costs of the proceedings giving rise to the appeal, and in the case of proceedings transferred or removed into the court, the costs of the proceedings before they were transferred or removed.

SECTION 98 COMMENTARY Courts powers as to costs ..................................................................................................................... [CPA 98.20] Solicitor and client costs ........................................................................................................................ [CPA 98.30] Costs orders against non-parties ........................................................................................................... [CPA 98.40] Costs orders in favour of non-parties .................................................................................................... [CPA 98.60] Capping costs ........................................................................................................................................ [CPA 98.80] Courts power to make special orders .................................................................................................. [CPA 98.100]

[CPA 98.20] Courts powers as to costs Section 98 confers an unlimited power to determine costs in proceedings. The power is, however, discretionary. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between the existence of a power and the occasion of its exercise: Hilliger v Hilliger (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 105; 69 WN (NSW) 109 at 108 (SR (NSW)). The statutory power is subject first to rules of court. The rules currently reflect the common law presumption that costs follow the event: UCPR r 42.1. Under the common law a successful party has a “reasonable expectation” of being awarded costs against the unsuccessful party: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; 72 ALJR 578; [1998] HCA 11 at [134]. Fairness dictates that the unsuccessful party typically bears the liability for costs: Oshlack at [67]. This means that the successful party in litigation is generally awarded costs, unless it appears to the court that some other order is appropriate, either as to the whole or some part of the costs: Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd [2000] NSWSC 232. The presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs is based on the principle that costs are compensatory: Ohn v Walton (1995) 36 NSWLR 77 at 79. The discretion of the court to depart from the presumption is unfettered; however, a court ought not exercise its discretion against a successful party arbitrarily or capriciously, or on no grounds at all: Oshlack at [22]. The discretion must be exercised judicially: Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732; and “according to rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion … benevolence … or sympathy”: Williams v Lewer [1974] 2 NSWLR 91 at 95. The usual rule is that the presumption will only be displaced “for good cause”: Jones v Curling (1884) 13 QBD 262 at 272. The purpose of an order for costs is to compensate the person in whose favour it is made and not to punish the person against whom the order is made: Allplastics Engineering Pty Ltd v Dornoch Ltd [2006] NSWCA 33 at [34]. The court is to have regard to the particular circumstances of the case, including the evidence adduced, the conduct of the parties and the ultimate result: Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700; [1971] 2 All ER 378; [1971] 2 WLR 564; London Welsh Estates Ltd v Phillip (1931) 144 LT 693; Hally v Dennis (1955) 95 CLR 661; 29 ALJR 374; 62 ALR(CN) 7 at 664 (CLR). Relevant conduct of the parties might occur in the course of the proceedings: Beoco Ltd v Alfa Laval Co Ltd [1995] QB 137; [1994] 3 WLR 1179; [1994] 4 All ER 464, or it may be conduct leading up to the commencement of the proceedings: Peters v Peters (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 398; 24 WN (NSW) 87 at 399. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

83

Civil Procedure Leg

(5) The powers of the court under this section apply in relation to a married woman, whether as party, tutor, relator or otherwise, and this section has effect in addition to, and despite anything in, the Married Persons (Equality of Status) Act 1996.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 98

[CPA 98.20]

However, the discretion should only be exercised for some reason connected with the case: Huxley v West London Extension Railway Co (1889) 14 App Cas 26 at 33–34; Durham v Collins [1999] SASC 163. Traditionally, misconduct or some sort of impropriety on the part of the successful party is a basis for the exercise of the discretion to displace the presumption: Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 873 at 874; Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47; Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 42 FLR 213; 28 ALR 201. There are very few, if any, exceptions outside the area of disentitling conduct: Oshlack at [70]. For a fuller discussion on costs see the commentary at UCPR Pt 42. [CPA 98.30]

Solicitor and client costs

In the application of the former DCR Pt 39A r 25 there was a clear difference between “solicitor and client” costs and “indemnity” costs. Further, solicitor and (own) client costs are not the same as costs on a solicitor-and-client bases. Section 98(1)(c) of the Act provides only for costs on the ordinary bases or on an indemnity basis, and the “solicitor and client” problem disappears: Bouras v Grandelis (2005) 65 NSWLR 214; [2005] NSWCA 463. [CPA 98.40]

Costs orders against non-parties

The terms of s 98 are sufficient to confer on the court a general power to make orders against non-parties: Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; 66 ALJR 560; 107 ALR 585; [1992] HCA 28 at [14]. However, s 98 must be read in conjunction with UCPR r 42.3 which places limitations on the exercise of the power: see the commentary under that rule. The Supreme Court, as a superior court, also has inherent jurisdiction, expressly preserved by CPA s 5(1), to order costs against officers of the court, ie legal practitioners: see the commentary at UCPR r 42.3. The other courts will only have those powers conferred by s 99 of this Act or s 348 of the Legal Profession Act 2004. [CPA 98.60]

Costs orders in favour of non-parties

There is no corresponding prohibition against costs orders in favour of non-parties and it seems that the terms of s 98 therefore are sufficient to enable the court to make an order for the benefit of a non-party. The Federal Court has been held to have this power pursuant to a similarly worded section: O’Keefe v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1559 at [24]. [CPA 98.80]

Capping costs

The terms of s 98(4) were considered in Re Sherbourne Estate (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003. In a family provision case the court was alarmed by the “grossly disproportionate costs”. No reference was made to CPA s 60 but a capping order was sought under s 98. It was observed that s 98(4)(a) empowers a court to deprive a successful party of the benefits of the usual costs order by limiting the recovery up to a point when, for example, the successful party’s further conduct of the case was no longer reasonable: at [34 ]–[35]. Under s 98(4)(b) the court may disallow part of the costs (a specified proportion) if, for example, the successful party failed on one or more substantial issues at [36]. Under s 98(4)(c), however, the court must specify the amount of costs to be paid: at [37]. This usually occurs by consent when the parties wish to avoid the delay, expense and aggravation of a contested costs assessment. The court will not perform an assessment in the same way as an assessor, but arrives at an estimate, by examining on the basis of particulars provided whether the quantification put forward is “logical, fair and reasonable”: at [38]. In this case, the order was sought not by the successful party, rather by the unsuccessful party: at [39]. The court said that the section should not be limited by reference to past practice, and that it was conceivable that s 98(4)(c) could ground an order capping the otherwise recoverable costs of the successful party, where those costs were “grossly excessive”, though this would be rare: at [40 ]–[42]. However, the court considered that it should only make a capping order in “the exceptional case in which it was satisfied that such an application can deal with the issues more quickly, cheaply and justly than an assessment under the Legal Profession Act 2004”: at [43 ]–[44]. In this case there was not sufficient material before the court to enable it to make any logical, fair and reasonable estimate of an appropriate sum to incorporate in such a costs order: at [45]. The court declined to make an order under s 98(4)(c) and considered that the costs should be quantified 84

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Judgments and orders Division 2 – Costs in proceedings

[CPA 98.100]

s 99

in the usual way, by assessment: at [50]. It was implicit in this reasoning that the costs assessor could take into account “the disproportion between the costs and outcome” of the case: at [50]. [CPA 98.100]

Courts power to make special orders

99

Civil Procedure Leg

The unlimited power to determine costs in proceedings conferred by s 98 allows the court to make special orders to suit particular circumstances. For example, in Herbert v Tamworth City Council (No 4) (2004) 60 NSWLR 476; [2004] NSWSC 394, an application was made that the plaintiff’s costs include the cost of briefing two counsel, including senior counsel: at [32]. The order was declined on the basis that a costs assessor is better able than the court to assess the merits of this issue. Liability of legal practitioner for unnecessary costs

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 76C; SCR Part 52A, rules 43 and 43A)

(1) This section applies if it appears to the court that costs have been incurred: (a) by the serious neglect, serious incompetence or serious misconduct of a legal practitioner, or (b) improperly, or without reasonable cause, in circumstances for which a legal practitioner is responsible. (2) After giving the legal practitioner a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the court may do any one or more of the following: (a) it may, by order, disallow the whole or any part of the costs in the proceedings: (i) in the case of a barrister, as between the barrister and the instructing solicitor, or as between the barrister and the client, as the case requires, or (ii) in the case of a solicitor, as between the solicitor and the client, (b) it may, by order, direct the legal practitioner: (i) in the case of a barrister, to pay to the instructing solicitor or client, or both, the whole or any part of any costs that the instructing solicitor or client, or both, have been ordered to pay to any other person, whether or not the solicitor or client has paid those costs, or (ii) in the case of a solicitor, to pay to the client the whole or any part of any costs that the client has been ordered to pay to any other person, whether or not the client has paid those costs, (c) it may, by order, direct the legal practitioner to indemnify any party (other than the client) against costs payable by that party. (3) Before making such an order, the court may refer the matter to a costs assessor (within the meaning of Part 7 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014) for inquiry and report. [Subs (3) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.3[3]; Act 28 of 2005, s 6 and Sch 5.3[3]]

(4) The court may direct that notice of any proceedings or order under this section with respect to a legal practitioner be given: (a) in the case of a barrister, to the instructing solicitor or client, or both, as the court may direct, or (b) in the case of a solicitor, to the client. (5) The court may give ancillary directions to give full effect to an order under this section, including directions to a legal practitioner to provide a bill of costs in assessable form: (a) to the court, or (b) to a party to the proceedings, or (c) in the case of a barrister, to the instructing solicitor or client, or both, or (d) in the case of a solicitor, to the client. (6) A party’s legal practitioner is not entitled to demand, recover or accept: (a) in the case of a barrister, from the instructing solicitor or client, or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

85

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 99

[CPA 99.20]

(b) in the case of a solicitor, from the client, any part of the amount for which the legal practitioner is directed by the court to indemnify any party pursuant to an order referred to in subsection (2)(c). (7) In this section, client includes former client. [S 99 am Act 7 of 2015; Act 28 of 2005]

SECTION 99 COMMENTARY Liability of legal practitioner for unnecessary costs ............................................................................... [CPA 99.20] Orders for party/party costs against legal practitioners ......................................................................... [CPA 99.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [CPA 99.1000]

[CPA 99.20]

Liability of legal practitioner for unnecessary costs

This section is derived from a number of provisions in the old SCA and SCR: see SCA s 76C, SCR Pt 52 rr 57 and 66, SCR Pt 52A rr 43 and 43A, and Practice Note 61. [CPA 99.40]

Orders for party/party costs against legal practitioners

The Supreme Court has an inherent power to order costs against a legal practitioner in cases involving misconduct, both in respect of practitioner/client costs and party/party costs: Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282; [1939] 4 All ER 484. This power is exercised sparingly, especially where the order sought is for indemnity costs: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Levick (1999) 43 ATR 621; 168 ALR 383; [1999] FCA 1580 at 627 (ATR); McKewins Hairdressing & Beauty Supplies Pty Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 74 ALJR 1000; 171 ALR 335; [2000] HCA 27 at 339 (ALR). Justice Hamilton encapsulated the tension between the duty of a practitioner to the client and the duty to the court in Pinebelt Pty Ltd v Bagley [2000] NSWSC 655 at [28]: [T]here are grave dangers in the too ready imposition of personal costs orders against practitioners … A feeling of threat of personal liability arising from decisions, some trifling in themselves and many necessarily taken in the sometimes white hot cauldron of litigation, has a potential to paralyse the decisive and fearless conduct which advocates are daily called upon to engage in. Section 99 confers a statutory power, which is also available to the District Court and the Local Court. The new section gathers together the concepts and terminology from these former provisions into a single simplified formula, under which the court has wide power to award costs personally against legal practitioners. Legal practitioners, as officers of the court, have duties to the court, and in the case of the new legislation the nature of these duties will be informed by the Guiding Principles set out in the Act at ss 56 to 60, in particular the overriding purpose of the facilitation of the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in proceedings. In addition to the inherent jurisdiction and the powers conferred by s 99, the courts are also empowered under s 348 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 to order that a practitioner personally pay the costs in circumstances where he or she provides legal services in proceedings claiming damages without there being reasonable prospects of success. This provision, or rather its predecessor in the 1987 Act, was most recently considered in Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153. The “chilling effect” of s 348 referred to in Lemoto at [126] was applied in Eurobodalla Shire Council v Wells [2006] NSWCA 5 where the Court of Appeal ordered the barrister and solicitor who prosecuted an unmeritorious appeal to personally pay the costs of the appeal. In that case the prospects of success were described as “hopeless”: at [26], and this should have been obvious prior to launching the appeal. In exercising its discretion the court went on to say that it saw “no redeeming feature in this case”, either in respect of any difficult question of law or in respect of the factual basis for the claim: at [29]. The “insuperable defects” in the case were obvious and it was inevitable that the appeal would fail: at [31]. The barrister and solicitor were “reckless” in continuing to prosecute the appeal: at [31]. The circumstances in which the discretion to order costs against legal practitioners might be exercised is discussed more fully in the commentary at [r 42.3.120]. 86

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Judgments and orders Division 3 – Payment of interest

[CPA 100.20] [CPA 99.1000]

s 100

References

See the article by Pincus and Heller, “Wasted costs orders against lawyers in Australia” (2005) 79 ALJ 497.

DIVISION 3 – PAYMENT OF INTEREST

100

Civil Procedure Leg

Commentary by Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court Interest up to judgment

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 94; Act No 9 1973, section 83A; Act No 11 1970, section 39A)

(1) In proceedings for the recovery of money (including any debt or damages or the value of any goods), the court may include interest in the amount for which judgment is given, the interest to be calculated at such rate as the court thinks fit: (a) on the whole or any part of the money, and (b) for the whole or any part of the period from the time the cause of action arose until the time the judgment takes effect. (2) In proceedings for the recovery of a debt or damages in which payment of the whole or a part of the debt or damages has been made after the proceedings commenced but before, or without, judgment being given, the court may include interest in the amount for which judgment is given, the interest to be calculated at such rate as the court thinks fit: (a) on the whole or any part of the money paid, and (b) for the whole or any part of the period from the time the cause of action arose until the time the money was paid. (3) This section: (a) does not authorise the giving of interest on any interest awarded under this section, and (b) does not authorise the giving of interest on a debt in respect of any period for which interest is payable as of right, whether by virtue of an agreement or otherwise, and (c) does not authorise the giving of interest in any proceedings for the recovery of money in which the amount claimed is less than such amount as may be prescribed by the uniform rules, and (d) does not affect the damages recoverable for the dishonour of a bill of exchange. (4) In any proceedings for damages, the court may not order the payment of interest under this section in respect of the period from when an appropriate settlement sum was offered (or first offered) by the defendant unless the special circumstances of the case warrant the making of such an order. (5) For the purposes of subsection (4), appropriate settlement sum means a sum offered in settlement of proceedings in which the amount for which judgment is given (including interest accrued up to and including the date of the offer) does not exceed the sum offered by more than 10 per cent.

SECTION 100 COMMENTARY Interest up to judgment ........................................................................................................................ [CPA 100.20] General principles ................................................................................................................................ [CPA 100.30] Restrictions on awarding interest ........................................................................................................ [CPA 100.40] Application of the section ..................................................................................................................... [CPA 100.60] Claiming interest .................................................................................................................................. [CPA 100.80] Rate of pre-judgment interest .............................................................................................................. [CPA 100.90] Interest on interest ............................................................................................................................. [CPA 100.100]

[CPA 100.20] Interest up to judgment This section is derived from SCA s 94 and is generally to the same effect as that section. See also DCA s 83A and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 39A. At common law, in the absence of an express or implied © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

87

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 100

[CPA 100.20]

contract, or mercantile usage, interest is not payable or recoverable on ordinary debts where there is late payment or non-payment: London Chatham & Dover Railway Co v South Eastern Railway Co [1893] AC 429. In equity the court could award interest where moneys had been withheld or misapplied by persons owing fiduciary duties: Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373; [1975] 1 All ER 849. This section amends the common law and gives the court power to award interest in proceedings for the recovery of money in respect of a period prior to judgment. The section does not confer an automatic entitlement to interest. [CPA 100.30] General principles The function of an award of interest is to compensate a plaintiff for loss or detriment suffered by being kept out of her or his money during the relevant period: MPB (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 5 ALJR 203; 98 ALR 193; 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-037; [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-082 at 663 (CLR); Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321; 74 ALJR 1247; [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-570; 173 AJR 564; [2000] HCA 42 at 328 (CLR). Nevertheless there must be a real and practical loss resulting from delay in the payment of damages to justify an award of interest. If a plaintiff has been indemnified by an insurance company interest may not be recoverable: Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd[1970] 1 QB 447. However if underwriters are entitled by way of subrogation to any award of interest, interest should be allowed: H Cousins & Co v D&C Carriers [1971] 2 QB 230. Similarly, just because a plaintiff is in liquidation does not mean that creditors should be deprived of interest on delayed dividends: Stanilite Pacific Ltd v Seaton (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 412. Interest and loss of earning may be alternative bases for assessing compensation and both should not be awarded for the same period: Screenco Pty Ltd v RL Dew Pty Ltd (2003) 58 NSWLR 720; [2003] NSWCA 319. [CPA 100.40]

Restrictions on awarding interest

Various statutory provisions impose restrictions on the amount of interest that can be awarded: Motor Accidents Act 1988 s 73 (no interest on non-economic loss, domestic services; nursing and attendance and three-quarters of the rate prescribed by CPA s 101 from when loss occurred till damages assessed, and restrictions on interest subject to settlement offers); Civil Liability Act 2002 s 18 (no interest on general damages and provisions for calculation of interest); Insurance Contracts Act 1984 s 57(3); Workers’ Compensation Act 1987 ss 66, 67 (as to limitation on amount of damages recoverable). If there is a contractual right to an amount of interest or some other entitlement to interest then the court cannot substitute its own rate of interest: s 100(3)(b). See Bans Pty Ltd v Ling (1995) 36 NSWLR 435. In the absence of special circumstances the court cannot award interest for the period after a settlement offer was made till judgment, where the plaintiff rejected the offer and the judgment amount is not at least 10% more than the offer: s 100(4). [CPA 100.60] Application of the section The section applies generally to liquidated and unliquidated claims. Plaintiffs seeking unliquidated damages may now accept a payment prior to judgment without losing their right to claim interest for the period up till payment. This is a significant change from SCA s 95(1A) the equivalent to s 100(2), which only applied to liquidated claims. The effect of s 100(2) is that where a payment is made after commencement but before judgment (whether or not judgment is ultimately given), the court may in its discretion order payment of interest on that amount for the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of payment. Thus, where a plaintiff is offered payment of the debt, without any interest, before judgment, s 100(2) allows the plaintiff to accept such payment and still go on to pursue the claim for interest. This does not affect the right of the parties to agree that the payment should be regarded as full satisfaction at the time of payment. Such a compromise as to interest has the advantage of early finality and certainty of amount for the plaintiff and of a final discharge for the defendant, and of reducing costs for both parties. [CPA 100.80] Claiming interest A claim for interest up to judgment must be specifically claimed in the statement of claim, cross-claim or summons. In the case of a liquidated claim, a claim for an order for interest up to judgment must specify the period or periods for which interest is claimed, and may specify the rate or rates at which interest is claimed. [CPA 100.90] Rate of pre-judgment interest Before 1 July 2010 the default rate of pre-judgment interest (the rate that would apply if no other rates of interest were specified) was equivalent to the rate of post-judgment interest as specified by UCPR r 36.7(1) 88

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

s 101

and as set out in UCPR Sch 5. From 1 July 2010 the rate of post judgment interest as specified under UCPR r 36.7(1) has been increased so that it is now calculated (twice a year) at a rate 6% above the cash rate published by the Reserve Bank in December and June each year. The default rate of pre-judgment interest that will now be allowed for periods after 30 June 2010 will no longer be equivalent to the default rate of post judgment interest. UCPR r 6.12(8), which specifies the rate of interest that is taken to be claimed if no other rates are specified, has been amended so that the default rate of pre-judgment interest is now calculated (twice a year) at a rate 4% above the cash rate published by the Reserve Bank in December and June each year. Consistent with this rule, the Supreme Court has published Practice Note – SC Gen 16, which also took effect on 1 July 2010, that advises that the court will have regard to these rates which are in accordance with the rates that were agreed to by the Discount and Interest Rate Harmonisation Committee which was established following a referral by the Council of Chief Justices. [CPA 100.100]

Interest on interest

The wording of subs (3)(a) has been amended from the wording in SCA s 95(2)(a) to clarify that the restriction only applies in respect of interest awarded under this section. The intention of this prohibition is to prevent an award of interest where the amount of damages recovered already includes an amount for interest, as for instance a claim upon a guarantee. It does not apply to a claim for the replacement of money as damages for a breach of contract, even though the quantum for damages is calculated by reference to interest which the plaintiff has had to pay for borrowed funds: Bushwall Properties Ltd v Vortex Properties Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1659; [1975] 2 All ER 214. 101

Interest after judgment

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 95; Act No 9 1973, section 85; Act No 11 1970, section 39)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, interest is payable on so much of the amount of a judgment (exclusive of any order for costs) as is from time to time unpaid. (2) Interest under subsection (1) is to be calculated, at the prescribed rate or at such other rate as the court may order, as from: (a) the date on which the judgment takes effect, or (b) such later date as the court may order. (3) Despite subsection (1), interest is not payable on the amount of a judgment if the amount is paid in full within 28 days after the date on which the judgment takes effect, unless the court orders to the contrary. (4) Unless the court orders otherwise, interest is payable on an amount payable under an order for the payment of costs. [Subs (4) subst Act 67 of 2015, Sch 1.2[2]]

(5) Interest on an amount payable under an order for the payment of costs is to be calculated, at the prescribed rate or at any other rate that the court orders, as from the date the order was made or any other date that the court orders. [Subs (5) subst Act 67 of 2015, Sch 1.2[2]]

(6) This section does not authorise the giving of interest on any interest payable under this section. (7) In this section, a reference to the prescribed rate of interest is a reference to the rate of interest prescribed by the uniform rules for the purposes of this section. Note: See section 136 in relation to the order in which payments on account of a judgment debt are to be appropriated. [S 101 am Act 67 of 2015]

SECTION 101 COMMENTARY Interest after judgment ......................................................................................................................... [CPA 101.20] Operation ............................................................................................................................................. [CPA 101.40] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

89

Civil Procedure Leg

Part 7 – Judgments and orders Division 3 – Payment of interest

[CPA 100.100]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 101

[CPA 101.20]

Interest on costs .................................................................................................................................. [CPA 101.50]

[CPA 101.20]

Interest after judgment

This section is based on SCA s 95, although there are some differences: the interest free period under SCA s 95 was only 21 days (now 28 days) and only applied in respect of common law claims; Prior to the CPA and UCPR the interest rate on judgment debts for each of the courts was the same and was that rate prescribed by SCA s 95 and set out in SCR Sch J. In the District Court this was effected by DCA s 85(2)(b), and in the Local Court by LCR Pt 13 r 3. Before 1 July 2010 the prescribed rates under this section were set out in UCPR Sch 5. From 1 July 2010 Sch 5 has been omitted from the rules and the prescribed rate of interest is now calculated by reference to the cash rate published by the Reserve Bank of Australia: r 36.7. [CPA 101.40]

Operation

Rule 36.7 provides that the prescribed rate at which interest is payable under this section is 6% above the cash rate published by the Reserve Bank (in December and June, for the following 6 months). Interest that has accrued prior to 30 June 2010 will however be calculated at the rates that used to apply under UCPR Sch 5. This section should be read together with UCPR r 36.4 – Date of effect of judgments and orders, see [r 36.4.40] for operation of the rule, [r 36.4.80] for interest after an appeal, and [r 36.4.100] for interest on costs. [CPA 101.50]

Interest on costs

Section 101(4) allows the court to award interest on costs. Interest does not run under s 101(1) of the CPA on so much of a judgment that arises under an order for costs, unless there is an order under s 101(4) or until the costs have been assessed and the registrar enters judgment, in accordance with the certificate of the costs assessor, for any unpaid costs: UCPR r 36.10(2). See Spedding v Nobles (No 2) (2007) 69 NSWLR 100; [2007] NSWCA 87 at [15]. The discretion to award interest on costs will be enlivened where the applicant has been out of pocket from having paid legal costs during the course of litigation: Australian Development Corp Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 280. Generally it will be appropriate to order interest on such amounts of costs as are assessed to be payable from the dates on which the costs concerned were paid: Grogan v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1101. See Grogan v Thiess Contractors for an example of how interest on costs might be calculated.

90

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 1 – Preliminary

[CPA 102.20]

s 102

PART 8 – ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS Commentary by Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court. Updated by David Ash, Barrister.

DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY 102

Definitions

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 99; Act No 11 1970, section 49)

Civil Procedure Leg

In this Part: chargee means the person to whom a charging order is addressed. charging order means an order referred to in section 106(1)(c). financial institution means an authorised deposit-taking institution within the meaning of the Banking Act 1959 of the Commonwealth. garnishee means the person to whom a garnishee order is addressed. garnishee order means an order referred to in section 106(1)(b). goods means chattels, other than chattels real. instalment order means an order referred to in section 107(1). order for examination means an order referred to in section 108(1). wage or salary includes: (a) earnings that, although not payable under a contract of employment, are analogous to or in the nature of wage or salary, and (b) earnings of a share farmer or share worker. writ for the levy of property means a writ referred to in section 106(1)(a). writ of delivery means a writ referred to in section 105. writ of execution means a writ of delivery, writ for the levy of property or writ of possession. writ of possession means a writ referred to in section 104. Note: Other words and expressions (for example, land and property) are defined in the Interpretation Act 1987.

SECTION 102 COMMENTARY Definitions of “chargee” and “charging order” ..................................................................................... [CPA 102.20] Definition of “financial institution” ......................................................................................................... [CPA 102.40] Definitions of “garnishee” and “garnishee order” ................................................................................. [CPA 102.60] Definition of “goods” ............................................................................................................................. [CPA 102.80] Definition of “instalment order” .......................................................................................................... [CPA 102.100] Definition of “wage or salary” ............................................................................................................. [CPA 102.120] Definitions of the writs ....................................................................................................................... [CPA 102.140]

[CPA 102.20]

Definitions of “chargee” and “charging order”

In Galbally & O’Bryan v Easton [2016] NSWSC 77 Hallen J said: 56 Section 102 of the Civil Procedure Act defines “chargee” as “the person to whom a charging order is addressed” and, somewhat unhelpfully, defines a charging order to be “an order referred to in section 106(1)(c)”. However, in ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Greig [1980] 1 NSWLR 112 at [18]-[19], Master Allen described the nature of a charging order as follows: “A charging order is a hypothecation. It does not involve any passing, from the owner of the property to the holder of the charge, of any of the rights of ownership. In this respect, a charging order, or other true hypothecation, stands in sharp contrast to a mortgage of land under Old System title whereby the mortgagor conveys his interest in the land to the mortgagee. The law, in my opinion, is accurately stated in Sykes, op cit, at pp 15, 16, as follows: ‘... whilst ... mortgage stricto sensu ... deal(s) with existing rights by assigning them, the hypothecation creates rights. ... (the) rights only arise on default; they are new creations © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

91

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 103

[CPA 102.20] coming into existence on that contingency ... what are created are mere potentially exercisable rights which automatically cease on repayment.” 57 It has also been said that it is not a mortgage but rather a “right of realisation by judicial process in case of non-payment of a debt”: Andersons Solicitors v Schigulski [2004] SASC 21; (2004) 88 SASR 1.

For a discussion of the charging order as a form of enforcement in Australian jurisdictions generally, see Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [19.360]. [CPA 102.40]

Definition of “financial institution”

Section 5 of the Banking Act 1959 (Cth) defines “authorised deposit-taking institution” as “a body corporate in relation to which an authority under s 9(3) [of the Commonwealth Act] is in force”. [CPA 102.60]

Definitions of “garnishee” and “garnishee order”

For a history of the term “garnishee” see [CPA 117.10]. Some jurisdictions now prefer the term “redirection order” over “garnishee order”. For a discussion of the redirection order as a form of enforcement in Australian jurisdictions generally, see Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [19.270]ff. [CPA 102.80]

Definition of “goods”

The etymology of the word “chattel” is closely linked to that of “cattle”. It appears in many NSW statutes. For a recent discussion by an intermediate court of the meaning in modern times, see Commissioner of State Revenue v Uniqema Pty Ltd (2004) 9 VR 523; [2004] VSCA 82 at [39]ff. [CPA 102.100]

Definition of “instalment order”

The 1869 English Debtors Act 1869 famously sought to abolish, or at least greatly curtail, imprisonment of debtors for non-payment. It also provided in Debtors Act 1869 s 5(2) that “any court may direct any debt due from any person in pursuance of any order or judgment of that or any other competent court to be paid by instalments, and may from time to time rescind or vary such order”. The section is the foundation of our courts’ statutory powers to order payments of judgment debts by instalments. [CPA 102.120]

Definition of “wage or salary”

The inclusive definition, having regard to CPA s 122, is clearly intended as ameliorative. Unsurprisingly, its original form was introduced at the height of the Great Depression, in the Small Debts Recovery (Amendment) Act 1933 (NSW), s 2(20). Share farming is a chiefly Australian expression which is used to describe one person farming land of another for an agreed portion of the profits. Share working is a peculiarly New South Wales term, also introduced by the 1933 Act. [CPA 102.140]

Definitions of the writs

The idea of the writ as a written command, order, or authority is fundamental to the court’s function and role in our common law system. The reforms consolidated in the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) extended to writs, but writs of execution and writs in aid of such writs of execution were specifically excluded: SCA, s 69(2). 103

Enforcement of judgments generally

Subject to this Part, the procedure for enforcing a judgment or order of the court is to be as prescribed by rules of court.

SECTION 103 COMMENTARY Enforcement of judgments generally ................................................................................................... [CPA 103.20] What about utilising the process of bankrupting or winding up? ........................................................ [CPA 103.30] What if the judgment debtor becomes bankrupt after judgment? ....................................................... [CPA 103.35] Is a judgment debt a secured debt? .................................................................................................... [CPA 103.40] 92

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 1 – Preliminary

[CPA 103.40]

Enforcement of judgments generally

The relationship between the rules and the general law was summarised by Ball J in Hall v Foster [2012] NSWSC 974: [15] Although the general rule is that once final orders have been made the proceedings cannot be reopened by the court, the court still has power to make additional orders for the enforcement of its own judgment. Section 106 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (the CPA), provides that a judgment debt may be enforced by means of a writ for the levy of property, a garnishee order or a charging order. Section 103 of the CPA states that the procedure for enforcing a judgment or order is to be prescribed by rules of court. That is done by Part 39 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) which sets out in detail the procedure for issuing writs of execution, writs against land, writs against goods, garnishee orders and charging orders. In addition, UCPR r 40.2 allows the appointment of a receiver of the income of the person bound by the judgment or the making of a sequestration order against such a person. Finally, UCPR r 25.14(4) makes it clear that the court can grant a freezing order against a judgment debtor if there is a danger that the judgment would be wholly or partly unsatisfied because, among other reasons, the assets of the judgment debtor are disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value. [16] Finally, the Court has an inherent equitable jurisdiction to enforce judgments, which is often referred to as “equitable execution”. As noted by his Honour, the UCPR rules relating to the enforcement of judgments and orders are: • Pt 39 – Enforcement of judgments – this Part includes rules relating to writs of execution, garnishment orders and charging orders; • Pt 40 – Additional measures for enforcing judgments and order of the Supreme Court and District Court – this Part includes rules relating to committal and sequestration. Also relevant are: Pt 37 – Time to pay and payment by instalments; Pt 38 – Examination of judgment debtor etc. [CPA 103.30] What about utilising the process of bankrupting or winding up? Almost invariably, a judgment debtor is either a natural person or a limited liability corporation regulated under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Often, a judgment creditor does not pursue one or other of the methods of enforcement prescribed under these rules: see [CPA 103.20] for a list. Instead, the judgment creditor chooses (in the case of a natural person) to issue a bankruptcy notice prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) or (in the case of a corporation) to issue a statutory demand prescribed by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Neither of those processes is dealt with under the rules. The user is referred to the specialist texts. However, the user should be wary of the possible effect of the rules on the relevant process. See eg [CPA 107.40] – Stay of execution and the effect on bankruptcy notices. [CPA 103.35]

What if the judgment debtor becomes bankrupt after judgment?

In Wentworth v Rogers [2009] NSWSC 1038, Rothman J said: [22] Debts that arise from judgments issued prior to the date of bankruptcy will be provable debts and will be enforceable only in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act: see Foots v Southern Cross Mind Management Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 56; (2007) 234 CLR 52. Unlike the factual situation with which the High Court was concerned in Foots, supra, the judgment on damages and the judgment on costs had issued (and, in relation to the costs, been assessed) prior to the date of bankruptcy. In those circumstances, the express provisions of s 58(3) of the Bankruptcy Act apply and prevail over the provisions of State Law, including the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. As is obvious from the foregoing, the judgment debt is a liability which arose before the date of bankruptcy and is therefore provable pursuant to the terms of s 82 of the Bankruptcy Act. [CPA 103.40] Is a judgment debt a secured debt? If A is B’s creditor, he/she may sue B and become B’s judgment creditor. This may afford A additional remedies. The usual examples are (a) enforcement afforded by a court in which the judgment is recognised; © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

93

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 103.20]

s 103

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 104

[CPA 103.40]

and (b) use of the judgment to found a bankruptcy notice, non-compliance with which itself founds a basis to petition for the sequestration of B’s estate. However and in general, the conversion of an unsecured obligation into a judgment debt does not of itself create any security in A over B’s property. Put another way, a judgment debt is still an unsecured debt. 104

Judgments for possession of land

(1) A judgment for the possession of land may be enforced by a writ of possession. (2) Execution of a writ of possession does not require any goods to be removed from the land.

SECTION 104 COMMENTARY Judgments for possession of land ....................................................................................................... [CPA 104.20] Directions as to enforcement ............................................................................................................... [CPA 104.30] A mandatory injunction for possession – is it a judgment for possession? ........................................ [CPA 104.40]

[CPA 104.20]

Judgments for possession of land

In Prentice v Constantinidis (No.2) [2015] FCCA 904, Manousaridis FCC J said: 30. In modern practice, the form of the words of a judgment for possession of land pronounced by the SCNSW is simply “judgment for possession of the land”. The meaning of that expression does not much matter because, once a judgment in this form is pronounced, section 104(1) of the CPA provides that such judgment “may be enforced by a writ of possession”. The writ of possession is a prescribed form. It is an order directing the Sheriff to enter the land described in the writ and “cause the person entitled to execution of judgment to have possession of it”. An application for a writ for possession is by notice of motion that is considered in chambers in the absence of the parties. The defendant does not need to be served with the application for the writ: UCPR r 39.2. The requirements for the affidavit in support of a writ of possession are set out in UCPR r 39.3(2). See [r 39.3.60] and approved forms 59 and 60. Further applications for directions with respect to enforcement are made under s 135. [CPA 104.30]

Directions as to enforcement

Users should be aware of the terms of s 135, headed “Directions as to enforcement”. It is likely to prove particularly useful in relation to the issue of writs of possession and of delivery. See commentary at [CPA 135.20]. [CPA 104.40]

A mandatory injunction for possession – is it a judgment for possession?

A mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to give vacant possession of the property is not a judgment for possession. It would not be enforceable by a writ for possession. A mandatory injunction would be enforceable only by contempt proceedings. See Trustee and Guardian (NSW) v Schneider [2011] NSWSC 424 at [22]. 105

Judgments for delivery of goods

A judgment or order for the delivery of goods may be enforced by a writ of delivery.

SECTION 105 COMMENTARY Judgments for delivery of goods ......................................................................................................... [CPA 105.20] Directions as to enforcement ............................................................................................................... [CPA 105.30]

94

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 1 – Preliminary

[CPA 105.30] [CPA 105.20]

s 106

Judgments for delivery of goods

An application for a writ for delivery of goods is by notice of motion that is considered in chambers in the absence of the parties. The defendant does not need to be served with the application for the writ: UCPR r 39.2. The requirements for the affidavit in support of a writ for the delivery of goods are set out in UCPR r 39.3(3). See [r 39.3.80] and approved forms 63 and 64. Further applications for directions with respect to enforcement are made under s 135. Directions as to enforcement

Users should be aware of the terms of s 135, headed “Directions as to enforcement”. It is likely to prove particularly useful in relation to the issue of writs of possession and of delivery. See commentary at [CPA 135.20]. 106

Judgments for payment of money

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 109; Act No 8 1901, sections 4 and 5)

(1) A judgment debt may be enforced by means of any one or more of the following: (a) a writ for the levy of property, (b) a garnishee order, (c) in the case of a judgment of the Supreme Court or the District Court, a charging order. (2) Subject to the uniform rules, a writ for the levy of property is sufficient authority for the Sheriff: (a) to seize and to sell goods of or to which the judgment debtor is or may be possessed or entitled or which the judgment debtor may, at law or in equity, assign or dispose of, and (b) to seize money belonging to the judgment debtor, and (c) to seize and to realise cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds, specialties or other securities for money belonging to the judgment debtor, and (d) to enter into possession of, and to sell, land of or to which the judgment debtor is seized or entitled, or which the judgment debtor may, at law or in equity, assign or dispose of, and (e) to take and to sell choses in action or equitable interests in goods or land held by the judgment debtor. (3) The power conferred on the Sheriff by subsection (2)(a) may not be exercised in relation to: (a) any clothing, or (b) any bedroom or kitchen furniture, or (c) any tools of trade (including vehicles, plant, equipment and reference books) not exceeding, in aggregate value, the sum prescribed by the uniform rules, if the clothing, furniture or tools are used by the judgment debtor or by any member of his or her family. (4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(d), the Sheriff is taken to have entered into possession of land when notice of the proposed sale of the land is published in accordance with the uniform rules. (5) The power conferred on the Sheriff by subsection (2)(d) may not be exercised in relation to land if the amount outstanding under the judgment is less than the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court when sitting in its Small Claims Division. [Subs (5) am Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2]

(6) A garnishee order or charging order addressed to the Crown binds the Crown as garnishee or chargee, as the case requires. Note: Divisions 2, 3 and 4, respectively, apply to the enforcement of writs for the levy of property, garnishee orders and charging orders. [S 106 am Act 94 of 2007]

SECTION 106 COMMENTARY Meaning of “judgment debt” ................................................................................................................. [CPA 106.10] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

95

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 105.30]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 106

[CPA 106.10]

Meaning and nature of “charging order” .............................................................................................. [CPA 106.11] Is a determination of compensation under the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 a judgment debt? ............................................................................................................................ [CPA 106.12] Certificates which may be filed ............................................................................................................ [CPA 106.15] Enforcing judgments for payment of money ........................................................................................ [CPA 106.20] An additional method of enforcing Supreme Court judgments ........................................................... [CPA 106.25] What if the judgment debtor becomes bankrupt after judgment? ....................................................... [CPA 106.30] Are contempt proceedings available for non-payment? ...................................................................... [CPA 106.35] Goods that can and cannot be seized under a writ for levy of property ............................................ [CPA 106.40] Method of seizure ................................................................................................................................ [CPA 106.60] Effect of seizure ................................................................................................................................... [CPA 106.80]

[CPA 106.10]

Meaning of “judgment debt”

Section 3(1) provides that in the Act, a “judgment debt” includes (a) any amount payable under a judgment; (b) any interest after judgment that is payable on that amount under s 101; and (c) any other amount payable under rules of court without the need for a judgment. Judgment creditors should be aware that unless the court otherwise orders, any payment made on account of a judgment debt is to be appropriated firstly towards s 101 interest and only then to the balance: see s 136. [CPA 106.11]

Meaning and nature of “charging order”

For a discussion of the nature and operation of the jurisdiction created by CPA s 106(1)(c), see [54] to [63] of Galbally & O’Bryan v Easton [2016] NSWSC 77. [CPA 106.12]

Is a determination of compensation under the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 a judgment debt? In Tempe Recreation Reserve Trust v Sydney Water Corporation (No 2) [2014] NSWLEC 23, Biscoe J said at [24]: Section 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 defines “judgment” as including “any order for the payment of money, including any order for the payment of costs”. However, the definition is not exhaustive. “Order” is not defined. Section 90 provides that the court is “to give such judgment or make such order as the nature of the case requires”. It might be said that this court’s determination of compensation under the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (Just Terms Act) is an order that the nature of the case requires within the meaning of s 90. However if that were so, the court would have power under Pt 8 (ss 102–138) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 to enforce a determination of compensation under the Just Terms Act, in particular as a “judgment debt”, that, under s 106(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, could be enforced against the acquiring authority by a writ for the levy of property. It might be thought that goes beyond what the legislature intended. [CPA 106.15]

Certificates which may be filed

There are a number of statutory regimes which permit an officer to issue a certificate which, when filed in the registry of a court having jurisdiction to give judgment for a debt of the same amount as the amount stated in the certificate, operates as such a judgment. One regime is the costs assessment system prescribed under the Legal Profession Act 2004. For another example, see s 51 of the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001. [CPA 106.20]

Enforcing judgments for payment of money

Judgments for money can be enforced by a writ for levy of property (see UCPR rr 39.1–28 and ss 109–116), garnishee orders (see UCPR rr 39.29–39.33 and ss 117–125) or charging orders (see UCPR rr 39.44, 39.45 and ss 126–128). Further applications for directions with respect to enforcement are made under s 135. [CPA 106.25]

An additional method of enforcing Supreme Court judgments

Supreme Court judgment creditors should be aware of an additional method of enforcement provided by UCPR r 40.2, namely either or both of (a) appointment of a receiver of the income of the property of the person bound by the judgment; and (b) sequestration of the property of the person bound by the judgment. 96

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[CPA 106.80]

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 1 – Preliminary

[CPA 106.30]

What if the judgment debtor becomes bankrupt after judgment?

s 107

See [CPA 103.35]. Are contempt proceedings available for non-payment?

The question of whether an order for contempt with respect to non-payment of an order for costs or any other monetary order available was addressed in Mahaffy v Mahaffy [2013] NSWSC 245. a summary application not requiring a final view, Garling J said: [81] It is a sufficient answer to this submission, at this stage of the proceedings, to note that the terms of s 106(1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides a discretion to the Court with respect to enforcement of a judgment debt, and the terms of the section do not suggest by the words used that it intends to provide a code which limits the steps of enforcement to those provided and thereby prevents a finding of contempt of Court. If that was the intention of the legislature, then express words would be needed. [82] It is also necessary to note the terms of s 131 of the Civil Procedure Act. It is as follows: 131. Committal for contempt Nothing in this Act or the Uniform Rules limits or otherwise affects the power of the court to attach or commit a person for contempt. [83] This section is to be found in Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Act, which is the Part which contains all of the provisions for the enforcement of judgments and orders. Contrary to the submissions of counsel…, this section tells against the proposition that the provision of s 106(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, precludes a finding of contempt. [CPA 106.40]

Goods that can and cannot be seized under a writ for levy of property

See [r 39.6.60]. [CPA 106.60]

Method of seizure

Entry into the place where the goods are located with production of the writ and an intimation to the judgment debtor or his or her household that the goods are taken in execution amounts to a valid seizure: Bissicks v Bath Colliery Co Ltd (1878) 3 Ex D 174. A seizure of part of the goods in the name of the whole of the goods is good seizure even where the premises are extensive and the goods widely scattered: Johnson v Pickering [1908] 1 KB 1. It is not sufficient to constitute a seizure to enter upon premises and demand the debt. [CPA 106.80]

Effect of seizure

When goods are seized they are said to come into custodia legis. They are available for the benefit of those who are entitled by law to any property in them. The general property in the goods remains with the execution debtor and no property in them passes to the judgment creditor. Pending sale, the position of the judgment creditor is similar to that of a creditor, having a legal right to have the goods sold and to be paid out of the proceeds. Any transfer of the property after the date of the writ is subject to the right of the sheriff to follow up and seize goods except in the case of a bona fide purchaser for value. When the sheriff enters into possession he or she acquires a specific property in the goods, however the property in the goods remains in the judgment debtor until sale: McQuarrie v Jaques (1954) 92 CLR 262; [1954] HCA 76. 107

Deferred payment and payment by instalments

(1) A court in which judgment has been entered may, subject to and in accordance with the uniform rules, make an order allowing for: (a) payment of the judgment debt within such time as is specified in the order, or (b) payment of the judgment debt by instalments, payable in such amounts and at such times as are specified in the order. Note: Such an order may be varied or rescinded pursuant to section 43(2) of the Interpretation Act 1987. The circumstances in which such an order may be varied or rescinded, and the procedure for varying or rescinding such an order, may be dealt with by the uniform rules.

(2) Subject to section 119, execution of a judgment for the payment of money is stayed while the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

97

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 106.35]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 107

[CPA 107.20]

judgment is the subject of an order in force under this section. (3) [Repealed] [Subs (3) rep Act 94 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1.12[4]] [S 107 am Act 94 of 2007]

SECTION 107 COMMENTARY Payment by instalments ....................................................................................................................... [CPA 107.20] When the judgment creditor is the Commissioner of Taxation ........................................................... [CPA 107.30] Stay of execution and the effect on bankruptcy notices ..................................................................... [CPA 107.40] Stay of execution and the effect on statutory demands ...................................................................... [CPA 107.45]

[CPA 107.20]

Payment by instalments

The rules relating to applications for payment of the judgment debt by instalments are contained in UCPR Pt 37. [CPA 107.30]

When the judgment creditor is the Commissioner of Taxation

The court has no power to make an instalment order when the judgment debt is derived from federal income tax: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Meakes [2014] NSWSC 1001. [CPA 107.40]

Stay of execution and the effect on bankruptcy notices

Section 107(2) provides for a stay, subject to s 119, which relates to garnishee orders. This specific and automatic provision may be compared to s 135, which provides the court with more general powers in relation to stays. Judgment creditors contemplating applying for the issue of a bankruptcy notice must be aware of the provisions of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). [CPA 107.45]

Stay of execution and the effect on statutory demands

A stay of execution in operation by virtue of s 107(2) may well provide, in terms of s 459J(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001, “some other reason” why a statutory demand should be set aside: Tatlers.com.au Pty Ltd v Davis (2006) 203 FLR 473; [2006] NSWSC 1055; cf Slocomb Investments Pty Ltd v JH & EJ Williams Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 918. 108

Order for examination

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 91; Act No 11 1970, section 41; SCR Part 43, rule 1)

(1) The court may, subject to and in accordance with the uniform rules, make an order requiring a person bound by a judgment or order: (a) to attend the court to be orally examined as to any material question, or (b) to produce any document or thing that is in his or her possession and that relates to a material question. (2) An order under this section with respect to a person that is a corporation: (a) may be addressed to any officer or former officer of the corporation, and (b) binds any such officer or former officer as if he or she were the person bound by the judgment or order. (3) Without limiting subsection (1), the uniform rules may require the judgment creditor under a judgment debt to have attempted to obtain information as to the judgment debtor’s financial circumstances (whether by means of a notice requiring the judgment debtor to supply such information or otherwise) before the judgment creditor may apply for an order under this section. (4) [Repealed] [Subs (4) rep Act 94 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1.12[5]]

(5) For the purposes of this section, the material questions in relation to a judgment or order are: 98

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 1 – Preliminary

[CPA 108.35]

s 108

(a)

to the extent to which it requires the person bound by it to pay money: (i) questions as to whether any and, if so, what debts are owing to that person, and (ii) questions as to whether that person has any and, if so, what other property or other means of satisfying the judgment or order, and (b) to the extent to which it does not require the person bound by it to pay money, such questions concerning or in aid of the enforcement or satisfaction of the judgment or order as may be specified in the order under this section.

SECTION 108 COMMENTARY Examination of judgment debtors ........................................................................................................ Examination of other persons bound by a judgment or order ............................................................ Does an inherent jurisdiction remain in the Supreme Court? ............................................................. A comparison between a liquidator’s examination and a judgment creditor’s examination ...............

[CPA 108.20] [CPA 108.25] [CPA 108.30] [CPA 108.35]

[CPA 108.20] Examination of judgment debtors The rules relating to the examination of judgment debtors, including the issuing of warrants for the arrest of judgment debtors that fail to appear are contained in UCPR Pt 38. [CPA 108.25] Examination of other persons bound by a judgment or order Section 108 is not limited to questions about judgments or orders for the payment of money. It has been used in aid of enforcement of an injunction: Austress Freyssinet Pty Ltd v Kowalski [2007] NSWSC 1105. [CPA 108.30]

Does an inherent jurisdiction remain in the Supreme Court?

In Wentworth v Rogers [2009] NSWSC 1038, Rothman J said: [19] … The provisions of s 108 … grant additional powers for the enforcement of orders and are not exclusive of powers that hitherto existed: see s 138 of the Civil Procedure Act. The Supreme Court of New South Wales, as a supreme court of general jurisdiction, has inherent power and jurisdiction to enforce its own judgments: see R v Metal Trades Employers’ Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union [1951] HCA 3; (1951) 82 CLR 208 at 241. That inherent jurisdiction is continued by operation of ss 22 and 23 of the : see Keramianakis v Regional Publishers Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 18; (2009) 237 CLR 268 at [36]. Those inherent powers and/or jurisdiction would seem to permit the examination of persons, other than parties, who, on reasonable grounds, are alleged to be party to avoiding or circumventing the execution of a judgment of the court. On one view, such a power is an incident of the inherent power to punish for contempt: see R v MTEA, supra at 241. [20] Such inherent powers and jurisdiction are subject to valid limitations imposed by the legislature. In particular, the inherent powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the provisions of s 108 of the Civil Procedure Act are overridden by any valid federal legislation inconsistent therewith. For reasons that become obvious, it is unnecessary for the court to deal with the broader scope and meaning of inconsistency under s 109 of The Constitution. It is sufficient to state the trite proposition that a valid federal law overrides a law of the State. [CPA 108.35]

A comparison between a liquidator’s examination and a judgment creditor’s examination

In Quadunion Builders Pte Ltd v Aircraft Support Industries Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1857, Adamson J said: [32] I am not persuaded that the comparison between an examination by a liquidator under the Corporations Act and an examination by a judgment creditor under s 108 of the Civil Procedure Act is necessarily helpful. The first is an investigative tool to inform a liquidator as to a range of matters, including as to potential causes of action and where assets of the company might be located, whereas the second is an adjunct to the enforcement of a judgment of the Court by a judgment creditor. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

99

Civil Procedure Leg

[S 108 am Act 94 of 2007]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 109

[CPA 108.35] [33] UCPR 38.2, in so far as it applies to a judgment of this Court, imposes only a requirement that the judgment creditor establish by affidavit that the judgment or order remains unsatisfied and whether an instalment order has been made. The “material questions” in s 108(5) of the Civil Procedure Act relate only to the means whereby the judgment debtor can satisfy the judgment. The answers to the material questions are designed to inform the judgment creditor as to what, if any, enforcement action, such as a garnishee order, can be taken; or whether, there being no real prospect that the judgment debtor can satisfy the judgment, the judgment creditor ought move to wind up or bankrupt the judgment debtor. [34] The purposes of a liquidator’s examination are much broader. Although the liquidator may conduct an examination to ascertain the assets of a company in liquidation, he or she may also wish to conduct an examination to ascertain a range of matters, including whether the company has engaged in insolvent trading; whether there are actions which may be brought against the directors; and so on.

DIVISION 2 – WRITS FOR THE LEVY OF PROPERTY SUBDIVISION 1 – ENFORCEMENT AGAINST GOODS AND SECURITIES 109

Effect of writ of execution on goods

(cf Act No 1 1923, section 29)

(1) A writ of execution against goods binds the property in the goods as from the time the writ is delivered to the Sheriff. (2) Despite subsection (1), a writ of execution does not affect the title to goods acquired by a person in good faith and for valuable consideration unless, when the person acquires title, he or she has notice that such a writ has been delivered to the Sheriff and remains unexecuted.

SECTION 109 COMMENTARY [CPA 109.20]

Effect of writ for levy of property on goods

This section supersedes Sale of Goods Act 1923 s 29. Upon delivery of the writ the sheriff acquires a right to seize the goods and any transfer or assignment of the property after the date the writ has been received by the sheriff is subject to the right of the sheriff to trace and seize the goods (Woodland v Fuller (1840) 11 Ad & El 859; 113 ER 641) unless the goods have been transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value: s 109(2). The property in the goods remains in the judgment debtor until the goods are sold and the judgment creditor has a status equivalent to a secured creditor: Re Davies; Ex parte Williams (1872) 7 Ch App 314; [1861–1873] All ER Rep 960. 110 How goods subject to conditional bill of sale to be dealt with (cf Act No 8 1901, section 16)

(1) If goods the subject of a writ for the levy of property (being goods in the possession of the judgment debtor) are the subject of a conditional bill of sale, the Sheriff may sell the judgment debtor’s interest in the goods without taking possession of them. (2) On receiving written notice of the purchase of the judgment debtor’s interest, the person having the benefit of the bill of sale (the holder of the bill) may take possession of the goods and, if he or she does so, is taken to hold them for the use of the purchaser, subject to the purchaser’s due payment of any amounts payable under the bill of sale. (3) If the goods are subsequently sold under the bill of sale, and there is any surplus remaining from the proceeds of sale after the debt to the holder of the bill is satisfied, the holder must pay the surplus to the purchaser, and, accordingly, the amount of that surplus is recoverable by the purchaser from the holder as a debt. 100

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 2 – Writs for the levy of property

[CPA 111.20]

s 112

(4) Nothing in this section affects the right of any judgment creditor to test the validity of any bill of sale by interpleader.

SECTION 110 COMMENTARY

[CPA 110.20]

How goods subject to conditional bill of sale to be dealt with

This section supersedes Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 16. There is no effective change. [CPA 110.25]

The current status of bills of sale

A bill of sale “is a document given with respect to the transfer of chattels, and is used in cases where possession is not intended to be given”: Johnson v Diprose [1893] 1 QB 512 at 515 per Lord Esher MR. Obviously enough, it has been widely used as a form of security. The Bills of Sale Act 1898 (NSW) was repealed by the Security Interests in Goods Act 2005 (NSW), in turn repealed by the Personal Property Securities (Commonwealth Powers) Amendment Act 2009 (NSW). Any judgment creditor seeking to enforce a judgment by recourse to the judgment creditor’s goods should consider the application if any of the Personal Property Securities scheme, and in particular whether the goods the proposed subject of enforcement are on the Scheme register. See generally www.ppsr.gov.au. 111

How securities to be dealt with

(cf Act No 8 1901, sections 6, 7 and 8)

(1) The Sheriff may hold any cheque, bill of exchange, promissory note, bond, specialty or other security for money as a security for the amount outstanding under the judgment and, if payment thereof has become due, may sue in the name of the Sheriff for the recovery of the sum secured thereby. (2) The payment to the Sheriff by the person liable on any such security for money, or the recovery by the Sheriff against the person so liable, discharges the person from that liability to the extent of the payment or recovery.

SECTION 111 COMMENTARY [CPA 111.20]

How securities to be dealt with

Subsection (1) supersedes Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 6 and subs (2) supersedes Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 7.

SUBDIVISION 2 – ENFORCEMENT AGAINST LAND 112 Effect of judgment and writ of execution on land (cf Act No 8 1901, section 13)

(1) A writ of execution against land binds the land, as from the time the writ is delivered to the Sheriff, in the same way as a writ of execution against goods binds the property in the goods. (2) Despite subsection (1), a writ of execution does not affect the title to land acquired by a person in good faith and for valuable consideration unless, when the person acquires title, he or she has notice that such a writ has been delivered to the Sheriff and remains unexecuted. (3) A judgment in any action at law does not of itself bind or affect any land.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

101

Civil Procedure Leg

How goods subject to conditional bill of sale to be dealt with ............................................................ [CPA 110.20] The current status of bills of sale ........................................................................................................ [CPA 110.25]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 113

[CPA 112.20]

SECTION 112 COMMENTARY Effect of writ for levy of property on land ............................................................................................. [CPA 112.20] Where a forfeiture order has been made ............................................................................................ [CPA 112.25]

[CPA 112.20]

Effect of writ for levy of property on land

This section supersedes the Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 13. See ss 105–105D of the Real Property Act 1900 as to the procedure and effect of registering a writ against land. A transfer lodged while the registration of a writ is effective against the relevant land cannot be registered unless the writ is referred to in the dealing as a prior encumbrance: Garnock v Black (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 1218. Although a purchaser for valuable consideration, pursuant to a valid sale entered into, but not lodged for registration, prior to the registration of a writ, has an equitable interest in that land, that interest should be protected by a caveat, this being the appropriate mechanism provided for by the Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438; 81 ALJR 1338; [2007] HCA 31. In that case the High Court held the purchasers liable for damages flowing from an injunction to prevent a sale by the sheriff. [CPA 112.25]

Where a forfeiture order has been made

“It is clear that a bare creditor has no interest in the debtor’s property. The effect of a forfeiture order is therefore to give the State preference over any creditors. So far as they are concerned, therefore, the confiscation of the assets of a criminal, operates to destroy any possibility of recovering any of the funds owed to them. Whilst one can readily accept that the legislation is intended to prevent criminals from keeping their ill-gotten gains, it is less obvious that, consistently with the stated objects of the legislation, innocent creditors should also be mulcted of their right to obtain payments of their debts. Does registration of a writ of execution of the title of the forfeited property make a difference?” For a discussion of s 112 and forfeiture orders made under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990, see Permanent Custodians Ltd v Tong (2012) 228 A Crim R 149; [2012] NSWSC 1373. 113

Sale or mortgage by judgment debtor of land affected by order

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 98A; Act No 9 1973, section 112; Act No 11 1970, section 62A)

(1) This section applies to land the subject of a writ for the levy of property: (a) that is registered, in the Register kept under the Real Property Act 1900, pursuant to section 105 of that Act, or (b) that is registered, in the General Register of Deeds kept under the Conveyancing Act 1919, pursuant to section 186 of that Act. (2) During the period: (a) that begins when the writ is registered in the relevant register, and (b) that ends at the expiration of 6 months after the writ is registered in the relevant register, or on the expiration of the writ, whichever first occurs, land the subject of the writ may not be sold or mortgaged by the judgment debtor otherwise than in accordance with this section. (3) Before the land may be sold or mortgaged by the judgment debtor: (a) the judgment creditor: (i) must consent, by notice in writing, to the sale or mortgage of the land by the judgment debtor, and (ii) must stipulate, in the notice of consent, the minimum amount to be paid to the Sheriff from the proceeds of the sale of the land or from the money advanced under the mortgage of the land, and (b) the judgment debtor must lodge the notice of consent with the Sheriff, and (c) the Sheriff, after due inquiry, must endorse the notice of consent with a certificate to the effect that the land has not been sold under the writ. (4) During the period of 8 weeks commencing on the date on which the Sheriff endorses the notice of consent, as referred to in subsection (3)(c): 102

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 2 – Writs for the levy of property

[CPA 113.30] (a) (b)

s 113

the judgment debtor may enter into an agreement for the sale or mortgage of the land, and the Sheriff is prohibited from causing the land to be sold.

(6) On payment to the Sheriff, from the proceeds of the sale of the land or from the money advanced under the mortgage of the land, of an amount that (together with any such deposit) is at least as much as the minimum amount referred to in subsection (3)(a)(ii): (a) any liability of the purchaser or mortgagee for payment to the judgment debtor from those proceeds or that advance is extinguished, to the extent of the amount paid to the Sheriff, and (b) the Sheriff, on production of the agreement for the sale or the mortgage instrument, must endorse: (i) in the case of a sale, the agreement for sale, or (ii) in the case of a mortgage, the mortgage instrument. [Subs (6) am Act 56 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]

(7) The purchaser’s or mortgagee’s interest in the land, as evidenced by the agreement or mortgage instrument so endorsed, is not affected by anything done under the writ, whether before or after the endorsement of the consent. [Subs (7) am Act 56 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[6]]

(8) The amount paid to the Sheriff, as referred to in subsection (6), is to be paid: (a) firstly, towards the Sheriff’s costs in connection with the execution of the writ, and (b) secondly, in reduction of the judgment debt, and (c) thirdly, if the amount exceeds the amounts required to satisfy the Sheriff’s costs and the judgment debt, to the judgment debtor. (9) In this section, notice of consent means a notice referred to in subsection (3)(a)(i). [S 113 am Act 56 of 2006]

SECTION 113 COMMENTARY Sale or mortgage by judgment debtor of land affected by a writ ........................................................ [CPA 113.20] Where a contract for sale has been entered into ................................................................................ [CPA 113.30] Registration of writ ............................................................................................................................... [CPA 113.40]

[CPA 113.20]

Sale or mortgage by judgment debtor of land affected by a writ

This section supersedes SCA s 98A, DCA s 112 and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 62A. This section regulates the sale by the judgment debtor of land the subject of a writ for the levy of property that has been registered in the Register kept under the Real Property Act 1900 or in the General Register of Deeds kept under the Conveyancing Act 1919. During the period of six months after registration of the writ or whenever the writ expires (whichever is the lesser period) the land may not be sold or mortgaged by the judgment debtor without the judgment creditor’s consent. Where consent is provided, it must be in writing and must indicate the amount of money from the sale or mortgage that is to be paid to the sheriff. A copy of the consent must be provided to the sheriff. The sheriff must endorse the memorandum of consent with a certificate to the effect that the land has not been sold under the writ. [CPA 113.30]

Where a contract for sale has been entered into

If a judgment debtor enters a contract for sale of a Torrens title property, a purchaser is well advised to lodge a caveat under the machinery provided for in the Real Property Act 1900. While an exchange of contracts prior to the period referred to in s 113(2) may not be a sale that is thereby barred, s 105A of the Real Property Act 1900 will act to protect a judgment creditor. So, where there is an exchange and later, a mere two hours prior to settlement, a third party judgment creditor causes a writ to be recorded against the land, the fact of exchange will be insufficient to deny the right of the Sheriff under the writ: Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438; 81 ALJR 1338; [2007] HCA 31. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

103

Civil Procedure Leg

(5) Any deposit paid under an agreement for the sale of the land is to be paid to the Sheriff, to be held by the Sheriff as stakeholder.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 114

[CPA 113.0]

[CPA 113.40]

Registration of writ

A number of amendments were made to the Conveyancing Act 1919 and the Real Property Act 1900 to streamline the process for recording a writ in the register at the Land and Property Information office (LPI), at the same time as the CPA came into effect. To commence enforcement of a writ against land, the creditor must register a copy of the writ for the levy of property under the Real Property Act 1900 s 105. It is open for the judgment creditor to take this step at any point of time after the issue of the writ of levy against property notwithstanding any action being taken by the sheriff to sell personal property. 114

Entry onto land for purposes of sale by auction

(cf Act No 8 1901, section 17A)

(1) The court may, in relation to land to be sold by public auction under a writ of execution, make orders: (a) authorising entry onto the land by the Sheriff (including entry by force if necessary) for the purpose of showing the land to prospective purchasers, and (b) authorising entry onto the land by prospective purchasers in the presence of the Sheriff. (2) For those purposes, such an order may also authorise the Sheriff to do either or both of the following: (a) to secure entry onto the land (including by breaking or replacing locks, bars and other devices restricting entry, if necessary), (b) to take such steps as are necessary to prevent persons from entering the land. (3) This section does not affect any other power of the court to make orders in relation to such matters. (4) A reference in this section to land includes any premises on land.

SECTION 114 COMMENTARY [CPA 114.20]

Entry onto land for purposes of sale by auction

This section supersedes Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 17A.

SUBDIVISION 3 – GENERAL 115 Effect of sale of property (cf Act No 8 1901, section 12)

(1) A sale of property by the Sheriff under this Part is as valid and effectual as if the property had been sold to the purchaser by the judgment debtor personally. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the sale of an equity of redemption or other equitable interest relating to land unless a deed of bargain and sale to the purchaser is duly executed by the Sheriff. (3) In a deed of conveyance executed by the Sheriff in relation to any land, a statement to the effect that: (a) the land has been sold under a writ for the levy of property, and (b) the writ for the levy of property has been issued pursuant to a judgment of a court in relation to proceedings specified in the writ, is admissible in any proceedings as evidence of those facts.

104

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 3 – Garnishee orders

[CPA 117.05]

s 117

SECTION 115 COMMENTARY [CPA 115.20]

Effect of sale of property

This section supersedes Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 12.

Subject to section 135: (a) the expiry of a writ for the levy of property does not affect any agreement for sale or other transaction entered into under the authority of the writ before that expiry, and (b) any action necessary to complete that sale or give effect to that transaction may be taken as if the writ were still in force.

SECTION 116 COMMENTARY [CPA 116.20]

Expiry of writ and renewal of writ

A writ is valid for execution for a period of 12 months from the date of issue: UCPR r 39.20. If a writ has been issued and has expired the judgment creditor can apply for a further writ or take other enforcement action: CPA s 138. A writ can be “renewed” under UCPR r 39.20 for the purposes of the Real Property Act 1900 s 105(5), to extend the registration of the writ under that Act. See CPA s 113(2) and the Real Property Act 1900 ss 105, 105A, 105B, 105C and 105D for effect of registration of a writ. See UCPR rr 39.21–28 as to rules that apply when a writ is being executed against land.

DIVISION 3 – GARNISHEE ORDERS SUBDIVISION 1 – ENFORCEMENT AGAINST DEBTS 117 Operation of garnishee order in relation to debts (cf Act No 9 1973, section 97)

(1) Subject to the uniform rules, a garnishee order operates to attach, to the extent of the amount outstanding under the judgment, all debts that are due or accruing from the garnishee to the judgment debtor at the time of service of the order. (2) For the purposes of this Division, any amount standing to the credit of the judgment debtor in a financial institution is taken to be a debt owed to the judgment debtor by that institution.

SECTION 117 COMMENTARY Garnishment – The current legislative scheme ................................................................................... [CPA 117.05] Meaning of “garnishee” ........................................................................................................................ [CPA 117.10] The Crown as garnishee ...................................................................................................................... [CPA 117.15] Attachment of debts ............................................................................................................................. [CPA 117.20] Debts which may be attached ............................................................................................................. [CPA 117.40] Equitable debts – trustees as debtors to beneficiaries ....................................................................... [CPA 117.50] Equitable debts – Share in proceeds of sale made by trustees ......................................................... [CPA 117.55] Garnishee orders are at the court’s discretion .................................................................................... [CPA 117.60]

[CPA 117.05]

Garnishment – The current legislative scheme

In Lin v Borrowdale [2011] NSWCA 65, Whealy JA gave the leading judgment, describing the relevant provisions from [39]: [39] Section 117 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (“CPA”) enables a judgment creditor to obtain a garnishee order. Subject to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, a garnishee order © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

105

Civil Procedure Leg

116 Effect of expiry of writ

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 117

[CPA 117.05] operates to attach, to the extent of the amount outstanding under the judgment, all debts that are due or accruing from the garnishee to the judgment debtor at the time of service of the order. [40] Section 123 of the CPA requires that a payment under a garnishee order must be made in accordance with, and to the judgment creditor specified in, the order. Section 124 enables a judgment creditor to apply to the court to complain that a garnishee order has not been complied with. The court hearing the application may hear and determine any question as to the liability of the garnishee to pay the debt, wage or salary sought to be attached by the garnishee order, and may give judgment in favour of the judgment creditor against the garnishee in the appropriate case. [41] Rule 39.34 of the (“UCPR”) requires that an application for a garnishee order in respect of a judgment is to be made by way of a Notice of Motion. Unless otherwise ordered, a Notice of Motion may be dealt with in the absence of the parties, and need not be served on the judgment debtor or proposed garnishee. Rule 39.35 requires that an affidavit in support of the application be filed and that it contain certain prescribed information, including identification of “any debts that appear to be owed by the garnishee to the judgment debtor”. Rule 39.36 stipulates that a garnishee order for debts must direct the garnishee to pay to the judgment creditor... all money (a) held by the garnishee for or on behalf of the judgment debtor, or (b) owed by the garnishee to the judgment debtor. The order takes effect when it is served on the garnishee (UCPRUniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 39.39). A garnishee who disputes the existence of a debt may file an affidavit to that effect (UCPRUniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 39.40). The court is given the power to hear and determine the garnishee’s claim and to give such judgment as the nature of the case requires. [42] Forms 69 and 70 are the relevant forms in relation to the issue of a garnishee order. Form 70 contains “important information for the garnishee” and notifies the garnishee that “it has the right to serve a statement disputing the issue as to whether a debt is payable and if so how much”. It provides information as to the appropriate forms for raising such a dispute. In particular, it enables the garnishee to raise the issue as to whether any debt sought to be attached by the garnishee order is effected by a claim by another person to any part of the monies, including any person claiming a charge, lien or other interest in any such money or debt.

[CPA 117.10]

Meaning of “garnishee”

The word “garnishee” comes from the Old French verb garner, to warn. Formerly, it was widely used: see eg Re Barns and Smith’s Case (1589) 74 ER 325. Today, its use is limited as a warning to a debtor that he/she should pay his/her debt not to the creditor but to some third party who has obtained judgment against the creditor. Thus A who obtains judgment against B may seek to garnish money owed by C to B. A will frequently seek to garnish B’s account at C bank. Or A may seek to garnish B’s salary due from B’s employer C. As to garnishment of income, see particularly s 119. However, use is not limited to judgment debts. The legislature sometimes permits government authorities, particularly tax bodies, to garnish money owed by a person to a taxpayer, where the taxpayer is in arrears. For an example of a statutory garnishment, see s 46 of the Taxation Administration Act 1996 (NSW). [CPA 117.15]

Meaning of “garnishee”

Section 106(6) provides that a garnishee order addressed to the Crown binds the Crown as garnishee. Semble, this cannot create a power in circumstances where the Crown owes no enforceable debt to the judgment creditor. For a discussion of the position in NSW generally, see Imperial Paint Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Hanson; Housing Commission (NSW) Garnishee (1955) 72 WN(NSW) 127. [CPA 117.20]

Attachment of debts

See UCPR rr 39.34–39.43 for the rules that apply to garnishee orders. A garnishee order operates to attach to all debts that are due or accruing from the garnishee to the judgment debtor to the extent of the judgment debt. It attaches to debts due and accruing at the time of service of the order unless the order provides otherwise. Money held in a financial institution to the credit of the judgment debtor is taken to be a debt owed to the judgment debtor by that institution: s 117(2). A garnishee order that attaches to wages or salary continues to have effect until the judgment debt has been satisfied: see s 119. 106

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 3 – Garnishee orders

[CPA 117.60] [CPA 117.40]

s 118

Debts which may be attached

The characteristics of the obligation must be considered in each case. So: (1) A debt may be attachable notwithstanding that adjustments need to be made before the precise amount is ascertained: O’Driscoll v Manchester Insurance Committee [1915] 3 KB 499; (2) A debt which presently exists but is not actually payable may be an accruing debt and as such attachable: Bank of New South Wales v Barlex Investments Pty Ltd (1964) 64 SR (NSW) 274; (3) An entered judgment is attachable: Holtby v Hodgson (1889) 24 QBD 103; (4) Where both debt and payment lie in the future the debt is not attachable: O’Driscoll v Manchester Insurance Committee [1915] 3 KB 499; (5) Money held jointly in a bank account with a person who is not a judgment debtor is not attachable: Phillips v MacMahon (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 206; (6) Money held in a bank account on trust for another and not beneficially for the judgment debtor is not attachable: Wentworth v Rogers [2003] NSWSC 472; (7) A debt conditional upon the happening of a future event is not attachable: Breen v Doyle (1920) 37 WN (NSW) 258; and (8) Unliquidated damages for breach of contract are not attachable: Synnott v Woods (1891) 8 WN (NSW) 4. [CPA 117.50]

Equitable debts – trustees as debtors to beneficiaries

For the purpose of negotiations with A (its judgment creditor), B deposited money into the trust account of C (B’s solicitor), and C deposited the money into the trust account of D (A’s solicitor). The negotiations failed, and D returned the money to C, who (again) held the money on trust for A. In the circumstances, C was A’s equitable debtor and A was entitled to seek a garnishee order in respect of the money: Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Limited v S [2014] NSWSC 1094; see also National Australia Bank Ltd v Nguyen [2014] NSWSC 1114, [28] and [32]. [CPA 117.55]

Equitable debts – Share in proceeds of sale made by trustees

An equitable debt comprising a share of proceeds held by trustees for the sale of land is a debt that could be the subject of a garnishee notice under s 117, and this does not change because the proceeds are the subject of an order for payment into court: Re Di Donato [2015] NSWSC 1923 at [28]. [CPA 117.60]

Garnishee orders are at the court’s discretion

The making of a garnishee order absolute is discretionary, and the court will not do so where the effect would be to confer a preference on a creditor, eg where a winding up order has been made or a petition presented: ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigrem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577; [2007] NSWSC 859 at [96]. 118

Time within which payment to be made

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 97B; Act No 11 1970, section 47B)

Payment of an amount with respect to a debt attached by a garnishee order must be made: (a) within 14 days after the date on which the order is served on the garnishee, or (b) if the order attaches a debt that falls due after that date, within 14 days after the date on which the debt falls due.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

107

Civil Procedure Leg

This section provides for the attachment of all debts (other than wages or salary, which are covered by s 119) at the time of service of the order, and not at the time the order was made. In Catalano v Managing Australian Destinations Pty Ltd (No 3) (2013) 306 ALR 449; [2013] FCA 1194, Flick J said at [7]: The reference to an amount “due or accruing” refers to an amount which is “due and payable”: cf. Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 40; (1981) 150 CLR 1 at 15 per Mason J. A debt which is “due or accruing” must be an absolute and not merely a conditional debt: Howell v Metropolitan District Railway Co (1881) 19 Ch D 508.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 119

[CPA 118.20]

SECTION 118 COMMENTARY [CPA 118.20]

Time within which payment to be made

If the court does not set aside or stay the garnishee order, the garnishee is required to pay the judgment creditor such amounts as are currently payable to the judgment debtor, up to the amount specified in the order, within 14 days of the service of the order. If the debt or part of the debt becomes payable to the judgment debtor on a date after the garnishment order is served (including wages or salary), then the money is payable to the judgment creditor 14 days after the money is due to be paid to the judgment debtor. See also s 120 and UCPR r 39.43. If an attached debt is due for payment after the expiration of 28 days after the service of the garnishee order, the garnishee is required before the expiration of the 28 day period to serve on the judgment creditor a notice specifying the date on which the debt is, or is likely to be due for payment to the judgment debtor and if the amount is less than the unpaid amount of the debt specified in the garnishee order, the amount of the debt.

SUBDIVISION 2 – ENFORCEMENT AGAINST WAGES OR SALARY [Subdiv 2 heading am Act 50 of 2015, Sch 4.3[1]]

119 Operation of garnishee order in relation to income (cf Act No 9 1973, section 97)

(1) Subject to sections 121 and 122 and the uniform rules, a garnishee order operates to attach, to the extent of the amount outstanding under the judgment: (a) any wage or salary that, while the order is in force, is payable to the judgment debtor by the garnishee, or (b) if the judgment debt becomes the subject of an instalment order, such amounts from the wage or salary payable to the judgment debtor by the garnishee as are equivalent to the instalments payable under the instalment order. (2) An instalment order with respect to a judgment debt the subject of a garnishee order takes effect in relation to the amounts payable under the garnishee order as from the time the instalment order is served on the garnishee. (3) A garnishee order ceases to have effect, in relation to the wage or salary payable to a judgment debtor, when the judgment debt is satisfied. (4) An order under this section addressed to the Crown as garnishee binds the Crown.

SECTION 119 COMMENTARY Operation of garnishee order in relation to income – no longer a four week limit .............................. [CPA 119.20] Relationship with an order to pay by instalments ................................................................................ [CPA 119.30] Garnishee orders against public servants ........................................................................................... [CPA 119.40]

[CPA 119.20]

Operation of garnishee order in relation to income – no longer a four week limit

A garnishee order against wages and salary now operates until the judgment debt is paid, instead of operating for only one month. Previously DCA s 97(2)(b) only allowed a garnishment order on wages and salaries to operate for a one month period unless pursuant to DCA s 98 an instalment order was made, in which case the garnishment order could continue until the debt was paid. The previous four-week limitation period required judgment creditors to come back to court and apply for a new garnishee order just before the end of the four-week period. [CPA 119.30]

Relationship with an order to pay by instalments

This provision does not prevent judgment debtors from applying to pay the judgment debt by instalments, the effect of which is that the garnishee order continues with the garnishee required to pay the amounts prescribed 108

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 3 – Garnishee orders

[CPA 121.20]

s 122

by the instalment order. Section 107(2) provides that “Subject to s 119, execution of a judgment for the payment of money is stayed while the judgment is the subject of an order in force under this section”. If an instalment order is made the onus will be on the judgment debtor to provide a copy of the order to the garnishee. See [r 37.5.60]. An order to pay by instalments also affects other garnishee orders: see s 121. Garnishee orders against public servants

A garnishee order that attaches to wages or salary will bind the Crown in respect of New South Wales but not in respect of the Commonwealth. The Attachment of Wages Limitation Act 1957 which provided an alternative means of deducting money from the wages of NSW Government employees has been repealed. Section 75 of the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) governs the procedure for applying for a garnishee against the wages or salary of a Commonwealth public servant. Part 8A of the Public Service Regulations 1999 (Cth) are the regulations prescribed thereunder. 120

Time within which payment to be made

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 97B; Act No 11 1970, section 47B)

Payment of an amount with respect to a wage or salary attached by a garnishee order must be made within 14 days after the date on which the wage or salary falls due. 121

Maximum payment under one of several concurrent garnishee orders

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 101; Act No 11 1970, section 51)

(1) This section applies to a garnishee in respect of a wage or salary that is attached by one or more garnishee orders of which one or more (but not all) are limited garnishee orders. [Subs (1) subst Act 67 of 2015, Sch 1.2[3]]

(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, a garnishee to whom this section applies is not required to pay an amount under any garnishee order that exceeds the greatest amount payable by the garnishee under any limited garnishee order attached to the relevant wage or salary. Note: Section 122 specifies the maximum total payment payable under one or more garnishee orders in respect of a wage or salary. [Subs (2) subst Act 67 of 2015, Sch 1.2[3]]

(3) In this section, limited garnishee order means a garnishee order in respect of a judgment debt that is the subject of an instalment order. [S 121 am Act 67 of 2015]

SECTION 121 COMMENTARY [CPA 121.20]

The effect of an instalment order on garnishee orders

A judgment debtor may apply to pay a judgment debt by instalments. If an instalment order stands, a garnishee order in respect of the same judgment debt is confined accordingly: see [CPA 119.30]. Section 121 extends the confinement to garnishee orders in respect of other judgment debts. As to the maximum total payment under all garnishee orders, see s 122. 122

Maximum total payment under all garnishee orders

(Act No 9 1973, section 99; Act No 11 1970, section 49)

(1) The amounts attached under one or more garnishee orders must not, in total, reduce the net weekly amount of any wage or salary received by the judgment debtor from the garnishee to less than $447.70 as adjusted under Division 6 of Part 3 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2013, Sch 1.2[1]; Act 37 of 2009, Sch 1.4]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

109

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 119.40]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 122

[CPA 122.20]

(1A) The amount of $447.70 referred to in subsection (1) is an adjustable amount for the purposes of Division 6 of Part 3 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. [Subs (1A) insrt Act 38 of 2013, Sch 1.2[2]]

(2) In this section: net weekly amount, in relation to any wage or salary payable to a judgment debtor, means the amount payable each week to the judgment debtor after deducting any taxes or other sums that, pursuant to any Act (including any Commonwealth Act), are required to be deducted from any such money. standard workers compensation weekly benefit [Repealed] [Def rep Act 38 of 2013, Sch 1.2[3]] [S 122 am Act 38 of 2013; Act 37 of 2009]

SECTION 122 COMMENTARY Maximum deductions ........................................................................................................................... [CPA 122.20] Concurrent garnishee orders in respect of the same judgment debt ................................................. [CPA 122.40]

[CPA 122.20]

Maximum deductions

Garnishee orders cannot reduce the net weekly income of a judgment debtor, ie after tax and after deducting other sums required to be deducted under an Act, to less than the standard workers compensation weekly benefit (the amount payable after 26 weeks of total incapacity under Workers Compensation Act 1987 s 37(1)(a)(i)). This amount is adjusted twice each year (April and October) to reflect changes to the Quarterly Wage Price Index for NSW. The current amount can be found at http://www.workcover.nsw.gov.au/ Publications/WorkersComp/Claims/Pages/benefits_guide.aspx. Garnishees have sometimes misunderstood the previous formula (DCA s 99 and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 49), and calculated the amount to be paid on a garnishee order with reference to a judgment debtor’s gross salary resulting in the judgment debtor sometimes being left with no income, once the tax on the gross salary is deducted from the standard workers compensation weekly benefit. [CPA 122.40]

Concurrent garnishee orders in respect of the same judgment debt

A judgment creditor is not prevented from issuing more than one garnishee order at a time: s 138(2)(b). However if the garnishee orders relate to salaries or wages then the limitations on amounts that can be deducted under this section apply. A garnishee uncertain as to her or his liability may apply to the court for directions pursuant to s 135. If an instalment application is granted, and the judgment creditor has issued a garnishee order against several employers of the judgment debtor, the judgment debtor should seek directions from the court as to how money should be deducted from each of the salaries or wages affected.

SUBDIVISION 2A – ENFORCEMENT BY OWNERS CORPORATIONS AGAINST RENT 122A Definitions In this Subdivision: owners corporation means an owners corporation within the meaning of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 or an association within the meaning of the Community Land Management Act 1989. real estate agent and trust account have the same meanings as they have in the Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 2002. unpaid contribution means a contribution under the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 or Community Land Management Act 1989 that has not been paid when it becomes due and payable to an owners corporation and includes any interest payable on the unpaid contribution and any expenses of the owners corporation incurred in recovering any such amounts. [S 122A insrt Act 50 of 2015, Sch 4.3[2]] 110

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 3 – Garnishee orders 122B

s 123

Application of Subdivision

This Subdivision does not apply unless the judgment creditor is an owners corporation and the judgment debt relates to an unpaid contribution. [S 122B insrt Act 50 of 2015, Sch 4.3[2]]

Operation of garnishee order in relation to rental income

(1) Subject to section 122E and the uniform rules, a garnishee order operates to attach, to the extent of the amount outstanding under the judgment: (a) any rent for the property to which the unpaid contribution relates that, while the order is in force, is held by a real estate agent in a trust account for the benefit of the judgment debtor, or (b) if the judgment debt becomes the subject of an instalment order, such amounts from any such rent as are equivalent to the instalments payable under the instalment order. (2) An instalment order with respect to a judgment debt the subject of a garnishee order takes effect in relation to the amounts payable under the garnishee order as from the time the instalment order is served on the garnishee. (3) A garnishee order ceases to have effect, in relation to the rent held for the benefit of a judgment debtor, when the judgment debt is satisfied. [S 122C insrt Act 50 of 2015, Sch 4.3[2]]

122D

Time within which payment to be made

Payment of an amount with respect to rent attached by a garnishee order must be made within 14 days after the date on which the rent is paid into the trust account. [S 122D insrt Act 50 of 2015, Sch 4.3[2]]

122E

Minimum income of judgment debtor

(1) This section applies if a judgment debtor satisfies a court that rent attached by a garnishee order is the only source of income of the judgment debtor. (2) The amounts attached under one or more garnishee orders must not, in total, reduce the net weekly amount of the rent received by the judgment debtor from the garnishee to less than $447.70 as adjusted under Division 6 of Part 3 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. (3) The amount of $447.70 referred to in subsection (2) is an adjustable amount for the purposes of Division 6 of Part 3 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. (4) In this section: net weekly amount, in relation to the rent payable to a judgment debtor, means the amount of rent for each week that is payable to the judgment debtor after deducting any taxes or other sums that, pursuant to any Act (including any Commonwealth Act), are required to be deducted from any such money. [S 122E insrt Act 50 of 2015, Sch 4.3[2]]

SUBDIVISION 3 – GENERAL 123

Payments by garnishee

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 105; DCR Part 33, rule 7; Act No 11 1970, section 47D; LCR Part 29, rule 3)

(1) A payment under a garnishee order must be made in accordance with, and to the judgment creditor specified in, the order. (2) The garnishee may, after the payment of each amount attached under the garnishee order, retain up to the amount prescribed by the uniform rules to cover the garnishee’s expenses in complying with the garnishee order. The amount retained by the garnishee is in addition to the amount attached under the order. [Subs (2) subst Act 67 of 2015, Sch 1.2[4]] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

111

Civil Procedure Leg

122C

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 123

[CPA 123.20]

(2A) If sufficient funds are not available to cover the prescribed amount referred to in subsection (2), the garnishee may retain that amount as soon as sufficient funds become available. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 67 of 2015, Sch 1.2[4]]

(3) A payment to the judgment creditor must be accompanied by a statement showing: (a) the amount attached under the garnishee order, and (b) how much of that amount has been retained by the garnishee, and (c) how much of that amount has been paid to the judgment creditor. (4) As between the garnishee and the judgment debtor, the amount attached under the garnishee order is taken, subject to any order of the court, to have been paid by the garnishee to the judgment debtor. Note: Such an order may be made, for example, if the garnishee has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (3).

(5) As between the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor, the amount of the payment to the judgment creditor is taken to have been paid by the judgment debtor to the judgment creditor in satisfaction, to the extent of that amount, of the judgment. [S 123 am Act 67 of 2015]

SECTION 123 COMMENTARY [CPA 123.20]

Amount that garnishee can retain

The garnishee can retain an amount to cover the garnishee’s expenses in complying with the garnishee order. The amount that can be retained is up to the amount specified in UCPR item 4 of Sch 3 to the rules (UCPR r 39.42). This amount is currently $13. The balance of the attached debt, or such reduced amount as may be required by operation of ss 121 and 122 if an instalment order has been made or if there are multiple garnishee orders in operation, is paid to the judgment creditor. Garnishee’s costs can only be retained if the payment to the judgment creditor is made within the 14 day period specified in ss 118 and 120. If the garnishee order relates to salary or wages, garnishee’s costs can be deducted when each payment is made to the judgment creditor. See [r 39.42.40]. Any amount retained by the garnishee for administrative expenses does not operate to reduce the judgment debt. 124

Procedure where garnishee order not complied with

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 102; Act No 11 1970, section 52)

(1) On the application of a judgment creditor who considers that a garnishee order has not been complied with, the court: (a) may hear and determine any question as to the liability of the garnishee to pay the debt, wage or salary or rent sought to be attached by the garnishee order, and (b) if satisfied that the garnishee is so liable, may give judgment in favour of the judgment creditor against the garnishee: (i) for the amount of that debt, wage or salary or rent, or (ii) for the unpaid amount of the judgment debt, whichever is the lesser. [Subs (1) am Act 50 of 2015, Sch 4.3[4]]

(2) The court may refuse to give such a judgment if it is of the opinion that such a judgment should not be given. (3) Without limiting subsection (2), the reasons that may lead the court to form such an opinion may include: (a) the smallness of the amount outstanding under the judgment, and (b) the smallness of the debt, wage or salary or rent to be attached. [Subs (3) am Act 50 of 2015, Sch 4.3[4]]

(4) As between the garnishee and the judgment debtor, an amount paid to the judgment creditor by 112

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 3 – Garnishee orders

[CPA 125.20]

s 125

the garnishee under a judgment given under this section is taken to have been paid to the judgment debtor. [S 124 am Act 50 of 2015]

Where garnishee order not complied with ........................................................................................... [CPA 124.20] Procedure ............................................................................................................................................. [CPA 124.40] The nature of the discretion ................................................................................................................. [CPA 124.60]

[CPA 124.20]

Where garnishee order not complied with

If a garnishee does not comply with the garnishee order, the judgment creditor may file a notice of motion to show cause. That motion will be considered in court. A filing fee is payable. See also UCPR r 39.40 as to the requirement for a garnishee to serve an affidavit on the judgment creditor if there is an assertion that there was no debt that could be attached, and UCPR r 39.41 as to where there may be a lien or other claim on the attached debt. [CPA 124.40]

Procedure

In Lewis v Lamb [2012] NSWSC 244, Beech-Jones J said at [4]: I make four points at the outset concerning [the regime]. First, by the operation of s 117 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 garnishee orders operate to attach to all debts due and owing as at the date of service of the order…. Second, on an application under s 124(1), … the Court must be positively satisfied that the garnishee is liable to pay the debt that is sought to be attached. Third, the operation of s 124 contemplates that the amount for which the judgment is to be entered is a known or fixed amount. The Court does not appear to me to have the power to enter judgment for an amount to be assessed. Fourth, s 124 confers a discretion as to whether judgment should be entered and, that discretion is to be exercised having regard to a number of factors that include those specified in s 124(3). For an example, see National Australia Bank Ltd v Nguyen [2014] NSWSC 1114. [CPA 124.60]

The nature of the discretion

In Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (2014) 289 FLR 373; [2014] NSWSC 1358, Young AJA discussed the basis of the discretion and expressed the view that “the personal circumstances of the debtor are generally not a legitimate matter for the court to consider”: at [36]. Note in the peculiar circumstances of that case, there may have been a public interest in the court protecting the funds from attachment; it was unnecessary to decide: at [37]. 125 Repayment of excess amounts (cf Act No 9 1973, section 106; Act No 11 1970, section 56)

(1) If a judgment creditor receives an amount paid under a garnishee order in excess of the amount required to satisfy the judgment, the judgment creditor: (a) must forthwith notify the judgment debtor and the garnishee of that fact, and (b) on demand made by the judgment debtor, must repay the excess to the judgment debtor. (2) The amount of the excess is recoverable from the judgment creditor, by the judgment debtor or by the garnishee, as a debt in any court of competent jurisdiction.

SECTION 125 COMMENTARY [CPA 125.20] Claim for recovery of excess payments to judgment creditor Normally any claim for overpayment to the judgment creditor would be made by the judgment debtor, unless the garnishee has already (double) paid the judgment debtor. If the judgment creditor either does not notify the judgment debtor and garnishee of the overpayment, or upon request by the judgment debtor fails to repay the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

113

Civil Procedure Leg

SECTION 124 COMMENTARY

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 126

[CPA 125.20]

overpayment, then proceedings can be commenced to recover the overpayment. The proceedings would be by statement of claim (for a liquidated amount). Subject to the jurisdictional limit, proceedings will normally be brought in the Local Court.

DIVISION 4 – CHARGING ORDERS 126

Operation of charging order in relation to specified security interests

(cf Act No 8 1901, section 27)

(1) This section applies to the following kinds of property in relation to a judgment debtor (referred to in this Division as security interests): (a) stock and shares in a public company, (b) money on deposit in a financial institution, being: (i) money held in the judgment debtor’s name in the judgment debtor’s own right or (ii) money held in the name of some other person in trust for the judgment debtor, (c) any equitable interest in property. (2) Subject to the uniform rules, a charging order operates, in relation to each security interest specified in the order: (a) to charge the security interest in favour of the judgment creditor to the extent necessary to satisfy the judgment, and (b) to restrain the chargee from dealing with the security interest otherwise than in accordance with the directions of the judgment creditor. (3) A charging order takes effect when it is made. (4) Despite subsection (3), the judgment creditor may not commence proceedings to take the benefit of a charge arising under a charging order until after the expiration of 3 months from the date of the order. (5) A charging order entitles the judgment creditor, in relation to the security interests charged by the order, to any relief to which the judgment creditor would have been entitled had the charge been made in the judgment creditor’s favour by the judgment debtor. Note: Section 106(1)(c) provides that a judgment debt may be enforced by a charging order only in the case of a judgment of the Supreme Court or the District Court. [S 126 am Act 67 of 2015, Sch 1.2[5]]

SECTION 126 COMMENTARY Charging orders ................................................................................................................................... [CPA 126.20] The nature of a charging order ............................................................................................................ [CPA 126.22] Section 126 is not a source of power .................................................................................................. [CPA 126.25] The Crown as charge .......................................................................................................................... [CPA 126.27] Money paid into court – When an “equitable interest” may arise ....................................................... [CPA 126.30] Is proprietorship of land an equitable interest? ................................................................................... [CPA 126.40]

[CPA 126.20]

Charging orders

This section supersedes Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 27. See UCPR Pt 39 Div 5 as to the rules that relate to charging orders (rr 39.44 and 45). See [r 39.44.60] as to the effect of a charging order, and [r 39.44.80] as to what can be charged; see also Uapproved Forms 73 and 74. [CPA 126.22]

The nature of a charging order

In Galbally & O’Bryan v Easton [2016] NSWSC 77, Hallen J said after setting out the section: 62. Thus, a charging order does not create an interest in the property of the judgment debtor the subject of the order. It does no more than secure the judgment debt by the making of that order and merely protects the interests of the judgment creditor to the extent necessary to satisfy the judgment. 114

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 4 – Charging orders

[CPA 126.40]

s 128

63. Furthermore, a charging order is not, of itself, execution of the judgment on which it is founded since it requires the commencement of “proceedings to take the benefit of a charge arising under a charging order” (s 126(4)). Section 126 is not a source of power

The source of power to impose a charging order is found in s 106(1)(c). “The fact that ss 124–128 do not empower the court to make a charging order is important. It shows that s 106 and ss 124–128 are to be read together, so that ss 124–128 describe the operation and effect of charging orders made under s 106. Those sections also limit the kinds of property in respect of which a charging order under s 106 can be made”: Paul Michael Pty Ltd v Urban Traders Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1246, [72] (White J). [CPA 126.27]

The Crown as chargee

Section 106(6) provides that a charging order addressed to the Crown binds the Crown as chargee. [CPA 126.30]

Money paid into court – When an “equitable interest” may arise

An order that moneys in court be paid out to a person gives rise to an equitable interest. The Registrar holds the moneys for no other purpose but to pay them to the person, and the relationship is one of trustee and beneficiary. There is thus a sufficient interest in the moneys in court to ground the operation of UCPR r 39.44: Patterson v Cohen [2006] NSWSC 424 at [7]. [CPA 126.40]

Is proprietorship of land an equitable interest?

In Paul Michael Pty Ltd v Urban Traders Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1246, White J said at [70]: It was held in relation to that section [s 126’s predecessor] that the power to make a charging order over an “equity of redemption or other equitable interest” to which a judgment debtor was entitled did not extend to making an order to charge land of the judgment debtor held under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) (Quint v Robertson (1985) 3 NSWLR 398; DM & BP Wiskich Pty Ltd v Saadi (New South Wales Supreme Court, 16 February 1996, Bryson J, unreported); Wentworth v Rogers [2004] NSWSC 1176). The defendants are the registered proprietors and therefore the legal owners of the land. As the legal owners of the land they do not also hold an equitable interest in the land. An equitable interest is something imposed on the legal title, not carved out of it. A legal owner does not hold the property on trust for himself or herself. The defendants’ interest as owners of the land is not an “equitable interest in property”. For a recent example of the application of this reasoning, see Chateau Constructions (Aust) Ltd v Zepinic [2013] NSWSC 1326, [22]–[34]. 127

Unauthorised transfer or disposal of security interest under charging order

(cf Act No 8 1901, section 29)

(1) A chargee or other person who, having notice of a charging order, deals with any security interest charged by the order otherwise than in accordance with the directions of the judgment creditor is liable to the judgment creditor for such amount (not exceeding the value of the security interest) as may be necessary to satisfy the judgment. (2) This section does not prevent the court from granting the judgment creditor, as a consequence of the chargee or other person having dealt with the security interest, any relief that is available apart from this section. 128

Disposal of security interest by judgment debtor invalid

(cf Act No 8 1901, section 30)

While a charging order is in force, any purported transfer or disposal by the judgment debtor of a security interest charged by the order, being a transfer or disposal effected otherwise than in accordance with the directions of the judgment creditor, is of no effect as against the judgment creditor.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

115

Civil Procedure Leg

[CPA 126.25]

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 129

[CPA 129.20]

DIVISION 5 – MISCELLANEOUS 129

No arrest on mesne process

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 10)

(1) No person is to be arrested on mesne process issued by the court. (2) This section does not affect any power of arrest exercisable pursuant to an arrest warrant issued under this or any other Act.

SECTION 129 COMMENTARY [CPA 129.20]

What is “mesne process”?

“For a legal debt or demand, plaintiffs seeking to compel an appearance by the defendant in one of the common law courts were obliged to rely upon mesne process including statutory provisions such as those with respect to writs of capias ad respondendum made by the Arrest on Mesne Process Act 1902 (NSW)”: Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380; 162 ALR 294; [1999] HCA 18, fn 61. The process under that Act was considered in Warringah Transport Co Pty Ltd v AM Kapral (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 586 at 594–596. The Act was repealed by the Supreme Court Act 1970, and s 10 of that Act was the predecessor of the current provision, itself being repealed in 2005. 130

Judgments not enforceable by certain means

(cf Act No 52 1970, section 98)

A judgment or order is not enforceable against a person: (a) by any process for attachment of the person, or (b) by any process for committal of the person, or (c) by any writ of capias ad satisfaciendum.

SECTION 130 COMMENTARY [CPA 130.20]

Committal

In the Supreme Court and District Court judgments and orders can be enforced by way of committal in certain circumstances. See UCPR rr 40.7 and 8, and related commentary. 131

Committal for contempt

Nothing in this Act or the uniform rules limits or otherwise affects the power of the court to attach or commit a person for contempt.

SECTION 131 COMMENTARY [CPA 131.20]

Interaction with s 106

This section tells against the proposition that the provision of s 106(1) of the Act precludes a finding for contempt: Mahaffy v Mahaffy [2013] NSWSC 245, [84]. 132

Sheriff may appoint custodian for goods

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 109(9))

(1) After seizing a judgment debtor’s goods pursuant to a writ of delivery or writ for the levy of property, the Sheriff, by notice in writing served on: (a) the judgment debtor, or 116

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 5 – Miscellaneous

[CPA 133.20]

s 133

(2) A custodian so appointed, and any other person aware that a custodian is so appointed, must not: (a) sell, give or otherwise deal with the goods, or (b) damage or destroy the goods, or (c) hide or remove the goods, or (d) cause, permit or allow the goods to be sold, given or otherwise dealt with, damaged or destroyed or hidden or removed, otherwise than with the leave of the court or the written consent of the Sheriff. Maximum penalty: 50 penalty units. (3) Prosecution of a person for an offence under subsection (2) does not prevent any other proceedings from being taken against the person in respect of an alleged failure to comply with a duty arising from the person’s appointment as a custodian of goods. [Cross-reference: A penalty unit is $110. See s 17 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.]

SECTION 132 COMMENTARY [CPA 132.20]

Custodian of goods

See also UCPR r 39.29 as to removals of goods and r 39.30 as to time of sale. 133

Judgments and orders unenforceable until entered

(1) A judgment or order of the court may not be enforced until it has been entered in accordance with the uniform rules. (2) This section extends to: (a) any judgment, order, determination or decree of a court, and (b) any adjudication or award of a person having authority to make an adjudication or award, that may be filed or registered in the court, or of which a certificate may be filed or registered in the court, under any other Act or law. (3) In (a) (b) (c)

subsection (2), law includes: a law of the Commonwealth, and a law of another State or Territory, and in relation to the Supreme Court, a law of a foreign country.

SECTION 133 COMMENTARY Judgments and orders unenforceable until entered ............................................................................ [CPA 133.20] Entry in the computerised court record system ................................................................................... [CPA 133.40] Filing of a legal costs assessor’s certificate ........................................................................................ [CPA 133.60]

[CPA 133.20]

Judgments and orders unenforceable until entered

Generally, all judgments and orders will be entered by the court registry when a default judgment is approved, or shortly after the judgment or order has been pronounced in court. See UCPR r 36.11 as to how a judgment or order is entered. The court may nevertheless direct that a judgment or order not be entered. Normally this would be for a short period to ensure the terms of the judgment or order were correct, with the intention of enabling the judgment or order to be amended or varied, and ensuring that it cannot be enforced in the meantime. The requirement to enter a judgment or order before it can be enforced extends to judgments, awards and certificates that are made by another court, tribunal or body, and lodged with the court for enforcement, such as certificates of judgment under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

117

Civil Procedure Leg

(b) any other person who has the custody of the goods, may appoint the judgment debtor or other person as custodian of the goods pending their delivery or sale under the writ.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 134

[CPA 133.20]

costs assessment certificates. The requirement for entry of these judgments, orders, certificates, determinations and decrees will be effected by the registry without requiring any action to be taken by the party seeking to enforce. [CPA 133.40]

Entry in the computerised court record system

Unless the court orders otherwise, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the court’s computerised court record system: UCPR r 36.11. This has led to transitional difficulties, particularly with respect to short minutes of order failing to make it on to the system in full: Cyril Smith & Associates Pty Ltd v Owners-Strata Plan No 64970 (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 245; Mills v Futhem Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 538; [2011] NSWCA 252. Practitioners should be aware that orders on the system need to be self-contained. In Jensen v Pearce [2013] DFC 93-431; [2013] NSWCA 247, Basten JA said at [16]: The importance of clear, precise and unambiguous orders is central to the proper exercise of the judicial function. Both courts and parties should have regard to the provisions relating to the entry and enforcement of orders. A judgment or order of a court “may not be enforced until it has been entered in accordance with uniform rules”: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 133(1). The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (to which s 133(1) refers) require that any judgment or order of the court be entered: r 36.11(1). Further, unless the court orders otherwise “a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the court’s computerised court record system”: r 36.11(2). The court did not otherwise order in the present case. However, it is by no means clear that a statement, contained in the computerised record system that the court “makes orders in accordance with” another document, the contents of which are not recorded in the computerised record system, involves the entry of the unrecorded orders. [CPA 133.60]

Filing of a legal costs assessor’s certificate

In Calandra v Murden [2015] NSWCA 231, the Court said at [5] in relation to a provision which provided that a costs certificate is, on filing in a court having jurisdiction to order the payment of the certified amount and with no further action, taken to be a judgement of that court: [Such a provision] is a deeming provision. Where its premise is satisfied and a certificate assessing costs is filed there is deemed “with no further action” to be a judgment of the court whose jurisdiction has been invoked: see Frumar v The Owners of Strata Plan 36957 [2010] NSWCA 172 at [8] (per Giles JA), [42] (per Handley AJA, Macfarlan JA agreeing).Section 133 of the Civil Procedure Act and provisions of the UCPR give effect to that deeming. Subsection 133(1) provides that a judgment of the court, here the Local Court, may not be enforced until it has been entered in accordance with the UCPR. As there used, “judgment” includes a determination of a costs assessor as an “adjudication or award of a person having authority to make an adjudication or award” (s 133(2)). 134

Stale judgments and orders enforceable only by leave

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 84A)

(1) An application by a judgment creditor for: (a) a writ of execution, or (b) a garnishee order, or (c) a charging order, or (d) an order for examination, may not be made, except by leave of the court, if the prescribed period has elapsed since the judgment was given or (in the case of a judgment, order or decree referred to in section 133(2)) was registered as referred to in section 133(2). (2) In this section, prescribed period means 12 years or, if the uniform rules prescribe a different period, the period so prescribed.

118

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 5 – Miscellaneous

[CPA 135.30]

s 135

SECTION 134 COMMENTARY [CPA 134.20]

Stale judgments

135

Directions as to enforcement

(1) The court may, by order, give directions with respect to the enforcement of its judgments and orders. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the court may make any of the following orders: (a) an order authorising the Sheriff to enter premises for the purpose of taking possession of goods under a writ of execution, (b) an order prohibiting the Sheriff from taking any further action on a writ, (c) an order prohibiting any other person from taking any further action, either permanently or until a specified day, to enforce a judgment or order of the court, (d) an order requiring the Registrar-General to cancel any recording of a writ for the levy of property that, under section 105 of the Real Property Act 1900, has been made in the Register under that Act, either generally or in relation to specified land.

SECTION 135 COMMENTARY Directions as to enforcement ............................................................................................................... The width of the power ........................................................................................................................ The width of the power in relation to prohibition ................................................................................. Restrictions on applying for orders authorising entry to premises by Sheriff ..................................... Stays of writs against trespassers – the nature of the discretion .......................................................

[CPA 135.20] [CPA 135.30] [CPA 135.35] [CPA 135.40] [CPA 135.45]

[CPA 135.20] Directions as to enforcement This provision gives broad power to the court to manage the enforcement of its judgments and orders, from granting and lifting stays, to directions as to how a writ should be executed. “The power is a discretion to be exercised in accordance with the dictates of justice: s 58”: Hickie v Land Enviro Corp Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 706, [7] (McCallum J). An application under this section would generally be by notice of motion; whether the notice of motion will be determined in the absence of the public and the parties, or will be listed in court will depend on the orders or directions being sought and as to whether and to what extent other persons may be adversely affected. The sheriff may file a notice of motion seeking directions pursuant to this section. For an example of this provision being utilised, see Leetham v Leetham [2011] NSWSC 201. [CPA 135.30]

The width of the power

In McLeary v Swift [2014] NSWSC 1414, Hallen J said: [56] In my view, s 135 does not limit the court’s jurisdiction to making orders with respect to the enforcement of judgments. The section specifically provides that the court may, by order, give directions with respect to the enforcement of its judgments and orders. Thus, the section extends to making orders in respect of enforcement of its orders: Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v Evans & Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 374; [2007] NSWCA 57 at [138]. [57] The power granted by s 135 is a discretion to be exercised in accordance with the dictates of justice: s 58(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act; Hickie v Land Enviro Corp Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 706, at [7]. [Emphasis in original] Section 135 does not oust or delimit the inherent jurisdiction of the Court: Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v Evans & Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 374; [2007] NSWCA 57 at [140]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

119

Civil Procedure Leg

In the Supreme Court the period after which leave was required to enforce a judgment was 10 years: SCR Pt 44 r 2(1)(a). In the District Court and Local Court the period was 12 years: DCA s 84A(1); DCR Pt 31 r 22; Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 64A. This period is consistent with the limitation period under the Limitation Act 1969 s 17, which bars an action on a judgment more than 12 years old. In the Local Court and District Court a certified copy of the judgment may be required to be produced if the original court records are no longer available. An application for leave to enforce a stale judgment is by way of notice of motion.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 136

[CPA 135.3]

[CPA 135.35]

The width of the power in relation to prohibition

In the matter of Re Webuildem Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 708, Black J said at [13]: Section 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) provides that, subject to the rules of court, the court may at any time, by order, stay any proceedings before it either permanently or until a specified day. Section 135 of the Civil Procedure Act permits the court to give directions as to enforcement, including an order prohibiting any person from taking any further action, either permanently or until a specified day, to enforce an order of the court. The court’s power to grant a stay under s 135 of the Civil Procedure Act is exercisable where the interests of justice so demand; the person seeking a stay must satisfy the court that the requirements of justice require one; and the court has a wide discretion whether to grant a stay and whether terms should be imposed on the grant of such a stay: Joskovitz v Bonnick [1964] VR 654 at 656; Tringali v Stewardson Stubbs & Collett Pty Ltd (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 335; 83 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 393; [1966] 1 NSWR 354 at 360–361; Victorian Securities Corporation Ltd v Icehot Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) [2010] NSWSC 1413 at [9]. [CPA 135.40]

Restrictions on applying for orders authorising entry to premises by Sheriff

UCPR r 39.52 imposes a restriction on judgment creditors, pursuing a writ for levy of property or for delivery of goods, applying for an order under this section: the Sheriff must have been refused entry to the premises where the goods are believed to be, and there must be “special circumstances”. [CPA 135.45]

Stays of writs against trespassers – the nature of the discretion

In Aboriginal Housing Co Ltd v Munro [2015] NSWSC 1155, RS Hulme AJ said: [21] It may be accepted that not uncommonly, perhaps frequently, in cases between mortgagors and mortgagees, the court will, after judgment for possession has been given, stay or delay further proceedings on the judgment. However, as an incident of deciding whether a similar course should be followed in this case, it is necessary to consider the respective legal positions of the parties. In McPhail v Persons Unknown it was made clear that at Common Law judgments against trespassers entitled an owner to issue a writ of possession immediately and would not be stayed, one rationale being that a person entitled to possession was entitled forcibly to eject trespassers and the courts should not give him any lesser rights. Nor would Courts of Equity assist a wrongdoer. Such considerations provide strong grounds for concluding that the discretions under s 67 and s 135 should not be exercised adversely to the Plaintiff and in favour of the Defendant. 136

Appropriation of payments towards judgment debt

Unless the court otherwise orders, any payment made on account of a judgment debt is to be appropriated: (a) firstly, towards such part of the judgment debt as comprises interest payable under section 101, and (b) secondly, towards the balance of the judgment debt.

SECTION 136 COMMENTARY Appropriation of payments towards judgment debt ............................................................................. [CPA 136.20] Bankruptcy notices ............................................................................................................................... [CPA 136.40]

[CPA 136.20]

Appropriation of payments towards judgment debt

This provision clarifies how money paid in respect of a judgment debt should be appropriated, whether the money is being paid to the judgment creditor directly or as the proceeds of execution are being applied to the debt by the sheriff. It addresses concerns raised by the Court of Appeal in Red Lea Chickens v Tansey (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, 17 July 1995) that there was no general provision defining how payments should be appropriated. In that case, which related to whether an instalment order should have been made, the court noted that if the payments were only appropriated to the accruing interest the principal was not being 120

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Enforcement of judgments and orders Division 5 – Miscellaneous

[CPA 138.20]

s 138

reduced and the judgment debt would never be paid. If payments are not appropriated to accruing interest first the judgment creditor is disadvantaged. Nevertheless, the court may make an order varying the normal appropriation rule, if that is appropriate. [CPA 136.40]

Bankruptcy notices

137

Execution of judgments and orders for costs

(1) A judgment may be enforced in relation to costs separately from its enforcement in relation to matters other than costs. (2) Unless the court otherwise orders, the costs recoverable under a writ of execution, garnishee order or charging order include: (a) costs in relation to any prior writ of execution, garnishee order or charging order in relation to the same judgment, whether or not the prior writ or order was productive, and (b) money recoverable under section 107(1) of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 of the Commonwealth.

SECTION 137 COMMENTARY [CPA 137.20]

Separate execution for costs

This section is adopted from SCR Pt 44 r 6. It is an exception to the general rule which prevents the issue of a second writ for levy of property until the first has expired or been cancelled. This section recognises that the quantum of costs may not be determined for a substantial period after the judgment has been delivered. Although SCR Pt 44 r 6 only allowed costs to be executed after the judgment had been executed, this provision has no such restriction. Although the judgment creditor can include the costs of prior enforcement in the writ, this is subject to UCPR r 39.47 that requires that these costs have been assessed (and the certificate filed) or otherwise determined by the court: see [r 39.47.40]. 138

Other methods of enforcing judgments

(1) Nothing in this Part limits the manner in which a judgment or order of the court may be enforced apart from this Act. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), nothing in this Part prevents the court: (a) from issuing consecutive writs for the levy of property against the same judgment debtor, or making consecutive garnishee orders or consecutive charging orders in respect of the same judgment debtor, in respect of the same judgment debt, or (b) from making concurrent garnishee orders against different garnishees, or consecutive garnishee orders against the same garnishee, in respect of the same judgment debt.

SECTION 138 COMMENTARY [CPA 138.20]

Other methods of enforcement

This section expressly preserves any other jurisdiction a court may have to enforce its judgments or orders, whether it be an inherent jurisdiction of the court (mainly applicable to the Supreme Court) or jurisdiction authorised by other legislation. For instance this Act does not specifically provide for enforcement by a writ in aid of writ: see [r 39.1.60]. Nor is there specific provision relating to a stop order: see SCR Pt 47 r 3.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

121

Civil Procedure Leg

A judgment creditor who has received part-payment of a judgment debt may wish to issue a bankruptcy notice. In the absence of an order of the relevant court to the contrary or of any effective agreement or appropriation to the contrary, s 136 will inform how interest if claimed in a notice must be calculated.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) [CPA Pt9.10]

PART 9 – TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN COURTS Commentary by Ed Cox, Barrister. Updated by Carol Webster SC.

PART 9 COMMENTARY Overview of Pt 9 ................................................................................................................................... [CPA Pt9.10] Comparison of provisions ..................................................................................................................... [CPA Pt9.15]

[CPA Pt9.10]

Overview of Pt 9

CPA Pt 9 consolidates the statutory powers for transfer of proceedings between courts previously contained in s 74 of the SCA, s 145 of the DCA and ss 21B to 21G of the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970. Whilst there are some minor changes to the form of the legislation, no change to the principles which apply to transfer applications was introduced. Amendments made in 2007 introduced a similar power, in Div 2A, for the transfer of proceedings from the Supreme Court to the Land and Environment Court. The Division was amended in 2009 to provide for transfer of proceedings between those courts: see [CPA 149B.40] and [CPA 149B.60]. Amendments made in 2010 introduced a new Div 3, providing for the transfer of proceedings between the Supreme Court and the Industrial Court. The Division was repealed in 2016 when the work of the Industrial Court was transferred to the Supreme Court: see [CPA Pt9.Div3.20]. The former Div 3 provided for transfer of proceedings between Local Courts. It was repealed on 6 July 2009 on the commencement of the Local Court Act 2007 (which repealed the Local Courts Act 1982 and replaced the separately constituted Local Courts with a single Local Court of NSW). [CPA Pt9.15]

Comparison of provisions

There are largely equivalent provisions in each of the four Divisions of Pt 9, which may usefully be tabulated as follows: Provision Comparison Div 1 Div 2 Div 2A Definitions s 139 s 145 s 149A Transfer s 140 s 146 s 149B Transfer orders s 141 s 147 s 149C Stay of proceedings s 142 Proceedings s 143 s 148 s 149D Transfer from District Court to s 144 Supreme Court Jurisdiction of lower / transferee s 149 s 149E court The principles applying to transfer applications is discussed at [CPA 140.20], and the factors relevant to the discretion exercised by the court are set out at [CPA 140.40].

122

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[CPA 140.20]

Part 9 – Transfer of proceedings between courts Division 1 – Transfer of proceedings from lower to higher court

s 140

DIVISION 1 – TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS FROM LOWER TO HIGHER COURT 139

Definitions

In this Division:

lower court means the court from which proceedings are transferred, or are proposed to be transferred, by a transfer order. transfer order means an order referred to in section 140. 140

Transfer of proceedings to higher court

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 145; Act No 11 1970, section 21B)

(1) The Supreme Court may, of its own motion or on application by a party to proceedings before the District Court or the Local Court, order that the proceedings, including any cross-claim in the proceedings, be transferred to the Supreme Court. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2]

(2) The District Court may, of its own motion or on application by a party to proceedings before the Local Court, order that the proceedings, including any cross-claim in the proceedings, be transferred to the District Court. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2]

(3) Proceedings in the District Court on a claim for damages arising from personal injury or death are not to be transferred to the Supreme Court under this section unless the Supreme Court is satisfied: (a) in the case of a motor accident claim or a workplace injury damages claim: (i) that the amount to be awarded to the plaintiff, if successful, is likely to be more than $1,000,000, and (ii) that the case involves complex legal issues or issues of general public importance, or (b) in any other case: (i) that the amount to be awarded to the plaintiff, if successful, is likely to exceed the jurisdictional limit of the District Court, or (ii) that there is other sufficient reason for hearing the proceedings in the Supreme Court. (4) Proceedings in the Local Court are not to be transferred to a higher court under this section unless the higher court is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for hearing the proceedings in the higher court. [Subs (4) am Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2]

(5) This section extends to proceedings that have been transferred to the District Court or the Local Court pursuant to a previous transfer order under this Division or under Division 2. [Subs (5) am Act 48 of 2016, Sch 2.6[3]; Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2] [S 140 am Act 48 of 2016; Act 94 of 2007]

SECTION 140 COMMENTARY Transfer regime between courts .......................................................................................................... [CPA 140.20] Factors relevant to discretion .............................................................................................................. [CPA 140.40] Personal injury proceedings (s 140(4)) ............................................................................................... [CPA 140.60]

[CPA 140.20]

Transfer regime between courts

The section confers a general discretionary power to transfer proceedings between courts. The legislation does not expressly proscribe all the relevant factors to be taken into account. Authorities which considered the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

123

Civil Procedure Leg

higher court means the court to which proceedings are transferred, or are proposed to be transferred, by a transfer order.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 140

[CPA 140.20]

previous legislation continue to provide guidance. Those authorities do not mandate any specific limitations on the circumstances which can be taken into account and a court will therefore consider all relevant circumstances: Re Thiess Bros Pty Ltd; Ex parte Delponte [1965] NSWR 1468; Re Dusmanovic Ex parte Dusmanovic [1967] 2 NSWR 125; (1967) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 642; Sanderson Motors Pty Ltd v Kirby [2000] NSWSC 924. The court in exercising its discretion will consider all the relevant facts and circumstances: Ritchie v Gumley (1953) 55 SR (NSW) 334; 72 WN (NSW) 298; 50 QJP 31; Re Frey; Ex parte McIntosh (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 519; George Pearse Pty Ltd v O’Flynn (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 400; 79 WN (NSW) 328; [1963] NSWR 102; Vigilant Finance (NSW) Pty Ltd, Ex parte; Cameron Smith, Re [1964] NSWR 1282. Generally an application for transfer must establish there is “sufficient cause”, “sound ground” or “good reason” to transfer the proceedings: Sanderson Motors Pty Ltd v Kirby [2000] NSWSC 924 at [3] and [4]; Re Frey; Ex parte McIntosh (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 519. It will commonly be appropriate to apply for transfer where the Local Court or District Court lacks jurisdiction or the proceedings would be more appropriately determined in a higher court. A transfer is now possible directly from the Supreme Court to a Local Court, which was not previously so. A common reason for transfer down is that the subject matter is manifestly below the limit in the lower court and there is no other reason for retention in the higher court. The section ought not be narrowly construed and all relevant circumstances should be considered absent specific words of limitation: KBRV Resort Operations Pty Ltd v Chilcott (2001) 51 NSWLR 516; [2001] NSWCA 116. The applicant for transfer bears the onus of satisfying the court that transfer is appropriate: Parry v WGE Engineering Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 337. A plaintiff may apply for an order transferring proceedings between courts: Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Jurd (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 22; [1966] 1 NSWR 301. Such applications are commonly made where there is evidence the plaintiff might receive an award of damages in excess of the jurisdictional limit of the lower court: for example Hewins v Formica Plastics Pty Ltd (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 469; [1968] 3 NSWR 793. In so concluding the court need not engage in an exercise of complete assessment, but arrives at a likelihood, as a matter of impression founded on the evidence before the court: Johnstone v New South Wales [2006] NSWCA 105 at [22]; Younes v QIC Ltd (t/as Westpoint Blacktown) [2012] NSWSC 451. [CPA 140.40]

Factors relevant to discretion

In exercising that discretion the court may take into account a wide range of circumstances including: (a) The damages sought exceed the jurisdiction of the court: Hewins v Formica Plastics Pty Ltd (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 469; [1968] 3 NSWR 793. (b) The court has insufficient jurisdiction to grant the final relief sought, for example where a final injunction or declaration is sought in the District Court or Local Court. (c) That the lower court has determined it does not have jurisdiction to serve a defendant ordinarily resident outside Australia: Thermasorb Pty Ltd v Rockdale Beef Pty Ltd (2005) 190 FLR 71; [2005] NSWSC 361. (d) Where related proceedings are being determined in another court: Ritchie v Gumley (1953) 55 SR (NSW) 334; 72 WN (NSW) 298; 50 QJP 31; Re Murray; Ex parte Hillman (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 726; [1961] NSWR 573; Re Hancock; Ex parte Australian General Disinfectant Co Pty Ltd (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 176; [1968] 2 NSWR 772. When considering the interaction between two proceedings in different courts it is relevant to consider the likelihood of any issue estoppel or different determinations of the same issue of fact. (e) Where the higher court has powers or procedures not available in the lower court (such as the power to take evidence on commission or taking accounts): Ex parte Heiliger (1897) 13 WN (NSW) 170; Tesoriero v Ferrarao (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Powell J, 21 August 1984). (f) Where the proceedings give rise to difficult factual or legal issues which ought to be determined in a superior court or where significant questions of law are involved. Examples of cases where transfer was refused include an absence of significant issues; delay in the conduct of the proceedings, where there is insufficient importance to issues, where the proceedings are part heard; or after 124

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[CPA 140.60]

Part 9 – Transfer of proceedings between courts Division 1 – Transfer of proceedings from lower to higher court

s 143

judgment: Kadic v Thiess Bros Pty Ltd (1967) 67 SR (NSW) 411; 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 270; [1967] 2 NSWR 257; Re Cemac Modular Constructions Pty Ltd; Ex parte Sadler [1973] 1 NSWLR 263. [CPA 140.60]

Personal injury proceedings (s 140(4))

The words “likely to exceed” in s 140(3) may however indicate the necessity of a degree of persuasion as to the likelihood of a plaintiff’s claim being accepted: White v Viewden Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 196. In Johnstone v New South Wales [2006] NSWCA 105 there was a submission to the Court of Appeal that the judge at first instance had not given sufficient reasons for his decision that the he was not satisfied that the amount of the plaintiff’s damages, if any, would be likely to exceed the jurisdictional limit of the District Court. The application for transfer was made under s 145(2) of the District Court Act 1973, which for present purposes was no different from CPA s 140(3)(b), which replaced it. In delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Giles JA said at [22]: It was submitted that the judge should have gone to each of the items in the assessment, and stated his own assessment in substitution for that proposed on behalf of the claimant, so that it was demonstrated quasi-mathematically that the threshold of $750,000 was not achieved. I do not think that is correct. The question for the judge was not an assessment of the individual components of a damages claim, but rather the broader question of whether it appeared likely to him that if the claimant were successful his damages would exceed $750,000. 141

Transfer orders

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 145; Act No 11 1970, section 21B)

(1) A transfer order takes effect when it is made. (2) A transfer order does not invalidate any order made or other thing done in the proceedings before the order was made. [Subs (2) am Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[5]]

(3) Any order made by the lower court may be varied or revoked by an order of the higher court. [S 141 am Act 56 of 2007]

142

Stay of proceedings in lower court

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 146; Act No 11 1970, section 21C)

(1) The higher court may make an order for a stay of proceedings in respect of which an application for a transfer order has been made. (2) Subsection (1) does not limit the power of the lower court to adjourn or stay the proceedings. 143

Proceedings after transfer

(cf Act No 11 1970, section 21E; DCR Part 5, rule 12)

(1) Subject to the rules of court applicable in the higher court, any proceedings with respect to which a transfer order takes effect are to be continued in the higher court: (a) as if the proceedings had been duly commenced in the higher court on the date on which they were commenced in the lower court, and (b) as if any cross-claim in the proceedings had been duly made in the higher court on the date on which it was made in the lower court. (2) For the purposes of any proceedings continued in the higher court: © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

125

Civil Procedure Leg

Ordinarily an application need satisfy the court that the plaintiff’s claim for damages may, if the plaintiff’s claim is accepted at its highest exceeds the lower court’s jurisdiction. If a defendant has consented to unlimited jurisdiction in the court below, that may tell against a transfer from the District Court to the Supreme Court of proceedings of a kind regularly heard by District Court judges: Mason v Telstra Corp Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1334.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 143 (a)

any abandonment of an amount under section 23 ceases to have effect except to the extent to which the amount originally claimed in the proceedings, or in any cross-claim in the proceedings, exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the higher court, and (b) any admission duly made in the lower court is to be treated as if it had been duly made in the higher court. (3) Subject to the rules of court applicable in the higher court, the power of the higher court to make orders as to costs includes a power to make orders with respect to the costs of: (a) the application for, and the making of, the transfer order, and (b) any step taken in the proceedings before the transfer order was made. 144

Transfer of certain proceedings from District Court to Supreme Court

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 147)

(1) This section applies to proceedings under Subdivision 2 of Division 8 of Part 3 of the District Court Act 1973. (2) If, during proceedings to which this section applies, the District Court decides that it lacks, or may lack, jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the proceedings, the District Court must order that the proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court. (3) Proceedings that are transferred to the Supreme Court under subsection (2): (a) are to be continued in the Supreme Court: (i) as if the proceedings had been duly commenced in the Supreme Court on the date on which they were commenced in the District Court, and (ii) as if any cross-claim in the proceedings had been duly made in the Supreme Court on the date on which it was made in the District Court, or (b) if the Supreme Court so orders, are to be remitted to the District Court and continued in the District Court as if they had not been transferred. (4) The District Court has, and may exercise, jurisdiction to hear and dispose of proceedings the subject of an order by the Supreme Court under subsection (3)(b), including such jurisdiction as is necessary to determine any question arising in any such proceedings. (5) If, during proceedings to which this section applies, the District Court decides that it is appropriate to do so for any reason other than the reason referred to in subsection (2), the District Court may order that the proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court. (6) Proceedings that are transferred to the Supreme Court under subsection (5), are to be continued in the Supreme Court: (a) as if the proceedings had been duly commenced in the Supreme Court on the date on which they were commenced in the District Court, and (b) as if any cross-claim in the proceedings had been duly made in the Supreme Court on the date on which it was made in the District Court. (7) Subject to the rules of court applicable in the Supreme Court, the power of the Supreme Court to make orders as to costs includes a power to make orders with respect to the costs of: (a) the application for, and the making of, an order under subsection (2) or (5), and (b) any step taken in the proceedings before an order under subsection (2) or (5) was made. [Subs (7) am Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[6]]

(8) The making of an order under subsection (2) or (5) does not invalidate any order previously made by the District Court in the proceedings. [S 144 am Act 56 of 2007]

126

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 9 – Transfer of proceedings between courts Division 2 – Transfer of proceedings from higher to lower court

s 146

DIVISION 2 – TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS FROM HIGHER TO LOWER COURT 145

Definitions

In this Division:

lower court means the court to which proceedings are transferred, or are proposed to be transferred, by a transfer order. transfer order means an order referred to in section 146. 146

Transfer of proceedings to lower court

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 143; Act No 11 1970, section 21F)

(1) If the Supreme Court is satisfied, in relation to proceedings before it: (a) that the proceedings could properly have been commenced in the District Court or the Local Court, and (b) that any cross-claim in the proceedings could properly have been brought as a cross-claim in the District Court or the Local Court, the Supreme Court may order that the proceedings, including any such cross-claim, be transferred to the District Court or to the Local Court, as the case requires. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2]

(2) If the District Court is satisfied, in relation to proceedings before it: (a) that the proceedings could properly have been commenced in the Local Court, and (b) that any cross-claim in the proceedings could properly have been brought as a cross-claim in the Local Court, the District Court may order that the proceedings, including any such cross-claim, be transferred to the Local Court. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2]

(3) In determining: (a) whether any proceedings could properly have been commenced in the lower court, or (b) whether any cross-claim could properly have been brought in the lower court, the higher court must have regard to the current limits of the lower court’s jurisdiction as if they had been the limits of that jurisdiction when the proceedings were commenced, or the cross-claim brought, in the higher court. (4) Proceedings in the Supreme Court on a claim for damages arising from personal injury or death are to be transferred under this section unless the Supreme Court is satisfied: (a) in the case of a motor accident claim or workplace injury damages claim: (i) that the amount to be awarded to the plaintiff, if successful, is likely to be more than $1,000,000, and (ii) that the case involves complex legal issues or issues of general public importance, or (b) in any other case: (i) that the amount to be awarded to the plaintiff, if successful, is likely to exceed the jurisdictional limit of the District Court, or (ii) that there is other sufficient reason for hearing the proceedings in the Supreme Court. (5) This section extends to proceedings that have been transferred to the Supreme Court or the District Court pursuant to a previous transfer order under Division 1. [S 146 am Act 94 of 2007]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

127

Civil Procedure Leg

higher court means the court from which proceedings are transferred, or are proposed to be transferred, by a transfer order.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 147

[CPA 146.20]

SECTION 146 COMMENTARY [CPA 146.20]

Operation

The operation of s 146 was considered by Gzell J in Read v McEwen (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 862. In that short decision, Gzell J was not satisfied by the applicant for transfer orders, the defendant, that the proceedings, in which an equitable charge over land was claimed, could have been commenced in the District Court. In Gatti v Calvary Health Care Riverina Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1077, Davies J refused the plaintiffs’ application to transfer personal injury proceedings to the District Court in the exercise of the s 146(1) discretion. His Honour rejected a submission that s 146(4) creates a presumption that personal injury proceedings are to be transferred unless either matter in paragraph (b) was established; the court must first be satisfied that the proceedings could properly have been commenced in the lower court. Davies J was not so satisfied on the medical evidence. In any event Davies J considered there was other sufficient reason to hear the proceedings in the Supreme Court. The defendants undertook not to raise any issue in relation to costs under the rules (see r 42.34), if the proceedings remained in the Supreme Court and damages did not exceed $500,000. Proceedings properly transferred from the District Court to the Supreme Court under CPA s 140 should not be re-transferred on the basis of the expanded jurisdiction the District Court under CPA s 149 if re-transferred: Ge v River Island Clothing Pty Limited [2001] NSWSC 935 at [20]; Sheedy v State Asphalt Services Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1532 at [13], [16]. 147

Transfer orders

(cf Act No 11 1970, section 21F)

(1) A transfer order takes effect when it is made. (2) A transfer order does not invalidate any order made or other thing done in the proceedings before the transfer order was made. 148 Proceedings after transfer (cf Act No 11 1970, section 21G)

(1) Subject to the rules of court applicable in the lower court, any proceedings with respect to which a transfer order takes effect continue in the lower court: (a) as if the proceedings had been duly commenced in the lower court on the date on which they were commenced in the higher court, and (b) as if any cross-claim in the proceedings had been duly made in the lower court on the date on which it was made in the higher court. (2) For the purposes of any proceedings continued in the lower court, any admission duly made in the higher court is to be treated as if it had been duly made in the lower court. (3) Subject to the rules of court applicable in the lower court, the power of the lower court to make orders as to costs includes a power to make orders with respect to the costs of: (a) the application for, and the making of, the transfer order, and (b) any step taken in the proceedings before the transfer order was made. 149

Jurisdiction of lower court

The lower court has, and may exercise, all of the jurisdiction of the higher court in relation to any proceedings to which a transfer order relates, including jurisdiction to determine any question arising in any such proceedings. [S 149 am Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[7]]

128

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 9 – Transfer of proceedings between courts Div 2A - Transfer of proceedings between courts

[CPA 149B.60]

s 149B

DIVISON 2A – TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN SUPREME COURT AND LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT [Div 2A subst Act 30 of 2009, Sch 1; insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[8]]

149A

Definitions

(1) In this Division: transferee court means the court to which proceedings are to be transferred pursuant to a transfer order. transferor court means the court from which proceedings are transferred pursuant to a transfer order. (2) For the purposes of this Division, proceedings are related if the matters with which they deal are so closely associated as to form part of the same controversy. [S 149A subst Act 30 of 2009, Sch 1; insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[8]]

149B

Transfer of proceedings between Supreme Court and Land and Environment Court

(1) If either the Supreme Court or the Land and Environment Court is satisfied, in relation to proceedings before it, that it is more appropriate for the proceedings to be heard in the other court, it may, on application by a party to the proceedings or of its own motion, order that the proceedings be transferred to the other court. (2) If either the Supreme Court or the Land and Environment Court is satisfied, in relation to proceedings before it, that: (a) there are related proceedings pending in the other court, and (b) it is more appropriate for the proceedings to be heard, together with the related proceedings, in the other court, it may, on application by a party to the proceedings or of its own motion, order that the proceedings be transferred to the other court and heard together with the related proceedings. (3) No appeal lies against a decision of the transferor court to make, or not to make, an order under this section. [S 149B subst Act 30 of 2009, Sch 1; insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[8]]

SECTION 149B COMMENTARY Operation ........................................................................................................................................... [CPA 149B.40] Basis for transfer ............................................................................................................................... [CPA 149B.60]

[CPA 149B.40]

Operation

The new Division 2A permits the Land and Environment Court to transfer proceedings to the Supreme Court, expanding the transfer powers available under the prior provisions. The prior provisions permitted the Supreme Court to transfer proceedings to the Land and Environment Court and gave the Land and Environment Court ancillary jurisdiction to deal with the transferred proceedings. The consequences of a transfer order being made are the same in substance as under the prior provisions (see ss 149D and 149E). [CPA 149B.60]

Basis for transfer

There are two bases on which proceedings might be transferred under s 149B: first, under s 149B(1), that it is “more appropriate” for the proceedings to be heard in the other court; secondly, under s 149B(2), that there are related proceedings pending in the other court and it is “more appropriate” for the proceedings to be heard in the other court together with the related proceedings. There is no definition of when a court might consider it “more appropriate” for proceedings to be heard in the other court, but there is a definition of when proceedings are to be considered “related” in s 149A: the matters with which the two proceedings deal “are so closely associated as to form part of the same controversy”. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

129

Civil Procedure Leg

transfer order means an order referred to in section 149B(1) or (2).

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 149C

[CPA 149B.60]

The factors discussed in [CPA 140.20] and [CPA 140.40] are likely to be significant, taken with the specialist jurisdiction of the Land and Environment Court. Compare also the “most appropriate” forum issues arising in relation to applications for transfer under the cross-vesting Acts: [r 44.5.60]. The operation of s 149B was considered by Gzell J in Transport Construction Authority v Parramatta City Council [2010] NSWSC 1168. It was submitted that where there were existing proceedings in the other court, the two requirements of s 149B(2) should be required to be satisfied and the more general provision in s 149B(1) should not be invoked to avoid those additional requirements. Gzell J did not find it necessary to resolve the construction issue. In Pierce v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 [2012] NSWLEC 33 Pepper J considered at [37] that having regard to the overriding purpose in CPA s 56, the factors likely to be relevant to the court’s exercise of the discretion to transfer include whether: (a) there is an issue concerning the jurisdiction of either court to hear and dispose of the proceedings; (b) either court has the power to grant the relief sought; (c) having regard to each court’s expertise and skill, one court is better placed to determine the issues raised by the proceedings; (d)-(e) the transfer will result in a saving of time and costs to the parties or a more efficient allocation of judicial resources; (f) the transfer is just in all the circumstances. In 363 Military Road Mosman Pty Ltd v The Owners Strata Plan 72814 [2012] NSWSC 263 Ward J accepted at [45] that it was not in the interests of the just, quick and cheap conduct of proceedings in the Supreme Court or the Land and Environment Court to permit concurrent proceedings in both courts with the same or similar evidence, particularly where the Supreme Court proceedings would become otiose for the plaintiff if the Land and Environment Court upheld that party’s appeal on planning issues. Ward J refused to transfer the Supreme Court proceedings to the Land and Environment Court, but stayed them pending the outcome of the latter proceedings: see [48]. 149C

Transfer orders

(1) A transfer order takes effect when it is made. (2) A transfer order does not invalidate any order made or other thing done in the proceedings before the order was made. (3) Any order made by the transferor court (other than the transfer order) may be varied or revoked by an order of the transferee court. [S 149C subst Act 30 of 2009, Sch 1; insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[8]]

149D

Proceedings after transfer

(1) Subject to the rules of court applicable in the transferee court: (a) any proceedings with respect to which a transfer order takes effect continue in the transferee court: (i) as if the proceedings had been duly commenced in the transferee court on the date on which they were commenced in the transferor court, and (ii) as if any cross-claim in the proceedings had been duly made in the transferee court on the date on which it was made in the transferor court, and (b) any proceedings with respect to which a transfer order under section 149B(2) takes effect are to be heard together with, and are taken to form part of, the related proceedings in the transferee court. (2) For the purposes of any proceedings continued in the transferee court: (a) any admission duly made in the transferor court is to be treated as if it had been made in the transferee court, and (b) in the case of proceedings affected by a transfer order under section 149B(2), any process or other documentation before the transferee court may be amended so as to reflect the merger of the proceedings concerned. 130

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 9 – Transfer of proceedings between courts Div 3 - Transfer of proceedings between Supreme Court and Industrial Court [Rep] s 149E (3) Subject to the rules of court applicable in the transferee court, the power of the transferee court to make orders as to costs includes a power to make orders with respect to the costs of: (a) the application for, and the making of, the transfer order, and (b) any step taken in the proceedings before the transfer order was made. [S 149D subst Act 30 of 2009, Sch 1; insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[8]]

The transferee court has, and may exercise, all of the jurisdiction of the transferor court in relation to any proceedings to which a transfer order relates, including jurisdiction to determine any question arising in any such proceedings. [S 149E subst Act 30 of 2009, Sch 1; insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[8]]

DIVISION 3 – TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN SUPREME COURT AND INDUSTRIAL COURT [REPEALED] [Div 3, ss 150–154, rep Act 48 of 2016, Sch 2.6[4]; reinsrt Act 63 of 2010, Sch 1.7[1]; Div 3, ss 150–153, rep Act 94 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1.12[6]]

DIVISION 3 COMMENTARY [CPA Pt9.Div3.20]

History

The Division was repealed as of 8 December 2016 on the commencement of the Industrial Relations Amendment (Industrial Court) Act 2016, which transferred the work of the Industrial Court to the Supreme Court. Div 3 as inserted in 2010 permitted the transfer of proceedings between the Supreme Court and the Industrial Court. The provisions were relevantly the same as those of Div 2A providing for transfer of proceedings between the Supreme Court and the Land and Environment Court. Editor’s note: Sections 150–154 are repealed and have not been reproduced.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

131

Civil Procedure Leg

149E Jurisdiction of transferee court

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 155

PART 10 – REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS IN SUPREME COURT [Pt 10 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY 155

Definitions

(cf s33A FCA)

In this Part: Court means the Supreme Court. defendant means a person against whom relief is sought in representative proceedings. group member means a member of a group of persons on whose behalf representative proceedings have been commenced. proceedings means proceedings in the Court other than criminal proceedings. representative party means a person who commences representative proceedings. representative proceedings—see section 157. sub-group member means a person included in a sub-group established under section 168. sub-group representative party means a person appointed to be a sub-group representative party under section 168. Note: For the purposes of comparison, a number of provisions of this Part contain bracketed notes in headings drawing attention (“cf”) to equivalent or comparable (though not necessarily identical) provisions of Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (“FCA”) of the Commonwealth as in force immediately before the commencement of this Part. [S 155 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

156

Application

This Part applies to proceedings commenced after the commencement of this section, whether the cause of action arose before or arises after that commencement. [S 156 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

DIVISION 2 – COMMENCEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS 157

Commencement of representative proceedings

(cf s33C FCA)

(1) Subject to this Part, where: (a) 7 or more persons have claims against the same person, and (b) the claims of all those persons are in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar or related circumstances, and (c) the claims of all those persons give rise to a substantial common question of law or fact, proceedings may be commenced by one or more of those persons as representing some or all of them. (2) Representative proceedings may be commenced: (a) whether or not the relief sought: (i) is, or includes, equitable relief, or (ii) consists of, or includes, damages, or (iii) includes claims for damages that would require individual assessment, or (iv) is the same for each person represented, and (b) whether or not the proceedings: (i) are concerned with separate contracts or transactions between the defendant in the proceedings and individual group members, or 132

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Representative proceedings in Supreme Court Division 2 – Commencement of representative proceedings (ii)

s 161

involve separate acts or omissions of the defendant done or omitted to be done in relation to individual group members.

[S 157 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

158

Standing

(1) For the purposes of section 157(1)(a), a person has a sufficient interest to commence representative proceedings against another person on behalf of other persons if the person has standing to commence proceedings on the person’s own behalf against that other person. (2) The person may commence representative proceedings on behalf of other persons against more than one defendant irrespective of whether or not the person and each of those persons have a claim against every defendant in the proceedings. (3) If a person has commenced representative proceedings, that person retains standing: (a) to continue the proceedings, and (b) to bring an appeal from a judgment in the proceedings, even though the person ceases to have a claim against any defendant. [S 158 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

159

Is consent required to be a group member?

(cf s33E FCA)

(1) Subject to subsection (2), the consent of a person to be a group member is not required. (2) None of the following is a group member in representative proceedings unless the person gives consent in writing to being so: (a) the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, (b) a Minister of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, (c) a body corporate established for a public purpose by a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, other than an incorporated company or association, (d) an officer of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, in his or her capacity as an officer. [S 159 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

160

Persons under legal incapacity

(cf s33F FCA)

(1) It is not necessary for a person under legal incapacity to have a tutor merely in order to be a group member. (2) A group member who is a person under legal incapacity may only take a step in representative proceedings, or conduct part of the proceedings, by the member’s tutor. [S 160 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

161

Originating process

(cf s33H FCA)

(1) The originating process in representative proceedings, or a document filed in support of the originating process, must, in addition to any other matters required to be included: (a) describe or otherwise identify the group members to whom the proceedings relate, and (b) specify the nature of the claims made on behalf of the group members and the relief claimed, and (c) specify the question of law or facts common to the claims of the group members. (2) In describing or otherwise identifying group members for the purposes of subsection (1), it is not necessary to name, or specify the number of, the group members. [S 161 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

133

Civil Procedure Leg

(cf s33D FCA)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 16 162

Right of group member to opt out

(cf s33J FCA)

(1) The Court must fix a date before which a group member may opt out of representative proceedings in the Court. (2) A group member may opt out of the representative proceedings by written notice given under the local rules before the date so fixed. (3) The Court may, on application by a group member, the representative party or the defendant in the proceedings, fix another date so as to extend the period during which a group member may opt out of the representative proceedings. (4) Except with the leave of the Court, the hearing of representative proceedings must not commence earlier than the date before which a group member may opt out of the proceedings. [S 162 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

163

Causes of action accruing after commencement of representative proceedings

(cf s33K FCA)

(1) The Court may at any stage of representative proceedings, on application by the representative party, give leave to amend the originating process commencing the representative proceedings so as to alter the description of the group. (2) The description of the group may be altered so as to include a person: (a) whose cause of action accrued after the commencement of the representative proceedings but before such date as the Court fixes when giving leave, and (b) who would have been included in the group, or, with the consent of the person would have been included in the group, if the cause of action had accrued before the commencement of the proceedings. (3) The date fixed under subsection (2)(a) may be the date on which leave is given or another date before or after that date. (4) If the Court gives leave under subsection (1), it may also make any other orders it thinks just, including an order relating to the giving of notice to persons who, as a result of the amendment, will be included in the group and the date before which such persons may opt out of the proceedings. [S 163 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

164

Situation where fewer than 7 group members

(cf s33L FCA)

If, at any stage of representative proceedings, it appears likely to the Court that there are fewer than 7 group members, the Court may, on such conditions (if any) as it thinks fit: (a) order that the proceedings continue under this Part, or (b) order that the proceedings no longer continue under this Part. [S 164 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

165

Distribution costs excessive

(cf s33M FCA)

If: (a)

the relief claimed in representative proceedings is or includes payment of money to group members (otherwise than in respect of costs), and (b) on application by the defendant, the Court concludes that it is likely that, if judgment were to be given in favour of the representative party, the cost to the defendant of identifying the group members and distributing to them the amounts ordered to be paid to them would be excessive having regard to the likely total of those amounts, the Court may, by order: 134

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Representative proceedings in Supreme Court Division 2 – Commencement of representative proceedings (c) (d)

s 168

direct that the proceedings no longer continue under this Part, or stay the proceedings so far as it relates to relief of the kind mentioned in paragraph (a).

[S 165 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

166

Court may order discontinuance of proceedings in certain circumstances

(1) The Court may, on application by the defendant or of its own motion, order that proceedings no longer continue under this Part if it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so because: (a) the costs that would be incurred if the proceedings were to continue as representative proceedings are likely to exceed the costs that would be incurred if each group member conducted a separate proceeding, or (b) all the relief sought can be obtained by means of proceedings other than representative proceedings under this Part, or (c) the representative proceedings will not provide an efficient and effective means of dealing with the claims of group members, or (d) a representative party is not able to adequately represent the interests of the group members, or (e) it is otherwise inappropriate that the claims be pursued by means of representative proceedings. (2) It is not, for the purposes of subsection (1)(e), inappropriate for claims to be pursued by means of representative proceedings merely because the persons identified as group members in relation to the proceedings: (a) do not include all persons on whose behalf those proceedings might have been brought, or (b) are aggregated together for a particular purpose such as a litigation funding arrangement. (3) If the Court dismisses an application under this section, the Court may order that no further application under this section be made by the defendant except with the leave of the Court. (4) Leave for the purposes of subsection (3) may be granted subject to such conditions as to costs as the Court considers just. [S 166 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

167

Effect of discontinuance order under this Part

(cf s33P FCA)

(1) If the Court makes an order under section 164, 165 or 166 that proceedings no longer continue under this Part: (a) the proceedings may be continued as proceedings by the representative party on the party’s own behalf against the defendant, and (b) on the application of a person who was a group member for the purposes of the proceedings, the Court may order that the person be joined as an applicant in the proceedings. (2) In this section: applicant, in relation to proceedings, includes a claimant or plaintiff (as the case may be) in the proceedings. [S 167 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

168

Determination of questions where not all common

(cf s33Q FCA)

(1) If it appears to the Court that determination of the question or questions common to all group members will not finally determine the claims of all group members, the Court may give directions in relation to the determination of the remaining questions. (2) In the case of questions common to the claims of some only of the group members, the directions © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

135

Civil Procedure Leg

(cf s33N FCA)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 168 given by the Court may include directions establishing a sub-group consisting of those group members and appointing a person to be the sub-group representative party on behalf of the sub-group members. [S 168 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

169

Individual questions

(cf s33R FCA)

(1) In giving directions under section 168, the Court may permit an individual group member to appear in the proceedings for the purpose of determining a question that relates only to the claims of that member. (2) In such a case, the individual group member, and not the representative party, is liable for costs associated with the determination of the question. [S 169 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

170

Directions relating to commencement of further proceedings

(cf s33S FCA)

If a question cannot properly or conveniently be dealt with by the Court under section 168 or 169, the Court may give directions for the commencement and conduct of other proceedings, whether or not group proceedings. [S 170 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

171

Adequacy of representation

(cf s33T FCA)

(1) If, on application by a group member, it appears to the Court that a representative party is not able adequately to represent the interests of the group members, the Court may substitute another group member as representative party and make such other orders as it thinks fit. (2) If, on application by a sub-group member, it appears to the Court that a sub-group representative party is not able adequately to represent the interests of the sub-group members, the Court may substitute another person as sub-group representative party and may make such other orders as it thinks fit. [S 171 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

172

Stay of execution in certain circumstances

(cf s33U FCA)

If a defendant in representative proceedings commences proceedings in the Court against a group member, the Court may order a stay of execution in respect of any relief awarded to the group member in the representative proceedings until the other proceedings are determined. [S 172 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

173

Approval of Court required for settlement and discontinuance

(cf s33V FCA)

(1) Representative proceedings may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of the Court. (2) If the Court gives such approval, it may make such orders as are just with respect to the distribution of any money, including interest, paid under a settlement or paid into the Court. [S 173 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

136

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Representative proceedings in Supreme Court Division 3 – Notices 174

s 176

Settlement of individual claim of representative party

(cf s33W FCA)

(1) A representative party may, with the leave of the Court, settle the party’s individual claim in whole or in part at any stage of the representative proceedings.

(3) If a person has sought leave to withdraw as representative party under subsection (2), the Court may, on application by a group member, make an order for the substitution of another group member as representative party and may make such other orders as it thinks fit. (4) Before granting a person leave to withdraw as a representative party: (a) the Court must be satisfied that notice of the application has been given to group members in accordance with section 175(1) and in sufficient time for them to apply to have another person substituted as the representative party, and (b) any application for the substitution of another group member as a representative party must have been determined. [S 174 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

DIVISION 3 – NOTICES 175

Notice to be given of certain matters

(cf s33X FCA)

(1) Notice must be given to group members of the following matters in relation to representative proceedings: (a) the commencement of the proceedings and the right of the group members to opt out of the proceedings before a specified date, being the date fixed under section 162(1), (b) an application by the defendant in the proceedings for the dismissal of the proceedings on the ground of want of prosecution, (c) an application by a representative party seeking leave to withdraw under section 174 as representative party. (2) The Court may dispense with compliance with any or all of the requirements of subsection (1) if the relief sought in the proceedings does not include any claim for damages. (3) If the Court so orders, notice must be given to group members of the bringing into Court of money in answer to a cause of action on which a claim in the representative proceedings is founded. (4) Unless the Court is satisfied that it is just to do so, an application for approval of a settlement under section 173 must not be determined unless notice has been given to group members. (5) The Court may, at any stage, order that notice of any matter be given to a group member or group members. (6) Notice under this section must be given as soon as practicable after the happening of the event to which it relates. [S 175 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

176

Notices under section 175

(cf s33Y FCA)

(1) The form and content of a notice under section 175 must be approved by the Court. (2) The Court must, by order, specify: (a) who is to give the notice, and (b) the way in which the notice is to be given. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

137

Civil Procedure Leg

(2) A representative party who is seeking leave to settle, or who has settled, the party’s individual claim may, with the leave of the Court, withdraw as representative party.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 176 (3) An order under subsection (2) may also include provision: (a) directing a party to provide information relevant to the giving of the notice, and (b) relating to the costs of giving notice. (4) An order under subsection (2) may require that notice be given by means of press advertisement, radio or television broadcast, or by any other means. (5) The Court may not order that notice be given personally to each group member unless it is satisfied that it is reasonably practicable, and not unduly expensive, to do so. (6) A notice that concerns a matter for which the Court’s leave or approval is required must specify the period within which a group member or other person may apply to the Court, or take some other step, in relation to the matter. (7) A notice that includes or concerns conditions must specify the conditions and the period, if any, for compliance. (8) The failure of a group member to receive or respond to a notice does not affect a step taken, an order made, or a judgment given, in any proceedings. [S 176 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

DIVISION 4 – POWERS OF THE COURT 177

Judgment—powers of the Court

(cf s33Z FCA)

(1) The Court may, in determining a matter in representative proceedings, do any one or more of the following: (a) determine a question of law, (b) determine a question of fact, (c) make a declaration of liability, (d) grant any equitable relief, (e) make an award of damages for group members, sub-group members or individual group members, being damages consisting of specified amounts or amounts worked out in such manner as the Court specifies, (f) award damages in an aggregate amount without specifying amounts awarded in respect of individual group members. (2) In making an order for an award of damages, the Court must make provision for the payment or distribution of the money to the group members entitled. (3) Subject to section 173, the Court is not to make an award of damages under subsection (1)(f) unless a reasonably accurate assessment can be made of the total amount to which group members will be entitled under the judgment. (4) If the Court has made an award of damages, the Court may give such directions (if any) as it thinks just in relation to: (a) the manner in which a group member is to establish the member’s entitlement to share in the damages, and (b) the manner in which any dispute regarding the entitlement of a group member to share in the damages is to be determined. [S 177 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

138

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Representative proceedings in Supreme Court Division 5 – Appeals 178

s 180

Constitution etc of fund

(1) Without limiting the operation of section 177(2), in making provision for the distribution of money to group members, the Court may provide for: (a) the constitution and administration of a fund consisting of the money to be distributed, and (b) either: (i) the payment by the defendant of a fixed sum of money into the fund, or (ii) the payment by the defendant into the fund of such instalments, on such terms, as the Court directs to meet the claims of group members, and (c) entitlements to interest earned on the money in the fund. (2) The costs of administering a fund are to be borne by the fund, or by the defendant in the representative proceedings, or by both, as the Court directs. (3) If the Court orders the constitution of a fund under subsection (1), the order must: (a) require notice to be given to group members in such manner as is specified in the order, and (b) specify the manner in which a group member is to make a claim for payment out of the fund and establish the group member’s entitlement to payment, and (c) specify a day (which is 6 months or more after the day on which the order is made) on or before which the group members are to make a claim for payment out of the fund, and (d) make provision in relation to the day before which the fund is to be distributed to group members who have established an entitlement to be paid out of the fund. (4) The Court may allow a group member to make a claim after the day fixed under subsection (3)(c) if: (a) (b)

the fund has not already been fully distributed or applied in accordance with an order under subsection (5), and it is just to do so.

(5) On application by the defendant after the day fixed under subsection (3)(d), the Court may make such orders as it thinks fit for the payment from the fund to the defendant of the money remaining in the fund. [S 178 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

179

Effect of judgment

(cf s33ZB FCA)

A judgment given in representative proceedings: (a) must describe or otherwise identify the group members who will be affected by it, and (b) binds all such persons other than any person who has opted out of the proceedings under section 162. [S 179 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

DIVISION 5 – APPEALS 180

Appeals

(cf s33ZC FCA)

(1) The following appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court in representative proceedings may (subject to the rules of court) themselves be brought in the Court of Appeal under section 101 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 as representative proceedings: (a) an appeal by the representative party on behalf of group members and in respect of the judgment to the extent that it relates to questions common to the claims of group members, © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

139

Civil Procedure Leg

(cf s33ZA FCA)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) s 180 (b)

an appeal by a sub-group representative party on behalf of sub-group members in respect of judgment to the extent that it relates to questions common to the claims of sub-group members.

(2) The parties to an appeal in respect of the determination of a question that relates only to the claim of an individual group member are that group member and the defendant. (3) If the representative party or the sub-group representative party does not bring an appeal within the time provided for instituting appeals, another member of the group or sub-group may, within a further 21 days, bring an appeal as representing the group members or sub-group members, as the case may be. (4) If an appeal is brought from the judgment of the Court in representative proceedings, the Court of Appeal may direct that notice of the appeal be given to such person or persons, and in such manner, as it considers appropriate. (5) This Part (other than section 162) applies to any such appeal proceedings despite the provisions of any other Act or law. (6) The notice instituting an appeal in relation to questions that are common to the claims of group members or sub-group members must describe or otherwise identify the group members or sub-group members, as the case may be, but need not specify the names or number of those members. [S 180 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

DIVISION 6 – MISCELLANEOUS 181

Costs

(cf s43 (1A) FCA)

Despite section 98, in any representative proceedings, the Court may not award costs against a person on whose behalf the proceedings have been commenced (other than a representative party) except as authorised by sections 168 and 169. [S 181 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

182

Suspension of limitation periods

(cf s33ZE FCA)

(1) On the commencement of any representative proceedings, the running of the limitation period that applies to the claim of a group member to which the proceedings relate is suspended. (2) The limitation period does not begin to run again unless either the member opts out of the proceedings under section 162 or the proceedings, and any appeals arising from the proceedings, are determined without finally disposing of the group member’s claim. (3) However, nothing in this section affects the running of a limitation period in respect of a group member who, immediately before the commencement of the representative proceedings, was barred by the expiration of that period from commencing proceedings in the member’s own right in respect of a claim in the representative proceedings. (4) This section applies despite anything in the Limitation Act 1969 or any other law. [S 182 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

183

General power of Court to make orders

(cf s33ZF FCA)

In any proceedings (including an appeal) conducted under this Part, the Court may, of its own motion or on application by a party or a group member, make any order that the Court thinks appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the proceedings. [S 183 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

140

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Representative proceedings in Supreme Court Division 6 – Miscellaneous 184

s 184

Reimbursement of representative party’s costs

(cf s33ZJ FCA)

(2) If, on an application under this section, the Court is satisfied that the costs reasonably incurred in relation to the representative proceedings by the person making the application are likely to exceed the costs recoverable by the person from the defendant, the Court may order that an amount equal to the whole or a part of the excess be paid to that person out of the damages awarded. s (3) On an application under this section, the Court may also make any other order that it thinks just. [S 184 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[2]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

141

Civil Procedure Leg

(1) If the Court has made an award of damages in representative proceedings, the representative party or a sub-group representative party, or a person who has been such a party, may apply to the Court for an order under this section.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated)

SCHEDULE 1 – APPLICATION OF ACT (Section 4)

Column 1 Court Supreme Court Land and Environment Court Industrial Relations Commission District Court Dust Diseases Tribunal Local Court

Column 2 Kinds of civil proceedings All civil proceedings All civil proceedings in Class 1, 2, 3, 4 or 8 of the Court’s jurisdiction All civil proceedings All civil proceedings All civil proceedings All civil proceedings under Part 3 of the Local Court Act 2007 All civil proceedings under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 All civil proceedings for which the Local Court has jurisdiction under section 91 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 Note: However the Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 excludes civil proceedings for which the Local Court has jurisdiction under section 91 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 from the provisions of Parts 3–9 of the Act other than section 87.

[Sch 1 am Act 48 of 2016, Sch 2.6[5]; Reg 296 of 2013, cl 3; Act 77 of 2009, Sch 2.6[3]; Act 107 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 29.1; Act 94 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1.12[7]; Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[9]; Reg 409 of 2005, cl 3]

142

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Schedule 2 – Constitution and Procedure of Uniform Rules Committee Schedule 2

cl 3A

SCHEDULE 2 – CONSTITUTION AND PROCEDURE OF UNIFORM RULES COMMITTEE (Section 8)

Part 1 – Constitution Definitions In this Schedule: ex-officio member means the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court, the Chief Judge of the District Court or the Chief Magistrate, and includes any of their nominees under section 8. [Def am Act 48 of 2016, Sch 2.6[6]; Act 77 of 2009, Sch 2.6[4]; Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[10]]

member means a member of the Uniform Rules Committee. 2

Term of office Subject to this Schedule: (a) an ex-officio member holds office indefinitely, and (b) any other member holds office for such period as is specified in his or her instrument of appointment, but is eligible (if otherwise qualified) for re-appointment.

3

Vacancy in office (1) The office of a member (other than an ex-officio member) becomes vacant if the member: (a) dies, or (b) resigns office by instrument in writing addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or (c) ceases to hold the office or qualification by virtue of which he or she was eligible for appointment as a member, or (d) has his or her appointment revoked by the person or body by whom or by which he or she was appointed.

(2) If the office of a member becomes vacant, a person is, subject to this Act, to be appointed to fill the vacancy. Note: See also section 47 of the Interpretation Act 1987 with respect to appointments generally. 3A

Deputies for members (1) An ex-officio member of the Uniform Rules Committee may nominate his or her own deputy.

(1A) Each person referred to in section 8(1) who is authorised to nominate or appoint some other person as a member of the Uniform Rules Committee may nominate or appoint a deputy for that member. (2) In the absence of an ex-officio member or a member appointed or nominated under section 8(1), the member’s deputy: (a) may, if available, act in the place of the member, and (b) subject to clause 6(6)—while so acting, has the functions of the member and is taken to be the member. (3) In this clause, ex-officio member means the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court, the Chief Judge of the District Court or the Chief Magistrate, but does not include any of their nominees under section 8(1). [Cl 3A am Act 53 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 3[1]–[3]; insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[11]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

143

Civil Procedure Leg

1

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) cl 4

Schedule 2

Part 2 – Procedure 4

General procedure

The procedure for the calling of meetings of the Uniform Rules Committee and for the conduct of business at those meetings is, subject to this Part, to be as determined by the Committee. 5

Quorum

The quorum for a meeting of the Uniform Rules Committee is 7 members, of whom at least 3 must be judicial officers. [Cl 5 am Act 77 of 2009, Sch 2.6[5]]

6

Presiding member

(1) At any meeting of the Uniform Rules Committee: (a) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or (b) the Chief Justice’s nominee referred to in section 8(1)(a), is to preside. (2) In the absence of the Chief Justice or the Chief Justice’s nominee: (a) the President of the Court of Appeal, or (b) the President’s nominee referred to in section 8(1)(b), is to preside. (3) In the absence of: (a) the Chief Justice or the Chief Justice’s nominee, and (b) the President of the Court of Appeal or the President’s nominee, the next most senior of the Judges of the Supreme Court, who are present is to preside. (4) In the absence of any Judge of the Supreme Court, the next most senior judicial officer who is present is to preside. (5) The presiding member has a deliberative vote and, in the event of an equality of votes, has a second or casting vote. (6) A person nominated as a deputy is not entitled to exercise any of the functions of a presiding member under this clause. [Cl 6 am Act 53 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 3[4]; Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[12]]

7

Decisions

A decision supported by a majority of the votes cast at a meeting of the Uniform Rules Committee at which a quorum is present is a decision of the Uniform Rules Committee. 8

Transaction of business outside meetings or by telephone

(1) The Uniform Rules Committee may, if it thinks fit, transact any of its business by the circulation of papers among all the members of the Committee for the time being, and a resolution in writing approved in writing by a majority of those members is taken to be a decision of the Committee, but only if the members from whom votes are received in relation to the resolution would form a quorum at an ordinary meeting of the Committee. (2) The Uniform Rules Committee may, if it thinks fit, transact any of its business at a meeting at which members (or some members) participate by telephone, closed-circuit television or other means, but only if any member who speaks on a matter before the meeting can be heard by the other members. (3) For the purposes of: (a) the approval of a resolution under subclause (1), or (b) a meeting held in accordance with subclause (2), the presiding member and each other member have the same voting rights as they have at an ordinary meeting of the Uniform Rules Committee. (4) A resolution approved under subclause (1) is to be recorded in the minutes of the meetings of the Uniform Rules Committee. 144

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Schedule 2 – Constitution and Procedure of Uniform Rules Committee Schedule 2

cl 9

(5) Papers may be circulated among the members for the purposes of subclause (1) by facsimile or other transmission of the information in the papers concerned. 9

First meeting

The first meeting of the Uniform Rules Committee is to be called by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in such manner as the Chief Justice thinks fit.

Civil Procedure Leg

[Sch 2 am Act 48 of 2016; Act 77 of 2009; Act 53 of 2008; Act 56 of 2007]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

145

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated)

SCHEDULE 3 – RULE-MAKING POWERS (Section 9(2))

1 The procedure (including the method of pleading) and the practice to be followed in the court in all civil proceedings in, or with respect to which, the court has jurisdiction (including the procedure and practice to be followed in the offices of the court), and any matters incidental to, or relating to, any such procedure or practice (including the manner and time of making any applications that under this or any other Act, or under any Commonwealth Act, are to be made to the court). 2 The rights and obligations of parties, prospective parties and other persons as to examination, interrogatories, discovery and inspection and other means of obtaining access to information, documents or things in relation to civil proceedings and prospective civil proceedings. [Cl 2 am Act 107 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1.6]

3 The service of documents (including the service of documents outside New South Wales, whether interstate or overseas). 4 The form and contents of any case stated to the court by or from any other court or person, and the time within which and the manner in which proceedings on a stated case are to be commenced and maintained and the court’s decision notified. 5

The practice and procedure to be followed in connection with interpleaders.

6 The practice and procedure to be followed in connection with the splitting and consolidation of civil proceedings. 7

The admission and exclusion of evidence and the manner in which evidence is to be tendered.

8 The practice and procedure to be followed in connection with the review by the court of decisions made on its behalf by registrars and other officers of the court. 9 The practice and procedure to be followed in connection with any appeal to the court, including the time within which, and the manner in which, such an appeal is to be made, and the practice and procedure to be followed in the court with respect to such an appeal. 10 The practice and procedure to be followed in connection with the transfer of any civil proceedings to or from the court and the practice and procedure to be followed with respect to civil proceedings that are so transferred. 11 The assignment of civil proceedings to any division of the court or to any list established within the court. 12

The nomination and appointment of suitable persons to be mediators for the purposes of Part 4.

13 The practice and procedure to be followed in relation to the mediation of any matter under Part 4 or the arbitration of any matter under Part 5. 14

The circumstances in which civil proceedings, or claims in civil proceedings, may be dismissed.

15 The circumstances in which the court may order parties to civil proceedings not to disclose matters that arise in hearings that are held in the absence of the public. 16 The circumstances in which the court may stay civil proceedings, either permanently or temporarily. 17 The practice and procedure to be followed with respect to the giving of judgment, including judgment that is reserved and judgment where the giving of reasons is deferred.

146

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Schedule 3 – Rule-making powers Schedule 3

cl 34

18 Matters relating to the costs of civil proceedings in the court and, in particular, prescribing, limiting or otherwise affecting the costs recoverable in any action or proceedings that the court considers might properly have been dealt with in a lower court. 19 The means for, and the practice and procedure to be followed in, securing the future conduct of parties to civil proceedings.

21 The circumstances in which the court may authorise entry on land for the purpose of enabling its orders to be enforced. 22 The exercise by the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to make orders for the enforcement of its judgments and orders. 23

The circumstances in which the court may vary or set aside its judgments and orders.

24 The means for proving particular facts, and the mode in which evidence may be given (including the administration of oaths to and the taking of the evidence of witnesses in or out of New South Wales), in any civil proceedings, or on any application in connection with, or at any stage of, any civil proceedings. 25

Matters relating to expert evidence, including: (a) the disclosure (by the furnishing of copies of reports or otherwise) of the nature of expert evidence to be given, and including the exclusion of expert evidence in case of non-compliance with the rules relating to expert evidence or with any order for disclosure of the nature of expert evidence, and (b) the use of expert witnesses including, in particular, the use of expert witnesses engaged jointly by parties to civil proceedings and the use of court-appointed expert witnesses.

25A The means for answering questions as to the principles of the law of a country other than Australia, and their application. [Cl 25A insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.3[1]]

26 The cases in which security may be required, and the form of such security, and the manner in which, and the person to whom, it is to be given. 27 For regulating or making other provision concerning interim payments referred to in Division 5 of Part 6. 28 The payment or transfer into or out of court and, subject to the consent of the Treasurer, the custody, management and investment of moneys, securities and effects. 29 The duties of registrars and other officers of the court in relation to or for the purpose of any civil proceedings. 30 Any matter with respect to civil proceedings for which rules of court may be made under the Act by which the court is constituted. 31 Any matter with respect to which the court has jurisdiction under any other Act or law (including any Commonwealth Act). 32 Any matter for which the rules set out in Schedule 7 made provision when that Schedule commenced. 33

Any matter for which any other Act provides that rules may be made under this Act.

34

Any matter of a savings or transitional nature consequent on the making of any uniform rule.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

147

Civil Procedure Leg

20 The means for, and the practice and procedure to be followed in, the enforcement and execution of judgments and orders.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) cl 35 35

Schedule 3 [Repealed]

[Cl 35 rep Act 1 of 2013, Sch 1.6[9]; insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[8]]

36

[Repealed]

[Cl 36 rep Act 1 of 2013, Sch 1.6[9]; insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[8]] [Sch 3 am Act 1 of 2013; Act 135 of 2010; Act 107 of 2006; Act 98 of 2005, s 3 and Sch 2.10]

148

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Schedule 4 – Repeals

SCHEDULE 4 – REPEALS (Section 6(1))

Administration of Justice Act 1924 No 42 Arbitration (Civil Actions) Act 1983 No 43 Arbitration (Civil Actions) Regulation 1999 Civil Procedure Leg

Attachment of Wages Limitation Act 1957 No 28 Damages (Infants and Persons of Unsound Mind) Act 1929 No 25 Foreign Judgments Act 1973 No 39 Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 No 8 Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 No 11 Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1923 No 4 Editor’s note: Schedule 5 is repealed and has not been reproduced.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

149

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated)

SCHEDULE 6 – SAVINGS, TRANSITIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS (Section 6(3))

Part 1 – General 1

Regulations

(1) The Governor may make regulations of a savings or transitional nature consequent on the enactment of the following Acts: this Act Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2006, to the extent that it amends this Act Courts Legislation Further Amendment Act 2006 (but only to the extent that it amends this Act) Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (but only to the extent to which it amends this Act) Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (but only to the extent to which it amends this Act) Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (but only to the extent that it amends this Act) Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010 any other Act that amends this Act (2) Any such provision may, if the regulations so provide, take effect from the date of assent to the Act concerned or a later date. (3) To the extent to which any such provision takes effect from a date that is earlier than the date of its publication in the Gazette, the provision does not operate so as: (a) to affect, in a manner prejudicial to any person (other than the State or an authority of the State), the rights of that person existing before the date of its publication, or (b) to impose liabilities on any person (other than the State or an authority of the State) in respect of anything done or omitted to be done before the date of its publication. [Cl 1 am Act 60 of 2012, Sch 3[2]; Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.3[2]; Act 63 of 2010, Sch 1.7[2]; Act 77 of 2009, Sch 2.6[6]; Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[13]; Act 56 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[7]; Act 23 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]

Part 2 – Provisions consequent on enactment of this Act 2

Definition In this Part: the old legislation means the Supreme Court Act 1970, the District Court Act 1973 and the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970, and the rules of court made under those Acts, as in force immediately before the commencement of this clause.

3

Rules under the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970

The Local Courts (Civil Claims) Rules 1988 are taken to have been made under the Local Courts Act 1982, and may be amended and repealed accordingly. 4 Regulations The following regulations are taken to have been made under section 18, and may be amended and repealed accordingly: (a) the Supreme Court Regulation 2000, (b) the District Court Regulation 2000, (c) the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Regulation 2000.

150

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Schedule 6 – Savings, Transitional and Other Provisions Schedule 6 5

cl 11

Pending proceedings

(1) Subject to subclause (2), this Act and the uniform rules apply to proceedings commenced before the commencement of this Act in the same way as they apply to proceedings commenced on or after that commencement.

6

Right to claim set-off (1) Subject to subclause (2), section 21 extends to: (a) any debt arising under an agreement entered into before the commencement of that section, and (b) any other debt arising before the commencement of that section.

(2) The court may order that section 21 does not apply to a debt referred to in subclause (1)(a) if it is satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice to make such an order. 7

Amendment of originating process after expiry of limitation period Section 65 extends to any proceedings commenced before the commencement of that section.

8

Delegations

Any delegation that was in force immediately before the commencement of this Act under a provision of the old legislation for which there is a corresponding provision in this Act is taken to be a delegation in force under the corresponding provision of this Act. 9

Construction of references Subject to this Schedule and the regulations, in any Act or instrument: (a) a reference to a provision of the old legislation for which there is a corresponding provision in this Act extends to the corresponding provision of this Act or the uniform rules, and (b) a reference to any act, matter or thing referred to in a provision of the old legislation for which there is a corresponding provision in this Act or the uniform rules extends to the corresponding act, matter or thing referred to in the corresponding provision of this Act or the uniform rules, as the case requires.

10

General saving Subject to this Schedule and the regulations: (a) anything begun before the commencement of this Act under a provision of the old legislation for which there is a corresponding provision in this Act or the uniform rules may be continued and completed under the old legislation as if this Act had not been enacted, and (b) subject to paragraph (a), anything done under a provision of the old legislation for which there is a corresponding provision in this Act or the uniform rules (including anything arising under paragraph (a)) is taken to have been done under the corresponding provision of this Act or the uniform rules, as the case requires.

11

Motor accident claims

(1) In the definition of motor accident claim in section 3(1), the reference to a claim within the meaning of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 includes a reference to a claim within the meaning of Part 5 of the Motor Accidents Act 1988. (2) In section 81(2), the reference to an award of damages to which Chapter 5 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 applies includes a reference to an award of damages to which Part 6 of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 applies.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

151

Civil Procedure Leg

(2) A court before which proceedings have been commenced before the commencement of this Act may make such orders dispensing with the requirements of the uniform rules in relation to the proceedings, and such consequential orders (including orders as to costs), as are appropriate in the circumstances.

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) cl 12

Schedule 6

Part 3 – Provisions relating to dismissal of proceedings [Pt 3 insrt Act 23 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]

12

Dismissal of proceedings

(1) Any proceedings taken to have been dismissed under clause 18 of the Civil Procedure Regulation 2005 before the repeal of that clause by the Civil Procedure Amendment (Savings and Transitional) Regulation 2005 are taken to have never been dismissed under that clause and may be continued accordingly. (2) Subclause (1) does not apply to any such proceedings to the extent to which they relate to a cause of action for which relief has been claimed in fresh proceedings, as referred to in section 91. (3) The District Court or Local Court, as the case may be, may make such orders as are necessary to enable the proceedings to be continued. [Cl 12 insrt Act 23 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]

Part 4 – Provisions consequent on enactment of the Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2007 [Pt 4 insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]]

13

Definitions In this Part: relevant commencement date means the date of the commencement of Schedule 2[9] to the Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2007. relevant proceedings means proceedings in Class 1, 2, 3 or 4 of the jurisdiction of the Land and Environment Court. unamended L & E legislation means the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 or the rules of court made under that Act, as in force immediately before the relevant commencement date.

[Cl 13 insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]]

14

Regulation

The Land and Environment Court Regulation 2005 is taken to have been made under section 18 and may be amended and repealed accordingly. [Cl 14 insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]]

15

Pending proceedings

(1) Subject to subclause (2), this Act and the uniform rules apply to relevant proceedings commenced in the Land and Environment Court before the relevant commencement date in the same way as they apply to relevant proceedings commenced on or after that commencement. (2) If relevant proceedings are commenced in the Land and Environment Court before the relevant commencement date, the Land and Environment Court may make such orders dispensing with the requirements of the uniform rules in relation to the proceedings, and such consequential orders (including orders as to costs), as are appropriate in the circumstances. [Cl 15 insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]]

16

Construction of references Subject to the regulations, in any other Act or instrument: (a) a reference to a provision of the unamended L & E legislation for which there is a corresponding provision in this Act extends to the corresponding provision of this Act or the uniform rules, and (b) a reference to any act, matter or thing referred to in a provision of the unamended L & E legislation for which there is a corresponding provision in this Act or the uniform rules extends to the corresponding act, matter or thing referred to in the corresponding provision of this Act or the uniform rules, as the case requires.

[Cl 16 insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]] 152

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Schedule 6 – Savings, Transitional and Other Provisions Schedule 6 General saving Subject to this Schedule and the regulations: (a) anything begun before the relevant commencement date under a provision of the unamended L & E legislation for which there is a corresponding provision in this Act or the uniform rules may be continued and completed under the unamended L & E legislation as if this Act had not been enacted, and (b) subject to paragraph (a), anything done under a provision of the unamended L & E legislation for which there is a corresponding provision in this Act or the uniform rules (including anything arising under paragraph (a)) is taken to have been done under the corresponding provision of this Act or the uniform rules, as the case requires. [Cl 17 insrt Act 56 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]]

Part 5 – Provisions consequent on enactment of Schedule 6.1 to Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010 [Pt 5 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[3]]

18

Effect of enactment of Part 10 on existing proceedings

(1) Except as provided by this clause or the regulations, nothing in the new Part affects the commencement or continuance of any action or proceedings of a representative character commenced otherwise than under the new Part before the commencement of that Part. (2) Subject to subclause (3), the new Part extends to proceedings commenced (but not finally determined) in the relevant court under Division 2 of Part 7 of the uniform rules before the commencement of that Part. (3) The relevant court may make such orders dispensing with or modifying the requirements of the new Part in relation to proceedings referred to in subclause (2) as the relevant court thinks appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the proceedings. (4) In this clause: relevant court, in relation to actions or proceedings referred to in subclause (1), means the court or tribunal in which the action or proceedings commenced. the new Part means Part 10 (as inserted by the Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010). [Cl 18 insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.1[3]]

Part 6 – Provisions consequent on enactment of Schedule 6.2 to Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010 [Repealed] [Pt 6 rep Act 1 of 2013, Sch 1.6[10]; insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[9]]

19

Application of Part 2A [Repealed]

[Cl 19 rep Act 1 of 2013, Sch 1.6[10]; subst Act 38 of 2011, Sch 1; insrt Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.2[9]]

Part 7 – Provision consequent on enactment of the Courts and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012 [Pt 7 insrt Act 60 of 2012, Sch 3[3]]

20

Validation of exercise of court’s functions

The exercise of a function of a court under this Act, or any other Act or law, by a registrar or other officer of the court pursuant to a direction given by instrument in writing by the senior judicial officer of the court is taken to be, and is taken to always have been, valid as it would have been had section 13 (as amended by the Courts and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012) been in force at the time the direction was given. [Cl 20 insrt Act 60 of 2012, Sch 3[3]] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

153

Civil Procedure Leg

17

cl 20

Civil Procedure Act 2005 – (Annotated) cl 2

Part 8 – Provisions consequent on enactment of Courts and Other Justice Portfolio Legislation Amendment Act 2015 21

Pending proceedings

The amendments made to this Act by Schedule 1.2 to the Courts and Other Justice Portfolio Legislation Amendment Act 2015 do not extend to proceedings commenced before the commencement of that Subschedule and those proceedings may continue as if those amendments had not been enacted. [Cl 21 insrt Act 67 of 2015, Sch 1.2[6]] [Pt 8 insrt Act 67 of 2015, Sch 1.2[6]] [Sch 6 am Act 67 of 2015; Act 1 of 2013; Act 60 of 2012; Act 38 of 2011; Act 135 of 2010; Act 63 of 2010; Act 77 of 2009; Act 56 of 2007; Act 56 of 2006; Act 23 of 2006]

Editor’s note: Schedule 7 is repealed and has not been reproduced.

154

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

CIVIL PROCEDURE REGULATION 2012 (NSW)

Part 2 – Fees generally 4 Fees payable in relation to court proceedings................................................................................158 5 Fees payable in relation to functions exercised by Sheriff............................................................. 159 6 Fees payable in relation to functions exercised by Marshal in Admiralty.......................................159 7 Persons by and to whom fees are payable.................................................................................... 159 8 When fees become due.................................................................................................................. 159 Part 3 – Hearing allocation fees and hearing fees 9 Payment of hearing allocation fees.................................................................................................160 10 Payment of hearing fees................................................................................................................. 160 Part 4 – Waiver, postponement and remission of fees 11 General power to waive, postpone and remit fees......................................................................... 161 12 Postponement of fees for pro bono parties.................................................................................... 161 13 Postponement of fees for legally assisted persons........................................................................ 161 Part 5 – Miscellaneous 14 Percentage of income from deposited funds payable to Consolidated Fund.................................162 15 Delegation of functions....................................................................................................................162 15A Proceedings excluded from provisions of Parts 3–9 of Act consequent on substitution or amendment of Schedule 1 to Act....................................................................................................162 17 Savings............................................................................................................................................162

SCHEDULE 1 – COURT FEES....................................................................................................................163 Part 1 – Supreme Court...................................................................................................................163 Part 2 – Land and Environment Court.............................................................................................165 Part 3 – District Court...................................................................................................................... 166 Part 4 – Local Court.........................................................................................................................167 Part 5 – Miscellaneous court fees................................................................................................... 167 SCHEDULE 2 – SHERIFF’S FEES............................................................................................................. 170

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

155

Civil Procedure Leg

Part 1 – Preliminary 1 Name of Regulation........................................................................................................................ 157 2 Commencement.............................................................................................................................. 157 3 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 157

Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (NSW) Table of Amending Legislation Principal legislation

Number

Civil Procedure Regulation 2012

393 of 2012

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration

Date of commencement 1 Sep 2012

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration

Date of commencement Cl 3: 21 Jan 2013

This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Civil Procedure Amendment (Notice Fees) Regulation 2012 Civil Procedure Further Amendment (Fees) Regulation 2012 Courts and Other Legislation Further Amendment Act 2013 Civil Procedure Amendment (Local Court Special Jurisdiction) Regulation 2013 Civil Procedure Amendment (Fees) Regulation 2013 Civil Procedure Amendment (Online Probate Notice Services Fees) Regulation 2014 Civil Procedure Amendment (Fees) Regulation 2014 Civil Procedure Amendment (Fees) Regulation 2015 Civil Procedure Amendment (Hearing Fees) Regulation 2015 Industrial Relations Amendment (Industrial Court) Act 2016

Number 649 of 2012

Civil Procedure Amendment (Fees) Regulation 2016

395 of 2016

156

650 of 2012 Act 1 of 2013

Sch 1: 1 Jan 2013

296 of 2013

Sch 1.7: 28 Feb 2013 Cl 4: 21 Jun 2013

333 of 2013

Sch 1: 1 Jul 2013

59 of 2014

Cl 3: 20 Feb 2014

405 of 2014

Sch 1: 1 Jul 2014

389 of 2015

Sch 1: 1 Aug 2015

494 of 2015

Cl 3: 1 Sep 2015

Act 48 of 2016

28 Feb 2013

18 Oct 2016

Sch 2.7: 8 Dec 2016 (Proc 674 of 2016, 15 Nov 2016) Sch 1: 1 Jul 2016

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 1 – Preliminary cl 3

PART 1 – PRELIMINARY 1

Name of Regulation This Regulation is the Civil Procedure Regulation 2012. Commencement

This Regulation commences on 1 September 2012 and is required to be published on the NSW legislation website. Note: This Regulation replaces the Civil Procedure Regulation 2005 which is repealed on 1 September 2012 by section 10(2) of the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989.

3

Definitions (1) In this Regulation: corporation has the same meaning as in section 57A of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth. grant of representation means a grant of probate, letters of administration or letters of administration with the will annexed. hearing allocation fee means a fee for allocating a date for the hearing of proceedings. hearing fee means a fee for the hearing of proceedings. legally assisted person means a person who is receiving: (a) legal assistance through a community legal centre that complies with the requirements of section 240 of the Legal Profession Act 2004, or (b) legal aid under the Legal Aid Commission Act 1979. pro bono party means a party to proceedings who is being represented under a pro bono scheme administered by the New South Wales Bar Association or the Law Society of New South Wales, or under a pro bono scheme established by rules of court, being a party in respect of whom a barrister or solicitor acting for the party in accordance with the scheme: (a) has certified in writing to the registrar of the court that the party is being so represented, and (b) has undertaken in writing to the registrar of the court: (i) to pay the filing fee for the originating process by which the proceedings have been commenced, and (ii) to pay any hearing allocation fee or hearing fee that becomes payable by the party in relation to the proceedings.

the Act means the Civil Procedure Act 2005. Note: The Act and the Interpretation Act 1987 contain definitions and other provisions that affect the interpretation and application of this Regulation.

(2) Notes included in this Regulation do not form part of this Regulation.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

157

Civil Procedure Leg

2

Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (NSW) cl 4

PART 2 – FEES GENERALLY 4

Fees payable in relation to court proceedings (1) This clause applies in relation to civil proceedings in the following courts: (a) the Supreme Court, (b) the Land and Environment Court, (c) the District Court, (d) the Local Court.

(2) The fee that a person must pay in respect of a matter referred to in Column 1 of Schedule 1 is: (a) the fee specified in respect of that matter in Column 2 of that Schedule, or (b) if the person is a corporation or an incorporated partnership and a fee is specified in respect of that matter in Column 3 of that Schedule, the fee so specified. Note: The fees in relation to particular courts are set out in Parts 1–4 of Schedule 1. The fees common to all courts are set out in Part 5 of that Schedule. [Subcl (2) am Reg 389 of 2015, Sch 1[1]]

(3) For the avoidance of doubt, the fee payable by a corporation or an incorporated partnership that commences or carries on proceedings in the name of a natural person pursuant to a right of subrogation is the fee applicable to a corporation or an incorporated partnership. [Subcl (3) am Reg 389 of 2015, Sch 1[1]]

(4) Despite subclauses (2) and (3), the fee payable by a corporation or an incorporated partnership that produces evidence, satisfactory to a registrar of the court: (a) that its turnover, in the financial year of the corporation or incorporated partnership immediately preceding the financial year in which the fees are to be taken, was less than $200,000, or (b) if the corporation or incorporated partnership has not been in existence for a full financial year, that its turnover in its first financial year is likely to be less than $200,000, is the fee specified in Column 2 of Schedule 1. [Subcl (4) am Reg 389 of 2015, Sch 1[1] and [2]]

(5) Despite subclause (2), no fee is payable in relation to the filing of notice of motion for any of the following: (a) an application for the issue of any process for which a fee is otherwise payable under Schedule 1, (b) an application for an instalment order, (c) an application for a writ of execution, (d) an application for a garnishee order, (e) an application for a charging order, (f) an application for a default judgment, (g) any application in relation to proceedings in the Local Court sitting in its Small Claims Division other than an application for an examination order. (6) Despite subclause (2), no fee is payable in relation to the filing of an originating process by which a question of law is referred to the Supreme Court for decision under: (a) section 61 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 of the Commonwealth, or (b) section 659A of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth. (7) Despite subclause (2), no fee is payable by any of the following in relation to industrial proceedings (as defined in Chapter 6A of the Industrial Relations Act 1996) unless Schedule 1 expressly says so: (a) any industrial organisation within the meaning of that Act, or (b) any association registered under Chapter 6 of that Act. 158

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 2 – Fees generally cl 8 Note: Industrial proceedings are proceedings before the Supreme Court under certain industrial legislation such as the Industrial Relations Act 1996. [Subcl (7) insrt Act 48 of 2016, Sch 2.7] [Cl 4 am Act 48 of 2016; Reg 389 of 2015]

5

Fees payable in relation to functions exercised by Sheriff

6

Fees payable in relation to functions exercised by Marshal in Admiralty

(1) In any civil proceedings in the Admiralty List in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court, a fee is payable to the Marshal in Admiralty in relation to any matter for which a fee is payable to the Sheriff in any other civil proceedings. (2) The fee payable to the Marshal in Admiralty in relation to any such matter is the same as the fee payable to the Sheriff in relation to that matter. 7

Persons by and to whom fees are payable

(1) Any fee imposed by Schedule 1 or 2 (other than a hearing allocation fee or hearing fee) is payable, by the person at whose request the relevant document is filed or service rendered: (a) in the case of a fee imposed by Schedule 1, to the registrar of the court, and (b) in the case of a fee imposed by Schedule 2, to the registrar of the court or to the Sheriff. (2) For the purposes of subclause (1), the fee imposed by item 2 of Part 5 of Schedule 1 is taken to be payable by the person who served the notice to produce under Part 34 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. (3) If a document is filed or service rendered at the request of a person acting as agent for another person, each of those persons is jointly and severally liable for payment of any such fee. (4) For the purposes only of subclause (2), a solicitor or other person by whom a person is carrying on proceedings is taken to be acting as an agent for that person. 8

When fees become due

(1) A fee imposed by Schedule 1 or 2 (other than a hearing allocation fee or hearing fee) becomes due when the document concerned is filed or the service concerned is rendered. (2) Despite subclause (1), a registrar who is requested to file a document or render a service may require any fee for the document or service to be paid before the document is filed or the service rendered.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

159

Civil Procedure Leg

The fee that a person must pay in relation to a matter referred to in Column 1 of Schedule 2 is the fee specified in respect of that matter in Column 2 of that Schedule.

Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (NSW) cl 9

PART 3 – HEARING ALLOCATION FEES AND HEARING FEES 9

Payment of hearing allocation fees (1) This clause applies in relation to civil proceedings in the Supreme Court or the District Court. (2) A hearing allocation fee in relation to any proceedings is payable: (a) by the plaintiff, or (b) if the court makes any order as to the payment of the fee, by the parties and in the proportions so ordered.

(3) If a party is carrying on proceedings by a solicitor or other person, the party and solicitor or other person are jointly and severally liable for the payment of the hearing allocation fee. (4) A hearing allocation fee is not payable in relation to any interlocutory hearing or to a trial for the assessment of damages only. (5) A hearing allocation fee becomes payable: (a) immediately after a date is allocated for hearing the proceedings, or (b) when the court or a registrar notifies the parties in writing of the court’s intention to allocate a date for hearing the proceedings, whichever first occurs. 10

Payment of hearing fees (1) This clause applies in relation to civil proceedings in the Supreme Court or the District Court.

[Subcl (1) am Reg 494 of 2015, cl 3]

(2) A hearing fee in relation to any proceedings is payable: (a) by the plaintiff, or (b) if the court makes any order as to the payment of the fee, by the parties and in the proportions so ordered. (3) If a party is carrying on proceedings by a solicitor or other person, the party and solicitor or other person are jointly and severally liable for the payment of the hearing fee. (4) A hearing fee is not payable in relation to a hearing whose sole purpose is the delivery of a reserved judgment. (5) A hearing fee becomes payable when the court or a registrar gives written notice to the person liable to pay the hearing fee of the amount of the fee payable. [Cl 10 am Reg 494 of 2015]

160

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Waiver, postponement and remission of fees cl 13

PART 4 – WAIVER, POSTPONEMENT AND REMISSION OF FEES 11

General power to waive, postpone and remit fees

(2) The Sheriff may, by order in writing, direct that the whole or any part of any fee payable to the Sheriff be waived, postponed or remitted, subject to such conditions (if any) as the Sheriff thinks fit to impose. (3) The powers conferred by this clause are to be exercised in accordance with such guidelines as may from time to time be published by the Attorney General. 12 Postponement of fees for pro bono parties (1) The taking of any fee in respect of the business of the court in relation to proceedings involving a pro bono party is, if the fee is payable by the party, to be postponed until judgment has been given in the proceedings. (2) The fee is not to be taken at all, or if taken must be remitted, if: (a) judgment is against the pro bono party, or (b) judgment is in favour of the pro bono party, but: (i) damages are not awarded (or only nominal damages are awarded) in his or her favour, and (ii) costs are not awarded in his or her favour. 13 Postponement of fees for legally assisted persons (1) The taking of any fee in respect of the business of the court in relation to proceedings involving a party who is a legally assisted person is, if the fee is payable by the party, to be postponed until judgment has been given in the proceedings. (2) The fee is not to be taken at all, or if taken must be remitted, if: (a) judgment in the proceedings is against the legally assisted person, or (b) judgment is in favour of the legally assisted person, but: (i) damages are not awarded (or only nominal damages are awarded) in his or her favour, and (ii) costs are not awarded in his or her favour.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

161

Civil Procedure Leg

(1) The registrar of the court may, by order in writing, direct that the whole or any part of any fee payable to the registrar be waived, postponed or remitted, subject to such conditions (if any) as the registrar thinks fit to impose.

Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (NSW) cl 14

PART 5 – MISCELLANEOUS 14 Percentage of income from deposited funds payable to Consolidated Fund A registrar must deduct, for payment into the Consolidated Fund, 2.5% of any amount received by way of interest or dividends on funds that are paid into court. 15 Delegation of functions (1) The registrar of a court may delegate to any person the exercise of any of the functions conferred on the registrar by this Regulation, other than this power of delegation. (2) The Sheriff may delegate to any person the exercise of any of the functions conferred on the Sheriff by this Regulation, other than this power of delegation. 15A Proceedings excluded from provisions of Parts 3–9 of Act consequent on substitution or amendment of Schedule 1 to Act Any civil proceedings for which the Local Court has jurisdiction under section 91 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 are excluded from the operation of sections 19–86 and 88–154 of the Act. [Cl 15A insrt Reg 296 of 2013, cl 4]

Editor’s note: Clause 16 is repealed and has not been reproduced.

17 Savings Any act, matter or thing that, immediately before the repeal of the Civil Procedure Regulation 2005, had effect under that Regulation continues to have effect under this Regulation.

162

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (NSW) Schedule 1

SCHEDULE 1 – COURT FEES (Clause 4)

Item 1 2

3 4

5

6

7

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable Filing an originating process (other than an originating process referred to in items 2–6) Filing an originating process by which an application for a grant of representation, or reseal of a grant of representation, in respect of an estate the sworn gross value of which: (a) is less than $100,000.00 (b) is $100,000.00 or more but less than $250,000.00 (c) is $250,000.00 or more but less than $500,000.00 (d) is $500,000.00 or more but less than $1,000,000.00 (e) is $1,000,000.00 or more but less than $2,000,000.00 (f) is $2,000,000.00 or more but less than $5,000,000.00 (g) is $5,000,000.00 or more Filing in the Court of Appeal a notice of intention to appeal Filing in the Court of Appeal a summons seeking leave to appeal or a cross-summons seeking leave to cross-appeal in proceedings where a notice of intention to appeal has been filed by the same party Filing in the Court of Appeal a summons seeking leave to appeal or a cross-summons seeking leave to cross-appeal in proceedings where a notice of intention to appeal has not been filed by the same party Filing in the Court of Appeal a notice of appeal or notice of cross-appeal: (a) in proceedings where leave to appeal has been granted (b) in proceedings where a notice of intention to appeal has been filed by the same party (c) in any other proceedings Allocating a date for hearing of the proceedings by one or more judges, a judge and jury or an associate judge

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Column 2 Standard fee $1,078.00

Column 3 Corporation fee $2,951.00

Nil $718.00

— —

$974.00

—

$1,493.00

—

$1,990.00

—

$3,316.00

—

$5,528.00 $308.00

— $705.00

$1,102.00

$2,157.00

$1,411.00

$2,861.00

$2,175.00

$4,410.00

$3,277.00

$6,569.00

$3,586.00 $2,151.00

$7,272.00 $4,917.00

Civil Procedure Leg

Part 1 – Supreme Court

163

Schedule 1 - Court fees Schedule 1

Item 8 9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16 17 18

19

20 21 22

23 24

164

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable Filing a requisition for trial by jury Retaining a jury after the first day of trial Note: The fees under this item are to be paid by the party requesting a jury for the trial. Referring proceedings for arbitration under Division 2 of Part 5 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 Filing an application for an order for the rehearing of proceedings under Division 3 of Part 5 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 Hearing of proceedings by one or more judges, for each day of hearing or part of a day of hearing: (a) on the 2nd, 3rd or 4th day (b) on the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th or 9th day (c) on or after the 10th day Hearing of proceedings by an associate judge, for each day of hearing or part of a day of hearing on or after the 2nd day Preparing appeal papers (for such number of copies as the registrar orders to be printed) in volumes of not more than 250 pages Filing a notice of motion Preparing a copy of a will Conducting a genealogical search on a probate file (for each file searched) Conducting a search for an application for a grant of representation or reseal of a grant of representation (for each file searched) Lodging a caveat against an application for a grant of representation or reseal of a grant of representation Conducting an adoption search (for each file searched) Issuing a registrar’s certificate as to the signature of a public notary Publishing on the NSW Online Registry website a notice of intention to apply for a grant of representation or reseal of a grant of representation Publishing on the NSW Online Registry website a notice of intended distribution Publishing on the NSW Online Registry website a notice of application for passing accounts

Column 2 Standard fee $1,112.00 $507.00 per day

Column 3 Corporation fee $2,224.00 $1,014.00 per day

$831.00

—

$633.00

$1,266.00

$857.00 $1,378.00 $2,774.00 $754.00

$1,967.00 $3,417.00 $6,742.00 $1,508.00

$727.00 per volume

$1,454.00 per volume

$395.00 $59.00 $116.00

$904.00 — —

$59.00

—

$42.00

$84.00

$59.00

—

$59.00

—

$44.00

—

$44.00

—

$44.00

—

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (NSW)

Item 25

26 27

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable Republishing on the NSW Online Registry website a notice of intention to apply for a grant of representation or reseal of a grant of representation Republishing on the NSW Online Registry website a notice of intended distribution Republishing on the NSW Online Registry website a notice of application for passing accounts

Column 2 Standard fee $18.00

Column 3 Corporation fee —

$18.00

—

$18.00

—

Part 2 – Land and Environment Court Note:

Fees that are payable in relation to proceedings before the Land and Environment Court in Class 5, 6 or 7 of its jurisdiction are set out in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Criminal Procedure Regulation 2010.

Item 1

2

3

4

5

6

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable Filing an originating process in Class 1 of the Court’s jurisdiction (other than an originating process referred to in item 2) Filing an originating process in Class 1 of the Court’s jurisdiction under section 97 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 where the matter relates to a development application or to a building application, and where the value of the development or building: (a) is less than $500,000.00 (b) is $500,000.00 or more but less than $1,000,000.00 (c) is $1,000,000.00 or more Filing an originating process in Class 2 of the Court’s jurisdiction (other than an originating process referred to in item 4) Filing an originating process in Class 2 of the Court’s jurisdiction where the matter relates to an application under the Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006 Filing an originating process in Class 3 of the Court’s jurisdiction (other than an originating process referred to in item 6 or 7) Filing an originating process in Class 3 of the Court’s jurisdiction where the matter relates to an appeal or objection against a valuation of land, and where the value of the land, as determined by the respondent valuing authority: (a) is less than $500,000.00 (b) is $500,000.00 or more but less than $1,000,000.00

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Column 2 Standard fee $917.00

Column 3 Corporation fee $1,834.00

$917.00 $4,195.00

$1,834.00 $5,571.00

$5,240.00 $917.00

$6,960.00 $1,834.00

$239.00

$478.00

$917.00

$1,834.00

$322.00 $507.00

$644.00 $1,014.00

165

Civil Procedure Leg

Schedule 1

Schedule 1 - Court fees Schedule 1

Item 7

8 9

10

11

12

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable (c) is $1,000,000.00 or more Filing an originating process in Class 3 of the Court’s jurisdiction where the matter relates to a claim for compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land, as referred to in section 24 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979, and where the amount offered as compensation by the resuming or constructing authority: (a) is less than $500,000.00 (b) is $500,000.00 or more but less than $1,000,000.00 (c) is $1,000,000.00 or more Filing an originating process in Class 4 of the Court’s jurisdiction Filing an originating process in Class 8 of the Court’s jurisdiction where the matter relates to small-scale title within the meaning of the Mining Act 1992 Filing an originating process in Class 8 of the Court’s jurisdiction (other than an originating process referred to in item 9) Filing a process to commence an appeal to the Court under section 56A of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 Filing a notice of motion

Column 2 Standard fee $917.00

Column 3 Corporation fee $1,834.00

$917.00 $4,195.00

$1,834.00 $5,571.00

$5,240.00 $917.00

$6,960.00 $1,834.00

$239.00

$478.00

$917.00

$1,834.00

$2,143.00

$4,286.00

$213.00

$426.00

Part 3 – District Court Item 1 2 3

4 5

6

166

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable Filing an originating process (other than an originating process referred to in item 2) Filing an originating process in relation to an appeal Allocating a date for hearing of the proceedings by a judge, a judge and jury or a judicial registrar Filing a requisition for trial by jury Retaining a jury after the first day of trial Note: The fees under this item are to be paid by the party requesting a jury for the trial. Referring proceedings for arbitration under Division 2 of Part 5 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005

Column 2 Standard fee $654.00

Column 3 Corporation fee $1,308.00

$269.00

$538.00

$699.00

$1,398.00

$1,118.00 $507.00 per day

$2,236.00 $1,014.00 per day

$827.00

—

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (NSW)

Item 7

8 9

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable Filing an application for an order for the rehearing of proceedings under Division 3 of Part 5 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 Filing a notice of motion Hearing of proceedings by one or more judges, for each day of hearing or part of a day of hearing: (a) on the 2nd, 3rd or 4th day (b) on the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th or 9th day (c) on or after the 10th day

Column 2 Standard fee $633.00

Column 3 Corporation fee $1,266.00

$84.00

$168.00

$409.00 $716.00 $1,023.00

$818.00 $1,432.00 $2,046.00

Civil Procedure Leg

Schedule 1

Part 4 – Local Court Item 1

2

3 4

5

6 7

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable Filing an originating process, under Part 3 of the Local Court Act 2007, in the Local Court sitting in its General Division Filing an originating process, under Part 3 of the Local Court Act 2007, in the Local Court sitting in its Small Claims Division Filing an application notice under Part 4 of the Local Court Act 2007 Filing an application for an order for the rehearing of proceedings under Division 3 of Part 5 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 Serving or attempting service by post of originating process by the Local Court

Column 2 Standard fee $239.00

Column 3 Corporation fee $478.00

$97.00

$194.00

$91.00

—

$418.00

$836.00

$41.00 for each address to which process posted $84.00

—

Filing a notice of motion Filing a notice of appeal, or application for leave to appeal, to the District Court under Part 3 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, as applied to proceedings under Part 4 of the Local Court Act 2007: (a) in relation to a single notice $113.00 (b) in relation to more than 1 notice arising $59.00 from the same court appearance

$168.00

— —

Part 5 – Miscellaneous court fees Item 1

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable Issuing a subpoena (for production, to give evidence, or both)

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Column 2 Standard fee $100.00

Column 3 Corporation fee $200.00

167

Schedule 1 - Court fees Schedule 1

Item 2

3

4

5 6

7

8

9 10

168

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable Receipt by the registrar of a document or thing produced in compliance with a notice to produce under Part 34 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Filing or registering a copy or certificate of a judgment, order, determination, decree, adjudication or award of any other court or person under section 133 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 Opening or keeping open the registry or part of the registry: (a) on a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday (b) on any other day before 9 am or after 5 pm Requesting production to the court of documents held by another court Furnishing one or more sealed or certified copies of a judgment or order, or of the written opinion or reasons for opinion of any judicial or other officer of the court Retrieving, providing access to and furnishing a copy of any document (otherwise than as provided for by items 6, 8 and 10)

Column 2 Standard fee $82.00

Column 3 Corporation fee $164.00

$90.00

$180.00

$721.00

$1,442.00

$59.00

$118.00

$59.00

—

$13.00, plus $7.00 — for each 10 pages (or part of 10 pages) after the first 20 pages

Retrieving and providing access to, but not furnishing a copy of, any file or box of files, where the file or box of files is retrieved from: (a) the Government Records Repository or any other off-site storage facility (other than the State Archives): (i) standard retrieval request $14.00 per file or box of files Such additional (ii) non-standard retrieval request fee incurred by a (including an urgent, high or after court hours priority retrieval request or a retrieval request for delivery to or from a regional location outside the Sydney metropolitan area) (b) the State Archives—standard retrieval $34.50 per file or request box of files Supplying a duplicate recording of sound$51.00 recorded evidence—per cassette tape or disc Supplying a copy of a transcript of any proceedings:

— —

— —

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (NSW) Schedule 1

11

12 13

Column 1 Column 2 Matter for which fee payable Standard fee (a) where the matter being transcribed is under $87.00, plus an — 3 months old additional $11.00 for each page after the first 8 pages (b) where the matter being transcribed is 3 $107.00, plus an months old or older — additional $12.50 for each page after the first 8 pages Note: A person who is supplied with a copy of a transcript of any court proceedings by a third party provider (not being a court or the Department of Justice’s Reporting Services Branch) may be liable to pay a fee stipulated by that provider for that service. Such a fee is not subject to this item. Conducting a civil litigation search $42.00 for each name of company or individual searched Amending on the NSW Online Registry website $18.00 any document (for each document amended) Providing any service for which a fee is not $42.00 otherwise imposed by this Schedule Note: A fee may not be imposed under this item except with the approval of the registrar.

Column 3 Corporation fee —

— Civil Procedure Leg

Item

$84.00

— $84.00

[Sch 1 subst Reg 395 of 2016, Sch 1; Reg 389 of 2015, Sch 1[3]; Reg 405 of 2014, Sch 1; am Reg 59 of 2014; subst Reg 333 of 2013, Sch 1; am Reg 650 of 2012; Reg 649 of 2012]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

169

Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (NSW)

SCHEDULE 2 – SHERIFF’S FEES (Clause 5)

Item 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12

13

170

Column 1 Matter for which fee payable Serving or attempting service of any document, including service by post and preparation of affidavit of service Executing or attempting execution of an arrest warrant under section 97 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 Executing or attempting execution of a writ of possession under Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 Executing or attempting execution of a writ of delivery under Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 Executing or attempting execution of a writ for the levy of property under Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005

Column 2 Fee $65.00 for each address at which, and each occasion on which, service is effected or attempted $82.00 for each address at which, and each occasion on which, execution is effected or attempted $339.00 for each address at which, and each occasion on which, execution is effected or attempted $82.00 for each address at which, and each occasion on which, execution is effected or attempted $82.00 for each address at which, and each occasion on which, execution is effected or attempted, plus 3% of the Note: The 3% levy in Column 2 is not payable proceeds of enforcement in relation to writs executed by the Marshal in Admiralty. $339.00 for each address at which, and Executing or attempting execution of any court process (other than a warrant or writ referred to each occasion on which, execution is effected or attempted in item 2, 3, 4 or 5) $832.00 Preparing for sale of land following receipt of notice of sale from judgment creditor under rule 39.22 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Furnishing a certified copy of a writ for the levy $25.50 of property for registration under section 105A of the Real Property Act 1900 $454.00 per Sheriff’s officer per day Providing Sheriff’s officers to guard property seized under a writ of execution under Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 Attending a view by a jury in civil proceedings $180.00 Opening or keeping open the Sheriff’s office on $728.00 a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday or on any other day before 9 am or after 5 pm $59.00 for each name of company or Conducting a debt search on a judgment debt individual searched registered with the Sheriff’s office for enforcement Retrieving, providing access to and furnishing a $13.00, plus $7.00 for each 10 pages (or part of 10 pages) after the first 20 copy of any document (otherwise than as pages provided by item 8)

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Schedule 2 – Sheriff’s fees Schedule 2

Civil Procedure Leg

[Sch 2 subst Reg 395 of 2016, Sch 1; Reg 389 of 2015, Sch 1[4]; Reg 405 of 2014, Sch 1; Reg 333 of 2013, Sch 1]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

171

DELEGATIONS Supreme Court Delegations Delegation to Registrars pursuant to s 13 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (26 November 2012) ..................................................................................................................[SCDel.10] Delegation to Chief Clerks pursuant to s 13 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (4 October 2007) ..................................................................................................................[SCDel.20] Delegation to Registrars and Chief Clerks pursuant to cl 15 of the Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (27 September 2012) ..............................................................[SCDel.30] Delegation to the Court of Appeal Registrar pursuant to s 13 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (2 January 2008) ................................................................................................[SCDel.40]

District Court Delegations

Delegations

Delegated powers of registrars — Civil Procedure Act 2005 (13 March 2006) .....[DCDel.10] Delegated powers of registrars — Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (13 March 2006) ..................................................................................................................[DCDel.20]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

173

Delegations [SCDel.10]

SUPREME COURT DELEGATIONS [SCDel.10] DELEGATION TO REGISTRARS UNDER S 13 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT 2005 Pursuant to s 13 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, I direct that a registrar of the court (including a person acting as the registrar or as a deputy to the registrar) may exercise the functions of the court as stated in Pts 1 to 3 of the schedule to this direction. Dated: 26 November 2012 TF Bathurst Chief Justice of New South Wales

Schedule Part 1 The functions of the court as provided for in column 1 but subject to the restriction (if any) mentioned in column 3. The matter in column 2 is inserted for convenience of reference only and does not affect the operation of the direction. Civil Procedure Act 2005 Column 1 Section Section 14

Column 2 Description Dispense with rules in particular cases

Section 26(1)

Referral to mediation

Section Section Section Section (3)(g) Section Section

38(1) 43 45 61(1), (2),(3)(f) and

Referral to arbitration Order for rehearing of arbitration Discontinuance of rehearing Directions as to practice and procedure

64 65

Section 66 Section 67

Amendment of documents Amendment of originating process after expiration of limitations period Adjournment of proceedings Stay of proceedings

Section 68 Section 86

Attendance and production Orders and terms

Section 93(2)

Judgment for Detention of Goods

Section 98

Costs

174

Column 3 Restriction Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with By consent of the parties or expressly unopposed

Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with Restricted to default judgments Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Delegations [SCDel.10] Interest up to judgment

Section 101

Interest after judgment

Section 107

Deferral of payments and payments by instalments Order for examination of judgment debtor Extension of period of enforcement of stale judgment Prohibit Sheriff from acting on writ of execution

Section 108 Section 134 Section 135(2)(b)

Section 140 Section 146

Transfer of proceedings Court or a Local Court Transfer of proceedings Court or a Local Court

In respect of a judgment given or entered under Part 16 of the Rules In respect of a judgment given or entered under Part 16 of the Rules

Restricted to a writ of execution issued pursuant to a judgment given by default from the District Only if by consent or expressly unopposed to the District On if by consent or expressly unopposed

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Rule Rule 1.12

Description Extension and abridgment of time

Rule 1.13 Part 2

Fixing time Case management generally

Rule 4.10(4) Rule 4.13 Part 5 Rule 6.1

Rejection of documents Place for filing Preliminary discovery Leave to take step without filing appearance Continuation of proceedings wrongly commenced by Statement of Claim Continuation of proceedings wrongly commenced by Summons Postpone return day in summons Leave to join causes of action Leave to join parties in proceedings involving common questions Leave to join parties having joint entitlement Stay proceedings until jointly liable persons added as defendants Order separate trials or other order to avoid inconvenient joinder

Rule 6.5 Rule 6.6 Rule 6.16 Rule 6.18 Rule 6.19 Rule 6.20 Rule 6.21 Rule 6.22

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Restriction Excluding abridging time for service of a summons Except a direction or order the subject of a restriction elsewhere in this direction.

175

Delegations

Section 100

Delegations [SCDel.10] Rule Rule 6.24 Rules 6.27 and 6.28

Rule 6.29 Rules 6.30 and 6.31 Rule 6.32 Rule 7.3 Rule 7.15(5) Rule 7.18 Rule 7.21 Rule 7.22 Rule 7.29 Rule 9.8(a) Rule 9.9 Rule 10.1 Rule 10.2

Rule 10.7 Rule 10.14 Rule 10.15 Rule 10.16 Rule 11.4 Rule 11.5 Rule 12.1 and 12.3 Rule 12.4 Rule 12.5 Rule 12.7(1)

Rule Rule Rule Rule 176

12.8 12.10 13.6 14.2

Description Order addition of parties Join third party and determine date of commencement of proceedings relating to them Order removal of party Effect of change of party in proceedings Future conduct of proceedings Leave to an unrepresented litigant to issue subpoena Leave to replace tutor in proceedings Appointment and removal of tutor Striking out appearance of person sued in a business name Leave to proceed before amendment made Withdrawal of solicitor Leave to separately determine cross-claims Leave for proceedings to continue together Service of filed documents Service of affadavits

Orders as to the giving of notice by the Court Substituted and informal service Possession of land; service by affixing copy of originating process Service on person in default by filing Leave to proceed when originating process served outside Australia Leave to serve documents outside Australia and confirmation thereof Leave to discontinue Stay of further proceedings to secure costs of discontinuance of proceedings Leave to withdraw an appearance Dismiss proceedings for want of due despatch by plaintiff

Restriction

Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with

Provided at least one month’s notice of the proposal to make such an order has been given to the plaintiff

Other grounds for dismissal Stay to secure costs after dismissal Dismiss for non appearance of plaintiff Dispense with further pleadings NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Delegations [SCDel.10] Rule Rule 14.3 Rule 14.5 Rules 14.22 – 14.24 Part 15

Description Time for filing defence Further pleadings Verification of pleadings Particulars

Part 16 Part18

Default judgment Motions

Part 19 Rules 20.2 and 20.3 Rules 20.9 – 20.12 Rule 20.34 Part 21 Part 22 Rule 23.4 Rule 23.7 Rule 23.8 Rule 23.9

Amendment Directions about mediation Arbitration Acknowledgment of a liquidated claim Discovery/Inspection/Production Interrogatories Order for medical examination Order for rehabilitation test Inspection of property Default in compliance under Part 23

Rules 24.3, 6, 9, and 14

Taking evidence otherwise than at trial

Rules 26.3, 4, 5, and 8 Rule 28.5 Rule 31.4 Rule 31.5

Receivers Consolidation, etc Service of witness statements Order re notice under s 67 or s 99 of the Evidence Act 1995 Directions before calling expert witnesses Service of experts’ reports Subpoenas Notice to produce at hearing Using irregular affidavit Cross examination of Deponent Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with Filing of affidavit

Rule 31.19 Rule 31.20(2)(a) Part 33 Part 34 Rule 35.1 Rule 35.2

Rule 35.9

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Restriction

Except for an order to dismissal the proceedings under UCPR 15.16

Except for an order that judgment be given, a defence be stuck out or that the proceedings, or nay part of the relief claimed in the proceedings be dismissed. Except where the order is made under section 7 or section 10 of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994.

177

Delegations

Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with

Delegations [SCDel.10] Rule Rule 36.1A

Description Consent Orders

Rule 36.11

Entry of judgment or orders

Rule 36.14

Service of Judgment or Order

Rule 36.16 Rule 36.17 Rule 36.18

Part 42

Setting aside default judgment “Slip rule” Variation of judgment or order against party operating under unregistered business name Instalment Orders Variation of Instalment Orders Examination of judgment debtor Application of Part to persons that are corporations Enforcement of judgments Payment of interest accruing on money paid into Court Non-attendance of parties following notice by Court Order for costs

Rule Rule Rule Rule

Costs of Discontinued Proceedings Security for costs Costs on Instalment Orders Entry and Removal from specialist list

Rule 37.4 Rule 37.6 Rules 38.1 – 38.5 Rule 38.7 Part 39 Rule 41.8(2) Rules 41.9

42.19 42.21 42.28 45.2

Part 46 Rule 49.22

178

Accounts and Enquiries Stay registrar’s decision

Restriction Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with Unless the Court directs entry to be effected in a specified manner. Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with

Restricted to proceedings in which the registrar has a function under an Act or the Rules, or in which the function has been delegated by this direction, or in which a matter has been referred to the registrar by a Judge or Associate Judge.

Except for Commercial List and Technology and Construction List matters Except UCPR 46.12(4)(b) Limited to staying the decision under review

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Delegations [SCDel.10]

Part 2 – Supreme Court Rules The functions of the Court as provided for in Column 1 but subject to the restriction (if any) mentioned in Column 3. and/or rule 51B – 5(8) 9 58

Part 59A Part 68 – Rule 2(2)(c)(ii) Part 71A – Rule 6(2) Rule 7 Part 80 – Rule 18(4) Rule 21(1) Rule 62 Part 80A – Rule 36

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Description

Restriction

Direction concerning filing of affidavit Direction concerning filing of affidavit Taking evidence for foreign and Australian courts and tribunals Enforcement of external judgments Administration of estates: determination of question Notifying the Sheriff of change in interest rate Assessment of costs and expenses

Delegations

Part Part Rule Rule Part

Time for advertising winding up application Order substituting plaintiff Examination of person concerned with corporation Examination of persons concerned with corporations

179

Delegations [SCDel.10]

Part 3 – General 1 Orders under the following legislation as provided – The matter in Column 2 is inserted for convenience of reference only and does not affect the operation of the direction. Part and/or rule Description (for information only) Contractors Debts Act 1997 (NSW) Section 7(1), (1)(A) Certification of debt by court Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) Section 36A Power to direct division of chattels

Section 55(2A), (3)

Section 63(3) Section 115(6)

Registrar to exercise this power only with the consent of the parties Right of purchaser to recover deposit etc Registrar to exercise this power only with the consent of the parties Covenants to produce implied by schedule of documents Powers, remuneration and duties of receiver Regulations respecting notices

Section 170(1)(d) Co-operatives Act 1992 (NSW) Section 105E General powers of the Court

Sch 4 cl 10 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Section 425 Subsection 429(3) Section 440D(1)

Sections 449C and 449D

Subsections 449E(1) and (1A)

Sections 459A and 459B (except in respect of applications under s 234) Section 459R

180

Restriction

Registrar to exercise this power only with the consent of the parties

Remuneration of a receiver, etc Fix a receiver’s remuneration Extend the period for submission of a controller’s report Grant leave to begin or proceed with a proceeding in a court against a company which is in administration, or in relation to any of its property Appoint an administrator of a company in administration, or of a deed of company arrangement, where there is a casual vacancy Fix the remuneration of an administrator of a company, or of a deed of company arrangement Order that an insolvent company be wound up in insolvency on an application made under s 459P, s 462 or s 464 Extend the period within which an application for a company to be wound up in insolvency must be determined

Where the application is not opposed

Where the application is not opposed

Where the application is not opposed

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Delegations [SCDel.10] Description (for information only) Order the winding up of a company

Section 465B

Substitute an applicant or applicants in an application under s 459P, 462 or 464 Grant leave to oppose an application under s 459P, 462 or 464 notwithstanding failure to file and serve notice of grounds of opposition and an affidavit verifying Otherwise order in respect of reimbursement of the applicant’s costs, and payment of the costs incurred by a company or liquidator as applicant Dismiss, adjourn or make an interim order in a winding up application

Section 465C

Subsections 466(2) and (4)

Section 467

Paragraph 470(2)(b) Section 471B

Section 472(1) Subsection 473(1) Subsection 473(2) Subsection 473(3) Subsection 473(7) Subsection 473(8)

Section 480 Subsection 481(1) Subsection 482(1) Paragraph 484(2)(b) Section 486

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Direct service of copy of order on another person Grant leave to begin or proceed with a proceeding in a court or enforcement process against a company being wound up by the Court or in relation to its property Appoint official liquidator Remove a liquidator appointed by the Court Determine provisional liquidator’s remuneration Determine remuneration of liquidator Fill vacancy in office of official liquidator in a winding up by the Court Declare whether anything to be done by liquidator is to be done by all or any one or more of appointees, where more than one liquidator is appointed by the Court Release liquidator and deregister company Order preparation of report on accounts of liquidator Order staying the winding up of a company for a limited time Fix remuneration of special manager = Order for inspection of books of company by creditors or contributories in a winding up by the Court

Restriction Where the application is not opposed

Where the Registrar makes the relevant winding-up order

Where the Registrar has power to make a final order on the application Where the Registrar makes the relevant winding up order Where the application is not opposed

Where the Registrar makes the relevant winding up order Where the application is not opposed

Where the application is not opposed Where the Registrar appoints the liquidators

Where the winding- up order was made by a Registrar

181

Delegations

Part and/or rule Section 461

Delegations [SCDel.10] Part and/or rule Section 500(2)

Description (for information only) Appoint liquidator to fill a casual vacancy in a voluntary winding up Paragraph 511(1)(b) Exercise, in a voluntary winding up, powers of the Court which might be exercised if a company were being wound up by the Court Paragraph 542(3)(a) Directions abridging the period for which books of the company must be retained Paragraph 585(b) Approval or direction in respect of manner of service of notice to Part 5.7 body of institution of action or proceeding against member Sections 596A, 596B Summon a person for examination about a corporation’s examinable affairs Section 596F Directions about examination Section 597, except subsection Conduct of examination (15) Subsection 601AH(2) Order that ASIC reinstate registration of a company

Subsection 601CC(9)

Order directing restoration of name of registered Australian body to the Register, and associated directions

Subsection 601CL(10)

Order directing restoration of name of registered foreign company to the Register, and associated directions

Section 1335 Require security to be given for costs Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) Section 168(2), (4), (7) Time limits for making certain requests Section 177(3) Certificates of expert evidence Section 193(1) Additional powers Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994 (Cth) Section 16 Non-compliance with subpoenas Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) Section 6 Application for, and effect of, registration of foreign judgments Section 7 Setting aside a registered judgment

182

Restriction Where the application is not opposed Where the power is one that the Registrar could exercise if the company were being wound up by the Court

Where notice of the application has been served on ASIC and the application is not opposed by ASIC or any other person Where notice of the application has been served on ASIC and the application is not opposed by ASIC or any other person Where notice of the application has been served on ASIC and the application is not opposed by ASIC or any other person

Registrar to exercise this power only with the consent of the parties

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Delegations [SCDel.10] Description (for information only) Issue of certificates of judgments obtained in Australian courts

Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1942 (NSW) Section 14E(1), (2) Joint hearing of certain proceedings

Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) Section 29 Subpoenas may be served in any part of Australia Section 30(1) Time for service Section 35(3) Entitlement to expenses Section 45(3) Entitlement to expenses Section 87(4) Entitlement to expenses Succession Act 2006 (NSW) Section 58(2) Application for extension of time

Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) Section 72 Production for examination of a person confined Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999 (NSW) Rule 2.12 Proof of publication Rule 2.13

Leave to creditor, contributory or officer to be heard Rule 11.3(7) Access to an affidavit filed to support an application for an examination summons Rule 11.4 Service of an examination summons Rule 11.8(1) Access to transcript of an examination, etc. Uncollected Goods Act 1995 (NSW) Section 18 Exercising the jurisdiction of the Court, including granting leave under subsection (1)

Restriction Registrar to exercise this power only with the consent of the parties Registrar to exercise this power only with the consent of the parties

Registrar to exercise this power only with the consent of the parties, excluding cases in which settlement requires approval

Where application is being heard by the registrar Where application is being heard by the registrar

2 Any judgment by consent and any order by consent. 3 Accepting an undertaking given to the Court for th e payment of a sum of money within a time specified in the undertaking. 4 The vouching or passing of the account of a receiver, manager, guardian, trustee, mortgagee or other fiduciary or the taking of any account, the making of any inquiry or the doing of any other thing to which Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Pt 46 applies and which is directed by any judgment or order. (This paragraph does not apply in relation to accounts referred to in s 85 of the Probate and Administration Act 1898.) 5 Certifying a copy of a document to be a true copy where the registrar is authorised under any Act or Commonwealth Act or under the rules to issue or fur nish a certificate or office copy of the document. 6 Order for costs provided it is unlikely in the opin ion of the registrar that the costs will exceed $20 ,000. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

183

Delegations

Part and/or rule Section 15(1)

Delegations [SCDel.10] 7 Any matter which a Judge or an Associate Judge may conduct or deal with and is referred to a registrar by order of a Judge or Associate Judge. 8 Accepting an undertaking, or the continuation of a n undertaking, given to the Court. 9 A registrar may exercise the functions of the Cour t for the purposes of, and in respect of all matter s incidental to, the exercise of the registrar’s powe rs under any Act, under any other provision of the rules, or under this direction. 10 A registrar may exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Court under the Mutual Recognition Act 1992 or under the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997. 11 Issuing subpoena. Note: Powers of the Registrar in Probate continue as specified in Supreme Court Rules 1970 Pt 78.

184

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Delegations [SCDel.20] [SCDel.20] DELEGATION TO CHIEF CLERKS UNDER S 13 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT 2005 Pursuant to section 13 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, I direct that a chief clerk of the court (including a person acting as a chief clerk) may exercise the functions of the court as stated in Parts 1 and 2 of the schedule to this direction. Dated: 4 October 2007 JJ Spigelman AC Chief Justice of New South Wales

Schedule Part 1 The functions of the court as provided for in column 1 but subject to the restriction (if any) mentioned in column 3. The matter in column 2 is inserted for convenience of reference only and does not affect the operation of the direction. Column 2 Description

Column 3 Restriction

Section 98

Costs

Section 100

Interest up to judgment

In respect of a judgment given by default under Part 16 of the Rules In respect of a judgment given by default under Part 16 of the Rules

Delegations

Column 1 Section Civil Procedure Act 2005

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules Rule Part 16

Description Default judgment

Rule 36.10 Rule 36.11

Filing of certificates Entry of judgment and orders

Rule 39.1(d)

Writ of possession

Restriction Restricted to the following – (a) judgment for possession of land under UCPR 16.4 (b) judgment for a liquidated demand under UCPR 16.6 (c) judgment for a mixed claim under UCPR 16.8 but only if the claims are for possession of land and a liquidated demand Unless the Court directs entry to be effected in a specified manner In respect of a judgment entered by default under Part 16 of the Rules

Part 2 1. Certifying a copy of a judgment, order or document to be a true copy, sealing a judgment or order that has been given or entered in proceedings, or sealing and signing a document that accurately sets out the terms of © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

185

Delegations [SCDel.20] the judgment or order given or entered in proceedings where the registrar, or other proper officer of the court, is authorised under any Act or Commonwealth Act or under the rules to issue or furnish a certificate, sealed copy or office copy of the document. 2. Issuing subpoena.

186

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Delegations [SCDel.40] [SCDel.30] DELEGATION TO REGISTRARS AND CHIEF CLERKS UNDER CL 15 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE REGULATION 2012 Pursuant to cl 15 of the Civil Procedure Regulation 2012, I direct that: 1. Any registrar of the Supreme Court (including a person acting as the registrar or as a deputy to the registrar) may exercise all of the functions conferred in respect of the regulation except in relation to the waiver or remission of fees. 2. The Prothonotary (including a person acting as the Prothonotary) may waive or remit a fee. 3. A chief clerk of the Supreme Court (including a person acting as a chief clerk) may postpone a fee imposed under the regulation provided that the fee is not postponed for a period of greater than seven days. This delegation takes effect from 27 September 2012. Dated: 27 September 2012 Linda Murphy

[SCDel.40] DELEGATION TO THE COURT OF APPEAL REGISTRAR UNDER S 13 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT 2005 Pursuant to section 13 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, I direct that the Registrar of the Court of Appeal (including a person acting as the registrar) may exercise the functions of the Court as stated in the schedule to this direction. Dated: 2 January 2008 JJ Spigelman AC Chief Justice of New South Wales

Schedule The functions of the court as provided for in column 1 but subject to the restriction (if any) mentioned in column 3. The matter in column 2 is inserted for convenience of reference only and does not affect the operation of the direction. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Column 1 Section Rule 13.4

Column 2 Description Frivolous and vexatious proceedings

Rule 51.4(3) Rule 51.5(1)

Addition or removal of party Leave to take step without entering appearance Extension of time Extension of time Extension of time Extension of time Extension of time Extension of time Extension of time Extension of time

Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule

51.6 51.9(1)(b) 51.10(2) 51.11(2) 51.16(1) 51.16(2) 51.17(2) 51.17(3)

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Column 3 Restriction Incompetent proceedings and failure to prosecute

187

Delegations

Principal Registrar

Delegations [SCDel.40] Rule 51.20(2) Rule 51.21 Rule 51.25(1) Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule

188

51.31(2) 51.33(1) 51.34(3) 51.39 51.41(1) 51.41(2) 51.50(1) 51.51(2) 51.51(5) 51.51(6) 51.57(1) 51.61

Specify return day for notice of appeal Alteration of return day Directions for preparation of appeal book Leave to amend appeal book Timetable for orange book Amendment of submissions Use of White Folder Objection to competency Costs on incompetency Security for costs Return day for motion Directions for filing evidence Directions for filing affidavits Directions for hearing in fixed vacation Evidence in support of motion

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

DISTRICT COURT DELEGATIONS [DCDel.10] DELEGATED POWERS OF REGISTRARS – CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT 2005 Under s 13 of the Civil Procedure Regulation 2005, I direct that the Principal Registrar, registrars for proclaimed places and assistant registrars may exercise the powers conferred by the legislation listed in column 1 and described in column 2, but subject to any restriction listed in column 3 The Hon. R.O. Blanch AM Chief Judge 13 March 2006 Civil Procedure Act 2005

Section 63

Column 2 Description Referral to mediation Referral to arbitration Order for rehearing Directions as to practice and procedure generally Directions with respect to procedural irregularities

Section 64

Amendment of documents generally

Section 65

Amendment of originating process after expiry of limitation period

Section 66 Section 67

Adjournment of proceedings before registrar Stay of proceedings

Section 98

Courts powers as to costs

Section 108

Determination of applications for orders for examination Orders extending the prescribed period for the issue of writs of execution, garnishee orders, etc Transfer of proceedings from Local Court to District Court Transfer of proceedings from District Court to the Local Court

Section 134

Section 140 Section 146

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Column 3 Restriction By consent of the parties

Delegations

Column 1 Section Section 26 Section 38 Section 43 Section 61(1) and (2)

Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with Restricted to those matters which a registrar may deal with

Pending a hearing by the court on the next available court sitting day Restricted to proceedings before a registrar

189

Delegations [DCDel.10] [DCDel.20] DELEGATED POWERS OF REGISTRARS – UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES Under s 13 of the Civil Procedure Regulation 2005, I direct that the Principal Registrar, registrars for proclaimed places and assistant registrars may exercise the powers conferred by the legislation listed in column 1 and described in column 2, but subject to any restriction listed in column 3 The Hon. R.O. Blanch AM Chief Judge 13 March 2006 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Column 1 Rule Rule 1.12 Rule 2.3 (except (k) & (I)) Rule 1.12 (except (k) & (I)) Rule 5.2 Rule 5.3 Rule 5.4 Rule 5.8 Rule 6.1 Rule 6.16 Rule 6.18 Rule 6.19 Rule 6.20 Rule 6.24 Rule Rule Rule Rule

6.27 6.29 6.30 6.32

Rule Rule Rule Rule

7.3 8.1 8.2 8.3

Rule 10.14 Rule 15.10 Rule 16 (except subrule 10) 190

Column 2 Column 3 Description Restriction Extension and abridgment of time Directions for the conduct of proceedings Directions for the conduct of proceedings Discovery to ascertain prospective defendant’s identity or whereabouts Discovery of documents from prospective defendant Discovery of documents from other persons Costs and other expenses No step without originating process or notice of appearance Alteration of return day in summons Joinder of causes of action Proceedings involving common questions of law or fact Proceedings affecting persons having joint entitlement Court may join party if joinder proper or necessary Joinder on application of third party Removal of parties by order Effect of certain changes on proceedings Orders as to future conduct of proceedings Leave to issue Subpoena. Venue at which proceedings to be heard Change of venue generally Part not to apply to orders for examination Orders for substituted service Orders for particulars Entry of default judgments NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Delegations

Rule 19.1–19.6 Rule 20.12 Rule 20.34(3) Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule

21.2 22.1 and 22.4 23.4 23.8(1)(a)-(e) 28.5

Rule 31.19 and 31.20

Rule 33.2 Rule 33.3 Rule 33.8

Rule 36.1 (Amendment to delegation 22/1/07

Rule 36.1A (Amendment to delegation 17/4/07) (Amendment to delegation 8/7/10, removal of column 3 restriction) Rule 36.16 (except subrule 3(b) Rule 36.17 Rule 36.18

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Orders for the amendment of documents Orders for the rehearing of actions referred to arbitration Entry of judgment pursuant to an acknowledgement of a liquidated claim Orders for discovery Orders to answer interrogatories Orders for medical examination Orders for the inspection of property etc Orders that matters be consolidated or heard together Court’s power to direct the service of experts’ reports

Issuing of subpoena Form of subpoena Directions in relation to the removal, return, inspection, copying and disposal of subpoenaed material General power to make orders as the nature of the case requires

Restricted to directions for the service of experts’ reports for the preparation of timetables for the case management of matters. This delegation does not extend to directions in relation to court-appointed experts (rule 31.46) and parties’ single experts (rule 31.37)

Order may be made by consent – to be consented to: (a) by the parties to the application for the order; and (b) by any other persons who will be required to comply with the order or to suffer anything to be done under the order

Court’s power to give judgment, or order that judgment be entered, in the terms of an agreement between the parties in relation to the proceedings between them

Orders setting aside a judgment entered under Part 16 Correction of judgment or order (slip rule) Orders for the variation of a judgment or order against a party operating under an unregistered business name

191

Delegations

[DCDel.20]

Delegations [DCDel.20] Rule 37.1 Rule 37.4

Rule 38.2–4

Rule 36.18

Rule 39.1 Rule 39.2 Rule 39.34, 39.35 and 39.38 Rule 42.7

192

Orders in accordance with instalment agreement Determination of objection to instalment order or to an order refusing an instalment application Determination of applications for orders for examination (see section 108 Civil Procedure Act 2005 ) Conducting an examination of a judgment debtor and the authorisation of issue of notice of judgment debtor under rule 38.6 Orders for leave to issue writ of execution Orders in respect of the issue of writs of execution Orders in respect of the issue of garnishee orders Orders that costs in interlocutory applications by payable before the conclusion of the proceedings

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 2005 – (ANNOTATED) Part 1 – Preliminary Division 1 – General 1.1 Name of rules.................................................................................................................................. 227 1.2 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 227 1.3 References to barristers and solicitors............................................................................................227 1.4 Saving as to discovery.................................................................................................................... 228 1.5 Application of these rules................................................................................................................ 229 1.6 Exclusion of provisions of Civil Procedure Act 2005...................................................................... 230 1.7 Local rules that prevail over these rules......................................................................................... 230 1.8 Determination of questions arising under these rules.................................................................... 231 1.9 Objections to production of documents and answering of questions founded on privilege........... 231 1.10 Powers of the judicial registrar [Repealed]..................................................................................... 233 1.10A Powers of associate Judges of the Supreme Court....................................................................... 233 1.10B When Part 11A concerning service under Hague Convention has effect.......................................234 Division 2 – Time 1.11 Reckoning of time........................................................................................................................... 235 1.12 Extension and abridgment of time.................................................................................................. 235 1.13 Fixing times..................................................................................................................................... 237

Division 4 – Distribution of business between Divisions of Supreme Court 1.16 Assignment of business to Divisions...............................................................................................239 1.17 Bulk transfers between Supreme Court Divisions.......................................................................... 240 1.18 Assignment of business to Common Law Division.........................................................................241 1.19 Assignment of business to Equity Division..................................................................................... 241 1.20 Declarations of right and injunctions............................................................................................... 242 1.21 Removal to Court of Appeal............................................................................................................ 242 Division 5 – Notices under section 78B of Judiciary Act 1903 of Commonwealth 1.22 Notice of constitutional matter.........................................................................................................243 1.23 Time for filing and service of notice of constitutional matter.......................................................... 244 1.24 Affidavit of service........................................................................................................................... 245 1.25 Documents for intervening Attorneys-General................................................................................ 245 Division 6 – Procedure in particular circumstances 1.26 Procedure under particular Acts......................................................................................................246 1.27 Procedure in particular District Court lists.......................................................................................246 Part 2 – Case management generally 2.1 Directions and orders...................................................................................................................... 247 2.2 Appointment for hearing.................................................................................................................. 247 2.3 Case management by the court......................................................................................................248 Part 3 – Electronic case management Division 1 – Preliminary 3.1 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 249 3.2 Application of Part........................................................................................................................... 250 Division 2 – Registration of users of Online Registry 3.3 Registration of users....................................................................................................................... 250 Division 3 – Filing documents using Online Registry 3.4 Electronic filing of documents......................................................................................................... 251 3.5 Uploading documents......................................................................................................................252 3.6 Electronic issuing of a document.................................................................................................... 253 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

193

UCPR

Division 3 – Fees and other amounts 1.14 Prescribed fees and other amounts................................................................................................ 238 1.15 Fees chargeable under the Oaths Act 1900................................................................................... 238

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15

Electronic service of a document.................................................................................................... 253 Use of Online Registry in business conducted in absence of public............................................. 254 Party filing document required to serve notice of listing.................................................................255 Request for a certified copy of a judgment or order.......................................................................255 Filing of affidavits using Online Registry’s XML filing..................................................................... 256 Written record to be kept of direction to e-file document submitted using Online Registry’s XML filing or if scanned copy of document is not uploaded...........................................................256 Filing of wills.................................................................................................................................... 256 Request to issue subpoena............................................................................................................ 257 Coversheet generated by Online Registry...................................................................................... 257

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 1 – Preparation of documents generally 4.1 Application of Division..................................................................................................................... 258 4.2 Documents to be filed to contain certain information..................................................................... 258 4.2A List of parties................................................................................................................................... 264 4.3 Paper and writing............................................................................................................................ 264 4.4 Signing documents.......................................................................................................................... 266 4.5 Address for service......................................................................................................................... 267 4.6 Changing address for service......................................................................................................... 269 4.7 Numbers.......................................................................................................................................... 270 4.7A Land descriptions............................................................................................................................ 270 4.8 Separate documents for separate process..................................................................................... 271 4.9 Delegation by NSW Trustee and Guardian.....................................................................................271 Division 2 – Filing of documents 4.10 Filing generally................................................................................................................................ 272 4.11 Case number or other unique identifier to be assigned to originating process..............................274 4.12 Lodgment of additional copies of originating process for service...................................................275 4.13 Place for filing..................................................................................................................................276 4.14 Filing of notices on behalf of multiple parties................................................................................. 276 4.15 Court’s power to deal with scandalous matter in documents......................................................... 277 4.16 Court to be advised as to subrogation to corporation.................................................................... 278 Part 5 – Preliminary discovery and inspection 5.1 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 280 5.2 Discovery to ascertain prospective defendant’s identity or whereabouts.......................................280 5.3 Discovery of documents from prospective defendant.....................................................................282 5.4 Discovery of documents from other persons.................................................................................. 284 5.5 Discovery and inspection generally.................................................................................................284 5.6 Security for costs.............................................................................................................................285 5.7 Privilege........................................................................................................................................... 285 5.8 Costs and other expenses.............................................................................................................. 286 Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 1 – General 6.1 No step without originating process or notice of appearance........................................................ 287 6.1A Proceedings that do not require a defendant................................................................................. 288 Division 2 – Originating process 6.2 How proceedings commenced........................................................................................................ 289 6.3 Where statement of claim required................................................................................................. 292 6.4 Where summons required............................................................................................................... 294 6.5 Proceedings wrongly commenced by statement of claim...............................................................296 6.6 Proceedings wrongly commenced by summons.............................................................................297 6.7 Determination.................................................................................................................................. 298 6.8 Originating process for recovery of land to be served on occupier................................................299 6.8A Originating process for proceedings to be entered in Possession List.......................................... 300 Division 3 – Defendant to proceedings to enter appearance 6.9 How appearance entered................................................................................................................ 300 194

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions 6.10 6.11

Time for appearance....................................................................................................................... 301 Defendant may submit to judgment by notice of appearance........................................................ 303

Division 4 – Contents of statement of claim and summons 6.12 Relief claimed.................................................................................................................................. 304 6.13 Notice to defendant in statement of claim...................................................................................... 306 6.14 Notice to defendant in summons.................................................................................................... 307 6.15 Summons to specify return day...................................................................................................... 308 6.16 Alteration of return day in summons............................................................................................... 308 6.17 Payment towards liquidated claim stays proceedings on claim..................................................... 309 Division 5 – Joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties 6.18 Joinder of causes of action............................................................................................................. 310 6.19 Proceedings involving common questions of law or fact................................................................ 311 6.20 Proceedings affecting persons having joint entitlement..................................................................313 6.21 Proceedings affecting persons having joint or several liability....................................................... 314 6.22 Court may order separate trials if joinder of party or cause of action inconvenient...................... 315 6.23 Effect of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.................................................................................. 316 6.24 Court may join party if joinder proper or necessary....................................................................... 316 6.25 Joinder as plaintiff requires party’s consent....................................................................................318 6.26 Joinder to recover costs.................................................................................................................. 318 6.27 Joinder on application of third party................................................................................................319 6.28 Date of commencement of proceedings in relation to parties joined............................................. 320 Division 6 – Removal of parties 6.29 Removal of parties by order............................................................................................................321 6.30 Effect of certain changes on proceedings.......................................................................................321 6.31 Court may dismiss proceedings not prosecuted following death of party...................................... 323

Division 8 – Referred questions of law and stated cases 6.33 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 325 6.34 Application of Division..................................................................................................................... 325 6.35 Originating process......................................................................................................................... 326 6.36 Form of special case....................................................................................................................... 327 6.37 Procedure for preparing special case............................................................................................. 328 6.38 Conduct of proceedings.................................................................................................................. 329 6.39 Insufficient case...............................................................................................................................329 6.40 Inferences........................................................................................................................................ 330 6.41 Referred matters under section 28 of the Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930.......................................................................................................................................... 331 Division 9 – Issues arising under foreign law 6.42 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 333 6.43 Filing of notices............................................................................................................................... 333 6.44 Orders..............................................................................................................................................336 6.45 Determination of issues arising in foreign court proceedings.........................................................337 Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 1 – General 7.1 By whom proceedings may be commenced and carried on.......................................................... 338 7.2 Affidavit as to authority to commence and carry on proceedings in Supreme Court or District Court................................................................................................................................................342 7.3 Issue of subpoena in certain circumstances requires leave...........................................................344 7.3A Notice of change of address by party............................................................................................. 345 Division 2 – Representation 7.4 Representation of concurrent interests [Repealed].........................................................................345 7.6 Representation in cases concerning administration of estates, trust property or statutory interpretation....................................................................................................................................348 7.7 Judgments and orders bind represented persons in estate and trust property proceedings 349 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

195

UCPR

Division 7 – Orders as to future conduct of proceedings 6.32 Orders as to the future conduct of proceedings............................................................................. 324

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) 7.8 7.9 7.10

Court may determine who has conduct of proceedings................................................................. 350 Judgments and orders bind beneficiaries....................................................................................... 350 Interests of deceased person..........................................................................................................351

Division 3 – Executors, administrators and trustees 7.11 Executors, administrators and trustees...........................................................................................352 7.12 Beneficiaries and claimants............................................................................................................ 353 Division 4 – Persons under legal incapacity 7.13 Definition..........................................................................................................................................354 7.14 Proceedings to be commenced or carried on by tutor................................................................... 355 7.15 Tutors generally...............................................................................................................................358 7.16 Tutor to file certain documents........................................................................................................359 7.17 Non-appearance of person under legal incapacity......................................................................... 360 7.18 Court may appoint and remove tutors............................................................................................ 361 Division 5 – Business names 7.19 Persons to sue and be sued in own name..................................................................................... 362 7.20 Proceedings against defendant operating under unregistered business name............................. 363 7.21 Defendant sued in business name to respond in own name......................................................... 364 7.22 Plaintiff to amend documents in the proceedings to replace business name with defendant’s own name........................................................................................................................................ 364 Division 6 – Relators 7.23 Relators........................................................................................................................................... 365 Division 7 – Appointment and removal of solicitors 7.24 Power to act by solicitor.................................................................................................................. 366 7.25 Adverse parties............................................................................................................................... 368 7.26 Change of solicitor or agent............................................................................................................ 369 7.27 Removal of solicitor......................................................................................................................... 370 7.28 Appointment of solicitor by previously unrepresented party........................................................... 371 7.29 Withdrawal of solicitor..................................................................................................................... 371 7.30 Effect of change.............................................................................................................................. 373 7.31 Actions by a solicitor corporation.................................................................................................... 374 Division 8 – Commencement of proceedings under particular Acts 7.32 Proceedings under the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989............................................ 375 Division 9 – Court appointed referral for legal assistance 7.33 Objectives........................................................................................................................................ 376 7.34 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 376 7.35 Pro Bono Panel............................................................................................................................... 377 7.36 Referral to a barrister or solicitor.................................................................................................... 377 7.37 Kind of assistance........................................................................................................................... 379 7.38 Provision of assistance by barrister or solicitor.............................................................................. 380 7.39 Cessation of assistance.................................................................................................................. 380 7.40 Application for leave........................................................................................................................ 381 7.41 Costs............................................................................................................................................... 381 7.42 Disbursements.................................................................................................................................382 Part 8 – Venue 8.1 Venue at which proceedings to be heard....................................................................................... 383 8.2 Change of venue generally............................................................................................................. 384 8.3 Part not to apply to orders for examination.................................................................................... 385 Part 9 – Cross-claims 9.1 Making of cross-claim..................................................................................................................... 387 9.2 Existing parties need not enter separate appearance.................................................................... 389 9.3 Cross-claimant may rely on previous pleadings............................................................................. 389 9.4 Defence........................................................................................................................................... 390 9.5 Default of cross-defendant to cross-claim.......................................................................................391 9.6 Service on active parties................................................................................................................. 392 196

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.10 9.11

Service on new parties....................................................................................................................392 Directions.........................................................................................................................................393 Proceedings to continue together................................................................................................... 393 Cross-claim may be separately prosecuted....................................................................................394 Contribution or indemnity................................................................................................................ 394

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 1 – Service generally 10.1 Service of filed documents.............................................................................................................. 396 10.2 Service of affidavits......................................................................................................................... 396 10.3 Service of originating process in Australia...................................................................................... 397 10.4 Operation of Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 of the Commonwealth......................... 398

Division 3 – Personal service 10.20 Personal service required only in certain circumstances................................................................413 10.21 How personal service effected generally........................................................................................ 415 10.22 Personal service on corporation......................................................................................................416 10.23 Personal service on Crown Solicitor............................................................................................... 417 10.24 Personal service on judicial officers................................................................................................418 10.25 Personal service on inmate of correctional centre..........................................................................419 10.26 Personal service on person who “keeps house”.............................................................................419 10.27 Proof of identity............................................................................................................................... 420 Division 4 – Service under particular Acts 10.28 Service under the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989.................................................... 421 10.29 Service under the Industrial Relations Act 1996.............................................................................421 Part 11 – Service of documents outside Australia and service of external process Division 1 – General 11.1 Application of Part........................................................................................................................... 424 11.2 Operation of Commonwealth laws and Hague Convention............................................................424 Division 1A – Service outside of Australia in accordance with harmonised rules 11.3 Division does not apply to service in New Zealand of documents for or in certain trans-Tasman proceedings.............................................................................................................. 425 11.4 Cases for service of originating process.........................................................................................426 11.5 When allowed with leave................................................................................................................ 427 11.6 Court’s discretion whether to assume jurisdiction...........................................................................428 11.7 Notice to person served outside Australia...................................................................................... 428 11.8 Time for filing appearance...............................................................................................................429 11.8AA Leave to proceed where no appearance by person....................................................................... 430 11.8AB Service of other documents outside Australia.................................................................................430 11.8AC Mode of service............................................................................................................................... 430 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

197

UCPR

Division 2 – Manner of service 10.5 The various methods of service...................................................................................................... 398 10.6 Service in accordance with agreement between parties................................................................ 400 10.7 Notice given or served by court...................................................................................................... 401 10.8 Service of defence by court............................................................................................................ 401 10.9 Service of process on defendant operating under unregistered business name........................... 402 10.10 Service of process on defendant operating under registered business name............................... 403 10.11 Service of process on partner in limited partnership...................................................................... 404 10.12 Service of process on person under legal incapacity..................................................................... 405 10.13 Acceptance of service by solicitor...................................................................................................406 10.14 Substituted and informal service generally..................................................................................... 407 10.15 Substituted and informal service of originating process in proceedings for possession of land..................................................................................................................................................409 10.16 Service by filing............................................................................................................................... 411 10.17 Service of injunctions.......................................................................................................................411 10.18 Service at address for service in other court or tribunal.................................................................412 10.19 Waiver of objection to service......................................................................................................... 413

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) Division 2 – Service outside Australia in accordance with Attorney General’s arrangements 11.8A Application of Division..................................................................................................................... 430 11.9 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 430 11.10 Filing of requisite documents.......................................................................................................... 431 11.11 Procedure on filing and lodgment................................................................................................... 433 11.12 Recovery of unpaid expenses.........................................................................................................434 Division 3 – Service of external process 11.13 Application....................................................................................................................................... 434 11.14 Requisite documents....................................................................................................................... 435 11.15 Service.............................................................................................................................................435 11.16 Affidavit of service........................................................................................................................... 435 11.17 Certificate........................................................................................................................................ 435 Part 11A – Service under the Hague Convention Division 1 – Preliminary 11A.1 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 437 11A.2 Provisions of this Part to prevail..................................................................................................... 439 Division 2 – Service abroad of local judicial documents 11A.3 Application of Division..................................................................................................................... 439 11A.4 Application for request for service abroad...................................................................................... 443 11A.5 How application to be dealt with..................................................................................................... 444 11A.6 Procedure on receipt of certificate of service................................................................................. 445 11A.7 Payment of costs.............................................................................................................................446 11A.8 Evidence of service......................................................................................................................... 446 Division 3 – Default judgment following service abroad of initiating process 11A.9 Application of Division..................................................................................................................... 446 11A.10 Restriction on power to enter default judgment if certificate of service filed..................................447 11A.11 Restriction on power to enter default judgment if certificate of service not filed............................448 11A.12 Setting aside judgment in default of appearance........................................................................... 448 Division 4 – Local service of foreign judicial documents 11A.13 Application of Division..................................................................................................................... 448 11A.14 Certain documents to be referred back to the Attorney-General’s Department of the Commonwealth................................................................................................................................449 11A.15 Service.............................................................................................................................................449 11A.16 Affidavit as to service...................................................................................................................... 450 Part 12 – Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process Division 1 – Discontinuance of claim 12.1 Discontinuance of proceedings....................................................................................................... 451 12.3 Effect of discontinuance.................................................................................................................. 454 12.4 Stay of further proceedings to secure costs of discontinued proceedings.....................................454 Division 2 – Withdrawal of appearance or pleading 12.5 Withdrawal of appearance.............................................................................................................. 455 12.6 Withdrawal of matter in defence or subsequent pleading.............................................................. 456 Division 3 – Dismissal of proceedings etc for lack of progress 12.7 Dismissal of proceedings etc for want of due despatch................................................................. 458 12.8 Additional grounds for dismissal of proceedings by Supreme Court or Land and Environment Court.......................................................................................................................... 459 12.9 Additional grounds for dismissal of proceedings by District Court or Local Court......................... 461 12.10 Stay of further proceedings to secure costs of proceedings dismissed......................................... 462 Division 4 – Setting aside originating process 12.11 Setting aside originating process etc.............................................................................................. 463 Part 13 – Summary disposal 13.1 Summary judgment......................................................................................................................... 467 13.2 Stay of judgment pending determination of cross-claim.................................................................470 13.3 Continuation of proceedings following partial judgment................................................................. 470 198

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions 13.4 13.5 13.6

Frivolous and vexatious proceedings..............................................................................................471 Continuation of proceedings following partial dismissal................................................................. 476 Non-appearance by plaintiff............................................................................................................ 476

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 1 – Preliminary 14.1 Application....................................................................................................................................... 480 Division 2 – Defence and further pleadings 14.2 Trial without further pleadings......................................................................................................... 480 14.3 Defence........................................................................................................................................... 480 14.4 Reply............................................................................................................................................... 481 14.5 Further pleadings............................................................................................................................ 481

Division 4 – Verification of pleadings 14.22 Pleadings in proceedings for defamation, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, death and personal injury.......................................................................................................................... 495 14.23 Verification of certain pleadings...................................................................................................... 496 14.24 Court may order pleadings to be further verified............................................................................ 497 Division 5 – General 14.25 Defence of tender............................................................................................................................497 14.26 Admission and traverse from pleadings..........................................................................................498 14.27 Joinder of issue............................................................................................................................... 499 14.28 Circumstances in which court may strike out pleadings.................................................................500 14.29 Defence of extinction of right or title............................................................................................... 502 Division 6 – Pleadings concerning defamation 14.30 Allegations in statements of claim generally...................................................................................503 14.31 Defamation defences generally.......................................................................................................503 14.32 Defence of justification generally.................................................................................................... 504 14.33 Defence of contextual truth............................................................................................................. 504 14.34 Defence of absolute privilege..........................................................................................................505 14.35 Defences for publication of public and official documents..............................................................505 14.36 Defences of fair report of proceedings of public concern...............................................................505 14.37 Defence of qualified privilege.......................................................................................................... 506 14.38 Defences of comment or honest opinion........................................................................................ 506 14.39 Defence of innocent dissemination................................................................................................. 507 14.40 Defence of triviality.......................................................................................................................... 507

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

199

UCPR

Division 3 – Form of pleading generally 14.6 Pleadings to be divided into paragraphs.........................................................................................482 14.7 Pleadings to contain facts, not evidence........................................................................................ 482 14.8 Pleadings to be brief....................................................................................................................... 484 14.9 References in pleadings to documents and spoken words............................................................ 484 14.10 Certain facts need not be pleaded..................................................................................................484 14.11 Conditions precedent presumed to have been met........................................................................485 14.12 Pleading of facts in short form in certain money claims.................................................................485 14.13 Pleading not to claim an amount for unliquidated damages.......................................................... 486 14.14 General rule as to matters to be pleaded specifically.................................................................... 487 14.15 Pleadings concerning possession of land.......................................................................................492 14.16 Defendant’s pleading of contributory negligence............................................................................ 493 14.17 New matter may be raised in pleading........................................................................................... 493 14.18 Pleadings to be consistent as to allegations of fact....................................................................... 494 14.19 Pleadings may raise points of law.................................................................................................. 494 14.20 Pleading the general issue..............................................................................................................495 14.21 Pleadings concerning claims under Property (Relationships) Act 1984......................................... 495

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) Part 15 – Particulars Division 1 – General 15.1 Pleadings must give all necessary particulars................................................................................ 509 15.2 Use of “Scott Schedule” in building, technical and other cases..................................................... 510 15.3 Allegations of behaviour in the nature of fraud...............................................................................510 15.4 Allegations as to condition of mind................................................................................................. 510 15.5 Allegations of negligence and breach of statutory duty in common law claims in tort...................511 15.6 Claims for out of pocket expenses..................................................................................................511 15.7 Claims for exemplary damages.......................................................................................................511 15.8 Claims for aggravated damages..................................................................................................... 512 15.9 Manner of giving particulars............................................................................................................ 512 15.10 Order for particulars........................................................................................................................ 513 15.11 Particulars concerning claims under Property (Relationships) Act 1984........................................514 Division 2 – Personal injury cases 15.12 Particulars required for proceedings generally............................................................................... 514 15.13 Particulars required for proceedings under Compensation to Relatives Act 1897.........................516 15.14 Statements, documents and reports to be complete...................................................................... 517 15.16 Effect of failure to comply with Division.......................................................................................... 518 15.17 Division not to apply in certain circumstances................................................................................518 Division 3 – Interim payments 15.18 Interim payments............................................................................................................................. 519 Division 4 – Defamation 15.19 Particulars in relation to statements of claim for defamation..........................................................519 15.20 Particulars in relation to statements of claim by corporations........................................................ 520 15.21 Particulars of defamation defences generally................................................................................. 520 15.22 Particulars in relation to defence of justification............................................................................. 521 15.23 Particulars in relation to the defence of contextual truth................................................................ 522 15.24 Particulars in relation to defence of absolute privilege................................................................... 522 15.25 Particulars in relation to defences for publication of public and official documents....................... 522 15.26 Particulars in relation to defences of fair report of proceedings of public concern........................ 523 15.27 Particulars in relation to defence of qualified privilege................................................................... 523 15.28 Particulars in relation to defences of comment and honest opinion...............................................524 15.29 Particulars in relation to defence of innocent dissemination.......................................................... 525 15.30 Particulars in relation to defence of triviality................................................................................... 525 15.31 Particulars concerning grounds that defeat defamation defences..................................................525 15.32 Particulars concerning damages..................................................................................................... 526 Part 16 – Default judgment 16.1 Application of Part........................................................................................................................... 527 16.2 Definition of “in default”................................................................................................................... 527 16.3 Procedure where defendant in default............................................................................................ 529 16.4 Default judgment on claim for possession of land..........................................................................533 16.5 Default judgment on claim for detention of goods.......................................................................... 536 16.6 Default judgment on debt or liquidated claim................................................................................. 537 16.7 Default judgment on claim for unliquidated damages.....................................................................539 16.8 Default judgment on mixed claims.................................................................................................. 541 16.9 Judgment for costs alone after other claims satisfied.................................................................... 541 16.10 Judgment not limited by plaintiff’s claims for relief......................................................................... 542 Part 17 – Admissions 17.1 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 545 17.2 Voluntary admissions of fact........................................................................................................... 545 17.3 Notice to admit facts....................................................................................................................... 546 17.4 Notice to admit documents............................................................................................................. 547 17.5 Admission of documents discovered...............................................................................................547 17.6 Restricted effect of admission......................................................................................................... 548 17.7 Judgment on admissions................................................................................................................ 549 200

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions Part 18 – Motions 18.1 Applications for court orders to be made by motion.......................................................................552 18.2 Requirement for notice.................................................................................................................... 555 18.3 Contents of notice of motion........................................................................................................... 556 18.4 Time for service of notice................................................................................................................558 18.5 Notice to be personally served on persons who have not entered appearance............................559 18.6 Hearing of interlocutory applications............................................................................................... 559 18.7 Motion may be dealt with in party’s absence..................................................................................560 18.8 Further hearing................................................................................................................................ 561 18.9 Directions as to conduct of proceedings on notice of motion.........................................................562 Part 19 – Amendment 19.1 Amending a statement of claim.......................................................................................................563 19.2 Amendments to add or remove parties...........................................................................................564 19.3 Duration of leave or consent........................................................................................................... 564 19.4 Disallowance of amendment........................................................................................................... 565 19.5 Mode of amendment generally........................................................................................................565 19.6 Court may give directions as to mode of amendment....................................................................566 Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing

Division 2 – Arbitration 20.8 Proceedings that may not be referred to arbitration....................................................................... 571 20.9 Reference to arbitration under Part 5 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005..........................................572 20.10 Medical reports................................................................................................................................ 573 20.11 Award of arbitrator...........................................................................................................................573 20.12 Rehearing........................................................................................................................................ 574 Division 3 – References to referees 20.13 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 575 20.14 Orders of referral............................................................................................................................. 576 20.15 Appointment of referees.................................................................................................................. 578 20.16 Two or more referees...................................................................................................................... 579 20.17 Inquiry and report............................................................................................................................ 579 20.18 Remuneration of referee................................................................................................................. 579 20.19 Court rooms.....................................................................................................................................580 20.20 Conduct of proceedings under the reference................................................................................. 581 20.21 Interlocutory directions.................................................................................................................... 583 20.22 Setting aside or variation of reference............................................................................................ 583 20.23 Report..............................................................................................................................................584 20.24 Proceedings on the report...............................................................................................................585 Division 3A 20.24A 20.24B 20.24C 20.24D

– Conciliation Application of Division..................................................................................................................... 590 Referral of recovery proceedings for conciliation............................................................................590 Certificate of result of conciliation of recovery proceedings........................................................... 591 Resolution of recovery proceedings after certificate issued........................................................... 591

Division 4 – Compromise 20.25 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 592 20.26 Making of offer.................................................................................................................................592 20.27 Acceptance of offer......................................................................................................................... 594 20.28 Withdrawal of acceptance............................................................................................................... 595 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

201

UCPR

Division 1 – Mediation 20.1 Application of Division..................................................................................................................... 567 20.2 Directions.........................................................................................................................................567 20.3 Statements as to proposed referral to mediation............................................................................568 20.4 Appointments by mediator.............................................................................................................. 569 20.5 Completion of mediation................................................................................................................. 569 20.6 Mediation session procedure.......................................................................................................... 570 20.7 Notifications after mediation............................................................................................................ 571

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) 20.29 20.30 20.31 20.32

Failure to comply with accepted offer............................................................................................. 596 Disclosure of offer to court or arbitrator.......................................................................................... 596 Compromises in certain Supreme Court proceedings.................................................................... 597 Offer to contribute............................................................................................................................597

Division 6 – Acknowledgment of liquidated claim 20.34 Defendant may file acknowledgment.............................................................................................. 598 Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents Division 1 – Discovery and inspection 21.1 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 602 21.2 Order for discovery..........................................................................................................................603 21.3 List of documents to be prepared................................................................................................... 605 21.4 Affidavit and certificate supporting list of documents......................................................................610 21.5 Documents to be made available....................................................................................................611 21.6 Subsequently found documents to be made available................................................................... 612 21.7 Discovered documents not to be disclosed.................................................................................... 613 21.8 Personal injury claims..................................................................................................................... 614 Division 2 – Notice to produce before hearing 21.9 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 614 21.10 Notice to produce for inspection by parties.................................................................................... 615 21.11 Production under notice to produce................................................................................................ 616 21.12 Personal injury claims..................................................................................................................... 617 21.13 Costs and expenses of compliance................................................................................................ 617 Part 22 – Interrogatories 22.1 Interrogatories................................................................................................................................. 618 22.2 Objections to specific interrogatories.............................................................................................. 620 22.3 Answers to interrogatories.............................................................................................................. 625 22.4 Insufficient answer...........................................................................................................................626 22.5 Default............................................................................................................................................. 627 22.6 Answers to interrogatories as evidence.......................................................................................... 627 Part 23 – Medical examinations and inspection of property Division 1 – Medical examination 23.1 Application and definitions.............................................................................................................. 629 23.2 Notice for medical examination....................................................................................................... 630 23.3 Expenses.........................................................................................................................................631 23.4 Order for examination..................................................................................................................... 631 23.5 Medical expert for person concerned..............................................................................................633 Division 2 – Rehabilitation assessment 23.6 Application and definitions.............................................................................................................. 633 23.7 Order for rehabilitation tests............................................................................................................634 Division 3 – Inspection of property 23.8 Inspection of property......................................................................................................................635 Division 4 – Default 23.9 Default............................................................................................................................................. 637 Part 24 – Taking evidence otherwise than at trial 24.1 Application of Part........................................................................................................................... 639 24.2 Construction of certain references.................................................................................................. 639 24.3 Order for examination of witness.................................................................................................... 639 24.4 Judicial officer or court officer as examiner.................................................................................... 640 24.5 Letter of request.............................................................................................................................. 641 24.6 Evidence otherwise than on oath....................................................................................................642 24.7 Documents for examiner................................................................................................................. 642 24.8 Appointment for examination.......................................................................................................... 643 24.9 Conduct of examination.................................................................................................................. 643 24.10 Examination of additional persons.................................................................................................. 644 202

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions 24.11 24.12 24.13 24.14 24.15 24.16 24.17 24.18 24.19 24.20

Objection......................................................................................................................................... 644 Recording of evidence generally.....................................................................................................644 Audio-visual recording of evidence................................................................................................. 645 Authentication and filing.................................................................................................................. 645 Special report.................................................................................................................................. 646 Default of witness............................................................................................................................ 646 Order for payment of expenses...................................................................................................... 646 Perpetuation of testimony............................................................................................................... 647 Operation of directions under Evidence on Commission Act 1995................................................ 647 Witness expenses........................................................................................................................... 647

Part 25 – Interim preservation Division 1 – General 25.1 Application....................................................................................................................................... 651 25.2 Order in urgent case before commencement of proceedings........................................................ 651 25.3 Preservation of property.................................................................................................................. 652 25.4 Disposal of personal property......................................................................................................... 653 25.5 Interim distribution........................................................................................................................... 654 25.6 Interim income................................................................................................................................. 654 25.7 Payment before ascertainment of all persons interested............................................................... 654 25.8 Meaning of “usual undertaking as to damages”............................................................................. 655 25.9 Orders may be made at any stage of proceedings........................................................................ 656

Division 3 – Search orders 25.18 Interpretation................................................................................................................................... 661 25.19 Search order....................................................................................................................................661 25.20 Requirements for grant of search order..........................................................................................661 25.21 Jurisdiction.......................................................................................................................................662 25.22 Terms of search order..................................................................................................................... 662 25.23 Independent solicitors..................................................................................................................... 662 25.24 Costs............................................................................................................................................... 663 Part 26 – Receivers 26.1 Application....................................................................................................................................... 664 26.2 Address for service......................................................................................................................... 667 26.3 Security............................................................................................................................................668 26.4 Remuneration.................................................................................................................................. 669 26.5 Accounts..........................................................................................................................................670 26.6 Default............................................................................................................................................. 671 26.7 Powers.............................................................................................................................................672 26.8 Account on death............................................................................................................................ 673 Part 27 – Disposal of land 27.1 Power to order sale......................................................................................................................... 674 27.2 Manner of sale................................................................................................................................ 675 27.3 Certificate of sale............................................................................................................................ 675 27.4 Mortgage, exchange or partition..................................................................................................... 676

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

203

UCPR

Division 2 – Freezing orders 25.10 Interpretation................................................................................................................................... 656 25.11 Freezing order................................................................................................................................. 657 25.12 Ancillary order................................................................................................................................. 658 25.13 Respondent need not be party to proceeding................................................................................ 658 25.14 Order against judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor or third party.............................. 658 25.15 Jurisdiction.......................................................................................................................................660 25.16 Service outside Australia of application for freezing order or ancillary order................................. 660 25.17 Costs............................................................................................................................................... 660

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) Part 28 – Separate decision of questions and consolidation Division 1 – Preliminary 28.1 Definition..........................................................................................................................................677 Division 2 – Separation of questions 28.2 Order for decision............................................................................................................................677 28.3 Record of decision.......................................................................................................................... 680 28.4 Disposal of proceedings.................................................................................................................. 680 Division 3 – Consolidation etc of proceedings 28.5 Consolidation etc of proceedings.................................................................................................... 681 Part 29 – Trials 29.1 Beginning and opposite parties.......................................................................................................683 29.2 Applications and requisitions for juries in proceedings other than defamation proceedings......... 683 29.2A Elections for juries in defamation proceedings............................................................................... 683 29.3 Time and place of trial.....................................................................................................................684 29.4 Trial to deal with all questions and issues...................................................................................... 684 29.5 Conduct of trials generally.............................................................................................................. 684 29.6 Order of evidence and addresses...................................................................................................685 29.7 Procedure to be followed if party is absent.................................................................................... 685 29.8 Dismissal of proceedings on plaintiff’s application..........................................................................686 29.9 Dismissal of proceedings on defendant’s application..................................................................... 686 29.10 Judgment for want of evidence....................................................................................................... 688 29.11 Judgment despite verdict, finding or assessment...........................................................................689 29.12 Death of party before judgment...................................................................................................... 689 29.13 Record of trial to be kept................................................................................................................ 689 29.14 Court may refuse to hear proceedings if fees unpaid.................................................................... 690 29.15 Statement in open court about settled defamation proceedings.................................................... 690 29.16 Offers to make amends for defamatory publications: determination of questions......................... 690 Part 30 – Assessment of damages and value of goods 30.1 Damages under judgment............................................................................................................... 691 30.2 Value of goods under judgment...................................................................................................... 692 30.3 Damages to time of assessment.....................................................................................................693 Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing 31.1 Manner of giving evidence at trial................................................................................................... 697 31.2 Evidence of witnesses at other hearings........................................................................................ 700 31.3 Evidence by telephone, video link or other communication........................................................... 701 31.4 Court may direct party to furnish witness statement...................................................................... 705 31.5 Notice under s 67 or s 99 of the Evidence Act 1995......................................................................708 31.6 Evidence on commission................................................................................................................ 710 31.7 Foreign material...............................................................................................................................711 31.8 Earlier evidence in the same proceedings......................................................................................713 31.9 Earlier evidence in other proceedings.............................................................................................714 31.10 Plans, photographs, audio-visual recordings and models.............................................................. 716 31.11 Production of court documents....................................................................................................... 717 31.12 Proof of court documents................................................................................................................ 718 31.13 Unstamped documents: arrangements under section 304 of the Duties Act 1997........................720 31.14 Unstamped documents: undertaking in respect of section 29 of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 725 31.15 Evidence of consent to act as tutor, trustee, receiver or other office............................................. 729 31.16 Evidence of published research concerning maintenance of children........................................... 729 31.16A Return of exhibits............................................................................................................................ 731 Division 2 – Provisions applicable to expert evidence generally Subdivision 1 – Preliminary 31.17 Main purposes of Division............................................................................................................... 736 31.18 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 737 204

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions Subdivision 2 – Expert witnesses generally 31.19 Parties to seek directions before calling expert witnesses............................................................. 740 31.20 Court may give directions regarding expert witnesses................................................................... 742 31.21 Expert evidence in chief to be given by way of experts’ reports....................................................743 31.22 Expert witness to provide details of contingency fees or deferred payment schemes.................. 743 31.23 Code of conduct.............................................................................................................................. 743 31.24 Conference between expert witnesses........................................................................................... 746 31.25 Instructions to expert witnesses where conference ordered before report furnished.................... 748 31.26 Joint report arising from conference between expert witnesses.................................................... 748 Subdivision 3 – Experts’ reports and expert evidence 31.27 Experts’ reports............................................................................................................................... 750 31.28 Disclosure of experts’ reports and hospital reports........................................................................ 751 31.29 Admissibility of expert’s report........................................................................................................ 753 31.30 Admissibility of expert’s report in District Court and Local Court................................................... 756 31.31 Fees for medical expert for compliance with subpoena................................................................. 758 31.32 Service of subpoena on medical expert..........................................................................................759 31.33 Subpoena requiring production of medical records........................................................................ 760 31.34 Supplementary reports by expert witness.......................................................................................760 31.35 Opinion evidence by expert witnesses............................................................................................761 31.36 Service of experts’ reports in professional negligence claims........................................................764

Subdivision 5 – Court-appointed experts 31.46 Selection and appointment..............................................................................................................773 31.47 Instructions to court-appointed expert.............................................................................................774 31.48 Court-appointed expert may apply to court for directions...............................................................774 31.49 Court-appointed expert’s report to be sent to registrar...................................................................774 31.50 Parties may seek clarification of court-appointed expert’s report...................................................775 31.51 Cross-examination of court-appointed expert................................................................................. 775 31.52 Prohibition of other expert evidence............................................................................................... 775 31.53 Remuneration of court-appointed expert.........................................................................................776 31.54 Assistance to court by other persons..............................................................................................776 Part 32 – Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Commonwealth) Division 1 – Preliminary 32.1 Interpretation................................................................................................................................... 778 32.2 Application of Part........................................................................................................................... 779 Division 2 – Commencement of proceeding 32.3 Commencement of civil proceeding for order under Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act................... 779 32.4 Interlocutory proceeding under Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act.................................................... 780 Division 3 – Subpoenas 32.5 Application for leave to serve subpoena in New Zealand.............................................................. 781 32.6 Application to set aside subpoena.................................................................................................. 782 32.7 Application for issue of certificate of non-compliance with subpoena............................................ 783 Division 4 – Enforcement of New Zealand orders and judgments 32.8 Notice of registration of NZ judgment............................................................................................. 784 32.9 Application for extension of time to give notice of registration of NZ judgment.............................784 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

205

UCPR

Subdivision 4 – Parties’ single experts 31.37 Selection and engagement............................................................................................................. 768 31.38 Instructions to parties’ single expert................................................................................................769 31.39 Parties’ single expert may apply to court for directions..................................................................769 31.40 Parties’ single expert’s report to be sent to parties........................................................................ 770 31.41 Parties may seek clarification of report...........................................................................................770 31.42 Tender of reports and of answers to questions.............................................................................. 771 31.43 Cross-examination of parties’ single expert.................................................................................... 771 31.44 Prohibition of other expert evidence............................................................................................... 771 31.45 Remuneration of parties’ single expert........................................................................................... 772

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) 32.10 32.11 32.12

Application to set aside registration of NZ judgment...................................................................... 784 Application for stay of enforcement of registered NZ judgment to enable liable person to appeal judgment.............................................................................................................................. 785 Application for extension of time to apply for stay of enforcement of registered NZ judgment to enable liable person to appeal judgment....................................................................................785

Division 5 – Miscellaneous 32.13 Application for order for use of audio link or audiovisual link.........................................................786 Part 33 – Subpoenas 33.1 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 788 33.2 Issuing of subpoena........................................................................................................................ 789 33.3 Form of subpoena........................................................................................................................... 791 33.4 Setting aside or other relief............................................................................................................. 793 33.5 Service.............................................................................................................................................795 33.6 Compliance with subpoena............................................................................................................. 796 33.7 Production otherwise than on attendance.......................................................................................798 33.8 Removal, return, inspection, copying and disposal of documents and things............................... 799 33.9 Inspection of, and dealing with, documents and things produced otherwise than on attendance.......................................................................................................................................800 33.10 Disposal of documents and things produced..................................................................................803 33.11 Costs and expenses of compliance................................................................................................ 804 33.12 Failure to comply with subpoena—contempt of court.....................................................................804 33.13 Documents and things in the custody of a court............................................................................ 805 Part 34 – Notices to produce at hearing 34.1 Notice to produce to court...............................................................................................................809 34.2 Production under notice to produce to court...................................................................................810 34.3 Costs and expenses of compliance................................................................................................ 812 Part 35 – Affidavits 35.1 Irregularity does not invalidate affidavit...........................................................................................815 35.2 Cross-examination of deponent...................................................................................................... 816 35.3 Persons who may make affidavit.................................................................................................... 817 35.3A Heading to affidavit..........................................................................................................................819 35.4 Format of affidavit dealing with more than one matter................................................................... 819 35.5 Alterations........................................................................................................................................820 35.6 Annexures and exhibits................................................................................................................... 820 35.7 Affidavits by persons who cannot read........................................................................................... 822 35.7A Name of legal practitioner or commissioner for affidavits on affidavit............................................ 823 35.7B Each page of affidavit to be signed................................................................................................ 823 35.8 Affidavit of service not to annex copies of filed documents........................................................... 824 35.9 Filing of affidavits.............................................................................................................................825 Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 1 – General 36.1 General relief................................................................................................................................... 828 36.1A Consent orders................................................................................................................................ 829 36.2 Written reasons for judgment.......................................................................................................... 831 36.3 Reserved decision........................................................................................................................... 832 36.4 Date of effect of judgments and orders.......................................................................................... 833 36.5 Time for compliance with judgments and orders............................................................................ 835 36.6 Judicial notice to be taken of orders and undertakings.................................................................. 836 36.7 Payment of interest......................................................................................................................... 837 36.8 Possession of land.......................................................................................................................... 838 36.9 Arrest warrants................................................................................................................................ 839 36.10 Filing of cost assessors’ certificates................................................................................................839 Division 2 – Entry of judgments and orders 36.11 Entry of judgments and orders........................................................................................................840

206

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions Division 3 – Copies and service 36.12 Registrar to furnish copies of judgments and other documents..................................................... 844 36.13 Registrar to furnish copies of external judgments.......................................................................... 846 36.14 Service of judgment or order not required...................................................................................... 847 Division 4 – Setting aside and variation of judgments 36.15 General power to set aside judgment or order............................................................................... 847 36.16 Further power to set aside or vary judgment or order....................................................................849 36.17 Correction of judgment or order (“slip rule”)................................................................................... 854 36.18 Variation of judgment or order against party operating under unregistered business name......... 855 Part 37 – Time to pay and payment by instalments 37.1 Instalments under Fines Act 1996...................................................................................................858 37.1A Instalment order made pursuant to agreement between judgment creditor and judgment debtor.............................................................................................................................................. 858 37.2 Application for instalment order by judgment debtor...................................................................... 859 37.3 Instalment order made by registrar................................................................................................. 861 37.4 Instalment order made by court...................................................................................................... 862 37.4A Payment of instalments under instalment order............................................................................. 864 37.5 Stay of execution pending determination of application for instalment order.................................865 37.6 Variation or rescission of instalment order on proof of improvement in judgment debtor’s financial circumstances................................................................................................................... 866 37.7 Effect of instalment order on judgment debt...................................................................................867 Part 38 – Examination of judgment debtor etc 38.1 Examination notice.......................................................................................................................... 869 38.2 Application for order for examination.............................................................................................. 870 38.3 Orders for examination....................................................................................................................871 38.4 Venue of examination......................................................................................................................872 38.5 Examination under an order for examination under rule 38.3........................................................ 873 38.6 Arrest warrant where person fails to comply with order for examination under rule 38.3............. 875 38.7 Application of Part to persons that are corporations...................................................................... 877

Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally 39.1 Circumstances in which issue of writ requires leave...................................................................... 879 39.2 Application for writ of execution...................................................................................................... 880 39.3 Affidavit in support of application for writ of execution................................................................... 881 39.3A Sheriff to be informed of persons in occupation of land.................................................................885 39.4 Order in which writs for the levy of property to be dealt with.........................................................885 39.5 Property to be sold promptly........................................................................................................... 886 39.6 Order in which property to be sold..................................................................................................886 39.7 Sale to be by public auction............................................................................................................888 39.8 Auctioneer....................................................................................................................................... 888 39.9 Sale to be arranged so as to obtain highest prices........................................................................889 39.10 Approximate market value.............................................................................................................. 890 39.11 Postponement................................................................................................................................. 890 39.12 Suspension of execution by judgment creditor............................................................................... 891 39.13 Sale by private treaty...................................................................................................................... 892 39.14 Conditions of sale............................................................................................................................893 39.15 How proceeds of enforcement to be applied.................................................................................. 894 39.16 Account............................................................................................................................................895 39.17 Sheriff may require security for costs of execution.........................................................................895 39.18 Sheriff to serve copy of writ when executing or attempting to execute writ................................... 896 39.19 When writ may not be executed..................................................................................................... 897 39.20 Expiry and renewal of writ of execution.......................................................................................... 897 Division 2 – Enforcement of writs against land 39.21 Judgment creditor’s notice to judgment debtor...............................................................................899 39.22 Judgment creditor’s application for sale..........................................................................................900 39.23 Sale to be publicly advertised......................................................................................................... 901 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

207

UCPR

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) 39.24 39.25 39.26 39.27 39.28

Proof of service and publication......................................................................................................902 Satisfaction by judgment debtor......................................................................................................902 Documents giving effect to sale...................................................................................................... 903 Sheriff or auctioneer to report......................................................................................................... 904 Payment to judgment debtor........................................................................................................... 904

Division 3 – Enforcement of writs against goods etc 39.29 Removal of goods........................................................................................................................... 906 39.30 Time of sale.....................................................................................................................................906 39.31 Sale to be publicly advertised......................................................................................................... 907 39.32 Sheriff or auctioneer to report......................................................................................................... 908 39.33 Possession fees.............................................................................................................................. 909 Division 4 – Garnishee orders 39.34 Application for garnishee order....................................................................................................... 909 39.35 Affidavit in support of application for garnishee order.................................................................... 910 39.36 Form of garnishee order for debts.................................................................................................. 911 39.37 Form of garnishee order for wage or salary................................................................................... 912 39.38 Court may refuse to make garnishee order.................................................................................... 913 39.39 When garnishee order takes effect................................................................................................. 914 39.39A When garnishee not obligated to pay amount to judgment creditor...............................................914 39.40 Affidavit that no debt due or accruing............................................................................................. 915 39.41 Lien or claim of third person........................................................................................................... 916 39.42 Amounts garnishee may retain....................................................................................................... 916 39.43 Notice required for certain attached debts yet to accrue................................................................917 39.43A Application of Division to application for garnishee order by owners corporation relating to unpaid contributions........................................................................................................................ 918 Division 5 – Charging orders 39.44 Application for charging order......................................................................................................... 918 39.45 Affidavit in support of application for charging order...................................................................... 920 Division 6 – General 39.46 Value below which Sheriff may not seize tools of trade................................................................. 921 39.47 Costs of prior execution not enforceable without costs assessor’s certificate............................... 922 39.48 Charge on partnership interest........................................................................................................922 39.49 Enforcement by or against non-party..............................................................................................923 39.50 Non-performance of condition......................................................................................................... 924 39.51 Return of writ................................................................................................................................... 925 39.52 Orders authorising entry to premises by Sheriff............................................................................. 927 Part 40 – Additional measures for enforcing judgments and orders of the Supreme Court and District Court Division 1 – Provisions applicable to the Supreme Court only 40.1 Application of Division..................................................................................................................... 928 40.2 Payment of money.......................................................................................................................... 928 40.3 Leave for issue: sequestration........................................................................................................ 929 40.4 Security for future conduct.............................................................................................................. 930 Division 2 – Provisions applicable to the Supreme Court, Land and Environment Court and District Court 40.5 Application of Division..................................................................................................................... 931 40.6 Doing or abstaining from doing an act............................................................................................931 40.7 Service of copy of judgment before committal or sequestration.................................................... 933 40.8 Substituted performance................................................................................................................. 934 Part 41 – Funds in court 41.1 Definitions........................................................................................................................................ 939 41.2 Deposit of funds.............................................................................................................................. 939 41.3 Withdrawal of deposited funds........................................................................................................ 939 41.4 Registrar to keep accounts............................................................................................................. 942 41.5 Investment....................................................................................................................................... 942 208

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions 41.6 41.7 41.8 41.9 41.10 41.11 41.12 41.13 41.14 41.15 41.16

Interest not payable on certain funds in court................................................................................ 942 Payment to the NSW Trustee and Guardian.................................................................................. 943 Interest on funds in court to abide the decision in proceedings.....................................................943 Non-attendance of parties following notice by court.......................................................................944 Unclaimed funds..............................................................................................................................945 Authority of recipient....................................................................................................................... 945 Death of payee................................................................................................................................ 946 Payment to partners........................................................................................................................ 947 Payment to executors or administrators......................................................................................... 947 Discharge of registrar...................................................................................................................... 948 Stop orders...................................................................................................................................... 948

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs 42.1 General rule that costs follow the event......................................................................................... 950 42.2 General rule as to assessment of costs......................................................................................... 963 42.4 Power to order maximum costs...................................................................................................... 965 42.5 Indemnity costs............................................................................................................................... 966 42.6 Amendment of pleading etc without leave...................................................................................... 972 42.7 Interlocutory applications and reserved costs.................................................................................972 42.8 Dispute of fact subsequently proved or admitted........................................................................... 975 42.9 Dispute of authenticity of document subsequently proved or admitted..........................................976 42.10 Disobedience to rule, judgment, order or direction.........................................................................977 42.11 Injunction......................................................................................................................................... 977

Division 3 – Offers of compromise 42.13 Application....................................................................................................................................... 979 42.13A Where offer accepted and no provision for costs........................................................................... 980 42.14 Where offer not accepted and judgment no less favourable to plaintiff......................................... 981 42.15 Where offer not accepted and judgment no more favourable to plaintiff....................................... 982 42.15A Where offer not accepted and judgment no less favourable to defendant.................................... 990 42.16 Costs with respect to interest..........................................................................................................991 42.17 Miscellaneous.................................................................................................................................. 991 Division 4 – Offers to contribute 42.18 Offer to contribute............................................................................................................................992 Division 5 – Proceedings discontinued or dismissed 42.19 Proceedings discontinued............................................................................................................... 992 42.20 Dismissal of proceedings etc.......................................................................................................... 993 Division 6 – Security for costs 42.21 Security for costs.............................................................................................................................994 Division 7 – General 42.22 Money paid into court....................................................................................................................1005 42.23 Costs in account............................................................................................................................1006 42.24 Costs of solicitor appointed as tutor..............................................................................................1007 42.25 Costs of trustee or mortgagee...................................................................................................... 1007 42.26 Order confirming rule as to payment of costs...............................................................................1008 42.27 Attendance.................................................................................................................................... 1009 42.28 Orders as to costs in relation to instalment order.........................................................................1010 42.29 Patents, trade marks and designs................................................................................................ 1010 42.30 Property (Relationships) Act 1984.................................................................................................1010 42.31 Recovery of assessed costs in Supreme Court............................................................................1012 42.32 Smyth orders................................................................................................................................. 1013 42.33 Certain costs orders not to be made unless parties have attempted to agree on amount..........1013 42.34 Costs order not to be made in proceedings in Supreme Court unless Court satisfied proceedings in appropriate court...................................................................................................1014 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

209

UCPR

Division 2 – Arbitration rehearings under Division 3 of Part 5 of Civil Procedure Act 2005 42.12 Rehearings under Division 3 of Part 5 of Civil Procedure Act 2005.............................................. 978

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) 42.35

Costs order not to be made in proceedings in District Court unless Court satisfied proceedings in appropriate court...................................................................................................1014

Part 43 – Interpleader proceedings Division 1 – Preliminary 43.1 Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1018 Division 2 – Stakeholder’s interpleader 43.2 Court may grant interpleader on application by stakeholder........................................................ 1019 Division 3 – Sheriff’s interpleader 43.3 Notice of claim by claimant........................................................................................................... 1021 43.4 Sheriff may apply for claimant’s proceedings to be restrained or stayed.................................... 1022 43.5 Admission of claim........................................................................................................................ 1023 43.6 Interpleader motion....................................................................................................................... 1023 Division 4 – General 43.7 Powers generally........................................................................................................................... 1024 43.8 Default by claimant........................................................................................................................1025 43.9 Neutrality of applicant....................................................................................................................1026 43.10 Order in multiple proceedings....................................................................................................... 1026 43.11 Trial of questions arising in proceedings for interpleader............................................................. 1027 Part 44 – Transfer of proceedings Division 2 – Cross-vesting laws 44.2 Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1028 44.3 Mode of application....................................................................................................................... 1029 44.4 Attorney-General........................................................................................................................... 1029 44.5 Application relating to transfer.......................................................................................................1030 44.6 Application of other laws or rules..................................................................................................1031 Division 3 – Transfers under other legislation 44.7 Proceedings after transfer etc to the Court...................................................................................1033 44.8 Directions and service of order..................................................................................................... 1033 Part 45 – Specialist lists Division 1 – Supreme Court specialist lists 45.1 Entry as indicated by originating process..................................................................................... 1035 45.2 Entry and removal of proceedings pursuant to order of Supreme Court..................................... 1036 45.3 The Administrative Law List.......................................................................................................... 1037 45.4 The Possession List...................................................................................................................... 1038 45.5 The Professional Negligence List..................................................................................................1039 45.6 The Commercial List..................................................................................................................... 1039 45.7 The Technology and Construction List..........................................................................................1041 45.7A The Revenue List.......................................................................................................................... 1042 45.8 Proceedings under particular Acts and instruments..................................................................... 1042 Division 2 – District Court specialist lists 45.9 Specialist lists................................................................................................................................ 1043 45.10 Entry as indicated by originating process..................................................................................... 1044 45.11 The Construction List.................................................................................................................... 1045 45.12 The Commercial List..................................................................................................................... 1046 45.13 The Professional Negligence List..................................................................................................1046 45.13A The Property Relationships List.................................................................................................... 1047 45.14 Proceedings under particular Acts and instruments..................................................................... 1047 Part 46 – Accounts and inquiries Division 1 – General 46.1 Application of Part......................................................................................................................... 1048 46.2 Account: summary order............................................................................................................... 1049 46.3 Account or inquiry at any stage.................................................................................................... 1049 46.4 Account: directions........................................................................................................................ 1049 46.5 Account: form and verification.......................................................................................................1050 210

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions 46.6 46.7 46.8 46.9

Account: filing and service............................................................................................................ 1050 Account: notice of charge or error................................................................................................ 1051 Account: allowances......................................................................................................................1051 Delay............................................................................................................................................. 1051

Division 2 – Equity Division of the Supreme Court: General 46.10 Application..................................................................................................................................... 1052 46.11 Motion to proceed......................................................................................................................... 1052 46.12 Notice of judgment........................................................................................................................ 1052 46.13 Directions.......................................................................................................................................1053 46.14 Representation of parties.............................................................................................................. 1053 46.15 Costs of attendance...................................................................................................................... 1053 46.16 Settlement of instrument............................................................................................................... 1053 46.17 Interest on debts........................................................................................................................... 1053 46.18 Interest on legacies....................................................................................................................... 1054 Division 3 – Equity Division of the Supreme Court: administration accounts and inquiries etc 46.19 Application..................................................................................................................................... 1054 46.20 Advertisements.............................................................................................................................. 1055 46.21 Particulars of claim........................................................................................................................ 1055 46.22 Notice of judgment........................................................................................................................ 1055 46.23 Examination of claims................................................................................................................... 1055 46.24 Account: list of claims................................................................................................................... 1056 46.25 Inquiry: list of claims......................................................................................................................1056 46.26 Verification of list........................................................................................................................... 1056 46.27 Adjudication................................................................................................................................... 1056 46.28 Notice to prove claim.................................................................................................................... 1057 Division 1 – General 47.1 Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1058 47.2 Preliminary point of law................................................................................................................. 1058 47.3 Time for applications and appeals................................................................................................ 1058 47.4 Subpoena...................................................................................................................................... 1059 47.5 Court assistance in taking evidence............................................................................................. 1059 47.6 Application to enforce award.........................................................................................................1060 47.7 Leave to appeal.............................................................................................................................1060 47.8 Method of entry into the Commercial Arbitration List....................................................................1060 Division 2 – Offer of compromise 47.10 Application of Division................................................................................................................... 1060 47.11 Interim awards............................................................................................................................... 1060 47.12 Mode of making offer.................................................................................................................... 1061 47.13 Application..................................................................................................................................... 1061 47.14 Time for making or accepting offer............................................................................................... 1061 47.15 Time for payment.......................................................................................................................... 1061 47.16 Withdrawal of acceptance............................................................................................................. 1062 47.17 Offer without prejudice.................................................................................................................. 1062 47.18 Disclosure of offer to arbitrator......................................................................................................1062 47.19 Failure to comply with accepted offer........................................................................................... 1062 47.20 Costs where offer not accepted.................................................................................................... 1063 Part 48 – Matters arising under Commonwealth intellectual property legislation Division 1 – Intellectual property cases generally 48.1 Application..................................................................................................................................... 1064 48.2 Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1064 48.3 Expressions in this Part................................................................................................................ 1064 48.4 Mode of commencement...............................................................................................................1065 48.5 Applications: service and date of hearing..................................................................................... 1065 48.6 Mode of giving notice to Commissioner........................................................................................1065 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

211

UCPR

Part 47 – Matters arising under the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) 48.7 48.8 48.9

Appearance of Commissioner....................................................................................................... 1065 Commissioner: notice of objection................................................................................................ 1066 Statement of facts......................................................................................................................... 1066

Division 2 – The Patents Act 1990 of the Commonwealth 48.10 Amendment of patent etc: section 105......................................................................................... 1066 48.11 Infringement proceedings: section 120(1).....................................................................................1067 48.12 Non-infringement declarations: section 125(1)............................................................................. 1067 48.13 Relief from unjustified threat: section 128(1)................................................................................ 1067 48.14 Compulsory licences, revocation etc.............................................................................................1067 48.15 Particulars of invalidity.................................................................................................................. 1068 48.16 Experiments...................................................................................................................................1068 Division 3 – The Trade Marks Act 1995 of the Commonwealth 48.17 Particulars of infringements...........................................................................................................1069 48.18 Counter-claim to proceedings for infringement............................................................................. 1069 48.19 Judgment in absence of defendant...............................................................................................1069 48.20 Evidences for purposes of regulation 8.2 of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995........................ 1069 Division 4 – The Designs Act 2003 of the Commonwealth 48.21 Particulars of infringements...........................................................................................................1070 48.22 Particulars of invalidity.................................................................................................................. 1070 48.23 Application for compulsory licence: section 90............................................................................. 1070 Division 5 – The Circuit Layouts Act 1989 of the Commonwealth 48.24 Applications concerning infringement of EL rights........................................................................ 1071 Part 49 – Reference and removal of proceedings, and appeals and reviews, within the court Division 1 – Matters before Supreme Court constituted by associate Judge 49.1 Construction of certain references................................................................................................ 1072 49.2 Reference and removal of proceedings........................................................................................ 1073 49.3 Disposal of proceedings referred or removed...............................................................................1074 49.4 Right of appeal.............................................................................................................................. 1074 Division 2 – Matters before a judicial registrar of the District Court 49.5 Reference of matter to the District Court...................................................................................... 1075 49.6 Court may order removal of proceedings from judicial registrar.................................................. 1076 49.7 Court may dispose of matter referred by or removed from judicial registrar............................... 1077 Division 3 – Procedures for appeals to court from decisions of associate Judge 49.7A Construction of certain references................................................................................................ 1077 49.8 Institution of appeal....................................................................................................................... 1078 49.9 Contents of notice of motion for appeal........................................................................................1079 49.10 Stay and reinstatement................................................................................................................. 1080 49.11 Cross-appeal................................................................................................................................. 1081 49.12 Evidence........................................................................................................................................ 1082 49.13 Notice of contention...................................................................................................................... 1083 Division 4 – Review of decisions of registrar (other than judicial registrar) 49.14 Application of Division................................................................................................................... 1084 49.15 Mandatory order to registrar..........................................................................................................1084 49.16 Reference of proceedings............................................................................................................. 1085 49.17 Removal of proceedings............................................................................................................... 1086 49.18 Disposal of proceedings referred or removed...............................................................................1086 49.19 Review of registrar’s directions, certificates, orders, decisions and other acts............................1087 Division 5 – Procedures for applications for review of decisions of registrar (other than judicial registrar) 49.20 Applications generally................................................................................................................... 1088 Part 50 – Appeals to the court Division 1 – Preliminary 50.1 Application..................................................................................................................................... 1091 50.2 Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1092 212

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions Division 2 – Appeals 50.3 Time for appeal............................................................................................................................. 1093 50.4 Statement of ground......................................................................................................................1096 50.5 Parties........................................................................................................................................... 1097 50.6 Filing with court below...................................................................................................................1098 50.7 Stay............................................................................................................................................... 1099 50.8 Security for costs........................................................................................................................... 1100 50.9 Date of hearing of appeal..............................................................................................................1100 Division 3 – Cross-appeals 50.10 Cross-appeal..................................................................................................................................1101 50.11 Notice of contention.......................................................................................................................1102 Division 4 – Applications for leave to appeal and cross-appeal 50.12 Leave to appeal............................................................................................................................. 1103 50.13 Leave to cross-appeal................................................................................................................... 1105 Division 5 – General 50.14 Reasons for decision, transcript and other parts of the record of the court below...................... 1106 50.15 Directions for service..................................................................................................................... 1107 50.16 Conduct of appeal......................................................................................................................... 1108 50.16A Objections to competency of appeal............................................................................................. 1109

Division 7 – Appeals to District Court under section 39 of Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 50.21 Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1112 50.22 Venue............................................................................................................................................. 1112 50.23 Application for leave...................................................................................................................... 1113 50.24 Tribunal record............................................................................................................................... 1114 50.25 Appeal............................................................................................................................................ 1115 Part 51 – Court of Appeal Division 1 – Preliminary 51.1 Application of Part..........................................................................................................................1117 51.2 Interpretation.................................................................................................................................. 1117 51.3 Application of rules to notices of cross-appeal..............................................................................1119 Division 2 – Parties and appearances 51.4 Parties............................................................................................................................................ 1119 51.5 No step without notice of appearance...........................................................................................1120 Division 3 – Notices of intention to appeal 51.6 Notices of intention to appeal........................................................................................................1120 51.7 Notices of intention to appeal cannot be filed in certain cases.................................................... 1120 51.8 Filing and service of a notice of intention to appeal..................................................................... 1120 51.9 Effect of service of notice of intention to appeal........................................................................... 1120 51.9A Service of notice of intention to appeal by prospective respondent............................................. 1121 Division 4 – Applications for leave to appeal or cross-appeal Subdivision 1 – Making applications for leave 51.10 Filing and service of summons seeking leave to appeal.............................................................. 1121 51.11 Filing and service of cross-summons seeking leave to cross-appeal.......................................... 1121 Subdivision 2 – Supporting documentation 51.12 Party to file and serve White Folder with summons seeking leave..............................................1122 51.13 Opposing party to file a response................................................................................................. 1123 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

213

UCPR

Division 6 – Appeals to District Court under section 91 of Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 50.17 Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1109 50.18 Defendants in appeal.....................................................................................................................1110 50.19 Children’s Court record.................................................................................................................. 1111 50.20 Notice of fresh evidence................................................................................................................ 1111

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) Subdivision 3 – Powers on applications for leave 51.14 Concurrent hearings in relation to leave applications................................................................... 1124 51.15 Court may determine application for leave without attendance....................................................1124 Division 5 – Appeals and cross-appeals Subdivision 1 – Institution of appeals and cross-appeals 51.16 Time for filing and service of notice of appeal.............................................................................. 1125 51.17 Filing and service of notice of cross-appeal..................................................................................1125 Subdivision 2 – Notices of appeal and cross-appeal 51.18 Contents of notice of appeal......................................................................................................... 1126 51.19 How claims for reinstatement or restitution to be made in appeal or cross-appeal..................... 1126 51.20 Notice of appeal to specify return day.......................................................................................... 1126 51.21 Alteration of return day in notice of appeal................................................................................... 1126 51.22 Absence of restriction on appeals as of right to be shown by certificate or affidavit................... 1127 51.23 Amendment of notice of appeal.................................................................................................... 1127 Subdivision 3 – Appeal Books and other supporting documentation 51.24 Registrar to collect certain papers when notice of appeal filed or concurrency determination is made.......................................................................................................................................... 1127 51.25 Preparation of Appeal Book...........................................................................................................1128 51.26 Division of Appeal Book.................................................................................................................1128 51.27 Contents of Red Book................................................................................................................... 1129 51.28 Contents of Black Book................................................................................................................. 1129 51.29 Contents of Blue Book...................................................................................................................1130 51.30 Contents of Orange Book..............................................................................................................1131 51.31 Disputes as to contents of Appeal Book....................................................................................... 1131 51.32 Filing, lodgment and service of sections of Appeal Book............................................................. 1132 51.33 Overriding obligation to file Orange Book..................................................................................... 1132 Subdivision 4 – Written submissions and chronologies 51.34 Filing written submissions and chronologies.................................................................................1132 51.35 Appellant’s chronology...................................................................................................................1133 51.36 Content of written submissions..................................................................................................... 1133 51.37 Time for filing of written submissions and chronologies............................................................... 1134 51.38 Service of written submissions and chronologies......................................................................... 1134 Subdivision 5 – Use of material from leave applications 51.39 Court may order use of White Folder instead of preparation of Appeal Book and submissions................................................................................................................................... 1134 Subdivision 5A – Written submissions—concurrent hearings 51.39A Concurrent hearings under rule 51.14.......................................................................................... 1135 Subdivision 6 – Notices of contention and objections to competency 51.40 Notices of contention..................................................................................................................... 1135 51.41 Objections to competency of appeal............................................................................................. 1135 Division 6 – Effect of applications for leave and appeals on court below 51.42 Copies of certain documents to be filed or lodged with court below............................................1136 51.43 Court below to retain exhibits if its decision is appealable........................................................... 1136 51.44 Appeal proceedings do not operate as stay unless Court or court below directs........................ 1136 Division 7 – Proceedings other than appeal proceedings 51.45 Proceedings in supervisory jurisdiction......................................................................................... 1137 Division 8 – Miscellaneous Subdivision 1 – Offers of compromise 51.46 Interpretation..................................................................................................................................1138 51.47 Making of offers of compromise.................................................................................................... 1138 51.48 Application of Division 3 of Part 42 to offers of compromise made in proceedings in Court 1138 51.49 Relevance of offers of compromise made in proceedings in court below.................................... 1139 Subdivision 2 – Powers of Court 51.50 Security for costs........................................................................................................................... 1139 214

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions 51.51 51.52 51.53 51.54 51.55

Additional evidence........................................................................................................................1139 Powers of Court on appeal not limited by certain procedural matters......................................... 1140 Circumstances in which Court may order new trial...................................................................... 1140 Reinstatement and restitution........................................................................................................1141 Short reasons for decision.............................................................................................................1141

Subdivision 3 – Discontinuances 51.56 Discontinuance of proceedings in Court....................................................................................... 1141 Subdivision 4 – Other 51.57 Hearing in fixed vacation............................................................................................................... 1142 51.58 Review of order of Judge of Appeal..............................................................................................1142 51.59 Review of decisions of Registrar...................................................................................................1142 51.60 Application for expedited hearing.................................................................................................. 1142 51.61 Affidavits in support of orders sought by notice of motion............................................................1143 Part 52 – Taking evidence for foreign and Australian courts and tribunals 52.1 Procedure...................................................................................................................................... 1145 52.2 Application of other rules regarding the taking of evidence..........................................................1148 52.3 Attendance of applicant................................................................................................................. 1148 52.4 Transcript of evidence and exhibits...............................................................................................1149 52.5 Certificate.......................................................................................................................................1149 52.6 Privilege of witness........................................................................................................................1149

Part 54 – Administration of estates and execution of trusts 54.1 Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1170 54.2 Application of Part......................................................................................................................... 1171 54.3 Relief without general administration............................................................................................ 1171 54.4 Claim under judgment................................................................................................................... 1172 54.5 Relief that may be granted............................................................................................................ 1172 54.6 Supreme Court not required to order general administration....................................................... 1172 54.7 Supreme Court may order general administration in certain circumstances................................ 1172 54.8 Conduct of sale..............................................................................................................................1173 Part 55 – Matters arising under the Trustee Act 1925 Division 1 – Judicial advice 55.1 Statement.......................................................................................................................................1176 55.2 Order..............................................................................................................................................1176 55.3 Application by beneficiary..............................................................................................................1176 55.4 Appeal............................................................................................................................................1177 Division 2 – New trustees 55.5 Application..................................................................................................................................... 1177 55.6 Evidence generally........................................................................................................................ 1177 55.7 Fitness of new trustee................................................................................................................... 1177 Division 3 – Payment into court 55.8 Application..................................................................................................................................... 1178 55.9 Proceedings for directions as to payment into court.....................................................................1178 55.10 Affidavit in support of summons.................................................................................................... 1178 55.11 Proceedings for directions as to payment out of court................................................................. 1179 55.12 Inquiries......................................................................................................................................... 1179 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

215

UCPR

Part 53 – Matters arising under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 of the Commonwealth 53.1 Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1151 53.2 Commencement of proceedings....................................................................................................1156 53.3 Evidence........................................................................................................................................ 1157 53.4 Security for costs........................................................................................................................... 1160 53.5 Order for registration..................................................................................................................... 1160 53.6 Notice of registration......................................................................................................................1161 53.7 Setting aside registration............................................................................................................... 1161 53.8 Enforcement...................................................................................................................................1168

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) Part 56 – Matters arising under the Adoption Act 2000 56.1 Interpretation..................................................................................................................................1181 56.2 Commencement of proceedings....................................................................................................1181 56.3 Duty to make full and frank disclosure..........................................................................................1183 56.4 How application for adoption order is to be dealt with..................................................................1183 56.5 Preliminary hearing........................................................................................................................1183 56.6 Applications appropriate for preliminary hearing...........................................................................1184 56.7 Filing of report in accordance with section 91 of the Adoption Act 2000..................................... 1187 56.8 Evidence in support of application for adoption order.................................................................. 1187 56.9 Judicial notice of instrument of consent........................................................................................ 1189 56.10 Notice to be given to Secretary.....................................................................................................1189 56.11 Proper officer of the Court............................................................................................................. 1191 56.12 Access to Court records................................................................................................................ 1192 56.13 Registration of adoption plans.......................................................................................................1192 56.14 Review of adoption plans.............................................................................................................. 1192 Part 56A – Matters arising under the Surrogacy Act 2010 56A.1 Interpretation..................................................................................................................................1194 56A.2 Commencement of proceedings....................................................................................................1194 56A.3 Duty to make full and frank disclosure..........................................................................................1194 56A.4 How application for parentage order is to be dealt with............................................................... 1195 56A.5 Preliminary hearing........................................................................................................................1195 56A.6 Applications appropriate for preliminary hearing...........................................................................1195 56A.7 Filing of report in accordance with section 17 of the Surrogacy Act 2010................................... 1195 56A.8 Evidence in support of application for parentage order................................................................ 1195 56A.9 Affidavit of Australian legal practitioner......................................................................................... 1196 56A.10 Access to Court records................................................................................................................ 1196 Part 57 – Matters arising under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 or Guardianship Act 1987 Division 1 – Preliminary 57.1 Interpretation................................................................................................................................. 1202 57.2 Commencement of proceedings................................................................................................... 1203 Division 2 – Applications under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 57.3 Parties to application under section 41 or 54............................................................................... 1203 57.4 Business concerning application under section 41 in the absence of parties..............................1204 57.5 Evidence in support of application under section 41 or 54.......................................................... 1204 57.6 Appointment of managers under section 52................................................................................. 1206 57.7 “Usual orders” under sections 41 and 54..................................................................................... 1206 57.8 Evidence in support of application under section 86.................................................................... 1207 57.9 Mode of making application under section 87.............................................................................. 1207 Division 3 – Miscellaneous 57.11 Setting aside or varying order....................................................................................................... 1208 57.12 Review under section 6L of the Guardianship Act 1987.............................................................. 1208 Part 58 – Representative proceedings 58.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 1209 58.2 Opt out notice................................................................................................................................ 1209 Part 59 – Judicial review proceedings 59.1 Application..................................................................................................................................... 1210 59.2 Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1210 59.3 Commencement and parties......................................................................................................... 1210 59.4 Content of summons..................................................................................................................... 1210 59.5 Service of summons......................................................................................................................1210 59.6 Response to summons..................................................................................................................1211 59.7 Procedure—evidence generally.....................................................................................................1211 59.8 Procedure—Court Book, defendant’s argument and plaintiff’s argument in reply........................1211 59.9 Special procedure where public authority is defendant................................................................ 1211 59.10 Time for commencing proceedings............................................................................................... 1212 216

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions 59.11

Security for costs...........................................................................................................................1212

SCHEDULE SCHEDULE SCHEDULE SCHEDULE SCHEDULE 1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 6 7

– – – – –

APPLICATION OF RULES............................................................................................1213 LOCAL RULES THAT PREVAIL OVER THESE RULES........................................ 1216 FEES AND OTHER PRESCRIBED AMOUNTS....................................................... 1217 SERVICE OUTSIDE OF AUSTRALIA WITHOUT LEAVE...................................... 1218 EXPERT WITNESS CODE OF CONDUCT

Application of code........................................................................................................................ 1220 General duties to the Court...........................................................................................................1220 Content of report........................................................................................................................... 1220 Supplementary report following change of opinion.......................................................................1221 Duty to comply with the court’s directions.................................................................................... 1221 Conferences of experts................................................................................................................. 1221

SCHEDULE 8 – ASSIGNMENT OF BUSINESS IN THE SUPREME COURT Part 1 – Legislation of New South Wales................................................................................................. 1222 Part 2 – Legislation of the Commonwealth...............................................................................................1228 SCHEDULE 9 – ASSIGNMENT OF BUSINESS IN THE DISTRICT COURT Part 1 – Legislation of New South Wales................................................................................................. 1230 Part 2 – Legislation of the Commonwealth...............................................................................................1230 SCHEDULE 10 – PROVISIONS REGARDING PROCEDURE UNDER PARTICULAR LEGISLATION Part 1 – New South Wales legislation....................................................................................................... 1231 Associations Incorporation Act 1984 1 2

Winding up .................................................................................................................................. 1231 Appeal from liquidator etc: section 58 ......................................................................................... 1231

Australian Mutual Provident Society (Demutualisation and Reconstruction) Act 1997 Application of other rules of court ..................................................................................................................... 1231 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Statement in summons ............................................................................................................... Notice of discharge of order: section 26 ..................................................................................... Form of acceptance etc of allegation: section 31 ....................................................................... Form of notice: section 44(2) ...................................................................................................... Examination order: prescribed officer: section 45 ....................................................................... Information for production order or search warrant: sections 58(1) and 66(1) .......................... Registration of interstate orders: section 77 ...............................................................................

1231 1231 1232 1232 1232 1232 1232

Contractors Debts Act 1997 1 2

Application: section 7(1) .............................................................................................................. 1232 Application: section 14(1) ............................................................................................................ 1233

Conveyancing Act 1919 1 2

Prescribed officer: section 66G(5)(b) .......................................................................................... 1233 Prescribed officer: section 98(1F) ............................................................................................... 1233

Co-operative Housing and Starr-Bowkett Societies Act 1998 Application of Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999 ............................................................................... 1233

Co-operatives Act 1992 Application of other rules of court ..................................................................................................................... 1233

Co-operatives (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 and Co-operatives National Law (NSW) Application of other rules of court ..................................................................................................................... 1233

Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 1 2 3

Statement in application for order ............................................................................................... 1234 Prescribed officer: sections 12 and 31D ..................................................................................... 1234 Information for production order .................................................................................................. 1234

Electricity Supply Act 1995 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

217

UCPR

Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) Service of certificate ......................................................................................................................................... 1234

Federal Courts (State Jurisdiction) Act 1999 1 2 3 4

Definitions .................................................................................................................................... Application for order under section 7 .......................................................................................... Application for order under section 10 ........................................................................................ Application for order under section 11(2) ....................................................................................

1234 1234 1234 1234

Gas Supply Act 1996 Service of certificate ......................................................................................................................................... 1235

Motor Accidents Act 1988 1 2 3 4

Statement of claim ...................................................................................................................... Service of statement of claim ...................................................................................................... Non-compliance with Act ............................................................................................................. Examination: section 66A ............................................................................................................

1235 1235 1236 1236

Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 1 2 3 4

Statement of claim ...................................................................................................................... Service of statement of claim ...................................................................................................... Non-compliance with Act ............................................................................................................. Examination: section 119 ............................................................................................................

1236 1236 1237 1237

New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985 Review of decision ............................................................................................................................................ 1237

Offshore Minerals Act 1999 Commencement of proceedings under section 354 ......................................................................................... 1237

Professional Standards Act 1994 Commencement of proceedings ....................................................................................................................... 1237

Public Health Act 1991 1 2 3 4

Definitions .................................................................................................................................... Section 18 applications ............................................................................................................... Medical practitioner to advise registrar ....................................................................................... Registrar to advise person concerned ........................................................................................

1238 1238 1238 1238

Restricted Premises Act 1943 Application for declaration: section 3(1) ........................................................................................................... 1238

Retirement Villages Act 1999 Consent of administrator ................................................................................................................................... 1239

Status of Children Act 1996 1 2 3 4

Parentage testing procedure: service of notice of motion on non-party ..................................... 1239 Service of notice of motion on person under legal incapacity .................................................... 1239 Service of order on person under legal incapacity ..................................................................... 1239 Service of report .......................................................................................................................... 1239

Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 1973 1 2

Commencement of proceedings ................................................................................................. 1239 Service of notice .......................................................................................................................... 1239

Strata Schemes (Leasehold Development) Act 1986 1 2

Commencement of proceedings ................................................................................................. 1239 Service of notice .......................................................................................................................... 1239

Taxation Administration Act 1996 Evidence of jurisdiction ..................................................................................................................................... 1240

Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 1 2

Statement in application .............................................................................................................. 1240 Prescribed officer: section 58H(2)(a) .......................................................................................... 1240

Witness Protection Act 1995 Section 19(2) and 34(2) applications ................................................................................................................ 1240 218

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of provisions Part 2 – Commonwealth legislation Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 Statement in application ................................................................................................................................... 1240

International War Crimes Tribunals Act 1995 Registration: section 45 .................................................................................................................................... 1240

Offshore Minerals Act 1994 Commencement of proceedings under section 354 ......................................................................................... 1240

Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 1 2

Statement in application .............................................................................................................. 1241 Information for production order or search warrant: sections 66(1) and 71(1) .......................... 1241

Retirement Savings Accounts Act 1997 1 2 3

Application by Regulator: section 119(3) .................................................................................... 1241 Notice of certain applications to be given to Regulator .............................................................. 1241 Intervention by Regulator ............................................................................................................ 1241

SCHEDULE 11 – PROVISIONS REGARDING PROCEDURE IN CERTAIN LISTS IN THE DISTRICT COURT Part 1 – Preliminary....................................................................................................................................... 1242 1

Definitions...................................................................................................................................... 1242

Division 1 – Proceedings generally 2 Proceedings under the Workers Compensation Acts................................................................... 1242 3 Commencement of proceedings................................................................................................... 1243 4 Coal Miners’ Workers Compensation List.....................................................................................1243 5 Functions of the registrar.............................................................................................................. 1243 6 Compliance with statutory restrictions on commencement of proceedings under the 1998 Act................................................................................................................................................. 1243 7 Particular proceedings commenced by summons........................................................................ 1244 8 Affidavits in support of summons under section 53 of the 1987 Act............................................ 1244 9 Applications for contribution, indemnity or apportionment............................................................ 1244 10 Application for further medical expenses etc................................................................................ 1245 11 Application for suspension of weekly payment............................................................................. 1245 12 Uninsured Liability and Indemnity Scheme...................................................................................1245 13 Applications in the case of death of worker..................................................................................1245 14 Service on insurer......................................................................................................................... 1246 15 Service on WorkCover Authority................................................................................................... 1246 16 Submission to award..................................................................................................................... 1246 17 Offer of compromise......................................................................................................................1246 18 Schedule of earnings.................................................................................................................... 1246 19 Proceedings deemed dismissed................................................................................................... 1247 20 Dismissal of proceedings.............................................................................................................. 1247 21 Medical examination......................................................................................................................1247 22 Expert evidence and hospital reports............................................................................................1248 23 Discontinuance.............................................................................................................................. 1248 24 Settling of awards..........................................................................................................................1249 Division 2 – Conciliation of coal miners’ claims 25 Referral.......................................................................................................................................... 1249 26 General powers of a conciliator.................................................................................................... 1249 27 Directions.......................................................................................................................................1249 28 Conciliation conference procedure................................................................................................1249 29 Conduct of a conciliation conference............................................................................................ 1250 30 Confidentiality................................................................................................................................ 1250 31 Dismissal of proceedings.............................................................................................................. 1250 32 Conciliation notifications................................................................................................................ 1250 33 Guidelines......................................................................................................................................1251 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

219

UCPR

Part 2 – Coal Miners’ Workers Compensation List................................................................................. 1242

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated) Part 3 – Medical panel procedures 34 35 36 37 38

Transferred applications................................................................................................................ 1251 Application for reference............................................................................................................... 1251 Order for report............................................................................................................................. 1251 Reports for medical panels........................................................................................................... 1251 Certificate...................................................................................................................................... 1252

Part 4 – Special Statutory Compensation List 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

Proceedings under the Special Statutory Compensation Acts..................................................... 1252 Commencement of proceedings................................................................................................... 1252 Special Statutory Compensation List............................................................................................ 1252 Directions.......................................................................................................................................1253 Expert evidence and hospital reports............................................................................................1253 Oral expert evidence..................................................................................................................... 1253 Settling of orders........................................................................................................................... 1253

Part 5 – Costs in Coal Miners’ Workers Compensation List and Special Statutory Compensation List matters 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Application..................................................................................................................................... 1254 Interpretation................................................................................................................................. 1254 Time for dealing with costs........................................................................................................... 1254 Claimant’s costs............................................................................................................................ 1254 Redemption cases.........................................................................................................................1254 Costs where other proceedings.................................................................................................... 1254 Assessed costs and other provisions............................................................................................1255 Preliminary discovery.................................................................................................................... 1255 Agreement as to costs.................................................................................................................. 1255 Agreement as to part of costs.......................................................................................................1255 When costs payable...................................................................................................................... 1255 Party and party basis.................................................................................................................... 1256 Indemnity basis............................................................................................................................. 1256 Costs order to confirm earlier costs orders...................................................................................1256

SCHEDULE 12 – SAVINGS AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS – Part 1 – Provision consequent on making of Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 59) 2013 1

Offers of compromise made before commencement of amendments......................................... 1257

Part 2 – Provision consequent on making of Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 68) 2014 2

Proceedings entered in Possession List before commencement of amendment........................ 1257

DICTIONARY................................................................................................................................................... 1258

220

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Table of Amending Legislation

Table of Amending Legislation Number

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 1 Jun 2005

Date of commencement 15 Aug 2005

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005

418 of 2005

Act 22 of 2005

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 26 May 2005

Date of commencement Sch 3: 1 Jun 2005

395 of 2005

5 Aug 2005

15 Aug 2005

396 of 2005

5 Aug 2005

15 Aug 2005

625 of 2005

30 Sep 2005

30 Sep 2005

717 of 2005

11 Nov 2005

11 Nov 2005

807 of 2005

9 Dec 2005

1 Jan 2006

808 of 2005

9 Dec 2005

9 Dec 2005

96 of 2006

10 Mar 2006

10 Mar 2006

171 of 2006

7 Apr 2006

7 Apr 2006

288 of 2006

9 Jun 2006

9 Jun 2006

391 of 2006

7 Jul 2006

7 Jul 2006

Act 120 of 2006

4 Dec 2006

Sch 2: 4 Dec 2006

716 of 2006

8 Dec 2006

8 Dec 2006

717 of 2006

8 Dec 2006

8 Dec 2006

164 of 2007

5 Apr 2007

5 Apr 2007

Act 27 of 2007

4 Jul 2007

327 of 2007

6 Jul 2007

Sch 2.58: 4 Jul 2007 6 Jul 2007

448 of 2007

7 Sep 2007

1 Jan 2008

449 of 2007

7 Sep 2007

7 Sep 2007

This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Dust Diseases Tribunal Amendment (Claims Resolution) Act 2005 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 1) 2005 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 2) 2005 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 3) 2005 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 4) 2005 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 5) 2005 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 6) 2005 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 7) 2006 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 8) 2006 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 9) 2006 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 10) 2006 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2006 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 11) 2006 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 12) 2006 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 13) 2007 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2007 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 14) 2007 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 16) 2007 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 15) 2007 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

UCPR

Principal legislation

221

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated)

Principal legislation

Number

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005

418 of 2005

This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 1 Jun 2005

Date of commencement 15 Aug 2005

Date of commencement 5 Oct 2007

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 17) 2007 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 18) 2007 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 19) 2007

501 of 2007

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 5 Oct 2007

539 of 2007

9 Nov 2007

9 Nov 2007

579 of 2007

7 Dec 2007

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 20) 2007 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 21) 2008 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 22) 2008 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 23) 2008 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 24) 2009 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 25) 2009 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 26) 2009 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 27) 2009 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 28) 2009 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 29) 2009 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 30) 2009 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 31) 2009 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 32) 2010

580 of 2007

7 Dec 2007

Sch 1: 7 Dec 2007; Sch 3 and Sch 4 items 1 and 3: 1 Jan 2008; Sch 2 and Sch 4[2]: 6 Jul 2009 Sch 1: 28 Jan 2008

63 of 2008

7 Mar 2008

Sch 1: 7 Mar 2008

338 of 2008

8 Aug 2008

Sch 1: 8 Aug 2008

494 of 2008

7 Nov 2008

Sch 1: 7 Nov 2008

222

88 of 2009

Sch 1: 6 Mar 2009

118 of 2009

R 3: 3 Apr 2009

166 of 2009

Sch 1: 8 May 2009

326 of 2009

Sch 1: 10 Jul 2009

473 of 2009

R 3: 18 Sep 2009

501 of 2009

Sch 1: 9 Oct 2009

569 of 2009

Sch 1: 11 Dec 2009

570 of 2009

Sch 1: 1 Feb 2010

172 of 2010

Sch 1[3], [4] and [6]: 7 May 2010; Sch 1[1], [2], [5] and [7]–[12]: 1 Jul 2010

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Principal legislation

Number

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 1 Jun 2005

Date of commencement 15 Aug 2005

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005

418 of 2005

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 15 Jun 2010

279 of 2010

Date of commencement Sch 2.51: 1 Jul 2010 Sch 1: 1 Jul 2010

280 of 2010

Sch 1: 25 Jun 2010

527 of 2010

Cl 3: 10 Sep 2010

528 of 2010

Sch 1: 10 Sep 2010

571 of 2010

Sch 1: 5 Oct 2010

594 of 2010

R 3: 15 Oct 2010

This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Health Practitioner Regulation Amendment Act 2010 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 33) 2010 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 34) 2010 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 35) 2010 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 36) 2010 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 37) 2010 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 38) 2010 Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010

Act 34 of 2010

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 39) 2010 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 40) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 41) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 42) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 43) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 44) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 45) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 46) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 47) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 48) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 49) 2011

678 of 2010

Sch 6.4: 4 Mar 2011 (Proc 118 of 2011, 3 Mar 2011) Sch 1: 10 Dec 2010

61 of 2011

Sch 1: 1 Mar 2011

101 of 2011

Sch 1: 4 Mar 2011

179 of 2011

Sch 1: 11 Mar 2011

188 of 2011

R 3: 15 Apr 2011

189 of 2011

Sch 1: 15 Apr 2011

396 of 2011

Cl 3: 5 Aug 2011

482 of 2011

Sch 1: 9 Sep 2011

483 of 2011

Sch 1: 9 Sep 2011

484 of 2011

R 3: 9 Sep 2011

590 of 2011

R 3: 18 Nov 2011

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Act 135 of 2010

7 Dec 2010

223

UCPR

Table of Amending Legislation

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 – (Annotated)

Principal legislation

Number

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005

418 of 2005

This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 1 Jun 2005

Date of commencement 15 Aug 2005

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 50) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 51) 2011 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 52) 2012 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 53) 2012 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 54) 2012 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 55) 2012 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 56) 2012 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 57) 2013 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 58) 2013 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 59) 2013 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 60) 2013 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 61) 2013 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 62) 2013 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 63) 2013 Work Health and Safety (Mines) Amendment Act 2014

631 of 2011

Date of commencement R 3: 9 Dec 2011

632 of 2011

Sch 1: 11 Oct 2013

313 of 2012

R 3: 6 Jul 2012

365 of 2012

Sch 1: 10 Aug 2012

366 of 2012

R 3: 10 Aug 2012

462 of 2012

R 3: 14 Sep 2012

608 of 2012

Sch 1: 21 Jan 2013

96 of 2013

Sch 1: 8 Mar 2013

108 of 2013

Sch 1: 15 Mar 2013

259 of 2013

Sch 1: 7 Jun 2013

374 of 2013

Sch 1: 5 Jul 2013

421 of 2013

Sch 1: 9 Aug 2013

422 of 2013

9 Aug 2013

29 of 2014

Sch 1: 10 Feb 2014

Act 71 of 2014

11 Nov 2014

Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2014 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 64) 2014 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 65) 2014 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 66) 2014

Act 88 of 2014

28 Nov 2014

224

95 of 2014

Sch 2.4: 1 Feb 2015 (Proc 787 of 2014, 12 Dec 2014) Sch 2.71: 8 Jan 2015 R 3: 7 Mar 2014

96 of 2014

Sch 1: 7 Mar 2014

339 of 2014

R 3: 6 Jun 2014

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Principal legislation

Number

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 1 Jun 2005

Date of commencement 15 Aug 2005

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005

418 of 2005

Date of gazettal/ assent/registration

501 of 2014

Date of commencement R 3: 8 Aug 2014

502 of 2014

Sch 1: 1 Sep 2014

709 of 2014

R 3: 7 Nov 2014

773 of 2014

R 3: 5 Dec 2014

This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 67) 2014 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 68) 2014 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 69) 2014 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 70) 2014 Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Legislation Amendment Act 2015 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 71) Rule 2015 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 72) Rule 2015 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 73) Rule 2015 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 74) Rule 2015 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 75) Rule 2015 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 76) Rule 2016 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 77) Rule 2016 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 78) Rule 2016 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 79) Rule 2016 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 80) Rule 2016 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 81) Rule 2016 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 82) Rule 2016 Uniform Civil Procedure (Amendment No 83) Rule 2016

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

Act 7 of 2015

9 Jun 2015

194 of 2015

Sch 2.44: 1 Jul 2015 (Proc 299 of 2015, 19 Jun 2015) Cl 3: 8 May 2015

195 of 2015

Cl 3: 8 May 2015

371 of 2015

Sch 1: 10 Jul 2015

372 of 2015

Cl 3: 10 Jul 2015

443 of 2015

Sch 1: 31 Jul 2015

255 of 2016 578 of 2016

Sch 1: 20 May 2016 Sch 1: 9 Sep 2016

621 of 2016

R 3: 14 Oct 2016

622 of 2016

R 3: 14 Oct 2016

715 of 2016

Sch 1: 8 Dec 2016

753 of 2016

Cl 3: 9 Dec 2016

754 of 2016

Sch 1: 9 Dec 2016

755 of 2016

Sch 1: 9 Dec 2016

225

UCPR

Table of Amending Legislation

PART 1 – PRELIMINARY Commentary by Carol Webster SC.

DIVISION 1 – GENERAL 1.1

Name of rules

These rules are the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. 1.2

Definitions

(1) Words and expressions that are defined in the Dictionary at the end of these rules have the meanings set out in the Dictionary. (2) Notes included in these rules do not form part of these rules. Note: In the notes, DCR means the District Court Rules 1973, LCR means the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Rules 1988 and SCR means the Supreme Court Rules 1970.

RULE 1.2 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 1.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 1.2.40]

[r 1.2.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision. There is no equivalent former SCR or DCR. [r 1.2.40]

Operation

The CPA includes definitions in s.3. A note at the end of the Dictionary sets out the words and expressions defined in the CPA, which consequently have the same meaning in the UCPR. Notes to each of the rules indicate the equivalent former SCR, DCR and LCR provisions. 1.3

References to barristers and solicitors

Profession Uniform Law (NSW). [Subr (1) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[1]; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1] and [2]]

(2) For the purposes of rule 33.9(9), a reference to a solicitor for a party includes a reference to: (a) a solicitor acting as agent for the solicitor for a party, and (b) any other solicitor belonging to or employed by the same firm or organisation as the solicitor for a party or the solicitor acting as agent for the solicitor for a party. [Subr (2) am Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[3]; insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

(3) For the purposes of rule 33.9(10): (a) a reference to a solicitor who removes a document or thing from the office of the registrar includes a reference to a solicitor who directs a person referred to in paragraph (b) to remove a document or thing from the office of the registrar, and (b) a reference to the personal custody of the solicitor includes a reference to the personal custody of: (i) any other solicitor belonging to or employed by the same firm or organisation as that solicitor, or any other person employed by that firm or organisation, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

227

UCPR Parts 1-10

(1) For the purposes of these rules: (a) a reference in these rules to a barrister is a reference to a legal practitioner who practises as a barrister, and (b) a reference in these rules to a solicitor is a reference to a legal practitioner who practises as a solicitor. Note: The rights of a person to practise as a barrister or to practise as a solicitor are regulated by the Legal

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.3

[r 1.3.20] (ii) any other solicitor acting as agent for that solicitor, and (iii) any other solicitor belonging to or employed by the same firm or organisation as a solicitor acting as agent for that solicitor, or any other person employed by that firm or organisation, and (iv) if the registrar has approved a firm or organisation to provide photocopying services in respect of documents, any employee of a firm or organisation so approved.

[Subr (3) am Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[4]; insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]] [R 1.3 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 716 of 2006; Rule 288 of 2006]

RULE 1.3 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 1.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 1.3.40]

[r 1.3.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision. There is no equivalent former SCR or DCR. [r 1.3.40]

Operation

This rule defines barrister and solicitor by reference to the method of practice of the legal practitioner, which is regulated by the Legal Profession Uniform Law (before 1 July 2015, the Legal Profession Act 2004). The SCR formerly contained definitions of barrister and solicitor, giving each term the same meaning as it had in the Legal Profession Act 1987. The DCA formerly defined solicitor as an attorney, solicitor and proctor of the Supreme Court. Rules 1.3(2) and 1.3(3) have given an extended meaning to solicitor for the purposes of r 33.9 regarding the inspection of, and dealing with, documents and things produced to the Registry of a court otherwise than at an appearance in court. In particular, an application to uplift a document or thing produced may be made by an employee or agent of a solicitor, as would commonly occur in practice. See [r 33.9.160] regarding the implied undertaking not to use documents for any purpose outside the conduct of the proceedings. 1.4 Saving as to discovery (cf SCR Part 1, rule 14)

These rules do not affect the right of any person to commence proceedings for discovery.

RULE 1.4 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 1.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 1.4.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.4.1000]

[r 1.4.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces SCR Pt 1 r 14. [r 1.4.40]

Operation

This rule preserves the Equity procedure for a bill of discovery: see [r Pt5.20] and McLean v Burns Philp Trustee Co Pty Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 926; [1985] 2 NSWLR 623 at 643–646 (NSWLR). Where a person became involved in the tortious acts of others, although innocently and without incurring any personal liability, that person may come under an equitable obligation to assist the injured person by giving information by way of discovery, to disclose the identity of the wrongdoers (whose identity is otherwise unable to be ascertained), and may be joined and ordered to give discovery for that purpose: Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133; [1973] 3 WLR 164; [1973] 2 All ER 943. 228

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 1 – Preliminary Division 1 – General

[r 1.5.60]

r 1.5

Preliminary discovery is available under Pt 5 of the UCPR, under r 5.2 to ascertain the identity or whereabouts of a prospective defendant, and under r 5.3 in relation to the decision whether or not to commence proceedings for an identified claim for relief. See [r 5.2.40] and [r 5.3.60]. [r 1.4.1000]

References

Related provisions: Preliminary discovery – Pt 5. See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co, 2014), [10.810]–[10.830]. 1.5

Application of these rules

(1) Subject to subrule (2), these rules apply to each court referred to in Column 1 of Schedule 1 in relation to civil proceedings of a kind referred to in Column 2 of that Schedule. (2) In respect of each court referred to in Column 1 of Schedule 1, civil proceedings of a kind referred to in Column 2 of that Schedule are excluded from the operation of each provision of these rules referred to in Column 4 of that Schedule in respect of those proceedings. (3) The exclusion of civil proceedings from any such provision is subject to such conditions, limitations or exceptions as are specified in Column 4 of Schedule 1 in relation to that provision. [Subr (3) insrt Rule 570 of 2009, Sch 1[1]]

(4) Without limiting the operation of subrule (2), if any Part, Division or other provision of these rules provides that it applies to proceedings or other matters in a specified court or courts, the Part, Division or other provision does not apply to proceedings or other matters in any other court. [Subr (4) insrt Rule 366 of 2012, r 3] [R 1.5 am Rule 366 of 2012; Rule 570 of 2009]

RULE 1.5 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 1.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 1.5.40] Limitations and exceptions ......................................................................................................................... [r 1.5.60]

[r 1.5.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision. There is no equivalent former SCR or DCR. Operation

This rule provides for the general application of the provisions of the UCPR to civil proceedings in NSW Courts. Schedule 1 to the UCPR specifies those kinds of proceedings in the Supreme Court, Industrial Relations Commission, Land and Environment Court, District Court, Dust Diseases Tribunal and Local Court to which the UCPR applies generally (the kinds of proceedings referred to in Column 2 of the Schedule), and then in Column 4, specifies provisions which do not apply to those kinds of proceedings. Civil proceedings are defined in CPA s 3 as meaning proceedings other than criminal proceedings. Criminal proceedings mean proceedings against a person for an offence, whether summary or indictable, and include committal proceedings, proceedings relating to bail, sentence and an appeal against conviction or sentence. SCR Pt 75 and DCR Pt 53 respectively set out the rules applicable to criminal proceedings in the Supreme and District Courts, pursuant to the rule making powers in SCA s 17 and DCA s 171, in addition to the various statutory provisions found in, for example, the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [r 1.5.60]

Limitations and exceptions

Rule 1.5(3) provides for conditions, limitations and exceptions on the exclusions in Column 4. For example, the provisions relating to offers of compromise in Div 4 of Pt 20 and Div 3 of Pt 42 of the UCPR do not apply to most proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of the jurisdiction of the Land and Environment Court subject to specific exclusions noted in Column 4 of the Schedule. No certification as to reasonable prospects of success is required in such proceedings: see [r 4.2.140]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

229

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 1.5.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.6

[r 1.5.60]

A number of Parts do not apply to civil proceedings in the Industrial Court, and further parts do not apply to civil proceedings in the Industrial Relations Commission unless and to the extent that the Commission orders that they should. A number of Parts do not apply to proceedings in the Small Claims Division of the Local Court. Rule 1.5(4) clarifies that where a Part or Division applies only to proceedings or matters in a specified court, it does not apply to proceedings or matters in any other court without any statement of exclusion in Schedule 1. 1.6

Exclusion of provisions of Civil Procedure Act 2005

In respect of each court referred to in Column 1 of Schedule 1: (a) civil proceedings of a kind referred to in Column 2 of that Schedule are excluded from the operation of the provisions of Parts 3 – 9 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 referred to in Column 3 of that Schedule in respect of those proceedings, and (b) the following proceedings, to the extent to which they are civil proceedings, are excluded from all of Parts 3 – 9 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005: (i) proceedings under the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990, (ii) proceedings under the Habitual Criminals Act 1957, (iii) proceedings under the Bail Act 1978, (iv) proceedings under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, (v) proceedings under Part 4 of the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996. [Para (b) am Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[1]] [R 1.6 am Rule 88 of 2009]

RULE 1.6 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 1.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 1.6.40]

[r 1.6.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision. There is no equivalent former SCR or DCR. [r 1.6.40]

Operation

Paragraph (a) of this rule modifies the application of CPA Pts 3–9 to the proceedings specified in Sch 1 to the UCPR. Paragraph (b) wholly excludes the proceedings referred to in that paragraph (to the extent that they are civil proceedings) from the operation of CPA Pts 3 to 9 – that is, all of the CPA except CPA Pts 1 and 2 dealing with preliminary and administrative matters. As to proceedings under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, from 21 June 2013 by amendment to Sch 1 of the CPA and Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 cl 15A, CPA s 87 regarding protection against self-incrimination applies to civil proceedings for which the Local Court has jurisdiction under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 s 91: see [CPA 4.20]. CPA s 4 provides generally for the application of the CPA to civil proceedings in the courts specified in Sch 1 to the CPA: see [CPA 4.20]. For example, CPA Pt 9, relating to transfer of proceedings between courts, and UCPR Pt 15 Div 3, Pt 21 and Pt 22 do not apply to civil proceedings in the Dust Diseases Tribunal. 1.7 Local rules that prevail over these rules The rules of court specified in Schedule 2 prevail over these rules.

RULE 1.7 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 1.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 1.7.40] 230

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 1 – Preliminary Division 1 – General

[r 1.8.1000] [r 1.7.20]

r 1.9

Comparison

This is a new provision. There is no equivalent former SCR or DCR. [r 1.7.40]

Operation

This rule provides for specified local rules (SCR, Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules, Industrial Relations Commission Rules, Land and Environment Court Rules, DCR, Dust Diseases Tribunal Rules), which have not been replaced by provisions of the UCPR, to prevail over the UCPR. Local rules are defined in CPA s 3 to mean rules of court other than uniform rules, that is the UCPR (made or taken to have been made under CPA s 9). Two specific forms (Forms A and B) were approved by the Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court under s 77A(1) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979, with effect from 1 July 2008. The approval specified the modifications to be made to other Approved Forms for use in the Land and Environment Court. 1.8

Determination of questions arising under these rules

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 4(b) and (d))

The court may determine any question arising under these rules (including any question of privilege) and, for that purpose: (a) may inspect any document in relation to which such a question arises, and (b) if the document is not before the court, may order that the document be produced to the court for inspection.

RULE 1.8 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 1.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 1.8.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.8.1000]

[r 1.8.20]

Comparison

This rule is substantially the same as SCR Pt 23 r 4. [r 1.8.40]

Operation

Where a document is not before the court, under r 1.8(b) the court can require the document to be produced to the court for inspection. Evidence Act 1995 s 133 also allows a court to require production to the court of, and to inspect, a document in relation to which any question has arisen under Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 – which applies to the adducing of evidence. [r 1.8.1000]

References

Related provisions: regarding subpoenas, Pt 33; notices to produce, Pt 34; and Pt 21 Div 2 (notice to produce before hearing under r 21.10). 1.9 Objections to production of documents and answering of questions founded on privilege (cf SCR Part 36, rule 13; DCR Part 28, rule 16)

(1) This rule applies in the following circumstances: (a) if the court orders a person, by subpoena or otherwise, to produce a document to the court or to an authorised officer, © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

231

UCPR Parts 1-10

This rule empowers the court to inspect documents on interlocutory applications to determine any question arising under the rules. That includes questions as to privilege in documents sought on subpoena or under a notice to produce.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.9

[r 1.9.20] (b)

if a party requires another party, by notice under rule 34.1, to produce a document to the court or to an authorised officer, (c) if a question is put to a person in the course of an examination before the court or an authorised officer.

[Subr (1) am Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[2]]

(2) In subrule (1), authorised officer means: (a) any officer of the court, or (b) any examiner, referee, arbitrator or other person who is authorised by law to receive evidence. (3) A person may object to producing a document on the ground that the document is a privileged document or to answering a question on the ground that the answer would disclose privileged information. (4) A person objecting under subrule (3) may not be compelled to produce the document, or to answer the question, unless and until the objection is overruled. (5) For the purpose of ruling on the objection: (a) evidence in relation to the claim of privilege may be received from any person, by affidavit or otherwise, and (b) cross-examination may be permitted on any affidavit used, and (c) in the case of an objection to the production of a document, the person objecting may be compelled to produce the document. (6) This rule does not affect any law that authorises or requires a person to withhold a document, or to refuse to answer a question, on the ground that producing the document, or answering the question, would be injurious to the public interest. [R 1.9 am Rule 88 of 2009; subst Rule 396 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.9 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 1.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 1.9.40] Distinction between production and inspection .......................................................................................... [r 1.9.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.9.1000]

[r 1.9.20]

Comparison

This rule is most closely modelled on DCR Pt 28 r 16. It does not differ in substance from SCR Pt 36 r 4 or DCR Pt 28 r 16. [r 1.9.40]

Operation

This rule provides for determination of objections to the production of documents, or answering of questions, on the grounds of privilege, that is that the document, production of which is sought, is a privileged document, or that the answer to the question asked would disclose privileged information. Those terms are defined in the Dictionary, by reference to Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995. Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act applies to the adducing of evidence. Until 6 March 2009, r 1.9(1) provided that the rule does not apply in circumstances in which Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 applied. Evidence Act 1995 s 131A now extends the application of Divs 1, 1A and 3 of the Evidence Act to pre-trial processes, described in the section as a “disclosure requirement”, defined in s 131A(2) Evidence Act to include subpoenas to produce, pre-trial discovery, non-party discovery, interrogatories and notices to produce. An objection to giving information or producing a document is to be determined by the application of Pt 3.10 as if the objection were to giving or adducing of evidence. See the discussion in Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) [EA.118.30]–[EA118.600]. In Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151 it was held that that r 1.9 applied only to an objection to production, and that the common law applied to interim use made of a document after production 232

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 1 – Preliminary Division 1 – General

[r 1.10.40]

r 1.10A

and before tender, such as granting of access under the three stage process for complying with a subpoena (National Employers’ Mutual General Assn Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372, see [r Pt33.40] and r 33.9 re granting of access). As to the various categories of privilege, see the following discussion: • [r 21.3.140] and [r 22.2.120] legal professional privilege (Evidence Act 1995, Pt 3.10, Div 1); • [r 21.3.160] and [r 22.2.140] privilege against self-incrimination (Evidence Act 1995, s 128); • [r 21.3.180] and [r 22.2.160] protected confidences (Evidence Act 1995, Pt 3.10, Div 1A and Div 1B, ss 126B, 126H); • [r 21.3.200] and [r 22.2.180] public interest immunity (Evidence Act 1995, s 130); and • [r 21.3.220] and [r 22.2.200] without prejudice statements (Evidence Act 1995, s 131). The common law rules regarding public interest immunity are maintained by r 1.9(6). [r 1.9.60]

Distinction between production and inspection

Where a person objects to production of what is said to be a privileged document, or alternatively resists a question on the basis that the answer would disclose privileged information, a distinction exists between consideration of the production and the inspection of documents. This rule which only deals with privilege against production. The determination of such an application is in accordance with the Evidence Act 1995 and the UCPR. An objection to inspection of subpoenaed documents will be determined according to common law rules of whether or not legal professional privilege applied, see: Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 74 NSWLR 469; [2009] NSWSC 225 at [5]; Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151. [r 1.9.1000]

References

Related provisions: regarding subpoenas, Pt 33; notices to produce, Pt 34 and Pt 21 Div 2 (notice to produce before hearing under r 21.10); discovery, Pt 21 Div 1; interrogatories, Pt 22. For annotations on privilege see [r 21.3.120]–[r 21.3.220] and [r 22.2.120]–[r 22.2.200]. See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co, 2014), [10.440]–[10.585]; Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) regarding Pt 3.10: [EA.117.30]–[EA.134.30]. 1.10

Powers of the judicial registrar [Repealed]

[R 1.10 rep Rule 279 of 2010, Sch 1[1]]

[r 1.10.40]

Operation

The judicial registrar of the District Court is appointed under DCA s 18FA. Schedule 1A to the DCA provides for the term of office, remuneration and leave entitlements of the judicial registrar. Rule 1.10 was repealed with effect from 25 June 2010. It was almost identical to DCR Pt 43A r 1 which remains in force. An appeal from a decision of the judicial registrar lies to the Court of Appeal in the same way as it does from a decision of the District Court constituted by a Judge, following the repeal of DCA s 18FB(2). See DCA s 127 regarding the requirements for leave to appeal and appeals as of right. 1.10A Powers of associate Judges of the Supreme Court (cf SCR Part 60, rule 1A)

(1) Subject to subrule (2), an associate Judge of the Supreme Court may exercise any of the powers of the Court under the Civil Procedure Act 2005, or under rules of court, in relation to defamation proceedings. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

233

UCPR Parts 1-10

RULE 1.10 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.10A

[r 1.10A.20]

(2) An associate Judge may not exercise the power conferred by rule 29.15 or 29.16 in relation to any such proceedings. Note: Section 118 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 sets out the powers exercisable by an associate Judge. Those powers include powers conferred by rules of court. In addition to the power conferred by this rule, see rule 1A of Part 60 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970, together with Schedule D to those rules, for other powers of the Supreme Court that may be exercised by an associate Judge. [R 1.10A insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.10A COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 1.10A.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 1.10A.40] Appeals from decisions of associate Judges ......................................................................................... [r 1.10A.60]

[r 1.10A.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. [r 1.10A.40]

Operation

This rule relates to defamation proceedings and supplements the provisions of SCR Pt 60 r 1A and Sch D to the SCR defining the matters which may be heard by an associate Judge. The limitation in r 1.10A(2), in relation to UCPR rr 29.15 and 29.16, has the effect that an associate Judge cannot approve, in private, a statement about settled proceedings or determine what must be done to carry out an offer to make amends. [r 1.10A.60]

Appeals from decisions of associate Judges

An associate Judge may refer proceedings to the Supreme Court constituted by a Judge, or such proceedings may be removed by order of a Judge under r 49.2: see [r 49.2.40] and [r 49.2.60]. Pursuant to SCA s 118(3) and r 49.4 an appeal lies to the Supreme Court constituted by a Judge from any decision of an associate Judge which cannot be appealed to the Court of Appeal: [r 49.4.40] and [r 49.4.60]. Appeals from decisions of associate Judges lie to the Court of Appeal in accordance with SCA ss 101 and 103 and SCR Pt 60 r 17. 1.10B

When Part 11A concerning service under Hague Convention has effect

The provisions of Part 11A have effect on and from the day on which the Hague Convention enters into force for Australia. [R 1.10B insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.10B COMMENTARY [r 1.10B.40]

Operation

Part 11A contains the nationally harmonised rules for service under the Hague Convention (the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters done at the Hague on 15 November 1965 – the definition appears in r 11A.1, to which the Dictionary to the UCPR refers for Hague Convention). By this rule, once Australia accedes to the Hague Convention, service outside Australia of documents relating to proceedings in the Supreme Court and service of judicial documents emanating from overseas Convention countries may be effected under the provisions of the Hague Convention.

234

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 1 – Preliminary Division 2 – Time

[r 1.11.40]

r 1.12

DIVISION 2 – TIME 1.11

Reckoning of time

(cf SCR Part 2, rule 2; DCR Part 3, rule 1; LCR Part 4, rule 1)

(1) Any period of time fixed by these rules, or by any judgment or order of the court or by any document in any proceedings, is to be reckoned in accordance with this rule. (2) If a time of one day or longer is to be reckoned by reference to a given day or event, the given day or the day of the given event is not to be counted. (3) If, apart from this subrule, the period in question, being a period of 5 days or less, would include a day or part of a day on which the registry is closed, that day is to be excluded. (4) If the last day for doing a thing is, or a thing is to be done on, a day on which the registry is closed, the thing may be done on the next day on which the registry is open. (5) Section 36 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (which relates to the reckoning of time) does not apply to these rules.

RULE 1.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 1.11.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 1.11.40]

[r 1.11.20]

Comparison

This rule is closely modelled on SCR Pt 2 r 2 and DCR Pt 3 r 1 and does not differ in substance to those rules. The substance of subr (5) of this rule has no equivalent in DCR Pt 3 r 1. [r 1.11.40]

Operation

Interpretation Act 1987 s 21(1) provides that month means a calendar month and calendar month means a period commencing at the beginning of a day of one of the 12 named months and ending immediately before the beginning of the corresponding day of the next named month, or (if there is no such corresponding day), at the end of the next month. In the Supreme Court, there is a fixed vacation and a variable vacation each year: SCR Pt 1A r 2. The fixed vacation is the six weeks from the beginning of the Monday before 24 December. In the past time did not run during part of the fixed vacation, by SCR Pt 2 r 5 which was not carried across to the UCPR. The equivalent provision of the DCR, Pt 3 r 4, was repealed in 1991. 1.12

Extension and abridgment of time

(cf SCR Part 2, rule 3; DCR Part 3, rule 2; LCR Part 4, rule 2)

(1) Subject to these rules, the court may, by order, extend or abridge any time fixed by these rules or by any judgment or order of the court. [Subr (1) am Rule 449 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

(2) The court may extend time under this rule, either before or after the time expires, and may do so after the time expires even if an application for extension is made after the time expires. [R 1.12 am Rule 449 of 2007]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

235

UCPR Parts 1-10

This rule provides the method of calculating time for the purposes of the UCPR and, importantly, judgements or orders prescribing times within which things must be done. UCPR r 1.11(5) specifically excludes the application of Interpretation Act 1987 s 36. This is particularly relevant for the calculation of periods of five days or less, where r 1.11(3) excludes any day or part of a day on which the relevant court registry is closed. Similarly, r 1.11(4) permits a thing to be done on the next day on which the court registry is open when the last day for the doing of the thing is a day on which the registry is closed.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.12

[r 1.12.20]

RULE 1.12 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.12.20] Operation – extension of time .................................................................................................................. [r 1.12.40] Operation – renewal of statement of claim .............................................................................................. [r 1.12.50] Application after expiration of time ........................................................................................................... [r 1.12.60] Costs relating to extension of time ........................................................................................................... [r 1.12.80] Operation – abridgment of time ............................................................................................................. [r 1.12.100] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 1.12.1000]

[r 1.12.20]

Comparison

This rule differs from former SCR Pt 2 r 3 and DCR Pt 3 r 2 in that it does not provide for extensions of time for filing, serving, or amending a document by consent. [r 1.12.40]

Operation – extension of time

This rule permits the court to extend any time period fixed by the rules or any judgment or order of the court. An extension of time may be granted conditionally (CPA s 86), and terms imposed on an extension of time may include payment of costs incurred by other parties. There is no unqualified right to an extension of time, even where it is shown that the other party would not suffer if the extension were granted. An applicant for an extension of time must give a proper or sufficient reason for the non compliance. A discretion to extend a time limit is to be exercised in the context of the statute or rule creating the discretion, considering the general purpose of the enactment to give effect to the court’s view of the justice of the case: Arthur Andersen Corp Finance Pty Ltd v Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 104 (Buzzle) at [28]–[43]. The court would consider the nature of the extension sought, the length and reasons for the delay, whether the delay was deliberate, the conduct of the parties generally and any hardship or prejudice caused to the plaintiff by refusing the extension or to the defendant by granting it: Buzzle at [43]; Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 198; [2015] NSWCA 130 at [22]–[23]. The discretion is to be exercised in light of CPAss 56–59: Buzzle at [35]–[36]; Weston v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd [2012] NSWCA 79; (2012) 88 ACSR 80 at [20]; Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 198; [2015] NSWCA 130 at [29]–[30]. Hardship or prejudice may include the personal strain of litigation: Richards v Cornford (No 3) [2010] NSWCA 134 per Allsop P at [42], applied by Hidden J in Anpor Holdings Pty Ltd v Swaab [2011] NSWSC 1591 at [28] and [39]. A contrary statutory provision as to time or the granting of an extension of time will prevail over the rule: McPherson v Lawless [1960] VR 363. [r 1.12.50]

Operation – renewal of statement of claim

The nature of the discretion to be exercised regarding renewal of a statement of claim was discussed in Arthur Andersen Corp Finance Pty Ltd v Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 104 at [28]–[43] and Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Kirk (2011) 82 ACSR 390; [2011] NSWCA 67 at [94]. The court should consider the attempts that had been made at service, the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, whether the delay was deliberate, whether notice of the application was given to the defendant, the conduct of the parties generally, and the hardship or prejudice caused to the plaintiff by refusing the extension or to the defendant by granting it: see Buzzle at [43]; Kirk, at [94]. A deliberate decision to allow a statutory limitation period to expire is a powerful factor against extension: Buzzle at [93]. Knowledge by a defendant of the proceedings and the nature of the claims made may mitigate the prejudice that delay in actual service could cause a defendant: Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Kirk (2011) 82 ACSR 390; [2011] NSWCA 67 at [123]–[129]; Hunter v Hanson [2014] NSWCA 263 at [123]. Ordinarily awaiting the result of another case is not a good reason for delay; delay pending the outcome of a test case or an appeal which could render the claim futile may in some circumstances amount to good reason: Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Kirk (2011) 82 ACSR 390; [2011] NSWCA 67 at [102]; Hunter v Hanson [2014] NSWCA 263. There is no right for the defendant to be heard on the application for extension of time: Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One Tel Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1320 at [9]–[12]; but see the discussion in Weston v Publishing and 236

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 1 – Preliminary Division 2 – Time

[r 1.13.40]

r 1.13

Broadcasting Ltd [2009] NSWSC 321 and Rich v Long [2008] NSWSC 487, regarding notification to the defendant. Under r 12.11(1)(e) the defendant may apply to set aside the originating process if and when served: see [r 12.11.40]. If that occurs, the statement of claim would be rendered stale and incapable of being served, and the proceedings would be dismissed. [r 1.12.60]

Application after expiration of time

In an appropriate case, the court may extend time on an application made after the time fixed had expired. The former SCR Pt 2 r 3 has been interpreted as applying to a self-executing order, so that the court making a self-executing order may extend the time for compliance even after the order had taken effect: FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268; 62 ALJR 216. [r 1.12.80]

Costs relating to extension of time

The usual principle that costs follow the event may be displaced where one party seeks dispensation from the court under what is frequently described as the “indulgence principle”: see [r 42.1.150]. [r 1.12.100]

Operation – abridgment of time

This rule permits the court to abridge any time period fixed by the rules or any judgment or order of the court. The question of abridgment of time most frequently arises with respect to service of a summons, subpoena or notice of motion. Where time for service has been abridged by order of a court, an endorsement stating the time within which the document is to be served should appear on the document served. [r 1.12.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co, 2014), [2.1110]–[2.1130], [2.1080]–[2.1100] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co., 1989), pp 237–239. Related rules: as to extension of time for appeals to the court: r 49.8 (appeal from a decision of an associate Judge to the Supreme Court constituted by a Judge), r 49.20 (application for review of a decision of a registrar other than judicial registrar), r 50.3 (appeals to the court), r 51.16 (appeals to the Court of Appeal); and as to judicial review proceedings r 59.10. 1.13

Fixing times

(cf SCR Part 2, rule 4; DCR Part 3, rule 3; LCR Part 4, rule 3)

RULE 1.13 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.13.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 1.13.40] References related rules ...................................................................................................................... [r 1.13.1000]

[r 1.13.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance to the former SCR Pt 2 r 4 and DCR Pt 3 r 3, with only minor changes to the wording. [r 1.13.40]

Operation

This rule permits the court to fix a specific time by which an action must be taken in connection with proceedings, where no particular time was fixed by the rules or a judgment or order of the court. The rules generally make provision for the time within particular steps must be undertaken, for example entering an appearance, filing a defence, filing and serving a list of documents and responding to a notice to produce before hearing. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

237

UCPR Parts 1-10

If no time is fixed by these rules, or by any judgment or order of the court, for the doing of any thing in or in connection with any proceedings, the court may, by order, fix the time within which the thing is to be done.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.14

[r 1.1.40]

[r 1.13.1000]

References related rules

Related provisions: commencement of proceedings: Pt 6; service: Pt 10; notice to produce before hearing: Pt 21 Div 2; discovery: Pt 21 Div 1; interrogatories: Pt 22.

DIVISION 3 – FEES AND OTHER AMOUNTS 1.14

Prescribed fees and other amounts

The fees and other amounts prescribed by these rules are set out in Schedule 3.

RULE 1.14 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.14.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 1.14.40]

[r 1.14.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision. There is no equivalent former SCR or DCR. [r 1.14.40]

Operation

This rule prescribes the fees payable under r 31.31 (witness subpoenaed but not called to testify), r 31.33 (for production of medical records) and r 39.42 (amount a garnishee may retain). The Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 provides the fees payable in relation to court proceedings, functions exercised by the Sheriff, functions exercised by the Marshal in Admiralty, and by whom and to whom fees are payable. Fees payable in relation to court proceedings include hearing allocation fees and hearing fees. There is provision for the waiver, postponement and remittal of fees. Schedule 1 to the Regulation makes separate provisions for court fees payable in the Supreme Court, District Court and Local Court, and miscellaneous court fees. A higher fee is generally payable by a corporate party. 1.15 Fees chargeable under the Oaths Act 1900 The fees chargeable under section 28 of the Oaths Act 1900 are set out in item 1 of Schedule 3.

RULE 1.15 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.15.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 1.15.40]

[r 1.15.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision. There is no equivalent former SCR or DCR. [r 1.15.40]

Operation

Fees are payable under Oaths Act 1900 2005 s 28 in respect of the taking of an oath before a person authorised under Oaths Act s 27, for the marking of an annexure or exhibit and for attesting a document. Oaths Act s 27(2) permits the Chief Justice to authorise persons other than Australian legal practitioners to take and receive affidavits concerning any manner within the jurisdiction of any court, by commission under the seal of the Supreme Court: Commissioners for affidavits.

238

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 1.16.60]

Part 1 – Preliminary Division 4 – Distribution of business between Divisions of Supreme Court

r 1.16

DIVISION 4 – DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS BETWEEN DIVISIONS OF SUPREME COURT [Div 4 insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

1.16

Assignment of business to Divisions

(cf SCR Part 12, rule 1(1))

Proceedings in the Supreme Court: (a) under an Act or instrument referred to in Column 1 of Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 8, or (b) under a provision referred to in Column 2 of that Part in respect of such an Act or instrument, are assigned to the Division of the Court referred to in Column 3 of that Part in respect of that Act, instrument or provision. [R 1.16 insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.16 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.16.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 1.16.40] Specialist lists ........................................................................................................................................... [r 1.16.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 1.16.1000]

[r 1.16.40] Operation This rule provides for the assignment to the Common Law or Equity Divisions of the Supreme Court of various proceedings under State or Commonwealth statutes. Schedule 8 to the UCPR also specifies the specialist list, if any, to which the proceedings are assigned under r 45.8. More general provision for the assignment of different kinds of proceedings to the Common Law or Equity Divisions is made in rr 1.18 and 1.19. Proceedings may be retained in a Division whether or not assigned to that Division by the SCA or rules: SCA s 54(2). SCA s 55 provides that a step taken, order made, judgment or other thing done in proceedings in any Division is valid even if done in a different Division than that to which the proceedings are assigned under the SCA or rules. While proceedings may be transferred between Divisions under SCA s 54(1), proceedings properly commenced in one Division should remain in that Division unless a sufficient case for transfer has been made out: Giorgi v European Asian Bank Aktiengesellschaft BC8601212 (Supreme Court; McClelland CJ in Eq; 3 March 1986), Ritchie’s Supreme Court Procedure (NSW), Practice Decision [13,040]. The court’s discretion to transfer proceedings between Divisions or Lists should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. A transfer between Divisions or Lists may be justified if an appropriate specialist list is available or the proceedings do not call for the specialist procedures a particular Division or list provides: Challenge Bank Ltd v Raine & Horne Commercial Pty Ltd (1989) 17 NSWLR 297; Anpor Holdings Pty Ltd v Swaab [2008] NSWSC 208. [r 1.16.60] Specialist lists Pt 45 Div 1 provides for the specialist lists in the Supreme Court. The List structure facilitates cases being dealt with by Judges who specialise in the particular field of law: Anpor Holdings Pty Ltd v Swaab [2008] NSWSC 208 at [10]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

239

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 1.16.20] Comparison This rule is new. Former SCR Pt 12 rr 4 and 5 assigned to the Common Law and Equity Divisions respectively proceedings under specified Acts. Former Schedule H to the SCR specified proceedings under various State and Commonwealth Acts which were assigned to the Administrative Law List of the Common Law Division.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.17

[r 1.16.60]

The present specialist lists, and the applicable Practice Notes, are: Common Law Division • Administrative & Industrial Law List – Practice Note SC CL 3 • Defamation List – Practice Note SC CL 4 • Possession List – Practice Note SC CL 6 • Professional Negligence List – Practice Note SC CL 7 Equity Division • Admiralty List – Practice Note SC Eq 2 • Commercial List – Practice Note SC Eq 3 • Technology and Construction List – Practice Note SC Eq 3 • Corporations List – Practice Note SC Eq 4 • Family Provision List – Practice Note SC Eq 7 • Protective List • Commercial Arbitration List – Practice Note SC Eq 9 • Revenue List – Practice Note SC Eq 10 • Probate List • Real Property List – Practice Note SC Eq 12 The relevant practice note should be consulted by plaintiffs before commencing proceedings, and by a defendant served with proceedings. There are special requirements when commencing proceedings intended to be entered in the Commercial List or the Technology and Construction List of the Equity Division. See [r 6.4.60], Practice Note SC Eq 3 and [r 45.6.60]. [r 1.16.1000]

References

Related provisions: SCA Pt 3, ss 49 and 53 to 55; [SCA 49.20]–[SCA 49.120]; Pt 45 Div 1. 1.17

Bulk transfers between Supreme Court Divisions

(cf SCR Part 14A, rule 7)

The Supreme Court may of its own motion, by a single order, direct that proceedings of a specified type be transferred between the Common Law Division and the Equity Division. [R 1.17 insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.17 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.17.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 1.17.40]

[r 1.17.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 14A r 7(1). [r 1.17.40]

Operation

This rule provides for the transfer of all proceedings of a specified type from one division to another, by a single order. This provision is most likely to be used where a specialist list is established in one of the divisions, and proceedings of the type appropriate to be entered in the particular list have been commenced in a different division. See [r 1.16.60].

240

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 1.18.20]

1.18

Part 1 – Preliminary Division 4 – Distribution of business between Divisions of Supreme Court

r 1.19

Assignment of business to Common Law Division

(cf SCR Part 12, rule 1(3))

The following proceedings in the Supreme Court are assigned to the Common Law Division: (a) proceedings for a debt arising under any Act (including any Commonwealth Act) by which any tax, fee, duty or other impost is collected or administered by or on behalf of the State or the Commonwealth, (b) proceedings on an appeal or application to the Court: (i) in respect of a decision of a public body (other than a court or tribunal) or public officer (other than an officer of a court or tribunal), or (ii) for the removal into the Court of any matter before a public body (other than a court or tribunal) or public officer (other than an officer of a court or tribunal), (c) proceedings on an appeal or application to the Court in respect of: (i) a decision of a public body constituted or established by or under a Commonwealth Act (other than a court exercising federal jurisdiction within the meaning of section 26 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 of the Commonwealth), or (ii) a decision of a person holding or acting in a public office under a Commonwealth Act (other than an officer of a court referred to in subparagraph (i)), (d) subject to section 53 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, proceedings that are not assigned to the Equity Division by these rules. [R 1.18 insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.18 COMMENTARY [r 1.18.20]

Comparison

Paragraph (a) is based on, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 4(4). Paragraphs (b) and (c) are based on, and the same in substance as, Pt 12 r 4(2)(b) and Pt 2 of Sch H of the SCR Pt 4(4). Paragraph (d) is new, but reflects SCA s 53(1)(d).

(cf SCR Part 12, rule 5(b))

The following proceedings in the Supreme Court are assigned to the Equity Division: (a) proceedings on an application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in respect of a minor, (b) proceedings for orders for the custody of and access to minors, (c) proceedings on an appeal to the Court in a Division in proceedings between husband and wife or parent and child, (d) proceedings for orders under and provision by or under any Act that a debenture or bond issued by a corporation constituted by that Act, or a coupon annexed to that debenture or bond, has been lost or destroyed or defaced and directions by or under that Act for advertisement relating to that debenture, bond or coupon, (e) proceedings for orders under any provision made by or under any Act for the appointment of a receiver of the income of a corporation which is constituted by that Act and which makes default in payment to the holder of any debenture, or coupon, issued or stock inscribed by that corporation, © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

241

UCPR Parts 1-10

1.19 Assignment of business to Equity Division

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.19

[r 1.19.20] (f)

proceedings in relation to any provision in any Act or Commonwealth Act by which a tax, fee, duty or other impost is levied, collected or administered by or on behalf of the State or the Commonwealth (other than proceedings for debt that are assigned to the Common Law Division by rule 1.18(a)).

[R 1.19 insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.19 COMMENTARY [r 1.19.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 12 r 5(b)(i)–(vi). 1.20 Declarations of right and injunctions (cf SCR Part 12, rule 3)

Proceedings need not be assigned to the Equity Division solely because a declaration of right or an injunction is claimed in the proceedings. [R 1.20 insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.20 COMMENTARY [r 1.20.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 12 r 3. 1.21 Removal to Court of Appeal (cf SCR Part 12, rule 2)

(1) The Supreme Court in a Division may, in relation to proceedings commenced in the Division, make an order that the proceedings be removed into the Court of Appeal: (a) if it makes an order under rule 28.2 for the decision of a question of law, or (b) if, having stated the question to be decided or determined, it is satisfied that special circumstances exist that render it desirable to make an order for their removal into the Court of Appeal. (2) If an order is made under subrule (1): (a) the Court of Appeal may order that the whole or any part of the proceedings be remitted to a Division for the determination, by trial or otherwise, of the proceedings or of any question arising in the proceedings, or (b) the proceedings may be continued and disposed of in the Court of Appeal. (3) Proceedings may be removed into the Court of Appeal under subrule (1) even if any decision or determination in the proceedings is expressed by any Act or law to be final or without appeal. (4) In this rule, question includes any question or issue in any proceedings, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by pleadings, agreement of parties or otherwise. [R 1.21 insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.21 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.21.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 1.21.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 1.21.1000]

242

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 1 – Preliminary Div 5 - Notices under s 78B of Judiciary Act 1903 of Commonwealth

[r 1.22.20] [r 1.21.20]

r 1.22

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 12 r 2. [r 1.21.40]

Operation

An order made under the rule may be appropriate where a motion, in substance, challenges the validity of another judge’s orders, or seeks to appeal from them. A single judge of a Division ought not decide whether another judge proceeded correctly: Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One Tel Ltd (in liq) [2010] NSWSC 586 at [11]. An order made under the rule removes the entire proceedings into the Court of Appeal, not only a part of the matter. The Court of Appeal then decides whether, and if so, how, the entire removed proceedings should be divided: Sivakumar v Pattison [1984] 2 NSWLR 78 at 79–80. The Court of Appeal may still remit the proceedings to a Division for determination of the proceedings or any question arising in the proceedings. Generally, the Court of Appeal should have the benefit of the concluded view of the Court in a Division: Barton v Berman [1980] 1 NSWLR 63 at 67, 77. SCA s 51(5)(a) provides for the removal into the Court of Appeal of proceedings by way of an appeal or stated case commenced in a Division if the Court in the Division is satisfied that special circumstances exist rendering it desirable for the proceedings to be removed into the Court of Appeal. An application under SCA s 51(5)(a) may be made on application by a party or of the Court’s own motion. [r 1.21.1000]

References

Related provisions: SCA s 51(5); re separate determination: [r 28.2.60].

DIVISION 5 – NOTICES UNDER SECTION 78B OF JUDICIARY ACT 1903 OF COMMONWEALTH [Div 5 insrt Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

1.22

Notice of constitutional matter

(cf Federal Court Rules, Order 51, rule 1)

(1) If proceedings pending in a court involve a matter arising under the Commonwealth Constitution or involving its interpretation within the meaning of section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 of the Commonwealth, the party whose case raises the matter must file a notice of a constitutional matter. court that involves a matter arising under the Commonwealth Constitution or involving its interpretation, the court is under a duty not to proceed in the cause unless or until it is satisfied that notice of the cause and the matter raised in the cause has been served on the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and the States. The purpose of such a notice is to afford the Attorneys-General a reasonable time to consider whether or not they wish to intervene in the proceedings or to have the cause removed into the High Court for determination.

(2) Notice of a constitutional matter must state: (a) specifically the nature of the matter, and (b) facts showing the matter is one to which subrule (1) applies. [R 1.22 insrt Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

RULE 1.22 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.22.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 1.22.40]

[r 1.22.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. It is based on FCR O 51 r 1. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

243

UCPR Parts 1-10

Note: Section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 of the Commonwealth provides that if a cause is pending in a State

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.23

[r 1.22.0]

[r 1.22.40]

Operation

The meaning of cause in Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B is found in s 2 of the Act. It includes any suit and also includes criminal proceedings. Matter includes any proceedings in a court, whether between parties or not, and any incidental proceeding in a cause or matter. The obligation of a party whose case raises a constitutional matter to file a notice reflects the duty on a court in which a cause is pending which involves a constitutional matter not to proceed in the cause unless and until satisfied that the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and of the States have been given notice of the constitutional matter and reasonable time has elapsed for the Attorneys-General to consider intervening in the proceedings or seeking removal of the cause to the High Court. The court may nonetheless hear and determine an application for urgent interlocutory relief where necessary in the interests of justice: Judiciary Act 1903 s 78B(5). The obligation of the court not to proceed does not depend on a party’s bona fide and genuine belief that a constitutional matter is raised, but the court’s satisfaction that a constitutional matter is involved: Green v Jones [1979] 2 NSWLR 812; (1979) 39 FLR 428 at 818. A party’s notice of constitutional matter should accordingly state the facts showing that a constitutional matter as defined in r 1.22(1) arises. 1.23

Time for filing and service of notice of constitutional matter

(cf Federal Court Rules, Order 51, rule 2)

(1) The party whose case raises the constitutional matter, or such other party as the court may direct, must file notice of a constitutional matter and serve a copy of the notice on all other parties and the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth, the States, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory: (a) if the matter arises before any directions hearing or case management conference in the proceedings, not later than 2 days before the date of that hearing or conference, or (b) if no directions hearing or case management conference has been fixed or is imminent, as soon as practicable, or (c) if the matter arises at a hearing, within such time as the court directs. (2) As soon as practicable after a party files and serves a notice in the circumstances referred to in subrule (1)(b), the party must apply to the court for directions. [R 1.23 insrt Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

RULE 1.23 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.23.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 1.23.40]

[r 1.23.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. Subrule (1) is based on FCR O 51 r 2, although FCR O 51 r 2 provides that if the matter arises before the date fixed for trial, notice of a constitutional matter must be served not later than 10 days before the date fixed for trial. [r 1.23.40]

Operation

This rule prescribes the time for service of notice of a constitutional matter on the Attorneys-General. Rule 1.24 requires the filing of affidavits of service, so that the court may determine whether a reasonable time has elapsed, in the terms of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B(2), for the Attorneys-General to consider the question of intervention in or removal of the proceedings. See [r 1.22.40]. Subrule (2) ensures that proceedings are promptly brought before the court for directions where a constitutional matter has been raised.

244

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 1.25.40]

1.24

Part 1 – Preliminary Div 5 - Notices under s 78B of Judiciary Act 1903 of Commonwealth

r 1.25

Affidavit of service

(cf Federal Court Rules, Order 51, rule 3)

The party whose case raises a constitutional matter must file an affidavit of service of each notice required to be served under rule 1.23, and must do so promptly after the notice is served. [R 1.24 insrt Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

RULE 1.24 COMMENTARY [r 1.24.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. It is based on FCR O 51 r 3, although that rule made more detailed provisions for the time by which the affidavit of service of notice of constitutional matter must be filed. 1.25 Documents for intervening Attorneys-General (cf Federal Court Rules, Order 51, rule 4)

The party whose case raises a constitutional matter must provide copies of any other documents that have been filed in the proceedings and that are relevant to the matter to any intervening Attorney-General as soon as practicable after notice of the intervention is given to the party. [R 1.25 insrt Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

RULE 1.25 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 1.25.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 1.25.40]

[r 1.25.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. It is based on FCR O 51 r 4, although this rule restricts the obligation for the party to provide copies of other documents filed in the proceedings to the intervening Attorney-General to documents that are relevant to the constitutional matter. Operation

This rule ensures that an intervening Attorney-General will be given copies of other documents filed in the proceedings, by any of the parties, by the party whose case raises a constitutional matter and places the onus to do so on that party. The restriction to other documents filed in the proceedings that are relevant to the constitutional matter reflects the fact that by Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B(2)(c) the court may continue to hear evidence and argument concerning matters severable from the constitutional matter while the Attorneys-General consider the question of intervention in or removal of the proceedings.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

245

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 1.25.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 1.26

[r 1.26.40]

DIVISION 6 – PROCEDURE IN PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES [Div 6 insrt Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

1.26

Procedure under particular Acts

(1) The provisions of Schedule 10 apply to proceedings under the Acts referred to in that Schedule. (2) A reference in any such provision to “the Act” is a reference to the Act referred to in the heading beneath which that provision appears. [R 1.26 insrt Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.26 COMMENTARY [r 1.26.40]

Operation

By this rule, as from 8 August 2008, the provisions of UCPR Sch 10 apply to proceedings under the various State and Commonwealth Acts specified in that Schedule, carrying over parts of SCR Sch J and DCR Pt 24C. 1.27 Procedure in particular District Court lists The provisions of Schedule 11 apply to proceedings in the District Court that are assigned to the Coal Miners’ Workers Compensation List or the Special Statutory Compensation List. [R 1.27 insrt Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 1.27 COMMENTARY [r 1.27.40]

Operation

By this rule, as from 8 August 2008, the provisions of UCPR Sch 11 apply to proceedings in the District Court assigned to the Coal Miners’ Workers Compensation List or the Special Statutory Compensation List, carrying over DCR ss24D, 24E, 24F and 39B.

246

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 2 – Case management generally [r 2.1.40]

r 2.2

PART 2 – CASE MANAGEMENT GENERALLY Commentary by Michael McHugh SC.

PART 2 COMMENTARY [r Pt2.20]

Case management

Rules of court not uncommonly now provide a general statement of an overriding purpose and a general statement of case management powers: Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Thomson, 2014) Ch 2. CPA Pt 6 builds upon and gives statutory supremacy to these rules and reinforces recent judicial pronouncements concerning case management and the duties of practitioners to give effect to the overriding purpose of facilitating the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings: State Pollution Control Commission v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 29 NSWLR 487 at 493–494; Ashmore v Corp of Lloyds [1992] 1 WLR 446; Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738 at 744. CPA Pt 6 Divs 1 and 2 should be read together with the specific rules in this Part. Part 6 of the CPA has the effect of reinforcing two points: (a) the courts and not the parties, are in charge of the proceedings and (b) practitioners are bound to help the court to get to the real point of a case as quickly as possible. 2.1

Directions and orders

(cf SCR Part 26, rule 1)

The court may, at any time and from time to time, give such directions and make such orders for the conduct of any proceedings as appear convenient (whether or not inconsistent with these rules or any other rules of court) for the just, quick and cheap disposal of the proceedings. Note: See also the guiding principles in relation to the conduct of court proceedings (set out in Division 1 of Part 6 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005) and the general powers of the court to give directions (set out in Division 2 of that Part).

RULE 2.1 COMMENTARY Operation

The rule underpins the case management provisions of CPA Pt 6 which should be read together. Such provisions confer wide powers in aid of the overriding purpose found in s 56: McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 104; Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 and see Bi v Mourad [2010] NSWCA 17 at [47] and following. Whilst r 2.1 does allow directions and orders which may be inconsistent with other rules, it is still subject to the CPA: Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372 at [91]. CPA s 58 requires the court to act in accordance with the dictates of justice set out in subs (2) in deciding whether to make orders or directions for the management of proceedings and in what terms any such order or direction should be made. The section also sets out the matters to which a court must have regard: ss 56 and 57, and the matters to which a court may have regard, for the purpose of determining what are the dictates of justice in a particular case. 2.2 Appointment for hearing (cf SCR Part 26, rule 2)

The court may, at any time and from time to time, of its own motion, appoint a date for a hearing at which it may give or make the directions or orders referred to in rule 2.1.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

247

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 2.1.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 2.3

[r 2.2.40]

RULE 2.2 COMMENTARY [r 2.2.40]

Operation

The rule underscores the case management provisions of CPA Pt 6, particularly Div 2. CPA s 62 also gives the court wide powers concerning the conduct of the hearing itself. 2.3

Case management by the court

(cf SCR Part 26, rule 3)

Without limiting the generality of rule 2.1, directions and orders may relate to any of the following: (a) the filing of pleadings, (b) the defining of issues, including requiring the parties, or their legal practitioners, to exchange memoranda in order to clarify questions, (c) the provision of any essential particulars, (d) the filing of “Scott Schedules” referred to in rule 15.2, (e) the making of admissions, (f) the filing of lists of documents, either generally or with respect to specific matters, (g) the delivery or exchange of experts’ reports and the holding of conferences of experts, (h) the provision of copies of documents, including their provision in electronic form, (i) the administration and answering of interrogatories, either generally or with respect to specific matters, (j) the service and filing of affidavits, witness statements or other documents to be relied on, (k) the giving of evidence at any hearing, including whether evidence of witnesses in chief must be given orally, or by affidavit or witness statement, or both, (l) the use of telephone or video conference facilities, video tapes, film projection, computer and other equipment and technology, (m) the provision of evidence in support of an application for an adjournment or amendment, (n) a timetable with respect to any matters to be dealt with, including a timetable for the conduct of any hearing, (o) the filing of written submissions.

RULE 2.3 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 2.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 2.3.40]

[r 2.3.20]

Comparison

There is no significant change from the former SCR. Specific additions to the list include the filing of “Scott Schedules” referred to in r 15.2 and written submissions. [r 2.3.40]

Operation

In exercising such powers, a court is required to take into account the overriding purpose of the CPA and the UCPR, stated in s 56(1) of the CPA and the objects identified in s 57(1). The minimisation of delay, within the limitations outlined in s 59 of the CPA, and the proportionality embodied in s 60 are also relevant; furthermore, the court may have regard to the matters specified in s 58(2). These powers and those found elsewhere, including CPA s 61(1), (2)(c) and UCPR rr 2.1, 2.2 can also be used to make orders relieving one party to civil litigation from complying, in whole or in part, with directions that would otherwise require that party to disclose to the other, in advance of the trial, all affidavits and reports to be adduced in evidence at the trial: Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372. Rule 29.5 (Conduct of trials generally) was used in tandem with r 2.1 in NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1561 where the applicant sought to reopen the case to call further evidence. 248

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 3 – Electronic case management Division 1 – Preliminary

[r 3.1.1000]

r 3.1

PART 3 – ELECTRONIC CASE MANAGEMENT [Pt 3 subst Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

Commentary by The Hon Richard Macready, Former Associate Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Updated by Joanne Shepard, Barrister.

DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY [Div 1 insrt Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

3.1

Definitions

(1) In this Part: applicable ECM system [Repealed] [Def rep Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[1]]

coversheet means a page that is generated by Online Registry that includes details about the case in which the document is being filed (including the case number). e-Court [Repealed] [Def rep Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[1]]

Online Registry means the electronic case management of that name established under clause 2 of Schedule 1 to the Electronic Transactions Act 2000. registered user, in relation to Online Registry, means a person who is registered as a user of the Registry. [Def am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[2]]

upload, in relation to a document, means to transfer an electronic version of the document from a computer or other device to Online Registry. [Def am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[3]]

(2) In this Part, a reference to filing a document in a court includes a reference to any other method of sending a document to the court. [R 3.1 am Rule 255 of 2016; subst Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]; am Rule 594 of 2010]

RULE 3.1 COMMENTARY

[r 3.1.20]

Comparison

The provisions of this Part are new and thus there are no corresponding provisions in the previous rules of the Supreme Court, District Court or the Local Court. Compare LCR Pt 19 r 2. [r 3.1.40]

Operation

This rule provides the necessary definitions for the operation of the Part. [r 3.1.1000]

References

CourtLinkNSW was established as an Electronic Court Management system under the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 from 25 October 2005. By amendments to the Electronic Transactions (ECM Courts) Order 2005 JusticeLink was established in it place.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

249

UCPR Parts 1-10

Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 3.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 3.1.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 3.1.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 3.2

3.2

[r 3.2.20]

Application of Part

This Part applies to those courts, and for the purposes, for which the use of an applicable ECM system is authorised by an order in force under clause 3 of Schedule 1 to the Electronic Transactions Act 2000. [R 3.2 subst Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]; am Rule 594 of 2010, r 3(2)]

RULE 3.2 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 3.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 3.2.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 3.2.1000]

[r 3.2.20]

Comparison

The provisions of this Part are new and thus there are no corresponding provisions in the previous rules of the Supreme Court, District Court or the Local Court. Compare LCR Pt 19 r 1. [r 3.2.40]

Operation

This rule provides the necessary link between the rules and an Electronic case management system authorised for a particular court under the Electronic Transactions Act 2000. [r 3.2.1000]

References

The current authorisation pursuant to s 14C of the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 is the Electronic Transactions (ECM Courts) Order 2005 last modified by No 267 of 2008 published in the Government Gazette No 76 of 27 June 2008 p 6346. It gives authority to use JusticeLink to the Court of Criminal Appeal, Supreme Court, District Court and Local Court for certain limited purposes. The purposes include: (a) Use in civil proceedings in the Supreme Court, District Court and Local Court to communicate in electronic form in connection with business of the Court being conducted in the absence of the public. (b) The filing of documents in electronic form in the Corporations list and Possession list in the Supreme Court. (c) Use in the Court of Criminal Appeal for filing and serving documents in electronic form and to communicate in electronic form in connection with the business of the Court being conducted in the absence of the public.

DIVISION 2 – REGISTRATION OF USERS OF ONLINE REGISTRY [Div 2 heading am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]] [Div 2 insrt Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

3.3

Registration of users

(1) Any person may apply to be a registered user of Online Registry by completing and submitting the application form, and agreeing to comply with the terms and conditions, published on the Online Registry website. [Subr (1) subst Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[5]]

(2) A person applying to be a registered user of Online Registry must provide such information as may be required by the application form, including whether or not the applicant is a legal practitioner. [Subr (2) subst Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[5]]

(3) A registrar of the court may direct that the registration of a person be cancelled if, in the opinion

250

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 3 – Electronic case management Division 3 – Filing documents using Online Registry

[r 3.3.40]

r 3.4

of the registrar, the person should not have been registered as a user of Online Registry or has breached any of the online conditions. [Subr (3) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[6]] [R 3.3 am Rule 255 of 2016; subst Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]; am Rule 166 of 2009; Rule 579 of 2007]

RULE 3.3 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 3.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 3.3.40]

[r 3.3.20]

Comparison

The provisions of this Part are new and thus there are no corresponding provisions in the previous rules of the Supreme Court, District Court or the Local Court. Compare LCR Pt 19 r 3. [r 3.3.40]

Operation

The rule provides for the registration of users of the system. In respect of legal practitioners this will be facilitated by reference to details of registrations maintained by professional regulatory bodies. An application form to be registered as a user is available on the Supreme Court Website accessed through www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au

DIVISION 3 – FILING DOCUMENTS USING ONLINE REGISTRY [Div 3 heading subst Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[7]] [Div 3 insrt Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

3.4

Electronic filing of documents

(1) This rule applies to any document that is permitted to be filed using Online Registry. [Subr (1) subst Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[8]]

(2) In any proceedings, a document permitted to be filed using Online Registry may be filed in the court on behalf of a party to the proceeding by a registered user of Online Registry who: (a) is authorised under rule 4.4 to sign documents on the party’s behalf, or (b) has been given permission to file the document on behalf of a person who is authorised under rule 4.4 to sign documents on the party’s behalf. (3) A document that is filed by means of Online Registry is taken to have been filed when Online Registry gives notice of acceptance of the document. [Subr (3) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]]

(4) Notice of acceptance of a document, and of the date and time of the acceptance, is to be given, by means of Online Registry, to the registered user by whom the document was filed. [Subr (4) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]]

(5) Despite a document being submitted to be filed by means of Online Registry, and notice of acceptance given by Online Registry, the document may subsequently be rejected by the court if the document fails to comply with any substantial requirements of the approved form or the rules in relation to such a document. [Subr (5) subst Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[9]] [R 3.4 am Rule 255 of 2016; subst Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]; am Rule 594 of 2010; Rule 580 of 2007; Rule 625 of 2005]

RULE 3.4 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 3.4.20] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

251

UCPR Parts 1-10

[Subr (2) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 3.5

[r 3.4.20]

Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 3.4.40] Format of filed documents .......................................................................................................................... [r 3.4.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 3.4.1000]

[r 3.4.20]

Comparison

The provisions of this Part are new and thus there are no corresponding provisions in the previous rules of the Supreme Court, District Court or the Local Court. Compare LCR Pt 19 r 4. [r 3.4.40]

Operation

This rule is the authority for the court to implement an electronic filing system and deals with the acceptance by the court of documents lodged electronically. [r 3.4.60]

Format of filed documents

The format in which documents are to be filed with the court is a matter which is determined by the Uniform Rules Committee under s 17 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. It can be expected that the court will require that documents be filed in a format which is secure and will enable the court to record different versions of the document during the life of the proceedings. For example only admitted parts of affidavits. [r 3.4.1000]

References

“Document” is a defined expression in the Dictionary. See cl 11 of Sch 1 of the Electronic Transactions Act 2000, which provides for uniform time for transactions by reference to Sydney time. Editor’s note: Rule 3.4A is repealed and has not been reproduced.

3.5

Uploading documents

(1) In this rule, document means a document submitted for filing in accordance with rule 3.4 and includes any attachment that forms part of or accompanies that document. (2) This rule applies to any document that may be, or is required to be, uploaded and submitted for filing by Online Registry. [Subr (2) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]]

(3) A true and complete copy of the document must be uploaded in a format that is permitted by Online Registry. [Subr (3) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]]

(4) Each document uploaded must be accurately described. (5) If the document is an affidavit, the description of the document must include the name of the deponent and the date that the affidavit was sworn or affirmed. (6) If a document that is required to be signed under rule 4.4 is uploaded, the document must be a scanned copy that includes a clear, legible copy of the signature of the person who signed the document. (7) If an affidavit or statement of evidence is uploaded, it must include: (a) a clear, legible copy of the signature of the deponent of the affidavit or person making the statement, and (b) if the document has been witnessed, a clear legible copy of the signature of the witness, and (c) if the document is an affidavit executed in New South Wales, a duly completed certificate under the Oaths Act 1900. (8) A person who has filed a document by uploading it is taken to have agreed that, if the court so requires, he or she will file the original document in accordance with the court’s directions. (9) The original signed copy of a document filed under this rule must be kept until the later of the following: 252

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 3 – Electronic case management Division 3 – Filing documents using Online Registry

[r 3.7.20]

r 3.7

(a)

2 years from after the date that proceedings in which the document was filed are determined by judgment, order or discontinuance, or (b) if the proceedings in which the document was filed is appealed, 2 years after the date that appeal is determined by judgment, order or discontinuance, or (c) 2 years after the date the document was filed. [R 3.5 am Rule 255 of 2016; subst Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

3.6

Electronic issuing of a document

(1) The court may, by means of Online Registry, issue a document to any party to proceedings who is a registered user of Online Registry. [Subr (1) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]]

(2) The date and time at which the document was issued must be set out in the document. (3) When issued by means of Online Registry, a document that is required to be signed by a person is taken to have been duly authenticated for the purposes of clause 5 of Schedule 1 to the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 if the person’s name is printed where his or her signature would otherwise appear. [Subr (3) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]] [R 3.6 am Rule 255 of 2016; subst Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

RULE 3.6 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 3.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 3.6.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 3.6.1000]

[r 3.6.20]

Comparison

The provisions of this Part are new and thus there are no corresponding provisions in the previous rules of the Supreme Court, District Court or the Local Court. Compare LCR Pt 19 r 5. [r 3.6.40]

Operation

This rule allows the court to issue a document electronically rather than by traditional methods of sealed paper copies. [r 3.6.1000]

References

3.7

Electronic service of a document

A party to any proceedings before the court may use electronic mail to serve a document on any other party to proceedings, whether by means of Online Registry or otherwise, but only with the consent of the other party. [R 3.7 am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]; subst Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]; am Rule 594 of 2010; Rule 338 of 2008]

RULE 3.7 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 3.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 3.7.40] Consent to electronic service ..................................................................................................................... [r 3.7.60] Time of service ........................................................................................................................................... [r 3.7.80] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 3.7.1000]

[r 3.7.20]

Comparison

The provisions of this Part are new and thus there are no corresponding provisions in the previous rules of the Supreme Court, District Court or the Local Court. Compare LCR Pt 19 rr 4 to 7. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

253

UCPR Parts 1-10

Sealing of process for service of originating process is dealt with in r 4.12.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 3.8

[r 3.7.0]

[r 3.7.40]

Operation

This rule allows service by electronic mail with the consent of the recipient. Such service does not have to involve the use of the court’s ECM system and can be by ordinary email between parties. [r 3.7.60]

Consent to electronic service

It is to be noted that service can only be affected electronically with the consent of the person to be served. In practice this will mean that originating process will invariably be served personally. The provisions of the rules, the forms and their use of an “address for service” will normally signify consent to electronic service. Rule 10.5(2)(c) provides that if an address for service is at a solicitor’s office and the address for service includes an electronic mail address then service may be by transmitting an electronic copy to that address. If a legal practitioner does not represent a party then in the ordinary course other methods of service will have to be used. Although “address for service” is not defined, the forms for appearance and originating process incorporate this requirement. [r 3.7.80]

Time of service

Provisions as to the time of service are contained in cl 14 of Sch 1 of the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 where the service is effected after 5 pm or on a non working day. In the first case service is deemed to be on the next day and in the second case on the next working day. Service by email was addressed by Austin J in Austar Finance Group Pty Ltd v Campbel (2007) 215 FLR 464; [2007] NSWSC 1493 [48]–[55]. His honour held that an electronic transmission by email can constitute service for the purposes of s 459G(3) of the Corporations Act if it is shown that the documents electronically transmitted have actually been received in a readable form by the person to be served or if it is shown that the case falls within one of the special exceptions permitted by rules of court. Difficulties of proof of service under former s 13 of the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 were discussed in Reed Constructions Australia Pty Ltd v Eire Contractors Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 678. The Electronic Transactions Act 2000 was amended by the Electronic Transactions Amendment Act 2010 to provide new provisions relating to service. Those provisions are contained in the new sections 13, 13A and 13B. [r 3.7.1000]

References

The manner of service is dealt with in r 10.5. 3.8

Use of Online Registry in business conducted in absence of public

(1) Any business that, pursuant to section 71 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, may be conducted in the absence of the public may be conducted by electronic communication sent and received by means of Online Registry, as provided by clause 9 of Schedule 1 to the Electronic Transactions Act 2000. [Subr (1) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]]

(2) A legal practitioner who is a registered user of Online Registry in relation to proceedings may participate in any such business: (a) directly (the legal practitioner sends communication in his or her own name), or (b) indirectly (someone authorised by the legal practitioner sends a communication in the legal practitioner’s name). [Subr (2) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]]

(3) A legal practitioner who authorises someone else to send a communication referred to in subrule (2)(b), is taken to have affirmed to the court that he or she has actual knowledge of the contents of the communication. [R 3.8 am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[4]; subst Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

254

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 3 – Electronic case management Division 3 – Filing documents using Online Registry

[r 3.8.1000]

r 3.10

RULE 3.8 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 3.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 3.8.40] Types of hearings that may be conducted electronically ........................................................................... [r 3.8.60] Electronic methods of conducting hearings ............................................................................................... [r 3.8.80] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 3.8.1000]

[r 3.8.20]

Comparison

The provisions of this Part are new and thus there are no corresponding provisions in the previous rules of the Supreme Court, District Court or the Local Court. [r 3.8.40]

Operation

This rule adopts the statutory ability under s 14I of the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 to conduct a hearing by electronic communication that necessarily will be in the absence of the public. [r 3.8.60]

Types of hearings that may be conducted electronically

Apart from the restrictions in s 71 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, cl 9 of Sch 1 of the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 provides that a hearing conducted for the purpose of receiving oral evidence is not within the permission granted under the section. [r 3.8.80]

Electronic methods of conducting hearings

The method of communication is not limited and can include E forum and ordinary email communication. In due course it will be able to facilitate callovers and other listing mechanisms. Practice Note SC GEN 12 makes provision for the procedures to be followed in the ECM court in the Court of Appeal and the Equity Division of the Supreme Court. For the form of orders establishing an ECM court for the purpose of conducting directions hearings, see Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v KLALC Property & Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 169. Failure to cooperate in the establishment of an ECM court can lead to orders compelling a party to be a registered user: see Hill v W&F Lechner Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 440. [r 3.8.1000]

References

Section 71 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 and cl 9 of Sch 1 of the Electronic Transactions Act 2000. Party filing document required to serve notice of listing

If, as a result of a document being filed using Online Registry, the registrar of the court lists proceedings, the party filing the document is required to serve any notice of listing issued by the registrar in relation to that listing on all other active parties. [R 3.9 subst Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]; am Rule 594 of 2010; Rule 625 of 2005]

3.10

Request for a certified copy of a judgment or order

(1) This rule applies to a request by a party or on behalf of a party for a sealed copy of a judgment or order submitted to the court using the Online Registry. (2) A request under this rule does not constitute a document being filed in the proceedings. (3) If the request is a valid request then a sealed copy of the judgment will be issued. [R 3.10 insrt Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

255

UCPR Parts 1-10

3.9

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 3.11 3.11

Filing of affidavits using Online Registry’s XML filing

(1) This rule applies to an affidavit that is filed in court by means of the Online Registry’s XML filing facility. (2) The person filing the affidavit is taken: (a) to have affirmed to the court that he or she has possession of the original affidavit, and (b) to have undertaken to the court that, if the court so directs, he or she will file the original affidavit in accordance with the court’s directions. (3) The original signed copy of the affidavit filed under this rule must be kept until the later of the following: (a) 2 years from after the date that proceedings in which the document was filed are determined by judgment, order or discontinuance, or (b) if the proceedings in which the document was filed is appealed, 2 years after the date that appeal is determined by judgment, order or discontinuance, or (c) 2 years after the date the document was filed. [R 3.11 insrt Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

3.12 Written record to be kept of direction to e-file document submitted using Online Registry’s XML filing or if scanned copy of document is not uploaded (1) If a document is submitted for filing using: (a) the Online Registry’s XML filing facility, or (b) the Online Registry facility where Online Registry generates the document and a copy of the document is not uploaded by the user: the person who has given permission for a document to be filed as referred to in rule 3.4(2)(b) must make a written record of the fact that he or she has given that permission. (2) The person who gave the permission is taken: (a) to have affirmed to the court that he or she has given the permission, and (b) to have undertaken to the court that, if the court so directs, he or she will produce to the court the written record referred to in subrule (1). (3) If any proceedings in which a document has been filed and the court requires production of the written record referred to in subrule (1), it may also stay proceedings until the record is produced. (4) A written permission for the purposes of rule 3.4(2)(b) is taken to be a written record for the purposes of this rule. (5) A written record must be kept until the later of the following: (a) 2 years from when the proceedings in which the document was filed are determined by a judgment, order or discontinuance, or (b) if the proceedings in which the document was filed is appealed, 2 years from when that appeal is determined by a judgment, order or discontinuance, or (c) 2 years from the date on which the document was filed. [R 3.12 insrt Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

3.13

Filing of wills

(1) This rule applies to a will that is required to be filed in court together with an application for probate of the will or for administration of a person’s estate with the will annexed, if the application is filed by means of Online Registry. (2) A true and complete scanned copy of the will must be submitted with the application. (3) The original will (or if the application relates to a copy of the will, the copy of the will sought to be proved) must be filed at, or mailed to, the Sydney Registry of the Supreme Court within 7 days after the date on which the application is filed. (4) The will filed under subrule (3) must be accompanied by a coversheet that includes the case number assigned to the application. 256

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 3 – Electronic case management Division 3 – Filing documents using Online Registry

r 3.15

(5) The person filing the application is taken to have affirmed to the court that he or she has possession of the will when the application is filed and that the will will be filed at or sent to the court in accordance with subrule (4). (6) In this rule, will includes any codicil or other testamentary instrument. [R 3.13 insrt Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

3.14

Request to issue subpoena

(1) This rule applies to a request on behalf of a party to issue a subpoena submitted to the court using the Online Registry. (2) A request to issue a subpoena using the online registry can only be made on behalf of a party who is represented by a solicitor. (3) A request to issue a subpoena is made by: (a) providing the name of the person to whom the subpoena is addressed, and (b) uploading a copy of the proposed subpoena in the approved form. (4) The registered user who submitted the request to issue a subpoena will receive confirmation that the request has been accepted when a coversheet is inserted as the first page of the uploaded subpoena in accordance with rule 3.15. [Subr (4) am Rule 501 of 2014, r 3(1)]

(5) If the request to issue a subpoena is for a subpoena for production and to allocate an early return date, the coversheet will also include a notice of the date, time and place where the person is required to attend to produce documents sought under the subpoena if the documents are not produced to the registry beforehand. (6) The coversheet will be sealed. (7) The coversheet is taken to be part of the issued subpoena for the purposes of these rules. [R 3.14 am Rule 501 of 2014; insrt Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

3.15

Coversheet generated by Online Registry

(1) The coversheet will include a seal and a note of the date and time of filing. (2) If a document is submitted for filing under rule 3.5 and accepted by the Online Registry, the registered user who submitted the document will be sent a copy of the document submitted for filing with a coversheet inserted as the first page of the document.

(4) If, as a result of the filing of a document, Online Registry has automatically listed the proceedings, then the coversheet will include a notice of the date, time and place that the proceedings have been listed. (5) If the document submitted for filing under rule 3.5 includes the other associated documents as attachments under that rule, then the document and the other associated documents will all be included under the one coversheet. [R 3.15 insrt Rule 29 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]

Editor’s note: Division 4 is repealed and has not been reproduced.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

257

UCPR Parts 1-10

(3) If a coversheet has been inserted as the first page of the document in accordance with subrule (2), the coversheet is taken to be part of the document for the purposes of this Part.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.1

[r Pt4.20]

PART 4 – PREPARATION AND FILING OF DOCUMENTS Commentary by Carol Webster SC.

PART 4 COMMENTARY [r Pt4.20]

General comments on Part 4

Part 4 of the UCPR brings together provisions about documents prepared for use in proceedings. The rules deal with the contents of the documents; their form, including the way in which numbers and dates should be expressed; who can sign a document on behalf of a party; what is a proper address for service to be specified in a document; and the filing of documents. Finally, under r 4.15, the court has power to deal with scandalous matter in documents.

DIVISION 1 – PREPARATION OF DOCUMENTS GENERALLY 4.1

Application of Division

This Division applies to and in respect of any document that is prepared by or on behalf of a person (whether or not a party) for use in proceedings.

RULE 4.1 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 4.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 4.1.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.1.1000]

[r 4.1.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision. There is no equivalent former SCR or DCR. [r 4.1.40]

Operation

This rule makes clear that rr 4.1 to 4.9 apply to all documents prepared by or on behalf of a person. It should be noted that the Uniform Rules Committee may approve forms for documents to be used in connection with civil proceedings under CPA s 17(1), and where a form has been approved, a document filed with or issued by a court is to be in that form under CPA s 17(3). Interpretation Act 1987 s 80 provides that substantial compliance with an approved form is sufficient. The approved forms may be found on the Civil Forms page of the Attorney General’s Department Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 website http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au. Redesigned Civil Forms approved for use from 29 January 2008 (1 January 2008 in relation to forms for the Court of Appeal) do not include information about how to complete the forms. This information is included in a separate document, Guide to preparing documents, available on the Civil Forms web page. It should be consulted before completing any of the redesigned Civil Forms. [r 4.1.1000]

References

Related provisions: CPA s 17; Interpretation Act 1987 s 80. 4.2

Documents to be filed to contain certain information

(cf SCR Part 1, rule 10, Part 7, rule 2, Part 11, rule 4, Part 65, rule 1; DCR Part 5, rule 2; LCR Part 36, rule 7)

(1) Originating process filed on behalf of a party in any proceedings must contain the following information: (a) the name of the court in which the proceedings are to be commenced, (b) if relevant, the division in which the proceedings are intended to be heard, (b1) if relevant, the list in which the proceedings are intended to be entered, (c) the venue at which the proceedings are intended to be heard, 258

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 1 – Preparation of documents generally (d) (e) (e1) (f) (g) (g1) (g2)

(h)

r 4.2

the title of the proceedings, the nature of the process (summons or statement of claim), if the party has engaged a solicitor to act as the party’s legal representative, the name of the solicitor, if the process is filed by a person who is neither the party nor the party’s solicitor or solicitor’s agent, the capacity in which the person acts when filing the document, the party’s address and the party’s address for service, if the party has engaged a solicitor to act as the party’s legal representative, the email address of the party’s solicitor, if the party has not engaged a solicitor to act as the party’s legal representative, the email address of the party or (if the party has no email address) a statement that the party has no email address, the address, if known, of any defendant.

Note:

A solicitor named on the originating process pursuant to paragraph (e1) is thereby the solicitor on the record in relation to the party on whose behalf the process is filed.

(2) A document filed on behalf of a person in relation to any proceedings (other than originating process) must contain the following information: (a) the title of the proceedings, as appearing on the originating process for the proceedings, (b) if relevant, the division in which the proceedings are intended to be heard, (b1) if relevant, the list in which the proceedings are intended to be entered, (c) the case number for the proceedings, as appearing on the originating process for the proceedings, (d) the nature of the document, (d1) if the person has engaged a solicitor to act as the person’s legal representative, the name of the solicitor, (e) if the document is filed by a person who is neither a party nor a party’s solicitor or solicitor’s agent, the capacity in which the person acts when filing the document, (f) if the person has engaged a solicitor to act as the person’s legal representative, the email address of the person’s solicitor, (g) if the person has not engaged a solicitor to act as the person’s legal representative, the email address of the person or (if the person has no email address) a statement that the person has no email address. Note 1: In relation to paragraph (c), see rule 9.1(4) and (5) which require cross-claims to be numbered. Note 2: A solicitor named in the document pursuant to paragraph (d1) is thereby the solicitor on the record in relation to the party on whose behalf the document is filed. [Subr (2) am Rule 96 of 2014, Sch 1[3] and [4]; Rule 374 of 2013, Sch 1[3] and [4]; Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[4]; Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[2]; Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[1]; Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[3]; Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[1]-[3]]

(2AA) An email address of the party’s solicitor or of the person’s solicitor (as the case may be) in subrules (1)(g1) and (2)(f) means: (a) the email address of the solicitor on the record, or (b) the email address of the contact solicitor, or (c) an email address of the solicitor’s firm which is regularly monitored and from which any emails can be forwarded to the solicitor on the record or the contact solicitor. Note: The terms solicitor on the record and contact solicitor are defined in the Dictionary. [Subr (2AA) insrt Rule 96 of 2014, Sch 1[5]]

(2A) A notice to be filed under Division 9 of Part 78 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970, or a caveat to be filed under Division 10 of that Part, must contain the following information: (a) if the notice or caveat relates to proceedings already commenced: © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

259

UCPR Parts 1-10

[Subr (1) am Rule 96 of 2014, Sch 1[1] and [2]; Rule 374 of 2013, Sch 1[1] and [2]; Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[3]; Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[1]; Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[2]; Rule 717 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[1] and [2]]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.2

[r 4.2.20] (i)

the title of the proceedings, as appearing on the originating process for the proceedings, and (ii) if relevant, the division in which the proceedings are intended to be heard, and (iii) if relevant, the list in which the proceedings are intended to be entered, (b) the case number or unique identifier assigned to the notice or caveat under rule 64 or 73 of that Part, as the case may be, (c) the nature of the document, (d) if the person has engaged a solicitor to act as the person’s legal representative, the name of the solicitor, (e) if the notice or caveat is filed by a person who is neither a party nor a party’s solicitor or solicitor’s agent, the capacity in which the person acts when filing the notice or caveat. [Subr (2A) insrt Rule 608 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]

(3) The originating process and any such document may also contain the DX address or fax number of the person, the person’s solicitor or the person’s solicitor’s agent. [Subr (3) am Rule 374 of 2013, Sch 1[5]; Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

(3A) Court documentation within the meaning of clause 4 (Restrictions on commencing proceedings without reasonable prospects of success) of Schedule 2 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 that is not required by that section to be certified must include a statement to the effect that it is not required to be so certified. [Subr (3A) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[2]; insrt Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

(3B) Subrule (3A) does not apply to documents that are filed in the Land and Environment Court in relation to proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of that Court’s jurisdiction. [Subr (3B) insrt Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[3]]

(4) In this rule, originating process does not include any process (such as a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons) by which a cross-claim is made. [Subr (4) insrt Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[4]] [R 4.2 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 96 of 2014; Rule 374 of 2013; Rule 608 of 2012; Rule 88 of 2009; Rule 494 of 2008; Rule 338 of 2008; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 391 of 2006; Rule 717 of 2005; Rule 625 of 2005; Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 4.2 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 4.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 4.2.40] Address for service ..................................................................................................................................... [r 4.2.60] Name of solicitor ......................................................................................................................................... [r 4.2.70] Email address ............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.2.75] Document filed by a person who is not the party, the party’s solicitor or solicitor’s agent ....................... [r 4.2.80] Pseudonym orders ................................................................................................................................... [r 4.2.100] Meaning of document ............................................................................................................................... [r 4.2.120] Certification of “reasonable prospects of success” .................................................................................. [r 4.2.140] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.2.1000]

[r 4.2.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts former SCR Pt 65 r 1, DCR Pt 47 r 1 and LCR Pt 36 r 7 regarding the information an originating process or other document filed on behalf of a person should contain and draws on former SCR Pt 7 r 2, Pt 11 r 4 and Pt 5 r 2. Rule 4.2 requires a document to bear the “title of the proceedings” whereas the former rules referred to a document being entitled between the parties. Taken with the requirements of the approved forms noted in [r 4.2.40], the rule is the same in substance to the former provisions. 260

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 4.2.75]

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 1 – Preparation of documents generally

r 4.2

[r 4.2.40] Operation This rule sets out the information an originating process or other document filed on behalf of a person should contain. The form of documents is prescribed by r 4.3 : see [r 4.3.40]. The definitions of “plaintiff” and “defendant” in CPA s 3 include a person by whom and a person against whom a cross-claim is made. Rule 4.2(1) deals with originating process. “Originating process” is defined in CPA s 3 as the process by which proceedings are commenced. The Dictionary to the UCPR defines “originating process” as the statement of claim or summons by which proceedings have been commenced, and includes a statement of cross-claim and a cross-summons, although r 4.2(4) modifies the definition for the purposes of r 4.2. Because r 4.2(1) does not apply to a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons, a cross-claimant cannot change the venue at which the proceedings are to be heard by nominating a different venue. The venue can only be changed by order of the court. The approved forms of statement of claim, summons, statement of cross-claim and cross-summons, respectively approved Forms 3A, 3B, 4B, 9 and 10, set out the headings under which the information required under r 4.2 should appear. The Title of the proceedings as referred to in r 4.2(1)(d) is the name of plaintiff and defendant, and if more than one, the number of plaintiffs and number of defendants or name of the second plaintiff or second defendant if only two. Note that r 4.3(3A) requires that the name of the first (or only) party on either side of the record be in bold type. Party details are to be set out on a separate page, including the name, address for service and any legal representative for each of the parties. A separate document, approved Form 2, must be filed and served where there are more than two plaintiffs (or cross-claimants) or defendants (or cross-defendants) and updated, re-filed and re-served by the relevant party with any document first recording a change in the parties to the proceedings, for example a cross claim: see [r 4.2A.40]. Rule 4.2(2) deals with documents other than originating process. Again, approved forms set out headings under which the information required by the rule should appear. The title of the proceedings and other formal details of the document can be copied from the originating process. Rule 4.2(2A) deals with notices and caveats to be filed under Divs 9 or 10 respectively in Pt 78 of the SCR in probate proceedings, which are not an “originating process”.

[r 4.2.70] Name of solicitor Where a party has a solicitor, documents filed on behalf of the party (both originating process and subsequent documents) should state both the name of the solicitor on the record and the name of the firm of solicitors. This is set out in the filing, issuing or preparation details section of approved forms as “[solicitor on record] [firm]”. The requirement to state the name of the solicitor on the record is found in r 4.2(1)(e1) and r 4.2(2)(d1). The solicitor on the record must hold an unrestricted practising certificate, under r 7.1(6): see [r 7.1.50]. The name, telephone number and email address of the contact solicitor – the solicitor with day to day conduct of the matter – should be stated in documents to be filed. The contact solicitor may be a different person to the solicitor on the record. As to the further documents to be filed when a solicitor is appointed to act for a party who had not previously had a solicitor, or when a party changes his or her solicitor, see [r 7.28.40] and [r 7.26.40]. [r 4.2.75] Email address Courts increasingly use email to contact parties. Documents filed for a represented party must state the solicitor’s email address: rr 4.2(1)(g1) and 4.2(2)(f). Documents filed for an unrepresented party must state the party’s email address or, if the person has no email address, that fact: rr 4.2(1)(g2) and 4.2(2)(g). Rule 4.2(2AA) makes clear that the email address of a party’s solicitor may be the email address of the solicitor on the record, the email address of the contact solicitor: see [r 4.2.70], or another email address of the firm which is regularly monitored and from which the solicitor on the record or the contact solicitor will be sent emails. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

261

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 4.2.60] Address for service A party’s address for service should be specified in accordance with r 4.5: see [r 4.5.40]. The address stated for the defendant in the originating process may show that service is to be effected outside the jurisdiction.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.2

[r 4.2.]

[r 4.2.80]

Document filed by a person who is not the party, the party’s solicitor or solicitor’s agent Subrules (1) and (2) specifically require the capacity in which a person who is not the party, the party’s solicitor or solicitor’s agent files a document to be set out. Rule 7.1 sets out who may commence and carry on proceedings on behalf of a party: see [r 7.1.40]. There are now separate approved forms for a summons, statement of claim and defence where the filing party is acting in person or by an authorised officer – approved Forms 3B, 4B and 7B. [r 4.2.100]

Pseudonym orders

Parties must generally be described by their full names. In Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Jones (1985) 2 NSWLR 47 the Court of Appeal assumed that it had power to forbid publication of the name of a party to proceedings where disclosure would defeat the ends of justice, one of the criteria specified in SCA s 80 regarding conducting hearings in camera (as to which now see CPA s 71). The Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (which repealed CPA s 72) provides in s 7(a) that the court may by a suppression or non-publication order prohibit or restrict the publication or disclosure of information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any of them. A suppression or non-publication order on one or more of the grounds set out in s 8(1), including that the order is necessary (a) to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, (c) to protect the safety of any person, (d) to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in criminal proceedings involving an offence of a sexual nature (including an act of indecency), or (e) in the public interest, the public interest significantly outweighing the public interest in open justice. The grounds must be specified in the order: s 8(2). The emphasis is on the demonstration that making the order is “necessary”, which is a strong word; such an order should be exceptional: Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52; 263 FLR 211; [2012] NSWCCA 125; Rinehart v Welker [2011] NSWCA 403 at [27]; Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; 267 ALR 12; [2010] HCA 21 at [30]. “Necessary” should not be given an unduly narrow construction; an order which protects the proper administration of justice, without impinging upon the principle of open justice, may be considered “necessary” if reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieve its perceived purpose: Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52; 263 FLR 211; [2012] NSWCCA 125 at [8], [48], [51]; R v Kwok (2005) 64 NSWLR 335; 158 A Crim R 160; [2005] NSWCCA 245 at [13], [34] and [38]–[40]. It is insufficient that the making or continuation of an order is “convenient, reasonable or sensible” or appears so on balance: Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; 267 ALR 12; [2010] HCA 21 at [31], approving what was said by Fullerton J and the Court of Appeal (Hodgson JA, Hislop and Latham JJ concurring) in Attorney-General (NSW) v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2007) 73 NSWLR 635; [2007] NSWCCA 307 at 641, cited in Rinehart v Welker [2011] NSWCA 403 at [31] and [106]. In the past the court has required evidence as to special prejudice the applicant would or might suffer by publication of the applicant’s identity or details of the proceedings in the ordinary open conduct of the court’s business. Compare John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) 62 NSWLR 512; [2005] NSWCA 101 and O’Shane v Burwood Local Court (NSW) (2007) 178 A Crim R 392; [2007] NSWSC 1300 with W v M [2009] NSWSC 1084 where Brereton J held that publication of the subject matter of the proceedings would defeat the very ends of the litigation. A pseudonym order was made with respect to a witness testifying pursuant to subpoena in Witness v Marsden (2000) 49 NSWLR 429; [2000] NSWCA 52, in circumstances where the witness reasonably feared death or physical injury, or an unnecessary loss of liberty and the order was a minimalist interference with open justice. In Hume v Council of the Kings School [2010] NSWSC 186 the applicant (and others) were alleged to have committed serious assaults including sexual assaults on the plaintiff. If charges were laid the Childrens (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 would have required non publication. The court made both pseudonym and non-publication orders (to which the defendant consented). The plaintiff did not oppose the non-publication order. Guidelines in relation to applications by plaintiffs to use initials instead of a full name were stated in J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 10. See Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [3.40]. 262

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 1 – Preparation of documents generally

[r 4.2.1000]

r 4.2

Suppression orders can only be made in circumstances where the ends of justice require the concealment of some part of the process: Re Applications by Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) (2004) 9 VR 275; [2004] VSCA 3 (affirmed on other grounds, Re Application by the Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) (2005) 79 ALJR 881; 214 ALR 422; [2005] HCA 18). [r 4.2.120]

Meaning of “document”

“Document” is defined in the Dictionary to the UCPR to include any part of the document and any copy of a document or part of the document. The Interpretation Act 1987 s 21 defines “document”. It provides that document means any record of information and includes: (a) anything on which there is writing, or (b) anything on which there are marks, figures, symbols or perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them, or (c) anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else, (d) a map, plan, drawing or photograph. Previously, “document” was defined in similar terms in former SCR Pt 1 r 8(1), DCR Pt 1 r 4(1) and LCR Pt 1 r 3(1). These definitions have not been reproduced. [r 4.2.140]

Certification of “reasonable prospects of success”

Clause 4 of Sch 2 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (before 1 July 2015, ss 347(2) and 347(3) of the Legal Profession Act 2004) prohibits the filing of court documentation on a claim or defence of a claim for damages without certification by a principal of a law practice or a legal practitioner associate responsible for the provision of the legal service concerned that the claim or defence (as appropriate) has reasonable prospect of success. The Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 Sch 2 cl 4(4) defines court documentation to be an originating process, defence or further pleading, or any amendment of it, or other document of a kind prescribed by the local regulations. Approved Form 3A – Statement of claim, Form 4A – Summons, Form 7A – Defence, Form 8 – Reply, Form 9 – Statement of cross-claim, and Form 10 – Cross-summons all include a form of certificate under Sch 2 cl 4(4)Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 to be completed by the party’s legal representative. If the claim does not require a certificate, r 4.2(3A) requires the lawyer to certify this, as set out in the first alternative paragraph under the heading Signature of legal representative in the approved forms. The forms of statement of claim, summons and defence for use by a party acting in person or by an authorised officer – respectively approved Forms 3B, 4B and 7B – do not include the certificates.

Rule 4.2(3B) makes clear that no certification as to reasonable prospects of success is required in documents filed in proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of the jurisdiction of the Land and Environment Court. This is reflected in Form B LEC, the approved form for applications in Class 1, 2 or 3 in the Land and Environment Court. [r 4.2.1000]

References

Definition of “originating process” – Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 3 and UCPR Dictionary. Definition of “document” – Interpretation Act 1987 s 21. Definition of “contact solicitor”, “solicitor on the record” and “unrestricted practising certificate” – UCPR Dictionary. Approved forms of originating process: Forms 3A and 3B – Statement of claim, Forms 4A and 4B – Summons, Form 9 – Statement of cross-claim, Form 10 – Cross-summons, Form 2 – List of parties. Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [3.40]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 65 r 1; DCR Pt 47 r 1; LCR Pt 36 rr 2 and 7.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

263

UCPR Parts 1-10

As to the meaning of “reasonable prospects of success”, see Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; [r 42.3.80] and the other cases referred to in that paragraph; Beaumont N J, “What are reasonable prospects of success?”(2004) 78 ALJ 812.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.2A

4.2A

[r 4.2A.20]

List of parties

(1) In any proceedings in which there are more than 2 plaintiffs, or more than 2 defendants, the plaintiff must file, together with the originating process, a list of parties. (2) In any proceedings in which there is a cross-claim brought by more than 2 cross-claimants, or to which there are more than 2 cross-defendants, or against a cross-defendant who is not already a party to the proceedings, the cross-claimant must file with the statement of cross-claim or cross-summons: (a) if no list of parties has yet been filed in the proceedings, a list of parties, or (b) if a list of parties has already been filed in the proceedings, an amended list of parties. (3) In any proceedings in which a list of parties has been filed, any party who files a document that effects a change of parties (including a change that involves the addition of a party who is not already a party to the proceedings) must file, together with the document, an amended list of parties. [R 4.2A subst Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[5]; insrt Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

RULE 4.2A COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.2A.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 4.2A.40]

[r 4.2A.20]

Comparison

This rule was introduced when the Civil Forms were redesigned for use from January 2008. The rule was repealed and substituted as from 6 March 2009. [r 4.2A.40]

Operation

This rule requires a separate document listing all of the details of parties to proceedings to be filed and served where there are more than two plaintiffs or two defendants, more than two cross-claimants or cross-defendants, or where a cross-defendant is not already a party to the proceedings. A plaintiff commencing proceedings involving that number of parties must file and serve with the originating process a List of parties in approved Form 2. A cross-claimant filing a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons involving that number of parties, or joining a new party to the proceedings, as a cross-defendant, must update any existing list of parties, or file a List of parties for the first time. The Guide to preparing documents describes the List in para 4.2. The List of parties is intended to be a reference for the court and the parties in multi party matters. A party filing a document first recording a change in the parties to the proceedings, so that there will be more than two plaintiffs or defendants, or cross-claimants or cross-defendants must also file a list of parties. This will be an update to the earlier list, if there was one, or a new document if no list of parties had previously been required. The Guide to preparing documents suggests that the parties co-operate by exchanging electronic copies of the completed form, so that it need not be re-created when relevant details change. 4.3

Paper and writing

(cf SCR Part 65, rule 2; DCR Part 47, rule 3; LCR Part 36, rule 4)

(1) A document must be on standard A4 paper of durable quality, capable of receiving ink writing. (2) Subject to the rules: (a) a document may be one-sided (that is, with writing on one side of each sheet) or two-sided (that is, with writing on both sides of each sheet), but not partly one-sided and partly two-sided, and (b) the sheets of a document must be securely fastened: (i) if the document is one-sided, at the top left hand corner, or 264

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 4.3.40]

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 1 – Preparation of documents generally

r 4.3

(ii) it the document is two-sided, along the left hand side, without obscuring the writing or the margin, and (c) a left margin of at least 25 millimetres, and a top margin of 30 millimetres, must be kept clear on each sheet of a document that bears writing, and (d) the pages of a document (that is, the sides of the sheets that bear writing) must be consecutively numbered. [Subr (2) am Rule 717 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[3]]

(3) The spacing between the lines of writing in a document must be at least 3 millimetres. (3A) The following information in a document must be set out in bold: (a) the name of the first plaintiff and first defendant in the title of the proceedings, (b) in the case of a cross-claim, the name of the first cross-claimant and first cross-defendant in the title to the proceedings, (c) in the case of a notice of motion, the name of the person affected by the orders sought, (d) in all cases, the name of the person specified in the filing details as the person for whom the document is filed. Note: Rule 4.2 requires the title of proceedings to be included in the originating process or other documents filed on or behalf of a person in proceedings. [Subr (3A) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[4] and [5]; insrt Rule 808 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

(4) A document must bear writing that is clear, sharp, legible and permanent, must not be a carbon copy and must not bear any blotting, erasure or alteration that causes material disfigurement. (5) This rule does not apply to a document to the extent to which the nature of the document renders compliance impracticable. [R 4.3 am Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 808 of 2005; Rule 717 of 2005]

RULE 4.3 COMMENTARY

[r 4.3.20] Comparison This rule is closely modelled on former SCR Pt 65 r 2, and the general substance of former DCR Pt 47 r 3 and LCR Pt 36 r 4. Unlike the former DCR Pt 47 r 3(2) and LCR Pt 36 r 4(2), r 4.3 does not require lodgment of as many copies of the document as there are parties to be served. A party may lodge additional copies for sealing under UCPR r 4.12: see [r 4.12.40]. The former requirement in the Local Court that a document be folded once lengthwise (that is, in back sheet form) under LCR Pt 36 r 4(3) has not been reproduced. All courts now adopt flat filing. [r 4.3.40] Operation This rule sets out the basic requirement for a document to be used in proceedings. The requirements of r 4.3(2)–(4) are designed to ensure that documents filed will be legible and a durable part of the records of the court. The writing on copies made on thermal facsimile paper, for example, is not permanent: it fades over time. Particular attention should be paid to the requirements to consecutively number all of the pages of a document and to securely fasten all the sheets of a document – at the top left hand corner, where all of the pages of the document are one-sided only, or along the left hand side where the document is two sided. Removable clips or fasteners should not be used. Failure to observe these requirements detracts from the court’s ability to use and refer to documents in proceedings. See, eg, the comments of Justice John Bryson in “Affidavits” (1999) 18 Aust Bar Rev 166 at 168–169. New r 4.3(3A) is designed to ensure that the name of the first party on either side of the record is highlighted, and readily apparent on the first page of a document, by being set out in bold. The former requirement that the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

265

UCPR Parts 1-10

Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 4.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 4.3.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.3.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.4

[r 4.3.40]

name of the first party on either side of the record be underlined was removed by amendments in December 2007, to avoid confusion with the use of underlining to indicate amendments to a filed document, in accordance with r 19.5(2)(b). The exception in subr (5) should be noted, but as an exception and only to the extent to which the nature of a particular document renders compliance with requirements of r 4.3 impracticable. This is unlikely to be the case with respect to originating process, defences, motions and similar formal notices, to give but some examples of the approved forms. [r 4.3.1000] References Bryson Justice J, “Affidavits” (1999) 18 Aust Bar Rev 166. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 65 r 2; DCR Pt 47 r 3; LCR Pt 36 r 4. 4.4

Signing documents

(cf SCR Part 65, rule 8, Part 66, rule 9; DCR Part 47, rule 5; LCR Part 36, rule 6)

(1) If, in any proceedings, a document is required to be signed by a party: (a) in the case of a party who is represented by a solicitor, the document may not be signed by the party but must instead be signed: (i) by the party’s solicitor, or (ii) by a solicitor acting as agent for the party’s solicitor, or (iii) by some other solicitor belonging to or employed by the same firm or organisation as the party’s solicitor or party’s solicitor’s agent, and (b) in the case of a party who is not represented by a solicitor, the document may be signed by the party and may also be signed by any other person who is authorised by these rules to commence proceedings on the party’s behalf. [Subr (1) am Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[6]; subst Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

(2) Subrule (1) is subject to the requirements of rule 35.3. [Subr (2) subst Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

(3) Despite subrule (1), a document prepared on behalf of a party in proceedings in the Local Court may instead be signed: (a) by a commercial agent with respect to debt collection (within the meaning of the Commercial Agents and Private Inquiry Agents Act 2004), in relation only to proceedings on an application for: (i) an instalment order, or (ii) an order for examination, or (iii) a writ of execution, or (iv) a garnishee order, or (b) by a person holding a licence as a real estate agent, strata managing agent or on-site residential property manager within the meaning of the Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 2002 in relation only to: (i) proceedings on an application referred to in paragraph (a), or (ii) the filing of a certificate under section 51 of the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001. [Subr (3) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]; Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[2]; Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[6]]

(4) Despite subrule (1), a document setting out proposed consent orders between the parties to the relevant proceedings may instead be signed on behalf of a party by the party’s barrister. [Subr (4) insrt Rule 462 of 2012, r 3] [R 4.4 am Rule 462 of 2012; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 716 of 2006; Rule 288 of 2006; Rule 625 of 2005]

266

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 1 – Preparation of documents generally

[r 4.4.1000]

r 4.5

RULE 4.4 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 4.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 4.4.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.4.1000]

[r 4.4.20]

Comparison

This rule is modelled on the former SCR Pt 65 r 8 and Pt 66 r 9, DCR Pt 47 r 5 and LCR Pt 36 r 6. The requirements of SCR Pt 65 r 8 that documents be signed by a party’s solicitor or by the party if not represented by a solicitor have been reproduced in substance. Express provision is made in r 4.4(4) for a party’s barrister to sign consent orders. In comparison with the former rules, r 4.4 limits the circumstances in which persons other than a party or a party’s solicitor may sign a document. The references in former SCR Pt 66 r 9(2) and DCR Pt 47 r 5(1)(e) and (3) to an “authorised signatory” have not been reproduced in r 4.4. Former DCR Pt 52 r 1 and LCR Pt 39 r 5 allowed a corporation to authorise an officer of the corporation to sign documents and act for the corporation. Although r 4.4 does not require a statement of the capacity in which a person other than a party signs a document, unlike former SCR Pt 66 r 9(1), DCR Pt 47 r 5(4) and LCR Pt 36 r 6(3), this requirement appears in the approved forms. [r 4.4.40]

Operation

This rule sets out the only persons by whom a document may be signed on behalf of the party. Rule 4.4(1)(a) prohibits a party who is represented by a solicitor from signing a document (see also [r 7.27.80]). Rule 4.2(1) and (2) specifically require the capacity in which a person who is not the party, the party’s solicitor or solicitor’s agent files a document to be stated in a document: see [r 4.2.80]. Rule 35.3 prescribes who may make an affidavit on behalf of a party. Rule 7.1 sets out who is authorised to commence proceedings on behalf of a party: see [r 7.1.40] – [r 7.1.60]. Under r 7.1(5), a commercial or other agent may commence a limited range of proceedings on behalf of a party in the Local Court, and by r 4.4(3) may sign a document in relation to such proceedings. Rule 7.31 specifically provides how any act, matter or thing is to be done where the solicitor for a person is a solicitor corporation: in that case, the act, matter or thing may be done by a solicitor who is a director, officer or employee of the corporation. [r 4.4.1000]

References

Related rules: r 4.2 regarding filing of documents; r 7.1 regarding commencement of proceedings; r 7.4 regarding a party acting by a solicitor.

4.5

Address for service

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 6; DCR Part 8, rule 8; LCR Part 7, rule 8)

(1) Subject to subrule (2), a person’s address for service is to be the address of a place in New South Wales (other than a DX address): (a) at which documents in the proceedings may be left for the person during ordinary business hours, and (b) to which documents in the proceedings may be posted for the person. (2) The address for service of a person who has a solicitor on the record is to be: (a) the office of the solicitor on the record, or (b) if the solicitor on the record has another solicitor acting as agent, the office of the agent. [Subr (2) subst Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[6]]

(3) Despite subrules (1) and (2): © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

267

UCPR Parts 1-10

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 65 r 8 and Pt 66 r 9; DCR Pt 47 r 5 and LCR Pt 36 r 6.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.5

[r 4.5.20] (a)

the address for service of a defendant who is served with originating process outside New South Wales, but in Australia, may be any address in Australia, whether inside or outside New South Wales, and (b) the address for service of a person who files a notice under section 19(1) of the Mutual Recognition Act 1992 of the Commonwealth (other than a person who is represented by a solicitor) may be any address in Australia, whether inside or outside New South Wales, and (c) the address for service contained in an application to set aside a subpoena made under section 35 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 of the Commonwealth (other than a person who is represented by a solicitor) may be: (i) any address in Australia, whether inside or outside New South Wales, or (ii) any address in New Zealand, and (d) the address for service of a person who has entered an appearance under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 of the Commonwealth is to be the address for service stated in relation to the appearance. [Subr (3) am Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[1]] [R 4.5 am Rule 632 of 2011; Rule 88 of 2009]

RULE 4.5 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 4.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 4.5.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.5.1000]

[r 4.5.20]

Comparison

This rule is modelled on SCR Pt 9 r 5 and similar in substance to DCR Pt 8 r 8. As compared to the former SCR, subr (2) simplifies the requirements for address for service of solicitors and their agents, and does not distinguish between city and country solicitors, or between those with a DX box and those without. [r 4.5.40]

Operation

This rule sets out the requirements of a proper address for service. Importantly, it must be the address of a place where documents may be left during ordinary business hours. Accordingly, a post office box is not a proper address for service: Croker v Ewen [2000] NSWCA 186; Sarikaya v Victorian WorkCover Authority (1997) 80 FCR 262. Rule 4.5(3) provides exceptions to the requirement that an address for service be a place in New South Wales, primarily relevant where the person was served outside New South Wales. It has been held that a requirement that an originating process state the plaintiff’s address meant the plaintiff’s place of residence, and was not satisfied by stating the address as care of the plaintiff’s solicitors: Sheen v Burke [1993] 1 VR 584; Stoy v Rees (1890) 24 QBD 748. See also [r 4.2.60] regarding the making of pseudonym orders. Where a plaintiff fails to state, or mis-states, the plaintiff’s address in the originating process, and it appears this was done with an intention to deceive, a defendant may seek security for costs: see [r 42.21.40]. Some approved forms, for example approved Forms 25 to 27 – Subpoenas, require the issuing party’s address for service under the Issuing details heading. [r 4.5.1000]

References

Related rules: Pt 10 regarding service of documents generally; Pt 11 regarding service of documents outside Australia; r 42.21 regarding security for costs; r 6.9 regarding entering an appearance; r 7.1 regarding “solicitor on the record”. See generally Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [3.40], and Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 211–212. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 9 r 6; DCR Pt 8 r 8; LCR Pt 7 r 8. 268

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 1 – Preparation of documents generally

[r 4.6.1000]

4.6

r 4.6

Changing address for service

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 6; DCR Part 8, rule 8; LCR Part 7, rule 8)

(1) A person may change his or her address for service by filing a notice of the change showing his or her new address for service and serving the notice on all other active parties. (2) [Repealed] [Subr (2) rep Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[6]] [R 4.6 am Rule 579 of 2007]

RULE 4.6 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 4.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 4.6.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.6.1000]

[r 4.6.20]

Comparison

This rule is similar in wording, and substantively the same as former SCR Pt 9 r 6(4) and (5), DCR Pt 8 r 8(3) and LCR Pt 7 r 8(4). Former subrule (2) (omitted in December 2007) had been based on, but was broader than the former SCR Pt 9 r 6(6), which referred to various forms of notices of change of solicitor. It provided that any document showing a new address for service that was filed and served on all other active parties was sufficient notice under this rule. [r 4.6.40]

Operation

The rule requires service on active parties (the former rules required that all parties to the proceedings be served). Active party is defined in the Dictionary to the UCPR, to mean a party who has an address for service in the proceedings other than a party against whom no further claim in the proceedings subsists (ie against whom judgment has been entered in the proceedings, or in respect of whom the proceedings have been dismissed, withdrawn or discontinued). Rule 10.16 (like the former SCR Pt 9 r 12) provides that filing is taken to have the same effect as service on a person in default of appearance or a person who has entered an appearance but is not an active party to the proceeding: see [r 10.16.40]. [r 4.6.1000]

References

Definitions: “Active party”, Dictionary to the UCPR. Related rules: r 10.16 and re change of, removal or withdrawal of solicitor, rr 7.26, 7.27, 7.28, 7.29 and 7.30. Approved forms: Form 76 – Notice of change of address for service, Form 77 – Notice of change of solicitor or appointment of solicitor, Form 78 – Notice of removal of solicitor, Form 80 – Notice of ceasing to act. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 9 r 6(4)–(6); DCR Pt 8 r 8(3); LCR Pt 7 r 8(4).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

269

UCPR Parts 1-10

This rule provides for a party to change her or his address for service. Form 76 is the approved form for a Notice of Change of Address for Service. Filing a Notice of Change or Appointment of solicitor – approved Form 77, Notice of Removal of solicitor – approved Form 78, or Notice of ceasing to act – approved Form 80, has the effect of notifying a change of address for service, as each of those forms note show a new address for service on that party.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.7

4.7

[r 4.7.20]

Numbers

(cf SCR Part 65, rule 4; DCR Part 47, rule 4; LCR Part 36, rule 5)

(1) All dates, sums and other numbers in a document are to be expressed in figures, rather than words. (2) Despite subrule (1): (a) months may be expressed in words, rather than numbers, and (b) if dates are expressed wholly in numbers, they must be expressed in the form DD/MM/YY or DD/MM/YYYY.

RULE 4.7 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 4.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 4.7.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.7.1000]

[r 4.7.20]

Comparison

Subrule (1) of this rule is almost identical to SCR Pt 47 r 4, DCR Pt 65 r 4 and LCR Pt 36 r 5. Subrule (2) is a new provision. [r 4.7.40]

Operation

This rule is designed to simplify the way in which numbers, including dates, are expressed in documents. A quantity should not be set out in words and then in numbers, such as “four (4)”. Dates should be expressed “1 January” rather than “the first day of January” or “January 1st”. Subrule (2) prohibits the use of “American” dating, as in MM/DD/YY. A date expressed wholly in numbers should be written 15/08/05 or 15/08/2005 and not 8/15/05 or 8/15/2005. [r 4.7.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 65 r 4; DCR Pt 47 r 4; LCR Pt 36 r 5. 4.7A

Land descriptions

(1) Unless the court otherwise orders, in any claim or judgment for the possession of land, and in any writ of execution in relation to land, the description of the land must include: (a) a formal description of the land sufficient to identify the land in any document establishing title to the land, together with any appropriate reference to title, and (b) the postal address (if any) of the land. (2) Without limitation, a formal description of land referred to in subrule (1)(a) may be given: (a) in the case of land under the provisions of the Real Property Act 1900 that comprises the whole of the land referred to in one or more folios of the register under that Act, by reference to the relevant folio identifiers, or (b) in the case of any land (including land referred to in paragraph (a)), by reference to: (i) a registered plan (within the meaning of the Conveyancing Act 1919), or (ii) a formal land survey plan (within the meaning of the Surveying Act 2002), or (iii) a metes and bounds description prepared by a registered land surveyor (within the meaning of the Surveying Act 2002). [R 4.7A insrt Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[7]]

270

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 1 – Preparation of documents generally

[r 4.8.1000]

r 4.9

RULE 4.7A COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.7A.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 4.7A.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 4.7A.1000]

[r 4.7A.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision. [r 4.7A.40]

Operation

This rule makes specific provision for the manner in which land is to be described in a claim or judgment for the possession of land, and in any writ of execution in relation to land. “Land” is defined in SCA s 19, and CPA s 20 defines what constitutes a claim for possession of land: see [CPA 20.20]. See [r 16.4.40] for discussion of the requirements for default judgment on a claim for possession of land. [r 4.7A.1000]

References

Related rules: r 6.8 regarding service of originating process for recovery of land; r 14.15 for specific pleading requirements in relation to proceedings for possession of land; r 16.4 regarding default judgment on a claim for possession of land; r 36.8 as to obtaining judgment for possession of land; in relation to the Supreme Court Possession List, r 45.4 and Practice Note SC CL 6 Supreme Court Common Law Division – Possession List. 4.8

Separate documents for separate process

Separate process (such as a defence and a statement of cross-claim or a cross-summons, or a reply and a defence to a statement of cross-claim) are to be dealt with in separate documents.

RULE 4.8 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 4.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 4.8.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.8.1000]

[r 4.8.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision. There is no equivalent former SCR, DCR or LCR. Operation

This rule requires a separate document for a defence and cross-claim, or reply and defence to cross-claim. This is to meet the future requirements of electronic filing of documents and CourtLink. Under the former SCR Pt 6 r 11(2), a cross-claim made solely against a party who claimed in the proceedings against the cross-claim could be included in the same document as the defence. [r 4.8.1000]

References

Related rules: Pt 3 regarding electronic case management generally, and rr 3.4 to 3.6 regarding electronic filing of documents. 4.9

Delegation by NSW Trustee and Guardian

(cf SCR Part 63, rule 16)

(1) If, in connection with any proceedings involving a person under legal incapacity, a delegate under section 9 of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 signs a document in the exercise of a function delegated under that section, the delegate must include in the document a statement: (a) of the delegate’s name and position, and (b) that the document is signed in exercise of a function delegated under that section, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

271

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 4.8.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.9

[r 4.9.20] (c)

if the delegate has not previously signed such a document in the proceedings, as to whether or not he or she has an interest in the proceedings adverse to that of the person under legal incapacity.

[Subr (1) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[1]]

(2) On request by the court, the registrar or any party to the proceedings, the delegate must furnish to the person making the request a photocopy of the delegation, certified by the delegate as being a true copy. [R 4.9 am Rule 501 of 2009]

RULE 4.9 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 4.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 4.9.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.9.1000]

[r 4.9.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical in wording to SCR Pt 63 r 16 and the same as that rule in substance. [r 4.9.40]

Operation

Rule 4.9 makes specific provisions for demonstration of the capacity in which a delegate of the NSW Trustee and Guardian (formerly the Protective Commissioner) signs a document in connection with proceedings involving a “person under legal incapacity”. See generally rr 7.13 to 7.18. [r 4.9.1000]

References

Related rules rr 7.13 to 7.18 regarding persons under legal incapacity. Definition of “person under legal incapacity”, Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 3. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 63 r 16.

DIVISION 2 – FILING OF DOCUMENTS 4.10 Filing generally (cf SCR Part 1, rule 9A)

(1) A person may lodge a document for filing in relation to any proceedings: (a) by delivering it to an officer of the court in the registry, or (b) by sending it by post to the registry’s business address. (c) [Repealed] [Subr (1) am Rule 621 of 2016, r 3(1) and (2)]

(2) Any person may lodge a document with an officer of the court for the purpose of its being filed in relation to proceedings, or proposed proceedings, in the court. (3) Unless acceptance of the document is subsequently refused by the court or by an officer of the court, a document is taken to have been filed when it is lodged for filing. (4) The court may refuse to accept a document for filing whether or not an officer of the court has accepted the document for filing. (5) An officer of the court may refuse to accept a document for filing in the following circumstances: (a) in the case of originating process: (i) if the location specified in the document as the venue at which the proceedings are to be heard is a location at which the court does not sit, or (ii) if the person on whose behalf the originating process is sought to be filed is the subject of an order of the Supreme Court declaring the person to be a vexatious litigant, 272

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 2 – Filing of documents

[r 4.10.80] (b)

r 4.10

in the case of a document for which a filing fee is payable, if the fee has not been paid or arrangements satisfactory to the officer of the court have not been made for its payment.

Note: See also rule 3.4 in relation to the electronic filing of documents. [R 4.10 am Rule 621 of 2016]

RULE 4.10 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.10.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 4.10.40] Filing in court ............................................................................................................................................ [r 4.10.60] Certification of reasonable prospects of success ..................................................................................... [r 4.10.80] Vexatious litigant ..................................................................................................................................... [r 4.10.100] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 4.10.1000]

[r 4.10.20]

Comparison

Subrules (1) to (4) of this rule are modelled on the former SCR Pt 1 r 9A and r 9B. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. District Court Act 1973 s 4(1) defined “file” as lodging with the registrar for the proper place in relation to the proceedings, for inclusion in the records of the court. In contrast to SCR Pt 1 r 9A, r 4.10(3) provides that a document is taken to be filed when lodged for filing unless acceptance is subsequently refused. Under former SCR Pt 1 r 9A, a document was not filed unless and until it was accepted. There was no similar requirement where a document was filed by being posted or sent by DX to the registry under SCR Pt 1 r 9B. This rule does not include the requirements in SCR Pt 1 r 9A(1A) or (1B) for certification under s 198L of the Legal Profession Act 1987 in relation to a claim for damages. This requirement is maintained in the approved forms: see [r 4.10.80] and [r 4.2.140]. [r 4.10.40]

Operation

This rule sets out how a document may be lodged for filing. Subrule (4) preserves the court’s ability to reject a document even if it was accepted over the counter by an officer in the court registry. Subrule (5)(b) requires that any applicable filing fee is paid, or arrangements for payment are made satisfactory to the officer of the court with whom the document is lodged. Filing fees are prescribed in the Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (located in Fees & Costs of this service). Filing in court

Rule 4.10(2) permits a person to lodge a document with an officer of the court, which does not include an associate to a judge or associate judge. The former SCR Pt 1 r 9A(1)(c) referred to a document filed with an associate to a judge or master. It was held in relation to the former SCR that the methods of filing documents provided for in the rules were non-exhaustive, so that where a trial judge concurs, filing may be effected by handing the document to the associate, although that person is not an officer of the court but a member of the judge’s staff: Beecham (Aust) Pty Ltd v Roque Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 1; 89 FLR 238 at 10 (NSWLR). Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 63 allows the court to waive a failure to comply with the rules. See also [r 2.1.40] and Civil Procedure Act 2005 Pt 6 regarding the court’s general power to give directions and make orders for the conduct of proceedings. It is anticipated that these will provide a source of power to allow a document to be filed in court, a practice which will continue, particularly bearing in mind the fact that most affidavits will now not be filed: r 35.9. Filing in court is subject to any requirement for payment of a filing fee. Usually originating process, even on an ex parte application, will be required to be filed in the registry, but if leave is given to file in court, it will be on an undertaking by the solicitor to pay the filing fee within a finite short time. [r 4.10.80] Certification of “reasonable prospects of success” The requirement in former SCR Pt 1 r 9A(1A) and (1B) that an originating process or defence on a claim for damages include a certification under Legal Profession Act 1987 s 198L(2) has not been reproduced in r 4.10. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

273

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 4.10.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.11

[r 4.10.80]

However, subs 347(2) and (3) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 prohibit the filing of court documentation on a claim or defence of a claim for damages without a lawyer’s certification that the claim or defence (as appropriate) has reasonable prospect of success, see [r 4.2.140]. [r 4.10.100]

Vexatious litigant

A person who “habitually and persistently and without any reasonable grounds” institutes proceedings in the Supreme Court, District Court or Local Court may be prohibited by order made under SCA s 84 from filing further proceedings without leave of the court: Public Trustee v Gittoes [2005] NSWSC 373; Attorney-General v Bar-Mordecai [2005] NSWSC 142; Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481; Jones v Skyring (1992) 66 ALJR 810; 109 ALR 303; Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478. An application may be made by the Attorney General in relation to proceedings against the same or different persons; or by a particular person aggrieved by the institution of vexatious proceedings against that person. The Supreme Court has power, of its own motion, to restrain further interlocutory motions without leave of the judge where a party persistently makes hopeless interlocutory applications: Wentworth v Graham (2003) 57 NSWLR 741; [2003] NSWCA 229; Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311; 48 ALJR 196; 3 ALR 19 at 320 (CLR). [r 4.10.1000]

References

Related provisions: rr 3.4 to 3.6 regarding the electronic filing of documents, wills and affidavits; Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 regarding filing fees; SCA s 84 regarding declaration as a vexatious litigant. Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [3.40] and Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 110–111, 245. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 1 rr 9A and 9B. 4.11

Case number or other unique identifier to be assigned to originating process

(cf SCR Part 1, rule 10; DCR Part 5, rule 3; LCR Part 5, rule 3)

(1) When originating process is accepted for filing, a case number or other unique identifier is to be assigned to the proceedings commenced by the process. (2) On accepting originating process for filing, an officer of the court must endorse on the process the case number or other unique identifier assigned to the proceedings commenced by the process. (3) In the case of originating process to commence proceedings for the grant of probate or administration, or the resealing of a foreign grant within the meaning of Part 78 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970, for an estate in respect of which: (a) a notice has been filed under Division 9 of that Part, or (b) a caveat has been filed under Division 10 of that Part, the case number or other unique identifier assigned to the proceedings is to be the same as that previously assigned to the notice or caveat. [Subr (3) insrt Rule 608 of 2012, Sch 1[2]] [R 4.11 am Rule 608 of 2012]

RULE 4.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 4.11.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 4.11.40] References ............................................................................................................................................ [r 4.11.1000]

[r 4.11.20]

Comparison

This rule is modelled on SCR Pt 1 r 10; DCR Pt 5 r 3; LCR Pt 5 r 3. Unlike those rules, r 4.11 provides for a numbering system which need not include the calendar year of filing; in the District Court the numbering need not relate to the particular District Court registry in which the originating process was filed. 274

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 2 – Filing of documents

[r 4.12.1000] [r 4.11.40]

r 4.12

Operation

This rule ensures that each originating process is allocated a unique identifying number. Rule 4.11 does not require that the identifying number series commence again each calendar year. The number is to be included on all documents filed after the originating process: r 4.2(2)(c). Notices and caveats filed under Divs 9 or 10 respectively in Pt 78 of the SCR in probate proceedings where no originating process has already been filed will also be allocated a unique identifying number. The number allocated to the notice or caveat will be used when a subsequent originating process is filed. [r 4.11.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 1 r 10; DCR Pt 5 r 3(3) and (4); LCR Pt 5 r 3(3) and (4). 4.12

Lodgment of additional copies of originating process for service

(cf SCR Part 7, rule 6; DCR Part 5, rule 3; LCR Part 5, rule 3)

(1) When filing originating process, a person may lodge additional copies for sealing. (2) On receiving such copies, an officer of the court: (a) must seal with the court’s seal a sufficient number of copies of the process for service on the other parties, and (b) if the process was filed by post, must forward the sealed copies to the lodging party. [Subr (2) am Rule 621 of 2016, r 3(3)]

(3) This rule does not apply in relation to originating process that is filed by means of an electronic case management system referred to in Part 3. Note: An original sealed copy of the originating process or a photocopy of a sealed copy may be served on a defendant: see rule 6.2. [R 4.12 am Rule 621 of 2016; Rule 482 of 2011, Sch 1[1]]

RULE 14.12 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.12.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 4.12.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 4.12.1000]

Comparison

Subrules (1) and (2) of this rule are the same in substance as SCR Pt 7 r 6; it differs from DCR Pt 5 r 3 in not requiring the filing of as many copies as there are parties. Subrule (3) is a new provision. [r 4.12.40]

Operation

This rule provides for a person to obtain additional sealed copies of an originating process for service, unless the originating process was filed electronically, when r 4.12(3) applies. Either an original sealed copy of the originating process or a photocopy of a sealed copy may be served on a defendant: see r 6.2(3A). A multi page document may bear the court seal only on the first page: see rr 6.2(3A) and 31.12(2). [r 4.12.1000]

References

Related rules: Pt 10 regarding service of documents generally, rr 6.2(3A) and 31.12(2) as to the form of sealed copies for service. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 7 r 6; DCR Pt 5 r 3; LCR Pt 5 r 3.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

275

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 4.12.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.13

4.13

[r 4.13.20]

Place for filing

(1) Subject to Part 3, a document (other than originating process) that is filed in relation to any proceedings must be filed: (a) subject to paragraphs (b) and (c), in the same registry as that in which the originating process was filed, or (b) if the proceedings have been transferred to another court, in the registry for that other court, or (c) if the court has ordered that documents are to be filed in some other registry, in that other registry. (2) In this rule, originating process does not include any process (such as a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons) by which a cross-claim is made. [R 4.13 subst Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[7]; am Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 4.13 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.13.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 4.13.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 4.13.1000]

[r 4.13.20]

Comparison

This rule removes the Supreme Court’s general requirement of filing in Sydney and its geographical requirements for the Common Law Division (SCR Pt 1 r 10A). It is otherwise the same in substance as SCR Pt 1 r 10A. There is no equivalent DCR provision. [r 4.13.40]

Operation

This rule requires documents filed after the originating process to be filed in the court registry for the venue where the proceedings are to be heard, or the new venue if the court orders a change of venue or transfer of the proceedings to another court. “Originating process” is defined in Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 3 as the process by which proceedings are commenced. The Dictionary to the UCPR defines “originating process” as the statement of claim or summons by which proceedings have been commenced, and includes a statement of cross-claim and a cross-summons. Rule 4.13(2) modifies the definition for the purposes of r 4.13 by excluding a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons. So that a defendant knows where further pleadings and other documents should be filed, r 6.13 requires a statement of claim to give the address of the registry where the statement of claim is filed. [r 4.13.1000]

References

Related rules: r 6.13 regarding a statement of claim. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 1 r 10A. 4.14 Filing of notices on behalf of multiple parties (cf SCR Part 11, rule 3)

Two or more persons filing the same notice of appearance, notice of motion or other notice in the same proceedings, by the same solicitor and on the same day, may do so by a single notice.

RULE 4.14 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.14.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 4.14.40] 276

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 4 – Preparation and filing of documents Division 2 – Filing of documents

[r 4.15.40]

r 4.15

References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 4.14.1000]

[r 4.14.20]

Comparison

This rule is modelled on, but applies more broadly than former SCR Pt 11 r 3 in that it applies to “a notice of motion or other notice in the same proceedings”, as well as to a notice of appearance. There is no equivalent DCR or LCR provision. [r 4.14.40]

Operation

This rule permits persons filing the same notice of appearance, notice of motion or other notice to file a single document rather than requiring a separate document for a notice filed by each of the persons. This is reflected in the Guide to preparing documents in relation to, for example the approved form of notice of appearance, Form 6. Paragraph 4.6 of the Guide to preparing documents indicates that the Filing party details should be repeated, in full, for each party appearing, before the Legal representative for filing party (or Contact details for filing party acting in person or by authorised officer) section is completed, once only for that document. [r 4.14.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 11 r 3(2). 4.15

Court’s power to deal with scandalous matter in documents

(cf SCR Part 38, rule 8, Part 65, rule 5; DCR Part 30, rule 8, Part 47, rule 7; LCR Part 25, rule 8, Part 36, rule 8)

(1) If irrelevant (a) (b) (c)

any matter contained in a document on the court file is scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive, the court may order: that the matter to be struck out of the document, or that the document be placed in a sealed envelope on the court file, or that the document be taken off the court file.

(2) A sealed envelope referred to in subrule (1)(b) may not be opened except by order of the court.

RULE 4.15 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.15.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 4.15.40] Application under this rule ........................................................................................................................ [r 4.15.60]

[r 4.15.20]

Comparison

This rule is modelled on former SCR Pt 65 r 5, DCR Pt 47 r 7 and LCR Pt 36 r 8. Former SCR Pt 38 r 8, DCR Pt 30 r 8 and LCR Pt 25 r 8 dealt with affidavits containing scandalous, irrelevant or otherwise oppressive material. Rule 4.15 extends the court’s power, to order that the document be placed in a sealed envelope on the court file, not to be opened without an order of the court. [r 4.15.40]

Operation

This rule allows the court to strike out of a document or remove from the court file, in one of the ways specified in r 4.15(1), matter which is “scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, irrelevant or oppressive”. Scandalous in this context means more than stating a scandalous fact; it means making a degrading charge which is irrelevant or alternatively providing unnecessary and degrading details about relevant charges: Wentworth v Rogers (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 19 June 1986) pp 13, 14, affirmed Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534. An application for an order under r 4.15 in the alternative may be included in a notice of motion seeking orders under r 13.4 or r 14.28 for the summary dismissal of proceedings or a pleading. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

277

UCPR Parts 1-10

References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 4.15.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 4.16

[r 4.15.40]

Under r 13.4 the court may dismiss the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief where the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court: see [r 13.4.80]; [r 13.4.120]. Under r 14.28 the court may strike out the whole or any part of a pleading which has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court: see [r 14.28.40]; [r 14.28.120]; [r 14.28.140]. [r 4.15.60]

Application under this rule

The court may make orders of its own motion or on the application of a party or the other person entitled to make such an application: CPA s 86(3). An application for an order under r 4.15 should be made by motion in the proceedings. See Pt 18 regarding motions generally. [r 4.15.1000]

References

Related provisions: r 13.4; r 14.28; Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 86(3). See generally Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 236–237. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 38 r 8, Pt 65 r 5; DCR Pt 30 r 8, Pt 47 r 7; LCR Pt 25 r 8, Pt 36 r 8. 4.16

Court to be advised as to subrogation to corporation

A person, when paying a filing fee, must advise the court if the proceedings to which the fee relates are being carried on by a corporation in the name of a natural person pursuant to a right of subrogation. [R 4.16 insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 4.16 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 4.16.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 4.16.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 4.16.1000]

[r 4.16.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule. [r 4.16.40]

Operation

This rule requires that a court be advised, for example on filing originating process, if proceedings which appear to be in the name of a natural person are in fact being carried on by a corporation pursuant to a right of subrogation. In those circumstances, cl 4(3) of the Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 (NSW) provides that the fees applicable to a corporation are payable in respect of the commencement or carrying on of the proceedings, including filing fees and hearing allocation fees. [r 4.16.1000]

References

Related rules: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 cl 4.

278

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 5 – Preliminary discovery and inspection [r Pt5.1000]

PART 5 – PRELIMINARY DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION Commentary by Michael McHugh SC.

PART 5 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 5 ..................................................................................................................... [r Pt5.20] Identity discovery ....................................................................................................................................... [r Pt5.40] Cause of action discovery .......................................................................................................................... [r Pt5.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r Pt5.1000]

[r Pt5.20]

General comments on Part 5

There are two basic types of preliminary discovery under the UCPR: Discovery to ascertain prospective defendant’s identity or whereabouts (“Identity Discovery” under r 5.2); and Discovery of documents from prospective defendant (“Cause of Action Discovery” under r 5.3). The former are based upon SCR Pt 3 r 1. The latter are new and based to a large extent on the Federal Court Rules 1979 O 15A r 6. The Part applies in the Supreme Court, District Court and Local Court. This exceptional right to discovery before pleading, in order to frame a pleading, re-introduces a similar right that existed under the Common Law Procedure Act 1899, where a period after the commencement of proceedings (by a writ) and before the plaintiff’s pleading had to be filed, could be used for an application for discovery; compare Cummings v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 246; (1981) 51 FLR 121. Bills of discovery were common in the Court of Chancery prior to the Court of Chancery Procedure Act 1852, when there was no discovery in the courts of common law: McLean v Burns Philp Trustee Co Pty Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 926; [1985] 2 NSWLR 623 at 643 (NSWLR) and following. For practical purposes, even if old Equity procedures remain as a matter of jurisdiction, their potential application is circumscribed by the current statutory regime. [r Pt5.40]

Identity discovery

The court may order preliminary discovery under r 5.2 to assist a plaintiff if it appears reasonable inquiries to ascertain the defendant’s identity or whereabouts have been unsuccessful and some other person may have information, including documents which may tend to assist in ascertaining the identity or whereabouts of the prospective defendant. The subrule was the subject of a 5 member Court of Appeal bench in Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Care Park Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 35. [r Pt5.60]

Cause of action discovery

Rule 5.4 allows the court to make an order for discovery of documents from a person who is not a party to the proceedings if it appears that the person may have or had possession of a document that relates to any question in the proceedings. Security for costs and costs can also be ordered under Pt 5: rr 5.6 and 5.8. The rules relating to preliminary discovery and inspection should not be confused with procedures for “freezing orders” (asset preservation orders or Mareva injunctions), or “search orders” (Anton Piller orders) and orders for the preservation of evidence, which might incidentally involve early, compulsory disclosures of information: Biscoe P, Mareva and Anton Piller Orders (LexisNexis, 2005). [r Pt5.1000]

References

The general rules relating to discovery r 21.1 to 21.8 and inspection of property apply to orders made under Pt 5. Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders are discussed at [r 21.3.60]. Further reading: “Preliminary discovery in the Federal Court: Order 15A of the Federal Court Rules 1979” (2004) 24 Aust Bar Rev 235; Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [10.810].

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

279

UCPR Parts 1-10

Where it appears that an applicant for an order for the preliminary discovery of documents (including things) from a prospective defendant may be entitled to make a claim for relief, reasonable inquiries have been unsuccessful and the information available is insufficient to enable a decision whether to commence proceedings or not, and the prospective defendant may have or had documents which would assist that decision, the court may make such an order: r 5.3.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 5.1

5.1

[r 5.1.20]

Definitions

(cf Federal Court Rules, Order 15A, rule 1)

In this Part: applicant means an applicant for an order under this Part. identity or whereabouts includes the name and (as applicable) the place of residence, registered office, place of business or other whereabouts, and the occupation and sex, of the person against whom the applicant desires to bring proceedings, and also whether that person is an individual or a corporation. [R 5.1 am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[6]]

RULE 5.1 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 5.1.20] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 5.1.1000]

[r 5.1.20]

Comparison

The definition of “identity or whereabouts” builds upon and enlarges the former definition of “description” as that term was used in SCR Pt 3 r 1. [r 5.1.1000]

References

“Possession”, is defined under the CPA as: otherwise than of land, includes custody and power – see UCPR Dictionary. 5.2

Discovery to ascertain prospective defendant’s identity or whereabouts

(cf Federal Court Rules, Order 15A, rules 3, 5 and 9)

(1) This rule applies if it appears to the court that: (a) the applicant, having made reasonable inquiries, is unable to sufficiently ascertain the identity or whereabouts of a person (the person concerned) for the purpose of commencing proceedings against the person, and (b) some person other than the applicant (the other person) may have information, or may have or have had possession of a document or thing, that tends to assist in ascertaining the identity or whereabouts of the person concerned. (2) The court may make either or both of the following orders against the other person: (a) an order that the other person attend the court to be examined as to the identity or whereabouts of the person concerned, (b) an order that the other person must give discovery to the applicant of all documents that are or have been in the other person’s possession and that relate to the identity or whereabouts of the person concerned. (3) A court that makes an order for examination under subrule (2)(a) may also make either or both of the following orders: (a) an order that the other person must produce to the court on the examination any document or thing that is in the other person’s possession and that relates to the identity or whereabouts of the person concerned, (b) an order that the examination be held before a registrar. (4) An order under this rule with respect to any information, document or thing held by a corporation may be addressed to any appropriate officer or former officer of the corporation. (5) A person need not comply with the requirements of an order under subrule (2)(a) unless conduct money has been handed or tendered to the person a reasonable time before the date on which attendance is required. 280

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 5 – Preliminary discovery and inspection [r 5.2.40]

r 5.2

(6) If the other person incurs expense or loss in complying with an order under subrule (2)(a), and the expense or loss exceeds the amount paid to the person under subrule (5), the court may order the applicant to pay to that person an amount sufficient to make good the expense or loss. (7) Unless the court orders otherwise, an application for an order under this rule: (a) must be supported by an affidavit stating the facts on which the applicant relies and specifying the kinds of information, documents or things in respect of which the order is sought, and (b) must, together with a copy of the supporting affidavit, be served personally on the other person. (8) An application for an order under this rule is to be made: (a) if it is made in relation to proceedings in which the applicant is a party, by notice of motion in the proceedings, or (b) in any other case, by summons. (9) This rule applies, with any necessary modification, where the applicant, being a party to proceedings, wishes to claim or cross-claim against a person who is not a party to the proceedings. [R 5.2 am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[7]]

RULE 5.2 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 5.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 5.2.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 5.2.1000]

[r 5.2.20]

Comparison

There is no significant change to the effect of the former SCR. However, there is now an express requirement for a supporting affidavit setting out the kinds of information, documents or things sought. Furthermore, unless the court otherwise orders, there is a requirement that the application and affidavit must be served on the party against whom the order is sought: Compare Stewart v Miller [1979] 2 NSWLR 128, and in which considerations for “reasonable inquiries” are still relevant. Operation

The rule assists in ascertaining the identity or location of a defendant. Where an applicant can show that he or she come under subr (1)(a) and the circumstances under subr (1)(b) may prevail, then the court may make orders under subrr (2) and (3). Such evidence would be by way of supporting affidavit setting out the factual circumstances giving rise to a claim, the reasonable inquiries made and the circumstances giving rise to grounds that some person may have information, or may have or have had possession of a document or thing, that tends to assist in ascertaining the identity or whereabouts of the person concerned. If made in relation to proceedings in which the applicant is a party, the application is by notice of motion in the proceedings (Pt 18) in any other case, by summons (Pt 6). “Reasonable Inquiries” The inquiry is an objective one and is not determined by the applicant’s belief that the inquiries which were made were reasonable: Age Co Ltd v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; [2013] NSWCA 26. Simply because an alternative legal avenue exists to seek determination of the identity or whereabouts of a person does not mean an applicant has failed to exhaust all reasonable inquiries. In Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Australian National Car Parks Pty Ltd (2007) 47 MVR 502; [2007] NSWCA 114 it was found that reasonable inquiries had taken place, despite the applicant not having pursued a freedom of information request. Mason P said “cost, delay and uncertainty of the alternative measures is relevant to the rule’s ‘reasonable inquiries’ component”: Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Australian National Car Parks Pty Ltd (2007) 47 MVR 502; [2007] NSWCA 114 at [14]. Moreover, an applicant must do more than simply express some subjective desire. The correct construction of the Rules was that, as well as the two jurisdictional barriers for an applicant to surmount, namely that the applicant made reasonable inquiries, and the respondent may have information to assist, the applicant must have also shown the applicant had, at the time of the application, the desire to commence proceedings against the person in question: Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Care Park Pty Ltd © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

281

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 5.2.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 5.3

[r 5.2.40]

[2012] NSWCA 35 at [112]. An applicant must provide the substance of the enquiries they have made: Age Co Ltd v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; [2013] NSWCA 26. And see CGU Insurance Ltd v Malaysia International Shipping Corp Berhad (2001) 187 ALR 279; [2001] FCA 1223 and Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Civil Aviation Authority (1995) 217 ALR 303; Brydon v Australian Rail Track Corp Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1560. [r 5.2.1000]

References

“Possession”, is defined under the CPA as: otherwise than of land, includes custody and power – see UCPR Dictionary. 5.3

Discovery of documents from prospective defendant

(cf Federal Court Rules, Order 15A, rules 6, 7 and 9)

(1) If it appears to the court that: (a) the applicant may be entitled to make a claim for relief from the court against a person (the prospective defendant) but, having made reasonable inquiries, is unable to obtain sufficient information to decide whether or not to commence proceedings against the prospective defendant, and (b) the prospective defendant may have or have had possession of a document or thing that can assist in determining whether or not the applicant is entitled to make such a claim for relief, and (c) inspection of such a document would assist the applicant to make the decision concerned, the court may order that the prospective defendant must give discovery to the applicant of all documents that are or have been in the person’s possession and that relate to the question of whether or not the applicant is entitled to make a claim for relief. (2) An order under this rule with respect to any document held by a corporation may be addressed to any officer or former officer of the corporation. (3) Unless the court orders otherwise, an application for an order under this rule: (a) must be supported by an affidavit stating the facts on which the applicant relies and specifying the kinds of documents in respect of which the order is sought, and (b) must, together with a copy of the supporting affidavit, be served personally on the person to whom it is addressed. (4) This rule applies, with any necessary modification, where the applicant, being a party to proceedings, wishes to decide whether or not to claim or cross-claim against a person who is not a party to the proceedings. [R 5.3 am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[8]]

RULE 5.3 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 5.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 5.3.40] Scope of the rule ........................................................................................................................................ [r 5.3.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 5.3.1000]

[r 5.3.20]

Comparison

Rule 5.3 is based upon O 15A r 6 of the Federal Court Rules 1979. [r 5.3.40]

Operation

The rule assists in determining whether or not proceedings should be brought against a defendant. Where an applicant can show that he or she come under subr (1)(a) and the circumstances under subr 1(b) and (c) may prevail, then the court may make orders and the prospective defendant must give discovery to the applicant of all documents that are or have been in the person’s possession and that relate to the question of whether or not the applicant is entitled to make a claim for relief. Such evidence would be by way of supporting affidavit 282

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 5 – Preliminary discovery and inspection [r 5.3.60]

r 5.3

setting out the circumstances giving rise to a claim, the reasonable inquiries made and the circumstances giving rise to grounds that some person may have information, or may have or have had possession of a document or thing, that tends to assist in determining whether or not the applicant is entitled to make a claim for relief. If made in relation to proceedings in which the applicant is a party the application is by notice of motion in the proceedings (Pt 18) in any other case, by summons (Pt 6). [r 5.3.60]

Scope of the rule

The key principles relevant to an application for preliminary discovery were set out in Hatfield v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2010) 77 NSWLR 506; [2010] NSWCA 69 (at [46]–[52]). The rule is construed beneficially and a determination does not involve an assessment of the merits of the proposed claim: Age Co Ltd v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; [2013] NSWCA 26.

Notwithstanding differences in drafting, cases considering O 15A(6) of the FCR still provide guidance on the construction and width of r 5.3. Even where the matters under the subrules are established, an order is discretionary: Western Bulk Carriers (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd [2002] FCA 1520. Where a respondent produces evidence of commercial confidence a balancing exercise must be undertaken by the court: C7 Pty Ltd v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1189; this may require consideration to be given to both the public interest in open litigation and the private interests of those affected by the litigation: Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 70 FCR 403. Further, where an applicant seeks to establish if a defamation action can be brought or whether an interlocutory injunction, to suppress publication, can be pursued, this discretionary aspect involves weighing up the interests of justice and free speech: Hatfield v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2010) 77 NSWLR 506; [2010] NSWCA 69 at [107]–[108]. Rule 5.3 does not have the requirement that there be “reasonable cause” as under O 15A(6). However, a similar consideration is likely to be needed for the court to make an order under r 5.3, where the determining factor is “if it appears to the court”. Such a requirement has been found to import an objective test into O 15A(6): Malouf v Malouf [1999] FCA 710. Where there is no reasonable cause to believe that one of the necessary elements of a potential cause of action exists, that takes the application outside the scope of the rule insofar as the application is based on that cause of action: John Holland Services Pty Ltd v Terranora Group Management Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 679. Preliminary discovery may be available to an applicant, even though the cause of action is clear on the information they do have, because they have insufficient information to decide whether the action is commercially viable: Garth Barnett Interior Design Pty Ltd v Ellis [2009] NSWCA 193. Or where, before embarking on the action, the plaintiff wishes to explore potential defences: Papaconstuntinos v Holmes a Court [2006] NSWSC 945; CGU Insurance Ltd v Malaysia International Shipping Corp Berhad (2001) 187 ALR 279; [2001] FCA 1223; Pioneer Energy Holdings v Seth [2014] NSWSC 492. However, merely seeking to assess the capacity of the proposed defendant to satisfy a judgment is not permitted: Aus Steel Pty Ltd v Marco Properties Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 550. An applicant must provide what information they have and detail what they require to decide whether or not to commence proceedings: Morton v Nylex Ltd [2007] NSWSC 562. Preliminary discovery cannot be used where an applicant has already decided to bring the case: Morton v Nylex Ltd [2007] NSWSC 562 at [33]; Contour Building & Construction Pty Ltd v Kerr [2008] NSWSC 883; St George Bank Ltd v Rabo Australia Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 147; [2004] FCA 1360; approved: Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd (2008) 169 FCR 435; [2008] FCAFC 133 at [36], [47]; Murray v Wheeler [2013] NSWSC 137. The power conferred by the rule is available to be invoked by a potential plaintiff who has, prima facie a cause of action, but who wishes to explore, before embarking on the action, potential defences available to the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

283

UCPR Parts 1-10

The determination of what is reasonable should also take into account any relationship between the applicant and the prospective defendant: Sinopharm Jiangsu Co Pty Ltd v Bank of China [2007] NSWSC 484. Preliminary discovery cannot itself be used to remedy deficiencies in the satisfaction of the conditions themselves: Airservices Australia v Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 200; [1999] FCA 886 at 202–203. Whilst an applicant does not have to prove a prima facie case in order to obtain preliminary discovery, it does have to demonstrate more than a mere possibility of a claim: Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Computer Management Services Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 536; [2000] FCA 969 at 541–542. See now Panasonic Australia Pty Ltd v Ngage Pty Ltd (2006) 69 IPR 595; [2006] NSWSC 399 – if there is reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may have a right of action against the respondent. Compare Cairns v Unicomb [2005] NSWSC 1279.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 5.4

[r 5.3.60]

proposed defendant. Papaconstuntinos v Holmes a Court [2006] NSWSC 945; CGU Insurance Ltd v Malaysia International Shipping Corp Berhad (2001) 187 ALR 279; [2001] FCA 1223. [r 5.3.1000]

References

“Possession”, is defined under the CPA as: otherwise than of land, includes custody and power – see UCPR Dictionary. 5.4

Discovery of documents from other persons

(cf Federal Court Rules, Order 15A, rule 8)

(1) The court may order that a person who is not a party to proceedings, but in respect of whom it appears to the court that the person may have or have had possession of a document that relates to any question in the proceedings, must give discovery to the applicant of all documents that are or have been in the person’s possession and that relate to that question. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, an application for an order under this rule: (a) must be supported by an affidavit stating the facts on which the applicant relies and specifying the kinds of documents in respect of which the order is sought, and (b) must, together with a copy of the supporting affidavit, be served personally on the person to whom it is addressed. [R 5.4 am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[9]]

RULE 5.4 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 5.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 5.4.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 5.4.1000]

[r 5.4.20]

Comparison

Rule 5.4 is based upon FCR O 15A r 8. [r 5.4.40]

Operation

This rule authorises third party discovery in respect of existing proceedings: Kimberley Securities Ltd v Byrne [2008] NSWSC 1214. The comparable Federal Court rule has been given a wide interpretation: Richardson Pacific Ltd v Fielding (1990) 26 FCR 188. Costs of reasonable compliance will usually be awarded to the third party: Sydney City Councilv Goldspar Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 769. [r 5.4.1000]

References

“Possession”, is defined under the CPA as: otherwise than of land, includes custody and power – see UCPR Dictionary. 5.5 Discovery and inspection generally (cf Federal Court Rules, Order 15A, rule 10)

Division 1 of Part 21 applies to and in respect of the discovery and inspection of documents the subject of an order for discovery under this Part in the same way as it applies to the discovery and inspection of documents the subject of an order for discovery under that Division. Note: See also rule 23.8 with respect to inspection of property. [R 5.5 am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[10]]

284

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 5 – Preliminary discovery and inspection [r 5.7.40]

r 5.7

RULE 5.5 COMMENTARY [r 5.5.1000]

References

The general rules relating to discovery r 21.1 to 21.8 and inspection of property, apply to orders made under Pt 5. 5.6

Security for costs

(cf Federal Court Rules, Order 15A, rule 11)

An order under this Part may be made subject to a condition requiring the applicant to give security for the costs of the person against whom the order is made. [R 5.6 am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[11]]

RULE 5.6 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 5.6.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 5.6.1000]

[r 5.6.40]

Operation

Security for costs in the normal circumstances of an indigent or foreign plaintiff are dealt with under r 42.21. Where security is sought, affidavit evidence setting out the likely cost of compliance should be served. Where such an order is made, there may be a set-off against an otherwise successful plaintiff’s costs: Andrews Advertising Pty Ltd v Andrews [2011] NSWSC 244 at [58]. [r 5.6.1000]

References

Rule 42.21 – Security for Costs and r 5.8 – Costs in preliminary discovery. 5.7

Privilege

An order under this Part does not operate so as to require the person against whom it is made to produce any privileged document that the person could not be required to produce: (a) if the applicant had commenced proceedings against that person, or (b) if that person had otherwise become a party to proceedings to which the applicant is a party, or (c) if the person had been served with a subpoena for production of the document in proceedings to which the applicant is a party. [R 5.7 am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[12]]

RULE 5.7 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 5.7.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 5.7.1000]

[r 5.7.40]

Operation

The rule maintains the general rule that privilege may be claimed in discovery proceedings. The general rules relating to discovery r 21.1 to 21.8 and inspection of property apply to orders made under Pt 5, r 5.5. “Privileged document” is defined in the Dictionary and also discussed at [r 21.1.40]. Where a party is required, by notice or order, to make discovery of documents, then, prima facie he or she is under a duty to list these documents, but he or she is entitled to claim privilege, in appropriate cases, from producing the documents for inspection: see also r 21.3(2)(d). Further, even where a document does not fall within one of the established grounds of privilege, it may nonetheless be protected from production on more general grounds, such as © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

285

UCPR Parts 1-10

(cf Federal Court Rules, Order 15A, rule 2)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 5.8

[r 5.7.40]

oppression or public policy, subject to the court’s discretion: see Turner v Davies [1981] 2 NSWLR 324 at 326–327. See further r 1.9 – Objections to production of documents founded on privilege. [r 5.7.1000]

References

Rule 1.9 – Objections to production of documents founded on privilege. Privilege in discovery: see [r 21.3.60] and the annotations thereto. 5.8

Costs and other expenses

(cf SCR Part 52A, rule 26; DCR Part 39A, rule 5; Federal Court Rules, Order 15A, rules 4 and 11)

(1) On any application for an order under this Part, the court may make orders for the costs of the applicant, of the person against whom the order is made or sought and of any other party to the proceedings. (2) The costs in respect of which such an order may be made include: (a) payment of conduct money, and (b) payments made on account of any expense or loss in relation to the proceedings, and (c) the costs of making and serving any list of documents, and (d) the costs of producing any documents for inspection, and (e) the costs of otherwise complying with the requirements of any order under Division 1 of Part 21, as applying to the discovery and inspection of documents the subject of an order for discovery under this Part. [R 5.8 am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[13]]

RULE 5.8 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 5.8.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 5.8.1000]

[r 5.8.40]

Operation

Costs of production may be ordered in the preliminary discovery proceedings, or abide the result of any subsequent substantive proceedings: Andrews Advertising Pty Ltd v Andrews [2011] NSWSC 244 at [57]. [r 5.8.1000]

References

See generally: Part 42 Costs; costs of production r 21.13 (Notice to Produce).

286

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 1 – General

[r 6.1.20]

r 6.1

PART 6 – COMMENCING PROCEEDINGS AND APPEARANCE Commentary by Carol Webster SC.

PART 6 COMMENTARY [r Pt6.20]

General commentary on UCPR Part 6

Part 6 of the UCPR brings together provisions about commencing proceedings, entering an appearance, joinder of causes of action and of parties, and removing parties. The provisions were previously found in different parts of the SCR, DCR and LCR. A number of the rules are based on provisions of the former SCR dealing with the form and content statements of claim and summonses. The DCR and LCR previously provided for two forms of statement of claim, an ordinary statement of claim and a statement of liquidated claim. The distinction has been abolished under the UCPR: see [r 6.2.20]. The only other method of commencing proceedings is by summons. There are approved forms of statement of claim and summons: approved Forms 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B respectively. Regard should be had to the title of the various rules, which are generally more descriptive than the relevant provisions of the former SCR, DCR and LCR.

DIVISION 1 – GENERAL 6.1

No step without originating process or notice of appearance

(cf SCR Part 11, rule 2)

(1) Except by leave of the court, a party may not take any step in proceedings (including any appearance in court) unless the party has filed a statement of claim or summons in the proceedings or has entered an appearance in the proceedings. [Subr (1) am Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

(2) Subrule (1) does not apply to: (a) a defendant who applies for an order under rule 12.11 (Setting aside originating process etc), or (b) a plaintiff who applies for an order under rule 25.2 (Order in urgent case before commencement of proceedings), or (c) a defendant who makes an application in relation to the setting aside or enforcement of any judgment. (3) In any proceedings, a person (not being a party and not having filed a notice of motion) may not take any step in the proceedings (including any appearance in court) unless he or she has filed a notice of address for service. [Subr (3) subst Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[3]] [R 6.1 am Rule 96 of 2006; Rule 625 of 2005]

RULE 6.1 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 6.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.1.40] Exceptions .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.1.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.1.1000]

[r 6.1.20]

Comparison

Subrule (1) of this rule is almost identical in wording and the same in substance as SCR Pt 11 r 2. Subrules (2) and (3) are new. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

287

UCPR Parts 1-10

[Subr (2) subst Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[2]; am Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[8]]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.1A

[r 6.1.20]

There is no equivalent DCR or LCR. [r 6.1.40]

Operation

The effect of the rule is that a party may not take any steps (unless within r 6.1(2), see [r 6.1.60]), without by one means or another filing a notice of address for service. “Originating process” is defined in CPA s 3 as the process by which proceedings are commenced. The Dictionary to the UCPR defines originating process as the statement of claim or summons by which proceedings have been commenced (and includes a statement of cross-claim and a cross-summons). The approved forms of statement of claim and summons contain an address for service, as does an appearance whether filed by a notice of appearance or defence (see [r 6.9.40]). The approved form of notice of motion also sets out the address for service of an applicant who is not already a party. An originating process which includes a claim for damages must (when filed by a legally represented party) include a certificate under the Legal Profession Act 2004 s 347 (the equivalent provision to the former Legal Profession Act 1987 s 198L): see [r 4.2.140] and approved Forms 3A and 4A. [r 6.1.60]

Exceptions

Rule 6.1(2) specifically sets out the exceptions: • applying to set aside originating process under r 12.11, when a party is challenging the court’s jurisdiction and intentionally does not “appear” in the proceedings. Rule 12.11(2) and (3) provide that such an application is made by notice of motion filed within the time limited for the defendant to enter an appearance on the proceedings, without entering an appearance. The notice of motion must bear a note stating the applicant’s address of service: see [r 12.11.100]; • urgently seeking an interim preservation order before commencing proceedings. The plaintiff would subsequently file summons or statement of claim, as appropriate: see [r 25.2.60]; • making an application in relation to the setting aside or enforcement of any judgment: see [r 36.15.40], [r 36.16.40]. [r 6.1.1000]

References

Definition of originating process – CPA s 3 and UCPR Dictionary. Approved forms: Forms 3A and 3B Statement of claim, Forms 4A and 4B Summons, Form 6 Appearance, Forms 7A and 7B Defence, Form 20 Notice of Motion. Related rules: r 4.5 address for service, r 12.11 setting aside originating process; r 25.2 re interim preservation order; r 36.15 and r 35.16 re setting aside or enforcing judgment. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 11 r 2. 6.1A

Proceedings that do not require a defendant

(cf SCR Part 58, rule 1, Part 70, rule 11, Part 73, rule 4 and Schedule J)

Unless the court otherwise orders, proceedings that may be commenced without joining any person as a defendant include the following: (a) proceedings under the Adoption Act 2000, (b) proceedings under section 33 of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995, (c) proceedings under the Jury Act 1977, (d) proceedings under section 17 of the Witness Protection Act 1995, (e) proceedings under rule 55.9. [R 6.1A insrt Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 6.1A COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.1A.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.1A.40]

288

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.1A.40] [r 6.1A.20]

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 2 – Originating process

r 6.2

Comparison

This rule is new. It makes common provision for the commencement of proceedings without joining any defendant, complementing the provisions of rr 52.1(2) and 55.9(3) (cf. former SCR Pt 58 r 1(b); Pt 70 r 11(3)). [r 6.1A.40]

Operation

The purpose of this rule is to prescribe non-exclusively proceedings that may be commenced without joining a defendant. Rule 52.1(2) regarding proceedings for an order under Evidence on Commission Act 1995 s 33 provides that no person is required to be joined as a defendant. Rule 55.9(3) regarding the commencement of proceedings in connection with the payment of funds into court under Pt 4 of the Trustee Act 1925 requires that no person be joined as a defendant unless the court otherwise orders. There is no reference to any defendant to proceedings under the Adoption Act 2000 in r 56.2, in contrast to the former SCR Pt 73 r 4(2). Under this rule, proceedings may be commenced without joining a defendant under the Jury Act 1977 s 26(3), where an order shortening the time for service of a jury summons is sought. The Witness Protection Act 1995 s 17 provides for the Supreme Court to make a witness protection order. Such proceedings are assigned to the Common Law Division by Sch 8 Pt 1.

DIVISION 2 – ORIGINATING PROCESS 6.2

How proceedings commenced

(cf SCR Part 4, rules 1 and 3, Part 7, rule 7; DCR Part 5, rules 5 and 6; LCR Part 5, rule 1)

[Subr (3A) insrt Rule 482 of 2011, Sch 1[2]]

(4) Subject to subrule (5), originating process is valid for service: (a) in the case of proceedings in the Supreme Court, the Land and Environment Court, the Dust Diseases Tribunal or the Local Court, for 6 months after the date on which it is filed, or (b) in the case of proceedings in the District Court: (i) for 6 months after the date on which it is filed: (A) if it is a statement of claim seeking relief in relation only to a debt or other liquidated claim, or (B) if the defendant (or at least one of the defendants) is to be served outside New South Wales, or (ii) for one month after the date on which it is filed, in any other case. [Subr (4) am Rule 95 of 2014, r 3; Rule 473 of 2009, r 3; Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]; Act 22 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 3[2]]

(5) Failure to serve originating process within the time limited by these rules does not prevent the plaintiff from commencing fresh proceedings by filing another originating process. [R 6.2 am Rule 95 of 2014; Rule 482 of 2011; Rule 473 of 2009; Rule 579 of 2007; Act 22 of 2005] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

289

UCPR Parts 1-10

(1) Subject to these rules, the practice notes and any other rules of court, a person may commence proceedings in the court by filing a statement of claim or a summons. (2) Subject to these rules, the practice notes and any other Act or law, the plaintiff may choose whether to commence proceedings by statement of claim or by summons. (3) Originating process must be served on each defendant. (3A) An originating process served in accordance with subrule (3) must include the following: (a) the seal of the court on the first page (whether an original sealed copy or a photocopy of a sealed copy), (b) the case number or unique identifier, (c) the listing date (if allocated by the court registry).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.2

[r 6.2.20]

RULE 6.2 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 6.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.2.40] Time for service of originating process in the District Court ...................................................................... [r 6.2.50] Service of originating process .................................................................................................................... [r 6.2.60] Consequences of failing to serve the originating process within time ....................................................... [r 6.2.80] Application for extension of time for service of originating process ........................................................ [r 6.2.100] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.2.1000]

[r 6.2.20]

Comparison

The rule draws together provisions that appeared in a number of places in the SCR, DCR and LCR. Rule 6.2(1) adopts the wording of former SCR Pt 4 r 1 and DCR Pt 5 r 6 and LCR Pt 5 r 1. Rule 6.2(2) adopts the wording of former SCR Pt 4 r 3(1). The substantive effect of those rules is unchanged, although only the Supreme Court formerly offered a general choice of commencing proceedings by summons or statement of claim. The DCR provided for commencement by statement of claim or statement of liquidated claim, or by summons in particular proceedings under the workers compensation legislation (DCR Pt 24D r 5). The LCR provided only for a statement of claim, either ordinary statement of claim or statement of liquidated claim. Rules 6.3 and 6.4 set out particular kinds of proceedings where a statement of claim or summons must be used, see [r 6.3.40] and [r 6.4.40]. Rule 6.2(3) adopts former SCR Pt 9 r 2(1) and the substantive effect of that rule is unchanged. Rule 6.2(4) adopts and substantially simplifies the provisions of former SCR Pt 7 r 7 and Pt 14C r 7, DCR Pt 5 r 5 and LCR Pt 5 r 5. Rule 6.2(4)(a) standardises the time limit for service after filing an originating process to six months in the Supreme Court, the Land and Environment Court, the Dust Diseases Tribunal or the Local Court. Under the former rules, in the Supreme Court, unless the court otherwise ordered, a statement of claim was valid for service for 12 months in the ordinary course, three months if it contained an application for an order under the Family Provision Act 1982 s 7, or four months where the originating process contained a claim for professional negligence, under Pt 14C r 7. In the Local Court, under Pt 5 r 5(1)(b) a statement of claim filed on or after 1 January 1992 was valid for service until such time as struck out under subr (1A). That subrule provided that a statement of claim would be struck out 12 months after filing unless some steps were taken such as the filing of a defence or an order for judgment made or judgment entered. DCR Pt 5 r 5(1)(c) and (c)(ii) provided that a statement of claim was valid for service for one month after the date on which filed or such further period as the court may direct. Rule 6.2(5) adopts the words of former SCR Pt 7 r 7(2), DCR Pt 5 r 5(4) and LCR Pt 5 r 5(3). The substantive effect of those rules is unchanged. [r 6.2.40]

Operation

The purpose of the rule is to regulate the way in which proceedings are to be commenced. The definition of originating process in the Dictionary to the UCPR and CPA s 3 should be borne in mind. The choice contemplated by r 6.2(2) is directly affected by rr 6.3 and 6.4. These rules specify particular kinds of proceedings for which a statement of claim or summons must be used: see [r 6.3.40]; [r 6.4.40]. The effect of r 6.2(3A) is that either an original sealed copy of the originating process or a photocopy of a sealed copy may be served on a defendant, and that only the first page of a multi page document need be sealed by the court: see also r 31.12(2). The purpose of r 6.2(4) is to require originating process to be served promptly so that the defendant is aware of proceedings that have been commenced in a court. [r 6.2.50]

Time for service of originating process in the District Court

The effect of r 6.4(b)(i), as amended in March 2014, is to extend the time for service of a District Court statement of liquidated claim (as to which see [r 6.3.30]), or originating process to be served outside this State, to six months, the same time limit as applies for originating process in the Supreme Court, Land and 290

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.2.1000]

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 2 – Originating process

r 6.2

Environment Court, Dust Diseases Tribunal and the Local Court. Otherwise District Court originating process must be served within one month (as was the case under former DCR Pt 5 r 5(1)(c) and (c)(ii)). [r 6.2.60]

Service of originating process

Generally, an originating process in the Supreme Court, the Land and Environment Court, the District Court or the Dust Diseases Tribunal must be personally served: r 10.20(2)(a). The provisions as to service of originating process in the Local Court differ, as set out in r 10.20(2)(b). Division 3 of Pt 10 of the UCPR (rr 10.20 to 10.27) deals with personal service of documents: see [r 10.20.60]. [r 6.2.80] Consequences of failing to serve the originating process within time A defendant served with what would otherwise be “stale” originating process may enter an appearance and defend the proceedings regardless of the question of time: see [r 10.20.80] and [r 10.19.40]. It may be possible to cure the irregularity of a stale originating process (served after the prescribed period) by order made under CPA s 63, compare SCA s 81(1) and DCA s 159. Alternatively an extension of the validity for service of the originating process may be sought under UCPR r 1.12 (compare former SCR Pt 2 r 3, DCR Pt 3 r 2, LCR Pt 4 r 2). The court may extend time under r 1.12 either before or after the time expires, and even if the application for extension is made after time expires: r 1.12(2), see [r 1.12.40]–[1.12.50] and [r 6.2.100].

[r 6.2.100] Application for extension of time for service of originating process On an application for an extension of time the reason for the delay in serving the originating process within the time prescribed must be explained, perhaps by showing what steps had been taken to attempt to serve the originating process. The principles on which the court would act on such an application were considered by Young CJ in Eq in Rich v Long [2008] NSWSC 487 and in Arthur Andersen Corp Finance Pty Ltd v Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 104 at [28]–[43]. The court should only extend time for good reason: Dagnell v JL Freedman & Co [1993] 1 WLR 388; [1993] 2 All ER 161. In that case it was said at 396 that a defendant has a right to be served with proceedings (if at all) within the statutory period of limitation plus the period of validity of a writ. The court should consider the attempts that had been made at service, the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, whether the delay was deliberate, whether notice of the application was given to the defendant, the conduct of the parties generally, and the hardship or prejudice caused to the plaintiff by refusing the extension or to the defendant by granting it: Arthur Andersen Corp Finance Pty Ltd v Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 104 at [43]; Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Kirk (2011) 82 ACSR 390; [2011] NSWCA 67, at [94]. See [r 1.12.50]. Where the limitation period has expired, but the initiating process is still valid for service, or the limitation period has expired, but the initiating process is no longer valid for service, unless the extension of time is for no more than a month or there is some suggestion that the defendants may seek to avoid service, an order extending time may be made on an ex parte application, but the defendants must be notified of the order within seven days and also notified that they have up until the expiration of 28 days after service of the process to set aside the order: Rich v Long [2008] NSWSC 487. [r 6.2.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [3.470]–[3.500], [5.90]. Related rules: r 10.20 as to service of originating process, rr 4.12(2) and 31.12(2) as to the form of sealed copies for service, [r 1.12.40] and [1.12.50] as to extending time for service and [r 12.11.40] as to setting aside service. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 4, rr 1 and 3, Pt 7 r 7, Pt 9 r 2(1); DCR Pt 5, rr 5 and 6; LCR Pt 5 r 1. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

291

UCPR Parts 1-10

Whilst fresh proceedings could be commenced by filing another process under r 6.2(5), that would require the plaintiff to pay a further filing fee. Further, if a statute of limitations had expired after filing of the first originating process, it would be essential to seek an extension of the validity for service of the originating process.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.3

6.3

[r 6..]

Where statement of claim required

(cf SCR Part 4, rule 2)

Proceedings of the following kinds must be commenced by statement of claim: (a) proceedings on a claim for relief in relation to a debt or other liquidated claim, (b) proceedings on a claim for relief in relation to a tort, (c) proceedings on a claim based on an allegation of fraud, (d) proceedings on a claim for damages for breach of duty (however arising) and the damages claimed consist of or include: (i) damages in respect of the death of any person, or (ii) damages in respect of personal injuries to any person, or (iii) damages in respect of damage to any property, (e) proceedings on a claim for relief in relation to a trust, other than an express trust wholly in writing, (f) proceedings on a claim for possession of land, (g) proceedings on a claim for relief under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984, (h) proceedings on a claim for relief in relation to the publication of defamatory matter. [Para (h) insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

(i)

proceedings for an order under section 106 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 that a contract is unfair,

[Para (i) insrt Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[1]]

(j)

proceedings on a claim for a civil penalty under section 357 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996,

[Para (j) insrt Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[1]]

(k)

proceedings on a claim for remuneration or other amounts under Part 2 of Chapter 7 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996.

[Para (k) insrt Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[1]] [R 6.3 am Rule 715 of 2016; Rule 807 of 2005]

RULE 6.3 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 6.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.3.40] Meaning of debt or other liquidated claim .................................................................................................. [r 6.3.60] Defamation proceedings ............................................................................................................................. [r 6.3.80] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.3.1000]

[r 6.3.20]

Comparison

The rule is based on former SCR Pt 4 r 2(1), reproducing provisions of the SCR that require or permit proceedings to be commenced by statement of claim. In the Supreme Court, para (a) relating to debt or liquidated claim is new. Paragraphs (b) to (f) of this rule are the same in substance as SCR Pt 4 r 2(1)(a)–(e). Paragraph (g) reproduces SCR Pt 77 r 76A. In the District Court, para (a) of this rule differs from former DCR Pt 5 r 6 by specifying that liquidated demands be commenced by statement of claim rather than statement of liquidated claim. The examples of an action for recovery of a debt or liquidated demand provided in former DCR Pt 5 r 6(2) are not included in the current rule. [r 6.3.40]

Operation

The rule sets out the kinds of proceedings that must be commenced by statement of claim. It is the counterpart of r 6.4, which deals with the kind of proceedings to be commenced by summons. The meaning of “debt or other liquidated claim” is discussed in [r 6.3.60]. 292

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.3.1000]

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 2 – Originating process

r 6.3

If proceedings that would fall within this rule are commenced by summons, the proceedings cannot be set aside: CPA s 63, r 6.6(1). They may be saved and remedied by r 6.6, see [r 6.6.40]. See [r 6.12.40] and [r 6.13.40] as to the contents of a statement of claim. The general principle that should guide the decision about how to commence proceedings for which no specific provision is made in r 6.3 or r 6.4(1) or (2) is set out in r 6.4(4). In particular, proceedings where there is likely to be a substantial dispute of fact should be commenced by statement of claim, so that the issues in the proceedings can be defined by the pleadings. A statement of claim is both an originating process and a pleading: CPA s 3 definition of originating process, Dictionary to the UCPR, definitions of originating process and pleading. As a pleading, a statement of claim must comply with Pt 14. There is a further distinction between proceedings commenced by statement of claim and proceedings by summons. The ordinary rule is that at the trial of proceedings commenced by statement of claim, or in which a statement of claim has been filed, witnesses’ evidence must be given orally: UCPR r 31.1. The court may order affidavits or witness statements under r 31.1(3) and r 31.1(4). [r 6.3.60]

Meaning of “debt or other liquidated claim”

Essentially a “debt” or “liquidated demand” is a specific sum of money due and payable. The sum must either be already ascertained, or be capable of being ascertained as a mere matter of arithmetic. The Dictionary specifically includes within the meaning of “liquidated claim” a claim for interest up to judgment: this is capable of being arithmetically ascertained. At common law such a claim was regarded as unliquidated: Dalgety Futures Pty Ltd v Poretsky [1980] 2 NSWLR 646. The meaning of the words “debt” and “liquidated demand” were discussed generally in Spain v Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd (1923) 32 CLR 138; 29 ALR 311; Alexander v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd [1956] VLR 436; [1956] ALR 1077; (1956) 30 ALJ 398 at 445 (VLR). A liquidated demand includes a claim on a common money count for the payment of the reasonable price for goods and labour, when no price or rate has been fixed by the parties: Lagos v Grunwaldt [1910] 1 KB 41; State Advances Recovery Offıce of Republic of South Africa v Fine (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 445; [1968] 1 NSWR 702. There are specific rules regarding liquidated claims: • as to entering default judgment on a liquidated claim: see [r 16.6.40]; • as to proceeding in the absence of a defendant to a liquidated claim: see r 29.7(3); • a defendant may pay the sum claimed and file a notice of payment, which stays proceedings unless the court orders otherwise: see [r 6.17.40]; • a defendant may also file a statement acknowledging the whole of the amount of the claim following which judgment may be entered: see [r 6.11.40]; [r 20.34.40]. Defamation proceedings

There are specific provisions regarding pleadings concerning defamation in UCPR Pt 14 Div 6, rr 14.30 to 14.40. [r 6.3.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [3.130], [3.180]–[3.240] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 39–43. Related rules: rr 6.2, 6.5, 6.6, 6.12 and 6.13 as to the contents of a statement of claim, r 6.17 as to payment, r 31.1 as to evidence at a trial, rr 6.11 and 20.34 regarding submitting to judgment on a liquidated claim. Approved form: Forms 3A and 3B Statement of claim. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 4 r 2.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

293

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 6.3.80]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.4

6.4

Where summons required

(cf SCR Part 4, rules 2, 2A and 3)

(1) Proceedings of the following kinds must be commenced by summons: (a) proceedings in which there is no defendant, (b) proceedings on an appeal or application for leave to appeal, other than proceedings assigned to the Court of Appeal, (b1) proceedings before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, (c) proceedings for preliminary discovery or inspection under Part 5, (d) proceedings on a stated case, (e) proceedings on an application for approval under section 75 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 of an agreement for the compromise or settlement of a claim, (f) proceedings on an application for a transfer order under Part 9 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, (g) proceedings on an application for the removal or transfer of proceedings to the court under any Act, other than an application for a transfer order under Part 9 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, (h) proceedings (other than proceedings on a claim for damages) on any application made under any Act (other than the Civil Procedure Act 2005), (h1) proceedings on an application under Chapter 5 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996, (i) proceedings on an application to the court under any Act, other than: (i) proceedings on an application under the Supreme Court Act 1970, the District Court Act 1973 or the Local Court Act 2007, and (ii) proceedings on an application that may properly be made in existing proceedings, (j) any other proceedings that, pursuant to these rules or any other rules of court, are required to be commenced by summons. [Subr (1) am Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[2]; Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[2]; Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[3]; Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[2]]

(2) Proceedings of the following kinds may be commenced by summons, except where the application is made in proceedings that have been commenced in the court: (a) proceedings on an application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, (b) proceedings on an application for an order for the custody of a minor, (c) proceedings on an application for an order for the appointment of a tutor of a person under legal incapacity, (d) proceedings on an application for a declaration of right, (e) proceedings on an application for an injunction, (f) proceedings on an application for the appointment of a receiver, (g) proceedings on an application for an order for the detention, custody or preservation of property, (h) proceedings on a claim for relief for trespass to land. Note: If proceedings have already been commenced, the application should be made by motion: see rule 18.1. [Subr (2) am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[15]-[17]]

(3) Proceedings in the Supreme Court that the plaintiff intends to be entered in the Commercial List or the Technology and Construction List are to be commenced by summons. (4) Proceedings: (a) in which the sole or principal question at issue is, or is likely to be, one of: (i) the construction of an Act or a Commonwealth Act, or 294

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 2 – Originating process

[r 6.4.60]

r 6.4

(ii) the construction of an instrument made under an Act or a Commonwealth Act, or (iii) the construction of a deed, will, contract or other document, or (iv) some other question of law, or (b) in which there is unlikely to be a substantial dispute of fact, are amongst those which are appropriate to be commenced by summons unless the plaintiff considers the proceedings more appropriate to be commenced by statement of claim. [Subr (4) insrt Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[18]] [R 6.4 am Rule 715 of 2016; Rule 501 of 2009; Rule 494 of 2008; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[14]]

RULE 6.4 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 6.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.4.40] Supreme Court, Equity Division – Commercial List and Technology and Construction List ..................... [r 6.4.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.4.1000]

[r 6.4.20]

Comparison

This rule groups together and reproduces the various provisions of the former SCR that require or permit application by summons, former SCR Pt 4 rr 2(2), 2A and 3. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. [r 6.4.40]

Operation

The rule sets out the kinds of proceedings that must be commenced by summons and those where a summons may be used. It is the counterpart of r 6.3 that set out the kinds of proceedings that must be commenced by statement of claim. See [r 6.14.40] and [r 6.15.40] as to the contents of a summons. The approved form of summons commencing an appeal under Pt 50, Form 84, contains a section Appeal grounds where the grounds of an appeal are to be set out, for example in relation to an appeal on an error of law from the Local Court to the Supreme Court. If proceedings that would fall within this rule are commenced by statement of claim, the proceedings cannot be set aside: CPA s 63, r 6.5(1). They may be saved and remedied by r 6.5: see [r 6.5.40].

There is a further distinction between proceedings commenced by statement of claim and proceedings by summons. The ordinary rule is that at the trial of proceedings commenced by statement of claim, or in which a statement of claim has been filed, witnesses’ evidence must be given orally: UCPR r 31.1. The court may order affidavits or witness statements under r 31.1(3) and (4). [r 6.4.60]

Supreme Court, Equity Division – Commercial List and Technology and Construction List

Rule 6.4(3) makes specific provision for proceedings in the Supreme Court intended to be entered in the Commercial List or the Technology and Construction List of the Equity Division to be commenced by summons. UCPR rr 45.6 and 45.7 (formerly SCR Pt 14 and Pt 14A) make specific provision for such proceedings, to which Practice Note SC Eq 3 applies: see [SC Eq 3] or on Lawbook Online. Under Practice Note SC Eq 3 there are additional requirements where proceedings are to be entered in the Commercial List or the Technology and Construction List. A statement in the form of Annexure 1 to the Practice Note must be filed with the summons, setting out in summary form: (a) the nature of the dispute; (b) the issues which the plaintiff believes are likely to arise, (c) the plaintiff’s contentions; and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

295

UCPR Parts 1-10

The general principle that should guide the decision about how to commence proceedings for which no specific provision is made in r 6.3 or r 6.4(1) or (2) is set out in r 6.4(4). In particular, proceedings where there is likely to be a substantial dispute of fact should be commenced by statement of claim, so that the issues in the proceedings can be defined by the pleadings. A summons is appropriate where the principal question is one of construction, or some other question of law.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.5

[r 6.4.60]

(d) the questions (if any) the plaintiff considers are appropriate to be referred to a referee for inquiry and report; and (e) a statement as to whether the parties have attempted to mediate and whether the plaintiff is willing to proceed to mediation at an appropriate time. See also [r 45.6.60]. [r 6.4.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [3.180]–[3.240] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 39–43. Related rules: rr 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, 6.14 and 6.15 as to the contents of a statement of claim, r 31.1 as to evidence at a trial, Pt 45 regarding specialist lists in the Supreme and District Court. Approved forms: Forms 4A and 4B Summons, Form 20 Notice of Motion, Form 84 Summons commencing an appeal. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 4, rr 2, 2A and 3. 6.5

Proceedings wrongly commenced by statement of claim

(cf SCR Part 4, rule 2B)

(1) Proceedings that have been commenced by statement of claim when they should have been commenced by summons are nevertheless, and for all purposes, taken to have been duly commenced as from the date of the filing of the statement of claim, and may be continued accordingly. (2) Despite subrule (1), the court may order the proceedings to be continued, as if they had been commenced by summons and as if any pleadings filed in the proceedings had been filed as affidavits, and may also make such orders as it thinks fit for the future conduct of the proceedings.

RULE 6.5 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 6.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.5.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.5.1000]

[r 6.5.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 4 r 2B. The wording of the rule has been simplified. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR. [r 6.5.40]

Operation

This rule is the counterpart of r 6.6 in relation to proceedings wrongly commenced by summons. Under this rule, proceedings wrongly commenced by statement of claim are for all purposes taken to have been duly commenced from the date of filing of the statement of claim. Rule 6.5(2) reflects the usual practice in relation to proceedings commenced by summons, that evidence in chief is given by affidavit rather than orally (compare UCPR r 31.1 in relation to proceedings commenced by statement of claim). Although the court may order that pleadings filed in the proceedings be treated as affidavits, a pleading is unlikely to set out relevant matters as fully as would an affidavit prepared for proceedings. [r 6.5.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [3.180]–[3.240] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) p 39. Related rules: rr 6.3, 6.6 and 31.1 as to evidence at a trial. 296

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 2 – Originating process

[r 6.6.40]

r 6.6

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 4 r 2B. 6.6

Proceedings wrongly commenced by summons

(cf SCR Part 5, rule 11)

(1) Proceedings that have been commenced by summons when they should have been commenced by statement of claim are nevertheless, and for all purposes, taken to have been duly commenced as from the date of the filing of the summons. (2) Despite subrule (1), the court may order that the proceedings continue on pleadings. (3) On or after making such an order, the court: (a) may order that any affidavits stand as pleadings, or (b) may make orders for the filing of a statement of claim or other pleadings. (4) After a statement of claim is filed pursuant to an order referred to in subrule (3)(b), the proceedings are to continue, subject to any other order of the court, as if commenced by statement of claim.

RULE 6.6 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 6.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.6.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.6.1000]

[r 6.6.20]

Comparison

The rule is based on former SCR Pt 5 r 11(1)–(2) and (4). There is no equivalent of the former SCR Pt 5 r 11(3). Under the SCR, when an order was made to file a statement of claim, the defendant was entitled to be served on the day of the order and had 21 days to file a defence. Under the UCPR, the proceedings are taken to have commenced with the original filing of the summons, and when the order is made, continue as if commenced by statement of claim. Rule 10.1 requires that all documents filed be served on each other active party “as soon as practicable”. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. [r 6.6.40]

Operation

Under this rule, proceedings wrongly commenced by summons are for all purposes taken to have been duly commenced from the date of filing of the statement of claim. Under r 6.6(2) (based on the former SCR Pt 5 r 11(1)), the court may order that the proceedings “continue on pleadings”. It may give directions as to the use, if any, to be made of affidavits that have been filed. Under the former SCR Pt 5 r 7, the court could also make orders for “defining the issues by pleadings”. In that case, the “pleadings” filed were sometimes described as “points of claim”, “points of defence” and so on, as a means of distinguishing them from pleadings in proceedings that are “proceeding on pleadings”. The distinction between the two was that proceedings on pleadings (commenced by statement of claim), evidence was usually oral rather than by affidavit, as was usual in proceedings commenced by summons. The distinction is maintained in UCPR r 31.1 – the ordinary rule is that at the trial of proceedings commenced by statement of claim, or in which a statement of claim has been filed, witnesses’ evidence must be given orally. The court may order affidavits or witness statements under rr 31.1(3) and (4): see [r 31.1.40]. A further distinction under the former rules was that in proceedings commenced by summons, discovery and interrogatories were not available on notice but required an order, whereas discovery and interrogatories were available on notice in proceedings commenced by statement of claim. That distinction is no longer relevant, in that neither discovery nor interrogatories are available on notice, but only by order, in any proceedings under the UCPR: see UCPR Pts 21 and 22. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

297

UCPR Parts 1-10

This rule is the counterpart of r 6.5 in relation to proceedings wrongly commenced by statement of claim.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.7

[r 6..40]

[r 6.6.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [3.180]–[3.240] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 39–41. Related rules: rr 6.2, 6.5 and 31.1 as to evidence at a trial. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 5 r 11. 6.7

Determination

(cf SCR Part 5, rule 8)

The court may, on the first or any later day of hearing: (a) hear and determine the proceedings or any claim in the proceedings, and (b) make such order or give such judgment as the nature of the case requires.

RULE 6.7 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 6.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.7.40] Practice as to first return of proceedings ................................................................................................... [r 6.7.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.7.1000]

[r 6.7.20]

Comparison

This rule is derived from former SCR Pt 5 r 8. Whereas the SCR Pt 5 r 8 applied only to proceedings commenced by summons on or after 16 June 2003 (see SCR Pt 5 r 1(1)), this rule does not contain those restrictions. It is otherwise the same as the SCR. [r 6.7.40]

Operation

The purpose of the rule is to provide for matters to be dealt with either on the first hearing date set out in the summons or statement of claim (frequently referred to as the “return date”), or fixed for hearing subsequently. There had previously been a distinction in the Supreme Court between a summons with and one without a hearing date appointed when the proceeding were commenced. The distinction was abolished from June 2003. CPA s 90(1) and UCPR r 36.1 allow the court to give such judgment or make such order as the nature of the case requires: see [CPA 90.20]; [r 36.1.40]. [r 6.7.60]

Practice as to first return of proceedings

The practice as to what will occur on the first hearing date set out in the summons or statement of claim differs in each of the Supreme Court, District Court and Local Court. In the Supreme Court, the practice differs depending upon the Division to which proceedings are assigned and any specialist list into which proceedings are entered. In the Supreme Court urgent matters or short matters ready for hearing on the return date may be referred to a duty judge. Often, on the first return date, proceedings are listed before a registrar who ascertains whether the proceedings are ready for hearing then or require directions to be made. The court’s discretion to make directions should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. The relevant court practice note should be consulted by plaintiffs before commencing proceedings, and by a defendant served with proceedings. [r 6.7.1000]

References

Related provisions: CPA s 90, UCPR r 36.1. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 5 r 8. 298

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 2 – Originating process

[r 6.8.60]

6.8

r 6.8

Originating process for recovery of land to be served on occupier

(cf SCR Part 7, rule 8)

(1) If, when proceedings for possession of land are commenced, a person (the occupier) not joined as a defendant is in occupation of the whole or any part of the land, the plaintiff: (a) must state in the originating process that the plaintiff does not seek to disturb the occupier’s occupation of the land, or (b) must serve the originating process on the occupier together with a notice to the effect that: (i) the occupier may apply to the court for an order that the occupier be added as a defendant, and (ii) if the occupier does not so apply within 10 days after service, the occupier may be evicted under a judgment entered in the occupier’s absence. (2) For the purposes of subrule (1), documents may be served on the occupier personally or by leaving the documents on the land concerned addressed to the occupier by name or addressed simply “to the occupier”. (3) If originating process is amended by the addition of a claim for possession of land, the time at which proceedings for possession of that land are commenced is taken, for the purposes of subrule (1), to be the time at which the amendment is made.

RULE 6.8 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 6.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.8.40] Meaning of occupier ................................................................................................................................... [r 6.8.60] Supreme Court, Common Law Division Possession List ........................................................................... [r 6.8.80] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.8.1000]

[r 6.8.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 7 r 8. The wording has been simplified and the order of former Pt 7 r 8(1A) and (2) have been reversed in new subrr (2) and (3). Operation

The rule sets out the requirements for service of originating process where the occupier is not joined as a defendant. The meaning of “occupier” is discussed in [r 6.8.60]. The object of the rule is to ensure that where a plaintiff seeks to disturb the occupier’s occupation of the land, the occupier must be given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to apply to be added as a defendant: see approved Form 5 for the form of notice under r 6.8(1)(b). Rule 6.8(3) ensures that where a claim for possession of land is added to existing proceedings, the requirements of r 6.8(1) apply for the benefit of an occupier who is not a defendant to the proceedings. There are specific provisions in relation to substituted and informal service of originating process in proceedings for possession of land in UCPR r 10.15. See [r 14.15.40] for specific pleading requirements in relation to proceedings for possession of land, and [r 36.8.40] for the requirements for obtaining a judgment for possession of land, which include an affidavit regarding service on persons in possession of the land whose occupation is sought to be disturbed. [r 6.8.60]

Meaning of “occupier”

It is not easy to give an accurate and exhaustive definition of “occupier”; while possession is the primary element of occupation, occupation includes something more: R v St Pancras Assessment Committee (1877) 2 QBD 581 at 588. A member of the family of a lessee of premises who resides at the premises with the lessee is not an “occupier”: National Commercial Banking Corp of Australia Ltd v MRM Holdings Pty Ltd (1983) 3 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

299

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 6.8.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.8A

[r 6.8.60]

BPR 9339 at 9343. A mortgagee has a better right of possession of land than a subsequent tenant of the mortgagor: Kerr v Sheriff (NSW) (1996) 9 BPR 16215. [r 6.8.80]

Supreme Court, Common Law Division Possession List

UCPR r 45.4 (formerly SCR Pt 14B) makes specific provision for proceedings in the Supreme Court intended to be entered in Possession List of the Common Law Division, to which Practice Note SC CL 6, Supreme Court Common Law Division – Possession List applies: see [SC CL 6] or on Lawbook Online. [r 6.8.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 144–146. Related rules: r 10.15 re substituted and informal service; r 36.8 as to obtaining judgment for possession of land; UCPR r 45.4 (formerly SCR Pt 14B) as to the Possession List. Approved forms: Forms 3A and 3B Statement of claim, Form 5 Notice to Occupier. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 7 r 8. 6.8A

Originating process for proceedings to be entered in Possession List

The originating process in proceedings in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court that are to be entered in The Possession List is to have a coversheet in the approved form. [R 6.8A insrt Rule 569 of 2009, Sch 1[1]]

RULE 6.8A COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.8A.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.8A.40]

[r 6.8A.20]

Comparison

This rule was inserted in December 2009. [r 6.8A.40]

Operation

This rule makes specific provision for a multi-language coversheet to be served with originating process in possession proceedings in the Supreme Court.

DIVISION 3 – DEFENDANT TO PROCEEDINGS TO ENTER APPEARANCE 6.9

How appearance entered

(cf SCR Part 11, rule 3)

(1) A defendant may enter an appearance in proceedings by filing a notice of appearance. (2) A defendant who files a defence in proceedings is taken to have entered an appearance in the proceedings. Note: Appearance may be withdrawn: see rule 12.5.

RULE 6.9 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 6.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.9.40] Withdrawal of an appearance .................................................................................................................... [r 6.9.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.9.1000]

300

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.9.1000] [r 6.9.20]

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 3 – Defendant to proceedings to enter appearance

r 6.10

Comparison

The rule is based on the former SCR Pt 11 r 3, but differs from SCR Pt 11 r 3 in that a defendant may enter an appearance under this rule by either filing a notice of appearance or simply filing a defence. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. The ordinary manner of indicating that the proceedings in the District Court or Local Court were to be contested was by filing a defence. [r 6.9.40]

Operation

The rule sets out how a defendant to proceedings formally notifies the court and the plaintiff that the defendant intends to take at least some part in proceedings. Entry of an appearance prevents a plaintiff signing default judgment without notice to the defendant. Rule 6.10 sets out the time within which an appearance must be entered: see [r 6.10.20]. Modern rules of court do not recognise the concept of a conditional appearance referred to in earlier authorities. Entering an appearance may amount to a submission to the jurisdiction and would waive any irregularities in the originating process or service of it. If a defendant wishes to object to the court’s jurisdiction, a defendant should not enter an appearance but instead make an application under r 12.11: see [r 12.11.40]. The approved forms of appearance (approved Forms 6A and 6B) and defence (approved Form 7A) require an address for service for the defendant and the name and practising certificate number of the solicitor on the record, acting for the defendant. Under r 6.11 a submitting appearance may be entered: see [r 6.11.40]. [r 6.9.60]

Withdrawal of an appearance

Rule 12.5 provides that a party against whom claims in the proceedings subsist may withdraw an appearance with the leave of the court: see [r 12.5.40] and the definition of active party in the Dictionary to the UCPR. Withdrawing an appearance should be distinguished from a party withdrawing instructions from the party’s solicitor or a solicitor seeking ceasing to act for a party (as to which see rr 7.26 to 7.30). [r 6.9.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [5.10]–[5.120], [5.70]–[5.120] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 18–22. Related rules: r 6.10 as to the time for entering an appearance, r 6.11 regarding a submitting appearance; r 12.11 regarding setting aside originating process, r 12.5 as to withdrawal of an appearance. Approved forms: Form 6A Appearance, Form 6B Submitting appearance, Forms 7A and 7B Defence.

6.10

Time for appearance

(cf SCR Part 7, rule 5, Part 11, rule 6)

(1) For the purposes of these rules, the time limited for a defendant to enter an appearance (whether by filing a notice of appearance in accordance with this Division or by filing a defence in accordance with Division 4) is: (a) in the case of proceedings commenced by statement of claim: (i)

(b)

28 days after service on the defendant of the statement of claim or such other time as the court directs for the filing of a defence, or (ii) if the defendant makes an unsuccessful application to have the statement of claim set aside, 7 days after the refusal of the application, whichever is the later, or in the case of proceedings commenced by summons: (i) on or before the return day stated in the summons, or

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

301

UCPR Parts 1-10

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 11 r 3.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.10

[r 6.10.20] (ii)

if the defendant makes an unsuccessful application to have the summons set aside, 7 days after the refusal of the application, whichever is the later. (2) A reference in subrule (1)(b) to a summons extends, in relation to the Land and Environment Court, to an application that, in accordance with the rules of that Court, commences proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of that Court’s jurisdiction. [Subr (2) insrt Rule 580 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]] [R 6.10 am Rule 580 of 2007]

RULE 6.10 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.10.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.10.40] Late appearance ....................................................................................................................................... [r 6.10.60] Land and Environment Court application ................................................................................................. [r 6.10.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.10.1000]

[r 6.10.20]

Comparison

The rule is based on the former SCR Pt 7 r 5. The wording has been simplified and the time limits made uniform compared with the former SCR Pt 7 r 5(e) in relation to the time for filing a defence to a statement of claim. The provision regarding entry of an appearance in response to a summons is unchanged. In all cases, however, an unsuccessful application to have the originating process set aside will set a time limit to file a defence, at seven days after refusal of the application – but only if the time limit would otherwise expire sooner. In the District Court, this rule standardises the time limit for filing a defence to a statement of claim, including a liquidated claim. [r 6.10.40]

Operation

Where a defendant fails to enter an appearance, either by filing a notice of appearance or by filing a defence within the time prescribed, in proceedings commenced by statement of claim a plaintiff may enter default judgment under UCPR Pt 16. Where a defendant fails to enter an appearance in proceedings commenced by summons, the plaintiff may seek the relief claimed in the defendant’s absence. UCPR Pt 7 sets out specific provisions as to the manner in which corporations, a person sued in a business name, executors, administrators and trustees, or a person under a legal capacity are permitted to commence and carry on proceedings. [r 6.10.60]

Late appearance

There is no direct equivalent of the former SCR Pt 11 r 6 which provided that a defendant may enter an appearance at any time without leave, but where an appearance is entered late, unless the court orders otherwise, the time for filing a defence and taking other steps is calculated as if the appearance had been entered within the time prescribed. [r 6.10.80]

Land and Environment Court application

Rule 6.10(2) makes specific provision for entry of an appearance to an application commencing proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of the Land and Environment Court’s jurisdiction, as though such an application were a summons. The provision is consequential on the CPA being applied to the Land and Environment Court (as from 28 January 2008). [r 6.10.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [5.10]–[5.120] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 18–22. 302

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.11.60]

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 3 – Defendant to proceedings to enter appearance

r 6.11

Related rules: UCPR Pt 16 as to default judgment, UCPR Pt 7 as to representation of parties. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 7 r 5, Pt 11 r 6. 6.11

Defendant may submit to judgment by notice of appearance

(cf SCR Part 11, rule 4(3), (4) and (5))

(1) A defendant who intends to take no active part in proceedings may include in the defendant’s notice of appearance a statement to the effect that the defendant submits to the making of all orders sought and the giving or entry of judgment in respect of all claims made, to which may be added the words “, save as to costs”. (2) Except by leave of the court, a defendant who has filed a notice of appearance containing a statement referred to in subrule (1) may not file a defence or affidavit or take any other step in the proceedings. Note: See rule 20.34 which allows the defendant in proceedings on a liquidated claim to file a statement acknowledging the whole of the amount of the claim.

RULE 6.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 6.11.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.11.40] Effect of a submitting appearance ............................................................................................................ [r 6.11.60] References ............................................................................................................................................ [r 6.11.1000]

[r 6.11.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 11 r 4(3) and (4). There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. [r 6.11.40]

Operation

A defendant who wishes to submit to the making of the orders sought, save as to any costs orders, may file a submitting appearance in approved Form 6B.

Under r 6.17, where a plaintiff makes a liquidated claim and specifies the lump sum costs and any filing fee paid, the defendant may, within the time limited for appearance, pay the amount claimed including interest, costs and the filing fee and then file a notice of payment. The filing of a notice of payment operates as a permanent stay of the proceedings unless the court orders otherwise: see [r 6.17.40]. [r 6.11.60]

Effect of a submitting appearance

A defendant who files a submitting appearance may only contest a claim for relief with the leave of the court. A submitting appearance may only be withdrawn with leave of the court: see [r 12.5.40]. A defendant who has filed a submitting appearance is not entitled to be given notice of the hearing nor file any answering affidavit without leave of the court: Trust Co of Australia Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 654 at 658; Fitter v Public Trustee [2007] NSWSC 1487. The circumstances in which such leave may be granted were considered in Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd v Registrar General (2009) 75 NSWLR 629; [2009] NSWSC 1143 at [79]–[83]. Leave was refused in that case where submissions filed by the submitting party took an adversarial stance. However, the court is not obliged to grant relief in favour of a plaintiff against a submitting defendant. The court may, in an ordinary case, grant relief sought by the plaintiff without looking into the facts of the case but has a discretion to refuse to do so if to grant relief without further examination might cause injustice: Trust Co of Australia Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 654 at 659–661. A tribunal properly joined as a party to judicial review proceedings is a proper respondent to them, but should not become a protagonist and would ordinarily submit to such orders as the court may make (save as to costs), © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

303

UCPR Parts 1-10

Rule 20.34 allows the defendant to proceedings where a liquidated amount is claimed to file a statement acknowledging the whole of the claim: see [r 20.34.40] and approved Form 35A.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.12

[r 6.11.60]

by filing an appropriate submitting appearance: R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13; 54 ALJR 314 at 17 and 35–36 (CLR). Such a tribunal may, where appropriate, present submissions regarding the powers and procedures of the tribunal where that would not risk endangering the impartiality of the tribunal in any rehearing of the original application before it: Holloway v Chairperson of the Residential Tribunal (2001) 51 NSWLR 716; 10 BPR 18905; [2001] NSWCA 209 at 726–728 (NSWLR), at [42]–[46]. [r 6.11.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [5.120]. Related rules: r 6.17 as to liquidated claims, r 20.34 as to statement acknowledging liquidated claim, r 12.5 as to withdrawal of an appearance. Approved forms: Form 6A Appearance, Form 6B Submitting appearance, Form 35A Acknowledgment of liquidated claim. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 11 r 4(3), (4).

DIVISION 4 – CONTENTS OF STATEMENT OF CLAIM AND SUMMONS 6.12

Relief claimed

(cf SCR Part 7, rule 1; DCR Part 5, rules 6 and 6A; LCR Part 5, rules 1 and 2)

(1) A statement of claim or summons must specifically state the relief claimed by the plaintiff. (2) If the relief claimed requires the determination or direction of the court on any question, the statement of claim or summons must state the question. (3) Costs referred to in section 59(1)(d) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (costs payable for the enforcement of a lump sum debt or liquidated sum for damages) must be specifically claimed. [Subr (3) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[3]; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[8]]

(4) Costs, other than those referred to in section 59(1)(d) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014, need not be specifically claimed. [Subr (4) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[3]; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[8]]

(5) Exemplary damages and aggravated compensatory damages must be specifically claimed. (6) An order for interest up to judgment must be specifically claimed. (7) In the case of a liquidated claim, a claim for an order for interest up to judgment: (a) must specify the period or periods for which interest is claimed, and (b) may specify the rate or rates at which interest is claimed. (8) If no rate of interest is specified under subrule (7)(b), the rate at which interest is claimed is taken to be: (a) in respect of the period from 1 January to 30 June in any year—the rate that is 4% above the cash rate last published by the Reserve Bank of Australia before that period commenced, and (b) in respect of the period from 1 July to 31 December in any year—the rate that is 4% above the cash rate last published by the Reserve Bank of Australia before that period commenced. Note: See Part 46 as to the additional matters to be included in a summons relating to an appeal. [Subr (8) subst Rule 279 of 2010, Sch 1[2]; am Rule 172 of 2010, Sch 1[1]] [R 6.12 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 279 of 2010; Rule 172 of 2010; Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 6.12 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.12.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.12.40] Costs ......................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.12.60] 304

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 4 – Contents of statement of claim and summons

[r 6.12.80]

r 6.12

Interest ...................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.12.80] Exemplary and aggravated compensatory damages ............................................................................. [r 6.12.100] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.12.1000]

[r 6.12.20]

Comparison

The rule is based on former SCR Pt 7 r 1, DCR Pt 5 rr 6 and 6A and LCR Pt 5 rr 1 and 2. It reproduces in substance SCR Pt 7 r 1 and adds a new subr (3). There is no equivalent provision to DCR Pt 5 r 6A subrr (b) to (f). DCR Pt 5 rr 6 and 6A and LCR Pt 5 rr 1 and 2 provided in more detail for the contents of ordinary and liquidated statements of claim, a distinction that is not relevant under the UCPR. [r 6.12.40]

Operation

The purpose of the rule is to require a specific statement of the relief claimed by the plaintiff and any question to be determined by the court in the statement of claim or summons. A statement of claim including a claim for damages must include a certificate under the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 Sch 2 cl 4(4) (before 1 July 2015, Legal Profession Act 2004 s 347, equivalent provisions to the former Legal Profession Act 1987 s 198L): see [r 4.2.140] and approved Form 3A. The approved forms now also require the Type of claim to be specified, for the main type of claim made on the proceedings, from the list of types of claim in s 6 of the Guide to preparing documents. The Guide to preparing documents states in paras 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 that this information is collected by the courts for statistical purposes and that the section should be left blank if there is no matching type of claim in the list. The request for relief or remedy (Relief claimed) now precedes the statement of material facts (Pleadings and particulars) in a statement of claim. The relief claimed, such as for debt, damages, or an injunction, should be set out in separate numbered paragraphs of the statement of claim or summons if more than one kind of relief is sought: see approved Forms 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B. A plaintiff should claim every kind of relief to which he or she is entitled from the defendant as a second action on the same cause of action will not be permitted to obtain relief which the plaintiff might have obtained in the first action: Isaacs & Sons v Salbstein [1916] 2 KB 139. Under what is often called the Anshun principle (Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; 55 ALJR 621; 36 ALR 3); see also Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313; [1843] All ER Rep 378), a plaintiff may be estopped in subsequent proceedings from raising a claim which could have been, but was not, raised in prior proceedings: see [r 14.14.220]. CPA s 90(1) allows the court to give such judgment or make such order as the nature of the case requires: see [CPA 90.20]. Under r 36.1 the court may give such judgment, or make such order, as the nature of the case requires, whether or not included in any originating process or notice of motion: see [r 36.1.40].

UCPR Pt 50 (formerly Pt 46, renumbered by amendments to the rules, Gaz 90, 7 July 2006, p 5280) makes specific provision for the content of a summons in an appeal to the Supreme Court or District Court. [r 6.12.60]

Costs

Lump sum costs must be specifically claimed under r 6.12(3). There is no requirement to include a claim for costs apart from lump sum costs within r 6.12(3), but it is usual to include a claim for costs, to draw to the defendant’s attention the potential liability for costs. [r 6.12.80]

Interest

A claim for interest up to judgment should be set out in the originating process. “Interest up to judgment” is defined in the Dictionary by reference to CPA s 100, Motor Accidents Act 1988 s 73, Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 s 137 and Workers’ Compensation Act 1987 s 151M. However r 36.1 allows the court to give such judgment or make such order as the nature of the case requires, whether or not included in the originating process or notice of motion: see [r 36.1.40] and CPA s 90(1) [CPA 90.20]; under CPA s 64(2) all necessary amendments are to be made to determine the real questions raised by or depending on the proceedings. SCA s 63 allows the Supreme Court to grant such relief as is required to determine all matters in controversy avoiding a multiplicity of legal proceedings. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

305

UCPR Parts 1-10

The rule makes specific provision regarding costs and interest: see [r 6.12.60] and [r 6.12.80] respectively. Rule 14.12 provides for the pleading of facts in short form in certain money counts: see [r 14.12.40].

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.13

[r 6.12.80]

A failure to include a claim for interest up to judgment may be overcome by r 36.1 or by amendment under CPA s 64 or, after judgment has been given, by virtue of the “slip rule” in r 36.17: L Shaddock & Assoc Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590; 56 ALJR 875; 43 ALR 473, see [r 36.17.60]. Rule 6.12(7) requires a specific statement of the period or periods for which interest is claimed in respect of a liquidated claim. “Liquidated claim” is defined in the Dictionary to the UCPR to include a claim for interest up to judgment. The meaning of “liquidated claim” is discussed in [r 6.3.60]. The rate or rates at which interest is claimed may be specified, but if no rate of interest is specified in the statement of claim, the rate prescribed by Sch 5 for the purposes of CPA s 101 will apply. After 1 July 2010 the rate will be prescribed by r 36.7(1), in broad terms as 6% above the cash rate last published by the Reserve Bank of Australia. [r 6.12.100]

Exemplary and aggravated compensatory damages

Rule 6.12(5) requires that exemplary and aggravated compensatory damages must be specifically claimed. Particulars must be given of the facts and circumstances on which the party pleading relies to establish the claim for exemplary or aggravated damages under UCPR rr 15.7 and 15.8: see [r 15.7.40] and [r 15.8.40]. There are restrictions on awarding exemplary and aggravated compensatory damages under the Civil Liability Act 2002: see [r 15.7.60] and [r 15.8.60]. [r 6.12.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [3.10]–[3.80] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 33-34, 171–172. Related provisions: UCPR Pts 14 and 15 regarding pleadings and particulars respectively; CPA s 90 and UCPR r 36.1; UCPR Pt 50 (formerly Pt 46) regarding appeals to the Supreme Court or District Court. Approved forms: Forms 3A and 3B Statement of claim, Forms 4A and 4B Summons. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 7 r 1; DCR Pt 5, rr 6 and 6A; LCR Pt 5, rr 1 and 2. Editor’s note: Rule 6.12A is repealed and has not been reproduced.

6.13 Notice to defendant in statement of claim (cf SCR Part 7, rule 3)

A statement of claim: (a) must state that, unless a defence is filed in the registry, the proceedings may result in a judgment or order against the defendant, and (b) must give the address of the registry where the statement of claim is filed (which will consequently be the address where any further pleadings and other documents are to be filed), and (c) must specify the time limited by these rules for filing a defence. Note: See rule 6.8 in relation to claims for the possession of land.

RULE 6.13 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.13.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.13.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.13.1000]

[r 6.13.20]

Comparison

This rule is modelled on former SCR Pt 7 r 3. In the Supreme Court this rule removes the geographical variations in requirements for filing a notice of appearance. The substantive effect of SCR Pt 7 r 3 in relation to a statement of claim is unchanged. 306

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.14.1000]

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 4 – Contents of statement of claim and summons

r 6.14

There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. [r 6.13.40]

Operation

The rule sets out the formal notes that must be included in a statement of claim to inform a defendant about the requirements for filing a defence and the consequences of failing to do so: see approved Forms 3A and 3B. There are additional requirements for notice to occupiers in relation to actions for possession: see [r 6.8.40]. [r 6.13.1000]

References

Related rules: UCPR r 6.14 regarding the notice to a defendant in a summons. Approved forms: Forms 3A and 3B Statement of claim. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 7 r 3. 6.14

Notice to defendant in summons

(cf SCR Part 7, rule 3)

A summons filed in proceedings in which there is a defendant: (a) must state that: (i) the proceedings may be heard, and (ii) the defendant is liable to suffer judgment or an order against the defendant, unless there is attendance before the court by the defendant or his or her barrister or solicitor at the time and place stated in the summons, and (b) must further state that, before any such attendance, the defendant must file a notice of appearance in the registry, and (c) must give the address of the registry at the place named as the place for attendance.

RULE 6.14 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.14.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.14.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.14.1000]

[r 6.14.20]

Comparison

This rule is modelled on former SCR Pt 7 r 3. In the Supreme Court this rule removes the geographical variations in requirements for filing a notice of appearance. The substantive effect of SCR Pt 7 r 3 in relation to a summons is unchanged.

[r 6.14.40]

Operation

The rule sets out the formal notes that must be included in a summons to inform a defendant about the requirements for entering an appearance and the consequences of failing to do so: see approved Forms 4A and 4B, and Form 84. The requirement under the former SCR Pt 7 r 3 that a defendant must file a notice of appearance in the registry before attending court on the return of the summons is maintained under r 6.14(b). See also [r 6.1.40]. If this has not been done before the first return date of the summons, leave may be sought to file a notice of appearance in court, alternatively an undertaking may be proffered that a formal appearance in accordance with the rules will be filed in the registry within a specified time. Under r 36.1 the court may give such judgment, or make such order, as the nature of the case requires, whether or not included in any originating process or notice of motion: see [r 36.1.40] and CPA s 90[CPA 90.20]. [r 6.14.1000]

References

Related rules: UCPR rr 6.1 and 6.13 regarding the notice to a defendant in a statement of claim. Approved forms: Forms 4A and 4B Summons, and Form 84 Summons commencing an appeal under Pt 50. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

307

UCPR Parts 1-10

There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.15

[r 6.14.1000]

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 7 r 3. 6.15

Summons to specify return day

(cf SCR Part 5, rule 3)

(1) A summons must state a return day. (2) The return day may be fixed by the court or, if not fixed by the court, is to be obtained from the registry. (3) If there is a defendant, the summons is to be served on the defendant not less than 5 days before the return day unless the court orders otherwise. (4) A summons is to bear a note stating the terms of any order made under subrule (3). (5) If a return day is obtained from the registry and the summons is to be served outside New South Wales, the return day is to be not less than one month after the date of filing of the summons.

RULE 6.15 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.15.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.15.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.15.1000]

[r 6.15.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 5 r 3. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. The former Pt 5 r 3(1) provided that a summons commencing proceedings must be in Form 6. Approved Forms 4A and 4B (and 84) are now the approved forms of a summons. [r 6.15.40]

Operation

The rule requires that all summonses must specify a date on which the proceeding will come before the court, under r 6.7 either for final determination or the making of directions: see [r 6.7.40]. The rule also ensures that unless the court otherwise orders, a defendant to be served in New South Wales should have five clear days notice of proceedings (see r 1.11). Time for service may be abridged under r 1.12. [r 6.15.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 5 r 3. Approved forms: Forms 4A and 4B Summons and Form 84 Summons commencing an appeal under Pt 50. 6.16 Alteration of return day in summons (cf SCR Part 5, rule 5A)

The court may, by notice given to the parties by telephone or otherwise, postpone the return day for a summons to a later day, and may authorise the parties’ solicitors to make corresponding alterations to the copies of the summonses held by them.

RULE 6.16 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.16.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.16.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.16.1000]

308

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 4 – Contents of statement of claim and summons

[r 6.17.40] [r 6.16.20]

r 6.17

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 5 r 5A, simplifying the wording of that rule. SCR Pt 5 r 5A referred to “an appointment for hearing”, whereas r 6.16 refers to a “return date” (as it was usually referred to in practice). There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. [r 6.16.40]

Operation

The rule allows the court to postpone the return date for a summons and facilitates notice of a changed date being given to the parties by telephone. See [r 6.7.60] as to the practice on the first return date of a summons. [r 6.16.1000]

References

Related rules: UCPR r 6.7. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 5 r 5A. 6.17

Payment towards liquidated claim stays proceedings on claim

(cf SCR Part 7, rule 4; DCR Part 14, rule 2; LCR Part 12, rule 2)

(1) This rule applies to proceedings in which the plaintiff makes a liquidated claim, but makes no claim of any other kind. (2) The defendant in any such proceedings may, within the time limited for appearance, pay to the plaintiff the sum of: (a) the amount claimed (other than costs), including any interest claimed, and (b) an amount for costs equal to the amount fixed in relation to such a claim by the regulations under the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014, and (c) if the amount so fixed does not include the fee paid on filing the originating process, an amount equal to that fee. [Subr (2) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[4]; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[9]]

(3) Having made such a payment, the defendant may file a notice of payment. (4) The filing of a notice of payment operates as a permanent stay of the proceedings unless the court orders otherwise. (5) A statement of claim commencing proceedings to which this rule applies must bear a note to the effect of this rule and must specify the amounts for costs referred to in subrule (2)(b) and (c).

RULE 6.17 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.17.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.17.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.17.1000]

[r 6.17.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 7 r 4, DCR Pt 14 r 2 and LCR Pt 12 r 2. The rule most closely follows the provisions of SCR Pt 7 r 4, and the substantive effect of that rule is unchanged. DCR Pt 14 r 2 and LCR Pt 12 r 2, which were in substantially the same terms, made more detailed provisions for entry of judgment by confession. Those rules also provided for an application for leave to pay the judgment by instalments by a defendant who filed a statement confessing to the whole or part of a plaintiff’s claim. [r 6.17.40]

Operation

The purpose of the rule is to allow a defendant to pay the amount of a liquidated claim, including interest, costs and the filing fee, within the time limited for appearance: see [r 6.10.40] – [r 6.10.60]. Actual payment of the amount claimed and the filing of a notice of payment result in a permanent stay of proceedings unless the court orders otherwise. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

309

UCPR Parts 1-10

[R 6.17 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 716 of 2006]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.18

[r 6.17.40]

The rule requires an additional note to a statement of claim to inform a defendant about the option to pay the amounts claimed. Where a liquidated amount is claimed, approved Forms 3A and 3B require the following details to be set out in the statement of claim: Amount of claim Interest Filing fees Service fees Solicitors fees TOTAL

$ $ $ $ $ $

(See the Guide to preparing documents para 4.3.2). The amount of costs claimed must be specified as lump sum costs: see [r 6.12.60]. See [r 6.12.80] regarding a claim for interest on a liquidated claim. [r 6.17.1000]

References

Related rules: UCPR r 20.34 regarding acknowledgment of liquidated claim; UCPR r 6.11 as to submission of judgment. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 7 r 4; DCR Pt 14 r 2; LCR Pt 12 r 2. Approved forms: Forms 3A and 3B Statement of claim, Form 35A Acknowledgment of liquidated claim.

DIVISION 5 – JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND JOINDER OF PARTIES 6.18

Joinder of causes of action

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 1; DCR Part 7, rule 1; LCR Part 6, rule 1)

(1) In any originating process, the plaintiff may claim relief against the defendant in respect of more than one cause of action in any of the following circumstances: (a) if the plaintiff sues in the same capacity, and claims the defendant to be liable in the same capacity, in respect of each cause of action, (b) if the plaintiff sues: (i) in his or her capacity as executor of the will of a deceased person, or administrator of the estate of a deceased person, in respect of one or more of the causes of action, and (ii) in his or her personal capacity, but with reference to the estate of the same deceased person, in respect of the remaining causes of action, (c) if the plaintiff claims the defendant to be liable: (i) in his or her capacity as executor of the will of a deceased person, or administrator of the estate of a deceased person, in respect of one or more of the causes of action, and (ii) in his or her personal capacity, and in relation to the estate of the same deceased person, in respect of the remaining causes of action, (d) if the court grants leave for all of the causes of action to be dealt with in the same proceedings. (2) Leave under subrule (1) may be granted before or after the originating process is filed.

RULE 6.18 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.18.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.18.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.18.1000] 310

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.18.1000] [r 6.18.20]

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 5 – Joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties

r 6.19

Comparison

Rule 6.18(1) is based on former SCR Pt 8 r 1, DCR Pt 7 r 1 and LCR Pt 6 r 1. The wording has been simplified but the substantive effect of the former rules, which were in the same terms in each of the jurisdictions, is unchanged. The granting of leave for different causes of action to be dealt with in the same proceedings was previously dealt with in former SCR Pt 8 r 4, DCR Pt 7 r 4 and LCR Pt 6 r 4. Subrule (2) of each of those rules provided that the plaintiff could apply for leave without serving notice of the motion on any person on whom the statement of claim has not been served. [r 6.18.40]

Operation

The rule allows separate causes of action to be joined in the one proceeding, provided the capacities of the plaintiff and defendant are within one of subr (1)(a)–(c), or if the court grants leave under subr (1)(d). An application for leave should be made by motion in the proceedings. See Pt 18 regarding motions generally. The court has the power to dispense with the filing and a service of a motion in the course of giving directions generally or otherwise managing the proceedings (CPA s 61, r 2.1). The court’s discretion to grant leave should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in proceedings, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. That may mean leave would be refused for joinder of unconnected causes of action where inconvenience would result from the joinder. The court may order separate trials if parties or causes of action are joined inconveniently: see [r 6.22.40]. The potential operation of issue estoppel should be considered in determining whether separate causes of action should be joined in the one proceeding. A party may be estopped from asserting in fresh proceedings issues which could and should have been litigated in earlier proceedings: see the discussion of issue estoppel generally and Anshun estoppel in [r 14.14.200] – [r 14.14.220]. If the proceedings are in the District Court or Local Court, the sum of the amounts claimed in respect of each of the causes of action joined in the one proceeding must not exceed the jurisdictional limit of the court: Brincat v Kilsby [1983] 1 VR 625. See [CPA 23.40] – [CPA 23.60] as to abandonment of excess claims. [r 6.18.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.130]–[9.160] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 170–171.

6.19

Proceedings involving common questions of law or fact

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 2; DCR Part 7, rule 2; LCR Part 6, rule 2)

(1) Two or more persons may be joined as plaintiffs or defendants in any originating process if: (a) separate proceedings by or against each of them would give rise to a common question of law or fact, and (b) all rights of relief claimed in the originating process are in respect of, or arise out of, the same transaction or series of transactions, or if the court gives leave for them to be joined. (2) Leave under subrule (1) may be granted before or after the originating process is filed.

RULE 6.19 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.19.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.19.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.19.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

311

UCPR Parts 1-10

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 rr 1 and 4; DCR Pt 7 rr 1 and 4; LCR Pt 6 rr 1 and 4.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.19 [r 6.19.20]

[r 6.19.20] Comparison

The rule is based on former SCR Pt 8 r 2, DCR Pt 7 r 2 and LCR Pt 6 r 2. The wording has been simplified but the substantive effect of the former rules, which were in the same terms in each of the jurisdictions, is unchanged. The granting of leave for different causes of action to be dealt with in the same proceedings was previously dealt with in former SCR Pt 8 r 4, DCR Pt 7 r 4 and LCR Pt 6 r 4. Subrule (2) of each of those rules provided that the plaintiff could apply for leave without serving notice of the motion on any person on whom the statement of claim has not been served. [r 6.19.40]

Operation

The purpose of the rule is to allow the joinder of multiple plaintiffs or defendants in the one proceedings provided there are common questions of law or fact and the rights of relief claimed arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. If these conditions are not fulfilled, leave of the court for the joinder is required. The wording of the rule is similar to r 28.5 regarding consolidation of actions: see [r 28.2.60] and [r 28.5.40]. It is not sufficient, for example, that there are common questions of law if the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of separate transactions: Payne v Young (1980) 145 CLR 609 at 618. “Transaction” is not restricted to breach of contract: Bendir v Anson [1936] 3 All ER 326 at 330. Proceedings by a liquidator against a number of defendants alleged to have received unfair preferences from related companies cannot be combined in a single proceeding without leave merely because common issues as to the date of the companies’ solvency would arise in respect of each transaction; the transactions are not the same “series of transactions”: Dean-Willcocks v Air Transit International Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 64; 42 ACSR 328; 20 ACLC 1464; [2002] NSWSC 525 at 71 [23] (NSWLR). In determining whether to grant leave, the court should consider the just resolution of the disputes between the parties having regard to the desirability of limiting costs and delay: Dean-Willcocks v Air Transit International Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 64; 42 ACSR 328; 20 ACLC 1464; [2002] NSWSC 525 at 72 [28] (NSWLR); Bishop v Bridgelands Securities (1990) 25 FCR 311; [1990] 41-060; and the efficient use of the resources of the parties and the court: Dean-Willcocks v Air Transit International Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 64; 42 ACSR 328; 20 ACLC 1464; [2002] NSWSC 525 at 73 [31]; Carter v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 109 FCR 215; 47 ATR 133; [2001] ATC 4260; [2001] FCA 575. Joinder of the insurer of a defendant which claimed it was not obliged to indemnify the defendant may be justified as avoiding multiplicity of proceedings: Bazem Pty Ltd v Bureau of Urban Architecture [2010] NSWSC 978 at [31], [43] (leave to appeal refused: CGU Insurance Ltd v Bazem Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 81), citing JN Taylor Holdings Ltd (In Liq) v Bond (1993) 59 SASR 432, Tatterson v Wirtanan [1998] VSC 88, Ashmere Cove Pty Ltd v Beekink (No 2) (2007) 244 ALR 534; [2007] FCA 1421 and Employers Reinsurance Corp v Ashmere Cove Pty Ltd (2008) 166 FCR 398; [2008] FCAFC 28. A defendant may be joined under the rule after the commencement of proceedings: Qantas Airways Ltd v AF Little Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 34. This rule should be read with r 6.18 regarding joinder of causes of action. See the discussion in [r 6.18.40] regarding the granting of leave by the court and the relevance of the jurisdictional limits applying in the District Court and Local Court. It should be borne in mind that generally, multiple plaintiffs must act by the same solicitor and counsel: Goold & Porter Pty Ltd v Housing Commission [1974] VR 102; Wedderburn v Wedderburn (1853) 17 Beav 158. [r 6.19.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.10], [9.130]–[9.160] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 170–171. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 rr 2 and 4; DCR Pt 7 rr 2 and 4; LCR Pt 6 rr 2 and 4.

312

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.20.40]

6.20

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 5 – Joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties

r 6.20

Proceedings affecting persons having joint entitlement

(cf SCR Part 8, rules 3 and 4; DCR Part 7, rules 3 and 4; LCR Part 6, rules 3 and 4)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, all persons jointly entitled to the same relief must be joined as parties in any claim for that relief that is made by any one or more of them. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, any other such person is to be joined: (a) as a plaintiff, if he or she consents to being a plaintiff, or (b) as a defendant, if he or she does not consent to being a plaintiff. (3) Despite subrule (1), a person may not be joined as a party to proceedings in contravention of any other Act or law. Note: See, for example, section 62 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 of the Commonwealth.

RULE 6.20 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.20.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.20.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.20.1000]

[r 6.20.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 8 r 3, DCR Pt 7 r 3 and LCR Pt 6 r 3, which were in the same terms. The wording of those rules has been simplified. Subrule (2) of the former rules provided: Subrule (1) applies subject to any Act and subject to section 62 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and applies unless the Court gives leave to the contrary. Rule 6.20(3) more generally prohibits joinder of a party to proceedings in contravention of any other act or law, although the note to the rule has a specific reference to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 62. [r 6.20.40]

Operation

Generally, all joint debtors or tortfeasors and all co-contractors should be joined as parties to the same proceeding. Where the subject matter of proceedings is property, all persons interested in it should ordinarily be parties to the proceedings. The court has wide powers to make orders as regarding the joinder or removal of parties: see rr 6.24 and 6.29; Qantas Airways Ltd v AF Little Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 34. The court may order separate trials if parties or causes of action are joined inconveniently: see [r 6.22.40]. The counterpart of this rule in relation to parties jointly liable to a plaintiff is r 6.21: see [r 6.21.40]. Where some of those jointly, but not severally, liable have not been joined to proceedings as defendants, proceedings may be stayed under r 6.21(2) until they are joined. A party may not be joined as a plaintiff in proceedings unless the party consents: see also [r 6.25.40]. A person who refuses to be joined as a plaintiff after being tendered an indemnity for costs may be joined as a defendant: Cullen v Knowles [1898] 2 QB 380. Generally, multiple plaintiffs (but not multiple defendants), must act by the same solicitor and counsel: Goold & Porter Pty Ltd v Housing Commission [1974] VR 102; Wedderburn v Wedderburn (1853) 17 Beav 158. Different considerations can apply in relation to a claims for relief under the Family Provision Act 1982, particularly where the estate is small, and in will construction cases. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

313

UCPR Parts 1-10

The purpose of the rule is to ensure that all parties jointly (as distinct from severally) entitled to the same relief enforce the claim to relief in one set of proceedings. Where there is or may be doubt as to which of two or more people is entitled to the relief claimed, they may be joined as plaintiffs in the alternative. Concurrent holders of a right need not be joined: Scott v Tuff-Kote (Aust) Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 537; [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 103.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.21

[r 6.20.0]

[r 6.20.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.10]–[9.120] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 170–171, 177–178. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8, rr 3 and 4; DCR Pt 7, rr 3 and 4; LCR Pt 6, rr 3 and 4. 6.21

Proceedings affecting persons having joint or several liability

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 5; DCR Part 7, rule 5; LCR Part 6, rule 5)

(1) A person who is jointly and severally liable with some other person in relation to any act, matter or thing need not be a defendant in proceedings with respect to that act, matter or thing merely because the other person is a defendant in those proceedings. (2) In any proceedings in which a defendant is one of a number of persons who are jointly, but not severally, liable in contract or tort, or under an Act or statutory instrument, the court may order that the other persons be joined as defendants and that the proceedings be stayed until those other persons have been so joined.

RULE 6.21 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.21.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.21.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.21.1000]

[r 6.21.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on the former SCR Pt 8 r 5, DCR Pt 7 r 5 and LCR Pt 6 r 5. In the Supreme Court, r 6.21 is the same in substance as SCR Pt 8 r 5, except that in the case of jointly but not severally liable defendants, the court may now make orders of its own motion: CPA s 86(3). In the District Court and Local Court, this rule is the same in substance as DCR Pt 7 r 5 and LCR Pt 6 r 5 in its application to jointly and severally liable defendants. In relation to jointly but not severally liable defendants, the DCR applied only to liability in contract, whereas this rule applies to liability in tort, contract, or under statute. Further, the court may now make orders of its own motion: CPA s 86(3). [r 6.21.40]

Operation

This rule is the counterpart of r 6.20 in relation to parties jointly entitled to relief, discussed at [r 6.20.40]. The purpose of both rules is to ensure that all parties jointly (as distinct from severally) liable are party to one set of proceedings in which that liability is enforced. The court has wide powers to make orders as regarding the joinder or removal of parties: see rr 6.24 and 6.29; Qantas Airways Ltd v AF Little Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 34. The court may order separate trials if parties or causes of action are joined inconveniently: see [r 6.22.40]. Generally, all joint debtors or tortfeasors and all co-contractors should be joined as parties to the same proceeding. Execution of a judgment against one tortfeasor may affect a plaintiff’s ability to recover from another. Further, an out-of-court release (as distinct from a covenant not to sue) generally operates as a release of all parties jointly liable. See the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.10]–[9.120]. Where a plaintiff is in reasonable doubt as to which of two or more person is liable to her or him, the defendants may be joined in the one action and the plaintiff’s claim made against them severally or in the alternative: Bullock v London General Omnibus Co [1907] 1 KB 264; [1904-7] All ER Rep 44; 76 LJKB 127; 95 LT 905; 23 TLR 62. In that event, the plaintiff may seek a “Bullock order” requiring the unsuccessful defendant to pay the costs of the successful defendant, on the basis that as between the plaintiff and the unsuccessful defendant the costs payable to the successful defendant were reasonably and properly incurred by the plaintiff: Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215; 60 ALJR 49; 62 ALR 527. Alternatively, a “Sanderson 314

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.22.1000]

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 5 – Joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties

r 6.22

order” may be sought, under which the plaintiff pays the costs of the successful defendant but is entitled to add those costs to the costs payable to the plaintiff by the unsuccessful defendant: Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533. See generally [r Pt42.250]. [r 6.21.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.10]–[9.120] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 170–171. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 5; DCR Pt 7 r 5; LCR Pt 6 r 5. 6.22

Court may order separate trials if joinder of party or cause of action inconvenient

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 6; DCR Part 7, rule 6; LCR Part 6, rule 6)

If the court considers that the joinder of parties or causes of action in any proceedings may embarrass, inconvenience or delay the conduct of the proceedings, the court: (a) may order separate trials, or (b) may make such other order as it thinks fit.

RULE 6.22 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.22.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.22.40] Alternative procedures .............................................................................................................................. [r 6.22.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.22.1000]

[r 6.22.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts the former SCR Pt 8 r 6 and DCR Pt 7 r 6. The substantive effect of the former rules is unchanged although the wording has been simplified. [r 6.22.40]

Operation

The purpose of the rule is to allow the court to order separate trials, or make other orders where the joinder of different parties or separate causes of actions would inhibit the efficient disposal of the proceedings.

The court’s discretion should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. The court may make orders of its own motion: CPA s 86(3). [r 6.22.60]

Alternative procedures

An application for separate trial or other orders under r 6.22 may be an alternative order included in a notice of motion seeking summary dismissal of proceedings under r 13.4 or the striking out of pleadings under r 14.28 (as to which see [r 13.4.40] – [r 13.4.60] and [r 14.28.40]). [r 6.22.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.10]–[9.120] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 170–171, 176–177. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 6; DCR Pt 7 r 6; LCR Pt 6 r 6.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

315

UCPR Parts 1-10

The court has power to order that questions or issues be determined separately under r 28.2: see [r 28.2.40]. There is a similar power in respect of cross-claims under r 9.10.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.23

6.23

[r 6.23.20]

Effect of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 7(1); DCR Part 7, rule 7(1); LCR Part 6, rule 7(1))

Proceedings are not defeated merely because of the misjoinder or non-joinder of any person as a party to the proceedings.

RULE 6.23 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.23.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.23.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.23.1000]

[r 6.23.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 8 r 7(1), DCR Pt 7 r 7(1) and LCR Pt 6 r 7(1). Subrule (2) of the local rules in each case, which provides that the court may determine the issues so far as they affect the parties’ rights and interests, has not been reproduced. The court may make orders of its own motion under CPA s 86(3). [r 6.23.40]

Operation

The rule is complementary to the court’s power to order joinder of proper parties under r 6.24 and removal of parties improperly joined under r 6.29: see [r 6.24.40] and [r 6.29.40]. The misjoinder of parties does not render void proceedings which are properly commenced, but the opposite party is entitled to have those parties improperly joined struck out: Sovereignton Pty Ltd v Public Transport Commission (NSW) [1980] 1 NSWLR 243 at 259. A mere misnomer of a party may be rectified by amendment: J Robertson & Co Ltd (in liq) v Ferguson Transformers Pty Ltd (1970) 44 ALJR 441; [1971] ALR 377. See [CPA 65.400] in relation to amendment where a party has been misnamed and UCPR r 19.2 regarding addition of parties. [r 6.23.1000]

References

Related provisions: CPA ss 65, 86; UCPR rr 6.32, 19.2. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 7(1); DCR Pt 7 r 7(1); LCR Pt 6 r 7(1). 6.24 Court may join party if joinder proper or necessary (cf SCR Part 8, rule 8(1); DCR Part 7, rule 8(1); LCR Part 6, rule 8(1))

(1) If the court considers that a person ought to have been joined as a party, or is a person whose joinder as a party is necessary to the determination of all matters in dispute in any proceedings, the court may order that the person be joined as a party. (2) Without limiting subrule (1), in proceedings for the possession of land, the court may order that a person (not being a party to the proceedings) who is in possession of the whole or any part of the land (whether in person or by a tenant) be added as a defendant.

RULE 6.24 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.24.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.24.40] Proceedings for possession of land ......................................................................................................... [r 6.24.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.24.1000]

316

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.24.1000] [r 6.24.20]

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 5 – Joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties

r 6.24

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 8 r 8(1), DCR Pt 7 r 8(1) and LCR Pt 6 r 8(1). Subrule (2) of the local rules in each case has not been reproduced. The court’s power to make orders of its own motion or on the application of a party or any other person entitled to make such an application is now found in CPA s 86(3), orders may be made on terms under CPA s 86(1) and (2), and UCPR r 6.32 provides for the court making such orders as it thinks fit for the further conduct of proceedings: see [r 6.32.40]. Rule 6.24(2) is based on SCR Pt 8 r 8(3). There was no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. [r 6.24.40]

Operation

The rule allows the court to join additional parties to proceedings. A person who is not a party may make an application to be joined under r 6.27, see [r 6.27.40]. The question to be asked as to whether a party ought to have been joined has been expressed as whether the person’s rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in respect of the subject matter of the action be directly affected by any order which may be made in the action: Penang Mining Co v Sam [1969] 2 MLJ 52; Qantas Airways Ltd v AF Little Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 34: News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410; 139 ALR 193 at 523–525 (FCR). Whether joinder is necessary is determined by categorising the particular claim proposed to be made and determining whether it has the necessary relationship to the matters in dispute in the proceedings as already constituted. The phrase “all matters in dispute in the proceedings” should not be construed as limited to matters arising on the existing pleadings: it may also properly include those disputed issues of fact which are subjacent to the pleadings: Qantas Airways Ltd v AF Little Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 34. The word “necessary” must be given its full weight. The object of the rule is to enable all matters in dispute in the proceedings to be “effectually and completely determined and adjudicated on”; the rule should not be given an enlarged meaning it does not bear on fair and reasonable interpretation: Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 1) [1971] AC 912 at 930; Carpenter v Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 186 FLR 104; 51 ACSR 245; [2004] NSWSC 973 at [14]. The joinder of a person with a view to creating an estoppel against the person, where neither plaintiff nor defendant seek relief against the person, is not “necessary”: Walker v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1985) 3 NSWLR 496. The power to join a party under this rule is additional to the power of the court to give leave or make orders in relation to the joinder of causes of action and parties under rr 6.18 to 6.21 but similar considerations would be relevant: see [r 6.18.40], [r 6.19.40], [r 6.20.40] and [r 6.21.40].

[r 6.24.60]

Proceedings for possession of land

Rule 6.24(2) deals specifically with proceedings for possession of land and the addition as a defendant of a person not party to the proceedings who is in possession of the whole or any part of the land. See [r 6.8.40] regarding proceedings for possession of land. [r 6.24.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.170]–[9.290] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 170–172. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 8(1), r 8(3); DCR Pt 7 r 8(1); LCR Pt 6 r 8(1).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

317

UCPR Parts 1-10

A person affected by an order made against them without having had a reasonable opportunity to be heard in relation to the order, for example not having been joined as a party to the proceedings, may apply to have the order set aside: Chappuis v Filo (1990) 19 NSWLR 490 at 512B; Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.25

6.25

[r 6.25.20]

Joinder as plaintiff requires party’s consent

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 8(2); DCR Part 7, rule 8(2); LCR Part 6, rule 8(2))

A person is not to be joined as a plaintiff in any proceedings except with his or her consent.

RULE 6.25 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.25.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.25.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.25.1000]

[r 6.25.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on former SCR Pt 8 r 8(2), DCR Pt 7 r 8(2) and LCR Pt 6 r 8(2). It reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 8 r 8(2). In the District Court and Local Court, this rule is the same in substance as DCR Pt 7 r 8(2) and LCR Pt 6 r 8(2) except that the plaintiff’s consent need not now be in writing. However it should be, unless announced by a person instructed by the new plaintiff in open court or there is proper evidence of consent. [r 6.25.40]

Operation

Under the rule, a person may not be joined to proceedings as a plaintiff unless the party consents. A person who refuses to be joined as a plaintiff after being tendered an indemnity for costs may be joined as a defendant: Cullen v Knowles [1898] 2 QB 380. See also [r 6.20.40]. [r 6.25.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 8(2); DCR Pt 7 r 8(2); LCR Pt 6 r 8(2). 6.26 Joinder to recover costs (cf SCR Part 52A, rule 4(3) and (4))

(1) Except to the extent to which these rules expressly provide, a party may not join another person as a party to any proceedings for the purpose of making an application for costs against the other person. (2) This rule does not apply: (a) if the other person would otherwise be a proper party to the proceedings, or (b) if the party joins the other person by means of a cross-claim in respect of a claim for costs against the party.

RULE 6.26 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.26.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.26.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.26.1000]

[r 6.26.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance SCR Pt 52A r 4(3) and (4). There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. [r 6.26.40]

Operation

The purpose of the rule is to set out when a person may be joined as a party for the purpose of making an application for costs against that person. 318

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 5 – Joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties

[r 6.27.60]

r 6.27

The question of when the other person would in any event be a proper party to the proceedings will be determined by r 6.24: see [r 6.24.40]. CPA s 22 governs when a cross-claim may properly be brought against the other person: see [CPA 22.60] – [CPA 22.80]. The making of an order for costs against a non-party is discussed in [r 42.3.60]. The court’s power to make an order for costs against a solicitor or barrister for a party does not depend upon the solicitor or barrister being made a party to the proceedings: see Legal Profession Act 1987 s 198M, Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; Legal Profession Act 2004 s 348, CPA s 99 and [r 42.3.80]. [r 6.26.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [17.210]–[17.500]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 52A r 4(3) and (4). 6.27

Joinder on application of third party

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 8; DCR Part 7, rule 8; LCR Part 6, rule 8)

A person who is not a party may apply to the court to be joined as a party, either as a plaintiff or defendant.

RULE 6.27 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.27.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.27.40] Intervention ............................................................................................................................................... [r 6.27.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.27.1000]

[r 6.27.20]

Comparison

The rule is based on SCR Pt 8 r 8(1), DCR Pt 7 r 8(1) and LCR Pt 6 r 8(1). Those rules provided for joinder of a person on the person’s own application where the person “ought to have been joined” or was a necessary party, pre-conditions to joinder now appearing in r 6.24. [r 6.27.40]

Operation

This rule allows a person who is not a party to seek to be joined to proceedings. The basis on which the court will order the joinder of a party is set out in r 6.24: see [r 6.24.40]. Intervention

Under r 6.24 and r 6.27 the court may grant leave to a party to “intervene” by being added as a defendant: Re Great Eastern Cleaning Service Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 278. An application is made by notice of motion including a formal notice of appearance. An intervener becomes a party to the proceedings entitled to participate and potentially exposed to liability for costs: Corporate Affairs Commission v Bradley; Commonwealth (Intervener) [1974] 1 NSWLR 391; (1974) 24 FLR 44. The position of an amicus curiae is different from that of an intervener: see the discussion in Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd v Lancken (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Sperling J, 1 August 1997); affirmed on appeal Attorney-General (NSW) v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 729. Whether leave to intervene should be granted depends on factors including whether the intervention will assist the court in deciding the case, whether it is in the parties’ interests to allow it, whether it will occupy time unnecessarily and add inappropriately to the cost of the proceedings: Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579; 71 ALJR 837; 146 ALR 248 at 603–604, 650–652 (CLR); National Australia Bank Ltd v Hokit Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 377 at 380–381; Carson v Legal Services Commissioner [2000] NSWCA 308 at [290]. Leave to intervene may be limited to particular issues and subject to such conditions. Counsel for the Attorney-General may appear as amicus curiae to present an argument upon government regulations. The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth may intervene in private proceedings where a party © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

319

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 6.27.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.28

[r 6.27.60]

has taken a course in the litigation which necessarily assumes the invalidity of Commonwealth legislation of high constitutional importance: Attorney-General (Cth) v T & G Mutual Life Society Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161; 52 ALJR 573; 19 ALR 385 at 581 (ALJR). The Attorney-General has a right to intervene in a case where the prerogatives or statutory powers of the Crown in relation to foreign powers are in issue. The Attorney-General intervening is not liable to pay nor entitled to receive costs: Attorney-General (Qld) v Holland (1912) 15 CLR 46; [1912] ALR 480. See also [r 7.3.40] regarding the restrictions on the Attorney-General’s right to make submissions after granting a fiat. [r 6.27.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.250]–[9.260]; KF O’Leary, “The Attorney-General and the role of amicus curiae” (1980) 54 ALJ 558. Related rules: r 6.24. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 8(1); DCR Pt 7 r 8(1); LCR Pt 6 r 8(1). 6.28

Date of commencement of proceedings in relation to parties joined

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 11(3) and (4); DCR Part 7, rule 11(3); LCR Part 6, rule 11(3))

If the court orders that a person be joined as a party, the date of commencement of the proceedings, in relation to that person, is taken to be the date on which the order is made or such later date as the court may specify in the order.

RULE 6.28 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.28.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.28.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.28.1000]

[r 6.28.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on former SCR Pt 8 r 11(3) and (4), DCR Pt 7 r 11(3) and LCR Pt 6 r 11(3). It simplifies the provisions of former Pt 8 r 11. The date of commencement of proceedings as regards the new party is now either the date of the joinder order, or a later date set by the court. In the District Court, where an amended originating process adding the party was filed, under DCR Pt 7 r 11(3) the date of commencement as regards the added party was the date of filing; under this rule, the date is either the date of the amendment order or a later date set by the court. [r 6.28.40]

Operation

Under this rule, the date of commencement of the proceedings in relation to the new party is the date on which the order is made or any later date specified by the court in the order. The same result follows where an order is made under CPA s 64(3) to allow an amendment to add a cause of action that has arisen after the commencement of the proceedings; the date of commencement of the new cause of action is the date on which the amendment is made subject toCPA s 65. CPA s 65 permits amendment notwithstanding the expiry of the relevant limitation period: see the discussion of the power to amend after expiry of a limitation period in [CPA 65.20]. UCPR r 6.28 relates the date of commencement of the proceedings in relation to the new party to the date of the order rather than the filing of an amended pleading, overcoming the problem considered in Fernance v Nominal Defendant (1989) 17 NSWLR 710. The position at common law, and under prior versions of the former SCR Pt 8 r 11(3), was that where a party was added pursuant to an order under former SCR Pt 8 r 8 or r 10, the date of commencement of the proceedings so far as concerns the added party was the date of filing of the originating process amended so as to add that party or, where no amended originating process was filed, the date of the amendment adding him as a party: Fernance v Nominal Defendant; Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1987] AC 189. The addition of a party under Pt 8 was an exception to the general rule that an amendment, under the former SCR Pt 20 (now see CPA s 64), takes effect from the date of the original document which it amends rather than the date on 320

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 6 – Removal of parties

[r 6.29.1000]

r 6.30

which the amendment is made, as to which see: Baldry v Jackson [1976] 2 NSWLR 415 at 419; McGee v Yeomans [1977] 1 NSWLR 273; Proctor v Jetway Aviation Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 166. A limitation defence must be specifically pleaded under r 14.14(3): see [r 14.14.140]. [r 6.28.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.230]. Related provisions: CPA s 64. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 11(3) and (4); DCR Pt 7 r 11(3); LCR Pt 6 r 11(3).

DIVISION 6 – REMOVAL OF PARTIES 6.29

Removal of parties by order

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 9; DCR Part 7, rule 9; LCR Part 6, rule 9)

The court may order that a person: (a) who has been improperly or unnecessarily joined, or (b) who has ceased to be a proper or necessary party, be removed as a party.

RULE 6.29 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.29.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.29.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.29.1000]

[r 6.29.20]

Comparison

The rule is based on former SCR Pt 8 r 9, DCR Pt 7 r 9 and LCR Pt 6 r 9 which were in identical terms. The court’s power to make orders of its own motion or on the application of a party is now found in CPA s 86(3). UCPR r 6.32 provides for the court making such orders as it thinks fit for the further conduct of proceedings: see [r 6.32.40]. These matters had been dealt with in the former SCR Pt 8 r 9, DCR Pt 7 r 9 and LCR Pt 6 r 9. The substantive effect of the former rules is unchanged. [r 6.29.40]

Operation

The rule is in effect the reverse of r 6.24 allowing the court to join necessary or proper parties. See [r 6.24.40] for a discussion of the basis on which the court will order the joinder of a party. A defendant’s name may be struck out as having been improperly joined, even if that leaves no defendant to the proceedings: Electronic Industries Imports Pty Ltd v Public Curator (Qld) [1960] VR 10. [r 6.29.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 9; DCR Pt 7 r 9; LCR Pt 6 r 9. 6.30

Effect of certain changes on proceedings

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 10; DCR Part 7, rule 10; LCR Part 6, rule 10)

(1) Proceedings do not abate as a result of a party’s death or bankruptcy if a cause of action in the proceedings survives. (2) If a cause of action survives, and the interest or liability of a party to any proceedings passes from © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

321

UCPR Parts 1-10

The purpose of the rule is to allow the court to remove parties who should not have been joined or who have ceased to be proper or necessary parties.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.30

[r 6.30.20]

the party to some other person, the court may make such orders as it thinks fit for the joinder, removal or re-arrangement of parties. (3) Without limiting subrule (2), if a party to an application under section 20 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 dies, the court may order the substitution of the legal representative, as mentioned in section 24(1) of that Act, as a party to the application. [Subr (3) insrt Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[4]] [R 6.30 am Rule 96 of 2006]

RULE 6.30 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.30.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.30.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.30.1000]

[r 6.30.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 8 r 10(1) and (2), DCR Pt 7 r 10(1) and (2) and LCR Pt 6 r 10(1) and (2). The wording of the former rules has been simplified. Subrule (3) of the local rules in each case has not been reproduced. The court’s power to make orders of its own motion or on the application of a party or any other person entitled to make such an application is now found in CPA s 86(3). [r 6.30.40]

Operation

Proceedings continue despite the death or bankruptcy of a party, provided at least one of the causes of action in the proceedings survives. That is a matter of substantive law. The rule and its predecessors, together with the statutory provisions regarding which causes of action survive death, abolished the former doctrine of abatement. Under that doctrine, an action “abated” (was suspended or terminated) for want of proper parties on a change in interest of a party, such as by marriage, death or bankruptcy. Most causes of action subsisting or vested in a party who dies survive against, or for the benefit of, the estate, save for purely personal rights: see Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 s 2 which sets the exceptions and limitations. Although there is no definition of “cause of action” for r 6.30 or in s 2, as the section is beneficial legislation, “cause of action” should be given wide construction: RL v NSW Trustee and Guardian (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 78 at [5] per Campbell JA. The rule allows the proceedings to be reconstituted in respect of the surviving causes of action. However, under r 6.31, if no order is made for the reconstitution of the proceedings within three months of the death, other parties may move for dismissal of the proceedings in relation to the deceased party: see [r 6.31.40]. Where a party dies after the verdict or finding on the issues of fact in the proceedings, the court may direct entry of judgment notwithstanding the death under r 29.12. On the bankruptcy of a natural person (or insolvency of a corporate party), proceedings are generally stayed subject to the orders of an appropriate court. A bankrupt’s property, which includes a chose in action, generally vests in the bankrupt’s trustee. The trustee may elect to prosecute or discontinue the action. The bankrupt may continue an action in respect of injury or death as set out in Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 60. After acquired property and “income” within the description in Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 131 may be dealt with by the bankrupt. If the bankrupt is the only defendant, the plaintiff cannot continue the action unless the court gives leave: Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 58, although the plaintiff may, if otherwise entitled, prove in the bankruptcy. Proceedings may continue in relation to a cause of action that is assigned. The assignee may be added or joined as a party to the proceedings: see the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.280]. The rule authorises the taking of steps up to the time a cause of action merges in a judgment. The name of an assignee of the debt cannot be substituted for a judgment creditor under this rule: May v Perpetual Trustees Queensland [2000] NSWCA 354. 322

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 6 – Removal of parties

[r 6.31.1000] [r 6.30.1000]

r 6.31

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.280] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 173–174 and the definition of “abatement of action” in Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, Bird R (ed) (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1983) pp 1–2. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 10; DCR Pt 7 r 10; LCR Pt 6 r 10. 6.31

Court may dismiss proceedings not prosecuted following death of party

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 12; DCR Part 7, rule 12; LCR Part 6, rule 12)

(1) This rule applies to any proceedings in which: (a) a party dies, but a cause of action in the proceedings survives his or her death, and (b) an order for the joinder of a party to replace the deceased party is not made within 3 months after the death. (2) The court may order that, unless an application to join a party to replace the deceased party is made within a specified time, the proceedings in relation to the cause of action concerned be dismissed. (3) An application for such an order may be made by any person to whom the deceased party’s liability in relation to the cause of action concerned has passed (whether or not a party to the proceedings). (4) On making an order under this rule, the court may give such directions as it thinks fit for service of the order on any person (whether or not a party to the proceedings) who is interested in continuing the proceedings.

RULE 6.31 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.31.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.31.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.31.1000]

[r 6.31.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance SCR Pt 8 r 12 and DCR Pt 7 r 12. Operation

The purpose of the rule is to ensure that steps are taken reasonably promptly for replacement of the deceased party, failing which the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed. Ordinarily an order for dismissal does not, subject to the terms on which the order was made, prevent the plaintiff from bringing fresh proceedings or claiming the same relief in fresh proceedings: see CPA s 91, [r 13.4.240]. The court’s discretion under the rule generally should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. UCPR r 7.10 provides for the making of orders in relation to proceedings where a deceased person’s estate is not represented in proceedings or the executors or administrators of the estate have an interest in the proceedings adverse to the interests of the estate: see [r 7.10.40]. [r 6.31.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 12; DCR Pt 7 r 12; LCR Pt 6 r 12.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

323

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 6.31.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.32

[r 6.32.20]

DIVISION 7 – ORDERS AS TO FUTURE CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS 6.32

Orders as to the future conduct of proceedings

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 11; DCR Part 7, rule 11; LCR Part 6, rule 11)

(1) If in any proceedings the court makes an order under Division 5 or 6, it may also make such orders as it thinks fit for the future conduct of the proceedings, including orders with respect to the following: (a) the service of the order, and other documents, (b) the amendment of documents, (c) the entering of an appearance, or the filing of a defence, by persons who are joined as defendants, (d) the substitution of one party for another party or former party. (2) If the court orders the substitution of one party for another party or former party, all things previously done in the proceedings have the same effect in relation to the new party as they had in relation to the old, subject to any other order by the court. Note: See rule 6.28 as to when proceedings are taken to have commenced in relation to a new party.

RULE 6.32 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.32.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.32.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.32.1000]

[r 6.32.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance SCR Pt 8 r 11(1) and (2) and DCR Pt 7 r 11(1) and (2). [r 6.32.40]

Operation

The purpose of the rule is to allow the court to make appropriate orders of the further conduct of proceedings where orders are made under UCPR Pt 6 Div 5: rr 6.18 to 6.28 or Div 6: rr 6.29 to 6.31. The court’s discretion under the rule should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. The addition of parties generally is discussed in [r 6.24.40]; see the discussion in [r 6.28.40] regarding the date of commencement of proceedings in relation to a party who is added to existing proceedings. Where a party is substituted for another rather than added as a party, the person is placed in the exact position of the party replaced: Chorlton v Dickie (1879) 13 Ch D 160. [r 6.32.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 11(1) and (2) and DCR Pt 7 r 11(1) and (2).

324

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 8 – Referred questions of law and stated cases

[r 6.34.40]

r 6.34

DIVISION 8 – REFERRED QUESTIONS OF LAW AND STATED CASES [Div 8 insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

6.33

Definitions

(1) In this Division: original proceedings, in relation to a referred question of law or stated case, means the proceedings (if any) in which the question or case has arisen. referred matter means a question of law or stated case that has been referred to the Supreme Court for determination. referring body means the court or other authority by which a question of law or stated case is referred to the Supreme Court for determination. (2) A reference in this Division to the Supreme Court includes a reference to the Court of Appeal where the proceedings concerned are assigned to or in the Court of Appeal. [Subr (2) insrt Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]] [R 6.33 am Rule 338 of 2008; insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

6.34

Application of Division

This Division applies to proceedings in the Supreme Court for an order with respect to a referred matter under a legislative provision, including (but not limited to) the following provisions: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997, section 79A, 118 or 118D, Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930, section 28, Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001, section 66, Powers of Attorney Act 2003, section 39, Real Property Act 1900, section 123 or 124, Note: This Division also applies by force of rules 12.1A and 15.1 of the Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999 to questions referred to the Supreme Court under the following Commonwealth legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, section 61, Corporations Act 2001, section 659A. [R 6.34 am Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[7]; subst Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[5]; insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

RULE 6.34 COMMENTARY

[r 6.34.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. [r 6.34.40]

Operation

This Division applies in the Supreme Court, where a question of law or case to be stated arises under statutory provisions including those set out in r 6.34: • Section 79A of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (questions of law arising in proceedings in the Tribunal for an original decision or the review of a reviewable decision, with the consent of the President of the Tribunal); • Section 118 or s 118D of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (questions of law arising in appeals to the Appeal Panel); • Section 28 of the Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930 (disputes regarding referenda); • Section 39 of the Powers of Attorney Act 2003 (referral of a question of law by the Guardianship Tribunal arising in an application before the Tribunal under Pt 5 of the Powers of Attorney Act 2003 to review of a power of attorney); © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

325

UCPR Parts 1-10

Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.34.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.34.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.35

[r 6.34.40] • Section 123 or s 124 of the Real Property Act 1900 (objection regarding bringing land under the Act or possessory application); • Section 61 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (question of law arising at a hearing before ASIC); or • Section 659A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (referral of a question of law by the Takeovers Panel arising in proceeding before the Panel).

Such a question may arise in proceedings in another tribunal. That tribunal, referred to in the Division as the referring body, may refer a question of law or state a case to the Supreme Court. The procedure to be followed is found in rr 6.35, 6.37 and 6.38. Specific provision is made in relation to disputes regarding referenda: see [r 6.41.60]. Provision is made for stating a case in other legislation, such as Criminal Appeal Act 1912, ss 5B and 5BA providing for a question of law arising in an appeal to be submitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal by the District Court and Land and Environment Court respectively. 6.35

Originating process

(1) [Repealed] [Subr (1) rep Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[6]]

(2) The originating process: (a) in the case of proceedings to which the Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999 apply, must be in the form of the originating process prescribed by rule 2.2 of those rules, and (b) in any other case, must be in the form of a summons. (3) The referred matter: (a) must be in the form of a special case, and (b) must be filed with the originating process. (4) The originating process must join as defendants (or as respondents where the proceedings are in the Court of Appeal): (a) if the referred matter has arisen in original proceedings, all of the parties to the original proceedings, or (b) in any other case, all of the persons who may be directly affected by the Supreme Court’s determination of the referred matter. [Subr (4) am Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[7]]

(5) In the case of proceedings under section 123 of the Real Property Act 1900, the originating process must also join the Registrar-General as a defendant. (6) The Supreme Court may order that such other persons as it considers appropriate be joined as defendants (or as respondents where the proceedings are in the Court of Appeal). [Subr (6) am Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[7]] [R 6.35 am Rule 338 of 2008; insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

RULE 6.35 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. Operation .................................................................................................................................................. Jurisdiction ................................................................................................................................................ Parties .......................................................................................................................................................

[r [r [r [r

6.35.20] 6.35.40] 6.35.60] 6.35.80]

References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.35.1000]

[r 6.35.20]

Comparison

This rule adapts to the UCPR the effect of SCR Pt 32 r 2. That rule required proceedings on a “stated case” to be commenced by summons claiming the decision or determination of the questions and matters stated for decision or determination in the stated case, which was to be filed and served with summons. 326

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 8 – Referred questions of law and stated cases

[r 6.36.40] [r 6.35.40]

r 6.36

Operation

This rule uses the terminology “special case”, the form of which is prescribed by r 6.36. There was no specific provision for joinder of parties in the former SCR Pt 32. As to the commencement of proceedings, see [r 6.2.40]. [r 6.35.60]

Jurisdiction

Proceedings would ordinarily be heard by a judge in a Division, unless, pursuant to SCA s 48, the proceedings are assigned to the Court of Appeal. Section 48(2) assigns to the Court of Appeal proceedings where the tribunal below was constituted by, in general terms, a judge. The full terms of the definition of specified tribunal should be noted, in s 48(1)(a): compare Administrative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel v Director-General, Department of Commerce [2008] NSWCA 140 at [84]–[85]. [r 6.35.80]

Parties

Until its amendment in August 2008, r 6.35(1) had required that (save in respect of proceedings under Real Property Act 1900 s 123), the referring body named as plaintiff. The anomalous nature of this rule was noted by the Court of Appeal in Administrative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel v Director-General, Department of Commerce [2008] NSWCA 140 at [14]–[16] and [90]. Ordinarily, a tribunal would not be joined as a party to, and would not participate in, proceedings by way of stated case or appeal from the tribunal: R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13; 54 ALJR 314 at 35–36 (CLR). [r 6.35.1000]

References

Definition of “originating process” – CPA s 3 and UCPR Dictionary. Related rules: Pt 4, regarding the form of documents, [r 6.23.40] and [r 6.24.40] regarding joinder of parties generally. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 32 r 2. 6.36

Form of special case

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 50, rule 1)

A special case: (a) must be divided into consecutively numbered paragraphs, and (b) must state concisely the questions to be decided and the facts from which those questions arise, and (c) must annex all documents necessary to enable the Supreme Court to decide those questions.

RULE 6.36 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.36.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.36.40] Content of the special case ...................................................................................................................... [r 6.36.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.36.1000]

[r 6.36.20]

Comparison

Although this rule is compared with FCR O 50 r 1, as to paragraphs (a) and (b) it is to the same effect as former SCR Pt 32 r 4. As to paragraph (c), SCR Pt 32 r 5 provided that the court and parties may refer to the whole contents of the documents in the stated case. [r 6.36.40]

Operation

Under this rule, the special case must state the questions to be decided identifying any specific questions of law for determination by the court. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

327

UCPR Parts 1-10

[R 6.36 insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.37

[r 6.36.40]

The rule requires all necessary documents to be annexed to the special case. It may be contrasted with High Court r 27.08.4, which provides that upon the argument of a special case stated pursuant to r 27.08.1, the parties may refer to the content of documents identified in the special case. [r 6.36.60]

Content of the special case

The special case should, in consecutively numbered paragraphs, set out clearly all the facts from which the questions to be decided arise. Where the referring body is another court or tribunal, the special case must set out clearly the facts found by the tribunal below and not merely restate the evidence before that tribunal: Melwood Units Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads [1979] AC 426; (1978) 52 ALJR 593 at 595E; Glover v MacDougall [1976] 2 NSWLR 359 at 361; Dennis v Watt (1942) 59 WN (NSW) 204. It was customary to annex the reasons for judgment in the tribunal below to a stated case, but they may not be regarded as a statement of facts or as a statement of the evidence: Brisbane City Council v Valuer-General (Qld) (1978) 140 CLR 41; 52 ALJR 768; 21 ALR 607 at 58 (CLR); 621 (ALR). [r 6.36.1000]

References

See Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [16.90]–[16.100]. Related rules: Pt 4, regarding the form of documents. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 32 r 4. 6.37

Procedure for preparing special case

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 50, rule 2)

(1) In the case of a referred matter that has arisen in original proceedings, a special case: (a) must be prepared in draft by the party having the conduct of the original proceedings in consultation with the other parties to those proceedings, and (b) must be settled by the referring body, unless the referring body otherwise directs. (2) In the case of a referred matter that has arisen otherwise than in original proceedings, a special case must be prepared: (a) in the case of proceedings under section 123 of the Real Property Act 1900, by the applicant referred to in that section, or (b) in any other case, by the referring body. [R 6.37 insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

RULE 6.37 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.37.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.37.40]

[r 6.37.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. It is based on FCR O 50 r 2(a)–(b). [r 6.37.40]

Operation

This rule makes clear which of the parties is to draft the special case, and the involvement of the relevant referring body in settling the special case.

328

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.39.20]

6.38

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 8 – Referred questions of law and stated cases

r 6.39

Conduct of proceedings

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 50, rule 4)

(1) This rule applies to any proceedings with respect to a referred matter that has arisen in original proceedings. (2) Subject to rule 7.8, the party at whose instance the matter has been referred is to have the conduct of the proceedings. [R 6.38 insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

RULE 6.38 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.38.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.38.40]

[r 6.38.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. It is based on FCR O 50 r 4(a). [r 6.38.40]

Operation

This rule makes clear which of the parties will have the conduct of the proceedings. Rule 7.8 provides that the court may give the conduct of the whole or any part of proceedings to such person as it thinks fit: see [r 7.8.40]. 6.39 Insufficient case (cf SCR Part 32, rule 7)

(2) In these circumstances, the Supreme Court: (a) may add to or otherwise alter the special case, or (b) may send the special case back to the referring body for the purpose of addition or other alteration. (c) [Repealed] [Subr (2) am Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[8] and [9]] [R 6.39 am Rule 338 of 2008; insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

RULE 6.39 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.39.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.39.40] Appeal from determination of a special case ........................................................................................... [r 6.39.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.39.1000]

[r 6.39.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 32 r 7, save that SCR Pt 32 r 7(1)(a) required the consent of the parties to additions or alterations to the stated case. There is no such limitation in r 6.39(2)(a). © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

329

UCPR Parts 1-10

(1) This rule applies to any proceedings in which it appears to the Supreme Court that a special case: (a) does not sufficiently state the questions to be decided or the facts from which those questions arise, or (b) does not annex sufficient documents, to enable it to determine the proceedings.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.40

[r 6.39.0]

[r 6.39.40]

Operation

As originally enacted, this rule, and in particular r 6.39(2)(c), provided a statutory basis for the Supreme Court to receive evidence and itself making findings of fact in addition to the facts set out in the stated case. Without such a rule, the Supreme Court would not be entitled to determine questions of fact: R v Rigby (1956) 100 CLR 146; [1957] St R Qd 266 at 150–151; White v Ridley (1977) 140 CLR 342; 27 ALR 661 at 362 (CLR) at 678; Brisbane City Council v Valuer-General (Qld) (1978) 140 CLR 41; 52 ALJR 768; 21 ALR 607 at 58; Johanson v Dixon (1979) 143 CLR 376; 25 ALR 65 at 382, 395 (CLR). Compare, eg, Criminal Appeal Act 1912, s 5B discussed in Sasterawan v Morris (2007) 69 NSWLR 547; 174 A Crim R 514; [2007] NSWCCA 185 (Basten JA, Grove and Hidden JJ) BC 200705318 at [10] applying R v Rigby (1956) 100 CLR 146; [1957] St R Qd 266 at 150–151 and Brisbane City Council v Valuer-General (Qld) (1978) 140 CLR 41; 52 ALJR 768; 21 ALR 607 at 58. The repeal of r 6.39(2)(c) removed the ability for the court to receive evidence and make findings of fact. The limits of the jurisdiction conferred on the court by the statutory provision pursuant to which a referral is made must always be borne in mind. Jurisdiction to hear and determine “any question of law referred to [the Supreme Court] under this section” does not permit the court to determine questions of fact or draw factual inferences: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel v Director-General, Department of Commerce [2008] NSWCA 140 at [88]–[89]. [r 6.39.60]

Appeal from determination of a special case

An appeal to the Court of Appeal against the determination by the court of a special case does not generally require leave: SCA s 101(1)(b). Of the statutes providing for referral, set out in r 6.34, specific provision regarding appeals is made only in the Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930: see [r 6.41.60]. [r 6.39.1000]

References

See Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [16.90]–[16.100]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 37 r 2. 6.40

Inferences

(cf FCR Ord 50, rule 1(3))

The Supreme Court may draw from the facts stated in, and the documents annexed to, a special case any inference, whether of fact or law, that might have been drawn from them if proved at a trial. [R 6.40 insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

RULE 6.40 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.40.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.40.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.40.1000]

[r 6.40.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on, but more extensive than, SCR Pt 37 r 6. It reflects, as noted, FCR O 50 r 1(3). [r 6.40.40]

Operation

This rule permits the court to draw inferences of both fact and law from the facts stated in, and any documents annexed to a special case, as though the court were conducting a trial. As with r 6.39, absent such a rule, the court could not draw inferences of fact. See the cases referred to in [r 6.39.40].

330

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 8 – Referred questions of law and stated cases

[r 6.41.60] [r 6.40.1000]

r 6.41

References

See Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [16.90]–[16.100]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 34 r 6. 6.41 Referred matters under section 28 of the Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930 (1) This rule applies to any question that is referred to the Supreme Court under section 28 of the Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930. (2) Proceedings on the question are commenced by transmission to the Prothonotary of a statement of the question, as provided for in section 29 of the Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930. (3) On receiving the statement, the Prothonotary must list the matter before a Judge of the Supreme Court for directions. (4) The Supreme Court may give all such directions as are necessary for the conduct and disposal of the proceedings on the question. (5) Rules 6.35–6.40 do not apply to the proceedings on the question. [R 6.41 insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[2]]

RULE 6.41 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 6.41.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.41.40] Procedure on reference under Div 6 Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act ..................... [r 6.41.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.41.1000]

[r 6.41.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. [r 6.41.40]

Operation

Such questions are referred by resolution of the Legislative Council or Legislative Assembly, and under s 29 transmitted to the Prothonotary by the President of the Legislative Council or Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. [r 6.41.60]

Procedure on reference under Div 6 Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act

By s 30 of the Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930, the powers of the Supreme Court on a reference under Div 6 are those conferred on the Court of Disputed Returns by the Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912. Section 31 of the Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930 entitles the Electoral Commissioner to be heard upon the hearing of the reference. The Supreme Court may also allow any other person to be represented and heard. In default of rules of court, the procedure in relation to a reference under Div 6 may be prescribed by a judge of the court: s 32 of that Act. Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912, s 161 sets out the powers of the Court of Disputed Returns. Under s 169 of the Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912, no appeal lies from any decisions of the Court of Disputed Returns to the Court of Appeal. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

331

UCPR Parts 1-10

The effect of this rule is to exclude questions referred to the Supreme Court under Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930, s 28 (Div 6, Disputed Returns) from the provisions of rr 6.35 to 6.40.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.41 [r 6.41.1000]

[r 6.41.0] References

Related legislation: Constitution Further Amendment (Referendum) Act 1930; Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912.

DIVISION 9 – ISSUES ARISING UNDER FOREIGN LAW [Div 9 insrt Rule 280 of 2010, Sch 1]

DIVISION 9 COMMENTARY General comments on Division 9 ....................................................................................................... [r Pt6.Div9.20] References ..................................................................................................................................... [r Pt6.Div9.1000]

[r Pt6.Div9.20]

General comments on Division 9

This Division applies only in the Supreme Court. It assists proof of foreign law in proceedings in the Supreme Court. Foreign (overseas) law is a fact and may be presumed to be the same as local law: see [r 6.43.60]; [r 14.10.40]. While the expression “question of foreign law” used in r 6.44(2) is not defined, it refers at least to the content of any applicable principle of law and its application in the circumstances: Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64 at [20] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P, Meagher JA). A Memorandum of Understanding between the Singapore and New South Wales Supreme Courts to work closely and expeditiously on issues arising under foreign law, to assist in determining complex cross border commercial and family disputes, was announced on 23 June 2010. These new rules support the Memorandum of Understanding. The Memorandum of Understanding recorded that the Supreme Court of Singapore was the first to refer a question of foreign law to a foreign court: Westacre Investments Inc v The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR (also known as Jugoimport-SDPR) [2009] 2 SLR (R) 166. The Commercial Court in London answered the question of English law: Westacre Investments Inc v Yugoimport SDPR [2008] EWHC 801 (Comm). A further Memorandum of Understanding (New York MOU) between the Chief Justice of New South Wales and the Chief Judge of the State of New York, to consult and co-operate on questions of law was announced on 28 October 2010. It acknowledged the procedure for referrals between the Supreme Court of Singapore and the Supreme Court of New South Wales. By an order dated 21 December 2010, Chief Judge Lippman of the State of New York established a protocol for the implementation of the New York MOU. The New York MOU and the Protocol are discussed extensively in Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64 (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P, Meagher JA), on appeal from Marshall v Fleming [2013] NSWSC 566 (Harrison J). The Memoranda of Understanding contemplate the institution of proceedings for an answer to the relevant question of foreign law in the jurisdiction whose governing law is that “foreign law”. Rule 6.43 requires notices regarding parties’ contentions as to applicable principles of foreign law to be filed and served within time limits commencing on the filing of pleadings: [r 6.43.40]. Under r 6.44 the Supreme Court may order that a question as to the principles of foreign law or as to their application be answered in proceedings to be commenced in a foreign court (with the consent of all parties), or by a referee appointed under Pt 20 Div 3: [r 6.44.40]. Under r 6.45 the Supreme Court may also determine an issue of Australian law relevant to an issue in proceedings in a foreign court, by answering a question ordered by the foreign court: [r 6.45.40]. These options may avoid the difficulties of foreign law being “lost in translation”, or decided differently by a local court than the foreign court would. There is also a Memorandum of Guidance between the Dubai International Finance Centre Courts and the Supreme Court of New South Wales (9 September 2013), setting out the parties’ understanding of the procedures for the enforcement of each party’s money judgments in the other’s courts, and Memoranda of Understanding on judicial exchange between each of the High People’s Court of Guangdong Province; the High People’s Court of Hubei Province and the High People’s Court of Shanghai, the People’s Republic of China and the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 332

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 9 – Issues arising under foreign law

[r Pt6.Div9.1000] [r Pt6.Div9.1000]

r 6.43

References

Memorandum of Understanding between the Supreme Court of Singapore and the Supreme Court of New South Wales on references of questions of law (available on the Supreme Court web site: http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/WebAnnounce listed at date: 14 September 2010.) Memorandum of Understanding between the Chief Justice of New South Wales and the Chief Judge of the State Of New York on references of questions of law (available on the Supreme Court web site: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/WebAnnounce listed at date: 20 December 2010.) Spigelman CJ “MOU between New York and New South Wales” address delivered 28 October 2010, “Law and International Commerce: Between the Parochial and the Cosmopolitan” address delivered 22 June 2010 and “Freezing Orders In International Commercial Litigation” Singapore Academy of Law Distinguished Speaker Series Inaugural Lecture delivered 6 May 2010 (all available on the Supreme Court web site: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_speeches#CJ.) J J Spigelman “Proof of Foreign Law by Reference to the Foreign Court” (2011) 127 Law Quarterly Review 208. SCA s 125 authorising the making of rules under the SCA or CPA regarding (a) referral of a question as to the principles of foreign law, or their application to a foreign court, and (b) provision to a foreign court of information, advice or assistance on a question as to the principles of Australian law or their application. Memorandum of Guidance between the Dubai International Finance Centre Courts and the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia – 2013 (available on the Supreme Court web site: http:// www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_internationaljudicialcooperation.html Memorandum of Understanding between the High People’s Court of Guangdong Province, The People’s Republic of China and the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia on judicial exchange – 2011 (available on the Supreme Court web site: http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_ internationaljudicialcooperation.html ) Memorandum of Understanding between the High People’s Court of Hubei Province, the People’s Republic of China and the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia on judicial exchange – 2011 (available on the Supreme Court web site: http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_ internationaljudicialcooperation.html ) Memorandum of Understanding between the High People’s Court of Shanghai, the People’s Republic of China and the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia on judicial exchange – 2011 (available on the Supreme Court web site: http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_ internationaljudicialcooperation.html ) 6.42

Definitions UCPR Parts 1-10

In this Division: foreign court means a court of a country other than Australia. foreign law means the law of a country other than Australia. [R 6.42 insrt Rule 280 of 2010, Sch 1]

6.43

Filing of notices

(1) A party who contends that an issue in proceedings in the Supreme Court is governed by foreign law must file and serve on the other parties affected by the issue a notice (a foreign law notice) setting out the relevant principles of foreign law and their application to the issue. (2) The foreign law notice must be filed and served by the party contending that an issue is governed by foreign law not more than 6 weeks after the filing by that party of a summons, statement of claim, statement of cross-claim or defence in respect of the proceedings. (3) A party on whom a foreign law notice is served who disputes the principles of foreign law or their application must file and serve on the other parties affected by the issue a notice setting out the matter or matters in dispute (a notice of dispute as to foreign law). © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

333

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.43

[r 6.43.40]

(4) The notice of dispute as to foreign law must be filed and served not more than 8 weeks after the date of service of the foreign law notice. [R 6.43 insrt Rule 280 of 2010, Sch 1]

RULE 6.43 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.43.40] Need for proof of foreign law ................................................................................................................... [r 6.43.60] Presumption that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum ................................................... [r 6.43.80] Effect on forum issues of the potential application of foreign law ......................................................... [r 6.43.100] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.43.1000]

[r 6.43.40]

Operation

This rule prescribes time limits for the filing and service of notices regarding the foreign law principles for which a party will contend. The obligation to file a notice arises when the party who contends that an issue in the local proceedings is governed by foreign law files a pleading. Subrule (2) requires the foreign law notice, setting out that party’s contentions as to relevant principles of foreign law and their application to be filed and served not more than six weeks after the filing of the party’s pleading. The opposite party then has eight weeks after being served to file (and serve) a notice of dispute as to foreign law, which identifies any disputed matters. In Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64 at [34] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P, Meagher JA) the court suggested that to demonstrate whether there was any dispute as to the principles of foreign law and the extent of any factual dispute, the foreign law notice should identify the cause of action under foreign law on which the first party relied, the elements of that cause of action and the facts said to make out those elements, and the notice of dispute as to foreign law should indicate whether the opposite party disputed the existence of the cause of action, its elements as articulated by the first party and what facts the opposite party disputed. The procedure and time limits are analogous to written submissions in appeal proceedings (rr 51.12, 51.13 as to applications for leave to appeal; r 51.36 in relation to appeals and r 51.45 in relation to proceedings in the Court of Appeal other than appeals). [r 6.43.60]

Need for proof of foreign law

Foreign law is a question of fact (about which Australian courts are not presumed to have any knowledge), to be proved by expert evidence: Neilson v Overseas Projects Corp of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331; 79 ALJR 1736; [2005] HCA 54 at [115] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64 at [20] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P, Meagher JA). Evidence is receivable as to the existence, the nature and the scope of any rules and principles of the law of a foreign jurisdiction are treated as an issue of fact. The effect of the application of those rules and principles to the particular facts and circumstances of a case is a question of law for the court of the forum, upon which evidence is not receivable: Neilson v Overseas Projects Corp of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331; 79 ALJR 1736; [2005] HCA 54 at [120] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79, National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1989) 22 FCR 209 at 226 (Gummow J); United States Surgical Corp v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 766. A party asserting that foreign law is applicable and is different from the law of the forum bears the onus of pleading and proving those matters; unless that party pleads and proves both the applicability and the content of the relevant part of foreign law the presumption that the foreign law to be applied is the same as the law of the forum would be applied: Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd (2010) 243 FLR 177; [2010] NSWCA 222 at [323] per Lindgren AJA with whom Basten and Young JJA agreed; referring to Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491; 76 ALJR 551; 187 ALR 1; 35 MVR 1; [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-646; [2002] AIPC 91-786; 23 NSWCCR 207; [2002] HCA 10 at [70]–[71] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; Dyno Wesfarmers Ltd v Knuckey [2003] NSWCA 375 per Young CJ in Eq at [49]–[56]; and Neilson v Overseas Projects Corp of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331; 79 ALJR 1736; [2005] HCA 54 at [125] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; at [267] per Heydon J. 334

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 6.43.1000]

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 9 – Issues arising under foreign law

r 6.43

This is an application of the pleading principles requiring matters that might otherwise take the opponent by surprise, or where a forensic advantage is sought, to be pleaded: Dyno Wesfarmers Ltd v Knuckey [2003] NSWCA 375 per Young CJ in Eq at [55]; BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt [1980] 1 NSWLR 496; (1980) 47 FLR 317 at [26]; [r 14.10.40]. [r 6.43.80]

Presumption that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum

In Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492; [2001] NSWCA 87 Heydon JA (with whom Spigelman CJ and Sheller JA agreed) considered the common assumption that if foreign law is not proved as a fact, a court has no alternative but to apply Australian law: [118]–[147]. Heydon JA concluded that it is difficult “to state exhaustively when a court will not assume that the unproved provisions of foreign law are identical with those of the lex fori”: at [162]. If parties fail to prove relevant foreign law, assuming that the lex fori will apply, the court may be reluctant to proceed on that assumption where there is reason to question the correctness of the facts (foreign law) admitted or agreed: at [160]. (See also BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt [1980] 1 NSWLR 496; (1980) 47 FLR 317 at [24]–[25].) In the absence of circumstances such as those considered in Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492; [2001] NSWCA 87, an Australian court would act on the basis that foreign law was the same as Australian law: Murakami v Wiryadi (2010) 268 ALR 377; [2010] NSWCA 7 at [78] per Spigelman CJ (with whom McColl and Young JJA agreed), Neilson v Overseas Projects Corp of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331; 79 ALJR 1736; [2005] HCA 54. [r 6.43.100]

Effect on forum issues of the potential application of foreign law

On an application for a stay of proceedings in New South Wales on the basis that Australia is a “clearly inappropriate forum”, the test in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; 65 ALJR 83; 97 ALR 124 requires consideration of the substantive law to be applied. The fact that a court would apply foreign law, or base its own analysis to a substantial degree on foreign law, is a significant factor to be taken into account: Murakami v Wiryadi (2010) 268 ALR 377; [2010] NSWCA 7 at [63], [150] per Spigelman CJ (with whom McColl and Young JJA agreed). The need to prove foreign law is itself a source of prejudice, carrying the risk that important aspects of the foreign law will be lost in translation: Murakami at [150], referring to James Hardie Industries Pty Ltd v Grigor (1998) 45 NSWLR 20; 16 NSWCCR 434 at 37, 42; Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2006] SGCA 39; [2007] 3 LRC 223 at [42].

[r 6.43.1000]

References

Spigelman CJ “Law and International Commerce: Between the Parochial and the Cosmopolitan” address delivered 22 June 2010 (available on the Supreme Court web site: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/ Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_speeches#CJ). Davies M, Bell AS, Brereton P Le G (eds.) Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia. (8th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) Chapter 17. Gray A “Choice of Law: The Presumption in the Proof of Foreign Law” (2008) 31 UNSWLJ 136. Odgers S Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) [1.4.4220] regarding Evidence Act 1995 ss 174 to 176.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

335

UCPR Parts 1-10

The identification of foreign law as the lex causae is not sufficient reason for an Australian Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction: Murakami at [151], referring to Puttick v Tenon Ltd (2008) 238 CLR 265; 83 ALJR 93; [2008] HCA 54 at [31]; Fleming v Marshall (2011) 279 ALR 737; [2011] NSWCA 86 at [10]–[11] per Spigelman CJ, [91] per Macfarlan JA and [101] per Sackville AJA. Difficulties in establishing facts in proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction may point to New South Wales as being a convenient forum for the identification of facts relating to events occurring here: Murakami at [161].

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 6.44

6.44

[r 6.44.40]

Orders

(1) The Supreme Court may, on the application of one or more of the parties and with the consent of all of the parties, order that proceedings be commenced in a foreign court in order to answer a question as to the principles of foreign law or as to their application. (2) The Supreme Court may, on the application of one or more of the parties or of its own motion, order that the question of foreign law be answered by a referee appointed in accordance with Division 3 of Part 20. (3) An (a) (b) (c)

order under subrule (1) must: state the question of foreign law to be answered, and state the facts or assumptions upon which the answer to the question is to be determined, and contain a statement to the effect that the foreign court may vary the facts or assumptions and the question to be answered, and (d) state whether and to what extent the parties may depart from the facts or assumptions in the determination of the question by the foreign court.

(4) The Supreme Court may give directions for the preparation of a statement as to the nature of the issue out of which the question arises for inclusion with the question to be answered by the foreign court or the referee. [R 6.44 insrt Rule 280 of 2010, Sch 1]

RULE 6.44 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.44.40] Application under this rule ........................................................................................................................ [r 6.44.60] Appeal ....................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.44.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.44.1000]

[r 6.44.40]

Operation

Under this rule, the Supreme Court may make orders with a view to a question of foreign law being answered either by a foreign court, with the consent of all parties, or by a referee appointed in accordance with Pt 20 Div 3. The New York Memorandum of Understanding (see [r Pt6.Div9.20]) does not contain provisions engaged on the making of an order under r 20.14 or otherwise, so as to require that a member of the New York Panel of Referees referred to in a subsequent Protocol (see [r Pt6.Div9.20]) be appointed (and accept appointment) as a referee for inquiry and report on any particular question of foreign law. If a referee is appointed the order must identify the referee and the question of foreign law to be determined by the referee: Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64 at [24]–[29], [31] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P, Meagher JA) The requirements for an order under r 6.44(1) providing for the commencement of proceedings in a foreign court are set out in subr (3), supplemented by subr (4) providing for directions for preparation of a statement as to the nature of the issue in the local proceedings out of which the question as to foreign law arises. For questions of foreign law to be answered by proceedings in a foreign court under, eg the New York Memorandum of Understanding and Protocol, the parties must co-operate in identifying the questions of law arising on particular facts and assumptions and agree to be bound by the result: Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64 at [26] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P, Meagher JA). [r 6.44.60] Application under this rule An application for an order under this rule should be made by motion in the proceedings setting out the orders sought, as to either commencement of proceedings in the foreign court or reference out. See UCPR Pt 18 regarding motions generally. The court’s discretion under the rule should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, 336

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 6 – Commencing proceedings and appearance Division 9 – Issues arising under foreign law

[r 6.45.1000]

r 6.45

having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. The court has the power to dispense with the filing and a service of a motion seeking such orders, in the course of giving directions generally or otherwise managing the proceedings (CPA s 61, UCPR r 2.1). [r 6.44.80]

Appeal

Supreme Court Act 1970 s 101(2)(e) provides for an appeal by leave against an interlocutory judgment or order in proceedings. An application for leave to appeal is made by summons r 51.10. [r 6.44.1000]

References

[r 20.14.60] re orders of referral. [r 28.2.140] regarding appeals from a determination of a separate question under r 28.2. 6.45

Determination of issues arising in foreign court proceedings

Proceedings for determination of an issue of Australian law, being an issue with respect to which the Supreme Court may exercise its jurisdiction and which is relevant to an issue in proceedings in a foreign court, may be commenced by summons seeking a declaration of the answer to a question in the form determined by the foreign court. [R 6.45 insrt Rule 280 of 2010, Sch 1]

RULE 6.45 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 6.45.40] Appeal ....................................................................................................................................................... [r 6.45.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 6.45.1000]

[r 6.45.40]

Operation

This rule authorises commencement of proceedings in the Supreme Court by summons to determine an issue of Australian law which is relevant to an issue in proceedings in a foreign court. It broadly corresponds with the Supreme Court’s power to order the commencement of proceedings in a foreign court to answer a question as to the principles of foreign law under r 6.44(1): see [r 6.44.40]. The court’s general jurisdiction to make declarations whether or not consequential relief is or could be claimed is found in SCA s 75: see [SCA 75.20] as to the scope of SCA s 75, and [SCA 75.60] regarding procedure. Appeal

A declaration made on such a summons is a final judgment or order in respect of which an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal. Leave to appeal may be required under SCA s 101(2)(r) unless the threshold of $100,000 value is met: see [SCA 101.100] and [SCA 101.140]. [r 6.45.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns, BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co, 2014) [1.30] and in Lindsay, GC Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 74–75.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

337

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 6.45.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.1

[r Pt7.20]

PART 7 – PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS AND REPRESENTATION Commentary by Carol Webster SC.

PART 7 COMMENTARY [r Pt7.20]

General comments on Part 7

Part 7 of the UCPR brings together provisions about parties to proceedings, including rules about representation of parties, persons under legal incapacity and business names. These provisions were found in different places in the SCR, DCR and LCR and, as to commencing and carrying on proceedings in those courts, in the DCA and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970. Some distinctions in procedures as between courts are maintained, particularly the Local Court, where commercial agents, real estate agents, strata managing agents and on-site residential property managers will be able to commence and carry on certain types of enforcement proceedings on behalf of a party: see [r 7.1.80]. In the Industrial Relations Commission (but not the Industrial Court), an industrial agent may commence and carry on proceedings on behalf of a party: see [r 7.1.80]. Rule 7.3 carries across to all courts the present Supreme Court requirement that a litigant not represented by a solicitor obtain the leave of the Court to issue subpoenas. The rule also generally prohibits the issuing of any subpoena in the Small Claims Division of the Local Court without the leave of the court: see [r 7.3.40]. Rule 7.4 provides for representative proceedings: see [r 7.4.40] ff. There are separate provisions applicable to proceedings concerning administration of a deceased person’s estate or property the subject of a trust: see rr 7.6 to 7.10; 7.11 to 7.12. Rules 7.13 to 7.18 deal with “persons under legal incapacity”, a term defined in CPA s 3 and r 7.13, see [r 7.13.20] – [r 7.13.40]. Persons under legal incapacity must act in proceedings by a “tutor”: see [r 7.14.40]. Rules 7.19 to 7.22 deal with proceedings in relation to businesses carried on under unregistered business names. Division 7, rr 7.24 to 7.31, contains the formal requirements for a party to proceedings to act (and cease to act) by a solicitor. The requirements for filing and service of notices of any change in a party’s representation repay close attention, see [r 7.26.40], [r 7.27.40], [r 7.28.40], [r 7.29.40] and [r 7.30.40].

DIVISION 1 – GENERAL 7.1

By whom proceedings may be commenced and carried on

(cf SCR Part 4, rules 4 and 4A, Part 66, rule 1; Act No 9 1973, section 43; Act No 11 1970, section 11)

(1) A natural person may commence and carry on proceedings in any court, either by a solicitor acting on his or her behalf or in person. (1A) Despite subrule (1), but subject to subrule (5), the court may order that proceedings commenced by a natural person acting on behalf of another person pursuant to a power of attorney be carried on, on behalf of that other person, by a solicitor. [Subr (1A) insrt Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[4]]

(2) A company within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth: (a) may commence and carry on proceedings in any court by a solicitor or by a director of the company, and (b) may commence and, unless the court orders otherwise, carry on proceedings in the Local Court by a duly authorised officer or employee of the company. [Subr (2) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

(3) In the case of proceedings in the Supreme Court, subrule (2)(a) authorises a company to commence proceedings by a director only if the director is also a plaintiff in the proceedings. 338

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 7.1.20]

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 1 – General

r 7.1

(4) A corporation (other than a company within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth): (a) may commence and carry on proceedings in any court by a solicitor, and (b) may commence and carry on proceedings in any court (other than the Local Court) by a duly authorised officer of the corporation, and (c) may commence and, unless the court orders otherwise, carry on proceedings in the Local Court by a duly authorised officer or employee of the corporation. [Subr (4) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

(4A) Despite subrules (1) – (4), any person may commence and, unless the Commission orders otherwise, carry on proceedings in the Industrial Relations Commission by an industrial agent within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1996. [Subr (4A) insrt Rule 570 of 2009, Sch 1[2]]

(4B) Subrule (4A) does not apply to or in respect of proceedings in the Industrial Relations Commission when constituted as the Industrial Court. [Subr (4B) insrt Rule 570 of 2009, Sch 1[2]]

(5) Despite subrules (1) – (4), any person may commence and, unless the court orders otherwise, carry on proceedings in the Local Court: (a) by a commercial agent with respect to debt collection (within the meaning of the Commercial Agents and Private Inquiry Agents Act 2004), in relation only to proceedings on an application for: (i) an instalment order, or (ii) an order for examination, or (iii) a writ of execution, or (iv) a garnishee order, or (b) by a person holding a licence as a real estate agent, strata managing agent or on-site residential property manager within the meaning of the Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 2002 in relation only to: (i) proceedings on an application referred to in paragraph (a), or (ii) the filing of a certificate under section 51 of the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001. [Subr (5) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]; Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[3]]

[Subr (6) insrt Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[8]] [R 7.1 am Rule 570 of 2009; Rule 501 of 2009; Rule 88 of 2009; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 288 of 2006]

RULE 7.1 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 7.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 7.1.40] Solicitor on the record ................................................................................................................................ [r 7.1.50] Incorporated body ....................................................................................................................................... [r 7.1.60] Proceedings in the Supreme Court ............................................................................................................ [r 7.1.70] Proceedings in the Local Court .................................................................................................................. [r 7.1.80] Appearance by other unqualified persons ................................................................................................ [r 7.1.100] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.1.1000]

[r 7.1.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, subr (1) reflects the substance of Pt 4 r 4. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

339

UCPR Parts 1-10

(6) A solicitor who is a person’s solicitor on the record must hold an unrestricted practising certificate. Note: The term solicitor on the record is defined in the Dictionary.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.1

[r 7.1.20]

The remainder of the rule, together with r 7.2, adopts much of the substance of former SCR Pt 4 r 4A but distinguishes between companies within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and corporations other than companies within the meaning of that Act in its provisions as to who may commence proceedings. “Corporation” included any artificial person under SCR Pt 1 r 8(1), and any body of persons that may by law sue or be sued under DCA s 4(1). DCA s 43 and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 11 contained provisions regarding who may appear on behalf of a party to proceedings. DCR Pt 52 r 1 and LCR Pt 39 r 5 allowed a corporation to authorise an officer of the corporation to sign documents and act for the corporation. DCR Pt 52 r 2 required the authority to be under the seal of the corporation; a copy must be lodged with the registrar for the proper place in relation to the proceedings before the authorised officer takes any step in any proceedings by virtue of the authority. Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 11 had referred to the spouse or employee of a party (authorised by the party in writing) appearing for a party. There is no provision in this rule for a spouse or employee to appear for a party unless r 7.1(2)(e), 7.1(4)(c) or 7.1(5) is satisfied. Rule 7.1(5) is based on Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 11(2), but r 7.1(5) restricts the kinds of proceedings in a Local Court that a commercial or other agent may commence and carry on for a party. There was no similar restriction in Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 11. [r 7.1.40]

Operation

This rule deals with the way in which proceedings may be commenced or carried on. “Carry on proceedings” is defined in CPA s 19(2) to include defending proceedings, so there is no separate provision under the UCPR for entering an appearance in and defending proceedings, as had been the case under the former SCR Pt 11 r 1A. Generally, a natural person may commence and carry on proceedings in any court in person, and if desired, without retaining a solicitor, subject to the restrictions appearing in subsequent rules. They include that a “person under legal incapacity” must commence or carry on proceedings by a tutor, and a tutor will usually be required to act by a solicitor: see [r 7.14.40]. A relator must act by a solicitor: see [r 7.23.40]. A natural person acting on behalf of another person pursuant to a power of attorney may be ordered by the court to Act by a solicitor: r 7.1(1A). Rules 7.1(4A) and 7.1(4B) make specific provision for an industrial agent to commence and carry on proceedings on behalf of a party in the Industrial Relations Commission (when not constituted as the Industrial Court). Incorporated bodies such as companies may be parties to litigation in the same manner as natural persons. An association or committee created by statute may sue or be sued in its own name where it has a separate liability from that of its constituent members and separate ownership of property: Chaff & Hay Acquisition Committee v JA Hemphill & Sons Pty Ltd (1947) 74 CLR 375; 47 SR (NSW) 465; 64 WN (NSW) 187; 21 ALJ 158; [1947] ALR 330. The terms of the relevant statute must be consulted in relation to the various forms of statutory corporation and similar bodies that exist. A firm or partnership is not a legal entity. Generally, proceedings must be commenced or carried on in the names of the individuals involved in partnerships or businesses conducted under business names: see [r 7.20.40]. There are restrictions on how an incorporated body may commence or carry on proceedings that do not apply to natural persons: see [r 7.1.60]. Proceedings cannot be commenced against a company in liquidation or a company in voluntary administration, nor can steps be taken in existing proceedings, without leave of the court: Corporations Act 2001 s 471B and s 440D respectively. [r 7.1.50] Solicitor on the record To be the solicitor on the record, a solicitor must hold an unrestricted practising certificate. The contact solicitor with day to day carriage may be a different person, and need not hold an unrestricted practising certificate. There should be only one solicitor on the record: Konneh v New South Wales (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 390 at [77] (Garling J); Elphick v Westfield Shopping Centre Management Co Pty Ltd (2011) 216 IR 41; [2011] NSWCA 356 at [5]–[10] (Young JA). The Dictionary defines “solicitor on the record” and “unrestricted practising certificate”. Unrestricted practising certificate means an Australian practising certificate that is not subject to any condition under the 340

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 7.1.70]

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 1 – General

r 7.1

law of any State or Territory requiring the holder to engage in supervised legal practice (see Legal Profession Uniform Law s 49) or restricting the holder to practise as or in the manner of a barrister. Before 1 July 2015, the Dictionary definition adopted the similar definition found in s 4 of Legal Profession Act 2004. [r 7.1.60]

Incorporated body

The rule draws a distinction between a “company” within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 and all other forms of corporation. Neither “company” nor “corporation” are defined in the CPA or the Dictionary to the UCPR, nor in the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). The Corporations Act 2001 defines “company” as “a company registered under this Act”: s 9. “Corporation” is defined by s 57A for the purposes of the Act as including (a) a company; (b) any body corporate (whether incorporated in this jurisdiction or elsewhere) and (c) “an unincorporated body that under the law of its place of origin, may sue or be sued or may hold property in the name of its secretary or an officer of a body duly appointed for that purpose”. Both a company and a corporation may commence and carry on proceedings in any court by a solicitor. They may not act by any other agent unless the relevant rules of court are complied with or compliance with the rules dispensed with. Instructing counsel directly does not affect the need to comply with the rules: Jiwira Pty Ltd v Primary Industry Bank of Australia Ltd (Supreme Court of NSW; McLaughlin M; 17/02/95) BC9504254 at pp 9–10; Kenoss Pty Ltd v Palerang Council [2013] NSWCA 174 at [9]. Proceedings purportedly commenced on behalf of a party by an agent in breach of a requirement that a corporate party act by a solicitor are not a nullity (see CPA s 63). Such proceedings may be stayed until a solicitor is appointed to act for the corporation: Hubbard Assn of Scientologists International v Anderson (No 2) [1972] VR 577. See [r 7.1.100] regarding the granting of leave for an unqualified person to appear for a party in higher courts. If a company or corporation does not act by a solicitor, there are different requirements in the Supreme Court, District Court and Local Court for commencing and carrying on proceedings. Provided the requirements of the rules as to authorisation are complied with, practically speaking the authorised director or officer has the same entitlement to carry on proceedings as a litigant in person: see Manitowoc Crane Group Asia Pte Ltd v Preston Erection Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1141 at [16]–[18].

Where a director or authorised officer commences or carries on proceedings in the Supreme Court or District Court, r 7.2 must be complied with: see [r 7.2.40]. [r 7.1.70]

Proceedings in the Supreme Court

The most significant restrictions apply in the Supreme Court. A company may commence proceedings in the Supreme Court by a director of the company only if the director is also a plaintiff in the proceedings, under r 7.1(2)(a) and r 7.1(3). If the director does not have a separate cause of action and make a personal claim for relief the director may be removed from the proceedings: Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 266 at [15]; Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 42 at [18]; Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1519; Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 383 at [9]–[10]; Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 23 at [20]; JSBG Developments Pty Ltd v Kozlowski (2009) 75 NSWLR 745; [2009] NSWSC 1128 at [18] (Barrett J); Connectland Pty Ltd v Porthaven Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 616 at [18]–[19] (White J); DB Mahaffy & Assoc Pty Ltd v Mahaffy [2011] NSWSC 673 at [27] (White J) and Re DB Mahaffy & Assoc Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 776 at [2] (Brereton J) and Re DB Mahaffy & Co Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1286 at [2]–[3] (Brereton J). Proceedings may be stayed to permit the company to retain a solicitor: Tanamerah Estates Pty Ltd v Tibra Capital Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1519. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

341

UCPR Parts 1-10

The requirement that a corporation act by a solicitor may be dispensed with (see CPA s 14): Bay Marine Pty Ltd v Clayton Country Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 8 NSWLR 104; Access Services Group Pty Ltd v McLoughlin (2006) 201 FLR 16; 57 ACSR 725; [2006] NSWSC 532 at [11]–[16]; Connectland Pty Ltd v Porthaven Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 616 at [19]. Usually exceptional circumstances must be demonstrated: Bay Marine Pty Ltd v Clayton Country Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 8 NSWLR 104 at [107B]; Access Services Group Pty Ltd v McLoughlin (2006) 201 FLR 16; 57 ACSR 725; [2006] NSWSC 532 at [15]–[16]. In the absence of an arguable claim, an adjournment to permit a corporation to appear by a solicitor may be refused: Connectland Pty Ltd v Porthaven Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 616.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.2

[r 7.1.70]

This restriction does not apply in the District Court or Local Courts. There is no similar restriction on a corporation commencing proceedings by a duly authorised officer of the corporation under r 7.1(4)(b). [r 7.1.80]

Proceedings in the Local Court

There are fewer restrictions on commencing and carrying on proceedings in the Local Court. Rule 7.1(2)(b) and r 7.1(4)(c) allow a duly authorised officer or employee of a company or corporation to commence and, unless the court makes a contrary order, carry on proceedings in a Local Court for a party. Rule 7.1(5) allows a commercial agent with respect to debt collection (these terms are defined in the Commercial Agents and Private Inquiry Agents Act 2004, s 3), or a licensed real estate agent, strata managing agent or on-site residential property manager (as defined in subr (5)) to commence and, again unless the court makes a contrary order, carry on certain kinds of proceedings in the Local Court on behalf of any person, as set out in subr (5)(a)(i)–(iv) and (b)(ii) (generally relating to enforcement of judgments). [r 7.1.100]

Appearance by other unqualified persons

Leave of the court is required for an unqualified person not authorised under r 7.1 to address the court on behalf of a litigant. Such leave will rarely be granted in higher courts; as a general rule the public interest in the effective disposal of litigation in the courts is best achieved by parties employing qualified lawyers – a lay advocate is unqualified, unaccredited and uninsured, and not subject to any disciplinary code: Damjanovic v Maley (2002) 55 NSWLR 149; 195 ALR 256; [2002] NSWCA 230 at [1], [2], [74]–[79], and [81]–[83] (NSWLR); Hubbard Assn of Scientologists International v Anderson [1972] VR 340 at 343; Manitowoc Crane Group Asia Pte Ltd v Preston Erection Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1141 at [16]–[19]; Malouf v Malouf (2006) 65 NSWLR 449; [2006] NSWCA 83 at [170]–[179] (Mason P). [r 7.1.1000]

References

Definitions: “carry on proceedings” CPA s 3; “company” – Corporations Act 2001 s 9; “commercial agent” and “debt collection” – Commercial Agents and Private Inquiry Agents Act 2004 s 3; “industrial agent”Industrial Relations Act 1996 – Dictionary; “solicitor on the record” – UCPR Dictionary; “unrestricted practising certificate” – UCPR Dictionary. Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.570]; Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 21–22, 147, 177–178. As to dispensing with requirements of the rules: CPA s 14. As to curing procedural irregularities: CPA s 63. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 4 rr 4 and 4A; DCA s 43; Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 11. 7.2 Affidavit as to authority to commence and carry on proceedings in Supreme Court or District Court (cf SCR Part 4, rule 4A, Part 11, rule 1A)

(1) A person who commences or carries on proceedings in the Supreme Court or District Court: (a) as the director of a company within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth, or (b) as the authorised officer of a corporation (other than a company within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth), must file with the originating process, notice of appearance or defence, as the case may be, an affidavit as to his or her authority to act in that capacity, together with a copy of the instrument evidencing that authority. (2) The affidavit made by the director of a company within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth must contain: (a) a statement to the effect that: 342

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 1 – General

[r 7.2.40]

(b)

r 7.2

(i) the director is a director of the company, and (ii) the director has been authorised by a resolution of the directors duly passed at a meeting of directors held on a specified date (which must not be earlier than 21 days before the date of the affidavit) to commence and carry on the proceedings, as the case requires, and (iii) the authority has not been revoked, and (iv) the director is aware that he or she may be liable to pay some or all of the costs of the proceedings, or a statement to the effect that: (i) the director is the managing or governing director of the company and has authority to exercise the powers of the directors, and (ii) the director is aware that he or she may be liable to pay some or all of the costs of the proceedings.

(3) The affidavit made by the authorised officer of a corporation (other than a company within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth) must contain a statement to the effect that: (a) the officer is the holder of a specified office within the corporation, and (b) the officer has been authorised by the corporation to commence and carry on the proceedings, and (c) the authority has not been revoked, and (d) the officer is aware that he or she may be liable to pay some or all of the costs of the proceedings.

RULE 7.2 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 7.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 7.2.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.2.1000]

[r 7.2.20]

Comparison

Rule 7.2(1) contains an additional requirement not appearing in SCR Pt 4 r 4A and Pt 11 r 1A, the filing of a copy of the instrument evidencing the authority of the director or authorised officer with the originating process, notice of appearance or defence and affidavit made in accordance with subr (2) or (3). This is modelled on DCR Pt 52 r 2. DCR Pt 52 rr 1 and 2 required that an authority given by a corporation to an officer of the corporation to act for the corporation be under the seal of the corporation, and lodged with the registrar for the proper place in relation to the proceedings before the authorised officer takes any step in any proceedings by virtue of the authority. SCR Pt 4 r 4A and Pt 11 r 1A dealt separately with commencement and carrying on proceedings and entering an appearance and defending proceedings, a distinction no longer required given the definition of “carry on” proceedings in CPA s 19(2). This rule differs from SCR Pt 11 r 1A in that, as in r 7.1, there are different requirements for companies within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and corporations other than companies within the meaning of that Act: see [r 7.1.60]. The provisions of the former SCR Pt 11 r 1A(4) and (5) have not been reproduced. Subrule (4) allowed a plaintiff to amend the originating process to add the authorised director as a defendant within 28 days after service of a notice of appearance by an authorised director on behalf of a corporate defendant. Subrule (5) provided for the making of costs orders against the corporation and the authorised director appearing for it. The making of costs orders is now dealt with in CPA s 98 and UCPR r 42.3. [r 7.2.40]

Operation

This rule applies only in the Supreme Court and District Court. It requires specific evidence of the authority of a director or authorised officer who commences or carries on proceedings on behalf of a company or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

343

UCPR Parts 1-10

Rule 7.2 reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 4 r 4A and Pt 11 r 1A.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.3

[r 7.2.40]

corporation in the Supreme Court or District Court. Costs orders may be made against the director or authorised officer under CPA s 98 and UCPR r 42.3: see [r 42.3.80]. The first document in the proceedings filed by the director or authorised officer must be accompanied by an affidavit complying with r 7.2(2) or r 7.2(3) and, under r 7.2(1), a copy of the instrument evidencing the director or authorised officer’s authority to act on behalf of the company or corporation (unless that is annexed to the affidavit). The procedures ensure that a director or authorised officer purporting to act on behalf of a company or corporation deposes to the authority given to the person and acknowledges that he or she may be liable to pay some or all costs of the proceedings: May v Christodoulou [2011] NSWCA 75; 80 NSWLR 462, per Handley AJA at [8]. [r 7.2.1000]

References

Definitions: “carry on proceedings” CPA s 19(2); “company” in Corporations Act 2001 s 9. Related rules: r 7.1; r 42.3 in relation to costs, and in particular [r 42.3.80]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 4 r 4A, Pt 11 r 1A. 7.3

Issue of subpoena in certain circumstances requires leave

(cf SCR Part 66, rule 1A)

(1) A subpoena may not be issued, except by leave of the court, unless the party at whose request the subpoena is to be issued is represented by a solicitor in the proceedings. (2) Leave under subrule (1) may be given either generally or in relation to a particular subpoena or subpoenas. (3) Despite subrule (1), a subpoena may not be issued in relation to proceedings in the Small Claims Division of the Local Court, except by leave of the court, in any circumstances. [Subr (3) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]] [R 7.3 am Rule 579 of 2007]

RULE 7.3 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 7.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 7.3.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.3.1000]

[r 7.3.20]

Comparison

Subrules (1) and (2) of r 7.3 reproduce the substance of former SCR Pt 66 r 1A. There is no equivalent DCR or LCR. Rule 7.3(3) is new. [r 7.3.40]

Operation

Subrules (1) and (2) require a party not represented by a solicitor to obtain the leave of the court to issue subpoenas. That leave may be given generally, or restricted to a particular subpoena or group of subpoenas. Subrule (3) generally prohibits the issue of a subpoena in any proceedings in the Small Claims Division of the Local Court without the leave of the court. [r 7.3.1000]

References

Related rules: regarding subpoenas generally, see Pt 33. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 66, r 1A.

344

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 2 – Representation

[r 7.3A.1000]

7.3A

r 7.4

Notice of change of address by party

(1) A party who changes his or her address must, within a reasonable time after the change, file a notice of the change. (2) A copy of the notice of change, as filed, must be served on all other active parties. (3) It is sufficient compliance with this rule if: (a) the new address of the party is also his or her address for service, and (b) the party has changed his or her address for service to the new address in accordance with rule 4.6. [R 7.3A insrt Rule 421 of 2013, Sch 1[1]]

RULE 7.3A COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.3A.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.3A.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.3A.1000]

[r 7.3A.20]

Comparison

This new rule was part of a series of amendments to give effect to certain recommendations made in the New South Wales Law Reform Commission report Security for costs and associated costs orders, Report 137 (2012), in particular recommendation 2.3. [r 7.3A.40]

Operation

Subrules (1) and (2) require that parties give notice of changes of address. This may be done by adapting Form 76 – Notice of change of address for service. Subrule (3) provides that no separate notice need be given under r 7.3A if the party’s address is also the party’s address for service, and notice given of a change of address for service under r 4.6: see [r 4.6.40]. The rule requires service on active parties. Active party is defined in the Dictionary to the UCPR, to mean a party who has an address for service in the proceedings other than a party against whom no further claim in the proceedings subsists (ie against whom judgment has been entered in the proceedings, or in respect of whom the proceedings have been dismissed, withdrawn or discontinued). [r 7.3A.1000]

References

Definitions: Active party, Dictionary to the UCPR. Approved forms: Form 76 – Notice of change of address for service. New South Wales Law Reform Commission report Security for costs and associated costs orders, Report 137 (2012) paragraphs 2.41–2.52.

DIVISION 2 – REPRESENTATION 7.4

Representation of concurrent interests [Repealed]

[R 7.4 rep Act 135 of 2010, Sch 6.4; am Rule 569 of 2009; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 539 of 2007]

RULE 7.4 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 7.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 7.4.40] The same interest or liability ...................................................................................................................... [r 7.4.60] Identifying the class – the availability of discovery and interrogatories ..................................................... [r 7.4.80] Limitation periods ..................................................................................................................................... [r 7.4.100] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

345

UCPR Parts 1-10

Related rules: regarding changing address for service, r 4.6.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.4

[r 7.4.20]

Unincorporated associations .................................................................................................................... [r 7.4.120] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.4.1000]

[r 7.4.20]

Comparison

As originally enacted, this rule reproduced the substance of former SCR Pt 8 r 13(1)–(3) and (7) and DCR Pt 7 r 15(1)–(3) and (7). There is no equivalent LCR. See now CPA Pt 10 and rr 58.1 to 58.2 (Representative proceedings in the Supreme Court). [r 7.4.40] Operation The rule allows one party (either plaintiff or defendant) to represent other persons who have a common interest (as described in r 7.4(1)(a) and r 7.4(2A)) or the same liability, where the class of persons having that common interest or same liability in the action is too large for each person to be a party individually. The discretion under r 7.4(2) is not constrained by preference for an “opt out” representative action over an “opt in” representative action: Jameson v Professional Investment Services Pty Ltd (2009) 72 NSWLR 281; [2009] NSWCA 28 at [98], [102], [120] and [124] per Spigelman CJ, with whom Allsop P and Ipp JA agreed. Where a plaintiff sues the defendant as representing other persons pursuant to this rule, all represented persons will be bound by the result of the proceedings but there are restrictions on enforcement against non-parties: see [r 7.5.40]. The rule refers to “numerous” persons – five persons will not be regarded as “numerous” unless the amount involved is very small, or the court is satisfied that it is the wish of all the persons interested that a representation order should be made: Re Braybrook [1916] WN (Eng) 74. The procedure is available in all causes and matters where the conditions regarding the nature of the interest, as described in subrr (1) and (2A), are fulfilled. Historically the conditions, for unity of interest, were as stated in Duke of Bedford v Ellis [1901] AC 1 at 8: • there must be a common interest; • there must be a common grievance; and • the relief must be beneficial to all parties represented by the representative party. Rule 7.4 provides for a representative action by persons having a common interest or same liability in proceedings. Subrule (1) was amended, and subr (2A) inserted, to clarify when representative proceedings may be commenced and carried on, following the decision of White J in O’Sullivan v Challenger Managed Investments Ltd (2007) 214 FLR 1; [2007] NSWSC 383. The question to be considered, is whether the plaintiff and the represented persons have a community of interest in the determination of any substantial question of law or fact: Carnie v Esanda Finance Corp Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398; 69 ALJR 206; 127 ALR 76; [1995] ASC 56-296 at 427 (CLR). In Carnie, borrowers from the defendant were found to have the same interest in a determination as to whether variation agreements complied with the Credit Act 1984. New r 7.4(4D) is based in part on Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 33N(1) and allows the court to order that proceedings cease to be representative proceedings where the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so for one of the reasons set out in the sub-rule, essentially because representative proceedings are unnecessary or likely to be more costly than separate proceedings. Proceedings concerning the administration of a deceased person’s estate or property the subject of a trust are excluded from r 7.4, but separate provision is made in r 7.6 for such proceedings: see [r 7.6.40]. The Federal Court rules for representative actions and case law are not applicable to r 7.4 of the UCPR: Jameson v Professional Investment Services Pty Ltd (2009) 72 NSWLR 281; [2009] NSWCA 28at [106], [108] and [112] per Spigelman CJ, with whom Allsop P and Ipp JA agreed. A traditional representative action, under r 7.4 (or r 7.6) is not a “class action” as may be brought in the Federal Court, South Australia or Victoria, as to which see for example Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.360]–[9.510]. [r 7.4.60] The same interest or liability The words “the same interest in any proceedings” are directed to issues that are “real” or “of substance”; it is not necessary to show that litigation of the common issue would be likely to resolve the claims of all group members wholly or to any significant degree: Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 255; 73 ALJR 1427; 346

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 7.4.120]

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 2 – Representation

r 7.4

[1999] HCA 48 at [11]–[14], [27], [28], [30] and [32] (CLR). The amendments made in November 2007, following the decision of White J in O’Sullivan v Challenger Managed Investments Ltd (2007) 214 FLR 1; [2007] NSWSC 383, particularly new subrr (4A), (4B) and (4C), confirm that position regarding the result of litigating the common issue; compare O’Sullivan v Challenger Managed Investments Ltd (2007) 214 FLR 1; [2007] NSWSC 383 at [49], [58] and [72]. A representative action extends to cases in which each member of the class has a separate but common cause of action in tort provided there is a common “right” or common purpose; the mere existence of a common “wrong” will not necessarily suffice: Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1981] Ch 229; [1980] 2 WLR 239; [1979] 3 All ER 507; Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021, 1039. For r 7.4 to apply, at the time of commencement of the proceedings there must be a class of persons sufficiently identified as “numerous persons having the same interest” in the particular proceedings: Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; 80 ALJR 1441; [2006] HCA 41 at [54] and [214]. [r 7.4.80]

Identifying the class – the availability of discovery and interrogatories

Because judgment will be a judgment against all represented members of the class: see [r 7.5.40], the precise class interested in the cause of action must be known: Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565; 63 ACSR 346; [2007] NSWCA 117 at [75] and [83]. The court may, by exercising the discretion to order otherwise under subr (2), exclude represented persons from the action where the court is not satisfied that the interests of the absent but represented class are being properly advanced: Carnie v Esanda Finance Corp Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398; 69 ALJR 206; 127 ALR 76; [1995] ASC 56-296 at 427 (CLR).

The power to “otherwise order” in subr (2) gives the court the power to close the representative class, to restrict it to those who have already chosen to “opt in”. Lead plaintiffs may be entitled, at an appropriate stage, to discovery of transactions within the scope of the representative proceedings including the identity of those persons who could be invited to join in properly constituted representative proceedings: Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2006) 63 NSWLR 203; [2005] NSWCA 83 at [269]–[271] and [299]; Trendlen Pty Ltd v Mobile Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 741 at [90]. [r 7.4.100]

Limitation periods

For the purposes of limitation periods, time stops running for the whole group when the lead plaintiff commences proceedings, although the defendant may raise against the lead plaintiff and other represented parties any other available defence even if it is not common to all plaintiffs: Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2006) 63 NSWLR 203; [2005] NSWCA 83. [r 7.4.120]

Unincorporated associations

The use of representative proceedings to sue unincorporated associations may be unsuccessful given the common interest requirement: Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565; 63 ACSR 346; [2007] NSWCA 117 at [74]. Where there are separate defences open to some members of the association and not others, the defendants would not have the necessary common interest: Barker v Allanson [1937] 1 KB 463; [1937] 1 All ER 75; Attorney-General (Vic) v Brighton City [1964] VR 59; (1962) 18 LGRA 82. The difficulties that can arise were discussed in Lee v Surry Hills Mutual Loan Club [2007] NSWSC 650. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

347

UCPR Parts 1-10

Where there is a division of opinion between the plaintiff and those claimed to be represented, dissentients may be joined as defendants or represented by the defendant: John v Rees [1970] Ch 345; [1969] 2 All ER 274; [1969] 2 WLR 1294; (1969) 113 SJ 487. It should be borne in mind that generally, multiple plaintiffs (but not multiple defendants), must act by the same solicitor and counsel: Goold & Porter Pty Ltd v Housing Commission [1974] VR 102; Wedderburn v Wedderburn (1853) 17 Beav 158. There should be only one solicitor on the record for a party: Konneh v New South Wales (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 390 at [77] (Garling J); unless leave were granted under the Supreme Court’s inherent power: Elphick v Westfield Shopping Centre Management Co Pty Ltd (2011) 216 IR 41; [2011] NSWCA 356 at [5]–[10] (Young JA).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.6

[r 7.4.120]

The interest of members joining after a particular date, for example of a contract sued upon, cannot be included in represented proceedings: Banfield v Wells-Eicke [1970] VR 481; Carlton Cricket & Football Social Club v Joseph [1970] VR 487; (1969) 65 QJP 8. See generally Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.330]. [r 7.4.1000]

References

See Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.300]–[9.350]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 13; DCR Pt 7 r 15. Editor’s note: Rule 7.5 is repealed and has not been reproduced.

7.6 Representation in cases concerning administration of estates, trust property or statutory interpretation (cf SCR Part 8, rule 14)

(1) In relation to proceedings concerning: (a) the administration of a deceased person’s estate, or (b) property the subject of a trust, or (c) the construction of an Act, instrument or other document, where a person or class of persons is or may be interested in or affected by the proceedings, the court may appoint one or more of those persons to represent any one or more of them. (2) A person or persons may not be appointed under subrule (1) unless the court is satisfied of one or more of the following: (a) that the person or class, or a member of the class, cannot, or cannot readily, be ascertained, (b) that the person or class, or a member of the class, although ascertained, cannot be found, (c) that, although the person or class, or a member of the class, has been ascertained and found, it is expedient for the purpose of saving expense (having regard to all of the circumstances, including the amount at stake and the degree of difficulty of the issue or issues to be determined) for a representative to be appointed to represent any one or more of them. (3) For the purposes of this rule, persons may be treated as having an interest or liability: (a) even if, in relation to one or more of them, the interest or liability is a contingent or future interest or liability, or (b) even if one or more of those persons is an unborn child. (4) This rule does not limit the operation of rule 7.10.

RULE 7.6 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 7.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 7.6.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.6.1000]

[r 7.6.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 8 r 14(1) to (2). The substance of Pt 8 r 14(4) (which relates to proposed compromise in this context) is found in UCPR r 20.31. There is no equivalent DCR or LCR. [r 7.6.40]

Operation

This rule makes special provision for representative proceedings (discussed generally at [r 7.4.40] – [r 7.4.60]) in relation to the administration of an estate, property the subject of a trust or the construction of an Act, 348

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 2 – Representation

[r 7.7.1000]

r 7.7

instrument or other document. Proceedings concerning administration of an estate or property the subject of the trust are specifically excluded from r 7.4 by r 7.4(5). The District Court has a limited jurisdiction with respect to the administration of estates and execution of trusts under DCA s 134(1)(e) and (f). In administration or construction proceedings in which an unidentified, or unborn, or untraceable person is included, a representative order under r 7.6 should be sought. The role of a representative appointed under r 7.6 was discussed in Arakella Pty Ltd v Paton (2004) 60 NSWLR 334; [2004] NSWSC 13 at [54]–[55], [61] and [64] (NSWLR) in relation to the former SCR Pt 8 r 14. Rule 7.10 provides for the making of orders in relation to proceedings where a deceased person’s estate is not represented in proceedings or the executors or administrators of the estate have an interest in the proceedings adverse to the interests of the estate: see [r 7.10.40]. [r 7.6.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 14. 7.7 Judgments and orders bind represented persons in estate and trust property proceedings (cf SCR Part 8, rule 14)

A judgment or order made in proceedings in which a party has, by an order under rule 7.6, been appointed to represent a number of persons, or members of a class of persons, binds all such persons, and all members of such a class, as if they had been parties to the proceedings.

RULE 7.7 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 7.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 7.7.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.7.1000]

[r 7.7.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 8 r 14(3). There is no equivalent DCR or LCR. Operation

This rule provides for the effect of a judgment or order made in proceedings where the court has made a representation order under r 7.6. It provides finality in relation to the administration of a deceased person’s estate, property the subject of a trust or questions of construction the subject of the proceedings. It is the equivalent of r 7.5 in relation to ordinary representative proceedings where an order has been made under r 7.4, but without the additional provisions in r 7.5 requiring leave of the court to enforce a judgment or order against a person represented but not a party to the proceedings: see [r 7.5.40]. Where proceedings concern the administration of a deceased person’s estate or property the subject of a trust, the persons interested or who may be affected are far more readily identifiable than may be the case in relation to ordinary representative proceedings where an order may be made under r 7.4. [r 7.7.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 14.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

349

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 7.7.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.8

7.8

[r 7.8.20]

Court may determine who has conduct of proceedings

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 17; DCR Part 7, rule 14; LCR Part 6, rule 15)

The court may give the conduct of the whole or any part of any proceedings to such person as it thinks fit.

RULE 7.8 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 7.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 7.8.40] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.8.1000]

[r 7.8.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 8 r 17, DCR Pt 7 r 14 and LCR Pt 6 r 15. [r 7.8.40]

Operation

This rule reflects the court’s control over proceedings. The court’s discretion to make orders under this rule should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. [r 7.8.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 17; DCR Pt 7 r 14; LCR Pt 6 r 15. 7.9

Judgments and orders bind beneficiaries

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 15)

(1) This rule applies to proceedings that have been commenced by or against a trustee, executor or administrator, including proceedings to enforce a security by way of foreclosure or otherwise. (2) It is not necessary to join as a party any of the persons having a beneficial interest under the trust, or in the estate, concerned. (3) Subject to subrule (4), any judgment that is given, and any order that is made, is as binding on a person having a beneficial interest under the trust, or in the estate, as it is binding on the trustee, executor or administrator. (4) If, in relation to proceedings in which such a judgment or order has been made, the court is satisfied that the representative, trustee, executor or administrator did not in fact represent some or all of the persons having a beneficial interest under the trust, or in the estate, the court may order that the judgment or order does not bind those persons. (5) This rule does not limit the power of the court to order that a party be joined under rule 6.24.

RULE 7.9 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 7.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 7.9.40] Binding effect of judgment .......................................................................................................................... [r 7.9.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.9.1000]

350

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 2 – Representation

[r 7.9.1000] [r 7.9.20]

r 7.10

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 8 r 15. There is no equivalent DCR or LCR. [r 7.9.40]

Operation

The effect of this rule is that it is generally not necessary to join the beneficiaries where proceedings are brought by or against a trustee, executor or administrator, although the court may order that any or all of the beneficiaries be joined as parties in their own right under r 6.27. See [r 6.24.40] regarding the addition of parties generally. The joinder of a beneficiary would be appropriate where the beneficiary has an adverse interest to that of the trustee, executor or administrator and the beneficiary: Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.340]–[9.350]. The court may make a representation order in respect of a beneficiary under r 7.6 in administration or construction cases: see [r 7.6.40]. Rule 7.10 provides for the making of orders in relation to proceedings where the executors or administrators of the estate have an interest in the proceedings adverse to the interests of the estate: see [r 7.10.40]. An application by a non-party to be added as a party should be made by motion in the proceedings. See Pt 18 regarding motions generally. The court has the power to dispense with the filing and service of a motion, in the course of giving directions generally or otherwise managing the proceedings (CPA s 61, r 2.1). [r 7.9.60]

Binding effect of judgment

Rule 7.9(3) provides that a judgment given or order made in proceedings within r 7.9 binds beneficiaries as well as the trustee, executor and administrator, unless the court is satisfied that the representative, trustee, executor or administrator did not in fact represent one or more beneficiaries. In that event, under r 7.9(4) the court may order that the judgment or order does not bind those beneficiaries. Like r 7.7, r 7.9(3) provides finality in relation to proceedings within the rule: compare [r 7.5.40] and [r 7.7.40]. [r 7.9.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.350]. As to the addition of parties generally, see [r 6.24.40]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 15. Interests of deceased person

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 16; DCR Part 7, rule 13; LCR Part 6, rule 14)

(1) This rule applies to any proceedings in which it appears to the court: (a) that a deceased person’s estate has an interest in the proceedings, but is not represented in the proceedings, or (b) that the executors or administrators of a deceased person’s estate have an interest in the proceedings that is adverse to the interests of the estate. (2) The court: (a) may order that the proceedings continue in the absence of a representative of the deceased person’s estate, or (b) may appoint a representative of the deceased person’s estate for the purposes of the proceedings, but only with the consent of the person to be appointed. (3) Any order under this rule, and any judgment or order subsequently entered or made in the proceedings, binds the deceased person’s estate to the same extent as the estate would have been bound had a personal representative of the deceased person been a party to the proceedings. (4) Before making an order under this rule, the court may order that notice of the application be given © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

351

UCPR Parts 1-10

7.10

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.10

[r 7.10.20]

to such of the persons having an interest in the estate as it thinks fit.

RULE 7.10 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.10.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.10.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.10.1000]

[r 7.10.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 8 r 16, DCR Pt 7 r 13 and LCR Pt 6 r 14. [r 7.10.40]

Operation

This rule provides for the making of orders in relation to proceedings where a deceased person’s estate is not represented in proceedings or the executors or administrators of the estate have an interest in the proceedings adverse to the interests of the estate. Such a situation may arise where one of two executors makes a claim against the estate under the Family Provision Act 1982, discussed in Stedman v O’Hearn [2006] NSWSC 1122. In that case a representative order was made under r 7.10 to appoint the other executor to represent the estate and remove the plaintiff executor from any role in Family Provision Act 1982 proceedings against the estate. Rule 6.31 requires that steps are taken reasonably promptly for replacement of a deceased party, failing which the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed: see [r 6.31.40]. If a person other than the personal representative of the deceased is to be appointed to represent the estate, that person should be someone with a real interest in contesting any liability which it is sought to visit on the estate: Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Johnson [1981] 2 NSWLR 617 at 623–624. Persons with an interest in the estate must be given notice before any order is made under this rule. Where an order is made under the rule, the estate may be bound by a judgment given or order made in the proceedings even if the estate was not represented in the proceedings. The estate will not be bound if an order is not made under this rule: Re Richerson (No 2) [1893] 3 Ch 146. Even if an order is made under this rule that proceedings continue in the absence of a representative, any judgment must still be entered against an identified person: Colquhoun v Graffıone (2000) 97 FCR 376; [2000] FCA 325 at [26]–[27]; Ivanovski v Perdacher [2009] NSWSC 913 at [49]. [r 7.10.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.350], 96 and 600. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 8 r 16; DCR Pt 7 r 13; LCR Pt 6 r 14.

DIVISION 3 – EXECUTORS, ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES 7.11

Executors, administrators and trustees

(cf SCR Part 68, rule 4)

(1) In proceedings relating to an estate, all executors of the will of the deceased, or all administrators of the estate, must be parties unless one or more of them has represented the others pursuant to rule 7.4. [Subr (1) am Rule 449 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[3]]

(2) In proceedings relating to a trust, all trustees must be parties. (3) In proceedings commenced by executors, administrators or trustees, any executor, administrator or trustee who does not consent to being joined as a plaintiff must be made a defendant. [R 7.11 am Rule 449 of 2007]

352

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 3 – Executors, administrators and trustees

[r 7.12.40]

r 7.12

RULE 7.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 7.11.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.11.40] References ............................................................................................................................................ [r 7.11.1000]

[r 7.11.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 68 r 4. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. [r 7.11.40]

Operation

The rule requires that all executors of a will or administrators of an estate be parties to proceedings relating to the estate unless the proceedings are constituted as representative proceedings under r 7.4. Similarly, all trustees must be parties in proceedings relating to a trust. An executor, administrator or trustee who refuses to join in proceedings as a plaintiff may be joined as a defendant, as is the case generally in relation to the joinder of parties: see [r 6.20.40]; [r 6.25.40]. [r 7.11.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2005) pp 618, 623; (7th ed, Lawbook Co., 2007) pp 596, 600. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 68 r 4. 7.12 Beneficiaries and claimants (cf SCR Part 68, rule 5)

(1) In proceedings relating to an estate, all persons having a beneficial interest in or claim against the estate need not be parties, but the plaintiff may make parties of such of those persons as he or she thinks fit. (2) In proceedings relating to a trust, all persons having a beneficial interest under the trust need not be parties, but the plaintiff may make parties of such of those persons as he or she thinks fit. (3) This rule has effect despite rule 6.20 (Proceedings affecting persons having joint entitlement).

Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.12.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.12.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.12.1000]

[r 7.12.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 68 r 5. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR or LCR. [r 7.12.40]

Operation

The rule allows a plaintiff commencing proceedings relating to an estate or a trust to determine which of the persons having a beneficial interest in or claim against the estate, or interest under the trust, to join as defendants. Generally, two or more sets of costs will not be allowed to successful defendants between whom no conflict of interest could arise in the presentation of their cases: Statham v Shephard (No 2) (1974) 23 FLR 244. A representative order may be made under r 7.6 where appropriate: see [r 7.6.40]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

353

UCPR Parts 1-10

RULE 7.12 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.13

[r 7.12.40]

If a plaintiff proposed to name all interested parties as defendants, the plaintiff should inform the various classes of defendant that members of a class should retain the same solicitor and counsel, as only in exceptional circumstances will more than one set of costs be allowed for each interest. A beneficiary not joined by the plaintiff who contends that her or his interests would be adversely affected may seek to be joined as a party under r 6.27. See [r 6.24.40] regarding the addition of parties generally. [r 7.12.1000]

References

As to the addition of parties generally, see [r 6.24.40]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 68 r 5.

DIVISION 4 – PERSONS UNDER LEGAL INCAPACITY 7.13

Definition

In this Division, person under legal incapacity includes a person who is incapable of managing his or her affairs.

RULE 7.13 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.13.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.13.40] Requirements for court approval of settlements or compromises ........................................................... [r 7.13.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.13.1000]

[r 7.13.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. “Person under legal incapacity” is defined in CPA s 3 to mean: any person who is under a legal incapacity in relation to the conduct of legal proceedings (other than an incapacity arising under section 4 of the Felons (Civil Proceedings) Act 1981) and, in particular, includes: (a) a child under the age of 18 years, and (b) an involuntary patient, a forensic patient or a correctional patient within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2007, and (c) a person under guardianship within the meaning of the Guardianship Act 1987, and (d) a protected person within the meaning of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009, and (e) an incommunicate person, being a person who has such a physical or mental disability that he or she is unable to receive communications, or express his or her will, with respect to his or her property or affairs. A “minor” is a person under the age of 18 years: CPA s 3 (compare former SCA s 19(1), DCR Pt 1 r 4(1) and LCR Pt 1 r 3(1)). The former rules referred to a “disable person”, defined as a minor or incompetent person under SCR Pt 1 r 8(1), DCR Pt 1 r 4(1) and LCR Pt 1 r 3(1). “Incompetent person” was defined as a person who is not a minor and who is incapable of managing her or his affairs, who is “incommunicate”, or a minor who has a curator. [r 7.13.40]

Operation

The rule includes within those persons who can only act by a tutor (see [r 7.14.40]) a person who is incapable of managing her or his own affairs. See [r 7.14.50]. A person incapable of, or substantially impeded in, the management of her or his affairs may be under disability for the purposes of limitation periods running against the person: Limitation Act 1969 ss 11(3) and 52 (subject to ss 50F and 50E regarding personal injury cases). The meaning of “incapable of, or substantially impeded in, the management of affairs” was discussed in Kotulski v Attard [1981] 1 NSWLR 115 at 117–118 and New South Wales v Harlum [2007] NSWCA 120 at [92]–[95] . There is a well established body of law about what is involved in deciding that a person is not capable of managing his or her own affairs for the purposes of the Protected Estates Act 1983 (now the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009): see P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579 at [266]–[273]; Re GHI (2005) 221 ALR 589; [2005] NSWSC 581 at [4]–[21], noted in contrast to the definition of “person under legal incapacity” in Doulaveras v Daher (2009) 354

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 7.13.1000]

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 4 – Persons under legal incapacity

r 7.14

253 ALR 627; [2009] NSWCA 58 at [155]–[157] per Campbell JA; Rappard v Williams [2013] NSWSC 1279 (Hallen J) at [73]–[81]; Stokes v McCourt [2014] NSWSC 61 (McDougall J) at [22]–[31]. The “test” stated in Y v S [1982] 2 NSWLR 700 at 702 referred to dealing with the ordinary routine affairs of man, rather than the words of the statute which are paramount: Guthrie v Spence [2009] NSWCA 369; 78 NSWLR 225 at [174]–[175]; Re R [2014] NSWSC 1810 at [94]; P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579 at [268]. A “competent” litigant in person must require a level of mental capacity greater than that of the “competent” represented plaintiff, because a litigant in person has to manage court proceedings in an unfamiliar and stressful situation, while the represented plaintiff must be capable of “managing his own affairs” to the extent of understanding the nature of the acts involved in retaining and instructing a solicitor: Murphy v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51; [2003] NSWSC 249 at [33]–[35] and [54]. A person who is under a disability for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1969 when a cause of action accrues may commence proceedings by a tutor despite the disability. [r.7.13.60]

Requirements for court approval of settlements or compromises

There are special requirements for court approval of settlements or compromises of actions involving persons under legal incapacity: CPA Div 4, ss 74–80 (formerly governed by the Damages (Infants and Persons of Unsound Mind) Act 1929). A claim for compensation under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) by a claimant who is unable to manage his or her own affairs should be commenced by a tutor and any settlement approved under CPA s 75(2): AEW v BW [2016] NSWSC 905. Court approval of a compromise or settlement is no longer required if, on the day the agreement for compromise or settlement is made, the person has turned 18 and is not otherwise within CPA s 76(1): CPA s 76(3A) inserted by the Courts and Other Justice Portfolio Legislation Amendment Act 2015 Sch 1.2 (commencing 24 November 2015, and applying only to new proceedings: CPA Sch 6 Part 8 cl 21). [r 7.13.1000]

References

Handford P, Limitation of Actions – The Australian Law (Lawbook Co., 2004) [15], [113], [115], [116] and [117]. Definitions: “person under legal incapacity” CPA s 3. Brereton P L G, “Acting for the Incapable – A delicate balance” (2013) 35 Aust Bar Rev 244 As to court approval of settlements or compromises: CPA Div 4, ss 74–80. Proceedings to be commenced or carried on by tutor

(cf SCR Part 63, rules 2 and 3(2); DCR Part 45, rules 2 and 3; LCR Part 34, rules 3 and 4)

(1) A person under legal incapacity may not commence or carry on proceedings except by his or her tutor. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, the tutor of a person under legal incapacity may not commence or carry on proceedings except by a solicitor.

RULE 7.14 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.14.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.14.40] When is a person under a legal incapacity .............................................................................................. [r 7.14.50] Change in the capacity of a party during proceedings ............................................................................ [r 7.14.60] Dispensing with the requirement for a tutor ............................................................................................. [r 7.14.70] Particular consequences of legal incapacity ............................................................................................ [r 7.14.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.14.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

355

UCPR Parts 1-10

7.14

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.14 [r 7.14.20]

[r 7.14.20] Comparison

This rule combines the substance of former SCR Pt 63 r 2 and r 3(2), DCR Pt 45 r 2 and Pt 45 r 3(2) and LCR Pt 34 r 3. SCR Pt 63 r 1, DCR Pt 45 r 1 and LCR Pt 34 r 2 had referred to both a next friend, appointed to represent a plaintiff, and a guardian ad litem, appointed to represent a defendant, each of whom was a “tutor”. The distinction is not reproduced in the UCPR. The requirement under SCR Pt 63 r 3(2) and DCR Pt 45 r 3(2) that a tutor act by a solicitor has been relaxed, insofar as r 7.14(2) allows for the court to order otherwise. [r 7.14.40]

Operation

“Tutor” is defined in CPA s 3 to mean a tutor appointed to represent the person, whether or not by the court in accordance with the uniform rules. The Dictionary to the UCPR specifically refers to a tutor appointed to represent the person (whether by the court or otherwise) in accordance with Div 4 of Pt 7, ie rr 7.13 to 7.18. It is in the defendant’s interests to ensure that a minor has a properly appointed tutor, so that the minor will be bound by the result of the proceeding: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62; 23 ALJ 48; [1949] ALR 333 at 83 and 113 (CLR). A tutor is liable for the costs of solicitors retained for the person under legal incapacity and potentially liable for the costs of the other party: see for example Yakmor v Hamdoush (No 2) (2009) 76 NSWLR 148; [2009] NSWCA 284; Stokes v McCourt [2014] NSWSC 61 (McDougall J) at [7]–[8]. A tutor is entitled to an indemnity for costs properly incurred on behalf of the person under legal incapacity, either from the person procuring the appointment or out of the estate of the person under legal incapacity: Murray v Kirkpatrick (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 162; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v P (1987) 11 NSWLR 200. Under CPA s 80, on application by the tutor for a person under legal incapacity, the Supreme Court may give directions with respect to the tutor’s conduct of proceedings in the Supreme Court or any other court. A tutor must act by a solicitor unless the court gives leave. Such leave will rarely be granted in higher courts: see [7.1.100]; Wang v New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 909 at [45]–[48] (Harrison J). Leave may be given where the tutor appointed was a solicitor: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v P (1987) 11 NSWLR 200; Sperling v Sperling [2015] NSWSC 286 at [17]–[27]. [r 7.14.50]

When is a person under a legal incapacity

Whether a party to proceedings is under a legal incapacity and requires a tutor (see [r 7.13.40]) depends on whether he or she is capable of understanding, with the assistance of such proper explanation from legal advisers and experts in other disciplines as the case may require, the issues on which consent or decision is likely to be necessary in the course of the proceedings: Masterman-Lister v Jewell [2003] 1 WLR 1511; [2003] 3 All ER 162 per Chadwick LJ at [75]; applied in Farr v Queensland [2009] NSWSC 906 per Price J at [15], and Murray v Williams [2010] NSWSC 1243 per Hammerschlag J at [26]; Rappard v Williams [2013] NSWSC 1279 (Hallen J) at [77]–[81]; Stokes v McCourt [2014] NSWSC 61 (McDougall J) at [31]. The question of legal incapacity depends on whether the person has the ability to understand and evaluate the particular task in question at the particular time: Guthrie v Spence [2009] NSWCA 369; 78 NSWLR 225 at [174]–[175]; CJ v AKJ [2015] NSWSC 498 at [27]-[34]. There is no universal test as to legal incapacity: A v A [2015] NSWSC 1778 at [76]-[79]. A tutor may be appointed for a party where responsible legal practitioners express rational and properly based, not tactical, concerns about the capacity of their client: Saravinovska v Saravinovski (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 64 at [15]. Where a party is under an incapacity it is not an alternative to appointment of a tutor that instructions are given by an attorney under an existing enduring power of attorney: Smilevska v Smilevska [2015] NSWSC 1794. A “protected person” within the meaning of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 1987 in respect of whom a financial management order has been made is “a person under legal disability” as defined by CPAs 3(1): P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579 at [161]. That person’s tutor prima facie should be the NSW Trustee: rr 7.15(3)–7.15(4). A dispensing order may be made as in [r 7.14.70]. In Slaveski v Victoria (2009) 25 VR 160; [2009] VSC 596 Kyrou J identified issues as potentially relevant to a determination of whether a self-represented party is capable of representing himself or herself including: 356

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 7.14.1000]

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 4 – Persons under legal incapacity

r 7.14

understanding the factual framework for the claims and the type of evidence required; understanding what is and is not relevant, the Court processes and the basic rules for conducting the case when these matters are explained; being able to control his or her emotions and behave in a non-abusive and non-threatening manner when events do not go his or her way during the trial and being able to assess any settlement proposal on its merits. [r 7.14.60]

Change in the capacity of a party during proceedings

A tutor’s authority to take steps in proceedings terminates when the minority ceases; without evidence that the tutor took an active part in proceedings after that time, the tutor cannot be liable for costs after that date. The solicitor acting for the plaintiff should determine whether the now adult plaintiff wishes to continue the action, and if so file a notice in the registry stating that the infant had attained majority. If necessary the title of the proceedings should be altered to reflect the absence of the tutor: Insurance Ministerial Corp (NSW) v Abualfoul (1999) 94 FCR 247; 162 ALR 417; [1999] FCA 433. Where a litigant becomes a person under legal incapacity during proceedings, the proceedings cannot continue without appointment of a tutor. A failure to appoint a tutor for the person as required by r 7.14 does not invalidate the proceedings. The irregularity can be dealt with under CPA s 63. If a tutor cannot immediately be appointed the court may stay the proceedings until the litigant recovers or a tutor can be appointed: Murphy v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51; [2003] NSWSC 249 at [33]–[35], [42] and [52]; Spellson v George (1987) 11 NSWLR 300. The appointment of a tutor protects all parties and the court’s process: Rappard v Williams [2013] NSWSC 1279 (Hallen J) at [93]. See [r 7.18.40] regarding the appointment of a tutor by the court. [r 7.14.70]

Dispensing with the requirement for a tutor

The court has power to dispense with requirements of the rules and to mould procedures to accommodate particular cases: CPA ss 14 and 16. UCPR r 7.18 provides express authority for the court to appoint and remove a tutor. Where a person in respect of whom a financial management order has been made (a) seeks under Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 Sch 6 cl 14 to appeal against the financial management order, or (b) applies for revocation of a financial management order or management order affecting his or her estate under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 1987 s 86, it may be rare that an objection would be taken to the competency of such proceedings commenced without a tutor. Prima facie, such an objection would not serve the protective purpose of the court’s jurisdiction nor promote coherence in the principled administration of the court’s protective jurisdiction: P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579 at [166]–[167]. The Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 Sch 6 cl 14(5) implicitly empowers the court to make interlocutory orders in conduct of an appeal under cl 14: P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579 at [167].

[r 7.14.80]

Particular consequences of legal incapacity

The plaintiff cannot take steps to obtain a judgment or orders in default of appearance against a defendant against who is a person under legal incapacity, apart from a seeking to have a tutor appointed: see [r 7.17.40]. Service on a person under legal incapacity may only be effected in accordance with r 10.12. Admissions in a pleading by or on behalf of a person under legal incapacity may only be made expressly: r 14.26 does not apply against a disabled person. A person under legal incapacity cannot be required to make admissions under CPA s 70. [r 7.14.1000]

References

Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.580], [11.230] and Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 83–84. Definitions: “person under legal incapacity” CPA s 3; “tutor” CPA s 3 and Dictionary to the UCPR. Related provisions: r 10.12; r 14.26; r 7.13; r 7.17; CPA ss 70, 80. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 63 rr 1, 2 and 3(2); DCR Pt 45 rr 1, 2 and 3; LCR Pt 34 rr 2, 3 and 4.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

357

UCPR Parts 1-10

An order was made dispensing with any need for a tutor in the conduct of the plaintiff’s appeal in P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.15

7.15

[r 7.15.20]

Tutors generally

(cf SCR Part 63, rules 4 and 5; DCR Part 45, rules 4 and 5; LCR Part 34, rules 5 and 6)

(1) Subject to this Division, a person may become the tutor of a person under legal incapacity without the need for any formal instrument of appointment or any order of a court. (2) Any person (other than a corporation) is eligible to be the tutor of a person under legal incapacity, in respect of any proceedings, unless the person is: (a) a person under legal incapacity, or (b) a judicial officer, a registrar or any other person involved in the administration of a court, or (c) a person who has an interest in the proceedings adverse to the interests of the person under legal incapacity. (3) In the case of proceedings with respect to the estate of a person whose estate is subject to management under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009, the tutor of that person is to be the person who has the management of the person’s estate under that Act. [Subr (3) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[5]]

(4) Subrule (3) does not apply if the person concerned declines to act as tutor or is unable to act as tutor, or if the court orders otherwise. (5) A person may not replace another person as tutor of a person under legal incapacity except by order of the court. (6) Anything that these rules authorise or require a party to do in relation to the conduct of proceedings may, if the party is a person under legal incapacity, be done on his or her behalf by his or her tutor. [R 7.15 am Rule 501 of 2009]

RULE 7.15 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.15.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.15.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.15.1000]

[r 7.15.20]

Comparison

Rule 7.15 subrr (1), (2) and (5) reproduce the substance of former SCR Pt 63 r 4(1) to (3) and (5), DCR Pt 45 r 4(1) to (3) and (5) and LCR Pt 34 r 5(1) to (3) and (5). Subrules (3) and (4) reproduce the substance of former SCR Pt 63 r 5(1) and (3), DCR Pt 45 r 5(1), (2) and (4) and LCR Pt 34 r 6(1), (2) and (4), making specific provision for a person whose estate is subject to management under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (formerly the Protected Estates Act 1983). The change under the UCPR is in relation to the documents to be filed where a tutor is acting on behalf of a person under legal incapacity under r 7.16: see [r 7.16.40]. Rule 7.15(6) reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 63 r 3(1), DCR Pt 45 r 3(1) and LCR Pt 34 r 4. [r 7.15.40]

Operation

An order of the court is not necessary for a person to become the tutor of a person under legal incapacity unless there is a change of tutor – r 7.15(5), [r 7.18.40] – or a tutor is required to be appointed during proceedings: see [r 7.14.60]. The only persons disqualified from being the tutor of a person under legal incapacity are set out in r 7.15(2). A corporation cannot be the tutor of a person under legal incapacity. Special provision is made in relation to a person whose estate is subject to management under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009, in that the person with management of the person’s estate is to be the tutor unless that person declines to act, is unable to act as tutor or the court orders otherwise: r 7.15(3) and (4). 358

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 4 – Persons under legal incapacity

[r 7.16.1000]

r 7.16

A tutor stands in the shoes of the person generally for the purposes of the litigation, for example to verify pleadings or make an affidavit supporting a list of documents: see [r 14.23.40]; [r 21.4.40]; compare [r 7.24.40] regarding acts which may be done by a party’s solicitor. [r 7.15.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.580], [11.230], and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 83–84. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 63 rr 4 and 5; DCR Pt 45 rr 4 and 5; LCR Pt 34 rr 5 and 6. 7.16

Tutor to file certain documents

(cf SCR Part 63, rule 4; DCR Part 45, rule 4; LCR Part 34, rule 5)

A tutor may not commence or carry on proceedings on behalf of a person under legal incapacity unless there have been filed: (a) the tutor’s consent to act as tutor, and (b) a certificate, signed by the tutor’s solicitor in the proceedings, to the effect that the tutor does not have any interest in the proceedings adverse to the interests of the person under legal incapacity.

RULE 7.16 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.16.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.16.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.16.1000]

[r 7.16.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 63 r 4(6), DCR Pt 45 r 4(6) and LCR Pt 34 r 5(6). There is no longer any requirement to file a certificate stating whether or not the person’s estate is subject to the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (formerly the Protected Estates Act 1983). Except for the reference to the filing of a tutor’s consent, the provisions of the former SCR Pt 63 r 4(4), DCR Pt 45 r 4(4) and LCR Pt 34 r 5(4) that a person shall not be made a tutor without the person’s consent have not been reproduced. Operation

This rule sets out the documents to be filed before a tutor takes any steps on behalf of a person under legal incapacity. These documents formally indicate to the court and the other parties that the tutor has consented to act as tutor and that there is no conflict of interest between the tutor and the person under legal incapacity. The tutor’s consent must be verified in accordance with r 31.15. The solicitor’s certification that the proposed tutor does not have an interest in the proceedings adverse to the person under legal incapacity has evidentiary effect absent evidence to the contrary, interpreting the rules so as to give effect to the overriding purpose in CPA s 56(2): Saravinovska v Saravinovski (No 5) [2015] NSWSC 128 at [36]–[47]. Although the rule does not refer in terms to service of these documents, r 10.1 requires that a party that files a document serve copies of it on each other active party as soon as practicable. These documents are usually served with the originating process. [r 7.16.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.580], and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 83–84. Definitions: “active party” Dictionary to the UCPR. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

359

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 7.16.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.17

[r 7.16.1000]

As to an application to appoint a tutor in proceedings: [r 7.18.40]. Approved forms: Form 30 Consent to act as tutor. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 63 r 4; DCR Pt 45 r 4; LCR Pt 34 r 5. 7.17

Non-appearance of person under legal incapacity

(cf SCR Part 63, rule 6; DCR Part 45, rule 6; LCR Part 34, rules 3A and 7)

(1) Subject to subrule (2), the plaintiff in proceedings against a defendant who is a person under legal incapacity may take no further step in the proceedings following service of the originating process until a tutor has entered an appearance on behalf of the defendant. Note: If no such appearance is entered, the plaintiff may apply to the court under rule 7.18 for the appointment of a tutor of the defendant, or for the removal and appointment of such a tutor.

(2) In the case of proceedings in the Local Court against a defendant who appears to be a person under legal incapacity by reason only of his or her minority: (a) the plaintiff may serve on the defendant a notice requiring a tutor of the defendant to enter an appearance in the proceedings, and (b) unless the court orders otherwise, the plaintiff may continue the proceedings as if the defendant were not a person under legal incapacity if such an appearance is not entered within 28 days after service of the notice. [Subr (2) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]] [R 7.17 am Rule 579 of 2007]

RULE 7.17 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.17.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.17.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.17.1000]

[r 7.17.20] Comparison Rule 7.17(1) reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 63 r 6(1), DCR Pt 45 r 6(1) and LCR Pt 34 r 7(1). Rule 7.17(2) reproduces in substance LCR Pt 34 r 3A and r 7(2). The provision to similar effect in DCR Pt 45 r 6(2) and r 2A has not been reproduced, as r 7.17(2) is restricted to proceedings in a Local Court. [r 7.17.40] Operation Where a person under legal incapacity is sued, unless an appearance is entered by a tutor for the person, the plaintiff cannot take any steps in the proceedings other than making an application to the court under r 7.18 for the appointment of a tutor for the person: see [r 7.18.40]. Where the parents of an infant defendant decline or are unable to act as the defendant’s tutor, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to identify an appropriate disinterested person to be appointed as tutor. A person to be appointed as tutor for a defendant in such circumstances would no doubt require an indemnity for costs. If a solicitor were appointed, the court may dispense with the requirement that the tutor act by a solicitor: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v P (1987) 11 NSWLR 200. The only exception to the effective bar on proceeding is with respect to proceedings within r 7.17(2), that is where a minor is sued in the Local Court. Under r 7.17(2), the plaintiff may serve a notice requiring a tutor to enter an appearance for the minor defendant, and if no such appearance is entered within 28 days, the plaintiff may proceed as if the defendant were an adult unless the court orders otherwise. [r 7.17.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 83–84. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 63 r 6; DCR Pt 45 r 6; LCR Pt 34 rr 3A and 7. 360

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 4 – Persons under legal incapacity

[r 7.18.40]

7.18

r 7.18

Court may appoint and remove tutors

(cf SCR Part 63, rules 5, 7 and 8; DCR Part 45, rules 7 and 8; LCR Part 34, rules 8 and 9)

(1) In any proceedings in which a party is or becomes a person under legal incapacity: (a) if the person does not have a tutor, the court may appoint a tutor, or (b) if the person has a tutor, the court may remove the party’s tutor and appoint another tutor. (2) In any proceedings concerning a person under legal incapacity who is not a party, the court may appoint a tutor of the person and join the person as a party to the proceedings. (3) If the court removes a party’s tutor, it may also stay the proceedings pending the appointment of a new tutor. (4) Subject to any order of the court, notice of any motion under this rule is to be served on the person under legal incapacity and, if it proposes removal of the person’s tutor, on the tutor. (5) In proceedings on a motion for the appointment of a tutor, evidence in support of the motion must include: (a) evidence that the party for whom a tutor is to be appointed is a person under legal incapacity, and (b) evidence that the proposed tutor consents to being appointed and does not have any interest in the proceedings adverse to the interests of the person under legal incapacity. (6) An application for appointment as tutor under this rule may be made by the court of its own motion or on the motion of any other person, including the proposed tutor.

RULE 7.18 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.18.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.18.40] Alternative source of power to appoint tutor ............................................................................................ [r 7.18.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.18.1000]

[r 7.18.20]

Comparison

Subrule (2) is based on former SCR Pt 63 r 7(1), DCR Pt 45 r 7(1) and LCR Pt 34 r 8(1) although dealing in terms with the joinder of a person under legal incapacity as a party to proceedings. Subrule (4) reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 63 r 7(1A) and r 8(2), DCR Pt 45 r 7(1A) and r 8(2) and LCR Pt 34 r 8(2) and r 9(2). Subrules (5) and (6) reproduce in substance former SCR Pt 63 r 7(2) and (1), DCR Pt 45 r 7(3) and (1) and LCR Pt 34 r 8(3) and (1). In contrast with the former provisions, appointment of a tutor under the UCPR need not be on motion by a party or other person; it may be of the court’s own motion. [r 7.18.40]

Operation

This rule sets out the evidence required on an application for the appointment of a tutor. An application should be made by motion in the proceedings. See Pt 18 regarding motions generally. As set out in r 7.18(5), the evidence must establish not only that the party for whom a tutor is to be appointed is a person under legal incapacity, but also the tutor’s consent and the lack of any conflict of interest with the party; see also [r 7.16.40] regarding the documents to be filed by a tutor and their evidentiary effect. On an application to appoint a tutor, the court must be persuaded that the party is incapable, as defined, of providing ongoing instructions to his or her solicitor so as to enable the litigation to proceed, as opposed to being unwilling or resistant to participating in the litigation: HSBC Bank Australia Ltd v Chang [2008] NSWSC 948. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

361

UCPR Parts 1-10

Subrules (1) and (3) of this rule reproduce the substance of former SCR Pt 63 rr 5(2) and 8(1), DCR Pt 45 rr 5(3) and 8(1) and LCR Pt 34 rr 6(3) and 9(1).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.19

[r 7.18.40]

See [r 7.14.50]. An order that a tutor be appointed for a person said to be under a legal incapacity must specify the tutor: Mao v AMP Superannuation Ltd [2015] NSWCA 252. The court may also remove a party’s tutor and, assuming that the party remains under legal incapacity, stay the proceedings pending the appointment of a new tutor. If the court orders that a tutor be removed, even if no substitute is proffered willing to accept liability for costs, the proceedings would usually be stayed pending appointment of a replacement tutor; an order dispensing with the requirement of a tutor is rarely justified: South v Northern Sydney Area Health Service [2003] NSWSC 479 at [9] (Burchett AJ); Wang v New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 909 at [44] (Harrison J).See [r 7.14.60] regarding the effect of a change in a person’s capacity during proceedings. [r 7.18.60]

Alternative source of power to appoint tutor

The Supreme Court also has inherent power under its parens patriae jurisdiction to appoint a tutor for the purposes of particular litigation where there may be doubt as to whether a person’s mental state falls within the statutory definition of “person under legal incapacity”: Re P [2006] NSWSC 1082 per Young CJ in Eq at [8]; Bobolas v Waverley Council (2012) 187 LGERA 63; [2012] NSWCA 126 per McColl JA at [60] (Macfarlan JA and Tobias AJA agreeing). [r 7.18.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.580], [11.230], and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 83–84. Approved forms: Form 30 Consent to act as tutor. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 63 rr 5, 7 and 8; DCR Pt 45 rr 7 and 8; LCR Pt 34 rr 8 and 9.

DIVISION 5 – BUSINESS NAMES 7.19

Persons to sue and be sued in own name

(cf SCR Part 64, rule 4)

Subject to this Division, persons are to sue and be sued in their own names, and not under any business name.

RULE 7.19 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.19.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.19.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.19.1000]

[r 7.19.20]

Comparison

This rule does not directly reproduce any provision of the former SCR Pt 64, DCR Pt 46 or LCR Pt 35. Former SCR Pt 64 r 1, DCR Pt 46 r 1 and LCR Pt 35 r 1 defined “business name”. The Dictionary to the UCPR now defines “business name” in similar terms, although not restricted to a business name registered under the Business Names Act 2002 or under Pt 3 of the Partnership Act 1892. [r 7.19.40]

Operation

This rule is a statement of the effect of the Division. The principle is developed in rr 7.20 to 7.22. [r 7.19.1000]

References

Definitions: “business name” Dictionary to the UCPR.

362

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 5 – Business names

[r 7.20.1000]

7.20

r 7.20

Proceedings against defendant operating under unregistered business name

(cf SCR Part 64, rule 2; DCR Part 46, rule 2; LCR Part 35, rule 2)

(1) Proceedings against a person in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by the person in the course of, or in relation to, a business carried on under an unregistered business name may be commenced against that person, as defendant, under that name. (2) For the purposes of any such proceedings, the unregistered business name is taken to be a sufficient description of that person. (3) Any judgment or order arising from any such proceedings may be enforced against that person.

RULE 7.20 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.20.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.20.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.20.1000]

[r 7.20.20]

Comparison

Rule 7.20 reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 64 r 2(1). The provisions of DCR Pt 46 r 2 and LCR Pt 35 r 2 did not in terms refer to commencement of proceedings in the business name. In contrast with SCR Pt 64 r 2, DCR Pt 46 r 2 and LCR Pt 35 r 2, r 7.20 is not explicitly limited to a business carried on within the State. [r 7.20.40]

Operation

As r 7.20 is not limited in terms to a business carried on within the State, unlike the former provisions (SCR Pt 64 r 2, DCR Pt 46 r 2 and LCR Pt 35 r 2), the general provisions regarding the jurisdiction of courts will determine where and when proceedings may be commenced in the Supreme Court, District Court and Local Courts.

In an appropriate case, consideration may be given to seeking “identity discovery” under r 5.2 to identify the personal defendant: see [r 5.2.40]. Service of process or documents relating to proceedings in relation to particular kinds of businesses are dealt with in the following rules: r 10.9 – defendant operating under unregistered business name; r 10.10 – defendant operating under registered business name and r 10.11 – partner in limited partnership (these matters were formerly dealt with in SCR Pt 64 rr 3 and 3A, DCR Pt 46 r 2 and LCR Pt 35 r 2). If it proves impracticable, after appropriate steps have been taken, to identify individuals where an unregistered business name has been sued, the court may give leave under r 7.22 for the proceedings to be continued in the unregistered business name: see [r 7.22.40]. [r 7.20.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2005) pp 614–616; (7th ed, Lawbook Co., 2007) pp 592–593 and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) p 177. As to service on businesses, see [r 10.9.40], [r 10.10.40], [r 10.11.40]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 64 r 2; DCR Pt 46 r 2; LCR Pt 35 r 2. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

363

UCPR Parts 1-10

This rule applies in respect of business names that should be but have not been registered under the Business Names Act 2002 s 4 (for example, business may be carried on under the proper names of the persons involved without registering a business name). A plaintiff is able to search the register of business names kept under that Act to identify the proprietors of a name (and their addresses) in order to name them individually as parties to proceedings.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.21

7.21

[r 7.20.1000]

Defendant sued in business name to respond in own name

(cf SCR Part 64, rule 4; DCR Part 46, rule 3; LCR Part 35, rule 3)

(1) In any proceedings in which a defendant is sued under a business name, the defendant must not enter an appearance or file a defence otherwise than in his or her own name. (2) When entering an appearance or filing a defence, the defendant must also file a statement of the names and residential addresses of all persons who were carrying on business under the business name concerned when the proceedings were commenced. (3) The court may order that a defendant’s notice of appearance or defence be struck out if the defendant has failed to comply with subrule (2).

RULE 7.21 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.21.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.21.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.21.1000]

[r 7.21.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance SCR Pt 64 r 4, DCR Pt 46 r 3 and LCR Pt 35 r 3. [r 7.21.40]

Operation

The rule requires a defendant sued under a business name to appear by the defendant’s own name and to supply a list of all other persons carrying on business under the business name when the proceedings were commenced. This facilitates the plaintiff amending the documents filed as required under r 7.22: see [r 7.22.40]. [r 7.21.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2005) pp 614–616; (7th ed, Lawbook Co., 2007) pp 592–593 and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) p 177. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 64 r 4; DCR Pt 46 r 3; LCR Pt 35 r 3. 7.22 Plaintiff to amend documents in the proceedings to replace business name with defendant’s own name (cf SCR Part 64, rule 5; DCR Part 46, rule 4; LCR Part 35, rule 4)

(1) In any proceedings in which a defendant is sued under a business name, the plaintiff must take such steps as are reasonably practicable: (a) to ascertain the name and residential address of the defendant, and (b) to amend such documents in the proceedings as will enable the proceedings to be continued against the defendant in his or her own name. (2) In any such proceedings, the plaintiff may not, except by leave of the court, take any step in the proceedings other than: (a) the steps of filing and serving originating process, and (b) steps to ascertain the name and residential address of the defendant, until the documents in the proceedings have been amended as referred to in subrule (1)(b).

364

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 6 – Relators

[r 7.22.1000]

r 7.23

RULE 7.22 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.22.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.22.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.22.1000]

[r 7.22.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 64 r 5(1) and (2), DCR Pt 46 r 4(1) and (2) and LCR Pt 35 r 4(1) and (2). The provisions in subrr (3) and (4) of each of those rules regarding the mode of amendment and service after amendment have not been reproduced in this rule. The provisions of SCR Pt 64 r 8, DCR Pt 46 r 7 regarding discovery in aid of identification of a defendant sued in a business name have not been reproduced – see the discussion at [r 7.20.40] regarding identification of such a defendant. [r 7.22.40]

Operation

This rule requires a plaintiff to take reasonably practical steps to determine the name and residential address of a defendant sued under a business name and amend the documents filed in the proceedings so as to name as a defendant the natural person rather than business name. Rule 19.1 allows one amendment to be made within 28 days after filing of a statement of claim, unless the court otherwise orders: see [r 19.1.20] – [r 19.1.40]. See also CPA s 64 regarding amendment outside the 28 day period and [r 19.5.40] regarding the mode of amendment of documents. Where defendant is sued under a business name, until the documents filed in the proceedings have been amended so as to name natural persons as defendants, the plaintiff cannot take any steps after filing and serving the originating process, other than steps to ascertain the name and residential address of a defendant, without the leave of the court. If, after appropriate steps have been taken to ascertain the name and residential address of a defendant, a plaintiff cannot identify name and address so as to be able to amend documents as required under this rule, leave may be sought to proceed to judgment against the business name as referred to in r 7.20(3). Rule 36.18 allows the court to vary a judgment or order entered against a person under a business name so that it may be enforced against an individual proprietor in the proprietor’s own name: see [r 36.18.40]. [r 7.22.1000]

References

Related provisions: CPA s 64, rr 19.1 and 19.5 regarding amendments. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 64 r 5; DCR Pt 46 r 4; LCR Pt 35 r 4.

UCPR Parts 1-10

DIVISION 6 – RELATORS 7.23 Relators (cf SCR Part 4, rule 5)

(1) A relator must act by a solicitor. (2) A solicitor may not act for a relator in any proceedings unless: (a) the relator has authorised the solicitor to act in that regard, and (b) a copy of the instrument authorising the solicitor to act in that regard has been filed.

RULE 7.23 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.23.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.23.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.23.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

365

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.24

[r 7.23.20]

[r 7.23.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 4 r 5. Subrule (3) of that rule provided that the authority for the solicitor to act could be written on the originating process but this is not carried over. [r 7.23.40]

Operation

A relator means the person responsible for costs, at whose suggestion (the Latin ex relatione, abbreviated ex rel), an action is commenced by the Attorney General. Relator proceedings are proceedings brought by a private citizen with the consent (the “fiat”) of the Attorney General seeking to enforce the law or the performance of duties by public bodies where the individual has suffered no special damage and does not seek to protect a private right. Relator proceedings may also be brought in relation to charitable trusts. The Charitable Trusts Act 1993 s 6 requires that where the Attorney General does not bring charitable trust proceedings as defined in the Act, with or without a relator, such proceedings may not be commenced without the authority of the Attorney General or leave of the court: Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski [2001] NSWSC 976. The courts do not have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Attorney-General to grant or refuse consent to a relator action: Gouriet v Union of Post Offıce Workers [1978] AC 435; [1977] 3 WLR 300; [1977] 3 All ER 70; (1977) 121 SJ 543, disapproving the dictum of Lord Denning MR in McWhirter v Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] QB 629 at 649, applied in Benjamin v Downs [1976] 2 NSWLR 199. Whilst the conduct of proceedings is left in the hands of the relator, that is as agent for the Attorney-General, and conduct of the proceedings is always under the control and direction of the Attorney-General: Gouriet v Union of Post Offıce Workers [1978] AC 435; [1977] 3 WLR 300; [1977] 3 All ER 70; (1977) 121 SJ 543 at 478 (AC). An attorney who granted a fiat for the institution of a proceeding may not thereafter intervene in the proceeding or make submissions either in support of or opposing the case advanced in the name of the attorney by the relator: Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 CLR 372; 76 ALJR 694; 188 ALR 1; [2002] HCA 16 at [286]–[287]. Where an undertaking as to damages is required as a condition of the grant of interim relief, the undertaking is given by the relator and not the Attorney-General: F Hoffmann-La Roche & Co Attorney-General v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 at 363 (see r 25.8 regarding the “usual undertaking as to damages”). [r 7.23.1000]

References

Regarding the exercise of the discretion whether or not to grant a fiat: The Hon L J King AC, QC, The Attorney-General, “Politics and the Judiciary” (2000) 74 ALJ 444 at 450–452. Regarding charitable trusts generally, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia Title 075 – Charities, (16) Court proceedings [75-1075]; [75-1255]. See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [9.560]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 4 r 5.

DIVISION 7 – APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF SOLICITORS 7.24

Power to act by solicitor

(cf SCR Part 66, rule 1; DCR Part 48, rule 1; LCR Part 37, rule 1)

(1) Every act, matter or thing which, by or under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 or these rules or otherwise by law, is required or allowed to be done by a party may be done by his or her solicitor. (2) Subrule (1) does not apply where the context or subject-matter otherwise indicates or requires.

RULE 7.24 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.24.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.24.40] 366

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 7 – Appointment and removal of solicitors

[r 7.24.80]

r 7.24

Challenge to solicitor’s retainer ................................................................................................................ [r 7.24.60] Solicitor being ordered to pay costs ......................................................................................................... [r 7.24.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.24.1000]

[r 7.24.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical in wording and the same in substance as former SCR Pt 66 r 1, DCR Pt 48 r 1 and LCR Pt 37 r 1. [r 7.24.40]

Operation

This rule makes clear that things required or permitted under the CPA or UCPR to be done by a party may be done by the party’s solicitor, except, by subr (2), where the context or subject matter otherwise indicates or requires. For example, the requirement that a party verify pleadings: see [r 14.23.40]; or make an affidavit supporting a list of documents: see [r 21.4.40]. See [r 7.1.100] regarding the granting of leave for an unqualified person to appear for a party in higher courts. [r 7.24.60]

Challenge to solicitor’s retainer

When a party to litigation challenges the retainer of the solicitor for the opposing party, for example by seeking an order that the appearances or defences of certain parties be struck out on the ground that the solicitor purporting to act for the parties is not retained, the onus of proving the lack of retainer is on the person making the challenge: Inglis v Moore (No 2) (1979) 46 FLR 470; 25 ALR 453 at 464–465 (ALR), Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 67 ALJR 678; 113 ALR 637 at 679–680 (also reported sub nom Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 67 ALJR 678; 113 ALR 637 at 638); Hawksford v Hawksford (2005) 191 FLR 173; [2005] NSWSC 463 at [34], [55]. A challenge to the retainer of the solicitor for the opposing party should be raised by motion, usually before the final hearing, and is not pleaded as a matter of defence: Doulaveras v Daher (2009) 253 ALR 627; [2009] NSWCA 58 at [133], [137]; per Campbell JA referring from [93] to Richard v Branson [1914] 1 Ch 968 and the line of authority considering it. [r 7.24.80]

Solicitor being ordered to pay costs

A challenge to the retainer of the solicitor for the opposing party should be raised by motion, usually before the final hearing, and is not pleaded as a matter of defence: Doulaveras v Daher (2009) 253 ALR 627; [2009] NSWCA 58 at [133], [137]; per Campbell JA referring from [93] to Richard v Branson [1914] 1 Ch 968 and the line of authority considering it. If a solicitor commences proceedings without being validly retained by plaintiff companies, parties which had not validly retained the solicitor may be struck out of the action and the solicitor ordered to bear so much of the defendant’s costs as were attributable to those companies being joined as plaintiffs and of the application challenging the retainer; the proceedings may be dismissed if no plaintiff then remained: Harry S Bagg’s Liquidation Warehouse Pty Ltd v Whittaker (1982) 44 NSWLR 421 at 430–431; AW & LM Forrest Pty Ltd v Beamish (1998) 146 FLR 450 at 458; Hawksford v Hawksford (2005) 191 FLR 173; [2005] NSWSC 463. A solicitor given notice of a challenge to retainer should determine whether the client’s authority to retain him or her can be objectively determined. Where that cannot be done, an order that the solicitor bear the costs may not be appropriate. If the solicitor acts for a defendant, and whether the defendant can retain a solicitor lies at the heart of the proceedings, a court would not readily order the solicitor to pay the costs of the proceedings even if it concluded that those the solicitor represented were not authorised to retain him or her: Zimmerman Holdings Pty Ltd v Wales [2002] NSWSC 447 at [5] per Bryson J; Hillig v Darkinjung Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 147 at [51]–[52], [55]–[56]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

367

UCPR Parts 1-10

When a party to litigation challenges the retainer of the solicitor for the opposing party, for example by seeking an order that the appearances or defences of certain parties be struck out on the ground that the solicitor purporting to act for the parties is not retained, the onus of proving the lack of retainer is on the person making the challenge: Inglis v Moore (No 2) (1979) 46 FLR 470; 25 ALR 453 at 464–465 (ALR), Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 67 ALJR 678; 113 ALR 637 at 679–680 (also reported sub nom Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 67 ALJR 678; 113 ALR 637 at 638); Hawksford v Hawksford (2005) 191 FLR 173; [2005] NSWSC 463 at [34], [55].

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.25

[r 7.24.0]

[r 7.24.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 21–22, 147–148 and 177. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 66 r 1; DCR Pt 48 r 1; LCR Pt 37 r 1. 7.25

Adverse parties

(cf SCR Part 66, rule 2; DCR Part 48, rule 2; LCR Part 37, rule 2)

If a solicitor or a partner of the solicitor is a party to any proceedings, or acts as solicitor for a party to any proceedings, that solicitor may not act for any other party in the proceedings, not in the same interest, except by leave of the court.

RULE 7.25 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.25.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.25.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.25.1000]

[r 7.25.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical in wording and the same in substance as former SCR Pt 66 r 2, DCR Pt 48 r 2 and LCR Pt 37 r 2. [r 7.25.40]

Operation

This rule prohibits a solicitor acting for a party in proceedings to which the solicitor or a partner of the solicitor is a party, and acting for parties not in the same interest, without the leave of the court. The rule applies where a partner of the solicitor acts for the other party because in general terms the knowledge of one partner is attributed to the other partners in a firm. The rule is designed to avoid conflict between the solicitor’s duty to serve the interests of each of the clients. The issue may arise where solicitors had been retained by the insurer of a party. The issue has been considered in practice where one party seeks to enjoin solicitors who formerly acted for the party from acting for another party, to protect confidential information disclosed in the course of the earlier retainer: Asia Pacific Telecommunications Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 550 (first application) and [2007] NSWSC 350 (second application); British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Blanch [2004] NSWSC 70; Belan v Casey [2002] NSWSC 58; Oceanic Life Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (1999) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-438; [1999] NSWSC 292; Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222; [1999] 2 WLR 215; [1999] 1 All ER 517; Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy (1999) 48 NSWLR 1; [1999] NSWCA 408 at 47–48. Generally counsel should not appear for two clients whose interests may conflict. The court is concerned that it should have the assistance of independent counsel for parties whose interests are not identical in the case before it: Nangus Pty Ltd v Charles Donovan Pty Ltd (in liq) [1989] VR 184. The Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 and Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 deal with conflict of interests (see rr 11 and 119 respectively). Failure to comply with those rules is capable of being professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct: Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) s 298(b) (formerly Legal Profession Act 1987 s 57D; Legal Profession Act 2004 s 498(1)(a)). [r 7.25.1000]

References

As to conflict of interests, see eg Dal Pont GE, Riley New South Wales Solicitors’ Manual (Law Society of New South Wales and Butterworths, subscription service) [7000] ff; Dal Pont GE, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility in Australia and New Zealand (4th ed, Lawbook Co., 2010) [7.05]ff; Young PW, “Prince Jefri Bolkiah Arrives in Australia” (1999) 73(11) ALJ 804. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 66 r 2; DCR Pt 48 r 2; LCR Pt 37 r 2.

368

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 7 – Appointment and removal of solicitors

[r 7.26.60]

7.26

r 7.26

Change of solicitor or agent

(cf SCR Part 66, rules 3 and 4; DCR Part 48, rule 4; LCR Part 37, rule 4)

(1) A party for whom there is a solicitor on the record in any proceedings may change solicitors. [Subr (1) am Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[9]]

(1A) The new solicitor on the record must hold an unrestricted practising certificate. [Subr (1A) insrt Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[10]]

(2) A solicitor who has another solicitor acting as his or her agent in relation to a party may change agents. (3) A party who changes solicitors, or whose solicitor changes agents, must file notice of the change. (4) A copy of the notice of change, as filed, must be served on all other active parties and, if practicable, on the former solicitor or agent. [R 7.26 am Rule 88 of 2009]

RULE 7.26 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.26.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.26.40] Form of notice .......................................................................................................................................... [r 7.26.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.26.1000]

[r 7.26.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 66 rr 3 and 4 and DCR Pt 48 r 4(1)–(3) and LCR Pt 37 r 4(1)–(3). Operation

While generally permitting a party to change solicitors, and a solicitor to change agents, the rule requires that a notice of any such change is filed with the court and served. Subrule (4) requires service on active parties and if practicable the former solicitor. “Active party” is defined in the Dictionary to the UCPR, to mean a party who has an address for service in the proceedings other than a party against whom no further claim in the proceedings subsists (ie against whom judgment has been entered in the proceedings, or in respect of whom the proceedings have been dismissed, withdrawn or discontinued). Rule 7.26(1A) expressly provides that a new solicitor on the record must hold an unrestricted practising certificate, carrying over the effect of r 7.1(6): see [r 7.1.50]. Rule 7.30 provides when any such change will take effect, which reflects the timing of filing and service of notice of the change: see [r 7.30.40]. [r 7.26.60]

Form of notice

Approved Form 77 – Notice of change or appointment of solicitor should be used where the firm of solicitors acting for a party changes (usually with a consequential change in the address for service), or a solicitor’s agent changes. The approved form of Notice of change of address for service (Form 76) will be applicable if only the address for service has changed, for example if the address of a party’s solicitors or the solicitor’s agent changes, or the name of the firm acting changes. Each form requires both the address for service for the party and the name of the solicitor acting for the party (the solicitor on the record: see [r 7.1.50]) as well as the contact solicitor, with day to day carriage of the proceedings if different. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

369

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 7.26.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.27

[r 7.2.60]

[r 7.26.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 21 and 148. Definitions: “active party” Dictionary to the UCPR. Approved forms: Form 76 Notice of change of address for service; Form 77 Notice of change or appointment of solicitor. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 66 rr 3 and 4; DCR Pt 48 r 4; LCR Pt 37 r 4. 7.27

Removal of solicitor

(cf SCR Part 66, rule 6; DCR Part 48, rule 4; LCR Part 37, rule 4)

(1) A party that terminates the authority of a solicitor to act on the party’s behalf must file notice of the termination. (2) A copy of the notice of termination, as filed, must be served on all other active parties and, if practicable, on the former solicitor. (3) Filing and service of the notice of termination on the other parties may be effected by the former solicitor. (4) This rule does not apply to a change of solicitor referred to in rule 7.26.

RULE 7.27 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.27.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.27.40] Form of notice .......................................................................................................................................... [r 7.27.60] Position of the former solicitor .................................................................................................................. [r 7.27.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.27.1000]

[r 7.27.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 66 r 6, DCR Pt 48 r 4(4) and LCR Pt 37 r 4(4). [r 7.27.40]

Operation

This rule requires that where a party terminates the retainer of the party’s solicitor, a notice of the termination must be filed with the court and served. Subrule (2) requires service on “active parties” and if practicable the former solicitor. Rule 7.30 provides when the termination will take effect, which reflects the timing of filing and service of notice of the termination of the solicitor’s retainer: see [r 7.30.40]. [r 7.27.60]

Form of notice

The approved form of Notice of removal of solicitor (Form 78) must be completed and served when a party terminates the authority of the party’s solicitor. The document will set out the new address for service for that party, which must comply with r 4.5, see [r 4.5.40]. [r 7.27.80]

Position of the former solicitor

If a party wishes to appear in person, having previously retained a solicitor, the solicitor should formally cease to act, although the solicitor may still remain in the background or be present in court in order to advise or assist a client; if the solicitor remained on the record while the client presented the case in person, there may be problems if the party appearing in person engaged in conduct which, if engaged in by a practitioner, would be a breach of the practitioner’s duty to the court: Wentworth v Rogers [1999] NSWCA 403 at [43]. The court will not generally permit a party to address the court while represented: Malouf v Malouf (2006) 65 NSWLR 449; [2006] NSWCA 83 at [170]–[179] (Mason P). 370

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 7 – Appointment and removal of solicitors

[r 7.28.1000] [r 7.27.1000]

r 7.29

References

Definitions: “active party” Dictionary to the UCPR. Approved forms: Form 78 Notice of removal of solicitor. Related rules: r 4.5, address for service. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 66 r 6; DCR Pt 48 r 4; LCR Pt 37 r 4. 7.28

Appointment of solicitor by previously unrepresented party

(cf SCR Part 66, rule 5; DCR Part 48, rule 3; LCR Part 37, rule 3)

(1) A party that acts for himself or herself in any proceedings may afterwards appoint a solicitor to act in the proceedings on the party’s behalf. (2) A party that appoints a solicitor as referred to in subrule (1) must file and serve notice of the appointment.

RULE 7.28 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.28.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.28.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.28.1000]

[r 7.28.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 66 r 5, DCR Pt 48 r 3(2) and LCR Pt 37 r 3(2). [r 7.28.40]

Operation

This rule requires that where a party appoints a solicitor, notice of the appointment must be filed with the court and served. The approved form is Form 77, Notice of change or appointment of solicitor. The notice should be served on “active parties”, as r 10.16 provides that filing is taken to have the same effect as service of a document required to be served on a person in default of appearance or a person who has entered an appearance but is not an active party to the proceeding: see [r 10.16.40]. Practically speaking it would be expected the new solicitor would promptly file and serve the appropriate notice.

[r 7.28.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 21 and 147–148. Definitions: “active party” Dictionary to the UCPR. Approved forms: Form 77 Notice of change or appointment of solicitor. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 66 r 5; DCR Pt 48 r 3; LCR Pt 37 r 3. 7.29 Withdrawal of solicitor (cf SCR Part 66, rule 7; DCR Part 48, rule 4; LCR Part 37, rule 4)

(1) A solicitor who ceases to act for a party in any proceedings may file notice of the change and serve the notice on the parties. (2) Except by leave of the court, a solicitor may not file or serve notice of the change unless he or she © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

371

UCPR Parts 1-10

Rule 7.30 provides when the notice will take effect, which reflects the timing of filing and service of notice of the appointment: see [r 7.30.40].

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.29

[r 7.29.20]

has filed and served on the client a notice of intention to file and serve the notice of change: (a) in the case of proceedings for which a date for trial has been fixed, at least 28 days before doing so, or (b) in any other case, at least 7 days before doing so. [Subr (2) am Rule 166 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]

(3) Unless notice of the change is filed with the leave of the court, a solicitor filing such a notice must include in the notice a statement as to the date on which service of the notice of intention required by subrule (2) was effected. (4) A solicitor may serve a notice of change or notice of intention under this rule on the former client by posting it to the former client at the residential or business address of the former client last known to the solicitor. [R 7.29 am Rule 166 of 2009]

RULE 7.29 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.29.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.29.40] Form of notices ......................................................................................................................................... [r 7.29.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.29.1000]

[r 7.29.20]

Comparison

This rule is modelled on former SCR Pt 66 r 7, DCR Pt 48 r 4(5)–(8) and LCR Pt 37 r 4(5)–(8). The time requirements for serving a notice of intention to cease to act provided in subr (2) for service on the former client have been standardised and adopt the former District Court requirements. DCR Pt 48 r 4(6)(a) also required that where a hearing date had not been fixed, the solicitor serve notice of the intention to cease to act on each party. Previously, unless leave had been granted, a solicitor had to file with a notice of ceasing to act an affidavit showing compliance with the rule as to service of notice of the intention to cease to act. [r 7.29.40]

Operation

The rule requires that the former client is given formal notice of the intention to cease to act before a notice of change is filed in the court registry and served on the client and the other parties. The notice should be served on “active parties”, as r 10.16 provides that filing is taken to have the same effect as service of a document required to be served on a person in default of appearance or a person who has entered an appearance but is not an active party to the proceeding: see [r 10.16.40]. The rule prevents solicitors ceasing to act for a client with less than 7 or 28 days notice in writing to the client (the longer period applying when a date for hearing has been fixed), unless the leave of the court is obtained, as in Super 1000 Pty Ltd v Pacific General Securities Ltd [2007] NSWSC 171. An application for leave under r 7.29(2) should be made by motion in the proceedings. See Pt 18 regarding motions generally. A solicitor’s failure to comply with r 7.29 may lead to an application for a costs order against the solicitor: see Leicester v Walton [1995] NSWCA 258; [CPA 98.40]; CPA s 99. Rule 7.30 provides when the notice of intention and notice of ceasing to act will take effect, which reflects the timing of filing and service of the notices: see [r 7.30.40]. While still on the record the solicitor remains responsible for the timely completion of steps to be taken on behalf of the party in the proceedings, such as the filing of submissions: see Leicester v Walton (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, Priestley, Sheller, Cole JJ, 22 November 1995) and [CPA 56.20] (overriding purpose). [r 7.29.60]

Form of notices

The approved form of Notice of intention to file a notice of ceasing to act (Form 79) must be filed and served by the solicitor who intends to cease acting, in accordance with the time limits set out in r 7.29(2), unless the court orders otherwise. 372

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 7 – Appointment and removal of solicitors

[r 7.30.40]

r 7.30

The approved form of Notice of ceasing to act (Form 80) may then be filed and served after the lapse of the relevant period of time, or in accordance with the orders made by the court. The date of service of the Notice of intention to cease to act (Form 79), or court order where applicable, must be set out in the Notice of ceasing to act. The Guide to preparing documents suggests that where the name of the party for whom the solicitor intends to cease to act does not appear in the title of the proceedings, as would be the case if that party was, for example, the third defendant, it is helpful to include both the name and role of the party in the Notice to [role of party] section of Form 79. The same will apply to Form 80. [r 7.29.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 21 and 148. Definitions: “active party” Dictionary to the UCPR. Approved forms: Form 79 Notice of intention to file and serve notice of ceasing to act, and Form 80 Notice of ceasing to act. As to costs orders: [CPA 98.40]; [CPA 99.40]; [r Pt42.280]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 66 r 7; DCR Pt 48 r 4; LCR Pt 37 r 4. 7.30

Effect of change

(cf SCR Part 66, rule 8; DCR Part 48, rule 5; LCR Part 37, rule 5)

A change for which notice is required or permitted to be given under this Division does not take effect: (a) as regards the court, until the notice is filed, and (b) as regards any person on whom it is required or permitted to be served, until a copy of the notice, as filed, is served on that person.

RULE 7.30 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.30.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.30.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.30.1000]

[r 7.30.20]

Comparison

[r 7.30.40]

Operation

The effect of this rule is that where another rule requires that notice of a change of representation is to be filed and served, the change does not take effect until the required notice of change has been filed (insofar as the court is concerned) and served on any other party required or permitted to be served with notice of the change. This is important because of the provisions for service on a party at the party’s address for service: see [r 10.5.40]. This rule applies to: • notice of change of solicitor or agent, required to be filed and served on all other “active parties”: see [r 7.26.40]; • notice of termination of the authority of a solicitor, required to be filed and served on all other “active parties”: see [r 7.27.40]; • notice of the appointment of a solicitor by a previously unrepresented party, required to be filed and served: see [r 7.28.40]; and • a solicitor’s notice of ceasing to act, required to be filed and served on the parties: see [r 7.29.40]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

373

UCPR Parts 1-10

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 66 r 8, DCR Pt 48 r 5 and LCR Pt 37 r 5.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.31

[r 7.30.40]

“Active party” is defined in the Dictionary to the UCPR, to mean a party who has an address for service in the proceedings other than a party against whom no further claim in the proceedings subsists (ie against whom judgment has been entered in the proceedings, or in respect of whom the proceedings have been dismissed, withdrawn or discontinued). [r 7.30.1000]

References

Definitions: “active party” Dictionary to the UCPR. Related rules: r 7.26, r 7.27, r 7.28, r 7.29. As to service: [r 10.5.40]. See generally the discussion in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) p 21. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 66 r 8; DCR Pt 48 r 5; LCR Pt 37 r 5. 7.31

Actions by a solicitor corporation

(cf SCR Part 66, rule 10)

Where, by or under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 or these rules or otherwise by law: (a) any act, matter or thing is authorised or required to be done by a solicitor for a person, and (b) the solicitor is a solicitor corporation, and (c) the act, matter or thing can, in the circumstances of the case, only be done by a natural person, the act, matter or thing may be done by a solicitor who is a director, officer or employee of the corporation.

RULE 7.31 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.31.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.31.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.31.1000]

[r 7.31.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical in wording and the same in substance as SCR Pt 66 r 10. There is no equivalent DCR or LCR provision. [r 7.31.40]

Operation

This rule makes specific provision for incorporated legal practices (see Legal Profession Act 1987 Pt 3 Div 2A and the former Pt 10A; Legal Profession Act 2004 Pt 2.6; from 1 July 2015 Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) Pt 3.7). [r 7.31.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 66 r 10.

374

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 7.32.60]

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 8 – Commencement of proceedings under particular Acts

r 7.32

DIVISION 8 – COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER PARTICULAR ACTS [Div 8 insrt Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 4[1]]

7.32

Proceedings under the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989

(1) Without limiting rule 7.1(1), an appropriate officer within the meaning of the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989 may commence and carry on proceedings in the Local Court by a police prosecutor in relation to an application under that Act: (a) for a pecuniary penalty order, forfeiture order or drug proceeds order under that Act, or (b) for confirmation of a freezing notice. [Subr (1) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 4[2]]

(2) Once proceedings of the kind referred to in subrule (1)(a) or (b) (the original proceedings) have been commenced under the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989 in relation to any person, whether in the Local Court or elsewhere, any further proceedings under that Act in relation to the same person (whether or not they form part of, or relate to, the original proceedings), are to be commenced by notice of motion filed in the original proceedings. Note: Pursuant to rule 6.4, the original proceedings must be commenced by summons. [Subr (2) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 4[2]] [R 7.32 am Rule 579 of 2007; insrt Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 4[1]]

RULE 7.32 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.32.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.32.40] Further proceedings ................................................................................................................................. [r 7.32.60]

[r 7.32.20]

Comparison

This rule is new. It makes specific provision for certain proceedings under the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989 consequential on amendments to that Act commencing on 1 January 2008. Operation

This rule permits a police prosecutor to commence and carry on proceedings under the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989 on behalf of the Commissioner of Police seeking a pecuniary penalty order, forfeiture order, or drug proceeds order, or an order confirming a freezing notice. Such orders are dealt with in Pt 2 and Div 1A of Pt 3 of that Act. The Commissioner of Police is an appropriate officer for the purpose of functions under the Act exercised before or in relation to the Local Court, other than in relation to restraining orders the subject of Div 2 of Pt 3 of the Act. This rule supplements the provision made in r 7.1 as to the circumstances in which someone who is not a solicitor may act on behalf of another person. Specific provision is made in r 7.1(5) for a commercial or other agent to commence and carry on limited kinds of proceedings in the Local Court: see [r 7.1.80]. [r 7.32.60]

Further proceedings

Rule 7.32(2) requires that all other proceedings and or further applications under the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989 relating to a particular person be commenced by a notice of motion filed in the original proceedings rather than separate summonses being filed. See Pt 18 regarding notices of motion generally. The court file created in relation to the original proceedings will then contain all subsequent applications without separate court files being created on the filing of further summonses.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

375

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 7.32.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.33

[r 7.33.20]

DIVISION 9 – COURT APPOINTED REFERRAL FOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE [Div 9 insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

7.33

Objectives

(cf SCR Part 66A, rule 1; DCR Part 28C, rule 1)

(1) In the interpretation of this Division, preference must be given to a construction that will promote, and be consistent with, the purpose in subrule (2) and the statements in subrules (3) and (4). (2) The purpose of this Division is to facilitate, where it is in the interests of the administration of justice, the provision of legal assistance to litigants who are otherwise unable to obtain assistance. (3) The provision of legal assistance under this Division is not intended to be a substitute for legal aid. (4) A referral under this Division is not an indication that the court has formed an opinion on the merits of a litigant’s case. (5) Nothing in this Division requires the court to make a referral, or to consider a litigant’s case for referral, under this Division. [R 7.33 insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 7.33 COMMENTARY [r 7.33.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 66A r 1 and DCR Pt 28C r 1. 7.34 Definitions (cf SCR Part 66A, rule 2; DCR Part 28C, rule 2)

In this Division: litigant, in relation to any proceedings, means: (a) a party to the proceedings, or (b) a person who has been served with a subpoena in the proceedings, or (c) a person who has applied to be joined in the proceedings. Pro Bono Panel means the list of barristers and solicitors referred to in rule 7.35. registrar means: (a) in relation to the Supreme Court, the principal registrar of that Court or any registrar of that Court nominated by the principal registrar, and (b) in relation to the Land and Environment Court, the registrar of that Court, and (b1) in relation to the Industrial Relations Commission, the Industrial Registrar referred to in section 207 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996, and (c) in relation to the District Court when sitting at a proclaimed place (within the meaning of the District Court Act 1973), the registrar of the District Court for that place, and (d) in relation to the Local Court, the registrar for that Local Court. [Def am Rule 773 of 2014, r 3; Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[2]; am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

scheme means the scheme for the provision of legal assistance to litigants under this Division. [R 7.34 am Rule 773 of 2014; Rule 326 of 2009; Rule 579 of 2007; insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

376

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 7.35.40]

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 9 – Court appointed referral for legal assistance

r 7.36

RULE 7.34 COMMENTARY [r 7.34.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 66A r 2 and DCR Pt 28C r 2 with the addition of a definition of registrar to define the relevant registrar for each of the Supreme Court, Land and Environment Court, District Court and Local Court. From 5 December 2014, the Industrial Registrar has been added in relation to the Industrial Relations Commission. In the Supreme Court, the principal registrar (see SCA s 19), may nominate a registrar to exercise the principal registrar’s powers under this Part. 7.35 Pro Bono Panel (cf SCR Part 66A, rule 3; DCR Part 28C, rule 3)

The registrar may maintain a list of persons: (a) who are barristers or solicitors, and (b) who have agreed to participate in the scheme in relation to that court. [R 7.35 insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 7.35 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.35.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.35.40]

[r 7.35.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 66A r 3 and DCR Pt 28C r 3. [r 7.35.40]

Operation

Each of the courts to whom the rules apply will maintain lists of barristers or solicitors who have agreed to participate in the court’s legal assistance scheme. In addition to the pro bono panels maintained by the courts, pro bono assistance schemes are operated by the Bar Association and the Law Society. Further, the approved forms of originating process require information about LawAccess to be included on the document, giving a litigant the telephone number and website address, www.lawaccess.nsw.gov.au, at the time they are served with the originating process. LawAccess provides, by telephone, information, some legal advice and referrals to other avenues of assistance.

(cf SCR Part 66A, rule 4; DCR Part 28C, rule 4)

(1) If satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice, the court may, by order, refer a litigant to the registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for legal assistance. (2) For the purposes of subrule (1), the court may take into account: (a) the means of the litigant, and (b) the capacity of the litigant to obtain legal assistance outside the scheme, and (c) the nature and complexity of the proceedings, and (d) any other matter that the court considers appropriate. (2A) The court may not refer a litigant for assistance under this rule if the litigant has obtained assistance under a previous referral at any time during the immediately preceding period of 3 years unless the court is satisfied that there are special reasons that justify a further referral. [Subr (2A) insrt Rule 166 of 2009, Sch 1[4]]

(3) The power to refer may be exercised in the absence of the public and without any attendance by or on behalf of any person. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

377

UCPR Parts 1-10

7.36 Referral to a barrister or solicitor

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.36

[r 7.36.20]

(4) If a litigant is referred for assistance under this rule, the registrar must attempt to arrange for legal assistance to be provided to the litigant by a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel. (4A) If the registrar is unable to arrange legal assistance for a litigant who is referred under this rule within 28 days after the litigant’s referral, the registrar may make an order terminating the litigant’s referral. [Subr (4A) insrt Rule 166 of 2009, Sch 1[5]]

(5) The registrar may refer a litigant to a particular barrister or solicitor only if the barrister or solicitor has agreed to accept the referral. (6) A referral to a barrister does not prevent a referral also being made to a solicitor and a referral to a solicitor does not prevent a referral also being made to a barrister. [R 7.36 am Rule 166 of 2009; insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 7.36 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.36.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.36.40] Application under this rule ........................................................................................................................ [r 7.36.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 7.36.1000]

[r 7.36.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 66A r 4 and DCR Pt 28C r 4. [r 7.36.40]

Operation

This rule permits a court to refer a party for pro bono assistance. Frequently such applications are dealt with in chambers. The pre-conditions to referral expressly invoke the interests of the administration of justice as well as the matters set out in r 7.36(2). In Hui v Commonwealth [2001] FCA 69, the Full Federal Court said at [6] that of the equivalent provision in the Federal Court Rules, O 80, that the focus should be on the needs of the court and the proper administration of justice and the use of O 80 should be confined to cases of particular need. The court would ordinarily be reluctant to grant certificates in respect of matters that appear to be without merit: Kelly v Mosman Municipal Council (2010) 178 LGERA 136; [2010] NSWCA 370 at [19]–[20]; Hetherington-Gregory v All Vehicle Services (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 257 at [3]–[7]; M v Director General, Department of Family & Community Services [2013] NSWCA 118 at [21]; Sharpe v Hargraves Secured Investments Ltd [2013] NSWCA 288 at [42]–[45]. It may be appropriate to grant a certificate for the limited purpose of obtaining advice – see r 7.37(a) – in a case which appears to be without legal merit where there is some prospect that the advice would assist the litigant to understand the defects in the case with a view to avoiding unnecessary litigation: Dafaalla v Concord Repatriation General Hospital [2007] NSWSC 602 at [9]; Phu v Department of Education & Training (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 119. The nature and complexity of the proceedings, the kind of assistance that might be provided and the extent to which such assistance would be likely to advance the just, quick and cheap resolution of the proceedings are relevant to consider: Margan v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 196 at [5]. Where the amounts at stake are exceeding extremely large, a pro bono referral is unlikely: Neale v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2015] NSWCA 136 at [13]. Frequently, it may be appropriate to consider referring a matter, if such consideration is to be given at all, at an early stage of proceedings involving a litigant in person, rather than later in proceedings, cf: Douglas v Land & Housing Corp (NSW) [2008] NSWCA 315 at [35]. A referral under r 7.36 has the potential to avoid a judge being required to undertake the difficult balancing act otherwise required of a court before whom an unrepresented litigant is appearing: Douglas v Land & Housing Corp (NSW) [2008] NSWCA 315 at [39]–[41], referring to McMurtrie v Commonwealth [2006] NSWCA 148 at [47] and Jae Kyung Lee v Bob Chae-Sang Cha [2008] NSWCA 13 at [48] regarding unrepresented litigants. 378

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 9 – Court appointed referral for legal assistance

[r 7.37.40] [r 7.36.60]

r 7.37

Application under this rule

An application by a litigant for a referral under r 7.36 should be made by motion in the proceedings, although the court may make a referral on its own motion. See Pt 18 regarding motions generally. While a degree of informality in the making of an application for a referral could be expected from an unrepresented litigant, the court would be assisted by an affidavit setting the litigant’s means and efforts to obtain other legal assistance, outside the pro bono scheme. [r 7.36.80]

Second application within three years

Rule 7.36(2A) requires the court to find “special reasons” justifying a further referral for pro bono assistance if the litigant has obtained assistance under a previous referral at any time within the previous three years. “Special reasons” so as to lift the case out of the ordinary were not found in Serobian v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2010] NSWSC 1165, see at [30]–[33] applying Gourlay v Casey (1927) 38 CLR 586; [1927] VLR 177 at 591, per Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Powers JJ; and Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195. The court is likely to require an explanation as to why any previous referral came to an end, pursuant to r 7.39 (as to which see [r 7.39.40]: compare Wily v Terra Cresta Business Solutions Pty Ltd (in liq) [2009] NSWSC 1324. The meaning of “special reasons” in the context of production of documents in relation to personal injury claims is discussed in [r 21.8.40] and [r 21.12.40]. [r 7.36.1000]

References

“Special reasons” see [r 21.8.40], [r 21.12.40]. Approved forms: Form 20 Notice of Motion, Form 40 Affidavit. 7.37

Kind of assistance

(cf SCR Part 66A, rule 5; DCR Part 28C, rule 5)

A referral may be made for the following kinds of assistance: (a) advice in relation to the proceedings, (b) representation on directions hearing, interlocutory or final hearing, arbitration or mediation, (c) drafting or settling of documents to be filed or used in the proceedings, (d) representation generally in the conduct of the proceedings or of part of the proceedings. [R 7.37 insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.37.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.37.40]

[r 7.37.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 66A r 5 and DCR Pt 28C r 5. [r 7.37.40]

Operation

This rule gives the court the power to limit the scope of a referral of a litigant for legal assistance. A referral may in the first case be only for advice and preparation of an amended pleading, if the practitioner is of the view that the party has an arguable case. The court may subsequently extend the certificate to provide for referral for other purposes: compare Dafaalla v Concord Repatriation General Hospital [2007] NSWSC 602 at [13]–[14].

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

379

UCPR Parts 1-10

RULE 7.37 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.38

7.38

[r 7.38.20]

Provision of assistance by barrister or solicitor

(cf SCR Part 66A, rule 6; DCR Part 28C, rule 6)

Subject to rule 7.39, if a barrister or solicitor agrees to accept a referral, he or she must provide assistance to the litigant in accordance with the referral. [R 7.38 insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 7.38 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.38.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.38.40]

[r 7.38.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 66A r 6 and DCR Pt 28C r 6. [r 7.38.40]

Operation

A barrister or a solicitor who agrees to accept a referral is obliged to provide legal assistance to the litigant and may only cease to do so in accordance with r 7.39. 7.39 Cessation of assistance (cf SCR Part 66A, rule 7; DCR Part 28C, rule 7)

(1) A barrister or solicitor who has agreed to accept a referral may cease to provide legal assistance to the litigant only: (a) in the circumstances set out in any practice rules governing professional conduct that apply to the barrister or solicitor, or (b) with the written agreement of the litigant, or (c) with the leave of the registrar. (2) If a barrister or solicitor ceases to provide legal assistance to a litigant, the barrister or solicitor must inform the registrar in writing within 7 days of so ceasing. (3) If a barrister or solicitor ceases to provide legal assistance to a litigant, the referral of the litigant for legal assistance in the proceedings concerned is taken, unless the court otherwise orders, to have been terminated on that cessation. [Subr (3) insrt Rule 166 of 2009, Sch 1[6]] [R 7.39 am Rule 166 of 2009; insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 7.39 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.39.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.39.40]

[r 7.39.20] Comparison This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 66A r 7 and DCR Pt 28C r 7. [r 7.39.40] Operation This rule provides for the mechanism by which a barrister or a solicitor who agreed to accept a referral may cease to provide legal assistance to a litigant. A barrister or solicitor who accepted a referral cannot otherwise cease to act. Unless the Court otherwise orders, there will be no referral of the litigant to a different barrister or solicitor after termination of the referral under r 7.39(3). The limitation on subsequent referrals under r 7.36(2A) will then apply to any application for a further referral. 380

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 7 – Parties to proceedings and representation Division 9 – Court appointed referral for legal assistance

[r 7.40.20]

r 7.41

The manner in which an application for leave of the Registrar to cease to provide legal assistance is to be made is set out in r 7.40. 7.40

Application for leave

(cf SCR Part 66A, rule 8; DCR Part 28C, rule 8)

(1) An application by a barrister or solicitor to the registrar for leave to cease to provide legal assistance must be in writing and must briefly state the reasons for the application. (2) A copy of the application for leave must be served on the litigant. (3) An application for leave may be heard by the registrar in the absence of the public and without any attendance by or on behalf of any person. (4) In deciding whether to grant leave under this rule, the registrar may consider any of the following matters: (a) whether the barrister or solicitor would be likely to be able to cease to provide legal assistance to the litigant under any practice rules governing professional conduct that apply to the barrister or solicitor, (b) any conflict of interest that the barrister or solicitor may have, (c) whether there is a substantial disagreement between the barrister or solicitor and the litigant in relation to the conduct of the litigation, (d) any view of the barrister or solicitor: (i) that the litigant’s case is not well founded in fact or law, or (ii) that the litigant’s prosecution of the litigation is an abuse of process, (e) whether the barrister or solicitor lacks the time to provide adequate legal assistance to the litigant because of other professional commitments, (f) whether the litigant has refused or failed to pay any disbursements requested under rule 7.42, (g) whether it is unfair to the barrister or solicitor to require him or her to continue to provide legal assistance under the scheme, (h) any other matter that the registrar considers relevant. (5) An (a) (b) (c)

application for leave under this rule and any related correspondence: is confidential, and is not part of the proceedings in relation to which the referral was made, and does not form part of the court file in relation to those proceedings.

[R 7.40 insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

[r 7.40.20]

UCPR Parts 1-10

RULE 7.40 COMMENTARY Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 66A r 8 and DCR Pt 28C r 8. 7.41 Costs (cf SCR Part 66A, rule 9; DCR Part 28C, rule 9)

(1) Subject to subrules (2) and (3) and rule 7.42, a barrister or solicitor who provides legal assistance to a litigant under the scheme must not seek or recover any costs for the legal assistance. (2) If an order for costs is made in favour of a litigant who is assisted under the scheme, the barrister or solicitor who has provided the legal assistance is entitled to recover the amount of costs that another person is required to pay under the order. (3) A barrister or solicitor must account to the litigant for any money received by the barrister or solicitor in respect of any disbursements that have been paid by the litigant. [R 7.41 insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

381

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 7.41

[r 7.41.20]

RULE 7.41 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.41.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.41.40]

[r 7.41.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 66A r 9 and DCR Pt 28C r 9. [r 7.41.40]

Operation

The rule permits a barrister or solicitor who has provided legal assistance pursuant to a referral to recover costs where another party is ordered to pay costs. The rule overcomes the problem of recovering costs under the indemnity principle where the barrister or solicitor is otherwise not permitted to seek payment of costs from his or her pro bono client. Under the indemnity principle a party ordered to pay costs is obliged to pay only those costs which the receiving party is legally obliged to pay his or her solicitor or barrister. See [r Pt42.500] as to the operation of the indemnity principle; Wentworth v Rogers [1999] NSWCA 403 at [52]–[55]; Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145 at [102]–[132]. 7.42 Disbursements (cf SCR Part 66A, rule 10; DCR Part 28C, rule 10)

A barrister or solicitor who provides legal assistance to a litigant under the scheme may request the litigant to pay any disbursements that have been, or may reasonably be, incurred by the barrister or solicitor on the litigant’s behalf in connection with the legal assistance. [R 7.42 insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 7.42 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 7.42.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 7.42.40]

[r 7.42.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 66A r 10 and DCR Pt 28C r 10. [r 7.42.40]

Operation

The rule permits a barrister or solicitor to request the litigant to pay disbursements in connection with the legal assistance, such as photocopying. A litigant’s refusal or failure to pay disbursements may be a basis for seeking leave to cease to provide assistance: see r 7.40(4)(f).

382

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Venue [r 8.1.60]

r 8.1

PART 8 – VENUE [Pt 8 note rep Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[3]]

Commentary by Ed Cox, Barrister. Updated by Carol Webster SC.

PART 8 COMMENTARY Overview of Part 8 ..................................................................................................................................... [r Pt8.20] Local Court Proceedings ............................................................................................................................ [r Pt8.40]

[r Pt8.20]

Overview of Part 8

UCPR rr 8.1 and 8.2 replace SCR Pt 33 r 2 and introduce a uniform procedure across all courts. In unifying the different courts venue procedures Pt 8 adopts with some modifications the change of venue provisions previously contained in DCR Pt 2A and DCA s 40. A similar procedure also existed in LCR Pts 1 and 3. [r Pt8.40]

Local Court Proceedings

On the commencement of the Local Court Act 2007 (which repealed the Local Courts Act 1982 and replaced the former separately constituted Local Courts with a single Local Court of NSW), a note to the Part stating that in the case of proceedings in a Local Court, a change of venue may involve the transfer of proceedings between Local Courts (dealt with in Div 3 of Pt 9 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, and Div 1 of Pt 44 of these Uniform Civil Procedure Rules) was deleted, as were those provisions of the CPA and these Rules. 8.1 Venue at which proceedings to be heard (cf Act No 9 1973, section 4; DCR Part 2A, rule 1; LCR Part 1, rule 3, Part 3, rule 2)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, the venue at which proceedings are to be heard is the venue specified by the plaintiff in the originating process. (2) The venue so specified must be a venue at which the court sits.

RULE 8.1 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 8.1.20] Presumption of appropriate venue ............................................................................................................. [r 8.1.60]

[r 8.1.20]

Comparison

Subrule (1) is similar in wording to para (a) of the definition of “proper place” in the District Court Act 1973 s 4. Subrule (2) reproduces the substance of former DCR Pt 2A r 1. [r 8.1.60]

Presumption of appropriate venue

When a plaintiff commences proceedings the summons or statement of claim must nominate a venue for the proceedings to be heard, a venue must be one at which the court usually sits. The initial venue nominated by the plaintiff may be varied by the court by its own motion or following an application by either party. Unless the court makes a specific order the venue for the hearing will be the place initially nominated by the plaintiff on the summons or statement of claim.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

383

UCPR Parts 1-10

There is no equivalent SCR provision.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 8.2

8.2

[r 8.2.20]

Change of venue generally

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 40; DCR Part 2A, rule 4)

(1) If it appears to the court: (a) that a fair or unprejudiced trial of a question arising or likely to arise in or in connection with any proceedings cannot otherwise be had, or (b) for any other reason it is appropriate for the venue of any proceedings to be changed, the court may, subject to this Part, make an order changing the venue of the proceedings. (2) The judicial officer before whom proceedings are being heard by the court may direct that proceedings commenced at one location be continued at another location at which he or she is authorised to hear those proceedings.

RULE 8.2 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 8.2.20] Principles relevant to change of venue ...................................................................................................... [r 8.2.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r 8.2.1000]

[r 8.2.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of DCA s 40 and Pt 2A r 4(1). The provisions in Pt 2A r 4(2) and (3) regarding transfer of the court file have not been reproduced in this rule. There is no equivalent SCR. [r 8.2.60]

Principles relevant to change of venue

The court has a discretion to order where the proceedings will be tried. The place of hearing must be a place where the court sits, subject to evidence being taken on commission, letters of request or special arrangement. The traditional test for determining whether the venue should be changed from the place nominated by the plaintiff is whether “there is a manifest preponderance of convenience in trying the cause in the place to which the defendant seek to remove the venue”: Church v Barnett (1871) LR 6 CP 116 at 177–178; see also Hobler v Francis [1911] St R Qd 17. That test has been applied by the Federal Court in relation to a differently worded rule: National Mutual Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1988) 19 FCR 155; 83 ALR 434. The test has also been described as requiring a defendant to show that the plaintiff’s nominated venue creates “great inconvenience or injustice”: Lehtonen v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1963] NSWR 323. Rule 8.2(1)(b) seems to vary the test stated above by providing a broad discretionary power to change the venue “for any other reason”. Rule 8.2(1)(a) seems to retain the presumption that a plaintiff is entitled to chose the venue, and the defendant must identify some particular injustice or inconvenience in that proposed venue. The precise limits of the new UCPR test will need to await judicial consideration. Some authorities have suggested that the place of hearing ought be that where the cause of action accrued or where the balance of the crucial witnesses reside: Lehtonen v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd [1963] NSWR 323; Kings Cross Whisper Pty Ltd v O’Neil [1968] 2 NSWR 289; Jacobs v Claudius Enterprises Pty Ltd [1985] ATPR 40-511; Hodder v Australian Workers’ Union [1985] 4 FCR 541; (1985) 11 IR 42. See also Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460; [1986] 3 WLR 972; [1986] 3 All ER 843 and Bankinvest Attorney-General v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711; 92 FLR 153; 90 ALR 407 concerning the approach to balancing the convenience of a particular venue for the hearing. In determining which is the appropriate venue the court may take into account a wide range of circumstances, including: (a) The venue nominated by the plaintiff at the time the summons or statement of claim is filed. (b) Whether the parties can be assured that they will receive a fair trial at the proposed venue. This consideration may however only be significant in cases to be tried before a jury. 384

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 8 – Venue [r 8.3.20]

r 8.3

(c) (d) (e) (f)

The ordinary place of residence or business of the parties and any material witnesses. The place where the cause of action arose, or has the most substantial or real connection. Any prejudice to a party cause by a particular venue. The costs, disruption or inconvenience associated with a particular venue to either a party or the court. (g) Any likely delay to the final resolution of the proceedings which would be occasioned by the change of venue. Different considerations apply to change of venue in criminal proceedings: R v Cattell (1967) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 391; [1968] 1 NSWR 156; R v Yanner [1998] 2 Qd R 208; (1997) 98 A Crim R 51. [r 8.2.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in BC Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co, 2014), [16.220]–[16.230]. 8.3 Part not to apply to orders for examination This Part does not apply to the examination of a judgment debtor under an order for examination.

RULE 8.3 COMMENTARY [r 8.3.20]

Comparison

UCPR Parts 1-10

There is no equivalent SCR or DCR.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

385

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt9.20]

PART 9 – CROSS-CLAIMS Commentary by Adrian Diethelm, Academic Dean and Deputy Rector, University of Sydney. Updated by Greg Sarginson, Barrister.

PART 9 COMMENTARY Right to cross-claim ................................................................................................................................... [r Pt9.20] Cross-claim and set-off – historical ............................................................................................................ [r Pt9.40] Cross-claim and set-off – limitation of actions ........................................................................................... [r Pt9.60] References ............................................................................................................................................. [r Pt9.1000]

[r Pt9.20]

Right to cross-claim

CPA s 22 confers on a defendant a right to cross-claim in the proceedings, the scope of the right varying according to whether the cross-defendant is a plaintiff in the proceedings. A defendant may cross-claim against a plaintiff for any relief which the court could grant in separate proceedings brought for that purpose. A cross-claim against a person not a plaintiff may only brought for relief which “relates to, or is connected with, the subject of” the proceedings which are already on foot. [r Pt9.40]

Cross-claim and set-off – historical

Cross-claims need to be distinguished from set-offs. CPA s 21 deals with set-off, s 22 with cross-claims, and s 90 allows judgment to be given for a balance of a claim and cross-claim. The history of this distinction is outlined in Stehar Knitting Mills Pty Ltd v Southern Textile Converters Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 514 and can be summarised as follows: (i) At common law if the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant in an amount equal to or exceeding the amount which the defendant owed to the plaintiff, that provided no ground for the defendant to resist judgment for the full amount of the plaintiff’s claim: relief could only be obtained in equity. (ii) The Statutes of Set-off of 1729 and 1735 permitted the defendant to plead a debt due from the plaintiff as a defence, so that judgment would only be given for the balance, if any, due from the defendant. These statutory provisions permitted set-off only where both claims were liquidated, and were made applicable in NSW by the Charter of Justice of 1828. (iii) The Common Law Procedure Act 1857 (NSW) provided that a counter-claim by the defendant in the nature of a cross-action (not falling within the Statutes of Set-off) could by leave of the judge be pleaded by way of set-off. This provision was interpreted to apply only to cross-actions which arose out of the same transaction. (iv) To overcome that interpretation a rule of court was made in 1926 that a cross-action could be set up whether or not it arose out of the same transaction, thus removing the need to plead any cross-action by way of set-off (ie as a defence). (v) By the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 s 3 a defendant was given the right to seek relief against a third party provided the claim was connected with the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim. (vi) The Statutes of Set-off were repealed by the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969. (vii) Section 78 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 made provision for the court to grant to the defendant all such relief against any person as might be granted if the defendant sued such person in separate proceedings. SCR Pt 15 r 25 provided that where a claim by a defendant to a sum of money (whether of an ascertained amount or not) was relied on as a defence, it may be set off against the plaintiff’s claim, whether or not the defendant also cross-claims for that sum of money. (viii) In Stehar Knitting Mills Pty Ltd v Southern Textile Converters Pty Ltd it was held that the effect of s 78 and Pt 15 r 25 was to permit legal set-off (and to extend its scope to unliquidated claims) despite the repeal of the Statutes of Set-off. (ix) SCR Pt 15 r 25 was omitted from SCR in 1984. The distinction between cross-claims and set-off at law did not affect the doctrine of equitable set-off, which, in circumstances where that doctrine applied, could operate substantively (ie extra-curially) to extinguish claims pro tanto: see Meagher R, Heydon J and Leeming M, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity Doctrines 386

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 9 – Cross-claims [r Pt9.1000]

r 9.1

and Remedies (4th ed, LexisNexis) Ch 37. Nor did it affect set-off in insolvency under s 86 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and (now) s 553C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The position, then, as from the repeal of SCR Pt 15 r 25 in 1984 was that there was no provision for legal set-off in NSW (that is, pleading a claim against the plaintiff by way of defence), and set-off was restricted to situations of equitable set-off or insolvency set-off: AWA Ltd v Exicom Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 19 NSWLR 705. In 2000 the Law Reform Commission (Report 94, Set-off) recommended the enactment of a right of set-off for liquidated claims, which has been done in CPA s 22. The distinction between a set off and a cause of action giving rise to a countervailing claim is relevant to whether or not a judgment creates an issue estoppel in subsequent proceedings between the parties: Chua v Archiworks Architects Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 411 at [44]–[46]. [r Pt9.60]

Cross-claim and set-off – limitation of actions

Section 74 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) provides that for the purposes of that Act a claim made “by way of set off, counterclaim or cross action” is, as against a person against whom the claim is made, a separate action and brought on the earlier of the date on which the person becomes a party to the principal action, and the date on which the person becomes a party to the claim. Thus, for the purposes of a set-off or a cross-claim against the plaintiff the relevant date will be the commencement of the proceedings, while for a cross-claim against a third party (or set-off raised by a third party cross-defendant) the relevant date will be the filing of the cross-claim: O’Neill v Foster (2004) 61 NSWLR 499; [2004] NSWSC 906; Stanton v The Owners - Strata Plan No 60724 [2010] NSWSC 175 at [20]–[28]; Cooper v Mulcahy [2012] NSWSC 373 at [214]–[215]. Where a cross claim is made by a defendant against a third party co-defendant who is also a party to the proceedings, the relevant date is the date they became a party to the proceedings: Nelson v Wyong Shire Council (1989) 68 LGRA 164 at 169; [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81–177; Weston v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd [2011] NSWSC 433 at [249]. The position under the Limitation Act 1969 may be contrasted with the pre-existing position stated by Dixon J in McDonnell & East Ltd v McGregor (1936) 56 CLR 50; [1936] ALR 324, to the effect that a set-off, as matter of defence, will not be barred unless the limitation period expired before the time at which the proceedings were commenced; but a cross-claim will be barred if the limitation period expired before the cross-claim is filed. Semble “no defence, properly so called is subject to a time bar”: Rederiv Rolimpex [1974] QB 233, followed in Sidney Raper Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1975] 2 NSWLR 227; (1975) 25 FLR 217, without however considering the extent to which this proposition is affected by s 74 of the Limitation Act 1969. [r Pt9.1000]

References

Limitation period for cross-claims: Handford, Limitation of Actions: The Australian Law (3rd ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) pp 87–88. 9.1

Making of cross-claim

(cf SCR Part 6, rule 10; DCR Part 20, rule 10; LCR Part 18, rule 1)

(1) A party (the cross-claimant) may make a cross-claim: (a) in proceedings commenced by statement of claim, within the time limited for the party to file a defence, or (b) in proceedings commenced by summons, before the return day specified in the summons, or within such further time as the court may allow. [Subr (1) subst Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

(2) A cross-claim is to be made: (a) by statement of cross-claim, in the case of a cross-claim in proceedings commenced by statement of claim, or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

387

UCPR Parts 1-10

Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) pp [7.180]–[7.230], [7.240]–[7.330].

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 9.1

[r 9.1.20] (b)

by cross-summons, in the case of a cross-claim in proceedings commenced by summons.

(3) Subject to this Part, these rules apply to a statement of cross-claim and cross-summons in the same way as they apply to a statement of claim and summons, respectively. (4) In any proceedings, each cross-claim is to be numbered (“first cross-claim”, “second cross-claim” and so on) in the order in which the cross-claims are filed. (5) For the purposes of rule 4.2(2)(d), the identification of a document as a cross-claim must include the number given to the cross-claim under this rule. [R 9.1 am Rule 164 of 2007]

RULE 9.1 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 9.1.20] Time for filing cross-claim ........................................................................................................................... [r 9.1.60] Cross-summons .......................................................................................................................................... [r 9.1.80] Can a pleaded cross-claim be filed in a proceeding commenced by summons? ................................... [r 9.1.100] Prescribed forms ...................................................................................................................................... [r 9.1.120]

[r 9.1.20]

Comparison

Under the SCR a cross-claim (referred to as such) could be brought in proceedings commenced either by statement of claim or by summons. SCR Pt 6 r 10 provided that a defendant to proceedings commenced by statement of claim could file a cross-claim within the time fixed for filing a defence. SCR Pt 6 rr 12 and 13 provided that a defendant to a summons could cross-claim against the plaintiff without leave within the time limited for entering an appearance, but required leave to cross-claim against any other person. Under this rule a distinction is now drawn between a “statement of cross-claim” in proceedings commenced by statement of claim and a “cross-summons” in proceedings commenced by summons. The former requirement in the Supreme Court for leave to cross-claim against a person other than the plaintiff in proceedings commenced by summons (SCR Pt 6 r 12) has been abolished. There is now no provision for the cross-claimant to add a cross-claim against the plaintiff to her or his defence; the cross-claim must now always be filed as a separate document (cf SCR Pt 6 r 11(2); DCR Pt 20 r 11(1)). Subrule 9.1(3) is to similar effect as SCR Pt 6 r 6(1)–(3) and DCR Pt 20 r 6(1)–(3). [r 9.1.60]

Time for filing cross-claim

Subrule 9.1(1) provides that a cross-claim is to be made within the time limited for a party to file a defence. In the case of proceedings commenced by statement of claim, this is 28 days after service of the statement of claim or such other time as the court directs: r 6.10(a) and r 14.3(1). In this respect the present rule is to the same effect as SCR Pt 6 r 10(2), and truncates the period of two months prescribed by DCR Pt 20 r 10(2)(a). However, in the case of proceedings commenced by summons, no defence to the summons is filed; r 6.10(b) requires that a defendant to a summons enter an appearance on or before the return day or seven days after any application to set aside the summons is refused. Thus the time limit prescribed by r 9.1(1) seems to be capable of application only in proceedings commenced by statement of claim and there is no time fixed by the rules within which a cross-claim must be filed in proceedings commenced by summons. The court has the discretion to permit cross claims to be filed outside the 28 day period. Such a discretion is conferred under s 22 of the CPA; subr 9.1(3) and r 1.12. The court will not generally exercise its discretion after the principal judgment has been satisfied (CSI International Co Ltd v Archway Personnel (Middle East) Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 1069; [1980] 3 All ER 215 at 220 and Stott v West Yorkshire Road Car Co Ltd [1971] 2 QB 651; Bank of Queensland v Jensen [2011] NSWSC 1566 at [25]–[28]), but may exercise its discretion in circumstances where judgment has been given, but not fully satisfied (Seltsam Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (1999) 17 NSWCCR 720; [1999] NSWCA 89; Accom Finance Pty Ltd v Kowalczuk [2006] NSWSC 730). The discretion must be exercised judicially and in such a way as to ensure that no prejudice is suffered by the potential cross defendant as a result of the late joinder: International Advisor Systems Pty Ltd v XYYX Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] NSWSC 430 at [4]. An informed decision by a party to allow the time period to file a cross 388

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 9 – Cross-claims [r 9.2.20]

r 9.3

claim to expire, and to allow proceedings to continue until seeking to file a cross claim at a late stage of the proceedings is a basis for refusing to exercise the discretion to allow the filing of a cross claim out of time: Juul v Northey [2010] NSWCA 211 at [247]. The judicial discretion whether or not to extend the period for the filing of a cross claim is to be considered in the context of ss 56 to 60 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005: Juul v Northey [2010] NSWCA 211 at [247]. Even in circumstances where a judgment has been entered and satisfied against a plaintiff and no proceedings remain on foot, the operation of s 22 of the CPA; subrr 9.1(3), 9.8, 9.10 and 1.12 gives the court the discretionary power to allow the filing of a cross claim in appropriate circumstances: Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Bluescope Steel Ltd [2012] NSWCA 240 at [55]. [r 9.1.80]

Cross-summons

Subrule 9.1(3) provides that the rules apply to a statement of cross-claim and cross-summons in the same way as they apply to a statement of claim and summons respectively. A statement of claim is a pleading and the defendant must file a defence to it, whereas no defence is filed to a summons. It follows that no defence is to be filed to a cross-summons. Rules 9.4 and 9.5 should accordingly be read as being restricted to statements of cross-claim and as not applying to cross-summonses. [r 9.1.100]

Can a pleaded cross-claim be filed in a proceeding commenced by summons?

The defendant in a proceeding commenced by summons may wish to cross-claim in respect of a claim for relief which, under r 6.3, would be required to be brought by statement of claim rather than summons if it were the subject of a separate proceeding. Or the defendant may wish to plead the proposed cross-claim in order to state its case clearly even though not required by any rule to do so. The present rules do not make any provision for this. Under SCR there did not appear to be any express prohibition on filing a pleaded cross-claim in a proceeding commenced by summons, although SCR Pt 6 r 6(1)–(3) might be thought to assume that a cross-claim in a summons proceeding would not be pleaded. Now subrr 9.1(2) and (3) require that a cross-claim in a summons proceeding be brought in the form of a summons rather than a pleading. It would thus be necessary to obtain an order to permit a statement of cross-claim (rather than cross-summons) to be filed, which, it is submitted, could be done under r 6.6(2) (as made applicable by r 9.1(3)). [r 9.1.120]

Prescribed forms

A statement of cross-claim is to be in Form 8 and a cross-summons in Form 9. Existing parties need not enter separate appearance

A party against whom a cross-claim is made (the cross-defendant) is not required to enter an appearance if he or she: (a) is a party to the proceedings in which the cross-claim is made, and (b) has entered an appearance in those proceedings.

RULE 9.2 COMMENTARY [r 9.2.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as Pt 6 r 6(4). 9.3

Cross-claimant may rely on previous pleadings

(cf SCR Part 6, rule 11; DCR Part 20, rule 11; LCR Part 18, rule 1)

A cross-claimant may, in the cross-claim, plead all or any of the facts on which he or she relies by reference to the previous pleadings in the proceedings from which the cross-claim arises.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

389

UCPR Parts 1-10

9.2

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 9.4

[r 9.3.20]

RULE 9.3 COMMENTARY [r 9.3.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, this rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 6 r 11(3); but the cross-claimant is now not expressly required to plead facts showing that the claim may, under CPA s 22 (formerly SCA s 78) be made in the proceedings. In the District Court, this rule reproduces the substance of DCR Pt 20 r 11(2); but the cross-claimant is now not expressly required to plead facts showing that the claim is a cross-claim as defined in DCR Pt 1 r 4(1). 9.4

Defence

The cross-defendant must include in his or her defence to a statement of cross-claim any grounds on which he or she disputes the claim made by the cross-claimant. [R 9.4 am Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[9]]

RULE 9.4 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 9.4.20] When is a defence to cross-claim required? .............................................................................................. [r 9.4.60] Content of defence to cross-claim ............................................................................................................. [r 9.4.80]

[r 9.4.20]

Comparison

This rule has no direct SCR or DCR equivalent, but the substance of this rule may be implicit in SCR Pt 6 r 6(1)–(3) and DCR Pt 20 r 6(1)–(3). [r 9.4.60]

When is a defence to cross-claim required?

Where a cross-claim is made by way of a statement of cross-claim, a defence to that pleading will be required to be filed within 28 days after service by the combined effect of r 9.1(3) and r 6.10(a) or r 14.3(1). Although r 9.4 is not in terms restricted to a defence to statement of cross-claim, it is submitted that, on the basis of r 9.1(3), it does not by implication require the filing of a defence to a cross-summons. [r 9.4.80]

Content of defence to cross-claim

Former DCR Pt 21 r 4(2) (inoperative for proceedings commenced after 1 January 1997) required a third party to plead in his defence any grounds on which he disputed the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant (in addition to grounds on which he disputed the defendant’s claim against the third party). No equivalent to that rule appeared either in DCR Pt 20 (operative from 1 January 1997) or in SCR. Nor does the present rule require it. However on general principles a cross-defendant should include in the defence to cross-claim a statement of any grounds which are relied upon to resist the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant. Further, the defence to cross-claim should plead any matter which, if not specifically pleaded, may take the other party by surprise; and that it is maintained makes any claim or other case of the cross-claimant not maintainable (r 14.4(2)), including fraud, performance, release, statute of limitation, extinction of right or title, voluntary assumption of risk, causation of accident by unknown and undiscoverable mechanical defect and facts showing illegality (r 14.4(3)). Practitioners are obliged to assist the court to understand the real issues in dispute between the parties, including identifying with precision and clarity in the pleadings the matters which are in dispute. “Trial by ambush” is not tolerated: Nowlan v Marson Transport Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 116; [2001] NSWCA 346; Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2008) 15 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-780; [2008] NSWCA 243; Sydney South West Area Health Service v MD (2009) 260 ALR 702; [2009] NSWCA 343; Permanent Custodians Ltd v King [2010] NSWSC 509 at [21]; Kelen v Vitaman Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 328 at [63].

390

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 9 – Cross-claims [r 9.5.80]

9.5

r 9.5

Default of cross-defendant to cross-claim

(cf SCR Part 6, rule 7; DCR Part 20, rule 7)

If a cross-defendant does not file a defence to a statement of cross-claim in accordance with these rules or an order of the court: (a) any judgment (including summary judgment, judgment by default or judgment by consent) on any claim, question or issue in the proceedings, so far as it is relevant to the cross-claim, and (b) any decision (including any decision by consent) on any claim, question or issue in the proceedings, so far as it is relevant, is binding, as between the parties to the cross-claim, unless the court orders otherwise. [R 9.5 am Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

RULE 9.5 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 9.5.20] Civil Procedure Act s 22 ............................................................................................................................. [r 9.5.60] Cross-defendant bound by adjudication on principal claim ....................................................................... [r 9.5.80]

[r 9.5.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 6 r 7 and DCR Pt 20 r 7. [r 9.5.60]

Civil Procedure Act s 22

Section 22(3)(b) of the CPA provides in effect that a cross-defendant becomes a party to the principal proceedings and, unless the court otherwise orders, is bound by any judgment or decision (including one made by consent or a default judgment) on any claim for relief in the proceedings. A cross-defendant is thus (in the absence of a contrary order) be bound by any findings or consent judgment as between a plaintiff and defendant. Rule 9.5 in effect confirms that the operation of s 22(3) extends to a situation where the cross-defendant fails to file a defence if required to do so by the rules or an order of the court. [r 9.5.80]

Cross-defendant bound by adjudication on principal claim

In Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 5 the CA held that the result of SCA s 78(4)(a), which provided that a cross-defendant becomes a party to the principal proceedings (in terms reflected in CPA s 22(3)(b)(i)), was that a cross-defendant is bound by the outcome of the litigation as between plaintiff and defendant and therefore can rely on issue estoppels flowing from a judgment as between those parties. In Insurance Exchange of Australasia v Dooley (2000) 50 NSWLR 222; [2000] NSWCA 159 the CA held that a third party in District Court proceedings was entitled to contest the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff and for that purpose to participate in the trial between plaintiff and defendant and invoke pre-trial procedures against the plaintiff, and to raise a defence on behalf of a defendant which the defendant himself has not raised. It followed that a third party has standing to appeal against a judgment in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant. See also Segboer v AJ Richardson Properties Pty Ltd (2012) 16 BPR 31235; [2012] NSWCA 253 at [12]. The binding effect on the third party of adjudication between plaintiff and defendant under rules equivalent to DCR Pt 20 does not depend on any order being made for that purpose: Helicopter Sales (Aust) Pty Ltd v Rotor-Work Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 1; 48 ALJR 390; 4 ALR 77. There is no contradiction between the principles in Helicopter Sales (Aust) Pty Ltd v Rotor-Work Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 1; 48 ALJR 390; 4 ALR 77 and Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 5: Chaina v Alvaro Homes Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 353 at [98].

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

391

UCPR Parts 1-10

The provision in CPA s 22(3)(b)(ii) that a cross-defendant is bound by any judgment between plaintiff and defendant reflects the position under the general law.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 9.6

9.6

[r 9.6.20]

Service on active parties

(cf SCR Part 6, rule 5; DCR Part 20, rule 5)

(1) If a cross-defendant is an active party, personal service of a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons on that party is not required. (2) Rule 10.16 (Service by filing) does not apply to service of a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons.

RULE 9.6 COMMENTARY [r 9.6.20]

Comparison

“Active party” is defined in the Dictionary. This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 6 r 5(2)–(3) and DCR Pt 20 r 5 as it relates to cross-claims against an existing party. 9.7

Service on new parties

(cf SCR Part 6, rule 5; DCR Part 20, rule 5; LCR Part 18, rule 1)

(1) This rule applies to the service of a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons on a person who is not already a party to the proceedings from which the cross-claim arises. (2) When serving the statement of cross-claim or cross-summons, the cross-claimant must serve on the cross-defendant both the originating process in the proceedings from which the cross-claim arises and such of the following documents as have been filed by or served on the cross-claimant: (a) in proceedings commenced by statement of claim or in which a statement of claim has been filed, any other pleadings, (b) in proceedings commenced by summons, any other cross-summonses, (c) any notices of motion not finally disposed of, (d) any affidavits, other than affidavits that are not relevant to the questions arising on the cross-claim, (e) any other documents that have been served by the plaintiff on the defendant, or by the defendant on the plaintiff, and are intended to be relied on, (f) any amendments to any of the documents referred to in paragraphs (a) – (e). (3) Service of a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons must be effected in accordance with the provisions of these rules with respect to service of originating process.

RULE 9.7 COMMENTARY [r 9.7.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 6 r 5(4) and DCR Pt 20 r 5 as it relates to cross-claims against a person not already a party. Under SCR Pt 6 r 5(1) and DCR Pt 20 r 5 service was to be effected “as soon as practical”. Under UCPR r 9.7(3), the rules for service of originating process apply.

392

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 9 – Cross-claims [r 9.9.20]

9.8

r 9.9

Directions

(cf SCR Part 6, rule 4; DCR Part 20, rule 4; LCR Part 18, rule 4)

The court, at any stage of the proceedings: (a) may order that any cross-claim, or any question in or arising on any cross-claim, is to be separately tried, and (b) may direct generally the extent to which the usual procedures at a trial or hearing are to be modified because of the joinder of the cross-defendant.

RULE 9.8 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 9.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................... [r 9.8.40] Procedure-Discovery and interrogatories by cross defendant against plaintiff .......................................... [r 9.8.60]

[r 9.8.20]

Comparison

Subrule (a) of this rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 6 r 4(a) and DCR Pt 20 r 4(a). Subrule (b) covers the substance of SCR r 4(b)–(d) and DCR Pt 20 r 4(b)–(d), but is wider in its application, permitting the court to “direct generally” in relation to variation of the usual procedures. [r 9.8.40]

Operation

Usually all cross-claims are tried together with the principal proceedings, as is required by r 9.9. The power to order separate trials of a plaintiff’s claim against a defendant and the defendant’s claim against a third party should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances: AMP Fire & General Insurance Co Ltd v Dixon [1982] VR 833 at 836. The power may be exercised to prevent third party proceedings against an insurer coming before a jury which is to try the action between plaintiff and defendant. But in such a case the third party insurer’s liability should not be determined before the determination of the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff, because that would be to determine a hypothetical question which the court will not do: AMP Fire & General Insurance Co Ltd v Dixon at 837; Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v National Jet Systems Pty Ltd (2004) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-648; [2004] SASC 438. Procedure-Discovery and interrogatories by cross defendant against plaintiff

Although a cross defendant is not usually entitled to interrogate a plaintiff as there is no issue between them (Buxton & Lysaught Pty Ltd v Buxton [1977] 1 NSWLR 285), the court may order discovery and interrogatories by a cross defendant against a plaintiff where they are necessary for the proper disposal of the proceedings (Cojuanco v Routley [1983] 1 NSWLR 723; Barker & Taylor Pty Ltd v Cablemakers (ACT) Pty Ltd [1982] 1 NSWLR 719). 9.9

Proceedings to continue together

(cf SCR Part 6, rule 6(1); DCR Part 20, rule 6(1); LCR Part 18, rule 3(1))

Unless the court orders otherwise, proceedings on a cross-claim are to be carried on together with the proceedings from which the cross-claim arises.

RULE 9.9 COMMENTARY Comparison ................................................................................................................................................ [r 9.9.20] Jury trial ...................................................................................................................................................... [r 9.9.60]

[r 9.9.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 6 r 6(1) and DCR Pt 20 r 6(1). © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

393

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 9.8.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 9.10

[r 9.9.0]

[r 9.9.60]

Jury trial

In a jury trial the judge is bound to give directions which will contribute to the internal consistency of the verdicts of the jury on the primary claim between plaintiff and defendant and the cross-claim: Stewart v Sydney County Council [1973] 1 NSWLR 444. 9.10

Cross-claim may be separately prosecuted

(cf SCR Part 6, rule 8; DCR Part 20, rule 8; LCR Part 18, rule 3(5))

(1) A cross-claim may proceed even if: (a) judgment has been entered on the originating process in the proceedings from which the cross-claim arises or any other cross-claim in the proceedings, or (b) the proceedings on the originating process or any other cross-claim have been stayed, dismissed, withdrawn or discontinued. (2) Proceedings on the originating process in the proceedings from which the cross-claim arises may proceed even if: (a) judgment has been entered on any cross-claim in the proceedings, or (b) the proceedings on any such cross-claim have been stayed, dismissed, withdrawn or discontinued.

RULE 9.10 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 9.10.20] Continuation after principal claim finalised ............................................................................................... [r 9.10.60]

[r 9.10.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 6 r 8 and DCR Pt 20 r 8, except that it also applies where proceedings on the cross-claim or originating process have been withdrawn. [r 9.10.60]

Continuation after principal claim finalised

In Crayford Freight Services Ltd v Coral Seatel Navigation Co (1998) 82 FCR 328; 162 ALR 119 the court granted leave nunc pro tunc, after the principal proceedings had been settled, to file a cross-claim which had been filed irregularly without leave before discontinuance of the principal claim. The court has the discretionary power to allow the filing of a cross claim after judgment has been entered in favour of a plaintiff (Seltsam Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (1999) 17 NSWCCR 720; [1999] NSWCA 89) and after judgment has been entered in favour of a plaintiff and satisfied (Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Bluescope Steel Ltd [2012] NSWCA 240). Such a power derives from the court’s power to extend the time for the filing of a cross claim in subrr 1.12 and 9.8 which permits the court to continue to act in the original proceedings (FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268; 62 ALJR 216. The factors relevant to the discretion whether or not to extend time are discussed at [r 9.1.60]. 9.11

Contribution or indemnity

(cf SCR Part 6, rule 9; DCR Part 20, rule 9; LCR Part 19, rule 1)

(1) If a defendant makes a cross-claim for contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim made against the defendant in the proceedings, judgment on the cross-claim: (a) is not to be entered except by leave of the court, and (b) is not to be enforced until any judgment in the proceedings against the defendant has been satisfied. 394

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 9 – Cross-claims [r 9.11.20]

r 9.11

(2) If a cross-claim in any proceedings includes a claim for contribution under section 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 in respect of a claim made in the proceedings against the party by whom it is filed, a defence to the cross-claim, or subsequent pleadings on the cross-claim, may not be filed unless the court so directs.

RULE 9.11 COMMENTARY [r 9.11.20]

Comparison

UCPR Parts 1-10

This rule reproduces in substance SCR Pt 6 r 9 and DCR Pt 20 r 9.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

395

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.1

[r 10.1.20]

PART 10 – SERVICE OF DOCUMENTS GENERALLY Commentary by Deborah Robinson, Barrister. Updated by Josephine Kelly.

DIVISION 1 – SERVICE GENERALLY 10.1 Service of filed documents (cf SCR Part 15, rule 28)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, a party that files a document must as soon as practicable serve copies of the document on each other active party. (2) In the case of proceedings in the Local Court, an originating process may, and a defence must, be served on the other parties, on behalf of the party by whom it was filed, by an officer of the Local Court. Note: See rules 10.7 and 10.8 as to how service is to be effected by a court. [Subr (2) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

(3) Despite subrule (2), a defence that is filed in proceedings in the Local Court by means of Online Registry (within the meaning of Part 3) must be served on the other parties by the party that filed the defence rather than by an officer of the Local Court. [Subr (3) am Rule 255 of 2016, Sch 1[11]; insrt Rule 527 of 2010, r 3] [R 10.1 am Rule 255 of 2016; Rule 527 of 2010; Rule 579 of 2007]

RULE 10.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 10.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 10.1.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 10.1.1000]

[r 10.1.20]

Comparison

This rule is similar to SCR Pt 15 r 28, but expands the operation of the rule to encompass a “document”. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 10.1.40]

Operation

Previously, SCR Pt 15 r 28 required service of “a pleading” on other parties to the proceedings on the same date that the pleading was filed. Rule 10.1 expands the operation of that rule by providing for service of “a document” that has been filed and ameliorates the rigidity of the prior rule by providing that service of that document must be “as soon as practicable”. [r 10.1.1000]

References

Definition of “document” in the UCPR Dictionary. 10.2 Service of affidavits (cf SCR Part 38, rule 7; DCR Part 30, rule 7; LCR Part 25, rule 7)

(1) A party intending to use an affidavit that has not been filed must serve it on each other interested party not later than a reasonable time before the occasion for using it arises. (2) A party who fails to serve an affidavit as required by subrule (1) may not use the affidavit except by leave of the court.

396

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 1 – Service generally

[r 10.3.40]

r 10.3

RULE 10.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 10.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 10.2.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 10.2.1000]

[r 10.2.20]

Comparison

This rule retains the substance of SCR Pt 38 r 7 and DCR Pt 30 r 7. [r 10.2.40]

Operation

This rule retains the substance of the previous rules but expands the operation of the rule to an affidavit “that has not been filed”. It is noted that new r 35.9 provides that an affidavit must not be filed except by leave of the court, unless required by the rules or a practice note. Refer to Practice Note SC Gen 4 – Affıdavits, for proceedings in which affidavits must be filed. Nevertheless, under r 10.2 the requirement to serve an affidavit on all other relevant parties “not later than a reasonable time” prior to relying upon it in court remains unchanged. If leave of the court is sought to use an affidavit that has not been served on each other interested party within a “reasonable time”, the applicant should provide reasons for the failure to serve and address the question of prejudice to the other side. What constitutes a “reasonable time” will depend on the circumstances of the matter, the contents of the affidavit and any prejudice flowing from late service to the party receiving it; a short affidavit to which no response can be provided will require less time than a weighty affidavit to which a response is anticipated. [r 10.2.1000]

References

Rule 35.9 – filing of affidavits. Practice Note SC Gen 4 – Affıdavits. 10.3 Service of originating process in Australia (cf SCR Part 10, rule 2B)

(1) This rule applies to proceedings in the Supreme Court.

(3) An originating process for service in Australia, but outside New South Wales, must bear a statement either that the plaintiff intends to proceed under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 of the Commonwealth or that the plaintiff intends to proceed under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. (4) The plaintiff may proceed otherwise than in accordance with the intention stated under subrule (3), but only with the leave of the court.

RULE 10.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 10.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 10.3.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 10.3.1000]

[r 10.3.20] Comparison This rule retains the substance of SCR Pt 10 r 2B. This rule does not apply in the District Court and there was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 10.3.40] Operation This rule retains the longstanding requirement that a party endorse on the originating process a statement as to whether it is intended to proceed under the rules or the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

397

UCPR Parts 1-10

(2) Subject to this Part, originating process may be served anywhere in Australia, whether in New South Wales or elsewhere.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.4

[r 10.3.40]

(SEPA). As the UCPR, and before that the SCR, contain no provisions detailing or regulating the requirements of service interstate, it is generally the practice that service is effected in accordance with the SEPA. The originating processes should be endorsed with a statement that the plaintiff intends to proceed under the SEPA and should attach the “Notice to the Defendant” in accordance with Form 1 under the SEPA. For the service of originating process refer to Pt 2 of the SEPA; for the service of subpoenas refer to Pt 3 of the SEPA and Form 2. Section 9(8A) of the SEPA provides that where a document is not an initiating process or subpoena, service may be effected in accordance with any applicable rules of court. Section 16 of the SEPA provides that “service is effective only if copies of such notices as are prescribed are attached to the process, or the copy of the process, served”. The time for entering an appearance is 21 days under the SEPA s 17. This previously represented an extension of time under SCR. However, UCPR r 6.10 now provides 28 days to enter an appearance after service of a statement of claim and until the return date on the summons to enter appearance after service of a summons. There is no requirement to obtain the leave of the court prior to effecting service under the SEPA. [r 10.3.1000]

References

Service and Execution of Process Act 1992, particularly Pts 2 and 3, and Forms 1 and 2. This Act has been reproduced in the Thomson Reuters NSW Civil Practice and Procedure: Supreme Court Practice and NSW Civil Practice and Procedure: District Court Practice services. 10.4

Operation of Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 of the Commonwealth

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 1A)

This Part does not limit the operation of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 of the Commonwealth or any other law of the Commonwealth.

RULE 10.4 COMMENTARY [r 10.4.20]

Comparison

This rule is similar to SCR Pt 9 r 1A, but specifies that the Part is subject to not only the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), but to any law of the Commonwealth. There was no equivalent DCR provision.

DIVISION 2 – MANNER OF SERVICE 10.5 The various methods of service (cf SCR Part 9, rules 3 and 4; DCR Part 8, rules 3, 9 and 12; LCR Part 7, rules 3, 9 and 12)

(1) Subject to these rules, a document may be served on a person: (a) by means of personal service, or (b) by posting a copy of the document, addressed to the person: (i) to the person’s address for service, or (ii) if the person is not an active party, to the person’s business or residential address, or (c) by leaving a copy of the document, addressed to the person: (i) at the person’s address for service, or (ii) if the person is not an active party, at the person’s business or residential address, with a person who is apparently of or above the age of 16 years and apparently employed or residing at that address, or (d) in the case of service on a corporation, by serving the document on the corporation in any manner in which service of such a document may, by law, be served on the corporation. [Subr (1) am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[19]] 398

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 2 – Manner of service

[r 10.5.1000]

r 10.5

(2) In the case of a person having an address for service that is a solicitor’s office address, service of a document on the person may also be effected: (a) if the notice advising the address for service includes a DX address, by leaving a copy of the document, addressed to the solicitor, in that DX box at that address or in another DX box for transmission to that DX box, or (b) if the notice advising the address for service includes a fax number, by faxing a copy of the document to that number, or (c) if the notice advising the address for service includes an electronic service address, by transmitting an electronic copy of the document to that address. [Subr (2) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[8]]

(3) Unless the contrary is proved, the time at which a document is taken to have been served is: (a) in the case of a document that is left in a DX box in accordance with subrule (2)(a), at the end of the second day following the day on which the copy is so left, or (b) in the case of a copy of a document that is faxed in accordance with subrule (2)(b), at the end of the first day following the day on which the copy is so faxed. Note: See clause 13 of Schedule 1 to the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 as to when an electronic copy of a document is taken to have been delivered to an electronic mail address. See also Division 3 of this Part as to how personal service is to be effected. [Subr (3) am Rule 594 of 2010, r 3(5)] [R 10.5 am Rule 594 of 2010; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 10.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 10.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 10.5.40] Affidavit of service .................................................................................................................................... [r 10.5.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 10.5.1000]

[r 10.5.20]

Comparison

This rule lists the methods of service that are variously permitted under these rules. This rule has equivalent provisions in SCR Pt 9 rr 3 and 4 and DCR Pt 8 rr 3, 7(2), 9 and 12. Operation

When personal service is not required (see [r 10.20.60] for when personal service is required), service may be effected by posting, or leaving with a person apparently employed or residing at the address, a copy of the document at the business or residential address of the person to be served. Where an address for service is a solicitor’s office address, service may now be effected electronically, if the notice of address for service provides an electronic mail address. While a post office box is not a “place of business”, service by posting to a post office box may be confirmed as sufficient: Macrae v St Margaret’s Hospital (1999) 19 NSWCCR 1; [1999] NSWCA 381. In any case where the efficacy or propriety of service is doubted it may be prudent to apply under r 10.14 for confirmation of informal service. If documentation has in fact been received, that may suffice to prove service, notwithstanding a deficiency in the mode of service: Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie (1996) 41 NSWLR 542; 133 FLR 303; 21 ACSR 440; 14 ACLC 1549; Pino v Prosser [1967] VR 835. Ordinarily, “irregular service” is merely voidable and will be effective unless a recipient applies to the court to set it aside: Davies v Alliance Acceptance Co Ltd (1993) 110 FLR 153 cited in Howship Holdings. [r 10.5.60]

Affidavit of service

Proof of service, when it is required, is evidenced by the filing of an affidavit of service in accordance with r 35.8. Under r 35.8 a copy of the document served must not be annexed to the affidavit of service. [r 10.5.1000]

References

[r 10.20.60] – documents requiring personal service. [r 10.14.120] – informal service. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

399

UCPR Parts 1-10

[r 10.5.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.6

[r 10..1000]

Rule 35.8 – affidavit of service. 10.6

Service in accordance with agreement between parties

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 9; DCR Part 8, rule 15; LCR Part 7, rule 15)

(1) In any proceedings, any document (including originating process) may be served by one party on another (whether in New South Wales or elsewhere) in accordance with any agreement, acknowledgment or undertaking by which the party to be served is bound. (1A) In relation to the service of an originating process in proceedings on a claim for possession of land, the agreement, acknowledgment or undertaking referred to in subrule (1) must be made after the originating process is filed but before it is served. [Subr (1A) insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]

(2) Service in accordance with subrule (1) is taken for all purposes (including for the purposes of any rule requiring personal service) to constitute sufficient service. [R 10.6 am Rule 326 of 2009]

RULE 10.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 10.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 10.6.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 10.6.1000]

[r 10.6.20]

Comparison

This rule incorporates the substance of SCR Pt 9 r 9 and DCR Pt 8 r 15. The prior SCR provision only permitted service on a defendant, whereas the DCR provision permitted service on a “party”. This rule permits service in accordance with any “agreement, acknowledgement or undertaking” whereas both prior provisions only permitted service in accordance with an “agreement”. [r 10.6.40]

Operation

Parties to a contract may agree that service can be effected in accordance with the provisions of that contract rather than in accordance with the court rules. However an agreement as to an appropriate jurisdiction in which to bring a claim is not of itself an agreement as to mode of service: Mondial Trading Pty Ltd v Interocean Marine Transport Inc (1985) 60 ALJR 277; 65 ALR 155. The provisions of an agreement relied upon must relate to the service of documents concerning judicial proceedings. The inclusion in a contract for the sale of land of a clause stating “a document under or related to this contract is served if it is served on the party’s solicitor, even if the party has died or any of them has died” was not considered sufficient to activate the predecessor to this rule or to signify that a defendant had agreed that an originating process in proceedings may be served in a particular way: Gaggin v Lemari (2000) 10 BPR 18381; [2000] NSWSC 856. The rule catches any “acknowledgement or undertaking”, however, problems may arise in evidencing such an acknowledgement or undertaking in the absence of a written agreement. In Ditfort v Temby (1990) 26 FCR 72; 97 ALR 409 the court was satisfied that the respondent, as the Director of Public Prosecutions, was “personally served” in accordance with arrangements that he had himself put into place within the Department and these arrangements were proved on the defendant’s own evidence. Statutes may provide for particular modes of service; for example, s 74N of the Real Property Act 1900 provides that an application with respect to a caveat may be served at the address shown on the caveat. The postal service rule under s 160 of the Evidence Act 1995 (which raises a presumption of receipt within four working days after posting) does not apply to service on parties to a contract with respect to a contract dispute if the presumption raised under that section is inconsistent with a term of the contract. [r 10.6.1000]

References

Section 160(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 – presumptions re postal service.

400

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 2 – Manner of service

[r 10.8.20]

10.7

r 10.8

Notice given or served by court

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 14)

Subject to any order of the court, any notice or other document that is required to be given to or served on any party by the court, or by any officer of the court, is taken to have been given or served if served in any manner in which a document not requiring personal service may be served under this Part.

RULE 10.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 10.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 10.7.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 10.7.1000]

[r 10.7.20]

Comparison

This rule repeats the substance of SCR Pt 9 r 14. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 10.7.40]

Operation

Subject to any contrary order of the court, this rule allows the court to effect service on a party without imposing upon the court the requirement to effect personal service. The various methods of service are enumerated in r 10.5. [r 10.7.1000]

References

UCPR r 10.5 – various methods of service. 10.8 Service of defence by court (cf LCR Part 9, rule 3)

(1) This rule applies to proceedings in the Local Court. [Subr (1) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

UCPR Parts 1-10

(2) When filing a defence, whether in person or by post, a party must lodge additional copies of the defence for service on each of the other active parties. [Subr (2) am Rule 621 of 2016, r 3(4)]

(3) On (a) (b) (c)

receiving such copies, an officer of the court: must mark each copy with the date of acceptance of the document, and must return one copy to the party by which it was filed, and must cause the remaining copies to be served on each of the other active parties.

[R 10.8 am Rule 621 of 2016; Rule 579 of 2007]

RULE 10.8 COMMENTARY [r 10.8.20]

Comparison

This rule does not apply in the Supreme Court or District Court and there was no equivalent SCR or DCR provision.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

401

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.9

10.9

[r 10.9.20]

Service of process on defendant operating under unregistered business name

(cf SCR Part 64, rule 3; DCR Part 46, rule 2; LCR Part 35, rule 2)

(1) This rule applies to any proceedings against a person in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by the person in the course of, or in relation to, a business carried on under an unregistered business name. (2) For the purposes of any such proceedings, any document may be served on the defendant, whether sued in his or her own name or under the unregistered business name: (a) by leaving it with a person who is apparently engaged in the business, and apparently of or above the age of 16 years, at any place at which business is carried on under that name, or (b) by sending it by post, addressed to the defendant, to any place at which business is carried on under that name, whether or not the place concerned is within New South Wales. (3) For the purposes of any such proceedings: (a) service of a document in accordance with subrule (2) is taken to constitute personal service, and (b) the place at which the document is left, or to which the document is sent by post, is taken to be the place of service of the document, and (c) in the case of a document sent by post, the document is taken to have been served at the end of 7 days after the day on which it was sent. (4) This rule does not limit any other law with respect to the service of documents.

RULE 10.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 10.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 10.9.40] Requirements after service ...................................................................................................................... [r 10.9.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 10.9.1000]

[r 10.9.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 64 r 3 and DCR Pt 46 r 2 as regards service on a defendant operating under an unregistered business name. [r 10.9.40]

Operation

This rule ameliorates the requirement for personal service by providing that personal service is deemed to have been effected on an unregistered business by postal transmission of a document to the place of business or by leaving a document with “a person who is apparently engaged in the business”. The proceedings must relate to the business as provided for under the terms of the rule. The rule changes the usual postal service presumption by requiring seven days to pass before service has been deemed to have been effected; this is contrary to s 160 of the Evidence Act 1995, which establishes a presumption that a postal article sent by prepaid post was received on the fourth working day after having been posted. Service may be effected outside NSW under this rule; for the requirements for service of originating process and subpoenas outside NSW, refer to r 10.3. [r 10.9.60]

Requirements after service

The prior requirements as contained in SCR Pt 64 with respect to proceedings against a business name are retained in substance in UCPR Pt 7 Div 5. While a plaintiff may commence proceedings against a business name and serve the process in accordance with this rule, further requirements are imposed under Pt 7 Div 5 before the proceedings can continue. Rule 7.22 provides that the plaintiff is to take such steps as are 402

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 2 – Manner of service

[r 10.10.40]

r 10.10

reasonably practicable to identify a person behind a business name and must amend the originating process to name the defendant personally. In the absence of such an amendment, leave is required to continue the proceedings against the business name: r 7.22(2). Under r 7.21 a defendant named as a business name must respond by filing an appearance and defence in her or his own name together with a statement of the names and residential addresses of all persons carrying on business under the business name; a defendant who fails to provide such a statement may be liable to have the appearance and defence struck out. [r 10.9.1000]

References

UCPR Pt 7 Div 5 – Business names. Definition of “business name”, “registered business name” and “unregistered business name” in UCPR Dictionary. 10.10

Service of process on defendant operating under registered business name

(cf SCR Part 64, rule 3)

(1) This rule applies to any proceedings against a person carrying on business under a registered business name in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by the person in the course of, or in relation to, business carried on under that name. (2) For the purposes of any such proceedings, any document may be served on the defendant, whether sued in his or her own name or under the registered business name: (a) by leaving it with a person who is apparently engaged in the business, and apparently of or above the age of 16 years, at any place at which business is carried on under that name, or (b) by sending it by post, addressed to the defendant: (i) to any place at which business is carried on under that name, or (ii) to the address for service of any person in whose name the business name is registered under the Business Names Act 2002, whether or not the place concerned is within New South Wales.

(4) This rule does not limit any other law with respect to the service of documents.

RULE 10.10 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.10.40] Requirements after service .................................................................................................................... [r 10.10.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.10.1000]

[r 10.10.20]

Comparison

This rule applies the provisions of SCR Pt 64 r 3 (regarding service on unregistered business name) to service on a registered business name. There was no equivalent provision under DCR. [r 10.10.40]

Operation

This rule ameliorates the requirement for personal service by providing that personal service is deemed to have been effected on a registered business by postal transmission of a document to the place of business or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

403

UCPR Parts 1-10

(3) For the purposes of any such proceedings: (a) service of a document in accordance with subrule (2) is taken to constitute personal service, and (b) the place at which the document is left, or to which the document is sent by post, is taken to be the place of service of the document, and (c) in the case of a document sent by post, the document is taken to have been served at the end of 7 days after the day on which it was sent.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.11

[r 10.10.40]

the registered business address, or by leaving a document with “a person who is apparently engaged in the business”. The proceedings must relate to the business as provided for under the terms of the rule. The rule changes the usual postal service presumption by requiring seven days to pass before service has been deemed to have been effected; this is contrary to s 160 of the Evidence Act 1995, which establishes a presumption that a postal article sent by prepaid post was received on the fourth working day after having been posted. Service may be effected outside NSW under this rule; for the requirements for service of originating process and subpoenas outside NSW, refer to r 10.3. [r 10.10.60]

Requirements after service

Refer to annotations under [r 10.9.60]. [r 10.10.1000]

References

UCPR Pt 7 Div 5 – Business names. Definition of “business name”, “registered business name” and “unregistered business name” in UCPR Dictionary. 10.11

Service of process on partner in limited partnership

(cf SCR Part 64, rule 3A)

(1) This rule applies to any proceedings against a partner in a limited partnership (within the meaning of Part 3 of the Partnership Act 1892) in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by any person in the course of, or in relation to, a business carried on by the partnership. (2) For the purposes of any such proceedings, any document may be served on the defendant, whether sued in his or her own name or under the firm-name of the partnership: (a) by leaving it with a person who is apparently engaged in the business, and apparently of or above the age of 16 years, at the registered office of the partnership, or (b) by sending it by post, addressed to the firm-name of the partnership, to the registered office of the partnership. (3) For the purposes of any such proceedings: (a) service of a document in accordance with subrule (2) is taken to constitute personal service, and (b) the place at which the document is left as referred to in subrule (2)(a), or to which the document is sent as referred to in subrule (2)(b), is taken to be the place of service of the document, and (c) in the case of a document sent as referred to in subrule (2)(b), the document is taken to have been served at the end of 7 days after the day on which it was sent. (4) This rule does not limit any other law with respect to the service of documents.

RULE 10.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 10.11.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.11.40] References .......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.11.1000]

[r 10.11.20]

Comparison

This rule incorporates the substance of SCR Pt 64 r 3A. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 10.11.40]

Operation

This rule ameliorates the requirement for personal service by providing that personal service is deemed to have been effected on a partner of a limited partnership by leaving a document with “a person who is 404

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 2 – Manner of service

[r 10.11.1000]

r 10.12

apparently engaged in the business” of the partnership at the registered business address or by sending a document addressed to the firm-name by post to the registered business address. A “limited partnership” is formed by and on registration of the partnership: s 50A(1) of the Partnership Act 1892. [r 10.11.1000]

References

Definition of “limited partnership” under s 50A(1) of the Partnership Act 1892. 10.12

Service of process on person under legal incapacity

(cf SCR Part 63, rule 15)

(1) This rule applies to any proceedings in which a document is required to be served personally on a person under legal incapacity. (2) Personal service on a person under legal incapacity may not be effected otherwise than in accordance with this rule. (3) If the person under legal incapacity has a tutor in the proceedings, the document may be served on the tutor. (4) The document may be served on any person (including the person under legal incapacity) whom the court may, before or after service, approve. (5) If the person to be served is a minor and has no tutor in the proceedings, the document may be served: (a) on the person, but only if the person is aged 16 years or more, or (b) on a parent or guardian of the person, or (c) if the person has no parent or guardian, on a person with whom he or she resides or in whose care he or she is. (6) If the person to be served is a protected person (within the meaning of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009) and has no tutor in the proceedings, the document may be served: (a) if the person has a manager in respect of his or her estate, on the manager, or (b) if the person does not have a manager, on a person with whom he or she resides or in whose care he or she is. [Subr (6) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[6]]

(8) In addition to any other service required by these rules: (a) a judgment or order requiring a person under legal incapacity to do, or refrain from doing, any act, and (b) a notice of motion for the committal of a person under legal incapacity, and (c) a subpoena addressed to a person under legal incapacity, must be served personally on the person. (9) Subrule (8) does not apply to an order for interrogatories or for discovery or inspection of documents. [R 10.12 am Rule 501 of 2009]

RULE 10.12 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.12.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.12.40] Definition of “person under a legal incapacity” ....................................................................................... [r 10.12.60] Appointment of a tutor ............................................................................................................................ [r 10.12.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.12.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

405

UCPR Parts 1-10

(7) Subject to subrule (8), a document served pursuant to this rule must be served in the manner required by these rules in relation to documents of the same kind.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.13

[r 10.12.20]

[r 10.12.20]

Comparison

This rule retains the substance of SCR Pt 63 r 15 and DCR Pt 45 r 15. The old terms “disable person” and “incompetent person” have been replaced by the term “person under a legal incapacity”. [r 10.12.40]

Operation

This rule permits service on a person under a legal incapacity, as set out under the rule, generally by permitting service on a tutor, parent, guardian or statutory manager under the Protected Estates Act 1983. Personal service is mandatory with respect to the specific documentation listed in r 10.12(8). The court retains a discretion to approve service otherwise than in accordance with this rule and that discretion is both prospective and retrospective: r 10.12(4). [r 10.12.60]

Definition of “person under a legal incapacity”

The definition of “person under a legal incapacity” in CPA s 3 includes the following: a child under 18 years of age; an involuntary forensic or correctional patient under the Mental Health Act 1990; a person under guardianship under the Guardianship Act 1987; a protected person under the Protected Estates Act 1983; and an incommunicate person. The definition excludes a felon under the Felons (Civil Proceedings) Act 1981. A child detainee can be served in the manner authorised under r 10.25(2). [r 10.12.80]

Appointment of a tutor

A person under a legal incapacity may not commence or carry on legal proceedings: r 7.14. If an incapacitated defendant fails to file a notice of appearance, r 7.18 allows a plaintiff to apply for the appointment of and/or removal of a tutor. If proceedings are on foot, the application is by way of notice of motion in the proceedings; if proceedings are not yet on foot, an application for the appointment of a tutor may be commenced by summons: r 6.4(2)(c). [r 10.12.1000]

References

CPA s 3 – definition of “person under legal incapacity”. UCPR Pt 7 Div 4 – persons under legal incapacity. 10.13

Acceptance of service by solicitor

(SCR Part 9, rule 7; DCR Part 8, rules 6 and 7; LCR Part 7, rules 6 and 7)

If a solicitor notes on a copy of: (a) any originating process, or (b) any other document required or permitted to be served in any proceedings, but not required to be personally served, that he or she accepts service of the document on behalf of any person, the document is taken to have been duly served on that person on the date on which the note is made or on such earlier date of service as may be proved.

RULE 10.13 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.13.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.13.40]

[r 10.13.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 9 r 7 and DCR Pt 8 r 6. The operation of the prior District Court rule was restricted to “originating process”.

406

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 2 – Manner of service

[r 10.14.40] [r 10.13.40]

r 10.14

Operation

The requirement for personal service on a party is dispensed with in the circumstances where that party’s solicitor accepts service. A notation on the document by the solicitor accepting service is necessary to evidence that service has been duly effected. If no appearance is filed within the time limited for filing an appearance (see r 6.10) a plaintiff may proceed to obtain default judgment in the usual way (see Pt 16). 10.14

Substituted and informal service generally

(cf SCR Part 9, rules 10 and 11; DCR Part 8, rules 5 and 16; LCR Part 7, rules 5 and 16)

(1) If a document that is required or permitted to be served on a person in connection with any proceedings: (a) cannot practicably be served on the person, or (b) cannot practicably be served on the person in the manner provided by law, the court may, by order, direct that, instead of service, such steps be taken as are specified in the order for the purpose of bringing the document to the notice of the person concerned. (2) An order under this rule may direct that the document be taken to have been served on the person concerned on the happening of a specified event or on the expiry of a specified time. (3) If steps have been taken, otherwise than under an order under this rule, for the purpose of bringing the document to the notice of the person concerned, the court may, by order, direct that the document be taken to have been served on that person on a date specified in the order. (3A) An application for an order under this rule must be supported by an affidavit by the applicant that includes: (a) a statement as to the applicant’s knowledge of the whereabouts of the person to be served, and (b) a statement as to any communications that have occurred between the applicant and the person to be served since the cause of action in the proceedings arose (including any communications by telephone, fax or electronic mail). [Subr (3A) insrt Rule 371 of 2015, Sch 1[1]]

(4) Service in accordance with this rule is taken to constitute personal service. [R 10.14 am Rule 371 of 2015]

RULE 10.14 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.14.40] Substituted service ................................................................................................................................. [r 10.14.60] Substituted service – form of order ........................................................................................................ [r 10.14.80] Substituted service on defendant abroad ............................................................................................ [r 10.14.100] Confirmation of informal service ........................................................................................................... [r 10.14.120] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.14.1000]

[r 10.14.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 9 rr 10 and 11, and DCR Pt 8 rr 5(2) and 16. [r 10.14.40]

Operation

An application for substituted service is made prospectively; an application for confirmation of informal service is made retrospectively. Both forms of service provide a means to effect a form of service in lieu of personal service. Substituted service applications are typically made where a defendant has been evading service. Applications to confirm informal service are typically brought to authorise a form of service which was effected without strict compliance with the rules. A notice of motion is required pursuant to r 18.1; the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

407

UCPR Parts 1-10

Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.14.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.14

[r 10.14.40]

nature of the application contemplates that the motion will not be served. Notwithstanding the utility of this rule, it should always be borne in mind that the court retains a discretion to set aside or vary any judgment or order entered in the absence of a defendant: r 36.16. [r 10.14.60] Substituted service An applicant under this rule must satisfy the court of two matters. First, that service “cannot practicably” be effected; this will generally be evidenced by affidavit(s) of attempted service. In order to establish impracticality some attempt, at least, should be made to effect service in accordance with the rules, or evidence should be led that it is so obviously futile as not to warrant an attempt at service: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sweeney (No 2) (2001) 38 ACSR 743; [2001] NSWSC 477. The requirement to effect personal service will not be displaced by the mere cost or inconvenience to a plaintiff of being required to effect service in accordance with the rules. The inconvenience of effecting service on multiple defendants who are dispersed over a wide geographical area may not be sufficient of itself to demonstrate impracticality, but may be when coupled with an application for short service on those defendants: Amos Removals & Storage Pty Ltd v Small [1981] 2 NSWLR 525. Second, the court must be satisfied that the steps proposed to be taken in lieu of service will address “the purpose of bringing the document to the notice of the person concerned” pursuant to r 10.14(1). It must be reasonably likely that the proposed method of substituted service will bring the proceedings to the defendant’s attention: Chappell v Coyle [1985] 2 NSWLR 73; Amos Removals & Storage Pty Ltd v Small [1981] 2 NSWLR 525. Affidavit evidence is required of inquiries that have been made and the basis of any belief that a form of service proposed will be reasonably likely to bring proceedings to a defendant’s attention. The efficacy of any form of substituted service proposed will depend entirely on the particular circumstances of the case. Searches may be undertaken of electoral rolls, the Australian Population Index and of the Property Information Office to identify a defendant’s address or land holdings; inquiries may be made of employers, employees, commercial contacts or family members. Historically, (prior to the Supreme Court Act 1970) substituted service was effected by way of advertisements. However, the efficacy of that method might be doubted unless the advertisements appear in a trade or professional publication and it can be proved that the defendant subscribes to or advertises in that publication. The court may authorise service by postal transmission to an address that has a clear connection to the person sought to be served. An agent may be utilised to effect substituted service, such as a family member, commercial contact, or person in occupation of the defendant’s land. [r 10.14.80] Substituted service – form of order 1. In lieu of personal service, service on X be effected by [nominate the proposed method]. 2. Service be deemed to have been effected [nominate time period] after compliance with order 1. 3. A copy of this order be served with the [statement of claim or summons]. With respect to order 1, if several methods of service are nominated they should be cumulative, rather than in the alternative, unless there is proof that each method on its own is reasonably likely to bring documentation to the attention of the defendant. If a form of service that utilises an agent is nominated, order 1 should read as follows: “In lieu of personal service, service be effected by personally serving Y [for example, a wife or a tenant] together with a letter requesting that Y bring the documents to the attention of the defendant”. On the expiration of the time period nominated in order 2, time begins to run under r 6.10(a)(i) for the filing of a notice of appearance and under r 14.3(1) for the filing of a defence. [r 10.14.100] Substituted service on defendant abroad Substituted service is not a means of enlarging the territorial jurisdiction of the court and reference should be made to Pt 11 for the conditions and requirements that apply to service on a defendant overseas. If a party cannot be served under Pt 11, and is not within the jurisdiction and therefore amenable to service, an order for substituted service cannot be made: Laurie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR 310; 32 ALJR 7. If a defendant is within the jurisdiction at the time of issue of the originating process and subsequently leaves, the foundation for an order for substituted service may exist: Laurie v Carroll. Substituted service of an originating process for an in personam claim can be ordered where the defendant is outside the jurisdiction, if direct personal service could have been effected under the rules of court and the case can be brought within one of the categories set out in Sch 6: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sweeney (No 2) (2001) 38 ACSR 743; [2001] NSWSC 477. In Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sweeney [2000] NSWSC 1249, it was determined that substituted service can be ordered for process which is to be served outside the jurisdiction, 408

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 2 – Manner of service

[r 10.14.1000]

r 10.15

but only where the court determines that personal service is impracticable: the court must apply the law of the place where the process is to be served and ask, in the light of that law, is it impracticable for any reason to personally serve the document. Service on solicitors in Sydney, in substitution for service on defendant corporations incorporated outside Australia and persons resident overseas, was permitted in the circumstances where the solicitors had been given a “watching brief” but not instructions to accept service: Gate Gourmet Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Gate Gourmet Attorney-General [2002] NSWSC 727. In Gate Gourmet, Young CJ noted a concern that “there be no encouragement to foreign people, who are involved in an Australian dispute, to get the best of both worlds by watching what is happening but never entering the arena”. For a very useful decision concerning substituted service containing foreign elements (foreign post offices and a foreign email address), refer to Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sweeney (No 2) (2001) 38 ACSR 743; [2001] NSWSC 477. [r 10.14.120]

Confirmation of informal service

If a form of service has been effected that was deficient or otherwise not in compliance with the rules, but the proceedings have nevertheless been brought to the attention of the person sought to be served, then an application may be brought for an order that the person is to be taken to have been served on a date specified by the court. The court will need to be satisfied that procedural fairness has been accorded to the person served and that the person has in fact been put on notice of the claim: WFM Motors Pty Ltd v Maydwell (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 23 April 1993). See also Cook v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 14 September 1994); Elcham v Darling Island Sydney Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 448; Zorbas v Titan Properties (Aust) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 486; Phelan v Ambridge Corp Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 136; [2005] NSWSC 875 (service not effected in compliance with s 109X of the Corporations Act 2001, informal service confirmed under r 10.14). In Gaggin v Lemari (2000) 10 BPR 18381; [2000] NSWSC 856 informal service was confirmed where the court was satisfied that the proceedings had been in fact brought to the attention of the person sought to be served, notwithstanding a failed attempt to effect service on a solicitor pursuant to a contract. Refer further to the annotations at [r 10.5.40]. [r 10.14.1000]

References

Rule 6.10 – time for filing an appearance. 10.15 Substituted and informal service of originating process in proceedings for possession of land (cf SCR Part 9, rule 5)

(2) On application under rule 10.14, the court may order that the plaintiff may serve the originating process on the defendant by affixing a copy of the originating process to a conspicuous part of the land: (a) in addition to any other steps ordered to be taken for the purpose of bringing the originating process to the notice of the person concerned, or (b) if the originating process cannot be served on the defendant without undue delay or expense. (3) An order under subrule (2) may direct that the originating process be taken to have been served on the defendant on the expiry of a specified time. (4) If a copy of the originating process has been affixed to a conspicuous part of the land otherwise than under an order under subrule (2), the court may order that the originating process be taken to have been served on the defendant on a date specified in the order. (5) If an originating process is served pursuant to an order under subrule (2) and the plaintiff applies for default judgment under rule 16.3, the application for default judgment must be limited to the possession of land (and not include any other relief such as damages) unless: (a) the originating process is taken to have been served because of a direction under rule 10.14(3), or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

409

UCPR Parts 1-10

(1) Without limiting rule 10.14, this rule applies to any originating process that is required to be served on a defendant in connection with proceedings for the possession of land.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.15

[r 10.15.20] (b)

the originating process was served directly on the defendant while attempting to serve it in accordance with an order made under subrule (2) and the plaintiff’s application for default judgment is supported by an affidavit specifying when, where and how service was effected.

(6) Service in accordance with this rule is taken to constitute personal service. [R 10.15 subst Rule 371 of 2015, Sch 1[2]; am Rule 501 of 2009]

RULE 10.15 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.15.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.15.40] Form of minute of order ......................................................................................................................... [r 10.15.60] Service on occupier ................................................................................................................................ [r 10.15.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.15.1000]

[r 10.15.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 9 r 5. There was no equivalent DCR provision as proceedings for possession are brought in the Supreme Court. [r 10.15.40]

Operation

This rule applies only to service of originating process in proceedings for possession of land. The rule provides a specific form of substituted service by permitting a plaintiff to apply for an order that service will have been duly effected upon the affixing of a copy of the originating process to a conspicuous part of the land. The rule allows an application to be brought prior to the affixing of process to the land (subr (2)) or after having affixed the process to the land (subr (4)). The application is brought ex parte and the rule provides in subr (5) that no motion is required to be filed or served. An applicant should file with the registry copies of the proposed minutes of order, together with an affidavit in support, for approval and entry. If the order authorising service under this rule is obtained prior to effecting service, a copy of that order should be served together with the originating process to reinforce the legitimacy of the mode of service utilised. [r 10.15.60]

Form of minute of order

The orders sought in the minute of order will generally include the following: 1. In lieu of personal service, service on the defendant be effected by affixing a copy of the originating process on [state where process will be affixed, being a conspicuous part of the land]. 2. Service be deemed to have been effected [nominate time period] after order 1 has been complied with. 3. A copy of this order be served with the originating process in the manner authorised by order 1. On the expiration of the time period nominated in order 2, time begins to run under r 6.10(a)(i) for the filing of a notice of appearance and under r 14.3(1) for the filing of a defence. [r 10.15.80]

Service on occupier

Where the land is occupied by a person or party other than the named defendant, the rules require notification to be given to that occupier of the claim for possession of the land. Rule 6.8 requires originating process for recovery of land to be served on an occupier, together with a “notice to occupier” (see Form 5). The occupier may be served personally or by leaving the documents on the land addressed to the “occupier”: r 6.8(2). The occupier may apply to be joined as a defendant in the proceedings: r 6.24(2). Default judgment in proceedings for possession of land cannot be obtained without affidavit evidence that occupants of the land were identified and served: r 16.4(3). [r 10.15.1000]

References

Rule 6.10 – time for entering an appearance. Rule 6.8 – originating process for recovery of land to be served on occupier.

410

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 2 – Manner of service

[r 10.17.20]

10.16

r 10.17

Service by filing

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 12)

(1) If in any proceedings any document is required or permitted to be served on: (a) a person who is in default of appearance, or (b) a person who has entered an appearance but is not an active party in the proceedings, the filing of the document is taken to have the same effect as service of the document on the person unless the court orders otherwise. (2) This rule does not apply to any document that is required to be served personally.

RULE 10.16 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.16.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.16.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.16.1000]

[r 10.16.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 9 r 16. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 10.16.40]

Operation

Where a person is in default of appearance (refer r 6.10) or is not an active party then, unless personal service is otherwise required under these rules (refer [r 10.20.60]), mere filing of the document is taken to be sufficient service on the party unless the court otherwise orders. An “active party” is a party with an address for service but against whom no outstanding claim subsists: UCPR Dictionary. This rule does not apply to service of a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons: r 9.6(2). [r 10.16.1000]

References

Definition of “active party” in UCPR Dictionary. Rule 6.10 – time for appearance. Service of injunctions

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 15)

If the court grants an interlocutory injunction, the party may serve notice of the injunction by letter signed by or on behalf of the registrar.

RULE 10.17 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.17.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.17.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.17.1000]

[r 10.17.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 9 r 15, except that notice under this rule may no longer be served by telegram. There was no equivalent DCR provision. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

411

UCPR Parts 1-10

10.17

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.18

[r 10.17.0]

[r 10.17.40]

Operation

In circumstances of particular urgency, leave of the court should be sought to effect service of the injunction by telephone or facsimile. Where time permits, service of a sealed copy of the orders is desirable. The practice in the Supreme Court has been that, upon the judge’s associate delivering the court file and judge’s notes to the registry, formal orders are prepared by the registry and entered by a registrar on an urgent basis. In order to facilitate speedy preparation of the orders, it is highly recommended that typed copies of the final orders be taken or emailed to the court registry. Upon entry of the orders, sealed copies are given to the applicant for service on, or transmission to, the parties to be served. [r 10.17.1000]

References

Part 25 – interim preservation. 10.18

Service at address for service in other court or tribunal

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 8)

If: (a)

a decision is given or a case is stated in proceedings before any judicial officer or other person (the proceedings below), and (b) a party to the proceedings below (the subject party) has an address for service in New South Wales for the purposes of those proceedings at the office of a solicitor (the address below), and (c) proceedings (not being proceedings in relation to punishment for contempt) arising out of the proceedings below are commenced in the court (the new proceedings), and (d) the plaintiff in the new proceedings has not received notice that the address below has ceased to be applicable, documents, including the originating process, may be served on the subject party at the address below, until the subject party has an address for service in the new proceedings, as if the address below were the subject party’s address for service in the new proceedings.

RULE 10.18 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.18.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.18.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.18.1000]

[r 10.18.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 9 r 8. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 10.18.40]

Operation

Where proceedings are subject to appeal or review in a higher court, and no notice has been received that the solicitors’ address in the original proceeding is no longer an “applicable” address for service, service may be effected on the solicitors acting in the original proceedings in accordance with this rule. “Notice” would clearly include any formal notification, such as a “notice of change” filed by a solicitor withdrawing from the proceedings (see r 7.29) however the rule does not require that notification be given by a formal document filed in the proceedings, consequently, “notice” appears to encompass other forms of notification. [r 10.18.1000]

References

Part 7 Div 7: appointment and removal of solicitors.

412

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 3 – Personal service

[r 10.19.1000]

10.19

r 10.20

Waiver of objection to service

(cf DCR Part 8, rule 5(3))

A party who files a document in reply to a document alleged to have been served on that party is taken to have waived any objection to the fact or manner of service unless he or she files and serves notice of the objection together with the document so filed.

RULE 10.19 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.19.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.19.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.19.1000]

[r 10.19.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of DCR Pt 8 r 5(3). There was no equivalent SCR provision. [r 10.19.40]

Operation

While there was no prior equivalent under the SCR, it has long been the case that a party who files a notice of appearance is taken to have waived any objection to the manner of service: Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270; 11 ALR 227 at 539 (CLR). Under r 10.20(5) a defendant who enters an appearance is deemed to have been personally served on the date the appearance was entered. This rule extends the operation of that basic principle and applies to any “document”. If a party proposes to object to the fact or manner of service, then a “notice of objection” should be filed together with the document in reply. There is no other reference in the UCPR to a “notice of objection” and the notice is not currently a prescribed form, so it may be that a letter will be a sufficient means of lodging any objection. [r 10.19.1000]

References

Rule 10.20(5) – deemed service upon entry of appearance.

DIVISION 3 – PERSONAL SERVICE 10.20

Personal service required only in certain circumstances

(1) Any document required or permitted to be served on a person in any proceedings may be personally served, but need not be personally served unless these rules so require or the court so orders. (2) Except as otherwise provided by these rules: (a) any originating process, and any order for examination or garnishee order, in proceedings in the Supreme Court, the Industrial Relations Commission (including the Commission when constituted as the Industrial Court), the Land and Environment Court, the District Court or the Dust Diseases Tribunal must be personally served, and (b) any originating process in the Local Court must be served in one of the following ways: (i) it may be personally served on the defendant, (ii) it may be left, addressed to the defendant, at the defendant’s business or residential address, with a person who is apparently of or above the age of 16 years and apparently employed or residing at that address, (iii) if served by the Local Court, it may be sent by post, addressed to the defendant, to the defendant’s business or residential address in an envelope marked with a return address (being the address of the Local Court but not so identified), and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

413

UCPR Parts 1-10

(cf SCR Part 9, rules 1 and 2; DCR Part 8, rule 3; LCR Part 7, rules 3 and 20)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.20

[r 10.20.20] (c)

any order for examination, garnishee order or subpoena for attendance in proceedings in the Local Court must be served in one of the following ways: (i) it may be personally served on the person to whom it is directed, (ii) it may be left, addressed to the person to whom it is directed, at that person’s business or residential address, with a person who is apparently of or above the age of 16 years and apparently employed or residing at that address, and (d) any subpoena for production in proceedings in the District Court or the Local Court must be served in one of the following ways: (i) it may be served personally on the person to whom it is directed, (ii) it may be left, addressed to the person to whom it is directed, at that person’s business or residential address, with a person who is apparently of or above the age of 16 years and apparently employed or residing at that address, (iii) it may be sent by post, addressed to the person to whom it is directed, to the person’s business or residential address in an envelope marked with the return address of the party at whose request the subpoena was issued. Note: As to service by post, see section 76 of the Interpretation Act 1987. [Subr (2) am Rule 570 of 2009, Sch 1[3]; Rule 63 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[1]; Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]; Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[20]-[22]; Act 22 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 3[3]]

(3) If an envelope, posted as referred to in subrule (2)(b)(iii), is returned to the court by the postal authority as having not been delivered to the addressee: (a) service of the document contained in the envelope is taken not to have been effected, and (b) any judgment given or entered on the basis of that service is to be set aside, and the registrar must so advise the party by whom or on whose behalf it was posted. [Subr (3) subst Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[23]]

(4) Service of a subpoena in accordance with subrule (2)(c)(ii) or (d)(ii) or (iii) is taken to be personal service for the purposes of rule 33.5(1). [Subr (4) am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[24]]

(5) Unless an earlier date is proved, a defendant who enters an appearance is taken to have been personally served with the relevant originating process on the date on which appearance was entered. (6) The provisions of this rule concerning the service of originating processes extend to the service of amended statements of claim if the defendant to be served has not filed either a notice of appearance or notice of defence. [Subr (6) insrt Rule 422 of 2013, r 3] [R 10.20 am Rule 422 of 2013; Rule 570 of 2009; Rule 63 of 2008; Rule 395 of 2005; Act 22 of 2005]

RULE 10.20 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.20.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.20.40] Documents requiring personal service ................................................................................................... [r 10.20.60] Date of service ....................................................................................................................................... [r 10.20.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.20.1000]

[r 10.20.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, this rule reproduces the requirements of Pt 9 rr 1 and 2, Pt 43 r 1 (service of order of examination) and Pt 46 r 4 (service of garnishee order). In the District Court, subr (1) of this rule is the same in substance as DCR Pt 8 r 3(1). There are new provisions in subrr (2) and (4) of this rule for the service of a subpoena for production. [r 10.20.40] Operation In very broad terms and subject to the further annotations below, personal service is required with respect to originating process, subpoenas or orders to attend or produce and prior to any enforcement action (refer further 414

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 3 – Personal service

[r 10.20.1000]

r 10.21

to [r 10.20.60]). Part 10 provides extensively for alternate forms of service which are taken to constitute personal service on various entities: unregistered businesses (r 10.9); registered businesses (r 10.10); limited partnership (r 10.11); corporations (r 10.22). Further exceptions to personal service arise with respect to parties bound under an agreement (r 10.6); persons under legal incapacity (r 10.12 but note exception at r 10.12(8)); Crown Solicitor (r 10.23); judicial officer (r 10.24); inmate or detainee (r 10.25); person who “keeps house” (r 10.26). A document that is not required to be personally served may still be personally served, or may be served by way of the methods outlined in r 10.5(1). [r 10.20.60]

Documents requiring personal service

The documents which require personal service are as follows: originating process or order for examination or garnishee order (r 10.20(2)(a)); a subpoena for attendance or production (r 33.5(1)) except for a District Court subpoena for production (r 10.20(2)(c)); notice of motion which is to be served on a non-party or a non-active party not in default of appearance (r 18.5); notice of motion for leave to enforce a judgment against a represented party (r 7.5); a summons or notice of motion and supporting affidavit for preliminary discovery (r 5.2(7)); notice of motion for the filing and passing of accounts to be served on representatives of a deceased receiver (r 26.8); sealed copy of judgment prior to enforcement by committal or sequestration (r 40.7); motion for interpleader on a claimant who is a non-party (stakeholder’s interpleader r 43.2(5)); motion to restrain claimant (sheriff’s interpleader rr 43.4(4) and 43.5(5)). “Originating process” includes a statement of claim, summons, statement of cross-claim and cross-summons: UCPR Dictionary. Nevertheless, if a cross-defendant is an active party in proceedings, then personal service of the cross-claim is not required: r 9.6. [r 10.20.80]

Date of service

Rule 10.20(5) provides that the date upon which a defendant enters an appearance is the date upon which a defendant is taken to have been personally served, unless an earlier date is proved. If no appearance is filed an applicant will need to file an affidavit of service pursuant to r 35.8 to evidence the date of service to prove to the court that the party is in default of entering an appearance and the applicant should therefore be entitled to proceed to default judgment etc. Note also r 19 which provides that a party is taken to have waived any objection to the fact or manner of service if a document in reply is filed, unless the party with the objection serves notice of an objection together with the document in reply. [r 10.20.1000]

References

Part 10 – various exceptions to personal service. Rule 35.8 – affidavit of service. 10.21

How personal service effected generally

(1) Personal service of a document on a person is effected by leaving a copy of the document with the person or, if the person does not accept the copy, by putting the copy down in the person’s presence and telling the person the nature of the document. (2) If, by violence or threat of violence, a person attempting service is prevented from approaching another person for the purpose of delivering a document to the other person, the person attempting service may deliver the document to the other person by leaving it as near as practicable to that other person. (3) Service in accordance with subrule (2) is taken to constitute personal service.

RULE 10.21 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.21.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.21.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.21.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

415

UCPR Parts 1-10

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 3; DCR Part 8, rules 3 and 14; LCR Part 7, rules 3 and 14)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.22

[r 10.21.20]

[r 10.21.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts the substance of SCR Pt 9 r 3(1) and DCR Pt 8 r 3(4) in subr (1), but now contains new subrr (2) and (3). New subr (2) has been adopted from DCR Pt 8 r 14. [r 10.21.40]

Operation

Subrule (1) provides for two modes of personal service. First, if the person being served does not decline to accept the document, service may be effected by leaving a copy of the document with the person. It is not necessary that its nature and purpose should be identified, described or brought to the attention of the person to be served: Ainsworth v Redd (1990) 19 NSWLR 78 at 86. A document may be left with a person even if the person does not actually take the document into her or his physical possession: Ainsworth v Redd (1990) 19 NSWLR 78. Where a companion of the person to be served takes a document that was tendered to the person, and afterwards the person to be served was seen reading the document, personal service had been achieved in accordance with the first mode: Ainsworth v Redd (1990) 19 NSWLR 78. The second mode of service is required if the person declines to accept the document. In this circumstance the document should be put down in the person’s presence and the nature of the document should be explained to the person. The requirement that the document be “put down in the person’s presence” may be satisfied by pushing a document under a locked door: Graczyk v Graczyk [1955] ALR (CN) 1077; or by attaching a document to the front of a locked door while advising the defendant that this is occurring: Re Hudson; Ex parte GE Crane & Sons Ltd (1990) 25 FCR 318. In circumstances of actual or apprehended violence, subr (2) permits the process server to leave a document “as near as practicable” to the person to be served. In cases where it is doubted that personal service was properly effected it may be prudent to make an application under r 10.14 for confirmation of informal service. [r 10.21.1000]

References

Rule 10.14 – confirmation of informal service. 10.22

Personal service on corporation

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 3; DCR Part 8, rule 12; LCR Part 7, rule 12)

Personal service of a document on a corporation is effected: (a) by personally serving the document on a principal officer of the corporation, or (b) by serving the document on the corporation in any other manner in which service of such a document may, by law, be served on the corporation.

RULE 10.22 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.22.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.22.40] Service under the Corporations Act 2001 .............................................................................................. [r 10.22.60] Service under the SEPA ......................................................................................................................... [r 10.22.80] Postal service ....................................................................................................................................... [r 10.22.100] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.22.1000]

[r 10.22.20]

Comparison

This rule retains the substance of SCR Pt 9 r 3 and DCR Pt 8412, but newly provides for service on a “principal officer” as defined in the Dictionary to the UCPR. [r 10.22.40]

Operation

Service under the Corporations Act 2001 continues to be authorised under the rule (see annotations below). “Principal officer” is defined in the UCPR Dictionary in similar terms to the prior SCR and DCR rules, but now incorporates into the definition “other person (however described) having the general function of accepting correspondence on behalf of the corporation”. 416

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 3 – Personal service

[r 10.23.20] [r 10.22.60]

r 10.23

Service under the Corporations Act 2001

Section 109X(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides: “a document may be served on a company by leaving it at, or posting it to, the company’s registered office.” Where there is no registered office, personal service on a principal officer in accordance with this rule or the Act should be attempted or an order for substituted service obtained. It is an abuse of process for a plaintiff to obtain default judgment against a defendant when it was known that the originating process had been left at a registered office no longer in use and had not and could not have come to the attention of the defendant: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Abberwood Pty Ltd (1990) 19 NSWLR 530; 20 ATR 1868; 90 ATC 4255; 8 ACLC 528; [1990] 2 ACSR 91. Section 109X(1)(b) provides that service may be personally effected on a director residing in Australia or in an external territory. Under s 109X(2) service may be effected on a director or company secretary by leaving the document at, or posting it to, the alternative address notified to ASIC under other provisions of the Act, but only with respect to proceedings in which the person is sued in their capacity, or with respect to conduct engaged in, as a director or secretary. Service on a liquidator or administrator is effected by service on the liquidator or administrator at her or his office at the address notified to ASIC: s 109X(1)(c) and (d). For service on registered foreign company see s 601CX of Corporations Act 2001. [r 10.22.80]

Service under the SEPA

The provisions of s 109X(1) and (2) of the Corporations Act 2001 noted at [r 10.22.60] do not apply where documents may be served under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992; Corporations Act 2001, s 109X(3) and Service and Execution of Process Act 1992, s 9(9) (SEPA). Nevertheless, s 9 of the SEPA replicates the substance of the Corporations Act 2001 provisions and allows for service by leaving, or posting, a document to a company’s registered office. Where service is effected under the SEPA, the prescribed notice should be attached: SEPA s 16. Section 9(8A) of SEPA provides that where a document is not an initiating process or subpoena, service may be effected in accordance with any applicable rules of court. [r 10.22.100]

Postal service

As to the time at which service by post under the Corporations Act 2001 is deemed to be effected, see s 160 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which establishes a presumption that a postal article sent by prepaid post was received on the fourth working day after having been posted. No presumption arises if service was effected under the terms of a contract, all parties to the proceedings are parties to the contract and the application of the presumption is inconsistent with a term of the contract. [r 10.22.1000]

References

Section 109X of the Corporations Act 2001.

10.23

Personal service on Crown Solicitor

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 3; DCR Part 8, rule 7A)

For the purposes of section 6 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1988, personal service of a document on the Crown Solicitor may be duly effected by leaving the document at the office of the Crown Solicitor with a person who is apparently a member of the Crown Solicitor’s staff.

RULE 10.23 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.23.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.23.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.23.1000]

[r 10.23.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 9 r 3(3) and DCR Pt 8 r 7A.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

417

UCPR Parts 1-10

UCPR Dictionary definition of “principal officer”.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.24

[r 10.23.0]

[r 10.23.40]

Operation

Unless a form of service other than personal service is authorised under the UCPR, “personal service” must be effected on the Crown Solicitor in accordance with this rule. For the categories of documents which require personal service, see [r 10.20.60]. [r 10.23.1000]

References

See [r 10.20.60] – documents requiring personal service. 10.24

Personal service on judicial officers

(cf SCR Part 9, rules 7A and 7B)

(1) In proceedings against a judicial officer, personal service of any document may be effected by leaving a copy of the document: (a) in the case of a judicial officer of the Supreme Court or District Court, at the office of the principal registrar of that Court, or (b) in any other case, at the office of the senior judicial officer of the court at which the decision or determination was made, addressed, in either case, to the judicial officer on whom it is to be served. [Subr (1) am Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) In subrule (1), judicial officer includes an Assessor within the meaning of the Local Court Act 2007. [Subr (2) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[2]] [R 10.24 am Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 501 of 2007]

RULE 10.24 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.24.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.24.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.24.1000]

[r 10.24.20]

Comparison

Prior SCR Pt 9 r 7A provided for service on magistrates and SCR Pt 9 r 7B for service on mining wardens. The new rule applies to “judicial officers”. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. [r 10.24.40]

Operation

Section 3 of the CPA provides that “judicial officer” has the same meaning as it has in the Judicial Offıcers Act 1986; that Act provides that a “judicial officer” is a judge of the Supreme Court, Land and Environment Court and District Court, an associate judge of the Supreme Court, a magistrate, a member of the Industrial Relations Commission or the President of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal. [r 10.24.1000]

References

Definition of “judicial officer” in the Judicial Offıcers Act 1986.

418

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 3 – Personal service

[r 10.25.1000]

10.25

r 10.26

Personal service on inmate of correctional centre

(cf DCR Part 8, rule 11; LCR Part 7, rule 11)

(1) Personal service of a document on an inmate (within the meaning of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999) is effected by leaving a copy of the document, at the correctional centre at which the inmate is held in custody, with the general manager of the correctional centre. [Subr (1) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[8]]

(2) Personal service of a document on a detainee (within the meaning of the Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987) is effected by leaving a copy of the document, at the detention centre at which the detainee is held in custody, with the centre manager of the detention centre. [R 10.25 am Rule 501 of 2009]

RULE 10.25 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.25.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.25.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.25.1000]

[r 10.25.20]

Comparison

This rule incorporates DCR Pt 8 r 11. There was no Supreme Court equivalent. The rule newly provides in subr (2) for service on a child detainee. [r 10.25.40]

Operation

This rule provides for a mode of service on an inmate or child detainee in lieu of personal service. For interstate service of a subpoena on an inmate of a correctional centre, refer to the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992, in particular, Pt 3 Div 2 (service of subpoenas on prisoners). A custodian must reasonably assist a prisoner served with a subpoena to comply with the subpoena, to apply for appropriate orders or to obtain legal advice: Service and Execution of Process Act 1992, s 129. [r 10.25.1000]

References

10.26

Personal service on person who “keeps house”

(cf DCR Part 8, rule 13; LCR Part 7, rule 13)

(1) If a person keeps house (that is, remains in premises to which a person attempting service cannot lawfully or practicably obtain access), the person attempting service may serve the document on the person keeping house: (a) by doing one of the following: (i) placing the document in the mail-box for the premises, (ii) affixing the document to an outer door of the premises, (iii) if the person attempting service cannot lawfully or practicably obtain access to any such mail-box or door, affixing the document to some part of the premises, or to some fence or wall surrounding the premises, as near as practicable to the principal door or entrance to the premises, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

419

UCPR Parts 1-10

Service and Execution of Process Act 1992.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 10.26

[r 10.26.20] (b)

within 24 hours after doing so, by posting a notice to the premises, addressed to the person keeping house, informing the person of the fact that the document has been so placed or affixed.

(2) Service in accordance with subrule (1) is taken to constitute personal service.

RULE 10.26 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.26.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.26.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.26.1000]

[r 10.26.20]

Comparison

This rule incorporates the substance of prior DCR Pt 8 r 13. There was no equivalent SCR provision. [r 10.26.40]

Operation

There was no equivalent provision in the SCR; in order to effect personal service under the SCR in the circumstances described in this rule an order authorising substituted service would have been required. The introduction of this rule relaxes the requirement to obtain an order (either for substituted service or to confirm informal service) in the particular circumstance where a person is “keeping house”. The prior DCR Pt 8 r 13 applied to a party “keeping house” at either a place of residence or place of business. The affidavit of service which is filed in reliance upon this rule would presumably require strong evidence that a person was in fact on the premises at the time of service and that they had been “keeping house”. In circumstances where a defendant is avoiding service but which do not otherwise fall within this rule, see annotations under substituted service under r 10.14. [r 10.26.1000]

References

UCPR r 10.14 – substituted and informal service. 10.27

Proof of identity

(cf SCR Part 9, rule 4A; DCR Part 8, rule 17; LCR Part 7, rule 17)

For the purposes of proof of service, evidence of a statement by a person of his or her identity or of his or her holding some office is evidence of his or her identity or that he or she holds that office, as the case may be.

RULE 10.27 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 10.27.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 10.27.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 10.27.1000]

[r 10.27.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 9 r 4A and DCR Pt 8 r 17. [r 10.27.40]

Operation

This rule facilitates the admission of statements of identity for the purpose only of proving service. For the requirements as to affidavits of service, refer to r 35.8. [r 10.27.1000]

References

Rule 35.8 – affidavits of service.

420

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 10 – Service of documents generally Division 4 – Service under particular Acts

r 10.29

DIVISION 4 – SERVICE UNDER PARTICULAR ACTS [Div 4 insrt Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 4[3]]

10.28

Service under the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989

In any proceedings in which notice under the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989 is required to be given in accordance with rules of court, the notice is to be given by filing it, and serving it on: (a) all active parties, and (b) all other persons to whom it is required by that Act to be given, as soon as practicable after it has been filed. [R 10.28 insrt Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 4[3]]

10.29

Service under the Industrial Relations Act 1996

In any served on effected: (a) (b)

proceedings under the Industrial Relations Act 1996 in which a document is required to be an industrial organisation within the meaning of that Act, service of the document must be

by by by (c) by

serving it personally on the organisation’s secretary or principal officer, or leaving it at the organisation’s registered office with a person who is apparently employed the organisation, or sending it by post, addressed to the organisation’s secretary or principal officer: (i) to the organisation’s address for service in the proceedings, or (ii) if it has no address for service in the proceedings, to the organisation’s registered office.

UCPR Parts 1-10

[R 10.29 insrt Rule 570 of 2009, Sch 1[4]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

421

PART 11 – SERVICE OF DOCUMENTS OUTSIDE AUSTRALIA AND SERVICE OF EXTERNAL PROCESS [Pt 11 heading subst Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

Commentary by Deborah Robinson, Barrister. Updated by Josephine Kelly.

PART 11 COMMENTARY Application ................................................................................................................................................ [r Pt11.20] Two routes to effecting service on an overseas defendant ..................................................................... [r Pt11.40] Sovereignty and service through diplomatic channels ............................................................................. [r Pt11.60]

[r Pt11.20]

Application

This Part applies only in the Supreme Court. Where proceedings have been commenced in the District Court and subsequently an overseas defendant or cross-defendant is joined, the proceedings should be transferred to the Supreme Court in order to obtain leave to continue the proceedings. The application for transfer is made to the Supreme Court, notwithstanding the proceedings are pending in the District Court. Transfers from the District Court to the Supreme Court are provided for in UCPR r 44.7 and CPA Pt 9 Div 1. [r Pt11.40]

Two routes to effecting service on an overseas defendant

Service may be effected by private means (refer to Div 1) or through diplomatic channels (refer to Div 2). In both cases, the leave of the court to continue the proceedings must subsequently be sought pursuant to r 11.4, unless the defendant files an appearance. Service of process out of the jurisdiction is an assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction with the potential to create diplomatic repercussions or embarrassment; consequently service through diplomatic channels has been traditionally regarded as according appropriate deference to the principle of sovereignty. However, contemporary advances in international trade, commerce, communication and transport have led to an increasing practice and acceptance of service by private means. Pragmatism has also had a role in changing practice: service in accordance with Div 2 is cumbersome and often slow, which may lead to the result that the originating process is stale by the time service has been effected. Due to the delays that can arise some countries actively encourage the service of process by private means, notwithstanding the existence of an international convention providing for service through diplomatic channels. Sovereignty and service through diplomatic channels

In Afro Continental Nigeria v Meridian Shipping Co SA [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 241, Lord Denning MR said at 245: “service of a writ out of the jurisdiction is an exercise of sovereignty within the country in which service is effected. It can only be done with the consent of that country. That is why our rules provide for service through judicial authorities of that country”. Omrod LJ observed in Camera Care Ltd v Victor Hasselblad Aktiebolag [1986] 1 FTLR 348, “service of process out of the jurisdiction is an unusual assertion by this country of extra-territorial jurisdiction which could have international repercussions, and so is very carefully controlled by the Rules of Court”. Careful consideration should be given to the status of international conventions and other arrangements between Australia and the country in which service is to be effected in determining whether service by private means will be considered offensive to sovereignty and damaging to intergovernmental relations. Information as to whether international conventions apply, whether private service may be appropriate, as well as information on the mechanics of and time frames for effecting service can be found by contacting the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department – Civil Justice Division.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

423

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r Pt11.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11.1

[r 11.1.20]

DIVISION 1 – GENERAL 11.1

Application of Part

(1) This Part applies to proceedings in the Supreme Court. (2) For the purposes of this Part, a reference to Australia includes a reference to the external Territories. [R 11.1 subst Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[1]]

RULE 11.1 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 11.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 11.1.40] References ............................................................................................................................................ [r 11.1.1000]

[r 11.1.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision and applies only in the Supreme Court. [r 11.1.40]

Operation

Historically, service on an overseas defendant has only been able to be effected in Supreme Court proceedings and, notwithstanding the adoption of uniform civil provisions, the requirement that proceedings be commenced in or transferred to the Supreme Court in order to obtain leave to proceed against an overseas defendant remains unchanged. In accordance with the prior practice, r 11.1(2) makes it clear that the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) continues to apply to service of NSW process in an external territory of Australia; the provisions of Pt 11 are not applicable to service within Australia. [r 11.1.1000]

References

Definition of “Australia” in s 3 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth). 11.2 Operation of Commonwealth laws and Hague Convention This Part does not require the leave of the Supreme Court for any service or other thing that may be effected or done under any law of the Commonwealth, the Hague Convention or Part 11A. Note: Part 11A deals with the service of judicial documents under the Hague Convention. [R 11.2 subst Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[1]; am Rule 326 of 2009]

RULE 11.2 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 11.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 11.2.40] Where overseas defendant is properly joined .......................................................................................... [r 11.2.60] Alternative causes of action ...................................................................................................................... [r 11.2.80]

[r 11.2.20]

Comparison

This rule and Sch 6 reproduces SCR Pt 10 r 1A in a different format; the only deletion is the removal of the reference to proceedings under the repealed Service and Execution of Process Act 1901. This rule does not apply in the District Court. [r 11.2.40]

Operation

The rule provides that only originating process founded on the causes of action enumerated in Sch 6 or in the circumstances otherwise provided for in Sch 6 can be served on an overseas defendant. Reference should be made to the specific paragraphs of the Schedule, but broadly speaking, actions arising in NSW or concerning property or acts within NSW fall within the terms of the Schedule. Regardless of whether the cause of action 424

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 11 – Service of documents outside Australia and service of external process [r 11.3.40] Division 1A – Service outside of Australia in accordance with harmonised rules

r 11.3

is identified in Sch 6, if the person to be served is domiciled or ordinarily resident in NSW or otherwise agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, that person can be served overseas. [r 11.2.60]

Where overseas defendant is “properly joined”

Paragraph (i) of Sch 6 provides that if proceedings are properly commenced against a person served or to be served in NSW and the person overseas is “properly joined” as a party to the proceedings, then the originating process can be served on the overseas party. The case against the resident defendant must be genuine and not doomed to failure: Tyne Improvement Commissioners v Armement Anversois SA (The Brabo) (No 2) [1949] AC 326. A determination of whether a defendant is “properly joined” requires reference to the rules and principles applicable to joinder and it is not necessary that the alleged liability of the person served overseas be joint with, or alternative to, that of a person within the State: Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth Steel Co Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 69. The rules relating to joinder are now found in UCPR Pt 6 Div 5. If the overseas party would be a proper party to the proceedings if that party were within the jurisdiction then para (i) may be invoked and further, the rule is not invalid by reason of its extra-territorial nature: Maclaine Watson & Co Private Ltd v Chen [1983] 1 NSWLR 163. [r 11.2.80]

Alternative causes of action

Paragraph (w) of Sch 6 provides that any causes of action relied upon can fall within one or more of the paragraphs of the Schedule. It is not sufficient to show that only one of the causes of action relied upon is within the Schedule and then, upon obtaining leave to bring the proceedings, to rely upon other causes of action which are not within the Schedule: Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Jumbo Scheepvaart Maatschappij (Curacao) NV (1988) 14 NSWLR 507 at 518.

DIVISION 1A – SERVICE OUTSIDE OF AUSTRALIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH HARMONISED RULES [Div 1A insrt Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]]

11.3 Division does not apply to service in New Zealand of documents for or in certain trans-Tasman proceedings This Division (which contains rules on service outside of Australia) does not apply to service in New Zealand of an originating process for, or of any other document to be served in or for, a proceeding an originating process for which may be served in New Zealand under Division 2 of Part 2 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 of the Commonwealth. [R 11.3 subst Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]; am Rule 326 of 2009]

RULE 11.3 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 11.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 11.3.40] Form of notice ........................................................................................................................................... [r 11.3.60] Translation of notice ................................................................................................................................. [r 11.3.80] Failure to serve notice ............................................................................................................................ [r 11.3.100]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 10 r 2A, except that it does not require notice “in the prescribed form”. This rule does not apply in the District Court. [r 11.3.40]

Operation

The rule does not require a notice in prescribed form and there is currently no form of notice adopted under the UCPR. Previously, Form 13A was the prescribed form under the equivalent provision of the SCR. Given that there are no significant variations in the rules providing for service outside Australia between the old SCR and the new UCPR, guidance may be taken from Form 13A: see [r 11.3.60]. Form 13A pointed out to the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

425

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 11.3.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11.4

[r 11.3.40]

defendant the opportunity to apply to set aside service, to submit to the jurisdiction, and noted that a failure to so apply may result in the court giving leave to the plaintiff to proceed. [r 11.3.60]

Form of notice

Form 13A, the prescribed notice under the predecessor to this rule, was in the following terms: Form 13A Pt 10, r 2A. (Notice to defendant served outside Australia) To the Defendant: 1. The Court may, on application made by you in accordance with the rules of Court, set aside the service on you of this statement of claim (or summons or as the case may be) where – (a) service is not authorised by the rules of the Court; or (b) this Court is an inappropriate forum for the trial of the proceedings. 2. Alternatively you may submit to the jurisdiction of the Court by filing the prescribed form of unconditional notice of appearance. 3. If you do not make an application under paragraph 1 or file a notice under paragraph 2, the Court may give leave to the plaintiff to proceed against you. [r 11.3.80]

Translation of notice

In the circumstances where the originating process is required to be translated, a translation of the notice should also be obtained and served together with the originating process: refer further to the annotations under [r 11.10.120]. [r 11.3.100]

Failure to serve notice

The fact that a notice has been omitted is not material unless injustice results from the absence of the notice: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sweeney (No 2) (2001) 38 ACSR 743; [2001] NSWSC 477. 11.4

Cases for service of originating process

(1) Originating process may be served outside of Australia without leave in the circumstances referred to in Schedule 6. (2) This rule extends to originating process to be served outside Australia in accordance with the Hague Convention. [R 11.4 subst Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]; am Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[6]]

RULE 11.4 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... Operation .................................................................................................................................................. Proceedings must fall under r 11.2 ........................................................................................................... Defendant has been properly served .......................................................................................................

[r 11.4.20]

[r [r [r [r

11.4.20] 11.4.40] 11.4.60] 11.4.80]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 10 r 2. This rule does not apply in the District Court. [r 11.4.40]

Operation

Service on an overseas defendant may be effected without first obtaining the leave of the court. However, if the defendant does not file an appearance then leave must be obtained under this section to continue the proceedings against the overseas defendant. The application is made ex parte. In order to succeed on an application for leave to proceed, the plaintiff must evidence that the proceedings fall under r 11.2 and that the 426

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 11 – Service of documents outside Australia and service of external process [r 11.5.20] Division 1A – Service outside of Australia in accordance with harmonised rules

r 11.5

defendant has been “properly served”. On an application by the defendant to set aside originating process under r 11.7, the question of appropriateness of forum explicitly arises: see annotations at [r 11.7.60]. [r 11.4.60]

Proceedings must fall under r 11.2

In determining whether or not leave to proceed will be granted, the court has to be satisfied that the proceedings fall under Sch 6. In Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; 74 ALJR 1219; 173 ALR 665; [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-569; [2000] HCA 41 the High Court determined that on a leave to proceed application (generally ex parte) an assessment of the strength of the claim is not required, provided that the statement of claim, alone or together with an affidavit as to the factual matters not set out in the statement of claim or particulars, discloses that a claim falls within this rule (previously, SCR Pt 10 r 1A). In other words, no assessment of the prospects of success of the claim is required. If, however, the application for leave to proceed is opposed and an application is brought to set aside service or have the court decline to exercise its jurisdiction (under prior SCR Pt 10 r 6A, now UCPR r 12.11) the court may pay regard to whether the claims made have insufficient prospects of success to warrant putting an overseas defendant to the time, expense and trouble of defending the claims. The test to be applied to determine whether or not the claim has insufficient prospects of success is the same as that applied in an application for summary judgment. [r 11.4.80]

Defendant has been “properly served”

On a leave to proceed application the plaintiff must evidence that the defendant has been “properly served”: Castagna v Concercia Pell Mec SpA (unreported, NSWCA (FC), Mahoney P, Handley JA and Waddell AJA, 15 March 1996). Proper service contains the following elements: there must be evidence of service of the originating process and the notice required under r 11.3; there must be evidence of service of a translated copy of the originating process and notice where a translation is required by r 11.10; see further the annotations at [r 11.10.120]; finally, there should be evidence of the mode of service appropriate in the foreign jurisdiction, particularly if personal service was not effected: see r 11.6 and [r 11.6.40]. 11.5

When allowed with leave

(1) In any proceeding when service is not allowed under Schedule 6, an originating process may be served outside of Australia with the leave of the court. (2) An application for leave under this rule must be made on notice to every party other than the person intended to be served. (3) A sealed copy of every order made under this rule must be served with the document to which it relates. (4) An application for leave under this rule must be supported by an affidavit stating any facts or matters related to the desirability of the court assuming jurisdiction, including the place or country in which the person to be served is or possibly may be found, and whether or not the person to be served is an Australian citizen. (5) The court may grant an application for leave if satisfied that: (a) the claim has a real and substantial connection with Australia, and (b) Australia is an appropriate forum for the trial, and (c) in all the circumstances the court should assume jurisdiction.

RULE 11.5 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 11.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 11.5.40]

[r 11.5.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 10 r 3. This rule does not apply in the District Court. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

427

UCPR Parts 11-20

[R 11.5 subst Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11.6

[r 11.5.40]

[r 11.5.40]

Operation

This rule only applies to documents other than originating process. The rule does not authorise a grant of leave for service in another country inconsistently with established criteria of international law with regard to comity, and further, the court will not lightly subject a foreigner to a subpoena in respect of conduct outside the jurisdiction, particularly if the utility of the subpoena is not clear and the administration of justice can be advanced by other means: Arhill Pty Ltd v General Terminal Co Pty Ltd (1990) 23 NSWLR 545. 11.6

Court’s discretion whether to assume jurisdiction

(1) On application by a person on whom an originating process has been served outside of Australia, the court may dismiss or stay the proceeding or set aside service of the originating process. (2) Without limiting subrule (1), the court may make an order under this rule if satisfied: (a) that service of the originating process is not authorised by these rules, or (b) that the court is an inappropriate forum for the trial of the proceeding, or (c) that the claim has insufficient prospects of success to warrant putting the person served outside Australia to the time, expense and trouble of defending the claim. [R 11.6 subst Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]]

RULE 11.6 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 11.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 11.6.40]

[r 11.6.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 10 r 5. This rule does not apply in the District Court. [r 11.6.40]

Operation

Even if personal service would be required if a document were to be served in Australia, this rule allows service to be effected in accordance with the law for service prevailing in the foreign jurisdiction: BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt [1980] 1 NSWLR 496; (1980) 47 FLR 317. The party effecting service should establish by evidence what is the prevailing law in that foreign jurisdiction (see discussion in BP Exploration at 503). 11.7 Notice to person served outside Australia If a person is to be served outside of Australia with an originating process, the person must also be served with a notice in the approved form informing the person of: (a) the scope of the jurisdiction of the court in respect of claims against persons who are served outside Australia, and (b) the grounds alleged by the plaintiff to found jurisdiction, and (c) the person’s right to challenge service of the originating process or the jurisdiction of the court or to file a conditional appearance. [R 11.7 subst Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]]

RULE 11.7 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 11.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 11.7.40] Inappropriate forum ................................................................................................................................... [r 11.7.60] References ............................................................................................................................................ [r 11.7.1000] 428

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 11 – Service of documents outside Australia and service of external process [r 11.8.20] Division 1A – Service outside of Australia in accordance with harmonised rules [r 11.7.20]

r 11.8

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 10 r 6A. This rule does not apply in the District Court. [r 11.7.40]

Operation

This rule, in conjunction with r 12.11, allows the court to set aside originating process served on a defendant abroad. This rule and r 12.11 reproduce the substance of the prior rules under the SCR. Rule 12.11 allows such an application to be brought without the entry of an appearance. The practice is that, on any such application, an appearance is not filed as an appearance ordinarily represents submission to the jurisdiction of the court. A strike out application should not be brought, as this involves submission to the jurisdiction; nevertheless deficiences in the pleadings may establish that the functional requirements of UCPR Sch 6 have not been met: Clark v Auspicious Yacht Sales Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 37. Under UCPR r 10.20(5) a defendant is taken to have been personally served on the date upon which an appearance is entered. An application to set aside the process or its service may nevertheless be brought notwithstanding the entry of an appearance: Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 36; [2000] NSWSC 507. In making an application to the court under this rule, consideration should be given to the criteria for leave to proceed under r 11.4 and the annotations under that rule. The question of appropriateness of forum is explicitly raised under this rule. [r 11.7.60]

Inappropriate forum

The question before the court is whether or not it is a “clearly inappropriate forum”, as opposed to the question of whether or not there is a “more appropriate forum”: Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; 65 ALJR 83; Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491; 76 ALJR 551; 187 ALR 1; 35 MVR 1; [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-646; [2002] AIPC 91-786; 23 NSWCCR 207; [2002] HCA 10 at [23] to [25]; James Hardie Industries Pty Ltd v Grigor (1998) 45 NSWLR 20; 16 NSWCCR 434. Whether jurisdiction exists in courts of another forum to deal with a matter may nevertheless be relevant: Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571; 70 ALJR 480. The court will consider the general circumstances of the case, including consideration of such issues as whether each forum recognises the orders and decrees of the other; which forum can provide more effectively for the proceedings; the connection of the parties to each jurisdiction and issues upon which relief might depend: Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571; 70 ALJR 480. [r 11.7.1000]

References

UCPR r 12.11 – set aside originating process etc. UCPR r 11.4 – leave to plaintiff to proceed. 11.8

Time for filing appearance

Except when the court otherwise orders, a defendant who has been served outside of Australia must file an appearance within 42 days from the date of service. [R 11.8 subst Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]; am Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[7] and [8]]

RULE 11.8 COMMENTARY [r 11.8.20]

Comparison UCPR Parts 11-20

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 10 r 6A. This rule does not apply in the District Court.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

429

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11.8AA

11.8AA

Leave to proceed where no appearance by person

(1) If an originating process is served on a person outside Australia and the person does not enter an appearance, the party serving the document may not proceed against the person served except by leave of the court. (2) An application for leave under subrule (1) may be made without serving notice of the application on the person served with the originating process. [R 11.8AA insrt Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]]

11.8AB Service of other documents outside Australia Any document other than an originating process may be served outside Australia with the leave of the court, which may be given with any directions that the court thinks fit. [R 11.8AB insrt Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]]

11.8AC Mode of service A document to be served outside Australia need not be personally served on a person so long as it is served on the person in accordance with the law of the country in which service is effected. [R 11.8AC insrt Reg 755 of 2016, Sch 1[2]]

DIVISION 2 – SERVICE OUTSIDE AUSTRALIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ARRANGEMENTS 11.8A Application of Division This Division does not apply to any document that is intended to be served on a person outside Australia in accordance with the Hague Convention. Note: Division 2 of Part 11A deals with the service of local judicial documents in a country (other than Australia) that is a party to the Hague Convention. [R 11.8A insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[9]]

11.9

Definitions

(cf SCR Part 10, rule 7)

In this Division: applicant means the person by whom an application is made under rule 11.10(1)(a). participating country means: (a) any country that is a signatory to an international convention with respect to the service of documents in that country to which Australia is a signatory, or (b) in relation to particular proceedings, any other country declared by the Attorney General, or by some other person authorised by the Attorney General for the purposes of this definition, by notice filed in the proceedings, to be a country to which this Division applies. [Def am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[9]]

undertaking as to expenses means an undertaking by an applicant or his or her solicitor to pay to the registrar an amount equal to the sum of all expenses incurred in consequence of the request for service. [R 11.9 am Rule 501 of 2009]

RULE 11.9 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................... [r 11.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 11.9.40] References ............................................................................................................................................ [r 11.9.1000] 430

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 11 – Service of documents outside Australia and service of external process [r 11.9.1000] Div 2 - Service outside Aus in accordance w Attorney General’s arrangements r 11.10 [r 11.9.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 10 r 7 and Pt 10 r 10(c). The definition of “applicant” is newly included. [r 11.9.40]

Operation

This Division provides for the service of documents on an overseas defendant through diplomatic channels. An applicant should first ascertain whether or not the country in which service is to be effected is a signatory to a relevant inter-national convention: check with the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department – Civil Justice Division. If the country is a signatory then the Attorney-General’s declaration under Para (b) of this rule is not required. If the country is not a signatory to an international convention then the Attorney must declare that it is appropriate to allow the documentation to proceed through diplomatic channels: refer further to [r 11.10.80]. Some countries refuse to allow service of Australian process through diplomatic channels. The United Kingdom no longer accepts requests for service through diplomatic channels from Commonwealth countries. [r 11.9.1000]

References

Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department – Civil Justice Division. 11.10

Filing of requisite documents

(cf SCR Part 10, rules 8, 9 and 10)

(1) A person requiring a document to be served in a participating country may file the following documents in the Supreme Court: (a) an application to the principal registrar of the Supreme Court that a sealed copy of a document be transmitted to that country for service on the person specified in the application as the person to be served, (b) if the applicant requires service of the document under an international convention with respect to the service of documents to which that country and Australia are both signatories, a statement to that effect, (c) the document to be served and (unless English is an official language of the country concerned) a translation of the document, (d) if any special manner of service is required, a request for service in that manner and (unless English is an official language of the country concerned) a translation of the request, (e) an undertaking as to expenses, together with such further copies of those documents as the principal registrar may direct. (2) A translation of a document referred to in subrule (1): (a) must be in an official language of the country in which service is required, and (b) must bear a certificate by the translator, in that language, stating his or her qualifications and certifying that the translation is a correct translation of the document.

Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 11.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 11.10.40] Application ............................................................................................................................................... [r 11.10.60] Attorney General’s declaration ............................................................................................................... [r 11.10.80] Documentation checklist ....................................................................................................................... [r 11.10.100] Failure to serve translated copy ........................................................................................................... [r 11.10.120]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

431

UCPR Parts 11-20

RULE 11.10 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11.10 [r 11.10.20]

[r 11.10.20] Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 10 rr 8, 9 and 10. It is now necessary that the translation contain certification that the translation is a “correct” translation. This rule does not apply in the District Court. [r 11.10.40]

Operation

It is noted that a definition of “applicant” is newly included under r 11.9 and the document which was styled “request” under the previous rules is now styled “application” under r 11.10. The change in nomenclature may indicate that, contrary to the prior practice, a notice of motion is now required. It is certainly arguable that the “application” does not fall within Pt 18 (which provides that applications for court orders are to be made by motion) as the Supreme Court makes no order under Pt 11 but merely accepts the documentation for filing, sealing and subsequent transmission to the Attorney General’s Department. The prior practice was that a letter of request would be delivered to the Prothonotary or Principal Registrar and no filing fee was paid. [r 11.10.60]

Application

Under the prior SCR, the application to the principal registrar was described as a “request and undertaking” and a prescribed form, Form 15, was used. While there is no equivalent form under the UCPR, guidance may be taken from Form 15 as the rules are unaltered in substance. Form 15 provided as follows: Form 15 Pt 10, r 10. REQUEST FOR SERVICE To the Prothonotary: I (name) request that a sealed copy of (description of document) be transmitted to (country) for service on (name), of (address) (pursuant to the Convention made between .......... and .......... ) and I undertake to pay to you an amount equal to the sum of all expenses incurred in consequence of this request. [r 11.10.80]

Attorney General’s declaration

If the country is not a signatory to an international convention on service, the NSW Attorney General’s approval, by way of declaration and notice filed in the proceedings, is required. In those circumstances, short written submissions enclosed with the application might facilitate processing. Submissions should address matters such as: why it is not offensive to principle or international comity to permit service to be effected on a foreign national in the particular case; confirmation that the proceedings fall under r 11.2 and are proceedings in which it will subsequently be appropriate to seek court’s leave to proceed under r 11.4; whether judgment, if obtained, can be enforced in NSW or, if it is proposed to enforce any judgment in the foreign jurisdiction; the identity of the international convention, treaty or other mechanism that provides for enforcement of any judgment. The Attorney’s declaration is not general as to appropriateness of service in the country of interest, but is particular to the proceedings in which the application is made. [r 11.10.100]

Documentation checklist

The following documentation should be filed in the Supreme Court: (a) Application to the principal registrar: refer to annotations under [r 11.10.60]. (b) Originating process. (c) A notice pursuant to r 11.3. (d) Certified translations of documents in (b) and (c), if the official language of the county in which service is to be effected is not English. (e) If any special manner of service is required, a request for service in that manner, along with a certified translation of that request. Most foreign countries require at least duplicate copies of the documents to be served, but some require documents in triplicate: check with the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department – Civil Justice Division for details. 432

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 11 – Service of documents outside Australia and service of external process [r 11.11.40] Div 2 - Service outside Aus in accordance w Attorney General’s arrangements r 11.11 [r 11.10.120]

Failure to serve translated copy

The rule requires service of translated copies of the documents, unless English is an official language of the country. The Commonwealth Attorney-General’s website contains information as to the official language of the country of interest. The object of service is to bring to the notice of the defendant the existence of the litigation, the terms of the claim and to point out the opportunity to defend it: Cook v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 14 September 1994). Nevertheless, a failure to serve a translated copy of the documentation might be remedied as an irregularity (under CPA s 63, previously SCA s 81) in circumstances where defendants are not prejudiced: in Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Schaerer [1998] NSWSC 473. 11.11

Procedure on filing and lodgment

(cf SCR Part 10, rules 11 and 12)

(1) After all relevant documents have been filed as referred to in rule 11.10, the principal registrar of the Supreme Court must seal them and send the lodged documents to the Director-General of the Attorney General’s Department for transmission for service, together with such letter of request (if any) as may be necessary. (2) A certificate as to service, attempted service or non-service of any document so sent that is issued by: (a) a judicial authority or other responsible person in the country concerned, or (b) a British or Australian consular authority in the country concerned, is evidence of the matters stated in the certificate.

RULE 11.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 11.11.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................. [r 11.11.40]

[r 11.11.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 10 rr 11 and 12. Operation

In broad terms, documentation travels the following route. Documents filed with the Supreme Court are transmitted to the NSW Attorney General for approval, or a declaration under r 11.9. The documents, together with that approval, are then transmitted to the Commonwealth Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which refers the documentation to the Australian embassy in the relevant country. The Australian embassy refers the documents to the foreign ministry of that country, which then refers the documents to the Justice Ministry, and from there, to the appropriate court to arrange for service to be effected. When service is effected through diplomatic channels, a certificate of service or non-service, as the case may be, eventually finds it way back to the NSW Supreme Court file. Once that certificate has been received, and if no appearance is filed, an application may be made to the court by motion for leave to proceed under r 11.4. Under this rule, the certificate of service takes the place of the traditional affidavit of service. The route just outlined provides many opportunities for the process to be delayed. Inquiries may be made of the Community Relations Division of the NSW Attorney General’s Department, or the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to ascertain the progress of documentation while it is still in this country. It is generally very difficult to ascertain the progress of the documentation in the foreign jurisdiction unless inquiries are made within that jurisdiction.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

433

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 11.11.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11.12

11.12

[r 11.12.20]

Recovery of unpaid expenses

(cf SCR Part 10, rule 13)

If an applicant who has given an undertaking as to expenses does not, within 7 days after service on the applicant of an account of expenses incurred in relation to his or her application, pay to the principal registrar of the Supreme Court the amount of the expenses, the Supreme Court: (a) may order the applicant to pay the amount of the expenses to the principal registrar, and (b) may stay the proceedings, until payment is made, so far as concerns the whole or any part of any claim for relief by the applicant.

RULE 11.12 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 11.12.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 11.12.40]

[r 11.12.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 10 r 13. [r 11.12.40]

Operation

The rule enables the court to enforce the undertaking as to expenses that is provided for under r 11.10(1)(e). An indication of the quantum of costs, if any, recoverable under the undertaking as to expenses may be obtained from the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department – Civil Justice Division. Many countries do not require any payment for their assistance in effecting service.

DIVISION 3 – SERVICE OF EXTERNAL PROCESS [Div 3 insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

11.13 Application (cf SCR Part 57, rule 1)

(1) Subject to subrule (2), this Division applies to the service in the State of any document that is required in connection with civil proceedings pending before a court outside the State, where: (a) a letter of request from the court has been received by the principal registrar of the Supreme Court, and (b) either: (i) the request is for service pursuant to a convention, or (ii) the Attorney General, or some other person authorised by the Attorney General for the purposes of this rule, certifies that effect ought to be given to the request. [Para (b) am Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

(2) This Division does not apply to the service in this State of any foreign judicial document (within the meaning of Part 11A) in accordance with a request for service made under the Hague Convention. Note: Division 4 of Part 11A deals with the service in New South Wales of foreign judicial documents originating in countries that are parties to the Hague Convention. [Subr (2) insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[11]] [R 11.13 am Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[10]; Rule 494 of 2008; Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]; insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

434

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 11 – Service of documents outside Australia and service of external process Division 3 – Service of external process 11.14

r 11.17

Requisite documents

(cf SCR Part 57, rule 2)

In order that service may be effected in accordance with this Division, the following documents must be delivered to the principal registrar of the Supreme Court, unless the principal registrar otherwise directs: (a) the document to be served and 2 copies of it, (b) a copy of the letter of request, (c) if the document or letter is not in English, a translation of it in English and a copy of the translation. [R 11.14 am Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[12]; Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]; insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

11.15

Service

(cf SCR Part 57, rule 3)

(1) The principal registrar of the Supreme Court is to request the Sheriff or some other person to serve the document concerned. [Subr (1) am Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) The document may be served in any manner in which originating process in proceedings in the Supreme Court may be served, including substituted service pursuant to rule 10.14. (3) Proceedings for an order for substituted service may be commenced only by the Attorney General. [R 11.15 am Rule 501 of 2007; insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

11.16

Affidavit of service

(cf SCR Part 57, rule 4)

(1) After the document has been served or attempts to serve the document have failed, the Sheriff or other person requested to serve the document must make an affidavit of service, and lodge it together with such further copies of the affidavit as the principal registrar of the Supreme Court may direct. [Subr (1) am Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) The affidavit must state when, where and how service was effected or attempted, and the costs incurred in connection with the service or attempted service. [R 11.16 am Rule 501 of 2007; insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

11.17

Certificate

(cf SCR Part 57, rule 5)

[Subr (1) am Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) A certificate referred to in subrule (1)(a): (a) must certify: (i) that the document or a copy of it was served on the person at the time, and in the manner, specified in the certificate, or (ii) if attempts to effect service failed, that service has failed and the reasons for the failure, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

435

UCPR Parts 11-20

(1) If the request for service is made pursuant to a convention, the principal registrar of the Supreme Court must give either: (a) a certificate complying with subrule (2), or (b) such other certificate as is appropriate to the terms of the relevant convention.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11.17 (b)

must certify the amount of the costs incurred.

(3) If the request for service is made otherwise than pursuant to a convention, the principal registrar of the Supreme Court must give either: (a) a certificate complying with subrule (4), or (b) such other certificate as is appropriate to the terms of the letter of request. [Subr (3) am Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(4) A certificate referred to in subrule (3)(a): (a) must annex the letter of request, a copy of the document to be served and of any translation, and a copy of the affidavit under rule 11.16, and (b) must identify the annexures, and (c) must certify: (i) that the manner of service of the document and the proof of service are such as are required by these rules in relation to the service of originating process of the Supreme Court, or (ii) if attempts to effect service failed, that service has failed and the reasons for the failure, and (d) must certify the amount of the costs incurred. (5) In each case, the certificate is to be sealed with the seal of the Supreme Court. (6) The principal registrar of the Supreme Court must send the certificate to the Director-General of the Attorney General’s Department or, if the letter of request or any relevant convention so requires, to the appropriate consul or other authority. [Subr (6) am Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]] [R 11.17 am Rule 501 of 2007; insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

436

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 11A – Service under the Hague Convention Division 1 – Preliminary

r 11A.1

PART 11A – SERVICE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION [Pt 11A insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

Commentary by Sigrid Neumeuller, Special Counsel. Updated by Mary-Ann de Mestre, Solicitor of NSW, Adjunct Fellow of Western Sydney University

DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY Note 1:

This Part forms part of a scheme to implement Australia’s obligations under the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. Under the Convention, the Attorney-General’s Department of the Commonwealth is designated as the Central Authority (under Article 2 of the Convention) and certain courts and government departments are, for certain purposes, designated as “other” or “additional” authorities (under Article 18 of the Convention). Note 2: This Part provides (in Division 2) for service in overseas Convention countries of local judicial documents (documents that relate to proceedings in the Court) and (in Division 3) for default judgment in proceedings in the Court after service overseas of such a document. Division 4, on the other hand, deals with service by the Court or arranged by the Court in its role as an other or additional authority, of judicial documents emanating from overseas Convention countries.

Note 3: The Attorney-General’s Department of the Commonwealth maintains a copy of the Convention, a list of all Convention countries, details of declarations and objections made under the Convention by each of those countries and the names and addresses of the Central and other authorities of each of those countries. A copy of the Convention can be found at http://www.hcch.net. 11A.1

Definitions

In this Part: additional authority, for a Convention country, means an authority that is: (a) for the time being designated by that country, under Article 18 of the Hague Convention, to be an authority (other than the Central Authority) for that country, and (b) competent to receive requests for service abroad emanating from Australia. applicant, for a request for service abroad or a request for service in this jurisdiction, means the person on whose behalf service is requested. applicant, for a request for service abroad or a request for service in this jurisdiction, means the person on whose behalf service is requested. Note: The term applicant may have a different meaning in other Parts of these rules. Central Authority, for a Convention country, means an authority that is for the time being designated by that country, under Article 2 of the Hague Convention, to be the Central Authority for that country. certificate of service means a certificate of service that has been completed for the purposes of Article 6 of the Hague Convention.

civil proceedings means any judicial proceedings in relation to civil or commercial matters. Convention country means a country, other than Australia, that is a party to the Hague Convention. defendant, for a request for service abroad of an initiating process, means the person on whom the initiating process is requested to be served. foreign judicial document means a judicial document that originates in a Convention country and that relates to civil proceedings in a court of that country. forwarding authority: © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

437

UCPR Parts 11-20

certifying authority, for a Convention country, means the Central Authority for the country or some other authority that is for the time being designated by the country, under Article 6 of the Hague Convention, to complete certificates of service in the form annexed to the Hague Convention.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11A.1

[r 11A.1.20] (a)

for a request for service of a foreign judicial document in this jurisdiction—the authority or judicial officer of the Convention country in which the document originates that forwards the request (being an authority or judicial officer that is competent under the law of that country to forward a request for service under Article 3 of the Hague Convention), or (b) for a request for service of a local judicial document in a Convention country—the Registrar. Hague Convention means the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters done at the Hague on 15 November 1965. initiating process means any document by which proceedings (including proceedings on any cross-claim or third party notice) are commenced. local judicial document means a judicial document that relates to civil proceedings in the Court. Registrar means the principal registrar of the Court, and includes any other person who, by delegation or otherwise, is authorised to exercise the functions of that office. request for service abroad means a request for service in a Convention country of a local judicial document mentioned in rule 11A.4(1). request for service in this jurisdiction means a request for service in this jurisdiction of a foreign judicial document mentioned in rule 11A.13(1). the Court means the Supreme Court. this jurisdiction means New South Wales. [R 11A.1 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

RULE 11A.1 COMMENTARY [r 11A.1.20]

Definitions

The term “judicial documents” is not defined in this Part. The Instructions for filling out the notice established by the author of the Report on the Recommendation by Mr Gustaf Moeller at lit (e) define a “judicial document”: Any document relating to litigation, including summary proceedings or uncontested proceedings, e.g. summons, judgment, order or application, is regarded as a judicial document. Any other legal document is to be classified as an extrajudicial document. The Report on the work of the Special Commission on the operation of the Convention of December 1977 at lit (e) sets out: Extrajudicial documents differ from judicial documents in that they are not directly connected with lawsuits, and they are distinguished from purely private acts by the fact that they require the intervention of an “authority” or of a “judicial officer” under the terms of the Convention. Examples of judicial documents are demands for payment, notices to quit in connection with leaseholds, and protests in connection with bills of exchange, on the condition that they emanate from an authority or from a process server. Instruments such as objections to marriage and consent to adoption require certain formalities. However, in certain legal systems such as England and Ireland, such documents are served by private persons with identical legal effect. The intent is to generally exclude documents emanating from private persons. However, the Commission encourages the Central Authorities to serve extrajudicial documents not emanating from an authority or from a judicial officer if these documents were of a type which normally would call for the intervention of an authority in their countries.

438

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 11A.3.20]

11A.2

Part 11A – Service under the Hague Convention Division 2 – Service abroad of local judicial documents

r 11A.3

Provisions of this Part to prevail

The provisions of this Part prevail to the extent of any inconsistency between those provisions and any other provisions of these rules. [R 11A.2 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

RULE 11A.2 COMMENTARY [r 11A.2.20]

Application

This Part applies to service abroad of all judicial documents to which the Convention applies. For the circumstances in which the Convention applies please see [r 11A.3.20]. This Part is the only mode of service to be used in relation to judicial documents of the Supreme Court in the event that the Convention applies. See [r 11A.3.20]. The District Court of NSW has jurisdiction of matters where the defendant is located overseas and was duly served. For a defendant located overseas at the time of service the Act requires that the defendant was served abroad in accordance with the Service of Execution and Process Act 1992: subss 47(1) and (3) of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW) . Any other documents to be served abroad or to be served in a non-Convention country need to be served in accordance with Pt 11.

DIVISION 2 – SERVICE ABROAD OF LOCAL JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS 11A.3

Application of Division

(1) Subject to subrule (2), this Division applies to service in a Convention country of a local judicial document. (2) This Division does not apply if service of the document is effected, without application of any compulsion, by an Australian diplomatic or consular agent mentioned in Article 8 of the Hague Convention. [R 11A.3 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

RULE 11A.3 COMMENTARY

[r 11A.3.20] When does the Convention apply? For the Convention to be applicable, all of the following requirements must be met: (a) a document is to be transmitted; (b) the address of the person to be served is known; (c) the document to be served is a judicial or extrajudicial document; (d) the document to be served relates to a civil or commercial matter; and (e) the document is to be transmitted from one State party to the Convention to another State party to the Convention for service in the latter. The law of the forum State determines whether or not a document has to be served abroad for service in the other State. See HCCH, 14: Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act= conventions.authorities&cid=17 for a list of designated central authorities and general information on mode of service for each Convention country. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

439

UCPR Parts 11-20

When does the Convention apply? ........................................................................................................ [r 11A.3.20] Parties to the Convention ....................................................................................................................... [r 11A.3.40] Civil and Commercial Matter .................................................................................................................. [r 11A.3.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11A.3 [r 11A.3.40]

[r 11A.3.20] Parties to the Convention

The partiesto the Convention are: States Albania Argentina Armenia Armenia Australia Belarus Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Canada China, People’s Republic of Costa Rica Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland India Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea, Republic of Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Mexico Monaco Montenegro Morocco Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal 440

S1

21-I-1966

7-I-1969 1-III-1966 15-XI-1965 12-I-1967 15-XI-1965 20-VII-1983

20-X-1989 25-XI-1965 25-I-1979 12-III-1970

27-X-1971

15-XI-1965 15-X-1968 5-VII-1971

R/A/Su 2 1-XI-2006 2-II-2001 27-VI-2012 27-VI-2012 15-III-2010 6-VI-1997 19-XI-1970 16-VI-2008 23-XI-1999 26-IX-1988 6-V-1991 16-III-2016 28-II-2006 26-X-1982 28-I-1993 2-VIII-1969 12-XII-1968 2-II-1996 11-IX-1969 3-VII-1972 27-IV-1979 20-VII-1983 13-VII-2004 10-XI-2008 23-XI-2006 5-IV-1994 14-VIII-1972 25-XI-1981 28-V-1970 13-I-2000 28-III-1995 2-VIII-2000 9-VII-1975 24-II-2011 2-XI-1999 1-III-2007 16-I-2012 24-III-2011 3-XI-1975 2-VIII-1969 13-II-1996 27-XII-1973

Type A A A A A A R A A A A A A A Su R R A R R R R A A A R R R R A A A R A A A A A R R A R

3

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 11A.3.60]

Part 11A – Service under the Hague Convention Division 2 – Service abroad of local judicial documents

States Republic of Moldova Romania Russian Federation Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States of America Venezuela Viet Nam

S1

21-X-1976 4-II-1969 21-V-1985

11-VI-1968 10-XII-1965 15-XI-1965

r 11A.3

R/A/Su 2 4-VII-2012 21-VIII-2003 1-V-2001 2-VII-2010 15-III-1993 18-IX-2000 4-VI-1987 31-VIII-2000 2-VIII-1969 2-XI-1994 23-XII-2008

Type A A A A Su A R A R R A

28-II-1972 1-II-2001 17-XI-1967

R A R

24-VIII-1967 29-X-1993 16-III-2016

R A A

3

The above status table can be found at: HCCH, Status Table, 14: Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (20-VII-2016) https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=17. The status table makes reference to declarations and reservations by parties, which may include requirements for translations of documents in particular languages, costs for execution of service and provisions for the application of the Convention to external territories of the parties as, for example, in the case of Australia. [r 11A.3.60]

Civil and Commercial Matter

“Civil or commercial matters” should be interpreted in an autonomous manner, without reference exclusively either to the law of the requesting State or to the law of the requested State, or to both laws cumulatively: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, Service, Taking of Evidence and Access to Justice Conventions (2 to 12 February 2009) at [13].

The Special Commission invites State parties to encourage their Central Authority to communicate with the forwarding authority when problems of interpretation arise. It recommends that State parties encourage forwarding authorities to include in their requests for service some information about the nature of the cause of action, in particular where a request may give rise to doubts as to whether it falls within the scope of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, Service, Taking of Evidence and Access to Justice Conventions (2 to 12 February 2009) at [14]. There had been two significant decisions rendered by the highest courts of two different State parties to the Convention concerning the scope of the concept “civil or commercial matters”. For this reason, the full discussion on this point had been deferred to the discussion on the Hague Evidence Convention: Report on the work of the Special Commission of April 1989 on the operation of the Hague Conventions of 15 November 1965 on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters and of 18 March 1970 on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters at [25]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

441

UCPR Parts 11-20

The Special Commission takes the view that a liberal interpretation should be given to the phrase “civil or commercial matters”. In doing so, one should focus on the nature of the cause of action and keep in mind that the Convention does not expressly exclude any particular subject matter from the scope of “civil or commercial matters”.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11A.3

[r 11A.3.60]

This discussion ultimately lent itself to the drafting of conclusions on the “scope of the two Conventions as to their subject-matter” which were included among the “Conclusions on the most important points considered by the Special Commission” as adopted on the final day of the meeting. The Conclusions, so far as they deal with the interpretation of the term “civil or commercial matters” are: (a) The words “civil or commercial matters” should be interpreted in an autonomous manner, without reference exclusively either to the law of the requesting State or to the law of the requested State, or to both laws cumulatively. (b) In the “grey area” between private and public law, the historical evolution would suggest the possibility of a more liberal interpretation of these words. In particular, it was accepted that matters such as bankruptcy, insurance and employment might fall within the scope of this concept. (c) Nothing prevents Contracting States from applying the Conventions in their mutual relations to matters of public law, though not necessarily in an identical manner for both Conventions. See Report on the work of the Special Commission of April 1989 on the operation of the Hague Conventions of 15 November 1965 on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters and of 18 March 1970 on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters at [26]. Nonetheless, some requests for service of process had been refused by the Central Authority in one of the German Länder involving law suits filed in the courts of the United States of America asserting claims for civil damages – for example arising from products liability – to which large claims for “punitive” damages were joined. The theory of this regional Central Authority, which was not necessarily shared by the Ministry of Justice in Bonn or by the Central Authorities of the other Länder, apparently was that excessive claims for punitive damages were penal rather than civil or commercial in nature. Subsequently to the Special Commission, on 9 May 1989, the Oberlandesgericht of Munich rejected this theory and characterised punitive damages as civil in nature (decision published in part in RIW 1989, Heft 6, p 483). A number of experts thought that: (a) it was for the requesting State to characterise the claim in respect of the substantive scope of the Convention; (b) since the Convention provided assistance in judicial proceedings, a liberal attitude should be taken – especially as the rules concerning recognition of foreign judgments would be used as the obvious means of counteracting procedural deficiencies at the time of service; (c) to the extent that it is established by the pleadings that “punitive damages” are to be paid to the plaintiff and not to the requesting State, it seems difficult to characterize such damages as other than an element of a civil or commercial action; and (d) it is impossible to characterise such an action as other than civil or commercial on the basis of the amounts claimed, since a civil or commercial action does not alter according to the amount of damages sought. In addition, it was pointed out: (e) that the service of documents abroad does not presuppose their validity in international litigation; (f) that the aim of the Convention is to inform the defendant rapidly of proceedings against him; and (g) that refusal to apply the Convention leads to the application of the domestic rules of procedure of the requesting State which is often disadvantageous to the defendant. The Special Commission which met in November 1977 to consider the operation of the Hague Service Convention concluded that claims for punitive damages fall within the scope of the Convention (see the Report of the Special Commission in Proceedings, Fourteenth Session, Tome IV, Judicial Co-operation at pp 381-382; Practical Handbook, at p 30): See the Report on the work of the Special Commission of April 1989 on the operation of the Hague Conventions of 15 November 1965 on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters and of 18 March 1970 on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters at [7]–[10].

442

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 11A.4.20]

11A.4

Part 11A – Service under the Hague Convention Division 2 – Service abroad of local judicial documents

r 11A.4

Application for request for service abroad

(1) A person may apply to the Registrar, in the Registrar’s capacity as a forwarding authority, for a request for service in a Convention country of a local judicial document. (2) The application must be accompanied by 3 copies of each of the following documents: (a) a draft request for service abroad, which must be in the approved form, (b) the document to be served, (c) a summary of the document to be served, which must be in the approved form, (d) if, under Article 5 of the Hague Convention, the Central Authority or any additional authority of the country to which the request is addressed requires the document to be served to be written in, or translated into, the official language or one of the official languages of that country, a translation into that language of both the document to be served and the summary of the document to be served. (3) The application must contain a written undertaking to the Court, signed by the legal practitioner on the record for the applicant in the proceedings to which the local judicial document relates or, if there is no legal practitioner on the record for the applicant in those proceedings, by the applicant: (a) to be personally liable for all costs that are incurred: (i) by the employment of a person to serve the documents to be served, being a person who is qualified to do so under the law of the Convention country in which the documents are to be served, or (ii) by the use of any particular method of service that has been requested by the applicant for the service of the documents to be served, and (b) to pay the amount of those costs to the Registrar within 28 days after receipt from the Registrar of a notice specifying the amount of those costs under rule 11A.6(3), and (c) to give such security for those costs as the Registrar may require. (4) The draft request for service abroad: (a) must be completed (except for signature) by the applicant, and (b) must state whether (if the time fixed for entering an appearance in the proceedings to which the local judicial document relates expires before service is effected) the applicant wants service to be attempted after the expiry of that time, and (c) must be addressed to the Central Authority, or to an additional authority, for the Convention country in which the person is to be served, and (d) may state that the applicant requires a certificate of service that is completed by an additional authority to be countersigned by the Central Authority. (5) Any translation required under subrule (2)(d) must bear a certificate (in both English and the language used in the translation) signed by the translator stating: (a) that the translation is an accurate translation of the documents to be served, and (b) the translator’s full name and address and his or her qualifications for making the translation. [R 11A.4 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

Approved form of request for service and certificate of service ............................................................ Approved form for summary of the document to be served .................................................................. Translations ............................................................................................................................................ Costs of service ......................................................................................................................................

[r 11A.4.20]

[r [r [r [r

11A.4.20] 11A.4.40] 11A.4.60] 11A.4.80]

Approved form of request for service and certificate of service

For the approved form please see Form 91 available at: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, Approved Civil Forms, http://www.ucprforms.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ucprforms/index.html. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

443

UCPR Parts 11-20

RULE 11A.4 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11A.5

[r 11A.4.20]

The use of the Model Form is mandatory (Article 3(1)): Conclusions and Recommendations of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, Service, Taking of Evidence and Access to Justice Conventions (2 to 12 February 2009) at [29]. The Special Commission recommends that the Model Form not be amended. The usefulness of the Form is further improved when forwarding authorities include, in particular, information about their competence and the nature of the cause of action, as well as the date of birth of the person to be served. Furthermore, the authority completing the Certificate is encouraged to indicate the relevant provisions in the law of the requested State under which service was effected: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, Service, Taking of Evidence and Access to Justice Conventions (2 to 12 February 2009) at [30]. [r 11A.4.40]

Approved form for summary of the document to be served

In the case of a judicial document, the summary to be served must contain the following details: 1. the nature and purpose of the document; 2. the nature and purpose of the proceedings and, when appropriate, the amount in dispute; 3. date and place for entering appearance, if appropriate; 4. court which has given judgment, if appropriate; 5. date of judgment, if appropriate; and 6. time limits stated in the document, if appropriate. For the approved form please see Form 92 available at: http://www.ucprforms.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ucprforms/ index.html. [r 11A.4.60]

Translations

See http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=17 for each country’s specific requirements for translations, including language to be used. Please also note the form requirements for translations prescribed in r 11A.4(5). [r 11A.4.80]

Costs of service

Generally, Article 12 of the Convention prohibits the requested state to charge for its services. However, the costs occasioned by: 1. the employment of a judicial officer or of a person competent under the law of the requested state; or 2. the use of a particular method of service, can be passed on to and are payable by the applicant for service under r 11A.4. Further details on the applicable costs of service for each state can be found under the hyperlink for the respective state referring to “Central Authority and practical information” at: http://www.hcch.net/index_ en.php?act=conventions.authorities&cid=17. 11A.5

How application to be dealt with

(1) If satisfied that the application and its accompanying documents comply with rule 11A.4, the Registrar: (a) must sign the request for service abroad, and (b) must forward 2 copies of the relevant documents: (i) if the applicant has asked for the request to be forwarded to a nominated additional authority for the Convention country in which service of the document is to be effected—to the nominated additional authority, or (ii) in any other case—to the Central Authority for the Convention country in which service of the document is to be effected. (2) The relevant documents mentioned in subrule (1)(b) are the following: (a) the request for service abroad (duly signed), (b) the document to be served, 444

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 11A.5.20] (c) (d)

Part 11A – Service under the Hague Convention Division 2 – Service abroad of local judicial documents

r 11A.6

the summary of the document to be served, if required under rule 11A.4(2)(d), a translation into the relevant language of each of the documents mentioned in paragraphs (b) and (c).

(3) If not satisfied that the application or any of its accompanying documents complies with rule 11A.4, the Registrar must inform the applicant of the respects in which the application or document fails to comply. [R 11A.5 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

RULE 11A.5 COMMENTARY [r 11A.5.20]

Compliance

For form compliance of the documents see: 1. Forms 91 and 92 of the model forms are available at: http://www.ucprforms.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ ucprforms/index.html; and 2. the instructions for completing the forms at: http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=27&dtid=2 There is no requirement for a completed Form to be legalised, or be made subject to any equivalent formality such as an Apostille: Article 3(1); Conclusions and Recommendations of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, Service, Taking of Evidence and Access to Justice Conventions (2 to 12 February 2009) at [34]. Procedure on receipt of certificate of service

(1) Subject to subrule (5), on receipt of a certificate of service in due form in relation to a local judicial document to which a request for service abroad relates, the Registrar: (a) must arrange for the original certificate to be filed in the proceedings to which the document relates, and (b) must send a copy of the certificate to: (i) the legal practitioner on the record for the applicant in those proceedings, or (ii) if there is no legal practitioner on the record for the applicant in those proceedings—the applicant. (2) For the purposes of subrule (1), a certificate of service is in due form if: (a) it is in the approved form, and (b) it has been completed by a certifying authority for the Convention country in which service was requested, and (c) if the applicant requires a certificate of service that is completed by an additional authority to be countersigned by the Central Authority, it has been so countersigned. (3) On receipt of a statement of costs in due form in relation to the service of a local judicial document mentioned in subrule (1), the Registrar must send to the legal practitioner or applicant who gave the undertaking mentioned in rule 11A.4(3) a notice specifying the amount of those costs. (4) For the purposes of subrule (3), a statement of costs is in due form if: (a) it relates only to costs of a kind mentioned in rule 11A.4(3)(a), and (b) it has been completed by a certifying authority for the Convention country in which service was requested. (5) Subrule (1) does not apply unless: (a) adequate security to cover the costs mentioned in subrule (3) has been given under rule 11A.4(3)(c), or (b) to the extent to which the security so given is inadequate to cover those costs, an amount equal to the amount by which those costs exceed the security so given has been paid to the Registrar. [R 11A.6 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

445

UCPR Parts 11-20

11A.6

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11A.7 11A.7

[r 11A.8.20] Payment of costs

(1) On receipt of a notice under rule 11A.6(3) in relation to the costs of service, the legal practitioner or applicant, as the case may be, must pay to the Registrar the amount specified in the notice as the amount of those costs. (2) If the legal practitioner or applicant fails to pay that amount within 28 days after receiving the notice: (a) except by leave of the Court, the applicant may not take any further step in the proceedings to which the local judicial document relates until those costs are paid to the Registrar, and (b) the Registrar may take such steps as are appropriate to enforce the undertaking for payment of those costs. [R 11A.7 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

11A.8

Evidence of service

A certificate of service in relation to a local judicial document (being a certificate in due form within the meaning of rule 11A.6(2)) that certifies that service of the document was effected on a specified date is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, sufficient proof that: (a) service of the document was effected by the method specified in the certificate on that date, and (b) if that method of service was requested by the applicant, that method is compatible with the law in force in the Convention country in which service was effected. [R 11A.8 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

RULE 11A.8 COMMENTARY [r 11A.8.20]

Evidence of service

The effect of a Certificate certifying the execution of a request constitutes authoritative confirmation that service has been effected in conformity with the law of the requested State, and creates at least a rebuttable presumption that service was properly performed. The probative value of the Certificate in the requesting State remains subject to that State’s law: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, Service, Taking of Evidence and Access to Justice Conventions (2 to 12 February 2009) at [33].

DIVISION 3 – DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOLLOWING SERVICE ABROAD OF INITIATING PROCESS 11A.9

Application of Division

This Division applies to civil proceedings for which an initiating process has been forwarded following a request for service abroad to the Central Authority (or to an additional authority) for a Convention country. [R 11A.9 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

RULE 11A.9 COMMENTARY [r 11A.9.20]

Application

The Convention contains two key provisions which protect the defendant: 1. prior to a judgment by default (Article 15); and 2. after a judgment by default (Article 16). Articles 15 and 16 require the judge to stay entry of judgment (Article 15) or allow the judge to relieve the defendant from the effects of the expiry of the time for appeal (Article 16), subject to certain requirements.

446

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 11A – Service under the Hague Convention [r 11A.10.20] Div 3 - Default judgment following service abroad of initiating process

11A.10

r 11A.10

Restriction on power to enter default judgment if certificate of service filed

(1) This rule applies if: (a) a certificate of service of initiating process has been filed in the proceedings (being a certificate in due form within the meaning of rule 11A.6(2)) that states that service has been duly effected, and (b) the defendant has not appeared or filed a notice of address for service. (2) In circumstances to which this rule applies, default judgment may not be given against the defendant unless the Court is satisfied that: (a) the initiating process was served on the defendant: (i) by a method of service prescribed by the internal law of the Convention country for the service of documents in domestic proceedings on persons who are within its territory, or (ii) if the applicant requested a particular method of service (being a method under which the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his or her residence) and that method is compatible with the law in force in that country, by that method, or (iii) if the applicant did not request a particular method of service, in circumstances where the defendant accepted the document voluntarily, and (b) the initiating process was served in sufficient time to enable the defendant to enter an appearance in the proceedings. (3) In subrule (2)(b), sufficient time means: (a) 42 days from the date specified in the certificate of service in relation to the initiating process as the date on which service of the process was effected, or (b) such lesser time as the Court considers, in the circumstances, to be a sufficient time to enable the defendant to enter an appearance in the proceedings. [R 11A.10 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

[r 11A.10.20] Restriction This rule has its basis in Article 15 of the Convention which sets out when service is validly effected. Service is valid if: (a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the State addressed for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory; or (b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by this Convention. And that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend. UCPR r 11A.10(2)(a)(iii) requires in addition that the defendant has “accepted the document voluntarily”. The Convention undoubtedly foreshadows the use of “alternative channels of transmission” through either: (a) the consular or diplomatic channels (direct or indirect) (Articles 8(1) and (9)); (b) postal channels (Article 10(a)); or (c) direct communication between judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination (Article 10(c)); or (d) direct communication between an interested party and judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination (Article 10(c)). Each State is entitled to object to the use of some of these alternative channels of transmission. There is neither a hierarchy nor any order of importance among the channels of transmission, and transmission through one of the alternative channels does not lead to service of lesser quality. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

447

UCPR Parts 11-20

RULE 11A.10 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11A.11

11A.11

[r 11A.12.20]

Restriction on power to enter default judgment if certificate of service not filed

(1) This rule applies if: (a) a certificate of service of initiating process has not been filed in the proceedings, or (b) a certificate of service of initiating process has been filed in the proceedings (being a certificate in due form within the meaning of rule 11A.6(2)) that states that service has not been effected, and the defendant has not appeared or filed a notice of address for service. (2) If this rule applies, default judgment may not be given against the defendant unless the Court is satisfied that: (a) the initiating process was forwarded to the Central Authority, or to an additional authority, for the Convention country in which service of the initiating process was requested, and (b) a period that is adequate in the circumstances (being a period of not less than 6 months) has elapsed since the date on which initiating process was so forwarded, and (c) every reasonable effort has been made: (i) to obtain a certificate of service from the relevant certifying authority, or (ii) to effect service of the initiating process, as the case requires. [R 11A.11 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

11A.12

Setting aside judgment in default of appearance

(1) This rule applies if default judgment has been entered against the defendant in proceedings to which this Division applies. (2) If this rule applies, the Court may set aside the judgment on the application of the defendant if it is satisfied that the defendant: (a) without any fault on the defendant’s part, did not have knowledge of the initiating process in sufficient time to defend the proceedings, and (b) has a prima facie defence to the proceedings on the merits. (3) An application to have a judgment set aside under this rule may be filed: (a) at any time within 12 months after the date on which the judgment was given, or (b) after the expiry of that 12-month period, within such time after the defendant acquires knowledge of the judgment as the Court considers reasonable in the circumstances. (4) Nothing in this rule affects any other power of the Court to set aside or vary a judgment. [R 11A.12 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

RULE 11A.12 COMMENTARY [r 11A.12.20]

Basis

This rule has its basis in Article 16 of the Convention dealing with the setting aside of default judgments. Article 16 does not apply to judgments concerning status or capacity of persons.

DIVISION 4 – LOCAL SERVICE OF FOREIGN JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS 11A.13 Application of Division (1) This Division applies to service in this jurisdiction of a foreign judicial document in relation to which a due form of request for service has been forwarded to the Court: (a) by the Attorney-General’s Department of the Commonwealth, whether in the first instance or following a referral under rule 11A.14, or (b) by a forwarding authority. 448

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 11A – Service under the Hague Convention Division 4 – Local service of foreign judicial documents

r 11A.15

(2) Subject to subrule (3), a request for service in this jurisdiction is in due form if it is in the approved form and is accompanied by the following documents: (a) the document to be served, (b) a summary of the document to be served, which must be in the approved form, (c) a copy of the request and of each of the documents mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b), (d) if either of the documents mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) is not in the English language, an English translation of the document. (3) Any translation required under subrule (2)(d) must bear a certificate (in English) signed by the translator stating: (a) that the translation is an accurate translation of the document, and (b) the translator’s full name and address and his or her qualifications for making the translation. [R 11A.13 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

11A.14 Certain documents to be referred back to the Attorney-General’s Department of the Commonwealth If, after receiving a request for service in this jurisdiction, the Registrar is of the opinion: (a) that the request does not comply with rule 11A.13, or (b) that the document to which the request relates is not a foreign judicial document, or (c) that compliance with the request may infringe Australia’s sovereignty or security, or (d) that the request seeks service of a document in some other State or Territory of the Commonwealth, the Registrar must refer the request to the Attorney-General’s Department of the Commonwealth together with a statement of his or her opinion. Note: The Attorney General’s Department of the Commonwealth will deal with misdirected and non-compliant requests, make arrangements for the service of extrajudicial documents and assess and decide questions concerning Australia’s sovereignty and security. [R 11A.14 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

11A.15

Service

(1) Subject to rule 11A.14, on receipt of a request for service in this jurisdiction, the Court must arrange for the service of the relevant documents in accordance with the request.

(3) Service of the relevant documents may be effected by any of the following methods of service: (a) by a method of service prescribed by the law in force in this jurisdiction: (i) for the service of a document of a kind corresponding to the document to be served, or (ii) if there is no such corresponding kind of document, for the service of initiating process in proceedings in the Court, (b) if the applicant has requested a particular method of service and that method is compatible with the law in force in this jurisdiction, by that method, (c) if the applicant has not requested a particular method of service and the person requested to be served accepts the document voluntarily, by delivery of the document to the person requested to be served. [R 11A.15 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

449

UCPR Parts 11-20

(2) The relevant documents mentioned in subrule (1) are the following: (a) the document to be served, (b) a summary of the document to be served, (c) a copy of the request for service in this jurisdiction, (d) if either of the documents mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) is not in the English language, an English translation of the document.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 11A.16 11A.16

Affidavit as to service

(1) If service of a document has been effected pursuant to a request for service in this jurisdiction, the person by whom service has been effected must lodge with the Court an affidavit specifying: (a) the time, day of the week and date on which the document was served, and (b) the place where the document was served, and (c) the method of service, and (d) the person on whom the document was served, and (e) the way in which that person was identified. (2) If attempts to serve a document pursuant to a request for service in this jurisdiction have failed, the person by whom service has been attempted must lodge with the Court an affidavit specifying: (a) details of the attempts made to serve the document, and (b) the reasons that have prevented service. (3) When an affidavit as to service of a document has been lodged in accordance with this rule, the Registrar: (a) must complete a certificate of service, sealed with the seal of the Court, on the reverse side of, or attached to, the request for service in this jurisdiction, and (b) must forward the certificate of service, together with a statement as to the costs incurred in relation to the service or attempted service of the document, directly to the forwarding authority from which the request was received. (4) A certificate of service must be: (a) in the approved form, or (b) if a form of certificate of service that substantially corresponds to the approved form accompanies the request for service, in that accompanying form. [R 11A.16 insrt Rule 326 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

450

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 12 – Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process [r Pt12.20] Division 1 – Discontinuance of claim r 12.1

PART 12 – DISCONTINUANCE, WITHDRAWAL, DISMISSAL AND SETTING ASIDE OF ORIGINATING PROCESS Commentary by Carol Webster SC.

PART 12 COMMENTARY [r Pt12.20]

General comments on Part 12

Part 12 brings together the provisions of the rules regarding: • discontinuance of proceedings on the plaintiff’s application, rr 12.1 to 12.4; • withdrawal of an appearance or of admissions made by a party: rr 12.5 to 12.6; and • the court’s power to dismiss proceedings and make other orders where the parties fail to prosecute proceedings “with due despatch”: rr 12.7 to 12.10. Under r 12.11 a defendant who objects to the court’s jurisdiction may seek to set aside the originating process or service of it.

DIVISION 1 – DISCONTINUANCE OF CLAIM 12.1 Discontinuance of proceedings (cf SCR Part 21, rules 2 and 5; DCR Part 18, rule 1; LCR Part 17, rule 1)

(1) The plaintiff in any proceedings may, by filing a notice of discontinuance, discontinue the proceedings, either as to all claims for relief or as to all claims for relief so far as they concern a particular defendant: (a) with the consent of each other active party in the proceedings, or (b) with the leave of the court. [Subr (1) am Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]; subst Rule 717 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[4]; am Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[11]]

(2) A notice of discontinuance: (a) must bear a certificate by the plaintiff, or by his or her solicitor, to the effect that the plaintiff does not represent any other person, and (b) except where it is filed with the leave of the court, must be accompanied by a notice from each party whose consent is required by subrule (1) to the effect that the party consents to the proceedings being discontinued in accordance with the notice of discontinuance. [Subr (2) am Rule 717 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

(3) If any such consent is given on terms, those terms are to be incorporated in the notice of consent. (4) If any party has not been served with the originating process, the plaintiff must file an affidavit to that effect. (5) For the purposes of this rule, proceedings on a cross-claim are taken to be different proceedings to the proceedings on the originating process and to proceedings on any other cross-claim.

RULE 12.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 12.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 12.1.40] Cross-claims ............................................................................................................................................. [r 12.1.60] Joint plaintiffs ............................................................................................................................................ [r 12.1.80] Discontinuance by leave ........................................................................................................................ [r 12.1.100] Principles applying to the granting of leave to discontinue .................................................................... [r 12.1.120] Application under this rule ...................................................................................................................... [r 12.1.140] Costs consequences .............................................................................................................................. [r 12.1.160] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

451

UCPR Parts 11-20

[R 12.1 am Rule 716 of 2006; Rule 717 of 2005; Rule 625 of 2005]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 12.1

[r 12.1.20]

Effect of discontinuance ......................................................................................................................... [r 12.1.180] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 12.1.1000]

[r 12.1.20] Comparison Subrules (1) and (2) are based on former SCR Pt 21 r 2 and SCR Pt 21 r 5, DCR Pt 18 r 1 and DCR Pt 18 r 4 and LCR Pt 17 r 1(2) and LCR Pt 17 r 5. This rule is broader than the former rules, which permitted discontinuance only before the beginning of the trial or hearing. Subrule (3) is based on, but broader than, former SCR Pt 21 r 5(3), DCR Pt 18 r 4(3) and LCR Pt 17 r 5(3) which permitted a notice to state that no order would be sought as to the costs occasioned by the discontinued claim. Subrule (4) is new, and relates to requirement under subrr (1)(a) and (2)(b) that each other active party in the proceedings, from whom consent is required under subr (1)(b), consents to discontinuance. Subrule (5) is new. [r 12.1.40] Operation This rule allows a plaintiff to discontinue proceedings, in whole – ie, as to all claims for relief against all defendants, or in part, as to all claims for relief against a particular defendant with the consent of each other “active party”. An “active party”, as defined in the Dictionary to the UCPR, is a party against whom claims in the proceedings subsist. Rule 12.1 allows a notice of discontinuance by consent to be filed after the beginning of the trial, unlike the former SCR Pt 21 r 2, DCR Pt 18 r 1 and LCR Pt 17 r 1; cf Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 8) (1987) 12 IPR 75 at 76. Approved Form 33 is the form for notice of discontinuance. A notice of discontinuance must include the statements required by the rules that the plaintiff does not represent any other person and that each party on whom the originating process had been served and each party who had been joined in the proceedings consents to the discontinuance. Approved Form 33 also includes the consents required from each other active party, unless the notice is filed with leave, and a statement of the terms on which consent is given by each such party. Where the plaintiff is unable to obtain the consents required by r 12.1(1)(a), the court may grant leave to discontinue under r 12.1(1)(b): see [r 12.1.100] – [r 12.1.120]. If the plaintiff desires to withdraw only some claims against a defendant this cannot be done by notice of discontinuance but may be achieved by asking the Court to dismiss those claims, or by amending the statement of claim to omit them or even by informing the defendant that the plaintiff does not intend to proceed with them. [r 12.1.60] Cross-claims “Originating process” is defined in CPA s 3 as the process by which proceedings are commenced. The Dictionary to the UCPR defines “originating process” as the statement of claim or summons by which proceedings have been commenced, and includes a statement of cross-claim and a cross-summons. The definitions of “plaintiff” and “defendant” in CPA s 3 include a person by whom and a person against whom a cross-claim is made. Rule 12.1(5) makes specific provision for cross-claims, so that it is clear that the proceedings or cross-claim may be discontinued, subject to the rules, separately from proceedings on the originating process. Under the former rules, where a plaintiff could only discontinue a claim before the beginning of the trial or hearing of the proceedings on the claim, it was held that where there is a single trial of proceedings with both a claim and cross-claim, the beginning of the trial was the critical event in relation to an application to discontinue the cross-claim: Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 8) (1987) 12 IPR 75 at 76. [r 12.1.80] Joint plaintiffs One of several co-plaintiffs does not have an absolute right to withdraw from proceedings. If a plaintiff who is a necessary party to a cause of action wishes to withdraw, that party may be removed as a plaintiff and added as a defendant to the proceedings: Re Mathews [1905] 2 Ch 460. See [r 6.20.40] regarding joint causes of action. 452

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 12 – Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process [r 12.1.1000] Division 1 – Discontinuance of claim r 12.1 [r 12.1.100]

Discontinuance by leave

The court may grant leave to a plaintiff to discontinue proceedings where the plaintiff has been unable to obtain the consents required under r 12.1(1)(a). The court may also make an order dismissing proceedings on the plaintiff’s application under r 29.8 at any time (cf former SCR Pt 34 r 6A; DCR Pt 26 r 6A; LCR Pt 21 r 5(1)). An order granting leave to discontinue may be made on terms: CPA s 86(1) and (2). A term of the order may be that the plaintiff pays the defendant’s costs of the proceedings on the discontinued claim. [r 12.1.120]

Principles applying to the granting of leave to discontinue

The court normally allows a plaintiff to discontinue provided no injustice will be caused to the defendant, as it is not desirable that a plaintiff should be compelled to litigate against her or his will. In granting leave, the court considers whether the defendant would be deprived of an advantage already gained in the litigation; the court may impose terms to protect a forensic advantage that has been gained by the defendant: Covell Matthews v French Wools Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 876; [1977] 2 All ER 591 at 879 (WLR); Visy Board Pty Ltd v Attorney General (Cth) (1984) 2 FCR 113, per Sweeney J at 142-143, Lockhart J at 161, Sheppard J at 184-185; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 8) (1987) 12 IPR 75 at 76-77. The requirement for leave, in the absence of consent, contemplates a judicial review of all relevant circumstances and the satisfaction of the court that the grant of leave is proper in all the circumstances including as between respondents: Trade Practices Commission v Manfal Pty Ltd (No 3) (1991) 33 FCR 382 at 384; Greaves v CGU Insurance Ltd [2004] NSWSC 912 per Bergin J at [5]-[8]. Earlier versions of the equivalent rules permitted a plaintiff to discontinue before the pleadings closed without either leave of the court or consent of the other parties. Such a notice of discontinuance could, however, be struck out by the court as an abuse of process where, if the leave of the court had been required, the court would have either refused leave or imposed terms on any grant of leave to protect the defendant against injustice: Packer v Meagher [1984] 3 NSWLR 486; Castanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd [1981] AC 57. [r 12.1.140]

Application under this rule

An application for leave to discontinue should be made by motion in the proceedings. See Pt 18 regarding motions generally. The court has the power to dispense with the filing and service of a motion seeking leave to discontinue in the course of giving directions generally or otherwise managing the proceedings (CPA s 61, UCPR r 2.1). [r 12.1.160]

Costs consequences

Unless the court otherwise orders or the defendants affected agree not to seek costs, a plaintiff who discontinues proceedings must pay those defendants’ costs in relation to the claim as at the date of filing the notice of discontinuance: see [r 42.19.40]. [r 12.1.180]

Effect of discontinuance

Discontinuance of proceedings does not, subject to any terms of the discontinuance (either agreed or imposed by the court), prevent the plaintiff from claiming the same relief in fresh proceedings: see [r 12.3.40]. However, fresh proceedings may be stayed until any costs payable by the plaintiff in respect of the discontinued proceedings have been paid: see [r 12.4.40]. References

Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [12.670]–[12.780] and Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 85-86. Definitions: “active party” Dictionary to the UCPR; “originating process” – CPA s 3 and UCPR Dictionary. Related provisions: UCPR r 42.19 regarding costs; CPA s 86(1) and (2). Approved forms: Form 33 – Notice of Discontinuance. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 21 r 2 and SCR Pt 21 r 5; DCR Pt 18 r 1 and DCR Pt 18 r 4; LCR Pt 17 r 1(2) and LCR Pt 17 r 5.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

453

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 12.1.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 12.3 Editor’s note: Rule 12.2 is repealed and has not been reproduced.

12.3 Effect of discontinuance (cf SCR Part 21, rule 7; DCR Part 18, rule 7; LCR Part 17, rule 8)

(1) A discontinuance of proceedings with respect to a plaintiff’s claim for relief does not prevent the plaintiff from claiming the same relief in fresh proceedings. (2) Subrule (1) is subject to the terms of any consent to the discontinuance or of any leave to discontinue.

RULE 12.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 12.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 12.3.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 12.3.1000]

[r 12.3.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 21 r 7, DCR Pt 18 r 7 and LCR Pt 17 r 8. [r 12.3.40]

Operation

This rule makes clear that the discontinuance of proceedings does not prevent the plaintiff from claiming the same relief in fresh proceedings, subject to any terms imposed by the court. However, fresh proceedings may be stayed until any costs payable by the plaintiff in respect of the discontinued proceedings have been paid: see [r 12.4.40]. If the plaintiff is not permitted to discontinue and there is a hearing on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, dismissal of the claim or entry of judgment on the plaintiff’s claim may give rise to an estoppel against fresh proceedings claiming the same relief: CPA s 91, Newmont Pty Ltd v Laverton Nickel NL (No 2) [1981] 1 NSWLR 221. See the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [12.750]. [r 12.3.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [12.750] and Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) p 86. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 21 r 7; DCR Pt 18 r 7; LCR Pt 17 r 8. 12.4

Stay of further proceedings to secure costs of discontinued proceedings

(cf SCR Part 21, rule 8; DCR Part 18, rule 8; LCR Part 17, rule 9)

If: (a)

as a consequence of the discontinuance of proceedings, a plaintiff is liable to pay the costs of another party in relation to those proceedings, and (b) before payment of the costs, the plaintiff commences further proceedings against that other party on the same or substantially the same cause of action as that on which the former proceedings were commenced, the court may stay the further proceedings until those costs are paid and may make such consequential orders as it thinks fit. Note: See also section 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 as to the terms on which a stay may be granted, and rule 42.19 as to costs payable in relation to discontinued proceedings.

454

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 12 – Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process [r 12.5.40] Division 2 – Withdrawal of appearance or pleading r 12.5

RULE 12.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 12.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 12.4.40] Application under this rule ........................................................................................................................ [r 12.4.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 12.4.1000]

[r 12.4.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 21 r 8, DCR Pt 18 r 8 and LCR Pt 17 r 9, except that under r 12.4, in addition to staying the further proceedings the court is expressly authorised to make “such consequential orders as it thinks fit”. [r 12.4.40]

Operation

This rule expressly provides that fresh proceedings brought in relation to a claim for relief that had been discontinued may be stayed until costs the plaintiff was liable to pay as a consequence of the dismissal have been paid. See [r 12.1.160] regarding costs under r 12.1. See also CPA s 67 regarding the duration of stays. Subject to the rules, the court may at any time and from time to time, by order, stay any proceedings before it, either permanently or until a specified day: CPA s 67. [r 12.4.60]

Application under this rule

An application for a stay should be made by motion in the proceedings. See UCPR Pt 18 regarding motions generally. The court has the power to dispense with the filing and service of a motion in the course of giving directions generally or otherwise managing the proceedings (CPA s 61, UCPR r 2.1). [r 12.4.1000]

References

Related provisions: CPA s 67. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 21 r 8; DCR Pt 18 r 8; LCR Pt 17 r 9.

DIVISION 2 – WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE OR PLEADING 12.5 Withdrawal of appearance (cf SCR Part 21, rule 1)

An active party may withdraw an appearance by leave of the court.

RULE 12.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 12.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 12.5.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 12.5.1000]

[r 12.5.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 21 r 1. It applies to an “active party” rather than to a “party who has entered an appearance” as under the former rule. Operation

An “active party”, as defined in the Dictionary to the UCPR, is a party against whom claims in the proceedings subsist. A defendant who has submitted to the making of the orders sought remains an “active party”: see [r 6.11.40]. The discretion to permit an appearance, including a submitting appearance, to be withdrawn is a broad discretion to be exercised judicially: Garsec v His Majesty Sultan of Brunei (2007) 213 FLR 331; [2007] NSWSC 882 at [50]; Fitter v Public Trustee [2007] NSWSC 1487 at [19]–[23]; Tory v Megna [2012] NSWCA 41 at [10]; Hilton v Gidley [2014] NSWSC 874. Leave may be granted where an appearance was entered without authority, or under a mistake, for example as to the existence of a serious question arising under a © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

455

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 12.5.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 12.6

[r 12.5.40]

convention as to the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant: Rothmans of Pall Mall (Overseas) v Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp [1981] 1 QB 368; [1980] 3 WLR 642; [1980] 3 All ER 359 at 381E (QB); Firth v Mowlem & Co Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 1184; [1978] 3 All ER 331. Whether the defendant has an arguable case is relevant: Evergreen Tours Pty Ltd v McLaren [2010] NSWSC 1362 at [17]–[19]; Hilton v Gidley [2014] NSWSC 874. Leave may be refused where an appearance is entered deliberately on competent legal advice and not by mistake: Evergeen; Somportex Ltd v Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp [1968] 3 All ER 26; Garsec v Sultan of Brunei at [48]. Compare Laurie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR 310; 32 ALJR 7 at 335-336 (CLR); and Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) at 20. A defendant may apply to have the originating process, or service of it, set aside, or otherwise object to the court’s jurisdiction without entering an appearance under r 12.11: see [r 12.11.40]. [r 12.5.1000]

References

Definitions: “active party” Dictionary to the UCPR. Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 20-21; Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [5.130]. Related rule: r 6.11 as to submitting appearance, r 12.11 regarding setting aside originating process etc. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 21 r 1. 12.6

Withdrawal of matter in defence or subsequent pleading

(cf SCR Part 21, rules 3 and 5; DCR Part 18, rule 2; LCR Part 17, rule 2)

(1) A party raising any matter in a defence or subsequent pleading may withdraw the matter at any time. (2) Despite subrule (1), a party may not withdraw any admission, or any other matter that operates for the benefit of another party, except with the consent of the other party or by leave of the court. (3) A withdrawal under this rule is to be made by filing a notice of withdrawal stating the extent of the withdrawal. (4) If the withdrawal is by consent, the notice under subrule (3) must be accompanied by a notice from each party whose consent is required by subrule (2) to the effect that the party consents to the admission or other matter being withdrawn in accordance with the notice of withdrawal.

RULE 12.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 12.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 12.6.40] Principles regarding the granting of leave to withdraw admissions ......................................................... [r 12.6.60] Application for leave to withdraw matter in defence ................................................................................ [r 12.6.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 12.6.1000]

[r 12.6.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of former SCR Pt 21 rr 3 and 5, DCR Pt 18 rr 2 and 4 and LCR Pt 17 rr 2 and 5. [r 12.6.40]

Operation

Under this rule a party may only withdraw an admission, or other matter in a defence or subsequent pleading that operates for the benefit of the other party, with consent or leave of the court: r 12.6(2). A statement in a defence or subsequent pleading that is not within subr (2) may be withdrawn at any time. 456

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 12 – Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process [r 12.6.1000] Division 2 – Withdrawal of appearance or pleading r 12.6 In either case a notice of withdrawal must be filed under r 12.6(3) stating the extent of the withdrawal. Although the rule does not refer in terms to service of the notice of withdrawal, UCPR r 10.1 requires that a party that files a document serve copies of it on each other active party as soon as practicable. There is no prescribed form for a notice of withdrawal by consent. Approved Form 33, the approved form for a notice of discontinuance, may be adapted for the purpose, including the consent required by r 12.6(2), from each party for whose benefit the admission or other matter would operate. [r 12.6.60]

Principles regarding the granting of leave to withdraw admissions

The court may grant leave for a formal admission made by a party in proceedings to be withdrawn if justice so requires. The court may decline to grant leave in the interests of justice. The court may have regard not only to whether the admission was made in error but also to the public interest in the efficient administration of justice: Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738 at 741, 746. This may include prejudice to the other party by reason of the withdrawal of the admission, where the party has prepared his or her case on the basis of the admission and issues of case management having regard to CPA ss 56 to 60: Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230; NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2010] NSWSC 969 at [39]. Different principles may apply to the granting of leave to withdraw an admission in a defence. The admission in the defence of an allegation in a pleading does not necessarily connote an acknowledgment of the correctness of the fact admitted: Demasi v Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, McClelland CJ in Eq, 14 June 1995). See also Silver v Dome Resources NL [2005] NSWSC 265 at [8] and the cases there cited, particularly Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Santow J, 16 October 1996); Jeans v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2003) 204 ALR 327; [2003] FCAFC 309 at [17] and [18]; and SLE Worldwide Australia Pty Ltd v Wyatt Gallagher Bassett Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 816 at [56]. A party applying for leave to withdraw an admission bears a forensic onus to explain the circumstances giving rise to the application and to satisfy the court that a grant of leave would not prejudice an opponent’s right to a fair trial: Maile v Rafiq [2005] NSWCA 410 at [42]; and Rigato Farms Pty Ltd v Ridolfi [2001] 2 Qd R 455; [2000] QCA 292 at 459-460, [27] per McPherson JA. [r 12.6.80]

Application for leave to withdraw matter in defence

An application for leave under r 12.6 should be made by motion in the proceedings. See UCPR Pt 18 regarding motions generally. The court has the power to dispense with the filing and service of a motion in the course of giving directions generally or otherwise managing the proceedings (CPA s 61, UCPR r 2.1). A sensible explanation for the making of the admission, based on evidence of a solid and substantial character, will be required: Celestino v Celestino [1990] FCA 299; MindShare Communications Ltd v Orleans Investments Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 637 at [2]. [r 12.6.1000]

References

Definitions: “active party” Dictionary to the UCPR. Related rules: UCPR r 10.1. Shaw JW, “When can a party to civil proceedings withdraw an admission?” (2003) 77 ALJ 731.

UCPR Parts 11-20

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 21 rr 3 and 5; DCR Pt 18 rr 2 and 4; LCR Pt 17 rr 2 and 5.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

457

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 12.7

[r 12.7.20]

DIVISION 3 – DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS ETC FOR LACK OF PROGRESS 12.7

Dismissal of proceedings etc for want of due despatch

(cf SCR Part 5, rule 12, Part 32A, rules 1 and 2; DCR Part 18, rules 3 and 9; LCR Part 17, rule 4)

(1) If a plaintiff does not prosecute the proceedings with due despatch, the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed or make such other order as the court thinks fit. (2) If the defendant does not conduct the defence with due despatch, the court may strike out the defence, either in whole or in part, or make such other order as the court thinks fit. Note: See rule 42.20 as to the effect of dismissal with respect to costs. [R 12.7 am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[25]]

RULE 12.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 12.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 12.7.40] Application under this rule ........................................................................................................................ [r 12.7.60] Effect of dismissal of proceedings ............................................................................................................ [r 12.7.80] Effect of striking out defence .................................................................................................................. [r 12.7.100] Appeal from order dismissing proceedings ............................................................................................ [r 12.7.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 12.7.1000]

[r 12.7.20]

Comparison

Rule 12.7(1), applying to plaintiffs, is modelled on former SCR Pt 5 r 12, DCR Pt 18 r 3 and LCR Pt 17 r 4. Rule 12.7(2), applying to defendants, is new but to similar effect as r 12.7(1). Rule 12.7 does not expressly provide that the plaintiff or defendant should have “a reasonable opportunity to be heard” as was the case with respect to plaintiffs under SCR Pt 5 r 12, DCR Pt 18 r 3 and LCR Pt 17 r 4. [r 12.7.40]

Operation

The court has a discretion in dismissing proceedings, striking out the defence or making another order under this rule. The discretion should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, which requires the court to focus on the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. See [CPA Pt6.20], [CPA 56.20], [CPA 57.20], [CPA 58.20]. In Stollznow v Calvert [1980] 2 NSWLR 749, the Court of Appeal held, affirming the decision at first instance of Cross J, that while useful guidance may be provided by the manner of exercise of the court’s discretion in other cases to dismiss proceedings for want of prosecution, each case must depend on its own facts; fixed formulae cannot be prescribed to limit the judicial discretion to do what is just between the parties in the circumstances. On this basis it is relevant to consider the lack of blame of the plaintiff, compared with any fault of the plaintiff’s solicitors, rather than some principle of general deterrence adopted from the criminal law, to deter other lawyers from being dilatory in the prosecution of their clients’ cases. Inaction by the defendant in the face of impending prejudice to the defendant if the delay continued may render a later claim of actual prejudice by the defendant less creditworthy. See also Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [1986] 4 NSWLR 491. [r 12.7.60]

Application under this rule

An application for dismissal of proceedings or to strike out a defence should be made by motion in the proceedings. See UCPR Pt 18 regarding motions generally. The court may also make orders of its own motion: CPA s 86(3). 458

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 12 – Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process [r 12.7.1000] Division 3 – Dismissal of proceedings etc for lack of progress r 12.8 [r 12.7.80]

Effect of dismissal of proceedings

An order for dismissal does not, subject to the terms on which the order was made, prevent the plaintiff from bringing fresh proceedings on the same cause of action: CPA s 91. If the court makes an order dismissing proceedings, in whole or in part, the plaintiff must pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings to the extent to which they have been dismissed unless the court otherwise orders: UCPR r 42.20(1), see [r 42.20.40]. If a party then commences fresh proceedings on the same or substantially the same cause of action or for the same or substantially the same relief as the proceedings that were dismissed before paying those costs, the court may stay the fresh proceedings until the costs are paid and make such consequential orders as it thinks fit: r 12.10. [r 12.7.100]

Effect of striking out defence

If the court makes an order striking out a defence, generally or in part, the defendant must pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings in relation to the matters in respect of which the defence is struck out unless the court otherwise orders: UCPR r 42.20(2). To the extent that the defence is struck out, the plaintiff may seek default judgment under UCPR r 16.3, as the defendant is relevantly “in default” for the purposes of UCPR Pt 16: see [r 16.2.40], [r 16.3.40] – [r 16.3.120]. [r 12.7.120]

Appeal from order dismissing proceedings

An order dismissing proceedings for want of prosecution is interlocutory, it is not final in legal effect: Macatangay v New South Wales (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 272 at [11]; In the Matter of An Appeal by Luck (2003) 78 ALJR 177 at 179; 203 ALR 1 at 4; [2003] HCA 70 at [9]; Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 at 11C; Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423; 40 ALJR 102; [1966] ALR 705 at 440 (CLR); [1966] HCA 36; Tampion v Anderson (1973) 48 ALJR 11; 3 ALR 414 at 12 (ALJR); 415-417 (ALR). An order striking out a defence and giving leave to enter judgment is interlocutory, but that is not the same as an order that summary judgment be entered: Nepean Engineering Pty Ltd v Total Process Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (2005) 64 NSWLR 462; [2005] NSWCA 409 at [6] distinguishing Cox Bros (Aust) Ltd v Cox (1934) 50 CLR 314; [1934] ALR 193; 8 ALJ 107. An appeal to the Court of Appeal against an order made in the Supreme Court or District Court dismissing proceedings or striking out a defence requires leave: SCA s 101(2)(e); DCA s 127(2)(a). Leave is also required for an appeal from a judgment or order on an application for summary judgment: SCA s 101(2)(l); DCA s 127(2)(d). An application for leave to appeal is made by summons: UCPR r 51.10 (formerly SCR Pt 51 r 4(1)). A purported appeal commenced without leave where leave is required may be dismissed as incompetent (as in Render v Gleeson [1999] NSWCA 154). An appeal to the Supreme Court against an order for summary dismissal under UCPR r 13.4 made in the General Division of the Local Court requires leave: Local Court Act 2007 s 40(2)(a). [r 12.7.1000]

References

Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [12.500]–[12.650] and Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) p 236.

12.8 Additional grounds for dismissal of proceedings by Supreme Court or Land and Environment Court (cf SCR Part 32A, rules 1 and 2)

(1) This rule applies to proceedings in the Supreme Court or the Land and Environment Court. [Subr (1) am Rule 580 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

459

UCPR Parts 11-20

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 5 r 12, Pt 32A r 2; DCR Pt 18 rr 3 and 9; LCR Pt 17 r 4.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 12.8

[r 12.8.20]

(2) The court may, of its own motion, make an order dismissing the proceedings if it appears from the court’s records that, for over 5 months, no party to the proceedings has taken any step in the proceedings. [Subr (2) am Rule 580 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

(3) Such an order may not be made: (a) if the proceedings, or any part of the proceedings, are listed for a future date, or (b) if there are any notices of motion or other applications in the proceedings that are yet to be determined, or (c) if a party satisfies the court that such an order should not be made. [Subr (3) am Rule 580 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[4]; subst Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[27]]

(4) Before such an order is made, notice of the proposed order is to be given to the plaintiff and to each other active party, being a notice that gives each of them a reasonable opportunity to be heard in relation to the proposal. (5) A notice under subrule (4) may be served on a person: (a) if the person has provided an email address to the court, by sending it to that email address, or (b) if the person has not provided an email address or the email has been returned undelivered, by sending it by post, addressed to the person: (i) at the person’s address for service, or (ii) if the person has no address for service, at the person’s last known address, in an envelope marked with the court’s return address. [Subr (5) subst Rule 195 of 2015, cl 3(1); am Rule 580 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

(6) A notice, posted as referred to in subrule (5)(b), is taken to have been received by the person to whom it was addressed even if it is returned to the court as having not been delivered to the addressee. [Subr (6) am Rule 195 of 2015, cl 3(2); Rule 580 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

(7) Despite subrule (4), the court may make an order under subrule (2) without notice being given under subrule (4) if: (a) the proceedings the subject of the order are proceedings that are entered in the Possession List, and (b) it appears from the court’s records that, for over 9 months, no party to the proceedings has taken any step in the proceedings. [Subr (7) insrt Rule 502 of 2014, Sch 1[1]] [R 12.8 am Rule 195 of 2015; Rule 502 of 2014; Rule 580 of 2007; subst Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[12]; am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[26]]

RULE 12.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 12.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 12.8.40] Supreme Court Possession list proceedings ........................................................................................... [r 12.8.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 12.8.1000]

[r 12.8.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on and has similar effect to former SCR Pt 32A r 2. Rule 12.8(3)(a) and (b) and r 12.8(5) and (6) are new. Rule 12.8(3)(c) does not require a party to demonstrate “special circumstances” rendering it desirable that an order for dismissal not be made, as was required under former SCR Pt 32A r 2(1). [r 12.8.40]

Operation

This rule is a source of power in the Supreme Court and Land and Environment Court for the court to dismiss proceedings in which no step has been taken for five months – a form of statutory determination that the proceedings are not being prosecuted expeditiously. Rule 12.9 is the equivalent of this rule in the District Court and Local Court: see [r 12.9.40]. 460

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 12 – Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process [r 12.9.20] Division 3 – Dismissal of proceedings etc for lack of progress r 12.9 An order cannot be made under the rule where the proceedings are listed for a future date or there are pending motions: r 12.8(3)(a) and (b). As to satisfying the court that an order should not be made under r 12.8(3)(c), see also [r 12.7.40] regarding dismissal of proceedings for want of prosecution generally. The parties are to be given notice of the proposal to make an order under the rule and a reasonable opportunity to be heard: r 12.8(4), unless the proceedings are in the Possession List: see [r 12.8.60]. The method of giving notice under r 12.8(4) is prescribed by rr 12.8(5) and 12.8(6). It includes sending to an email address the person has provided to the court: r 12.8(5)(a), provided the email is not returned undelivered: r 12.8(5)(b). See [r 12.7.80] regarding the effect of dismissal of proceedings and [r 12.7.120] regarding appeal. An order made under this section may be set aside under r 36.12(2): see [r 36.16.230]. [r 12.8.60]

Supreme Court Possession list proceedings

Rule 12.8(7) is a new provision applying only to proceedings in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court (entered in the Possession List after 1 September 2014) in which a claim for possession of land is made. Where no party has taken any step in the proceedings for over 9 months, and provided the proceedings are not listed for a future date and there are no pending motions (r 12.8(3)(a) and (b)), such proceedings may be dismissed without notice being given under r 12.8(4). Plaintiffs and practitioners must be alert to the lapse of time with no step being taken to prosecute the proceedings: compare [r 12.9.40]. [r 12.8.1000]

References

Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [12.500]–[12.650]. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 32A rr 1 and 2. 12.9

Additional grounds for dismissal of proceedings by District Court or Local Court

(1) This rule applies to proceedings in the District Court or the Local Court that have been commenced by statement of claim or in which a statement of claim has been filed. [Subr (1) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

(2) The court may, of its own motion, make an order dismissing the proceedings if: (a) a defence or cross-claim is not filed, or (b) an application for default judgment is not filed, or (c) the proceedings are not otherwise disposed of, within 9 months after the statement of claim is filed. [Subr (2) am Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

(3) Such an order may be made without notice to the plaintiff or any other party. (4) Such an order may not be made if there are any notices of motion or other applications in the proceedings that are yet to be determined. [R 12.9 am Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 327 of 2007]

RULE 12.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 12.9.20] Regulation ................................................................................................................................................. [r 12.9.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 12.9.1000]

[r 12.9.20]

Comparison

This rule has similar effect to DCR Pt 18 r 9, in that it provides grounds in the District Court for dismissal of the proceedings entirely where, in effect, the plaintiff should have disposed of proceedings and has not done so. This rule replaces former DCR Pt 1 r 7A regarding preliminary dismissal of proceedings. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

461

UCPR Parts 11-20

Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 12.9.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 12.10

[r 12.9.20]

Whereas DCR Pt 18 r 9 applied where six months and 28 days had elapsed since commencement, and proceedings were automatically taken to be dismissed under that rule, this rule applies when nine months have elapsed; under this rule the court has a discretion to dismiss proceedings. In the Local Court, LCR Pt 5 r 5(1A) provided that a statement of claim would be struck out 12 months after filing unless some steps were taken such as the filing of a defence or an order for judgment made or judgment entered. [r 12.9.40]

Operation

This rule is an additional source of power in the District Court and Local Court for the court to dismiss proceedings in which a statement of claim has been filed, where subr (2) applies – a form of statutory determination that the proceedings are not being prosecuted expeditiously. Rule 12.8 is the equivalent of this rule in the Supreme Court and Land and Environment Court: see [r 12.8.40]. An order cannot be made under the rule where there are pending motions: r 12.9(4), compare r 12.8(3)(a) which refers to the proceedings or any part of the proceedings being listed for a future date. Also in contrast to r 12.8, an order may be made under r 12.9 dismissing proceedings without notice to the plaintiff or any other party. Plaintiffs and practitioners must be alert to the lapse of time after filing of the statement of claim. See [r 12.7.80] regarding the effect of dismissal of proceedings and [r 12.7.120] regarding appeal. An order made under this section may be set aside under r 36.12(2): see [r 36.16.230]. [r 12.9.60]

Regulation

Clause 18 of the Civil Procedure Regulation 2005, which provided for automatic dismissal of inactive District Court or Local Court proceedings after 12 months, was rescinded (Gaz 122, 7 October 2005, p 8169). [r 12.9.1000]

References

Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [12.500]–[12.650]. Superseded rules: DCR Pt 18 r 9; DCR Pt 1 r 7A; LCR Pt 5 r 5(1A). 12.10

Stay of further proceedings to secure costs of proceedings dismissed

(cf SCR Part 40, rule 8(2); DCR Part 18, rule 8; LCR Part 17, rule 9)

If: (a)

as a consequence of the dismissal of proceedings, a party is liable to pay the costs of another party in relation to those proceedings, and (b) before payment of the costs, the party commences further proceedings against that other party on the same or substantially the same cause of action, or for the same or substantially the same relief, as that on or for which the former proceedings were commenced, the court may stay the further proceedings until those costs are paid and make such consequential orders as it thinks fit. Note: See also section 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 as to the terms on which a stay may be granted, and rule 42.20 as to costs payable in relation to proceedings that are dismissed.

RULE 12.10 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 12.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 12.10.40] Application under this rule ...................................................................................................................... [r 12.10.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 12.10.1000]

462

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 12 – Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process [r 12.10.1000] Division 4 – Setting aside originating process r 12.11 [r 12.10.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 32A r 3 and Pt 40 r 8(2), DCR Pt 18 r 8 and LCR Pt 17 r 9, except that under r 12.10, in addition to staying the further proceedings, the court is expressly authorised to make “such consequential orders as it thinks fit”. [r 12.10.40]

Operation

This rule is the equivalent of r 12.4 in relation to proceedings which are discontinued under r 12.1. LCR Pt 17 r 4(2) expressly provided that where an action was dismissed under LCR Pt 17 r 4(1), rr 8 and 9 applied as though the dismissal were a discontinuance. There was no similar express provision in SCR Pt 5 r 12 or DCR Pt 18 r 3. Subject to the rules, the court may at any time and from time to time, by order, stay any proceedings before it, either permanently or until a specified day: CPA s 67. [r 12.10.60]

Application under this rule

An application for a stay should be made by motion in the proceedings. See UCPR Pt 18 regarding motions generally. The court has the power to dispense with the filing and service of a motion in the course of giving directions generally or otherwise managing the proceedings (CPA s 61, UCPR r 2.1). [r 12.10.1000]

References

Related provisions: CPA s 67. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 32A r 3, Pt 40 r 8(2); DCR Pt 18 r 8; LCR Pt 17 r 9.

DIVISION 4 – SETTING ASIDE ORIGINATING PROCESS 12.11

Setting aside originating process etc

(1) In any proceedings, the court may make any of the following orders on the application of a defendant: (a) an order setting aside the originating process, (b) an order setting aside the service of the originating process on the defendant, (c) an order declaring that the originating process has not been duly served on the defendant, (d) an order discharging: (i) any order giving leave to serve the originating process outside New South Wales, or (ii) any order confirming service of the originating process outside New South Wales, (e) an order discharging any order extending the validity for service of the originating process, (f) an order protecting or releasing: (i) property seized, or threatened with seizure, in the proceedings, or (ii) property subject to an order restraining its disposal or in relation to which such an order is sought, (g) an order declaring that the court has no jurisdiction over the defendant in respect of the subject-matter of the proceedings, (h) an order declining to exercise jurisdiction in the proceedings, (i) an order granting such other relief as the court thinks appropriate. (2) Such an order may not be made unless notice of motion to apply for the order is filed by the defendant within the time limited for the defendant to enter an appearance in the proceedings. (3) Notice of motion under subrule (2): (a) may be filed without entering an appearance, and (b) must bear a note stating the applicant’s address for service. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

463

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf SCR Part 11, rule 8)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 12.11

[r 12.11.20]

(4) The making of an application for an order under subrule (1) does not constitute submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

RULE 12.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 12.11.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 12.11.40] Originating process served outside Australia ......................................................................................... [r 12.11.60] Basis for application under r 12.11 ......................................................................................................... [r 12.11.80] Application under this rule .................................................................................................................... [r 12.11.100] Late application ..................................................................................................................................... [r 12.11.120] Subpoenas and notices to produce in connection with an application under the rule ........................ [r 12.11.140] Appeal from order setting aside service ............................................................................................... [r 12.11.160] References .......................................................................................................................................... [r 12.11.1000]

[r 12.11.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to and reproduces in substance former SCR Pt 11 r 8, but see [r 12.11.120] regarding the prescription of a time for making an application under the rule. There is no equivalent DCR or LCR. [r 12.11.40]

Operation

This rule allows a defendant to apply to set aside the originating process or service of it, or otherwise object to the court’s jurisdiction in the proceedings. This includes seeking to set aside service pursuant to an order for substituted service: Alstom Ltd v Sirakas [2010] NSWSC 669. By r 12.11(1)(e) there is a specific inclusion of where time for service of the statement of claim is extended: see [r 1.12.40]–[1.12.50]. Two of a series of six orders extending time for service were set aside in Weston (liquidator of One.Tel Ltd (in liq)) v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd (now known as Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd) [2011] NSWSC 433, upheld on appeal: Weston v Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd (2012) 88 ACSR 80; [2012] NSWCA 79. The effect of orders under r 12.11(1)(e) is to render the statement of claim stale and incapable of being served. The proceedings would then be dismissed. An originating process may be served within Australia, but outside New South Wales, in accordance with UCPR r 10.3, see [r 10.3.40]. UCPR Pt 11 deals with service of documents outside Australia in proceedings in the Supreme Court: see [r 11.2.40]–[r 11.2.80]. An application under this rule may be made without formally entering an appearance in the proceedings – entering an appearance may amount to a submission to the jurisdiction and would waive any irregularities in the originating process or service of it. A party who files a document in reply to a document alleged to have been served is taken to have waived any objection to the fact or manner of service unless notice of the objection is filed and served together with the document filed: see [r 10.19.40]. Subject to that, an application for an order under r 12.11(1) may be made although an appearance has been entered: Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 36; [2000] NSWSC 507 at [8]. Rule 12.11(4) makes it unnecessary to consider earlier authorities that suggested that the entry of a conditional appearance before protesting jurisdiction may amount to a submission to the jurisdiction in the event that the court decides that it has or will exercise jurisdiction, discussed in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [5.130]. [r 12.11.60]

Originating process served outside Australia

See Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; 74 ALJR 1219; 173 ALR 665; [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-569; [2000] HCA 41 at [40], [41], [55], [60]. The Supreme Court may make an order under r 12.11 on the application of a defendant served with originating process outside Australia: r 11.7. The grounds on which such an order may be made include that service of the originating process outside Australia was not authorised by the rules (see UCPR r 11.2 and UCPR Sch 6) or that the Supreme Court is an inappropriate forum for the trial of the proceedings. See [r 11.7.60] as to “inappropriate forum”. 464

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 12 – Discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal and setting aside of originating process [r 12.11.160] Division 4 – Setting aside originating process r 12.11 [r 12.11.80]

Basis for application under r 12.11

Three common bases for seeking to set aside service, or have the court decline to exercise jurisdiction are first that the claims made are not within the rules, second the court is an inappropriate forum for the trial of the proceedings, third that the claims made have insufficient prospects of success to warrant putting an overseas defendant to the time, expense and trouble of defending the claims: Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; 74 ALJR 1219; 173 ALR 665; [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-569; [2000] HCA 41 at 575 [55] (CLR). The prospects of success of a claim made in originating process served outside the jurisdiction arise for consideration only if the court is not persuaded that it is an inappropriate forum for trial of the proceedings: Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; 74 ALJR 1219; 173 ALR 665; [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-569; [2000] HCA 41 at 575 [56]. The same test should be applied to the prospects of success of the claims made as is applied in an application for summary judgment: Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; 74 ALJR 1219; 173 ALR 665; [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-569; [2000] HCA 41 at 576 [60]. See [r 13.1.100] and [r 13.4.120]. [r 12.11.100]

Application under this rule

An application for an order under the rule is made by notice of motion filed within the time otherwise limited for the defendant to enter an appearance in the proceedings: see [r 6.10.40] and UCPR Pt 18 regarding motions generally. An application for an order under r 12.11 is specifically excluded from the general requirement in UCPR r 6.1 that a party may not take any step in the proceedings without entering an appearance. Because a notice of motion seeking an order under this rule will usually be filed without the defendant having formally entered an appearance, the notice of motion must state the defendant’s address for service: r 12.11(3)(b), [r 6.9.40]. Form 20, the approved form of notice of motion, provides for the address for service and name and practising certificate number of the solicitor for an applicant who is not a party, and these sections should be completed for a notice of motion seeking an order under this rule. [r 12.11.120]

Late application

Rule 12.11(2) provides that an order under r 12.11(1)“may not be made” unless the notice of motion is filed within the time limited for the defendant to enter an appearance, in contrast to former SCR Pt 11 r 8 which provided “the court may, on application made by a defendant … on notice of motion filed” and then subr (2)(c)“within the time limited for entering an appearance”. It was held in relation to the former SCR Pt 11 r 8 that the prescription of time for application was directory and that an application under that rule could not necessarily fail if made out of time: Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 36; [2000] NSWSC 507. [r 12.11.140]

Subpoenas and notices to produce in connection with an application under the rule

A foreign applicant for an order setting aside service, although resisting the court’s jurisdiction, is a “party” to the proceedings to whom the plaintiff is entitled to issue a r 21.10 notice to produce: Barach v University of New South Wales (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 185 at [26]–[28] applying News Corp Ltd v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 40 NSWLR 250; 21 ACSR 403 at 257–260 (NSWLR). The foreign applicant may apply for an “otherwise order” under r 21.11 (see [r 21.11.40]), as was obtained by the foreign corporation under SCR Pt 36 r 16 in News Corp Ltd v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 40 NSWLR 250; 21 ACSR 403 at 261–262 (NSWLR). [r 12.11.160]

Appeal from order setting aside service

An order setting aside service is interlocutory: Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Kirk [2010] NSWCA 132 per Basten JA. An appeal to the Court of Appeal accordingly requires leave: SCA s 101(2)(e). An application for leave to appeal is made by summons: UCPR r 51.10 (formerly SCR Pt 51, r 4(1)). © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

465

UCPR Parts 11-20

It has been held in relation to the former SCR Pt 11 r 8 that the purpose of the rule is to allow a defendant outside the jurisdiction to protest service without acknowledging the court’s jurisdiction; and it must be an ancillary right that reasonably necessary subpoenas can be issued: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sweeney (No 2) [2000] NSWSC 1211 at [15].

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 12.11

[r 12.11.160]

A purported appeal commenced without leave where leave is required may be dismissed as incompetent (as in Render v Gleeson [1999] NSWCA 154). [r 12.11.1000]

References

Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [4.550], [5.80]–[5.130]; Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 20–21, 206–209. Related rules: UCPR r 1.12 regarding extension of time for service of a statement of claim; UCPR r 10.3 regarding service of originating process; UCPR r 10.19 regarding waiver of objections to service. UCPR r 11.2 – service of originating process outside Australia; UCPR r 11.4 – leave to plaintiff to proceed; UCPR r 11.7 – inappropriate forum. Approved forms: Form 20 – Notice of Motion. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 11 r 8.

466

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 13 – Summary disposal [r 13.1.20]

r 13.1

PART 13 – SUMMARY DISPOSAL Commentary by Carol Webster SC.

PART 13 COMMENTARY [r Pt13.20]

General comments on Part 13

Rules 13.1 and 13.4 provide methods of disposing of proceedings without trial. Rule 13.1 allows a plaintiff, including a person making a cross-claim, to seek summary judgment against a defendant who does not have a bona fide defence to the claim, or whose only defence is as to the amount of the damages claimed. Rule 13.4 provides a corresponding right for a defendant, including a defendant to a cross-claim, to seek the summary stay or dismissal of an unmeritorious claim. These summary procedures are only available where it is clear to the court that there is no real question to be tried: see the authorities discussed at [r 13.4.120]. 13.1 Summary judgment (cf SCR Part 13, rule 2; DCR Part 11A, rule 2; LCR Part 10A, rule 2)

(1) If, on application by the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff’s claim for relief or any part of the plaintiff’s claim for relief: (a) there is evidence of the facts on which the claim or part of the claim is based, and (b) there is evidence, given by the plaintiff or by some responsible person, that, in the belief of the person giving the evidence, the defendant has no defence to the claim or part of the claim, or no defence except as to the amount of any damages claimed, the court may give such judgment for the plaintiff, or make such order on the claim or that part of the claim, as the case requires. (2) Without limiting subrule (1), the court may give judgment for the plaintiff for damages to be assessed. (3) In this rule, a reference to damages includes a reference to the value of goods.

RULE 13.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 13.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 13.1.40] Application under this rule ........................................................................................................................ [r 13.1.60] Timing of the application .......................................................................................................................... [r 13.1.80] Alternative procedure ............................................................................................................................... [r 13.1.90] Principles applying to an application for summary judgment ................................................................. [r 13.1.100] Setting aside summary judgment ........................................................................................................... [r 13.1.120] Appeal from entry of summary judgment ............................................................................................... [r 13.1.140] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 13.1.1000]

[r 13.1.20]

Comparison

Rule 13.1 omits the reference in subr (1) of each of those rules to the court making orders on terms, however under CPA s 86(1)(b) the power of the court to make orders includes the power to make orders on terms. Rule 13.1 also omits provisions to the effect of DCR Pt 11A r 2(3) and LCR Pt 10A r 2(3), DCR Pt 11A r 2(5) and LCR Pt 10A r 2(5). DCR Pt 11A r 2(3) and LCR Pt 10A r 2(3) provided that a judgment entered under the rule may on sufficient cause being shown be set aside, on terms, by order of the court. DCR Pt 11A r 2(5) and LCR Pt 10A r 2(5) stated expressly that evidence in support of an application under the rule “shall be” by affidavit unless the court otherwise orders, and that the Parts of those rules regarding motions apply to an application under the rule. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

467

UCPR Parts 11-20

This rule adopts the words of SCR Pt 13 r 2, DCR Pt 11A r 2 and LCR Pt 10A r 2 with three general exceptions. The last of these has widened the application of r 13.1. Subject to that matter, the substantive effect of SCR Pt 13 r 2, DCR Pt 11A r 2 and LCR Pt 10A r 2 is unchanged insofar as the power to grant summary judgment is concerned.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 13.1

[r 13.1.20]

Finally, r 13.1 omits the restriction that applied to SCR Pt 13 r 2, DCR Pt 11A r 2 and LCR Pt 10A r 2, such that summary judgment was generally not available in proceedings where there were claims of fraud, defamation, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment (see SCR Pt 13 r 1, DCR Pt 11A r 1 and LCR Pt 10A r 1(1A)). The effect of SCR Pt 13 r 1 was that summary judgment was not available in proceedings within the application of SCA s 88 – that section was repealed as from 18 January 2002 by the Courts Legislation Amendment (Civil Juries) Act 2001. [r 13.1.40]

Operation

Rule 13.1 allows a plaintiff to seek summary judgment against a defendant who does not have a bona fide defence to the claim, or whose only defence is as to the amount of the damages claimed. The purpose of the rule is to prevent unnecessary or protracted trial or hearings. An application for summary judgment may be made by a cross claimant because “plaintiff” includes a person by whom a cross-claim is made under the definition in CPA s 3. [r 13.1.60]

Application under this rule

An application for summary judgment should be made by motion in the proceedings. See Pt 18 regarding motions generally. An application may be made for judgment as to the whole or a part of a plaintiff’s claim. The application must be supported by evidence from the plaintiff, or a person referred to in r 35.3, that verifies the facts on which the claim (or that part of the claim the subject of the application for summary judgment) is based. The evidence in chief of a witness in an interlocutory hearing must be given by affidavit unless the court orders otherwise: r 31.2. If necessary, there may be separate affidavits made by different persons with the appropriate knowledge of the facts: r 35.3(5). Rule 35.3(3) provides that subject to any order of the court, a person making an affidavit must have knowledge of the facts deposed to in the affidavit. However, Evidence Act 1995 s 75 provides that in an interlocutory proceeding, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence if the party who adduces it also adduces evidence of its source (compare the former SCR Pt 36 r 4 and DCR Pt 28 r 5). The plaintiff or other responsible person must also depose to a belief that the defendant has no defence to the claim (or part of the claim the subject of the application) or no defence except as to the amount of damages claimed: r 13.1(1)(b). Damages includes the value of goods: r 13.1(3). Evidence of an “opinion” rather than a belief will not comply with the rules. The requisite belief can be established by an inference properly drawn from evidence furnished by the plaintiff or other responsible person: Cosmos E-C Commerce Pty Ltd v Bidwell Associates Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 81 at [46] and [47]; Harry Smith Car Sales Pty Ltd v Claycom Vegetable Supply Co Pty Ltd (1978) 29 ACTR 21 at 23. The defendant may oppose the application. In opposing the summary entry of judgment, a defendant seeks to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue: Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87; 57 ALJR 621; 48 ALR 1 at 99 (CLR). See [r 13.1.100] and [r 13.4.120]. [r 13.1.80]

Timing of the application

An application for summary judgment may be made before or after a defence is filed. If a defendant fails to enter an appearance, by filing a notice of appearance or a defence, within time (generally 28 days after service of the originating process, but see [r 6.10.40]) a plaintiff may enter default judgment under Pt 16. Delaying the application until after a defence is filed may affect the ability of the plaintiff or other responsible person to depose to a belief that there is no defence to the claim. However, it may be that the defence itself discloses facts that warrant an application for summary judgment. Where a plaintiff serves a notice of motion seeking summary judgment on a defendant before a defence has been filed, the time within which a defence must be filed may be fixed by the court after the motion for summary judgment has been dealt with: r 14.3(2). Practically speaking an application for default judgment is then barred until after the motion for summary judgment has been dealt with. [r 13.1.90]

Alternative procedure

An application for orders striking out a defence and that default judgment be given for the plaintiff under r 16.4 may be an alternative to seeking summary judgment under to r 13.1, for example NAB Ltd v Thirup 468

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 13 – Summary disposal [r 13.1.1000]

r 13.1

[2011] NSWSC 911. See [r 16.4.40], and compare [r 13.4.80] regarding an application for an order under r 14.28 in the alternative to an application for an order under r 13.4. [r 13.1.100]

Principles applying to an application for summary judgment

Provided there is evidence of the matters required (see [r 13.1.60]), the court considers whether to exercise the power conferred by r 13.1. The power to enter summary judgment should be exercised with great care, and an order under the rule should only be made where it is clear that there is no real question to be tried: Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87; 57 ALJR 621; 48 ALR 1 at 99 (CLR); Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886; 116 ALR 545; [1993] Aust Torts Reports 62,435 (81-236) at 602 (CLR). If there is a “real question”, either of fact or law, and the rights of the parties depend on it, it is not open for the court to intervene summarily: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62; 23 ALJ 48; [1949] ALR 333 at 91 (CLR). It must be clear that there are no facts in issue. The test applied in considering an application for summary judgment is similar to that applying to an application for summary dismissal: see the discussion of the authorities at [r 13.4.120]. Judgment may be entered for damages to be assessed. Damages includes the value of goods: r 13.1(3). The court may refuse to grant summary judgment where there is no defence to the action, but there is a defence to part of the relief claimed: ZS Projects Pty Ltd v G & R Investments Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 686; 89 FLR 335; 8 IPR 460; [1987] AIPC 37,522 (90-392) at 690 (NSWLR). An order may be made on terms: CPA s 86(1)(b). [r 13.1.120]

Setting aside summary judgment

[r 13.1.140] Appeal from entry of summary judgment An appeal to the Court of Appeal against the entry of a judgment under r 13.1 in the Supreme Court or District Court requires leave: SCA s 101(2)(l); DCA s 127(2)(d). An application for leave to appeal is made by summons: UCPR r 51.10 (formerly SCR Pt 51 r 4(1)). A purported appeal commenced without leave where leave is required may be dismissed as incompetent (as in Render v Gleeson [1999] NSWCA 154). A respondent served with an apparently incompetent appeal should seek an order dismissing the appeal out as incompetent by notice of motion filed and served on all other parties to the appeal within 28 days after service of the notice of appeal: see UCPR r 51.41 (formerly 21 days, under SCR Pt 51 r 25). An appeal to the Supreme Court against a judgment entered under r 13.1 made in the Local Court requires leave: Local Court Act 1970 s 40(2)(a). A party who is dissatisfied with a judgment or order of the Local Court may appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment or order only on the basis that a judgment or order made by the court sitting in its General Division was erroneous in point of law; or in the case of a judgment or order made by the court sitting in its Small Claims Division, only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or denial of natural justice: Local Court Act 2007 s 39(1) and (2). An appeal to the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order made in the General Division of the Local Court requires leave: Local Court Act 2007 s 40(2)(a). A judgment determining issues of liability but leaving open the assessment of damages is not a final judgment: Triden Properties Ltd v Capita Financial Group Ltd (unreported, NSWCA, 26 November 1993) applying Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423; 40 ALJR 102; [1966] ALR 705. [r 13.1.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [12.300]–[12.420] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 233-234. On the use of hearsay evidence and Evidence Act 1995 s 75, see Odgers SJ, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) [1.3.3700] pp 252–254; (7th ed, Lawbook Co., 2007) pp 270-271. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

469

UCPR Parts 11-20

A judgment entered under r 13.1 may be set aside under r 36.15 or r 36.16 if the provisions of one of those rules are satisfied: see [r 36.15.40] – [r 36.15.120] and [r 36.16.40] – [r 36.16.240] (and compare former DCR Pt 11A r 2(3) and LCR Pt 10A r 2(3)).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 13.2

[r 13.1.1000]

As to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (but not the Court of Appeal) and to the District Court: [r 50.12.40] and following. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 31 r 2; DCR Pt 11A r 2 and LCR Pt 10A r 2. 13.2

Stay of judgment pending determination of cross-claim

(cf SCR Part 13, rule 3; DCR Part 11A, rule 2A)

If the court gives judgment against a party under rule 13.1, and that party has made a cross-claim against the party obtaining the judgment, the court may stay enforcement of the judgment until determination of the cross-claim.

RULE 13.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 13.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 13.2.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 13.2.1000]

[r 13.2.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts and simplifies the wording of SCR Pt 13 r 3(2) and DCR Pt 11A r 2A(2). Those rules had referred to the party against whom summary judgment was entered having “claimed relief” against the plaintiff where r 13.2 refers specifically to a cross-claim. The substantive effect of SCR Pt 13 r 3(2) and DCR Pt 11A r 2A is unchanged. [r 13.2.40]

Operation

The rule allows the court to stay the enforcement of a summary judgment entered under r 13.1 until the defendant’s cross-claim against the plaintiff is determined. A cross-claim may be separately prosecuted from the original proceedings under r 9.10(1). [r 13.2.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 13 r 3(2); DCR Pt 11A r 2A(2). 13.3 Continuation of proceedings following partial judgment (cf SCR Part 13, rule 6; DCR Part 11A, rule 4; LCR Part 10A, rule 4)

If, in any proceedings: (a) a party applies for judgment, and (b) the proceedings are not wholly disposed of by the judgment, the proceedings may be continued as regards any claim or part of a claim not disposed of by the judgment.

RULE 13.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 13.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 13.3.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 13.3.1000]

[r 13.3.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts the wording of SCR Pt 13 r 6, DCR Pt 11A r 4 and LCR Pt 10A r 4, but so as to deal only with an application for summary judgment. The former rules dealt with both summary judgment and an application for summary stay or dismissal. Partial dismissal is now dealt with by r 13.5. The substantive effect of SCR Pt 13 r 6, DCR Pt 11A r 4 and LCR Pt 10A r 4 relating to partial judgment is unchanged. 470

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 13 – Summary disposal [r 13.4.20] [r 13.3.40]

r 13.4 Operation

If an application for summary judgment wholly fails, the proceedings continue as though the application had not been made. If an application succeeds in whole or in part, but the orders made do not dispose of the whole of the proceedings, the proceedings continue with respect to the remaining claims. Rule 13.5 is the counterpart to this rule in relation to summary dismissal of frivolous or vexatious proceedings; see [r 13.5.40]. [r 13.3.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 13 r 6; DCR Pt 11A r 4; LCR Pt 10A r 4. 13.4

Frivolous and vexatious proceedings

(cf SCR Part 13, rule 5; DCR Part 11A, rule 3; LCR Part 10A, rule 3)

(1) If in any proceedings it appears to the court that in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings: (a) the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or (b) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or (c) the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the court, the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed generally or in relation to that claim. (2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1).

RULE 13.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 13.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 13.4.40] Application under this rule ........................................................................................................................ [r 13.4.60] Alternative procedures .............................................................................................................................. [r 13.4.80] No application where multiple defendants ............................................................................................. [r 13.4.100] Principles applying to an application for summary dismissal ................................................................. [r 13.4.120] Reasonable cause of action ................................................................................................................... [r 13.4.130] Novel cause of action ............................................................................................................................. [r 13.4.140] Abuse of process .................................................................................................................................... [r 13.4.160] Concurrent proceedings ......................................................................................................................... [r 13.4.180] Forum non conveniens ........................................................................................................................... [r 13.4.200] Stay as a remedy ................................................................................................................................... [r 13.4.220] Effect of summary dismissal ................................................................................................................... [r 13.4.240] Appeal from summary dismissal order ................................................................................................... [r 13.4.260] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 13.4.1000]

Comparison

This rule adopts the wording of SCR Pt 13 r 5, DCR Pt 11A r 3 and LCR Pt 10A r 3, save that it provides only for summary dismissal whereas each of those rules provided for stay or dismissal of a claim within the rule. Rule 13.4(2) is in identical terms to SCR Pt 13 r 5(2). There is no provision in the same terms as DCR Pt 11A r 3(2) and LCR Pt 10A r 3(2), subrules which provided that evidence in support of an application under the rule “shall be” by affidavit unless the court otherwise orders, and that the Parts of those rules regarding motions apply to an application under the rule. The substantive effect of SCR Pt 13 r 5, DCR Pt 11A r 3 and LCR Pt 10A r 3 relating to summary dismissal is unchanged. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

471

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 13.4.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 13.4 [r 13.4.40]

[r 13.4.40] Operation

The rule allows a party to seek summary dismissal of an unmeritorious claim, including a cross claim. The definitions of “plaintiff” and “defendant” in CPA s 3 include a person by whom, and a person against whom a cross-claim is made. The rule protects a defendant against an unmeritorious claim; and ensures that serious disputes are not delayed by cases which have no reasonable chance of success: Spellson v George (1992) 26 NSWLR 666 at 678. [r 13.4.60]

Application under this rule

An application under r 13.4 should be made by motion in the proceedings. See Pt 18 regarding motions generally. An application may be made for dismissal of the whole or a part of a claim. Any evidence to be relied on in support of an application for summary dismissal must be given by affidavit unless the court orders otherwise: r 31.2. Rule 35.3(3) provides that subject to any order of the court, a person making an affidavit must have knowledge of the facts deposed to in the affidavit. However, Evidence Act 1995 s 75 provides that in an interlocutory proceeding, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence if the party who adduces it also adduces evidence of its source (compare the former SCR Pt 36 r 4 and DCR Pt 28 r 5). [r 13.4.80]

Alternative procedures

The court may also strike out the whole or any part of a pleading which discloses no reasonable cause of action, has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, under r 14.28 (compare SCR Pt 15 r 26; DCR Pt 9 r 17; LCR Pt 8 r 3). Such an application focuses attention on the plaintiff’s pleading rather than the plaintiff’s case: Agius v New South Wales [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-656; [2001] NSWCA 371 at [24]. The court’s powers under CPA ss 64 and 65, and Pt 19 to allow amendment of pleadings to remedy defects in a pleading should be borne in mind: see [r Pt19.20]. An application for an order under r 14.28 in the alternative may be included in a notice of motion seeking an order under r 13.4. The courses of action open to a defendant who alleges that the plaintiff’s claim should not be allowed to go to trial were discussed in Brimson v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 937 at 940-944. An attack may be made on the pleading under r 14.28 or by application for separate determination of a question under r 28.2 (see [r 28.2.60]). An application under r 13.4 attacks the plaintiff’s case and under that rule the court has power to dismiss the whole or part of the plaintiff’s claim. [r 13.4.100]

No application where multiple defendants

One of a number of defendants is not entitled to summary dismissal before trial because of evidentiary difficulties in the plaintiff’s case if the case of another defendant may implicate the moving defendant: Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 at 12; Breheny v Cairncross [2002] NSWCA 69 at [3], [7]. However the principle will not defeat an application for strike out where the defendant can identify a deficiency of evidence in the plaintiff’s case and establish that evidence to fill those gaps is unlikely to be forthcoming: PAO v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney [2011] NSWSC 1216 at [106]. [r 13.4.120]

Principles applying to an application for summary dismissal

The test applied in considering an application for summary dismissal is broadly similar to that applying to an application for summary judgment: see [r 13.1.100], subject to the discussion at [r 13.4.130]. A party should only be denied the opportunity to place her or his case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes, where there is a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if the proceedings were to go to trial in the ordinary way: Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; 74 ALJR 1219; 173 ALR 665; [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-569; [2000] HCA 41 at 575-576 (CLR); Batistatos v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27 at 275 (CLR) [46]; Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; 84 ALJR 612; [2010] HCA 28 at 131 (CLR) [24] per French CJ and Gummow J, 139–40 (CLR) [54] per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Shaw v New South 472

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 13 – Summary disposal [r 13.4.160]

r 13.4

Wales (2012) 219 IR 87; [2012] NSWCA 102 at [33] and [129]–[133] (Barrett JA, Beazley, McColl, Macfarlan JJA and McClellan CJ at CL agreeing); Brimson v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 937 at 944G. The test to be applied to where lack of a cause of action is alleged has been expressed as: “so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed”; “manifestly groundless”; “so manifestly faulty that it does not admit of argument”; “discloses a case which the Court is satisfied cannot succeed”; “under no possibility can there be a good cause of action”; “be manifest that to allow them” (the pleadings) “to stand would involve useless expense”: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; 38 ALJR 253; [1965] ALR 636 at 128-129 (CLR). That assessment is made taking the plaintiff’s case at its highest – an applicant for summary dismissal must accept the truth of all allegations in the statement of claim, and the ranges of meaning the assertions of fact in the statement of claim are reasonably capable of bearing: Penthouse Publications Ltd v McWilliam (unreported, NSW Ct CA, Priestley and Meagher JJA and Waddell AJA, 15 March 1991); Agius v New South Wales [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-656; [2001] NSWCA 371 at [24]. The exercise of the jurisdiction is not, however, reserved for those cases where argument is unnecessary to evoke the futility of the plaintiff’s claim; argument, perhaps even of an extensive kind, may be necessary to demonstrate that the case of the plaintiff is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; 38 ALJR 253; [1965] ALR 636 at 130 (CLR). Exceptional caution is necessary where it is apparent that the ultimate outcome turns upon the resolution of some disputed issue or issues of fact: Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886; 116 ALR 545; [1993] Aust Torts Reports 62,435 (81-236) at 603 (CLR); Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62; 23 ALJ 48; [1949] ALR 333 at 91 (CLR); or where questions of credit are involved: Spellson v George (1992) 26 NSWLR 666 at 678. [r 13.4.130]

Reasonable cause of action

A proceeding need not be “hopeless” or “bound to fail” for it to have no reasonable prospects of success under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A: Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; 84 ALJR 612; [2010] HCA 28 at 139 (CLR) [52], per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. Reasonable prospects of success means more than “fanciful” prospects: Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; 84 ALJR 612; [2010] HCA 28 at 128, 130, 132 (CLR) [17], [22], [25] per French CJ and Gummow J. Rule 13.4 permits summary dismissal of proceedings in which no reasonable cause of action is disclosed. Taken with the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in s 57, the test under r 13.4 is arguably less strict than before the CPA: Commonwealth v Griffıths (2007) 70 NSWLR 268; [2007] NSWCA 370 at 299-300 [155], Bott v Carter [2012] NSWCA 89 at [13]–[14] (Basten JA with whom McColl and Whealy JJA agreed); Shaw v New South Wales (2012) 219 IR 87; [2012] NSWCA 102 at [33] and [129]–[133] (Barrett JA, Beazley, McColl, Macfarlan JJA and McClellan CJ at CL agreeing); Simmons v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 455 at [64] (Hammerschlag J); Asuzu v Bar Assn Council (NSW) [2012] NSWCA 406 at [117] (Ward JA); Walker v University of Sydney [2013] NSWSC 104 at [28]–[30] (Harrison J). Novel cause of action

A court at first instance should be astute not to risk stifling the development of the law by summarily dismissing an action where there is a reasonable possibility that it will be found, in the development of the still embryonic law, that a cause of action does lie: Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia v Hunt (1982) 44 ALR 365 at 373-374; Gibson v Parkes District Hospital (1991) 26 NSWLR 9; [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-140 at 35 (NSWLR). [r 13.4.160]

Abuse of process

Proceedings brought for the predominant purpose of achieving objects ulterior to the purpose of a cause of action are an abuse of process: Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431; 107 ALR 635; 34 AILR 373 at 529 (CLR); Carson v Legal Services Commissioner [2000] NSWCA 308 at [107], [111], [300]; Van Der Lee v NSW [2002] NSWCA 286. Proceedings may be designed to produce a result beyond the simple attainment of the relief sought without necessarily involving any improper purpose. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

473

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 13.4.140]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 13.4

[r 13.4.160]

Champerty or third party assistance, such as from a litigation funder, do not per se constitute abuse of process: Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2006) 63 NSWLR 203; [2005] NSWCA 83. A party’s attempt to relitigate against an issue which was decided in earlier proceedings against other parties may amount to an abuse of process: Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198; [2001] NSWCA 142; Haines v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1995) 43 NSWLR 404 at 414. [r 13.4.180]

Concurrent proceedings

It may be vexatious and oppressive to bring two actions in courts governed by the same procedure where the judgments are followed by the same remedies, where one will do; the identity of the parties, the factual substratum in each case and the legal basis of the claims must be closely scrutinised: McHenry v Lewis (1882) 22 Ch D 397 at 400, applied in Maple v David Syme & Co Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 97; Hughes Motor Service Pty Ltd v Wang Computer Pty Ltd (1978) 35 FLR 346 and Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v The Boots Co (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 287; referred to in Commonwealth v Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd (2003) 1 DDCR 1; [2003] NSWCA 192 at [54]–[73]. To the extent permitted by Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; 65 ALJR 83, the court should strive to avoid the situation of concurrent actions: Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571; 70 ALJR 480 at 591 (CLR). [r 13.4.200]

“Forum non conveniens”

Where it is contended that New South Wales is a clearly inappropriate forum for the action (“forum non conveniens”) a permanent stay or anti-suit injunction may be sought. In the Supreme Court, service of originating process outside Australia may be set aside under r 11.7, see [r 11.7.60]. The principles to be applied in applications for a stay on inappropriate forum grounds are those stated by Deane J in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197; 62 ALJR 389 at 247-248 (CLR); Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; 65 ALJR 83; CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345; 71 ALJR 1143; 146 ALR 402. Those principles include the proposition that a party who has regularly invoked the jurisdiction of a competent court has a prima facie right to insist upon its exercise and to have her or his claim heard and determined: Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197; 62 ALJR 389 at 243-244 (CLR); Owners of Strata Plan No 51487 v Broadsand Pty Ltd (2001) 132 IR 361; [2001] NSWSC 813 (Bryson J). Steps short of a permanent stay or anti suit injunction may be appropriate in a particular case: CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345; 71 ALJR 1143; 146 ALR 402 at 389 (fn 98) (CLR). [r 13.4.220] Stay as a remedy Rule 13.4 does not provide for either stay or dismissal of a claim within the rule, as had been the case under the former rules: see [r 13.4.20]. However, subject to the rules, the court may at any time and from time to time, by order stay any proceedings before it, either permanently or until a specified day: CPA s 67. CPA s 67 does not in its terms authorise a permanent stay. The Supreme Court had power, in its inherent jurisdiction, to grant a permanent stay in appropriate circumstances. CPA s 5(1) expressly provides that nothing in the CPA or the UCPR limits the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, so it is likely that the Supreme Court retains the power to grant a permanent stay where appropriate. In a situation where dismissal of proceedings is not an appropriate remedy, the court would have power under CPA s 67 to grant a stay. A stay may be varied, discharged or suspended. It does not finally dispose of proceedings as an order dismissing proceedings does, but see [r 13.4.240] regarding the bringing of fresh proceedings after an order for summary dismissal. Proceedings may be stayed temporarily where proceedings are pending in another court and it is desirable that those other proceedings should proceed to their conclusion. The factors to be considered include: which proceeding was commenced first; whether the termination of one proceeding is likely to have a material effect on the other; the public interest; the undesirability of two courts competing to see which of them determines the suit first; the relative progress of each proceeding and the conduct of the parties in this regard; financial disadvantage to either party by reference to the place where the proceedings are to be determined; the location of any witnesses to be called and the undesirability of substantial waste of time and effort if it becomes a common practice to bring actions into courts involving substantially the same issues: L & W Developments Pty 474

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 13 – Summary disposal [r 13.4.1000]

r 13.4

Ltd v Della (2003) 135 IR 118; [2003] NSWCA 140 at [51]–[53]; Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v The Boots Co (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 287 at 290-291; Rexam Australia Pty Ltd v Optimum Metallising Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 916 at [21]–[22] (Einstein J); Challenger Group Holdings Ltd v Concept Equity Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 374 at [44] (Einstein J). The timing of commencement of the actions may also be relevant, if the first proceedings were commenced for the purpose of forestalling threatened proceedings in the other jurisdiction. [r 13.4.240] Effect of summary dismissal Ordinarily an order for summary dismissal does not, subject to the terms on which the order was made, prevent the plaintiff from bringing fresh proceedings or claiming the same relief in fresh proceedings: CPA s 91. If the court makes an order dismissing proceedings, in whole or in part, the plaintiff must pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings to the extent to which they have been dismissed unless the court orders otherwise: r 42.20. If a party then commences fresh proceedings on the same or substantially the same cause of action or for the same or substantially the same relief as the proceedings that were dismissed before paying those costs, the court may stay the fresh proceedings until the costs are paid and make such consequential orders as it thinks fit: r 12.10. The defendant may raise the defence of res judicata or issue estoppel. The principle of issue estoppel applies only where an issue in a second action is undoubtedly identical to an issue necessarily decided in a previous action: Co-ownership Land Development Pty Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 519; [1973] 1 ALR 201, see [r 14.14.200]. As to abuse of process in seeking to relitigate an issue, see [r 13.4.160]. [r 13.4.260]

Appeal from summary dismissal order

An order for summary dismissal under r 13.4 is interlocutory, it is not final in legal effect: Macatangay v New South Wales (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 272 at [11]; In the Matter of An Appeal by Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 at 4; 78 ALJR 177 at 179; [2003] HCA 70 at [9]; Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 at 11C; Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423; 40 ALJR 102; [1966] ALR 705 at 440 (CLR); [1966] HCA 36; Tampion v Anderson (1973) 48 ALJR 11; 3 ALR 414 at 12 (ALJR); 415-417 (ALR). An order is final in legal effect if it concludes the rights of the parties as between themselves: Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423; 40 ALJR 102; [1966] ALR 705 at 440 (CLR); Tampion v Anderson (1973) 48 ALJR 11; 3 ALR 414 at 12 (ALJR). It was held in Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 at 11C that an order for summary dismissal under SCR Pt 13 r 5 is an interlocutory order. That decision of the Court of Appeal is persuasive rather than a binding precedent as it was reversed by the High Court (30 April 1993, (1993) 10 Leg Rep SL 2): King Investment Solutions Pty Ltd v Hussain (2005) 64 NSWLR 441; [2005] NSWSC 1076 at [20] (Campbell J). An appeal to the Court of Appeal against an order for summary dismissal under r 13.4 made in the Supreme Court or District Court requires leave as an interlocutory order: SCA s 101(2)(e); DCA s 127(2)(a). An application for leave to appeal is made by summons: UCPR r 51.10 (formerly SCR Pt 51 r 4(1)). A purported appeal commenced without leave where leave is required may be dismissed as incompetent (as in Render v Gleeson [1999] NSWCA 154). An appeal to the Supreme Court against an order for summary dismissal under r 13.4 made in the General Division of the Local Court requires leave: Local Court Act 2007 s 40(2)(a). [r 13.4.1000]

References

On the use of hearsay evidence in interlocutory proceedings and Evidence Act 1995 s 75, see Odgers SJ, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) [1.3.3700]–[1.3.3740]. Res judicata and issue estoppel: see [r 14.14.200]. As to “forum shopping” and the anti suit injunction: Bell AS, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2003). As to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (but not the Court of Appeal) and to the District Court: [r 50.12.40] ff. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

475

UCPR Parts 11-20

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [12.430]–[12.480] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 234–235.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 13.5

13.5

[r 13.4.1000]

Continuation of proceedings following partial dismissal

(cf SCR Part 13, rule 6; DCR Part 11A, rule 4; LCR Part 10A, rule 4)

If, in any proceedings: (a) a party applies for an order for dismissal of proceedings, and (b) the proceedings are not wholly disposed of by dismissal, the proceedings may be continued as regards any claim or part of a claim not disposed of by dismissal.

RULE 13.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 13.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 13.5.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 13.5.1000]

[r 13.5.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts the wording of SCR Pt 13 r 6, DCR Pt 11A r 4 and LCR Pt 10A r 4, but so as to deal only with an application for summary stay or dismissal. The former rules dealt with both summary stay or dismissal and an application for summary judgment. Partial judgment is now dealt with by r 13.3. The substantive effect of SCR Pt 13 r 6, DCR Pt 11A r 4 and LCR Pt 10A r 4 relating to partial dismissal is unchanged. [r 13.5.40]

Operation

If an application for summary dismissal wholly fails, the proceedings continue as though the application had not been made. If an application succeeds in whole or in part, but the orders made do not dispose of the whole of the proceedings, the proceedings continue with respect to the remaining claims. This rule is the counterpart of r 13.3 in relation to partial judgment: see [r 13.3.40]. [r 13.5.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 13 r 6; DCR Pt 11A r 4; LCR Pt 10A r 4. 13.6 Non-appearance by plaintiff (cf SCR Part 13, rule 5A)

(1) If there is no attendance by or on behalf of a plaintiff at a hearing of which the plaintiff has had due notice, the court may adjourn the hearing to another date and direct that not less than 5 days before that date a notice of the adjournment be served on the plaintiff advising that the proceedings may be dismissed if there is no attendance by or on behalf of the plaintiff at the adjourned hearing. (2) If the plaintiff has been given notice in accordance with subrule (1) and there is no attendance by or on behalf of the plaintiff at the adjourned hearing, the court may dismiss the proceedings. (3) This rule does not restrict any other power of the court to dismiss proceedings. [R 13.6 insrt Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[28]]

RULE 13.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 13.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 13.6.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 13.6.1000]

476

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 13 – Summary disposal [r 13.6.1000] [r 13.6.20]

r 13.6

Comparison

This rule adopts SCR Pt 13 r 5A. Although there were references in that rule to “hearing (including the hearing of an interlocutory or other application and a directions hearing), or at a trial” and “hearing or trial”, rather than simply “hearing” as in r 13.6(1), the substantive effect of r 13.6 is the same. “Hearing” is defined in CPA (NSW) s 3 as including both trial and interlocutory hearing (the dictionary to the UCPR also defines “hearing” as including trial). There was no direct equivalent in the DCR and LCR, although DCR Pt 26 r 5A and Pt 1 r 7A provided for the making of a preliminary dismissal order if the plaintiff did not appear when an action was called on for trial. [r 13.6.40]

Operation

The rule allows the court to dismiss proceedings where the plaintiff fails to appear, provided that notice had been given of the hearing date and the plaintiff had been advised that the proceedings may be dismissed if there was no appearance at the adjourned hearing. The court may dismiss proceedings under the rule on its own motion or an application by a party: CPA s 86(3). [r 13.6.1000]

References

UCPR Parts 11-20

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 13 r 5A; DCR Pt 26 r 5A and Pt 1 r 7A; LCR Pt 21 r 3(1)(b).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

477

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt14.20]

PART 14 – PLEADINGS Commentary by Michael McHugh SC.

PART 14 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 14 ................................................................................................................. [r Pt14.20] New matters to note ................................................................................................................................. [r Pt14.40] Pleading a statutory cause of action ....................................................................................................... [r Pt14.60] Defences .................................................................................................................................................. [r Pt14.80] Reply and further pleadings ................................................................................................................... [r Pt14.100] Set-off ..................................................................................................................................................... [r Pt14.120] Amendment ............................................................................................................................................ [r Pt14.140] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r Pt14.1000]

[r Pt14.20] General comments on Part 14 The Dictionary defines a “pleading” to include a statement of claim, defence, reply and any subsequent pleading for which leave is given under Pt 14, but does not include a summons or notice of motion. Pleadings set out in summary form the material facts upon which a party to civil proceedings (defined r 1.5) rely for their cause of action or defence. The nature of any relief sought should generally be specifically identified: Pheeney v Doolan [1977] 1 NSWLR 601. Nevertheless r 36.1 authorises the court to grant such relief as the nature of the case may require. Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; 57 ALJR 80; 44 ALR 117 at 664 (CLR) summarises the functions of pleadings: they furnish a statement of the case sufficiently clear to allow the other party a fair opportunity to meet it; they define the issues for decision in the litigation and thereby enable the relevance and admissibility of evidence to be determined at the trial; and they give a defendant an understanding of a plaintiff’s claim in aid of the defendant’s right to make a payment into court. See further Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279; 64 ALJR 244; 92 ALR 53 and Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 76 ALJR 1024; 190 ALR 370; [2002] HCA 31. Hence, pleadings limit the scope of particulars, discovery and interrogatories. They also assist in determining where the burden of proof lies on questions of fact, and in defining any issue estoppel: see [r 14.14.180]. Once issues have been finally determined by judicial decision, they cannot again be raised in other litigation between the parties or their privies: Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; 42 ALJR 89; Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363; 78 ALJR 1031; [2004] HCA 34. The course of pleading is: plaintiff’s statement of claim; defendant’s defence; any reply by the plaintiff to the defence. The sequence is the same where a counter-claim arises: defendant’s cross-claim against the plaintiff; plaintiff’s defence to the cross-claim; any reply thereto by the defendants/cross-claimant. Except by leave of the court, a party to proceedings may not file any pleading subsequent to a reply: r 14.5. [r Pt14.40] New matters to note As the UCPR applies to the District Court and Local Court and generally follows Supreme Court procedure, a number of changes have been made to pleading in the lower courts, care should be taken using precedents. Rules 14.6 to 14.20 carry over some of the SCR relating to the form and manner of pleadings, and also apply to the Local Court. Rule 14.2 enables a plaintiff to plead “short facts” in certain money proceedings; however, a defendant can require the plaintiff to plead the facts in full by giving notice under r 14.12(2)–(4). A pleading must not claim an amount for unliquidated damages: r 14.13. However, certain exceptions may apply in Local Court proceedings: r 14.13(2) and (3). Rule 14.15 expands the matters that must be pleaded in proceedings for possession of land. The former SCR Pt 15A – Limiting issues – does not appear in the UCPR. Its requirement of only maintaining an issue if it was reasonable to do so has to a certain extent been picked up by CPA Pt 6, especially, ss 56, 59 and 60. The former rule relating to close of pleadings (SCR Pt 15 r 22) is not included in the UCPR. [r Pt14.60] Pleading a statutory cause of action When making a claim on a cause of action arising under an Act or regulation, it is necessary not only to refer to the relevant Act or regulation, but also to plead as facts the elements essential for bringing the claim within the legislation: Proctor v Jetway Aviation Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 264 at 268. 478

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings [r Pt14.140] [r Pt14.80]

Defences

The UCPR include SCR Pt 15 r 2, which permits trial without further pleadings. This procedure is now available in the District Court and Local Court. The time limit for a defendant to file a defence to a statement of claim is 28 days after the service of the statement of claim unless the court otherwise orders: r 14.3. A defendant to a statement of claim must file a defence in accordance with r 14.3 or risk default under r 16.2 and be liable to have default judgment signed against them under r 16. The rules do not expressly take notice of the common agreement between litigants for the filing of the defence only after further particulars have been sought and received. A defence generally takes one or more of the following forms: a traverse, ie a denial or non-admission of the plaintiff’s allegations; a confession and avoidance (admission of the facts alleged by the plaintiff with an allegation of other facts which excuse or justify them); an objection in point of law, or a plea that the statement of claim discloses no cause of action. An allegation not traversed is deemed to have been admitted. Independent of pleadings, formal admissions can be made under r 17 – Admissions, for the purpose only of the (particular) proceedings, as a further means of defining the issues in those proceedings and preserving an entitlement to fight other proceedings on broader grounds. There are two common, formal deficiencies in pleading defences that can be noted. First, it is dangerous to plead a non-admission in a form that asserts that the pleading party “does not know and cannot admit”, as the pleading party unnecessarily commits itself to a state of knowledge which might change before trial and which, in any event, tells an opponent more than it needs to know. Second, parties who plead “[the party] does not plead to paragraph x because it contains no allegation against it” generally fail to recognise that rules of court – if strictly construed – must treat that as an implied admission. If parties wish to distance themselves from what appear to be allegations directed against other parties they should nevertheless formally record that they make no admissions as to those allegations. Any number of defences may be pleaded together – in the alternative or otherwise – although they are inconsistent. A defendant may raise by its defence, without leave, as many distinct and separate, and therefore inconsistent, defences as it may think proper; and it is not necessarily an abuse of the court’s process to do so: Casey v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1981] 1 NSWLR 305. Alternative legal defences based upon the same factual scenario are unlikely to involve any difficulty in verifying the pleading. However, care must be taken that alternative factual scenarios are still sufficiently consistent to enable the pleading to be verified, and as to which r 14.22 applies. In some cases it may be appropriate to plead “should the court find that … (a fact against the earlier pleading) … then [the party] says … (alternative pleading)”: Fenton v Fenton (1966) 85 WN (NSW) (Pt 1) 430; 9 FLR 224; [1966] 2 NSWR 605. [r Pt14.100]

Reply and further pleadings

A plaintiff may file a reply in proceedings in the Supreme Court or District Court: r 14.4. A plaintiff in Local Court proceedings may only file a reply by leave of the court. The time limit for a plaintiff to file a reply is 14 days after service of the defence on the plaintiff. A party to proceedings may not file any pleading subsequent to a reply without leave of the court: r 14.5. Set-off

Section 21 of the CPA reintroduces the law of set-off, as recommended by the Law Reform Commission in 2000 in Report No 94. Clause 6 of Sch 6 CPA deals with when the right to claim set-off may apply. The history of set-off in NSW is referred to in Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed, LexisNexis, 2002) at [37-080]. Set-off is a mechanism that allows one party to apply a debt owed to him or her by another party, to discharge all or part of a debt that he or she owes to the other party. This mechanism saves parties from having to bring separate proceedings with respect to each of the debts. The set-off of Local Court judgments is governed by CPA s 96. [r Pt14.140]

Amendment

CPA Pt 6 and UCPR Pt 2 (case management) embody a stringent case management regime; Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27; Shao Chun Bi v Mourad [2010] NSWCA 17. Amendment is governed by r 19. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

479

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r Pt14.120]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.1

[r Pt14.1000]

[r Pt14.1000]

References

Rule 6.3 governs matters to be commenced by statement of claim and r 6.3 regulates summons. Regard may also be had to UCPR Pt 6 Div 4 – Contents of statement of claim and summons. Defective pleadings can be struck out: r 14.28; proceedings may be determined summarily or dismissed: r 13.4; judgment on admissions can be obtained: r 17.7. Further reading: Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) Ch 6; Jacob and Goldrein, Pleadings: Principles and Practice (1990). On the preparation of pleadings: Neville & Ashe, Equity Precedents (NSW) (1981) and Bullen and Leake, Precedents of Pleading (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1975).

DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY 14.1

Application

This Part applies to proceedings commenced by statement of claim and to proceedings in which a statement of claim has been filed.

DIVISION 2 – DEFENCE AND FURTHER PLEADINGS 14.2

Trial without further pleadings

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 2)

(1) If in the opinion of the court: (a) the issues between the parties can be defined without further pleadings, or (b) for any other reason the proceedings may properly be tried without further pleadings, the court may order that the proceedings be so tried. (2) A court that makes an order under subrule (1) may direct the parties to prepare a statement of the issues involved in the proceedings or, if the parties do not agree on a statement, may settle a statement itself.

RULE 14.2 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 14.2.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 14.2.1000]

[r 14.2.40]

Operation

This is a case management rule. It allows the court to implement what in its opinion will advance the “overriding purpose” set out in s 56 of the CPA and hence to which s 58 CPA would apply. Rule 14.2 has been invoked by a party concerned that admissions in a defence or filing of defence would expose them to a civil penalty and so the matter ought proceed without pleadings: Pascoe v Divisional Security Group Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 197; [2007] NSWSC 211. Simply pleaded liquidated claims for a “common money count” can fall under this rule: Tagget v McLean Austquip Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1310. [r 14.2.1000]

References

CPA Pt 6. 14.3 Defence (cf SCR Part 15, rule 3; DCR Part 10, rule 1; LCR Part 9, rule 1)

(1) Subject to these rules, the time limited for a defendant to file a defence is 28 days after service on the defendant of the statement of claim or such other time as the court directs for the filing of a defence. (2) If, before the defendant files a defence, a notice of motion for summary judgment under rule 13.1 is served on the defendant, but the court does not on that motion dispose of all of the claims for relief against the defendant, the court may fix a time within which the defendant must file a defence. 480

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 2 – Defence and further pleadings

[r 14.4.40]

r 14.5

Note: See rule 9.11(2) under which a defence to a cross-claim for contribution under section 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 may not be filed unless the court so directs.

RULE 14.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 14.3.20] Equitable defences ................................................................................................................................... [r 14.3.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 14.3.1000]

[r 14.3.20]

Comparison

The changes to this rule reflect an intention in the UCPR to standardise, to the extent considered practicable, all time periods to 28 days. As a result the operative time for filing the defence begins after service, rather than 14 days after the time for an appearance. [r 14.3.60]

Equitable defences

Inferior courts lack a general equitable jurisdiction and hence the Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act 1972 ss 5, 6 and 7, enables those courts to give effect to equitable defences. [r 14.3.1000]

References

Specific rules relating to defences are rr 14.15, 14.24 and 14.25. 14.4 Reply (cf SCR Part 15, rule 4)

(1) In proceedings in the Supreme Court or the District Court, a plaintiff may file a reply to a defence. (2) In proceedings in the Local Court, a plaintiff may file a reply to a defence only by leave of the Court. [Subr (2) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

(3) The time limited for the plaintiff to file a reply is 14 days after service of the defence on the plaintiff. [Rule 14.4 am Rule 579 of 2007]

RULE 14.4 COMMENTARY [r 14.4.40]

Operation

14.5 Further pleadings (cf SCR Part 15, rule 5)

(1) Except by leave of the court, a party to proceedings may not file any pleading subsequent to a reply. (2) The time limited for a party to seek leave to file a pleading subsequent to a reply (the further pleading) is 14 days after service on the party of the pleading to which further pleading responds. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

481

UCPR Parts 11-20

There is an implied joinder of issue on a defence – r 14.27, hence, it is unnecessary to serve a reply if the plaintiff only wishes to deny the allegations contained in the defence. If, however, the plaintiff wishes to set up an affirmative case in answer to the facts alleged by the defendant, then a reply is necessary to comply with the “surprise rule”r 14.14 and any practice in relation to defences filed in defamation proceedings such as under the repealed SCR Pt 67 r 19 malice and other matters which defeat a defence ought be in a reply. There is a sharp distinction between a reply and a defence to a cross-claim: a reply will not always be necessary, but a defence to a cross-claim must be pleaded in accordance with the rules applicable to the defence to a statement of claim.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.5

[r 14.5.20]

RULE 14.5 COMMENTARY [r 14.5.20]

Comparison

This rule has removed the extension of time available under SCR Pt 15 r 5 with which to file the notice of motion. Any such late application would now arguably need to seek relief from r 1.12(2) or CPA s 14.

DIVISION 3 – FORM OF PLEADING GENERALLY 14.6 Pleadings to be divided into paragraphs (cf SCR Part 15, rule 6; DCR Part 9, rule 2)

If a pleading alleges or otherwise deals with several matters: (a) the pleading must be divided into paragraphs, and (b) each matter must, so far as convenient, be put in a separate paragraph, and (c) the paragraphs must be numbered consecutively.

RULE 14.6 COMMENTARY [r 14.6.40]

Operation

As the pleadings will define the litigation they should be clear and unambiguous. To roll separate matters into one paragraph produces positive mischief for both the defendant and the trial judge: Monte v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 663 at 677. Matters of fact and law should also be separated. Breaches of the rule should be complained of inter partes and, when not cured and ambiguous or otherwise embarrassing, relief obtained by motion and supporting affidavit: r 14.28. 14.7 Pleadings to contain facts, not evidence (cf SCR Part 15, rule 7; DCR Part 9, rule 3)

Subject to this Part, Part 6 and Part 15, a party’s pleading must contain only a summary of the material facts on which the party relies, and not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved.

RULE 14.7 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 14.7.40] Material facts ............................................................................................................................................ [r 14.7.60] Material facts, not law .............................................................................................................................. [r 14.7.80] Material facts, not evidence ................................................................................................................... [r 14.7.100] All material facts ..................................................................................................................................... [r 14.7.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 14.7.1000]

[r 14.7.40]

Operation

Part 6 relates to commencing proceedings and appearance and Pt 15 to particulars. This rule sets out the guiding principles of pleading: namely, that a pleading should state (1) material facts, not law; (2) material facts, not evidence; (3) material facts only; (4) all material facts; and (5) in a summary form. To plead facts which are not material only enables the defendant to traverse them thus giving rise to an immaterial issue: Lightning Ridge Mining NL v Jacombe [1978] 1 NSWLR 253. [r 14.7.60]

Material facts

The particular circumstances of each case will determine what are the material facts. Great care should be taken when using pleadings from similar cases. Material facts are at a minimum all those facts that a party must prove in order to either obtain the relief sought or deny it: Philipps v Philipps (1878) 4 QBD 12. Facts 482

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 3 – Form of pleading generally

[r 14.7.1000]

r 14.7

relating to aggravation or mitigation of damages should be pleaded: Plato Films Ltd v Speidel [1961] AC 1090, as are facts alleging the capacity of a party other than a natural person to sue or be sued. Material facts should not be left to the particulars as these need not be traversed and serve a different purpose from pleadings: One Tel Ltd (in liq) v Rich (2003) 45 ACSR 466; [2003] NSWSC 522; H 1976 Nominees Pty Ltd v Galli (1979) 40 FLR 242; 30 ALR 181; Pinson v Lloyds & National Provincial Foreign Bank Ltd [1941] 2 KB 72 at 75. Facts which are not material at the particular stage of the pleadings should be omitted, even if it is possible that they may become material at a later stage: Marginson v Ian Potter & Co (1976) 136 CLR 161; 50 ALJR 735; 11 ALR 64. “Material” means material to the claim, that is, to the cause or causes of action which are relied on. Facts that have to be established before a cause of action is complete are “material facts”: Colavon Pty Ltd v Bellingen Shire Council (2008) 51 MVR 549; [2008] NSWCA 355 at [100]. The requirement of a statement of material facts does not exclude the allegation of legal categories, such as duty of care, fiduciary duty, trust and contract. The general requirement to avoid surprise means that material facts must be stated in such a way that a defendant can understand the materiality of the facts, that is, how they are material to a cause of action. Where there is a danger of surprise, which arises particularly where there is lack of precision and clarity in the pleading, it may well be appropriate to require a plaintiff, either in a statement of claim or in particulars, to explicitly relate the facts it pleads to specified causes of action: Kirby v Sanderson Motors Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 135; [2002] NSWCA 44 per Hodgson JA. [r 14.7.80]

Material facts, not law

The inferences of law to be drawn from the pleaded facts need not be stated in the pleading though this does not exclude the allegation of legal categories referred to in Kirby v Sanderson Motors Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 135; [2002] NSWCA 44. Thus if the material facts are alleged, the court may “proceed to judgment without putting any particular legal label upon the cause of action”: per Denning J in Shaw v Shaw [1954] 2 QB 429 at 441. If the material facts are alleged it is not necessary to plead the legal result; and if for convenience this is pleaded, the party is not bound by, or limited to, the legal result he or she has alleged but may rely on any legal consequences of the pleaded facts which may properly flow from them: Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) [1974] Ch 269. This rule against pleading the law, because it obscures or conceals the facts of the case, is not inconsistent with the rule (r 14.19) which permits a party to raise a point of law, because it defines or isolates an issue or question of law on the facts as pleaded. However, statutory defences in legislation such as the Civil Liability Act 2002 ought be specifically pleaded – r 14.14 and see Bellingen Shire Council v Colavon Pty Ltd (2012) 188 LGERA 169; [2012] NSWCA 34 at [23]. [r 14.7.100]

Material facts, not evidence

The dividing line between statements which contain sufficient indication to prepare an opponent for the case to be met at trial and mere statements of evidence is sometimes hard to draw and should not invite meticulous criticism: Pinson v Lloyds & National Provincial Foreign Bank Ltd [1941] 2 KB 72. However, the rule remains that only the material facts must be pleaded and not the evidence proving those facts. For example a plaintiff might aver that he or she was run down by a motor vehicle but not that witness A saw such a running down. [r 14.7.120]

All material facts

It is not sufficient to allege facts which would constitute a cause of action only if there were added further facts which are not stated: West Rand Central Gold Mining Co Ltd v The King [1905] 2 KB 391. References

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 14.7.1000]

Striking out pleadings: r 14.28; Summary stay or dismissal: r 13.4; Judgment on admissions: r 17.7.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

483

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.8

14.8

[r 14.9.40]

Pleadings to be brief

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 8; DCR Part 9, rule 4)

A pleading must be as brief as the nature of the case allows. 14.9

References in pleadings to documents and spoken words

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 9; DCR Part 9, rule 5)

If any documents or spoken words are referred to in a pleading: (a) the effect of the document or spoken words must, so far as material, be stated, and (b) the precise terms of the document or spoken words must not be stated, except so far as those terms are themselves material.

RULE 14.9 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 14.9.40] Incorporation of documents ...................................................................................................................... [r 14.9.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 14.9.1000]

[r 14.9.40]

Operation

This rule sits beside the requirement under r 14.7 that only material facts are pleaded and not the evidence establishing those facts. Only the effect of the document or words spoken as material facts are necessary to comply. [r 14.9.60]

Incorporation of documents

The mere reference to a document in a pleading does not have the effect of incorporating the document in the pleading: Metropolitan Theatres Ltd v Harris (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 228; 52 WN (NSW) 68; Bloeman v Atkinson [1977] Qd R 291; TCS ACES Pty Ltd v Mikohn Gaming Australasia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1139 at [7]; Hill End Gold Ltd v First Tiffany Resource Corp [2008] NSWSC 1412 at [10]. [r 14.9.1000]

References

Rule 14.7 and the annotations thereto. 14.10

Certain facts need not be pleaded

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 10; DCR Part 9, rule 6)

A party need not plead a fact if: (a) the fact is presumed by law to be true, or (b) the burden of disproving the fact lies on the opposite party, except so far as may be necessary to meet a specific denial of that fact by another party’s pleading.

RULE 14.10 COMMENTARY [r 14.10.40]

Operation

The presumption that a foreign law is the same as the lex fori is not of universal application: BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt [1980] 1 NSWLR 496; (1980) 47 FLR 317. A person who relies on foreign law must plead and prove it where: 1. the person wishes to take forensic advantage of a provision of that law; or 2. the opponent might be taken by surprise if the foreign law were not pleaded: Dyno Wesfarmers Ltd v Knuckey [2003] NSWCA 375 (international matter). 484

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 3 – Form of pleading generally

[r 14.11.60]

r 14.12

A matter of which the court takes judicial notice, such as inter-State statutes, does not have to be pleaded: Walker v WA Pickles Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 281. There would appear to be no room for the operation of the common law doctrine of judicial notice, strictly so called, since the enactment of the Evidence Act 1995, s 144 in this volume; Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 78 ALJR 394; 204 ALR 258; [2004] HCA 6 at [17]. 14.11

Conditions precedent presumed to have been met

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 11; DCR Part 9, rule 7)

If it is (a) (b) (c) (d)

a condition precedent necessary for a party’s case in any pleading that: a thing has been done, or an event has happened, or a state of affairs exists, or has existed at some time or times, or the party is ready and willing, or was at all material times ready and willing, to perform an obligation, a statement to the effect that the condition has been satisfied is taken to be implied in the party’s pleading.

RULE 14.11 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 14.11.40] Onus ........................................................................................................................................................ [r 14.11.60]

[r 14.11.40]

Operation

Due to r 14.11 of Rules, an averment of readiness and willingness is not necessary in a statement of claim for specific performance: Dalswinton Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Cole [2006] NSWSC 570. Essential parts of a cause of action but not a condition precedent must be pleaded: Hollis v Marshall (1858) 2 H & N 755; Hart v Nominal Defendant [1971] 1 NSWLR 147. [r 14.11.60]

Onus

If the onus is not on the plaintiff to specifically plead compliance with a condition precedent, the onus is on the defendant to plead the plaintiff’s non-compliance with it before the plaintiff is required to plead compliance in reply: Hu v Northern Sydney Area Health Service (2002) 1 DCLR (NSW) 19. The onus at trial is not affected. It is often difficult to decide whether a particular matter is a condition precedent to the plaintiff’s right of action or is something essential to her or his right of action, other than a condition precedent, which ought to be pleaded. See Newtown Management Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 67219 [2009] NSWSC 150 at [162]–[164]. 14.12 Pleading of facts in short form in certain money claims

(1) Subject to this rule, if the plaintiff claims money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for any of the following: (a) goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, (b) goods bargained and sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, (c) work done or materials provided by the plaintiff for the defendant at the defendant’s request, (d) money lent by the plaintiff to the defendant, (e) money paid by the plaintiff for the defendant at the defendant’s request, (f) money had and received by the defendant for the plaintiff’s use, (g) interest on money due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and forborne at interest by the plaintiff at the defendant’s request, © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

485

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 12; DCR Part 9, rule 8)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.12

[r 14.12.40]

(h) money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them, it is sufficient to plead the facts concerned in short form (that is, by using the form of words set out in the relevant paragraph above). (2) The defendant may file a notice requiring the plaintiff to plead the facts on which he or she relies in full (that is, in accordance with the provisions of this Part other than this rule). (3) Such a notice must be filed within the time limited for the filing of the defence. (4) If the defendant files a notice under this rule: (a) the plaintiff must, within 28 days after service of the notice: (i) file an amended statement of claim pleading the facts on which he or she relies in full, and (ii) include in the amended statement of claim a note to the effect that the statement has been amended in response to the notice, and (b) if a defence has not been filed, the time limited for the filing of defence is extended until 14 days after service on the defendant of the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim.

RULE 14.12 COMMENTARY [r 14.12.40]

Operation

This rule enables a plaintiff to plead a short form of statement of claim in actions upon simple contracts, or in cases of quasi-contractual liability, where he or she is claiming a liquidated amount. It is an exception to the rule which requires a party to plead all the material facts on which it relies. Where this rule applies, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to plead the facts according to the formula provided in subr (1). If the substance of the cause of action clearly falls within the terms of subr (1), then the fact that it is not phrased in the exact terms of one or more of the categories thereof does not mean that the rule has no application: Astronaut Travel Service Pty Ltd v Premier-Premal Pty Ltd (1973) 3 DCR (NSW) 225. The plaintiff’s right to plead the short forms of money counts is subject to the defendant’s right to require by notice that the plaintiff plead the facts on which it relies: subr (2). Notice to plead facts will delay the proceedings and operate as a temporary bar to default judgment: subr (4). The filing of a notice to plead facts constitutes the taking of a “step in the proceedings” within s 6 of the Arbitration Act 1902 (NSW) (repealed) (later s 53 Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) (also repealed)): Reliable Roof Treatments Pty Ltd v Citra Constructions Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 285. 14.13 Pleading not to claim an amount for unliquidated damages (cf SCR Part 15, rule 12A; LCR Part 5, rule 1)

(1) A pleading must not claim an amount for unliquidated damages. (2) Despite subrule (1), a pleading in proceedings in the Local Court may claim an amount for unliquidated damages if: (a) the claim is for the recovery of: (i) the cost of repair to a motor vehicle, or (ii) the value, less any salvage value, of a motor vehicle, or (iii) the towing of a motor vehicle, or (iv) the cost of hiring a replacement car, where the repair, loss, towing or cost of hiring is a consequence of damage alleged to have been sustained as a result of the negligence of the defendant or the defendant’s servant or agent, or (b) the claim is for the recovery of: (i) the cost of repair to property other than a motor vehicle, or 486

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 3 – Form of pleading generally

[r 14.13.40]

r 14.14

(ii) the value, less any salvage value, of property other than a motor vehicle, where the repair or loss is a consequence of damage alleged to have been sustained as a result of the negligence of the defendant or the defendant’s servant or agent in driving, riding or controlling a motor vehicle. [Subr (2) am Rule 96 of 2013, Sch 1; Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

(3) In subrule (2), a reference to a motor vehicle is a reference to a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999, and includes a reference to a trailer within the meaning of that Act. [R 14.13 am Rule 96 of 2013; Rule 579 of 2007]

RULE 14.13 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 14.13.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 14.13.40]

[r 14.13.20]

Comparison

There is no change from the former SCR. The former LCR applied in respect of a “debt or liquidated demand” and not “unliquidated damages”. [r 14.13.40]

Operation

Some claims must still be specifically included: r 15.6 – Out of pocket expenses. 14.14

General rule as to matters to be pleaded specifically

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 13; DCR Part 9, rule 9)

(1) In a statement of claim, the plaintiff must plead specifically any matter that, if not pleaded specifically, may take the defendant by surprise. (2) In a defence or subsequent pleading, a party must plead specifically any matter: (a) that, if not pleaded specifically, may take the opposite party by surprise, or (b) that the party alleges makes any claim, defence or other case of the opposite party not maintainable, or (c) that raises matters of fact not arising out of the preceding pleading. (3) Matters which must be pleaded pursuant to subrule (2) include (but are not limited to) fraud, performance, release, statute of limitation, extinction of right or title, voluntary assumption of risk, causation of accident by unknown and undiscoverable mechanical defect and facts showing illegality.

RULE 14.14 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 14.14.40] Trial by ambush ...................................................................................................................................... [r 14.14.60] Failing to plead ....................................................................................................................................... [r 14.14.80] Fraud .................................................................................................................................................... [r 14.14.120] Statute of limitation ............................................................................................................................... [r 14.14.140] Voluntary assumption of risk ................................................................................................................ [r 14.14.160] Contributory negligence ........................................................................................................................ [r 14.14.180] Res judicata; issue estoppel ................................................................................................................ [r 14.14.200] The Anshun principle ............................................................................................................................ [r 14.14.220] Estoppel; statutory scheme .................................................................................................................. [r 14.14.240] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

487

UCPR Parts 11-20

Examples .............................................................................................................................................. [r 14.14.100]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.14 [r 14.14.40]

[r 14.14.40] Operation

This rule enforces one of the fundamental principles of the system of pleading material facts; that every pleading must plead specifically any matter essential to a claim or defence which might take the opposite party by surprise or raises issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleading. Therefore, wherever a party has a special ground of defence or raises an affirmative case to destroy a claim or defence, it must specifically plead the matter it relies on for such purpose: Bellingen Shire Council v Colavon Pty Ltd (2012) 188 LGERA 169; [2012] NSWCA 34 at [23]. An opposing party ought be given a proper opportunity to fully appreciate the material facts: Kirby v Sanderson Motors Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 135; [2002] NSWCA 44. [r 14.14.60]

Trial by ambush

The culture of trial by ambush and adversarial tactics in civil proceedings (ie reserving as many unpleasant surprises for an opponent and only revealing them at the last moment at the trial) has long since passed: Nowlan v Marson Transport Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 116; [2001] NSWCA 346; particularly at [28]–[32], [40]–[46]; Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 80 at [60]. Heydon JA in Nowlan gave unqualified approval to the statement of Allsop J in White v Overland (2001) 67 ALD 731; [2001] FCA 1333 at [4] that: [I]t should always be recognised that in the propounding of issues for trial the parties should take steps to ensure that all relevant parties to the dispute are cognisant of what the issues are. Heydon JA at [127] observed that it is no longer open to practitioners, even practitioners in personal injury work, “to maintain poker faces, to keep their guards up at all times, and to let opponents who are proceeding in ignorance continue in that course”. [r 14.14.80] Failing to plead What follows from failing to plead a matter and therefore to put it in issue, will depend on the circumstances of each case, the importance of the issue and when it arises between the parties. If the issue first arises at or shortly before trial it may lead to a successful adjournment application by opponents with adverse costs orders or the inability to rely upon the matter without amendment. Perhaps worse still is that an appeal point may be taken: Bright v Sampson & Duncan Enterprises Pty Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 346. Where a particular relief or defence is not claimed a judge may still grant the relief or defence in an appropriate case: r 36.1. However, it is open to the parties by their conduct of the trial to consent to a widening or narrowing of the issues defined by the pleadings. Demonstration to an appellate court of how a trial was conducted depends on proof by affidavit, or on an admission, or on clear evidence in the transcript or in some other part of the record of the proceedings, or on an inference from the record: Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 78 ALJR 394; 204 ALR 258; [2004] HCA 6. A cause of action not clearly pleaded may be treated as failing to be pleaded; Ingot Capital Investment Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2008) 73 NSWLR 653; [2008] NSWCA 206. As Ipp JA explained at [358] “[i]f the plaintiff does not make clear that it is relying on a cause of action so made up, the defendant may be prejudiced. If so, the plaintiff will be precluded from relying on that cause of action”. The exercise of such a discretion is predicated upon fairness to the parties: Bellingen Shire Council v Colavon Pty Ltd (2012) 188 LGERA 169; [2012] NSWCA 34 at [24]. Where for example fraud is alleged by a plaintiff against a defendant and is sufficiently particularised in the statement of claim, the repetition of those particulars in any reply is unnecessary. Where there is a failure to observe the rule but it is not a matter of substance it may not result in shutting the party out from relief sought: Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279; 64 ALJR 244; 92 ALR 53. [r 14.14.100] Examples Apart from those matters expressly referred to in subr (3) any matter falling into subrr (1) and (2) must be specifically pleaded. These can include foreign law: Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491; 76 ALJR 551; 187 ALR 1; 35 MVR 1; [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-646; [2002] AIPC 91-786; 23 NSWCCR 207; [2002] HCA 10 and failure to mitigate damages: Plato Films Ltd v Speidel [1961] AC 1090. Where an express condition was raised at trial without having been covered in pleadings, this rule had applied and evidentiary material tending to establish the condition was improperly admitted: Bright v Sampson & Duncan Enterprises Pty Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 346. In negligence where a Civil Liability Act 2002 defence 488

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 3 – Form of pleading generally

[r 14.14.120]

r 14.14

is relied upon, it must be specifically plead; Sydney South West Area Health Service v MD (2009) 260 ALR 702; [2009] NSWCA 343 at [22]–[23]. An intention to plead the original publication in a defamation action and to seek to recover, as a consequence of that original publication, damage suffered by reason of republication or repetition, where the defendant is responsible for the republication, must be made clear in the statement of claim: Sims v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317. In Singleton v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 722, Hunt J considered that the plaintiff was now obliged by the former SCR Pt 15 r 13(1) to specifically plead a claim for aggravated compensatory damages. Where a plaintiff raises malice in reply to a defence of statutory fair comment etc, then although it may not “raise a matter of fact not arising out of the preceding pleading”, it may nevertheless take the defendant by surprise if not specifically pleaded. Therefore, although the plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of strict pleading issues, to lead evidence of malice under the joinder of issue, without pleading malice as an allegation of fact, nonetheless, he or she is required by the “surprise rule” to allege malice in her or his reply, and to give particulars of that allegation as required by r 15.4: Cawley v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 225. Further examples are discussed in the following paragraphs. [r 14.14.120]

Fraud

If any party intends to set up an allegation of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, then it must be clearly and specifically pleaded and particulars must be given. But failure to give proper particulars is, under SCA s 81, a mere irregularity, not invalidating the proceedings: Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 57 FCR 360. Such proceedings must be commenced by a statement of claim: r 6.3(c). An allegation of dishonesty must be pleaded clearly and with particularity. That is laid down by the rules and it is a well-recognised rule or practice. This does not import that the word “fraud” or the word “dishonesty” must necessarily be used. The facts alleged may sufficiently demonstrate that dishonesty is allegedly involved, but where the facts are complicated this may not be so clear, and in such a case it is incumbent upon the pleader to make it clear when dishonesty is alleged. If he or she uses language which is equivocal, rendering it doubtful whether he or she is in fact relying on the alleged dishonesty of the transaction, this will be fatal; the allegation of its dishonest nature will not have been pleaded with sufficient clarity: per Buckley LJ in Belmont Finance Corp Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd [1979] Ch 250 at 268. Where for example a defendant’s case is that a plaintiff is lying about the circumstances of an injury it is not incumbent upon the respondent to plead fraud in answer to the plaintiff’s claim: Jazairy v Najjar (1998) 27 MVR 498; [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-476 at 506 to 508; Ghazal v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 at 347. However, the court pointed out in Jazairy that there is a duty, in fairness, to confront a plaintiff with such a contention before it is proper to rely upon it. In Ghazal, Mahoney JA at 347 emphasised the necessity to make clear at an appropriate time that an allegation of the nature of fraud is to be made and that it will be a real issue at the trial. See further Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 80.

Legal practitioners raising allegations of fraud need specific instructions and an appropriate evidentiary foundation: see Ghazal at 348-349. But a pleader is not obliged to conduct a mini-trial in her or his mind to reach a conclusion that the allegations would on the balance of probabilities succeed. It is sufficient if the material provides a reasonable basis for the allegation if nothing else is proved: Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 57 FCR 360. An application to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud should be made in separate proceedings (Spies v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 24 NSWLR 691) with the standard of proof appropriate to so serious an allegation that the defendant or someone for whom the defendant was responsible was guilty of fraud. Moreover, the plaintiff must also prove that the evidence of fraud was discovered for the first time after the date of the impeached judgment; and must show that it is reasonably clear that this newly discovered evidence would have produced an opposite result to that obtained at the earlier hearing: per Brownie J, Rahisi Pty Ltd © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

489

UCPR Parts 11-20

In Yeshiva Properties No 1 Pty Ltd v Joan Marshall [2005] NSWCA 23, Bryson JA stated that claims alleging accessory liability are close to a claim of fraud, with knowledge and intention of central importance. Further, where an equitable claim is based on alleged dishonesty, it is inappropriate that there should be anything less than a fully distinct statement in the pleading of what it is in substance that is charged against the alleged accessory.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.14

[r 14.14.120]

v Banzato [1996] ASC 56-346 referring to Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 at 538-539 and Monroe Schneider Assocs (Inc) v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 37 FCR 234 at 238-243. Where fraud or dishonesty is alleged under Corporations Law, the requirements of r 14.14 may be dispensed with if specifically pleading a statutory defence could lead to self-incrimination; MacDonald v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2007) 73 NSWLR 612; [2007] NSWCA 304. However, Mason P stressed at [54] that “dispensation should only go so far as is necessary to serve the privilege and the interests it protects”. See also r 14.2. [r 14.14.140]

Statute of limitation

Any statute of limitation, which is relied upon by the defendant, is a matter requiring specific pleading. Even where the limitation statute extinguishes (and does not merely bar) the cause of action after the prescribed period, the fact of the extinction must, nevertheless, be pleaded under this rule or in proceedings commenced by summons in the Supreme Court, under r 14.29 and also under Limitation Act 1969, s 68A: compare Proctor v Jetway Aviation Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 166. [r 14.14.160]

Voluntary assumption of risk

A plea of voluntary assumption of risk – volenti non fit injuria – must be specifically made whether relied upon by the defendant, or by the plaintiff. [r 14.14.180]

Contributory negligence

Contributory negligence must be specifically pleaded by a defendant and particulars of contributory negligence must be given when it is pleaded by any party. Further regard should be had to r 14.16. Contributory negligence is not a defence; it is a plea that goes to reduction of damages: Benjamin v Currie [1958] VR 259 at 263. The effect of a successful plea of contributory negligence is set out in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 9 reproduced in the Supreme Court Practice volume of this service. But s 9 does not operate to defeat any defence arising under a contract (s 9(2)) and limited liability provisions in a contract or enactment may impose restrictions on the amount recoverable (s 9(3)). If the defendant fails to plead contributory negligence, then the court has no jurisdiction to make a finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff and reduce her or his damages accordingly: Fookes v Slaytor [1978] 1 WLR 1293; [1979] 1 All ER 137. [r 14.14.200]

Res judicata; issue estoppel

Allegations of fact raised to establish common law or equitable estoppel must be specifically pleaded so as not to infringe the “surprise rule”. In Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532, Dixon J distinguished res judicata from issue estoppel as follows: in the first the very right or cause of action claimed or put in suit has in the former proceedings passed into judgment, so that it is merged and has no longer an independent existence, while in the second, for the purpose of some other claim or cause of action, a state of fact or law is alleged or denied the existence of which is a matter necessarily decided by the prior judgment, decree or order. Reliance on the same cause of action in successive proceedings will ordinarily raise the same issues, so that if a litigant is defeated by res judicata an issue estoppel will also be present. But the converse is not necessarily true: an issue estoppel may defeat a litigant without res judicata doing so; cf the passages from the judgment of Dixon J in Blair v Curran; per Lindgren J, (Wong’s case). Where the earlier proceeding is dismissed insofar as it is based on a particular cause of action, that cause of action does not merge in the judgment and therefore is not a case of res judicata: Macquarie Bank Ltd v National Mutual Life Assn of Australasia Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 543 at 546 and Wong’s case at [46]. A determination of costs questions does not involve a regime fundamentally different to determination of issues necessary to establish a cause of action: Clancy v Santoro [1999] 3 VR 783 per Ashley J at [58]. The doctrine of res judicata is concerned with facts and not reasons and therefore, for its purposes, one is restricted to the examination of the plaintiff’s pleadings and the court’s orders: Pollnow v Armstrong [2000] NSWCA 245. 490

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 3 – Form of pleading generally

[r 14.14.220]

r 14.14

A judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or law disposes once and for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between parties or their privies: Murphy v Abi-Saab (1995) 37 NSWLR 280 (CA) at 287–288 (Murphy’s case) referring to Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251; 74 A Crim R 462 at 261 and Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 531-533. Res judicata and issue estoppel do not apply unless the parties in both proceedings are identical: Tedeschi v Legal Services Commission (1997) 43 NSWLR 20; Palmbay Nominees Pty Ltd v Fowler [2003] WASCA 217. Compare Moy v Warringah Council (2004) 142 A Crim R 577; 133 LGERA 49; [2004] NSWCCA 77 (application of the extended doctrine of res judicata on issue estoppel in respect of a different party where the question in the second proceeding is the same as that decided in the first). Query whether a judgment in default of appearance which is not made on the merits gives rise to a plea of res judicata or issue estoppel: Palmbay Nominees at [118]–[120]. In Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575; 77 ALJR 255; [2002] HCA 56 at [36], the court said: the common law favours the resolution of particular disputes between the parties by the bringing of a single action rather than successive proceedings. The principle of res judicata, issue estoppel, and what has come to be known as Anshun estoppel, all find their roots in that policy … It seems that res judicata and issue estoppel apply where the earlier proceeding was in the nature of an application for judicial review of an administrative action and do so independently of any exercise of discretion: Wong’s case at [41]. Only a decision about a matter which is necessary to decide can create an issue estoppel. A practical test of whether a decision is fundamental is to ask whether it is possible to appeal against the finding: Murphy’s case, at 288; also Minero Pty Ltd v Redero Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Santow J, 29 July 1998). It seems that a referee’s determination under SCR Pt 72 which has not yet been adopted by the court is not a determination giving rise to res judicata or estoppel in the Anshun sense: Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (2001) 10 BPR 18593; [2001] NSWSC 154 at [81], [82]. Where a determination is supplanted by an appellate court’s decision any estoppel arising from that earlier decision will not run because it is the latter court’s determination which disposes once and for all of any issue of fact which might be an ultimate fact fundamental to the decision: Bankstown Football Club Ltd v CIC Insurance Ltd (1998) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-406 at 74,458. But an issue decided in an inferior court within jurisdiction, subject to appeal, can create an issue estoppel binding on the superior court and an attempt to re-litigate simple issues of fact can be an abuse of process even if an issue estoppel did not exist: Tiufino v Warland (2000) 50 NSWLR 104; [2000] NSWCA 110. It seems that in Australia even when the court reaches a mistaken conclusion, its findings cannot be litigated again, but in such a case, a closer examination of what is actually decided may be called for: Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21385; [2003] NSWSC 600 and commentary at (2003) 77 ALJ 584. The decision of a State administrative tribunal such as the Industrial Relations Commission may create an issue estoppel if the same issue is raised in later litigation: Lambidis v Commissioner of Police (1995) 37 NSWLR 320; 12 NSWCCR 225; Miller v University of New South Wales (2003) 132 FCR 147; [2003] FCAFC 180 at [65] and [5.1.56A]. But the decision of an administrative tribunal in respect of a “jurisdictional fact” is neither conclusive nor binding: Kowalski v Trustee, Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd Staff Superannuation Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 18 at [13]. An issue decided in a case between a third party and an insurer exercising the right of subrogation may not bind the insured: Linsley v Petrie [1998] 1 VR 427; (1998) 9 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-349. The Anshun principle

A person may be estopped from raising a claim or defence, which, although not litigated in previous proceedings, could have been raised, if the court in the exercise of a broad discretion determines that it is unreasonable for her or him not to have raised the claim in the previous proceedings: Boles v Esanda Finance Corp Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 666 (Boles’ case). Issue estoppel is available in subsequent proceedings to a party who became a third party to original proceedings under SCA s 78, but who was not sued by the plaintiff in the original proceedings: Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 5. Boles’ case applied the Anshun principle (Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; 55 ALJR 621; 36 ALR 3). The Anshun principle is not one that can be applied mechanically and there may be circumstances where a party may justifiably refrain from litigating an issue in one proceeding, yet wish to litigate the issue in other proceedings: Doyle CJ in Pertsinidis v Australian Central Credit Union Ltd (2001) 80 SASR 76; [2001] SASC 244 at [38]. The mere fact that the matter could have been raised does not mean it should have been raised (for the operation of the principle). Rather, it has to be so relevant as to make it unreasonable not to raise it: © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

491

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 14.14.220]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.15

[r 14.14.220]

Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski (2010) 75 NSWLR 245; [2010] NSWCA 33 per Allsop P at [4].Where the Anshun estoppel test is met, the court has a discretion, where special circumstances exist, to allow the later proceeding to continue; Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 204 ALR 722; 81 ALD 109; [2004] FCA 51 at [49]. The Anshun principle does not necessarily prevent a plaintiff who was successful against the same defendant in earlier proceedings in respect of the same subject matter from issuing fresh proceedings to litigate an issue which could have been raised in earlier proceedings and which will not result in a judgment which conflicts with the judgment in the earlier proceedings: Hayes v Development Assessment Commission (No 4) (1997) 95 LGERA 7. Compare R v Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 619; [2001] VSCA 140 (different species of relief; fresh proceedings on same cause of action where earlier proceedings went to trial); C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Noon [2011] NSWCA 397. The Anshun principle may only apply to cross-claims in exceptional cases: Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 51 FCR 529; 123 ALR 642 at 649. It may be appropriate to apply the Anshun principle where a cross-claim overlaps the facts of a principal claim. But where there are substantial additional facts, a question of degree arises and separate proceedings may be indicated: Ling v Commonwealth (1996) 68 FCR 180; 139 ALR 159. The Anshun principle is not applicable where the previous proceedings were in a court outside Australia and where that court did not decide the issue which was possible for it to determine and the plaintiff is suing on a personal equity in a New South Wales court: National Commercial Bank v Wimborne (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 12 March 1992). In Murphy v Abi-Saab (1995) 37 NSWLR 280 Gleeson CJ at 287 considered that it was unnecessary to decide whether the so called Anshun estoppel is simply one example of issue estoppel. As to the similarity and differences between estoppel by record and the Anshun principle, see Macquarie Bank Ltd v National Mutual Life Assn of Australasia Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 543 at 558 and Minero Pty Ltd v Redero Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Santow J, 29 July 1998). Further regard can be had to Justice KR Handley, “Anshun Today” (1997) 71 ALJ 934; the Hon Mr Justice Ormiston, “Abuse of process, Anshun and the Criminal Law – a commentary” (1997) 71 ALJ 942; and, Justice Beaumont, “Commentary on Anshun Today” (1997) 71 ALJ 950. In Mortimer v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 450, McClellan J held that the Anshun principle did not apply to a SCR Pt 31 determination – Separate Decision of Questions: Consolidation because “an Anshun estoppel could not arise to preclude argument with respect to an interlocutory issue which was not but could have been raised”: at [28]. It seems that the Anshun principle applies to issues relevant to the question of costs which should have been raised before a costs assessor, but a costs assessor has no jurisdiction to hear a cross-claim based on negligence or to award damages: Ryan v Hansen (2000) 49 NSWLR 184; [2000] NSWSC 354, Kirby J at [42] and [49]. On an Anshun estoppel appeal the standard of appellate review is that of Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; 53 ALJR 293, not House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; 9 ABC 117: CG Maloney Pty Ltd v Noon [2011] NSWCA 397. [r 14.14.240]

Estoppel; statutory scheme

An estoppel will not operate to defeat a statutory scheme which obliges the liquidator to distribute the real assets among the true creditors and it cannot operate to give an entitlement which is denied by the combined terms of the Companies (Vic) Code and the Building Societies Act 1986 (Vic): Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15; 67 ALJR 961; 117 ALR 321. Proprietary estoppel cannot bind the Crown where the representation is beyond its statutory powers: New South Wales v Scharer (2003) 131 LGERA 208; [2003] NSWCA 328. 14.15

Pleadings concerning possession of land

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 15)

(1) This rule applies to proceedings on a claim for possession of land. (2) The plaintiff must plead specifically the following matters: (a) the nature of any instrument (such as a certificate of title, conveyance, will, trust instrument, mortgage or lease) from which the plaintiff’s claim is alleged to be derived, 492

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 3 – Form of pleading generally

[r 14.16.1000]

r 14.17

(b)

if any such instrument is alleged to impose an obligation on the defendant whose breach has given rise to the plaintiff’s claim (such as an obligation to pay money to the plaintiff), the existence of that obligation and the occurrence of any such breach, (c) if any such instrument is alleged to confer a right on the plaintiff that vests at a specified time or is contingent on the occurrence of a specified event, the existence of that right and the occurrence of any such time or event, (d) if the plaintiff’s right to possession arises from the defendant’s failure to pay money to the plaintiff, particulars of the date on which the failure began, the amount of money currently unpaid and the method by which that amount has been calculated, (e) if the plaintiff’s right to possession arises from any other act or omission by the defendant, particulars of the date on which the act or omission occurred and the nature of the act or omission, (f) if the plaintiff’s right to possession is not exercisable until the plaintiff has given notice to the defendant of the plaintiff’s intention to exercise that right, the date on which, and the terms in which, such notice was given. (3) The defendant must plead specifically every ground of defence on which he or she relies, including: (a) any claim for relief against forfeiture, and (b) any claim for rectification, and (c) any claim for relief under the Contracts Review Act 1980, and it is not sufficient for a defendant to merely state that he or she is in possession of the land (whether personally or by a tenant) and relies on that possession.

RULE 14.15 COMMENTARY [r 14.15.40]

Operation

This rule expands the matters that must be pleaded in proceedings for the possession of land, to make mandatory those matters which should have always been pleaded. As such particular breaches of proper pleading in possession claims will be express, avoiding unnecessary argument and facilitating the “overriding purpose” in CPA s 56. See further Annex 1 of the Supreme Court Common Law Practice Note 6, headed “Supreme Court Short Form of Statement of Claim for Possession [and Debt] against a Borrower/Mortgagor” and which refers to this rule. 14.16 Defendant’s pleading of contributory negligence (cf SCR Part 15, rule 14; DCR Part 9, rule 10)

A defendant who relies on contributory negligence must plead specifically the contributory negligence.

RULE 14.16 COMMENTARY [r 14.16.1000]

References

14.17 New matter may be raised in pleading (cf SCR Part 15, rule 16; DCR Part 9, rule 11)

A party may plead any matter even if the matter has arisen after the commencement of the proceedings.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

493

UCPR Parts 11-20

Further regard may be had to the notes on contributory negligence in [r 14.14.180]. Particulars must be given: r 15.5.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.18

[r 14.17.40]

RULE 14.17 COMMENTARY [r 14.17.40]

Operation

Matter arising after commencement may be pleaded. In this rule, “matter” does not extend to include a “cause of action”; “the cause of action in respect of which a litigant approached the court of justice must be complete at the time when he or she issues the process”: per Lord Hanworth MR in Re Keystone Knitting Mills’ Trademark [1929] 1 Ch 92 at 103; Baldry v Jackson [1976] 2 NSWLR 415. But this principle does not alter the well-established right to plead by cross-claim a cause of action which has arisen since the proceedings were commenced: Baldry v Jackson at 419. 14.18 Pleadings to be consistent as to allegations of fact (cf SCR Part 15, rule 17; DCR Part 9, rule 12)

(1) A party must not in any pleading make an allegation of fact, or raise any ground or claim, inconsistent with any of his or her previous pleadings. (2) Subrule (1) does not affect the right of a party to make allegations of fact, or raise grounds or claims, in the alternative.

RULE 14.18 COMMENTARY [r 14.18.40]

Operation

As the rule makes clear, facts and claims in the alternative do not involve a departure: Suvaal v Cessnock City Council (2003) 77 ALJR 1449; [2003] HCA 41. The rule against departure has no application to pleadings in separate proceedings and therefore does not prevent a party from pleading in a counterclaim something inconsistent with what he or she has pleaded in her or his defence: Northern Territory Housing Commission v Territory Bricks Pty Ltd (1983) 71 FLR 273. See further Schmierer v Keong [2005] NSWSC 1081. 14.19 Pleadings may raise points of law (cf SCR Part 15, rule 18; DCR Part 9, rule 13)

A pleading may raise any point of law.

RULE 14.19 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 14.19.40] Objection in point of law ......................................................................................................................... [r 14.19.60]

[r 14.19.40]

Operation

If the point of law in question requires material facts to be proved and accepted by the court, those material facts must be stated in the pleading and it is inadequate to simply refer to the particular statute: Benton v Scott’s Refrigerated Freightways [2008] NSWCA 143. [r 14.19.60]

Objection in point of law

A party may allege that the pleading of the opposite party is in some way legally defective, for example that it contains a misinterpretation of a statute, or that it discloses no good cause of action, or ground of defence, set-off, cross-claim, reply and so on. Where costs can be saved by a point of law which requires serious argument and consideration, being disposed of before trial, the point should be raised in the pleading and application should be made under r 28.2 – Separation of questions – for the trial of this point as a preliminary issue. An alternative procedure for determining such questions is by making a declaration under SCA s 75: Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Law Society (NSW) [1976] 1 NSWLR 686.

494

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 4 – Verification of pleadings

[r 14.22.20]

14.20

r 14.22

Pleading the general issue

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 27)

A pleading may not plead the general issue.

RULE 14.20 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 14.20.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 14.20.40]

[r 14.20.20]

Comparison

There is no significant change from the effect of the former rules as the District Court Act 1973 s 181 and Sch 2 completed the process of repealing various statutory provisions for pleading the general issue. [r 14.20.40]

Operation

Pleading the general issue had allowed a defendant – usually a government authority – to deny the whole of the plaintiff’s claim. 14.21

Pleadings concerning claims under Property (Relationships) Act 1984

A pleading with respect to a claim for relief under section 20(1) of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 must plead specifically any contribution referred to in that subsection on which the plaintiff relies.

DIVISION 4 – VERIFICATION OF PLEADINGS 14.22 Pleadings in proceedings for imprisonment, death and personal injury

defamation,

malicious

prosecution,

false

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 23(16) and (17))

(1) This Division does not apply to pleadings in proceedings for the recovery of damages for: (a) defamation, or (b) malicious prosecution, or (c) false imprisonment, or (d) trespass to the person, or (e) death, or (f) personal injury. (2) Despite subrule (1), the court may order that this Division is to apply to any or all pleadings in any such proceedings (including pleadings filed before the order is made) with such variations (if any) as the court may direct.

RULE 14.22 COMMENTARY Comparison

The exclusion from this Division of those matters in subr (1) was formerly within SCR Pt 15 r 23(16) and (17).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

495

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 14.22.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.23

14.23

[r 14.23.20]

Verification of certain pleadings

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 23(1) – (7); DCR Part 10, rule 2(1) – (6))

(1) This rule applies to proceedings in the Supreme Court and the District Court. (2) A party’s pleading (including any amendment of the pleading) must be verified by affidavit. Note: See rule 35.3 as to who may make such an affidavit. (3) The affidavit verifying a pleading must state: (a) as to any allegations of fact in the pleading, that the deponent believes that the allegations are true, and (b) as to any allegations of fact that the pleading denies, that the deponent believes that the allegations are untrue, and (c) as to any allegations of fact that the pleading does not admit, that after reasonable inquiry the deponent does not know whether or not the allegations are true. (4) If the deponent is unable to make an affidavit that complies with subrule (3) in relation to all parts of a pleading, the affidavit may comply with so much of that subrule as can be complied with and state why the affidavit does not comply with the remainder of that subrule. (5) Subject to any order of the court, an affidavit made in accordance with subrule (4) is taken to comply with subrule (3). (6) Unless the court otherwise orders, the affidavit verifying a pleading must be subscribed to the pleading. [Subr (6) subst Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[11]] [R 14.23 am Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 14.23 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 14.23.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 14.23.40]

[r 14.23.20]

Comparison

There is no significant change from the effect of the former rules though those who may make an affidavit verifying the pleading are now found under r 35.3. The express availability under the former subr (8) to apply to the court for verification or further verification of the pleading is now provided for under r 14.24. [r 14.23.40]

Operation

The nature of the verification required by Pt 14 Div 4 is limited, by r 14.23, to verification that allegations of fact or denials of fact are, to the belief of the deponent, true: Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 503. A non-admission will traverse the allegation of fact: r 14.26. Failure to verify a defence in accordance with this rule may mean default: r 16.2. There is nothing inconsistent with the verification of a pleading in permitting an amendment withdrawing an admission: Demasi v Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, McClelland CJ in Eq, 14 June 1995); Squire v Squire [1972] Ch 391. Service on the defendant of an unverified statement of claim containing a deliberately false material assertion did not contain an express representation by the plaintiff that the facts were true and correct and did not, of itself, constitute an actus reus for the purposes of criminal liability: Jamieson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 574; 67 A Crim R 150. The function of an unverified statement of claim in the District Court is not an evidentiary one but to identify issues of fact for determination at the trial: Dow Corning Australia Pty Ltd v Paton [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-485. Further regard may be had to Jamieson v The Queen. 496

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 5 – General

[r 14.24.40]

14.24

r 14.25

Court may order pleadings to be further verified

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 23(8) – (14); DCR Part 10, rule 2(7) – (10))

(1) Within 14 days after service of an affidavit under rule 14.23 in relation to a pleading, a party may apply to the court for a direction that the party pleading verify or further verify the pleading and for such other directions as may be appropriate. (2) If a party applies to the court under subrule (1), the court may direct the party pleading to file such further affidavit (if any), by such deponent and as to such facts as the court may determine. (3) The court may, by order, grant leave to a party to file, instead of an affidavit complying with rule 14.23(3), an affidavit by such deponent and as to such facts as the court may determine.

RULE 14.24 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 14.24.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 14.24.40]

[r 14.24.20]

Comparison

This rule was formerly contained within SCR Pt 15 r 23(8)–(10). An application under the rule without having served notice of the motion is no longer expressly provided for. [r 14.24.40]

Operation

An application under the rule should be by Notice of Motion with supporting affidavit – Pt 18.

DIVISION 5 – GENERAL 14.25

Defence of tender

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 24; DCR Part 10, rule 1A; LCR Part 9, rule 1)

(1) If, in proceedings on a liquidated claim, a defence of tender before commencement of the proceedings is pleaded, the tender is not available as a defence unless and until the amount has been paid into court. (2) In the case of a tender to which section 224 of the Customs Act 1901 of the Commonwealth applies: (a) subrule (1) does not apply to a defence that pleads the tender, and (b) the amount tendered may be paid into court when the defence is filed. (3) On paying the money into court, the defendant must file notice of the payment into court and serve the notice on each other party to the proceedings. (4) The plaintiff may accept the money by filing a notice of acceptance. (5) If the plaintiff accepts the money, the proceedings are to be stayed in relation to the defence of tender. UCPR Parts 11-20

(6) Whether or not accepted, the money must not be paid out except by order of the court.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

497

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.26

[r 14.25.40]

RULE 14.25 COMMENTARY [r 14.25.40]

Operation

Where a creditor sues for a liquidated amount, the defence of tender may be pleaded by the defendant if he or she made a valid tender of the amount before commencement of proceedings and is only available in answer to a liquidated claim. Thus, it is a good defence to an action to recover a debt: Re Mona [1894] P 265; but it cannot be pleaded as a defence to a claim for unliquidated damages: Davys v Richardson (1888) 21 QBD 202 at 205 (re damages for wrongful dismissal). Where the plaintiff’s liquidated claim is accompanied by a claim for an order for interest up to judgment, it would seem that the defendant who pleads tender would not need to pay into court any sum on account of the interest claimed. This is because, if the defence of tender is successful, the defendant will normally be entitled to judgment, including judgment for the costs of the action: Dixon v Clark (1848) 136 ER 919; 5 CB 365 at 377; Griffıth v Ystradyfodwg School Board (1890) 24 QBD 307. Further, if the defence succeeds, the plaintiff should not recover interest for the period after tender because the defendant will have established that “the plaintiff had no right to bring his action”: Griffıths v School Board of Ystradyfodwg at 308. However, quaere whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest for the period between the accrual of the action and the tender. If the defence of tender fails, then the plaintiff will be entitled to a judgment for a sum of money, and the court may award interest under SCA s 94; DCA s 83A. Where a defendant wishes to rely on the defence of tender, he or she should in her or his defence, plead the fact of tender before commencement of proceedings, state the fact of payment into court, and the amount; and then pay the money into court, with her or his defence; and then give notice to the plaintiff of the payment in. 14.26

Admission and traverse from pleadings

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 20, Part 63, rule 9; DCR Part 9, rule 14, Part 45, rule 9)

(1) An allegation of fact made by a party in a pleading is taken to be admitted by any opposite party required to plead in response unless: (a) in the pleading in response, the opposite party traverses the allegation, or (b) a joinder of issues under rule 14.27 operates as a denial of the allegation. (2) A traverse may be made by denial or by a statement of non-admission, either expressly or by necessary implication, and either generally or as to any particular allegation. (3) Despite subrule (1), a pleading in response to a pleading that alleges the suffering of damage or an amount of damages is taken to traverse the allegation unless it specifically admits the allegation. (4) Subrule (1) does not apply to an opposite party who is a person under a legal incapacity. [Subr (4) subst Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[12]] [R 14.26 am Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 14.26 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 14.26.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 14.26.40] Admissions ............................................................................................................................................. [r 14.26.60] Negative allegations ............................................................................................................................... [r 14.26.80] Confession and avoidance ................................................................................................................... [r 14.26.100]

[r 14.26.20]

Comparison

There is no significant change from the effect of the former rules, though this rule incorporates the former SCR r 63.9 in subr (4).

498

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 5 – General

[r 14.27.40] [r 14.26.40]

r 14.27

Operation

A traverse may be made by a denial or a statement of non-admission: the distinction between the two which is usually observed, is that a party denies any matter which, if it had occurred, would have been within her or his own knowledge, while he or she refuses to admit matters which are alleged to have happened without her or his knowledge. A statement of non-admission commonly indicates that the disputed fact is not within the party’s knowledge: Greater Taree City Council v Murowski Investments Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 258. [r 14.26.60]

Admissions

A further reason why pleadings should be clear is to gain the benefit of a non-traverse as an implied admission under the rule. However, the court is not bound to accept them: Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) Pty Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 147; [2004] NSWSC 967 at [17], reversed on other grounds Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 1; [2005] NSWCA 319. The rule does not apply to an allegation of law as opposed to one of fact. A traverse may be implied as well as express, and therefore there is no implied admission where a traverse is made by necessary implication. As to applications for judgment on admissions, r 17.7. [r 14.26.80]

Negative allegations

A traverse of a negative allegation, that is a traverse involving a double negative, may amount to the setting up of an affirmative case by the defendant, in which case he or she may be required to give particulars: Candler v South Australian Institute of Technology (1973) 6 SASR 162. [r 14.26.100]

Confession and avoidance

A pleading is said to be in confession and avoidance when it confesses (ie admits) the truth of an allegation of fact contained in the preceding pleading, but avoids it (ie deprives it of effect) by alleging some new matter which, as a general rule, must be specifically pleaded: r 14.14. 14.27

Joinder of issue

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 21; DCR Part 9, rule 15)

(1) A pleading may expressly join issue on a previous pleading. (2) If there is no reply by a plaintiff to a defence, there is an implied joinder of issue on that defence. (3) If there is no answer by the opposite party to a reply or subsequent pleading, there is an implied joinder of issue on the reply or subsequent pleading. (4) There can be no joinder of issue, express or implied, on a statement of claim. (5) An implied joinder of issue on a pleading operates as a denial of every allegation of fact made in the pleading. (6) An express joinder of issue on a pleading operates as a denial of every allegation of fact made in the pleading other than an allegation that is expressly admitted.

RULE 14.27 COMMENTARY Operation

Where a defendant has cross-claimed against the plaintiff a defence to the cross-claim must be filed or default risked: r 9.5.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

499

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 14.27.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.28

14.28

[r 14.28.20]

Circumstances in which court may strike out pleadings

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 26; DCR Part 9, rule 17; LCR Part 8, rule 3)

(1) The court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the whole or any part of a pleading be struck out if the pleading: (a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading, or (b) has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings, or (c) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. (2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1).

RULE 14.28 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 14.28.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 14.28.40] Interlocutory or final ................................................................................................................................ [r 14.28.60] No reasonable cause of action or defence ............................................................................................ [r 14.28.80] Amendments ......................................................................................................................................... [r 14.28.100] Embarrassment .................................................................................................................................... [r 14.28.120] Abuse of process .................................................................................................................................. [r 14.28.140] Estoppels .............................................................................................................................................. [r 14.28.160] Inherent power ...................................................................................................................................... [r 14.28.180] Striking out statement of claim ............................................................................................................. [r 14.28.200] Striking out particulars .......................................................................................................................... [r 14.28.220] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 14.28.1000]

[r 14.28.20]

Comparison

There is no significant change from the effect of the former rules which were entitled “Embarrassment, etc”. [r 14.28.40]

Operation

The rule empowers the court to strike out any pleading which does not conform with the overriding rule that a pleading must contain only material facts to support a party’s claim or defence, and must not therefore, in whole or part, be such as to disclose no reasonable case or cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay or otherwise be an abuse of the process of the court: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Thai (1993) 26 ATR 108; 93 ATC 4530; Northam v Favelle Favco Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 7 March 1995). Although the rules state that the order may be made at any stage of the proceedings, still the application should always be made promptly. This is particularly so where the defendant, in seeking a summary disposal of the action, not only makes application under this rule for striking out the whole of the statement of claim, but also seeks stay or dismissal of the action either pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court, or under r 13.4. Where it appears that it will be impossible for the plaintiff to amend or plead a reasonable cause of action, the more appropriate course is to dismiss the proceedings under r 13.4, rather than striking them out under r 14.28, though prudent practice demands the latter is also sought in the alternative: Waters v Commonwealth [2012] NSWSC 790. Regard should be had to CPA Pt 6 – Conduct of court proceedings and UCPR r 2 – Case management and the annotations thereto. [r 14.28.60]

Interlocutory or final

An order to strike out a statement of claim is interlocutory; the action remains on foot and the rights of the parties are not thereby finally disposed of; but an order to dismiss an action is final: Florida Investments Pty Ltd v Milstern (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1972] WAR 148. 500

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 5 – General

[r 14.28.140] [r 14.28.80]

r 14.28

No reasonable cause of action or defence

Successful applications relying upon no reasonable cause of action or defence must pass the General Steel test (the proceedings are obviously so untenable that it cannot possibly succeed) General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; 38 ALJR 253; [1965] ALR 636. Likewise the power to order summary judgment must be exercised with “exceptional caution” and “should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried … Nowhere is that need for exceptional caution more important than in a case where the ultimate outcome turns upon the resolution of some disputed issue or issues of fact. In such a case, it is essential that great care be exercised to ensure that under the guise of achieving expeditious finality a plaintiff is not improperly deprived of his opportunity for the trial of his case by the appointed tribunal”: Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886; 116 ALR 545; [1993] Aust Torts Reports 62,435 (81-236) at 602. The result is predicated on the fact if it were otherwise the court would need to prematurely try the action: Remington v Scoles [1897] 2 Ch 1 at 7 and applies whether a question of fact or law: Ion v Danutz [2012] NSWSC 941. [r 14.28.100]

Amendments

If the pleading can be amended to overcome the defect leave can be granted to amend: Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 and further regard may be had to r 19. Hence, where possible, a common order following a successful application under the rule to strike out a pleading, is to give leave to file and serve a further pleading by a particular date and failing that the proceedings are to stand dismissed. [r 14.28.120]

Embarrassment

A pleading may be embarrassing even though it contains allegations of material facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, if the material facts alleged are couched in expressions which leave difficulties or doubts about recognising or piecing together what is referred to: Northam v Favelle Favco Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 7 March 1995, 6301 of 1992). As observed in McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424, although the pleading of a conclusion may, in some circumstances constitute a material fact, nevertheless, the pleading will be embarrassing if allegations are made at such a level of generality that the defendant does not know in advance the case it has to meet: Charlie Carter Pty Ltd v Shop Distributive & Allied Employees Assn (WA) (1987) 13 FCR 413 at 417-418. In such a case, the appropriate remedy is to strike out the pleading rather than to order the provision of particulars, as it is not the function of particulars to take the place of the necessary averments in a pleading: Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 109 at 112-114. Abuse of process

The expression “abuse of process” is used when a litigant engages in improper procedure and misuses the processes of the court: Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1982] AC 529. It is not essential to the exercise of the jurisdiction that there be an improper act as well as an improper purpose, and the improper purpose need not be the sole purpose of the moving party; the predominant purpose is the criterion: Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431; 107 ALR 635; 34 AILR 373. The filing of a statement of claim may be an abuse of process because of its contents, untenability or for other reasons: Ford v Nagle [2004] NSWCA 33. Amendments brought for improper purpose to avoid prior findings of court constituted an abuse of process: Marshall v Fleming [2012] NSWSC 698; destruction of evidence: Clark v NSW [2012] NSWCA 139 at [84]–[108]; where res judicata applies: Ayoub v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [2011] NSWSC 606. In Rahman v Dubs [2012] NSWSC 1065, Garling J examines the relevant authorities over the last 100 years. A defence which traverses a number of facts which are not really in dispute, is not an abuse of process, as the defendant is entitled to put the plaintiff to proof of the facts alleged by her or him in her or his statement of claim. But such a defence may be struck out as an abuse of process where the defendant is seeking to relitigate questions which have already been determined in other proceedings to which he or she was a party: Casey v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1981] 1 NSWLR 305; State Bank of New South Wales v Stenhouse Ltd [1997] Aust Torts Reports 81-423; Cleary v Jeans (2006) 65 NSWLR 355; [2006] NSWCA ; Five D Pty Ltd v Impact Building Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 993 (party not involved in earlier proceedings). © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

501

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 14.28.140]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.29

[r 14.28.160]

[r 14.28.160]

Estoppels

Pleadings can and will be struck out where the pleading party infringes one of the various estoppels or brings a cause of action which has already been judicially determined. See the annotations under r 14.14 beginning [r 14.14.200]. [r 14.28.180]

Inherent power

Apart from the rules, the superior courts have an inherent power to strike out proceedings which are an abuse of its process: Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665; Bik v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 679. This inherent power is not confined to pleadings, but extends to all forms of court process, for example a subpoena duces tecum: Bank of New South Wales v Withers (1981) 52 FLR 207; 35 ALR 21; R v Barton [1981] 2 NSWLR 414. Further regard may be had to British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (2002) 7 VR 524; [2002] VSCA 197 (discovery, destruction of documents by defendant; when order striking out defence may be made). [r 14.28.200]

Striking out statement of claim

A statement of claim should not be struck out unless it is clear that it shows no reasonably arguable cause of action and if that conclusion cannot be firmly reached the action should be allowed to proceed: Florida Investments Pty Ltd v Milstern (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1972] WAR 148; Transocean Capital Pty Ltd v AFSIG Pty Ltd (2006) 202 FLR 270; [2006] NSWSC 806. A statement of claim should not be struck out, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the rules of court as to pleadings, if it is possible to salvage something out of the plaintiff’s “messy verbiage” which would support a cause of action: Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1 QB 443 discussed in Egan v Minister for Transport (1976) 14 SASR 445. In Turner v The Bulletin Newspaper Co Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 69; [1974] 3 ALR 491; [1974] HCA 25 (noted in 48 ALJ 447), the majority of the High Court, in considering the equivalent Victorian rule O 19 r 27, took the view that the power given by the rule extended only to the removal from a pleading of “objectionable matter” for the reasons given in the rule; but the power does not extend to dismissing the action or making an order for judgment; and while the whole of the pleading may be struck out pursuant to the rule, when this is done, leave to replead ought to be granted. A statement of claim issued before the cause of action is complete discloses no reasonable cause of action and accordingly may be struck out under the rule. Baldry v Jackson [1976] 1 NSWLR 19; and the same principle applies to cross-claims. However, leave may be granted to bring a further cross-claim: Servcorp (Aust) Pty Ltd v Abgarus Pty Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 281. [r 14.28.220]

Striking out particulars

When particulars are delivered they are to be treated as a component part of the pleading (though not pleaded to: r 15), and become subject to the rules of pleading; and they may be ordered to be struck out as being inadequate or irrelevant to the issue or because they tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay a fair trial of the action: per Walters J in Minchin v Adamson (1975) 10 SASR 119 at 122. [r 14.28.1000]

References

Compare r 13.4 – Summary stay or dismissal; r 4.15 – Court’s power to deal with scandalous matter in documents; CPA Pt 6 – Conduct of court proceedings. 14.29

Defence of extinction of right or title

(cf SCR Part 5, rule 5B)

For the purposes of section 68A of the Limitation Act 1969, a claim by the defendant that a right or title has been extinguished under Division 1 of Part 4 of that Act may be made by affidavit or by notice.

502

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 6 – Pleadings concerning defamation

r 14.31

DIVISION 6 – PLEADINGS CONCERNING DEFAMATION [Div 6 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

Note: The Defamation Act 2005 applies to the publication of defamatory matter after the commencement of that Act. The Act commenced on 1 January 2006. However, the Defamation Act 1974 (as in force before its repeal by the Defamation Act 2005) continues to apply to the following causes of action by virtue of clause 2 (Application of this Act) of Schedule 4 (Savings, transitional and other provisions) to the Defamation Act 2005: (a) a cause of action for defamation that accrued before 1 January 2006, (b) a cause of action for defamation that accrued after the commencement of the Defamation Act 2005, but only if: (i) the action is raised in proceedings that include other causes of action that accrued before 1 January 2006, and (ii) the action accrued no later than 12 months after the earliest pre-1 January 2006 action accrued, and (iii) each action in the proceedings arose out of the publication of the same, or substantially the same, matter on different occasions. Clause 2 of Schedule 4 to the Defamation Act 2005 also ensures that any other law (both legislative and common law) that would have applied to such causes of action but for the enactment of the new Act will continue to apply to such causes of action. 14.30

Allegations in statements of claim generally

(cf SCR Part 67, rule 11; DCR Part 49, rule 10)

(1) A statement of claim seeking relief in relation to the publication of defamatory matter must not include any allegation that the matter or its publication was false, malicious or unlawful. (2) Any such statement of claim must: (a) subject to subrule (3), specify each imputation on which the plaintiff relies, and (b) allege that the imputation was defamatory of the plaintiff. (3) A plaintiff in proceedings for defamation must not rely on two or more imputations alleged to be made by the defendant by means of the same publication of the same matter unless the imputations differ in substance. [R 14.30 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

14.31

Defamation defences generally

(cf SCR Part 67, rules 13 and 19(1); DCR Part 49, rule 12)

(1) Subject to rules 14.32 – 14.40, a defendant in proceedings for defamation must plead any defamation defence specifically.

(3) If a plaintiff intends to meet any defamation defence: (a) by alleging that the defendant was actuated by express malice in the publication of the matter complained of, or (b) by relying on any matter which, under the Defamation Act 1974 or the Defamation Act 2005, defeats the defence, then the plaintiff must plead that allegation or matter of defeasance by way of reply. [R 14.31 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

503

UCPR Parts 11-20

(2) If the plaintiff in defamation proceedings complains of two or more imputations, the pleading of any of the following defences must specify to what imputation or imputations the defence is pleaded: (a) a defence under section 15(2) or 16(2) of the Defamation Act 1974, (b) a defence under section 25 or 26 of the Defamation Act 2005, (c) the defence of justification at common law.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.32 14.32

Defence of justification generally

(cf SCR Part 67, rule 14; DCR Part 49, rule 13)

(1) Defence under Defamation Act 1974 Subject to rule 14.31(2), a defence under section 15(2) of the Defamation Act 1974 is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges: (a) that the imputation in question was a matter of substantial truth, and (b) either: (i) that the imputation in question related to a matter of public interest, or (ii) that the imputation in question was published under qualified privilege. Note: The defence of justification under section 15(2) of the Defamation Act 1974 applies to the exclusion of the common law defence of justification. See section 15(1) of the Defamation Act 1974.

(2) Defences under Defamation Act 2005 and at common law Subject to rule 14.31(2), a defence of justification under section 25 of the Defamation Act 2005 or at common law is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges that the imputation in question was substantially true. Note: The defence of justification under section 25 of the Defamation Act 2005 is in addition to, and does not vitiate, limit or abrogate, the common law defence of justification. See section 24(1) of the Defamation Act 2005. [R 14.32 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

14.33

Defence of contextual truth

(cf SCR Part 67, rule 15; DCR Part 49, rule 14)

(1) Defence under Defamation Act 1974 Subject to rule 14.31(2), a defence under section 16 of the Defamation Act 1974 is sufficiently pleaded if it: (a) alleges either: (i) that the imputation in question related to a matter of public interest, or (ii) that the imputation in question was published under qualified privilege, and (b) specifies one or more imputations on which the defendant relies as being contextual to the imputation in question, and (c) as to the contextual imputations on which the defendant relies: (i) alleges either that they related to a matter of public interest or that they were published under qualified privilege, and (ii) alleges that they were matters of substantial truth, and (d) alleges that, by reason that the contextual imputations on which the defendant relies are matters of substantial truth, the imputation in question did not further injure the reputation of the plaintiff. (2) Defence under Defamation Act 2005 Subject to rule 14.31(2), a defence under section 26 of the Defamation Act 2005 is sufficiently pleaded if it: (a) specifies one or more imputations on which the defendant relies as being contextual to the imputation in question, and (b) alleges each contextual imputation on which the defendant relies was substantially true, and (c) alleges that the imputation in question did not further harm the reputation of the plaintiff because of the contextual imputations on which the defendant relies. [R 14.33 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

504

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 6 – Pleadings concerning defamation 14.34

r 14.36

Defence of absolute privilege

(1) This rule applies: (a) to a defence of absolute privilege under Division 3 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974 or under section 27 of the Defamation Act 2005, and (b) to the defence of absolute privilege at common law. (2) A defence to which this rule applies is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges that the matter complained of was published under absolute privilege. [R 14.34 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

14.35

Defences for publication of public and official documents

(1) Defence under section 25 of Defamation Act 1974 A defence under section 25 of the Defamation Act 1974 is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges that the matter complained of was: (a) a document or record specified as a document or record to which that section applies or a copy of such a document or record, or (b) a fair summary of, or a fair extract from, such a document or record. (2) Defence under section 27 of Defamation Act 1974 A defence under section 27 of the Defamation Act 1974 is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges that the matter complained of was a notice published in accordance with the direction of a court. (3) Defence under section 28 of Defamation Act 2005 A defence under section 28 of the Defamation Act 2005 is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges that the matter complained of was contained in: (a) a public document or a fair copy of a public document, or (b) a fair summary of, or a fair extract from, a public document. [R 14.35 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

14.36

Defences of fair report of proceedings of public concern

(2) Defences under Defamation Act 2005 A defence under section 29 of the Defamation Act 2005 is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges that: (a) the matter complained of was, or was contained in, a fair report of any proceedings of public concern, or (b) the matter complained of: (i) was, or was contained in, an earlier published report of proceedings of public concern, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

505

UCPR Parts 11-20

(1) Defences under Defamation Act 1974 A defence under section 24 of the Defamation Act 1974 is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges that: (a) the matter complained of was a fair protected report, or (b) the matter complained of was a later publication by the defendant of: (i) a protected report or a copy of the protected report, or a fair extract or fair abstract from, or fair summary of, a protected report that was previously published by another person, or (ii) material purporting to be a protected report or a copy of a protected report, or of a fair extract or fair abstract from, or fair summary of, material purporting to be a protected report that was previously published by another person, and the defendant did not have knowledge that should have made the defendant aware that the protected report is not fair or the material purporting to be a protected report was not a protected report or is not fair.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.36 (ii)

was, or was contained in, a fair copy of, a fair summary of, or a fair extract from, the earlier published report, and the defendant had no knowledge that would reasonably make the defendant aware that the earlier published report was not fair. [R 14.36 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

14.37

Defence of qualified privilege

(cf SCR Part 67, rule 16; DCR Part 49, rule 15)

(1) This rule applies: (a) to a defence under Division 4 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974 or section 30 of the Defamation Act 2005, and (b) to any other defence of qualified privilege other than any of the following: (i) a defence under Division 5, 6 or 7 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974, (ii) a defence under section 28, 29 or 31 of the Defamation Act 2005, (iii) the defence of fair comment at common law. (2) A defence to which this rule applies is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges that the matter complained of was published under qualified privilege. [R 14.37 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

14.38

Defences of comment or honest opinion

(cf SCR Part 67, rule 17(1) and (2); DCR Part 49, rule 16(1) and (2))

(1) Defences under Defamation Act 1974 A defence under Division 7 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974 is sufficiently pleaded if, as to the matter it alleges was comment, it: (a) either: (i) alleges that the comment was comment based on proper material for comment and on no other material, or (ii) alleges that the comment was comment based to some extent on proper material for comment and represented an opinion that might reasonably be based on that material to the extent to which it was proper material for comment, and (b) alleges that the comment related to a matter of public interest, and (c) either: (i) alleges that the comment was the comment of the defendant, or (ii) alleges that the comment was the comment of a servant or agent of the defendant, or (iii) alleges that the comment was not, and in its context and in the circumstances of the publication complained of did not purport to be, the comment of the defendant or of any servant or agent of the defendant. Note: A defence of fair comment under Division 7 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974 applies to the exclusion of the common law defence of fair comment. See section 29 of the Defamation Act 1974.

(2) Defences under Defamation Act 2005 A defence under section 31 of the Defamation Act 2005 is sufficiently pleaded if, as to the matter it alleges was opinion, it: (a) either: (i) alleges that the opinion was based on proper material and on no other material, or (ii) alleges that the opinion was an opinion based to some extent on proper material and represented an opinion that might reasonably be based on that material to the extent to which it was proper material, and (b) alleges that the opinion was an opinion related to a matter of public interest, and (c) either: 506

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 14 – Pleadings Division 6 – Pleadings concerning defamation

r 14.40

(i) alleges that the opinion was an expression of opinion of the defendant, or (ii) alleges that the opinion was an expression of opinion of an employee or agent of the defendant, or (iii) alleges that the opinion was an expression of opinion of a person other than the defendant or an employee or agent of the defendant. Note:

A defence of honest opinion under section 31 of the Defamation Act 2005 is in addition to, and does not vitiate, limit or abrogate, the common law defence of fair comment. See section 24(1) of the Defamation Act 2005.

(3) Defence of fair comment at common law A defence of fair comment at common law is sufficiently pleaded if, as to the matter it alleges was comment, it: (a) alleges that the comment was comment based on true facts or material that was published under privilege, and (b) alleges that the comment related to a matter of public interest. (c) [Repealed] Note: See the note to subrule (2). [Subr (3) am Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[4] and [5]] [R 14.38 am Rule 288 of 2006; insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

14.39

Defence of innocent dissemination

A defence under section 32 of the Defamation Act 2005 is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges that: (a) the defendant published the matter complained of merely in the capacity, or as an employee or agent, of a subordinate distributor, and (b) the defendant neither knew, nor ought reasonably to have known, that the matter was defamatory, and (c) the defendant’s lack of knowledge was not due to any negligence on the part of the defendant. [R 14.39 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

14.40

Defence of triviality

(1) This rule applies to: (a) a defence under section 13 of the Defamation Act 1974, and (b) a defence under section 33 of the Defamation Act 2005. (2) A defence to which this rule applies is sufficiently pleaded if it alleges that the circumstances of publication of the matter complained of were such that the plaintiff was unlikely to sustain any harm.

UCPR Parts 11-20

[R 14.40 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[3]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

507

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt15.20]

PART 15 – PARTICULARS Commentary by Michael McHugh SC.

PART 15 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 15 ................................................................................................................. [r Pt15.20] When required .......................................................................................................................................... [r Pt15.40] New matters to note ................................................................................................................................. [r Pt15.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r Pt15.1000]

[r Pt15.20]

General comments on Part 15

The purpose of particulars is to concentrate and refine issues of fact and to prevent surprise and consequent delay: Bailey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 136 CLR 214; 51 ALJR 429; their function is not to circumscribe, modify or alter the cause of action sued upon: Katsilis v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1977) 52 ALJR 189. The proper function of particulars is not to state the material facts omitted from the statement of claim in order, by filling the gaps, to make good on inherently bad pleading, however common that pernicious practice may have become: Pinson v Lloyds & National Provincial Foreign Bank Ltd [1941] 2 KB 72 per Scott LJ. As Hunt J succinctly stated in Sims v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317 at 321: The object of particulars is to save expense in preparing to meet a case which may never be put: McSpedden v Harnett (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 116 at 119; 59 WN 98; Turner v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 228 at 229; and to make the party’s case plain so that each side may know what are the issues of fact to be investigated at the hearing: Kelly v Kelly (1950) 50 SR (NSW) 261 at 265; 67 WN 193 at 196; Bailey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 136 CLR 214 at 219. See, generally, Phillopini v Leithead [1959] SR (NSW) 352 at 358, 359; 76 WN 150 at 152; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Thomson (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 553 at 557, 558; Ellis v Grant (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 920 at 924, 925. Particulars inform one’s opponent of the nature of the case it has to meet, as opposed to the way in which the case will be proved. They enable an opponent to know what evidence ought to be gathered. Importantly, they limit the generality of pleadings. Particulars prevent surprise and together with the pleadings define the relevance of matters at trial, subject to any agreement between parties as to issues. Where evidence is led outside the particulars of any claim a successful objection may be taken if the evidence creates an injustice or an embarrassment to the opponent: Vlasic v Federal Capital Press (1976) 9 ACTR 1; Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1985] 2 NSWLR 340. Where evidence is in fact adduced outside the scope of particulars the court may act upon it: Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; 57 ALJR 80; 44 ALR 117. [r Pt15.40]

When required

Apart from r 15.1, which states all necessary particulars must be given, the rules provide specifically for certain particulars to be given in specific classes of case, for example: in the case of a liquidated claim, a claim for an order for pre-judgment interest must specify the period or periods for which interest is claimed, and may specify the rate or rates at which interest is claimed: r 6.12(7); allegations of behaviour in the nature of fraud: r 15.3; allegations as to condition of mind: r 15.4; allegations of negligence and breach of statutory duty in common law claims in tort: r 15.5; claims for out of pocket expenses: r 15.6; claims for exemplary damages: r 15.7; claims for aggravated damages: r 15.8; claims under Property (Relationships) Act 1984: r 15.11. Extensive particulars must be provided in personal injury cases: Div 2 and in defamation: Div 4. [r Pt15.60]

New matters to note

A Scott Schedule may be prepared in building, technical and other cases involving the liability or amount of numerous items: r 15.2. Particulars can be included in a pleading or set out in a separate document filed with the pleading: r 15.9. UCPR Pt 15 Div 2 deals with matters involving personal injury particulars and amongst other matters requires the service of the plaintiff’s particulars of damage on the defendant or its insurer. 508

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 15 – Particulars Division 1 – General

[r 15.1.60] [r Pt15.1000]

r 15.1

References

For matters to be commenced by statement of claim see Pt 6.3 and for summons see Pt 6.4. Regard should also be had to UCPR Pt 6 Div 4 governs the contents of statement of claim and summons. Further reading: Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) Ch 6 and Jacob and Goldrein, Pleadings: Principles and Practice (1990). On the preparation of pleadings: Neville & Ashe, Equity Precedents (NSW) (1981) and Bullen and Leake, Precedents of Pleading (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 1975).

DIVISION 1 – GENERAL 15.1

Pleadings must give all necessary particulars

(cf SCR Part 16, rules 1 and 1A; DCR Part 9, rule 19; LCR Part 8, rule 2)

(1) Subject to this Part, a pleading must give such particulars of any claim, defence or other matter pleaded by the party as are necessary to enable the opposite party to identify the case that the pleading requires him or her to meet. (2) Subrule (1) does not require a pleading to give particulars of any claim for interest up to judgment other than those required by rule 6.12(7).

RULE 15.1 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 15.1.40] Particulars ................................................................................................................................................. [r 15.1.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 15.1.1000]

[r 15.1.40]

Operation

The question of what is necessary to enable an opponent to identify the case they have to meet does not revolve around whether one party has adequate knowledge of the actual facts; it is a question of whether they have adequate knowledge of what the other party alleges are the facts, for that is the case which they must meet: Sims v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317 at 321 per Hunt J; Turner v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 228; Emmerton v University of Sydney [1970] 2 NSWR 633 at 635; Bailey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 136 CLR 214; 51 ALJR 429. Particulars

The word “particulars” is not a synonym for the word “evidence”. Particulars are not to be sought or given in order simply to discover or reveal the details of the evidence that is to be led: R v Manos; Ex parte Samuels (1981) 28 SASR 262. However, the distinction between particulars and evidence will not always be clear. It may be necessary to disclose evidence through the particulars, to ensure that the opposite party can identify the case they have to meet; Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Newcastle Formwork Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 144 at [18]; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229 at [177]. A party is not entitled, in effect, to amend a pleading by giving particulars of further material facts. To permit a party to do so would be to allow amendment contrary to the requirements of the rules concerning the filing of an amended pleading. However, it is possible that particulars in effect amending a pleading might be accepted by an opponent and proceedings might be conducted on that basis. The opposite party might have so conducted itself as to represent that no objection would be taken to the case being conducted on the basis of them, although, strictly speaking, there should have been an amendment: Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1985] 2 NSWLR 340. It may be permissible for the court in proceedings for leave to amend, to have regard to the particulars by way of “additional evidence” for the purpose of the determination of the question, eg whether the grant of leave to amend would be a futility: Campbell v Metway Leasing Ltd [1998] ATPR 41-630 at 40,919. In MacDonald v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2007) 73 NSWLR 612; [2007] NSWCA 304, it was held that particulars need not be provided if they would lead to self-incrimination. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

509

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 15.1.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 15.2

[r 15.4.40]

[r 15.1.1000]

References

Rule 15.10 provides a source of power for a court to order provision of particulars. 15.2

Use of “Scott Schedule” in building, technical and other cases

(cf DCR Part 9, rule 19A; LCR Part 8, rule 7)

(1) In proceedings involving a building, technical or other matter in which several items of a claim are in dispute as to liability or amount, or both, the party making the claim may, and if the court so orders must, prepare and file a “Scott Schedule” in the approved form. (2) A party on whom a Scott Schedule is served must complete and file the Schedule.

RULE 15.2 COMMENTARY [r 15.2.20]

Comparison

This rule is based upon the former District Court rule. However, it does not have the requirement that a completed Scott Schedule must be filed and served 21 days after service. The discretion that a judge of the District Court had to not hear a case in the event of non-compliance has also been removed. Such a course would now lie in CPA Pt 6 particularly in s 56(3) – Party’s duty to assist the court to further the overriding obligation. 15.3 Allegations of behaviour in the nature of fraud (cf SCR Part 16, rule 2; DCR Part 9, rule 20)

A pleading must give particulars of any fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence on which the party relies.

RULE 15.3 COMMENTARY [r 15.3.40]

Operation

As in all actions based on fraud, particulars of the fraud must be exactly given and the allegations must be established by the strict proof which such a charge requires: Wentworth v Rogers [No 5] (1986) 6 NSWLR 534. Full particulars are expected of any allegation of fraud or dishonesty: see [r 14.14.120]. However, where fraudulent conduct is not particularised, evidence may still be admissible where the opposing party introduced the underlying issue: Qureshi v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1605. 15.4

Allegations as to condition of mind

(cf SCR Part 16, rule 3; DCR Part 9, rule 21)

(1) A pleading that alleges any condition of mind must give particulars of the facts on which the party pleading relies. (2) In subrule (1), condition of mind includes any disorder or disability of mind, any malice and any fraudulent intention, but does not include knowledge.

RULE 15.4 COMMENTARY [r 15.4.40]

Operation

The exclusion of knowledge from the meaning of “condition of mind” is not to be interpreted as providing that particulars of mere knowledge may never be required to be given; Fox v H Wood (Harrow) Ltd [1963] 2 QB 601; Lyons v Kern Konstructions (Townsville) Pty Ltd (1983) 70 FLR 135; 47 ALR 114. The overriding 510

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 15 – Particulars Division 1 – General

[r 15.7.40]

r 15.7

question must be whether the particulars are “necessary” within the meaning of r 15.1. Where the effect of an allegation of knowledge comes very close to an allegation of fraudulent intention, particulars may often be necessary. The issue requires a close examination of the pleadings under consideration in specific proceedings: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 599. See further: Banks v Alphatise Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1437 at [7]–[18]; Davis v Halliday Financial Management Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1371 at [26]–[28]. 15.5 tort

Allegations of negligence and breach of statutory duty in common law claims in

(cf SCR Part 16, rule 4; DCR Part 9, rule 22; LCR Part 8, rule 4)

(1) The particulars to be given by a pleading that alleges negligence (whether contributory or otherwise): (a) must state the facts and circumstances on which the party pleading relies as constituting the alleged negligent act or omission, and (b) if the party pleading alleges more than one negligent act or omission, must, so far as practicable, state separately the facts and circumstances on which the party relies in respect of each alleged negligent act or omission. (2) The particulars to be given by a pleading that alleges breach of statutory duty: (a) must state the facts and circumstances on which the party pleading relies as constituting the alleged breach of statutory duty, and (b) if the party pleading alleges more than one breach of statutory duty, must, so far as practicable, state separately the facts and circumstances on which the party relies in respect of each alleged breach of statutory duty. 15.6

Claims for out of pocket expenses

(cf SCR Part 16, rule 5; DCR Part 9, rule 23; LCR Part 8, rule 5)

A party pleading who claims damages that include money that he or she has paid or is liable to pay must give particulars of that money.

RULE 15.6 COMMENTARY [r 15.6.40]

Operation

Such particulars should allege all out of pocket expenses whether contingent or not. 15.7 Claims for exemplary damages (cf SCR Part 16, rule 5A)

The particulars to be given by a pleading that claims exemplary damages must state the facts and circumstances on which the party pleading relies to establish that claim.

RULE 15.7 COMMENTARY Civil Liability Act 2002 .............................................................................................................................. [r 15.7.60]

[r 15.7.40]

Operation

Aggravated damages are given to compensate the plaintiff when the harm done to them by a wrongful act was aggravated by the manner in which the act was done; exemplary damages, on the other hand, are intended to punish the defendant, and presumably to serve one or more of the objects of punishment – moral retribution or

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

511

UCPR Parts 11-20

Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 15.7.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 15.8

[r 15.7.40]

deterrence: Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124; [1966] HCA 40 at 149 (CLR). Exemplary damages ought rarely to be awarded: Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 45; [1998] HCA 70. [r 15.7.60]

Civil Liability Act 2002

Section 21 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 prohibits a court from awarding exemplary damages for specified personal injury actions, subject to Sch 1 of that Act: New South Wales v Mastronardi [2003] NSWCA 72. 15.8

Claims for aggravated damages

(cf SCR Part 16, rule 5B)

The particulars to be given by a pleading that claims aggravated compensatory damages must state the facts and circumstances on which the party pleading relies to establish that claim.

RULE 15.8 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 15.8.40] Civil Liability Act 2002 .............................................................................................................................. [r 15.8.60]

[r 15.8.40]

Operation

The facts relied on to support a claim for aggravated damages should be pleaded: Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; compare Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225. See also R v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 31 at 33. Aggravated damages are compensatory in their nature, not punitive: Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027 at 1050. For the distinction between aggravated and exemplary damages, see [r 15.7.40]. [r 15.8.60]

Civil Liability Act 2002

Section 21 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 prohibits a court from awarding aggravated damages for specified personal injury actions, subject to Sch 1 of that Act: New South Wales v Mastronardi [2003] NSWCA 72. 15.9 Manner of giving particulars (cf SCR Part 16, rule 6; DCR Part 9, rule 25; LCR Part 8, rule 6)

The particulars to be given by a pleading must be set out in the pleading or, if that is inconvenient, must be set out in a separate document referred to in the pleading and filed with the pleading.

RULE 15.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 15.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 15.9.40]

[r 15.9.20]

Comparison

The former subr (2) which stated that where the necessary particulars were large and were served they need not be filed, has been deleted. [r 15.9.40]

Operation

Where particulars are required, they should be set out in the pleading, or in a separate document, which is filed and served with the pleading. The rule governs particulars to be given by a pleading. It does not, however, preclude the provision of particulars subsequent to the filing of a pleading or by other means.

512

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 15 – Particulars Division 1 – General

[r 15.10.60]

15.10

r 15.10

Order for particulars

(cf SCR Part 16, rule 7; DCR Part 9, rule 26; LCR Part 8, rule 8)

(1) The court may order a party to file: (a) particulars of any claim, defence or other matter stated in the party’s pleading or in any affidavit relevant to the proceedings, or (b) a statement of the nature of the case on which the party relies, or (c) if the party claims damages, particulars relating to general or other damages. (2) Without limiting subrule (1), if a pleading alleges that a person had knowledge or notice of some fact, matter or thing, the court may order that party to file: (a) if the pleading alleges knowledge, particulars of the facts on which that party relies, and (b) if the pleading alleges notice, particulars of the notice.

RULE 15.10 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 15.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 15.10.40] Application to the court ........................................................................................................................... [r 15.10.60] Time of application ................................................................................................................................. [r 15.10.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 15.10.1000]

[r 15.10.20]

Comparison

There is no significant change to the rules, though subr (3) has been removed, which stated the court should not make an order under the rule before the filing of the defence unless in its opinion it was warranted for a special reason. [r 15.10.40]

Operation

If a party omits to give any particulars which ought to be given, or if the particulars given are insufficient or inadequate, the other party may apply for an order for particulars. Such an application should normally be preceded by a written request for the required particulars. The court probably has no power to make a self-executing order for particulars which has the effect of preventing a party leading evidence at the trial in support of a claim which remains on the pleadings if particulars are not supplied: Douglas v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 126. If under the current civil procedure rules there is such a power, it is likely to be found in the case management procedures in CPA Pt 6. Application to the court

As a general proposition, when particulars are necessary to the proper conduct of litigation, they will be ordered so that issues may be clearly defined and evidence led and argument advanced directed to those issues: Bailey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 136 CLR 214; 51 ALJR 429. The concern is with the sufficiency of particulars to inform an opponent of the case to be met, not with whether particulars are sufficient to establish that case: Sims v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317. Particulars will not be ordered of a pleading which merely puts the other party to proof even where a defence traverses a negative allegation in a statement of claim: Transport Action Group Against Motorways Inc v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (1998) 103 LGERA 338 at 341. Interrogatories in the nature of a request for particulars will not be ordered except in special circumstances: Conde v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 221. A request for names and addresses of pre-accident treating doctors was not a request for particulars contemplated by the SCR rule: Bellamy v Bennett [1999] NSWSC 912. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

513

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 15.10.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 15.11

[r 15.10.60]

In exceptional circumstances, a party who is ordered to give particulars is allowed, before giving them, to interrogate his or her opponent, or to obtain discovery of documents. The court may make such an order where it appears that the party required to serve the particulars does not know facts necessary to enable him or her to do so, or where it appears in the nature of things that the pleading or particulars will be of the sketchiest possible character and will almost certainly require amendment: Lyons v Kern Konstructions (Townsville) Pty Ltd (1983) 70 FLR 135; 47 ALR 114; Pawlowski v Mike Boylan Real Estate [1975] 3 QL 335. [r 15.10.80]

Time of application

Applications should be made promptly in accordance with the guiding principles in CPA Pt 6 Div 1, and see Zeaiter v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 929. Generally, the court may be disinclined to make an order for particulars before a defence is filed. However, query how deletion of the former subr (3) – which stated the court should not make an order under the rule before the filing of the defence has been removed unless in its opinion it was warranted for a special reason – has affected that proposition. The purpose of former SCR Pt 16 r 7(3) and DCR Pt 9 r 26(4) was said to be to prevent applications for particulars being employed to gain time for the defence. The current rules differ in that they do not provide that only in specific circumstances can an order for part of a claim be made before a defence is filed. However, in the context of the case management regime for which CPA Pt 6 provides, a defendant cannot safely assume that it has an entitlement to particulars before a defence is filed or a least the nature of its own case is made manifest. [r 15.10.1000]

References

See Discovery r 21 and Interrogatories r 22. 15.11

Particulars concerning claims under Property (Relationships) Act 1984

The particulars to be given by a pleading with respect to a claim for relief under section 20(1) of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 must include: (a) particulars of any payment on which the plaintiff relies as to any contribution referred to in that subsection, and (b) particulars of any document on which the plaintiff relies as evidence that any such payment has been made.

RULE 15.11 COMMENTARY [r 15.11.20]

Comparison

This rule complements r 14.21 which deals with pleadings concerning claims under Property (Relationships) Act 1984.

DIVISION 2 – PERSONAL INJURY CASES 15.12 Particulars required for proceedings generally (cf DCR Part 9, rule 27(2) – (5))

(1) This rule applies to a claim for damages in respect of personal injuries arising from any event (the accident), other than a claim that is the subject of proceedings under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897. (2) On or as soon as practicable after serving the statement of claim, the plaintiff must serve on the defendant, or on the defendant’s insurer or solicitor, a statement accompanied by the following documents: (a) copies of all documents available to the plaintiff in support of a claim for special damage and economic loss, whether past, present or continuing, including: (i) hospital, medical and similar accounts, and (ii) letters from a workers’ compensation insurer indicating moneys paid to or for the plaintiff, and 514

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 15 – Particulars Division 2 – Personal injury cases

(b)

r 15.12

(iii) letters from employers, wage records, income records and group certificates, and (iv) reports, award rates and correspondence relied on to support any claim in respect of domestic assistance or attendant care, copies of all hospital and medical reports available at the time of serving the statement on which the plaintiff intends to rely at the hearing.

(2A) On or as soon as practicable after serving the statement required by subrule (2), the plaintiff must file a copy of that statement (without the accompanying documents required by this rule). [Subr (2A) insrt Rule 569 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]

(3) The statement must set out the following particulars: (a) particulars of injuries received, (b) particulars of continuing disabilities, (c) particulars of out-of-pocket expenses. (4) If the statement makes any claim in respect of domestic assistance or attendant care, it must also set out full particulars of the claim.

(6) If the statement makes any claim in respect of loss of income, copies of the following documents must be served on all active parties: (a) a letter from the employer or employers (if any) of the plaintiff immediately before the accident the subject of the proceedings, providing particulars of: (i) the dates on which the plaintiff was absent from work due to the accident, and (ii) the total net remuneration lost by the plaintiff in respect of that absence, including overtime, and (iii) if the plaintiff returned to work for that employer, the plaintiff’s classification and duties, and any alteration in the remuneration paid to the plaintiff, after that return, and (iv) if that employment has been terminated, the date of and reason for the termination, (b) if the plaintiff was self-employed immediately before the accident, copies of any accountants’ reports or other documents on which the plaintiff intends to rely to establish his or her pre-accident income, © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

515

UCPR Parts 11-20

(5) If the statement makes any claim in respect of loss of income, it must also set out the following particulars: (a) the name and address of each employer during the 12 months immediately before the accident, together with details of the periods of employment, capacity in which employed and net earnings during each period of employment, (b) the name and address of each employer since the accident, together with details of the periods of employment, capacity in which employed and net earnings during each period of employment, (c) the amount claimed in respect of loss of income to the date of the statement (by comparison between what the plaintiff has earned since the accident and what the plaintiff would have earned but for the accident) setting out, in respect of what the plaintiff would have earned but for the accident, including, where appropriate: (i) particulars of the earnings of comparable employees and the identity of those employees, or (ii) particulars of any payment that the plaintiff would have received under a relevant award or industrial agreement, together with the title of that award or industrial agreement, (d) particulars of any alleged loss of earning capacity and future economic loss, (e) if the plaintiff is self-employed or has been self-employed at any time during the 12 months immediately before the accident, such additional particulars as will achieve full disclosure of the basis of the claim for loss of income.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 15.12

[r 15.12.40] (c)

copies of the plaintiff’s income tax returns relating to income received during the period of 2 financial years ending immediately before the financial year that included the date of the accident, together with copies of any income tax returns lodged by the plaintiff since the date of the accident.

[Subr (6) am Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[13]]

(7) If any, or any part of, any document required to be served by subrule (6) cannot be served, a statement of the reasons why it cannot be served must be included in the documents served. [R 15.12 am Rule 569 of 2009; Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 15.12 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 15.12.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 15.12.1000]

[r 15.12.40]

Operation

This rule sets out the requirement for filing and serving particulars in personal injuries cases: Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 claims are governed by r 15.13. See also intentional torts: Styles v Clayton Utz (No 3) (2011) 255 FLR 364; [2011] NSWSC 1452. The requirement that the particulars under the rule be served “as soon as practicable” after serving the statement of claim means there is some scope for reasonableness. However breaches can be dealt with severely: r 15.16. In Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; 57 ALJR 80; 44 ALR 117, the High Court held that the corresponding Victorian rule, O 19 r 5A (which is similar, but not identical) does no more than extend the ambit of the particulars which a plaintiff is required to furnish. This rule does not apply to indemnity or contribution proceedings; Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Newcastle Formwork Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 144 at [22]. However, some particulars must still be provided in such proceedings; Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Newcastle Formwork Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 144 at [23] and [25]. The rationale for this exclusion can be seen in New South Wales v McKittrick [2009] NSWCA 63 at [8], where it was said that “a plaintiff cannot be required to particularise a case of which it is ignorant”. The barriers in personal injury proceedings to discovery (UCPR, Pt 21) and interrogatories (UCPR, Pt 22) do not exist in indemnity and contribution cases; New South Wales v McKittrick [2009] NSWCA 63 at [8]. [r 15.12.1000]

References

Ongoing compliance with the rule is required by r 15.14. As to breach see r 15.16. See the particulars required under the Motor Accidents Act 1988. 15.13

Particulars required for proceedings under Compensation to Relatives Act 1897

(cf DCR Part 9, rule 27(6) and (7))

(1) This rule applies to a claim for damages in respect of personal injuries arising from any act, neglect or default (the accident) that is the subject of proceedings under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897. (2) On or as soon as practicable after serving the statement of claim, the plaintiff must serve on the defendant, or on the defendant’s insurer or solicitor: (a)

516

in respect of each person on whose behalf the proceedings are commenced, a statement containing the following information: (i) the person’s name, address, relationship to the deceased person the subject of the proceedings, marital status and any anticipated alteration to that status,

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 15 – Particulars Division 2 – Personal injury cases

[r 15.13.1000]

r 15.14

(ii)

whether the person’s dependency on the deceased person, or the person’s reliance on services provided by the deceased person, is claimed to have been whole or partial, the circumstances in which the person received support or services from the deceased person, and the quantum of that support or those services during the 12-month period immediately before the death of the deceased person, and (b) in respect of each person on whose behalf the proceedings are commenced, copies of the following documents: (i) a copy or extract of the person’s birth certificate and, if the person has been married, a copy of the person’s marriage certificate, (ii) copies of any bank statements, financial records or other documents on which the person intends to rely to establish the extent of the support and other benefits provided to the person by the deceased person, covering a period of not less than 12 months immediately before the date of the death of the deceased person, and (c) in respect of the deceased person, copies of the following documents: (i) a letter from the employer (if any) of the deceased person immediately before the accident, providing particulars of the deceased person’s remuneration and prospects of promotion at the date of his or her death, (ii) copies of the deceased person’s income tax returns relating to income received during the period of 2 financial years ending immediately before the financial year that included the date of his or her death, (iii) copies of all documents, including accounts and receipts, in support of any claim for the cost of a funeral or headstone or for any other expenses relating to the deceased person’s death, (iv) copies of documents evidencing the net value of the estate of the deceased person. [Subr (2) subst Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[14]]

(3) On or as soon as practicable after serving the statement required by subrule (2), the plaintiff must file a copy of that statement (without the other documents required to be served by this rule). [Subr (3) reinsrt Rule 569 of 2009, Sch 1[4]; rep Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[14]]

(4) If any, or any part of, any document required to be served by subrule (2) cannot be served, a statement of the reasons why it cannot be served must be included in the documents served. [R 15.13 am Rule 569 of 2009; Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 15.13 COMMENTARY [r 15.13.1000]

References

Ongoing compliance with the rule is required by r 15.14. 15.14 Statements, documents and reports to be complete

(1) The statement and documents required by rule 15.12 or 15.13 to be served: (a) must be as final and complete as to the plaintiff’s case as they can, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, be made, and (b) must contain such information as the plaintiff can then provide as to any medical examination of the plaintiff to be conducted after the date of service. (2) As soon as practicable after becoming aware that any information contained in a statement or document that has been served as required by rule 15.12 or 15.13 is no longer accurate and complete as regards the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff must give to all active parties such advice as is necessary to make that information accurate and complete. (3) If the plaintiff gives advice as referred to in subrule (2), the court may direct the plaintiff to file an amended statement of particulars. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

517

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf DCR Part 9, rule 27(8)–(10))

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 15.14 (4) Unless the court orders otherwise, the plaintiff must file a copy of the final statement of particulars at least 42 days prior to the date fixed for hearing or arbitration of the proceedings. (5) Subject to subrules (3) and (4), an amended statement of particulars may not be filed except by leave of the court.

Editor’s note: Rule 15.15 is repealed and has not been reproduced.

15.16 Effect of failure to comply with Division (cf DCR Part 9, rule 27(11))

If, after conducting a review or status conference or otherwise, the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has not sufficiently complied with the requirements of this Division, the court may dismiss the proceedings or make such other order as it thinks fit.

RULE 15.16 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 15.16.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 15.16.1000]

[r 15.16.40]

Operation

Where there has not been sufficient compliance with the Division, evidence setting out the steps taken to comply with the Division and any reasons concerning delay should be the subject of an affidavit if there are concerns of a dismissal under the rule. If further delay is unavoidable a notice of motion and supporting evidence seeking to defer the application of the Division under r 15.17 should be considered. [r 15.16.1000]

References

This is a case management rule – refer to annotations at CPA Pt 6 and UCPR Pt 2. 15.17 Division not to apply in certain circumstances (cf DCR Part 9, rule 27(1))

This Division does not apply to a claim that is accompanied by: (a) a notice of motion seeking a separate trial on the question of liability, or (b) a notice of motion seeking an order to defer the application of this Division to the proceedings.

RULE 15.17 COMMENTARY [r 15.17.40]

Operation

Whenever a matter is for any reason not going to be able to proceed expeditiously after the filing of the claim, consideration should be given to an application under the rule. An example is where the injuries the subject of the claim have yet to stabilise or the claim is filed to overcome a looming limitation bar. Supporting evidence giving a basis for the deferral of the Division is a necessity.

518

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 15 – Particulars Division 4 – Defamation

r 15.19

DIVISION 3 – INTERIM PAYMENTS 15.18

Interim payments

(cf SCR Part 16, rule 8)

If an application for an order under section 82 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 is made in any proceedings, the plaintiff must serve on the defendant against whom the order is sought, no later than the date of filing of notice of the motion: (a) if the application relates to a claim for damages in respect of personal injuries, the statement and documents referred to in rule 15.12, or (b) if the application relates to a claim for damages under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 that includes a claim for loss of maintenance and support, the statement and documents referred to in rule 15.13.

DIVISION 4 – DEFAMATION [Div 4 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]] Note: The Defamation Act 2005 applies to the publication of defamatory matter after the commencement of that Act. The Act commenced on 1 January 2006. However, the Defamation Act 1974 (as in force before its repeal by the Defamation Act 2005) continues to apply to the following causes of action by virtue of clause 2 (Application of this Act) of Schedule 4 (Savings, transitional and other provisions) to the Defamation Act 2005: (a) a cause of action for defamation that accrued before 1 January 2006, (b) a cause of action for defamation that accrued after the commencement of the Defamation Act 2005, but only if: (i) the action is raised in proceedings that include other causes of action that accrued before 1 January 2006, and (ii) the action accrued no later than 12 months after the earliest pre-1 January 2006 action accrued, and (iii) each action in the proceedings arose out of the publication of the same, or substantially the same, matter on different occasions. Clause 2 of Schedule 4 to the Defamation Act 2005 also ensures that any other law (both legislative and common law) that would have applied to such causes of action but for the enactment of the new Act will continue to apply to such causes of action.

15.19

Particulars in relation to statements of claim for defamation

(1) The particulars required by rule 15.1 in relation to a statement of claim seeking relief in relation to the publication of defamatory matter must include the following: (a) particulars of any publication on which the plaintiff relies to establish the cause of action, sufficient to enable the publication to be identified, (b) particulars of any publication, circulation or distribution of the matter complained of or copy of the matter complained of on which the plaintiff relies on the question of damages, sufficient to enable the publication, circulation or distribution to be identified, (c) if the plaintiff alleges that the matter complained of had a defamatory meaning other than its ordinary meaning—particulars of the facts and matters on which the plaintiff relies to establish that defamatory meaning, including: (i) full and complete particulars of the facts and matters relied on to establish a true innuendo, and (ii) by reference to name or class, the identity of those to whom those facts and matters were known, (d) if the plaintiff is not named in the matter complained of—particulars of identification of the plaintiff together with the identity, by reference to names and addresses or class of persons, of those to whom any such particulars were known, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

519

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf SCR Part 67, rule 12; DCR Part 49, rule 11)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 15.19

[r 15.19.40] (e)

particulars of the part or parts of the matter complained of relied on by the plaintiff in support of each pleaded imputation.

(2) Such of the following as is applicable must be filed and served with a statement of claim seeking relief in relation to the publication of defamatory matter (or any amended statement of claim) and be referred to in the statement of claim or amended statement of claim: (a) a legible photocopy of the original publication or, in the case of an internet, e-mail or other computer displayed publication, a printed copy, (b) a typescript, with numbered lines, of: (i) if the original publication is in English—the text of the original publication, or (ii) otherwise—a translation of the text of the original publication. (3) Subrule (2)(b) must be complied with in respect of radio and television publications. [R 15.19 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 15.19 COMMENTARY [r 15.19.40]

Operation

A defamatory publication is not actionable unless it is established to have been published “of and concerning” the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff is not expressly named, it must be established that the matter was published to at least one person who had knowledge of extrinsic facts that would provide the necessary identification: Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239; [1971] 2 All ER 1156 at 1243-4. Defamatory meaning including any extrinsic facts (facts not published which are necessary to carry the imputation to the plaintiff), or true innuendo (extrinsic facts relied upon to give the matter complained of another meaning) or false innuendo (the meaning conveyed does not require knowledge of extrinsic facts); and identification of the plaintiff may be required. Particulars of publication should also include the named media, edition, circulation or broadcast location and date; and in non-media suits, the persons or class of persons to who, dates and places where the matter complained of was published. Where the matter complained of does not identify the plaintiff by its full corporate title and where persons with knowledge of the facts particularised would know another company conducted a similar business as that discussed in the matter complained of and the particulars provided are not capable of identifying the plaintiff, the claim pleaded is liable to be struck out: Palace Films Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1136. Further, which parts of the matter complained of as applicable needs to be identified and its numbered lines referred to in the statement of claim – eg where imputation “X” is first pleaded the numbered lines of the matter complained of where imputation “X” is alleged to arise ought be included. 15.20 Particulars in relation to statements of claim by corporations The particulars required by rule 15.1 in relation to a statement of claim seeking relief in relation to the publication of defamatory matter about a corporation must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the plaintiff relies to establish that the corporation is not precluded from asserting a cause of action for defamation. Note: Subject to limited exceptions, corporations are precluded from bringing defamation proceedings: (a) in relation to causes of action to which the Defamation Act 1974 applies, by section 8A of that Act, and (b) in relation to causes of action to which the Defamation Act 2005 applies, by section 9 of that Act. [R 15.20 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

15.21 Particulars of defamation defences generally (cf SCR Part 67, rule 18; DCR Part 49, rule 17)

(1) The particulars of a defamation defence required by rule 15.1 must, unless the court orders otherwise, include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish: (a) that any imputation, notice, report, comment or other material was or related to a matter of public interest, 520

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 15 – Particulars Division 4 – Defamation

[r 15.21.40] (b) (c) (d)

r 15.22

that any imputation was published under qualified privilege, that any imputation or contextual imputation was true or was a matter of substantial truth, that any material being proper material for comment was a matter of substantial truth.

(2) If a defendant in proceedings for defamation intends to make a case in mitigation of damages by reference to: (a) the circumstances in which the publication complained of was made, or (b) the reputation of the plaintiff, or (c) any apology for, or explanation or correction or retraction of, any imputation complained of, or (d) any recovery, proceedings, receipt or agreement to which section 48 of the Defamation Act 1974 or section 38(1)(c), (d) or (e) of the Defamation Act 2005 applies, the defendant must give particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to make that case. (3) If a defendant in proceedings for defamation intends to show, in mitigation of damages, that any imputation complained of was true or was a matter of substantial truth, the defendant must give particulars identifying the imputation, stating that intention, and of the facts, matters and circumstances the defendant relies on to establish that the imputation was true or was a matter of substantial truth. (4) The particulars required by subrules (2) and (3) must be set out in the defence, or, if that is inconvenient, may be set out in a separate document, referred to in the defence and that document must be filed and served with the defence. [R 15.21 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 15.21 COMMENTARY [r 15.21.40]

Operation

This rule sets out the general requirements for particulars in defamation defences. Regard should also be had to the following rules: r 15.22 (truth); r 15.23 (contextual truth); r 15.24 (absolute privilege); r 15.25 (public and official documents); r 15.26 (fair report); r 15.27 (qualified privilege); r 15.28 (comment); r 15.29 (innocent dissemination); and r 15.30 (triviality). 15.22 Particulars in relation to defence of justification (1) Defence under section 15 of Defamation Act 1974 Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence under section 15(2) of the Defamation Act 1974 must (unless the court orders otherwise) include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish: (a) that the imputation in question was a matter of substantial truth, and (b) either: (i) that the imputation in question related to a matter of public interest, or (ii) that the imputation in question was published under qualified privilege. Note: The defence of justification under section 15(2) of the Defamation Act 1974 applies to the exclusion of the (2) Defences under section 25 of Defamation Act 2005 and at common law Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence of justification under section 25 of the Defamation Act 2005 or at common law must (unless the court orders otherwise) include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that the imputation in question was substantially true. Note: The defence of justification under section 25 of the Defamation Act 2005 is in addition to, and does not vitiate, limit or abrogate, the common law defence of justification. See section 24(1) of the Defamation Act 2005. [R 15.22 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

521

UCPR Parts 11-20

common law defence of justification. See section 15(1) of the Defamation Act 1974.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 15.23 15.23

[r 15.23.40] Particulars in relation to the defence of contextual truth

(1) Defence under section 16 of Defamation Act 1974 Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence under section 16 of the Defamation Act 1974 must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish: (a) that the imputation in question related to a matter of public interest or was published under qualified privilege, and (b) that the contextual imputations on which the defendant relies: (i) related to a matter of public interest or that they were published under qualified privilege, and (ii) are matters of substantial truth. (2) Defence under section 26 of Defamation Act 2005 Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence of contextual truth under section 26 of the Defamation Act 2005 must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that the contextual imputations on which the defendant relies are substantially true. [R 15.23 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 15.23 COMMENTARY [r 15.23.40]

Operation

Contextual imputations are pleaded by a defendant alleging the plaintiff’s imputations, if carried, do not further harm the reputation of the plaintiff because of the substantial truth of the contextual imputation – eg. a contextual imputation in the matter complained of that “the plaintiff is a convicted murderer” would “swamp” the plaintiff’s imputation that the “plaintiff is unkind to his mother”. 15.24 Particulars in relation to defence of absolute privilege (1) This rule applies: (a) to a defence of absolute privilege under Division 3 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974 or under section 27 of the Defamation Act 2005, and (b) to the defence of absolute privilege at common law. (2) Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence of absolute privilege to which this rule applies must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that the imputation or matter complained of was published under absolute privilege. [R 15.24 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

15.25 Particulars in relation to defences for publication of public and official documents (1) Defence under section 25 of Defamation Act 1974 Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence under section 25 of the Defamation Act 1974 must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that the matter complained of was: (a) a document or record specified as a document or record to which that section applies or a copy of such a document or record, or (b) a fair extract or fair abstract from, or a fair summary of, such a document or record. (2) Defence under section 27 of Defamation Act 1974 Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence under section 27 of the Defamation Act 1974 must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that the matter complained of was a notice published in accordance with the direction of a court. 522

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 15 – Particulars Division 4 – Defamation

r 15.27

(3) Defence under section 28 of Defamation Act 2005 Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence under section 28 of the Defamation Act 2005 must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that the matter complained of was contained in: (a) a public document or a fair copy of a public document, or (b) a fair summary of, or a fair extract from, a public document. [R 15.25 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

15.26

Particulars in relation to defences of fair report of proceedings of public concern

(1) Defences under section 24 of Defamation Act 1974 Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence under section 24 of the Defamation Act 1974 must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that: (a) the matter complained of was a fair protected report, or (b) the matter complained of was a later publication by the defendant of: (i) a protected report or a copy of the protected report, or a fair extract or fair abstract from, or fair summary of, a protected report that was previously published by another person, or (ii) material purporting to be a protected report or a copy of the protected report, or of a fair extract or fair abstract from, or fair summary of, material purporting to be a protected report that was previously published by another person, and the defendant did not have knowledge that should have made the defendant aware that the protected report is not fair or the material purporting to be a protected report was not a protected report or is not fair. (2) Defences under section 29 of Defamation Act 2005 Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence under section 29 of the Defamation Act 2005 must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that: (a) the matter complained of was, or was contained in, a fair report of any proceedings of public concern, or (b) the matter complained of: (i) was, or was contained in, an earlier published report of proceedings of public concern, and (ii) was, or was contained in, a fair copy of, a fair summary of, or a fair extract from, the earlier published report, and the defendant had no knowledge that would reasonably make the defendant aware that the earlier published report was not fair. [R 15.26 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

Particulars in relation to defence of qualified privilege

(1) This rule applies: (a) to a defence under Division 4 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974 or section 30 of the Defamation Act 2005, and (b) to any other defence of qualified privilege other than any of the following: (i) a defence under Division 5, 6 or 7 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974, (ii) a defence under section 28, 29 or 31 of the Defamation Act 2005, (iii) the defence of fair comment at common law. (2) Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence of qualified privilege to which this rule applies must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that the imputation or matter complained of was published under qualified privilege. [R 15.27 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

523

UCPR Parts 11-20

15.27

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 15.28

[r 15.27.40]

RULE 15.27 COMMENTARY [r 15.27.40]

Operation

Full particulars are required for both common law and statutory qualified privilege defences where pleaded, the latter necessarily addressing the “checklist” in the statutes. 15.28 Particulars in relation to defences of comment and honest opinion (cf SCR Part 67, rule 17(3) – (6); DCR Part 49, rule 16(3) – (6))

(1) Defences under Division 7 of Part 3 of Defamation Act 1974 Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence of comment under Division 7 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974 must include: (a) particulars identifying the material on which it is alleged that the matter alleged to be comment was comment and identifying to what extent that material is alleged to be proper material for comment, and (b) as to material alleged to be proper material for comment, particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that allegation. (c) if the defendant relies on a defence under section 33 of that Act—particulars identifying the servant or agent of the defendant whose comment it is alleged to be. Note: A defence of fair comment under Division 7 of Part 3 of the Defamation Act 1974 applies to the exclusion of the common law defence of fair comment. See section 29 of the Defamation Act 1974.

(2) Defences under section 31 of Defamation Act 2005 Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence of honest opinion under section 31 of the Defamation Act 2005 must include: (a) particulars identifying the material on which it is alleged that the matter alleged to be an opinion was an opinion and identifying to what extent that material is alleged to be proper material, and (b) as to material alleged to be proper material, particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that allegation, and (c) if the defendant relies on a defence under section 31(2) of that Act—particulars identifying the employee or agent of the defendant whose opinion it is alleged to be, and (d) if the defendant relies on a defence under section 31(3) of that Act—particulars identifying the commentator whose opinion it is alleged to be. Note: A defence of honest opinion under section 31 of the Defamation Act 2005 is in addition to, and does not vitiate, limit or abrogate, the common law defence of fair comment. See section 24(1) of the Defamation Act 2005.

(3) Defence of fair comment at common law Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence of fair comment at common law must include: (a) particulars identifying the material on which it is alleged that the matter alleged to be comment was comment and identifying to what extent that material is alleged to be based on true facts or material that was published under privilege, and (b) as to material alleged to be true facts or material that was published under privilege, particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that allegation. Note: See note to subrule (2). [R 15.28 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

524

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 15 – Particulars Division 4 – Defamation

[r 15.30.40] 15.29

r 15.31

Particulars in relation to defence of innocent dissemination

Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence under section 32 of the Defamation Act 2005 must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that: (a) the defendant published the matter complained of merely in the capacity, or as an employee or agent, of a subordinate distributor, and (b) the defendant neither knew, nor ought reasonably to have known, that the matter was defamatory, and (c) the defendant’s lack of knowledge was not due to any negligence on the part of the defendant. [R 15.29 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

15.30

Particulars in relation to defence of triviality

(1) This rule applies to: (a) a defence under section 13 of the Defamation Act 1974, and (b) a defence under section 33 of the Defamation Act 2005. (2) Without limiting rule 15.21, the particulars required by rule 15.1 for a defence to which this rule applies must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the defendant relies to establish that the circumstances of publication of the matter complained of were such that the plaintiff was unlikely to sustain any harm. [R 15.30 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 15.30 COMMENTARY [r 15.30.40]

Operation

Note that s 13 of the Defamation Act 1974 does not include the word “any” before “harm” and may include hurt feelings – see the discussion of this issue in Szanto v Melville [2011] VSC 574 at [157]–[164] and in Enders v Erbas [2014] Aust Torts Reports 82-161; [2014] NSWCA 70 at [95]–[108]. See further Jones v Sutton (2004) 61 NSWLR 614; [2004] NSWCA 439, compare with Papaconstuntinos v Holmes ′a Court [2011] NSWCA 59. 15.31

Particulars concerning grounds that defeat defamation defences

(cf SCR Part 67, rule 19(1); DCR Part 49, rule 18)

(1) If a plaintiff intends to meet any defamation defence: (a) by alleging that the defendant was actuated by express malice in the publication of the matter complained of, or (b) by relying on any matter which, under the Defamation Act 1974 or the Defamation Act 2005, defeats the defence, then the particulars required by rule 15.1 in relation to the reply must include particulars of the facts, matters and circumstances on which the plaintiff relies to establish that allegation or matter of defeasance. (2) The particulars required by subrule (1) must be set out in the reply, or, if that is inconvenient, may be set out in a separate document, referred to in the reply, and that document must be filed and served with the reply.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

UCPR Parts 11-20

[R 15.31 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

525

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 15.32 15.32

[r 15.32.40] Particulars concerning damages

(cf SCR Part 67, rule 19(2) and (3); DCR Part 49, rule 18)

The plaintiff must give: (a) particulars of facts, matters and circumstances on which the plaintiff will rely in support of a claim for aggravated damages, and (b) particulars of any claim the plaintiff makes by way of: (i) special damages, or (ii) any claim for general loss of business or custom. [R 15.32 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

RULE 15.32 COMMENTARY [r 15.32.40]

Operation

Aggravated damages are warranted only where the conduct in question has been established as being lacking in bona fides, improper or unjustifiable: Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497; 51 SR (NSW) 173; 68 WN (NSW) 187 at 514. Other conduct of the defendants, such as the manner and extent of publication, is capable of aggravating the harm done by a defamatory publication and is not required to meet the Triggell v Pheeney test. The conduct of the proceedings is in a different category because the law sanctions the conduct of a vigorous defence, whereas an unjustifiable or improper defence will sound in additional damages: McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 7) (2013) 277 FLR 418; [2013] NSWSC 933. Special damages compensate for any loss of business or earnings the plaintiff may have suffered as a result of the defamation. Damage from each imputation is presumed. However, in respect of special damages, the plaintiff has the onus of establishing that such damage was caused by the imputations, and was not too remote - Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225. The precise nature, amount and the basis of quantification should be particularised.

526

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 16 – Default judgment [r 16.1.40]

r 16.2

PART 16 – DEFAULT JUDGMENT Commentary by Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court. Updated by Mandy Tibbey, Barrister.

PART 16 COMMENTARY [r Pt16.20]

General comments on Part 16

A default judgment is not a judgment given by the court but is a judgment entered in accordance with rules of court where a defendant has failed to file a defence or is otherwise in default in relation to a defence. This Part does not deal with judgments and orders that may be made by the court as a result of a party being in default of the rules generally or in respect of any directions that may have been made as part of the case management of the proceedings (see Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 61(3)). Most of the judgments entered in the Local Court are default judgments for liquidated claims. Default judgments in the District Court are generally restricted to liquidated claims. In the Supreme Court most default judgments relate to possession of land. Default judgments for detention of goods are relatively rare in all jurisdictions. As to default judgments for unliquidated claims, see discussion at [r 16.7.20]. 16.1 Application of Part (cf SCR Part 17, rule 1; DCR Part 13, rule 1; LCR Part 11, rule 1)

This Part applies to proceedings commenced by statement of claim.

RULE 16.1 COMMENTARY [r 16.1.40]

Operation

Default judgment can only be sought in proceedings commenced by statement of claim. Despite this provision, the default judgment provisions will apply if the court makes an order that proceedings commenced by summons continue on pleadings pursuant to r 6.6. The default judgment provisions also apply in respect of any statements of cross-claim (see rr 9.1(3) and 9.5). Default judgment cannot be sought in proceedings commenced by summons. Because a default judgment can only be entered, as of right, for liquidated claims, possession of land, detention of goods, for damages to be assessed or a combination of these, the standard default judgment procedure is not appropriate for proceedings which seek other types of relief. See [r 16.10.20] for the procedure that applies in cases where other relief is being sought. Because of this restriction, the standard default judgment procedure is not generally appropriate for statements of claim filed in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court. Nor is the procedure available in proceedings commenced by Originating Process under the Corporation Rules (see Re Salfa Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] NSWSC 1493. If proceedings are not properly commenced by statement of claim, then a plaintiff will not be able to rely upon such proceedings having been accepted by the registry in attempting to enliven Pt 16 where the rules of court state that proceedings ought to have been commenced in some other way: Wily v King [2010] NSWSC 352. 16.2

Definition of “in default”

(1) A defendant is in default for the purposes of this Part: (a) if the defendant fails to file a defence within the time limited by rule 14.3(1) or within such further time as the court allows, or (b) if the defendant fails to file any affidavit verifying his or her defence in accordance with any requirement of these rules, or (c) if, the defendant having duly filed a defence, the court orders the defence to be struck out. (2) Despite subrule (1), a defendant is not in default if the defendant: (a) has made a payment towards a liquidated claim under rule 6.17, or (b) has filed an acknowledgment of claim under rule 20.34, or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

527

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf SCR Part 17, rule 2; DCR Part 13, rule 1; LCR Part 11, rule 1)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 16.2

[r 16.2.20] (c)

has filed a defence after the time limited by these rules or allowed by the court, but before a default judgment is given against the defendant.

[Subr (2) am Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]] [R 16.2 am Rule 327 of 2007]

RULE 16.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 16.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 16.2.40] Bars to default judgment .......................................................................................................................... [r 16.2.60]

[r 16.2.20]

Comparison

A defendant will be in default if the defendant fails to file a defence in accordance with r 14.3(1), where a defence is struck-out (eg pursuant to r 14.28 or if the defence is not verified.pursuant to r 14.23(2). The rule provides certain exceptions including where an acknowledgment of claim has been filed or full payment has been made in respect of the claim. The rule specifically provides that a defendant is not in default if a defence is filed, even if it is filed late, but before default judgment is entered (r 16.2(c)). [r 16.2.40]

Operation

The time to file a defence is generally 28 days after the statement of claim is served upon the defendant: r 14.3(1). This time may be extended by the court, and if this has been done the defendant will not be in default until the extended time has passed. A defendant will not be prevented from filing a defence after the time to file a defence has passed, although the court may subsequently reject the defence pursuant to r 4.10(4); note that this is a rejection by the court and not by a registry officer. There will normally be a delay between when an application for default judgment is filed and when it is considered and entered by the registry. If the defendant files a defence in this intervening period default judgment should not be entered: Gill v Woodfin (1884) 25 Ch D 707. If a plaintiff wants to have a late filed defence struck-out they will need to apply by notice of motion. Verification of pleadings including the defence is required in the Supreme Court and District Court except for proceedings for defamation, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, death or personal injury: rr 14.22, 14.23. If a defence has been struck-out the court may grant leave to file a further defence before a certain date. Provided the further defence is filed by that date the defendant would not be in default. The court may order that a filed defence be struck out if a party fails to comply with other orders of the court See for example Zhu v Yingle Culture Exchange (Aust) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1339, where the court made orders for discovery and payment of costs, in default of which the court ordered that the defence be struck out. In Alstom Ltd v Sirakas [2012] NSWSC 1064 the discretion of the court to strike out a defence pursuant to r 12.7 was enlivened where a party failed to comply with court orders, to conduct his case with “due dispatch” and appeared to have abandoned the proceedings. In those circumstances, summary judgment was granted pursuant to r 13.1 but Lindsay J, noted (at [21]) that as a consequence of the defence having been struck out, the Plaintiff could have applied for a default judgment, pursuant to rule r 16.3(1)(a), read with rule r 16.2(1)(c). In Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd v Chowdhury [2012] NSWSC 592 the court held that a defence did not comply with court rules because it contained no pleadings and particulars and should not have been accepted for filing. The court refused to accept the defence pursuant to r 4.10(3) and 4.10(4), leaving it open to the plaintiff to apply for default judgment pursuant to rr 16.2 and 16.4. A defence will be struck out, in whole or in part, where it is plain and obvious that the defence is so clearly untenable that it cannot succeed: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; 38 ALJR 253; [1965] ALR 636; Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62; 23 ALJ 48; [1949] ALR 333; O’Brien v Bank of Western Australia Ltd (2013) 16 BPR 31705; [2013] NSWCA 71. If the whole of a defence is struck out, a plaintiff could apply for default judgment pursuant to Pt 16. Where a default judgment is set aside on a false basis (because a false affidavit was sworn, resulting in default judgment issuing, then being set aside) default judgment can be reinstated: Westpac Banking Corp oration Ltd v Kekatos [2015] NSWSC 1629 per Adamson J. 528

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 16 – Default judgment [r 16.2.60] [r 16.2.60]

r 16.3 Bars to default judgment

The entry of default judgment will not be permitted in the following circumstances (in addition to the circumstances noted in [r 16.2.40]): • in the Supreme Court, if service has been effected outside Australia pursuant to Pt 11 and if leave to proceed has not been granted; • if the defendant is a person under legal incapacity and a tutor has not entered an appearance: r 7.17. If no appearance has been filed by a tutor, then the plaintiff would need to apply for a tutor to be appointed before proceeding to enter default judgment. Note different provisions apply for the Local Court: r 7.17(2); • if proceedings were commenced against the defendants in their business name and the statement of claim has not been amended to name the defendants in their own names and if leave to proceed has not been granted: r 7.22; • if the defendant has filed a notice of payment pursuant to r 16.17(3). If the plaintiff wants to dispute that the full amount had been paid then a notice of motion will need to be filed; • if the defendant has filed an acknowledgment pursuant to r 20.34. In this event the registry will enter a judgment against the defendant pursuant to the acknowledgment: r 20.34(3); • if in a money claim, a notice to plead facts has been filed and no amended statement of claim has been subsequently filed: r 14.12. If an amended statement of claim is filed then the defendants have a further 14 days to file their defence; • if in a claim for possession any person has filed a notice of motion to be added as a defendant and that motion is still outstanding: r 16.4(2); • if the plaintiff has filed a notice of motion for summary judgment against the defendant before a defence has been filed: r 14.3(2); • if the plaintiff has filed an amended statement of claim pursuant to r 19.2 (ie within 28 days of filing the original statement of claim). The defendant has a further 14 days to file a defence from when the amended statement of claim is served: r 19.2(2); • if the statement of claim is served on the defendant more than six months after the date on which it was filed in the Supreme Court (or the Local Court), or more than one month after the statement of claim was filed in the District Court (unless the defendant is to be served interstate, in which case the statement of claim is valid for six months): r 6.2. The validity of the statement of claim for service can be extended. If the matter is not subject to case management this would be done by filing a notice of motion to be considered in chambers, supported by an affidavit detailing what attempts have been made to serve the defendant. If the matter is being case managed, the extension of the validity for service can be sought at a directions listing; • if the defendant has filed a notice of motion within 28 days of service of the statement of claim pursuant to r 12.11 (challenging the jurisdiction of the court), and that motion is still outstanding; • if the defendant is a bankrupt or a company in liquidation and leave to proceed has not been granted under the relevant legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 58; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 471B; • if there is already a default or other judgment entered against the defendant in the same proceedings. 16.3

Procedure where defendant in default

(1) If a defendant is in default, the plaintiff: (a) may apply for judgment to be given under this Part, according to the nature of his or her claim for relief, against the defendant in default, and (b) may carry on the proceedings against any other party to the proceedings. [Subr (1) am Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(1A) Unless the court otherwise orders, an application under this rule: (a) may be dealt with in the absence of the parties, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

529

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf SCR Part 17, rule 3; DCR Part 13, rule 1)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 16.3

[r 16.3.40] (b)

need not be served on the defendant.

[Subr (1A) insrt Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[29]]

(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, an application for judgment to be given under this Part must be accompanied by: (a) an affidavit of service of the statement of claim (the affidavit of service), and (b) an affidavit in support of the application (the affidavit in support). [Subr (2) am Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(3) An affidavit of service is unnecessary in relation to a statement of claim whose service has been effected by the Local Court under rule 10.1(2). [Subr (3) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

(4) Unless the court orders otherwise, an affidavit in support is valid for the purposes of an application only if it has been sworn within 14 days before the date on which the application is filed. [R 16.3 am Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 327 of 2007; Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 16.3 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 16.3.40] Affidavit of service .................................................................................................................................... [r 16.3.60] Procedure for applying for default judgment – new procedure .............................................................. [r 16.3.100] Applying for default judgment where no defence filed ........................................................................... [r 16.3.105] Applying for default judgment after a defence has been struck out ...................................................... [r 16.3.110] Warning before entry of default judgment .............................................................................................. [r 16.3.120] Setting aside a default judgment ............................................................................................................ [r 16.3.140] Defence filed after a default judgment entered ...................................................................................... [r 16.3.160] Costs of a default judgment ................................................................................................................... [r 16.3.180]

[r 16.3.40]

Operation

An application for default judgment is made by notice of motion to be considered in chambers. There are different approved forms depending on the nature of the claim: Possession of land Detention of goods Liquidated claims Unliquidated damages

Form Form Form Form

36 37 38 39

If the claim is a mixed claim, the plaintiff will need to draft an appropriate form depending on the component claims. No filing fee is payable on a notice of motion for a default judgment: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 cl 4(5)(e). An application for default judgment must be accompanied by an affidavit in support. The affidavit in support must be sworn within 14 days before the date of filing the application for default judgment: r 16.3(4). The approved notice of motion forms includes an appropriate affidavit. The affidavit should be sworn by the plaintiff or an appropriate officer of the plaintiff rather than by a solicitor or agent: see r 35.3 for persons who can swear an affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff. A plaintiff can enter default judgment against a defaulting defendant and carry on the proceedings against the other defendants, even though that defendant may have a joint liability with the other defendants: r 16.3(1); CPA s 95. [r 16.3.60]

Affidavit of service

An application for default judgment should be accompanied by an affidavit of service of the statement of claim as well as affidavit in support of the application. There may be one affidavit of service for each defendant, or one affidavit of service if each defendant was served by the same person. For the contents of an affidavit of service see r 35.8. The statement of claim must not be annexed to the affidavit of service, but the affidavit of service must clearly identify the document that was served (refer to case number and the date that the statement of claim was filed). The plaintiff may seek an exemption from the requirement to file an affidavit of service if the defendant has filed a notice of appearance, and more than 28 days have passed. The court will 530

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 16 – Default judgment [r 16.3.120]

r 16.3

take the appearance as an acknowledgment of service and may in the absence of an affidavit of service, assume that the statement of claim was served on the day the notice of appearance was filed. The affidavit in support of the application is also required to state when and how the statement of claim was served on each defendant: rr 16.4(3)(f), 16.5(2)(f) and 16.7(2)(d). This requirement is in addition to the requirement to file an affidavit of service. [r 16.3.100]

Procedure for applying for default judgment

Under the uniform rules an application for default judgment is made by filing a special form of notice of motion that includes the relevant affidavit in support. Normally the notice of motion will be accompanied by an affidavit, or affidavits of service. Entry of the default judgment will occur when the default judgment is recorded on the registry computer system or a form of the judgment is signed and sealed by a registrar: r 36.11(2)(a) and 36.11(2A)(a). The registry will either forward a notice to the plaintiff confirming that default judgment has been entered or forward a signed and dated copy of the judgment. Although registries used to allow a notice of motion for a writ to enforce the judgment to be filed with the notice of motion for default judgment, the Supreme, District and Local Courts no longer accepts a notice of motion for a writ until the relevant judgment has been entered. JusticeLink checks that a judgment has been entered against a defendant and has not been stayed or set aside before any enforcement action can be taken. [r 16.3.105]

Applying for default judgment where no defence filed

Where no defence is filed at all, it is possible to apply for default judgment pursuant to r 16.3: see discussion in Alesco Corp Ltd v Te Maari [2015] NSWSC 469 per Hallen J at [40]–[58], a situation where it was alleged that an employee had misappropriated money and she and her husband had failed to file a defence. [r 16.3.110]

Applying for default judgment after a defence has been struck out

If a defence has been struck-out and no subsequent defence has been filed then a plaintiff can apply for default judgment. If a defence has been struck-out on an application under CPA s 61(3)(c) (or UCPR r 12.7(2)), because of a default in complying with a direction or timetable, then the plaintiff can also apply for a consequent order that default judgment be entered. (See for example Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Baker [2013] NSWSC 1826 (failure to serve evidence) and Bechara v Bates (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1588 (failure to produce documents in answer to a Notice to Produce and failed to explain that failure, the defence was struck out by self-executing order and plaintiff was able to apply for default judgment under r 16.3). Any such application for default judgment still requires compliance with the requirement to provide an appropriate affidavit in support (as required by rr 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7 and 16.8), unless the court otherwise ordered; the court would have to provide reasons why an affidavit was not required: Gregory’s Transport Pty Ltd v Ray’s Haulage Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 333. For a discussion of the enforcement and effect of foreign judgments in the context of an application for default judgment, see Maleski v Hampson [2013] NSWSC 1794. [r 16.3.120]

Warning before entry of default judgment

Although there is no requirement to notify a defendant that is in default of an intention to apply for default judgment to be entered, it may nevertheless be appropriate in certain circumstances, particularly if a defendant has entered an appearance in the proceedings. See Redditch Benefit Building Society v Roberts [1940] Ch 415; [1940] 1 All ER 342; Pope v Aberdeen Transport Co Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 1550. If the defendant has sought further particulars before the time to file a defence has expired, and the plaintiff disputes that further particulars may be necessary, it would be prudent to advise the defendant before proceeding to enter default judgment – failure to do so may mean that the default judgment is more likely to be set aside and there may be an order for costs against the plaintiff. See IMG of America Pty Ltd v Townsend (unreported, NSWSC, Allen M, 25 July 1983); Mulric Pty Ltd v SD Myers Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 121. In appropriate cases the court may direct that the motion for default judgment be served notwithstanding r 16.3(1A)(b): Northumbrian Ice Cream Co Ltd v Breakaway Vending Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1216. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

531

UCPR Parts 11-20

If a defence is not filed within time, a plaintiff may apply for default judgment. (See for example BNY Trust Co of Australia Pty Ltd v Banksia Finance & Leasing Co Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1776; Atanaskovic t/as Hartnell v Robey [2014] NSWSC 150).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 16.3 [r 16.3.140]

[r 16.3.140] Setting aside a default judgment

The relevant rule relating to applications to set aside a default judgment is r 36.16(2)(a) and 36.16(2)(b). The general power to set aside judgment, contained in r 36.15 may also be relevant where default judgment has been entered: Fenato v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2010) 78 NSWLR 20; [2010] NSWCA 80. To succeed in an application to set aside default judgment the defendant must explain the delay in filing a defence and show that there is an arguable defence on the merits: Cohen v McWilliam (1995) 38 NSWLR 476; 128 FLR 263; Grave v Blazevic Holdings Pty Ltd (2010) 79 NSWLR 132; [2010] NSWCA 324; Jensen v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2011] NSWCA 36; Zippoz Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2011] NSWCA 164; National Australia Bank Ltd v Amed [2011] NSWSC 988; Driat Pty Ltd v Thomas [2012] NSWSC 71; Dunwoodie v Teachers Mutual Bank Ltd (2014) 9 BFRA 433; [2014] NSWCA 24 per McColl JA at [43]–[46]. See also National Australia Bank v Cavill Proteas Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 703 and Malak v Pepsico Australia Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 85. Although each application will need to be considered having regard to its particular facts, there will be circumstances where prejudice to the plaintiff may justify maintaining a default judgment that may have been irregularly entered: Arnold v Forsythe [2012] NSWCA 18; Acimall Australia v Cong Bui Buu t/a Austcraft Furnitures [2004] NSWLC 4. The court will also now have regard to CPA s 56 (the “overriding purpose”) in determining whether the particular circumstances of the case justify an application to set aside a default judgment: Borowiak v Hobbs [2006] NSWSC 1089; Westpac Banking Corp v Gilio [2011] NSWSC 1309. Any application to set aside a default judgment should be made as soon as possible after the default judgment comes to the attention of the defendant. If a clerical error has been made in entering a default judgment the error may be corrected pursuant to r 36.17 (the “slip” rule). If the plaintiff is aware of an error in the default judgment, and no enforcement action has been taken pursuant to the default judgment, the plaintiff should bring the error to the attention of the registry, without filing a notice of motion and incurring additional costs. On an application to set aside a default judgment the plaintiff will not generally be entitled to cross-examine a defendant as to the legitimacy of his or her defence: Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Lanmar Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 549. Cross-examination of the defendant might be appropriate where there is an assertion that the proposed defence is a sham or a fraud and that the application to set aside the default judgment is an abuse of process. A default judgment that has been entered illegally is liable to be set aside; for instance if the defendant is a foreign state and the requirements for service as set out in the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) have not been complied with: Pan v Bo (2008) 220 FLR 271; [2008] NSWSC 961. [r 16.3.160]

Defence filed after a default judgment entered

A defence filed after a default judgment has been entered will be a nullity if the default judgment is not set aside: Guardian Co-op Housing Society v Pritchard [2002] NSWSC 1002. The defendant will need to apply by notice of motion for the default judgment to be set aside. [r 16.3.180]

Costs of a default judgment

The costs that are to be allowed on a default judgment are the prescribed costs for entering a default judgment under cl 112 of the Legal Profession Regulation 2005 and Sch 2 of that regulation, together with the filing fee and any service expenses. These various components need to be identified in the affidavit in support of the motion as filing fees, service fees and solicitor’s fees: r 16.4(3)(e); r 16.5(2)(d); r 16.6(2)(d). The Legal Profession Regulation 2005 does not specify an amount of costs for default judgment for delivery of goods in the Supreme Court; the amount allowed for a default judgment on a liquidated claim in the Supreme Court is the amount that will be allowed. Service fees that can be claimed are limited to the service fees that would have been charged by the sheriff – see Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 2.

532

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 16 – Default judgment r 16.4

16.4

Default judgment on claim for possession of land

(cf SCR Part 17, rule 7)

(1) Subject to rule 36.8, if the plaintiff’s claim against a defendant in default is for possession of land only, judgment may be given for the plaintiff for possession of land, as against the defendant, and for costs. [Subr (1) am Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) If, before judgment is given, any person files notice of motion for the person’s addition as a defendant, judgment may not be given under this rule until the motion is disposed of. [Subr (2) subst Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[3]]

[Subr (3) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[5]; Rule 483 of 2011, Sch 1[1]; Rule 189 of 2011, Sch 1[1]; Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[10]; Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[9] and [10]; Act 27 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2.58; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[16] and [17]]

(4) A reference in this rule to a residential tenancy agreement within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 is taken to include a reference to a residential tenancy agreement within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 as in force before its repeal. [Subr (4) insrt Rule 189 of 2011, Sch 1[2]] [R 16.4 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 483 of 2011; Rule 189 of 2011; Rule 501 of 2009; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 327 of 2007; Act 27 of 2007; Rule 716 of 2006] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

533

UCPR Parts 11-20

(3) The relevant affidavit in support: (a) must identify any persons (other than parties to the proceedings) who were in occupation of the whole or any part of the land: (i) as at the time the originating process was filed, or (ii) if the claim for possession arises from an amendment to the originating process, as at the time the amendment was made, and, if any such person was in occupation of the land pursuant to a right of occupation under a residential tenancy agreement within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010, must contain a statement to that effect, and (b) in relation to each such person: (i) must state that the person’s occupation of the land is not to be disturbed, or (ii) must state that the person is no longer in occupation of any part of the land, or (iii) must state that the person has been served with a notice pursuant to rule 6.8 and that the time allowed for the person to apply to the court to be joined as a defendant has now passed, as the case requires, and (c) if the claim for possession of the land arises from a default in the payment of money, must give particulars of the default (including any payments made to date to reduce the amount owing and the current amount owing taking into account any such payments), and (d) must state the source of the deponent’s knowledge of the matters stated in the affidavit concerning the occupation of the land and any default in the payment of money referred to in paragraph (c), and (e) must state whether costs are claimed and, if so, how much is claimed for costs, indicating: (i) how much is claimed on account of professional costs (not exceeding the amount fixed by the regulations made for the purposes of section 59 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014), and (ii) how much is claimed on account of filing fees, and (iii) how much is claimed on account of the costs of serving the originating process, and (f) must state when and how the originating process was served on the defendant.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 16.4

[r 16.4.20]

RULE 16.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 16.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 16.4.40] Possible bars to possession proceedings ................................................................................................ [r 16.4.60] Service of the statement of claim on defendants and “occupiers” .......................................................... [r 16.4.80] “notice to occupiers” and application to be joined as a defendant ........................................................ [r 16.4.100] Mortgagee repossession of rented properties ........................................................................................ [r 16.4.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 16.4.1000]

[r 16.4.20]

Comparison

Subrule 3(d), (e) and (f) applies to all types of default judgment applications. The District Court has jurisdiction to consider claims for possession of land, subject to a jurisdictional limit of $20,000 (District Court Act 1973 s 133(1)). The provisions of this rule now apply to a claim for possession of land filed in the District Court. [r 16.4.40]

Operation

Proceedings for possession of land must be commenced by statement of claim: r 6.3 and Sch 6, Pt 1 Item 6. Land is not defined in the Civil Procedure Act 2005 or the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 however see the broad definition in Supreme Court Act 1970 s 19. The plaintiff must have an immediate right of possession at the time the statement of claim issues. In proceedings for recovery of premises any interest that the defendant has in the land must be terminated before proceedings are commenced. For tenanted premises subject to a periodic tenancy this will normally require the service of a notice to quit. See also Real Property Act 1900 s 57 and Conveyancing Act 1919 s 111 in respect of notices that need to be provided before a mortgagor exercises a power of sale. If a mortgaged property is tenanted then notice must be served on the tenants at least 30 days before possession can be taken of the property: Residential Tenancies Act 1987 s 71A (superseded by Residential Tenancies Act 2010 s 122 on 31 January 2011) (see [r 16.4.120]). The order sought in the statement of claim is for judgment for possession of land. The relevant land must be accurately described in the statement of claim, as default judgment can only be entered for the land as so described. If the description of the land needs to be amended, this can be done without leave pursuant to r 19.1, but the time for the defendant to file a defence would begin to run again from when the amended statement of claim was served. In addition to possession, the statement of claim can seek such other relief as is appropriate. The following forms of relief would still permit default judgment to be entered: amounts unpaid under the mortgage; amounts unpaid under the tenancy before the tenancy was terminated; mesne profits (ie damages for wrongful occupation of the land). The approved form of notice of motion for default judgment for possession is Form 36 or Form 36A if a claim for a liquidated amount is also made. An application for striking out a defence and issuing of default judgment under r 16.4 can be an alternative to seeking summary judgment pursuant to r 13.1: NAB Ltd v Thirup [2011] NSWSC 911. [r 16.4.60]

Possible bars to possession proceedings

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction where the premises are prescribed premises: Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act 1948 s 69(1); nor where the rent has not exceeded $25.20 per week: Landlord and Tenant Act 1899 s 2A. Generally a landlord cannot seek possession of residential premises subject to a residential tenancy agreement other than in the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal: Residential Tenancies Act 2010 s 122. Proceedings for recovery of a “farm” under a mortgage may be prevented if the provisions of the Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994 have not been complied with: see s 8(1) of that Act. There was a practice requiring the affidavit in support to specifically state that these provisions did not apply to the proceedings. Although an explicit statement is no longer required, the statement of claim and affidavit in support should include sufficient information to make it apparent that these provisions do not apply. If this is not apparent from the statement of claim and the affidavit in support of the application, the registry may require additional affidavit evidence to be provided. Default judgment for possession of a company title unit is not appropriate: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v MacDonald [2000] NSWSC 791. 534

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 16 – Default judgment [r 16.4.120] [r 16.4.80]

r 16.4 Service of the statement of claim on defendants and “occupiers”

The statement of claim should name as defendants all persons against whom the plaintiff wants to obtain a judgment. Each defendant should be served personally: r 10.20(2)(a). Substituted service may be allowed if a defendant is unable to be served personally without undue delay or expense: r 10.14 (substituted service generally) and r 10.15 (substituted service by affixing process to the land). Where an occupier is in occupation, but is not joined as a defendant, then the plaintiff must comply with r 6.8 and either state in the statement of claim that the occupiers’ occupation is not to be disturbed, or serve the statement of claim and a notice to occupiers on each occupier. Ideally each occupier should be served personally, but they may be served by leaving the documents on the land (normally in the mail box) addressed to them by name, or if this unknown “to the occupier”: r 6.8(2). See also [r 16.4.120] as to requirements to provide notice to tenant occupiers of mortgaged properties. [r 16.4.100]

“notice to occupiers” and application to be joined as a defendant

The notice to occupiers is an approved form, which is annexed to the statement of claim: Form 5. It advises the occupiers that they may apply to the court to be added as defendants, and that if they do not apply within 10 days they may be evicted under a judgment entered against the defendant. The relevant occupiers are those at the time the statement of claim is issued, or if the statement of claim is amended to add a claim for possession of land, the occupiers at the time the amended statement of claim is filed. If the actual identity or numbers of occupiers is not known and cannot be readily ascertained sufficient copies of the notice should be left to satisfy the court that all occupiers have been notified. Normally the notice to occupiers is served around the same time as the statement of claim is served on the defendants. When the defendants are served they are commonly asked whether there were any occupiers (other than themselves). There is no definition of “occupier” in the Act or Rules. Sometimes occupation denotes legal possession in the technical sense, sometimes mere physical presence: Pro-Campo Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax (NSW) (1981) 12 ATR 26; 81 ATC 4270 at 4276. A lessee is an occupier, however family members residing with the lessee are only residents or inhabitants: Carter v Carroll (1967) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 17; [1968] 3 NSWR 542 at 546-547 (MSWR); National Commercial Banking Corp of Australia Ltd v MRM Holdings Pty Ltd (1983) 3 BPR 9339. It is not intended that every person whose fate must depend on the fate of the tenant must receive a notice: Kerr v Sheriff (NSW) (1996) 9 BPR 16215. For discussion of when an occupier need not be added as a defendant see Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd v Windermere Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 421. See also [r 16.4.120] as to requirements to provide notice to tenants of mortgaged properties before taking possession of the property. Mortgagee repossession of rented properties

From 19 June 2009 Residential Tenancies Act 1987 s 71A (superseded by Residential Tenancies Act 2010 s 122 on 31 January 2011) has required mortgagees to give tenants a minimum of 30 days notice in writing, before taking possession of the property. Section 122(2)(a) requires the affidavit in support of the motion for default judgment to specify if any of the occupiers are in occupation pursuant to a residential tenancy agreement under the Act. If there are no occupiers at the time the statement of claim was issued this does not need to be addressed. If there were any occupiers under a tenancy agreement this should be mentioned in paragraph 4 of the approved form. If those tenants have been given notice under s 122 this can be also noted in paragraph 5 of the approved form. The occupation of the property by tenants who have not been served under s 122(1) does not prevent default judgment being entered, but will mean that a writ of possession cannot be executed till at least 30 days have passed since the notice to vacate was given. See UCPR r 39.3A. There is no prescribed form of notice, but the notice to vacate must specify the date by which the former tenant is to vacate the premises, and that date must be not less than 30 days after the date on which the notice is given: s 122(2). See s 130 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 and Residential Tenancies Regulation 2006 cl 28 (superseded by Residential Tenancies Act 2010 s 122 on 31 January 2011) as to the methods by which the notice may be given; service by post to the residential premises or to the tenants usual place of business or employment will be sufficient. If notice was given by post then notice will be deemed to have been effected 5 working days later: Interpretation Act 1987 s 76. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

535

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 16.4.120]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 16.5

[r 16.4.1000]

[r 16.4.1000]

References

See definition of land in Supreme Court Act 1970 s 19: Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 20 (which replaces Supreme Court Act 1970 ss 79 and 92) as to what constitutes a claim for possession of land. 16.5

Default judgment on claim for detention of goods

(cf SCR Part 17, rule 6)

(1) If judgment (a) (b)

the plaintiff’s claim against a defendant in default relates to the detention of goods only, may be given for the plaintiff against the defendant, in accordance with the plaintiff’s claim: for delivery of the goods to the plaintiff and for costs, or for payment to the plaintiff of the value of the goods (as assessed by or in accordance with the directions of the court) and for costs, at the plaintiff’s option. Note: See Part 30 for provisions as to assessment of value of goods.

[Subr (1) am Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) The relevant affidavit in support: (a) must state which goods have, and which have not, been delivered to the plaintiff since the time the originating process was filed, and (b) must give particulars of any payments that the defendant has made to the plaintiff in respect of the goods or state that no such payments have been made, as the case may be, since the time the originating process was filed, and (c) must state the source of the deponent’s knowledge of the matters stated in the affidavit concerning the delivery or non-delivery of the goods, and (d) must state whether costs are claimed and, if so, how much is claimed for costs, indicating: (i) how much is claimed on account of professional costs (not exceeding the amount fixed by the regulations made for the purposes of section 59 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014), and (ii) how much is claimed on account of filing fees, and (iii) how much is claimed on account of the costs of serving the originating process, and (e) must state when and how the originating process was served on the defendant. [Subr (2) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[5]; Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[11] and [12]; Act 27 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2.58; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[16] and [17]] [R 16.5 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 327 of 2007; Act 27 of 2007; Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 16.5 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 16.5.40] Default judgment for delivery of the goods .............................................................................................. [r 16.5.60] Default judgment for payment of the value of the goods ......................................................................... [r 16.5.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 16.5.1000]

[r 16.5.40]

Operation

For this rule to be operative the proceedings for detention of goods must have been commenced by statement of claim. The order sought in the statement of claim is for judgment for delivery of specified goods. The relevant goods must be accurately described in the statement of claim as default judgment can only be entered in respect of goods as they are described in the statement of claim. The goods should be described with sufficient particularity that the defendant can identify the goods to comply with the judgment, and the sheriff can identify the goods if they have to be seized from the defendant. If there is more than one item of goods, the relevant items should be listed in a schedule in the statement of claim. If the description of the goods needs to be amended, this can be done without leave pursuant to r 19.1, but the time for the defendant to file a 536

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 16 – Default judgment [r 16.5.1000]

r 16.6

defence would begin to run again from when the amended statement of claim was served. In addition to delivery of the goods, the statement of claim can seek such other relief as is appropriate, including damages for the detention of the goods and costs. The motion for default judgment must state whether the plaintiff seeks judgment for delivery of the goods or for the value of the goods as assessed. The affidavit in support of the motion must specify whether any of the goods have been delivered to the plaintiff since the statement of claim was issued, and whether any payments have been made to the plaintiff in respect of the goods. If payments have been made in respect of the goods, this will bar entry of default judgment for delivery of the goods. The approved form of notice of motion for default judgment for detention of goods is Form 37. The solicitor’s costs that are to be allowed on a default judgment are the prescribed costs for entering a default judgment under cl 112 of the Legal Profession Regulation 2005 and Sch 2 of that regulation. The Legal Profession Regulation 2005 does not however specify an amount of costs for default judgment for delivery of goods in the Supreme Court; the amount allowed for a default judgment on a liquidated claim in the Supreme Court is the amount that will be allowed. [r 16.5.60]

Default judgment for delivery of the goods

If default judgment is entered for delivery of the goods, this can be enforced by way of a writ of delivery: CPA s 105. The application for default judgment can be for fewer than all of the goods referred to in the statement of claim, if some of the goods have been delivered to the plaintiff in the meantime. Any goods that have been delivered or returned should be clearly identified in the affidavit in support of the application. See r 39.3(3) as to requirements for an affidavit in support of a writ of delivery. If the relevant goods are not delivered by the defendant or able to be seized by the sheriff, or the goods delivered are damaged or not the goods that were sought in the statement of claim, the plaintiff can file a further motion seeking such relief as is appropriate – see CPA s 93. [r 16.5.80]

Default judgment for payment of the value of the goods

If default judgment is entered for payment of the value of the goods as assessed, the judgment cannot be enforced until the value of the goods has been determined. If costs have been sought in the application, these will be allowed for in the judgment at the prescribed rate, but are only costs up until the entry of default judgment (ie there is no order for costs in relation to the assessment hearing). The registry will list the matter for callover, directions or otherwise, with the intent that the matter proceed to a hearing to assess the value of the goods: rr 30.1, 30.2. Even though a defence may not have been filed the defendant may wish to defend the assessment hearing, and will be entitled to be heard on the assessment hearing provided a notice of appearance has been entered in the proceedings. The plaintiff is entitled to file a notice of motion seeking such relief as may be appropriate which can be heard with the assessment hearing: CPA s 93. [r 16.5.1000]

References

CPA ss 93, 105 – Power of the court to give a judgment for possession of goods and to issue a writ for delivery of goods; rr 30.1, 30.2 re assessment of value of goods; r 39.3(3) as to the affidavit in support of a writ for delivery. 16.6

Default judgment on debt or liquidated claim

(1) If the plaintiff’s claim against a defendant in default is for a debt or liquidated claim or for a claim for unliquidated damages of the kind referred to in rule 14.13(2), judgment may be given for the plaintiff against the defendant for: (a) a sum not exceeding the sum claimed, and (b) interest up to judgment, and (c) costs. [Subr (1) am Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) The relevant affidavit in support: (a) must state the amount due to the plaintiff, in respect of the cause of action for which the proceedings were commenced, as at the time the originating process was filed, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

537

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf SCR Part 17, rule 4; DCR Part 13, rule 1; LCR Part 11, rule 1)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 16.6

[r 16.6.40] (b)

must give particulars of any reduction of that amount, and costs, as a consequence of any payments made, or credits accrued, since the time the originating process was filed, and (c) must state the source of the deponent’s knowledge of the matters stated in the affidavit concerning the debt or debts, and (d) must state the amount claimed by way of interest, and (e) must state whether costs are claimed and, if so, how much is claimed for costs, indicating: (i) how much is claimed on account of professional costs (not exceeding the amount fixed by the regulations made for the purposes of section 59 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014), and (ii) how much is claimed on account of filing fees, and (iii) how much is claimed on account of the costs of serving the originating process, and (f) must state when and how the originating process was served on the defendant. [Subr (2) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[5]; Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[13] and [14]; Act 27 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2.58; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[16] and [17]] [R 16.6 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 327 of 2007; Act 27 of 2007; Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 16.6 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 16.6.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 16.6.1000]

[r 16.6.40]

Operation

This rule applies to proceedings where the plaintiff seeks judgment for a liquidated debt or demand. In proceedings where r 14.13 applies, the amounts paid, or the quotes obtained and relied upon should be listed and totalled to form the “liquidated” demand. The claim can include a claim for interest pursuant to the terms of a contract or may seek interest up to judgment at such rates as are provided by CPA s 100: see UCPR r 36.7 and Practice Note SC Gen 16 and Practice Note DC (Civil) No 15. The claim for interest and its basis must be clearly stated in the statement of claim. The term “debt or liquidated claim” used in r 16.6 is not defined in the UCPR. A claim is not necessarily one for a liquidated amount merely because it can be readily quantified. For a discussion of whether a claim is a “liquidated claim” see Arnold v Forsythe [2012] NSWCA 18 per Sackville AJA at [44]–[68]. The requirement of r 16.6(2)(f) to state how the originating Statement of Claim was served must be adhered to, and failure to do so can be raised on appeal, even if not raised at first instance, as entering judgment without r 16.6(2)(f) being satisfied constitutes an irregularity that is a matter of law and, pursuant to UCPR r 36.15(1), the court has a discretion as to whether or not to set aside default judgment irregularly entered: Violi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] NSWCA 152 per Emmett JA at [66]–[71]; Bergin CJ in Eq at [91] and Sackville AJA at [123]–[126]. Default judgment on a liquidated claim cannot be entered for a principal amount greater than was claimed in the statement of claim. The application for default judgment is in approved (Form 38). The affidavit in support of the application is also required to state when and how the statement of claim was served on each defendant: r 16.6(2)(f). This requirement is in addition to the requirement to file an affidavit of service. The requirement for the affidavit in support is set out in r 16.3(2). See Gregory’s Transport Pty Ltd v Ray’s Haulage Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 333. Default judgment is entered irregularly where statement of claim did not plead material facts demonstrating that liability to pay a sum had accrued, as required by the rules of pleading, and did not plead a claim for a debt or liquidated sum within the meaning of r 16.6: Arnold v Forsythe [2012] NSWCA 18, applying Fenato v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2010) 78 NSWLR 20; [2010] NSWCA 80. A liquidator’s cause of action to recover money as a debt due to the company pursuant to s 588M of the Corporations Act is not for a “debt or liquidated claim” and cannot be commenced by statement of claim or default judgment sought on it: Wily v King [2010] NSWSC 352. 538

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 16 – Default judgment [r 16.7.40]

r 16.7

In Moon v Mun [2012] NSWSC 973, where a Local Court Magistrate purported to proceed without an affidavit in support being tendered, as required in r 16.6 and did not purport to rely on the power in r 16.3 to “otherwise order” and provide reasons for “otherwise ordering”, Schmidt J held (at [23]) that he would not be empowered to proceed under r 16.6. This decision was overturned upon appeal, but not on this point: Moon v Mun [2013] NSWCA 217. See also Ion v Danutz [2012] NSWSC 941 per Harrison AsJ, to the same effect. Recovery, on a common money count, of secret commission paid, can amount to a debt or liquidated claim: Woolworths Ltd v Wills [2013] NSWSC 1417 (20 September 2013) per Lindsay J at [12]–[13]. [r 16.6.1000]

References

UCPR r 36.7 and Practice Note DC (Civil) No 15 – Interest Rates. 16.7

Default judgment on claim for unliquidated damages

(cf SCR Part 17, rule 5)

(1) If the plaintiff’s claim against a defendant in default is for unliquidated damages only, judgment may be given for the plaintiff against the defendant for damages to be assessed and for costs. Note: See Part 30 for provisions as to assessment of damages. [Subr (1) am Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) The relevant affidavit in support: (a) must state that the matter has not been settled with the defendant, and (b) must state the source of the deponent’s knowledge of the matters stated in the affidavit concerning the claim, and (c) must state whether costs are claimed and, if so, how much is claimed for costs, indicating: (i) how much is claimed on account of professional costs (not exceeding the amount fixed by the regulations made for the purposes of section 59 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014), and (ii) how much is claimed on account of filing fees, and (iii) how much is claimed on account of the costs of serving the originating process, and (d) must state when and how the originating process was served on the defendant. [Subr (2) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[5]; Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[15] and [16]; Act 27 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2.58; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[16] and [17]] [R 16.7 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 327 of 2007; Act 27 of 2007; Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 16.7 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 16.7.40] Application for default judgment ............................................................................................................... [r 16.7.45] Application ................................................................................................................................................ [r 16.7.50] Assessment hearing ................................................................................................................................. [r 16.7.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 16.7.1000]

Operation

In the Supreme Court and the District Court, statements of claim for unliquidated claims are now case managed from the filing of the statement of claim. New statements of claim are listed for directions before a registrar (or a judge in respect of some specialist lists). Directions made by the registrar (or judge) will have regard to the objects of case management set out in s 57 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. Although plaintiffs in unliquidated claim proceedings in the Supreme Court have been able to apply for default judgment where the defendant is in default of filing a defence. There is usually little practical advantage in so doing. Most defendants in personal injury cases (the vast bulk of unliquidated claims) are insured and defences are regularly filed later than 28 days after the statement of claim has been served. Defendants will often apply for © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

539

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 16.7.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 16.7

[r 16.7.40]

an extension of time to file their defences when the matter is listed for directions, and this will (at least in the Supreme Court) usually be granted. The time that is reasonable for filing a defence will depend on the complexity of the case. [r 16.7.45]

Application for default judgment

In practice, it is generally more effective to seek appropriate directions from the registrar (or judge) and admissions from the defendant as part of the case management process. If a defendant is in default the registrar (or judge) can enter default judgment, or make directions to like effect as part of the case management of the proceedings; see r 16.10. If a matter is in the course of case management it is not appropriate for default judgment to be entered without leave of the court: Altarama Ltd v Forsyth [1981] 1 NSWLR 188. This effectively means that the application for default judgment under this rule can only be made after the defendant is in default and before the matter is listed for directions, otherwise the application should be brought pursuant to r 16.10. There may be some tactical advantage in applying for default judgment under this rule if the defendant is known to be uninsured and it is clear that there is no real defence as to the question of liability. In the District Court, plaintiffs were encouraged to apply for an order for judgment by being offered a fast track and an early listing of the assessment hearing, although the common result was that an order for judgment resulted in a defence being filed. A default judgment entered pursuant to this rule is not automatically set aside when a defence is filed. The court may treat the defence as a nullity if the default judgment has not been set aside: see [r 16.3.160]. If in an unliquidated claim a judicial officer gives judgment for a party under r 16.7 and proceeds to make a determination as to quantum without an assessment hearing, that decision will be set aside as being irregular and procedurally unfair: Monkton v Stephenson [2011] NSWSC 67 per Hall J. Graham v Powell (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 185 is an example of a matter where default judgment was entered pursuant to r 16.7. In a defamation matter, the defence of the unrepresented respondent had been struck out several times. Slattery J ruled that as the Respondent’s present defence did not take issue with the fact of publication or idea of defamatory imputations but attempted to justify such imputations, the Applicant’s case was made out and default judgment was entered. A default judgment entered pursuant to r 16.7 is not a final judgment, so issue estoppels do not arise between the parties when it is entered, because issue estoppels can only arise where matters have been determined with complete precision and where a statement of claim pleads a number of causes of action in the alternative, those matters have not been determined with precision so as to give rise to issue estoppels (Sneddon v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 351 per Meagher J at [183]–[186]). [r 16.7.50]

Application

The application for default judgment is in approved Form 39. The affidavit in support of the application is also required to state when and how the statement of claim was served on each defendant: r 16.6(2)(d). This requirement is in addition to the requirement to file an affidavit of service. [r 16.7.60]

Assessment hearing

If default judgment is entered for damages to be assessed, the judgment cannot be enforced until the quantum of damages has been determined. If costs have been sought in the application, these will be allowed for in the judgment at the prescribed rate, but are only costs of the default judgment (ie it is not an order for costs in relation to the proceedings generally). If the matter is not already listed for case management directions, which is unlikely, the registry will list the matter for callover, directions or otherwise, with the intent that the matter proceed to a hearing to assess the quantum of damages: r 30.1. Even though a defence may not have been filed the defendant may wish to defend the assessment hearing, and will be entitled to be heard on the assessment hearing provided a notice of appearance has been entered in the proceedings. Even though liability may not be in issue, the assessment process may require extensive case management, particularly in respect of complex Supreme Court cases. [r 16.7.1000]

References

UCPR r 30.1.

540

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 16 – Default judgment [r 16.9.40]

16.8

r 16.9

Default judgment on mixed claims

(cf SCR Part 17, rule 8)

(1) If the plaintiff’s claim against a defendant in default includes any 2 or more of the claims referred to in this Part, and no other claim, judgment may be given for the plaintiff against the defendant on any of those claims as if it were the plaintiff’s only claim for relief against that defendant. [Subr (1) am Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) In the case of two or more such claims, the relevant affidavit in support must comply with the requirements of this Part in relation to each of those claims. [R 16.8 am Rule 327 of 2007]

RULE 16.8 COMMENTARY [r 16.8.40]

Operation

Mixed claims possible under this rule include: possession of land, a liquidated claim and possibly unliquidated damages (on a mortgage or for a commercial tenancy); detention of goods and an unliquidated claim for damages (in respect of losses resulting from the detention of the goods); or a claim for liquidated damages and unliquidated damages (in respect of a breach of contract). There is no approved form of affidavit in support of a motion for default judgment for a mixed claim; it is therefore necessary to formulate an appropriate affidavit based on the approved forms and the requirements of this Part. If the statement of claim includes a mixed claim, one component of which is a claim for unliquidated damages, the matter will be case managed and the reservations as to the utility of applying for default judgment noted in [r 16.7.40] should be noted. 16.9 Judgment for costs alone after other claims satisfied (cf SCR Part 17, rule 10(1); DCR Part 31, rule 13; LCR Part 26, rule 4)

(1) If a plaintiff is entitled to have judgment given under this Part against a defendant in default for any relief and for costs, but it appears by affidavit that, by reason of the defendant having satisfied the plaintiff’s claims, it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to continue the proceedings against the defendant, judgment for the plaintiff may be given under this Part against that defendant for costs alone. [Subr (1) am Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) Whatever the plaintiff’s claims for relief against a defendant in default, if: (a) the defendant satisfies the plaintiff’s claims or complies with the plaintiff’s demands, or (b) it otherwise becomes unnecessary for the plaintiff to continue the proceedings against the defendant, the court may, on application by the plaintiff, give judgment against the defendant for costs. [R 16.9 am Rule 327 of 2007]

Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 16.9.40] Affidavit ..................................................................................................................................................... [r 16.9.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 16.9.1000]

[r 16.9.40]

Operation

The premise of this rule is that if a claim has been satisfied by the defendant after the statement of claim has been filed, the plaintiff should not be deprived of the necessary costs and expenses of bringing the action. This rule allows the entry of a default judgment for costs alone in respect of a claim which could have been determined by default judgment (ie a claim for possession, detention of goods, a liquidated claim or an © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

541

UCPR Parts 11-20

RULE 16.9 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 16.10

[r 16.9.40]

unliquidated claim or a combination of these claims). The defendant must be in default of filing a defence. The application is by notice of motion for entry of default judgment for costs. The notice of motion is dealt with in chambers. There is no prescribed amount of costs that are to be allowed on such a default judgment under the Legal Profession Regulation 2005, although the amounts provided for a default judgment for the principal claim in the statement of claim in Sch 2 of that regulation would normally be allowed, together with the filing fee and any service expenses (service expenses that can be claimed are limited to the service fees that would have been charged by the sheriff). Judgment will not usually be made for costs to be assessed. [r 16.9.60]

Affidavit

There is no approved form of the affidavit in support of the motion, but the relevant affidavit appropriate for a default judgment of the principal claim is a useful guide for the information that needs to be included. The principal element of the affidavit is to establish that the principal claim has been satisfied. There may be a practical difficulty in establishing that a claim for unliquidated damages has been satisfied for the purposes of this rule, as it will need to be established that any amount tendered to the plaintiff was not intended to also include the costs. The registry may be reluctant to enter default judgment on such an application without notice to the defendant where the defendant has entered an appearance, and may require that the motion be served and listed. The rule also allows a plaintiff in proceedings that could not have been disposed of by default judgment to apply for costs, if the claims have been satisfied or it is otherwise unnecessary to continue the proceedings against the defendant. Such an application is by way of notice of motion to be considered in court. The orders in such circumstances are discretionary and the costs awarded may be for a specific amount or for costs to be assessed (see s 98 CPA). The notice of motion should be served on the defendant, whether or not an appearance has been entered. [r 16.9.1000]

References

CPA s 98; Legal Profession Regulation 2005 cl 112 and Sch 2. 16.10

Judgment not limited by plaintiff’s claims for relief

(cf SCR Part 17, rules 9 and 10(2))

Whatever the plaintiff’s claims for relief against a defendant in default, the court may, on application by the plaintiff, give such judgment against the defendant as the plaintiff appears to be entitled to on his or her statement of claim.

RULE 16.10 COMMENTARY [r 16.10.40]

Operation

In a case in which the statement of claim claims relief other than of a type specified in rr 16.4 to 16.8, the plaintiff cannot enter default judgment as of right. Generally the claims for which there is a right to seek default judgment are claims in respect of which a successful plaintiff would have a common law right for judgment of the kind sought. Other types of claim, such as for accounts to be taken, a permanent injunction or for specific performance of a contract are discretionary orders, and there is no right to obtain default judgment. The court retains the right to refuse to enter judgment in appropriate circumstances: Termijtelen v Van Arkel [1974] 1 NSWLR 525. The plaintiff may apply by notice of motion for leave to enter default judgment or for a direction that default judgment be entered. This rule also applies if, although the statement of claim only includes claims for which default judgment can be entered, events subsequent to the filing of the statement of claim make entry of judgment for the original claim or claims inappropriate. For instance in a claim for detention of goods, if the goods are returned in a damaged condition, the plaintiff can now apply for damages to be assessed even if this was not originally sought in the statement of claim. If a matter is in the course of case management it is not appropriate for default judgment to be entered without leave of the court: Altarama Ltd v Forsyth [1981] 1 NSWLR 188.

542

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 17 – Admissions [r Pt17.100]

PART 17 – ADMISSIONS Commentary by Adrian Diethelm, Academic Dean and Deputy Rector, University of Sydney. Updated by Mandy Tibbey, Barrister.

PART 17 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 17 ................................................................................................................. [r Pt17.20] Formal admissions – Civil Procedure Act 2005 ....................................................................................... [r Pt17.40] Formal admissions – Evidence Act 1995 ................................................................................................. [r Pt17.60] Formal admissions – pleadings ............................................................................................................... [r Pt17.80] Orders made without admissions ........................................................................................................... [r Pt17.100] Informal admissions – Evidence Act ...................................................................................................... [r Pt17.120] Informal admissions – general law ........................................................................................................ [r Pt17.140] Admissions by agents ............................................................................................................................ [r Pt17.145] Admissibility and weight of informal admissions .................................................................................... [r Pt17.150] Informal admissions – matters of law .................................................................................................... [r Pt17.160] Informal admissions – statements in pleadings ..................................................................................... [r Pt17.180] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r Pt17.1000]

[r Pt17.20]

General comments on Part 17

An admission is an express or implied statement made by or on behalf of a party against that party’s interest. An admission can be made without any formality and might, for example, be implied from conduct. The expression “informal admission” is used in this commentary to distinguish that concept from that of a “formal admission”. Formal admissions are those made during or for the purposes of the litigation, and have the effect of eliminating issues or reducing their ambit. Formal admissions may be made pursuant to this Part, in pleadings, in correspondence between parties or orally to the court. A party who has made a formal admission may not contradict it unless it is withdrawn by leave of the court, and evidence which is relevant only to an admitted fact will be rejected as not being relevant to any issue in the proceedings: Cross on Evidence (6th Aust ed and subscription service, LexisNexis) at [3160]. Informal admissions are a species of evidence, and may operate by way of exception to the rule against hearsay. An informal admission, as distinct from a formal one, can be explained away or qualified by other evidence. [r Pt17.40]

Formal admissions – Civil Procedure Act 2005

CPA s 70 provides, in effect, that the court may require a party to make admissions with respect to any document or question of fact, and order that the costs of proof occasioned by any refusal or neglect to do so are to be paid by that party. Such an admission is to be for the purposes only of the proceedings, are to be subject to all just exceptions, and may be amended or withdrawn with the leave of the court. [r Pt17.60]

Formal admissions – Evidence Act 1995

Section 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 provides, in effect, that where parties have agreed that a fact is not to be disputed for the purposes of the proceedings (such agreement being either expressed in writing which is adduced in evidence or, with the leave of the court, stated before the court), evidence is not required to prove the existence of the agreed fact, and may not be adduced to contradict or qualify the agreed fact. Formal admissions – pleadings

UCPR r 14.26 provides in effect that an allegation of fact made in a pleading is taken to be admitted by any opposite party unless it is traversed in its pleading in response (unless there is an implied joinder of issue under r 14.27). [r Pt17.100]

Orders made “without admissions”

In the conduct of interlocutory disputes parties need to consider whether orders might usefully be agreed or consented to on the express basis that the parties’ agreement, or a party’s consent, is to be recorded as being “without admissions of any kind”. Not all orders necessarily lend themselves to such a solution: eg a declaration, or agreement, as to property rights. Nevertheless an interlocutory regime on a “without admissions” basis can facilitate preparations for trial that embody an element of compromise. A party which © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

543

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r Pt17.80]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt17.100] agrees, or consents to, interlocutory orders should generally, as a matter of prudence, only do so on a “without admissions” basis in case the fact of agreement or consent is later alleged to constitute an admission. [r Pt17.120]

Informal admissions – Evidence Act

Informal admissions are dealt with in ss 81 to 90 of the Evidence Act 1995. [r Pt17.140]

Informal admissions – general law

An informal admission by words or conduct made by a party or those in privity with the party is admissible evidence against the party of the truth of its contents: Cross on Evidence (8th Aust ed 2010 and subscription service, LexisNexis) at [33425]. The conditions of admissibility are (1) that the statement or conduct is an “admission” in the sense that it is adverse to the party’s case; (2) if the party is litigating in a representative capacity, the statement must have been made in that capacity; (3) when a statement contains items favourable to a party’s case in addition to the admission, the party may require the favourable items to be proved; (4) admissions not based on personal knowledge may lack evidential value; (5) if the statement was not made by the party, it must have been made by one “in privity” with the party. The reader is referred to works on evidence law, such as Cross on Evidence (8th Aust ed 2010 and subscription service, LexisNexis) at pp 362–414 (book); [33420]–[33590] (looseleaf) and Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016). [r Pt17.145]

Admissions by agents

An agent may have the authority to make an admission on behalf of a party, eg managing director making out of court admissions on behalf of company: Fraser Henleins Pty Ltd v Cody (1945) 70 CLR 100. Where a witness who is an employee of a party is asked a question about matters not within his personal knowledge, in court, and the party whose witness is giving the evidence objects to the question, the authority of the witness to answer such a question and to thereby make an admission is withdrawn: Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82. See also s 87 of the Evidence Act 1995 regarding admissions made with authority by agents. In Pacific Resources International Pty Ltd v UTI (Aust) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1083 Stevenson J admitted into evidence a letter by a solicitor providing further and better particulars, on the basis as stated at [46] that: A solicitor has ostensible authority of his or her clients to make admissions (for example, see Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 369; (2008) 167 FCR 314 per Rares J at [18]), although not if the admissions are contrary to the facts (see Frederic T Horne, Cordery’s Law relating to Solicitors, 8th ed (1988) at 78, citing Scott LJ in Groom v Crocker [1939] 1 KB 194 at 222-224; not repeated in Cordery’s on Legal Services, 9th ed, but see [3255] in vol 1). He held that it would be open to the court to find that the letter providing particulars contained admissions within the meaning of s 87(1)(a) of the Evidence Act. [r Pt17.150]

Admissibility and weight of informal admissions

Admissions made otherwise than in pleadings (“informal admissions”) are admissible but the probative force of the admissions will be determined by reference to the circumstances in which they were made: Lustre Hosiery Ltd v York (1935) 54 CLR 134; Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82; RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 152; Kelly v Mawson [1981] 1 NSWLR 184; (1981) 5 ACLR 500 at 185 (NSWLR). [r Pt17.160]

Informal admissions – matters of law

While informal admissions may be made as to matters of fact, it is doubtful whether they may be made as to matters of mixed law and fact, or of matters of law: that is to say, evidence of admissions as to such matters is likely to be of no evidentiary value: Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317; 77 ALJR 1706; 201 ALR 139; [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-712; [2003] HCA 51 at [68]–[71]. [r Pt17.180]

Informal admissions – statements in pleadings

A party may seek to tender a statement made by the opposite party in another proceeding as an admission for the purposes of the present proceeding. The traditional view is that a statement in a pleading is not an admission in this sense (ie cannot be used as an informal admission), because such a statement “does not 544

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 17 – Admissions [r 17.2.60]

r 17.2

amount to an assertion of belief in the correctness of the facts pleaded”: Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70; 64 ALJR 412; 93 ALR 435; 5 BR 109 at 85-86 (CLR), affirming Boileau v Rutlin (1848) 2 Ex 665; 154 ER 657; Buckmaster v Meiklejohn (1853) 8 Ex 634; 155 ER 1506. However, the rationale for this proposition assumes that the pleading has not been verified, as is noted in Laws at 86. Pleadings in many kinds of proceedings are now required to be verified by UCPR r 14.23 (or may be so ordered by the court under r 14.24): it may be that in such a case the proposition in Boileau v Rutlin does not apply and the verified statement can be used as an admission. [r Pt17.1000]

References

CPA s 70; Evidence Act 1995 s 191 – formal admissions. Evidence Act 1995 ss 81 to 90 – admissions. Cross on Evidence (6th Aust ed and subscription service) [3160] (formal admissions); [33420]–[33460] (admissibility of informal admissions); [33465] (statements of mixed law and fact); [33470]–[33510] (implied admissions); [33515]–[33590] (vicarious admissions). Statements made in former proceedings: UCPR r 17.6; Cross on Evidence (6th Aust ed and subscription service) [33510], [33525]. Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) 17.1

Definitions

In this Part, other than rule 17.5: the admitting party means a party who is admitting, or being asked to admit, any matter. the requesting party means a party in whose favour another party is admitting, or being asked to admit, any matter. 17.2

Voluntary admissions of fact

(cf SCR Part 18, rule 1; DCR Part 15, rule 1; LCR Part 14, rule 1)

(1) The admitting party may, by a notice served on the requesting party, admit, in favour of the requesting party only and for the purposes of the proceedings only, the facts specified in the notice. (2) The admitting party may, with the leave of the court, withdraw any such admission.

RULE 17.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 17.2.20] Withdrawal of admissions ......................................................................................................................... [r 17.2.60]

[r 17.2.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 18 r 1 and DCR Pt 15 r 1. Form 35 in the DCR was a prescribed form of notice of admission. There is no prescribed form in the UCPR. Withdrawal of admissions

This rule requires the leave of the court for the withdrawal of an admission made under the rule, as do rr 17.3 and 17.4. Factors in the exercise of the discretion to grant leave were considered in Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738: the court will have regard to whether the admission was made in error and to the public interest in the efficient administration of justice. Where a party makes a clear and distinct admission which is accepted by the opponent and acted upon, an application to withdraw the admission should not be freely granted; it will usually be appropriate to grant leave where it is shown that the admission is contrary to the actual facts; leave may also be appropriate where the admission was made inadvertently or without due consideration of material matters: Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Santow J, 16 October 1996) Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Xiong [2010] NSWSC 1518 per Slattery J; BC201010336. Whether the court will permit an admission to be withdrawn will depend upon a process of weighing competing considerations, one of which might be the proper application of © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

545

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 17.2.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 17.3

[r 17.2.60]

case management principles (Jeans v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2003) 204 ALR 327; [2003] FCAFC 309), which need to be assessed in the context of CPA Pt 6 Div 1: Investec Bank (Aust) Ltd v Burge (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1557 at [17]. See also discussion of principles in Le Meilleur Pty Ltd v Jin Heung Mutual Savings Bank Co Ltd (2011) 256 FLR 240; 6 BFRA 361; [2011] NSWSC 1115 at [307]–[315] per Ward J (as she then was) and in Candy v GIO General Ltd [2013] NSWSC 810 per Campbell J. Where an admission is not said to be erroneous, and powers of attorney were signed and admissions were verified in earlier pleadings, it is not appropriate to grant an application to withdraw an admission: Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Coppola [2011] NSWSC 1326 per Walmsley AJ; BC201109171. Where an issue is already determined, leave to withdraw admission may not be granted: Preston v Nikolaidis [2011] NSWSC 1074 per Black J, BC201107130. 17.3

Notice to admit facts

(cf SCR Part 18, rule 2; DCR Part 15, rule 2; LCR Part 14, rule 2)

(1) The requesting party may, by a notice served on the admitting party (the requesting party’s notice), require the admitting party to admit, for the purposes of the proceedings only, the facts specified in the notice. (2) If, as to any fact specified in the requesting party’s notice, the admitting party does not, within 14 days after service on the admitting party of the requesting party’s notice, serve on the requesting party a notice disputing that fact, that fact is, for the purposes of the proceedings only, taken to have been admitted by the admitting party in favour of the requesting party only. (3) The admitting party may, with the leave of the court, withdraw any such admission.

RULE 17.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 17.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 17.3.30] Prescribed forms ...................................................................................................................................... [r 17.3.60]

[r 17.3.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, this rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 18 r 1. In the District Court, under DCR Pt 15 r 2 such a notice could only be served on a party if 28 days had elapsed since the originating process (or other process by which the party was joined) was served on that party, but this rule has no such requirement. This rule is otherwise the same in substance as the DCR. [r 17.3.30]

Operation

Even if a Notice to Admit Facts is not in the approved form, as per r 17.3 (Form 16) and does not explicitly refer to costs, it may be relied upon by a judge in relation to costs: Noxequin Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] NSWSC 87 at [43]–[47] per Barrett J. The cost of proving those matters could be assessed on an indemnity basis pursuant to r 42.8. Rule 42.8 provides that unless the court orders otherwise, the disputing party must, where a fact in dispute is subsequently proved or is subsequently admitted, pay the costs of the party who is served with a notice disputing a fact under r 17.3, on an indemnity basis, where those costs are incurred in proving the fact or if the fact has not been proved, in preparation for proving the fact: Westpac Banking Corporatio v Mahabat [2016] NSWSC 102 per Davies J. A notice to admit facts under r 17.3 and to admit documents under r 17.4 can be set aside, for example if it seeks admissions or documents that are not relevant to issues in dispute, is oppressive or and abuse of process: Parkesbourne Mummel Landscape Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning (2009) 170 LGERA 118; [2009] NSWLEC 101 per Lloyd J. 546

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 17 – Admissions [r 17.4.60]

r 17.5

If a notice is directed to one respondent, but not to another, any failure to respond can only be taken to apply in relation to the party to whom the notice is addressed (thus wives will not be bound by their husband’s failure to respond to a notice addressed to the husband only: Rumble v Liverpool Plains Shire Council [2015] NSWCA 125 per Beazley JA at [19]. For a successful attempt to withdraw deemed admissions on the basis that the admissions were not admissions as to facts, but as to mixed questions of law and/or mixed questions of fact and law, see Integrated Asset Management Pty Ltd v Trans Communication Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1690. Where a Notice to admit the fact that a person was not mentally ill was not responded to and there was compelling evidence that the person was mentally ill, then despite the deemed admission, the court found that the person was mentally ill: M v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 1876. [r 17.3.60]

Prescribed forms

A notice to admit facts should be in approved Form 16, and a notice disputing facts in Form 17. 17.4

Notice to admit documents

(cf SCR Part 18, rule 5; DCR Part 15, rule 5; LCR Part 14, rule 3)

(1) The requesting party may, by a notice served on the admitting party (the requesting party’s notice), require the admitting party to admit the authenticity of the documents specified in the notice. (2) If, as to any document specified in the requesting party’s notice, the admitting party does not, within 14 days after service on the admitting party of the requesting party’s notice, serve on the requesting party a notice disputing the authenticity of that document, the authenticity of that document is, for the purposes of the proceedings only, taken to have been admitted by the admitting party in favour of the requesting party only. (3) The admitting party may, with the leave of the court, withdraw any such admission.

RULE 17.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 17.4.20] Prescribed forms ...................................................................................................................................... [r 17.4.60]

[r 17.4.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 18 r 5 and DCR Pt 15 r 5. [r 17.4.60]

Prescribed forms

A notice to admit the authenticity of documents should be in approved Form 16, and a notice disputing authenticity in Form 17. 17.5 Admission of documents discovered (cf SCR Part 18, rule 4; DCR Part 15, rule 4)

(1) In this rule: requesting party means the party by whom a list of documents is served under rule 21.3. [Subr (1) subst Rule 808 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[2]]

(2) If a requesting party allows inspection of any documents referred to in a list of documents under rule 21.5, the admitting party is taken to have made the following admissions in favour of the requesting party, unless the court orders otherwise:

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

547

UCPR Parts 11-20

admitting party means the party on whom a list of documents is served under rule 21.3.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 17.5

[r 17.5.20] (a)

in respect of each document described in the list as an original document, that the document is an original document and was printed, written, signed or executed as it purports to have been, (b) in respect of each document described in the list as a copy of an original document, that the document is a true copy. [Subr (2) am Rule 808 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[3]]

(3) Subrule (2) does not apply to a document referred to in the list of documents if the admitting party: (a) has, by his or her pleading, denied the authenticity of the document, or (b) has served on the requesting party, within 14 days after the time limited under rule 21.5 for inspection of a document, a notice to the effect that the admitting party disputes the authenticity of the document. (4) The admitting party and the requesting party are taken to be in the same position as they would have been in had the admitting party, on the date of service of the list of documents, served on the requesting party a notice requiring production at the trial of such of the documents specified in the list as are in the possession of the requesting party. [Subr (4) subst Rule 808 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[4]] [R 17.5 am Rule 808 of 2005]

RULE 17.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 17.5.20] Admission as to authenticity of documents .............................................................................................. [r 17.5.60] Requirement for production at trial ........................................................................................................... [r 17.5.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 17.5.1000]

[r 17.5.20]

Comparison

This rule should be compared with SCR Pt 18 r 4 and DCR Pt 15 r 4. [r 17.5.60]

Admission as to authenticity of documents

This rule has the opposite effect to the predecessor rules. Under SCR Pt 18 r 4 and DCR Pt 15 r 4, the party being served with a list of documents was taken to have made the specified admissions in favour of the party serving the list. Under this rule the party serving the list is taken to have made the specified admissions in favour of the party being served with the list. It is not clear if the change is intentional or the result of a mistake, and if intentional, what the reason for the reversal would be. [r 17.5.80]

Requirement for production at trial

Subrule 17.5(4) requires a party serving a list of documents to produce at the trial such of the documents as are in that party’s possession. The effect of a notice to produce documents is stated in UCPR Pt 34. [r 17.5.1000]

References

UCPR rr 34.1 to 34.2 – notice to produce at hearing. 17.6 Restricted effect of admission (cf SCR Part 18, rule 6; DCR Part 15, rule 6; LCR Part 14, rule 6)

An admission made under this Part in connection with any proceedings: (a) may not be used in those proceedings except in favour of the party in whose favour it was made, and (b) is taken to have been made for the purposes of those proceedings only.

548

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 17 – Admissions [r 17.6.60]

r 17.7

RULE 17.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 17.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 17.6.40] Evidence in other proceedings ................................................................................................................. [r 17.6.60]

[r 17.6.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 18 r 6 and DCR Pt 15 r 6. [r 17.6.40]

Operation

The rule deals only with the effect of formal admissions made under this Part. It restricts the effect of such an admission to the proceedings in which it is made, and contemplates that an admission may be made in favour of some but not all of the other parties to the proceeding. It would appear that the rule would not apply to admissions deemed to be made by UCPR r 14.26 (non-traverse of allegation in pleading) as such are not made “under this Part”. [r 17.6.60]

Evidence in other proceedings

UCPR r 31.9 governs the use in proceedings of evidence taken or affidavits filed in other proceedings. There is a question whether evidence adduced by a party in other proceedings can amount to an admission. The answer to that question might depend on whether the evidence was given by the party itself or simply by a witness called by the party. Evidence from a mere witness might constitute an admission by the party who called that witness if given in circumstances (eg by affidavit) indicating that the party had the opportunity to adopt it as evidence of the true facts and had done so. Each case must depend on its own facts in this context. As Young CJ in Eq has noted (Reale Bros Pty Ltd v Reale (2003) 179 FLR 427; [2003] NSWSC 666; Wily v Lo Presti (1997) 16 ACLC 82), the general law position is stated in British Thomson Houston Co Ltd v British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd [1924] 2 Ch 160. There it was held (1) that the oral evidence of a non-party witness called at a trial cannot be used in subsequent proceedings as an admission made by the party who called the witness; but (2) such evidence might be used in proof of the state of mind of the party who called it; and (3) if the evidence given in the prior proceeding was that of an agent of the party (or a fortiori of the party himself – or herself) then it may be admissible in subsequent proceedings as an admission. However, (4) affidavits of third persons used by a party in former proceedings may be received as evidence against the party in subsequent proceedings. 17.7 Judgment on admissions (cf SCR Part 18, rule 3; DCR Part 15, rule 3; LCR Part 14, rule 5)

(1) If admissions are made by a party, whether by his or her pleadings or otherwise, the court may, on the application of any other party, give any judgment or make any order to which the other party is entitled on the admissions. (2) The court may exercise its powers under this rule even if the other questions in the proceedings have not been determined.

RULE 17.7 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 17.7.40] Admissions made by pleadings ................................................................................................................ [r 17.7.60] Failure to file pleading .............................................................................................................................. [r 17.7.80] Judgment on admissions is discretionary .............................................................................................. [r 17.7.100] Evidence admissible on application ....................................................................................................... [r 17.7.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 17.7.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

549

UCPR Parts 11-20

Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 17.7.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 17.7 [r 17.7.20]

[r 17.7.20] Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 18 r 3 and DCR Pt 15 r 3. [r 17.7.40]

Operation

The rule confers a discretionary power on the court to give judgment or make orders on the basis of admissions, whether these are contained in pleadings or otherwise. The rule permits informal admissions to be relied upon in support of an application under it: Freres v Jenssen (1970) 44 ALJR 191. Where informal admissions are relied on they must be proved in accordance with applicable rules of evidence. Judgment can be given on the basis of admissions obtained as a result of a Notice to Admit Facts or Notice to Admit Documents, which operate as “deemed admissions”: see Scott MacRae Investments Pty Ltd v Baylily Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 82. [r 17.7.60]

Admissions made by pleadings

Under UCPR r 14.26, an allegation of fact made by a party in a pleading is taken to be admitted by any opposite party required to plead in response unless (a) in the pleading in response, the opposite party traverses the allegation, or (b) there is an implied joinder of issue under r 14.27. A statement that a defendant “does not plead” to a particular allegation in a Statement of Claim counts as an admission of that allegation: Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 39, Campbell JA (with whom McColl JA and Handley AJA agreed) at [62] and [63]. See also Branson v Tucker [2012] NSWCA 310 at [4] per Campbell JA (with whom Beazley and Barrett JA agreed and Jupiters Ltd v UAERJ Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1469 (4 October 2013) per Stevenson J at [51]. A court is not bound to act on admissions made by the parties and is averse to do so where there is doubt as to whether the admissions are correct: Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492; [2001] NSWCA 87 at [157] per Heydon JA and Jupiters Ltd at [61] per Stevenson J. See also Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Bradshaw [2013] NSWSC 1276 (13 September 2013) per Bellew J. [r 17.7.80] Failure to file pleading The failure to file a defence might not give rise to deemed admissions of the facts alleged in the statement of claim under UCPR r 14.26: My Distributors Pty Ltd v Omaq Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 578; Australian Securities Commission v Macleod (1994) 54 FCR 309; 130 ALR 717. Rule 17.7 might not therefore be available to support a judgment based on failure to file a defence as an alternative to seeking a default judgment under Pt 16. [r 17.7.100] Judgment on admissions is discretionary The power of the court under the rule is discretionary and the court is not bound to give judgment because of admissions in the pleadings or because of default in pleading: Termijtelen v Van Arkel [1974] 1 NSWLR 525. The court will not give judgment on an admission arising from a failure to defend when the admission is contrary to facts found after the hearing of the suit as against another defendant: Termijtelen v Van Arkel. An admission must be clear and unambiguous for a discretion to be exercised in favour of entering judgment. It is appropriate to exercise the discretion to enter judgment only where the case is clear and unanswerable and even then, the Court is not compelled to enter judgment: Moon v Mun [2013] NSWCA 217 per Basten JA (commencing at [38]); and Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Bradshaw [2013] NSWSC 1276 per Bellew J and Juliex Pty Limited v Shoalhaven City Council [2015] NSWSC 618 per AsJ Harrison AsJ at [47]–[48]. The discretion must be exercised with great caution: Re the Trade Marks Act 1955-1958 and the Registered Trade Marks “Certina” and “Certina DS” (1970) 44 ALJR 191 per Barwick CJ. Where a defence is struck out, that defence cannot form the basis of a judgment made solely on admissions. Moon v Mun [2013] NSWCA 217 at [48] per Barrett JA. [r 17.7.120] Evidence admissible on application On an application for judgment or orders on admissions, in order to prove the fact that admissions have been made and the terms of such admissions, it may be necessary for the moving party to prove the circumstances in which a statement was made and other background facts, and such evidence is admissible: Kelly v Mawson [1981] 1 NSWLR 184; (1981) 5 ACLR 500. 550

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 17 – Admissions [r 17.7.1000] [r 17.7.1000]

r 17.7 References

UCPR Parts 11-20

Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014), [6.390], [12.480]–[12.490].

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

551

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 18.1

[r Pt18.20]

PART 18 – MOTIONS Commentary by Melissa Fisher, Barrister

PART 18 COMMENTARY [r Pt18.20]

General comments on Part 18

This Part governs the procedure for making interlocutory or procedural applications in proceedings. 18.1 Applications for court orders to be made by motion (cf SCR Part 19, rule 1; DCR Part 16, rule 1; LCR Part 15, rule 1)

An interlocutory or other application is to be made by motion unless these rules otherwise provide.

RULE 18.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 18.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 18.1.40] Whether a particular application can be made ........................................................................................ [r 18.1.60] Form ......................................................................................................................................................... [r 18.1.80] Evidence by affidavit ............................................................................................................................... [r 18.1.100] Supporting affidavit ................................................................................................................................. [r 18.1.120] Affidavit in support to be served in reasonable time .............................................................................. [r 18.1.140] Repeated applications ............................................................................................................................ [r 18.1.160] Applications under the Corporations Act ................................................................................................ [r 18.1.180] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 18.1.1000]

[r 18.1.20]

Comparison

All applications are now to be made by motion unless the rules otherwise provide (see, for example, r 31.28(2) where the rules otherwise provide). Prior to the commencement of the UCPR, a range of applications within the jurisdiction of the registrars were dealt with in chambers without the requirement to file a notice of motion. Whilst practices varied, these included applications for default judgments, short service and garnishee orders. It is not the case that all applications made by notice of motion will be placed in the motions list for hearing. For example, applications for default judgments continue to be dealt with in chambers by the registrar: see [r 16.3.100]; as are applications for examination orders: see [r 38.2.40]; and applications for writs of execution: see [r 39.2.40]. Note that it is no longer the case that the party making the application is called the applicant and that any other party to the application is called the respondent. Parties to the proceedings are to be identified as such, for example, the plaintiff or the defendant. A person will only be identified as an applicant or a respondent if the person is not already a party to the proceedings. [r 18.1.40]

Operation

The purpose of this rule is to proscribe the mode in which applications are to be made, namely by motion. Whether a particular application can be made is to be determined by general principles as modified by any relevant statutory provisions: Phillips v Walsh (1990) 20 NSWLR 206; St George Commercial Credit Corp Ltd v Wallis [2001] NSWSC 23. In Gorman v Health Care Complaints Commission (NSW) [2012] NSWCA 251, the Court of Appeal observed at [96]: An interlocutory application should bear an appropriate relationship with the principal proceedings if it is to be heard with or as part of those principal proceedings. At the very least, the relief which is sought in an interlocutory motion must be relief which is sought for the purpose of advancing the claims made in the principal proceedings Rosseau Pty Ltd (in liq) v Jay-O-Bees Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 50 ACSR 565; [2004] NSWSC 818 at [63]–[72]. Such a purposive requirement has long been recognised. Before filing a notice of motion, the moving party should request the consent of the other party or parties in the proceedings to the interlocutory orders sought. A party who moves the court unnecessarily, without 552

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 18 – Motions [r 18.1.160]

r 18.1

previously seeking consent of the other party, is at a risk of an adverse costs order: Moore v Gannon (1915) 32 WN (NSW) 60; Glandon Pty Ltd v Strata Consolidated Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 543; Araf Capital Funding Pty Ltd v Megaloudis [2006] NSWSC 1255. [r 18.1.60]

Whether a particular application can be made

Whether a particular application can be made is to be determined by general principles as modified by any relevant statutory provisions. One such principle is that when proceedings have been disposed of by final order which has been entered, the proceedings are at an end and cannot be revived. There are a number of exceptions to this principle, one of which is that, subsequent to a final order, application may be made for the purpose of dealing with a matter involved in, or arising in the course of, working out that order: Phillips v Walsh (1990) 20 NSWLR 206; Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council v Bonnici [2002] NSWCA 313; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Yandal Gold Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 542; Australian Hardboards Ltd v Hudson Investment Group Ltd (2007) 70 NSWLR 201; [2007] NSWCA 104; Kelly v Public Trustee [2007] NSWSC 1485. See also Gould v Purtle [2014] NSWSC 493 and El-Saeidy v Land & Housing Corp (NSW) [2014] NSWCA 172 at [66]. It is necessary in every case for the court to consider whether it is appropriate on the facts to allow proceedings to go forward by way of motion or, alternatively, whether separate proceedings should be commenced. One of the factors which may be taken into consideration by the court in allowing the motion is whether the matters raised in the notice of motion are sufficiently within the ambit of the proceedings as originally constituted: St George Commercial Credit Corp Ltd v Wallis [2001] NSWSC 23. The setting aside of consent orders requires a new action brought for that purpose – a motion should not be brought in the original proceedings: Spies v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 24 NSWLR 691; Re Webuildem Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 708 at [55]; Romeo v Papalia [2012] NSWCA 221 at [78]–[80]; Italian Forum Ltd v The Owners - Strata Plan 60919 (2012) 16 BPR 31685; [2012] NSWSC 895 at [33]–[39]; Buckman v Rose-Rapmund [2015] NSWSC 311 at [11]–[12]. However, if an application to set aside final orders made by consent is brought in an inappropriate form that is a matter capable of waiver: Across Australia Finance v Bassenger [2008] NSWSC 799. [r 18.1.80]

Form

Generally, a notice of motion is to comply with Form 20. Note, however, that there exist 17 other “notice of motion” forms. These forms are for specific applications, for example, Notice of Motion Examination Order (Form 53) and Notice of Motion Garnishee Order (Form 69). [r 18.1.100]

Evidence by affidavit

Evidence on a motion is by affidavit. Rule 31.2 provides that evidence in chief of any witness at a hearing must be given by affidavit unless the court otherwise orders. Section 3 of the CPA defines “hearing” to include an interlocutory hearing: see [r 31.2.20]–[r 31.2.1000]. [r 18.1.120]

Supporting affidavit

The affidavit or affidavits in support should set out the factual basis for the relief sought, including reference to any relevant correspondence between the parties. Affidavit in support to be served in reasonable time

Rule 35.9 provides that, generally, affidavits are not to be filed in proceedings except by leave of the court. Practice Note SC Gen 4 – Affıdavits reinforces the rule. Nevertheless, it is axiomatic that affidavits in support of a motion should be served on the other party or parties prior to the interlocutory hearing. Rule 10.2 provides that a party intending to use an affidavit that has not been filed must serve it not later than a reasonable time before the occasion for using it arises: see [r 10.2.40]. [r 18.1.160]

Repeated applications

Interlocutory orders create no res judicata or issue estoppel and the court has jurisdiction to set aside, vary or discharge an interlocutory order. Similarly, where an application for interlocutory relief is refused, the Court has jurisdiction to entertain a second application for the same relief: Bajramovic v Calubaquid (2015) 71 MVR 15; [2015] NSWCA 139 at [40]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

553

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 18.1.140]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 18.1

[r 18.1.160]

Historical note – the ordinary rule of practice Up until the NSW Court of Appeal decision in Bajramovic v Calubaquid (2015) 71 MVR 15; [2015] NSWCA 139, the courts in NSW had consistently applied the ordinary rule of practice that, where an interlocutory order of a substantive nature has been made after a contested hearing, an application to set aside, vary or discharge the order must be founded on a material change of circumstances since the original application was heard, or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the court on the hearing of the original application: Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44. Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print was cited with approval by the NSW Court of Appeal in Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 313, Levy v Bablis [2012] NSWCA 77 and Ballard v Brookfield Australia Investments Ltd [2013] NSWCA 82. In Nominal Defendant v Manning (2000) 50 NSWLR 139; 31 MVR 524; [2000] NSWCA 80, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that it was too extreme a proposition to state that no second interlocutory application can be entertained unless there is a change of circumstances or unless evidence is relied on which could not reasonably have been obtained earlier. However, a litigant bringing a second application where circumstances have not changed on evidence available earlier is facing serious and self-created risks of an adverse exercise of judicial discretion. In National Parks & Wildlife Service v Pierson (2002) 55 NSWLR 315; [2002] NSWCA 273 at [17] the NSW Court of Appeal held that nothing said by the majority in Manning could be construed as indicating a permissive or relaxed attitude of the court to the bringing of more than one interlocutory application for the same order – indeed, quite the contrary. National Parks & Wildlife Service v Pierson was cited with approval in the following cases: R v Taylor (2007) 169 A Crim R 543; [2007] NSWCCA 104 at [31]; JBK Engineering Pty Ltd v Brick & Block Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 163 at [4]–[7]; Northern Star Agriculture Pty Ltd v Morgan & Banks Developments Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 98; Sundararajah v Teachers Federation Health Ltd (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 471; Menulog Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 440; Welker v Rinehart (No 6) [2012] NSWSC 160; Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Tannous (No 4) [2013] NSWSC 182; Wright v Optus Administration Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1709. In Wright v Optus Administration Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1709 at [4], Campbell J observed that a question may arise about the continued authority of Nominal Defendant v Manning in the light of the efficiency provisions of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, namely ss 56–60. In Bajramovic v Calubaquid (2015) 71 MVR 15; [2015] NSWCA 139 the Court of Appeal was asked to reconsider what was held in Nominal Defendant v Manning (2000) 50 NSWLR 139; 31 MVR 524; [2000] NSWCA 80 in light of ss 56–60 of the CPA. The overriding principle: Court must do whatever the interests of justice require In Bajramovic v Calubaquid (2015) 71 MVR 15; [2015] NSWCA 139 the Court of Appeal held it was not necessary to determine the question of the correctness of Nominal Defendant v Manning in light of ss 56–60 of the CPA. The court (at [38]–[45]) set out the legal principles to be applied when considering second applications. They are as follows: • Interlocutory orders create no res judicata or issue estoppel and the court has jurisdiction to set aside, vary or discharge an interlocutory order. Similarly, where an application for interlocutory relief is refused, the Court has jurisdiction to entertain a second application for the same relief (see [40]); • Clearly enough, it would be conducive to injustice and would be an enormous waste of judicial time and resources if there were no limits imposed on the entitlement of a party to re-litigate at will an application for interlocutory relief. That is to say, it may well be an abuse of process for a party who has been unsuccessful in obtaining interlocutory relief or in resisting interlocutory relief to re-litigate the very same question. However, there will be circumstances in which it is not an abuse of process (see [40]); • It would not ordinarily be an abuse of process to endeavour to do so where there has been a change of circumstances or where evidence has become available that was not available at the time of the original hearing. However, that is not an exhaustive statement of the circumstances in which a second application after an initial unsuccessful application may be made or in which an application may be made to set aside, vary or discharge an order already made (see [41]); 554

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 18 – Motions [r 18.1.1000]

r 18.2

• The overriding principle is that the Court must do whatever the interests of justice require in the particular circumstances of the case. While the ordinary rule of practice is that an application to set aside, vary or discharge an order must be founded on a material change of circumstances or the discovery of new material that could not reasonably have been put before the Court on the nearing of the original application, that is no more than an ordinary rule of practice (see [41]); • In particular, there is no general principle that a second interlocutory application that raises additional evidence that was available at the time of the first application cannot be entertained (see [41]); • In deciding whether to make any order or direction for the management of proceedings, the Court must seek to act in accordance with the dictates of justice. For the purpose of determining what are the dictates of justice in a particular case, the Court must have regard to the overriding purpose in s 56 of the CPA and may have regard to a number of other matters, including (see [44]): – The degree of expedition with which the respective parties have approached the proceedings; – The degree to which the respective parties have fulfilled their duties to assist the Court to further the overriding purpose set out in s 56 of the CPA; and – The degree of injustice that would be suffered by the respective parties as a consequence of any order or direction; • It would be too simplistic a view to limit the circumstances in which a second application might be made after an unsuccessful application to the situation where there has been a change of circumstances or evidence has become available that was not available at the time of the original hearing. The overriding requirement is that the outcome of any second application for interlocutory relief is a just one (see [45]). [r 18.1.180]

Applications under the Corporations Act

Applications in Corporations Act 2001 matters are to be made in a special manner. Schedule 2 of the UCPR provides that the Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999 prevail over UCPR. Rule 2.2 of the Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999 provides that a person must make an application required or permitted by the Corporations Act 2001 by filing an interlocutory process. An interlocutory process must be in accordance with Form 3 of those Rules. [r 18.1.1000]

References

See Pt 35 as to the form of affidavits; r 10.2 as to service of affidavits; Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999, r 2.2(1), 2.2(2) and 2.2(4). See Pt 42 for costs generally and in particular r 42.7 – interlocutory applications. See r 37.2(4) where a notice of motion does not have to be filed and served by a judgment debtor making an application for an instalment order in certain circumstances. See r 42.10 as to the court’s powers where there has been disobedience to the rules. 18.2

Requirement for notice

(cf SCR Part 19, rule 2; DCR Part 16, rule 2; LCR Part 15, rule 2)

(2) Despite subrule (1), a person may move the court to make an order without notice of motion having been filed or served on a person if: (a) that person consents to the making of the order, or (b) the preparation, filing or service of the notice would cause undue delay or other prejudice to the person by whom the order is sought, or (c) the court dispenses with the requirement for such notice to be filed or served, or (d) under these rules or the practice of the court, the motion may be made without the prior filing or service (as the case may be) of notice of motion. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

555

UCPR Parts 11-20

(1) A person may not move the court to make any order unless notice of motion has been filed and served on each person affected by the proposed order.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 18.3

[r 18.2.20]

RULE 18.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 18.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 18.2.40] Service of sealed copy of notice required ................................................................................................ [r 18.2.50] Who should be served with notice ........................................................................................................... [r 18.2.60] Filing in court ............................................................................................................................................ [r 18.2.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 18.2.1000]

[r 18.2.20]

Comparison

The substance of this rule remains unaltered. [r 18.2.40]

Operation

This rule ensures procedural fairness. It is axiomatic that the other parties to the proceedings have written notice of the orders which the moving party seeks from the court. Nevertheless, the rules do provide for the making of applications in certain circumstances, including urgent applications, without the need to file and serve a notice of motion. Note also that under r 18.6(2) an application may be made without the need to file and serve a notice of motion. See Petronaitis v Rowles [2012] NSWCA 236 as an example of where the court, pursuant to r 18.2(2)(c), has dispensed with the requirement for a notice of motion to be served. [r 18.2.50]

Service of sealed copy of notice required

This rule requires service of the sealed copy of a notice of motion: Petronaitis v Rowles [2012] NSWCA 236. [r 18.2.60]

Who should be served with notice

Where there is doubt as to who should be given notice, notice should be given to all parties interested in the proceedings: Re King & Co’s Trademark [1892] 2 Ch 462. Note that r 23.8(3) requires that, in relation to applications for inspection of property, notice be served on each person affected by the order made. Pursuant to r 31.28 an application for an order pertaining to the service of expert’s reports and hospital reports may be made without serving a notice of motion. [r 18.2.80]

Filing in court

With leave, a motion may be filed in court: Beecham (Aust) Pty Ltd v Roque Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 1; 89 FLR 238. [r 18.2.1000]

References

As to applications for inspection of property, see r 23.8. As to applications by other parties at the hearing of a motion, see r 18.6(2). 18.3

Contents of notice of motion

(cf SCR Part 19, rule 2(4) and (5); DCR Part 16, rule 2(3) and (4); LCR Part 15, rule 2(3) and (3A))

(1) A notice of motion for an order: (a) must identify the person by whom the order is sought: (i) if the person is already a party to the proceedings, as that party (for example, as first plaintiff or second defendant), or (ii) if the person is not yet a party to the proceedings, as the applicant, and (b) must identify each person affected by the order: (i) if that person is already a party to the proceedings, as that party (for example, as second plaintiff or first defendant), or (ii) if that person is not yet a party to the proceedings, as the respondent, and (c) if the person by whom the order is sought is not already an active party, must state an address for service for that person, and 556

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 18 – Motions [r 18.3.60]

r 18.3

(d)

unless the motion is to be moved in the absence of the public, must state the date and time when, and the place where, the motion is to be moved, and (e) if the court makes an order as to the time by which the notice is to be served, must bear a note of the order made, and (f) must state concisely the nature of the proposed order.

[Subr (1) am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[30]]

(1A) In the case of proceedings in Class 1, 2, 3 or 4 of the Land and Environment Court’s jurisdiction, a notice of motion must identify a person who is not yet a party to the proceedings by name alone, and not as the applicant or respondent as required by subrule (1)(a)(ii) or (b)(ii). [Subr (1A) insrt Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

(2) Costs need not be specifically claimed in the notice of motion. (3) If a notice of motion is of a kind that, under any Act, any rules of court or any practice of the court, is dealt with in the absence of the public, the notice of motion must contain a statement to the effect that the motion is to be so dealt with. (4) If it becomes necessary for an application under subrule (3) to be dealt with in court, the registrar is to refer it to the court and give notice to the parties that the application has been so referred. [R 18.3 am Rule 338 of 2008; Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 18.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 18.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 18.3.40] Nature of orders sought ........................................................................................................................... [r 18.3.60] Clarity of orders ........................................................................................................................................ [r 18.3.80] Notice to be addressed to party to be served ........................................................................................ [r 18.3.100] Fixing of hearing date ............................................................................................................................. [r 18.3.120] Hearing in absence of the public ........................................................................................................... [r 18.3.140] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 18.3.1000]

[r 18.3.20]

Comparison

This is now a discrete rule. Prior to the commencement of the UCPR, the requirements as to the content of notices had been incorporated into the rule requiring that notice be given. Rule 18.3(1) places greater emphasis on identifying the parties in the notice. Rule 18.3(1)(f) provides that the notice must state concisely the nature of the proposed orders and is in identical terms to SCR Pt 19 r 2(4)(e). Note that there is now no requirement to state the grounds on which the order is sought either in the notice or in the supporting affidavit. This had been a requirement of DCR Pt 16 r 2(d). Rule 18.3(3) and 18.3(4) are new rules of practice in both jurisdictions and provide for the notice to contain a statement that the motion be dealt with in the absence of the public where under the rules or practice of the court such motions are generally dealt with in this way. Operation

This rule sets out the information which must be included in the notice of motion. Failure to comply with this rule may result in the court registry refusing to accept the notice for filing. If, on the hearing of the motion, it is discovered that the notice does not comply with this rule, the court may grant leave to amend the notice. (Pursuant to CPA s 64, the court may order that leave be granted to amend any document in the proceedings.) The moving party may be liable to pay the costs thrown away: see r 42.10 (disobedience to rules). [r 18.3.60]

Nature of orders sought

Rule 18.3(1)(f) requires that the notice state concisely the nature of the proposed order. While the rule does not specifically require it, it is of assistance to the court to cite in the notice the rule or section of the CPA (or other statute) pursuant to which an order is sought, for example, “an order pursuant to r 23.8(1)(a) of the UCPR for the inspection of property, namely …”. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

557

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 18.3.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 18.4

[r 18.3.60]

[r 18.3.80]

Clarity of orders

The moving party on an application always has the primary responsibility for ensuring that there is clarity as to the orders which are sought: Maloney v Kull (unreported, NSWCA, 21 February 2003). [r 18.3.100]

Notice to be addressed to party to be served

The notice of motion should be addressed to the party to be served and not the solicitor acting for that party (although service may be effected by serving the notice on the party’s solicitor): Re Baptist (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 268. [r 18.3.120]

Fixing of hearing date

Rule 18.3(1)(d) provides that the notice must state the date and time when the motion is to be moved. The information as to the date and time the motion will be moved (or the return date as it is usually called) is provided to the moving party by court staff when the notice is filed in the registry. [r 18.3.140]

Hearing in absence of the public

Section 71 of the CPA provides that the business of the court may be conducted in the absence of the public in a range of circumstances. This includes the hearing of an interlocutory application (except while a witness is giving oral evidence) or if the business concerns the guardianship, custody or maintenance of a minor. The practice of the court allows some motions to be dealt with in the absence of the public, for example, probate and adoption applications, enforcement applications and urgent stay applications. The notice must contain a statement that the motion be dealt with in the absence of the public if that is what is required in the circumstances. Affidavits in support of interlocutory applications that are to be considered in the absence of the parties (that is, in chambers) need to be filed with the notice of motion: see [r 35.9.100]. [r 18.3.1000]

References

See s 71 of the CPA – Business in the absence of the public. See r 42.10 as to the court’s powers where there has been disobedience to the rules. See s 64 of the CPA as to amendment of documents. 18.4

Time for service of notice

(cf SCR Part 19, rule 3; DCR Part 16, rule 3; LCR Part 15, rule 3)

Unless the court orders otherwise, a notice of motion must be served at least 3 days before the date fixed for the motion.

RULE 18.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 18.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 18.4.40] Calculating the time .................................................................................................................................. [r 18.4.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 18.4.1000]

[r 18.4.20]

Comparison

The rule is unchanged. [r 18.4.40]

Operation

This rule proscribes the minimum time in which a notice of motion is to be served. If leave of the court has not been obtained by the moving party for an abridgement of time for service of the notice of motion (see r 1.12) and the moving party fails to comply with r 18.4, the party upon whom the notice was served may make an application to have the hearing of the motion adjourned. If that application is successful, the costs of the adjournment may be awarded against the moving party: see r 42.10. 558

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 18 – Motions [r 18.5.1000] [r 18.4.60]

r 18.6

Calculating the time

The date fixed for the motion would be a “given day” and therefore should not be counted when calculating the 3 days required by the rule: r 1.11(2). “Not less than three days before” means three clear days before the return day: Howey & Co Pty Ltd v Creative Projects International Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 898. [r 18.4.1000]

References

See r 1.11(2) as to the reckoning of time. See r 1.12 as to the abridgement of time for service. See r 42.10 as to the court’s powers where there has been disobedience to the rules. 18.5

Notice to be personally served on persons who have not entered appearance

(cf SCR Part 19, rule 4; LCR Part 15, rule 2(4))

A notice of motion must be personally served if the person on whom it is to be served: (a) is not a party to the proceedings, or (b) is a party to the proceedings, but is not an active party (otherwise than because the party has failed to comply with the requirements of these rules with respect to entering an appearance).

RULE 18.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 18.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 18.5.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 18.5.1000]

[r 18.5.20]

Comparison

This rule clarifies the rule as it existed in the SCR. Note that the rule is new to District Court practice. [r 18.5.40]

Operation

This rule provides that a notice of motion must be served personally on a person if the person is not a party to the proceedings or, if a party, they do not have an address for service. The rule does not apply if a person is a party but has not complied with the rules regarding entering an appearance. See UCPR Pt 6 rr 9–11 as to entering an appearance. Failure to comply with this rule may result in an adverse costs order: r 42.10. [r 18.5.1000]

References

As to service of documents generally, see UCPR Pt 10 and in particular rr 10.20–10.27 in regard to personal service. As to the rules for entering an appearance, see rr 6.9–6.11. See r 42.10 as to the court’s powers where there has been disobedience to the rules. 18.6 Hearing of interlocutory applications

(1) A party’s notice of motion in any proceedings must include, so far as practicable, all applications that the party desires to make in relation to the proceedings and that, having regard to the nature of the proceedings, can conveniently be dealt with at the one time. (2) On the hearing of a party’s notice of motion, any other party may make any application in relation to the proceedings. (3) If on the hearing of a party’s notice of motion, any other party makes an application under subrule (2), the court: (a) may deal with both applications at the hearing, or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

559

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf LCR Part 15, rule 5)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 18.6

[r 18.6.20] (b)

may adjourn the hearing and, if appropriate, may direct any necessary notice of motion to be given to the other parties.

RULE 18.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 18.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 18.6.40] As far as practicable, all applications to be made at the one time .......................................................... [r 18.6.60] Any other party may make an application at the hearing ........................................................................ [r 18.6.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 18.6.1000]

[r 18.6.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule as far as Supreme Court and District Court practice is concerned. The rule existed in similar form in LCR Pt 15 r 5(2) and (3). [r 18.6.40]

Operation

This rule is concerned with the efficient use of the court’s time and resources and the minimisation of the costs of litigation. It requires that, as far as is practicable, a party’s motion must include all applications that the party is contemplating making. The clear aim is to discourage the bringing of successive applications in the proceedings. [r 18.6.60]

As far as practicable, all applications to be made at the one time

Before moving the court, careful consideration should be given to the range of possible applications which the moving party may wish to bring in the proceedings. Of course, circumstances may arise after the hearing of a motion by reason of which the moving party decides to make a further application. It would appear that the moving party would need to demonstrate to the court that the orders sought arose from events or circumstances which were unforeseen at the time of the disposal of the previous application. Failure to persuade the court on this point may result in the court awarding costs against the moving party: see r 42.10. [r 18.6.80]

Any other party may make an application at the hearing

The rule also provides that any other party may make an application on the hearing of the notice of motion. There would appear to be no requirement to file and serve a notice of motion unless directed to do so by the court under r 18.6(3)(b). [r 18.6.1000]

References

See r 42.10 as to the court’s powers where there has been disobedience to the rules. 18.7 Motion may be dealt with in party’s absence (cf SCR Part 19, rule 5; DCR Part 16, rule 5; LCR Part 15, rule 5(2A))

If service of a notice of motion on any party is required by these rules, and notice of motion has been duly served on that party, the court may hear and dispose of the motion in the absence of that party.

RULE 18.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 18.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 18.7.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 18.7.1000]

[r 18.7.20]

Comparison

This rule is substantially unchanged except for the prefacing phrase “If service of a notice of motion on any party is required by these rules”. Service is required under r 18.2(1). However, r 18.2(2) enables a party to move the court without notice in certain circumstances. 560

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 18 – Motions [r 18.8.1000] [r 18.7.40]

r 18.8

Operation

This rule enables the court to hear and dispose of a motion in the absence of a party who has been duly served. If a party wishes to be heard in opposition to a motion, it must be represented or (if unrepresented) present at the hearing of the motion. The court will not exercise its powers under this rule until it satisfies itself that there has been proper service of the notice of motion, in which case the moving party will be required to produce to the court an affidavit of service. An inability to produce an affidavit of service or otherwise prove proper service may result in the court adjourning the hearing to allow for the rules regarding service to be complied with and awarding costs against the moving party: see r 42.10. See Gould v Purtle [2014] NSWSC 493 at [18]–[33] where a notice of motion was heard in the absence of a party. Where the rules of service have been complied with, and an opposing party fails to appear at the hearing of the motion, an appeal from the orders made is unlikely to be successful. [r 18.7.1000]

References

See r 18.2. See r 42.10 as to the court’s powers where there has been disobedience to the rules. 18.8

Further hearing

(cf SCR Part 19, rule 8)

(1) If notice of a motion for any day has been filed or served, and the motion is not disposed of on that day: (a) the court may hear and dispose of the notice of motion on any later day fixed by the court, and (b) subject to subrule (2), filing or service of a further notice of motion is not required. (2) Subrule 1(b) does not apply: (a) if the court directs the filing or service of a further notice of motion, or (b) if service is required on a person on whom notice of motion has not previously been served.

RULE 18.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 18.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 18.8.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 18.8.1000]

[r 18.8.20]

Comparison

This rule remains essentially unchanged from SCR Pt 19 r 8. However, it is an entirely new rule to District Court practice. [r 18.8.40]

Operation

This rule provides that the filing of a further notice of motion is not required if the motion is part-heard and adjourned to another day. However, the rule does not apply if the court directs that a further notice of motion be filed and served or that service is required on a person on whom notice of motion has not previously been served. References

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 18.8.1000]

As to the filing and serving of a further notice of motion, see rr 18.2, 18.3, 18.4 and 18.5.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

561

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 18.9

18.9

[r 18.9.20]

Directions as to conduct of proceedings on notice of motion

(cf SCR Part 34, rule 6(1))

In proceedings on a notice of motion, the court may give directions as to the order of evidence and address and generally as to the conduct of the proceedings.

RULE 18.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 18.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 18.9.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 18.9.1000]

[r 18.9.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule of practice in both the Supreme Court and the District Court. [r 18.9.40]

Operation

This rule specifically gives the court power to control the conduct of proceedings on a notice of motion. Pursuant to CPA s 62, the court has a general power to give directions as to the conduct of any hearing in proceedings, including directions as to the order of evidence and addresses. [r 18.9.1000]

References

As to the court’s general power to give directions as to the conduct of hearings see s 62 of the CPA.

562

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 19 – Amendment [r Pt19.1000]

r 19.1

PART 19 – AMENDMENT Commentary by Michael McHugh SC.

PART 19 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 19 ................................................................................................................. [r Pt19.20] Correction of judgment or order (slip rule) ............................................................................................... [r Pt19.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r Pt19.1000]

[r Pt19.20]

General comments on Part 19

The CPA and UCPR have each adapted parts of the former SCR Pt 20. Sections 64 and 65 move rules into the Act. This has been done to remove any doubt about lower courts’ ability to make rules dealing with amendments to originating process outside a limitation period, as argued in Air Link Pty Ltd v Paterson (No 2) (2003) 58 NSWLR 388; [2003] NSWCA 251: Second Reading Speech 6 April 2005. Section 64 of the CPA empowers the courts to order that any document in the proceedings be amended. Section 65 permits amendments of originating process after the expiry of a limitation period to operate effectively. Further, if there has been a mistake in the name of a party, the section applies to the person intended to be made a party as if he or she were a party: East West Airlines Ltd v Turner (2010) 78 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCA 53. [r Pt19.40]

Correction of judgment or order (“slip rule”)

Part 19 does not apply to the “amendment” of a judgment or order. The classic “slip rule” governing formal correction of errors in judgments, orders and certificates is contained in r 36.17. [r Pt19.1000]

References

CPA ss 64 and 65. Rule 36.17. 19.1

Amending a statement of claim

(cf SCR Part 15, rule 12, Part 20, rules 2 and 2A; DCR Part 17, rules 2 and 2A; LCR Part 16, rule 2)

(1) A plaintiff may, without leave, amend a statement of claim once within 28 days after the date on which it was filed, but, unless the court otherwise orders, may not amend it after a date has been fixed for trial. [Subr (1) subst Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[4]]

(2) If a plaintiff amends his or her statement of claim under subrule (1) after the defendant has filed a defence, the defendant may amend his or her defence at any time within 14 days after service of the amended statement of claim. (3) A plaintiff’s right to make an amendment under subrule (1) is not affected by any amendment the plaintiff has made under rule 7.22. [R 19.1 am Rule 164 of 2007]

Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 19.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 19.1.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 19.1.1000]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

563

UCPR Parts 11-20

RULE 19.1 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 19.2

[r 19.1.20]

[r 19.1.20]

Comparison

Formerly a party could amend its pleading once at any time before the close of pleadings. Rule 19.1 imposes a 28 day period in which to make an amendment. Moreover, the rule relating to amendments by consent has been removed. Part 15 r 12 of the SCR related, in part, to amendments made necessary by a plaintiff when the defence was served in money claims. Rule 7.22 relates to amendment where it is necessary to replace the business name sued with the defendant’s own name. [r 19.1.40]

Operation

An application for leave to amend is made under Pt 18 – Motions. Rule 42.6 states that, unless the court orders otherwise, a party that amends a pleading or summons without leave must, after the conclusion of the proceedings, pay the costs of and occasioned by the amendment. [r 19.1.1000]

References

CPA s 64 governs amendments outside the 28 day period – see [CPA 64.20]. Rule 42.6 governs the costs of amendments made without leave. 19.2

Amendments to add or remove parties

(cf SCR Part 20, rule 2(4) and (5); DCR Part 17, rule 2(4) and (5); LCR Part 16, rule 2(3A) and (3B))

(1) Subject to subrules (2) and (3), the amendments that may be made under rule 19.1 include an amendment that would have the effect of adding a party to, or removing a party from, the proceedings. (2) An amendment that would have the effect of adding a person as a plaintiff in proceedings in which a solicitor is acting for the current plaintiff may not be made unless, at the time the amendment is made, the same solicitor: (a) is acting for the person to be added, and (b) certifies on the amended document: (i) that he or she is acting for the person to be added, and (ii) that the person to be added consents to being added as a plaintiff. (3) An amendment that would have the effect of removing a party from the proceedings may not be made unless that party consents to being removed from the proceedings. (4) If a person is added as a party under this rule, the date of commencement of the proceedings in relation to that person is taken to be the date on which the amended document is filed.

RULE 19.2 COMMENTARY [r 19.2.1000]

References

CPA s 65 may allow pleadings to be amended outside a limitation period. 19.3 Duration of leave or consent (cf SCR Part 20, rule 5(1))

An order giving leave to amend a document ceases to have effect: (a) at the expiration of the time specified in the order as the time within which the amendment must be made, or (b) if no such time is specified, at the expiration of 14 days after the date on which the order is made.

RULE 19.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 19.3.20] 564

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 19 – Amendment [r 19.4.40]

r 19.5

Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 19.3.40]

[r 19.3.20]

Comparison

Rule 19.3 is not stated to be subject to r 1.12 – Extension and abridgement of time, as the SCR was. However, r 1.12 may still be utilised. [r 19.3.40]

Operation

A failure to amend before the expiration of the time specified in r 19.3 and the relevant limitation period may allow a defendant to successfully plead the time bar: Fernance v Nominal Defendant (1989) 17 NSWLR 710; Windsurf Holdings Pty Ltd v Leonard [2009] NSWCA 6. 19.4

Disallowance of amendment

(cf SCR Part 20, rule 3; DCR Part 17, rule 3; LCR Part 16, rule 3)

(1) If a party amends a pleading, as referred to in rule 19.1(1) or (2), the court may, by order, disallow the amendment. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, notice of motion for such an order must be filed within 14 days after the date on which the amended document was served on the applicant. (3) If, on the hearing of an application for an order under this rule, the court is satisfied that, had an application for leave to make the amendment been made, it would not have granted leave to make the whole or some part of the amendment, the court must disallow the amendment or that part, as the case may be.

RULE 19.4 COMMENTARY [r 19.4.40]

Operation

An application is made under Pt 18 – Motions. 19.5 Mode of amendment generally (cf SCR Part 20, rules 7 and 8; DCR Part 17, rules 7 and 8; LCR Part 16, rules 7 and 8)

(1) Subject to any directions referred to in rule 19.6, amendments to a filed document must be made by filing a fresh document that has been amended in accordance with these rules or pursuant to an order of the court.

(3) A document amended under this rule must be marked with the following particulars: (a) the date of the amendment, (b) if the amendment is made pursuant to an order of the court, the date of the order, (c) if the amendment is made otherwise than pursuant to an order of the court, a reference to the provision of these rules that authorises the amendment, (d) the manner in which the omission and insertion of matter have been indicated in the amended document. (4) An amended document must retain the existing paragraph numbering, with any additional © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

565

UCPR Parts 11-20

(2) The amendments must be indicated as follows: (a) the omission of existing matter must be indicated in such manner (such as striking through the matter, with or without underlining) as does not affect the legibility of the matter being omitted, and (b) the insertion of new matter must be indicated in such manner (such as the use of underlining, bolding or italics) as distinguishes it from existing matter (including existing matter to be omitted).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 19.5

[r 19.5.20]

paragraphs that are inserted after an existing paragraph bearing the number of that paragraph together with the letters “A”, “B” and so on, as in these rules. [Subr (4) insrt Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[17]] [R 19.5 am Rule 579 of 2007; subst Rule 808 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

RULE 19.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 19.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 19.5.40]

[r 19.5.20]

Comparison

There is no substantial change from the effect of the SCR. However, subr (3)(c) requires that a note detailing the amendments be given and subr (4) makes express the informal practice adopted by many litigants. [r 19.5.40]

Operation

The usual form of noting amendments on fresh documents is by detailing the matters required under subr (2), under the title of the document. The amendments themselves should, where new, be underlined, and where removed, be struck through. 19.6 Court may give directions as to mode of amendment (cf SCR Part 20, rule 6; DCR Part 17, rule 6; LCR Part 16, rule 6)

If the court orders, or grants leave for, the amendment of a filed document, the court may give such directions as it thinks fit concerning: (a) the mode of amendment, and (b) the mode of service of the amended document or of notice of the amendment, and (c) the time within which the amended document or notice of amendment is to be filed and served.

RULE 19.6 COMMENTARY [r 19.6.1000]

References

The courts’ general powers to make directions are contained in CPA Pt 6 and r 2 – Case management.

566

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 1 – Mediation

[r 20.2.40]

r 20.2

PART 20 – RESOLUTION OF PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT HEARING DIVISION 1 – MEDIATION Commentary by Deborah Robinson, Barrister. Updated by Mary-Ann de Mestre, Solicitor of NSW, Adjunct Fellow of Western Sydney University. 20.1 Application of Division This Division applies to matters referred to mediation under Part 4 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005.

RULE 20.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 20.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 20.1.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 20.1.1000]

[r 20.1.20]

Comparison

This rule refers to Pt 4 of the CPA (see ss 25 to 34), which replaces the mediation provisions that were found as SCA Pt 7B and DCA Pt 3A. SCR Pt 72C provided for mediation rules. There were no mediation rules in the DCR. [r 20.1.40]

Operation

The rules rely on the statutory jurisdiction granted in the Act. Detailed consideration should be given to the provisions under Pt 4 of the Act. [r 20.1.1000]

References

Refer to annotations under CPA Pt 4. 20.2 Directions (cf SCR Part 72C, rule 1)

The court may give directions regulating the practice and procedure to be followed in a mediation, including the preparation and service of documents.

RULE 20.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 20.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 20.2.40] Information on Supreme Court website .................................................................................................... [r 20.2.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 20.2.1000]

[r 20.2.20]

Comparison

[r 20.2.40]

Operation

Sufficient disclosure of the real issues in the dispute, and the evidence in support of those issues, is generally necessary to effect settlement: see further the annotations under [CPA 26.100]. Directions may be sought with respect to the service of evidence, reports, document bundles, schedules, valuations, statements of issues and position papers, amongst other things, to facilitate the mediation process. In considering the directions required reference should be made to the court’s broad general jurisdiction to give directions pursuant to CPA Pt 6. The court will decline to give orders or directions imposing conditions in relation to a mediation which © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

567

UCPR Parts 11-20

This rule incorporates the substance of SCR Pt 72C r 1. There were no mediation provisions in the DCR.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.3

[r 20.2.40]

has been voluntarily arranged between the parties and does not arise pursuant to a court order under s 26 of the CPA: Thomas v Yates [2008] NSWSC 282. Upon appointment, the mediator has a statutory jurisdiction to give directions for the preparation for, and conduct of, the mediation: CPA s 32. [r 20.2.60]

Information on Supreme Court website

Information is provided on the Supreme Court website under the heading “mediation”. This document explains the purpose, benefits and operation of mediations, which may be of particular assistance in outlining the concepts to an unrepresented litigant. Further, the document gives administrative information in relation to court annexed mediations and specifies the documentary requirements for parties who participate in court annexed mediations. As affidavits are no longer filed with the court it may be necessary to provide the registrar mediator with a bundle of documents one week prior to the mediation date. The website also contains a link to the standard form of Order for referral to mediation. [r 20.2.1000]

References

CPA ss 26 and 32. CPA Pt 6. 20.3

Statements as to proposed referral to mediation

(cf SCR Part 72C, rule 2; Act No 9 1973, section 164A; Act No 11 1970, section 21L)

On any occasion that proceedings are before the court for directions, the court may require each active party to state any of the following: (a) whether the party consents to referral of a matter arising in the proceedings for mediation, (b) whether the parties agree as to who is to be the mediator, (c) whether the parties agree as to the proportions in which the costs of mediation are to be borne, and the terms of any such agreement.

RULE 20.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 20.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 20.3.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 20.3.1000]

[r 20.3.20]

Comparison

This rule incorporates SCR Pt 72C r 3. The previous rule required such a statement to be made on the “first” occasion whereas the current rule requires a statement on “any” occasion the matter is before the court for directions. [r 20.3.40]

Operation

The small amendment noted in [r 20.3.20] highlights the requirement to consider mediation at all stages of the litigation, in conformity with the principle of just, quick and cheap resolution. Consideration should be given on an intermittent basis to the possibility of mediation, pursuant to the obligation on all legal practitioners to advise clients of alternatives to fully contested litigation; see further the annotations under [CPA 26.120]. Where the parties do not agree as to the choice of mediator, the court may select the mediator or appoint a mediator pursuant to the Joint Protocol set out in Supreme Court Practice Note Gen 6 – Mediation; see further the annotations under [CPA 26.160]. [r 20.3.1000]

References

CPA s 26. Rule 38 of the NSW Barristers’ Rules 2011, r 17A of the Advocacy Rules under s 23 of the Solicitors’ Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995. Supreme Court Practice Note Gen 6 – Mediation.

568

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 1 – Mediation

[r 20.4.1000]

20.4

r 20.5

Appointments by mediator

(cf SCR Part 72C, rule 3)

(1) Within 7 days after being notified that a matter has been referred for mediation, the mediator to whom the matter is referred must appoint a time for the mediation and notify the parties, in writing, of the time appointed. (2) The mediator may also appoint a time for a preliminary meeting of the parties.

RULE 20.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 20.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 20.4.40] Information session with registrar prior to appointment of mediator ........................................................ [r 20.4.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 20.4.1000]

[r 20.4.20]

Comparison

This rule incorporates the substance of SCR Pt 72C r 3(a) and (b). The directions power which was previously provided to a mediator under Pt 72C r 3(c) is now found in CPA s 32. [r 20.4.40]

Operation

At a preliminary meeting directions may be sought to ensure adequate disclosure of issues and exchange of material prior to the mediation, if such directions have not already been sought from the court. The mediator has a statutory jurisdiction to give directions, by virtue of CPA s 32. Practices may vary between mediators and there is no guidance in the CPA or UCPR as to the content of a preliminary meeting. A preliminary meeting may assist parties who have been ordered to attend mediation to understand the process and parameters of mediation, the duty to participate in good faith and the potential benefits of a mediated settlement. [r 20.4.60]

Information session with registrar prior to appointment of mediator

Pursuant to para 8 of Supreme Court Practice Note Gen 6 the court may refer a matter to a registrar for an information session of 15–30 minutes duration. If, at the conclusion of the information session, the parties do not agree to mediation the registrar will report this outcome to the court. If the parties agree to mediation the registrar may make the necessary orders and if the registrar is to be the mediator, may give directions to facilitate the preparation for mediation. Refer further to paras [11]–[13] of PN SC Gen 6. [r 20.4.1000]

References

Directions power of mediators: CPA s 32. Supreme Court Practice Note Gen 6. 20.5

Completion of mediation

The parties and the mediator must conduct the mediation with the object, so far as practicable, of completing the mediation within 28 days.

RULE 20.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 20.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 20.5.40]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

569

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf SCR Part 72C, rule 4)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.6

[r 20.5.20]

[r 20.5.20]

Comparison

There is no change in this rule from SCR Pt 72C r 4. [r 20.5.40]

Operation

Subject to the mediator’s authority to control the parameters of the mediation and the terms of any agreement entered into between the parties to the mediation, it may be possible to seek an adjournment to attend to matters newly arising at the mediation. Further, there may be a late appreciation of the need to attend to ancillary matters, such as the need to obtain taxation advice with respect to the formulation of terms of settlement. Such an application should ordinarily not be necessary; issues should be dealt with in the course of case preparation and at the preliminary conference. 20.6

Mediation session procedure

(cf SCR Part 72C, rule 6)

(1) The following provisions apply to the conduct of a mediation session unless the mediator, or the court, otherwise directs: (a) the session must be attended: (i) subject to subparagraph (ii), by each party or, if a party is a corporation, by an officer of the corporation having authority to settle the proceedings, or (ii) if the conduct of the proceedings by a party is controlled by an insurer, by an officer of the insurer having authority to settle the proceedings, (b) a party may be accompanied by that party’s barrister or solicitor at the session. (2) A person who is required by subrule (1)(a) to attend a mediation session may do so by telephone, video link or other form of communication, but only with the leave of the court or the mediator. [Subr (2) insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[6]] [R 20.6 am Rule 494 of 2008]

RULE 20.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 20.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 20.6.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 20.6.1000]

[r 20.6.20]

Comparison

There is no change from SCR Pt 72C r 6. [r 20.6.40]

Operation

The court may accommodate the particular needs or difficulties of a party by appropriate directions: Rajski v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 478 (mediation held in location proximate to residence of party with medical condition, parties not compelled to confront each other directly when emotional outbursts anticipated). Directions may alleviate the special difficulties associated with holding mediations in certain matters, such as where Apprehended Violence Orders have been obtained. A “support person” is not entitled to attend a mediation unless all parties consent; attendance will generally be subject to a requirement that the support person be bound by a confidentiality agreement. It is noted that there is no express requirement on the Crown to ensure that an officer of the Crown with authority to settle the proceedings is in attendance; if difficulties are anticipated, a specific direction should be sought from the court pursuant to r 20.2. The court will not intervene by order or direction to require the attendance of a party personally at a mediation in the circumstances where the agreement to mediate was voluntary, not court ordered pursuant to s 26: Thomas v Yates [2008] NSWSC 282.

570

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 2 – Arbitration

[r 20.7.40] [r 20.6.1000]

r 20.8

References

UCPR r 20.2. 20.7

Notifications after mediation

Within 7 days after the conclusion of the last mediation session, the mediator must advise the court of the following: (a) the time and date the first mediation session commenced, and (b) the time and date the last mediation session concluded. [R 20.7 subst Rule 88 of 2009, Sch 1[11]]

RULE 20.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 20.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 20.7.40]

[r 20.7.20]

Comparison

This Rule has been amplified from the provisions previously contained in SCR Pt 72C r 7. The prior rule only required notification of the conclusion of a mediation within 7 days. [r 20.7.40]

Operation

The amendment to this section to require the mediator to provide the court with a statement as to the time and date of the commencement and conclusion of the mediation session arose as a result of the dispute ventilated in Sharjade Pty Ltd v RAAF (Landings) Ex-Servicemen Charitable Fund Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1347. In that case, a dispute arose on a costs argument as to the admissibility of a Calderbank offer made by email on the evening of the day the mediation was conducted, and whether that document was privileged pursuant to s 30(4) of the CPA as being a document arising as a result of, or in the course of a follow up of, a “mediation session” (“mediation session” being a term broadly defined in s 30(1)). The provision is restricted to advising the court as to the time and date of the mediation session, and the mediator should not report to the court on additional matters, as that would be contrary to the integrity of the confidentiality regime: see Cook v Taing [2014] VSC 428 where the mediator was criticized for reporting to the court that the parties had settled the matter subject to execution of a Deed of Settlement. For a discussion of the scope of a “mediation session” see the annotations under [CPA 30.30].

DIVISION 2 – ARBITRATION Commentary by Peter Johnstone, President of the Children’s Court of New South Wales. Updated by Greg Sarginson. Barrister. 20.8 Proceedings that may not be referred to arbitration

For the purposes of section 38(3)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, the following proceedings may not be referred for arbitration unless the parties consent or the court finds there are special circumstances to justify their referral: (a) proceedings in which there is an allegation of fraud, (b) proceedings in the Small Claims Division of the Local Court. [R 20.8 am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

571

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf DCR Part 51A, rule 2; LCR Part 38, rule 12)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.9

[r 20.8.20]

RULE 20.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 20.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 20.8.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 20.8.1000]

[r 20.8.20]

Comparison

The Arbitration (Civil Actions) Act 1983 was repealed by the Civil Procedure Act 2005, which in turn incorporated the relevant provisions of the former Act into Pt 5 – Arbitration of Proceedings. Parts of the former rules now appear in the Act. This rule does not change the substance of its predecessor provision. [r 20.8.40]

Operation

The court may order that proceedings be referred for determination by an arbitrator: see s 38(1), but not proceedings to which s 38(3) applies. Before referring proceedings for arbitration, the court must consider the preparations for hearing made by the parties, deal with any applications that should be dealt with before hearing, and give directions for the conduct of the proceedings before the arbitrator: see s 38(2). Certain proceedings may not be referred: see s 38(3). This includes proceedings where there is no dispute, where judgment has been given or entered, where cause is shown why the proceedings should not be referred, and proceedings of a kind prescribed by the rules: see s 38(4). Rule 20.8 provides for other classes of proceedings which may not be referred for arbitration. They are proceedings involving an allegation of fraud and proceedings in the Small Claims Division of the Local Court. See also Morgan v Johnson (1998) 44 NSWLR 578 at 585, 599. [r 20.8.1000]

References

See generally CPA Pt 5. 20.9

Reference to arbitration under Part 5 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005

(cf SCR Part 72B, rule 1; DCR Part 51A, rule 3; LCR Part 38, rule 3)

(1) If an arbitrator is not prepared to hear or determine referred proceedings, whether before or after any hearing has commenced, the arbitrator must as soon as practicable inform the referring court of that fact, specifying his or her reasons. (2) If an arbitrator declines or fails to hear and determine referred proceedings, the referring court must revoke the order referring the proceedings to the arbitrator and may make another order referring the proceedings to another arbitrator.

RULE 20.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 20.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 20.9.40]

[r 20.9.20]

Comparison

The substance of the rule is unchanged. [r 20.9.40]

Operation

An arbitrator may need to decline the referral, in which event the referring court is to be informed as soon as possible, with the reasons. If an arbitrator so declines or otherwise fails to proceed with the arbitration, the court must revoke the referral: see s 38(4). It may then refer the proceedings to another arbitrator.

572

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 20.10.40]

20.10

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 2 – Arbitration

r 20.11

Medical reports

(cf SCR Part 72B, rule 2; DCR Part 51A, rule 6; LCR Part 38, rule 7)

(1) In this rule, medical expert includes dentist, medical practitioner, occupational therapist, physiotherapist and psychologist. (2) A medical expert’s written report as to a person’s past, present or probable future physical or mental condition: (a) is not admissible unless it has been served on each of the active parties no later than 28 days before the arbitration hearing, and (b) if so served, is admissible as evidence of the matters contained in it, unless the referring court or the arbitrator orders otherwise. (3) At any arbitration, a party is not entitled to adduce a medical expert’s oral evidence as to a person’s past, present or probable future physical or mental condition unless the referring court or the arbitrator so directs or unless each of the parties consent.

RULE 20.10 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 20.10.40]

[r 20.10.20]

Comparison

The substance of the rule is unchanged. [r 20.10.40]

Operation

In arbitrations the presumption is that the expert medical evidence will be by way of written report rather than oral evidence. In the absence of consent of the parties, oral evidence cannot be introduced unless the court or the arbitrator so directs: see Hann v Nield (unreported, NSWSC, James J, 14 October 1993). The medical reports must be served to make them admissible. 20.11 Award of arbitrator (cf SCR Part 72B, rule 3; DCR Part 51A, rule 9; LCR Part 38, rule 10)

(1) An arbitrator’s award, and his or her reasons for the award, are to be in or to the effect of the approved form. (2) An arbitrator’s reasons for an award are to be specified so that, in his or her opinion, they make the parties aware of his or her view of the case made by each of them.

(4) As soon as practicable after receiving an arbitrator’s award, the registrar must send to each of the parties a copy of the award, with the date of sending set out in the award or in a notice accompanying the award. (5) For the purposes of subrule (4), date of sending means the date of leaving, sending, transmitting or otherwise serving copies of the award.

RULE 20.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 20.11.20] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

573

UCPR Parts 11-20

(3) If a party fails to attend a hearing before an arbitrator, the arbitrator must include in his or her reasons for an award the fact that the party failed to attend and any information known to the arbitrator relating to the party’s reasons for the failure to attend.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.12

[r 20.11.20]

Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 20.11.40]

[r 20.11.20]

Comparison

The substance of the rule is unchanged. [r 20.11.40]

Operation

The arbitrator must record the determination and reasons in a written award signed by the arbitrator: see s 39(2). Rule 20 deals with the format of the arbitrator’s reasons, and the content required. The award is to be sent immediately to the referring court: see s 39(3). The registrar must then send copies to the parties with the date of sending set out in the award or in an accompanying notice: see r 20.12(4). The rule is designed to overcome the problem identified in Walshe v Prest [2004] NSWCA 94. 20.12

Rehearing

(cf SCR Part 72B, rule 5; DCR Part 51A, rule 11; LCR Part 38, rule 12)

(1) An application under section 42 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 for the rehearing of referred proceedings is to be made by notice of motion. (2) On the date fixed for the proceedings to be listed before the court, or any date to which the proceedings are adjourned, the court must make a determination as to whether the proceedings are to be a full rehearing or a limited rehearing. (3) Before the record of any proceedings is brought before the court for a rehearing, the registrar must seal within the record, or separate from the record, both the application for rehearing and all information as to the nature and quantum of the arbitrator’s award. (4) Despite subrule (3), the court is not required to disqualify itself from rehearing the proceedings because it becomes aware in any manner of information as to the nature or quantum of the arbitrator’s award. (5) Unless the court otherwise orders, matter that has been sealed within the record is not to be opened, and matter that has been separated from the record is not to be returned to the record, until after the rehearing has been determined.

RULE 20.12 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.12.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 20.12.40]

[r 20.12.20]

Comparison

The former rule is incorporated, but the new rule contains some additional matters. [r 20.12.40]

Operation

Either party may apply for a rehearing, although there are limitations to the right: see s 43. The application is to be made by notice of motion: see r 20.12(1). The court must determine whether the rehearing is to be a full or limited rehearing: see r 20.12(2). The registrar is to seal within the record the documents specified in r 20.12(3), which is not opened until after the rehearing: see r 20.12(5).

574

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 3 – References to referees

[Pt 20.Div3.1000]

r 20.13

DIVISION 3 – REFERENCES TO REFEREES Commentary by Dr Michelle Sanson, Lawyer and Author.

DIVISION 3 COMMENTARY Structure of Part 20 Division 3 .......................................................................................................... [Pt 20.Div3.20] Comparison ....................................................................................................................................... [Pt 20.Div3.40] Operation ........................................................................................................................................... [Pt 20.Div3.60] References .................................................................................................................................... [Pt 20.Div3.1000]

[Pt 20.Div3.20]

Structure of Part 20 Division 3

This Division comprises 12 rules relating to the discretion of the court to refer questions or issues of fact or law to referees, with or without the consent of the parties, and the use of reports from such referrals. It forms part of three divisions, the purport of which is to enable the determination of a dispute without resorting to a final judicial hearing: Rail Corp (NSW) v Vero Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 926. [Pt 20.Div3.40]

Comparison

Each of the 12 rules in this Division relates to the rules in Pt 72 of the former SCR. Specifically, r 20.13 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 1, r 20.14 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 2, r 20.15 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 3, r 20.16 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 4, r 20.17 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 5, r 20.18 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 6, r 20.19 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 7, r 20.20 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 8, r 20.21 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 9, r 20.22 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 10, r 20.23 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 11 and SCR Pt 72 r 12, and r 20.24 relates to SCR Pt 72 r 13. The lack of substantial difference in the UCPR and the old SCR Pt 72 has been recognised judicially in Tryhaz Pty Ltd v Fielder Engineers Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 906. Where the wording of the rules is identical (or for practical purposes, identical) to that of the respective rule in SCR Pt 72, cases on SCR Pt 72 apply and are referred to below. [Pt 20.Div3.60]

Operation

This Division applies in both the Supreme and District Courts. It has the effect of splitting part of a case off for determination by a court appointed referee, but the court retains the discretion as to whether to accept the referee’s findings. [Pt 20.Div3.1000]

References

Robinson G, “The Liability of Arbitrators, Mediators, Referees and Experts and the Application of Professional Indemnity Insurance”, The Arbitrator & Mediator Vol 23 No 1, 2004, p 23. Hon Mr Justice Russell Bainton, “References Out of the Supreme Court to Special Referees”, Arbitrator Vol 17, 1998, p 129. NSW Law Reform Commission, Report 109, Expert Witnesses, 2005. 20.13 Definitions (cf SCR Part 72, rule 1)

In this Division: question includes any question or issue arising in any proceedings, whether of fact or law, or both, and whether raised by pleadings, agreement of parties or otherwise.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

575

UCPR Parts 11-20

order of referral means an order in force under rule 20.14.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.14

[r 20.13.20]

RULE 20.13 COMMENTARY [r 20.13.20]

Comparison

The definitions in this rule make no substantive change to the provisions in SCR Pt 72 rr 1 and 2. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR. 20.14 Orders of referral (cf SCR Part 72, rule 2)

(1) At any stage of the proceedings, the court may make orders for reference to a referee appointed by the court for inquiry and report by the referee on the whole of the proceedings or on any question arising in the proceedings. (2) The court must not make an order under subrule (1) in respect of a question to be tried with a jury.

RULE 20.14 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.14.20] Referral of a question to a referee ......................................................................................................... [r 20.14.60] Referral where arbitration agreement is in existence ............................................................................ [r 20.14.80]

[r 20.14.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 72 r 2. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. [r 20.14.60]

Referral of a question to a referee

Any issue or question of fact or law arising in the proceedings may be the subject of an order of referral (rr 20.13 to 20.14), which may, of course, at any time be vacated: Thompson v White [2008] NSWSC 1 or amended (Iacullo v Iacullo (No 3) [2012] NSWSC 274). A reference to a referee may be made in any proceedings except those before a jury (r 20.14(2)). The court can make the order referring to a referee against the wishes of the parties (Park Rail Developments Pty Ltd v RJ Pearce Assocs Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 123) but may consider their views, and whether a reference would be in the interests of justice: see Cave v Allen Jack & Cottier Pry Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1365 where the court considered relative speed, procedural flexibility and informality of the reference, and likely cost savings. The court may make multiple referrals to a referee in the same matter (Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Comerford [2001] NSWSC 293). In that case a referral was made on causation and after the referee’s report was received a second referral was made, this time to determine liability to pay damages. Similarly in Byrne v Byrne [2011] NSWSC 1437, a reference for an accountant to report on the value of assets and liabilities of a partnership was followed by a further reference to serve as a receiver. The court has a wide discretion in deciding what matters are to be referred and may refer the whole of the proceedings to a referee. See for example Lane Cove Council v Davies [2012] NSWSC 727. However a court will only refer matters within its area of expertise to a referee in exceptional circumstances (Al Amanah College Inc v Minister for Education & Training (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 254). Also, although the court may refer any question to referees, it must specify at the time of the reference, and not at a later time, what that question or questions is. In Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64 a reference was considered of no effect because the court did not identify a particular question or questions of foreign law which were to be referred. The referral can be made at any stage in proceedings (r 20.14(1)), even during the hearing (Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 333). In that case the court raised the desirability of referral early in the final hearing, given the technical nature of the architectural and engineering issues. The parties had previously considered a reference but could not agree on the referee. The List Judge was not directed to the possibility. The court vacated the final hearing and made a referral to a referee. In BestCare Foods Ltd v Origin Energy LPG Ltd [2011] NSWSC 908 a referral on damages was made to a referee before the court had made its findings on liability. 576

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 20.14.80]

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 3 – References to referees

r 20.14

The form of order is as per Supreme Court Practice Note SC Eq 3 (formerly Practice Note 100, Annexure 2). However in Rhodes v Christine Elizabeth Fletcher & Quasar Professionals Act Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 797 the orders made by consent referring the matter to an accountant made no reference to the Supreme Court Rules, but the court inferred from the way the orders were worded, including the use of “reference” and “referee”, that it was meant to be a reference to a referee and not a reference to a court appointed expert, or an agreement by the parties to abide by whatever the accountant agreed upon would decide. In contrast in Campbell v Crane (2013) 17 BPR 32483; [2013] NSWCA 43, the court declined to treat an order as a reference to a referee under r 20.14 because it stated that the person selected to value land was to “act as an expert and not as an arbitrator”. [r 20.14.80]

Referral where arbitration agreement is in existence

In Aerospatiale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Elspan International Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 321 the court made orders referring disputes over the construction of a hangar and associated buildings to an arbitrator as referee. The construction contracts contained arbitration clauses, but not all the parties in the proceedings were party to them. The court referred those parts of the dispute to arbitration pursuant to s 7 of the International Arbitration Act 1974, and as to the remainder of the dispute between those parties and those not party to the arbitration agreements, made orders under SCR Pt 72 (the precursor to UCPR Pt 20 Div 3) referring those disputes to the arbitrator as a referee. In doing so, the court applied the following considerations: 1. whether the intrusion of additional parties into an arbitral process may result in a lessening of privacy, especially as to findings on credit, bearing in mind that proceedings before a referee are likely to be private in a practical sense; 2. the degree of proximity between the issues and parties to the arbitration and the litigation; 3. any unfairness to a party flowing from a concurrent hearing; 4. savings of cost and time to the parties; 5. avoidance of duplicated hearings; 6. the prospect of inconsistent findings of fact and law; 7. the prospect of confusion where the same person sits as arbitrator and referee, creating a risk that the award under the arbitration may deal with a dispute not contemplated by the arbitration agreement, potentially invalidating the award; 8. the comparative lack of finality under Pt 72 when compared with arbitration, since the report of the referee must be considered by the court (giving rise to the possible incongruity of an award standing yet a similar finding under reference being reversed); 9. the difficulty that parties to the litigation may be required to be present throughout the arbitration/reference proceeding even if they were involved only to a limited degree; and 10. the calibre and reputation of the proposed adjudicator. This approach was followed in ACD Tridon Inc v Tridon Australia Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 896, where some parts of the claim were under an arbitration agreement and others were made under statute or in equity. The court recognised that the court did not have jurisdiction to require a party to submit to arbitration in respect of parts of its claims outside the arbitration agreement, but on the other hand was required to order a stay of proceedings in so far as they related to matters within the arbitration agreement. The court addressed the 10 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

577

UCPR Parts 11-20

Referral to referees can help to resolve situations where an arbitration clause applies to only some of the parties (Aerospatiale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Elspan International Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 321), or some of the issues (ACD Tridon Inc v Tridon Australia Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 896). Courts may be obliged to refer parties, whose contract contains an arbitration clauses, to arbitration under s 8 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW) and s 7 of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), and achieve consolidation the court may refer non-contractual issues and/or non parties, to the arbitrator as a referee. As the UCPR only provides for reference to a single referee, it is unlikely that situations with arbitration clauses that provide for arbitration by a panel of three arbitrators could be so referred, unless perhaps the reference is to the President of the tribunal and the President’s decision applies on non-contractual issues or with respect to non-parties. However if there were differing views amongst arbitrators, there may be an inconsistent outcome between the arbitral award and the referee report. The better course at the outset may be for the contracting parties to agree to vary the arbitration agreement to a sole arbitrator rather than a panel, or for the non-parties to be persuaded to agree to arbitration on the basis of the clause.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.15

[r 20.14.80]

considerations outlined above and decided to proceed on the basis that the adjudication would in part be an arbitration and in part a report by a referee. The court recognised that referral to a referee was less “final” than a determination by an arbitrator, but considered that “the reduction in finality seems to be a reasonable price to pay for efficiency and speed of primary outcome”. 20.15

Appointment of referees

(cf SCR Part 72, rule 3)

(1) Subject to this rule, the court may appoint any person as a referee. (2) A judicial officer or other officer of the court may not act as a referee otherwise than with the concurrence of the senior judicial officer.

RULE 20.15 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.15.20] Who may be a referee ........................................................................................................................... [r 20.15.60] The reference must be to a specific person or persons ........................................................................ [r 20.15.80] Court may order a non-party to nominate a suitable referee .............................................................. [r 20.15.100] A person performing a similar role may be treated as a referee ......................................................... [r 20.15.120]

[r 20.15.20]

Comparison

Although the terminology has changed, this rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 72 r 3. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. [r 20.15.60]

Who may be a referee

Anyone may be appointed as a referee, including for example a receiver in relation to partnership property (Walkabout II Pty Ltd v Jabulani Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1569). If the person is a judge, the “senior judicial officer” must concur with the appointment (r 20.15). None of the definitions in the CPA, in r 20.13 or the Dictionary at the end of the Rules defines “senior judicial officer”. However, it clearly means the Chief Justice in relation to the Supreme Court and the Chief Judge in relation to the District Court. In practice the court may allow time for the parties to agree upon a suitable person, and may even suggest a specific person the court considers appropriate to serve as referee given the factual, legal and technical aspects of the case: see eg, Cave v Allen Jack & Cottier Pry Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1365 at [16]. [r 20.15.80]

The reference must be to a specific person or persons

In Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64, the Court of Appeal held that a referral to “a member of the New York Panel of Referees” was beyond power as it did not appoint a particular person or persons as referee. [r 20.15.100]

Court may order a non-party to nominate a suitable referee

Where the parties cannot agree upon a suitable person for the court to appoint as a referee, the court may set up a mechanism for a neutral person not involved in the dispute to nominate a referee. In Ahmed v Chowdhury (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 954, the court made an order for the President of the Law Society of New South Wales to nominate a suitably qualified solicitor, whom the court could then appoint as referee. Although the non-party may nominate a suitable referee, there is no power to delegate the power to appoint a referee to someone who is not at least an officer of the court (Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64). [r 20.15.120]

A person performing a similar role may be treated as a referee

Where a court makes orders for determination of an issue in proceedings by a third party with specialist expertise, without specific mention that the order was made under this Part, the third party may be treated as a referee and the determination as a referee report: Iacullo v Iacullo [2012] NSWSC 189.

578

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 3 – References to referees

[r 20.17.20]

20.16

r 20.18

Two or more referees

(cf SCR Part 72, rule 4)

(1) If the court appoints 2 referees and a decision to be made in the course of proceedings under the reference is not agreed, the decision that is binding is: (a) if a judicial officer is a referee, the decision of the judicial officer, or (b) in any other case, the decision of the referee appointed by the court to be senior referee. (2) If the court appoints 3 or more referees, any decision to be made in the course of proceedings under the reference may be made by a majority of the referees and, failing a majority, the decision that is binding is: (a) if a judicial officer is a referee, the decision of the judicial officer, or (b) in any other case, the decision of the referee appointed by the court to be senior referee.

RULE 20.16 COMMENTARY [r 20.16.20]

Comparison

Although the terminology has changed, this rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 72 r 4. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. 20.17 Inquiry and report (cf SCR Part 72, rule 5)

(1) The court may, at any time and from time to time: (a) authorise the referee to inquire into and report on any facts relevant to the inquiry and report on the matter referred, and (b) direct the referee to make a further or supplemental report or inquiry and report, and (c) give such instructions as the court thinks fit relating to the inquiry or report. (2) Instructions under subrule (1)(c) may include provision concerning any experiment or test for the purposes of any inquiry or report of a referee.

RULE 20.17 COMMENTARY [r 20.17.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 72 r 5. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR. 20.18 Remuneration of referee

(1) The court: (a) may determine the amount of the fees to be paid to a referee, and (b) may direct how, when and by whom the whole or any part of any such fees are to be payable, and (c) may determine the consequences of failure to comply with a direction under paragraph (b). (2) Subrule (1) does not affect the powers of the court as to costs.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

579

UCPR Parts 11-20

(cf SCR Part 72, rule 6)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.19

[r 20.18.20]

RULE 20.18 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.18.20] Payment of referee’s fees ...................................................................................................................... [r 20.18.60] Costs of a reference are determined separately to costs of the proceedings generally ....................... [r 20.18.80]

[r 20.18.20]

Comparison

This rule is virtually identical to and has the same effect as SCR Pt 72 r 6. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. [r 20.18.60]

Payment of referee’s fees

The court decides how much the referee is to be paid, who is to pay it, when and how (r 20.18). Referee fees may include claims in respect of work delegated by the referee to others: Nutech Wall & Ceiling Systems Pty Ltd v VMF Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 737. The provision made by the court for the funding of the reference is subject to a subsequent application for an order for the costs of the reference to be borne by the unsuccessful party (ACD Tridon Inc v Tridon Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 357). Although under UCPR rule 6.24 the court may join a party if joinder is proper or necessary, this does not include joinder of a solicitor for the purposes of payment of referee fees as there is no basis in contract, tort or other statutory basis for such liability: New Price Retail Services Pty Ltd v Hanna [2014] NSWSC 1051; Cf. Birkai Pty Ltd v Permanent Custodians Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 178. [r 20.18.80]

Costs of a reference are determined separately to costs of the proceedings generally

The costs of a reference made under Pt 20 of the UCPR are a separate category to costs in the proceedings generally, and are to be determined separately (Thompson v NSW Land and Housing Corp (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 1658 applying Attard v James Legal Pty Ltd (2010) 80 ACSR 585; [2010] NSWCA 311 and drawing an analogy with s 369 of the LPA). The reference mechanism is procedural and has no effect unless the court adopts the referee report, so the costs of the reference cannot themselves be considered damages because to do so would have the effect of enlarging the substantive right to damages (Thompson v NSW Land and Housing Corp (No 3)). They also cannot be considered expenses “incidental to” the presentation or defence of a claim under an insurance policy because there is no nexus between the expense of the reference and the presentation of a claim (Thompson v NSW Land and Housing Corp (No 3)). 20.19 Court rooms (cf SCR Part 72, rule 7)

The court may give directions for the provision: (a) of services of officers of the court, and (b) of court rooms and other facilities, for the purpose of any reference under this Division.

RULE 20.19 COMMENTARY [r 20.19.20]

Comparison

This rule is virtually identical to and has the same effect as SCR Pt 72 r 7. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR.

580

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 3 – References to referees

[r 20.20.60]

20.20

r 20.20

Conduct of proceedings under the reference

(cf SCR Part 72, rule 8)

(1) The court may give directions with respect to the conduct of proceedings under the reference. (2) Subject to any direction under subrule (1): (a) the referee may conduct the proceedings under the reference in such manner as the referee thinks fit, and (b) in conducting proceedings under the reference, the referee is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform himself or herself in relation to any matter in such manner as the referee thinks fit. (3) Evidence before the referee: (a) may be given orally or in writing, and (b) if the referee so requires, must, be given on oath or by affidavit. (4) A referee may take the examination of any person. (5) Each party must, within a time fixed by the referee but in any event before the conclusion of evidence on the inquiry, give to the referee and each other party a brief statement of the findings of fact and law for which the party contends. (6) The parties must at all times do all things which the referee requires to enable a just opinion to be reached and no party may wilfully do or cause to be done any act to delay or prevent an opinion being reached.

RULE 20.20 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.20.20] Procedure adopted by the referee ......................................................................................................... [r 20.20.60] Referee may take a broad approach ..................................................................................................... [r 20.20.80] Referee immunity ................................................................................................................................. [r 20.20.100] Actual or apprehended bias of referee ................................................................................................. [r 20.20.120]

[r 20.20.20]

Comparison

This rule is virtually identical to and has the same effect as SCR Pt 72 r 8. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. Procedure adopted by the referee

The referee decides how the proceedings under the reference are conducted, and is not subject to the rules of evidence (r 20.20(2)). This is subject to any directions by the court with respect to the conduct of the proceedings under the reference (r 20.20(1) and r 20.17(1)(c)). The referee’s freedom can extend to permitting amendments or additions to pleadings (Chocolate Factory Apartments Pty Ltd v Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 547) and to choosing the method by which a determination will be made (Chelva Holdings Pty Ltd v Brodyn Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 701). In that case a referee decided to make calculations off the plans rather than redoing the calculations from scratch. The court stated that this will not be considered inappropriate if the reference did not specify that a particular other method be used, and the referee used the referee’s expertise in deciding an appropriate method. Otherwise, the referee may adopt a methodology or process which may not be the same as what the judge would have adopted, and provided the methodology may be justified it will not be disturbed: BestCare Foods v Origin Energy [2012] NSWSC 574. The referee’s freedom to determine how proceedings under the reference are conducted is also subject to the basic requirement of natural justice. In Owners Strata Plan 57504 v Building Insurers’ Guarantee Corp (2008) 15 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-792; [2008] NSWSC 1022, the court held that there was a breach of natural justice in circumstances where a referee expressed an interim or tentative view and halted otherwise relevant © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

581

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 20.20.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.20

[r 20.20.60]

evidence on point, then later changed the view without giving the parties the opportunity to respond. In Telecomputing PCS Pty Ltd v Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Aust) Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 513; 8 BCL 286 the court referred to the requirement for referees to afford parties natural justice, saying that what natural justice may require in a given case may vary substantially. The best guide is a test of fairness, which demands that each party be afforded a proper opportunity of putting before the referee particulars of the contentions relied upon and an opportunity to comment not just on the information adduced by the other side, but also any information on contentious matters which may have been gathered by the referee. Further it means that a referee should not form a concluded opinion or close her or his mind to the contentions of the parties before all the evidence is in. However a failure to afford the parties natural justice may not of itself be fatal to the adoption of the report – see commentary at [r 20.24.60], regarding Woolf v 52 Birriga Road Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 921. The closeness of the referee’s relationship with the court may well bring with it rights and obligations beyond, for example, the role of an expert appointed by the parties pursuant to a contractual provision: Firedam Civil Engineering Pty Ltd v Shoalhaven City Council [2010] NSWCA 59. [r 20.20.80]

Referee may take a broad approach

In situations where a referee is called upon to determine reasonable costs, the referee may take a broad approach, rather than proceeding item by item. This emphasises that the whole purpose of resorting to reference to a referee rather than costs assessment is to reduce litigation costs (Powers v Stoikos [2007] NSWSC 675). However, the referee is not free to create their own approach where there is already a legally accepted approach in existence, such as for calculating goodwill in a partnership: Old v Hodgkinson [2008] NSWSC 697. [r 20.20.100]

Referee immunity

Despite not being an officer of the court, a referee is entitled to immunity as a matter of policy (Xuereb v Viola (1989) 18 NSWLR 453). In Najjar v Haines (1991) 25 NSWLR 224 Kirby P said the reason for this was that a referee was integrated in the decision-making procedures of the Supreme Court, and accordingly there is no basis to seek a costs order against a referee. [r 20.20.120]

Actual or apprehended bias of referee

The referee must be actually impartial, and must be perceived by a disinterested bystander to be so (Xuereb v Viola (1989) 18 NSWLR 453). An order appointing a referee may be set aside for apprehended bias (Najjar v Haines (1991) 25 NSWLR 224). The test is whether a moderately-informed observer who knows the actual circumstances of the case would regard the referee as subject to a reasonable risk of being unable to deal impartially with the proceedings: S & M Motor Repairs Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 358; 91 FLR 175; 11 IPR 97. An example of what amounts to apprehended bias is the failure by a referee to disclose being a director of a company which was negotiating large commercial contracts with a litigant in the reference (Najjar v Haines (1991) 25 NSWLR 224) and an example of what does not amount to apprehended bias was a barrister in a case describing the referee as a “mate” without something more (David v Vamiso Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 326). However, the mere fact of communications between the referee and one party to the exclusion of the other are not grounds for a finding of apprehended bias: (Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 540). Instead, the court must consider the content and context of the communications. In Carbotech, in holding that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias, the court took into account that: • the expectations placed on judges to have no communications ex parte whatsoever, does not apply to a referee, “who is not a lawyer let alone a judicial officer”: at 53; • the orders for reference contemplated there would be single-party communications, as each party would send secret formulas to the referee without the other party obtaining a copy; • the referee in this case was called to apply scientific expertise to compare formulas, and not to pass opinions or evaluate evidence; • all of the ex parte communications involved matters of administration and procedure; and • no substantive change was made to the report after it was first submitted to one party only. Where there are ex parte communications, and a party was instrumental in establishing the practice of such communications, and engaged in ex parte communications itself, that party cannot then complain that the conduct of the referee creates a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the referee (New Price Retail 582

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 3 – References to referees

[r 20.21.80]

r 20.22

Services Pty Ltd v Hanna [2014] NSWSC 553). A party wishing to allege actual or apprehended bias must do so promptly otherwise the party may be considered to have waived such an opportunity (New Price Retail Services Pty Ltd v Hanna [2014] NSWSC 553). 20.21

Interlocutory directions

(cf SCR Part 72, rule 9)

The court may, at any time and from time to time, on application of the referee or of a party, give directions with respect to any matter arising in proceedings under the reference.

RULE 20.21 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.21.20] Court directions in respect of a reference .............................................................................................. [r 20.21.60] Supervisory role of the court .................................................................................................................. [r 20.21.80]

[r 20.21.20]

Comparison

This rule was virtually identical to and has the same effect as SCR Pt 72 r 9. There is no equivalent provision in the DCR. [r 20.21.60]

Court directions in respect of a reference

Whilst the court has power to give directions with respect to the reference, it is contrary to policy to order production of documents: Varley v Varley [2007] NSWSC 125. In that case, the plaintiff had failed to lodge adequate documents to the referee, and sought directions from the court for the production of documents to the referee. The court refused, and said that if inadequacy of documentation provided results in the referee’s report not being adopted, the party who has provided the inadequate material might be at risk as to the costs of the reference. [r 20.21.80]

Supervisory role of the court

Although it is ordinary practice for a court to leave the conduct of a reference by a referee unimpeded, the court may intervene at any time: Owners of Strata Plan 64622 v Australand Corp Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 614. In that case a party sought orders from the court that an affidavit filed by the other party annexing privileged documents should not be part of the information in the reference. The court agreed, deciding that it was more suited to decide questions of privilege than a non-legally qualified referee. Note that the court left open the argument that the referee may consider privileged material anyway, seeing the referee is not bound by the rules of evidence. 20.22

Setting aside or variation of reference

(cf SCR Part 72, rule 10)

(1) The court may, of its own motion or on application by a referee or a party, set aside or vary any order of referral.

RULE 20.22 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.22.20] Variation of a reference .......................................................................................................................... [r 20.22.40] Distinction between court directions and variation of reference ............................................................ [r 20.22.60]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

583

UCPR Parts 11-20

(2) Nothing in this rule affects any other power of the court to set aside or vary an order of referral.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.23

[r 20.22.20]

[r 20.22.20]

Comparison

This rule is virtually identical to and has the same effect as SCR Pt 72 r 10. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. [r 20.22.40]

Variation of a reference

The court has wide discretion to vary a reference. This may involve amending the order for reference to allow greater clarity by confining the reference in a manner which reflects the task the referee has indicated to be undertaken (Iacullo v Iacullo (No 3) [2012] NSWSC 274 and Iacullo v Iacullo (No 4) [2012] NSWSC 331), just as it may involve the addition of tasks to the reference. For example, a referee’s role in determining the assets and liabilities of a partnership may be expanded pursuant to r 20.22 to cover acting as a receiver: Byrne v Byrne [2011] NSWSC 1437. [r 20.22.60]

Distinction between court directions and variation of reference

If a party considers that a legal issue relating to a reference should have been decided by a court, this would require an application to vary the order of referral under r 20.22 as distinct from an application for the court to give directions under r 20.21: Nutech Wall & Ceiling Systems Pty Ltd v VMF Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 737. In that case the court did not specify the relevant date at which the profit and loss of a joint venture should be determined by the referee. The defendant allegedly asked the referee to return to the court for directions on this legal issue. The court stated that it would be in the nature of an application for variation not directions, and in the circumstances it was for the defendant and not the referee to seek such a variation. 20.23

Report

(cf SCR Part 72, rules 11 and 12)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, the referee must make a written report to the court on the matter referred to the referee, annexing the statements given under rule 20.20(5) and stating: (a) the referee’s opinion on the matter, and (b) the referee’s reasons for that opinion. (2) On receipt of the report, the court must send it to the parties.

RULE 20.23 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.23.20] Referee report to include reasons .......................................................................................................... [r 20.23.60]

[r 20.23.20] Comparison This rule is virtually identical to and has the same effect as SCR Pt 72 rr 11 and 12. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. [r 20.23.60] Referee report to include reasons The referee’s written report to the court includes the referee’s opinion, and reasons for that opinion (r 20.23(1)) including, for example, an explanation of the process of reasoning or calculation resulting in the figures assessed (Powers v Stoikos [2007] NSWSC 675). This does not, however, require that the referee provide a comprehensive summary of what information each party disclosed, nor does the referee have to disclose in advance the referee’s “mental processes” or “thinking” in advance of the actual reasons (Woolf v 52 Birriga Road Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 921). If the reasons given are inadequate the referee’s report may be set aside (Franks v Berem Constructions Pty Ltd [1998] NSWSC 692) or remitted to the referee for further explanation (Powers v Stoikos [2007] NSWSC 675). The referee is entitled to form an opinion preferring one strand of evidence to another provided the referee’s process is properly explained in the report and is shown to depend upon the expert’s specialised knowledge (Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; 53 ACSR 110; [2005] 3 ABC(NS) 390; [2005] NSWSC 149). 584

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 3 – References to referees

[r 20.24.60]

20.24

r 20.24

Proceedings on the report

(cf SCR Part 72, rule 13)

(1) If a report is made under rule 20.23, the court may on a matter of fact or law, or both, do any of the following: (a) it may adopt, vary or reject the report in whole or in part, (b) it may require an explanation by way of report from the referee, (c) it may, on any ground, remit for further consideration by the referee the whole or any part of the matter referred for a further report, (d) it may decide any matter on the evidence taken before the referee, with or without additional evidence, and must, in any event, give such judgment or make such order as the court thinks fit. (2) Evidence additional to the evidence taken before the referee may not be adduced before the court except by leave of the court.

RULE 20.24 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.24.20] Court use of the referee’s report ............................................................................................................ [r 20.24.60] Circumstances where court will consider evidence put before the referee ........................................... [r 20.24.80] Reconsideration of questions of law .................................................................................................... [r 20.24.100] New questions of law, and new evidence ............................................................................................ [r 20.24.120] Remission of report to referee ............................................................................................................. [r 20.24.140] Rejection of referee’s report ................................................................................................................. [r 20.24.160] Appeal from court’s use of referee’s report .......................................................................................... [r 20.24.180]

[r 20.24.20]

Comparison

This rule has the same effect as SCR Pt 72 r 13. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. [r 20.24.60]

Court use of the referee’s report

The principles applied in exercising this discretion are well established and have been set out in various cases (such as Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 902). The court has applied the same principles to r 20.24 as under the former SCR Pt 72 r 13 (Powers v Stoikos [2007] NSWSC 675), as set out in Chocolate Factory Apartments Pty Ltd v Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 547 , which is now routinely cited as the accepted principles applying to a court’s use of a referee report. They are: 1. An application is not an appeal either by way of hearing de novo or by way of rehearing. 2. The discretion to adopt, vary or reject the report is to be exercised in a manner consistent with both the object and purpose of the rules and the wider setting in which they take place. It is undesirable to attempt closely to confine the manner in which the discretion is to be exercised. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

585

UCPR Parts 11-20

The court may make whatever use of the referee’s report it thinks fit, including to adopt, vary, or reject all or part of the report, remit any part of it for further consideration by the referee, or require further explanation from the referee (r 20.24(1)). The court must use its discretion to decide “whether to give the court’s imprimatur to a decision made outside the normal curial process by a person charged with the duty of assessing a particular question in the light of the evidence and coming to an informed conclusion, often as to matters lying within a field in which that person has special expertise”: Illawarra Hotel Co Pty Ltd v Walton Construction Pty Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 410; [2013] NSWCA 6. The court must exercise the discretion in accordance with the approach set out in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; 9 ABC 117 at 505 (CLR): see Illawarra Hotel Co Pty Ltd v Walton Construction Pty Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 410; [2013] NSWCA 6.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.24

[r 20.24.60]

3. The purpose of the rule is to provide, where the interests of justice so require, a form of partial resolution of disputes alternative to orthodox litigation; that purpose would be frustrated if the reference were to be treated as some kind of warm up for the real contest. 4. In so far as the subject matter of dissatisfaction with a report is a question of law, or the application of legal standards to established facts, a proper exercise of discretion requires the judge to consider and determine that matter afresh. 5. Where a report shows a thorough, analytical and scientific approach to the assessment of the subject matter of the reference, the court would have a disposition towards acceptance of the report, for to do otherwise would be to negate both the purpose and the facility of referring complex technical issues to independent experts for enquiry and report. 6. If the referee’s report reveals some error of principle, absence or excessive jurisdiction, patent misapprehension of the evidence or perversity or manifest unreasonableness in fact finding, that would ordinarily be a reason for rejection. In this context, patent misapprehension of the evidence refers to a lack of understanding of the evidence as distinct from the according to particular aspects of it different weight; and perversity or manifest unreasonableness mean a conclusion that no reasonable tribunal of fact could have reached. The test denoted by these phrases is more stringent than “unsafe and unsatisfactory”. 7. Generally, the referee’s findings of fact should not be re-agitated in the court. The court will not reconsider disputed questions of fact where there is factual material sufficient to entitle the referee to reach the conclusions he or she did, particularly where the disputed questions are in a technical area in which the referee enjoys an appropriate expertise. Thus, the court will not ordinarily interfere with findings of fact by a referee where the referee has based his or her findings upon a choice between conflicting evidence. 8. The purpose of the rule would be frustrated if the court were required to reconsider disputed questions of fact in circumstances where it is conceded that there was material on which the conclusions could be based. 9. The court is entitled to consider the futility and cost of re-litigating an issue determined by the referee where the parties have had ample opportunity to place before the referee such evidence and submissions as they desire. 10. Even if it were shown that the court might have reached a different conclusion in some respect from that of the referee, it would not be (in the absence of any of the matters referred to in sub para (6) above) a proper exercise of its discretion to allow matters agitated before the referee to be re-explored so as to lead to qualification or rejection of the report. 11. Referees should give reasons for their opinion so as to enable the parties, the court and the disinterested observer to know that the conclusion is not arbitrary, or influenced by improper considerations; but that it is the result of a process of logic and the application of a considered mind to the factual circumstances proved. The reasoning process must be sufficiently disclosed so that the court can be satisfied that the conclusions are based upon such an intellectual exercise. 12. The right to be heard does not involve the right to be heard twice. 13. A question as to whether there was evidence on which the referee, without manifest unreasonableness, could have come to the decision to which he or she did come is not raised “by a mere suggestion of factual error such that, if it were made by a trial judge, an appeal judge would correct it”. The real question is far more limited: “to the situation where it is seriously and reasonably contended that the referee has reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal of fact could have reached; that is, a decision that any reasonable referee would have known was against the evidence and weight of evidence”. 14. Where, although the referee’s reasons on their face appear adequate, the party challenging the report contends that they are not adequate because there was very significant evidence against the referee’s findings with which the referee did not at all deal, examination of the evidence may be undertaken to show that the reasons were in fact inadequate because they omitted any reference to significant evidence. 15. Where the court decides that the reasons are flawed, either on their face or because they have been shown not to deal with important matters, the court has a choice. It may decline to adopt the report, 586

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 20.24.80]

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 3 – References to referees

r 20.24

or it may itself look at the detail of the evidence to decide whether or not the expense of further proceedings before the referee (which would be the consequence of non adoption) is justified. McDougall J has further clarified that the discretions conferred by r 20.24 are not subject to limitations or conditions in the rule itself – the guidelines as stated above do not confine or restrict the discretions, nor override the “central significance” of s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005: BestCare Foods v Origin Energy [2012] NSWSC 574. The task for a court in determining whether to adopt a referee report is qualitatively different in context to a judicial review of an administrative decision: Woolf v 52 Birriga Road Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 921. The task is not to determine the legal validity of the report but whether the ultimate interests of justice are served through its adoption. Indeed the 15th principle from Chocolate Factory Apartments Pty Ltd v Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 547 has been applied in Iacullo v Iacullo [2013] NSWSC 1517 where the court considered that, where it was submitted to the court that the referee should have given more reasoning for considering MYOB records adequate when other physical documents could have been examined, the expense of further proceedings before the referee was not appropriate or justified. To determine is not in the interests of justice to adopt the referee report, there is no requirement that there be an error on the part of the referee. An example given as obiter in Owners Strata Plan No 72381 v Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 442 was where evidence upon which the referee report was based was found to have been procured through a bribe. The main issue in that case was whether an alleged misunderstanding by an expert of their role in conclaving warranted rejection of aspects of a referee report. The court held it would not be in the interests of justice to re-agitate the issues, it would increase costs and uncertainty, and undermine the referral process. Similarly, in Quest Rose Hill Pty Ltd v The Owners Strata Plan No 64025 [2016] NSWSC 978, a party argued that the referee report should be qualified because the referee failed to consider a relevant matter. Making reference to s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 and the fact that the party failed to direct the referee’s attention to it, the court held that where a party fails to raise an issue that it later seeks to rely upon, the same principles apply before a referee as would apply in court. It is the court which makes findings of fact or law either explicitly, or implicitly, by adopting a report. It is entirely the court’s decision – for example it is not the place of a referee to indicate to the parties a willingness to reconsider a question in the referee report: Woolf v 52 Birriga Road Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 921. The referee’s report is of no legal consequence unless and until it is adopted (Xuereb v Viola (1989) 18 NSWLR 453). The court may reject, adopt, vary and remit various parts of the one referee’s report, see for example Banabelle Electrical Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 714. Of course, only those parts that are adopted have legal consequences for the parties in the proceedings. Evidence put before the referee does not become evidence in the proceedings unless it is separately tendered and admitted (Homebush Abattoir Corp v Bermria Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 605). Circumstances where court will consider evidence put before the referee

There are three circumstances in which a court considering whether to adopt a referee’s report should or could go to the evidence before the referee: Franks v Berem Constructions Pty Ltd [1998] NSWSC 692, referred to with approval in Tryhaz Pty Ltd v Fielder Engineers Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 906. They are: 1. If there is a real question as to whether there was evidence on which the referee, without manifest unreasonableness, could have come to the decision to which he or she did come. This is limited to the situation where it is seriously and reasonably contended that the referee has reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal of fact could have reached; that is, a decision that any reasonable referee would have known was against the evidence and weight of evidence; 2. Where, although the referee’s reasons on their face appear adequate, the party challenging the report contends that they are not adequate because there was very significant evidence against the referee’s findings with which the referee did not at all deal. In these circumstances, examination of the evidence would show that the reasons were in fact inadequate because they omitted any reference to significant evidence; and 3. Where the court decides that the reasons are flawed, either on their face or because they have been shown not to deal with important matters, the court has a choice. It may decline to adopt the report. Or it may itself look at the detail of the evidence to decide whether or not the expense of further proceedings before the referee (which would be the consequence of non adoption) was justified. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

587

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 20.24.80]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.24 [r 20.24.100]

[r 20.24.80] Reconsideration of questions of law

Where the subject matter of dissatisfaction with a referee’s report is a question of law, or the application of legal standards to established facts, a judge is required to consider and determine that matter afresh (the “fourth” of the principles in Chocolate Factory Apartments Pty Ltd v Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 547 which have been repeatedly adopted in New South Wales courts and were described by the NSW Court of Appeal as “highly influential”: Mainteck Services Pty Ltd v Stein Heurtey SA (2014) 310 ALR 113; [2014] NSWCA 184). See also Homebush Abattoir Corp v Bermria Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 605). This applies irrespective of whether the referee is a former judicial officer (Eko Investments Pty Ltd v Austruc Constructions Ltd [2009] NSWSC 208). Examples where courts have reconsidered questions of law include whether a claim is statute barred: Owners of Strata Plan 64415 v Vero Insurance Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1500; whether a referee’s conclusions as to waiver of privilege are correct: Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd v Queensland Investment Corp [2011] NSWSC 127; whether procedural fairness was denied: Eko Investments Pty Ltd v Austruc Constructions Ltd [2009] NSWSC 208; whether a duty of care was owed: New South Wales v Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-917; [2007] NSWSC 1045; whether a referee erred in making a calculation at the date of breach not date of hearing (Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (in Liq) [2015] NSWSC 851); and whether a referee reversed the onus of proof, or applied an incorrect standard: Owners of Strata Plan No 68372 v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1807. If the court does find errors of law on the part of the referee, but they do not affect the correctness of the overall outcome, they are not in themselves grounds to set aside the report: Corbett Court Pty Ltd v Quasar Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd (2009) 25 BCL 29; [2008] NSWSC 1163. [r 20.24.120]

New questions of law, and new evidence

It is in the court’s discretion to allow new questions of law not raised before the referee to be argued before the court at the time of adoption of the report: Tryhaz Pty Ltd v Fielder Engineers Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 906. However issues which were waived by a party before the referee cannot be revived before the court at the time adoption of the referee report is being considered: Owners of Strata Plan 64415 v Vero Insurance Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1500 at [26]. It is also most unlikely the court will allow the parties to bring forward fresh evidence at the time of the adoption of the report which could have been brought forward before the referee (Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Welling [2000] NSWCA 360). If parties argue a reference should be reopened on the basis of new evidence, the common law rules for ordering a new trial may be applied: Tsu v Nemeth [2012] NSWCA 29. The court will consider the credibility of the fresh evidence and the certainty that its availability to the referee would have produced a different result. However r 20.24(1)(c) confers scope for flexibility (Tsu v Nemeth [2012] NSWCA 29 at [24]) and, as the referee is not bound by the rules of evidence, it is possible that evidence which would not have produced a different result in a retrial (such as hearsay evidence) may do so before a referee: Tsu v Nemeth [2012] NSWCA 29 at [36]. [r 20.24.140]

Remission of report to referee

The court may remit aspects of a referee report, for example so that the referee may provide further explanation of the process of reasoning by which conclusions in the report were reached (Powers v Stoikos [2007] NSWSC 675). In Rhodes v Christine Elizabeth Fletcher & Quasar Professionals Act Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 797 two aspects of a referee report were remitted to the referee for further consideration. In that case, a reference was made to a referee for the purposes of valuation of the plaintiff’s shareholding. The referee received information and relied on it in the report without giving the other party an opportunity to comment on it or make submissions about it. The court held that the opportunity should have been afforded for a comment on the information, and the failure to provide such opportunity was in breach of natural justice. Similarly in Owners Strata Plan 57504 v Building Insurers’ Guarantee Corp (2008) 15 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-792; [2008] NSWSC 1022, the court remitted a report to the referee for further consideration and report, where there was a breach of natural justice. The court held that, while a referee is not bound to adhere to any interim or tentative view, where such a view has been expressed to the parties, natural justice requires that the parties be informed of any change in view and be given the opportunity to address the situation, particularly 588

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 20.24.180]

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 3 – References to referees

r 20.24

where the referee halted otherwise relevant evidence on the point at the time of the interim or tentative view being expressed. In that case, an interim view was expressed by a referee that, if remedial building work is required, all tiles on affected balconies will need replacement. In the report, the referee’s estimate was based on replacement of only 30% of the tiles, but the referee failed to give the parties the opportunity to address the approach to quantification. A report may be remitted to the referee more than once in the one case. In Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 894 the report was remitted to the referee twice, the second time to clarify/reconsider fees properly allowable to a joint venture in the light of varied findings following the first remitter. The court will not remit, however, where this will not correct problems with the referee’s conduct or report. For example in Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] ANZ ConvR 351; [2004] NSWSC 487, a landlord and tenant dispute in which the whole of the dispute was referred to a referee, the court would not remit on account of gross delay by the referee and a failure to deal with the full range of issues of liability. Similarly the court may decide, if sufficient time has elapsed since the referee’s enquiry, that there is little to be gained from remittal to the referee as opposed to remittal to the court: Origin Energy LPG Ltd v BestCare Foods Ltd [2013] NSWCA 90. [r 20.24.160]

Rejection of referee’s report

Grounds for rejecting a report may include an error of principle; a patent misapprehension of the evidence; and perversity or manifest unreasonableness in fact finding (Super Pty Ltd v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 549), an error in reasoning (Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd v Queensland Investment Corp [2011] NSWSC 127) or a breach of procedural fairness, such as where a referee relied on a document without giving notice of the parties of the referee’s intention to so rely: Gigi Entertainment Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2010] NSWSC 906. The principles applicable to rejection of a referee’s report were summarised in ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 665, including: 1. The court has a wide discretion in considering a referee’s report and the decision as to whether or not a report should be adopted is an exercise in discretion; 2. In exercising the discretion the nature of the complaints made about the report, the type of litigation involved as well as the length and complexity of the proceedings before the referee are all relevant considerations;

In Allied Constructions Pty Ltd v Hyder Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 808 and Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 894 [7] – [11], these principles were adopted, and referred to as the “relevant principles”. They were also used in Chocolate Factory Apartments Pty Ltd v Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 441 where the court emphasised that where a party submits that whole or part of a referee’s report should be rejected the contentions ought to be “poignantly and pointedly” linked back to one of the principles, rather than being general submissions. The court may also reject only certain findings in the report (Eko Investments Pty Ltd v Austruc Constructions Ltd [2009] NSWSC 208) and may replace them with other findings (Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Sydney Catchment Authority [2007] NSWSC 220). It is not necessary that the report be rejected in its entirety – specific paragraphs of a report may be rejected and the remainder adopted: BestCare Foods v Origin Energy [2012] NSWSC 574. [r 20.24.180]

Appeal from court’s use of referee’s report

Where there is an appeal from a court’s decision to adopt, vary or reject a referee’s report in whole or in part, the appeal does not entail a review of the referee’s reports, rather, it entails identification of an appealable error in which the court exercised its discretion in relation to a referee report (Mainteck Services Pty Ltd v Stein Heurtey SA (2014) 310 ALR 113; [2014] NSWCA 184, applying language used by Gleeson CJ in Nine Network Pty Ltd v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd [1994] NSWCA 235). The jurisdiction of the appellate © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

589

UCPR Parts 11-20

3. If there is a “real question” as to whether there was any evidence for a referee’s decision the court can consider the material that was put before the referee; 4. If the challenge is based on the referee’s failure to refer to very significant evidence against the finding the referee made, the court may need to consider the evidence before the referee; and 5. There is no implied authority given to the referee to make errors of law, and if discovered by the court, the court should use its discretion to correct such errors.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.24A

[r 20.24.180]

court is conditional upon identification of an error on the part of the trial judge: Ryde City Council v Tourtouras [2007] NSWCA 218. In that case, the trial judge’s substantive reconsideration of factual findings and evaluation of causation by the referee was held to constitute an improper exercise of the trial judge’s discretion in relation to the referee’s report. The court stated that if the trial judge thought there was an omission in the reasoning of the referee, an appropriate course would be to remit the matter to the referee for clarification. Where a court’s decision to adopt a referee’s report cannot be shown on appeal to be based upon a material error on the part of the judge, there is no ground for appealing the decision: Italform Pty Ltd v Sangain Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 427. There, a primary judge refused to reject a referee’s report despite submissions that the referee concluded reliance on a representation that conflicted with the terms of the written contract. The appeal court held that the trial judge did not err in concluding that was not a reason to reject the report, because such a finding was open to the referee in the circumstances. The appeal court may consider the evidence before the referee to determine whether the primary judge properly exercised the discretion in relation to the 13th principle set out in Chocolate Factory (see [r 20.24.60]): Origin Energy LPG Ltd v BestCare Foods Ltd [2013] NSWCA 90. In that case the court concluded that the primary judge should not have accepted an assumption made by a referee as there was inadequate evidence. See also lllawarra Hotel Co Pty Ltd v Walton Construction Pty Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 410; [2013] NSWCA 6 where the court considered that evidence lacking explanation or exposition of its basis, should not have been accepted as reliable. The court stated at [49] that “a judge’s decision to adopt a referee’s report on the basis of findings of the referee that the judge holds to be supported by the evidence before the referee will be susceptible to correction on appeal if it was wrong for the judge to conclude that the evidence supported the findings (and a fortiori if the findings were not made). This is an application of the broader principle that the decision of the judge may properly be challenged on appeal if the judge concluded that an ultimate finding of the referee was open when it simply was not open”. In hearing an appeal from a court’s use of a referee’s report, the question for the appeal court is not whether the referee was in error, but whether the court had erred in exercising the discretion in relation to the adoption, variation or rejection of the report: Origin Energy LPG Ltd v BestCare Foods Ltd [2013] NSWCA 90. In that case, however, the court conflated guidelines for assessing a referee report (in Chocolate Factory Apartments Pty Ltd v Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 547) with the approach to assessing a primary judge’s assessment of a referee report. The 6th guideline refers to a referee report revealing “manifest unreasonableness in fact finding” as a reason for rejection, whereas the court in Origin Energy LPG Ltd v BestCare Foods Ltd [2013] NSWCA 90 concluded that the primary judge’s acceptance of the referee ruling in a situation where “there was no (or no more than a mere scintilla of) evidence … was manifestly unreasonable in the sense considered in Chocolate Factory”. It is unclear whether the court was, thereby, intending that the same guidelines that are used for court consideration of a referee report should be used for appellate court consideration of a primary judge’s consideration of a referee report.

DIVISION 3A – CONCILIATION [Div 3A insrt Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[3]]

20.24A

Application of Division

This Division applies to proceedings on a claim for the recovery of remuneration or other amounts under Part 2 of Chapter 7 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (recovery proceedings). [R 20.24A insrt Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[3]]

20.24B

Referral of recovery proceedings for conciliation

The Supreme Court must refer recovery proceedings to the Industrial Relations Commission for conciliation if the Court is satisfied that a conciliation by the Commission has not been attempted by the parties. Note: Section 371 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 provides that the Supreme Court is not to make an order under Part 2 of Chapter 7 of that Act until the parties to the application for the order satisfy the Court that they unsuccessfully attempted to settle the matter by means of a conciliation conducted by the Commission. [R 20.24B insrt Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[3]] 590

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[Pt 20.Div4.20] 20.24C

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 4 – Compromise

r 20.24D

Certificate of result of conciliation of recovery proceedings

If during a conciliation of recovery proceedings by the Industrial Relations Commission: (a) the matters in dispute are settled, or (b) the member of the Industrial Relations Commission conducting the conference forms the opinion that all reasonable attempts to settle the matter by conciliation have been made but have been unsuccessful, the member of the Commission conducting the conference must issue a certificate to that effect. [R 20.24C insrt Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[3]]

20.24D

Resolution of recovery proceedings after certificate issued

(1) This rule applies to any proceedings in respect of which the member of the Industrial Relations Commission conducting a conciliation has issued a certificate under rule 20.24C. (2) If the certificate indicates that the member of the Commission conducting the conference has formed the opinion that all reasonable attempts to settle the matter by conciliation have been made but have been unsuccessful, the Supreme Court is to determine the proceedings. Note: If a conciliation results in the proceedings being settled, section 371(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 requires the Court to make an order that, to the extent authorised by that Act, gives effect to the terms of the settlement. [R 20.24D insrt Rule 715 of 2016, Sch 1[3]]

DIVISION 4 – COMPROMISE Commentary by Michael McHugh SC.

DIVISION 4 COMMENTARY [Pt 20.Div4.20]

General comments on Div 4

UCPR Pt 20 Div 4 regulates the making of offers of compromise. Part 42 Div 3 governs the costs consequences of such offers. The breadth of the court’s discretionary powers under UCPR Pt 42 militates against any suggestion that the system of formal offers of compromise is exhaustive of the extent to which evidence of settlement negotiations can affect decisions on costs. The court’s power under s 131(2)(h) of the Evidence Act 1995 to receive such evidence on the question of costs operates in the same direction. The widespread practice of including offers of compromise in correspondence marked “without prejudice save as to costs” (reflecting Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333; [1975] 3 WLR 586; [1976] Fam 93) offers a form of procedure alternative to the formal system of offers, but it appeals only to the general discretionary powers of the court. It does not allow parties the certainty of the procedure and the general consequences of the formal system. Offers of compromise which fail for technical reasons can in some circumstances be relied upon as Calderbank type offers: Jones v Bradley (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 258 at [5]; Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 194 at [26]–[27]; Old v McInnes [2011] NSWCA 410 (must be some indication to conclude was also Calderbank).

The rules relating to offers of compromise are designed to promote a reasonable approach to settlement by both plaintiffs and defendants, and to pass a real cost burden to litigants who unreasonably prolong litigation in the face of sensible and fair offers of compromise. To attract the cost sanctions in UCPR Pt 42 Div 3 (r 42.14 – plaintiff’s offer and r 42.15 – defendant’s offer), there must be a genuine offer of compromise: Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd (1990) 25 NSWLR 353 at 355; Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 358 at 366–368. An offer of compromise need not relate to all claims in the proceedings: Whitehouse Properties Pty Ltd v Bond Brewing (NSW) Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 17. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

591

UCPR Parts 11-20

Disputes about whether proceedings have been compromised can now more readily be resolved in the proceedings themselves by virtue of the express power contained in CPA s 73. Absent that provision great uncertainty attended the question whether such disputes required the institution of fresh proceedings: Phillips v Walsh (1990) 20 NSWLR 206 at 210.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.25

[Pt 20.Div4.20]

Note rr 20.25 and 20.26 were amended to the effect that from 7 June 2013 offers of compromise no longer had to be “exclusive of costs” – see [r 20.26.40]. 20.25

Definitions

(cf SCR Part 22, rule 3)

In this Division: final deadline [Repealed] [Def rep Rule 259 of 2013, Sch 1[1]]

judgment in favour of the defendant includes a dismissal of a summons or a statement of claim. [Def insrt Rule 259 of 2013, Sch 1[2]]

offer means an offer of compromise referred to in rule 20.26. period of acceptance for an offer means the period of time during which the offer is open for acceptance. [Def subst Rule 259 of 2013, Sch 1[3]] [R 20.25 am Rule 259 of 2013]

20.26

Making of offer

(cf SCR Part 22, rules 1A, 2, 3 and 4; DCR Part 19A, rules 1, 2, 2A, 3 and 4; LCR Part 17A, rules 2 and 5)

(1) In any proceedings, any party may, by notice in writing, make an offer to any other party to compromise any claim in the proceedings, either in whole or in part, on specified terms. (2) An offer under this rule: (a) must identify: (i) the claim or part of the claim to which it relates, and (ii) the proposed orders for disposal of the claim or part of the claim, including, if a monetary judgment is proposed, the amount of that monetary judgment, and (b) if the offer relates only to part of a claim in the proceedings, must include a statement: (i) in the case of an offer by the plaintiff, as to whether the balance of the proceedings is to be abandoned or pursued, or (ii) in the case of an offer by a defendant, as to whether the balance of the proceedings will be defended or conceded, and (c) must not include an amount for costs and must not be expressed to be inclusive of costs, and (d) must bear a statement to the effect that the offer is made in accordance with these rules, and (e) if the offeror has made or been ordered to make an interim payment to the offeree, must state whether or not the offer is in addition to that interim payment, and (f) must specify the period of time within which the offer is open for acceptance. [Subr (2) subst Rule 259 of 2013, Sch 1[4]]

(3) An offer under this rule may propose: (a) a judgment in favour of the defendant: (i) with no order as to costs, or (ii) despite subrule (2)(c), with a term of the offer that the defendant will pay to the plaintiff a specified sum in respect of the plaintiff’s costs, or (b) that the costs as agreed or assessed up to the time the offer was made will be paid by the offeror, or (c) that the costs as agreed or assessed on the ordinary basis or on the indemnity basis will be met out of a specified estate, notional estate or fund identified in the offer. [Subr (3) subst Rule 259 of 2013, Sch 1[4]]

(4) If the offeror makes an offer before the offeree has been given such particulars of the offeror’s 592

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 4 – Compromise

[r 20.26.40]

r 20.26

claim, and copies or originals of such documents available to the offeror, as are necessary to enable the offeree to fully consider the offer, the offeree may, within 14 days of receiving the offer, give notice to the offeror that: (a) the offeree is unable to assess the reasonableness of the offer because of the lack of particulars or documents, and (b) in the event that rule 42.14 applies to the proceedings, the offeree will seek an order of the court under rule 42.14(2). [Subr (4) subst Rule 259 of 2013, Sch 1[4]]

(5) The closing date for acceptance of an offer: (a) in the case of an offer made two months or more before the date set down for commencement of the trial—is to be no less than 28 days after the date on which the offer is made, and (b) in any other case—is to be such date as is reasonable in the circumstances. [Subr (5) subst Rule 259 of 2013, Sch 1[4]]

(6) [Repealed] [Subr (6) rep Rule 259 of 2013, Sch 1[4]]

(7) [Repealed] [Subr (7) rep Rule 259 of 2013, Sch 1[4]]

(8) Unless the notice of offer otherwise provides, an offer providing for the payment of money, or the doing of any other act, is taken to provide for the payment of that money, or the doing of that act, within 28 days after acceptance of the offer. (9) An offer is taken to have been made without prejudice, unless the notice of offer otherwise provides. (10) A party may make more than one offer in relation to the same claim. (11) Unless the court orders otherwise, an offer may not be withdrawn during the period of acceptance for the offer. (12) A notice of offer that purports to exclude, modify or restrict the operation of rule 42.14 or 42.15 is of no effect for the purposes of this Division. [R 20.26 am Rule 259 of 2013]

RULE 20.26 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 20.26.40] Original offer, successive trials ............................................................................................................... [r 20.26.60] Withdrawal of accepted offer of compromise ......................................................................................... [r 20.26.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 20.26.1000]

[r 20.26.40]

Operation

There must be substantial compliance with the form and terms of the rules: Leach v Nominal Defendant (QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd) (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 391. An offer of compromise that does not comply is ineffective for obtaining a special costs order under UCPR rr 42.14 and 42.15 and will not act as a Calderbank offer unless something in it or the surrounding circumstances indicates it is proposed to be relied upon on question of costs, irrespective of its effectiveness as an offer under r 20.26 – Whitney v Dream Developments Pty Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 311; [2013] NSWCA 188. A valid offer may specify that each party is to bear own costs: Jojoenu Investments Pty Ltd v Mosman Municipal Council (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 208. What constitutes “such time as is reasonable in the circumstances” under the former r 20.26(7)(b) and now “such date” under r 20.26(5)(b), will vary greatly from case to case. For example, in Pittorino v Yates [2009] NSWCA 87, 28 days given to accept the offer, two months prior to the commencement of the trial, was held not to be a reasonable period. This was due to an expert opinion not being available before the end of the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

593

UCPR Parts 11-20

The rule applies to successive offers and applies to the first offer that is not less than the judgment recovered unless the court otherwise orders: Hillier v Sheather (1995) 36 NSWLR 414.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.27

[r 20.26.40]

period. For consideration of whether an offer late in a case’s preparation provides “such time as is reasonable in the circumstances” see Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 85 at [20]. An offer of compromise made after 7 June 2013 must not include an amount for costs, except in accordance with r 20.26(3)(a), nor be expressed to be inclusive of costs and otherwise must comply with r 20.26(2). Offers may now include an offer of costs as agreed or assessed – r 20.26(3)(b) cf. with the operation of s 151Z of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW): Dailhou v Kelly (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1220. An offer of compromise made before 7 June 2013 had to be exclusive of costs, except where it states that it is a verdict for the defendant and that the parties are to bear their own costs – r 20.26(2). For a discussion of the rationale behind the former r 20.26(2), see Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 141 at [16]–[30]. [r 20.26.60]

Original offer, successive trials

An offer of compromise made before a trial operates at that trial and in respect of the appeal from that trial and it may also continue to govern the offerror’s entitlement to costs until the final judgment on the claim to which the offer relates: Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 404; South Sydney Council v Walsh (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 111 (offer of compromise prior to delivery of judgment by District Court judge may continue to have cost consequences for an appeal). [r 20.26.80]

Withdrawal of accepted offer of compromise

A court may make an order pursuant to r 20.26(11) permitting that offer to be withdrawn, even after the acceptance by a party of an offer under Pt 20 during its currency; cf r 20.28. Where an offerer relies upon the categorical statement of the law by an appellate court which is subsequently reversed at the time of or during the currency of an offer, the interests of justice are appropriately served by permitting that offer of compromise to be withdrawn, notwithstanding the importance that agreements following compromise be enforced: see Spring v Sydney South West Area Health Services [2009] NSWSC 420 (during currency of an offer based on Rufo v Hosking (2004) 61 NSWLR 678; [2004] NSWCA 391 the Court of Appeal by its decision in Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504; [2009] NSWCA 76 held that Rufo was wrongly decided as a matter of important legal principle, and declined to follow it. Held that at time offer made not unreasonable for applicant to assume Rufo represented the law). Whether the court will exercise its discretion to permit the withdrawal of an offer will be determined by the circumstances of the matter and the interests of justice. The assessment of “reasonable time” depends on the circumstances when the offer is made. [r 20.26.1000]

References

UCPR Pt 42 Div 3 (r 42.14 – plaintiff’s offer and r 42.15 – defendant’s offer). 20.27

Acceptance of offer

(cf SCR Part 22, rule 3; DCR Part 19A, rule 3; LCR Part 17A, rule 5)

(1) A party may accept an offer by serving written notice of acceptance on the offeror at any time during the period of acceptance for the offer. (2) An offer may be accepted even if a further offer is made during the period of acceptance for the first offer. (3) If an offer is accepted in accordance with this rule, any party to the compromise may apply for judgment to be entered accordingly.

RULE 20.27 COMMENTARY Entry of judgment under 20.27(3) .......................................................................................................... [r 20.27.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 20.27.1000]

594

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 4 – Compromise

[r 20.28.60] [r 20.27.80]

r 20.28

Entry of judgment under 20.27(3)

The purpose of the subrule may properly be seen as providing the parties with the means to put an end to the claim by the entry of judgment – Dawson v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 542. Entry of judgment brings finality to the claim, it being the general rule that the court ordinarily has no power to set aside a final judgment once it has been passed and entered (Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; 45 ALJR 598 at 530 (CLR); Meehan v Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 146; [2002] NSWCA 22 at [23] and [26]); Burell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218; [2008] HCA 34. [r 20.27.1000]

References

UCPR Pt 42 Div 3 (r 42.14 – plaintiff’s offer and r 42.15 – defendant’s offer). 20.28

Withdrawal of acceptance

(cf SCR Part 22, rule 5; DCR Part 19A, rule 5; LCR Part 17A, rule 7)

(1) A party who accepts an offer may withdraw the acceptance in any of the following circumstances by serving written notice of withdrawal on the offeror: (a) if the offer provides for payment of money, or the doing of any other act, and the sum is not paid to the offeree or into court, or the act is not done, within 28 days after acceptance of the offer or within such other time as the offer provides, or (b) if the court grants the party leave to withdraw the acceptance. (2) If acceptance of an offer is withdrawn: (a) except as provided by paragraph (b), all steps in the proceedings that have been taken as a consequence of the offer having been accepted cease to have effect, and (b) the court may give directions: (i) to restore the parties as nearly as may be to their positions at the time of the acceptance, and (ii) to give effect to any steps in the proceedings that have been taken as a consequence of the offer having been accepted, and (iii) to provide for the further conduct of the proceedings, and may do so either after the offer is withdrawn or when granting leave to withdraw the offer.

RULE 20.28 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 20.28.40] Offer made by mistake ........................................................................................................................... [r 20.28.60] References ............................................................................................................................................ [20.28.1000]

Operation

Leave to withdraw offer of compromise requires the party seeking leave to show a sufficient change in circumstances since the offer was made to make it just that the applicant be permitted to withdraw the offer: Scanruby Pty Ltd v Caltex Petroleum Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 411 (leave to withdraw offer nunc pro tunc prior to entry of judgment). While it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would give rise to leave, some examples may include: a change in the position of the parties brought about by the discovery of new evidence, a change in the law due to retrospective legislation or judicial decision after the date of the offer, or mistake: Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349; [1998] 4 All ER 513; [1998] 3 WLR 1095; or fraud: Knight v Burgess [1972] ALR 628. [r 20.28.60]

Offer made by mistake

An agreement by the parties to compromise litigation is subject to the procedures of the court which are concerned with the overriding interests of justice. Thus, where the defendant had accepted an offer of compromise that the plaintiff’s solicitor made by mistake and a reasonable solicitor for the defendant would © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

595

UCPR Parts 11-20

[r 20.28.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.29

[r 20.28.60]

have considered that the offer was likely to be a mistake, the court may consider it unjust to enforce the terms of settlement or that it is in the interests of justice that the matter proceed to trial. This is especially so, where judgment has not been entered: Lewis v Combell Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 528; Mohamed v Farah [2004] NSWSC 482. [20.28.1000]

References

UCPR Pt 42 Div 3 (r 42.14 – plaintiff’s offer and r 42.15 – defendant’s offer). 20.29

Failure to comply with accepted offer

(cf SCR Part 22, rule 8; DCR Part 19A, rule 8; LCR Part 17A, rule 10)

(1) If the plaintiff, being a party to an accepted offer, fails to comply with the terms of the offer, the defendant is entitled: (a) to such judgment or order as is appropriate to give effect to the terms of the accepted offer, or (b) to an order that the proceedings be dismissed, and to judgment accordingly, as the defendant elects, unless the court orders otherwise. (2) If the defendant, being a party to an accepted offer, fails to comply with the terms of the offer, the plaintiff is entitled: (a) to such judgment or order as is appropriate to give effect to the terms of the accepted offer, or (b) to an order that the defence be struck out, and to judgment accordingly, as the plaintiff elects, unless the court orders otherwise. (3) If a party to an accepted offer fails to comply with the terms of the offer, and a defendant in the proceedings has made a statement of cross-claim or cross-summons that is not the subject of the accepted offer, the court: (a) may make such order or give such judgment under this rule, and (b) may make such order as to the further conduct of proceedings on the statement of cross-claim or cross-summons, as it thinks fit.

RULE 20.29 COMMENTARY [r 20.29.1000]

References

CPA Pt 6 – Case management powers. 20.30 Disclosure of offer to court or arbitrator (cf SCR Part 22, rule 7; DCR Part 19A, rule 7; LCR Part 17A, rule 9)

(1) No statement of the fact that an offer has been made may be contained in any pleading or affidavit. (2) If an offer is not accepted, no communication with respect to the offer may be made to the court at the trial or, as the case may require, to the arbitrator. (3) Despite subrule (2), an offer may be disclosed to the court or, as the case may require, to the arbitrator: (a) if a notice of offer provides that the offer is not made without prejudice, or (b) to the extent necessary to enable the offer to be taken into account for the purpose of determining an amount of interest up to judgment, or (c) after all questions of liability and relief have been determined, to the extent necessary to determine questions as to costs, or (d) to the extent necessary to enable the offer to be taken into account for the purposes of section 73(4) of the Motor Accidents Act 1988, section 137(4) of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 or section 151M of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. 596

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 20 – Resolution of proceedings without hearing Division 4 – Compromise

[r 20.32.40] 20.31

r 20.32

Compromises in certain Supreme Court proceedings

(cf SCR Part 8, rule 14)

(1) This rule applies to proceedings in the Supreme Court concerning: (a) the administration of a deceased person’s estate, or (b) property the subject of a trust, or (c) the construction of an Act, instrument or other document, involving any matter in which one or more persons have the same interest or liability. (2) The court may approve a compromise: (a) that one party has assented to, or (b) that the court has sanctioned on behalf of one party, being in either case a compromise that affects other persons (not being parties) having the same interest or liability, but only if the court is satisfied that the compromise will be to the benefit of those other persons. (3) A compromise referred to in subrule (2) binds the absent persons unless the court’s approval of the compromise has been obtained by fraud or non-disclosure of material facts. 20.32

Offer to contribute

(cf SCR Part 22, rule 12; DCR Part 19A, rule 11; LCR Part 17A, rule 13)

(1) If in any proceedings: (a) one party (the first party) stands to be held liable to another party (the second party) to contribute towards any debt or damages which may be recovered against the second party in the proceedings, and (b) the first party, at any time after entering an appearance, makes an offer to the second party to contribute to a specified extent to the debt or damages, and (c) the offer is made without prejudice to the first party’s defence, the offer must not be brought to the attention of the court or any arbitrator until all questions of liability or amount of debt or damages have been decided. (2) In subrule (1), debt or damages includes any interest up to judgment claimed on any debt or damages.

RULE 20.32 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.32.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 20.32.40]

[r 20.32.20]

Comparison

There is not considered to be any significant change to the effect of the former SCR, notwithstanding that the reference to interest claimed under specific Acts has been omitted. [r 20.32.40]

Operation

UCPR Parts 11-20

If a party has made an offer to contribute, as referred to in r 20.32, the court must take into account both the fact and the amount of the offer in exercising its discretion as to costs: r 42.18.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

597

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 20.34 Editor’s note: Division 5 is repealed and has not been reproduced.

DIVISION 6 – ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF LIQUIDATED CLAIM Commentary by Dr Michelle Sanson, Lawyer and Author.

DIVISION 6 COMMENTARY [Pt 20.Div6.20]

Structure of Part 20 Division 6

This Division comprises a single rule relating to the defendant acknowledging a liquidated claim. This is in addition to r 6.11 which allows the defendant in proceedings on a liquidated claim to submit to judgment by notice of appearance. 20.34

Defendant may file acknowledgment

(cf DCR Part 14, rule 2; LCR Part 12, rule 2)

(1) In proceedings with respect to a liquidated claim, the defendant may file a statement acknowledging the whole of the amount of the claim. (2) Subrule (1) does not apply if the defendant has filed a defence or the plaintiff has, in accordance with these rules, filed an application for a default judgment. (3) On the filing of a statement under subrule (1), judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff for the whole of the amount of the claim. (4) Judgment entered as referred to in subrule (3) fully discharges all of the plaintiff’s claims in the proceedings. (5) In proceedings in which a default judgment has been set aside under rule 36.15 or 36.16, the defendant may not file a statement referred to in subrule (1) except by leave of the court. Note: See rule 6.11 which allows the defendant in proceedings on a liquidated claim to submit to judgment by his or her notice of appearance.

RULE 20.34 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 20.34.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 20.34.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 20.34.1000]

[r 20.34.20]

Comparison

This rule is derived from Pt 14 r 2 of the DCR, which formerly included the more loaded term “confession” (judgment by confession or agreement). There was no equivalent rule in the former SCR. Where the wording of the rules is identical (or for practical purposes, identical) to the respective rule in DCR Pt 14, cases on Pt 14 of the DCR apply and are referred to below. [r 20.34.40]

Operation

This Division applies in both the Supreme Court and District Court. The effect of the defendant filing an acknowledgment of liquidated claim is for judgment to be entered in favour of the plaintiff in the sum claimed, in the same way it would be with a default judgment. [r 20.34.1000]

References

The approved form is Form 35A: Acknowledgment of liquidated claim.

598

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

UCPR Parts 21-30

PART 21 – DISCOVERY, INSPECTION AND NOTICE TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS Commentary by Michael McHugh SC.

PART 21 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 21 ................................................................................................................. [r Pt21.20] Discovery and inspection (rr 21.1–21.8) .................................................................................................. [r Pt21.40] Notice to produce before hearing (rr 21.9–21.12) ................................................................................... [r Pt21.60] Discovery generally .................................................................................................................................. [r Pt21.80] Purpose of discovery ............................................................................................................................. [r Pt21.100] Procedure and extent of discovery ........................................................................................................ [r Pt21.120] Misuse of material disclosed on discovery ............................................................................................ [r Pt21.140] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r Pt21.1000]

[r Pt21.20]

General comments on Part 21

In general terms the word “discovery” might describe any form of interlocutory procedure for the compulsory disclosure by an opponent or a third party of information material to questions in dispute in proceedings. At common law, discovery was unknown. Equity aided legal process by procedures for the discovery of documents (broadly governed now by UCPR Pt 21) and for the discovery of facts (now broadly governed by UCPR Pt 22 dealing with interrogatories). Part 21 governs the discovery of documents by parties to proceedings. The practical utility of proceedings for discovery of documents depends upon the availability of an objective standard against which to measure an obligation to give discovery, as well as the amounts of work and expense involved in performance of the obligation. For many years, under the influence of Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD 55 at 62–63, a broad view was taken of discoverable documents. The discovery of documents material to a fact in issue needed to include documents that might lead to a “chain of enquiry” towards relevant facts as well as documents directly related to a fact in issue. With the advent of modern copying and information systems, and increasingly complex litigation, this approach to discovery became prohibitively expensive, oppressive and ineffectual. Courts have accordingly endeavoured to preserve the integrity of their interlocutory procedures by limiting the scope of discovery to defined topics or classes of documents: Jolowicz JA, On Civil Procedure (Cambridge UP, 2000). This approach has an affinity for procedures for obtaining documents upon subpoena insofar as it requires a party seeking material to define the ambit of what is sought. An important difference, however, is that, subject to rules of court, discovery of documents requires disclosure of documents once, but no longer, held; production of documents on subpoena is directed to documents in the possession custody or power of the recipient of the subpoena at the time it is served. Discovery can be a highly expensive exercise. Courts should astutely ensure that they are not used as weapons of oppression. Even when all parties are well-resourced, over-enthusiastic and unnecessary use of discovery impedes the due administration of justice and undermines confidence in the court system’s ability to resolve disputes justly, quickly and cheaply. If discovery is being abused, the courts can and should control it: Palavi v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 264, per Allsop P at [101]. Courts might still, in an appropriate case, make orders for “general discovery” (in which the ambit of discovery is defined by materiality to questions in dispute identified by pleadings) but such cases are rare and the UCPR does not provide for it: Palavi v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 264. The more common approach is to confine, and control, the discovery process to identified topics or classes of documents. [r Pt21.40]

Discovery and inspection (rr 21.1–21.8)

Rules 21.1–21.8 are based upon the Supreme and District Court Rules. The court may make an order that a party must give discovery of documents within a specific class or classes; or one or more samples (selected in a manner as the court may specify) of documents within such a class. The party ordered to give discovery must comply with the order within 28 days or such other time as the court may order by serving on the party © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

599

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt21.40] who applied for the order, a notice that lists all of the documents referred to in the order. The list must comply with r 21.3(2). The party must keep the documents accessible and capable of convenient inspection by the party that applied for the order: r 21.5. The obligation continues up to the end of the hearing: r 21.6. An order for discovery is not to be made for personal injury claims unless the court, for special reasons, otherwise orders: r 21.8. Note Practice Note No SC Eq 11 now applies to discovery in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court, other than those in the Commercial Arbitration List. Under this new regime the court will only make orders for discovery – now termed “disclosure of documents” – before the parties have served their evidence in matters where there are exceptional circumstances necessitating disclosure – see [r 21.2.100]. [r Pt21.60]

Notice to produce before hearing (rr 21.9–21.12)

Party A can require Party B to produce (a) a document or thing referred to by Party B in any originating process, pleading, affidavit or witness statement filed or served by Part B and any other specific document that is referred to in the notice and is relevant to a fact in issue: r 21.10. Under r 21.11 Party B must comply with the notice within a reasonable time by producing the documents; or if a document is not produced, by serving a notice in accordance with r 21.11(1)(b). In personal injury claims a party does not have to comply with a notice to produce if the document or thing has not been referred to in any originating process, pleading, affidavit or witness statement filed or served by that party unless the court, for special reasons, otherwise orders: r 21.12. Note, Notice to Produce at Hearing is dealt with under: r 34.1. Practice Note SC Eq 11 (see [r 21.2.100]) does not, in terms, apply to notices to produce because such notices do not seek an order for “disclosure of documents”. However, in Owners Strata Plan SP 69567 v Baseline Constructions Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 502 at [23]–[24] Stevenson J observed that: It would subvert the intended operation of the Practice Note if parties could avoid its operation by adopting the expedient of serving a notice to produce, rather than seeking an order for disclosure. Indeed, if a notice to produce was served with the object of avoiding the operation of the Practice Note, such service might well constitute an abuse of the Court’s process. [r Pt21.80] Discovery generally The procedure of discovery and inspection of documents involves two distinct stages, the discovery and the inspection. A party is obliged to disclose the existence of all relevant documents in her or his possession, custody or power, including those which the opposite party is not entitled to inspect. The obligation to give inspection extends prima facie to all documents to which the obligation to give discovery extends, except those documents which are privileged from production. Rule 21 deals with the discovery of documents, whilst other rules and powers deal with discovery type procedures and include: preliminary discovery under r 5; discovery of facts through interrogatories under r 22; discovery in aid of enforcement under r 38 medical examinations and the inspection of property under r 23 interim preservation in the Supreme and District Court under r 25; Subpoenas under r 33; Notice to Produce under r 34.1 and; equitable discovery and the preservation of documents under the Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction. Rule 1.4 states that the rules do not affect the right of any person to commence proceedings for discovery. Hence the history of discovery is significant as the right to discovery still exists as a principle of equity. Further reading in this regard is contained within Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) Ch 10 and Simpson SD, Bailey DL and Evans EK, Discovery and Interrogatories (2nd ed, Butterworths, 1990). [r Pt21.100]

Purpose of discovery

Discovery is intended to promote a fair trial: Percy v General Motors-Holden’s Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 289. Parties must disclose the existence of relevant documents in their possession and subject to privilege make them available for inspection. Thus discovery reduces surprise, ensures each party is aware of the other party’s relevant documents and assists in the defining and narrowing of issues. Discovery can be burdensome on the court system. In Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] ATPR (Digest) 46-274; [2007] FCA 1062 excessive discovery led to a lengthy trial and over $200 million being spent on litigation. Sackville J at [21] pointed out that such discovery comes at a heavy cost not only to the parties, but also the court system, and in turn the community. See also Palavi v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 264 per Allsop P at [101]. 600

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents

[r Pt21.120]

Procedure and extent of discovery

The procedure of discovery of documents by notice or order, under r 21, is only available as between parties to the proceedings and, semble, only for parties between whom issues have been raised by pleadings. Generally, discovery is not available between co-defendants in the absence of a cross-claim between them (compare Buxton & Lysaught Pty Ltd v Buxton [1977] 1 NSWLR 285 however, the court may make an order for discovery under Pt 21.2 against any party to the proceedings; it is not available against a person who is not a party: Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Bond (1982) 61 FLR 91. The servants or agents of a corporation can be required to give discovery on behalf of the corporation: Harrington v North London Polytechnic [1984] 1 WLR 1293; [1984] 3 All ER 666. However, discovery of documents or facts is available, against a person who may be a stranger or, presumably, a prospective defendant, for the purpose of ascertaining the identity or description of a prospective defendant and whether the applicant may be entitled to make a claim for relief against them. This is the procedure of preliminary discovery and inspection contained in UCPR Pt 5. Subject to these provisions, discovery of documents or facts against a stranger cannot as a general rule be obtained, nor is it proper to join a stranger as a party merely for the purpose of discovery. If documents or information in the possession of a stranger are required, it is ordinarily necessary to subpoena the documents or call the stranger as a witness at the hearing: Burstall v Beyfus (1884) 26 Ch D 35 at 40–41. There is, however, an exception to this rule. In Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133; [1973] 3 WLR 164; [1973] 2 All ER 943, the House of Lords held that where a stranger, who may be personally liable for a wrong, has provided facilities for its commission, he or she may be ordered to give discovery to the party wronged in proceedings brought for discovery only. Such orders are also available against prospective defendants: Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 55; and in respect of prospective defendants: Loose v Williamson [1978] 1 WLR 639; [1978] 3 All ER 89. Regard should now also be had to r 5, preliminary discovery. The Norwich Pharmacal Co case was applied in P v T Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1309; [1997] 4 All ER 200 where discovery was granted to ascertain whether the defendant had any documents containing allegations made against the plaintiff by an unidentified third party to enable the plaintiff to clear his name in an action against the third party. These orders arise from the Supreme Court’s long established power to grant discovery in equity: see Computershare Ltd v Perpetual Registrars Ltd [2000] 1 VR 626 (17 April 2000) (Scope of “Norwich Order”).The power to make these exceptional orders relating to discovery where not now found in the rules is based on the inherent jurisdiction of the court (per Lord Denning MR in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd at 61). In Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; 43 ALD 481 Gummow J outlined the steps that could be taken for obtaining discovery of medical records of a patient kept by a doctor where the patient became involved in foreign proceedings in which the doctor was not a party. See Swanston and McDonald, “Patients’ right of access to medical records – a ‘test case’” (1997) 71 ALJ 332. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to order a defendant to make an affidavit of discovery in aid of a Mareva injunction in respect of the foreign assets of a company registered in NSW: Ballabil Holdings Pty Ltd v Hospital Products Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 155; [1985] 3 ACLC 220. The District Court may also grant any injunctive relief, including relief in the nature of Mareva relief or an Anton Piller order. Practice Note No SC Eq 11 now applies to discovery in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court – see [r Pt21.40] above. [r Pt21.140]

Misuse of material disclosed on discovery

A party or her or his legal representative, to whom documents have been disclosed in the process of discovery, may use the documents concerned or any of the material therein contained, or any knowledge acquired from the inspection of these, only for the proper purposes of the conduct of the proceedings in which the order for discovery has been obtained, and there is an implied undertaking binding that party or her or his legal representative not to use such documents or such material or knowledge for any ulterior or collateral purpose: Kimberley Mineral Holdings Ltd (in liq) v McEwan [1980] 1 NSWLR 210; (1980) 4 ACLR 851 at 216 (NSWLR). See also Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46; British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158. A notice to produce documents under © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

601

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r Pt21.140]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 21.1

[r Pt21.140]

s 33 of the Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 must be complied with according to its terms: Australian Securities Commission v Ampolex Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 504; 85 A Crim R 240. [r Pt21.1000]

References

Division 1 of Pt 4.6 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) deals with requests to produce documents or call witnesses and s 35 with the effect of calling for the production of documents. Further reading: Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014); Simpson SD, Bailey DL and Evans EK, Discovery and Interrogatories (2nd ed, Butterworths, 1990); Biscoe P, Mareva and Anton Piller Orders (Lexis Nexis, 2005).

DIVISION 1 – DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION 21.1

Definitions

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 1; DCR Part 22, rule 1)

(1) In this Division: excluded document, in relation to proceedings the subject of an order for discovery, means any of the following documents: (a) any document filed in the proceedings, (b) any document served on party A after the commencement of the proceedings, (c) any document that wholly came into existence after the commencement of the proceedings, (d) any additional copy of a document included in the list of documents, being a document that contains no mark, deletion or other matter, relevant to a fact in question, not present in the document so included, (e) any document comprising an original written communication sent by party B prior to the date of commencement of the proceedings of which a copy is included in the list of documents, but does not include any document that the court declares not to be an excluded document for the purposes of those proceedings. list of documents means a list of documents referred to in rule 21.3. order for discovery means an order referred to in rule 21.2. party A means a party to whom another party is giving discovery, or being ordered to give discovery, of documents. party B means a party who is giving discovery, or being ordered to give discovery, of documents. party B’s affidavit means an affidavit prepared in relation to the list of documents under rule 21.4. Note: See the Dictionary for further definitions including, in particular, a definition of possession. (2) For the purposes of this Division, a document or matter is to be taken to be relevant to a fact in issue if it could, or contains material that could, rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of that fact (otherwise than by relating solely to the credibility of a witness), regardless of whether the document or matter would be admissible in evidence.

RULE 21.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 21.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 21.1.40] Relevant to a fact in issue ........................................................................................................................ [r 21.1.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 21.1.1000]

602

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 21.1.20]

Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents Division 1 – Discovery and inspection

r 21.2

Comparison

There are no substantial changes arising from the new drafting of the rule. Note however, that the former SCR Pt 23 r 1(c) which related to the definition of “privileged documents” is now found in the Dictionary, as is the definition of “documents”. [r 21.1.40]

Operation

The rule and the Dictionary define the meaning of some key words in Pt 21, being “document”, “excluded document”, “privileged document”, “privileged information” and “possession”. The latter three are found in the Dictionary. The effect of the rule is to apply the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) definitions of privilege. As Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 74 ALJR 339; [1999] HCA 67 illustrates, there is no necessary or direct correlation between the statutory definition of “privilege” and common law analogs. However, as the Evidence Act 1995 was drafted with common law concepts in mind, an understanding of the Act might be informed by an understanding of common law principles. [r 21.1.60]

Relevant to a fact in issue

The definition in subr (2) of “relevant to a fact in issue” is not dissimilar to the test of relevance in s 55(1) Evidence Act 1995. The key difference under r 21.1 is that the focus is upon what the document may or does contain and not upon its admissibility. A further difference is that the definition specifically excludes matters relating solely to the credibility of a witness, consistently with common law authority: Thorpe v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1989] 1 WLR 665; [1989] 2 All ER 827, noted in (1990) 64 ALJ 738. Compare Liristis v Gadelrabb [2009] NSWSC 441 in the context of subpoenae on credit. [r 21.1.1000]

References

Annotations on privilege are found at r 21.3 21.2

Order for discovery

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 3(1), (2) and (3); DCR Part 22, rule 3(1), (2) and (3))

(1) The court may order that party B must give discovery to party A of: (a) documents within a class or classes specified in the order, or (b) one or more samples (selected in such manner as the court may specify) of documents within such a class. (2) A class of documents must not be specified in more general terms than the court considers to be justified in the circumstances. (3) Subject to subrule (2), a class of documents may be specified: (a) by relevance to one or more facts in issue, or (b) by description of the nature of the documents and the period within which they were brought into existence, or (c) in such other manner as the court considers appropriate in the circumstances. (4) An order for discovery may not be made in respect of a document unless the document is relevant to a fact in issue. [Subr (4) insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[6]] [R 21.2 am Rule 164 of 2007]

RULE 21.2 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 21.2.40] Documents within a class or classes ....................................................................................................... [r 21.2.60] By relevance to one or more facts in issue ............................................................................................. [r 21.2.80] Equity Division Proceedings ................................................................................................................... [r 21.2.100] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

603

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 21.1.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 21.2 [r 21.2.40]

[r 21.2.40] Operation

The court can make an order on the application of a party or of its own motion and on any terms and conditions it thinks fit – CPA s 86. [r 21.2.60]

Documents within a class or classes

In making an order for discovery of documents within a class or classes, the court may specify such matter or matters in question as it considers to be justified, and may, in an appropriate case, make an order so extensive as to be equivalent to general discovery. The basis for an order is that discovery is necessary in the interests of a fair trial: Percy v General Motors-Holden’s Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 289. In Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD 55 at 63, Brett LJ considered that a document may be discoverable if it is relevant to a train of inquiry which may directly or indirectly enable the party requiring the affidavit either to advance its own case or damage the case of its adversary. However in National Australia Bank Ltd v Idoport Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 8 (15 February 2000) the majority said at [7] in a passage considered relevant to r 21: It was intended that the new rules would exclude Brett LJ’s “train of inquiry” idea as a factor in deciding relevance. In our view this was achieved by the definition of relevance in (Pt 23) r 1(d). The “train of inquiry” idea could make a document discoverable even if it did not itself advance one party’s case, damage that of the other, or relate to an issue; under the new rules, a document must be relevant to a fact in issue in the defined sense. [r 21.2.80]

By relevance to one or more facts in issue

The definition in r 21.1(2) of “relevant to a fact in issue” is not dissimilar to the test of relevance in s 55(1) Evidence Act 1995. The key difference under r 21.1 is that the focus is upon what the document may or does contain and not upon its admissibility. A further difference is that the definition specifically excludes matters relating solely to the credibility of a witness. A court should not order discovery on matters going solely to credit or to the existence of similar facts which have no material bearing on the relevant facts to be decided but were merely prejudicial as showing instances of similar conduct in other situations: Thorpe v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1989] 1 WLR 665; [1989] 2 All ER 827, noted in (1990) 64 ALJ 738. Compare Liristis v Gadelrabb [2009] NSWSC 441 in the context of subpoenae on credit. [r 21.2.100]

Equity Division Proceedings

Practice Note No SC Eq 11 commenced on 26 March 2012 and applies to discovery in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court, other than those in the Commercial Arbitration List. The purpose which is served by Practice Note SC Eq 11, as noted in Leighton International v Hodges [2012] NSWSC 458 at [4]–[7], is the latest step taken by the court in its efforts to deal with the costs of litigation, particularly so far as it concerns the costs of discovery of electronic material. The usual course in the Equity Division was noted by Bergin CJ in Eq in Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd (2012) 295 ALR 348; [2012] NSWCA 430 at [65]–[66], commences with the plaintiff’s service of the evidence including documents on which it relies, followed by the defendant’s service of the evidence including the documents on which it relies, so that the real issues in proceedings are confined not only by the pleadings but also by the evidence. That approach will serve the purpose of the Practice Note, of seeking to do what can be done in the vast majority of cases to avoid unnecessary discovery. Note this case went to the High Court Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 on its own facts. Under this new regime the court will only make orders for discovery – now termed “disclosure of documents” – before the parties have served their evidence in matters where there are exceptional circumstances necessitating disclosure. Such an application, even by consent, must be supported by an affidavit setting out the necessity, the classes of documents sought and the likely costs of disclosure. “Exceptional circumstances” – There can be no all encompassing definition of “exceptional circumstances”; what is required is an assessment of the relevant provision and its application in the particular case; and such circumstances require something more than circumstances which are regularly, routinely or normally encountered – Leighton International at [19]. Exceptional circumstances might be met where information 604

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents Division 1 – Discovery and inspection

r 21.3

necessary for one party’s case was solely within the knowledge of another party from which disclosure was sought: Naiman Clarke Pty Ltd v Tuccia [2012] NSWSC 314 at [26]. Or may be established by demonstrating the necessity to obtain documents to fairly prepare a case for trial, that is, that the party is unable to serve its evidence without certain documents: Danihel v Manning [2012] NSWSC 556 at [16] per Bergin CJ in Eq. In Leda Manorstead Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2012) 89 ATR 102; [2012] NSWSC 913 at [17], Gzell J reviewed these authorities and emphasised the need for “caution against setting the bar too high”. “Necessitating disclosure” – The Practice Note also provides that disclosure will be ordered only when it is “necessary” for the resolution of the real issues in dispute. McDougall J observed in Leighton International at [22] that this contemplates that disclosure is shown to be reasonably necessary for disposing of the matter fairly or in the interests of a fair trial. In that case, at [55], his Honour allowed disclosure where the Plaintiff did not have sufficient documents otherwise to make out its case. 21.3

List of documents to be prepared

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 3(5) and (6); DCR Part 22, rule 3(5) and (6))

(1) Party B must comply with an order for discovery by serving on party A a list of documents that deals with all of the documents (other than excluded documents) referred to in the order. [Subr (1) am Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[13]]

(2) The list of documents: (a) must be divided into two parts: (i) Part 1 relating to documents in the possession of party B, and (ii) Part 2 relating to documents that are not, but that within the last 6 months prior to the commencement of the proceedings have been, in the possession of party B, and (b) must include a brief description (by reference to nature and date or period) of each document or group of documents and, in the case of a group, the number of documents in that group, and (c) must specify, against the description of each document or group in Part 2 of the list of documents, the person (if any) who party B believes to be in possession of the document or group of documents, and (d) must identify any document that is claimed to be a privileged document, and specify the circumstances under which the privilege is claimed to arise. (3) Party B must comply with the requirements of subrule (1): (a) within 28 days after an order for discovery is made, or (b) within such other period (whether more or less than 28 days) as the order may specify. [R 21.3 am Rule 625 of 2005]

RULE 21.3 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 21.3.40] Time of order ............................................................................................................................................ [r 21.3.50] Anton Piller orders .................................................................................................................................... [r 21.3.60] Possession ............................................................................................................................................. [r 21.3.100] Documents privileged from production ................................................................................................... [r 21.3.120] Legal professional privilege .................................................................................................................... [r 21.3.140] Privilege against self-incrimination ......................................................................................................... [r 21.3.160] Protected confidences ............................................................................................................................ [r 21.3.180] Public interest immunity ......................................................................................................................... [r 21.3.200] Statements made without prejudice ....................................................................................................... [r 21.3.220] Waiver of privilege .................................................................................................................................. [r 21.3.240] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 21.3.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

605

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 21.2.100]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 21.3 [r 21.3.40]

[r 21.3.40] Operation

The first step (after an order or agreement), in the discovery process is the preparation of a list of all relevant documents that are in the possession of the party making discovery. The list is in two distinct Parts. Those that are and those that were within the last six months within the party’s possession. In either Part, the documents must be described by reference to their nature, date or period and where in a group, by the number of them. Rule 21.3 does not require the contents of a document to be described, just the “nature” and “date or period” of each document: r 21.3(2)(b) and, if the document is in the possession of another person, who that person is: r 21.3(2)(c): Palavi v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 264 at [59]. The list must specify, against the description of each document or group in Pt 2 of the list of documents, the person (if any) who the party giving discovery believes to be in possession of the document or group of documents in Pt 2. It is incumbent on a party to sufficiently particularise its claim for privilege over the documents in accordance with the rules: Franks v Warringah Council [2010] NSWSC 1318. Although failure to comply with r 21.3(2)(d) does not necessarily preclude a party from maintaining a claim for privilege, non-compliance may have significant consequences: Bailey v Department of Land & Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100. [r 21.3.50]

Time of order

The general rule is that no order for discovery will be made until after the joinder of issues: Sunday Times Newspaper Co Ltd v Sun Newspaper Co Ltd (1919) 36 WN (NSW) 72; Latec Finance Pty Ltd v Jury (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 674; [1960] NSWR 321; Schlam v WA Trustee Executor & Agency Co Ltd [1964] WAR 178. Exceptions can include when a document is referred to in an opponent’s pleading: Australian Joint Stock Bank v Meldrum (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 233. Note Practice Note No SC Eq 11 (see [r 21.2.100]) now applies to discovery in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court, other than those in the Commercial Arbitration List. Under this new regime the court will only make orders for discovery – now termed “disclosure of documents” – before the parties have served their evidence in matters where there are exceptional circumstances necessitating disclosure. [r 21.3.60]

Anton Piller orders

One type of discovery which may be made at the commencement of proceedings where specifically warranted is by virtue of an Anton Piller order. The usual form of such an order, made in the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction, is an order that the defendant should permit the persons specified in the order to enter upon his, or its, premises, and to inspect, take copies of, and to remove, specified material, or classes of material, indicating, where appropriate, documents, articles or other forms of property. It is an extraordinary remedy, designed to obtain, and to preserve, vital evidence pending the final determination of the plaintiff’s claim in the proceedings, in a case in which it can be shown that there is a high risk that, if forewarned, the defendant, would destroy, or hide, the evidence, or cause it to be removed from the jurisdiction of the court. For this reason, such orders are invariably made ex parte: Long v Specifier Publications Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 545 per Powell JA; Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 55. An applicant for an Anton Piller order must have an extremely strong prima facie case, and must demonstrate that the damage which they have suffered or might suffer is very serious and that there is a real possibility that the defendant might destroy incriminating documents. The usual requirement of frank and full disclosure that applies in ex parte applications applies, as does the requirement of an undertaking as to damages. A detailed discussion of the requirements for an Anton Piller order in NSW and any breach thereof is found in Long v Specifier Publications Pty Ltd. A precedent can be found in the White Book (2000 edition), in an annotation to Pt 25 of the Civil Procedure Rules (Interim Remedies and Security for Costs) at 25 CPD–016. See also PMSI Group Pty Ltd v Wilson [2003] NSWSC 263. [r 21.3.100]

Possession

“Possession” is defined in the Dictionary to include custody or power. A party has a document in her or his “power” only if he or she is in fact in possession of it, or has an immediate indefeasible legal right at the time of discovery to demand possession from the person in whose possession it is: Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 1) [1980] 1 WLR 627. A party has “custody” of a document even where he or she does not have 606

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents Division 1 – Discovery and inspection

r 21.3

sole legal possession of it, but holds it, for example, as agent or servant for a third party: Turner v Davies [1981] 2 NSWLR 324, but see Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (No 2) (1981) 55 FLR 212; [1982] ATPR 40-280. [r 21.3.120]

Documents privileged from production

“Privileged document” is defined in the Dictionary. The various categories answering the description are discussed below. While it is not appropriate to give such a detailed description as would nullify a claim for privilege, some description must be given of the document or group of documents, other than in a vague way, and the grounds of privilege should be stated in accordance with r 21.3(2)(d): IOL Petroleum Ltd v O’Neill (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 9 October 1995); see also Bailey v Department of Land & Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100. Where a party is required, by notice or order, to make discovery of documents, then, prima facie he or she is under a duty to list these documents, but he or she is entitled to claim privilege, in appropriate cases, from producing the documents for inspection: r 21.3(2)(d). In Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; 51 ALJR 198 at 689, Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ said it is for the party claiming privilege to show that the documents for which the claim is made are privileged. The question of the onus and extent of establishing privilege under the CPA is discussed in Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 16) [2013] NSWSC 418. Further, even where a document does not fall within one of the established grounds of privilege, it may nonetheless be protected from production on more general grounds, such as oppression or public policy, subject to the court’s discretion: see Turner v Davies [1981] 2 NSWLR 324 at 326–327. See further r 1.9 – Objections to production of documents founded on privilege. [r 21.3.140]

Legal professional privilege

Division 1 of Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995: in Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; 51 ALJR 198, the majority of the High Court held that legal professional privilege was confined to documents which are brought into existence for the sole purpose of their being submitted to legal advisers for advice or for use in legal proceedings. A document which would in any event have been brought into existence for another purpose was not privileged from production after discovery on that ground; contra Barwick CJ who propounded a less stringent test, namely that the dominant purpose should be the touchstone, and the dominant purpose test has now been adopted by the Evidence Act 1995: see ss 118–120. Grant v Downs was overruled by the majority in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 74 ALJR 339; [1999] HCA 67 who held that the correct test at common law for claiming legal professional privilege in respect of discovery and inspection is the dominant purpose test and not the sole purpose test (followed, Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 74 ALJR 378; [1999] HCA 6). Legal professional privilege is not merely a rule of substantive law. It is described as both an important common law right and immunity: Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; 77 ALJR 40; [2002] HCA 49. Legal professional privilege is confined to communications although documents may be treated as communications: Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 584–585. In Boyes v Colins (2000) 23 WAR 123; [2000] WASCA 344 at [36]–[38], it was held that communications may include video films and that litigation privilege, a division of legal professional privilege, does not depend on information being “communicated” eg notes on cross-examination by Counsel, always retained in Counsel’s possession and never imparted to anyone, remain subject to privilege. At common law legal professional privilege is confined to advisers who are legal practitioners: Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd v Arthur Andersen [2002] 1 Qd R 233; (2001) 47 ATR 11; [2001] QCA 115 but see the Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Rooney (1994) 36 NSWLR 122 and the Evidence Act 1995 Pt 3.10 particularly ss 119, 120. Legal professional privilege can only be displaced by legally admissible evidence; hearsay is not generally admissible; the party resisting the claim should prove something to give colour to the charge: to the standard of a prima facie case; Re Moage Ltd (in liq); Sheahan v Pitterino (1998) 82 FCR 10; 26 ACSR 726; Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424; [2004] FCA 332; Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501. In Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; [1983] HCA 39, the majority of the High Court held that documents which were prepared for the purpose of obtaining professional advice, other than in relation to legal proceedings, were privileged and could not be made the subject of a search © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

607

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 21.3.140]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 21.3

[r 21.3.140]

warrant under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) for the purposes of a taxation inquiry. As to whether privilege attaches to communications made by a client to a foreign lawyer, see Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424; [2004] FCA 332. Where legal professional privilege is claimed, but there is unsatisfactory evidence of the documents being created for the dominant purpose of legal advice, judges may inspect the relevant document and form their own view: Barnes v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 67 ATR 284; 242 ALR 601; [2007] FCAFC 88. Failure to comply with r 21.3(2)(d) is not fatal to a claim for legal professional privilege but may result in a costs order: Bailey v Department of Land & Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 at [39]–[41]. The court’s power to inspect documents to determine a claim for legal professional privilege was exercised sparingly: see Woollahra Municipal Council v Westpac Banking Corp (1994) 33 NSWLR 529: compare the cases under rr 1.8 and 1.9. No adverse inference can be drawn merely from a claim for legal professional privilege: Standard Chartered Bank of Australia v Antico (1993) 36 NSWLR 87. For circumstances where legal professional privilege will extend to a party who is not the client of a lawyer but who has a bona fide belief on reasonable grounds that he or she is, and the types of communication that are not within the scope of legal professional privilege, see Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Rooney (1994) 36 NSWLR 122. This privilege extends to those who have a common interest in the subject matter of the advice: see Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd v Webb (1995) 18 ACSR 418; 13 ACLC 1749. Compare Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 405. In the case of joint privilege, it is sufficient as against third persons, if only one of the parties claims the privilege but all have to agree for the purpose of waiving it: Re Nika Management Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (1996) 14 ACLC 326. See Evidence Act 1995 Pt 3.10 Div 1. [r 21.3.160] Privilege against self-incrimination Section 87 of the CPA is relevant to protection against self-incrimination in interlocutory matters, including orders for production and witness statements, and mirrors the certificate regime under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995. Evidence Act 1995 s 128: in the absence of statutory compulsion, a party is generally not bound to answer any question if the answer would, in the opinion of the judge, have a tendency to expose the deponent to any criminal charge, penalty, or forfeiture which the judge regards as reasonably likely to be preferred or sued for: Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253 at 257; Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328; 57 ALJR 236. Or civil penalty: Rich v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129; 78 ALJR 1354; [2004] HCA 42. This common law principle has been generally preserved in Evidence Act 1995 s 128, however, it does not apply to corporations: Evidence Act 1995 s 187; Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477; 68 ALJR 127; 82 LGERA 51. The privilege against self incrimination may be waived: see Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412; Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 1 FCR 526; contra, Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) ATPR 45–531. An individual respondent is at liberty to apply to the court for an order absolving them from describing in their list of documents any particular document which would tend to expose her or him to a penalty: Trade Practices Commission v IMB Group Pty Ltd [1994] ATPR 41-348. [r 21.3.180]

Protected confidences

Professional confidential relationship privilege, Evidence Act 1995 Pt 3.10 Div 1A: a communication made in confidence by one person to another person (including one in the presence of a specified third party) may be privileged if it is a protected confidence as defined by s 126A(1) of the Evidence Act 1995. Broadly speaking, the court would need to balance the harm done if the confidence were disclosed against the harm if the evidence were not adduced (s 126B). Section 126B of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) gives a discretion to the court in relation to the adducing of protected confidences. Note however, that the discretion is curtailed by subs (3). The protected confidences privilege is subject to waiver (s 126C) and will be lost for communications made and documents prepared in the furtherance of a fraud, an offence or an act which renders a person liable to a civil penalty: s 126D. At common law, communications made to a priest are not generally privileged: see R v Hay (1860) 175 ER 933; 2 F & F 4. However, communications where confessions are privileged unless made for a criminal purpose: Evidence Act 1995 s 127 and would otherwise fall under s 126B – ALRC Report 26 at [903]–[909]. 608

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents Division 1 – Discovery and inspection

r 21.3

Other relationships which are arguably protected are doctor and patient: Report 26 at [910]–[918]; psychotherapist and patient: Report 26 at [919]–[934]; social-worker and client: Report 26 at [935]–[941]; journalist and source: Report 26 at [948]–[954]. The Evidence Act 1995 definition of “protected confidence” is broad: Mok v Crime Commission (NSW) [2002] NSWCA 53 and could arguably apply to other relationships including accountant and client: Report 26 at [955]. Evidence Act 1995 Pt 3.10 Div 1B: these are somewhat similar provisions to the professional confidential relationship privilege in respect of sexual assault communications privilege where a communication is made in confidence to a counsellor by a victim (or alleged victim) of sexual assault where that counsellor is treating that person for an emotional or psychological condition (s 126G). Contractual duty of confidence: The duty of confidence which exists between solicitor and client, banker and customer, doctor and patient and accountant and client, is subject to, and overridden by, the duty of any party to that contract to comply with the law of the land. If a party is required, whether at common law or under statute, to disclose in defined circumstances confidential information, then he or she must do so, and any express contract to the contrary would be illegal or void: Brayley v Wilton [1976] 2 NSWLR 495; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 499; 53 ALJR 336 at 515 (CLR) at 339; O’Reilly v Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria (1983) 153 CLR 1; 57 ALJR 342 – compare Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; [1983] HCA 39. The contractual duty of confidence between a solicitor and client is a principle distinct from legal professional privilege: Crowley v Murphy (1979) 38 FLR 371; 28 ACTR 1; affirmed in part in (1981) 52 FLR 123; 34 ALR 496. See further “Evidence – Confidential Communications” (1998) 72 ALJ 510. [r 21.3.200]

Public interest immunity

Evidence Act 1995 s 130: this category concerns the rule which, although not a true rule of privilege, operates to exclude relevant evidence when it concerns matters of State interest and should be confined to the conduct of governmental functions: R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681; [1999] NSWCCA 166 at [54]. There is no rule under the common law that a claim by the Crown, on the grounds of public interest, for immunity from production of a class of documents of a high level of public importance, is conclusive. The court has a discretion to review the Crown’s claim and, in doing so, must balance the general desirability that documents of that kind should not be disclosed against the need to produce them in the interests of justice: See Evidence Act 1995 s 130(4), (5) regarding the things the court may consider in deciding whether to order disclosure; Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; 53 ALJR 11; 21 ALR 505; noted (1980) 54 ALJ 364; Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090; [1979] 3 WLR 722; [1979] 3 All ER 700. See National Australia Bank Ltd v Saunders (1988) 12 NSWLR 623; Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450; 159 FLR 132; [2000] SASC 83 and R v Young. Limited access may be permitted upon the applicant’s offering confidentiality undertakings regarding its experts and legal representatives: Transport Action Group Against Motorways Inc v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (1998) 103 LGERA 338. The public’s legitimate interest in obtaining information about the affairs of public authorities, referred to in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10; 69 ALJR 404 at 32–33 (CLR), may be outweighed by national security and diplomatic considerations: Commonwealth v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 26 June 1995). For a High Court decision on the procedure to be followed by the trial judge where the Crown objects to a subpoena on the ground that to do so would be prejudicial to national security, see Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404; 58 ALJR 97. For balancing the need for confidentiality of the Protective Commissioner’s material and the need for disclosure in the interests of justice, see B v N (1994) 35 NSWLR 140. Both the common law and s 130 require two broad stages of analysis: first the assessment of the character of the information or document (as state papers or as relating to a matter of state) and secondly a weighing or balancing exercise to assess the public interest on whether disclosure would prejudice the proper functioning of the government: New South Wales v Public Transport Ticketing Corp [2011] NSWCA 60 at [42]. The immunity of cabinet documents from disclosure is not absolute. However, it is doubtful whether civil proceedings will ever warrant the production of documents recording cabinet deliberations upon a matter which remains current or controversial: Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604. A party seeking the production of documents by subpoena cannot, as of right, cross-examine the deponent of an affidavit tendered to support a claim of privilege for such document on the ground of public interest as this could endanger the non-disclosure of the document: Workers’ Compensation Commission (NSW) v FAI Insurances Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 362. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

609

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 21.3.200]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 21.4

[r 21.3.200]

[r 21.3.220]

Statements made without prejudice

Evidence Act 1995 s 131: communications between parties to a dispute, which are made “without prejudice” for the purpose of negotiating a compromise or settlement, are not admissible in evidence: Evidence Act 1995 s 131 but subject to s 131(2): Rabin v Mendoza & Co [1954] 1 WLR 271; [1954] 1 All ER 247. If, however, they result in a concluded agreement, they are admissible: Attorney-General v Dyer [1947] Ch 67. See Evidence Act 1995 s 131(2)(f) and they are also admissible for determining liability for costs: see s 131(2)(h). Even when there is no heading “without prejudice”, privilege will attach to communications which are genuine negotiations with intent to compromise an existing dispute: Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608; 38 ALJR 27 at 614. The words “without prejudice” do not of themselves confer upon any document an immunity from production in court: Davies v Nyland (1975) 10 SASR 76 at 89–90; Bentley v Nelson [1963] WAR 89. The statement in respect of which privilege is claimed must have some bearing on negotiations for a settlement: Field v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285; 32 ALJR 110 and s 131(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 requires it to have a direct connection and this is a question of nexus: GPI Leisure Corp Ltd (in liq) v Yuill (1997) 42 NSWLR 225. Admissions in negotiations not relevant to the dispute in which they are made, may be admissible: see Direct Acceptance Corp Ltd (rec & mgr apptd) (in liq) v Lord (unreported, NSWSC, Giles J, 3 September 1993) and so may documents that are “pleaded into relevance”: Western Australia v Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) (1996) 142 ALR 597; Van Der Lee v NSW [2002] NSWCA 286 (admissibility of “without prejudice” communications as evidence of abuse of process). Documents referred to in the course of without prejudice discussions may be privileged if they would not otherwise have come to the notice of the other side, and without prejudice material cannot generally be used for the purpose of making an order for costs against a recalcitrant party: see Lukies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283. The rule in Pitts v Adney (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 886 that without prejudice communications can be admitted where otherwise the court may be misled is now found in the Evidence Act 1995 s 131(2)(g): Marks v Government Insurance Offıce Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128; 137 ALR 579. [r 21.3.240]

Waiver of privilege

Privilege may be waived expressly or impliedly by the conduct of the privilege holder or their lawyer. An implied waiver occurs when, by reason of some conduct on the privilege holder’s part, it becomes unfair to maintain the privilege. The holder of the privilege should not be able to abuse it by using it to create an inaccurate perception of the protected communication: Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 487–488. What brings about waiver is the inconsistency, which the courts, where necessary informed by considerations of fairness, perceive, between the conduct of the client and maintenance of the confidentiality; not some overriding principle of fairness operating at large: Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 74 ALJR 378; [1999] HCA 6 at [29]. See also s 122 of the Evidence Act 1995 though note that it has the effect that privilege may be lost in circumstances which are not identical to the circumstances in which privilege may be lost at common law: Mann v Carnell at [23]. The New South Wales Court of Appeal recently reviewed the authorities in this area in the context of a claim of mistaken disclosure in Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd (2012) 295 ALR 348; [2012] NSWCA 430; on appeal Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 (on the facts the issue of waiver should never have been raised: [35]). [r 21.3.1000]

References

Rules 1.8 and 1.9 – Inspection of and objections to production of documents founded on privilege. 21.4

Affidavit and certificate supporting list of documents

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 3(5), (6) and (7); DCR Part 22, rule 3(5), (6) and (7))

(1) The list of documents must be accompanied by: (a) a supporting affidavit, and 610

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents Division 1 – Discovery and inspection

r 21.5

(b) if party B has a solicitor, by a solicitor’s certificate of advice. Note: See rule 35.3 as to who may make such an affidavit. (2) The affidavit referred to in subrule (1)(a) must state that the deponent: (a) has made reasonable inquiries as to the documents referred to in the order, and (b) believes that there are no documents (other than excluded documents) falling within any of the classes specified in the order that are, or that within the last 6 months before the commencement of the proceedings have been, in the possession of party B (other than those referred to in Part 1 or 2 of the list of documents), and (c) believes that the documents in Part 1 of the list of documents are within the possession of party B, and (d) believes that the documents in Part 2 of the list of documents are within the possession of the persons (if any) respectively specified in that Part, and (e) as to any document in Part 2 of the list of documents in respect of which no such person is specified, has no belief as to whose possession the document is in, and must state, in respect of any document that is claimed to be a privileged document, the facts relied on as establishing the existence of the privilege. (3) The solicitor’s certificate of advice referred to in subrule (1)(b) must state that the solicitor: (a) has advised party B as to the obligations arising under an order for discovery (and if party B is a corporation, which officers of party B have been so advised), and (b) is not aware of any documents within any of the classes specified in the order (other than excluded documents) that are, or that within the last 6 months before the commencement of the proceedings have been, in the possession of party B (other than those referred to in Part 1 or 2 of the list of documents).

RULE 21.4 COMMENTARY [r 21.4.40]

Operation

The persons who may make an affidavit are set out in UCPR r 35.3. As a general rule, an affidavit verifying a list of documents is conclusive and must be accepted by the party seeking discovery as being sufficient and true: Birmingham v London [1913] 3 KB 850 at 855; and generally the deponent will not be cross-examined on it: Fruehauf Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 359. However, it is considered that a party is entitled to apply to the court, under r 1.8 – Determination of questions arising under these rules – for a further and better list of documents verified by affidavit in certain circumstances: Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol-Myers Co [1979] VR 273; Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd [2000] NSWSC 520. Rule 1.9 – Objections to production of documents founded on privilege – allows the court, for the purpose of ruling on the objection, to: (a) compel the person objecting to produce the document or thing; and (b) permit evidence in relation to the claim of privilege to be given by any other person by affidavit or otherwise; and (c) permit cross-examination on any affidavit used in support of the claim. 21.5

Documents to be made available

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 3(9) and (10); DCR Part 22, rule 3(9) and (10))

(1) Subject to the requirements of any Act or law, Party B must ensure that the documents described in Part 1 of the list of documents (other than privileged documents): (a) are physically kept and arranged in a way that makes the documents readily accessible and capable of convenient inspection by party A, and (b) are identified in a way that enables particular documents to be readily retrieved, from the time the list of documents is served on party A until the time the trial of the proceedings is completed. [Subr (1) subst Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[6]] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

611

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 21.4.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 21.5

[r 21.5.40]

(2) Within 21 days after service of the list of documents, or within such other period or at such other times as the court may specify, party B must, on request by party A: (a) produce for party A’s inspection the documents described in Part 1 of the list of documents (other than privileged documents), and (b) make available to party A a person who is able to, and does on party A’s request, explain the way the documents are arranged and assist in locating and identifying particular documents or classes of documents, and (c) provide facilities for the inspection and copying of such of the documents (other than privileged documents) as are not capable of being photocopied, and (d) provide photocopies of, or facilities for the photocopying of, such of the documents as are capable of being photocopied, subject to: (i) party A’s solicitor undertaking to pay the reasonable costs of providing those photocopies or facilities, or (ii) if party A has no solicitor, party A providing to party B an amount not less than a reasonable estimate of the reasonable costs of providing those photocopies or facilities. [R 21.5 am Rule 288 of 2006]

RULE 21.5 COMMENTARY [r 21.5.40]

Provision of documents by mistake

The New South Wales Court of Appeal recently reviewed the authorities in this area in the context of a claim of mistaken disclosure in Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd (2012) 295 ALR 348; [2012] NSWCA 430 (appeal pending). 21.6 Subsequently found documents to be made available (cf SCR Part 23, rule 3(8); DCR Part 22, rule 3(8))

If at any time after party B’s affidavit is made, and before the end of the hearing, party B becomes aware: (a) that any document within the class or classes specified in the relevant order for discovery (not being an excluded document) but not included in Part 1 of the list of documents is within, or has come into, party B’s possession, or (b) that any document included in Part 1 of the list of documents which was claimed to be a privileged document was not, or has ceased to be, a privileged document, party B must forthwith give written notice to party A of that fact, and comply with rule 21.5 in respect of the document, as if the document had been included in Part 1 of the list of documents and the list had been served on the date of the giving of the notice.

RULE 21.6 COMMENTARY [r 21.6.40]

Operation

Continuing obligation: A party is bound to disclose documents which were in their possession at the time the list is verified. Hence where relevant documents later come to light which were in their possession they must also be discovered. If a document comes into the hands of a party after initial discovery has been made, it is subject to discovery and production in the same way and to the same extent as if it had been available earlier: Donaldson v Harris [1973] 4 SASR 299 at 316. However, in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 47 ALR 693 (Fed Ct, FC), it was held that there is no continuing obligation imposed on a party who has been served with a notice for discovery to make further discovery each time fresh documents relevant to the issues in the case come into that party’s possession or power. The use at trial of such late discovered documents by the party giving discovery will depend upon any steps needed to protect the other party from the effects of the late disclosure: Cooke v Australian National Railways Commission (1985) 39 612

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents Division 1 – Discovery and inspection

r 21.7

SASR 146. Given that discovery contains ongoing obligations, it is not possible to declare a party has complied with its obligations pursuant to discovery in the matter: Venacom Pty Ltd v Morgan Brooks Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 46. 21.7

Discovered documents not to be disclosed

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 3(11) and (12); DCR Part 22, rule 3(11) and (12))

(1) No copy of a document, or information from a document, obtained by party A as a result of discovery by party B is to be disclosed or used otherwise than for the purposes of the conduct of the proceedings, except by leave of the court, unless the document has been received into evidence in open court. (2) Nothing in subrule (1) affects the power of the court to make an order restricting the disclosure or use of any document, whether or not received into evidence, or the operation of any such order.

RULE 21.7 COMMENTARY [r 21.7.40]

Operation

Misuse of material disclosed on discovery: In substance, r 34.1 embodies in statutory form what is often called the “Harman” implied obligation of confidentiality (see Home Offıce v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280; [1982] 1 All ER 532; [1982] 2 WLR 338): Steffen v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2009] NSWSC 883. A party or her or his legal representative, to whom documents have been disclosed in the process of discovery, may use the documents concerned or any of the material therein contained, or any knowledge acquired from the inspection of these, only for the proper purposes of the conduct of the proceedings in which the order for discovery has been obtained, and there is an implied undertaking binding that party or her or his legal representative not to use such documents or such material or knowledge for any ulterior or collateral purpose: Kimberley Mineral Holdings Ltd (in liq) v McEwan [1980] 1 NSWLR 210; (1980) 4 ACLR 851 at 216 (NSWLR); British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158. See further Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management & Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46. An application for leave to disclose documents the subject of the undertaking when sought by subpoena in another jurisdiction was granted in Zhu v Yingle Culture Exchange (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2009] NSWSC 897. The undertaking does not apply once the document has been produced and read out in open court or otherwise adduced in evidence in court proceedings unless the court continues restraint: Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10; 69 ALJR 404 at 32–33 (CLR); Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 218. In Dagi v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1996] 2 VR 567 a party was released from the implied obligation of confidentiality of confidential documents where in the special circumstances there had been a breach of that obligation by the other party. This use of documents for an ulterior or collateral purpose, being a breach of a negative undertaking, may, according to ordinary principles, be restrained by injunction, or, depending on the circumstances, be punishable as a civil contempt of court: Pacific Basin Exploration Pty Ltd v XLX (NL) [1985] WAR 11; (1984) 2 IPR 489; Street v Hearne (2007) 70 NSWLR 231; [2007] NSWCA 113. Arbitration proceedings may attract confidentiality in respect of documents compulsorily disclosed similar to that attaching to discovery proceedings in a court, subject to the public’s legitimate interest in obtaining information about the affairs of public authorities: . A notice to produce documents under s 33 of the Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 must be complied with according to its terms, despite the fact that the recipient would otherwise be under a duty at common law to obtain leave of the court to release documents held under compulsory process of a court: Australian Securities Commission v Ampolex Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 504; 85 A Crim R 240.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

613

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 21.7.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 21.8

21.8

[r 21.8.40]

Personal injury claims

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 5; DCR Part 22, rule 5)

In any proceedings on a common law claim: (a) for damages arising out of the death of, or bodily injury to, any person, or (b) for contribution in respect of damages so arising, an order for discovery may not be made in relation to any document unless the court, for special reasons, orders otherwise.

RULE 21.8 COMMENTARY [r 21.8.40]

Operation

Personal injury actions: The core of the requirement for “special reasons” is that there be something unusual or different to take the matter the subject of the discretion out of the ordinary course: Minister for Community Services & Health v Thoo (1988) 8 AAR 245; 78 ALR 307 at 324 (Burchett J). But that does not require that the case be extremely unusual, uncommon or exceptional: Department of Social Security v Hodgson (1992) 37 FCR 32; 27 ALD 309; 108 ALR 322; Binks v North Sydney Council [2001] NSWSC 27 (special circumstances discussed).

DIVISION 2 – NOTICE TO PRODUCE BEFORE HEARING 21.9 Definitions (1) In this Division: notice to produce means a notice to produce referred to in rule 21.10. party A means a party to whom another party is producing, or being asked to produce, documents or things for inspection. party B means a party who is producing, or being asked to produce, documents or things for inspection. (2) For the purposes of this Division, a document or thing is to be taken to be relevant to a fact in issue if it could, or contains material that could, rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of that fact (otherwise than by relating solely to the credibility of a witness), regardless of whether the document or thing would be admissible in evidence.

RULE 21.9 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 21.9.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 21.9.1000]

[r 21.9.40]

Operation

Notice to produce generally: A Notice to Produce acts in a similar way as a subpoena does but between parties. Party A can require Party B to produce (a) a document or thing referred to by Party B in any originating process, pleading, affidavit or witness statement filed or served by Party B and any other specific document that is referred to in the notice and is relevant to a fact in issue: r 21.10. Under r 21.11 Party B must comply with the notice within a reasonable time by producing the documents; or if a document is not produced, by serving a notice on accordance with r 21.11(1)(b). In personal injury claims a party does not have to comply with a notice to produce if the document or thing has not been referred to in any originating process, pleading, affidavit or witness statement filed or served by that party unless the court, for special reasons, otherwise orders: r 21.12. 614

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents Division 2 – Notice to produce before hearing

r 21.10

Practice Note SC Eq 11 (see [r 21.2.100]), does not, in terms, apply to notices to produce because such notices do not seek an order for “disclosure of documents”. However, in Owners Strata Plan SP 69567 v Baseline Constructions Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 502 at [23]–[24] Stevenson J observed that: It would subvert the intended operation of the Practice Note if parties could avoid its operation by adopting the expedient of serving a notice to produce, rather than seeking an order for disclosure. Indeed, if a notice to produce was served with the object of avoiding the operation of the Practice Note, such service might well constitute an abuse of the Court’s process. See also: MyPet Brands Pty Ltd v Beonic Technologies Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1628 at [35]; Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool City Council [2014] NSWSC 372 at [74]. [r 21.9.1000]

References

Notice to produce at hearing are dealt with under r 34.1. 21.10

Notice to produce for inspection by parties

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 2(1); DCR Part 22, rule 2(1), (1A) and (2))

(1) Party A may, by notice served on party B, require party B to produce for inspection by party A: (a) any document or thing that is referred to in any originating process, pleading, affidavit or witness statement filed or served by party B, and (b) any other specific document or thing that is clearly identified in the notice and is relevant to a fact in issue. (2) A notice to produce may specify a time for production of all or any of the documents or things required to be produced.

RULE 21.10 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 21.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 21.10.40]

[r 21.10.20]

Comparison

There is no substantial change from the former subrules, other than the requirement that the maximum number of documents that could be required under subr (1)(b) was 50, has been removed. It is considered that the requirement may be reinstated and where there is likely to be a large number of documents to be produced the procedure under discovery be used. [r 21.10.40]

Operation

Relevant to a fact in issue: A fact is in issue if it is in the “field of contest” between the parties:New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Daya [2008] NSWSC 763; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Gordon [2006] NSWSC 1473 at [9]. The definition in r 21(2) of “relevant to a fact in issue” is not dissimilar to the test of relevance in s 55(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 and hence a document will be relevant to a fact in issue if its contents can rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of that fact. The key difference under r 21.10 is that the focus is upon what the document may or does contain and not upon its admissibility. A further difference is that the definition specifically excludes matters relating solely to the credibility of a witness. A court should not order discovery on matters going solely to credit or to the existence of similar facts which have no material bearing on the relevant facts to be decided but were merely prejudicial as showing instances of similar conduct in other situations: Thorpe v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1989] 1 WLR 665; [1989] 2 All ER 827, noted in (1990) 64 ALJ 738.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

615

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 21.10.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 21.11

21.11

[r 21.11.40]

Production under notice to produce

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 2(3) and (4); DCR Part 22, rule 2(3) and (4))

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, party B must, within a reasonable time after being served with a notice to produce: (a) produce for party A’s inspection such of the documents or things referred to in the notice (other than privileged documents) as are in party B’s possession, and (b) serve on party A, in respect of any document that is not produced, a notice stating: (i) that the document is a privileged document, or (ii) that the document is, to the best of party B’s knowledge, information and belief, in the possession of a person identified in the notice, or (iii) that party B has no knowledge, information or belief as to the existence or whereabouts of the document. (2) For the purposes of subrule (1): (a) unless party B establishes to the contrary, 14 days or longer after service of the notice is to be taken to be a reasonable time, and (b) unless party A establishes to the contrary, less than 14 days after service of the notice is to be taken to be less than a reasonable time.

RULE 21.11 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 21.11.40] Documents privileged from production ................................................................................................... [r 21.11.60]

[r 21.11.40]

Operation

“Possession” is defined in the Dictionary to include custody or power. A party has a document in her or his “power” only if he or she is in fact in possession of it, or has an immediate indefeasible legal right at the time of discovery to demand possession from the person in whose possession it is: Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 1) [1980] 1 WLR 627. A party has “custody” of a document even where he or she does not have sole legal possession of it, but holds it, for example, as agent or servant for a third party: Turner v Davies [1981] 2 NSWLR 324, but see Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (No 2) (1981) 55 FLR 212; [1982] ATPR 40-280. A party may be required to file and serve an affidavit setting out attempts to locate documents: Inglis v Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council [2009] NSWLEC 189. See further [r 21.3.40]. [r 21.11.60]

Documents privileged from production

“Privileged document” is defined in the Dictionary. The various categories answering the description are discussed at [r 21.3.60] and following. While it is not appropriate to give such a detailed description as would nullify a claim for privilege, some description must be given of the document or group of documents, other than in a vague way, and in accordance with r 21.3(2)(d) the grounds of privilege should be stated: IOL Petroleum Ltd v O’Neill (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 9 October 1995). Where a party is required, by notice or order, to make discovery of documents, then, prima facie he or she is under a duty to list these documents, but he or she is entitled to claim privilege, in appropriate cases, from producing the documents for inspection: r 21.3(2)(d). Further, even where a document does not fall within one of the established grounds of privilege, it may nonetheless be protected from production on more general grounds, such as oppression or public policy, subject to the court’s discretion: see Turner v Davies [1981] 2 NSWLR 324 at 326–327. See further r 1.9 – Objections to production of documents founded on privilege.

616

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

21.12

Part 21 – Discovery, inspection and notice to produce documents Division 2 – Notice to produce before hearing

r 21.13

Personal injury claims

(cf SCR Part 23, rule 5, Part 24, rule 1(3); DCR Part 22, rule 5)

In any proceedings on a common law claim: (a) for damages arising out of the death of, or bodily injury to, any person, or (b) for contribution in respect of damages so arising, a party is not required to comply with a notice to produce in relation to a document or thing that has not been referred to in any originating process, pleading, affidavit or witness statement filed or served by that party unless the court, for special reasons, orders otherwise.

RULE 21.12 COMMENTARY [r 21.12.40]

Operation

The core of the requirement for “special reasons” is that there be something unusual or different to take the matter the subject of the discretion out of the ordinary course: Minister for Community Services & Health v Thoo (1988) 8 AAR 245; 78 ALR 307 at 324 (Burchett J). But that does not require that the case be extremely unusual, uncommon or exceptional: Department of Social Security v Hodgson (1992) 37 FCR 32; 27 ALD 309; 108 ALR 322: Binks v North Sydney Council [2001] NSWSC 27 (special circumstances discussed). 21.13 Costs and expenses of compliance (cf rule 33.11)

(1) The court may order party A to pay the amount of any reasonable loss or expense incurred by party B in complying with a notice to produce. (2) If an order is made under subrule (1), the court must fix the amount or direct that it be fixed in accordance with the court’s usual procedure in relation to costs. [R 21.13 insrt Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

617

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 21.12.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 22.1

[r Pt22.20]

PART 22 – INTERROGATORIES Commentary by Michael McHugh SC.

PART 22 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 22 ................................................................................................................. [r Pt22.20] Disclosure to third party for collateral purpose ........................................................................................ [r Pt22.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r Pt22.1000]

[r Pt22.20]

General comments on Part 22

Interrogation is a procedure for the discovery of material facts through replies to written questions. Their objective is to enable the party interrogating to obtain material facts in order to either support or establish proof of its own case; to find out what case it has to meet; or to destroy or damage the case brought by its opponent: Adams v Dickeson [1974] VR 77. Answers to interrogatories might also narrow the issues for trial and may assist in the promotion of settlement by allowing the respective parties to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. Interrogatories must be answered to the best of the knowledge, information and belief of the party interrogated. They hence have an advantage over cross-examination as the party is bound to answer not only from their own knowledge but from the party’s current and former servants and agents. Answers may be required to be verified. Answers may be tendered, in whole or part, as evidence at the hearing. Interrogatories are available in each of the Supreme Court, District Court and Local Court. However parties are no longer able to administer interrogatories simply by service of a notice. Leave of the court is required: r 22.1. A court will not order interrogatories unless it is satisfied that such an order is necessary: r 22.1(4). They will not be ordered in “personal injury” claims unless satisfied that special reasons exist to justify the making of the order: r 21.2(3). A party may only object to answering interrogatories upon certain grounds: r 22.2. Rules 22.4 and 22.5 deal with failing to sufficiently answer an interrogatory. The expense in time and money involved in delivering proper interrogatories and obtaining answers can often outweigh the potential benefit in gaining admissions assisting the party interrogating or harming the opponents case: Ryan v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 101 FLR 396; though not always: Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 241 at [20]–[36]. [r Pt22.40]

Disclosure to third party for collateral purpose

Disclosure of answers to interrogatories to a third party for a collateral purpose where they have not been tendered or read in open court is contempt of court (except where the court in whose process the answers have been given under compulsion gives leave to disclose them): Ainsworth v Hanrahan (1991) 25 NSWLR 155 at 168. The use of discovered materials to frame cross-claims or to add new causes of action or parties in the same proceedings is not a collateral or ulterior purpose: Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 57 FCR 360. [r Pt22.1000]

References

For judgments on admissions, see r 17.7. Further reading: Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co, 2014); Simpson SD, Bailey DL and Evans EK, Discovery and Interrogatories (2nd ed, Butterworths, 1990). 22.1

Interrogatories

(cf SCR Part 24, rules 1–6; DCR Part 22A, rules 1 – 6)

(1) At any stage of the proceedings, the court may order any party to answer specified interrogatories. (2) An application for such an order must be accompanied by a copy of the proposed interrogatories. (3) In the case of proceedings on: (a) 618

a claim for damages arising out of the death of, or bodily injury to, any person, or NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 22 – Interrogatories r 22.1

(b) a claim for contribution in relation to damages so arising, such an order is not to be made unless the court is satisfied that special reasons exist that justify the making of the order. (4) In any case, such an order is not to be made unless the court is satisfied that the order is necessary at the time it is made. (5) An (a) (b) (c)

order to answer interrogatories: may require the answers to be given within a specified time, and may require the answers, or any of them, to be verified by affidavit, and in circumstances in which rule 35.3 authorises someone other than the party to whom the order is addressed to make the relevant affidavit, may specify the person to make the affidavit, or the persons from whom the person to make the affidavit may be chosen, in relation to the interrogatories or any of them.

RULE 22.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. Operation .................................................................................................................................................. Form of interrogatories ............................................................................................................................. Necessary at the time the order is made .................................................................................................

[r 22.1.20]

[r [r [r [r

22.1.20] 22.1.40] 22.1.60] 22.1.80]

Comparison

Interrogatories by notice are no longer available, subject to any informal arrangement between the parties. Rule 21.1 requires that any application for an order must be accompanied by a copy of the proposed interrogatories. Rule 35.3 deals with persons who may make an affidavit. [r 22.1.40]

Operation

Interrogatories are available in each of the Supreme Court, District Court and Local Court. However, interrogatories by notice are no longer available. Parties require leave of the court to ask interrogatories: r 22.1. The court will not order interrogatories unless it is satisfied that such an order is necessary: r 22.1(4). An order for interrogatories in any claim for (or contribution for) damages arising out of the death of, or bodily injury to, any person will not be made unless the court is satisfied that special reasons exist that justify the making of the order: r 22.2(3). See El Hayek v Vasic [2010] NSWSC 1498 at [49]–[51] where what constitutes special reasons was discussed. Typically, but not exclusively, what will take the matter “out of the ordinary” (Priest v New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 12 at [126]–[128]) is: (a) an inability to obtain the requisite factual material without the exercise of the discretion; (b) that the applicant is in a position of some disability or disadvantage; (c) the complexity of the subject matter is such that without the exercise of the discretion, real prejudice will result to the applicant; and (d) that in order to achieve the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, the discretion should be exercised. In addition, as with all questions of discovery, an issue of relevance must be satisfied, namely that the material sought to be discovered, and the answers to interrogatories will relate to a fact in issue. There are also other discretionary considerations. [r 22.1.60]

Form of interrogatories

An application seeking an order for interrogatories must be accompanied by a copy of the proposed interrogatories. It is not the function of the court to settle interrogatories on such an application but to determine whether any interrogatories should be permitted: Codd v Dunlap [1906] WN 57 at 78. Where permitted, argument may be had regarding objections to the extent and nature of the interrogatories: American Flange & Manufacturing Co Inc v Rheem (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1965] NSWR 193. The court may consider the type and nature of the proceeding, the stage of the proceedings, any offer made by the party being © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

619

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 22.1.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 22.2

[r 22.1.60]

interrogated to make admissions or produce documents. Of relevance to these questions are also the number of interrogatories and the time and expense required to answer them: Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Assn Inc (1986) 66 ALR 541; [1986] ATPR 40-725. Interrogatories should be as concise as possible and allow of little or no ambiguity if the answers are to be of any practical use. Interrogatories should be grouped by topic and numbered consecutively. The form of an interrogatory can be guided by postulating whether such a question could be asked in the examination in chief of a witness: Dunbar v Perc [1956] VLR 583. The fact that an interrogatory might be the subject of a question in cross-examination is not, of itself, an objection to it. If, however, a question could be asked only upon an issue of credit or only in order to test the truth of a claim made by that party (and thus only in cross-examination) an order will not be made that the interrogatory be answered. That is because it is not one which requires an answer or because an order is not necessary at an interlocutory stage: Hansen v Border Morning Mail Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 44; Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v CE Heath Insurance Brooking (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 703 at 709; Horsnell v Allworth Constructions Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 844 at [24]. [r 22.1.80]

Necessary at the time the order is made

An order for interrogatories is not to be made unless the court is satisfied that the order is necessary at the time it is made. The test is not, in part, whether costs or expenses will be saved by such an order; but is solely whether such an order is “necessary” ie reasonably necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter: Boyle v Downs [1979] 1 NSWLR 192. Compare AZ v DQ [2003] NSWSC 1108. Interrogatories must not exceed the legitimate requirements of the particular occasion: White & Co v Credit Reform Association and Credit Index Ltd [1905] 1 KB 653 at 659; Potter’s Sulphide Ore Treatment Ltd v Sulphide Corp Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 101; 28 WN (NSW) 118; Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v CE Heath Insurance Brooking (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 703. An examination of the pleadings and any particulars thereof is usually the best way to determine the matters in question between the parties: Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341; 33 ALJR 168. Hence, orders for interrogatories are unlikely to be made before the close of the pleadings, nevertheless, the court can, in exceptional circumstances, order interrogatories before the close of pleadings: Kaiser v George Laurens (NSW) Pty Ltd [1982] 1 NSWLR 294. Interrogatories must be necessary, and the necessity for them (including their relevance) must be manifest at the interlocutory stage at which they are sought to be administered: Barbarian Motor Cycle Inc v Koithan (1984) 35 SASR 481. Used in this context, the word “necessary” means necessary in the interests of a fair trial: Marshall v Prescott [2012] NSWSC 515 at [43]. They may properly be directed to ascertain what case the interrogating party has to meet or to limit the generality of pleadings. A party is entitled to interrogate as to material facts going to an issue; however, the distinction between interrogatories inquiring as to mere evidence of material facts and interrogatories as to material facts themselves is not always easy to determine: Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Hawked [1984] VR 587. An interrogatory going to a question of credit is not necessary at the time the order is made, as such a question may only be asked (and in limited circumstances) in cross examination: Hansen v Border Morning Mail Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 44. It is not appropriate to interrogate as to the adequacy of a party’s discovery: Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 432; American Flange & Manufacturing Co Inc v Rheem (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1965] NSWR 193 at 196. 22.2

Objections to specific interrogatories

(cf SCR Part 24, rule 6(3))

A party may not object to being ordered to answer an interrogatory except on the following grounds: (a) the interrogatory does not relate to any matter in issue between that party and the party seeking the order, (b) the interrogatory is vexatious or oppressive, (c) the answer to the interrogatory could disclose privileged information.

620

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 22 – Interrogatories r 22.2

RULE 22.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 22.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 22.2.40] Vexatious or oppressive ........................................................................................................................... [r 22.2.60] Privileged information ............................................................................................................................... [r 22.2.80] Privilege .................................................................................................................................................. [r 22.2.100] Legal professional privilege .................................................................................................................... [r 22.2.120] Privilege against self-incrimination ......................................................................................................... [r 22.2.140] Protected confidences ............................................................................................................................ [r 22.2.160] Public interest immunity ......................................................................................................................... [r 22.2.180] Statements made without prejudice ....................................................................................................... [r 22.2.200] Waiver of privilege .................................................................................................................................. [r 22.2.220]

[r 22.2.20]

Comparison

There are no substantial changes to the effect of the former subrules. See the definition of “privileged information” below. [r 22.2.40]

Operation

It is not permissible to interrogate as to matters beyond the issues, as disclosed by the pleadings and particulars: Ring-Grip (Australasia) Pty Ltd v HPM Industries Pty Ltd [1971] 1 NSWLR 798; (1971) 19 FLR 369; Redmond v Uebergang [1984] 1 NSWLR 311. As a general rule, interrogatories as to the contents of a document are not allowable, but it is permissible to interrogate as to the meaning of symbols, ciphers and abbreviations: Sharpe v Smail (1975) 49 ALJR 130. The use of the word “necessary” in the rule excludes interrogatories which constitute a fishing expedition, an interrogatory to which the answer could readily be proved by a witness who would be called at the trial in any event (Venacom Pty Ltd v Morgan Brooks Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 46) and an interrogatory which is directed to a matter which is already admitted: Lang v Australian Coastal Shipping Commission [1974] 2 NSWLR 70. Interrogatories may be directed not only as to matters directly in issue but also to facts which are relevant to some question in issue. An interrogatory cannot be described as fishing if it is directed to obtaining information as to a fact relevant to an issue raised by the pleadings. However, a question going merely to credit will not be allowed: Sharpe v Smail (1975) 49 ALJR 130. A party that fails to object on the ground of privilege, at the time it is ordered to answer an interrogatory, is not thereby precluded from making such an objection at the time of answering the interrogatory: Bailey v Department of Land & Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100. Interrogatories should not assume the existence of a fact which has not been admitted: Konings v Naylor [1964] Qd R 235. [r 22.2.60]

Vexatious or oppressive

Successful objections may be based upon oppression or unfairness: Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 3) [1992] 1 Qd R 587. As a general principle, interrogatories should only be directed to information which is within the knowledge of the party interrogated. However, “within the knowledge” extends to inspecting records so that the interrogated party is bound to refresh its memory in this way: cf American Flange & Manufacturing Co Inc v Rheem (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1965] NSWR 193; and further, it is not necessarily oppressive to expect the person interrogated to return to the scene of the accident in order to answer the interrogatory: Sroka v Gorbal (1980) 25 SASR 356. Interrogatories can be distinguished from particulars of the pleadings, the purpose of which are to define and narrow the issues in the proceeding and interrogatories in the nature of a request for particulars may be disallowed: Conde v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 221. Interrogatories which are prolix and oppressive or unnecessary may be disallowed: American Flange & Manufacturing Co Inc v Rheem (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1965] NSWR 193. Interrogatories drafted too widely or vaguely may be disallowed as oppressive: Kirkup v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1165; [1983] 3 All ER 147. An application to serve further amended interrogatories was still partially successful in O’Brien v Little [2007] NSWSC 282. A defendant cannot in the usual course administer interrogatories to a co-defendant, where there is no cross-claim between them: Buxton & Lysaught Pty Ltd v Buxton [1977] 1 NSWLR 285. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

621

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 22.2.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 22.2 [r 22.2.80]

[r 22.2.60] Privileged information

Privileged information is defined in the Dictionary: privileged information means any of the following information: (a) information of which evidence could not, by virtue of the operation of Division 1 of Part 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995, be adduced in the proceedings over the objection of any person, (b) information that discloses a protected confidence, the contents of a document recording a protected confidence or protected identity information (within the meaning of section 126B of the Evidence Act 1995) where: (i) consent by the protected confider (within the meaning of section 126C of that Act) has not been given to disclosure of the confidence, contents or information, and (ii) section 126D of that Act would not operate to stop Division 1A of Part 3.10 of that Act from preventing the adducing of evidence in respect of the confidence, contents or information, (c) information of which evidence could not be adduced in the proceedings by virtue of the operation of section 126H of the Evidence Act 1995, (d) information that tends to prove that a party by whom a document is required to be made available, or by whom an interrogatory is to be answered, under section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 or section 87 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005: (i) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, or (ii) is liable to pay a civil penalty, (e) information the admission or use of which in a proceeding would be contrary to section 129 of the Evidence Act 1995, (f) information that relates to matters of state within the meaning of section 130 of the Evidence Act 1995, (g) information to which section 131 of the Evidence Act 1995 applies, (h) information: (i) the disclosure of the contents of which, or (ii) the production of which, or (iii) the admission or use of which, in the proceedings would be contrary to any Act (other than the Evidence Act 1995) or any Commonwealth Act (other than the Evidence Act 1995 of the Commonwealth), but does not include information that the court declares not to be privileged information for the purposes of those proceedings. See further r 1.9 – Objections to production of documents founded on privilege. [r 22.2.100]

Privilege

Through operation of the UCPR provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) relating to privilege have statutory application to interlocutory proceedings generally rather than merely in the context of rulings on the admissibility of evidence. Although concepts embodied in the Act have affinity with the common law there is not an exact equivalence. A leading text on the topic is Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016). [r 22.2.120]

Legal professional privilege

Division 1 of Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995: Legal professional privilege protects from compulsory disclosure evidence of communications made for the dominant purpose of seeking or obtaining legal advice (“Advice privilege”) or legal proceedings (“Litigation privilege”). The test is currently one of “dominant purpose” not “sole purpose”: Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 74 ALJR 339; [1999] HCA 67; Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 74 ALJR 378; [1999] HCA 6, the High Court abandoned the “sole purpose” test formerly established by Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; 51 ALJR 198. Legal professional privilege is not merely a rule of substantive law. Since Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; [1983] HCA 39 it has been recognised in Australia as a fundamental civil right, not merely a rule of evidence. As such it can be claimed in extra curial contexts: Daniels Corp International Pty 622

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 22 – Interrogatories r 22.2

Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; 77 ALJR 40; [2002] HCA 49. Legal professional privilege is confined to communications although documents may be treated as communications: Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 584–585. Privilege may attach to communications made by a client to a foreign lawyer, see Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; 213 ALR 108; [2004] FCAFC 337. Exceptionally, privilege may extend to a party who is not the client of a lawyer but who has a bona fide belief on reasonable grounds that he or she is: Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Rooney (1994) 36 NSWLR 122. Legal professional privilege extends to those who have a common interest in the subject matter of advice: see Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd v Webb (1995) 18 ACSR 418; 13 ACLC 1749. Compare Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 405. In the case of joint privilege, it is sufficient as against third persons, if only one of the parties claims the privilege but all have to agree for the purpose of waiving it: Re Nika Management Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (1996) 14 ACLC 326. See Evidence Act 1995 Pt 3.10 Div 1. See further [r 21.3.140]. [r 22.2.140] Privilege against self-incrimination Section 87 of the CPA is relevant to protection against self-incrimination in interlocutory matters, including orders for production and witness statements, and mirrors the certificate regime under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995. Evidence Act 1995 s 128: In the absence of statutory compulsion, a party is generally not bound to answer any question if the answer would, in the opinion of the judge, have a tendency to expose the deponent to any criminal charge, penalty, or forfeiture which the judge regards as reasonably likely to be preferred or sued for: Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253 at 257; Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328; 57 ALJR 236. This common law principle has been generally preserved in Evidence Act 1995 s 128. However, it does not apply to corporations: Evidence Act 1995 s 187; Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477; 68 ALJR 127; 82 LGERA 51. The privilege against self-incrimination may be waived: see Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412, but waiver of the privilege on one occasion does not necessarily preclude a claim of privilege on a subsequent occasion: Griffın v Sogelease Australia Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 257; [2003] NSWCA 158. An individual respondent is at liberty to apply to the court for an order absolving them from describing in their list of documents any particular document which would tend to expose her or him to a penalty: Trade Practices Commission v IMB Group Pty Ltd [1994] ATPR 41-348. Characterisation of proceedings as “protective” of the public rather than “punitive” does not preclude availability of a claim of privilege: Rich v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129; 78 ALJR 1354; [2004] HCA 42. [r 22.2.160]

Protected confidences

Professional confidential relationship privilege, Evidence Act 1995 Pt 3.10 Div 1A: A communication made in confidence by one person to another person (including one in the presence of a specified third party) may be privileged if it is a protected confidence as defined by s 126A(1) of the Evidence Act 1995. Broadly speaking, the court would need to balance the harm done if the confidence were disclosed against the harm if the evidence were not adduced (s 126B). Section 126B of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) gives a discretion to the court in relation to the adducing of protected confidences. However, the discretion is curtailed by subs (3). The protected confidences privilege is subject to waiver (s 126C) and will be lost for communications made and documents prepared in the furtherance of a fraud, an offence or an act which renders a person liable to a civil penalty: s 126D. At common law, it seems that communications made to a priest are not privileged: see R v Hay (1860) 175 ER 933; 2 F & F 4. However, these communications are privileged unless made for a criminal purpose: Evidence Act 1995 s 127 and would otherwise fall under s 126B – ALRC Report 26 at [903]–[909]. Other relationships which are arguably protected are doctor and patient Report 26 at [910]–[918]; psychotherapist and patient Report 26 at [919]–[934]; social-worker and client Report 26 at [935]–[941]; journalist and source Report 26 at [948]–[954]. The Evidence Act 1995 definition of “protected confidence” is broad: Mok v Crime Commission (NSW) [2002] NSWCA 53 and could arguably apply to other relationships including accountant and client: Report 26 at [955]. Evidence Act 1995 Pt 3.10 Div 1B: These are somewhat similar provisions to the professional confidential relationship privilege in respect of sexual assault communications privilege where a communication is made in © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

623

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 22.2.160]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 22.2

[r 22.2.160]

confidence to a counsellor by a victim (or alleged victim) of sexual assault where that counsellor is treating that person for an emotional or psychological condition (s 126G). Contractual duty of confidence: The duty of confidence which exists between solicitor and client, banker and customer, doctor and patient and accountant and client, is subject to, and overridden by, the duty of any party to that contract to comply with the law of the land. If a party is required, whether at common law or under statute, to disclose in defined circumstances confidential information, then he or she must do so, and any express contract to the contrary would be illegal or void: Brayley v Wilton [1976] 2 NSWLR 495; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 499; 53 ALJR 336 at 515 (CLR) at 339; O’Reilly v Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria (1983) 153 CLR 1; 57 ALJR 342. The contractual duty of confidence between a solicitor and client is a principle distinct from legal professional privilege: Crowley v Murphy (1979) 38 FLR 371; 28 ACTR 1; affirmed in part in (1981) 52 FLR 123; 34 ALR 496. See further “Evidence – Confidential Communications” (1998) 72 ALJ 510. [r 22.2.180]

Public interest immunity

Evidence Act 1995 s 130: This category concerns the rule which, although not a true rule of privilege, operates to exclude relevant evidence when it concerns matters of State interest and should be confined to the conduct of governmental functions: R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681; [1999] NSWCCA 166 at [54]. There is no rule under the common law that a claim by the Crown, on the grounds of public interest, for immunity from production of a class of documents of a high level of public importance, is conclusive. The court has a discretion to review the Crown’s claim and, in doing so, must balance the general desirability that documents of that kind should not be disclosed against the need to produce them in the interests of justice: See Evidence Act 1995 s 130(4), (5) regarding the things the court may consider in deciding whether to order disclosure: Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; 53 ALJR 11; 21 ALR 505; Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404; 58 ALJR 97; National Australia Bank Ltd v Saunders (1988) 12 NSWLR 623; Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450; 159 FLR 132; [2000] SASC 83; R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681; [1999] NSWCCA 166. Limited access may be permitted upon the applicant’s offering confidentiality undertakings regarding its experts and legal representatives: Transport Action Group Against Motorways Inc v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (1998) 103 LGERA 338. The public’s legitimate interest in obtaining information about the affairs of public authorities, referred to in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10; 69 ALJR 404 at 32–33 (CLR), may be outweighed by national security and diplomatic considerations. Both the common law and s 130 require two broad stages of analysis: first the assessment of the character of the information or document (as state papers or as relating to a matter of state) and secondly a weighing or balancing exercise to assess the public interest on whether disclosure would prejudice the proper functioning of the government: New South Wales v Public Transport Ticketing Corp [2011] NSWCA 60 at [42]. For balancing the need for confidentiality of the Protective Commissioner’s material and the need for disclosure in the interests of justice, see B v N (1994) 35 NSWLR 140. Where answers are sought to interrogatories on deliberations and votes in the Executive Council and in Cabinet, the public interest may be in favour of immunity from disclosure. On the other hand, Cabinet minutes and the like could be disclosed when they had become merely of historical interest: Whitlam v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1985) 73 FLR 414; 60 ACTR 7. [r 22.2.200]

Statements made without prejudice

Evidence Act 1995 s 131: Communications between parties to a dispute, which are made “without prejudice” for the purpose of negotiating a compromise or settlement, are not admissible in evidence: Evidence Act 1995 s 131 but subject to s 131(2); Rabin v Mendoza & Co [1954] 1 WLR 271; [1954] 1 All ER 247. If, however, they result in a concluded agreement, they may be admissible: Attorney-General v Dyer [1947] Ch 67. However, the ambit of the privilege and its continuance is governed by the purpose for which it is recognised: Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley & Assoc Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 86. Under the Evidence Act 1995 settlement offers may be admissible for determining liability for costs: see s 131(2)(h). Documents referred to in the course of without prejudice discussions may be privileged if they would not otherwise have come to the notice of the other side, and without prejudice material cannot generally be used for the purpose of making an order for costs against a recalcitrant party: Lukies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283. The rule in Pitts v Adney (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 886 that without prejudice communications can be admitted where otherwise the court may be misled is now found in the Evidence Act 1995 s 131(2)(g). 624

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 22 – Interrogatories

[r 22.2.220]

r 22.3 Waiver of privilege

Privilege may be waived expressly or impliedly by the conduct of the privilege holder or their lawyer. An implied waiver occurs when, by reason of some conduct on the privilege holder’s part, it becomes unfair to maintain the privilege. The holder of the privilege should not be able to abuse it by using it to create an inaccurate perception of the protected communication: Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 487–488. What brings about waiver is the inconsistency, which the courts, where necessary informed by considerations of fairness, perceive, between the conduct of the client and maintenance of the confidentiality; not some overriding principle of fairness operating at large: Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 74 ALJR 378; [1999] HCA 6 at [29]. See also s 122 of the Evidence Act 1995 though note that it has the effect that privilege may be lost in circumstances which are not identical to the circumstances in which privilege may be lost at common law: Mann v Carnell at [23]. 22.3

Answers to interrogatories

(cf SCR Part 24, rules 4 and 6; DCR Part 22A, rules 4 and 6)

(1) A party who has been ordered to answer interrogatories must do so within the time required by the order by serving a statement of answers on all other active parties. (2) Such a statement: (a) must deal with each interrogatory specifically, setting out each interrogatory followed by the answer to it, and (b) must answer the substance of each interrogatory without evasion, and (c) to the extent to which, and in the manner in which, the order so requires, must be verified by affidavit. Note: See rule 22.6 as to the admission in evidence of answers to interrogatories.

RULE 22.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 22.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 22.3.40] Knowledge, information and belief ........................................................................................................... [r 22.3.60] Information of servant or agent ................................................................................................................ [r 22.3.80]

[r 22.3.20]

Comparison

There are no substantial changes to the effect of the former subrules, however, r 22.3 now specifically requires that the interrogatory being answered be set out before the answer, rather than leaving that matter to the prescribed form. [r 22.3.40]

Operation

Answers to interrogatories should deal with each interrogatory specifically, by answering the substance of the interrogatory without evasion. If objection is taken to answering the interrogatory the basis of that objection should be made. A general denial is not a sufficient answer: Earp v Lloyd (1858) 70 ER 24; 4 K & J 58. An unreasonably wide interrogatory need not be answered with the same degree of specificity as if the interrogatory had been properly limited: Parker v Wells (1881) 18 Ch D 477 at 485. Hence, where a substantial answer has been attempted, a further answer might not be ordered: Bolckow Vaughan & Co v Fisher (1882) 10 QBD 161 at 170; Aspar Autobarn Co-op Society v Dovola Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 284; 74 ALR 550 at 552 (ALR). Nevertheless, it has been stressed that a party should not evade answer by taking technical objection where a wide interrogatory is largely unobjectionable: Aspar Autobarn. Although the general rule requires that answers be confined to the questions put, it may be reasonable for explanations and qualifications to be added to avoid an answer being unfair, incomplete or misleading: Lyell v Kennedy (No 3) (1884) 50 LT 730; (1884) 27 Ch D 1; [1881–1885] All ER Rep 814.. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

625

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 22.3.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 22.4

[r 22.3.40]

[r 22.3.60]

Knowledge, information and belief

The answer to an interrogatory should contain all the information sought or it is insufficient: Bolckow Vaughan & Co v Fisher (1882) 10 QBD 161. To do so an answer must be to the best of her or his knowledge, information and belief: Adams v Dickeson [1974] VR 77; Sharpe v Smail (1975) 49 ALJR 130. Where an answer cannot be given on the basis of knowledge, information and belief, the answer given can state “… save as stated, I am unable to answer this interrogatory further from knowledge, information and belief”: Dooly v Oldman [1949] ALR (CN) 1053. In circumstances where information is available to the deponent but there is no belief, there must be reason to doubt its truth: Sharpe v Smail. A simple “yes” or “no” answer may be sufficient where the answer is not capable of being misunderstood: Winterbottom v Vardon & Sons Ltd [1921] SASR 364. [r 22.3.80]

Information of servant or agent

A party is bound to answer interrogatories from information supplied by servants or agents, if the party believes such information to be true, but not otherwise: Gilchrist v R Wallace Mitchell Pty Ltd [1972] VR 481. However, a party cannot by refusing to believe information when there is no reason to doubt its truth, escape from an obligation to answer to the best of its knowledge, information and belief: Sharpe v Smail (1975) 49 ALJR 130. The party interrogated must show that it made all proper inquiries of its servants and agents (Sharpe v Smail) including, within the limits set by the principle of oppressiveness, those who were its agents at the material time but are no longer: Derham v Amev Life Insurance Co Ltd (1978) 20 ACTR 23; noted (1978) 52 ALJ 464. An answer by a company to interrogatories must be made to the best of the company’s (not the company secretary’s) knowledge, information and belief: Re Johnson Corp Ltd (1984) 2 ACLC 625. 22.4

Insufficient answer

(cf SCR Part 24, rule 8; DCR Part 22A, rule 8)

(1) If a party who has been ordered to answer interrogatories under rule 22.1 fails to answer an interrogatory sufficiently within the time specified in the order or, if no such time is specified, within 28 days after being served with the order, the court: (a) may order the party to make a further answer, and to verify that further answer by affidavit, or (b) may order the party or, as the case requires, any person of the kind referred to in rule 35.3(1), to attend to be orally examined. (2) This rule does not limit the power of the court under rule 22.5.

RULE 22.4 COMMENTARY [r 22.4.40]

Operation

An assessment of the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory will not generally consider its objective truth: Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341; 33 ALJR 168 at 344–345. However, where untruthfulness can be established other means or by reference to the pleadings, the court can go behind the answer: : Lyell v Kennedy (No 3) (1884) 50 LT 730; (1884) 27 Ch D 1; [1881–1885] All ER Rep 814. Where an interrogatory is not itself clearly expressed, a further answer will not be ordered: Hawke v Tamworth Newspaper Co Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 699 at 707. The onus is on an applicant to show that there are sufficient reasons justifying a departure from the general rule of practice that only one set of interrogatories be delivered: Goding v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 170; 39 ALJR 121. If, without the opportunity to interrogate further, the case might not be heard upon its merits, leave may be given: Kerrisk v North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 398.

626

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 22 – Interrogatories

22.5

r 22.6

Default

(cf SCR Part 24, rule 9)

(1) If a party who has been ordered to answer interrogatories under rule 22.1 or 22.4 fails to answer an interrogatory sufficiently, the court may give or make such judgment or such order as it thinks fit, including: (a) if the party in default is a plaintiff, an order that the proceedings be stayed or dismissed as to the whole or any part of the relief claimed by the party in the proceedings, or (b) if the proceedings were commenced by statement of claim and the party in default is a defendant, an order that the party’s defence be struck out. (2) If a party has a solicitor, an order under rule 22.1 or 22.4 need not, for the purposes of enforcement of the order by committal or sequestration, be served personally. (3) If an order under rule 22.1 or 22.4 is not served personally on a party having a solicitor, the order may not be enforced by committal of any person, or by sequestration of any person’s property, if that person shows that he or she did not have notice of the order within sufficient time to comply with the order.

RULE 22.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 22.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 22.5.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 22.5.1000]

[r 22.5.20]

Comparison

There are no substantial changes to the effect of the former subrules. However a subrule stating that a solicitor is guilty of misconduct, if without reasonable cause he or she fails to notify a party of orders under (r 22.1 or 22.4), has been removed and subr (3) is new. [r 22.5.40]

Operation

Where there is default under r 22.1 or 22.4, the court has a discretion to stay or dismiss as to the whole or any part of the relief claimed by a plaintiff in the proceedings, or strike out the defence in the case of a defaulting defendant. A similar rule under discovery was not included (SCR Pt 23 r 4) in the UCPR r 21. Any such order under r 22.5 is likely to be guided by the matters set out in CPA Pt 6. [r 22.5.1000]

References

CPA Pt 6; Striking out pleadings: r 14.28; Summary stay or dismissal: r 13.4; Judgment on admissions: r 17.7. 22.6 Answers to interrogatories as evidence (cf SCR Part 24, rule 10; DCR Part 22A, rule 10)

(1) A party: (a) may tender as evidence one or more answers to interrogatories without tendering the others, and (b) may tender as evidence part of an answer to an interrogatory without tendering the whole of the answer. (2) If the whole or part of an answer to an interrogatory is tendered as evidence, the court: (a) may look at the whole of the answer, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

627

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 22.5.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 22.6

[r 22.6.40] (b)

if it appears to the court that any other answer or any part of an answer is so connected with the matter tendered that the matter tendered ought not to be used without that other answer or part, may reject the tender unless that other answer or part is also tendered.

RULE 22.6 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 22.6.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 22.6.1000]

[r 22.6.40]

Operation

The rule allows the party interrogating or another party in the same interest to tender the answers to interrogatories as evidence in the proceedings. As answers are informal admissions only, the party answering is not prevented from adducing evidence which contradicts or explains the answers: Stateliner Pty Ltd v Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 16; Saad v TWT Ltd (1995) 38 AILR 5-038. [r 22.6.1000]

References

Judgment on admissions: r 17.7.

628

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 23 – Medical examinations and inspection of property Division 1 – Medical examination

r 23.1

PART 23 – MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS AND INSPECTION OF PROPERTY Commentary by Melissa Fisher, Barrister.

PART 23 COMMENTARY [r Pt23.20]

General comments on Part 23

This Part is divided into four Divisions: • Division 1 – Medical examination (rr 1–5) • Division 2 – Rehabilitation assessment (rr 6–7) • Division 3 – Inspection of property (r 8) • Division 4 – Default (r 9) It provides for pre-trial procedures under which a party may examine the person or the property the subject matter of the proceedings.

DIVISION 1 – MEDICAL EXAMINATION 23.1 Application and definitions (cf SCR Part 25, rule 1; DCR Part 23, rule 1; LCR Part 20, rule 1)

(1) This Division applies to proceedings in which: (a) a person’s physical or mental condition is relevant to a matter in question, and (b) either: (i) that person is a party, or (ii) that person is a person for whose benefit a party is claiming relief under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897. (2) In this Division: first party means the party referred to in subrule (1)(b). medical examination includes any examination by a medical expert but does not include tests referred to in Division 2. medical expert includes dentist, medical practitioner, occupational therapist, optometrist, physiotherapist and psychologist. notice for medical examination means a notice referred to in rule 23.2(1). person concerned means the person referred to in subrule (1)(a) (whether or not the first party) whose physical or mental condition is relevant to a matter in question.

RULE 23.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. Operation .................................................................................................................................................. Wide application ....................................................................................................................................... Examination of non-party .........................................................................................................................

[r 23.1.20]

[r [r [r [r

23.1.20] 23.1.40] 23.1.60] 23.1.80]

Comparison

There are minor changes to the wording of subr (1) of r 23.1. In subr (2) a new term “notice for medical examination” is defined. Further, the definition of “person concerned” is extended by the phrase “(whether or not the first party) whose physical or mental condition is relevant to a matter in question”. [r 23.1.40]

Operation

This rule sets out when Div 1 (Medical examination) applies in proceedings and provides definitions for key terms. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

629

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 23.1.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 23.2

[r 23.1.40]

[r 23.1.60]

Wide application

Rules 1–5 are not limited to particular types of proceedings. They extend to all proceedings where the physical or mental condition of a person is relevant to a matter in question and that person is a party to proceedings. [r 23.1.80]

Examination of non-party

Pursuant to r 23.1(1), Pt 23 applies only to the medical examination of parties to proceedings or persons for whose benefit a party is claiming under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW). No express power is conferred on a party (or the court) to require a person not a party to proceedings to undergo a medical examination. The indirect mechanism of ordering a stay against the plaintiff is not available, unless the plaintiff has some means of requiring a person not a party to proceedings to undergo a medical examination: Kurnell Passenger & Transport Service Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council (2009) 230 FLR 336; [2009] NSWCA 59 per Basten JA (with whom Glass JA agreed) at [79]–[80]. 23.2

Notice for medical examination

(cf SCR Part 25, rule 2; DCR Part 23, rule 2; LCR Part 20, rule 2)

(1) Any party other than the first party may serve on the first party a notice for the medical examination of the person concerned. (2) A notice for medical examination is to be in the form of a request that the person concerned submit to examination by a specified medical expert at a specified time and place.

RULE 23.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 23.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 23.2.40] No requirement for filing ........................................................................................................................... [r 23.2.60] Copy of report of medical examination .................................................................................................... [r 23.2.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 23.2.1000]

[r 23.2.20] Comparison Rule 23.2 has undergone minimal change relative to the SCR. There are minor changes to the language to add greater clarity. However, in relation to the DCR there has been one significant change: there is no longer a requirement that the request be “reasonable”. [r 23.2.40] Operation This rule provides for the serving of a notice requesting a person to submit to a medical examination by a specified medical expert at a specified time and place. The notice should comply with r 23.2(2). As to non-compliance with a notice, see r 23.9. [r 23.2.60] No requirement for filing The rules do not require that the notice be filed before it is served. In the District Court it has been the practice to serve the notice without filing. [r 23.2.80]

Copy of report of medical examination

As a matter of fairness, the defendant should disclose to the plaintiff any report of the examination: Clarke v Martlew [1973] QB 58. See the analysis of authorities on this point by Higgins J in Deacon v Australian Capital Territory (2001) 172 FLR 123; [2001] ACTSC 8 at [117]–[123]. Note that the court has no express power (other than the power in r 31.28) to order that such medical reports be served on the plaintiff. See r 31.28 as to disclosure of experts’ reports and hospital reports. [r 23.2.1000] References See r 31.28 as to disclosure of experts’ reports and hospital reports. As to non-compliance with a notice, see r 23.9. 630

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

23.3

r 23.4

Expenses

(cf SCR Part 25, rule 3; DCR Part 23, rule 3; LCR Part 20, rule 3)

A party who serves a notice for medical examination must, on request by the first party, pay to the first party a reasonable sum to meet the travelling and other expenses of the person concerned of and incidental to the medical examination, including the expenses of having a medical expert chosen by the person attend the examination.

RULE 23.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 23.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 23.3.40] Entitlement to expenses ........................................................................................................................... [r 23.3.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 23.3.1000]

[r 23.3.20]

Comparison

Rule 23.3 remains unchanged, save for the deletion of the last words “pursuant to rule 6” (that rule is now r 23.5). [r 23.3.40]

Operation

This rule provides that, if requested to do so, a party requiring a medical examination must pay the expenses of the person being examined. It further provides for the payment of expenses incurred as a result of the responsible party electing under r 23.5 to have her or his medical expert present at the examination. [r 23.3.60]

Entitlement to expenses

The “first party” is entitled to her or his lost earnings as well as her or his out-of-pocket expenses. Guides to the amounts to be tendered were provided in SCR Sch G, Table 3 and DCR Sch, Items 1–4. There are currently no similar guides in the Schedules to the UCPR. [r 23.3.1000]

References

See r 23.5 – Medical expert for person concerned. 23.4 Order for examination (cf SCR Part 25, rule 5; DCR Part 23, rule 5; LCR Part 20, rule 5)

(1) The court may make orders for medical examination, including an order that the person concerned submit to examination by a specified medical expert at a specified time and place. (2) If the court orders that the person concerned submit to examination by a medical expert, the person must do all things reasonably requested, and answer all questions reasonably asked, by the medical expert for the purposes of the examination.

RULE 23.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 23.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 23.4.40] What constitutes a reasonable medical examination ............................................................................... [r 23.4.60] Timing of order ......................................................................................................................................... [r 23.4.80] Copy of report of medical examination .................................................................................................... [r 23.4.90] Cross-claimant may apply for order ....................................................................................................... [r 23.4.100] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 23.4.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

631

UCPR Parts 21-30

Part 23 – Medical examinations and inspection of property Division 1 – Medical examination

[r 23.3.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 23.4 [r 23.4.20]

[r 23.4.20] Comparison

There have been only minor changes to the language of r 23.4. [r 23.4.40]

Operation

This rule provides that the court may make orders for the medical examination of a person. If an order is made, the person is required to cooperate in the medical examination. Failure to comply with an order may result in the party’s claim being dismissed: see r 23.9 (default). The power granted to the court by r 23.4 is discretionary. The discretion is to be exercised judicially and having regard to factors relevant to the exercise of discretion in the particular case: KF v Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children [2010] NSWSC 891 at [21]. See Hamilton v New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1437 for a discussion of the rule and the relevant principles to be applied. This rule extends to an order directed to, and appropriate for, the bringing about of medical examination, including the kind of medical examination routinely carried out by pathologists (thus the taking of blood samples from a party may be ordered): Rowlands v New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 715; [2009] NSWCA 136; Plowman v Sisters of St John of God Inc [2014] NSWSC 333. [r 23.4.60]

What constitutes a reasonable medical examination

Whether a proposed examination is reasonable is a question of fact and degree which depends on all the circumstances of the particular case: Stace v Commonwealth (1989) 51 SASR 391. As to what is a reasonable medical examination, see also Oliver v Rheem (Aust) Pty Ltd (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 59; [1965] NSWR 1321; Pucci v Humes Ltd [1970] 2 NSWR 139; Angliss v Urquhart [2001] NSWCA 441. Rule 23.4 includes medical examinations in which a blood sample is taken and analysed: Govers v Luff (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 5 November 1997). A procedure involving the admission of a party to hospital for an extended period so that he or she may be assessed fully, is not a medical examination within the meaning of this rule: Herbert v O’Neill (unreported, Roden J, 15 February 1980) although in Cordwell v Austral Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Pty Ltd (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 247; [1962] NSWR 571 it was held that a reasonable medical examination is not necessarily confined to one consultation and in the case of one injury causing continuing disabilities, several consultations to observe the course of the injury and disabilities may be reasonable. [r 23.4.80]

Timing of order

An order under r 23.4 can be made up until the time of the trial. If such an order is made, the question of whether any report which is produced as a result of the examination should be allowed into evidence is a matter for the trial judge. However, note that, pursuant to r 31.28(3)(a), an expert’s report is not admissible, except by leave of the court or consent of the parties, if it has not been served in accordance with r 31.28(1). See rr 31.29 and 31.30 as to admissibility of experts’ reports. [r 23.4.90]

Copy of report of medical examination

As a matter of fairness, the defendant should disclose to the plaintiff any report of the examination: Clarke v Martlew [1973] QB 58. See the analysis of authorities on this point by Higgins J in Deacon v Australian Capital Territory (2001) 172 FLR 123; [2001] ACTSC 8 at [117]–[123]. Note that the court has no express power (other than the power in r 31.28) to order that such medical reports be served on the plaintiff. See r 31.28 as to disclosure of experts’ reports and hospital reports. [r 23.4.100]

Cross-claimant may apply for order

A cross-claimant may apply for an order that the plaintiff be medically examined although no claim is made by the plaintiff against the cross-claimant: Downs v Civil & Civic Pty Ltd (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 152; [1964] NSWR 523. [r 23.4.1000]

References

See r 23.9 as to failure to comply with orders under this Part.

632

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

23.5

r 23.6

Medical expert for person concerned

(cf SCR Part 25, rule 6; DCR Part 23, rule 6; LCR Part 20, rule 7)

The person concerned may have a medical expert of his or her choice attend a medical examination under this Division.

RULE 23.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 23.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 23.5.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 23.5.1000]

[r 23.5.20]

Comparison

Rule 23.5 is essentially unaltered. [r 23.5.40]

Operation

This rule provides that a person undertaking a medical examination pursuant to r 23.2 or r 23.4 may have her or his own medical expert attend the medical examination. Note that under r 23.3 the expenses of that medical expert are to be paid by the party requiring the medical examination. [r 23.5.1000]

References

Rules 23.2, 23.3, and 23.4.

DIVISION 2 – REHABILITATION ASSESSMENT 23.6 Application and definitions (cf SCR Part 25, rule 7A; DCR Part 23, rule 7)

(1) This Division applies to proceedings in which the extent of impairment of a party’s earning capacity due to personal injuries to that party is relevant to any matter in question. (2) In this Division: occupational rehabilitation service has the same meaning as it has in section 59 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. party concerned means the party referred to in subrule (1).

RULE 23.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 23.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 23.6.40]

[r 23.6.20]

Comparison

Rule 23.6 is unchanged. [r 23.6.40]

Operation

This rule sets out when Div 2 (Rehabilitation assessment) applies in proceedings and provides definitions for key terms.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

633

UCPR Parts 21-30

Part 23 – Medical examinations and inspection of property Division 2 – Rehabilitation assessment

[r 23.6.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 23.7

23.7

[r 23.7.20]

Order for rehabilitation tests

(cf SCR Part 25, rule 7B; DCR Part 23, rule 8)

(1) The court may make orders for testing the party concerned for the purpose of assessing the extent of impairment of the party’s earning capacity, including an order to submit to a test, under the direction of a medical practitioner, during a specified period and at a specified place. (2) The specified place referred to in subrule (1) may be: (a) a hospital, or (b) a rehabilitation centre conducted by a hospital, or (c) some other suitable place, at which treatment by way of rehabilitation, or an occupational rehabilitation service, is provided. (3) If the court makes an order under subrule (1) that the party concerned submit to a test, the party concerned must do all things reasonably requested, and answer all questions reasonably asked, by any medical practitioner, or by any person conducting the test, for the purposes of the test. (4) The terms on which the court may make orders under subrule (1) include terms for the payment by the party obtaining the order to the party concerned of any expense or loss incurred in complying with the order.

RULE 23.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 23.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 23.7.40] Contrast with rule 23.4 ............................................................................................................................. [r 23.7.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 23.7.1000]

[r 23.7.20]

Comparison

Apart from minor changes to language, r 23.7 remains unchanged. [r 23.7.40]

Operation

This rule provides that the court may order that a person undergo testing to assess the extent of impairment to that person’s earning capacity, including submission to tests during a specified period in hospital. Where the court has made such as order, the person so ordered must cooperate with the testing. Failure to comply with an order may result in the party’s case being dismissed under r 23.9. The party requesting the testing may be ordered to meet the expenses of, or loss incurred by, the person who is the subject of the testing. An application for an order under this rule should be made by notice of motion. [r 23.7.60]

Contrast with rule 23.4

This rule overcomes the limitations of rr 23.2 and 23.4 where the term “medical examination” has been held not to include admitting a person to hospital for the purpose of carrying out a full assessment of disabilities: Herbert v O’Neill (unreported, Roden J, 15 February 1980). See Rowlands v New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 715; [2009] NSWCA 136 as to when urine drug screening testing may be ordered prior to a neuropsychological examination. [r 23.7.1000]

References

See rr 23.2 and 23.4. See also Pt 18 – Motions.

634

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 23 – Medical examinations and inspection of property Division 3 – Inspection of property

r 23.8

DIVISION 3 – INSPECTION OF PROPERTY 23.8

Inspection of property

(cf SCR Part 25, rule 8; DCR Part 23, rule 9; LCR Part 20, rule 8)

(1) For the purpose of enabling the proper determination of any matter in question in any proceedings, the court may make orders for any of the following: (a) the inspection of any property, (b) the taking of samples of any property, (c) the making of any observation of any property, (d) the trying of any experiment on or with any property, (e) the observation of any process. (2) An order under subrule (1) may authorise any person to enter any land, or to do any other thing, for the purpose of getting access to the property. (3) A party applying for an order under this rule must, so far as practicable, serve notice of motion on each person who would be affected by the order if made. (4) The court is not to make an order under this rule unless it is satisfied that sufficient relief is not available under section 169 of the Evidence Act 1995. (5) This rule extends to proceedings on an application for an order under Part 5 (Preliminary discovery and inspection). (6) In this rule, property includes any land and any document or other chattel, whether in the ownership or possession of a party or not.

RULE 23.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 23.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 23.8.40] Third party rights ...................................................................................................................................... [r 23.8.60] Section 169 of the Evidence Act .............................................................................................................. [r 23.8.80] Preservation of documents ..................................................................................................................... [r 23.8.100] Experimentation ...................................................................................................................................... [r 23.8.120] Authenticity of a will ................................................................................................................................ [r 23.8.140] Broad definition of property .................................................................................................................... [r 23.8.160] The utility of inspection ........................................................................................................................... [r 23.8.180] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 23.8.1000]

[r 23.8.20] Comparison Rule 23.8 is substantively unchanged from the SCR and DCR except for subr (5) which is new to both jurisdictions. Subrule (5) provides that this rule extends to proceedings on an application for an order under Pt 5 – Preliminary discovery and inspection. It would appear that this subrule was included to overcome the omission in the SCR identified by Hunt J in Cummings v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 246; (1981) 51 FLR 121. [r 23.8.40] Operation This rule provides for the inspection of property (including land, documents and other chattels), the taking of samples, the observing of processes and the conducting of experiments where it is material to the proper determination of the questions in dispute between the parties. The definition of “property” includes the inspection of a computer hard drive by a forensic computer expert: Cadence Australia Pty Ltd v Chew [2008] NSWSC 1074; Total Real Estate Training Pty Ltd v Howard [2011] NSWSC 735. Note that a party applying for preliminary discovery under Pt 5 can now also seek an order for inspection of property under this rule. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

635

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 23.8.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 23.8

[r 23.8.40]

An order for the inspection of property may be made so that the court at the hearing can make a proper determination of the proceedings touching the property: Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Peeru (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 7 November 1990). The rule extends to authorising inspection by persons other than parties (or their agents), and inspection of property (including documents) not owned by parties: Persson v Heathwoods Pty Ltd (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 27; 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 285; Barton v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 729; [1970] 3 NSWR 141; Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Peeru (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 7 November 1990). Where the inspection of property involves access to confidential information involving third parties, the court may limit the ambit of the inspection order: Cadence Australia Pty Ltd v Chew [2008] NSWSC 1076. As an application under this rule is an interlocutory one, compliance with the rules in Pt 18 – Motions is required. [r 23.8.60]

Third party rights

The power should be exercised with caution when third party rights are involved. The power is a discretionary one and in many cases good reason might exist why such an order should not be made: Persson v Heathwoods Pty Ltd (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 27; 86 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 285; Evatt v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) NSW 384; [1970] 1 NSWR 97. In Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Peeru (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 7 November 1990) it was held that the power should only be exercised in relation to third parties when the court considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so. In Cadence Australia Pty Ltd v Chew [2008] NSWSC 1076, limits were placed on the ambit of the inspection order to protect confidential business information involving third parties which was not relevant to the facts in issue in the litigation. [r 23.8.80]

Section 169 of the Evidence Act

The court cannot make an order under this rule unless it is satisfied that sufficient relief is not available under s 169 of the Evidence Act 1995. Under s 167 of the Evidence Act 1995, a party may request that another party produce a document or thing or permit the examination or testing of a document or thing. Time limits exist for the making of a request under s 168. Pursuant to s 169, if a party fails or refuses to comply with the request, the court may make an order directing the party to comply with the request and/or that the party produce the document or thing. [r 23.8.100]

Preservation of documents

The court’s power under this rule is distinct from the inherent power of the court to make an Anton Piller (or search and seizure) order and its power to make a search order pursuant to r 25.19. If there is a danger that documents or other material vital to the plaintiff’s case will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction, the court may permit the plaintiff to enter the defendant’s premises to inspect and remove those documents or other material: Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 55. In a proper case such an order will be made ex parte. See Practice Note SC Gen 13 Supreme Court – Search Orders. [r 23.8.120]

Experimentation

The rule specifically contemplates orders for the observation of processes and the conduct of experiments. Section 53 of the Evidence Act 1995 also confers a power to order the holding of a “demonstration, experiment or inspection”. Under that section, the order cannot be made unless the court is satisfied that the judge will be present. There is no such requirement under this rule. It is unsettled law as to whether the Act narrows the discretion conferred by the rule. [r 23.8.140]

Authenticity of a will

Where the authenticity of a will is in dispute, an order may be made under this rule for expert examination: Re Saxton [1962] 1 WLR 859; [1962] 2 All ER 618. [r 23.8.160]

Broad definition of “property”

Note that the definition of “property” in this rule is very broad. It has been held that autopsy samples are property within the meaning of the rule: Pecar v National Australia Trustees Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Bryson J, 27 November 1996). 636

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 23.8.180]

r 23.9

The utility of inspection

In Hamod v New South Wales (No 6) [2007] NSWSC 1366, there was a dispute as to the authenticity of a platinum certificate that was in the possession of the plaintiff. The second defendant sought an order pursuant to r 23.8 and s 169 of the Evidence Act 1995 that the certificate be made available for examination at the premises of a forensic expert. The plaintiff opposed the order in the absence of what he regarded as adequate security arrangements. He also argued that the inspection was without utility as the second defendant had always maintained the certificate was invalid or a forgery. Justice Harrison rejected the latter argument, stating that: It does not appear to me accurate to suggest that the second defendant can or should be limited to evidence upon which it presently intends to rely if better evidence were available. This is so even though [the expert’s] examination of the certificate may produce results that support the plaintiff. His Honour ordered that the certificate be transported from an undisclosed suburb in Sydney to the Manly premises of the forensic expert for the purpose of scientific examination; that the plaintiff was entitled to remain with, or in close proximity to, the certificate at all times while scientific testing took place; and that the plaintiff make arrangements for the security for the certificate while it was being transported. [r 23.8.1000]

References

See ss 52, 53, and 54 of the Evidence Act 1995 as to experimentation. See ss 166–169 of the Evidence Act 1995 as to requests for documents and things. See also Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) or subscription service. See UCPR Pt 5 – Preliminary discovery and inspection.

DIVISION 4 – DEFAULT 23.9

Default

(cf SCR Part 25, rule 10; DCR Part 23, rule 10; LCR Part 20, rule 10)

(1) If a party makes default in compliance with this Part, or a notice or order under this Part, the court may give or make such judgment or such order as it thinks fit, including: (a) if the party in default is a plaintiff, an order that the proceedings be dismissed as to the whole or any part of the relief claimed by the party in the proceedings, or (b) if the proceedings were commenced by statement of claim and the party in default is a defendant, an order that the party’s defence be struck out and that judgment be given accordingly. (2) If a person for whose benefit relief is being claimed, not being a party, makes default in compliance with this Part, or an order under this Part, the court may give such judgment, or make such order, as it thinks fit, including an order that the proceedings be dismissed as to the relief so claimed. (3) This rule does not limit the powers of the court to punish for contempt.

RULE 23.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 23.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 23.9.40] What constitutes unreasonable refusal .................................................................................................... [r 23.9.60] Non-compliance by non-party .................................................................................................................. [r 23.9.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 23.9.1000]

[r 23.9.20]

Comparison

References to the court staying proceedings have been omitted. The powers of the court under this rule have been strengthened to deal with non-compliance with orders and notices by persons who are not parties but for whose benefit relief is claimed. In response to non-compliance by such persons the court may give any © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

637

UCPR Parts 21-30

Part 23 – Medical examinations and inspection of property Division 4 – Default

[r 23.9.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 23.9

[r 23.9.20]

judgment or make any order it thinks fit. The phrase “or such order as it sees fit” in r 23.9(1) encapsulates the power to order a stay of proceedings until a plaintiff attends a medical examination in circumstances where the plaintiff has unreasonably refused to attend the examination: Edmeades v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1969] 2 QB 67; [1969] 2 WLR 668; [1969] 2 All ER 127; Lane v Wills [1972] 1 All ER 430; [1972] 1 WLR 326; Starr v National Coal Board [1977] 1 All ER 243; [1977] 1 WLR 63. Note that the court has the power to stay proceedings pursuant to s 67 of the CPA (see Rowlands v New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 715; [2009] NSWCA 136). Note also that the power to deal with non-compliance with a notice for medical examination, previously the subject of a discrete rule, is now incorporated in this rule. [r 23.9.40]

Operation

The rule makes explicit the power of the court to dismiss proceedings or strike out a defence where a party fails to comply with an order or notice under this part. It should be noted that the court’s power is not limited to ordering that the proceedings be dismissed or a defence struck out – the court may make any order it thinks fit. The refusal to comply with a notice for medical examination must be unreasonable before the court can exercise its powers under this rule. The rule also empowers the court to deal with the non-compliance with an order or notice by a person who is not a party but for whose benefit relief is claimed. It would appear that, in most cases, the party seeking such an order under this rule is required to make an application by way of notice of motion: See Pt 18 – Motions. [r 23.9.60]

What constitutes unreasonable refusal

What constitutes unreasonable refusal to submit to a medical examination is to be determined having regard to both the nature of the proposed examination and the plaintiff’s circumstances. It will be a matter of fact, to be judged on the evidence brought forward in each case. A request may be reasonable from a defendant’s point of view and yet a plaintiff may refuse to undergo the examination without being held to have acted unreasonably: Stace v Commonwealth (1988) 49 SASR 492. If the examination carries a real, even if minimal, risk of injury it can never be unreasonable for a plaintiff to refuse to undergo the procedure: Aspinall v Sterling Mansell [1981] 3 All ER 866 at 868. For a discussion of factors relevant to whether a plaintiff has unreasonably refused a medical examination see Booth v Kendall [2009] QSC 237 at [14]–[19] and Dikschei v Epworth Foundation [2010] VSC 435. [r 23.9.80]

Non-compliance by non-party

Where a person not a party to the proceedings, and not a beneficiary of relief claimed, refuses to comply with an order for inspection, there would seem to be no effective sanction against them under this rule. Non-compliance would be punishable as contempt in the Supreme Court but it is unclear that it would amount to contempt in the face of the court attracting the sanction of the District Court. [r 23.9.1000]

References

See Pt 18 – Motions. See Cordwell v Austral Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Pty Ltd (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 247; [1962] NSWR 571 for a case where this rule was invoked.

638

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 24 – Taking evidence otherwise than at trial [r 24.2.20]

r 24.3 UCPR Parts 21-30

PART 24 – TAKING EVIDENCE OTHERWISE THAN AT TRIAL Commentary by Greg Sarginson, Barrister. 24.1 Application of Part This Part applies to proceedings in the Supreme Court or the District Court.

RULE 24.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 24.1.20] Overview ................................................................................................................................................... [r 24.1.40]

[r 24.1.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule. [r 24.1.40]

Overview

The provisions of Pt 24 allow the District and Supreme Court to take evidence outside of New South Wales, and in particular, outside Australia. Australia is a party to the Hague Convention on the taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (1970). Part 24 operates in conjunction with the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) and Evidence on Commission Act 1995 (NSW). In respect of service of documents outside Australia, the document must be served on a party in accordance with the law of the country in which service is effected. Australia is a party to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Proceedings (1965). For the relevant provisions in respect of service of documents outside Australia, see r 11A. In respect of service of Subpoenas and initiating processes outside of New South Wales but within Australia, the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) applies. In respect of interstate or overseas witnesses, where evidence is not taken on commission, evidence may be given by way of audio-visual link or audio link. The relevant provisions are contained in the Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 (NSW) and r 31.3. 24.2 Construction of certain references (cf SCR Part 27, rule 1)

In this Part, a reference to the Evidence on Commission Act 1995, or to a provision of that Act, includes a reference to the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 of the Commonwealth, or to the corresponding provision of that Act.

RULE 24.2 COMMENTARY [r 24.2.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 1. There is no equivalent DCR. 24.3 Order for examination of witness (cf SCR Part 27, rule 1A; DCR Part 25, rule 1)

(1) For the purposes of any proceedings, the court may make an order for the examination of a person, otherwise than at trial, at any place: (a) in New South Wales, or (b) outside New South Wales, but in Australia, or (c) outside Australia. (2) An order under this rule: © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

639

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 24.3

[r 24.3.20] (a) (b)

must nominate the person by whom the examination is to be conducted (the examiner), and may specify the time at which, or within which, the examination is to be conducted.

RULE 24.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 24.3.20] Distinction between evidence on commission and examination .............................................................. [r 24.3.40]

[r 24.3.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 1A and DCR Pt 25 r 1. An alternative to taking evidence on examination otherwise than at the trial is for evidence to be given at the trial by way of telephone, video link, or other communication in circumstances where a witness is unable to attend the trial in person: subr 31.3 and commentary thereto. [r 24.3.40]

Distinction between evidence on commission and examination

Evidence given other than at trial is traditionally referred to as “evidence on commission”. This derives from the power of a superior court to issue a commission for the taking of evidence: Callen v Partridge (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 211; [1962] NSWR 1052. Part 24 does not refer to “evidence on commission” but uses the phrase evidence on “examination”. Section 7(1)(b) of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 and ss 6(1)(b) and 20(1)(b) of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995 use the phrase “commission”. However, there are no practical differences between evidence taken on examination, and evidence taken on commission. 24.4

Judicial officer or court officer as examiner

(cf SCR Part 27, rule 1C; DCR Part 25, rule 3)

(1) A judicial officer or other officer of the court may not act as an examiner otherwise than with the concurrence of the senior judicial officer. (2) An applicant for an order for a person’s examination, outside New South Wales, by a judicial officer or other officer of the court may request the proposed examiner to certify the amount which in his or her opinion should be paid into court as provision for expenses of the examination. (3) Such an order may be expressed to be conditional on the payment into court, by such person and within such time as the court may specify, of not less than the amount certified in accordance with subrule (2). (4) If satisfied that the amount paid or payable into court is or may be insufficient to provide for the expenses of the examination, the court, on application of the registrar: (a) may make an order directing the party on whose application the order for examination was made to pay into court such further amount, and within such time, as the court may specify, and (b) may make an order: (i) staying the proceedings, so far as they concern the whole or any part of any claim for relief by that party, or (ii) suspending the operation of the order for examination, until such payment is made. (5) The registrar must apply so much of the amount paid into court as may from time to time be required for the purpose in the payment, to or at the direction of the examiner, of: (a) expenses incurred in relation to the examination, or (b) advances for expenses to be incurred in relation to the examination. (6) Any amount paid under subrule (5) that is not required for expenses in relation to the examination must be repaid into court. (7) After the conclusion of the examination, on the examiner certifying that no expenses in relation to 640

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 24 – Taking evidence otherwise than at trial r 24.5

the examination remain unpaid or unrecouped from the money in court, the registrar must, subject to any order of the court, refund to the person by whom the money was paid into court (and, if more than one, in the same proportions as their respective payments into court) any money remaining in court.

RULE 24.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 24.4.20] Criteria for making an order for evidence on commission ....................................................................... [r 24.4.40]

[r 24.4.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 1C and DCR Pt 25 r 3, except that the SCR and DCR required the applicant to request a certificate of expenses, whereas subr (2) of this rule permits the applicant to do so. [r 24.4.40]

Criteria for making an order for evidence on commission

The provisions of r 24.4(1) should be read in conjunction with ss 6(1)(c) and 20(1)(c) of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995 which allows a “superior court” (defined in s 18 to mean the Supreme Court, the District Court, the Land and Environment Court, the Industrial Relations Commission in Court Session, and the Dust Diseases Tribunal) to issue a request for the judicial authorities of another country (or State) to take the evidence of a person. Section 7(1)(c) of the contains the same provision, but in respect of the High Court, Federal Court, Supreme Courts of a Territory, or State Supreme Court exercising federal jurisdiction. Section 20(2) sets out the criteria for the court to consider before making an order for evidence on examination. It must be in the interests of justice to do so, having regard to factors including the willingness of the witness to travel to NSW to give evidence; whether the evidence of the witness is material; and having regard to the interests of the parties whether the interests of justice will be served by making the order. Such criteria are also contained in s 7(2) of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994. In Australian Secuirties & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; [2004] NSWSC 467, Austin J ordered that evidence of a witness be taken on examination by himself as trial judge in the United Kingdom rather than the witness give evidence by way of audio-visual link, due to the length of the likely cross examination; the need for the witness to be cross examined on numerous documents; time zone differences; potential technological problems with the audio-visual link; and the importance of the judge being able to best assess the credit of the witness by being physically present when the witness gave evidence. Payment of the expenses of the trial judge was certified under r 24.4(2): Australian Secuirties & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 50 ACSR 357; [2004] NSWSC 750. 24.5

Letter of request

(cf SCR Part 27, rule 2; DCR Part 25, rule 5)

(1) After an order is made under section 6(1)(c) or 20(1)(c) of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995 for the issue of a letter of request, or an order of the same kind is made under section 9 or 23 of that Act, the party obtaining the order: (a) must lodge with the principal registrar: (i) a form of the appropriate letter of request, and (ii) the interrogatories (if any) and cross-interrogatories (if any) to accompany the letter of request, and (iii) if the letter of request is to be issued to the judicial authorities of a country in which English is not an official language appropriate to the place where the evidence is to be taken, and unless the court orders otherwise, a translation of the documents referred to in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) into an official language of that country appropriate to that place, and (b) must file: (i) a copy of each of the documents referred to in paragraph (a), and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

641

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 24.4.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 24.5

[r 24.5.20] (ii)

an undertaking by the party obtaining the order, or his or her solicitor, to pay all expenses incurred by the court, or by any person at the request of the court, in respect of the letter of request.

(2) A translation filed under subrule (1)(a) must be certified by the person making it to be a correct translation, and the certificate must state the person’s full name and address and the office or qualification by reason of which the person so certifies.

RULE 24.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 24.5.20] Requirements of letter of request ............................................................................................................. [r 24.5.40]

[r 24.5.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 2 and DCR Pt 25 r 5. [r 24.5.40]

Requirements of letter of request

Article 3 of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (1970) sets out the requirements of the letter of request. 24.6 Evidence otherwise than on oath (cf SCR Part 27, rule 2B; DCR Part 25, rule 7)

Unless the court orders otherwise: (a) a person may be examined outside Australia, otherwise than on oath, under an order under rule 24.3(1)(c), and (b) evidence of a person may be taken outside Australia, otherwise than on oath, under an order under section 6(1)(c) or 20(1)(c) of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995, or under an order of the same kind made under section 9 or 23 of that Act, if the person is examined or the evidence is taken in accordance with the procedure of the country concerned.

RULE 24.6 COMMENTARY [r 24.6.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 2B and DCR Pt 25 r 7. 24.7 Documents for examiner (cf SCR Part 27, rule 3; DCR Part 25, rule 8)

(1) The party obtaining an order for examination before an examiner must furnish the examiner with copies of such of the documents in the proceedings as are necessary to inform the examiner of the issues to which the examination is to relate. (2) If the documents in the proceedings are not sufficient to inform the examiner of the issues to which the examination is to relate, the court may, in the order for examination or in a later order, state the issues to which the examination is to relate. (3) This rule does not apply if the examiner is a judicial officer of the court by which the order for examination was made.

642

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 24 – Taking evidence otherwise than at trial [r 24.9.40]

r 24.9

[r 24.7.20]

UCPR Parts 21-30

RULE 24.7 COMMENTARY Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 3 and DCR Pt 25 r 8. 24.8 Appointment for examination (cf SCR Part 27, rule 4; DCR Part 25, rule 9)

(1) The examiner is to appoint a place (and, subject to the order for examination, a time) for the examination. (2) The time appointed by the examiner must be as soon as practicable after the making of the order, having regard to all the circumstances (including the convenience of the person to be examined). (3) The examiner must give notice of an appointment under this rule to the party obtaining the order and, not less than 3 days before the time appointed, that party must give notice of the appointment to each other party.

RULE 24.8 COMMENTARY [r 24.8.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 4 and DCR Pt 25 r 9. 24.9 Conduct of examination (cf SCR Part 27, rule 5; DCR Part 25, rule 10)

(1) The examiner must permit the parties to attend the examination, together with their barristers and solicitors. (2) Subject to this Part, the proceedings before the examiner are to be in accordance with the procedure of the court. (3) Unless the court orders otherwise: (a) a person who is examined before an examiner may be cross-examined and re-examined, and (b) the examination, cross-examination and re-examination of such a person are to be conducted in the same way as at a trial. (4) The examiner may put any question to a person being examined: (a) as to the meaning of any answer made by that person, or (b) as to any matter arising in the course of the examination. (5) The examiner may adjourn the examination from time to time or from place to place.

RULE 24.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 24.9.20] Procedure before examiner ...................................................................................................................... [r 24.9.40]

[r 24.9.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 5 and DCR Pt 25 r 10. [r 24.9.40]

Procedure before examiner

Proceedings before the examiner should proceed on the same basis as proceedings at a trial, with evidence in chief, cross-examination, and re-examination. Sections 7 and 21 of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995, and s 8 of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 empower the court to give directions in respect of the procedure before an examiner, including the power to modify normal procedure where appropriate to do so. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

643

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 24.10

24.10

[r 24.9.40]

Examination of additional persons

(cf SCR Part 27, rule 6; DCR Part 25, rule 11)

(1) On the application of a party to the proceedings, an examiner who is a judicial officer of the court may examine any person not named or provided for in the order for examination. (2) With the written consent of each party to the proceedings, an examiner who is not a judicial officer of the court may examine any person not named or provided for in the order for examination and, if he or she does so, must annex those consents to the transcript of that person’s evidence.

RULE 24.10 COMMENTARY [r 24.10.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 6 and DCR Pt 25 r 11. 24.11 Objection (cf SCR Part 27, rule 7; DCR Part 25, rule 12)

(1) If a party objects to a question put to a person being examined, or a person being examined objects to answering such a question or to producing any document or thing: (a) the examiner must state to the parties his or her opinion, but must not decide, on the validity of the objection, and (b) the question, the ground for the objection, the examiner’s opinion on the objection and the answer (if any) of the person being examined must be set out in the transcript of that person’s evidence or in a statement attached to the transcript, and (c) the court may, on motion by any party, decide the validity of the objection, and (d) if the court decides against the objector, the court may order the objector to pay the costs occasioned by the objection. (2) This rule does not apply if the examiner is a judicial officer of the court.

RULE 24.11 COMMENTARY [r 24.11.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 7 and DCR Pt 25 r 12. 24.12 Recording of evidence generally (cf SCR Part 27, rule 8; DCR Part 25, rule 13)

The evidence taken at an examination must be recorded in writing (whether longhand or shorthand) or by some other method (whether mechanical, electronic or otherwise) that is capable of making a permanent record of the evidence.

RULE 24.12 COMMENTARY [r 24.12.20] Comparison This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 8(1) and DCR Pt 25 r 12(1), updating the permitted methods for recording evidence. The SCR Pt 27 r 8(2), (3) and (4) and DCR Pt 25 r 12(2), (3) and (4), which specified what the evidence must contain as regards what was said at the examination, have not been reproduced. 644

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 24 – Taking evidence otherwise than at trial

24.13

r 24.14

Audio-visual recording of evidence

(cf SCR Part 27, rule 8A; DCR Part 25, rule 14)

The court or the examiner may give directions for the making of an audio-visual recording of the proceedings on an examination.

RULE 24.13 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 24.13.20] Admissibility of audio-visual recording ................................................................................................... [r 24.13.40]

[r 24.13.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 8A and DCR Pt 25 r 14. [r 24.13.40]

Admissibility of audio-visual recording

In Hyslop v Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (No 2) (1987) VR 309, Nicholson J held that the videotape recording of the evidence in chief, cross-examination and re-examination of a terminally ill plaintiff whose evidence was given in hospital before an examiner was admissible evidence to be shown to the jury at the subsequent trial: see also Evidence on Commission Act 1995 ss 22, 24 and 26; Foreign Evidence Act 1994 ss 9, 12 and 14. 24.14

Authentication and filing

(cf SCR Part 27, rule 9; DCR Part 25, rule 15)

(1) A transcript of the evidence recorded in relation to an examination must be prepared and the person who prepares the transcript must certify that it is a correct transcript of the evidence so recorded. (2) The examiner must sign the transcript of the evidence and any document that constitutes an audio-visual recording under rule 24.13. (3) The examiner must certify on the transcript, or on a separate document annexed to the transcript, as to the time occupied in the examination and as to the fees received by the examiner in respect of the examination. (4) The examiner must send the transcript of the evidence, and any document that constitutes an audio-visual recording under rule 24.13, to the registrar and the registrar must file them in the proceedings. (5) Unless the court orders otherwise, the examiner must send the exhibits to the registrar, and the registrar must deal with the exhibits in such manner as the court may direct. (6) Subrules (1), (3) and (4) do not apply if the examiner is a judicial officer of the court.

RULE 24.14 COMMENTARY [r 24.14.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 9 and DCR Pt 25 r 15. However, there is no requirement in this rule that where the evidence is recorded in writing, the person examined must sign the record.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

645

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 24.14.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 24.15

24.15

[r 24.15.20]

Special report

(cf SCR Part 27, rule 10; DCR Part 25, rule 16)

(1) The examiner may furnish to the court a special report with regard to any examination conducted by the examiner and with regard to the absence of any person from, or the conduct of any person at, the examination. (2) The court may direct such proceedings to be taken, or make such order, on the report as the court thinks fit.

RULE 24.15 COMMENTARY [r 24.15.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 10 and DCR Pt 25 r 16. 24.16 Default of witness (cf SCR Part 27, rule 11; DCR Part 25, rule 17)

(1) If a person, required by subpoena to attend before an examiner who is not a judicial officer of the court: (a) refuses to be sworn for the purposes of the examination, or (b) refuses to answer any lawful question, or (c) refuses to produce any document or thing, the examiner must, at the request of any party, give to that party a certificate, signed by the examiner, of the refusal. (2) On the certificate being filed, and on motion by any party, the court: (a) may order the person to be sworn, or to answer the question or to produce the document or thing, as the case may be, and (b) may order the person to pay any costs occasioned by the refusal.

RULE 24.16 COMMENTARY [r 24.16.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 11 and DCR Pt 25 r 17. 24.17 Order for payment of expenses (cf SCR Part 27, rule 12; DCR Part 25, rule 18)

If a party fails to comply with an undertaking referred to in rule 24.5(1)(b)(ii) within 7 days after service on the party of notice of the amount of the expenses concerned, the court: (a) may order the party to pay the amount of the expenses to the registrar by a specified date, and (b) if the party fails to comply with that order by the specified date, may give such judgment, or make such order, as it thinks fit.

646

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 24 – Taking evidence otherwise than at trial r 24.20

RULE 24.17 COMMENTARY [r 24.17.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 27 r 12 and DCR Pt 25 r 18, except that the court’s powers have been widened. Under the SCR and DCR, where the party had not paid the expenses concerned within 7 days, the court had the power to stay proceedings; under this rule, the court may give such judgment or make such order as it sees fit. 24.18 Perpetuation of testimony (cf SCR Part 27, rule 13; DCR Part 25, rule 19)

(1) Witnesses may not be examined to perpetuate testimony unless proceedings to perpetuate that testimony have been commenced. (2) Any person may commence proceedings to perpetuate testimony that may be material for establishing any right or claim to any relief, which right or claim cannot be established before the happening of a future event. (3) If proceedings to perpetuate testimony touch any matter or thing in which the Crown may have an interest, the Attorney General may be made a defendant. (4) If, under subrule (3), the Attorney General is made a defendant to proceedings to perpetuate testimony, evidence taken in those proceedings is not inadmissible in other proceedings just because the Crown was not a party to the proceedings to perpetuate testimony. (5) Subrule (2) does not affect the right of any person to commence proceedings to perpetuate testimony in cases to which that subrule does not apply.

RULE 24.18 COMMENTARY [r 24.18.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 27 r 13 and DCR Pt 25 r 19, except that it no longer provides that proceedings to perpetuate testimony are to be set down for trial. 24.19 Operation of directions under Evidence on Commission Act 1995 (cf SCR Part 27, rule 2A; DCR Part 25, rule 6)

To the extent to which they deal with matters arising under the Evidence on Commission Act 1995, the provisions of this Part are subject to any directions given by a superior court under section 7 or 21 of that Act.

RULE 24.19 COMMENTARY [r 24.19.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 27 r 2A and DCR Pt 25 r 6. 24.20 Witness expenses (cf DCR Part 25, rule 21)

A witness attending before an examiner to be examined, or to produce a document, is entitled to payment of the same amount for conduct money expenses and loss of time as he or she would have been entitled to on attending to give evidence, or to produce a document, at the trial of the proceedings before the court. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

647

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 24.19.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 24.20

[r 24.20.20]

RULE 24.20 COMMENTARY [r 24.20.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of DCR Pt 25 r 21. There is no equivalent SCR provision.

648

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 25 – Interim preservation

PART 25 – INTERIM PRESERVATION Commentary by Adrian Diethelm, Academic Dean and Deputy Rector, University of Sydney. Updated by Mandy Tibbey, Barrister.

PART 25 COMMENTARY Scope of Part 25 ...................................................................................................................................... [r Pt25.20] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r Pt25.1000]

[r Pt25.20] Scope of Part 25 The word “preservation” in the title to the Part should be understood to refer to preservation of rights which are the subject matter of the proceeding rather than being restricted to preservation of property. In general the rules in this Part qualify or condition the exercise of powers derived from elsewhere. The Part applies only to proceedings in the Supreme Court or the District Court: r 25.1. SCA s 66(4) grants a general power to the Supreme Court to grant an interlocutory injunction “in any case in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient to do so”: Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; 76 ALJR 1; 185 ALR 1; 54 IPR 161; [2001] Aust Torts Reports 81-627; [2001] HCA 63. The court has an inherent power to grant interlocutory injunctions (CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345; 71 ALJR 1143; 146 ALR 402 at 391–392 (CLR)) and has power to make interlocutory orders in the nature of injunctions (whether or not so described) under numerous statutes. A third party may approach the court for orders to vary the terms of a search order. (See for example Global Medical Solutions Australia Pty Ltd v Axiom Molecular Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 86 per Stevenson J). The District Court has a limited power under DCA s 140 (see also DCA s 141) to grant temporary injunctions for a period not exceeding 14 days, or exceeding that period if necessary to enable Supreme Court proceedings to be commenced or heard. Applications for orders for interim preservation may be urgent. If so, see Supreme Court Practice Note no SC Eq 8 Urgent Matters in the Equity Division. If ex parte orders are sought, note the obligation of candour on legal representatives addressing the court or attesting to affidavits. This obligation requires disclosure of relevant matters that could affect the court’s determination and which may be adverse to the applicant’s case. A lack of candour may result in any orders obtained being later dissolved: Walter Rau Nuesser Und Fett AG v Cross Pacific Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 955; BC 200505075 at [38]. It is usually desirable to advise the opposing party in writing that an application will be made for orders, providing a copy of the proposed orders, inviting the party to respond and agree to the orders proposed, in the interests of costs or otherwise, or to be represented when the application is made. There will be cases where it is not appropriate to give the opposing party notice of the application, for example in relation to “freezing orders”. See for example Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd (in liq) v Yahaya [2013] NSWSC 853 where there was held to be a strong prima facie case of fraudulent misappropriation and freezing and search orders were made. No notice to the other side was appropriate because of the possibility that relevant evidence may be destroyed in advance of a search being conducted. If an application is to be made before the duty judge of a particular division, telephone the associate to the judge and advise of the nature of the application, whether you expect that the opposing party will be present, likely duration of the hearing and what time you expect to be ready to appear before the judge. If the associate gives you a specific time to appear, be there on time or, if that is not possible, telephone the associate well before that time arrives to advise the judge of any problem in meeting the timetable. Prepare a Notice of Motion (see UCPR r 18.1), including an order for short service and at least one affidavit in support of the application. Usually, such an affidavit would include the following: 1. a copy of the orders you seek, 2. copies of correspondence notifying the other party of the proposed application, 3. proof that such correspondence was posted or otherwise notified to the opposing party and came to the attention of that party (for requirements of proof, see Brown v Bluestone Property Services Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 869 per Barrett J at [12] and [13]). © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

649

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r Pt25.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt25.20] 4. copies of responses to such correspondence; 5. evidence in support of the application. In interlocutory proceedings, the hearsay rule does not apply if the party who adduces the evidence also adduces evidence of its source (s 75, Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)). The deponent of any affidavit to be tendered (often a solicitor instructed by a party) should be available for cross examination. Ensure that instructions are obtained as to the form of undertakings, including undertakings as to damages, which are usually required. If ex parte orders are sought, it is possible that the court will make such orders for a limited period (eg two days) within which the opposing party and other relevant entities should be served with copies of the orders. If so, the judge would relist the matter at the conclusion of the limited period. Alternatively, the court may decline to make the orders sought and relist the matter within a short period with orders for notice to the other party. If orders are to be taken out immediately (for service of sealed orders on an opposing party and/or other entity), advise the judge at the conclusion of the hearing of the application, as the judge’s associate will take the court file to the registry to have the orders typed by the registry. A copy of the judge’s notes of the orders may also be sought. Peruse the orders typed by the registry with care to ensure that they accurately reflect the orders made by the judge. Proof of service of such orders (by affidavit) will often be required when the matter is next before the court. If an application for interim orders is refused, a further application may be made, particularly (but not only) if new evidence becomes available that was not reasonably available on the earlier application or there is a material change in circumstances: Fletcher v Besser [2010] NSWCA 30. However multiple interlocutory applications where evidence was earlier available but not presented risk being viewed as an abuse of process inviting adverse exercise of judicial discretion: Nominal Defendant v Manning (2000) 50 NSWLR 139; 31 MVR 524; [2000] NSWCA 80 [71]–[72] and [122]–[124]. Applications may also be made for variation of interlocutory orders (See s 66, SCA and UCPR r 36.16). An application may be made to extend an injunction, as to time, parties or terms: Katerson Pty Ltd v Thambipillay [2016] NSWSC 1226 A motion may be filed for the discharge of orders made where there has been a lack of candour on the part of the moving party (in an ex parte application) or where circumstances have changed (See Ezystay Systems Pty Ltd v Link 2 Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 180 for unsuccessful application). An appeal against the decision of a single judge may lie to the Court of Appeal. See for example McMahon v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2013] NSWCA 201. [r Pt25.1000]

References

Cairns B, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [13.150]–[13.230] and [13.240]–[13.260]. Interlocutory injunctions – see annotations to SCA s 66. Biscoe, Mareva and Anton Piller Orders: Freezing and Search Orders (LexisNexis, 2005). Heydon and Loughlan, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (LexisNexis Butterworths 2007), at [39.42]–[39.52]. Jacobs, McCarthy & Neggo, Injunctions: Law and Practice (Lawbook Co., subscription service). Young PW, Croft C and Smith ML On Equity, (Lawbook Co, 2009), at [16.300]–[6.600] Supreme Court Practice Note no SC Eq 8 Urgent Matters in the Equity Division.

650

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

r 25.2

DIVISION 1 – GENERAL [Div 1 heading insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[7]]

25.1

Application

(1) This Part applies to proceedings in the Supreme Court, the Industrial Court, the Land and Environment Court or the District Court. [Subr (1) am Rule 570 of 2009, Sch 1[5]; Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[7]]

(2) Divisions 2 and 3, but not this Division, also apply to proceedings in the Dust Diseases Tribunal. [Subr (2) insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[8]] [R 25.1 am Rule 570 of 2009; Rule 494 of 2008; Rule 288 of 2006]

RULE 25.1 COMMENTARY [r 25.1.20]

Comparison

This is a new provision. 25.2 Order in urgent case before commencement of proceedings (cf SCR Part 28, rule 1)

(1) In an urgent case, the court, on the application of a person who intends to commence proceedings, may do any of the following: (a) it may make any order which the court might make in proceedings on an application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, (b) it may make any order for the custody of a minor, (c) it may grant any injunctive relief, including relief in the nature of a freezing order under Division 2 (Mareva relief) or a search order under Division 3 (an Anton Piller order), (d) it may make an order extending the operation of a caveat under: (i) the Real Property Act 1900, or (ii) the Offshore Minerals Act 1999, or (iii) the Offshore Minerals Act 1994 of the Commonwealth, (e) it may appoint a receiver, (f) it may make an order for the detention, custody or preservation of property under rule 25.3, to the same extent as if the applicant had commenced the proceedings and the application were made in the proceedings. [Subr (1) am Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[9]]

(2) In relation to proceedings in the Supreme Court, an application under subrule (1) may be made in any division of the Court but must, so far as practicable, be made in the division to which the proceedings that are intended to be commenced would be assigned. (3) A person making an application under subrule (1) must give an undertaking to the court to the effect that the applicant will file originating process commencing the proceedings within such time as the court may order or, if the court makes no such order, within 48 hours after the application is granted. [R 25.2 am Rule 288 of 2006]

RULE 25.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 25.2.20] Order before proceedings commenced .................................................................................................... [r 25.2.60] Particular powers ...................................................................................................................................... [r 25.2.80] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

651

UCPR Parts 21-30

Part 25 – Interim preservation Division 1 – General

[r 25.1.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 25.3

[r 25.2.20]

[r 25.2.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 28 r 1, except that under subr (3) an applicant must give an undertaking to file originating process within such time as the court orders, or else within 48 hours after an application is granted. Under the SCR, an applicant was required to file an undertaking within 14 days of determination of the application. There is no equivalent DCR provision. [r 25.2.60]

Order before proceedings commenced

The rule enables the court to make orders before proceedings are commenced, which it would otherwise be empowered to make after commencement. An undertaking from a plaintiff is required that proceedings will be commenced within 48 hours or such other period as the court may order. Proceedings are commenced by filing a statement of claim or summons: r 6.2. If the party seeking the asset preservation order is not, at the time of seeking the orders, in a position to file a statement of claim where it would otherwise be required, then a short form summons should be filed with the Notice of Motion seeking asset preservation orders and affidavit in support of the application for the asset preservation orders. If an order is sought pursuant to this rule, it would, if possible, be prudent to have available, at the hearing of the application, a copy of the substantive originating document (eg statement of claim) proposed to be filed to commence proceedings or to be in a position to advise the court of the time period within which a statement of claim will be filed. [r 25.2.80]

Particular powers

Reference should be made to the following provisions: (a) habeas corpus: SCA s 71; SCR Form 71; (b) custody of minors: SCR Pt 69; Infants’ Custody and Settlements Act 1899; (c) injunctions: SCA s 66; DCA s 140; (d) caveats: Real Property Act 1900 Pt 7A; (e) receivers: SCA s 67; UCPR Pt 26. 25.3

Preservation of property

(cf SCR Part 28, rule 2)

(1) In proceedings concerning property, or in which any question may arise as to property, the court may make orders for the detention, custody or preservation of the property. (2) An order under subrule (1) may authorise any person to enter any land or to do any other thing for the purpose of giving effect to the order. (3) In proceedings concerning the right of any party to a fund, the court may order that the fund be paid into court or otherwise secured.

RULE 25.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 25.3.20] Property .................................................................................................................................................... [r 25.3.60] Determination of merits not required ........................................................................................................ [r 25.3.80] Order to be limited to preservation ......................................................................................................... [r 25.3.100] Documents .............................................................................................................................................. [r 25.3.120]

[r 25.3.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 28 r 2. There is no equivalent DCR provision. 652

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 25.3.60]

r 25.4

“Property”

An order under this rule should be made only for the purpose of keeping intact specific property, which, if it were destroyed, would vitiate a judgment of the court in respect of the disposition of such specific property: see Lisec Australia Pty Ltd v Lisec Australia [2015] NSWSC 365 as an example of an order that specific machinery not be dismantled for a certain time. See alsoPizzey Properties Pty Ltd v Edelstein [1977] VR 161. Thus, where moneys have been paid into a bank account an order does not lie under this rule to restrain their disbursement: Pizzey Properties; Wentworth v Rogers (No 8) (1986) 7 NSWLR 207. As to what constitutes a “fund” see Newcastle City Council v Caverstock Group Pty Ltd (2008) 163 LGERA 83; [2008] NSWCA 249. An application can be made in relation to monies held in court: Re C & L Cameron Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 676 per Ward J; Paul v Girgis [2013] NSWSC 1725 per Davies J, where orders for payment into court were made pending finalisation of court proceedings and the costs assessment process. [r 25.3.80]

Determination of “merits” not required

On an application under this rule a consideration of the merits of the respective cases of the parties is not demanded. To that extent, the rule can be contrasted with an application for an interlocutory injunction where the applicant must show a prima facie case or serious question to be tried. “What is involved is an exercise in salvage, pending, and for the purpose of, the ultimate determination – so as to prevent a determination one way or the other proving abortive”: Johnson v Tobacco Leaf Marketing Board [1967] VR 427 at 430. Where fraud is made out ( eg because of admissions), the court may be more ready to draw the inference that there is a risk of dissipation of assets with a view to frustrating the court’s ultimate judgment, even where such assets may be held jointly with another person (eg spouse) without knowledge of the fraud. The type of assets (whether cash, shared or property that is easily moveable or quickly encumbered) may also be taken into account in determining whether to grant an order: Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Fitzgerald [2016] NSWSC 420 at [8] per Kunc J. [r 25.3.100]

Order to be limited to preservation

If an order is sought in a form which involves consequences beyond the purpose of preserving the property and which cannot be reversed, that is a consideration operating against the making of the order: Johnson v Tobacco Leaf Marketing Board [1967] VR 427. [r 25.3.120]

Documents

The expression “any property or thing … as to which any question may arise” in proceedings extends to documents relating to the subject matter of proceedings: Hyland v AGC (Wholesale) Pty Ltd [1983] 1 VR 222. However, the present rule does not extend to an order for the inspection of any property or thing, unlike the rules of court considered in Hyland v AGC (Wholesale) Pty Ltd and Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 2) [1992] 1 Qd R 237. In the latter case an order sought for inspection of a site and equipment in the possession of a stranger to the litigation was refused. 25.4

Disposal of personal property

(cf SCR Part 28, rule 3)

If, in proceedings concerning property (other than land) or in which any question may arise as to any property (other than land), it appears to the court that: (a) the property is of a perishable nature or is likely to deteriorate, or (b) for any other reason it is desirable that the property should be sold or otherwise disposed of, the court may make an order for the sale or other disposal of the whole or any part of the property by such person, and in such manner, as the court may direct.

RULE 25.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 25.4.20] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

653

UCPR Parts 21-30

Part 25 – Interim preservation Division 1 – General

[r 25.3.120]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 25.5

[r 25.4.20]

Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 25.4.30] Rule is ancillary only ................................................................................................................................ [r 25.4.40]

[r 25.4.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 28 r 3. There is no equivalent District Court Rules 1973 provision. [r 25.4.30]

Operation

See for example Gilgandra Marketing Co-Op Ltd v Australian Commodity Merchandise Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2011] NSWSC 69. [r 25.4.40]

Rule is ancillary only

This rule does not confer authority to order a sale of chattels as a form of independent substantive relief; the power conferred is only ancillary to other relief: Ferrari v Beccaris [1979] 2 NSWLR 181. In Ferrari power to order a sale of co-owned chattels was exercised under s 36A of the Conveyancing Act 1919. 25.5

Interim distribution

(cf SCR Part 28, rule 4)

If, in proceedings concerning property, it appears to the court that the property is more than sufficient to answer the claims on the property for which provision ought to be made in the proceedings, the court may allow any part of the property to be conveyed, transferred or delivered to any person having an interest in the property.

RULE 25.5 COMMENTARY [r 25.5.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 28 r 4. There is no equivalent DCR provision. 25.6 Interim income (cf SCR Part 28, rule 5)

If, in proceedings concerning property, it appears to the court that the whole or any part of the income of the property is not required to answer the claims on the property or its income for which provision ought to be made in the proceedings, the court may allow that income or part to be paid, during such period as the court may determine, to all or any of the persons having an interest in the income.

RULE 25.6 COMMENTARY [r 25.6.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 28 r 5. There is no equivalent DCR provision. 25.7 Payment before ascertainment of all persons interested (cf SCR Part 28, rule 6)

If two or more persons are entitled to share in a fund, the court may order or allow immediate payment to any of those persons of his or her share without reserving any part of that share to meet the subsequent costs of ascertaining any other of those persons.

654

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 25 – Interim preservation Division 1 – General

[r 25.8.80]

r 25.8

[r 25.7.20]

UCPR Parts 21-30

RULE 25.7 COMMENTARY Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 28 r 6. There is no equivalent DCR provision. 25.8 Meaning of “usual undertaking as to damages” (cf SCR Part 28, rule 7(2))

The “usual undertaking as to damages”, if given to the court in connection with any interlocutory order or undertaking, is an undertaking to the court to submit to such order (if any) as the court may consider to be just for the payment of compensation (to be assessed by the court or as it may direct) to any person (whether or not a party) affected by the operation of the interlocutory order or undertaking or of any interlocutory continuation (with or without variation) of the interlocutory order or undertaking.

RULE 25.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 25.8.20] Undertaking as to damages – when required .......................................................................................... [r 25.8.60] Enforcement ............................................................................................................................................. [r 25.8.80]

[r 25.8.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 28 r 7(2). There is no equivalent DCR provision. [r 25.8.60]

Undertaking as to damages – when required

The “usual undertaking as to damages” will normally be required from a plaintiff as a term of the grant of any interlocutory restraining order, including an injunction, an order extending the operation of a caveat under the Real Property Act 1900 and an order for the appointment of a receiver and manager or provisional liquidator. An undertaking as to damages is not always required. In environmental litigation, for example, it may not be required of a non-institutional litigant: Boronia Park Preservation Group v MSMG Developments Pty Ltd (2015) 209 LGERA 259; [2015] NSWLEC 112 per Pepper J at [63] and [70]–[77]. In Cleveland Investments Global Ltd v Ficaro Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 473, Kunc J granted a freezing order against two companies where one was registered in the British Virgin Islands and the other in Australia. [r 25.8.80]

Enforcement

If the party providing the undertaking as to damages is unsuccessful in the proceedings and an opposing party seeks to enforce the undertaking, whether or not to enforce the undertaking and extent to which to enforce it will be assessed by the court in all the circumstances. The court will consider whether or not an injuction ought to have been granted and if necessary, conduct a inquiry into damages: Moraitis Fresh Packaging New South Wales Pty Ltd v Fresh Express Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 704 per McLaughlin AsJ, and cases cited there including Air Express Ltd v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1981) 146 CLR 249; 55 ALJR 107; 33 ALR 578 per Gibbs J at 311, per Aicken J at 261and per Mason J at 323. In European Bank Ltd v Evans (2010) 240 CLR 432; [2010] HCA 6 at [29], the High Court identified the approach to be taken in an inquiry for damages said to arise from the usual undertaking as to damages under the materially identical predecessor to UCPR r 25.8, as being to ask three questions: “What is the loss that is now alleged?”, “Did that loss flow directly from the order of 18 May 2004?” and “Could the loss sustained have been foreseen at the time of that order?” as to the third. See also Aryzta Australia Pty Ltd v Jakimovski (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 48 and Nader v Ronca [2013] NSWSC 542. An undertaking as to damages will not necessarily be set aside for want of candour where the plaintiff has not informed the judge as to their ability to honour the undertaking as to damages: French v Chapple [2000] NSWSC 1240. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

655

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 25.9

[r 25.8.80]

Whether a third party could enforce the undertaking may depend upon how widely it is drawn: Churnin v Pilot Developments Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1459 and Churnin v Pilot Developments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 831. 25.9

Orders may be made at any stage of proceedings

(cf SCR Part 28, rule 7(1))

Orders may be made under this Part at any stage of proceedings.

RULE 25.9 COMMENTARY Orders made prior to trial ......................................................................................................................... [r 25.9.10] Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 25.9.20]

[r 25.9.10]

Orders made prior to trial

Orders made in the Supreme Court prior to trial may not be continued after judgment, pending appeal: Tomasetti v Brailey [2012] NSWCA 6; BC201200858. [r 25.9.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 28 r 7(1). There is no equivalent DCR provision.

DIVISION 2 – FREEZING ORDERS Note: The provisions of this Division comprise uniform rules developed under the auspices of the Australian Council of Chief Justices. [Div 2 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

DIVISION 2 COMMENTARY [Pt25.Div2.20]

Practice and procedure for freezing orders

See Practice Note SC Gen 14 Supreme Court-Freezing orders (also known as “Mareva orders” or “asset preservation orders”). This applies to the Court of Appeal, Equity and Common Law divisions of the Supreme Court. It sets out the court’s usual practice relating to freezing orders and the usual terms of such orders. An example of such an order is annexed. It can be adapted as appropriate. A form of undertakings that may be required of an applicant is also annexed to the practice note. 25.10 Interpretation (cf Federal Court Rules Order 25A, rule 1)

In this Division: ancillary order has the meaning given by rule 25.12. another court includes a court outside New South Wales, whether inside or outside Australia. applicant means a person who applies for a freezing order or an ancillary order. freezing order has the meaning given by rule 25.11. respondent means a person against whom a freezing order or an ancillary order is sought or made. Note 1: The definition of judgment in the Federal Court Rules is not included above. The word is defined in section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 for the purposes of that Act and these rules. In any notice of motion for a freezing order, a party should be referred to by the appropriate expression prescribed by rule 18.3.

Note 2:

[R 25.10 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]] 656

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

25.11

r 25.11

Freezing order

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25A, rule 2)

(1) The court may make an order (a freezing order), upon or without notice to a respondent, for the purpose of preventing the frustration or inhibition of the court’s process by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment of the court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied. (2) A freezing order may be an order restraining a respondent from removing any assets located in or outside Australia or from disposing of, dealing with, or diminishing the value of, those assets. [R 25.11 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

RULE 25.11 COMMENTARY [r 25.11.20]

Jurisdiction to grant freezing order

The jurisdiction to grant a freezing order is intended to prevent frustration of court processes by restraining 1. disposal of assets within the jurisdiction; 2. removal of assets out of the jurisdiction; 3. otherwise dealing with assets to prevent them being accessed upon judgment being given and/or 4. the absconding of a person where there is a real risk that a judgment may not be satisfied in whole or in part: Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380; 162 ALR 294; [1999] HCA 18; Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435; 73 ALJR 687; 162 ALR 336; [1999] HCA 19 at [50]–[52]; Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; 112 ALR 289; Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319; Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612; 61 ALJR 332; 71 ALR 457 at 623 (CLR); Frigo v Culhaci (1998) NSWSC 393. It is not necessary to prove that there is an intent to frustrate the court’s processes, simply that the purpose or effect of conduct will have that result: Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave GmbH and Co KG (The Niedersachsen) [1983] 1 WLR 1412; [1984] 1 All ER 398. Freezing Orders may be made subject to conditions: Peters v Lithgow Force Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1616 per Slattery J. Orders may be made conditional upon the applicant promptly pursuing costs assessment. A freezing order may be made against a third party where that party holds power of disposition over assets of the potential judgment debtor or when court processes available to a judgment creditor may oblige the third party to contribute funds in satisfaction of the judgment debt: Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380; 162 ALR 294; [1999] HCA 18; Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority NSW [1992] NSWCA 62 (re successor corporations); Winter v Marac Australia Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 11; Hu v PS Securities Pty Ltd (2011) 82 ASCR 234; [2011] NSWSC 98 where trust assets in relation to which judgment had been given were transferred after judgment to another entity; see also Brereton J in Finn v Carelli [2007] NSWSC 261 at [2]–[5]. Where a party seeks a freezing order on an ex parte basis and it is later found that the party did not provide full and frank disclosure, the freezing order may be dissolved: Print Management Australia Pty Ltd v Pasupati [2008] NSWSC 342 where the party failed to disclose that it had lodged a caveat on a property, so little risk that asset could be disposed of without notice, freezing orders dissolved, with costs. Application may be made to extend freezing orders where real risk of disposal of assets continues and the case being litigated continues to be a “good arguable case”: Westpac Banking Corp v McArthur [2007] NSWSC 1347; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sigalla (No 2) (2010) 240 FLR 327; [2010] NSWSC 792; Thaler v Amzalak (No 4) [2013] NSWSC 1345 per Beech-Jones J, order granted ex parte for short period where likely failure to honour prospective judgment. In FremantleMedia Ltd v Yu [2016] NSWSC 1167, McDougall J granted a freezing order over assets in Australia where the plaintiffs had commenced proceedings in China and there was a risk that if assets were from Australia, they may not be available to satisfy any judgment obtained in Beijing, China. A freezing order is a discretionary matter for the court: Severstal Export GmbH v Bhushan Steel Ltd [2013] NSWCA 102; (2013) 84 NSWLR 141 at [160]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

657

UCPR Parts 21-30

Part 25 – Interim preservation Division 2 – Freezing orders

[r 25.11.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 25.12

[r 25.11.20]

In Malvina Park Pty Ltd (t/as Firths the Superannuation Lawyers) v Pollard [2015] NSWSC 578 the court, per Schmidt J, refused a freezing order for legal costs and fees payable by client where a matter had settled, the client was disgruntled and the insurer had paid the settlement monies direct to the client. It was held that there was no evidence that the client was dissipating assets. The proper legal costs of the defence are usually exempted from the scope of an asset preservation order: Harrison Partners Construction Pty Ltd v Jevena Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 317 Brereton J at [10]; Ryan v Ryan [2012] NSWSC 636 at [91]; Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 at 569; Glenwood Management Group Pty Ltd v Mayo [1991] 2 VR 49; Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88; Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (In liq) [2004] NSWSC 64. 25.12

Ancillary order

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25A, rule 3)

(1) The court may make an order (an ancillary order) ancillary to a freezing order or prospective freezing order as the court considers appropriate. (2) Without limiting the generality of subrule (1), an ancillary order may be made for either or both of the following purposes: (a) eliciting information relating to assets relevant to the freezing order or prospective freezing order, (b) determining whether the freezing order should be made. [R 25.12 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

25.13

Respondent need not be party to proceeding

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25A, rule 4)

The court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order against a respondent even if the respondent is not a party to a proceeding in which substantive relief is sought against the respondent. [R 25.13 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

25.14

Order against judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor or third party

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25A, rule 5)

(1) This rule applies if: (a) judgment has been given in favour of an applicant by: (i) the court, or (ii) in the case of a judgment to which subrule (2) applies—another court, or (b) an applicant has a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action that is justiciable in: (i) the court, or (ii) in the case of a cause of action to which subrule (3) applies—another court. (2) This subrule applies to a judgment if there is a sufficient prospect that the judgment will be registered in or enforced by the court. (3) This subrule applies to a cause of action if: (a) there is a sufficient prospect that the other court will give judgment in favour of the applicant, and (b) there is a sufficient prospect that the judgment will be registered in or enforced by the court. (4) The court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor if the court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because any of the following might occur: (a) the judgment debtor, prospective judgment debtor or another person absconds, (b) the assets of the judgment debtor, prospective judgment debtor or another person are: 658

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

r 25.14

(i) removed from Australia or from a place inside or outside Australia, or (ii) disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value. (5) The court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a person other than a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor (a third party) if the court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that: (a) there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because: (i) the third party holds or is using, or has exercised or is exercising, a power of disposition over assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor, or (ii) the third party is in possession of, or in a position of control or influence concerning, assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor, or (b) a process in the court is or may ultimately be available to the applicant as a result of a judgment or prospective judgment, under which process the third party may be obliged to disgorge assets or contribute toward satisfying the judgment or prospective judgment. (6) Nothing in this rule affects the power of the court to make a freezing order or ancillary order if the court considers it is in the interests of justice to do so. [R 25.14 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

RULE 25.14 COMMENTARY [r 25.14.20]

General

An order may be made, in an appropriate case, in favour of an unsuccessful plaintiff appellant where there is a “good arguable case” as referred to in r 25.14(1)(b): Bhushan Steel Ltd v Severstal Export GmbH [2012] NSWSC 583; Tomasetti v Brailey [2012] NSWCA 6. In Samimi v Seyedabadi [2013] NSWCA 279, per McColl JA, freezing orders were imposed where a respondent engaged in conduct that had the potential to frustrate judgment, was evasive in disclosing intentions re property and, prima facie, appeared to have breached undertakings. In Aughen v Poynter [2013] NSWSC 1052, White J held at [21]–[22] that the Local Court has the inherent power to prevent the abuse of its power and has power under r 25.14 to impose freezing orders for enforce a judgment obtained in its general division. In Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Vitale [2015] NSWSC 352 Slattery J held that freezing orders should be continued where a bankrupt was influencing the disposition of assets. In Kazacos v Shuangling International Development Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 835 Darke J proposed to make orders permitting a proposed sale of a property but making a freezing order restraining a third party from dealing with the net proceeds of sale where there was a “good and arguable case”, there were no other assets in the jurisdiction and, as set out in r 25.14(5) it appeared that the third party may have a right of disposition over the proceeds of sale. In Cleveland Investments Global Ltd v Ficaro Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 473, Kunc J made a freezing order pursuant to r 25.14, freezing assets of a third party estate pending construction of a will where, depending on construction of the will, a judgment debtor could be the sole beneficiary. A freezing order should generally be for no more than the amount thought likely to be obtained upon judgment in favour of a party: OXC Bidco Pty Ltd v Dickson [2016] NSWSC 968 at [14] per Stevenson J citing Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88 at 19 per Mason P, Sheller JA and Sheppard AJA; Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380; 162 ALR 294; [1999] HCA 18 at 428; see also P Biscoe, Freezing and Search Orders: Mareva and Anton Piller Orders, (2nd ed 2008, LexisNexis Buttterworths) at [6.55]).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

659

UCPR Parts 21-30

Part 25 – Interim preservation Division 2 – Freezing orders

[r 25.14.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 25.15

25.15

[r 25.17.20]

Jurisdiction

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25A, rule 6)

Nothing in this Division diminishes the inherent, implied or statutory jurisdiction of the court to make a freezing order or ancillary order. [R 25.15 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

25.16

Service outside Australia of application for freezing order or ancillary order

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25A, rule 7)

An application for a freezing order or an ancillary order may be served on a person who is outside Australia (whether or not the person is domiciled or resident in Australia) if any of the assets to which the order relates are within the jurisdiction of the court. [R 25.16 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

25.17

Costs

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25A, rule 8)

(1) The court may make any order as to costs as it considers appropriate in relation to an order made under this Division. (2) Without limiting the generality of subrule (1), an order as to costs includes an order as to the costs of any person affected by a freezing order or ancillary order. [R 25.17 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

RULE 25.17 COMMENTARY [r 25.17.20]

Third party awarded costs

Note that a third party (such as a bank) that incurs costs if a freezing order is granted may be awarded those costs. Project Development Co Ltd SA v KMK Securities Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 1470; [1983] 1 All ER 465; Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Ireland (1994) 12 WAR 485.

DIVISION 3 – SEARCH ORDERS Note: The provisions of this Division comprise uniform rules developed under the auspices of the Australian Council of Chief Justices. [Div 3 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

DIVISION 3 COMMENTARY [Pt25.Div3.20]

Practice and procedure for search orders

See Practice Note SC Gen 13 Supreme Court – Search Orders (also known as “Anton Piller Orders”). This applies to the Court of Appeal, Equity and Common Law divisions of the Supreme Court. It sets out the court’s usual practice relating to search orders and the usual terms of such orders. An example of such an order is annexed. It can be adapted as appropriate. A form of undertakings that may be required of an applicant is also annexed to the practice note.

660

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

25.18

r 25.20 UCPR Parts 21-30

Part 25 – Interim preservation Division 3 – Search orders

[r 25.19.20]

Interpretation

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25B, rule 1)

In this Division: applicant means an applicant for a search order. described includes described generally whether by reference to a class or otherwise. premises includes a vehicle or vessel of any kind. respondent means a person against whom a search order is sought or made. search order has the meaning given by rule 25.19. Note: In any notice of motion for a search order, a party should be referred to by the appropriate expression prescribed by rule 18.3. [R 25.18 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

25.19

Search order

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25B, rule 2)

The court may make an order (a search order), in any proceeding or in anticipation of any proceeding in the court, with or without notice to the respondent, for the purpose of securing or preserving evidence and requiring a respondent to permit persons to enter premises for the purpose of securing the preservation of evidence which is or may be relevant to an issue in the proceeding or anticipated proceeding. [R 25.19 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

RULE 25.19 COMMENTARY [r 25.19.20]

Search orders

For a discussion of weighing competing considerations of achieving the purpose of the search order as opposed to maintaining privacy, redaction and undertakings, see Global Medical Solutions Australia Pty Ltd v Axiom Molecular Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1517 per Stevenson J. 25.20 Requirements for grant of search order (cf Federal Court Rules Order 25B, rule 3)

The court may make a search order if the court is satisfied that: (a) an applicant seeking the order has a strong prima facie case on an accrued cause of action, and (b) the potential or actual loss or damage to the applicant will be serious if the search order is not made, and (c) there is sufficient evidence in relation to a respondent that: (i) the respondent possesses important evidentiary material, and (ii) there is a real possibility that the respondent might destroy such material or cause it to be unavailable for use in evidence in a proceeding or anticipated proceeding before the court. [R 25.20 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

661

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 25.21 25.21

[r 25.19.20] Jurisdiction

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25B, rule 4)

Nothing in this Division diminishes the inherent, implied or statutory jurisdiction of the court to make a search order. [R 25.21 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

25.22

Terms of search order

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25B, rule 5)

(1) A search order may direct each person who is named or described in the order: (a) to permit, or arrange to permit, such other persons as are named or described in the order: (i) to enter premises specified in the order, and (ii) to take any steps that are in accordance with the terms of the order, and (b) to provide, or arrange to provide, such other persons named or described in the order with any information, thing or service described in the order, and (c) to allow such other persons named or described in the order to take and retain in their custody any thing described in the order, and (d) not to disclose any information about the order, for up to 3 days after the date on which the order was served, except for the purposes of obtaining legal advice or legal representation, and (e) to do or refrain from doing any act as the court considers appropriate. (2) Without limiting the generality of subrule (1)(a)(ii), the steps that may be taken in relation to a thing specified in a search order include: (a) searching for, inspecting or removing the thing, and (b) making or obtaining a record of the thing or any information it may contain. (3) A search order may contain such other provisions as the court considers appropriate. (4) In subrule (2): record includes a copy, photograph, film or sample. [R 25.22 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

25.23

Independent solicitors

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25B, rule 6)

(1) If the court makes a search order, the court must appoint one or more solicitors, each of whom is independent of the applicant’s solicitors (the independent solicitors), to supervise the execution of the order, and to do such other things in relation to the order as the court considers appropriate. (2) The court may appoint an independent solicitor to supervise execution of the order at any one or more premises, and a different independent solicitor or solicitors to supervise execution of the order at other premises, with each independent solicitor having power to do such other things in relation to the order as the court considers appropriate. [R 25.23 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

662

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

25.24

Part 25 – Interim preservation Division 3 – Search orders

r 25.24

Costs

(cf Federal Court Rules Order 25B, rule 7)

(1) The court may make any order as to costs that it considers appropriate in relation to an order made under this Division. (2) Without limiting the generality of subrule (1), an order as to costs includes an order as to the costs of any person affected by a search order. [R 25.24 insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

663

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 25.19.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 26.1

[r 26.1.20]

PART 26 – RECEIVERS Commentary by Joanne Shepard, Barrister. 26.1 Application This Part applies to proceedings in the Supreme Court.

RULE 26.1 COMMENTARY Proceedings in the Supreme Court .......................................................................................................... [r 26.1.20] “Receiver” or “receiver and manager” ...................................................................................................... [r 26.1.40] Appointment pursuant to s 67 Supreme Court Act 1970 ......................................................................... [r 26.1.60] Appointment pursuant to Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provisions ........................................................... [r 26.1.80] Appointment in respect of assets of a corporation ................................................................................ [r 26.1.100] Appointment in respect of assets of a partnership ................................................................................. [r 26.1.110] Appointment in respect of assets of a partnership ................................................................................ [r 26.1.120] Appointment in other circumstances ...................................................................................................... [r 26.1.130] Consent to act ........................................................................................................................................ [r 26.1.140] Fitness to act .......................................................................................................................................... [r 26.1.160] Fitness to Act and s 418 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) .......................................................................... [r 26.1.180] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 26.1.300]

[r 26.1.20]

Proceedings in the Supreme Court

Part 26 applies to Supreme Court proceedings for the appointment of a receiver whether under statute or pursuant to the court’s equitable jurisdiction. Generally, the aim of the appointment is to protect and preserve property for the benefit of those interested in it. Receivers may also be appointed to manage property such as a business to be sold as a going concern. The role of a court-appointed receiver is to take possession of some or all of the property or take over management of the entity as an officer of the Court and do so with the duty of dealing with the assets or entity fairly in the interests of all the parties to proceedings: Re Newdigate Colliery Ltd [1912] 1 Ch 468 at 478 per Buckley LJ; Duffy v Super Centre Development Corp Ltd [1967] 1 NSWR 328 at 383 per Street J; Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Men’s Health Pty Ltd (NSWSC, Young J, 30 April 1998, unreported); State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Chia [2000] NSWSC 552; (2000) 50 NSWLR 587 at [867] per Einstein J. Proceedings on an application for the appointment of a receiver may be commenced by summons (r 6.4(2)(f)) unless the application is made in proceedings which have already commenced. In this case, the application should be made by way of motion: r 18.1. Similarly, proceedings for the appointment of a receiver under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) must be commenced by an originating process unless the application is to be made in extant proceedings in which case an interlocutory process is required: r 2.2 of the Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999; Forms 2 and 3. [r 26.1.40]

“Receiver” or “receiver and manager”

While Pt 26 refers to “receiver” and not “receiver and manager” the rules apply equally to proceedings for both types of appointments. The additional office of “manager” does not deprive the person of their status as a “receiver”: Re Surfside Palms Motel Pty Ltd (1984) 9 ACLR 179 (SCNSW), per McLelland J at 181. [r 26.1.60] Appointment pursuant to s 67 Supreme Court Act 1970 Section 67 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 provides: The court may, at any stage of proceedings, on terms, appoint a receiver by interlocutory order in any case in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient so to do. The statutory prescription does not enlarge the position as it existed in equity and an appointment will only be made where remedies at law are inadequate: Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1991] 1 VR 386; [1990] 1 ACSR 445 (VSCA) at 462 per Kaye, Murphy and Brooking JJ. The nature of the remedy is extreme and so less drastic remedies, which will achieve the same effect, will be preferred by the court: Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1991] 1 VR 386; [1990] 1 ACSR 445 at 456 – 458 per Kaye, Murphy and Brooking JJ; Liquor National Wholesale Pty Ltd v Redrock Co Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 392, per Brereton J; Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd [1990] 3 ACSR 183 (NSWSC) per Rolfe J. The appointment of a receiver will normally be in order to protect a proprietary interest 664

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 26 – Receivers r 26.1

in assets; however, a proprietary interest is not strictly necessary provided there is a legal or equitable right at stake: Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1991] 1 VR 386; [1990] 1 ACSR 445 at 462 – 463 per Kaye, Murphy and Brooking JJ. The wording of the section mirrors that of s 66 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) regarding the grant of injunctions and similar principles and procedures apply. As such, an application ought to address matters such as the balance of convenience and whether an undertaking as to damages ought to be required. As with injunctions, an ex parte application will only be granted in the most extreme cases: Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1991] 1 VR 386; [1990] 1 ACSR 445. Full disclosure is required at the time of the application to appoint. An interim order appointing a receiver may be set aside with indemnity costs if it later transpires that the jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied because there are no relevant “proceedings”: Ramsay v Featherston Resources Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1923 at [19]. The principles are discussed in detail in Young PW, Croft C and Smith ML, On Equity (Lawbook Co., 2009) at [16.610]–[16.730]. The power under s 67 carries with it the implied power to give advice and directions to any receiver appointed, although it is not an unlimited power: Mariconte v Batiste (2000) 48 NSWLR 724; [2000] NSWSC 288 at [74]–[75] per Austin J; In the matter of Anglican Development Fund Diocese of Bathurst (receivers & managers appointed) [2015] NSWSC 440 at [12]–[14], [55] per Brereton J. For the appointment of a receiver in the context of a family law dispute by way of accrued jurisdiction, see McDermott v McDermott [2014] FamCA 615. [r 26.1.80] Appointment pursuant to Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provisions Certain provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) empower the court to appoint a receiver in specific circumstances: (a) Section 233(1)(h): the court may order the appointment of a receiver in an oppression action by a shareholder if it is “appropriate” and provided the grounds in s 232 are satisfied. (b) Section 283HB(1)(g): the court may, on the application of a trustee for debenture holders, make any order that it considers appropriate to protect the interests of existing or prospective debenture holders. For the interaction between s 67 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 and s 283HB, see Re Metal Storm Ltd (2014) 100 ACSR 637; [2014] NSWSC 813, at [80]–[86]. (c) Section 1323(1)(h): the court may order the appointment of a receiver to protect the interests of an aggrieved person to whom a company may become liable with respect to a prosecution, investigation or civil proceeding under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Section 1323(4) expressly forbids the court to require the applicant or another person to provide an undertaking as to damages as a condition of making the order. Nevertheless, the absence of an undertaking remains an important consideration in whether to exercise the discretion to order the appointment: Ramsay v Featherston Resources Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1923 at [21]. (d) Section 1101B(4)(g): the court may order the appointment of a receiver to the property of a financial services licensee provided there are the grounds, as specified in s 1101B(1), to make the order and provided the court is satisfied that the order “would not unfairly prejudice any person”. Section 1101B(6) expressly forbids the court to require the applicant or another person to provide an undertaking as to damages as a condition of making the order. (e) While not specifically referring to “receivers”, s 601EE has been relied upon as a source of power for their appointment. Section 601EE provides that the court may make any orders it considers appropriate in the winding up of an unregistered managed investment scheme. The winding up of these schemes must be administered by the court which, in a practical sense, may require the appointment of a receiver, as the court’s officer: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v GDK Financial Solutions Pty Ltd (2006) 60 ACSR 447; 236 ALR 699; [2006] FCA 1415, per Finkelstein J at [26]; affirmed in Western Retirement Village Management Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2007] FCAFC 75 at [29]. [r 26.1.100]

Appointment in respect of assets of a corporation

The most common application for the appointment of a receiver is in respect of assets of corporations. Such an application is not a substitute for voluntary administration or winding up and it will not be sufficient that a company is in financial difficulties or is financially embarrassed: Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1990) 1 ACSR 445 (VSCA) at 467 – 468 per Kaye, Murphy and Brooking JJ. Further, © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

665

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 26.1.100]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 26.1

[r 26.1.100]

where the company itself (or a friendly creditor) applies for the appointment of a receiver, a receiver should not be appointed unless the Court is satisfied that the creditors – or at least a very substantial body of them – support the application: Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1991] 1 VR 386; [1990] 1 ACSR 445 (VSCA) at 469 – 470 per Kaye, Murphy and Brooking JJ; In the matter of Coogee Sports Club Ltd [2016] NSWSC 817 at [21] per Stevenson J. Where the court appoints a receiver over the property of a corporation (whether pursuant to its equitable jurisdiction, a provision of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or under any other Act), the requirements specified in Pt 5.2 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) also apply. [r 26.1.110]

Appointment in respect of assets of a partnership

In the context of a partnership, the traditional position was that, in circumstances where there is no dispute that a partnership was in existence but has now dissolved, an interim receiver would be appointed almost as a matter of course: Tate v Barry (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 380 and Davey v Donnelly (NSWSC, M McLelland J, 16 May 1991, unreported). More recent decisions have confirmed, however, that there is no presumption that a receiver will be appointed and the question will remain one of discretion: Rowlands v MacDonald [2002] NSWSC 282 at [28] per Barrett J; Cuming v Hennesy [2005] NSWSC 1219 at [8]–[11] per Young CJ in Eq; Liquor National Wholesale Pty Ltd v Redrock Co Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 392 at [49]–[51] per Brereton J. The principles relevant to appointing a receiver to a partnership are set out in Morkaya v Parkinson [2008] NSWSC 1050 at [18]–[20] per Brereton J. A factor against an appointment is if it will be potentially ruinous. An appointment of a receiver may be ruinous where it may harm or destroy the goodwill of a going concern or where the partnership assets are modest and unable to absorb the costs of receivership: Rowlands v MacDonald [2002] NSWSC 282 at [28]; Cuming v Hennesy [2005] NSWSC 1219 at [5]-[6]. Nonetheless, if the parties are in an intractable dispute, the appointment of a receiver may be inevitable even if ruinous: Morkaya v Parkinson [2008] NSWSC 1050 at [20] per Brereton J. If the court declines to appoint a receiver where the parties are in dispute, “it will usually require that there be some mechanism in place to provide comfort to the Court and to the party not in control as to the interim management of the partnership business”: Morkaya v Parkinson [2008] NSWSC 1050 at [20] per Brereton J. [r 26.1.120]

Appointment in respect of assets of a partnership

When appointing a receiver over a law practice, issues of professional standing may be relevant. In Henry v Stewart (NSWSC, Cohen J, 9 June 1995, unreported), it was considered desirable that there be no step taken which would have an adverse effect upon the professional standing and integrity of the partners as solicitors. This proposition was cited with approval in Liquor National Wholesale Pty Ltd v Redrock Co Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 392 at [51] per Brereton J. Part 6.5 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law governs the appointment of a receivers to legal practices. [r 26.1.130]

Appointment in other circumstances

Section 67 provides for the appointment of a receiver but does not provide any limitation on the circumstances in which such an appointment may be made. There is authority for the appointment of a receiver where a creditor seeks to enforce a judgment debt or arbitral award (Hall v Foster [2012] NSWSC 974 at [16]–[19] per Ball J; DM & BP Wiskich Pty Ltd v Saadi (NSWSC, Bryson J, 16 February 1996, unreported); Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd v Gujarat NRE Coke Limited (No 2) [2015] FCA 809 per Foster J), where a person cannot manage their own affairs (JMK v RDC and PTO v WDO [2013] NSWSC 1362 per Lindsay J), over a trust or trust assets (See v Hardman [2002] NSWSC 287 at [18] per Bryson J), over an unincorporated association (Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of Islamic Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211 at [48] per Brereton J) and over a political party incorporated under the relevant political associations legislation (McLean v McKinlay [2004] WASC 2 at [33] per Johnson J). However, it will not be appropriate to appoint a receiver over assets of a body which is exercising powers of management conferred by statute: Parker v Camden London Borough Council [1986] 1 Ch 162.

666

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 26 – Receivers

[r 26.1.140]

r 26.2 Consent to act

It is the court’s practice to require the applicant to file a notice of consent to act from the proposed appointee at the time the application is heard. UCPR r 31.15, specifies the requirements of a document to be considered as evidence of the receiver’s consent. Form 8 of the Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999 (Consent of Liquidator/ Provisional Liquidator) may be adapted to suit the specific purposes of the receivership. [r 26.1.160]

Fitness to act

On making the application, evidence ought also be adduced of the proposed appointee’s fitness to act. Generally, the receiver ought to be disinterested and impartial and have no interest in the property and no pre-existing relationship which might create a conflict in carrying out the duties of the appointment. The exception to this is with respect to partnerships where, because it may be ruinous to the business, a partner, not guilty of misfeasance, may be appointed as receiver: see Young PW, Croft C and Smith ML, On Equity (Lawbook Co., 2009) at [16.630]. See also Liquor National Wholesale Pty Ltd v Redrock Co Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 392 at [58] per Brereton J where, as an alternative to the appointment of an independent receiver, directions were made such that the first defendant was required to conduct the business as a “quasi-receiver” for the benefit of the alleged joint venture between the plaintiff and the defendant. [r 26.1.180] Fitness to act and s 418 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) If the appointment is over the property of a corporation, the proposed appointee must be an official liquidator and not be disqualified by virtue of any of the matters listed in s 418 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). [r 26.1.300]

Comparison

This is a new rule. 26.2

Address for service

(cf SCR Part 29, rule 1)

A receiver must, within 7 days after appointment as such, file a notice specifying an address for service.

RULE 26.2 COMMENTARY General ..................................................................................................................................................... [r 26.2.20] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) requirements ............................................................................................... [r 26.2.40] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 26.2.300]

[r 26.2.20]

General

The rule requires a receiver to file a notice specifying an address for service within 7 days of the appointment. [r 26.2.40] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) requirements Note also the initial lodgment and notification requirements under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) with respect to receivers appointed over a company’s assets: (a) section 429(2): notice of appointment to be served on the company as soon as practicable; (b) section 427(1): the applicant must lodge with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission a notice of the appointment within 7 days; and (c) section 427(2): the receiver appointed must lodge with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission notice of the address of the person’s office in the prescribed form within 14 days of the appointment. [r 26.2.300]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 29 r 1. There is no equivalent DCR.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

667

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 26.2.300]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 26.3

26.3

[r 26.3.20]

Security

(cf SCR Part 29, rule 2)

(1) If the court appoints a receiver, the court may give directions for the filing by the receiver of security in accordance with this rule. (2) If the court directs the appointment of a receiver, then, unless the court orders otherwise, a person must not be appointed receiver under the direction until security has been filed in accordance with this rule. (3) Subrules (1) and (2) have effect subject to any provision for the time being in force made by or under any Act. (4) A security to be filed in accordance with this rule must be a security approved by the court that the receiver will account for what he or she receives as receiver and will deal with what he or she receives as the court may direct. (5) If a security has been filed under this rule, the court may make orders for the vacation of the security.

RULE 26.3 COMMENTARY Purpose of security ................................................................................................................................... [r 26.3.20] Deferment of security and/or appointment ............................................................................................... [r 26.3.40] Requirement for security .......................................................................................................................... [r 26.3.60] Form and extent of security ..................................................................................................................... [r 26.3.80] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 26.3.300]

[r 26.3.20]

Purpose of security

As UCPR r 26.3(4) makes clear, the purpose of the security is to ensure that the receiver will account for all receipts and deal with them as directed by the court. [r 26.3.40]

Deferment of security and/or appointment

Rule 26.3(1) provides that the court may make an order appointing the receiver which allows the appointment to take effect immediately without necessarily requiring the provision of security. Alternatively, r 26.3(2) provides that the court may make a direction that a receiver be appointed which appointment is conditional upon the provision of security unless the court orders otherwise. The difference in wording is discussed in McIntyre v Perkes (1988) 15 NSWLR 417 at 421 (NSWCA). A form of order may envisage, eg the provision of an undertaking by the applicant for a certain initial period of the receivership in lieu of security until such time as the orders require the receiver to furnish security in the usual manner: Makins v Ibotson [1891] 1 Ch 133. [r 26.3.60]

Requirement for security

Where the proposed receiver is an official liquidator it is the practice of the Equity Division not to require security: McIntyre v Perkes (1988) 15 NSWLR 417 at 421 (NSWCA). Where the receiver is appointed without remuneration in, say, a partnership case, the requirement for security may be waived: Lamerand v Lamerand (No 1) (1960) 80 WN (NSW) 198; [1962] NSWR 246. [r 26.3.80]

Form and extent of security

Unlike other jurisdictions (see, eg r 14.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011), the UCPR does not prescribe a form of security. The security may take the form of a deed of guarantee, an undertaking or a recognisance signed by the receiver and the receiver’s sureties (who also guarantee the receiver’s performance of his or her duties). Security may also take the form of a payment into court. In approving the amount of the security, the 668

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 26 – Receivers r 26.4

court may require evidence of the nature and value of the property over which the receiver is appointed as well as the expected value of receipts. The order ought to provide that the security be in force for the duration of the appointment. [r 26.3.300]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 29 r 2. There is no equivalent DCR. 26.4

Remuneration

(cf SCR Part 29, rule 3)

A receiver is to be allowed such remuneration (if any) as may be fixed by the court.

RULE 26.4 COMMENTARY Entitlement to remuneration ..................................................................................................................... [r 26.4.20] Scale and amount of remuneration .......................................................................................................... [r 26.4.40] Section 425 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ................................................................................................ [r 26.4.60] Receiver’s indemnity and lien .................................................................................................................. [r 26.4.80] Deviations from the usual rule ............................................................................................................... [r 26.4.100] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 26.4.300]

[r 26.4.20]

Entitlement to remuneration

An insolvency practitioner appointed as a receiver will usually be appointed on the basis that he or she will receive reasonable remuneration and reimbursement of reasonable expenses out of the receivership assets: Westpac Banking Corp v ITS Taxation Services (2004) 183 FLR 273; [2004] NSWSC 50 at [16] per Austin J. Nonetheless, expenses and remuneration are conceptually different. A receiver’s right to recover expenses is analogous to a trustee’s right of indemnity and is separate from the statutory right to recover remuneration which concerns payment for service rendered as opposed to debts incurred: Venetian Nominees Pty Ltd v Conlan (1998) 20 WAR 96 at 100 – 101 per Ipp and Kennedy JJ (Wallwork J agreeing); In the matter of Wine National Pty Limited [2016] NSWSC 4 at [12] per Black J. The remuneration of a Court-appointed receiver may be approved by the Court that appointed the receiver: ASIC v Lawrenson Light Metal Die Casting Pty Ltd (1999) 33 ACSR 288 at [17]–[20] per Gillard J; In the matter of Wine National Pty Limited [2016] NSWSC 4 at [13] per Black J. [r 26.4.40]

Scale and amount of remuneration

The principles relevant in determining an application to approve the remuneration of a receiver were set out by Young CJ in Eq in Ide v Ide (2004) ACSR 324 at [39]–[49]. These principles have been adopted albeit with some minor qualification in later cases (see In the matter of Wine National Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 4 at [13]–[14] per Black J). It is usual for the order of appointment to make provision for the payment of remuneration upon a scale which reflects the professional hourly rates (which may be recorded in the receiver’s consent to act or the affidavit of fitness). A further application is then made at the appropriate time and usually before a registrar for the approval of the payment of remuneration out of receivership funds. On this further application, the evidence in support, based upon records maintained in the receiver’s files and daily timesheets, ought to detail: (a) the persons doing the work; (b) the rank and charge out rate of each person; (c) the tasks performed; and (d) the time spent performing those tasks: see Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Enterprise Solutions 2000 Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 082 at [5]. Any remuneration must be fair and reasonable. The receivers must provide sufficient information to enablethe Court to assess whether their remuneration is reasonable and the tasks performed were prudent and the onus is on the receivers to justify the reasonableness: ASIC v Letten (No 23) [2014] FCA 985 at [14] per Gordon J; © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

669

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 26.4.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 26.5

[r 26.4.40]

Templeton v ASIC (2015) 108 ACSR 545 at [15] per Besanko, Middleton and Beach JJ; In the matter of AAA Financial Intelligence Ltd (in liq) ACN 093 616 445 [2014] NSWSC 1004 at [18] per Brereton J. The reasonableness of the remuneration will depend on the circumstances of a particular case. A number of typical relevant factors are set out in In the matter of Wine National Pty Limited [2016] NSWSC 4 at [15] per Black J. However, the question of proportionality – in terms of the work done as compared with the size of the property or activity the subject of the administration or benefit to be gained from the work – will be an important consideration in determining the overall reasonableness of the work done: Templeton v ASIC (2015) 108 ACSR 545 at [31]–[34] per Besanko, Middleton and Beach JJ. The question of proportionality will “loom large” particularly in the context of smaller liquidations: In the matter of Independent Contractor Services (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 106 at [32] per Brereton J. [r 26.4.60] Section 425 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) The court’s power to fix the remuneration of a receiver appointed over a company’s assets is also governed by s 425 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) which enumerates the matters to which the court must have regard. Rule 9.1 of the Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999 sets out a detailed regime for the content and timing of an application for the fixing of the receiver’s remuneration pursuant to s 425. [r 26.4.80]

Receiver’s indemnity and lien

With respect to a receiver’s costs, expenses and remuneration, a receiver may be indemnified from and have an equitable lien over the receivership property: Re Application of Central Commodities Services Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 25 at 26–27 per Needham J and the cases cited therein. The right to an indemnity and lien arises in respect of expenses properly incurred in the identification and distribution of property or stock: Re Wine National Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1516, at [12] and [13]. [r 26.4.100]

Deviations from the usual rule

A partner appointed as receiver over the assets and business of the partnership may be appointed without remuneration. The case is otherwise with respect to professional insolvency practitioners. However, the court retains a discretion to decline to make such an order even in these cases. In Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Carey (No 12) (2007) 60 ACSR 597; [2007] FCA 35, French J expressly left open the question of whether the remuneration and costs of a receiver appointed under s 1323 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) on application by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ought to be paid out of the company’s assets. In that case, it was not an “obvious proposition” that the fees of receivers appointed to carry out the public statutory function of identifying and protecting the assets of individuals and corporations for creditor and other claims should be taken out of the assets to be protected. [r 26.4.300]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 29 r 3. There is no equivalent DCR. 26.5

Accounts

(cf SCR Part 29, rule 4)

(1) A receiver must file accounts at such intervals or on such dates as the court may direct. (2) On the day on which he or she files an account, a receiver must file a notice of motion applying for an order to pass the account. (3) Unless the court orders otherwise, the receiver must attend on the hearing of the application under subrule (2).

RULE 26.5 COMMENTARY Duty to account ........................................................................................................................................ [r 26.5.20] Procedure for passing of accounts .......................................................................................................... [r 26.5.40] 670

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 26 – Receivers r 26.6

Corporations Act requirements ................................................................................................................. [r 26.5.60] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 26.5.300]

[r 26.5.20]

Duty to account

The rule enforces the requirement for court appointed receivers to file accounts at such intervals or on such dates as the court directs. It is the receiver’s fundamental duty to record all receipts and payments related to the receivership and to account for the balance appearing due, unless the court orders otherwise, even if the whole of the receivership assets have not yet been realised: Mirror Group Newspapers Plc v Maxwell & Ors (No 2) [1998] 1 BCLC 638 at 648 per Ferris J; In the matter of Wine National Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 4 at [12] per Black J. For a detailed examination of the receiver’s obligation to account see O’Donovan, Company Receivers and Administrators (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at Ch 27. [r 26.5.40]

Procedure for passing of accounts

The receiver must file accounts with the court, which, as a matter of practice, ought to be in proper form and verified by affidavit (see UCPR r 46.5). A notice of motion must also be filed applying for an order for the passing of the accounts and the receiver must attend at the hearing of the motion unless otherwise ordered. The hearing is usually before a master or registrar. The procedure for the passing of accounts is set out by Powell J in Kraft v Kupferwasser (1991) 23 NSWLR 236. [r 26.5.60]

Corporations Act requirements

Section 432 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) prescribes the form of accounts and the timing for their lodgment with ASIC which is a separate obligation to that under UCPR r 26.5 imposed on receivers over company assets. [r 26.5.300]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 29 r 4, except that the receiver now files a notice of motion to apply for an order to pass the account, rather than obtaining an appointment to pass the account. There is no equivalent DCR. 26.6

Default

(cf SCR Part 29, rule 5)

(1) If a receiver fails to comply with a requirement of these rules, or of an order or direction of the court: (a) to file an account or affidavit, or (b) to attend on the hearing of an application for an order to pass an account, or (c) to do any other thing, the court may make such orders and give such directions as the court thinks fit. (2) Without limiting subrule (1), the orders and directions that may be made or given include orders and directions: (a) for the discharge of the receiver, and (b) for the appointment of another receiver, and (c) for the payment of costs. (3) Without limiting subrule (1), if a receiver fails to comply with a requirement of these rules, or of an order or direction of the court, to pay into court any sum shown by an account as due from the receiver, the court may charge the receiver with interest on that sum, at the relevant rate set out in rule 36.7(1) or such lesser rate as the court may determine, while that sum is in his or her possession as receiver. [Subr (3) am Rule 172 of 2010, Sch 1[2]]

(4) This rule does not limit the powers of the court as to the enforcement of orders or as to the punishment of contempt. [R 26.6 am Rule 172 of 2010] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

671

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 26.5.300]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 26.6

[r 26.6.20]

RULE 26.6 COMMENTARY Defaults ..................................................................................................................................................... [r 26.6.20] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provisions ................................................................................................... [r 26.6.40] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 26.6.300]

[r 26.6.20]

Defaults

The rule addresses the default of a receiver with respect to the principal duties to comply with court directions and to do all things necessary for the passing of the accounts and accounting for sums due from the receivership. The principal remedies are the discharge of the receiver, a costs order against the receiver and an order that the receiver pay interest on any moneys for which he or she has failed to account. Any party may apply for orders or directions under this rule. [r 26.6.40] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provisions Section 434 provides that a receiver may make good any default in lodging accounts within 14 days upon being served a notice to that effect, failing which a court may make an order directing the receiver to make good the default. A court may remove a receiver for misconduct under s 434A, but only on application of the corporation. [r 26.6.300]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 29 r 5. There is no equivalent DCR. 26.7

Powers

(cf SCR Part 29, rule 6)

(1) The court may authorise a receiver to do (either in the name of the receiver or in the name of the parties or any of them, and either generally or in any particular case) any act or thing that the parties or any of them might do if of full age and capacity. (2) Subrule (1) has effect even if the parties or any of them are not of full age and capacity. (3) This rule does not limit any power of the court apart from this rule to authorise a receiver to do any act or thing.

RULE 26.7 COMMENTARY Powers under the rule .............................................................................................................................. [r 26.7.20] Powers under s 420 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ................................................................................... [r 26.7.40] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 26.7.300]

[r 26.7.20]

Powers under the rule

The rules allow the court to authorise the receiver to exercise any powers held by any of the parties to the application without prejudice to any other power the court may have to authorise additional powers. The powers will be tailored to the requirements of the receivership such that a receiver appointed over a business undertaking may be given broad powers of management whereas a receiver appointed over an asset may only be given the power to realise that asset and account for and distribute the proceeds. For a discussion of the implied powers to give directions to receivers under s 67 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, see [26.1.60]. [r 26.7.40] Powers under s 420 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) A receiver appointed over the property of a corporation is taken to have the powers set out in s 420 unless otherwise ordered by the court. Section 420(1) empowers the receiver to perform all things necessary or convenient in connection with the receivership. Section 420(2) comprehensively enumerates, without limiting 672

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 26 – Receivers r 26.8

the effect of s 420(1), a range of powers unless limited by a court order. If a court order lists some of the s 420(2) powers and not others, the receiver’s powers are taken to be limited to those specific powers: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Australian Investors Forum (2003) 44 ACSR 503; [2003] NSWSC 130, per Austin J at [16]. [r 26.7.300]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 29 r 6. There is no equivalent DCR. 26.8

Account on death

(cf SCR Part 29, rule 7)

(1) If a receiver in any proceedings dies, the court may make such orders as the court thinks fit for the filing and passing of accounts by the representatives of the deceased receiver and for the payment into court of any amount shown to be due. (2) The court must not make any order under subrule (1) unless notice of motion has been served on the representatives. (3) A notice of motion under this rule must be served personally.

RULE 26.8 COMMENTARY Liability of deceased receiver’s representatives ...................................................................................... [r 26.8.20] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 26.8.300]

[r 26.8.20]

Liability of deceased receiver’s representatives

Where the receiver dies, the deceased’s representatives may be ordered to file and pass accounts and pay into court the balance shown to be due. [r 26.8.300]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 29 r 7, except that whereas under the SCR the notice of motion could be served in any manner in which a statement of claim could be served, under this rule, the notice of motion must be served personally.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

673

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 26.8.300]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 27.1

[r 27.1.20]

PART 27 – DISPOSAL OF LAND Commentary by Joanne Shepard, Barrister. 27.1 Power to order sale (cf SCR Part 30, rule 2)

In proceedings in the Supreme Court in relation to land, other than proceedings in the Common Law Division for possession of land, the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings: (a) order that the whole or any part of the land be sold, and (b) order that any party in receipt of the rents or profits of the land, or otherwise in possession of the land, deliver possession to such person as the Court may direct.

RULE 27.1 COMMENTARY Power to order sale under UCPR Pt 27.1 ................................................................................................ [r 27.1.20] Alternative powers to order sale .............................................................................................................. [r 27.1.40] Interaction of alternative powers to order sale ......................................................................................... [r 27.1.60] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 27.1.300]

[r 27.1.20]

Power to order sale under UCPR Pt 27.1

This section is intended to empower the court to preserve the value of real property, the subject of proceedings in the Supreme Court, by its immediate sale. Pt 27.1 of the UCPR is derived from s 55 of the Chancery Procedure Act 1852 which applied to cases for the administration of estates and was not used for ordinary suits of foreclosure: London & County Banking Co v Dover (1879) 11 Ch D 204; King Investment Solutions Pty Ltd v Hussain (2005) 64 NSWLR 441; [2005] NSWSC 1076 (reported in full at (2005) 13 BPR 25,077) at [78] per Campbell J. See also Parker’s Practice in Equity (NSW), (2nd ed, 1949), pp 21–22 which considered the purpose of s 14 of the Equity Act 1901 (now repealed) the terms of which were similar to UCPR Pt 27.1. [r 27.1.40]

Alternative powers to order sale

Where the land is old system, the court will rely on s 103 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 for its jurisdiction to order a sale in proceedings for foreclosure or redemption, but where there is a registered or unregistered mortgage on Torrens Title land, the court will rely on its equitable jurisdiction to make the order: King Investment Solutions Pty Ltd v Hussain (2005) 64 NSWLR 441; [2005] NSWSC 1076 at [72]–[82]; Yarrangah Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1999) 9 BPR 17,061; [1999] NSWSC 97 at [22]–[30] per Young J (as his Honour then was); New Beach Apartments Pty Ltd v Epic Hotels Pty Ltd [2007] 2 BFRA 257; (2007) 14 BPR 26317; [2007] NSWSC 474 per White J. The remedy is standard for an equitable chargee in that it is sufficient if the equitable chargee shows that the charge exists and is enforceable and that default has occurred, subject to the court’s consideration of those who will be affected adversely by the making of the order: Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Donnelly [2012] NSWSC 1615, per Garling J at [29] and [30]. Section 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 also authorises the sale or partition of property held in co-ownership in certain circumstances. [r 27.1.60]

Interaction of alternative powers to order sale

For the interaction of s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919, Property Relationships Act 1984 (NSW) and Pt 27.1 of the UCPR, see Richards v Withers [2010] NSWSC 1158; Cusick v Savage [2008] NSWSC 212. [r 27.1.300]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 30 r 2. There is no equivalent DCR.

674

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 27 – Disposal of land

27.2

r 27.3 UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 27.2.300]

Manner of sale

(cf SCR Part 30, rule 3)

(1) This rule applies if the Supreme Court makes an order under rule 27.1 that land be sold. (2) The Supreme Court may appoint a party or other person to have the conduct of the sale. (3) The Supreme Court may permit the person having the conduct of the sale to sell the land in such manner as he or she thinks fit. (4) The Supreme Court may direct any party to join in the sale and conveyance or transfer or in any other matter relating to the sale. (5) The Supreme Court may give such further directions as it thinks fit for the purpose of effecting the sale, including any one or more of the following: (a) a direction fixing the manner of sale (that is, whether sale is to be by contract conditional on approval of the Court, by private treaty, by public auction, by tender, or by some other manner), (b) a direction fixing a reserve or minimum price, (c) a direction requiring payment of the purchase money into Court or to trustees or other persons, (d) a direction for settling the particulars and conditions of sale, (e) a direction for obtaining evidence of value, (f) a direction fixing the remuneration to be allowed to any auctioneer, real estate agent or other person.

RULE 27.2 COMMENTARY Manner of sale .......................................................................................................................................... [r 27.2.20] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 27.2.300]

[r 27.2.20]

Manner of sale

Rule 27.2 applies with respect only to sales ordered pursuant to UCPR r 27.1. However, the procedure employed by the court with respect to sales under s 103 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 and with respect to judicial sale in equity may be employed by analogy (cf Harden Shire Council v Richardson (2012) 188 LGERA 200; [2012] NSWSC 622 at [187] with respect to sale under the Local Government Act 1993). The procedure for judicial sale in equity is set out in Sood v Christianos (2008) 14 BPR 26101; [2008] NSWSC 1087 at [19]–[37] per Brereton J. See also New Beach Apartments Pty Ltd v Epic Hotels Pty Ltd [2007] 2 BFRA 257; (2007) 14 BPR 26317; [2007] NSWSC 474. [r 27.2.300]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 30 r 3. There is no equivalent DCR. 27.3

Certificate of sale

(cf SCR Part 30, rule 4)

(1) If, pursuant to this Part, land is sold by public auction, the auctioneer must, unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise, certify the result of the sale. (2) If, pursuant to this Part, land is sold otherwise than by public auction, the solicitor of the person having the conduct of the sale must, unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise, certify the result of the sale. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

675

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 27.3

[r 27.3.20]

(3) The Supreme Court may require that the certificate be verified by affidavit of the person certifying. (4) The person having the conduct of the sale must file the certificate and affidavit, if any.

RULE 27.3 COMMENTARY Form ......................................................................................................................................................... [r 27.3.20] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 27.3.300]

[r 27.3.20]

Form

There is no prescribed form for the certificate. [r 27.3.300]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 30 r 4. There is no equivalent DCR. 27.4 Mortgage, exchange or partition (cf SCR Part 30, rule 5)

If the Supreme Court makes an order for the mortgage, exchange or partition of land, rules 27.2 and 27.3 apply to the mortgage, exchange or partition, so far as applicable and with any necessary modifications, in the same way as they apply to a sale of land under this Part.

RULE 27.4 COMMENTARY Procedure for mortgage, exchange or partition ....................................................................................... [r 27.4.20] Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 27.4.300]

[r 27.4.20]

Procedure for mortgage, exchange or partition

Parts 27.2 and 27.3 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, on their face, appear also to apply to the partition of land say, for example, under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919. However, it is noted s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 also has its own prescriptive regime for partition (see also s 66H of that Act). [r 27.4.300]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to, and the same in substance as, SCR Pt 30 r 5. There is no equivalent DCR.

676

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 28 – Separate decision of questions and Consolidation Division 2 – Separation of questions

[r 28.2.20]

r 28.2 UCPR Parts 21-30

PART 28 – SEPARATE DECISION OF QUESTIONS AND CONSOLIDATION Commentary by Carol Webster SC.

DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY 28.1 Definition (cf SCR Part 31, rule 1)

In this Part, question includes any question or issue in any proceedings, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by pleadings, agreement of parties or otherwise.

RULE 28.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 28.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 28.1.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 28.1.1000]

[r 28.1.20]

Comparison

The definition of “question” is in identical terms to the definition appearing in SCR Pt 31 r 1. There was no equivalent rule in the District Court or Local Court although there was a rule regarding consolidation in the District Court in the same terms as r 28.5, referring to common questions. [r 28.1.40]

Operation

The rule defines “question” broadly for the purposes of r 28.2 regarding determination of separate questions and r 28.5 regarding consolidation of multiple proceedings. A pleading may raise any point of law: r 14.19. [r 28.1.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 31 r 1.

DIVISION 2 – SEPARATION OF QUESTIONS 28.2 Order for decision (cf SCR Part 31, rule 2)

The court may make orders for the decision of any question separately from any other question, whether before, at or after any trial or further trial in the proceedings.

RULE 28.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 28.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 28.2.40] When an order for separate determination will be made ......................................................................... [r 28.2.60] Separate determination of liability and damages ..................................................................................... [r 28.2.80] Application under this rule ...................................................................................................................... [r 28.2.100] Alternative procedures ............................................................................................................................ [r 28.2.120] Appeal from determination on separate question .................................................................................. [r 28.2.140] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 28.2.1000]

[r 28.2.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts the words of SCR Pt 31 r 2, omitting SCR Pt 31 r 2(b), “the statement of a case and the question for decision”. The substantive effect of SCR Pt 31 r 2 is unchanged. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

677

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 28.2 [r 28.2.40]

[r 28.2.20] Operation

The purpose of the rule is to allow for the preliminary determination of a question or questions raised in the proceedings with a view to saving time and costs by not hearing all of the issues. The court’s discretion under the rule should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. The separate determination of issues which could resolve significant parts of the litigation expeditiously is desirable, where appropriate: Allandale Blue Metal Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services [2013] NSWCA 103; (2013) 195 LGERA 182 at [88]–[89] and [95]; Tyrrell v The Owners Corp Strata Scheme 40022 [2007] NSWCA 8 at [6]–[7] and Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd v Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1464 (Integral Home Loans) at [6] per Brereton J; Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; 73 ALJR 522; [1999] HCA 9 at [51]. In Integral Home Loans Brereton J expressed the view that since the CPA “the court should take a more interventionist role in identifying and separating important issues which can resolve significant parts of the litigation expeditiously”. Where the court has made an order under r 28.2, the Supreme Court in a Division may under UCPR r 1.21(1)(a) (formerly SCR Pt 12 r 2(1)(a)) make an order that the proceedings be removed into the Court of Appeal: see [r 1.21.40]. The basis on which such an order might be made was discussed by Fullerton J in Stewart v Ronalds [2009] NSWSC 455. [r 28.2.60]

When an order for separate determination will be made

In the ordinary course, all issues for determination should be determined together: Tallglen Pty Ltd v Pay TV Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 130 at 141; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Clune [2008] NSWSC 1125 at [6]. The principles that determine whether to make an order for separate determination were summarised in Southwell v Bennett [2010] NSWSC 1372 at [15] and Crawley v Vero Insurance Ltd (2012) 17 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-946; [2012] NSWSC 593 at [16]–[19]. The separate and preliminary determination of a question may be appropriate where the question is critical to the outcome of the proceedings and if decided in one way would bring the proceedings to an end, where it would obviate unnecessary and expensive hearing of other questions or where there is a strong prospect that the parties would agree upon the result if the core of their dispute was decided: Tallglen Pty Ltd v Pay TV Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 130 at 141–142; CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O’Neill [1985] 1 NSWLR 601 at 606C–D; Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; 73 ALJR 522; [1999] HCA 9, at [49] and [51]; Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1999) 217 ALR 495; [1999] FCA 718 at [8]–[9]. All facts relevant to the determination must be found or agreed: Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; 73 ALJR 522; [1999] HCA 9 at [51]–[53]. The rule includes the power to order a question be decided after all other issues in the proceedings: Crawley v Vero Insurance Ltd (2012) 17 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-946; [2012] NSWSC 593 at [20]. Where common questions of fact or law arise in a number of separate proceedings, the separate and preliminary determination of the common questions of fact or law would enable the identical issues to be tried once only in a manner binding on all of the parties: Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 26 NSWLR 411; 9 ACSR 309 at 429G (NSWLR); Kosciusko Thredbo Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 96. However, savings in time and expense by the determination of a separate question are often illusory. The proceedings may be fragmented and there is the potential for further appeals, delaying resolution of the proceedings. An order for the separate determination of a question or questions should only be made where the utility, economy and fairness to the parties of the separate hearing is beyond question: Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19 at 55 (CLR). The separate decision procedure is not likely to be appropriate where determination of the question would involve the credit of a witness whose evidence would be relevant to the remaining issues or would require findings of fact likely to be contentious on remaining issues in the proceedings. If a judge makes findings about the credibility of a witness in interlocutory proceedings, the judge may be disqualified from hearing the substantive proceedings, if a fair-minded observer would conclude that the judge had formed opinions that might affect the judge’s conclusions as to the remaining issues: Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley 678

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 28 – Separate decision of questions and Consolidation Division 2 – Separation of questions

r 28.2

Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 26 NSWLR 411; 9 ACSR 309; Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; 74 ALJR 1380; 174 ALR 655; 26 Fam LR 627; [2000] HCA 48. Findings expressed in terms of finality made at an interlocutory stage about an issue relevant to the proceedings as a whole may indicate that the judge has formed a conclusion on the issue adverse to one party before the evidence and addresses on the issue are complete: Kwan v Kang [2003] NSWCA 336 at [86]–[87]. [r 28.2.80] Separate determination of liability and damages Rule 15.17 provides that Div 2 of Pt 15 regarding particulars does not apply to a claim for personal injury damages accompanied by a notice of motion seeking a separate trial on the question of liability. The High Court has criticised separate trial of questions of liability and damages, or of duty of care and breach in negligence actions: Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19 at 33–34 (CLR), 55 (CLR); New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; 195 ALR 412; [2003] HCA 4 at 575 (CLR). In tort cases in which damages are the gist of the action separate trials ought not to be ordered unless it is accepted that compensable damage has been sustained: Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; 164 ALR 606; [1999] HCA 36 at 332 (CLR); Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19 at 33–34 (CLR); New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; 195 ALR 412; [2003] HCA 4; Tyrrell v The Owners Corp Strata Scheme 40022 [2007] NSWCA 8 at [12]–[16]. [r 28.2.100] Application under this rule An application for determination of a separate question should be made by motion in the proceedings setting out the question or questions proposed. See UCPR Pt 18 regarding motions generally. The court has the power to dispense with the filing and a service of a motion seeking an order under r 28.2, in the course of giving directions generally or otherwise managing the proceedings (CPA s 61, r 2.1). The question or questions to be determined should be stated with particularity: American Home Assurance Co v Ampol Refineries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 13 at 18G; Rajski v Carson (1988) 15 NSWLR 84 at 88C–D. [r 28.2.120] Alternative procedures Under r 9.8 the court may order the separate trial of a cross-claim or any question arising in or on a cross-claim. Under r 6.22 the court may order separate trials where the joinder of parties or causes of action may embarrass, inconvenience or delay the conduct of the proceedings. Under r 28.5 the court may order that proceedings be consolidated or tried at the same time: see [r 28.5.40]. In the course of determining an application for an order under r 13.4(1)(b) staying or dismissing the proceedings generally (or any claim for relief in the proceedings) or under r 14.28 that the whole or any part of a pleading be struck out, on the basis that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed (see [r 13.4.20] and [r 14.28.20] ff) the court may determine a question which could otherwise have been the subject of a separate question under r 28.2. Further, under SCA s 75 in an appropriate case the court may make binding declarations of right (whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not). [r 28.2.140] Appeal from determination on separate question An appeal lies to the Court of Appeal against the decision on a separate question by leave of the Court of Appeal: SCA s 103. Section 101(2)(e) of the SCA also provides for an appeal by leave against an interlocutory judgment or order in proceedings. An application for leave to appeal is made by summons: SCR Pt 51 r 4(1). Generally a trial on all issues should be concluded before an appeal is heard, but countervailing circumstances may exist where important questions of general application or principle are involved or where the appeal on the separate questions might effectively terminate the litigation or substantially narrow the issues for trial and consequently the costs of substantial commercial litigation: American Home Assurance Co v Ampol Refineries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 13 at 19E. It should be borne in mind that on appeal from a final order the Court of Appeal may correct any interlocutory order which affected the final result: Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478; 76 ALJR 828; 188 ALR 353; [2002] HCA 22 at 483–484 (CLR). On appeal from the separate determination of a question in proceedings, the Court of Appeal may amend the question to facilitate provision by the court of the answer that will ensure the more effective disposal of the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

679

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 28.2.140]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 28.3

[r 28.2.140]

real question in controversy between the parties, provided the amendment does not alter the substance of the appeal: CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O’Neill [1985] 1 NSWLR 601 at 606F–607E. [r 28.2.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 31 r 2. Alternative sources of power to order separate trials: r 6.22, r 9.8. Leave to appeal: [r 50.12.20] ff. See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [12.660], [16.90]–[16.100] and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1989) pp 203–205. 28.3

Record of decision

(cf SCR Part 31, rule 5)

If any question is decided under this Part, the court must, subject to rule 28.4, either: (a) cause the decision to be recorded, or (b) give or make such judgment or order as the nature of the case requires.

RULE 28.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 28.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 28.3.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 28.3.1000]

[r 28.3.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts SCR Pt 31 r 5, which was in almost identical terms to this rule. The substantive effect of SCR Pt 31 r 5 is unchanged. There was no equivalent rule in the District Court or Local Court. [r 28.3.40]

Operation

The rule provides for a written record of the decision made by the court on the separate question or the making of appropriate orders in light of the determination of the questions. Rule 28.4 allows the court to deal with the balance of the proceedings where the determination of the question substantially disposes of the proceedings or the whole or a part of a claim for relief. [r 28.3.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 31 r 5. See [r 28.4.40] regarding disposal of the proceedings. See [r 36.2.60] regarding written reasons for judgment generally. 28.4 Disposal of proceedings (cf SCR Part 31, rule 6)

(1) This rule applies if the decision of a question under this Division: (a) substantially disposes of the proceedings or of the whole or any part of any claim for relief in the proceedings, or (b) renders unnecessary any trial or further trial in the proceedings or on the whole or any part of any claim for relief in the proceedings. (2) In the circumstances referred to in subrule (1), the court may, as the nature of the case requires: (a) dismiss the proceedings or the whole or any part of any claim for relief in the proceedings, or (b) give any judgment, or 680

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

(c)

r 28.5

make any other order.

RULE 28.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 28.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 28.4.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 28.4.1000]

[r 28.4.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts SCR Pt 31 r 6, which was in almost identical terms to this rule. The substantive effect of SCR Pt 31 r 6 is unchanged. There was no equivalent rule in the District Court or Local Court. [r 28.4.40]

Operation

The rule allows the court to deal with the whole of the proceedings where the determination of the separate question substantially disposes of the proceedings or the whole or a part of a claim for relief, or renders further trial unnecessary. [r 28.4.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 31 r 6.

DIVISION 3 – CONSOLIDATION ETC OF PROCEEDINGS 28.5 Consolidation etc of proceedings (cf SCR Part 31, rule 7; DCR Part 12, rule 7)

If several proceedings are pending in the court and it appears to the court: (a) that they involve a common question, or (b) that the rights to relief claimed in them are in respect of, or arise out of, the same transaction or series of transactions, or (c) that for some other reason it is desirable to make an order under this rule, the court may order those proceedings to be consolidated, or to be tried at the same time or one immediately after another, or may order any of them to be stayed until after the determination of any other of them. Note: See also Division 5 of Part 6 with respect to joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties.

RULE 28.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 28.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 28.5.40] Alternatives to consolidation ..................................................................................................................... [r 28.5.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 28.5.1000]

[r 28.5.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts SCR Pt 31 r 6 and DCR Pt 12 r 7, which were in almost identical terms to this rule. The substantive effect of those rules is unchanged. There was no equivalent rule in the Local Court. [r 28.5.40]

Operation

The rule allows the court to consolidate separate proceedings into a single “consolidated proceeding”. Such an order would be appropriate where that could achieve gains in terms of efficiency in time and costs. Compare [r 6.19.40] regarding joinder of multiple plaintiffs or defendants in one proceedings where there are common questions of law or fact and rights of relief arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

681

UCPR Parts 21-30

Part 28 – Separate decision of questions and Consolidation Division 3 – Consolidation etc of proceedings

[r 28.5.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 28.5

[r 28.5.40]

In determining whether proceedings should be tried together, the court is likely to take into account whether: (1) the proceedings are broadly of a similar nature; (2) there are issues of fact and law common to each proceeding; (3) witnesses (lay and expert) in one proceeding would be witnesses in one or more of the other proceedings; (4) a proposal for a test case has been considered with the parties agreeing to abide the outcome or the determination of common issues of fact and law; (5) there is a prospect of multiple appeals with substantial delays if the proceedings are not tried at the same time; (6) there would be a substantial saving of time if the proceedings were tried at the same time rather than separately; (7) an order that the proceedings be tried at the same time would create difficulties in terms of trial management, complexity of procedural issues and determining cross-admissibility of evidence; (8) one proceeding is further advanced in preparation for trial than the others; (9) there are parties to one or some only of the proceedings who would be inconvenienced if all of the proceedings are tried at the same time: Ghose v CX Reinsurance Company Ltd [2010] NSWSC 110 at [29]; Humphries v Newport Quays Stage 2A Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 699 at [11]. The court’s discretion under the rule should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding purpose expressed in CPA s 56, to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues between the various parties, having regard to the objects of case management expressed in CPA s 57, which include the efficient disposal of the business of the court and efficient use of available judicial resources. The potential advantages of consolidation of five separate claims regarding defective products (including a single set of pleadings with a more rational pleading structure) were considered by Austin J in A Goninan & Co Ltd v Atlas Steels (Australia) Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 956 at [60]–[65]. [r 28.5.60]

Alternatives to consolidation

Consolidation orders are rarely made; the more usual order is that proceedings in which common questions arise be heard together, with evidence in each to be treated as evidence in the other: Todd v Jones [1969] VR 169; Bolwell Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Foley [1984] VR 97; A Goninan & Co Ltd v Atlas Steels (Australia) Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 956 at [21]. This avoids the requirement for common representation in a consolidated action: see Strata Plan 61287 v Brookfield Multiplex Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1302 at [7]–[14]. Alternatively the common questions in each of the proceedings could be determined first pursuant to orders made under r 28.2 (as to which see [r 28.2.60]) and the balance of each of the proceedings dealt with separately. The possibility that a judge may be disqualified from hearing multiple proceedings involving the same witnesses referred to in [r 28.2.60] should be borne in mind when considering an order that proceedings be tried one immediately after the other. [r 28.5.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 31 r 7, DCR Pt 12 r 7. Related rules: r 6.18 regarding joinder of causes of action and r 6.19 regarding joinder of multiple plaintiffs or defendants.

682

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 29 – Trials r 29.2A

PART 29 – TRIALS Commentary by Carol Webster SC. 29.1 Beginning and opposite parties (cf SCR Part 34, rule 1; DCR Part 26, rule 1A; LCR Part 21, rule 1A)

Subject to any directions given by the court, for the purposes of this Part: (a) if the burden of proof on any issue lies on the plaintiff, the plaintiff is to be the beginning party and the defendant the opposite party, and (b) if the burden of proof on all the issues lies on the defendant, the defendant is to be the beginning party and the plaintiff the opposite party.

RULE 29.1 COMMENTARY [r 29.1.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 1 and DCR Pt 26 r 1A. 29.2 Applications and requisitions for juries in proceedings other than defamation proceedings (1) This rule applies to proceedings other than defamation proceedings. (2) An application in proceedings to which this rule applies for the proceedings to be tried by jury must be made by notice of motion. (3) For the purposes of section 85 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 and section 76A of the District Court Act 1973, a requisition for a jury in proceedings to which this rule applies must be filed at the same time as the notice of motion referred to in subrule (2) is filed. (4) Unless the court otherwise orders, a notice of motion under subrule (2) must be filed: (a) if the notice is filed by the plaintiff: (i) within 56 days after service on the defendant of the statement of claim, or (ii) if a defence is served on the plaintiff within that period, within 28 days after service of the defence on the plaintiff, or (b) if the notice is filed by the defendant: (i) within 28 days after service on the defendant of the statement of claim, or (ii) if, pursuant to rule 14.3, the court directs some other date for the filing of a defence, within 28 days after the date fixed by the court’s direction. [R 29.2 subst Rule 179 of 2011, Sch 1; am Rule 166 of 2009; subst Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[5]]

RULE 29.2 COMMENTARY [r 29.2.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, this rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 3 and adds the requirement that the notice of motion be filed no later than 2 months before the first status conference. In the District Court, this rule reproduces the substance of DCR Pt 12 r 5. 29.2A Elections for juries in defamation proceedings (1) An election under section 21 of the Defamation Act 2005 for defamation proceedings to be tried by jury must be made by filing a notice of election for a jury trial and serving the notice on each other active party in the proceedings. Note: Section 21(2)(b) of the Defamation Act 2005 requires an election to be accompanied by the fee prescribed by the regulations under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 for the requisition of a jury in the court concerned. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

683

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 29.2.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 29.2A

[r 29.3.20]

(2) A party may file and serve a notice of election for a jury trial only if: (a) the party has served a notice of intention to file the notice of election on each other active party before a date has been fixed for the hearing of the defamation proceedings, and (b) a notice of motion has not been filed under subrule (4) or, if such a notice of motion has been filed and served, the court has refused to make the order sought in the notice of motion. (3) A party who serves a notice of intention to file a notice of election for a jury trial must, before a date has been fixed for the hearing of the defamation proceedings, inform the court that the notice of intention has been served. (4) A party on whom a notice of intention to file a notice of election for a jury trial is served may, within 21 days of being served with the notice, file a notice of motion seeking an order under section 21 of the Defamation Act 2005 that the proceedings not be tried by jury. (5) If a notice of motion is filed under subrule (4), a date may not be fixed for the hearing of the defamation proceedings until the court has disposed of the motion. (6) Without limiting subrule (2), a notice of election for a jury trial may not be filed or served if: (a) the court makes an order under section 21 of the Defamation Act 2005 (whether or not of its own motion) that the defamation proceedings not be tried by jury, or (b) a date has been fixed for the hearing of the defamation proceedings. [R 29.2A insrt Rule 179 of 2011, Sch 1]

29.3

Time and place of trial

(cf SCR Part 34, rule 4)

The court may make such order as it thinks fit for fixing the time and place of trial.

RULE 29.3 COMMENTARY [r 29.3.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 4. There is no equivalent DCR provision. 29.4 Trial to deal with all questions and issues (cf SCR Part 33, rule 4)

Unless the court orders otherwise, proceedings are to be listed for trial generally, that is, for hearing of all questions and issues arising on every claim for relief in the proceedings.

RULE 29.4 COMMENTARY [r 29.4.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 33 r 4. There is no equivalent DCR provision. 29.5 Conduct of trials generally (cf SCR Part 34, rule 6(1))

The court may give directions as to the order of evidence and addresses and generally as to the conduct of the trial.

684

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 29 – Trials [r 29.6.20]

r 29.7

[r 29.5.20]

UCPR Parts 21-30

RULE 29.5 COMMENTARY Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 6(1). There is no equivalent DCR provision. 29.6 Order of evidence and addresses (cf SCR Part 34, rule 6; DCR Part 26, rule 6; LCR Part 21, rule 4)

(1) Subject to these rules and to any direction of the court: (a) if the only parties are one plaintiff and one defendant, and there is no statement of cross-claim or cross-summons, the order of evidence and addresses is to be as provided by this rule, and (b) in any other case, the order of evidence and addresses is to be as provided by this rule, subject to any modifications that the nature of the case requires. (2) The beginning party may make an address opening his or her case and may then adduce evidence. (3) If, at the conclusion of the beginning party’s evidence, no document or thing has been admitted in evidence on tender by the opposite party, the opposite party may elect to adduce evidence or not to adduce evidence. (4) If the opposite party elects to adduce evidence: (a) the opposite party may make an opening address before adducing evidence, and (b) after adducing evidence, the opposite party may make an address closing his or her case, and (c) after the close of the opposite party’s case, the beginning party may make an address closing his or her case. (5) If the opposite party elects not to adduce evidence: (a) the beginning party may make an address closing his or her case, and (b) after the close of the beginning party’s case, the opposite party may make an address stating his or her case.

RULE 29.6 COMMENTARY [r 29.6.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 6(2)–(6) and DCR Pt 26 r 6. 29.7 Procedure to be followed if party is absent (cf SCR Part 5, rule 9, Part 13, rule 5A, Part 34, rule 5; DCR Part 26, rule 5A; LCR Part 21, rule 2)

(1) This rule applies when a trial is called on. (2) If any party is absent, the court: (a) may proceed with the trial generally or so far as concerns any claim for relief in the proceedings, or (b) may adjourn the trial. (3) If, in relation to a liquidated claim, the plaintiff appears, but a defendant does not appear, the court may, without proceeding to trial, give judgment against that defendant on evidence of: (a) the amount then due to the plaintiff in respect of the cause of action for which the proceedings were commenced, and (b) any payments made or credits accrued since the commencement of the proceedings in reduction of the amount of the plaintiff’s claim or costs. (4) If, in relation to any proceedings, the defendant appears, but the plaintiff does not appear, the court may dismiss the proceedings. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

685

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 29.7

[r 29.7.20]

(5) Subrules (3) and (4) do not limit the court’s powers under subrule (2). [R 29.7 subst Rule 717 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[7]]

RULE 29.7 COMMENTARY [r 29.7.20]

Comparison

Part 13 r 5A of the SCR has not been reproduced. The operative parts of SCR Pt 34 r 5 have been embodied in r 29.7(1) but without the addition of a special power to set aside or vary any judgment obtained. An application to set aside may be made under r 36.16(2)(b). This rule also replaces SCR Pt 5 r 9 in proceedings commenced by summons. In the District Court, in the plaintiff’s absence, under DCR Pt 26 r 5A the court had the power to make a preliminary dismissal order; under this rule, however, the court may either proceed in the plaintiff’s absence or adjourn. In the defendant’s absence, under this rule the court may proceed with the trial, or adjourn, or in the case of a liquidated claim, give judgment against the defendant, but there is no specific provision for the court to adjourn in the case of a liquidated claim. 29.8 Dismissal of proceedings on plaintiff’s application (cf SCR Part 34, rule 6A; DCR Part 26, rule 6A; LCR Part 21, rule 5(1))

(1) On the application of the plaintiff in any proceedings, the court may make an order for the dismissal of the proceedings to the extent to which they concern: (a) the whole or any part of the plaintiff’s claim for relief, and (b) any cause of action relevant to that claim or part of the claim. (2) Subject to subrule (3), such an order may be made at any time. (3) In the case of a trial with a jury, such an order may be made only if the application for the order is made before the jury gives a verdict.

RULE 29.8 COMMENTARY [r 29.8.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 6A and DCR Pt 26 r 6A. 29.9 Dismissal of proceedings on defendant’s application (cf SCR Part 34, rule 7; DCR Part 26, rule 7; LCR Part 21, rule 5(2) – (7))

(1) A defendant in proceedings in which the plaintiff is the beginning party may apply to the court for an order: (a) for the dismissal of the proceedings, or (b) for the dismissal of the proceedings to the extent to which they concern any cause of action relevant to the plaintiff’s claim for relief against that defendant, on the ground that, on the evidence given, a judgment for the plaintiff could not be supported. (2) Such an application may be made at any time after the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff in his or her case in chief. (3) The plaintiff may argue, or decline to argue, the question raised by the application. (4) The court may not make an order under this rule unless the plaintiff argues the question raised by the application and the defendant satisfies the court that, on the evidence given, a judgment for the plaintiff could not be supported. (5) If the plaintiff declines to argue the question raised by the application, or if the defendant fails to 686

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 29 – Trials r 29.9

satisfy the court that, on the evidence given, a judgment for the plaintiff could not be supported, the defendant: (a) may adduce evidence or further evidence, or (b) may make an application under rule 29.10. (6) If fewer than all defendants apply to the court under subrule (1), the court must not deal with any such application before the conclusion of the evidence given for all parties.

RULE 29.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 29.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 29.9.40] Effect of order for dismissal ...................................................................................................................... [r 29.9.60] No application where multiple defendants ............................................................................................... [r 29.9.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 29.9.1000]

[r 29.9.20] Comparison This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 7 (except that it is no longer restricted to common law claims) and DCR Pt 26 r 7. [r 29.9.40] Operation Under this rule, a defendant may seek dismissal of the proceedings as a whole or in relation to any cause of action relevant to the plaintiff’s claim for relief against that defendant. Such an application was formerly described as a defendant’s application for non suit of the plaintiff. The ground for dismissal under this rule is similar to that for judgment by direction under r 29.10. The plaintiff’s evidence must be taken at its highest: see [r 29.10.60]. In seeking dismissal under this rule, unlike seeking judgment under r 29.10, the defendant is not put to an election as to calling evidence: see [r 29.10.40]. The plaintiff may decline to argue the question raised by the application in which case the defendant must decide whether to call evidence or make an application under r 29.10. The court has no discretion to permit argument of the question if the plaintiff declines to argue it: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sydney Investment House Equities Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 796 at [8]. [r 29.9.60] Effect of order for dismissal As with an order for dismissal made under r 12.7 (dismissal of proceedings etc for want of due dispatch) an order for dismissal under r 29.9 does not, subject to the terms on which the order was made, prevent the plaintiff from bringing fresh proceedings on the same cause of action: CPA s 91. See [r 12.7.80]. UCPR r 42.20(1) requires the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings to the extent to which they have been dismissed unless court otherwise orders. Fresh proceedings on the same or substantially the same cause of action or for the same or substantially the same relief maybe stayed until such costs have been paid under r 12.10. [r 29.9.80] No application where multiple defendants UCPR r 29.9(6) requires the court not to deal with an application under r 29.9(1) until the conclusion of the evidence given for all parties if the application is made by some but not all defendants. That is because the case of another defendant may implicate the moving defendant or defendants. A similar restriction ordinarily applies to an application for summary dismissal, although there as a matter of discretion: Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 at 12; Breheny v Cairncross [2002] NSWCA 69 at [3], [7]. Compare J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458; 46 IR 242 as to whether a defendant should be required to elect, in the absence of a rule to the effect of r 29.9(6). [r 29.9.1000] References As to the effect of dismissal of proceedings for want of prosecution: [r 12.7.80]; as to costs: [r 42.20.40]; as to summary dismissal: [r 13.4.100] and [r 13.4.120]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

687

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 29.9.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 29.10

[r 29.9.1000]

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 34 r 7; DCR Pt 26 r 7. 29.10

Judgment for want of evidence

(cf SCR Part 34, rule 8; DCR Part 26, rule 8; LCR Part 21, rule 6)

(1) An opposite party may apply to the court to give judgment for the opposite party, either generally or on any claim for relief in the proceedings, on the ground that, on the evidence given, a judgment for the beginning party could not be supported. (2) Such an application may be made at any time after the conclusion of the evidence for the beginning party in his or her case in chief. (3) The court may not give judgment under this rule unless the opposite party satisfies the court that, on the evidence given, a judgment for the beginning party could not be supported. (4) If the opposite party fails to satisfy the court that, on the evidence given, a judgment for the beginning party could not be supported, the opposite party may not adduce evidence or further evidence in the proceedings generally or on the claim for relief concerned, as the case may be, except by leave of the court. (5) If not all opposite parties apply to the court under subrule (1), the court must not deal with any such application before the conclusion of the evidence given for all parties.

RULE 29.10 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 29.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 29.10.40] Principles applying to an application under this rule .............................................................................. [r 29.10.60] Effect of verdict by direction ................................................................................................................... [r 29.10.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 29.10.1000]

[r 29.10.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 8 and DCR Pt 26 r 8. [r 29.10.40]

Operation

An application for a verdict by direction under r 29.10 requires the opposite party to elect not to give evidence or to give further evidence in relation to the proceedings generally or the claim for relief the subject of the application, except by leave of the court (sought after an unsuccessful application: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sydney Investment House Equities Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 814 at [3] and [24]). SCR Pt 34 r 8 prohibited giving evidence after an unsuccessful application under the rule. Compare [r 29.9.40] regarding an application for dismissal. UCPR r 29.10(5) requires the court not to deal with an application under r 29.10(1) until the conclusion of the evidence given for all parties if the application is made by some but not all opposite parties. See [r 29.9.80] in relation to the similar restriction on the court dealing with an application under r 29.9. [r 29.10.60]

Principles applying to an application under this rule

An application made under this rule is considered on the evidence led to the time of the application, taken at its highest, or on “the jury basis”. As discussed in Mailman v Ellison [1993] NSWCA 169 and Hunt v Watkins (2000) 49 NSWLR 508; [2000] NSWCA 229, the question is not what conclusions of fact the judge would make but the conclusions which a jury or fact finding tribunal could, on the evidence, make without error. That is, whether at the time of the application there is evidence which, if accepted, would justify and sustain a verdict in the plaintiff’s favour. Judgment should be given under r 29.10 (or the plaintiff’s case dismissed under r 29.9) if there is an absence of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s case. The question is not whether the plaintiff’s case should be accepted, but whether there is evidence capable of establishing the matters the plaintiff must establish to succeed. If an application is made for judgment with respect to the whole of the proceedings, the application 688

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 29 – Trials r 29.13

should be dismissed if the plaintiff demonstrates that there is sufficient evidence to support at least one of the claims for relief: Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sydney Investment House Equities Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 814 at [6]. [r 29.10.80]

Effect of verdict by direction

A verdict by direction will, in contrast to dismissal under r 29.9, dispose of the proceedings or cause of action: compare [r 29.9.60]. [r 29.10.1000]

References

See generally the discussion in Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure, (10th ed, Lawbook Co, 2014) [12.140]–[12.210], and in Lindsay GC, Guide to the practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, (LawBook Co, 1989) p 86. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 34 r 8; DCR Pt 26 r 8. 29.11

Judgment despite verdict, finding or assessment

(cf SCR Part 34, rule 8A)

If, at a trial with a jury, a verdict is given or a finding or assessment is made, the court may give judgment as it thinks fit despite the verdict, finding or assessment.

RULE 29.11 COMMENTARY [r 29.11.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 8A. There is no equivalent DCR provision. 29.12 Death of party before judgment (cf SCR Part 34, rule 10)

(1) If a party dies after the verdict or finding on the questions of fact, the court may give judgment, and judgment may be entered, despite the death. (2) Subrule (1) does not limit the court’s power to make orders for the joinder, removal or re-arrangement of parties under Part 6.

RULE 29.12 COMMENTARY [r 29.12.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 10. There is no equivalent DCR provision. 29.13 Record of trial to be kept (cf SCR Part 34, rule 9; DCR Part 26, rule 8A)

The associate, or other officer of the court present at the trial, is to maintain and complete a record of the trial.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

689

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 29.12.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 29.14

[r 29.13.20]

RULE 29.13 COMMENTARY [r 29.13.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 34 r 9 and DCR Pt 26 r 8A. 29.14 Court may refuse to hear proceedings if fees unpaid (cf Supreme Court Regulation 2000, clause 12; District Court Regulation 2000, clause 9A)

The court may refuse to hear, or to continue to hear, proceedings in respect of which a hearing allocation fee or hearing fee remains due and unpaid. [R 29.14 am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[31]]

RULE 29.14 COMMENTARY [r 29.14.20]

Comparison

This replaces and is the same in substance as Supreme Court Regulation 2000 cl 12. 29.15 Statement in open court about settled defamation proceedings (cf SCR Part 67, rule 21; DCR Part 49, rule 19)

With the leave of the court, a party to proceedings for defamation that have been settled may make in open court such statement about the proceedings as has been approved by the court in private. [R 29.15 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[6]]

29.16 Offers to make amends for defamatory publications: determination of questions (cf SCR Part 67, rule 22; DCR Part 49, rule 20)

The court may hear an application and determine any question under section 9F(2) of the Defamation Act 1974 or section 15(3) of the Defamation Act 2005 in the absence of the public. [R 29.16 insrt Rule 807 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[6]]

690

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 30 – Assessment of damages and value of goods [r 30.1.40]

r 30.1 UCPR Parts 21-30

PART 30 – ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES AND VALUE OF GOODS Commentary by Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court. Updated by Mandy Tibbey, Barrister.

PART 30 COMMENTARY [r Pt30.20]

Overview

This Part deals with assessment of damages and the assessment of the value of goods. This Part applies where default judgment has been granted (pursuant to r 16.5 or r 16.7), where liability has been admitted (pursuant to r 20.27, r 20.34 or r 17.7), where there has been a summary judgment for liability (pursuant to r 13.1(1)(b)) and where liability has been determined after a trial as to liability (where an order has been made pursuant to r 29.4). The rules in this Part are largely derived from SCR Pt 35, and there is no effective change from those rules. 30.1 Damages under judgment (cf SCR Part 35, rule 1; DCR Part 11A, rule 2(2); LCR Part 10A, rule 2(2))

(1) This rule applies to proceedings in which judgment against a party has been given for damages to be assessed. (2) Subject to subrule (3), the proceedings are to proceed to trial for assessment of damages. (3) If the proceedings are carried on against the party on any claim for relief not determined by the judgment, or against any other party, the trial for assessment of damages is to be held together with any other trial in the proceedings.

RULE 30.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 30.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 30.1.40] Evidence on an assessment hearing ....................................................................................................... [r 30.1.60] Appearance and representation ............................................................................................................... [r 30.1.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 30.1.1000]

[r 30.1.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 35 r 1 and DCR Pt 27 r 1. In the District Court DCR Pt 11 r 3 prescribed the procedure where an order for judgment (in effect a default judgment for liability) had been entered; this rule supersedes that rule. Subrule (3) of this rule corresponds and is to the same effect as SCR Pt 35 r 1(2) and DCR Pt 27 r 1. [r 30.1.40]

Operation

Statements of claim for unliquidated claims in the Supreme Court and District Court are case managed from the filing of the statement of claim. New statements of claim are listed for directions before a registrar (or a judge in respect of some specialist lists). If judgment is entered (by default, consent or admission) or otherwise made (after a hearing) for damages to be assessed, the judgment cannot be enforced until the quantum of damages has been determined. If the matter is not already listed for case management directions, which is unlikely, the registry will list the matter for callover or directions, with the intent that the matter proceed to a hearing to assess the quantum of damages. Even though a defence may not have been filed, or the defence may only relate to liability the defendant may wish to defend the assessment hearing, and will be entitled to be heard on the assessment hearing provided a notice of appearance has been entered in the proceedings. Even though liability may not be in issue, the assessment process may require extensive case management, particularly in respect of complex Supreme Court cases. Subrule (3) follows the logic of r 29.4, which states that generally all issues in a proceeding are to be determined at the one trial. See also CPA s 90, which requires the court to give judgment having regard to each © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

691

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 30.2

[r 30.1.40]

of the claims in the proceedings. The effect of subr (3) is that if the plaintiff has obtained a judgment for liability and for damages to be assessed against a defendant and there is an outstanding cross-claim or the plaintiff is proceeding against other defendants, the assessment of damages hearing will, unless the court otherwise orders, be deferred until the rest of the proceedings are ready to be heard. This avoids duplication of hearings, and the possibility that issues in an earlier assessment hearing may be determined without hearing from other potentially affected parties. This rule operates where a separate judgment (sometimes default judgment) has been entered in relation to liability only. Where a hearing dealing with damages has been held, this rule does not confer a discretion to permit a supplementary hearing if a party failed to substantiate some issues in relation to damages in the earlier hearing: Voss v Ipkendanz [2009] NSWSC 562. As to what constitutes a “continuing cause of action” see Lahoud v Lahoud (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 55 at [23] per Handley AJA. [r 30.1.60]

Evidence on an assessment hearing

Evidence of facts on an assessment hearing is to be by way of affidavits unless the court orders otherwise: r 31.1(4)(b). Evidence taken at a trial may be used for any subsequent trial for the assessment of damages or of the value of goods in the same proceedings, saving all just exceptions and unless the court orders otherwise: r 31.8(2). [r 30.1.80]

Appearance and representation

If a party is not physically present, then it must be proven that the party was made aware of the date for the assessment hearing and chose not to attend before an assessment hearing can proceed: French Consulting Pty Ltd v Donald [2011] NSWSC 584 per Hallen AsJ. [r 30.1.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 35 r 1; DCR Pt 11 r 3, Pt 27 r 1. Default judgment for liability damages to be assessed: r 16.7. See commentary at [r 16.7.40] and [r 16.7.60]. Evidence on an assessment hearing: r 31.1(4)(b); r 31.8(2). Continuation of proceedings after a partial judgment: r 13.3. 30.2

Value of goods under judgment

(cf SCR Part 35, rule 2)

Rule 30.1 applies to proceedings in which judgment is given for the value of goods to be assessed (with or without damages to be assessed) in the same way as it applies to a judgment for damages to be assessed.

RULE 30.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 30.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 30.2.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 30.2.1000]

[r 30.2.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 35 r 2, and is to the same effect. There was no equivalent rule in the District Court. [r 30.2.40]

Operation

The legislative authority for the court to assess the value of detained goods is provided by CPA s 93. Statements of claim for detention of goods are not case managed until a defence is filed. If judgment is entered (by default, consent or admission) or otherwise made (after a hearing) for the value of goods to be assessed, the judgment cannot be enforced until the value of the goods has been determined. If default judgment has 692

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 30 – Assessment of damages and value of goods r 30.3

been entered or the matter is otherwise not listed for case management directions, the registry will list the matter for callover or directions, with the intent that the matter proceed to a hearing to assess the value of the goods. See also [r 30.1.60]. [r 30.2.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 35 r 2. Judgments for detention of goods: CPA s 93. Default judgment for detention of goods (value to be assessed): r 16.5. See commentary at [r 16.5.80]. 30.3

Damages to time of assessment

(cf SCR Part 35, rule 3; DCR Part 27, rule 2, LCR Part 22, rule 2)

(1) If damages are to be assessed in respect of: (a) a continuing cause of action, or (b) repeated breaches of recurring obligations, or (c) intermittent breaches of a continuing obligation, the damages are to be assessed up to the time of assessment, including damages for breaches occurring after the commencement of the proceedings. (2) Subrule (1) applies to the assessment of damages under this Part or otherwise.

RULE 30.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 30.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 30.3.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 30.3.1000]

[r 30.3.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on and to the same effect as SCR Pt 35 r 3 and DCR Pt 27 r 2. [r 30.3.40]

Operation

As a general rule, “damages for tort or for breach of contract are assessed as at the date of the breach” (Lord Wilberforce in Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd (1976) AC 443 at 468). There are exceptions to this rule. In personal injury cases the date of the judgment is the proper date at which to assess damages: O’Brien v McKean (1968) 118 CLR 540; 42 ALJR 223; [1969] ALR 65. Other exceptions to the general rule are discussed in Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; 63 ALJR 51; 82 ALR 587; [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-224. Where there is a continuing cause of action the plaintiff can recover for loss suffered up to the date that the damage is incurred, which will be determined at the date of the judgment. It is not possible to recover apprehended future loss for future damage. This needs to be distinguished from assessing future loss of earning capacity arising from damages that have already arisen: Mann v Capital Territory Health Commission (1982) 148 CLR 97; 56 ALJR 261; 42 ALR 46; [1982] HCA 10. A continuing cause of action is a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought. A claim in nuisance will constitute a continuing cause of action: Hole v Chard Union [1894] 1 Ch 293. As damages cannot be awarded for apprehended future loss it may be appropriate to seek to delay the assessment of the damages until the full extent of the loss or damage can be determined. In relation to equitable damages (pursuant to SCA s 68), there is no general rule that damages should be assessed at the time of judgment: ASA Constructions Pty Ltd v Iwanov [1975] 1 NSWLR 512. The court may fix a date for assessment of damages that is appropriate in the circumstances: Madden v Kevereski [1983] 1 NSWLR 305. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

693

UCPR Parts 21-30

[r 30.3.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 30.3 [r 30.3.1000]

[r 30.3.40] References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 35 r 3; DCR Pt 27 r 2. Equitable damages: SCA s 68.

694

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

PART 31 – EVIDENCE Commentary by Mark Walsh, Barrister.

Overview .................................................................................................................................................. [r Pt31.20] Part 31 procedures, evidence legislation and the CPA ........................................................................... [r Pt31.40] Contents of Division 1 of Part 31 ............................................................................................................. [r Pt31.60] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r Pt31.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r Pt31.1000]

[r Pt31.20]

Overview

UCPR Pt 31 prescribes the procedure for adducing lay and expert evidence at both interlocutory and final hearings. It has two distinct Divisions: Division 1 – Evidence at hearing: Sets out the steps necessary prior to adducing evidence, and also the ways that evidence is to be given at hearing. Importantly, this Division affects the operation, prescribes the necessary pre-hearing procedures and sets out relevant considerations for the court at hearing of legislative provisions including the Evidence Act 1995, for facilitation of proof, the use of technology to give evidence, timing for hearsay and tendency notices and matters regarding stamp duties. Division 2 – Provisions applicable to expert evidence generally: Codifies procedures for the use of expert opinion evidence in proceedings. The purposes of this Division are set out in r 31.17. They include ensuring that the court, rather than the parties, has control over the appointment and engagement of expert witnesses to provide assistance by giving expert evidence; to restrict unnecessary costs due to expert assistance; and not to compromise the interests of justice. The date of commencement of the current Division 2 was 8 December 2006. Its rules take into account the recommendations of the NSW Law Reform Commission’s Report 109. The expert witness code of conduct has been amended (see UCPR Sch 7), also effective from 8 December 2006. [r Pt31.40]

Part 31 procedures, evidence legislation and the CPA

The utility of the procedures in UCPR Pt 31 for the court and the parties is enhanced by CPA ss 61 and 62 which provide powers to a court to give directions for practice and procedure or for the conduct of a hearing. The “overriding purpose” of the CPA in s 56 is patent in Pt 31 with early and timely pre-hearing evidentiary requirements. This approach allows earlier identification, and narrowing, of the real issues in dispute to promote a just, quick and cheap resolution of disputes. For example the service of a hearsay notice per s 67 of the Evidence Act 1995 is required by r 31.5 before the date for determining the date of the hearing. To utilise the ameliorating provisions in Commonwealth and NSW evidence legislation, which soften the harshness of the common law or provide exceptions to statutory provisions, compliance by parties with the timetable for the applicable regimen established by Pt 31 Div 1 is prudent. However, where any inconsistency arises between legislation and delegated legislation such as the rules generally the former will apply: see s 11 of the Evidence Act 1995, Lane v Jurd (No 2) (1995) 40 NSWLR 708. Generally a discretion exists for the court to excuse compliance with an individual rule by making an “order otherwise”. However, the party seeking such an order bears the onus of establishing why such an order ought to be made. Matters such as prejudice to the opponent, or lack of any prejudice, and the absence of any satisfactory explanation by an applicant for its default may result in the discretion not being exercised by the court: see Adams v Kennick Trading (International) Ltd [1986] 4 NSWLR 503 at 506. The court has the power to dispense with rules in particular civil proceedings per CPA s 14, and to make directions per CPA s 63 with respect to procedural irregularities, including a failure to comply with the rules. As to extension and abridgment of time fixed by the rules or any judgment or order of the court, see r 1.12: El Ali v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1988) 15 NSWLR 303. In deciding to make any order or direction for the management of proceedings the court is required to follow the dictates of justice by CPA s 58 (which sets out relevant matters for the court to consider in doing so). In Harding v Bourke (2000) 48 NSWLR 598; [2000] NSWCA 60 at [26] Mason P, with whom Meagher and Heydon JJA agreed, stated: Such a dispensing power is commonly encountered in rules of court and it serves to remind that the rules are the servants of justice, not their masters. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

695

UCPR Parts 31-40

PART 31 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt31.40] The continued application of this principle after the 2005 reforms to procedure was explained by Young JA (with whom Basten JA and Handley AJA agreed) in Hodder Rook & Assocs Pty Ltd v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 279 at [38]: [T]he basic principle [is] that the rules of the court are to be the servant of justice, not its master. No matter how inconvenient it may be, a judge must never lose sight of his or her primary duty and that is to ensure a fair trial. This is now made statutory by s 56(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. In Dennis v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2008] NSWCA 37 at [28]–[29] Spigelman CJ, with whom Basten and Campbell JJA agreed, explained that earlier common law authority as to case management practices in courts, such as Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146; 71 ALJR 294 and the common law principles for which that authority stands, have been modified by statute both directly and via the rules of court pursuant to statutory authority. Such common law authority is to be understood to operate subject to the statutory duty imposed upon the courts by the “statutorily compulsory” considerations of ss 56 and 57 of the CPA, see s 58(2)(a) and Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230 at [38], to give effect to the “overriding purpose”. The objectives of case management found in provisions such as Pt 6 of the CPA include the timely disposal of the proceedings at an affordable cost and were enacted after the decision of J L Holdings. Earlier decisions by which courts granted an indulgence to litigants absent prejudice or on payment of costs for the opposing party are to be understood as superseded in the changed circumstances where the objectives of case management such as Pt 6 subsequently have been expressed in the rules. This has been recognised by the courts in recent decisions including that the purpose of case management by the courts is for the resolution of disputes to serve the public as a whole and not merely the parties to proceedings in question and that delay has deleterious effects not only to those parties, but to other litigants, see: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27. In the exercise of its power arising under the CPA and the UCPR, including to relieve a party from compliance with provision of the rules or a practice note or to make “orders otherwise” under the rules, a court is required to take into account the overriding purpose stated in CPA s 56(1) and the objects identified in s 57(1); together with the object of minimising delay per s 59, the principle of proportionality stated in s 60 and the matters specified in s 58(2), to the extent the court considers those matters relevant. A decision in a particular case is likely to require a “weighing of considerations that will not always be easy to reconcile”: see Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372 at [90]–[96], [107]. [r Pt31.60] Contents of Division 1 of Part 31 31.1 Manner of giving evidence at trial 31.2 Evidence of witnesses at interlocutory hearings 31.3 Evidence by telephone, video link or other communication 31.4 Court may direct party to furnish witness statement 31.5 Notice under s 67 or s 99 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) 31.6 Evidence on Commission 31.7 Foreign material 31.8 Earlier evidence in the same proceedings 31.9 Earlier evidence in other proceedings 31.10 Plans, photographs, audio-visual recordings and models 31.11 Production of court documents 31.12 Proof of court documents 31.13 Unstamped documents: arrangements under s 304 of the Duties Act 1997 (NSW) 31.14 Unstamped documents: undertaking per s 29 of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 (NSW) 31.15 Evidence of consent to act as tutor, trustee, receiver or other office 31.16 Evidence of published research concerning maintenance of children 31.16A Return of exhibits [r Pt31.80]

Operation

Part 31 Div 1 sets out matters of practice and procedure for evidence both for pre-hearing matters and for hearing. The rules in Div 1 affect the operation and use at hearing of Commonwealth and State evidence legislation including the following: 696

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.1.20]

r 31.1

Duties Act 1997: see r 31.13 Evidence Act 1995: see rr 31.1 and 31.5 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth): see r 31.3 Evidence on Commission Act 1995: see r 31.6 Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth): see r 31.7 Stamp Duties Act 1920: see r 31.14 [r Pt31.1000]

References

DIVISION 1 – EVIDENCE AT HEARING 31.1

Manner of giving evidence at trial

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 2; DCR Part 28, rule 2; LCR Part 25, rule 9)

(1) This rule applies to a trial of proceedings commenced by statement of claim, or in which a statement of claim has been filed. (2) Subject to subrules (3), (4) and (5) and to the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995, a witness’s evidence at a trial must be given orally before the court. [Subr (2) am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[32]]

(3) The court may order that all or any of a witness’s evidence at a trial must be given by affidavit or, subject to rule 31.4, by witness statement. (4) Unless the court orders otherwise, evidence of facts must be given by affidavit if the only matters in question are: (a) interest up to judgment in respect of a debt or liquidated claim, or (b) the assessment of damages or the value of goods under Part 30, or (c) costs. (5) Unless the court otherwise orders, at any trial on an assessment of the amount to be recovered by a plaintiff after default judgment has been given, the following evidence may be given by affidavit: (a) evidence of the identity of any motor vehicle, (b) evidence of the damage sustained by a motor vehicle in a particular collision, (c) evidence of the reasonable cost of repairing that damage. [Subr (5) insrt Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[33]] [R 31.1 am Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 31.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 31.1.40] Interaction of rules and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ........................................................................... [r 31.1.60] Evidence of facts by affidavit .................................................................................................................... [r 31.1.80] Non-compliance with court order as to affidavit evidence ....................................................................... [r 31.1.90] Development of the receipt and use of oral evidence at trials .............................................................. [r 31.1.100] Demeanour ............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.1.120] Direction that affidavit intended to be used in proceedings not be served ........................................... [r 31.1.140] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 31.1.1000]

[r 31.1.20]

Comparison

This rule is similar in substance to SCR Pt 36 r 2 and DCR Pt 28 r 2. Under the SCR and DCR, the requirement that a witness’s evidence be given orally was subject to any agreement between the parties, but this rule contains no such provision. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

697

UCPR Parts 31-40

Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) or subscription service.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.1

[r 31.1.20]

[r 31.1.40]

Operation

This rule provides that a witness must give evidence orally at a trial of proceedings before the court, except when the exceptions in subrr (3), (4) and (5) or provisions of the Evidence Act are engaged. Rule 31.1 is not confined either by or to questions of infirmity, and interacts with other rules such as r 24.3, which confers a discretion at large upon a judicial officer. The rules establish an integrated process as to how matters should proceed in court: Nominal Defendant v Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer [2010] NSWCA 376 at [39], [44]. The appropriate originating process in proceedings, ie statement of claim or summons, is generally determined by r 6.3 which sets out proceedings to be commenced by statement of claim, and r 6.4 which sets out proceedings to be commenced by summons. Where proceedings have been wrongly commenced by statement of claim, the court may order that the proceedings be continued as if commenced by summons and that the pleadings filed in the proceedings be treated as affidavits: see r 6.5. Where proceedings are wrongly commenced by summons, the court may order that the proceedings are to continue as if commenced by, and make orders for the filing of a statement of claim which will attract the provisions of r 31.1 as set out in r 6.6(4). [r 31.1.60]

Interaction of rules and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)

UCPR Pt 29 – Trials – sets out relevant procedural matters. Provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 about giving evidence at trials include: • s 26: the court’s control over questioning of witnesses; • s 28: the court’s control over the order of the giving of oral evidence; • s 29: the manner and form of questioning witnesses and their responses together with the giving of evidence in the form of charts, summaries or other explanatory material; • s 30: the use of interpreters; • s 31: evidence of deaf and mute witnesses. • s 53 : the court may order a demonstration, experiment or inspection be held, ie: including what was previously known as a “view”. • s 54 : the court may draw any reasonable inference from what it sees, hears or otherwise notices during a demonstration, experiment or inspection. [r 31.1.80]

Evidence of facts by affidavit

This rule incorporates the provisions in Pt 30 – Assessment of damages and value of goods – thus r 31.1(3), (4), (5) preclude the giving of oral evidence of facts at trial in certain matters, for example proceedings in which judgment against a party has been given for damages to be assessed, see [r 30.1.40], [r 30.1.60]. The requirement that evidence of facts relevant to the determination of the issues of costs be given by affidavit emphasises the need for preparation of such material well in advance of trial, as the attempted tender of documents from the bar table, such as correspondence, may be rejected. [r 31.1.90] Non-compliance with court order as to affidavit evidence A party who fails to comply with an order for the service of evidence in chief by affidavit will often be precluded from relying upon evidence which is served late if the opposite party would thereby be prejudiced, see Beattie v Osman (No 3) [2009] NSWSC 824 at [37]. Where a party is granted leave to file and serve affidavit evidence as to a specific issue such as traversing other evidence as to a conversation which is in issue and in fact goes beyond the limited area for which leave has been granted, such leave may be revoked to preserve an approaching hearing date, see Sedrak v Starr [2009] NSWSC 996. [r 31.1.100]

Development of the receipt and use of oral evidence at trials

This rule reflects the evolution of the method of the search for truth in common law proceedings. Ancient forms of action did not include oral evidence as we know it today. However, with time, trial by ordeal or trial by battle fell from favour. One of the earlier methods was trial by witnesses which involved testimony or endorsement of a party’s account of facts by friends who usually had little or no knowledge of the relevant 698

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.1.1000]

r 31.1

facts. Further development led to the modern approach where witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the relevant facts give evidence in open court and are subject to scrutiny including the testing of their evidence by the opponent. The method of determination of factual matters continues to change. Previously it was the province of the jury alone, yet recently the use of juries has diminished, in favour of the trial judge determining both matters of fact and law. Demeanour

The reliance on the witness’s demeanour in court has historically been of great significance to the judge’s findings and decision. This so-called trial judge’s advantage has as a matter of policy not easily been disturbed on appeal. More recently questions as to the value of demeanour have arisen: Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 326 at 348; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; 77 ALJR 989; [2003] HCA 22 at [30]–[31]. [r 31.1.140]

Direction that affidavit intended to be used in proceedings not be served

The court has wide powers to make directions for the conduct of proceedings, see CPA s 14 (power to dispense with requirements of the rules), s 15 (power to issue practice notes), and Pt 6 – Case management and interlocutory matters. The power to protect confidential information from inappropriate disclosure in the course of litigation, where the purpose of maintaining confidentiality was for a forensic purpose in the context of the litigation, was well established prior to the CPA and the UCPR: see Markus v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd (1983) 25 NSWCCR 1 (documents not subject to privilege, recording investigations undertaken by insurer’s loss adjuster casting doubt upon the genuineness of the plaintiffs’ claims under an insurance policy notwithstanding the prospect of facilitating settlement). The exercise of this power is to be determined in accordance with the interests of justice and is pursuant to the discretion conferred on the court as to case management: see Kimberley Mineral Holdings Ltd (in liq) v McEwan [1980] 1 NSWLR 210; (1980) 4 ACLR 851 (power of the court to give such directions for the conduct of the proceedings as appear best adapted for their just, quick and cheap disposal and to prevent abuse of its process). The CPA and UCPR confer extensive powers on the court to make orders for the pre-trial management of proceedings including “such other directions with respect to the conduct of the proceedings as it considers appropriate”, see CPA s 61 and directions for the conduct of the proceedings UCPR rr 2.1, 2.3. Whether an order is appropriate in a particular case will depend on a number of considerations including the application of the criteria stated in CPA s 56, s 57(1) and “the dictates of justice” as defined in CPA s 56, s 58(2): see Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372 at [90]–[96] (direction by court exempting defendant insurer from standard directions in Practice Note SC CL 5 requiring service of certain affidavits on plaintiff insured). Under the CPA s 61 and UCPR, courts in New South Wales continue to have power to make orders relieving one party to civil litigation from complying in whole or part with directions that would otherwise require that party to disclose to another party in advance of the trial all affidavits and reports to be adduced at trial: see Halpin at [107]. [r 31.1.1000]

References

Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372. Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014). UCPR Pt 29 – Trials. Evidence Act 1995. State Rail Authority (NSW) v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 73 ALJR 306; 160 ALR 588; [1999] HCA 3. Hon Justice Peter McClellan, “Who is telling the truth? Psychology, common sense and the law”, (1983) 57 ALJ 679. Re L, “Oral versus Written Evidence: The Myth of the ‘Impressive Witness’” (1983) 57 ALJ 679. Ellard J, “A Note on Lying and its Detection” (1996) 2 The Judicial Review 303. Underwood J, Has the Trial Process Reached its “Use By” Date, Judicial Conference of Australia, 7 November 1998: http://www.jca.asn.au/pubs/Underwoodpaper.html. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

699

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 31.1.120]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.2

31.2

[r 31.1.1000]

Evidence of witnesses at other hearings

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 3; DCR Part 28, rule 3)

Subject to rule 31.1, evidence in chief of any witness at any hearing must be given by affidavit unless the court orders otherwise. [R 31.2 am Rule 717 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[8]]

RULE 31.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 31.2.40] Exception to hearsay rule in interlocutory proceedings ........................................................................... [r 31.2.60] Dispensing with rules of evidence ............................................................................................................ [r 31.2.70] Oral evidence and additional oral evidence ............................................................................................. [r 31.2.80] Loss of client legal privilege, compulsion of law and r 31.2 .................................................................. [r 31.2.100] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 31.2.1000]

[r 31.2.20]

Comparison

This rule removes the choice previously existing in SCR Pt 36 r 3 and DCR Pt 28 r 3. The new rule requires evidence in chief of witnesses to be by affidavit at any hearing, subject to r 31.1. [r 31.2.40]

Operation

This rule makes affidavit evidence mandatory at all hearings (note CPA s 3 provides the following definition: hearing includes both trial and interlocutory hearing), but the rule provides the court with a discretion to make “orders otherwise”. However, the operation of r 31.1 will preclude affidavit evidence being presented at trial of proceedings commenced by statement of claim absent an order pursuant to r 31.1(3) or by operation of the court’s practice notes or practice directions. Underpinning this rule is the desirability of a party having notice of an opponent’s evidence to avoid surprise and potential delay due to the need for an adjournment, to meet unexpected evidence. A party who fails to comply with an order of service of evidence in chief by affidavit will often be precluded from relying upon evidence which is served late if the opposite party would thereby be prejudiced, see Beattie v Osman (No 3) [2009] NSWSC 824 at [37]. Useful guidance for the preparation and use of affidavits is to be found at [r Pt35.40]. A party may require by written notice the attendance for cross-examination of a person who made an affidavit, such notice must be given a reasonable time before the required attendance. If reasonable notice has been given, and the deponent fails to attend, the court may order that the affidavit is not to be used, unless the deponent is dead or the court “orders otherwise”, see r 35.2. One relevant consideration in the exercise of the court’s discretion is whether there is need for, or any utility in permitting cross-examination. Where the contents of the affidavit are not contentious, or central to the dispute between the parties, its use may be permitted notwithstanding the unavailability of the deponent for cross-examination, see [r 35.2.40]. A most relevant consideration will be whether the affidavit is formal in the sense of fulfilling a procedural requirement of legislation, or alternatively substantive in the sense of containing evidence on a central issue in contest in the proceedings. [r 31.2.60]

Exception to hearsay rule in interlocutory proceedings

Section 75 of the Evidence Act 1995 provides an exception to the hearsay rule, found in s 59 of that Act, for an interlocutory proceeding. Thus affidavit evidence that deposes to matters on “information and belief” is admissible in an interlocutory hearing (assuming that it is not excluded for other reasons eg s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995), provided the party who seeks to rely on it also adduces evidence of its source, see: Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) at [1.3.3700] to [1.3.3740]. [r 31.2.70]

Dispensing with rules of evidence

The power to dispense with the rules of evidence for proving a matter that is not bona fide in dispute such as non-compliance as to proper form, such as the requirements of Evidence Act 1995 s 75, is available generally for all courts pursuant to CPA s 70 and as to specific provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 pursuant to s 190. 700

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.3.20] [r 31.2.80]

r 31.3

Oral evidence and additional oral evidence

Where material contained in an affidavit is rejected by the court as being inadmissible, eg for reasons of form, an application to lead oral evidence from the deponent on that material ought to be made. Leave will usually be granted in the interests of justice and due to the difficulty for an opponent to show any real prejudice. [r 31.2.100]

Loss of client legal privilege, compulsion of law and r 31.2

Rule 31.2 does not legally compel a party to either give the evidence or to swear in affidavit form any evidence in chief that is to be adduced in a trial. Thus the operation of Evidence Act 1995 s 122(5)(a)(iii), whereby a party does not suffer the loss of client legal privilege merely because the substance of the evidence has been disclosed under compulsion of law, does not arise. Furthermore, the obligation arising from r 31.2 is subject to the court making “orders otherwise” to relieve a party from the operation of this rule: see Wilesmith v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints [2006] NSWSC 936. [r 31.2.1000]

References

UCPR Pt 35 – Affidavits. Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) or subscription service. Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 31.3

Evidence by telephone, video link or other communication

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 2A; DCR Part 28, rule 2A; LCR Part 23, rule 1C)

(1) If the court so orders, evidence and submissions may be received by telephone, video link or other form of communication. (2) This rule does not apply in circumstances in which leave for remote appearances from New Zealand in Australian proceedings within the meaning of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 of the Commonwealth could be granted under that Act. [Subr (2) subst Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[2]] [R 31.3 am Rule 632 of 2011]

RULE 31.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 31.3.40] Operation of Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 ............................................................ [r 31.3.60] Provisions in the Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 relevant to the making of directions for the use of audio and audio visual links ........................................................................ [r 31.3.80] Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) ........................................................................................... [r 31.3.100] Relevant considerations for the exercise of the court’s discretion to make orders under this rule ...... [r 31.3.120] Practical matters for the use of audio and audio visual links ................................................................ [r 31.3.140] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 31.3.1000]

[r 31.3.20]

Comparison

Other than changing the term “audio-visual method” to “video link”, this rule reproduces the broad substance (if not the form – gone is the all encompassing “directions for and in relation to the proceedings”) of SCR Pt 36 r 2A and DCR Pt 28 r 2A, and the exception set out in subr (2) now also applies to the District Court. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

701

UCPR Parts 31-40

Rule 31.2 provides a discretion in the court to make “orders otherwise” where the interests of justice including consideration of the “overriding purpose” will be best served by evidence in chief being given other than by affidavit as required by r 31.2. Each case will turn on its own facts, however examples might include the evidence of a disinterested, uncooperative or unfavourable witness (see, for example, Evidence Act 1995 s 38), or matters where the advantage of a trial judge to assess the demeanour and reliability of witnesses while giving oral evidence is required.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.3

[r 31.3.20]

In 2012 subr (2) was amended following the commencement of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), and the repeal of the Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994 (Cth). [r 31.3.40]

Operation

This rule envisages the use of suitable technology to achieve the overriding purpose as stated in CPA s 56 and also UCPR rr 2.1 and 2.3 (see particularly r 2.3(1) re video and other technology) for the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in dispute. Power is also conferred on the court by CPA ss 61, 62 to make directions as to practice and procedure, or the conduct of the hearing. This rule allows the court to order evidence be given and submissions made from a place removed from the courtroom using telecommunications technology. Methods envisaged include telephone, ie audio alone, and video link. The inclusion of the term “other form of communication” allows for, and anticipates innovation, and the possibility for the court to accommodate unusual circumstances (r 2.3(1) includes “video tapes, film projection, computer and other equipment and technology”). In circumstances where leave could be sought under s 50 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) (see [r 31.3.100] which limits the technology to audiovisual link or audiolink) this rule does not apply. Sections 51 and 52 of that Act state that before a court may make such a direction it must be satisfied as to the availability and effectiveness of the necessary facilities. This rule applies to criminal proceedings as specified by the regulations, see SCR Pt 75 r 3(5) and SCA Third Schedule – Criminal Proceedings. [r 31.3.60]

Operation of Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998

The Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 facilitates the taking of evidence and the making of submissions by audio links and audio visual links (each is defined in s 3). The Act applies to any court created by the NSW Parliament; it facilitates and extends the operation beyond NSW jurisdiction of what is otherwise a broad and undefined rule. The Act provides for the use of an audio/audio visual link (“A/AV link”) with places in NSW, other States of the Commonwealth and foreign countries, other than the place at which the court is sitting. It applies to both civil and criminal proceedings. The Act applies to persons defined as an “accused detainee” (see s 3 – in effect, a person held in custody). The Act deems the remote premises at which the A/AV link is being used as being part of the NSW courtroom in Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 s 5C, specifying that this has effect for the purposes of the laws relating to evidence, procedure, contempt of court (s 20 prescribing certain behaviour as being contempt of court subject to a maximum penalty of imprisonment for three months), or perjury. Matters relating to the administration of oaths and affirmations are to be found in Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 s 5D. Part 4 of the Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 includes provisions in ss 20A and 20B which set a benchmark for suitable audio visual and audio facilities, s 20C confers power on the court to make orders for the payment of expenses incurred in connection with taking evidence or making submissions by A/AV link, s 20D makes provision for failure of technology and s 20E sets out a protocol for putting documents to a remote person. [r 31.3.80]

Provisions in the Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 relevant to the making of directions for the use of audio and audio visual links General considerations The court must not make a direction for the use of an A/AV link per s 5B of the Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998, if: (a) facilities are unavailable, or (b) it is satisfied that it is more convenient not to use the A/AV link, or (c) it is satisfied that the direction is unfair to the party seeking the direction, or (d) it is satisfied that there will be default by the person for whom the A/AV link is sought. Accused detainees Only an audio visual link and not an audio link is available under the Act for the appearance in proceedings other than in person of an accused detainee. Note that Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 s 5BA requires an accused detainee to appear physically in court in physical appearance proceedings (see s 3). 702

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.3.100]

r 31.3

Appearances before the court by an accused detainee other than in physical appearance proceedings must be by audio visual link, unless the court otherwise directs, see Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 s 5BB. Government Agency witness, including “expert” witnesses and PN SC Gen 15 Section 5BAA of the Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 raises a presumption that evidence from public servants, including police and also experts will be by video-link or telephone. A “government agency witness” is defined in s 5BAA to mean a member of staff of the Government Service or the NSW Health Service or a person employed or engaged by any government agency who has provided an expert’s report for use in proceedings or proposed proceedings or who is called as an expert to give opinion evidence in proceedings; also a police officer for the prosecution or any other witness as prescribed by the regulations called for the purpose of corroboration of another police officer must give evidence to the court by audio-link or audio-visual link from any place within New South Wales unless the court otherwise directs. A direction otherwise will apply when such links are not available or cannot reasonably be made available. The definition of “expert” and “expert’s report” is broad and unrelated to the Expert Code in UCPR Sch 7. Thus expert’s report includes a “hospital report” which is defined as a written statement concerning a patient made by or on behalf of a hospital which a party intends to adduce in evidence in chief at trial. The otherwise direction may be of the court’s own motion or on the application of a party to proceedings. Considerations to the exercise of the court’s discretion to make such a direction include that the evidence to be given is likely to be contentious or that it is in the interests of the administration of justice or the government agency witness to give evidence by appearing physically before the court, see Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 s 5BAA. The application of cl 5 of Practice Note SC Gen 15 as to “Appearances by government agency witnesses” requires the parties to advise the court no later than 10 working days prior to hearing. See also cl 6 regarding “Applications by designated government agencies” which requires government agencies to lodge pre-hearing applications for directions to facilitate the use of audio-visual links at the court no later than 10 working days prior to a hearing and to serve other parties. [r 31.3.100]

Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth)

The purpose of this Act is to (a) streamline the process for resolving civil proceedings with a trans-Tasman element in order to reduce costs and improve efficiency; and (b) minimise existing impediments to enforcing certain NZ judgments and regulatory sanctions; and (c) implement the Trans-Tasman Agreement in Australian law. Provisions to implement the Trans-Tasman Agreement in New Zealand law are in the NZ Act. The Act has terms that are defined in s 4 (including audio link, audiovisual link, civil proceeding, defendant, document, plaintiff) or in another provision of the Act. If another provision defines the term, s 4 will have a signpost to that definition. This Commonwealth Act facilitates matters relating to evidence and other forensic procedure in and between Australia and New Zealand. The Act does not derogate from the inherent power of the Supreme Court, but provides an extended jurisdiction for courts for procedural matters on either side of the Tasman. Part 6 – Remote Appearances of the Act and the corresponding provisions in Pt 6 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Regulation 2012 together define the courts of a State or Territory in which evidence may be taken by audiovisual link or audio link. The term remote appearance is defined in s 4 of the Act as appears remotely: a person appears remotely in a hearing related to a proceeding in a court or tribunal in the territory of a party to the Trans-Tasman Agreement if the person participates in the hearing, from the territory of the other party to the Agreement, by remote appearance medium, which s 4 defines as meaning audio link or audiovisual link. The Act makes provision in s 50 for “Remote appearances related to remote evidence”. Section 50 provides that the Australian court or tribunal may, on application by a party, give leave for: © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

703

UCPR Parts 31-40

Thus the physical appearance before the court by an accused detainee is required in relevant criminal proceedings (see Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 s 3, eg any trial or hearing of charges, any inquiry into a person’s fitness to be tried for an offence or first bail appearance for bail), unless the court “otherwise directs”, eg is satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice for the accused detainee to appear by AV link, see s 5BA(5). Relevant factors for the court to take into account include those set out in Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 s 5BA(6) which relate to security of persons, risk of escape and past behaviour by the accused detainee.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.3

[r 31.3.100]

(a) the giving of evidence; or (b) the examination of a person giving evidence under paragraph (a); or (c) the making of submissions relating to the giving of evidence under paragraph (a); from New Zealand in one or more hearings related to the proceeding by: (d) the remote appearance medium specified by the court or tribunal i.e. by audiovisual link or audio link. Similar provisions to the A/AV Act above are pre-requisites to the use of A/AV links per this Act, including that persons in the court room and at the remote location must be able to hear (for audio link), s 52 or see and hear (for audiovisual link) each other, s 51. If the Australian court or tribunal gives leave, then a qualified NZ lawyer who is not otherwise entitled to appear before the court or tribunal is entitled to practise as a barrister, a solicitor, or both, in relation to that leave, see ss 48(4) and 50(3). [r 31.3.120]

Relevant considerations for the exercise of the court’s discretion to make orders under this rule

The court’s determination of an application for the use of technology will depend on the circumstances of each case, thus earlier authorities will be of only limited assistance. Ultimately the court will need to be satisfied that the making of the order will advance the cause of justice: Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219. Practical considerations will include the comparison of cost for each alternative and any time zone difficulty. There is a difference in the Federal Court’s approach which is to accept the use of technology unless some good reason be shown for a remote witness to attend in person, as opposed to the NSW line of authority which states that a witness must physically attend court to give evidence, unless good reason is established for the use of video link: Australian Medical Imaging Pty Ltd v Marconi Medical Systems Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 1; [2001] NSWSC 651. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; 22 ACLC 1125; [2004] NSWSC 467 provides a detailed analysis by Austin J of authorities on the topic and an approach to considering the issue and other alternatives, including the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth), see particularly [17]–[18] followed by Howie J in R v Wilkie (2005) 193 FLR 291; [2005] NSWSC 794. His Honour provides a summary of the “recurring themes” in applications for the use of technology in Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich at [19] which include: “the appropriateness of audiovisual facilities for centrally important evidence, the assessment of credit where evidence is given by audiovisual link, difficulties raised by the use of documents for cross-examination in audiovisual evidence, technological difficulties due to lapse of time between transmission and receipt of questions and answers, and difficulties posed by the use of audiovisual facilities where the cross-examination is lengthy”. An application for the use of video link in criminal proceedings to allow two witnesses, who were found to hold fears for their safety and to be scared of the accused, to give evidence by video link in a manner that their facial features could not be observed by the accused was granted in R v Ngo (2001) 124 A Crim R 151; [2001] NSWSC 339. Dunford J held that otherwise they would not do justice to themselves as witnesses and therefore the interests of the administration of justice required the making of the order. On appeal, R v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82, the Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s decision, explaining at [108] that a court must consider the degree and effect of any unfairness and at [124] that the phrase “in the interests of the administration of justice” is a broad one which requires assessing the impact on the fairness of the trial for the accused, the fairness to the witnesses and to the Crown, together with the general community. A determination under this rule that evidence may be given by an audio link or audio-visual link requires the applicant to satisfy the court that it is in the interests of the administration of justice for the court to do so. Consideration of the provisions in CPA Pt 6, especially s 60 concerning whether the cost to the parties is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute, will be critical in making an order that evidence be received by telephone, video link or other form of communication rather than by personal appearance in court: Markisic v United States of America [2006] NSWSC 839. [r 31.3.140]

Practical matters for the use of audio and audio visual links

The Supreme Court and the District Court are equipped with facilities for audio and audio visual conferencing. Early planning and preparation by an applicant, including coordination of the remote site and the court, is essential to persuade the court of the merits of an application for the use of such technology at hearings. 704

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.3.1000]

r 31.4

The Supreme Court’s website provides helpful guidance regarding the facilities for the delivery of both video and telephone conferencing services at the Video and telephone conferencing page (http:// www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_courtroomtechnology/sco2_ videoconferencingteleconferening.html) which contains relevant information as to the steps and the fees involved: see links to “Forms” and “Fees”. A useful guide to the process is found in the online documents “The Video Conference — what happens?”. Further practical details of the use of technology in the Court is at “Summary of courtroom technology facilities” (see [r 31.3.1000] for URL links). Contact with the List Clerk prior to an application will assist. Once the appropriate order has been made by the judge, it is necessary to submit the appropriate forms to, and to contact the registry (tel: 1300 679 272) or the Video Conference contact person (tel: +612 9230 8038). In the District Court the List Office can provide the details or go to the FAQ on the court’s website at the Facilities and support page at: http://www.districtcourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/districtcourt/facilities_support.html. Details regarding Technology in courts are at: http://www.districtcourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/districtcourt/ technology.html. See for example page regarding Interpreters and translators at: http://www.districtcourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ districtcourt/interpreters.html If an order has been made or is likely to be made in the District Court the List Office (tel: +612 9377 5833) should be notified: (a) to make arrangements for a conference phone to be available in the court room for an audio link; or (b) to make arrangements for video conferencing facilities through the private sector including the payment of fees and charges for a video link. [r 31.3.1000]

References

Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; 22 ACLC 1125; [2004] NSWSC 467. R v Rail Corp (NSW) [2012] NSWSC 832. Markisic v United States of America [2006] NSWSC 839. Practice Note SC Gen 7 – Use of technology is reproduced in the Practice Notes section of this service. It is also available at: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/ a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/19ae2d221b09c4fbca257483001d0781?OpenDocument. Practice Note SC Gen 15 – Use of audio-visual links in criminal and certain civil proceedings is reproduced in the Practice Notes section of this service. It is also available at: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_ notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/7bd5e80ccc50a600ca2574fc0080118d? OpenDocument. “Summary of courtroom technology facilities”, available at: http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ supremecourt/sco2_courtroomtechnology.html. Local Court: Local Court Practice Note No 7 of 2008 – Use of Audio Visual Link in criminal and civil proceeding is reproduced in the Practice Notes section of this service. It is also available at: http://www.localcourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/localcourts/practice_notes.html. 31.4

Court may direct party to furnish witness statement

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 4A)

(1) The court may direct any party to serve on each other active party a written statement of the oral evidence that the party intends to adduce in chief on any questions of fact to be decided at any hearing (a witness statement). (2) A direction under subrule (1): © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

705

UCPR Parts 31-40

Evidence in support of an application will include the availability of the technological facility both at the court and the remote place, cost considerations, time zone differences and the facts that cause the use of technology to be appropriate.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.4

[r 31.4.20] (a)

may make different provision with regard to different questions of fact or different witnesses, and (b) may require that notice be given of any objection to any of the evidence in a witness statement and of the grounds of any such objection. (3) Each witness statement must be signed by the intended witness unless the signature of the witness cannot be procured or the court orders otherwise. (4) If an intended witness to whose evidence a witness statement relates does not give evidence, no party may put the statement in evidence at the hearing except by leave of the court. (5) If the party serving the statement calls as a witness at the hearing any person whose witness statement has been served pursuant to a direction under subrule (1): (a) that person’s witness statement is to stand as the whole of his or her evidence in chief, so long as that person testifies to the truth of the statement, and (b) except by leave of the court, the party may not adduce from that person any further evidence in chief. (6) A party who fails to comply with a direction given under this rule may not adduce evidence to which the direction relates, except by leave of the court. (7) This rule does not deprive any party of the right to treat any communication as privileged and does not make admissible any evidence that is otherwise inadmissible. (8) An application by a party for an order that the party not be required to comply with a direction under this rule in respect of any proposed witness or witnesses (whether or not such a direction has been given) may be made without serving notice of motion.

RULE 31.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 31.4.40] Exercise of discretion to direct a party to serve witness statements ....................................................... [r 31.4.50] Relief from the operation of the rule ........................................................................................................ [r 31.4.60] Witness statements and privilege ............................................................................................................ [r 31.4.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 31.4.1000]

[r 31.4.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 36 r 4A, except subrr (6) and (7) of the SCR which required the witness statement to be handed up in court bearing a note of the details of service. There is no equivalent DCR provision. Practice notes in each court make provision for witness statements in categories of cases, see particularly proceedings in Specialist Lists in the Supreme Court. [r 31.4.40]

Operation

This rule and r 2.3(k) provide for, and prescribe the manner of, giving evidence by witness statement. A witness statement has the aim of providing admissible factual evidence to an opposing party prior to the hearing. It has some of the characteristics of an affidavit, but differs in that it is not subject to the formalities and sanctions of the Oaths Act 1900, nor is it filed in the court (except for the requirements of Practice Notes and Specialist Lists, eg the Supreme Court’s Commercial List and Technology and Construction List). A witness statement must be signed by the intended witness. However, it is not until the witness testifies to the truth of the statement when called at hearing to give evidence that a party may put the witness statement into evidence. The purposes of a witness statement include to: (a) set out the maker’s evidence in chief of factual matters which a party proposes to lead from that witness at hearing; (b) alert the opposing party to factual issues intended to be relied upon at hearing in order to provide an opportunity to the opposing party to meet those issues; 706

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.4.80]

r 31.4

(c) allow the parties to identify and confine the factual matters really in dispute prior to hearing; (d) confine the evidence in chief at the hearing to that contained in the witness statements, other than with leave of the court;

[r 31.4.50]

Exercise of discretion to direct a party to serve witness statements

This rule confers a general power on the court to direct the service or exchange of a witness statement (defined in r 31.4(1)), which will be exercised according to the relevant circumstances of the particular case. Considerations will include: first, the need to identify the real issues in dispute; secondly, if the statement(s) would enable the parties to assess the relevant strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases; and thirdly, the provisions of CPA Pt 6 and in particular s 56 and the overriding purpose. A further consideration will be the cost of preparation of witness statements and whether oral evidence will provide the court with a better opportunity to assess credibility and reliability of the relevant witnesses. The applicant bears the onus to satisfy the court to exercise the power to make the direction, see Thompson v Dal Cin [2006] NSWSC 1249 at [12]–[15]. [r 31.4.60]

Relief from the operation of the rule

Relief from the operation of the rule and leave to adduce evidence additional to that contained in witness statements may be refused. Broader considerations beyond the parties’ interests, such competition for scarce judicial resources, may lead to such a refusal, see: Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1987] AC 189; Bomanite Pty Ltd v Slatex Corp Aust Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 379; 104 ALR 165; Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27. An order for costs thrown away may not redress the financial or non-financial prejudice to a party: see Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1219 at [49]–[65]; as to discretionary considerations in relation to the filing of a new expert’s report in breach of directions: see Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 706. There are exceptions to the rule requiring the attendance at hearing of the maker of the witness statement, including pursuant to s 63 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW): Lane v Jurd (No 2) (1995) 40 NSWLR 708, where the maker of the statement was deceased. Pursuant to s 63, the onus lies on the party wishing to tender the statement to establish unavailability and that all reasonable steps have been taken to compel attendance: see Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598; [2009] NSWSC 769. Even so, the discretion per Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 135 may lead to the tender being refused: Longhurst v Hunt (2004) 42 MVR 267; [2004] NSWCA 91. The rule contains provision to grant leave to excuse a party from its operation in addition to the court’s powers to make orders and directions as required by the dictates of justice: see CPA s 58, [r Pt31.20]. An application under subr (8) does not require a notice of motion to be served. However, an application will have better prospects of success if supported by evidence in admissible form, and if made without delay. Contested applications for relief on probative factual matters, such as exceptions to the operation of the hearsay rule, are prudently made by notice of motion, and supported by affidavit evidence. [r 31.4.80]

Witness statements and privilege

Laws relating to privilege apply to witness statements: see UCPRPt 3.10 Div 1 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The dominant purpose test as explained by the High Court in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 74 ALJR 339; [1999] HCA 67, applies to a claim for client legal privilege over a witness statement. Privilege may be lost by the voluntary service of a statement on an opposing party. However, pursuant to s 122 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) client privilege will not be lost in relation to a disclosure made as a result of duress or deception, under compulsion of law, or by an unauthorised employee. Privilege will be lost over a witness statement, which furthers the commission of a fraud or an offence, or the commission of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty, or that is in © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

707

UCPR Parts 31-40

(e) minimise the risk of surprise to a party leading to delay due to the need for an adjournment. Care needs to be taken in the drafting of witness statement to avoid delay at hearing caused by the need to lead oral evidence of factual matters which are contained in a statement which are inadmissible eg due to form: see as to conversations LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688 at [11]. Proof of, and reference to, voluminous documents in the witness statement is efficiently achieved by the use of a paginated tender bundle or an exhibit to the witness statement, rather than annexures.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.5

[r 31.4.80]

furtherance of a deliberate abuse of power: see Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 125. The court may receive evidence on the voir dire and, if an abuse of process is established, then rule the evidence admissible: Van Der Lee v NSW [2002] NSWCA 286. A witness statement brought into existence for the dominant purpose of being laid before the court as the witness’s evidence and served upon an opponent loses the essential element of confidentiality (as defined in EAs 117) of being kept away from an opposing party. Thus once served in any proceedings a witness statement loses the protection of EAs 117 and prima facie would not be privileged, see New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 at [28], [29]; Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 74 NSWLR 469; [2009] NSWSC 225 at [11]–[29]; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) FCR 547; [2009] FCAFC 32 at [37], [42] and [54]. Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 and Dubbo City Council v Barrett [2003] NSWCA 267 are decisions where the parties assumed that the documents were privileged, and are authority for what they decide, not what they assume (Markisic v Commonwealth (2007) 69 NSWLR 737; [2007] NSWCA 92 at [56]). The question of the dominant purpose for the preparation of a witness statement will be determined objectively by the court and evidence of a party’s solicitor, whilst relevant, will not be determinative, see Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 74 ALJR 339; [1999] HCA 67 at [172]; Sydney Airports Corp Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 at [6] and the onus lies upon a party asserting that the document is subject to privilege; Buzzle Operations at [22]. [r 31.4.1000]

References

Cairns BC, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014). Evidence Act 1995. Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) or subscription service. 31.5

Notice under s 67 or s 99 of the Evidence Act 1995

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13D; DCR Part 28, rule 9A; LCR Part 23, rule 3A)

Unless the court orders otherwise, notice for the purposes of section 67 or 99 of the Evidence Act 1995 must be given: (a) in any case where the court by notice to the parties fixes a date for determining the date for hearing, not later than 21 days before the date fixed by that notice, and (b) in any other case where the place of hearing is a place other than Sydney, not later than 21 days before the first call-over held in respect of the sittings at that place, and (c) in any other case, not later than 21 days before the date on which the court determines the date for hearing.

RULE 31.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.5.20] Operation of s 67 or s 99 of the Evidence Act 1995 notices ................................................................... [r 31.5.40] Exercise of the court’s discretion where no notice or late service .......................................................... [r 31.5.60] Form of notices ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.5.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 31.5.1000]

[r 31.5.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 36 r 13D. In the District Court, the time limits under this rule replace the former requirement under DCR Pt 28 r 9A of giving notice 28 days before the hearing. 708

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.5.1000] [r 31.5.40]

r 31.5

Operation of s 67 or s 99 of the Evidence Act 1995 notices

The exceptions to the common law rules of evidence to which these notices relate are part of the significant reforms made by the Evidence Act 1995, including by increasing and widening the circumstances in which statements of deceased persons may be placed in evidence: see Turnbull v Gorgievski [1999] NSWSC 871. Hearsay notices alert an opposing party to the intention to adduce hearsay evidence of factual assertions which will not be able to be tested by cross-examination. In the event of prejudice a s 67 notice relying on s 64 (maker available) must be answered by a written objection not later than 21 days after service of the hearsay notice. That objection may be determined before hearing on application of a party. In civil or criminal proceedings, a tendency or coincidence notice (per Evidence Act 1995 s 99) alerts an opposing party to the intention to lead evidence of facts that would otherwise be excluded by the tendency and coincidence rules in Evidence Act 1995 ss 97 and 98. Part 3.6 of Ch 3 forms a code for the operation and restrictions on the use of such evidence. Service of a s 67 or s 99 notice may be proved by an affidavit of the person who served, gave or sent the notice per s 181 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). [r 31.5.60]

Exercise of the court’s discretion where no notice or late service

The exception to the hearsay rule has inherent in it potential prejudice to an opposing party due to the effect of allowing into evidence asserted facts the veracity of which an opposing party is unable to test by cross-examination. The failure to give notice should not lightly be excused. However, ultimately the discretion lies with the trial judge even if notice has not been given: Villanueva v New South Wales [1999] NSWCA 105. In deciding whether to give leave, permission or a direction under the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), a court must take into account the matters set out in Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 192 (see Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 75 ALJR 454; 118 A Crim R 247; 177 ALR 285; [2001] HCA 4 at [41]) and may impose terms as it thinks fit. Notwithstanding the absence of formal compliance with the requirements of the Evidence Regulation 2010 (NSW), the court will look to substance of the matter. Thus where an opposing party is substantially on notice of the relevant matters, despite the absence of formal notice, the court may make a direction under s 67(4) that the exception to the hearsay rule provided by s 63(2) is to apply: Turnbull v Gorgievski [1999] NSWSC 871. Where a party serves a s 67 notice contrary to r 31.5 and a judge is satisfied that there would be serious potential prejudice to another party in extending time for service of the s 67 notice or dispensing with the requirement for such a notice, and the date for the hearing was determined many months before, an application for leave to rely upon evidence that is the subject of the s 67 notice is likely to be refused: see Tobin v Ezekiel [2009] NSWSC 1209. [r 31.5.80]

Form of notices

The required contents of the notices in addition to the requirements of Evidence Act 1995 ss 63, 64 (hearsay) and ss 97, 98, 99 (tendency and coincidence) are found in the Evidence Regulation 2010: • cl 4: notice of previous representation; • cl 5: notice of tendency evidence; • cl 6: notice of coincidence evidence. [r 31.5.1000]

References

Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) [1.32420]–[1.3.2560], [1.3.7080]–[1.37140], [2.1.10]. Forms for s 67 hearsay notices, s 97 tendency notices and s 99 coincidence notices may be found on the Federal Court website: http://www.federalcourt.gov.au/forms-and-fees/forms/federal-court-rules. Form 62: Notice of intention to adduce evidence of previous representation. Form 63: Notice of objection to tender of hearsay evidence if maker of representation available. Form 64: Notice of intention to adduce tendency evidence. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

709

UCPR Parts 31-40

In civil proceedings, a hearsay notice (Evidence Act 1995 s 67), or a tendency or coincidence notice (Evidence Act 1995 s 99) must be given no later than 21 days before the date for determining the date of the hearing.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.6

[r 31.5.1000]

Form 65: Notice of intention to adduce coincidence evidence. 31.6

Evidence on commission

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 6; DCR Part 28, rule 7)

(1) The court may permit a party to any proceedings the subject of an order under rule 24.3 (relating to the taking of evidence otherwise than at trial) to tender in the proceedings the evidence of a person examined under the order. (2) The evidence is not admissible in the proceedings if: (a) it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the person examined is in New South Wales and is able to attend the hearing, or (b) the evidence would not have been admissible had it been given orally at the hearing of the proceedings. (3) If it is in the interests of justice to do so, the court may exclude from the proceedings any evidence of the person examined even though the evidence is otherwise admissible. (4) Unless the court orders otherwise, evidence in any proceedings that a case falls within: (a) subrule (2)(a), or (b) section 8(2)(a) or 22(2)(a) of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995, or (c) section 9(2)(a) of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 of the Commonwealth, may be given by affidavit on information and belief, but the person making the affidavit must give the source of and ground for the information and belief. (5) The judicial officer presiding at the trial may make any necessary observations and findings as to demeanour and credibility of the person examined, and act on them for the determination of the issues at the trial, if: (a) the examination has been conducted by the same judicial officer, or (b) an audio-visual recording under rule 24.13 is tendered in evidence at the trial, except where the trial is before a jury. (6) In this rule, evidence includes: (a) any document or thing produced at the examination, and (b) any answers made (whether in writing, or orally and reduced to writing) to any written interrogatories presented at the examination, and (c) any audio-visual recording made in accordance with rule 24.13.

RULE 31.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 31.6.40] Doubt as to attendance and compelling a witness to attend ................................................................... [r 31.6.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 31.6.1000]

[r 31.6.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 36 r 6. Subrule (1) of this rule generally follows the provision of DCR Pt 28 r 7(3) that in a trial the court may admit a deposition in evidence in relation to the proof of particular facts. The qualifications to the general provision found in subrr (2)–(5) of this rule do not have equivalent DCR provisions. [r 31.6.40]

Operation

This rule sets out the procedure and requirements for the adducing at hearing of evidence obtained pursuant to the Evidence on Commission Act 1995 (NSW) or the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) or UCPR Pt 24 – Taking of evidence other than at trial. 710

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.6.1000]

r 31.7

Taking evidence on commission is a means for a party to adduce evidence from a witness not available to give evidence in person for the purpose of proceedings in New South Wales. UCPR Pt 24 sets out the procedure for that process. The transcript and/or video record of the evidence taken on commission, eg per s 8 of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995 (NSW), may subsequently be tendered, with the inherent risk of the material being ruled inadmissible, see: Indochina Medical Co Pty Ltd v Nicolai [2013] NSWCA 436 at [48]. This is in contrast to evidence adduced by video link, eg per s 5B of the Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 (NSW), where the evidence is received by the court as it is given and there is no need for the subsequent tender of the transcript or video record: see r 31.3; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; 22 ACLC 1125; [2004] NSWSC 467. The general provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 as to admissibility also apply, the expectation being that the person conducting the examination may not be closely concerned with questions of admissibility, see: British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks per Spigelman CJ at [71]–[75]. Even if the evidence is technically admissible, the court has a discretion to exclude it if satisfied that the interests of justice so require (r 31.6(3)), Indochina Medical at [48]. Evidence taken on commission is not admissible if the court is satisfied that the person examined is in New South Wales and able to attend the hearing: see r 31.6(2). [r 31.6.60]

Doubt as to attendance and compelling a witness to attend

At common law, witnesses beyond the jurisdiction of the court, eg if outside Australia, are not compellable or subject to orders to be examined. Section 7 of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995 (NSW) provides a procedure to achieve this end. This requires a letter of request to be sent, by a direction of the court, to the judicial authority of the foreign country where the witness is located and, on receiving the cooperation of the relevant judicial authority, to take the evidence of such a person in that foreign country. There is utility in supplementing the application for the proposed order for the issue of a letter of request, once the foreign country has acted upon it, for a further order under r 31.6(1). [r 31.6.1000]

References

Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (9th ed, LexisNexis, 2013) para [17015]. Indochina Medical Co Pty Ltd v Nicolai [2013] NSWCA 436. British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 838. Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598; [2009] NSWSC 769. Halsbury’s Laws of Australia (LexisNexis) [195-8630], [325-8220], [325-8240]. 31.7

Foreign material

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 6B)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, a party who adduces foreign material under section 24 or 32 of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 of the Commonwealth as evidence: (a) must give at least 14 days’ written notice to each other active party of: (i) the intention to adduce evidence under that section, and (ii) the nature of the foreign material, and (b) must adduce all relevant evidence available to that party: (i) as to whether the person who gave the testimony that is the subject of the foreign material is in Australia and is able to attend the hearing, and (ii) if the foreign material is adduced under section 24 of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 of the Commonwealth, of the matters to which section 25(2)(a) or (c) of that Act refer, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

711

UCPR Parts 31-40

The Evidence on Commission Act 1995 is part of the statutory mechanism by which Australia’s domestic law implemented the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 847 UNTS 231 (dated 18 March 1970), which entered into force for Australia on 22 December 1992, see British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158 at 494 (NSWLR).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.7

[r 31.7.20] (iii)

if the foreign material is adduced under section 32 of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 of the Commonwealth, of the matters to which section 33(2)(a) or (c) of that Act refer.

(2) In this rule foreign material has the same meaning as it has in the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 of the Commonwealth.

RULE 31.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 31.7.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 31.7.1000]

[r 31.7.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 36 r 6B, except that notice in subr (1) must be given to each “active party”, rather than to each party with an address for service. The UCPR Dictionary definition applies: active party, in relation to any proceedings, means a party who has an address for service in the proceedings, other than: (a) a party against whom judgment has been entered in the proceedings, or (b) a party in respect of whom the proceedings have been dismissed, withdrawn or discontinued, being, in either case, a party against whom no further claim in the proceedings subsists. There is no equivalent DCR provision. [r 31.7.40]

Operation

This rule sets out the mandatory procedural requirements for at least 14 days notice to be given to each active party, by a party who intends to adduce “foreign material” (see definition in s 3 of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth) – in essence testimony in documentary form). “Foreign material” is evidence obtained as a result of a request under that Act, made by or on behalf of the Attorney General, to a foreign country in regard to Australian criminal proceedings, or “related civil proceedings”, subject to the restrictions in s 24. A similar mechanism is available in Corporations Act 2001 or Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 proceedings, in which ASIC is a party, for ASIC to make a request for foreign material to a “foreign business authority” as defined in s 3, for use in Australian civil proceedings: see Pt 4 of the Act. These proceedings are not “related civil proceedings” per s 32, and are subject to the separate matters set out in s 33 which are to be considered by the court when such material is adduced. The 14 day written notice to each other active party must include: the nature of the foreign material; all relevant evidence available to the party of matters which might preclude the tender of the foreign material – such as the person being in Australia and being able to attend hearing; probative and prejudicial matters as to the availability of the evidence; and whether such evidence ought be tested by challenging the person who made the testimony. These notice provisions raise similar considerations to those of hearsay notices ie to allow other “active parties” to consider any prejudice (including the prejudicial matters included in the notice) arising from the adducing of the foreign material. However, there is no mechanism to object to the tender of such material prior to hearing. The relevant considerations to the admission of foreign material at hearing includes the total matrix of evidence in the case, together with possible inferences of fact to be drawn from the foreign material: see R v Burns (No 4) [1999] SASC 559. [r 31.7.1000]

References

Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 838. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; 22 ACLC 1125; [2004] NSWSC 467.

712

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.8.80]

31.8

r 31.8

Earlier evidence in the same proceedings

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 5; DCR Part 28, rule 6)

(2) Evidence taken at a trial may be used for any subsequent trial for the assessment of damages or of the value of goods in the same proceedings, saving all just exceptions and unless the court orders otherwise. (3) Subject to subrules (1) and (2), evidence taken at a hearing may not be used as evidence in any subsequent hearing in the same proceedings except by leave of the court.

RULE 31.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 31.8.40] Earlier evidence taken at a trial ............................................................................................................... [r 31.8.60] Earlier evidence taken at a hearing ......................................................................................................... [r 31.8.80] Discretionary considerations as to use of earlier evidence ................................................................... [r 31.8.100] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 31.8.1000]

[r 31.8.20]

Comparison

The term “earlier evidence” in this rule has a different meaning to its use in r 31.9. This rule is a new and more flexible approach to matters contained in SCR Pt 36 r 5 and DCR Pt 28 r 6, which were identical. Other than on an assessment of damages the predecessors to this rule required specificity as to the use of the earlier evidence as to proof of particular facts. This rule is more liberal in its approach to the manner in which the earlier evidence is used. [r 31.8.40]

Operation

Underpinning the operation of this rule is the likely waste of the court’s time if the evidence was given again, and also the risk of the evidence coming out in different form in the second trial in the same proceedings. There is the proviso that the operation of the rule in the circumstances of the matter is not contrary to the requirements of justice. When proceedings are listed for trial generally, it is for hearing of all questions and issues arising on every claim for relief in the proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise, per UCPR r 29.4. In the operation of r 31.8, the following definitions set out in s 3 of the CPA are pertinent: hearing includes both trial and interlocutory hearing. trial means any hearing that is not an interlocutory hearing. [r 31.8.60]

Earlier evidence taken at a trial

This rule specifies two instances where earlier evidence taken at a trial in the same proceedings may be used in any subsequent trial in those proceedings, unless the court makes an order otherwise. They are: (a) subr (1) where a question is tried separately. See: r 6.22 (order for separate trials re inconvenient joinder), r 9.8 (directions re cross-claims) and r 28.2 (order for separate decision of question); and, (b) subr (2) for assessment of damages or the value of goods. [r 31.8.80]

Earlier evidence taken at a hearing

In subr (3) the rule proscribes the use of evidence taken at a hearing in a subsequent hearing in the same proceedings, without the leave of the court. As an example this subrule covers the circumstance such as an order by the Court of Appeal for re-hearing, see: Murray v Commissioner of Police (2004) 2 DDCR 31; [2004] NSWCA 365 – matter remitted to the District Court for further determination on condition that the evidence © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

713

UCPR Parts 31-40

(1) Evidence taken at a trial with respect to a question that is ordered to be tried separately may be used in any subsequent trial in the same proceedings, saving all just exceptions and unless the court orders otherwise.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.9

[r 31.8.80]

on that further determination be limited to the evidence before the primary judge, and that no further evidence shall be adduced except by leave of a judge of the District Court. [r 31.8.100]

Discretionary considerations as to use of earlier evidence

The onus lies on the party seeking to resist the use of the earlier evidence taken at a trial, and the onus lies on the party seeking to use earlier evidence in all other instances. The use of earlier evidence will be subject to the discretionary considerations found in the CPA including the overriding purpose (s 56), objects of case management (s 57) and the dictates of justice (s 58). The court will be mindful of its power to make directions as to practice and procedure (s 61) and as to the conduct of the hearing (s 62). In addition the operation of the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 and exclusionary provisions including ss 135 and 136 may be relevant. One example where possible unfairness may arise in the use of the rule is in regard to the use earlier evidence received on an interlocutory hearing, such as determination of a separate question, where by the exception found in s 75 of the Evidence Act 1995 hearsay, and thus untested, material has been admitted into evidence, which on a case by case basis will require the court to exercise its discretion as to its use and any appropriate orders, eg general discretion to limit use of evidence per s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995. [r 31.8.1000]

References

Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1193. Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598; [2009] NSWSC 769. 31.9

Earlier evidence in other proceedings

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 7; DCR Part 28, rule 10)

(1) In any proceedings, evidence taken, or an affidavit filed, in other proceedings may not be used as evidence, saving all just exceptions and unless the court orders otherwise. (2) Leave may not be granted under subrule (1) except to allow the evidence taken, or affidavit filed, in the other proceedings to be used in relation to the proof of particular facts.

RULE 31.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 31.9.40] Use of earlier evidence from other proceedings ...................................................................................... [r 31.9.60] Tender of transcript from Royal Commission ........................................................................................... [r 31.9.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 31.9.1000]

[r 31.9.20]

Comparison

The term “earlier evidence” in this rule has a different meaning to its use in r 31.8. This rule is a new approach to matters contained in SCR Pt 36 r 7 and DCR Pt 28 r 10, which were identical. [r 31.9.40]

Operation

This rule does not affect the operation of the law relating to a judgment in rem or the law relating to res judicata or issue estoppel. This rule requires a party who seeks to use evidence taken, or an affidavit filed, but presumably not read or alternatively not admitted into evidence, to only use such material by leave of the court and in relation to the proof of particular facts. The rule thus precludes the use of expert opinion evidence. Necessarily a party seeking leave first must identify with precision the facts sought to be proved by the earlier evidence, as uncertainty about the evidence is a reason for refusing leave. The rule is a pre-cursor to, and does not go to issues of admissibility: see Wentworth v Rogers (No 12) (1987) 9 NSWLR 400 at 423. 714

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.9.1000]

r 31.9

This rule is more confined than its predecessor under the SCR/DCR, however it is likely that as a condition of the admission of an affidavit filed in other proceedings, the party tendering the deposition will be required to make the deponent available for cross-examination: see Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1193.

Decisions on the earlier rules provide some guidance to the operation of this rule, however the difference in wording and the need for relevant matters to be considered on each application of this rule make any exhaustive specification of the factors in the exercise of the discretion not possible: see Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1193. [r 31.9.60]

Use of earlier evidence from other proceedings

In considering the use of such material, an important distinction is whether the other proceedings were between the same parties or their privies, in which case admissions or matters estoppel may arise, or different parties where there is likely to be less potency to such evidence, other than for use in regard to the exceptions to the credibility rule: see ss 103, 104, 106, 108 and 108A of the Evidence Act 1995. Authority, albeit obiter dicta, on the predecessor to this rule is to the effect that such evidence may only be tendered in proceedings between the same parties or their privies as were the parties to the original proceedings, and where the issues were the same: see Wentworth v Rogers (No 12) (1987) 9 NSWLR 400 at 423. A similar approach has been followed in the Federal Court, see decisions referred to in Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1193. Such an approach appears to place an unnecessary gloss on the words of r 31.9, but such matters will be a relevant to the grant of leave. Ultimately the actual wording of the rule is pertinent, and its use in particular circumstances as to earlier evidence must be considered by reference to the overriding purpose and the dictates of justice as defined in the CPA. An alternative approach to relying upon UCPR r 31.9 may be to serve a hearsay notice pursuant to s 67 of the Evidence Act 1995 to which is annexed the affidavit of the evidence of a witness if the person falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule in s 59 provided by ss 63 and 64, see Marshall v Prescott (No 1) [2013] NSWSC 1108 (affidavit of New York attorney annexed to affidavit of local solicitor witness not admitted into evidence in the absence of a hearsay notice which complied with EA s 67). [r 31.9.80]

Tender of transcript from Royal Commission

A Royal Commission is a “business” as defined in cl (1)(d) of Pt 2 of the Dictionary to the Evidence Act 1995 and the transcript of the hearing of a Royal Commission is a document within s 69(1) of the Evidence Act 1995. Thus a previous representation contained in a document such as a transcript which is part of the records of a business where such representation was made by a person who had personal knowledge of the asserted fact is rendered admissible by operation of s 69 of the Evidence Act 1995, unless exclusionary provisions apply, such as ss 69(3)(a), 135 or s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995. Rule 31.9 does not prohibit the reception into evidence of extracts of such a transcript which is otherwise admissible under s 69 of the Evidence Act 1995, nor is it necessary for a party to seek leave or to rely upon that rule for the admission of such transcript, see: Thomas v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 160. [r 31.9.1000]

References

Re Prime City Investments Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1287. Wentworth v Rogers (No 12) (1987) 9 NSWLR 400. Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1193. Thomas v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 160.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

715

UCPR Parts 31-40

The proper approach to the operation of this rule is from the starting point that an affidavit filed in other proceedings may not be used in evidence, subject to certain exceptions. If such an exception arises, the only use is “in relation to the proof of particular facts”. Failure to identify such “particular facts” in relation to the proof to be relied on in a case, and failure to serve the affidavit, is likely to lead to a finding by a court that it would be unjust for the affidavit to be relied on at all under r 31.9, see Re Prime City Investments Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1287 at [8].

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.10

31.10

[r 31.10.20]

Plans, photographs, audio-visual recordings and models

(cf SCR Part 14, rule 2, Part 36, rule 8; DCR Part 28, rule 11; LCR Part 23, rule 4)

(1) At least 7 days before the commencement of a hearing, a party who intends to tender any plan, photograph, audio-visual recording or model at the hearing must give the other parties an opportunity to inspect it and to agree to its admission without proof. [Subr (1) am Rule 590 of 2011, r 3(1)]

(2) A party who fails to comply with subrule (1) may not tender the plan, photograph, audio-visual recording or model in evidence except: (a) in the case of a prescribed item—where the court is satisfied that the party had a legitimate forensic purpose for not giving the other parties an opportunity to inspect the item, or (b) in any other case—by leave of the court. [Subr (2) subst Rule 590 of 2011, r 3(2)]

(3) This rule does not apply to any proceedings entered, or intended to be entered, in: (a) the Commercial List or the Technology and Construction List in the Supreme Court, or (b) the Commercial List or the Construction List in the District Court. [Subr (3) insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[7]]

(4) In this rule: audio-visual recording includes a sound recording or a record of moving images (or both) whether stored on film, audio or video tape, digitally, electronically or by any other means. prescribed item means a photograph or audio-visual recording that was made or obtained in connection with the relevant proceedings, by or at the request of a party, for the purpose of testing the credibility of a witness at the hearing. [Subr (4) insrt Rule 590 of 2011, r 3(3)] [R 31.10 am Rule 590 of 2011; Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[6]]

RULE 31.10 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.10.40] Factors relevant to the grant of leave to a party who fails to comply with r 31.10(1) ........................... [r 31.10.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.10.1000]

[r 31.10.20]

Comparison

Subrule (2) of this rule differs from the identical provisions in SCR Pt 36 r 8 and DCR Pt 28 r 11, where the failure to afford another party the opportunity to inspect the plan, photograph or model did not affect its admissibility. Under the new rule, such failure means the object cannot be tendered except by leave. This rule is otherwise the same in substance as the SCR and DCR. [r 31.10.40]

Operation

This rule requires a party who intends to tender any plan, photograph, audio-visual recording or model at a hearing to allow the other parties an opportunity to inspect the proposed evidence and to agree to its admission without proof, at least seven days before the commencement of the hearing. Compliance with subr (1) is a necessary but not sufficient basis to ensure that the plan, photograph, audio-visual recording or model will be received into evidence without proof, absent the agreement of the other parties. Furthermore, failure to comply with subr (1) places the onus on the party wishing to tender the plan, photograph, audio-visual recording or model to obtain the grant of leave pursuant to subr (2)(b) from the court to do so, quite aside from any contest on admissibility on tender. Relevant considerations will include the overriding purpose (s 56), objects of case management (s 57) and the dictates of justice (s 58) and the 716

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.10.1000]

r 31.11

A further exception to the requirement in subr (1) is provided in subr (2)(a) for a prescribed item which is defined in subr (4) as a photograph or audio-visual recording that was made or obtained in connection with the relevant proceedings, by or at the request of a party, for the purpose of testing the credibility of a witness at the hearing, eg surveillance film. The onus lies on the party failing to comply with subr (1), to establish that it had “a legitimate forensic purpose” for not giving the other parties an opportunity to inspect the item to satisfy subr (2)(a). The rule does not apply to proceedings in the Commercial List or the Technology and Construction List in the Supreme Court, or the Commercial List or the Construction List in the District Court. [r 31.10.60]

Factors relevant to the grant of leave to a party who fails to comply with r 31.10(1)

In considering the interests of justice, including the factors relevant to the “overriding purpose”, the court will be mindful of the principles relating to the use of photographic evidence to consider the possibility of prejudice to the party affected by the failure to comply with this rule. In Yarrabee Coal Co Pty Ltd v Lujans (2009) 53 MVR 187; [2009] NSWCA 85 at [20]–[29], Beazley JA provides a helpful summary of principles relating to the use of photographic evidence. In an earlier appeal in that matter, Lujans v Yarrabee Coal Co Pty Ltd (2008) 83 ALJR 34; 249 ALR 663; [2008] HCA 51 at [15], the High Court of Australia cautioned of the danger and the misleading effect generated by examining copies of photographic exhibits rather than the exhibits themselves and problems that can arise in interpreting photographs. The High Court has also warned that photographs can be untrustworthy if used for the purpose of assessing dimensions or geographical features, such as the gentleness or otherwise of a slope at the scene of an accident, see Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [74] (CLR). The deceptive nature of such photographs is that they focus on a particular scene that is static. This is the antithesis of the relevant evidence such as in a case of a pedestrian walking along a footpath, Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-955; [2008] NSWCA 130 at [70]–[72]. [r 31.10.1000]

References

Yarrabee Coal Co Pty Ltd v Lujans (2009) 53 MVR 187; [2009] NSWCA 85. Markus v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd (1983) 25 NSWCCR 1. Boyes v Colins (2000) 23 WAR 123; [2000] WASCA 344. Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372. Lujans v Yarrabee Coal Co Pty Ltd (2008) 83 ALJR 34; 249 ALR 663; [2008] HCA 51. Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-955; [2008] NSWCA 130 at [70]–[72]. 31.11

Production of court documents

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 10; DCR Part 28, rule 13; LCR Part 23, rule 6)

Unless the court orders otherwise, the registrar must produce to the court any document in the registrar’s custody that, by notice in writing, any party to proceedings requests the registrar to produce to the court for the purposes of the proceedings.

RULE 31.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.11.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.11.40] Access to court files ................................................................................................................................ [r 31.11.60] References .......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.11.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

717

UCPR Parts 31-40

provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 eg ss 135, 136 and exclusionary provisions such as the hearsay rule and the opinion rule. Evidentiary matters relevant to seeking leave and as to admissibility will include evidence of provenance of the object, such as the instructions given to and the processes undertaken by, and the qualifications/objectivity of the drawer of a plan, the person taking/making the photograph or the maker of the model.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.12

[r 31.11.20]

[r 31.11.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 36 r 10 and DCR Pt 28 r 13. [r 31.11.40]

Operation

This rule imposes a duty on the registrar of a court on the written request of party to proceedings to produce to the court (not the party) any document in the registrar’s custody. On its face the rule is not limited to documents in the party’s proceedings. The breadth of the rule is moderated by providing for discretion in the court to make orders otherwise. The content of the written notice is not prescribed, however at the very least identification of the document(s), and a positive statement that production of the document is for the purposes of the proceedings (with brief reasons if possible), signed by the party or the party’s solicitor on the record is likely to facilitate the process. Once the document is produced to the court, and absent an order otherwise, the party (and presumably any other active party) will need to seek access to the document. Principles relevant to subpoenas and notices to produce will provide some guidance to considerations in the operation of this rule: see UCPR Pt 33. [r 31.11.60]

Access to court files

A separate process exists in each court for a party or non-parties to gain access to court files. Inquiries ought to be made to the registrar of the relevant court. Practice Note SC Gen 2 – Supreme Court – Access to Court Files (prescribes the procedures surrounding the provision of access to court files). Access to material in any proceedings is restricted to parties, except with the leave of the court. Access will normally be granted to non-parties in respect of pleadings and judgments in proceedings that have been concluded, except in so far as an order has been made that they or portions of them be kept confidential; documents that record what was said or done in open court; material that was admitted into evidence; and information that would have been heard or seen by any person present in open court. Notwithstanding this rule and the practice note the trial judge will determine all matters relating to access regarding material in evidence in the trial including transcripts of evidence, affidavits and exhibits: Hammond v Scheinberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 49; [2001] NSWSC 568; as opposed to a file held in the registry where the matter is not proceeding. As to the applicable principles for access including open justice see Hammond at [8]. However, if the judge or the registrar dealing with the application so determines, material or portions of it will be kept confidential. Access to other material will not be allowed unless a registrar or judge is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist. [r 31.11.1000]

References

Supreme Court: Practice Note SC Gen 2 – Supreme Court – Access to Court Files is reproduced in the Practice Notes section of this service. It is also available at: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/ nswsc_pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/5f2bddd07a106a9fca2572ed000cec95?OpenDocument. District Court: Practice Note DC (Civil) No 11 – Access To Court Files By Non-Partiesis reproduced in the Practice Notes section of this service. It is also available at: http://www.districtcourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ districtcourt/practice_notes.html. 31.12

Proof of court documents

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 9; DCR Part 28, rule 12; LCR Part 23, rule 5)

(1) A document purporting to be marked with the seal of any court or tribunal is admissible in evidence without further proof. (2) For the purposes of subrule (1), it is sufficient that only the first page of a document consisting of multiple pages is marked with the seal. [Subr (2) insrt Rule 482 of 2011, Sch 1[3]] [R 31.12 am Rule 482 of 2011]

RULE 31.12 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.12.20] 718

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.12.80]

r 31.12

Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.12.40] Overlap with provisions of Evidence Act 1995 ....................................................................................... [r 31.12.60] Definition of document per Evidence Act 1995 ...................................................................................... [r 31.12.80] Use of court documents from other proceedings ................................................................................. [r 31.12.100] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.12.1000]

[r 31.12.20]

Comparison

[r 31.12.40]

Operation

The Dictionary to the UCPR states: document includes any part of a document and any copy of a document or part of a document. The effect of this rule is that a document marked with the seal of any court or tribunal proves itself on its face and is admissible into evidence. The rule thus facilitates the proof of court or tribunal documents. The rule creates a presumption of the authenticity and the regularity both of the sealing, and of any document so marked with the seal of a court or tribunal, allowing its admission into evidence without further proof. The nature of the seal and the process by which the registrar seals a document in the Supreme Court, including the Court of Appeal and its Divisions, is found in SCR Pt 1 r 9, which also states that a rubber stamp facsimile may be used instead of a seal. The latter is the same in all the courts. In the District Court similar provision is found in DCR Pt 1 r 6, which also specifies the nature of documents to be sealed by the registrar. In the Local Court the relevant provision is LCR r 16. Documents marked with a seal (or stamp) by the registrar of a court will include any order, notice, warrant, judgment or process made given or issued by the registrar, or any document required to be sealed under the rules. Subrule (2) clarifies that it is sufficient for the court to seal for evidentiary purposes only the first page of a document consisting of more than one page. Commencement of proceedings requires service of an originating process in accordance with UCPR r 6.3(2), which must include the seal of the court (original sealed copy or photocopy of sealed copy), the case number or unique identifier and the listing date allocated by the registry: see r 6.2(3A). [r 31.12.60]

Overlap with provisions of Evidence Act 1995

The rule also picks up the operation of substantive provisions of Pt 4.3 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), specifically s 150 (as to seals of a court or tribunal) and ss 156, 157 as to public documents and court processes. The term “public document” is defined the Evidence Act 1995 Dictionary as follows: public document means a document that: (a) forms part of the records of the Crown in any of its capacities, or (b) forms part of the records of the government of a foreign country, or (c) forms part of the records of a person or body holding office or exercising a function under or because of the Commonwealth Constitution, an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, or (d) is being kept by or on behalf of the Crown, such a government or such a person or body, and includes the records of the proceedings of, and papers presented to: (e) an Australian Parliament, a House of an Australian Parliament, a committee of such a House or a committee of an Australian Parliament, and (f) a legislature of a foreign country, including a House or committee (however described) of such a legislature. [r 31.12.80]

Definition of document per Evidence Act 1995

The Evidence Act 1995 Dictionary provides the following definitions: document means any record of information, and includes: (a) anything on which there is writing, or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

719

UCPR Parts 31-40

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 36 r 12 and DCR Pt 28 r 13; note that “document” as defined in the Dictionary includes “any copy of a document”.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.13

[r 31.12.80]

(b) anything on which there are marks, figures, symbols or perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them, or (c) anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else, or (d) a map, plan, drawing or photograph. 8 References to documents A reference in this Act to a document includes a reference to: (a) any part of the document, or (b) any copy, reproduction or duplicate of the document or of any part of the document, or (c) any part of such a copy, reproduction or duplicate. Clearly there will be some practical difficulty to affixing the seal of a court or tribunal to some documents as defined above, however there is utility by the inclusion of “copy, reproduction or duplicate” in the definition. [r 31.12.100]

Use of court documents from other proceedings

The better view is that “document” for use in proceedings is to be understood in the context of this rule by the broad definition found in the Evidence Act 1995, see: [r 31.12.80]. This rule facilitates the operation of s 157 of the Evidence Act 1995 which relates to the proof of public documents relating to court processes and the adducing of a document that purports to be a copy of a public document such as a court document. Further, this rule facilitates the operation of ss 178–180 of the Evidence Act 1995 as to proof of convictions, acquittals and other judicial proceedings. It thus operates as an exception to the hearsay rule. However, as to the use to which documents admitted under this rule may be put, the scope of operation of ss 157 and 178–180 is limited by s 91 of the Evidence Act 1995, which excludes the admission of evidence of judgments and convictions to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in such a proceeding and also the effect of s 60 of the Evidence Act 1995, to prove a fact if relevant for another purpose. The limited exceptions to s 91 applicable to civil proceedings are contained in ss 92 and 93. Thus, s 92(2) creates an exception permitting the use in civil proceedings of evidence of a criminal conviction; see for example: Lopresto v Golding (1957) 31 ALJ 851 – the fact of a conviction of a breach of a Road Traffıc Act 1934 is cogent but not conclusive evidence in civil proceedings for negligence. Section 93(c) confirms that s 91 does not affect a judgment in rem or the law relating to res judicata or issue estoppel. [r 31.12.1000]

References

Kay S, “Security and Authentication Requirements in Court Process: Part 1” (2001) 4(1) Int LB 5. Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) or subscription service. Evidence Act 1995. 31.13

Unstamped documents: arrangements under section 304 of the Duties Act 1997

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 10B)

(1) The “usual undertaking by person liable” if given to the court by a party in relation to an instrument referred to in section 304(2) of the Duties Act 1997 is an undertaking that the party will, within a time specified by the court, transmit the instrument to the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue. (2) The “usual undertaking by person not liable” if given to the court by a party in relation to an instrument referred to in section 304(2) of the Duties Act 1997 is an undertaking that the party will, within a time specified by the court, forward to the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue the name and address of the person liable to pay duty on the instrument under that Act together with the instrument.

RULE 31.13 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.13.20] 720

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.13.40]

r 31.13

[r 31.13.20]

Comparison

Other than the reference to the Chief Commissioner by full title, this rule is identical to SCR Pt 36 r 10B. There is no equivalent DCR provision. [r 31.13.40]

Operation

This rule sets out the procedure for the use of the ameliorating provisions in s 304(2) of the Duties Act 1997 (s 304 set out in full at [r 31.13.200]). The Duties Act 1997by the operation of its provisions, including, but not limited to, s 304(1), restricts the use in proceedings of an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument that effects a dutiable transaction or is chargeable with duty, which was first executed on or from 1 July 1998. The predecessors to s 304, such as s 29 of the Stamp Duties Act 1920, were enacted so that stamp objections might be cured without the necessity of sending the instrument to the Stamp Office during a trial to be made admissible, see Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359; 37 ALR 194; 5 ALJ 110; [1931] HCA 359 per Dixon J at 381 (CLR). The Stamp Duties Act 1920 s 29 applies to an instrument first executed, or relating to applicable transactions or property in NSW, before 1 July 1998. See [r 31.14.200]. Both Acts provide that a dutiable instrument, or copy, which is not duly and sufficiently stamped is not available for use in law or equity, and may not be pleaded or admitted into evidence, other than in criminal proceedings. Not all instruments are subject to stamp duty. Under the Duties Act 1997, certain transactions, including secured loan transactions, will attract duty. However, a simple transaction under which money is lent under a deed, without security, does not attract duty pursuant to the Act if it does not create a security interest in favour of a lender, see Juric-Kacunic v Vaupotic (2013) 18 BPR 35131; [2013] NSWSC 41 at [55]. This rule sets out the procedure for arrangements, in the nature of undertakings, per Duties Act 1997 s 304(2) to allow a dutiable instrument, which is not duly or properly stamped to go into evidence, and which would otherwise be barred from having any legal effect in civil proceedings by operation of Duties Act 1997 s 304(1). The rule prescribes the substance of the undertaking which is to be given to the court by either: • A person liable to pay stamp duty: to transmit the instrument, by arrangements approved by the court (including timeliness) to the Chief Commissioner, who, per Duties Act 1997 s 307, may impound an instrument which is not properly stamped until any duty or interest or penalty tax have been paid, or • A person not liable to pay stamp duty: to transmit the instrument together with the name and address of the person liable, by arrangements approved by the court (including timeliness) to the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue, per Duties Act 1997 s 304(2)(b). Alternatively, the belated stamping of an instrument, and payment of any fine due, allows it to be used in proceedings, see: Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359; 37 ALR 194; 5 ALJ 110; [1931] HCA 359. An instrument is fully effective ab initio when stamped, see: Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy v D’Jamirze (1999) 48 NSWLR 416; 43 ATR 456; [1999] NSWSC 1249 at [58]. However, the failure by a party to take a point regarding the use or admissibility into evidence of an unstamped document will cause a right to merge on the decision in fully contested litigation before a court or an arbitrator. An appellate court will no longer be concerned with the admissibility of the documents at first instance, and furthermore, a party will be estopped from taking the point for the first time on appeal: see McKensey v Hewitt (2004) 61 NSWLR 54; [2004] NSWSC 636 at [32]–[34] per Young CJ in Eq (decision on Stamp Duties Act 1920). © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

721

UCPR Parts 31-40

Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.13.40] Effect of failing to stamp or to sufficiently stamp an instrument ............................................................ [r 31.13.60] Undertakings and Duties Act 1997 s 304 ............................................................................................... [r 31.13.80] Stamp duty points at interlocutory hearings ......................................................................................... [r 31.13.100] Can an unstamped instrument give rise to a caveatable interest? ..................................................... [r 31.13.120] Test for admissibility ............................................................................................................................. [r 31.13.140] Proving transaction evidenced by witness’s unstamped document ..................................................... [r 31.13.160] Section 304 of the Duties Act 1997 ..................................................................................................... [r 31.13.200] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.13.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.13 [r 31.13.60]

[r 31.13.40] Effect of failing to stamp or to sufficiently stamp an instrument

The exclusionary effect of Duties Act 1997 s 304 is similar to its predecessor, s 29 of the Stamp Duties Act 1920, the rationale of which is to protect that part of the revenue derived from stamp duty by proscribing the use in court proceedings of an instrument (per the Dictionary“includes a written document and a written statement”) relating to “dutiable property” (Duties Act 1997 s 11) and “dutiable transactions” (Duties Act 1997 s 8) which require stamping (Duties Act 1997 s 288). A starting point is to determine whether under the Act the instrument deals with a matter attracting duty and, if so, whether the instrument has been duly stamped. Reference to the Act will determine whether or not duty is payable on an instrument: eg an application to extend a caveat was refused as the agreement to mortgage creating a caveatable interest was not stamped and the agreement was unenforceable as an equitable mortgage: Boral Recycling Pty Ltd v Wake [2009] NSWSC 712. However, the proscription only applies where the instrument is in issue in the proceedings. Further, the provision applies to dutiable instruments “wheresoever executed”. An instrument which has not been duly stamped has been described as “being struck with legal sterility”, see: Dent v Moore (1919) 26 CLR 316; 19 SR (NSW) 344; 36 WN (NSW) 46; 25 ALR 437; [1919] HCA 11; Halloran v Minister Administering National Parks & Wildlife Act 1974 (2006) 229 CLR 545; 80 ALJR 519; [2006] HCA 3 at [22]. Secondary evidence, such as a copy of an unstamped instrument is not admissible. The relevant date is the first date that the instrument is “executed”. Notwithstanding the failure to duly stamp an instrument, if it is stamped and the fine paid, the instrument may be used in proceedings, and it is as efficacious as if it had never been subject to the exclusionary provision, see Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359; 37 ALR 194; 5 ALJ 110; [1931] HCA 359; Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy v D’Jamirze (1999) 48 NSWLR 416; 43 ATR 456; [1999] NSWSC 1249 at [56]. [r 31.13.80]

Undertakings and Duties Act 1997 s 304

Prior to the admission into evidence of an unstamped instrument per Duties Act 1997 s 304(2), the court must first approve arrangements to give notice and also custody of the instrument, until it is duly stamped, to the Chief Commissioner, or alternatively for the Chief Commissioner to be given information to allow the collection of the duty from the person liable to pay it, see: Weston and Cussen as liquidators of Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd v Metro Apartments Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 682. This rule and the relevant provisions of the Duties Act 1997 s 304, differs significantly from UCPR r 31.14(1) and Stamp Duties Act 1920 s 29. The latter required an undertaking for the payment of duty to be given by a solicitor, whereas this rule requires the party to give the undertaking and thus to take responsibility for any default by bringing it to the notice of and dealing directly with the Chief Commissioner. Strictly, there is no option available to a party liable to pay duty for its solicitor to give an undertaking to the court to pay that duty. Thus, case law on the earlier act must be read conscious of this important change. Nonetheless, as part of the arrangements approved by the court, an undertaking from a solicitor may be accepted to transmit the instrument to the Chief Commissioner, see: Weston and Cussen as liquidators of Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd v Metro Apartments Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 682 at [18], per Campbell J. The provision of the undertaking by the party as part of arrangements approved by the court allows the unstamped instrument to be tendered in evidence. However, until it is stamped it is not available for use in law or equity per Duties Act 1997 s 304(1), see Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd v Baddock [2002] NSWSC 857 at [46]. Breach of the undertaking is likely to cause the instrument to remain legally sterile, and on the application of a party, or on the court’s own motion, will lead to a withdrawal of the order admitting the instrument into evidence or the making of a fresh order to that effect, see: Weston and Cussen as liquidators of Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd v Metro Apartments Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 682 at [15] per Campbell J. The line of authority commencing with Dent v Moore (1919) 26 CLR 316; 19 SR (NSW) 344; 36 WN (NSW) 46; 25 ALR 437; [1919] HCA 11 at 324 (CLR) remains the law, as to the public policy considerations underpinning and the effect of stamp duties legislation, and that in the eyes of the law an unstamped dutiable instrument is a nullity. If for any reason the court does not approve arrangements, or the party is unable or unwilling to give the undertaking, an application for an adjournment for a brief time to pay the duty and to have the instrument stamped is prudent. 722

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.13.120] [r 31.13.100]

r 31.13

Stamp duty points at interlocutory hearings

A stamp duty point taken under the Duties Act 1997 is likely to involve the intricacies of that legislation and to require proof to clearly demonstrate that (a) the instrument is dutiable; and (b) that the duty has not been paid. Often it is inappropriate to deal with these matters at an interlocutory stage, see Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd v Baddock [2002] NSWSC 857. [r 31.13.120]

Can an unstamped instrument give rise to a caveatable interest?

It remains to be determined whether the operation and meaning of the terms of Duties Act 1997 s 304 are different to the Stamp Duties Act 1920 s 29, as to whether an unstamped contract is capable of giving rise to a caveatable interest in land. The question as to whether stamping has retrospective effect, or as to whether it means that the relevant charging/security clauses are effective from the date of stamping is subject to some difference in first instance authorities on that point, see Schibaia v Elias [2013] NSWSC 1485 at [28]–[32]; TNT Building Trades Pty Ltd v Benelong Developments Pty Ltd (admins apptd) (2012) 91 ACSR 17; (2012) 91 ACSR 17. A line of decisions that the effect of stamping of an instrument was not retrospective to a caveatable interest includes Boral Recycling Pty Ltd v Wake [2009] NSWSC 712. This was followed in the Supreme Court with the decision of White J in Bellissimo v JCL Investments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1260. The contrary view is that the failure to stamp a security instrument said to give rise to a caveatable interest may be cured with retrospective effect by stamping prior to hearing: McCallum v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWCA 218 at [18]–[20] (dealing with s 84 of the Stamp Duties Act 1920), Arnautovic v Cvitanovic (2011) 199 FCR 1; [2011] FCA 809 (dealing with s 211 of the Duties Act 1997). The court has found that there was a serious issue to be tried to establish a caveatable interest based on an unstamped instrument subject to Duties Act 1997 s 304, see: Weston and Cussen as liquidators of Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd v Metro Apartments Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 682 at [20] per Campbell J, whereas an unstamped contract subject to Stamp Duties Act 1920 s 29 did not give rise to a caveatable interest, see: Australian Property & Management Pty Ltd v Devefi Pty L (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 7 April 1997). Whether the legal effect of the two provisions is different or not, there is likely to be a serious question to be tried as to whether or not Duties Act 1997 s 304(1) issues, and the intricacies of the Duties Act 1997, ought be determined at an interlocutory stage, see: Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd v Baddock [2002] NSWSC 857. An application to extend a caveat relying on an agreement to mortgage creating a caveatable interest which was not stamped, thereby making the agreement unenforceable as an equitable mortgage, was refused. The court found that s 205 of the Duties Act attracted the obligation to stamp the instrument and that the failure to stamp invoked the operation of s 211. Thus a mortgage that is required to be stamped is enforceable only to the extent of the amount secured by it on which duty has been paid. In this case, where no duty was paid, the relevant amount, for the purposes of s 211(1) was zero. The court refused an application by the plaintiff to attend to stamping requirements, and also suggested that there was no point in standing the matter down to enable the mortgage to be stamped, as that would make it enforceable only from the date of stamping: Boral Recycling Pty Ltd v Wake [2009] NSWSC 712. This latter point is yet to be determined, mindful that under the Stamp Duties Act 1920 late stamping might have validated an instrument ab initio: McKensey v Hewitt (2004) 61 NSWLR 54; [2004] NSWSC 636 at [11]). Also an undertaking pursuant to s 304(2), as prescribed in r 31.13, to pay the duty, is not enough. Only when the duty is paid does the instrument becomes valid ab initio: Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359; 37 ALR 194; 5 ALJ 110; [1931] HCA 359 at 383 (CLR). In any event the operation of the exclusionary provisions of the Duties Act 1997 will be assessed on the day of the hearing in respect of the particular caveat lodged: Boral Recycling Pty Ltd v Wake [2009] NSWSC 712 at [15].

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

723

UCPR Parts 31-40

A failure to properly stamp a dutiable instrument, such as a contract central to a plaintiff’s case, may be fatal and lead to summary dismissal of proceedings. Such a dilemma may be rectified by the plaintiff stamping the document either during or with an undertaking immediately after a hearing, but prior to the delivery of summary judgment, see: Caxton Street Agencies Pty Ltd v Korkidas [2002] QSC 210.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.13 [r 31.13.140]

[r 31.13.120] Test for admissibility

The court will assess the instrument on its face as to whether it has been duly or sufficiently stamped. The onus lies on the party objecting to its use in proceedings, although the court may go behind the consideration stated on the face of the instrument to show that the instrument has not been sufficiently stamped. For the question of admissibility to arise under r 31.13 and the Duties Act 1997 (s 304), the party seeking to rely on that provision must identify dutiable property as defined in the Duties Act 1997 s 11(1) which is the subject of the relevant transaction. As an example, to seek an undertaking from an opponent as a condition of admissibility per r 31.13, in regard to documents/transactions alleged to transfer goodwill and the right to use that goodwill from one business to another (and thus subject to duty), a party must establish firstly the existence of the relevant goodwill and, secondly, that the relevant document on its face sought, attempted or purported to affect an assignment of such goodwill, otherwise the documents will be admissible without any undertaking, see BIS Cleanaway (t/as CHEP) v Tatale [2007] NSWSC 378. A determination made by the Chief Commissioner under s 8(2) that no further duty is payable on a “dutiable transaction” is conclusive evidence of the validity of the assessment and is not open to challenge other than in review proceedings between the taxpayer and the Commissioner. Accordingly, another party cannot contest that the Commissioner had correctly assessed duty paid in respect of the relevant transaction between it and the taxpayer. Thus a lost contract which effected that transaction will be held to be stamped by such a notice of assessment by the Chief Commissioner, and documents in the nature of secondary evidence of that contract are not instruments chargeable with duty within the meaning of s 304 of the Duties Act 1997, see Fineglow Pty Ltd v Anastasopoulos (2002) 57 NSWLR 39; [2002] NSWSC 1181. [r 31.13.160]

Proving transaction evidenced by witness’s unstamped document

In Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2006) 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 at [21], Austin J noted that the following forensic procedure, set out in the headnote to Birchall v Bullough [1896] 1 QB 325, was permissible, notwithstanding that the Stamp Act 1891 (UK) said that an instrument not duly stamped was not to be “given in evidence or be available for any purpose whatever”: In an action for money lent, an insufficiently stamped promissory note, purporting to be signed by the defendant and expressed to be given for money lent, was put into the defendant’s hands by the plaintiffs’ counsel for the purpose of refreshing his memory and obtaining from him an admission of the loan. However the individual circumstances of a case must be considered for the suitability of such an approach. The High Court of Australia provides guidance as to the limits to that forensic procedure in Dent v Moore (1919) 26 CLR 316; 19 SR (NSW) 344; 36 WN (NSW) 46; 25 ALR 437; [1919] HCA 11 at 322-323 (CLR) by reference to the operation of the Stamp Duties Act 1898 and the rejection of parol evidence of written contracts. A defendant’s assertion that a plaintiff cannot rely on a deed as the source of any financial obligation of the defendant because the deed is not duly stamped with mortgage duty under the Duties Act 2007, may compel the defendant to give the “usual undertaking by person liable” under UCPR r 31.13(1), to introduce into evidence pursuant to s 304(1) of the Duties Act the instrument upon whose unstamped quality its defence rests: TQM Design & Construct Pty Ltd v Golden Plantation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 500 at [14]. [r 31.13.200] Section 304 of the Duties Act 1997 304 Receipt of instruments in evidence (1) An instrument that effects a dutiable transaction or is chargeable with duty under this Act is not available for use in law or equity for any purpose and may not be presented in evidence in a court or tribunal exercising civil jurisdiction unless: (a) it is duly stamped, or (b) it is stamped by the Chief Commissioner or in a manner approved by the Chief Commissioner. (2) A court or tribunal may admit in evidence an instrument that effects a dutiable transaction, or is chargeable with duty in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and that does not comply with subsection (1): (a) if the instrument is after its admission transmitted to the Chief Commissioner in accordance with arrangements approved by the court or tribunal, or 724

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

r 31.14

(b) if (where the person who produces the instrument is not the person liable to pay the duty) the name and address of the person so liable is forwarded, together with the instrument, to the Chief Commissioner in accordance with arrangements approved by the court or tribunal. (3) A court or tribunal may admit in evidence an unexecuted copy of an instrument that effects a dutiable transaction, or is chargeable with duty in accordance with the provisions of this Act, if the court or tribunal is satisfied that: (a) the instrument of which it is a copy is duly stamped, or is stamped in a manner approved by the Chief Commissioner, or (b) the copy is duly stamped under section 299. [r 31.13.1000]

References

Dent v Moore (1919) 26 CLR 316; 19 SR (NSW) 344; 36 WN (NSW) 46; 25 ALR 437; [1919] HCA 11. Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359; 37 ALR 194; 5 ALJ 110; [1931] HCA 359. Hill DG, Duties Legislation (Lawbook Co., subscription service) at [24.0550]–[24.0630]. Bevan C, Stamp Duties Handbook (2nd ed, Lawbook Co.) at [22.70], [22.80]. Butt P, “Unstamped Documents and Caveatable Interests – Conveyancing and Property” (2002) 76 ALJ 667. Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (9th ed, LexisNexis, 2013) [39135]. 31.14 Unstamped documents: undertaking in respect of section 29 of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 (cf SCR Part 36, rule 10A; DCR Part 28, rule 13A)

(1) The “solicitor’s usual undertaking as to stamp duty”, if given to the court by a solicitor in relation to an instrument referred to in section 29 of the Stamp Duties Act 1920, or an unexecuted copy referred to in that section, is an undertaking that the solicitor will cause the instrument or copy to be presented to the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue for assessment in accordance with that Act and cause any duty and fine to which the instrument or copy is liable to be paid. (2) The “party’s usual undertaking as to stamp duty”, if given to the court by a party in relation to an instrument referred to in section 29(4) of the Stamp Duties Act 1920, is an undertaking that the party will, within 28 days, inform the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue of the name of the person primarily liable to duty in respect of the instrument and lodge the instrument or a copy of the instrument with the Chief Commissioner.

RULE 31.14 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.14.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.14.40] Interaction of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 and the Duties Act 1997 ...................................................... [r 31.14.60] Basis for solicitor giving undertaking and an alternative ........................................................................ [r 31.14.80] Rationale for legislative exclusion of unstamped instruments ............................................................. [r 31.14.100] Evidentiary onus ................................................................................................................................... [r 31.14.120] Setting aside default or summary judgment ......................................................................................... [r 31.14.140] Merger on judgment, estoppel and stamp duty ................................................................................... [r 31.14.160] Proving transaction evidenced by witness’s unstamped document ..................................................... [r 31.14.180] Section 29 of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 ............................................................................................ [r 31.14.200] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.14.1000]

[r 31.14.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same as SCR Pt 36 r 10A and DCR Pt 28 r 13A. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

725

UCPR Parts 31-40

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.14.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.14 [r 31.14.40]

[r 31.14.20] Operation

An unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument is struck with legal sterility, see: Dent v Moore (1919) 26 CLR 316; 19 SR (NSW) 344; 36 WN (NSW) 46; 25 ALR 437; [1919] HCA 11, as is secondary evidence of an instrument, such as a copy. This rule sets out two forms of undertaking, being part of arrangements to be approved by the court, to allow a party to circumvent the exclusionary effect of s 29 of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 which would otherwise prevent the use, or admission into evidence, in proceedings of such an instrument. A party liable to duty in respect of the instrument: the solicitor of that party must give to the court the undertaking as formulated in r 31.14(1), which includes: (a) to present the instrument or copy to the Chief Commissioner for the assessment of duty and fine payable, and (b) to cause such duty and fine as is liable to be paid. A party not being a person primarily liable to duty in respect of the instrument: the party per Stamp Duties Act 1920 s 29(4) must give to the court the undertaking, as formulated in UCPR r 31.14(2), which includes: (a) to inform the Chief Commissioner of the name of the person liable for duty, and (b) to lodge the instrument or a copy with the Chief Commissioner. Such arrangements may also include time stipulations, or that evidence of the performance of the undertaking be presented to the registrar within a short period of time eg the duly stamped instrument, see: Re Coolgardie Goldfields Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 475 at 480. Notwithstanding the failure to duly stamp an instrument, if it is stamped and any fine or interest paid, the instrument may be used in proceedings, and it is as efficacious as if it had never been subject to the exclusionary provision, see Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359; 37 ALR 194; 5 ALJ 110; [1931] HCA 359; Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy v D’Jamirze (1999) 48 NSWLR 416; 43 ATR 456; [1999] NSWSC 1249 at [56]; Halloran v Minister Administering National Parks & Wildlife Act 1974 (2006) 229 CLR 545; 80 ALJR 519; [2006] HCA 3 at [87], but note potential difficulties examined by Heydon J at [97]. [r 31.14.60]

Interaction of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 and the Duties Act 1997

This rule facilitates the operation of Stamp Duties Act 1920 s 29 ([r 31.14.200]) which applies to an instrument first executed, or relating to applicable transactions or property in NSW, before 1 July 1998. It requires the payment of “Duty” on and for that instrument, which is defined in s 3 as including every written document, or a copy, to allow it to be “Duly stamped”. The Duties Act 1997 per s 304 ([r 31.13.200]) restricts the use in proceedings of an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument that effects a dutiable transaction or is chargeable with duty, which was first executed on or from 1 July 1998. Both Acts provide that other than in criminal proceedings, a dutiable instrument, or copy which is not duly and sufficiently stamped may not be pleaded or admitted into evidence. [r 31.14.80]

Basis for solicitor giving undertaking and an alternative

Unstamped instruments are rendered impotent in proceedings by the Stamp Duties Act 1920 as a means to protect the revenue raised from stamp duty. It has been settled practice, since stamp duties were first imposed, to admit into evidence an unstamped document (being an “instrument”) on the personal undertaking of a solicitor, as an officer of the court, see: Dimmock v Whymark (1965) 65 SR (NSW) 194; 82 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 29; [1964-1965] NSWR 1557. The consequence of the undertaking is that the solicitor, as the court’s officer, must claim indemnity from the client. There are likely to be undesirable financial consequences for the solicitor if the client is unable or unwilling to indemnify, particularly if the sum is substantial and the client a company of modest assets, as the court will compel the solicitor to make good the undertaking on the faith of which the court has acted, see: Re Coolgardie Goldfields Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 475 at 479. Conventionally counsel will not give such personal undertakings, nor is there provision for such in either limb of this rule. If, in regard to an unstamped instrument, a solicitor is without satisfactory instructions, or is unwilling or unable to give the personal undertaking to the court, the alternative is for the party to seek a short adjournment of the proceedings to enable the duty and any fine to be paid and for the instrument to be stamped. 726

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.14.180] [r 31.14.100]

r 31.14

Rationale for legislative exclusion of unstamped instruments

Notwithstanding consent by the parties, in civil proceedings the court may not take into account an instrument which is relevant to the issues in dispute if the instrument is dutiable and has not been duly stamped. It is precluded from being used in proceedings by Stamp Duties Act 1920 ss 27, 28 and 29. The underlying rationale for this law is that it is not the mere convention of parties which creates the contract, but operation of the law (including the State’s structures such as the courts for the determination of disputes) on their bargain which allows the enforcement of obligations. [r 31.14.120]

Evidentiary onus

When considering the admission of an instrument, the court will look to the face of the instrument to see if it has been duly, or sufficiently, stamped. A party seeking to prevent the use of an instrument in proceedings bears the onus, eg in an application for summary dismissal of proceedings for specific performance on the ground that the instrument relied upon to found the plaintiff’s action is not duly stamped, a defendant must establish that the relevant contract was not stamped, see: Ossmun Pty Ltd v Smith (1990) 21 ATR 1052; 90 ATC 4867. Thus a strike out application by a defendant based on an unstamped copy of an instrument, where evidence of the state of stamping of the original is unavailable to the court, will not succeed, see: Jeans West (Distributors) Pty Ltd v Toivola Pty Ltd (1990) 20 ATR 1858; 90 ATC 4151; Hill DG, Stamp Duties New South Wales Australian Capital Territory, (Lawbook Co., subscription service) at [3.900]. [r 31.14.140]

Setting aside default or summary judgment

Interlocutory orders, such as for default or summary judgment, obtained by relying upon an unstamped dutiable instrument will be set aside upon the point being taken by a party (or the court), even if such an application is brought belatedly after the passage of a number of years, see: Webster v Zervos (unreported, NSWSC, Master Harrison, 2 October 1997); Lill v Merchant Capital (WA) Ltd (1996) 15 WAR 536; 96 ATC 4331. Absent remedial steps, such as those provided in Stamp Duties Act 1920 s 29, reference to an unstamped deed of guarantee in a statement of claim is ineffectual under the stamp duties legislation and the instrument a nullity and unavailable to found a plea of election or waiver or repudiation in an application to set aside summary judgment, see: Lill v Merchant Capital (WA) Ltd (1996) 15 WAR 536; 96 ATC 4331. [r 31.14.160]

Merger on judgment, estoppel and stamp duty

The failure by a party to take a point regarding the use or admissibility into evidence of an unstamped document will cause a right to merge on the decision in fully contested litigation before a court or an arbitrator, and thus an appellate court will no longer be concerned with the effect of Stamp Duties Act 1920 s 29 on the admissibility of the documents at first instance. Further a party would be estopped from taking the point for the first time on appeal, see: McKensey v Hewitt (2004) 61 NSWLR 54; [2004] NSWSC 636 at [32]–[34] per Young CJ in Eq. [r 31.14.180]

Proving transaction evidenced by witness’s unstamped document

In Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2006) 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 at [21], Austin J noted that the following forensic procedure, set out in the headnote to Birchall v Bullough [1896] 1 QB 325, was permissible, notwithstanding that the Stamp Act 1891 (UK) said that an instrument not duly stamped was not to be “given in evidence or be available for any purpose whatever”: In an action for money lent, an insufficiently stamped promissory note, purporting to be signed by the defendant and expressed to be given for money lent, was put into the defendant’s hands by the plaintiffs’ counsel for the purpose of refreshing his memory and obtaining from him an admission of the loan. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

727

UCPR Parts 31-40

Parliament has legislated to require duty to be payable on dutiable instruments, such as a document, as a means of obtaining revenue to maintain the apparatus of government. Payment of stamp duty is enforced by providing that an unstamped dutiable instrument is sterile, or not effectual at law and that the transaction which is embodied by the instrument is a nullity in the eye of the law, see: Dent v Moore (1919) 26 CLR 316; 19 SR (NSW) 344; 36 WN (NSW) 46; 25 ALR 437; [1919] HCA 11 at 324-325 (CLR); Ash Street Properties Pty Ltd v Pollnow (1987) 9 NSWLR 80; 18 ATR 935; 87 ATC 4609.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.14

[r 31.14.180]

However the individual circumstances of a case must be considered for the suitability of such an approach. The High Court of Australia provides guidance as to the limits to that forensic procedure in Dent v Moore (1919) 26 CLR 316; 19 SR (NSW) 344; 36 WN (NSW) 46; 25 ALR 437; [1919] HCA 11 by reference to the operation of the Stamp Duties Act 1898 and the rejection of parol evidence of written contracts. [r 31.14.200] Section 29 of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 29 Inadmissibility of unstamped and other instruments (1) Except as aforesaid, no instrument executed in New South Wales or relating (wheresoever executed) to any property situate or to any matter or thing done or to be done in any part of New South Wales, shall, except in criminal proceedings, be pleaded or given in evidence, or admitted to be good, useful, or available in law or equity for any purpose whatsoever, unless it is duly stamped in accordance with the law in force at the time when it was first executed: Provided that any instrument chargeable with duty before the appointed day shall be deemed to be duly stamped in accordance with the law in force at the time when it was first executed, notwithstanding that the duty chargeable on such instrument is denoted in terms of the currency provided for by Part II of the Currency Act 1965 of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia or any Act passed in amendment of or substitution for the same. (2) Subsection (1) of this section applies to and in respect of an unexecuted copy of an instrument referred to in that subsection (being an instrument that was first executed on or after 20th October 1982) in the same way as it applies to the instrument unless: (a) the court is satisfied that the instrument of which it is a copy is duly stamped, or (b) the copy is duly stamped in accordance with section 73D. (3) No instrument made or executed (whether in New South Wales or elsewhere) on or after 21 November 1986 in respect of a transaction to which Division 3A of Part 3 applies, shall, except in criminal proceedings, be pleaded or given in evidence, or admitted to be good, useful, or available in law or equity for the purpose of proving that a change in beneficial ownership to which the transaction relates occurred, unless: (a) an instrument to effect that transaction has been sufficiently stamped, or (b) any statement required to be lodged under section 44A in respect of the transaction has been lodged and the duty and any fine with which the statement is chargeable have been paid. (4) Sections 27 and 28 and this section do not apply to an instrument or a copy of an instrument tendered as evidence on behalf of a party (not being a person who is primarily liable to duty in respect of the instrument) if the court is satisfied: (a) that the party has informed, or will in accordance with arrangements approved by the court inform, the Chief Commissioner of the name of the person primarily liable to duty in respect of the instrument, and (b) that the party will, in accordance with arrangements approved by the court, lodge the instrument or a copy of the instrument with the Chief Commissioner. [r 31.14.1000]

References

Dent v Moore (1919) 26 CLR 316; 19 SR (NSW) 344; 36 WN (NSW) 46; 25 ALR 437; [1919] HCA 11. Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359; 37 ALR 194; 5 ALJ 110; [1931] HCA 359. Halloran v Minister Administering National Parks & Wildlife Act 1974 (2006) 229 CLR 545; 80 ALJR 519; [2006] HCA 3. Hill DG, Stamp Duties New South Wales Australian Capital Territory (Lawbook Co., subscription service). Mr Justice PW Young, “Stamp Duties”, Recent Cases (1997) 71 ALJ 674. Dimmock v Whymark (1965) 65 SR (NSW) 194; 82 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 29; [1964-1965] NSWR 1557.

728

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Division 1 – Evidence at hearing

[r 31.15.1000]

31.15

r 31.16

Evidence of consent to act as tutor, trustee, receiver or other office

(1) A document: (a) purporting to contain a person’s written consent to act as tutor of a person under legal incapacity, to act as trustee, to act as receiver or to act in any other office on appointment by the court, and (b) purporting to have been duly executed and authenticated, is evidence of the consent. (2) A document is duly executed and authenticated for the purposes of subrule (1): (a) in the case of a consenting person who is a natural person, if the document is signed by the consenting person and the signature is verified by some other person, or (b) in the case of a consenting person that is a corporation, if the seal of the corporation is affixed to the document in accordance with the law regulating the use of the seal.

RULE 31.15 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.15.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.15.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.15.1000]

[r 31.15.20]

Comparison

This rule is similar to SCR Pt 36 r 11. In subr (1)(a) the term “person under a legal incapacity” (defined in SCA s 3) replaces the term “disable person”. Subrule (2)(a) applies to a consenting person “who is a natural person”, whereas the SCR referred to a consenting person who is “not a corporation”. Under subr (2)(b) of this rule, in the case of a corporation the corporation’s seal now must be affixed in accordance with “the law regulating the use of the seal” rather than under the specific provisions of subr (2)(b) of the SCR. There is no equivalent DCR provision. [r 31.15.40]

Operation

This rule creates a presumption of regularity of the creation and the veracity of the contents of a document evidencing consent to act, and thus the consent of a person (including a corporation) to act as a tutor, trustee, receiver or any other office providing the requirements of execution and authentication in subr (2)(b) are fulfilled. It thus averts the exclusionary consequences of the hearsay rule and the detailed requirements of strict proof which might otherwise be in contest. The rule in essence facilitates proof of such consent. [r 31.15.1000]

References

Approved Form 30: Consent to Act as Tutor per UCPR rr 7.13–7.18 is available at: http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/spu/ll_ucpr.nsf/pages/ucpr_forms. 31.16

Evidence of published research concerning maintenance of children

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13E)

If the proper needs of a minor are relevant, the court may have regard, to the extent to which it considers appropriate, to any relevant findings of published research in relation to the maintenance of minors.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

729

UCPR Parts 31-40

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 11)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.16

[r 31.16.20]

RULE 31.16 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.16.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.16.40] Pre-trial matters and preparation to facilitate use of findings ................................................................ [r 31.16.60] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ..................................................................................................................... [r 31.16.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.16.1000]

[r 31.16.20]

Comparison

This rule is almost identical to SCR Pt 36 r 13E and the same in substance. There is no equivalent DCR provision. [r 31.16.40]

Operation

The gateway issue for the use of this rule is whether the proper needs of a minor are relevant to the matter before the court. If so, a court may take notice of, and presumably allow into evidence, published research in relation to the maintenance of minors, without the need to call the author of the research. In this manner the rule provides an exception to the hearsay rule, an exception to the opinion rule, and facilitates proof of the relevant findings from the published research. It thus alleviates the need for complex and expensive steps for proving ancillary matters required by a strict approach to the law of evidence. [r 31.16.60]

Pre-trial matters and preparation to facilitate use of findings

Unusually, no notice provision is included in the rule, but it would appear forensically prudent for a party seeking to rely on this rule to put the findings into evidence to serve a notice to admit to facts (UCPR r 17.4) and a notice to admit documents (UCPR r 17.5), to narrow the issues in dispute and to minimise any surprise to, or claim of prejudice by, an opponent and to determine the attitude of an opponent prior to hearing. Generally a party seeking to rely on findings in relation to the maintenance of minors will need to satisfy the court of their relevance, including the provenance and the pedigree of the “published research” (this term is not defined in the UCPR) involving such issues as peer review/publication methods; eg the distinction between research published on a website, as opposed to a hard copy journal, and to establish that it is appropriate for the court to have regard the research findings. The availability for tender on a voir dire at hearing of at the least the complete published research from which the findings are taken, including endnotes, publication medium details (eg the journal and the author’s curriculum vitae) would appear prudent, if the matters are in contest. The court is likely to take judicial notice of, or to use s 144 of the Evidence Act 1995 – “Matters of common knowledge” for publications by the Family Court or well-known and respected researchers who publish findings as to the maintenance of minors. [r 31.16.80]

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Section 66J of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) contains a similar provision to r 31.16 of longstanding: see C v L [2002] Fam CA 163 as to s 66J and the use of research of Donald Lee of Deakin University in 1989 as adjusted for inflation to confirm that the expenditure claimed by the mother in that matter was reasonable. In Coon v Cox (1993) 116 FLR 166; [1994] FLC 92-464 at 695 (Fam LR), the court compared and contrasted two well-known studies concerning maintenance of minors, the 1984 Kerry Lovering of the Australian Institute of Family Studies paper entitled Costs of Children in Australia and the 1989 study/tables by Donald Lee of Deakin University, working under contract to the Australian Institute of Family Studies. The Lee study/tables are regularly updated and have been held to be the preferred source: see W & F [2003] Fam CA 173; In the Marriage of Streets (1994) 122 FLR 103; 18 Fam LR 275; [1994] FLC 92-509. More recent and varied published research is available, including at the sites listed at [r 31.16.1000]. [r 31.16.1000]

References

Family Court of Australia: http://www.familylawcourts.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/FLC/Home/ Property+and+Money+Matters/Costs+of+maintaining+children/. Australian Institute of Family Studies: http://www.aifs.org.au. 730

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

[r Pt31.Div2.20]

r 31.16A

Costs of children: research commissioned by the Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support: http:// business.curtin.edu.au/local/docs/A5gray.pdf. Child Family Community Australia is an information exchange hosted by Australian Institute of Family Studies (AIFS) which has publications on the topic of “Costs of children” at: http://www.aifs.gov.au/cfca/bibliographies/costofchildren.php. Return of exhibits

(cf SCR Part 75, rule 3I)

Where proceedings have been concluded and: (a) 4 months have expired since the conclusion, and (b) there is no undisposed of appeal, or application for leave to appeal, in respect of the proceedings, the registrar may, unless the court otherwise orders, return any exhibit in the proceedings still in the custody of the registrar by forwarding it to the party from whom it was received. [R 31.16A insrt Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[8]]

RULE 31.16A COMMENTARY Comparison .......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.16A.20] Operation .............................................................................................................................................. [r 31.16A.40]

[r 31.16A.20]

Comparison

This rule is similar in form to SCR Pt 75 r3I, however this rule applies to all proceedings subject to the UCPR as opposed to the limited application of its predecessor to specified criminal proceedings. There is no equivalent DCR provision. [r 31.16A.40]

Operation

This rule is a non-contentious machinery provision to allow a court to control exhibits in its custody after a dispute has been resolved, subject to an order otherwise, and also addresses increasing storage capacity challenges for courts due to the trend towards voluminous documentary exhibits. The “4 months” time period accords with the time allowed for a party to seek review of the court’s determination of the proceedings. Should a party be considering further agitation of proceedings, it ought to seek an order otherwise within the meaning of this rule (in addition to any other necessary relief), before the period of four months in r 31.16A(a) expires.

DIVISION 2 – PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO EXPERT EVIDENCE GENERALLY [Div 2 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

DIVISION 2 COMMENTARY Overview of Part 31 Division 2 ........................................................................................................ [r Pt31.Div2.20] Considerations leading to expert evidence rules contained in 8 December 2006 amendments .... [r Pt31.Div2.40] Contents of Part 31 Division 2 ......................................................................................................... [r Pt31.Div2.60] References ................................................................................................................................... [r Pt31.Div2.1000]

[r Pt31.Div2.20]

Overview of Part 31 Division 2

The common law concept that a person who has specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience – an “expert” – may assist the court by providing opinion evidence wholly or substantially based on that specialised knowledge which is beyond the general knowledge and common sense of a court underpins this © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

731

UCPR Parts 31-40

31.16A

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.16A

[r Pt31.Div2.20]

Division. The recurring demand by courts that expert evidence should be unbiased and transparent in the reasoning process to furnish the trier of fact with criteria enabling evaluation of the expert’s conclusions is promoted by the rules. An example is the requirements and underlying principles of the code of conduct and the presumption of the exclusion of expert evidence which fails to acknowledge and to agree to be bound by the contents of the code of conduct. These rules address matters of practice and procedure for the use of expert evidence in proceedings or proposed proceedings. Lawyers need to note the distinction in this Division between the use of the terms “adducing evidence” and “admissibility”. The former is used to impose a prerequisite on a party before a court considers the latter. Failure to comply with the requirements of the rules for adducing evidence, absent the grant of leave by the court to excuse such default, will result in the question of admissibility not arising, usually to the detriment of the non-complying partys prospects of success. The obligation on a party to make timely disclosure of any expert evidence upon which it relies is clear from the obligation arising from r 31.19 – Parties to seek directions before calling expert witnesses and also is stated in r 31.28, which helps to achieve the overriding purpose in CPA s 56. The consequent mechanism to facilitate proof of expert evidence, see rr 31.29(1) and 31.30(1), given timely disclosure, and the sanction in r 31.28(3), for non-compliance by a party, has similar effect. Any potential prejudice to a party being taken by surprise due to late service or non-disclosure of expert evidence is addressed, by requiring the party not complying with disclosure requirements to satisfy the court that there are “exceptional circumstances that warrant the granting of leave” to excuse its default. The Civil Procedure Act 2005 states guiding principles for the exercise of broad case management powers in proceedings including: s 56 (overriding purpose); s 57 (objects of case management); s 58 (court to follow dictates of justice); s 59 (elimination of delay); and ss 61, 62 (power of court to give directions) to maximise the effectiveness of expert assistance to a court. Those provisions, in addition to the rules in this Division, provide a court with the power to determine whether, and how, it may be assisted by expert evidence, per r 31.19. Rule 31.20 provides specific directions available to a court as to practice and procedure regarding expert evidence. Examples of such directions include court-appointed experts [r 31.18.60], parties single experts [r Pt31.Div2.Sdiv4.20], conferences amongst experts [r 31.24.40] – [r 31.24.60], [r 31.26.40] – [r 31.26.80], joint reports, and the taking of evidence after an expert conclave or by concurrent evidence (sometimes referred to as “hot-tub” format) to facilitate expert assistance to the court for the just, quick and cheap resolution of any dispute amongst experts. Helpful guidance on the forensic issues relevant to expert evidence is provided by Justice Robert McDougall in a paper entitled Some thoughts on calling expert evidence, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/mcdougall131109.pdf/$file/mcdougall131109.pdf. [r Pt31.Div2.40]

Considerations leading to expert evidence rules contained in 8 December 2006 amendments

Amendments to the rules in Pt 31 regarding expert evidence took effect from 8 December 2006. The new Div 2 to Pt 31 implements the recommendations of the Report of the NSW Attorney-Generals Working Party on Civil Procedure: Reference on Expert Witnesses: 14 November 2006 (“Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report”). The brief by the Attorney General to the Working Party on Civil Procedure was to consider the NSW Law Reform Commissions Report 109 on Expert Witnesses (“LRC Report 109”) and to report on the adoption of its recommendations. The LRC Report 109 suggested two significant changes to the existing regime in regard to expert evidence: 1. A “permission rule”, ie that no expert evidence should be called without the leave of the court, see LCR 109 pp 82-83; and 2. The inclusion of provisions for joint witnesses in addition to the existing provisions for court-appointed experts, see LCR 109 pp 106-124. The Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report, which was written by Mr Justice Hamilton, Chair of the Working Party on Civil Procedure, summarises the Working Party discussion and recommendations. There were two underlying principles recommended by the Working Party. Firstly, an approach to the regime for expert evidence that permits the maximum possible flexibility to accommodate the differing needs of different courts and the differing requirements of individual matters arising from subject matter or size of the 732

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r Pt31.Div2.60]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.16A

amount in dispute. Secondly, the need for the court to maintain control of the situation so far as giving expert evidence is concerned. The Working Party rejected LRC Report 109 Recommendation 6.1 Permission Rule, see reasons paras 6-13 of the Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report. Instead the Working Party suggested that a rule obliging parties to seek directions as to expert evidence for hearing be introduced, see [14] –[19].

The overall effect of the amendments is to give to the court much greater control of the use of expert evidence in hearings. As stated by the Working Party “… the court must seize and maintain control of the situation so far as the giving of expert evidence is concerned”. The amendments are to be understood and applied mindful of the overriding purpose as provided in s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. The objects of the amendment to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 were stated (as opposed to the Explanatory note to the Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report) in the Explanatory Note to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 12) 2006 as: (a) to replace the existing rules concerning the appointment and engagement of expert witnesses with new rules, and (b) to replace the existing code of conduct for expert witnesses with a new code of conduct. The amendments are potentially far-reaching in their attempt to change the existing forensic culture in which the parties determine the nature and extent of expert assistance at hearing, to one where the court will have comprehensive and flexible control over all aspects of expert evidence. [r Pt31.Div2.60]

Contents of Part 31 Division 2

Subdivision 1 – Preliminary 31.17 Main purposes of Division 31.18 Definitions Subdivision 2 – Expert witnesses generally 31.19 Parties to seek directions before calling expert witnesses 31.20 Court may give directions regarding expert witnesses 31.21 Expert evidence in chief to be given by way of experts’ reports 31.22 Expert witness to provide details of contingency fees or deferred payment schemes 31.23 Code of conduct 31.24 Conference between expert witnesses 31.25 Instructions to expert witnesses where conference ordered before report furnished 31.26 Joint report arising from conference between expert witnesses Subdivision 3 – Experts’ reports and expert evidence 31.27 Experts’ reports 31.28 Disclosure of expert’s reports and hospital reports 31.29 Admissibility of expert’s report 31.30 Admissibility of expert’s report in District Court and Local Courts 31.31 Fees for medical expert for compliance with subpoena 31.32 Service of subpoena on medical expert 31.33 Subpoena requiring production of medical records 31.34 Supplementary reports by expert witness 31.35 Opinion evidence by expert witnesses 31.36 Service of experts’ reports in professional negligence claims Subdivision 4 – Parties’ single experts 31.37 Selection and engagement 31.38 Instructions to parties’ single expert © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

733

UCPR Parts 31-40

The Uniform Rules Committee adopted the recommendations of the Working Party. No “permission rule” for the use of expert evidence was implemented by the new rules. Instead a provision to require parties to seek directions before calling expert witnesses (r 31.19) and to allow the court to give directions regarding expert witnesses (r 31.20) were introduced.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.16A 31.39 31.40 31.41 31.42 31.43 31.44 31.45

[r Pt31.Div2.60]

Parties’ single expert may apply to court for directions Parties’ single expert’s report to be sent to parties Parties may seek clarification of report Tender of reports and of answers to questions Cross-examination of parties’ single expert Prohibition of other expert evidence Remuneration of parties’ single expert

Subdivision 5 – Court-appointed experts 31.46 Selection and appointment 31.47 Instructions to court-appointed expert 31.48 Court-appointed expert may apply to court for directions 31.49 Court-appointed expert’s report to be sent to registrar 31.50 Parties may seek clarification of court-appointed expert’s report 31.51 Cross-examination of court-appointed expert 31.52 Prohibition of other expert evidence 31.53 Remuneration of court-appointed expert 31.54 Assistance to court by other persons [r Pt31.Div2.1000]

References

Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; 277 ALR 611; [2011] HCA 21 HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; 160 ALR 554. Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; 54 ACSR 326; 23 ACLC 1111; [2005] NSWCA 152. Bergin CJ in Equity, The Expert’s Lament, a paper delivered at the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales Annual Conference 2011, 5–6 May 2011, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_ court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/bergin060511.pdf/$file/bergin060511.pdf. McClellan CJ at CL, Admissibility of expert evidence under the Uniform Evidence Act, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/mccle llan021009.pdf/$file/ mcclellan021009.pdf. McClellan CJ at CL, Concurrent expert evidence, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/ Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/mcclellan291107.pdf/$file/mcclellan291107.pdf. Garling J, Concurrent Expert Evidence Reflections and Development, a paper delivered at the Australian Insurance Law Association Twilight Seminar Series, 17 August 2011, available at http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/Garling170811.pdf/$file/ Garling170811.pdf. McDougall J in a paper entitled Some thoughts on calling expert evidence, available at http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/mcdougall131109.pdf/$file/ mcdougall131109.pdf. Rares J, Using the “Hot Tub’” – How Concurrent Expert Evidence Aids Understanding Issues, a paper delivered at the New South Wales Bar Association Continuing Professional Development Seminar, 23 August 2010, available at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/aboutct/judges_papers/speeches_raresj12.html. Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) or subscription service. Freckelton & Selby, Expert Evidence Law, Practice Procedure and Advocacy (4th ed, Lawbook Co., 2009). NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109: Expert Witnesses, July 2005. NSW Attorney Generals Working Party on Civil Procedure: Reference on Expert Witnesses Report 14 November 2006 (referred to above as the Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/spu/ll_ucpr.nsf/vwFiles/Expert %20Witness%20Report.doc/$file/ Expert%20Witness%20Report.doc. 734

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r Pt31.Div2.1000]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.16A

Explanatory note to Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ lawlink/spu/ll_ucpr.nsf/vwFiles/UCPR%20no%2012.doc/$file/UCPR %20no%2012.doc. Australian Law Reform Commission Report 102: Uniform Evidence Law, December 2005, see Ch 9 – “The Opinion Rule and its Exceptions”. The Expert Witness Directory 2012, www.theexpertwitnessdirectory.co.uk/.

(4th

ed,

Thomson

–

Sweet

&

Maxwell):

http://

Practice Note SC Gen 11 Supreme Court – Joint Conferences of Expert Witnesses, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/ 991e2f2f3bcd8289ca2572ed000cec4b?OpenDocument. Note The provisions of this Division replace those of former Divisions 2 and 3, as in force immediately before 8 December 2006. The numbering of the individual provisions of this Division varies considerably from that of the provisions of the former Divisions. The following Table identifies the new rules corresponding to former rules 31.17–31.35. Table Former rule Rule 31.17 Rule 31.18 Rule 31.18A Rule 31.19 Rule 31.20 Rule 31.21 Rule 31.22 Rule 31.23 Rule 31.24 Rule 31.25 Rule 31.26 Rule 31.27 Rule 31.28 Rule 31.29 Rule 31.30 Rule 31.31 Rule 31.32 Rule 31.33 Rule 31.34 Rule 31.35

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

New rule Rule 31.18 Rule 31.28 Rule 31.29 Rule 31.30 Rule 31.31 Rule 31.32 Rule 31.33 Rule 31.27 Rule 31.34 Rules 31.24 and 31.26 Rule 31.35 Rule 31.36 Rule 31.18 Rule 31.46 Rule 31.23 Rule 31.49 Rule 31.51 Rule 31.52 Rule 31.53 Rule 31.54

735

UCPR Parts 31-40

Concurrent evidence – New methods with experts – Judicial Commission of New South Wales, DVD, available at http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/evidence_dvd.php.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.17

[r 31.17.20]

SUBDIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY [Subdiv 1 heading insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

31.17

Main purposes of Division

(cf Queensland Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rule 423; United Kingdom Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rule 35.1)

The main purposes of this Division are as follows: (a) to ensure that the court has control over the giving of expert evidence, (b) to restrict expert evidence in proceedings to that which is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings, (c) to avoid unnecessary costs associated with parties to proceedings retaining different experts, (d) if it is practicable to do so without compromising the interests of justice, to enable expert evidence to be given on an issue in proceedings by a single expert engaged by the parties or appointed by the court, (e) if it is necessary to do so to ensure a fair trial of proceedings, to allow for more than one expert (but no more than are necessary) to give evidence on an issue in the proceedings, (f) to declare the duty of an expert witness in relation to the court and the parties to proceedings. [R 31.17 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.17 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.17.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.17.40] Consideration of competing discretionary factors .................................................................................. [r 31.17.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.17.1000]

[r 31.17.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule which has no direct predecessor in the old rules. In principle, but not in form, it follows the reforms in the United Kingdom which were introduced in 1999 by the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK), which implemented the recommendations in the Woolf Report in 1996, see CPR (UK) Part 35. The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 423 states the “Purposes of Pt 5” being “Part 5 – Expert evidence”, however that rule differs in both form and substance from this rule. [r 31.17.40]

Operation

The best available guide to the intended operation of this rule, other than the brief Explanatory note to the amendments [r Pt31.Div2.40], may be found in the Explanatory note to the Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report [r Pt31.Div2.1000] for the proposed amendments after considering the recommendations in the NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109: Expert Witnesses, July 2005. The underlying principles for the amendments recommended by the Working Party are an approach permitting maximum flexibility to allow a case by case approach to the requirements for expert assistance and to ensure that the court maintains control over the giving of expert evidence. A helpful summary of the aims of the reforms which also inform the use of this rule for the exercise of the courts discretion, is stated in CPR (UK) Part 35 Practice Direction #35: Part 35 is intended to limit the use of oral expert evidence to that which is reasonably required. In addition, where possible, matters requiring expert evidence should be dealt with by a single expert...There is annexed to this Practice Direction a protocol for the instruction of experts to give evidence in civil claims. Experts and those instructing them are expected to have regard to the guidance contained in the protocol. The approach of courts to the statement by Parliament of the purpose or the objects of legislation, eg Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 56; Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 ss 5 and 6 may give guidance to the application of this rule at hearing, see Interpretation Act 1987 s 33. 736

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

[r 31.17.1000]

r 31.18

This rule does not apply and a party is not obliged to move the court for directions before obtaining an expert’s report in the context of interlocutory proceedings: see Stolfa v Owners Strata Plan 4366 (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 531 at [2]. Consideration of competing discretionary factors

The exercise of the judicial discretion provided in Div 2, including to make an “order otherwise” or to “grant leave”, to excuse compliance requires a balance to be drawn between competing factors. Firstly, case management principles and the need for courts to provide expeditious resolution of disputes, and secondly, to ensure that the disputes are resolved so as to privide justice according to law to the parties in the dispute. These factors, although competing, are not disconnected. Failure to give sufficient weight to the condition that a court is required to give a just result to the parties may lead to appellable error due to the court’s descretion miscarrying, see Owners of Strata Plan 58577 v Banmore Developments Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 325 at [2] and [14]; Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372 at [90]–[96], [107]. [r 31.17.1000]

References

McClellan CJ at CL, Admissibility of expert evidence under the Uniform Evidence Act, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/mcclellan021009.pdf/$file/ mcclellan021009.pdf. McDougall J in a paper entitled Some thoughts on calling expert evidence, available at http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/mcdougall131109.pdf/$file/ mcdougall131109.pdf. NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109: Expert Witnesses, July 2005. Civil Procedure Rules (UK): Part 35 & Practice Direction 35http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/ contents/parts/part35.htm. Pearce DC & Geddes RS, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (6th ed, LexisNexis, 2006) at [4.42]. Interpretation Act 1987. 31.18

Definitions

(cf SCR Part 36, rules 13A and 13C; DCR Part 28, rule 8; LCR Part 23, rule 1D)

In this Division: court-appointed expert means an expert appointed pursuant to rule 31.46. expert, in relation to any issue, means a person who has such knowledge or experience of, or in connection with, that issue, or issues of the character of that issue, that his or her opinion on that issue would be admissible in evidence. expert witness means an expert engaged or appointed for the purpose of: (a) providing an expert’s report for use as evidence in proceedings or proposed proceedings, or (b) giving opinion evidence in proceedings or proposed proceedings. expert’s report means a written statement by an expert (whether or not an expert witness in the proceedings concerned) that sets out the expert’s opinion and the facts, and assumptions of fact, on which the opinion is based. hospital report means a written statement concerning a patient, made by or on behalf of a hospital, that the party serving the statement intends to adduce in evidence in chief at the trial. parties’ single expert means an expert engaged pursuant to rule 31.37. [R 31.18 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

737

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 31.17.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.18

[r 31.18.20]

RULE 31.18 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.18.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.18.40] Court appointed expert ........................................................................................................................... [r 31.18.60] Expert ..................................................................................................................................................... [r 31.18.80] Expert witness ...................................................................................................................................... [r 31.18.100] Expert’s report ...................................................................................................................................... [r 31.18.120] Hospital report ...................................................................................................................................... [r 31.18.140] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.18.1000]

[r 31.18.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, the definitions in this rule of “court-appointed expert”, “expert witness”, “experts report”, and “hospital report” match those in SCR Pt 36 rr 13A and 13C. The definition of “expert” is new (but cf “expert” as defined in SCR Pt 1 r 8). In the District Court, the definitions in this rule of “experts report”, and “hospital record” match those in DCR Pt 28 r 8. The definitions of expert witness and expert are new (but cf “expert” as defined in DCR Pt 1 r 4). [r 31.18.40]

Operation

This rule defines essential terms and states fundamental concepts which are integral to the procedure set out in this Division for the provision of expert assistance to a court. The rule attempts to create a cohesive procedural structure to allow a uniform approach to the form, substance and facilitation of proof of the evidence of experts. Necessarily, this rule has an exclusionary effect to restrict the use of expert evidence at hearing, subject to provision for the court to grant leave to excuse non-compliance with its contents. A gateway issue is whether or not a court requires the assistance of expert evidence, see Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486; 34 ALJR 118; [1960] ALR 524. [r 31.18.60]

Court appointed expert

The broad discretion conferred on a court under the CPA and the UCPR, and specifically Part 31 Division 2 regarding expert assistance, to achieve the overriding purpose, include that stated in r 31.46 for court-appointed experts. The court may appoint an expert, either by selecting its own expert or by appointing an expert selected by the parties. The court-appointed expert may be authorised to inquire into and report on any question requiring expert opinion, or on any relevant facts. A similar provision for a court to appoint an assessor who has “skill and experience” was introduced in the United Kingdom following the recommendations in the Woolf Report in 1996, see Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) r 35.15. [r 31.18.80]

Expert

The definition of an “expert” by reference to admissibility at hearing requires consideration of the Evidence Act 1995 (EA) (located behind the “Evidence” tabcard in the Uniform Civil Procedure volume). In particular, note the exclusionary provisions, such as the opinion rule in Evidence Act 1995 s 76, together with the exception to that rule in s 79 regarding the opinion of a person based wholly or substantially on specialised knowledge arising from training, study or experience, see HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; 160 ALR 554. This rule explicitly reinforces the central role of the trial judges discretion to admit or reject evidence upon which a party seeks to rely at hearing. For examples of the application of the definition by the court to exclude purported expert evidence, see: Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485 per Campbell J at [11] re the SCR: “It does not seem to me that the definition of “expert witness” is able to catch the situation involved here, where an officer of a party, not engaged for any particular purpose, has, at a time before court proceedings were contemplated, expressed an expert opinion in a report, and that report is tendered in later proceedings”; applied by Harrison AssocJ regarding rr 31.18, 31.23 in Sharkawy v Toman [2007] NSWSC 621. Notwithstanding the content of the duties to the court owed by expert witnesses under r 31.23, there is no reason why expert witnesses who have a material interest in the proceedings in which they are to testify should not be able to comply with those duties. Furthermore, such an expert might well be able to give truthful evidence to ensure that the court is fully informed of her or his reasoning process and that the evidence is 738

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.18.1000]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.18

without vice. Such matters may be tested in cross-examination and go to weight not admissibility: see Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 at [17], [47] and [200]–[219]. Expert witness

The definition of “expert witness” incorporates the definition of “expert” above, and necessarily picks up the provisions of EA ss 76–79. It has the effect of regularising and facilitating the use of expert evidence to achieve the overriding purpose. The engagement of the expert to give opinion evidence (presumably to fall within the ambit of EA s 79) for “proceedings or proposed proceedings” requires strict compliance by a party at all stages of a matter with the underpinning principle that the primary duty of an expert is to assist the court, and not to be an advocate for the party’s case. This concept is reinforced by the rules in Pt 31 Div 2 including rr 31.29 and 31.30 (admissibility of expert’s report) and r 31.23 (expert witnesses must comply with code of conduct). “Expert witness” is defined by “engaged for the purpose of” and in practice notes of courts as “engaged by a party”. Thus evidence of experts such as a treating doctor or a company’s accountant may not necessarily be subject to this Division, albeit qualifying under s 79 as an exception to the opinion rule. [r 31.18.120]

Expert’s report

The definition “expert’s report” incorporates the above definition of “expert”. Importantly this definition applies to evidence to be adduced at trial (see CPA s 3: “trial” means “any hearing that is not an interlocutory hearing”). The distinction between the adducing of evidence at trial, as opposed to the admission of evidence (which raises separate considerations for the court upon the report being adduced), means that this definition comprises the following four cumulative requirements for the form of the expert report: 1. written report; 2. sets out expert’s opinion; 3. sets out facts on which opinion is formed; 4. contains (and thereby limits) the substance of the expert’s evidence to be adduced in chief at trial. The definition has resonance with, and reiterates, the contents of the code of conduct (see UCPR Sch 7 and [r 31.23.40] and also the common law, see Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305. [r 31.18.140]

Hospital report

The inclusion of this definition in this Division facilitates the proof of hospital records without the need to establish the prerequisites of EA s 69 – the hearsay rule exception for business records – including matters of provenance. [r 31.18.1000]

References

HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; 160 ALR 554. Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; 54 ACSR 326; 23 ACLC 1111; [2005] NSWCA 152. Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 at [17], [47] and [200]–[219]. Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) or subscription service. Freckelton & Selby, Expert Evidence Law, Practice Procedure and Advocacy (4th ed, Lawbook Co., 2009). NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109: Expert Witnesses, July 2005. Australian Law Reform Commission Report 102: Uniform Evidence Law, December 2005, see Ch 9 – “The Opinion Rule and its Exceptions”.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

739

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 31.18.100]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.19 Editor’s note: Rule 31.18A is repealed and has not been reproduced.

SUBDIVISION 2 – EXPERT WITNESSES GENERALLY [Subdiv 2 heading insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

SUBDIVISION 2 COMMENTARY [r Pt31.Div2.Sdiv2.20]

Overview of Subdivision 2

The amendments introduced on 8 December 2006 by this subdivision relate to expert witnesses generally and include, per the Explanatory note to the Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report (online reference at [r Pt31.Div2.1000]): (a) a new rule requiring parties to seek directions before calling expert witnesses (r 31.19); (b) a new rule relating to the directions that the court can give regarding expert witnesses (r 31.20); (c) a new rule requiring an expert witness to provide details of contingency fees or deferred payment schemes (r 31.22); (d) rules relating to the expert witness code of conduct (r 31.23) and joint conferences between expert witnesses (rr 31.24 to 31.26). 31.19

Parties to seek directions before calling expert witnesses

(1) Any party: (a) intending to adduce expert evidence at trial, or (b) to whom it becomes apparent that he or she, or any other party, may adduce expert evidence at trial, must promptly seek directions from the court in that regard. (2) Directions under this rule may be sought at any directions hearing or case management conference or, if no such hearing or conference has been fixed or is imminent, by notice of motion or pursuant to liberty to restore. (3) Unless the court otherwise orders, expert evidence may not be adduced at trial: (a) unless directions have been sought in accordance with this rule, and (b) if any such directions have been given by the court, otherwise than in accordance with those directions. (4) This rule does not apply to proceedings with respect to a professional negligence claim. [Subr (4) insrt Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[5]] [R 31.19 am Rule 327 of 2007; subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]; am Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 31.19 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.19.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.19.40] Nature of and time for making directions ............................................................................................... [r 31.19.50] Expert evidence in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court – PN SC Eq 5 ...................................... [r 31.19.60] Expert evidence in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court – PN SC Eq 1 .................................... [r 31.19.100] Rule does not apply to professional negligence claim proceedings .................................................... [r 31.19.120] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.19.1000]

[r 31.19.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule, which elaborates on case management principles in Pt 6 of the CPA. 740

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.19.40]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.19

Operation

The obligation of seeking directions as to expert witnesses lies upon the parties. It is anticipated that this can be done in the course of ordinary directions hearings or case management conferences, without any special application to the Court. However if such an opportunity is not available then directions will be sought by notice of motion absent provision in a practice note or a practice direction of the court. This rule operates in regard to expert evidence to be adduced at trial, as opposed to at hearings, ie it does not cover interlocutory hearings. The court may make “orders otherwise” utilising the power conferred by r 31.19(3) or pursuant to the provisions of Pt 6 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 where non-compliance has occurred. The primary purpose of this rule is to control the calling of expert evidence to that which is required to achieve the overriding purpose. Relevance or admissibility is not a sufficient basis for a direction under this rule, see Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (2011) 189 LGERA 348; [2011] NSWCA 195 at [35]. Directions should be sought before the expert is retained, let alone before the expert provides a report, see Chapman v Chapman [2007] NSWSC 1109 at [6]. It may be necessary for an applicant under this rule to provide some specificity as to the proposition or propositions that the expert evidence is expected to support, rather than merely to identify the area of expertise, see Shellharbour at [26]. [r 31.19.50] Nature of and time for making directions Directions made by the court under this rule deal with the service of reports, restricting evidence that may be adduced, including the number of experts that may be called, requiring the appointment and instruction of a court appointed expert, and requiring experts in relation to the same issue to confer. Directions may be made at any time, including during the course of a hearing, subject to procedural fairness and rules of evidence: see Laws v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 53; [2007] NSWSC 316 at [71]–[72] per Rothman J. [r 31.19.60] Expert evidence in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court – PN SC Eq 5 This practice note which applies to proceedings in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court supplements the Rules and ensures that the court’s processes are consistent with the “overriding purpose”. The practice note aims to encourage a cooperative approach between prospective parties prior to the commencement of proceedings, to ensure parties promptly obtain expert evidence directions in accordance with this rule to minimise costs and to reduce the hearing time. The practice note provides in Annexure A a form entitled “Request for Expert Evidence Directions” to facilitate the making of directions pursuant to this rule, including in the absence of the parties if that form is signed by all lawyers. Furthermore, the practice note provides for any dispute over expert matters to be raised at the next listed directions hearing and, absent an upcoming directions hearing, for a party to have the proceedings listed before the court on three day’s notice to the court and the other party or parties. [r 31.19.100] Expert evidence in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court – PN SC Eq 1 This practice note sets out the court’s expectations of practitioners appearing in the Equity List, including those in regard to the use of a single expert or court appointed expert or the use of appropriate concurrent evidence processes. The “Usual Order for Hearing” contained in Annexure A to this practice note makes extensive provision for expert evidence and provides for early agreement between parties no later than 10 weeks before the hearing date, including a Statement of Issues for Expert Assistance to the Court, and for the provision of that document to experts to produce a joint report or separate reports dealing with matters that are unable to be agreed upon. Furthermore, parties are required to produce a draft agenda for discussion of contested issues in the concurrent evidence session at trial which, with the above documents, are to be filed with the court and served on the other parties no later than four weeks before the hearing date in cases where expert evidence is to be given concurrently. [r 31.19.120] Rule does not apply to professional negligence claim proceedings A “professional negligence claim” means a claim for damages, indemnity or contribution based on an assertion of professional negligence, see definitions in the UCPR Dictionary. Relevantly, r 31.19 is not applicable to proceedings with respect to a professional negligence claim. However, r 31.36“Service of experts’ reports in professional negligence claims” makes provision with regard to the service of expert’s reports in professional negligence claims, including that a person commencing a professional negligence claim must file and serve © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

741

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 31.19.120]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.20

[r 31.19.120]

with the statement of claim commencing such an expert’s report that includes an opinion supporting each breach of duty and damage and the causal relationship between the two: see Salzke v Khoury (2009) 74 NSWLR 580; [2009] NSWCA 195. In the Supreme Court, Practice Note SC CL 7 – Professional Negligence List makes provision in regard to expert witnesses including restricting the number of experts to be called and providing sanctions such as rejecting the tender of an expert’s report or refusing to allow an expert to be called if the court considers that an unnecessary expert has been qualified. [r 31.19.1000]

References

Salzke v Khoury (2009) 74 NSWLR 580; [2009] NSWCA 195. Practice Note SC Eq 1 – Case Management, available at: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/ nswsc_pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/036caabf393a7f34ca25765 1001d40db?OpenDocument. Practice Note SC Eq 5 – Expert Evidence in the Equity Division, available at: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/509706fbec738345ca25753c00060d0d? OpenDocument. Practice Note SC CL 7 – Professional Negligence List, available at: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_ notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/a476042cfd07ec80ca257410001cbbdc? OpenDocument. Bergin CJ in Equity, The Expert’s Lament, a paper delivered at the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales Annual Conference 2011, 5–6 May 2011, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_ court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/bergin060511.pdf/$file/bergin060511.pdf. 31.20

Court may give directions regarding expert witnesses

(1) Without limiting its other powers to give directions, the court may at any time give such directions as it considers appropriate in relation to the use of expert evidence in proceedings. (2) Directions under this rule may include any of the following: (a) a direction as to the time for service of experts’ reports, (b) a direction that expert evidence may not be adduced on a specified issue, (c) a direction that expert evidence may not be adduced on a specified issue except by leave of the court, (d) a direction that expert evidence may be adduced on specified issues only, (e) a direction limiting the number of expert witnesses who may be called to give evidence on a specified issue, (f) a direction providing for the engagement and instruction of a parties’ single expert in relation to a specified issue, (g) a direction providing for the appointment and instruction of a court-appointed expert in relation to a specified issue, (h) a direction requiring experts in relation to the same issue to confer, either before or after preparing experts’ reports in relation to a specified issue, (i) any other direction that may assist an expert in the exercise of the expert’s functions, (j) a direction that an expert who has prepared more than one expert’s report in relation to any proceedings is to prepare a single report that reflects his or her evidence in chief. [R 31.20 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.20 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.20.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.20.40]

[r 31.20.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule. 742

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.22.40] [r 31.20.40]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.23

Operation

The broad scope of the directions provided above ought not be seen to limit the powers that a court enjoys under Pt 6 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 to make directions in regard to the use of expert evidence in proceedings. This rule has a broader operation than r 31.19, which prima facie applies to expert evidence to be adduced at trial unless the court otherwise orders.

31.21

Expert evidence in chief to be given by way of experts’ reports

Unless the court otherwise orders, an expert witness’s evidence in chief must be given by the tender of one or more expert’s reports. [R 31.21 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

31.22 Expert witness to provide details of contingency fees or deferred payment schemes (1) A person who is engaged as an expert witness in relation to any proceedings must include information as to any arrangements under which: (a) the charging of fees or costs by the expert witness is contingent on the outcome of the proceedings, or (b) the payment of any fees or costs to the expert witness is to be deferred, in, or in an annexure to, any report that he or she prepares for the purposes of the proceedings. (2) If a report referred to in subrule (1) indicates the existence of any such arrangements, the court may direct disclosure of the terms of the engagement (including as to fees and costs). [R 31.22 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.22 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.22.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.22.40]

[r 31.22.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule, which elaborates on case management principles in Pt 6 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. [r 31.22.40]

Operation

The basis for this rule is the apprehension that where there is a speculative element or an arrangement for deferral of payment to expert witnesses contingent upon an outcome favourable to the party retaining the expert witness, the potential for an interest in the outcome of the proceedings ought to be disclosed. 31.23

Code of conduct

(cf SCR Part 39, rule 2; DCR Part 28A, rule 2; LCR Part 38B, rule 2)

(1) An expert witness must comply with the code of conduct set out in Schedule 7. (2) As soon as practicable after an expert witness is engaged or appointed: (a) in the case of an expert witness engaged by one or more parties, the engaging parties, or one of them as they may agree, or (b) in the case of an expert witness appointed by the court, such of the affected parties as the court may direct, must provide the expert witness with a copy of the code of conduct. (3) Unless the court otherwise orders, an expert’s report may not be admitted in evidence unless the report contains an acknowledgment by the expert witness by whom it was prepared that he or she has © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

743

UCPR Parts 31-40

This rule does not apply in the context of interlocutory proceedings and a party is not obliged to move the court for directions before obtaining an expert’s report: see Stolfa v Owners Strata Plan 4366 (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 531 at [2].

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.23

[r 31.23.20]

read the code of conduct and agrees to be bound by it. (4) Unless the court otherwise orders, oral evidence may not be received from an expert witness unless the court is satisfied that the expert witness has acknowledged, whether in an expert’s report prepared in relation to the proceedings or otherwise in relation to the proceedings, that he or she has read the code of conduct and agrees to be bound by it. [R 31.23 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.23 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.23.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.23.40] Code of conduct ..................................................................................................................................... [r 31.23.60] Non compliance and orders that the rule not apply ............................................................................... [r 31.23.80] Earlier decisions regarding the SCR and Sch K .................................................................................. [r 31.23.100] Distinction between oral and written evidence ..................................................................................... [r 31.23.120] Joint expert reports ............................................................................................................................... [r 31.23.140] Expert evidence from part of an expert’s report .................................................................................. [r 31.23.160] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.23.1000]

[r 31.23.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 36 r 13C(1) and (2) and DCR Pt 28 r 9C(1) and (2). [r 31.23.40] Operation This rule imposes an obligation on an expert witness to comply with the code and its underpinning concepts. Its effect is to require an expert to provide a warranty to a court and to all parties of the integrity of the expert’s evidence. The contents of the code go to both the form and substance of the expert’s evidence, particularly the foundation for, and the transparency of, the expert’s reasoning process, plus the absence of bias. Thus, by the expert agreeing to be bound by, and complying with the form required by the code, a court may be satisfied that it receives proper expert assistance. Further, a court is able to compare like with like on expert issues. Such engagement on expert issues also allows the parties to make early and informed decisions as to prospects and strategy. A witness who is an officer of a party and not engaged for any particular purpose will not become an “expert witness” by expressing an expert opinion in a report at a time before court proceedings were contemplated: see Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485 per Campbell J at [11] re SCR; applied by Harrison AssocJ regarding r 31.23 in Sharkawy v Toman [2007] NSWSC 621. [r 31.23.60]

Code of conduct

The Expert witness code of conduct (UCPR Sch 7) is the successor to Sch K of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 and similar provisions in the District Court and Local Court. The concepts which inform its contents include the need for transparency, integrity and objectivity as a foundation for the receipt, and use by the court, of expert evidence in proceedings: see National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1993) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 at 81; Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305 at 739 [79] (NSWLR). A court is likely to refer to those concepts, together with the overriding purpose – CPA s 56, and the dictates of justice – CPA s 58, in considering whether to exercise its discretion to grant leave to excuse non-compliance with r 31.23 to make an order otherwise. The amendments to the rules introduced on 8 December 2006 included the replacement of the expert witness code of conduct contained in Sch 7. The new code includes some of the existing provisions and new provisions that require the expert to comply with the courts directions (cl 3) and to work co-operatively with other expert witnesses (cl 4). [r 31.23.80] Non compliance and an order otherwise that the rule not apply Non-compliance with this rule places a significant burden upon a party in attempting to seek an order otherwise, with related effects on service under r 31.28 (prior to 8 December 2006, r 31.18. 744

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.23.120]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.23

In Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 380; [2009] NSWSC 49 Barrett J differentiated between the operation of the provisions to make an order otherwise to excuse non-compliance under r 31.23 as to the code, on the one hand, as opposed to the requirements for the grant of leave under r 31.28 in regard to service, on the other. The Court of Appeal has stated that there is no reason in logic or in law for reading the words “exceptional circumstances” in r 31.28 into r 31.23(3): Hodder Rook & Assocs Pty Ltd v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 279 at [60] per Young JA (with whom Basten JA and Handley AJA agreed). The suggestion that an expert preparing a report without having agreed to be bound by the code of conduct gives rise to a real risk that the expert will have committed to a particular form of opinion which an ex post facto adoption of the code cannot cure has some validity but must not be elevated to a general rule. Each case must be considered on its merits. The court may consider that the assumed “real risk” is non-existent or minor. If so, in the case where an expert makes an initial report without having the Code in mind and then is shown the Code and swears that in fact he or she did abide by it and now affirms the original report, the evidence should be admitted. Again, if the court can see that he or she is not just rubber stamping the original report, the later report should be admitted into evidence: Hodder Rook & Assocs Pty Ltd v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 279 at [63] per Young JA (with whom Basten JA and Handley AJA agreed). [r 31.23.100]

Earlier decisions regarding the SCR and Sch K

Decisions under the former rules and the predecessor to the code provide broad guidance as to the applicable principles, however caution is required as to their utility given the changes introduced by the CPA, particularly ss 56–60 and the overriding purpose. In Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2002] NSWSC 980, Einstein J suggested strict compliance with the rules on expert evidence was necessary, and declined to make an order otherwise to excuse non-compliance. Accordingly, the tender of an expert’s report was rejected. The contents of [9] of his Honour’s reasons has resonance with the overriding purpose and the desirability of improving the quality of expert evidence. On the other hand, the court has excused non-compliance in circumstances where the failure to comply was said to be technical in the sense that the report was in fact prepared in compliance with the code: see Barack v WTH Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 649; or that the expert witness sufficiently confirms compliance with the code after being apprised of its contents: see Langbourne v State Rail Authority [2003] NSWSC 537; Jermen v Shell Co of Australia Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1106; or where the court is satisfied as to the integrity of the expert evidence; see United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 870. These decisions relate to Sch K and SCR Pt 36 rr 13 and 13C. Earlier decisions regarding the SCR and SCR Sch K (the predecessor to r 31.23 and the current code) must be understood with the benefit of the explanation and the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Hodder Rook & Assocs Pty Ltd v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 279 as to the operation of r 31.23 and the proper approach to its application in proceedings. [r 31.23.120]

Distinction between oral and written evidence

This rule makes compliance with the code of conduct mandatory, unless the court orders otherwise. Furthermore, r 31.21 states that an expert witness’s evidence in chief must be given by the tender of one or more expert’s reports, unless the court orders otherwise. The content of this rule differs from its earlier form (see r 31.18 prior to 8 December 2006), and when read with other rules in Division 2 including r 31.21 appear to restrict the application of Portal Software International Pty Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1228 at [7]. In that matter, Brereton J determined that where a party tenders expert evidence in the form of an affidavit that material will generally be regarded as a substitute for oral evidence, rather than as a report. Under the current rules an order otherwise would be necessary to excuse non-compliance. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

745

UCPR Parts 31-40

Furthermore, in considering making an order otherwise, a relevant consideration for a court is the nature of the case. Thus in a commercial cause a higher degree of alertness to strict compliance with procedure requirements may be indicated than a personal injury case, see Portal Software International Pty Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1228. In that case, Brereton J stated that a court may dispense with strict compliance where it is otherwise satisfied of the likely impartiality of the opinions noted in the report, see United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 870.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.24

[r 31.23.120]

[r 31.23.140]

Joint expert reports

An expert report prepared by two persons, where one person has not complied with UCPR Sch 7, and has not been shown to have relevant qualifications or expertise may lead to the rejection of the evidence on tender at trial. The integrity of the report may be destroyed if the collaboration has been such that it is not possible to say which parts of the report have come from the expert and which from the co-author. If the expert opinion cannot be shown to be based on the expert witness’s specialised knowledge, per Evidence Act 1995 s 79, and if partly based on the knowledge or opinion of someone else this requirement cannot be met, it is prima facie inadmissible: see Cooke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2002) 51 ATR 223; [2002] FCA 1315. To determine the admissibility of the joint report in whole, or alternatively in part, the party tendering it should seek leave to examine the witness present to give evidence as to which parts of the joint report he has been wholly responsible: see Paino v Paino [2005] NSWSC 1313 at [9]. Unless satisfied that the report or a part thereof is based wholly or substantially on an expert’s knowledge, the court is likely to reject the tender: Paino v Paino (2008) 40 Fam LR 96; [2008] NSWCA 276. The question of whether an expert report was based wholly or substantially on the witness’s specialised knowledge is to be determined on the balance of probabilities, see Evidence Act s 142. Additionally, a distinction is required between the factual components of a report which may be delegated to another, see Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; 53 ACSR 110; [2005] 3 ABC(NS) 390; [2005] NSWSC 149 at [329], and those expressed as the opinion of the expert, see Paino v Paino (2008) 40 Fam LR 96; [2008] NSWCA 276. However, before rejecting the tender of evidence in the form of an expert report as inadmissible, a trial judge must take into account the court’s duty to “do its best” in determining matters for which expert opinion is of assistance, such as valuation of real estate including that located outside the jurisdiction. In this regard, a court ought to consider whether material annexed to an expert report including copies and translations of official records, descriptions of properties and various sale and purchase prices ought be received into evidence: see Paino v Paino (2008) 40 Fam LR 96; [2008] NSWCA 276 at [81]–[83]. [r 31.23.160]

Expert evidence from part of an expert’s report

Opinion evidence of an expert contained in a report prepared with a non-expert co-author may be rejected on tender due to: non-compliance with the UCPR Sch 7; prejudice due to late service; delay due to the need for an adjournment; operation of the Evidence Act 1995 ss 76, 79 or s 135 – if the other party must tease out the facts and assumptions or reasoning process founding the opinion properly to probe, and to test the expert’s opinion: see B v Protective Commissioner [2000] NSWSC 718; Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305. [r 31.23.1000]

References

Hodder Rook & Assocs Pty Ltd v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 279. Paino v Paino (2008) 40 Fam LR 96; [2008] NSWCA 276. Portal Software International Pty Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1228. Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305. NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109, paras 3.11–3.12. 31.24

Conference between expert witnesses

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13CA; DCR Part 28, rule 9D; LCR Part 23, rule 1E)

(1) The court may direct expert witnesses: (a) to confer, either generally or in relation to specified matters, and (b) to endeavour to reach agreement on any matters in issue, and (c)

746

to prepare a joint report, specifying matters agreed and matters not agreed and reasons for any disagreement, and

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.24.60]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.24

(2) The court may direct that a conference be held: (a) with or without the attendance of the parties affected or their legal representatives, or (b) with or without the attendance of the parties affected or their legal representatives, at the option of the parties, or (c) with or without the attendance of a facilitator (that is, a person who is independent of the parties and who may or may not be an expert in relation to the matters in issue). (3) An expert witness so directed may apply to the court for further directions to assist the expert witness in the performance of his or her functions in any respect. (4) Any such application must be made by sending a written request for directions to the court, specifying the matter in relation to which directions are sought. (5) An expert witness who makes such an application must send a copy of the request to the other expert witnesses and to the parties affected. (6) Unless the parties affected agree, the content of the conference between the expert witnesses must not be referred to at any hearing. [R 31.24 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.24 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.24.20] Operation of conference between expert witnesses .............................................................................. [r 31.24.40] Practice notes for joint conferences of expert witnesses ....................................................................... [r 31.24.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.24.1000]

[r 31.24.20]

Comparison

This rule has evolved from the content of SCR Pt 36 r 13CA and DCR Pt 28 r 9C(3), and should be read together with r 31.26. [r 31.24.40]

Operation of conference between expert witnesses

This rule is an explicit statement of a court’s power to address the need of an individual matter for case management directions guided by the aim of the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in dispute. Joint expert conferences before hearing can achieve the overriding purpose per CPA s 56 by narrowing the issues in dispute between parties, identifying and limiting the contested issues which require expert evidence at hearing, thus shortening the trial and enhancing settlement prospects. [r 31.24.60]

Practice notes for joint conferences of expert witnesses

The Practice Note SC Gen 11 – Joint Conferences of Expert Witnesses is essential reading for lawyers considering whether to apply for directions under this rule in proceedings, or to advise a party directed to participate in a joint conference. It also informs as to appropriate practice and considerations to the use of joint conferences in other courts. Practice Note SC Gen 11 facilitates compliance with directions made per this rule, including setting out matters of protocol, practice and procedure. It provides insight into the objectives, see cl 5, and appropriate preparation in regard to joint conferences, see cll 6–10. In addition, it examines “nuts and bolts” matters to allow a joint experts’ report to be produced consequent to directions per this rule, see PN SC Gen 11 cll 25–29. This practice note emphasises the operation of r 31.24(3) which allows an expert directed to confer to apply to the court for further directions by arrangement with the associate of the judge who directed the conference, see PN SC Gen 11 cl 35. Practice Note SC Eq 3 – Commercial List and Technology and Construction states: Experts © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

747

UCPR Parts 31-40

(d) to base any joint report on specified facts or assumptions of fact, and may do so at any time, whether before or after the expert witnesses have furnished their experts’ reports.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.25

[r 31.24.60] 39. Where experts’ reports have been or are to be served (whether pursuant to an order or direction of the Court or not) the Court will, unless otherwise persuaded, direct, upon such terms as it thinks fit, that the parties cause the experts or some of them to confer with a view to identification and a proper understanding of any points of difference between them and the reasons therefor and a narrowing of such points of difference. The Court may, at the same time or subsequently, direct that the parties and/or the experts prepare an agreed statement of the points of agreement, and of difference remaining, between experts following such conference and the reasons therefore (see Schedule 7 of the UCPR).

[r 31.24.1000]

References

Practice Note SC Gen 11 – Joint Conferences of Expert Witnesses: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf. Practice Note SC Eq 3 – Commercial List and Technology and Construction: see http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf. Guerin v Watts [2002] NSWSC 692 (pre-trial joint meeting of experts in medical negligence claim). NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109: Expert Witnesses paras 3.14–3.16. 31.25

Instructions to expert witnesses where conference ordered before report furnished

If a direction to confer is given under rule 31.24(1)(a) before the expert witnesses have furnished their reports, the court may give directions as to: (a) the issues to be dealt with in a joint report by the expert witnesses, and (b) the facts, and assumptions of fact, on which the report is to be based, including a direction that the parties affected must endeavour to agree on the instructions to be provided to the expert witnesses. [R 31.25 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

31.26

Joint report arising from conference between expert witnesses

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13CA; DCR Part 28, rule 9D; LCR Part 23, rule 1E)

(1) This rule applies if expert witnesses prepare a joint report as referred to in rule 31.24(1)(c). (2) The joint report must specify matters agreed and matters not agreed and the reasons for any disagreement. (3) The joint report may be tendered at the trial as evidence of any matters agreed. (4) In relation to any matters not agreed, the joint report may be used or tendered at the trial only in accordance with the rules of evidence and the practices of the court. (5) Except by leave of the court, a party affected may not adduce evidence from any other expert witness on the issues dealt with in the joint report. [R 31.26 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.26 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.26.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.26.40] Expert withdrawing admission made in joint report ............................................................................... [r 31.26.60] Adducing expert evidence inconsistent with the joint report .................................................................. [r 31.26.70] Practice notes for joint conferences of expert witnesses ....................................................................... [r 31.26.80] Report from conclave of experts .......................................................................................................... [r 31.26.100] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.26.1000]

[r 31.26.20]

Comparison

This rule has evolved from the content of SCR Pt 36 r 13CA and DCR Pt 28 r 9C(3), and should be read together with r 31.24. 748

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.26.1000] [r 31.26.40]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.26

Operation

Rule 31.26 is permissive and not mandatory. It does not require but merely permits the admission of a joint report, particularly where a joint report or a report comprised of the reports of separate experts does not comply with the requirements of Evidence Act 1995, s 79, or where the report(s) might be excluded under Evidence Act 1995, s 135: Barescape Pty Ltd v Bacchus Holdings Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 345; [2011] NSWSC 1002 at [3]. [r 31.26.60]

Expert withdrawing admission made in joint report

Notwithstanding the agreement of the parties’ experts to the content of a joint report, given unusual circumstances a court will exercise its discretion to permit a party to withdraw such an admission. Thus expert evidence which would otherwise be lost in the face of the joint report, an example of such circumstances includes personal difficulty and medical conditions suffered by the expert, see Schmierer v Keong [2005] NSWSC 1081, will be resurrected for that party. Subrule (5) provides the basis for the court to grant leave to adduce such evidence. However the onus clearly lies on the party seeking such indulgence and costs orders are the likely price of same. [r 31.26.70]

Adducing expert evidence inconsistent with the joint report

Where experts qualified by different parties have been required by directions of the court to confer and prepare a joint report and have done so including reaching agreement on some issues and not others, the court will be slow to permit one of the parties to adduce evidence from a further expert witness after the conclave has taken place and the joint report has been prepared. Such a course would defeat the purpose of the expert conclave process particularly if the evidence of the further expert witness included an opinion contrary to at least some of those agreed to by some of the experts in the course of the conclave and joint report: see Lucantonio v Kleinert [2009] NSWSC 929. The case management of expert evidence by the court would be entirely frustrated if a party was permitted to call a further expert witness not involved in the conclave and the preparation of a joint report. [r 31.26.80]

Practice notes for joint conferences of expert witnesses

The Practice Note SC Gen 11 – Joint Conferences of Expert Witnesses is essential reading for lawyers considering whether to apply for directions under this rule in proceedings, or to advise a party directed to participate in a joint conference. It also informs as to appropriate practice and considerations to the use of joint conferences in other courts. Practice Note SC Gen 11 facilitates compliance with directions made per this rule, including setting out matters of protocol, practice and procedure. It provides insight into the objectives, see cl 5, and appropriate preparation in regard to joint conferences, see cll 6–10. In addition, it examines “nuts and bolts” matters to allow a joint experts’ report to be produced consequent to directions per this rule, see PN SC Gen 11 cll 25–29. [r 31.26.100]

Report from conclave of experts

An example of the report arising from a conclave of experts, including questions and answers provided to assist the court, may be found in Laws v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 53; [2007] NSWSC 316 at [74]–[76] per Rothman J. [r 31.26.1000]

References

Practice Note SC Gen 11 – Joint Conferences of Expert Witnesses: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf. Practice Note SC Eq 3 – Commercial List and Technology and Construction: see http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

749

UCPR Parts 31-40

This rule states matters of practice and procedure as to the form and substance of joint expert reports. Subrule (5) precludes a party from adducing other expert evidence, consistent with the main purposes of Division 2 stated in r 31.17. The overriding purpose per CPA s 56 is achieved by narrowing the issues in dispute between parties, identifying and limiting the contested issues which require expert evidence at hearing, thus shortening the trial and enhancing settlement prospects.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.27

[r 31.26.1000]

Guerin v Watts [2002] NSWSC 692 (pre-trial joint meeting of experts in medical negligence claim). Barescape Pty Ltd v Bacchus Holdings Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 345; [2011] NSWSC 1002 (failure of expert report to disclose reasoning process, leading to exclusion of joint report under Evidence Act 1995, s 135). X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Specialty Network (No 5) [2011] NSWSC 1351. NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109: Expert Witnesses [3.14]–[3.16].

SUBDIVISION 3 – EXPERTS’ REPORTS AND EXPERT EVIDENCE [Subdiv 3 heading insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

SUBDIVISION 3 COMMENTARY [r Pt31.Div2.Sdiv3.20]

Overview of Subdivision 3

The amendments introduced on 8 December 2006 by this subdivision relate to expert witnesses generally and include, per the Explanatory note to the Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report (online reference [r Pt31.Div2.1000]): A new rule dealing with the content of experts reports (r 31.27). Rules generally carried over from the existing UCPR relating to the disclosure and admissibility of experts reports and hospital reports (rr 31.28 to 30), subpoenas for medical experts (rr 31.31 to 31.33), opinion evidence by expert witnesses (r 31.35) and the service of experts reports in professional negligence claims (r 31.36). 31.27

Experts’ reports

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13C; DCR Part 28, rule 9C; LCR Part 23, rule 1D)

(1) An expert’s report must (in the body of the report or in an annexure to it) include the following: (a) the expert’s qualifications as an expert on the issue the subject of the report, (b) the facts, and assumptions of fact, on which the opinions in the report are based (a letter of instructions may be annexed), (c) the expert’s reasons for each opinion expressed, (d) if applicable, that a particular issue falls outside the expert’s field of expertise, (e) any literature or other materials utilised in support of the opinions, (f) any examinations, tests or other investigations on which the expert has relied, including details of the qualifications of the person who carried them out, (g) in the case of a report that is lengthy or complex, a brief summary of the report (to be located at the beginning of the report). (2) If an expert witness who prepares an expert’s report believes that it may be incomplete or inaccurate without some qualification, the qualification must be stated in the report. (3) If an expert witness considers that his or her opinion is not a concluded opinion because of insufficient research or insufficient data or for any other reason, this must be stated when the opinion is expressed. (4) If an expert witness changes his or her opinion on a material matter after providing an expert’s report to the party engaging him or her (or that party’s legal representative), the expert witness must forthwith provide the engaging party (or that party’s legal representative) with a supplementary report to that effect containing such of the information referred to in subrule (1) as is appropriate. [R 31.27 subst Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

750

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.28.40] 31.28

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.28

Disclosure of experts’ reports and hospital reports

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13A; DCR Part 28, rule 8; LCR Part 23, rule 3)

(2) An application to the court for an order under subrule (1) (other than an order solely for abridgment or extension of time) may be made without serving notice of motion. (3) Except by leave of the court, or by consent of the parties: (a) an expert’s report or hospital report is not admissible unless it has been served in accordance with this rule, and (b) without limiting paragraph (a), an expert’s report or hospital report, when tendered under section 63, 64 or 69 of the Evidence Act 1995, is not admissible unless it has been served in accordance with this rule, and (c) the oral expert evidence in chief of any expert is not admissible unless an expert’s report or hospital report served in accordance with this rule contains the substance of the matters sought to be adduced in evidence. (4) Leave is not to be given as referred to in subrule (3) unless the court is satisfied: (a) that there are exceptional circumstances that warrant the granting of leave, or (b) that the report concerned merely updates an earlier version of a report that has been served in accordance with subrule (1). [R 31.28 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.28 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.28.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.28.40] Importance of the code of conduct ........................................................................................................ [r 31.28.60] Leave to excuse non-compliance & exceptional circumstances ............................................................ [r 31.28.80] Reports produced on subpoena ........................................................................................................... [r 31.28.100] Supreme Court practice notes as to service of reports ....................................................................... [r 31.28.120] District Court practice note for service of reports ................................................................................ [r 31.28.140] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.28.1000]

[r 31.28.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, the equivalent SCR applied only to proceedings for damages in respect of death or personal injury, or by court direction; this rule has no such restrictions. Under SCR Pt 36 r 13A, service was required 21 days before the date for determining the trial date, or 21 days before the trial (unless the matter was heard outside of Sydney). The requirements for service are now determined by court order, or practice note, or else prescribed as 28 days before hearing. This rule is otherwise the same in substance as the SCR. In the District Court, under DCR Pt 28 r 8, service was required 28 days before the status conference, unless the court ordered otherwise; the requirements for service are now determined by court order, or practice note, or else prescribed as 28 days before hearing. This rule is otherwise the same in substance as the DCR. [r 31.28.40]

Operation

This rule requires a party to give timely notice of its proposed expert evidence which other parties must meet at hearing. Subrule (1) sets out alternative time regimes for the service of an “experts report” (see definition [r 31.18.120]) before the evidence of that expert may be received into evidence at a hearing (as opposed to a trial in r 31.18). © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

751

UCPR Parts 31-40

(1) Each party must serve experts’ reports and hospital reports on each other active party: (a) in accordance with any order of the court, or (b) if no such order is in force, in accordance with any relevant practice note, or (c) if no such order or practice note is in force, not later than 28 days before the date of the hearing at which the report is to be used.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.28

[r 31.28.40]

Non-compliance with the rule has significant exclusionary effects. First, as a barrier to the admission into evidence of an experts report which has not been disclosed/served per the rule. Second, to confine a partys expert evidence (including oral testimony) to the substance of those matters contained in the experts report. Third, to make timely service an additional requirement to the facilitation of proof provided by the exceptions to the hearsay rule in EA s 63 (maker not available), s 64 (maker available) and s 69 (business records). Compliance with the rule facilitates the admissibility and thus proof of the experts report as evidence of the experts opinion without further oral or other evidence, see rr 31.29(1) and 31.30(1). The hierarchy in subr (1) means that a lawyer must check the practice notes of the court relevant to the proceedings, see [r 31.28.120] – [r 31.28.140]. Rule 31.28 does not apply to a joint report prepared in accordance with UCPR r 31.26, The former is directed to individual reports of experts, or hospital reports, and does not address the admissibility of joint reports of experts following joint conferences: X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Specialty Network (No 5) [2011] NSWSC 1351 at [72]. [r 31.28.60]

Importance of the code of conduct

An experts report must comply with the principles informing the contents of the code of conduct , the requirements of which are also set out r 31.27. [r 31.28.80]

Leave to excuse non-compliance & exceptional circumstances

The operation of subr (3) excludes the admission of a report which has not been served in conformity with this rule. Furthermore, other than an updating report (r 31.28(4)(b)), the court is required to be satisfied that there are “exceptional circumstances” (r 31.28(4)(a)) that warrant the grant of leave per r 31.28(3), before excusing non-compliance with the requirements of disclosure/service. A lesser test applies to the grant of leave for the admission of an updating or supplementary experts report. The term “exceptional circumstances” is not defined in the CPA. The use of the term “exceptional circumstances” elsewhere provides some guidance as to its meaning in this rule. In regard to the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW), the term has been held to mean factors in a particular case which take them out of the general rule, see Re A (2003) 30 Fam LR 387; [2003] NSWSC 595; ie to the effect that in the normal course, absent exceptional circumstances, the order should not be made. Also, in regard to the Bail Act 1978 (NSW), exceptional circumstances must be shown before appeal bail may be granted. Ultimately, it is impossible to demonstrate an individual circumstance which would amount to “exceptional circumstances” as each matter will necessarily turn on its own facts: Marotta v The Queen (1999) 73 ALJR 265; 160 ALR 525; [1999] HCA 4 at 267 (ALJR). The costs orders under the former District Court Rules 1973 Pt 39A r 25(6) provided that exceptional circumstances are those where an order is required to avoid substantial injustice, see Lee v Abbes [2003] NSWCA 24. Also, see jurisprudence on guideline criminal sentencing and the presumption that such sentences will apply absent exceptional circumstances, see R v Bahsa (2002) 138 A Crim R 245; [2003] NSWCCA 36; R v Takai (2004) 149 A Crim R 593; 42 MVR 473; [2004] NSWCCA 392. A summary of the approach of the court to the term “exceptional circumstances” is provided in Yacoub v Pilkington (Aust) Ltd [2007] NSWCA 290 at [66]–[67], per Campbell JA (agreed in by Tobias JA and Handley AJA), including an analysis of the question of construction concerning “exceptional circumstances” in the predecessor to r 31.28, ie r 31.18. Amongst other matters the court noted that any decision about whether there are exceptional circumstances would need to bear in mind the explicit statement of objectives of the court in the management of litigation contained in CPA ss 56 to 59. The onus to satisfy the court that the grant of leave is warranted lies on the non-complying party. In considering an application for the grant of leave to excuse non-compliance with the rule, a court will consider the circumstances of the individual matter and the guidance provided by the principles in CPA ss 56-60 and the matters set out in EA s 190(3), (4). Compliance with the disclosure requirements, and thus avoidance of the exclusionary effect of this rule, may be dispensed with by consent of the parties, see r 31.28(3). 752

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.28.1000] [r 31.28.100]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.29

Reports produced on subpoena

Circumstances such as the production on subpoena of an experts report close to or at trial are likely to comprise exceptional circumstances to warrant the grant of leave. As with its predecessor, this rule only applies to reports in the possession of the party prior to the deadline arising from subr (1), see Dawson v Hall (1994) 10 NSWCCR 388. [r 31.28.120]

Supreme Court practice notes as to service of reports

Practice Note SC CL 5 – General Case Management List. Practice Note SC CL 7 – Professional Negligence List. See [r 31.28.1000] for online references. [r 31.28.140]

District Court practice note for service of reports

District Court Practice Note DC (Civil) No 1 includes the following: 3.4 At the pre-trial conference, the Court will examine the timetables proposed by the parties and make appropriate directions and orders, including orders for service of medical and expert reports (see rule 31.28). Disputes between the parties will be resolved or a hearing date fixed for a motion. The steps in the timetable will become orders of the court that must be strictly complied with. Failure to comply with those orders will be treated seriously and may lead to costs orders. 7.4 Unless orders are made at the status conference, the Court will usually not allow parties to rely on medical reports and experts reports served after the status conference (see rule 31.28(1)(a)). [r 31.28.1000]

References

Yacoub v Pilkington (Aust) Ltd [2007] NSWCA 290. Harding v Bourke (2000) 48 NSWLR 598; [2000] NSWCA 60. Practice Note SC CL 1 – General: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/ SCO_procedures. Practice Note SC CL 5 – General Case Management List: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/ Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_procedures. Practice Note DC (Civil) No 1 – Case Management in the General List: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ lawlink/district_court/ll_districtcourt.nsf/pages/dc_practice_notes. 31.29

Admissibility of expert’s report

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13B)

(1) If an expert’s report is served in accordance with rule 31.28 or in accordance with an order of the court, the report is admissible: (a) as evidence of the expert’s opinion, and (b) if the expert’s direct oral evidence of a fact on which the opinion was based would be admissible, as evidence of that fact, without further evidence, oral or otherwise. (2) Unless the court otherwise orders, a party may require the attendance for cross-examination of the expert by whom the report was prepared by notice served on the party by whom the report was served. (3) Unless the court otherwise orders, such a requirement may not be made later than: (a) in the case of proceedings for which the court has fixed a date for trial, 35 days before the date so fixed, or (b) in any other case, 7 days before the date on which the court fixes a date for trial. (4) The parties may not by consent abridge the time fixed by or under subrule (3). (5) If the expert’s attendance for cross-examination is required under subrule (2), the report may not © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

753

UCPR Parts 31-40

Practice Note SC CL 1 – General.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.29

[r 31.29.20]

be tendered under section 63, 64 or 69 of the Evidence Act 1995 or otherwise used unless the expert attends or is dead or the court grants leave to use it. (6) The party using the report may re-examine the expert if the expert attends for cross-examination pursuant to a requirement under subrule (2). (7) This rule does not apply to proceedings in the District Court or the Local Court or to proceedings on a trial with a jury. [Subr (7) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]] [R 31.29 am Rule 579 of 2007; R 31.29 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.29 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.29.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.29.40] Different procedures in Supreme, District and Local Courts ................................................................. [r 31.29.60] Admissibility of expert evidence ............................................................................................................. [r 31.29.80] Attributed histories ................................................................................................................................ [r 31.29.100] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.29.1000]

[r 31.29.20] Comparison In the Supreme Court, SCR Pt 36 r 13B required only the party who served the report to be notified, either seven days before the date for setting down the trial date, or 35 days before the trial (unless the matter was heard outside of Sydney). Rule 31.29 is otherwise the same in substance as the SCR. In the District Court, under DCR Pt 28 r 9A the party requiring the experts attendance was required to notify the party who served the report (seven days before the first date set for status conference or call-over), and the other parties (one day before the first date set for status conference or call-over). Rule 31.30 is otherwise the same in substance as the DCR. [r 31.29.40] Operation The above rule has the effect of facilitating proof of an experts report which has complied with the prerequisite of disclosure per r 31.28. Nonetheless, such experts report must comply with the requirements of the definition in r 31.18 and the requirements of EA s 79. The principal difference between the procedure in the Supreme Court, r 31.29, and the District Court and Local Courts, r 31.30, is in regard to which party has the obligation to procure the attendance of an expert for cross-examination at trial. In the District Court and Local Courts per r 31.30 the party requiring the attendance of an expert for cross-examination must notify the expert 28 days before the date on which attendance is required and all other parties 28 days before the date fixed for hearing. Neither rule applies to proceedings in either the Supreme Court or District Court on a trial with a jury, see r 31.29(7) and r 31.30(8). Subrule (5) confines the operation of exceptions to the hearsay rule found in EA ss 63, 64 and 69 however there is a discretion for a court to grant leave to excuse non-compliance. [r 31.29.60] Different procedures in Supreme, District and Local Courts In the Supreme Court per r 31.29(2) a party may require attendance for cross-examination of the expert by notice served on the party by whom the report was served in accordance with the time provisions of r 31.29(3) ie in subr (3)(a) 35 days before the date fixed for trial or in any other case seven days before the date on which the court fixes a date for trial. In the Supreme Court parties may not by consent abridge that time. In the District Court and Local Court per r 31.30(2) the obligation to procure attendance of an expert whose report has been served lies upon the party requiring that expert for cross-examination. Further, the cross-examining party must notify the expert at least 28 days before the date on which attendance is required per subr (2)(b). Also, the party who requires the attendance of an expert per subr (2) must inform the other parties at least 28 days before the date fixed for hearing per subr (4)(a), and also pay to the person whose attendance is required reasonable expenses to comply with that requirement. In the case of reluctance, that party may subpoena the expert, see rr 31.31, 31.32. 754

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.29.1000]

r 31.29

Admissibility of expert evidence

“The principles governing the admissibility of expert evidence under the exception to the opinion rule in s 79(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 are summarised in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; 277 ALR 611; [2011] HCA 21. The discussion in the judgment of the plurality (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) at [31]–[42] emphasises the following matters. First, when addressing the admissibility of expert opinion, it is necessary to identify the fact or facts in issue to which the opinion is said to be relevant in the sense required by s 55(1) of the Act. Secondly, it is necessary to identify the specialised knowledge on which the expert’s opinion is wholly or substantially based. It must also be shown that the specialised knowledge is based on training, study or experience. Thirdly, ordinarily the evidence must explain how the relevant field of specialised knowledge in which the witness is expert and on which the opinion is based, has been applied to produce the opinion propounded. Finally, a failure to demonstrate that an opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge, which in turn is based on the witness’s training, study or experience goes to the admissibility of the evidence and not merely to its weight.”: per Meagher JA (agreed in by Barrett JA and Sackville AJA) Cambridge v Anastasopoulos [2012] NSWCA 405 at [26]. The reasons of Heydon JA in Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305 explain the approach required by an expert to allow a report to be admissible in proceedings. First, the report must expose the experts reasoning process and furnish to the court (and thus to the opponent) the means of evaluating the experts reasoning process, and consequently the validity of the experts conclusion: see Makita at [59] and [64]. Second, unless there is sufficient congruence between the facts assumed by the expert and the facts established at hearing, the tender of an experts report will be rejected. Expert opinion is only relevant following the proof at trial of facts “sufficiently like those upon which the experts opinion is based”: see Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85. Clearly, a problem arises in proceedings if an experts report has been admitted into evidence prior to the evidence of factual matters. A debate continues as between the contents of an experts report in regard to issues of fact and opinion. It may be a prudent course at hearing to seek a direction pre trial per CPA s 61 or at trial per CPA s 62 or r 31.35(a) that expert evidence not be given or received into evidence until after factual evidence is received. [r 31.29.100]

Attributed histories

Another vice which may arise from an experts report is the potential operation of Evidence Act 1995 s 60 particularly in regard to attributed histories, see NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109 paras 6.64–6.66. On one view, the exception to the hearsay rule provided by Evidence Act 1995 s 60 to the effect that where evidence is relevant for a non-hearsay purpose it may be received in evidence for all purposes represents a reversal of Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642; 35 ALJR 301; [1963] ALR 134. That case stated that out of court statements made by a person as to bodily symptoms were not admissible as proof of those facts in a physicians report. As to the issue in regard to the report of an expert psychiatrist, see Gordon v The Queen (1982) 41 ALR 64. The prudent approach to such material is to seek an order per EA s 136 to limit the use of the evidence. [r 31.29.1000]

References

Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (12th ed, Lawbook Co, 2016) or subscription service. Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; 277 ALR 611; [2011] HCA 21. HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; 160 ALR 554. Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; 54 ACSR 326; 23 ACLC 1111; [2005] NSWCA 152. Cambridge v Anastasopoulos [2012] NSWCA 405. Freckelton & Selby, Expert Evidence Law, Practice Procedure and Advocacy (4th ed, Lawbook Co., 2009). NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109 paras 6.64–6.66. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

755

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 31.29.80]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.30

31.30

[r 31.29.1000]

Admissibility of expert’s report in District Court and Local Court

(cf DCR Part 28, rule 9; LCR Part 23, rule 2)

(1) This rule applies to proceedings in the District Court or the Local Court. [Subr (1) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]]

(2) If an expert’s report is served in accordance with rule 31.28 or in accordance with an order of the court, the report is admissible: (a) as evidence of the expert’s opinion, and (b) if the expert’s direct oral evidence of a fact on which the opinion was based would be admissible, as evidence of that fact, without further evidence, oral or otherwise. (3) Unless the court orders otherwise: (a) it is the responsibility of the party requiring the attendance for cross-examination of the expert by whom an expert’s report has been prepared to procure that attendance, and (b) the party requiring the expert’s attendance must notify the expert at least 28 days before the date on which attendance is required. (4) Except for the purpose of determining any liability for conduct money or witness expenses, an expert does not become the witness for the party requiring his or her attendance merely because his or her attendance at court has been procured by that party. (5) A party who requires the attendance of a person as referred to in subrule (2): (a) must inform all other parties to the proceedings that the party has done so at least 28 days before the date fixed for hearing, and (b) must pay to the person whose attendance is required (whether before or after the attendance) an amount sufficient to meet the person’s reasonable expenses (including any standby fees) in complying with the requirement. (6) If the attendance of an expert is required under subrule (2), the report may not be tendered under section 63, 64 or 69 of the Evidence Act 1995 or otherwise used unless the expert attends or is dead or the court grants leave to use it. (7) The party using an expert’s report may re-examine an expert who attends for cross-examination under a requirement under subrule (2). (8) This rule does not apply to proceedings on a trial with a jury. [R 31.30 am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[4]; insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.30 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.30.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.30.40] Different procedures in Supreme, District and Local Courts ................................................................. [r 31.30.60] Admissibility of expert evidence ............................................................................................................. [r 31.30.80] Attributed histories ................................................................................................................................ [r 31.30.100] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.30.1000]

[r 31.30.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, SCR Pt 36 r 13B required only the party who served the report to be notified, either seven days before the date for setting down the trial date, or 35 days before the trial (unless the matter was heard outside of Sydney). Rule 31.29 is otherwise the same in substance as the SCR. In the District Court, under DCR Pt 28 r 9A the party requiring the experts attendance was required to notify the party who served the report (seven days before the first date set for status conference or call-over), and the other parties (one day before the first date set for status conference or call-over). Rule 31.30 is otherwise the same in substance as the DCR. 756

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.30

[r 31.30.40] Operation The above rule has the effect of facilitating proof of an experts report which has complied with the prerequisite of disclosure per r 32.18. Nonetheless, such experts report must comply with the requirements of the definition in r 31.18 and the requirements of Evidence Act 1995 s 79. The principal difference between the procedure in the Supreme Court, r 31.29, and the District Court and Local Courts, r 31.30, is in regard to which party has the obligation to procure the attendance of an expert for cross-examination at trial. In the District Court and Local Courts per r 31.30 the party requiring the attendance of an expert for cross-examination must notify the expert 28 days before the date on which attendance is required and all other parties 28 days before the date fixed for hearing. Neither rule applies to proceedings in either the Supreme Court, District Court or Local Court on a trial with a jury, see r 31.29(7) and r 31.30(8). Subrule (5) confines the operation of exceptions to the hearsay rule found in Evidence Act 1995 ss 63, 64 and 69 other than to provide a discretion to a court to grant leave to excuse non-compliance. [r 31.30.60] Different procedures in Supreme, District and Local Courts In the Supreme Court per r 31.29(2) a party may require attendance for cross-examination of the expert by notice served on the party by whom the report was served in accordance with the time provisions of r 31.29(3) ie in subr (3)(a) 35 days before the date fixed for trial or in any other case seven days before the date on which the court fixes a date for trial. In the Supreme Court parties may not by consent abridge that time. In the District Court and Local Court per r 31.30(2) the obligation to procure attendance of an expert whose report has been served lies upon the party requiring that expert for cross-examination. Further, the cross-examining party must notify the expert at least 28 days before the date on which attendance is required per subr (2)(b). Also, the party who requires the attendance of an expert per subr (2) must inform the other parties at least 28 days before the date fixed for hearing per subr (4)(a), and also pay to the person whose attendance is required reasonable expenses to comply with that requirement. In the case of reluctance, that party may subpoena the expert, see rr 31.31, 31.32. [r 31.30.80] Admissibility of expert evidence “The principles governing the admissibility of expert evidence under the exception to the opinion rule in s 79(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 are summarised in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; 277 ALR 611; [2011] HCA 21. The discussion in the judgment of the plurality (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) at [31]–[42] emphasises the following matters. First, when addressing the admissibility of expert opinion, it is necessary to identify the fact or facts in issue to which the opinion is said to be relevant in the sense required by s 55(1) of the Act. Secondly, it is necessary to identify the specialised knowledge on which the expert’s opinion is wholly or substantially based. It must also be shown that the specialised knowledge is based on training, study or experience. Thirdly, ordinarily the evidence must explain how the relevant field of specialised knowledge in which the witness is expert and on which the opinion is based, has been applied to produce the opinion propounded. Finally, a failure to demonstrate that an opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge, which in turn is based on the witness’s training, study or experience goes to the admissibility of the evidence and not merely to its weight.”: per Meagher JA (agreed in Barrett JA and Sackville AJA) Cambridge v Anastasopoulos [2012] NSWCA 405 at [26]. The reasons of Heydon JA in Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305 explain the approach required by an expert to allow a report to be admissible in proceedings. First, the report must expose the experts reasoning process and furnish to the court (and thus to the opponent) the means of evaluating the experts reasoning process, and consequently the validity of the experts conclusion, see Makita at [59] and [64]. Second, unless there is sufficient congruence between the facts assumed by the expert and the facts established at hearing, the tender of an experts report will be rejected. Expert opinion is only relevant following the proof at trial of facts “sufficiently like those upon which the experts opinion is based”, see Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85. Clearly, a problem arises in proceedings if an experts report has been admitted into evidence prior to the evidence of factual matters. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

757

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 31.30.80]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.31

[r 31.30.80]

A debate continues as between the contents of an experts report in regard to issues of fact and opinion. It may be a prudent course at hearing to seek a direction pre trial per CPA s 61 or at trial per CPA s 62 or r 31.35(a) that expert evidence not be given or received into evidence until after factual evidence is received. [r 31.30.100]

Attributed histories

Another vice which may arise from an experts report is the potential operation of Evidence Act 1995 s 60 particularly in regard to attributed histories, see NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109 paras 6.64–6.66. On one view, the exception to the hearsay rule provided by Evidence Act 1995 s 60 to the effect that where evidence is relevant for a non-hearsay purpose it may be received in evidence for all purposes represents a reversal of Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642; 35 ALJR 301; [1963] ALR 134. That case stated that out of court statements made by a person as to bodily symptoms were not admissible as proof of those facts in a physicians report. As to the issue in regard to the report of an expert psychiatrist, see Gordon v The Queen (1982) 41 ALR 64. The prudent approach to such material is to seek an order per EA s 136 to limit the use of the evidence. [r 31.30.1000]

References

Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; 277 ALR 611; [2011] HCA 21. Yacoub v Pilkington (Aust) Ltd [2007] NSWCA 290. HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; 160 ALR 554. Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; 54 ACSR 326; 23 ACLC 1111; [2005] NSWCA 152. Cambridge v Anastasopoulos [2012] NSWCA 405. Freckelton & Selby, Expert Evidence Law, Practice Procedure and Advocacy (4th ed, Lawbook Co., 2009) NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109 paras 6.64–6.66 31.31

Fees for medical expert for compliance with subpoena

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13BA)

(1) If a subpoena is served on a medical expert who is to give evidence of medical matters but is not called as a witness, the expert is, unless the court orders otherwise, entitled to be paid, in addition to any other amount payable to the expert, the amount specified in item 2 of Schedule 3. (2) The amount payable under subrule (1) must be paid to the expert by the issuing party within 28 days after the date for the expert’s attendance. (3) A party that requires an expert’s attendance under rule 31.29(2), but subsequently revokes it, must pay to the issuing party any amount paid by the issuing party under subrule (2), but otherwise such an amount is not recoverable by the issuing party from any other party unless the court so orders. (4) In this rule, issuing party means the party at whose request a subpoena is issued. [R 31.31 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.31 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.31.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.31.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.31.1000]

[r 31.31.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 36 r 13BA, except that now the amount in subr (2) must be paid within 28 days (rather than 30 days) of the date of the experts attendance. There is no equivalent DCR provision. 758

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

[r 31.32.1000] [r 31.31.40]

r 31.32

Operation

Evidence of courteous communication with experts by an issuing party, including the notice as required by r 31.30(2)(b), and consideration of an experts other obligations, is more likely to allow an issuing party to successfully seek an order otherwise as to such fee. [r 31.31.1000]

References

Part 33–Subpoenas. UCPR Sch 3–Fees and other prescribed amounts. 31.32

Service of subpoena on medical expert

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13BB)

(1) Service of a subpoena on a medical expert may be effected, at any place at which the expert’s practice is carried on, by handing it over to a person who is apparently engaged in the practice (whether as an employee or otherwise) and is apparently of or above the age of 16 years. (2) If a person refuses to accept a subpoena when it is handed over, the subpoena may be served by putting it down in the person’s presence after he or she has been told of its nature. (3) If a subpoena requires a medical expert to attend court on a specified date for the purpose of giving evidence on medical matters, it must be served on the expert not later than 21 days before the date so specified unless the court orders otherwise. (4) The parties may not by consent abridge the time fixed by or under subrule (3). [R 31.32 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.32 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.32.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.32.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.32.1000]

[r 31.32.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 36 r 13BB. There is no equivalent DCR provision. [r 31.32.40]

Operation

This rule sets out the procedure required for valid service of a subpoena on a medical expert relevant to proceedings, as opposed to other experts or witnesses who will generally be subject to the requirements of UCPR Pt 33. The notification requirement for an expert whose attendance is required for cross-examination in the District Court and Local Courts per r 31.30(2) and (4) is 28 days. That is, there must be communication at least a week prior to the minimum time of 21 days provided in this rule for valid service of a subpoena on a medical expert. For a non-medical expert, the requirements of Pt 33 will be applicable. The time fixed under subr (3) of 21 days may not be abridged by consent of the parties. [r 31.32.1000]

References

UCPR Pt 33–Subpoenas.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

759

UCPR Parts 31-40

In addition to reasonable expenses for experts in District Court and Local Court proceedings per r 31.30(4), r 31.31(1) and UCPR Sch 3 stipulate that the current fee payable to an expert witness who is subpoenaed but not called is $214.00, absent an order otherwise. A party who requires attendance of any expert ought promptly to seek such an order otherwise, as delay, eg the need to make an application on another occasion, will be costly.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.33

31.33

[r 31.33.20]

Subpoena requiring production of medical records

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13BC)

(1) A subpoena for production may require a medical expert to produce medical records or copies of them. (2) A person is not required to comply with a subpoena for production referred to in subrule (1) unless the amount specified in item 3 of Schedule 3 is paid or tendered to the person at the time of service of the subpoena or a reasonable time before the date on which production is required. (3) Rule 33.6 (Compliance with subpoena) does not apply to a subpoena to which subrule (1) applies. (4) Rule 33.7 (Production otherwise than on attendance) applies to the photocopies in the same way as it applies to the records. (5) If, after service of a subpoena for production referred to in subrule (1), the party who requested the issue of the subpoena requires production of the original medical records without the option of producing copies of them, the party must request the issue of, and serve, another subpoena requiring production of the original medical records. [R 31.33 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.33 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.33.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.33.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.33.1000]

[r 31.33.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 36 r 13BC. There is no equivalent DCR provision. [r 31.33.40]

Operation

This rule provides the basis for a party to obtain medical records or copies to audit the material relied upon by an expert in preparing a written report. It also allows a party to assess that material to determine the need and any basis for cross-examination of an expert at trial. The rule is confined as to the documents which it addresses eg memoranda of fees and other correspondence are not picked up by this rule. The exception to the more flexible requirements of r 33.6 as set out in r 31.33(3) necessitate strict compliance by the issuing party with its obligations under this rule. [r 31.33.1000]

References

UCPR Pt 33–Subpoenas UCPR Sch 3–Fees and other prescribed amounts UCPR Sch 3–Fees and other prescribed amounts 31.34

Supplementary reports by expert witness

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 13C; DCR Part 28, rule 9C; LCR Part 23, rule 1D)

(1) If an expert witness provides a supplementary report to the party by whom he or she has been engaged, neither the engaging party nor any other party having the same interest as the engaging party may use: (a) the supplementary report, or (b) any earlier report affected by the supplementary report, unless all of those reports have been served on all parties affected. 760

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.35

(2) For the purposes of this rule, supplementary report, in relation to an earlier report provided by an expert witness, includes any report by the expert witness that indicates that he or she has changed his or her opinion on a material matter expressed in the earlier report. (3) This rule does not apply to a report prepared by a court-appointed expert. [R 31.34 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

[r 31.34.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 36 r 13C(3) and DCR Pt 28 r 9C(3). 31.35 Opinion evidence by expert witnesses (cf Federal Court Rules, Order 34A, rule 3)

In any proceedings in which two or more parties call expert witnesses to give opinion evidence about the same issue or similar issues, or indicate to the court an intention to call expert witnesses for that purpose, the court may give any one or more of the following directions: (a) a direction that, at trial: (i) the expert witnesses give evidence after all factual evidence relevant to the issue or issues concerned, or such evidence as may be specified by the court, has been adduced, or (ii) the expert witnesses give evidence at any stage of the trial, whether before or after the plaintiff has closed his or her case, or (iii) each party intending to call one or more expert witnesses close that party’s case in relation to the issue or issues concerned, subject only to adducing evidence of the expert witnesses later in the trial, (b) a direction that, after all factual evidence relevant to the issue, or such evidence as may be specified by the court, has been adduced, each expert witness file an affidavit or statement indicating: (i) whether the expert witness adheres to any opinion earlier given, or (ii) whether, in the light of any such evidence, the expert witness wishes to modify any opinion earlier given, (c) a direction that the expert witnesses: (i) be sworn one immediately after another (so as to be capable of making statements, and being examined and cross-examined, in accordance with paragraphs (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h)), and (ii) when giving evidence, occupy a position in the courtroom (not necessarily the witness box) that is appropriate to the giving of evidence, (d) a direction that each expert witness give an oral exposition of his or her opinion, or opinions, on the issue or issues concerned, (e) a direction that each expert witness give his or her opinion about the opinion or opinions given by another expert witness, (f) a direction that each expert witness be cross-examined in a particular manner or sequence, (g) a direction that cross-examination or re-examination of the expert witnesses giving evidence in the circumstances referred to in paragraph (c) be conducted: (i) by completing the cross-examination or re-examination of one expert witness before starting the cross-examination or re-examination of another, or (ii) by putting to each expert witness, in turn, each issue relevant to one matter or issue at a time, until the cross-examination or re-examination of all of the expert witnesses is complete, © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

761

UCPR Parts 31-40

RULE 31.34 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.35

[r 31.35.20] (h)

a direction that any expert witness giving evidence in the circumstances referred to in paragraph (c) be permitted to ask questions of any other expert witness together with whom he or she is giving evidence as so referred to, (i) such other directions as to the giving of evidence in the circumstances referred to in paragraph (c) as the court thinks fit.

[R 31.35 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.35 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.35.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.35.40] Practice notes and experts ..................................................................................................................... [r 31.35.60] Experience in the Land and Environment Court .................................................................................... [r 31.35.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.35.1000]

[r 31.35.20]

Comparison

This rule is new to the Supreme Court and District Court. Paragraphs (a) to (g) of this rule reproduce the substance of FCRO 34A r 3. [r 31.35.40]

Operation

This rule articulates specific directions for effective case management of expert evidence by a court in conformity with the overriding purpose. It represents a novel and flexible approach to allow a court to take an individualised approach to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the expert issues in dispute in particular proceedings. Thus, a court may make directions such as conclaving where the evidence of all expert witnesses is taken simultaneously. Such process may include directions that an expert may ask questions of any other expert witness. This process has become known as “hot tubbing”. A variation of the process has been in use in the Federal Court of Australia (see Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 34A r 3). Its benefits are said to include that experts are able to define for their purposes points of agreement and disagreement; the impact of the failings of adversarial practice are reduced and experts necessarily conduct a dialogue by more familiar discourse, including allowing experts to express their own views in their own words rather than being confined to answering the questions of advocates. Experts are able to give their evidence to the court without the distortions inherent in the conventional process; and areas of agreement and disagreement become clarified. Garling J, Concurrent Expert Evidence Reflections and Development, a paper delivered at the Australian Insurance Law Association Twilight Seminar Series, 17 August 2011, available at http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/Garling170811.pdf/$file/ Garling170811.pdf. [r 31.35.60]

Practice notes and experts

Practice Note SC Eq 3 – Commercial List and Technology and Construction, states: Experts 39. Where experts reports have been or are to be served (whether pursuant to an order or direction of the Court or not) the Court will, unless otherwise persuaded, direct, upon such terms as it thinks fit, that the parties cause the experts or some of them to confer with a view to identification and a proper understanding of any points of difference between them and the reasons therefore and a narrowing of such points of difference. The Court may, at the same time or subsequently, direct that the parties and/or the experts prepare an agreed statement of the points of agreement, and of difference remaining, between experts following such conference and the reasons therefore (see Schedule 7 of the UCPR). Practice Note SC Gen 11 Supreme Court – Joint Conferences of Expert Witnesses, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/ 991e2f2f3bcd8289ca2572ed000cec4b?OpenDocument. 762

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.35.1000] [r 31.35.80]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.35

Experience in the Land and Environment Court

McClellan CJ at CL of the Supreme Court of NSW (former Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court) provides insight into the operation of the hot tubbing process (and also other issues pertinent to expert evidence) in his lecture “Expert Witnesses: The Experience of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales”, 20-24 March 2005 XIX Biennial Lawasia Conference 2005: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/ lec/ll_lec.nsf/vwFiles/Speech_21Mar05_CJ.doc. Guidance by McLelland CJ at CL as to be processed is provided in Concurrent evidence – New methods with experts – Judicial Commission of New South Wales, DVD http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lec/ll_ lec.nsw/vwFiles/Speech_21Mar05_CJ.doc. His Honour describes a procedure where experts are sworn and their written reports tendered together with a document which reflects their pre-trial discussions, ie matters upon which they agree or disagree; the judge then identifies with the help of the advocates and in the presence of expert witnesses the topics which require discussion in order to resolve the outstanding issues; each expert witness is then invited to briefly speak to their position on the first issue followed by a general discussion of the issue, during which they can ask each other questions; advocates are invited to join in the discussion by asking questions of their own, or any other expert witnesses; having completed discussion on one issue the court then moves onto the next issue. [r 31.35.1000]

References

Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; 72 ALJR 1484; 102 A Crim R 289; 157 ALR 394; [1998] HCA 60. Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305. Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85. NSW Law Reform Commission Report 109 para 6.64–6.66. Practice Note SC Gen 11 Supreme Court – Joint Conferences of Expert Witnesses, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/ 991e2f2f3bcd8289ca2572ed000cec4b?OpenDocument. Bergin CJ in Equity, The Expert’s Lament, a paper delivered at the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales Annual Conference 2011, 5–6 May 2011, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_ Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/bergin060511.pdf/$file/bergin060511.pdf. Garling J, Concurrent Expert Evidence Reflections and Development, a paper delivered at the Australian Insurance Law Association Twilight Seminar Series, 17 August 2011, available at http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/Garling170811.pdf/$file/ Garling170811.pdf. Rares J, Using the “Hot Tub” – How Concurrent Expert Evidence Aids Understanding Issues, a paper delivered at the New South Wales Bar Association Continuing Professional Development Seminar, 23 August 2010, available at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/aboutct/judges_papers/speeches_raresj12.html. Hon Justice AR Abadee RFD, “The expert witness in the new millennium”, paper delivered to the General Surgeons Australia 2nd Annual Scientific Meeting –2 September 2000. Hon Justice Peter McClellan, “Expert Witnesses: The Experience of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales”, 20-24 March 2005 XIX Biennial Lawasia Conference 2005: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ lawlink/lec/ll_lec.nsf/vwFiles/Speech_21Mar05_CJ.doc. Concurrent evidence – New methods with experts – Judicial Commission of New South Wales, DVD: http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lec/ll_lec.nsw/vwFiles/Speech_21Mar05_CJ.doc.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

763

UCPR Parts 31-40

A similar practice has been in place for some time in the Land and Environment Court of NSW. Its operation is described in BGP Properties Pty Ltd v Lake Macquarie City Council (2004) 138 LGERA 237; [2004] NSWLEC 399 at [121] including the significant efficiencies it delivers. An example of a successful use of the procedure in the Land and Environment Court, where the oral evidence of six expert witnesses in respect of town planning issues and development potential was taken concurrently, is found in the case of Walker Corp Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (2004) 134 LGERA 195; [2004] NSWLEC 315.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.36

31.36

[r 31.36.20]

Service of experts’ reports in professional negligence claims

(cf SCR Part 14C, rules 1 and 6; DCR Part 28, rule 9B)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, a person commencing a professional negligence claim (other than a claim against a legal practitioner) must file and serve, with the statement of claim commencing the professional negligence claim, an expert’s report that includes an opinion supporting: (a) the breach of duty of care, or contractual obligation, alleged against each person sued for professional negligence, and (b) the general nature and extent of damage alleged (including death, injury or other loss or harm and prognosis, as the case may require), and (c) the causal relationship alleged between such breach of duty or obligation and the damage alleged. (2) In the case of a professional negligence claim against a legal practitioner, the court may order the plaintiff to file and serve an expert’s report or experts’ reports supporting the claim. (3) If a party fails to comply with subrule (1) or (2), the court may by order made on the application of a party or of its own motion dismiss the whole or any part of the proceedings, as may be appropriate. (4) Without limiting subrule (1) or (2), the court may, on the application of any of the parties, give directions as to the expert evidence to be adduced at trial. [Subr (4) subst Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[6]]

(5) Directions under subrule (4) may be sought at any directions hearing or case management conference or by notice of motion. [Subr (5) insrt Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[6]]

(6) Unless the court otherwise orders, no party may adduce any expert evidence at trial unless the evidence: (a) has been filed and served under subrule (1) or (2), or (b) has been served pursuant to directions given under subrule (4). [Subr (6) insrt Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[6]] [R 31.36 am Rule 327 of 2007; insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.36 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.36.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.36.40] Components of this rule ......................................................................................................................... [r 31.36.60] Nature of expert reports and the meaning of “opinion supporting” in r 31.36(1) ................................... [r 31.36.80] Limitation problems, orders otherwise and dismissal applications ...................................................... [r 31.36.100] Decisions as to non-compliance under earlier rules SCR Pt 14C ....................................................... [r 31.36.120] Costs orders on r 31.36(3) applications ............................................................................................... [r 31.36.140] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.36.1000]

[r 31.36.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, this rule is the same in substance as the former SCR Pt 14C rr 1 and 6. In the District Court, this rule is the same in substance as the former DCR Pt 28 r 9B. [r 31.36.40]

Operation

The primary purpose of this rule is to discourage the commencement of unmeritorious litigation. This rule supplements other rules which have a similar purpose such as the requirement for a legal practitioner to provide a certificate as to reasonable prospects of success pursuant to Legal Profession Act 2004 s 347(2). Questions of compliance with the rule must take into account that early expenditure on quantification of 764

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.36.80]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.36

Rule 31.36 has been described as basically a rule that serves case management purposes and is designed to assist in achieving the overriding purpose of s 56(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, namely “to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings” (see also ss 57, 58 and 59): see Salzke v Khoury (2009) 74 NSWLR 580; [2009] NSWCA 195 per Ipp JA at [59]. It is the procedural basis of the professional negligence list in the Supreme and District Courts. In the Supreme Court the list was established in April 1999 coinciding with the amendment which introduced Pt 14C to the Supreme Court Rules. The Explanatory note to that amendment stated: In proceedings in the list, copies of expert reports must be served on all parties by the person making the professional negligence claim at an early stage in the proceedings. This requirement is designed to eliminate delay and expense in assessing the claim. This rule replaces the rules of each court, eg SCR Pt 14C and DCR Pt 28 r 9B, in regard to this specialised list for proceedings involving professional negligence or professional negligence claims, terms defined in the Dictionary to these Rules as: professional negligence means the breach of a duty of care or of a contractual obligation in the performance of professional work or in the provision of professional services by a medical practitioner, an allied health professional (for example, dentist, chemist, physiotherapist), a hospital, a solicitor or a barrister. professional negligence claim means a claim for damages, indemnity or contribution based on an assertion of professional negligence. Thus the definition of “professional negligence” in this rule limits the scope of the application of this rule to those professions as defined, eg a claim against an engineer for professional negligence is not subject to this rule. It is essential that a lawyer acting in proposed or existing “professional negligence claims” which is subject to this rule also have a sound understanding of any practice note for the relevant court, eg Practice Note SC CL 7 – Professional Negligence List. Note the requirements that each party not appearing in person be represented by a lawyer familiar with the proceedings and equipped with instructions sufficient to allow all appropriate orders and directions to be made: see Practice Note SC CL 7, cl 20. [r 31.36.60]

Components of this rule

Rule 31.36(1) requires a plaintiff in a professional negligence action to disclose, when the statement of claim is filed, the expert opinion on which the claim is based. Non-compliance with r 31.36(1) does not invalidate proceedings, a situation which has been said to be clear from the provisions of r 31.36(3): Klewer v Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children [2010] NSWSC 18 at [12]. Rule 31.36(1) is not inflexible, because it expressly provides that the court may make an “order otherwise”. The failure to comply with the requirement of an Act or regulation does not, without further order, invalidate the conduct: Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291; 72 ALJR 1386; Yango Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 410; 53 ALJR 1; 21 ALR 585; [1978] HCA 42. The failure to comply with subrr (1) or (2) permits the court to consider, on application of a party or of its own motion, whether to dismiss the whole or any part of the proceedings pursuant to r 31.36(3): see Klewer v Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children [2010] NSWSC 18 at [18]. Subrules (4), (5) and (6) to r 31.36 contemplate that orders may be made after the claim has been commenced relating to expert evidence not filed and served at the time the claim was commenced. [r 31.36.80]

Nature of expert reports and the meaning of “opinion supporting” in r 31.36(1)

Construction and the meaning of this subrule were explained by Ipp JA (with whom Basten JA and Gzell J agreed) in Salzke v Khoury (2009) 74 NSWLR 580; [2009] NSWCA 195 at [60]–[63], [69]–[70] where his Honour noted the following aspects of the rule: [61] ...the rule cannot be construed to mean that an individual expert’s report must include an opinion supporting all the matters referred to in sub-rule 1(a), (b) and (c). Those matters would usually involve fundamentally different categories of expertise. Nor can the rule preclude an expert’s report relevant only to one or two of those matters. Accordingly, the fact that opinions in an expert’s report support only one or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

765

UCPR Parts 31-40

damage may well be unjustifiable. See generally Salzke v Khoury (2009) 74 NSWLR 580; [2009] NSWCA 195 per Basten JA at [123]; Wei Fan v South Eastern Sydney and Illawarra Area Health Service [2010] NSWSC 123.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.36

[r 31.36.80]

even part of one of the matters in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) does not detract from the use that may be made of that report to support a plaintiff’s claim for the purposes of UCPR 31.36(1). ... The opinions may only support a single link in the chain that constitutes the plaintiff’s case. Opinions of that kind are nevertheless relevant in determining whether there has been compliance with UCPR 31.36(1). [62] ...the opinions in the expert’s report merely have to “support” one or more of the matters referred to in sub-rule 1(a), (b) or (c). The opinions do not have to “prove” anything. A report, at the stage that it is considered for the purposes of UCPR 31.36(1), is not evidence. [63] UCPR 31 (the rule dealing with expert evidence) contemplates that experts will prepare their own reports (see, for example, UCPR 31.23(3) and clause 5(2) of the Expert Witness Code of Conduct (Schedule 7 to the UCPR). This is consistent with the principle that expert evidence presented to the court should be the independent product of the expert: National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Company Limited (the “Ikarian Reefer”) [1993] 2 Lloyds Rep 68. Thus, the report should be construed benevolently and not as if it were a pleading or an affidavit or even a statement of a witness prepared by a lawyer. As the reports are not evidence they do not, singly or together, have to establish a prima facie case against a defendant, see Salzke [69]. Thus a plaintiff may adduce other evidence, not of an expert nature, which supplements the material contained in the reports filed under r 31.36(1) in such a way as to prove her or his case; such as evidence by eyewitnesses may supplement expert opinion to establish breach of duty of care or circumstantial evidence that may, alone, or in combination with expert evidence, establish causation in a specific case, see Salzke [70]. [r 31.36.100]

Limitation problems, orders otherwise and dismissal applications

A prudent solicitor who is concerned about the expiration of the limitation period for proposed proceedings for which inadequate expert opinion in a report is available, ought to commence the professional negligence claim without filing expert reports as the rule contemplates and then seek an order otherwise pursuant to r 31.36(1). Once an order otherwise is made by the court, such as obtaining leave from an assistant registrar of the District Court to file a statement of claim without filing expert reports, and absent the order being revoked, varied or set aside, r 31.36(3) is not engaged and there is no utility for another party to seek dismissal of the proceedings where a plaintiff is in default of subsequent directions for filing of reports. Rather, any application for dismissal ought to be founded upon CPA s 61(3) for lack of compliance with orders or directions of the court or pursuant to r 12.7. The discretion conferred by the latter provisions and also in regard to an application for summary dismissal differs from that conferred on a judicial officer by r 31.36(3). If a plaintiff has been unable to comply with directions for the filing of expert evidence reports, an application for an extension of time to file expert reports supported by an affidavit providing a cogent explanation for the delay and the non-compliance ought to be made at the earliest opportunity. Absent evidence of the existence of real prejudice to the opponent, the interests of justice will favour such an extension, particularly where the plaintiff will be subjected to extreme prejudice due to the effect of a limitation bar if the proceedings are dismissed: see Salzke v Khoury (2009) 74 NSWLR 580; [2009] NSWCA 195. That prejudice to a plaintiff of being shut out will usually be of substantial weight and importance in weighing the justice of the case in considering dismissal. [r 31.36.120]

Decisions as to non-compliance under earlier rules SCR Pt 14C

Decisions under the predecessor to this rule, ie prior to the introduction of the reforms of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, allowed plaintiffs who commenced professional negligence claims without the support of expert opinion as set out in the SCR or DCR rules, to be afforded the opportunity to comply with such obligations within a reasonable time: see ZN v Australian Red Cross Society [2002] NSWSC 697. The better view is that the introduction of the “overriding purpose” and the contents of CPA Pt 6 generally, including the “dictates of justice”, render pre-UCPR decisions to some extent academic as to guidance for the exercise of the court’s discretion provided in subr (3) “as may be appropriate”. Yet an enduring theme is that the exercise of the court’s discretion under this rule will necessarily turn upon the circumstances and the justice of the individual matter. The rule applies to a plaintiff and does not require a health professional to file expert evidence supporting the defence case. Considerations as to non-compliance with the rule will take into account the burden of earlier expenditure on quantification of damage which may be unjustifiable, plus the acknowledged difficulties and 766

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence [r Pt31.Div2.Sdiv4.20] Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.36

delays likely to be faced by a plaintiff seeking to obtain reports in support of quantification. The relevant opinions should not be scrutinised too finely in an attempt to demonstrate that they do not satisfy the rule which should not be turned into an unreasonable hurdle to be surmounted by plaintiffs with legitimate claims. The rule ought not act to provide a further procedural opportunity for defendants to delay resolution of the legitimate claims on merits, or increase the costs faced by an indigent plaintiff with a legitimate claim. See Salzke v Khoury (2009) 74 NSWLR 580; [2009] NSWCA 195 per Basten JA at [123]; Wei Fan v South Eastern Sydney and Illawarra Area Health Service [2010] NSWSC 123. Costs orders on r 31.36(3) applications

Ordinarily the usual order as to costs pursuant to UCPR r 42.1 will apply unless disqualifying circumstances arise. A relevant consideration may be that the defendant has prevented the plaintiff from having the benefit of information including documents that the defendant had and knew of and which clearly informed some important aspects of the case that a plaintiff may wish to propound: see Wei Fan v South Eastern Sydney and Illawarra Area Health Service (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 343. Such a course by a defendant may also lead to an order pursuant to s 6(1) of the CPA for production of copies of documents to be made available to a plaintiff within a reasonable time: see Wei Fan v South Eastern Sydney and Illawarra Area Health Service (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 343 at [17]. [r 31.36.1000]

References

Salzke v Khoury (2009) 74 NSWLR 580; [2009] NSWCA 195. Wei Fan v South Eastern Sydney and Illawarra Area Health Service [2010] NSWSC 123. Wei Fan v South Eastern Sydney and Illawarra Area Health Service (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 343. ZN v Australian Red Cross Society [2002] NSWSC 697. Practice Note SC CL 7 – Professional Negligence List: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/ nswsc_pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/a476042cfd07ec80ca257410001cbbdc?OpenDocument.

SUBDIVISION 4 – PARTIES’ SINGLE EXPERTS [Subdiv 4 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

SUBDIVISION 4 COMMENTARY [r Pt31.Div2.Sdiv4.20]

Overview of Subdivision 4

The amendments introduced on 8 December 2006 by this subdivision relate to expert witnesses generally and, per the Explanatory note to the Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report (online reference [r Pt31.Div2.1000]), relate to Parties single experts generally and include new rules creating the institution of parties single experts under which the court orders parties to jointly engage a single expert. These rules are based on draft rules prepared by the Law Reform Commission, per the Working Party Explanatory note. In Tomko v Tomko [2007] NSWSC 1486 at [17], Brereton J proposed the following guidelines, which were later accepted by the Court in Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023 per White J at [12]: • An order for a single expert is a first step, not necessarily the last word on the topic. While the magnitude of the case will influence the court’s willingness to permit further reports, having regard to considerations of proportionality, the process was not intended to substitute trial by expert for trial by court. • It will be a significant factor in favour of permitting further exert evidence if the existence of a competing respective expert opinion can be shown. • It will be a significant factor in favour of permitting further expert evidence if otherwise the party affected would have a legitimate sense of grievance that it had not be permitted to advance its case at trial.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

767

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 31.36.140]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.37

31.37

[r 31.37.20]

Selection and engagement

(1) If an issue for an expert arises in any proceedings, the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order that an expert be engaged jointly by the parties affected. (2) A parties’ single expert is to be selected by agreement between the parties affected or, failing agreement, by, or in accordance with the directions of, the court. (3) A person may not be engaged as a parties’ single expert unless he or she consents to the engagement. (4) If any party affected knows that a person is under consideration for engagement as a parties’ single expert: (a) the party affected must not, prior to the engagement, communicate with the person for the purpose of eliciting the person’s opinion as to the issue or issues concerned, and (b) if the party affected has previously communicated with the person for that purpose, he or she must notify the other parties affected as to the substance of those communications. [R 31.37 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.37 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.37.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.37.40] Practice Note ........................................................................................................................................ [r 31.37.200] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.37.1000]

[r 31.37.20]

Comparison

This rule and the following rules in this subdivision are similar to the single expert rules found in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) r 35.7. [r 31.37.40]

Operation

An order for a single expert is a first step, not necessarily the last word on the topic. The magnitude of the case will influence the court’s willingness to permit further reports, having regard to considerations of proportionality: see Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 587 at [17]. Where the court appoints a single expert pursuant to this rule no party may adduce evidence of any other expert unless by leave of the court: see r 31.44. However, where there is some arguable basis to challenge the report of a single expert, the court should be disposed to grant leave lest trial by judge be supplanted by trial by single expert: see Tomko v Tomko [2007] NSWSC 1486 per Brereton J at [9]; Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023 per White J at [12]. [r 31.37.200]

Practice Note

Practice Note SC Gen 10 – Single Expert Witness: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_ pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/8b06c4890fd7b7d3ca2572ed000cec28?OpenDocument. [r 31.37.1000]

References

Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023. Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd (2009) 73 NSWLR 302; [2009] NSWSC 120.

768

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

[r 31.39.200]

31.38

r 31.39

Instructions to parties’ single expert

(1) The parties affected must endeavour to agree on written instructions to be provided to the parties’ single expert concerning the issues arising for the expert’s opinion and concerning the facts, and assumptions of fact, on which the report is to be based. (2) If the parties affected cannot so agree, they must seek directions from the court.

RULE 31.8 COMMENTARY Practice Note ........................................................................................................................................ [r 31.38.200] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.38.1000]

[r 31.38.200]

Practice Note

Practice Note SC Gen 10 – Single Expert Witness: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_ pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/8b06c4890fd7b7d3ca2572ed000cec28?OpenDocument. [r 31.38.1000]

References

Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023. Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd (2009) 73 NSWLR 302; [2009] NSWSC 120. 31.39

Parties’ single expert may apply to court for directions

(1) The parties’ single expert may apply to the court for directions to assist the expert in the performance of the expert’s functions in any respect. (2) Any such application must be made by sending a written request for directions to the court, specifying the matter in relation to which directions are sought. (3) A parties’ single expert who makes such an application must send a copy of the request to the parties affected. [R 31.39 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.39 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.39.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.39.40] Practice Note ........................................................................................................................................ [r 31.39.200] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.39.1000]

[r 31.39.20]

Comparison

This rule is similar in substance to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) r 35.14. [r 31.39.40]

Operation

This rule provides for a parties’ single expert to seek directions from the court, eg in circumstances where one party has attempted to communicate with the expert. [r 31.39.200]

Practice Note

Practice Note SC Gen 10 – Single Expert Witness: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_ pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/8b06c4890fd7b7d3ca2572ed000cec28?OpenDocument.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

769

UCPR Parts 31-40

[R 31.38 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.40

[r 31.39.200]

[r 31.39.1000]

References

Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023. Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd (2009) 73 NSWLR 302; [2009] NSWSC 120. 31.40

Parties’ single expert’s report to be sent to parties

(1) The parties’ single expert must send a signed copy of his or her report to each of the parties affected. (2) Each copy must be sent on the same day and must be endorsed with the date on which it is sent. [R 31.40 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.40 COMMENTARY Practice Note ........................................................................................................................................ [r 31.40.200] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.40.1000]

[r 31.40.200]

Practice Note

Practice Note SC Gen 10 – Single Expert Witness: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_ pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/8b06c4890fd7b7d3ca2572ed000cec28?OpenDocument. [r 31.40.1000]

References

Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023. Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd (2009) 73 NSWLR 302; [2009] NSWSC 120. 31.41

Parties may seek clarification of report

(1) Within 14 days after the parties’ single expert’s report is sent to the parties affected, and before the report is tendered in evidence, a party affected may, by notice in writing sent to the expert, seek clarification of any aspect of the report. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, a party affected may send no more than one such notice. (3) Unless the court orders otherwise, the notice must be in the form of questions, no more than 10 in number. (4) The party sending the notice must, on the same day as it is sent to the parties’ single expert, send a copy of it to each of the other parties affected. (5) Each notice sent under this rule must be endorsed with the date on which it is sent. (6) Within 28 days after the notice is sent, the parties’ single expert must send a signed copy of his or her response to the notice to each of the parties affected. [R 31.41 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.41 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.41.20] Practice Note ........................................................................................................................................ [r 31.41.200] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.41.1000]

[r 31.41.20]

Operation

This rule provides a mechanism by which either party can seek clarification of a single expert’s report. However, neither party should have a conference with the single expert or otherwise communicate with the single expert for the purposes of evaluating or testing her or his opinion in the absence of the other party, without that party’s prior written consent: see Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd (2009) 73 NSWLR 302; 770

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

[r 31.44.20]

r 31.44

[2009] NSWSC 120 at [12]. If clarification is required the appropriate course is for written questions to be asked of the expert in accordance with r 31.41, or for directions to be sought from the court. A question will be one by way of clarification if it seeks to elicit better understanding of what is the expert’s opinion, or how that opinion has been reached. A question in the nature of cross-examination, which seeks to challenge the expert’s opinion or to undermine it, is not by way of clarification: see Tomko v Tomko [2007] NSWSC 1486 at [5]. Practice Note

Practice Note SC Gen 10 – Single Expert Witness: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_ pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/8b06c4890fd7b7d3ca2572ed000cec28?OpenDocument. [r 31.41.1000]

References

Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023. Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd (2009) 73 NSWLR 302; [2009] NSWSC 120. 31.42

Tender of reports and of answers to questions

(1) Subject to rule 31.23(3) and unless the court orders otherwise, the parties’ single expert’s report may be tendered in evidence by any of the parties affected. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, any or all of the parties’ single expert’s answers in response to a request for clarification under rule 31.41 may be tendered in evidence by any of the parties affected. [R 31.42 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

31.43

Cross-examination of parties’ single expert

Any party affected may cross-examine a parties’ single expert, and the expert must attend court for examination or cross-examination if so requested on reasonable notice by a party affected. [R 31.43 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

31.44

Prohibition of other expert evidence

Except by leave of the court, a party to proceedings may not adduce evidence of any other expert on any issue arising in proceedings if a parties’ single expert has been engaged under this Division in relation to that issue. [R 31.44 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.44 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.44.20] Practice Note ........................................................................................................................................ [r 31.44.200] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.44.1000]

[r 31.44.20]

Operation

Guidelines relating to the exercise of the court’s discretion of whether to grant leave to adduce expert evidence in addition to that of the parties’ single expert are identified by Brereton J in Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 587 at [17]: • an order for the appointment of a single expert is the first step and not necessarily the last word on the topic; • the process under the Rules was not intended to substitute trial by expert for trial by court; • a significant factor to the grant of leave will be the existence of a competing respective expert opinion; and • a significant factor in favour of permitting further expert evidence will be if a party affected would otherwise have a legitimate sense of grievance that it had not been permitted to advance its case at trial. Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 587 was followed by White J in Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023; leave to adduce evidence pursuant to r 31.44 is a consideration separate from the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

771

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 31.41.200]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.45

[r 31.44.20]

admissibility of evidence at hearing, eg an expert’s report which does not contain an acknowledgement of the code requiring an application for an order otherwise pursuant to r 31.23(3): see Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023 at [21]. A party adversely affected by a single expert’s opinion which may be determinative of the issue may justly complain that he or she does not know of the content passing between an expert and another party. For justice to be seen to be done it is important that there be no unauthorised private communication between a party and a single expert jointly retained by all parties. The affected party would have a legitimate grievance in such circumstances if refused leave to adduce other expert evidence in addition to the single expert. Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd (2009) 73 NSWLR 302; [2009] NSWSC 120. A further expert opinion which does not manifest the existence of a significant competing expert opinion is likely to be rejected: see Stolfa v Owners Strata Plan 4366 (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 531. [r 31.44.200]

Practice Note

Practice Note SC Gen 10 – Single Expert Witness: see http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_ pc.nsf/a15f50afb1aa22a9ca2570ed000a2b08/8b06c4890fd7b7d3ca2572ed000cec28?OpenDocument. [r 31.44.1000]

References

Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023. Stolfa v Owners Strata Plan 4366 (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 531. Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 587. 31.45

Remuneration of parties’ single expert

(1) The remuneration of a parties’ single expert is to be fixed by agreement between the parties affected and the expert or, failing agreement, by, or in accordance with the directions of, the court. (2) Subject to subrule (3), the parties affected are jointly and severally liable to a parties’ single expert for his or her remuneration. (3) The court may direct when and by whom a parties’ single expert is to be paid. (4) Subrules (2) and (3) do not affect the powers of the court as to costs. [R 31.45 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

SUBDIVISION 5 – COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS [Subdiv 5 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

SUBDIVISION 5 COMMENTARY [r Pt31.Div2.Sdiv5.20]

Overview of Subdivision 5

The amendments introduced on 8 December 2006 by this subdivision relate to expert witnesses generally and include, per the Explanatory note to the Working Party 2006 Expert Witnesses Report (online reference [r Pt31.Div2.1000]): (a) The existing rules in relation to court-appointed experts (b) New rules relating to instructions to court-appointed experts (r 31.47), permitting a court-appointed expert to apply to the court for directions (r 31.48) and clarification of a court-appointed experts report (r 31.51).

772

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.46.40]

31.46

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.46

Selection and appointment

(1) If an issue for an expert arises in any proceedings the court may, at any stage of the proceedings: (a) appoint an expert to inquire into and report on the issue, and (b) authorise the expert to inquire into and report on any facts relevant to the inquiry, and (c) direct the expert to make a further or supplemental report or inquiry and report, and (d) give such instructions (including instructions concerning any examination, inspection, experiment or test) as the court thinks fit relating to any inquiry or report of the expert or give directions concerning the giving of such instructions. (2) The court may appoint as a court-appointed expert a person selected by the parties affected, a person selected by the court or a person selected in a manner directed by the court. (3) A person must not be appointed as a court-appointed expert unless he or she consents to the appointment. (4) If any party affected knows that a person is under consideration for appointment as a court-appointed expert: (a) the party affected must not, prior to the appointment, communicate with the person for the purpose of eliciting the person’s opinion as to the issue or issues concerned, and (b) if the party affected has previously communicated with the person for that purpose, he or she must notify the court as to the substance of those communications. [R 31.46 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.46 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.46.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.46.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 31.46.1000]

[r 31.46.20]

Comparison

The substance of the rule remains unchanged. [r 31.46.40]

Operation

The rule empowers the court to appoint an expert, either by selecting its own expert or by appointing an expert selected by the parties. The court-appointed expert may be authorised to inquire into and report on any question requiring expert opinion, or on any relevant facts. Traditionally, the use of single court-appointed experts has not been common: see Re Saxton [1962] 1 WLR 968; [1962] 3 All ER 92 at 972. However, in 2005 the Supreme Court introduced a practice note in the Common Law Division which required single expert evidence, unless the court otherwise orders, in respect of heads of damage in claims for personal injury damages. This includes, but is not limited to domestic care, nursing care, physiotherapy, speech therapy, home modification, motor vehicles or aids and equipment, being evidence of the kind ordinarily given by rehabilitation consultants, occupational therapists, nursing and domestic care providers, architects, builders, motor vehicle consultants, and by aids and equipment suppliers. It is anticipated, therefore, that the frequency of court-appointed experts will henceforth increase markedly. This development coincides with a trend in this regard in some specialised jurisdictions in NSW including the Land and Environment Court and the Workers Compensation Commission. It also mirrors reforms in the United Kingdom following the recommendations in the Woolf Report in 1996, implemented in the Civil Procedure Rules of 1998: see CPR (UK) r 35.4(1) and r 35.7. There has also been a reference by the Attorney General to the NSW Law Reform Commission in relation to expert witnesses generally. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

773

UCPR Parts 31-40

(cf SCR Part 39, rule 1; DCR Part 28A, rule 1; LCR Part 38B, rule 1)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.47

[r 31.46.40]

[r 31.46.1000]

References

Sperling HD, “Expert Evidence: The Problem of Bias and Other Things”, a speech to the Annual Conference of the NSW Supreme Court, 3-4 September 1999, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/ supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_speech_sperling_030999. Davies G, “Court Appointed Experts”, a paper to the Annual Supreme and Federal Court Judges conference, 29 January 2004. 31.47

Instructions to court-appointed expert

The court may give directions as to: (a) the issues to be dealt with in a report by a court-appointed expert, and (b) the facts, and assumptions of fact, on which the report is to be based, including a direction that the parties affected must endeavour to agree on the instructions to be provided to the expert. [R 31.47 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

31.48

Court-appointed expert may apply to court for directions

(1) A court-appointed expert may apply to the court for directions to assist the expert in the performance of the expert’s functions in any respect. (2) Any such application must be made by sending a written request for directions to the court, specifying the matter in relation to which directions are sought. (3) A court-appointed expert who makes such an application must send a copy of the request to the parties affected. [R 31.48 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

31.49

Court-appointed expert’s report to be sent to registrar

(cf SCR Part 39, rule 3; DCR Part 28A, rule 3; LCR Part 38B, rule 3)

(1) The court-appointed expert must send his or her report to the registrar, and a copy of the report to each party affected. (2) Subject to rule 31.23(3) and unless the court orders otherwise, a report that has been received by the registrar is taken to be in evidence in any hearing concerning a matter to which it relates. (3) A court-appointed expert who, after sending a report to the registrar, changes his or her opinion on a material matter must forthwith provide the registrar with a supplementary report to that effect. [R 31.49 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.49 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.49.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.49.40]

[r 31.49.20]

Comparison

The mechanical parts of the rule are unchanged. [r 31.49.40]

Operation

An experts report is sent to the registrar who sends a copy to the parties: cf Cement Linings Ltd v Rocla Ltd (1939) 40 SR (NSW) 491 at 495. Upon receipt by the registrar, the report is taken to have been admitted in evidence in the proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise. Although in evidence, the court is not bound to accept the experts opinion: see Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (Aust) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253; 54 ALJR 254 at 269; Non-Drip Measure Co Ltd v Strangers Ltd (1960) RPC 135. Expert opinion, like any other evidence, must be comprehensible and lead to conclusions that are rationally based. The process of inference that leads to conclusions must be stated 774

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 31.52.40]

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally

r 31.52

or revealed in a way that enables the conclusions to be tested as to their reliability: see Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218; [2001] NSWCA 305; Clough v Tameside & Glassop Health Authority [1998] 3 FCR 133; [1998] 1 WLR 1478; [1998] 2 All ER 971 at 939. These principles apply to court-appointed experts. 31.50

Parties may seek clarification of court-appointed expert’s report

[R 31.50 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

31.51

Cross-examination of court-appointed expert

(cf SCR Part 39, rule 4; DCR Part 28A, rule 4; LCR Part 38B, rule 4)

Any party affected may cross-examine a court-appointed expert, and the expert must attend court for examination or cross-examination if so requested on reasonable notice by a party affected. [R 31.51 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.51 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.51.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.51.40]

[r 31.51.20]

Comparison

The rule has changed to reflect that the report is admissible irrespective of whether the parties have or have not agreed to be bound by it. [r 31.51.40]

Operation

The rule provides for the attendance of the court-appointed expert for cross-examination by the parties. 31.52

Prohibition of other expert evidence

(cf SCR Part 39, rule 6; DCR Part 28A, rule 6; LCR Part 38B, rule 6)

Except by leave of the court, a party to proceedings may not adduce evidence of any expert on any issue arising in proceedings if a court-appointed expert has been appointed under this Division in relation to that issue. [R 31.52 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.52 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.52.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.52.40] Relevant considerations for the grant of leave to adduce further expert evidence ............................... [r 31.52.60]

[r 31.52.20]

Comparison

The new rule is significantly different, and the right of parties to adduce their own expert evidence is now available only with the courts leave. The reference of questions to a court-appointed expert aims to reduce the number of expert witnesses heard in a case, sometimes that result will not be achieved. The grant of the courts leave may be subject to terms, such as, the opportunity for parties to file further non-expert evidence and for the court-appointed expert to prepare a response to a partys expert: see Owners Strata Plan 58577 v Banmor Developments Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 174. [r 31.52.40]

Operation

If the court has appointed an expert, no other expert evidence may be adduced, except with leave. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

775

UCPR Parts 31-40

Any party affected may apply to the court for leave to seek clarification of any aspect of the court-appointed expert’s report.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 31.53

[r 31.52.40]

The grant of the court’s leave may be subject to terms, such as the opportunity for parties to file further non-expert evidence and for the court-appointed expert to prepare a response to a party’s expert: see Owners Strata Plan 58577 v Banmor Developments Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 174. [r 31.52.60]

Relevant considerations for the grant of leave to adduce further expert evidence

A balance needs to be drawn between case management principles and the need for Courts to provide expeditious resolution of disputes and to ensure that those disputes are resolved so as to privide justice according to law to the parties. These factors are not disconnected. Placing too much weight on one factor may cause the exercise of the Court’s discretion to miscarry and to not give a just result to the parties, particularly if the consequence of dismissing an application is to deprive a party of making out its case at trial: Owners of Strata Plan 58577 v Banmore Developments Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 325. 31.53

Remuneration of court-appointed expert

(cf SCR Part 39, rule 5; DCR Part 28A, rule 5; LCR Part 38B, rule 5)

(1) The remuneration of a court-appointed expert is to be fixed by agreement between the parties affected and the expert or, failing agreement, by, or in accordance with the directions of, the court. (2) Subject to subrule (3), the parties affected are jointly and severally liable to a court-appointed witness for his or her remuneration. (3) The court may direct when and by whom a court-appointed expert is to be paid. (4) Subrules (2) and (3) do not affect the powers of the court as to costs. [R 31.53 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.53 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.53.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.53.40]

[r 31.53.20]

Comparison

The rule remains substantially the same. [r 31.53.40]

Operation

The experts remuneration and arrangements for payment, for the report and attendance to give evidence, is fixed by the court but payable by the parties. The courts general discretion as to costs is not affected. 31.54

Assistance to court by other persons

(cf SCR Part 39, rule 7; DCR Part 28A, rule 7; LCR Part 38B, rule 7)

(1) In any proceedings, the court may obtain the assistance of any person specially qualified to advise on any matter arising in the proceedings and may act on the adviser’s opinion. (2) Rule 31.53 applies to and in respect of a person referred to in subrule (1) in the same way as it applies to and in respect of a court-appointed witness. (3) This rule does not apply to proceedings in the Admiralty List of the Supreme Court or to proceedings that are tried before a jury. [R 31.54 insrt Rule 717 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

RULE 31.54 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 31.54.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 31.54.40] 776

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 31 – Evidence Div 2 - Provs applicable to expert evidence generally [r 31.54.20]

r 31.54

Comparison

This rule, which dates back to the Equity Act 1880, was limited to the Equity Division of the Supreme Court, but now has general application (except for the Admiralty List in the Supreme Court or a cause tried before a jury). Operation

The rule allows the court to take advice on any matter from a specially qualified person: see Adhesives Pty Ltd v Aktieselskabet Dansk Gaerings-Industri (1935) 55 CLR 523 at 580; Cement Linings Ltd v Rocla Ltd (1939) 40 SR (NSW) 491. Editor’s note: Division 3 has been repealed and has not been reproduced.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

777

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 31.54.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 32.1

[r Pt32.20]

PART 32 – TRANS-TASMAN PROCEEDINGS ACT 2010 (COMMONWEALTH) [Pt 32 subst Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

Commentary by Dr Michelle Sanson, Lawyer and Author.

PART 32 COMMENTARY [r Pt32.20]

Structure of Part 32

Part 32 comprises five divisions with thirteen rules relating to obtaining evidence from New Zealand, including relevant definitions, leave to serve subpoenas in New Zealand, registration of New Zealand judgments and provisions with respect to evidence by way of audio or audiovisual link.

DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY [Div 1 heading insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

32.1 Interpretation (cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rule 34.61)

(1) In this Part: Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act means the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 of the Commonwealth. (2) Expressions used in this Part and the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act have the same meanings in this Part as they have in that Act, except where the subject-matter or context otherwise indicates. Note: The following expressions used in this Part are defined in the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act: • • • • • • • • • • • •

audio link audiovisual link civil proceeding defendant document enforcement entitled person given liable person party person named plaintiff

[R 32.1 subst Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 32.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 32.1.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 32.1.1000]

[r 32.1.20]

Comparison

Up until October 2013 there were seven rules in Pt 32, without divisions, relating to the former Pt 36A. However with the coming into force of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) there are thirteen rules in five divisions. As of 11 October the Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994 (Cth) was repealed and the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) entered into force to give effect to the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand on Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement, done at Christchurch on 24 July 2008. The Act allows subpoenas to be served on a person in New Zealand with leave of an Australian court, and greater use of technology for people to give 778

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 32 – Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Commonwealth) Division 2 – Commencement of proceeding

[r 32.2.40]

r 32.3

evidence from New Zealand in Australian proceedings and from Australia in New Zealand proceedings. It is the underlying Act to Pt 32 and accordingly the entire Pt 32 was replaced in October 2013. However some content is similar to that of the previous Pt 32 and to that end, cases relating to those aspects remain relevant to practitioners. [r 32.1.40]

Operation

[r 32.1.1000]

References

On evidence by video link, see Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 (NSW). Also ALRC Issues Paper 23 – Chapter 5 Technology in dispute resolution. Refer to r 24.3 for the power to make an order for the examination of a person. Note that Supreme Court Practice Note 127: Use of Technology in Civil Litigation has been repealed. National Interest Analysis [2011] ATNIA 3: discusses the intention of the Trans Tasman Proceedings Act to remove the requirement for leave to serve a subpoena in New Zealand, replacing it with a similar process to that of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth). 32.2

Application of Part

This Part applies in relation to any civil proceeding under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act. Note: The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act also makes provision in relation to certain criminal proceedings and judgments. [R 32.2 subst Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 32.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 32.2.40]

[r 32.2.20]

Comparison

There was no equivalent provision. [r 32.2.40]

Operation

The provision makes clear that only those aspects of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act relevant to civil proceedings are applicable. This reflects the fact that the UCPR are rules with respect to civil procedure (s 9(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)).

DIVISION 2 – COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDING [Div 2 heading insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

32.3

Commencement of civil proceeding for order under Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act

(cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rules 34.63 and 34.65)

(1) Except as otherwise provided by this Part, a civil proceeding for an order under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act must be commenced by filing a summons. (2) The summons must be supported by an affidavit that states the material facts on which the plaintiff relies that are necessary to give the defendant fair notice of the case to be made against the defendant at the hearing of the proceeding. (3) Without limiting subrule (2), an affidavit in support of a summons seeking an order for interim relief under section 25 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act must state the following: © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

779

UCPR Parts 31-40

Part 32 applies in both the Supreme and District Courts and has the effect that a person or thing in New Zealand can be brought into proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court or District Court. The UCPR applies to all proceedings regarding interim relief (s 27 Tran-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth)).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 32.3

[r 32.3.20] (a)

(b)

(c) (d)

if the plaintiff has commenced a civil proceeding in a New Zealand court: (i) that the person has commenced the proceeding in a New Zealand court, and (ii) the relief sought in the New Zealand proceeding, and (iii) the steps taken in the New Zealand proceeding, if the plaintiff intends to commence a civil proceeding in a New Zealand court: (i) when the intended proceeding will be commenced, and (ii) the court in which the intended proceeding is to be commenced, and (iii) the relief to be sought in the intended proceeding, the interim relief sought, why the interim relief should be given.

(4) A copy of the originating process filed (or proposed to be filed) in the New Zealand court concerned should, if available, be annexed to an affidavit referred to in subrule (3). [R 32.3 subst Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 32.3.20] Requirements ........................................................................................................................................... [r 32.3.60]

[r 32.3.20]

Comparison

There was no equivalent provision. [r 32.3.60]

Requirements

The approved form is Form 4A: Summons. The affidavit must contain particular details as to the underlying civil proceeding (r 32.3(3)) and attach a copy of the originating process (r 32.3(4)). 32.4

Interlocutory proceeding under Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act

(cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rule 34.64)

(1) Once a proceeding (the original proceeding) is commenced under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act in relation to any person, any further proceeding for an order under that Act in relation to the same person (whether or not the further proceeding forms part of, or relates to, the original proceeding) is to be commenced by notice of motion filed in the original proceeding. (2) The notice of motion must be supported by an affidavit that states the material facts on which the plaintiff relies that are necessary to give the defendant fair notice of the case to be made against the defendant at the hearing of the further proceeding. [R 32.4 subst Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 32.4.20] Notice of Motion ....................................................................................................................................... [r 32.4.60]

[r 32.4.20]

Comparison

There was no equivalent provision. [r 32.4.60]

Notice of Motion

The approved form is Form 20: Notice of Motion.

780

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 32.5.60]

Part 32 – Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Commonwealth) Division 3 – Subpoenas

r 32.5

DIVISION 3 – SUBPOENAS [Div 3 heading insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

32.5

Application for leave to serve subpoena in New Zealand

(cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rules 34.66 and 34.67)

(2) The notice of motion must be accompanied by: (a) a copy of the subpoena in relation to which leave is sought, and (b) an affidavit stating, briefly but specifically, the following: (i) the name, occupation and address of the person named, (ii) whether the person named is over 18 years old, (iii) the nature and significance of the evidence to be given, or the document or thing to be produced, by the person named, (iv) details of the steps taken to ascertain whether the evidence, document or thing could be obtained by other means without significantly greater expense, and with less inconvenience, to the person named, (v) the date by which it is intended to serve the subpoena in New Zealand, (vi) details of the amounts to be tendered to the person named to meet the person named’s reasonable expenses of complying with the subpoena, (vii) details of the way in which the amounts mentioned in subparagraph (vi) are to be given to the person named, (viii) if the subpoena requires a specified person to give evidence—an estimate of the time that the person named will be required to attend to give evidence, (ix) any facts or matters known to the person making the application that may be grounds for an application by the person named to have the subpoena set aside under section 36(2) or (3) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act. Note: Before granting leave under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act to serve the subpoena, a court may require the person making the application to undertake to meet the expenses reasonably incurred by the person named in complying with the subpoena if those expenses exceed the allowances and travelling expenses to be provided to the person named at the time of service of the subpoena. [R 32.5 subst Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 32.5.20] Applying for leave to serve subpoena ...................................................................................................... [r 32.5.60] Affidavit supporting the application for leave ........................................................................................... [r 32.5.80] Considerations taken into account in granting leave to serve subpoena .............................................. [r 32.5.120]

[r 32.5.20]

Comparison

Prior to October 2013, Pt 32.2 of the UCPR covered application for issue of a subpoena, and the substantive requirements do not differ. [r 32.5.60]

Applying for leave to serve subpoena

A subpoena must not be served in New Zealand without the leave of the Australian court (Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) s 31(1)). The approved form is Form 23: Subpoena. Provisions relating to subpoenas are in Part 5, Division 2 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), and these are taken from the former Evidence and Procedure Act 1994 (Cth) (Explanatory Memorandum to the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Bill 2010 (Cth)). To apply for leave to serve a subpoena, a notice of motion is required (r 32.5(1)), with attached subpoena and affidavit. The approved form is Form 20: Notice of Motion. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

781

UCPR Parts 31-40

(1) An application under the Trans-Tasman Proceeding Act for leave to serve a subpoena in New Zealand must be made by filing a notice of motion.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 32.6

[r 32.5.60]

Since October 2013, an application for leave to serve a subpoena under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) is no longer required to be made to a Supreme Court judge. It may be made in the court in which the proceedings are being heard, and if the proceeding is in an Australian tribunal, leave must be given by an inferior court. In deciding whether to grant leave to serve the subpoena the court must consider the significance of the evidence to be given, or the document or thing to be produced, and whether it could be obtained by other means without significantly greater expense, and with less inconvenience to the person named (s 31 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth)). The Court must provide a date by which the subpoena must be served, and may also impose other conditions relating to the service of the subpoena. [r 32.5.80]

Affidavit supporting the application for leave

The affidavit in support of the application for leave to serve a subpoena under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) must annex a copy of the subpoena and set out the information referred to in r 32.5(2)(b). In relation to the requirement that the affidavit set out whether the person named in the subpoena is over 18 years of age (r 32.5(2)(b)(ii), s 9(5)), the court may, in the absence of an explicit statement to this effect, draw this as an inference: Khatz Capital Ltd v Wilding [2003] NSWSC 173, where the court inferred that the partners of PriceWaterhouseCoopers named in the subpoena were over 18 years of age, in the absence of express words to that effect in the affidavit. The court stated that the requirement under Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 9(5) does not require the court to “actively inquire” into the age of the person to be served, and the negative command does not operate if either there is no evidence as to the person’s age or the evidence there is does not show the person to be under 18. [r 32.5.120]

Considerations taken into account in granting leave to serve subpoena

Section 9(3) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) provides a non-exhaustive list of the considerations taken into account in determining an application for leave to serve a subpoena. Considerations include the significance of the evidence to be obtained to the proceedings in which it is to be used, whether the evidence to be obtained under the subpoena could be obtained by another means with less inconvenience and not significantly more expense. For example, in Khatz Capital Ltd v Wilding [2003] NSWSC 173 the court considered a subpoena to produce documents to be of significance to the commercial dispute that lay at the centre of the proceedings, and that there was no other apparent source from which the documents could be obtained. 32.6

Application to set aside subpoena

(cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rule 34.68)

(1) An application to set aside a subpoena issued under the Trans-Tasman Proceeding Act to be served in New Zealand must be made by filing a notice of motion in the proceeding in which the subpoena was issued. (2) The notice of motion must be accompanied by: (a) a copy of the subpoena, and (b) an affidavit stating: (i) the material facts on which the application is based, and (ii) whether the person making the application requests that any hearing be held by audio link or audiovisual link. [R 32.6 subst Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 32.6.20] Setting aside the subpoena ...................................................................................................................... [r 32.6.60]

782

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 32.7.60] [r 32.6.20]

Part 32 – Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Commonwealth) Division 3 – Subpoenas

r 32.7

Comparison

Prior to October 2013, Pt 32.5 of the UCPR covered application to set aside a subpoena issued under the former act, the Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994 (Cth). Setting aside the subpoena

An application to set aside the subpoena must be made to the court which granted leave to serve the subpoena and the affidavit must set out the details of any facts or matters known to the deponent which may provide cause for the subpoena to be set aside under s 36 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). Section 36(2) sets out the circumstances in which the Court must set aside the subpoena, namely if the person does not have the necessary travel documents and cannot obtain them in time, has legally imposed restricted movement (such as bail or parole), or would be exposed to detention for serving a sentence or prosecution for an offence, or imposition of a penalty in a civil matter if the person came to Australia. Section 36(3) sets out the circumstances in which the court may set aside the subpoena, and is non-exhaustive. Circumstances include where the evidence could be given by another means without significantly more expense, where compliance would cause hardship or serious inconvenience to the person named in the subpoena, or where the document or thing should not be taken out of New Zealand. The determination may be made without a hearing unless it is so requested. 32.7

Application for issue of certificate of non-compliance with subpoena

(cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rule 34.69)

(1) A party may apply to the court that issued a subpoena to be served in New Zealand for the issue of a certificate of non-compliance with the subpoena. (2) The application may be made: (a) if the proceeding in which the subpoena was issued is before the court—orally to the court, or (b) by filing a notice of motion in the proceeding in which the subpoena was issued. (3) An (a) (b) (c) (d)

application must be accompanied by: a copy of the subpoena, and a copy of the order giving rise to the subpoena, and an affidavit of service of the subpoena, and a further affidavit stating the following: (i) whether any application was made to set aside the subpoena, (ii) the material in support of any application in subparagraph (i), (iii) any order that disposed of the application in subparagraph (i), (iv) the material facts relied on for the issue of a certificate of non-compliance.

[R 32.7 subst Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 32.7.20] Setting aside the subpoena ...................................................................................................................... [r 32.7.60]

[r 32.7.20]

Comparison

Prior to October 2013, Pt 32.4 of the UCPR covered application to issue a certificate of non-compliance with a subpoena. [r 32.7.60]

Failure to comply with the subpoena

Where the relevant proceedings are in the Supreme Court, an application for a certificate under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) s 38 may be made orally (r 32.7(2)(a)). If the relevant proceedings are in the District Court, the application must be made by notice of motion (r 32.7(2)(b)). The certificate may be used in a proceeding to punish the person for not complying with the subpoena. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

783

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 32.6.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 32.8

[r 32.7.60]

DIVISION 4 – ENFORCEMENT OF NEW ZEALAND ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS [Div 4 insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

32.8

Notice of registration of NZ judgment

(cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rule 34.72)

(1) A plaintiff must not take any step to enforce a registered NZ judgment in the period mentioned in section 74(2) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act unless the plaintiff has filed an affidavit in the proceeding in which the judgment was registered that states that notice of the registration of the NZ judgment has been given in accordance with section 73 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act and any regulations made under that Act. (2) If a defendant against whom the registered judgment is enforceable is out of Australia, the documents mentioned in subrule (1) may be served without leave of the court. Note: Parts 11 and 11A otherwise provide for service of documents outside Australia. (3) A plaintiff must file an affidavit in the court that registered the judgment proving service of the documents in subrule (1) before any step is taken to enforce the registered judgment. [R 32.8 insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.8 COMMENTARY [r 32.8.20]

Comparison

There was no equivalent provision. 32.9 Application for extension of time to give notice of registration of NZ judgment (cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rule 34.73)

(1) An application by an entitled person for an extension of the time within which to give notice of the registration of a NZ judgment under section 73(3) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act must be made by filing a notice of motion in the proceeding in which the judgment was registered. (2) The notice of motion must be accompanied by an affidavit stating: (a) briefly but specifically, the grounds relied on in support of the application, and (b) the material facts relied on in support of the application, and (c) why notice was not given within time. [R 32.9 insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.9 COMMENTARY [r 32.9.20]

Comparison

There was no equivalent provision. 32.10 Application to set aside registration of NZ judgment (cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rule 34.74)

(1) An application by a liable person to set aside the registration of a NZ judgment under section 72(1) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act must be made by filing a notice of motion in the proceeding in which the judgment was registered.

784

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 32.11.20]

Part 32 – Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Commonwealth) Division 4 – Enforcement of New Zealand orders and judgments

r 32.12

Note: An application to set aside the registration of a NZ judgment must be made within 30 working days of the court after the day on which the liable person was served with notice of the registration, or within any shorter or longer period that the court considers appropriate—see section 72(2) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act. (2) The notice of motion must be accompanied by an affidavit stating: (a) briefly but specifically, the grounds on which the registration of the judgment should be set aside, and (b) the material facts relied on in support of the application.

RULE 32.10 COMMENTARY [r 32.10.20]

Comparison

There was no equivalent provision. 32.11 Application for stay of enforcement of registered NZ judgment to enable liable person to appeal judgment (cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rule 34.75)

(1) An application by a liable person for a stay of the enforcement of a registered NZ judgment under section 76(1) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act to enable the person to appeal the judgment must be made by filing a notice of motion in the proceeding in which the judgment was registered. (2) The notice of motion must be accompanied by an affidavit stating: (a) the order sought, and (b) briefly but specifically, the grounds relied on in support of the order sought, and (c) the material facts relied on in support of the application. [R 32.11 insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.11 COMMENTARY [r 32.11.20]

Comparison

There was no equivalent provision. 32.12 Application for extension of time to apply for stay of enforcement of registered NZ judgment to enable liable person to appeal judgment (cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rule 34.76)

(1) An application by a liable person for an extension of the time within which to apply for the stay of enforcement of a registered NZ judgment under section 76(3) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act to enable the person to appeal the judgment must be made by filing a notice of motion in the proceeding in which the judgment was registered. (2) The notice of motion must be accompanied by an affidavit stating: (a) the order sought, and (b) briefly but specifically, the grounds relied on in support of the application, and (c) the material facts relied on in support of the application, and (d) why the application was not made within time. [R 32.12 insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

785

UCPR Parts 31-40

[R 32.10 insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 32.13

[r 32.12.20]

RULE 32.12 COMMENTARY [r 32.12.20]

Comparison

There was no equivalent provision.

DIVISION 5 – MISCELLANEOUS [Div 5 insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

32.13 Application for order for use of audio link or audiovisual link (cf Federal Court Rules 2011, rule 34.77)

(1) An application by a party for an order that evidence be taken, or submissions be made, by audio link or audiovisual link from New Zealand must be made by filing a notice of motion. (2) Subrule (1) does not apply to a request mentioned in rule 32.6(2)(b)(ii). [R 32.13 insrt Rule 632 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

RULE 32.13 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 32.13.20] Evidence by audiovisual means ............................................................................................................. [r 32.13.60]

[r 32.13.20] Comparison Prior to October 2013, Pt 32.6 of the UCPR covered an application for a direction that evidence be taken, or submissions made, by video-link or telephone from New Zealand, under the Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act 1994 (Cth). The new wording encompasses any audio or audiovisual link, and can therefore encompass use of technology such as Skype. There is no longer mention of the need for an affidavit to accompany the notice of motion however it is clear that aspects such as the reason for such a procedure and the nature of the evidence to be obtained, must be considered by the court. [r 32.13.60] Evidence by audiovisual means With respect remote appearances from New Zealand in Australian proceedings within the meaning of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), r 32.13 applies over the standard rule in r 31.3 for evidence by telephone, video link or other communication (r 31.3(2)). The approach taken to video link applications was set out by Austin J in Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; 22 ACLC 1125; [2004] NSWSC 467. The overriding principles are that first the court should strongly encourage the use of this technology provided it is cost-effective and reliable, recognising that it may still be acceptable if it saves time and money but delivers a product not quite as good as the traditional alternative. Second, there will be exceptional cases where the court will consider there are good grounds for proceeding by viva voce evidence even where a sound new technology is available. Submissions referring to previous cases where evidence was obtained by audiovisual facilities were considered to be of limited assistance to the court, as the court said that the exercise of its discretion will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. The court referred to the following considerations, in addition to the obvious practical matters like cost and difficulty caused by differences in time zones, which may make obtaining evidence by video link unsuitable: 1. Central importance of evidence and its contentiousness – if there is anticipated to be lengthy and complex cross-examination including as to credit; 2. Assessment of credit – generally the video will capture “subtle nuances” but where the issue of credit is likely to depend on the witness’s responses to questions based on documents shown to her or him, the court and cross-examiner may be at real disadvantage; 3. Management of documents in cross-examination – where there will be a large volume of documents put before a witness, some of which may not be in the tender bundle; 4. Technological difficulties – if the equipment to be used involves a time lapse between question and answer, and there is to be lengthy cross-examination; and 786

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 32.13.60]

Part 32 – Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Commonwealth) Division 5 – Miscellaneous

r 32.13

5. Length of cross-examination – this is more relevant when it comes to time differences. For example if there is to be five days cross-examination of a witness in London, evidence given 8.00 am to 11.00 am is received 5.00 pm to 8.00 pm in Sydney, and this would mean twice as many days to take the evidence. The earlier part of the day in Sydney may involve cross-examination on other matters but this makes it onerous on the barristers involved to run two cross-examinations at the same time.

The evidence is adduced by audiovisual means and there is no need for subsequent tender of the transcript or video record (Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 49 ACSR 578; 22 ACLC 1125; [2004] NSWSC 467).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

787

UCPR Parts 31-40

Additionally, in Laporte Group Australia Ltd v Vatselias (unreported, NSWSC, Young J, 15 November 1991), the court held that it was consistent with the proper administration of justice to take witnesses’ convenience into account.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 33.1

[r Pt33.20]

PART 33 – SUBPOENAS Note:

The provisions of this Part comprise uniform rules developed under the auspices of the Australian Council of Chief

Justices. [Pt 33 note insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[11]]

Commentary by Deborah Robinson, Barrister. Updated by Josephine Kelly.

PART 33 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r Pt33.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r Pt33.40]

[r Pt33.20]

Comparison

These subpoena rules have been adopted from previous rules found in SCR Pt 37. Part 37 was itself amended on 1 May 2004 to adopt the national harmonised rules developed under the auspices of the Council of Chief Justices. The harmonised subpoena rules have been adopted by the Federal Court, Family Court, and the Supreme Courts of New South Wales, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory. Adoption of the harmonised rules is still being considered by the Supreme Courts of Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. Queensland has declined to adopt the harmonised rules. [r Pt33.40]

Operation

There are three stages to a subpoena for production: National Employers’ Mutual General Assn Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372. The first stage is production of the documents to the court: refer to annotations under r 33.4 with respect to objections that may be taken to production. Production is to the court, not to a party to the proceedings: Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564. The second stage is a determination of whether or not inspection should be allowed of the documents produced: refer to annotations under r 33.9 with respect to objections, which may be taken to access. The third stage is the admission of documents at a hearing or trial: this stage is governed by the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 and is not dealt with under this Pt 33. 33.1 Definitions (cf SCR Part 37, rule 1)

(1) In this Part: addressee means the person who is the subject of the order expressed in a subpoena. conduct money means a sum of money or its equivalent, such as pre-paid travel, sufficient to meet the reasonable expenses of the addressee of attending court as required by the subpoena and returning after so attending. issuing officer means an officer of the court who is empowered to issue a subpoena on behalf of the court. issuing party means the party at whose request a subpoena is issued. registrar, in relation to proceedings in respect of which a subpoena is sought or issued, means: (a) in relation to the Supreme Court, the principal registrar, and, and (a1) in relation to the Industrial Court, the industrial registrar referred to in section 207 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996, and (b) in relation to the District Court: (i) the principal registrar, or (ii) the registrar of the District Court for the proclaimed place (within the meaning of the District Court Act 1973) where the subpoena was issued, or where the subpoena is returnable, whichever is applicable, and (c) in relation to the Local Court, the registrar of the Local Court for the venue where the subpoena was issued. [Def am Rule 570 of 2009, Sch 1[6]; Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1] and [5]; Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[3]] 788

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 33 – Subpoenas [r 33.1.20]

r 33.2

subpoena means (a) (b) (c)

an to to to

order in writing requiring the addressee: attend to give evidence, or produce the subpoena or a copy of it and a document or thing, or do both of those things,

and includes a summons to that effect under section 165 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996. [Def am Rule 570 of 2009, Sch 1[7]]

(3) To the extent that a subpoena requires the addressee to produce the subpoena or a copy of it and a document or thing, it is called a subpoena to produce. Note: See also rules 7.3, 10.12, 10.20, 31.20, 31.22 and 31.23 with respect to the issue and service of subpoenas. [R 33.1 am Rule 570 of 2009; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 501 of 2007]

RULE 33.1 COMMENTARY [r 33.1.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.1 replicates SCR Pt 37.1. The DCR definition of “requesting party” now corresponds to “issuing party” and “person named” now corresponds to “addressee”. The DCR definition of “return date” is not included in the new provisions, and was never defined under prior Supreme Court Rules 1970, nevertheless that term will continue to be understood as the date upon which an addressee is required to comply with a subpoena. 33.2 Issuing of subpoena (cf SCR Part 37, rule 2)

(1) The court may, in any proceeding, by subpoena order the addressee: (a) to attend to give evidence as directed by the subpoena, or (b) to produce the subpoena or a copy of it and any document or thing as directed by the subpoena, or (c) to do both of those things. (2) An issuing officer must not issue a subpoena: (a) if the court has made an order, or there is a rule of the court, having the effect of requiring that the proposed subpoena: (i) not be issued, or (ii) not be issued without the leave of the court and that leave has not been given, or (b) requiring the production of a document or thing in the custody of the court or another court. (3) The issuing officer must seal with the seal of the court, or otherwise authenticate, a sufficient number of copies of the subpoena for service and proof of service. (4) A subpoena is taken to have been issued on its being sealed or otherwise authenticated in accordance with subrule (3).

RULE 33.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 33.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 33.2.40] When to issue a subpoena ...................................................................................................................... [r 33.2.60] Documents sought from a party to proceedings ...................................................................................... [r 33.2.80] No subpoena to a court .......................................................................................................................... [r 33.2.100] Production of things ................................................................................................................................ [r 33.2.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 33.2.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

789

UCPR Parts 31-40

(2) To the extent that a subpoena requires the addressee to attend to give evidence, it is called a subpoena to attend to give evidence.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 33.2 [r 33.2.20]

[r 33.2.20] Comparison

Rule 33.2 adopts the previous SCR provision and replaces DCR Pt 29 r 6. In 2004 an amendment was introduced in SCR Pt 66 r 1A requiring litigants in person to seek leave of the court to issue subpoenas; this rule has now been incorporated in UCPR r 7.3. The most significant variation to DCR is the incorporation of this express provision in relation to litigants in person. [r 33.2.40]

Operation

There are two forms of subpoena: a subpoena to produce and/or a subpoena to attend to give evidence. A subpoena to produce may require production of documents or things. The court’s jurisdiction to order compulsory attendance or production, by way of subpoena or other order, is found in CPA s 68. Generally, a subpoena may be issued as of right in proceedings by a party represented by a solicitor, subject to any later objection or application by the addressee or another party to the proceedings. In the Supreme Court, a party represented by a solicitor may issue a subpoena and obtain a return date by the simple administrative expedient of completing the form “Application to issue Subpoena” on the Supreme Court website. It should be noted that an undertaking must be provided in the following terms: “I undertake to notify all other parties in these proceedings of the subpoena that have been issued and the return date that has been allocated pursuant to this application, within 3 working days”. However, UCPR r 7.3 requires litigants in person to obtain the leave of the court prior to issuing a subpoena. A litigant in person, unaided by legal advice, may cause a subpoena to issue which is oppressive and the court has a supervisory jurisdiction over such litigants prior to the issue of the subpoena. In the absence of a proper forensic purpose, a litigant in person may be declined leave: Samootin v Shea [2004] NSWCA 115. [r 33.2.60]

When to issue a subpoena

A subpoena to attend to give evidence is not issued until there is an occasion for giving oral evidence at a trial or hearing of the proceedings. Until amendments to the SCR in 1988 and the issue of Practice Note 51, parties to proceedings were not entitled to issue a subpoena for production returnable before trial. The amendments were designed to facilitate settlement and trial preparation: refer to prior Supreme Court Practice Note 51. Following the 1988 amendments, the court was authorised to grant leave to issue a subpoena for production on “any other occasion”. Practice Note 51 contained the exhortation that any such subpoena should not be a “fishing expedition”; a “fishing expedition” is a circumstance where a party seeks discovery, issues a subpoena or administers interrogatories for the purpose of discovering a case of which that party is presently unaware: Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 250. Rule 33.2 contains no prohibition on issuing a subpoena in the earliest stages of the litigation, however, if pleadings have not yet closed it may not be possible to ascertain if the documents sought under the subpoena have apparent relevance to the proceedings. It may be considered onerous to put a third party to the trouble of producing documents in litigation in which he or she has no interest when the issues are not yet defined and discovery not yet completed. It might be noted that a third party has an entitlement to claim for costs and expenses pursuant to r 33.11. Under the terms of the rule a subpoena may be issued “in any proceedings”, this includes proceedings for the examination of a judgment debtor: Barclay Mowlem Construction v Tesrol Walsh Bay [2005] NSWSC 944. [r 33.2.80]

Documents sought from a party to proceedings

While a subpoena may be issued to a party, a subpoena is not required to obtain production of documents from a party to proceedings and reference should be made to Pts 21 and 34 for methods to obtain production from a party to the proceedings. Initially, discovery processes should be employed, as set out in Pt 21, by issuing a notice to produce for inspection or obtaining an order for discovery. It may be inappropriate to issue a subpoena for production to a third party as an alternative to seeking discovery from a party to the proceedings: Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Deluxe Coachlines Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 592; 67 ALR 93 (where documents could be sought on discovery thereby making production by third party unnecessary). Part 34 makes it clear that production can be sought from a party at trial without the need to issue a subpoena and r 34.2 may be invoked to obtain production by a party at any hearing or before any examiner (refer to Pt 24 for proceedings before an “examiner”). A “hearing” is any trial or interlocutory hearing: CPA s 3(1). If a party desires production under the supervision of the court prior to a hearing, it may be possible to have a notice to produce 790

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 33 – Subpoenas [r 33.2.1000]

r 33.3

returnable at a directions’ hearing, case conference or in a return of subpoena list, subject to obtaining leave of the court pursuant to r 34.1(1)(b) to have the notice to produce returnable in that list and subject to the practices prevailing at the time in that jurisdiction. [r 33.2.100]

No subpoena to a court

[r 33.2.120]

Production of things

Rule 33.2 permits a subpoena to issue that requires the production of a “thing”. It may be used to seek production of, amongst other things, films, tape recordings or disks. The court has an inherent jurisdiction to order the production of such things, and the equipment to make their contents intelligible, although notice should be given to the witness in order to avoid oppression: Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News Ltd [1976] QB 23; [1975] 2 WLR 987; [1975] 2 All ER 1009 (film viewed at the television studio of the witness). [r 33.2.1000]

References

Rule 7.3 – litigants in person. UCPR Pts 21 and 34 – production by a party. CPA s 68 – jurisdiction. Rule 1.3 – definition of “hearing”. 33.3

Form of subpoena

(cf SCR Part 37, rule 3)

(1) A subpoena must be in the approved form. (2) A subpoena must not be addressed to more than one person. (3) Unless the court orders otherwise, a subpoena must identify the addressee by name or by description of office or position. (4) A subpoena to produce must: (a) identify the document or thing to be produced, and (b) specify the date, time and place for production. (5) A subpoena to attend to give evidence must specify the date, time and place for attendance. (6) The date specified in a subpoena must be the date of trial or any other date as permitted by the court. (7) The place specified for production may be the court or the address of any person authorised to take evidence in the proceeding as permitted by the court. (8) The last date for service of a subpoena: (a) is the date falling 5 days before the earliest date on which an addressee is required to comply with the subpoena or an earlier or later date fixed by the court, and (b) must be specified in the subpoena. [Subr (8) subst Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[7]]

(9) If the addressee is a corporation, the corporation must comply with the subpoena by its appropriate or proper officer. [R 3.33 am Rule 164 of 2007]

RULE 33.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 33.3.20] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

791

UCPR Parts 31-40

It is not appropriate for a court to issue a subpoena on another court: r 33.2(2)(b). Rule 33.13 provides a mechanism to obtain documents in the custody of another court, by way of a letter of request. Refer to the annotations under r 33.13.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 33.3

[r 33.3.20]

Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 33.3.40] Abridgement of time ................................................................................................................................. [r 33.3.60] Subpoenas for production ........................................................................................................................ [r 33.3.80] Production by corporations, partnerships and unincorporated associations ......................................... [r 33.3.100] Custody or control of documents ........................................................................................................... [r 33.3.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 33.3.1000]

[r 33.3.20]

Comparison

Rule 3 replicates the SCR provisions and adopts in substance the provisions contained in the DCR. Previously, DCR Pt 29 r 6(5) required the “leave” of the court to obtain an early return date for a subpoena for production; this new rule allows a subpoena to be returnable on any date as “permitted” by the court: r 33.3(6). Refer further to the annotations under [r 33.3.80]. [r 33.3.40]

Operation

The prescribed form of subpoena may be downloaded from the court’s website: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au. [r 33.3.60]

Abridgement of time

Time is reckoned in accordance with UCPR r 1.11 and may be abridged pursuant to UCPR r 1.12. Five clear days are required between service and the return date, unless an order abridging the time for service is obtained. A sample form of short service order is available on the District Court website under “Frequently Asked Questions” under “Policy and Procedure”: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/dc/. [r 33.3.80]

Subpoenas for production

Subpoenas for production may be returnable at trial or at any other date as permitted by the court: r 33.3(6). The term “permitted” appears to connote an administrative discretion. The current Supreme Court practice is that a return date may be obtained by completing a standard form, being “Application to issue Subpoena” which is found on the Supreme Court website under “Forms and Fees – Administrative”. The District Court and Supreme Court have Return of Subpoena Lists, independent of Directions Lists, and subpoenas for production are generally returnable in these lists. [r 33.3.100]

Production by corporations, partnerships and unincorporated associations

Subrules 33.3(3) and 33.3(9) provide for production by the appropriate or proper officer. Where the addressee is a corporation, the subpoena is addressed to “XYZ Pty Limited by its proper officer”: Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 153 CLR 134; 57 ALJR 31; 43 ALR 659; [1982] ATPR 40-322; [1982] HCA 66 at 146 (CLR) (but not to “the proper officer of XYZ Pty Limited”Re BPTC Ltd (in liq) (No 2) (1992) 29 NSWLR 713; 10 ACLC 1431; 8 ACSR 533). If this fine distinction is not observed, reliance might be placed on “Note 3” in the standard form of subpoena which provides that if a subpoena is addressed to a corporation, the corporation must comply with the subpoena by its appropriate or proper officer. A party may subpoena a company’s documents from a director of the company without first directing a subpoena to the company itself, particularly when that director owns and effectively controls the company or has full and unqualified possession of the documents: Southern Pacific Hotel Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corp Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 710; [1984] 2 ACLC 483. A subpoena to a partnership will generally be addressed to “the partners” rather than an individual partner. Production of documents from an unincorporated association may be sought from the executive officer of that association rather than from the individual members: Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 153 CLR 134; 57 ALJR 31; 43 ALR 659; [1982] ATPR 40-322; [1982] HCA 66. [r 33.3.120]

Custody or control of documents

There is no requirement on an addressee to produce documents which are not within the possession, custody or control of the addressee. It is preferable, but not necessary, to address a subpoena to an employer rather than an employee: Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 153 CLR 134; 57 ALJR 31; 43 ALR 659; [1982] ATPR 40-322; [1982] HCA 66. As to whether or not a person with actual possession of, but not ultimate authority over, documents has an entitlement to object to production of documents to the court, and a discussion of the degree of possession, custody or control of documents that is required, see Rochfort. Where 792

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 33 – Subpoenas [r 33.4.60]

r 33.4

a subpoena is for the production of a document, it must be shown that the document existed at the relevant time and that it was in the possession of the witness under subpoena: O’Born v Commissioner for Government Transport (1959) 77 WN (NSW) 81. [r 33.3.1000]

References

Rules 1.11 and 1.12 – time. Setting aside or other relief

(cf SCR Part 37, rule 4)

(1) The court may, on the application of a party or any person having a sufficient interest, set aside a subpoena in whole or in part, or grant other relief in respect of it. (2) An application under subrule (1) must be made on notice to the issuing party. (3) The court may order that the applicant give notice of the application to any other party or to any other person having a sufficient interest.

RULE 33.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 33.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 33.4.40] Standing to set aside ................................................................................................................................ [r 33.4.60] Grounds to set aside ................................................................................................................................ [r 33.4.80] Substitute for discovery .......................................................................................................................... [r 33.4.100] Legitimate forensic purpose ................................................................................................................... [r 33.4.120] Oppression ............................................................................................................................................. [r 33.4.140] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 33.4.1000]

[r 33.4.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.4 replicates SCR Pt 37 r 4. Previous DCR Pt 29 r 8 adopted the substance of the SCR provision and DCA s 66 provided that a person would not be bound to produce under a subpoena where “the person would not be bound to produce upon a subpoena for production in the Supreme Court”. The DCR provisions made it express that a motion was required to bring the application and that the court could of its own motion make an order to set aside a subpoena. [r 33.4.40]

Operation

Rule 33.4 refers to an “application” which must be made on “notice”. While reference is not specifically made to the requirement to file a Notice of Motion, the prior prevailing practice in the Supreme Court was that a motion would be filed on an application to set aside a subpoena. Reference should be made to UCPR r 18.1 which provides that “an interlocutory or other application is to be made by motion unless these rules otherwise provide”. A distinction should be drawn between objections to production which take the form of an application by notice of motion to set aside a subpoena and an objection to access which occurs subsequent to the production of documents to the court and takes the form of an oral application or a written objection: refer to the three stages of production at [r Pt33.40] and the annotations under r 33.9 with respect to objections to access. These distinctions are not always observed: for an example of a case where a party with an objection to production (on the grounds of lack of relevance and abuse of process) was permitted to take instead an objection to access, see Short v Crawley [2004] NSWSC 1031. [r 33.4.60]

Standing to set aside

An addressee has standing to bring an application to set aside a subpoena, notwithstanding the addressee is not a party to the proceedings: Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564; and such an addressee may, by leave, appeal an unfavourable decision: Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News Ltd [1976] QB 23; [1975] 2 WLR 987; [1975] 2 All ER 1009. An application to set aside a subpoena which is an abuse of process may be made by the addressee, a party to the litigation and any other © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

793

UCPR Parts 31-40

33.4

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 33.4

[r 33.4.60]

person who might be shown to have a legitimate interest in having the subpoenas set aside: Botany Bay Instrumentation & Control Pty Ltd v Stewart [1984] 3 NSWLR 98. In determining if a person has standing to apply, the court will pay regard to the terms of the rule, in particular, the expression “a person having sufficient interest” and will examine the connection between the documents sought to be produced under the subpoena and the person seeking to have the subpoenas set aside: Compsyd Pty Ltd v Streamline Travel Service Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 648. “Sufficient interest” may be evidenced by establishing that the moving party has a proprietary interest in the documents, or that the documents contain confidential or privileged information: Compsyd. A party moving the court to set aside a subpoena has a right to appear by counsel: Senior v Holdsworth; Ex parte Independent Television News Ltd [1976] QB 23; [1975] 2 WLR 987; [1975] 2 All ER 1009; Christie v Ford [1957] 2 FLR 202; Wilkinson v Wilkinson (1901) 1 SR (NSW) Eq 285. [r 33.4.80]

Grounds to set aside

There are a number of related heads upon which an application to set aside a subpoena may be based, as indicated in the following annotations, and it should be noted that there is considerable overlap between them. Broadly, an application to set aside a subpoena falls under the umbrella of a complaint of abuse of process; a complaint of oppression may be encompassed by, or be distinguished from, a complaint of abuse of process. The various related heads of objection to a subpoena include: using a subpoena as a substitute for discovery; insufficient particularisation of the documents called for; using a subpoena as a “fishing expedition”; oppression of the addressee; and lack of legitimate forensic purpose. [r 33.4.100]

Substitute for discovery

A subpoena cannot be used as a substitute for discovery or as an alternative to obtaining an order for further or better discovery: Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564; National Employers’ Mutual General Assn Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372; Finnie v Dalglish [1982] 1 NSWLR 400; Botany Bay Instrumentation & Control Pty Ltd v Stewart [1984] 3 NSWLR 98. A subpoena cannot be used to obtain a form of discovery against a third party and should not impose upon a third party the task of forming a judgment whether a document relates to issues between the litigants: Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564; National Employers’ Mutual General Assn Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372; Finnie v Dalglish [1982] 1 NSWLR 400; Spencer Motors Pty Ltd v LNC Industries Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 921; Southern Pacific Hotel Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corp Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 710; [1984] 2 ACLC 483. Refer further to [r 33.4.140] regarding proper particularisation of a subpoena. [r 33.4.120]

Legitimate forensic purpose

It is trite law that a subpoena must call for documents which have apparent relevance to the issues in dispute in the proceedings. The absence of apparent relevance of the documents sought is a sufficient ground to set aside a subpoena in whole or in part: Portal Software International Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1115. Nevertheless a document need not be admissible in evidence, nor does a party need to give an undertaking to tender the document in evidence, for the purpose of obtaining production and inspection of that document: National Employers’ Mutual General Assn Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372. A document is “sufficiently relevant” if production is reasonably likely to add, in the end, in some way or other, to the relevant evidence in the case: Spencer Motors Pty Ltd v LNC Industries Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 921. A subpoena must have a legitimate forensic purpose or it will be an abuse of process: R v Tastan (1994) 75 A Crim R 498. It is improper to issue a subpoena, not for the purpose of the litigation, but for some spurious purpose, such as to inspect the documents in connection with other proceedings, or for some private purpose, or in collusive proceedings to give them publicity: National Employers’ Mutual General Assn Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 at 382. A subpoena not issued for the purpose of a pending trial, hearing or application is an abuse of process: Botany Bay Instrumentation & Control Pty Ltd v Stewart [1984] 3 NSWLR 98. Nevertheless, the practice of making subpoenas returnable before trial is desirable as it enables disputes to be resolved and the required documents to be produced to ensure the efficient conduct of the trial: Southern Pacific Hotel Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corp Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 710; [1984] 2 ACLC 483. It might be noted that since the decisions in Botany Bay and Southern Pacific there has been a steadily developing practice of utilising early return dates of subpoenas as an ordinary incident of case preparation. A subpoena not issued bona fide for the purpose of obtaining relevant evidence and where the witness to whom the subpoena was addressed was unable to give relevant evidence is an abuse of process: R v Baines [1909] 1 KB 258; R v Hove Justices; Ex parte Donne [1967] 2 All ER 1253; (1967) 131 JP 460; Botany Bay Instrumentation & Control 794

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 33 – Subpoenas [r 33.4.1000]

r 33.5

Pty Ltd v Stewart [1984] 3 NSWLR 98. A “fishing expedition” is a circumstance where a party seeks discovery, issues a subpoena or administers interrogatories for the purpose of discovering a case of which that party is presently unaware: Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 250. It is sufficient to submit that documents sought under a subpoena may assist a party as to the precise nature of any amendment that may be required, as this approach does not satisfy the requirement that a subpoena have a legitimate forensic purpose: ACN 008 664 257 Pty Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (in liq) [2005] NSWSC 881. Oppression

A failure to properly particularise the documents sought to be produced under the subpoena is oppressive: Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 and documents should be specified with reasonable particularity: Lane v Registrar of Supreme Court (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 245; 55 ALJR 529. A subpoena requiring the production of documents “relating to” or “referring to” a particular subject matter is not necessarily oppressive or an abuse of process: Spencer Motors Pty Ltd v LNC Industries Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 921; Dunn v KAZ Group Ltd [2006] NSWSC 8. While a subpoena requiring production of documents “relating to” a specified subject matter may not be objectionable a subpoena will be oppressive if the call, as understood by a member of the public, is too wide or uncertain: Southern Pacific Hotel Services Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Corp Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 710; [1984] 2 ACLC 483. It is oppressive or an abuse of process to call for the production of documents which place an excessive burden on the producing party and where the documents appear not to be sufficiently relevant to the proceedings: Spencer Motors Pty Ltd v LNC Industries Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 921. It may be oppressive to call for the production of all “originals or copies” of documentation in the circumstances where that documentation is located in many places: Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Tuxford [2002] NSWCA 139. In a proper case, a subpoena will be set aside because of the voluminous nature of the call and the difficulty and expense in complying with the call, particularly where the forensic purpose of the call is insufficiently identified. In some cases, it may be that the expense of complying with the call, when production is not otherwise objected to, may be met by sensible negotiation to provide the addressee with the cost and expenses of complying with the call, and at any rate, the addressee may apply to be reimbursed for the costs and expenses of complying with the call: see r 33.11. Generally, an addressee must comply with a subpoena for production whether or not the addressee’s costs and expenses have been met. However, where it is completely predictable that expenses will be incurred by a producing party, it is not open to the issuing party to make no attempt to estimate what those expenses might be, demand compliance with the subpoena and take the attitude that it will leave the addressee in the position where it is necessary to retain a lawyer and make an application to the court for reimbursement of the expenses of complying with the subpoena (under r 33.11): Foyster v Foyster Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 881. If an addressee has a sound basis for doubting that he or she will actually be paid their expenses if the subpoena is complied with, that may in some circumstances provide a basis for setting aside the subpoena as oppressive: Foyster v Foyster Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 881. [r 33.4.1000]

References

Part 18 – notices of motion. Rule 33.11 – costs and expenses of addressee. 33.5

Service

(cf SCR Part 37, rule 5)

(1) A subpoena must be served personally on the addressee. (2) The issuing party must serve a copy of a subpoena to produce on each other active party as soon as practicable after the subpoena has been served on the addressee. [Subr (2) am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[38]] [R 33.5 am Rule 395 of 2005]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

795

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 33.4.140]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 33.6

[r 33.5.20]

RULE 33.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 33.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 33.5.40] Time for service of a subpoena ................................................................................................................ [r 33.5.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 33.5.1000]

[r 33.5.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.5 replicates SCR Pt 37 r 5 and replaces DCR Pt 29 r 7. The requirement to serve a subpoena five clear days prior to the date for production or attendance remains the same. A District Court subpoena for production may be served by post or in the manner authorised by r 10.20(2)(d). Further, refer to r 33.6(3) which envisages a circumstance where a subpoena must be complied with notwithstanding that it has not been personally served. [r 33.5.40]

Operation

A Supreme Court subpoena for production must be personally served. A subpoena for production in the District Court may be served by leaving it at the person’s business or residential address in the manner authorised under r 10.20(2)(d)(ii). A District Court subpoena for production may also be served by post as authorised by r 10.20(2)(d)(iii). Further, r 33.6(3) provides that if an addressee has actual knowledge of the subpoena and its requirements, an addressee must comply with the subpoena notwithstanding it has not been personally served. Rule 10.14 provides for substituted or informal service, where it is not “practicable” to effect personal service. For a discussion on the principles to apply with respect to the service of a subpoena outside the State or outside Australia, refer to Arhill Pty Ltd v General Terminal Co Pty Ltd (1990) 23 NSWLR 545. For service outside the state but within Australia see the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth). [r 33.5.60]

Time for service of a subpoena

Rule 33.5 expressly provides that a subpoena to produce must be served on each other active party as soon as practicable after the subpoena has been served on the addressee. The Practice Note DC (Civil) No 8 requires service within seven days of issue; if the return date is less than two weeks away then service must be effected within 24 hours: para [2.2(c)] Practice Note DC (Civil) No 8. [r 33.5.1000]

References

Part 10 – Service, particularly Div 3. Rule 10.14 – substituted and informal service. Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth). Practice Note DC (Civil) No 8 – Early return of subpoena. 33.6

Compliance with subpoena

(cf SCR Part 37, rule 6)

(1) An addressee need not comply with the requirements of a subpoena to attend to give evidence unless conduct money has been handed or tendered to the addressee a reasonable time before the date on which attendance is required. (2) An addressee need not comply with the requirements of a subpoena unless it is served on or before the date specified in the subpoena as the last date for service of the subpoena. (3) Despite rule 33.5(1), an addressee must comply with the requirements of a subpoena even if it has not been served personally on that addressee if the addressee has, by the last date for service of the subpoena, actual knowledge of the subpoena and of its requirements. (4) The addressee must comply with a subpoena to produce: (a) by attending at the date, time and place specified for production and producing the subpoena or a copy of it and the document or thing to the court or to the person authorised to take evidence in the proceeding as permitted by the court, or 796

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 33 – Subpoenas [r 33.6.40] (b)

r 33.6 by delivering or sending the subpoena or a copy of it and the document or thing to the registrar at the address specified for the purpose in the subpoena, so that they are received not less than 2 clear days before the date specified in the subpoena for attendance and production.

(5) In the case of a subpoena that is both a subpoena to attend to give evidence and a subpoena to produce, production of the subpoena or a copy of it and of the document or thing in any of the ways permitted by subrule (4) does not discharge the addressee from the obligation to attend to give evidence. (6) Unless a subpoena specifically requires the production of the original, the addressee may produce a copy of any document required to be produced by the subpoena. UCPR Parts 31-40

[Subr (6) insrt Rule 569 of 2009, Sch 1[5]]

(7) The copy of a document may be: (a) a photocopy, or (b) in any electronic form that the issuing party has indicated will be acceptable. (c) [Repealed] [Subr (7) am Rule 396 of 2011, r 3; Rule 172 of 2010, Sch 1[3] and [4]; insrt Rule 569 of 2009, Sch 1[5]] [R 33.6 am Rule 396 of 2011; Rule 172 of 2010; Rule 569 of 2009]

RULE 33.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 33.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 33.6.40] Calling on a subpoena for production in court ......................................................................................... [r 33.6.60] No documents produced by addressee ................................................................................................... [r 33.6.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 33.6.1000]

[r 33.6.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.6 replicates SCR Pt 37 r 7. A significant variation to the prior District Court practice is that under DCR Pt 29 r 2(1) conduct money was required with respect to subpoenas to produce and subpoenas to attend to give evidence; new r 33.6(1) only requires conduct money to be tendered with respect to a subpoena to attend to give evidence. [r 33.6.40]

Operation

Conduct money is only expressly required with respect to a subpoena to attend to give evidence, not a subpoena for production. It may be that this change from the traditional position is designed to encourage an addressee to produce to the court under the mechanism provided for in r 33.6(4)(b) rather than attend court and thereby incur the costs of attendance. Government departments and authorities commonly have a set rate of fees charged by them for compliance with a subpoena, and inquiries should be made of the addressee to determine that rate. An addressee may obtain an order under r 33.11 for costs incurred in complying with the subpoena: refer to the annotations under r 33.11. If you are the issuing party and the addressee defaults in attendance or production, you must have an affidavit of evidencing timely service of the subpoena if you wish to satisfy the court that there has been a default in compliance. An affidavit of service with respect to a subpoena to attend to give evidence must incorporate a statement as to the conduct money that was tendered to the addressee, and the date upon which that money was tendered, in order to be effective to demonstrate a failure to comply: refer to the requirements of r 33.6(1). With respect to a subpoena for production, it may be convenient to merely adjourn the subpoena to another date to provide the addressee with a further opportunity to comply with the subpoena, in conjunction with delivering a letter to the addressee noting that a default in compliance with a subpoena is a contempt of court: refer to r 33.12. If there is a default in attendance by the addressee in court, and you are able to tender an affidavit of service, the presiding officer may be requested to formally call on the subpoena: if there is no attendance, you may ask that the failure to appear be formally noted on the court record. The formal call is used where there has been serious and ongoing default in production and is a precursor to an application for contempt. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

797

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 33.7

[r 33.6.40]

[r 33.6.60]

Calling on a subpoena for production in court

Where documents are not produced to the registry under the mechanism provided in r 33.6(4)(b) documents are produced at an appearance in court. A call is made in the following terms: the addressee is called, is asked to identify their full name and address and then asked if they produce documents in answer to the subpoena, together with the subpoena itself. The documents produced are then handed over to the custody of the court. The addressee is then asked if they have any objection to access. If they have no objections, they are excused. The parties may then raise any objections they have to access or apply for particular forms of access orders (such as restricted access orders: refer to [r 33.9.100]). If an objection is to be taken to production of the documents by a third party (refer to r 33.4), and a notice of motion has not already been filed, an applicant may seek a timetable to file and serve any motion and affidavit in support, together with an order that access not be granted to the documents until further order of the court. In the course of a busy Return of Subpoena List this procedure is dealt with in short compass: reference should be made to Registrar’s Procedure Note No 1 – “Subpoena List Procedure” for the procedures adopted in the Return of Subpoena List in the Supreme Court. [r 33.6.80]

No documents produced by addressee

Where an addressee is called upon to produce under a subpoena at a hearing and the addressee informally advises the court, or informs the court through counsel, that there are no documents to produce, the court may, at its discretion, give appropriate directions to allow the addressee to be sworn and examined on the question of the existence of documents: refer to Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 2) (1989) 21 FCR 306; 88 ALR 90 for a discussion of the applicable principles and procedure to be adopted. In a Return of Subpoena List a direction may be sought that the addressee files an affidavit as to whether or not there are documents or further documents to be produced to the court in answer to the subpoena. [r 33.6.1000]

References

Rule 33.11 – costs and expenses of addressee. Supreme Court Registrars’ Procedure Note No 1 – “Subpoena List Procedure”. Rule 33.12 – contempt. 33.7

Production otherwise than on attendance

(cf SCR Part 37, rule 7)

(1) This rule applies if an addressee produces a document or thing in accordance with rule 33.6(4)(b). (2) The registrar must, if requested by the addressee, give a receipt for the document or thing to the addressee. (3) If the addressee produces more than one document or thing, the addressee must, if requested by the registrar, provide a list of the documents or things produced. (4) The addressee may, with the consent of the issuing party, produce a copy, instead of the original, of any document required to be produced. (5) The addressee may at the time of production inform the registrar in writing that any document or copy of a document produced need not be returned and may be destroyed.

RULE 33.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 33.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 33.7.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 33.7.1000]

[r 33.7.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.7 replicates SCR Pt 37 r 7. This rule maintains the substance of the District Court practice in that it does not require production of original documents (although if the addressee sought to produce copies, the 798

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 33 – Subpoenas [r 33.8.40]

r 33.8

issuing party’s consent was not required under the prior District Court Form of subpoena) and it continues to allow for the destruction of documents (if the addressee consents). Operation

Rule 33.7 applies if the addressee produces to the registry pursuant to r 33.6(4)(b). If the addressee has no objection to production or access or application for costs and expenses, it is possible to produce to the court per r 33.6(4)(b) without formal attendance ever being required. The terms of the rule are reflected in the notes to the prescribed subpoena form which advise an addressee of the entitlement to produce a copy instead of the original if the issuing party consents and seeks the addressee’s view as to whether documents need to be returned or destroyed. For the procedure that applies when documents are disposed of see r 33.10. [r 33.7.1000]

References

Prescribed form of subpoena, in particular notes 9, 10 and 11. Rule 33.10 – disposal of documents. 33.8

Removal, return, inspection, copying and disposal of documents and things

(cf SCR Part 37, rule 8)

The court may give directions in relation to the removal from and return to the court, and the inspection, copying and disposal, of any document or thing that has been produced to the court in response to a subpoena.

RULE 33.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 33.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 33.8.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 33.8.1000]

[r 33.8.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.8 replicates SCR Pt 37 r 8. There were previously no express provisions in the DCR with respect to the copying and uplifting of documents, with the exception of the procedure established under prior District Court Practice Note 64, nevertheless, the copying of documents was generally permitted and uplifting access could be sought. [r 33.8.40]

Operation

A grant of leave to inspect documents had generally incorporated a grant of leave to photocopy documents, but this new r 33.8 makes explicit that the court may authorise the copying of documents. To the extent that the “disposal” of documents equates to the court’s authority to destroy documents, reference should be made to the annotations to r 33.10. Rule 33.8 allows the court to give directions with respect to the removal from and return to the court of subpoenaed material; the rule makes express what was otherwise known as leave to uplift documents. It should be noted that the producing party has a proprietary interest in the documents produced to the court but that the rule does not expressly provide that the consent of a producing party should be sought: it may nevertheless be prudent to obtain such consent in order to satisfy the court that uplifting access should be granted. An institutionalised form of uplifting and copying access was available in the Supreme Court and District Court by way of prior Supreme Court Practice Note 107 and District Court Practice Note 64, whereby, approved firms were appointed to uplift and copy documents on behalf of a party to the proceedings. Both these practice notes have now been repealed. The Supreme Court has reintroduced the procedure in Practice Note SC Gen 3 – Copying of court documents. The consent of the producing party is not required when use is made of the procedure provided for under Practice Note SC Gen 3; the proprietary interest of the producing party is protected by the requirement for approved firms to obtain insurance or lodge a bond with the court.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

799

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 33.7.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 33.9 [r 33.8.1000]

[r 33.8.40] References

Practice Note SC Gen 3 – Copying of court documents. Rule 33.10 – disposal of documents. 33.9 Inspection of, and dealing with, documents and things produced otherwise than on attendance (cf SCR Part 37, rule 9)

(1) This rule applies if an addressee produces a document or thing in accordance with rule 33.6(4)(b). (2) On the request in writing of a party, the registrar must inform the party whether production in response to a subpoena has occurred, and, if so, include a description, in general terms, of the documents and things produced. (3) Subject to this rule, no person may inspect a document or thing produced unless the court has granted leave and the inspection is in accordance with that leave. (4) Unless the court orders otherwise, the registrar may permit the parties to inspect at the office of the registrar any document or thing produced unless the addressee, a party or any person having sufficient interest objects to the inspection under this rule. (5) If the addressee objects to a document or thing being inspected by any party to the proceeding, the addressee must, at the time of production, notify the registrar in writing of the objection and of the grounds of the objection. (6) If a party or person having a sufficient interest objects to a document or thing being inspected by a party to the proceeding, the objector may notify the registrar in writing of the objection and of the grounds of the objection. (7) On receiving notice of an objection under this rule, the registrar: (a) must not permit any, or any further, inspection of the document or thing the subject of the objection, and (b) must refer the objection to the court for hearing and determination. (8) The registrar must notify the issuing party of the objection and of the date, time and place at which the objection will be heard, and the issuing party must notify the addressee, the objector and each other party accordingly. (9) The registrar must not permit any document or thing produced to be removed from the office of the registrar except on application in writing signed by the solicitor for a party. Note: See rule 1.3(2) with respect to the meaning of the reference to a solicitor for a party. [Subr (9) am Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[12]]

(10) A solicitor who signs an application under subrule (9) and removes a document or thing from the office of the registrar, undertakes to the court by force of this rule that: (a) the document or thing will be kept in the personal custody of the solicitor or a barrister briefed by the solicitor in the proceeding, and (b) the document or thing will be returned to the registry in the same condition, order and packaging in which it was removed, as and when directed by the registrar. Note: See rule 1.3(3) with respect to the meaning of the reference to a solicitor who removes a document or thing from the office of the registrar and the reference to the personal custody of the solicitor. [Subr (10) am Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[13]]

(11) The registrar may, in the registrar’s discretion, grant an application under subrule (9) subject to conditions or refuse to grant the application. [R 33.9 am Rule 288 of 2006]

800

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 33 – Subpoenas [r 33.9.100]

r 33.9

Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 33.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 33.9.40] Objections to access ................................................................................................................................ [r 33.9.60] Legitimate forensic purpose must be identified ........................................................................................ [r 33.9.80] Objections on the ground of privilege .................................................................................................... [r 33.9.100] Restricted access ................................................................................................................................... [r 33.9.120] Objection to access on fairness grounds ............................................................................................... [r 33.9.140] Implied undertaking ................................................................................................................................ [r 33.9.160] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 33.9.1000]

[r 33.9.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.9 replicates SCR Pt 37 r 9. This rule constituted a significant variation of the DCR practice that was provided for in Pt 29 rr 6B and 6C and District Court Practice Note 58. However, the prior District Court practice, which requires an issuing party to endorse a proposed access order on a subpoena has been re-instated in Practice Note DC (Civil) No 8 – Early Return of Subpoenas. The new provisions promote the making of orders for access in non-contentious matters without necessitating an appearance before the court. Under r 33.9(2) a party will only be notified of the fact of production upon making a request in writing. [r 33.9.40]

Operation

Rule 33.9 dictates the procedure that applies when documents have been produced to the registry in accordance with r 33.6(4)(b). For the procedure that applies when documents are produced at an appearance in court, refer to [r 33.6.60]. Rule 33.9 provides that when documents are produced to the registry access may be permitted by the registrar unless the court “otherwise orders” (r 33.9(4)) or unless an addressee or person having a sufficient interest objects to inspection. In the absence of any objection expressly being taken, it is difficult to see upon what basis a registrar would decline to permit access to the documents, unless it was apparent on the face of the documents that the interest of a person, who was neither a party nor an addressee but otherwise had a “sufficient interest”, would be prejudiced by allowing access; in such a circumstance it may be open to the registrar to direct that that person be notified of the proposal to allow access to the documents. [r 33.9.60]

Objections to access

An objection to access should be differentiated from an objection to production: refer to the three stages of consideration of the use of documents produced under a subpoena in [r Pt33.40]. An objection to production is taken by Notice of Motion and seeks to relieve a party of the requirement to produce the documents to the court at all. An objection to access may be taken without a motion at the time the documents are produced to the court. If the documents are produced in court, an objection is made orally. If the documents are produced to the registry in accordance with r 33.6(4)(b), the objection is made in writing, stating the grounds of the objection, in accordance with subrr 33.9(5) and (6). [r 33.9.80]

Legitimate forensic purpose must be identified

The lack of a legitimate forensic purpose entitles a party to bring an application to set aside the subpoena, rather than merely adopting the course of producing the documents and then objecting to access: R v Tastan (1994) 75 A Crim R 498; Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Tuxford [2002] NSWCA 139. However, if documents are produced on subpoena and an objection is taken to their being inspected, inspection should not be permitted unless and until the party who procured the issue of the subpoena identifies a legitimate forensic purpose: Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Tuxford [2002] NSWCA 139, and refer to the authorities cited therein. The onus of demonstrating a legitimate forensic purpose falls on the issuing party and the purpose must be expressly and precisely identified: R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14; 39 A Crim R 406; R v Tastan (1994) 75 A Crim R 498; Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Tuxford [2002] NSWCA 139. [r 33.9.100]

Objections on the ground of privilege

Under s 133 of the Evidence Act 1995 the court is entitled to inspect a document for the purpose of determining a claim of client legal privilege. UCPR r 1.8 reflects this, by providing that a court may inspect a document and order that the document be produced to the court for the purpose of determining “any question © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

801

UCPR Parts 31-40

RULE 33.9 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 33.9

[r 33.9.100]

arising under these rules (including any question of privilege)”. A common practice where a claim of client legal privilege is made is that an objection is taken to access rather than production; the documents are produced to the court for the purpose of determining the claim of privilege and, in the interim, an order is sought that there be “no access to the documents until further order”. UCPR r 1.9 provides for objections to production founded on privilege, nevertheless, where a person objects to production on the ground of privilege the court may still compel production of the document for the purpose of determining the claim: r 1.9(2)(a). If a party to proceedings anticipates that it has a claim of privilege with respect to documents that have been produced to the court by a third party then an order for “first access” may be sought. For the duration of the period of first access the party has the opportunity to investigate the claim; on the next occasion the matter is before the court the application to restrict or preclude access may be formally taken. It may be anticipated that an affidavit substantiating the claim of privilege will be required to support the claim and that further, the court may permit cross-examination on the affidavit: r 1.9(2)(a) and (b). [r 33.9.120]

Restricted access

There are occasions where the documents produced under a subpoena are relevant to the proceedings but contain confidential or commercially sensitive information. In these circumstances an application may be made for restricted access or that access be restricted to documents that have been subject to a masking process. Such an order may restrict access to the legal advisors: Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd (2000) 18 ACLC 609; [2000] NSWSC 138; or to the legal advisors and independent experts: Kimberley Mineral Holdings Ltd (in liq) v McEwan [1980] 1 NSWLR 210; (1980) 4 ACLR 851; and may be subject to the condition “until further order of the court”. For an example of the use of masking see First Capital Partners Pty Ltd v Sylvatech Ltd (2004) 186 FLR 266; [2004] NSWSC 846. For an example of a restricted access order, the imposition of conditions and the use of masking, see B v N (1994) 35 NSWLR 140 at 147. Notwithstanding the implied undertaking and the express undertaking required by the Supreme Court (refer to [r 33.9.160]) there is an increasingly common practice that the party seeking restricted access orders further require that any person granted access to the documents sign a confidentiality undertaking prior to inspection. For a discussion of the difficulties which may arise from imposing a restriction on the ability of lawyers to speak to their clients and disclose to clients information produced to them, see Portal Software International Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1115 and cases cited therein. [r 33.9.140]

Objection to access on “fairness” grounds

Access to documents may be deferred in the interest of justice, where the document is to be used for the purpose of testing the credibility of a witness: Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson (1976) CLC 40-266. [r 33.9.160]

Implied undertaking

The entitlement to inspect documents produced to the court carries with it the implied undertaking that the documents will not be used for an improper or collateral purpose, or indeed, for any purpose outside the conduct of the proceedings: Home Offıce v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280; [1982] 1 All ER 532; [1982] 2 WLR 338; Ainsworth v Hanrahan (1991) 25 NSWLR 155; Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp (1998) 86 FCR 215; 166 ALR 699; 28 ACSR 343; [1998] FCA 849. The form of undertaking required in the Supreme Court may be found on the Supreme Court website under “Forms – non-prescribed”, under “request for inspection of documents produced under subpoena and undertaking”. The form of undertaking does not merely preclude disclosure of the document, but also expressly precludes disclosure of the information contained in the documents produced, unless the document is admitted into evidence. Once a document or the information contained therein is admitted into evidence then, subject to any contrary order of the court, that information is in the public domain with the result that, for example, a journalist may report on those matters raised in evidence in public proceedings (refer to Hammond v Scheinberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 49; [2001] NSWSC 568) and further, may seek access to the court file for the purpose of reporting matters in the public interest (pursuant to Practice Note Gen 2 and Practice Note DC (Civil) No 11). Once a document or the information contained therein is admitted into evidence, a party to the proceedings is regarded as having been released from the undertaking: Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10; 69 ALJR 404; and it is considered that there is little purpose in requiring the parties or their legal representatives to continue to honour any express or implied undertaking: United States Surgical Corp v Hospital Products International Pty 802

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 33 – Subpoenas [r 33.10.40]

r 33.10

Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 766. A party may seek the leave of the court to be released from implied undertakings to use the documents only for the purpose of the proceedings: see Premier Travel Pty Ltd v Satellite Centres of Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 864. [r 33.9.1000]

References

UCPR r 1.8 and r 1.9 – production of documents over which a claim of privilege has been made.

33.10

Disposal of documents and things produced

(cf SCR Part 37, rule 10)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, the registrar may, in the registrar’s discretion, return to the addressee any document or thing produced in response to a subpoena. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, the registrar must not return any document or thing under subrule (1) unless the registrar has given to the issuing party at least 14 days’ notice of the intention to do so and that period has expired. (3) [Repealed] [Subr (3) rep Rule 631 of 2011, r 3(1); reinsrt Rule 569 of 2009, Sch 1[6]; rep Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[8]]

(4) The addressee must complete the notice and declaration in the subpoena and produce the subpoena (or copy of the subpoena) with the documents produced to the court under the subpoena. [Subr (4) subst Rule 631 of 2011, r 3(2); reinsrt Rule 569 of 2009, Sch 1[6]; rep Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[8]]

(5) Subject to subrule (6), the registrar may, on the expiry of 4 months from the conclusion of the proceeding, cause to be destroyed all the documents produced in the proceedings in compliance with a subpoena, that were declared by the addressee to be copies. [Subr (5) insrt Rule 569 of 2009, Sch 1[6]]

(6) The registrar may cause to be destroyed those documents, declared by the addressee to be copies, that have become exhibits in the proceeding when they are no longer required in connection with the proceeding, including on any appeal. [Subr (6) insrt Rule 569 of 2009, Sch 1[6]] [R 33.10 am Rule 631 of 2011; Rule 569 of 2009; Rule 164 of 2007]

RULE 33.10 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 33.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 33.10.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 33.10.1000]

[r 33.10.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.10 replicates SCR Pt 37 r 10. It corresponds closely to the substance of DCR Pt 29 r 3(3) and (3A), with the variation that a time period of 14 days notice is imposed in r 33.10(2) and (4). [r 33.10.40]

Operation

Rule 33.10 gives the registrar a broad discretion to return or destroy subpoenaed documents, subject to giving 14 days notice to the issuing party of the intention to do so and obtaining the consent of the addressee to the destruction of documents. It has long been the case that, regardless of any requirement in a subpoena to produce the “original” document, addressees frequently retain original documents and merely produce copies to the court. The production of copies is generally sufficient, except in such circumstances as where fraud is alleged or a handwriting expert is required, and the failure to observe the requirement to produce an original to the court does not often cause any difficulty or controversy. Nevertheless, the consent of the issuing party to produce a copy rather than the original must be sought by the addressee: r 33.7(4) and notes 9, 10 and 11 to the form of subpoena. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

803

UCPR Parts 31-40

Practice Note DC (Civil) No 8 – Entry Return of Subpoenas.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 33.11

[r 33.10.40]

[r 33.10.1000]

References

Rule 33.7(4) – addressee may produce copy with the consent of the issuing party. 33.11

Costs and expenses of compliance

(cf SCR Part 37, rule 11)

(1) The court may order the issuing party to pay the amount of any reasonable loss or expense incurred in complying with the subpoena. (2) If an order is made under subrule (1), the court must fix the amount or direct that it be fixed in accordance with the court’s usual procedure in relation to costs. (3) An amount fixed under this rule is separate from and in addition to: (a) any conduct money paid to the addressee, and (b) any witness expenses payable to the addressee.

RULE 33.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 33.11.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 33.11.40] References .......................................................................................................................................... [r 33.11.1000]

[r 33.11.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.11 replicates SCR Pt 37 r 11. This rule is the same in substance as DCR Pt 29 r 8A. [r 33.11.40]

Operation

Rule 33.11 provides for a third party addressee to recover the costs of complying with a subpoena. Further, the court has an inherent jurisdiction to order the payment of reasonable expenses, including compensation for a witness’s time, whether before or after the subpoena is complied with, and whether or not it is complied with or set aside or compliance is dispensed with: Danieletto v Khera (1995) 35 NSWLR 684; see also J Aron Corp v Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 996. As to the items to be considered and the rate at which time can be charged see Deposit & Investment Co Ltd v Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co (1996) 39 NSWLR 267. Where it is completely predictable that expenses will be incurred by a producing party, it is not open to the issuing party to make no attempt to estimate what those expenses might be, demand compliance with the subpoena and take the attitude that it will leave the addressee in the position where it is necessary to retain a lawyer and make an application to the court for reimbursement of the expenses of complying with the subpoena: Foyster v Foyster Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 881. It is sensible for an addressee to negotiate with the issuing party as to the costs of compliance; if negotiations are not successful, an application may be brought by motion to have those costs met. [r 33.11.1000]

References

Part 18 – motions. Annotations under [r 33.4.140] – oppression of the addressee. 33.12

Failure to comply with subpoena—contempt of court

(cf SCR Part 37, rule 12)

(1) Failure to comply with a subpoena without lawful excuse is a contempt of court and the addressee may be dealt with accordingly. (2) Despite rule 33.5(1), if a subpoena has not been served personally on the addressee, the addressee may be dealt with for contempt of court as if the addressee had been so served if it is proved that the 804

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 33 – Subpoenas [r 33.12.1000]

r 33.13

addressee had, by the last date for service of the subpoena, actual knowledge of the subpoena and of its requirements. (3) Subrules (1) and (2) are without prejudice to any power of the court under any rules of the court (including any rules of the court providing for the arrest of an addressee who defaults in attendance in accordance with a subpoena) or otherwise, to enforce compliance with a subpoena.

Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 33.12.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 33.12.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 33.12.1000]

[r 33.12.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.12 replicates SCR Pt 37 r 12. DCR Pt 29 r 9 (order to show cause) is not replicated in the UCPR. [r 33.12.40]

Operation

A subpoena is a peremptory order of a court, to be obeyed unless the court makes an order to the contrary; a refusal to obey a subpoena is a contempt of court: James v Cowan (1929) 42 CLR 305; [1928] 3 ALJR 170. The destruction of a relevant document before a subpoena has been issued can amount to contempt: Registrar of Supreme Court, Equity Division v McPherson [1980] 1 NSWLR 688. Before a witness can be dealt with for contempt for failing to produce a document on subpoena, there must be evidence both that the document exists, or did exist, and that it was in the possession of the witness: O’Born v Commissioner for Government Transport (1959) 77 WN (NSW) 81. The minimum necessary for a contempt conviction constituted by disobedience to a court order, is wilfulness in the failure to comply, it is not sufficient merely to evidence a failure to fully comply with the terms of a subpoena: Markisic v Keelty [2005] NSWSC 1124. Rule 42.27 of UCPR provides that where a person fails to attend court in answer to a subpoena or to answer a charge of contempt, the court may order that person to pay the costs occasioned by the default. A corporation that fails to answer a subpoena to produce may also be liable to an order for costs under this rule. Section 97 of the CPA provides that the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of any person who fails to comply with a subpoena. Section 131 of the CPA provides that nothing in this Act or the uniform rules limits or otherwise affects the power of the court to attach or commit a person for contempt. [r 33.12.1000]

References

CPA s 97 – warrant for arrest. Section 131 – contempt. Rule 42.27 – costs order against defaulting addressee. 33.13

Documents and things in the custody of a court

(cf SCR Part 37, rule 13)

(1) A party who seeks production of a document or thing in the custody of the court or of another court may inform the registrar in writing accordingly, identifying the document or thing. (2) If the document or thing is in the custody of the court, the registrar must produce the document or thing: (a) in court or to any person authorised to take evidence in the proceeding, as required by the party, or (b) as the court directs. (3) If the document or thing is in the custody of another court, the registrar must, unless the court has otherwise ordered: (a) request the other court to send the document or thing to the registrar, and (b) after receiving it, produce the document or thing: © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

805

UCPR Parts 31-40

RULE 33.12 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 33.13

[r 33.13.20] (i)

in court or to any person authorised to take evidence in the proceeding as required by the party, or (ii) as the court directs.

RULE 33.13 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 33.13.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 33.13.40] Objection to a letter of request ............................................................................................................... [r 33.13.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 33.13.1000]

[r 33.13.20]

Comparison

Rule 33.13 replicates the SCR provisions. There was no equivalent provision in the DCR. [r 33.13.40]

Operation

It is not appropriate for a court to issue a subpoena on another court: r 33.2(2)(b). Rule 33.13 provides a mechanism to obtain documents in the custody of another court, by way of a letter of request. This rule will most commonly be invoked where a party or addressee has already produced documents to one court and production of those documents is sought in proceedings in another court. It may also be invoked to request production of a court file from one court to another court. If documents are sought which are held in another court registry, this rule provides the mechanism by which to obtain production of those documents. A letter of request should be delivered to the registry and an officer of the registry will then make the request for production from the other court. There is no prescribed form for the request. As the Protective Commissioner was defined as a Master of the Supreme Court pursuant to Pt 1.8, it was the case that a subpoena for production should not have been issued to the Commissioner: B v N (1994) 35 NSWLR 140; however, note that the Protective Commissioner is no longer included under the definition of “Associate Judge” under Pt 1 r 8 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970. It is further noted that the Supreme Court Registry, not the Office of the Protective Commissioner, now retains custody of court files where proceedings have been brought in the protective jurisdiction. [r 33.13.60]

Objection to a letter of request

Rule 33.13 provides that a registrar must produce the document or thing in court or to any person authorised to take evidence in the proceedings or as the court directs. This rule does not expressly provide for notice to other parties to the proceedings, or indeed to other parties to the first set of proceedings, that a letter of request has been issued. Nevertheless, by restricting production to a court, a person authorised to take evidence or as otherwise directed by the court it may be assumed that the other parties, if not all persons with a sufficient interest, will receive notice of the fact that production has occurred pursuant to a letter of request. The prevailing practice in the Supreme Court is that when documents are produced pursuant to a letter of request and a party applies for access to the file, the proceedings are listed for mention before a registrar which provides the parties with an opportunity to be heard on the question of the appropriateness of production and orders for access. Default access orders are not made with respect to court files; access must be applied for. In determining whether access should be granted, the court may have regard to any relevant practice note applicable in the producing court. Presumably a party may utilise a Notice of Motion under Pt 18 to bring an application to object to the production of documents pursuant to a letter of request where the documents are irrelevant or the call for production otherwise amounts to an abuse of process. Even if it is the case that access has been granted in proceedings in another court, the appropriateness of production and access should be assessed in the proceedings in which the letter of request has issued; the issues in dispute are necessarily different in both sets of proceedings and the parties to the proceedings may be different and be entitled to be heard. This situation may be distinguished from the situation where proceedings have been transferred from one court into another court, along with the subpoenaed documents: if access has been granted in the other court then it is difficult to see that there could be any basis upon which a party could object to the continuation of access. 806

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 33 – Subpoenas [r 33.13.1000] [r 33.13.1000]

r 33.13 References

UCPR Parts 31-40

Rule 33.3(2)(b) – prohibition on addressing a subpoena to a court.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

807

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt34.20]

PART 34 – NOTICES TO PRODUCE AT HEARING Commentary by Hamish Stitt, Barrister and The Hon Justice Geoff Lindsay, Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Updated by Greg Sarginson, Barrister.

PART 34 COMMENTARY Overview of Part 34 ................................................................................................................................. [r Pt34.20] Historical context ...................................................................................................................................... [r Pt34.40] Comparative advantages of notices to produce and subpoenas ............................................................ [r Pt34.60]

[r Pt34.20]

Overview of Part 34

This Part provides, in conjunction with CPA s 17(3), a statutory form of notice to produce (Form 22) having the effect of a “Subpoena to Produce” (governed by UCPR Pt 33) served by one party to proceedings on another. The party to whom a notice is addressed need not have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, but the absence of submission to the court’s jurisdiction might provide a basis upon which (pursuant to CPA s 14 or r 34.2(1)) the court will dispense with any requirement for production: News Corp Ltd v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 40 NSWLR 250; 21 ACSR 403. A notice to produce is generally regarded as having the same coercive effect as a subpoena so that compliance with it is mandatory unless production is excused by the court: CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 1; 109 ALR 673 at 3 (FCR); Potts v Dennis Jones & Co Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 61; 17 ACSR 770; 13 ACLC 1096 at 70E (FCR); Re Moage Ltd (in liq) (1997) 77 FCR 81; 25 ACSR 53; 15 ACLC 1034 at 100F (FCR). In practice, there might be substantial overlap between the operation of r 34.1 (which provides for production to the court at a hearing) and r 21.10 (which provides for production inter partes before a hearing), but Pt 21 does not provide for a notice to produce served under it to have the force of a subpoena. Part 34 is supplemented by the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 36, which provides that the court may order a person who is present at a hearing, and is compellable to give evidence, to give evidence and to produce documents or things even if a subpoena or other process requiring her or him to attend for that purpose has not been duly served. [r Pt34.40]

Historical context

At common law the concept of a “Notice to Produce” generally related to the service by a party of a notice calling upon another party to produce the original of a document which the party giving the notice sought to tender in evidence. Such a notice did not operate as a subpoena. A recipient of such a notice was not obliged to produce the document called for (being entitled to answer a call with the words “not produced” and no explanation), but if it did not produce the document sought it might itself be precluded from using it in the proceedings. The necessity for a notice to produce, from the perspective of the giver of it, arose from a rule of evidence (“the best evidence rule” or, in the present context, more aptly “the original document rule”) that required proof of the contents of a document by tender of the original document or, before secondary evidence of the contents could be adduced, evidence of a search for the original, including the service of a notice to produce if the document might be thought to be in the possession of the recipient of the notice: Glass HH (ed), Seminars on Evidence (Law Book Co, 1970) 4-5; Cross on Evidence (Butterworths) paragraphs [39040] – [39050]. The object of service of a notice to produce was, accordingly, to preclude objection being taken to secondary evidence of the contents of a document. On that basis, if the original document was in court, notice to produce could be served during a hearing. In those circumstances the party serving the notice and calling for the document could be compelled by the recipient of the call to tender the document even if it might otherwise be inadmissible: Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; 11 ALJ 201. This learning has been substantially displaced by the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ss 35 and 51. The former section abolished the rule in Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; 11 ALJ 201. The latter abolished the best evidence rule in its application to documents. [r Pt34.60]

Comparative advantages of notices to produce and subpoenas

A party may be served with both a notice to produce and a subpoena in substantially similar terms. This is sometimes (but not uniformly) done if the party serving the process anticipates a need to enforce it by alleging that non-compliance constitutes a contempt of court, and seeks to reinforce the coercive character of a notice 808

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 34 – Notices to produce at hearing [r 34.1.40]

r 34.1

A notice to produce has a number of advantages over a subpoena. First, it need not be issued or sealed by the court as must a subpoena; it is merely served inter partes. Second, there is no general requirement (as there is with a subpoena) that it be served together with conduct money; cf r 33.6(1). Third, the formal time restrictions which govern the service of subpoenas do not apply to notices to produce; cf r 33.6(2). Fourth, a notice to produce can be served at a party’s address for service as a matter of course (r 10.5) whereas a subpoena must usually be served personally if it is to be strictly enforced; cf rr 33.5, 33.6(3) and 10.13(b). Fifth, if the party serving a notice anticipates non-production of the document or thing to which the notice relates, and a need to adduce secondary evidence relating to it, there may be a forensic advantage (based upon the function of a notice to produce at common law) in having given the recipient of the notice an opportunity to produce the original document or thing. 34.1

Notice to produce to court

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 16; DCR Part 28, rule 18; LCR Part 23, rule 9)

(1) A party may, by notice served on another party, require the other party to produce to the court, or to any examiner: (a) at any hearing in the proceedings or before any such examiner, or (a1) at any time fixed by the court for the return of subpoenas, or (b) by leave of the court, at some other specified time, any specified document or thing. (2) The other party must comply with a notice to produce: (a) by producing the notice or a copy of it, and the document or thing, to the court, or to the examiner authorised to take evidence in the proceeding as permitted by the court, at the date, time and place specified for production, or (b) by delivering or sending the notice or a copy of it, and the document or thing, to the registrar at the address specified for the purpose in the notice, so that they are received not less than 2 clear days before the date specified in the notice for production. [Subr (2) insrt Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[19]] [R 34.1 am Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[18]]

RULE 34.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 34.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 34.1.40]

[r 34.1.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, this rule and r 34.2 reproduce the substance of SCR Pt 36 r 16. In the District Court, this rule reproduces the substance of DCR Pt 28 r 18(1), but does not include the exception of a “privileged document or thing”. [r 34.1.40]

Operation

A notice to produce operates in a manner not dissimilar to a subpoena for production. A party seeking to rely upon a notice formally calls upon it in open court and (if required) produces to the court both a copy of the notice and evidence of its service. The recipient of a notice responds, as does the recipient of a subpoena, either by making a production to the court and submissions about claims of privilege and objections to access, or by making an application (generally under r 34.2(1)) for relief from any obligation to comply with the notice. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

809

UCPR Parts 31-40

to produce (based on r 34.2(1)) by direct reliance upon the enforceability of a subpoena, which (as is recognised by r 32.2(1)) has the character of an order of the court itself and is supported (in r 33.12) by an express power to deal with a contempt. Unless non-compliance is to be visited with an application that the non-compliant party be dealt with for contempt, such a precaution is generally unnecessary. Rule 34.2(1) obliges the recipient of a notice to produce to produce the document or thing sought in the notice without the need for any subpoena to be issued.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 34.2

[r 34.1.40]

Consistently with r 33.3(6), with the leave of the court a notice to produce can be made returnable at a specified time other than at a hearing: r 34.1(1)(b). This is a departure from old practice (reflected in Botany Bay Instrumentation & Control Pty Ltd v Stewart [1984] 3 NSWLR 98) that viewed as an abuse of process attempts to procure the production of documents otherwise than for the purpose of a hearing that was actually pending: Hamilton JP, “Nuts and Bolts for Judicial Officers”, in Lindsay G (ed), The Handbook (Lawbook Co., 2005) at [9.2200]. Previously DCR Pt 28 r 18(1) allowed for an exception for claims of privilege and SCR Pt 36 r 16 was read subject to the provisions relating to privilege contained in SCR Pt 36 r 13. The removal of these exceptions from the text of the provisions specifically relating to notices to produce should not be taken as indicating that privilege is no longer able to be claimed or that Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) has no application to notices to produce. The reference in r 34.1 to an “examiner” is a reference to a person appointed as such under r 24.3 to take evidence otherwise than at trial. A notice to produce, whether returnable before or at the hearing, can be set aside by the court (see the discussion of the relevant principles at [r 34.2.40]). “Specified document or thing” in r 34.1 means “described” or “identified” sufficient for a party to “cut the document out from the universe of documents by some description or identification”. The notice to produce must not put the party producing the document in the position of having to judge the legal effect of a document or its capacity to prove something: Patonga Beach Holdings Pty Ltd v Lyons [2009] NSWSC 869 at [12]–[15], Re Colorado Products Pty Ltd (in prov liq) [2013] NSWSC 392 at [37]. 34.2

Production under notice to produce to court

(cf SCR Part 36, rule 16; DCR Part 28, rule 18; LCR Part 23, rule 9)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, the other party must produce the document or thing in accordance with the notice to produce, without the need for any subpoena for production, if the document or thing is in his or her possession. (2) [Repealed] [Subr (2) rep Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[20]]

(3) Except by leave of the court, a party may not search for, or inspect, any document or thing that has been produced by another party under this rule but not admitted into evidence. [R 34.2 am Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 34.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 34.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 34.2.40] Inspection of documents .......................................................................................................................... [r 34.2.60]

[r 34.2.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, this rule and r 34.1 reproduce the substance of SCR Pt 36 r 16. In the District Court, subrr (2) and (3) of this rule have no equivalent DCR. [r 34.2.40]

Operation

By virtue of r 34.2(1) a notice to produce, duly given, has the same effect as a subpoena for production, and compliance is mandatory unless production is excused by the court: see [r Pt34.20]; Norris v Kandiah [2007] NSWSC 1296 at [4]; Patonga Beach Holdings Pty Ltd v Lyons [2009] NSWSC 869 at [11]; Owners Strata Plan SP 69567 v Baseline Constructions Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 502 at [9]. Although there is no express power to set aside a notice to produce such as r 33.4 provides in relation to subpoenas, the expression “unless the court orders otherwise” in r 34.2 operates to the same effect, and CPA s 14 provides a general power in the court to dispense with any requirement of rules of court. 810

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 34 – Notices to produce at hearing r 34.2

On a recipient’s application to be relieved from any requirement to comply with a notice to produce said to be oppressive, the court generally applies the principles that govern an application to set aside a subpoena: Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 5) (2005) 216 ALR 147; [2005] FCA 510 at [10]; Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2010] NSWCA 100 at [33]. That is, whether the documents sought are of apparent relevance to the issues in the proceedings (National Employers’ Mutual General Assn Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 at 385) and, more particularly, whether the documents are reasonably likely to add, in the end, in some way or other, to the relevant evidence in the case: Spencer Motors Pty Ltd v LNC Industries Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 921 at 927. It is sufficient if the documents could “possibly throw light on” the issues in the substantive proceedings, or it appears “on the cards” they will do so. However, caution has been expressed in respect of the breadth of the “on the cards test”, with the test of legitimate forensic purpose being expressed as “it must be shown that it is likely the documentation will assist on an identified issue, or there is a reasonable basis beyond speculation that it is likely the documentation will”: ICAP Pty Ltd v Moebes [2009] NSWSC 306 at [30]; SingTel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston [2010] NSWSC 1491 at [21]–[31]; Ahmed v Ahmed [2013] NSWSC 1814 at [21]. “Mere relevance” does not of itself constitute a legitimate forensic purpose if the subpoena (or notice to produce) is a “fishing expedition” to discover whether there is a case at all: Attorney-General (NSW) v Chidgey (2008) 182 A Crim R 536; [2008] NSWCCA 65; Ahmed v Ahmed [2013] NSWSC 1814 at [28]. The issues in the substantive proceedings are gleaned from the pleadings, the affidavits, and the legal principles which govern the claim for relief in the substantive proceedings: Portal Software International Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1115; SingTel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston (2011) 81 NSWLR 526; [2011] NSWSC 1083 at [21]. Where there are pleadings, affidavits are not to be considered as a “freestanding souce of data”, but in the context of proving and elucidating the issues as defined in the pleadings: Ahmed v Ahmed [2013] NSWSC 1814 at [24]. In determining whether a subpoena or notice to produce is oppressive, the court exercises a power to control and supervise its process to prevent injustice, having regard not only to the purpose for which the process has been issued, but also the consequences for each party if it is enforced or set aside: Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 5) (2005) 216 ALR 147; [2005] FCA 510 at [12]. The confidentiality of documents sought may be a factor taken into account in determining whether the process is oppressive, but it is not determinative, and it might go only to what (if any) orders are to be made relating to inspection and publication of the documents: Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 5) (2005) 216 ALR 147; [2005] FCA 510 at [11]; Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Western Power Corp (1998) 19 WAR 350 at 380. A subpoena or notice to produce may be regarded as oppressive, and consequently set aside by the court, if it involves numerous documents and unduely impinges upon a party’s preparation for hearing, or conduct of the proceedings: Tony Azzi (Automobiles) Pty Ltd v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 283. A subpoena or notice to produce may be set aside if it is served shortly before a hearing, as it is not reasonable to expect parties to cease preparations for trial in order to meet the last minute demands of their opponents for production of documents: IceTV Pty Ltd v Ross [2009] NSWSC 832 at [7]; Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski [2010] NSWSC 1186 at [3]. In proceedings in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court, a notice to produce that is inconsistent with Practice Note SC Eq 11 (which commenced on 26 March 2012 and relevantly provided that the court will not make an order for disclosure of documents until the parties have served their evidence, unless there are exceptional circumstances necessitating disclosure) will be set aside: Owners Strata Plan SP 69567 v Baseline Constructions Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 502; Re Mempoll Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1057 at [12]–[14]; Re Colorado Products Pty Ltd (in prov liq) [2013] NSWSC 392 at [6]. [r 34.2.60]

Inspection of documents

Documents produced to the court in answer to a notice to produce are in the control of the court, as they would be if produced on subpoena; access by a party will ordinarily be allowed by the court if there is a legitimate forensic purpose for it, even if the documents are not admissible as evidence in the proceedings: National Employers’ Mutual General Assn Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 at 382-386. A party who inspects documents obtained on a notice to produce has an obligation not to use them for any improper purpose; knowledge acquired from inspection of them can be used only for purposes connected with the proceedings. The court has power to make appropriate orders, to exact undertakings, to limit inspection (eg, to the legal representatives of a party, or to expert witnesses), to redact parts of documents, or to delay inspection, in order to ensure that documents are not used for an improper purpose, or to protect a legitimate entitlement to confidentiality: Kimberley Mineral Holdings Ltd (in liq) v McEwan [1980] 1 NSWLR 210; © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

811

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 34.2.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 34.3

[r 34.2.60]

(1980) 4 ACLR 851; Registrar of Supreme Court, Equity Division v McPherson [1980] 1 NSWLR 688 at 694-695 (reversed on other grounds, Lane v Registrar of Supreme Court (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 245; 55 ALJR 529). Although courts are reluctant to exclude the parties to litigation from knowledge of relevant material by limiting access to their advisors, such an approach may be warranted if the parties are trade rivals, or potential trade rivals, and the material contains commercially sensitive information. The court must strike a fair balance between the needs of the party seeking access to the information and the legitimate concerns of a trade rival to retain the secrecy of commercially sensitive information: Portal Software International Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1115 at [41]–[42]; Drivetime Radio Australia Pty Ltd v Pivotal Creative Solutions Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 763; NAK Australia Pty Ltd v Starkey Consulting Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1136 at [8]–[9]; Cadbury Pty Ltd v Amcor Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 663; Lenark Pty Ltd v TheChairmen1 Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 415 at [11]–[15]; Westgate Finance v May [2012] NSWSC 806 at [24]–[25]. The party seeking additional protection by way of restricted access bears the onus of establishing that each document in relation to which additional protection is sought warrants that protection: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1024; Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales (No 5) [2009] FCA 1011; ICAP Australia Pty Ltd v Moebes [2010] NSWSC 738; Lenark Pty Ltd v TheChairmen1 Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 415 at [15] .Lack of relevance is not a ground for the court granting leave to redact a document: Westgate Finance v May [2012] NSWSC 806 at [23]–[24]. The court regulates the inspection of documents in its care, having regard to rights of privacy: Tradestock Pty Ltd v TNT (Management) Pty Ltd (1983) 81 FLR 91; 50 ALR 461; [1983] ATPR 40-402. Nevertheless, the court’s power (recognised in r 34.2(3)) to permit public access to documents within the control of the court must be recognised. Practice notes govern the current practice of the courts: in the Supreme Court, Practice Note SC Gen 2; in the District Court, Practice Note DC (Civil) No 11. 34.3

Costs and expenses of compliance

(cf rule 33.11)

(1) The court may order the party requiring production to pay the amount of any reasonable loss or expense incurred by the party required to produce in complying with a notice to produce. (2) If an order is made under subrule (1), the court must fix the amount or direct that it be fixed in accordance with the court’s usual procedure in relation to costs. [R 34.3 insrt Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[7]]

RULE 34.3 COMMENTARY [r 34.3.20]

Orders for costs and expenses

The power under r 34.3 is the same as the power under r 33.11(1) and r 33.11(2) in respect of the cost of complying with a subpoena. In respect of what is “reasonable loss or expense” see [r 33.11.40]. The parties must attempt to agree on the amount of costs and expenses payable in respect of compliance with the notice to produce before seeking an order from the court: see UCPR r 42.33.

812

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 35 – Affidavits [r Pt35.40]

PART 35 – AFFIDAVITS Commentary by The Hon Justice Geoff Lindsay, Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court. Updated by Greg Sarginson, Barrister.

Overview .................................................................................................................................................. [r Pt35.20] Preparation of affidavits ........................................................................................................................... [r Pt35.40] Other rules relating to affidavits ............................................................................................................... [r Pt35.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r Pt35.1000]

[r Pt35.20]

Overview

An affidavit is written evidence generally prepared out of court for use in connection with court proceedings. Affidavits take many forms. Some are formal in the sense that they are prepared in compliance with a requirement (often a procedural requirement) of legislation or a court order. Others are substantive in the sense that they contain evidence intended to be adduced at a hearing. The distinction, here expressed, between “formal” and “substantive” affidavits is no more than an analytical tool. All affidavits need to be prepared with the purpose they are intended to serve clearly in view. All must be sworn or affirmed in accordance with the Oaths Act 1900 (NSW): s 29. A deliberately false statement contained in an affidavit can expose the deponent to prosecution for perjury. See also ss 30, 31 and 33 as to other offences in relation to affidavits. If there is doubt as to whether an affidavit has been duly sworn or affirmed, the court may receive evidence in respect of the circumstances surrounding the making of the affidavit: Fastlink Calling Pty Ltd v Macquarie Telecom Pty Ltd (2008) 217 FLR 366; 26 ACLC 374; [2008] NSWSC 299; Micar Group Pty Ltd v Insul-Trade LLC (2010) 244 FLR 403; [2010] NSWSC 1391. The affidavit should clearly state whether it is sworn or affirmed, rather than the phrase “sworn/affirmed”, so that it is clear to the court that the deponent appreciates the solemnity of what he or she is doing: Zorbas v Sidiropoulous (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 197 per Young JA at [98]; Spinoccia Compressor & Air Tools Sales & Services Pty Ltd v Challenger Managed Investments Ltd (2010) 78 ATR 185; [2010] NSWSC 1310. It is not essential that an affidavit contain the deponent’s residential address and the absence of an address (or the provision of a business address) does not make the affidavit irregular as to form: Short v Burn [2012] NSWSC 695 at [43]. [r Pt35.40]

Preparation of affidavits

The key to preparation of any affidavit prepared in compliance with the requirements of legislation or a court order is to focus close attention on the purpose, and content, of the requirement to be satisfied. Each element of a formal requirement should be addressed. That demands an analysis of what precisely is required to be undertaken before preparation of the affidavit. The key to preparation of a substantive affidavit is, again, to focus on the purpose it is to serve. If it is intended to be adduced as evidence at a hearing the starting point is often identification of the questions in dispute (or otherwise needed to be proved) at the hearing and the evidentiary purpose of the particular affidavit. The admissibility of an affidavit as evidence is generally subject to rules of evidence – presently embodied principally in the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) – that have application to evidence generally. Accordingly, an affidavit should be prepared with the rules of evidence in mind. A practical working rule is often to test the admissibility of a statement in an affidavit by considering whether oral evidence of that statement could be adduced in examination in chief or (if the affidavit is in reply to an opponent’s affidavit) in reply. If an affidavit is to serve any evidentiary purpose it should generally be relevant to, and probative of, a fact in issue. To be persuasive, it should be well structured. That generally means presentation of facts in chronological order, or in discretely marked topics, with the benefit of material documents presented as annexures or exhibits to the affidavit. In many cases, a persuasive affidavit cannot be prepared without the drafter first having mastered all available documents (whether or not each document is reproduced as an annexure or an exhibit) and prepared a chronology of material events. In New South Wales contentious evidence of conversations or oral statements is generally required to be presented in the form of direct speech. Evidence recounted in the form of indirect speech might be rejected as © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

813

UCPR Parts 31-40

PART 35 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt35.40] inadmissible because its form does not permit a court to assess for itself the force and effect of what was actually said. Accordingly, wherever possible deponents should be pressed to set out oral statements and conversations in direct speech. Other than in formal procedural affidavits, affidavit evidence should be drafted using the deponent’s own words and expressions: Macquarie Developments Pty Ltd v Forrester [2005] NSWSC 674. In Macquarie Developments affidavits by different deponents using identical words required explanation to avoid devaluation of the evidence. The court will treat with caution any evidence contained in an affidavit which has a high degree of similarity in content, detail, terminology and sequence with the affidavits of other witnesses, due to the likelihood of direct or indirect collaboration: Seamez v McLaughlin [1999] NSWSC 9; Rosebanner Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (2009) 223 FLR 406; [2009] NSWSC 43; Celermajer Holdings Pty Ltd v Kopas (2011) 16 BPR 30735; [2011] NSWSC 40 at [183]–[189]. If an affidavit is a “cut and paste” exercise, it may not be accepted as the independent recollection evidence of the witness: Dialog Pty Ltd v Addease Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1359; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Hobbs [2012] NSWSC 1276 at [1048]–[1052]. Deponents can obtain a measure of protection against criticism in cross-examination by expressly recording in their affidavits that oral statements or conversations recorded in direct speech were “to the effect” of (rather than in the precise terms of) the words set out in the affidavit. [r Pt35.60] Other rules relating to affidavits • Rule 3.5 – electronic filing (eFiling) of affidavits • Rule 6.6(3)(a) – the court may order that an affidavit stand as a pleading • Rule 7.2 – affidavit as to authority to take proceedings on behalf of a corporation • Rule 10.2 – service of affidavits • Rule 9.7(2)(d) – service of existing affidavits on new parties • Rules 14.23 and 14.24 – verification of pleadings • Rule 21.4 – verification of list of documents • Rule 22.3 – verification of answers to interrogatories • Rule 31.1(3) – court may order that evidence is given by affidavit • Rule 31.1(4) – some evidence must be given by affidavit: interest up to judgment, assessment of value of goods, costs • Rule 31.2 – evidence on an interlocutory hearing to be by affidavit, unless the court otherwise orders • Rule 31.9 – use of affidavit from other proceedings • See also [r 35.9.60] for affidavits to be filed in support of certain motions and [r 35.9.80] for other affidavits which are required to be filed. • Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999 r 2.4 – affidavits in support of initiating or interlocutory process • PN SC Gen 4 – Affidavits (commentary at [r 35.9.60]) • PN DC (Civil) No 4 – Proceeding under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 and Family Provision Act 1982 (evidence to be by affidavit) • PN DC (Civil) No 9 – Summonses and motions: para 6 [r Pt35.1000]

References

A classic paper on the preparation of affidavits is that of JP Bryson QC (now Bryson JA), “How to Draft an Affidavit” (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 250. A companion paper, which highlights the distinction between affidavits and pleadings, is Campbell J’s “The Purpose of Pleadings” (2004) 25 Aust Bar Rev 116. Although affidavits and pleadings serve different functions (and distinctions between them need to be borne in mind) both need to be prepared with a view to their prospective use as instruments designed to persuade a court to adopt a particular course of action. Approved form of affidavit: Form 40.

814

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 35 – Affidavits [r 35.1.60]

35.1

r 35.1

Irregularity does not invalidate affidavit

(cf SCR Part 38, rule 5; DCR Part 30, rule 5; LCR Part 25, rule 5)

An affidavit may, with the leave of the court, be used despite any irregularity in form.

Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 35.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 35.1.40] Irregularities to be avoided ....................................................................................................................... [r 35.1.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 35.1.1000]

[r 35.1.20]

Comparison

This rule is identical to SCR Pt 38 r 1 and DCR Pt 30 r 5(2). Subrule (1) of DCR Pt 30 r 5 allowed an irregular affidavit to be filed; this subrule is no longer required in light of r 4.10. [r 35.1.40]

Operation

There is an approved form of affidavit (Form 39), which should be used. There are also approved forms of affidavits in support of certain motions (which are incorporated into the relevant notice of motion) and an approved form for an affidavit of service (Form 41). This rule recognises that mistakes can and do occur when affidavits are being drafted and sworn. Whether an irregular affidavit will be permitted to be used is a matter for the discretion of the court. It should not be assumed that the court will permit an irregular affidavit to be used. The discretion to allow an irregular affidavit to be used will be exercised having regard to the overriding purpose – “the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings”: CPA s 56. Relevant factors to be considered will be the nature and significance of the irregularity, the potential injustice if the evidence is rejected, the importance of the affidavit to the proceedings, the difficulty in having the irregularity corrected; the delay that may be caused if the irregularity has to be remedied, and the additional costs that may be incurred. The court may allow an irregular affidavit to be used but upon terms, such as that a corrected affidavit is filed. In general if there is an irregularity in an affidavit in support of a motion that is to be considered in the absence of the parties and that irregularity is apparent to the registrar or the judicial officer considering the motion, the affidavit will not be permitted to be used and may be rejected pursuant to r 4.10(4), and a requisition to have the affidavit corrected will be raised. The power of the court to grant leave to use an irregular affidavit under r 35.1 is limited to irregularities as to form, not evidence which is inadmissible by reason of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). Although there is no rule of evidence that makes evidence of a conversation in an affidavit inadmissible if it is not in direct speech (particularly if the witness is unable to recall the precise words used), the probative value of the evidence may be diminished if evidence of the conversation is not given in direct speech, and the provisions of s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 may be raised: LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688 at [8]–[9]; Hamilton-Smith v George [2006] FCA 1551 at [79]–[84]. [r 35.1.60]

Irregularities to be avoided

The following common irregularities can be avoided by carefully checking the affidavit after it has been drafted and after it has been sworn by the deponent: • The affidavit is undated, incorrectly dated or has inconsistent dates. See r 4.7 as to how dates should appear in the affidavit. See also r 35.3A • The pages (including any annexures) are not consecutively numbered, pages are missing or not in the correct order: r 4.3(2)(d); r 35.6(3) • The paragraphs are not numbered or are misnumbered: r 35.4 • The annexures referred to in the affidavit are not annexed, do not bear an annexure note or the annexure note is incomplete or unsigned: r 35.6(2) • There are alterations or erasures which have not been initialled by the deponent and the person taking the affidavit: r 35.5 © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

815

UCPR Parts 31-40

RULE 35.1 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 35.2

[r 35.1.60] • The affidavit is not signed by the deponent and/or the person taking the affidavit, after the jurat and on each page of the affidavit: r 35.7B • The capacity of the person taking the affidavit and her or his name and address have not been inserted: r 35.7A • The affidavit is not firmly bound. A bull clip does not constitute “secure fastening”, as the court may assume that the bull clip is a group of related documents: r 4.3(2)(b)

[r 35.1.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 38 r 1; DCR Pt 30 r 5. 35.2

Cross-examination of deponent

(cf SCR Part 38, rule 9; DCR Part 30, rule 9; LCR Part 25, rule 10)

(1) A party may, by written notice served on the party serving or proposing to use an affidavit, require the attendance for cross-examination of the person by whom the affidavit has been made. (2) Such notice is to be given a reasonable time before the time at which the person is required to attend for cross-examination. (3) If reasonable notice of such a requirement has been given in respect of an affidavit, and the deponent does not attend for examination, the affidavit may not be used unless the deponent is dead or unless the court orders otherwise. (4) If a person making an affidavit is cross-examined, the party using the affidavit may re-examine the person.

RULE 35.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 35.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 35.2.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 35.2.1000]

[r 35.2.20]

Comparison

This rule is similar to SCR Pt 38 r 9 and DCR Pt 30 r 9, which are in identical terms. Subrule (1) now specifies that the notice must be in writing, and subr (2) requires reasonable notice. [r 35.2.40]

Operation

Each party intending to rely upon an affidavit must serve it on each other interested party a reasonable time before the affidavit is to be relied upon: r 10.2. As part of case management the court will normally direct that any affidavits to be relied upon at a hearing be served, (and possibly filed – see [r 35.9.40]) before a specified date, allowing the other parties sufficient time to determine whether the evidence should be put to cross-examination. The court may also direct that any notice of parties required for cross-examination be provided by a specified date. Such a direction prevents any arguments as to what might constitute reasonable notice under subr (2). The number of witnesses that are required to be called on a hearing may have a significant impact on the length of the hearing. Whether procedural fairness requires that the deponent of an affidavit be available for cross-examination depends upon the facts of each case. If a deponent’s evidence is both contentious and material to a central fact in issue, a court is likely to be less inclined to allow her or his affidavit to be used without the deponent being available for cross-examination than might otherwise be the case. However, there is no absolute right to cross-examine the deponent of an affidavit; whether cross-examination is allowed is a matter within the discretion of the court: Comet Products UK Ltd v Hawkex Plastics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 67 at 74-75; Clyne v Law Society (NSW) (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 4 September 1987) p 10. The factors to be taken into account in exercising this discretion include the ambit of the dispute which is capable of resolution by cross-examination and the requirement for the court to exercise its discretion in a way which results in the just, 816

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 35 – Affidavits [r 35.2.1000]

r 35.3

quick and cheap resolution of the real issues between the parties: Cairns v Cairns [2006] NSWSC 364; Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369 at [28]–[30].

Quite apart from this rule, the court may not permit cross-examination of an affidavit read on an interlocutory application unless specifically satisfied that there is some need, and utility, in permitting cross-examination. On an interlocutory application, where there is to be no final determination of facts but simply an assessment of whether there is a serious question to be tried, coupled with consideration of the balance of convenience, cross-examination directed simply towards resolution of competing versions of disputed facts is unnecessary and without utility. If an affidavit is allowed under this rule to be used as evidence notwithstanding the unavailability of the deponent for cross-examination that fact, alone, does not exempt the affidavit from a need to be admissible according to ordinary rules of evidence, and the weight of the evidence might be affected by the unavailability of the deponent: Curley v Duff [1985] 2 NSWLR 716 at 718. A party relying upon an affidavit the deponent of which is required for cross-examination generally bears the expenses of the deponent’s attendance at court to give evidence, subject to the court’s consideration of the costs of the proceedings in due course. However, the court does have jurisdiction to order that, in the first instance, the expenses of a deponent attending for cross-examination be borne by the party that requires the attendance: Stanley-Hill v Kool [1982] 1 NSWLR 460 at 475. An applicant under this rule for leave to use an affidavit without the deponent being available for cross-examination should consider whether, in lieu of or as a supplement to such an application, reliance might be placed on Evidence Act 1995 s 63, which permits an out-of-court statement to be adduced as evidence (as an exception to the hearsay rule) when the maker of the statement is not available to give evidence. [r 35.2.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 38 r 9; DCR Pt 30 r 9. Service of affidavits: r 10.2 Evidence Act 1995 s 63. 35.3

Persons who may make affidavit

(cf SCR Part 24, rule 7; DCR Part 22A, rule 7)

(1) If a party is required by these rules to file an affidavit or to verify any matter by affidavit, such an affidavit may be made by the party or: (a) if the party is a person under legal incapacity, by the party’s tutor, or (b) if the party is a corporation, by a member or officer of the corporation or (if it is in liquidation) by its liquidator, or (c) if the party is a body of persons lawfully suing or being sued: (i) in the name of the body, or (ii) in the name of any member or officer of the body, or (iii) in the name of any other person associated with the body, by a member or officer of the body, or (d) if the party is the Crown or an officer of the Crown suing or being sued in his or her official capacity, by an officer of the Crown, or (e) if the proceedings are being brought in the plaintiff’s name by some other person pursuant to a right of subrogation: (i) by that other person, or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

817

UCPR Parts 31-40

In circumstances where a deponent has been given written notice of being required for cross examination a reasonable time before the hearing, but the deponent becomes unavailable to attend court for a legitimate reason, the court may allow parts of the affidavit to be read, but exclude other parts where the opposing party suffers prejudice by reason of the inability to cross examine: Vella v Wai Lai Investment (Australia) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 583 (deponent overseas due to mother’s recent death).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 35.3

[r 35.3.20] (ii)

if that other person is a corporation, by a member or officer of the corporation or (if it is in liquidation) by its liquidator.

[Subr (1) am Rule 171 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[1]]

(2) Such an affidavit may also be made, in relation to proceedings in the Local Court: (a) by the party’s solicitor, or by a commercial agent with respect to debt collection (within the meaning of the Commercial Agents and Private Inquiry Agents Act 2004), in relation only to proceedings on an application for: (i) an instalment order, or (ii) an order for examination, or (iii) a writ of execution, or (iv) a garnishee order, or (v) default judgment (but only in the Small Claims Division), or (b) by a person holding a licence as a real estate agent, strata managing agent or on-site residential property manager within the meaning of the Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 2002 in relation only to: (i) proceedings on an application referred to in paragraph (a), or (ii) the filing of a certificate under section 51 of the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001. [Subr (2) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]; Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[14]; Rule 171 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[2]; Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[40]]

(2A) If more than one person is qualified to make an affidavit on behalf of a party, it is sufficient for such an affidavit to be made (subject to subrules (1) and (2)) by any one or more of them. [Subr (2A) insrt Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[4]]

(3) Subject to any order of the court, the person by whom an affidavit is made must be a person having knowledge of the facts deposed to in the affidavit. (4) If an affidavit is made by a person other than the party required to file or verify the affidavit, the affidavit must set out the facts that qualify the person to make the affidavit. (5) Subject to subrule (1), a requirement of these rules for an affidavit as to any matter may be satisfied by separate affidavits made by separate persons in relation to separate aspects of that matter. [R 35.3 am Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 501 of 2007; Rule 288 of 2006; Rule 171 of 2006; Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[39]]

RULE 35.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 35.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 35.3.40] Person under legal incapacity .................................................................................................................. [r 35.3.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 35.3.1000]

[r 35.3.20]

Comparison

This rule is derived from various requirements that were previously included in various SCR and DCR rules, but mainly the rules relating to verifying pleadings and answers to interrogatories: see SCR Pt 15 r 23(2), Pt 17 r 4(3), Pt 24 r 7; DCR Pt 10 r 2, Pt 22A r 7. [r 35.3.40]

Operation

The provisions of this rule, as to who can make an affidavit, apply to the following affidavits: • Verifying pleadings: rr 14.23 and 14.24 • Verifying list of documents: r 21.4 • Verifying answers to interrogatories: r 22.3 • In support of application for default judgment: rr 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.8 and 16.9 • In support of judgment for possession of land: r 36.8 818

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 35 – Affidavits [r 35.3A.1000] • • • • • •

In In In In In In

r 35.4

support support support support support support

[r 35.3.60]

of of of of of of

application application application application application application

for for for for for for

instalment order: r 37.2 examination order: r 38.2 writ of execution: r 39.3 a garnishee order: r 39.35 charging order: r 39.45 writ of sequestration: r 40.3

Person under legal incapacity

[r 35.3.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 15 r 23(2), Pt 17 r 4(3), Pt 24 r 7; DCR Pt 10 r 2, Pt 22A r 7. 35.3A Heading to affidavit The heading to an affidavit must include the name of the deponent and the date on which the affidavit is made. [R 35.3A insrt Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[21]]

RULE 35.3A COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 35.3A.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 35.3A.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 35.3A.1000]

[r 35.3A.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule introduced in December 2006. [r 35.3A.40]

Operation

This rule was introduced to allow judicial officers to more readily identify particular affidavits at a hearing. The rule reinforces the provisions of the approved form of affidavit (Form 39). In practice the date that an affidavit is sworn will often be left blank on the printed document, on the basis that it will be completed after the affidavit has been sworn. Although it would be an irregularity to leave the date of the affidavit in the heading blank (see r 35.1) it is important, to avoid judicial censure, that the incomplete dates in the body of the affidavit and in the heading are completed before the affidavit is filed. [r 35.3A.1000]

References

See approved Form 40. 35.4 Format of affidavit dealing with more than one matter (cf SCR Part 38, rule 2; DCR Part 30, rule 2; LCR Part 25, rule 2)

If the body of an affidavit alleges or otherwise deals with more than one matter: (a) it must be divided into paragraphs, and (b) each matter must, so far as convenient, be put in a separate paragraph, and (c) the paragraphs must be numbered consecutively.

RULE 35.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 35.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 35.4.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 35.4.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

819

UCPR Parts 31-40

The definition of a person under a legal incapacity is contained in s 3 of the CPA.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 35.5

[r 35.4.20]

[r 35.4.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 38 r 2(2) and DCR Pt 30 r 2(2). [r 35.4.40]

Operation

The object of this rule is to make affidavits readable and to facilitate their convenient and efficient use in court. Separately numbered paragraphs assist the parties and the court when referring to evidence contained in the affidavit. [r 35.4.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 38 r 2(2); DCR Pt 30 r 2(2). 35.5

Alterations

(cf SCR Part 38, rule 3; DCR Part 30, rule 3; LCR Part 25, rule 3)

If there is any interlineation, erasure or other alteration in the jurat or body of an affidavit, the affidavit may not be used, except by leave of the court, unless the person before whom the affidavit is sworn initials the alteration and, in the case of an erasure, rewrites in the margin of the affidavit any words or figures written on the erasure and signs or initials them.

RULE 35.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 35.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 35.5.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 35.5.1000]

[r 35.5.20]

Comparison

This rule is the same in substance as SCR Pt 38 r 3 and DCR Pt 30 r 3. [r 35.5.40]

Operation

Any alteration, erasure or other amendment must be initialled before the affidavit is sworn or affirmed. If the affidavit needs to be amended after it has been made it will need to be re-sworn. In current practice this rule should only be utilised in extraordinary circumstances (where the affidavit is required urgently and when the affidavit has been made away from the solicitor’s office). The court will not appreciate an affidavit, which bears alterations or erasures, when the affidavit could have been easily corrected and the page or pages bearing the alteration re-printed. [r 35.5.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 38 r 3; DCR Pt 30 r 3. 35.6 Annexures and exhibits (cf SCR Part 38, rule 4; DCR Part 30, rule 4; LCR Part 25, rule 4)

(1) A document to be used in conjunction with an affidavit may be made: (a) an annexure to the affidavit, or (b) an exhibit to the affidavit. (2) An annexure to an affidavit must be identified as such by a certificate endorsed on the annexure (and not on a page separate from the annexure) signed by the person before whom the affidavit is made. (3) The pages of an affidavit, together with any annexures, must be consecutively numbered in a single series of numbers. (4) An exhibit to an affidavit must be identified as such by a certificate attached to the exhibit entitled in the same manner as the affidavit and signed by the person before whom the affidavit is made. 820

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 35 – Affidavits [r 35.6.1000]

r 35.6

(4A) The pages of an exhibit to an affidavit must (where practicable) be consecutively numbered in a single series of numbers. [Subr (4A) insrt Rule 501 of 2014, r 3(2)]

(6) If any other party so requires, a party who serves an affidavit to which a document is an exhibit: (a) must produce the document for inspection by that other party, or (b) must provide a photocopy of the document to that other party, or (c) must produce the document at some convenient place to enable it to be photocopied by that other party. [R 35.6 am Rule 501 of 2014]

RULE 35.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 35.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 35.6.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 35.6.1000]

[r 35.6.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, this rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 38 r 4 and Pt 65 r 2(3)(d). However, there is no longer a specific requirement to seek leave to file an affidavit (with annexures) of more than 50 pages, nor a specific requirement to deliver an exhibit to the judge’s chambers prior to hearing where it would be convenient. In the District Court, r 35.6(1) and 35.6(2) of this rule reproduce the substance of DCR Pt 30 r 4. There were no directly comparable provisions in the DCR to r 35.6(3)–35.6(6) of this rule. [r 35.6.40]

Operation

Generally it is preferable that documents referred to in an affidavit are annexures rather than exhibits, so that the relevant evidence is complete in a single document. There are circumstances however when consideration should be given to making documents exhibits to the affidavit. Although there is no longer a rule that restricts affidavit size (SCR Pt 38 r 4(2) limited affidavits, including annexures to 50 pages), it is still desirable that affidavits be kept to a manageable size. As a matter of useability, if an affidavit refers to a large number of documents it may be more convenient to have those documents bound in a separate bundle of exhibits to the affidavit, which can be referred to while the affidavit is being read. If a document referred to in the affidavit is large and either of minor importance or if only part of the document is really relevant, then to save costs, it may be appropriate to exhibit that document rather than annex it to the affidavit. If the document cannot be conveniently reproduced on A4 sized pages it should be made an exhibit to the affidavit. The distinction between annexures and exhibits in the context of s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was considered in Robowash Pty Ltd v Robowash Finance Pty Ltd (2000) 158 FLR 338; 19 ACLC 393; [2000] WASCA 409 and White J in Tatlers.com.au Pty Ltd v Davis (2007) 213 FLR 109; [2007] NSWSC 835 at [10]–[23]. Although exhibits to an affidavit are not filed (subr (5)), the court may make directions for working copies of exhibited documents to be lodged either with the judicial officer assigned to hear the case or with the registry. If a document is made an exhibit to an affidavit then a properly identified copy of that exhibit (subr (4)) must be available to provide to the court when the affidavit is being read. For the form of the certificate identifying an exhibit see Form 42. If an affidavit is eFiled, any “annexure” that cannot be accepted by the eFiling system is taken to be an exhibit rather than an annexure: r 3.5. [r 35.6.1000] References Superseded rules: SCR Pt 38 r 4; DCR Pt 30 r 4. Exhibit Certificate: Form 42. Electronically filed affidavits: r 3.5. PN SC Gen 4 – Affidavits: paras 11 and 13. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

821

UCPR Parts 31-40

(5) An exhibit to an affidavit must not be filed.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 35.7

35.7

[r 35.6.1000]

Affidavits by persons who cannot read

An affidavit made by a blind or illiterate person may not be used unless: (a) the affidavit bears a certificate referred to in section 27A of the Oaths Act 1900, or (b) the court is otherwise satisfied: (i) that the affidavit was read to the deponent in the presence of the person before whom it was made, and (ii) that it appeared to that person that the deponent understood the affidavit.

RULE 35.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 35.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 35.7.40] Blind or illiterate deponent ........................................................................................................................ [r 35.7.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 35.7.1000]

[r 35.7.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 38 r 2(3) and (4) and DCR Pt 30 r 2(3) and (4). The form of the certificate that should be included in the affidavit is now specified in the Oaths Act 1900 s 27A. [r 35.7.40]

Operation

The CPA amended the Oaths Act 1900 to insert s 27A, which is in the following terms: If it appears to the person before whom an affidavit is made (the authorised person) that the person making the affidavit (the deponent) is blind or illiterate, the authorised person must certify, in or below the jurat: (a) that the affidavit was read to the deponent in the presence of the authorised person, and (b) that it appeared to the authorised person that the deponent understood the affidavit, and (c) that the deponent subscribed the affidavit (by signature or mark) in the presence of the authorised person. Although there is no specific rule that applies if the deponent is literate but unable to understand or express themselves in English, a certificate to similar effect could be included on the affidavit provided the person taking the affidavit is fluent in the language of the deponent. The certificate should state that the affidavit has been read to the deponent in a stated language understood by her or him, and that he or she appeared to understand it. If the affidavit has to be read to the deponent by an interpreter, it is appropriate for that interpreter to swear an affidavit setting out what occurred and indicating what was stated by the deponent to indicate her or his understanding and acknowledgment of the affidavit. [r 35.7.60]

Blind or illiterate deponent

Any objection to an affidavit based on the deponent being blind or illiterate must be raised no later than when the deponent is in the witness box. The ability of the deponent to understand the affidavit can be tested in cross examination, and further evidence can be led by the deponent to establish literacy and have the affidavit read to him in his or her language. It is a question for the court as to whether or not the deponent understands the affidavit: Advanced Timber & Hardware (Superstore) Pty Ltd v Kovacevic [2011] NSWSC 366 at [27]–[30]. [r 35.7.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 38 r 2(3) and (4); DCR Pt 30 r 2(3) and (4). Certificate to appear in affidavit: Oaths Act 1900 s 27A.

822

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 35 – Affidavits [r 35.7B.20]

r 35.7B

35.7A Name of legal practitioner or commissioner for affidavits on affidavit

(1) A legal practitioner who takes and receives an affidavit concerning any matter within the jurisdiction of the court must, by use of a stamp or otherwise, add, legibly below the legal practitioner’s signature, the legal practitioner’s name and address together with the word “barrister” or “solicitor”, as the case requires. (2) A commissioner for affidavits who takes and receives an affidavit concerning any matter within the jurisdiction of the court, must, by use of a stamp or otherwise, add, legibly below the commissioner’s signature, the commissioner’s name and address together with the words “commissioner for affidavits”. (3) In this rule, commissioner for affidavits means a person who is authorised by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, under section 27(2) of the Oaths Act 1900, to take and receive affidavits. [R 35.7A insrt Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[41]]

RULE 35.7A COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 35.7A.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 35.7A.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 35.7A.1000]

[r 35.7A.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 38 r 2(4A) and (4B). The rule has been extended, in that it previously only applied to solicitors. It now applies to barristers and solicitors. There was no equivalent rule in the District Court. [r 35.7A.40]

Operation

Legal practitioners (including interstate practitioners) with a current practising certificate are authorised to take and receive affidavits: Oaths Act 1900 s 27(1) and (5). The Chief Justice may authorise other persons to take and receive affidavits. These persons are commissioners for affidavits: Oaths Act 1900 s 27(2). This rule requires the person taking the affidavit to either print or otherwise subscribe on the affidavit (under her or his signature) their capacity to take the affidavit (barrister, solicitor or commissioner for affidavit) and their name and address. [r 35.7A.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 38 r 2(4A) and (4B). Authority to take and receive affidavits: Oaths Act 1900 s 27. 35.7B

Each page of affidavit to be signed

Each page of an affidavit must be signed by the deponent and by the person before whom it is sworn. [R 35.7B insrt Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[41]]

RULE 35.7B COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 35.7B.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 35.7B.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 35.7B.1000]

[r 35.7B.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 38 r 2(5). There was no corresponding District Court rule. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

823

UCPR Parts 31-40

(cf SCR Part 38, rule 2(4A), (4B) and (5))

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 35.8

[r 35.7B.20]

[r 35.7B.40]

Operation

This rule helps to protect the authenticity of the affidavit. When drafting an affidavit it is appropriate to include provision at the base of each page for signing by the deponent and the witness, as a reminder of this rule. Although a failure to have each page signed is an irregularity which can be overcome by r 35.1, it is preferable that the defect is avoided. [r 35.7B.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 38 r 2(5). 35.8

Affidavit of service not to annex copies of filed documents

(cf SCR Part 38, rule 7A; DCR Part 30, rule 10; LCR Part 25, rule 11)

(1) An affidavit of service of a document that has been served must clearly identify the document, but must not annex a copy of the document unless the document has not been filed. [Subr (1) am Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[15]]

(2) An affidavit of service must contain: (a) a statement as to when, where, how and by whom service was effected, and (b) a statement, using as nearly as practicable the actual words used by the person to whom the process was delivered, as to what, if anything, that person said, on the occasion of service, concerning the service or the subject matter of the proceedings, and (c) a statement that the deponent is over the age of 16 years, or is of a named class of persons who by virtue of their status, occupation or otherwise must be over that age. [R 35.8 am Rule 288 of 2006]

RULE 35.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 35.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 35.8.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 35.8.1000]

[r 35.8.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on DCR Pt 30 r 10 and LCR Pt 25 r 11, which were in similar terms. There was no rule in the Supreme Court that set out the requirements for an affidavit of service, although SCR Pt 38 r 7A, which provided for affidavits of service of affidavits, said that the affidavit served was not to be annexed to the affidavit of service. The rule has been expanded so that the prohibition on annexing the document served now applies to all documents served, provided the document has been filed. There is also no longer a provision permitting the exhibiting of the document served to the affidavit, although this is not expressly prohibited. The requirement to not annex the document being served is a new requirement for the Supreme Court, where the practice has always been to annex the document being served, unless it was an affidavit (SCR Pt 38 r 7A). In the District Court the requirement to not annex the document served now also applies to statements of claim. [r 35.8.40]

Operation

Most affidavits of service relate to service of a statement of claim in support of an application for default judgment, although it is also common to prepare affidavits of service of summonses and notices of motion (and related documents) where it is likely that an application will be made to proceed with a hearing in the absence of a defendant. A copy of the document served must not be annexed to the affidavit if the document has been filed (subr (1)), however it should be clearly identified in the affidavit by referring to the name of the document, the name of the proceedings, the case number, the date the document was filed and which party or parties the document was filed on behalf of. The requirements for service (personal and otherwise) of documents are set out in r 10.20. 824

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 35 – Affidavits [r 35.9.60]

r 35.9

An affidavit of service of a document that has not been filed should include the document served as an annexure to the affidavit of service (identified by an annexure note). An affidavit of service of an order should also annex a copy of the order, as should affidavits of service prepared to show compliance with directions to serve but not file documents by specified dates. There is an approved form of affidavit of service: Form 41. If the affidavit of service relates to a document that has not been filed then the approved form needs to be modified to make reference to the annexure. [r 35.8.1000]

References UCPR Parts 31-40

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 30 r 10; SCR Pt 38 r 7A. Service requirements: see UCPR Pt 10. Affidavit of service: Form 41. 35.9

Filing of affidavits

(cf SCR Part 38, rule 6; DCR Part 30, rule 6; LCR Part 25, rule 6)

Except (a) (b) (c)

by in in in

leave of the court, an affidavit must not be filed unless it is filed: accordance with these rules, or accordance with other rules of court applicable to the court in which it is filed, or accordance with a practice note applicable to the court in which it is filed.

RULE 35.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 35.9.20] Operation – affidavits to be used at a hearing ......................................................................................... [r 35.9.40] Operation – District Court ......................................................................................................................... [r 35.9.60] Operation – Supreme Court ..................................................................................................................... [r 35.9.80] Affidavits to be used in respect of motions to be considered in the absence of the parties ................. [r 35.9.100] Affidavits to be filed pursuant to other rules .......................................................................................... [r 35.9.120] Certain proceedings where affidavits are required to be filed ............................................................... [r 35.9.140] Obtaining a direction for non-service of affidavits .................................................................................. [r 35.9.160] Confidentiality of information in affidavits ............................................................................................... [r 35.9.180] Affidavits served in breach of rules or directions ................................................................................... [r 35.9.200] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 35.9.1000]

[r 35.9.20]

Comparison

This rule is modelled on DCR Pt 30 r 6. In the Supreme Court, this rule has superseded the previous rule (SCR Pt 38 r 6), which required the filing of all affidavits. In the District Court DCR Pt 30 r 6A required the registrar to return affidavits that were “no longer required for use in the proceedings”. [r 35.9.40]

Operation – affidavits to be used at a hearing

This rule should be read with PN SC Gen 4 – Affidavits, in respect of Supreme Court proceedings and PN DC (Civil) No 9 – Summonses and motions (para 6), in respect of motions and summons proceedings in the District Court. The basic premise of this rule is that affidavits to be relied upon at a hearing are not to be filed before the hearing, but will be filed in court if they are to be read during the proceedings. The object of the rule is to avoid affidavits that will not be relied upon, being filed and becoming part of the court record with the attendant administrative expense of filing and storing them. Despite this general provision the court may nevertheless make directions for affidavits to be filed. [r 35.9.60]

Operation – District Court

Practice Note DC (Civil) No 1-Case Management in the General List does not stipulate that affidavits are to be filed in respect of motions, but 7.9 of the practice note states that affidavits will be handed back to the parties at the conclusion of the hearing of a notice of motion. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

825

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 35.9 [r 35.9.80]

[r 35.9.60] Operation – Supreme Court

Practice Note SC Gen 4 – Affidavits (paras 9 to 14) provides that the parties are to deliver a “tender bundle” of documents to be relied upon, including any affidavits, to the chambers of the presiding judicial officer at least 48 hours prior to a scheduled hearing. The tender bundle is to include copies of the exhibits to the affidavits, unless the size or nature of the exhibit makes this inappropriate. Original affidavits and exhibits are to be brought to the hearing and be available for production to the court. If an affidavit is read it is to be filed in court. At the conclusion of the hearing the tender bundles will either be returned or destroyed. The tender bundle should be provided in a folder or folders with an index. The court may make directions for the earlier provision of the tender bundle or as to how the tender bundle should be compiled. See also Practice Note SC Eq 1 – Supreme Court Equity Division – Case Management. This practice note includes a “Usual Order for Hearing” which provides for a Court Book containing, inter alia, all affidavits to be relied upon at the trial being delivered to the Trial Judge’s Associate no later than 3 working days before the hearing date. Affidavits are commonly read by a judicial officer before a hearing, as a form of preparation and to shorten the hearing time. This is specifically authorised by CPA s 69 and UCPR r 2.4. [r 35.9.100]

Affidavits to be used in respect of motions to be considered in the absence of the parties Affidavits in support of motions that are to be considered in the absence of the parties (pursuant to r 18.3(3)) will need to be filed at the same time as the notice of motion is filed. Specific provisions apply to such applications: • Application for default judgment: rr 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.8 and 16.9 • Application to issue or set aside a subpoena for service in New Zealand: rr 32.2 and 32.5 • Judgment for possession of land: r 36.8 • Application for instalment order: r 37.2 • Application for examination order: r 38.2 • Application for writ of execution: r 39.3 • Application for a garnishee order: r 39.35 • Application for charging order: r 39.45 • Application for writ of sequestration: r 40.3 • Application for hearing in fixed vacation (Court of Appeal): r 51.57 If an affidavit filed in support of a motion being considered in the absence of the parties contains an irregularity or does not provide sufficient evidence to allow the making of the orders, the registrar or judicial officer considering the application will issue a requisition requiring the defect to be corrected or requiring additional affidavit evidence to be provided. [r 35.9.120] Affidavits to be filed pursuant to other rules Some rules require that affidavits be filed: • As to authority to take proceedings on behalf of a corporation: r 7.2 • Verifying pleadings: r 14.23 • Entry of judgment in respect of outstanding costs payable in respect of costs certified by a costs assessor: r 36.10 • Issue of judgment creditor’s notice: r 39.21 • Where proposed sale of land under a writ: r 39.22 • In support of interpleader: r 43.2(3) • In support of appeal: r 50.14 • Absence of restrictions on appeals as of right (Court of Appeal): r 51.22 [r 35.9.140]

Certain proceedings where affidavits are required to be filed

Practice Note SC Gen 4 – Affidavits specifies that, subject to a contrary order, affidavits that are to be relied upon, are to be filed in respect of the following types of proceedings: • Court of Criminal Appeal 826

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 35 – Affidavits [r 35.9.1000] Adoptions Admiralty List Corporations List Probate List Protective List Appeals under Pt 50

[r 35.9.160]

Obtaining a direction for non-service of affidavits

Although r 10.2 requires a party intending to rely upon an affidavit to serve it on each other interested party a reasonable time before it is to be used, the court has a discretion to make an order that a party is not required to serve affidavits in appropriate circumstances. The usual circumstance where such an order may be sought is where the information in the affidavit will not advance the other side’s case and is of such a character that if it were disclosed to the other side, it might tempt that other side to tailor or adjust the evidence; typically in a case where there are allegations of fraud: Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 588; [2009] NSWSC 644 (upheld on appeal: Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 78 NSWLR 265; 261 ALR 741; [2009] NSWCA 372). [r 35.9.180]

Confidentiality of information in affidavits

There is a presumption that affidavit evidence filed and read in a proceeding will be public information (see [r 36.12.80]). Blanket claims that information in an affidavit is confidential should not be made. A party claiming that evidence in an affidavit should be regarded as confidential and protected from disclosure may be required to substantiate that claim “paragraph by paragraph”: Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One Tel Ltd [2009] NSWSC 821. To maintain confidentiality of information in an affidavit the court may make orders for the affidavit to be placed in a sealed envelope and stored separately from the court file and the party who filed the affidavit may be required to provide a redacted version of the affidavit. [r 35.9.200]

Affidavits served in breach of rules or directions

In respect of affidavits served in breach of rules, directions, practice notes or orders the court has a discretion to refuse to admit the evidence: s 62(3)(b) and (c) of the CPA. The rule should also be read in conjunction with r 10.2 and the provisions of ss 56 to 59 of the CPA. Failure of a party to give an adequate explanation for the late service of affidavits is a relevant factor: Reliance Financial Services New South Wales Pty Ltd v Griffıths [2010] NSWSC 1490 at [38]–[39]. [r 35.9.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 30 r 6; SCR Pt 38 r 6. Reading affidavits before a hearing: CPA s 69, UCPR r 2.4. Filing of affidavits electronically: UCPR r 3.5. Practice Note SC Gen 4 – Affıdavits; PN DC (Civil) No 9 – Summonses and motions.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

827

UCPR Parts 31-40

• • • • • •

r 35.9

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.1

[r Pt36.20]

PART 36 – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS Commentary by Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court. Updated by Mark Walsh, Barrister.

PART 36 COMMENTARY Contents of Part 36 .................................................................................................................................. [r Pt36.20] Judgments and orders ............................................................................................................................. [r Pt36.40]

[r Pt36.20]

Contents of Part 36

Part 36 brings together various rules that relate to judgments and orders, both final and interlocutory: how they are made, conveyed, recorded, set aside and varied. Although largely based on rules in SCR Pts 40 and 41, the corresponding provisions in DCR Pt 31 and LCR Pt 26 have also been considered and adopted so that there is a uniform set of rules. Where appropriate, rules that were previously specific to a jurisdiction or jurisdictions have been adopted and included (eg r 36.3). The rules in this Part should be read together with CPA Pt 9. For instance CPA s 102 that deals with the effect of dismissal of proceedings is based on SCR Pt 40 r 8. [r Pt36.40]

Judgments and orders

Generally, a “judgment” is regarded to be the binding final decision of the court and other decisions are termed “orders”: Bernard Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2014) [16.270]. That definition does not apply to the way those terms are used in the UCPRs. An order can also be a binding final decision of the court (see for instance r 36.16(3)). In the CPA s 3, “judgment” is defined to include “any order for the payment of money, including any order for the payment of costs”. There is no further definition of “order” or “judgment” in the UCPR or the CPA. Generally the terms appear in the rules together and appear to be interchangeable. A better way of understanding the term “judgment” is that it is a type of order that determines a claim for relief. Judgments are usually given in respect of proceedings commenced by statement of claim. A judgment is in favour of one party and against another party and, unless the judgment is for the defendant, directs the party against whom the judgment is given to perform specified acts, principally relating to the payment of money, but also for the delivery of goods, and giving up of possession of land. Generally judgments are enforceable by issuing a writ of execution. The notion of an order is wider than judgment. The orders made determining proceedings commenced by summons are usually phrased as orders rather than as judgments, although the order may have the same effect as a judgment. An order may require someone to do or refrain from doing an act (injunctions). A declaration by the court is a type of order, as are orders in the nature of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. There are also procedural orders as provided for under CPA ss 61 and 62.

DIVISION 1 – GENERAL 36.1 General relief (cf SCR Part 40, rule 1; DCR Part 31, rule 8; LCR Part 26, rule 1)

At any stage of proceedings, the court may give such judgment, or make such order, as the nature of the case requires, whether or not a claim for relief extending to that judgment or order is included in any originating process or notice of motion.

RULE 36.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 36.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 36.1.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 36.1.1000]

[r 36.1.20]

Comparison

The provisions of SCR Pt 40 r 1, DCR Pt 31 r 8 and LCR Pt 26 r 1 were in identical terms to each other: The Court may, at any stage of any proceedings, on the application of any party, give such judgment or make such order as the nature of the case requires, notwithstanding that the applicant does not make a claim for relief extending to that judgment or order in any originating process. 828

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 1 – General

[r 36.1A.20]

r 36.1A

This rule has been widened in that it now does not require the judgment or order to be made on the application of a party. This is in accordance with a general philosophy under the rules that to allow effective case management and to do justice between the parties the court should not be restricted to making orders upon the application of parties. See CPA s 86(3). The width of the rule has been clarified by adding the words “or notice of motion”. The rule is not limited to making orders relating to the principal proceedings (as defined in the originating process), but also extends to making orders relating to any interlocutory proceedings. Operation

Each statement of claim, summons or notice of motion must state the relief claimed and/or the questions for determination by the court: rr 6.12, 18.3(1)(f). Normally the relief that is granted to a party will be based on the orders sought in the relevant process. In matters that are pleaded, the relief should be founded on the causes of action pleaded: Gould v Mount Oxide Mines Ltd (in liq) (1916) 22 CLR 490 at 517. Nonetheless the effect of this rule is that the court may, subject to its jurisdiction, grant any relief that it thinks appropriate to the facts as proved, even if such relief was not originally claimed. This rule allows the court to do justice in cases where the plaintiff has failed to properly claim relief that is appropriate to the case as pleaded, or where the evidence that has emerged at trial does not correspond to the particulars as pleaded: Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; 57 ALJR 80; 44 ALR 117. It also allows the court to make appropriate orders where circumstances have changed since the proceedings commenced. [r 36.1.1000]

References

Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 90 – after trial the court is required to give judgment or make such judgment as the nature of the case requires; r 16.10 – if a defendant is in default the court may whatever the claim in the statement of claim, give such judgment as the plaintiff appears to be entitled on the statement of claim; SCA s 60 – the Supreme Court is required to recognise and take notice of incidental equities in determining appropriate relief: SCA s 63 – on a final determination the court will grant, “all such remedies as any party may appear to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim brought forward in the proceedings so that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of those matters avoided”. 36.1A

Consent orders

(1) The court may give judgment, or order that judgment be entered, in the terms of an agreement between parties in relation to proceedings between them. (2) Unless the court, for special reasons, otherwise orders, the court must refuse to give judgment, or order that judgment be entered, in terms that restrict, or purport to restrict, any disclosure of the terms of the judgment or order. (3) Subrule (2) does not limit the effect of any agreement between the parties that contains provisions that restrict the parties, or purport to restrict the parties, from disclosing the terms of the agreement or of the judgment or order. [R 36.1A insrt Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[9]]

RULE 36.1A COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 36.1A.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 36.1A.40] Terms not to be disclosed ...................................................................................................................... [r 36.1A.60] Court may refuse to make order by consent ......................................................................................... [r 36.1A.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 36.1A.1000]

[r 36.1A.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule that was introduced when r 20.33, which related to judgment by agreement, was omitted (in April 2007). The judgment by agreement procedure in r 20.33 was derived from DCR Pt 14 r 3; there was no equivalent rule in the Supreme Court, although consent orders and judgments were commonly made and entered in that court. Rule 20.33 described an administrative process for the registrar to enter consent © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

829

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 36.1.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.1A

[r 36.1A.20]

judgments. This rule now applies to giving (or pronouncing) consent judgments as well as entering them, and is framed in terms of the “court” rather than being limited to the “registrar”. The provisions of subr (2) carry forward a restriction that was originally imposed by r 20.33(3). [r 36.1A.40]

Operation

Parties can apply for a judgment under this rule either by applying to the court on an occasion that the matter is before the court, by filing a notice of motion, or by filing a form of consent judgment. The terms of the agreement between the parties (subr (1)) will normally be in writing signed by the parties, but this is not required if the application is made in open court and the terms of the agreement are recorded by the court. Most consent judgments will be entered by a registrar (under delegated authority) in accordance with a form of consent judgment signed by the relevant parties and filed. Consent judgments that involve a party under a legal incapacity require approval of the court pursuant to Civil Procedure Act 2005 ss 75 and 76. [r 36.1A.60]

Terms not to be disclosed

The form of consent judgment should not include a provision that “terms are not to be disclosed”: subr (2). Although it has been common practice to include such a provision in terms of settlement and consent judgments, it has been the view of some registrars and judges that such provisions are inconsistent with the need for the judicial process to be open and transparent. In the past, some registrars deleted such restrictive provisions before entering a judgment or rephrased them so that they only applied to the parties. Although subr (2) permits the court to prevent disclosure in special circumstances, any such application would need to be considered by a judicial officer rather than a registrar. If the parties want the terms of their agreement to remain confidential from non-parties, and they either do not want to apply or cannot establish special circumstances under subr (2), then several options are available. The plaintiff can discontinue the proceedings under r 12.1. The notice of discontinuance can include terms such as to costs, but the parties should be aware that the notice of discontinuance is a document that could be inspected by non-parties (subject to the provisions of Practice Note SC Gen 2 in the Supreme Court or Practice Note DC (Civil) No 11 in the District Court). A notice of discontinuance should only be filed if the plaintiff has been paid according to the agreement or if there is an enforceable agreement that can be the subject of separate proceedings. Alternatively, the consent judgment may exclude any terms that the parties wish to remain confidential on the basis that these provisions are included in a separate document that the parties can independently proceed upon if the provisions are breached. Any matters not included as an order or judgment in the consent judgment will not be enforceable in the original proceedings. If a matter has “settled in principle” shortly before trial, there may be practical difficulties in some courts when applying to have the hearing date vacated, however most judges and registrars will be prepared to adjourn such matters for mention or further directions to allow the parties to finalise the settlement. [r 36.1A.80]

Court may refuse to make order by consent

Normally when a consent order is tendered to a judge by parties who are all sui juris, the judge will be obliged to make the order requested (Noel v Becker [1971] 1 WLR 355; 2 All ER 1186). However, there are circumstances in which a judge will not be so obliged, which were stated in Kalyk v Whelan (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 31 July 1985) where the court refused to make a consent order for costs, as: 1. Where there is an order involving the procedure for dealing with resolution of questions before the court; 2. Where the orders refused do not accord with legal principle or are couched in vague and uncertain terms or are unenforceable; 3. Where there is either no jurisdiction to make the order or considerable doubt as to the court’s jurisdiction; 4. Where there is a condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction to be proved to the court before it can make an order or where the legislature has committed to the court and not the parties’ responsibility of making a decision; or 5. Where the public interest demands that the court should not give its imprimatur to the private agreement of the parties. For example, in declaratory proceedings affecting public rights, as the court’s order may be interpreted by the public as a definitive determination by the court of the point in dispute. 830

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 1 – General

[r 36.2.40] [r 36.1A.1000]

r 36.2

References

The approved form for a consent judgment or order is Form 44. The old Form 28, Agreement as to Judgment, is now redundant. Practice Note DC (Civil) No 7 – Court Approval of Settlements. Written reasons for judgment

(cf SCR Part 40, rule 2; DCR Part 31, rule 9; LCR Part 26, rule 2)

(1) If the court gives any judgment, or makes any order or decision, and its reasons for the judgment, order or decision are reduced to writing, it is sufficient for the court to state its judgment, order or decision orally, without stating the reasons. (2) After a judgment, order or decision has been stated orally under subrule (1), a written copy of it, including the court’s reasons for it, must then be delivered to an associate, registrar or some other officer of the court for delivery to the parties or may instead be delivered directly to the parties.

RULE 36.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 36.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 36.2.40] Reasons for judgment .............................................................................................................................. [r 36.2.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 36.2.1000]

[r 36.2.20]

Comparison

Although SCR Pt 40 r 2, DCR Pt 31 r 9 and LCR Pt 26 r 2, are all drafted in slightly different terms they have a similar effect. This rule adopts and clarifies those rules. The rule has been extended to decisions and reasons for decisions. It also now allows the court to deliver the written reasons directly to the parties (which was previously only allowed under the District Court Rules 1973). [r 36.2.40]

Operation

This rule applies if the court has reserved a decision after a hearing, or in rare circumstances if the matter has been considered in the absence of the parties on affidavit evidence and written submissions. Although subr (2) refers to a written copy of the judgment, order or decision inferring that it is a separate document to the written reasons in subr (1), in practice the written reasons will usually include the terms of the judgment, order or decision that the reasons relate to (usually in the last paragraph of the reasons). In most cases the rule will be satisfied by the judicial officer or registrar reading out aloud the terms of the judgment, order or decision, and handing sufficient copies of the written reasons to the parties or their representatives in court, or to an associate or other officer in court who will arrange to have them delivered to the parties. The rule has been extended to decisions and reasons for decisions. This will include written reasons that may not result in the court making a judgment or order, but may set out findings or proposed orders (a common procedure in the Equity Division where reasons are delivered and the matter is adjourned for proposed short minutes of order to be submitted). Although the rule anticipates that a reserved decision will be delivered in open court in the presence of the interested parties, a reserved decision can be delivered orally in chambers in the absence of the parties, and the reserved judgment subsequently posted to the parties: McClymont v The Owners-Strata Plan No 12139 (2009) 74 NSWLR 404; [2009] NSWSC 276. However as a matter of procedural fairness this process should not be adopted unless the parties agree and can be advised promptly as to the terms of the decision. The use of email and ECM systems (or On Line courts – see Pt 3) to advise parties of decisions, particularly interlocutory directions, as well as the electronic publication of reasons for judgment on CaseLaw may mean that the procedural fairness and “open justice” issues associated with not delivering decisions in open court are less significant. Advising the parties electronically in relation to reserved decisions can be expected to become more common and an accepted method of reducing litigation costs. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

831

UCPR Parts 31-40

36.2

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.3

[r 36.2.40]

[r 36.2.60]

Reasons for judgment

A judicial officer has a duty to give reasons sufficient to expose her or his reasoning process: Carlson v King (1947) 64 WN (NSW) 65; Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376; Housing Commission (NSW) v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378; (1983) 53 LGRA 325; Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 20. The reasons given must be sufficient, where there is a right of appeal, to allow that right to be exercised, but it is not necessary for a judge who is exercising a discretionary judgment to detail each factor which he or she has found to be relevant or irrelevant, or to itemise, for example, in the assessment of damages for tort, each of the factual matters to which he or she had had regard. Nor is a judge required to make an explicit finding on each disputed piece of evidence. It will be sufficient, if the inference as to what is found is appropriately clear: Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247. A judicial officer’s reasons for judgment may be withdrawn or amended at any time before entry of the judgment to which they relate. A convenient summary of the principles is to be found in Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Lines MacFarlane & Marshall Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 28; [2001] VSCA 167 at 47 [49]. In Palmer v Clarke (1989) 19 NSWLR 158, it was held that a District Court judge has no power to pronounce orders and then give reasons for those orders on a later occasion. [r 36.2.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 40 r 2; DCR Pt 31 r 9; LCR Pt 26 r 2. See also FCR r 35.2. 36.3

Reserved decision

(cf DCR Part 2A, rule 7, Part 31, rule 10)

(1) If in any proceedings a judicial officer reserves his or her judgment or decision on any question, he or she: (a) may give the judgment or decision, either in open court or in the absence of the public: (i) at the venue for those proceedings, or (ii) at any other place at which he or she is authorised to hear or dispose of those proceedings, or (b) may reduce the judgment or decision to writing, sign it and forward it to the registrar at the venue for the proceedings. (2) If a registrar receives a judgment or decision forwarded under subrule (1)(b): (a) the registrar must appoint a time for the judgment or decision to be read, and (b) the registrar must give at least 24 hours’ notice to the parties, in writing or otherwise, of the appointed time, and (c) at the appointed time, the judgment or decision must be read by another judicial officer of the court, or by the registrar, whether or not the court is sitting at that time. (3) A judgment or decision given under subrule (1)(a) or read under subrule (2)(c) takes effect on the day on which it is so given or read and is as valid as if given by the judicial officer at the hearing of the proceedings to which the judgment or decision relates. (4) Rule 36.2 applies to a judgment or decision referred to in this rule in the same way as it applies to a judgment or decision referred to in that rule.

RULE 36.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 36.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 36.3.40] Where reserved judgment can be delivered ............................................................................................ [r 36.3.60] Compliance with rule ................................................................................................................................ [r 36.3.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 36.3.1000] 832

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 1 – General

[r 36.3.1000] [r 36.3.20]

r 36.4

Comparison

[r 36.3.40]

Operation

The primary purpose of this rule is to allow reserved decisions to be delivered at a suitable venue without unnecessary delay, when the judicial officer that heard the proceedings may not be available. This is particularly important when judicial officers may be on lengthy country circuits. Normally, at least in the Supreme Court, reserved decisions will be delivered by the judicial officer that heard the proceedings, in open court, so that any applications flowing from the judgment (including a possible stay pending an appeal or to delay entry if there is a patent error in the orders) can be promptly considered. This rule authorises the reserved decision to be delivered by a registrar or another judicial officer, in open court or in chambers. The registry of the court where the decision is to be delivered is responsible for notifying the parties (at least 24 hours before the decision is delivered). This rule explicitly states that when a reserved judgment is given in any of the manners prescribed by this rule, the judgment or order takes effect on the day on which it is given or read; this is subject to any order to the contrary pursuant to r 36.4(3). [r 36.3.60]

Where reserved judgment can be delivered

There are no restrictions on when or where the Supreme Court may sit. The District Court may sit at “proclaimed places” as proclaimed by the governor under District Court Act 1973 s 18F. See also DCA ss 32, 33 and 34. [r 36.3.80]

Compliance with rule

The District Court and Local Court must strictly comply with the requirements relating to the delivery of judgments: Palmer v Clarke (1989) 19 NSWLR 158. See also Cumming v Tradebanc International Ltd [2002] NSWSC 70, where purported delivery of a judgment by fax by a magistrate was held to be invalid. However in McClymont v The Owners-Strata Plan No 12139 (2009) 74 NSWLR 404; [2009] NSWSC 276, it was held that pursuant to subr (1)(a) a reserved decision, in that case by a Local Court assessor, could be delivered orally in chambers in the absence of the parties, and the reserved judgment subsequently posted to the parties. Although not complied with in that case, it was also held that although there is no express requirement in r 36.2(1) or r 36.3(1)(a) for the Court to give notice, the giving of adequate notice to the parties is a fundamental requirement of procedural fairness. [r 36.3.1000]

References

See SCA s 45A as to the requirements for delivering a judgment of the Court of Appeal. Superseded rules: DCR Pt 2A r 7 and Pt 31 r 10, and LCR Pt 3 r 8. 36.4

Date of effect of judgments and orders

(cf SCR Part 40, rule 3; DCR Part 31, rule 13A(2))

(1) A judgment or order takes effect: (a) as of the date on which it is given or made, or (b) if the court orders that it not take effect until it is entered, as of the date on which it is entered. (2) Despite subrule (1), if an order of the court directs the payment of costs, and the costs are to be assessed, the order takes effect as of the date when the relevant cost assessor’s certificate is filed. (3) Despite subrules (1) and (2), the court may order that a judgment or order is to take effect as of a date earlier or later than the date fixed by those subrules. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

833

UCPR Parts 31-40

This rule is based on DCR Pt 2A r 7 and Pt 31 r 10, and LCR Pt 3 r 8. There was no equivalent rule in the Supreme Court. This rule now applies to all jurisdictions governed by these rules. The rule has been varied in that it no longer refers to the judgment or decision being given in chambers; instead the rule authorises a decision being given either in open court or in the absence of the public. The rule now allows the reserved judgment or decision to be read by another judicial officer as an alternative to being read by a registrar. The rule has been clarified to make it clear that r 36.2 applies to a reserved decision delivered by a registrar or judicial officer on behalf of the judicial officer that heard the proceedings.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.4

[r 36.4.20]

RULE 36.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 36.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 36.4.40] Date of effect of judgment or order can be earlier or later ...................................................................... [r 36.4.60] Interest after an appeal ............................................................................................................................ [r 36.4.80] Order for payment of costs – interest .................................................................................................... [r 36.4.100] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 36.4.1000]

[r 36.4.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 40 r 3 and has the same effect as that rule. The drafting has been varied so that the provisions relating to judgments and orders have been combined, and the provisions relating to costs orders has been updated to refer to cost assessment rather than taxation of costs. In the District Court Rules 1973 Pt 13 r 13A(2), which relates to interest, specified that judgment takes effect on the day when it is entered or given. See also DCR Pt 2A r 7(3) and LCR Pt 3 r 8(3), which stated that reserved judgments take effect on the date when they are read. As there was no equivalent to subr (2) in the District Court, interest on costs (to be assessed) used to run from the date of the costs order rather than when the costs were assessed or taxed. The District Court and Local Court did not have any power to vary the date that a judgment or order took effect. [r 36.4.40]

Operation

The main reason for determining when a judgment or order takes effect is in determining the amount of interest that is payable. The period for which pre-judgment interest may be payable under CPA s 100 terminates on the date that the judgment “takes effect”. Thereafter interest under CPA s 101 becomes payable (ie interest on the judgment debt). The date on which a judgment or order “takes effect” is either the date when the judgment or order is given (or pronounced) in court, or, if the judgment or order is not pronounced in court but is made in chambers or in the absence of the parties, when entered (as per r 36.11), or in the case of an order for costs which proceeds to being assessed, on the date the costs assessor’s certificate is filed pursuant to r 36.10. The court may nevertheless order that interest should run from a different date to the date that the judgment or order takes effect: CPA s 101(2)(b). [r 36.4.60]

Date of effect of judgment or order can be earlier or later

Subrule (3) allows the court to make an additional order to the effect that the judgment or order takes effect from a date earlier or later than the date when the order or judgment is given or entered. Equivalent rules have been interpreted as authorising the court to antedate a judgment only on some good ground, that is, where there is something exceptional in the facts. The principle is that justice requires it: Re Keystone Knitting Mills’ Trademark [1929] 1 Ch 92 at 98. The most common case in which an order will be antedated is where a party has died after the case has been heard and whilst judgment is reserved: see Turner v London & Southwestern Railway Co (1874) LR 17 Eq 561; Ecroyd v Coulthard [1897] 2 Ch 554. In Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Healey (No 2) (1991) 22 NSWLR 380 at 387, which related to interest on a refund of part of a judgment debt before a succesful appeal, Kirby P said that the rule allows the court to do what is just in a particular case where the usual position would produce unfairness. In Belgian Grain Produce Co v Cox & Co [1919] WN 317, the English Court of Appeal ruled that a similar provision must be used with great caution and something exceptional must be shown before a judgment is antedated. Where a judgment or order provides that judgment be entered for damages to be assessed, there is an implicit order that the judgment takes effect at a later date, that being the date when the damages have been assessed. [r 36.4.80]

Interest after an appeal

If a judgment has been appealed, the general rule is that the judgment takes effect from the date on which the sum of money which is awarded on the final appeal became payable for the first time. Thus, where a plaintiff succeeds at trial and that judgment is upheld, the date on which the judgment takes effect is the date of the original judgment. If judgment is varied on the appeal interest runs on the amount as varied from the date of the original judgment: Nicholson v Nicholson (1994) 35 NSWLR 308. If the plaintiff fails at trial but is 834

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 1 – General

[r 36.4.1000]

r 36.5

awarded damages on appeal, interest runs from the date of the appeal judgment. If the Court of Appeal substitutes a judgment its order normally makes it clear from when the judgment takes effect. [r 36.4.100]

Order for payment of costs – interest

If the court assesses or the parties agree to costs at a specific sum and an order for costs is made for a specific sum, then there might be an expectation that this would be the day from which interest on those costs would run, however the exclusion of costs orders in subs (1) of CPA s 101 means that no interest is payable unless a specific order for interest is made under subs (4): Spedding v Nobles (No 2) (2007) 69 NSWLR 100; [2007] NSWCA 87 at [15]. In light of Spedding v Nobles, a party entitled to a costs order who has already paid the costs as between the client and the legal practitioners can and should apply for an order to be made under CPA s 101(4). If such an order is made, interest on costs will run on those costs, whether as assessed or agreed, from when those costs were paid by the client. The court may vary the operation of an order made under CPA s 101(4) by specifying that the interest should run from some later date; for instance, if the client paid an amount on account of costs to be incurred when instructions were given, the court may order that interest should run from a date when the solicitor would have been entitled to render an account for those services. For an example of how an order for interest on costs could be framed, see Abraham v St Mark’s Orthodox Coptic College (No 3) [2008] NSWSC 1027. If there has been an agreement as to costs as between the parties and those costs are not payable immediately, the agreement should be included in a consent order which makes provision for the payment of interest on those costs. [r 36.4.1000]

References

See commentary at [r Pt42.660]. Interest after judgment: CPA s 101. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 40 r 3; DCR Pt 31 r 13A(2). See also FCR rr 35.3, 36.6; HCR rr 8.02, 8.06.02. Compare with English Civil Procedure Rules 1998 r 40.7: the power to antedate a judgment has been taken away, but the court has power to order that a judgment take effect at some later date. 36.5

Time for compliance with judgments and orders

(cf SCR Part 40, rule 4; DCR Part 31, rule 12)

(1) If a judgment or order requires a person to do an act within a specified time, the court may, by order, require the person to do the act within another specified time. (2) If a judgment or order requires a person: (a) to do an act forthwith or forthwith on a specified event, or (b) to do an act but does not specify a time within which he or she is required to do the act, the court may, by order, require the person to do the act within a specified time.

RULE 36.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 36.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 36.5.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 36.5.1000]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

835

UCPR Parts 31-40

The effect of subr (2), rr 36.10 and 36.11, and CPA s 101(4) and (5) is that, unless the court specifies that the costs order takes effect from some other date, or makes an order that interest on costs should run from another date, the costs order will take effect, and interest on those costs will run, from the date that the certificate of assessment is filed in a registry. If the costs cannot be agreed and need to be assessed, interest only runs from when the costs assessment certificate is lodged at a registry under r 36.10.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.6

[r 36.5.20]

[r 36.5.20]

Comparison

This rule is to the same effect as SCR Pt 40 r 4 and DCR Pt 31 r 12. The only changes are as to drafting style. SCR Pt 40 r 4 and DCR Pt 31 r 12 were in identical terms. [r 36.5.40]

Operation

This rule allows the court to set a date by which an order must be complied with. This applies to mandatory injunctions, as well as procedural directions made in the proceedings. The rule allows any date so set to be changed. Subrule (2) clarifies the court’s power to specify a time under subr (1) even if the original order only specified that it be done “forthwith” or did not specify a particular time. An order that does not specify when something has to be done by or is ambiguous as to when it has to be done, may not be enforceable until this has been clarified by a later order: Wyszynski v Bill [2005] NSWSC 110. [r 36.5.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 40 r 4; DCR Pt 31 r 12. See also FCR r 35.4; HCR r 8.05. 36.6

Judicial notice to be taken of orders and undertakings

(cf SCR Part 40, rule 10; DCR Part 31, rule 14; LCR Part 26, rule 5)

(1) In any proceedings, the court may take judicial notice of: (a) any order made by the court, or by any other court, and (b) any undertaking given to the court, or to any other court. (2) In any proceedings, the court may be informed of an order or undertaking by (among other things) reference to: (a) a note made by the judicial officer making the order or accepting the undertaking, or by his or her associate or by any other proper officer, or (b) a note made by the registrar or other officer making the order or accepting the undertaking.

RULE 36.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 36.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 36.6.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 36.6.1000]

[r 36.6.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 40 r 10. Similar provisions in DCR Pt 31 r 14 and LCR Pt 26 r 12 referred to judicial notice of orders of the court, but did not refer to undertakings given to the court. This rule has been expanded so that the court can now take judicial notice of an order or undertaking to the court, whether that order was made, or the undertaking given in the current court or in another court. [r 36.6.40]

Operation

In practice it will not normally be necessary to refer to a note of an order or undertaking as all orders should be recorded and entered pursuant to r 36.11, and all undertakings that relate to an order will be recorded in the same way. [r 36.6.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 40 r 10; DCR Pt 31 r 14; LCR Pt 26 r 12. See also FCR r 35.9.

836

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 1 – General

[r 36.7.1000]

36.7

r 36.7

Payment of interest

(cf SCR Part 40, rule 7)

(1) The prescribed rate at which interest is payable under section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (a) (b)

in respect of the period from 1 January to 30 June in any year—the rate that is 6% above the cash rate last published by the Reserve Bank of Australia before that period commenced, and in respect of the period from 1 July to 31 December in any year—the rate that is 6% above the cash rate last published by the Reserve Bank of Australia before that period commenced.

[Subr (1) subst Rule 172 of 2010, Sch 1[5]]

(2) The Local Court may not order the payment of interest up to judgment in any proceedings in which the amount claimed is less than $1,000. [Subr (2) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]; insrt Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[42]] [R 36.7 am Rule 172 of 2010; Rule 579 of 2007; Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 36.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 36.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 36.7.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 36.7.1000]

[r 36.7.20]

Comparison

This rule was amended, to take effect from 1 July 2010. Prior to amendment this rule provided a reference to a Schedule that set out prescribed rates of interest on judgment for various periods (Sch 5). [r 36.7.40]

Operation

The interest rate on a judgment is not determined by the rate applicable when the judgment was given, but the rate or rates that apply from time to time until the judgment is paid: see Heydon v NRMA (2001) 53 NSWLR 600; [2001] NSWCA 445 for discussion on application of interest. Before 1 July 2010 post judgment interest rates were prescribed by the UCPR Rule Committee and published in UCPR Sch 5. The rates of interest in Sch 5 were set having regard to the Reserve Bank cash rate, commercial rates of interest as set by the major banks, as well as the rates of interest being applied by courts in other states and by the Federal Court. There was no prescribed formula but the object was to set a rate which compensated plaintiffs for the loss or detriment suffered by being kept out of their money during the relevant period (MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203; 98 ALR 193 at 663 (CLR)), but which did not punish the judgment debtor (Batchelor v Burke (1981) 148 CLR 448; 55 ALJR 494; 35 ALR 15 at 455 (CLR)). The rate should encourage the judgment debtor to pay the judgment debt but not provide a windfall to the judgment creditor. From 1 July 2010 this rule was amended so that interest is calculated, as specified by the rule, based on the Reserve Bank cash rate. This rule was amended to implement recommendations of the Council of Chief Justice’s Rules Harmonisation Committee with the intent of eventually having the same interest rate apply to judgments in all Australian jurisdictions. Schedule 5 has been omitted from the UCPR but should still be used to calculate interest that may have accrued on judgments before 1 July 2010. The court may order that interest be applied to the judgment at a specific rate: CPA s 101(1). This will usually only be done if there was a higher rate of interest specified in the contract upon which the judgment is based. Generally the court will not specify a rate of interest and the prescribed rate of interest will apply. [r 36.7.1000]

References

Superseded legislation: SCA s 95; DCA s 85; LCA s 39; superseded rules: SCR Pt 40 r 7(2); LCR Pt 13 r 3; UCPR Sch 5. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

837

UCPR Parts 31-40

is:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.8

[r 36.7.1000]

See also HCR r 8.06; FCR r 35.8. 36.8

Possession of land

(cf SCR Part 40, rule 11)

Unless the court orders otherwise, judgment for possession of land may not be given or entered against a defendant in his or her absence unless the plaintiff files an affidavit: (a) stating that, when the originating process was filed or (if the claim for possession arises from an amendment to the originating process) when the amendment was made: (i) specified persons (other than parties to the proceedings) had been in occupation of the whole or any part of the land, or (ii) no persons (other than parties to the proceedings) had been in occupation of the whole or any part of the land, and (b) stating that, as to each person specified in accordance with paragraph (a)(i) (other than a person whose occupation the plaintiff does not seek to disturb): (i) the originating process has been duly served on the person, or (ii) the person has, since the time referred to in paragraph (a), ceased to be in occupation of any part of the land, and (c) in relation to a claim for possession by reason of default in the payment of money, stating particulars of the default.

RULE 36.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 36.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 36.8.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 36.8.1000]

[r 36.8.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 40 r 11. The rule has been varied in that SCR Pt 40 r 11 required the affidavit to “show” which persons were occupiers and “prove” that they had been served or ceased to be in occupation. The rule now only requires that this be “stated”. [r 36.8.40]

Operation

Most judgments for possession of land are default judgments pursuant to Pt 16 r 4. That rule requires compliance with this rule. This rule will also apply to a judgment entered pursuant to Pt 16 r 10. The rule also applies to proceedings that have been listed for hearing and where the defendant has failed to appear. The court may dispense with the rule, but would normally only do so if the court can be satisfied of the matters governed by the rule in some other way. Although the rule no longer requires the plaintiff to prove that occupiers have been served or have ceased to be in possession, the affidavit should include reference to the deponent’s source of knowledge as to the statements regarding the occupiers. See [r 16.4.80] and [r 16.4.100] for discussion about serving occupiers. If the claim for possession is based on a default in the payment of money (as for instance where the relevant land is subject to a mortgage), this rule requires an affidavit giving particulars of the default; generally all payments and when they were made should be listed as well as all overdue and unpaid scheduled payments. The approved form of notice of motion for default judgment for possession of land (Form 36) includes an optional paragraph to set out the particulars of the default (or annex a schedule); if this optional paragraph is included the deponent is also required to state the source of knowledge relating to the default. [r 36.8.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 40 r 7.

838

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 1 – General

[r 36.9.1000]

36.9

r 36.10

Arrest warrants

An arrest warrant issued by order of the court must be signed by a judicial officer or by a registrar.

Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 36.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 36.9.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 36.9.1000]

[r 36.9.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule. [r 36.9.40]

Operation

In the Supreme Court and District Court, bench warrants are usually signed by the relevant judge. The court can however direct that an arrest warrant be issued, and this would authorise a registrar to issue the warrant. Arrest warrants issued after an examinee has failed to appear in respect of an examination order under Pt 38 may be issued by the registrar in the District Courts; the registrar does not have delegated authority to issue the warrant in these circumstances in the Supreme Court: Delegations to Registrar under the Civil Procedure Act. Other registry officers cannot sign an arrest warrant. The approved form for an arrest warrant is Form 58. [r 36.9.1000]

References

CPA s 97. Approved form of warrant: Form 57. 36.10 Filing of cost assessors’ certificates (cf SCR Part 40, rule 12)

(1) A cost assessor’s certificate: (a) may be filed in the proceedings to which it relates, or (b) may be filed in fresh proceedings, whether in the same court or another court. (2) A number of certificates may be filed together under subrule (1) if each of the certificates: (a) relates to the same costs assessment, and (b) requires the same person or persons to pay costs. [Subr (2) subst Rule 678 of 2010, Sch 1]

(3) The certificate or certificates must be accompanied by an affidavit, sworn not more than 14 days before the certificate or certificates are filed, stating: (a) if some of the costs specified in the certificate or certificates have been paid—the amount of the costs that have been paid, or (b) that none of the costs specified in the certificate or certificates have been paid. [Subr (3) subst Rule 622 of 2016, r 3(1); am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[6]; insrt Rule 678 of 2010, Sch 1] Note: The certificate or certificates will, from the date of filing, be taken to be a judgment of the court under the legal costs legislation (as defined in section 3A of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014) for the amount of costs that have not been paid. [R 36.10 am Rule 622 of 2016, r 3(2); Act 7 of 2015; Rule 678 of 2010]

RULE 36.10 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 36.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 36.10.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 36.10.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

839

UCPR Parts 31-40

RULE 36.9 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.11

[r 36.10.20]

[r 36.10.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 40 r 12, and sets out the procedure for lodging a costs assessment certificate for enforcement purposes. There were no equivalent rules in the District Court or Local Court. The rule has been amended to make it applicable to all courts, and does not refer to specific legislation. Subrule (3) of SCR Pt 40 r 12, which related to referring to the persons on the certificate as plaintiff and defendant has not been included in this rule. [r 36.10.40]

Operation

Legal Profession Act 2004 s 368 makes provision for filing a copy of a costs assessment certificate in a court having jurisdiction to order the payment of that amount of money. The certificate is taken to be a judgment of that court for the amount of unpaid costs. If the certificate relates to a costs order of a proceeding in the court, the certificate can be filed in that proceeding, but the certificate can also be filed in another court, and if this is done the registry will allocate a new proceedings number. If the certificate relates to costs as between a legal practitioner and client, the certificate will always be filed in a new proceeding, even if the costs relate to an existing proceeding. Pursuant to r 36.11(3) a certificate filed pursuant to this rule will be recorded as a judgment of the court. The party seeking to recover the costs should file an affidavit as to the amount of unpaid costs as of the date when the certificate is filed. It would be inappropriate to file a certificate without an accompanying affidavit if any amounts have been paid in respect of the costs, as judgment will be entered on the assumption that no such sums have been paid. Such an irregularity may disentitle the party seeking to recover the costs from enforcing the judgment: Patterson v Cohen [2006] NSWSC 424. If an application for a writ for levy of property is subsequently made a further affidavit of the current debt will need to be filed: r 39.4(4). A filing fee is payable – see: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 1 Pt 5 Item 3. Approved Form 45 can be used as a cover or backing sheet when the certificate is filed. [r 36.10.1000]

References

See also r 36.11(2) and CPA s 133(2). Superseded rule: SCR Pt 40 r 12. Legal Profession Act 2004: s 368. Superseded legislation: Legal Profession Act 1987: ss 208J, 208JA, 208KF and 208KH.

DIVISION 2 – ENTRY OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS 36.11

Entry of judgments and orders

(cf SCR Part 41, rule 11)

(1) Any judgment or order of the court is to be entered. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the court’s computerised court record system. [Subr (2) subst Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[9]]

(2A) If the court directs that a judgment or order be entered forthwith, the judgment or order is taken to be entered: (a) when a document embodying the judgment or order is signed and sealed by a registrar, or (b) when the judgment or order is recorded as referred to in subrule (2), whichever first occurs. [Subr (2A) insrt Rule 717 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[9]]

(3) In this rule, a reference to a judgment or order of the court includes a reference to any judgment, order, determination, decree, adjudication or award that has been filed or registered in the court, or of which a certificate has been filed or registered in the court, as referred to in section 133(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. 840

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 2 – Entry of judgments and orders

[r 36.11.50]

r 36.11

(4) This rule does not limit the operation of rule 36.10. [Subr (4) insrt Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[8]] [R 36.11 am Rule 494 of 2008; Rule 391 of 2006; Rule 717 of 2005]

Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 36.11.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 36.11.40] Distinction between making and entry of orders .................................................................................... [r 36.11.50] Procedure for entry – old procedure ...................................................................................................... [r 36.11.60] Supreme Court procedure ...................................................................................................................... [r 36.11.61] District Court and Local Court procedure ............................................................................................... [r 36.11.62] Procedure for entry – new procedure ..................................................................................................... [r 36.11.80] Applying to vary a judgment or order that has been entered less than 14 days beforehand ............. [r 36.11.100] References .......................................................................................................................................... [r 36.11.1000]

[r 36.11.20]

Comparison

The rule that specified when Supreme Court judgments and orders needed to be entered was SCR Pt 41 r 11; there were no equivalent rules in the District Court or Local Court. Subrule (1) of this rule now requires all orders and judgment to be entered; SCR Pt 41 r 11 specified that certain interlocutory orders did not need to be entered. The rule that specified the mode of entry of judgments and orders was SCR Pt 41 r 13; there were no rules relating to entry in the District Court or Local Court. The procedure in the Supreme Court required the order or judgment to be included in a document. The judgment or order was entered when a registrar (or other authorised officer) sealed the document. The mode of entry as prescribed by subr (2) is by recording the order or judgment on the registry’s computer system. Rule 2A also provides for entry by signing and sealing a document, when the court has ordered that the order be entered forthwith. In the Supreme Court SCR Pt 41 r 13(3) specified that subject to certain exceptions, orders and judgments were not to be entered unless the court directed that they be entered or one of the parties applied for the order or judgment to be entered. This restriction no longer applies to entering judgments and orders. The rules relating to the parties filing a minute of the judgment or order and for the registrar settling and signing the judgment or orders (SCR Pt 41 rr 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9) have not been carried forward to these rules. Subrule (3) is a new provision that clarifies the operation of this rule with respect to judgments and other awards and certificates from other tribunals or external bodies that are filed at the court for the purposes of enforcement. Subrule (4) requires that this rule be read with r 36.10 (in relation to costs assessment certificates). [r 36.11.40]

Operation

All judgments and orders will now be entered without any need for a party to apply for entry. If the order or judgment is announced in court entry may occur at the same time as the judgment or order is announced or immediately after the order or judgment is announced, or the judgment or order may be recorded after the court has adjourned. The court may however direct when an order is made that its subsequent recording on the computer system not be taken to constitute entry. This will be a rare occurrence, such as where the court is on notice that the terms of the order may require amendment. The court could at a later stage then direct that the order previously recorded be entered. If an order needs to be entered urgently then this may be effected by the registrar signing and sealing a document that sets out the terms of the order. Judgments and orders may be entered by the judicial officer or registrar that makes the order or judgment, the judicial officer’s associate or a registry officer. [r 36.11.50]

Distinction between making and entry of orders

This rule retains the distinction between the giving or making of judgments or orders, and the entry or perfection of those judgments or orders, although in practice entry may be virtually contemporaneous with the making of the order. As such the existing body of jurisprudence in relation to the setting aside or variation of entered orders applies. The circumstances in which perfected orders may be set aside or varied are more limited than those in which an unentered order may be set aside or varied. In Sirius Shipping Corp v The Ship Sunrise [2006] NSWSC 1393, it was held that an order dismissing the proceedings which had been entered by © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

841

UCPR Parts 31-40

RULE 36.11 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.11

[r 36.11.50]

entry into the registry’s computer system could not be set aside. Subrules 36.16(3A) and (3B) were introduced to give the court and the parties a 14 day window to consider the terms of an order or judgment made in court; during this period the jurisprudence that applied to unentered orders will apply in relation to an application to set aside or vary the orders. For more detailed commentary see r 36.16. [r 36.11.60]

Procedure for entry – old procedure

The procedure for recording and entering orders and judgments was different in the Supreme Court to the procedure in the District Court and Local Court. [r 36.11.61]

Supreme Court procedure

After a hearing, the terms of the judgment or orders were recorded by the associate of the presiding judge or master, either on the court file cover or on a separate “associate’s record of the proceedings” or both. The terms of an order could be recorded on a separate document (usually prepared by one of the parties) referred to as the short minutes of order. As a method of recording the orders made, the associate’s notes could refer to “orders being made as per the short minutes of order”. The short minutes of order were usually identified by being dated and possibly signed or initialled by the judge or master. The relevant file (and/or “associate’s record”) was referred to the registry and registry staff would record the order or judgment on the registry computer system (“Courtnet”). If the order was a winding up order under the Corporations Law or required the registry to transfer the proceedings to another court, a form of the order would be prepared by the registry, and entered by signing and sealing the form. Although SCR Pt 41 r 11 required that final orders and judgments were to be entered, this was commonly not done, unless enforcement action was required or an appeal was filed. The registry was prohibited from entering an order unless the court directed entry, or one of the parties applied. To have an order or judgment entered one of the parties would lodge a draft form (or minute) of the judgment or order in duplicate. The draft minute was supposed to have been served on the other parties at least 2 days before it was lodged: SCR Pt 41 r 3(2). Most judgments and orders were entered by a chief clerk. Although the rules provided for settling the minute of judgment or order at an appointment with the parties (SCR Pt 41 rr 4, 5), in practice this was not done. The current practice in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court, where the more complex orders are made, has been for the parties to be directed to bring in short minutes of order, which are settled by the judicial officer before announcing the order. The chief clerk compared the draft minute of judgment or order with the court file and/or the Courtnet record, and if satisfied that the draft minute set out the terms of the relevant judgment or order would sign and seal the minute. This effected entry. One copy of the signed minute would be retained on file as the original, and the other would be returned to the party that filed the draft minute. Orders and judgments made in the absence of the parties, such as default judgments, were made and entered when a draft minute of the judgment or order was signed and sealed by a chief clerk or registrar. Subsequently the default judgment or order was recorded on Courtnet. The signed and sealed minute of the judgment or order became the formal record of the judgment or order. [r 36.11.62]

District Court and Local Court procedure

In the District Court and Local Court there was no formal procedure for entry of judgments. The practice in those courts was that a judgment was effective from when it was pronounced, and formal entry was not required to perfect the judgment. However, a judgment could not be enforced until the registry had some record that the relevant judgment had been made. Although all District Court registries and most Local Courts have recorded their judgments and orders on a computer system for some years, this was not regarded as the official court record. The associate’s note of the judgment on the court file, signed or initialled by the judge, or the magistrate’s notes kept with the court file were regarded as the official court record. This recording of the judgment probably constituted the “perfection” of the judgment for the purposes of the test in Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; 45 ALJR 598. See [r 36.16.60]. The entry of a default judgment was usually noted on the application for default judgment or affidavit of debt. Minutes or certificates of judgment were not produced as a matter of course in the District Court or Local Court, and were typically only required if the judgment was to be enforced in another jurisdiction, an appeal had been filed or if bankruptcy proceedings were contemplated. [r 36.11.80]

Procedure for entry – new procedure

This rule now specifies that generally entry occurs when the judgment or order is recorded on the registry computer system. It is no longer necessary for a hardcopy form of the judgment or order to be prepared or 842

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 2 – Entry of judgments and orders

[r 36.11.1000]

r 36.11

This rule attempts to reconcile the different practices in each jurisdiction, and anticipates the future implementation of a comprehensive electronic case management system (“JusticeLink”) that will allow at least some court proceedings to be conducted without reliance on a physical paper file. Undefended proceedings in the Supreme Court Possession List that are commenced by filing an electronic statement of claim (using a prototype version of JusticeLink) are now being processed electronically, including the entry of default judgment. A paper file is not created until a defence is filed or an application made to set aside default judgment. The electronic record of an order or judgment will now be regarded as the court record rather than any document or note on the court’s paper file; this may take the form of an electronic document or may be recorded simply as text. It is expected that computer terminals will be installed in courtrooms once the new JusticeLink computer registry system is implemented. Although orders and judgments made in court will continue to be recorded on paper by many associates and recorded later on the computer system, the new JusticeLink computer system will allow the associate or judicial officer to directly record the proposed orders in chambers before court, or in court when settling the proposed orders. The proposed orders will be able to be viewed and edited by the judicial officer before it is saved. The judicial officer will therefore have the opportunity to effect entry of the judgment or order after its content has been confirmed, when or shortly after it is announced in court. It is also expected that there will be a facility which will allow parties to file short minutes of order electronically so that the terms of those short minutes can be edited by the judicial officer or the associate for inclusion in the final terms of the judgment or order. When an order or judgment is made in the absence of the public, such as default judgments and consent orders, the judicial officer or registrar that makes the order need not record it directly onto the computer system and may record that the order is made by annotating and signing the relevant notice of motion or signing a minute of order. This will operate as an instruction to the judicial officer’s associate or to a registry officer that the order or judgment is to be entered. The current practice of the Supreme Court registry is for default judgments and other orders made ex parte by a registrar to be entered pursuant to r 36.11(2A)(a); the registrar making an ancillary order that the judgment or order be entered forthwith. A form of the judgment or order (in Form 43) should be submitted in duplicate with the application. One copy will be signed and sealed (constituting entry), and the other copy will be signed and dated with the date of entry and returned to the applicant. If a sealed copy of the judgment or order is required then this must be specified in the application or an accompanying document. A fee of $48 will be payable if a sealed copy of the judgment or order is required by the applicant: r 36.12(1) and (1A). [r 36.11.100]

Applying to vary a judgment or order that has been entered less than 14 days beforehand

A party can apply to set aside or vary an entered judgment or order on the same basis as if the judgment or order had not been entered provided a notice of motion to do so is filed within 14 days of the date of entry: r 36.16(3A). However the court has no power to extend this 14 day period: r 36.16(3C); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Meredith (No 2) (2008) 75 NSWLR 462; [2008] NSWCA 133. If the terms of the orders that have been made are complex or may be contentious it will be appropriate to either seek a direction that the orders not be regarded as entered, on the basis that short minutes be prepared and confirmed prior to a further direction of the court that the orders be entered, or for liberty to apply in relation to the orders within a reasonable period of time, usually 28 days. [r 36.11.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 41 rr 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13. Compare with the procedure provided by Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) O 60.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

843

UCPR Parts 31-40

sealed for entry to occur. However, if an order needs to be entered urgently entry may be effected by signing and sealing a document which sets out the terms of the judgment or order. The current practice of the Supreme Court registry is to require applicants for default judgments and other ex parte orders to lodge a form of judgment or order in duplicate with the relevant application, which can be signed and sealed by the registrar (and thus entered), with a copy of the signed document being returned to the applicant as advice that the judgment or order has been made and entered.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.12

[r 36.12.20]

DIVISION 3 – COPIES AND SERVICE 36.12

Registrar to furnish copies of judgments and other documents

(cf SCR Part 41, rule 15; DCR Part 31, rule 16; LCR Part 26, rule 7)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, on payment of the fee prescribed by the regulations under the Civil Procedure Act 2005, the registrar must: (a) furnish a sealed copy of any judgment or order that has been entered in the proceedings to any person who applies for such a copy, or (b) seal a document provided by the person that, in the opinion of the registrar, accurately sets out the terms of the judgment or order. [Subr (1) subst Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

(1A) A document sealed by a registrar in accordance with subrule (1)(b) is taken to be a sealed copy of the relevant judgment or order. [Subr (1A) insrt Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, on payment of the fee prescribed by the regulations under the Civil Procedure Act 2005, the registrar: (a) must furnish to any party to any proceedings, and (b) may furnish to any other person appearing to have a sufficient interest in the proceedings, a copy of any pleading or other document that has been filed in the proceedings. (3) Despite subrules (1) and (2), the registrar must not furnish a copy of an adoption order made in proceedings under the Adoption Act 2000 to any person, except the plaintiff in those proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise. [R 36.12 am Rule 96 of 2006]

RULE 36.12 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 36.12.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 36.12.40] Applying for a sealed copy of a judgment or order ................................................................................ [r 36.12.60] Applying for a copy of a pleading or other document ............................................................................ [r 36.12.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 36.12.1000]

[r 36.12.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 41 r 15. That rule provided for the provision of a “certified copy” or an “office copy” of the judgment or order entered in the proceedings. This requirement has been replaced by providing for a sealed copy of the judgment or order. This rule also supersedes DCR Pt 31 r 16 and LCR Pt 26 r 7. Those rules provided for the provision of a “certificate of judgment”; there is no corresponding provision in this rule for a certificate of judgment. The certificate of judgment was a document that set out the current debt owed under the judgment; the sealed copy of the judgment that will now be provided will be for the judgment as originally entered. The restriction in DCR Pt 31 r 16(3) and LCR Pt 26 r 7(3) to prevent the issue of a certificate, when the relevant judgment has been stayed is not reflected in this rule. As a matter of practice, any sealed judgment or order issued under this rule will bear a note if the relevant judgment is stayed, or has been set aside or varied by a later judgment or order. The restriction on providing a copy of an adoption order in SCR Pt 41 r 15(3) has been carried over into subr (3). [r 36.12.40]

Operation

This rule now provides for the registry producing a sealed judgment or order on request. Generally, judgments and orders do not need to be served: r 36.14. A form of the order or judgment should only be required if: there is an intention to register the order interstate or overseas for enforcement; there is an intention to take bankruptcy proceedings; the relevant order has to be served on the other party as a term of the relevant order (eg order for substituted service) or; the order is an injunction. The District Court and Local Court will no 844

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 3 – Copies and service

[r 36.12.1000]

r 36.12

longer issue certificates of judgment, but a sealed judgment instead. This will indicate the amount that the judgment was originally entered for; the onus is on the party relying on that judgment in an interstate court or in bankruptcy to advise that court as to the current indebtedness of the judgment debtor under the judgment. If a judgment or order is stayed, or has been set aside or varied by a later order, the form of the judgment or order provided should bear a note to this effect. Applying for a sealed copy of a judgment or order

A fee applies for providing a certified copy of a judgment or order – see: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 1 Pt 5(7). The current practice in the Supreme and District Courts is to require the applicant for a certified copy of a judgment or order to provide a document (in the approved form – Form 43 that sets out the terms of the relevant judgment or order. If a form of the judgment or order has already been issued by the registry, then a sealed copy of that document may be provided instead. The fee for a certified copy of the judgment or order still applies even if the document is prepared by the applicant and that amount should be submitted with the request: r 36.12(1). If a party is applying by notice of motion to be considered in chambers for an order to be made that will require service, copies of the relevant order should be filed with the relevant notice of motion. The fee for a certified copy of the judgment or order is applicable. Parties applying for injunctive relief should, wherever possible, prepare a form of order that embodies the orders that are being applied for. If the application is successful the court can either adopt or vary the orders set out in the draft document, and if the orders are the same the form can be used as a copy to be sealed and served. The judge considering the application, or the registrar entering the injunction, may direct that an electronic copy of the proposed orders (or the orders as made by the judge) be forwarded by email to the judge (via his or her associate), or to the registry. [r 36.12.80]

Applying for a copy of a pleading or other document

Although parties to proceedings are entitled to copies of documents filed in proceedings, non-parties will need to establish “sufficient interest” before copies are provided. A fee applies for providing copies of documents: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 1 Pt 5(7). A non-party seeking copies of documents will need to apply for access to the court file pursuant to Practice Note SC Gen 2 (in the Supreme Court) or Practice Note DC (Civil) No 11 (in the District Court). Those practice notes set out when access to information on court files will normally be granted or refused to non-parties. In summary, access will normally be granted in respect of: • pleadings (unless they have been struck out pursuant to r 14.28) in proceedings that have been concluded, except in so far as an order has been made that they or portions of them be kept confidential; • documents that record what was said, or information that was disclosed in open court; and • documents that were admitted into evidence, unless the judge or registrar dealing with the application considers that the material or portions of it should be kept confidential. Access to other material will not be allowed unless a registrar or judge is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist. Access to affidavits, witness statements or tender bundles (pursuant to Practice Note SC Gen 4) will not normally be granted unless they have been read or tendered in the proceedings. [r 36.12.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 41 r 15; DCR Pt 31 r 16; LCR Pt 26 r 7. Fees: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012. Access to court files: Practice Note SC Gen 2; Practice Note DC (Civil) No 11 (in the District Court). See also UCPR r 14.28 as to orders striking out pleadings.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

845

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 36.12.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.13

36.13

[r 36.13.20]

Registrar to furnish copies of external judgments

(cf SCR Part 41, rule 15A)

(1) In this rule: external judgment, in relation to a court, means: (a) a judgment or order of any other court that is registered or filed in the court under any Act (including any Commonwealth Act), or (b) a cost assessor’s certificate issued otherwise than in relation to proceedings in the court. judgment or order includes: (a) an amendment of or to a judgment or order, and (b) a certificate of a judgment or order. section 21B certificate means a certificate filed in the court under section 21B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914 of the Commonwealth. (2) On payment of the prescribed fee, the registrar: (a) must furnish a certified copy of an external judgment or section 21B certificate: (i) if the external judgment is registered or filed under an order of the court, to any party to the proceedings in which the order for registration was made, and (ii) if the external judgment is registered otherwise than under an order of the court, to the person on whose application registration was effected, and (iii) if the external judgment or section 21B certificate is filed in the court, to any person who filed the judgment or certificate, and (b) may furnish a certified copy of an external judgment or section 21B certificate to any other person appearing to have a sufficient interest in the judgment or certificate. (3) On the certified copy of the external judgment or section 21B certificate concerned, the registrar must endorse a statement that indicates the following matters: (a) the provision under which registration or filing was effected, (b) the date of registration or filing, (c) if registration or filing was effected by means of a faxed copy, that registration or filing was so effected, (d) if registration or filing has been cancelled or has ceased to have effect, the date of cancellation or cessation.

RULE 36.13 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 36.13.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 36.13.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 36.13.1000]

[r 36.13.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on and has the same effect as SCR Pt 41 r 15A. The only changes to wording are minor drafting changes. There were no equivalent rules in the District Court or Local Court rules, although DCR Pt 31 r 16 and LCR Pt 26 r 7 operated to similar effect. [r 36.13.40]

Operation

This rule applies to judgments of other courts registered in the court, and certificates filed under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 21B(3). This rule will mainly apply to judgments registered under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 s 105. Such judgments can be enforced as if they were an order of the court. A certificate issued under s 21B(3) is a certificate that a person is required to pay reparation in respect of a federal offence. 846

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 4 – Setting aside and variation of judgments

[r 36.14.1000]

r 36.15

Such a certificate when registered can be enforced as a judgment of the court. The Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) s 105(3) allows a faxed copy of a judgment to be registered provided an original sealed copy is filed within 7 days. A fee applies to supply a certified copy of an external judgment: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 1 Pt 5(7); r 36.11(3). [r 36.13.1000]

References

See also r 36.11(3). Superseded rule: SCR Pt 41 r 15A.

36.14

Service of judgment or order not required

(cf SCR Part 41, rule 16; DCR Part 31, rule 17; LCR Part 26, rule 8)

A sealed copy of a judgment or order need not be served unless these rules expressly so require or the court so directs.

RULE 36.14 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 36.14.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 36.14.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 36.14.1000]

[r 36.14.20]

Comparison

This rule is to the same effect as SCR Pt 41 r 16, DCR Pt 31 r 17 and LCR Pt 26 r 8, the only difference being that this rule specifies a “sealed copy” rather than a “minute”. [r 36.14.40]

Operation

A judgment or order that can be enforced by way of a writ of execution does not need to be served before enforcement is commenced. If an order requires a person to do an act or refrain from doing an act (ie an injunction), then a sealed copy of the order should be served on the person bound by the order. If the order is not served then it may not be enforceable: rr 40.6 and 40.7. The sealed copy of the order served on a person bound by the order should be endorsed with the notice specified under r 40.7(3). If the court makes an order that affects a non-party, for instance in relation to the administration of an estate, the execution of a trust or the sale of a property, it will normally make a direction for service of the order. A sealed copy of an order for substituted service will normally have to be served, as this will usually be a condition of the order for substituted service. [r 36.14.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 41 r 16; DCR Pt 31 r 17; LCR Pt 26 r 8.

DIVISION 4 – SETTING ASIDE AND VARIATION OF JUDGMENTS 36.15

General power to set aside judgment or order

(cf DCR Part 13, rule 1, Part 31, rule 12A; LCR Part 11, rule 1, Part 26, rule 3)

(1) A judgment or order of the court in any proceedings may, on sufficient cause being shown, be set aside by order of the court if the judgment was given or entered, or the order was made, irregularly, illegally or against good faith. (2) A judgment or order of the court in any proceedings may be set aside by order of the court if the parties to the proceedings consent.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

847

UCPR Parts 31-40

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 21B(3), Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) s 105(3).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.15

[r 36.15.20]

RULE 36.15 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 36.15.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 36.15.40] Where the court may set aside a judgment or order ............................................................................. [r 36.15.60] Setting aside an order by consent ......................................................................................................... [r 36.15.80] Irregular judgments or orders ............................................................................................................... [r 36.15.100] Judgments or orders obtained illegally or against good faith – fraud .................................................. [r 36.15.120] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 36.15.1000]

[r 36.15.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on DCR Pt 31 r 12A and LCR Pt 11 r 1 (which were in identical terms) and there are no effective differences, other than in drafting style. Although this rule excludes the words “on terms”, this is no longer necessary because any order of the court can be made on terms: CPA s 86(2). There was no equivalent rule in the Supreme Court. [r 36.15.40]

Operation

This rule should be read together with r 36.16, which adopts SCR Pt 40 r 9, the rule that governed setting aside or varying judgments and orders in the Supreme Court. Although SCR Pt 40 r 9 limited the power of the Supreme Court to set aside or vary an order or judgment after it had been entered, the Supreme Court nevertheless retained an inherent, although limited jurisdiction to set aside or vary a judgment or order after it had been entered outside the exceptions noted in that rule (see [r 36.16.140]). This rule specifies the criteria that should be applied before a judgment or order is set aside. In the District Court and Local Court, DCR Pt 31 r 12A and LCR Pt 11 r 1 can be considered to be the sole basis for setting aside a judgment or order made in court (there were separate rules for setting aside default judgments: DCR Pt 13 r 1(2); LCR Pt 26 r 4(2)): Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571. It is arguable whether this rule is a complete codification of the grounds for setting aside a judgment or order, or whether the Supreme Court retains some further jurisdiction to set aside or vary judgments. In practice any claim to a right to set aside a judgment or order should be able to be based on one of the criteria under this rule. As the Local Court and District Court regarded their judgments and orders to be effective without requiring formal entry DCR Pt 31 r 12A and LCR Pt 1 r 1 did not distinguish between whether the application to set aside the judgment or order was made before or after entry. On the face of this rule the criteria are applicable even after the judgment or order has been entered. There was no provision in the District Court or Local Court to vary an order or judgment rather than set it aside; however, r 36.16 now provides for varying as well as setting aside judgments and orders in certain circumstances. [r 36.15.60]

Where the court may set aside a judgment or order

Most of the relevant case law and principles in considering when a court may set aside a judgment or order have arisen where the relevant judgment or order has not been entered and these are considered in greater detail at [r 36.16.60] and following. There are very few reported cases that deal with the operation of DCR Pt 31 r 12A (or LCR Pt 11 r 1). In Hoskins v Van Den-Braak (1998) 43 NSWLR 290 the Court of Appeal held that where a cross-defendant and his legal representatives were not served with a cross-claim on which judgment was given against the cross-defendant, prima facie the proceedings, and the judgment are nullities. In that case the cross-respondent was entitled ex debito justitiae to have the judgment set aside unconditionally. In Patrick Stevedores No 1 Pty Ltd v Kilkelly [2004] NSWCA 237 the Court of Appeal held that DCR Pt 31 r 12A did not authorise the trial judge to vary the costs orders taken out in the court below just because they did not reflect the orders made, where there is no finding of irregularity. He may however have been able to set them aside under the slip rule. [r 36.15.80]

Setting aside an order by consent

Subrule (2) provides that an order or judgment may be set aside by consent. However in deciding whether to make such an order the court would have regard to the interests of third parties: Permanent Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Stocks & Holdings (Canberra) Pty Ltd (1976) 15 ACTR 45; 28 FLR 195. An application to set aside or vary a judgment or order by consent should be made by filing a consent order signed by each of the parties. If the order relates to varying a judgment see r 20.33. 848

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 4 – Setting aside and variation of judgments

[r 36.15.1000] [r 36.15.100]

r 36.16

Irregular judgments or orders

See discussion at [r 36.16.220] as to setting aside irregularly entered default judgments. See also Hoskins v Van Den-Braak (1998) 43 NSWLR 290 (referred to at [r 36.16.60]) where the Court of Appeal held the judgment in that case was irregular. Judgments or orders obtained illegally or against good faith – fraud

There has been a limited equitable jurisdiction to set aside a judgment that has been procured by fraud. Kirby P summarised the principles in Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534. The party challenging the judgment must plead fraud as a substantive allegation, the newly discovered facts must be material and go beyond a mere allegation of perjury and it must be inequitable for the party responsible for the fraud to have taken advantage of the judgment. An application to set aside a judgment on the grounds of fraud should be in a separate proceedings commenced by statement of claim: r 6.3(c), and see comments of Kirby P in Wentworth v Rogers (No 5). Subrule (1) is not substantially different from the former DCR Pt 31 r 12A, which it replaces. In dealing with Pt 31 r 12A in Coles v Burke (1987) 10 NSWLR 429, the Court of Appeal held that there is no inherent power in the District Court to set aside a judgment, and the statutory provisions are the only source of such power. The case determined that to bring the rule into play there must be misconduct by the person who procured the judgment. Coles was distinguished by the Court of Appeal in Roach v B & W Steel Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 110, in which it was held that, even where there had been no personal misconduct in the procuring of the judgment, it was “against good faith” for a party to retain the benefit of a judgment after it emerged that the judgment had resulted from an unwitting breach of an agreement as to the course the litigation was to take. Coles and Roach were again considered by the Court of Appeal in Kendell v Carnegie (2006) 68 NSWLR 193; (2006) 68 NSWLR 193. Although procedural irregularity may ground an application to set aside an interlocutory order or a default judgment (although there are general provisions for setting aside these orders in r 36.16), a procedural irregularity will not of itself authorise setting aside a judgment duly entered after a hearing on the merits where the parties were represented and fully heard: Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Heperu Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 78 NSWLR 190; [2009] NSWCA 387. In that case the respondent asserted that the judgment was irregularly entered because the appellant had failed to correctly identify the correct defendant. Despite this irregularity, the Court of Appeal held that CPA s 63(3)(a), which permits the setting aside of a judgment or order where there has been a procedural irregularity, should not be read to include setting aside a judgment after a trial or appeal where the parties have been fully heard. Subrule (1) does not displace the fundamental common law rule that a final judgment formally entered can only be set aside on appeal or in proceedings based on fraud. [r 36.15.1000]

References

Superseded rules; DCR Pt 31 r 12A and LCR Pt 11 r 1. 36.16

Further power to set aside or vary judgment or order

(cf SCR Part 40, rule 9)

(1) The court may set aside or vary a judgment or order if notice of motion for the setting aside or variation is filed before entry of the judgment or order. (2) The court may set aside or vary a judgment or order after it has been entered if: (a) it is a default judgment (other than a default judgment given in open court), or (b) it has been given or made in the absence of a party, whether or not the absent party had notice of the relevant hearing or of the application for the judgment or order, or (c) in the case of proceedings for possession of land, it has been given or made in the absence of a person whom the court has ordered to be added as a defendant, whether or not the absent person had notice of the relevant hearing or of the application for the judgment or order. [Subr (2) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[11]; Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[8] and [9]] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

849

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 36.15.120]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.16

[r 36.16.20]

(3) In addition to its powers under subrules (1) and (2), the court may set aside or vary any judgment or order except so far as it: (a) determines any claim for relief, or determines any question (whether of fact or law or both) arising on any claim for relief, or (b) dismisses proceedings, or dismisses proceedings so far as concerns the whole or any part of any claim for relief. [Subr (3) am Rule 501 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[5]; Rule 449 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[4]; Rule 164 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[10]]

(3A) If notice of motion for the setting aside or variation of a judgment or order is filed within 14 days after the judgment or order is entered, the court may determine the matter, and (if appropriate) set aside or vary the judgment or order under subrule (1), as if the judgment or order had not been entered. [Subr (3A) insrt Rule 449 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

(3B) Within 14 days after a judgment or order is entered, the court may of its own motion set aside or vary the judgment or order as if the judgment or order had not been entered. [Subr (3B) insrt Rule 449 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

(3C) Despite rule 1.12, the court may not extend the time limited by subrule (3A) or (3B). [Subr (3C) insrt Rule 449 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[5]]

(4) Nothing in this rule affects any other power of the court to set aside or vary a judgment or order. [R 36.16 am Rule 501 of 2009; Rule 501 of 2007; Rule 449 of 2007; Rule 327 of 2007; Rule 164 of 2007]

RULE 36.16 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 36.16.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 36.16.40] Judgment or order has not been entered .............................................................................................. [r 36.16.60] Judgment or order has been entered less than 14 days beforehand ................................................... [r 36.16.80] Finality of entered judgments – the general principle .......................................................................... [r 36.16.100] Where an unentered final judgment or order may be set aside .......................................................... [r 36.16.120] Other powers to set aside a judgment or order ................................................................................... [r 36.16.140] Examples where re-opening was denied ............................................................................................. [r 36.16.160] Examples where re-opening was permitted ......................................................................................... [r 36.16.180] Where a judgment or final order may be set aside even though it has been entered ........................ [r 36.16.200] Variation of interlocutory orders ............................................................................................................ [r 36.16.210] Orders made in the absence of a party ............................................................................................... [r 36.16.220] Setting aside an order dismissing the proceedings ............................................................................. [r 36.16.230] Setting aside default judgment ............................................................................................................. [r 36.16.240] Setting aside default judgments obtained irregularly ........................................................................... [r 36.16.260] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 36.16.1000]

[r 36.16.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 40 r 9. Supreme Court Rule Pt 40 r 9 had a separate subr (3) that dealt with orders as distinct from judgments (which were dealt with in subrr (1) and (2)) Subrules (1) and (2) of this rule now deal with judgments and orders. There was no equivalent rule in the District Court or Local Court Rules. Subrules (3A), (3B) and (3C) have been included more recently (September 2007) and there were no equivalent pre-UCPR rules. [r 36.16.40]

Operation

This rule includes several separate and distinct powers to set aside or vary judgments or orders, which are additional to and alternatives to the provisions in the other rules in this part. In summary, the provisions in this rule relate to: • Judgments or orders that have not been entered: subr (1) • Default judgments: subr (2)(a) • Judgments or orders made in the absence of a party: subr (2)(b) and (c) 850

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 36.16.100]

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 4 – Setting aside and variation of judgments

r 36.16

• Interlocutory orders: subr (3) • Judgments or orders that have been entered less than 14 days before: subr (3A) and (3B) Judgment or order has not been entered

This rule gives a general power to set aside or vary a judgment or order before it is entered: subr (1). As to when and how a judgment or order is entered, see [r 36.11.40]. As the procedure for entry of judgments and orders under these rules will generally only allow a relatively short period between when the order or judgment is pronounced until when it is entered, compared to the procedure applicable in the Supreme Court before the operation of these rules, subr (1) has limited application. An application under subr (1) must be made as soon as possible after the judgment or order is pronounced. It may be almost impossible to file a notice of motion in time, unless the court has directed that the judgment or order is not to be entered forthwith. An oral application to set aside or vary can be made as soon as the judgment or order is pronounced or an application to defer entry can be made. [r 36.16.80]

Judgment or order has been entered less than 14 days beforehand

The power to set aside an entered judgment or order on application made within 14 days of entry (subr (3A))) or by the court of its own motion within 14 days of entry (subr (3B)) is a new provision. The court has no power to extend time to file an application under subr (3A) or (3B): Subr (3C). This was confirmed by Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Meredith (No 2) (2008) 75 NSWLR 462; [2008] NSWCA 133. If the terms of the orders that have been made are complex or may be contentious it will be appropriate to either seek a direction that the orders not be regarded as entered, on the basis that short minutes be prepared and confirmed prior to a further direction of the court that the orders be entered, or for liberty to apply in relation to the orders within a reasonable period of time, usually 28 days. The provisions in Pt 36 retain the distinction between the giving or making of judgments or orders, and the entry or perfection of those judgments or orders. This was so that the new rules would be consistent with the existing body of jurisprudence on this subject, rather than codifying the circumstances in which judgments might be set aside or varied. It was foreseen that problems could arise under the new regime by virtue of the speed with which orders are entered by being recording in computerised court record systems. In many instances entry of orders is virtually contemporaneous with the making of the orders. The circumstances in which perfected orders may be set aside or varied are more limited than those in which an unentered order may be set aside or varied. In Sirius Shipping Corp v The Ship Sunrise [2006] NSWSC 1393, it was held that an order dismissing the proceedings which had been entered by entry into the registry’s computer system could not be set aside. Under the old Supreme Court provisions, entry of orders was generally left in the hands of the parties and there was time for the parties to absorb the content of the orders and to make an application to vary the terms of the orders before they were entered. Subrules (3A) and (3B) were introduced to give the court and the parties a 14 day window to consider the terms of an order or judgment made in court; during this period the jurisprudence that applied to unentered orders will apply in relation to an application to set aside or vary the orders. It is likely that the perceived risk of the early entry of orders is higher than the reality. Most errors in orders can be corrected by applying the slip rule (rule 31.17 and (3B)) and there is jurisprudence that will often allow orders that have been entered to be set aside or varied – see following commentary. There are nevertheless a small class of cases where, but for these provisions, there would be no remedy other than an appeal to correct an “error” in an entered order. There is a risk that these provisions may encourage applications to “re-open” determined proceedings by applying for a different result after a determination on the merits; however, if there has been a proper determination on the merits, the final order will not be disturbed. [r 36.16.100]

Finality of entered judgments – the general principle

The general principle is that a court has no power to set aside a final judgment once it has been formally recorded or entered, and that this can only be done on an appeal. There is no inherent power to set aside a judgment or order by reason of changed circumstances on an application after the case has been finally disposed of and the orders entered: Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; 45 ALJR 598; Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; 51 ALJR 315; Meehan v Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 146; [2002] NSWCA 22; Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218; [2008] HCA 34. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

851

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 36.16.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.16

[r 36.16.100]

[r 36.16.120] Where an unentered final judgment or order may be set aside While a superior court of record has power to re-examine matters that have been found by it, where an order has not been entered, that jurisdiction is only to be exercised in exceptional cases. The jurisdiction is not to be exercised unless the applicant can show that by accident, without fault on his or her part, they had not been heard: Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672, also applied in Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 at 302 and 303. The applicant must also either show an error in the court’s reasoning because of a misapprehension of the facts and/or an error in the court’s reasoning because of some misapprehension of the relevant law: R v Giri (No 2) [2001] NSWCCA 234; Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council; State Rail Authority (NSW) v Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 29; 56 ALJR 800, Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2). [r 36.16.140] Other powers to set aside a judgment or order The Supreme Court has an inherent power to set aside a judgment or order in certain circumstances over and above the powers provided for by this rule: where the orders do not truly represent what the court had intended to pronounce; where the order or judgment at issue is directly contrary to the court’s intention, the test of necessity governing the scope of the inherent jurisdiction may extend to protecting the integrity of the administration of justice and/or to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice: Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd v The J Aron Corp (2007) 70 NSWLR 411; [2007] NSWCA 195. See, however, the strong views against such a residual power expressed in Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218; [2008] HCA 34. [r 36.16.160] Examples where re-opening was denied Where the ground was that the court misconstrued a section of legislation, this was said to be an attempt to re-argue the substantial question decided in the appeal after hearing full argument from counsel for the parties: Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672. Where the grounds are an allegation of bias against the court or allegations of mistaken findings of fact, the proper procedure is to seek special leave to appeal from the High Court: Wentworth v Rogers (No 9) (1987) 8 NSWLR 388 at 395. Where what is occurring is the re-agitation of arguments already considered by the court: Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 at 302. Where the parties have been sufficiently heard on the impugned issue: Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2). Where even if there be the possibility of some misapprehension on the court’s part as to the facts or relevant law, this misapprehension can be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the re-hearing. The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to re-argue their cases: Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) per Mason CJ at 303. [r 36.16.180]

Examples where re-opening was permitted

Where costs issue was overlooked by counsel: De L v Department of Community Services (NSW) (1997) 190 CLR 207; [1997] HCA 14. Where the court’s reasons for judgment inadvertently did not deal with important matters argued by counsel at the hearing where an appeal to correct this would involve inevitable delay: Twenty-First Australia Inc v Shade Matter No 2428/98 [1998] NSWSC 380. Where the court’s reasons involve “infelicity of expression and ambiguous statements” which may be corrected by the trial judge upon the bringing in of short minutes: Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) (1998) 29 ACSR 290. Where the trial judge recalled his order after deciding it was wrong immediately after making it: Pittalis v Sherefettin [1986] QB 868. [r 36.16.200]

Where a judgment or final order may be set aside even though it has been entered An error arising from an accidental slip or omission may be corrected at any time by further order in the action: L Shaddock & Assoc Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590; 56 ALJR 875; 43 ALR 473 at 594-595 (CLR). See [r 36.17.60]. An order may be made in the action for the correction of the records of the court to make certain that they truly represented what the court had pronounced or had intended 852

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 36.16.240]

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 4 – Setting aside and variation of judgments

r 36.16

to pronounce: Ainsworth v Wilding [1896] 1 Ch 673 at 678-679; Ivanhoe Gold Corp Ltd v Symonds (1906) 4 CLR 642 at 669. An order can be reconsidered if the matter has not been finally heard and determined according to law: Sirius Shipping Corp v The Ship Sunrise [2007] NSWSC 766. See, however, a conflicting view in the same case: Sirius Shipping Corp v The Ship Sunrise [2006] NSWSC 1393. See also arguments against such a power expressed in Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218; [2008] HCA 34. Variation of interlocutory orders

Interlocutory orders may be varied or set aside in appropriate circumstances: Hutchinson v Nominal Defendant [1972] 1 NSWLR 443. Interlocutory orders relating to practice and procedure, such as timetables for filing and service of documents may be set aside or varied as necessary to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. The court has power and almost a duty to review all interlocutory orders, other than those which decide the rights of parties, so that they may be varied or rescinded whenever circumstances change sufficiently: Wilkshire and Coffey v Commonwealth of Australia (1976) 9 ALR 325 at 331-332; Douglas v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 126 at 134. However, if the purported application to set aside an interlocutory order amounts to an appeal against the original decision it will not be permitted: Director of Public Prosecutions v Geraghty [2000] NSWSC 228. If an interlocutory decision intending to govern the rights of the parties or the conduct of the proceedings has been made after a contested hearing the court will be reluctant to vary the order unless there has been a material change in circumstances: Hillston v Bar-Mordecai [2002] NSWSC 477. [r 36.16.220]

Orders made in the absence of a party

Before an order is made that will seriously affect a person in her or his property, he or she must be given a reasonable opportunity of appearing and presenting their case: Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1; J v Lieschke (1987) 162 CLR 447; 61 ALJR 143. Persons likely to be adversely affected by orders have a right to be heard: Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571. Where due notice has been given to potentially affected parties or where the urgency of a matter requires the court may proceed to hear and determine proceedings. All parties to the proceedings (including cross-defendants) are entitled to be heard. If a party is absent when the proceedings were determined, they are entitled to apply for the orders to be set aside or varied under subr (2)(b). Subrule (2)(c), which relates to occupiers of land that have been made defendants is a special instance already covered by subr (2)(b). [r 36.16.230]

Setting aside an order dismissing the proceedings

The provisions of subr (2)(b) can apply to an order dismissing proceedings made administratively in the absence of the parties pursuant to r 12.9 (because of inactivity for 9 months in the Local and District Courts) or r 12.8r 12.8 (because of inactivity for 5 months, in the Supreme and Land & Environment Courts): As New Printing Machinery Co Pty Ltd v Hymans Asset Management Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 222. The reference in subr (2)(b) to the absence “of a party” includes the absence of all parties. [r 36.16.240]

Setting aside default judgment

A default judgment is one that has been entered pursuant to Pt 16 of the rules. Before an order is made that will seriously affect a person in her or his property, he or she must be a given a reasonable opportunity of appearing and presenting their case: Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1. If the default judgment was entered regularly in accordance with the rules the court must consider whether there would be some purpose in setting aside the judgment. To establish this, the defendant has to establish a defence on the merits and must explain the delay in filing a defence: Cohen v McWilliam (1995) 38 NSWLR 476; 128 FLR 263. See also National Australia Bank v Cavill Proteas Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 703 and Malak v Pepsico Australia Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 85. Each case will depend on its own facts, and the question whether the delay can be adequately compensated for in costs, and whether the explanation for the delay is reasonable, are matters to be considered in the exercise of the court’s discretion: Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 at 480. On an application to set aside a default judgment the plaintiff will not generally be entitled to cross-examine a defendant as to the legitimacy of his or her defence: Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Lanmar Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 549. Cross-examination of the defendant might be appropriate where there is an assertion that the proposed defence is a sham or a fraud and that the application to set aside the default judgment is an abuse of process. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

853

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 36.16.210]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.17

[r 36.16.240]

Rule 36.16(2)(a) expressly excludes default judgments given in open court. This exclusion relates to default judgments given in court usually following an order striking out a defence; this is a relatively common procedure in the Possession List in the Supreme Court. This exclusion only operates if the defendant was at the court when the order was made, otherwise subr 2(b) or 2(c) would apply. If the default judgment is given in open court and the defendant was present, then the defendant has to appeal against the default judgment in the same way as he or she would have to appeal against another decision that was given in open court. In relation to a default judgment given in open court by a judge in the Supreme or District Courts this would be by way of a summons for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal (or if given by an associate judge or registrar, an appeal or review under Pt 49). [r 36.16.260]

Setting aside default judgments obtained irregularly

A default judgment is irregularly obtained where, for example it is entered prematurely, or before actual default is made by the defendant; or where it is entered for too much. Where a judgment is obtained irregularly the defendant is entitled to have the judgment set aside as of right: Johnsen v Duks (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 272; [1963] NSWR 730. A judgment for more than the amount actually due at the time judgment is entered is irregular and will be set aside: HR Turner & Sons Pty Ltd v Rhodes [1970] 1 NSWR 305. [r 36.16.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 40 r 9. 36.17

Correction of judgment or order (“slip rule”)

(cf SCR Part 20, rule 10; DCR Part 17, rule 10; LCR Part 16, rule 10)

If there is a clerical mistake, or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission, in a judgment or order, or in a certificate, the court, on the application of any party or of its own motion, may, at any time, correct the mistake or error.

RULE 36.17 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 36.17.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 36.17.40] Where the slip rule may apply ................................................................................................................ [r 36.17.60] Where the slip rule may not apply ......................................................................................................... [r 36.17.80] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 36.17.1000]

[r 36.17.20] Comparison This rule adopts SCR Pt 20 r 10, DCR Pt 17 r 10 and LCR Pt 16 r 10. The one difference between this rule and SCR Pt 20 r 10 is that SCR Pt 20 r 10 specifies that the mistake, error or omission is in a minute of the judgment or order. The District Court and Local Court provisions, which were in identical terms did not refer to a minute of the judgment or order. Subrule (2) of SCR Pt 20 r 10; DCR Pt 17 r 10 and LCR Pt 16 r 10, which excluded the provisions of certain rules related to the mode of amendment to documents and service of documents has not been carried forward to this rule. [r 36.17.40] Operation This rule empowers the court to correct a clerical mistake in a judgment, order or certificate or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission. Generally the application should be by notice of motion, although if the error or omission is identified immediately after the judgment or order is announced it should be made orally before the court adjourns. In practice, applications under SCR Pt 20 r 10 were limited to applications to amend an order or judgment that had been entered and obvious errors could often be dealt with by filing a consent order without requiring the filing of a notice of motion. Applications to amend a judgment or order that had not been entered were made under SCR Pt 40 r 9 rather than relying upon the slip rule (see comments above regarding r 36.16 which is the corresponding rule in the UCPR). See for example: PM Sulcs and Assoc Pty Ltd v Daihatsu Aust Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 798. The rewording of this rule in relation to the Supreme Court rule now clarifies that the rule extends to the actual order or judgment rather than just relating to the document embodying that judgment or order. 854

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 36 – Judgments and orders Division 4 – Setting aside and variation of judgments

[r 36.18.20]

Where the slip rule may apply

To correct the records of the court to make certain that they truly represented what the court had pronounced or had intended to pronounce: Ainsworth v Wilding [1896] 1 Ch 673 at 678-679; Ivanhoe Gold Corp Ltd v Symonds (1906) 4 CLR 642 at 669. The slip rule extends to authorising corrections resulting from the inadvertence of a party’s legal representatives: L Shaddock & Assoc Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590; 56 ALJR 875; 43 ALR 473 (order amended to include interest); Commonwealth v McCormack (1984) 155 CLR 273 (where there was a failure to order a repayment of money). If the matter had been raised on the hearing if such an order would have been made as of course: Barrell Insurances Pty Ltd v Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd (1983) 58 ALJR 51; 9 ALR 384 (as a result of the failure of the parties to advert to the consequences in relation to costs of the final order made by the High Court in relation to the proceedings before the primary judge in the Supreme Court); Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215; 60 ALJR 49; 62 ALR 527. Matters such as costs or interest on a judgment that are almost always incidentally involved in proceedings may be considered under the slip rule even though they are not specifically raised at the hearing provided the omission was accidental: Storey & Keers Pty Ltd v Johnstone (1987) 9 NSWLR 446. [r 36.17.80]

Where the slip rule may not apply

An omission or mistake should not be treated as accidental if the proposed amendment requires the exercise of an independent discretion or is a matter upon which a real difference of opinion might exist: Storey & Keers Pty Ltd v Johnstone (1987) 9 NSWLR 446. Where the only slip or omission, if there be any, consisted of one on the part of counsel: Brew v Whitlock (No 3) [1968] VR 504 (decided before L Shaddock & Assoc Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590; 56 ALJR 875; 43 ALR 473 and distinguished). Judgments and orders cannot be amended to deal with matters that were not in issue in the proceedings. Such matters must be dealt with by way of appeal: Storey & Keers Pty Ltd v Johnstone (1987) 9 NSWLR 446 at 453. To avoid problems that may arise as to whether the failure of the court to make a specific order as to costs or interests was deliberate or an accidental omission, the omission should be brought to the attention of the court at the earliest opportunity after the judgment is delivered and before the judgment has been entered. [r 36.17.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 20 r 10; DCR Pt 17 r 10; LCR Pt 16 r 10. Compare HCR r 3.01.2. 36.18 Variation of judgment or order against party operating under unregistered business name (cf SCR Part 64, rule 7; DCR Part 46, rule 6; LCR Part 35, rule 6)

(1) In any proceedings in which judgment has been given, or an order made, against a person under a business name, the court may vary the judgment or order so as to make it a judgment or order against the person in the person’s own name. (2) Notice of motion for a direction under subrule (1) must be personally served on the person.

RULE 36.18 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 36.18.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 36.18.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 36.18.1000]

[r 36.18.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on and has the same effect as SCR Pt 64 r 7, DCR Pt 46 r 6 and LCR Pt 35 r 6. These rules were each located in a Part of the rules dealing with Business Names. The other provisions relating to proceeding against business names are now located in Pt 7 Div 5.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

855

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 36.17.60]

r 36.18

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 36.18 [r 36.18.40]

[r 36.18.20] Operation

The rules relating to proceeding against an unregistered business name are in Pt 7 Div 5:. see also r 10.10 as to service requirements. The plaintiff needs leave to proceed against an unregistered business name defendant that has not filed an appearance: r 7.22(2). If leave has been granted default judgment may be entered against the business name. This rule allows the plaintiff to apply, by notice of motion, to substitute the name of the individual defendant or defendants in lieu of the business name, after judgment has been entered against the business name. The notice of motion will be made returnable in court. The proposed individual defendant is to be served personally: subr (2); it is possible however, to apply for substituted service or for service to be dispensed with: r 10.14. [r 36.18.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 64 r 7; DCR Pt 46 r 6; LCR Pt 35 r 6.

856

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 37 – Time to pay and payment by instalments [r Pt37.20]

PART 37 – TIME TO PAY AND PAYMENT BY INSTALMENTS Commentary by Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court. Updated by David Ash, Barrister.

PART 37 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 37

In summary, and subject to qualifications and commentary herein: • A judgment debtor can apply to the relevant court’s registrar for the making of an order that he, she or it pay the judgment debt by instalments. • As a rule of thumb, the higher the court or the greater the amount, the less likely the registrar is to deal with the application in chambers and without hearing the creditor. • An order made in chambers will be either an order granting or an order refusing. An order must be notified to the parties, and either party may make an objection, which objection is heard by the court under r 37.4. As a hearing under r 37.4 is the most likely forum in which both sides will be heard, it is appropriate that the factors to be taken into account – whether by a registrar determining an application without hearing both sides or by a court on a contested hearing – be listed in the commentary thereunder, at [r 37.4.100]. The provisions of Pt 37 adopt, with some minor variations, the pre-UCPR procedures of the District Court and Local Court set out in DCR Pt 31A and LCR Pt 27. In the Local and District Courts most instalment applications are considered by a registrar. The relevant provisions of the District Court and Local Court Rules had identical wording. The Supreme Court Rules had no specific rules providing for the payment of judgments by instalments and registrars never dealt with such applications, except by consent. The Supreme Court did however make orders in the nature of instalment orders, generally as a result of an application to stay enforcement. In the Supreme Court these orders were generally made by a judge. The primary purpose of an instalment order is to stay enforcement of the judgment. Instalment applications are common in the Local Court; they are generally made by unrepresented defendants after a default judgment has been entered against them and where enforcement action is pending. To a lesser extent, applications are also made at the same time as an acknowledgment of liquidated claim (pursuant to r 20.34) is filed. The procedures in this Part provide a relatively simple mechanism for a registrar to consider an application by a judgment debtor seeking a stay of enforcement on condition that the judgment debt is paid by instalments. The primary consideration on an initial application being considered by a registrar will be to minimise unnecessary hardship to the judgment debtor that may result if a writ for levy of property is executed or if a large proportion of the judgment debtor’s wage or salary is garnisheed. Generally the capacity to pay a judgment debt in Local Court proceedings will be determined by the judgment debtor’s income flow, rather than the judgment debtor’s assets, and will make provision for payments from the judgment debtor’s after tax wages or salaries on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis. While the potential hardship to the judgment debtor is the primary consideration, the instalment order must be reasonable; the instalment payments must reduce the outstanding judgment after interest, and the judgment must be paid off within a reasonable period of time. Interest accumulates on the unpaid amount of the judgment at the prescribed rate (r 36.7). Generally instalment orders are structured so that the judgment will be paid within one to two years. Most judgment creditors in the Local Court will not object to an instalment order on the basis that it is better to recover the judgment by instalments over a couple of years rather than spend additional amounts seeking to enforce the judgment, which may not be successful. Instalment applications are less common in the District and Supreme Courts. Registrars in the Supreme and District Courts will generally only be dealing with instalment applications following the entry of default judgment. Applications in relation to judgments following a contested hearing will usually be considered by the trial judge rather than a registrar pursuant to r 37.4. As judgments in the District and Supreme Courts will normally be for considerably larger amounts than in the Local Court, slightly different considerations will apply. There is no presumption that a judgment debtor is entitled to an instalment order, there is in fact a presumption that the judgment creditor is entitled to the fruits of its success. Despite the provisions in r 37.3 a registrar will be less inclined to deal with an instalment application without considering the position of the judgment creditor, and most instalment applications in the Supreme Court will be listed after notice has been given to the judgment creditor. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

857

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r Pt37.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 37.1

37.1

[r Pt37.20]

Instalments under Fines Act 1996

This Part does not apply to a fine in relation to which enforcement action is being taken under Division 4 of Part 4 of the Fines Act 1996. Note: The Fines Act 1996 has its own regime for the payment of fines by instalments. [R 37.1 insrt Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[12]]

RULE 37.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 37.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 37.1.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 37.1.1000]

[r 37.1.20]

Comparison

Rule 37.1 was inserted in August 2008. It has no cognate in the former rules. [r 37.1.40]

Operation

Rule 37.1 clarifies that the provisions of this Part do not apply in relation to any actions to enforce fines by the State Debt Recovery Office. As to an application for time to pay fines by instalments under the Fines Act, see s 100 of that Act. [r 37.1.1000]

References

For the procedure that applies in relation to enforcement of fines see the Fines Act 1996 Pt 4. 37.1A Instalment order made pursuant to agreement between judgment creditor and judgment debtor (cf DCR Part 31A, rule 2; LCR Part 27, rule 2)

(1) A judgment creditor and judgment debtor may enter into an agreement (an instalment agreement): (a) specifying the amount agreed by them to be owing under the judgment debt, and (b) specifying by what instalments, payable at what times, that amount is to be paid. (2) An instalment agreement may be entered into whether or not an instalment order is already in force in respect of the judgment debt. (3) An instalment agreement may be entered into on behalf of a judgment creditor or judgment debtor by his or her solicitor or barrister. (4) An instalment agreement has no effect for the purposes of this rule unless the signature of each person executing it (other than a solicitor or barrister) is witnessed by a registrar or other officer of the court or by a solicitor or barrister. (5) As soon as practicable after an instalment agreement is filed, the court must make an instalment order that gives effect to the agreement. [Former r 37.1 renum Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[12]]

RULE 37.1A COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 37.1A.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 37.1A.40] Where instalment order signed by a party – subrule (4) ....................................................................... [r 37.1A.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 37.1A.1000]

858

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 37 – Time to pay and payment by instalments [r 37.1A.1000] [r 37.1A.20]

r 37.2

Comparison

Rule 37.1A was originally r 37.1 but was renumbered when a new r 37.1 was inserted in August 2008. This rule effectively combines, with no effective change, several provisions scattered through DCR Pt 31A r 2, namely subrr (1)(b), (2), (3) and (4)(b). Operation

Ideally, any instalment orders should be made by agreement, and should be made as soon as possible, rather than waiting till enforcement action has been taken against the judgment debtor. A judgment debtor should seek to obtain the consent of the judgment creditor before making an application under r 2. The agreement that is filed should be in the form of a consent order with provision for it to be signed and dated by the registrar. Traditionally an instalment order sets out the amount, the rate (whether weekly, fortnightly, monthly or otherwise), and the date of first payment; it may also make provision for payment of an initial lump sum. The order will be made when it is “entered” in accordance with r 36.11. [r 37.1A.60]

Where instalment order signed by a “party” – subrule (4)

Rule 37.1A varies the general provisions that relate to an order made by consent to the extent that where it is being signed by a party, rather than their legal representative, the signature has to be witnessed. [r 37.1A.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 31A r 2(1)(b), (2), (3) and (4)(b); LCR Pt 27 r 2(1)(b), (5), (6) and (7)(b). 37.2

Application for instalment order by judgment debtor

(cf DCR Part 31A, rule 2; LCR Part 27, rule 2)

(1) A judgment debtor may apply to the court for an instalment order with respect to the amount owing under the judgment debt. (2) Such an application: (a) may be made whether or not some other instalment order is in force in relation to the judgment debt, and (b) must be supported by an affidavit as to the judgment debtor’s financial circumstances, and (c) must be dealt with as soon as practicable after it is made. (3) An application under this rule: (a) except as provided by paragraph (b), is to be dealt with by the registrar under rule 37.3, or (b) if it is made during a hearing before the court, is to be dealt with by the court under rule 37.4. (4) Notice of motion of an application under this rule does not have to be filed or served if the application is made during the hearing at which the judgment debtor is being examined pursuant to an order for examination. (5) [Repealed] [Subr (5) rep Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[6]; am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]] [R 37.2 am Rule 579 of 2007]

RULE 37.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 37.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 37.2.40] Orders sought in application .................................................................................................................... [r 37.2.60] Instalment order made during an examination ......................................................................................... [r 37.2.80] Matters to be considered when making an application .......................................................................... [r 37.2.100] When the judgment creditor is the Commissioner of Taxation .............................................................. [r 37.2.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 37.2.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

859

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 37.1A.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 37.2 [r 37.2.20]

[r 37.2.20] Comparison

Rule 37.2 is based on DCR Pt 31A r 2(1)(a); r 37.2(4) is based on DCR Pt 32 r 5A. An instalment application can no longer be made by a spouse or defacto on behalf of the judgment debtor (DCR Pt 31A r 1A). [r 37.2.40] Operation A judgment debtor may make an application for an instalment order. For procedure applicable when making an application at the hearing see [r 37.4.60]. An instalment order before a hearing can only be made by consent: see [r 37.1A.40]. If the application is being made after the hearing, it will usually be made by way of notice of motion to be determined by the registrar in the absence of the public Note r 18.3(3), which provides that such a notice of motion must contain a statement to the effect that the motion is to be so dealt with. The application must be supported by an affidavit as to the judgment debtor’s financial circumstances. There are approved forms which incorporate the notice of motion and the application. The first form is Form 46 – Notice of motion to pay by instalments – individual. The second is Form 47 – Notice of motion to pay by instalments – corporation. The forms are found at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/spu/ll_ucpr.nsf/pages/ucpr_ forms. In the case of a corporation, the person making the affidavit should be a director or otherwise duly authorised. Even if there is already an instalment order in effect, this does not prevent the judgment debtor from making a new application, particularly if their financial position has deteriorated: r 37.2(2)(a). The judgment debtor may make any number of applications to pay by instalments. However, for subsequent applications there is no automatic stay of enforcement until the application is determined (r 37.5(2)), and the judgment debtor is liable to have a further costs order made against her or him. An instalment order subsequent in time supersedes a former order. There is no filing fee on a notice of motion for an instalment order to be determined in the absence of the parties: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 cl 4(5)(b) [r 37.2.60]

Orders sought in application

District Court Rules 1973 Pt 31A r 2A required that the application set out the proposed instalments and when they were to be made. Rule 37.2(1) does not require the applicant to specify a proposed instalment regime, although this should generally be done. An instalment order should set out the proposed instalment amount, the proposed rate (whether weekly, fortnightly, monthly or otherwise), and the proposed date of first payment. It may also make provision for payment of an initial lump sum. It may be appropriate, in certain circumstances, to propose alternative instalment regimes. [r 37.2.80] Instalment order made during an examination Rule 37.2(4) recognises that many applications for an instalment order may arise as a result of the judgment debtor being examined pursuant to Pt 38. This subrule allows a judgment debtor being examined to apply for an instalment order without requiring the filing of a notice of motion or an affidavit. As the judgment creditor will usually be present at an examination of the judgment debtor, they will be entitled to be heard before an instalment order is made. As a matter of practice, registrars may be reluctant to make an order under this provision unless it is by consent, and if it is not by consent the application should not be made before the examination has been completed. Despite the provision of this rule the judgment debtor may be directed to file and serve a notice of motion. [r 37.2.100] Matters to be considered when making an application The primary consideration in the making of the application is a due completion of the prescribed documents. However, any practitioner retained to assist in the settling of the application should bear in mind the matters which will be considered by the registrar (or by the court, if there is an objection). These matters are discussed below, at [r 37.4.100]. [r 37.2.120] When the judgment creditor is the Commissioner of Taxation This is discussed below, at [r 37.4.120]. [r 37.2.1000] References Superseded rules: DCR Pt 31A r 2(1)(a), Pt 32 r 5A; LCR Pt 27 r 2(1)(a), Pt 28 r 4. 860

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 37 – Time to pay and payment by instalments [r 37.3.100]

37.3

r 37.3

Instalment order made by registrar

(1) The registrar may deal with an application for an instalment order: (a) by making an instalment order in relation to the amount owing under the judgment debt, or (b) by making an order refusing the application. (2) As soon as practicable after making an instalment order under this rule, the registrar: (a) must give notice of the order to the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor, and (b) must also give to the judgment creditor a copy of the affidavit referred to in rule 37.2(2)(b). (3) Either party may file an objection to an order made under subrule (1)(a) or (b) at any time within 14 days after the order is made. [R 37.3 am Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 37.3 COMMENTARY An overview .............................................................................................................................................. [r 37.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 37.3.40] Matters to be considered .......................................................................................................................... [r 37.3.60] Objection to order made by registrar ..................................................................................................... [r 37.3.100] When the judgment creditor is the Commission of Taxation ................................................................. [r 37.3.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 37.3.1000]

[r 37.3.20]

An overview

“The general thrust of these provisions is such that, in cases dealt with by a registrar…, the judgment [debtor’s] application for an instalment order is advanced and dealt with on an ex parte basis, with notice of any instalment order made being given to the judgment creditor after the event, accompanied by the affidavit on which the judgment debtor relied in pursuing the application for the order. This is the effect of r 37.3(2). It is then open to the judgment creditor to act under r 37.3(3) to ‘file an objection to’ the instalment order. Such an objection must be dealt with under r 37.4, a rule which deals alike with three different kinds of processes, namely, an application for an instalment order under r 37.2(3)(b) (that is, an application made otherwise than to the registrar under r 37.3), an objection against refusal of an instalment order and an objection against the making of an instalment order”: Tatlers.com.au Pty Ltd v Davis (2006) 203 FLR 473; [2006] NSWSC 1055 at [20] (Barrett J). [r 37.3.40]

Operation

An order made under r 37.3 will usually be made by the registrar in chambers based on the judgment debtor’s affidavit in support of the application. It is important that the affidavit is complete and comprehensive so that the registrar, and the judgment creditor, can assess that the proposed offer as to payment of instalments is reasonable in all the circumstances. If the registrar is in any doubt as to the completeness of the information provided, the application may be refused. The registrar may hear the judgment debtor personally if he or she thinks this is appropriate. There is no obligation to give the judgment creditor an opportunity to make representations, although the registrar has the option of listing the matter for hearing if that is appropriate. If the registrar considers the instalment application in the absence of the parties, he or she will arrange to have the parties advised promptly as to the result (whether granted or refused), and will forward a copy of the judgment debtor’s affidavit to the judgment creditor. [r 37.3.60]

Matters to be considered

For matters to be considered, see the commentary below, at [r 37.4.100]. [r 37.3.100]

Objection to order made by registrar

The judgment debtor can file an objection if the instalment application is refused or the terms of the instalment orders made by the registrar are less favourable than they are prepared to accept. The judgment creditor can © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

861

UCPR Parts 31-40

[Subr (1) am Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[43]]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 37.4

[r 37.3.100]

file an objection if an instalment application is granted. Any notice of objection should be filed within 14 days of when the instalment order is made. (Under DCR Pt 31A r 2(5), the time to file a notice of objection was 14 days from when notice of the order was forwarded to the judgment debtor.) This time may be extended either by the registrar or the court, and would normally be extended if the person seeking to file the objection can establish a delay in being advised of the orders made by the registrar. The notice of objection will be treated as a notice of motion to review the decision of the registrar. A notice of objection to an instalment order is an approved form: Form 50. If there is a stay of enforcement of the judgment (by operation of r 5) the registrar may arrange for the early listing of the objection hearing to reduce prejudice to the judgment creditor. [r 37.3.120]

When the judgment creditor is the Commissioner of Taxation

This is discussed below, at [r 37.4.120]. [r 37.3.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 31A r 2(4); LCR Pt 28 r 2(7). 37.4

Instalment order made by court

(cf DCR Part 31A, rule 2; LCR Part 27, rule 2)

(1) This rule applies if the court is dealing with: (a) an application for an instalment order pursuant to rule 37.2(3)(b), or (b) an objection against an order made under rule 37.3(1)(a) or (b). (2) On receiving the application or objection, the court: (a) must set the matter down for hearing, and (b) must give notice of the time, date and place of the hearing to the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor, and (c) if it has not already been done, must also give to the judgment creditor a copy of the affidavit referred to in rule 37.2(2)(b). (3) The court may determine an application for an instalment order, or an objection against an order refusing such an application: (a) by making an instalment order in relation to the amount owing under the judgment debt, or (b) by dismissing the application. (4) The court may determine an objection against the making of an instalment order: (a) by varying or rescinding the instalment order, or (b) by dismissing the objection. (5) As soon as practicable after making its determination, the court must give notice of the determination, and (if it makes or varies an instalment order) of the terms of the order or the order as varied, to the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor.

RULE 37.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 37.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 37.4.40] A de novo hearing in open court .............................................................................................................. [r 37.4.50] Applications during a hearing ................................................................................................................... [r 37.4.60] Notice to the parties ................................................................................................................................. [r 37.4.80] Matters to be considered by the court ................................................................................................... [r 37.4.100] When the judgment creditor is the Commissioner of Taxation .............................................................. [r 37.4.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 37.4.1000]

[r 37.4.20]

Comparison

Rule 37.4 is effectively the same as DCR Pt 31A r 2(6) and (7), except that there is no provision for the matter to be listed automatically just because the registrar refuses an instalment application. 862

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 37 – Time to pay and payment by instalments [r 37.4.100] [r 37.4.40]

r 37.4 Operation

Rule 37.4 deals with the consideration of an instalment application by a judicial officer, either as a review of a decision by a registrar, or ancillary to the hearing of a matter by that judicial officer. [r 37.4.50]

A de novo hearing in open court

[r 37.4.60]

Applications during a hearing

Rule 37.4 does not only deal with reviews, ie hearings of objections to orders by registrars. As r 37.4(1)(a) says, it also applies where an application for an instalment order is made pursuant to r 37.2(3)(b), ie “during a hearing before the court”. It is possible that such an application could be made if the court has delivered reasons but has not given judgment or has given judgment but has some ancillary matters (such as costs) to be considered. Such an application is by a notice of motion that would be made returnable before the judicial officer still dealing with the matter, and would normally be listed on the next occasion that the case was listed. If the motion only sought an instalment order no fee would be payable: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 cl 4(5)(b). It would be possible for the application to be included in a notice of motion seeking other orders (in which case a filing fee may be payable). If there is a stay of enforcement (by operation of r 7.5), the registrar may arrange to have the motion listed urgently and may abridge the time for service accordingly. [r 37.4.80]

Notice to the parties

Rule 37.4(5) provides for the court giving notice of the determination of an application under this rule to the judgment creditor and judgment debtor. As these applications will be heard in open court after due notice to the parties, this notice will be normally effected by pronouncing the relevant orders in court after the delivery of an extempore judgment. Rules 36.2 and 36.3 apply if judgment is reserved. Subrule (5) however, obliges the registry to notify any parties affected by the orders that do not attend the hearing or do not attend the court when the reserved judgment is delivered. [r 37.4.100]

Matters to be considered by the court

Whether it is a registrar considering an application under r 37.2 or a court hearing and determining a contested objection to a registrar’s decision (or, more rarely, a court hearing an application under r 37.2(3)(b)), the tribunal is exercising a discretion judicially. In Hellier Capital Pty Litd v Albarran [2009] NSWSC 403 (13 May 2009), McDougall J considered the authorities. In summary, his Honour observed that the rules set out no criteria, either in deciding to make an order or in deciding to rescind or vary one. His Honour pointed out that there are prerequisites in r 869 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) which provided guidance. These are (a) whether the judgment debtor is employed; (b) the judgment debtor’s means of satisfying the order; (c) whether the judgment debt, including any interest, will be satisfied within a reasonable time; (d) the necessary living expenses of the judgment debtor and the enforcement debtor’s dependants; (e) other liabilities of the judgment debtor; (f) if the applicant is the judgment debtor – whether, having regard to the availability of other enforcement means, making the order would be consistent with the public interest in enforcing money orders efficiently and expeditiously. His Honour also referred to the requirement in that jurisdiction that in deciding the amount and timing of the instalments, the court must be satisfied that the instalment order will not impose unreasonable hardship on the enforcement debtor. His Honour then referred to a number of general law principles: (a) That an instalment order should not be made if the judgment debtor’s means are sufficient to enable payment immediately and in full. (b) That an instalment order should not be made if the result is futile, in that the judgment debtor could not meet the obligations thereunder. (c) That the period of time for payment under the instalment order must be reasonable, having regard to the amount of the debt and the time before it will be satisfied, if an order is made. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

863

UCPR Parts 31-40

All applications under r 37.4 are heard in open court. Moreover, if (as is usual) the hearing is a review of a decision by a registrar made under r 37.3, the hearing is a hearing de novo and the parties may seek to lead fresh evidence. On a review the court may vary or rescind the instalment order or can dismiss the objection.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 37.4A

[r 37.4.100]

(d) That it would not ordinarily be a proper exercise of the discretion to make an instalment order if the amount proposed to be paid would not enable some reduction to be made in the amount of the judgment debt. That is a relevant circumstance because of course judgment debts carry interest; an instalment order which chipped away at part only of the interest obligation, but did not permit any reduction of the principal amount of the judgment, would be inefficacious. (e) That a successful party is entitled to the fruits of its success, and to enforce the court’s orders. Legitimate public interest requires that the court be slow to interfere in the normal processes of enforcement. It is impossible to list all relevant features. The only true parameter is that there is a discretion to be exercised judicially. Peculiarities will exist in each (necessarily) peculiar case. Two peculiarities in Hellier referred to by McDougall J were: • As to the relevant criteria, the judgment debtor was an insolvency practitioner. In the words of his Honour, there was “a public interest in having trained people, who perform important work, remaining available to perform that work. It would be a loss to the community if [the judgment debtor’s] services as an insolvency practitioner were not available to the community; particularly, although this is not a consideration of great significance, during what is often called the ‘global financial crisis’”: [20]. • As to the appropriate order, the court upheld an order which allowed for payments over almost four years. His Honour considered that, in context, the period was not unconscionable. [r 37.4.120]

When the judgment creditor is the Commissioner of Taxation

In Re Pollack; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 32 FCR 40; 22 ATR 670, a majority of the Full Federal Court held to the effect that a state legislative scheme providing for payment of judgment debts by instalments was inconsistent with a Commonwealth legislative scheme which allowed the Commissioner to grant permission for payment by instalments of a tax liability (including a tax liability sued on to judgment by the Commissioner). The current Commonwealth legislation provides that the Commissioner may permit payment of a “tax-related liability” by instalments: Taxation Administration Act 1953, Sch 1 s 255-15 The legislation also deals with “[civil] proceedings to recover an amount of a tax-related liability”: see eg Taxation Administration Act 1953, Subdiv 255-C. It must be supposed that the reasoning of the majority in Pollack may well lead a court to conclude that there is a relevant inconsistency in the current Commonwealth and state regimes, with the result that it is not open for a judgment debtor to apply to a court; the whole of his, her or its right in relation to a taxation obligation is the right to seek permission from the Commissioner. (As to the question of merger, see the reasons of Gummow J at 58.) [r 37.4.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 31A r 2(6) and (7); LCR Pt 28 r 2(9) and (10). 37.4A Payment of instalments under instalment order (1) Unless the court for special reasons orders otherwise, the judgment debtor must pay the amounts under an instalment order to the judgment creditor. (2) This rule does not apply to money recovered on behalf of a person under legal incapacity. Note: The payment of money recovered on behalf of a person under legal incapacity is regulated by section 77 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. [R 37.4A insrt Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[11]]

RULE 37.4A COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 37.4A.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 37.4A.40]

[r 37.4A.20]

Comparison

There was no equivalent rule in the former Rules. 864

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 37 – Time to pay and payment by instalments [r 37.5.60] Operation

Rule 37.4A was introduced to remove a doubt as to whether court registries could refuse to accept instalment payments by judgments debtors after an instalment order had been made. Some judgment debtors, particularly in the Local Court, believed that the appropriate procedure after an instalment order was made was to pay the instalments into court on the basis that the court needed to be aware that the instalment order was being complied with. This rule makes it clear that, unless the court specifically orders otherwise, instalment payments are to be made directly to the judgment creditor. This means that the court will not normally be aware as to whether an instalment order is being complied with or not; the onus is placed on the judgment creditor to specify the breach of the instalment order and the consequent removal of the stay if subsequent enforcement is required. If the judgment creditor is a person under a legal incapacity (see CPA s 3) the instalment order will generally make specific provision for payment to such persons as the court might nominate under CPA s 3, or for payment into court. 37.5

Stay of execution pending determination of application for instalment order

(1) Execution of the judgment to which an application for an instalment order relates is stayed: (a) from the time the application is made until the time the application is determined, and (b) if the application is refused by an order under rule 37.3(1)(b) and an objection against the order is filed under rule 37.3(3), from the time the objection is filed until the time the objection is determined. (2) Subrule (1) does not apply if the applicant has previously made an application under this rule with respect to the same judgment debt. Note: See also section 107(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 which provides for stay of execution of the judgment while an instalment order is in force.

RULE 37.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 37.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 37.5.40] Stay of execution when an instalment order is in force ........................................................................... [r 37.5.60] Stay of execution on subsequent instalment applications ....................................................................... [r 37.5.80] Bankruptcy notices ................................................................................................................................. [r 37.5.100] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 37.5.1000]

[r 37.5.20]

Comparison

District Court Rules 1973 Pt 31A r 2(8) effectively provided for a stay of enforcement from when the application for instalment order was filed by a judgment debtor, till when it was determined by a judicial officer. As there is now no longer an automatic referral to the court when the registrar refuses an application, there is now no continuation of the stay of enforcement in these circumstances. [r 37.5.40]

Operation

The stay of enforcement under r 37.5 applies till the application is dismissed by the registrar or the application for a review is dismissed by a judicial officer. The stay of enforcement under this rule only applies if the application is the first one made in respect of the judgment debt. There is no stay of enforcement after the registrar has dismissed the application until a notice of objection is filed by the judgment debtor. [r 37.5.60]

Stay of execution when an instalment order is in force

Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 104(2) provides that enforcement of the judgment is stayed while an instalment order is in force and s 113(b) provides that a garnishee order made against income continues to have effect but is varied to make it attach only the amount of the instalments ordered. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

865

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 37.4A.40]

r 37.5

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 37.6 [r 37.5.80]

[r 37.5.60] Stay of execution on subsequent instalment applications

Although there is no automatic stay of enforcement on any instalment applications after the first, the judgment debtor can apply for such an order by notice of motion. If the application is to be considered by a registrar it would be appropriate for the judgment debtor to approach the duty registrar, to consider the instalment application as a matter of urgency and if necessary to make a stay order pending the determination of the application. If the registrar has refused a subsequent application, and the judgment debtor intends to object to this decision, the registrar may stay enforcement (on terms) pending the hearing of the review by the court. If enforcement action is pending the registrar will normally arrange the early listing of the objection hearing (whether or not a stay of enforcement is granted). [r 37.5.100]

Bankruptcy notices

Judgment creditors wishing to apply for the issue of a bankruptcy notice should consider the effect of this section on the operation of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). [r 37.5.1000]

References

CPA ss 104(2), 113(b). Superseded rules: DCR Pt 31A r 2(8) and (9); LCR Pt 28 r 2(12) and (13). 37.6 Variation or rescission of instalment order on proof of improvement in judgment debtor’s financial circumstances (cf DCR Part 31A, rule 3; LCR Part 27, rule 3)

(1) A judgment creditor may apply to the court for the variation or rescission of an instalment order. (2) Such an application must be supported by an affidavit as to the judgment debtor’s financial circumstances, indicating the extent to which they appear to have improved since the instalment order was made. (3) On receiving the application, the registrar: (a) must set the matter down for hearing, and (b) must give notice of the time, date and place of the hearing to the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor. (4) The court may determine the application: (a) by varying or rescinding the instalment order to which it relates, or (b) by dismissing the application. (5) As soon as practicable after making its determination, the court must give notice of the determination and, if it varies the instalment order, of the terms of the order as varied: (a) to the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor, and (b) if the determination relates to an instalment order to which a garnishee order is subject, to the garnishee.

RULE 37.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 37.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 37.6.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 37.6.1000]

[r 37.6.20]

Comparison

Rule 37.6 is effectively the same as DCR Pt 31A r 3(1), except that it does not make specific provision for awarding costs where a party has acted unreasonably. This is left to the general powers of the court to award costs. 866

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 37 – Time to pay and payment by instalments [r 37.7.1000] [r 37.6.40]

r 37.7

Operation

An application under r 37.6 is by notice of motion to be listed in court. The affidavit in support of this application must be served on the judgment debtor, but need not be filed until the hearing of the application. If the application is considered by a registrar, then the decision of the registrar is subject to review under the provisions of Pt 49. [r 37.6.1000]

References

37.7

Effect of instalment order on judgment debt

(cf DCR Part 31A, rule 3; LCR Part 27, rule 3)

Subject to any agreement referred to in rule 37.1A, an instalment order ceases to have effect if the judgment debtor fails to comply with the order. [R 37.7 am Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[13]]

RULE 37.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 37.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 37.7.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 37.7.1000]

[r 37.7.20]

Comparison

The operation of r 37.7 is effectively the same as for DCR Pt 31A r 3(2). [r 37.7.40]

Operation

Where a judgment debtor has defaulted and failed to pay an instalment in accordance with the order made, a judgment creditor may enforce the balance of the judgment debt. The affidavits in support of the approved notices of motion to enforce a judgment include provision for stating that an instalment order has ceased to have effect; the reason (ie the nature of the default) must be stated. If the instalment order is made by consent pursuant to r 37.1, the parties can agree that the effects of failure to meet one instalment should be postponed for a specified time. [r 37.7.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 31A r 3(2); LCR Pt 28 r 3(2).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

867

UCPR Parts 31-40

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 31A r 3(1); LCR Pt 28 r 3(1).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt38.20]

PART 38 – EXAMINATION OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR ETC Commentary by Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court. Updated by David Ash, Barrister.

PART 38 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 38 ................................................................................................................. Legislative provisions ............................................................................................................................... Application to officers and former officers of debtor corporations ........................................................... Examination of a bankrupt judgment debtor ............................................................................................ Examination of persons that are not a judgment debtor (in the Supreme Court) ...................................

[r Pt38.20]

[r [r [r [r [r

Pt38.20] Pt38.40] Pt38.50] Pt38.60] Pt38.80]

General comments on Part 38

The rules and procedures relating to the examination of judgment debtors differed between the Supreme Court and the District and Local Courts. In practice, the examination of judgment debtors in the Supreme Court is rare; most default judgments are for possession of land, and in respect of defended proceedings, most plaintiffs have a reasonable idea of the defendants’ capacity to pay before the proceedings are commenced. The examination of judgment debtors is much more common in the Local Court and to a lesser extent in the District Court, where there are more default judgments for liquidated claims against individuals. The rules in this Part relating to the examination of judgment debtors borrow from the former rules of each of the jurisdictions, but because of the greater use of the procedure in the lower jurisdictions the rules have been more closely modelled on the procedures that existed in those courts. [r Pt38.40]

Legislative provisions

The legislative authority for the procedure in this Part is CPA s 108. That section authorises the court to issue an order requiring a judgment debtor (or an officer of a corporate judgment debtor) to appear and answer questions and/or produce documents relating to their capacity to satisfy the judgment or order. The relevant judgment or order does not need to be for money. Many of the legislative provisions relating to the examination of judgment debtors in the DCA and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 have now been brought into the rules in this Part. [r Pt38.50]

Application to officers and former officers of debtor corporations

The effect of r 38.7 is to extend the application of the Part to officers and former officers of debtor corporations. Judgment creditors should consider whether to utilise the rule, and if so against whom. [r Pt38.60]

Examination of a bankrupt judgment debtor

The Part cannot have application to a bankrupt. Section 58(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) provides that when a person becomes a bankrupt, all of that person’s property vests in the Official Trustee. The Bankruptcy Act prohibits a creditor from enforcing any remedy against the bankrupt in respect of a provable debt, other than under the provisions of that act: Wentworth v Rogers [2009] NSWSC 1038. The claim, being a provable debt against a bankrupt, is converted from a chose in action to an equitable right to share in the bankrupt estate: Clyne v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 154 CLR 589; [1984] HCA 44 at 594-5 (CLR). [r Pt38.80]

Examination of persons that are not a judgment debtor (in the Supreme Court)

Although CPA s 108 specifically refers to persons “bound by a judgment or order” being required to attend for examination, the Supreme Court, as a court of general jurisdiction, retains an inherent power to order the examination of persons, other than parties who, on reasonable grounds, are alleged to be a party to avoiding or circumventing the execution of a judgment of the Court: Wentworth v Rogers [2009] NSWSC 1038. Moreover, s 108 itself is not limited to questions about judgments or orders for the payment of money. For example, it has been used in aid of enforcement of an injunction: Austress Freyssinet Pty Ltd v Kowalski [2007] NSWSC 1105.

868

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 38 – Examination of judgment debtor etc [r 38.1.1000]

38.1

r 38.1

Examination notice

(1) The person in whose favour a judgment or order has been given or made may, by notice in writing served on the person bound by the judgment or order (an examination notice), require that person to do either or both of the following: (a) to provide answers to specified material questions, (b) to produce for inspection by the judgment creditor specified documents in relation to material questions. (2) An examination notice must specify the period (being not less than 28 days) within which its requirements must be complied with.

RULE 38.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 38.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 38.1.40] Operation – Supreme Court ..................................................................................................................... [r 38.1.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 38.1.1000]

[r 38.1.20]

Comparison

This is a new rule. Although Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 43A provided for the registrar issuing an examination notice, this was an alternative procedure to the usual procedure of applying for an examination summons. The examination notice in this rule is not issued by the court and is a prerequisite to applying for an examination order (at least in the Local Court and District Court). [r 38.1.40]

Operation

The service of an examination notice is a prerequisite for applying for an examination order in the Local and District Courts. See CPA s 108(3). There are two approved forms, Form 51 – Examination notice – Individual, and Form 52 – Examination notice – Corporation, found at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/spu/ll_ ucpr.nsf/pages/ucpr_forms. A person who wishes to respond on behalf of a debtor corporation should be a director or otherwise duly authorised. The examination notice is not filed. The examination notice must specify a date not less than 28 days after the notice is served by which the questions are to be answered: subr (2). If the notice requires the production of documents, it should allow the judgment debtor the option of providing copies of the documents if that is practicable. The examination notice need not be served personally. If the judgment debtor has an address for service (r 4.5), the notice should be sent to that address. An examination debtor cannot be required to answer questions or produce documents that are not relevant to their capacity to satisfy the judgment: see r 38.3(5). [r 38.1.60]

Operation – Supreme Court

The service of an examination notice is not required as a prerequisite for applying for an order for examination in respect of a Supreme Court judgment. It may nevertheless be a cost effective method of obtaining information that may be useful, and which can be used as the basis for cross-examination if an examination order is subsequently issued. The issue of an examination order is discretionary, so the registrar may require an explanation if the examination notice procedure has not been used. [r 38.1.1000]

References

Analogous superseded procedure: Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 43A.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

869

UCPR Parts 31-40

(cf Act No 11 1970, section 43A)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 38.2

38.2

[r 38.2.20]

Application for order for examination

(1) An application for an order for examination with respect to the enforcement of a judgment or order must be supported by an affidavit as to the following matters: (a) that the judgment or order remains unsatisfied, (b) that the applicant has served an examination notice on the person bound by the judgment or order but that person has failed, within the time limited by the notice: (i) to provide any or sufficient answers to the questions specified in the notice, or (ii) to produce any or sufficient documents for inspection by the applicant, as to any material questions, (c) that the person bound by the judgment or order has not, within the previous 3 months, provided any or sufficient answers, or produced any or sufficient documents, in response to any previous examination notice, (d) in the case of a judgment or order for the payment of money, whether or not an instalment order has previously been made in relation to the amount payable under the judgment or order and, if such an order has been made, that the person bound by the judgment or order has failed to comply with the instalment order. (2) The provisions of subrule (1)(b) and (c) do not apply in relation to a judgment or order of the Supreme Court. [Subr (2) insrt Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[44]]

(3) Unless the court otherwise orders, an application under this rule: (a) may be dealt with in the absence of the parties, and (b) need not be served on the person bound by the judgment or order. [Subr (3) insrt Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[44]] [R 38.2 am Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 38.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 38.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 38.2.40] Examination in relation to non-monetary judgments ................................................................................ [r 38.2.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 38.2.1000]

[r 38.2.20]

Comparison

This rule is not based on any prior rule, but is a reflection of the requirements that have to be met before an examination order is issued under r 38.3. [r 38.2.40]

Operation

An application for an examination order is by notice of motion to be considered in chambers. The standard filing fee for a notice of motion is payable: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 1. There is an approved form which incorporates the affidavit in support of the application: Form 53. The application is considered ex parte and does not need to be served on the judgment debtor: subr (3). In the District Court and Local Court, there is no need to file a draft form of the order being sought. The application is granted the registry will produce a form of the order. In the Supreme Court, the registry may direct that a draft form of the order is lodged; the current practice is to require that a draft form of the order is lodged in duplicate Form 54). The affidavit in support of the application is to deal with the following matters: • The amount of the judgment debt outstanding (if the judgment or order is not a monetary judgment then such information as is appropriate to indicate that the judgment or order is unsatisfied). As the issue of an examination order is discretionary, the registrar may decline to issue an order if the outstanding judgment debt is small. 870

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 38 – Examination of judgment debtor etc [r 38.2.1000]

r 38.3

In respect of applications filed in the Supreme Court, although para (b) of the rule requires information about the service of an examination notice, this is not a prerequisite for Supreme Court proceedings: subr (2). In respect of applications filed in the District Court and Local Court, the affidavit should also give such information as to the residential, work and business addresses of the judgment debtor as may assist the registry to determine the appropriate venue: r 38.4. If the date of the judgment or order sought to be enforced is more than 12 years old then leave to issue the examination order will be required: CPA s 134. The affidavit in support of the motion provides for the inclusion of the filing fee, service fee and solicitor’s fee; these amounts will become part of the judgment debt. The amount currently charged by the sheriff for service of documents (Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 2) can be claimed as the service fee. In relation to solicitor’s costs, Legal Profession Regulation 2005 Sch 2 specifies prescribed costs that can be claimed in relation to notices of motion being filed in the District and Local Courts, however there is no prescribed amount for a notice of motion being filed in the Supreme Court; the Supreme Court will generally allow 130% of the prescribed amount for this work in the District Court. [r 38.2.60]

Examination in relation to non-monetary judgments

Part 38 does not apply to examination in relation to non-monetary judgments: Austress Freyssinet Pty Ltd v Kowalski [2007] NSWSC 1105. However, CPA s 108 does authorise the court to make orders for examination in relation to non-monetary judgments. Such an application would be by notice of motion in the proceedings. See Austress Freyssinet v Kowalski as to the procedure that could apply. [r 38.2.1000]

References

As to mode of applying for an examination summons/order (superseded rules): SCR Pt 43 r 3; DCR Pt 32 r 1; LCR Pt 28 r 1. 38.3

Orders for examination

(cf DCR Part 25, rules 1 and 3; LCR Part 28, rules 1 and 2)

(1) In the case of a judgment or order of any court other than the Supreme Court, the court may not make an order for examination against the person bound by the judgment or order unless it is satisfied that the person: (a) has been served with an examination notice in accordance with rule 38.1, and (b) has failed, within the time limited by the notice: (i) to provide any or sufficient answers to the questions specified in the notice, or (ii) to produce any or sufficient documents for inspection by the judgment creditor, as to any material questions. (2) An order for examination must specify the time, date and place at which the person bound by the judgment or order is required to attend for examination. (3) An order for examination must be served on the person bound by the judgment or order at least 14 days before the day on which he or she is required to attend for examination. (4) A court that has made an order for examination may not, within 3 months after the order is made, make a further order for examination of the same person, on the application of the same person and in relation to the same judgment or order. (5) A person may refuse to produce a document or thing in response to an order for examination if the © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

871

UCPR Parts 31-40

• For District Court and Local Court matters: when an examination notice was served, when it was required to be answered or complied with; and that there has either been no answer or compliance, or that the answer or compliance is insufficient. If the judgment debtor has provided an insufficient answer or compliance, relevant details must be given and a copy of such answers annexed. • Verification that the proposed examinee has not, within the previous three months, provided any or sufficient answers, or produced any or sufficient documents, in response to any previous examination notice. • If an instalment order has been made in respect of the judgment debt (if so provide date and details) and if there has been any failure to comply with that order (if so provide details).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 38.3

[r 38.3.20]

person could lawfully refuse to produce that document or thing on a subpoena for production.

RULE 38.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 38.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 38.3.40] Restrictions on further examinations ........................................................................................................ [r 38.3.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 38.3.1000]

[r 38.3.20]

Comparison

The prerequisite for the service of an examination notice under r 38.1 is a new provision. The issue of an examination order was the practice in the Supreme Court: SCR Pt 43 r 1(1). The District Courts and Local Courts used to issue an examination summons (DCR Pt 32 r 1; LCR Pt 28 r 1). The provision in subr (2) is new but reflects former practice in all courts. The provision for service on the examinee at least 14 days before the examination date in subr (3) adopts the time for service provided by DCR Pt 32 r 3 and LCR Pt 28 r 2; there was no minimum time for service specified for the Supreme Court. The provision in subr (4) adopts a restriction on the issue of further examination summonses in DCA s 91(5) and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 41(6). Subrule (5) is a new provision, although it reflects existing law. [r 38.3.40]

Operation

The issue of an examination order is discretionary. For applications not in the Supreme Court the registrar considering the application must be satisfied of the matters in subr (1). The application will be considered by a registrar (or such other officer as may be authorised by the senior judicial officer) in chambers. If the registrar makes an examination order the matter will be listed on a date at least 14 days in the future. The registry will issue copies of the order for service on the person to be examined, and return them to the judgment creditor. The order for examination must be served personally (for Supreme Court and District Court proceedings): r 10(2)(a). Examination orders in the Local Court may be served personally or by leaving them with someone over the age of 16 years at the residential or business address of the examinee: r 10(2)(c). No conduct money needs to be provided. The approved form for an examination order is Form 53. [r 38.3.60]

Restrictions on further examinations

If the court has already made an order for examination of a judgment debtor, then a further order cannot be issued against that judgment debtor until at least 3 months have passed since the original order was issued: r 38.3(4). [r 38.3.1000]

References

Superseded legislation: DCA s 91(5) and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 41(6). Superseded rules: SCR Pt 43; DCR Pt 32 rr 1, 3; LCR Pt 28 rr 1, 2. 38.4

Venue of examination

(1) Subject to this rule, the examination of a person in respect of a judgment or order is to be conducted at the same venue as that where the judgment or order was entered. (2) If, in the case of proceedings before the District Court, the Court is satisfied that the person neither resides nor carries on business within 30 kilometres of the proclaimed place where the judgment or order was entered, then the examination is to be conducted at the proclaimed place nearest to where the person resides or carries on business, as the Court may determine. (3) If, in the case of proceedings before the Local Court, the Court is satisfied that the person neither resides nor carries on business within 30 kilometres of the venue where the judgment or order was entered, then the examination is to be conducted at the premises of the Court nearest to where the person resides or carries on business, as the Court may determine. [Subr (3) subst Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[7]; am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 2[1]] [R 38.4 am Rule 579 of 2007] 872

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 38 – Examination of judgment debtor etc [r 38.4.1000]

r 38.5

RULE 38.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 38.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 38.4.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 38.4.1000]

Comparison

The Supreme Court had no special provision for the venue of the examination; it was assumed that the venue would be the location of the registry where the relevant proceedings were filed, which would generally be where judgment was entered. In the Local Court, Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 41(1) required that the examination be conducted in the district in which the judgment debtor had her or his place of abode, business or employment. In the District Court, DCA s 91(1A) required the registrar to determine the proclaimed place that in the opinion of the registrar, was the most easily accessible for the examinee. [r 38.4.40]

Operation

The place where the examination will be conducted will be inserted on the examination order issued by the registry. The purpose of the rule, at least in relation to District Court and Local Court proceedings, is to minimise the inconvenience to non-corporate judgment debtors in complying with the order, bearing in mind the size of the debt and that they are not being provided with conduct money. In practice many default judgments may be entered in a registry which while convenient to the judgment creditor may not be convenient for the judgment debtor. The affidavit in support of the application should give such information as to the residential, work and business addresses of the judgment debtor as may assist the registry to determine the appropriate venue. [r 38.4.1000]

References

Superseded legislation: Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 41(1); DCA s 91(1A). 38.5

Examination under an order for examination under rule 38.3

(cf DCR Part 32, rules 1 and 5; LCR Part 28, rules 1 and 3)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, examination of a person under an order for examination is to be conducted by the person on whose application the order was made. (2) Examination of a person under an order for examination may be conducted by the court if: (a) the person attends for examination following his or her arrest pursuant to a warrant issued under section 97 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 as a consequence of the person’s failure to comply with an order for examination, or (b) the person attends for examination otherwise than at the time specified in the order, or (c) the court is satisfied for any other reason that the circumstances so warrant. [Subr (2) am Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[6]]

(3) If the examination of a person under an order for examination is conducted by the court: (a) the person may be required to answer questions on oath, and (b) the examination may be conducted in open court or in the absence of the public, as the court directs, and (c) the court must notify the person on whose application the order was made of the person’s answers to the questions asked at the examination. (4) An examination under this rule may be adjourned from time to time, as occasion requires. (5) In this rule: order for examination means an order for examination referred to in rule 38.3. [Subr (5) subst Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[7]] [R 38.5 am Rule 96 of 2006] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

873

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 38.4.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 38.5

[r 38.5.20]

RULE 38.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 38.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 38.5.40] Examination by registrar ........................................................................................................................... [r 38.5.60] Nature of the examination ........................................................................................................................ [r 38.5.80] Power to issue subpoenas ..................................................................................................................... [r 38.5.100] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 38.5.1000]

[r 38.5.20]

Comparison

In the District Court and Local Court the applicant for an examination summons could request that the examination be conducted by a registrar if the examination was to be at a court more than 30 km from where the applicant had an address for service, business address or agent: DCR Pt 32 r 1(2); LCR Pt 28 r 1(2). There was no equivalent provision in the Supreme Court. Subrule (1) of this rule now provides that, subject to an order of the court, the examination will be conducted by the judgment creditor; subr (2) specifies when the examination may be conducted by the court. In the District Court and Local Court there was provision for the examination being conducted in court or in chambers: DCR Pt 32 r 5(1); LCR Pt 28 r 3(1). There was no equivalent provision in the Supreme Court. Subrule (3)(b) of this rule provides that if the examination is being conducted by the court it may be in open court or in the absence of the public. In the District Court and Local Court there was provision for the registrar reporting to the judgment creditor if the examination was conducted by a registrar: DCR Pt 32 r 5B; LCR Pt 28 r 5. Subrule (3)(c) of this rule provides that if the examination is conducted by the court, the court must notify the judgment creditor of the answers given at the examination. The District Court and Local Court rules also specifically provided for adjourning an examination: DCR Pt 32 r 5C; LCR Pt 28 r 6. Subrule (4) of this rule has a similar provision. This rule uses the term “court” rather than “registrar”, which acknowledges that the examination may be conducted by another authorised officer or by a judicial officer. This negates the need for a rule like DCR Pt 32 r 5C, which stated that the court could exercise the registrar’s powers. See also r 37.2(4) which allows the registrar to consider an instalment application during an examination, which adopts DCR Pt 32 r 5A and LCR Pt 28 r 5. Subrule (5) was added to make it clear that this rule does not extend to examination orders issued under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 596A and 597. [r 38.5.40]

Operation

Examinations will be listed for a date and a time at a particular courthouse. Generally the courtroom that the examination will be conducted in will not be allocated until the day before the examination is scheduled. The actual courtroom that the examination will be initially called in will be published in the court list. Examinations in the Supreme Court and District Court are listed before a registrar. Subject to an order to the contrary, the examination will be conducted by the judgment creditor or by her or his legal representatives: r 38.5(1). See r 7.1 as to who can carry on proceedings for a party. Generally, examination matters are included in a list of other matters listed for directions or hearing by the registrar. The examination may proceed if the examinee is in attendance. It may be necessary for the matter to be referred to another registrar or adjourned to another date if the examination cannot be concluded on the day. If the matter is adjourned there is no need to serve a fresh examination order. The examination will be on oath. The role of the registrar is to preside over the examination and, where necessary determine what questions may be answered and what documents are required to be produced. The registrar may make an instalment order at the conclusion of the proceedings: r 37.2(4). If the examinee fails to appear after the matter has been called the usual practice is to apply for an adjournment; if an adjournment is granted the examinee must be advised of the adjourned date. The Legal Profession Regulation 2005 Sch 2 specifies prescribed costs that can be claimed in relation to conducting an examination or attending to conduct an examination where the examinee fails to appear in the Local and District Courts; these costs become part of the enforceable judgment debt. No prescribed costs apply in relation to examinations conducted in the Supreme Court; the judgment creditor should apply to the registrar for an order for costs in a specific sum. The amount of costs that will be allowed in the Supreme Court will depend on the time taken to conduct the examination, but in relation to a standard examination or 874

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 38 – Examination of judgment debtor etc [r 38.5.1000]

r 38.6

in those circumstances where the examinee fails to attend, the Supreme Court will generally allow 130% of the prescribed amount for the equivalent work in the District Court. Examination by registrar

The registrar will rarely conduct examinations in the Supreme Court or District Court. There may be circumstances in Local Court proceedings where a registrar upon application by the judgment creditor may conduct an examination to minimise expense and inconvenience. In the Supreme Court and District Court, examinations will generally only be conducted by a registrar if the examinee has been arrested and brought before the court on short notice, or in the unlikely case where a warrant for arrest has issued and the examinee attends at the registry volunteering to be examined. If the examinee arrives late on the day scheduled for the examination and after the judgment creditor or her or his representatives have left, or on another day, the registrar will normally decline to conduct the examination and advise the examinee to return to the court on the adjourned date. There are approved forms relating to examinations of individuals (Form 55) and for officers of corporations (Form 56). [r 38.5.80]

Nature of the examination

The examination is a cross-examination, inquisitorial in nature. The examination is to investigate the judgment debtor’s ability to satisfy the judgment or order. The judgment debtor must disclose all assets and means to pay: see CPA s 108(5) as to the material questions. Inquiries about other persons or in respect of judgments against other persons are not allowed. The questions asked might extend to property the judgment debtor may have in the future, but cannot extend to questions about whether alternative processes such as bankruptcy should be instituted, as such questions do not refer to the means of the party to satisfy the judgment. The registrar must be astute to ensure that the examination process is not abused or used oppressively: McCormack v National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 303. [r 38.5.100]

Power to issue subpoenas

An examination in aid of enforcement is a “proceeding” for the purposes of r 33.2, and the court may issue subpoenas provided they have a legitimate forensic purpose: Barclay Mowlem Construction v Tesrol Walsh Bay [2005] NSWSC 944, [8]. [r 38.5.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 32 rr 1, 5, 5A, 5B, 5C, 5D; LCR Pt 28 rr 1, 3, 4, 5, 6. See also r 37.2 as to instalment applications. 38.6 38.3

Arrest warrant where person fails to comply with order for examination under rule

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 92; Act No 11 1970, section 42; DCR Part 32, rule 6; LCR Part 28, rule 7)

A warrant issued under section 97 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 as a consequence of a person’s failure to comply with an order for examination referred to in rule 38.3: (a) may be issued or revoked by the court of its own motion or on the application of the person in whose favour a judgment or order has been given or made, and (b) must be expressed to expire no later than 3 months after the date on which it is issued, and (c) may not be issued in relation to a person’s failure to comply with an order for examination earlier than 14 days, nor later than 3 months, after the court has served notice on the person to whom the order for examination is addressed that failure to attend for examination may result in the person’s arrest. [R 38.6 subst Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[8]]

RULE 38.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 38.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 38.6.40] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

875

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 38.5.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 38.6

[r 38.6.20]

References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 38.6.1000]

[r 38.6.20]

Comparison

In the District Court and Local Court, the relevant legislation authorised the issue of a warrant of apprehension if a judgment debtor failed to appear in compliance with an examination summons: DCA s 92; Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 42. The registrar could authorise the issue of the warrant on the occasion when the examinee failed to appear but the warrant could only issue after 14 days from when the judgment debtor had been served with notice that the examination had been adjourned: DCA s 92(3); Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 42(3). After that 14 day period and within three months of the service of the notice of the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor could apply for the issue of a warrant of apprehension: DCA s 92(4); Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 42(4). Such warrants were issued by a registrar: DCA s 92(5); Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 42(5). In the rules there were provisions that any such warrants would expire after three months: DCR Pt 32 r 6; LCR Pt 28 r 7. There were no equivalent provisions in the Supreme Court; if an examinee failed to appear the registrar could refer the matter to a judge who could issue a bench warrant pursuant to SCR Pt 42 r 7. The power to issue a warrant is now allowed by CPA s 97; this section is based on SCR Pt 42 r 7 and is not specific to examination orders. Subrule (2) of this rule adopts the 14 day minimum and three months maximum period from when notice is served on the examinee, in which a warrant may issue. Subrule (1)(b) adopts the three months expiry period for the warrant and subr (1)(a) provides that the warrant may be issued or revoked by the court of its own motion or on the application of the judgment creditor. The current rule is somewhat simpler than the prior provisions in the District Court and Local Court. The prior procedure involved the registrar authorising the issue of a warrant at the time when the examinee failed to appear; that is no longer required. [r 38.6.40]

Operation

If the examinee fails to appear at the examination, the judgment creditor may simply request an adjournment. In this event the judgment creditor will be required to notify the examinee of the adjourned date; such notification may also advise of an intention to apply for an arrest warrant to issue under r 38.6 if there is a failure to appear on the next occasion. Alternatively, the judgment creditor may apply for an adjournment and request that the registrar issue a notice to the examinee under r 38.6(c) warning that an arrest warrant may issue if there is a failure to attend for examination (within 14 days). The period of the adjournment may be within 14 days or for greater than 14 days, but if it is within the 14 day period, it will allow the examinee to appear without the risk of an arrest warrant being issued in the meantime. The registrar should send a copy of the notice served on the examinee to the judgment creditor (the judgment creditor should note the date of the notice to determine the earliest date when an application for a warrant can be made). After 14 days from when the registrar’s notice was served on the examinee, if the examinee has failed to appear at any adjourned or re-scheduled examination, the judgment creditor may apply, by notice of motion to be considered in chambers, for an arrest warrant to issue. There is an approved form for such an application – Form 57. The motion must be supported by an affidavit, or affidavits, verifying that the judgment or order remains unsatisfied, as to the service of the examination order and all subsequent communications with the judgment debtor as to any adjournments of the examination, and as to the failure to appear. The notice of motion will be considered by a judicial officer in the Supreme Court or by a registrar in the District Court. Any application to issue an arrest warrant must be made within three months of when the registrar’s notice was served on the examinee. If an examinee attends to be examined, and is examined, any arrest warrant that was issued under this rule will be revoked. If the examinee voluntarily attends the registry while an arrest warrant is in force, the registrar will arrange for the examination to proceed as soon as practicable, and if necessary the examination will be conducted by the registrar. The filing fee, service fee and solicitor’s fee associated with filing the notice of motion for an arrest warrant become part of the judgment debt provided the order is granted. The amount currently charged by the sheriff for service of documents (Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 2) can be claimed as the service fee. In relation to solicitor’s costs, Legal Profession Regulation 2005 Sch 2 specifies prescribed costs that can be claimed in relation to notices of motion being filed in the District and Local Courts, however there is no prescribed amount for a notice of motion being filed in the Supreme Court; the Supreme Court will generally allow 130% of the prescribed amount for this work in the District Court. 876

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 38 – Examination of judgment debtor etc [r 38.7.40]

r 38.7

[r 38.6.1000]

References

Superseded legislative provisions: DCA s 92; Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 42. Superseded rules: DCR Pt 32 r 6; LCR Pt 28 r 7; SCR Pt 42 r 7. For power to issue a warrant see CPA s 97. Application of Part to persons that are corporations

(1) In the case of a person that is a corporation: (a) any examination notice under this Part may be addressed to an officer or former officer of the corporation, and (b) any order for examination under this Part may be made against an officer or former officer of the corporation, and any such officer or former officer is bound by the requirements of this Part in respect of that notice or order as if he or she were the corporation. (2) If an examination notice is addressed to an officer or former officer of a corporation in relation to a judgment or order, any subsequent order for examination in respect of the same judgment or order must, unless the court orders otherwise, be made against the same officer or former officer.

RULE 38.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 38.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 38.7.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 38.7.1000]

[r 38.7.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court and District Court examination orders could be issued against an officer or former officer of a judgment debtor corporation: SCR Pt 43 r 2; DCA s 91(1)(b). In the District Court DCA s 91(4) also provided that: (t)he examination summons shall not be directed to an officer or former officer of a corporation … unless the Court or the issuing registrar is satisfied by affidavit or otherwise that the officer or former officer is likely: (a) to have sufficient knowledge of the affairs of the corporation to enable the officer or former officer to give such answers as might be required of a judgment debtor who is not a corporation, or a substantial part of those answers, at an examination … or (b) to have in his or her possession or control any document or thing which tends to show the true financial circumstances of the corporation. There is no equivalent restriction under this rule or Part. In the Local Court, Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 45 provided that an examination order could be issued against officers or former officers of “a body corporate or other body of persons that may by law be sued”. Subrule (2) of this rule is a new provision. [r 38.7.40]

Operation

If the judgment debtor is a corporation an examination order may be issued to a director, the manager or secretary to attend the court in answer to the examination order on behalf of the judgment debtor corporation to answer questions and produce documents on behalf of that corporation. Should a warrant be subsequently issued for the failure to appear on the examination, the warrant is directed to the person named in the examination order: CPA s 108(2)(b). The name and address of the person who is required to attend on behalf of the corporation for examination together with their office in that corporation are to be stated in the affidavit in support of the application. The issue of an examination order is discretionary and the registrar may decline to issue the examination order unless it is clear that the officer nominated in the application, particularly if that person is a former officer, is likely to have sufficient knowledge of the affairs of the corporation. The effect of subr (2) is that the judgment creditor must be selective and nominate the officer who is most likely to have the best knowledge of the corporation’s affairs. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

877

UCPR Parts 31-40

38.7

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 38.7 [r 38.7.1000]

[r 38.7.40] References

Superseded provisions: SCR Pt 43 r 2; DCA s 91(1)(b), (4); Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 45.

878

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally

[r Pt39.20]

r 39.1

PART 39 – ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS Commentary by Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court. Updated by David Ash, Barrister.

PART 39 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 39

Part 39 of the rules deals with the general methods of enforcing judgments: writs of execution, garnishment and charging orders. Part 40 covers committal and sequestration. Division 1 (rr 1–20) deals with writs of execution generally. Rule 1 specifies circumstances when leave to issue a writ is required. Rules 2 and 3 specify how to apply for a writ of execution. Most of the rest of the rules in Div 1 relate to writs for levy of property. Division 2 (rr 21–28) relates to execution against land, and Div 3 (rr 29–33) relates to execution against goods. Division 4 (rr 34–43) deals with garnishment. Division 5 (rr 44 and 45) deals with charging orders. Miscellaneous rules are placed in Div 6 (rr 46–50). The rules in this Part should be read together with the provisions in CPA Pt 8. Under CPA s 135 the court can make directions as to the enforcement of its orders.

DIVISION 1 – ENFORCEMENT OF WRITS OF EXECUTION GENERALLY 39.1 Circumstances in which issue of writ requires leave (cf SCR Part 44, rule 2)

(1) A writ of execution may not be issued in the following circumstances except by leave of the court: (a) if there has been any change in the persons entitled or liable to execution under the judgment, whether by assignment, death or otherwise, (b) if the judgment is against the assets of a deceased person coming to the hands of an executor or administrator after the judgment took effect, and the writ is against those assets or any of them, (c) if a person’s entitlement under the judgment is subject to fulfilment of a condition, (d) if the writ is a writ for the possession of land, (e) if the writ is against property in the hands of a receiver appointed by the court, (f) if the writ is against property in the hands of a sequestrator, (g) if the writ is in aid of another writ of execution. Note: See also section 134 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 with respect to stale judgments. (2) If leave is required, it may be applied for in the notice of motion for the issue of the writ of execution. (3) The motion for leave must be supported by the following evidence: (a) evidence that the applicant is entitled to proceed to execution on the judgment, (b) evidence that the person against whom execution is sought to be issued is liable to execution on the judgment, (c) if the judgment is for the payment of money, evidence as to the amount due on the date of the motion, (d) if subrule (1)(a) applies, evidence as to the change which has taken place, (e) if subrule (1)(b) or (c) applies, evidence that a demand to satisfy the judgment has been made on the person liable to satisfy it and that the person has not satisfied it. (4) Subrule (1) does not limit the operation of any other Act or law that requires leave for the issue of a writ of execution.

RULE 39.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 39.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 39.1.40] Scope of provisions .................................................................................................................................. [r 39.1.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 39.1.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

879

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r Pt39.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.2

[r 39.1.20]

[r 39.1.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.1 is based on SCR Pt 44 r 2. Although the rule has been substantially redrafted it is to the same effect. Under SCR Pt 44 r 2 leave was required where more than 10 years had elapsed since the judgment took effect: subr (1)(a); and if this was applicable the affidavit in support needed to explain the delay: subr (4)(b). These provisions are no longer included in the rule. However, stale judgments, being those judgments more than 12 years old, require leave before enforcement action can be taken: CPA s 134. The 12-year period adopts the period that was applicable in the District Court. This rule can be compared with DCA s 107 which also required leave in respect of the matters in subr (1)(a) and (b); and DCR Pt 34 r 1 which specified the terms of the affidavit in support of the leave application in similar terms to subr (3) of this rule. In DCR Pt 34 r 1(1)(a) there was a requirement that the notice of motion for leave was, unless the court otherwise orders, to be served on the person against whom execution was being sought. In SCR Pt 44 r 2(3) there was a provision that, unless the court otherwise orders, the application for leave could be made without filing or serving the motion. Subrule (2) of this rule states that if leave is required it may be applied for in the motion for the issue of the writ of execution, and r 39.2(2) states that unless the court orders otherwise, a notice of motion to issue a writ need not be served on the judgment debtor. [r 39.1.40]

Operation

Applications for leave to issue a writ under r 39.1 are to be by notice of motion to be considered in chambers. The application will be considered by a registrar, and if it is determined that the judgment debtor or some other persons should be on notice of the application and have an opportunity to be heard, the motion will be listed in court and the parties advised accordingly: r 18.3(4). No filing fee is payable to file the notice of motion, however if the notice of motion also seeks the issue of the writ the registry will charge the sheriff’s execution fee. If the notice of motion seeks leave to issue the writ and to issue the writ, the affidavit in support (or affidavits in support) must deal with such of the matters in r 39.1(3) and r 39.3 as are appropriate, and must be sworn no earlier than 14 days before the application is filed: r 39.3(1). If the judgment or order being enforced is more than 12 years old leave will be required pursuant to CPA s 134. [r 39.1.60]

Scope of provisions

In the SCA most forms of writ were abolished: SCA s 69(1); however writs of execution and writs in aid of execution (r 39.1(1)(g)) were specifically preserved: SCA s 69(2)(b) and (c). Writs in aid of enforcement include the writ of assistance and the writ of restitution. See Maher v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) (2004) 211 ALR 656; [2004] FCA 1398 for discussion and case law references. Leave is required under r 39.1(1)(a) if the judgment creditor has died or become bankrupt or where there has been an assignment of the judgment debt. Leave is required under r 39.1(1)(e) or (f) because otherwise the sheriff would be in contempt of court: Edwards v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 291. [r 39.1.1000]

References

Superseded legislation: DCA s 107. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 44 r 2; DCR Pt 34 r 1. 39.2

Application for writ of execution

(1) An application for a writ of execution in respect of a judgment is to be made by way of notice of motion. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, a notice of motion under this rule: (a) may be dealt with in the absence of the parties, and (b) need not be served on the judgment debtor. (3) The application must indicate the extent (if any) to which the judgment debt has been satisfied under any writ of execution, garnishee order or charging order issued by the court.

880

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally

[r 39.2.1000]

r 39.3

RULE 39.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 39.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 39.2.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 39.2.1000]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court, application for a writ was made by filing a form of the writ in duplicate with an affidavit in support: SCR Pt 44 r 7. In the District Court, the application was made by filing the affidavit grounding the writ: DCR Pt 34 r 4. In the Local Court, the application was made by filing an application for the writ (which was not verified – see Form 72): LCR Pt 30 r 2. Rule 39.2 now requires that the application to issue a writ be made by notice of motion to be considered in chambers. [r 39.2.40]

Operation

Rule 39.2 should be read with r 39.3. An application for a writ is made by filing a notice of motion to be considered in chambers. There are approved forms of notice of motion which incorporate the relevant affidavit in support: Notice Notice Notice Notice

of of of of

motion motion motion motion

– – – –

writ writ writ writ

for for for for

possession of land restitution the delivery of goods the levy of property

Form Form Form Form

59 61 63 65

No filing fee is payable in respect of the motion: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 cl 4(5)(c). However, the registry will require payment of the sheriff’s execution fee – see: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 2. Consideration should be given as to whether leave to issue the writ is required: r 39.1. [r 39.2.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 44 r 7; DCR Pt 34 r 4; LCR Pt 30 r 2. Forms: SCR Form 52 writ of possession; Form 53 writ of specific delivery; Form 54 writ of delivery; Form 57 writ of levy of property; Local Court – Form 72 application to issue execution. 39.3 Affidavit in support of application for writ of execution (cf DCR Part 34, rule 13)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, an applicant for a writ of execution must file an affidavit in support of the application, being an affidavit sworn not more than 14 days before the date of filing. (2) In the case of a writ for the possession of land, the affidavit in support: (a) must identify any persons (other than parties to the proceedings) who were in occupation of the whole or any part of the land: (i) as at the time the originating process was filed, or (ii) if the claim for possession arises from an amendment to the originating process, as at the time the amendment was made, and, if any such person was in occupation of the land pursuant to a right of occupation under a residential tenancy agreement within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010, must contain a statement to that effect, and (b) in relation to each such person: (i) must state that the person’s occupation of the land is not to be disturbed, or (ii) must state that the person is no longer in occupation of any part of the land, or (iii) must state that the person has been served with a notice pursuant to rule 6.8 and that the time allowed for the person to apply to the court to be joined as a defendant has now passed, as the case requires, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

881

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 39.2.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.3 (c)

if the claim for possession of the land arises from a default in the payment of money, must give the particulars required under subrule (2A), and (d) must state the source of the deponent’s knowledge of the matters stated in the affidavit concerning the occupation of the land and any default in the payment of money referred to in paragraph (c), and (e) must state whether costs are claimed and, if costs are claimed and the costs claimable are fixed by law, the amount (not exceeding the amount so fixed) that is claimed for costs. Note: The costs fixed by law referred to in paragraph (e) include costs that are fixed under section 59(1)(d) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014. [Subr (2) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[7]; Rule 483 of 2011, Sch 1[2]; Rule 189 of 2011, Sch 1[3]; Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[12]; Act 27 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2.58; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[22]]

(2A) The particulars required for the purposes of subrule (2)(c) are: (a) if judgment has been entered for the payment of money in addition to possession of the land—each of the following particulars: (i) the amount of the judgment debt, (ii) the amount of interest accruing on the judgment debt to date, (iii) any payments made by or on behalf of the judgment debtor after judgment was entered, (iv) the current amount owing taking into account the matters referred to in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii), or (b) if judgment has been entered only for possession of the land—each of the following particulars: (i) the amount owing following the default, (ii) any payments made to date to reduce the amount owing, (iii) the current amount owing taking into account any such payments. [Subr (2A) insrt Rule 483 of 2011, Sch 1[3]]

(3) In the case of a writ for the delivery of goods, the affidavit in support: (a) must state which goods have not been delivered to the plaintiff since the time the judgment was given, and (b) must give particulars of any payments that the defendant has made to the plaintiff in respect of the goods or state that no such payments have been made, as the case may be, since the time the judgment was given, and (c) must state the address at which the goods are alleged to be located. [Subr (3) am Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[18]]

(4) In the case of a writ for the levy of property, the affidavit in support: (a) must state the amount payable under the judgment, together with any costs and interest payable in relation to the judgment, as at the date of swearing of the affidavit, and (b) must state the address or addresses at which property belonging to the judgment debtor may be located, and (c) if the judgment was entered as a result of the filing of a cost assessor’s certificate, must include a statement to that effect, together with a statement to the effect that the determination set out in the certificate: (i) is not subject to any suspension under section 86 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 that has not been ended under that section, and (ii) is not subject to any suspension under section 90 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 that has not been ended under that section. [Subr (4) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[8]; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[23]]

(5) Any application by the judgment creditor for a writ of execution in relation to a judgment debt that has been the subject of an instalment order that has ceased to have effect may not be granted unless the judgment creditor has filed an affidavit as to the judgment debtor’s failure to comply with the order. 882

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally

[r 39.3.60]

r 39.3

(6) A reference in this rule to a residential tenancy agreement within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 is taken to include a reference to a residential tenancy agreement within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 as in force before its repeal. [Subr (6) insrt Rule 189 of 2011, Sch 1[4]] [R 39.3 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 483 of 2011; Rule 189 of 2011; Rule 501 of 2009; Rule 579 of 2007; Act 27 of 2007; Rule 716 of 2006]

[r 39.3.20] Comparison The requirements of an affidavit in support of a writ of execution were set out in SCR Pt 44 r 7 and DCR Pt 34 r 4. The requirements as to what needed to be set out in the affidavit as to the enforcement of a judgment for money were specified in SCR Pt 44 r 7(1)(c)(i)–(ix) and in DCR Pt 34 r 4(a)–(i). The requirements in respect of an application for leave to issue a writ of possession are set out in SCR Pt 42 r 4(3). In respect of a writ for levy of property, the requirements under r 39.3 are generally a simplification of the requirements set out in SCR Pt 44 r 7 and DCR Pt 34 r 4; the affidavit now only requires a statement of the amount payable under the judgment, together with costs and interests as at the date of swearing the affidavit, rather than the historical and calculation details previously required. The requirement in subr (4)(c) is adopted from SCR Pt 44 r 7(1)(viii) and (ix), but the relevant statement is not required unless it is applicable to the judgment being enforced. Subrule (5) is a new provision that flows from the operation of CPA s 107(2), which provides for stay of execution of the judgment while an instalment order is in force, and r 37.7, which provides that an instalment order ceases to have effect if the judgment debtor fails to comply with the order. [r 39.3.40] Operation Rule 39.3 should be read with r 39.4. An application for a writ is made by filing a notice of motion to be considered in chambers. There are approved forms of notice of motion which incorporate the relevant affidavit in support: Notice Notice Notice Notice

of of of of

motion motion motion motion

– – – –

writ writ writ writ

for for for for

possession of land restitution the delivery of goods the levy of property

Form Form Form Form

59 61 63 65

[r 39.3.60] Writ for the possession of land Writs for possession of land are issued under CPA s 104. All writs for possession of land require leave: r 39.1(1)(d). If judgment for possession was given after a hearing, leave to issue the writ may have already been given. If this is the case then this should be stated in the affidavit. Most writs for possession of land are issued in the Supreme Court in respect of default judgments for possession of land. The application for the writ (and for leave to issue the writ) may be filed at the same time as the application for default judgment; the application to issue the writ is accepted on a provisional basis. The notice of motion to issue the writ should also seek leave to issue the writ (to comply with r 39.1(1)(d)). The requirements for an application for default judgment and to issue a writ relates to similar matters: see r 16.4(3) and compare to r 39.3(2). See [r 16.4.80] and [r 16.4.100]. Writs for possession of land are now forwarded directly to the sheriff once they have been issued, rather than being returned to the plaintiff. The registry will require payment of the sheriff’s execution fee – see: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 2. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

883

UCPR Parts 31-40

RULE 39.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 39.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 39.3.40] Writ for the possession of land ................................................................................................................. [r 39.3.60] Notice to tenant occupiers before taking possession .............................................................................. [r 39.3.70] Writ for delivery of goods ......................................................................................................................... [r 39.3.80] Writ for levy of property .......................................................................................................................... [r 39.3.100] Writ of restitution ..................................................................................................................................... [r 39.3.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 39.3.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.3 [r 39.3.70]

[r 39.3.60] Notice to tenant occupiers before taking possession

From 19 June 2009 Residential Tenancies Act 1987 s 71A (superseded by Residential Tenancies Act 2010 s 122 on 31 January 2011) has required mortgagees to give tenants a minimum of 30 days notice in writing, before taking possession of the property. Rule 39.3(2)(a) requires the affidavit in support of the motion for the writ of possession to specify if any of the occupiers were in occupation pursuant to a residential tenancy agreement under the Act. If there were no occupiers at the time the statement of claim was issued, this does not need to be addressed. Any occupiers under a tenancy agreement should be mentioned in paragraph 3 of the approved form. If those tenants have been given notice under s 71A this can be also noted in paragraph 4 of the approved form. See also r 39.3A, which authorises the sheriff to request relevant information in relation to tenant occupiers to verify that they have been given the appropriate notice. There is no prescribed form of notice, but the notice to vacate must specify the date by which the former tenant is to vacate the premises, and that date must be not less than 30 days after the date on which the notice is given: s 71A(2). See Residential Tenancies Act 1987 s 130 and Residential Tenancies Regulation 2006 cl 28 (superseded by Residential Tenancies Act 2010 s 122 on 31 January 2011) as to the methods by which the notice may be given; service by post to the residential premises or to the tenants usual place of business or employment will be sufficient. If notice was given by post then notice will be deemed to have been effected five working days later: Interpretation Act 1987 s 76. [r 39.3.80]

Writ for delivery of goods

Writs for delivery of goods are issued under CPA s 105. The terms of the writ to which the plaintiff is entitled will depend on the terms of the judgment under CPA s 93; the judgment may be for the specific delivery of the goods, or for the goods or their assessed value. The application for a writ of specific delivery of goods can be filed at the same time as the application for default judgment (where the plaintiff has elected to seek specific delivery); the application to issue the writ is accepted on a provisional basis. The requirements for an application for default judgment and to issue a writ relates to similar matters: see r 16.5(2) and compare to r 39.3(3). As such, if the applications are being filed at the same time, the applications can rely upon one affidavit that deals with both applications. See [r 16.5.60]. Writs for delivery of goods are forwarded directly to the sheriff once they have been issued, rather than being returned to the plaintiff. The registry will require payment of the sheriff’s execution fee – see: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 2). [r 39.3.100]

Writ for levy of property

Writs for levy of property are authorised by CPA s 106(1)(a). The powers of the sheriff in respect of a writ of levy of property are set out in CPA s 106(2), (3), (4) and (5). The requirements for the affidavit in support of a writ for levy of property are set out in r 39.3(4). The reference to provisions of the Legal Profession Act 1987 or the Legal Profession Act 2004 ss 377 and 386 in r 39.3(4)(c) is to possible stays that may apply in respect of a certificate of costs assessment when an appeal is filed to the Supreme Court or a review is filed. This only needs to be referred to in the affidavit if the judgment being enforced derives from the lodgement of a costs assessment certificate. If the judgment being enforced has been the subject of an instalment order pursuant to Pt 37 the affidavit in support of the application (or some other secondary affidavit) must show facts that establish the instalment order has ceased to have effect: r 39.3. The requirements for an application for default r 39.4 judgment and to issue a writ relates to similar matters: see r 16.6(2) and compare to r 39.3(4). See [r 16.6.40]. Writs for levy of property are forwarded directly to the sheriff once they have been issued, rather than being returned to the plaintiff. The registry will require payment of the sheriff’s execution fee – see: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 2. [r 39.3.120]

Writ of restitution

Writs of restitution are issued if a defendant resumes possession of a property after a writ for possession has been executed. A writ of restitution may also be issued where a defendant is successful in having a judgment for possession and a writ of possession set aside. There are no specific rules that relate to a writ of restitution, however they are in the nature of a writ for possession or are a writ in aid of another writ and require leave: r 39.1(1)(d) and (g). All writs of restitution are issued in the Supreme Court. Although they are rare, they have become more common in recent years following an increase in judgments for possession of land. Writs of restitution will be forwarded directly to the sheriff once they have been issued, rather than being returned to 884

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 39.3A.1000]

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally

r 39.4

the applicant. The registry will require payment of the sheriff’s execution fee – see: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 2), when the notice of motion is filed. [r 39.3.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 42 r 4(3); SCR Pt 44 r 7; DCR Pt 34 r 4.

(1) This rule applies to: (a) a writ for the possession of land, and (b) a writ for the levy of property in respect of which a notice of sale of land has been filed as referred to in rule 39.22(1)(b). (2) If the Sheriff so requests, the judgment creditor or other person for whose benefit the writ has been issued must inform the Sheriff as to whether any person is in occupation of the land pursuant to a right of occupation under a residential tenancy agreement, within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010. [Subr (2) subst Rule 189 of 2011, Sch 1[5]]

(3) A reference in this rule to a residential tenancy agreement within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 is taken to include a reference to a residential tenancy agreement within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 as in force before its repeal. [Subr (3) insrt Rule 189 of 2011, Sch 1[6]] [R 39.3A am Rule 189 of 2011; insrt Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[13]]

RULE 39.3A COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.3A.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.3A.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.3A.1000]

[r 39.3A.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.3A is a new rule inserted following amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (superseded by Residential Tenancies Act 2010 s 122 since 31 January 2011), which require mortgagees to provide notices to vacate to tenants before taking possession of the property. [r 39.3A.40]

Operation

Rule 39.3A authorises the sheriff to obtain information from the plaintiff to verify whether there are tenants in occupation of a property, and if there are that notices to vacate have been served and that the time specified in those notices to vacate has expired. See [r 39.3.70]. [r 39.3A.1000]

References

Residential Tenancies Act 1987 ss 71A and 130. Residential Tenancies Act 2010 ss 122 and 223. 39.4 Order in which writs for the levy of property to be dealt with (cf SCR Part 44, rule 8; Act No 9 1973, section 108)

Writs for the levy of property against the same judgment debtor are to be enforced by the Sheriff in the order in which they are received by the Sheriff, regardless of the order in which they were issued.

RULE 39.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 39.4.20] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

885

UCPR Parts 31-40

39.3A Sheriff to be informed of persons in occupation of land

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.5

[r 39.4.20]

Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 39.4.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 39.4.1000]

[r 39.4.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.4 adopts the rule relating to priority of writs under DCA s 108 and the Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 17 (now repealed). [r 39.4.40]

Operation

As between the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor, the date of the issue of the writ determines its priority. As between the judgment creditor and third parties and as between different judgment creditors, the writ binds the property of the judgment debtor from the date of delivery to the sheriff. The former practice of the Supreme Court was to return the issued writ to the requesting party. In the Local and District Courts the issued writ was forwarded directly to the sheriff. From the implementation of the UCPR, the Supreme Court has also forwarded writs directly to the sheriff. When an integrated registry computer system has been implemented in all the courts, the issue of the writ will be advised to the sheriff at the same time as it is issued, and this rule may be redundant. [r 39.4.1000]

References

Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 17; note that s 29 has been repealed. District Court Act 1973 s 108. See also SCR Pt 44 r 8(5). 39.5

Property to be sold promptly

(cf SCR Part 45, rule 5)

Subject to this Division, any property to be sold under a writ for the levy of property must be put up for sale as soon as practicable, having due regard to the interests of each of the parties and to the need to avoid of the sacrifice of the reasonable value of the property.

RULE 39.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 39.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 39.5.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 39.5.1000]

[r 39.5.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.5 adopts SCR Pt 45 r 5 and DCA s 109(6). It is, however, subject to r 39.30. Compare this with Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 59(4). [r 39.5.40]

Operation

Rule 39.5 should be read together with r 39.30. [r 39.5.1000]

References

Rule 39.5 adopts SCR Pt 45 r 5 and DCA s 109(6). Compare Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 59(4) and DCR Pt 35 r 3; LCR Pt 30 r 13. 39.6

Order in which property to be sold

(cf SCR Part 45, rule 4; Act No 9 1973, section 110; Act No 11 1970, section 62A)

(1) If it appears to the Sheriff that the value of the property affected by a writ for the levy of property is greater than the amount outstanding under the judgment debt, the Sheriff may not cause to be sold any more of the property than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment. 886

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally

[r 39.6.80]

r 39.6

(3) Land must not be sold before any other property unless: (a) the judgment debtor so requests, or (b) the Sheriff is satisfied that the land should be sold before the other property in order to minimise hardship to the judgment debtor or some other person.

RULE 39.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 39.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 39.6.40] Goods that can and cannot be seized ..................................................................................................... [r 39.6.60] Method of seizure and effect of seizure ................................................................................................... [r 39.6.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 39.6.1000]

[r 39.6.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.6 adopts SCR Pt 45 r 4, which was to the same effect as DCA ss 109(4) and 110(2). There are also equivalent provisions to r 36.9(2) in Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 62A(3). [r 39.6.40]

Operation

The operation of r 39.6 will depend on the size of the judgment and the assets that are available to be seized. In selecting the property to be sold, the sheriff has regard to what is best for the expeditious execution of the judgment without undue expense. Property is sold in such an order as to minimise hardship to the judgment debtor and other persons. In respect of a Supreme Court or District Court judgment it may well be reasonable for the sheriff to determine that land should be sold before personal assets, where it is clear that the value of the personal assets will be insufficient to satisfy the judgment. The judgment debtor can always request the sheriff to sell land before selling other property: r 39.6(3)(a). [r 39.6.60]

Goods that can and cannot be seized

See CPA s 102(2) as to property that can be seized and sold. Property that can be seized includes: choses in action, dividends, emblements, equitable interests, interest in hire purchase agreements, money, and shares. Property that cannot be seized (most of which is intangible, subject to the rights of third parties or cannot be sold) includes: liens held by the debtor, property held in trust for third parties, patents, and property under bailment to the judgment debtor. Under CPA s 102(3), the sheriff cannot seize items which are being used by the judgment debtor or his or her family such as: • any clothing; • any bedroom or kitchen furniture; • any tools of trade (including vehicles, plant, equipment and reference books), not exceeding, in aggregate value, the sum of $2,000. See r 39.46. For discussion of what can and cannot be seized see, Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, Vol 17, paras [471]–[486]. Property which is held jointly or in common may be seized and the judgment debtor’s interest sold: Stevens v Young [1973] 2 NSWLR 750. For how goods subject to a conditional bill of sale are dealt with see CPA s 110. For how cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds, etc are dealt with, see CPA s 111. [r 39.6.80]

Method of seizure and effect of seizure

See [CPA 106.40] and [CPA 106.60]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

887

UCPR Parts 31-40

(2) Subject to subrule (3), property is to be sold: (a) in such order as seems to the Sheriff best for the speedy satisfaction of the judgment without undue expense, and (b) subject to paragraph (a), in such order as the judgment debtor may direct, and (c) subject to paragraphs (a) and (b), in such order as seems to the Sheriff best for minimising hardship to the judgment debtor or any other person.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.7

[r 39.6.80]

[r 39.6.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 45 r 4. See also DCA ss 109(4) and 110(2); Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 62A(3). Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, Vol 17, paras [471]–[486]. 39.7

Sale to be by public auction

(cf DCR Part 35, rule 5; LCR Part 30, rule 15)

(1) Subject to rule 39.13, property sold under a writ for the levy of property must be sold by public auction, by the Sheriff or by an auctioneer appointed under rule 39.8, to the highest bidder. (2) Property must not be sold by public auction for a price substantially below its approximate market value, as fixed by the Sheriff under rule 39.10.

RULE 39.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 39.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 39.7.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 39.7.1000]

[r 39.7.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.7(1) is based on SCR Pt 45 r 10, DCR Pt 35 r 5 and LCR Pt 30 r 15. This rule now specifies that the sale is to be by the sheriff or an auctioneer appointed under r 39.8. Subrule (2) is based on SCR Pt 45 r 9(4), DCR Pt 35 r 7(4) and LCR Pt 30 r 15(4). [r 39.7.40]

Operation

The sheriff must attempt to sell seized goods by public auction. Only if the goods cannot receive a bid that meets their approximate market value, as fixed by the sheriff under r 39.10, can the goods be offered for sale by private treaty under r 39.13. [r 39.7.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 10; DCR Pt 35 r 5 and LCR Pt 30 r 15. SCR Pt 45 r 9(4); DCR Pt 35 r 7(4) and LCR Pt 30 r 15(4). See also Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 11. 39.8

Auctioneer

(cf SCR Part 45, rule 6; DCR Part 35, rule 3A; LCR Part 30, rule 13A)

(1) If the nature and apparent value of property to be sold under a writ for the levy of property is such that it appears to the Sheriff that it is reasonable to sell the property, the Sheriff may appoint a duly qualified auctioneer to sell the property. [Subr (1) am Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[17]]

(2) An auctioneer appointed to sell any property under a writ for the levy of property must, as soon as practicable after the Sheriff advises that the auctioneer’s services will not be required in respect of the writ, or otherwise requests an account of the auctioneer’s charges, advise the Sheriff of the amount of those charges to date. (2A) If, after the appointment of the auctioneer, it appears to the Sheriff that it is not reasonable to proceed with the sale, the Sheriff may direct that the property be withdrawn from sale. [Subr (2A) insrt Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[18]]

(3) An auctioneer appointed by the Sheriff to sell property under a writ for the levy of property must 888

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally

[r 39.9.40]

r 39.9

as soon as practicable after receiving any money under the writ pay the money to the Sheriff, less the amount of any charges payable to the auctioneer in respect of the writ. [R 39.8 am Rule 288 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[16]]

RULE 39.8 COMMENTARY

[r 39.8.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.8 is based on SCR Pt 45 r 6, and DCR Pt 35 r 3A. Under subr (1) of this rule, the auctioneer must be duly qualified. In SCR Pt 45 r 6(1) the auctioneer was required to hold an appropriate license under the Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 1941; in DCR Pt 35 r 3A(1) the same effect was achieved by referring to DCA s 111, which required the same thing. The equivalent rule in the Local Court was LCR Pt 30 r 13A. The qualifications of an auctioneer are now governed by the Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 2002. For land sales the Sheriff’s Office will call for potential auctioneers to tender. [r 39.8.40]

Operation

If the nature and apparent value of the property to be sold (eg antiques, paintings and jewellery) are such that it appears reasonable to the relevant sheriff officer to do so, he or she may appoint an auctioneer to sell the property. The duties of the auctioneer in relation to the sale are set out in r 39.8. See also r 39.27 as to reporting after the sale. For land sales the Sheriff’s Office will call for potential auctioneers to tender. [r 39.8.1000]

References

Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 2002. Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 6; DCR Pt 35 r 3A; LCR Pt 30 r 13A. 39.9 Sale to be arranged so as to obtain highest prices (cf SCR Part 45, rules 5, 7 and 8; Act No 11 1970, section 59)

For the purpose of obtaining the highest prices for the property, the Sheriff: (a) must ascertain what appears to the Sheriff to be the best place for the sale to be held, and (b) must cause the sale to be held at the place so ascertained.

RULE 39.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 39.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 39.9.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 39.9.1000]

[r 39.9.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.9 is based on SCR Pt 45 r 7. This rule clarifies what was previously an implicit requirement, ie ascertaining the best place for the sale to be held. This requirement was also implied by DCR Pt 35 r 2(1) and LCR Pt 30 r 12(1), which permitted the sheriff to move the goods to a place where “in his judgment” the highest prices for the goods were most likely to be obtained. [r 39.9.40]

Operation

The venue for the auction sale is determined by the sheriff’s officer, and is to be at a place where the highest price for the property, in the opinion of the officer, is likely to be obtained. This rule should be read together with r 39.5. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

889

UCPR Parts 31-40

Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 39.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 39.8.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 39.8.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.10

[r 39.9.40]

[r 39.9.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 rr 5, 7 and 8; DCR Pt 35 r 2(1); LCR Pt 30 r 12(1). 39.10

Approximate market value

(cf SCR Part 45, rule 7; DCR Part 35, rule 8; LCR Part 30, rule 6)

(1) Before selling property under a writ for the levy of property, the Sheriff must fix the approximate market value of the property, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, but need not disclose that value to any other person before the sale. (2) For the purpose of fixing such a value, the Sheriff: (a) may require the judgment creditor to furnish the Sheriff with any information known to, or reasonably capable of ascertainment by, the judgment creditor in respect of the property, and (b) may engage a suitably qualified and experienced valuer to provide the Sheriff with an opinion as to the value of the property if the nature and apparent value of the property so warrant. (3) If the judgment creditor unreasonably fails to furnish any information referred to in subrule (2)(a), the Sheriff must report the failure to the court, and may refuse to proceed further towards the sale of the property.

RULE 39.10 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.10.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.10.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.10.1000]

[r 39.10.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.10 is based on SCR Pt 45 r 7, DCR Pt 35 r 8 and LCR Pt 30 r 6. These rules were all in essentially the same terms. Although this rule has been re-written, it is to the same effect. Subrule (4) in each of the superseded rules is now incorporated in r 39.7(2). [r 39.10.40]

Operation

Before an auction the sheriff’s officer must determine the approximate market value of the property up for sale. The judgment creditor can be asked to provide such information as he or she may have, and a valuer can be retained if the nature and potential value of the property justify it. As the property cannot be sold for a price substantially less than the value fixed under this rule (r 39.7(2)), this value is in the nature of a reserve price. [r 39.10.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 7; DCR Pt 35 r 8; LCR Pt 30 r 6. 39.11 Postponement (cf DCR Part 35, rule 6; LCR Part 30, rule 16)

(1) The Sheriff may from time to time postpone the sale of property under a writ for the levy of property, or require any auctioneer appointed to sell the property to postpone any such sale, if the Sheriff thinks it proper to postpone the sale: (a) to avoid a sacrifice of the reasonable value of the property, or (b) to comply with a request by the judgment creditor for the postponement. (2) If the date to which the sale of property is postponed under subrule (1) falls after the date on which the writ would otherwise expire, the date of expiry of the writ is postponed to the date of the postponed sale.

890

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 39.11.1000]

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally

r 39.12

RULE 39.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 39.11.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.11.40] References .......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.11.1000]

Comparison

Rule 39.11 khoan is based on, and is to the same effect as SCR Pt 45 r 12, DCR Pt 35 r 11 and LCR Pt 30 r 16. These rules were all in essentially the same terms. The District Court and Local Court rules also referred to “bailiff” (now redundant), and the Supreme Court rule excluded the operation of SCR Pt 62 r 3, which would have otherwise required the instruction from the judgment creditor to be in writing. [r 39.11.40]

Operation

The sheriff’s officer, but not an auctioneer, may from time to time postpone or require the auctioneer to postpone the sale if he or she thinks it proper to do so to avoid a sacrifice of the reasonable value of the property or to comply with a request by the judgment creditor. The effect of such a postponement is that the validity of the writ is extended, if necessary, till the date of the postponed sale. A request by the judgment creditor to postpone the sale is not a request for the sheriff to withdraw from possession of the property or to suspend execution of the writ: r 39.12. The request to the sheriff from the judgment creditor to postpone the sale does not need to be in writing (compare requests to stay execution under r 39.12). [r 39.11.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 12; DCR Pt 35 r 11; LCR Pt 30 r 16. 39.12

Suspension of execution by judgment creditor

(cf DCR Part 34, rule 8; LCR Part 30, rule 7)

(1) If, at any time before property is seized under a writ for the levy of property, the judgment creditor: (a) requires the Sheriff, by notice in writing, to suspend execution of the writ, or (b) requires the Sheriff, by a subsequent notice in writing, to resume execution of the writ, the Sheriff must comply with the requirement. (2) If, at any time after property is seized under a writ for the levy of property, the judgment creditor (having entered into an arrangement with the judgment debtor with respect to the Sheriff’s withdrawal and re-entry into possession of the property and notified the Sheriff of the arrangement): (a) requires the Sheriff, by notice in writing, to withdraw from possession of the property and suspend execution of the writ, or (b) requires the Sheriff to re-enter into possession of the property and resume execution of the writ, the Sheriff must comply with the requirement. (3) If, at any time after property is seized under a writ for the levy of property, the judgment creditor (not having notified the Sheriff of an arrangement referred to in subrule (2)) requires the Sheriff, by notice in writing, to withdraw from possession of the property and suspend execution of the writ, the judgment creditor is taken to have abandoned the execution, and the Sheriff must withdraw from possession of the property. (4) For the purposes of subrule (3), a request to postpone the sale of property under a writ for the levy of property is not a request to withdraw from possession of the property or to suspend execution of the writ. (5) The Sheriff’s duty under this rule to resume execution of a writ for the levy of property (the original writ) is subject to the Sheriff’s duties under this Part with respect to any other writ for the levy of property that had been issued against the same judgment debtor when execution of the original writ was suspended and, for that purpose, any other such writ is to be executed, and the proceeds of sale dealt with, as if that other writ had been received by the Sheriff before the original writ. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

891

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 39.11.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.12

[r 39.12.20]

RULE 39.12 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.12.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.12.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.12.1000]

[r 39.12.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.12 is based on DCR Pt 34 r 8 and LCR Pt 30 r 7. There was no equivalent rule in the Supreme Court but SCR Pt 62 r 2 required that any request for a suspension of execution by the judgment creditor or to withdraw such a request needed to be in writing. The prior District Court and Local Courts rules, DCR Pt 34 r 8 and LCR Pt 30 r 7, had references to “the bailiff” (a term which is now obsolete); in the equivalent of subr (1) there was specific provision that the suspension of execution could not be conditional; instead of referring to whether the property has been seized or not they referred to whether a levy had been made; and there was a reference to the bailiff “returning the writ”, a concept which has not been carried into this rule or this Part. Rule 39.12(5) is a new provision. [r 39.12.40]

Operation

If the sheriff has not yet seized any property, the judgment creditor may in writing require the sheriff’s officer to suspend execution of the writ. This request cannot be subject to conditions. The judgment creditor may subsequently in writing require the resumption of execution. Any such request to suspend or resume must be complied with: r 39.12(1). If the sheriff has seized property and the judgment creditor and judgment debtor have entered into an agreement that the sheriff’s officer be at liberty to withdraw and re-enter possession, and communicate that agreement to the sheriff’s officer, and request the sheriff’s officer to withdraw from possession and to suspend execution, the sheriff’s officer will do so but will also comply with any subsequent request in writing from the judgment creditor to re-enter possession and resume execution in accordance with the terms of the agreement: r 39.12(2). If the sheriff has seized property and the judgment creditor requests the sheriff to withdraw from possession or suspend execution of the writ (other than postponing the auction under r 39.11(2)) and does not state that this request is pursuant to an agreement with the judgment debtor, then the judgment creditor is deemed to have abandoned the execution and the sheriff’s officer will withdraw from possession: r 39.12(3). Rule 39.12(5) applies if there are multiple writs issued against the same judgment debtor. If a judgment creditor suspends execution of a writ under this rule, the sheriff can continue to execute other writs against the judgment debtor, and the suspended writ loses priority if the judgment creditor changes her or his mind and requests that the sheriff resume possession, as the property previously seized may now have been seized in respect of another writ. [r 39.12.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 34 r 8; LCR Pt 30 r 7; SCR Pt 62 r 2. 39.13

Sale by private treaty

(cf SCR Part 45, rule 11; DCR Part 35, rule 8; LCR Part 30, rule 18)

(1) If, at a public auction, the highest bid of property to be sold under a writ for the levy of property is substantially below their approximate market value, as fixed by the Sheriff, the Sheriff or (if the Sheriff so approves) the auctioneer may sell the property by private treaty. (2) The Sheriff must not approve a sale of property by private treaty at a price substantially below a fair value determined by the Sheriff. (3) In determining a fair value for the property for the purposes of subrule (2), the Sheriff: (a) must take into account all the relevant circumstances, including but not limited to: (i) the approximate market value of the property fixed by the Sheriff, and (ii) the amount of the highest bid for the property at the public auction, and (iii) the likelihood or otherwise of there being a higher bid if the property were again put up for sale by public auction, and 892

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 39.13.1000] (b)

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally

r 39.14

must not determine a fair value that is substantially below the amount of the highest bid for the property at the public auction.

RULE 39.13 COMMENTARY

[r 39.13.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.13 is based on SCR Pt 45 r 11, DCR Pt 35 r 8 and LCR Pt 30 r 18. All these rules were in similar terms and are to the same effect as this rule; DCR Pt 35 r 8 and LCR Pt 30 r 18 referred to “goods” while SCR Pt 45 r 11 referred to “property”. In the District Court there was a corresponding rule that related to the sale of land: DCR Pt 36 r 11A. [r 39.13.40]

Operation

Rule 39.13 authorises the sheriff to sell land or goods by private treaty but only in the circumstances set out in the rule. The approximate market value referred to in subr (3)(a)(i) has to be set by the sheriff before the public auction: r 39.10. The terms of the sale are those set in r 39.14. [r 39.13.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 11; DCR Pt 35 r 8; DCR Pt 36 r 11A; LCR Pt 30 r 18. 39.14

Conditions of sale

(cf DCR Part 35, rule 9; LCR Part 30, rule 19)

(1) The Sheriff may sell property under a writ for the levy of property, or require any auctioneer appointed to sell such property: (a) on terms as to payment that the purchaser must pay: (i) an amount equal to at least 10% of the purchase price by way of deposit forthwith on the sale, and (ii) the balance of the purchase price within such period, not exceeding 2 days after the sale (in the case of goods) and 6 weeks after the sale (in the case of land), as the Sheriff may determine prior to the sale, or (b) on terms as to payment that the purchaser must pay the whole of the purchase price forthwith on the sale. (2) If a sale of property is partly of goods and partly of land, the goods may be sold on the same terms as to payment as the land. (3) The Sheriff may require payment to be in cash, by bank draft or, if the Sheriff so approves, by credit card. (4) If payment is made by credit card, any charge made to the Sheriff or auctioneer in respect of the payment is to form part of the costs of the execution.

RULE 39.14 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.14.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.14.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.14.1000]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

893

UCPR Parts 31-40

Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.13.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.13.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.13.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.15

[r 39.14.20]

[r 39.14.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.14 is based on, and has the same effect as SCR Pt 45 r 13. There were similar rules in the District Court and Local Court: DCR Pt 35 r 9, which related to sale of goods, DCR Pt 35 r 11B, which related to sale of land, and LCR Pt 30 r 19, which related to sale of goods. This rule relates to the sale of property generally. [r 39.14.40]

Operation

Rule 39.14 establishes the conditions of sale of goods or land whether by way of auction (under r 39.7) or by way of private treaty (under r 39.13). [r 39.14.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 13; DCR Pt 35 r 9; DCR Pt 35 r 11B; LCR Pt 30 r 19. 39.15

How proceeds of enforcement to be applied

(cf Act No 8 1901, sections 9 and 17; LCR Part 30, rule 20)

(1) The proceeds of enforcement of a writ for the levy of property are to be applied as follows: (a) firstly, to the Sheriff to cover the Sheriff’s fees and expenses in executing the writ, (b) secondly, to the judgment creditor to satisfy the judgment debt, (c) thirdly, to the judgment debtor as to any amount remaining. (2) If the Sheriff receives writs for the levy of property (whether from the same or from different courts) in relation to more than one judgment creditor, the judgment creditors are to be paid from the proceeds of enforcement of the writs in the order in which the writs were received by the Sheriff.

RULE 39.15 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.15.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.15.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.15.1000]

[r 39.15.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.15 derives from the Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 ss 9 and 17 (repealed). Section 9 provided for money recovered on the writ being paid to the judgment creditor “as is sufficient to discharge the amount by such writ to be levied and if after satisfaction of the amount so levied together with poundage and expenses any surplus remains in the hand of such sheriff or officer, the same shall be paid to the person against whom such writ has been sued out”. In the Local Court LCR Pt 30 r 20 provided a scheme for the sheriff in respect of receipting, holding and disbursing money received in respect of a writ of execution, which while specifying certain time periods is essentially the same priority as specified in subr (1) of this rule. Section 17 (of the Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901) was the rule that governed priority of writs. It provided that priority was determined by the time of delivery to the sheriff in respect of writs from the Supreme Court, and the time of application for issue in the District Court and Local Court. The priority under this rule is determined by the date the writ is received by the sheriff. [r 39.15.40]

Operation

Rule 39.15 sets out how the proceeds of the enforcement of a writ of levy of property will be applied. The proceeds may be money paid to the sheriff by the judgment debtor to satisfy or partially satisfy the judgment, money seized by the sheriff under CPA s 106(2)(b) or the proceeds of the sale of goods, whether by auction (r 39.7) or by private treaty (r 39.13), seized under CPA s 106. All of the sheriff’s fees and expenses will be deducted before any payments are made to the judgment creditor. In respect of how moneys are appropriated to the judgment debt and accrued interest see CPA s 136. If there are surplus funds after the judgment creditor has been paid these will be paid to the judgment debtor. Upon request, the sheriff will supply an account of the moneys relating to the execution of the writ: r 39.16. If there are multiple writs for levy of property being executed against the one judgment debtor, the judgment creditors will be paid based on the priority of their 894

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally

[r 39.16.1000]

r 39.17

writs, which is determined by the order in which the writs were received by the sheriff: r 39.15(2). If a judgment creditor requests the sheriff to suspend execution of the writ, then that judgment creditor may lose priority if there are subsequent writs for levy of property received by the sheriff against that judgment debtor: r 39.12. [r 39.15.1000]

References

Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 ss 9 and 17 (repealed).

39.16

Account

(cf DCR Part 34, rule 9; LCR Part 30, rule 8)

On the request of the judgment creditor, or of any person who claims that his or her property has been sold by the Sheriff under a writ for the levy of property, the Sheriff must give that judgment creditor or person: (a) a report of any sale under the writ, and (b) an account of: (i) the proceeds of the sale and any other money received under the writ, and (ii) the Sheriff’s fees and expenses in relation to the writ, and (iii) the manner of disposal of the proceeds or other money.

RULE 39.16 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.16.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.16.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.16.1000]

[r 39.16.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.16 is based on, and has the same effect as DCR Pt 34 r 9 and LCR Pt 30 r 8 (those rules were in identical terms), and SCR Pt 45 r 14. [r 39.16.40]

Operation

Upon request the sheriff will provide to the judgment creditor or judgment debtor an account of the moneys in relation to the execution of the writ. See r 39.15 as to how proceeds are to be applied. See also r 39.32, which requires the sheriff to report to the judgment creditor after the sale of goods. [r 39.16.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 14; DCR Pt 34 r 9; LCR Pt 30 r 8. 39.17

Sheriff may require security for costs of execution

(cf DCR Part 34, rule 7; LCR Part 30, rule 5)

(1) At any time after receiving a writ of execution, the Sheriff may require the judgment creditor: (a) to lodge such security for payment of the Sheriff’s costs in relation to the execution of the writ, or (b) to give such undertaking as to payment of the Sheriff’s costs in relation to the execution of the writ, as the Sheriff considers appropriate. (2) If the judgment creditor fails to comply with such a requirement, the Sheriff: (a) may refuse to execute the writ, and (b) may withdraw from any possession into which the Sheriff may have entered under the writ. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

895

UCPR Parts 31-40

Superseded rule: LCR Pt 30 r 20.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.18

[r 39.17.20]

RULE 39.17 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.17.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.17.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.17.1000]

[r 39.17.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.17 is based on SCR Pt 62 r 5. Subrule (1) of that rule allowed the sheriff to require security or an undertaking in respect of any process lodged with the sheriff for service or execution, and subr (2) permitted the sheriff to defer service or execution until the security or undertaking was provided. In the District Court and Local Court DCR Pt 34 r 7 and LCR Pt 30 r 5 authorised the registrar to require the deposit of a sum to cover the likely costs of executing the writ, and permitted the registrar to refuse to issue the writ, and the bailiff to withdraw from possession and return the writ if the money was not paid. [r 39.17.40]

Operation

When the application for a writ of levy of property is filed the registry will collect, on behalf of the sheriff, a fee to cover the initial execution of the writ. Each subsequent attempted execution will incur an additional fee. If goods are seized, a further fee applies. If the sale of goods or land is required, the sheriff is also entitled to recover expenses for advertising, auctioneers’ fees, valuation fees, storage fees, etc. The sheriff is also entitled to a 3% levy of the amount collected on the writ. Rule 39.17 authorises the sheriff to assess what the relevant expenses are likely to be and require the judgment creditor to either pay that sum on account or give an undertaking to pay those expenses if they cannot be recovered by the sheriff on the execution. As a matter of practice, the sheriff will require that seizure fees be paid and a deposit for expenses incurred on the sale be paid before any further steps are taken. The judgment creditor may consider requesting the sheriff to suspend execution or to postpone a sale if the expenses are likely to exceed the amounts likely to be recovered. See rr 39.11(1)(b) and 39.12. Expenses paid in advance by the judgment creditor become part of the judgment debt and can be recovered as part of the execution process. Those expenses can also be recovered on the execution of a later writ: CPA s 137(2)(a). The sheriff’s fees and expenses in executing the writ (that are not paid in advance or that exceed the deposit) are deducted from the proceeds of the execution before any proceeds are paid to the judgment creditor: r 39.15. Any disputes that cannot be resolved between the judgment creditor and the sheriff may be the subject of an application to the court pursuant to CPA s 135. [r 39.17.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 62 r 5; DCR Pt 34 r 7; LCR Pt 30 r 5. 39.18

Sheriff to serve copy of writ when executing or attempting to execute writ

(cf DCR Part 34, rule 5)

On executing a writ of execution, the Sheriff must cause a copy of the writ to be served on the judgment debtor or left in a conspicuous position at the place where the writ was executed.

RULE 39.18 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.18.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.18.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.18.1000]

[r 39.18.20]

Comparison

In the District Court and Local Court the registry produced a notice to the debtor when the writ was issued, which was given to the judgment debtor when the writ was executed: DCR Pt 34 r 5(2), LCR Pt 30 r 3(2). There was no such requirement in the Supreme Court. Rule 39.18 requires that a copy of the writ is served on the judgment debtor or left at the place where execution was effected. 896

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 1 – Enforcement of writs of execution generally

[r 39.20.20] [r 39.18.40]

r 39.20

Operation

When the sheriff intends to execute a writ, a document is produced that sets out the current judgment debt and any fees that the judgment debtor is liable to pay. When the writ is executed a copy of this notice is given to the judgment debtor. Rule 39.18 requires the sheriff to provide a copy of the writ to the judgment debtor, or if the judgment debtor is not present, to leave a copy of the writ in a conspicuous location on the property. In practice the copy of the writ will normally be annexed to the notice produced by the sheriff. [r 39.18.1000]

References UCPR Parts 31-40

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 34 r 5(2); LCR Pt 30 r 3(2). Local Court Form 74; District Court Form 95. 39.19

When writ may not be executed

(cf DCR Part 34, rule 10)

(1) A writ of execution may not be executed on Christmas Day or Good Friday. (2) The Sheriff is not required to execute a writ of execution on any day on which court registries need not be open.

RULE 39.19 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.19.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.19.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.19.1000]

[r 39.19.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.19 adopts DCR Pt 34 r 10. In the Local Court LCR Pt 30 r 9, was in similar terms to subr (1). There was no equivalent rule in the Supreme Court. [r 39.19.40]

Operation

Rule 39.19(2) does not prevent the sheriff from executing a writ on a day when registries are closed. [r 39.19.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 34 r 10; LCR Pt 30 r 9. 39.20

Expiry and renewal of writ of execution

(cf SCR Part 44, rule 8; DCR Part 34, rule 2; LCR Part 30, rule 1, Part 30A, rule 2)

A writ of execution has effect for 12 months but may, subject to these rules, be renewed by the court. [R 39.20 am Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[9]]

RULE 39.20 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.20.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.20.40] Where Torrens title land the subject of a writ is held on trust ............................................................... [r 39.20.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.20.1000]

[r 39.20.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court writs were valid for execution for 12 months from the date of issue, but the validity could be repeatedly extended for further periods of up to 12 months provided the application was made while the writ was still valid: SCR Pt 44 r 9. In the District Court and Local Court writs were valid for a six month © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

897

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.20

[r 39.20.20]

period from when they were issued, but could be extended for a further six months (ie up to 12 months in total) provided the application to extend was made within the original six month period: DCR Pt 34 r 2, LCR Pt 30 r 1. In the Local Court there was a further provision (LCR Pt 30A r 2) that provided for a writ being renewed for the purposes of the Real Property Act 1900 s 105(5), but not for a period greater than the 12 months period provided by LCR Pt 30 r 1. Rule 39.20 specifies that writs are effective for 12 months, but that they can be renewed. See also r 39.11(2) which provides that if a writ was due to expire after a sale has been postponed the expiry will be postponed till the sale. [r 39.20.40]

Operation

A writ is valid for execution for a period of 12 months from the date of issue. If the sheriff postpones a sale under r 39.11(1) and the date to which the sale is postponed falls after the date on which the writ would otherwise expire, the date of the expiry is postponed to the date of the postponed sale: r 39.11(2). The expiry of a writ for the levy of property does not affect any agreement for sale or other transaction entered into under the authority of the writ before that expiry and any action necessary to complete that sale or give effect to that transaction may be taken as if the writ were still in force: CPA s 116. If a writ has been issued and has expired the judgment creditor can apply for a further writ or take other enforcement action: CPA s 138. There may be occasions where there is a tactical advantage in issuing a further writ before the original writ has expired (to retain priority over other judgment creditors who may not have issued or registered their own writs where the original writ is due to expire). If the original writ has not expired it will need to be cancelled before a further writ can issue. In the absence of any specific rules as to the cancellation of a writ this would be an application under CPA s 135. The “renewal” of a writ under this rule is a renewal for the purposes of the Real Property Act 1900 s 105(5), which extends the registration of the writ under that Act. See CPA s 113(2) and the Real Property Act 1900 ss 105, 105A, 105B, 105C and 105D for effect of registration of a writ. See rr 39.21–39.28 as to rules that apply when a writ is being executed against land. An application to renew the writ would be by motion to be considered in chambers. [r 39.20.60]

Where Torrens title land the subject of a writ is held on trust

As to writs of execution on land the subject of the Real Property Act 1900, see generally the commentary at [CPA 112.20]. In Agusta Pty Ltd v Provident Capital Ltd (2012) 16 BPR 30397; [2012] NSWCA 26, Barrett JA said: [60] Under s 105A(9) [of the Real Property Act], the “protected period” in relation to a writ is the period starting when the writ is recorded in the register and ending six months later or upon the earlier expiry of the writ (under r 39.20 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, a writ has effect for twelve months but may be renewed). [61] The impact of these provisions upon a writ obtained by a judgment creditor of a registered proprietor holding land on trust is, in summary, as follows: 1 The judgment creditor can, without difficulty, obtain recording of the writ by the Registrar-General in respect of the land. Given the rule in s 82 that, subject to the narrow exception in s 12(1)(f), trusts are not to be recorded in the register, the Registrar-General will, in the normal course, have no grounds for thinking that the registered proprietor holds in a fiduciary capacity and the judgment creditor will not need to furnish proof in accordance with s 105(3). 2 The “protected period” begins when the recording is made and, unless the writ expires in the meantime, the “protected period” continues for the ensuing six months. 3 If a sale is made by the Sheriff and a transfer giving effect to the sale is lodged, the transfer can be registered despite the recording of the writ and that registration will cause the transferee to hold free from all estates and interests except those recorded on the folio of the register or preserved by s 42. 4 Any beneficial interest in the land that the trustee has by reason of its right of indemnity out of trust property will, of course, be an interest that is not recorded on the folio of the register and is incapable of being so recorded. Nor will it enjoy protection under s 42. The transferee under the transfer given by the Sheriff on completion of the sale will therefore take free from that interest. 898

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 2 – Enforcement of writs against land

[r 39.21.20] [r 39.20.1000]

r 39.21

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 44 r 9; DCR Pt 34 r 2; LCR Pt 30 r 1, Pt 30A r 2. Real Property Act 1900 ss 105, 105A, 105B, 105C and 105D.

DIVISION 2 – ENFORCEMENT OF WRITS AGAINST LAND Judgment creditor’s notice to judgment debtor

(cf DCR Part 36, rule 2; LCR Part 30A, rule 3)

(1) A judgment creditor may file an affidavit verifying: (a) the registration of a writ for the levy of property: (i) in the Register kept under the Real Property Act 1900, pursuant to section 105 of that Act, or (ii) in the General Register of Deeds kept under the Conveyancing Act 1919, pursuant to section 186 of that Act, and (b) the receipt by the judgment creditor of advice from the Sheriff to the effect that the Sheriff cannot obtain satisfaction of the writ by proceeding further against the goods of the judgment debtor. Note: Section 72 of the Fines Act 1996 provides that a property seizure order under that section operates as a writ for the levy of property issued by the Local Court and, for that purpose, that the State Debt Recovery Office is taken to be the judgment creditor. [Subr (1) am Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[14]]

(1A) A copy of the advice referred to in subrule (1)(b) must be annexed to the affidavit. [Subr (1A) insrt Rule 338 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[15]]

(2) On filing an affidavit referred to in subrule (1) the judgment creditor may lodge with the registrar in duplicate, and the registrar must seal, a notice (the judgment creditor’s notice) advising the judgment debtor of the following: (a) that a writ for the levy of property has been registered as referred to in subrule (1)(a), (b) that the judgment creditor intends that land of the judgment debtor be sold after the lapse of 4 weeks, (c) that the judgment debtor is entitled to sell or mortgage the land, but only in accordance with section 113 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, (d) that the judgment debtor is entitled to apply for an instalment order under section 107 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. [Subr (2) am Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[24]]

(3) A sealed copy of the judgment creditor’s notice is to be served on the judgment debtor. [R 39.21 am Rule 338 of 2008; Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 39.21 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.21.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.21.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.21.1000]

[r 39.21.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.21 is based on SCR Pt 45 r 15, DCR Pt 36 r 2 and LCR Pt 30A r 3. Although each of these were drafted with slight differences, they are all to the same effect as each other and to this rule. This rule explicitly specifies the nature of the registration of the writ, and in SCR Pt 45 r 15(2)(d) the reference was to an application to a stay rather than to making an instalment application. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

899

UCPR Parts 31-40

39.21

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.22

[r 39.21.20]

[r 39.21.40]

Operation

If the sheriff’s officer cannot obtain satisfaction of the writ by proceeding further against the goods of the judgment debtor, the sheriff’s officer will give notice to this effect to the judgment creditor. Such notice is required before the judgment creditor can seek sale of the land pursuant r 39.21(1)(b). The sheriff can also proceed to a sale of the judgment debtor’s land where the judgment debtor has requested that the land be sold before all or any of the judgment debtor’s personal goods are sold (r 39.6(3)(a)), or if the sheriff is satisfied that the sale of the land before the sale of all or any of the personal goods would minimise hardship to the judgment debtor or any other person (r 39.6(3)(b)). The sheriff cannot proceed to sell land if the amount outstanding under the judgment is less than $10,000: CPA s 106(5). The application to issue the notice under this rule should be by a notice of motion to be considered in chambers with an accompanying affidavit and two copies of the notice to be sealed by the registrar. The affidavit must annex a copy of the advice from the sheriff that the sheriff cannot obtain satisfaction of the writ by proceeding further against the goods of the judgment debtor: r 39.21(1A). The judgment debtor may sell the land after the writ has been registered but only in accordance with the procedure set out in CPA s 113. The approved form is Form 67. [r 39.21.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 15; DCR Pt 36 r 2; LCR Pt 30A r 3. Real Property Act 1900 s 105; Conveyancing Act 1919 s 186; 39.22

Judgment creditor’s application for sale

(cf DCR Part 36, rules 4 and 6; LCR Part 30A, rules 5 and 7)

(1) Land may not be sold under a writ for the levy of property until the following steps have been completed: (a) the judgment creditor has filed an affidavit of service of a judgment creditor’s notice under rule 39.21, (b) the judgment creditor has filed a notice of sale in the approved form (the notice of sale) and lodged 6 copies of it with the registrar, (c) the registrar has sealed each copy of the notice of sale so lodged and returned them to the judgment creditor, (d) the judgment creditor has given the 6 sealed copies of the notice of sale to the Sheriff, (d1) if required to do so under rule 39.3A, the judgment creditor has informed the Sheriff, in accordance with that rule, as to whether any person is in occupation of the land, (e) the Sheriff has fixed a date for the sale of the land, being a date occurring not less than 4 weeks after the date on which the judgment creditor’s notice was served on the judgment debtor, (f) the Sheriff has inserted the date so fixed in each copy of the notice of sale, (g) the Sheriff has returned 2 copies of the notice of sale, in which the date for the sale of the land has been inserted, to the judgment creditor, (h) at least one week before the date for the sale of the land, the judgment creditor has served a copy of the notice of sale, in which the date for the sale of the land has been inserted, on the judgment debtor, (i) the judgment creditor has furnished to the Sheriff such information as in his or her possession, or as he or she can reasonably obtain, that is relevant to the ascertainment of the value of the interest to be sold, including: (i) particulars of the value most recently assigned by the Valuer-General to the land the subject of the interest, and (ii) particulars of the title to that land as revealed by a recent search at the office of the Registrar-General. [Subr (1) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[14]]

(2) The approved form referred to in subrule (1)(b) must contain a statement reminding the judgment 900

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 2 – Enforcement of writs against land

[r 39.23.20]

r 39.23

debtor of his or her right to apply for an instalment order under section 107 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. [R 39.22 am Rule 501 of 2009]

RULE 39.22 COMMENTARY

[r 39.22.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.22 is based on SCR Pt 45 rr 17 and 19, DCR Pt 36 rr 4 and 6, and LCR Pt 30A rr 5 and 7. Although the rules are worded slightly differently, they describe the same general procedure as each other and this rule. [r 39.22.40]

Operation

Rule 39.22 sets out a detailed procedure that must be followed before land can be sold to satisfy a writ of levy of property (at the request of the judgment creditor). There is an approved form of the notice of sale – Form 68. This rule should be read with rr 39.23 and 39.24 as prerequisites to the sale of the land. The sheriff cannot proceed to sell land if the amount outstanding under the judgment is less than $10,000: CPA s 106(5). The sheriff cannot complete the sale if there are occupiers under a tenancy agreement pursuant to the Residential Tenancies Act 1987, and either those occupiers have not been given notice to vacate the premises pursuant to s 71A of that Act or the time to vacate pursuant to the notice has not expired. This prohibition is preserved in s 122 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 that superseded the s Residential Tenancies Act 1987 on 31 January 2011. See [r 39.3.70] and [r 39.3A.40]. [r 39.22.1000]

References

Superseded rules: Supreme Court Rules 1970 Pt 45 rr 17 and 19; DCR Pt 36 rr 4 and 6; and LCR Pt 30A rr 5 and 7. 39.23 Sale to be publicly advertised (cf DCR Part 36, rule 8; LCR Part 30A, rule 9)

(1) The Sheriff, or the auctioneer appointed by the Sheriff, must cause an advertisement of any sale of land, including a full description of the land, to be published in the Gazette, and in a newspaper circulating in the district in which the land is situated, at least one week before the date fixed for the sale. (2) The sale of any land under a writ for the levy of property may, in addition to being advertised under subrule (1), be further advertised by the Sheriff, or the auctioneer appointed to sell the land, if the further advertisement is approved by the Sheriff.

RULE 39.23 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.23.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.23.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.23.1000]

[r 39.23.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.23 is based on SCR Pt 45 r 20, DCR Pt 36 r 8 and LCR Pt 30A r 9. The only effective difference between those rules and the current rule is that in SCR Pt 45 r 20 the approval for further advertisements was from the registrar rather than the sheriff.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

901

UCPR Parts 31-40

Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.22.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.22.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.22.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.24

[r 39.23.20]

[r 39.23.40]

Operation

The sheriff’s officer or auctioneer selling the land is required to arrange a notice of the sale, including a full description of the land to be sold to be advertised in the Gazette, and in a newspaper circulating in the district where the land is situated, at least one week before the date fixed for the sale. The sale may only be further advertised with the approval of the sheriff. [r 39.23.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 20; DCR Pt 36 r 8; LCR Pt 30A r 9. 39.24

Proof of service and publication

(cf DCR Part 36, rule 9; LCR Part 30A, rule 10)

Before the sale of any land takes place under a writ for the levy of property, the judgment creditor must lodge with the Sheriff an affidavit as to: (a) the service on the judgment debtor of the notice of sale under rule 39.22, and (b) the date and particulars of publication of each advertisement published under rule 39.23 in relation to the sale.

RULE 39.24 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.24.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.24.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.24.1000]

[r 39.24.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.24 is based on SCR Pt 45 r 21, DCR Pt 36 r 9 and LCR Pt 30A r 10. This rule differs from those rules in that it does not require the sheriff to annex a copy of the affidavit to the sheriff’s return of the writ. The “return” of the writ process has not been carried through to these rules. [r 39.24.40]

Operation

Before the sale of any land takes place pursuant to a request by the judgment creditor, the judgment creditor is required to lodge with the sheriff required to execute the writ an affidavit as to the service on the judgment of the duly endorsed notice of sale under Pt 39 r 22(1)(h) and the date and particulars of publication of every advertisement of the sale under Pt 39 r 23. [r 39.24.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 21; DCR Pt 36 r 9; LCR Pt 30A r 10. 39.25

Satisfaction by judgment debtor

(cf DCR Part 36, rule 7; LCR Part 30A, rule 8)

If, before or at the time fixed for the sale of land under a writ for the levy of property, the judgment debtor indicates to the Sheriff, or to the auctioneer appointed to sell the land, that the judgment debtor intends to satisfy the writ, the judgment debtor must pay to the Sheriff or auctioneer: (a) the amount due under the judgment, including interest, and (b) the costs of the execution then known to the Sheriff or auctioneer, including any fees payable in respect of the execution to an auctioneer, and (c) an amount determined by the Sheriff as security for the judgment creditor’s costs of the execution other than those referred to in paragraph (b), and, on receipt of the money, the Sheriff or auctioneer must cancel the sale.

902

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 2 – Enforcement of writs against land

[r 39.26.1000]

r 39.26

RULE 39.25 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.25.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.25.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.25.1000]

[r 39.25.20]

Comparison

[r 39.25.40]

Operation

The sale will only be cancelled pursuant to r 39.25 if the judgment debtor pays the full amount of the judgment debt including all interest, the costs of execution and an additional amount assessed by the sheriff to cover the judgment creditor’s costs of the execution (other than the costs of issuing the writ which are governed by the Legal Profession Regulation 2005, and any fees already paid by the judgment creditor). The sheriff will account for moneys paid and apply the proceeds pursuant to r 39.15(1)(a) and (b). There will, unless the judgment creditor and debtor can agree as to what amount should be allowed for the judgment creditor’s costs of the execution, an amount that the sheriff will have to pay to the registrar to cover the judgment creditor’s costs. The money paid to the registrar will be dealt with pursuant to r 39.28. [r 39.25.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 19; DCR Pt 36 r 7; LCR Pt 30A r 8. 39.26

Documents giving effect to sale

(1) If land is sold at auction under a writ for the levy of property, the Sheriff and the purchaser must each sign an appropriate contract of sale forthwith after the auction is completed. (2) As soon as practicable after receiving payment in full for land sold under a writ for the levy of property, an appropriate conveyance or transfer (to be prepared by the purchaser) must be executed by the Sheriff and delivered to the purchaser for the purpose of giving effect to the sale.

RULE 39.26 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.26.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.26.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.26.1000]

[r 39.26.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.26(1) is a new rule but reflects existing practice. Subrule (2) is based on DCR Pt 36 r 14. [r 39.26.40]

Operation

Rule 39.26 applies when the land is sold by auction (under Pt 39 r 7). If the land is put up for sale by public auction, it will be sold to the highest bidder unless the highest bid is substantially below the value previously fixed by the sheriff (under Pt 39 r 10). The conditions of sale are those prescribed under Pt 39 r 14. [r 39.26.1000]

References

Superseded rule: DCR Pt 36 r 14. See the Real Property Act 1900 s 105B as to registration of transfer pursuant to sale under writ.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

903

UCPR Parts 31-40

Rule 39.25 is based on SCR Pt 45 r 19, DCR Pt 36 r 7 and LCR Pt 30A r 8. The only effective difference between this rule and those rules is that this rule does not require the sheriff to return the writ to the registrar when the sale is cancelled. The concept of returning the writ has not been carried forward to these rules.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.27

39.27

[r 39.27.20]

Sheriff or auctioneer to report

(cf DCR Part 36, rule 12; LCR Part 30A, rule 15)

As soon as practicable after the sale of land under a writ for the levy of property has been completed, the Sheriff or auctioneer appointed to sell land must make a report to the registrar as to: (a) the approximate market value of the land fixed by the Sheriff, and (b) the amount of the highest bid at the sale, and (c) whether or not the judgment debtor was identified to the Sheriff or auctioneer as being present at the sale, and (d) the amount of the auctioneer’s charges, and (e) any other matter which the Sheriff or auctioneer considers should be reported to the registrar.

RULE 39.27 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.27.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.27.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.27.1000]

[r 39.27.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.27 is based on, and to the same effect as SCR Pt 45 r 23, DCR Pt 36 r 12(1) and LCR Pt 30A r 15(1). [r 39.27.40]

Operation

The sheriff’s officer or auctioneer who conducted the sale of land under a writ for levy of property must report to the registrar in compliance with r 39.27. See also r 39.32, which is a general duty to report the results of a sale of land. [r 39.27.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 23; DCR Pt 36 r 12(1); LCR Pt 30A r 15(1). 39.28

Payment to judgment debtor

(cf DCR Part 36, rule 13; LCR Part 30A, rule 16)

(1) A judgment creditor at whose request a writ for the levy of property has been issued may file: (a) evidence of an agreement with the judgment debtor as to the amount of the judgment creditor’s costs of the execution, or (b) a notice of motion for the assessment of those costs. (2) Any evidence or notice of motion referred to in subrule (1) must be filed within 2 months after the receipt by the issuing registrar of: (a) the proceeds of sale of any land, or (b) any money under section 113(5) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, or (c) any money under rule 39.25, or within such further time as may be consented to in writing by the judgment debtor. (3) If the judgment creditor files any evidence or notice in accordance with subrule (2), the registrar must as soon as practicable pay to the judgment debtor any money held by the registrar over and above the amount necessary to satisfy the writ for the levy of property. (4) If the judgment creditor: (a) 904

does not file any evidence or notice in accordance with subrule (2), and NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 2 – Enforcement of writs against land

[r 39.28.1000]

r 39.28

(b)

does not within the time allowed in that regard advise the registrar of any consent by the judgment debtor to extend that time, the registrar may pay to the judgment debtor any money mentioned in subrule (2) and held by the registrar over and above the total of the amount necessary to satisfy the judgment (including interest) and the costs of the execution (other than solicitor’s profit costs) then known to the registrar.

(6) Nothing in this rule affects the right of the judgment creditor to recover against the judgment debtor the costs of execution of the writ for the levy of property.

RULE 39.28 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.28.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.28.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.28.1000]

[r 39.28.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.28 is based on, and has the same effect as SCR Pt 45 r 24, DCR Pt 36 r 13 and LCR Pt 30A r 16. [r 39.28.40]

Operation

Rule 39.28 sets out a procedure for dealing with the balance of the proceeds of the execution, paid by the sheriff to the registrar to cover the judgment creditor’s costs of the execution that cannot be ascertained when the proceeds of the execution are being accounted for by the sheriff. This rule applies, if the land was sold at auction under the writ, or by the judgment debtor under the procedure in CPA s 108(5), or if the judgment debtor pays the money prior to sale under r 39.25. Any application by the judgment creditor in respect of the money held by the registrar must be made within two months of the registrar receiving the money: subr (2). Although the judgment debtor can consent to an extension of this time the registrar will normally have already refunded the money to the judgment debtor after two months have passed: subr (3). There are two different ways the money held could be dealt with. If the judgment creditor and judgment debtor can agree as to what the costs of the judgment creditor should be, a consent order for the payment out of specific amounts to the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor should be filed. If the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor cannot agree, or there is some doubt as to the agreement, the judgment creditor can apply by motion for the costs to be determined. This will, at least initially, be a notice of motion to be considered in chambers by a registrar. The registrar may, depending on the amount of the costs being claimed and whether the judgment debtor has entered an appearance in the proceedings, direct that the motion be listed for hearing: r 18.3. Any such determination will have regard to the guiding principles in CPA Pt 6 Div 1. If the registrar makes an order ex-parte, the judgment debtor can apply to have it set aside: r 36.16(2)(b). The notice of motion should be supported by an affidavit, which either provides evidence as to an alleged agreement as to the costs or the judgment creditor’s claim for costs of the execution. The registrar may allow costs at a specific sum (CPA s 98(4)(b)), and order that money be paid out accordingly. If no application is made by the judgment creditor under this rule, the registrar will generally be required to refund the moneys held to the judgment debtor, provided the sheriff has paid the judgment creditor all moneys that the judgment creditor was entitled to including the costs of the execution that could be ascertained: subrr (3) and (4). Even if money is refunded to the judgment debtor, this does not prevent the judgment creditor seeking to recover the costs of the execution from the judgment debtor: subr (6). [r 39.28.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 45 r 24; DCR Pt 36 r 13; LCR Pt 30A r 16. See also Legal Profession Regulation 2005 Sch 2 as to fixed costs of issuing a writ of execution.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

905

UCPR Parts 31-40

(5) The registrar must pay to the judgment creditor any money referred to in this rule that the registrar is not by this rule required to pay to the judgment debtor.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.29

[r 39.29.20]

DIVISION 3 – ENFORCEMENT OF WRITS AGAINST GOODS ETC 39.29

Removal of goods

(cf DCR Part 35, rule 2; LCR Part 30, rule 12)

(1) If any goods are seized under a writ for the levy of property, the Sheriff may remove them: (a) to a place where, in his or her judgment, the highest prices for the goods are most likely to be obtained, or (b) to a place of safe keeping. (2) As soon as practicable after removing any such goods, the Sheriff must notify the judgment debtor of their removal and give the judgment debtor an inventory of the goods so removed.

RULE 39.29 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.29.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.29.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.29.1000]

[r 39.29.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.29 is based on, and to same effect as DCR Pt 35 r 2 and LCR Pt 30 r 12. There was no equivalent rule in the Supreme Court. This rule does not specify the method of notification of the judgment debtor in subr (2). [r 39.29.40]

Operation

Rule 39.29 authorises the sheriff to remove seized goods to a central place for sale or storage. See also CPA s 132, which allows the sheriff to appoint a custodian of the seized goods. [r 39.29.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 35 r 2; LCR Pt 30 r 12. 39.30

Time of sale

(cf DCR Part 35, rule 3; LCR Part 30, rule 13)

(1) Goods must not be sold under a writ for the levy of property before the sixth day after they were seized under the writ. (2) Despite subrule (1): (a) goods of a perishable nature may be sold forthwith after they are seized, and (b) if the judgment debtor so requests in writing, other goods may be sold at any time. (3) Goods seized under a writ for the levy of property are to remain in such custody as the Sheriff may appoint pending their sale under the writ.

RULE 39.30 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.30.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.30.40] Duty to maintain possession .................................................................................................................. [r 39.30.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.30.1000]

[r 39.30.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.30 is based on, and has the same effect as DCR Pt 35 r 3 and LCR Pt 30 r 13. The District Court and Local Court rules were said to be subject to provisions in their court Acts that any property was to be put up for sale “as early as may be with due regard to the interests of the parties and to avoid the sacrifice of the 906

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 39.30.1000]

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 3 – Enforcement of writs against goods etc

r 39.31

reasonable value of the property”: DCA s 109(6); Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 59(4). The corresponding rule in the Supreme Court was SCR Pt 45 r 5, which was to the same effect as DCA s 109(6) and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 59(4), and which has been carried into these rules as r 39.5. [r 39.30.40]

Operation

[r 39.30.60]

Duty to maintain possession

At common law it is the duty of the sheriff (or bailiff) to retain possession of the goods until sale: Ackland v Paynter (1820) 8 Price 95; 146 ER 1142. Goods seized under a writ of possession will, while awaiting sale, remain in such custody as the sheriff may appoint: subr (3). A custodian of the property seized may be appointed by the sheriff: CPA s 132. The custodian may be the judgment debtor: CPA s 132(1)(a). If the sheriff, without lawful authority, abandons the goods, he or she will be liable to the judgment creditor for damages and the goods are no longer the subject of the writ: Crowder v Long (1828) 8 B & C 598; 108 ER 1164; Shaw v Kirby (1888) 4 TLR 314. [r 39.30.1000]

References

Rule 39.30 adopts DCR Pt 35 r 3 and LCR Pt 30 r 13. Compare SCR Pt 45 r 5, DCA s 109(6) and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 59(4). 39.31

Sale to be publicly advertised

(cf DCR Part 35, rule 4; LCR Part 30, rule 14)

(1) The Sheriff must cause notice of the intended sale of any goods under a writ for the levy of property to be affixed: (a) at or near the entrance to the place where the sale is to be held, or (b) if the sale is not to be held in a city or town, at the court-house or some convenient public place, at least 5 days before the date appointed for the sale. (2) If goods are removed from a place in a city or town under rule 39.29(1)(a), the Sheriff must cause notice of the intended sale of the goods to be affixed on or near the entrance to that place at least 5 days before the date appointed for the sale. (3) At least 5 days before the date appointed for the sale of any equity of redemption or other equitable interest in any goods, the Sheriff must cause notice of the intended sale, and particulars of the interest to be sold: (a) to be affixed at or near the entrance to the place where the sale is to be held, and (b) to be advertised in a newspaper circulating in the district in which the sale is to take place. (4) In addition to any other notice of a sale that he or she is required to give, the Sheriff must give such notice, by advertisement in a newspaper or otherwise, as appears necessary to give due publicity to the sale. (5) If an auctioneer has been appointed by the Sheriff to sell the goods, the notice referred to in subrule (4) may, with the approval of the Sheriff, be given by the auctioneer.

RULE 39.31 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.31.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.31.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.31.1000] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

907

UCPR Parts 31-40

Rule 39.30 has to be read with r 39.5. The minimum period of six days in this rule is to prevent hardship to the judgment debtor that may arise from the sale of goods on short notice, and to allow the judgment debtor an opportunity to raise funds to pay the judgment debt before the goods are sold. The judgment debtor can agree in writing to the goods being sold earlier. Perishable goods can be sold immediately.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.32

[r 39.31.20]

[r 39.31.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.31 is based on DCR (NSW) Pt 35 r 4. A similar rule in the Local Court, LCR Pt 30 r 14 incorporated provisions similar to what are now subrr (1), (2) and (4) in this rule. In the District Court and Local Court rules the times specified in subrr (1) and (2) were four days rather than the five days prescribed under this rule, and in the District Court rule the time specified in the provision corresponding to subr (3) was six days, which has been reduced to five days under this rule. The corresponding rule in the Supreme Court was SCR Pt 45 r 9, which gave discretion to the sheriff as to the timing and placing of advertisements; it also provided for an appointed auctioneer placing advertisements with the approval of the sheriff. [r 39.31.40]

Operation

Rule 39.31 prescribes the minimum notice that the sheriff must provide in respect of a proposed auction sale of goods seized on a writ of levy of property: subrr (1) and (2). An additional requirement is imposed if the relevant goods are the subject of an equity of redemption or are an equitable interest in the goods: subr (3). The sheriff retains a discretion to authorise such additional advertising as may be appropriate to give publicity to the sale: subrr (4) and (5). This rule should be read together with r 39.9. [r 39.31.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 35 r 4; LCR Pt 30 r 14; SCR Pt 45 r 9. Compare with r 39.23 which specifies requirements for advertising the sale of land. 39.32

Sheriff or auctioneer to report

(cf SCR Part 45, rule 14; DCR Part 34, rule 9; LCR Part 30, rule 8)

As soon as practicable after the sale of goods under a writ for the levy of property has been completed, the Sheriff or auctioneer appointed to sell the goods must make a report to the judgment creditor as to results of the sale. [R 39.32 subst Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[45]]

RULE 39.32 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.32.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.32.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.32.1000]

[r 39.32.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.32 is a new requirement, although there were rules requiring the sheriff to report after a sale of land (DCR Pt 36 r 12 and LCR Pt 30A r 15 – these rules have now been adopted in r 39.27), and a general requirement for the sheriff to provide an account on request (SCR Pt 45 r 14, DCR Pt 34 r 9 and LCR Pt 30 r 8 – these rules have now been adopted in r 39.16). [r 39.32.40]

Operation

The sheriff is required to report to the judgment creditor after the sale of goods whether the goods have been sold by auction (r 39.7) or by private treaty (r 39.13). [r 39.32.1000]

References

Superseded rules (reporting after sale of land): SCR Pt 45 r 23; DCR Pt 36 r 12(1); LCR Pt 30A r 15(1). Superseded rules (accounting to judgment creditor): SCR Pt 45 r 14; DCR Pt 34 r 9; LCR Pt 30 r 8. See also r 39.27 (reporting after sale of land) and r 39.16 (accounting on execution of writ)

908

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 4 – Garnishee orders

[r 39.33.1000]

39.33

r 39.34

Possession fees

(cf DCR Part 35, rule 1; LCR Part 30, rule 11)

(2) Subject to subrule (1), if more than one person is necessarily engaged in keeping possession of any goods under a writ for the levy of property, the fees payable to each such person are, unless the court orders otherwise, chargeable against the judgment debtor as part of the costs of the execution. (3) This rule does not affect any amount that may be payable to the Sheriff, by way of fees, out of money paid to the Sheriff by the judgment debtor.

RULE 39.33 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.33.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.33.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.33.1000]

[r 39.33.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.33 is based on DCR Pt 35 r 1 and LCR Pt 30 r 11. There was no equivalent rule in the Supreme Court. Subrule (3) is a new provision. [r 39.33.40]

Operation

The purpose of r 39.33(1) is to encourage the judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment debt on the original attendance of the sheriff, to minimise costs and expenses being incurred. Rule 39.33(2) provides that if more than one sheriff’s officer, or other custodian is required to properly maintain possession of the goods, the sheriff will normally be entitled to recover the additional relevant fee. See [r 39.30.40] as to duty of the sheriff to maintain possession, and [r 39.18.40] as to procedure when the sheriff attends to execute a writ for levy of property. [r 39.33.1000]

References

Superseded rules: DCR Pt 35 r 1; LCR Pt 30 r 11.

DIVISION 4 – GARNISHEE ORDERS 39.34

Application for garnishee order

(1) An application for a garnishee order in respect of a judgment is to be made by way of notice of motion. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, a notice of motion under this rule: (a) may be dealt with in the absence of the parties, and (b) need not be served on the judgment debtor or the proposed garnishee. (3) The application must indicate the extent (if any) to which the judgment debt has been satisfied under any writ of execution, garnishee order or charging order issued by the court.

RULE 39.34 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.34.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.34.40] Overview of the current legislative scheme ........................................................................................... [r 39.34.60] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

909

UCPR Parts 31-40

(1) No fees for keeping possession of any goods under a writ for the levy of property are payable to any person, or chargeable against the judgment debtor as costs of the execution, if the amount due under the writ is paid to the Sheriff within one hour after they are seized under the writ.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.35

[r 39.34.20]

References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.34.1000]

[r 39.34.20]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court the application for a garnishment notice was made by filing a form of the garnishment notice in duplicate (with as many copies as required for service) together with an affidavit in support: SCR Pt 46 r 3. The garnishment notice when issued was given a date before the court at which the garnishee and judgment creditor could appear to dispute the garnishment notice. The garnishee could accept the garnishee order by paying the relevant money into court, in which case the judgment creditor would apply to have the money paid out on the return of the garnishment notice. In the District Court and Local Court the application was made by filing a form of garnishee order in duplicate (with as many copies as required for service) with an affidavit in support: DCR Pt 46 r 34; DCA s 97; LCR Pt 29 r 1; Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(3). The rule now provides that the application is to be made by notice of motion to be considered in chambers. The approved form of motion includes the appropriate affidavit in support. The garnishee order is not made returnable before the court; if the garnishee or judgment debtor wants to dispute the garnishee order, they can file a notice of motion to have the garnishee order set aside. If the garnishee fails to comply with the order the judgment creditor will need to file a notice of motion to confirm the garnishee order, and for judgment to be entered against the garnishee: CPA s 124. [r 39.34.40]

Operation

Rule 39.34 should be read with r 39.35. An application for a garnishee order is made by filing a notice of motion to be considered in chambers. There is an approved form of the notice of motion which incorporates the relevant affidavit in support – Form 69. No filing fee is payable in respect of the motion: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 cl 4(5)(d). [r 39.34.60]

Overview of the current legislative scheme

For an overview of the scheme by the NSW Court of Appeal, see the judgment of Whealy JA in Lin v Borrowdale [2011] NSWCA 65, extracted at [CPA 117.05]. [r 39.34.1000]

References

Superseded rules and legislation: SCR Pt 46 r 3; DCR Pt 46 r 34; DCA s 97; LCR Pt 29 r 1; Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(3). Supreme Court Form 58; District Court Forms 81, 82, 83; Local Court Forms 66, 67, 70. 39.35

Affidavit in support of application for garnishee order

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, an applicant for a garnishee order must file an affidavit in support of the application, being an affidavit sworn not more than 14 days before the date of filing. (2) The affidavit in support: (a) must identify the garnishee, and any debts that appear to be owed by the garnishee to the judgment debtor, and (b) must state the amount payable under the judgment, together with any costs and interest payable in relation to the judgment, as at the date of swearing of the affidavit, and (c) if the judgment was entered as a result of the filing of a cost assessor’s certificate, must include a statement to that effect, together with a statement to the effect that the determination set out in the certificate: (i) is not subject to any suspension under section 86 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 that has not been ended under that section, and (ii) is not subject to any suspension under section 90 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 that has not been ended under that section. [Subr (2) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[9]; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[23]]

(3) Any application by the judgment creditor for a garnishee order in relation to a judgment debt that has been the subject of an instalment order that has ceased to have effect may not be granted unless the 910

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 4 – Garnishee orders

[r 39.35.1000]

r 39.36

judgment creditor has filed an affidavit as to the judgment debtor’s failure to comply with the order. [R 39.35 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 716 of 2006]

RULE 39.35 COMMENTARY

[r 39.35.20]

Comparison

An affidavit in support of a garnishment order was required by DCA s 97 and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(3); the prescribed forms of affidavit required the judgment creditor to state that the judgment debt was unsatisfied and that there appeared to be a debt due or accruing to the judgment debtor from the garnishee. See also SCR Pt 46 r 3(3). Rule 39.35 now specifies the contents of the affidavit in support of the garnishee order, which are similar to the requirements of an affidavit when applying for a writ of execution: see r 39.3. [r 39.35.40]

Operation

The issue of a garnishee order to enforce a judgment debt is authorised by CPA s 106(1)(b). The effect of a garnishment order in respect of a debt owed by the garnishee to the judgment debtor is set out in CPA s 117, and in respect of wages and salaries payable to the judgment debtor, in CPA s 119. As to garnishment orders against public servants see [CPA 119.40]. The requirements for the affidavit in support of a garnishment order are set out in r 39.35(4). There is an approved form of notice of motion applying for a garnishment order that includes an affidavit in support – Form 69. The reference to provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2004 ss 377 and 386 is to possible stays that may apply in respect of a lodged certificate of costs assessment, when an appeal is filed to the Supreme Court or a review is filed. This only needs to be referred to in the affidavit if the judgment being enforced derives from the lodgement of a costs assessment certificate. If the judgment being enforced has been the subject of an instalment order pursuant to Pt 37, the affidavit in support of the application must show facts that establish that the instalment order has ceased to have effect: r 39.35(3). [r 39.35.60]

Debts owed by garnishee to the debtor

Rule 39.35(2)(a) requires the affidavit in support of the application to identify the garnishee, and the debts that appear to be owed by the garnishee to the judgment debtor. Normally the relevant information will be obtained from the answers to an examination notice issued under r 38.1 or from the answers given on an examination held under r 38.5, but may be from evidence that was disclosed at the trial. The most common forms of debt liable to be attached are bank accounts and salary or wages. Examples of other debts, which may be attached, are set out in [CPA 117.40]. The garnishee order will be prepared by the registry from the information that is provided in the affidavit, so it is important that the information relating to the garnishee: his, her or its name and address are accurate; and that the description of the asserted debt is as accurate as possible. For the order to bind the garnishee, the judgment debtor must be described with sufficient clarity that the garnishee can identify the account which is to be attached: DJ Colburt & Sons Pty Ltd v Ansen (1967) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 64; [1966] 2 NSWR 289. [r 39.35.1000]

References

Superseded rules and legislation: SCR Pt 46 r 3; DCR Pt 46 r 34; DCA s 97; LCR Pt 29 r 1; Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(3); District Court Forms 81, 82; Local Court Forms 66 and 67. 39.36

Form of garnishee order for debts

(cf SCR Part 46, rule 3; Act No 9 1973, section 97; Act No 11 1970, section 47)

(1) A garnishee order for debts must direct the garnishee to pay to the judgment creditor, to the extent of the amount outstanding under the judgment, all money: (a) held by the garnishee for or on behalf of the judgment debtor, or © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

911

UCPR Parts 31-40

Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.35.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.35.40] Debts owed by garnishee to the debtor ................................................................................................. [r 39.35.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.35.1000]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.36

[r 39.36.20] (b)

owed by the garnishee to the judgment debtor.

(2) The amount outstanding under the judgment must be specified in the order.

RULE 39.36 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.36.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.36.40] Service of the garnishee order ............................................................................................................... [r 39.36.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.36.1000]

[r 39.36.20]

Comparison

The content of the garnishee order under r 39.36 is the same as was required under DCA s 97(3) and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(4), although this rule has been limited to garnishee orders that relate to debts that are not a wage or salary. See also r 39.37. [r 39.36.40]

Operation

If the garnishee order is made (see r 39.38), the form of the garnishee order will be prepared by the registry based on the information provided in the notice of motion and the affidavit in support. In the Supreme Court the current practice is to require that a draft form of the order is lodged in duplicate (Form 70). The affidavit in support should include such particulars of the debt to be attached as are known to or reasonably capable of ascertainment by the judgment creditor and that will be sufficient to enable the garnishee to identify the debt. [r 39.36.60]

Service of the garnishee order

Service of the garnishee order on the garnishee must be personal service (in the Supreme Court and District Court): r 10.20(2)(a). In the Local Court garnishee orders may also be served by leaving them with someone over the age of 16 years at the residential or business address of the garnishee: r 10.20(2)(c). The rules do not require the garnishee order to be served on the judgment debtor. [r 39.36.1000]

References

See DCA s 97(3) and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(4). See also SCR Pt 46 r 3; DCR Pt 33 r 3 and LCR Pt 29 r 2. 39.37

Form of garnishee order for wage or salary

(cf SCR Part 46, rule 3; Act No 9 1973, section 97; Act No 11 1970, section 47)

(1) A garnishee order for wage or salary must direct the garnishee to pay to the judgment creditor: (a) during the period for which the order is in force, and (b) to the extent of the amount outstanding under the judgment, such amounts, from the wages or salary payable by the garnishee to the judgment debtor, as are specified in the order. (2) The amount outstanding under the judgment must be specified in the order.

RULE 39.37 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.37.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.37.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.37.1000]

[r 39.37.20]

Comparison

The content of the garnishee order under r 39.37 is the same as was required under DCA s 97(3) and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(4), although this rule has been specified as only applying to a garnishee order for wage or salary. See also r 39.36. 912

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 4 – Garnishee orders

[r 39.38.1000] [r 39.37.40]

r 39.38

Operation

The garnishee order will be prepared by the registry based on the information provided in the notice of motion and the affidavit in support. In the Supreme Court the current practice is to require that a draft form of the order is lodged in duplicate (Form 71). [r 39.37.1000]

References

See DCA s 97(3) and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(4).

39.38

Court may refuse to make garnishee order

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 97; Act No 11 1970, section 47)

(1) The court may refuse to make a garnishee order if of the opinion that such an order is inappropriate. (2) Without limiting subrule (1), the reasons that may lead the court into forming such an opinion may include: (a) the smallness of the amount recoverable under the judgment debt, and (b) the smallness of the debt, wage or salary to be attached.

RULE 39.38 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.38.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.38.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.38.1000]

[r 39.38.20]

Comparison

A garnishment notice under SCR Pt 46 r 3 was issued by leave. In the District Court and Local Court the relevant legislation provided that the registrar could refuse to make the order because of the smallness of the judgment debt, or of the debt or wage or salary to be attached, or for any other reason: DCA s 97(4); Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(5). [r 39.38.40]

Operation

The court’s power to make a garnishee order is discretionary. Applications to issue a garnishee order will normally be considered by a registrar. Rule 39.38 provides a discretion to refuse to make an order where, by reason of the smallness of the judgment debt or of the amount to be recovered, or of the debt sought to be attached, or for any other reason, the registrar is of the opinion that a garnishee order should not be made. The discretion must be exercised judicially and not capriciously. Reasons held to be sufficient to justify refusing to make a garnishee order include: • where the issue of the order would be inequitable; • where the making of the order would have facilitated a double payment; • where the order is sought against a debtor of the deceased estate of the judgment debtor at a time before probate or letters of administration have been granted; • where the executor of a judgment creditor who has not been made a party to the judgment seeks attachment; • where the amount set out in the affidavit as due and owing is clearly incorrect according to the record of the registry; and • where the registrar forms a view that the application is frivolous or vexatious. [r 39.38.1000]

References

See SCR Pt 46 r 3; DCA s 97(4); Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(5).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

913

UCPR Parts 31-40

See also SCR Pt 46 r 3; DCR Pt 33 r 3 and LCR Pt 29 r 2.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.39

39.39

[r 39.39.20]

When garnishee order takes effect

A garnishee order takes effect when it is served on the garnishee.

RULE 39.39 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.39.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.39.40] What is attached, who is to be paid ....................................................................................................... [r 39.39.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.39.1000]

[r 39.39.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.39 has the same effect as SCR Pt 46 r 5, DCA s 97(2) and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(2)(a). [r 39.39.40]

Operation

The garnishee order operates immediately upon the service of the garnishee order. This is different to when other orders take effect, ie when they are made or entered: r 36.4(1). See CPA ss 117 and 119. [r 39.39.60]

What is attached, who is to be paid

The garnishee order operates to attach in the hand of the garnishee, to the extent of the amount specified in the order, all debts which are due or accruing from the garnishee to the judgment debtor at the time of service of the order (whether or not they were due or accruing when the order was made). If the court does not set aside or stay the garnishee order, the garnishee is required to pay the judgment creditor such amounts as are currently payable to the judgment debtor, up to the amount specified in the order, within 14 days of the service of the order: CPA s 118(a). If the debt or part of the debt becomes payable to the judgment debtor on a date after the garnishee order is served (including wages or salary), then the money is payable to the judgment creditor 14 days after the money is due to be paid to the judgment debtor: CPA ss 118(b) and 120. [r 39.39.1000]

References

See: SCR Pt 46 r 5; DCA s 97(2); Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47(2)(a). 39.39A

When garnishee not obligated to pay amount to judgment creditor

A garnishee order does not operate to attach to a debt if the debt is an amount of less than $20 standing to the credit of the judgment debtor in a financial institution. [R 39.39A insrt Rule 339 of 2014, r 3]

RULE 39.39A COMMENTARY Meaning of “financial institution” ........................................................................................................ [r 39.39A.100]

[r 39.39A.100]

Meaning of “financial institution”

In Pt 8 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, headed “Enforcement of judgments and orders”, the expression “financial institution” is “an authorised deposit-taking institution within the meaning of the Banking Act 1959 of the Commonwealth”: s 102.

914

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 4 – Garnishee orders

[r 39.40.1000]

39.40

r 39.40

Affidavit that no debt due or accruing

(1) A garnishee who believes that: (a) no debt from the garnishee to the judgment debtor was due or accruing when the garnishee order was served on the garnishee, or (b) no wage or salary will become payable by the garnishee to the judgment debtor during the period for which the order will be in force, may serve on the judgment creditor a statement to that effect, verified by affidavit, being a statement that contains a summary of the grounds on which the garnishee’s belief is based. (2) A disclosure of any information in an affidavit under subrule (1) does not, if the disclosure was reasonable in the circumstances, subject the garnishee to any action, liability, claim or demand.

RULE 39.40 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.40.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.40.40] Where garnishee order not complied with ............................................................................................. [r 39.40.60] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.40.1000]

[r 39.40.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.40 is based on and has the same effect as DCA s 97C and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47C. There was no equivalent provision in the Supreme Court; a garnishee who disputed the existence of a debt that could be attached was required to appear on the return of the garnishee notice: SCR Pt 46 r 9. [r 39.40.40]

Operation

A garnishee who believes that, at the time of service of the garnishee order, there was no debt due or accruing from the garnishee, may serve on the judgment creditor an affidavit which is to that effect and contains a summary of the grounds on which that belief is based: r 39.40(1). The affidavit does not need to be filed at this stage. See Pt 35 as to rules relating to affidavits. See Form 72 as to form of the affidavit. A disclosure of any information in an affidavit served pursuant to this rule will not, if the disclosure was reasonable in all the circumstances, subject the garnishee to any liability, claim or demand: r 39.40(2). If the judgment debtor does not accept the information in the affidavit, and wants to pursue the attachment of the debts, he or she will need to file and serve a notice of motion to be considered in court that will require the garnishee to show cause. A filing fee is payable. [r 39.40.60]

Where garnishee order not complied with

If the garnishee does not serve an affidavit pursuant to this rule and does not otherwise comply with the garnishee order, the judgment creditor may file a notice of motion to show cause. That motion will be considered in court. A filing fee is payable. If the garnishee fails to comply with the order the judgment creditor can apply for judgment to be entered against the garnishee, however the court may decline to enter judgment, because of the smallness of the debt or of the outstanding judgment, or for any other reason: CPA s 124. [r 39.40.1000]

References

Superseded legislation: DCA s 97C; Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47C. Compare to: SCR Pt 46 r 9.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

915

UCPR Parts 31-40

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 97A; Act No 11 1970, section 47A)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.41

39.41

[r 39.41.20]

Lien or claim of third person

(cf Act No 9 1973, section 104)

(1) This rule applies in circumstances in which the garnishee claims that some person, other than the judgment debtor, is or may be entitled to: (a) any money paid under a garnishee order, or (b) any debt, wage or salary attached by a garnishee order, or (c) any charge or lien on, or other interest in, any such money, debt, wage or salary. (2) In these circumstances, the court may hear and determine the garnishee’s claim and give such judgment or make such order in respect of the claim (including an order barring the claim and an order for the payment into court by a judgment creditor of money received under the garnishee order) as the nature of the case requires.

RULE 39.41 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.41.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.41.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.41.1000]

[r 39.41.20]

Comparison

r 39.41 is based on and has the same effect as DCA s 104. In the Supreme Court SCR Pt 46 r 10 was to similar effect; it authorised the court to hear and determine any claims by other persons who might have an interest in the attached debt, and to make directions for the giving of notice to such persons. [r 39.41.40]

Operation

The garnishee may include an assertion of a lien or other interest by a third party in an affidavit served on the judgment creditor pursuant to r 39.40. In that case, if the judgment creditor wants to pursue the garnishment, he or she can file a notice of motion to show cause. A copy of the notice of motion should also be served on the other person or person who may have an interest in the attached debt, as the court will usually require service of these persons before it can hear and determine this issue. The garnishee can also file a notice of motion to either set aside the garnishee order or have the issue as to any other interest in the attached debt determined by the court. Any such motion should be served on the other person or persons that may have an interest in the attached debt, as the court will usually require service of these persons before it can hear and determine the issue, as well as the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor. If a third party has a lien or charge over the attached debt the court must take that fact into account: MG Charley Pty Ltd v FH Wells Pty Ltd (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 754; [1963] NSWR 22. The court may set aside a garnishee order if the money is held on trust: Plunkett v Barclays Bank Ltd [1936] 2 KB 107; [1936] 1 All ER 653; Wentworth v Rogers [2003] NSWSC 472. The third party may be given leave to appear on the motion and assert a claim to the debt: Wentworth v Rogers [2003] NSWSC 472. [r 39.41.1000]

References

Superseded provisions: DCA s 104; SCR Pt 46 r 10. 39.42

Amounts garnishee may retain

For the purposes of section 123(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, the prescribed amount that may be retained by the garnishee out of money deducted under a garnishee order is as specified in item 4 of Schedule 3.

916

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 4 – Garnishee orders

[r 39.43.40]

r 39.43

RULE 39.42 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.42.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.42.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.42.1000]

Comparison

In the Supreme Court there was provision for the garnishee retaining an amount for her or his costs out of the attached debt before paying that money into court: SCR Pt 46 r 6. In the District Court and Local Court there were also provisions for the garnishee retaining an amount for her or his costs before paying the balance of the attached debt to the judgment creditor: DCA s 97A; Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47D(a), and there were provisions in the rules that fixed the amount that could be retained: DCR Pt 33 r 7 and LCR Pt 29 r 3. [r 39.42.40]

Operation

The garnishee can retain an amount up to the amount specified in item 4 of Sch 3 to the rules (currently $13), to cover the garnishee’s expenses in complying with the garnishment order, before forwarding the balance of the attached debt to the judgment creditor: CPA s 123. This amount can only be retained if the payment to the judgment creditor is made within the 14-day period specified in CPA ss 118 and 120. If the garnishee order relates to salary or wages, this amount can be deducted when each payment is made to the judgment creditor. If the judgment is the subject of an instalment order then the garnishee is not entitled to retain any amount: item 4(c) of Sch 3. [r 39.42.1000]

References

Superseded provisions: SCR Pt 46 r 6; DCA s 97A, Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47D(a), DCR Pt 33 r 7; LCR Pt 29 r 3. 39.43 Notice required for certain attached debts yet to accrue (cf Act No 9 1973, section 97C; Act No 11 1970, section 47C)

(1) If a garnishee order attaches a debt that is due for payment to the judgment debtor more than 28 days after service of the order on the garnishee, the garnishee must, within that period of 28 days, cause notice of that fact to be served on the judgment creditor. (2) The notice must specify: (a) the date on which the debt is, or is likely to be, due for payment to the judgment debtor, and (b) if the amount of the debt is less than the unpaid amount of the judgment debt specified in the garnishee order, the amount of the debt. Note: The giving of false or misleading information in such a notice constitutes an offence under section 307B of the Crimes Act 1900.

RULE 39.43 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.43.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.43.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.43.1000]

[r 39.43.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.43 is based on DCA s 97C and Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47C, which were in identical terms to each other. This rule is to same effect except that the debts that must be disclosed are those that are due more than 28 days, rather than 21 days after the service of the order. [r 39.43.40]

Operation

If an attached debt is due for payment after the expiration of 28 days after the service of the garnishee order, the garnishee is required before the expiration of the 28 day period to serve on the judgment creditor a notice © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

917

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 39.42.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.43A

[r 39.43.40]

specifying the date on which the debt is, or is likely to be due for payment to the judgment debtor and if the amount is less than the unpaid amount of the debt specified in the garnishee order, the amount of the debt. An example of such a debt would be a term deposit that falls due in over a month’s time; debts which are not immediately due and may not be due for an extended time may become the subject of a charging order: see [r 39.44.80]. The notice can be served by post to the judgment creditor’s address for service. [r 39.43.1000]

References

Superseded legislation: DCA s 97C; Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 47C. 39.43A Application of Division to application for garnishee order by owners corporation relating to unpaid contributions (1) This Division applies to an application by an owners corporation for a garnishee order for rent in relation to unpaid contributions in the same way as it applies to an application for a garnishee order for wages or salary, subject to the following: (a) a reference to a wage or salary is taken to be a reference to rent, (b) an affidavit in support of the application under rule 39.35 must include a statement that the judgment debt relates to an unpaid contribution. (2) In this rule, owners corporation and unpaid contribution have the same meanings as in Subdivision 2A of Division 3 of Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. [R 39.43A insrt Reg 753 of 2016, cl 3]

DIVISION 5 – CHARGING ORDERS 39.44

Application for charging order

(1) An application for a charging order in respect of a judgment is to be made by way of notice of motion. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, a notice of motion under this rule: (a) may be dealt with in the absence of the parties, and (b) need not be served on the judgment debtor or the proposed chargee. (3) [Repealed] [Subr (3) rep Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[46]] [R 39.44 am Rule 395 of 2005]

RULE 39.44 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.44.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.44.40] Meaning of “proposed chargee” ............................................................................................................. [r 39.44.45] Charging order against partnership property ......................................................................................... [r 39.44.50] Effect of charging order .......................................................................................................................... [r 39.44.60] Property chargeable ............................................................................................................................... [r 39.44.80] Charging order against land ................................................................................................................. [r 39.44.100] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.44.1000]

[r 39.44.20]

Comparison

The power of the Supreme Court and District Court to make charging orders was authorised by the Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 Pt 5 (now repealed). The power is now recognized by CPA s 106(1)(c). Note that the section does not refer to the Land and Environment Court. The other legislative provisions relating to charging orders are CPA ss 126, 127 and 128. The Supreme Court rules governing charging orders were in SCR Pt 47; the District Court had no specific rules. The application for a charging order was made by notice of motion in the proceedings: SCR Pt 47 r 1. The judgment creditor could make an ex parte application without serving the notice of motion, and an order nisi could be made: Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 918

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 5 – Charging orders

[r 39.44.80]

r 39.44

1901 s 28. When the matter was listed, the court could either discharge or vary the order: Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 32; or make the order absolute: s 31. The application for a charging order under this rule is still made by notice of motion, which need not be served on the judgment debtor. The charging order is no longer made returnable before the court; if the chargee or the judgment debtor wants to dispute the charging order, they can file a notice of motion to have the charging order set aside. If the chargee deals with the interest secured by the charging order other than in accordance with a direction of the judgment creditor, the judgment creditor can file a notice of motion to confirm the charging order, and for judgment to be entered against the chargee: CPA s 127(1). Operation

Rule 39.44 should be read with r 39.45. An application for a charging order is made by filing a notice of motion to be considered in chambers. There is an approved form of the notice of motion which incorporates the relevant affidavit in support – Form 73). No filing fee is payable in respect of the motion: Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 cl 4(5)(d). The security interest that is to be charged must be described with sufficient clarity that the person to be bound by the order (the chargee) can identify the interest. Although there is no prescribed amount for solicitor’s costs for filing a motion for a charging order, the approved form provides for a claim for solicitor’s fees and for service fees. The prescribed amount allowed for filing a notice of motion for a writ of execution would be a reasonable amount to claim for the solicitor’s costs of filing this motion (see Legal Profession Regulation 2005 Sch 2) and the amount currently charged by the sheriff for service of documents (Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 Sch 2) can be claimed as the service fee. [r 39.44.45]

Meaning of “proposed chargee”

The rule refers to “the judgment debtor or the proposed chargee”. Given the context in which the relevant legislation is found, it seems unlikely that a proposed chargee would or could be other than the relevant judgment debtor, and see McLeary v Swift [2013] NSWSC 1674, [11]–[13]. [r 39.44.50]

Charging order against partnership property

The provisions of this division only apply to charging orders in relation to the property of the judgment debtor: CPA s 126(1). Historically, one of the main uses of charging orders has been to enforce judgments in relation to judgment debtors whose principal assets are held by a partnership. In NSW, the power to issue charging orders against partnership property is governed by the Partnership Act 1892 rather than by the CPA. Jurisdiction to issue charging orders against partnership property is limited to the Supreme Court: Partnership Act 1892 s 23. An application to issue a charging order against partnership property should be made pursuant to r 39.48 rather than pursuant to r 39.44. [r 39.44.60]

Effect of charging order

The issue of a charging order to enforce a judgment debt is authorised by CPA s 106(1)(c). The effect of a charging order in respect of a security interest of the judgment debtor of a type as specified in CPA s 126(1) (see [r 39.44.80]), is that the security interest is charged in favour of the judgment creditor to the extent necessary to satisfy the judgment, and the chargee is restrained from dealing with the security interest otherwise than in accordance with the directions of the judgment creditor: CPA s 126(2). While a charging order is in force, any purported transfer or disposal by the judgment debtor of a security interest charged by the order, being a transfer or disposal effected otherwise than in accordance with the directions of the judgment creditor, is of no effect as against the judgment creditor: CPA s 128. Any dealing with the charged security interest by someone who has notice of the charging order may render that person liable to the judgment creditor for the amount of the value of the security interest: CPA s 127. A charging order takes effect when it is made: CPA s 126(3). The charging order entitles the judgment creditor to enforce the charge in the same way as if it had been made in their favour by the judgment debtor: CPA s 126(5). The judgment creditor may not however commence proceedings to take the benefit of the charge till three months have expired since the charging order was made: CPA s 126(4). [r 39.44.80]

Property chargeable

Under CPA s 126(1) the following interests may be the subject of a charging order: • stock and shares in a public company; © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

919

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 39.44.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.45

[r 39.44.80]

• money on deposit in a financial institution, in the judgment debtor’s name in the judgment debtor’s own right; • money on deposit in a financial institution money held in the name of some other person in trust for the judgment debtor; or • any equitable interest in property. If money is held on trust for the judgment debtor, but he or she is only one of several potential beneficiaries there may not be a chargeable interest: Wentworth v Rogers [2004] NSWSC 1192. A judgment debtor who is the registered proprietor of land under the Real Property Act 1900 holds no equitable interest in the land by that alone. As explained by White J in Paul Michael Pty Ltd v Urban Traders Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1246, [70]: The defendants are the registered proprietors and therefore the legal owners of the land. As the legal owners of the land they do not also hold an equitable interest in the land. An equitable interest is something imposed on the legal title, not carved out of it. A legal owner does not hold the property on trust for himself or herself. The defendants’ interest as owners of the land is not an “equitable interest in property”. Money paid into court as security for a judgment may be the subject of a charging order: Patterson v Cohen [2006] NSWSC 424. [r 39.44.100]

Charging order against land

A charging order cannot be made against a registered proprietor of land under the Real Property Act 1900, as the proprietor has no equitable interest: see [r 39.44.80] above. A charging order can be issued in relation to an equitable interest in the land. As much flows from CPA s 126(1)(c) itself. In the ordinary course, the charging order itself would give rise to a caveatable interest. [r 39.44.1000]

References

Superseded rules and legislation: Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 Pt 5; SCR Pt 47. For charging orders against partnership property, see Partnership Act 1892 s 23 and r 39.48. 39.45

Affidavit in support of application for charging order

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, an applicant for a charging order must file an affidavit in support of the application, being an affidavit sworn not more than 14 days before the date of filing. (2) The affidavit in support: (a) must state the amount payable under the judgment, together with any costs and interest payable in relation to the judgment, as at the date of swearing of the affidavit, and (b) if the judgment was entered as a result of the filing of a cost assessor’s certificate, must include a statement to that effect, together with a statement to the effect that the determination set out in the certificate: (i) is not subject to any suspension under section 86 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 that has not been ended under that section, and (ii) is not subject to any suspension under section 90 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 that has not been ended under that section, and (c) must indicate the extent (if any) to which the judgment debt has been satisfied under any other writ of execution, garnishee order or charging order issued by the court. [Subr (2) am Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.44[10]; Rule 716 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[25]; Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[47]]

(3) Any application by the judgment creditor for a charging order in relation to a judgment debt that has been the subject of an instalment order that has ceased to have effect may not be granted unless the judgment creditor has filed an affidavit as to the judgment debtor’s failure to comply with the order. [R 39.45 am Act 7 of 2015; Rule 716 of 2006; Rule 395 of 2005]

920

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 6 – General

[r 39.46.1000]

r 39.46

RULE 39.45 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.45.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.45.40] Calculation of interest upon part payment ........................................................................................... [r 39.45.100] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.45.1000]

Comparison

There were no rules in the SCR or DCR that prescribed what evidence was required to support an application for a charging order. The circumstances when a charging order could issue were set out in Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 27 (now repealed). [r 39.45.40]

Operation

Rule 39.45 should be read with r 39.44. The requirements for the affidavit in support of a charging order are set out in subr (2). There is an approved form of notice of motion applying for a charging order that includes an affidavit in support – Form 73). The reference to provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2004 ss 377 and 386 is to possible stays that may apply in respect of a lodged certificate of costs assessment when an appeal is filed to the Supreme Court or a review is filed. If the judgment being enforced has been the subject of an instalment order pursuant to Pt 37, the affidavit in support of the application (or some other secondary affidavit) must show facts that establish the instalment order has ceased to have effect: subr (3). [r 39.45.100]

Calculation of interest upon part payment

When calculating interest after a part payment has been made, the maker of the affidavit should have regard to CPA s 136, which determines whether the payment is to be applied first to interest or to the debt principal. [r 39.45.1000]

References

Superseded legislation: Judgment Creditors’ Remedies Act 1901 s 27.

DIVISION 6 – GENERAL 39.46

Value below which Sheriff may not seize tools of trade

For the purposes of section 106(3)(c) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, the aggregate value below which tools of trade may not be seized and sold by the Sheriff in execution of a judgment is $2,000.

RULE 39.46 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.46.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.46.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.46.1000]

[r 39.46.20]

Comparison

Under CPA s 106(3)(c) the sheriff is not permitted to seize any ordinary tools of trade, plant and equipment, professional instruments and reference books, not exceeding in the aggregate the sum prescribed by r 39.46. Under DCA s 109(1) the relevant sum was $500, and in the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 59(1) the sum was $2,000. [r 39.46.40]

Operation

Under CPA s 106(3)(c) the sheriff in executing a writ for levy of property is not permitted to seize any ordinary tools of trade, plant and equipment, professional instruments and reference books, not exceeding in the aggregate the sum prescribed by r 39.46 (ie $2,000). [r 39.46.1000]

References

Superseded legislation: DCA s 109(1); Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 59(1).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

921

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 39.45.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.47

39.47

[r 39.47.20]

Costs of prior execution not enforceable without costs assessor’s certificate

(cf SCR Part 44, rule 10)

Except by leave of the court, the costs referred to in section 137(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 must not be included in the amount for which a writ for the levy of property, garnishee order or charging order may be issued if a cost assessor’s certificate has been issued in respect of the costs of the prior writ or order but has not been filed.

RULE 39.47 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.47.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.47.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.47.1000]

[r 39.47.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.47 adopts provisions in SCR Pt 44 r 10(2). [r 39.47.40]

Operation

Under CPA s 137 the judgment creditor is entitled to recover the costs of prior enforcement by writ, garnishment or charging order on any subsequent enforcement process. Rule 39.47 prevents the judgment creditor seeking to recover such amounts unless they have been either approved by the court (either on application under this rule or if previously approved for example under r 39.28) or assessed by a costs assessor. If the costs of prior execution have been assessed the certificate can be filed in the proceedings (r 36.10) and becomes enforceable pursuant to the Legal Profession Act 2004 s 368. [r 39.47.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 44 r 10. Legal Profession Act 1987 ss 208J, 208JA, 208KF and 208KH; Legal Profession Act 2004, s 368. 39.48

Charge on partnership interest

(cf SCR Part 47, rule 2)

(1) An application to the Supreme Court under section 23 of the Partnership Act 1892 (which relates to procedure against partnership property by a judgment creditor of a partner) is to be made: (a) if the judgment is a judgment in proceedings in the Supreme Court, by notice of motion in the proceedings, or (b) if the judgment is not a judgment in proceedings in the Supreme Court, by summons joining the judgment debtor and his or her partners as defendants. (2) An application under section 23 of the Partnership Act 1892 made by a partner of the judgment debtor in consequence of an application under that section made by the judgment creditor is to be made by notice of motion in the proceedings in which the judgment creditor applies. (3) A summons or notice of motion filed under this rule, and an order made on an application under section 23 of the Partnership Act 1892, must be served on the following persons (other than the applicant): (a) the judgment creditor, (b) the judgment debtor, (c) such of the judgment debtor’s partners as are within New South Wales, and, if so served, has effect as if it had been served on all of the partners.

922

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 6 – General

[r 39.48.1000]

r 39.49

RULE 39.48 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.48.20] History ..................................................................................................................................................... [r 39.48.30] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.48.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.48.1000]

[r 39.48.20]

Comparison

[r 39.48.30]

History

In Brown, Janson & Co v Hutchinson & Co [1895] 1 QB 737, Lindley LJ opened his reasons saying: The Partnership Act of 1890, as is well known, made very little alteration in the legal procedure except by s 23. Section 23 is absolutely new. It replaced a very cumbrous method of proceeding which had to be adopted before and even under the Judicature Act. [r 39.48.40]

Operation

Applications under the Partnership Act 1892 s 23 can only be brought in the Supreme Court. The section permits applications to be made for a charging order in respect of a partner’s interest in the partnership property and profits. The section and this rule only apply to unincorporated partnerships: Partnership Act 1982 s 23(4). If the charging order is sought in relation to a judgment of the Supreme Court, then the application is made by notice of motion. The notice of motion will be listed for hearing and should be served on the judgment debtor as well as any other partners. If the motion only seeks a charging order then no filing fee is payable: Civil Procedure Regulation 2005 cl 4(5)(d). Although Approved Form 73 (Notice of motion for charging order) is not strictly applicable to an application under r 39.48, it can be used as a precedent. If the charging order is sought in relation to a judgment of the Local or District Court then the application is made by summons filed in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court. The standard fee for a summons will apply. Approved Form 73 can be used as a precedent although it will need to be redrafted in the form of a summons. The judgment debtor and all the other partners must be nominated as defendants. [r 39.48.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 47 r 2. Partnership Act 1892 s 23. For general procedure relating to charging orders (against the property of the judgment debtor), see r 39.44. 39.49

Enforcement by or against non-party

(cf SCR Part 42, rule 10)

(1) If, in any proceedings, a person who is not a party obtains an order, or an order is made in favour of a person who is not a party, that person may enforce the order as if that person were a party. (2) If, in any proceedings, a judgment or order may be enforced against a person who is not a party, the judgment or order may be enforced against that person by the same means as if that person were a party. (3) If, in any proceedings, compliance with a judgment or order may be enforced against a corporation that is not a party, any senior officer of the corporation is liable to the same process of enforcement as if the corporation were a party.

RULE 39.49 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.49.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.49.40] Nature and scope ................................................................................................................................... [r 39.49.60] Meaning of “senior officer” of a corporation ......................................................................................... [r 39.49.100] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

923

UCPR Parts 31-40

Rule 39.48 adopts the provisions of SCR Pt 47 r 2.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.50

[r 39.49.20]

References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.49.1000]

[r 39.49.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.49 adopts the provisions of SCR Pt 42 r 10. [r 39.49.40]

Operation

Othodoxy requires that persons in whose favour and against whom orders are made be parties. This is not always so. Some examples: (a) In cases where one person has been appointed to represent a class of persons, the class may be bound: UCPR7.7. This rule relates to a limited subject matter of cases. For the modern “representative proceedings”, see CPA Pt 10. (b) Beneficiaries will usually be bound in proceedings commenced by or against the trustee: UCPR7.9. (c) As to costs orders for and against non-parties other than legal practitioners: see [CPA 98.40], [CPA 98.60]. (d) As to a liability of legal practitioners for unnecessary costs, see CPA s 99. (e) Interesting and largely untested possibilities lie in CPA s 56(4), which proscribes conduct in legal representatives of parties and also persons with “relevant interests”. Such persons would include a parent of a corporate party. For a short discussion, see Abigroup Ltd v Abignano (1992) 39 FCR 74, 85 – 86. [r 39.49.60]

Nature and scope

In McLeary v Swift [2013] NSWSC 1674, Windeyer AJ considered the applicability of the rule to an order already made in the form “Defendant to pay within 28 days to the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, into Australian Taxation Office income tax account number xxx, in favour of yyy, in a specified amount.” At [15] his Honour said: I consider on its proper construction this order is in favour of the Deputy Commissioner who could enforce the order. There are some difficulties with this now because the taxation debt has in fact been paid by parties associated with the plaintiff. The promise under the contract was to pay to the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, albeit for the credit of yyy. In Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 at 91 Lord Pearce in his speech referred to a similar rule in O 45, r 9(1) of theRules of the Supreme Court 1965 (UK). His Lordship, in referring to the rights of the widow entitled to the benefit of a contract but not a contracting party, said that the rule would appear to enable the widow “to enforce ... payment by the appointment of a receiver, by writ of fi. fa., or even by judgment summons”. However, as I have said, I think that this right or power would reside in the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [who was not a party to the matter]. [r 39.49.100]

Meaning of “senior officer” of a corporation

The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) section 9 provides meanings for “officer” and “senior manager” but not “senior officer”. It also provides a meaning for “director” – itself the typical officer – which covers so-called “shadow directors”, as to which see the ASIC commentary at:http://www.asic.gov.au/insolvency-resources. [r 39.49.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 42 r 10. 39.50

Non-performance of condition

(cf SCR Part 42, rule 11)

If a person is entitled under a judgment or order subject to the fulfilment of a condition, but the condition is not fulfilled, then, unless the court orders otherwise: (a) the person loses the benefit of the judgment or order, and (b) any other person interested may take any steps: (i) that are warranted by the judgment or order, or 924

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 6 – General

[r 39.50.1000] (ii)

r 39.51

that might have been taken had the judgment not been given or entered or the order not been made.

Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.50.20] Nature of a conditional judgment ........................................................................................................... [r 39.50.30] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.50.40] Executing a conditional judgment ........................................................................................................ [r 39.50.100] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.50.1000]

[r 39.50.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.50 adopts the provisions of SCR Pt 42 r 11. [r 39.50.30]

Nature of a conditional judgment

In Asia Pacific Glass Pty Ltd v Sindea Trading Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (2003) 47 ACSR 737; [2003] NSWSC 845, Barrett J said at [13]: A condition of the kind with which I am presently concerned is not, of itself, a source of obligation. The successful plaintiff is not, by the conditional order, directed to do the things that make up the condition. Failure by the plaintiff to do those things does not entail, in any sense, disobedience: Talbot v Blindell [1908] 2 KB 114. It is just that the plaintiff has not done things the doing of which is, by the terms of the order, necessary to secure for the plaintiff the benefit of the order. The concept underlying a conditional order is that the court, by the condition, specifies what the successful party must do in order to have the benefit of the order; and it is then for that party to decide whether he or she will take the specified steps and secure that benefit or not take them and thereby forego it. There has been some discussion of these matters at appellate level in England (City of Westminster Assurance Co Ltd v Ainis (1975) 29 P & CR 469) and New Zealand (McIvor v Donald [1984] 2 NZLR 487). [r 39.50.40]

Operation

Normally if the court makes an order subject to a condition it will adjourn the proceedings to ensure that the condition has been met, and will then make such orders as are appropriate if the condition has not been met. If there was an order staying the enforcement of a judgment subject to certain conditions being met, and those conditions had not been met, then the judgment creditor would be entitled under this rule to pursue the judgment without a further order of the court, but would need to file an affidavit showing that the relevant conditions had not been complied with. [r 39.50.100]

Executing a conditional judgment

A writ of execution may not issue without leave if a person’s entitlement under the judgment is subject to fulfilment of a condition: see UCPR 39.1(c). [r 39.50.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 42 r 11. 39.51 Return of writ (cf SCR Part 44, rule 9; DCR Part 44, rule 6; LCR Part 30, rule 22)

On request by the judgment creditor, the Sheriff must return the writ to the court by which it was issued, together with a notice indicating: (a) what action, if any, has been taken in execution of the writ, and (b) whether or not the writ has been satisfied. [R 39.51 insrt Rule 395 of 2005, r 3 and Sch 1[48]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

925

UCPR Parts 31-40

RULE 39.50 COMMENTARY

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 39.51

[r 39.51.20]

RULE 39.51 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.51.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.51.40] Interaction with bankruptcy ..................................................................................................................... [r 39.51.60] Partially unsatisfied writs ...................................................................................................................... [r 39.51.100] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.51.1000]

[r 39.51.20]

Comparison

The corresponding rule in the Supreme Court was SCR Pt 44 r 9. There was no equivalent rule in the District Court. Although the rule has been significantly redrafted it is to the same effect as SCR Pt 44 r 9. [r 39.51.40]

Operation

Under r 39.51 a judgment creditor contemplating taking bankruptcy proceedings against the judgment debtor may request the sheriff to provide a report as to the steps taken to execute the writ and as to the fact, if applicable, that there are currently no further assets which can be seized to satisfy the outstanding judgment debt. If a writ is returned unsatisfied this constitutes an act of bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(d)(ii). An act of bankruptcy also occurs if execution has been issued and any of the judgment debtor’s property has either been sold by the sheriff or held by the sheriff for 21 days: Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 40(1)(d)(i). [r 39.51.60]

Interaction with bankruptcy

Section 40(1)(d)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) provides that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy if “execution has been issued against him or her under process of a court and has been returned unsatisfied”. In Lewis v Lamb [2012] FMCA 392, Smith FM said: [16] These procedures [culminating in the current rule] follow procedures provided under the previous NSW rules of court, and reflect comparable provisions found in English and Australian court procedures for a long time, albeit abandoning Latin descriptors of the relevant writs. It is clear, and was not contested before me, that an action taken by the NSW Sheriff in accordance with r 39.51 constitutes the “return” of “execution ... issued against (a debtor) under process of a court” for the purposes of s 40(1)(d)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. However, it was contested in the present case whether a Sheriff’s notice under r 39.51 showed that the writ was “returned unsatisfied” for the purposes of the s 40(1)(d)(ii). [17] A procedure for a sheriff to make a “return” to the court from which a writ of execution was issued has a long history in Australian courts, and bankruptcy legislation has long provided an act of bankruptcy based upon evidence of a return showing that execution was “unsatisfied”. The words “returned unsatisfied” are therefore also terms of art when used in this context. His Honour went on to discuss the term of art. If a judgment creditor wishes to rely on a return for the purposes of bankruptcy proceedings, reference should be had to his Honour’s reasons. [r 39.51.100]

Partially unsatisfied writs

If a first seizure proves inadequate to extinguish the judgment debt, the Sheriff is authorized by the writ to make further seizure until the writ is completely executed: Kirk v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1988) 19 FCR 530, 559. Note that a writ only has effect for 12 months although it may be renewed: UCPR 39.20. [r 39.51.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 44 r 9. See also Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40.

926

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 39 – Enforcement of judgments Division 6 – General

[r 39.52.1000]

39.52

r 39.52

Orders authorising entry to premises by Sheriff

[R 39.52 insrt Rule 579 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[19]]

RULE 39.52 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................ [r 39.52.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 39.52.40] References ......................................................................................................................................... [r 39.52.1000]

[r 39.52.20]

Comparison

Rule 39.52 is a new provision which was added to the rules in December 2007. [r 39.52.40]

Operation

Section 135(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 permits the court to make an order authorising the sheriff to enter premises for the purposes of taking possession of goods under a writ of execution. The purpose of r 39.52 is to ensure that a judgment creditor does not pre-empt an obstructive judgment defendant by applying to the court for directions before the sheriff has attempted to execute the writ in the ordinary course. [r 39.52.1000]

References

See CPA s 135(2)(a).

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

927

UCPR Parts 31-40

An order under section 135(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 may not be made in respect of any goods unless the court is satisfied: (a) that, while attempting to seize the goods, the Sheriff has been refused entry to the premises where they are believed to be, or (b) that there are special circumstances that justify the making of such an order.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 40.1

[r Pt 40.20]

PART 40 – ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR ENFORCING JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND DISTRICT COURT Commentary by Steven Jupp, Registrar, Supreme Court. Updated by David Ash, Barrister.

PART 40 COMMENTARY [r Pt 40.20]

General comments on Part 40

According to its heading, this Part of the rules deals with enforcement procedures that are either only available in the Supreme Court or only available in the Supreme and District Courts. However, some of the rules are expressed to apply to the Land and Environment Court: see r 40.5. These additional methods of enforcement include the appointment of receivers and committal and sequestration.

DIVISION 1 – PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO THE SUPREME COURT ONLY 40.1 Application of Division This Division applies to judgments and orders of the Supreme Court (in this Division referred to simply as judgments), and so applies in addition to the provisions of Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005.

RULE 40.1 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 40.1.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 40.1.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 40.1.1000]

[r 40.1.20]

Comparison

Division 1 of this Part deals with procedures that only apply in the Supreme Court; the relevant rules have been generally adopted (with some changes) from miscellaneous rules from various Parts of the SCR. [r 40.1.40]

Operation

The procedures dealt with in this Division and Part of the rules are in addition to the normal means of enforcing judgments and orders provided for under CPA Pt 8 and UCPR Pt 39. [r 40.1.1000]

References

Superseded rules: SCR Pt 42 r 2, Pt 44 r 3, Pt 53 r 6. 40.2 Payment of money (cf SCR Part 42, rule 2)

(1) A judgment for the payment of money (including a judgment for the payment of money into court) may be enforced by one or more of the following means: (a) appointment of a receiver of the income of the property of the person bound by the judgment, (b) sequestration of the property of the person bound by the judgment. (2) Subrule (1) does not affect any other means for enforcement of a judgment for the payment of money.

928

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Pt 40 - Additional measures: enforcing judgments & orders - Supreme Court & District Court [r 40.3.20] Division 1 – Provisions applicable to the Supreme Court only r 40.3

RULE 40.2 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 40.2.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 40.2.40] Payment of money into court ................................................................................................................... [r 40.2.60] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 40.2.1000]

Comparison

This rule is derived from SCR Pt 42 r 2. Under that rule enforcement of payment of money, including payment of money into court, could be enforced by appointment of a receiver and committal and sequestration. However SCA s 98 prohibited the enforcement of a judgment for the payment of money by committal. This prohibition has been carried forward to CPA s 130. This rule does not authorise enforcement of a payment of money by committal. However, a judgment for the payment of money by a specified time may be able to be enforced by committal for contempt under r 40.7. [r 40.2.40]

Operation

A judgment or order for the payment of money to a person may be enforced by any of the means set out in CPA s 106(1), but in the Supreme Court can also be enforced by appointment of a receiver or by sequestration. These remedies are cumulative and not alternative remedies. See UCPR Pt 26 for the rules relating to receivers. Before a judgment can be enforced by sequestration, leave must be granted (r 40.3) and there must be compliance with r 40.7. An order for the payment of money by a specified time may be able to be enforced by committal for contempt under r 40.7: see CPA s 131. [r 40.2.60]

Payment of money into court

Rule 40.2(1) specifically states that a judgment for the payment of money into court is, for the purpose of the rule, a judgment for the payment of money. However, such a judgment may not be a judgment debt, and the usual means of enforcement of a judgment debt (spelt out in CPA s 106(1) and acknowledged in r 40.2(2)) may not be available: Nicholson (otherwise McDonald) v McDonald [1936] VLR 233 at 234. [r 40.2.1000]

References

Superseded rule; SCR Pt 42 r 2. 40.3 Leave for issue: sequestration (cf SCR Part 44, rule 3)

(1) A writ of sequestration may not be issued except by leave of the court. (2) An applicant for leave under this rule: (a) must file notice of motion, and (b) must serve the notice, and any affidavit in support of the motion, personally on the person whose property is sought to be sequestrated. (3) The court may dispense with service under subrule (2)(b).

RULE 40.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 40.3.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 40.3.40] Effect of a sequestration order ................................................................................................................. [r 40.3.60] Number of sequestrators .......................................................................................................................... [r 40.3.80] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 40.3.1000]

[r 40.3.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts SCR Pt 44 r 3. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

929

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 40.2.20]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 40.4

[r 40.3.20]

[r 40.3.40]

Operation

An application for leave to issue a writ of sequestration could be one of the alternative orders sought in a notice of motion for contempt. The court may dispense with service of the motion seeking leave to issue the writ of sequestration, but would normally only do so where the person bound has absconded, is clearly in contempt and has been on notice that an order for sequestration was going to be made, or where the sequestration order should be made urgently to ensure that the order has some efficacy (such as where assets that may be seized may otherwise be transferred). [r 40.3.60]

Effect of a sequestration order

An outline of this “old weapon of the Chancery Court” is provided by Windeyer J in Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 498-501. A sequestration order can only be made where the judgment or order requires an act to be done or money to be paid within a specific time, a sealed copy of the judgment or order has been served on the person bound with a warning that contempt proceedings may be taken if they are not complied with (r 40.7), and the order has not been complied with (ie they are in contempt). See r 36.5 if the court has not specified a time for doing the act. A writ of sequestration issues against the estate of the person bound by the order and binds their real and personal property from the date of its issue until the order or judgment has been complied with, or the court makes another order. The writ authorises the seizure of the real and personal property of the person bound, by sequestrators appointed by the court, who can hold the property until the order is complied with, or the contempt is purged. [r 40.3.80]

Number of sequestrators

Although the practice has been that 5 sequestrators be appointed, there does not appear to be any specific reason for this. In Duncan-Strelec v Tate [2009] NSWSC 112 it was held that 2 sequestrators (who were professional insolvency practitioners) was sufficient. [r 40.3.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 44 r 3. 40.4

Security for future conduct

(cf SCR Part 53, rule 6)

(1) If, (a) (b) (c)

for the purpose of security for future conduct, the court: requires any person to pay money into court or otherwise to deposit money, or puts any person on terms of payment into court or other deposit of money, or puts any person on terms of procuring payment into court or other deposit of money by some other person, the court must, by order, specify the circumstances in which the money so paid or deposited is to be forfeited, returned or otherwise disposed of. (2) If, (a) (b) (c)

for the purpose of security for future conduct, the court: requires any person to submit to an order for the payment of money, or puts any person on terms of submitting to an order for the payment of money, or puts any person on terms of procuring some other person to submit to an order for the payment of money, the court must, by order, specify the circumstances in which the order for the payment of money may be made and may, by order, specify the manner in which the submission is to be made.

RULE 40.4 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 40.4.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 40.4.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 40.4.1000] 930

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Pt 40 - Additional measures: enforcing judgments & orders - Supreme Court & District Court [r 40.5.1000]Div 2 - Provs app to Supreme Court, Land & Environment Court & District Court r 40.6 [r 40.4.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts the provisions of SCR Pt 53 r 6. [r 40.4.40]

Operation

[r 40.4.1000]

UCPR Parts 31-40

This is included as another form of enforcement, because the court may order forfeiture of security provided pursuant to this rule when the order requiring the security has not been complied with. The court may also make an order pursuant to subr (2) that requires a person to submit to an order for the payment of money in certain specified circumstances. References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 53 r 6.

DIVISION 2 – PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO THE SUPREME COURT, LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT AND DISTRICT COURT [Div 2 heading am Rule 580 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[5]]

40.5

Application of Division

This Division applies to judgments and orders of the Supreme Court, the Land and Environment Court or the District Court (in this Division referred to simply as judgments), and so applies in addition to the provisions of Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. Note: Under the District Court Act 1973, the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by this Division may also be exercised by the District Court in relation to certain judgments and orders of the District Court. [R 40.5 am Rule 580 of 2007, r 3 and Sch 1[6]]

RULE 40.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 40.5.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 40.5.40] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 40.5.1000]

[r 40.5.20]

Comparison

Division 2 of this Part deals with procedures that apply only in the Supreme Court and District Court (ie do not apply in the Local Court); the relevant rules have been generally adopted from the relevant rules in SCR Pt 42, as there were no specific rules in the District Court. See DCA Div 8 subdivs 2 and 3 as to the powers of the District Court which can be exercised in relation to certain judgments and orders. [r 40.5.40]

Operation

The procedures described in this Division and Part of the rules are in addition to the normal means of enforcing judgments and orders provided for under CPA Pt 8 and UCPR Pt 39, and for the Supreme Court are in addition to the provisions in Div 1 of this Part. [r 40.5.1000]

References

See SCR Pt 42; DCA Div 8 subdivs 2 and 3. 40.6 Doing or abstaining from doing an act (cf SCR Part 42, rule 6)

(1) This rule applies in the following circumstances: (a) if: (i) a judgment requires a person to do an act within a time specified in the judgment, and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

931

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 40.6

[r 40.6.20] (ii) (b)

the person fails to do the act within that time or, if that time is extended or abridged, within that time as extended or abridged,

if: (i)

a judgment requires a person to do an act forthwith, or forthwith on a specified event, and (ii) the person fails to do the act as so required, (c)

if:

(i) a judgment requires a person to abstain from doing an act, and (ii) the person disobeys the judgment, but does not apply to a judgment for the payment of money (including a judgment for the payment of money into court). (2) In following (a) (b) (c)

circumstances to which this rule applies, a judgment may be enforced by one or more of the means: committal of the person bound by the judgment, sequestration of the property of the person bound by the judgment, if the person bound by the judgment is a corporation: (i) committal of any officer of the corporation, and (ii) sequestration of the property of any officer of the corporation.

RULE 40.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 40.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 40.6.40] Committal .................................................................................................................................................. [r 40.6.60] Proceeding against officers of a corporation ............................................................................................ [r 40.6.80] Enforcement of orders made in Family Provision Act applications ........................................................ [r 40.6.100] Does the rule apply to undertakings? .................................................................................................... [r 40.6.120] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 40.6.1000]

[r 40.6.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts SCR Pt 42 r 6(1) and (2). This rule includes an additional provision in subr (1) that it does not apply to a judgment for the payment of money. This exclusion was previously provided for in SCR Pt 42 r 6(3) by reference to the restriction to enforcing monetary judgments in SCA s 98. [r 40.6.40]

Operation

This rule allows enforcement of orders to do an act or to abstain from doing an act by means of sequestration or by committal. Leave is required before a judgment can be enforced by sequestration: r 40.3. There must be compliance with r 40.7 before either committal or sequestration can occur. [r 40.6.60]

Committal

The court may order that a person be committed for not obeying a court order. Punishing the defaulter is intended to compel compliance with the order: Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483. The court when it makes an order for committal will authorise the sheriff (by warrant) to take the person into custody, either for a fixed period of time or until the contempt is purged. [r 40.6.80]

Proceeding against officers of a corporation

If the person bound by an order is a corporation, then the order if breached can be enforced by the committal or sequestration of an officer of the corporation: subr (2)(c). The relevant officer must be on due notice of the order: r 40.7. Proceeding against the officer is not a direct enforcement of the judgment but is directed toward obtaining the cooperation of the officer to persuade the corporation to comply with its obligations under the order. If a company is in liquidation and legally unable to comply with a particular order, subr (2)(c) provides no power to commit an officer or to sequestrate that officer’s property: ANS Nominees Pty Ltd v Beverly Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 875 at 878G. 932

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Pt 40 - Additional measures: enforcing judgments & orders - Supreme Court & District Court [r 40.6.1000]Div 2 - Provs app to Supreme Court, Land & Environment Court & District Court r 40.7 [r 40.6.100]

Enforcement of orders made in Family Provision Act applications

An order for provision out of an estate under the Family Provision Act 1982 cannot be enforced by way of contempt proceedings. Such orders are not a judgment or order for the payment of money that can be enforced. The appropriate method to enforce such an order is to commence an administration suit or a summons for payment of a legacy: Liprini v Liprini [2008] NSWSC 423. Does the rule apply to undertakings?

The rule is directed to judgments. In England, it has been held to apply to undertakings, with the result that officers of a corporation who do not aid or abet a company’s breach of its undertaking may nonetheless be liable under subr (2)(c): Biba Ltd v Stratford Investments Ltd [1973] Ch 281 at 287D-287E. This holding has not been followed in NSW: Alexander v Crawford [2003] NSWSC 426 at [35]–[37]. [r 40.6.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 42 r 6. 40.7

Service of copy of judgment before committal or sequestration

(cf SCR Part 42, rule 8)

(1) A judgment is not enforceable by committal or sequestration unless: (a) a sealed copy of the judgment is served personally on the person bound by the judgment, and (b) if the judgment requires the person to do an act within a specified time, the sealed copy is so served within that time or, if that time is extended or abridged, within that time as extended or abridged. (2) If the person is a corporation, the judgment is not enforceable by committal of an officer of the corporation or by sequestration of the property of an officer of the corporation unless, in addition to service under subrule (1): (a) a sealed copy of the judgment is served personally on the officer, and (b) if the judgment requires the corporation to do an act within a specified time, the sealed copy is so served before that time expires. (3) The sealed copy of the judgment must bear a notice (naming the persons concerned) that the person served is liable to imprisonment or to sequestration of property: (a) where the judgment requires the person to do an act within a specified time, if the person fails to do the act within that time, or (b) where the judgment requires the person to do an act forthwith or forthwith on a specified event, if the person fails to do the act as so required, or (c) where the judgment requires the person to abstain from doing an act, if the person disobeys the judgment. (4) If a person liable to committal or sequestration by way of enforcement of a judgment has notice of the judgment: (a) by being present when the judgment is directed to be entered, or (b) by being notified of the terms of the judgment, whether by telephone, telegram or otherwise, the judgment may be enforced against that person by committal or sequestration without service having been effected in accordance with this rule. (5) The court may dispense with service under this rule. (6) This rule does not apply to a committal or sequestration arising from a failure to comply with the requirements of a subpoena. [Subr (6) insrt Rule 327 of 2007, r 2 and Sch 1[10]] [R 40.7 am Rule 327 of 2007]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

933

UCPR Parts 31-40

[r 40.6.120]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 40.8

[r 40.7.20]

RULE 40.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 40.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 40.7.40] Dispensing with service ............................................................................................................................ [r 40.7.50] References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 40.7.1000]

[r 40.7.20]

Comparison

This rule is based on SCR Pt 42 r 7, and although there has been substantial re-drafting, which makes it easier to understand, it is to the same effect. [r 40.7.40]

Operation

This rule is mainly concerned with enforcing injunctive relief that requires a person (normally a defendant) to either do something or refrain from doing something; it is not concerned with punishing contempt: ANS Nominees Pty Ltd v Beverly Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 875. Before a person bound by an order can be sequestrated or committed they must be given notice of the order. The order must be entered before it can be enforced: CPA s 133. Notice is normally given by serving a sealed form of the order. A sealed form of the order will be issued by the registry upon request: r 36.12. If the order is an injunction the registry will include a warning to the party bound in accordance with subr (3). The party requesting the issue of the order may need to provide the registry with the names of officers of a corporation bound by the order, if it is intended that they should be served. The court will be reluctant to commit unless the orders are clear and unambigous: Wyszynski v Bill [2005] NSWSC 110. In Ronowska v Kus (No 2) (2012) 221 A Crim R 261; [2012] NSWSC 817 (27 July 2012), Pembroke J said at [29]: “a judgment may be enforced by committal to prison without service having been effected under r 40.7 if the person liable to committal had notice of the judgment by being present when the judgment was directed to be entered or was notified of the terms of the judgment by ‘telephone, telegram or otherwise’. This must of course include notification by email”. [r 40.7.50]

Dispensing with service

In Ronowska v Kus (No 2) (2012) 221 A Crim R 261; [2012] NSWSC 817 (27 July 2012), Pembroke J said at [29]: “Rule 40.7(5) provides that the court may dispense with service under r 40.7. This is an express power, confined in its operation to r 40.7, operating independently of the general statutory power to dispense with any requirement of the rules of court in relation to particular civil proceedings: Section 14, Civil Procedure Act 2005. Avoidance of service is a circumstance which might justify the exercise of the power to dispense with service under r 40.7: NCR Australia Pty Ltd v The Credit Connection Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1118 at [59] (Campbell J); Drummoyne Municipal Council v Lewis [1974] 1 NSWLR 655 at 658 (Holland J). In such a case it might be appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment even if r 40.7 has not been satisfied: NCR Australia at [59]”. [r 40.7.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 42 r 7. 40.8 Substituted performance (cf SCR Part 42, rule 9)

If a judgment requires a person to do an act and the person does not do the act, the court: (a) may direct that the act be done by a person appointed by the court, and (b) may order the person to pay the costs incurred pursuant to the direction.

RULE 40.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 40.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 40.8.40] Use in the Land and Environment Court .................................................................................................. [r 40.8.60] 934

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Pt 40 - Additional measures: enforcing judgments & orders - Supreme Court & District Court [r 40.8.1000]Div 2 - Provs app to Supreme Court, Land & Environment Court & District Court r 40.8 References ........................................................................................................................................... [r 40.8.1000]

[r 40.8.20]

Comparison

This rule adopts SCR Pt 42 r 9(1). [r 40.8.40]

Operation

As to the practice and usage of the word “registrar”, see: Guo v Bank of China Ltd [2008] NSWCA 89. [r 40.8.60]

Use in the Land and Environment Court

Despite the heading to the Part, Div 2 expressly applies to the Land and Environment Court. In Armidale Dumaresq Council v Vorhauer (No 3) (2014) 205 LGERA 155; [2014] NSWLEC 50, Pepper J said: [23] Rule 40.8 of the UCPR has been utilised by this court to make substituted performance orders. In Wollongong City Council v Falamaki (No 3) [2009] NSWLEC 80 at 47 Pain J applied the rule to make an order permitting a council to undertake demolition of a structure if the respondent, Dr Falamaki, did not comply with an order to do so within a certain period of time, in order to avoid the need for further litigation. [24] Similarly, in Eurobodalla Shire Council v Gerondal (No 3) [2012] NSWLEC 46, Biscoe J made a substituted performance order to the effect that, if Mrs Gerondal did not comply with an order to remove certain items from her property within three months, the council would be entitled to enter the property and carry out the works at her cost. Informing the exercise of his Honour’s discretion was the history of defiance and default by Mrs Gerondal, and her claimed inability to comply with a prevention notice issued by the council (the non-compliance with which resulted in the proceedings before the court) due to ill health (at [31]). [25] In the Federal Court of Australia, a similar rule has been applied in Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 at [34]–[37] and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp v Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 496 at [8]–[9]. [r 40.8.1000]

References

Superseded rule: SCR Pt 42 r 9(1). See also SCA s 100 – appointment to execute instrument.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

935

UCPR Parts 31-40

Orders pursuant to this rule would normally relate to the signing of documents, such as contracts for sale and transfers. The person that is normally nominated is the registrar. Such an order would not prevent the court from punishing the person bound who fails to comply for contempt.

PART 41 – FUNDS IN COURT Commentary by Anthony Cheshire, Barrister. Update by David Ash, Barrister.

PART 41 COMMENTARY General comments on Part 41 ................................................................................................................. [r Enforcement ............................................................................................................................................. [r Procedure ................................................................................................................................................. [r Does payment in render the court trustee of the money? ....................................................................... [r Other effect of payment into court ........................................................................................................... [r

[r Pt41.20]

Pt41.20] Pt41.40] Pt41.60] Pt41.70] Pt41.80]

General comments on Part 41

Part 41 does not govern circumstances in which funds may be paid into court, or the mechanism by which this may be done. It deals only with the management of those funds once they have been received by the court.

• Moneys recovered in proceedings on behalf of a person under legal incapacity: CPA s 77 • Moneys required to be paid into court in support of a defence of tender: r 14.25 • An interim preservation order in respect of a fund forming the disputed subject matter of proceedings: r 25.3(3) • Moneys shown by an account to be due from a receiver: Pt 26 and see especially r 26.6 • Moneys to which a garnishee makes no claim: r 39.34 et seq, particularly r 39.41 • Moneys ordered as security for costs under r 42.21 • Moneys to which an applicant makes no claim in interpleader proceedings: Pt 43 • Moneys ordered as security for an appeal under r 45.10, 45.22 or 46.7 Other examples inclued: • Moneys offered as compensation to all persons entitled under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897: s 6A of that Act • Moneys paid in discharge of a lien or security: SCA s 74 • Moneys said to be owing under a mortgage where a mortgagee seeks to exercise a power of sale, although different considerations apply depending upon whether the challenge is to the sum owing (see Harvey v McWatters (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 173; 66 WN (NSW) 72) or the power of sale itself (see Starceavich v Swart & Associates Pty Ltd (2006) 12 BPR 98204; [2006] NSWSC 960, Parist Holdings Pty Ltd v Perpetual Nominees Ltd [2006] NSWSC 599 and National Australia Bank Ltd v Convy [2007] NSWSC 1039). • Moneys ordered as a condition of a statutory demand being set aside under s 459M of the Corporations Act (see, eg, Midas Management Pty Ltd v Equator Communications Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 759). Part 4 of the Trustee Act 1925 provides for payment of money or securities into court by a trustee. UCPR Part 41 is a general provision, while payment into court under Pt 4 is specifically covered by UCPR 55 Div 3. Note that if there are rival claims to the trust fund, an application by way of interpleader under UCPR Pt 43 may be the appropriate course: Kennett v Charlton [2007] NSWSC 190. There seems no reason why orders for the payment of moneys in and out of court should not also be made pursuant to the general powers of the court to govern its own procedures, whether pursuant to CPA s 16 or the court’s inherent jurisdiction. Thus, for instance the court can order moneys previously paid out pursuant to a court order to be paid back into court, in whole or in part, such as where the sum exceeds the entitlement of the party to whom the moneys were paid out and/or where an appeal against the original order is pending: Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd v Lemery Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1417. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

937

UCPR Parts 41-50

Funds may be paid into court in many different circumstances, both voluntarily and pursuant to an order of the court. Examples under the CPA and the UCPR include:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 [r Pt41.20] [r Pt41.40] Enforcement A judgment for the payment of money into court appears to include a judgment for the payment of money into court: UCPR 40.2. It appears, then, that such a judgment is enforceable under the usual provisions, as to which see CPA s 106. If the judgment is for payment into the Supreme Court – the usual place – the judgment may be enforced by appointment of a receiver or by sequestration: see UCPR 40.2(1). Presumably, the person at whose instance the court gave judgment would have standing to be an applicant. As to whether contempt proceedings are available for non-payment, see [CPA 106.35]. [r Pt41.60] Procedure Where no procedure is prescribed by the rules or the relevant legislation under which it is sought to make the payment into court, an application should be made by Notice of Motion in existing proceedings under Part 18 or otherwise presumably by summons under Part 6. In either case, a supporting affidavit should be filed. Unlike the specific procedure for trustees paying money into court – as to which see UCPR 55.10 – UCPR Pt 41 prescribes no specific matters. However, as the affidavit serves the purpose of explaining why the payment in is (sought to be) made, the deponent should identify: • The authority – legislative or judicial – said to found the application, if any. If an order is sought upon an agreement or upon some other basis, ie without legislative or judicial authority, this should be made clear at the outset. • The payer. • The capacity in which the deponent makes the affidavit (eg as an officer of or solicitor for the payer). • The form and amount of the payment. • The necessary facts explaining the payment in. If the payment in is upon a legislative or judicial authority, it is likely that the authority will speak for itself. In other cases, further explanation will be required. A question for the deponent in each case may be, will the court and any person with a potential interest in the payment understand from my affidavit the basis upon which the payment has been made? • The name and address – and, usefully, any reference number from previous correspondence – of any person with a potential interest in the payment, and if the person is known to be under a legal incapacity, the name and address, so far as it is known, of an appropriate third party: cf UCPR 55.10. [r Pt41.70] Does payment in render the court a trustee of the money? There is no express provision in the Rules or the Civil Procedure Act governing the vesting of monies paid into court (cf Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 119, which vests the legal ownership “in the registrar on behalf of the court”). In JKB Holdings Pty Ltd v de la Vega [2013] NSWSC 501 at [99], Lindsay J said: At least in proceedings in which parties have agreed that moneys be paid into court “to abide the order of the Court” in circumstances in which there is no pre-existing trust, the right of the claimant of funds in court may, generally, be a right to due administration of the funds in court, and a right to be heard about disposition of those funds, rather than a right of property: Harmer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 264; 66 ALJR 89 at 272-274. His honour went on to identify and discuss four points of interest arising from Harmer. [r Pt41.80] Other effects of payment into court There are conflicting authorities as whether upon payment into court the paying party gives up any interest in the monies so that none of the claimants has a beneficial interest in the money whilst it remains in court and until a final decision of the court with order for payment out (see Pilmer v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (No 2) (2004) 90 SASR 465; 187 FLR 315; 212 ALR 636; [2004] SASC 389 at [76] et seq), or whether in certain circumstances the paying party, or indeed any other claimant, may continue to have an equitable interest whilst the monies remain in court (see Duncan v National Australia Bank Ltd (2006) 95 SASR 208; 235 ALR 385; [2006] SASC 239). Upon payment into court, the paying party appropriates those monies and sets them aside specifically to answer the opposing party’s claim if it is made good. This has been described as “giving of a charge on 938

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 41 – Funds in court [r 41.2.20]

r 41.3

property in favour of the [opposing party]”: Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth, Field Warne (A Firm) [2006] VSCA 123 at [22] and the cases there cited. Thus, any trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator may not claim those funds, but rather “the money must remain in court until the plaintiff’s claim is decided by the court or there is an adjudication upon proof in bankruptcy or in the winding up”: Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth, Field Warne (A Firm) [2006] VSCA 123. See also JKB Holdings Pty Ltd v de la Vega [2013] NSWSC 501 at [105]–[106]. 41.1

Definitions

In this Part: deposited funds means money that has been deposited in a bank in accordance with rule 41.2. funds in court means money that has been paid into court.

RULE 41.1 COMMENTARY [r 41.1.20]

Comparison

41.2 Deposit of funds Within one day after money is paid into court, the registrar must deposit the money in the court’s bank account. [R 41.2 subst Rule 391 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

RULE 41.2 COMMENTARY [r 41.2.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 1. There was no equivalent DCR provision. 41.3 Withdrawal of deposited funds (cf SCR Part 50, rules 2 and 3)

(1) Deposited funds may not be withdrawn or paid except by the authority of these rules or of a judgment or order. (2) [Repealed] [Subr (2) rep Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

(3) [Repealed] [Subr (3) rep Rule 494 of 2008, r 2 and Sch 1[10]] [R 41.3 am Rule 494 of 2008]

RULE 41.3 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 41.3.20] Overview ................................................................................................................................................... [r 41.3.30] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 41.3.40] Is notice to persons with potential claims required? ................................................................................ [r 41.3.60] What is the requisite notice? .................................................................................................................... [r 41.3.80] Is there a general duty of disclosure? .................................................................................................... [r 41.3.100] Is an order for payment out final or interlocutory? ................................................................................. [r 41.3.120] © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

939

UCPR Parts 41-50

This is a new provision.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 41.3 [r 41.3.20]

[r 41.3.20] Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 rr 2 and 3, except that now the withdrawal or payment of deposited funds must be by means of a cheque. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 41.3.30]

Overview

Reference should also be had to the commentary on UCPR 43.11. In JKB Holdings Pty Ltd v de la Vega [2013] NSWSC 501 Lindsay J said at [14]: The diversity attending payments into court calls attention to the need, on an application for payment out, to inquire as to the nature and purpose of the antecedent payment in. This is necessary to ensure that the Court acts within its mandate, judicially, and in a manner that gives due recognition to the rights and expectations of persons who may claim to be “entitled” to property affected by an exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. Rule 41.3 requires the authority of a judgment, order or other rule of court for monies to be withdrawn or paid out of court and r 41.11 dictates that monies may only be paid out to entitled parties (or their solicitor). There is no general provision contained in Part 41 or elsewhere in the Rules expressly permitting the court to make orders for monies to be paid out of court, but it is likely that such a power would be inferred from r 41.3. Alternatively, recourse can be made to the court’s general powers to govern its own procedures, whether pursuant to CPA s 16 or the court’s own inherent jurisdiction. In practice, the power to make further orders in respect of funds in court, including payments out of court, will often be covered by any specific statutory power under which the funds were paid into court (eg in relation to Pt 4 of the Trustee Act 1925, see UCPR 55.11); or will be created by the order for payment into court, for instance where the funds are to “abide the further order of the Court”. Where any order for payment out of court is subsequently set aside, an order for repayment into court may be made (see Xenos v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 973, where the order for payment out of court was “procured against good faith” and was set aside under r 36.15(1)). [r 41.3.40]

Operation

A judgment or order satisfying this rule is a necessary prerequisite to the Registrar paying the funds out. Depending upon the precise terms of any such order, it may not be self-acting and may not require any party or the Registrar to take any action. It may operate as no more than an authorisation: (a) for a party to approach the Registrar and request that the funds be paid out pursuant to such order; and (b) for the Registrar to comply with such a request. Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd v Lemery Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1417. A judgment or order under this rule may be set aside or varied under the provisions of Part 36, Division 4. It may also be reviewed, at least until it has been drawn up, passed and entered: Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd v Lemery Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1417 applying DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226; [2000] HCA 17. In the event of no action being taken pursuant to a judgment or order under this rule, regard should be had to the provision in respect of unclaimed funds contained in r 41.10. [r 41.3.60]

Is notice to persons with potential claims required?

Where a payment into court has been made under a particular statute or another Part of the Rules, the procedure for seeking payment out of court may be set out in that statute or Rule: see eg UCPR 55.11, which deals with payments out of funds paid into court under Part 4 of the Trustee Act 1925. In the absence of any applicable statute or other Rule, in the same way as there is no express general power under which monies may be paid out of court (see [r Pt41.80]), no general procedure for the making of such orders is specified. 940

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 41 – Funds in court [r 41.3.120]

r 41.3

Rule 41.9 expressly permits the court to make orders, including payment out of court, affecting parties who have been notified of an intention for funds to be paid out of court but who fail to attend. This rule does not, however, require that such notice be given or provide that monies may only be paid out of court under this rule. There is then no express requirement in the Rules for the court to give notice of any application for payment out of court or of an intended payment out of court to any party. However, in practice, the court can be expected to require informal notice to be given to such persons as may appear to it to have a potential interest in the monies in court. [r 41.3.80]

What is the requisite notice?

That matter was concerned not with the general provisions of UCPR Pt 41, but with the specific requirements under UCPR Pt 55 Div 3, which relates to funds paid in under Pt 4 of the Trustee Act 1925. However, the statement is generally applicable. The requisite notice is proper notification, and mere service of an application and an affidavit may not, in a particular set of circumstances, amount to this. [r 41.3.100]

Is there a general duty of disclosure?

Payments into court cover a wide set of circumstances. At one end, A may pay money into court and choose to say clearly in their affidavit something to the effect “It’s not my money, and I don’t need notice when it is paid out”. At the other end, the payment in may be in the course of a dispute between A and B, where at first glance it seems clear that either A or B and no-one else is entitled. However, and whatever is clear at the time of payment in, circumstances may have changed at the time someone is applying for payment out. For example and most obviously, a relevant person may have become insolvent and the person’s administrator may – or may not – have a statutory right to claim the fund which right did not exist, or was not engaged, at the time of the payment in. It may be that the idea of “strict proof” in the sense used in the extract in [r 41.3.80] is a sufficient guard against error. However, a person seeking an ex parte injunction has a duty to bring to the notice of the court all facts material to the determination of the claimant’s right to the order, it being no excuse for the claimant to say that they were not aware of the facts’ importance: as to injunctions, see Thomas A Edison Ltd v Bullock (1912) 15 CLR 679 at, 681–682 (Isaacs J). While any application will depend on its circumstances, given the nature of an order for payment out and while each application will turn on its facts, there may be a good case for imposing a general duty in similar terms – that is, on disclosure as distinct from the more onerous task of positive investigation – on claimants in applications for payments out. [r 41.3.120]

Is an order for payment out final or interlocutory?

In JKB Holdings Pty Ltd v de la Vega [2013] NSWSC 501 Lindsay J said at [9]: Whether a determination about payment of money out of court bears the character of an interlocutory or final judgment depends on the context, and terms, in which the particular decision is made. Some determinations about payment out may be entirely administrative in character and, accordingly, characterised as interlocutory. Other determinations, made after a contested hearing about the merits of competing, substantive entitlements, may bear the character of a final judgment. In each case, characterisation of the Court’s decision depends upon its legal effect: Carr v Finance Corp of Australia Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 246; [1981] HCA 20 at 248. An adjudication of competing claims of substantive right generally bears the character of a final judgment; not so, a discretionary management decision about a matter of practice or procedure: A Hudson Pty Ltd v Legal & General Life of Australia Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 701 at 712A-C, 714G-715B, 716C-717B and 718B-E.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

941

UCPR Parts 41-50

In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Estate of the Late Mahmoud Slieman [2010] NSWSC 661 at [11], Slattery J said: The Court requires strict proof as to who has the entitlement to the funds in court. There is a heavy burden placed on the party seeking payment of money out of court [under Trustee Act s 98 and UCPR r 55.11]. It is necessary for that party not only to prove his or her entitlement to the funds but also to prove that all other potential claimants to the funds in court have been properly notified. Otherwise there is a risk of incorrect payments being made.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 41.4

41.4

[r 41.4.20]

Registrar to keep accounts

(cf SCR Part 50, rule 4)

The registrar must, in relation to any deposited funds, keep an account of the deposit and of all withdrawals (including withdrawals of interest).

RULE 41.4 COMMENTARY [r 41.4.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 4. There was no equivalent DCR provision. 41.5 Investment (cf SCR Part 50, rule 5)

The court may direct that any deposited funds be invested in any manner in which a trustee is authorised to invest trust money under the Trustee Act 1925.

RULE 41.5 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 41.5.20] What is an authorised investment? .......................................................................................................... [r 41.5.30]

[r 41.5.20]

Comparison

The requirements for the investment of deposited funds under this rule replace the list of options available under SCR Pt 50 r 5. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 41.5.30]

What is an authorised investment?

The Trustee Act 1925 no longer speaks in terms of authorised investments. However, cl 4 of the Trustee Regulation 2010 identifies a number of investments “that a trustee might reasonably consider appropriate for the investment of trust funds”. 41.6 Interest not payable on certain funds in court (cf SCR Part 50, rule 5A)

(1) Money that is paid into court as security for costs or as security on an appeal, or in relation to an offer of compromise under the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984, does not bear interest. (2) Subrule (1) does not apply to interest accruing on money paid to the NSW Trustee and Guardian. [Subr (2) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[15]] [R 41.6 am Rule 501 of 2009]

RULE 41.6 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 41.6.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 41.6.40]

942

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 41 – Funds in court [r 41.7.60] [r 41.6.20]

r 41.8 Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 5A. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 41.6.40]

Operation

Deposited funds will bear interest save in the circumstances set out in this rule: r 41.2(2). 41.7

Payment to the NSW Trustee and Guardian

(cf SCR Part 50, rule 6A)

(1) The registrar may, and if the court so directs, must: (a) pay funds in court to the NSW Trustee and Guardian for payment into the NSW Trustee and Guardian’s common fund, or (b) demand repayment by the NSW Trustee and Guardian to the registrar of money so paid. (2) When making a payment referred to in subrule (1)(a), the registrar must give particulars of the payment. [Subr (2) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[17]]

(3) When making a repayment referred to in subrule (1)(b), the NSW Trustee and Guardian must give particulars of the repayment and any interest. [Subr (3) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[15] and [18]] [R 41.7 am Rule 501 of 2009]

RULE 41.7 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 41.7.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 41.7.40] What is the common fund and what is the interest rate? ........................................................................ [r 41.7.60]

[r 41.7.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 6A. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 41.7.40]

Operation

The registrar may pay funds in court to the NSW Trustee and Guardian or demand payment from the Public Trustee of money so paid of her or his own motion, but must do so if the court so directs: r 41.7(1). [r 41.7.60]

What is the common fund and what is the interest rate?

Information about the common fund and contact details are at http://www.tag.nsw.gov.au/your-funds-and-thensw-trustee-and-guardian.html. 41.8 Interest on funds in court to abide the decision in proceedings (cf SCR Part 50, rule 6)

(1) This rule applies if money is paid into court pursuant to an order to abide the decision in the proceedings, and is either invested or paid to the NSW Trustee and Guardian. [Subr (1) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[15]]

(2) The court may, on application by a party or by its own motion, order the payment of interest to any party. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

943

UCPR Parts 41-50

[Subr (1) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[15] and [16]]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 41.8

[r 41.8.20]

(3) Despite subrule (2), if: (a) the court makes an order that the whole of the money be paid to one or more parties, and (b) the order does not expressly provide for the payment (or non-payment) of any interest accruing on the money, any interest accruing on the money is to be paid to the party or parties. (4) Unless the court orders otherwise, the interest paid to a party under subrule (3) is to bear the same proportion to the total interest accruing on the total amount of money paid into court as the money paid to the party bears to the total amount of money paid into court. (5) In this rule, interest accruing on money means interest accruing on the money as a result of its investment under rule 41.5 or payment to the NSW Trustee and Guardian under rule 41.7. [Subr (5) am Rule 501 of 2009, Sch 1[15]] [R 41.8 am Rule 501 of 2009]

RULE 41.8 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 41.8.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 41.8.40]

[r 41.8.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 8. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 41.8.40]

Operation

Where money has been invested pursuant to r 41.5 or paid to the Public Trustee under r 41.7, the court may order that interest may be paid to any party: r 41.8(2). In the absence of an express order, any interest actually accrued will be payable together with the capital sum (r 41.8(3)) and payable on a pro rata basis with that capital sum (r 41.8(4)). 41.9 Non-attendance of parties following notice by court (cf SCR Part 50, rule 6AA)

If the court gives notice to parties of its intention to order the payment to a party of funds in court, or of any interest accruing on those funds, and the party fails to attend court as directed in the notice, the court: (a) may order the payment of the funds or any interest accruing on those funds (or both) to one or more of the parties, in such proportions as the court thinks fit, or (b) may direct the registrar to pay the funds or any interest accruing on the funds (or both) to the Treasurer for payment into the Consolidated Fund, or (c) may decide not to make any such order.

RULE 41.9 COMMENTARY Comparison .............................................................................................................................................. [r 41.9.20] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 41.9.40]

[r 41.9.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 6AA. There was no equivalent DCR provision.

944

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 41 – Funds in court [r 41.10.20] [r 41.9.40]

r 41.11 Operation

This rule is not in mandatory form so that there would seem to be requirement for all interested parties be given notice of an intention to order payment out of funds in court. It would also seem from its terms that the rule is not the sole source of the power to order payment out of court. See further [r Pt41.100]. 41.10

Unclaimed funds

(cf SCR Part 50, rule 6B)

(2) Any matter in respect of which there are unclaimed funds must be referred to the court by the registrar for a direction under subrule (3). (3) The court may direct the registrar to pay the unclaimed funds to the Treasurer for payment into the Consolidated Fund. (4) On the application of a person entitled to unclaimed funds paid to the Treasurer under subrule (3), the court may direct the Treasurer to pay the funds into court for payment to the person so entitled. (5) If satisfied that a person’s failure to make such an application was due to the fact that: (a) the person was then a person under legal incapacity, or (b) the unclaimed funds could not be dealt with until the happening of an event subsequent to the direction referred to in subrule (3), the court may also order the Treasurer to pay into court, for payment to the person, an amount equivalent to the interest (if any) that would have been payable had the unclaimed funds paid to the Treasurer been deposited funds during the period between the date of their payment to the Treasurer under subrule (3) and the date of their repayment by the Treasurer under subrule (4).

RULE 41.10 COMMENTARY [r 41.10.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 6B. There was no equivalent DCR provision. 41.11 Authority of recipient (cf SCR Part 50, rule 7)

Subject to these rules, funds in court may not be paid out of court except to the party entitled or (on the party’s written authority or by order of the court) to the party’s solicitor.

RULE 41.11 COMMENTARY Comparison ............................................................................................................................................. [r 41.11.20] Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 41.11.40]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

945

UCPR Parts 41-50

(1) In this rule, unclaimed funds means funds that have been paid into court in relation to any matter, including any interest accruing on those funds, other than funds or interest that have been paid to the Treasurer pursuant to a direction under rule 41.9(b), where: (a) judgment has been entered on the matter, and (b) the whole or any part of the funds or interest remains unclaimed after 6 years from either of the following: (i) the making of an order for the payment of the whole of the funds or interest (or any part that is unclaimed), (ii) if no such order is made, the date of the judgment.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 41.12

[r 41.11.20]

[r 41.11.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 7. There was no equivalent DCR provision. [r 41.11.40]

Operation

In JKB Holdings Pty Ltd v de la Vega [2013] NSWSC 501 Lindsay J said at [7]–[8]: The word “entitled” in UCPR r 41.11 is directed to the time of payment out. An order authorising, or directing, a payment out to a party establishes, rather than merely evidences, that party’s entitlement to receive the money paid out pursuant to the order. Rule 41.11 is directed towards orderly management of funds in court. A payment out must be made to the ″party entitled″ personally unless a payment to the party’s solicitor is duly authorised, in which event payment can be made to the solicitor. Rule 41.11 does not mandate that funds in court can only be paid out to, or at the direction of, the party who paid them in. Once moneys are paid into court they come under the general control of the court and are liable to be dealt with, in the ordinary course of the business of the court, subject to such orders as may be made by the court from time to time. See also the commentary on UCPR 41.3. 41.12

Death of payee

(cf SCR Part 50, rule 9)

(1) If: (a) by any judgment or order, the court directs payment of funds in court to any person, and (b) it appears to the registrar: (i) that the person has died since the date on which the judgment or order took effect, and that probate of the person’s will or letters of administration of the person’s estate have been granted to an executor or administrator, or (ii) that the person had died on or before the date on which the judgment or order took effect, and that his or her entitlement to payment arose under a direction for payment to creditors, shareholders or debenture holders, then, unless the judgment or order otherwise directs, the registrar may pay the money to the deceased person’s executor or administrator. (2) Subject to subrule (3), this rule does not authorise payment of the funds to a deceased person’s executor or administrator if the deceased person appears to the registrar to have been entitled as trustee, executor or administrator, or otherwise not in his or her own right and for his or her own use. (3) The registrar may, under this rule, pay the money to an executor of the will of the person to whom payment is directed if it appears to the registrar that the person was entitled as sole or sole surviving executor.

RULE 41.12 COMMENTARY [r 41.12.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 9. There was no equivalent DCR provision.

946

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 41 – Funds in court [r 41.14.20]

41.13

r 41.14

Payment to partners

(cf SCR Part 50, rule 10)

If, by any judgment or order, the court directs payment of funds in court to any persons described in the judgment or order, or in a certificate of an associate Judge of the Supreme Court, as partners, or as trading or carrying on business in the name of a firm, then, unless the judgment or order otherwise directs, the registrar may pay the funds to any one or more of those persons or to their survivors. [R 41.13 am Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[14]]

RULE 41.13 COMMENTARY [r 41.13.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 10.

41.14 Payment to executors or administrators (cf SCR Part 50, rule 11)

(1) If: (a) by any judgment or order, the court directs the payment of funds in court to any persons described in the judgment or order, or in a certificate of an associate Judge of the Supreme Court, as executors or administrators, and (b) it appears to the registrar: (i) that one or more of them has died since the date on which the judgment or order took effect, or (ii) that one or more of them had died on or before the date on which the judgment or order took effect, but is described in the judgment, order or certificate as an executor of the will or administrator of the estate of a creditor, shareholder or debenture holder, then, unless the judgment or order otherwise directs, the registrar may pay the funds to their survivors. [Subr (1) am Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[15]]

(2) If: (a) by any judgment or order, the court directs the payment of funds in court to any persons described in the judgment or order, or in a certificate of an associate Judge of the Supreme Court, as executors or administrators, and (b) the funds in court total less than $200, then, unless the judgment or order otherwise directs, the registrar may pay the funds to any of them. [Subr (2) am Rule 625 of 2005, r 2 and Sch 1[16]] [R 41.14 am Rule 625 of 2005]

RULE 41.14 COMMENTARY [r 41.14.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 11. There was no equivalent DCR provision.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

947

UCPR Parts 41-50

There was no equivalent DCR provision.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 41.15

41.15

[r 41.15.20]

Discharge of registrar

(cf SCR Part 50, rule 8)

(1) Any person entitled to payment of funds in court may request the registrar to send the person a cheque for the payment to a specified address. (2) Payment, by the bank on which it is drawn, of a cheque sent in accordance with such a request is taken to be a discharge to the registrar for the amount of the payment. (3) Subject to subrule (2), any direction, cheque or other document for the payment of money out of court is taken, when signed by the payee, to be a discharge to the registrar for the amount of the payment. (4) Nothing in subrule (2) or (3): (a) prevents the registrar from requiring a receipt for any payment made by the registrar, or (b) affects the operation of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 or the Duties Act 1997.

RULE 41.15 COMMENTARY [r 41.15.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 50 r 8. As payment out of court is now to be made by cheque, the rule concerns the procedure for payment by cheque and subsequent discharge of the amount payable. There was no equivalent DCR provision. 41.16 Stop orders (cf SCR Part 47, rule 3)

(1) This rule applies to funds in the Supreme Court. (2) If: (a) the interest of any person in any funds in court has been mortgaged, charged or assigned, or (b) a person having an interest in any funds in court is a debtor under a judgment or order of the court, the court may, on application by the mortgagee, chargee, assignee or creditor under the judgment or order, make an order prohibiting the transfer, sale, delivery out, payment or other dealing in respect of the whole or any part of the funds, or of any income derived from the funds, without notice to the applicant. (3) An application under subrule (2) is to be made: (a) if there are proceedings in the court in relation to the funds, by notice of motion in the proceedings, or (b) in any other case, by summons joining as defendants all persons whose interests may be affected by the application. (4) The notice of motion or summons must be served on each person whose interest may be affected by the application, but not on any other person. (5) The court may, on terms, dispense with the joinder of any person as defendant and dispense with service on any person. (6) The court may order the applicant for an order under subrule (2) to pay the costs of any party to any proceedings in relation to which the funds are in court, or of any other person interested in the funds. (7) Subrule (6) does not affect the general powers of the Supreme Court as to costs.

948

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 41 – Funds in court [r 41.16.20]

r 41.16

RULE 41.16 COMMENTARY [r 41.16.20]

Comparison

This rule reproduces the substance of SCR Pt 47 r 3.

UCPR Parts 41-50

This rule does not apply in the District Court and there is no equivalent DCR provision.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

949

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.1

[r 42.1.40]

PART 42 – COSTS Commentary by Peter Johnstone, President of the Children’s Court of New South Wales. Updated by Janet McDonald.

DIVISION 1 – ENTITLEMENT TO COSTS 42.1 General rule that costs follow the event (cf SCR Part 52A, rule 11)

Subject to this Part, if the court makes any order as to costs, the court is to order that the costs follow the event unless it appears to the court that some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs.

RULE 42.1 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 42.1.40] The meaning of event .............................................................................................................................. [r 42.1.50] Costs where no determination on the merits ........................................................................................... [r 42.1.52] Costs of cross claims ............................................................................................................................... [r 42.1.55] Costs of submitting parties ....................................................................................................................... [r 42.1.57] Displacing the usual rule – general principles ......................................................................................... [r 42.1.60] Circumstances that may justify displacement of the usual rule ............................................................... [r 42.1.62] The application of the usual rule in interlocutory applications ................................................................. [r 42.1.65] The application of the usual rule in appeals ............................................................................................ [r 42.1.70] The usual rule as it applies in proceedings with multiple parties including Bullock and Sanderson orders ................................................................................................................................................ [r 42.1.100] The usual rule as it applies to multiple issues ....................................................................................... [r 42.1.120] The usual rule as it applies to costs out of a fund ................................................................................. [r 42.1.200] The Usual Rule in the Land and Environment Court ............................................................................. [r 42.1.260] Other particular circumstances displacing the usual rule ...................................................................... [r 42.1.300]

[r 42.1.40]

Operation

Although costs are in the discretion of the court: CPA s 98(1), r 42.1 recognises the principle that justice and fairness requires that, other than in special cases, a party is entitled to the costs of an issue on which he succeeds: Laguillo v Haden Engineering Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 306 at 308 and 309 per Reynolds JA. This principle has its root in the early statutes which conferred power on courts of common law to award costs to the successful party and from the approach the courts of equity took to the exercise of its discretion: see Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; 66 ALJR 560; 107 ALR 585; [1992] HCA 28 at 182–183 (CLR). Compensation for the costs incurred in bringing a successful action was, and is regarded as necessary to ensure fairness and justice: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; 72 ALJR 578; 152 ALR 83; [1998] HCA 11 at 120 (CLR), at [67]. Such approach may be contrasted with the “American Rule” whereby in the absence of limited statutory exceptions each party bears its own costs: Foots v Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd (2007) 234 CLR 52; 82 ALJR 173; 241 ALR 32; [2007] HCA 56 at [29]; Oshlack at [134]. Although a successful party has a “reasonable expectation” of being awarded costs against the unsuccessful party: Donald Campbell & Co v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 812, cited by McHugh J in Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; 50 A Crim R 287; 7 ALR 45 [1990] HCA 59, at 569 (CLR); see also at 557, per Dawson J; Oshlack at [134]; and fairness dictates that the unsuccessful party typically bears the liability for costs: Oshlack at [67], such that this is regarded as the “usual rule”, there is no absolute rule with respect to the exercise of the court’s discretion; a party has no right to the order of costs, notwithstanding its success in the litigation: Oshlack at [134] per Kirby J. The principle that costs follow the event is subject to the ability of the court, expressly referred to in r 42.1, to make such orders as to costs as it appears to the court the justice of the case may require: Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242; Fordyce v Fordham (2006) 67 NSWLR 497; [2006] NSWCA 274; Hooker v Gilling (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 214 at [24]. 950

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

[r 42.1.52]

r 42.1

Nevertheless, a successful party in litigation is generally awarded costs: Yazgi v Permanent Custodians Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 306 at [24], unless it appears to the court that the justice of the case requires that some other order is appropriate, either as to the whole or some part of the costs: Foots v Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd (2007) 234 CLR 52; 82 ALJR 173; 241 ALR 32; [2007] HCA 56 at [26]–[27]; Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242 at [30]–[32]; Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd [2000] NSWSC 232. See [r 42.1.60]–[r 42.1.300] for more commentary. [r 42.1.50]

The meaning of event

In determining who the “successful party” is, it is necessary to decide whether the party really has been successful, which may not necessarily be the party who obtained an order: Hansen at [29]; Grant v Brewarrina Shire Council [No 3] (2003) 125 LGERA 348; [2003] NSWLEC 108 at [5]; Hooker v Gilling (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 214 at [25]–[31]; Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 873 (at 874). For instance, a plaintiff who recovers nominal damages may not necessarily be regarded as successful: Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies; Grant. [r 42.1.52]

Costs where no determination on the merits

Without a hearing on the merits, and a decision thereon, there is no “event” to enliven r 42.1: Fire Containment Pty Ltd v Robins (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 547 at [11]; Lake Burrendong State Park Trust v Thompson [2011] NSWSC 1554 at [71]. The general principle in relation to costs where proceedings are determined without a hearing on the merits, is that the court will make no order as to costs with the intent that each party bear its own costs: Re Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622; 71 ALJR 533; 143 ALR 1; [1997] HCA 6 at 625 (CLR); Ferguson v Hyndman [2006] NSWSC 538 at [1]. The basis for this principle is that a court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties: Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194 at 201, as to do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigated action which by settlement or extracurial action they had avoided and with no hearing on the merits the court is necessarily deprived of the factor that usually determines whether or how it will make a costs order: Lai Qin at 642. The application of this general principle is secondary however, in the event that rr 42.19 and 42.20 apply. Those rules provide a “starting point” as regards the appropriate order for costs in the event of discontinuance and dismissal respectively, unless the Court determines, in its discretion, that an alternative order is appropriate: Australiawide Airlines Ltd v Aspirion Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 365 at [48]–[49]. As to costs in the event of a discontinuance under r 42.19 see [r 42.19.40]. As to costs in the event of dismissal under r 42.20 see [r 42.20.40]. Rules 42.1, 42.19 and 42.20 do not provide for a presumption as to the disposition of costs but rather provide a “prima facie disposition as to costs unless displaced by a discretionary decision”: Foley v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd [2008] NSWSC 778 at [28]; Australiawide Airlines Ltd at [53]. There are essentially three circumstances in which the court may conclude that the interests of justice require an order for costs to be made when there has been no hearing on the merits. The first is where the conduct of one party has been unreasonable: Lai Qin at 624–625; Indyk v Wiernik [2006] NSWSC 868; Muhibbah Engineering (M) BHD v Trust Co Ltd [2009] NSWCA 205. The second is where the court is satisfied that one party has had a substantial victory and the other a substantial loss: Edwards Madigan Torzillo Briggs Pty Ltd v Stack [2003] NSWCA 302 at [5]; Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW (2006) 153 IR 386; [2006] NSWCA 129 at [23]–[25]. A settlement that amounts to a capitulation by one © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

951

UCPR Parts 41-50

At its simplest “the event” is the ultimate outcome of the case, although the circumstances of the case may make identification of “the event” difficult. Although there is no authoritative resolution of the meaning of “the event” within r 42.1: Baker v Towle (2008) 39 Fam LR 323; [2008] NSWCA 73 at [20]–[23], it may be identified by giving consideration to the practical outcome of the proceedings, by reference to who the successful party in the proceedings was, having in mind the matters over which the parties joined issue and who succeeded on them: Hansen v Monterey (Coolah) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1383 at [29] per Schmidt J. Generally the phrase costs “follow the event” means that party who succeeded overall receives the costs of the action, however where an action involves separate issues, the “event” may refer to the result of individual issues: Williams v Stanley Jones & Co Ltd [1926] 2 KB 37; Jelbarts Pty Ltd v McDonald [1919] VLR 478; (1919) 25 ALR 252. As to the application of the usual rule to individual issues, see commentary below at [42.1.60].

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.1

[r 42.1.52]

party may justify a departure from the usual rule: Ferguson v Hyndman [2006] NSWSC 538 at [1]. The third circumstance is where, although both parties have acted reasonably, one party was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried: Lai Qin at 625. This last circumstance has been described as “rare” given that the court will not engage in a de facto hearing of the matter. An example of such a circumstance is where a case raises questions of law that are resolved in another case, the former case will be taken to have had, in substance, a hearing on the merits in relation to those questions: Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) (2006) 153 IR 386; [2006] NSWCA 129 at [39]; Coffee v Scanlon (1992) 26 NSWLR 485; (1992) 41 IR 65. [r 42.1.55]

Costs of cross claims

The prima facie principle to be applied in relation to cross-claims, as in relation to other matters, is that costs follow the event. Accordingly, the prima facie position is that where a defendant’s cross-claim against a cross-defendant fails, whether or not the defendant/cross claimant has been successful against the plaintiff, is that the cross claimant pays the cross-defendant’s costs of the cross-claim: Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242 at [30]. If the cross claimant succeeded against the cross defendant, but failed against the plaintiff, the cross claimant is prima face entitled not only to its costs against the cross defendant, but also to an indemnity for any costs liability to the plaintiff proportionate to the contribution made by the cross defendant to the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff: Ace-Semi Trailer Sales Pty Ltd v Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd [2009] NSWCA 381 at [114]. This is consistent with s 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946: see James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Wyong Shire Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 679; [2000] NSWCA 107; Estate of the Late M T Mutton [2007] NSWCA 340 at [50], [251]–[263] and Ace-Semi Trailer Sales at [115]. Where the nature of the plaintiff’s claim made it reasonable for the defendant to cross-claim against another party, and that defendant’s cross-claim fails solely by reason of the failure of the plaintiff’s claim, a court may order that plaintiff to pay not only the costs of the defendant/cross-claimant, but also the costs of the cross-defendant: Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242 at [31]; Corbett v Nguyen (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 673 at [7], unless there were separate issues on the cross-claim: Kalls Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baloglow [2006] NSWSC 1021; See also Fubilan Catering Services Ltd v Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1497. Where there are cross-claims or cross-appeals with different parties succeeding to varying degrees on separate issues, the court may apportion the costs: Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v McGregor (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 453 at [20]; Wilson v Carter [2006] NSWSC 88; Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] NSWSC 480 at [20]–[22]. See further discussion below at [42.1.100] regarding multiple parties and Bullock and Sanderson orders. [r 42.1.57]

Costs of submitting parties

UCPR 6.11(1) expressly permits a defendant to file an appearance submitting to the orders sought “save as costs”. While the Rules do not provide specifically for the costs consequences of filing a submitting appearance it is ordinarily the case that a defendant who submits and takes no part in the determination of issues that are actively contested by other parties, should not be ordered to pay any costs subsequently incurred in the conduct of the proceedings: Develtor Property Group Pty Ltd v Newcastle City Council [2001] NSWLEC 47 at [38] and [42]; Highland v Labraga (No 3) [2006] NSWSC 871; China Shipping (Australia) Agency Co Pty Ltd v D V Kelly Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1557. A submitting party who genuinely takes no part in the proceedings will not be ordered to pay costs, as it would be contrary to the dictates of justice and “unjust and unreasonable”: see China Shipping (Australia) Agency Co Pty Ltd v D V Kelly Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1557 per Rein J at [12]. However, the position will change where that party does in fact take some active part in the proceedings: Highland v Labraga (No 3) [2006] NSWSC 871; Hillig v Darkinjung Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 147 at [66]; Hornsby Shire Council v Valuer General (NSW) [2008] NSWSC 1281; or where the conduct of the submitting party made the proceedings necessary: Buzrio Pty Ltd v Consumer, Trader & Tenancy Tribunal (NSW) (No 4) [2010] NSWSC 41 at [15]; see also Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority (NSW) (No 2) (2008) 72 NSWLR 273; [2008] NSWCA 201 where the submitting party did not actively oppose the orders sought, but neither did it consent to them in circumstances where, as a model litigant, it ought. 952

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

[r 42.1.60] [r 42.1.60]

r 42.1

Displacing the usual rule – general principles

Although r 42.1 expresses the “usual rule” that a successful party should receive his or her costs, it also explicitly states that costs are in the discretion of the court and consequently there are circumstances in which the successful party may be deprived of some or all of their costs or even ordered to pay the costs of the unsuccessful party. The court’s discretionary power as to costs is wide and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve justice in the particular case: New South Wales v Stanley [2007] NSWCA 330 at [18]; Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373 at [8].

The court must not exercise its discretion to award costs against a successful party arbitrarily or capriciously, or on no grounds at all: Oshlack at [22]. The discretion must be exercised judicially and “according to rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion … or even benevolence … or sympathy”: Williams v Lewer [1974] 2 NSWLR 91 at 95; Coffee v Scanlon (1992) 26 NSWLR 485; (1992) 41 IR 65 at 489 (NSWLR) at 489. The court must have regard to the particular circumstances of the case, including the evidence adduced, the conduct of the parties and the ultimate result: Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700; [1971] 2 All ER 378; [1971] 2 WLR 564; London Welsh Estates Ltd v Phillip [1931] WN 44; Hally v Dennis (1955) 95 CLR 661; 29 ALJR 374; 62 ALR (CN) 7 at 664 (CLR). The discretion should only be exercised for some reason connected with the case: Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 812. This may, however, include conduct antecedent to the litigation insofar as it bears on matters leading up to that litigation: Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242 at [119]; Peters v Peters (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 398; 24 WN (NSW) 87 at 399. The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 is frequently cited as a starting point when considering the type of circumstances in which a Court may deprive a successful party of their costs. At 60, Atkin LJ said: “In the case of a wholly successful defendant, in my opinion the judge must give the defendant his costs unless there is evidence that the defendant (1) brought about the litigation, or (2) has done something connected with the institution or the conduct of the suit calculated to occasion unnecessary litigation and expense, or (3) has done some wrongful act in the course of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains.” In short, the usual rule may displaced where there has been some sort of disentitling conduct on the part of the successful party: Oshlack, above at [40] and [69]; Arian v Nguyen (2001) 33 MVR 37; [2001] NSWCA 5 at [36]; Aussie Ideas Pty Ltd v Tunwind Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 286; GR Vaughan (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Vogt [2006] NSWCA 263; Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 873 at 874 (All ER). The disentitling conduct does not necessarily need to amount to misconduct, and may simply be any conduct “calculated to occasion unnecessary expense”: Keddy v Foxall [1955] VLR 320; [1955] ALR 835 at 323–324 (VLR); Lollis v Loulatzis (No 2) [2008] VSC 35 at [28]. In Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 86 ACSR 119; [2011] NSWCA 256 at [97]–[98], Campbell JA examined when a court may properly depart from the usual order as to costs by citing the non-exhaustive list of examples of a successful plaintiff’s “misconduct” as compiled by McHugh J in Oshlack at [69]. Where, in any particular case, the conduct does not fall within the scope of these examples, a discretion remains as whether it is still appropriate for the court to depart from the usual order as to costs. Although “disentitling conduct” is typically the basis for a successful party to be deprived of their costs the discretion must not be exercised to punish the person against whom the order is made, as the purpose of an order for costs is to indemnify or compensate the person in whose favour it is made and not to punish the person against whom it is made: Ohn v Walton (1995) 36 NSWLR 77; Oshlack at [65], Dr Douglass v Lawton Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 90 at [22]. The test of whether an order for costs should be made against an unsuccessful plaintiff or complainant is therefore not whether he or she had done anything to warrant punishment but whether, in the circumstances, the defendant or respondent should be compensated: Ohn per Gleeson CJ at 79D-F, cited in Allplastics Engineering Pty Ltd v Dornoch Ltd [2006] NSWCA 33 at [34]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

953

UCPR Parts 41-50

The discretion to make “some other order” will be exercised where the “overall justice of the case” warrants some other order: McCusker v Rutter (2010) 7 ASTLR 137; [2010] NSWCA 318. The circumstances in which a court may decline to award a successful party their costs or order an unsuccessful party to pay the costs of the unsuccessful party are non-exhaustive: each case will depend on their own circumstances and what is necessary, in those circumstances, to do justice between the parties.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.1

[r 42.1.60]

It is for the losing party to establish a basis for any departure from the usual rule: Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 1111 at [10]; New South Wales v Stanley [2007] NSWCA 330 at [24]. [r 42.1.62] Circumstances that may justify displacement of the usual rule The court’s discretion to deprive a successful party of their costs has been used in a wide variety of circumstances. Examples include: • where the party’s conduct occasioned unnecessary expense or delay: Dr Douglass v Lawton Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 90 (late amendment of pleadings requiring adjournment; see also Beoco Ltd v Alfa Laval Co Ltd [1995] QB 137; [1994] 3 WLR 1179; [1994] 4 All ER 464 at 154 (QB), but cf Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 1111 at [22]–[27] where there had been earlier notice of the amendment and plaintiff succeeded in substance; and note the provisions of r 42.6; SDW v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (2008) 222 FLR 86; [2008] NSWSC 1249 at [34]–[36] (excessive and indiscriminate photocopying and printing of documents); MacDougall v Curlevski (1996) 40 NSWLR 430 (successful defendant had withheld evidence in an arbitration hearing under the Arbitration (Civil Actions) Act 1983, which evidence was subsequently adduced at a rehearing before a District Court judge causing a different result) (cf Howard v Telstra Corp Ltd [2003] NSWCA 188); Lollis v Loulatzis [2008] VSC 35 at [29] (respondent’s ordered to pay only 80% of successful applicant’s costs as applicant partly responsible for excessive time spent at trial); see also Independent Commission against Corruption v Cripps (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Sully J, 27 August 1996); Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229; 188 ALR 143; [2001] FCA 1865; • where a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages, unless some other right is vindicated by the judgment: Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 171 at [14]; Ng v Chong [2005] NSWSC 385. If the substance of the claim was compensatory damages, and the successful party only recovers nominal damages or trivial damages, the event is lost, and costs may be awarded to the losing party: Oshlack at [70]; NexusMinerals NL v Brutus Constructions Pty Ltd (unreported, Fed Ct of Appeal (FC), 10 September 1997); see also Alltrans Express Ltd v CVA Holdings Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 685; [1984] 1 WLR 394; Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 873; Mid-City Skin Cancer & Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak [2006] NSWSC 1149. This is particularly so when the amount recovered is the result of a formal verdict, but in substance the proceedings wholly failed: Berrico Estate Pty Ltd v Andersen [2003] NSWCA 23 at [35] and [39]; particularly when the proceeds of the verdict do not even go to the plaintiff, such as a refund to Medicare: AMC Caterers Pty Ltd v Stavropoulos [2005] NSWCA 79 at [1]. The matter ultimately depends on the facts of each particular case: Eko Investments Pty Ltd v Austruc Constructions Ltd [2009] NSWSC 371 at [18]–[23]; • where a successful party obtains relief no better than already offered in settlement of the dispute, for instance where the successful party recovers less than an offer of compromise or less than an offer in a Calderbank letter: see the fuller discussion below in the commentary under rr 42.13, 42.14 and 42.15; • where a litigant is an officer of government and has failed to act as a “model litigant”: Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2) (2008) 72 NSWLR 273; [2008] NSWCA 201 (respondent rail authority ordered to pay the successful appellant’s costs, because although it did not actively oppose the orders sought, nor did it assist the Court to arrive at proper and just result, as it had a duty to do); • where the conduct of the successful party caused the litigation: Ex parte Hall (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 374 (FC) (unsuccessful plaintiff had been misled by the terms of the council clerk’s letter regarding the grounds upon which the council had refused approval for erection of housing); Wood v Crawford [No 2] [2010] NSWSC 252 (plaintiff successful in obtaining orders that he was entitled to beneficial ownership of property only awarded 50% of his costs as his conduct, including default in payment of joint mortgage, constituted cause of litigation); see also Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47; Redden v Chapman (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 24; Holden v Cronulla Golf Club Ltd (Young J, 24 June 1986, unreported); Rowland v Portus (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 74; Pratten v Warringah Shire Council (1969) 90 WN (NSW) 134; 954

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

[r 42.1.65]

r 42.1

Examples where the court has not been persuaded to displace the usual rule include: • Heperu Pty Ltd v Morgan Brooks Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 80, where the court considered whether the inexperience of an unrepresented litigant caused a longer trial than would have been the case if he had been legally represented, but found, the self-represented litigant did not protract the trial by reason of unreasonable conduct or “perverse resistance to procedure” and in fact did “his best to assist in the orderly and efficient conduct of the trial”: at [17]; • AMC Caterers Pty Ltd v Stavropoulos [2005] NSWCA 79 at [4]–[6], where the court considered that the mere fact that a defendant strenuously defends a claim does not entitle the plaintiff to the costs of a trial where the plaintiff does not succeed, or does not succeed to any material extent; • Metsikas v Quirk [2010] NSWSC 756 at [7] where Brereton J considered that the mere fact that proceedings are properly and reasonably brought is insufficient reason for depriving an otherwise ultimately successful defendant of its costs; • Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1176 where the court found that the defendant was not disentitled from obtaining costs because of misconduct in relation to transaction subject of proceedings as the “principled approach to dealing with costs requires the Court to focus upon and only upon, the conduct of the actual proceedings that have taken place.” Einstein J at [12]; • Adamson v Liu (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 864 where the court considered that applicant’s impoverished financial situation was not relevant to matter of costs orders; see also Fay v Moramba Services Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 725 at [3]. A litigant’s impecuniosity may be better addressed by allowing time to pay the costs: Tzavellas v Canterbury City Council (1999) 105 LGERA 262 at 265; • Rose v Boxing NSW Inc [2007] NSWSC 256 at [7] where Brereton J found that the status of the losing voluntary association, and the extent of its funds, did not confer on it an immunity from costs orders where it had engaged unsuccessfully in litigation; • Wentworth v Rogers [2003] NSWSC 944 at [39] where Howie J rejected the submission that the losing party should not pay costs because she came close to succeeding – see also Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; 50 A Crim R 287; 7 ALR 45 [1990] HCA 59 per McHugh J at 567. [r 42.1.65]

The application of the usual rule in interlocutory applications

Unless there is an order to the contrary, interlocutory costs are to be paid and dealt with in the same way as the general costs of the proceedings: r 42.7; His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142 at [16]ff. Steps taken that ought to be regarded as reasonably taken in the management of the proceedings towards a hearing should be treated as costs in the proceedings generally: Metlife Insurance Ltd v Visy Board Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 111 at [10]. Nevertheless, as r 42.7 explicitly provides, costs of interlocutory applications are in the discretion of the court and consequently the court, consistent with r 42.1, will take account of the outcome of an interlocutory application, this being the applicable “event”, in order to determine whether it is appropriate to order that costs of the interlocutory application “follow the event” or not. As a matter of practice the “usual rule” that the successful party should receive their costs is disregarded in circumstances where the party had sought a dispensation, indulgence or favour of the Court. Sometimes © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

955

UCPR Parts 41-50

• where the unsuccessful party has brought the litigation in the public interest or the proceedings are in the nature of a test case. As to costs in public interest litigation see [r 42.1.300]; as to costs in a test case where the parties seek to settle a point of law and are unconcerned with the impact of the decision in the particular case, the usual rule will be ousted as a matter of practice: A Goninan & Co Ltd v Gill (2001) 51 NSWLR 441; (2001) 21 NSWCCR 552; [2001] NSWCA 77 at [60]; (appellant company ordered to pay costs of the respondent worker of a successful appeal against a finding by a costs assessor that the company was required to pay costs of $542.50 for assessing the worker’s costs; per Heydon JA at [60]: “The proceedings were … of considerable potential benefit to the company and its insurer, but of no benefit, and much potential detriment, to the worker.”); see also CSR v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1; (2005) 222 ALR 1; (2005) 80 ALJR 59; [2005] HCA 64; • where an order was sought by way of preliminary discovery against an agent to disclose the identity of the principal, it was considered appropriate not to order costs against the losing, but “innocent” party: Bio Transplant Inc v Bell Potter Securities Ltd [2008] NSWSC 694.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.1

[r 42.1.65]

referred to as the “indulgence principle”, such “principle” holds that the party seeking the indulgence should pay the costs of the application irrespective of the outcome, unless the other party had unreasonably opposed the indulgence: Holt v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128; [2000] NSWCA 143 at [121];Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd (in receivership) (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 797 at [6] per Young CJ in Eq. It may now be doubted, however, whether “there is such an overarching principle”: Fordham v Fordyce (2007) 154 LGERA 49; [2007] NSWCA 129 at [50]. See also the discussion in Salvation Army v Rundle [2008] NSWCA 347 at [109]–[111] and [144]–[153]. While the usual rule under r 42.1 is the appropriate starting point the enquiry then becomes whether in the exercise of the court’s discretion, the usual rule should be displaced, or whether some other order is to be preferred, such as, that the costs be the applicant’s costs in the proceedings: Nowlan v Marson Transport Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 116; [2001] NSWCA 346 at [37]. So, for example, where the party seeking the indulgence has been guilty of some relevant delinquency, costs might nevertheless be awarded in favour of the unsuccessful opposing party: Pascoe v Edsome Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 544. The discretion as to costs may be exercised in interlocutory applications where there is misconduct or professional discourtesy. For example, unnecessarily requiring practitioners for cross-examination on affidavits: Business in Focus (Aust) Pty Ltd v Begun Property Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 264 at [19]; or not sending a letter before action or attempting to discuss with the other side the orders sought and trying to reach agreement first: Araf Capital Funding Pty Ltd v Megaloudis [2006] NSWSC 1255 at [10]; McIlraith v Ilkin [2008] NSWCA 11 at [19]. Similarly, the court said in Owners of Strata Plan 60693 v Anneliese Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] NSWSC 210 at [9]: The mere circumstance that a court reserves leave to apply to it on short notice is not a carte blanche to parties, even court-appointed liquidators, to come to Court on that notice without having given reasonable notice to the other party of what relief they are seeking and what material they are relying on to support it. [r 42.1.70]

The application of the usual rule in appeals

Rule 42.1 applies equally to costs of appeals and so the court can make such order for the whole or any part of the costs of an appeal as it, in its discretion, considers fair and just. It is common, when a party succeeds in an appeal on a point not taken below, for that party to receive no costs of the appeal Nassif v Fahd [2007] NSWCA 308; Tagget v Sexton (2009) 255 ALR 522; [2009] NSWCA 91 at [89]. If the circumstances are such that the entire appeal process has been necessitated by the failure to take a point in the court below, it can sometimes be appropriate for the appellant to pay the costs of both parties to the appeal notwithstanding that the appellant has succeeded in the appeal: Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 39 at [123] citing NRMA Insurance Ltd v B & B Shipping & Marine Co Pty Ltd (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 273; 64 WN (NSW) 58 at 282; Conder v Silkbard Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 459 at [37]; Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367; 31 ALJR 158; 64 ALR (CN) 1201; [1957] HCA 28; Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269; 53 ALJR 59; 22 ALR 119; 4 Fam LR 474; [1978] FLC 90-506; [1978] HCA 44 at [15]. Similarly, where an appellant succeeded not because of error on the part of the trial judge, but because of “considerable indulgence” on the part of the appellate court in allowing matters not pleaded to be raised on appeal, the appellant was held not to have succeeded on appeal in the manner contemplated by r 42.1 and the court departed from the usual rule: Hooker v Gilling (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 214 at [31]. Likewise, a successful appellant who does not comply with the rules for preparation of Appeal Books may be deprived of costs: Jeffery v Lintipal Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 138 at [66]–[68]. [r 42.1.100]

The usual rule as it applies in proceedings with multiple parties including Bullock and Sanderson orders

Unless the order specifies otherwise, an order for costs against two or more parties (whether defendants or plaintiffs, third parties or even non-parties) renders each of them jointly and severally liable to pay the costs concerned: Mike Gaffıkin Marine Pty Ltd v Princes Street Marina Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Young J, 15 July 1996); Ryan v South Sydney Junior Rugby League Club Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 660 at 663; Rushcutters Bay Smash Repairs Pty Ltd v H McKenna Netmakers Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 670; Shang v Zhang (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 1355 at [13], [18] per Young CJ in Eq. A consequence of this rule is that a person who discharges a costs liability can seek contribution from the others who are jointly liable for the costs, however the circumstances may be such that the court may, in its discretion, determine that it is more appropriate for it to apportion liability between multiple parties in order to 956

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 42.1.100]

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

r 42.1

do what is just in the circumstances: Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2006] NSWSC 583; Shang v Zhang (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 1355 at [13], [18] per Young CJ in Eq. This is more likely to occur when one of the multiple parties conducts a separate or distinct case that has caused the opponent to incur costs referable only to that separate or distinct case: Stumm v Dixon & Co (1889) 22 QBD 529; Mt Gambier Co-op Milling Society Ltd v Williams [1921] SASR 185; Thiess Watkins White Construction Ltd (in liq) v Witan Nominees (1985) Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 452 at 454. A court may even order one losing party to pay the costs of all parties: Willis v Trotter (1897) LR 18 NSW (Eq) 155 at 158. See also s 35A(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002, which empowers the court to order a defendant in proceedings involving an apportionable claim to pay costs unnecessarily incurred by a plaintiff in circumstances where that defendant fails to bring to the plaintiff’s attention the existence of another potential concurrent wrongdoer.

Where the plaintiff succeeds as against one defendant but not the other, the usual rule will apply such that the plaintiff will pay the successful defendant’s costs and receive costs from the unsuccessful defendant. Where both defendants were jointly represented by the same solicitors and counsel, there is a “rule of thumb” that the successful defendant should recover from the plaintiff a proportionate share of the “common” costs referable to the claim pressed against each defendant as well as any costs referable solely to the plaintiff’s claim against the successful defendant: Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232 [90]–[104]; Russo v Russo (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 449 at [105]. This rule of thumb is convenient for the “ordinary case”, but is not to be automatically applied in every case: King Network Group Pty Ltd v Club of the Clubs Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 204 at [25]–[35]. The application of the usual rule where multiple plaintiffs are represented by the same solicitors and counsel, but not all succeed, has the result that the successful plaintiff may recover his or her costs from the defendant, while the unsuccessful plaintiffs must pay the defendant’s costs as occasioned by their having been joined: Duchman v Oakland Diary Co Ltd [1930] 4 DLR 989 at 992, per Middleton JA of the Ontario Supreme Court, cited with approval by Einstein J in Currabubula at [104] and see Gove v Black [2006] WASC 298. What this means in terms of the actual costs the successful plaintiff is able to recover from the unsuccessful defendant and hence consequently what costs are able to be recovered by the defendant from the unsuccessful plaintiffs, is dependent upon the terms of the solicitor’s retainer with the plaintiff. Unless otherwise stated the “retainer of a solicitor by several plaintiffs is a joint and several retainer and each plaintiff is prima facie liable to the solicitor jointly and severally for all the costs of the action; and for this reason, satisfactory or unsatisfactorily, costs awarded to one plaintiff to secure him, or indemnify him, carry all the general costs.”: Duchman at 992, per Middleton JA. The effect of this is that in circumstances were the majority of the plaintiffs’ costs are “general costs”, that is, they were necessarily incurred for the cases of all the plaintiffs, an order that the defendant pay one of the plaintiff’s costs, but not the others, will nevertheless mean that the defendant is obliged to pay all of the plaintiffs’ jointly incurred costs (assessed as between parties) and may not then seek to recover their reciprocal costs from any unsuccessful plaintiff: see Einstein J’s explanation in Currabubula and Paola v State Bank NSW [2000] NSWSC 232 at [104]; and Russo at [105]. Nevertheless a court must still follow the dictates of justice rather than mechanically apply “rules” such as those expressed in Currabubula: McCausland v Surfing Hardware International Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 590. The primary issue for determination is that of fairness between the parties, having regard to the manner in which the trial or appeal has been conducted: Chen v Chan (2009) VSCA 233 at [10b]. The application of the usual rule and the “rule of thumb” in circumstances where the plaintiff has succeeded against one, but not all of the defendants, can result in a significantly diminished, if not pyric victory for the plaintiff. To address this the courts have exercised their discretion to displace the usual rule by making “Bullock” or “Sanderson” orders. A “Bullock Order” requires the unsuccessful defendant/s to pay the plaintiff by way of reimbursement any costs the plaintiff has to pay the successful defendant/s: Bullock v London General Omnibus Co [1907] 1 KB 264; [1904-7] All ER Rep 44; 76 LJKB 127; 95 LT 905; 23 TLR 62. A “Sanderson Order” is more direct and © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

957

UCPR Parts 41-50

Where there are multiple successful defendants with separate representation, the court will not normally allow more than one set of costs where the interest of the successful defendants is identical and there is no conflict of interest between them. This principle is subject to a number of provisos as discussed in Milillo v Konnecke (2009) 2 ASTLR 235; [2009] NSWCA 109 at [109]–[130], citing Woodward J in Statham v Shephard (No 2) (1974) 23 FLR 244 Woodward J.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.1

[r 42.1.100]

simply requires the unsuccessful defendant/s to pay the costs of the successful defendant/s, leaving the plaintiff out of the process entirely: Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533. The advantages of a Sanderson Order apply particularly in cases of an insolvent unsuccessful defendant. It also has the advantage of eliminating unnecessary administrative and procedural steps: Coombes v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 70 at [42]. Bullock (and Sanderson) Orders should only be made where two pre-conditions are satisfied: first, that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to proceed against the successful defendant, and secondly, that the conduct of the unsuccessful defendant made it fair to impose liability upon it for the costs of the successful defendant: Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215; 60 ALJR 49; 62 ALR 527 at [230]; Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee v Gibson [2000] NSWCA 179 at [128]. The conduct must be more than a denial of liability. It does not need to amount to misconduct, but it must be conduct sufficient to make it fair to make the order: Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 304 at [29], such as creating circumstances of uncertainty as to who is the proper defendant: Dominello v Nominal Defendant (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 257, citing Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Palmer (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 140 at [35]. There is no additional pre-condition to the effect that the causes of action must be substantially connected or interdependent: Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 71 at [16]–[18]; ACQ Pty Ltd v Cook (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 306. Properly understood, the interdependence of claims against two defendants or the need to join both in circumstances where only one may be liable, but the plaintiff is unable to determine which, are examples of circumstances which may demonstrate the reasonableness of the plaintiff joining the successful defendant: Stephens v Giovenco (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 144 at [18]. Examples of the first precondition as to reasonableness on the plaintiff’s part include: Victoria v Horvath (No 2) [2003] VSCA 24 at [9], where both the state and police officers were joined as defendants where there was some doubt as to whether the police officers were acting within the scope of their authority; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 71 where it was said at [19], that it will frequently be reasonable to sue both employer and the third party tortfeasor because of the difficulties in determining the apportionment requirement under s 151Z(2)(c) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. Examples of the second precondition as to the conduct of the unsuccessful defendant that makes it appropriate to exercise the discretion include: Coombes v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 70, where the unsuccessful council failed to concede that it bore responsibility for the roadworks that caused the plaintiff’s accident, rather than the RTA: Roads and Traffıc Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 238 ALR 761; [2007] HCA 42 at [189]–[192] and [297]–[299], where the plaintiff joined the council as a defendant only as a result of the late joinder of the council by the RTA); PricewaterhouseCoopers Legal v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2007] ANZ ConvR 645; [2008] NSW ConvR 56-197; [2007] NSWCA 271 at [179] where an unsuccessful defendant (Casey) relied on the content of an alleged telephone conversation to bring a claim for contribution against Bettaway; PWC, “as a precaution” brought a similar claim against Bettaway in the event that the conversation was proved and was successful in getting an order that the costs it had to pay to Bettaway for this unsuccessful claim, be paid by Casey); Browning v Bitupave Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 81 at [11]–[15] where the plaintiff only joined the council due to information she received from the unsuccessful defendant and in light of the unsuccessful defendant’s cross claim against the council; Sayseng v Kellogg Superannuation Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1009 at [54] per Nicholas J where “the insurer’s conduct in wrongfully denying liability to the trustee under the policy was fons et origo of the proceedings” and consequently the insurer was ordered to pay the unsuccessful defendant trustee’s costs and the plaintiff’s costs. Examples of unsuccessful applications for Bullock and Sanderson Orders include: Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 71 at [22]; Guides Australia Inc v McMartin [2006] NSWCA 20 at [191]–[198]; Chotiputhsilpa v Waterhouse [2005] NSWCA 342 at [52]; Edson v Roads & Traffıc Authority (2006) 65 NSWLR 453; 45 MVR 183; [2006] NSWCA 68 at [157]–[164]; Riz v Perpetual Trustee Australia Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1488; Middleton v Erwin (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 200; Liverpool City Council v Turano (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 176; Ralston v Bell & Smith (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 913 at [40]; Whitbread v Rail Corporation NSW [2011] NSWCA 130 at [263]. [r 42.1.120] The usual rule as it applies to multiple issues The general approach of the court is to order costs in accordance with the outcome of the proceedings as a whole without attempting to differentiate between particular issues on which the party may not have 958

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

r 42.1

succeeded: Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 304 at [38]; Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373; James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 296 at [31]–[36]; Coshott v Barry [2014] NSWSC 238 at [8]; Waters v P C Henderson (Aust) Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal, 6 July 1994, unreported); Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association Inc (1986) ATPR 40-748; [1986] FCA 382. However, the dictates of justice may require that the costs of the proceedings should follow the “verdicts on the issues”, rather than the outcome as a whole: Keith Bray Pty Ltd v Hamburg-Amerikanische [1970] 3 NSWR 226 at 227 per Macfarlan J. A separable issue can relate to “any disputed question of fact or law” before a court on which a party fails, notwithstanding that they are otherwise successful in terms of the ultimate outcome of the matter: James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 296 at [34]; Bostik at [38]; Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 12; Forster v Farquhar [1893] 1 QB 564 at 569; Hughes. Where there is a mixed outcome in proceedings, the question of apportionment is very much a matter of discretion and mathematical precision is illusory. The exercise of the discretion depends upon matters of impression and evaluation: James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) at [36], citing Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261 at 272: Bostik at [38] and see Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 256 at [84]; Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373 at [11]; Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski [2006] NSWSC 626 at [16]; Lewis v Kation Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 480 at [18]ff; Booksan Pty Ltd v Wehbe (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 103; Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 7 at [32]; Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCAFC 107 at [5]; Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261 at 272. Canada Bay Council v F & D Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] NSWCA 57 at [22] and Turkmani v Visvalingham (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 279. Factors which the Court may take into account when determining whether to make orders as to costs so as to reflect the respective success of the parties in relation to the litigated issues include: • where a particular issue or group of issues is clearly dominant or separable: Waters v P C Henderson (Aust) Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal, 6 July 1994, unreported); Bostik at [38]; Cross v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 120 at [13]; Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v McGregor (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 453 at [18]–[20]; Monie v Commonwealth (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 15 at [63]–[66]; Rockdale City Council v Micro Developments Pty Ltd [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-954; [2008] NSWCA 128 at [114]–[116]; Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373 at [6]; Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Mahommed (No 2) (2011) 80 NSWLR 210; (2011) 80 NSWLR 210 at [62]–[63]; • if the matters upon which that an otherwise successful party was unsuccessful took up a significant part of the trial, either by way of evidence or argument: Sabah Yazgi v Permanent Custodians Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 306 at [24]; Bostik at [38]; • if the appellant loses on a separate issue argued on the appeal which has increased the time taken in hearing the appeal, then a special order for costs may be appropriate which deprives the appellant of the costs of that issue: Sydney City Council v Geftlick (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 374 at [27]; Bostik at [38]; • where a party unreasonably pursued a particular issue: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; 72 ALJR 578; 152 ALR 83; [1998] HCA 11 at 122 (CLR); • that it will generally be inappropriate to exclude from a costs award against a plaintiff issues unsuccessfully raised by a defendant, even if those issues are severable, so long as the defendant acted reasonably in raising those issues, but less often the case that a defendant would be ordered to pay the costs of severable issues unsuccessfully raised by an otherwise successful plaintiff, having regard to s 56 of the CPA 2005: Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 171 at [9]–[10]. A party may not only be deprived of its costs, but may also be ordered to pay the costs of the opponent if it loses on an issue, or raising the issue was unreasonable: Forster v Farquhar [1893] 1 QB 564; Rosniak v Government Insurance Offıce (1997) 41 NSWLR 608; 26 MVR 204; [1997] Aust Torts Reports 81-440. Usually, however, a court will only deprive the successful party of the costs relating to an issue on which it lost when that issue was clearly dominant or separable: Monie v Commonwealth (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 15 at © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

959

UCPR Parts 41-50

[r 42.1.120]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.1

[r 42.1.120]

[63]–[66]; Rockdale City Council v Micro Developments Pty Ltd [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-954; [2008] NSWCA 128 at [114]–[116]; Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373 at [6]; Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Mahommed (No 2) (2011) 80 NSWLR 210; (2011) 80 NSWLR 210 at [62]–[63]. Separability of an issue is, however, not of itself sufficient: Hawkesbury District Health Service Ltd v Chaker (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 30 at [14]. The issue must also be “clearly dominant”: Sydney Ferries v Morton (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 238 at [18]. As to when an issue is clearly dominant see Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corp Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 86 ACSR 119; [2011] NSWCA 256 at [107]. Thus a party may be successful in the proceedings generally, but have costs awarded against it on particular issues: Canada Bay Council v F & D Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] NSWCA 57 at [38]; Pacific General Securities Ltd v Soliman & Sons Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 724. The discretion should be exercised with caution: Waterways Authority (NSW) v Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 183. In Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd [1985] ATPR 46,270 costs were awarded against the successful defendants who had unnecessarily prolonged proceedings with “significant and disparate issues on which they were not successful”. In Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373 at [9], the court held that contributory negligence was a separable issue as to which the losing party should not have to pay the otherwise successful party’s costs. It may also be appropriate, where each party has had substantial success, to order that there be no order as to costs: Hogan v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 74 at [40]; Xstrata Qld Ltd v Santos Ltd [2005] QSC 358; AWB Ltd v Cole (No 6) (2006) 235 ALR 307; [2006] FCA 1274. [r 42.1.200] The usual rule as it applies to costs out of a fund The “usual rule” prima facie applies in the usual way in cases involving funds, such as cases involving trusts, deceased estates, insolvent estates and cases under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984, although in a number of instances there are additional or alternate applicable costs provisions (see further below). Thus for instance, a trustee, who in this capacity, successfully prosecutes or defends proceedings, is prima facie, entitled to an order for costs against the losing party and if trust funds were used to incur those costs, the costs order will operate to indemnify the trust fund. Conversely if the trustee unsuccessfully prosecutes or defends a claim, but did so reasonably, for the benefit of the trust and the costs were not improperly incurred, the trustee will be entitled, without order of the court, to be indemnified for his or her costs incurred as well as any he or she is ordered to pay to the successful party, from the trust funds: Miller v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572; 10 ALJR 35; [1936] ALR 301; HCA 13; Hardoon v. Belilios [1901] AC 118 at 123. Nevertheless the existence of a fund typically raises issues as to whether the costs of either or both the successful party and the losing party should be ordered to be paid for out of the fund, if for no other reason as to give certainty as to the entitlement of the parties to receive money from the fund. As a general rule an order that a party be paid their costs out of a fund will be justified if the expenditure resulted in a benefit to the common property represented by the fund and the expenditure has been reasonably incurred: Permanent Trustee Co v Redman (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 353 at 360; McCusker v Rutter (2010) 7 ASTLR 137; [2010] NSWCA 318 at [40]; Chick v Grosfeld (No 4) [2013] NSWSC 509 at [14]. This is reflected in r 42.25 which provides specific direction to the court as to costs of a trustees and mortgagees: see [r 42.25.40]. The position concerning costs in probate suits is succinctly stated in Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Baker [1999] NSWCA 244 at [13] and [14]. See also the discussion in Grynberg v Muller [2002] NSWSC 350 from [32] and Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker (2007) 14 BPR 26,867; [2007] NSWCA 136 at [125]. Subject to two well-recognised, but overlapping exceptions, the basic rule in probate actions is that, ordinarily, costs follow the event, the exceptions being where the testator had been the cause of the litigation: Barker above at [15]; and where the “circumstances led reasonably to an investigation concerning the testator’s will”: Re Estate of Grounds [2005] NSWSC 1311. In those circumstances both parties will be entitled to an order that the costs be paid out of the estate. An example of probate litigation caused by the testator, due to her conduct and habits leading to difficulty in determining capacity is Grynberg v Muller [2002] NSWSC 350 at [49]. As to family provision proceedings, it has been said that such cases “stand apart from cases in which costs follow the event” and that costs in such cases “generally depend on the overall justice of the case” with the 960

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

[r 42.1.260]

r 42.1

effect that it may be appropriate for there to be “no order for costs [against an unsuccessful applicant] if it would have a detrimental effect on the applicant’s financial position” and “there may even be circumstances in which it is appropriate for an unsuccessful party to have his or her costs paid out of the estate.”: per Gauldron J in Singer v Berghouse (1993) 67 ALJR 708; 114 ALR 521 at 522. That reality is acknowledged by s 99 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) which provides the court with a general discretion to order the costs of family provision proceedings under Chapter 3 of the Act, be paid out of the estate or notional estate or both: see Walsh v Walsh (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1281 at [30]–[38].

Parties in family provision proceedings also need to be mindful of para 24 of Practice Note SC Eq 7 – Family Provision, which provides: “Orders may be made capping the costs that may be recovered by a party in circumstances including, but not limited to, cases in which the value of the estate is less than $500,000.” Executors acting honestly and with propriety are entitled to costs not recoverable from another party from the estate, on an indemnity basis: Milillo v Konnecke (2009) 2 ASTLR 235; [2009] NSWCA 109 at [130]; Diver v Neal [2009] 2 ASTLR 89; [2009] NSWCA 54 at [80]. As to cases under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984, see Dunstan v Rickwood (No 2) (2007) 38 Fam LR 491; [2007] NSWCA 266. In such cases the court will be more ready to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event and look to the “overall justice of the case”: Re Sherbourne Estate (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003 at [61]–[66]; see also Moussa v Moussa [2006] NSWSC 509. For an application of these principles, involving a capping order, see Jensen v Ray [2011] NSWCA 247 at [60]ff. The “event” in such cases is not always easy to determine and might be interpreted in a variety of ways in the one case. Where an order for adjustment is made, the costs order to be made will rarely, if ever, depend simply upon which party commenced the proceedings. The real question is, what is the appropriate order for costs, and in most cases that will almost invariably depend upon the exercise of the discretion under r 42.1, according to the facts and circumstances of each case: Baker v Towle (2008) 39 Fam LR 323; [2008] NSWCA 73 at [22]–[25]. There are costs penalties in matters involving the adjustment of interests in property as between de facto partners under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 where the value or amount does not exceed the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court sitting in its general division: see r 42.30, [r 42.30.40]. As for the basis of assessment of costs payable from a fund see r 42.5(a). [r 42.1.260]

The Usual Rule in the Land and Environment Court

Rule 42.1 is an excluded provision in relation to proceedings in the Land and Environment Court in: • Class 1 (environment planning and protection appeals); • Class 2 (local government and miscellaneous appeals and applications); • Class 3 (land tenure, valuation, ratings and compensation matters): r 1.5(2); Sch 1 of the UCPR. Thus while the Land and Environment Court may award costs under CPA s 98, its costs discretion in Class 1, 2 or 3 proceedings is not subject to the usual rule as expressed in r 42.1, that costs follow the event: Dillon v Gosford City Council (2011) 184 LGERA 179; 284 ALR 619; [2011] NSWCA 328. While r 42.1 does apply to Class 4 and Class 8 proceedings: UCPR r 1.5(1) and Sch 1, the Land and Environment Court Rules as to costs prevail over r 42.1 of the UCPR to the extent of any inconsistency between them: CPA s 11 and UCPR r 1.7 and Sch 2; Hume Coal Pty Ltd v Alexander (No 4) [2013] NSWLEC © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

961

UCPR Parts 41-50

Despite a view that family provisions proceedings “stand apart from cases in which costs follow the event” and the specific discretion given in s 99 of the Succession Act 2006, the estate does not automatically bankroll the legal costs of every party who wishes to be heard. An unsuccessful claimant will be ordered to pay the costs of the estate: Moussa v Moussa [2006] NSWSC 509 at [5]; Carey v Robson (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1199 at [17] and [26]; Bowditch v NSW Trustee & Guardian [2012] NSWSC 702 at [34]. Indeed it has been said that “although there can be departure from the usual principle that costs follow the event and that an unsuccessful applicant for a family provision order might not be required to pay costs, or might even have his or her costs out of the estate, that is not the usual order”: Friend v Brien (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 614 per White J at [20]. This needs to be borne in mind by parties who desire to participate in the proceedings but whose interests are already adequately protected. Parties and their legal representatives must take reasonable steps to avoid duplicated or unnecessary legal representation: Milillo v Konnecke (2009) 2 ASTLR 235; [2009] NSWCA 109 at [125]–[128]. See also Ireland v Retallack (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1096.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.1

[r 42.1.260]

106 at [6]. Rule 4.2 of the Land and Environment Court Rules 2007 provides that in Class 4 proceedings the “Court may decide not to make an order for the payment of costs against an unsuccessful applicant in any proceedings if it is satisfied that the proceedings have been brought in the public interest.”: Anderson obh Numbahjing Clan within the Bundjalung Nation v NSW Minister for Planning (No 2) (2008) 163 LGERA 132; [2008] NSWLEC 272. [r 42.1.300]

Other particular circumstances displacing the usual rule

Other situations where the presumption that costs follow the event may be varied include: 1. Public interest: Public interest considerations may influence the discretion: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; 72 ALJR 578; 152 ALR 83; [1998] HCA 11. However, with the passage of the CPA and the UCPR, care must be taken in this area of the law of costs: Hastings Point Progress Assn Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39 at [22]. Proceedings involving public authorities in the discharge of their powers and obligations may sometimes give rise to the displacement of the presumption where issues of public importance are involved: Lyster v Camberwell City Council (1989) 69 LGRA 250; Kent v Cavanagh (1973) 1 ACTR 43; Independent Commission against Corruption v Cripps (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Sully J, 27 August 1996); or there was an element of public benefit in the clarification of the law: Blue Wedges Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage & the Arts (2008) 165 FCR 211; 245 ALR 584; [2008] FCA 8 at [73]; especially if this involves an element of benefit to the winning party, such as certainty for future disputes: Leghaei v Director-General of Security (No 2) [2006] FCA 114. See also Darcy v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 413. However, such public interest considerations are special to the particular circumstances, often the relevant statutory provision, and should not be seen as constituting a general exception to the presumption: Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; 65 ALJR 151; 50 A Crim R 287; 7 ALR 45; Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; 72 ALJR 578; 152 ALR 83; [1998] HCA 11 at 94–95; North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (No 2) [2002] FCA 564. It is not sufficient that the appeal involves an important question of law whose resolution was in the public interest if the appeal was of a private nature involving the pursuit of private commercial interests: Geeveekay Pty Ltd v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria (No 2) [2008] VSC 152 at [6]; Coombes v Registrar of Aboriginal Corps (No 2) [2008] FCA 1078; Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts (No 2) [2009] FCA 466. Other factors that will militate against a departure from the usual outcome identified in r 42.1 are that the defendant is a commercial enterprise, not a public authority; that the question of public interest does not have broad ramifications for the community at large; or that the matter involved the private interests of the members of the plaintiff association: Hastings Point Progress Assn Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39 at [11]. 2. Partnerships: The usual rule in proceedings for the winding-up or dissolution of a partnership is that the costs of the proceedings consequent upon and necessary for the dissolution should be paid out of partnership assets, unless there is a good reason for making some other order: Slim v Kabra [2006] NSWSC 837 at [9]. 3. Contractual agreement: The usual rule may be displaced by contractual agreement: Rail Corp (NSW) v Leduva Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 800 at [18]; Re Solicitor’s Bill of Costs (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132; AGC (Advances) Ltd v West (1984) 5 NSWLR 301; Re Adelphi Hotel (Brighton) Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 498; [1953] 1 WLR 955; Heaps v Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pty Ltd [2000] NSW ConvR 55-945; [2000] NSWSC 542. 4. Civil proceedings to stay a criminal prosecution: Where the proceedings were brought to stay a criminal prosecution, the usual rule that costs follow the event may be displaced in favour of the general rule that costs are not to be awarded for or against the crown in criminal matters: R v Goia (1988) 19 FCR 212; 35 A Crim R 473; 81 ALR 656. Prosecutions for contempt, however, are not criminal proceedings to which the usual rule will apply: Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Sexton [2008] NSWSC 352.

962

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

[r 42.2.50]

42.2

r 42.2

General rule as to assessment of costs

(cf SCR Part 52A, rule 32; DCR Part 39A, rule 10; LCR Part 31A, rule 6)

Unless the court orders otherwise or these rules otherwise provide, costs payable to a person under an order of the court or these rules are to be assessed on the ordinary basis.

RULE 42.2 COMMENTARY Bases of Payment and Assessment of Costs .......................................................................................... [r 42.2.40] The Ordinary Basis ................................................................................................................................... [r 42.2.50]

Bases of Payment and Assessment of Costs

Rule 42.2 concerns the extent to which a party ordered to pay costs to another party must reimburse that party, or in other words, the extent of the receiving party’s indemnity. By using certain terminology, the court can direct the level to which a party is to be indemnified by another party for the costs the first party had to incur in conducting the litigation. That direction, as to the basis upon which the costs to be paid are to be quantified, is known as the basis of payment, and if to be assessed, the basis of assessment. The procedure for assessment of ordered costs post 30 June 2015 is governed by Pt 7 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (LPUL Application Act): s 64. Rule 42.2 provides a general rule, subject to the court’s discretion, that costs are to be assessed on “the ordinary basis”. Pursuant to s 98(1)(c) and r 42.5 the court may order that costs be paid on an “indemnity basis”. While these are the only two bases of payment/assessment referred to in either the CPA (s 98(1)(c)) or the UCPR, courts continue to make orders for costs on other bases, in particular on a “solicitor-client basis” and on a “trustee basis”: see Latham v Hubbard, Re; Estate of Ross [2014] NSWSC 805 per White J at [31] for a compendium of cases in which costs have been awarded since the introduction of the CPA, on a basis other than “ordinary” or “indemnity”. While White J in Latham considered that s 98(1)(c) does not impliedly limit the bases on which the court can order costs to be paid, he also considered (at [33]) that there was, at least in that case, no difference between the trustee basis and the indemnity basis. The basis of payment or assessment is sometimes confused with the type of costs being assessed. There are essentially two types of costs. Costs ordered by a court to be paid by one party to another, or by a non-party, by way of indemnity or partial indemnity towards the expense of litigation, are known as “party-party costs”, “party and party costs”, or, under the LPUL Application Act, “ordered costs”: see definition in s 63 of that Act. “Practitioner-client costs”, also known as “solicitor-client costs”, are the other type of costs, being those costs which a client pays to his or her legal practitioner (or which a third-party payer may pay) for the legal services that the practitioner provides. Unfortunately until the introduction of the CPA the various courts’ rules described the bases upon which the quantum of party/party costs, or “ordered costs”, could be determined using terminology that echoed the type of costs, eg “party/party basis” (referred to in the now repealed SCR Pt 52A) and “solicitor/client basis” (referred to in the now repealed DCR Pt 39A r 25(4)). The absence of statutory definitions for these terms is problematical to their continued use as most cases that shed light upon their meanings have their foundations in repealed or otherwise not directly applicable, statutory provisions. [r 42.2.50] The Ordinary Basis A costs assessor assessing costs on the “ordinary basis” pursuant to an order made by a court on or after 1 July 2015 is to determine what is a “fair and reasonable” amount of costs for the work concerned and may have regard to the factors in ss 172(1) and 172(2) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (LPUL) (as if that section also applies to ordered costs and so applies with any necessary modifications): s 3 of the CPA, Division 3 of Part 7 of the LPUL Application Act and s 76 of that Act. Sections 172(1) and 172(2) of the LPUL provide: (1) A law practice must, in charging legal costs, charge costs that are no more than fair and reasonable in all the circumstances and that in particular are– (a) proportionately and reasonably incurred; and (b) proportionate and reasonable in amount. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

963

UCPR Parts 41-50

[r 42.2.40]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.2

[r 42.2.50]

(2) In considering whether legal costs satisfy subsection (1), regard must be had to whether the legal costs reasonably reflect– (a) the level of skill, experience, specialisation and seniority of the lawyers concerned; and (b) the level of complexity, novelty or difficulty of the issues involved, and the extent to which the matter involved a matter of public interest; and (c) the labour and responsibility involved; and (d) the circumstances in acting on the matter, including (for example) any or all of the following– (i) the urgency of the matter; (ii) the time spent on the matter; (iii) the time when business was transacted in the matter; (iv) the place where business was transacted in the matter; (v) the number and importance of any documents involved; and (e) the quality of the work done; and (f) the retainer and the instructions (express or implied) given in the matter. As to orders for costs made prior to 1 July 2015, “ordinary basis” means the basis of assessing costs set out in ss 364(1) and 364(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2004: s 3 of the CPA prior to amendment by the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Legislation Amendment Act 2015. Sections 364(1) and 364(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 provided: (1) In conducting an assessment of legal costs payable as a result of an order made by a court or tribunal, the costs assessor must consider: (a) whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the work to which the costs relate, and (b) whether or not the work was carried out in a reasonable manner, and (c) what is a fair and reasonable amount of costs for the work concerned. (2) In considering what is a fair and reasonable amount of legal costs, a costs assessor may have regard to any or all of the following matters: (a) the skill, labour and responsibility displayed on the part of the Australian legal practitioner or Australian-registered foreign lawyer responsible for the matter, (b) the complexity, novelty or difficulty of the matter, (c) the quality of the work done and whether the level of expertise was appropriate to the nature of the work done, (d) the place where and circumstances in which the legal services were provided, (e) the time within which the work was required to be done, (f) the outcome of the matter. The “ordinary basis” is regarded as the least generous basis of assessment. Prior to the introduction of the CPA the least generous basis of assessment was referred to as the “party and party basis”. However, since the Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 the default basis for the assessment of costs has been founded on the more liberal concept of “fair and reasonable” costs rather than “necessary and proper” costs, as was applied under the traditional “party and party basis” and, at least in theory, there should not be a significant difference between costs ordered to be paid on the ordinary basis and costs ordered to be paid on an indemnity basis: Bouras v Grandelis (2005) 65 NSWLR 214; [2005] NSWCA 463 at [127]; Kalls Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baloglow [2006] NSWSC 1021 at [4]. This change was expressly made in order to increase the amount of costs recoverable by a successful party and reduce the gap between practitioner and clients costs and party and party costs: Latham at [26].

964

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

[r 42.4.100]

r 42.4

Editor’s note: Rule 42.3 is repealed and has not been reproduced.

42.4 Power to order maximum costs (cf SCR Part 52A, rule 35A)

(2) A maximum amount specified in an order under subrule (1) may not include an amount that a party is ordered to pay because the party: (a) has failed to comply with an order or with any of these rules, or (b) has sought leave to amend its pleadings or particulars, or (c) has sought an extension of time for complying with an order or with any of these rules, or (d) has otherwise caused another party to incur costs that were not necessary for the just, quick and cheap: (i) progress of the proceedings to trial or hearing, or (ii) trial or hearing of the proceedings. (3) An order under subrule (1) may include such directions as the court considers necessary to effect the just, quick and cheap: (a) progress of the proceedings to trial or hearing, or (b) trial or hearing of the proceedings. (4) If, in the court’s opinion, there are special reasons, and it is in the interests of justice to do so, the court may vary the specification of maximum recoverable costs ordered under subrule (1).

RULE 42.4 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 42.4.40] Capping orders ....................................................................................................................................... [r 42.4.100] Interplay of r 42.4 with Practice Notes ................................................................................................... [r 42.4.120]

[r 42.4.40]

Operation

Rule 42.4 confirms the power of the court, of its own motion or on the application of a party, to set an upper limit on the amount recoverable. However, the maximum amount specified may not include costs arising from the circumstances specified in subr (2). [r 42.4.100]

Capping orders

The power given to the court by r 42.2 to make “capping orders” is “designed to put into the Court’s hands a brake on intemperate and disproportionately expensive conduct of proceedings”: Re Sherbourne Estate (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003 per Palmer J at [29] and complements the directives provided in ss 56 and 60 of the CPA for the just, quick, cheap resolution of the real issues in proceedings in such a way that the cost to the parties is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter of the dispute: rE Sherborne Estate (No 2) at [29]–[30]. Rule 42.4 provides the court with a similar power to that provided under CPA s 98(4)(c) which enables the court to order a specified gross sum for costs, however it has been said the remedy under r 42.4 is “prophylactic” and cannot be used as a cure for excessive expenditure at the time of making a final costs order at the conclusion of the proceedings: Sherborne Estate (No 2) at [31]; Hammond v Hammond [2012] NSWSC 1326 at [26]; see also Nudd v Mannix [2009] NSWCA 327 at [27]. Other powers of the court, specifically s 98(4)(c) must be engaged for that purpose., although it has been said that such a case would be exceptional because the court would have to make an informed decision to assess the reasonableness of the costs incurred © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

965

UCPR Parts 41-50

(1) The court may by order, of its own motion or on the application of a party, specify the maximum costs that may be recovered by one party from another.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.5

[r 42.4.100]

with the attendant higher risk of greater cost and delay than would attend an assessment of costs by a costs assessor in accordance with the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW): Sherborne Estate (No 2) at [42] and [44]; Kay v Archbold [2008] NSWSC 254 at [20]. A capping order, under r 42.4 is anticipatory (although see Nudd v Mannix [2009] NSWCA 327 at [23]–[27]) and may be made at the outset of proceedings or at an interlocutory stage as a case management tool in conjunction with ss 56 and 60 CPA to limit the costs that may be recovered following the determination of the proceedings: Sherborne Estate (No 2) at [26] and [31]; Wende v Horwath (NSW) Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 550 at [105]. A capping order will readily be made in cases involving the division of a fund, such as the adjustment of interests of de facto partners in property under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 or in respect of deceased estates under the Family Provision Act 1982, especially where the fund is small in proportion to the legal costs incurred: eg Blanchfield v Johnston [2007] NSWSC 143 at [61]–[62]; Dinnen v Terrill [2007] NSWSC 1405 at [37]; Dalton v Paull (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 803. Capping orders may also be appropriate in cases involving the public interest: see Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc (2010) 176 LGERA 424; [2010] NSWCA 263 at [218] where the Court of Appeal upheld an order that the maximum costs that may be recovered by one party from another in these proceedings was $20,000 on the basis that a person’s capacity to bring proceedings to prevent a breach or threatened breach of environmental protection laws would be seriously undermined if some protection against large costs bills was not available. The concept of capping has received considerable attention in England where capping orders are being made on a regular basis. For a discussion of the English experience, see the paper by Justice Hamilton Containment of Costs: Litigation and Arbitration (1 June 2007) pp 7–9. This is also on the Supreme Court website (http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_index choose the link to Speeches and papers by Judges, then choose Hamilton J). [r 42.4.120]

Interplay of r 42.4 with Practice Notes

Rule 42.4 is echoed by cl 24 of Practice Note SC Eq 7 which provides that orders be made capping the costs that may be recovered by a party in circumstances including, but not limited to, cases in which the value of the estate is less than $500,000. Similarly Local Court Practice Note Civ 1, Part G provides that, where the amount of the claim is $20,000 or less, unless the court otherwise orders, certain orders capping costs to a fixed amount depending upon the circumstances, will be taken to have been made when the defence is filed unless a procedure is followed up to two weeks prior to the first review date, to vary the maximum costs order. Such practice note does not however fetter the court’s discretion to otherwise order: Ada Evans Chambers Pty Ltd v Santisi [2014] NSWSC 538. 42.5

Indemnity costs

(cf SCR Part 52A, rule 37)

If the court determines that costs are to be paid on an indemnity basis: (a) in the case of costs payable out of property held or controlled by a person who is a party to the proceedings: (i) in the capacity of trustee, executor, administrator or legal representative of a deceased estate, or (ii) in any other fiduciary capacity, all costs (other than those that have been incurred in breach of the person’s duty in that capacity) are to be allowed, and (b) in any other case, all costs (other than those that appear to have been unreasonably incurred or appear to be of an unreasonable amount) are to be allowed.

966

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

[r 42.5.40]

r 42.5

RULE 42.5 COMMENTARY Indemnity basis costs ............................................................................................................................... [r 42.5.30] Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 42.5.40]

[r 42.5.30]

Indemnity basis costs

The power of the court to make an order that costs be awarded on the indemnity basis is found in s 98(1)(c); r 42.5 provides the definition of “indemnity basis costs”. If the court determines that costs are to be paid on an indemnity basis and costs are to be paid out of property held or controlled by a person who is a party to the proceedings, in the capacity of trustee, executor, administrator or legal representative of a deceased estate, or in any other fiduciary capacity, all costs (other than those that have been incurred in breach of the person’s duty in that capacity) are to be allowed: r 42.5(a). In any other case, all costs (other than those that appear to have been unreasonably incurred or appear to be of an unreasonable amount) are to be allowed: r 42.5(b). This reflects the general law concept of indemnity costs: see for instance EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59; [1982] 2 All ER 980; [1982] 3 WLR 245 at 71 (Ch). Section 75(2) of the LPUL Application Act provides that if a court or tribunal has ordered that costs are to be assessed on an indemnity basis, the costs assessor must assess the costs on that basis, having regard to any relevant rules of the court or tribunal and any relevant regulations: see also s 75(1). Consequently it appears that the criteria for assessment of indemnity basis costs is not governed by the criteria set out in s 76 of the LPUL Application Act,which provides that in conducting an assessment of “ordered costs”, the costs assessor must determine what is a fair and reasonable amount of costs for the work concerned. Given the similarity in terminology found in s 76 of the LPUL Application Act and r 42.5(b) there should not be a significant difference, at least in theory, between costs ordered to be paid on the ordinary basis and costs ordered to be paid on an indemnity basis: Bouras v Grandelis (2005) 65 NSWLR 214; [2005] NSWCA 463 at [127]; Kalls Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baloglow [2006] NSWSC 1021 at [4]. The essential distinction between indemnity basis costs and ordinary basis costs involves questions of onus of proof: Friend v Brien (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 614 at [27]. An assessor assessing costs on an indemnity basis is directed by r 42.5(b) to allow all costs the subject of the application, unless the paying party can establish that the cost was unreasonably incurred or of an unreasonable amount: National Australia Bank Ltd v Chen-Conway (2008) 2 BFRA 637; (2008) 2 BFRA 637 at [12]; Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd (2011) 12 DCLR (NSW) 304; [2011] NSWDC 55 at [54]–[58]. In other words there is no onus upon the claiming party, when costs are to be assessed on an indemnity basis, to prove that an item of work was actually undertaken, that it was reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount, but rather the onus is upon the paying party to show that it was not. It may be observed that this approach is consistent with the historical approach taken to the assessment of indemnity basis costs. Megarry VC in EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1982] 2 All ER 980 at 989 considered that the receiving party with the benefit of an order for indemnity basis costs should get the benefit of any doubt in the mind of the taxing master: see also Bouras v Grandelis (2005) 65 NSWLR 214; [2005] NSWCA 463; per Santow JA at [117]–[114]. Whether costs appear to be of an unreasonable amount or to have been unreasonably incurred are questions of fact to be found by the cost assessor in each case: Porter v John Fairfax Publications [2001] NSWSC 680 at [29] per O’Keefe J; Madden v New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corp [1999] NSWSC 196. [r 42.5.40]

Operation

The court may order that costs be awarded on an indemnity basis: CPA s 98(1)(c). While this section makes plain that courts the subject of the CPA have the power to order indemnity basis costs, in the absence of any limitation expressed, or implied, into a particular provision enabling a court or tribunal to award costs, a court or tribunal is likely to be regarded as having the power to award costs on other than the ordinary basis: Walton © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

967

UCPR Parts 41-50

Rule 42.5, like r 42.2, is concerned with the extent to which a party ordered to pay costs to another party must reimburse that party, or in other words, the extent of the receiving party’s indemnity. By using certain terminology, the court can direct the level to which a party is to be indemnified by another party for the costs the first party had to incur in conducting the litigation. That direction, as to the basis upon which the costs to be paid are to be quantified, is known as the basis of payment, and if to be assessed, the basis of assessment. The procedure for assessment of costs post 30 June 2015 is governed by Pt 7 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (LPUL Application Act): s 64 of that Act.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.5

[r 42.5.40]

v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440 at 461; Greenhouse v Heatherington (1978) 122 Sol Jo 47; Milosevic v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1993) 31 NSWLR 323; Andrew v Barnes (1888) 39 Ch D 133 at 138. While r 42.5 provides for different measures for the assessment/payment of costs on an indemnity basis depending upon whether the costs are to be paid out of fund held or controlled by a party to the proceeding or not, the rule does not itself provide that costs payable from a fund are to be paid on an indemnity basis. The making of an indemnity costs order requires an exercise of discretion. The discretion, although absolute, must be exercised judicially: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; 72 ALJR 578; 152 ALR 83; [1998] HCA 11 at 81 [22] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ; Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 at 400–401 per Woodward J; Mead v Watson (2005) 23 ACLC 718; [2005] NSWCA 133 at [8]; Chaina v Alvaro Homes Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 353 at [113]; and accordingly sufficient reasons should be given: Whiterod v Taylor (2006) FLC 93-266; [2006] FamCA 433. There must be some special or unusual feature or circumstance in the case justifying such an award: Mead v Watson at [8]; Harrison v Schipp [2001] NSWCA 13 at [139]; Chen v Karandonis [2002] NSWCA 412 at [110]; Olsen v Second East Auction Holdings Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1840 at [19]; Rosniak v Government Insurance Offıce (1997) 41 NSWLR 608; 26 MVR 204; [1997] Aust Torts Reports 81-440 at 616 (NSWLR); Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225; 118 ALR 248 at 233–234. Such special or unusual circumstance must concern the conduct of a party against whom it is made that relates to the proceedings themselves, that is, some “relevant delinquency” by the party as a litigant: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; 72 ALJR 578; 152 ALR 83; [1998] HCA 11; Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1; [1991] ASC 56-039 at 34 (NSWLR); Westpac Banking Corp v Ollis [2007] NSWSC 1008 at [6]; Mead v Watson at [9]. Relevant delinquency, however, does not mean moral delinquency or some ethical shortcoming in the antecedent facts which have given rise to the litigation, but delinquency bearing a relevant relation to the conduct of the case: White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) v G B White [2004] NSWSC 303 at [11], cited in Ingot Capital Investment v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets (No 7) [2008] NSWSC 199 at [24]; NMFM Property Pty Limited v Citibank Limited (No 11) (2001) 109 FCR 77; [2001] FCA 480 at 92 (FCR), cited in Mead v Watson at [9]. See also Liverpool City Council v Estephan [2009] NSWCA 161 at [95]. Relevant delinquency can include the unreasonable rejection of an offer of settlement (reflected in the presumption in favour of an order of indemnity costs where an offer of compromise in accordance with r 20.26 has been made by one party, but not accepted by the other and where the offeror has bettered the offer in the litigation: see Pt 42 Div 3), as well as more obvious “blameworthy” conduct such as the bringing of a case without chances of success, abuse of process and unreasonable conduct in the proceedings such as fraud or misleading the court. See discussion below as to the open categories of cases in which an order for indemnity costs may be made. There is, however, an anomalous class of case that is not dependent on the concept of disapproval or “relevant delinquency”: Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 568; [1991] ATPR 41-114. This class of case relates to successful public interest cases or test cases: Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1; [1991] ASC 56-039. The philosophy behind the making of indemnity costs orders in such cases is that it would not be in the public interest for the successful litigant to be heavily out of pocket in consequence of the public-spirited action that had been taken: Tobacco Institute at 571–2 per Morling J. Not all public interest cases will qualify for indemnity costs, such as where the claim was not brought in an “unselfish pursuit of public interest”, but for personal gain: NSW Medical Defence Union Ltd v Crawford (1993) 31 NSWLR 469; 11 ACSR 406; 11 ACLC 1114; 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-192. An order for indemnity basis costs may also arise pursuant to a contractual entitlement: National Australia Bank Ltd v Chen-Conway (2008) 2 BFRA 637; (2008) 2 BFRA 637 at [3]; Rail Corp NSW v Leduva Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 800 at [18]; Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray [2005] NSWCA 87; Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 1139 at [22], [39]; Westpac Banking Corporation v Mason [2011] NSWSC 1241 at [38]; Secure Funding Pty Limited v StarkSecure Funding Pty Limited v Conway [2013] NSWSC 1536; Re Solicitor’s Bill of Costs; Re Shanahan (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132; AGC (Advances) Ltd v West (1984) 5 NSWLR 301; Re Adelphi Hotel (Brighton) Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 498; [1953] 1 WLR 955; Heaps v Longman [2000] NSW ConvR 55-945; [2000] NSWSC 542; Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (No 2) [1993] Ch 171 at 194. 968

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 42.5.40]

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

r 42.5

The concept of disapproval for blameworthy conduct has found expression in many cases: Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green [2004] NSWCA 341 at [48]; Raja v Rubin [2000] Ch 274; [1999] 3 All ER 73; [1999] 3 WLR 606 at 289 (Ch); Medical Defence Union Ltd (NSW) v Crawford (1993) 31 NSWLR 469; 11 ACSR 406 at 428 (ACSR), despite the fact that an award of indemnity costs is intended to be compensatory and not punitive . An indemnity costs order is designed to compensate the successful party for the costs they should not have been required to incur, rather than to punish the unsuccessful party or deter other litigants from commencing cases that might be attended to by uncertainty: Hamod v New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCA 424; [2002] FCAFC 97 at [20]. Nevertheless, as Giles JA noted in Liverpool City Council v Estephan [2009] NSWCA 161 at [91] the reimbursement of costs at the higher level can be seen as punishment. Still, as the function of an indemnity costs order is compensatory such an order should be limited to the costs incurred by reason of the impugned conduct: Liverpool City Council v Estephan at [95]. An award of indemnity costs will not be made because the case involves a high degree of difficulty, complexity or novelty: Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWSC 126 at [23]; Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128; 137 ALR 579 at 141, (although it may affect the type of costs allowed on assessment) nor is impecuniosity a factor: Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1341 at [58]–[59]; Marks v GIO at 142. Similarly the fact that the successful party was supported by a litigation funder is irrelevant to the exercise of the discretion: Kenneally v Pouras (2007) 250 LSJS 248; [2007] SASC 303 at [39]. While it is suggested that a formal warning of an intention to claim indemnity costs will make the awarding of indemnity costs more likely: Huntsman Chemical Co Aust Ltd v International Pools Aust Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242; 125 FLR 151; [1995] ATPR 41-403, it is not necessarily a prerequisite: Mandarin International Developments Pty Ltd v Growthcorp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1998) 143 FLR 408 at 423–4 per Santow J (SC(NSW)); Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd No 7 (2008) 65 ACSR 324; [2008] NSWSC 199 at [78]; Horseshoe Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Murray Smith t/as South Coast Tile & Slate Co (unreported, NSW Ct of Appeal, 7 November 1995). It has also been emphasised that the categories of cases justifying an award of indemnity costs are not closed: Chaina at [113]; PCRZ Investments Pty Ltd v National Golf Holdings Ltd [2002] VSCA 24 at [35]–[36]; Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd (unreported, Fed Ct of Appeal, French J, 3 May 1991); Singleton v Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 103; Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225; 118 ALR 248 at 233–234 (FCR), 257 (ALR). Also, the mere existence of facts and circumstances capable of warranting an order for costs calculated on the indemnity basis does not mean that the court is obliged to make such an order, as costs, ultimately, remain in the discretion of the court: Bolger v McDermott (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1330 at [45]. Nevertheless it is convenient, to group the cases into some arbitrary categories, but it should be noted that the cases often overlap or fit into one or more of these categories: 1. Hopeless cases: Indemnity costs may be awarded in cases that are commenced or continued where there is no chance of success, or more specifically, “where the applicant, properly advised, should have known that he had no chance of success”. The case most frequently cited for this principle is Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 at 400–401, however there are innumerable affirmations and restatements: see for instance Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd (No 2) (2009) 15 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-795; [2009] NSWCA 12 at [4]; Harrison v Schipp [2001] NSWCA 13 at [138]; © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

969

UCPR Parts 41-50

It is generally accepted that a court will not lightly depart from the awarding of costs on the ordinary basis: Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 358 at 370; Huntsman Chemical Co Aust Ltd v International Pools Aust Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242; 125 FLR 151; [1995] ATPR 41-403 at 247 and 250 and caution must be exercised when departing from making costs orders on the usual basis: Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green [2004] NSWCA 341; Ng v Chong [2005] NSWSC 385 at [13]; Olsen v Second East Auction Holdings Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1840 at [19]. In recent years however, there has been a tendency to grant indemnity costs orders more readily than was the case in the past. It has been suggested this may be seen as an element of a broader policy directed to limiting the litigation of cases where there are no reasonable prospects of success and encouraging the settling of cases that should be settled: Chaina at [111] and see Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128; 137 ALR 579 at 132. Nevertheless the standard to be applied in awarding indemnity costs is not to be diminished to the extent that an unsuccessful party will be at risk of an order for costs assessed on an indemnity basis, absent some blameworthy conduct on its part: Chaina at [113].

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.5

[r 42.5.40]

Commonwealth of Australia v Ryan (No 2) [2002] NSWCA 386 at [6]; Chen v Karandonis [2002] NSWCA 412 at [110]. In such cases there is said to be a presumption that the action was commenced or continued for some ulterior motive, or because of some willful disregard of the known facts or the clearly established law, however establishing these matters is not itself a requirement to enliven the discretion. Examples of a hopeless case include where a limitation period applies: Hillebrand v Penrith Council [2000] NSWSC 1058, or the matters raised have been decided previously: Bayne v Blake (No 3) (1909) 9 CLR 366; [1909] HCA 60. Other circumstances include a claim that is “without substance”, “groundless”, “fanciful or hopeless” or so weak as to be futile. This might be the result of “wilful disregard of the known facts or the clearly established law”: O’Keefe v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1559; Frippery Pty Ltd v Booth [2008] FCA 514. The principle applies equally to untenable appeals: Bon Appetit Family Restaurant Pty Ltd v Mongey [2009] NSWCA 14 at [2]–[3]. The order will more readily be made where a letter before action from the defendant is sent pointing out the deficiencies of the case and putting the plaintiff on notice of an intention to apply for indemnity costs: McIlraith v Ilkin [2008] NSWCA 11 at [19]. See also: Bilous v Mudaliar (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 239 at [11]; Business Acquisitions Australia Pty Ltd v Renshall [2006] NSWSC 1399 at [55]; Cirillo v Consolidated Press Property Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 179; Huntsman Chemical Co Aust Ltd v International Pools Aust Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242; 125 FLR 151; [1995] ATPR 41-403; CGI Information Systems & Management Consultants Pty Ltd v APRA Consulting Pty Ltd (2003) 47 ACSR 100; [2003] NSWSC 728; J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) (No 2) (1993) 46 IR 301 at 303; Blueseas Investments Pty Ltd v Mitchell (1999) 151 FLR 298; 25 Fam LR 65; [1999] FLC 92-856; [1999] FamCA 745; Dooney v Henry (2000) 74 ALJR 1289; 174 ALR 41; 45 ATR 113; 35 ACSR 155; [2000] HCA 44 at 1296 (ALJR); Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 47 ATR 1; 179 ALR 406; [2001] HCA 26 at 415. However, mere weakness of a case will not be sufficient to warrant an exercise of the discretion to award indemnity costs: see Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534. As to the dangers of assessing “hopelessness” in the “bright light of hindsight”, see Grynberg v Muller [2002] NSWSC 350 at [48]. 2. Abuse of process: Costs may be awarded on an indemnity basis where the proceedings amount to an abuse of process: Baillieu Knight Frank (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ted Manny Real Estate Pty Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 359; 10 ACSR 537 at 362 (NSWLR), such as where they are commenced other than in good faith, or for an ulterior or collateral purpose: Hawke v Limbo (unreported, NT Sup Ct, Kearney J, 9 August 1990), including commencing defamation proceedings for the ulterior purpose of investigating the conduct of a royal commission: Packer v Meagher [1984] 3 NSWLR 486 at 500; or presenting a winding up petition against a solvent company to put pressure on it to pay money in respect of a bona fide dispute: Re a Company (No 0012209 of 1991) [1992] 2 All ER 797; [1992] 1 WLR 351; Polaroid Australia Pty Ltd v Minicomp Pty Ltd (1997) 16 ACLC 529. See also McAuliffe v Commonwealth [2007] NSWSC 178; Re SCA Properties Pty (in liq) (1999) 17 ACLC 1611; [1999] QSC 180; McKewins Hairdressing & Beauty Supplies Pty Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 74 ALJR 1000; 171 ALR 335; [2000] HCA 27; Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 at 401. 3. Unreasonable conduct in the proceedings: Inordinate delay and unnecessarily prolonging the proceedings may justify an award of indemnity costs: Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1102 at [26]; Qantas Airways Ltd v Dillingham Corp (unreported, SCNSW, Rogers J, 14 May 1987): Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8) [2006] FCA 1537 at [31]; although prolonging the proceedings without more is not usually sufficient: Hurstville Municipal Council v Connor (1991) 24 NSWLR 724 at 735. Inordinate delay may suffice: Re Wilcox; Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR 151; 141 ALR 727; [1997] ATPR 41-557 at 153–154 (FCR); or delay occasioned by the making of unjustified allegations: Arian v Nguyen (2001) 33 MVR 37; [2001] NSWCA 5 at [37]; Degmam Pty Ltd (in liq) v Wright (No 2) [1983] 2 NSWLR 354 at 358; Melouhowee Pty Ltd v Steenbohm (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Waddell J, 6 February 1992) at 3. Other behaviour held to be sufficiently delinquent 970

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

[r 42.5.40]

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

r 42.5

Other conduct sounding in an award of indemnity costs includes deliberate or high handed conduct: Rouse v Shepherd (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 277 and other aggressive or uncooperative behaviour leading to delay, inconvenience and needless cost: Preston v Preston [1982] Fam 17; [1981] 3 WLR 619; [1982] 1 All ER 41 at 58–59 (All ER); Unioil International Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (No 2) (1997) 18 WAR 190; otherwise wasting the court’s time, such as with arguments which have no prospect of success: Buckingham Gate International Pty Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 411; [2000] NSWSC 946; Asia Strategic Investment Alliances Pty Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Ltd [1999] NSWSC 601 at [76]–[77], or behaviour which causes unnecessary anxiety, trouble or expense, such as the failure to adhere to proper procedure: FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Burns (1996) 9 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-384, the disregard of court orders: O’Keefe v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1559 at [35], conducting “trolley load litigation” by producing, at short notice, vast quantities of documents that cannot be absorbed on the run: Michael Wilson and Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2009] NSWSC 669 at [14]–[21], the refusal to withdraw an improper caveat on the title of land in an attempt to coerce payment of a secured loan: Martin v Carlisle [2008] NSWSC 1276, or where the moving party fails to turn up on a motion. An ex parte order obtained against an innocent third party may be grounds for an order for indemnity costs: Project Development Co Ltd SA v KMK Securities Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 1470; [1983] 1 All ER 465 at 1472; Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Ireland (1994) 12 WAR 485 at 485; Westpac Banking Corp v Hilliard [2001] VSC 198. Contempt cases will not automatically attract indemnity costs, and it remains a matter of discretion in individual cases: McIntyre v Perkes (1988) 15 NSWLR 417; Evenco Pty Ltd v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters etc Union of Employees (Qld) [1999] QSC 53. An award may be more likely were no other monetary penalty is imposed: McIntrye at 427; Pattison v Bell [2007] FCA 137 at [50]. The impugned conduct must be connected with the litigation itself, as opposed to the subject matter of the litigation, or causative of the litigation: Mead v Watson (2005) 23 ACLC 718; [2005] NSWCA 133 at [9]–[10], or done contemporaneously and influenced by the existence of the proceedings: Masha Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] VSC 56 at [15]–[18] and [24]. But see Residents Against Improper Development Inc v Chase Property Investments Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 623; Scott v O’Riley [2007] NSWSC 192. 4. Fraud and deception:: Unfounded allegations of fraud or improper conduct may justify an award of indemnity costs: Parisi v Nigro [2006] NSWCA 121; Re Bisyk (No 2) (1980) 32 OR (2d) 281 at 287; Maule v Liporoni (No 2) (2002) 122 LGERA 216; [2002] NSWLEC 140 at 22; Jeans v Bruce [2004] NSWSC 758; Ingot Capital Investment v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets (No 7) [2008] NSWSC 199; as will deceptive behaviour calculated to harm the other party: Ecrosteel Pty Ltd v Perfor Printing Pty Ltd (1996) 37 IPR 22; [1997] AIPC 91-314, maintaining a defence which is known to be false: Westpac Banking Corp v Ollis [2007] NSWSC 1008 at [7] and [11], or where the rights and privileges of the other party are flouted or abused: Ugly Tribe Co Pty Ltd v Sikola [2001] VSC 189. Other examples of sufficient dishonest conduct are breach of fiduciary duty, or fabricated evidence: Barrett Property Group Ltd v Metricon Homes Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1823; Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 at 538; Ronald v Harper (1913) 19 ALR 263; [1913] VLR 311. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

971

UCPR Parts 41-50

includes; knowingly maintaining a false defence: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Saleh [2007] NSWSC 990; maintaining a cross claim on a basis that was inconsistent with the defence to the main claim: International Advisor Systems Pty Ltd v XYYX Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 312; failings in relation to the discovery of documents: Masha Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] VSC 56 at [17]–[21]; failing to brief expert witnesses with true and complete relevant history: Mabbett v Watson Wyatt Superannuation Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 460; unreasonable delay in seeking the vacation of a trial date: Crump v Equine Nutrition Systems Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1080 at [21]–24]; or making multitudinous amendments: Qantas Airways Ltd v Dillingham Corp (unreported, SCNSW, Rogers J, 14 May 1987). See also Sirtes v Pryer [2006] NSWSC 438; LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 74; Sydney City Council v Geftlick [2006] NSWCA 280; Huntsman Chemical Co Aust Ltd v International Pools Aust Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242; 125 FLR 151; [1995] ATPR 41-403.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.6

[r 42.5.40]

5. Offers of compromise and Calderbank letters: The discretion to award costs on an indemnity basis is most often exercised in circumstances relating to offers of compromise: see rr 42.14(2)(b) and 42.15(2)(b) and Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93; [1975] 3 All ER 333; [1975] 3 WLR 586 Offers of compromise and Calderbank letters are discussed more fully below under rr 42.13, 42.14 and 42.15. 42.6

Amendment of pleading etc without leave

(cf SCR Part 52A, rule 15)

Unless the court orders otherwise, a party that amends a pleading or summons without leave must, after the conclusion of the proceedings, pay the costs of and occasioned by the amendment.

RULE 42.6 COMMENTARY [r 42.6.40]

Operation

Rule 42.6 creates a presumption that a party who amends a pleading or summons without leave must pay any costs occasioned by the amendment: see r 19.1. This is consistent with the usual rule that a successful applicant for leave to amend pays the unsuccessful respondent’s costs, the amendment being an indulgence granted by the court, the costs associated with which could have been avoided had the applicant got the pleading right or complete in the first place: Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2009) 73 ACSR 252; [2009] NSWSC 805 at [43]. Such costs will include any costs associated with the amendment, but also those costs thrown away as a result of the amendment to compensate for any prejudice arising from the amendment: Stewart v North Metropolitan Tramways Co (1886) 16 QBD 556. See also Public Trustee v Nash (1920) 38 WN (NSW) 142. Rule 42.6 does not apply to Land and Environment Court proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of its jurisdiction, other than proceedings under s 56A of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979: UCPR Sch 1. 42.7 Interlocutory applications and reserved costs (cf SCR Part 52A, rule 16; DCR Part 39A, rule 22; LCR Part 31A, rule 17)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, the costs of any application or other step in any proceedings, including: (a) costs that are reserved, and (b) costs in respect of any such application or step in respect of which no order as to costs is made, are to be paid and otherwise dealt with in the same way as the general costs of the proceedings. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, costs referred to in subrule (1) do not become payable until the conclusion of the proceedings.

RULE 42.7 COMMENTARY Operation .................................................................................................................................................. [r 42.7.40] The Usual Rule in relation to Interlocutory Costs .................................................................................... [r 42.7.60] Timing of Payment of Interlocutory Costs ................................................................................................ [r 42.7.80] Payment vs Assessment of Interlocutory Costs ..................................................................................... [r 42.7.100]

[r 42.7.40]

Operation

Rule 42.7 provides for three “usual rules” concerning interlocutory costs: (1) that the costs of any application or interlocutory step in any proceedings are to be paid and dealt with in the same way as the general costs of the proceedings: r 42.7(1); His Eminence Metropolitan 972

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

[r 42.7.80]

r 42.7

Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142 at [16]ff; (2) that reserved costs and any costs in respect of any interlocutory application or step in respect of which no order as to costs is made, will be incorporated as part of the general costs of the proceedings: r 42.7(1)(a) and (b); and (3) that interlocutory costs are payable at the conclusion of the proceedings: r 42.7(2); Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 1; [2002] NSWSC 432 at [10]. Each of these “usual rules” can be altered if the court ‘orders otherwise. The costs of an interlocutory application include both costs of and costs incidental to the application: Hancock v Rinehart [2015] NSWSC 1640 at [14] per Brereton J citing Wentworth v Wentworth (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, Clarke JJA and Grove AJA, 21 February 1996) at 17 per Clarke JA. The Usual Rule in relation to Interlocutory Costs

The application of the usual rule set out in r 42.7(1) will result in an order that the costs of the interlocutory application be “costs in the cause” or “costs in the proceedings” (the terms are interchangeable) or “the plaintiff’s/defendant’s costs in the cause”. An order that costs be “costs in the cause” means that whichever party is ultimately successful in the proceedings and obtains an order for costs will be entitled to the costs that have been made “costs in the cause”: Nixon v Howes (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 156 at 158; J T Stratford and Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 at 1123. An order that costs be “the plaintiff’s/defendant’s costs in the cause” means that the named party is entitled to the costs of the interlocutory proceedings if they win and that they will not be obliged to pay the costs of the interlocutory proceedings if they ultimately lose the proceedings: Metropolitan Petar at [22]; Lindley at 1153. Rule 42.7(1) does not operate to fetter the court’s discretion as to costs: the court is to apply the “usual rule” in the exercise of its discretion, and not as a matter of course: Metropolitan Petar at [28]. Consequently the court, consistent with r 42.1, will take account of the outcome of an interlocutory application, this being the applicable “event”, in order to determine whether it is appropriate to order that costs of the interlocutory application “follow the event” or not, as well as other matters, such as the nature of the relief sought by the applicant and the conduct of the parties during the course of the application. In the case of interlocutory injunctions for instance, it is usual for the court to order that costs be costs in the cause or even the applicant’s costs in the cause as “at the stage of granting an interlocutory injunction, the court is not in a position to adjudicate on the ultimate outcome of the proceedings. Rather, provided there is a reasonable case to be tried, the Court’s focus in deciding whether to grant the application for interlocutory relief is on other considerations and, in particular, on determining whether, on the balance of convenience, an injunction ought to be granted. Accordingly, if a plaintiff who applies for an interlocutory injunction is not ultimately successful in the proceedings, that plaintiff should not receive the costs of the application for an injunction which, when the matter is considered in overview cannot be sustained. However … each case must depend on its own facts”. Metropolitan Petar per Beazley, Giles and Hodgson JJA at [21]; cited with approval by Ward J in New South Wales v Gevaux [2011] NSWSC 758 at [13]. On the other hand, if the party seeking an indulgence of the court is also guilty of some relevant delinquency, costs might nevertheless be awarded in favour of the unsuccessful opposing party: Pascoe v Edsome Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 544. Generally however, consistent with Rule 42.7(1), steps taken that ought to be regarded as reasonably taken in the management of the proceedings towards a hearing should be treated as costs in the proceedings generally: Metlife Insurance Ltd v Visy Board Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 111 at [10]. See [r 42.1.65] regarding the application of the rule that costs follow the event in interlocutory applications. [r 42.7.80]

Timing of Payment of Interlocutory Costs

The usual rule set out in r 42.7(2) provides that an order for costs in respect of interlocutory proceedings is not immediately enforceable: His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142 at [49]. If proceedings remain on foot following an appeal, the appeal costs must also await the conclusion of the proceedings: Metropolitan Petar at [49] and see Richards v Kadian [2005] NSWCA 373. It has been said that the usual rule “tends to avoid multiple assessments of costs at various stages of the proceedings [which] assessments might well prove to be time wasting and pointless by costs orders that are © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

973

UCPR Parts 41-50

[r 42.7.60]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.7

[r 42.7.80]

made for and against parties at various times during the course of the proceedings”: Hargood v OHTL Public Company Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 511 per Davies J at [7]; see also Richards v Kadian [2005] NSWCA 373 at [7]. Consequently, an order that costs be paid forthwith is an exception which will only be made in a case that is out of the ordinary: Re Elsmore Resources Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1390 per Black J at [5], cited with approval by Davies J in Hargood at [8]; as such an order “has the capacity to stultify proceedings particularly brought by persons with limited resources, and also has the risk of operating unfairly where, over the course of the proceedings, there may be orders which are made that one or other party should pay the costs of the other from time to time”: Elsmore Resources at [5]. The usual rule may, however, be displaced, and the discretion to order the immediate payment of interlocutory costs is wide and unfettered: Gattelleri v Meagher [1999] NSWSC 1279 at [9]; Plaza West Pty Ltd v Simon’s Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 556, Gzell J at [13]. “In the end, the demands of justice are the only determinant”: Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd at [7]. The discretion to order that costs be payable forthwith may be made at any time prior to the conclusion of the proceedings: Showtime Touring Group Pty Ltd v Mosley Touring Inc (2013) 296 ALR 597; [2013] NSWCA 53 at [29] per Bathurst CJ, McColl JA at [33] and Bergin CJ in Eq at [34] agreeing. The discretion has been exercised in a variety of circumstances: 1. Where the decision relates to the determination of a discrete or self-contained question: Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 1; [2002] NSWSC 432 at [11]–[13]; Richards v Kadian [2005] NSWCA 373 at [6]–[7] (appeal which had wider significance than the action per se, particularly to the appellant’s insurer); Perpetual Trustee Co v McAndrew [2008] NSWSC 790 (unsuccessful application for summary judgment); Ark Hire Pty Ltd v Barwick Event Hire Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 488 at [46]–[49] (costs of application for contempt “to enforce what it should already have been obtained”); Bromhead v Graham (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 710 (application for dissolution of a partnership, with damages yet to be assessed); Megna v Marshall [2005] NSWSC 1326 at [26] (unsuccessful application to administer interrogatories); Hamod v NSW [2007] NSWSC 707 (unsuccessful discovery appeal). 2. Where the costs are significant and there is likely to be a delay in the conclusion of the proceedings: Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 1; [2002] NSWSC 432 at [11]–[13]; particularly if the receiving party is impecunious and the application diverted funds from the substantive cause: Reserve Rifle Club Inc v NSW Rifle Association Inc [2010] NSWSC 351. This ground assumes particular relevance where there has been a hearing and decision on a separate question, such as liability, under r 28.2. This issue was considered in Herbert v Tamworth City Council (No 4) (2004) 60 NSWLR 476; [2004] NSWSC 394, where after determining liability in favour of the plaintiff, the court indicated that the assessment of damages might be delayed for some 10 years. This was considered a strong ground for ordering that the costs be paid forthwith rather than at the conclusion of the proceedings: at [30]. 3. Where the costs were incurred by unreasonable or unnecessary conduct of a party: Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 1; [2002] NSWSC 432 at [11]–[13] (costs abnormally increased by the service of very voluminous material at the last moment, the vast bulk of which was not referred to on the application); Vitoros v Raindera Pty Limited [2014] NSWSC 99 at [20] (various appearances before the court necessitated by the plaintiff’s ongoing failures to comply with orders of the court); Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 1630 at [8] (wrongful suppression of material documents, expenses unnecessarily incurred in defending a claim for legal professional privilege); Stokes (by a tutor) v McCourt [2013] NSWSC 1014 at [164]–[165] (defendant’s delays in the conduct of the principal proceedings, and the possibility that he was conducting a war of attrition in the conduct of interlocutory disputes against the plaintiff, was sufficient to displace the usual rule). The court will take into account the extent to which the parties have failed to facilitate the overriding purpose of the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings as required by s 56 of the CPA 2005: Bevillesta Pty Ltd v D Tannous 2 Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 277 at [37] 4. Where the costs order involves third parties, such as legal practitioners: Bagley v Pinebelt Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 830 at [7] (improper lodgment of caveat by barrister). North South Construction Services Pty Ltd v Construction Pacific Management Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 286 at [35]–[36] (abuse of process by non-party to the proceedings). 974

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

[r 42.7.100]

r 42.8

For cases where the exercise of the discretion has been refused, see Cameron v Ofria [2007] NSWCA 37 at [12] (successful application to strike out cross claim said to be ordinary interlocutory application in the general course of the proceedings); Hargood v OHTL Public Company Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 511 (failed application for stay and likely two years before conclusion of proceedings not sufficient for displacement of usual rule); Hall v Swan [2013] NSWSC 1758 at [11]–[15] (delay in service of expert reports); Eastmark Holdings Pty Ltd v Kabraji (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1255 at [42]–[46] (various motions heard together, general weighing up of the discretionary factors). [r 42.7.100]

Payment vs Assessment of Interlocutory Costs

It may be observed however, that an applicant for assessment of ordered costs must be a person who has paid or is liable to pay those costs or a person or has received or is entitled to receive those costs: s 74 Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (LPUL Application Act). This provision is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to the now repealed s 353(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2004. Presumably if, as the Court of Appeal has said, it is possible to apply for assessment of interlocutory costs which have not been made payable forthwith, s 74 does not require an applicant for assessment to have a present liability to pay or a present entitlement to receive those costs. If that is the case, it appears that clause 57 of Practice Note SC Eq 3 – Supreme Court Equity Division – Commercial List and Technology and Construction List, has no work to do. That clause provides: “Unless otherwise ordered, a party in whose favour an order for costs is made may proceed to assessment of such costs forthwith”. It may also be observed that if an assessment of the interlocutory costs does proceed and one or more certificates of determination are issued, such certificates may be filed in the office or registry of a court having jurisdiction to order the payment of that amount of money, and with no further action, taken to be a judgment of that court for the amount of unpaid money: s 70(5) of the LPUL Application Act. Rule 36.10 sets out the procedure to be followed when filing a certificate of determination in the relevant court. There is no statutory or rule based impediment that would prevent the filing of a certificate of determination which is founded upon an order for costs which has not been made payable forthwith. See further [r 42.31.30] and [r 36.10.40]. 42.8

Dispute of fact subsequently proved or admitted

(1) In this rule: disputing party means the party who serves a notice disputing a fact under rule 17.3(2). fact in dispute means the fact that is the subject of a notice served under rule 17.3(2). requesting party means the party who is served with a notice disputing a fact under rule 17.3(2). (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, the disputing party must, after the conclusion of proceedings in which a fact in dispute is subsequently proved or is subsequently admitted by the disputing party, pay the requesting party’s costs, assessed on an indemnity basis, being costs incurred by the requesting party: (a) in proving the fact, or (b) if the fact has not been proved—in preparation for the purpose of proving the fact. (3) An entitlement to costs under this rule is not affected by any order as to costs unless that order makes particular reference in that regard. [R 42.8 subst Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[9]]

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

975

UCPR Parts 41-50

Rule 42.7(2) provides that costs do not become payable until the conclusion of the proceedings. In His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142 at [49], the Court of Appeal observed that the rule does not prevent the parties from taking “steps to quantify any such order, but that is a different matter to the question of enforceability”. That view was endorsed by Beazley P in Wende v Horwath (NSW) Pty Ltd (2014) 86 NSWLR 674; [2014] NSWCA 170 at [5], however her Honour’s view and that of the court in Metropolitan Petar, were obiter dicta. See also Eastmark Holdings Pty Ltd v Kabraji (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1255 at [43] per Hallen AsJ (as he then was) (cf Zisti v Bartter Enterprises Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 146 Barrett JA at [73], Beazley P and Ward JA agreeing).

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.9

[r 42.8.40]

RULE 42.8 COMMENTARY [r 42.8.40]

Operation

A party who unnecessarily puts the other to proof of a fact in relation to which a notice to admit facts was served, is required to pay the costs of proving that fact on an indemnity basis. That requirement, by virtue of r 42.8(3), will persist, even in the face of an order that the party with the obligation to pay is to receive their costs of the proceedings, unless the subsequent costs order expressly provides that they are not obliged to pay costs pursuant to r 42.8(2). As a court order is required to enable an application for an assessment of ‘ordered costs’ to be made, obtaining an order to reflect the rule based costs entitlement is recommended: see ss 63 and 74(1) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2015 and cl 35 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Regulation 2015 (NSW). Rule 42.26 facilitates the conversion of a rule based entitlement to an order of the court. See [r 42.26.40]. In Peter Vitek v Estate Homes Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1948, Rein J ordered the third defendant to pay the plaintiffs’ costs arising out of notices to admit on an indemnity basis, in circumstances where the third defendant did not admit the value of the subject property on 22 October 2004 was $1.979,290, as found by Barrett J in an earlier judgment dated 31 March 2010, causing the plaintiffs to incur costs in having to pursue the valuer, who had given evidence before Barrett J and of obtaining further evidence from him. In Noxequin Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] NSWSC 87 Barrett J considered that a letter inviting the cross defendant to admit insolvency was sufficient to engage the costs penalty set out in r 42.8 as while it was not a notice in the approved form (Form 16) “the message conveyed by the letter was unmistakable and [the cross defendant’s] refusal, by the reply, to admit insolvency can, in light of the outcome, be seen to have been unreasonable”. Rule 42.8 does not apply to Land and Environment Court proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of its jurisdiction, other than proceedings under s 56A of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979: UCPR Sch 1. 42.9

Dispute of authenticity of document subsequently proved or admitted

(1) In this rule: disputing party means a party who serves a notice disputing the authenticity of a document under rule 17.4(2) or 17.5(3). document in dispute means a document that is the subject of a notice served under rule 17.4(2) or 17.5(3). requesting party means a party who is served with a notice disputing the authenticity of a document under rule 17.4(2) or 17.5(3). (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, the disputing party must, after the conclusion of proceedings in which the authenticity of a document in dispute is subsequently proved or is subsequently admitted by the disputing party, pay the requesting party’s costs, assessed on an indemnity basis, being costs incurred by the requesting party: (a) in proving the authenticity of the document, or (b) if the authenticity of the document has not been proved—in preparation for the purpose of proving the authenticity of the document. (3) An entitlement to costs under this rule is not affected by any order as to costs unless that order makes particular reference in that regard. [R 42.9 subst Rule 96 of 2006, r 2 and Sch 1[10]]

976

NSW Civil Procedure Handbook 2017

Part 42 – Costs Division 1 – Entitlement to costs

[r 42.10.40]

r 42.11

RULE 42.9 COMMENTARY [r 42.9.40]

Operation

A party who unnecessarily puts the other to proof of the authenticity of a document in relation to which a notice to admit authenticity of documents was served, is required to pay the costs of proving the authenticity of the document on an indemnity basis. See [r 42.8.40]. In Peter Vitek v Estate Homes Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1948, Rein J ordered the third defendant to pay the plaintiffs’ costs arising out of notices to admit on an indemnity basis, in circumstances where the third defendant did not admit that certain documents were authentic copies of what was handed over as the counterparts on exchange of contracts. The third defendant had wrongly refused to make the admission as she disputed that she had signed the documents, but this was not the admission she was asked to make: see judgment at [16]–[17]. Rule 42.9 does not apply to Land and Environment Court proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of its jurisdiction, other than proceedings under s 56A of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979: UCPR Sch 1 42.10 Disobedience to rule, judgment, order or direction

If a party fails to comply with a requirement of these rules, or of any judgment or order of the court, the court may order the party to pay such of the other parties’ costs as are occasioned by the failure.

RULE 42.10 COMMENTARY [r 42.10.40]

Operation

A party who does not comply with the rules or a judgment or order may be required to pay the costs occasioned by such failure. Despite breaches of procedural orders and consequent adverse costs orders arising from such breaches being relatively commonplace, r 42.10 has received little judicial attention. Presumably this is because itadds little to the court’s unfettered discretion as to costs and the long established principles which guide the exercise of the discretion. Nevertheless, the rule is available to complement the powers given to the court in s 98 and, more particular, ss 56(5) and 61(3), which provide for costs sanctions against parties who fail to comply with their obligations to assist the court in furthering their “overriding purpose” of a just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. It is important to bear in mind however, that the awarding of costs between parties is always compensatory rather than punitive, so that the rationale behind the rule is to compensate the other party for the costs occasioned by the contravening party’s actions, rather than to punish the contravening party. See comments in Hamod v NSW (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCA 424; FCAFC 97 at [20] and Liverpool City Council v Estephan [2009] NSWCA 161 at [95] in the context of the awarding of indemnity costs. 42.11

Injunction

(cf SCR Part 52A, rule 27)

(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, an order as to costs with respect to an interlocutory injunction that continues an earlier interlocutory injunction, with or without modification, is to include the costs of the earlier injunction. (2) In this rule, interlocutory injunction means an interlocutory injunction granted by the Supreme Court, and includes a temporary injunction granted by the District Court under section 140 of the District Court Act 1973.

© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS

977

UCPR Parts 41-50

(cf SCR Part 52A, rule 25; DCR Part 39A, rule 4)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.12

[r 42.11.40]

RULE 42.11 COMMENTARY Operation ................................................................................................................................................ [r 42.11.40] References .......................................................................................................................................... [r 42.11.1000]

[r 42.11.40]

Operation

Costs with respect to the continuation of an interlocutory injunction include the costs of the earlier injunction. [r 42.11.1000]

References

See also the commentary concerning r 42.7.

DIVISION 2 – ARBITRATION REHEARINGS UNDER DIVISION 3 OF PART 5 OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT 2005 42.12

Rehearings under Division 3 of Part 5 of Civil Procedure Act 2005

(cf SCR Part 52A, rule 30)

(1) In this rule: party A means the party on whose application a rehearing has been conducted. party B means any party to a rehearing other than party A. rehearing means a rehearing conducted under Division 3 of Part 5 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. (2) If the determination of the court is not substantially more favourable to party A than is the determination of the arbitrator, the court: (a) may not order party B