North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order: When Bad Behaviour Pays 0192888323, 9780192888327

Table of contents :
cover
titlepage
copyright
Prologue
Acknowledgements
Contents
List of Tables
Abbreviations and Note on Spellings
Introduction: When bad behaviour pays
North Korea: The known unknown
North Korea: A history of delinquency
Studying North Korea
North Korea: Who decides?
Global nuclear order
What is status?
Strategic delinquency in international relations
Outline of the book
1 The world through Pyongyang's eyes
Korea: Unified by name but not by nature
Resisting Japanese imperialism
Kim Il Sung: The guerrilla fighter
Divine worship: The legacies of Japanese rule
Uncertain friendships: Chinese and Soviet influences
Korean War: A catalyst for deviance
Juche: The antithesis of the post-war international order
A hostile world: How North Korea orders international relations
Allies abroad: A common enemy
The road not taken: Two roads diverged
Back to juche: Losing friends in a `hostile world'
Conclusion
2 Strategic delinquency: Benefits of norm-breaking
North Korea and a changing global nuclear order
Global nuclear order: Status and hierarchy
States behaving badly: Norm-breaking in international relations
Status, norm-breaking, and the global nuclear order
Strategic engagement in delinquency: A trade-off
Strategic delinquency: A theoretical framework
A tripartite typology of delinquency
Benefits of delinquency
Strategic delinquency: All about status?
Conclusion
3 Quest for significance: The first nuclear crisis of the 1990s
Delinquency in the early post-war order
Nuclear ambitions of its own
Joining the global nuclear order
When crisis commences
A peace-loving power and the loss of allies: The first phase
Buying time for a nuclear programme
`Your Israel in East Asia': The second phase
Momentary outward compliance with nuclear norms
A `sea of fire': The third phase
`If war comes'
`A crisis that could be avoided'
`How can God die?'
Strategic delinquency and the first nuclear crisis
Conclusion
4 A nuclear North Korea: Costs and benefits of delinquency
Prelude to another crisis
`The Western world thinks we are belligerent'
A proliferation fixation
`When everything went to hell': The first phase
A weakened global nuclear order
Having the bomb: An irrefutable logic
Six parties, one goal: `Accept us as a nuclear state'
A fully fledged nuclear weapons state: The second phase
Second time lucky? Four more years of ABC
Waiting for benefits: `Commitment for commitment, action for action'
Only $24 million: `Ready to go to nuclear testing'
A now nuclear North Korea: Provocations and rewards
`Not a tribunal against North Korea'
`One meeting away from a breakthrough': The third phase
`We could get something significant from North Korea'
False optimism: `Getting them off their plutonium programme'
No carte blanche: The problems of verification
`These guys won't implement': When dialogue collapses
Clean slates: Defending the supreme interests
Strategic delinquency and the second nuclear crisis
Conclusion
5 Strategic patience meets strategic delinquency
Anything but Bush? A new administration in Washington
Not with a whimper but with a bang
An increasingly fragile US-led nuclear order
Strategic patience: A `middle path'
Keeping North Korea in a box
`A terrible embarrassment'
An H-bomb of justice? North Korean impatience
When strategic patience meets strategic delinquency
Conclusion
6 Bad romance: Trump, Kim, and the quest for nuclear status
Fire, fury, and the costs of delinquency: The first phase
Close to the red line: Brinkmanship and a war of words
`Will the US give a damn?': The second phase
Completing the state nuclear force
Showmanship and semantics in Singapore
Losing interest in the global nuclear order
The art of the no-deal: The third phase
Missiles and free food
Theatre without substance: Third time lucky?
Talks without results: `Everything changed after Stockholm'
Strategic delinquency, status, and Kim Jong Un
Conclusion
Conclusion: Strategic delinquency and North Korea—an assessment
Further questions: Status, delinquency, and the global nuclear order
The North Korea problem: Where solutions elude
Epilogue: Sanction above all sanctions
Coronavirus: The sanction above all sanctions
Practising what one preaches: Thus spake Kim Yo Jong
Strategic patience 2.0: Diplomacy and stern deterrence
The land of least lousy options
Quo vadimus?
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order

North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order When Bad Behaviour Pays Edward Howell

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Edward Howell 2023 The moral rights of the author have been asserted All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2022952147 ISBN 978–0–19–288832–7 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192888327.001.0001 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

Prologue Nobody likes to be laughed at, especially if you do not know why the other person is laughing. Any conversation becomes a game of Moscow rules. One mid-autumn afternoon in Beijing, together with other academics and diplomats from the four corners of the globe, I readied myself to speak at a conference. My fellow interlocutor, also at the conference, was a senior official from the North Korean Ministry of Defence. In an era when North Korean officials overseas rarely answer the telephone, let alone attend conferences, any opportunity to interact with them is worth taking. Upon mentioning my research, the minister guffawed. At first, I feared that I had committed a linguistic faux pas. Nuclear weapons are hardly a laughing matter; the North Koreans would know this more than anyone. My fears were quashed, however, when the minister retorted, in English, with more than a teaspoonful of sarcasm, ‘What do you want to know?’ The juxtaposition of appearance in the ensuing photograph could not have been starker: I was wearing a suit and tie from a Western capitalist brand; the Minister was clad in the trademark olive North Korean military uniform and unhemmed trousers. For our differences in creed—political and sartorial—the lingua franca of (supposed) wit prevailed: ‘You are the first Englishman I have met. Are you representing your country?’ Having affirmed in the negative, then came the retort which would match any comments expounded by today’s politicians: ‘Do all English people take pictures with people with whom they’ve never met?’ A droll smile was followed by a parting cheerio. For all these pleasantries, my quest to gain a North Korean perspective on its nuclear programme remained unfulfilled. It was highly likely that the official may not have known much about it himself. Those in the know are in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, or the United Front Work Department, none of whom were present. It made sense: why would they attend a conference with an audience including officials from their ultimate adversary of the United States, even if it were hosted by the North’s alleged friend of China?1 When, the next day, the official delivered his own speech, not once did the word ‘nuclear’ feature. A term that would feature five times, however, was ‘hostile policy’, which listeners came to expect every time the United States or its alliance with South Korea was given even a fleeting mention. It was no surprise that the speech was littered with characteristically ambiguous, bombastic rhetoric. But the mention of the ‘hostile policy’ was no slip of the tongue.

1 The United Front Work Department was initially responsible for leading North Korea’s policy approach towards the now infamous meetings between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in 2018 and 2019.

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Prologue

In a subsequent interview with a senior South Korean official, who had engaged in numerous negotiations with the North over the past thirty years, the diplomat dryly remarked, with more than a sigh of regret: ‘They take their nuclear weapons for granted now.’ E.H.K.H.

Acknowledgements From its genesis, this book would not have reached its conclusion without the encouragement of numerous mentors and colleagues. It is the result of research which I undertook at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. First and foremost, I would like to thank Rosemary Foot, Andrew Hurrell, Neil MacFarlane, and John Nilsson-Wright, all of whom offered constructive feedback of inestimable value at different phases of this work, from its beginnings as a D.Phil. thesis at the University of Oxford. Rosemary offered excellent feedback in the latter stages of the project; John provided useful suggestions, particularly with respect to the historical context of the analysis. I am grateful to Andy for his thoughtprovoking comments throughout this project and his phenomenal understanding of the breadth and depth of debates within the discipline of International Relations. Neil has been an encouraging mentor: his good humour, crispness of thought, and discerning questions catalysed greater clarity of argument and analysis. At the University of Oxford, I received useful feedback from Carlotta Minnella, Dominic Johnson, and Kate Sullivan de Estrada. Particular thanks go to Carlotta, who saw this project from its pre-nascent incarnations and was always willing to read and provide timely feedback. More broadly, at the University of Oxford and beyond, I would like to thank all those who offered encouragement and advice during this project, including Nigel Biggar, Matthew Burnett, Paul Deb, Joshua S. Glicklich, Robin Lane Fox, Jonathan Leader Maynard, Raphaël Lefèvre, Jane Lightfoot, Abigail Parker, Frederick Richards, and Andrew Sillett. The research for this project involved many meetings with international officials, negotiators with North Korea, and North Korean defectors. I would like to extend my thanks to all those who agreed to speak to me, whose identities I have protected. The extensive research for this book could not have been undertaken without the generosity of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, the Economic and Social Research Council, Merton College, and the Warden and Fellows of New College. For offering valuable and constructive feedback on what follows in this book, I am immensely grateful to Alex Fleming-Brown, Samuel Gibson, Charlie Morrell-Brown, Jonathan Rampley-Sturgeon, Charlie Rogers, and George Tench. Their insightful comments, good humour, and conversations about the direction of this book were invaluable. Furthermore, I would like to extend my gratitude to Fr Huw Chiplin, formerly parish priest of St Matthew’s, W14, for our fruitful discussions and for his critical reading of this book. I would like to thank my parents for their support. Finally, it would be remiss of me not to extend my thanks to Shuman Tse. Beyond providing Cantonese culinary creations, I would like to thank Mr Tse for his fervent enthusiasm for discourse, which, unfortunately, is increasingly under threat today.

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Acknowledgements

The book would not have come into fruition without the patience, advice, and enthusiasm of Dominic Byatt at Oxford University Press. Two anonymous referees offered vital feedback and suggestions on the original manuscript and book proposal, which have significantly strengthened the work and its analysis. For the past three-and-a-half years, it has been a joy to have been a lecturer at New College, University of Oxford. My students have been outstandingly receptive, despite my (attempts at) humour and perhaps all-too frequent references, in tutorials, to North Korea; International Air Transport Association codes; and gastronomy (albeit not in the same sentence). As they venture into their respective careers, I have no doubt that they will use their intellectual inquisitiveness to good effect. This book is for them. To the reader, true to my obsession with correct English grammar, this book does not contain a single split infinitive. Caveat lector, any errata therein are my own responsibility. Nonetheless, I hope that the book shines some light on a country that is often deemed a known unknown, at a time when any resolution to the so-called ‘North Korea problem’ only seems to exacerbate in elusiveness. E.H.K. Howell University of Oxford March 2023

Contents List of Tables Abbreviations and Note on Spellings

Introduction: When bad behaviour pays North Korea: The known unknown North Korea: A history of delinquency Studying North Korea North Korea: Who decides? Global nuclear order What is status? Strategic delinquency in international relations Outline of the book

1. The world through Pyongyang’s eyes Korea: Unified by name but not by nature Resisting Japanese imperialism Kim Il Sung: The guerrilla fighter Divine worship: The legacies of Japanese rule Uncertain friendships: Chinese and Soviet influences Korean War: A catalyst for deviance Juche: The antithesis of the post-war international order A hostile world: How North Korea orders international relations Allies abroad: A common enemy The road not taken: Two roads diverged Back to juche: Losing friends in a ‘hostile world’ Conclusion

2. Strategic delinquency: Benefits of norm-breaking North Korea and a changing global nuclear order Global nuclear order: Status and hierarchy States behaving badly: Norm-breaking in international relations Status, norm-breaking, and the global nuclear order Strategic engagement in delinquency: A trade-off Strategic delinquency: A theoretical framework A tripartite typology of delinquency Benefits of delinquency Strategic delinquency: All about status? Conclusion

xii xiii

1 4 4 6 9 11 12 13 17

20 21 23 25 27 28 30 34 36 39 42 45 49

51 52 56 59 61 64 65 67 72 81 84

x

Contents

3. Quest for significance: The first nuclear crisis of the 1990s Delinquency in the early post-war order Nuclear ambitions of its own Joining the global nuclear order When crisis commences A peace-loving power and the loss of allies: The first phase Buying time for a nuclear programme ‘Your Israel in East Asia’: The second phase Momentary outward compliance with nuclear norms A ‘sea of fire’: The third phase ‘If war comes’ ‘A crisis that could be avoided’ ‘How can God die?’ Strategic delinquency and the first nuclear crisis Conclusion

4. A nuclear North Korea: Costs and benefits of delinquency Prelude to another crisis ‘The Western world thinks we are belligerent’ A proliferation fixation ‘When everything went to hell’: The first phase A weakened global nuclear order Having the bomb: An irrefutable logic Six parties, one goal: ‘Accept us as a nuclear state’ A fully fledged nuclear weapons state: The second phase Second time lucky? Four more years of ABC Waiting for benefits: ‘Commitment for commitment, action for action’ Only $24 million: ‘Ready to go to nuclear testing’ A now nuclear North Korea: Provocations and rewards ‘Not a tribunal against North Korea’ ‘One meeting away from a breakthrough’: The third phase ‘We could get something significant from North Korea’ False optimism: ‘Getting them off their plutonium programme’ No carte blanche: The problems of verification ‘These guys won’t implement’: When dialogue collapses Clean slates: Defending the supreme interests Strategic delinquency and the second nuclear crisis Conclusion

5. Strategic patience meets strategic delinquency Anything but Bush? A new administration in Washington Not with a whimper but with a bang An increasingly fragile US-led nuclear order Strategic patience: A ‘middle path’ Keeping North Korea in a box ‘A terrible embarrassment’

85 88 94 96 97 102 104 106 107 110 113 115 117 120 122

124 125 129 130 132 134 135 137 141 142 143 145 148 150 151 153 155 157 159 161 163 166

169 171 172 173 176 179 181

Contents An H-bomb of justice? North Korean impatience When strategic patience meets strategic delinquency Conclusion

6. Bad romance: Trump, Kim, and the quest for nuclear status Fire, fury, and the costs of delinquency: The first phase Close to the red line: Brinkmanship and a war of words ‘Will the US give a damn?’: The second phase Completing the state nuclear force Showmanship and semantics in Singapore Losing interest in the global nuclear order The art of the no-deal: The third phase Missiles and free food Theatre without substance: Third time lucky? Talks without results: ‘Everything changed after Stockholm’ Strategic delinquency, status, and Kim Jong Un Conclusion

Conclusion: Strategic delinquency and North Korea—an assessment Further questions: Status, delinquency, and the global nuclear order The North Korea problem: Where solutions elude

Epilogue: Sanction above all sanctions Coronavirus: The sanction above all sanctions Practising what one preaches: Thus spake Kim Yo Jong Strategic patience 2.0: Diplomacy and stern deterrence The land of least lousy options Quo vadimus?

Bibliography Index

xi 184 188 191

194 196 200 203 206 209 214 216 219 223 225 228 233

235 238 241

244 245 247 250 252 253

256 295

List of Tables Table 2.1 Trade-offs of delinquency

82

Table 3.1 Three phases of the first nuclear crisis

100

Table 4.1 Strategic delinquency in the third phase of the second nuclear crisis

152

Table 6.1 Strategic delinquency during the Trump administration

230

Abbreviations and Note on Spellings AF: CCP: CIA: CTBT: CVID: CWIHP: DMZ: DNI: DPRK: FMCT: HEU: HIA: HPPA: HST: IAEA: ICBM: INF: JCPOA: KCBN: KCNA: KEDO: KPA: LRBM: LWR: NAM: NKIDP: NNWS: NPR: NPT: NSC: NSS: NWS: ODI: PDS: PTBT: PRC: ROK: SALT: SLBM: SPT: SRBM:

Agreed Framework Communist Party of China United States Central Intelligence Agency Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement Cold War International History Project Demilitarized Zone Director of National Intelligence (United States) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Highly enriched uranium Hoover Institute Archive Wilson Center History and Public Policy Program Archive Public Papers of President Harry S. Truman International Atomic Energy Agency Intercontinental ballistic missile Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Korean Central Broadcasting Network Korean Central News Agency Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Korean People’s Army Long-range ballistic missile Light-water reactor Non-Aligned Movement North Korea International Documentation Project (Wilson Center) Non-nuclear weapon state (according to the NPT) Nuclear Posture Review Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty National Security Council (United States) National Security Strategy Nuclear weapon state (according to the NPT) Office of the Director of National Intelligence Pyongyang Domestic Service Partial Test Ban Treaty People’s Republic of China Republic of Korea (South Korea) Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Submarine-launched ballistic missile Six-Party Talks Short-range ballistic missile

xiv

Abbreviations and Note on Spellings

SST: START: THAAD: TPNW: UNSC: UNSCR: USDS: USDT: WMD: WPK:

State Sponsor of Terrorism Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Terminal High Altitude Area Defence Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Resolution US Department of State US Department of the Treasury Weapons of mass destruction Workers’ Party of Korea

When romanizing Korean words, there is widespread variation in terms of whether the Revised Romanization system or McCune-Reischauer system is used. This book uses North Korean spellings for North Korean names (for example, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un, and other senior North Korean officials), and adopts South Korean preferred spellings for South Korean names (for example, Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye, Moon Jae-in). For place names, English spellings are used, such as Pyongyang, Seoul, or Kaesong.

Introduction When bad behaviour pays

The tenth day of October is no ordinary autumn day for North Korea and its people. It is one of the three most important holidays of the North Korean calendar year, along with the birthday of the founder of the nation, the Eternal President Kim Il Sung (15 April), and that of his successor, the so-called ‘Dear Leader’ of Kim Jong Il (16 February). The date of 10 October marks the founding of the predecessor to what is today called the Workers’ Party of Korea, the ruling party of North Korea. The seventy-fifth anniversary of this auspicious occasion was widely expected to be a day of especial jubilation. The Party, the alpha and omega of North Korean politics and society, had reached a milestone anniversary. These occasions are frequent spectacles targeting domestic and international audiences, often featuring parades of the state’s latest nuclear weaponry, missiles, and military equipment and speeches from the leader. The year 2020 also marked seventy years since the commencement of the Korean War, a war, which, so the North Korean narrative goes, saw the United States admit its ‘ignominious defeat for the first time in history’.1 As the pitch-black sky loomed over Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, during the early hours of the morning, however, the celebrations of 10 October 2020 would be somewhat more subdued. The coronavirus pandemic was ravaging across the globe, and North Korea was far from immune to its impacts. As its economy suffered cataclysmically, a surprisingly emotional Kim Jong Un rose to the podium and pleaded with his people. Struggling to contain his tears, the Supreme Leader apologized for having failed to provide his pledged domestic economic development. He thanked the military for their assistance in efforts to recover from flooding and the pandemic and expressed his gratitude to the people for placing their trust in the Party, like all North Koreans have been told to do. For all Kim Jong Un’s laments, there was one noticeable sight. Rolling through Kim Il Sung Square was the world’s largest road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Hwasong-17. This missile was far larger and more powerful than previous ICBMs. The Hwasong-15, tested in November 2017, had the capacity to strike the contiguous US mainland.2 Given 1 Rodong Sinmun, ‘Month of Solidarity with Korean People Closes in Cuba’, 11 August 2017. 2 North Korea has codenamed several of its short, intermediate, and long-range missiles with the name Hwasong, which can be translated as ‘Mars’, or, literally, ‘fire star’. This particular missile, whilst initially— and presumptively—codenamed Hwasong-16 by international observers, became more commonly, and officially, known as Hwasong-17.

North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order. Edward Howell, Oxford University Press. © Edward Howell (2023). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192888327.003.0001

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North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order

its sheer size and weight, the Hwasong-17’s effectiveness remains questionable.3 Nevertheless, North Korea was sending a clear message to its people and the world. Despite the toll of the coronavirus pandemic on the North’s economy (and more on that, later in the book), one thing was clear: North Korea was not getting rid of its nuclear weapons just yet. ∗∗∗ This book asks the fundamental question of how North Korea has become a nucleararmed state and how we might account for its nuclear behaviour over the past thirty years. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea) may not be recognized as a nuclear state by the international community and nuclear nonproliferation regime. Nevertheless, despite a dire economic situation and political isolationism, it has managed to acquire significant nuclear and missile capabilities since the end of the Cold War. This is a state that has unabashedly broken international norms and rules of state behaviour, both pertaining to the human rights of its people and through its unwavering pursuit of nuclear weapons. It is no surprise that North Korea has garnered a reputation as the poster-child of delinquency in international relations, a state whose behaviour was once described by former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, as akin to that of an ‘unruly teenager [. . .] seeking attention’.⁴ More recently, three summits, numerous missives between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump, and a marked acceleration in the DPRK’s nuclear and missile capabilities have only placed the state further in the global limelight. Yet, North Korea shows little desire to abandon its ‘treasured sword’ of nuclear weapons any time soon.⁵ As the threat to regional and global security posed by a nuclear North Korea continues to grow, there has never been a more pressing time than the present to understand the nature of, and motivations behind, its actions. In offering a comprehensive account of North Korea’s nuclear behaviour over time, this book aims to answer three questions. How might we understand North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons? What delinquent behaviour has North Korea deployed over time in relation to its nuclear ambitions and beyond? What have been the outcomes of such delinquency? In answering these questions, this book makes the overarching argument that for North Korea, delinquent behaviour can bring, and has brought, pay-offs. First, it contends that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, over time, have been—and remain—part and parcel of a greater desire for status within the international community. Second, North Korea’s engagement in delinquent behaviour has been far from irrational: rather, it has been strategic. Through pioneering the framework of ‘strategic delinquency’, this book explores the circumstances under which delinquent behaviour has allowed North Korea to gain beneficial outcomes, the types of behaviour in which North Korea has engaged, and the benefits and costs it has gained. North Korea has learnt that although breaking international

3 Michael Elleman, ‘Does Size Matter? North Korea’s Newest ICBM’, 38North, 21 October 2020; Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer, ‘A Titan among Trucks: What North Korea’s “monster” Hwasong-16 TEL Really Means’, NKPro, 20 November 2020. ⁴ Reuters, ‘Clinton Likens North Korea to Unruly Children’, 20 July 2009. ⁵ Rodong Sinmun, ‘DPRK’s Nuclear Deterrence Is Treasured Sword of Nation’, 29 June 2017.

Introduction: When bad behaviour pays

3

norms—not least of nuclear non-proliferation—may initially lower its international reputation and status, it can also reap rewards in so doing. What, therefore, is strategic delinquency? In brief, strategic delinquency refers to the calculated exercise of delinquent—and at times compliant—behaviour with respect to international norms to reap pay-offs, even if delinquent behaviour may initially lower a state’s international standing. For an action to be considered delinquent, it must transgress established norms and conventions of behaviour that are accepted as legitimate within a particular society or order. Within international society, scholarship suggests that dominant norms are set by those actors with the greatest material power and highest social status. In turn, these norms, of which nuclear non-proliferation is one, become intersubjectively accepted as dominant by other powers.⁶ In shedding light on North Korea’s strategic deployment of bad behaviour, this book adopts a North Korea-centric world view as its starting point. Pyongyang’s actions are inextricably related to its historically constructed understanding of the international environment in which it is situated. Only by understanding how North Korea conceptualizes the world around it can we gain a richer account of how it understands ideas of status in the global nuclear order and broader international order and how it behaves in response to its status position with respect to its nuclear ambitions. By drawing upon first-hand interviews with international negotiators with the DPRK and elite and non-elite North Korean defectors, this book sheds light on how North Korea has understood—and continues to understand—its prized possession of its nuclear programme and how it has behaved in response. For Nicholas Miller and Vipin Narang, ‘according to most theories of nuclear proliferation, North Korea did not stand much of a chance of successfully acquiring nuclear weapons. As an economically backward, neopatrimonial regime subject to the threat of preventive strikes and war, North Korea should have failed.’⁷ Yet, North Korea has defied these odds. Rather than ‘failing’, it has been able to ‘muddle through’.⁸ In the face of repeated international condemnation for its behaviour and changes in the geopolitical environment catalysed by the collapse and reform of its Cold War partners, North Korea has continued to behave in ways that diverge from the norms of expected state behaviour in international relations. Seventeen years before he entered the Oval Office, Donald Trump—writing in 2000—asserted how ‘North Korea exports exactly one thing to the rest of the world—trouble.’⁹ Such ⁶ See, e.g. Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ian Clark, ‘International Society and China: The Power of Norms and the Norms of Power’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7(3), 2014, 315–40; Pu Xiaoyu, ‘Socialisation as a Two-Way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(4), 2012, 341–67; Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2004). For a realist perspective on how international order is only legitimate once its norms are acceptable to great powers, see Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (London: Gollancz, 1977). ⁷ Nicholas L. Miller and Vipin Narang, ‘North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We Learn from Its Successful Nuclearization?’, Texas National Security Review, 1(2), 2018, 59. ⁸ Marcus Noland uses this term to describe the DPRK’s survival throughout the famine of the 1990s. See Marcus Noland, ‘Why North Korea Will Muddle Through’, Foreign Affairs, 76(4), July/August 1997, 105–18. ⁹ Donald J. Trump, The America We Deserve (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), 125.

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North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order

‘trouble’—upon which Trump would capitalize as president—has only worsened since the turn of the century. How, therefore, might we understand the DPRK’s behaviour?

North Korea: The known unknown Since its inception in 1948, North Korea has been an object of fascination and frustration for scholars and policymakers. It is a regime-state about which so little is known.1⁰ Everyone seems to have an opinion as to how and why the DPRK behaves in the way it does, symptomatic of the lack of information emanating from the regimestate. Claims such as ‘North Korea only wants to survive’; it ‘wants nuclear weapons to avoid a war with the United States’, or ‘North Korea wants to be integrated into the international community to boost its economy’ are all too common. Whilst these claims are all, to differing extents, true, they overlook a fundamental explanation for the DPRK’s behaviour, namely, status. Such an explanation is vital to understanding why, in the twenty-first century, this underdeveloped country with an economy thirty times smaller than its southern counterpart, continues to behave as if war on the Korean Peninsula is imminent. In a strikingly disparaging—though not incorrect—assessment of the DPRK, the essayist Christopher Hitchens once described the North Korean people as ‘living in the dark, kept in perpetual ignorance and fear, brainwashed into the hatred of others, regimented and coerced and inculcated with a death cult’.11 Over the years, North Korea has been bestowed with countless labels across scholarship, policymaking, and popular perceptions, whether a ‘hermit kingdom’, a ‘rogue’ state, or an outlier to the international community, to name just a few. These labels, however, only shed light on a very small part of the enigma that is the DPRK. Referring to its nuclear programme, former US Secretary of State, George Shultz, remarked in 2018 how ‘North Korea is a small, poor country, and it has some awesome power.’12 By paying attention to how this country has behaved in ways that break international norms as part of a quest for international status, a better understanding of the motivations behind its nuclear behaviour can be gleaned.

North Korea: A history of delinquency Writing in 1970, Chong-sik Lee and Nam-sik Kim described the DPRK as ‘one of the most efficient totalitarian regimes existing in the world today’ whereby ‘through 1⁰ Throughout this book, the author refers to North Korea as a regime-state, given how the survival of the regime and the state remain intimately linked, and, notably, the close tethering of the regime and the state in cultivating domestic support and directing foreign policy. See Edward Howell, ‘The juche H-bomb? North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and Regime-State Survival’, International Affairs, 96(4), 2020, 1051–68. 11 Christopher Hitchens, Arguably: Essays (London: Atlantic Books, 2012), 558. 12 Bloomberg, ‘George Shultz Sees “Different Attitude” from North Korea’, 7 May 2018, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2018-05-06/george-shultz-sees-different-attitude-fromnorth-korea-video (accessed 19 December 2022).

Introduction: When bad behaviour pays

5

purges, systematic purification campaigns, indoctrination, and streamlining of organizations, Kim Il-song has been able to place the twelve million people in North Korea under tight control’.13 Over fifty years later, North Korea may have evolved into what the Workers’ Party bombastically describes as a ‘full-fledged nuclear state’ of nearly 26 million inhabitants, but Lee and Kim’s description still resonates.1⁴ The DPRK has earned a reputation as the epitome of delinquency and does not seem to show remorse for defying international norms. Its human rights record is one of the worst in the world. The Freedom House Index ranks the regime-state 205th out of a total of 210 countries, regarding political rights and civil liberties, ahead only of Turkmenistan, Eritrea, South Sudan, Syria, and Tibet.1⁵ The totalitarian regime has gained notoriety for exerting oppressive ideological and physical control upon its own people and even upon citizens of other countries. Its egregious human rights violations have been harrowingly recounted by defectors and corroborated by a damning UN Commission of Inquiry Report in 2014.1⁶ The imprisonment and beating of US student, Otto Warmbier, whilst visiting Pyongyang in 2016—and his subsequent death— is one of many indictments of the North’s gross breaching of human rights norms. Meanwhile, the DPRK has hitherto conducted six nuclear tests and copious missile launches. At the time of writing, speculation pervades as to when a seventh nuclear test will occur. Not only has North Korea accelerated the scope and sophistication of its nuclear and missile development over time, but also its self-confidence in its status as ‘a full-fledged nuclear power that has been possessed of the most powerful inter-continental ballistic rocket capable of hitting any part of the world’ has bolstered.1⁷ Moreover, a staged event as part of a 2020 documentary, The Mole, by Danish film director, Mads Brügger, revealed the startling reality of North Korea’s desires to engage in clandestine trade of nuclear arms and methamphetamine in exchange for smuggled oil.1⁸ Beyond its nuclear aspirations, North Korea has infiltrated cyberspace. Who can forget when North Korea orchestrated cyberattacks on Sony Pictures in 2014, in response to the release of the comedy, The Interview—a parody of Kim Jong Un—or on the United Kingdom’s National Health Service system,

13 Chong-sik Lee and Nam-sik Kim, ‘Control and Administrative Mechanisms in the North Korean Countryside’, Journal of Asian Studies, 29(2), 1970, 309. 1⁴ See, e.g. KCNA (Korean Central News Agency), ‘WPK’s Line on Simultaneously Carrying on Economic Construction, Building of Nuclear Forces Is Justifiable’, 3 April 2014; Pyongyang Times, ‘Self-Development, Key to Victory and Glory’, 22 January 2016. 1⁵ Freedom House, ‘2022 Countries and Territories’, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/countries/ freedom-world/scores?sort=asc&order=Total%20Score%20and%20Status (accessed 6 January 2023). 1⁶ One outstanding account of North Korea’s human rights violations is Sandra Fahy, Dying for Rights: Putting North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses on the Record (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019). 1⁷ Kim Jong Un made this claim following the test of the DPRK’s first ICBM on 4 July 2017: KCNA, ‘Report of DPRK Academy of Defence Science’, 4 July 2017. 1⁸ BBC, The Mole, available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p08tqd6q (accessed 17 August 2022). For analysis on North Korea’s clandestine trade networks, see Sheena Chestnut, ‘Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks’, International Security, 32(1), 2007, 80–111; David L. Asher, ‘Testimony of David L. Asher, Institute for Defense Analysis’, at ‘North Korea: Illicit Activity Funding the Regime’, Hearing before the Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 25 April 2006, available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28241/htl/CHRG-109shrg28241.htm (accessed 19 December 2022).

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three years afterwards? More recently, in March 2022, over $600 million entered into the coffers of the regime following a North Korean cyber-heist on the non-fungible token-based video game, Axie Infinity.1⁹ With Kim Jong Un intent on maintaining his grip on power, even members of his own family have not been immune from the consequences of his actions: the regime-orchestrated assassination of Kim’s halfbrother, Kim Jong Nam, with VX nerve agent in Kuala Lumpur Airport in 2017 adds to the litany of examples of North Korea’s penchant for delinquency. Engaging in financially and socially costly nuclear and missile development outside of the non-proliferation regime; illicit trade in arms and drugs; chemical weapons attacks and cyberattacks; and, in so doing, evading unilateral and multilateral sanctions would be a ‘cocktail of hamartia’ for any state.2⁰ However, North Korea has continued to pursue its nuclear aspirations under the material constraints of sanctions and social constraints of a lowering of its status such that some scholars have concluded, not unrealistically, that we must learn to live with a nuclear North Korea.21 How has it been able to do so, and what outcomes have ensued? In international relations, state behaviour that breaches international norms is often deemed to be irrational and emotionally charged. The United States, as the global hegemon, has been subject to considerable scrutiny in this vein, with the Global War on Terror after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 being just one example.22 Yet, despite growing scholarship on the role of emotions in foreign policy decision-making,23 inadequate attention has been paid to the actions of ‘rogue’ regimes. With respect to North Korea, as Andrei Lankov argues, although Kim Jong Un’s behaviour may be unpredictable, the regime ‘is just taking logical actions to survive’.2⁴ This book looks at one such far from irrational action: the strategic deployment of delinquent behaviour with respect to the global nuclear order and the wider international order.

Studying North Korea Within the disciplines of International Relations and Political Science, scholarship on North Korea and its nuclear programme has frequently concerned the roles of deterrence, the security dilemma, and rational actor behaviour, which gained popularity in 1⁹ Edward Howell, ‘How North Korea’s Crypto Hackers Are Funding Kim’s Missile Habit’, The Spectator, 26 April 2022. 2⁰ With thanks to Alex Fleming-Brown for this aphorism. 21 Andrei Lankov, ‘Why the United States Will Have to Accept a Nuclear North Korea’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2(3), 2009, 251–64; Toby Dalton, ‘On North Korea’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 September 2020, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/09/on-north-koreapub-82524 (accessed 19 December 2022). 22 See, e.g. Christian Reus-Smit, ‘International Crises of Legitimacy’, International Politics, 44, 2007, 157–74. 23 See, e.g. Keren Yarhi-Milo, Who Fights for Reputation: The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018); Todd H. Hall, Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016). 2⁴ Andrei Lankov, ‘Kim Jong Un Is a Survivor, Not a Madman’, Foreign Policy, 26 April 2017.

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the immediate post-Cold War era.2⁵ Yet, the argument that nuclear weapons allow the DPRK to sustain its regime through maintaining deterrence against the United States provides only a partial understanding of the DPRK’s behaviour and its domestic and foreign policy goals. Why states behave delinquently having acquired weaponized nuclear capabilities remains unconsidered, especially if nuclear possession brings both security and insecurity, together with a range of social and material costs, to the possessor. Of course, North Korea values deterrence and, importantly, regime stability and survival, but central to North Korea’s behaviour is how it orders the world around it in social and material terms. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the DPRK’s construction of the US ‘hostile policy’ as a core ideological prism through which it frames its external environment. Understanding the nuclear order—and wider international order—in terms of ‘how social kinds are put together’, as Alexander Wendt highlights, especially the ‘social kind’ of the North Korean regime-state, offers a helpful complement to existing approaches focusing on deterrence and security.2⁶ Beyond security concerns, scholarship on why some states choose to nuclearize and defy the non-proliferation norm has focused on domestic economic interests,2⁷ role identity factors,2⁸ the allure of incentives,2⁹ and cognitive factors.3⁰ Within the academic discipline of International Relations, theoretical approaches in line with the English School and social constructivism have extensively underscored how the socialization pressures of international society may induce states to comply with dominant norms, such as of nuclear non-proliferation, given the status value of being recognized as a norm-abiding actor.31 However, North Korea has done precisely the opposite. Just what existing scholarship overlooks is how delinquency has become a response for North Korea against its self-inflicted position of marginalization within international society and how, through delinquent behaviour, it has sought—and obtained—benefits. There remains a wealth of literature analysing North Korea’s broader domestic and foreign policies, which comprises analysis of its nuclear programme, human 2⁵ Benjamin Frankel, ‘The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation’, Security Studies, 2(3–4), 1993, 37–78; Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds, The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (London: Frank Cass, 1993); John M. Deutch, ‘The New Nuclear Threat’, Foreign Affairs, 71, 1992, 120–35; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15(4), 1990, 5–56. 2⁶ Alexander Wendt, ‘On Constitution and Causation in International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 24(5), 1998, 103. 2⁷ Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 2⁸ Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 2⁹ Alexander H. Montgomery, ‘Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network’, International Security, 30(2), 2005, 153–87. 3⁰ Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate’, Nonproliferation Review, 4(1), 1996, 43–60. 31 See, e.g. Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019); Iver B. Neumann, ‘Russia as a Great Power, 1815– 2007’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 11(2), 2008, 128–51; James M. Goldgeier and Philip E. Tetlock, ‘Psychology and International Relations Theory’, Annual Review of Political Science, 4, 2001, 67–92.

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rights violations, and the evolution of domestic policy from the state’s inception under Kim Il Sung to the contemporary rule of Kim Jong Un.32 A smaller corpus of scholarship has focused on the influence of domestic stakeholders on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. In one example, Daniel Pinkston posits how domestic interest groups of ‘the Korean Workers Party elite and the National Defence Commission have the greatest influence over missile development policy’.33 That said, rarely have the regime-state’s nuclear endeavours been analysed with a North Korean world view as its starting point, which this book hopes to remedy. Analyses of the DPRK remain hampered by the lack of access to the state and dearth of information about domestic and foreign policymaking. Nonetheless, such scarcity of information should not detract from the pursuit of academic inquiry into this country. As Samuel S. Kim reminds us, ‘the secrecy of the DPRK system and the paucity of data is stimulus to theorizing’.3⁴ Not unrelated to such paucity of data is the breadth of critique of existing accounts of the regime-state’s behaviour. In one such example, B.R. Myers laments how: by far the most common mistake, however, has been the projection of Western or South Korean values and common sense onto the North Koreans. For example: having been bombed flat by the Americans in the 1950s, the DPRK must be fearful for its security, it must want the normalization of relations with Washington.³⁵

Myers’s somewhat pessimistic conclusion is only partially accurate. As this book will show, North Korea does desire and—at times—has sought normalization of relations with the United States whilst concurrently strengthening its nuclear programme. Nevertheless, Myers’s criticisms are not incorrect, for they point to a fundamental issue. To gain a richer understanding of how North Korea behaves in relation to the global nuclear order, and for what purposes, we must recognize how the DPRK views international order, its position within it, and how it responds to such positioning. It is for this reason that this book proffers a North Korea-centric outlook on international order. It goes without saying that doing so does not equate to showing sympathy for the ruling regime, which is brutal, oppressive, and a deplorable violator of domestic and international norms. Yet, if feasible policy solutions to the ‘North Korea problem’ are to be devised, we must try and understand how this country and its leaders view themselves and the world around them. 32 See, e.g. Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Ken E. Gause, North Korean House of Cards: Leadership Dynamics under Kim Jong-un (Washington, DC: Committee of Human Rights in North Korea, 2015); For accounts of Kim Jong Un, see Anna Fifield, The Great Successor: The Divinely Perfect Destiny of Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019); Jung H. Pak, Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator (New York: Penguin Random House, 2020). 33 Daniel A. Pinkston, ‘Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program’, Nonproliferation Review, 10(2), 2003, 11. 3⁴ Samuel S. Kim, ‘In Search of a Theory of North Korean Foreign Policy’. In: Samuel S. Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 6. 3⁵ B.R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2010), 8.

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Recent studies have shown that North Korean provocations tend to decrease in frequency and intensity when bilateral and multilateral negotiations are ongoing. Yet, why might diplomacy have a ‘restraining effect on the number of provocations’?3⁶ Analyses have underscored how the DPRK has made instrumental use of its nuclear programme for the purposes of brinkmanship and bargaining, especially when negotiations with the United States do take place.3⁷ That said, is the ‘North Korean nuclear challenge [. . .] now best thought of as a deterrence problem rather than a denuclearization one’?3⁸ The question of how and why this state behaves in ways that defy the nuclear order, having acquired nuclear weapons, remains unanswered. Thus, by focusing on how North Korea understands its position within the global nuclear order and international order as social orders, this book seeks to remedy this problematique. As will be seen, through strategic delinquency and framing its deployment of delinquent and compliant behaviour in response to the US ‘hostile policy’, North Korea has been rewarded.

North Korea: Who decides? Given its totalitarian political system underpinned by the state ideology of juche (commonly translated as ‘self-reliance’), it is hardly surprising that the leader of the ‘uniquely unique’ North Korean regime-state is central to domestic and foreign policy decision-making.3⁹ International negotiators with the DPRK frequently remark upon the difficulties of negotiating with the North owing to the unwavering message discipline of their northern counterparts. As former US Special Representative for North Korea Policy during the Trump administration, Stephen Biegun, asserted in the wake of US–DPRK negotiations at Hanoi and Stockholm in 2019: ‘there’s not a word uttered that isn’t connected to the top’. The North Korean ‘system does not allow for thinking on the fly’.⁴⁰ Outlining his frustration in negotiating with North Korea, a former US intelligence official recognized the plight of his North Korean counterparts, remarking to the author how: ‘They don’t have that much leeway themselves in 3⁶ Lisa Collins, ‘25 Years of Negotiations and Provocations: North Korea and the United States’, CSIS Beyond Parallel, 2017, available at: https://beyondparallel.csis.org/25-years-of-negotiations-provocations (accessed 20 August 2022). 3⁷ Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US–North Korea Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Ramon Pacheco Pardo, North Korea–US Relations under Kim Jong Il: The Quest for Normalization? (New York: Routledge, 2014). 3⁸ Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen, ‘Conclusion: Deterrence and Beyond’. In: Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen, eds, North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 195. Kim and Cohen acknowledge the difficulties in determining whether the DPRK’s nuclear weapons are solely for deterrent purposes. See also: David C. Kang, ‘Rethinking North Korea’, Asian Survey, 35(3), 1995, 253–67; David C. Kang, ‘Threatening, but Deterrence Works’. In: Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, eds, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, 2nd edn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 41–70. 3⁹ Sung-Yoon Lee, ‘North Korean Exceptionalism and South Korean Conventionalism: Prospects for a Reverse Formulation?’, Asia Policy, 15, 2013, 62. ⁴⁰ NKNews, ‘An Interview with Stephen Biegun’, NKNews Podcast, Episode 191, 14 July 2021, available at: https://www.nknews.org/category/north-korea-news-podcast/older-podcasts/an-interview-withstephen-biegun-nknews-podcast-ep-191/902590/ (Accessed 5 January 2023).

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the negotiations [. . .] you have to keep going back to Pyongyang to get the mission to move on language, to move on issues.’⁴1 When one speaks of North Korea’s ‘national interest’, one often refers to the ‘leadership interest’, given how the leader, ruling over the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) has ‘almost total power’ over domestic and foreign policy.⁴2 Yet, as Patrick McEachern reminds us, there is ‘limited institutional plurality’ within the domestic political system.⁴3 For instance, despite the personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung, competing interest groups to the WPK both existed and gained more prominent roles in decision-making following the first power transition to his son, Kim Jong Il, in 1994.⁴⁴ These groups comprised the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the National Defence Commission (which, in 2016 was replaced by the State Affairs Commission), and the Cabinet. Following Kim Jong Il’s accession to power, the role of the Party declined, and that of the KPA rose as the second Kim consolidated power by ensuring control and loyalty of the military.⁴⁵ The transition of power to Kim Jong Un—the grandson of Kim Il Sung—in 2011 saw the erosion of his father’s ‘militaryfirst’ or songun politics. Rather, the young leader reasserted the importance of the Party akin to the days of his grandfather, purging and removing senior military officials in June 2018 and stressing complete loyalty to him as leader, given how many officials had served under his father.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Thomas Schäfer, a former German Ambassador to the DPRK, questions whether Kim Jong Un is the ‘sole ruler’. In his self-published account, Schäfer mentions how Kim Jong Un: is perhaps not even the most powerful man in North Korea. Rather, I believe that the country is governed by a precarious collective, whose composition varies and in which individuals sometimes have weaker, sometimes stronger influence, and whose personal power base is based not only on their formal positions, but also on informal networks of relationships

whereby ‘the leadership circle is often recruited from the ranks of old “revolutionary” families whose founders were comrades-in-arms of Kim Il Sung’. Although ‘there may be personal and political differences between them, they have a common interest in ⁴1 US intelligence official (interview, 2019). ⁴2 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 4. ⁴3 Patrick McEachern, ‘Interest Groups in North Korean Politics’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 8(2), 2008, 235. ⁴⁴ Charles K. Armstrong, ‘The Nature, Origins, and Development of the North Korean State’. In: Samuel S. Kim, ed., The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 39–64; Ken E. Gause, North Korea under Kim Chong-Il: Power, Politics, and Prospects for Change (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011). ⁴⁵ Terence Roehrig, ‘The Roles and Influence of the Military’. In: Park Kyung-Ae and Scott Snyder, eds, North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 47–57; Dae-Sook Suh, ‘Military-First Politics of Kim Jong Il’, Asian Perspective, 26(3), 2002, 145–67. ⁴⁶ Hyonhee Shin and Josh Smith, ‘North Korea’s Three New Military Leaders Are Loyal to Kim, Not Policies’, Reuters, 4 June 2014.

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preserving the system and, for reasons of legitimacy, in continuing the Kim dynasty’. These individuals, Schäfer alludes, most likely comprise representatives of the armed forces and the bodies responsible for personnel and internal security, in particular the Central Committee Department for Organization and Guidance. This department is responsible for all important personnel decisions and maintains the authority over state security. It was an important instrument by which Kim Jong Il ruled.⁴⁷

That the roles of competing interest groups during the rule of Kim Jong Un— compared to that of Kim Jong Il—may not be as a large as assumed is an important theme upon which this book could elaborate at length. The leader himself is not exempt from factional disputes within and between the Party, military, and elite families; many of the latter exert considerable influence over economic policy. Indeed, North Korean society is socially stratified according to songbun, or proximity to the regime, where an individual’s personal status is tied to their family’s historical loyalty to the regime. Fundamentally, however, the focus of this book is less on the processes of decision-making but more on the outcomes, interactions in international relations, and what we see in North Korea’s final behavioural choices with respect to the nuclear order and international order.

Global nuclear order What is the global nuclear order? Although frequently invoked in scholarship and policymaking, the term has remained elusive to definition. First mentioned— although, ironically, not defined—by Michael Mandelbaum in 1977,⁴⁸ one definition refers to ‘the international order developed to address a distinctive set of problems, issues and goals associated with nuclear technology’.⁴⁹ At the heart of the nuclear order is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which bifurcates signatories to the Treaty into nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). NWS are legally permitted to possess weaponized nuclear capabilities and comprise those states that tested a nuclear device before 1 January 1967, of which there are five: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia. All other states must sign the Treaty as NNWS and renounce their weaponized nuclear ambitions. In addition to these five states, there are also four additional states that possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. These states have ⁴⁷ Thomas Schäfer, From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: How the Hardliners Prevailed (Independently published, 2021), 164. ⁴⁸ Michael Mandelbaum, ‘International Stability and Nuclear Order: The First Nuclear Order: The First Nuclear Regime’, in David C. Gompert, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard L. Garwin, and John H. Barton, eds, Nuclear Weapons and World Politics: Alternatives for the Future (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), 15–80. ⁴⁹ William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order (London: Routledge, 2011), 10.

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weaponized either without having acceded to the NPT or as is unique to North Korea, having signed and subsequently withdrawn from the Treaty.⁵⁰ Notably, Iran signed and ratified the NPT in 1970 but was found in noncompliance with its NPT obligations. Following the US and Iranian withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) deal of 2015, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence expressed concern that ‘Iranian officials have abandoned some of Iran’s commitments and resumed some nuclear activities that exceed the JCPOA limits.’⁵1 Although North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT was of its own volition, it is no exaggeration to say that the regime-state’s actions have contributed to its marginalized position within the global nuclear order. Nevertheless, existing scholarship has rarely narrated the nuclear order from the perspectives of ‘rogue’ actors.⁵2 Doing so is a pressing task, given the challenges posed by these actors to the stability of the nuclear order and regional and global security. As will be seen, North Korea’s framing of international order, and how it behaves, remains inextricably tied to its conceptualization of the United States, and the United States’ role as the global hegemon and custodian of the global nuclear order. We thus cannot understand North Korea’s delinquent nuclear behaviour without understanding its relationship with the United States. Nonetheless, how does North Korea interact with the nuclear order, the broader international order, and the United States itself? This book terms such interactions to form an approach of ‘strategic delinquency’, central to which is how delinquent behaviour might, contra common belief, elevate a state’s status.

What is status? Often conflated with the similar but not identical terms of prestige and reputation, the notion of status has formed the subject of lively scholarly attention in the academic field of International Relations. This book adopts the definition of status proffered by Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, referring to ‘collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capacities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, and diplomatic clout)’, which form a ‘relative social relationship involving hierarchy and deference’.⁵3 ⁵⁰ North Korea remains the only state to have signed—in 1985—and withdrawn—in 2003—from the NPT. Of note, Israel’s nuclear policy is one of ‘nuclear opacity’ whereby it has neither confirmed nor denied its possession of nuclear weapons. See Avner Cohen, ‘Israel’s Nuclear Future: Iran, Opacity, and the Vision of Global Zero’. In: Catherine M. Kelleher and Judith Reppy, eds, Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 187–206. ⁵1 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community’, 9 April 2021, 14. ⁵2 The term rogue, in reference to North Korea, was catalysed by President Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ statement in 2002. Following the removal of the DPRK as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) in 2008, the term declined in usage but revived following its redesignation as a SST on 20 November 2017. ⁵3 Deborah Welch Larson, T.V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Status and World Order’. In T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds, Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 13.

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In so doing, this book does not purely render status as synonymous with material prestige, which remains the predominant concern of realist accounts. Rather, in adopting the aforementioned definition, this book defines a state’s status as composed both of material clout, such as military or economic capabilities, and its ability to fulfil social responsibilities within international society. When this book describes actions as elevating or lowering a state’s international status, both material and social facets of status must be considered. In line with understandings of status as comprising a relationship of hierarchy, positive status refers to an elevation in a state’s status within a particular order, of which the global nuclear order is just one example. It is frequently gained when a state conforms with dominant material and social norms. By contrast, negative status is the obverse: a lowering of a state’s status owing to behaviour that deviates from dominant norms and the resultant disapproval and opprobrium from international society. Importantly, understandings of status can remain in the eyes of the beholder. For example, even if other states may seek to weaken North Korea’s international status owing to its violations of nuclear norms, Pyongyang insists to domestic and international audiences that it has the righteous status of a great power, exercising legitimate measures to defend against an antagonistic United States.⁵⁴ For example, the Kim Jong Il regime’s slogan of creating a ‘strong and prosperous nation’ (kangsong taeguk), demonstrates just how Pyongyang perceived—and continues to perceive—its international status, corroborated, in recent years, by its expanding nuclear and missile capabilities.⁵⁵

Strategic delinquency in international relations Through the framework of strategic delinquency, this book makes the overarching argument that North Korea has engaged strategically in different types of delinquent behaviour in anticipation of the ensuing dividends and as part of a quest for greater international status. ‘Strategic delinquency’ demonstrates just how state behaviour that breaks international norms can lead to positive outcomes. The framework challenges existing claims in scholarship whereby norm-breaking behaviour inflicts little more than opprobrium and stigma and lowers a state’s status, especially if the state already occupies a weak social or material position within international order. Delinquency comprises ‘acts, the detection of which is thought to result in the punishment of the person committing them by agents of the larger society’⁵⁶ such as those that ‘violate institutionalized expectations [. . .] which are shared as legitimate within a social system’.⁵⁷ Yet, deviating from expected behaviour may, in fact, ⁵⁴ Pekka Korhonen and Tomoomi Mori, ‘North Korea as a Small Great Power’, Asia-Pacific Journal, 17(5), 2019, 13. ⁵⁵ Rodong Sinmun, ‘Let Us Go All Out for a General Onward March to Build a Kangsong Taeguk’, 5 January 1999. ⁵⁶ Travis Hirschi, Causes of Delinquency (Berkeley, CA: University of Columbia Press, 1969), 47. ⁵⁷ Albert K. Cohen, Deviance and Control (Hoboken, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966), 462.

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catalyse beneficial outcomes, especially if states leverage their opposition to the strictures of international order and the initial low status that ensues. North Korea is one example. This framework makes a twofold scholarly contribution. First, it broadens the theoretical focus of existing literature, which is largely concerned with how states attain positive outcomes through conforming with dominant norms, of which nuclear non-proliferation is one example. The recent flurry of scholarship on social status, particularly emanating from the social constructivist school of International Relations, has advanced understandings of status beyond realist accounts, the latter whereby status remains intertwined with notions of material prestige. Even so, these recent accounts remain clustered around the status ambitions of rising powers, such as China and Russia,⁵⁸ or how smaller states can elevate their international standing through upholding existing norms of international society, such as by acting as mediators of interstate conflict.⁵⁹ The potential for the infliction of negative status to lead to positive outcomes remains overlooked. Second, the framework contributes to scholarship on North Korea, offering a new perspective on analysing the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions. In so doing, it goes further than approaches that focus solely either on ideational concerns or rationalist approaches concerning nuclear deterrence, in sympathy with neoclassical realism and the influence of systemic and domestic-level variables on state behaviour.⁶⁰ In pioneering the framework of strategic delinquency, this book argues how, over time, North Korea has leveraged delinquent behaviour as a route towards beneficial outcomes and, in so doing, has been willing to accept the trade-offs of such behaviour. In brief, the framework of strategic delinquency focuses on three types of delinquent behaviour: norm transgression, provocation, and deception. It highlights how, whilst these forms of delinquency can bring costs, they can also bring benefits, comprising security through nuclear deterrence, regime survival, and economic assistance (material benefits); and recognition as an equal nuclear power, sovereign state, and significant international actor (social benefits). Through exercising strategic delinquency, this book argues how, over a series of crises from the early 1990s until the second decade of the twenty-first century, North Korea has learnt the value of transgressing dominant international norms in anticipation of the social and material pay-offs that may arise. The benefits obtained ⁵⁸ See, e.g. Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy’, International Security, 34(4), 2010, 63–95; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, ‘Managing Rising Powers: The Role of Status Concerns’. In: Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics, 33–57; Anne Clunan, ‘Historical Aspirations and the Domestic Politics of Russia’s Pursuit of International Status’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47(3–4), 281–90. ⁵⁹ William C. Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking’, Review of International Studies, 44(3), 2018, 526–46. ⁶⁰ For one example of neoclassical realism, see Randall L. Schweller, ‘Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 11(1), 23–48.

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from past norm-defiant actions have informed decision-making behind subsequent actions. Yet, although the DPRK might be a state for which breaking norms can bring—and has brought—dividends, it is important to remember that North Korea does not always behave delinquently. As the strategic delinquency framework shows, by engaging in a repertoire of delinquent and compliant behaviour, North Korea can mitigate the costs of delinquency. For instance, Pyongyang pledged to freeze its nuclear production in 1994 and 2005, announced a moratorium on long-range missile and nuclear testing in 2017, and stressed that it would ‘never use nuclear weapons nor transfer nuclear weapons [. . .] unless there are nuclear threat[s] [. . .] against the DPRK’.⁶1 Yet, the DPRK does not wish to compromise upon its national interests, which comprise the pursuit of two simultaneous and conflicting goals that remain unacceptable for international society: first, developing nuclear and missile capabilities; second, international recognition and acceptance as a de facto nuclear state and significant power. It is important to recognize how the North Korean regime deems delinquent actions to be justified. It often vindicates its nuclear aspirations as necessary for selfdefence and deterrence, resisting what it describes as a ‘hostile policy’ originating from the United States and reflected in the wider international order.⁶2 According to North Korea, US leadership of the liberal international order aims to ‘create the conditions for forcing the DPRK to drop arms and toppling its social system’.⁶3 Even during its membership of the NPT, the DPRK routinely flouted core nuclear norms of non-proliferation and nuclear restraint through covert development of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU); and clandestine nuclear exchange with, inter alia, Pakistan, Syria, and Libya.⁶⁴ In understanding North Korea’s pursuit of delinquency, this book incorporates rich empirical analysis. Interviews with elite international negotiators with North Korea and elite and non-elite North Korean defectors are coupled with in-depth analysis of North Korean and international policy sources. Not incorrectly, Victor Cha, former Deputy Head of the US Delegation to the Six-Party Talks—under the George W. Bush administration—stressed the arduous nature of studying ‘North Korean perceptions and behaviour based on hard evidence. North Korea is the blackest of black boxes and no such reliable information is available.’⁶⁵ Despite growing scholarship on domestic politics, the lack of access to the DPRK for the purposes of research, inability to interview North Korean government officials, and a dearth of available archival materials pertaining to its nuclear ambitions, render it difficult ⁶1 Rodong Sinmun, ‘New Year Address of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un for 2019’, 1 January 2019. ⁶2 Chapters 1 and 2 of this volume offer detailed analysis of the ‘hostile policy’. ⁶3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at First Session of 14th SPA’, 13 April 2019. ⁶⁴ Article II of the NPT states how any non-nuclear state agrees ‘not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’. ⁶⁵ Victor D. Cha, ‘The Rationale for “Enhanced” Engagement of North Korea: After the Perry Policy Review’, Asian Survey, 39(6), 1999, 847.

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to analyse the regime-state.⁶⁶ The secrecy within which the DPRK’s nuclear programme is shrouded cannot be underestimated, given the bureaucratic structures of the ruling party. As one South Korean diplomat stressed to the author, ‘even the North Korean Ministry of Defence would not know anything about his country’s nuclear programme’ since the key agencies aware of nuclear developments remain the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Bureau of Atomic Energy.⁶⁷ Hence, to gain meaningful insight into North Korea’s nuclear behaviour, a more original methodological approach is required. Triangulating interviews with documentary analysis sheds light on first-hand accounts of the ‘targets of North Korean behaviour’ and rhetoric—namely, international negotiators—together with the official North Korean perspective on its nuclear programme.⁶⁸ Since North Korea’s nuclear behaviour also targets domestic—as well as international—audiences, North Korean defectors were a ‘loose proxy’ for the diverse domestic perceptions of the regime and state, given their range in social standing.⁶⁹ Interviews with US, South Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian policymakers offered first-hand insight into negotiations with the DPRK and the actions of their North Korean counterparts. Nonetheless, given how many interviewees had served in, advised, or continue to advise various governments during different time periods, and have been anonymized to protect their identities, their claims should not be treated as unembellished truth. Many interviewees admitted how even when sat across the negotiating table from their North Korean counterparts, they struggled to ascertain the true intentions of their counterparts’ statements. Yet, even if interview evidence may indicate how these interlocutors perceived North Korea’s intentions, rather than North Korea’s intentions per se, they nonetheless offer a rich source of empirical evidence. Korean and English-language versions of North Korean state media—renowned for its hyperbolic rhetoric—were analysed, namely, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA); Rodong Sinmun; Uriminzokkiri; Naenara News, and the Pyongyang Times. Although frequently dismissed as braggadocio, the sheer state control over media outlets means that they provide the most accurate, available representation of the North Korean regime’s position towards its domestic and foreign policies. Whilst English-language versions tend to be directed at foreign audiences, those in Korean more often target the domestic population. Triangulating pronouncements in both languages allowed analysis of how the regime communicates its foreign policies to ⁶⁶ For David Kang, the difficulties of interrogating North Korean state media pronouncements are compounded by the lack of clarity between ‘what competing policymakers write for public consumption and their own preferences’. See David Kang, ‘They Think They’re Normal: Enduring Questions and New Research on North Korea—a Review Essay’, International Security, 36(3), 2012, 145. Suk-Young Kim highlights how primary source materials are confined to archives in the United States containing North Korean documents from 1945 to 1950—before the DPRK joined the nuclear order—as well as films, documentaries, and books from the late 1950s. See Suk-Young Kim, Illusive Utopia: Theater, Film, and Everyday Performance in North Korea (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 319. ⁶⁷ Republic of Korea (ROK) negotiator (interview, 2019) ⁶⁸ Pacheco Pardo, North Korea–US Relations under Kim Jong Il, 14. ⁶⁹ Jieun Baek, North Korea’s Hidden Revolution: How the Information Underground Is Transforming a Closed Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 128.

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domestic and international audiences. Speeches of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, and official pronouncements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—one key negotiating body with the United States—were also consulted. WikiLeaks cables containing transcripts of meetings between North Korean officials and their US, South Korean, and Chinese counterparts revealed third-party perceptions of North Korea’s motivations behind its behaviour and verbatim comments made by North Korean officials. Recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency and US State Department files, together with archival documents from the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and the International Atomic Energy Agency Archives in Vienna illuminated North Korea’s relationship with international order before and after it joined the NPT. The totalitarian nature of the North Korean state renders it unwise to demonstrate—in a positivist sense—any causal relationship between types of North Korean behaviour, their outcomes, and motivations. Doing so is antithetical to the aim of the book. Rather, the book offers an exploratory narrative of the types of behaviour in which North Korea has engaged over time and the outcomes that have ensued.

Outline of the book Before understanding North Korea’s behaviour with respect to international order and the global nuclear order, it is vital to understand North Korea’s world view. Chapter 1 explores North Korea’s outlook on international relations since the regimestate’s inception in 1948. It argues how the DPRK’s world view was primarily influenced by two facets: first, the legacy of pre-war Japanese colonialism, central to shaping its state identity; and second, Pyongyang’s heuristic of the US ‘hostile policy’ in which it positioned itself—ideologically and politically—in opposition to the United States following the division of the Peninsula after the Second World War. During the early Cold War era, North Korea’s ambitions vis-à-vis international order remained heavily influenced by its resentment of the post-war liberal international order created and institutionalized by the United States; its early initial economic success following the end of the Korean War compared to its southern counterpart; its partnerships with its Cold War patrons of China and the Soviet Union (USSR); and a desire to enhance its status as a then new state. This desire intensified following China’s nuclear test in 1964, the consolidation of the nuclear order with the establishment of the NPT, the nuclear ambitions of South Korea in the 1970s, and Soviet and Chinese turns to Seoul at the end of the Cold War. As this chapter emphasizes, the US ‘hostile policy’ remains a fundamental, lasting justification by the regime for its delinquent behaviour in opposition to the global nuclear order. Chapter 2 presents the framework of strategic delinquency as an heuristic through which to understand North Korea’s behaviour. Drawing on the importance of negative status in international relations, this framework demonstrates how, whilst norm-breaking behaviour may initially lower a state’s status and inflict costs, it

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can also bring beneficial outcomes, as the case of North Korea shows. Thus, North Korea’s behaviour is anything but irrational. In putting forth this framework, this chapter offers a typology of delinquent behaviour—norm transgression, deception, provocation—and the material and social benefits that can ensue, which comprise deterrence; economic benefits; regime survival (material); and recognition as a sovereign, equal, and significant actor (social). This chapter then considers two alternative explanations for North Korea’s delinquent nuclear behaviour, namely, deterrence and domestic legitimacy. In so doing, this chapter makes clear how statuscentred explanations must be considered in tandem with, and not in opposition to, these alternative accounts. Being seen as an ‘unruly teenager’, therefore, may not, after all, be so undesirable for North Korea. The next four chapters apply the framework of strategic delinquency to four time periods with respect to North Korea: the ‘first nuclear crisis’ of the 1990s (Chapter 3), the ‘second nuclear crisis’ of the 2000s (Chapter 4), the Obama administration (Chapter 5), and North Korea’s revealing behaviour during the Trump administration (Chapter 6). Each chapter traces North Korea’s behaviour in diverging from, or complying with, nuclear and wider international norms and the resultant costs, benefits, and trade-offs, drawing upon rich empirical evidence and analysis. Chapter 3 contends that North Korea’s penchant for delinquency preceded its accession to the NPT in 1985. Yet, even after it joined the NPT as a NNWS, it continued to transgress institutionalized norms whilst seeking to normalize relations with the United States. Culminating in the signing of the US–DPRK Agreed Framework in October 1994, the ‘first nuclear crisis’ saw the DPRK learn how provocative behaviour could bring negotiations with the United States. Moving to the second nuclear crisis from 2002 to 2009, Chapter 4 traces the collapse of the Agreed Framework, and argues how, despite a pro-engagement administration in Seoul under Kim Dae-jung, the arrival of the Bush administration in 2001 and its hawkish approach towards North Korea catalysed further North Korean delinquency. During this time, Pyongyang pursued two conflicting goals: normalization of relations with the United States and accelerated weaponized nuclear development. Its pursuit of these goals became increasingly determined following its self-declared withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. The multilateral Six-Party Talks, which aimed to bring the North into recompliance with its nuclear obligations, would fail and be exploited by the DPRK to engage in bilateral dialogue with the United States. During the ‘second nuclear crisis’, the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 and its second in 2009, after withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks when it felt no benefits could arise. Chapter 5 applies the framework of strategic delinquency to the Obama administration. This juncture offers a useful counter-example to the idea that delinquent behaviour will bring beneficial outcomes. The administration’s lack of high-level dialogue with North Korea was epitomized by its policy of ‘strategic patience’, which it deemed to be a middle ground between engaging and containing the DPRK. This chapter argues how, during this time, coupled with the reticence of the United States to engage with the DPRK, North Korea’s external environment changed further,

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with a conservative turn in the South Korean administration and growing imposition of unilateral and multilateral sanctions. After the domestic power transition to Kim Jong Un in 2011, Pyongyang persisted evermore determinedly to reach its coveted status of a nuclear-armed state. The lack of international rewards reaped only heightened its delinquency. Chapter 6 concerns the revealing behaviour of North Korea in the context of the Trump administration in Washington and the pro-engagement approach of the Moon Jae-in administration in Seoul. The period from 2017 to the end of 2019 saw dramatic shifts in North Korean behaviour: initial escalation of rhetoric between Washington and Pyongyang triggered fears of nuclear war, especially after North Korea launched three intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2017. These heightened tensions were followed by unanticipated US–DPRK and inter-Korean presidentiallevel summitry in 2018 and interpersonal communications between Trump and Kim Jong Un. Nevertheless, inter-Korean and US–DPRK relations eventually broke down in the latter half of 2019. Central to this brief period of de-escalation was the North’s self-declaration, in 2018, of having completed its nuclear programme and obtained nuclear status. This chapter contends that although the DPRK benefited from the optics of leader-to-leader summitry, North Korea’s ultimate ambition was to achieve sanctions relief from the United States. When multiple rounds of summitry failed to achieve this goal, the DPRK retreated from dialogue and continued its nuclear delinquency. The concluding chapter provides an overview of this theoretical and empirical findings of this book, illuminating the puzzle of why North Korea exercises delinquent behaviour despite exhibiting the desire for greater international recognition and status. This chapter suggests how the framework of strategic delinquency may shed light on the behaviour of other ‘rogue’ states that violate the norms of the nuclear order, such as Iran, Pakistan, or Israel. An epilogue follows this chapter, updating North Korea’s behaviour to the present day as the regime-state grapples with domestic and international changes: the implications of the coronavirus pandemic from January 2020, the elections of Joe Biden as President of the United States in November 2020, and of Yoon Suk-yeol as President of South Korea in March 2022. Given how North Korea orders international relations, the epilogue underscores how the ‘North Korea problem’ is not limited to its nuclear ambitions. As the Biden administration continues to implement its North Korea policy, and as South Korea witnesses a conservative turn in leadership, North Korea is unlikely to abandon its framing of international relations through the US ‘hostile policy’ unless Washington makes the first move.

1 The world through Pyongyang’s eyes How does North Korea conceptualize international order, and how has its world view developed over time? In 1993, a US Central Intelligence Agency estimate reached two somewhat unsurprising conclusions in this regard: first, that ‘Pyongyang continues to behave in ways that are counterproductive to its desperate need for Western economic assistance’ and, second, that North Koreans ‘mistrust the outside world and view international relations as a win–lose game in which they hold a weak hand’.1 What is somewhat ironic, however, is that the document, entitled ‘The World through Pyongyang’s Eyes’, failed to explain just how and why North Korea understands the international environment in which it is situated in these ways. Only by delving deeper into the origins and evolution of North Korea’s mistrust of the world around it can a richer understanding of North Korea’s behaviour—including its delinquent behaviour—vis-à-vis international order be ascertained. This chapter offers a comprehensive historical analysis and overview on just what comprises a North Korean perspective on international relations. At its core, this chapter argues how North Korea’s world view stands in stark contrast to that of the Western liberal international order. Despite the inception of the regime-state in 1948 in the aftermath of the Second World War, North Korea’s outlook on international relations, the evolution of its state identity, and its quest for international status, were heavily influenced by the pre-war legacies of Japanese imperial rule over the then unified Korean Peninsula. Coupled with these legacies was the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) antagonism towards the United States, a resentment which became further entrenched after the inconclusive end of the Korean War and from which North Korea would develop the notion of a US ‘hostile policy’. The US ‘hostile policy’ would become a formative ideological prism through which Pyongyang would view the world and engage with it—not least with the nuclear order—in years to come. Beyond its resentment for Japanese colonialism and the United States, its allies, and US-led liberal international order, this chapter contends that central influences on North Korea’s outlook on international relations in the early Cold War era included its initial economic success compared to South Korea and the ideological exceptionalism granted by its partnership with the Sino-Soviet alliance and global communist movement. A then new state, led by Kim Il Sung, North Korea craved international recognition, status, and legitimacy, which intensified following China’s first nuclear 1 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World through P’yongyang’s Eyes’, 18 March 1993.

North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order. Edward Howell, Oxford University Press. © Edward Howell (2023). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192888327.003.0002

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test in 1964. As relations between Beijing and Moscow soured, however, Pyongyang turned to the Third World, attempting to cultivate a leadership role in the NonAligned Movement. Its efforts would be unsuccessful, plagued by problems closer to home. As Japan and South Korea experienced rapid economic booms, and gained international status, the DPRK’s economy would undergo a precipitous decline, and North Korea would rapidly lose its status as the more economically prosperous Korea. Moreover, South Korea’s brief but concerted nuclear ambitions of its own would further cement North Korea’s framing of the international environment as ‘hostile’. Importantly, the paltry nature of North Korea’s economy in the 1980s would detract its once close allies of the Soviet Union (USSR) and China, whose overtures towards establishing relations with South Korea, coupled with the subsequent end of the Cold War, dealt the North the final blow. Having lost the support of its patrons, North Korea’s perspective of international relations as a set of hostile structures would only intensify, paving the way for its nuclear ambitions as a path towards greater status.

Korea: Unified by name but not by nature Much of how both North and South Korea conceptualized their own respective identities in the aftermath of the Second World War stemmed from their tumultuous pre-war history as a single, unified Peninsula. The North Korean leadership has often been described as ‘dynastic’.2 Some perspectives go so far as to equate the Kim regime with quasi-religion, defined by the deification of the Kim regime and the personality cult of leadership.3 Yet, before its division, the unified Korea was ruled dynastically in a more typical sense of the word. Korea was ruled by a series of successive dynasties prior to its annexation by Japan in 1910. The Three Kingdoms of Korea—Goguryeo, Silla, and Baekje—exerted control over differing areas of the territory from 57 bc to 668 ad. Whilst the Goguryeo controlled the northern half of the Peninsula, the Silla and Baekje dominated the southern half. Yet, though unified in name, the Peninsula was far from peaceful. The Goguryeo would often engage in territorial conflict with the Silla and Baekje and with Chinese dynasties. As Lee Ki-baik asserts: ‘Only through warfare could they 2 See, e.g. Virginie Grzelczyk, ‘In the Name of the Father, Son, and Grandson: Succession Patterns and the Kim Dynasty’, Journal of Northeast Asian History, 9(2), 2012, 33–68; An Tai Sung, ‘North Korea: From Dictatorship to Dynasty’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 4(3), 1977, 172–83; Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004). 3 Author interviews with North Korean defectors corroborate this claim: one elite defector argued how the domestic rule of the North Korean regime is premised upon convincing the North Korean people that ‘Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are essential to their lives, almost like a God.’ North Korean defector and survivor of the Yodok concentration camp, Kang Chol-hwan, describes how ‘all during my childhood, Kim Il-sung had been like a god to me’. See Kang Chol-hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag (New York: The Perseus Press, 2001), 136. For more on the personality cults of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, see Chong-sik Lee, ‘Evolution of the Korean Workers’ Party and the Rise of Kim Chōng-Il’, Asian Survey, 22(5), 1982, 434–48; Fyodor Tertitskiy, ‘The Ascension of the Ordinary Man: How the Personality Cult of Kim Il-Sung Was Constructed (1945–1974)’, Acta Koreana, 18(1), 2015, 209–31.

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compensate for the inadequacy of the resources within their boundaries [. . .] the Koguryō people gave the impression to the Chinese of being vigorous, warlike, and fond of attacking their neighbors.’⁴ Lee’s evaluation of the Goguryeo (Koguryō) is highly telling for the logic that would be adopted by modern-day North Korea, a nation-state that felt forced to compensate for inadequate resources through engaging in war and for whom warfare and militaristic behaviour would be central to its pursuit of international status. The defeat of the Goguryeo in 668 by an alliance of the Silla and Tang dynasties— the latter of China—saw the Silla attempt, unsuccessfully, to consolidate power. The Goryeo dynasty took power in 918, with Kaesong—a city that would exhibit great significance in years to come—as their capital. Yet, four centuries of turmoil, with invasions by the Mongols and a period as a vassal state of the Mongols under the rule of Kublai Khan (c. 1270–1356) ended with the overthrow of the Goryeo dynasty by general Yi Seong-gye in 1392. The Joseon dynasty would take power, adopting Confucianism as its underlying ideology and becoming, in essence, a tributary state of China and its successor states.⁵ Under the leadership of King Sejong from 1418 to 1450, the Peninsula was stabilized: the king would devise the modern Korean alphabet, Hangeul, and resist conflict with Japan.⁶ Nonetheless, dynastic politics within the Joseon would take its toll: ‘there were uncles killing nephews, and brothers killing brothers, all to stay in the line of succession’.⁷ Such behaviour would resonate with North Korean actions in the twenty-first century, as subsequent chapters will show. Korea’s immunity to conflict with Japan would be short-lived. The Imjin War of 1592–1598, catalysed by the Japanese invasion of Korea, reinforced Japan’s hegemonic ambitions to control Korea and Ming China. Japan eventually retreated, at the cost of between 100 000 and 200 000 Korean lives.⁸ Yet, Ming China’s active support for the plight of Joseon would leave a formative legacy on Sino-Korean bilateral relations, as China expected to be repaid for ‘rescuing Korea from Japan’.⁹ Whilst Korea could be left alone to pursue its own interests, Ming China’s support of Joseon Korea was conditional upon the latter’s deference to the Confucian moral hierarchy and respect for Chinese legitimacy.1⁰ The rule of Qing China (1636–1912) was accompanied by a period of ‘long peace’ and normalization of Sino-Korean relations. Japan’s hegemonic ambitions, however, did not abate, especially after the Meiji Restoration, as it sought to sever Korea from China’s orbit. The unequal Japan–Korea ⁴ Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 23. ⁵ Kang Jae-eun, The Land of Scholars: Two Thousand Years of Korean Confucianism (Paramus: Homa & Sekey, 2006), 354. ⁶ Lee Jee Kyoung, ‘The Aggressive National Defense Posture Taken during the Reign of King Sejong of the Joseon Dynasty’, Review of Korean Studies, 9(3), 2006, 153. ⁷ Dae-Sook Suh in James Brooke, ‘A Mystery about a Mistress in North Korea’, New York Times, 27 August 2004, A3. ⁸ Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 159. ⁹ Ji-Young Lee, ‘Diplomatic Ritual as a Power Resource: The Politics of Asymmetry in Early Modern Chinese–Korean Relations’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 13(2), 2013, 320. 1⁰ Robert E. Kelly, ‘A “Confucian Long Peace” in Pre-Western East Asia?’, European Journal of International Relations, 18(3), 2011, 407–30; Leif-Eric Easley and In Young Park, ‘China’s Norms in Its Near Abroad: Understanding Beijing’s North Korea Policy’, Journal of Contemporary China, 25(101), 659.

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Treaty of 1876 aimed to open Korea to Japanese trade and free it from the isolationist tendencies of Joseon rule and the protection of China. Increasing military conflict between Japan and Korea following the signing of the treaty resulted in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) culminating in a crushing defeat of Qing China. The Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, signed in the aftermath of the war, saw China recognize Korean independence. Yet, the Korean Empire, established by the Joseon Dynasty in 1897, would not last for long. Although the establishment of the Empire ‘marked a final symbolic cutting of Korea’s vassal ties to the Ch’ing’,11 as Korea underwent economic, military, and cultural modernization, the Korean Empire became a hotbed of competition between great powers including Russia, the United States, and, of course, Japan. Japan ultimately aimed to occupy Korea, a goal which would form part and parcel of its wider regional aspirations for Pan-Asian hegemony.12 The Peninsula became a battleground for great power conflict. Following Japan’s victory in the Russo– Japanese War of 1904–1905 Japan, under its first Prime Minister, Ito Hirobumi, strove to force Korea into signing a treaty whereby Korea would become a Japanese protectorate.13 Korea’s failure to gain support from Russia, France, the United Kingdom, China, and Germany, however, saw the eventual signing of the Treaty on 17 November 1905, leading to this untimely fate.1⁴ Less than five years later, as the Japanese military occupation of Korea intensified, the signing of the Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910 signified the ‘complete and permanent cession to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea’.1⁵ The splendid isolation enjoyed by Joseon Korea would be no more.

Resisting Japanese imperialism To say that the Japanese annexation of the Korean Peninsula was unpopular with the Korean people would be a vast understatement. As Michael J. Seth asserts: its authoritarian rule, its mass mobilization campaigns, and its attempt at forced assimilation touched the lives of almost every Korean, often in disturbing and even traumatizing ways. As Koreans responded to the demands, opportunities, and challenges presented by the colonial regime, they developed the ideological divisions that would be so important in determining the course of their history after 1945. 11 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), 128. 12 Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 1931–1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 13 Hilary Conwoy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868–1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 332–33. 1⁴ Andre Schmid, Korea between Empires, 1895–1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 29. 1⁵ ‘The Korea–Japan Annexation Treaty’, 22 August 1910, available at: https://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/m/eng/ pds/pomflet_05.jsp (accessed 19 December 2022).

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Japanese colonial rule aimed to foster the development of ‘economic, educational, and governmental institutions’ modelled upon those in Japan: Korean cultural artefacts were destroyed, Korean language newspapers were censored, and the Japanese attempted to replicate the Korean education system with that of their own.1⁶ Somewhat expectedly, an anti-Japanese, Korean nationalism developed which, whilst ‘never able to mount a sustained threat to Japanese rule’,1⁷ would have a lasting impact on both Koreas after their eventual division post-Second World War. The unsuccessful attempts by South Korean diasporic communities to call for self-determination, on 1 March 1919, in the wake of the Versailles Peace Conference—and Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’—only accelerated nationalist fervour, if disparate, across the nation-state. The establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai on 11 April, led by Syngman Rhee, who himself was in the United States, was ‘largely a symbolic act, and its members saw bringing the cause of Korean independence before world opinion as their main task for the time being’.1⁸ Though largely symbolic, however, the legacy of Japanese colonialism would play a vital role in Rhee’s own future endeavours as he would become the President of the First Republic of Korea in 1948. Japanese rule and the resultant oppressive treatment of Korean citizens catalysed the flight of many Koreans to Manchuria. It was, as Andrei Lankov notes, ‘a natural place for Koreans who did not feel comfortable with Japanese colonial rule, or who wanted to challenge it’. Despite the presence of Japanese troops—since 1906—aiming to increase Japanese control over the region, the central Chinese government was able to resist. Within this context, it seemed no surprise that the family of Kim Il Sung migrated to Manchuria after Kim’s birth in Japanese Korea. Whilst biographies of Kim’s upbringing offer scant detail, the official North Korean biography, written by Baik Bong, highlights how, following his education in Manchuria, Kim actively engaged with various anti-Japanese guerrilla movements there. His involvement in an underground Marxist organization led by the Chinese Communist Party resulted in a brief period of imprisonment in 1929.1⁹ Yet, as Lankov asserts, ‘the early 1930s were a time when the anti-Japanese movement was gathering momentum in Manchuria’, comprising both Korean and Chinese nationals, from Communists to nationalists, of which Kim joined the Communist guerrilla movement.2⁰ The accession of Hirohito as Emperor of Japan, in 1926, only strengthened antiJapanese sentiment within Korea, criticizing Japan’s perspective on the Korean people 1⁶ Michael J. Seth, A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 265. 1⁷ Adrian Buzo, Politics and Leadership in North Korea: The Guerrilla Dynasty, 2nd edn (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 3. 1⁸ Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 199. Manela details the South Korean diasporic community’s quest for liberation from Japanese rule, notably at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 1⁹ Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Song: The Formation of North Korea, 1945–1960 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 52; Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 6. For Kim Il Sung’s official biography, see: Baik Bong, Kim Il Sung Biography Vol. 1: From Birth to Triumphant Return to Homeland (Beirut: Dar Al-Talia, 1973). 2⁰ Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Song, 52.

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as backward and racially impure, whose education was infiltrated by Western missionaries. Yet, although we should be wary of overestimating the extent to which Japanese colonialism contributed to Korea’s economic growth in the post-war era, the development of anti-Japanese sentiment would have profound implications on Kim Il Sung’s later actions.21

Kim Il Sung: The guerrilla fighter The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 caused a further exodus of Koreans to China, or to the Soviet Union (USSR), to join Soviet-supported forces. Kim Il Sung’s role in anti-Japanese guerrilla movements within Manchuria became increasingly prominent, especially as the Communist movement in Manchuria was gaining support from Korean communists in China, affiliated to the Chinese Communist Party. As Japan forcibly relocated peasants in Manchuria and engaged in ‘mopping up campaigns’ which killed and imprisoned thousands of communists, the communists’ anti-Japanese struggle intensified.22 In Manchuria, Kim became one of several notable anti-Japanese partisans, a role exaggerated by the North Korean narrative into highlighting how he single-handedly led a revolution for Korean independence, which climaxed in the ultimate ouster of Japanese forces in 1945.23 Imperial Japanese rule of Korea, seen as a culmination of Japan’s far earlier hegemonic endeavours, would leave a potent legacy on how Korea and the Korean people would understand the world. As the Soviet Union declared war on Japan following its invasion of Manchuria, and as the Red Army moved into Pyongyang in August 1945, Emperor Hirohito infamously announced Japan’s surrender from the Second World War, admitting how thenceforth, Japan would be ‘enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable’.2⁴ Although the ousting of imperial Japanese rule saw the end of Japanese annexation of the Korean Peninsula, life would far from return to the status quo ante. US–Soviet discussions reached an agreement that the Peninsula was to be divided along the 38th parallel, in no small part a result of ‘the suddenness of the Japanese surrender’.2⁵ The southern half would be controlled by the United States Military Government and the northern half by Soviet forces. The demarcation point 21 Stephan Haggard, David Kang, and Chung-in Moon, ‘Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development: A Critique’, World Development, 25(6), 1997, 867–81. For an account that highlights the legacy of Japanese colonialism on Korea’s future economic growth, see Bruce Cumings, ‘The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea’. In Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds, The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 478–96. 22 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 26. 23 Baik, Kim Il Sung Biography Vol. 1: From Birth to Triumphant Return to Homeland. 2⁴ Gyokuon hōso (‘The Jewel Voice Broadcast’), available at: https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/gallery/ en/0000000002 (accessed 10 December 2020); Robert J.C. Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Stanford, CA: Stanford California Press, 1954), 248. 2⁵ ‘Draft Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’, 22 August 1945, in John P. Glennon, N.O. Sappington, Laurence Evans, Herbert A. Fine, John G. Reid, and Ralph R. Goodwin, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. VI: The British Commonwealth, the Far East (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 1039.

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was selected, somewhat arbitrarily, at the Potsdam Conference of 1945, to ‘define the areas in which the Russian and American military commands would accept the surrender of the Japanese forces’.2⁶ US troops rapidly entered Seoul in September 1945. Kim Il Sung returned to what was now the Soviet-controlled northern part of the Peninsula (specifically, the port city of Wonsan), aiming to solidify Communist rule north of the 38th parallel, from 1945 to 1948. He became the chair of the North Korean Bureau of the Korean Communist Party in October 1945, a position endorsed by the Soviet Union.2⁷ As one Soviet account put it, discussions between former Soviet Minister for Internal Affairs, Lavrentiy Beria, and Stalin were ongoing in the wake of Soviet intervention in Pyongyang; Beria himself deemed Kim Il Sung to be ‘the perfect man for the job’.2⁸ A stalemate in US–Soviet talks at Yalta and Moscow only solidified Communist factions north of the 38th parallel under the influence of Moscow. The now fragmented Korean Communist Party, following liberation from Japanese rule, sought a leader. Cho Man-sik, bestowed with control of Pyongyang from the Japanese Governor at the end of the Second World War, rapidly fell from grace with the USSR. Instead, Kim Il Sung emerged victorious, and, with prior support from the Soviets, would be at the helm of the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee formed in 1946. Kim himself consolidated power through creating the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in February 1948, recruiting former anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters and supported with military equipment from the USSR. A core aim of the KPA was to ‘extend the revolution to the South if the ROK regime were to collapse’, a goal that would remain particularly salient in years to come.2⁹ With any resolution to ongoing US–Soviet talks seeming increasingly unlikely, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was dispatched to oversee democratic elections across the Peninsula. Syngman Rhee, who had fought for Korea’s independence from Japan nearly thirty years earlier, was elected the President of the First Republic of Korea (ROK) on 20 July 1948. No such democratic elections took place north of the 38th parallel. The Soviets barred the UN Commission from entering the territory, and, on 9 September, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established, led by Kim Il Sung. The resultant establishment of the ROK saw the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the northern half of the Peninsula by the end of 1948 and the withdrawal of US forces from the south in June 1949.3⁰ Emerging from Japanese annexation, the two Koreas had gained independence but were now on a divided Peninsula. Each Korea viewed the other as illegitimate, 2⁶ Shannon McCune, ‘The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea’, World Politics, 1(2), January 1949, 223. 2⁷ Balázs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet–DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 14. 2⁸ Fyodor Tertitskiy, ‘Soviet Officer Reveals Secrets of Mangyongdae’, DailyNK, 2 January 2014. 2⁹ Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 217. 3⁰ President Harry S. Truman, ‘Statement by the President on the Decision to Withdraw U.S. Forces from Korea, 1947–1949’. In: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry Truman, 1952–53 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), 945–50; see also: ‘Ciphered Telegram from Gromyko to Tunkin at the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, 11 September 1949, AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, list 45.

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an understanding that remains to this day. In the eyes of North Korea and the Soviet Union, only the DPRK was the legitimate government of the entire Peninsula. The first ROK Constitution of 1948, created by Syngman Rhee, too, stressed how ‘the territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands’.31 Conflict between the two Koreas, therefore, was possible, especially since, for Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee, reunification of the Peninsula under their own respective leadership was a paramount goal.32

Divine worship: The legacies of Japanese rule With a divided but decolonized Peninsula, and following the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, memories of Japanese occupation may have easily become relegated to the not-so-distant past. Yet, the legacy of Japanese imperial rule, not least under Hirohito, would have profound implications upon ideas of Korean nationalism and, most instrumentally, on how North Korea would conceptualize its external environment. It was not just the resentment of Japan that would bolster Korean nationalism on both sides of the 38th parallel: as Carter Eckert highlights, ‘there was little, if any, feeling of loyalty toward the abstract concept of Korea as a nation-state’ until the rise of Japanese ambitions in the late nineteenth century.33 Despite this resentment, the North Korean leadership would draw heavily upon Japanese symbolism, iconography, and race-based nationalism for its own new political system. As Brian Myers attests, ‘having been ushered by the Japanese into the world’s purest race, the Koreans in 1945 simply kicked the Japanese out of it [. . .] Japanese symbols were transposed into Korean ones. Mount Paektu, hitherto known only as the peninsula’s highest peak, suddenly attained a Fuji-like, sacral status’, and ‘much of the Japanese version of Korean history—from its blanket condemnation of Chinese influence to its canards about murderous Yankee missionaries—was carried over whole’.3⁴ The theatrics of the Japanese imperial household, stressing filial piety, loyalty to the 31 For a brief overview of the ROK Constitution since 1948, and its last revision in 1987, see: http:// english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/images/eng/main/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Korea.pdf (accessed 18 August 2022). Article 9 of the Socialist Constitution of the DPRK, however, states how the ‘DPRK shall strive to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of Korea [. . .] and reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity’: see ‘The Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, 2014, available at: https://www.hrnk. org/uploads/pdfs/4047.pdf (accessed 19 August 2022). 32 William W. Stueck Jr, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward Korea and China, 1947– 1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 237. As Suk-Young Kim accurately posits, ‘the two Koreas actually count on the divide to justify their legitimacy as nation-states’, whereby the divided Korean Peninsula ‘aspires to produce citizenship based on oppositional forces: people’s affiliation to the state is defined not by what they support but by what they oppose’. See Suk-Young Kim, DMZ Crossing: Performing Emotional Citizenship along the Korean Border (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 6. 33 Carter Eckert, Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945 (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1991), 226 3⁴ B.R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves—and Why It Matters (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2010), 34.

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sovereign, and the ritualism of royal pageantry in Meiji Japan, would form essential components of the rule of the Kim regime.3⁵ In this vein, as former deputy director of the South Korean National Intelligence Service, Ra Jong-yil, emphasized, a key lesson Kim Il Sung would learn from Japanese colonialism was not simply the importance of loyalty to the emperor from the people; it was also the elevated, almost god-like status of the Japanese imperial family: ‘members of Kim Il-sung’s family were like living gods, just like members of the Japanese Imperial family were considered so until the end of World War II’. The Supreme Leader himself, namely Kim Il Sung, thus sought to establish an ‘omnipotent presence close to [that of] God’.3⁶ Thus, despite portraying themselves as unfair victims of Japanese brutality, Japanese race-based nationalism, and the iconography associated with its leadership, became formative influences upon Kim Il Sung’s consolidation of domestic power, the dissemination of his cult of personality, and also to North Korea’s view of international relations. Akin to Emperor Hirohito, Kim was frequently photographed atop a white horse, a symbol of racial purity.3⁷ As Myers argues, ‘it was the Japanese who taught the Koreans to see themselves as part of a uniquely pure and virtuous race’, a logic which would be manifest in what would become the state ideology of juche.3⁸ Pyongyang had to compensate for its vulnerability ‘as children to an evil world’, not least the United States, which the North viewed as responsible for the division of the Peninsula post-war.3⁹ Despite Kim Il Sung’s role in the anti-Japanese struggle, Japanese colonialism, therefore, not only influenced North Korea’s own national identity but also how the DPRK conceptualized its position relative to that of the traditional great powers, not least the Soviet Union and United States, as it established itself as a new state.

Uncertain friendships: Chinese and Soviet influences The legacy of Japanese colonialism on North Korean race-based nationalism—what Myers terms a form of far-right fascism—was not the sole influence on North Korea’s understanding of international relations and its position within it. Soviet and 3⁵ Heonik Kwon and Byung-Ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 62. 3⁶ Ra Jong-yil, Inside North Korea’s Theocracy: The Rise and Sudden Fall of Jang Song-thaek (New York: SUNY Press, 2019), 22. Ra defines the North Korean regime as a theocracy, whereby ‘political power takes on religious characteristics depending on the intensity of its concentration [. . .] power can at times be a secular confinement replacing a religious savior, and it becomes the glory that takes the place of God’s glory’. See Ra Jong-yil, ibid., xv. 3⁷ In one alternative account, Armstrong highlights how the DPRK’s ideology was not fascist and that any resemblance to interwar Japan, such as its rhetoric of the fatherly leader, is ‘superficial’. See Charles K. Armstrong, ‘The Nature, Origins, and Development of the North Korean State’. In: Samuel S. Kim, ed., The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 39–64. 3⁸ Myers, The Cleanest Race, 77. 3⁹ Ibid., 34.

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Chinese influences were also strong, the latter having gained potency following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949. Kim Il Sung’s desire to reunify Korea through force became ever more entrenched with time. Scholarly debate proliferates pertaining to the exact influences of Stalin and Mao vis-à-vis Kim Il Sung’s decision to invade the South on 25 June 1950, thereby commencing the Korean War. Archival evidence highlights how ‘the situation at the 38th parallel became even more tense in 1948 after the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Korea. During this period, Kim Il Sung and other Korean leaders were firmly determined to unify the country by military means’, and Kim ‘persistently pressed for agreement from Stalin and Mao Zedong’ for support.⁴⁰ Following the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea in June 1949, the USSR deemed it to be ‘inadvisable’ for Kim Il Sung to invade the South for fear of US assistance to its allies in Seoul. The USSR was concerned that ‘a drawn out war in Korea could be used by the Americans for purposes of agitation against the Soviet Union and for further inflaming war hysteria’, not least amidst strengthening anti-Communist sentiment within the United States at the time.⁴1 Yet, Kim’s persistence would continue, and Stalin would gradually warm to the idea. In January 1950, Stalin informed Soviet general and Ambassador to North Korea, Terenty Shtykov, that Kim’s plans for invasion ‘must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk’, both to the North and, primarily, to the Soviet Union.⁴2 Agreeing to provide arms and military supplies to the KPA, a series of discussions between Kim and Stalin, and Kim and Mao, ensued.⁴3 A cable sent from Shtykov conveys a meeting with Kim in which, having ‘finished the drafting of a decision in principle for an attack’ on the South, Shtykov provided tacit acceptance for Kim’s invasion, whereby ‘inasmuch as Kim Il Sung is disposed to begin the operation at the end of June [. . .] we might accordingly agree with this time’.⁴⁴ Stalin himself became increasingly fearful that South Korea ‘could be used as a beachhead for aggressive action on the Asian mainland by a rearmed Japan’ even despite concerns—shared by Mao—about the military weakness of the North.⁴⁵ Instead, Stalin encouraged Kim Il Sung to engage in guerrilla activities in the ROK rather than launch an all-out ⁴⁰ ‘Background Report on the Korean War, 9 August 1966’, Fond 5, Opis 58, Delo 266, l. 122–31, in Kathryn Weathersby, ‘The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence’, Journal of American-East Relations, 2(4), Winter 1993, 441. ⁴1 ‘Telegram from Tunkin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Reply to 11 September Telegram’, 14 September 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 46–53. See also Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope 1946–1952 (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), 333–37. ⁴2 ‘Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov’, 30 January 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 5a, d. 3, p. 11, l. 92, and RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 346, ll. 0069-0073, translated by Gary Goldberg. ⁴3 ‘Message, Stalin to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)’, 18 March 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, List 142, Fond and Opis not given. ⁴⁴ ‘Cable Nos 408–410, Shtykov to Vyshinsky (for the Politburo)’, 30 May 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitriĭ Antonovich Volkogonov papers, 1887–1995, mm97083838. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), translated by Gary Goldberg. ⁴⁵ Kathryn Weathersby, ‘Stalin, Japan, and the Decision for War in Korea’, paper presented at the conference on ‘Postwar Japan: What Does It Mean to World Civilization?’ Kobe, 2–7 January 1996, 24.

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attack.⁴⁶ As Sheila Miyoshi Jager accurately surmises in one of the best accounts of the Korean War, ‘Stalin had not categorically rejected Kim’s plan, but had qualified his support based on the right conditions. Kim would have to be patient and wait for the right opportunity.’⁴⁷ Kim would not have to wait long. Having initially resisted Kim Il Sung’s calls for an invasion, why, in early 1950, did Stalin grant ‘reluctant consent’ to his North Korean counterpart?⁴⁸ Preoccupied by a desire to turn Mao’s attention away from capturing Taiwan, to secure a Soviet buffer zone into East Asia and bring China into the Soviet sphere of influence, and to isolate China from the United States, Stalin was persuaded by Kim Il Sung that, in the event of any inter-Korean conflict, the United States would not intervene.⁴⁹ Regarding the latter, the famous speech by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January 1950 notably and explicitly excluded the Korean Peninsula from the US defence perimeter, which seemed only to reinforce this eventuality.⁵⁰ Stalin ‘was principally interested in how a war in Korea would affect his relations with the United States. Only if that war would promote his larger schemes would he agree to it.’⁵1 Delegating responsibility for the Korean situation to Mao, and convinced by Kim’s unwavering belief that any war ‘would be won in three days’ followed by ‘an uprising of 200 000 Party members in South Korea’ against the Rhee regime, without any involvement from the United States, Stalin assented. Yet, Stalin issued a stern warning to Kim Il Sung in April 1950 whereby ‘if you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help.’⁵2

Korean War: A catalyst for deviance Despite the prevalence of revisionist accounts of the Korean War, most prominently spearheaded by the leftist US historian, Bruce Cumings,⁵3 the international consensus is that the war commenced by the North Korean invasion of the South on 25 ⁴⁶ Wada Haruki, ‘The Korean War, Stalin’s Policy, and Japan’, Social Science Japan Journal, 1(1), 1998, 12; see also ‘Draft Reply to Mao Zedong’s Telegram from Stalin via Molotov’, 26 October 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 332, ll. 47–48, and RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 333, ll.0046-0048, translated by Gary Goldberg. ⁴⁷ Sheila Miyoshi Jager, Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2013), 55. ⁴⁸ Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, P’yŏngyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1975), 108. ⁴⁹ For a considerations of Stalin’s reluctance to foster a fully fledged alliance with the People’s Republic of China, see Shen Zhihua, ‘Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s Strategic Goals in the Far East’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 2(2), Spring 2000, 44–68. ⁵⁰ Dean G. Acheson, ‘Crisis in Asia—an Examination of U.S. Policy’, Department of State Bulletin, XXII(551), 23 January 1950, 111–18. ⁵1 Sergei N. Goncharov, John Wilson Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 142. ⁵2 Ibid., 145. Christensen provides a further account of the vacillations between Mao and Stalin’s initial reluctance to approve Kim’s plans to unify the Peninsula by force. See Thomas J. Christensen, Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and the Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 28–62. See also Kathryn Weathersby, ‘Should We Fear This? Stalin and the Danger of War with America’, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 39, July 2002, 1–27. ⁵3 Cumings’s revisionist account blames the United States and ROK, post-Second World War, for the onset of conflict on the Peninsula. See Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2010).

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June 1950.⁵⁴ Following the North Korean invasion, the UN Security Council issued resolution 82, which designated the DPRK as the ‘aggressor’ of the Korean War, a categorization which North Korea unsurprisingly dismissed.⁵⁵ As Khrushchev would note in his memoirs, the war ‘was the initiative of Comrade Kim Il Sung, and it was supported by Stalin and many others’.⁵⁶ One such other, of course, was China, whose intervention in October 1950 in support of its socialist partner was underpinned by several motivations. As Shen Zhihua postulated, it was part of ‘China’s responsibilities for the socialist camp (especially for North Korea)’ and a means of consolidating the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China whilst strengthening the Sino-Soviet alliance by convincing Stalin that ‘Mao and his comrades were “genuine international Communists”’.⁵⁷ As Hongkoo Han observes, the DPRK benefited through Chinese material support: ‘had it not been for China’s involvement, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could not have survived the war’.⁵⁸ The process and aftermath of the Korean War would leave core legacies on North Korea’s understanding of international relations (so soon after the division of the Peninsula), especially in cementing the North’s dependence on support from the Soviet Union (USSR) and its partnership with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As is well known, the North Korean narrative, however, diverges from these realities. The North fundamentally denies the international understanding of the Korean War as having commenced by the invasion of the South by Communist North Korean forces under the leadership of Kim Il Sung. Rather, what the North terms the ‘Fatherland Liberation War’ [joguk haebang jeonjaeng], according to the North Korean perspective, was a result of US–ROK bombardments and shelling across the 38th parallel into the DPRK, triggering a response from North Korean forces.⁵⁹ Kim Il Sung himself expounded that the DPRK sought to counter the US plan to ‘occupy

⁵⁴ In addition to that by Sheila Miyoshi Jager, excellent accounts of the Korean War and its influence on North Korea’s post-war behaviour include Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Heonik Kwon, After the Korean War: An Intimate History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). ⁵⁵ UNSCR 82, S/1501, (1950), 25 June 1950. ⁵⁶ Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1990), 144. ⁵⁷ Shen Zhihua, ‘Revisiting Stalin’s and Mao’s Motivations in the Korean War’, Wilson Center: Sources and Methods, 22 June 2020, available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/revisiting-stalins-andmaos-motivations-korean-war (accessed 19 December 2022). For more on China’s role in the Korean War, see Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). ⁵⁸ Hongkoo Han, ‘Colonial Origins of Juche: The Minsaengdan Incident of the 1930s and the Birth of North Korea–China Relationship’. In: Jae-Jung Suh, ed., Origins of North Korea’s Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), 33. Han asserts that Mao suffered both the loss of Taiwan and also his first son, Mao Anying, in the Korean War. Han’s narrative sits in line with the concerns of Stalin and Mao at the time regarding North Korea’s inability to win any conflict on the Peninsula unaided. ⁵⁹ Channing Liem, The Korean War: An Unanswered Question (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1993).

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South Korea [and] enforce a colonial enslavement policy’ whereby ‘the U.S. imperialists [. . .] ordered their henchmen Syngman Rhee clique and started an armed aggression on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’.⁶⁰ This narrative, whilst, of course, specious and false, became central to Kim Il Sung’s governance of the state after the end of the Korean War and to how North Korea conceptualized international order during these post-war years. After three years of conflict, the inconclusive end to the Korean War has become one of the most infamous junctures of twentieth-century history. As one former US governmental official put it, the divided Korean Peninsula was, and remains, unique: the ‘inter-Korean variable’ is one that ‘no other country has to deal with [. . .] Japan doesn’t have a North Japan!’⁶1 As Patrick Porter notes, the war was part and parcel of the wider US strategy ‘to defend authoritarian regimes from ruthless communist adversaries’ whereby ‘the USA waged wars that laid waste to large parts of the Korean peninsula, and a devastating conflict’.⁶2 The Korean War ended in a ceasefire, and an armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom on 27 June 1953; the armistice thus meant that the two Koreas remain technically at war to this day. Most notably, the signatories to the armistice were the DPRK, PRC, and UN Command (the latter on behalf of the United States and South Korea) but not South Korea. South Korea’s notable absence was due to Syngman Rhee’s inhibitions about being seen to have failed in his goal to unify the Peninsula under the ROK’s control, were he to have signed the agreement.⁶3 As part of the resultant US–ROK Mutual Defence Treaty, signed on 1 October 1953, the United States would permanently station troops in the ROK, a manoeuvre that would become an ongoing and persistent criticism from the DPRK in years to come.⁶⁴ The Korean War, which many have described to be simultaneously a cause and consequence of the ensuing Cold War, cannot be reduced merely to an ideological battle within the context of a bipolar Cold War order or to a civil war between two states, each with the mentality of being the ‘pure’ Korea.⁶⁵ It was also a conflict exacerbated by misperceptions, especially on the part of the United States vis-à-vis China’s intention and ability to intervene and advance along the Yalu River.⁶⁶ A key catalyst for the end of the war, as Rosemary Foot argues, came from the threat of nuclear use ⁶⁰ Kim Il Sung, History of the Just Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean People (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961). ⁶1 Senior US governmental official (interview, 2021). ⁶2 Patrick Porter, The False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia, Delusion and the Rise of Trump (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020), 109. ⁶3 Foot, The Wrong War, 230–31; Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 159. ⁶⁴ ‘Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea’, 1 October 1953, available at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp (accessed 19 December 2022). ⁶⁵ For an excellent analysis of this latter point, see: Meredith D. Shaw and David C. Kang, ‘The SeventyYear History of North Korean Cultural Formation’. In: Youna Kim, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society (London: Routledge), 76–90; William Stueck, ‘The Korean War’. In: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 266–88. ⁶⁶ Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 169.

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by US President Eisenhower (also considered by his predecessor, Truman), which only furthered North Korea’s awareness of its weaker material position vis-à-vis the United States, especially its inability to retaliate against any potential US pre-emptive strikes.⁶⁷ Eisenhower himself asserted that the DPRK ‘didn’t want a full-scale war or an atomic attack’,⁶⁸ a view echoed by his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who insisted that it was the communist forces’ ‘knowledge of the U.S. willingness to use force’ that triggered the ‘end to hostilities’ on the Peninsula.⁶⁹ The use of nuclear weapons was actively contemplated from the war’s outset: following the ceasefire, General Douglas MacArthur, who had led US forces into their successful landing at Incheon in September 1950, asserted how ‘between 30 and 50 atomic bombs would have more than done the job’ of ending the Korean War.⁷⁰ Eisenhower, too, threatened to ‘hit them with everything we[‘ve] got’ if North Korea broke the conditions of the armistice agreement.⁷1 Nevertheless, denying that nuclear coercion catalysed the war’s ending, the North Korean narrative deems the armistice to be evidence of the US acknowledging its ‘ignominious defeat for the first time in history’, owing to the resilience of Kim Il Sung.⁷2 The armistice agreement saw the establishment of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as a border between the two Koreas, but the psychological legacy of the war on North Korea’s understanding of international relations, and its place within it, would be much more potent than any physical border. As Suk-Young Kim reminds us, the ‘temporary halt’ to the Korean War triggered ‘schizophrenic conditions, simultaneously marked by potential peace and conflict’ from which both Koreas would have to ‘envision distinctive identities vis-à-vis each other’.⁷3 First and foremost, the legacy of the war would contribute to an elevated threat perception from the United States,

⁶⁷ Rosemary Foot, ‘Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict’, International Security, 13(3), 1988/1989, 92–112. For Truman’s contemplations in November 1950 of using the atomic bomb on the Korean Peninsula to end the Korean War, see President Harry S. Truman, ‘The President’s News Conference’. In: Public Papers of President Harry S. Truman, 30 November 1950, available at: https://www. trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/295/presidents-news-conference (accessed 26 December 2022); John P. Glennon, ed, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Vol. VII (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 1098–100, 1142, 1158, 1323–32; Konrad Ege and Arjun Makhijani, ‘US Nuclear Threats: A Documentary History’, Counterspy, 6(2), July–August 1982, 11–12; Bernard Gwertzman, ‘U.S. Papers Tell of ’53 Policy to Use A-Bomb in Korea’, New York Times, 8 June 1984, A8; Roger Dingman, ‘Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War’, International Security, 13(3), Winter 1988/1989, 50–91. ⁶⁸ Sherman Adams, First Hand Report: The Inside Story of the Eisenhower Administration (London: Hutchinson, 1962), 55. ⁶⁹ John A. Bernbaum, Lisle A. Rose, and Charles S. Sampson, eds, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. V, Pt 2 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), 1811–14. ⁷⁰ ‘Texts of Accounts by Lucas and Considine on Interview with MacArthur in 1954’, New York Times, 9 April 1964, 16. MacArthur was notably removed from his post following, inter alia, actions counter to the Truman administration’s demands, not least in provoking China. ⁷1 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985[2005]), 167; CIA, ‘NSC 170/1’, 19 July 1954; ‘Progress Report on NSC 170/1 Korea (Policy Approved by the President)’, 30 December 1954. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. V, Pt 2, 1620–24; Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 181. ⁷2 Rodong Sinmun, ‘Month of Solidarity with Korean People Closes in Cuba’, 11 August 2017. ⁷3 Kim, DMZ Crossing, 18.

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South Korea, and wider international society; second, the DMZ ‘locked the division of the peninsula into place, separat[ing] two societies that then grew further apart’.⁷⁴ Thus, following the end of the Korean War, Pyongyang’s conceptualization of international order was a far cry from the Western liberal international order that became embedded within US hegemony after the Second World War. Rather, it comprised a messy and complex range of influences, which, intertwined with each other, characterized a Hobbesian view of international relations in which North Korea felt marginalized. The legacy of Japanese colonialism accelerated a desire to be free from oppression and influenced how North Koreans saw themselves as a people; partnerships with the Soviet Union and China—not least during the Korean War— underscored the North’s ideological exceptionalism rooted in global communism; the US threat of nuclear weapons in the Korean War further cemented Pyongyang’s framing of its world view in opposition to the United States and everything for which it stood. It was not just North Korea’s conceptualization of a hostile international society that became especially entrenched following the Korean War. From such conceptualizations emerged particular responses. As a former US intelligence official stressed to the author, ‘North Korea’s bad behaviour obviously goes back to the Korean War.’⁷⁵

Juche: The antithesis of the post-war international order The US and Soviet division of the Korean Peninsula after the Second World War, and subsequent entrenchment of this division following the Korean War, had seminal implications on North Korea’s world view. At its core, the Korean War cemented North Korea’s outlook on international relations as comprising an amalgam of USled structures that were inherently hostile to the regime-state and in opposition to its interests. It was a world view that thus stood in stark contrast to that of the United States. Expectedly, the proximity to which the United States came to nuclear use on the Peninsula would leave a lasting impact on North Korea and, in subsequent years, would influence its conceptualization of the global nuclear order. Within this international context, therefore, the North Korean leadership aimed to situate itself firmly in resistance to the post-war Western liberal international order—what Ikenberry terms the US ‘liberal hegemonic order’—characterized by ‘open markets, multilateral institutions, cooperative security, alliance partnership, democratic solidarity and United States hegemonic leadership’.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Wada Haruki, The Korean War: An International History (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 294. ⁷⁵ US intelligence official (author interview, 2019). ⁷⁶ G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Liberal International Order and Its Discontents’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 38(3), 2010, 512. For more on the US-led post-war international order, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order and Major War

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In the early days of the regime-state, North Korea desired no such integration into the US-led liberal international order as Kim Il Sung attempted to consolidate domestic power as the leader of a then new state. One of North Korea’s principal responses in resisting the US-led international order was encapsulated in the development of the autarkic state ideology of juche, a term which literally means ‘actor’ or ‘agency’ but is often mistranslated as ‘self-reliance’. Juche emphasized the importance of maintaining complete political (jaju), economic (jarip), and military (jawi) independence.⁷⁷ Most accurately summarized by the adage that ‘what man makes is his destiny’,⁷⁸ juche, whilst initially a variant of Marxism–Leninism, quickly became its own ideology in and of itself.⁷⁹ The proclamation of juche as the guiding ideology of the DPRK in 1955 triggered factional movements from Soviet and Chinese groups, and their North Korean affiliates, who attempted to remove Kim from power.⁸⁰ As the USSR’s de-Stalinization agenda took hold, not least as a result of Khrushchev’s infamous speech of 1956, Kim emphasized juche as the ruling ideology of both the Party and the regime-state, in so doing conducting large-scale purges of existing Party members, especially those who opposed the ideology. Kim’s consolidation of power was further entrenched following the constitutional enshrinement of juche in the revision of North Korea’s constitution in 1972, which also bestowed Kim Il Sung with the title of President of North Korea.⁸1 Although scholarly debates proliferate regarding whether juche actually wielded any meaningful influence over North Korea’s domestic or foreign policies, the ideology would certainly become a useful tool for the Kim regime to justify its domestic control and personality cult of leadership and vindicate its delinquent behaviour, particularly, in later years, with respect to the nuclear domain.⁸2

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order’, Review of International Studies, 25(2), April 1999, 179–96. ⁷⁷ Kim Il Sung, ‘On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Chuch’e in Ideological Work’, 28 December 1955. In: Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung: Selected Works, Vol. 1 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971), 582–606. It is worth noting that juche was not specifically the creation of Kim Il Sung but of Hwang Jang Yop, Chairman of Assembly from 1972 to 1983. Hwang defected to South Korea in 1997. Myers claims that juche was never a guiding ideology for the DPRK’s domestic or foreign policy but little more than a ‘myth’ designed to deceive the United States and South Korea and generate legitimacy for the ruling regime. See B.R. Myers, North Korea’s Juche Myth (Busan: Sthele Press, 2015). ⁷⁸ This was the most common response from North Korean defectors when asked, by the author, to summarize juche. ⁷⁹ Kim Il Sung, ‘On Socialist Construction in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the South Korean Revolution’, 14 April 1965. In: Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung: Selected Works, Vol. 19 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1984), 236–85. ⁸⁰ James F. Person, ‘New Evidence on North Korea in 1956’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 16, 447–527; Andrei Lankov, ‘Kim Il Sung’s Campaign against the Soviet Faction in Late 1955 and the Birth of Chuch’e’, Korean Studies, 23, 1999, 43–67. ⁸1 Dae-Sook Suh, ‘North Korea: The Present and the Future’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 5(1), 1993, 67. ⁸2 In one recent example, at the 2017 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, then DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho stated how North Korea’s ‘possession of nukes and ICBM is a legitimate option for self-defence in the face of clear and real nuclear threat posed by the U.S.’ See Ri Yong Ho, ‘Statement by H.E. Ri Yong Ho, Minister of Foreign Affairs—Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, ASEAN Regional Forum, Manila, 7 August 2017. For an analysis of how North Korea’s nuclear doctrine became entrenched within juche ideology, see Edward Howell, ‘The Juche H-Bomb? North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and Regime-State Survival’, International Affairs, 96(4), 2020, 1051–68.

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To preserve the three domains of juche, and strengthen his own power, Kim Il Sung would enact juche through harsh and oppressive societal control, economic and political asceticism, and emphasis on loyalty to the nation and, ultimately, to his regime. As a North Korean defector recounted to the author, ‘juche implies that a country needs a good dictatorship, and to be successful, we need a great leader. Once the people really believe, they’d think people like Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are essential to their lives.’⁸3 As another put it, ‘we had complete family loyalty to Kim Il Sung— that North Koreans should have nothing to envy, and no need to compare with other countries, was central to our ideology’.⁸⁴

A hostile world: How North Korea orders international relations Following the end of the Korean War, nowhere did North Korea’s world view become more entrenched than in its framing of the regime-state in direct opposition to the United States and the US-led international order. According to North Korea, the post-war international environment was, and remains, inherently antagonistic towards the regime-state. To this day, the regime has certainly not shied away from frequent accusations towards the United States and its allies of seeking to ‘overthrow’ and ‘stifle’ the regime-state.⁸⁵ This world view became epitomized by the North Korean notion of a so-called ‘hostile policy’ originating from the United States, its allies, and the wider US-led international order. Despite its propagandistic value, the heuristic of the ‘hostile policy’ should not be dismissed as mere bluster emanating from the mouthpieces of the regime. Far from it: it would form a central ideological prism through which North Korea would interpret, conceptualize, and respond to the Western liberal international order—and, over time, the global nuclear order—in the years after the Korean War. Crucially, the ‘hostile policy’ would allow North Korea to justify its delinquent and norm-breaking behaviour, which, as subsequent chapters will argue, would extend well into the nuclear domain. Indeed, the notion continues to be invoked to this day as part of the DPRK’s justifications for its nuclear ambitions.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, what is this ‘hostile policy’? How has the DPRK defined this wide-ranging and somewhat ambiguous concept which has, over time, become central to how it frames, understands, and responds to its position within international society? ⁸3 Elite North Korean defector (interview, 2017) ⁸⁴ North Korean defector B (interview, 2019) ⁸⁵ For instance, see KCNA (Korean Central News Agency), ‘S. Korean Puppet Regime Slammed for Strengthening Cooperation to Stifle DPRK’, 26 December 2016. A KCNA editorial in 1997 underscored how ‘it was the U.S. imperialists’ long-dreamt ambition for world supremacy to stifle the young Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in its cradle’: KCNA, ‘U.S. Imperialists, Igniter of Korean War’, 19 June 1997. ⁸⁶ For instance, North Korea dismissed the Biden administration’s US North Korea Policy Review— which emphasized a US approach of ‘diplomacy and stern deterrence’—as an example of the US ‘hostile policy’. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry Director General of Department of U.S. Affairs’, 2 May 2021.

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The DPRK was, and remains, vociferous in its criticisms of what it deems to be threatening actions and rhetoric emanating from the United States, its allies, but also international organizations such as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, within which the United States plays a fundamental role of leadership.⁸⁷ Nonetheless, as subsequent chapters will examine, the post-war international order and its institutions—not least the nuclear non-proliferation regime—were not immune from criticism from states apart from North Korea.⁸⁸ In one example, in relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Pakistan has often justified its nuclear ambitions as part of the state’s ‘conception of itself as a rebel against Western imperialism’.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the specific notion of the US ‘hostile policy’ remains unique to how North Korea frames its social understanding of international society, its position within it, and how it chooses to respond to its resultant status and positioning within the society of states. It is only by understanding the ‘hostile policy’, therefore, that North Korea’s behaviour after the end of the Korean War, both in relation to the broader US-led international order and, more specifically, the global nuclear order, can be most effectively contextualized. Much akin to North Korea’s own nuclear ambitions, as later chapters will argue, the ‘hostile policy’ as a notion has itself evolved, particularly during the Cold War and post-Cold War years. At its core, the hostile policy stems from the DPRK’s deep-rooted perception since its inception in 1948 – and even, arguably, following the initial division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945 – and most notably following the Korean War, that the international order, led by the United States, is fundamentally unjust. It must be remembered that according to Pyongyang, the United States and South Korea were the aggressors that instigated the Korean War.⁹⁰ Thus, pitting itself at odds with ideas of post-war US hegemony, invoking the ‘hostile policy’ has offered a convenient means for the North Korean regime-state to vindicate its delinquent behaviour and degrade the statuses of the United States, South Korea, and its allies. For all its frequent invocations, however, the regime has been notoriously elusive in defining the contents of this ‘policy’, even as it gained momentum during the early Cold War years. A recent 2020 report from the Institute for Disarmament and Peace, a think tank of the North Korean Foreign Ministry, however, provided arguably the most detailed—albeit still highly equivocal—definition of the ‘hostile policy’ to date, namely, as comprising the ‘pursuit of permanent division of the Korean peninsula and ceaseless nuclear threats and blackmail against the DPRK’.⁹1 This definition, however, offers limited insight on the specific actions that Pyongyang deems to be ‘hostile’. Yet, this ambiguity, in fact, is ⁸⁷ See, e.g. KCNA, ‘Invariable Hostile Policy toward DPRK’, 31 January 1997; KCNA, ‘Rodong Sinmun Urges U.S. to Renounce Its Hostile Policy toward Korea’, 23 August 1997. ⁸⁸ William J. Perry and Tom Z. Collina, The Button: The New Nuclear Arms Race and Presidential Power from Truman to Trump (Dallas, TX: BenBella Books, 2020), 194–95. ⁸⁹ Glenn Chaftez, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot, ‘Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, Political Psychology, 17(4), 1996, 748. ⁹⁰ See, e.g. , ‘We Will Smash Enemies If They Pounce upon Us’, 5 December 1998; KCNA, ‘Day of Second Liberation’, 25 July 1998; KCNA, ‘Banner of Songun Should Be Held Higher for Peace of Korean Peninsula’, 25 June 2011. ⁹1 KCNA, ‘Withdrawal of U.S. Hostile Policy towards DPRK’, 25 June 2020.

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deliberate and to North Korea’s benefit. In an interview with the author, a former US intelligence official stressed how discussions with North Korean officials reinforced the all-encompassing and ambiguous nature of the ‘policy’. As the official recounted, ‘what it is, it’s everything [. . .] from the presence of US troops on the Korean Peninsula, including the joint exercises between the US and South Korea [. . .] hostile US media [. . .] insults hurled at them, US complaints about human rights, lack of freedom, the gulags’.⁹2 A South Korean senior negotiator with the DPRK agreed, stressing how North Korea ‘see[s] all US attitudes towards North Korea as hostile’.⁹3 To shed light on the ‘hostile policy’ and its importance in terms of how North Korea engages with international order, not least the global nuclear order, this book categorizes the policy in a tripartite vein, as comprising political, economic, and social indicators.⁹⁴ Politically, the policy is manifest, at its core, in the US–ROK security alliance, perceived by the DPRK as an existential threat and witnessed in activities it deems to be ‘hostile’, especially annual defensive US–ROK military exercises, the first of which commenced in 1955. The DPRK has repeatedly dismissed these exercises as ‘war games’ and ‘war drills’.⁹⁵ As subsequent chapters contend, North Korea viewed these exercises as part of a US desire to instigate regime change, particularly during the 1990s.⁹⁶ Economic aspects of the US ‘hostile policy’ refer primarily to unilateral and multilateral sanctions enforced upon the DPRK. In line with the regime-state’s narrative of its inception, North Korea has frequently denounced UN Security Council sanction resolutions as being ‘cooked up’ by the United States, which has furthered its opposition to international order as a mere manifestation of US hegemonic ambitions.⁹⁷ Such denunciations are not limited to recent sanctions, such as those that specifically targeted the North Korean economy, imposed in 2017.⁹⁸ Unsurprisingly, the DPRK also dismissed United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 of 25 June 1950, which designated North Korea as the ‘aggressor’ of the Korean War.⁹⁹ Beyond its economic and political dimensions, the US ‘hostile policy’ importantly occupies a social dimension. This social facet is highly pertinent in understanding ⁹2 US intelligence official (interview, 2019). ⁹3 ROK negotiator DPRK (interview, 2019). ⁹⁴ Edward Howell, ‘North Korean Think Tank Statement Shows Focus on U.S. “Hostile Policy” Prevails’, NKPro, 28 June 2020. ⁹⁵ See, e.g. KCNA, ‘War Drills under Fire’, 11 April 1997; Rodong Sinmun, ‘KPA General Staff Warns Aggressors of Merciless Nuclear Counter-Action of Justice’, 3 March 2017. ⁹⁶ A CIA estimate in 1997 concluded that the DPRK was likely to collapse within five years owing to economic deterioration, and the increasing need to import aid and food from China. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘Exploring the Implications of Alternative North Korean Endgames’, Intelligence Report, 21 January 1998. For similar perspectives, see also Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History 3rd edn (Reading, MA: Addison-Weasley, 2013), 289–95; Aidan Foster-Carter, North Korea After Kim Ilsung: Controlled Collapse? (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994); Aidan Foster-Carter, ‘North Korea: All Roads Lead to Collapse—All the More Reason to Engage Pyongyang’. In: Marcus Noland, ed., The Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1995), 27–38. ⁹⁷ See, e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘U.S. Sanctions and Pressure Racket Will Be Foiled: KAPPC Spokesman’, 25 December 2017. ⁹⁸ UNSCR 2371, 2375, and 2397, respectively. As Chapter 6 argues, these sanctions ultimately led to the curtailment of the US–DPRK summit at Hanoi in 2019. ⁹⁹ UNSCR 82, S/1501, (1950), 25 June 1950.

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how North Korea responds to the Western-led international order, and global nuclear order—and its position within these orders—as inherently social orders. As will be outlined later in this book, the North Korean regime has frequently vindicated its delinquent behaviour as a justified response to a range of actions it deems to be ‘hostile’, whether international labelling of the DPRK as a ‘rogue’ actor or rhetorical criticism and condemnation of its nuclear or missile development or its ongoing human rights violations. For example, President George W. Bush’s infamous designation of the DPRK as part of the ‘axis of evil’ in 2002, coupled with the DPRK’s status as a US State Sponsor of Terrorism—from 1988 to 2008, and from 2017 onwards—were all perceived by North Korea as exemplifying the US ‘hostile policy’.1⁰⁰ Without understanding the potent ideological prism of the US ‘hostile policy’, therefore, any understandings of just what comprises a North Korean view of international relations remain incomplete. As this book will contend, North Korea has deployed a repertoire of behaviour—both in line with and departing from international norms—in response to the ‘policy’ as part of a quest for status and to gain beneficial outcomes. Yet, the roots of the ‘hostile policy’ in the aftermath of the Korean War sheds valuable light on additional influences on North Korea’s world view, beyond Japanese imperialism and an opposition to the United States, as Pyongyang sought to strengthen its counter-hegemonic strategy in opposing the preponderance of the United States.

Allies abroad: A common enemy In the face of what it deemed to be an increasingly ‘hostile’ United States, North Korea sought to pursue ideological exceptionalism as embedded in global communism during the early Cold War. It focused predominantly on its Soviet and Chinese partners, and their common opposition to the United States, and Western hegemony. Nevertheless, the Sino-Soviet alliance proved to be a troublesome partner. As the alliance began to fray, arguably from the late 1950s, Pyongyang increasingly found itself caught within a delicate balancing act to maintain its individual bilateral relations with Beijing and Moscow. With the Cold War ongoing, the North strove to cultivate a prominent role amongst Third World states within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), attempting to forge close friendships with other socialist states such as Cuba. This ambition within the NAM would further shape North Korea’s outlook on international relations as it sought solidarity with fellow states that resisted imperialism as well as the Cold War superpower rivalry. North Korea sent delegates to the Tricontinental Conference of January 1966 hosted by Fidel Castro in Havana, a conference concerning countries then undergoing revolutionary movements. The conference’s prime objective was to ‘address 1⁰⁰ For an extensive treatment of how these incidents affected North Korea’s behaviour and its quest for international status, see Chapters 4 and 6.

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the role of US imperialism in the Cold War world’, especially as the US invasion of Vietnam was taking hold.1⁰1 At the conference, Pyongyang managed to attain the support of several Third World states, not least Cuba, in relation to the ‘struggle of the Korean people for the unification of their country and for the expulsion of the Yankee troops from South Korea’.1⁰2 Kim Il Sung, too, cultivated close interpersonal relations with leaders of anti-imperialist movements such as Sukarno in Indonesia. As Benjamin R. Young highlights, Kim saw ‘the Third World as a new revolutionary force in world politics and as a valuable ally on the Korea question’, namely, in relation to his pursuit of a unified Peninsula under the North’s control.1⁰3 Exploiting the NAM for his own domestic objectives, however, would eventually prove costly. Indeed, it appeared that initially, the bonds forged between North Korea and other NAM states were mutual: Che Guevara visited Pyongyang in 1960, ‘singling out North Korea and China for special praise’ as ‘examples of Asiatic socialism’.1⁰⁴ Moreover, in 1967, Fidel Castro characterized Kim Il Sung as ‘one of the most eminent, outstanding, heroic leaders of socialism’.1⁰⁵ Yet, despite initially acquiring support from Non-Aligned States—such as Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Algeria—for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s pursuit of ‘Third World diplomacy’ as a means of gaining international status and legitimacy would be fleeting.1⁰⁶ In its voracious desire to spread North Korea’s juche ideology and political model abroad (Kim Il Sung sent delegations to over 80 countries in 1973 alone), North Korea did garner some support.1⁰⁷ In 1976, for instance, an Ethiopian official lauded how ‘the political independence and economic self-reliance, which is resolutely defended by the Korean people, is an excellent model for the socialist Ethiopian people’.1⁰⁸ Nevertheless, archival material highlights how, following North Korea’s official entry into the NAM 1⁰1 Manuel Barcia, ‘Locking Horns with the Northern Empire’: Anti-American Imperialism at the Tricontinental Conference of 1966 in Havana’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 7(3), 2009, 208. 1⁰2 US Government, The Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian, and Latin American Peoples: A Staff Study prepared for the subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal security laws, 89th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1966), 79. 1⁰3 Young offers an excellent account of North Korea’s relations with the Third World: Benjamin R. Young, Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2021), 94. 1⁰⁴ Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (London: Bantam Books, 1997), 489–95. 1⁰⁵ ‘From a 2 June 1967 Memo of the Soviet Embassy in the DPRK (1st Secretary V. Nemchinov) about ‘Some New Factors in Korean–Cuban Relations’, 2 June 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, 53–57, obtained by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg. 1⁰⁶ Samuel S. Kim, ‘Pyongyang, the Third World, and Global Politics’. In: Tae-Hwan Kwak, Wayne Patterson, and Edward A. Olsen, eds, The Two Koreas in World Politics (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1983), 85. 1⁰⁷ ‘Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK, Report, 27 September 1973. Subject: The DPRK and the NonAligned Summit in Algiers’, 27 September 1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Non-Aligned Movement, 1973, 120. doboz, 209-10, 00614/49/1973, obtained and translated for North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) by Balazs Szalontai. 1⁰⁸ ‘Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK, Report, 28 April 1976. Subject: Visit of an Ethiopian government delegation in the DPRK’, 28 April 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J1-j Ethiopia, 1976, 52. doboz, 41-1, 003195/1976, translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai.

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in 1975, member states became increasingly weary with Kim Il Sung’s persistence to host NAM summits in Pyongyang in 1983 and 1986. The North’s myopia became widely seen as an egotistical effort to promote Kim Il Sung’s personal objectives, namely, ‘to prevent South Korea from joining the non-Alignment Movement’ and gain support for ‘national unification’ rather than any desire to stimulate the wider interests ‘of the socialist community within the movement’.1⁰⁹ NAM states quickly became frustrated with Pyongyang’s incessant emphasis on the ‘warlike’ situation on the Peninsula, owing to US–ROK military exercises. Moreover, the DPRK’s hosting of the Education and Culture Conference of the NAM in Pyongyang in 1983 was poorly received. Other NAM states chastised North Korea for ‘imposing the peculiar Korean juche line’ on its participants, seeking to export the juche model abroad in an aggressive fashion.11⁰ In one instance, whilst North Korea sent engineers, military advisors, and agricultural experts to Ethiopia following the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 and continued to aid construction projects in providing ammunition and weapons (catalysing a friendship between Kim Il Sung and the Marxist–Leninist leader of Ethiopia, Mengistsu Haile Mariam), ‘juche, the Ethiopians felt, did not translate’.111 As one account posits, Ethiopian academics who visited Pyongyang to learn about juche ‘came back running’.112 To this day, North Korea continues to maintain cordial relations—if little more than rhetorical affirmations of solidarity—with former Third World states, including Ethiopia and Cuba. Regarding the latter, Pyongyang vociferously opposed the extension of the US trade embargo to Cuba under Trump, pledging, in 2017, that it will ‘extend full support [. . .] to the Party, government and people of Cuba in their struggle for independence against imperialism and for socialism and will always be standing shoulder to shoulder with them’.113 In the heydays of the Cold War, however, the North’s self-perception as ‘a vanguard in a new international order that prioritized national liberation and global decolonization’ would not be matched by empirical realities.11⁴ Indeed, Pyongyang’s economic decline from the 1970s would repel other NAM states from sharing Kim Il Sung’s desire for North Korea to occupy a leadership role in the Third World.11⁵ 1⁰⁹ ‘Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK, Report, 11 March 1982. Subject: North Korean activities in the Non-Aligned Movement’, 11 March 1982, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIXJ-1-j Korea, 1982, 80. doboz, 10, 002796/1982, obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai. 11⁰ ‘Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK, Ciphered Telegram, 15 August 1983. Subject: Conference of the ministers of education and culture of the Non-Aligned Movement in Pyongyang’, 15 August 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Non-Aligned Movement, 1983, 130. doboz, 209-7, 005155/1983, translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai. 111 Charles K. Armstrong, ‘Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations’, North Korea International Documentation Project, Working Paper No. 1, April 2009, 13. 112 Ibid., 13. 113 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Hits at U.S. New Cuba Policy’, 22 June 2017. 11⁴ Young, Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader, 26. 11⁵ R.R. Krishnan, ‘North Korea and the Non-Aligned Movement’, International Studies 20(1–2), 1981, 299–313; Frank Dikötter, Dictators: The Cult of Personality in the Twentieth Century (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 139–41.

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The road not taken: Two roads diverged It can be seen that during the early days of the Cold War, there was a wealth of influences on North Korea’s conceptualization of international order: anti-colonialism stemming from Japanese imperialism and North Korea’s engagement with the Third World; relatedly, the ideological exceptionalism obtained from its relationship with the USSR and China; and, fundamentally, a deep-rooted counter-hegemonic opposition to the United States and its ‘hostile policy’. Nevertheless, North Korea’s understanding of international order became increasingly defined by changes closer to home, particularly its initial relative economic success compared to its South Korean counterpart in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War. Even during Japanese annexation, as Lankov notes, the northern half of the Peninsula was a hotbed of Japanese investment, given its abundance in natural resources and geographical proximity to China, which Japan viewed as having useful geostrategic purpose for the expansion of its empire. By 1940, the Hamhung chemical plant—in the city of Hamhung, which would become the North’s second largest city—was the second largest such plant globally, much to the envy of the USSR. In contrast, the southern half of the Peninsula ‘remained an underdeveloped agricultural backwater’.11⁶ Despite the ravages of the Korean War, including US air raids, post-war reconstruction revived Pyongyang’s industrial infrastructure. As Lankov asserts, ‘nobody doubts that until the mid-1960s (at the very least) in terms of basic macroeconomic indicators, the Socialist North was ahead of the capitalist South’.11⁷ Yet, North Korea’s economy would experience a drastic decline in the 1970. The centrally planned economy was reduced to ‘planning without facts’ whereby ‘the regime’s muscular and unceasing activity in indoctrination and information control ha[d] strangled scientific and technological innovation’.11⁸ For all Kim Il Sung’s emphases on labour mobilization, heavy industry, and agricultural development, ‘Juche Economics’, epitomized by a growing diversion of resources for military purposes to combat an ever-stronger South Korea, would take its toll from the 1970s as shortages in natural resources and hard-currency debt problems abounded.11⁹ In contrast, the South was no longer the ‘backwater’ of the 1940s. An intensive state-led economic strategy under the authoritarian military rule of Park Chunghee—who acceded to power in 1961—was premised on export-orientated growth in heavy industry dominated by conglomerates. From the 1960s onwards, South Korea became the ‘Miracle on the Han River’, and ‘premier development success story of the

11⁶ Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 71–72. See also Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 185–86. 11⁷ Lankov, The Real North Korea, 72. 11⁸ Nicholas Eberstadt, The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 6. 11⁹ Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 41–76; Hy-Sang Lee, North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 81–85; Nicholas Eberstadt, “Self-Reliance’ and Economic Decline: North Korea’s International Trade, 1970–1995’, Problems of Post-Communism, 46(1), 1999, 3–13.

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last half century’.12⁰ From 1974, the two Koreas would progress down two different economic trajectories, so much so that by 1992, the gross national product (GNP) per capita of the South was over seven times that of its northern counterpart.121 Pyongyang’s obsession with economic autarky within an already inefficient economic apparatus, and on excessive military spending to fulfil its aim of reunification of the Peninsula, would only increase its dependence upon Soviet and Chinese aid. As Pyongyang resisted any temptations towards economic reform, the two Koreas would venture down radically different economic paths, which would have profound implications on their future political and economic prospects. Kim Il Sung’s determination to pursue economic self-reliance and resist integration into the Western liberal international economic order was clear. In subsequent years, this approach would become a way for the North to justify its immunity from the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s. Indeed, a Rodong Sinmun article of 1998 accurately surmised what the ruling regime perceived to be the benefits of North Korea’s economic model, stressing how ‘reform’ and ‘opening’ were the ‘honeycoated poison’ of the Western imperialists; Pyongyang vowed to resist ‘globalization’ and instead ‘adhere to the line of building an independent national economy’.122 Such a dogmatic pursuit of an ‘independent’ economy from the days of the early Cold War would quickly force North Korea to make critical decisions about its political future. The pressures of an increasingly prosperous South Korea, coupled with growing schisms within the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1960s and 1970s, following Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization speech, triggered the North’s leadership to seek new ways of bolstering the regime-state’s international standing and legitimacy, especially as economic change and prosperity were only a stone’s throw away from Pyongyang, on the other side of the DMZ. Beyond the Peninsula, too, even North Korea’s enemy of old, Japan, would experience an economic miracle of its own in the post-war era, becoming the second largest global economy—to its steadfast ally of the United States—in 1968.123 Despite state propaganda lauding the virtues of a self-reliant national economy and deriding the strategic developmentalism of South Korea and Japan, North Korea’s understanding of international order as a set of hostile structures was only becoming more entrenched in the eyes and minds of the ruling regime. Yet, it was not just South Korea’s economic growth that led North Korea to consider nuclearization as a 12⁰ Marcus Noland, ‘Korea’s Growth Performance: Past and Future’, Asian Economic Policy Review, 7(1), 2012, 20. Even Bruce Cumings, despite criticizing South Korea’s authoritarian rule of the 1970s and 1980s, admits that the ROK’s economic growth became ‘the most highly touted developmental success story in the world’. See Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, updated edn (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 342. 121 Namkoong Young, ‘A Comparative Study on North and South Korean Economic Capability’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, 9(1), 1995, 6; see also Barry Gillis, ‘North Korea and the Crisis of Socialism: The Historical Ironies of National Division’, Third World Quarterly, 13(1), 1992, 116–17. 122 Rodong Sinmun, ‘Let Us Adhere to the Line of Building an Independent National Economy’, joint article with Kulloja, 17 September 1998. 123 For two canonical works on Japan’s post-war economic growth, see Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 525–40.

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response to being seen as the economically inferior Korea on the Peninsula. Coupled with South Korea’s economic boom of the 1970s, under the leadership of Park Chunghee, were Seoul’s nuclear ambitions of its own.12⁴ As archival evidence highlights, these ambitions were actively pursued by the Park government amidst concerns of a weakening of the US–ROK alliance under the Nixon administration and South Korea’s fears that the removal of US troops would, as Park himself stressed, render the DPRK ‘inclined to make a miscalculation’,12⁵ a view shared by the US Central Intelligence Agency at the time.12⁶ South Korea’s own nuclear ambitions throughout the 1970s, witnessed in active dialogue with France and Canada for nuclear processing plants, would, however, be brief.12⁷ Pressure from then US Secretary State, Henry Kissinger, to abandon the security umbrella provided by the United States over the South in the event that South Korea nuclearized, would be too great a cost.12⁸ Instead, Washington agreed to participate in defensive military exercises and continue to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the South to assuage Seoul’s concerns.12⁹ Kim Il Sung ‘felt betrayed’ by the South’s nuclear aspirations since, in his view, ‘the only potential target for these nuclear weapons was his own regime’.13⁰ North Korea’s desire to assert agency as a then new state in the international community would only intensify. Its perception of the Western liberal international order as deliberately counter to its interests and quest for legitimacy was thus profoundly affected by a confluence of international, regional, and domestic-level concerns: internationally,

12⁴ Seoul telegram 8023 to Department of State, ‘ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles’, 2 December 1974, Secret, excised copy attached to W.R. Smyser and David Elliott to Secretary Kissinger, ‘Development of U.S. Policy toward South Korean Development of Nuclear Weapons’, 28 February 1975, Secret, in The United States and South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1974–1976, Part I, EBB 582, ed. William Burr, 22 March 2017. 12⁵ President Park made this remark in an interview on 12 June 1975. See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, ‘Korea: Park’s Inflexibility’, Washington Post, 12 June 1975, A19. 12⁶ CIA National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking, June 1978, ii, available at: http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CIA_ROK_ Nuclear_DecisionMaking.pdf (accessed 20 December 2022). 12⁷ Embassy Seoul, ROK Nuclear Reprocessing Plans, 15 September 1975, WikiLeaks Cable: 1975SEOUL07186_b. For similar sentiment regarding South Korea’s desires for peaceful nuclear capabilities see: Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, 27 August 1975 in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-12; State Department telegram 213134 to U.S. Embassy London, 8 September 1975, Secret, forwarding U.S. Embassy Seoul telegram 6989 to Department of State, ‘Nuclear Reprocessing Plant’, 8 September 1975, Secret, excised copy RG 59, AAD, MDR release by NARA, in The United States and South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1974–1976, Pt I, EBB 582, ed. William Burr, 22 March 2017, Document 21. 12⁸ CIA National Foreign Assessment Center, South Korea, 8, 13; Section 6, ‘Study Prepared by the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, Washington’, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976. See also Se Young Jang, ‘The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 39(4), 2016, 502– 20; Peter Hayes, Scott Bruce, and Chung-in Moon, ‘Park Chung Hee, the US–ROK Strategic Relationship, and the Bomb’, Asia-Pacific Journal, 9(44), 2011, 6; Peter Hayes, ‘The Republic of Korea and Nuclear Issue’. In: Andrew Mack, ed., Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 51–83; Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991). 12⁹ Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 32–52; Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Andrew Mack, ‘North Korea and the Bomb’, Foreign Policy, 83, Summer 1991, 87–104. 13⁰ Alexandre Y. Mansourov, ‘The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program’, Nonproliferation Review, 2(3), 1995, 29.

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with respect to its role in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Sino-Soviet alliance but also growing concerns pertaining to South Korea’s own nuclear and broader status aspirations. Fearing relegation to the status of a ‘typical example of a Third World state’,131 as its enemies of old rapidly gained status and legitimacy in international society, Pyongyang had to rethink its strategy. Nuclear weapons offered one possible option.

Back to juche: Losing friends in a ‘hostile world’ North Korea’s enactment of juche politically and economically was inextricably intertwined with Kim Il Sung’s attempts to strengthen domestic power. Meanwhile, the fraying Sino-Soviet relationship in the 1960s and 1970s forced North Korea into an uneasy position in balancing its bilateral relations with the USSR and the PRC, whilst implementing juche within its borders. Yet, North Korea’s isolation would only worsen over time. The ‘hermit kingdom’, once the moniker of Joseon Korea, would soon become the soubriquet of the DPRK. The booming South Korean economy—coupled with the end of military rule after the assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1979—did not go unnoticed amongst states in the East Asian region and beyond. China and the former Soviet Union (USSR) were no exceptions, despite their commitment to maintaining relations with North Korea. In 1961, China and North Korea had signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance; that same year, the Soviet Union and the DPRK signed a similar treaty. With the transfer of power to Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China underwent an extensive period of economic ‘reform and opening up’. In Moscow, the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was accompanied by his doctrine of perestroika (‘reconstruction’), of which a core component was ‘new political thinking’ whereby Moscow began to depart from the ideological dogmatism of Marxism–Leninism and forge new interstate relations, not least with the West.132 As the ‘de-ideologization of Soviet foreign policy’ took place, Soviet–DPRK ties waned—a process not unrelated to Pyongyang’s economic stagnation—and the USSR gradually called for the normalization of relations with South Korea.133 Growing, if indirect, trade between the USSR and South Korea would take place, and a summit between South Korean President Roh Tae-woo and Mikhail 131 Armstrong, ‘Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations’, 14. 132 Archie Brown, The Human Factor: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Thatcher, and the End of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 209–63. 133 Seung-Ho Joo, ‘Soviet Policy toward the Two Koreas, 1985–1991: The New Political Thinking and Power’, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 14, 1995, 24. See also: Kim Hakjoon, ‘The Process Leading to the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union’, Asian Survey, 37(7), July 1997, 637–51. In a speech on 16 September 1988, Gorbachev stressed that ‘possibilities could open up for forming economic relations with South Korea as well’. See Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘For Building New Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at Krasnoyarsk, September 16, 1988 (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1988); Yu-Nam Kim, ‘Perestroika and the Security of the Korean Peninsula’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 1(1), 1989, 160.

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Gorbachev in 1990 would pave the way for Russia to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1991, following the end of the Cold War. The establishment of Soviet–ROK relations had a profound impact upon the DPRK’s social status. The USSR no longer viewed North Korea as part of the status community of socialist states; it did not treat Pyongyang ‘differently from other neighbo[u]ring countries’, not least South Korea, the latter frequently derided by the North as a ‘puppet state’ of the United States. For instance, the USSR agreed to deliver ‘defensive weapons’ both to the ROK and DPRK, which, in Pyongyang’s eyes, was tantamount to North Korea being seen as equal—and not exceptional—to the South.13⁴ Evidence suggests that at the individual level, relations between Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung declined from the late 1980s following Kim’s refusal to accept the Soviet proposal that both Koreas be admitted to the United Nations.13⁵ For Kim, crossrecognition—whereby the United States and Japan would recognize North Korea, and the USSR and China would do the same towards South Korea—sat firmly at odds with North Korea’s vision of a unified Peninsula controlled by the North.13⁶ Despite continued recognition by the USSR, Moscow’s turn to Seoul considerably altered North Korea’s own understanding of international relations and would have noticeable effects on the North’s behaviour. Moscow would prioritize its relations with the nascent economic powerhouse of Seoul over those with Pyongyang and its associated stagnant economic growth and industrial production. The DPRK accused the USSR of having bargained away ‘the dignity and honor of a socialist state and the interests and faith of its ally for the $2.3 billion it was to receive from South Korea’.13⁷ Furthermore, North Korean state media opined how the USSR’s call to recognize the ‘two Koreas’ was akin to ‘committing separatist acts against the reunification of Korea’. Doing so was an example of ‘perfidy [. . .] injustice and arbitrariness’ as part of the ‘crafty disrupting moves of the imperialists, obsessed with dollars’.13⁸ On the part of North Korea, therefore, the resultant losses of material benefits and social status were substantial. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the new Russian government, having established ties with Seoul, withdrew economic and technical assistance to Pyongyang, most noticeably in the form of Russian technicians working in the DPRK, and insisted that the DPRK repay loans provided by the former USSR. By pivoting to Seoul, Moscow had ‘washed [its] hands of the Pyongyang regime’ and left the North Korean economy on a path

13⁴ Byung-joon Ahn, ‘Korean–Soviet Relations: Contemporary Issues and Prospects’, Asian Survey, 31(9), 1991, 824; see also Jane Shapiro Zacek, ‘Russia in North Korean Foreign Policy’. In: Samuel S. Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 81. 13⁵ Kim Hakjoon, ‘The Process Leading to the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations’, 641–42. 13⁶ Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, ‘Gorbachev and Post-Gorbachev Policy toward the Korean Peninsula: The Impact of Changing Russian Perceptions’, Asian Survey, 32(8), 1992, 757–72. Edward A. Olsen, Toward Normalizing U.S.–Korea Relations: In Due Course? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 84–86; James Clay Moltz, ‘The Renewal of Russian–North Korean Relations’. In: James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds, The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), 197. 13⁷ ‘Diplomatic Relations Bargained for Dollars’, Pyongyang Times, 6 October 1990, in Rhee Sang-Woo, ‘North Korea in 1990: Lonesome Struggle to Keep Chuch’e’, Asian Survey, 31(1), 1991, 71–78. 13⁸ KCNA, ‘Commentary Denounces USSR Diplomatic Ties’, 5 October 1990, FBIS-EAS-90-194, 7–11.

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of decline.13⁹ The Soviet Union’s normalization of relations with South Korea further intensified the DPRK’s disillusionment with its former Communist allies, the nuclear order, and the wider international order. As subsequent chapters will show, the establishment of Soviet–ROK ties was a particularly ‘big blow for North Korea’, as a former South Korean nuclear envoy emphasized, since ‘North Korea acceded to the NPT at the invitation of the Soviet Union [. . .] [but] had a sense of loss and betrayal after the Soviet Union formed diplomatic relations with South Korea. South Korea made friends with North Korea’s former sponsors.’1⁴⁰ From North Korea’s perspective, the DPRK was cheated upon by the USSR, once the very reason behind its accession to the NPT in 1985.1⁴1 North Korea’s isolation would worsen. In 1992, China followed the Soviet path, normalizing relations with South Korea: ‘the DPRK had now almost completely lost its second major ally’.1⁴2 China became increasingly averse towards economic interactions with the stagnating economy of the DPRK. Although Sino-DPRK trade volumes doubled between 1986 and 1988, and whilst China continued to support the DPRK through supplying oil, material, and financial assistance, aid was reduced to a minimum. As a Chinese analyst accurately put it, Kim Il Sung now ‘faced his enemy from the South, and his ally from the North had formed relations with his enemy!’1⁴3 From the North Korean perspective, Sino-ROK normalization demonstrated how China, long deemed to be an ally of the DPRK, not least vis-à-vis Mao’s—albeit reluctant— support for Kim Il Sung’s invasion of the ROK in 1950, could ‘be very rude to North Korea, and does not prioritise North Korea’s interests’.1⁴⁴ The CCP frequently asserted its lack of intention to establish diplomatic ties with South Korea. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping himself argued how ‘it would not be in China’s best interest to develop relations with South Korea’,1⁴⁵ a claim repeated by then Chinese Premier Li Peng in July 1988.1⁴⁶ Yet, for all North Korea’s increasing dependency on imports of Chinese crude oil, the allure of Seoul’s economic growth would be too strong for Beijing to resist.1⁴⁷ China was North Korea’s largest trade partner during the 1970s and 1980s. As trade with the USSR declined in the late 1980s, the DPRK became increasingly dependent on China. However, following 13⁹ Charles K. Armstrong, ‘“A Socialism of Our Style”: North Korean Ideology in a Post-Communist Era’. In: Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 39; see also: Zacek, ‘Russia in North Korean Foreign Policy’, 82–84. 1⁴⁰ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 1⁴1 Vladimir F. Li, ‘North Korea and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’. In: Clay Moltz and Mansourov, eds, The North Korean Nuclear Program, 139. 1⁴2 Natalya Bazhanova, ‘North Korea’s Decision to Develop an Independent Nuclear Program’. In: Clay Moltz and Mansourov, eds, The North Korean Nuclear Program, 132. 1⁴3 Chinese thinktank analyst (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁴ Chinese nuclear analyst (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁵ Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea–China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 57. 1⁴⁶ See ‘PRC Group Proposes Liaison Offices’, Korea Times, 5 July 1988, FBIS-EAS-88-128, 31. 1⁴⁷ General Secretary of the CCP, Zhao Ziyang, affirmed to then DPRK Foreign Minister, Kim Yongnam that China would stand by its ‘position of not having political relations with South Korea’. See: KCNA, ‘China Will Not “Cross Recognize” Two Koreas’, 7 November 1988, FBIS-EAS-98-215, 7; see also Yongho Kim, North Korean Foreign Policy: Security Dilemma and Succession (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 75–76.

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Sino-ROK recognition, China requested that all trade be conducted in hard currency. Pyongyang could no longer benefit from reduced ‘friendship’ prices; it was thus being treated like any other state.1⁴⁸ Although the PRC rescheduled North Korea’s payment of its deficit and encouraged cross-border trade, which saw trade volumes rise between 1992 and 1993, the new diplomatic ties with Seoul in 1992 would shift Sino-North Korean trade to a market basis.1⁴⁹ Chinese food exports to the DPRK—crucially, of grain—declined by over half from 1993 to 1994, and Beijing’s insistence on cash payment would be too much for Pyongyang to fulfil. As Haggard and Noland accurately surmise, ‘if there was a single proximate trigger to the North Korean famine, Chinese trade behaviour during these crucial years is a plausible candidate’.1⁵⁰ Thus, North Korea perceived the abandonment from its former allies as part of a US, South Korean, and Soviet (and later, Chinese) ‘conspiracy to topple the socialist system in the DPRK’.1⁵1 As Armstrong put it, ‘the Pyongyang regime was devastated. Its two major allies had recognized its archenemy, while the DPRK remained estranged from the United States and Japan’.1⁵2 With both socialist partners recognizing the ROK, ‘North Korea could no longer play off Moscow and Beijing’, and ‘China and the Soviet Union would no longer accuse the other of betraying North Korea by improving relations with the South’.1⁵3 The once precarious balancing act of leveraging its relations with its Soviet and Chinese friends—if not allies per se—to reap maximum benefits became a distant memory for North Korea. North Korea had little choice but to enact juche in its purest form, refusing to pursue economic reform and instead opting to enact ‘socialism our style’.1⁵⁴ With respect to the burgeoning Soviet and Chinese relations with South Korea, as Levin accurately wrote in 1991, ‘Moscow’s decision to establish full diplomatic relations and Beijing’s quieter agreement to initiate de facto ties (through trade offices performing consular connections)’ only strengthened international perceptions that ‘North Korea’s failure is nearly complete’.1⁵⁵ The Sino and Soviet rapprochement with South Korea would impose severe material and social challenges upon North Korea, not least by reaping fewer benefits

1⁴⁸ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 30–33; see also James Reilly, ‘The Curious Case of China’s Aid to North Korea’, Asian Survey, 54(6), 2014, 1158–83. 1⁴⁹ Ilpyong J. Kim, ‘China in North Korean Foreign Policy’. In: Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 107–109. 1⁵⁰ Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, 31–32. 1⁵1 KCNA, ‘Soviet Diplomatic Moves with ROK Criticized’, 18 September 1990, FBIS-EAS-90-182, 14– 15. 1⁵2 Charles K. Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 278. 1⁵3 Ibid., 276. 1⁵⁴ This slogan was introduced by Kim Jong Il in May 1991, in warning how ‘a slight slackening of ideological education may result in the wind of bourgeois liberalism blowing in’. See Kim Jong Il, ‘Our Socialism Centred on the Masses Shall Not Perish: Talk to the Senior Officials of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, 5 May 1991 In: Kim Jong Il, Selected Works, Vol. 11, January–July 1991 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 2006), 61; Lee, North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress, 217–18. 1⁵⁵ Norman D. Levin, ‘North Korea in 1991: A Defining Moment?’ In: Michael J. Mazarr, John Q. Blodgett, Cha Young-koo, and William J. Taylor, eds, Korea 1991: The Road to Peace (Washington, DC: Westview Press, 1991), 103–104.

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from its once proximate partners. These manoeuvres would form seminal influences on how the DPRK would conceptualize and respond to international relations in the post-Cold War era. Pyongyang’s perception of an antagonistic international order at odds with its very existence would strengthen and play no small part in motivating the resultant deployment of delinquent behaviour.

Conclusion North Korea’s view on international relations is, therefore, a product of several competing and evolving factors stemming from before the division of the Korean Peninsula at the end of the Second World War. As this chapter has demonstrated, the long-standing enmity between Japan and North Korea was rooted in, and even existed prior to, the Japanese annexation of the then unified Korea. Japan’s hegemonic ambitions within the East Asian region during the late nineteenth century, and even Korea’s period of dynastic rule, also made considerable contributions to shaping how North Korea saw the world around it. Such a contribution was seen on two fronts: first, in terms of how North Korea would develop its own national identity—especially given its experience of the iconography of the Japanese emperor; and second, how North Korea would strive to assert itself in a world dominated by great powers. The establishment of the DPRK and ROK, in 1948, as two separate states on a single but divided Peninsula was formative to how North Korea framed its outlook on international relations, most notably in opposition to that of the United States and its allies. The vision of a post-war Western liberal international order, with the United States as a benign unipolar global hegemon, was, at its core, antithetical to the Hobbesian vision of international relations that Pyongyang held, and continues to hold, to this day. Nowhere has such opposition been more prominently seen than through the North’s conceptualization of the heuristic of the US ‘hostile policy’, which would become a core justification for North Korea’s deviant behaviour in subsequent years, most prominently with respect to the global nuclear order. It was, however, not just the legacies of Japanese colonialism and the Second World War which had profound consequences on how North Korea conceptualized international relations and its place within it. The US threat of using nuclear weapons during the Korean War, and its inconclusive ending, only heightened the DPRK’s early mistrust of the United States and its desire for international status. As the ensuring bipolarity of the Cold War ordered international relations as a battle for ideological supremacy between the Western and Eastern blocs, North Korea would have to maintain a precarious balancing act between its Communist patrons of the Soviet Union (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China. The ideological exceptionalism brought by the global Communist movement would further entrench North Korea’s opposition to the United States. Moreover, coupled with changing dynamics in the Sino-Soviet relationship, North Korea would be compelled to seek its own followership within like-minded anti-imperial and anti-colonial movements in the

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Third World, in no small part motivated by its own historical memories of Japanese imperial rule. As this chapter has contended, North Korea’s unsuccessful quest for leadership within the NAM would be compounded by challenges closer to home. No longer the more prosperous Korea from the 1970s onwards, Pyongyang’s insistence on economic autarky, according to the tenets of juche, would prove untimely as its adversaries of Japan and South Korea would, in contrast, experience dramatic economic growth. North Korea continued to assert itself as a then new sovereign state, whose national interests should not be infringed by other powers, but also desired international status to bolster the regime-state’s standing in international society.1⁵⁶ Increasingly unable to fulfil its objectives of domestic economic growth, leadership in the Third World, or ascendant international status, North Korea and its leadership had to reconsider its quest for significance, legitimacy, and international standing. Nuclear weapons offered one avenue towards this goal. Indeed, as subsequent chapters will argue, although North Korea’s nuclear ambitions cannot be attributed to a single point in time, they cannot be effectively analysed or theorized without understanding the DPRK’s own world view on international relations and how such an outlook developed over time. For, as Jonathan Pollack aptly reminds us: for North Korea, the ‘past is still the present’.1⁵⁷

1⁵⁶ Eberstadt, The North Korean Economy, 67. 1⁵⁷ Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017), 194.

2 Strategic delinquency Benefits of norm-breaking

Having outlined how North Korea frames its external environment, this chapter argues how, in order to gain a more robust understanding of North Korea’s behaviour in relation to the global nuclear order, it is important to pay attention to questions of status and the possible benefits that can be gained from delinquent behaviour. The case of North Korea and its nuclear development poses two broader questions in this regard: first, what behaviour can be exercised by states that object to the social and material norms of a particular order? The second question is, how might states benefit from breaking international norms? In exploring how states can deploy a repertoire of delinquent and compliant behaviour with respect to international norms—such as nuclear norms—to obtain beneficial outcomes, this chapter pioneers the framework of ‘strategic delinquency’. Even if possessing nuclear weapons may beget security but also — simultaneously — insecurity for an aspirant nuclear state and bring further costs, such as lowering the state’s status (negative status), benefits can still arise. This framework underscores how states do not simply ‘learn to live with their lower status’ but can capitalize upon their initially degraded status as a means towards positive social and material outcomes.1 In defining status, it is important to note how this chapter—and book—does not limit status merely to material power, even if it forms one important facet of a state’s status. As the introductory chapter of this book has made clear, this book defines status as ‘collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capacities, culture, demographic position, sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout)’, beliefs which constitute a ‘relative social relationship involving hierarchy and deference’.2 In so doing, the framework of strategic delinquency makes a threefold scholarly contribution. First, it illuminates the behavioural strategies of a state situated on the fringes of international society rather than of rising or great powers, even if the framework can be applied to these latter states. Second, it challenges the assumption that states must conform with dominant systemic norms to reap rewards, given how any 1 Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 74. 2 Deborah Welch Larson, T.V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Status and World Order’, in T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds, Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7, 13.

North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order. Edward Howell, Oxford University Press. © Edward Howell (2023). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192888327.003.0003

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deviation from these norms generates the undesirable attribute of negative status. Third, it offers a new approach to understanding North Korea’s nuclear ambitions beyond existing accounts, which cluster around nuclear deterrence;3 Pyongyang’s involvement in clandestine networks of nuclear proliferation,⁴ the domestic bureaucratic politics of the Workers’ Party,⁵ and whether the international community should ‘contain’ or ‘engage’ a nuclear North Korea.⁶ Furthermore, the framework of ‘strategic delinquency’ demonstrates how alternative approaches to those centred around status (namely, nuclear deterrence and domestic legitimacy) need not be in zero-sum tension with status-based accounts to gain a richer understanding of North Korea’s nuclear behaviour. Certainly, they can co-exist with, and enhance, each other. Prior to any analysis of a state’s engagement with the nuclear order, whether through breaking or complying with the order’s norms, however, it is important to clarify how the order itself has changed with time. When applied to the case of North Korea, the framework of strategic delinquency sheds light first upon how North Korea’s engagement with the global nuclear order remains heavily premised upon ideas of material and social status and, second (and relatedly), how the order is both material and social.

North Korea and a changing global nuclear order Just as the international geopolitical environment and nuclear ambitions of states have evolved with time, so too has the global nuclear order.⁷ Fundamentally, the development of the nuclear order has been inextricably embedded within the United States’ hegemonic leadership of the post-war international order. The Manhattan 3 See, e.g. Victor D. Cha, ‘Engaging North Korea Credibly’, Survival, 45, 2002, 136–55; Ankit Panda, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (London: Hurst, 2020); Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen, eds, North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017); Vipin Narang, ‘Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers: North Korea and Iran’, Washington Quarterly, 38(1), 2015, 73–91; Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, ‘The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation’, International Security, 39(2), 2014, 7–51. ⁴ Sheena Chestnut, ‘Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks’, International Security, 32(1), 2007, 80–111; Andrea Berger, Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers (London: Routledge, 2015); Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, ‘Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, International Security, 29(2), 2004, 5–49. ⁵ See, e.g. Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005); Patrick McEachern, Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Post-Totalitarian Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Daniel A. Pinkston, ‘Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program’, Non-Proliferation Review, 10(2), 2003, 1–15. ⁶ See, e.g. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, 2nd edn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Scott A. Snyder, ‘Confronting the North Korean Threat: Reassessing Policy Options’, Statement by Scott A. Snyder before the United States Senate Committee on foreign Relations, 1st session, 11th Congress, 31 January 2017; James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, ‘How to Deal with North Korea’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2003, 16–30. ⁷ Walker describes the nuclear order as ‘entail[ing] the primary goals of world survival, war avoidance and economic development; and the quest for a tolerable accommodation of pronounced differences in the capabilities, practices, rights and obligations of states’: William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order (London: Routledge, 2011), 89.

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Project, which commenced during the Second World War, was fundamental to the United States’ own nuclear development. To date, the United States remains the only state to use nuclear weapons, as witnessed in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945. Constructed between 1945 and 1959, the early global nuclear order was centred around the hegemonic position of the United States as the guarantor of the post-war international order and, until 1949 (when the USSR would conduct its first nuclear test), the monopoly held by the United States as the world’s sole nuclear-armed state. During the Cold War, the nuclear order was consolidated, particularly from 1960 to 1989, as the United States sought to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology across states, especially following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.⁸ During this time, the ‘nuclear taboo’ became entrenched in the establishment of core treaties and institutions, including the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1957 and 1968 (the latter between the United States and Soviet Union), respectively.⁹ Scholarship during the Cold War predominantly concerned how the deterrent value of nuclear weapons and fear of mutually assured destruction brought international stability, as was witnessed in the ‘long peace’ and resultant absence of ‘hot’ war between the two Cold War superpowers.1⁰ Amidst the throes of détente, subsequent treaties between the United States and USSR stabilized the nuclear order, notably the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of 1972 and 1979, and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, which limited the build-up of strategic offensive weapons by the Cold War superpowers.11 Nonetheless, archival evidence reveals how, even whilst the order was being consolidated in the 1960s, opposition was brewing. The fomenting resistance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to US hegemony and its prohibition from acquiring nuclear weapons according to the NPT, catalysed indigenous plans for nuclear development and acquisition, initially aided by the Soviet Union (USSR). These plans accelerated after China conducted its first

⁸ Alexander Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018). ⁹ Andrew J. Coe and Jane Vaynman, ‘Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, Journal of Politics, 77(4), 2015, 983–97. For more on the ‘nuclear taboo’, see Nina Tannenwald, ‘The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use’, International Security, 53(3), Summer 1999, 433–68. 1⁰ Key proponents include Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946); Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better’, Adelphi Papers, 21(171), 1981; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe’, International Security, 9(3), Winter 1984–1985, 19–46; John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System’, International Security, 10(4), Spring 1986, 99–142. 11 The SALT II agreement of 1979 was not ratified by the US Senate—following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year—or the Supreme Soviet. Yet, both states honoured the terms of the agreement until it expired on 31 December 1985. The INF Treaty sought to eliminate nuclear and conventional ballistic and cruise missiles ranging between 300 and 3,400 miles.

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nuclear test in 196412 and as South Korea developed nascent—albeit eventually short-lived—nuclear ambitions of its own.13 With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and subsequent end of the Cold War, global confidence in the nuclear order strengthened following nuclear disarmament by South Africa, Belarus, and Ukraine, the latter which has subsequently attracted much attention in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.1⁴ The indefinite extension of the NPT at the NPT Review Conference in 1995 bolstered such confidence, together with the adoption of the Additional Protocol in 1997, which strengthened IAEA safeguards and the Agency’s inspection powers.1⁵ These junctures were central to the continued US leadership of the nuclear order after the end of the Cold War, which revolved around prohibiting additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, fragilities with the order were also being exposed during this time, not least owing to North Korea’s own actions. Despite joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) in 1985, it continued to develop plutonium; engage in clandestine trade of nuclear and missile material; and produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), covertly, despite freezing plutonium production in 1994 as part of the US–DPRK Agreed Framework.1⁶ Beyond North Korea, further concerns of the stability of the global nuclear order arose from the nuclear ambitions of non-legal nuclear states such as Iraq – as was witnessed during the Cold War – and nuclear testing by non-NPT signatories of India and Pakistan in 1998, twenty-four years after India had conducted its first nuclear test.1⁷ Moreover, multilateral agreements began to fail, such as the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), plans for which were established in 1995, which aimed to ban the production of fissile material for weaponized nuclear development.1⁸ The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, though signed on 24 September 1996,

12 It remains unclear as to whether North Korea’s early nuclear aspirations comprised the sole pursuit of peaceful nuclear energy or both peaceful and weaponized programmes. See: ‘Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry’, HPPA, 18 May 1977. 13 ‘Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, ‘Reactions among the North Korean Masses to China’s Nuclear Test’, 21 October 1964, HPPA, PRC FMA 113-00395-08, 62–63. 1⁴ In 1993, John Mearsheimer argued how ‘pressing Ukraine to become a nonnuclear state is a mistake’: John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent’, Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 1993, 50. 1⁵ Nicola Horsburgh, China and Global Nuclear Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 15–16; Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Global Nuclear Order (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019); Steven E. Miller, ‘The Rise and Decline of Global Nuclear Order?’. In: Steven E. Miller, Robert Levgold, and Lawrence Freedman, eds, Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Global Order (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2019), 13. 1⁶ CIA, Untitled [assessment provided to Congress], November 2002, NSA EBB No. 98, Document 22. Chapters 3 and 4 provide further treatment of the Agreed Framework and the DPRK’s engagement in covert HEU production. 1⁷ George Bunn, ‘The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems’, Arms Control Today, 33(1), 2003, 4–10. 1⁸ Robert J. Einhorn, ‘Controlling Fissile Materials Worldwide: A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and Beyond’. In: George P. Shultz, Steven P. Andreasen, Sidney D. Drell, and James E. Goodby, eds, Reykjavik Revisited: Steps toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2008), 279–313; John Carlson, ‘Can a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Be Effectively Verified?’, Arms Control Today, 35(1), January/February 2005, 25–29.

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never entered into force since China, Iran, Israel, and the United States did not ratify the treaty; India, Pakistan, and the DPRK refused even to sign it.1⁹ By the turn of the century, scholarly and policy consensus pointed to a nuclear order in decline owing to three principal reasons: first, evidence of states violating the NPT’s norms by engaging in horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation; second, stagnant progress towards global nuclear disarmament; third, and relatedly, unsuccessful efforts to revitalize the global nuclear order and its norms.2⁰ North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 marked a cornerstone moment whereby an NPT signatory voluntarily renounced its membership of a core institution of the nuclear order.21 The revelation, in 2004, of a clandestine nuclear proliferation network commanded by Pakistani scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan (known as A.Q. Khan)— including Pakistan, Iran, and the DPRK—heightened fears that states outside of the NPT could develop and acquire nuclear weapons indigenously and covertly, and, in so doing, successfully undermine the norms of the nuclear order.22 Meanwhile, international attempts to revitalize norms of deterrence, disarmament, and non-proliferation bore minimal fruit.23 The NPT Review Conference in 2005 only reinforced disagreement amongst NWS regarding the pursuit of global disarmament, and cemented divisions within and between NWS, NNWS, and non-NPT signatories.2⁴ In the milieu of a weakened nuclear order, the DPRK’s first nuclear test in October 2006 only exacerbated global concern of the minimal enforcement power of 1⁹ George Perkovich, ‘India’s Nuclear Weapons Debate: Unlocking the Door to the CTBT’, Arms Control Today, 26(4), May/June 1996, 11; Keith A. Hansen, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider’s Perspective (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 2⁰ For such perspectives, see Miller, ‘The Rise and Decline of the Global Nuclear Order?’; Graham Allison, ‘Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats’, Foreign Affairs, 89(1), 2010, 74–85; Nina Tannenwald, ‘The Great Unraveling: The Decline of the Nuclear Normative Order’. In: Nina Tannenwald and James M. Acton, eds, Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2018), 6–32; Nina Tannenwald, ‘How Strong Is the Nuclear Taboo Today?’, Washington Quarterly, 43(3), 2018, 90. 21 Although the DPRK remains the only state to have acceded to and withdrawn from the NPT, the validity of its self-proclaimed withdrawal is debatable since it did not provide the requisite three-month notice under Article X of the Treaty. See George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, ‘NPT Withdrawal: Time for the Security Council to Step In’, Arms Control Today, May 2005, available at: https://www.armscontrol. org/act/2005-05/features/npt-withdrawal-time-security-council-step (accessed 20 December 2022). 22 Chung Min Lee, Fault Lines in a Rising Asia (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace), 2016, 252–61; Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the A.Q. Khan Network (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 241–51; David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ‘Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks’, Washington Quarterly, 28(2), 2005, 111– 28. Dr Siegfried Hecker, one of the first Western nuclear scientists to visit the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility, stressed how the DPRK had gained ‘significant help from Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan’ in developing nuclear technologies, especially for uranium enrichment. See: Barbara Demick, ‘North Korea Not a Nuclear Threat to U.S. Yet, Scientist Says’, Los Angeles Times, 14 February 2013. 23 Horsburgh, China and Global Nuclear Order, 16; William Walker, ‘The International Nuclear Order after the Cold War—Progress and Regress’. In: Hanns W. Maull, ed., The Rise and Decline of the PostCold War International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 93; Ramesh Thakur, ‘A Bifurcated Global Nuclear Order: Thou May vs. Thou Shall Not Possess or Use Nuclear Weapons’. In: Giuliana Z. Capaldo, The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, 2017 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 71–113; George Perkovich, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon Wolfsthal, A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 22. 2⁴ Harald Müller, ‘A Treaty in Troubled Waters: Reflections on the Failed NPT Review Conference’, International Spectator: International Journal of International Affairs, 40(3), 2005, 38–39; John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, ‘The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Mission Impossible?’, Nonproliferation Review,

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the nuclear order to instigate North Korea’s re-compliance with the non-proliferation regime.2⁵ More recent attempts to stabilize the nuclear order have hitherto failed in their objectives, whether the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 2010; the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between the European Union, permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and Iran; or the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, signed in 2017.2⁶ The constraining and enabling nature of the nuclear order is such that states that accept the order’s norms will be restricted in their material ambitions by the order’s normative and institutionalized constraints. Nevertheless, aspirant nuclear states can also exploit cleavages within the nuclear order to their advantage.2⁷

Global nuclear order: Status and hierarchy Existing scholarship on the nuclear order largely explores the role of the United States as the order’s custodian; the bifurcation between legal and non-legal nuclear states enshrined by the NPT; and the greater material power and social status occupied by the five NWS—who are also permanent members of the UN Security Council— in comparison with NNWS and non-NPT signatories.2⁸ Scholarly attention has also focused upon how great or rising powers engage with the order, how non-great powers remain subject to the order’s rules and norms, and how the NPT enshrines a social hierarchy between states.2⁹ Whilst all parties to the NPT can pursue peaceful nuclear technology, NNWS and non-NPT signatories must join the Treaty on the condition that they abandon any weaponized nuclear capabilities, given how the five nuclear states pledge to pursue universal disarmament.3⁰ States that oppose these strictures 12(2), 2005, 271–301; William C. Potter, ‘The NPT Review Conference: 188 States in Search of Consensus’, International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 40(3), 2005, 19–31. 2⁵ As Chapter 4 highlights, UN Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted on 14 October 2006, did not lead to the DPRK re-joining the NPT or ceasing nuclear and missile testing. 2⁶ The US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, after which—on 5 January 2020—Iran declared its non-compliance with the agreement, plunged the nuclear order into further uncertainty. See Donald J. Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, The White House, 8 May 2018; Parisa Hafezi, ‘Iran Says No Limits on Enrichment, Stepping Further from 2015 Deal: TV’, Reuters, 5 January 2020. 2⁷ North Korea deemed the refusal of NWS to sign the TPNW to have ‘cast a gloomy shadow on the prospects of the treaty’, against which the DPRK would not ‘flinch even an inch from the road to bolstering up the nuclear forces’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘DPRK Will Not Flinch from Bolstering Nuclear Force: DPRK Representative to UN’, 7 October 2017. 2⁸ Mlada Bukovansky, Ian Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 70–72; William Walker, ‘Nuclear Order and Disorder’, International Affairs, 76(4), 2000, 729. 2⁹ Nye argues how ‘most states are likely to accept some ordered inequality in weaponry because anarchic equality appears more dangerous’. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘NPT: The Logic of Inequality’, Foreign Policy, 59, Summer 1985, 127. Two realist accounts of the global nuclear order include Michael Rühle, ‘Enlightenment in the Second Nuclear Age’, International Affairs, 83(3), 2007, 511–22; Henry D. Sokolski, ‘Towards an NPT-Restrained World that Makes Economic Sense’, International Affairs, 83(3), 2007, 531–48. 3⁰ Article IV of the NPT asserts how ‘all the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy’. Article VI underscores how ‘each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation

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have frequently dismissed the nuclear order as a mere microcosm of US hegemony. North Korea is not alone in this regard. India and Pakistan, two non-NPT signatories, shared this view, as did Iran, despite the latter being a NNWS.31 Criticizing the divisions within the nuclear non-proliferation regime, T.V. Paul underscores how the regime ‘expects the two types of states to have two different behavioral patterns’, creating a ‘state of affairs [which] would continue as long as the Treaty lasts’.32 For Bertrand Badie, the NPT represents a ‘logic of relegation [. . .] clos[ing] the door of the club to those who wished for a bomb of their own’.33 Yet, as Grégoire Mallard reminds us, the pursuit of nuclear weapons by ‘rogue’ nuclear states, whether as a reaction to the hierarchical nature of the non-proliferation regime or otherwise, has posed a grave threat to the stability of the nuclear order in the postCold War era.3⁴ Whilst these actors have often opposed the structures of the nuclear order, as manifest in their disruption of the order’s norms, the order has rarely been narrated from their perspectives. Thus, the global nuclear order is materially and socially defined: materially, in terms of which states can possess weaponized nuclear capabilities; state nuclear doctrines; arms control; command-and-control doctrines; and the interstate exchange of civil nuclear technology.3⁵ Socially, the order is defined in relation to the nuclear nonproliferation norm and the social roles and responsibilities occupied by actors within the order.3⁶ As one facet of the post-war Western liberal international order, the social norms governing the nuclear order have been created by great powers, particularly the United States as the order’s hegemon, whence a set of expected behaviours have become institutionalized over time.3⁷ The varying social rights and responsibilities of nuclear and non-nuclear states have embedded differing statuses to NWS, NNWS, and non-NPT signatories. Under the NPT, NWS signatories are obligated not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS. In contrast to NNWS, NWS signatories are recognized as legitimate possessors of nuclear weapons and accorded with higher social status as upholders of the of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’: ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)’, available at: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text (accessed 6 January 2023). 31 Etel Solingen and Wilfred Wan, ‘Critical Junctures, Developmental Pathways, and Incremental Change in Security Institutions’. In: Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 565. 32 T.V. Paul, ‘Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16(1), 2003, 136. 33 Bertrand Badie, Humiliation in International Relations: A Pathology of Contemporary International Systems, trans. Jeff Lewis (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 57. 3⁴ Grégoire Mallard, Fallout: Nuclear Diplomacy in an Age of Global Fracture, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 247. 3⁵ William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004), 27. 3⁶ ‘1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, NPT/CONF.1995/6, 15 March 1995. See also Bukovansky et al., Special Responsibilities, 82–87. 3⁷ Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Interplay between the International System and the Global Nuclear Order’. In: Miller, Levgold, and Freedman, eds, Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age, 62. One such expected behaviour is the non-use of nuclear weapons; see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

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institutionalized and normative order.3⁸ A NWS or NNWS that complies with the NPT and nuclear norms is also recognized as a responsible international actor. Yet, non-NPT or NNWS signatories that pursue weaponized nuclear ambitions are stigmatized by the custodians of the nuclear order for having flouted the nonproliferation norm.3⁹ Even amongst non-NPT signatories, states can occupy different statuses vis-à-vis the nuclear order, marked by differing treatment from the order’s guarantor of the United States.⁴⁰ For example, Israel pays little cost for its posture of nuclear opacity, given its strong relationship with the United States, in contrast to the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK or Pakistan, which the US views with disdain.⁴1 The nuclear order embodies the idea that states seek their identities to be respected and recognized by international society.⁴2 For instance, despite the DPRK’s selfinflicted marginalization vis-à-vis the order, it has sought recognition as a significant international actor—not least from the United States—and, in recent years, a significant nuclear power, much ‘like Russia and China’.⁴3 Some accounts may deem the nuclear order to be inseparable from ideas of US hegemony, ‘reflect[ing] its power and preferences along with those of its allies, and, at times, its adversaries and other states’.⁴⁴ Yet, whilst North Korea is one such adversary, it seeks to shape the order by attempting—even if unsuccessfully—to alter the behaviour of other members, including the United States, by breaking the order’s norms.⁴⁵ Although challengers to the nuclear order may aim to contest the notion that ‘nuclear weapons are the status symbols of the powerful alone’,⁴⁶ unique to North Korea’s counter-hegemonic

3⁸ David Vital, ‘Double-Talk or Double-Think? A Comment on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty’, International Affairs, 44(3), 1968, 420; Brad Roberts, ‘All the King’s Men? Refashioning Global Nuclear Order’, International Affairs, 83(3), 2007, 527; Jan Ruzicka, ‘Behind the Veil of Good Intentions: Power Analysis of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime’, International Politics, 55(3–4), 2018, 369–85. 3⁹ Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, ‘On Compliance’, International Organization, 47(2), 1993, 175–205; Richard Price, ‘Nuclear Weapons Don’t Kill People, Rogues Do’, International Politics, 44(2–3), 2007, 232–49; Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, ‘Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo’. In: Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 114–53; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society’, International Organization, 68(1), 2015, 143–76. ⁴⁰ Thakur’s notion of ‘normative inconsistency’, whereby norms are applied unevenly to different states, can be seen in the United States’ application of the nuclear non-proliferation norm to Iraq, Israel, India, and North Korea. See Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 276; Wade L. Huntley, ‘Rebels without a Cause: North Korea, Iran and the NPT’, International Affairs, 82(4), 2006, 723–42. ⁴1 George H. Quester, ‘Knowing and Believing about Nuclear Proliferation’, Security Studies, 1(2), 1991, 270–82. ⁴2 Michelle Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 38–39, 47. ⁴3 Kim Yong Chol made this comparison to James Clapper, during Clapper’s visit to Pyongyang in 2014. See James R. Clapper, Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence (New York: Viking, 2018), 277. ⁴⁴ Nick Ritchie, ‘A Hegemonic Nuclear Order: Understanding the Power Politics of Nuclear Weapons’, Contemporary Security Policy, 40(4), 2019, 411. ⁴⁵ Ursula Jasper, ‘Dysfunctional, but Stable—a Bourdieuian Reading of the Global Nuclear Order’, Critical Studies on Security, 4(1), 2015, 47–50. For one critique of the nuclear order’s hierarchy, as became prominent in the 1990s vis-à-vis the nuclear ambitions of India and Pakistan, see Hugh Gusterson, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination’, Cultural Anthropology, 4(1), 1999, 111–43. ⁴⁶ Gusterson, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Other’, 131.

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challenge is how it frames the nuclear order and post-war liberal international order in US-centric terms, namely, through the lens of the US ‘hostile policy’.

States behaving badly: Norm-breaking in international relations For constructivist scholars Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, a norm is ‘a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity’.⁴⁷ As underscored by Hedley Bull, a pioneer of the English School approach to international relations, norms are instrumental for the existence of an international society whereby ‘a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’.⁴⁸ For states to be respected as legitimate and responsible international actors, they must conform with the social norms of international society, which are both systemic and domestic. The former includes the rudimental norm of sovereignty—broadly accepted by the pluralist approach to the English School as sacrosanct—as well as formal and informal institutions, of which international law, international human rights regimes, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime are but three examples. The latter includes good governance over citizens and the related provision of public goods and services to them.⁴⁹ Whilst conformity with dominant social norms is rewarded by international society through bestowing positive status upon a state, behaviour that departs from these norms frequently lowers a state’s status and reputation, thereby inflicting negative status.⁵⁰ Despite the taboo surrounding breaking international norms, states may vindicate norm-breaking behaviour by delegitimizing or altering existing norms or stressing their compliance with other norms that better serve their interests. A norm-violating state may, as Dunne argues, ‘justify its actions with reference to another norm or gives reasons why the action constitutes a legitimate exception’.⁵1 Recent scholarship

⁴⁷ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52(4), 1998, 891. Krasner defines norms as ‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’. See Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’. In: Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2. ⁴⁸ Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 4th edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1977[2012]), 13. ⁴⁹ For more on the distinction between pluralism and solidarism within the English School, see Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 144–51. ⁵⁰ Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Economy of Esteem and Climate Change’, St Antony’s International Review, 5(2), 2010, 18. ⁵1 Tim Dunne, ‘English School and Global Governance’, paper presented to Contending Perspectives on Global Governance, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, 18–19 October 2002; see also: Alice D. Ba, ‘On Norms, Rule Breaking, and Security Communities: A Constructivist Response’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 5(2), 2005, 259.

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has posited these claims vis-à-vis the revisionist behaviour of great powers.⁵2 For example, the United States has used the agency accompanied with its preponderant material power to breach and refashion existing norms to fulfil its interests.⁵3 The global ‘War on Terror’ following 9/11 marked one example where the United States attempted to justify its violations of international human rights norms and norms against the use of force in the name of upholding the norm of international stability.⁵⁴ As Harold Hongju Koh contends, ‘instead of acting firmly and surgically against Al Qaeda, the United States squandered global goodwill by invading Iraq, committing torture, opening Guantánamo, flouting domestic and international law, and undermining civilian courts’.⁵⁵ The administration of Donald Trump flouted norms of the liberal international order, whether through deploying air strikes in Syria in 2017 and 2018 or retrenching from multilateralism, as evident in the withdrawal of the United States, inter alia, from the Paris Climate Change Agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and World Health Organization, the latter during the apotheosis of the coronavirus pandemic. Such retrenchment led to Margaret MacMillan concluding, pessimistically, that ‘the United States has lost much of its moral authority’.⁵⁶ In line with this view, Reus-Smit argues how, if the global hegemon does not act in accordance with existing international norms, ‘the legitimacy of its leadership will fast erode’.⁵⁷ Whilst time will tell whether the legitimacy of the United States has been eroded, states that resent the US-led international order have exploited the United States’ norm-deviant behaviour to their advantage, particularly by portraying it as an unbenevolent hegemon that has failed to uphold the post-war norms it created. Scholarship within the constructivist school of International Relations (IR) has placed notable focus upon the idea of ‘norm entrepreneurship’,⁵⁸ contending how

⁵2 Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, ‘Global Norms and Major State Behaviour: The Cases of China and the United States’, European Journal of International Relations, 19(2), 2011, 329–53; Ian Clark, ‘Setting the Revisionist Agenda for International Legitimacy’, International Politics, 44, 2007, 325–35. ⁵3 Ian Hurd, ‘Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy’, International Politics 44(2–3), 2007, 209; Stephen Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, ‘International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism’, Perspectives on Politics, 3(3), 2005, 509–24; Bruce Cronin, ‘The Paradox of Hegemony: America’s Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations’, European Journal of International Relations, 7(1), 2001, 103–30. See also: Patrick Porter, The False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia, Delusion and the Rise of Trump (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020). ⁵⁴ Averell Schmidt and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Breaking the Ban? The Heterogeneous Impact of US Contestation of the Torture Norm’, Journal of Global Security Studies, 4(1), 2019, 105–22. ⁵⁵ Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 94. ⁵⁶ Margaret MacMillan, ‘Which Past Is Prologue? Heeding the Right Wrongs from History’, Foreign Affairs, 99(5), September/October 2020, 12–22. For whether the preferences of a state leader will be dampened by bureaucratic constraints after their election, see Robert Jervis, ‘Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?’, Security Studies, 22(2), 2013, 153–79. ⁵⁷ Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 102. ⁵⁸ See Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 887–917. Two seminal constructivist works include Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46(2), 1992, 391–425; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Constructivist arguments gained fruition within the discipline of IR following its ‘constructivist turn’; see Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics, 50(2), 1998, 324–48.

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Western liberal states diffuse their own normative models across international society, aiming to promote the political and economic betterment of non-Western states.⁵⁹ Additional arguments have concerned norm creation from non-Western regions⁶⁰ and ‘norm antipreneurs’, namely, those states that favour the normative status quo.⁶1 Nevertheless, it is not just the hegemon which can refashion existing norms. ‘Rogue’ states can also interpret extant normative frameworks to serve their interests, even if they may not necessarily be norm entrepreneurs.⁶2 Yet, why might a state violate international norms if doing so lowers its status? Might negative status procure beneficial outcomes?

Status, norm-breaking, and the global nuclear order For Robert Gilpin, prestige, ‘rather than power’, is ‘the everyday currency of international relations—if your strength is recognised, you can generally achieve your aims without having to use it’.⁶3 Such realist perspectives underscore how states compete for status and material clout within the anarchic international environment since state leaders care about how their state is seen by the leaders and populations of other states.⁶⁴ Status is an end in itself, and a means to other domestic and international goals, whether bolstering a leader’s domestic support or gaining economic benefits or international legitimacy as a norm-conforming power.⁶⁵ Beyond economic and military clout, thus expanding upon realist understandings, status is also a social concept tied to a state’s fulfilment of rights and responsibilities in line with international norms. For Duque, social status ‘concerns identification ⁵⁹ Amitav Acharya, Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 52–53. ⁶⁰ Amitav Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism’, International Organization, 58, 2004, 239–75; Amitav Acharya, ‘Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Rule-Making in the Third World’, International Studies Quarterly, 55(1), 2011, 95–123; Pu Xiaoyu, ‘Socialisation as a Two-Way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(4), 2012, 341–67. ⁶1 Alan Bloomfield, ‘Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change’, Review of International Studies, 42(2), 2016, 310–33. ⁶2 Carmen Wunderlich, Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs: Black Sheep or Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing? (Cham: Springer, 2020), 273–75. ⁶3 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 30. ⁶⁴ William C. Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War’, World Politics, 61(1), 2009, 34–36; Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, ‘Reputation and Status as Motives for War’, Annual Review of Political Science 17, 2014, 371–93; Jonathan Mercer, ‘Anarchy and Identity’, International Organization, 49(2), 1995, 229–52; Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017); Daniel Markey, ‘Prestige and the Origins of War’, Security Studies, 8(4), 1999, 126–72. For an integration of realist and constructivist approaches to status and conflict, see Barry O’Neill, Honor, Symbols and War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001). ⁶⁵ Keohane, ‘The Economy of Esteem and Climate Change’, 19; Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War’, 34–37; Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, ‘Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach’. In: Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security, 79–104.

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processes to which an actor receives admission into a club once they are considered to follow the rules of membership’.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, existing accounts across different theoretical persuasions offer limited insight into how states respond to lower-status positions within international order, instead focusing on the ascendant status ambitions of rising powers, such as China, Russia, or India.⁶⁷ Scholarship on ‘small states’, such as Norway and Qatar, concerns how they can increase their status through conforming with international norms by mediating interstate conflict.⁶⁸ Although de Carvalho and Neumann posit how some small states, such as Burma (Myanmar) or the DPRK, may wish to elevate their international status through less norm-compliant pathways, the possibility that norm-breaking behaviour can bring external benefits, as part of accepting the trade-off of such actions, remains overlooked.⁶⁹ Violating the norms of the global nuclear order, such as part of a yearning to be ‘equal members of international society’,⁷⁰ generates costs, such as stigmatization from the order’s custodians.⁷1 Yet, non-NPT and NNWS signatories that breach nuclear norms through pursuing weaponized nuclear development may, in fact, accelerate their nuclear development rather than internalizing and showing remorse for the stigma.⁷2 They may ‘cope strategically with the shame to which they are subjected and, in some cases, may challenge a dominant moral discourse by wearing their stigma as a badge of pride’.⁷3 Through what the social psychologist Erving Goffman terms counterstigmatization, a state may turn the stigma associated with violating nuclear norms ‘into an emblem of pride’ and subsequently ‘value their exclusionary status’.⁷⁴ One effect of weaponized nuclear possession becoming an ‘emblem of pride’ or

⁶⁶ Marina Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach’, International Studies Quarterly, 61, 2018, 577. ⁶⁷ Three examples include Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019); Anne Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). ⁶⁸ William C. Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking’, Review of International Studies, 44(3), 2018, 526–46; Iver B. Neumann, ‘Status Is Cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians Seek Great-Power Status’. In: Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, eds, Status in World Politics, 85–115; Phil Baxter, Jenna Jordan, and Lawrence Rubin, ‘How Small States Acquire Status: A Social Network Analysis’ International Area Studies Review, 21(3), 2018, 191–213. ⁶⁹ Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann, Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 5. ⁷⁰ Kjølv Egeland, ‘The Road to Prohibition: Nuclear Hierarchy and Disarmament, 1968–2017’, thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, December 2017, 213. ⁷1 Zarakol defines stigmatization as ‘the internalisation of a particular normative standard that defines one’s own attributes as undesirable’. See Ayse Zarakol, ‘What Made the Modern World Hang Together: Socialisation or Stigmatisation?’, International Theory, 6(2), 2014, 314. ⁷2 Patricia Shamai, ‘Name and Shame: Unravelling the Stigmatization of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Contemporary Security Policy, 36(1), 2015, 104–22. ⁷3 Adler-Nissen, ‘Stigma Management in International Relations’, 153. ⁷⁴ Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (New York: Prentice Hall, 1963), 112–13.

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‘badge of honour’ for some states may be a bolstering of domestic legitimacy.⁷⁵ At the international level, such deviant behaviour can form part of counter-hegemonic strategies, whether asserting self-perceived moral superiority over the nuclear order’s custodians or attempting to garner support from other, like-minded, stigmatized actors. Thus, states can respond in three ways to their lower-status positions within the nuclear order. First, they can accept the material and social constraints of acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state; second, they can form favourable relationships with great powers to elevate their standing; third, they can flout the order’s norms and react to the consequences. States who pursue the first path willingly forfeit their right to develop weaponized nuclear capabilities. Here, the short-lived weaponized nuclear ambitions of South Korea in the 1970s—which influenced North Korea’s own nuclear aspirations—is pertinent.⁷⁶ The second path sees states forging relationships with the custodians of the nuclear order to assert their readiness to comply with the order’s norms. India is one exceptional example, having gained acceptance—albeit not universal—as a responsible nuclear power committed to arms control and non-proliferation, despite not signing the NPT. After conducting nuclear tests in 1998, it placed civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, imposed a moratorium on nuclear testing, and signed a civil nuclear trading agreement with the United States in 2005.⁷⁷ Yet, despite the tolerance by the United States of a nuclear India (in contrast to the DPRK or Iran), India remains opposed to the NPT and has historically cultivated a following from other states that resisted the US-led international order.⁷⁸ Given North Korea’s unwillingness to renounce its nuclear ambitions and failed attempts to improve relations with the United States, the DPRK has responded to its low status within the nuclear order by breaking nuclear and wider international norms. Existing accounts, such as by Shane Smith, highlight how, given the North’s perception of South Korea and the United States as ‘more immediate and existential threats [. . .] it would thus be unsurprising if the North used nuclear threats and provocations in an effort to generate instability that, in turn, might open opportunities to advance its interests’. Yet, this account neither offers any treatment of how and why the DPRK may view the United States as posing such ‘existential threats’ nor how one such interest the DPRK wishes to advance, through violating international ⁷⁵ Victor D. Cha, ‘North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?’ Political Science Quarterly, 117(2), 2002, 209–30. ⁷⁶ South Korea joined the NPT as a NNWS in 1975 and suspended its nuclear programme in December 1976. ⁷⁷ Kate Sullivan de Estrada and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Trustworthy Nuclear Sovereigns? India and Pakistan after the 1998 Tests’, Stosunki Międzynarodowe—International Relations, 52(2), 2016, 289–306; Barbara Crossette, ‘New Delhi Pledges to Sign World Ban on Nuclear Tests’, New York Times, 25 September 1998, A1. The US–India nuclear agreement, approved by Congress on 1 October 2008, allowed India to engage in nuclear trade. See: The White House, ‘Joint Statement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’, 18 July 2005. ⁷⁸ Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 199–202; Itty Abraham, ‘From Bandung to NAM: NonAlignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 46(2), 2008, 195–219.

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norms, is the pursuit of international status.⁷⁹ Thus, a new framework is required to gain a richer understanding of North Korea’s engagement with the global nuclear order.

Strategic engagement in delinquency: A trade-off Strategic delinquency refers to the purposeful engagement in norm-breaking behaviour from which positive outcomes can be reaped. Far from being irrational, the framework of strategic delinquency underscores how, despite the manifold costs of breaking norms, which may initially lower a state’s status, thereby inflicting negative status, states can willingly accept the trade-offs of delinquent behaviour and gain beneficial outcomes. In relation to International Relations theory, the framework both challenges and complements rational actor and constructivist accounts of state behaviour. In contrast to rationalist accounts, strategic delinquency does not assume that states will always engage in behaviour that maximizes benefits and minimizes costs. Behaviour that may be strategic or reasoned—according to the state deploying such acts—is not necessarily rational. As Jeff Colgan convincingly observes regarding the trade-offs of norm-defiance, ‘noncompliance is always risky and sometimes costly’ since ‘an act of noncompliance creates the risk that some powerful actor, often the hegemon, will punish the noncompliant actor’.⁸⁰ Yet, even if the non-compliant actor may be aware of the likelihood of punishment, and the possible nature of punishment, the strategic delinquency framework highlights how states can choose to behave delinquently in pursuit of certain outcomes. This pursuit may be motivated by ideational factors in addition to material reasons stemming from the anarchic structure of the international system. Crucially, the strategic delinquency framework offers one means of understanding how states can leverage and accept the costs of norm-breaking behaviour to their advantage. With respect to North Korea, this framework highlights one way in which the regime-state responds to how it orders it external environment and its position within the international order. As Chapter 1 examined, such ordering occurs most prominently through the ideological prism of the US ‘hostile policy’, premised upon the DPRK’s fundamental conceptualization of the United States as a ‘hostile’ actor. At its core, North Korea’s strategic engagement in delinquency vis-à-vis the post-war international order and global nuclear order has been driven by its perception that the rules and norms of international order were intentionally designed to exclude the DPRK and its interests. The DPRK has reframed the ‘negative attribute’ of nuclear possession and development ‘as a positive’ and justified its norm-violation ⁷⁹ Shane Smith, ‘North Korea’s Strategic Culture and Its Evolving Nuclear Strategy’, In: Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner, and Marilyn J. Maines, eds, Crossing Nuclear Thresholds: Leveraging Sociocultural Insights into Nuclear Decisionmaking (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 241. ⁸⁰ Jeff D. Colgan, Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 40–41.

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‘by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation’.⁸1 By breaking and complying with international norms in a myriad of ways, North Korea has been able to extort concessions and reap dividends from the United States, South Korea, and the wider international community, even if unexpectedly. The strategic delinquency framework underscores two reasons why a state might violate international norms, including nuclear norms. First, despite the likelihood of punishment, whether sanctions or international labelling as a ‘rogue’ state, amongst other costs, the benefits obtained may compensate for these costs. Norm-violating states take these costs into consideration as part of the trade-off of deploying delinquent behaviour. Second, states can learn from the outcomes of past actions to inform future behavioural choices. As Colgan postulates, ‘when an actor (like North Korea, in the nuclear realm) chooses noncompliance, it does not know for sure the probability or magnitude of imposed punishment’.⁸2 Yet, if a state has received benefits from previous delinquent actions, it can thus learn under what conditions norm-violating behaviour can pay and when the trade-offs will be too great. If the benefits from non-compliance are high, a norm-violating state may further its delinquency; if the benefits are likely to be low, the state may choose either to comply with (some) international norms and/or restrain its delinquent actions, whilst threatening to revert to delinquency if compliant actions reap few rewards. Thus, norm-compliant behaviour also comprises a state’s exercise of strategic delinquency.

Strategic delinquency: A theoretical framework The framework of strategic delinquency typifies delinquent behaviour in a tripartite fashion, comprising norm transgression, provocation, and deception. States can deploy any or all of these actions with respect to a range of orders—such as the global nuclear order—with the aim of reaping particular outcomes; the latter include, inter alia, deterrence, regime security, or recognition as a significant international actor. The different types of delinquent behaviour and their outcomes are not mutually exclusive but coexist and inform each other. For example, whilst North Korea may deploy nuclear brinkmanship as a form of provocation, brinkmanship alone does not explain why the DPRK has, at times, deployed actions where the costs have significantly outweighed the benefits.⁸3 Moreover, whilst aspirant nuclear states can comply ⁸1 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy’, International Security, 34(4), 2010, 67, 73–74. ⁸2 Colgan, Partial Hegemony, 41. ⁸3 For applications of brinkmanship to North Korea, see Nicholas L. Miller and Vipin Narang, ‘North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We Learn from Its Successful Nuclearization?’, Texas National Security Review, 1(2), 2018, 58–74; Michael D. Cohen and Sung Chull Kim, ‘Introduction: A New Challenge, a New Debate’. In: Kim and Cohen, eds, North Korea and Nuclear Weapons, 1–15; Charles L. Pritchard, ‘North Korean Nuclear Brinkmanship: Testing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, Nautilus Institute: DPRK Briefing Book, 16 November 2003; Ramon Pacheco Pardo, North Korea–US Relations under Kim Jong Il: The Quest for Normalization (New York: Routledge, 2014).

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with nuclear norms if they deem the benefits of doing so to be substantial, norm compliance must be managed with alacrity to avoid contradicting state interests. For instance, North Korea cannot comply completely with nuclear norms since doing so would force the DPRK to abandon its nuclear programme. Yet, it can self-impose moratoria on nuclear and long-range missile testing, from which it can try to extort international concessions. The next section will demonstrate how the strategic engagement in delinquency can catalyse benefits of economic assistance; negotiations with great powers; and social recognition as a sovereign, equal, and significant international actor. As has been mentioned, a state can learn from the positive and negative outcomes from its behaviour—whether complying with or breaching norms—to motivate subsequent behaviour, particularly by realizing how external actors respond to delinquency. Whilst Todd Hall posits how provocative state behaviour diminishes with time as ‘actions or events ebb into the past and lose their immediacy and salience’, this claim does not hold true for North Korea, for whom past actions, especially the responses of external powers, are formative influences on its contemporary decision-making.⁸⁴ As Ra Jong-yil stresses, the DPRK’s emphasis on the past is accurately surmised by the axiom of US writer, William Faulkner, whereby ‘the past is never dead. It’s not even past.’⁸⁵ Acts of delinquency can target domestic and international audiences. With respect to the DPRK, delinquent behaviour is aimed at both referent audiences in different ways.⁸⁶ As Samuel S. Kim compellingly asserts, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions ‘no longer fall neatly into the dichotomous categories of domestic/societal and external/systemic variables’.⁸⁷ Claims that the North’s first two nuclear tests (in 2006 and 2009) targeted international audiences, whilst the third (in 2013) was aimed domestically are grossly oversimplified.⁸⁸ The North’s nuclear aspirations are simultaneously for domestic regime security and, internationally, for ‘deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy’.⁸⁹ If the international level did not influence North Korea’s behaviour, why did North Korea join and withdraw from the NPT? Why did it conduct ten missile launches in January 2022 as its economy suffered during the coronavirus pandemic? ⁸⁴ Todd H. Hall, ‘On Provocation: Outrage, International Relations, and the Franco-Prussian War’, Security Studies, 26(1), 2017, 8. ⁸⁵ Ra Jong-yil, Inside North Korea’s Theocracy: The Rise and Sudden Fall of Jang Song-thaek (New York: SUNY Press, 2019), 115–70. ⁸⁶ Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy’, International Security, 35(1), 2010, 44–74. ⁸⁷ Samuel S. Kim, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy and the Interface between International and Domestic Politics’, Asian Perspective, 34(1), 2010, 53–54. ⁸⁸ Taehee Whang, Michael Lammbrau, and Hyung-min Joo, ‘Talking to Whom? The Changing Audience of North Korean Nuclear Tests’, Social Science Quarterly, 98(3), 2017, 976–92. ⁸⁹ Daniel R. Coats, ‘Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record for the Senate Armed Services Committee, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community’, Senate Armed Services Committee, 23 May 2017, available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/ Testimonies/SASC%202017%20ATA%20SFR%20-%20FINAL.PDF (accessed 21 December 2022).

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A tripartite typology of delinquency Norm transgression comprises the overt or covert breaking of dominant norms. Often deployed to express dissatisfaction against a perceived injustice within international order, such behaviour is pursued such that the delinquent actor can gain attention from an international audience and assert agency. Frequently belligerent, norm transgression is the broadest category of delinquent behaviour, inflicting negative status on the respective state. With respect to the global nuclear order, norm transgression is diverse. It can comprise the decision by a non-NPT signatory or NNWS to engage in covert nuclear and missile development or, more overtly, to test nuclear weapons. Such behaviour can also include a state’s refusal to accede to the order’s normative frameworks. The DPRK’s refusal to comply with IAEA safeguards until 1992 (even if the delay was partially due to procedural errors from the IAEA), seven years after it joined the NPT, is just one example. Whilst norm-transgressive actions can catalyse domestic support for the regime through nationalist rhetoric and ideology, it is more often aimed at international audiences, whether other states that lead alternative normative orders or individual adversaries. The latter is apposite vis-à-vis North Korea, given its longstanding framing of norm-transgressive behaviour in response to actions of South Korea and the United States. North Korea’s norm transgressions rarely target other states that might lead alternative orders or with whom the DPRK expresses solidarity. Although one of the DPRK’s many violations of the non-proliferation norm has been witnessed in horizontal nuclear proliferation with the nuclear ‘rogues’ of Pakistan, Iran, and Syria, these actions were, as a former senior US official informed the author, purely ‘transactional’.⁹⁰ Pyongyang seeks neither to promote alternative normative models of international order nor actively to join ideational networks of solidarity.⁹1 Rather, for all the rhetorical affirmations of support between these states and the DPRK, this exchange of nuclear technologies, fissile material, and know-how provided Pyongyang with financial benefits and expertise, allowing it to accelerate its indigenous nuclear development.⁹2

⁹⁰ US Assistant Secretary of State (interview, 2019). ⁹1 Carmen Wunderlich, Andrea Hellmann, Daniel Müller, Judith Reuter, and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, ‘Non-Aligned Reformers and Revolutionaries: Egypt, South Africa, Iran, and North Korea’. In: Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, eds, Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2013), 281. ⁹2 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: A Story of Defiance, Deterrence and Deviance (London: Hurst, 2018), 121–37. For instance, Syria has outlined its support for ‘recognizing only the democratic people’s republic of Korea in the Korean peninsula’, with President Bashar al-Assad stressing, in 2015, how the DPRK and Syria shared a common ‘essence and purpose…to weaken the countries that have independent decision and stand in the face of Western projects’. See Syrian Arab News Agency, ‘Syria Recognizes DPRK Only’, 10 January 1997; Syrian Arab News Agency, ‘President al-Assad: Steadfastness of Independent Countries Capable of Restoring Balance to International Arena’, 4 December 2018.

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Whilst norm-transgressing behaviour can lower a state’s status, such as by being labelled as a ‘rogue’ or pariah state, one benefit can be the increased attention from the referent audience. North Korea has not been immune from this logic. Its normtransgressing behaviour with respect to the NPT has catalysed high-level negotiations with the United States aiming to compel the regime-state to re-comply with the nonproliferation regime. Provocations comprise intentionally threatening actions, whether visible or rhetorical, overt or covert. James C. Scott highlights how marginalized actors can exercise subtle acts of resistance—‘weapons of the weak’—towards hegemonic structures.⁹3 Yet, whilst North Korea’s provocations may be motivated by counter-hegemonic strategies, they are notorious for their overt nature, targeting the United States, South Korea, Japan, the institutions of the US-led global nuclear and wider international order, and, at times, China.⁹⁴ The testing of a nuclear device by a non-NPT signatory is both provocative and in violation of nuclear norms. Yet, provocations need not always transgress international norms. One example of provocative behaviour is brinkmanship, which, for North Korea, has been a frequent response to US actions, allowing the regime-state to ‘pri[s]e concessions out of much more powerful states’.⁹⁵ The DPRK has numerously threatened ‘countermeasures’ in response to US–Republic of Korea (ROK) defensive military exercises, ultimately aiming to lower the status of the United States by portraying it as a hostile actor.⁹⁶ As Pacheco Pardo highlights, the DPRK has fluctuated between high- and low-intensity brinkmanship towards the United States to maximize international concessions.⁹⁷ Nonetheless, brinkmanship alone cannot illuminate the outcomes of, and reasoning behind, particular actions, especially when the costs outweigh the benefits. Pyongyang’s decision to test its first nuclear device in October 2006, whilst the Six-Party Talks—a multilateral forum aimed at instigating the DPRK’s denuclearization—were ongoing, is just one example. Analogous to

⁹3 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985). ⁹⁴ Sino-DPRK relations reached a nadir in 2017 after the DPRK criticized China’s support for United Nations sanctions. Marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Sino-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 2021, however, Xi Jinping declared his support ‘to lift the friendly cooperation between the two countries to new levels so as to bring more benefits to the two countries and their people’. Kim Jong Un pledged to ‘attach greater importance to the DPRK–China friendship’ and ‘march forward hand in hand with the CPC [the Chinese Communist Party], the Chinese government and the Chinese people in the sacred journey of building socialism and communism’. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Xi Jinping tong chaoxian zuigao lingdao ren jinzhengen jiu “Zhong chao youhao hezuo huzhu tiaoyue” qianding 60 zhounian hu zhi hedian’ [‘Xi Jinping Exchanges Congratulatory Messages with DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un on the 60th Anniversary of the China–DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance’, 11 July 2021. For an overview of Sino-DPRK relations, see Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘Why China Won’t Rescue North Korea: What to Expect if Things Fall Apart’, Foreign Affairs, 97(1), January/February 2018, 58–68. ⁹⁵ William Walker and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘The Problem of Weak Nuclear States’, Nonproliferation Review, 20(3), 2013, 424. ⁹⁶ See, e.g. KCNA (Korean Central News Agency), ‘KCNA Refutes U.S. Call for DPRK’s CVID’, 15 June 2004; KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter-Measures against UNSC’s “Resolution 1874”’, 13 June 2009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘DPRK Permanent Representative at UN Sends Letter to UNSC President’, 27 August 2017. ⁹⁷ Pacheco Pardo, North Korea–US Relations, 117–36.

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norm transgressions, provocations aim to attract attention and assert agency, which, for North Korea, forms part of its desire for international recognition as a de facto nuclear state and to be taken seriously as a significant international actor. Beyond visible actions, provocations can comprise threatening rhetoric from state leadership directed at another state, which may not strictly breach international norms. As part of a state’s counter-hegemonic strategy, rhetorical provocations can reject the validity or legitimacy of the US-led international order, its norms, and any condemnation inflicted upon the delinquent state. North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric has frequently threatened war on the Korean Peninsula, targeting the United States and South Korea. For example, in August 2017, North Korea threatened to ‘envelop[e] fire at Guam’ following President Trump’s claim that the DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests would be ‘met with fire, fury, and frankly power’ from the United States.⁹⁸ In another instance, North Korea has repeatedly dismissed multilateral sanctions enforced by the United Nations Security Council as illegitimate and ‘cooked up’ by the United States.⁹⁹ Similar rhetoric has been witnessed in Iran’s denigration of US sanctions on crude oil exports as ‘an economic war’.1⁰⁰ Provocations can inflict numerous costs on the provocateur, whether economic sanctions (a material cost) or negative status as a delinquent or rogue actor (a social cost). Nonetheless, in the case of North Korea, as later chapters will show, provocations can also bring benefits, including recognition as an equal and significant international actor. Continued provocations may be rewarded through compelling the state towards norm-compliant behaviour. At the same time, bombastic rhetoric and behaviour may be a smokescreen for state weakness, to the additional advantage of the provocative actor. As Denny Roy posits, a ‘madman’ image may induce caution amongst adversaries, even if the delinquent state’s capabilities are inferior.1⁰1 For example, despite the rudimentary nature of its nuclear capabilities during the 1990s, the DPRK’s rhetorical and visible provocations created an aura of feigned irrationality amongst the international community. In response, it gained recognition as a significant actor through being invited to negotiations with great powers to compel more compliant behaviour. Yet, whilst provocative behaviour vis-à-vis the nuclear order may allow a state to resist aspects of the order with which it may be dissatisfied, provocations alone are insufficient for states to reap benefits and mitigate against the costs of their actions. A delinquent state can—and does—engage in norm compliance. As former US National Intelligence Officer for North Korea, Markus Garlauskas, compellingly asserts with respect to the DPRK, ‘engagement and provocation are not mutually exclusive—they

⁹⁸ Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, ‘Trump Threatens “Fire and Fury” against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.’, New York Times, 8 August 2017. ⁹⁹ This term is a favourite of the North Korean Foreign Ministry in dismissing international condemnation and sanctions imposed on the DPRK. See ‘Remarks by Mr. Jon Yong Ryong, at the UN Conference on Disarmament’, CD/PV.1277, 19 February 2013; KCNA, ‘DPRK Refutes UNSC’s “Resolution” Pulling Up DPRK over Its Satellite Launch’, 23 January 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman’, 24 December 2017. 1⁰⁰ Parisa Hafezi, ‘Rouhani Says Iran to Sell Oil, Defy U.S. Sanctions’, Reuters, 5 November 2018. 1⁰1 Denny Roy, ‘North Korea and the “Madman” Theory’, Security Dialogue, 25(3), 1994, 311–12.

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often go hand in hand in Pyongyang’s calculus’.1⁰2 To maximize the receipt of benefits from violating nuclear and wider norms, a state can exercise deception, comprising feigned compliance with international norms. To deceive means ‘to cause to believe what is false; to mislead as to matter of fact, lead into error, impose upon, delude’. Deceptive behaviour on the part of states takes many forms: outright denial of allegations of delinquency; justifying deviant behaviour as a necessary response to the actions of other actors; and misinforming domestic and international audiences of a state’s intentions, motivations, and capabilities. False compliance with international norms is one example of deception, masking deviant intention even if knowledge of deception is not widely known amongst other actors. As subsequent chapters demonstrate, North Korea has engaged in each type of deception over time. First, during the Kim Il Sung and early Kim Jong Il eras, the DPRK denied the existence of its nuclear ambitions until it allegedly admitted its covert development of an HEU programme in October 2002.1⁰3 Second, North Korea has often justified its belligerent behaviour as a self-defensive response to the US ‘hostile policy’, within which has comprised calls by the United States and the IAEA for the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear programme.1⁰⁴ In so doing, Pyongyang has stressed how it is a ‘peace loving’ actor with ‘nukes of justice’, forced into developing weaponized nuclear capabilities owing to ‘hostile’ actions of the United States.1⁰⁵ Finally, central to North Korea’s early nuclear ambitions has been to misinform international audiences of the extent of its nuclear capabilities and intentions. Bermudez and Richardson aptly surmise North Korea’s strategic deployment of deception: ‘allow[ing] our enemies to know only what we what them to know—a very small amount—about our capabilities, practicing deception, misdirection, and misinformation in all phases’, whilst ‘develop[ing] and expand[ing] our true capabilities in secret’ to create ‘an erroneous picture of spiritual and physical strength’ towards the international community.1⁰⁶ Deception thus demonstrates how a state can be willing to accept the trade-offs of norm-flouting behaviour by mitigating against the costs of such acts. A further form of deception is ‘cosmetic’ or mock compliance with international norms. Mock compliance serves two purposes: first, convincing an international referent audience of such compliance can divert international attention away from

1⁰2 Markus V. Garlauskas, ‘What the Re-Emergence of Kim Yong Chol Could Mean for North Korean Policymaking’, NKNews, 8 July 2017. 1⁰3 U.S Department of State, ‘North Korean Nuclear Program’, 16 October 2002. Whether North Korean officials admitted the existence of an HEU programme to their US counterparts remains debatable, as Chapter 4 contends. 1⁰⁴ The North Korean regime has often deemed these calls as an ‘encroachment of sovereignty’, an accusation the DPRK has also levied following international condemnation of its missile and nuclear tests. See KCNA, ‘KPA General Staff Spokesman Blasts Hostile Forces’ Anti-DPRK Racket’, 18 April 2009. 1⁰⁵ See, e.g. KCNA, ‘KCNA Commentary Terms U.S. Enemy of Int’l Community’, 26 September 2016. 1⁰⁶ Joseph S. Bermudez Jr and Sharon A. Richardson, ‘A North Korean View on the Development and Production of Strategic Weapon Systems’. In Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 89.

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covert deviance and ‘pacify international criticism’ on the target state;1⁰⁷ second, norm compliance can be a bargaining chip to induce the provision of concessions. In the case of North Korea, the regime-state has engaged in ‘cosmetic compliance’ with respect to nuclear non-proliferation and international human rights regimes. Despite the United Nations Commission of Inquiry Report in 2014 concluding that the regime-state had engaged in ‘systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations’,1⁰⁸ the regime rejected the report as being underpinned by malign US intentions and asserted its commitment towards upholding its population’s human rights.1⁰⁹ North Korea has also deployed deception in relation to the nuclear order, continuing to engage in the covert production of HEU even after it froze plutonium production at Yongbyon as part of the 1994 US–DPRK Agreed Framework.11⁰ Mainly targeting international audiences, deception is primarily driven by counter-stigmatization, whereby the transgressor portrays itself as being victimized and stigmatized by other states. Stigmatization elicits acute social costs, such as international perceptions as a norm-violating actor, as witnessed after North Korea’s so-called admission of its covert HEU programme in October 2002, following its designation, by the United States, as part of the ‘axis of evil’ earlier that year. After Pyongyang’s deception was revealed, it restarted plutonium production and declared its withdrawal from the NPT. Thus, despite the social and material costs of being seen as a deceptive international actor, by successfully deceiving the international community of the true extent of its nuclear capabilities at the time, an aspirant nuclear state can avoid ‘the negative repercussions’ of norm violation.111 The Agreed Framework offers another example: Pyongyang received pledges of light-water reactors and diplomatic normalization with the United States for agreeing to freeze its plutonium production, despite concurrently engaging in covert HEU development. Through ‘mock’ compliance, North Korea could gain bilateral negotiations as a dialogic partner of the United States. Deception can—less commonly—target domestic audiences, especially if the ruling regime wishes to reduce awareness of individual actions amongst its population. The North Korean famine of the 1990s offers a useful example where the regime remained recalcitrant to disclose the extent of its then nascent nuclear ambitions to its

1⁰⁷ Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices’. In: Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 25. 1⁰⁸ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/63, 7 February 2014, 15. For the DPRK’s ‘cosmetic’ compliance with international human rights norms to deviate from international scrutiny, see ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Vitit Muntarbhorn’, 4 August 2009, A/64/224, 10. 1⁰⁹ KCNA, ‘UN Human Rights Council’s “Resolution on Human Rights” against DPRK Rejected by DPRK FM Spokesman’, 22 March 2020. 11⁰ The closed nature of the regime renders it impossible to ascertain whether North Korea actually intended to freeze its nuclear programme—and halt its nuclear aspirations—following the signing of the Agreed Framework. 111 Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, ‘Opaque Nuclear Proliferation’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 13(3), 1990, 29.

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people, given the financial cost of nuclear acquisition and development and possible repercussions on domestic legitimacy.112

Benefits of delinquency The framework of ‘strategic delinquency’ focuses on three types of material and social benefits that can ensue from different types of delinquency vis-à-vis the global nuclear order: deterrence; regime survival; economic assistance (material); and three types of social recognition, as an equal, sovereign, and significant actor (social). These benefits do not exist in isolation of each other. Not only do certain benefits arise in relation to particular forms of delinquency but also materially beneficial outcomes can bring social rewards. Importantly, the decision to behave delinquently involves a trade-off with respect to the costs of such actions since a delinquent state can concurrently reap benefits and costs. For instance, multilateral economic sanctions have continued to be imposed upon the DPRK even whilst the regime-state has engaged in negotiations with great powers. The perception that delinquent behaviour has been rewarded, however, can influence the delinquent state’s future behaviour. Indeed, North Korea has engaged in a ‘learning process in order to achieve the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States’ even if the prioritization of normalization has fluctuated with time, especially after its first nuclear test in 2006.113 For all the regime’s inflexibility in international negotiations, it has not pursued identical behavioural strategies over time.

Material benefits of delinquency Deterrence In no small part a legacy of Cold War thinking, deterrence has been widely deemed to be a principal motivation behind states’ decisions to nuclearize.11⁴ Scholarship has highlighted how nuclear states can deter unequally depending upon the level of credible threat generated to adversaries.11⁵ Yet, deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, is also accurately conceptualized as a material benefit that a state might gain from delinquent nuclear behaviour. Nuclear deterrence can be obtained through norm-transgressive and provocative behaviour. For North Korea, repeated nuclear and missile testing, during and 112 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Politics’, Current History, 103(674), 2004, 273–79. 113 Pacheco Pardo, North Korea–US Relations, 119–20. 11⁴ Examples of deterrence-based arguments applied to the DPRK include David C. Kang, ‘Threatening, but Deterrence Works’. In: Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 41–69; Samuel S. Kim, ‘U.S.–China Competition over Nuclear North Korea’, Insight Turkey, 19(3), 2017, 121–38; Peter Hayes and Scott Bruce, ‘North Korean Nuclear Nationalism and the Threat of Nuclear War in Korea’, Pacific Focus, 26(1), 2011, 65–89. 11⁵ Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

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after its membership of the NPT, coupled with an intensification of brinkmanship have strengthened deterrence. The stability-enhancing features of deterrence have motivated future acts of delinquency, including escalation of provocations, and covert nuclear development (deception). Most notably after its first nuclear test, Pyongyang’s invocations of the deterrent value of its nuclear programme have been accompanied by numerous self-proclamations of its status as a ‘full-fledged nuclear weapons state’.11⁶ In April 2013, the Law on Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State reinforced how nuclear weapons ‘serve the purpose of deterring and repelling the aggression and attack of the enemy against the DPRK and dealing retaliatory blows at the strongholds of aggression’.11⁷ Relatedly, the deterrent generated by the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities has allowed it to enter negotiations with great powers, such as seen during the 2000s, and with the Trump administration, thereby increasing the regime’s leverage to call for social recognition as an equal and significant actor. Deterrence remains one possible material benefit of delinquent nuclear behaviour. That said, whilst deterrence may assist in understanding how acquiring nuclear weapons may enhance an aspirant state’s security through preventing conflict, the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons does not immunize the aspirant nuclear state from considerations of pre-emptive strikes, as was witnessed vis-àvis the DPRK during the 1990s. Beyond rationalist approaches to deterrence, there exists a further disjuncture between the positive, security-enhancing value of nuclear weapons for states and the negative social value arising from flouting the nuclear non-proliferation norm. Yet, the deterrent features of the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities have also allowed the regime-state to call for social recognition as an equal and significant nuclear state by providing an opportunity for the North to engage in negotiations with great powers. Domestically, too, North Korea offers one example of a state whereby, despite bolstering its nuclear capabilities, the survival of the Kim regime has hitherto remained intact. Indeed, regime survival is another benefit of strategic delinquency.

Regime survival Regime survival refers to the ability of the aspirant nuclear state to pursue its domestic and foreign policies—within which lie its nuclear ambitions—without interference from other states or the international community, whether via pressure to denuclearize through rhetorical condemnation or the imposition of sanctions.11⁸ As Ankit Panda notes, regime survival has been the ‘longest-standing raison d’être’ behind Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions since the regime-state’s inception.11⁹ Whilst John 11⁶ For one of the first mentions of this term, see KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Denuclearization of Korea’, 31 March 2005. 11⁷ KCNA, ‘Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted’, 1 April 2013. 11⁸ The North Korean regime consistently criticizes any outside interference in its internal affairs as part of the US ‘hostile policy’. See KCNA, ‘DPRK FM Addresses UNHRC Session’, 5 March 2015; KCNA, ‘KCNA on Interference in DPRK’s Internal Affairs’, 23 October 1999. 11⁹ Ankit Panda, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (London: Hurst, 2020), 71.

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Swenson-Wright posits how ‘it is a truism to argue that the principal objective of North Korea’s government is regime continuity and there appears little reason to question this assumption’,12⁰ the material benefit of regime survival for the North Korean regime is embedded in social self-perceptions of the DPRK as a sovereign state unwilling to abide by the rules of the Western liberal international order. Indeed, the sheer importance of survival for the regime has caused some analysts to question whether the incumbent regime of Kim Jong Un simply wishes to pursue regime survival as its primary goal or the age-old objective of reunifying the Korean Peninsula under the North’s control.121 Aspirant nuclear states can ensure regime survival through provocations such as by testing current and potential nuclear and missile capabilities. Statements from North Korean officials have frequently affirmed how the regime-state’s nuclear possession is ‘central to the DPRK’s survival’, resisting what it claims to be ‘hostile’ actions of the United States, whether B-52 bomber missions over the Korean Peninsula or US–ROK military exercises.122 For North Korea, regime survival serves domestic and international purposes: the former, given alleged factional tensions between and within the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and military Korean People’s Army (KPA),123 as well as domestic crises such as the famine of the 1990s or the coronavirus pandemic from 2020.12⁴ Internationally, North Korea’s regime survival remains highly interconnected with, if not dependent upon, the policies towards the DPRK adopted by the United States and South Korea.12⁵ Discourse surrounding North Korea’s regime collapse notably pervaded scholarly and policy circles in Washington during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.12⁶ Subsequent US administrations have called on North Korea to 12⁰ John Swenson-Wright, ‘Inter-Korean Relations and the Challenge of North-East Asian Regional Security’. In: Andrew T.H. Tan, ed., East and South-East Asia: International Relations and Security Perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 148. 121 Jung H. Pak, Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator (New York: Penguin Random House, 2020), 235. 122 According to former US Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, this claim was made by former Head of the North Korean Reconnaissance General Bureau, Kim Yong Chol, during a meeting in Pyongyang, in 2014. See Clapper, Facts and Fears, 276–77. 123 It was reported that Kim Jong Il did not want the DPRK to develop or test nuclear weapons, but ‘because he needed military support to remain in power himself and to arrange for a succession by one of his sons, Kim had to go along with the military’s desire to test its nuclear weapons’. See Embassy Shanghai, WikiLeaks Cable: 06SHANGHAI6518_a, 13 October 2006. 12⁴ Marcus Noland, ‘Why North Korea Will Muddle Through’, Foreign Affairs, 76(4), July/August 1997, 105–18; Victor Cha, Katrin Fraser Katz, and J. Stephen Morrison, ‘North Korea’s Covid-19 Lockdown: Current Status and Road Ahead’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 March 2022, 1–4. 12⁵ For instance, after Trump provoked North Korea with ‘fire and fury’ on 8 August 2017, Kim Jong Un delayed the decision to launch Hwasong-12 missiles in response, waiting for any further action taken by the US. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘KPA Will Take Practical Action: Commander of Strategic Force’, 10 August 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Kim Jong Un Inspects KPA Strategic Force Command’, 15 August 2017. 12⁶ John Bolton, who served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security affairs under the George W. Bush administration, was denounced by the North Korean Foreign Ministry as a ‘human scum and bloodsucker [. . .] a beastly man bereft of reason’ following Bolton’s call for an approach of rollback of the DPRK’s nuclear programme, without any concessions from the United States. The North’s distaste of Bolton would continue during his role as National Security Advisor in the Trump administration. See KCNA, ‘Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Slams U.S. Mandarin’s Invective’, 4 August 2003; KCNA, ‘KCNA Blasts Remarks of U.S. Undersecretary of State’, 12 August 2003. For Bolton’s

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take the first step towards denuclearization before any international concessions are made, as exemplified in the Obama administration’s policy of ‘strategic patience’, which occurred whilst the conservative South Korean administrations of Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye were pursuing approaches less conducive to inter-Korean engagement. Beyond bolstering regime survival through sustaining nuclear deterrence, delinquent nuclear behaviour can also strengthen domestic legitimacy, particularly in the case of authoritarian regimes. The embedding of the North Korean regime’s nuclear doctrine within the state ideology of juche offers one useful example.12⁷ Regime survival can catalyse further social recognition as an equal negotiating partner whereby great powers, such as the United States, seek to induce North Korean compliance with human rights norms and nuclear norms. Importantly, the North Korean regime perceives its continued survival—coupled with any such recognition of this sovereignty—as evidence of the regime-state’s legitimacy, even if such legitimacy is not conferred by the custodians of the liberal international order. Beyond nuclear deterrence, economic assistance—not least from China, South Korea, and, at times, the United States—is a further material benefit from norm-breaking behaviour and a key contributing factor to the DPRK’s regime security and survival.

Economic assistance External economic assistance can include the provision of humanitarian and financial assistance and material goods from the international community. Domestically, economic assistance—through humanitarian assistance—can aim to improve standards of living in states with poor economic growth and development. Here, the DPRK is a useful case in point. Given how its delinquent behaviour may bring nuclear deterrence and regime survival, there may be little incentive for the regime to offer nuclear concessions. Yet, international economic assistance may, in fact, alter North Korea’s behaviour, given the urgency in bolstering its paltry levels of economic growth. Within the context of the coronavirus pandemic, the DPRK’s dramatic reduction in economic growth—owing to its self-enforced border closure—raises the question of whether North Korea will have little choice but to seek international economic assistance and offer political concessions in return. International pledges of economic assistance to a delinquent state can occur under two conditions. First, economic assistance can form part of the international community’s desire to compel norm-compliant behaviour on the part of the delinquent state; second, and relatedly, it can be a reward for (feigned) compliant actions taken by the delinquent actor.12⁸ In one example, the DPRK acceded the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a NNWS only after the USSR promised to provide light-water reactors speech, see John R. Bolton, ‘A Dictatorship at the Crossroads’, Remarks in Seoul, South Korea, 31 July 2003, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB111520394717724357 (accessed 8 January 2023). 12⁷ For this argument, see Edward Howell, ‘The Juche H-bomb? North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and Regime-State Survival’ International Affairs, 96(4), 2020, 1051–68. 12⁸ Patrick M. Morgan, ‘Deterrence and System Management: The Case of North Korea’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 23(2), 2006, 121–38.

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(LWRs), hoping to curtail the North’s then nascent nuclear ambitions.12⁹ What is more, in the Agreed Framework, the United States pledged to replace the DPRK’s proliferation-prone gas-graphite reactors with more proliferation-resistant LWRs and provide heavy fuel oil in the interim to restrain Pyongyang’s then-developing nuclear aspirations. Nevertheless, given how North Korea orders its external environment, the regimestate has not responded to international economic assistance through exhibiting greater compliance with either nuclear or human rights norms. The knowledge that delinquency can bring benefits has contributed to Pyongyang’s strategy of breaking nuclear norms and being increasingly willing to accept the trade-offs that ensue, not least the material costs of economic sanctions. Over time, Pyongyang has leveraged its nuclear development as a bargaining chip to extract political and economic concessions from the United States and South Korea.13⁰ Yet, beyond political and economic concessions, delinquency can also bring social rewards.

Social benefits of delinquency: Three types of recognition Whilst less tangible than their material counterparts, the framework of strategic delinquency focuses on three forms of positive social outcomes that can ensue from norm-breaking behaviour: recognition as equal, recognition as sovereign, and recognition as significant. As Murray reminds us, states seek ‘social survival’ whereby their identities and statuses are recognized in line with those that they believe they deserve.131 Akin to their material counterparts, the social benefits of delinquent behaviour can co-exist with, and inform, each other and intersect with particular material benefits and particular types of delinquency. For example, through developing and testing missile and nuclear capabilities, North Korea has strengthened its nuclear deterrent and prolonged its regime survival. In so doing, it has gained social recognition as a significant and, at times, equal international actor, not least through being invited to negotiations with great powers, whether South Korea or the United States.

Recognition as sovereign Although frequently deemed to be ‘a unique state’ in terms of its establishment, and the legacies of history underpinning its contemporary totalitarian rule, the 12⁹ Alexandre Y. Mansourov, ‘The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program’ Nonproliferation Review, 2(3), 1995, 27. 13⁰ Leon V. Sigal, ‘The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding the Failure of the “Crime-andPunishment” Strategy’, Arms Control Today, 1 May 1997; Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). According to Siegfried Hecker, the DPRK will neither abandon nor sell its nuclear weapons unilaterally, irrespective of the price: Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises’, Daedalus, 139(1), 2010, 73. 131 Murray, The Struggle for Recognition, 38–39.

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DPRK remains a sovereign state.132 Nowhere is such sovereignty more clearly witnessed than in its membership of the United Nations. Despite such membership, central to sovereignty in a thin, Westphalian sense is the existence of interstate diplomatic relations. Whilst it may have diplomatic relations with numerous states, the DPRK’s lack of such ties with the United States and South Korea has prompted calls from Pyongyang to normalize relations with Washington, a longstanding goal which gained potency under the leadership of Kim Il Sung during the 1990s. One means by which delinquency can catalyse recognition as a sovereign state is through provocation and deception. For example, despite the then prevalent international knowledge of North Korea’s early nuclear aspirations, the regime-state’s admission to the United Nations at the same time as South Korea—in 1991—marked one, albeit rudimentary, juncture during which the North was recognized as a sovereign state. US pledges to normalize diplomatic and economic relations with the DPRK as part of the Agreed Framework, on the condition that the DPRK freeze plutonium production at Yongbyon, is another instance of rewarding the DPRK with sovereign recognition.133 Through recognition as a sovereign actor, delinquent states can demand further forms of social recognition, such as entry to international institutions, even without any real desire to comply with a range of international norms. For instance, dialogue between South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, and North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, in 2018, revealed how Kim wished for North Korea to gain international economic ‘integration’ by joining the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, despite having little intention of engaging in nuclear disarmament.13⁴ Analogous to the material benefits of delinquent behaviour, recognition of a state as a sovereign actor is not cost-free. A delinquent state may be recognized as a sovereign actor through gaining affirmations of respect for its regime survival from other states or being provided with economic assistance. Nonetheless, being recognized as a sovereign actor through membership of the United Nations does not immunize a state from international opprobrium or sanctions if it breaches international norms, as highlighted by the cases of North Korea, Burma (Myanmar), and Iran, inter alia, with respect to UN Security Council sanctions resolutions vis-à-vis breaches of human rights and nuclear non-proliferation norms.

Recognition as equal A third form of recognition brought by delinquent nuclear behaviour is recognition of a state as an equal actor with other states. This recognition through status equivalence can occur in three ways: first, negotiations with great powers can catalyse the 132 Andrei Lankov asserts how ‘the staggering economic success of Korea’s other state—the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, as it is commonly known—is what has made North Korea so very unique, and simultaneously explains many of the extraordinary and tragic choices made by North Korea’s leaders’. See Lankov, The Real North Korea, xv. 133 As subsequent chapters demonstrate, this ‘freeze’ would mark no substantive concession on North Korea’s longer-term nuclear aspirations. 13⁴ Dagyum Ji, ‘North Korea Wants to Join IMF and World Bank, Pursue Economic Reform: Moon’, NKNews, 24 September 2018.

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delinquent state’s self-perception as being on equal terms with great powers, as dialogue partners; second, somewhat paradoxically, such negotiations can allow a state that violates the norms of the nuclear non-proliferation regime to be recognized as a nuclear-armed state in international relations; third, and more broadly, recognition as an equal actor can become a marker of legitimacy, whether on the part of other states or by how the delinquent state perceives its own identity and status. The DPRK is not the only state that has leveraged its nuclear behaviour for the purposes of recognition as an equal international actor through status parity. Notably, the decision by Mao to acquire nuclear weapons for China, culminating in its first nuclear test in 1964, was motivated by his desire for the then new state of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to avoid being bullied by great powers within the US-led post-war international order.13⁵ In the case of North Korea, recognition as an equal actor comprises recognition as a sovereign state but also engagement with the custodians of the nuclear order on equal terms, whether manifest in the reciprocal exchange of concessions or in negotiations with great powers. Crucially, these actions, which the DPRK deems as evidence of its sovereign international status, stems from the DPRK’s self-perception as a nuclear state. Recognition as an equal actor can be garnered through provocations and norm-transgressive actions—such as by conducting missile and nuclear tests—but also through exercising mock compliance with nuclear norms and international demands. For example, through brinkmanship, witnessed in nuclear and missile testing, the DPRK has asserted itself as a nuclear-armed power. From North Korea’s perspective, bolstering its nuclear and missile capabilities offers one route towards dialogue with the United States, which Pyongyang has often perceived as occurring on equal terms between two nuclear states. At the same time, norm-compliant actions—feigned or genuine—can portray the DPRK as a state that is willing to conform with the nuclear order, aiming to induce other states to take seriously its desires through engaging in high-level negotiations and offering concessions. One example of such norm compliance was witnessed in Kim Jong Un’s declaration, in 2016, of North Korea’s no-first-use policy, which asserted how the DPRK ‘would not use nuclear weapons first, unless the forces of aggression that are hostile to us violate our sovereignty with their own nuclear weapons’ and would ‘faithfully observe our commitments to nuclear non-proliferation’.13⁶ In tandem with the no-first-use policies of China and India, this assertion, however questionable, exemplified North Korea’s lofty desire for international recognition as a nuclear-armed power, equal to any legal NWS. 13⁵ Useful analyses of China’s nuclear ambitions as part of its status aspirations include Pan Zhenqiang, ‘A Study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 1(1), 2018, 121–23; John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure’, International Security, 35(2), Autumn 2010, 48–87. 13⁶ KCNA, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s Report to the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea’, 20 June 2016.

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The social benefit of recognition as an equal actor is tethered to material benefits of nuclear deterrence and regime survival. North Korea’s continued survival, whilst enhancing its nuclear capabilities, has been met with international engagement, leading to the regime concluding that the costs of breaking norms do not outweigh the benefits. One prominent example of recognition as an equal actor was witnessed in the visit to Pyongyang by former US President, Jimmy Carter, in June 1994, to de-escalate US–DPRK tensions. As is well documented, the Clinton administration exhibited concern that the visit would signal US legitimation of the Kim Il Sung regime.13⁷ Moreover, whilst each of the two Koreas constitutionally deems the other to be illegitimate, inter-Korean presidential-level summitry has occurred in 2000, 2007, and 2018. North Korean state media hailed the Panmunjom Declaration, arising from the April 2018 inter-Korean summit, as ‘usher[ing] in a new era of common prosperity by their concerted efforts’.13⁸ Recognition as equal, therefore, does not just take place between the DPRK and the United States. Nevertheless, whilst such recognition may be a beneficial social outcome gained from delinquency, an additional, related type of recognition can be garnered, namely, recognition as a significant actor.

Recognition as significant States that violate international norms, particularly those that are ruled by authoritarian regimes, frequently desire to be ‘left alone’ from international pressure towards norm compliance, in no small part such that they can pursue counterhegemonic strategies against the Western liberal international order and its guarantor of the United States.13⁹ These states may consider themselves to occupy exceptional positions within international institutionalized regimes, such as those that have acquired and developed nuclear weapons without signing the NPT (namely, India, Pakistan, and Israel) or developed nuclear weapons whilst party to the Treaty such as Iran and the DPRK. Akin to India, Pakistan, or Israel, Pyongyang ultimately seeks international recognition as a significant de facto nuclear state that is not party to the NPT. The North Korean regime perceives recognition as a significant actor as a further marker of international legitimacy, even if such legitimacy may not be bestowed by the international community. A state can deem itself to be a significant actor owing to its continued regime survival, despite international calls for regime change. Whilst the DPRK is a legitimate state according to a narrow, Westphalian understanding of legitimacy (namely, a sovereign state member of the United Nations), it has been far less successful at gaining international legitimacy from a solidarist understanding of international society.1⁴⁰ For Hurd, legitimacy relies upon ‘the normative belief by an 13⁷ US Department of State, ‘Cable, State 140071 to Amembassy Moscow, Subject: A/S Gallucci Briefs Russians on DPRK Talks, July 7, 1994’; Marion Creekmore, A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker, and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006), 27; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 3rd edn (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 331–33. 13⁸ Rodong Sinmun, ‘Panmunjom Declaration Is Historic Milestone for Independent Reunification’, 12 May 2018. 13⁹ US NSC official (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁰ ROK negotiator to UN (interview, 2017).

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actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed’.1⁴1 According to this perspective, an actor’s lack of compliance with an order’s rules and norms can be explained by an alleged moral obligation to resist these strictures if it deems these rules and norms to have been designed without its interests in mind. If legitimacy is a ‘generalised perception that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and institutions’, delinquent states deem such ‘socially constructed system[s]’ to be anything but ‘desirable, proper, or appropriate’.1⁴2 According to these understandings – in line with the solidarist approach of the English School of International Relations theory – North Korea’s lack of international legitimacy arises from how its contraventions of nuclear and broader international norms, and justifications for delinquent behaviour, are anything but validated by international society. Fundamentally, Pyongyang deems the normative strictures of the nuclear order as illegitimate, rooted within the US ‘hostile policy’ and desire to ‘stifle’ the DPRK via regime change.1⁴3 As such, North Korea considers itself to have no obligation to comply with the norms of international society. Yet, whilst it may wish to be free from international pressures to denuclearize, the DPRK does not want to be portrayed as an insignificant global actor. For a delinquent state, recognition as a significant actor can stem from the state’s ability to alter the behaviour of great powers or garner recognition as an equal dialogue partner with great powers. In the case of North Korea, being portrayed as a significant international actor can also bolster the regime’s self-perception of the DPRK as an exceptional state. Indeed, Pyongyang has been able to exploit international norms in ways that serve its interests. For instance, its self-proclaimed ‘suspension’ of its withdrawal from the NPT in June 1993 came after high-level dialogue with the United States following the North’s initial threat to withdraw from the Treaty three months earlier. Central to Pyongyang’s ‘suspension’ was its declaration of its ‘unique status’ with respect to the NPT, a notion which it frequently invoked thereafter to immunize itself from the constraints of the non-proliferation regime such as IAEA special inspections on its nuclear facilities.1⁴⁴ A further instance occurred in 2005 during the Six-Party Talks. With negotiations failing to bring North Korea into re-compliance with the non-proliferation regime, the United States declared that it had no intention of invoking regime change and was prepared to negotiate with the DPRK in its status quo form.1⁴⁵ North Korea perceived this attestation as a marker of respect, which, ironically, only furthered its delinquent nuclear 1⁴1 Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International Organization, 53(2), 1999, 381. 1⁴2 Mark C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 1995, 574. 1⁴3 See, e.g. KCNA, ‘U.S. Shameless Threat Lambasted’, 20 January 2013; KCNA, ‘Nothing Can Block DPRK’s Advance: Rodong Sinmun’, 16 June 2012; KCNA, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s Policy Speech’, 14 April 2019. 1⁴⁴ The invocation of this ‘unique status’ would be a key justification by the North Korean regime for its lack of complete compliance with nuclear norms. 1⁴⁵ US Department of State, ‘U.S. Opening Statement at the Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks’, 26 July 2005, available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/50510.htm (accessed 6 January 2023).

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behaviour. As a former South Korean senior negotiator with the DPRK aptly put it, it was only following Pyongyang’s first nuclear test in 2006, when the DPRK ‘showed the US the real capacity to do harm, [that] the US had no choice but to come [to the negotiating table]’.1⁴⁶ Thus, international engagement with North Korea as a norm-violating actor may bolster the ruling regime’s self-perception of the DPRK’s status as a significant— and even exceptional—international actor. Nevertheless, international recognition of a delinquent state as a significant actor may sit in tension with the regime-state’s self-declared status as an equal actor. The case of North Korea highlights how it has not always been an equal participant in negotiations. During the Six-Party Talks, Pyongyang was both at and on the negotiating table, given how the objective of the forum was its ultimate denuclearization.

Strategic delinquency: All about status? Strategic delinquency is thus an active strategy that states can pursue to reap positive outcomes from delinquent behaviour, despite also incurring costs. In the case of North Korea, the regime-state must exercise norm-breaking behaviour in a strategic fashion—involving a trade-off calculation—to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs obtained on any given occasion. The DPRK’s engagement with the global nuclear order and wider international order shows how one means of maximizing the receipt of benefits is through oscillating between normative compliance and defiance. Paradoxically, North Korea has been able to increase its international status and standing through reaping international concessions, despite breaking nuclear norms, engaging in contrived normative compliance, and without offering any substantial concessions on its nuclear ambitions. Table 2.1 outlines the possible costs and benefits from each type of delinquent behaviour. Yet, is strategic delinquency all about a quest for international status? Of course, states may violate international norms, such as vis-à-vis the global nuclear order, for other reasons. Two alternative explanations to status are deterrence and domestic legitimacy. With respect to North Korea, whilst this book does not claim that North Korea’s nuclear behaviour is all about status, it is important to highlight how and where these alternative accounts might fall short. Although Scott Sagan deemed deterrence to provide the ‘most parsimonious explanation for nuclear weapons proliferation’, deterrence alone fails to shed light on two areas.1⁴⁷ First, contra deterrence theory, the acquisition of nuclear weapons may beget insecurity for some states; second, states still break nuclear norms after having acquired a nuclear deterrent. Despite any positive outcomes that may ensue, nuclear possession and development come at both a financial and social cost to 1⁴⁶ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁷ See: Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security, 21(3), 1996, 57.

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Table 2.1 Trade-offs of delinquency Norm transgression

Provocation

Deception

Benefits

- Domestic legitimacy - International attention - Negotiations with great powers

- Deterrence - Regime security - Economic concessions through brinkmanship - International attention - Negotiations with great powers to compel compliance - Recognition as a sovereign and/or significant international actor - Recognition as an equal dialogue partner

- Economic concessions from feigned norm compliance - Negotiations with great powers - Recognition as an equal dialogue partner

Costs

- International opprobrium as a norm-violator - Multilateral/unilateral economic sanctions

- International opprobrium and lowering of reputation - Multilateral/unilateral economic sanctions

- International opprobrium - Perception as an untrustworthy actor

Source: author.

aspirant nuclear states. The example of North Korea in the 1990s raises the question of why a state suffering domestic economic decline would pursue covert HEU development and clandestine nuclear exchange with other ‘rogue’ states.1⁴⁸ As one US analyst stressed, Pyongyang has wanted—and still wants—‘the prestige of being one of the few countries that have nuclear weapons, to reflect the legitimacy of the regime’.1⁴⁹ A second alternative explanation for delinquent behaviour is domestic legitimacy. Legitimacy is not just bestowed upon states internationally. Authoritarian regimes rely heavily on domestic popular acquiescence and legitimation to ensure their survival, even if such acquiescence arises out of fear rather than genuine support.1⁵⁰ For authoritarian regimes, invoking domestic legitimacy remains a powerful justification

1⁴⁸ Selig S. Harrison, ‘Did North Korea Cheat?’, Foreign Affairs, 84(1), January/February 2005, 99–110; Mun Suk Ahn, ‘What Is the Root Cause of the North Korean Nuclear Program?’, Asian Affairs; An American Review, 38(4), 2011, 180–81. 1⁴⁹ US analyst (interview, 2017). 1⁵⁰ The concept of ‘preference falsification’ highlights how, for individuals living under authoritarian regimes, public acquiescence to the regime can mask private grievances. See Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

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for their continued survival to the international community.1⁵1 With respect to so-called ‘rogue’ nuclear states, in particular, the international stigma of nuclear possession can be reframed from a negative to a positive attribute to bolster domestic legitimacy. The Iranian regime, for instance, speaks of the ‘sacred value’ of nuclear weapons to corroborate Iran’s self-identification as the state at the vanguard of Islam in the Gulf region.1⁵2 For North Korea, the Kim regime, across its three leaders, has aimed to strengthen domestic legitimacy by justifying its nuclear development as evidence of indigenous technological and scientific prowess and embedding its nuclear doctrine within the state ideology of juche, through what Edward Howell terms its ‘nuclear ideology’.1⁵3 According to North Korean defectors interviewed by the author, many elite and non-elite North Koreans ‘think that if the country did not have nuclear weapons, the regime would collapse’.1⁵⁴ As another put it: ‘even though a lot of North Koreans dislike Kim Jong Un [compared to Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung] [. . .] nuclear weapons are something to be proud of ’.1⁵⁵ For the North Korean regime, gaining domestic support for its delinquent behaviour, in line with the narrative promulgated by the regime-state, offers one means by which it can seemingly justify its breaking of international norms. By claiming that the DPRK is a ‘peace-loving power’ with a ‘sincere wish to contribute to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia and the rest of the world’, the North Korean regime can portray the DPRK as a morally just state—in contrast to how it views the United States—through appealing to domestic nationalism.1⁵⁶ Yet, the intermestic coupling between domestic and international spheres in the case of North Korea emphasizes how focusing on the domestic level at the expense of the international level, or vice versa, fails to generate a fuller understanding of North Korea’s delinquent behaviour—particularly with respect to the nuclear domain—and the ensuing outcomes. Given how evidence shows that North Korea’s delinquency has been rewarded by the international community, even if unintentionally, understanding how such rewarding has taken place is crucial to determining Pyongyang’s behavioural calculus. Were North Korea’s behaviour solely to advance its domestic interests, explaining its accession to and withdrawal from the NPT—in 1985 and 2003—becomes an arduous task. Thus, just as Sagan deemed domestic politics and prestige to have limited explanatory power in understanding why states nuclearize, Sagan’s preferred explanation of deterrence, as a single explanans, also offers limited value in illuminating North Korea’s behaviour and its outcomes, which ideas of status can enhance. 1⁵1 Alexander Dukalskis, The Authoritarian Public Sphere: Legitimation and Autocratic Power in North Korea, Burma and China (London: Routledge, 2017). 1⁵2 Willis Stanley, The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Washington, DC: United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2006); Morteza Dehghani, Scott Atran, Rumen Iliev, Sonya Sachdeva, Douglas Medin, and Jeremy Ginges, ‘Sacred Values and Conflict over Iran’s Nuclear Program’, Judgment and Decision Making, 5(7), 2010, 540–46. 1⁵3 Howell, The Juche H-bomb?’, 1056–59. 1⁵⁴ Elite defector G, (interview, Seoul, 2017). 1⁵⁵ Elite defector A (interview, Seoul, 2017). 1⁵⁶ For one invocation of this claim, see KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-Party Talks’, 29 June 2004.

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Conclusion The framework of strategic delinquency illuminates how and why states may behave delinquently in relation to nuclear norms and international norms. Going beyond understandings of status that conceptualize the notion in purely material terms, and which are limited to ideas of positive status, the framework shows how negative status—the lowering of a state’s status which initially arises from norm-flouting behaviour—can be leveraged for positive ends. Indeed, to understand delinquent state behaviour in international relations, including and beyond the case of North Korea, we must pay greater attention to how states can deploy—and have deployed— norm-breaking behaviour strategically. The strategic engagement in delinquent behaviour has been one means by which the DPRK has responded to its marginalized position within international society and self-constructed heuristic of the US ‘hostile policy’. By providing a typology of a range of delinquent behaviour and the outcomes that may ensue, the strategic delinquency framework shows how states, including North Korea, can garner domestic and international status, amongst other benefits, without conforming to dominant international norms. Moreover, unlike the—albeit outdated—stereotypes of North Korea as an irrational actor, what can be seen is how the regime-state neither deploys delinquent actions in an irrational manner nor always behaves delinquently.1⁵⁷ By oscillating between behaviour that brings negative and positive status, North Korea can avoid compromising upon its national interests. How, therefore, has North Korea deployed delinquent behaviour? How has its exercise of delinquency evolved? Focusing on four time periods (the ‘first nuclear crisis’ of the 1990s, the ‘second nuclear crisis’ of the 2000s, the ‘strategic patience’ of the Obama administration, and engagement during the Trump administration), Chapters 3–6 will demonstrate how, over time, Pyongyang has exercised varying degrees of delinquency in relation to the nuclear order and wider international order. What can be seen is that the scope conditions under which delinquency generates positive outcomes for the DPRK have also developed. Crucially, North Korea’s behaviour does not exist in isolation, remaining contingent upon actions taken by South Korea, China, and the United States, not least its perception of a US ‘hostile policy’ with respect to the latter.

1⁵⁷ For one useful refutation of this stereotype, see Andrei Lankov, ‘Kim Jong Un Is a Survivor, Not a Madman’, Foreign Policy, 26 April 2017.

3 Quest for significance The first nuclear crisis of the 1990s

Sitting across from Kang Sok Ju (First Vice Foreign Minister of North Korea from 1986 to 2010 and lead negotiator to the United States during the first and second nuclear crises), a former US official recounted Kang’s adamance that North Korea would not compromise upon its nuclear programme unless it gained a concession in return: Kang Sok Ju explained to me that if he was going to shut down the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon and close up all the facilities there—put everything under IAEA safeguards—he was going to have to get something from the international community.¹

Even for international officials negotiating with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), unpacking the true intentions of the regime at any given time is an arduous task. The regime’s negotiating style is characteristically inflexible. North Korean negotiators must take all directives and considerations back to Pyongyang before any further progress can be made, a process that is, understandably, frustrating for their South Korean, US, or other counterparts. Yet, historically, North Korean negotiations have also emphasized the sheer importance placed by the DPRK on ensuring that its preferred outcomes are gained. In this vein, Kang’s statement to his US counterpart is telling. It reveals just what North Korea wanted to achieve through its behaviour during the so-called ‘first nuclear crisis’ of the 1990s.2 This temporal juncture is highly salient given how, during this time, North Korea exercised both compliant and deviant behaviour with respect to international order and the global nuclear order. Of note, it joined the latter, acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985. Yet, what did Pyongyang hope to achieve in its domestic and foreign policy actions during this period? As has been documented, the DPRK’s world view during the 1990s was heavily shaped by its changing relationship with its Cold War partners, the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), the end of the Cold War, and the desire to forge new relationships with the United States. Within this changing international 1 US negotiator AF (interview, 2019). 2 The period from the early 1990s to the Agreed Framework is commonly described—if somewhat hyperbolically, as some diplomats suggested to the author—as the first nuclear crisis, nomenclature which arose out of escalated US–DPRK tensions from late 1992 to 1994.

North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order. Edward Howell, Oxford University Press. © Edward Howell (2023). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192888327.003.0004

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environment, North Korea hoped to achieve several goals. First, the DPRK hoped to pursue and develop weaponized nuclear capabilities to defend national security and counter the so-called US ‘nuclear threat’ in South Korea.3 Second, the DPRK actively sought engagement with the United States on equal terms as a ‘dialogic partner’.⁴ Finally, and relatedly, North Korea wanted to normalize diplomatic relations with the United States in no small part owing to the benefits such normalization could bring to a country whose domestic problems—not least economic—were taking their toll. This latter goal became increasingly prominent over time as North Korea’s quest for international status and recognition gained in potency. During the first nuclear crisis, North Korea was able to reap beneficial outcomes from its strategic behaviour in compliance with, and defiance of, nuclear norms and wider international norms. Pyongyang gained greater bargaining power and leverage to engage in negotiations with the United States, from which it could gain additional benefits such as recognition as a significant power or the provision of economic assistance. Importantly, the first nuclear crisis demonstrates a core lesson for North Korea: both before and after it joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea learnt that delinquency could lead to advantageous outcomes. The regimestate would rapidly learn from the benefits reaped from past delinquent behaviours and international responses to its actions to inform future actions. This chapter divides the first nuclear crisis into three phases. The first phase, from December 1985 to January 1992, was characterized by outward compliance with the nuclear order following North Korea’s accession to the NPT, during which time Pyongyang continued to deceive the international community of its nuclear ambitions. The second phase, from January 1992 to March 1993, saw a more pronounced shift towards delinquency, even after the DPRK signed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. During this time, whilst the benefits of delinquent behaviour became apparent for the DPRK, heightened DPRK–US tensions culminated in an act of norm transgression, namely, North Korea’s threat to abrogate from the NPT out of its own volition. The third phase, from March 1993 to October 1994, saw intensified tensions with the United States but eventually resulted in a return to outward compliance with the nuclear order. North Korea signed the Agreed Framework (AF) whereby it pledged to freeze plutonium production in return for a wealth of concessions, including light-water reactor provision and normalization of economic and political relations with the United States. Yet, de-escalation of the nuclear crisis only occurred when the United States lowered its demands on the DPRK to allow the continuation of negotiations such that an agreement could be reached. What this chapter shows is that North Korea only complied with nuclear and international norms when doing so did not go against its national interests. A crucial facet of the DPRK’s negotiating strategy at the time was to hold the United States—and international community—to account for its failures to uphold past pledges, a logic 3 ‘Commentary Alleges U.S. ‘Nuclear War Plot’, Pyongyang Domestic Service, 13 July 1989, FBIS-EAS89-134, 15. ⁴ ‘Envoy Addresses UN on Nuclear Issue, N-S Talks’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 9 November 1993, FBIS-EAS-93-216, 13.

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that would become an increasingly consistent feature in its rhetoric in future years.⁵ The eventual collapse of the Agreed Framework would form a recurrent theme over the next three decades, as subsequent chapters will show, to justify North Korea’s provocative behaviour towards the United States and its allies. This chapter proceeds in three parts. Before analysing North Korea’s changing behaviour over the three phases of the first nuclear crisis, the chapter first contends that Pyongyang’s norm-breaking behaviour in the post-war years—before it joined the nuclear order—and subsequently during the crisis stemmed from its conceptualization of international order as embedded within the US ‘hostile policy’. Only by understanding the DPRK’s actions in the years after the Second World War, the Korean War, and as the early nuclear order was consolidated can greater insight into North Korea’s nuclear ambitions be gleaned. What can be seen, however, is that the outcomes of delinquency were not always positive for North Korea. The second part of this chapter focuses on key junctures following North Korea’s accession to the NPT in 1985. It argues that Pyongyang’s behaviour was driven by goals of regime security and status ambitions as a then new member of the international system, especially the status value of being a state which, in the future, could possess nuclear weapons. North Korea’s provocative and deceptive acts would intensify with time, when it felt it could not gain sufficient pay-offs, whether from its Cold War patrons or adversaries. Ultimately, Pyongyang would recognize the need to make concessions of its own, as manifest in the Agreed Framework of 1994, a manoeuvre which only underscored the DPRK’s status ambitions and penchant for international rewards. The final section of this chapter argues how North Korea’s behaviour during the first nuclear crisis sits in line with the expectations of the framework of strategic delinquency. Despite continued bellicosity as a member of the nuclear order, the DPRK successfully convinced the United States to lower its demands for norm compliance and reward the North with pledges of economic and diplomatic normalization. North Korea would learn an essential lesson from its interactions with the United States during the first nuclear crisis, namely, that by bringing dividends, delinquent behaviour could form part and parcel of the DPRK’s quest for international significance. The first nuclear crisis offered North Korea an ideal opportunity to test its strategic engagement in delinquency, namely by witnessing how the international community would respond. Indeed, the pursuit of nuclear weapons remained deeply interwoven with how North Korea sought to mitigate what it deemed to be a US ‘hostile policy’ by asserting its status internationally. At the same time, the North sought other goals beyond status, namely domestic legitimacy, the related consolidation of the Kim Il Sung regime, and development of a deterrent to fend off possible pre-emptive attack and enforcement of regime change. Yet, although scholarship emphasizes how deterrence might offer the optimal account of North Korea’s nuclear behaviour and its motivations, it provides limited insight on Pyongyang’s actions ⁵ One example of this rationale was witnessed in the DPRK’s demands for the Korean War Armistice Agreement to be replaced with a permanent peace treaty. See KCNA (Korean Central News Agency), ‘Joseonban-dui pyeonghwabojangchegyesulib-e gwanhan joseon-oegyobu seongmyeong’ [‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement concerning Peace on the Korean Peninsula’], 28 April 1994.

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during the specific period of the first nuclear crisis, when its nuclear capabilities were, at best, rudimentary. Any empirical analysis of North Korea’s behaviour, not least with respect to its nuclear ambitions, however, requires a methodological caveat. The regime-state’s totalitarian nature renders it impossible to elucidate, in a causal fashion, how the regime perceives its actions. Nevertheless, extensive documentary analysis of North Korean and international policy sources, coupled with in-depth interviews with international negotiators with the DPRK and North Korean defectors, whilst far from free from their own biases, offer the best possible picture behind what the North Korean regime says about its behaviour and how the regime-state may benefit from its actions, not least vis-à-vis the global nuclear and international orders.

Delinquency in the early post-war order The DPRK’s nuclear ambitions were ‘never written in any DPRK military regulations’ but most likely ‘hidden away in Kim Il-sung’s head’.⁶ Nevertheless, such aspirations most likely emerged in the 1940s in relation to nuclear power.⁷ The DPRK took advantage of its initial Cold War partnerships with the Soviet Union (USSR) and China, which led to the establishment of a nuclear research reactor at Yongbyon aimed at developing nuclear energy, predominantly—if not solely—for peaceful purposes.⁸ In this vein, the Soviet Union assented to transfer a ‘small two to fourmegawatt research reactor’ to Pyongyang, which began operation in 1967.⁹ However, Moscow remained reluctant to provide technology for plutonium and uranium production, key ingredients for weaponized nuclear capabilities, which was met with frustration from Kim Il Sung.1⁰ Yet, even in 1967, the temptation of weaponized nuclear capabilities would prove difficult for Kim to resist. China’s first nuclear test three years earlier, in 1964, intensified Kim Il Sung’s ambitions to nuclearize. Archival material highlights how the North responded with envy, with North Korean officials claiming how the DPRK would be ‘even more ⁶ Alexandre Y. Mansourov, ‘The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program’, Nonproliferation Review, 2(3), 1995, 29. ⁷ See communications between the DPRK, USSR, and Hungary, in Balázs Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko, ‘North Korea’s Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian Archives’, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 53, August 2006. ⁸ Mansourov, ‘The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program’, 26; Walter C. Clemens, Jr, ‘North Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons: New Historical Evidence’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 10(1), 2010, 127–54. ⁹ Clemens, Jr, ‘North Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons’, 131. See also Michael J. Mazarr, ‘Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea’, International Security 20(2), Autumn 1995, 92–122; Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (London: Macmillan, 1995); Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr, ‘North Korea—Set to Join the “Nuclear Club”’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 23 September 1989, 594–97. 1⁰ NKIDP (North Korea International Documentation Project), ‘From the Journal of Gromyko, Record of a Conversation with Ambassador Ri Sin-Pal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, 28 April 1958; NKIDP, ‘Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Soviet Specialists in North Korea’, 27 September 1963.

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formidable’ with such ‘powerful weapons in our hands’.11 Nonetheless, Mao’s recalcitrance towards the DPRK developing indigenous nuclear capability was clear, on grounds not only of cost but also the prospect of a having a nuclear neighbour. Indeed, the Chinese nuclear test amounted to $2 billion. The North Korean regime, however, ignored such concerns. First and foremost, even prior to the establishment of the NPT, the DPRK questioned the notion that some states could acquire nuclear weapons but others were unable to do so; whereby the United States could ‘have a large [nuclear stockpile][…] [but] we are to be forbidden even to think about the manufacture of nuclear weapons’.12 Yet, such evidence shows that North Korea rapidly recognized not only the material value of nuclear weapons but also their status value. The United States, too, contributed in no small part to such perceptions. In 1963, former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted how, following the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States ‘had sold to the rest of the world two ideas. One was that nuclear weapons were a status symbol. The great powers had them; if you didn’t have them, you were a second-rate power. Secondly, if you had them, you could do anything. These were magical weapons.’13 This adage would resonate with the DPRK for years to come. Kim Il Sung could not have been immune to the ‘magical’ allure of nuclear weapons. The North Korean leader was adamant that the then new regime-state of his own creation—so the North Korean narrative goes—would not be seen, domestically and internationally, as a ‘second-rate power’. These status concerns would interact with growing geopolitical considerations for North Korea’s envy of China’s nuclear success was not simply a question of displeasure at its neighbour having ‘got there first’. The test occurred amidst increasing tensions within the Sino-Soviet alliance as North Korea sought to manage its bilateral relations with its Cold War partners. The once cordial relations between Pyongyang and Beijing were, as Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng accurately posit, nowhere near as ‘close as lips and teeth’, as Mao (allegedly) once asserted.1⁴ Any such cordiality was fast becoming a distant memory. Mao’s radical and revolutionist domestic and foreign policies, marked most notably by the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, was viewed with sharp disdain in Pyongyang. The Red Guards personally derided Kim Il Sung as a ‘millionaire, an aristocrat and a leading bourgeois element’, antithetical to the communist values expounded by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).1⁵ Moreover, China’s growing distancing from the

11 For the DPRK’s displeasure that China ‘got there first’, see: ‘Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, “Reactions to China’s Nuclear Test”’, 17 October 1964, HPPA, PRC FMA 113-00395-08, 58–59; ‘Reactions among the North Korean Masses to China’s Nuclear Test’, 21 October 1964, HPPA, PRC FMA 113-00395-08, 62–63. 12 NKIDP, ‘Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol’, 24 August 1962. 13 Dean Acheson, ‘The Obstacles to Partnership with Europe’, Engineering and Science, 26(6), 1963, 13. 1⁴ For an outstanding analysis of the tumultuous and changing relationship between China and North Korea from 1949 to 1976, see Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Sino-North Korean Relations, 1949–1976, Revised edn, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020). 1⁵ Donald S. Zagoria and Young Kun Kim, ‘North Korea and the Major Powers’, Asian Survey, 15(12), December 1975, 1031.

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de-Stalinization agenda of the Soviet Union forced Pyongyang into a more conscious balancing act vis-à-vis its relations with Moscow and Beijing.1⁶ Yet, the North did not wish to sacrifice its receipt of aid and military support from its two Cold War partners.1⁷ On 11 July 1961, Pyongyang signed the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty, whereby both parties pledged to defend each other militarily in any conflict, only a few days after it had signed a similar Treaty with the Soviet Union.1⁸ In the DPRK, the Soviet-supplied reactor began operation in 1967, the presence of which catalysed the establishment the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, which would form the heart of the North’s nuclear programme.1⁹ Even as its demands for nuclear assistance from other socialist states—throughout the 1960s and 1970s—failed, the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions did not abate, especially as, during the 1970s, South Korea, then under the authoritarian rule of President Park Chung-hee, exhibited a desire for weaponized nuclear capabilities of its own.2⁰ This latter revelation would further North Korea’s desire to assert itself as a then new state in the international community since Kim Il Sung felt that the ‘only potential target for these [the Republic of Korea’s] nuclear weapons was his own regime’.21 The establishment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty—by the United States and Soviet Union—in 1968, as the hallmark of the global nuclear order, coupled with South Korea’s economic success of the 1970s, would exert profound influences both on how North Korea would frame international relations— as Chapter 1 demonstrated—and, fundamentally, develop its subsequent nuclear ambitions. North Korea’s perspective on international relations was thus a product of international-, regional-, and domestic-level considerations. Over time, the potency of the US ‘hostile policy’ as a core ideological prism through which the DPRK viewed the world around it would only strengthen in its influence on Pyongyang’s behaviour. However, North Korea did not develop nuclear weapons straightaway. Beyond their financial cost, Pyongyang would have to amass the technology and expertise to develop these weapons, amidst the reluctance of other socialist states to assist in this endeavour. Whilst any such nuclear aspirations were being considered, North Korea was engaging in delinquent behaviour with respect to the post-war liberal norm of non-aggression. 1⁶ Mao notably denounced Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi as ‘capitalist roaders’ following their resistance towards the Cultural Revolution, a resistance which is not unconnected to Khrushchev’s ‘de-Stalinization’ speech of 1956. See Sergey Radchenko, ‘1956’. In: Stephen A. Smith, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 140–56. 1⁷ Shen and Xia, A Misunderstood Friendship, 137–95; Nobuo Shimotomai, ‘Kim Il Sung’s Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing, 1956–1972’. In: Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed., The Cold War in East Asia, 1945–1991 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 122–51. 1⁸ ‘Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, 11 July 1961, available at: https://www.marxists.org/ subject/china/documents/china_dprk.htm (accessed 21 December 2022). 1⁹ A CIA cable in June 1965 stated how ‘a search of the area of Yongbyon […] has revealed an installation which is probably a nuclear research center reportedly being constructed in the area’, the design of which was similar to those in the USSR. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), ‘Cable to AFSSO USAF from NPIC’, 4 June 1965. 2⁰ Seoul telegram 8023 to Department of State, ‘ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles’, 2 December 1974, in National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 582. 21 Mansourov, ‘The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program’, 29.

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North Korea’s behaviour in the 1960s and 1970s, in opposition to the norms of the Western liberal post-war international order, would influence its future intentions to violate nuclear non-proliferation norms. Yet, to what aspects of this order was North Korea so vehemently opposed? As John Ikenberry notes, the Western liberal post-war international order was ‘organized around the United States and its liberal democratic allies and clients’, around ‘economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity’, entrenching the ‘deep rooted rules and norms of sovereignty’ as epitomized by the Charter of the United Nations.22 Mazarr compellingly argues that the order was underpinned by a ‘specific set of firm rules (such as nonaggression)’ and ‘long-term aspirations (such as liberal values)’, witnessed in the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation norms and need to ‘advance [the] prevalence of democracy’, crucially, of the Western liberal variant.23 Such liberal international norms, embedded within international institutions such as the United Nations, would ‘establish what constitutes legitimate and acceptable behaviour in relations among sovereign states’.2⁴ It was not North Korea’s opposition to the norm of non-aggression per se that catalysed delinquency. At its heart, Pyongyang opposed the US leadership of postwar international relations. We must not forget that North Korea fundamentally viewed the United States and South Korea as responsible for commencing the Korean War. More fundamentally, according to Pyongyang’s narrative, it was the United States and its ‘hostile policy’ that catalysed the division of the Korean Peninsula after the Second World War. North Korea’s fundamental perception of a United States that was inimical to its very existence, therefore, would motivate its exercise of delinquent behaviour in future years. One of the first acts of North Korean defiance from the post-war norm of nonaggression occurred on 21 January 1968, when a commando raid—known as the Blue House raid—attempted, unsuccessfully, to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee.2⁵ Only two days later, the DPRK captured the USS Pueblo—a US naval intelligence ship—in the Sea of Japan/East Sea, in response to which the United States planned to deploy naval and air forces in the area.2⁶ The DPRK justified its capture of the Pueblo as a countermeasure against prior US military and nuclear deployment in South Korea and the United States’ desire for ‘unleashing a war’ on the 22 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The End of Liberal International Order’, International Affairs, 94(1), 2018, 12, 16–17. 23 Michael J. Mazarr and Ashley L. Rhoades, Testing the Value of the Postwar International Order (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 20, 56. 2⁴ Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, ‘Introduction’. In: Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, eds, US Hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 13. 2⁵ For more on South Korean incidents perpetrated by or involving the DPRK, see: CIA, ‘Incidents Involving N. Korea’, 23 February 1968; CIA Directorate of Intelligence, ‘North Korea: Opposition to Peaceful Reunification’, 18 November 1985. 2⁶ Sergey S. Radchenko, ‘The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives’, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 47, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006; B.C. Koh, ‘The Pueblo Incident in Perspective’, Asian Survey 9(4), 1969, 264–80; Richard A. Mobley, Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crisis (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003).

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Peninsula.2⁷ The invocation of the ‘hostile policy’ quickly became a convenient but powerful means for Pyongyang to justify its aggressive behaviour during the Cold War. Although the attack was condemned by the Soviet Union, as Soviet–DPRK ties waned, China pledged to ‘grant its full support to the DPRK’.2⁸ Were North Korea to ‘unleash military operations against the Americans on the Korean peninsula’, China would provide ‘comprehensive assistance’, particularly materially.2⁹ Evidence demonstrates how North Korea’s belligerent behaviour was due to a confluence of interweaving factors, including the domestic power consolidation of Kim Il Sung;3⁰ a desire to reunify the Korean Peninsula—unfulfilled during the Korean War—and undermine the US–ROK alliance31 but also to benefit materially from a stronger relationship with China. The Pueblo Incident worsened North Korea’s international reputation as a state with a penchant for belligerence. Archival evidence shows how first, the attack reinforced North Korea’s disdain for the US–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance and US conventional presence in Seoul, arising from the US–ROK Mutual Defence Treaty of 1953. Second, and importantly, prior knowledge that it would receive material support from the PRC provided one incentive for North Korea’s actions, highlighting Pyongyang’s proclivity towards obtaining pay-offs from delinquency even in the early days of the post-war order. The establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in February 1968, created by the USSR and the United States, would become the keystone of the global nuclear order and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Yet, as a result, Soviet–DPRK relations would worsen. Whilst the USSR pledged to assist its allies of East Germany (GDR) and Czechoslovakia in their nuclear development, other states, such as Romania, Vietnam, and the DPRK, were excluded. Romanian and North Korean officials clamorously criticized the Treaty for favouring the nuclear ambitions of great powers, particularly the five legal nuclear-weapons states, lamenting how ‘small countries should not suffer a loss as a consequence of the treaty’.32 The DPRK’s resentment towards the nuclear order thus originated from the order’s very inception.

2⁷ ‘Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP SECRET, No. 76.053, Regular’, 28 February 1968, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. 2⁸ ‘Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.069’ 17 March 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. 2⁹ ‘First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in North Korean Reports on Sino-Korean Relations in 1966’, 2 December 1966, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 22, 109, d. 22, 38–49, obtained by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg. 3⁰ NKIDP, ‘Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.053’, 28 February 1968. 31 ‘Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP SECRET, No. 76.046, Urgent’, 19 February 1968, Political Affairs Fond, Telegrams from Pyongyang, TOP SECRET, 1968, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe; ‘Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.047’, 19 February 1968, Political Affairs Fond, Telegrams from Pyongyang, TOP SECRET, 1968, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. 32 ‘Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry’, 29 February 1968, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1968, 58. doboz, 5, 001871/1968, obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai.

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A further departure from the norm of nonaggression took place in 1969, when the DPRK shot down a US intelligence aircraft, EC-121, over the East Sea. The North criticized the aircraft of the ‘insolent U.S. imperialist aggressor army’ for ‘intruding deep into the territorial air of the northern half of the republic’.33 North Korea’s justification here demonstrated its desire not only to maintain territorial control but also, importantly, to fray the US–ROK alliance, given its fears of an increasingly assertive South Korea seeking status as an economic and nuclear power. The Three Principles of National Unification on 4 July 1972, signed by the two Koreas, committed both states to equivocal goals of independence, peaceful unification, and national unity. The two sides pledged ‘not to slander or defame each other [and] not to undertake military provocations whether on a large or small scale’, underscoring the importance of dignity and status for both Koreas.3⁴ However, North Korea would not mute its criticisms. Pyongyang viewed Seoul’s own nuclear ambitions and the presence of US tactical nuclear weapons on the Peninsula since 1959 as violating this declaration. At the time, South Korea’s own nuclear ambitions, coupled with its perception as a farfrom-benign power by its northern counterpart, exerted considerable influence on North Korea’s weaponized nuclear aspirations.3⁵ Even after US pressure compelled the South to suspend its plans to develop a nuclear programme between 1976 and 1977, the DPRK’s external geopolitical environment would shift against its favour.3⁶ For all the regime’s rhetorical platitudes of juche—with respect to economic autarky and political self-reliance—Kim Il Sung would be forced to enact juche in practice, ultimately shunning integration with the liberal international order. North Korea continued to violate the post-war norm of non-aggression, even beyond assassinations, aircraft shootings, or hijackings. The forced abduction of citizens from Japan to North Korea between 1977 and 1983, was another example of delinquency, which continues to hinder contemporary relations between the two states. Part of a mission by North Korean spy agencies to acquire international intelligence, these abductions of everyday Japanese citizens sought to provide the regime with knowledge of Japanese language and culture with which to train North Korean agents. Even before the abductions, a burgeoning community of ethnic Koreans in Japan, who initially affiliated with the Japanese Left before evolving into groups espousing pro-North Korean values, sought, in the 1950s, to persuade ethnic Koreans living in Japan to migrate to North Korea, promising hyperbolic expectations

33 US Government, US Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 91st Congress, First Session, Vol. 115, Pt 9, 12524 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969). 3⁴ ‘The 4 July South–North Joint Communiqué’, 4 July 1972. 3⁵ Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons, February 1978 (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1978). See also: Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, ‘Appendix B’: Deployments by Country, 1951–1977’, NDRC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, 66–67; Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, ‘Where They Were’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 55(6), 1999, 26–35. 3⁶ CIA, ‘South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking’, June 1978. For US pressure on Seoul, see, e.g. US Department of State, ‘State Department Telegram 240,692 to U.S. Embassy Seoul, “Deputy Secretary Ingersoll’s Meeting with Ambassador Hahm of Korea”’, 9 October 1975; US Department of State, ‘Korean Reprocessing – the Next Step’, 18 November 1975.

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of a socialist paradise.3⁷ The most prominent of these groups, the Chongryon, was established in 19553⁸ and aimed to resist what it deemed to be the South Korean government’s ‘neglect [of] the South Korean diaspora in Japan’.3⁹ Attempts by Japan and South Korea to induce a formal apology from North Korea for these abductions have borne little fruit, despite a meeting in 2002 between Kim Jong Il and then Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, seeing Kim acknowledge—albeit far from explicitly—North Korea’s responsibility for its actions. The so-called ‘abduction issue’ continues to plague Japan–DPRK ties to this day.⁴⁰

Nuclear ambitions of its own Despite the halting of South Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the DPRK continued to call upon other states for nuclear assistance.⁴1 For instance, North Korea boldly asserted to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, in 1977, that it was ‘equipping itself with nuclear weapons’.⁴2 Such behaviour could have been influenced by India’s nuclear test in 1974, ten years after that of China, which further illustrated the possible nuclear achievements of a less economically developed state that had itself resisted joining the NPT.⁴3 In 1977, the DPRK placed its Soviet-supplied reactor and critical assembly under IAEA safeguards, pledging against using nuclear fuel to ‘further any military purpose’, including weaponized development.⁴⁴ The North Korean regime 3⁷ Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 23–24. For revealing accounts of the North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens, see Patricia G. Steinhoff, ‘Kidnapped Japanese in North Korea: The New Left Connection’, Journal of Japanese Studies, 30(1), 2004, 123–42; Brad Williams and Erik Mobrand, ‘Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea’, Journal of Asian Studies, 69(2), 2010, 507–36; Sandra Fahy, Dying for Rights: Putting North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses on the Record (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 88–90. 3⁸ The Chongryon remain in operation to this day; see http://www.chongryon.com (accessed 4 July 2021). 3⁹ John Lie, Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 37–38. See also Apichai W. Shipper, ‘Nationalisms of and against Zainichi Koreans in Japan’, Asian Politics & Policy, 2(1), 2010, 55–75; Alexander Dukalskis, Making the World Safe for Dictatorship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 159–85. ⁴⁰ Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Opening Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Press Conference on the Outcome of his Visit to North Korea’, Pyongyang, North Korea, 17 September 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/press. html (accessed 9 January 2023). see also Victor D. Cha, ‘Mr. Koizumi Goes to Pyongyang’, Comparative Connections, October 2002, available at: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/ legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/0203qjapan_korea.pdf (accessed 21 December 2022); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Talks between Japan and North Korea on the Abductions Issue’, 6 August 2021, available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kp/page1we_000069.html (accessed 22 December 2022). For an overview of the influence of Koizumi’s dialogue with Kim Jong Il on future Japan–DPRK engagement, see Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings University Press, 2007), 1–50, 426–29. ⁴1 Document No. 28, Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 February 1976, Cold War International History Project, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 83. doboz, 6, 002134/1976, obtained and translated for CWIHP and NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) by Balazs Szalontai. ⁴2 Document No. 36 Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 February 1977, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1977, 78. doboz, 81-2, 001197/1/1977, obtained and translated for CWIHP by Balazs Szalontai. ⁴3 Clemens, Jr, ‘North Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons’, 135. ⁴⁴ IAEA Archives, ‘Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, Pyongyang, 20 July 1977, INFCIRC/252.

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emphasized its pursuit of purely peaceful nuclear energy, even amidst US suspicions in the 1980s regarding the potential for North Korea’s then new reactor to produce ‘significant quantities of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium’.⁴⁵ The resultant negative international attention garnered by the DPRK only reinforced further international suspicions of Pyongyang’s alleged lack of intention to develop nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, North Korea’s aggressive behaviour continued. The failed assassination of Park Chung-hee did not dissuade a further unsuccessful attempt by North Korean forces, on 9 October 1983, to assassinate another South Korean President, Chun Doo-hwan, during Chun’s state visit to Burma. The ‘Rangoon Bombing’, similar to the Blue House raid of 1968, likely stemmed from the DPRK’s opposition to US nuclear presence in South Korea but also from a desire to escalate crisis on the Peninsula.⁴⁶ Given Chun’s lack of domestic popularity in South Korea, Pyongyang believed that by assassinating Chun, a revolution in the South could be unleashed, and South Korea’s economic trajectory, by then outperforming the North, could be retarded.⁴⁷ Just as the DPRK blamed the Pueblo Incident on the United States, this time it accused South Korea.⁴⁸ Episodes of delinquency would culminate in the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 in November 1987. Though the DPRK continues to avail itself of accountability for this attack, the sole surviving perpetrator—one of two North Korean agents—later testified that Kim Jong Il had ordered the bombing.⁴⁹ If previous acts of delinquency had reaped dividends for the DPRK, this act of terrorism resulted in the largest social cost theretofore. In 1988, the DPRK was placed on the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list,⁵⁰ classed as a state that had ‘repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism’.⁵1 Together with Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, Syria, Cuba, and Iran, this social categorization would have profound impacts on future North Korean behaviour towards the United States. Whilst its provocations may have garnered international attention, North Korea’s reputation as a state that violated the norms of responsible behaviour only worsened. As its status quickly declined, it became, as Geldenhuys posits, ‘an ideal candidate for demonization by foreigners’.⁵2

⁴⁵ CIA, ‘Nuclear Reactor under Construction in North Korea’ 19 April 1984. CIA analysis questioned the efficacy of the reactor, given the lack of ‘advanced engineering techniques’ accessible to the DPRK, but admitted that ‘the North Koreans probably are technically capable of building the reactor without foreign assistance’. ⁴⁶ ‘Foreign Ministry Statement on Burmese Decision’, 4 November 1983, FBIS-APA-83-216, 7 November 1983, D1-D3. ⁴⁷ Adrian Buzo, Politics and Leadership in North Korea: the Guerrilla Dynasty, 2nd edn (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 103. ⁴⁸ CIA Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Rangoon Bombing Incident—the Case against the North Koreans’, 19 October 1983, 4–5. ⁴⁹ CIA, ‘North Korea: Responsibility for the Korean Airline Bombing’, 11 February 1988, 3. For the testimony of Kim Hyun-hee, who was later pardoned by South Korea on account of being brainwashed into planting the bomb by the North Korean leadership, see Hyun-hee Kim, The Tears of My Soul (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1993). ⁵⁰ Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr, ‘North Korea and Support to Terrorism: An Evolving History’, Journal of Strategic Security, 3(2), 2010, 45–54. ⁵1 See Section 6(j) of the (now repealed) Export Administration Act of 1979, enforced from 1979 to 1994. ⁵2 Deon Geldenhuys, Deviant Conduct in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 174.

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Joining the global nuclear order Amidst international opprobrium for its terroristic behaviour, the DPRK would unabashedly assert the peaceful nature of its nuclear ambitions. Kim Jong Il himself, primed to succeed Kim Il Sung, would frequently call for the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) to use ‘atomic and solar energy […] in the national economy’, suggesting how the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions—peaceful or otherwise—were also targeting domestic audiences to supply sufficient energy domestically but also bolster domestic legitimacy through the material prestige associated with nuclear possession.⁵3 As its delinquency continued, North Korea’s international reputation deteriorated. From Pyongyang’s perspective, the continuation of the US ‘hostile policy’, manifest in US–ROK military exercises—such as ‘Team Spirit’, which commenced in 1977—justified its ongoing norm-breaking actions.⁵⁴ Such physical indicators of the ‘hostile policy’ only reinforced, in North Korea’s view, the desire of the United States for a unified Peninsula under South Korea’s control.⁵⁵ Despite weakening Soviet– DPRK ties, however, North Korea would commit a surprising act of compliance with nuclear norms. On 12 December 1985, the DPRK acceded to the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state, following ‘heavy pressure from the Soviet Union’.⁵⁶ Joining the NPT meant that the DPRK ‘foreswore the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons and agreed to IAEA safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear activities’ and would be required to halt any weaponized nuclear ambitions.⁵⁷ Even if North Korea did wish to pursue weaponized nuclear development after having joined the NPT, doing so would render it an illegitimate nuclear weapons state, from which social costs would arise. Crucially, however, the DPRK would only heed the Soviet call to join the NPT if the USSR provided light-water reactors (LWRs) in return. The dividends from such compliance seemed too large to resist given North Korea’s desperate attempts to build indigenous reactors. As a former South Korean negotiator with the DPRK stressed: ‘North Korea wanted to build light-water reactors in the 80s, but the Soviet advice was […] you’ve got to join the NPT. If not, we cannot help you. It is mandatory.’⁵⁸

⁵3 Kim Jong Il, ‘gwahaggisul-eul deoug baljeonsikilde daehayeo’ [On the Further Development of Science and Technology], Speech Delivered to the Senior Officials of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea’, 3 August 1985, In: Kim Jong Il, gimjeong-il seonjib 8 (1984-1986) [Kim Jong Il Works Vol. 8], (Pyongyang: Workers’ Party of Korea Publishing House, 2006), 240-262. ⁵⁴ KCNA, ‘Pyongyang Denies Developing Nuclear Weapons’ 4 August 1989, FBIS-EAS-89-149, 23–24 ⁵⁵ See, e.g. KCNA, ‘KCNA Reacts to “Terrorist Group” Label’, 9 April 1988, FBIS-EAS-88-069, 8; ‘Daily Demands “Solid Peace” on Korean Peninsula’, 2 August 1989, FBIS-EAS-89-147, 22–25. ⁵⁶ US Assistant Secretary of State (interview, 2019). See also Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 3–5. ⁵⁷ CIA, ‘North Korea: Potential for Nuclear Weapon Development’, September 1986, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 87, Document No. 7. ⁵⁸ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019).

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The Soviet pledge was never fulfilled, a manoeuvre which would hinder future Soviet–DPRK bilateral relations.⁵⁹ Instead, with no Soviet LWRs, the DPRK constructed a 5-megawatt graphite-moderated reactor, fuel processing plant, and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon with little external assistance; the reactor would go critical in 1986.⁶⁰ At the same time, ongoing targeting of the United States for bringing ‘all kinds of nuclear weapons to South Korea’ and conducting Team Spirit, derided as a ‘nuclear-test war exercise’, continued apace.⁶1 Hence, as Samuel Kim convincingly argues, paraphrasing Marx, North Korea’s ‘decision to go nuclear was not made overnight’. Rather, the DPRK ‘do[es] not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under the circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past’.⁶2 Indeed, three fundamental circumstances, both encountered and ‘transmitted from the past’, affected North Korea’s nuclear ambitions at the time: the legacy of the Korean War, the pursuit of what Pyongyang deemed to be a ‘hostile policy’ from the United States and South Korea, and waning ties with the USSR and China. Thus, even before it joined the NPT, North Korea’s delinquent behaviour brought social costs; the DPRK became viewed, internationally, as a state that deliberately sought to break international norms. Yet, despite being bestowed with negative status following its post-war acts of delinquency, Pyongyang hoped that by joining the global nuclear order, it would reap benefits not limited to LWRs.

When crisis commences Though it may have joined the NPT, North Korea’s resentment of the post-war liberal international order did not abate and would influence its ensuing behaviour vis-à-vis the global nuclear order. Just as it resisted the United States’ post-war goals to establish and preserve an international order underpinned by Western liberal norms, the consolidation of the global nuclear order saw the DPRK seek to subvert norms of non-proliferation and arms control.⁶3 The collapse of the USSR and end of the Cold War posed a pressing global concern for nuclear proliferation, given the diffusion of ⁵⁹ Clemens Jr, ‘North Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons’, 146; Jacques E.C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians and Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 254; Alexander Zhebin, ‘A Political History of Soviet–North Korean Nuclear Cooperation’. In: James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds, The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), 29–30. For more on the Soviet influence on the DPRK’s accession to the NPT, see John M. Deutch, ‘The New Nuclear Threat’, Foreign Affairs, 71(4), 1992, 120– 34; Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, ‘The Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Problems and Prospects’, Contemporary Security Policy, 14(2), 1993, 65–92. ⁶⁰ Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises’, Daedalus, 139(1), 2010, 44–56; Matthias Dembinski, ‘North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime’, Nonproliferation Review, 2(2), 1995, 31–39; Olli Heinonen, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Enrichment: Capabilities and Consequences’, 38North, 22 June 2011. ⁶1 KCNA, ‘KCNA ‘Detailed Report’ Explains NPT Withdrawal’, 22 January 2003 ⁶2 Samuel S. Kim, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy and the Interface between International and Domestic Politics’, Asian Perspective, 34(1), 2010, 57. ⁶3 Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), 19–47.

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the USSR’s nuclear stockpile across the then new post-Soviet states.⁶⁴ As the dominant architect and guarantor of the post-Cold War order, the United States sought, in the words of President George H.W. Bush, to create a ‘new world order’ based on ‘international norms and rights’, including nuclear non-proliferation and human rights norms.⁶⁵ Washington’s fear of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) acquisition by terrorist groups and ‘rogue’ states became a defining feature of its hegemony of the post-Cold War global nuclear order, a fear that would only intensify with time and affect the behaviour of those states that opposed its leadership.⁶⁶ The aftermath of the First Gulf War and revelation of Iraq’s nuclear programme exposed the inability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime to pre-empt ‘that one of its members ha[d] begun marching down the road toward weapon production’.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, the United States took active steps to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation norm. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I, signed in 1991 between the United States and USSR, reduced the nuclear arsenals of the two Cold War superpowers by two-thirds.⁶⁸ Its successor, START II, was signed in 1993 but never entered into force.⁶⁹ Hopes of the consolidation of the nuclear order were raised after South Africa voluntarily abandoned its nuclear weapons programme in 1989 and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) in 1991. In 1992, China, which had tested its first nuclear device in 1964, joined the NPT as a nuclear weapon state (NWS). These actions would precede the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.⁷⁰ Yet, for Pyongyang, the nuclear order remained a manifestation of the US ‘hostile policy’: the order’s bolstering did little to prevent North Korea from contravening its norms and reneging on broader non-aggression agreements with South Korea. However, as will be seen, the DPRK’s behaviour with respect to the nuclear order throughout the 1990s would quickly become characterized by tit-for-tat diplomacy. North Korea would ‘answer dialogue with dialogue and strength with strength’.⁷1 Certainly, regime survival and security motivated North Korea’s actions, not least the possible deterrent value that could be acquired through nuclearization. As Patrick

⁶⁴ Joseph F. Pilat, ‘The NPT’s Prospects’. In: Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds, 1995: A New Beginning for the NPT (Los Alamos, NM: Springer, 1995), 50. ⁶⁵ George H.W. Bush, ‘Out of These Troubled Times [. . .] a New World Order’, Washington Post, 12 September 1990; John W. Dietrich, ‘U.S. Human Rights Policy in the Post-Cold War Era’, Political Science Quarterly, 121(2), 2006, 274; David M. Malone, ‘The UN Security Council in the Post-Cold War World: 1987–97’, Security Dialogue, 28(4), 1997, 393–408. ⁶⁶ Anthony Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States’, Foreign Affairs, 73(2), 1994, 45–55; Ashok Kapur, ‘Rogue States and the International Nuclear Order’, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 51(3), 1996, 420–39. ⁶⁷ Leonard Weiss, ‘Tighten Up on Nuclear Cheaters’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 47(4), 1991, 12; David Fischer, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Prospects for the Nonproliferation Regime after the Gulf War’, Energy Policy, 20(7), 1992, 672–73. ⁶⁸ ‘START I Treaty’, 31 July 1991, available at: https://fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/abatext.htm (accessed 21 December 2022). ⁶⁹ US Department of State, ‘US and Russia Sign START II Treaty’, US Department of State Dispatch, 3 January 1993, 20–25. ⁷⁰ Tariq Rauf and Rebecca Johnson, ‘After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime’, Nonproliferation Review 3(1), 1995, 28–42. ⁷1 KCNA, ‘Spokesman Denounces U.S. ‘Military Threats’, 25 September 1994, FBIS-EAS-91-186, 42.

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Morgan reminds us, regime collapse during the 1990s seemed ‘at least as dangerous, and much more likely, than its use of nuclear weapons’.⁷2 At the same time, the United States, seeking to maintain stability on the Peninsula, tried to offer concessions to North Korea in the hope that it would halt its nuclear aspirations. In response to the suspension of Team Spirit in 1992, North Korea signed IAEA safeguards, halted fuel rod reprocessing, delayed the refuelling of its reactor, and signed the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization with South Korea in December that year.⁷3 Despite desiring recognition as a sovereign and equal international actor, as could be gained from diplomatic normalization with the United States, the 1990s saw the DPRK engage in a range of delinquent actions that generated negative status. Indeed, a central lesson that the DPRK would learn during this period was that strategic engagement in delinquency could reap beneficial outcomes, not least social recognition as an equal dialogue partner with the United States, as witnessed in high-level negotiations after the North threatened to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993. This section categorizes the first nuclear crisis into three phases (see Table 3.1). During this first crisis, North Korea sought to assert itself as a significant actor in international relations and learn the possible trade-offs between the costs and benefits of delinquent actions. During the first phase, post-accession to the NPT, North Korea behaved deceptively to seek international attention as a then comparatively new member of international society, whose norms it continued to resent. Outward compliance with the nuclear order, by joining the NPT, however, masked the continued pursuit of nuclear development. In so doing, North Korea sought social recognition as a sovereign actor—part of the nuclear order—but also material benefits of LWR provision from the USSR. In the second phase, the DPRK engaged more overtly in provocative and norm transgressive acts, which did bring pay-offs. Although this phase culminated in North Korea’s announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993, high-level bilateral meetings with the United States in January 1992 provided an opportunity for North Korea to test how outward compliance with the nuclear order would be perceived by the United States to inform future behaviour. Through such actions, the DPRK gained recognition as an equal negotiating partner of the United States. Compliant behaviour, however, did occur, although less frequently: for instance, the DPRK declared its past reprocessing activities and nuclear and fissile material to the IAEA in May 1992, an action required for all NNWS members of the NPT who had assented to IAEA safeguards.⁷⁴ The third phase witnessed an increasingly strategic engagement in delinquency characterized by a range of behaviour, including continued provocations towards the United States and greater compliance with the nuclear order. This phase culminated ⁷2 Patrick M. Morgan, ‘Deterrence and System Management: The Case of North Korea’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 23(2), 2006, 121–38. For a similar view, see Paul Bracken, ‘Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea’, Survival, 35(3), 1993, 137–53. ⁷3 Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 31. ⁷⁴ For more on IAEA safeguards, see: ‘The Agency’s Safeguards System’, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, 16 September 1968.

Table 3.1 Three phases of the first nuclear crisis Phase

Period

Description

Key events

Compliant or delinquent behaviour?

Type of delinquent behaviour

Benefits

1

12 December 1985–30 January 1992

Signing the NPT to accepting IAEA safeguards

- Joins NPT - Operates 5-megawatt reactor - Russia and China establish relations with South Korea - Signs Joint Declaration of Denuclearization between the two Koreas

Outwardly compliant

- Deception - Provocation

- Social recognition as part of nuclear order - Material benefit of LWR provision from USSR

2

31 January 1992–12 March 1993

US–DPRK negotiations and the DPRK’s threat to withdraw from the NPT

- Kanter–Kim high-level meeting - IAEA safeguards signed and ratified - North Korea declares nuclear facilities and plutonium production - IAEA inspections find discrepancy in declaration - DPRK announces withdrawal from NPT to take effect from three months from 12 March 1993

Delinquent

- Provocation - Norm transgression - Deception

- Nuclear deterrence - Regime survival - Recognition as equal

3

13 March 1993–21 October 1994

US–DPRK high-level dialogue to Geneva Agreed Framework

- US–DPRK high-level dialogue leads to suspension of withdrawal from NPT - DPRK extracts fuel rods from reactor earlier than expected - Announces withdrawal from IAEA - IAEA unable to verify DPRK’s plutonium production - Jimmy Carter visits Pyongyang - Agreed Framework

Delinquent Outwardly compliant

- Provocation - Deception (outward compliance)

- Regime survival - Economic assistance - Recognition as significant and equal

Source: Author adaptation from Jina Kim, The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 16. Reproduced with permission of SNCSC.

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in North Korea’s outward compliance with nuclear norms—whilst not re-joining the NPT—through the signing of the US–DPRK Agreed Framework in October 1994. The DPRK reaped positive social and material outcomes as a result and could pursue its goals of diplomatic and economic normalization with the United States.

A peace-loving power and the loss of allies: The first phase After joining the NPT, the DPRK’s nuclear development was rudimentary, comprising one 4-megawatt reactor (provided by the USSR), a 5-megawatt indigenous reactor, a 50-megawatt reactor yet to be constructed, and a ‘radiochemical laboratory’ designed to separate plutonium from nuclear fuel and manage nuclear waste.⁷⁵ Whilst joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state placed the DPRK’s indigenous 5-megawatt reactor under IAEA inspections, the regime continued to stress how it was a ‘peace-loving’ power aiming to ‘prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons’ globally⁷⁶ and support nuclear disarmament on the Korean Peninsula.⁷⁷ Importantly, from the early stages of this first phase, the DPRK urged the United States to engage in dialogue, seeking to replace the Korean War Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. Pyongyang hoped that this manoeuvre would remove the rationale for the stationing of US conventional forces in South Korea. Such demands also suggested the DPRK’s desire to continue its own narrative of the Korean War—portraying the United States and South Korea as belligerent powers—and hold the United States to account, according to North Korea’s interpretation of the rules of international order.

‘A big blow for North Korea’ Even amidst growing international suspicions of weaponized nuclear development at Yongbyon in the late 1980s, North Korean state media vehemently denied any such claims. Instead, Pyongyang used these accusations to call for US forces to withdraw ⁷⁵ ‘North’s Nuclear Capability Assessed’—So Yong-ha, July 1989, FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, 23– 26; David Albright, ‘North Korean Plutonium Production’, Science & Global Security, 5(1), 1994, 75. See also Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou, ‘Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran’, Arms Control Today, 37(2), 2007, 6–11; Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, ‘The North Korean Bomb and Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia’, Asian Perspective, 19(2), 1995, 153–74. ⁷⁶ ‘Nonproliferation Treaty Explained to Listeners’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 9 June 1991, FBIS-EAS-91-113, 12–13. ⁷⁷ ‘Government Statement on New Peace Proposal’, Pyongyang Domestic Service, 23 June 1986, FBISAPA-86-120, D1–D3. One possible reason for North Korea’s stance in support of global nuclear disarmament, beyond the desire to be seen as a responsible power, could have been its albeit waning success at attempting to lead the Non-Aligned Movement. See Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK, ‘North Korean Activities in the Non-Aligned Movement’, 11 March 1982, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1982, 80. doboz, 10, 002796/1982, obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai.

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from the Peninsula and did not abandon its exercise of delinquency.⁷⁸ The international geopolitical and ideological environment in which North Korea was situated, however, was rapidly moving against its favour. As Chapter 1 demonstrated, North Korea’s stagnant economic growth was increasingly rendering it the inferior Korea compared to its southern counterpart. Its paltry economic performance did not go unnoticed by its Cold War partners of the Soviet Union (USSR) and China—and members of the Non-Aligned Movement—both of which were developing closer rapprochement with the booming economic powerhouse of South Korea. The establishment of Soviet–ROK and Sino-ROK relations in 1990 and 1992, respectively, propelled North Korea’s provocative rhetoric. The DPRK threatened to withdraw from the NPT ‘if Soviet-South Korean diplomatic relations were formed, and US nuclear presence in South Korea continued’.⁷⁹ As a former Soviet diplomat stressed, whilst the USSR ‘dismissed’ this threat, ‘at the time […] the North Koreans did what they said they would do in the years to follow’.⁸⁰ This turn to Seoul only accelerated North Korea’s ‘sense of isolation and betrayal’ whereby following the Soviet establishment of relations with the DPRK’s adversary of the ROK, ‘they turned to nuclear weapons’.⁸1 For Pyongyang, the Soviet promise to provide LWRs— the very reason behind the North’s accession to the NPT—was becoming an ever distant prospect. Moreover, Soviet assistance to the DPRK was declining, both in military assistance (in nuclear materials, air defence missiles, and fighter bombers) and economic assistance (which had multiplied since 1984) as bilateral trade in industrial equipment, oil, and coal dropped.⁸2 The USSR insisted on hard currency payment for Soviet goods, given the DPRK’s intense dependence on the Soviet Union for crude oil, which placed the North Korean economy under growing strain.⁸3 Beijing’s pivot to Seoul was also motivated by a growing aversion towards economic interactions with a stagnating North Korean economy. Whilst China continued to supply oil and provide financial assistance to the DPRK, such aid was reduced to the bare minimum. Pyongyang no longer benefited from ‘friendship’ prices in

⁷⁸ Rodong Sinmun, ‘The U.S. Imperialists Should Withdraw From South Korea Immediately’, 8 September 1989, FBIS-EAS-89-179, 10–12. US intelligence reports remained aware of the DPRK’s denial of its nuclear development throughout this time. See CIA, ‘North Korea: Denial of Nuclear Arms Production’, 9 August 1989, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 87, Document No. 14. ⁷⁹ Rodong Sinmun, ‘The U.S. Imperialists Should Withdraw From South Korea Immediately’, 8 September 1989, FBIS-EAS-89-179, 10–12. In a discussion between Russian Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and DPRK Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam in 1988, Kim emphasized how, for the ‘countries of the [socialist] commonwealth’ to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, would be ‘nothing but betrayal of the interests and ideals of socialism’. See ‘Diary of Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze on a meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam’, 23 December 1988, Hoover Institute Archive. ⁸⁰ Former Soviet diplomat (interview, 2019). ⁸1 ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). ⁸2 Byung-joon Ahn, ‘Korean–Soviet Relations: Contemporary Issues and Prospects’, Asian Survey, 31(9), 1991, 824; C.S. Eliot Kang, ‘North Korea’s International Relations: The Successful Failure?’. In Samuel S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 285; Kongdan Oh, ‘Leadership Change in North Korean Politics: The Succession to Kim Il Sung’, RAND R-3697-RC, 1988, 63–64. ⁸3 Jane Shapiro Zacek, ‘Russia in North Korean Foreign Policy’. In: Samuel S. Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 81.

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trading with its northeastern neighbour.⁸⁴ In addition to losing material benefits, North Korea’s social status, as a member of the community of Cold War socialist states, was diminishing. It would be an understatement to say that the regime in Pyongyang felt frustrated at the losses incurred by the abandonment of its Cold War partners. The North felt betrayed by the USSR for its lack of LWR provision and by China, given the CCP’s past affirmations that it would not forge ties with South Korea. This fraying of ties with China and the USSR (and successor state of Russia)— a relationship the DPRK had attempted to manage with alacrity, during the Cold War—would profoundly shape North’s world view after the end of the Cold War.

Buying time for a nuclear programme North Korea’s actions at the time remind us, however, that Pyongyang was, in fact, preparing for the day when Moscow and Beijing would no longer be its guarantors. Archival evidence suggests that during Soviet–ROK talks in the late 1980s, the DPRK had developed its ‘first nuclear device’ at Yongbyon, which it intentionally ‘conceal[ed] from the world public and international monitoring organizations’.⁸⁵ Such concealment was accompanied by profuse denial and deception on the part of the regime, amid growing international pressure for the regime-state to sign IAEA safeguards. The North would only accede to safeguards if ‘the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula’ was ‘remov[ed] […] in accordance with the […] [Nonproliferation] treaty’, a ‘danger’ which referred to the US conventional presence in South Korea and US–ROK military exercises.⁸⁶ Given the fact that the DPRK was so opposed to the nuclear order from its inception, invoking the language of the order may seem puzzling. Doing so, however, became a powerful currency for Pyongyang to try and reap benefits at a time when any such benefits—material or social—were becoming increasingly scarce. Although North Korea neither valued nor saw legitimacy in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it exercised counter-stigmatization, reversing the stigma from the DPRK to the United States. A statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990 made clear how, according to North Korea’s perspective, it was the United States that was a malign nuclear power, posing a ‘threat of nuclear attack on our country, a non-nuclear state’.⁸⁷ Soon after, the DPRK would be admitted to the United Nations, on 18 September 1991, together with South Korea. Such membership provided the DPRK with the international status and legitimacy of a sovereign nation-state, from which it could exploit the principle of sovereign ⁸⁴ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 30–33; James Reilly, ‘The Curious Case of China’s Aid to North Korea’, Asian Survey, 54(6), 2014, 1158–83. ⁸⁵ ‘KGB Document Reveals DPRK Nuclear Potential’ IZVESTIYA, 24 June 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-22, 11–13 ⁸⁶ Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 16 November 1990, UNSC S/21, 957. ⁸⁷ Ibid.

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equality to ‘buy time for its [nuclear] weapons programme’.⁸⁸ Even prior to joining, North Korea underscored how its membership would not ‘hand over North Korean sovereignty’ to the United Nations.⁸⁹ The United States would offer its largest concession to North Korea to date, announcing the removal of its nuclear weapons from South Korea on 27 September 1991. This act was part of the United States’ broader commitment to reducing its global nuclear arsenal. It was a small victory for Pyongyang, and led the DPRK— by then a sovereign member of the United Nations—to underscore its role as an equal party in negotiations with the United States. For instance, the North Korean regime stressed how international inspections on its nuclear facilities were contingent upon reciprocal North Korean inspections on US nuclear and military bases in South Korea.⁹⁰ If neither its Cold War partners nor former Third World states would provide concessions or support, reaching out to its enemies in pursuit of international status would offer another option. Pyongyang did just that. Between 1991 and 1992, the DPRK signed two landmark agreements with South Korea, both of which affirmed North Korea’s growing outward compliance with international norms. The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation—signed on 13 December 1991— saw the two Koreas pledge neither to ‘slander or vilify each other’ nor ‘use force against each other’.⁹1 The agreement was well received in the South. Archival evidence shows how, following this declaration, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo, reaffirmed that ‘there do not exist any nuclear weapons, whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of Korea’ and called on North Korea to ‘conclude and ratify a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, shut down all nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities, and submit unconditionally to international inspection’.⁹2 Roh’s assertion cannot be isolated from his then foreign policy of Nordpolitik, seeking to normalize ties with China and the Soviet Union (USSR) as an indirect path to enacting change in and normalizing relations with the North. An arguably more important document in relation to the nuclear order was signed on 20 January 1992: the Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Entering into force on 19 February 1992, the two Koreas made substantial commitments against weaponized nuclear development, ⁸⁸ This claim was made by Ko Young-Hwan, a senior North Korean diplomat, in Mark Hibbs, Ann MacLachlan, and Naoki Usui, ‘North Korean Weapons Suspicions Bring Heated Discussions at IAEA’, Nucleonics Week 32(38), 19 September 1991, 14. ⁸⁹ Dae-Sook Suh, ‘North Korea: The Present and the Future’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 5(1), 1993, 62, 78. ⁹⁰ George H.W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons’, 27 September 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H.W. Bush, 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), available at: https://bush41library.tamu.edu/ archives/public-papers/3438 (accessed 10 January 2023). ⁹1 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, 13 December 1991, CD/1147. See ‘Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13322 to SecState, Subject: Prime Ministers Sign Joint Agreement’, 13 December 1991, 32, in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 610, Document No. 7. ⁹2 IAEA Archives, ‘Special Announcement on a Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula’, 18 December 1991, GOV/INF/642.

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namely, ‘not [to] test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons’; to use nuclear energy ‘solely for peaceful purposes’; and ‘not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities’.⁹3 Although this agreement may seem incongruous with the DPRK’s then early nuclear aspirations, it exemplified North Korea’s simultaneous engagement in outward compliance and deviance vis-à-vis the nuclear order. The DPRK used these agreements to its advantage. It could criticize any South Korean attempt to ‘slander’ or ‘vilify’ the DPRK as a violation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation; and could leverage the wording of the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization to deem its covert pursuit of uranium enrichment not to be in contravention of the agreement. As one analyst put it to the author, the North Korean perspective at the time was that whilst ‘building a facility to enrich uranium would be a violation of the declaration […] it doesn’t say you can’t acquire centrifuges’.⁹⁴ By signing these two agreements, however, North Korea, which remained a US State Sponsor of Terrorism, would gain a written security assurance from the United States, high-level US–DPRK dialogue in 1992, and possible economic and energy assistance.

‘Your Israel in East Asia’: The second phase Bilateral dialogue between US Under-Secretary of State, Arnold Kanter, and WPK secretary for international affairs, Kim Yong Sun, took place in January 1992; the most high-level dialogue between the two states to date. North Korea’s rhetoric emphasizing its commitment to IAEA safeguards had paid off. The United States offered normalized relations and North Korean inspections of US military bases in the South if the DPRK abandoned its nuclear programme. Moreover, the United States accommodated a crucial demand of the DPRK, granting the suspension of Team Spirit in 1992, which Pyongyang had long derided as ‘a preliminary nuclear war’ and manifestation of the US ‘hostile policy’.⁹⁵ Soon afterwards, the DPRK agreed to sign IAEA safeguards on 30 January 1992, a delay partly attributed to procedural error from the IAEA, seven years after it had joined the NPT, ‘on the premise that none of the NPT member countries will deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and pose a nuclear threat to us’.⁹⁶ These events epitomized the value North Korea placed on reciprocity. It would set the tone for future negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang and allowed North Korea to exploit the suspension of Team Spirit—albeit for a single year—in its subsequent engagement with the United States, particularly in the context of US recalcitrance in future years towards doing so. Outward compliance with the nuclear order would continue, not least in the words of Kim Il Sung, who stressed how ⁹3 ‘Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’, 20 January 1992. ⁹⁴ US Track 1.5 negotiator (interview, 2019). ⁹⁵ KCNA, ‘Pyongyang Denies Developing Nuclear Weapons’, 4 August 1989. ⁹⁶ KCNA, ‘KCNA ‘Detailed Report”, 22 January 2003.

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North Korea had ‘no intention or capacity to develop nuclear weapons’ but would only ‘accept nuclear inspection if fair treatment is assured’.⁹⁷ Though an equivocal statement, Pyongyang’s yearning for normalized ties with the United States and the ascendant status that would ensure was clear. At the same time, the DPRK was able to hold out the prospect of breaking from nuclear norms if such ‘fair treatment’ from the IAEA and the custodians of the nuclear order were not on North Korea’s terms. Signing IAEA safeguards seemed a purely symbolic exercise of feigned compliance with the nuclear order. Through delays on the part of the DPRK, not least by insisting on multiple conditions (namely, a security assurance from the United States and a halt to US–ROK military exercises) prior to signing, North Korea gained time to assess whether acquiescing to safeguards would, in fact, bring benefits. Having obtained these benefits, the DPRK declared its nuclear facilities and material for IAEA inspection in May 1992, placing seven sites for inspection and declaring it had obtained 90 grams of plutonium from the reprocessing of 89 fuel rods in 1989.⁹⁸ For all the regime’s platitudes of its commitment to ‘realiz[ing] the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula’ as marked by its early submission of its declaration to the IAEA, Pyongyang hoped that feigned compliance would reduce international scrutiny on the extent of its nuclear development and allow it to continue its plutonium and uranium enrichment.⁹⁹ As a US negotiator with the DPRK during the Clinton administration astutely put it, North Korea ultimately wanted to elicit tacit international acceptance and recognition of its nuclear programme. Recounting a discussion with North Korean officials in later years, the negotiator highlighted how: Ri Yong Ho, in the 1990s negotiations, said to me that: we want to be your Israel in East Asia. We will be a strategic ally of the US, and, in return, the implication was that you will tolerate, and overlook, our nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁰

Momentary outward compliance with nuclear norms Despite North Korea’s growing outward compliance with nuclear norms and its declaration of nuclear facilities and material, such obedience would occur concurrently with the construction of ‘two nuclear reactors whose sole purpose appears to be to ⁹⁷ Pyongyang Times, ‘New Year Address of President Kim Il Sung’, 1 January 1992. Meetings between Kim Il Sung and South Korean Prime Minister, Chong Won-sik, in February 1992 saw Kim reaffirm that ‘foreign forces’ be withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula and that North Korea had no intention of developing nuclear weapons; Kim stressed how it would be ‘unimaginable for us to develop nuclear weapons that can wipe out the Korean people’. See: Steven R. Weisman, ‘North Korean Leader’s Statement Renews Doubts on Nuclear Issue’, New York Times, 21 February 1992, 9; ‘Chong Won-sik Sums Up Results of Premier Talks’ KBS-1, 21 February 1992, FBIS-EAS-92-036, 17. ⁹⁸ US Government Accountability Office, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues’, October 1996, 24; ‘North’s IAEA Report Reveals Key New Facilities’, KBS-1, 5 May 1992, FBIS-EAS-92-088, p.22. ⁹⁹ ‘Ministry Spokesman Discusses Report to IAEA’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 6 May 1992, FBIS-EAS-92-088, 9; KCNA, ‘Spokesman on Submitting Nuclear Report to IAEA’, 5 May 1992, FBIS-EAS92-087, 11; ‘Spokesman Gives Arrival Statement’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 5 May 1992, FBISEAS-92-087, 14; KCNA, ‘South Urged to Implement Documents Faithfully’, 6 May 1992, FBIS-EAS-92-088, 13. 1⁰⁰ US NSC official (interview, 2019).

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make plutonium’.1⁰1 IAEA visits to Yongbyon in May 1992 seemed at odds with the mantra of the ruling regime regarding its lack of nuclear ambitions. First, inspections found an industrial facility near completion, which could process uranium into plutonium (euphemistically termed by the DPRK as a ‘radio-chemical laboratory’) together with two undeclared nuclear waste storage sites, which the DPRK insisted were ‘military sites’ and thus free from the purview of inspections.1⁰2 Second, there were noticeable discrepancies in the quantity of plutonium declared. Inspections concluded that Pyongyang had, in fact, engaged in several plutonium separation efforts between 1989 and 1991.1⁰3 Such deliberate deception of the international community, all the while stressing its lack of ‘will and ability to produce’ nuclear weapons, only furthered international speculation of North Korea’s intention to subvert nuclear norms for instrumental gain.1⁰⁴ Insisting that the two nuclear waste storage sites were ‘military sites’ did not, according to the NPT, make the DPRK exempt from IAEA inspections. IAEA safeguards stressed how ‘routine inspections’ could comprise ‘audit of records and reports’ in locations beyond those where a state’s nuclear material would be found. Furthermore, special inspections, for which the IAEA later called, given the DPRK’s ‘widening non-compliance’ with IAEA safeguards, could occur when ‘[a]ny unforeseen circumstance requires immediate action’.1⁰⁵ A site could be subject to special inspection even if it did not contain nuclear material. The DPRK thus continued to violate the norms of the nuclear order in a strategic fashion, seeking to dictate the terms under which any outward compliance would take place. Pyongyang’s belligerence was to become increasingly visible. The North refused to accept the legitimacy and conclusions of the inspections of May 1992, deeming them to have been ‘not conducted in compliance with the agency’s rules’ but rather ‘under US manipulation’,1⁰⁶ as a ‘pretence for strangling the DPRK’.1⁰⁷ Moreover, North Korea rejected calls by the United States and the IAEA for further, special inspections, to clarify discrepancies in its declaration. In response, Pyongyang threatened ‘countermeasures of self-defense’.1⁰⁸ Here, the invocation of the US ‘hostile policy’, albeit

1⁰1 Robert M. Gates, ‘Statement of Robert M. Gates, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, March 27, 1992’, Regional Threats and Defense Options for the 1990s: Hearings. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 321. 1⁰2 Mark Hibbs, ‘Pyongyang Again Stalling IAEA Safeguards Implementation’, Nucleonics Week, 33(37), 1992, 13; KCNA, ‘Report on Inspections Issued’, 22 February 1993, 16. 1⁰3 David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna: IAEA, 1997), 288–89; David K. Albright, ‘How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 50(5), 1994, 46–53. 1⁰⁴ ‘Kim Yong-nam Speech at UN General Assembly’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 1 October 1992, FBIS-EAS-92-191, 4–5. 1⁰⁵ George Bunn, ‘Nuclear Safeguards: How Far Can Inspectors Go?’, IAEA Bulletin, 48(2), 2003, 50; IAEA, ‘The Agency’s Safeguards System’, 16 September 1968, INCFIRC/66/Rev.2. 1⁰⁶ KCNA, ‘KCNA ‘Detailed Report”, 22 January 2003. 1⁰⁷ IAEA Archives, ‘Statement […] by a Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, 31 January 1994, GOV/INF/726. 1⁰⁸ KCNA, ‘Report on Inspections Issued’ 22 February 1993, FBIS-EAS-93-033, 14; David E. Sanger, ‘In Reversal, North Korea Bars Nuclear Inspectors’, New York Times, 9 February 1993, 13. For similar DPRK reactions towards the IAEA’s call for special inspections, see KCNA, ‘Atomic Energy Ministry on IAEA’, 21 February 1993, FBIS-EAS-93-033, 10; ‘JNCC Head: IAEA Inspection “Totally Unjust”’, Korean Central

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not in name, highlights how the DPRK would respond to any criticism through this lens. Pyongyang sought to portray the United States as a morally bankrupt power; it accused the IAEA of adopting ‘double standards’ towards non-NPT states and for being a vehicle for the United States to impose its ‘hostile’ intentions on North Korea. Provocative rhetoric from the DPRK would heighten when, on 9 March 1993, Kim Jong Il declared the Korean Peninsula to be in a ‘semi-state of war’ owing to the continuation of Team Spirit exercises, which the North deemed as preparation for the United States ‘waging a surprise preemptive strike’.1⁰⁹ Having received the benefit of cancelled Team Spirit exercises a year earlier, North Korea would explore and exploit this possibility once more. Such heightened rhetoric, which only reaffirmed the value that the North placed on the exercises as an existential threat to the regime-state, was followed by a surprising announcement, on 12 March 1993, of the DPRK’s intention to withdraw from the NPT. Each party to the NPT is permitted to withdraw under Article X if it ‘decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country’.11⁰ As a then NNWS, North Korea’s decision to invoke Article X was not beyond its rights. Yet, Pyongyang justified its self-declared abrogation from the institutionalized nuclear order as a response to ‘nuclear war threats’, which, in its view, comprised Team Spirit and ongoing IAEA calls for inspections of nuclear waste sites.111 The timing was no coincidence: the North’s announcement occurred when Russia admitted it would be unable to provide LWRs, in response to which the DPRK ‘buckl[ed] down develop an atomic energy technology of our own’.112 How can we account for North Korea’s shift from outward compliance with the nuclear order to accelerated rhetorical provocation and norm transgression? North Korea’s behaviour during this second phase shows that it desired a status it did not have (namely, that of a nuclear state) by refusing to acquiesce to the expected behaviour, as well as the material and social constraints of a NNWS member of the NPT. Even as a party to the Treaty, and after acceding to safeguards, the DPRK was unwilling to accept the expectations of the nuclear order. By allowing access to IAEA inspectors, but dictating the specific sites at which inspections could occur, and denying IAEA access to the nuclear waste sites, North Korea wanted to assert its opposition and resistance towards the nuclear order. Pyongyang wished, simultaneously, to

Broadcasting Network, 19 February 1993, FBIS-EAS-93-032, 8; ‘DPRK Delegate Addresses IAEA Meeting’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 25 February 1993, FBIS-EAS-93-037, 26 February 1993, 8. 1⁰⁹ ‘Kim Chong-Il Orders Army Mobilization’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 8 March 1993, FBIS-EAS-93-043, 8 March 1993, 9–11. Earlier, in 1992, the DPRK had continued its rhetorical provocations vis-à-vis the US decision to conduct Team Spirit in 1993: ‘Press statement by Kim Chong-u, chairman of the North-South Joint Economic Cooperation and Exchange Committee’, FBIS-EAS-92-206, 22 October 1992, 21. 11⁰ Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 111 ‘Report […] on the Non-Compliance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the Agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea […] Annex 7, INFCRIC/419, IAEA, April 8, 1993’; ‘Commentary Defends Withdrawal’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, FBIASEAS-93-047, 23. 112 KCNA, ‘KCNA ‘Detailed Report”, 22 January 2003.

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maintain the façade of complying with the nuclear order whilst engaging in deception. It sought status as a significant power—by concealing its nuclear development from international attention—without compromising upon its nuclear aspirations.

A ‘sea of fire’: The third phase The international community’s surprise at North Korea’s announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993 was epitomized in the near-immediate call by the United States to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. Such negotiations bore fruit – at least in the short-term – culminating in a joint statement in June 1993 whereby the DPRK agreed ‘to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal’ and exercise the ‘impartial application of fullscope safeguards’. Both sides also pledged ‘against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons’ and ‘mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty’.113 It was a useful learning experience for North Korea, demonstrating how acts of delinquency (namely threatening to abrogate from the institutionalized nuclear order) could become a powerful, attention-seeking currency to receive social recognition as an equal negotiating partner with great powers, not least the United States, at little cost. Washington’s rush to negotiations underscored two vital points: not only did the DPRK’s threat to withdraw from the NPT question the legitimacy of the institutionalized nuclear order, but also the United States’ response demonstrated the value the United States placed on its role as the order’s custodian. The decision to engage with the DPRK was less a result of the actual threat posed by its then rudimentary nuclear capabilities and more a response to the potentially destabilizing effects on the nuclear order augured by the possibility of North Korea’s permanent abrogation. With the upcoming NPT Review Conference of 1995 raising questions of the indefinite extension of the Treaty, the untimely withdrawal of a ‘rogue’ state actor from the Treaty would portray the nuclear order in a far from positive light. A key consequence of the DPRK’s suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT would be how the regime would repeatedly assert its self-perceived ‘unique status’ vis-à-vis the nuclear order since it had not strictly committed to re-complying with the Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. The DPRK resisted IAEA calls for ad hoc inspections on its nuclear facilities on account of its ‘unique status’. Its repeated reference to such status, simultaneously inside and outside of the nuclear order, became, as a former Soviet diplomat put it, a ‘creative solution’ demonstrating its ‘residual willingness to negotiate’ with the US only when concessions could be provided.11⁴ In so doing, the DPRK could selectively incorporate the rules of the nuclear order. In December 1993, the DPRK provided the IAEA with access to five out of seven

113 KCNA, ‘Joseonminju juuinmingonghwagug-mihabjung-gug gongdongseongmyeong’ [‘DPRK–US Joint Statement’], 11 June 1993. 11⁴ Former Soviet diplomat (interview, 2019).

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declared nuclear facilities, justifying how it ‘only had to receive inspections for ensuring the continuity of the safeguards measures’ but did not have to accept full-scale inspections.11⁵ The North’s justification was that its ‘unique status’ was recognized by the United States and the IAEA. Although far from the truth (the United States and the IAEA did not recognize such status), this proclamation demonstrates the emphasis placed on status by the DPRK during this time as it sought to gain international acceptance and legitimation of this ‘unique status’. The IAEA’s conclusion that it could not be assured that the DPRK was ‘using nuclear material solely for peaceful purposes’ was a pay-off for the North.11⁶ In Pyongyang’s view, it had succeeded in deceiving the international community of the actual extent of its nuclear ambitions. Pyongyang’s decision to ‘suspend’ its withdrawal from the NPT also bolstered the regime-state’s domestic legitimacy. It sustained the historical narrative that the DPRK was situated within an antagonistic international order led by the ‘hostile policy’ of the United States, whereby the ‘NPT and IAEA […] were being appropriated to realize the impure US political goal of eliminating our system’.11⁷ North Korea thus used the so-called ‘hostile policy’ to vindicate its continued nuclear endeavours, an act which would only intensify in future years. Nevertheless, the third phase of the nuclear crisis would witness a marked acceleration in strategic delinquency. A cyclical pattern would ensue: provocations from the DPRK would be reciprocated with international condemnation—from the United States, the United Nations, ROK, and the IAEA—which would catalyse further provocations from the North. In one notorious instance, a North Korean official stressed to his South Korean counterpart, in March 1994, that the DPRK could turn Seoul into a ‘sea of fire’ if ‘a war breaks out’.11⁸ The United States referred such escalatory rhetoric to the United Nations, which called for economic sanctions to be imposed if the DPRK continued to evade IAEA inspections. This condemnation was met by a further North Korean provocation, threatening to withdraw from the NPT once more and adopt ‘self-defensive measures’ against the United States if sanctions were enforced.11⁹ Such ‘tit-for-tat diplomacy’ would become a central feature of North Korea’s future negotiating behaviour.12⁰ Inherent to North Korea’s strategic logic of delinquency during this time (which would continue in later years), therefore, was to ‘make other countries nervous about doing anything that might provoke North Korea into some irresponsible action that could lead to a nuclear conflict’.121 Doing

11⁵ KCNA, ‘KCNA ‘Detailed Report”, 22 January 2003. 11⁶ IAEA Archives, ‘Press Release—Vienna, 93/25’, 2 December 1993. See ‘Board Agrees on Need for Action’, Yonhap, 4 December 1993, FBIS-EAS-93-232, 30; David E. Sanger, ‘U.N. Agency Finds No Assurance on North Korean Atomic Program’, New York Times, 3 December 1993, 8. 11⁷ KCNA, ‘KCNA ‘Detailed Report”, 22 January 2003. 11⁸ ‘TV Airs Delegates’ Remarks’, KBS-1, 19 March 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-054, 21 March 1994, 38–39. See ‘Politicians React to Talks’ Rapture’, Yonhap, 21 March 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-054, 42; ‘Country’s Delegate Interviewed’, Hankyoreh, 20 March 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-054, 21 March 1994, 39. 11⁹ KCNA, ‘KCNA on Ministry Statement’ 21 March 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-054, 21–24. For the DPRK’s announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT, see ‘Statement Notes Withdrawal’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 12 March 1993, FBIS-EAS-93-047, 18. 12⁰ Sigal, Disarming Strangers, 125. 121 US NSC official (interview, 2019).

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so would give the United States little option but to negotiate with the DPRK for fear of conflict escalation. North Korea’s behaviour during 1994 supports this assertion. In April 1994, the DPRK reaffirmed its refusal of full IAEA inspections at Yongbyon and only allowed IAEA inspectors to view, but not sample, the removal of spent fuel rods.122 Yet, Pyongyang deliberately extracted fuel rods earlier than the IAEA inspection date of 15 May, free from the purview of IAEA inspectors, thereby reducing the IAEA’s ability to determine the actual extent and history of the North’s plutonium production.123 Here, North Korea’s learning from the outcome of previous delinquent actions can be seen: Pyongyang realized that attention-seeking, provocative behaviour would be reciprocated by high-level dialogue with the United States, which could lead to the provision of concessions. Moreover, the outcome of high-level dialogue could be accelerated through selective compliance with the nuclear order. The DPRK’s acceptance of partial IAEA inspections—justified by its ‘unique status’—was one example whereby Pyongyang was pursuing a ‘two track policy: reach out to former enemies and develop nuclear weapons’.12⁴ In emphasizing reciprocity, Pyongyang insisted that it would end its invocation of its ‘unique status’ vis-à-vis the NPT and allow IAEA inspectors to measure fuel rod samples only if the IAEA withdrew its insistence on ad hoc inspections.12⁵ Critical to North Korea’s behaviour was pledging normcompliant actions only when the international community accepted North Korea’s own terms and preferences. Pyongyang wanted to be seen as the actor calling for— rather than a recipient of—dialogue with the United States and the IAEA. Each time the United States—or IAEA—refused such negotiations, the DPRK would revert to its narrative of being victimized by post-war international order, underpinned by the US ‘hostile policy’. North Korea’s norm-transgressive behaviour continued throughout 1994. The DPRK withdrew from the IAEA on 13 June, after the IAEA suspended ‘non-medical Agency assistance’ earlier in the month,12⁶ which the DPRK decried as an ‘insult to our people’.12⁷ This withdrawal was an active step taken by the North to retreat further from the constraints of the nuclear order. In Pyongyang’s eyes, it would no longer be subject to IAEA inspections or its obligations under IAEA safeguards, a view which

122 ‘Answers by a Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry’, 3 May 1994, S/1994/540; KCNA, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Fuel Rod Replacement’, 27 April 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-082, 28 April 1994, 23–24. 123 For the complete statement, see KCNA, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Fuel Rod Replacement’, 14 May 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-094, 9; KCNA, ‘More on Announcement: Replacement of Fuel Rods of 5 Megawatt Nuclear Power Station Begins’, 14 May 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-094, 16 May 1994, 10–11; ‘Interview by a Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 14 May 1994, Pyongyang, INFCIRC/444, 30 May 1994. 12⁴ US Track 1.5 negotiator (interview, 2019). 12⁵ KCNA, ‘Foreign Ministry Responds to UN Statement’, 1 June 1994, 13. 12⁶ ‘Implementation of the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, GOV/2742, 10 June 1994, A/49/173, S/1994/702. 12⁷ KCNA, ‘Foreign Ministry Issues Statement’, 13 June 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-113, 14; ‘Commentary Justifies Withdrawal from IAEA’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 14 June 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-115, 13; ‘Just Self-Defensive Measure’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 14 June 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-115, 13–15; ‘“Special” Inspections Never Allowed’, Kyodo, 7 June 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-110, 21.

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the IAEA rejected.12⁸ Crucially, withdrawing from the IAEA meant that the Agency could no longer verify North Korea’s past plutonium production, giving North Korea greater leverage to question the Agency’s claims and further its nuclear ambitions.

‘If war comes’ The spring and summer of 1994 saw North Korea’s provocative behaviour reach an apotheosis. It was, however, not just an accumulation of Pyongyang’s long-standing dissatisfaction with the global nuclear order. The DPRK was also responding to the increasingly vocal policy discourse in the United States surrounding possible regime collapse in Pyongyang, coupled with growing consideration within the Clinton administration of a US strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Writing in the Washington Post in June 1994, former US National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and former US Undersecretary of State Arnold Kanter (the latter having engaged in dialogue with the DPRK in 1992) asserted how the United States ‘should tell North Korea that it must permit continuous, unfettered IAEA monitoring to confirm that no further reprocessing is taking place, or we will remove its capacity to reprocess’. In so doing, ‘Pyongyang must be made to understand that […] if war comes, it will result in the total defeat of North Korea and the demise of the Kim Il Sung regime’.12⁹ According to a former US negotiator, the DPRK still wished ‘to normalise relations and have special relations with the US’ in the context of the post-Cold War environment, and ‘they see in Bill Clinton maybe somebody who is willing to get their attention’.13⁰ Yet, despite any such desires on the North’s part, the summer of 1994 saw heightened concerns in Washington of a possible North Korean conventional invasion of the South. Operations Plan 5027 (OPLAN 5027), a US war plan initiated post Korean War, initially aimed to protect South Korea from any Northern invasion. In 1975, after the crushing US defeat in Vietnam, the US revived the plan to comprise greater forward deployment of US forces: after restraining a North Korean invasion, the United States would ‘move north, seize the North Korean city of Gaesung [Kaesong], bomb North Korean targets, and eventually capture Pyongyang’.131 In the wake of the first nuclear crisis, OPLAN 5027 was updated in 1992 to comprise a ‘pre-hostility phase’ whereby US and South Korean conventional forces would cross the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and capture Pyongyang before hostilities ensued. By June 1994, the ultimate aim became to ‘remove Kim Jong-il and his regime’.132 Further to increasing 12⁸ ‘No “Written Notification”’, Yonhap, 14 June 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-114, 33. 12⁹ Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter, ‘Korea: Time for Action’, Washington Post, 15 June 1994, a25. 13⁰ Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) negotiator (interview, 2019). 131 Terence Roehrig, ‘Restraining the Hegemon: North Korea, the US and Asymmetrical Deterrence’. In: Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, eds, The United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 175. 132 Terence Roehrig, From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 207. For more on OPLAN 5027, see Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

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the deployment of conventional troops on the Peninsula, then US Defence Secretary, William Perry, ‘readied a detailed plan to attack the Yongbyon facility with precision-guided bombs’ in the form of a surgical strike.133 These contingency plans demonstrated the drastic escalation of tensions from the former two phases of the first nuclear crisis. Nonetheless, the United States’ attempt to launch a ‘surgical strike’ was not entirely in response to the DPRK’s then rudimentary nuclear capabilities at Yongbyon. Rather, it was owing to the potent fear of a North Korean conventional attack on the South, coupled with heightened (mis)perceptions of regime collapse in Pyongyang, despite claims that Kim Jong Il had been groomed as heir to Kim Il Sung since the early 1980s.13⁴ As Don Oberdorfer argues, Washington’s intention to launch either a conventional or a nuclear attack on Pyongyang was underpinned by the apprehension that the DPRK ‘could pound Seoul with five thousand rounds of artillery within the first twelve hours’.13⁵ These plans, however, were subsequently shelved. In line with the neorealist ‘security dilemma’, the United States calculated that any defensive US build-up of forces on the Peninsula would be interpreted by the DPRK offensively as marking an intent to overthrow the regime, against which it would respond aggressively.13⁶ Indeed, a former US diplomat underscored how both he and the then Commander of the US Forces in Korea, ‘agreed that the buildup [of US forces] of that significance suddenly would precipitate some sort of response in the North that could lead to conflict’.13⁷ With respect to the notion of a ‘surgical strike’, a senior US military official exclaimed how ‘there ain’t no such thing’.13⁸ The nature of North Korea’s response to any US action was complicated by the question of time, given how the North remained highly cognizant of actions taken by the United States on other states that resented the US-led international order. The same diplomat reminded the author how the First Persian Gulf War, only a few years earlier, had left a lasting legacy on Kim Il Sung, who ‘had watched Desert Storm very carefully […] he saw how the United States built its forces to overwhelming superiority, and attack with devastating speed and success; and he said: I will know that if you try to build up your forces, we will have a repeat of that attempt’.13⁹ Abandoning plans for a surgical strike, however, did not end the ‘constant drumbeat for regime change’ within Washington as tensions between Washington and Pyongyang looked 2002), 119–20; ‘OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War—West’, available at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/ops/oplan-5027.htm (accessed 19 December 2020). 133 Ash B. Carter and William J. Perry, ‘Back to the Brink’, Washington Post, 20 October 2002, B01; William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 105–106. 13⁴ See, e.g., Rin-Sup Shinn, ‘North Korea in 1981: First Year for De Facto Successor Kim Jong Il’, Asian Survey, 22(1), 1982, 99-106. 13⁵ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 3rd edn (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 314; see also Marion Creekmore, A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker, and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006), 55. 13⁶ For two perspectives on the ‘security dilemma’, see Stephen van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, International Security, 18(4), Spring 1994, 5–39; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’, International Security, 23(4), Spring 1999, 49–80. 13⁷ US diplomat (interview, 2019). 13⁸ Ibid. 13⁹ Ibid.

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primed to escalate.1⁴⁰ The White House had to find an urgent solution before North Korea made any further manoeuvre.

‘A crisis that could be avoided’ The Clinton administration reluctantly admitted that the international community would ‘never know with confidence’ the true extent of the DPRK’s plutonium programme.1⁴1 Deception on the part of North Korea seemed to pay off; it could pursue its nuclear ambitions with less restraint and scrutiny from the non-proliferation regime and the international community. As US–DPRK tensions escalated, former US President, Jimmy Carter, agreed to visit Pyongyang to defuse the crisis. As an advisor to Carter revealed, the former President ‘decided to take advantage of a couple of past invitations from North Korea to visit’, but, despite Carter’s calls for ‘the Clinton administration to send a high-level person to talk with the President of North Korea, the administration refused to do that unless North Korea complied with all the demands the IAEA and US were making on it’. More fundamentally, however, were concerns in Washington that a visit by a senior US official, or even Clinton himself, would ‘give unnecessary status to North Korea and its President’, an impression the United States was determined to avoid.1⁴2 Carter’s role was clear: he ‘got the reluctant consent of Clinton to go, as long as he went on his own, and not as an emissary of the Clinton administration’.1⁴3 For all the Clinton administration’s efforts to ensure that Carter was not representing the US government, Carter was still briefed by the administration prior to—and during—his visit to Pyongyang. It was a last resort by the United States to overcome what was becoming a highly intractable problem with no simple solution. As one negotiator put it, the fear of conventional war on the Korean Peninsula brought the United States close to ‘evacuating all US personnel from South Korea’.1⁴⁴ In Pyongyang, Carter secured a commitment from Kim Il Sung to allow IAEA inspectors to remain at Yongbyon, whilst agreeing to special inspections of the two nuclear waste sites on the condition that the US provided LWRs and guaranteed against a nuclear attack on the DPRK.1⁴⁵ According to an advisor to Carter at the time, Kim ‘saw that this was a crisis that could be avoided’. The now ageing North Korean leader ‘felt that the situation had gotten beyond where it should be, and the brakes needed to be put on it’, but ‘Kim Il Sung did not want to appear to be backing down from the decisions he had made, or his son had made on his behalf ’. Carter’s rationale for negotiations was underpinned by ‘treating Kim Il Sung as a person of importance and 1⁴⁰ Ibid. 1⁴1 Scowcroft and Kanter, ‘Korea: Time for Action’, a25. 1⁴2 US government advisor (interview, 2019). 1⁴3 Ibid. 1⁴⁴ KEDO negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁵ ‘DPRK Vows To “Comply in Full” With NPT’, Yonhap, 23 June 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-121, 28–30; Creekmore, A Moment of Crisis, 178; Elaine Sciolino, ‘For Carter, a Thrust onto the Front Pages Again’, New York Times, 23 June 1994, 6.

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of equality; and not saying anything that seems to threaten the national existence of the country and regime’.1⁴⁶ Ultimately, Carter provided the North Korean regime with ‘the main thing that Kim Il Sung wanted’, namely, ‘respect and recognition and the status that the Carter visit would give him’.1⁴⁷ The two leaders ‘were feeling very good about what had happened’, with ‘some discussion about the possibility of a North–South Korean summit’. Kim Il Sung agreed to meet South Korean President, Kim Yong-sam, without preconditions, to ‘pick up from what had been left off since 1992 and 1993’.1⁴⁸ There are various reasons behind Pyongyang’s outward compliance with international demands during this time, both in committing to IAEA inspections at Yongbyon and reviving relations with the South. Improved inter-Korean relations would have aided DPRK–US ties, from which North Korea could gain status benefits. Kim Il Sung’s voracious pursuit of normalized relations with the United States was only further exemplified in his meeting with Carter. Normalization would mitigate against the isolation faced by the DPRK in a changing post-Cold War order, whereby ‘the Soviet Union is gone away; China is modernizing and is not their friend’.1⁴⁹ Nevertheless, North Korea seemed unwilling to abandon its nuclear aspirations straightaway: lingering desires of the prospect of being a weaponized nuclear power continued to allure the regime. In Pyongyang, one revealing incident occurred when Kang Sok Ju, who would lead future North Korean negotiations, alerted Carter that ‘now that we have unloaded these spent fuel rods, we have to do something with them in a very short period of time’. Whilst Carter suggested the possibility of storing the rods for longer, Kang’s point underscored a not so subtle message whereby, according to the DPRK, ‘the only thing we could do [with the fuel rods] was to turn them into plutonium and do it quickly’.1⁵⁰ Although interview evidence may highlight how the Kim-Carter negotiations bestowed North Korea with recognition as an equal and significant state actor, such recompense was weak. North Korea did not gain any tangible benefits at a time when its economy was struggling. Despite ‘a sigh of relief in Seoul and everywhere else’ that US–DPRK hostilities had eased, chagrin proliferated within the Clinton administration, in whose view Carter had ‘taken over the foreign policy of Korea from the State department’.1⁵1 In one notable incident, following his meeting with Kim Il Sung, Carter, interviewed in Pyongyang on CNN, announced that a deal between the United States and DPRK had been reached, erroneously claiming that the United States would be unlikely to impose UN Security Council sanctions on the DPRK.1⁵2 1⁴⁶ US government advisor (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁷ Ibid. 1⁴⁸ Ibid. 1⁴⁹ KEDO negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁵⁰ US government advisor (interview, 2019). 1⁵1 US diplomat (interview, 2019); see also: Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 331. 1⁵2 In an interview in 2003, Carter asserted that: ‘I presented only the commitments that Kim Il Sung had made to me and I gave my own personal assessment of what those commitments might mean. But I think everyone knew that I was not representing the U.S. government.’ See PBS Frontline, ‘Interview: Jimmy Carter’, PBS Frontline, 21 March 2003, available at: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/ interviews/carter.html (accessed 21 December 2022)).

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Thus, whilst it may have prevented an escalation of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Carter’s visit yielded positive and negative outcomes for Washington and Pyongyang. The United States gained a weak assurance that North Korea was able— if not willing—to offer concessions on its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, even if confidence about the sincerity of the DPRK’s commitment remained low. North Korea gained recognition as a significant international actor at a time of heightened brinkmanship and provocations. More pessimistically, however, the visit can be portrayed not as direct response to North Korea’s nuclear behaviour per se. Rather, it was the last option available for the United States amidst internal debates within Washington regarding fears of a North Korean conventional attack on the South. Carter’s visit allowed North Korea to learn a valuable lesson, namely, that the international community would listen, if not acquiesce, to exercises of outward compliance with the nuclear order on the part of the DPRK. Furthermore, the visit also offered Kim Il Sung a means of strengthening domestic legitimacy: he could claim personal responsibility for defusing the nuclear crisis whilst also ‘leaving the future open for further negotiations which he planned to direct in the months to come’.1⁵3

‘How can God die?’ Despite scepticism regarding whether the summer of 1994 represented the moment when ‘we were closest to actual real war on the Peninsula’,1⁵⁴ the easing of US– DPRK tensions did not abate questions of regime change and the eventual transfer of power to Kim Jong Il, who had been anointed as successor in 1980 and, in 1993, became Chairman of the National Defence Commission. Notably, speculation prevailed regarding whether the declining health of Kim Il Sung had led to his son taking a more active role in domestic and foreign policy decision-making.1⁵⁵ With respect to Kim Il Sung, Jonathan Pollack asserts that ‘as long as Kim was alert and alive, his authority was presumably unchallenged, though he was in declining health’ since Kim Jong Il’s responsibilities were largely confined to domestic ‘construction projects […] propaganda and cinematic activities’.1⁵⁶ This view was corroborated by a US government advisor, who mentioned how, during Carter’s visit to Pyongyang, ‘Kim Il Sung gave every indication that he was still the person in-charge […] on questions of war and peace’ and ‘this key critical [nuclear] issue’.1⁵⁷ 1⁵3 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 336. 1⁵⁴ Former Soviet diplomat (interview, 2019). 1⁵⁵ Pan Suk Kim, ‘Will North Korea Blink?: Matters of Grave Danger’, Asian Survey, 34(3), 1994, 260; Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017), 111–12. Mansourov argues how ‘Kim Il Sung is said to have advised Kim Jong Il repeatedly to step back from the domestic political arena and economic policy-making and leave both to the party and government officials, while concentrating his energy on cultivating national military power.’ See: Alexandre Y. Mansourov, ‘Korean Monarch Kim Jong Il: Technocrat Ruler of the Hermit Kingdom Facing the Challenge of Modernity’, Nautilus Institute: DPRK Briefing Book, 10. 1⁵⁶ Pollack, No Exit, 111. 1⁵⁷ US government advisor (interview, 2019).

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The sudden death of Kim Il Sung on 8 July 1994, however, only a month after meeting with Carter, had profound domestic and international consequences. Testimonies from North Korean defectors highlight how the North Korean population questioned whether Kim Jong Il would be the same ‘smart leader to lead [the people] to a better future’ as his father, especially given the personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung.1⁵⁸ Another defector recounted their disbelief at the death of the leader, expressing how: ‘I learned Kim Il Sung was God—how can God die?’1⁵⁹ International speculation of North Korea’s survival amplified the then prevalent discourse amongst policymakers and scholars regarding the possible collapse of North Korea and any instability that could arise with the transfer of power to Kim Jong Il. As one scholar wrote, ‘economic and political collapse’ would be a ‘more likely scenario’ than any North Korean military action as the domestic economy deteriorated.1⁶⁰ Inter-Korean and US–DPRK dialogue were suspended following the death of Kim Il Sung. Yet, within policy circles in Washington, there was an implicit hope that any North Korean collapse would relieve the United States of its efforts to induce North Korea into compliance with nuclear norms. In one example, a US analyst involved in dialogue with the DPRK recounted a startling conversation with the chief US negotiator to the DPRK at the time, Robert Gallucci. Gallucci nonchalantly mentioned how ‘North Korea will not last more than five years. We don’t have to worry about the implementation [of any agreement]. Stupid second Kim will not last long; North Korea will be disappearing; and the nuclear problem will be gone away.’1⁶1 It has, of course, become a matter of history that Pyongyang would defy this logic, but despite such sentiment at the time, US–DPRK negotiations recommenced in August 1994, culminating in the signing of the Agreed Framework (AF) in Geneva on 21 October 1994. The Agreed Framework was a landmark deal, offering arguably the biggest set of concessions to the DPRK in return for what was, at the time, a comparably large concession from the North. North Korea agreed to suspend its plutonium production at Yongbyon, replace its more proliferation-prone graphite reactors with more proliferation-resistant LWRs, halt reprocessing of spent fuel, and seal the radiochemical laboratory under IAEA monitoring. In return, the United States would provide a security assurance against the use or threat of nuclear weapons, economic and energy assistance (the latter as an ‘interim energy alternative’ whilst the LWRs were under construction), and prospects of diplomatic and economic normalization. Beneficial outcomes were in abundance. 1⁵⁸ Defector B (interview, 2017); Elite defector C (interview, 2017). 1⁵⁹ Defector B (interview, 2017). 1⁶⁰ Leif R. Rosenberger, ‘Unifying Korea: Beyond Hopes and Fears’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 16(3), 1994, 295. Aidan Foster-Carter argued how North Korea, post-Kim Il Sung, would likely face ‘controlled collapse’; see Aidan Foster-Carter, North Korea After Kim Il-sung: Controlled Collapse? (London: The Economic Intelligence Unit, 1994); Aidan Foster-Carter, ‘North Korea: All Roads Lead to Collapse—All the More Reason to Engage Pyongyang’ In, Marcus Noland, ed., The Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995), 27–38. 1⁶1 US Track 1.5 official (interview, 2019).

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Any negotiations, however, must contain compromise. The AF was no exception. Prior to signing the deal, the United States had to lower its expectations of the DPRK by abandoning its long-standing call for special inspections on the DPRK’s nuclear facilities, a requirement that the United States and the IAEA had maintained throughout the crisis. With negotiations on special inspections ‘not going anywhere’, the United States agreed to ‘give North Korea about five years before it has to allow special nuclear ambitions’.1⁶2 What can be seen is not just the United States’ urgency at reaching an agreement with North Korea amidst fears of conflict escalation. Washington’s willingness to compromise on a condition that it had insisted throughout the crisis also demonstrated the extent to which the United States valued a deal with the DPRK. In light of such placation, North Korean negotiator Kang Sok Ju hoped that the AF would ‘resolve the so-called nuclear issues once and for all’ and ‘lead to the normalization of the [US–DPRK] bilateral relations’ from which the North could garner status as a significant actor.1⁶3 Yet, most tellingly, as one of the US negotiators emphasized to the author, Kang made clear to his US counterparts that North Korea would ‘have to get something from the international community’ following its plutonium freeze. As the US negotiator emphasized, ‘normalization was going to be much more important to their security than two 1000-megawatt light-water reactors’.1⁶⁴ The signing of the deal initiated a plethora of questions, for many of which there remain no definitive answers. Did North Korea’s plutonium freeze represent a genuine desire to suspend its nuclear development? Alternatively, did North Korea intend to cheat on the Framework all along; to take international concessions but give few sincere commitments towards abandoning its nuclear ambitions in return? Certainly, cynical readings prevailed vis-à-vis North Korea’s intentions, and the US placation of the DPRK. Within the United States, even before the Framework was signed, then Republican Senator of Arizona, John McCain, derided the Clinton administration’s negotiation tactics as ‘a policy of appeasement’ predicated upon ‘the ill-founded belief that the North Koreans really just want to be part of the community of nations and want diplomatic relations’.1⁶⁵ Writing in the aftermath of the agreement, Samuel S. Kim described the AF as ‘an exchange of unequal concessions— Washington’s maximum quids for Pyongyang’s minimum quo’.1⁶⁶ North Korea would remain cognizant of this logic of unequal exchange in the future.1⁶⁷ 1⁶2 US Department of State, ‘Opening Remarks by Ambassador Robert Gallucci’, Daily Press Briefing, 21 September 1994. 1⁶3 ‘DPRK’s Chief Negotiator Confirms Nuclear Accord’, Xinhua, 18 October 1994, FBIS-CHI-94-202, 1; KCNA, ‘Kang Sok-chu’s Geneva News Conference Reported’, 19 October 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-202, 30. 1⁶⁴ US negotiator AF (interview, 2019). 1⁶⁵ Nancy Mathis, ‘U.S.–N. Korea Must Comply before Aid Is Considered’, Houston Chronicle, 13 June 1994, A9. Charles Krauthammer, writing in 1993, described the Clinton administration’s policy towards the DPRK in a similar manner to McCain, namely as ‘all carrot and no stick’. Charles Krauthammer, ‘North Korea’s Coming Bomb’, Washington Post, 5 November 1993, A27. 1⁶⁶ Samuel S. Kim, ‘North Korea in 1994: Brinkmanship, Breakdown, and Breakthrough’, Asian Survey, 35(1), 1995, 20. 1⁶⁷ As subsequent chapters highlight, the Agreed Framework would become an ongoing reference point for North Korea to justify future behaviour.

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Yet, policymakers in Washington recognized how the Framework was a last resort against the alternative of possible conflict with the DPRK rather than a permanent response to curtail North Korea’s then nascent nuclear aspirations.1⁶⁸ Henry Kissinger argued how, whilst the AF would not ‘cure’ North Korea’s programme, it would instigate a period of ‘remission’ in its operation, which could, however, be revived.1⁶⁹ Although discourse of regime collapse continued to murmur around policy circles in Washington as Kim Jong Il consolidated power, albeit slowly, what would become increasingly apparent was that the ‘second Kim’ would indeed ‘last long’; North Korea would not disappear and the nuclear problem would not go away.

Strategic delinquency and the first nuclear crisis The first nuclear crisis taught North Korea an important lesson upon which it would draw in years to come, namely, that the strategic engagement in delinquent behaviour could generate positive outcomes. The crisis marked a culmination of the DPRK’s behaviour in the early post-war era, during which time it accumulated negative status as a norm-violating international actor vis-à-vis post-war norms of non-aggression. After joining the global nuclear order through acceding to the NPT, Pyongyang’s behaviour would be met with further costs of social opprobrium as its nuclear ambitions became increasingly apparent. Yet, the North would also gain benefits. From the post-war era to the first nuclear crisis, North Korea’s behaviour was heavily motivated by status considerations. The nuclearization of China and the burgeoning nuclear ambitions of South Korea, coupled with Kim Il Sung’s desire to consolidate power domestically and portray the DPRK as a significant international actor, all elevated Pyongyang’s status ambitions. China’s nuclear test notably provided North Korea with the first glimpse of how nuclear weapons could become a marker of status in international relations. North Korea’s accession to the NPT, thereby relinquishing its nuclear ambitions on paper, underscores the prominence of status as a motivation behind its behaviour during the late Cold War compared to deterrence. Had deterrence been the principal motivation, the DPRK would not have accepted the material constraints as a NNWS by joining the NPT, even after the Soviet pledge of LWRs. As tensions heightened between North Korea and the United States, most notably in 1993 and 1994, the signing of the AF presented a further opportunity for North Korea to procure beneficial outcomes through temporarily freezing plutonium production at Yongbyon, however questionable its actual intentions may have been. Had deterrence been the sole driver of Pyongyang’s actions, why, therefore, would it freeze plutonium production? The beneficial prospect of normalized relations with the United States and the value the North placed on this possibility offers one plausible explanation.

1⁶⁸ KCNA, ‘KCNA “Detailed KCNA Report”’, 22 January 2003. 1⁶⁹ Henry Kissinger, ‘No Compromise, But A Rollback’, Washington Post, 6 July 1994, A19.

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During the first nuclear crisis, Pyongyang’s initial exercise of deception was manifest in repeated assertions of its lack of intention to develop weaponized nuclear capabilities whilst a NNWS party to the NPT. Over time, however, the North’s behaviour markedly accelerated in delinquency as growing IAEA demands for inspections exacerbated Pyongyang’s frustrations. North Korea became ever more adamant that it would only comply with nuclear norms if US–ROK military exercises were suspended, the IAEA halted its insistence on inspections, and the US provided economic assistance and diplomatic normalization. The suspension of US–ROK exercises in 1992, after which Pyongyang selectively complied with IAEA safeguards and subsequently provided an incomplete declaration of its nuclear facilities, demonstrated the continuation of its deceptive behaviour. Over time, provocative and norm-transgressive actions would intensify. Rhetorical threats to withdraw from the NPT and engage in conventional warfare vis-à-vis South Korea would, paradoxically, be rewarded by the international community as the United States became desperate for stability on the Peninsula. The second and third phases of the crisis demonstrate how, by garnering the attention of the United States through provocations and being rewarded through high-level negotiations, North Korea could justify its behaviour through counter-stigmatization. It frequently portrayed the United States as an unbenevolent hegemon forcing the DPRK with little choice but to behave delinquently. Not only was the US ‘hostile policy’ becoming increasingly entrenched in Pyongyang’s world view, but, in addition, vindicating its belligerent actions by blaming the United States represented a continuation of the North’s strategy from the early post-war era. A core aim of North Korea’s interactions with the United States during the first nuclear crisis was to pursue diplomatic normalization. High-level bilateral dialogue, seen in the second and third phases, offered one means to this end. North Korea wanted diplomatic normalization for the benefits it would bring, particularly economic assistance and social status as a significant and sovereign state. Normalization would reduce Pyongyang’s negative status, having been designated a US State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1988, and presented one solution to the DPRK’s increasing isolation ‘when it became clear to Kim that the Soviet Union is falling apart’ as Chinese and Russian support declined.1⁷⁰ When applied to the first nuclear crisis, the framework of strategic delinquency demonstrates how the DPRK’s pursuit of normalization, whilst never achieved, brought benefits even if Pyongyang had been inflicted with costs from its exercise of delinquent behaviour and pursuit of economic autarky, not least stagnating economic performance and a degraded international status as its notoriety for norm violations grew. Although some negotiators with the DPRK deemed the AF as ‘never a genuine commitment to relinquish their pursuit of nuclear weapons’,1⁷1 a Soviet diplomat asserted how, beyond the status benefits for the DPRK, normalization could ‘open a new path towards a civilian nuclear programme’ whereby ‘they began to entertain 1⁷⁰ US Track 1.5 official (interview, 2019). 1⁷1 US NSC official (interview, 2019).

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this naïve idea: what if […] America regarded them differently, not in the existential threat kind of terms?’1⁷2 A fundamental condition of the AF was that, in return for freezing plutonium production, the United States would provide the DPRK with LWRs, which would be critical in bolstering Pyongyang’s domestic energy. Although economic assistance and pledges of normalized relations would bolster the domestic legitimacy of the Kim Il Sung regime, Kim’s voracious pursuit of normalizing relations with the North’s ‘hostile’ adversary highlights how, just as explanations of deterrence were insufficient for understanding the DPRK’s behaviour during this time, so, too, are explanations of domestic legitimacy. North Korea’s behavioural choices during the first nuclear crisis remained highly influenced by considerations at the international level, even if they were undergirded by a somewhat outdated belief that mere nuclear possession would be sufficient to bring ascendant international status. Nonetheless, although the ‘first nuclear crisis’ taught the DPRK that strategic engagement in delinquent behaviour could bring positive outcomes, North Korea soon discovered that its efforts to deceive the international community would not go unnoticed.

Conclusion ‘Koreans have a saying: “sword to sword: rice cake to rice cake”. It is time to throw away the sword and hold up the rice cake.’1⁷3 This analogy, made in 1993 by North Korean diplomat Kim Yong Sun, formerly head of the International Affairs department of the WPK, encapsulates North Korea’s strategic behaviour during the first nuclear crisis. As evidence shows, the DPRK’s behaviour was informed by a quest for greater international recognition as part of its opposition to the so-called US ‘hostile policy’ and US leadership of the Western liberal post-war international order and the global nuclear order therein. Developing weaponized nuclear capabilities would offer one way for Pyongyang to resist what it deemed to be an unjust US hegemonic leadership. North Korea’s engagement with the early institutionalized nuclear order was heavily influenced by its exercise of delinquency vis-à-vis the post-war order even before it joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. After acceding to the Treaty, North Korea continued to learn from how the international community would respond to deceptive, provocative, and norm-transgressive actions to inform future actions. As shown by the example of North Korea’s threat to abrogate from the NPT, the DPRK could test how the United States would respond to attention-seeking provocations, especially those that transgressed nuclear norms. As the first nuclear crisis progressed, North Korea was able to learn that deceptive behaviour could procure beneficial outcomes. 1⁷2 Former Soviet diplomat (interview, 2019). 1⁷3 Peter Hayes, ‘Overcoming U.S.–DRPK Hostility: The Missing Link between a Northeast Asian Comprehensive Security Settlement and Ending the Korean War’, North Korean Review, 11(2), 2015, 80; Peter Hayes, ‘The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony’, Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 4(10), 2006, 4.

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By pledging outward, if feigned, compliance with the nuclear order, such as through signing IAEA safeguards, the DPRK could gain social recognition as a sovereign and equal state through negotiations with the United States. Such compliance concurrently masked inward deviance, as seen by the continuation of its nuclear aspirations, which would only heighten after the AF was signed. The first nuclear crisis thus justified North Korea’s strategic delinquency, deploying behaviour that brought both positive and negative status, and generated positive outcomes. Crucially, the crisis provided the North with a seminal learning experience, which would motivate its future behaviour, namely, a greater understanding of how to respond to international opprobrium and negative status such that it could reap concessions. This process of learning underscores the evolutionary nature of the framework of strategic delinquency, whereby negative status can be leveraged towards positive outcomes. Yet, the historical record is well known. The United States’ accommodation of North Korea’s interests in the prelude to the AF would not compel North Korea to comply with nuclear norms. The shift to a Republican-controlled Congress soon after the Framework was signed and the arrival of the Bush administration in Washington at the turn of the century only entrenched the centrality of the US ‘hostile policy’ to North Korea’s world view as both sides would eventually fail to implement their respective terms of the Framework. The DPRK would become increasingly suspicious of whether the United States would provide LWRs or make headway in normalizing diplomatic and economic relations, which were then so coveted by the regime-state. As will be seen, North Korea’s threats to withdraw from the nuclear order if the international community did not acquiesce to its desires—as was witnessed during the first nuclear crisis—were not mere bluster. The end of the first nuclear crisis did not mark the end of other crises involving North Korea. With the breakdown of the AF, heightened tensions would catalyse a so-called ‘second nuclear crisis’ in the 2000s. The DPRK’s subsequent decision to withdraw from the NPT, in 2003, following revelations of its covert pursuit of highly enriched uranium whilst its plutonium production was frozen, would have deleterious implications for the nuclear order. Efforts to address its nuclear development through the multilateral Six-Party Talks would see the DPRK exploit the forum through feigned outward compliance with the institutionalized and normative nuclear order. With the Bush administration undoing the engagement pursued by Clinton, North Korea’s exercise of provocative and norm-transgressing behaviour would become more sustained. As Chapter 4 will contend, however, whilst Pyongyang did eventually receive benefits of recognition (a lesson learnt from the 1990s), its frustrations with the international community would amplify with time. With reduced incentives to comply with nuclear and international norms, the DPRK’s deployment of delinquency would only become more frequent.

4 A nuclear North Korea Costs and benefits of delinquency

Though ‘they would not admit it’, the central lesson that North Korea learnt during the 2000s was ‘how difficult it is to fool the Americans’. As a former South Korean senior negotiator with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) asserted, ‘it is more difficult to fool them twice than once. They failed in fooling the US into believing that they don’t have a highly enriched uranium programme.’1 The Agreed Framework may have ended the first nuclear crisis but it did not stop future crises from emerging. Even during the Framework’s signing, North Korea was engaging in activities that risked rapidly escalating international tensions sooner than they did. As this chapter contends, the ‘second nuclear crisis’, which lasted from January 2002 to November 2009, saw North Korea’s unsuccessful deception of the United States and its aggressive pursuit of two contradictory goals: normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States and the development of weaponized nuclear capabilities. To fulfil these goals, the North accelerated its strategic deployment of behaviour that brought negative status, namely norm transgression, provocation, and deception. Two critical events during the second nuclear crisis catalysed such behaviour. First, Pyongyang intensified provocative and deceptive actions following its self-declared withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, after which it declared its ‘nuclear status’ in February 2005, for the first time. Second, in October 2006, the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test. It subsequently intensified brinkmanship with the United States and refused to make any substantial concessions on its nuclear programme unless significant pay-offs were obtained.2 Three patterns in North Korea’s behaviour during this time can be noticed: first, it deemed the US ‘hostile policy’ to have intensified, against which it sought to vindicate belligerent behaviour; second, the DPRK sustained its long-standing preference for bilateral negotiations with the United States; third, the DPRK sought to damage the standing of the United States. The North’s pursuit of international attention and self-assertion as a nuclear-armed state was motivated by the changing nature of the global nuclear order and policies of the new US administration of George 1 Republic of Korea (ROK) negotiator (interview, 2019). 2 One example is the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, signed on 19 September 2005. Yet, some South Korean and US policymakers involved in the Talks disputed the DPRK’s sincerity at pledging towards ‘denuclearization’.

North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order. Edward Howell, Oxford University Press. © Edward Howell (2023). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192888327.003.0005

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W. Bush. Building upon the lessons from the first nuclear crisis, North Korea’s delinquent behaviour during the second nuclear crisis was rewarded: it gained the material benefits of nuclear deterrence and regime survival and the social benefits of recognition as a significant actor and negotiating partner of the United States, not least by exploiting the multilateral Six-Party Talks through bilateral negotiations with the United States. The second nuclear crisis taught the DPRK two lessons. First, it recognized the limits of deception as a path towards gaining international concessions and placed growing attention on feigned compliance with the norms of the nuclear order. Second, although a lesson from the first nuclear crisis—that bellicose behaviour could lead to negotiations with the United States—became more apparent, so too did the costs of delinquency, both in terms of financial sanctions and social reputational costs. Dividing the second nuclear crisis into three phases, North Korea’s engagement with the global nuclear order and the United States evolved over time. The first phase, from January 2002 to January 2005, saw Pyongyang expose the fragilities within the nuclear order to its advantage, most notably through its withdrawal from the NPT. The DPRK subsequently participated in the Six-Party Talks to reap pay-offs from bilateral dialogue with the United States. The second phase, from February 2005 to December 2006, comprised the DPRK’s declaration of its nuclear status and first nuclear test, after which it intensified its nuclear development but recognized that delinquent behaviour would not be cost-free. As motivations of nuclear deterrence gained potency in driving the DPRK’s actions, so too did the North’s pursuit of international recognition as a significant international actor and a nuclear state. The third phase, from January 2007 to May 2009, saw oscillating delinquency and compliance in relation to nuclear norms: the former comprising low-level brinkmanship when the DPRK deemed the US ‘hostile policy’ to have intensified, the latter when it thought the US would provide concessions. Nevertheless, when North Korea felt that its national interests could not be accommodated, the DPRK abandoned its norm-compliant actions and reverted to delinquency. Following heightened provocations, it withdrew from the Six-Party Talks and tested a second nuclear device in 2009. The second nuclear crisis had no definite ending since, as part of its strategic calculations between the costs and benefits of delinquent behaviour, North Korea simply withdrew from international attempts to curb its nuclear aspirations when it sensed that no positive outcomes could ensue.

Prelude to another crisis The emergence of the second nuclear crisis can be attributed to three principal factors: first, a breakdown in the US–DPRK Agreed Framework; second, a weakened global nuclear order from the early 2000s; third, a heightened perception on the part of North Korea that changes in US foreign policy under a then new administration exacerbated the ‘hostile policy’. These causes would instigate the scope conditions under which North Korea would deploy strategic delinquency, criticizing

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the hawkish approach of the Bush administration and the United States’ inability to fulfil past pledges made towards the DPRK. Washington’s eagerness towards fulfilling the Agreed Framework was evident in the establishment of the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) after the Framework’s signing.3 This consortium of the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan was established to provide North Korea with economic assistance, two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWRs), fuel oil and to allow Pyongyang to pursue nuclear energy generation. The Framework also saw pledges of diplomatic and economic normalization of relations between the United States and DPRK, manifest in the opening of liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang, which, beyond economic benefits, would grant the DPRK with recognition as an equal, sovereign international actor. Normalization of relations would both bolster North Korea’s international status and strengthen regime security. As a former US intelligence official underscored, ‘they’re never going to have security if it’s not a normal relationship’.⁴ If the Agreed Framework looked to benefit North Korea socially and materially, what went wrong? Whilst some officials negotiating with the DPRK argued how the North was committed to the plutonium freeze, ‘hoping we’d [the US would] play, and hedging that we wouldn’t’,⁵ others were more sceptical, deeming North Korea to have intentionally cheated on the Framework from the outset. Indeed, even if the DPRK wanted international respect, it dragged its feet during the post-Framework negotiations, hindering progress towards the opening of liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington. One negotiator stressed how the DPRK was unwilling to pay ‘Washington prices for an embassy’ in the United States.⁶ Another official highlighted how Pyongyang would not ‘allow the US to use a diplomatic pouch to support the mission [in the DPRK]’ for fear of outside information infiltrating into the diplomatic compound.⁷ With respect to the provision of LWRs, a US official serving at the time recalled how his North Korean counterparts: insisted that they didn’t want South Korean light-water reactors, but US lightwater reactors, and the South Koreans insisted that they were going to have the Korean standard reactor which was a derivative of US technology. We spent an entire month negotiating with Kim Kye Gwan, and what we were going to call that.⁸

Negotiating with the North was, as expected, onerous. In conversation with his US counterparts, North Korean negotiator, Kang Sok Ju, asserted how, although he hoped the Agreed Framework would ‘lead to the normalization of the bilateral 3 Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/457, 2 November 1994, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1994/infcirc457.pdf (accessed 22 December 2022). ⁴ US intelligence official (interview, 2019). ⁵ US Track 1.5 official (interview, 2019). ⁶ US Assistant Secretary of State (interview, 2019). ⁷ US NSC official (interview, 2019). ⁸ US diplomat (interview, 2019).

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relations’, the North would have to ‘get something from the international community’.⁹ Kang repeatedly referred to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ‘special inspections’ on nuclear waste sites, the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon (which could then extract enough plutonium to generate four or five nuclear weapons), and irradiated fuel rods from the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon as the North’s ‘chips’.1⁰ According to a senior South Korean negotiator, whilst the DPRK ‘wanted normalization of relations’, the plutonium freeze at Yongbyon was not simply a means towards normalization. It was also a way for the North to ascertain the bargaining power of nuclear weapons. With plutonium production frozen, international scrutiny could be eased off the DPRK, and it could continue ‘hedging by continuing secretly to pursue enriched uranium’.11 Ultimately, as the South Korean official emphasized, ‘they were willing to give up their plutonium at the time because they were too confident that they could conceal their clandestine [highly enriched] uranium programme’.12 Such views are difficult to reconcile, given the inability to uncover North Korea’s actual intentions. Yet, what can be said with greater certainty is that the Republican control of Congress in November 1994 was instrumental in the Agreed Framework’s demise, given the vociferous Republican opposition to the Framework as tantamount to an act of appeasement. After its signing, appropriating funds for fuel oil and other concessions pledged by the United States became akin to ‘pulling teeth’.13 As one senior US negotiator put it, ‘it became very difficult for the Clinton administration to do much with North Korea’ since ‘they were not inclined to pay a high political price for being more active in normalizing relations’.1⁴ With these domestic constraints, LWR construction and the provision of fuel oil as an interim supply of energy following the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor were seldom timely. It ‘caused North Korea a lot of anger’; as such, ‘they began abrogating their side of the agreement […] we cannot demonise North Korea from the beginning’.1⁵ Even a senior US negotiator admitted how ‘both of us bear responsibility for the failure of the evolution of relations to normalcy’ since ‘we did not move aggressively to normalisation, and I can understand why the North Koreans were disappointed’.1⁶ Coupled with North Korea’s escalating distrust of the United States was its increasingly precarious domestic situation. Severe economic stagnation—following the loss of Soviet and Chinese assistance post-Cold War—and the collapse of the Public Distribution System were compounded by flooding and drought from 1995 to 1998, catalysing large-scale crop destruction and famine. Despite an estimated 600,000 to 1.5 million deaths from the famine (euphemistically termed the ‘Arduous March’ by the regime), Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions did not dampen.1⁷ ⁹ Ibid. 1⁰ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 3rd edn (Reading, MA: Addison-Weasley, 2013), 275. 11 US diplomat (interview, 2019). 12 ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). 13 US diplomat (interview, 2019). 1⁴ US negotiator AF (interview, 2019). 1⁵ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 1⁶ US negotiator AF (interview, 2019). 1⁷ For an excellent account of the North Korean famine, see Sandra Fahy, Marching through Suffering: Loss and Survival in North Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 4.

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The United States’ inability to fulfil its terms of the Agreed Framework entrenched North Korea’s perception of the United States as a ‘hostile’ actor, which had already worsened owing to US–ROK military exercises and the imposition of economic sanctions as part of the Trading with the Enemy Act.1⁸ From North Korea’s perspective, if the United States failed to uphold its commitments, why should the DPRK? Beyond US–DPRK bilateral relations, the nuclear order was not evolving in the North’s favour. The NPT was extended indefinitely at the 1995 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), a consensus was reached on concluding the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty before 1996, and the Additional Protocol was adopted in 1997, giving the IAEA further powers to access and verify facilities of non-nuclear weapons states and their compliance with IAEA safeguards.1⁹ Such consolidation sought to contain the weaponized nuclear ambitions of non-NPT signatories and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), particularly following discoveries of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear development during the First Gulf War and the DPRK’s incomplete plutonium declaration to the IAEA. Nonetheless, the consolidation of the nuclear order did little to stem the ambitions of aspirant nuclear states. As international knowledge of Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear aspirations developed, discourse surrounding so-called ‘rogue states’ hostile to the United States and US-led liberal international order gained traction.2⁰ In Pyongyang’s eyes, this discourse was inherently part of the US ‘hostile policy’. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the DPRK test-fired a three-stage Taepodong-1 rocket over Japan on 31 August 1998—several months after the nuclear tests of non-NPT signatories, India and Pakistan—which it euphemistically labelled a ‘satellite launch’ to avoid contravening the Agreed Framework. Yet, progress on fulfilling the Framework’s terms was slow. Nearly four years after its signing, the possibility that the United States would renege on its pledges became increasingly likely.21 That same year, the Foreign Ministry threatened that if LWRs were not provided, the DPRK would withdraw from the Framework and resume ‘nuclear research’.22 These threats, which aimed to advance US compliance with its obligations, was part of a lesson the DPRK learnt from the first nuclear crisis. By holding the United States to account, the DPRK could vindicate its own subsequent actions by blaming the United States’ actions—or lack of them. Subsequent rhetorical threats were somewhat successful: the DPRK’s threat to ‘blow up the U.S. territory’ following US speculation of underground nuclear facilities was met with an easing of US trade sanctions on the 1⁸ KCNA (Korean Central News Agency), ‘Nobody Can Slander DPRK’s Missile Policy’, 16 June 1998. 1⁹ Theodore Hirsch, ‘The IAEA Additional Protocol: What It Is and Why It Matters’, Nonproliferation Review, 11(3), 2004, 143–44; William Walker, ‘The International Nuclear Order after the Cold War— Progress and Regress’. In: Hanns W. Maull, ed., The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 92. See IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), ‘Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s)’, INFCIRC/540, September 1997. 2⁰ Anthony Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States’, Foreign Affairs, 73(2), March/April 1994, 45–55; ‘Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States’, 31 July 1998, available at: https://irp.fas.org/threat/missile/rumsfeld/toc.htm (accessed 5 January 2023). 21 KCNA, ‘Underground Structure near Nyongbyon Is Not “Secret Underground Nuclear Facility”’, 19 September 1998. 22 KCNA, ‘LWR Provision Is U.S. Obligation = DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman’, 6 March 1998.

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DPRK in September 1999.23 In return, North Korea pledged not to undertake missile tests whilst dialogue was ongoing.2⁴ Reciprocity would become a core logic of North Korea’s behaviour vis-à-vis the United States and increasingly motivate Pyongyang’s actions, delinquent and compliant, during the second nuclear crisis and beyond.

‘The Western world thinks we are belligerent’ Easing economic sanctions was critical to inducing North Korea’s norm compliance. An extensive review of US policy towards the DPRK, headed by US North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Advisor to the President — and former Secretary of Defense — William Perry, concluded that the United States ought to ‘deal with the North Korean government as it is, not as we might wish it to be’.2⁵ This not unrealistic ambition triggered US and South Korean engagement with the DPRK. The ‘Sunshine Policy’ of the liberal South Korean government under Kim Dae-jung saw the first presidential-level inter-Korean summit held in June 2000, where Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il agreed to resolve the issue of reunification, foster economic cooperation, and allow reunions of families divided by the inter-Korean border.2⁶ A more important meeting occurred on 12 October 2000, when North Korean special envoy, Vice-Marshal Jo Myong Rok, visited Washington, a visit reciprocated by that of US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to Pyongyang on 24 October. Although little attention is paid to this agreement, the Joint US–DPRK Communiqué presented one of the clearest indicators of ‘how far they [the DPRK] were prepared to go’ in establishing new relations with Washington.2⁷ The two sides pledged to improve bilateral relations through establishing a peace treaty to end the Korean War, ceasing mutual ‘hostile intent’, and promoting non-interference and economic cooperation. North Korea would halt missile tests and engage in talks with the United States regarding humanitarian aid provision.2⁸ Despite scepticism in Washington and Seoul regarding the DPRK’s lack of intention to comply with the Agreed Framework, the North remained interested in improving ties with the United States but only if doing so would be beneficial for the DPRK. The Joint Communiqué exemplified how Pyongyang was ‘willing to give up their plutonium programme […] if the price was right’.2⁹ The material and social costs of a missile testing moratorium could be mitigated by economic assistance, continued regime survival, and recognition as a sovereign and equal actor through 23 KCNA, ‘KPA Will Answer U.S. Aggression Forces’ Challenge with Annihilating Blow’, 2 December 1998; KCNA, ‘Annihilating Blow Will Be Given’, 3 December 1998; see also David Sanger, ‘Trade Sanctions on North Korea Are Eased by U.S.’, New York Times, 18 September 1999, 1; Christopher Wren, ‘North Korean, at UN, Urges US to Lift Economic Embargo’, New York Times, 26 September 1999, 9. 2⁴ KCNA, ‘DPRK Not to Launch Missile’, 24 September 1999. 2⁵ William J. Perry, ‘Review of United States Policy toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations’ unclassified report, Washington, DC, 12 October 1999. 2⁶ ‘South–North Joint Declaration’, Pyongyang, 15 June 2000. 2⁷ CIA official (interview, 2020). 2⁸ US Department of State, ‘U.S.–D.P.R.K. Joint Communique’, 12 October 2000. 2⁹ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019).

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high-level negotiations with the United States. The Communiqué granted North Korea favourable recognition as a significant and sovereign international actor, not least from the US pledge of non-interference. In her visit to Pyongyang, Albright recounted Kim Jong Il’s insistence that the 1998 missile launch would be the DPRK’s ‘first launch—and our last’. Kim bemoaned how ‘the Western world thinks we are belligerent, and the U.S. has a lot of misunderstanding about us’, which improved US–DPRK relations, as outlined in the Joint Communiqué, would remedy.3⁰ Hopes of remedying any ‘misunderstandings’, however, were hampered as the Bush administration took power. US–DPRK bilateral relations and the US leadership of the global nuclear order would undergo significant change. Whilst the 2000 NPT RevCon saw greater acceptance from NPT signatories on the rights and responsibilities granted to nuclear weapon states (NWS), the new administration’s distaste for multilateralism saw the United States retreat from its NPT obligations vis-à-vis disarmament, withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, and direct its energies towards regimes considered anathema to US values.31 The DPRK would feel that it had little choice but to respond delinquently to an increasingly antagonistic international order.

A proliferation fixation The Bush administration sought to consolidate the United States’ hegemonic position atop the global nuclear order through shifting its policy from non-proliferation—as witnessed in the aftermath of the Cold War—to counter-proliferation. Central to the administration’s aim to ‘recast the international order in its self-interest’32 was a ‘proliferation fixation’ seeking to prevent ‘unpleasant regimes from developing nuclear or lesser weapons of mass destruction’.33 This fixation heightened following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent Global War on Terror, catalysed by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which became evident in US actions seen to be contravening international law such as the treatment of potential terror suspects.3⁴ As former senior IAEA official vocalized, the Bush administration ‘did not care much for the NPT or any other disarmament or arms control treaty’. Rather, its policymaking was engulfed by the view that ‘for the strongest [power], that means not to have

3⁰ Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir, rev. edn (New York: HarperCollins, 2013), 467. See also: US Department of State, ‘Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Press Conference, Pyongyang,’, 24 October 2000; ‘North Korea and the United States’, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 164, Document 18. 31 Wade Huntley, ‘Missile Defense: More May Be Better—for China’, Nonproliferation Review, 9(2), 2002, 68–81. 32 William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), 56. 33 John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 129. 3⁴ Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 94.

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any legal restrictions’.3⁵ One of the most infamous moments of the Bush administration came in the 2002 State of the Union Address, whereby the President designated Iran, Iraq, and the DPRK as part of the global ‘axis of evil, aiming to threaten the peace of the world’ through their (alleged) pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.3⁶ Categorizing the regime-state as part of an ‘axis of evil’ entrenched North Korea’s perception of a US ‘hostile policy’ targeting adversarial regimes in physical and social terms. This perception only intensified following the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and National Security Strategy (NSS). The NPR deemed a North Korean attack on the South as an ‘immediate contingen[cy]’ for which the United States should ready itself, given the DPRK’s ‘active WMD and missile programs’ and its sponsoring of terrorist activity.3⁷ The NSS, too, asserted how the US would ‘act pre-emptively […] to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries’, of which North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ambitions comprised one such act.3⁸ It is hardly surprising that within this context, North Korea would accelerate provocations.3⁹ As a South Korean official stressed, Pyongyang felt that the ‘axis of evil’ nomenclature was ‘a clear violation of the Agreed Framework based on mutual respect; their [the DPRK’s] regime survival was threatened by the US side’. Corroborating this claim, a US negotiator deemed the Bush administration’s rhetoric to be: precisely what the North has a sense of insecurity about […] the North was linked, with no idea at all, as part of the ‘axis of evil’ with Iran and Iraq, and the deal with the Agreed Framework, flawed as it was, was scrapped […] Yongbyon was reactivated […] as soon as it was possible.⁴⁰

It was not just Bush’s criticism of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions that would trigger provocations from the North. Bush infamously remarked how: ‘I loathe Kim Jong Il. I’ve got a visceral reaction to this guy because he is starving his people.’⁴1 North Korea aimed to resist the social costs of opprobrium from the United States through its counter-hegemonic strategy. It would strategize future behaviour following what it considered to be US violations of the Agreed Framework: materially, the lack of reliable provision of heavy fuel oil and delay to LWR construction demonstrated the United States’ lack of intent at abiding by the Framework; socially, the ‘axis of evil’ contradicted the US pledge to normalize US–DPRK diplomatic relations. 3⁵ IAEA official (interview, 2020). See also Hans Blix, ‘Introduction: The Present Nuclear Order, How It Came About, Why It May Not Last’. In: Olav Njølstad, ed., Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 7. 3⁶ George W, Bush, ‘President Delivers State of the Union Address’, The White House, 29 January 2002. 3⁷ The NPR designated the DPRK, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya, as ‘among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies’. See: Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 8 January 2002, available at: https://www.nuclearinfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/DOD_Nuclear_ Posture_Review_Excerpts_January_2002_volume_1_of_1.pdf (accessed 12 January 2023). 3⁸ ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, September 2002, (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002) 15. 3⁹ KCNA, ‘Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Slams Bush’s Accusations’, 31 January 2002. ⁴⁰ US diplomat (interview, 2019). ⁴1 Bob Woodward, ‘A Course of “Confident Action”’, Washington Post, 19 November 2002, A1.

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With the Bush administration calling for unilateral North Korean disarmament, North Korea realized that if norm-compliant actions still brought social opprobrium, it would resort to delinquency.

‘When everything went to hell’: The first phase In summer 2002, conditions for another nuclear crisis were ripe. US intelligence reports in June that year concluded that North Korea had ‘embarked on a program to create weapons by using highly enriched uranium’.⁴2 This assertion was supported by a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimate in November 2002, which highlighted how the DPRK had, in 2001, ‘begun constructing a centrifuge facility’ that could ‘produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational—which could be as soon as mid-decade’.⁴3 If true, whilst North Korea may not have strictly breached the Agreed Framework, which specified the freeze of plutonium production, it would have more certainly violated the spirit of the deal and contravened the Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1991. The latter specified how both Koreas would possess neither nuclear reprocessing nor uranium enrichment facilities. Whilst the precise date as to when the second nuclear crisis began remains debated, the crisis arguably commenced after the United States confronted North Korea regarding its covert highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme in October 2002. Although the extent to which North Korean officials admitted the existence of the programme to the United States remains questionable, as one senior US official ‘in the room’ stressed, ‘it turned out to be quite clear that [they had] highly enriched uranium, which is much more concealable [than plutonium]’.⁴⁴ Another official highlighted how Kang Sok Ju had offered a ‘tacit admission’ of the programme, saying ‘we have stronger stuff than uranium enrichment, and we’re fully entitled to it’.⁴⁵ The North’s ‘neither-confirm-nor-deny’ approach was underscored by a South Korean negotiator, who recalled how, although ‘in official meetings’, senior North Korean negotiator, Kim Kye Gwan, ‘denied it flatly […] he never denied it to me [privately]’.⁴⁶ Explanations abound for North Korea’s quasi-revelation: one US official admitted how he was ‘not sure Kang Sok Ju really ever acknowledged highly enriched uranium’, treating Kang’s declaration that ‘we have even bigger weapons than that’ as referring to ‘the unity of the North Korean people. The US said that this meant nuclear

⁴2 Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 28. ⁴3 CIA, Untitled [‘Assessment Provided to Congress’], November 2002, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 98, Document 22. ⁴⁴ US Assistant Secretary of State (interview, 2019). ⁴⁵ US official (interview, 2019). ⁴⁶ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019).

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weapons.’⁴⁷ According to a former senior US official in the Bush administration, however, ‘there was still a feeling in 2002 that Kim Jong Il could be talked down out of his nuclear tree’, but it was after the North’s revelation of its HEU programme ‘when everything went to hell, and we realised there was no need for negotiating much further’.⁴⁸ Such interview evidence paints a startling picture of North Korea’s attempts to mask its HEU production whilst the Agreed Framework remained just about intact. Two readings of North Korea’s motivations vis-à-vis the Framework thus emerge: first, the DPRK was eager to gain diplomatic normalization and energy compensation, but HEU offered a last resort to continue its nuclear aspirations if it did not receive its pledges from the United States. The second reading is more pessimistic: North Korea intentionally aimed to deceive the international community to gain concessions; ‘pretend to give up on the plutonium programme, and deny the existence of the clandestine enrichment programme’.⁴⁹ As mutual trust between the United States and the DPRK declined, and US policy heightened in hawkishness, North Korea recognized the limits to deception and calculated alternative strategies to offset the social costs of nuclear development. North Korea accelerated brinkmanship as US policies exacerbated in hawkishness. KEDO’s decision to halt heavy fuel oil delivery in November 2002 saw the DPRK reactivate plutonium production at Yongbyon on 13 December. Citing Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ as a ‘flagrant violation’ of the Agreed Framework, the DPRK did not wait to engage in dialogue but removed restrictions to its nuclear development one by one.⁵⁰ The expulsion of IAEA inspectors from Yongbyon in December 2002 rendered the Agency unable to verify any diversion of nuclear material for weaponization, which would only benefit Pyongyang.⁵1 Insisting that dialogue would be a necessary precursor to any change to its nuclear development,⁵2 which the United States was unwilling to accept, the DPRK proclaimed its immediate withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003, an ultimate act of norm transgression.⁵3 Though it invoked Article X of the Treaty, the legal validity of the North’s withdrawal remains disputed since it did not provide the requisite three-month notice.⁵⁴ Yet, the North Korean regime justified its withdrawal owing to a ‘dangerous situation where our nation’s sovereignty and our state’s security are being seriously violated’ by the United States and the IAEA.⁵⁵ The legacy of the first nuclear crisis was becoming reflected in Pyongyang’s ⁴⁷ US negotiator (interview, 2019). ⁴⁸ Senior US official (interview, 2019). ⁴⁹ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). ⁵⁰ KCNA, ‘Operation and Building of Nuclear Facilities to Be Resumed Immediately’, 12 December 2002. ⁵1 KCNA, ‘U.S. Accusations against DPRK Rebuffed’, 24 December 2002; IAEA, ‘IAEA Director General Cites DPRK “Nuclear Brinkmanship”’, 26 December 2002. ⁵2 KCNA, ‘KCNA Urges U.S. to Do Soul Searching’, 28 December 2002. ⁵3 IAEA, ‘IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in North Korea’, IAEA, 6 January 2003. ⁵⁴ George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, ‘NPT Withdrawal: Time for the Security Council to Step In’, Arms Control Today, 35, May 2005, available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005-05/features/nptwithdrawal-time-security-council-step (accessed 19 December 2022). ⁵⁵ KCNA, ‘Statement of DPRK Government on Its Withdrawal from NPT’, 10 January 2003

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actions a decade later as it increasingly viewed the institutions of the nuclear order as emblematic of the United States’ desire to ‘choke North Korea’.⁵⁶ North Korea’s withdrawal was hardly unforeseen. Pyongyang aimed to assuage negative international perceptions of its ‘rogue’ status by reiterating its desire for nuclear energy—and not weapons—for ‘peaceful purposes’.⁵⁷ Yet, its abrogation from the NPT contributed to and exposed the fragile nature of the nuclear order, demonstrating the weak enforcement power of the non-proliferation regime once a state had withdrawn from it. As a Bush administration official begrudgingly admitted, withdrawing from the NPT ‘was one of the few cards they could play. I can’t say I liked it, but I wasn’t particularly surprised.’⁵⁸ Equally unsurprising was North Korea’s nearimmediate recommencement of its 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, followed by a barrage of provocations: a threat to withdraw from the Korean War Armistice Agreement — following planned US–ROK ‘Foal Eagle’ military exercises — and the firing of anti-ship missiles.⁵⁹ North Korea subsequently rebuffed US overtures to dialogue, but why did it do so if dialogue could bring benefits? Situating North Korea’s behaviour within the framework of strategic delinquency and the DPRK’s concurrent goals of diplomatic relations with the United States and nuclear development offers one possible explanation. Although the North desired recognition as an equal and sovereign international actor, it was not prepared to attain this goal at any cost. As then US Secretary of State Colin Powell opined, Pyongyang wanted to be recognized for doing what no other state had done, namely, withdrawing from the global nuclear order and subsequently nuclearizing.⁶⁰

A weakened global nuclear order North Korea’s revelations of its covert HEU programme and withdrawal from the NPT would have lasting implications on the global nuclear order. Nevertheless, Pyongyang thus capitalized upon its lesson from the first nuclear crisis whereby delinquency could bring pay-offs. The negative status that ensued from the Bush administration’s approach vis-à-vis the DPRK would intensify North Korean brinkmanship but also norm-compliant actions, the latter as it continued to seek normalization of relations with the United States. Fissures in the nuclear order deepened following the US ground invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003. The fate of Saddam Hussein would become a potent lesson for North ⁵⁶ Japanese government advisor (interview, 2019). ⁵⁷ For the DPRK’s statement of withdrawal from the NPT, see KCNA, ‘Statement of DPRK Government on Its withdrawal from NPT’. ⁵⁸ Senior US official (interview, 2019). ⁵⁹ KCNA, ‘U.S. Anti-DPRK International Pressure Campaign Assailed’, 6 February 2003; KCNA, ‘Spokesman for Panmunjom Mission of KPA Issues Statement’, 18 February 2003; KCNA, ‘Projected U.S. War Exercises Slammed’, 25 February 2003. ⁶⁰ CNN, ‘Powell Slams N. Korean “Disregard” for Nuke Treaty’, 11 January 2003, available at: https:// edition.cnn.com/2003/US/01/11/nkorea.react/index.html (accessed 22 December 2022).

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Korea with respect to the consequences faced by states that resented the US-led international order. As a former US negotiator with the DPRK convincingly highlighted, the invasion, predicated upon a misperception of nuclear possession, allowed North Korea to plan its behaviour: ‘Saddam bluffed, and got caught out, and what lesson are you going to try if you’re North Korea […] develop a deterrent, and don’t get attacked.’⁶1 Another fissure in the nuclear order arose after the revelation, in early 2004, of a clandestine network of horizontal nuclear proliferation commandeered by Pakistani nuclear physicist A.Q. Khan, involving, inter alia, the DPRK, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria. During the 1990s, North Korea sold missiles to Pakistan in exchange for nuclear weapons designs, enriched uranium, and sample centrifuges, whilst the DPRK then espoused outward compliance with the NPT as a NNWS.⁶2 This disclosure further illuminated the ability of non-NPT signatories to subvert the nuclear non-proliferation norm covertly, whilst developing indigenous nuclear capabilities and extorting benefits from the international community. The global nuclear order was also being undermined by a lack of consensus from its custodians as they attempted to respond to changing threats of proliferation, whilst also pursue their as-of-yet unfulfilled quest towards global nuclear disarmament. The US–India civilian nuclear deal of 2005 exacerbated tensions within and amongst non-NPT signatories. From North Korea’s perspective, the deal embedded the Bush administration’s targeting of non-democratic regimes rather than the nuclear ambitions of non-NPT signatories per se. The United States’ willingness to form special relations with India—which had pledged a nuclear testing moratorium in 1998—but not North Korea, which had then withdrawn from the NPT, intensified Pyongyang’s gaze on the global nuclear order as discriminatory, widening the status discrepancy between non-NPT member states of India and the DPRK vis-àvis their treatment by the United States. As the second nuclear crisis ensued, North Korea’s nuclear aspirations became more pronounced, taking advantage of a weakened global nuclear order—to which it was itself contributing—and what it perceived to be an increasingly ‘hostile’ United States under the Bush administration.⁶3

Having the bomb: An irrefutable logic North Korea does not make decisions in isolation. In a realist vein, the US invasion of Iraq can be seen as an attempted signal of strength to allies and adversaries.⁶⁴ The invasion provided an opportune moment for North Korea to degrade the international status of the United States, whilst the South Korean administration under Roh ⁶1 KEDO negotiator (interview, 2019). ⁶2 US National Security Council (NSC) official (interview, 2019). ⁶3 IAEA, ‘20/20 Vision for the Future’, February 2008; IAEA, ‘Report of the Commission of Eminent Persons’, GOV/2008/22-GC(52)/INF/4, 23 May 2008. ⁶⁴ Senior US official (interview, 2019).

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Moo-hyun sought to continue the inter-Korean engagement pursued by Kim Daejung. To this day, the North Korean regime continues to invoke the fate of Saddam Hussein to justify its nuclear behaviour. As a South Korean negotiator put it, the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath caused the DPRK to be ‘afraid of the US, because when the US declares they will do something, they do something’; for North Korea, the US ‘hostile policy’ became ‘actual hostility’.⁶⁵ Washington’s misperceptions of Iraq as possessing nuclear weapons struck a chord with Pyongyang. Iraq, like the DPRK, was part of the ‘axis of evil’. Following discussions with North Korean officials at the time, a journalist surmised how: ‘[John] Bolton’s going around saying “North Korea’s next”; the Bush administration is pushing the doctrine of regime change; if you’re North Korea thinking, how do we protect ourselves, the logic of having the bomb is irrefutable.’⁶⁶ The Bush administration’s developing North Korea policy would live up to its eventual nickname of ABC, or ‘Anything But Clinton’, especially given the pugnacious stance taken by some officials, such as John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Internal conflict within Bush’s circle of advisors would worsen with time. According to a US official serving at the time: we were bedazzled as an administration. We had two negotiating teams: [Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Jim Kelly leading an interagency team, and John Bolton actively undermining us. There was a feeling that any compromise with North Korea would be a sign of weakness, and the Defense Department, and neocons, and Bolton, were primarily on that wicket. They didn’t want us to be seen as weak.⁶⁷

Following unsuccessful trilateral talks between China, the United States, and the DPRK in April 2003, which aimed to compel the DPRK to rejoin the nonproliferation regime, the DPRK advanced its reprocessing of spent fuel rods. Pyongyang would only dismantle its nuclear programme and allow IAEA inspections if the United States offered ‘normalised relations, economic aid, security guarantees, and a nonaggression pact’.⁶⁸ With the Bush administration diminishing the North’s status in its rhetoric, such as seen in Bolton’s denunciation of Kim Jong Il as a ‘tyrannical rogue state leader’, further North Korean provocations ensued.⁶⁹ The North would respond vituperatively, denouncing Bolton as ‘human scum and bloodsucker’.⁷⁰ Yet, in early August 2003, North Korea agreed to participate in multilateral dialogue. Hosted by China, the Six-Party Talks—a forum involving South Korea, China, ⁶⁵ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). ⁶⁶ US journalist (interview, 2019). ⁶⁷ Senior US official (interview, 2019). ⁶⁸ Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2008), 171. ⁶⁹ John R. Bolton, ‘A Dictatorship at the Crossroads’, Wall Street Journal, 31 July 2003 . ⁷⁰ KCNA, ‘Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Slams U.S. Mandarin’s Invective’, 4 August 2003; see also KCNA, ‘KCNA on DPRK’s Nuclear Deterrent Force’, 10 June 2003.

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the United States, Japan, and Russia—aimed to curb the DPRK’s nuclear aspirations and bring it into re-compliance with the non-proliferation regime. Although the DPRK would continue to behave delinquently during the initial rounds of talks, it would also pursue normalization of relations with the United States. The DPRK would exploit the Six-Party Talks to engage in bilateral talks as an equal negotiating partner of the United States. Of course, North Korea was hardly an equal negotiating partner: after all, the aim of the Talks was to halt its nuclear development. Nonetheless, by participating, the DPRK aimed to ‘show the world community whether the U.S. has a true willingness to make a switchover in its policy towards the DPRK or not’, a willingness it fundamentally doubted.⁷1

Six parties, one goal: ‘Accept us as a nuclear state’ Participating in the Six-Party Talks would allow North Korea to gain greater bargaining power. Its preference for bilateral dialogue with the United States was no secret to the other parties. A South Korean negotiator at the time stressed how, from the inception of the Talks, ‘the most meaningful negotiating channel was between Pyongyang and Washington’.⁷2 As the Agreed Framework demonstrated, the DPRK could garner economic benefits—fuel oil and food aid—whilst pledging towards an equivocal goal of nuclear disarmament. The early stages of the talks demonstrated how the DPRK was pursuing a dual-pronged strategy of normalization of relations with the United States—seeing what concessions it could gain from Washington— and nuclear development, despite its mock compliance with nuclear norms.⁷3 As a US negotiator revealed, the North’s participation ‘was partly done out of a sense of good manners towards the Chinese, but also done out of a sense of let’s see if there is anything in it for us’.⁷⁴ During the early stages of the Six-Party Talks, North Korean rhetoric frequently contained pledges to comply with nuclear norms. Stressing its commitment to the ‘denuclearization of the Korean peninsula’, the North held out the possibility that it would ‘increase [its] nuclear deterrent’ if the United States continued ‘to stifle the DPRK by force’.⁷⁵ This ambiguous invocation of ‘stifling’ gave the DPRK leeway to revive provocations if it perceived any negotiations to go against its interests. North Korea’s strategy was thus underpinned by reciprocity, coupled with an ultimate unwillingness to compromise on its core preferences it would only allow nuclear inspections, halt nuclear production and missile testing, and dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear facility if the United States offered concessions. The DPRK’s desired concessions comprised signing a non-aggression treaty, establishing diplomatic relations, ⁷1 KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-Party Talks’, 5 August 2003. ⁷2 ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). ⁷3 Embassy Shanghai, WikiLeaks Cable: 08SHANGHAI273_a, 22 July 2008; Embassy Beijing, WikiLeaks Cable: 08BEIJING4223_a, 14 November 2008. ⁷⁴ US negotiator (interview, 2019). ⁷⁵ KCNA, ‘Keynote Speeches Made at Six-Way Talks’, 29 August 2003.

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completing LWR construction as outlined in the Agreed Framework, compensating for the loss of electricity due to the freeze at Yongbyon, increasing humanitarian food aid supplies, and guaranteeing inter-Korean and Japan–DPRK economic cooperation. It was a lengthy list of demands. Yet, North Korea wanted to avoid a repetition of the Agreed Framework. The United States’ inability to follow through on its Framework obligations had cemented Pyongyang’s distrust of Washington. If the United States accused the DPRK of violating prior pledges, the DPRK would simply frame these accusations as an act of hypocrisy. The Six-Party Talks offered North Korea an opportunity to ‘draw attention [to itself] and get free goods’.⁷⁶ Whilst Pyongyang wanted nuclear deterrence, regime survival, and economic assistance, it also treasured social recognition as a negotiating partner with the United States and a significant nuclear state, even if its nuclear capabilities were then only developing. This ambition was well engrained in Pyongyang’s psyche. As a former US intelligence official stressed: ‘they want to be accepted—and they stated it in 2003—as a nuclear weapons state; not de facto, but de jure’. In discussions with his North Korean counterparts in 2003, this official was surprised at ‘the candour with which they said: accept us as a nuclear state, as you accept Pakistan, and accept the possibility that we could sell or provide weapons or fissile weapons’. Whilst this remark was expressed privately since ‘they know it’s a red line internationally’, such blatant admission of the possibility of selling or providing nuclear weapons to other states ‘goes well beyond the pale’.⁷⁷ This yearning for acceptance as a nuclear state, and to be treated as such, remained critical for North Korea. Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions remained inseparable from concerns of international status. Yet, the Six-Party Talks epitomized North Korea’s inflexibility. With its visceral opposition to the US policy of ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement’ (CVID), a demand it deemed to be degrading to its social status and material interests, the first three rounds of the SPT ended inconclusively. Progress was also hindered by what a US official—who participated in the Talks—described as the ‘foolish’ US approach whereby any negotiations with the DPRK occurred multilaterally instead of in the DPRK’s preferred bilateral format. Paradoxically, doing so further benefited North Korea. North Korean officials could ‘pretend they were interested in dialogue and negotiations, and it was the big, bad, Americans who were not’, simultaneously lowering the status of the United States in front of the other parties.⁷⁸ The five parties were frustrated with Pyongyang’s obstinance, but the feeling was mutual. The DPRK revived plutonium processing at Yongbyon in January 2004, announcing that it would ‘now be used for weapons’ and not ‘for peaceful purposes’.⁷⁹ The North never forgave the United States for its decision to suspend heavy fuel oil exports as the Agreed Framework disintegrated. Meanwhile, the nuclear order would ⁷⁶ Track 1.5 official (interview, 2019). ⁷⁷ US intelligence official (interview, 2019). ⁷⁸ US official (interview, 2019). ⁷⁹ Kim Kye Gwan made these statements to an unofficial US delegation upon their visit to the DPRK in January 2004. See ‘Testimony of Siegfried S. Hecker at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea”’, 21 January 2004, available at: https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf (accessed 22 December 2022).

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become increasingly destabilized following revelations of the DPRK’s involvement in the so-called A.Q. Khan network.⁸⁰ Pyongyang’s response was surprising: it overtly stressed its entitlement ‘to sell missiles to earn foreign exchange’ but highlighted how it ‘would never allow such transfers to al-Qaeda or anyone else’.⁸1 Then-Foreign Minister, Paek Nam Sun, revealed to veteran scholar Selig Harrison in 2004 that although the DPRK remained open to abandoning nuclear weapons, President Bush was ‘using the shock of the September 11 attacks to turn Americans against North Korea’. Paek viewed Bush’s policy with disdain, revealing how ‘the truth is that we want and need your friendship’.⁸2 What these claims show is that, unlike in the 1990s, North Korea was openly admitting its nuclear development and the financial value of nuclear exchange, whilst attempting to delineate moral boundaries to its behaviour by clarifying its lack of intention—even if only rhetorically—to engage with terrorist groups. How might North Korea have benefited from participating in clandestine nuclear proliferation? A senior US official stressed how, rather than demonstrating solidarity with other states that resented the US-led nuclear order, Pyongyang’s involvement was ‘purely transactional’; it needed money.⁸3 Yet, these revelations only heightened North Korea’s criticisms of the United States’ inability to uphold its Agreed Framework commitments. Perhaps expectedly, referring to the US failure to fulfil its Framework pledges, a US negotiator during the 1990s underscored how ‘I do not regard it as anything like the material breach of the terms of the Framework which was represented by the North Korean decision to cheat on the deal, to move on with uranium enrichment by secretly engaging in a deal with the Pakistanis.’⁸⁴ The counterfactual of whether a less hawkish US foreign policy would have catalysed greater North Korean compliance raises a salient question. Had US–DPRK rapprochement continued akin to when the Joint Communiqué of 2000 was signed, would North Korea have exercised the same extent of belligerence? Rather than unilaterally abandoning its nuclear ambitions, a more likely scenario would have been the imposition of less stringent conditions for dialogue with the United States. Nevertheless, despite being labelled a ‘rogue’ state by the Bush administration, and following its withdrawal from the NPT, the DPRK gained recognition as a dialogic partner of the United States via the Six-Party Talks. This recognition allowed the North to feel that it had the upper hand in any subsequent negotiations. Nonetheless, its continued reticence towards denuclearization following three inconclusive rounds of talks between August 2003 and July 2004 forced the United States to devise ⁸⁰ Sheena Chestnut, ‘Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks’, International Security, 32(1), 2007, 80–111; Andrea Berger, Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers (London: Routledge, 2014) 31. ⁸1 Victor Mallet, ‘N. Korea Offers U.S. Pledge on Arms’, Financial Times, 4 May 2004. ⁸2 Daniel W. Drezner, ‘North Korea Talks to Selig Harrison’, Foreign Policy, 4 May 2004. In another interview, Harrison noted how the DPRK ‘want[s] improved relations with the United States […] [and] a step-by-step process of simultaneous trade-offs in which the two sides agree on step one—you do this, we do this—and when that happens, which moves the two countries closer to being friends, then you go to step two’. See: Selig S. Harrison, ‘Q&A: Selig Harrison on North Korea’, New York Times, 11 May 2004. ⁸3 US diplomat (interview, 2019). ⁸⁴ US negotiator AF (interview, 2019).

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alternative strategies to prevent the DPRK from withdrawing from the forum altogether. The United States proposed a phased approach, pledging ‘lasting benefits’ after the DPRK ‘had dismantled its nuclear programmes’.⁸⁵ The North, however, did not respond immediately. Although China ‘scheduled another session from September 2004, the North Koreans would not come back then, because they were hoping they could wait out and benefit from the US elections’.⁸⁶ This strategy would become typical of North Korea’s future behaviour. Whilst the DPRK’s hereditary rule means that a leader is leader for life, the four- and five-year terms of US and South Korean presidencies, respectively—restricted to a single term in South Korea—mean that North Korea frequently awaits changes in US and South Korean policy as new administrations take office before making its next manoeuvre. In 2004, Pyongyang was anticipating whether a new administration in the Oval Office would continue—or reverse—the first Bush administration’s goal of CVID.⁸⁷ Central to North Korea’s decision-making was how it would strategize its response to the US ‘hostile policy’, a process which became more important than multilateral dialogue for its own sake. US–ROK military exercises, coupled with the passing of the US North Korean Human Rights Act (HRA) in September 2004 compelled Pyongyang to suspend its participation in the Six-Party Talks, arguing that it had little choice ‘but to possess a nuclear deterrent’ to ‘counter the ever-growing US threat and aggression against the DPRK’.⁸⁸ Though the HRA did not specifically target its nuclear ambitions, North Korea viewed the Act as epitomizing US ‘hostility’ and ‘aggression’ in its broadest form, which could only be combatted through the development of a nuclear deterrent. Only after Bush’s re-election, in November, did the DPRK recommit to the talks. In line with the framework of strategic delinquency, the North could re-evaluate its participation in the talks according to what costs and benefits could be obtained. Thenceforth, North Korea accelerated provocations and pursued recognition as a significant nuclear state since it viewed the US ‘hostile policy’ as having intensified. As international calls for its denuclearization heightened, the DPRK was determined to assert its status as a significant international actor in the face of an external environment that it felt was evermore unwilling to accommodate its interests. ⁸⁵ James A. Kelly, ‘Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Programs’, testimony by James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 15 July 2004, available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm (accessed 22 December 2022). ⁸⁶ US Assistant Secretary of State (interview, 2019). ⁸⁷ Although in September 2004, then North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations, Pak Gil Yon, denied any such strategy, future chapters outline a pattern of North Korean provocations in US election years, before abstaining from further provocations in the immediate prelude to an election. See: Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, 107; Anne Wu, ‘What China Whispers to North Korea’, Washington Quarterly, 28(2), 2005, 35–48. ⁸⁸ Choe Su Hon, ‘Statement by H.E. Mr. Choe Su Hon’, United Nations General Assembly, 27 September 2002; see also: KCNA, ‘U.S. “North Korean Human Rights Act” Flailed’, 5 October 2004.

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A fully fledged nuclear weapons state: The second phase North Korea remained interested in normalizing relations with the United States, particularly owing to the resultant status benefits, but would only re-enter the SixParty Talks if the United States did not ‘slander’ the DPRK’s ‘system’—an adjective which the DPRK would define—and, as such, the DPRK could ‘respect and treat [the US] as a friend’.⁸⁹ Only a few days after this announcement, however, the United States would rub salt further into the wound. Newly appointed US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, described the DPRK—together with Iran, Cuba, Belarus, and Zimbabwe—as ‘outposts of tyranny’, arguing that the United States must ‘insist that Iran and North Korea abandon their nuclear weapons’.⁹⁰ North Korea had been bestowed with another negative social label. Deeming the United States to have vilified its status once more, Pyongyang self-declared its withdrawal from the SixParty Talks, threatening additional, unknown, nuclear development if denunciations continued.⁹1 The value North Korea placed on its social status was evident in a statement by the DPRK’s Foreign Ministry on 31 March 2005, which publicly acknowledged, for the first time, that the DPRK had ‘become a full-fledged nuclear weapons state’ and would only return to the Six-Party Talks given an ‘end to the growing U.S. nuclear threat’.⁹2 Until that point, the DPRK had either denied its nuclear development— up to the HEU revelation in 2002—or adopted an approach of neither confirm nor deny. Here, however, was an open admission of North Korea’s self-perceived status and future aspirations. Although it was yet to test a nuclear device, with its indigenous nuclear capabilities far from perfected, this announcement weakened the global nuclear order as evidence of the DPRK’s past export of nuclear material to Libya and Pakistan became apparent and the possibility of a bespoke nuclear deal between the United States and India—a NWS and non-NPT signatory—became ever more likely. North Korea’s declaration was also a means of leveraging the Six-Party Talks to pursue bilateral dialogue with the United States, and receive pledges of concessions, whilst refusing to compromise on its nuclear development. With China and the United States failing to induce North Korea to return to the Talks, Kim Jong Il announced how the DPRK would only do so if ‘the United States firmly recognizes North Korea as a partner and respects it’.⁹3 Senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Nam, argued likewise: ‘if the United States recognizes our ⁸⁹ KCNA, ‘U.S. Congress Delegation Leaves’, 15 January 2005. ⁹⁰ Condoleezza Rice, ‘Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-Designate Dr. Condoleezza Rice’, US Department of State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 18 January 2005, available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/40991.htm (accessed 22 December 2022). For the DPRK’s denunciation of Rice’s rhetoric, see KCNA, ‘Spokesman for DPRK FM Blasts U.S. State Secretary’s Reckless Remarks’, 17 March 2005. ⁹1 KCNA, ‘DPRK on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-Party Talks for Indefinite Period’, 10 February 2005. ⁹2 KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Denuclearization of Korea’, 31 March 2005. ⁹3 Norimitsu Onishi, ‘Kim Jong Il Signals Readiness to Resume Nuclear Arms Talks’, New York Times, 18 June 2005.

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system and institution, we too will treat it as a friend’.⁹⁴ Fearing the consequences of an unrestrained nuclear North Korea, the United States stressed that it would recognize the sovereignty of, and not invade, the DPRK and hold bilateral talks within the six-party framework.⁹⁵ These claims paid dividends: on 9 July, the DPRK confirmed its return.⁹⁶ North Korea’s behaviour during the first three years of the Six-Party Talks underscores how, by doggedly emphasizing the value of social recognition as an equal negotiating partner of the United States, it could secure a US commitment towards recognizing its sovereign status. The DPRK could hold the United States accountable to these pledges whilst maintaining its security ambitions around what it claimed was a purely defensive pursuit of nuclear weapons. Regarding North Korea’s objectives during this time, a British diplomat surmised how: what it wants, is, crucially […] respect and security. It has, over a long period, formed the belief that the only way to achieve these things is to develop a credible nuclear deterrent: it simply doesn’t believe that the international community will ever be nice to it unless it can defend itself.⁹⁷

Such defence was not limited to physical defence. North Korea was also concerned with defending its self-perceived status. Pursuing defence through developing a nuclear deterrent, as the framework of strategic delinquency shows, was concurrent with its social objectives of garnering recognition as an equal and sovereign state and significant international actor. In relation to the latter, the DPRK wished to gain status as a self-declared nuclear state that had nuclearized outside of the nonproliferation regime, in the face of opprobrium from the United States and global nuclear order.

Second time lucky? Four more years of ABC The rhetoric of regime change would dampen under the second Bush administration, even if its policy did not revert to the status quo ante, namely, the engagement of the Clinton administration. The United States demonstrated a greater willingness to offer potential normalization of relations in exchange for North Korean denuclearization.⁹⁸ Tit-for-tat diplomacy, witnessed during the first nuclear crisis, took centre stage during the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks. The US commitment towards ⁹⁴ J. Chang, ‘U.S. Ready to Respect N. Korea in Nuclear Negotiations’, Yonhap, 20 June 2005. ⁹⁵ Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the USA, ‘Six-Party Talks to Resume this Month’, 10 June 2005; KCNA, ‘Contacts between Heads of DPRK and U.S. Delegations to Sixth-Party Talks Made’, 11 July 2005. ⁹⁶ KCNA, ‘Spokesman for DPRK FM on Contact between Heads of DPRK and U.S. Dels’, 11 July 2005. ⁹⁷ UK diplomat (interview, 2019). ⁹⁸ Christopher Hill, who commenced as US negotiator to the SPT in the fourth round, on 26 July 2005, was eager to ensure that subsequent rounds ‘would not be a carbon copy of the previous three rounds’. See: Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 377.

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bilateral US–DPRK dialogue and its affirmation against the pursuit of regime change saw the North Korean Foreign Ministry respond with norm-compliant rhetoric, stressing how the DPRK did not ‘intend to keep [its nuclear weapons] permanently’ and would abandon its nuclear programme were the United States ‘open to the relations of peaceful co-existence’.⁹⁹ An increasingly common theme in statements from the North Korean regime at the time, however, related to the sequencing of any denuclearization. Here, the United States and the DPRK were at loggerheads: Washington was willing to improve ties with Pyongyang only after the North had engaged in verified dismantlement of its nuclear programme. Pyongyang insisted on the reverse, namely, that normalization of relations would be a precondition to any nuclear concessions. Such variation in sequencing would hamper subsequent rounds of Talks, and future US–DPRK dialogue.1⁰⁰ A cynical reading of North Korea’s behaviour could contend that it was never ‘truly interested in better relations with the US on anything other than its own terms’.1⁰1 According to a South Korean negotiator, North Korea ‘didn’t care about status […] all they want is real nuclear weapons to rely on in a time of crisis, as a marker of deterrence against the US’.1⁰2 Yet, were the benefits of elevated status, brought by normalized relations, merely by-products of gaining nuclear deterrence? Questioning such views, a former Professor at Kim Il Sung University argued how ‘improving ties with the United States was unquestionably the number one priority for North Korea. The fact that the DPRK was willing to endure the awkward dialogue structure of the Six-Party Talks indicated just how important contact with the US was to North Korea’ for international and domestic gain, as would be reflected in North Korea’s later actions.1⁰3

Waiting for benefits: ‘Commitment for commitment, action for action’ Given North Korea’s reticence towards denuclearization, the signing of the Joint Statement at the second phase of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks, on 19 September 2005, was surprising, offering one of the hitherto clearest definitions of just what denuclearization might entail. The six parties affirmed the goal of the ‘verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner’. In return for the North’s commitment to abandoning existing nuclear weapons programmes, complying with IAEA safeguards, and returning to the NPT, the five parties would provide benefits. The United States agreed to normalize relations and restated its lack of intention to invade or attack the DPRK. South Korea, too, agreed not to receive ⁹⁹ KCNA, ‘DPRK FM on Government’s Stand for Peace and Stability on Korean Peninsula’, 31 July 2005. 1⁰⁰ As Chapter 6 argues, these divergent logics would also obstruct negotiations between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in 2018 and 2019. 1⁰1 US official (interview, 2019). 1⁰2 ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁰3 Embassy Seoul, WikiLeaks Cable: 06SEOUL498, 14 February 2006.

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or deploy nuclear weapons on the Peninsula, in line with the 1992 Joint Declaration, and the six parties pledged to replace the Korean War Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace treaty.1⁰⁴ Yet, amidst supposed agreement, disagreement also abounded. Considering the DPRK’s insistence on its right to peaceful nuclear energy, the parties could not concur on an ‘appropriate time’ to discuss the provision of LWRs. Whilst the United States insisted that they would only be provided after the DPRK had eliminated its nuclear programmes, the DPRK desired LWRs before any dismantlement took place.1⁰⁵ Central to this Joint Statement was the clause of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action’. The five parties would take simultaneous steps in offering concessions to the DPRK after the North had taken steps vis-à-vis its nuclear programme. North Korea would exploit this logic during the second nuclear crisis and beyond, maintaining its opposition towards calls for unilateral disarmament. Was the 19 September declaration a ‘fundamental breakthrough’, signalling the DPRK’s ‘willingness to relinquish the nuclear option’?1⁰⁶ Alternatively, was North Korea ‘ready to abandon their nuclear programme on the condition that they could hide it’?1⁰⁷ A former US intelligence official emphasized the rarity of the DPRK denuclearizing even when its nuclear capabilities were far from extensive: Pyongyang would simply ‘wait for the benefits’.1⁰⁸ Yet, these perspectives need not be in tension. Although the Joint Statement saw a de-escalation in the Bush administration’s rhetoric of regime change, it only reasserted the United States’ impatience at reaching the outcome of North Korea’s denuclearization.1⁰⁹ Whilst the Statement – and Pyongyang’s pledges therein – provided one means for North Korea to earn the status of responsible non-nuclear weapon state in all but name, the agreement ‘began to fall apart almost literally before the ink was dry’.11⁰ It was ill timed, amidst a crisis within the nuclear order. The May 2005 NPT RevCon revealed the impasse between members of the non-proliferation regime regarding how to withhold the nuclear aspirations of non-NPT signatories, especially the now former signatory of the DPRK. The five NWS seemed equally ambivalent about their own commitments to universal disarmament, given ongoing preparations for the US–India civilian nuclear deal, which would be signed two months later. Would the ‘Indian option’ be available to North Korea, namely, ‘achieve normalization and a peace regime while keeping even a small number of nuclear weapons’?111 Expectedly, North Korea was dissatisfied with the US–India agreement. North Korean officials argued to their US counterparts that ‘you get along with India and Pakistan, and

1⁰⁴ US Department of State, ‘Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing’, 19 September 2005, available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm (accessed 6 January 2023) 1⁰⁵ KCNA, ‘Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Six-Party Talks’, 21 September 2005. 1⁰⁶ Chinese analyst (interview, 2019). 1⁰⁷ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁰⁸ US intelligence official (interview, 2019). 1⁰⁹ WikiLeaks: The Podesta Emails, No. 56939, 4 August 2009. 11⁰ Chinoy, Meltdown, 251. 111 Embassy Seoul, WikiLeaks Cable: 07SEOUL2696, 5 September 2007.

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they have nuclear weapons, and whether you like it or not, we’re going to outlast you, and you’re going to get used to it’.112 Following the Joint Statement, the DPRK continued to interpret the notion of ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ on its own terms—a process that would resonate in subsequent years—namely, whereby the United States would withdraw its security guarantee over South Korea through ceasing US–ROK military exercises and removing US troops from the ROK.113 By maintaining this definitional discrepancy between how the DPRK interpreted ‘denuclearization’ to that of the other five parties, Pyongyang could hold out the possibility of further negotiations. Despite the Joint Statement, North Korea’s ambitions of developing a nuclear deterrent whilst garnering recognition as a nuclear state did not subside. As a South Korean nuclear envoy posited, Pyongyang became increasingly unabashed about its nuclear ambitions after 2005. The envoy’s North Korean counterparts would assert how, whilst ‘we have no plan to nuclearise; what you are doing is forcing us to go that way’.11⁴ From North Korea’s perspective, any norm-deviant nuclear behaviour would be a necessary response to the ‘hostility’ of the United States since the United States refused to terminate US–ROK military exercises and would only offer concessions after North Korea took steps towards denuclearization. Immediately after the Joint Statement was signed, however, Pyongyang would be dealt a major blow as it would learn that delinquent actions beyond the nuclear domain would inflict considerable financial costs. Hoping to reduce these costs, it furthered provocations, aiming to counter-stigmatize and worsen the status of the United States.

Only $24 million: ‘Ready to go to nuclear testing’ Central to the ‘hostile policy’, as a South Korean nuclear envoy emphasized, is how the DPRK saw ‘all US attitudes towards North Korea as hostile’, whether criticisms of its nuclear ambitions or condemnation of its domestic human rights abuses.11⁵ For North Korea, any improvement in US–DPRK relations could only ensue were the ‘policy’ erased. What might such a scenario entail? A private conversation between a South Korean official and Kim Kye Gwan revealed how the DPRK would judge ‘whether the US [wa]s serious about abandoning its hostile policy, or not […] on the basis of the providing of light-water reactors’. Yet, for North Korea to comply with nuclear norms, additional benefits would be required such as a peace treaty to end the Korean War.11⁶ US–DPRK dialogue within the Six-Party Talks suddenly stalled following the US government’s decision to freeze over $24million of North Korean assets held in 112 US official (interview, 2019). 113 John S. Park, ‘Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks’, Washington Quarterly, 28(4), 2005, 73– 91; Virginie Grzelczyk, ‘Six-Party Talks and Negotiation Strategy: When Do We Get There?’, International Negotiation, 14(1), 2009, 95–119. 11⁴ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 11⁵ Ibid. 11⁶ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019).

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the Macau-based bank, Banco Delta Asia (BDA). Following prior investigation into North Korea’s clandestine activities as part of the Illicit Activities Initiative, launched in 2003, the United States designated BDA a ‘financial institution of primary money laundering concern’, after North Korean officials had been found to be laundering profits from drug trafficking and currency counterfeiting, and pursuing illicit activities through front companies working via BDA.11⁷ Expectedly, North Korea’s response was far from docile. The Foreign Ministry decried the freeze as an ‘antiDPRK diatribe’ and ‘fabrication solely intended to tarnish the image of the DPRK’.11⁸ Delinquent behaviour thus did not always bring preferred outcomes for North Korea; the international community could not be easily deceived. Given how these sanctions did not specifically concern the North’s nuclear ambitions, the United States insisted that the Six-Party Talks continued. Yet, North Korean officials walked out of the fifth round of talks, which commenced on 9 November, given the United States’ unwillingness to release the funds.11⁹ After KEDO withdrew workers from the LWR construction site in Kumho, North Korea’s provocative rhetoric intensified since the prospect of gaining LWRs had, by then, evaporated.12⁰ Pyongyang accused the United States of having ‘totally scrapped the A[greed] F[ramework] […] causing huge economic losses to the DPRK’.121 Crucially, whilst the United States viewed the BDA issue as separate from that of North Korea’s nuclear development, for the DPRK, the two issues remained intertwined, part and parcel of the US ‘hostile policy’.122 ‘It’s only $24 million’, a South Korean negotiator exclaimed to Kim Kye Gwan in April 2006; ‘you got twenty times more for the inter-Korean summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il in 2000! Why do you take it so seriously?’123 More than just another financial constraint, the owners of the frozen accounts were ‘powerful agencies’ within the North Korean regime. Furthermore, the US decision to freeze the funds entrenched the North’s view of the United States as discriminating against the DPRK, whilst all the while the United States was failing to uphold the global nuclear order and refusing to provide the long-awaited LWRs, which, as a former US intelligence official put it, the DPRK deemed ‘their sovereign right […] to 11⁷ US Department of the Treasury, ‘Finding that Banco Delta Asia SARL Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern’, 20 September 2005. For more on North Korea’s illicit activities, see David L. Asher, ‘Testimony of David L. Asher, Institute for Defense Analysis’, at “North Korea: Illicit Activity Funding the Regime”, Hearing before the Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security Committee’, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 25 April 2006, available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28241/html/CHRG109shrg28241.htm (accessed 22 December 2022). 11⁸ KCNA, ‘U.S. Anti-DPRK Diatribe Assailed’, 18 October 2005; KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Urges U.S. to Lift Financial Sanctions’, 28 February 2006. 11⁹ KCNA, ‘DPRK Delegation Returns from Six-Party Talks’, 12 November 2005; KCNA, ‘Kim Kye Gwan Interviewed in Beijing’, 12 November 2005; Joseph Kahn, ‘North Korea and U.S. Spar, Causing Talks to Stall’, New York Times, 12 November 2005, A6. 12⁰ KEDO formally terminated the LWR project on 31 May 2006. 121 KCNA, ‘KCNA Blasts U.S. and KEDO’s Total Stoppage of LWR Construction’, 6 December 2005; KCNA, ‘Japanese Heavyweight’s Ridiculous Remarks Flayed’, 7 December 2005. 122 David Lague, ‘U.S. Negotiator Urges North Korea to End Standoff on Financial Curbs’, New York Times, 22 December 2006, A5. 123 ROK negotiator (interview, 2019).

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having civilian nuclear energy’. Within the non-proliferation regime, as this official explained, ‘there’s an obligation on the part of nuclear weapons states to provide civilian nuclear assistance to non-nuclear weapons states. You can see where North Korea is on about that.’12⁴ The longer the money remained frozen, the less ashamed Pyongyang would be in violating nuclear norms. Kim Kye Gwan boldly announced to his South Korean counterpart how only one solution to this intractable issue remained: ‘we are ready to go to nuclear testing’.12⁵ North Korea sought to capitalize upon its withdrawal from the NPT by developing nuclear capabilities free from the institutional and normative constraints of the non-proliferation regime. In addition, given how the BDA freeze lowered the DPRK’s status, the North could enhance its nuclear deterrent and force the United States to ‘create the condition[s]’ for its return to the talks, namely, by releasing the funds.12⁶ Meanwhile, North Korea continued to exercise weak rhetorical compliance with the nuclear order by pledging to abide by the Joint Statement. It was a further facet of its negotiating strategy in line with the framework of strategic delinquency. As a South Korean diplomat accurately surmised, ‘when the cost is too high, and when US pressure becomes unbearable, they would pretend to retreat. When things become better, they would proceed, stop, and/or retreat, depending on the situation.’12⁷ By calling on the United States to engage in dialogue whilst feigning its commitment to denuclearization, North Korea could test whether such mock compliance—given the then known nature of the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions, in contrast to the 1990s—would bring benefits, a lesson it could remember for the future. Any mock compliance was temporary, and Kim Jong Il’s commitment to Madeleine Albright six years earlier seemed little more than vacuous words. Despite placing a moratorium on missile testing in 1999, the DPRK fired at least seven missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-2, on 5 July 2006. State media justified the launches as self-defensive manoeuvres without which ‘the US would have’ attacked the DPRK more than once as it had listed the former as part of an ‘axis of evil’ and a ‘target of preemptive nuclear attack’.12⁸ Deeming itself to be free from any NPT obligations, the DPRK, which had also not acceded to the Missile Technology Control Regime, escalated belligerence at will. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1695 condemned the launches; in response, the DPRK derided the resolution as an ‘act of war’ against which it would ‘bolster its war deterrent’.12⁹ Vindicating its provocations by blaming the US ‘hostile policy’, which, according to the DPRK, comprised not only the BDA freeze but also multilateral sanctions banning the selling of missile-related material to the DPRK, North Korea continued 12⁴ US intelligence official (interview, 2019). 12⁵ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). 12⁶ KCNA, ‘To Increase Military Deterrent Is DPRK’s Right for Self-Defense: Kim Yong Nam’, 14 April 2006. 12⁷ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). 12⁸ KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Its Missile Launches’, 7 July 2006. 12⁹ KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measures to Bolster War Deterrent’, 4 October 2006.

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to invoke the defensive nature of its missile and nuclear development. Its highintensity brinkmanship was part of its strategy of delinquency: nuclear development thus became both a defensive end and a means towards recognition as a significant nuclear power—that had nuclearized beyond the NPT—and negotiating partner of the United States. The North hoped that the United States would offer economic and diplomatic normalization.

A now nuclear North Korea: Provocations and rewards It would be incorrect to say that North Korea did not alert the international community of its impending nuclear test. Six days before the test, the Foreign Ministry highlighted the DPRK’s ‘principled stand […] to materialize the denuclearization of the peninsula through dialogue’ but warned how the ‘U.S.[’s] extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure’ would mean that ‘the DPRK will in the future conduct a nuclear test under the condition where safety is firmly guaranteed’.13⁰ The DPRK continued to pledge mock compliance with nuclear norms, particularly global disarmament since it was a commitment that the United States had not fulfilled. On 9 October 2006, North Korea practised what it preached, conducting its first nuclear test and hitherto most attention-seeking manoeuvre. Motivated by domestic and international factors, its Foreign Ministry asserted how the test represented the desires of the ‘KPA [Korean People’s Army] and the people to have powerful self-reliant defence capability’ and was ‘entirely attributable to the U.S. nuclear threat, sanctions and pressure’. A somewhat paradoxical assertion from the Foreign Ministry, however, was that the test would ‘constitute a positive measure’ for implementing the 19 September declaration, abiding by ‘Kim Il Sung’s last instruction’, namely, his ‘will to denuclearize the peninsula through dialogue’.131 When understood through the lens of status, and strategic delinquency framework, these claims are far from illogical. As a South Korean envoy to the Six-Party Talks highlighted: ‘North Korea said that their nuclear weapons would expedite the denuclearization process since North Korea could deal with the US as an equal partner, with equal treatment.’132 Yet, why conduct an only ‘partially successful’ test with a yield of less than 1 kiloton, whilst the Six-Party Talks were ongoing?133 First, ‘in North Korea’s eyes, [the talks] were dead’. The North thus felt that it could breach any agreements at will.13⁴ Second, evidence shows how Kim Jong Il was pressurized into doing so by factions 13⁰ The Foreign Ministry described the ‘grave situation on the Korean Peninsula in which the supreme interests and security of our State are seriously infringed upon and the Korean nation stands at the crossroads of life and death’: ibid. 131 KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. Moves Concerning Its Nuclear Test’, 12 October 2006. 132 ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 133 Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises’, Daedalus, 139(1), 2010, 47. 13⁴ UK diplomat (interview, 2019).

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between and within the Party and the military.13⁵ Whilst North Korea’s negotiating style has been frequently described as beholden to talking points directed from central leadership, whereby power emanates through ‘transmission belts’ from the leader, competing interests of elites prevail.13⁶ A core feature of Kim Jong Il’s rule was prioritizing the military over the Party, exemplified in his ‘military-first’ or songun policy.13⁷ A third explanation for the test was the BDA asset freeze. A former US intelligence official underscored how North Korean officials at the time revealed how the test ‘was because of the Banco Delta Asia [issue] and the feeling that the US was not sincere in its Joint Statement of 2005’.13⁸ Fourth, we must not forget that North Korea was, at least in its own perspective, ready to test a nuclear device in October 2006 in terms of technological development. The nuclear test underscored the importance Pyongyang placed on reciprocity — albeit on the DPRK’s own terms — which was becoming an ongoing feature of the second nuclear crisis. For the North, the US failure to abide by its pledges in the Joint Statement, coupled with the BDA freeze, became core justifications for its delinquency. A former KEDO negotiator supported this view, arguing how North Korea ‘felt there was no benefit […] from continuing to talking to the US, and they wanted to up the ante; so, they doubled down and said, ok, now we’ve got nuclear weapons, it’s going to cost you more’.13⁹ The ‘treasured sword’ of nuclear weapons became a critical brinkmanship tactic to provide Pyongyang with leverage against what it deemed to be an increasingly ‘hostile’ United States.1⁴⁰ As a South Korean nuclear envoy aptly surmised: whenever they make provocations, they get something in return. When the North Koreans blasted the first bomb, the Americans began negotiations […] North Korea believes that this is the way to handle America; by making provocations to try and form a certain atmosphere in which they can have some negotiations in their favour.¹⁴¹

The nuclear test did not just emphasize the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. As one South Korean negotiator argued, whilst the DPRK could have delayed the test ‘if they had a satisfactory deal with the US, they decided that by testing, they would get the upper hand but also take the opportunity to make technical progress in nuclear development’. Confirming Pyongyang’s earlier assertion of its status as a ‘full-fledged nuclear state’, the negotiator stressed how ‘before that [test], they were clearly saying they had a nuclear deterrent, but they wanted others to believe they had the capabilities [so that] they could have a much better deal on the table’. North Korea could 13⁵ Embassy Shanghai, WikiLeaks Cable: 06SHANGHAI6518_a, 13 October 2006. 13⁶ Alexandre Y. Mansourov, ‘Inside North Korea’s Black Box: Reversing the Optics’. In: Kongdan Oh, ed., North Korean Policy Elites (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2004), IV-20. 13⁷ Patrick McEachern, ‘Interest Groups in North Korean Politics’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 8(2), 2008, 242–44. 13⁸ US intelligence official (interview, 2019). 13⁹ KEDO negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁰ US Department of Defense advisor (interview, 2019). 1⁴1 ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019).

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‘expect to have different treatment when the US knew they had nuclear weapons’, marked by recognition as a significant and equal nuclear state to the United States.1⁴2 Compared to previous occasions, the international community would not be as forthcoming in rewarding North Korea’s delinquency, testament to a process of learning on the part of the United States and South Korea of how to deal with a now nuclear DPRK. Predictably, the DPRK dismissed the subsequent infliction of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, which called for its return to the Six-Party Talks. Instead, the DPRK paid lip-service to nuclear norms, emphasizing its commitments to global disarmament and how it would only return to the Talks were the BDA funds unfrozen.1⁴3 Somewhat surprisingly, the North pledged not to conduct further nuclear tests ‘unless the US harasses the North’.1⁴⁴ The US ‘hostile policy’ thus had instrumental value as an expedient justification for delinquency, allowing the DPRK to exploit its negative status. As a US official involved in the SPT corroborated, North Korea wanted maximum pay-offs from minimal concessions: ‘no sanctions; give us a peace treaty; and then we’ll address your concerns, which is explicitly what they said’.1⁴⁵

‘Not a tribunal against North Korea’ ‘The Six Party Talks are not a tribunal against North Korea’, North Korean officials lamented to their South Korean counterparts.1⁴⁶ Despite Pyongyang’s frustration with being at and on the negotiating table, the other parties, particularly the United States, were desperate for the North to return to talks. For Mitchell Reiss, KEDO’s chief negotiator, a key ‘procedural shortcoming’ of the Six-Party Talks was that North Korea would only ‘emerg[e] from its shell [at the talks] after many months of cajoling, flattery, and outright bribery by some of the other parties’.1⁴⁷ The United States wished to sustain its reputation as upholding the liberal international order and did not want to be seen by domestic audiences as being unable to bring North Korea back into compliance with nuclear norms. A clear status discrepancy was at stake. North Korea perceived itself as a state that had developed indigenous nuclear capability outside of the non-proliferation regime, dissatisfied with the regime’s bifurcation between NWS, NNWS, and non-NPT signatories. Pyongyang sought to leverage its self-perceived nuclear status to gain bilateral negotiations with the United States, even if the other five parties viewed this status as a 1⁴2 ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁴3 UNSCR 1718, S/RES/1718 (2006), 14 October 2006; KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Totally Refutes UNSC “Resolution”’, 18 October 2006. 1⁴⁴ Xinhua, ‘China Envoy Holds Talks with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang’, 19 October 2006; Xinhua, ‘N. Korea Won’t Stage Second Nuke Test unless Provoked’, 22 October 2006. 1⁴⁵ US official (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁶ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁷ Mitchell B. Reiss, ‘North Korea: Getting to Maybe?’, In: Patrick M. Cronin, (ed.), Double Trouble: Iran and North Korea as Challenges to International Security (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 111.

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negative attribute. Trilateral talks between the United States, the DPRK, and China in October and November 2006, saw Pyongyang agree to re-enter the talks only if it could garner bilateral dialogue with the United States. This insistence on bilateral dialogue emphasized the DPRK’s desire to be recognized as an equal negotiating partner of the United States: the North ultimately viewed multilateral talks as hindering the pursuit of its self-interests.1⁴⁸ Any hint of North Korea re-joining the talks, however, would remain conditional on US action with respect to the frozen BDA funds, exemplified by the short-lived recommencement of the Six-Party Talks on 18 December 2006. Without their release, North Korea would not offer one iota of concessions. North Korean statements demonstrate how senior officials may have been aware of the United States’ dilemma between incentivizing the North into complying with nuclear norms and the need for any denuclearization process to begin with concessions from Pyongyang. Kim Kye Gwan reaffirmed how the DPRK saw the United States as ‘jointly undertaking dialogue and pressure, carrots and sticks. And we are standing against them with dialogue and shields, and by a shield we are saying we will further improve our deterrent.’1⁴⁹ Kim’s statement further attests to the importance of reciprocity in North Korea’s negotiating tactics during the crisis, given Pyongyang’s self-perception as a nuclear state. The North’s obstinacy to verbal or tangible concessions, however, would not last long, for it would learn that to gain any positive outcomes, it would need to compromise.

‘One meeting away from a breakthrough’: The third phase Bemoaning that ‘it sometimes seems as if the sole objective of the Six-Party Talks is to get Pyongyang simply to show up’, Reiss’s cynicism exemplifies North Korea’s behaviour during the third phase of the crisis, between 2007 and 2009.1⁵⁰ Pyongyang only ‘showed up’ if the other five parties offered prior concessions. Having tested its first nuclear device, albeit with limited success, the DPRK maintained its preference for bilateral talks with the United States but increasingly feigned compliance with nuclear norms. Mock compliance aimed to accelerate dialogue and economic concessions from the United States, especially with the BDA freeze remaining. Whilst tit-for-tat behaviour continued until Pyongyang felt its needs were accommodated, brinkmanship intensified when the DPRK recognized that no further benefits could be gleaned from the talks. Table 4.1 outlines the evolution in North Korea’s behaviour during the third phase.

1⁴⁸ Singaporean official (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁹ Reuters, ‘North Korea Blames Stalled Talks on U.S. Money Curbs’, 22 December 2006. 1⁵⁰ Reiss, ‘North Korea: Getting to Maybe?’, 111.

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Table 4.1 Strategic delinquency in the third phase of the second nuclear crisis Date

US behaviour

North Korean response

Type of behaviour from DPRK

13 February 2007

Joint Statement Pledges to continue US–DPRK bilateral relations, remove DPRK from State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) List, and end Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) Five parties agree to provide energy, economic, and humanitarian aid to DPRK

Joint Statement Pledges to close and seal Yongbyon and reprocessing facility within sixty days, invite IAEA inspections, and declare nuclear programmes in full

Compliant

14 June 2007

Transfers Banco Delta Asia funds to North Korea

Compliant

7 September 2007

In response to North Korea’s pledge, Bush outlines plans for a peace agreement with the DPRK following disarmament

Invites IAEA inspectors to discuss shutdown of operations at Yongbyon; operations suspended in July Pledges to declare its nuclear programmes and disable all existing facilities in return for economic, energy, and humanitarian aid

3 October 2007

Joint Statement Pledges to increase US–DPRK bilateral exchanges, instigates processes to remove the DPRK from the SST list and TWEA in parallel with North Korea’s actions Continues dialogue even after North Korea does not meet the 31 December deadline for its nuclear declaration North Korea presents a declaration of its nuclear stockpile to China; US delists North Korea from the TWEA

Joint Statement Agrees to disable all nuclear facilities and reprocessing plants and provide a complete declaration of all nuclear programmes by end of 2007 Accuses the United States of reneging on its commitments vis-à-vis removal from SST list Agrees to implement 19 September agreement

Compliant

31 December 2007

26 June 2008

Bush notifies Congress of intention to remove the DPRK as a SST

Destroys cooling tower at an atomic reactor at Yongbyon

Compliant

Delinquent

Compliant

A nuclear North Korea: Costs and benefits of delinquency August 2008

Fails to delist the DPRK as a SST within the intended timeframe

11 October 2008

Removes North Korea as a SST

December 2008

Suspends fuel shipments to DPRK given lack of verification commitment

5 April 2009

13–14 April 2009 16 April 2009

29 April 2009

25 May 2009

UNSC condemns Taepodong-II launch

Restarts fuel reprocessing at Yongbyon; IAEA removes seals and surveillance from the reprocessing plant; IAEA inspectors barred from 9 October Resumes disablement of nuclear facilities the next day; allows US and IAEA inspectors to Yongbyon Threatens to adjust disablement of nuclear facilities if aid is suspended Launches Taepodong-II missile, which it claims to be a ‘communications satellite’ Withdraws from Six-Party Talks IAEA inspectors leave DPRK after DPRK ceases cooperation with IAEA

Delinquent

Restarts fuel rod reprocessing at Yongbyon; warns of further missile launches and nuclear tests Conducts second nuclear test

Delinquent

153

Compliant

Delinquent

Delinquent

Delinquent

Delinquent

Source: author.

‘We could get something significant from North Korea’ High-level US–DPRK negotiations in January 2007 saw North Korea agree to re-join the Six-Party Talks, freeze nuclear activity at Yongbyon, allow IAEA monitoring, and halt future illicit activities. These were substantial concessions. In return, the United States would release the Banco Delta Asia funds and provide economic aid. As the Six-Party Talks resumed on 8 February, South Korea agreed to provide heavy fuel oil following the initial freeze at Yongbyon and incentivized the North with a greater quantity of oil should it disable the reactor and declare its nuclear programmes in full.

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The BDA funds were not only a useful bargaining chip for North Korea, but they were also valuable leverage for the international community to induce North Korea into norm compliance. Characterizing the muted optimism in Washington and Seoul, a South Korean negotiator highlighted how, at the time, he thought that ‘with BDA alone, we could get something significant from North Korea’.1⁵1 The five parties seemed to be inching towards their goal of North Korean recompliance with the non-proliferation regime. A further agreement between the six parties, on 13 February 2007, aimed to implement the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 and provided a roadmap to the goals outlined in 2005. The DPRK was given sixty days to close Yongbyon and its reprocessing facility, invite IAEA inspections, and provide a complete declaration of its nuclear programmes. In response, the United States would remove the DPRK from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list and as part of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA); and the five parties agreed to provide economic, energy, and humanitarian aid to the North.1⁵2 In no uncertain terms, North Korea was receiving benefits. Moreover, the social stigma of being listed as an SST would be eliminated, a designation that had long irritated officials in Pyongyang. Underscoring these concerns, the lead North Korean negotiator to the Six-Party Talks, Kim Kye Gwan, argued that ‘the image of North Korea began to be tarnished from the time North Korea was put on the list’. Pyongyang feared that international perceptions of its ‘rogue’ status could ‘be used on them in a bad way by the US, when the US was fighting the war on terrorism’.1⁵3 Yet, espousing a more sceptical view towards the North’s norm compliance, the South Korean official in whom Kim confided asserted that ‘they believed the February 13 2007 agreement was produced after and as a result of the first nuclear test […] when they showed the US the real capability to do harm. The US had no choice but to come [to negotiations].’1⁵⁴ In line with this logic, North Korea was behaving in a strategically delinquent way. Indeed, one additional way to reap rewards was through oscillating between delinquency and compliance. As a Chinese government official stressed, North Korea is akin to ‘a misbehaving child who requires chocolates and patience to induce positive behavio[u]r’.1⁵⁵ The United States granted North Korea its wish. The BDA assets were released after North Korea pledged to use the funds solely for humanitarian and educational purposes. Whilst it would receive the assets much later, their release was more than an act of goodwill from the United States and its allies. Nonetheless, the United States and South Korea overestimated the extent to which the unfreeze would catalyse North Korean nuclear concessions. According to a South Korean negotiator, ‘when we promised to unfreeze the funds of BDA, we insisted that a [nuclear] unfreeze was not enough. What Kim Kye Gwan agreed to was the disablement of Yongbyon

1⁵1 1⁵2 1⁵3 1⁵⁴ 1⁵⁵

ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). US Department of State, ‘North Korea—Denuclearization Action Plan’, 13 February 2007. ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). Ibid. Embassy Moscow, WikiLeaks Cable: 08MOSCOW2856_a, 24 September 2008.

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facilities’.1⁵⁶ As a former KEDO negotiator wryly emphasized: ‘Chris Hill [the lead US negotiator] thought he was one meeting away from a breakthrough [regarding a denuclearization deal] after unfreezing their funds’.1⁵⁷ The United States was desperate for North Korea to remain within the Six-Party Talks. Despite lingering mistrust between the two Koreas and the United States and DPRK, each of the five parties offered different rewards for North Korean acts of norm compliance, even if these actions were easily reversible. Having suspended operations at Yongbyon in July 2007, South Korea provided 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. With the reactor sealed and disabled, the DPRK pledged to declare its nuclear programmes and disable all facilities in return for economic, energy, and humanitarian aid and normalization of relations with the United States. The United States subsequently raised a monumental concession, suggesting a peace treaty to end the Korean War; South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun, proposed a joint inter-Korean economic zone.1⁵⁸ These were no paltry rewards. Hopes were quickly dashed. Israel’s successful air strike on a suspected nuclear reactor in Syria, at al-Kibar, on 16 September 2007, raised suspicions about North Korea’s involvement in the reactor’s construction and nuclear trade with Syria during the 1990s. Whilst these revelations lowered Pyongyang’s international status, the United States would have been unwise to have let such speculation affect the Six-Party Talks. Washington was desperate to continue negotiations since North Korean compliance with nuclear norms was becoming increasingly rare.

False optimism: ‘Getting them off their plutonium programme’ The second phase of the sixth round of Talks, from 27 to 30 September 2007, saw further North Korean compliance with nuclear norms, highlighting the importance of alternating between norm compliance and norm defiance for the DPRK. A Joint Statement of 3 October established the second set of actions to implement those in the 19 September 2005 statement, comprising North Korea’s disablement of all nuclear facilities and reprocessing plants and a complete declaration of all nuclear programmes by the end of the year. In return, in addition to US–DPRK bilateral dialogue, the United States would remove the DPRK from the SST list and terminate the TWEA ‘in parallel with the DPRK’s actions’.1⁵⁹ Pyongyang also committed to enhancing cooperation with Seoul. In a second landmark summit, this time between 1⁵⁶ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁵⁷ KEDO negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁵⁸ The White House, ‘President Bush Meets with South Korean President Roh’, The White House, 7 September 2007. Yet, evidence asserts that inter-Korean mistrust remained even following these suggestions. See Embassy Seoul, WikiLeaks Cable: 07SEOUL3006, 4 October 2007. 1⁵⁹ US Department of State, ‘Six-Party Talks—Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement’, 3 October 2007.

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President Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong Il from 2 to 4 October 2007, the two leaders agreed to implement the SPT statements and pledged non-interference and greater economic cooperation.1⁶⁰ It would, however, be premature to suggest that North Korea had abandoned its goals of developing a sizeable nuclear deterrent whilst normalizing ties with the United States. Whilst Ramon Pacheco Pardo postulates that North Korea’s pursuit of normalization decreased in potency after its first nuclear test, the framework of strategic delinquency highlights how the two goals did not need to be in tension.1⁶1 North Korea wanted to reap the material benefit of deterrence and the social benefit of recognition as a sovereign state, the latter through diplomatic normalization. As Table 4.1 shows, the end of 2007 marked a turning point in North Korea’s behaviour. Its actions became increasingly delinquent, driven by several factors. First, North Korea had failed to deceive the international community: a visit by US experts to Yongbyon in November 2007 found traces of enriched uranium on aluminium tubes. Assessing North Korea’s intentions following this revelation, a senior South Korean negotiator claimed that ‘I suspect Kim Kye Gwan knew that North Korea was trying to hide. From that moment [when US officials were shown the North’s facilities], they thought that even if they abandoned their plutonium programme, they could still pursue a nuclear weapons programme without being detected.’1⁶2 This observation demonstrates how North Korea may have implemented lessons from its earlier actions, namely, pledging to halt plutonium reprocessing at Yongbyon but developing nuclear weapons through other, covert means. Whilst it may have learnt the limits of deception earlier in the crisis, it did not abandon such acts. A second North Korean concern came from the slow US progress in removing the DPRK as an SST and from the TWEA. In return, Pyongyang did not declare its nuclear programmes by the 31 December deadline.1⁶3 Nearly a year later, the Foreign Ministry claimed that the North was still ‘work[ing] towards’ dismantling Yongbyon, which it aimed to complete by October 2008.1⁶⁴ Expectedly, any progress towards this objective would be contingent upon North Korea deeming the United States to have lessened its ‘hostile policy’. Tit-for-tat diplomacy between the DPRK and the United States became more pronounced throughout 2008. Having declared its nuclear stockpile on 26 June, the United States removed the DPRK from the TWEA, and Bush notified Congress of his intention to remove the DPRK as an SST.1⁶⁵ In a visual response of norm compliance, North Korea destroyed a cooling tower at an atomic reactor at Yongbyon on 1⁶⁰ ‘Declaration on the Advancement of South–North Korea Relations, Peace and Prosperity’, 4 October 2007. 1⁶1 Ramon Pacheco Pardo, North Korea–US Relations under Kim Jong Il: The Quest for Normalization (New York: Routledge, 2014), 118. 1⁶2 ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁶3 KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Implementation of October 3 Agreement’, 4 January 2008. 1⁶⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Press Communique of the Heads of Delegation Meeting’, 12 July 2008. 1⁶⁵ US Department of State, ‘North Korean Six-Party Talks and Implementation Activities’, 31 July 2008; US Department of State, ‘North Korea: Presidential Action on State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)’ 26 June 2008; George W. Bush, ‘President Bush Discusses North Korea’, The White House, 26 June 2008.

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28 June, in full view of international observers.1⁶⁶ Pyongyang’s willingness for bilateral dialogue with the United States was becoming more apparent. Yet, why exercise such a highly optical act? Was the DPRK demonstrating a ‘show of nuclear accord’, as The Washington Post reported, or merely pretending to comply with nuclear norms? Whilst North Korea had not abandoned its nuclear ambitions by any means, one US negotiator described the event as a ‘symbol that somehow, we were getting them off their plutonium programme’ and that Washington was able ‘sabotage’ Pyongyang’s plutonium and HEU production.1⁶⁷ Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to conclude that the North deemed the ‘hostile policy’ to have abated. With the contents of the ‘policy’ determined by Pyongyang, when it deemed the ‘policy’ to heighten, it would adjust its brinkmanship tactics—between ‘low’ and ‘high’ intensity—accordingly.1⁶⁸

No carte blanche: The problems of verification From August 2008, Pyongyang’s delinquency intensified as it increasingly realized how continued participation in the Six-Party Talks would not bring about its desired outcomes, no matter how much it exploited the multilateral format for bilateral dialogue with the United States. As a South Korean official emphasized, this was a ‘cycle of negotiations, provocations, then negotiations. This would go on and on.’ At its core, ‘if the prospects of negotiations were dim, then they would shift to brinkmanship to cause other states to make concessions’.1⁶⁹ Such cyclical behaviour became especially prominent from mid-to-late-2008, when the DPRK would exercise brinkmanship to seek the attention of the United States without compromising on its nuclear goals. Interviews with South Korean and US negotiators at the time underscore how whilst the DPRK’s behaviour became increasingly anticipated, it remained unclear as to whether North Korea would uphold any previous agreements within the SPT, given its ongoing criticisms of the United States’ failure to fulfil its past commitments: ‘North Korea would continue with the Six-Party Talks but make further demands to maximise its awards at each stage.’1⁷⁰ After the United States did not delist the DPRK as an SST in its pledged forty-fiveday time frame, the DPRK resumed fuel reprocessing at Yongbyon, removed IAEA seals and surveillance, and, on 9 October, barred IAEA inspectors.1⁷1 Not only did Kim Kye Gwan’s earlier words become clearer regarding how North Korea viewed its

1⁶⁶ Choe Sang-Hun, ‘North Korea Destroys Tower at Nuclear Site’, New York Times, 28 June 2008; Blaine Harden and Stella Kim, ‘N. Korea Razes Cooling Tower in Show of Nuclear Accord’, Washington Post, 28 June 2008, A10. 1⁶⁷ US negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁶⁸ Pacheco Pardo, North Korea–US Relations under Kim Jong Il, 57–63. 1⁶⁹ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 1⁷⁰ Embassy Shanghai, WikiLeaks Cable: 07SHANGHAI416_a, 5 July 2007. 1⁷1 KCNA, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesman on DPRK’s Decision to Suspend Activities to Disable Nuclear Facilities’, 26 August 2008; IAEA, ‘IAEA Inspectors No Longer Permitted Access to Yongbyon’, 9 October 2008; Reuters, ‘U.S. Won’t Take N. Korea Off Terrorism List Yet’, 11 August 2008.

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SST status as tarnishing its international image but also, so too did Pyongyang’s conceptualization of international relations in social terms. The North feared that such negative status could inflict social and material costs. Thus, it continued its nuclear ambitions, giving the United States little choice but to heed its demands.1⁷2 Eventually, the United States removed the DPRK as an SST on 11 October, a manoeuvre reciprocated the next day with the DPRK announcing the disabling of its nuclear facilities and re-entry of IAEA and US inspectors to Yongbyon. Pyongyang was reacting with alacrity: it was ‘desperate for a deal’ with Washington owing to the ensuing benefits, not least possible diplomatic recognition.1⁷3 Mock compliance, masking delinquency, demonstrated how the DPRK sought to enhance its image in the eyes of the other five parties, whilst ‘retain[ing] a hedge to be able to restart the facilities if the [October 3 2007] agreement f[e]ll through’.1⁷⁴ These two goals were anything but mutually exclusive. Drawing upon the collapse of the Agreed Framework, the DPRK had learnt to ready itself if the United States revoked any of its commitments. Any de-escalation in North Korean delinquency would be short-lived. Delinquency would accelerate dramatically from late 2008 owing to deepening cleavages within the Six-Party Talks regarding disablement and verification of the DPRK’s nuclear facilities. Pyongyang insisted that any verification would be minimal, limited to ‘field visit, confirmation of document and interview with technicians’ specifically at Yongbyon.1⁷⁵ In contrast, the United States called for the complete verification and dismantlement of all declared and undeclared facilities and the collection of samples from these facilities. This demand was unacceptable to the DPRK: doing so would expose its ongoing nuclear development and violations of previous commitments to comply with the non-proliferation regime. Washington’s insistence on such sequencing led to the DPRK slowing the pace at which it unloaded fuel rods, criticizing the delayed receipt of financial compensation from the five parties as outlined in the February and October six-party agreements.1⁷⁶ A US official recounted how North Korean officials ‘were saying: “we can’t give you a carte blanche to look at every facility that is suspicious, but why not start with what you had [in the declaration], and we can increase the scope in the future”’. As was fundamental to North Korea’s negotiating strategy, it would urge the United States to adopt ‘countermeasures’ following ‘very small steps’ on its part.1⁷⁷ The DPRK’s fundamental unwillingness towards complete verification and declaration of its facilities and its insistence on a much lengthier 1⁷2 ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 1⁷3 ROK negotiator (interview, 2019); see also KCNA, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesman on DPRK’s Will to Cooperate in Verification of Objects of Nuclear Disablement’, 13 October 2008. 1⁷⁴ Report of the visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK), Pyongyang, and the Nuclear Center at Yongbyon, February 12–16, 2008: Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘North Korea and Its Nuclear Program—a Reality Check. A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations’, United States Senate, 23 October 2008, 7, available at: https://fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/dprk.pdf (accessed 22 December 2022). 1⁷⁵ KCNA, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesman Holds Some Forces Accountable for Delayed Implementation of Agreement’, 12 November 2008. 1⁷⁶ The ‘delayed economic compensation’ referred to the energy assistance the DPRK claimed it would receive from the five parties following the freeze of the Yongbyon reactor in July 2007. See Peter Crail, ‘North Korea Hedges on Nuclear Sampling’, Arms Control Today, 38(1), December 2008, 58. 1⁷⁷ US negotiator (interview, 2019).

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process of sequencing only aroused suspicions of its intentions. Yet, this time, highlevel dialogue with the United States, which had become an all-too-frequent reward for delinquency, would not be a sufficient concession for North Korea. This is not to say, however, that the DPRK had abandoned its goal of normalizing relations with the United States. More specifically, North Korea’s strategic engagement with international order was premised upon how any benefits from its actions—norm-deviant or compliant—could not outweigh the costs. North Korea was adopting a rational choice strategy. The costs of verification far surpassed the benefits of any bilateral dialogue to induce US accommodation of the North’s demands. US–DPRK talks in October 2008 merely achieved an ‘oral understanding’: all parties to the SPT would provide economic and energy assistance to the DPRK if it disabled its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. This ‘understanding’ gave false hopes of a consensus amongst the five parties; the reality was far from it. Whilst China and Russia continued to provide economic and energy provisions irrespective of progress at Yongbyon, the United States, keen to avoid a repetition of the Agreed Framework (rewarding Pyongyang without any concessions in return), suspended fuel shipments in December 2008, a manoeuvre which catalysed rhetorical and visible provocations from the North.1⁷⁸

‘These guys won’t implement’: When dialogue collapses The United States knew well that any reduction in concessions to the DPRK would instigate provocations, especially given how the DPRK framed the US ‘hostile policy’ as encompassing a range of facets, whether financial sanctions, verbal condemnations (nuclear and non-nuclear-related), or the withdrawal of material concessions. Although previous occurrences had prompted low levels of brinkmanship—such as provocative rhetoric—this time, there was a marked escalation in brinkmanship. The North restarted nuclear operations at Yongbyon, a move which would precipitate the eventual collapse of the Six-Party Talks.1⁷⁹ Interviews with then serving US and South Korean officials reveal a consensus regarding the rapid breakdown of the SPT over the single issue of verification. A US negotiator insisted how the ‘failure of the Talks lay on the North Korean side’.1⁸⁰ As another US official highlighted, the DPRK ‘would not agree to inspection, verification, and an inspection protocol that would address undeclared sites’ and thus ‘all of our efforts to get negotiations started to fall apart’.1⁸1 Certainly, there were strong domestic motivations for Washington to reach an agreement with Pyongyang, given strident international criticism of US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.1⁸2 Yet, the difficulties of negotiating with North Korea 1⁷⁸ US Department of State, ‘Daily Press Briefing’, Sean McCormack’, Spokesman, Washington, DC, 12 December 2008. 1⁷⁹ Yoo Choonsik, ‘N. Korea Threatens to Slow Nuclear Disablement’, Reuters, 14 December 2008. 1⁸⁰ US negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁸1 US NSC official (interview, 2019). 1⁸2 Notably, Christopher Hill would later serve as US Ambassador to Iraq from 2009 to 2010.

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would affect even the most experienced negotiators. As one US Track 1.5 negotiator emphasized, after the Six-Party Talks were over, lead US negotiator, Christopher Hill, admitted: ‘I’m glad I left the job […] these guys [the DPRK] won’t implement.’1⁸3 The South Korean perspective corroborated the idea that, as one South Korean negotiator highlighted, verification was a ‘direct cause of the collapse’ of the Six-Party Talks.1⁸⁴ From the outset of talks, ‘North Korea didn’t like the six-party format. They preferred to have bilateral negotiations with the Americans’, and when they did not gain their preferred outcomes, they would opine that ‘the Six-Party Talks are dead’.1⁸⁵ Multilateral talks may have offered the DPRK an opportunity to negotiate with the United States, China, and South Korea, but the North’s dissatisfaction was hardly surprising, given how the aim of the forum was to instigate its denuclearization. Visits by US scientists to the DPRK’s nuclear facilities in 2008 reinforced the divergent US and North Korean approaches towards the sequencing of verification. One such visit confirmed US suspicions of the DPRK’s covert pursuit of HEU. As a former South Korean negotiator stressed, ‘North Korea believed that by going so far as showing their missile plant and giving samples […] they could clarify US suspicions; but it only enhanced them. It backfired.’1⁸⁶ From Pyongyang’s perspective, the ‘action-for-action’ principle of the SPT joint statements and lack of economic benefits from the five parties, especially the United States, only furthered its opposition to demands for verification. If Pyongyang could not offer meagre concessions on its nuclear programme and gain economic assistance and recognition as a dialogue partner of the United States in return, what was the purpose of the talks? This mentality took shape in 2009, as North Korea realized how further negotiations regarding verification would fail to achieve its demands. The very idea of verification was antithetical to its interests: ‘if they agreed to verification; they would have to give up [their nuclear weapons and ambitions]’.1⁸⁷ As the Six-Party Talks reached an impasse, global attraction diverted to domestic politics within North Korea. Speculation of Kim Jong Il’s health fomented following a stroke in mid-August 2008, with some negotiators concluding that ‘decision making was breaking down’1⁸⁸ within the regime, given Kim’s ‘failure to anoint a successor’.1⁸⁹ An ailing leader triggered questions of domestic instability between competing interest groups, such as the military and Party, and the future of the then-ongoing Six-Party Talks. Kim Jong Il had hitherto cemented a reputation as a ‘micromanaging’ workaholic, with one assessment referring to him as akin to ‘Jimmy Carter on an authoritarian tear’.1⁹⁰ A further international concern arose from changes in North Korea’s external geopolitical environment. With the conclusion of Bush’s presidency,

1⁸3 Track 1.5 official (interview, 2019). 1⁸⁴ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 1⁸⁵ Ibid. 1⁸⁶ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁸⁷ US official (interview, 2019). 1⁸⁸ US negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁸⁹ Embassy Seoul, WikiLeaks Cable: 08SEOUL1020_a, 20 May 2008. 1⁹⁰ Peter Maass, ‘The Last Emperor’, New York Times Magazine, 19 October 2003, 38; see also: Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 222.

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the election of the Democrat Barack Obama as his successor on 4 November 2008 portended a less pugnacious US foreign policy towards the DPRK. Only months earlier, however, the arrival of the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration in Seoul would undo past attempts at engaging with the North by his predecessors, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. In his ‘Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness’ plan of 2008, Lee pledged to increase the North’s gross domestic GDP per capita to $3000 only if the North took active steps towards denuclearization.1⁹1 Expectedly, Pyongyang rebuffed this manoeuvre, and Lee’s disdain for engagement strengthened. Everything that the United States had ‘struggled, schemed, and bargained to achieve’ throughout the SPT process ‘would be jeopardised’.1⁹2 Even US officials recognized the North’s frustrations. As one exclaimed, ‘it’s not a one-sided history […] Lee Myung-bak tore up the 2007 North-South deal that was negotiated when the Bush government took over.’1⁹3 A role reversal in the US–ROK alliance was unfolding. Whilst the Bush administration’s policies were arguably tempered, albeit minimally, by the engagement-orientated approaches of Kim and Roh; now, Washington, as the stronger alliance partner, would have to manage Seoul’s aversion to engagement. North Korea’s conceptualization of the US ‘hostile policy’ expanded during this time to encompass the broader US-led international order. With new administrations in Seoul and Washington, the moment was opportune for Pyongyang to test how its adversaries would respond by launching an Unha-2 rocket carrying an ‘experimental communications satellite’ on 5 April 2009.1⁹⁴ A UN Security Council President Statement condemned the launch for testing technology which, if developed, could be used for launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. The infliction of multilateral economic sanctions on the DPRK looked likely. In earlier phases of the second nuclear crisis, the DPRK feigned compliance with nuclear norms to reap potential benefits. This time, as Pyongyang’s frustration with the SPT reached an apotheosis, it declared its permanent withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, claiming that they had had ‘lost the meaning of their existence’.1⁹⁵ Yet, as evidence underscores, it was never enamoured with the forum from the beginning.

Clean slates: Defending the supreme interests By 2009, North Korea was well versed at reneging from agreements and institutionalized orders of its own accord. Its not unexpected withdrawal from the SPT had a comparable aim to its abrogation from the NPT, namely, to free itself from any 1⁹1 For an overview of this policy, see Suh Jae Jean, The Lee Myung-Bak Government’s North Korea Policy: A Study on Its Historical and Theoretical Foundations (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009), 7–19. 1⁹2 Chinoy, Meltdown, 374. 1⁹3 US Track 1.5 official (interview, 2019). 1⁹⁴ KCNA, ‘KCNA on DPRK’s Successful Launch of Satellite Kwangmyongsong-2’, 5 April 2009. 1⁹⁵ KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNSC’s “Presidential Statement”’, 14 April 2009.

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commitments by which it was bound whilst party to the respective regime. The reason for the withdrawal, six years after it renounced its membership of the NPT and the IAEA, was due to the lack of concessions received from the other five parties and their refusal to acquiesce to the North’s demands. Coupled with these factors were the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemnation of the missile launch, a conservative administration in Seoul, and new US administration. ‘Kim Jong Il made a very conscious decision at the beginning of the Obama administration to destroy the previous Six-Party Talks, in order to start afresh with Obama.’1⁹⁶ Analogous to when Pyongyang waited for Bush’s re-election in 2004, ‘they decided to reset the terms of the debate’, given the change in US administration and likely change of policy.1⁹⁷ ‘The slate was wiped clean’, and the DPRK could recalculate its behavioural strategies, especially as continued dialogue was failing to provide any positive outcomes for Pyongyang unless it committed the ultimate sacrifice of agreeing to verification.1⁹⁸ One slate that was never wiped clean, however, was the heuristic of the US ‘hostile policy’, the definitional scope of which remained firmly in the North’s hands. Having withdrawn from the SPT, the DPRK exploited its negative status amidst its growing reputation as a nuclear norm-violator. On 14 April 2009, it informed the IAEA that it would cease all cooperation with the Agency. The next day, IAEA inspectors removed seals and switched off surveillance cameras at the Yongbyon facilities, before departing the country on 16 April.1⁹⁹ The stage was set for North Korea to further its nuclear development. A general spokesman of the KPA asserted how the DPRK would ‘punish anyone who encroaches upon the sovereignty and dignity of the DPRK’, such as through sanctions imposition.2⁰⁰ Fuel rod reprocessing at Yongbyon restarted in April 2009, together with overt warnings from the regime of future missile and nuclear tests ‘to defend its supreme interests’.2⁰1 Such warnings were not bluster. The presidency of Barack Obama—who had only been in power for four months—would commence with a bang. The DPRK conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May and, unlike previous provocations, did not wait for the United States to respond with conciliatory measures. Rather, state media defended the test as bolstering its ‘nuclear deterrent for self-defence’.2⁰2 Following the low yield of its first nuclear test, the second test represented a critical juncture in North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, especially if normalized ties with the Washington did not materialize. Expectedly, the DPRK blamed the United States for the collapse of the Six-Party Talks. As senior WPK official, Kim Yong Nam, made clear in August 2009, North Korea’s fundamental frustration with the SPT was that it was disallowed from pursuing nuclear weapons and that, following nuclear and missile tests, UNSC sanctions were imposed. In contrast, ‘the United States, Russia, and China […] had launched 1⁹⁶ 1⁹⁷ 1⁹⁸ 1⁹⁹ 2⁰⁰ 2⁰1 2⁰2

US NSC official (interview, 2019). US Department of Defense advisor (interview, 2019). US official (interview, 2019). IAEA, ‘IAEA Inspectors Depart DPRK’, 16 April 2009. KCNA, ‘KPA General Staff Spokesman Blasts Hostile Forces’ Anti-DPRK Racket’, 18 April 2009. KCNA, ‘UNSC Urged to Retract Anti-DPRK Steps’, 29 April 2009 KCNA, ‘KCNA Report on New Successful Underground Nuclear Test’, 25 May 2009.

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numerous satellites and conducted numerous nuclear tests’. Kim Yong Nam accused the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—also the five NWS—of having ‘killed the Six Party Talks’ by ‘applying a double standard’ to the DPRK. Whilst the North insisted its openness towards dialogue, it specified how ‘the nuclear issue should be discussed between the United States and the DPRK’ since, in the North’s eyes, the ‘hostile policy’ remained an inherent US creation.2⁰3 Unlike the first nuclear crisis, the second nuclear crisis was never resolved by consensus or concessions, given the collapse of the Six-Party Talks after the DPRK’s withdrawal. North Korea was unwilling to pursue diplomatic relations with the United States at the cost of compromising upon its nuclear ambitions. As the framework of strategic delinquency demonstrates, there was a trade-off between delinquency and compliance: delinquency became a reserve option whenever attempts at norm compliance compromised the regime-state’s interests. As Kim Yong Nam asserted, ‘if the United States was unwilling to co-exist with the DPRK’ and ‘continued to make it difficult for the people of North Korea’, the North had no choice but to ‘continue to make missiles and nuclear weapons’.2⁰⁴

Strategic delinquency and the second nuclear crisis The second nuclear crisis was motivated by North Korea’s pursuit of two contradictory goals: diplomatic normalization with the United States and the development of a viable nuclear weapons programme. Whilst these objectives were strange bedfellows in the eyes of the international community, for North Korea, they were anything but odd. In seeking these goals, the DPRK exercised delinquent and norm-compliant behaviour. It criticized US attempts to uphold the global nuclear order through failing to engage in promoting nuclear norms, particularly global nuclear disarmament; capitalized upon fissures within the order—notably in the first and second phases of the crisis—and exposed inconsistencies within US policy towards North Korea during the two Bush administrations. The logic of strategic delinquency was witnessed in multiple instances during the second nuclear crisis. Inflicted with negative status, whether through social labels as a ‘rogue’ state or sanctions imposition, the DPRK leveraged the multilateral Six-Party Talks for bilateral purposes and gained some concessions from the United States, such as its removal as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and pledges of diplomatic normalization, economic, and energy assistance. During the crisis, the DPRK’s attempts to rebuke the United States as an unbenevolent hegemon—through counter-stigmatization—formed one justification for its counter-hegemonic strategies in response to a US foreign policy that contrasted with that of the Clinton administration, especially during and after the Agreed Framework. In so doing, 2⁰3 ‘Meeting with Kim Yong Nam, President, Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Pyongyang’, 4 August 2009, WikiLeaks: The Podesta Emails, No. 56939. 2⁰⁴ Ibid.

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North Korea turned the stigma from its delinquency into a point of social pride, whilst obtaining material benefits. North Korea’s deceptive and norm-transgressive behaviour during the second nuclear crisis both succeeded and floundered in achieving positive outcomes: the former, in terms of its participation in the Six-Party Talks, which it could co-opt—albeit not always successfully—for bilateral purposes; the latter, in one example, in its failure to deceive the United States of its covert HEU programme, which was one catalyst of the crisis. In the second phase, following its self-declaration as a nuclear state in 2005, the DPRK complied with nuclear norms but accelerated provocations after the Banco Delta Asia asset freeze of September 2005 and its first nuclear test of 2006. Over time, Pyongyang would exercise greater norm compliance as it gained confidence in its nuclear status and the deterrent value of its nuclear and missile capabilities. Yet, whilst the DPRK pledged greater norm compliance in the third phase, notably by committing to uphold the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, thereby abiding by nuclear norms, such compliance would be premature. As the five parties insisted on verification mechanisms concerning nuclear dismantlement, the DPRK resorted to delinquency, withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks and conducting its second nuclear test. Acquiescing to such a demand was one step too far for it would have forced the North to concede upon its nuclear aspirations that were gaining traction. Despite its low yield, North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, followed by its second in 2009, were critical to its escalation of brinkmanship and receipt of international attention. As Victor Cha posited, ‘Pyongyang seeks to build a better nuclear weapon and ballistic missile, and there is no substitute for learning by doing.’2⁰⁵ The regime repeatedly emphasized how developing a viable deterrent would resist what it portrayed as an increasingly ‘hostile’ United States, amidst discourse of regime change within the Bush administration. Its sporadic efforts at engaging with the Six-Party Talks, marked by pledges and momentary acts of norm compliance, aimed to distract the other parties from its nuclear development. Corroborating this view, a lead US negotiator to the SPT claimed how the DPRK exercised a ‘deliberate effort […] to create a crisis which they thought they could milk, by getting bigger concessions. They were not going to give up their nuclear weapons.’2⁰⁶ Deterrence, however, cannot explain the true extent of North Korea’s strategic delinquency during the second nuclear crisis; it remained only half of a dual-pronged goal. Were deterrence the sole motivation behind its behaviour, North Korea’s voracious pursuit of international status would not have been as prominent. The regime’s lack of international legitimacy reinforced how ‘it’s no question that status is part of North Korea’s behaviour’ as witnessed in its exasperation with the lack of recognition accorded to it—in line with the DPRK’s perceptions of its own status—throughout the SPT.2⁰⁷ A former US intelligence official stressed how, in discussions with North Korean officials during the crisis, it became increasingly evident that acceptance and

2⁰⁵ Victor D. Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (London: Vintage, 2012), 293. 2⁰⁶ US negotiator (interview, 2019). 2⁰⁷ Ibid.

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recognition as a nuclear state was the DPRK’s ‘overarching goal’, which ‘they mentioned […] in our negotiations, no question, going back to 2003’.2⁰⁸ Deterrence was one pathway towards such recognition: Pyongyang thus had little choice but to ‘blast a bomb and go nuclear, and continue negotiating on that basis; so, that was their strategic decision’.2⁰⁹ Slow to consolidate power, Kim Jong Il was also concerned with domestic stability; the DPRK’s struggling economic development after the famine; and, in his later years, his declining health. Author interviews with elite and non-elite North Korean defectors underscored how, whilst acquiring a nuclear deterrent ensured regime security through bolstering nationalism and popular acquiescence, over time, realization of the financial cost of nuclear development only increased popular scepticism about the regime’s platitudes. Yet, domestic legitimacy alone cannot explain North Korea’s behaviour. Were Kim Jong Il purely concerned with domestic legitimacy, he would have likely pursued rapprochement with the United States—allegedly the lasting wish of Kim Il Sung—at any cost, even that of nuclear development.21⁰ The DPRK’s yearning for international status was reflected in its provocative reactions to denigrations to its status, such as being listed as a State Sponsor of Terrorism or as part of the ‘axis of evil’. The regime remained concerned with how it was perceived by the international community. Amidst intra-regime factionalism whereby ‘some elements of the North Korean government were looking for more isolation, fearing that real contact with the outside world would threaten regime survival’,211 North Korea’s oscillating compliant and deviant behaviour vis-à-vis nuclear norms during the Six-Party Talks highlighted the value the DPRK placed on the possible rewards emanating from beyond the domestic sphere. Over time, however, Pyongyang became unwilling to accept such rewards, such as recognition of its nuclear status, for what it deemed a comparably meagre benefit of dialogue with the United States. It recognized how, having failed both to improve ties with the United States according to its own terms and reap its preferred benefits, it would revert to delinquency, as witnessed in its second nuclear test. The second nuclear crisis underscores how North Korea was fundamentally unwilling to sacrifice nuclear development for the potential benefits of recognition as a sovereign, equal, and significant nuclear state garnered from diplomatic normalization with the United States, especially if the only path to normalization involved verification of its nuclear programmes and facilities according to the United States’ terms. Were Pyongyang to have allowed the collection of samples from its nuclear facilities, any discrepancies found—akin to its incomplete plutonium declaration in 1992—would have imposed additional costs. With the DPRK refusing US overtures for negotiations vis-à-vis verification, hopes of a deal had faded.212

2⁰⁸ US intelligence official (interview, 2019). 2⁰⁹ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 21⁰ Leon V. Sigal, ‘Paved with Good Intentions: Trump’s Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 3(1), 2020, 178. 211 Embassy Moscow, WikiLeaks Cable: 09MOSCOW1216_a, 20 May 2009. 212 US NSC official (interview, 2019).

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Thus, evidence shows how the DPRK’s strategic delinquency during the second nuclear crisis was a product of the lessons learnt from the first nuclear crisis and collapse of the Agreed Framework. The North’s distrust of the United States and its pledges heightened with time. North Korea increasingly recognized that the negative status arising from its withdrawal from institutionalized nuclear regimes and multilateral dialogue and conduct of missile and nuclear tests would not bring sufficient rewards. Even if it could garner recognition as an equal negotiating partner of the United States through bilateral dialogue, such recognition would prove futile for Pyongyang, given the United States’ insistence that any normalization of relations would be contingent upon prior verification and dismantlement. As the five parties’ insistence on verification grew, North Korea accelerated bellicosity, aware that any revival of dialogue would not alter the United States’ position.

Conclusion The second nuclear crisis demonstrates how North Korea engaged in the strategic pursuit of delinquency for two initially conflicting objectives: normalizing relations with the United States and developing nuclear capabilities. Whilst its behaviour did not conform with the normative expectations of state behaviour within international society, the second nuclear crisis exemplifies how North Korea deemed such rule-breaking acts as necessary responses to the ‘hostile policy’ of the United States. Despite its costs, the DPRK was willing to accept the trade-offs of delinquency. North Korea’s delinquent behaviour throughout the second nuclear crisis was strongly influenced by—albeit not solely due to—the breakdown of the Agreed Framework. In Pyongyang’s eyes, the Framework’s demise epitomized how the United States could not be trusted to uphold its normative and material pledges, especially as the Bush administration took hold. The revelation of the DPRK’s clandestine pursuit of HEU catalysed questions of whether the North deliberately intended to cheat on its Agreed Framework commitments from the outset. Nevertheless, a South Korean nuclear envoy highlighted how the broader issue pertained to mistrust between Washington and Pyongyang: ‘we cannot demonise North Korea from the beginning, but North Korea was ready to do that because they were suspicious, just like we would be suspicious’.213 From January 2002 to November 2009, delinquency became part of North Korea’s strategy to obtain beneficial outcomes: materially, in relation to regime survival through developing a credible nuclear deterrent and attempting to garner international economic assistance; socially, in terms of recognition as an equal negotiating partner of the United States and self-declared nuclear-armed state. Such behaviour was driven by the North’s desire to resist what it framed as an ever-expanding US ‘hostile policy’, a growing willingness to degrade the reputation of the United States as the global hegemon, and a preference for bilateral negotiations with the United 213 ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019).

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States over any multilateral initiatives. The backdrop of a weakened nuclear order allowed the DPRK to contribute to and disrupt the order, exploiting its cleavages and weak enforcement power by becoming the first state to accede and withdraw—albeit self-declaredly—from the NPT and advance its nuclear development. North Korea’s deployment of delinquency evolved during the second nuclear crisis: international discovery of its HEU programme underscored the limits of deception, after which it heightened visible and rhetorical provocations. After being compelled to the Six-Party Talks, having withdrawn from the NPT, North Korea recognized that compliant actions—such as by pledging to halt nuclear production— could form part of its strategic exercise of delinquency to garner positive outcomes. Nevertheless, though the talks provided the North with the opportunity to negotiate bilaterally with the United States, China, and South Korea, the DPRK’s unequal participation in the dialogue heightened its dissatisfaction with the United States as the guarantor of the global nuclear order. From the second phase of the crisis, the North became increasingly reactive, intensifying delinquency when benefits were not gained, and retreating from belligerence when rewards were reaped, such as following its removal as a US State Sponsor of Terrorism in 2008. Although the DPRK’s dissatisfaction with the Six-Party Talks from the outset is far from surprising, its withdrawal from the forum underscored how it would neither compromise on its nuclear ambitions nor engage in dialogue if few, if any, preferable benefits could be obtained. Doing so allowed Pyongyang to accelerate delinquency, unconstrained by any normative and institutional agreements signed during the talks. Indeed, the second nuclear crisis demonstrates how actions of the United States—and other parties— heavily influenced the DPRK’s behaviour, especially given the legacy of Washington’s previous attempts to accommodate Pyongyang’s interests during the first nuclear crisis. Whilst Pyongyang gained few substantial benefits after having withdrawn from the SPT, the second nuclear crisis allowed the DPRK to realize two lessons: first, that it was harder to deceive the international community than it initially thought; second, that provocative behaviour could still be rewarded through negotiations with the United States. Whilst this second lesson was initially garnered from the first nuclear crisis, a key difference was that during the second nuclear crisis, the DPRK became a nuclear state. The second nuclear crisis would leave salient legacies on North Korea’s future behaviour as the Obama administration took office in Washington and Seoul pursued a more anti-engagement approach. As the new US president would soon realize, managing the risk of incentivizing North Korea to comply with nuclear norms without being seen to offer rewards would be no easy task. Furthermore, the DPRK would draw upon the lessons of the second nuclear crisis over a decade later in its actions with respect to the Trump administration. Then, as subsequent chapters argue, North Korea would recognize the necessity of feigning compliance with US demands for denuclearization, if only to obtain the dividend of presidential-level dialogue. Importantly, it was during the second nuclear crisis that North Korea became a nuclear-armed state. Nuclear tests, however successful, would become a valuable

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material and social currency for North Korea to exploit weaknesses in the global nuclear order and US global hegemony, negotiate from a position of greater strength, and reap rewards whilst making few concessions. As North Korean officials mentioned to a South Korean nuclear envoy at the time, ‘India and Pakistan: they have nuclear weapons, they can cooperate with the international community and the United States; so why are you treating North Korea like that?’21⁴

21⁴ Ibid.

5 Strategic patience meets strategic delinquency ‘Now is the time for a strong nuclear response, and North Korea must know that the path to security and respect will never come through threats and illegal weapons’, said President Barack Obama, as the Six-Party Talks began to collapse.1 As the President would later admit: ‘We needed to find a means to prevent Iran and North Korea from advancing their nuclear programs […] it was time to ramp up international pressure on both countries, including with enforceable economic sanctions.’2 Amidst such emboldened rhetoric, why did North Korean officials decry that Obama ‘had no stomach’?3 Why, merely 100 days into his presidency, did North Korean state media castigate the administration as ‘little different from the former Bush administration which had persisted in its policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK’?⁴ Only four months after Obama took office, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test in April 2009. The next seven years would see a marked acceleration in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) nuclear aspirations: it would conduct a further three nuclear tests and, between 2012 and 2016, over seventy missile tests.⁵ The Obama administration did not simply inherit the same North Korea as its Republican predecessor. The not unanticipated death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011 saw a power transition to Kim’s second son, Kim Jong Un, which few observers predicted. The young and inexperienced leader would take control of a state which, only a year earlier, had become the target of the US policy of ‘strategic patience’, a policy that the US administration deemed to be a calculated via media between the engagement and containment of the Clinton and Bush administrations. However, as this chapter demonstrates, North Korea did not agree with this description. It would react to ‘strategic patience’ with strategic delinquency of its own, even if it recognized how, in contrast to the second nuclear crisis, few positive outcomes would ensue. This chapter argues how the eight years of the Obama administration challenged the notion proffered in the strategic delinquency framework, whereby delinquent behaviour would reap positive outcomes. Rather, it highlights how delinquent 1 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered’, The White House, 5 April 2009. 2 Barack Obama, The Promised Land (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2020), 348. 3 Singaporean diplomat (interview, 2019). ⁴ KCNA (Korean Central News Agency), ‘Rodong Sinmun on DPRK’s Tough Stand against Hostile Forces’, 12 May 2009. ⁵ Lisa Collins, ‘25 Years of Negotiations and Provocations: North Korea and the United States’, CSIS Beyond Parallel, 2017, available at: https://beyondparallel.csis.org/25-years-of-negotiations-provocations (accessed 22 December 2022). North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order. Edward Howell, Oxford University Press. © Edward Howell (2023). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192888327.003.0006

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behaviour did not always bring benefits to the DPRK, even despite Pyongyang’s willingness to engage in normative non-compliance with the global nuclear order and wider international order. Following the precipitous collapse of the Six-Party Talks and the DPRK’s second nuclear test, Pyongyang’s dissatisfaction with Washington grew. Whilst ‘strategic patience’ may have portended a change from the hawkish approach of the early Bush administration, in the North’s eyes, the United States remained an inherently hostile power, in no small part owing to the recent legacies of the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The DPRK would view ‘strategic patience’ as tantamount to US disengagement within the context of continued calls by the United States to strengthen the global nuclear order. In return, Pyongyang would respond by intensifying delinquency, particularly—according to the strategic delinquency framework—provocations. As South Korea underwent a shift to conservatism, unilateral and multilateral sanctions on the DPRK—not just from South Korea—became increasingly frequent. Free from the constraints of the NonProliferation Treaty, the North would respond by escalating its belligerent rhetoric and actions. The Obama administration thus offers a useful counter-case to the first and second nuclear crises since, even though North Korea behaved in accordance with the framework of strategic delinquency, few beneficial outcomes ensued. Despite exuding greater confidence in asserting its self-perceived nuclear status during this time, the lack of rewards reaped only further entrenched Pyongyang’s aspirations to expand the technological scope and number of its nuclear and missile capabilities and its quest for international recognition as a nuclear power. Although the United States recognized the DPRK as an equal negotiating partner during the talks leading to the short-lived ‘Leap Day Deal’ of 2012, such recognition was short-lived. With the United States adamant that it would only provide concessions if the North took the first step towards denuclearization (an approach that was also taken by South Korea), the DPRK did obtain one beneficial outcome: time, not only to further its nuclear development but also to sustain the status quo and maintain regime survival as the third generation of Kim leadership took hold. Before focusing on North Korea’s behaviour from 2009 to 2016 and its interactions with the global nuclear order, this chapter argues how, true to its previous logic, the DPRK thought it could ‘wipe the slate clean’ with the arrival of a new US administration to gain further concessions.⁶ Growing fissures in the global nuclear order, as the order’s custodians struggled to develop a concerted strategy towards disarmament, would play into the North’s hands. The DPRK could operationalize its self-perceived status as a nuclear-armed state outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and exploit the United States’ leadership of the order as emblematic of its ‘hostile policy’. Such contempt would also translate into the North’s bilateral relations with the United States. As ‘strategic patience’ took hold, Pyongyang would continue to break nuclear norms as efforts to extort benefits from the United States became increasingly unsuccessful.

⁶ US official (interview, 2019).

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Anything but Bush? A new administration in Washington The days of the ‘Anything but Clinton’ policy of the Bush administration had passed. Obama strove to counteract the hawkish foreign policy tendencies of his Republican predecessor. The new incumbent was occupying the White House during troubled times for the status of the United States as the guarantor of international order. The lasting legacies of the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with Washington’s reticence to advance global nuclear disarmament—not least at the two most recent NPT Review Conferences in 2000 and 2005—presented an image of a purely self-interested global hegemon, firmly in line with realist accounts. This image was especially potent in the eyes of those states that resented the United States. For all its claims of upholding liberal post-war norms and the rule of law, the United States’ foreign policy behaviour in the new millennium catalysed scepticism amongst allies and adversaries alike of its role as a benign unipolar global hegemon. As Patrick Porter argues, the Iraq War ‘was an effort [by the US] to reorder the world. Its makers aimed to spread capitalist democracy on their terms, and to demonstrate strength.’⁷ Washington’s demonstration of strength did not emerge in isolation: it was a product of a longer-term pivot to the Middle East during the 1990s, after the First Persian Gulf War. Given the strong US foreign policy focus on this region, it is hardly surprising that the Clinton administration was precluded from advancing its diplomatic engagement with the DPRK at the turn of the century, even despite the visit of North Korean official, Jo Myong Rok, to Washington in 2000. Amidst the post-9/11 furore and US preoccupation with the Global War on Terror, previous US administrations had long underscored how the Middle East would not distract the United States from addressing North Korea’s violations of nuclear and human rights norms. As Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, insisted, the United States was ‘capable of fighting two major regional conflicts […] of winning decisively in one and swiftly defeating in the case of the other, and let there be no doubt about it’.⁸ As has been seen, the fall of the Saddam regime left a resounding legacy for the North, a legacy which would soon be coupled with that of Gaddafi’s Libya. With respect to North Korea’s perspective on international order during the mid-2000s, a former US negotiator during the 1990s remarked how ‘they see that we get to a point where the behaviour of regimes we don’t like results in a change of regime’.⁹ Indeed, although discussions surrounding a US pre-emptive strike at Yongbyon were shelved during the Clinton administration, support for the idea still prevailed in US policy circles. As US Secretaries of Defense, William Perry and Ash Carter—the former who served under Clinton, the latter who would serve under Obama—highlighted, the Bush administration’s preoccupation with Iraq led to a resultant ‘downplaying’ of ‘the mounting ⁷ Patrick Porter, The False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia, Delusion and the Rise of Trump (Cambridge: Polity, 2020), 112. ⁸ Donald Rumsfeld, ‘We Are Capable of Fighting 2 Major Regional Conflicts’, Los Angeles Times, 24 December 2002. ⁹ US official AF (interview, 2019).

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danger posed by North Korea’. Rather, Perry and Carter called for a pre-emptive strike on the DPRK’s missile and nuclear facilities, which ‘could be seen by the North Korean leadership for what it is: a limited act of defense of the U.S. homeland against a gathering threat, and not an overall attack on North Korea’.1⁰ Yet, in contrast to the early years of the Bush administration, the North Korea inherited by the Obama administration was a self-declared nuclear state. Pyongyang’s desire to resist the ‘aggressive and predatory nature of the U.S. imperialists’ and dampen Washington’s global hegemony had only strengthened.11 The North Korean regime was adamant that neither the state nor regime would suffer a fate akin to Saddam’s Iraq—or, subsequently, Gaddafi’s Libya—and would do all within its remit to avoid this eventuality.

Not with a whimper but with a bang Pyongyang’s second nuclear test, on 25 May 2009, was both an expression of its future nuclear ambitions and a means of testing the response of the new US administration. The nuclear test followed the so-called ‘satellite’ launch on 5 April, the same day on which Obama was due to make an address in Prague. Speaking from Prague, the President underscored that ‘North Korea broke the rules again by testing a rocket that could be used for long range missiles. This provocation underscores the need for action.’12 By the time it had withdrawn from the Six-Party Talks, as it was readying for its second nuclear test, the DPRK had likely clarified its approach towards the United States under the new Obama administration. The North Korean Foreign Ministry underscored that the ‘U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK remains unchanged’ in light of US–Republic of Korea (ROK) military exercises (Foal Eagle and Key Resolve) and condemnation of its ‘launch of satellite for peaceful purposes’. The prism of the ‘hostile policy’ looked set to continue under the Obama administration, as did the North’s warnings that it would ‘bolster its nuclear deterrent’, both of which exemplified its continued pursuit for international recognition as a nuclear state.13 The newly incumbent US president expounded how North Korea’s second nuclear test was ‘a grave threat to the peace and stability of the world’, against which the ‘United States and the international community must take action in response’.1⁴ This statement, however, would prove costly for the United States. Reluctant to replicate the policies of the Bush administration, that of Obama would soon fall into a trap 1⁰ Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, ‘The Case for a Preemptive Strike on North Korea’s Missiles’, TIME, 8 July 2006. 11 KCNA, ‘U.S. Attempt to Perpetuate Its Military Presence in Iraq under Fire’, 18 June 2007. 12 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered’, The White House, 5 April 2009. 13 KCNA, ‘Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Blasts U.S. Invariable Hostile Policy towards It’, 8 May 2009. 1⁴ Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on North Korea’, The White House, 25 May 2009.

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of taking little action either to engage or constrain the DPRK. Whilst Senator of Illinois, Obama himself urged Bush to ‘wean America off Middle Eastern soil’.1⁵ Yet, shifting attention to East Asia (as would be exemplified in the administration’s socalled ‘pivot’ to Asia, from 2011),1⁶ a policy of all-out engagement vis-à-vis the DPRK, however, would contradict Obama’s pre-election pledges. With respect to the latter, Obama notably called on the United States to ‘develop a strong international coalition to […] eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons program’, whereby ‘I will not take the military option off the table. But our first measure must be sustained, direct and aggressive diplomacy —the kind that the Bush administration has been unable and unwilling to use.’1⁷ As he took office, Obama’s preferred approach would become one where those countries ‘that break the rules will automatically face strong international sanctions’.1⁸

An increasingly fragile US-led nuclear order During the first and second Obama administrations, Pyongyang’s behaviour was inextricably linked to the deepening cleavages within the global nuclear order. The North would test the United States in two ways: first, the nature of the US commitment to the global nuclear order, given the ‘few signs of tangible progress’ made vis-à-vis global disarmament;1⁹ second, with respect to US–DPRK bilateral relations, and what would eventually become the US policy of ‘strategic patience’. Even with a new administration in Washington, the US ‘hostile policy’ remained central to North Korea’s world view and actions as it sought to exploit fractures within the nuclear order and oppose the United States’ role as the order’s custodian. As a former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) official emphasized to the author, there were continuities from the Bush era with respect to how the United States foresaw its role with respect to the nuclear order. Washington’s ‘philosophy [wa]s that we are stronger and bigger than anybody else, and for the strongest, that means not to have any legal restrictions’.2⁰ Writing in 2009, Rajagopalan echoed such sentiment, arguing how the nuclear non-proliferation regime ‘was created, sustained, and managed by the US because it was in American interest, and the US was able to convince others in that project’.21 The DPRK adamantly opposed such actions. It would be a vast overstatement even to say that the regime-state was ever ‘convinced’ of the 1⁵ Obama, The Promised Land, 47. 1⁶ See Barack Obama ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament’, The White House, 17 November 2011. 1⁷ Barack Obama, ‘Renewing American Leadership’, Foreign Affairs, 86(4), 2007, 9. 1⁸ The White House, ‘Obama Administration Approach to Foreign Policy’, 22 January 2009. 1⁹ William Walker, ‘The International Nuclear Order after the Cold War—Progress and Regress’. In: Hanns W. Maull, ed., The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 96. 2⁰ IAEA official (interview, 2020). 21 Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime’. In: N.S. Sisodia, V. Krishnappa, and Priyanka Singh, eds, Proliferation and the Emerging Nuclear Order in the Twenty-First Century (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009), 24.

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United States’ hegemony of the nuclear order, even prior to its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and the Six-Party Talks in 2009. Certainly, North Korea’s actions had exacerbated fragility within the order, amidst growing concerns from non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and non-NPT signatories regarding the lack of progress towards the Article VI obligations of nuclear weapon states (NWS). Attempts to revive the order through the US–Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Nuclear Security Communiqué, both of 2010, bore little fruit, merely repeating the importance of implementing treaties on nuclear security and preventing non-state terrorist actors from acquiring and transferring nuclear material.22 After a hardly successful NPT Review Conference in 2005, the 2010 Conference epitomized the nuclear order’s instability as parties failed to reach a globally acceptable consensus on verification mechanisms of states’ nuclear facilities. Questions on how the United Nations Security Council should respond to instances of non-compliance with the NPT were left unanswered. These fissures played into North Korea’s hands. The regime-state had catalysed a fundamental concern with respect to the non-proliferation regime: if the legal NWS and wider nuclear order could do little to force a state to re-comply with the NPT once it had withdrawn from it, would other dissatisfied states simply follow suit? As the Obama administration took power, it would not just be North Korea that would be culpable of catalysing instability within the nuclear order. The bolstering of nuclear forces by India and Pakistan with few regional arms control arrangements, coupled with China’s struggle to balance its own nuclear capabilities and ambitions with its desire to be seen as a responsible power—albeit as a legal NWS—only furthered global concern.23 Yet, these weaknesses in the systemic nuclear order would benefit North Korea in two ways. First, and most obviously, the DPRK could reinforce its status as a nuclear-armed state no longer party to the NPT, underscoring its contempt for the United States—as the custodian of the nuclear order—and its ‘hostile policy’. In just one example, Pyongyang stressed how it ‘d[id] not care about’ questions of its right to nuclear possession posed at the 2010 RevCon, given its position ‘outside the NPT’, unconstrained by the nuclear order’s normative and institutionalized regimes and strictures.2⁴ Second, and relatedly, the North could exercise counter-stigmatization, delegitimizing any criticisms of its nuclear development by pointing to the United States' own lack of commitment towards upholding its NPT obligations vis-à-vis nuclear disarmament. This second point would form an enduring criticism throughout the Obama administration, which the DPRK would leverage to vindicate its nuclear development in future years.2⁵

22 Nuclear Security Summit, ‘Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit’, MOFA Japan, 13 April 2010, available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/nuclear_security/2010/ pdfs/communique.pdf (accessed 22 December 2022). 23 Walker, ‘The International Nuclear Order after the Cold War’, 99–100. 2⁴ KCNA, ‘KCNA on NPT Conference’, 14 May 2010; KCNA, ‘FM Spokesman on Right to Bolster Nuclear Deterrent’, 24 May 2010. 2⁵ For instance, see KCNA, ‘KCNA Commentary Accuses U.S. of Posing Nuclear Threat and Sparking Arms Race’, 11 May 2015.

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During the Obama administration, North Korea increasingly cared about international recognition as a nuclear state; after all, it had conducted not one but two nuclear tests. In 2010, it chastised the United States for ‘brand[ing] the DPRK as “a nuclear criminal”,’ and ‘spreading [the] assertion that the DPRK should not be recognized as a nuclear weapons state’.2⁶ Although Pyongyang asserted how it ‘d[id] not want any body to recognize it as a nuclear weapons state’ and remained ‘satisfied with the pride and self-esteem that it is capable of reliably defending the sovereignty of the country […] with its own nuclear weapons’, this statement does not mean that the regime-state was content with retaining a position of low status with respect to the nuclear order.2⁷ North Korea desired independence in security—in line with juche ideology—and international acceptance as a nuclear power. As such, the DPRK continued to dismiss any international claims of any North Korean ‘nuclear threat’ as false since, for Pyongyang, nuclear development was a necessary and defensive manoeuvre.2⁸ Numerous unsuccessful missile launches did not bring benefits for Pyongyang, especially as the policy of ‘strategic patience’ took shape in 2009 and 2010.2⁹ At its heart, strategic patience saw the United States attempt to uphold its role as the guarantor of the global nuclear order and post-war international order by waiting for North Korea to undertake ‘concrete and irreversible steps to fulfill its obligations and eliminate its nuclear weapons program’ before any dialogue or economic assistance ensued.3⁰ Yet, Pyongyang’s ‘determination to cause trouble’31 only continued, in no small part due to the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1874 on 12 June, which strengthened financial restrictions against North Korean firms, banned all weapons exports from the DPRK (and most imports), urged the DPRK to return to the NPT and Six-Party Talks, and called upon states not to offer any financial assistance towards the North’s nuclear development.32 North Korea’s response signalled a return to the reactive behaviour of previous periods. A statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry dismissed the resolutions as an illegitimate ‘act of war’ and ‘product of the U.S.-led offensive of international pressure aimed at undermining the DPRK’s ideology and its system’. Referring to the DPRK as ‘a proud nuclear power’, it outlined actions the North would take in response: weaponizing newly extracted plutonium from Yongbyon, commencing uranium enrichment, and reacting to sanctions with ‘retaliation’.33 2⁶ KCNA, ‘Hostile Forces’ Brigandish Accusations against “Nuclear Issue”’, 3 June 2010. 2⁷ KCNA, ‘FM Spokesman on Right to Bolster Nuclear Deterrent’, 24 May 2010. 2⁸ KCNA, ‘KCNA Commentary Accuses U.S. of Posing Nuclear Threat and Sparking Arms Race’. 2⁹ Voice of America, ‘Clinton Calls “Exploratory” Meeting with North Korea “Quite Positive”’, 10 December 2009; Dongsoo Kim, ‘The Obama Administration’s Policy toward North Korea: The Causes and Consequences of Strategic Patience’, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 9(1), 2016, 33; Scott A. Snyder, ‘US Policy toward North Korea’, SERI Quarterly, 6(1), 2013, 99–102. 3⁰ Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama and President Lee Myung-Bak of Republic of Korea’, The White House, 19 November 2009. 31 Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace (New York: Penguin, 2014), 275. 32 UNSCR 1874, S/RES/1874 (2009). 33 KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter-Measures against UNSC’s “Resolution 1874”’, 13 June 2009.

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For the international community, especially the United States, the DPRK was no ‘proud nuclear power’. It was a serial violator of international nuclear nonproliferation and human rights norms. Washington was not prepared to sit idly by, at least in its rhetoric. The DPRK’s provocative response to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 underscored the likelihood that North Korea would revert to its time-honoured strategy of responding to sanctions and pressure with delinquent behaviour. By provoking the United States, it hoped that, for all the costs of delinquency, financial and otherwise, the United States could be compelled into offering concessions, especially given how Washington was determined at least to try and engage with Pyongyang. Indeed, during the second nuclear crisis, efforts at dialogue had induced some norm compliance from the North. In December 2009, high-level US–DPRK talks between US Special Envoy for North Korea Policy, Stephen Bosworth, and senior North Korean official, Kim Kye Gwan, reached a mildly momentous breakthrough. Kim pledged to resume the Six-Party Talks in the hope that existing multilateral sanctions might be removed. The resumption of these talks alone, however, would be an insufficient concession for the DPRK as Obama’s strategy of strengthening pressure and waiting took hold. The United States insisted that the United Nations Security Council would only ‘evaluate the status of the sanctions’ if, in addition to returning to the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK made ‘significant progress’ on denuclearization.3⁴ Would North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks despite having previously withdrawn from the dialogue so abruptly? Amidst muted optimism surrounding a potential revival of the Talks, Bosworth offered a pessimistic, if realistic, conclusion: ‘I would not rule it out, but I wouldn’t rule it in either.’3⁵

Strategic patience: A ‘middle path’ North Korea would accelerate its delinquency both within and beyond the nuclear domain not simply due to the imposition of multilateral sanctions. In addition to the Obama administration’s tightening of pressure on North Korea whilst waiting for the regime-state to alter its behaviour (which, as a former South Korean diplomat suggested, was not unrelated to Obama’s desire to avoid offending China), the policies of the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration in Seoul soured inter-Korean relations. Within this context, one delinquent act was North Korea’s sinking of a South Korean naval corvette—ROKS Cheonan—on 26 March 2010, by means of a torpedo attack, whilst the vessel was in the Yellow Sea. Unsurprisingly dismissed by the DPRK as part of an ‘anti-DPRK smear campaign’ led by ‘traitor Lee Myung Bak’, Pyongyang vituperiously threatened ‘various forms of tough measures including an all-out war’, in light of the international condemnation that it received.3⁶ The sinking 3⁴ Stephen Bosworth, ‘Briefing on Recent Travel to North Korea’, US Department of State, 16 December 2009. 3⁵ Ibid. 3⁶ KCNA, ‘National Defence Commission Issues Statement’, 20 May 2010.

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of the Cheonan highlighted the North’s growing propensity for delinquency beyond the nuclear domain. The North remained averse to accepting responsibility for the attack, describing it as a ‘regretful accident’ caused by the fault of South Korean ‘military warmongers’ and criticizing the planned US–ROK military exercises at the time.3⁷ Instead, between 26 March and 24 May, Pyongyang’s denunciations of the South would become increasingly vociferous after a multinational investigation into the sinking placed liability on the North. Deeming the South to have committed a ‘criminal act of totally denying and scrapping the historic June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration’ from the two inter-Korean summits, in 2000 and 2007 respectively,3⁸ North Korean state media affirmed how the South’s blaming of the DPRK was ‘little short of openly declaring the total severance of the north–south relations and by a war’.3⁹ Pyongyang’s criticisms of the conservative administration in Seoul would heighten in brazenness, yet, at the same time, the costs of delinquency to North Korea would become increasingly apparent. Beyond the social condemnation and material costs of existing multilateral sanctions on the DPRK, in response to the sinking of the Cheonan, the ROK enforced sanctions of its own. The ‘May 24 measures’, known as such owing to the day of their imposition, halted inter-Korean trade and aid projects, forbade North Korean ships from entering South Korean waters, and banned South Koreans from visiting the DPRK for business purposes.⁴⁰ The DPRK decried the measures as ‘hurting the dignity of the supreme leadership’⁴1 and, in future years, would invoke these sanctions for ‘bringing the inter-Korean relations to a collapse’.⁴2 Throughout 2010, North Korea would accelerate its delinquent behaviour as it sought to enhance its self-declared status as a nuclear state, but its actions would only further bestow it with negative status. A visit by Western scientists to Pyongyang in November 2010 saw North Korean officials disclose the surprising extent of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme. Siegfried Hecker, one of the scientists who visited the site, alarmingly noted how he was: shocked by the sight of a modern uranium centrifuge facility in Yongbyon, which our hosts justified as being required to make fuel for the indigenous experimental light water reactor […] although I had long ago concluded, despite Pyongyang’s repeated denials, that North Korea had a[n] uranium enrichment program, I (and most Western analysts) had not expected it to progress this far.

For Hecker, this discovery was telling: ‘Pyongyang wanted us to tell the world that it will build its own light water reactor and that it developed centrifuge technologies that few other countries have mastered.’⁴3 It was an accurate conclusion: the North 3⁷ KCNA, ‘Military Commentator Denies Involvement in Ship Sinking’, 17 April 2010; see also KCNA, ‘Military Commentator on Truth behind “Story of Attack by North”’, 25 May 2010. 3⁸ KCNA, ‘NDC Spokesman Rebukes Lee Myung Bak’s “Statement to People”’, 24 May 2010. 3⁹ KCNA, ‘South Korean War Like Forces’ Reckless Provocation Blasted’, 24 May 2010. ⁴⁰ Lee Myung-bak, ‘South Korean President Lee’s National Address’, 24 May 2010. ⁴1 KCNA, ‘S. Korean Warmongers’ Planned War Exercises Failed’, 15 March 2012. ⁴2 KCNA, ‘Rodong Sinmun Calls for Earliest Possible Ouster of S. Korean Traitors’, 21 September 2012. ⁴3 Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘Extraordinary Visits: Lessons Learned from Engaging with North Korea’, Nonproliferation Review, 18(2), 2011, 451

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sought to demonstrate its technical capabilities—which observers had long doubted following the low yield of its first nuclear test in 2006—and, in so doing, vindicate its claims to nuclear status. On 23 November, less than two weeks after the conclusion of the visit of US scientists, the North deployed artillery fire against South Korean forces on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island. The DPRK justified this action on account of South Korean forces shelling into northern territory. At the time, the South was conducting its annual Hoguk military exercise with the United States, in response to which the DPRK ‘wired a complaint…asking whether (the exercise) was an attack against the North.’⁴⁴ As a former US official in the Obama administration highlighted, the North’s provocations ‘were intended in part to intimidate the South, but [also] to demonstrate that the North Korean regime was not willing to run considerable risk to challenge the status quo’.⁴⁵ North Korea, therefore, was willing to escalate brinkmanship such that it could be seen to express its dissatisfaction at the policies of the ROK and the United States without the provocative nature of a nuclear or missile launch, which would have likely induced further sanctions. Yet, the logic that provocations could lead to negotiations did not materialize this time. The Cheonan sinking and shelling of Yeonpyeong were not enough to bring the United States to talks. As a US official involved in negotiations with the DPRK put it, ‘all our efforts to get negotiations started to fall apart’ as the North’s provocations escalated.⁴⁶ US negotiations with the DPRK witnessed a hiatus until 2011, when dialogue between Stephen Bosworth and Kim Kye Gwan resumed.⁴⁷ It was a last-minute attempt by the Obama administration to keep the door ajar to negotiations, even amidst the imposition of sanctions. As a former Obama administration official mentioned, whilst it has since become ‘almost universal wisdom’ that strategic patience ‘meant do nothing and just wait’, the Obama administration ‘repeatedly tried to talk to the North Koreans, and the North Koreans just wouldn’t [respond]’.⁴⁸ During this second attempt at dialogue between Kim and Bosworth, the DPRK reaffirmed its readiness to resume the Six-Party Talks. It was, fundamentally, a weak pledge from Pyongyang, given its inherent, well-known dislike of the multilateral forum. Yet, it still wanted concessions from the United States, which Washington was unwilling to provide. The core aim of strategic patience, according to one US official, was to forge ‘a middle path that was trying to make clear to North Korea that it was not going to be accepted as a nuclear weapons state’. In support of strategic patience, this official clarified how the policy neither sought to ‘go in and say “we’re going to blast them ⁴⁴ KCNA, ‘KPA Supreme Command Issues Communiqué’, 23 November 2010; Korea Herald, ‘North Korea fires artillery into sea near western border’, 23 November 2010. The US condemned the Yeonpyeong attack as a violation of the Korean War Armistice Agreement and asserted the ‘defensive’ nature of planned military exercises in November and December 2010. See The White House ‘Statement by the Press Secretary on North Korean Shelling of South Korean Island’, 23 November 2010; US Forces Korea Public Affairs, ‘Naval Readiness Exercise Announced’, 23 November 2010. ⁴⁵ US Assistant Secretary of State (interview, 2019). ⁴⁶ US NSC official (interview, 2019). ⁴⁷ Stephen W. Bosworth, ‘Remarks after Meeting with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister’, US Department of State, 29 July 2011. ⁴⁸ US official (interview, 2019).

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to hell”’ nor did it ‘do what appeasement advocates want which was to give North Korea everything it wants’.⁴⁹ The difficulties of straddling this via media, however, would catalyse lasting criticism of the US approach. The Obama administration thus attempted to stress how it would be less easily swayed by North Korean provocations than its predecessors. Nevertheless, as a former US envoy for North Korea underscored, the North’s initial disdain for ‘strategic patience’ grew with time: they did not like the Obama administration at all, and that had a lot to do with Obama’s strategy of isolating them, and ignoring their offers for talks […] and socalled strategic patience, that is, if you just isolate them, they won’t survive long, or they will come with much more open attitude towards giving up nuclear weapons. So, they didn’t like that. They were consistently provoking him to essentially come to terms with North Korea as it is.⁵⁰

North Korea neither adopted a ‘more open attitude towards giving up nuclear weapons’ nor did its survival become increasingly precarious, even amidst an impending transition of leadership. Whilst previous transitions of power from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il catalysed considerable disquiet—in Washington, Seoul, and beyond—regarding possible regime collapse, the transition to Kim Jong Un would raise different questions. According to some reports, Kim Jong Un was designated as successor from early 2009, instigating questions of how the inexperienced leader would address the increasing domestic and foreign policy issues faced by the DPRK.⁵1 These questions would generate a new urgency as Kim Jong Il’s declining health culminated in his death on 17 December 2011 and the resultant transfer of power to his second son.

Keeping North Korea in a box Kim Jong Un had to ‘show legitimate progress on the economy’ to his people; his foreign policy was underpinned by the logic whereby ‘if the world keeps North Korea in a box, Kim Jong Un has no alternate course but to continue down the path of the nuclear programme, and try to use the programme to extort whatever money they (sic) can, from the international community’.⁵2 The North’s disdain for ‘strategic patience’ would heighten; it increasingly viewed the policy as keeping it ‘in a box’. Continued delinquency failed to extort benefits from the United States. The Obama administration remained adamant that it would not fall foul of North Korean ⁴⁹ Ibid. ⁵⁰ US envoy (interview, 2019). ⁵1 Yonhap, ‘N. Korean Leader Names Third Son as Successor: Sources’, 15 January 2009. See: Ken E. Gause, North Korean House of Cards: Leadership Dynamics under Kim Jong-un (Washington, DC: Committee of Human Rights in North Korea, 2015). ⁵2 US government advisor (interview, 2017).

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attempts to seek international attention and, in so doing, be rewarded. As a former official in the administration put it, Pyongyang’s strategy of conducting provocations to garner attention ‘didn’t work that much with the Obama administration, because they were very chained on using the strategic patience model of not engaging with North Korea until it demonstrates a real commitment to denuclearization’.⁵3 According to the DPRK, this lack of engagement was tantamount to an act of disrespect towards its status; it would soon push back. Given its desire to avoid talks with the DPRK for their own sake, the two terms of the Obama administration unsurprisingly saw only four instances of high-level US– DPRK dialogue.⁵⁴ One could expect that North Korea would treasure each instance of dialogue to achieve its continued goals of normalizing relations with the United States and gaining its preferred outcomes. Yet, beyond obtaining any benefits, Pyongyang instead sought additional time to continue its nuclear development, especially given a lack of engagement with Washington and Seoul. Fully aware that opportunities for dialogue with the Obama administration would be few and far between, Kim Kye Gwan ‘had to swallow deeply’ before he pledged—once more—to Stephen Bosworth, in 2011, that the DPRK would return to the Six-Party Talks.⁵⁵ As a former US intelligence official mentioned, ‘they liked bilateral talks, but they knew we wanted the Six-Party Talks’.⁵⁶ As this statement highlights, the North was willing to demonstrate some form of compromise with the United States—and accommodate the United States’ interests at the most rudimentary level—even if only in rhetoric, if doing so could allow it to reap rewards without making any substantial nuclear concessions. The transfer of power to Kim Jong Un, however, did not change North Korea’s conceptualization of the United States as a ‘hostile’ actor and its resultant policies. Yet, the North was suffering severe domestic food shortages. Throughout 2011, the DPRK increasingly appealed for international food assistance, especially in the wake of intensified flooding in 2010.⁵⁷ Reports throughout 2011 by the then US Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, Robert King, highlighted how the United States was willing to provide humanitarian assistance, which would be treated as separate to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.⁵⁸ That said, how the DPRK would engage with such claims would offer a useful indication of its willingness to engage with the United States more widely, such as with respect to nuclear talks. Continued US–DPRK dialogue in February 2012, held in Beijing, generated early, if premature, confidence from the United States and its allies. Would the new North Korean leader place greater trust in the regime-state’s eternal adversary of the United ⁵3 US Department of Defense advisor (interview, 2019). ⁵⁴ Beyond Parallel, ‘Database: U.S.–DPRK Negotiations from 1990 to 2018’, available at: https:// beyondparallel.csis.org/u-s-dprk-negotiations-1990-2017 (accessed 3 December 2020). ⁵⁵ CIA official (interview, 2020). ⁵⁶ Ibid. ⁵⁷ Whilst North Korean state media never directly admitted a domestic food crisis, it highlighted its receipt of food aid from Russia and corroborated global concern about food supply ‘in developing countries’. See KCNA, ‘Russia’s Delivery of Food to DPRK Completed’, 10 November 2011; KCNA, ‘Concern about Food Supply Increases’, 20 October 2011; Choe Sang-Hun, ‘North Korea’s Children Need Food Aid, UN Warns’, 25 November 2011. ⁵⁸ Wee Sui-Lee, ‘U.S. Says No Nuclear Link with N. Korea Food Talks’, Reuters, 15 December 2011.

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States, even if the North continued to view the United States as a hostile actor? The Leap Day Deal, signed on 29 February, saw the United States offer nutritional assistance to the DPRK and facilitate cultural and educational exchanges if the North suspended long-range missile launches, nuclear tests, and operations at Yongbyon—including uranium enrichment—and allowed IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. On the surface, the rationale behind the deal was no different to the agreements during the Six-Party Talks: the United States would provide rewards to the DPRK if it offered concessions on its nuclear development. Given the North’s desperation for food assistance, hopes were high within Washington and Seoul that the North would accept the deal. Nonetheless, not unlike previous agreements, the Leap Day Deal would be short-lived. Instead of complying with the deal, North Korea would react to strategic patience with strategic delinquency.

‘A terrible embarrassment’ Whilst arguably promising on paper, the ‘Leap Day Deal’ broke down even before the ink was dry. The Deal was, as one US official at the time lamented, ‘a terrible embarrassment’ for Washington.⁵⁹ Only two weeks after the agreement was signed, the DPRK announced that it would test a missile—disguised as a satellite—aboard an Unha-3 rocket, as part of ‘the government’s policy for space development and peaceful use’.⁶⁰ True to its word, the launch, which ultimately failed, duly took place on 12 April 2012. Although its lack of success questioned the sophistication of Pyongyang’s missile capabilities, the DPRK’s decision to conduct the launch, having just signed the Deal, demonstrated the true nature of its intransigence. Unsurprisingly, the regime justified the test as of a satellite for peaceful space exploration, in contrast to the international claim that the rocket launch—testing missile technology—had violated UN Security Council sanctions resolutions.⁶1 On the day the Deal was signed, North Korean state media outlined how the United States had also sent a communications satellite into orbit as ‘part of its programme for aerial espionage against other countries’.⁶2 Though brief, it was a telling signal: in Pyongyang’s eyes, if the United States could launch satellites into orbit, why should the DPRK be prohibited from doing so? The North would simply disguise—albeit unsuccessfully—a rocket launch as if for the purposes of space exploration. The art of deception that had failed in the DPRK’s desire to misinform the United States of its HEU capabilities in 2002 would fail once more, a decade later. By violating the Leap Day Deal, the DPRK had abandoned hope of receiving any benefits for small-scale concessions on its nuclear programme. Given minimal inter-Korean

⁵⁹ US official (interview, 2019). ⁶⁰ KCNA, ‘DPRK to Launch Application Satellite’, 16 March 2012. ⁶1 KCNA, ‘DPRK’s Satellites for Peaceful Purposes to Continue Orbiting Space: Spokesman for KCST’, 19 April 2012. ⁶2 KCNA, ‘U.S. Launches Communications Satellite for Military Purposes’, 29 February 2012.

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and US–DPRK engagement at the time, the North intensified its nuclear ambitions.⁶3 Just how desperate was North Korea for food assistance? What can be seen is that the DPRK was unwilling to compromise on its nuclear programme at any cost, in no small part owing to the then new leadership. Given the Obama administration’s claim that the launch was evidence of Pyongyang’s abrogation from the Deal, North Korea resorted to delinquency, viewing the US ‘hostile policy’ as having intensified. One US negotiator was particularly critical of the Obama administration’s statement that the North’s launch had violated the Leap Day Deal, arguing that, after ‘things fell apart over disagreement over satellite launches’, the United States had ‘lost that opportunity to get access to North Korean advancements in the nuclear programme’.⁶⁴ With the United States unwilling to continue with the agreement, Pyongyang gained additional time to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities and calculate its behavioural strategies towards Washington and Seoul. Statements from the North Korean regime demonstrate how, beyond the need for food assistance, status remained a concern for Kim Jong Un during this time. Kim’s constitutional revision of 13 April 2012 referred to the DPRK as a ‘nuclear state’; this continuation of its first declaration of nuclear status in 2005 was no longer mere rhetoric but enshrined in North Korean law. This manoeuvre only emphasized the importance for the DPRK of being accorded recognition as a nuclear state, even if such recognition would not be granted internationally.⁶⁵ After this moment, increased missile and nuclear testing became seemingly natural actions, which Pyongyang would justify in response to growing international condemnation and, moreover, to emphasize its status as a self-proclaimed nuclear state.⁶⁶ It would come as no surprise, therefore, that the DPRK would conduct a successful satellite launch on 12 December 2012, together with a third nuclear test on 12 February 2013.⁶⁷ North Korea continued to exploit the lack of US engagement pursued by the Obama administration at the time, threatening ‘more powerful’ countermeasures against the United States if sanctions—unilateral and multilateral—were imposed; in March 2013, the DPRK nullified the Korean War Armistice Agreement.⁶⁸ With the imposition of UNSC 2094 after its third nuclear test, the DPRK refused to accept the resolution as legitimate. Congruous with previous responses to sanctions, Pyongyang

⁶3 UK diplomat (interview, 2019). ⁶⁴ US CIA official (interview, 2020). ⁶⁵ Naenara, ‘“Preamble” to the Constitution of the DPRK’, available at: http://www.naenara.com.kp/ index.php/Main/index/en/politics?arg_val=constitution (accessed 5 January 2023). ⁶⁶ KCNA, ‘KCNA Releases Report on Satellite Launch’, 12 December 2012; KCNA, ‘DPRK People Seized with Great Joy over Satellite Launch’, 13 December 2012; KCNA, ‘Army-People Rallies Hail Successful Satellite Launch’, 15 December 2012; KCNA, ‘DPRK Terms U.S. Hostile Policy Main Obstacle in Resolving Nuclear Issue’, 31 August 2012. ⁶⁷ KCNA, ‘KCNA Report on Successful 3rd Underground Nuclear Test’, 12 February 2013. ⁶⁸ KCNA, ‘Second Korean War Is Unavoidable: DPRK FM Spokesman’, 7 March 2013. For another attack on the US ‘hostile policy’, see KCNA, ‘US Criminal Propensity Justifies North Korea’s Nukes’, 12 March 2013.

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once again decried the resolution as having been ‘cooked up’ by the United States as part of its ‘hostile policy’ to ‘stifle the DPRK’.⁶⁹ As a former diplomat serving in Pyongyang made clear, North Korea’s provocative behaviour following the collapse of the Leap Day Deal was a ‘reaction to the general perception [by the North] that the international perception [of the DPRK] was getting more hostile. These were the days of Lee Myung-bak; the end of the Sunshine Policy; Kaesong Industrial Complex hanging by a thread’. Importantly, one reason for the escalation in provocations was that, by that time, North Korea had ‘taken a measure of Obama. Strategic patience clearly didn’t suit the North Koreans, and quite possibly, they were trying to force [themselves] out of the bubble’ of a lack of sustained engagement with the United States.⁷⁰ Supporters of ‘strategic patience’ from within the Obama administration highlighted how the shift towards increased sanctioning of the DPRK actually demonstrated the policy’s active nature. As one official put it, ‘whenever the North Koreans said “that was a violation of UN resolutions”, the Obama administration went to the United Nations, and got more resolutions, and got more sanctions’.⁷1 Indeed, as a former US Assistant Secretary of State surmised, ‘the Obama administration was beginning to move in th[e] direction’ where ‘if you can create in the leadership’s minds the fear that they are putting their country on the verge of extinction, the rational decision will be to realise this’.⁷2 Although this logic would have likely crossed the minds of the North Korean leadership under Kim Jong Un, Pyongyang’s behaviour at the time was far from irrational. Whilst delinquent behaviour certainly brought costs of social opprobrium and material sanctions, it also allowed the youthful Kim to consolidate power domestically. Nuclear ambitions, in terms of capabilities and international recognition as a nucleararmed state would become even more intertwined with domestic goals. In March 2013, Kim declared the byungjin line of simultaneous nuclear and economic development, a move which told ‘his people that they can have both nuclear weapons and prosperity’.⁷3 Succeeding the slogan of ‘strong and prosperous nation’ (kangsong taeguk), which encapsulated the military-first (songun) politics of Kim Jong Il,⁷⁴ the byungjin line accentuated how nuclear development was both a complementary and equal goal to economic prosperity: the two could be pursued in tandem. This policy was enforced with near-immediate effect. The DPRK’s status as a ‘fullfledged nuclear weapons state’ was enshrined into law on 1 April 2013, and operations

⁶⁹ KCNA, ‘DPRK Refutes UNSC’s “Resolution” Pulling Up DPRK over Its Satellite Launch’, 23 January 2013; see also KCNA, ‘DPRK NDC Issues Statement Refuting UNSC Resolution’, 24 January 2013; KCNA, ‘U.S. to Blame for Nuclear Issue on Korean Peninsula’, 29 January 2013. ⁷⁰ UK diplomat (interview, 2019). ⁷1 US official (interview, 2019). ⁷2 US Assistant Secretary of State (interview, 2017). ⁷3 Jung H. Pak, Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator (New York: Penguin Random House, 2020), 227–28. ⁷⁴ See: Rodong Sinmun, ‘Let Us Go All Out for a General Onward March to Build a Kangsong Taeguk’, 5 January 1999; Rodong Sinmun, ‘Orhaereul gangseongdaeguk geonseorui widaehan jeonhwanui haero binnaejia’ [‘This Year Marks the Year of the Great Transition of the Construction of a Strong Nation’], 1 January 1999.

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resumed at Yongbyon, following their partial disablement in October 2007.⁷⁵ Unsurprisingly, heightened brinkmanship, manifest in provocative rhetoric and actions, ensued. The lack of engagement pursued by the United States and South Korea intensified Pyongyang’s distrust of Seoul and Washington and provided the North with greater confidence in its ability to behave provocatively. Now a self-declared nuclear power, Pyongyang deemed itself to be no longer bound by the institutionalized and normative constraints of the NPT and was unphased by actions taken by the custodians of the global nuclear order. A resolution adopted at the IAEA General Conference in September 2013, which called on the DPRK to return into compliance with its Six-Party Talks agreements, the NPT, and IAEA safeguards, and refuted its status as a NWS, did little to deter the DPRK.⁷⁶

An H-bomb of justice? North Korean impatience As one US official put it, although strategic patience aimed to instigate ‘evolution and revolution in North Korea’ in the longer-term—through continued sanctioning— even ‘Obama’s people had given up after the collapse of the Leap Day agreement’.⁷⁷ It was a victory for the North, whose exacerbating apathy with the lack of highlevel dialogue pursued by the United States provided additional time to further its missile and nuclear aspirations. Launches of short-range rockets, followed by two medium-range Rodong missiles in March 2014, highlighted how the DPRK’s normviolating behaviour would not abate. Despite condemnation from the UN Security Council, not least including China, North Korea’s provocations would continue, both in rhetoric and actions, threatening to conduct a further nuclear test if ‘sanctions and pressure’ prevailed.⁷⁸ Whilst no nuclear test would be imminent, artillery fire across the disputed inter-Korean Northern Limit Line—in the Yellow Sea—in May and October would precede subsequent exchange of gunfire across the land border. The latter was in response to the launch of balloons—containing leaflets criticizing Kim Jong Un—across the inter-Korean border by South Korean activist groups. What Pyongyang had long termed ‘anti-DPRK psychological warfare’⁷⁹ had reached an apotheosis. In turn, it blamed its southern counterpart for aggravating—and not defusing—inter-Korean tensions.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ KCNA, ‘Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State’, 1 April 2013; KCNA, ‘DPRK to Adjust Uses of Existing Nuclear Facilities’, 2 April 2013. This law would be replaced on 8 September 2022, by a new law ‘on the state policy on the nuclear forces’. See KCNA, ‘Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated’, 9 September 2022. ⁷⁶ IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, GC(57)/RES/14, 20 September 2013. ⁷⁷ US NSC official (interview, 2019). ⁷⁸ KCNA, ‘DPRK, Not Wavered by Any Pressure’, 5 May 2014. ⁷⁹ See, e.g. KCNA, ‘KPA Warning to U.S. Korean Military for Psywar’, 25 February 2011; KCNA, ‘S. Korean Military Warmongers Urged to Halt Psywar against DPRK’, 23 March 2011. ⁸⁰ KCNA, ‘Rodong Sinmun Blasts S. Korean Authorities’ Move to Escalate Confrontation with DPRK’, 15 September 2014.

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2014 would provide a crucial example of the all-encompassing nature of the US ‘hostile policy’, witnessed in the release of The Interview, a comedy distributed by Sony Pictures, concerning a fictional and successful assassination of Kim Jong Un by two maverick US journalists. The North Korean Foreign Ministry lambasted the movie as ‘the most undisguised terrorism and a war action’ that ‘hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership’, against which the North would ‘invite a strong and merciless countermeasure’ if its screening continued.⁸1 In a complaint filed against the United Nations, the DPRK’s Permanent Representative urged the United States to ‘ban the production and distribution’ of the film or else ‘it will be fully responsible for encouraging and sponsoring terrorism’.⁸2 Whilst the release was delayed to December, from October, the hacking of Sony’s computer systems in November 2014 by an anonymous organization euphemistically named Guardians of Peace suggested a highly plausible link between the group and the DPRK.⁸3 The group also threatened terrorist attacks on cinemas that planned to broadcast the film, warning them to ‘Remember the 11th of September 2001’.⁸⁴ Although Pyongyang’s initial denunciations of the movie were expected, its escalatory reaction was less so: the North denied any responsibility for the attack, derided the United States as using the attack to target the DPRK, and condemned Obama’s consideration of redesignating the DPRK as a US State Sponsor of Terrorism.⁸⁵ Thus, North Korea’s perception of the Obama administration would worsen: ‘strategic patience’ and sanctions, which the DPRK viewed as a clear economic indicator of the ‘hostile policy’, were now coupled with what the North perceived to be an insult to its social status. That the DPRK was widely seen as culpable for the cyberattack—even if the extent of its involvement remained, at the time, unknown—only lowered its international status. The leverage the North had gained from past delinquent and norm-compliant behaviour, such as during the second nuclear crisis, was fast eroding. The Obama administration imposed additional unilateral sanctions in January 2015, in response both to the cyberattack and its prior provocative rhetoric and behaviour. These sanctions specifically targeted North Korean individuals and entities involved in its arms trade, not least the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the DPRK’s primary intelligence agency.⁸⁶ Within this context, Washington rebuffed Pyongyang’s calls for ⁸1 KCNA, ‘DPRK FM Spokesman Blasts U.S. Moves to Hurt Dignity of Supreme Leadership of DPRK’, 25 June 2014. For a subsequent denunciation after the release of The Interview, see KCNA, ‘U.S. Urged to Honestly Apologize to Mankind for Its Evil Doing before Groundlessly Pulling up Others’, 21 December 2014. ⁸2 ‘Letter Dated 27 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General’, A/68/934-S/2014/452, 27 June 2014. ⁸3 Initial FBI evidence regarding the link between the DPRK and ‘Guardians of Peace’ was questioned on the grounds of Pyongyang’s ‘technical competence’ to carry out such an attack. See Stephan Haggard and Jon R. Lindsay, ‘North Korea and the Sony Hack: Exporting Instability through Cyberspace’, East West Center: Asia Pacific Issues, 117, May 2015, 3. ⁸⁴ FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), ‘Update on Sony Investigation’, 19 December 2014, available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation (accessed 22 December 2022); see also Emily VanDerWerff and Timothy B. Lee, ‘The 2014 Sony Hacks, Explained’, VOX, 3 June 2015; ⁸⁵ Eric Bradner, ‘Obama: North Korea’s Hack Not War, but “Cyber Vandalism”’, CNN, 24 December 2014. For North Korea’s response, see KCNA, ‘Sony Pictures Entertainment Incident Is Misfortune Caused by U.S. Itself: Minju Joson’, 30 December 2014. ⁸⁶ ‘Executive Order 13687 of January 2, 2015—Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea.’

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engagement. With the annual US–ROK spring military exercises nigh, the North proposed that, in return for their cancellation, the DPRK would suspend further nuclear testing, whilst simultaneously calling for dialogue with the United States. The North was not just trying to assert itself as the actor calling for talks. Ironically, it dismissed the military exercises as part of an ‘anachronistic policy hostile towards the DPRK’ and urged the United States to ‘make a policy switch’.⁸⁷ For a state whose contemporary behaviour remained guided by a particular, fallacious interpretation of history, such a claim was hypocritical. Nevertheless, the United States’ refusal to accept the North’s proposal propelled the DPRK’s delinquency as it evermore determinedly sought to demonstrate its indigenous development of nuclear and missile capabilities. In contrast to the first and second nuclear crises, North Korea’s response to what it perceived to comprise the US ‘hostile policy’ would, this time, be far more belligerent. Whilst bellicose rhetoric would persist, the DPRK would launch numerous missiles throughout 2015, commencing with short-range missile tests in February, before experimenting with submarine-launched ballistic missiles later in the year. Invoking the rhetoric of war became increasingly common: in just one example, Kim Jong Un issued a rallying cry, on 20 August 2015, for the KPA to be ‘fully battle ready to launch surprise operations’ against the South as inter-Korean skirmishes took place.⁸⁸ By behaving provocatively, the North was eager to showcase its new and developing nuclear and missile capabilities and reinforce how its nuclear ambitions would not be deterred by any sanctions, whether unilaterally imposed by the United States or other state, or multilateral, namely, from the United Nations.⁸⁹ Pyongyang would conduct its fourth and fifth nuclear tests on 6 January and 9 September 2016, respectively. Unsurprisingly, whilst the former was justified on account of its ongoing dissatisfaction with the US–ROK alliance, not least amidst discussions to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea, more surprising was Pyongyang’s announcement that this fourth test was of a hydrogen bomb, in line with Kim Jong Un’s warnings in December 2015.⁹⁰ The claim was met with international scepticism. As Bruce Bennett noted, ‘if North Korea really did test a hydrogen bomb, its yield should have been about 100 times as large as the yield of this test’.⁹1 Yet, irrespective of whether or not North Korea actually tested a hydrogen bomb, North Korean state media was quick to highlight how the test was a success. Emphasizing how the test fulfilled the ‘strategic determination of the WPK [Workers’ Party of Korea]’ and demonstrated the ‘higher stage of the DPRK’s development of nuclear force’, state media lauded how the ‘H-bomb of justice’ epitomized the North’s role as a ‘peace-loving’ and ‘responsible nuclear weapons ⁸⁷ KCNA, ‘KCNA Report’, 10 January 2015. ⁸⁸ KCNA, ‘DPRK FM on Situation that Reached Brink of War’, 21 August 2015. ⁸⁹ Under existing Executive Orders, 13551 and 13882, the United States expanded entities subject to sanctions to include, amongst others, the Strategic Rocket Force of the Korean People’s Army, and the DPRK’s foreign trade banks. See US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Targets North Korea’s Global Weapons Proliferation Network’, 8 December 2015. ⁹⁰ Pyongyang Times, ‘Kim Jong Un Inspects Renovated Revolutionary Site’, 10 December 2015. ⁹1 Leo Byrne, ‘North Korean Test Unlikely to Be Hydrogen Bomb—Bennett’, NKNews, 6 January 2016.

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state’, in contrast to the ‘vicious hostile policy’ of the United States.⁹2 For Pyongyang, its rationale for developing a hydrogen bomb was simple: it was a ‘legitimate right to self-defense’ to counter the ‘nuclear threat and blackmail of the U.S.-led hostile forces’.⁹3 What these statements also expound—albeit less clearly—is the DPRK’s growing concern with its status as a nuclear-armed power. After the fourth nuclear test, the DPRK justified its nuclear endeavours by invoking the language of international law—deeming it not to have breached any such law—and nuclear responsibility. In May 2016, Kim Jong Un outlined how the DPRK would firmly adopt a no-first-use policy whereby, as a ‘responsible nuclear state’, it would not use nuclear weapons first ‘unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes’.⁹⁴ As a former Obama administration official put it, ‘the tests in 2013 and 2014 heightened up tensions on the Peninsula but it didn’t get the Obama administration to engage’.⁹⁵ North Korea thus pursued further provocations but sought to emphasize its self-perceived status as a responsible nuclear actor as if to incentivize the United States to enter negotiations. Continued delinquency, exemplified by a further long-range missile launch on 7 February 2016, and rhetoric highlighting the North’s readiness to make a ‘retaliatory nuclear strike at the U.S. mainland [at] any moment’ would be coupled with frequent assertions that the DPRK was a responsible nuclear state.⁹⁶ Strategic delinquency was clearly at work: if the international community would not accept the DPRK as a nuclear state, Pyongyang could continue to assert its self-declared nuclear status until the custodians of the global nuclear order had little choice but to do so. The Obama administration’s approach to the DPRK—coupled with that of the conservative Lee and Park administrations in Seoul—had evolved into a policy of resorting to sanctions whenever North Korea breached nuclear norms. However, it was not just unilateral sanctions that would intensify. Increasingly stringent UNSC resolutions ensued. UNSCR 2270—approved by all permanent and observer members—banned metal and coal exports, sanctioning institutions such as the Munitions Industry Department and Reconnaissance General Bureau and imposing a travel ban and asset freeze on North Korean officials involved in nuclear development.⁹⁷ A further nuclear test, the North’s fifth, took place on 9 September. Two nuclear tests within the space of nine months demonstrated the sheer determination of the North Korean regime—and Kim Jong Un himself—to enhance the sophistication of its capabilities. The fifth nuclear test marked a critical juncture in the DPRK’s nuclear development whereby the regime-state purported to have succeeded in mounting a warhead onto a ballistic missile, not least a Hwasong intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). ⁹2 KCNA, ‘DPRK Proves Successful in H-Bomb Test’, 6 January 2016. ⁹3 KCNA, ‘DPRK’s Access to H-Bomb Is Right to Self-Defense: Rodong Sinmun’, 7 January 2016. ⁹⁴ KCNA, ‘Kim Jong Un Makes Report on the Work of WPK Central Committee at Its 7th Congress’, 7 May 2016. Kim would reiterate this policy, in 2020, at the seventy-fifth anniversary of the WPK. ⁹⁵ US Department of Defense advisor (interview, 2019). ⁹⁶ KCNA, ‘Nobody Can Block DPRK’s Advance: Its NDC Spokesman’, 3 April 2016. ⁹⁷ UNSCR 2270 (2016), S/RES/2270 (2016), 2 March 2016.

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Pyongyang’s claim that it would produce ‘as many as it requires’ of ‘a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified warheads of a higher strike power’ dampened previous scepticism of its nuclear capabilities amongst international observers. If its earlier claims that it had successfully miniaturized a warhead were true, the North was getting closer in targeting South Korea and Japan within striking distance.⁹⁸ More than that, the timing of the fifth test was significant: only a day earlier, the North Korean Foreign Ministry had called for the withdrawal of US troops in South Korea as the only means for ‘lasting peace and security on the peninsula and Northeast Asia’.⁹⁹ The eventual decision by the United States and the ROK, in July 2016, to deploy the THAAD anti-ballistic missile defence system in South Korea, not least in light of North Korea’s ongoing missile and nuclear tests, was, expectedly, vehemently criticized by the DPRK and also by China.1⁰⁰ Within the backdrop of minimal high-level engagement with the United States and South Korea, North Korea accelerated down the path towards nuclear status. The ongoing cycle of provocations followed by sanctions imposition, followed by further provocations, became a hallmark of North Korea’s behaviour during the final year of the Obama administration, even as sanctions became increasingly stringent. Notably, UNSCR 2321, imposed on 30 November, was deemed the ‘toughest and most comprehensive sanctions regime ever imposed’ on the DPRK. A further eleven North Korean officials were subject to a travel ban and asset freeze, and the Security Council called on states to suspend scientific and technical cooperation with groups representing the DPRK.1⁰1 It was no surprise that North Korea dismissed and ignored these sanctions as illegitimate and unwarranted. Yet, ongoing sanctions imposition would have a formative influence in motivating future delinquent behaviour during Obama’s last months in office.1⁰2

When strategic patience meets strategic delinquency Ever since the instigation of the Obama administration’s policy of ‘strategic patience’, North Korea had recognized that it would receive few international benefits from its norm-breaking behaviour. In response to the financial and social costs of sanctions ⁹⁸ James Pearson, ‘North Korea’s Bomb Is More Powerful, but Worry Is Miniaturization’, Reuters, 9 September 2016. ⁹⁹ Rodong Sinmun, ‘DPRK FM Spokesman Demands Pullout of U.S. Forces from S. Korea’, 8 September 2016. 1⁰⁰ See, e.g. KCNA, ‘Artillery Bureau of General Staff of KPA Strongly Warns against U.S. and S. Korea’s Decision to Deploy THAAD’, 11 July 2016; KCNA, ‘CPRC Spokesman Denounces S. Korea’s Decision on THAAD Deployment’, 14 July 2016. See also Reuters, ‘China Says South Korea’s THAAD Anti-Missile Decision Harms Foundation of Trust’, 25 July 2016. 1⁰1 United Nations, ‘Security Council Strengthens Sanctions on Democratic Republic of Korea’, 30 November 2016, available at: https://press.un.org/en/2016/sc12603.doc.htm (accessed 12 January 2023); UNSCR 2321 (2016), S/RES/2321 (2016), 30 November 2016. 1⁰2 KCNA, ‘DPRK Govt. Spokesman Clarifies Its Stand to Resolutely Counter UN “Resolution on Sanctions”’, 4 March 2016; KCNA, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Rejects UNSC “Resolution on Sanctions”’, 4 March 2016; KCNA, ‘DPRK People Enraged at Adoption of UNSC “Resolution”’, 5 March 2016.

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and a desire to take advantage of an enfeebled nuclear order, Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions became more entrenched during the latter years of the second Obama administration. With increasingly advanced nuclear capabilities compared to the first nuclear test of 2006, could the North compel the international community to acquiesce to its desires by demonstrating that it was, in effect, a nuclear state in all but name? It was not just the technological advancement in the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities. Pyongyang’s determination to pursue its nuclear capabilities and gain international recognition as a nuclear state, and also self-recognition of nuclear status, was much more overt and flagrant than during the first nuclear crisis, when the regime-state actively denied its nuclear aspiration. For all North Korea’s wishes to reap concessions from dialogue, however, its nuclear development became increasingly embedded in Kim Jong Un’s individual domestic and foreign policies. A then Minister in the South Korean government recalled a startling account to the author of how, in a meeting with two of Kim Jong Un’s most senior aides in 2016, a document outlining the DPRK’s recent missile and nuclear test was, in fact, dated November 2015. During that time, working-level inter-Korean dialogue was taking place. Thus, the North’s core objectives during the early Kim Jong Un era were, in fact, set in stone irrespective of the outcomes of any possible dialogue. As the official mentioned, the objectives were threefold: ‘to complete ballistic missile tests; be seen as a nuclear power; and declare itself a nuclear power’, a goal which remained firmly in place after Obama’s second term ended.1⁰3 By expanding the scope and sophistication of its nuclear and missile capabilities, North Korea could benefit from their resultant deterrent value but also the status that would be generated as a self-proclaimed, indigenous nuclear state. Certainly, deterrence remains a plausible explanation for the DPRK’s behaviour under Kim Jong Un’s early rule, whereby heightened nuclear development could be easily justified in response to its perceived ‘territorial threat’ emanating from the US ‘hostile policy’.1⁰⁴ Although any forcible intervention in the DPRK remained off the cards for the United States, highlighting the power of, and reliance upon, deterrence, the North’s heightened ‘siege mentality’ was not least due to its inability to extract concessions from the United States, given the US policy of ‘strategic patience’. The North deemed the failure of the Leap Day Deal at the end of the first Obama administration as a deliberate attempt by the United States to sabotage further dialogue. In response, Pyongyang enhanced its nuclear deterrence; it was one of the few positive outcomes the North could obtain during this time. Strategic patience, therefore, was met with strategic delinquency, even though few beneficial outcomes—material or social—ensued, and delinquent behaviour came at a growing financial cost.1⁰⁵ Just as the United States could be seen to have lost interest in compelling North Korea to denuclearize following the collapse of the Leap Day Deal, ‘by 2016, the 1⁰3 ROK minister (interview, 2019). 1⁰⁴ Mark S. Bell, ‘Nuclear Opportunism: A Theory of How States Use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(1), 2019, 9. 1⁰⁵ US official (interview, 2019).

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North Koreans had given up on Obama. They were thinking about the next US administration, and that’s when Kim Jong Un intensified his missile campaign.’1⁰⁶ Nevertheless, North Korea’s international status concerns were also intertwined with questions of domestic status. Kim Jong Un, who had taken power nearly three years after the Obama administration entered the Oval Office, sought to consolidate power domestically—and quickly. His byungjin line of parallel nuclear and economic development was not just a foreign policy tool, reinforcing the DPRK’s continued nuclear ambitions to the United States and South Korea. It also underscored the centrality of nuclear weapons to sustaining domestic legitimacy. In December 2013, having announced the byungjin line earlier in the year, Kim ordered the execution of his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, who the regime accused of being a traitor by pursuing ‘a wild ambition to grab the supreme power of our party and state’.1⁰⁷ Bolstering control at home, coupled with demonstrating an increasingly assertive pursuit of nuclear and missile capabilities internationally, signalled a more potent desire for domestic and international status on the part of Kim Jong Un. As Leon Sigal argues, aspirant nuclear powers ‘crave reassurance to ease their insecurity and often respond better to inducements than to threats’.1⁰⁸ Indeed, the lack of inducements from the United States and South Korea only furthered North Korea’s delinquency as the new leader took control. Thus, the Obama administration’s policy of ‘strategic patience’ demonstrates how, despite North Korea not receiving comparable social or material benefits—as the framework of strategic delinquency suggests—for its delinquent behaviour, it continued to break nuclear and international norms through exercising a range of provocations. The North’s trust for the United States and South Korea declined considerably following the imposition of unilateral and multilateral sanctions, which the DPRK deemed to epitomize the US intention to ‘suffocate its economy’.1⁰⁹ According to the North Korean regime, if the international community was unwilling to engage in dialogue, the DPRK would simply accelerate its nuclear and missile development. Yet, during this time, North Korea also sought status as a nucleararmed power. Since such status could not be obtained through any form of social recognition—earned through dialogue—with the United States, enhancing rhetorical provocations and conducting missile and nuclear tests became the only remaining options in Pyongyang’s playbook. Supporters of ‘strategic patience’—largely those officials within the Obama administration—deemed the approach to be the ‘optimal policy given all of the constraints’, knowing full well that the DPRK would neither disarm unilaterally nor would the United States ‘give them what they wanted’, not least legitimization of its nuclear status.11⁰

1⁰⁶ US Department of Defense advisor (interview, 2019). 1⁰⁷ KCNA, ‘Traitor Jang Song Thaek Executed’, 13 December 2013. 1⁰⁸ Leon V. Sigal, ‘How to Bring North Korea Back into the NPT’, In: Olav Njølstad, ed., Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 81. 1⁰⁹ KCNA, ‘FM Accuses US of Creating Atmosphere of International Pressure’, 28 May 2010. 11⁰ US official (interview, 2019).

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Nonetheless, the policy attracted fierce criticism, even within Washington, as equivalent to shirking responsibility for the North Korean nuclear problem. Expounding one such criticism, a former US negotiator with the DPRK during the first nuclear crisis decried how: ‘I was deeply disappointed that for eight years, Obama did nothing on Korea. He did literally nothing. He said: “we won’t buy the same horse twice”. That’s not even a policy! That’s just a giveaway!’111 Ultimately, although North Korea’s refusal to reciprocate Obama’s calls for dialogue constrained US policy options towards the DPRK, ‘strategic patience’ was premised upon an unrealistic objective, namely, that the North would willingly take the first step towards conceding on its nuclear programme. In fact, it would undergo the reverse, increasing—not reducing—its nuclear and missile capabilities. As former US Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, convincingly highlighted: ‘Korea was one issue on which I let President Obama know—privately—that I thought his policy rationale of not discussing anything else until North Korea agreed to end its nuclear capacity and ambitions was flawed.’112 Strategic delinquency during the Obama administration thus highlighted how North Korea was willing to continue its delinquent nuclear behaviour even if the costs outweighed the few material and social benefits that it received. One benefit—not unrelated to the strategic delinquency framework—that Pyongyang did reap during this period, however, was time; time to develop and enhance the sophistication of its nuclear capabilities, preserve nuclear deterrence, and maintain regime survival. The era of the Obama administration thus offers a useful counter-example where, despite the lack of positive outcomes gained by the DPRK, its delinquent behaviour did not subside. Rather, it exploited wider systemic failures within the nuclear order—with respect to the lack of global progress towards nuclear disarmament—and importantly, the comparable lack of engagement by the United States and the ROK, to its advantage.

Conclusion Although delinquent behaviour does not always reap benefits, the lack of rewards and ongoing infliction of costs need not preclude the delinquent state actor from continuing to breach international norms. As shown by North Korea’s behaviour during the two-term presidency of Barack Obama, such norm-breaking behaviour intensifies under three key scope conditions: a weakened global nuclear order marred by a waning commitment to universal disarmament; a lack of engagement from the United States and South Korea; and consolidation of power of state leadership, epitomized by the accession of Kim Jong Un in 2011. Whilst heightened rhetoric became a mainstay of North Korea’s provocative behaviour throughout the eight years of the Obama 111 US ambassador (interview, 2019). 112 James R. Clapper, Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence (New York: Viking, 2018), 49.

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administration, the North intensified brinkmanship and provocations in the form of nuclear and missile testing as the imposition of unilateral and multilateral sanctions became an increasingly frequent international response to the DPRK’s actions. The Obama administration demonstrates how the limited US–DPRK and interKorean engagement saw North Korea accelerate provocations in a cyclical fashion. Within the context of ‘strategic patience’, the first and second Obama administrations aimed to avoid rewarding the North’s increasingly visible delinquent behaviour. As such, provocations were often followed by sanctioning instead of negotiations, to which the North responded with further visible and rhetorical provocations. Evidence shows how the DPRK viewed ‘strategic patience’ as merely another iteration of the US ‘hostile policy’, especially the US precondition that any dialogue and concessions be preceded by unilateral steps towards nuclear disarmament. Though strategic patience may have brought the DPRK few material and social benefits, the North was able to buy time to accelerate its nuclear and missile development and enhance its capabilities. By dismissing sanctions as illegitimate and part of the US ‘hostile policy’, Pyongyang was able to fulfil its own self-conceptualized status as a significant nuclear actor, even if such recognition was explicitly denied internationally. Yet, just as North Korea waited for the election of Barack Obama in 2008 before devising its approach to the United States, the same strategic behaviour would occur eight years later. As a former US intelligence official underscored, ‘when there’s a leadership change in the US, things change in regard to relations with North Korea’.113 2016 would be no different. Prior to the election of President Donald Trump on 8 November, North Korea enhanced provocations. It fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile in October, to test the resolve of the then unknown new incumbent, but only conducted large-scale provocations once the new President had taken office.11⁴ Nevertheless, Trump’s election came at a time when increasingly severe multilateral sanctions were imposed on the DPRK. As had become typical of the North’s rhetoric, the DPRK would denounce UNSCR 2321 just as it had any other United Nations sanctions resolution, for having ‘created the danger of imminent war on the Korean peninsula’ against which the ‘U.S. and other countries involved […] will have to be wholly responsible for the ensuing consequences’.11⁵ As 2016 drew to a close, however, the arrival of the Trump administration would bring a revealing policy approach to the DPRK that not even Kim Jong Un could have anticipated. This was a president whose pre-election campaign saw him deride the US conventional presence in Seoul and call on Japan and South Korea to build their own nuclear arsenals.11⁶ This was a president with no prior political experience

113 US intelligence official (interview, 2019). 11⁴ This sequence of waiting prior to the outcome of a US presidential election, before conducting provocations, was also witnessed during the second nuclear crisis, as Chapter 4 outlined. 11⁵ KCNA, ‘UNSC “Resolution on Sanctions” 2321 Rejected’, 22 December 2016. 11⁶ David Sanger and Maggie Haberman, ‘In Donald Trump’s Worldview, America Comes First and Every Body Else Pays’, New York Times, 26 March 2016.

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who, seventeen years earlier, in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal, entitled ‘America Needs a President Like Me’, wrote, somewhat presciently, that, were he president: North Korea would suddenly discover that its worthless promises of civilized behaviour would cut no ice. I would let Pyongyang know in no uncertain terms that it can either get out of the nuclear arms race or expect a rebuke similar to the one Ronald Reagan delivered to Muammar Gadhafi in 1986.¹¹⁷

Here, Trump was referring to the US bombing of Libya in April 1986, an act which destroyed five ground targets. Yet, emblematic of his somewhat contradictory approach, this was also a president who openly announced vis-à-vis his soon-to-be North Korean counterpart: ‘I would have no problem speaking to him.’11⁸

11⁷ Donald J. Trump, ‘“America” Needs a President Like Me’, Wall Street Journal, 30 September 1999, A26. 11⁸ Steve Holland and Emily Flitter, ‘Exclusive: Trump Would Talk to North Korea’s Kim, Wants to Renegotiate Climate Accord’, Reuters, 17 May 2016.

6 Bad romance Trump, Kim, and the quest for nuclear status

‘Will the US give a damn shit to us if we don’t have nuclear weapons?’1 When asked about North Korea’s three launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2017, a senior South Korean negotiator with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) exclaimed how such would be the mentality adopted by his northern counterparts. He was far from wrong. This view would be reflected in the DPRK’s behaviour from 2017 as the Trump administration took power in Washington, and the unusually liberal approach of Moon Jae-in would attempt to gain momentum in Seoul. Not even Kim Jong Un could foresee the arrival of a New York businessman into the Oval Office, never mind one who raised the possibility of eating a ‘hamburger over a conference table’ with his North Korean counterpart.2 Such words would become characteristic of the presidential-level summitry and exchange of ‘love letters’ between the two leaders but not before ballistic missile launches, brinkmanship, and a vituperative war of words characterized the period soon after the forty-fifth president entered the Oval Office. This chapter concerns North Korea’s behaviour from 2017 to 2019, whereby Kim Jong Un commenced his sixth year as the leader of the DPRK. It argues that during this period, North Korea exercised delinquent and compliant behaviour in relation to the nuclear order and wider international order in pursuit of three goals: first, to bolster the scope and sophistication of its nuclear capabilities; second, to call for the easing of sanctions; and third, to receive international recognition as a nuclear-armed power. Although the DPRK had been pursuing these goals since the second nuclear crisis, this chapter contends that North Korea’s quest during the Trump administration was more potent, given the unique, evolving relationship between the United States and the DPRK and the exceptional policy approaches from the US and South Korean administrations. Within this context, however, the DPRK continued to resist the US ‘hostile policy’ and attempt to mitigate the costs of increasingly stringent sanctions. The North deployed delinquent behaviour strategically to reap material and social benefits, even if such rewards were only temporary. In making this argument, this chapter categorizes the period from 2017 to 2019 into three phases. The first phase, from January to December 2017, saw heightened 1 Republic of Korea (ROK) negotiator (interview, 2019). 2 Steve Holland and Emily Flitter, ‘Exclusive: Trump Would Talk to North Korea’s Kim’, Reuters, 17 May 2016. North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order. Edward Howell, Oxford University Press. © Edward Howell (2023). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192888327.003.0007

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North Korean provocations, most notably three ICBM launches within the space of four months. The second phase, from January to October 2018, marked an unusual shift towards growing North Korean norm-compliant actions vis-à-vis nuclear norms and the United States’ demands. This phase was (in)famously characterized by presidential summitry between the United States and North Korea in Singapore. In contrast, the third phase, from November 2018 to December 2019, saw a return to delinquency interspersed with instances of compliant actions—the latter prior to a second US–DPRK summit—as relations between the United States and DPRK reached a nadir. Over time, North Korea lost interest in dialogue with the United States, exhibiting greater confidence in its self-declared status as a nuclear-armed state which, in the eyes of the ruling regime, had ‘perfectly accomplished’ its nuclear programme.3 This chapter places predominant focus on relations between Washington and Pyongyang, which is both intentional and far from unwarranted. Indeed, it is central to understanding North Korea’s behaviour from North Korea’s own perspective. Whilst inter-Korean and Sino-DPRK ties strengthened marginally from 2017 to 2020, these relations formed part of, and were held captive to, the DPRK’s broader strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Fundamentally, as statements from North Korean officials—particularly those in the Foreign Ministry—asserted, the DPRK’s relationship with the United States at this time was the most salient, given its perception of the United States as its main provocateur and principal referent actor of its actions.⁴ Throughout the Obama administration, the DPRK’s norm-breaking behaviour was unrewarded, catalysing further provocations. Yet, the contradictory provision of inducements and punishments by the Trump administration would see North Korea leverage the trade-offs associated with delinquency to reap positive outcomes. During the first phase, the DPRK responded to the hawkish rhetoric of the Trump administration and intensified unilateral and multilateral sanctions imposition with rhetorical and visible provocations. In 2017 alone, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, launched three ICBMs, and increasingly called for sanctions easing. During the second phase, the North’s insistence on sanctions easing as a condition of any nuclear concessions became increasingly vociferous, particularly following Kim Jong Un’s declaration, in April 2018, of the ‘completion’ of the DPRK’s nuclear programme. This phase saw greater feigned compliance with the demands of the United States—which comprised nuclear norms—as a path towards the provision of economic assistance, strengthening of nuclear deterrence, and recognition as an equal and significant actor, from the US and South Korea. Although the DPRK would be successful in the short-term, with presidential-level summitry taking place without any nuclear concessions, the unwillingness of the United States to ease sanctions

3 On 21 April 2018, Kim Jong Un proclaimed the completion of the North Korean nuclear programme in the previous year, declaring how the DPRK had ‘perfectly accomplished the great historic cause of building the state nuclear force’ whereby ‘a fresh climate of détente and peace is being created on the Korean peninsula’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Third Plenary Meeting of Seventh C.C., WPK Held in Presence of Kim Jong Un’, 21 April 2018. ⁴ This claim was made by the DPRK’s then first Vice Foreign Minister, Choe Son Hui, at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, 21 October 2017.

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saw the North revert to delinquency during the third phase. Following inconclusive presidential-level and working-level talks in 2019, North Korea lost interest both in bilateral dialogue with the United States and South Korea and engaging with the global nuclear order. Instead, Pyongyang resorted to weak assertions of its commitment to norms of non-proliferation, no first-use, and nuclear restraint, declaring itself a ‘responsible nuclear state’ whilst justifying its continued nuclear possession as a non-Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member to counter what it deemed to be an intensifying US ‘hostile policy’.⁵

Fire, fury, and the costs of delinquency: The first phase Donald J. Trump would be a president like no other. Nowhere would his disdain for protocol be more evident than in his approach to North Korea. His rhetoric early in his pre-election campaign was, in fact, praised by North Korean media. The DPRK supported Trump’s scepticism of the US–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance—which he deemed an unnecessary financial burden—since the North had long sought the withdrawal of US troops from the Peninsula. A pro-North Korean news outlet in China, DPRK Today, extolled, ‘who knew that the slogan “Yankee Go Home” would come true like this?’⁶ Nevertheless, Trump simultaneously supported harsh containment. He called on Japan and South Korea to nuclearize themselves instead of relying on the US nuclear umbrella, a view that North Korean diplomat, Ri Jong Ryul, deemed ‘totally absurd and illogical’. As Ri exclaimed, ‘the US tells us to give up our nuclear programme, is preparing a nuclear attack on us, and on the other hand would tell its allies to have nuclear weapons. Isn’t this a double standard?’⁷ Soon after taking office, the new President expectedly declared the ‘era of strategic patience’ to be ‘over’.⁸ For Trump, his predecessor’s North Korea policy was epitomized in one word: ‘Stupid’.⁹ Veteran journalist Bob Woodward recounted Trump’s personal contempt for his predecessor: ‘he didn’t respect Obama. Didn’t like him. Thought he was an asshole.’1⁰ The end of strategic patience was, as expected, received positively in Pyongyang: it offered the North an opportunity to exploit the reactive approach of the Trump administration—and the President himself—by pursuing two goals: first, accelerating the development of its nuclear capabilities in line with the byungjin policy; second, seeking de facto international recognition of its nuclear status through behaving belligerently. The DPRK aimed to coerce the United States into ⁵ KCNA, ‘Kim Jong Un Makes Report on Work of WPK Central Committee at Its 7th Congress’, 7 May 2016 ⁶ DPRK Today, ‘teuleompeuchung-gyeog eulo boneun hangugui jeongcheseong’ [‘Trump’s Shock Doctrine on the Identity of Korea’], 31 May 2016. ⁷ Ri made these remarks in a rare television interview. See Will Ripley and Tim Schwarz, ‘North Korean Official on Trump Comments: “Totally Absurd and Illogical”’, CNN, 17 April 2016. ⁸ Donald Trump and Abe Shinzo, ‘Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Abe of Japan’, The White House, 6 November 2017. ⁹ Doug Wead, Inside Trump’s White House: The Real Story of His Presidency (New York: Center Streets, 2019), 20. 1⁰ Bob Woodward, Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), 191.

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offering concessions, particularly given how Pyongyang perceived itself as an equal negotiating partner. Kim Jong Un wasted no time in proclaiming these aims to the outside world. In his 2017 New Year’s Address, he announced that the DPRK was in its ‘final stages’ of ICBM preparations.11 Such high-intensity brinkmanship towards the United States would strengthen throughout the year as the North advanced its nuclear and missile development. Intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles were launched in February and March 2017, accompanied by verbal threats of the North’s readiness for ‘all-out war’ against the United States. This provocative rhetoric was in reaction to the US deployment of aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to the Peninsula in April, against which the DPRK threatened to ‘deal merciless blows at the enemies’.12 These actions, early in the Trump administration, formed a response to the administration’s discourse of containment and regime change, emanating from both the President’s mouth and online. Somewhat unconventionally, Trump capitalized upon Twitter to pronounce his domestic and foreign policies, not least his dissatisfaction at the DPRK’s behaviour. Meanwhile, US–ROK defensive military exercises continued apace. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Ja Song Nam, the DPRK’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations declared how these exercises, held in March, were creating a ‘near-war situation’ on the Peninsula as part of US preparations for ‘a nuclear pre-emptive strike against the DPRK for “regime change”’.13 In what would be one of numerous examples throughout his four-year presidency, the DPRK’s failed launch of an intermediate-range Hwasong-12 ballistic missile on 28 April was immediately followed by a tweet from the US President: ‘North Korea disrespected the wishes of China and its highly respected President when it launched, though unsuccessfully, a missile today. Bad!’1⁴ Prior to the launch, the President tweeted: ‘North Korea is looking for trouble. If China decides to help, that would be great. If not, we will solve the problem without them! U.S.A’.1⁵ North Korea had to accustom itself to the unusual diplomacy of Trump and his administration. In one respect, the Trump’s administration’s early rhetoric resonated with that of George W. Bush. The then Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, offered one example, highlighting how the United States was ‘reviewing all of the status of North Korea, both in terms of state sponsorship of terrorism as well as the other ways in which we can bring pressure to bear on the regime in Pyongyang […] [to] reengage with us on a different footing than the past talks have been held’.1⁶ Tillerson’s statement, upon first glance, may have suggested a more equal status bestowed upon the DPRK in any possible talks with the United States. Yet, the North responded to Tillerson’s statement by threatening a ‘super-mighty preemptive strike’ that would ‘wipe out not only the US imperialists’ invasion forces in South Korea and its surrounding 11 KCNA, ‘Kim Jong Un’s 2017 New Year’s Address’, 2 January 2017. 12 KCNA, ‘Final Doom Waits U.S.: Minju Joson’, 23 April 2017. 13 ‘Letter dated 22 March 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’, A/71/848-S/2017/243. 1⁴ Donald Trump, Twitter Post, 28 April 2017, 7:26PM EST. 1⁵ Donald Trump, Twitter Post, 11 April 2017, 8:03PM EST. 1⁶ Rex Tillerson, ‘Secretary of State Rex Tillerson: Press Availability’, Washington DC, 19 April 2017.

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areas, but the US mainland and reduce them to ashes’.1⁷ When viewed through the lens of the ‘hostile policy’, the DPRK viewed Tillerson’s claims as invoking physical and social components of the ‘policy’, the latter with respect to the possible reinstatement of North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, which it had—under the Bush administration—determinedly resisted. The ensuing war of words between the United States and the DPRK would, akin to its past actions, see North Korea react to what it deemed to be confrontational rhetoric from the United States with provocations of its own: intensifying brinkmanship—through provocative rhetoric and behaviour—formed part of the DPRK’s goal of status parity with the United States. In so doing, the North hoped to obtain economic assistance, sanctions removal, and social recognition as a nuclear state and dialogue partner. Kim Jong Un’s dual-pronged strategy of enhancing nuclear capabilities and pursuing improved ties with the United States was not dissimilar to that pursued by Kim Jong Il during the Clinton administration. Nonetheless, unique to 2017 was the increasingly interpersonal interactions between US and North Korean leaders, which would not always reap desirable outcomes for both sides. Beyond test-fires of short and medium-range missiles in April and May, the North’s ambitions for status parity with the United States intensified following the test of two Hwasong-14 ICBMs on 4 and 28 July. These launches reinforced the North’s growing self-perception of its status as a ‘full-fledged nuclear power’.1⁸ ICBM development and testing maintained the pursuit of nuclear deterrence and regime survival and were inherently tethered to the DPRK’s desire to gain international attention, especially from the United States. A former US official highlighted how Choe Son Hui, then Director General of the North American Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mentioned how the Kim Jong Un regime was guided by the mentality ‘that unless we can show the Americans that we can hit them, they won’t take us seriously’.1⁹ Yet, the North also viewed its ICBM capability as a ‘precious strategic asset that cannot be bartered for anything’.2⁰ Importantly, from North Korea’s perspective, compromising upon its ICBM capabilities would be a concession on its deterrent capabilities, and, ultimately, regime security. As if one iteration of this claim were insufficient, the then Foreign Minister, Ri Yong Ho, underscored how the DPRK would ‘under no circumstances, put the nukes and ballistic rockets on [the] negotiating table […] unless the hostile policy and nuclear threat of the U.S. against the DPRK are fundamentally eliminated’.21 For all the idiosyncrasies of the Trump 1⁷ Rodong Sinmun, ‘jamyeol-eul jaechonghaneun “daebugseonjetagyeog”gido’ [‘Praying for the SelfDefeating “Preemptive Strike on North Korea”’], 20 April 2017. See also KCNA, ‘Rodong Sinmun Blasts U.S., S. Korea for DPRK-Targeted Military Moves’, 20 April 2017. 1⁸ KCNA, ‘Report of DPRK Academy of Defence Science’, 4 July 2017. 1⁹ CIA official (interview, 2020). 2⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Kim Jong Un Guides Second Test-Fire of ICBM Hwasong-14’, 28 July 2017. 21 Ri Yong Ho, ‘Statement by H.E. Ri Yong Ho, Minister of Foreign Affairs—Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum’, Manila, 7 August 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘FM Ri Yong Ho Makes Speech at Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum’, 8 August 2017.

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administration, the DPRK’s world view continued to be guided by the US ‘hostile policy’, which remained a convenient justification for its recalcitrance towards nuclear dismantlement. North Korean statements from July 2017 onwards reinforced the regime-state’s determination to gain international concessions without complying with the norms of the nuclear order. Rhetorical tensions between Trump and Kim reached an apotheosis when, in August 2017, the US president warned—using uncharacteristically bellicose language—that North Korea’s relentless nuclear threats would be ‘met with fire, fury, and frankly power’.22 The Commander of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Strategic Force responded in equally belligerent terms. Stressing how ‘only absolute force can work on him [Trump]’, the DPRK considered ‘enveloping fire’ on a US Air Force base in Guam to ‘neutralize’ the ‘threat’ of US B-1B bomber aircraft flying over the Korean Peninsula and would be ‘closely watching the speech and behavior of the U.S’.23 The next day, state media warned how preventative war was anything but a ‘privileged option for the U.S’.2⁴ These warnings underscore the extent to which North Korea’s behaviour remained contingent upon actions taken by the United States. At first glance, they may seem at odds with Kim Jong Un’s prior claims of the North’s responsible nuclear status. Yet, central to the DPRK’s unusual no-first-use policy is that the policy holds ‘unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes’.2⁵ Given the all-encompassing nature of North Korea’s construction of the US ‘hostile policy’, the North likely deemed Trump’s rhetoric to exemplify such ‘encroachment’ of sovereignty, thereby offering grounds to violate its no-first-use policy. Subsequent provocations escalated beyond missile launches. The North conducted a further nuclear test—its sixth—in September, which it claimed, as it had in January 2016, to be of a thermonuclear bomb.2⁶ With a yield of approximately 250 kilotons, deemed ‘the maximum estimated containable yield for the Punggye-ri test site’, there was, this time, greater international confidence that this test was actually of a thermonuclear bomb.2⁷ The yield of the sixth nuclear test was in marked contrast with the largely unsuccessful first nuclear test of 2006, and the six-to-sixteen kiloton yield of the North’s third test in 2013. North Korea was accelerating its nuclear capabilities at speed. Not only did this larger yield underscore the North’s increasingly advanced nuclear capabilities, but it also vindicated the DPRK’s self-perception of its status as a significant nuclear power and its hopes of being treated as such by the United States. In Pyongyang’s eyes, the DPRK was another nuclear state. Yet, the North would have to mitigate the costs of its delinquency, which would only become evident over time. 22 Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, ‘Trump Threatens “Fire and Fury” against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.’, New York Times, 8 August 2017. 23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘KPA Will Take Practical Action; Commander of Strategic Forces’, 10 August 2017. 2⁴ KCNA, ‘“Preventive War” is Not Privileged Option for U.S.’, 11 August 2017. 2⁵ KCNA, ‘Kim Jong Un Makes Report on the Work of WPK Central Committee at Its 7th Congress’. 2⁶ KCNA, ‘Kim Jong Un Gives Guidance to Nuclear Weaponization’, 3 September 2017. 2⁷ Frank Pabian, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Jack Liu, ‘North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Satellite Imagery Shows Post-Test Effects and New Activity in Alternate Tunnel Portal Areas’, 38North, 12 September 2017.

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North Korea’s behaviour during the early Trump administration confirmed the perspective of a former US intelligence official, who highlighted how the DPRK has always been ‘very sensitive’ to the respective administration in the Oval Office.2⁸ The imposition of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2375 on 11 September, which reduced oil provision to the DPRK by 30 per cent and limited the issues of visas by foreign governments to North Korean workers, did not lessen the North’s spate of provocations.2⁹ Attention-seeking rhetoric emanated from the ruling regime, particularly Kim Jong Un himself, who stressed how, in the event of any sanctions imposition, the DPRK would produce as many ‘powerful nuclear weapons…as it wants’.3⁰ Threatening, once more, to ‘reduce the U.S. mainland into ashes’ and ‘sink’ Japan, further statements emphasized how no state would be immune from the DPRK’s provocations so long as they were allies of the United States, thereby inherently part of the ‘hostile policy’.31

Close to the red line: Brinkmanship and a war of words Unsurprisingly, North Korea dismissed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2375 and adopted its tried-and-tested strategy of using rhetorical threats to pressurize Washington and Seoul into offering concessions. Beyond the financial cost of sanctions, Trump’s escalatory rhetoric was a considerable influence in escalating the North’s delinquency. At his first UN General Assembly, in September 2017, the President announced, using language atypical of even his most hawkish predecessors, that the United States would ‘have no choice but to totally destroy [sic] North Korea’ if ‘forced to defend itself or its allies’. Referring to Kim Jong Un’s accelerating nuclear and missile development, Trump exclaimed how ‘Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and his regime.’32 It was a surprising ad hominem attack, to which North Korea would respond in kind. Kim Jong Un dismissed the US President as ‘a mentally deranged U.S. dotard’ who ‘made the most ferocious declaration of war in history’, against which the North would adopt ‘the highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history’.33 A longstanding North Korean rhetorical response to the US ‘hostile policy’— whether ‘Team Spirit’ exercises, or President Bush’s categorization of the DPRK as part of the ‘axis of evil’ in 2002—has been to threaten ‘countermeasures’. This time, although the precise countermeasure was unspecified, Foreign Minister, Ri Yong 2⁸ US intelligence official (interview, 2019). 2⁹ UNSCR 2375 (2017), S/RES/2375 (2017), 11 September 2017, 3⁰ KCNA, ‘Kim Jong Un Gives Guidance to Nuclear Weaponization’, 3 September 2017. 31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘KAPPC Spokesman on DPRK Stand toward UNSC “Sanctions Resolution”’, 13 September 2017. 32 Donald Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, The White House, 19 September 2017. 33 North Korea’s choice of the arcane, esoteric word, ‘dotard’—defined as a ‘state or period of senile decay marked by decline of mental poise and alertness’—caused a global hullaballoo: Reuters, ‘What’s a “Dotard” Anyway? Kim’s Insult to Trump’, 22 September 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of Chairman of State Affairs Commission of DPRK’, 22 September 2017.

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Ho, offered one elaboration: borrowing from Trump’s rhetoric, Ri emphasized how ‘none other than Trump himself is on a suicide mission’, justifying North Korea’s nuclear development as a ‘righteous, self-defensive measure’. Would the countermeasure comprise continued development and testing of nuclear and missile capabilities? In the same statement, Ri unusually asserted how North Korea did ‘not need anyone’s recognition of our status as a nuclear weapon state and our capability of nuclear strike’, a claim that may initially seem incompatible with the DPRK’s status ambitions.3⁴ Yet, Ri’s claim can be read ironically, as a demonstration of greater selfconfidence in its status as a state that had nuclearized beyond the non-proliferation regime.3⁵ Whilst the DPRK yearned for international recognition of such status, a lack of status recognition would not preclude its nuclear aspirations or leveraging of delinquent behaviour to gain concessions. North Korea was thus highly reactive to the online and offline behaviour of the US administration. Trump’s tweets, which would become a notorious hallmark of his presidency, would continue to provoke the DPRK. In September 2017, the President tweeted that North Korea ‘won’t be around much longer’,3⁶ a claim interpreted by Ri Yong Ho as a ‘declaration of war’ against which ‘all options will be on the operation table’.3⁷ This example offers salient comparison with the first nuclear crisis, during which time discourse of regime change proliferated within US policy circles, amidst fears of a conventional invasion of the South by the North. Whilst questions of regime change were less frequent in 2017, US and South Korean concerns of the consequences of conventional and nuclear conflict had, in fact, escalated. Summarizing such fears, a US journalist recounted how, after visiting the Demilitarized Zone in November 2017, with US officials, including then Secretary of Defense James Mattis, the anxiety amongst the Trump administration was palpable: ‘there were times at the Pentagon when they were seriously afraid. They were running table-top exercises; you would never even conceive that we would be entering a war with North Korea, but when you’re looking at another nuclear state, it gets scary real[ly] fast.’3⁸ Although North Korea did not follow through on its rhetorical threats to commence ‘war’ until any US response became clear, Pyongyang’s exacerbated threats towards the United States became one means to attract the global hegemon’s attention. Corroborating this observation, a US negotiator highlighted how North Korea’s provocations during Trump’s presidency were fundamentally underpinned by brinkmanship. Pyongyang did all it could ‘to get very close to the red line, but not quite cross it’.3⁹ Categorized in the strategic delinquency framework as part of the broader behaviour of provocations, the DPRK hoped that by escalating belligerence 3⁴ Ri Yong Ho, ‘Statement by H.E. Mr. Ri Yong Ho’, 72nd Session of the UNGA, 23 September 2017. 3⁵ Negotiators with the DPRK often highlighted to the author how irony was not uncommon to the DPRK’s diplomacy. 3⁶ Donald Trump, Twitter Post, 24 September 2017, 4:08AM, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/ status/911789314169823232?lang=en (accessed 23 December 2022). 3⁷ Reuters, ‘North Korea Accuses U.S. of Declaring War, Says Can Take Countermeasures’, 25 September 2017. 3⁸ US journalist (interview, 2020). 3⁹ US ambassador (interview, 2019).

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‘close to the red line’, the United States would accommodate its interests akin to during the first nuclear crisis. Importantly, whilst the North continued to defend its actions in response to the US ‘hostile policy’, as seen during the second nuclear crisis, the ‘policy’ was not confined to the nuclear domain. The imprisonment of US university student, Otto Warmbier, during his visit to the DPRK in 2016, and his subsequent death upon returning—comatose—to the United States in June 2017, was the result of North Korean brutality.⁴⁰ Pyongyang’s treatment of Warmbier led to its relisting as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) by President Trump on 20 November 2017, a move the DPRK criticized as exemplifying the US desire to ‘suffocate independent countries disobedient to it’.⁴1 Ideas of ‘suffocation’ featured prominently in North Korean discourse following this relisting, which in no small part influenced the timing of its third ICBM test on 28 November. This launch of a Hwasong-15 was, according to the DPRK, the first test of a missile capable of striking the entirety of the US mainland.⁴2 Although another UNSC sanctions resolution, 2397, was imposed, which further curtailed the North’s petroleum imports and called on North Korean workers abroad to be repatriated within twenty-four months, the North once again derided the resolution as an ‘act of war […] tantamount to [a] complete economic blockade’ and ignoring its ‘fair and legitimate’ right to nuclear and missile development outside of the non-proliferation regime.⁴3 North Korea’s behaviour worsened. Statements from the regime increasingly invoked war, not least as a response to the Trump administration’s rhetoric. Such actions were largely expected: as the Bush administration demonstrated, North Korea responds to provocations with provocations and to negotiations with negotiations. Akin to the second nuclear crisis, Pyongyang’s delinquency in 2017 generated substantial social costs beyond the material costs of unilateral and multilateral sanctions. The relisting of North Korea as an SST, and resultant lowering of its status saw Pyongyang warn how ‘the more desperate efforts Trump makes to strangle the DPRK by “demonizing” it, the dearer price the U.S. will have to pay’.⁴⁴ Although improved nuclear and missile capabilities would enhance nuclear deterrence, the North’s behavioural calculations during the first year of the Trump administration were heavily influenced by concerns of status. Elevated international status would also bolster Kim Jong Un’s domestic consolidation of power with respect to the Party, military, and population. As a South Korean government official highlighted, Pyongyang wanted ‘negotiations with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank, its name removed from the list of US State Sponsors of Terrorism, and they may want to have diplomatic recognition from Western countries’, whilst ⁴⁰ According to the DPRK, Warmbier attempted to steal a poster from his hotel. ⁴1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘FM Blasts U.S. for Re-listing DPRK as “Sponsor of Terrorism”’, 22 November 2017. See also: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement by Director of Press of Institute for American Studies of DPRK Foreign Ministry’, 28 November 2017; Uriminzokkiri, ‘U.S. Should Withdraw Re-listing of DPRK as “Sponsor of Terrorism”’, 25 November 2017; KCNA, ‘DPRK People Enraged at Another Provocation Made by U.S.’, 24 November 2017. ⁴2 KCNA, ‘DPRK Gov’t Statement on Successful Test-Fire of New-Type ICBM’, 29 November 2017. ⁴3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman’, 24 December 2017. ⁴⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘FM Blasts U.S. for Re-listing DPRK as “Sponsor of Terrorism”’, 22 November 2017.

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refusing to ‘give up nuclear weapons’.⁴⁵ Such a contradiction, which first became apparent during the second nuclear crisis, would only amplify under the Trump administration. Yet, this time, the North was now a nuclear-armed state in all but name. Pyongyang’s actions remained highly contingent upon the policies adopted by Washington. A US negotiator made clear how, in 2016, discussions with his North Korean counterparts revealed that the DPRK wanted to ‘get over the disaster of Obama and pick things up again’, resurrecting dialogue with the United States.⁴⁶ Intensifying belligerence and providing the United States with little choice but to respond in a conciliatory fashion was one means of doing so. Validating this claim, a senior South Korean negotiator recounted how, after the ICBM launches of 2017, North Korean officials exclaimed: ‘will the US give a damn shit to us if we don’t have nuclear weapons?’⁴⁷ Still, central to the deployment of strategic delinquency is knowing when to behave delinquently and when to abstain. 2018 would see North Korea alter its behaviour dramatically by engaging in greater outward compliance with the United States’ demands, which comprised abiding by nuclear norms. Doing so would—for some time, at least—bring pay-offs.

‘Will the US give a damn?’: The second phase The ten months between January and October 2018 witnessed a noticeable deescalation in North Korea’s delinquent behaviour. Even if it did not intend to heed international norms in the longer-term, this behavioural change was characterized by a more determined pursuit of two goals: first, to diminish the negative consequences of increasingly stringent sanctions imposed upon the regime-state; second, to receive recognition as a de facto nuclear power from the United States. Pyongyang wanted to minimize the costs that would arise from accelerated nuclear and missile development, upon which it remained unwilling to compromise. In his New Year’s Address in 2018, Kim Jong Un warned the United States that the ‘nuclear button is on my office desk all the time’, highlighting how these words were ‘not merely a threat but a reality’.⁴⁸ This address mentioned the word ‘nuclear’ twenty-four times, in contrast to five mentions in 2017, as well as ‘war’ and the ‘United States’ thirteen and ten times, respectively (compared to nine and four in 2017). Whilst the significance of individual mentions of words should not be exaggerated, they do illuminate the regime’s policy directions and how it communicates its intentions to foreign audiences. In the same speech, however, Kim surprisingly called for dialogue with the South, pledging to send a North Korean delegation to the Winter Olympic Games hosted in PyeongChang, South Korea, in February. Amidst stalled inter-Korean dialogue under the previous two conservative administrations ⁴⁵ ⁴⁶ ⁴⁷ ⁴⁸

ROK government advisor (interview, 2019). CIA official (interview, 2020). ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). Rodong Sinmun, ‘Kim Jong Un’s New Year Address’, 2 January 2018.

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in South Korea, the liberal administration of Moon Jae-in seized Kim’s olive branch. On 3 January, the North reopened the infamous inter-Korean hotline, a communication system between the two Koreas which the DPRK severed in 2008, 2010, 2013, and 2016. The Moon administration also convinced the North to send athletes to PyeongChang, following high-level talks in January.⁴⁹ Yet, just as Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address delineated the DPRK’s policy priorities for the forthcoming year, Trump’s inaugural State of the Union Address, on 30 January, offered one of the first outlines of what would become the United States’ policy of ‘maximum pressure’. Criticizing the North’s egregious human rights violations following the death of Otto Warmbier, the President stressed how ‘we must modernize and rebuild our nuclear arsenal, hopefully never having to use it, but making it so strong and powerful that it will deter any acts of aggression’.⁵⁰ North Korea was, indeed, one the referent actors of Trump’s claims. Amidst signs of a possible thawing in inter-Korean ties, clashes within the Trump administration proliferated regarding a so-called ‘bloody nose’ strategy, comprising a limited strike on North Korean nuclear sites.⁵1 One oppositional voice to this notion was Professor Victor Cha, a former advisor to the George W. Bush administration. Nominated for the US ambassadorship to South Korea in December 2017, the sudden withdrawal of Cha’s nomination was widely seen as a response to his criticisms of the strategy, which would risk ‘escalating into a war that would likely kill tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Americans’.⁵2 The extent to which such a preventive strike on North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities was considered by the Trump administration remains unknown, but it was certainly not off the table. According to one senior official in the Trump administration and proponent of military action against the North, ‘bloody nose’— which the official defined as ‘a very limited strike to signal intention’—was ‘never used or thought about’ but ‘a myth created by those who were trying to undermine [the Trump administration’s policies]’.⁵3 It seems questionable that this strategy was never ‘thought about’, given the then escalation of rhetoric between Washington and Pyongyang. The US State Department made clear how the aim of ‘maximum pressure’ was to ‘bring North Korea to the negotiating table’, that ‘denuclearization is the only acceptable outcome […] and that it will be achieved one way or another’.⁵⁴ Whilst a ‘bloody nose’ might have been one possible means for Washington to achieve denuclearization, another means would be through leveraging its alliance with South Korea, especially given the pro-engagement administration in Seoul. ⁴⁹ Yonhap, ‘Nambuggowigeubhoedam gongdongbodomun jeonmun’ [‘Joint Press Release on InterKorean High-Level Talks’] Yonhap, 9 January 2018. ⁵⁰ Donald J. Trump, ‘State of the Union 2018’, CNN, 31 January 2018. ⁵1 Gerald F. Seib, ‘Amid Signs of a Thaw in North Korea, Tensions Bubble Up’, Wall Street Journal, 9 January 2018; Mark Landler, ‘Trump Vows a Muscular America to Confront a World of Enemies’, New York Times, 30 January 2018. ⁵2 Victor D. Cha, ‘A “Bloody Nose” Risks Hurting the U.S.’, Washington Post, 31 January 2018. ⁵3 Senior Trump administration official (interview, 2019). ⁵⁴ This claim was made by State Department spokeswoman, Heather Nauert; see Zachary Cohen, Nicole Gaouette, Barbara Starr, and Kevin Liptak, ‘Trump Advisors Clash over “Bloody Nose” Strike on North Korea’, CNN, 1 February 2018.

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Indeed, inter-Korean dialogue in early 2018 would facilitate talks between Washington and Pyongyang.⁵⁵ Following further inter-Korean talks in March, South Korean officials visited the United States to convey Kim Jong Un’s intentions for direct negotiations with Washington.⁵⁶ The then South Korean National Security Advisor, Chung Eui-yong, issued a list of promises made by Kim to the Trump administration: a commitment to denuclearization, a missile and nuclear test moratorium, permission for routine US–ROK military exercises to continue, an eagerness to meet Trump.⁵⁷ For a US president driven by impulse, North Korea was no exception. Trump agreed, and instead of pursuing the usual route of working-level, then higher-level talks, he went straight to the leader and aimed to ‘meet Kim Jong-un by May to achieve permanent denuclearization’.⁵⁸ At the same time, relations between Pyongyang and Beijing, which had then-seen no active affirmation since Kim Jong Un had taken power, would strengthen, and subsequently hinder, future US–DPRK relations as Sino-US ties soured.⁵⁹ The first meeting between Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping took place in March 2018. As a Chinese negotiator affirmed, Beijing and Pyongyang were, for several years, broadly united in the ‘step-by-step’ approach to the sequencing of denuclearization. According to this official, the DPRK should only suspend nuclear and missile tests if US–ROK military exercises were paused.⁶⁰ The actions of Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump during this time had powerful domestic motivations. Just as Kim sought to strengthen power domestically, Trump was eager to demonstrate to the US population that ‘maximum pressure’ far surpassed any policies of his predecessors. For all North Korea’s criticisms of ‘maximum pressure’ as part of a US desire to ‘isolate and stifle the DPRK’,⁶1 against which the DPRK would ‘bolster nuclear deterrence at maximum speed’,⁶2 the Trump administration naively deemed dialogue between Xi and Kim as ‘evidence that our campaign of maximum pressure is creating the appropriate atmosphere for dialogue with North Korea’.⁶3 Yet, the North would quickly leverage Trump’s contradictory rhetoric of pressure and engagement to extort benefits.⁶⁴ With UN Security Council sanctions on the DPRK becoming increasingly stringent—three resolutions were passed in 2017—and US–ROK military exercises ongoing, the DPRK continued to pursue ⁵⁵ KCNA, ‘DPRK High-Level Delegation Meets S. Korean President’, 11 February 2018. ⁵⁶ Kim Jong Un stressed the need to ‘vigorously advance the north–south relations’ and ‘write a new history of national unification’: KCNA, ‘Kim Jong Un Meets Members of Delegation of Special Envoy of S. Korean President’, 6 March 2018. ⁵⁷ Chung Eui-yong, ‘Remarks by Republic of Korea National Security Advisor Chung Eui-Yong’, The White House, 8 March 2018. ⁵⁸ Chung Eui-yong, ‘Remarks by […] Chung Eui-Yong’, The White House, 8 March 2018. ⁵⁹ Xinhua, ‘U.S. Hails Developments on Korean Peninsula Issue after Kim Jong Un’s China Visit’, 29 March 2018. ⁶⁰ PRC official (interview, 2017). ⁶1 KCNA, ‘U.S.-Led International Pressure Can Never Work on DPRK: Foreign Ministry Spokesman’, 27 April 2017. ⁶2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘DPRK Will Bolster Deterrence at Maximum Speed: Foreign Ministry Spokesman’, 1 May 2017. ⁶3 Reuters, ‘China Briefs Trump on Kim Jong Un’s Visit: White House’, 28 March 2018. ⁶⁴ Rodong Sinmun, ‘Truth of “Maximum Pressure and Engagement”, U.S. Hostile Policy against DPRK’, 26 May 2017; KCNA, ‘Nukes Represent Supreme Interests of DPRK: Rodong Sinmun’, 13 May 2017; KCNA, ‘Rodong Sinmun on Trump’s National Security Strategy’, 7 January 2018.

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recognition as a nuclear state, not least to mitigate the financial constraints of sanctions. As then Vice-Foreign Minister, Choe Son Hui emphasized, in 2017, DPRK–US ties formed the most salient interstate relationship for the North at the time: since ‘direct nuclear and military threats are coming from the United States […] we have to settle the problem with the United States’.⁶⁵ Settling the problem, however, did not involve complying with nuclear norms of disarmament or non-proliferation. Rather, as a former US official underscored, the DPRK wanted ‘to have its cake and eat it’; to ‘continue to develop nuclear weapons while, in the meantime, deflecting attention from that and trying to get sanctions lifted’.⁶⁶

Completing the state nuclear force Although the North Korean regime reinforced its position outside of the NonProliferation Treaty to vindicate its nuclear behaviour, April 2018 saw a volte-face. To the surprise of international observers, Kim Jong Un announced a moratorium on nuclear, intermediate-range, and intercontinental missile testing and pledged to shut down the Punggye-ri test site, used for the past six nuclear tests. The decision was justified on account of the DPRK having accomplished the ‘great historic cause’ of ‘completing the state nuclear force’ in the previous year as part of its wish ‘to make positive contributions to the building of a world free form nuclear weapons’.⁶⁷ Concurrently, Kim Jong Un announced that the byungjin line of parallel economic and nuclear development—which, since 2013, had guided North Korea’s domestic and foreign policies—would be replaced by a ‘new strategic line’, focusing exclusively on domestic economic development.⁶⁸ These two manoeuvres were significant for how North Korea perceived its status, internationally and domestically. It hoped that having obtained nuclear status, the ‘prospect of DPRK–U.S. dialogue’ would be realized.⁶⁹ Given North Korea’s history of delinquency, it would be naïve to assume that declaring the end of the byungjin policy and suspending nuclear and long-range missile testing signified a genuine intention to comply with the norms of the global nuclear order. Rather, as the strategic delinquency framework suggests, it formed part of a strategy to alleviate the costs of the DPRK’s prior delinquent actions (namely, sanctions) whilst garnering international recognition. Thus, Pyongyang’s logic could be encapsulated in this way: if legal nuclear weapon states (NWS) did not constantly ⁶⁵ Choe Son Hui, ‘Statement by Choe Son Hui’, Moscow Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 October 2017. ⁶⁶ US official (interview, 2019). ⁶⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Third Plenary Meeting of Seventh C.C., WPK Held in Presence of Kim Jong Un’, 21 April 2018. ⁶⁸ For more on the new strategic line, see Robert Carlin, ‘Kim Jong Un’s New Strategic Line’, 38North, 23 April 2018. ⁶⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Meeting of Political Bureau of C.C., WPK Held under Guidance of Kim Jong Un’, 10 April 2018.

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test nuclear weapons, why should the DPRK need to do so to prove its nuclear status? Following this self-declaration, North Korea’s interest in complying with nuclear norms waned. It increasingly called upon the United States to ease unilateral and multilateral sanctions, seeking to be treated as a de facto nuclear state whilst making weak commitments towards global disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear restraint. From North Korea’s perspective, any negotiations with the US thenceforth would occur between two nuclear powers of equal status. Inter-Korean dialogue catalysed a presidential-level summit between the two Koreas on 27 April 2018 (the first since 2007), which only evidenced the North’s minimal intention to engage with the nuclear order. Whilst the resultant Panmunjom Declaration demonstrated potent rhetoric towards mutual improvement in interKorean relations, there was scant mention of North Korean compliance with nuclear norms. The two Koreas pledged to establish a peace regime, enhance economic cooperation, and work towards a ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’.⁷⁰ A more substantive outcome was the establishment of a liaison office—as a de facto embassy—in Kaesong, north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and home to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a special administrative region and industrial park, which was closed by the South Korean government in 2016. Ever the narcissist, Trump praised the ‘historic meeting’ between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un as demonstrating how ‘the intense pressure of sanctions is working’, a claim that could not have been further from the truth.⁷1 Certainly, North Korean rhetoric may have softened from invoking conventional and nuclear war with the United States and South Korea, as witnessed during the first year of Trump’s presidency.⁷2 Nonetheless, as a South Korean official stressed, the North’s nuclear ambitions had formed long before: ‘from Kim Jong Un’s inauguration, they were determined to go for nuclear weapons’ and receive ‘economic, diplomatic, and political gains’ from the United States and the ROK.⁷3 Amidst thawing inter-Korean times, relations between Washington and Pyongyang fluctuated. The North continued to reject US calls to disarm unilaterally, in line with the United States’ goal of complete, verifiable, irreversible, dismantlement (CVID).⁷⁴ Pyongyang’s logic was clear: it would not make a single concession unless it obtained prior concessions from the United States.⁷⁵ The North threatened to revive provocations were its interests unaccommodated—highlighting how the self-imposed test moratorium could be breached at will—especially as US rhetoric escalated following the appointment of notable hawk, John Bolton, as National Security Advisor in April 2018, prior to the inter-Korean summit. Bolton’s ⁷⁰ ‘Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula’, 27 April 2018. ⁷1 Mike Pence, ‘Statement from Vice President Mike Pence on the Inter-Korean Summit’, The White House, 27 April 2018, ⁷2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Historic North–South Summit for National Reconciliation and Unity, Peace and Prosperity’, 28 April 2018. ⁷3 ROK minister (interview, 2019). ⁷⁴ Kelsey Davenport, ‘“Denuclearization” Poses Summit Challenge’, Arms Control Today, 48(4), 2018, 23–24. ⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Statement by First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of DPRK’, 16 May 2018.

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invocations of the ‘Libya model’, comprising military intervention if ‘Kim Jong Un doesn’t make a deal’ with the United States, expectedly catalysed a bellicose response from the DPRK. Pyongyang stressed its status as a ‘nuclear weapon state’ and warned that ‘whether the U.S. will meet us at a meeting room or encounter us at nuclear-to-nuclear showdown is entirely dependent upon the decision and behavior of the United States’.⁷⁶ As one US negotiator emphasized, the comparison between North Korea and Libya was far from accurate: the DPRK’s nuclear material and capabilities paled in comparison to those of Libya, whereby ‘Gaddafi had the material all spread out like a bunch of two-year olds with their toys, all willy-nilly’.⁷⁷ Furthermore, as a former US intelligence official affirmed, North Korean officials asserted how ‘the Libya model doesn’t apply to North Korea. There’s no way they’re just going to denuclearise.’⁷⁸ The reactive nature of President Trump was witnessed when he suddenly cancelled his planned meeting with Kim ‘based on the tremendous anger and open hostility’ following North Korea’s assertion of its nuclear status.⁷⁹ The DPRK’s response was milder than anticipated, merely repeating its opposition to unilateral disarmament, perhaps to assert its self-perception as an equal dialogue partner of the United States.⁸⁰ The timing of Trump’s announcement was ironic. That same day, the DPRK announced the demolition of the Punggye-ri test site, demonstrating its ability to comply, visibly, with nuclear norms.⁸1 Further inter-Korean summitry in May, and continued high-level US–DPRK dialogue, saw Trump reverse his decision and recommit to meeting Kim Jong Un. The first summit between incumbent North Korean and US leaders since the Korean War would take place on 12 June, in Singapore.⁸2 Trump’s decision to meet the North Korean leader resurfaced memories of the Clinton administration’s concerns prior to Jimmy Carter’s visit to Kim Il Sung, in 1994. Unsurprisingly, John Bolton was one of Trump’s most clamorous opponents. A lifelong sceptic of North Korea’s intention to denuclearize, for all Trump’s proclamations that the summit ‘will be great theatre’, Bolton feared that any leader-to-leader meeting would undermine the enforcement of sanctions and risk ‘legitimizing Kim Jong Un’, by ‘suggesting the North was no longer dangerous’.⁸3 As a former US negotiator to the Agreed Framework affirmed, Bolton had ‘no interest in attempting to solve the threat of North Korea through negotiations’, a claim that would resonate throughout Trump’s presidency.⁸⁴ ⁷⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Statement by Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of DPRK’, 24 May 2018. ⁷⁷ US Assistant Secretary of State (interview, 2019). ⁷⁸ US intelligence official (interview, 2019). ⁷⁹ The White House, ‘Letter to Chairman Kim Jong Un’, 24 May 2018. ⁸⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘joseon-oemuseong je-1-busang damhwa balpyo’ [‘Statement by First Foreign Minister’], 25 May 2018. ⁸1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of Nuclear Weapons Institute of DPRK’, 24 May 2018. ⁸2 Moon Jae-in, ‘Address by President Moon Jae-in on the May 26 Inter-Korean Summit’, Cheong Wa Dae, 27 May 2018; Donald Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump after Meeting with Vice Chairman Kim Yong Chol’, The White House, 1 June 2018. ⁸3 John Bolton, The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), 94–95. ⁸⁴ US negotiator AF (interview, 2019).

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Trump would not be the only beneficiary of summitry with his North Korean counterpart. For Kim Jong Un, having self-declared the DPRK as a nuclear state only months prior to the summit, North Korea’s diplomatic gambit was strategic. With expanded nuclear capabilities and ‘plausible second-strike capability’,⁸⁵ Pyongyang could negotiate from what it deemed to be a position of strength compared to previous negotiations, hoping to exploit the US–ROK alliance and the weakened nuclear order and reap concessions. With respect to the nuclear order, the situation could not have been timelier for Pyongyang. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), passed on 7 July 2017, prematurely elevated hopes of a nuclear-free world, but the lack of support from the five NWS; states in alliances with the United States (namely, Japan and South Korea) and, unsurprisingly, non-NPT signatories, including Israel, Pakistan, and the DPRK, limited its ability to stabilize the nuclear order.⁸⁶ Moreover, despite the establishment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement between Iran, the permanent members of the UNSC, and the European Union, in 2015, aimed at limiting Iran’s nuclear stockpile, the United States withdrew from the deal in May 2018.⁸⁷ Doing so provided the DPRK, and other states that resisted the United States, with greater opportunity to pursue counter-hegemonic strategies and ‘advance along their own roads’ unconstrained by normative pressure.⁸⁸ Ahead of the Singapore Summit, the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA elevated international expectations of Trump’s ability to strike a deal with Kim Jong Un, given the President’s adamance that Washington ‘would not stand for a deal that only partially denuclearized North Korea’.⁸⁹ The Singapore Summit would allow North Korea to leverage the US retrenchment from multilateralism to garner favourable outcomes: socially, the status as a significant dialogue partner of the United States worthy of negotiations; materially, the retention of its nuclear arsenal, bolstering of deterrence, and regime security. Indeed, the DPRK was ‘quite confident’ that it could continue its nuclear ambitions and obtain concessions from the United States.⁹⁰

Showmanship and semantics in Singapore The Singapore Summit was a small victory for North Korea. As a former US negotiator with the DPRK asserted, Pyongyang had ‘succeeded in bringing Donald Trump as a supplicant’ and could continue ‘getting something out of it even though they are ⁸⁵ Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 201. ⁸⁶ Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, ‘Nuclear Disarmament without the Nuclear-Weapon States: The Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty’, Daedalus 149(2), 2020, 171–89; Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, ‘The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Opportunities Lost?’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 July 2017; Michael Hamel-Green, ‘The Nuclear Ban Treaty and 2018 Disarmament Forums: An Initial Impact Assessment’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 1(2), 2018, 437. ⁸⁷ Donald J. Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, The White House, 8 May 2018. ⁸⁸ Pyongyang Times, ‘US Withdrawal from Iranian Nuclear Deal under Fire’, 14 May 2018. ⁸⁹ Victor D. Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, updated edn (New York: HarperCollins, 2018), 473. ⁹⁰ US official (interview, 2019).

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not putting something in’.⁹1 This logic was not incorrect; the summit and its optics highlighted the value that the DPRK placed upon being recognized as a negotiating partner of the United States and the urgency with which it sought sanctions easing. North Korea’s strategy was successful: pledge vague commitments to international norms, avoid offering tangible nuclear concessions, and reap benefits from the United States. Like Kim Jong Un, Trump revelled in the theatre of the summit. As John Bolton recounted, the President was ‘obsessed’ with the press coverage and viewed the summit as ‘an exercise in publicity’, despite having previously castigated Kim Jong Un as being ‘full of shit’.⁹2 The apparent bonhomie between the two leaders gave the impression that the past year of ad hominem attacks was confined to the past.⁹3 Such enthusiasm for the leader-to-leader dialogue was, expectedly, not shared by Bolton, who dismissed the very idea of the summit as ‘meaningless’, given the North’s reticence towards CVID. Whilst Kim blamed the ‘hostile policies of past US administrations’ for US–DPRK tensions, the North Korean leader played into Trump’s proclivity towards showmanship. Indeed, when Kim asked Trump whether the US President could trust him, ‘it was a question designed to elicit a positive response […] it showed he had Trump hooked’.⁹⁴ For all his disdain for engaging with the North, Bolton’s account, whilst far from unbiased, reinforces North Korea’s strategic engagement in delinquency. North Korea made no concessions on existing and future nuclear programmes but reaped the positive outcome of regime survival. The summit’s equivocal Joint Statement further benefited Kim. The two states pledged to forge ‘new U.S.–DPRK relations’ and a ‘lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula’; the DPRK committed to recovering prisoner-of-war remains, and ‘work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’.⁹⁵ This final commitment was arguably the most important with respect to the global nuclear order, but, paradoxically, carried the least substantive meaning. Yet, the North gained a surprising verbal pledge from Trump to halt US–ROK military exercises, which Trump, using North Korea’s nomenclature for these exercises, dismissed as ‘very provocative…war games’ and a financial burden; with respect to sanctions, the President hubristically asserted that he ‘look[ed] forward to taking them off ’.⁹⁶ These words stunned observers. Indeed, immediately after Trump’s election, a Singaporean diplomat revealed how he urged North Korean officials to ‘cut out a deal’ with Trump since the President ‘has no conception of the past’.⁹⁷ The President’s contradictory derision of the US–ROK alliance whilst seeking to maintain US strength ⁹1 US negotiator (interview, 2019). ⁹2 Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, 105–107. ⁹3 Bolton noted how, prior to the summit, although Trump claimed that the United States could impose ‘three hundred more sanctions’ on the DPRK, the summit was an opportunity that Trump could not miss. See: Ibid, 107. ⁹⁴ Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, 109. ⁹⁵ The White House, ‘Joint Statement […] at the Singapore Summit’, 12 June 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Joint Statement from Kim Jong Un and Trump after Summit’, 13 June 2018. ⁹⁶ Donald J. Trump, ‘Press Conference by President Trump’, The White House, 12 June 2018. ⁹⁷ Singaporean diplomat (interview, 2019).

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overseas, crystallized this claim. Trump’s vanity was clear: the President wanted to give the impression that ‘he stopped long-range ballistic missile testing and nuclear testing’,⁹⁸ which, as a South Korean nuclear envoy emphasized, he would frame as a feat ‘his predecessors never achieved’.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, Singapore was no exception to the travails of negotiating with North Korea and only epitomized the North’s adamance to avoid conceding on its nuclear programme irrespective of the situation or who was sat in the Oval Office. Definitional divergences between how the United States and North Korea interpreted the ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ and the sequencing of any such process would be a deliberate ploy by Pyongyang to reinforce its unwillingness to comply with nuclear norms. Although state media praised the summit for ushering in a ‘new chapter’ in US–DPRK relations, this definitional impasse would fundamentally obstruct any improvement in relations. Whilst the United States defined the denuclearization of North Korea in terms of nuclear dismantlement, the North’s preferred term, the denuclearization of the Peninsula, referred to a far loftier objective: the removal of the US security guarantee over South Korea; cancellation of joint military exercises; and sanctions relief, before any nuclear concessions were made. The DPRK’s emphasis on ‘simultaneous action’ regarding the sequencing of denuclearization was nothing new: reciprocity was central to its negotiations with the United States during the first and second nuclear crises. North Korea’s obsession over the definition of denuclearization was much more than a semantic spat. Rather, it was part and parcel of strategic delinquency: to avoid conceding on its treasured nuclear development whilst framing the United States as a ‘hostile’ actor. According to a South Korean negotiator, Kim Jong Un aimed to advance the ‘termination of the US hostile policy’ at the Singapore Summit through four means: ‘new relations with the US; sanctions relief; a peace regime that would end the state of war; and [to] turn US–North Korean relations into normal relations that could destroy the rationale for US troops in Korea and the UN Forces Command’. As North Korean actions and statements—before and after the summit— reveal, Pyongyang sought acceptance as a nuclear weapons state, which it hoped would catalyse a withdrawal of the ‘hostile policy’. The US pledge that it ‘would never resort to force on the Korean Peninsula’ signified recognition of North Korea’s status as a significant state.1⁰⁰ Much to Pyongyang’s chagrin, Trump’s claim to ease sanctions did not materialize. Whilst the Trump administration failed in ‘making North Korea believe they’re more secure so they can give up nuclear weapons’,1⁰1 the DPRK successfully leveraged the Singapore Summit to ‘decode Trump’s showmanship’.1⁰2 The North Korean regime learnt the power of pledging amorphous claims towards nuclear norm

⁹⁸ US NSC official (interview, 2019). ⁹⁹ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 1⁰⁰ ROK negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁰1 US envoy (interview, 2019). 1⁰2 US negotiator (interview, 2019). This official recounted how former US Special Representative for North Korea Policy, Sung Kim, emphasized this point, vis-à-vis the Singapore Summit.

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compliance without any real intention to alter the status quo, actions which are not incongruent with the expectations of the strategic delinquency framework. The negative status bestowed upon Pyongyang following its provocations in 2017, coupled with the positive status—albeit minimal—acquired after the de-escalation of tensions in early 2018 culminated in the receipt of pay-offs: a US pledge to suspend US–ROK military exercises; an ambiguous North Korean commitment to denuclearization, thereby allowing the status quo to continue (material); and recognition as an equal negotiating partner and significant international actor through presidential-level dialogue (social). By calling on the United States to end its demands for CVID, Pyongyang had successfully attracted the attention of the global hegemon. A visit to Pyongyang by then US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, in July of 2018 saw the North lambast CVID as ‘gangster-like’ and express distrust of Trump’s claim that US–ROK exercises would be suspended. Though nearly twenty-five years prior, the lessons of the Agreed Framework resonated in relation to how the North perceived the United States as an untrustworthy power whose actions did not match its words.1⁰3 A lesson from the second nuclear crisis (namely, the dismantlement of the water-cooling tower at Yongbyon in 2008), would also take hold. Cognizant of the possibility of further sanctions and the impact on the ‘new strategic line’, the North paid lip service to some of its pledges made in Singapore, seeking to exploit the US insistence on CVID. A rocket engine test stand at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station at Tongchang-ri—a key missile launch site in the development of ICBM technologies—was dismantled on 24 July.1⁰⁴ The North also returned fifty-five boxes to the United States, containing the remains of US service members during the Korean War.1⁰⁵ Yet, these concessions were minimal. Dismantlement at Sohae could be reversed, and further testing sites were most likely present.1⁰⁶ What is more, these actions did not demonstrate outward compliance with the nuclear order per se but rather compliance with US demands, within which featured the equivocal goal of ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’. North Korea’s behaviour during the second phase of the Trump administration epitomized its desire—as a self-perceived nuclear power—to obtain status parity as an equal dialogue partner with the United States. Its short-term goal following the Singapore Summit concerned sanctions relief, rather than being seen to comply with the norms of the nuclear order, the latter which declined in priority. Amidst interpersonal camaraderie between Trump and Kim Jong Un, which was anything but reflected in improved interstate ties, the North capitalized upon fissures within the Trump administration between hardliners—who called for stronger sanctions, given the DPRK’s lack of commitment to denuclearization1⁰⁷—and moderates. The latter 1⁰3 KCNA, ‘FM Spokesman on DPRK–U.S. High-Level Talks’, 7 July 2018. 1⁰⁴ Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr, ‘North Korea Begins Dismantling Key Facilities at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station’, 38North, 23 July 2018. 1⁰⁵ Alex Ward, ‘North Korea Returns Remains of 55 US Service Members’, VOX, 27 July 2018. 1⁰⁶ Construction at Sohae restarted following the Hanoi Summit of February 2019. 1⁰⁷ Bolton made this assertion in an interview; see Felicia Sonmez, ‘North Korea Has Not Taken Steps to Denuclearize, Bolton Says’, Washington Post, 7 August 2018; US Department of State, ‘North Korea Sanctions and Enforcement Actions Advisory’, 23 July 2018.

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were described by the DPRK as those actors who accused the United States of ‘going against the intention of president Trump to advance the DPRK–U.S. relations’.1⁰⁸ Trump’s penchant for flattery was further reflected in the exchange of ‘love letters’—as the President termed them—with his North Korean counterpart. Twentyeight such letters would be exchanged from April 2018 to August 2019. To Bolton’s irritation, upon receipt of a missive from Kim, Trump would read ‘one oleaginous passage after another’, as if oblivious to Bolton’s claims of Kim being ‘a dictator of a rat-shit little country’ who ‘doesn’t deserve another meeting with you’.1⁰⁹ Thus, Pyongyang could leverage the weakened nuclear order, the opportunities provided by the Singapore Summit, and Trump’s disposition for dialogue to request a second presidential summit. Indeed, the US announced plans for such an occasion in September 2018, which would provide the North with another opportunity to call for sanctions easing in exchange for increasingly limited nuclear concessions.11⁰ Inter-Korean relations would also advance. A third summit between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un, in September 2018, saw the two Koreas agree to enhance humanitarian cooperation; jointly host the 2032 Summer Olympic Games; and remove landmines, guard posts, weapons, and personnel in the Joint Security Area. Regarding the nuclear order, however, the North’s commitments were becoming much less substantial with each successive summit. Kim Jong Un agreed to dismantle the missile engine test site at Tongchang-ri—the same location where the rocket engine test-stand was deconstructed in July—and facilities at Yongbyon, but only if prior to any North Korean manoeuvre, the United States adopted corresponding measures.111 North Korea’s logic was hardly surprising: the collapse of the Agreed Framework and Six-Party Talks had taught Pyongyang that it should not provide the United States with any unilateral concessions before any such pledges had materialized. A former US negotiator corroborated this view, arguing how, after the Agreed Framework collapsed, North Korea learnt to ‘giv[e] a little’ in exchange for international concessions.112 In Singapore, North Korea received few material benefits; sanctions relief was not one.113 Yet, the status quo of regime survival upheld by nuclear deterrence was maintained. As former German Ambassador to the DPRK, Thomas Schäfer, concluded: ‘Pyongyang had reason to be highly satisfied with the political development of the first half of 2018. It had spectacularly broken diplomatic isolation—Kim Jong Un had also met with Xi Jinping several times—and thus put the necessary prerequisites in place for perforating the united sanctions front’. The DPRK ‘had temporarily renounced certain weapons tests, which, by its own declaration, it no longer needed anyhow. No wonder Kim Jong Un told South Korean special envoy Chung Eui-yong 1⁰⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Statement of Spokesperson for DPRK Foreign Ministry’, 9 August 2018. 1⁰⁹ Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, 125. 11⁰ Hyonhee Shin and Steve Holland, ‘North Korea’s Kim Asks Trump for Another Meeting in “Very Warm” Letter’, Reuters, 10 September 2018. 111 ‘Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018’, 19 September 2018. 112 US negotiator AF (interview, 2019). 113 Advisor to US Secretary of Defense (interview, 2019).

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in September 2018 that he had ‘unwavering confidence’ in Trump and hoped to achieve the ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula during his first term’.11⁴ For all these benefits, however, Pyongyang remained frustrated. Obtaining sanctions relief would be difficult as its calls for dialogue with the United States during the latter half of 2018 would fall on deaf ears.

Losing interest in the global nuclear order North Korea reverted to its old playbook. It revived provocations from November 2018, albeit in a less belligerent fashion than in 2017. Although there were no ICBM launches or nuclear tests, the DPRK tested short-range missiles and, on 15 November, an ‘ultramodern tactical weapon’, of which few details were revealed.11⁵ These tests were a clarion call for international attention, especially since Trump’s pledge to ease sanctions, which the DPRK viewed as integral to improved relations with the United States, remained unfulfilled. Pyongyang hoped that Washington would accommodate its proposed ‘step-by-step’ approach towards the provision of concessions and sequencing of denuclearization, in contrast to Washington’s logic, which, as a US negotiator summarized, was one of: ‘you do everything first, and then I’ll do something afterwards. Until then, I’ll do nothing.’11⁶ The stagnancy in US–DPRK talks can be partially attributed to the bureaucratic constraints within the North Korean regime. That the North Korean Foreign Ministry rebuffed US calls for dialogue in September 2018 also reflected how responsibility for negotiations with the United States lay not with the Foreign Ministry but with the United Front Department, then-led by Kim Yong Chol. Working-level US–DPRK dialogue largely involved Kim Yong Chol, Mike Pompeo, and senior officials on both sides, including the US Special Representative for North Korea Policy, Stephen Biegun. With plans for a second summit ongoing, the United States produced a roadmap envisioning improved political and economic relations with the DPRK. Yet, this roadmap remained heavily contingent upon Pyongyang’s nuclear disarmament: if the North did not wish to denuclearize, there would be no improved relations. By deliberately offering allusive and elusive definitions of the notion of ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’, and only committing to nuclear dismantlement under lofty conditions, the DPRK could prolong the status quo. Unusually, in December 2018, Pyongyang provided its clearest interpretation of the notion to date, namely, as ‘removing all elements of nuclear threats from the areas of both the north and the south of Korea and also from surrounding areas from where the Korean peninsula is targeted’. Were these goals unfulfilled, the DPRK would ‘look 11⁴ Thomas Schäfer, From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: How the Hardliners Prevailed (Independently published, 2021), 141–42. 11⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Supervises Newly Developed Tactical Weapon Test’, 16 November 2018. 11⁶ US negotiator AF (interview, 2019).

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for a new way’.11⁷ Pronouncements from the regime mentioned the notion of a ‘new way’ increasingly prominently throughout late 2018. In his 2019 New Year’s Address, Kim Jong Un referred to the ‘new way’ as tethered to ‘defending the sovereignty of the country’, most likely referring to a revival of nuclear development and missile testing since the moratorium on testing, earlier in the year, was self-imposed. Given the history of North Korea’s delinquent behaviour, reneging upon the moratorium would not be unforeseen.11⁸ As part of its trade-off between norm-defiant and normcompliant actions, if Pyongyang felt that no positive outcomes would ensue from compliance, it could—and would—revert to delinquency. A key challenge for US–DPRK negotiations following the Singapore Summit was sustaining continuity in dialogue since ‘the meetings were followed by long periods of non-communication’.11⁹ Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un would capitalize upon Trump’s personal desire for talks, especially since any similar opportunity would be rare in the future.12⁰ What was not to like? Trump had ‘given them [the DPRK] face, legitimacy, and he has flattered the leader, and the leader is very important to them […] he has not talked about things like human rights abuses’.121 Even if workinglevel negotiations made sluggish progress, ‘love letters’ increased in frequency and cordiality after the Singapore Summit. Each leader praised the other effusively for their personal willingness to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. In one letter of December 2018, Trump wrote how ‘a great result will be accomplished between our two countries’ and ‘the only two leaders who can do it are you and me’.122 In February of 2019, North Korean state media underscored the ‘irreversible’ nature of Kim Jong Un’s ‘pledge to work towards “complete denuclearisation” of the Peninsula’, affirming how the North would ‘no longer make or test nuclear weapon[s]’ nor ‘use them or propagate them’.123 Beyond paying lip service to nuclear norms, such statements from the North Korean regime served to assure the United States of the North’s commitment to a deal. Providing scant—if any—evidence of steps towards nuclear concessions was part of the DPRK’s ongoing strategy to reap concessions from the United States. Even as US–DPRK relations thawed, Kim Jong Un did not wish to alienate China, which did not look favourably on the fact that Kim’s first meeting with Xi Jinping took place in 2018, seven years after Kim had ascended to power. Sino-DPRK ties would warm after the Singapore Summit as Kim sought advice on how to obtain the best possible 11⁷ KCNA, ‘It Would Be Better to Search for New Way Rather than Facing Barrier on Old Way’, 20 December 2018 11⁸ Rodong Sinmun, ‘New Year Address of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un for 2019’, 1 January 2019. State media would repeat this threat throughout January and February: see Arirang Meari, ‘ijeneun migugi silcheonjeoghaengdong-eulo hwadabhaeya handa’ [‘Now the United States Must Respond by Taking Practical Action’], 4 February 2019. 11⁹ ‘An Interview with Stephen Biegun’, NKNews Podcast, Episode 191, 14 July 2021. 12⁰ In an interview with the author, a former US official exclaimed how Trump ‘treats Kim Jong Un as his buddy’, which ‘helps Kim Jong Un for the things he shouldn’t be doing, but also makes the United States to be seen as a country that is falling apart’. 121 US intelligence official (interview, 2019). 122 Woodward, Rage, p.174. 123 Rodong Sinmun, ‘gimjeong-eun jang-gun pyeonghwaui sae lyeogsaleul sseuda’ [‘General Kim Jong Un’s New History of Peace’], 13 February 2019.

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results from his engagement with Trump. A visit by Kim to Beijing, from 7 to 10 January 2019, affirmed the Sino-DPRK relationship and reinforced the North Korean leader’s intention to obtain positive outcomes from the second US–DPRK summit.12⁴ During his State of the Union Address, Trump proudly announced that a second US–DPRK summit would be held from 27 to 28 February in Hanoi.12⁵ Speculation abounded as to the location: would exposure to Vietnam’s ideologically communist but economically capitalist system inspire Kim to reform North Korea similarly? Since it was suspected that Kim would travel by train to Vietnam, Hanoi was deemed more convenient than other locations, such as Da Nang. No detail was going unconsidered, and both sides had high expectations of reaching an agreement, as Trump’s prior communications with Kim revealed.12⁶ Although the second summit promised further theatrical diplomacy, Trump was, this time, more responsive to criticisms from within his administration. Whilst Bolton ‘harboured a hope that this wouldn’t go forward’ since ‘he didn’t have an alternative’ to the presidential dialogue, the best he could do was to convince Trump that if no acceptable deal could be reached with Kim, the US president should—and would—‘walk away’.12⁷ The Hanoi Summit presented another opportunity for Pyongyang to be seen as an equal negotiating partner of the United States, whilst continuing its pursuit of sanctions easing. Nevertheless, as the former Head of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Korean Mission Centre, Andrew Kim, accurately surmised, the North entered the talks pursuing conflicting goals: a ‘strong desire to improve North Korea’s relationship with the U.S.’ whilst refusing to compromise on its nuclear programme.12⁸ This pursuit would catalyse the now infamous outcome.

The art of the no-deal: The third phase Prior to the summit, Kim Jong Un promised to bring a ‘big present’ to Hanoi, widely seen by the US to comprise an offer to close the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility. If true, it would be at least the third time that the DPRK had made such a proposition (and only on one occasion, in 1994, did it arguably heed its word). The United States was engulfed in a dilemma: would no deal be better than a bad deal? The timing of the Hanoi Summit allowed the DPRK to take advantage of additional fissures within the global nuclear order and continue to frame international order through the ideological prism of the US ‘hostile policy’, even amidst thawing US–DPRK relations. The US’s reticence to sign the TPNW, established in 2017, made 12⁴ Choe Sang-Hun, ‘North Korea’s Leader, Kim Jong-un, Arrives in China by Train’, New York Times, 7 January 2019. 12⁵ Donald Trump, Twitter Post, 9 February 2019, 12:33AM, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/1094031561861881856 (accessed 23 December 2022). 12⁶ Woodward, Rage, 174. 12⁷ ‘An Interview with Stephen Biegun’, 14 July 2021; Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, 324. 12⁸ Sung Andrew Kim, ‘Transcript: Andrew Kim on North Korea Denuclearization and U.S.–DPRK Diplomacy’, 25 February 2019, available at: https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/transcript-andrew-kim-northkorea-denuclearization-and-us-dprk-diplomacy (accessed 15 January 2023).

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clear to Pyongyang that, given Washington’s unwillingness to commit to nuclear disarmament, there was little urgency for the DPRK to follow suit. Yet, Pyongyang would soon realize that feigning compliance with Washington’s demands and nuclear norms would prove insufficient to extort international concessions. From November 2018, the DPRK unabashedly declared its loss of interest on two fronts: first, in the global nuclear order; and second, in being seen, internationally, as a norm-compliant power. Rather, it pursued two goals increasingly determinedly: the easing of bilateral and multilateral sanctions and social recognition as a significant nuclear state of status parity with the United States. A leaked internal North Korean document from November 2018 confirmed these goals: Kim sought a ‘final deal’ towards North Korea’s international acceptance as a ‘global nuclear strategic state […] raising the [DPRK’s] status as a world-class nuclear force nation’. The DPRK would resist any US attempts—including dialogue—‘to get rid of our nuclear weapons by any means’—and seek to ‘protect the revolutionary leadership like an impregnable fortress’.12⁹ This overt admission of the DPRK’s status ambitions contrasted prior claims by US officials during the second nuclear crisis, outlining how the DPRK was uninterested in elevating its status, such as through normalizing relations with the United States. Yet, this time, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities had increased in sophistication and scope. Pyongyang was thus clear that it would only normalize relations with the United States if its nuclear aspirations remained untouched. As a South Korean nuclear envoy put it, delinquency is ‘the only way Kim Jong Un can sit with Trump. How can this happen if we don’t have an operational arsenal? They [North Korean officials] would say? Only when we resort to forceful things that the US dislikes does the US pay attention to us, and the US has to have a deal.’13⁰ At Hanoi, Trump’s inflated hubris in his ability to reach an agreement with his counterpart was matched by Kim Jong Un. Although North Korean state media praised the ‘significant advance in the DPRK–U.S. relations’ witnessed in this second leader-to-leader meeting, the reality was far from the truth.131 Both Kim and Trump walked out with neither a deal nor a post-summit luncheon. The fundamental disagreement concerned the acceptability of the concessions that North Korea was willing to offer. Ostensibly, John Bolton was one of the summit’s victors, having persuaded Trump to ‘walk’ away when no consensus could be reached. A further dispute arose in terms of the narrative of the summit and its curtailed ending. According to Trump, although Kim was ‘willing to denuke a large portion of the areas that we wanted’, these concessions stopped at Yongbyon, for which the United States ‘couldn’t give up all sanctions’.132 Indeed, Kim Jong Un’s ‘big present’ had turned out to be merely that which the United States was anticipating.

12⁹ Baik Sung-won, ‘Leaked N. Korean Document Shows Internal Policy against Denuclearization’, VOA, 17 June 2019. 13⁰ ROK nuclear envoy (interview, 2019). 131 KCNA, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, President Trump Hold Second-Day Talks’, 1 March 2019. 132 Donald Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference | Hanoi, Vietnam’, The White House, 28 February 2019

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The North’s interpretation of the summit’s ending, however, differed. In a midnight press conference, Ri Yong Ho mentioned how the US rejected the DPRK’s proposal for the removal of five specific sanctions resolutions—imposed in 2016 and 2017—which targeted ‘the economy and livelihood of our people’ in return for the dismantlement of ‘all the nuclear material and production facilities in the Yongbyon area, including plutonium and uranium, in the presence of US experts’. Yet, whilst Pyongyang’s first aim of the Summit, namely sanctions easing, was unfulfilled, it was more successful in its second aim, to avoid making any substantial nuclear concessions, even if its desire to do so would precipitate the collapse of talks. Kim refused to accept Trump’s call for the DPRK to ‘take one more step besides the dismantlement of nuclear facilities’ at Yongbyon.133 Whilst not explicit in Trump’s words, such a step likely comprised the dismantlement of facilities beyond Yongbyon, a costly compromise which would have hampered the North’s future nuclear development. A former US negotiator revealed how the ‘main stumbling block to making any forward progress’ at Hanoi was Trump’s ‘demand that they include undeclared enrichment facilities beyond Yongbyon’.13⁴ There was also a question of loss of face: the Trump administration viewed accepting Yongbyon as a concession as tantamount to endorsing North Korea’s future nuclear ambitions. Nonetheless, as a South Korean official underscored, the North’s strategy of offering only Yongbyon, instead of other nuclear facilities, was far from novel and was ‘typical of North Korea’s negotiating behaviour’.13⁵ The ultimate failure of the Hanoi Summit was owing to a mutual mismatch of expectations on both sides. The DPRK ‘grossly overestimated how bad Trump was; they thought the US was weak; they had no Plan B. They thought, too, that Trump was desperate for a deal for internal political reasons.’13⁶ Expecting the North to place Yongbyon—and little else—on the negotiating table, the United States expected greater flexibility from their counterparts, namely, an alternative option or ‘Plan B’. A senior official then serving in the Trump administration validated this assertion, explaining how Kim Jong Un ‘went to Hanoi thinking he was going to get everything he wanted. He was going to blow up a tunnel at Yongbyon […] he thought it’d be easy, like the good old days under the Bush and Clinton administrations.’13⁷ A South Korean official concurred, arguing how North Korea wished to retain its nuclear weapons and secure a ‘level of normalization with the US’.13⁸ From these accounts, two themes emerge: first, the DPRK’s misjudgement of the US’s willingness to accommodate its interests, predicating its logic upon past agreements, such as the Agreed Framework; second, although the North may have been recognized

133 Ri Yong Ho, ‘Press Statement by Ri Yong-ho, Hanoi, Vietnam (midnight)’, Global News, 1 March 2019. 13⁴ US NSC official (interview, 2019). 13⁵ ROK minister (interview, 2019). 13⁶ UK diplomat (interview, 2019). As Pak argues, Kim miscalculated by ‘gambling that he had a more malleable partner’ in Trump. Jung H. Pak, Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA officer’s insights into North Korea’s enigmatic young dictator (New York: Penguin Random House, 2020), 223. 13⁷ Senior Trump administration official (interview, 2019). 13⁸ ROK minister (interview, 2019).

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as an equal negotiating partner of the United States, such recognition could not induce any compliance with the US’s demands, given the US’s refusal to ease sanctions. Then North Korean Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Choe Son Hui, offered a scathing post-mortem following the summit: ‘I have a feeling that our Chairman [Kim Jong Un] lost the will to continue the US–DPRK exchanges.’13⁹ North Korea’s lack of ‘intention to compromise with the U.S. in any form’ would only grow.1⁴⁰ For some analysts, Kim Jong Un’s objective, even at Hanoi, remained—and continues to be—the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under the North’s terms.1⁴1 Yet, this goal need not be incompatible with shorter-term aims to improve relations with the United States, even if only for instrumental purposes. As a former CIA official contended: the DPRK would keep unification ‘open as a possibility’, without doing ‘anything that would push [it] in that direction, because it would upset all [its] other near-term plans’.1⁴2 Interview evidence shows how whilst Kim sought benefits without making substantial nuclear concessions, the no-deal of Hanoi inflicted substantial social costs, particularly personal embarrassment at his flawed expectations of the United States’ propensity towards an agreement.1⁴3 Kim’s ‘position was so assaulted by the total failure in Hanoi, he could not conceivably go back to talks with the Americans unless there was a huge, demonstrable change in the American position’, namely, sanctions relief.1⁴⁴ With sanctions relief unlikely, ending the summit seemed superior to an unsatisfactory deal, but the outcome was far from desirable. Contrasting opinions emanate from those ‘in the room’ regarding the interpersonal interactions between Kim and Trump: one opinion stresses how, whilst the two leaders parted cordially, the summit’s abrupt ending ‘was much more of a shock’ to the DPRK than the United States, since the North expected to gain its ‘preferred outcome’.1⁴⁵ Another perspective, however, underscored the North’s embarrassment at misjudging the United States’ disposition: ‘when it was clear Trump was going to walk out of the room, Kim Jong Un went pale; blood drained from his face’.1⁴⁶

Missiles and free food Trump rationalized his decision to curtail the Hanoi Summit with the phrase: ‘sometimes you have to walk’.1⁴⁷Yet, the summit’s inconclusive ending worsened relations between Washington and Pyongyang as the North’s frustrations with the United 13⁹ Ri Yong Ho, ‘Press Statement by Ri Yong-ho, Hanoi, Vietnam’. 1⁴⁰ Eric Talmadge, ‘N. Korean Official: Kim Rethinking US Talks, Launch Moratorium’, Associated Press, 15 March 2019. 1⁴1 See, e.g. Pak, Becoming Kim Jong Un, 235. 1⁴2 CIA official (interview, 2019). 1⁴3 In email correspondence with the author, in 2019, a Track 1.5 negotiator with the DPRK disparagingly termed the summit the ‘Hanoi hijack’. 1⁴⁴ CIA official (interview, 2020). 1⁴⁵ ‘An Interview with Stephen Biegun’, 14 July 2021. 1⁴⁶ UK diplomat (interview, 2019). 1⁴⁷ Donald Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference | Hanoi, Vietnam’, The White House, 28 February 2019.

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States only grew. Scaled-down US–ROK military exercises—Dong Maeng—from 4 to 12 March, irritated the North.1⁴⁸ Nonetheless, in a somewhat paradoxical gesture considering the DPRK’s negotiating strategy at Hanoi, Kim Jong Un underscored how there was ‘no need to be obsessed with the summit with the U.S. with a thirst for the issue of easing sanctions’, insisting his openness towards ‘solving a problem through dialogue and negotiation’. These words, however, were not an admission of defeat at failing to convince the United States to lessen sanctions. In the same statement, Kim issued an ultimatum. Urging the United States ‘to quit its current calculation method’, the North would ‘wait for a bold decision from the U.S. with patience till the end of this year’.1⁴⁹ By setting the terms of dialogue, North Korea was turning the tables. It sought to reinforce its status as an equal negotiating partner of the United States and escalate brinkmanship by providing the United States with a time frame to alter its diplomatic strategy or else face detrimental consequences. Despite historically benefiting from delinquency, the North’s provocations after the Hanoi Summit failed to attract the attention of the United States in the ways Pyongyang desired. The testing of a ‘new-type tactical guided weapon’ on 18 April saw then Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, dismiss Kim Jong Un as a ‘tyrant’, suggesting the possibility that few benefits would come Pyongyang’s way.1⁵⁰ In response, senior North Korean official, Kwon Jong Gun, called for Pompeo to be removed from US negotiating teams, arguing that the DPRK would not ‘move […] one iota’ in offering any concessions to the US if ‘Pompeo engages in talks again’.1⁵1 US–DPRK relations seemed to be regressing to the ad hominem attacks of 2017. In another instance, the North’s Foreign Ministry lambasted John Bolton’s assertion that the DPRK must credibly demonstrate its intention to denuclearize prior to any US concessions.1⁵2 Importantly, the flurry of statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at this time underscored the Ministry’s ascendancy in diplomatic relations with the United States. After Hanoi, the portfolio for engaging with the United States was transferred from the United Front Department to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meaning that Choe Son Hui, promoted, in April, to First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, became a ‘much more prominent spokesperson’.1⁵3 Despite testing shortrange missiles in May 2019, which it justified as part of its strategy of ‘increasing the capability of the defence units’, the North had not yet violated its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and missile testing, which specifically referred to long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.1⁵⁴ Nevertheless, these provocations failed to 1⁴⁸ Dong Maeng means ‘alliance’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Criticizes Some Forces for Making Issue of Its Routine Self-Defensive Military Drill’, 8 May 2019. 1⁴⁹ KCNA, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at First Session of 14th SPA’, 13 April 2019 1⁵⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Weapon’, 18 April 2019. 1⁵1 KCNA, ‘U.S. Secretary of State Slammed’, 18 April 2019. 1⁵2 For Bolton’s remarks, see Nathan Crooks and Nick Wadhams, ‘Bolton Seeks “Real Indication” from North Korea before a Summit’, Bloomberg, 17 April 2019. For Choe’s response, see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Answer by First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of DPRK’, 20 April 2019. 1⁵3 ‘An Interview with Stephen Biegun’, 14 July 2021. 1⁵⁴ Rodong Sinmun, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Forefront Area and on Western Front’, 10 May 2019.

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attract the attention of the United States. Trump retorted nonchalantly how he was ‘not bothered’ about the launches.1⁵⁵ According to a former diplomat, ‘leaked documents out of North Korea indicated that senior North Korean officials were really furious that they fired these missiles, and Trump said hey, I don’t care. This really wasn’t what they wanted.’1⁵⁶ In Pyongyang’s eyes, two presidential-level summits had done little to alter the US ‘hostile policy’. Verbal criticisms of the DPRK from US officials were reciprocated by similar rhetoric—and belligerent behaviour—from the North Korean regime. North Korea’s distrust of the United States only grew as the Trump administration became increasingly sceptical of further dialogue. John Bolton’s lifelong cynicism towards engagement with the DPRK would prevail, chastising those within the US administration in favour of negotiations as wanting ‘nothing more than to return to the Clinton Administration’s Agreed Framework, or the Bush Administration’s Six-Party Talks, or the Obama Administration’s ‘strategic patience’.1⁵⁷ Not only did Bolton remain adamant that ‘someday North Korea is going to understand that nuclear weapons are not going to help them’,1⁵⁸ as one US official put it, but also, as another US negotiator revealed, Bolton preferred the United States to enter a ‘mode of aggressive containment with the use of force as necessary’.1⁵⁹ In an interview with the author, a then serving senior official reiterated such sentiment, emphasizing how, only when the DPRK made a ‘strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons’ would it ‘face a new role in the international community’.1⁶⁰ Despite Bolton’s wishful thinking, the DPRK did not close the door to dialogue with the United States—although the door was far from wide open. Whilst Trump’s proclivity towards interpersonal relations with Kim continued after Hanoi, they would be no substitute for improved interstate relations. At Hanoi, the US President asserted how ‘Chairman Kim promised me last time [that] he’s not going to do testing of rockets and nuclear […] I take him at his word.’1⁶1 Kim Jong Un would leverage this difference between the amicable interpersonal relations between Trump and Kim and stagnant interstate relations between Washington and Pyongyang, the latter which would undergo a precipitous decline. In his missives, Trump would play on Kim’s emotions to induce him to talks. In one letter of 22 March, Trump gushed how ‘you are my friend and always will be’, arguing how Kim had an ‘historic opportunity to fulfil [Kim Il Sung’s] dying wish—to achieve denuclearization’.1⁶2 Kim responded in a speech on 12 April that ‘as President Trump keeps saying, the personal ties between me and him are not hostile like the relations between the two countries and we still maintain good relations, as to be able to exchange letters asking about health anytime

1⁵⁵ Donald Trump and Abe Shinzo, ‘Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Abe of Japan’, The White House, 27 May 2019. 1⁵⁶ UK diplomat (interview, 2020). 1⁵⁷ Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, 333. 1⁵⁸ US negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁵⁹ US negotiator DPRK (interview, 2019). 1⁶⁰ Trump administration official (interview, 2019). 1⁶1 Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference | Hanoi, Vietnam’. 1⁶2 Robert L. Carlin, ‘The Real Lessons of the Trump–Kim Love Letters’, Foreign Policy, 13 August 2021.

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if we want’.1⁶3 Although the ‘love letters’ remained ‘cordial but infrequent’ following the Hanoi Summit, Kim Jong Un was undistracted from his ultimate goals.1⁶⁴ Writing to Trump in June 2019, commemorating the one-year anniversary of the Singapore Summit, Kim’s outlook was pessimistic, writing how ‘without a new approach and the courage it takes, the prospects for resolution of the issue will only be bleak’. The letter’s final sentence, however, offered hope: ‘I believe the one day will come sooner or later when we sit down together to make great things happen, with the will to give another chance to our mutual trust.’1⁶⁵ Another chance would soon arrive but not before the North could exploit the divisions within the Trump administration vis-à-vis the President’s penchant for leader-to-leader talks, and growing reticence within his administration. In one example, Bolton dismissed a US–ROK agreement of May 2019, whereby the US would provide food aid to the DPRK, as evidence that the North ‘could conclude “we fire missiles and get free food”’.1⁶⁶ A common target for North Korean criticism, Bolton’s reasoning for North Korea’s behaviour was consistent with the framework of strategic delinquency, whereby the DPRK could garner benefits without compromising on its existing nuclear arsenal and subsequent nuclear aspirations.1⁶⁷ The North’s rhetorical threats towards the United States, however, went beyond criticizing individual members of the Trump administration. More broadly, Pyongyang was frustrated at Washington’s continued calls for the North to comply with the global nuclear order, which it deemed to be an act of hypocrisy, as part of the double standards of the US ‘hostile policy’. The United States had failed to act upon its NPT commitments towards disarmament and refused to sign the TPNW. The inconclusive Hanoi Summit only furthered the DPRK’s distrust of the United States: one statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deemed the summit’s curtailment as part of a deliberate ‘scheme to annihilate [the DPRK] by force’.1⁶⁸ Even as it lost interest in global nuclear order, the DPRK continued to criticize instances of what it perceived to be the US ‘hostile policy’, as if to highlight how it remained interested in improving relations with the United States, if only as a route towards obtaining concessions. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un’s end-of-year deadline for the United States to adopt a ‘new strategy’ was another marker of the DPRK’s growing self-confidence as a significant nuclear power. It wanted to avoid the fate of the Six-Party Talks and ensure that any dialogue with the United States would be on terms acceptable to the North. The US Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific 1⁶3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at First Session of 14th SPA’. 1⁶⁴ Woodward, Rage, 176. 1⁶⁵ CNN, ‘Transcript: Kim Jong Un’s Letters to President Trump’, 9 September 2020. 1⁶⁶ Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, 342–43. 1⁶⁷ KCNA, ‘Spokesperson for Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK Slams U.S. National Security Adviser’, 27 May 2019. The DPRK castigated Bolton on several occasions as an ‘anti-DPRK war maniac’ obstructing dialogue. See Naenara News, ‘Bolton’s Sheer Sophism Failed’, 28 May 2019; TASS, ‘Pyongyang Set to Break Off Denuclearization Talks with Washington’, 15 March 2019, available at: http://tass.com/world/1048754 (accessed 23 December 2022). 1⁶⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Fate of DPRK–U.S. Joint Statement: Spokesperson for Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK’, 4 June 2019.

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Strategy Report of June 2019 amplified North Korean provocations. Calling for the ‘final, fully verifiable denuclearization as committed to by Chairman Kim Jong-un’, the report labelled the DPRK a ‘rogue state’, ‘serial proliferator’, and ‘security challenge for the Department of Defense, the global system, our allies and partners, and competitors’.1⁶⁹ Whilst not as damning as Bush’s ‘axis of evil’, these labels, which lowered the North’s status, were perceived, of course, as epitomizing the ‘hostile policy’. Yet, now that the DPRK had twice engaged in presidential-level dialogue with the United States, it could denounce such criticisms as evidence of US dishonesty at improving US–DPRK ties, an insult on its dialogue partner, and epitomizing the United States’ ‘ambition of disarmament first and overthrow of system thereafter’.1⁷⁰ Although Washington’s rhetoric was far from ‘fire and fury’, North Korea’s response underscored the regime’s ever-growing dissatisfaction at the United States, especially as intra-regime divisions cemented in Pyongyang.

Theatre without substance: Third time lucky? With the door to US–DPRK dialogue not completely closed, communication between Trump and Kim would, somewhat unexpectedly, bear fruit. During a visit to South Korea in June 2019, Trump tweeted his willingness to meet Kim Jong Un at the DMZ; a manoeuvre which US officials thought would elicit little response from their North Korean counterparts.1⁷1 Surprisingly, a meeting was arranged for 30 June, facilitated by South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who, since taking office in 2017, had hitherto failed to advance his pre-election policy of inter-Korean engagement. Trump’s tweet even surprised Choe Son Hui, who, unsure of Trump’s objectives, expressed uncertainty at the United States’ ‘very interesting suggestion’.1⁷2 Ensuring cooperation with South Korea would be vital for any successful US–DPRK dialogue, despite Trump’s disdain for the US–ROK alliance, about which the US President once exclaimed, ‘we’re losing a fortune […] why do we have our 32,000 soldiers over there, willing to fight for you?’.1⁷3 Indeed, Moon would be a crucial mediator between Washington and Pyongyang. Choe’s suspicions would be confirmed but so too would US doubts that Kim’s openness to meet with Trump was simply for Kim Jong Un to gain domestic and international status. The impromptu meeting inflated Trump’s pride. Crossing the inter-Korean border, he became the first US President to enter North Korean territory and pledged to invite Kim Jong Un ‘right now—to the White House’.1⁷⁴ As was becoming characteristic of this leader-to-leader dialogue, the meeting brought 1⁶⁹ US Department of Defense, ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’, 1 June 2019, 12. 1⁷⁰ KCNA, ‘U.S. Slammed for Its Provocation against DPRK’, 5 June 2019. 1⁷1 Donald Trump, Twitter Post, 28 June 2019, 6:51PM EST, available at: https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/1144740178948493314 (accessed 10 January 2023). 1⁷2 KCNA, ‘Statement Issued by First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of DPRK’, 29 June 2019. 1⁷3 Woodward, Rage, 191. 1⁷⁴ The White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump, Chairman Kim Jong Un, and President Moon’, 30 June 2019.

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theatre but little substance. Whilst both sides pledged a ‘new breakthrough in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and in the bilateral relations’, no concrete commitments to denuclearization were mentioned.1⁷⁵ Ambiguity was becoming a pay-off for the DPRK. Not only did Kim Jong Un refrain from making any nuclear concessions but he could also easily renege upon the wording of his pledges if the tide turned against Pyongyang. For Stephen Biegun, Kim’s attitude at this meeting was ‘very forward leaning …] we had Hanoi behind us now’.1⁷⁶ Yet, even if the leader may have exhibited greater willingness to further US–DPRK ties, both sides espoused fundamentally different starting points for the process of denuclearization, to the detriment of further talks. Whilst the DPRK argued that ‘before we take a step […] we need to see something on your side that’s demonstrable’, the US’s strategy was a ‘mirror image’ of what they tell the North Koreans, namely, ‘we can’t move ahead unless you do something’.1⁷⁷ By now, North Korea had achieved a bigger goal. Through participating in presidential-level talks, Kim Jong Un had grasped Trump’s ‘penchant for the theatrical’ by ‘creating the illusion of progress’.1⁷⁸ Pyongyang gained further leeway to resume provocations, launching short-range ballistic missiles in July and August and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on 2 October.1⁷⁹ The United States could do little but wait for the next overture of dialogue. The North would frequently make decisions at the last minute. It would take three months after the DMZ meeting before Pyongyang announced that working-level talks would be held in Stockholm, on 5 October. Meanwhile, the Trump administration would undergo a notable personnel change with the removal of John Bolton as National Security Advisor. Intra-administration factionalism had seemingly become too much for the President. Trump even empathized with North Korea’s rebukes of Bolton: he chastised Bolton’s invocations of the ‘Libya model’, claiming that he ‘did not blame Kim Jong Un’ for ‘want[ing] nothing to do with John Bolton’.1⁸⁰ Whether another impulsive remark or tactical choice of words, Trump failed to elicit a positive response from the North. Despite Choe Son Hui underscoring the North’s willingness for ‘comprehensive discussions’ following Bolton’s departure, such rhetoric was an unconvincing signal of any intention to comply with nuclear norms. Rather, it demonstrated the North’s impatience as Kim Jong Un’s deadline loomed and the US approach seemed not to change.1⁸1 1⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Has Historic Meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at Panmunjom’, 1 July 2019. 1⁷⁶ ‘An Interview with Stephen Biegun’, 14 July2021. 1⁷⁷ CIA official (interview, 2020). 1⁷⁸ Pak, Becoming Kim Jong Un, 224. 1⁷⁹ Voice of Korea, ‘DPRK Succeeds in Test-Firing New-Type Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile’, 2 October 2019. 1⁸⁰ Donald J. Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump in Meeting on E-Cigarettes’, The White House, 11 September 2019. 1⁸1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Issues Statement’, 9 September 2019.

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Talks without results: ‘Everything changed after Stockholm’ Expectations of US–DPRK working-level talks in Stockholm quickly deflated as dialogue commenced. The North’s logic was simple: gain aplenty whilst giving away as little as possible. As Stephen Biegun emphasized, the talks were ‘the most constrained of all the talks we had’: with a ‘very strictly prescribed engagement’ from the North Korean side, the DPRK’s concerns were epitomized in two phrases: ‘Tell us what you brought’ and ‘What else are you bringing?’ With the United States sticking firm to its denuclearization roadmap coupled with confidence-building measures to be discussed in future meetings, North Korean officials rapidly lost interest. Pyongyang was disappointed that despite its prior calls, the United States had failed to bring any ‘new package’ favourable to its interests. Akin to the collapse of the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK withdrew from the Stockholm talks when ‘they didn’t think they were going to get anywhere’, whereby no preferable outcomes could emerge from dialogue.1⁸2 Instead, Pyongyang accused the United States of ‘abusing the DPRK–U.S. dialogue’ for domestic purposes, namely, the upcoming presidential election.1⁸3 Kim Kye Gwan, lead negotiator during the Six-Party Talks, buttressed this claim, highlighting how North Korea was ‘no longer interested in such talks that bring nothing to us’ and would only resurrect dialogue if the US took ‘a bold decision to drop its hostile policy’.1⁸⁴ As Biegun—‘in the room’ at the time—highlighted, at the end of the meeting, his counterpart, Kim Myong Gil, ‘read a litany of complaints of everything the US has done: violate the spirit of Singapore; demonstrate hostility; show bad faith—on and on and on’.1⁸⁵ North Korean statements demonstrate two principal reasons for its withdrawal from working-level talks. First, it did not wish to engage in ‘sickening negotiations’ if the United States was unwilling to provide the North with any of its desired concessions.1⁸⁶ Second, Kim Myong Gil’s diatribe stressed how the DPRK wished to degrade the social status of the United States in the eyes of the international community, emphasizing how the ‘hostile policy’ precluded any further negotiations. At the same time, Pyongyang wanted the freedom to advance its nuclear development unabated. As had become a common negotiating strategy since the first nuclear crisis, when the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities were rudimentary, the regime-state utilized its withdrawal from any agreement or dialogue to justify further delinquency. Almost thirty years later, with increasingly advanced nuclear capabilities, the DPRK

1⁸2 CIA official (interview, 2020). 1⁸3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Fate of DPRK–U.S. Dialogue Depends on U.S. Attitude: DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’, 6 October 2019. 1⁸⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Advisor to DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Statement’, 18 November 2019. 1⁸⁵ ‘An Interview with Stephen Biegun’, 14 July 2021. For Kim Myong Gil’s statement, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Roving Ambassador Issues Statement’, 14 November 2019. 1⁸⁶ Pyongyang Times, ‘Fate of DPRK–US Dialogue Depends on US Attitude: DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’, 7 October 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Roving Ambassador Issues Statement’.

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could negotiate from a far stronger position. With its self-imposed moratorium on long-range missile and nuclear testing still in place, the DPRK intensified rhetorical provocations and rebuffed US overtures for negotiations.1⁸⁷ In a role reversal from earlier in the Trump administration, it was not North Korea seeking dialogue, but the United States, against which the North insisted that no talks would be held unless Pyongyang’s conditions were met. Such actions can be contextualized with respect to the North’s frustration at the lack of US flexibility on sanctions easing.1⁸⁸ In response to plans for US–ROK military exercises in November 2019, the North responded with bellicosity, threatening ‘shocking punishment’.1⁸⁹ For Pyongyang, the postponement of such exercises following the Singapore Summit, and their reduction in scale—instead of termination—was far from a significant concession. Rather, the North wanted the US to ‘quit the drill […] once and for all’ or else abandon any hopes of Washington’s ‘dream’ of denuclearization.1⁹⁰ Nevertheless, it was not just North Korea that would benefit from talks with its adversary. With the imminence of the US presidential election in November, any such dialogue would be a source of domestic and international legitimacy for the Trump administration, much to the ire of Pyongyang. The North Korean regime castigated the United States for refusing to take any reciprocal actions following those undertaken by the DPRK.1⁹1 In Pyongyang’s eyes, it received no reward for dismantling the Punggyeri test site, which it deemed to demonstrate its adherence to past inter-Korean and US–DPRK agreements.1⁹2 As US–DPRK relations dramatically stagnated, the North conducted artillery drills near its maritime border with South Korea and launched short-range projectiles from a new ‘super-large multiple launch rocket system’ in November 2019.1⁹3 Sanctions easing became an increasingly frequent prior condition for the DPRK’s engagement in any talks with the United States, yet, at the same time, the North’s ability to benefit from provocations was diminishing. Instead, Pyongyang’s behaviour revealed its lack of sincerity towards upholding the United States’ demands and nuclear norms. The conduct of a ‘crucial test’—widely speculated to be a ground test—to ‘bolster up the reliable strategic nuclear deterrent’ on 14 December, was particularly salient given its location, namely, the Sohae test site, a venue that the DPRK had, in Singapore, pledged to dismantle.1⁹⁴ The revival of operations at Sohae demonstrated the spurious nature of North Korea’s pledges: strategically, any norm-compliant behaviour

1⁸⁷ Donald Trump, Twitter Post, 17 November 2019, 2:58PM, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/1196080086686011398 (accessed 23 December 2022). 1⁸⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Advisor to DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Statement’. 1⁸⁹ KCNA, ‘Chairman of Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee Issues Statement’, 14 November 2019. 1⁹⁰ KCNA, ‘U.S. Should Not Dream about Negotiation for Denuclearization before Dropping Its Hostile Policy towards DPRK’, 18 November 2019; Edith M. Lederer, ‘North Korea Says It’s Gained Nothing from US but “Betrayal”’, Associated Press, 22 November 2019. 1⁹1 KCNA, ‘Statement of Spokesman for DPRK State Affairs Commission’, 13 November 2019. 1⁹2 Jo Chol Su, ‘Statement by Jo Chol Su, Director of the North American Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, 8 November 2019. 1⁹3 KCNA, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Inspects Test-Fire of Super-Large Multiple Launch Rocket System’, 29 November 2019. 1⁹⁴ KCNA, ‘Spokesman for Academy of Defence Science of DPRK Issues Statement’, 14 December 2019.

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with US demands and nuclear norms would always be overshadowed by the prospect of delinquency. As a former US official put it, the DPRK ‘cannot unilaterally say they’re denuclearising if they don’t get something from the Americans, and it’s got to be in a more or less reciprocal fashion: sanctions [easing] is not enough, they need a military step’, such as a cessation of US–ROK exercises.1⁹⁵ With Kim Jong Un’s end-of year-deadline approaching, North Korea looked to continue its nuclear development. The North Korean Foreign Ministry threatened a surprising ‘Christmas gift’ to the United States—speculated to be a missile or nuclear test—which never materialized.1⁹⁶ Kim warned that the DPRK would ‘take positive and offensive measures for fully ensuring the sovereignty and security of the country’ in ‘the fields of foreign affairs, munitions industry, and [the] armed forces’.1⁹⁷ His end-of-year address to the Workers’ Party intensified such bellicose rhetoric, criticizing the United States for failing to respond to the DPRK’s long-range testing moratorium. Nevertheless, in the same statement, Kim admitted how the DPRK would be unlikely to gain its preferred outcomes from the United States, and that the North Korean people must learn to ‘live under the sanctions by the hostile forces in the future’.1⁹⁸ To say that Kim’s statement was a sign of defeat, succumbing to the reality of sanctions enforcement, and relaxing its unwavering pursuit of sanctions relief, would, however, be far from the truth. Rather, it highlighted how, for North Korea, sitting with the enemy was not enough; tangible concessions had to be gained. In the same speech, Kim issued his most severe—and elusive—threat since the Hanoi Summit, arguing that the ‘world will witness a new strategic weapon to be possessed by the DPRK in the near future’. Providing no further details, he asserted that ‘the DPRK will steadily develop necessary and prerequisite strategic weapons for the security of the state until the U.S. rolls back its hostile policy towards the DPRK’, and ‘put on constant alert the powerful nuclear deterrent capable of containing the nuclear threats from the U.S. and guaranteeing our long-term security’. Specifically targeting the US, Kim warned how ‘the more the U.S. stalls for time and hesitates in the settlement of the DPRK–U.S. relations, the more helpless it will find itself before the might of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea getting stronger beyond prediction and the deeper it will fall into an impasse’.1⁹⁹ The end of 2019 was a far cry from the de-escalation of tensions between Washington and Pyongyang one year earlier. If the North Korean regime had hoped that ‘the guy they can do a deal with is Trump’, these aspirations were now dashed.2⁰⁰ The US President, too, had also failed to master the art of the deal with the DPRK. According to Pyongyang, for all Trump’s bonhomie with Kim Jong Un, this US administration was just like any other: hostile and untrustworthy of the DPRK. It was

1⁹⁵ 1⁹⁶ 1⁹⁷ 1⁹⁸ 1⁹⁹ 2⁰⁰

CIA official (interview, 2020). KCNA, ‘DPRK Vice Foreign Minister for U.S. Affairs Issues Statement’, 3 December 2019 KCNA, ‘Second-Day Session of 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK Held’, 30 December 2019. KCNA, ‘Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK’, 1 January 2020. Ibid. US Track 1.5 negotiator (interview, 2019).

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no surprise that the North would pay little more than lip service to nuclear norms of non-proliferation and disarmament post-Hanoi and merely repeat the necessity of its nuclear weapons for defensive, deterrent purposes. Complying with the nuclear order remained fundamentally inconducive towards its nuclear ambitions, no matter the ensuing benefits.2⁰1 Despite Pyongyang’s growing frustrations at the lack of concessions from the United States, coupled with its own reticence towards conceding on its nuclear programme, North Korea’s status ambitions remained, and it did not abandon the possibility of dialogue with the US. Yet, it would not engage in talks for their own sake, a rationale that senior Foreign Ministry official Jo Chol Su made clear following the Stockholm talks, whereby although the DPRK was ‘not interested’ in talks that ‘cannot bring about tangible results’, it would be ‘ready to meet any time’ if it obtained a ‘constructive and positive signal’ from Washington. The nature of any such ‘signal’, whilst unspecified, would be determined by the North Korean regime, and would likely include an easing of sanctions, an acceptance of Yongbyon as a concession, recognition of North Korea as a de facto nuclear state, abandoning the US ‘hostile policy’. In admitting how ‘DPRK–US relations are now being maintained purely by personal relations formulated between the supreme leaders of the DPRK and the United States’, Jo had underscored a vital point.2⁰2 For the North Korean regime, inter-leader personal relations were not enough; they had to be translated into tangible benefits. North Korea’s behaviour after the Hanoi Summit epitomizes the somewhat cynical assertion by a senior US negotiator whereby ‘I’ve never seen any major credible indication that the North Korean regime is truly interested in better relations with the US on anything other than its own terms.’2⁰3 Seeking to assert itself as a self-proclaimed nuclear power with enhanced nuclear and missile capabilities, North Korea’s disinterest in the nuclear order and negotiations can be explained by Kim Jong Un’s open acceptance that any sanctions easing would be unlikely, and thus the US ‘hostile policy’ would prevail. Only by behaving delinquently could it possibly compel the United States into making any compromises.

Strategic delinquency, status, and Kim Jong Un North Korea was no exception to the idiosyncrasies of Trump administration’s foreign policy. From 2017 to the end of 2019, delinquent behaviour brought the regimestate both costs and pay-offs. The provision of benefits took place under several scope conditions: first, the regime could exploit the contradictory policies of President Trump, namely, ‘maximum pressure’ at the interstate level coupled with a personal penchant for engagement. The Trump administration’s initial responsiveness to North Korean belligerence allowed Pyongyang to leverage provocative actions to 2⁰1 Choe Son Hui, ‘Statement by Choe Son Hui’. 2⁰2 Jo Chol Su, ‘Statement by Jo Chol Su’. 2⁰3 US official (interview, 2019).

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attract the attention of Washington. Second, Pyongyang could take advantage of the pro-engagement Moon Jae-in administration in Seoul to convey its desires to the United States, especially, but not exclusively, with respect to sanctions easing. Third, a nuclear North Korea could seek benefits by negotiating from a position of strength within the context of a weakened global nuclear order, to which the US’s own commitment was wavering. Yet, true to the framework of strategic delinquency, North Korea interspersed its delinquency with compliant actions vis-à-vis US demands and nuclear norms, notably in 2018. Table 6.1 shows this oscillation in behaviour from 2017 to 2019. Fundamentally, North Korea did not make any substantial concessions on its nuclear programme during the Trump administration’s term in power, despite obtaining benefits from the United States. This pessimistic outcome is in accordance with the strategic delinquency framework and reinforces one of the North’s principal aims during the early Trump administration, namely, to bolster its nuclear and missile capabilities in line with the byungjin policy. Provocations, heightened brinkmanship, and deception—the latter, in pledging feigned compliance with nuclear norms and the United States’ demands—were rewarded by the Trump administration through recognition as an equal dialogue partner and significant international actor, most notably through presidential-level summitry. The regime’s declaration of the ‘completion’ of the DPRK nuclear programme in April 2018 reinforced how the North would not compromise on its nuclear capabilities unless the United States offered its preferred concessions. Such a declaration, however, followed the imposition of substantial costs (including multilateral and unilateral sanctions), in response to the North’s provocations during the first phase. Even as leader-to-leader US-DPRK dialogue commenced in 2018, Washington would not grant Pyongyang’s wish of easing sanctions. Despite de-escalating belligerence towards the ROK and US in the second phase, in 2018, North Korea reverted to delinquency following unsuccessful dialogue at Hanoi and Stockholm, after which it felt no additional advantageous outcomes could be gained from complying with US demands and nuclear norms. In the third phase, from November 2018 to December 2019, the North lost interest in how the United States and broader global nuclear order perceived and responded to its actions. Despite claiming to be a responsible nuclear state, Pyongyang did not care to be seen as a nuclear norm-violator. The Trump administration’s approach to North Korea represented a stark contrast from the minimal engagement promulgated by the Obama administration, during which time North Korea was inflicted with more costs than benefits and responded to strategic patience with strategic delinquency. In the early Trump administration, North Korea responded to terse US rhetoric with provocations, conducting two nuclear tests and launching missiles of increasing length and sophistication, not least ICBMs. Doing so underscored the DPRK’s ‘siege mentality’: demonstrating its ability to strike the US mainland bolstered nuclear deterrence as a ‘bulwark against attempts at forcible regime change or outside interference in North Korean

Table 6.1 Strategic delinquency during the Trump administration Phase

Date

North Korean behaviour

US behaviour

Type of North Korean behaviour

Benefits and costs

1

2017

Intensified brinkmanship between Kim Jong Un and Trump; ad hominem attacks towards Trump Sixth nuclear test on 3 September ICBM launches in July and November Threat to launch a missile on US bases in Guam Degrades the status of the US as a ‘hostile’ actor

Heightened rhetoric from President Trump towards Kim Jong Un and the DPRK ‘Maximum pressure’ policy becomes the US approach

Delinquent

Costs: UNSCR 2356 (2 June)—sanctioning individuals for aiding nuclear programme UNSCR 2371 (5 August)—post-28 July ICBM test UNSCR 2375 (11 September)—post-sixth nuclear test UNSCR 2397 (22 December)—post-Hwasong-15 ICBM launch in November Benefits: Increased US attention Assertion of status as a nuclear-armed state

2

2018

De-escalation of US–DPRK conflict Expresses desire for talks with the US Effects reconciliation with South Korea Declares nuclear status and ‘completion’ of its nuclear programme; moratorium on intermediate and long-range missile testing

US–DPRK (Trump–Kim) summit in June 2018 Pledges to normalize relations and suspend US–ROK military exercises and raises possibility of sanctions easing

Compliant

Benefits: Asserts itself as a nuclear-armed state Deterrence; regime survival (material) Recognition as a negotiating partner of the United States and nuclear state (social) No additional UN sanctions Negotiations with the United States create conditions for concessions

3

November 2018— December 2019

Source: author.

Revival of brinkmanship after the Hanoi Summit Ongoing nuclear aspirations; missile testing in late 2019 Rebuffs US overtures for dialogue after Hanoi Threatens to develop a ‘new strategic weapon’ if US ‘hostile policy’ continues

Second US–DPRK presidential-level summit ends inconclusively DPRK withdraws from working-level US–DPRK talks in October 2019

Delinquent

Costs: UNSCR 2407 (21 March 2018) extends UNSCR 1718 mandate until April 2019 Benefits: Unrestrained nuclear and missile development Setting conditions for talks with the United States

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decision-making’.2⁰⁴ As Van Jackson convincingly argues, ‘only by holding the US homeland at risk of attack could Kim Jong Un be certain that the United States would not invade’.2⁰⁵ Yet, as one senior official in the Trump administration highlighted, the DPRK ‘already has a deterrent capability conventionally’.2⁰⁶ Was demonstrating ICBM capabilities solely about deterrence? After a discussion with senior North Korean officials in 2014, former US Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, concluded that, if North Korea ‘didn’t have their nuclear weapons, no one would pay attention to them, and they would have no viable deterrent. It is about “face”, recognition, and leverage. They have none of that without their nuclear weapons.’2⁰⁷ Evidence shows that Clapper’s conclusion was far from incorrect. Whilst a means of consolidating domestic legitimacy, Pyongyang’s nuclear behaviour was heavily influenced by international-level considerations. Kim Jong Un’s initial overtures to South Korea, the United States, and, later, China, signalled the importance Pyongyang placed upon international status. Were domestic legitimacy the sole driver of North Korea’s behaviour, Kim’s aversion towards normalizing relations with the United States—as was the insatiable pursuit of his grandfather, Kim Il Sung—cannot be convincingly explained. By learning to exploit Trump’s penchant for showmanship to its advantage, the DPRK exercised counter-stigmatization when it felt it did not receive adequate benefits from the United States. It justified its provocative behaviour according to what it deemed to be an expanding US ‘hostile policy’ and in response to the lack of US commitment to previous agreements, such as the Agreed Framework. The Trump administration offered the DPRK an ideal opportunity to degrade the status of the United States as a benign hegemon, not least given Trump’s own rhetoric and personality. Thus, the DPRK could seek to attract the attention of the United States and call for negotiations in anticipation of the resultant status and material benefits. Following its self-declaration as a nuclear state in 2018, Pyongyang leveraged such self-perceived nuclear status successfully, catalysing talks with South Korea and the custodian of the nuclear order, the United States. Subsequent US–DPRK presidentiallevel dialogue brought North Korea recognition as an equal negotiating partner of the United States and a significant nuclear actor, in part fulfilling its desire for status parity. Congruent with the framework of strategic delinquency, North Korea reaped such recognition without offering any substantial nuclear concessions. Despite being bestowed with negative status owing to its accelerating nuclear ambitions, the North simultaneously gained nuclear deterrence, regime security, and social recognition as a significant and sovereign actor, even if economic assistance, in the form of sanctions easing, remained elusive. By declaring the completion of its nuclear programme, North Korea sought to assert itself as an equal dialogue partner of the United States. Its self-imposed 2⁰⁴ Ankit Panda, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (London: Hurst, 2020), 86–87. 2⁰⁵ Jackson, On the Brink, 134. 2⁰⁶ Senior US official (interview, 2019). 2⁰⁷ James R. Clapper, ‘Keynote Remarks by The Honorable James Clapper’, 2017 J-CSIS Forum, 27 June 2017.

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moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing was not an indication of dampening nuclear aspirations. Rather, in Pyongyang’s view, a nuclear state need not engage in ongoing visible manifestations of its nuclear status, akin to the five legal NWS. Following this declaration, North Korea de-escalated its delinquent actions to compel South Korea and the United States to talks. Since ongoing provocations only brought costs—through unilateral and multilateral sanctions—given the United States’ insistence on CVID, the DPRK feigned compliance with the United States’ demands. In so doing, it gained pledges of concessions from South Korea and the United States, including declarations to end the Korean War (as outlined in the Panmunjom Declaration) and the—albeit amorphous—pledge of improved DPRK–US ties (in the Singapore Summit). This shift in behaviour in 2018 can be illuminated by the strategic delinquency framework. For North Korea, if no pay-offs would arise from continued delinquency, de-escalation offered one way of increasing the likelihood of positive outcomes at a time when Kim Jong Un had consolidated domestic power and self-declared the DPRK’s status as a nuclear state. Despite three presidential-level US–DPRK summits and three inter-Korean summits, the DPRK failed to convince the United States to ease sanctions. A common pattern in presidential-level talks was that ‘there was a lot of enthusiasm and energy between the two leaders but that on the North Korean side would fall flat’.2⁰⁸ This initial enthusiasm for dialogue would neither be translated into actionable outcomes, nor would communication between summits be sustained. For all the benefits of delinquency, North Korea’s strategic logic at the Hanoi Summit demonstrated how learning from the outcomes of past delinquent behaviour would not always be successful. At Hanoi, the North overestimated the determinedness of the United States to reach a consensus at whatever cost. The subsequent Stockholm talks were the final straw. Exasperated at complying with US demands, given the lack of rewards, Pyongyang insisted that any further talks would be on its own terms. In the meantime, it continued to hold the United States to account vis-à-vis its inability to fulfil previous pledges, whilst reaffirming that, since the DPRK had, in 2003, withdrawn from the NPT, it was not bound by the nuclear order’s normative and institutionalized strictures.

Conclusion As the Obama administration quickly realized, the power transition in North Korean leadership from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un saw an acceleration in the North’s nuclear ambitions, a pursuit which continued during the administration of Donald Trump. In line with the framework of strategic delinquency, although Pyongyang’s delinquent behaviour from 2017 to 2019 did generate negative status, given how North Korea made no substantial concessions on its nuclear programme, the DPRK was still rewarded through material and social benefits. Such benefits comprised 2⁰⁸ ‘An Interview with Stephen Biegun’, 14 July 2021.

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deterrence and regime survival (material) and recognition as an equal nuclear partner of the United States and significant international actor (social). During the Trump administration, North Korea pursued longer-term international recognition as a nuclear-armed state, especially from the United States, whilst developing its nuclear capabilities and calling, increasingly vociferously, for sanctions easing. Seeking to take advantage of a pro-engagement administration in Seoul, and the unique diplomacy of Trump, North Korea deployed both delinquent and compliant behaviour in relation to the nuclear order and broader international order to assert itself—and its self-conceptualised status—as a nuclear state, attract international attention, and gain status parity with the United States. Initially, the DPRK viewed the combination of Trump’s idiosyncratic approach with the Moon administration’s desire for engagement as an opportunity to gain rewards, compensating for the lack of benefits obtained during the Obama administration and previous conservative governments in Seoul. Yet, over time, North Korea’s nuclear behaviour became increasingly brazen. Whilst after the Singapore Summit, Pyongyang attempted to compel Washington to dialogue, the collapse of the Hanoi Summit saw North Korea lose interest in two fundamental areas: first, towards talks with the United States and the ROK; second, in being seen as an outwardly compliant power in relation to the nuclear order. The North unabashedly rebuffed future overtures to dialogue from the Trump administration since it felt that no additional benefits could be gained, not least its treasured goal of sanctions relief. Thus, in addition to capitalizing upon Trump’s predilection for reaching a deal, North Korea continued to test the extent to which the United States was willing to follow through on its pledges—written or verbal—and offer any concessions. What can be seen is that from 2018, sanctions easing became the principal goal for North Korea as presidential-level summitry took hold and as Kim Jong Un’s ‘new strategic line’ of domestic economic development became the guiding domestic policy. The Trump administration offers a revealing case of how negative status-inducing behaviour provided the DPRK with beneficial outcomes. Yet, it also underscores the importance of reciprocity in negotiations with North Korea. Notwithstanding the optics of leader-to-leader summitry, ambiguous commitments, and ‘love letters’, North Korea’s recalcitrance towards offering nuclear concessions ultimately initiated the breakdown in US–DPRK relations. Furthermore, for all Pyongyang’s engagement with Seoul and Beijing, particularly between 2018 and 2019, these bilateral relations were held hostage to the ties between Washington and Pyongyang. This chapter’s focus on US–DPRK relations specifically is especially warranted since, from North Korea’s perspective, it was its relationship with the United States that mattered the most. As the Trump administration entered its final year, however, international relations beyond the global nuclear order would undergo an unexpected disruption as the coronavirus pandemic took hold. Not even North Korea would be exempt from its implications. As Stephen Biegun put it, the possibility of any engagement with North Korea became ‘unimaginable’ since ‘there are no Zoom meetings between the North Koreans and the United States’.2⁰⁹ 2⁰⁹ Ibid.

Conclusion Strategic delinquency and North Korea—an assessment

To paraphrase the former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, North Korea remains a known unknown in international relations. It is hardly surprising that the behaviour of this so-called ‘hermit kingdom’ has remained elusive to tidy theorization.1 In conversation with the author, a former US negotiator with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) aptly summarized the frustrating nature of negotiating with North Korea: if I were doing a fishing treaty with Canada, I could pick apart their government, and know the bureaucratic [structure] of their government […] what their domestic concerns are, and what the international concerns are. I can’t do that with North Korea.²

Given the opaque nature of the regime-state, the near impossibility of uncovering the actual motivations behind North Korea’s behaviour means that any study that claims to determine the true causes of North Korea’s actions should be treated with caution. Rather, this book has pursued a more exploratory approach, aiming to elucidate the types and outcomes of actions which North Korea has deployed from the postCold War years—and beforehand—to the revealing engagement with Kim Jong Un pursued by Trump administration. In offering one account of how North Korea has become a nuclear-armed state, and its exercise of delinquent behaviour with respect to the global nuclear order, this book has argued how, over time, the DPRK has not only been increasingly willing to accept the trade-offs of such behaviour but has also reaped rewards. Through its rich empirical analysis, this book has adopted a North Korea-centric perspective to understand how and why North Korea has conceptualized international order, its position within it, and its resultant behaviour with respect to the global nuclear order and wider international order. Such an approach is important for developing future research and policy towards the DPRK. The central argument of this book is simple but powerful: through deploying a diverse range of delinquent behaviour in a strategic fashion, for over thirty 1 See, e.g. Nicholas L. Miller and Vipin Narang, ‘How North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds’, Texas National Security Review, 1(2), 2018, 58–75; David C. Kang, ‘International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War’, International Studies Quarterly, 47(3), 2003, 301–24; Linus Hagström and Magnus Lundström, ‘Overcoming US–North Korean Enmity: Lessons from an Eclectic IR Approach’, International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 54(4), 2019, 94–108. 2 US negotiator Agreed Framework (AF) (interview, 2019).

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years, North Korea has been able to reap beneficial outcomes. The regime-state has exploited the logic of rewarding delinquent behaviour with respect to international order and, more specifically, the global nuclear order, in seeking additional benefits. In so doing, the findings of this book make clear that whilst North Korea does value nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes, it also seeks status as a nuclear-armed state—in line with its own perception of its status—and recognition of such status from the international community. As the findings of this book have shown, there are several conditions under which North Korea’s delinquent behaviour has brought the regime-state beneficial outcomes. These conditions include the nature of US leadership and the value it has placed upon negotiating with North Korea; the United States’ propensity towards imposing sanctions; the eagerness of the South Korean administration to engage with the North; and the DPRK’s ability to persuade the international community of its willingness to comply with international norms, even if only feignedly. Most fundamentally, North Korea’s delinquent nuclear behaviour is a product of a deep-rooted world view centred around the ideological prism of the US ‘hostile policy’, against which it has justified its deviant behaviour as a rational and necessary response. Over time, actions taken by the international community—specifically the United States—to compel North Korea into greater compliance with nuclear and international norms have brought the DPRK pay-offs. From the ‘first nuclear crisis’ of the 1990s (as Chapter 3 demonstrated) to the unprecedented interactions between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un (as seen in Chapter 6), North Korea’s behaviour has evolved in no small part due to the changing approaches taken by the United States and South Korea, varying North Korean trust and distrust of other actors, and the extent of its nuclear development. Yet, a consistent theme from the second nuclear crisis onwards has been Pyongyang’s pursuit of two conflicting goals: first, the normalization of relations with the United States and the associated benefits; second, the development of credible weaponized nuclear capabilities. These goals—the former yet to be achieved, the latter which it is, arguably, increasingly close to obtaining— remain intimately tethered to North Korea’s conceptualization of the US-led global nuclear order, wider international order, and its position within these orders through the lens of the US ‘hostile policy’. This book has demonstrated how, over time, the North’s invocations of this so-called policy to vindicate its delinquent behaviour became increasingly frequent when it felt that its preferences were not being met. In addition to criticizing the ‘hostility’ of US hegemony and bilateral policies towards the DPRK, North Korea has fundamentally shaped the nuclear order by exposing its fragilities, particularly the weak enforcement power of the non-proliferation regime towards states that subvert its norms and choose to withdraw from it altogether. Through pioneering a theoretical framework of strategic delinquency, this book has shed light on two fundamental arguments overlooked in existing literature. First, extant scholarship overwhelmingly concerns how states can gain beneficial outcomes by conforming with norms of behaviour expected of states within international society. Yet, despite the initial infliction of negative status, delinquent behaviour can,

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in fact, bring positive outcomes for states. This process of obtaining dividends from delinquent behaviour is particularly pertinent for smaller states that may deem themselves to be marginalized within international society, whether owing to their own actions or otherwise, of which North Korea is one example. In typifying delinquent behaviour into three, interrelated categories (namely, norm transgression, provocation, and deception), this framework demonstrates how such delinquent acts with respect to the nuclear order can bring material and social benefits: the former pertaining to nuclear deterrence, regime-state survival, and economic assistance; the latter comprising three forms of recognition, namely as an actor that is sovereign, equal, and significant. Linked to these types of social recognition is the second scholarly contribution of this framework, namely, illuminating how the nuclear ambitions of aspirant nuclear states are not limited to deterrence or domestic legitimacy alone but can form part and parcel of a quest for status—amongst other benefits—in international relations. The case of North Korea has thus demonstrated how, by deviating from normative expectations of state behaviour in relation to the global nuclear order and international order, beneficial outcomes can still be reaped. Especially after it withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003, North Korea has tested the extent to which it can evade the institutionalized and normative constraints of the nuclear order through an increasingly determined quest for weaponized nuclear development. Through the lens of status, Pyongyang’s interactions with the nuclear order and wider international order can be understood in a far richer vein. Yet, the framework of strategic delinquency also highlights how delinquent behaviour will also bring costs to the actor in question. North Korea is no exception. As evidence shows, North Korea has suffered extensive costs from its delinquent behaviour, not least in the nuclear domain. Whilst the most obvious cost of its norm-breaking actions has been the imposition of unilateral and multilateral sanctions, social costs have also been enforced. North Korea’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism—from 1988 to 2008 and in 2017—presented a denigration to its international standing, which it voraciously attempted to remove. Similarly, the Banco Delta Asia asset freeze of 2005 carried social implications of portraying the DPRK as an untrustworthy international actor. Central to the framework of strategic delinquency, however, is that states do not always behave delinquently if they seek to obtain their preferred outcomes. In relation to the North Korean case, oscillating between delinquent and norm-compliant behaviour vis-à-vis nuclear and wider norms, coupled with a willingness to accept the costs of delinquent behaviour, have been central to the strategic nature of the DPRK’s engagement with the global nuclear order and broader international order. Such compliant behaviour has comprised suspensions of nuclear activity, for instance of plutonium production—a condition of the Agreed Framework—or pledges, whilst vacuous, to abide by nuclear norms and US demands for denuclearization. Although the latter gained notable prominence during presidential-level

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dialogue between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, North Korea lost interest in such talks, as US–DPRK relations stagnated in late 2019. During this time, compliant behaviour—even if feigned—took place under three conditions: first, when the DPRK recognized that compliant actions could bring positive outcomes; second, when it felt that it could exploit the Trump administration’s penchant for dialogue; and third, if it could attract the attention of South Korea to relay its desires to the United States. Importantly, however, as Chapters 4 and 5 highlight, the North’s decision to exercise norm-compliant behaviour during the ‘second nuclear crisis’ and, later, the Trump administration, occurred concurrently with its pursuit of international recognition as a de facto nuclear state and expanded nuclear and missile capabilities. Crucially, over time, North Korea has learnt from the outcomes of delinquent and compliant behaviour to inform its future choices. The salience of the past has been a formative influence on Pyongyang’s contemporary behaviour, whether its narrative pertaining to the Korean War or failed instances of cooperation with the United States. Even in recent years, the regime’s continued references to the Agreed Framework of 1994 and its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 reinforce how the DPRK deems its belligerence to be justified, given how it claims no longer to be bound by the institutionalized and normative constraints of the nuclear order.3 The outcomes of compliant actions, of which participating in the Six-Party Talks and leader-toleader summitry between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump are just two examples, also taught North Korea useful lessons. The DPRK recognized that if complying with nuclear norms would not reap positive outcomes, even if solely to pay lip-service to US demands, it would resort to delinquency. During the Trump administration, despite its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing; closure of a nuclear test site (at Punggye-ri), and pledge to dismantle a rocket engine launch site at Tongchang-ri, the regime made a concerted decision to revive provocations when no favourable outcomes could arise. Kim Jong Un’s subsequent admission that the DPRK must learn to live with sanctions only highlighted how the North did not care to be seen, internationally, as a norm-violator.

Further questions: Status, delinquency, and the global nuclear order The in-depth account of North Korea’s behaviour proffered in this book sows the seeds for further avenues of inquiry in three related strands of scholarship: first, ideas of status in international relations, namely the underexplored notion of negative status; second, notions of delinquent behaviour; and third, understandings of ‘rogueness’ with respect to the nuclear order and liberal international order. 3 See, e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula—an Urgent Demand of the Times—Kim Yong Guk, Director General of the Institute for Disarmament and Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, 4 September 2018.

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First, this book has demonstrated how North Korea has leveraged negative status for instrumental gain. Instead of complying with dominant norms of international society, North Korea has performed the obverse and exploited the negative status inflicted by the custodians of the global nuclear order as a route towards subjectively positive outcomes. In addition to understandings of negative status, the findings of this study raise questions of how different states conceptualize the idea of status. How might nuclear and non-nuclear states conceptualize and respond to negative status beyond the North Korean case? For instance, with respect to Iran (officially a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT) and the People’s Republic of China (a legal nuclear weapons state), how these states conceptualize status, order their external environment, and benefit from negative status is worthy of additional exploration.⁴ One question pertains to whether a state’s conceptualization of its status remains underpinned by its adherence to a thin, pluralist, or thick, solidarist notion of international society. As this book has argued, North Korea’s understanding of status within international relations remains somewhat outdated whereby mere nuclear possession seems sufficient for the regime-state to perceive itself—and thus warrant international recognition—as a significant international actor. Yet, the ruling regime faces a precarious dilemma between prioritizing economic development or nuclear ambitions. For now, the costs of the former seem too high for the regime to bear. The regime’s fear of dissemination of outside information within its borders would not only contradict its narrative of a ‘hostile’ United States but also exacerbate the possibilities for rising anti-regime statement such as amongst ruling elites.⁵ Without economic opening, it is unlikely to gain international legitimacy according to broader, solidarist understandings of international society. A second basket of questions pertaining to how and why states negotiate between breaking international norms and adhering to international pressures to comply with such norms should be explored beyond the North Korean case. The case of China is apposite, especially in reconciling between domestic and foreign policy goals with its desire to be perceived, internationally, as a responsible and legitimate nuclear power.⁶ In relation to the United States, too, a burgeoning body of scholarship questions the United States’ self-regard as a benign global hegemon in the 21st century, what Kishore Mahbubani terms an ‘assumption of virtue’.⁷ Even with respect

⁴ With respect to the behaviour of ‘important second-tier states’, see Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?’, International Affairs, 82(1), 2006, 1–19. ⁵ Jung H. Pak., ‘What Kim Wants: The Hopes and Fears of North Korea’s Dictator’, Foreign Affairs, 99(3), 2020, 96–106; Jieun Baek, North Korea’s Hidden Revolution: How the Information Underground Is Transforming a Closed Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 196–97. ⁶ Excellent accounts in this regard include Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). ⁷ Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy (New York: PublicAffairs, 2020), 183.

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to the DPRK, however, this avenue of research poses the additional question about leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes, namely, who decides whether a state’s behaviour should adhere to or diverge from international norms. In one opinion, Thomas Schäfer makes clear how, with respect to the DPRK, despite its totalitarian system, Kim Jong Un is ‘unlikely to be the sole ruler’, with ‘a precarious collective’ of individuals, ‘recruited from the ranks of old “revolutionary” families whose founders were comrades-in-arms of Kim Il Sung’.⁸ Third, given how this book has contended that North Korea conceptualizes and engages with the nuclear order in material and social terms, future research on the global nuclear order as a material and social order is warranted. Whilst Pyongyang’s desire to be seen as complying with the order’s norms has declined with time, there remains a plethora of questions regarding how the order can, and ought to be, strengthened, given the challenge to its stability posed by nuclear ‘rogues’—including the DPRK, Iran, and Pakistan—and non-nuclear weapon states. In September 2021, South Korea successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), becoming the eighth country to develop an SLBM, but the first non-nuclear weapon state to possess such a system (in addition to the five legal nuclear weapon states (NWS), and non-NPT members of India and North Korea).⁹ The consequences of the nuclear ambitions of aspirant nuclear states—beyond non-NPT signatories—on the nuclear order is worth further investigation. Nevertheless, states do not simply respond to the nuclear order. The DPRK and other ‘rogue’ nuclear states have contributed to exacerbating concerns regarding the order’s stability, especially how states that choose not to join the order, or join and withdraw from it—of which North Korea is hitherto the only example with respect to the NPT—can successfully circumvent its norms of non-proliferation and disarmament. Thus, two strands of further inquiry are worth considering: first, how do ‘rogue’ nuclear states envisage their positions within the nuclear order and narrate the order from localized perspectives? How do states that have not joined the NPT but have comparably greater integration into international society than the DPRK— such as Israel or Pakistan—or NPT signatories that flout the order’s norms—such as Iran—define their positions with respect to the nuclear order? Second, how do ‘rogue’ states reconcile between the international illegitimacy of nuclear possession and the resultant bolstering of domestic legitimacy? Whilst the DPRK exhibits a case of messy interplay between the costs and benefits of delinquent nuclear behaviour, do other states that resist nuclear norms prioritize social acceptance as de facto nuclear powers over deterrence to gain domestic and regional objectives? Taking the logic of strategic delinquency beyond the North Korean case, how—and by what methods— might other states benefit from violating nuclear norms, despite the initial lowering of international status? ⁸ Thomas Schäfer, From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: How the Hardliners Prevailed (Independently published, 2021), 164. ⁹ Josh Smith, ‘Analysis: S. Korea Blazes New Path with “Most Potent” Conventional Missile Submarine’, Reuters, 8 September 2021.

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The North Korea problem: Where solutions elude Understanding how North Korea orders the world and how it has benefited from the strategic deployment of delinquent behaviour carries vital policy implications as any consensual international approach to addressing the problem of a nuclear North Korea becomes increasingly elusive. As North Korea’s nuclear ambitions continue, concerning scenarios remain regarding the ability of North Korean individuals to export nuclear material to terrorist networks for financial gain—without authorization from the regime—or for terrorist groups to co-opt illicit interstate networks of nuclear trade.1⁰ Whilst we have neither witnessed the global ‘tragedy and terror’ that Philip Bobbitt predicted would happen once North Korea deployed nuclear weapons11 nor the nuclearization of Japan or South Korea,12 these scenarios cannot be ruled out.13 Fearing an expanding number of nuclear states, John Mueller asserts how ‘one way to reduce the likelihood that new nuclear states will emerge is a simple one: stop threatening them’.1⁴ Although deterrence has become a convenient—though not exclusive—justification for the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions, the regime’s perception of threat as encompassing issues beyond calls to denuclearize render devising any international policy particularly complex, especially on the part of the United States. Of course, the ‘North Korea problem’ is not limited to its nuclear programme. The issue extends to its egregious human rights violations of its population, totalitarian domestic governance, and the regime’s inability to provide public goods and services to its people. Coupled with these dimensions, a lack of global consensus in relation to how best to address the North’s nuclear ambitions, symptomatic of Mearsheimer’s ‘tragedy of great power politics’, has hampered any coherent international policy.1⁵ A recently declassified US policy document revealed how the Trump administration aimed to ‘convince the Kim regime that the only path to survival is to relinquish its nuclear weapons’.1⁶ In fact, the DPRK has concluded that keeping nuclear weapons seems the only way of maintaining the status quo. Scholars and policymakers must consider just how North Korea views international order (namely, through the—albeit delusional—prism of the US ‘hostile 1⁰ Tom Plant and Ben Rhode, ‘China, North Korea and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, Survival 55(2), 2013, 70. 11 Philip C. Bobbitt, ‘Waging War against Terror: An Essay for Sandy Levinson’, Georgia Law Review, 40(753), 2006, 761. 12 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Owl Books, 2005), 166. 13 In January 2023, South Korean President, Yoon Suk-yeol, surprisingly, and controversially, stated—in public—that South Korea could obtain nuclear weapons if threats emanating from North Korea were to heighten. See: Jeongmin Kim, 'Full Text: Yoon Suk-yeol’s remarks on South Korea acquiring nuclear arms’, NKPro, 13 January 2023. 1⁴ John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 145, emphasis original. 1⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). 1⁶ ‘U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific’, February 2018, 8, available at: https://trump whitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf (accessed 15 January 2023).

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policy’) and how it maintains a deep-rooted, if inaccurate, perception of being disadvantaged by the normative and institutionalized frameworks of international society. The North’s constant invocation of the ambiguous and ever-expanding ‘hostile policy’ has become a core obstacle for addressing its nuclear and human rights norm violations since just what comprises the ‘hostile policy’ is not limited to the North’s nuclear ambitions and is fundamentally determined by the North Korean regime. As a former senior South Korean negotiator lamented, ‘how can we make them believe that the US has abandoned its hostile policy? Even if the United States says it has done everything […] North Korea can still say that the US hasn’t really abandoned its hostile policy’, given how it is ‘not just about joint military exercises’. As the negotiator put it: When they see a resolution on North Korean human rights at the UN General Assembly; when they see the continuation of Voice of America broadcasting [into North Korea], that’s hostile policy […] when they see the talk about North Korean human rights in international institutions, they see that as part of subversive activity to overthrow their sacred regime.¹⁷

Given its wide interpretation of ‘hostility’, the North is likely to deploy nuclear delinquency in response to so-called ‘hostile’ acts beyond calls for its denuclearization. Its human rights violations, as documented in the UN Commission of Inquiry Report of 2014 and further reports by the UN Special Rapporteur to the DPRK, hinders its integration into international society.1⁸ Pyongyang’s engagement in illicit trade networks, ranging from luxury goods, to refined petroleum, to nuclear and fissile material, is becoming increasingly known to the international community.1⁹ The readiness of North Korean officials to strike deals in nuclear arms, missiles, drug manufacturing, and other sanctioned items—often involving third-state actors as ‘middle-men’—as recently as 2017, too, presents a startling but far from unanticipated picture of the DPRK’s penchant for clandestine behaviour.2⁰ Yet, North Korea has ostensibly secured resigned tolerance—if not acceptance—as a nuclear-armed state in all but name, and perhaps we will have little choice but to ‘live with a nuclear North Korea’.21 As Kim Jong Un reinforced in January 2021, the DPRK has few plans to abandon its nuclear ambitions any time soon but will instead improve the sophistication of its capabilities through solid-fuel inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), tactical nuclear weapons, military reconnaissance satellites, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Even after the Biden administration took 1⁷ Republic of Korea (ROK) negotiator (interview, 2019). 1⁸ For one North Korean response to the COI Report, see KCNA, ‘FM Spokesman Denounces U.S. for Anti-DPRK “Human Rights” Campaign’, 16 July 2015. 1⁹ UNSC (United Nations Security Council), ‘Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’ S/2020/840, 28 August 2020, 201–203. The UN Panel of Experts, established in 2006 following the first North Korean nuclear test, aims to support the UNSC Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718. 2⁰ Chad O’Carroll, ‘Gold, Drugs, Missiles: North Korea’s Attempted Illegal Sales through the KFA’, NKNews, 11 October 2020. 21 Andrei Lankov, ‘Learning to Live with a Nuclear North Korea’, East Asia Forum, 19 October 2016.

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office in January 2021, Kim highlighted how, irrespective of who is in power in the Oval Office, ‘key to establishing [a] new relationship between the DPRK and the U.S. lies in the withdrawal of its hostile policy’. Without this eventuality, the DPRK would ‘continuously strengthen military capabilities’ and ‘as a responsible nuclear weapons state, would not misapply the nuclear weapon unless the aggressive hostile forces try to use their nuclear against the DPRK’.22 As this book has demonstrated, North Korea has voraciously pursued normalization of relations with the United States. Despite its inconsistent commitment to this objective over time, normalization has remained a longstanding goal, even after its first nuclear test in 2006. Yet, despite differing conceptualizations of what normalization might entail between Washington and Pyongyang, the North has been—and remains—unwilling to abandon the ideological prism of the ‘hostile policy’ through which it conceptualizes international order since doing so would force the DPRK to justify domestically the abandonment of a narrative that has been central to the regime-state’s inception. Any efforts at trust-building with the DPRK, whether from the United States, South Korea, other states, or international institutions such as the European Union, must be reciprocated from Pyongyang for such manoeuvres to be effective. In one instance, a meeting between North Korean officials and those from the European Parliament, in November 2020, disclosed how the DPRK hoped to forge ‘a strong relationship with the U.S’ only once the US ‘hostile policy […] is dropped’.23 Whether such rhetoric merely implies North Korea’s willingness to be rewarded without offering any concessions remains debatable. We must prepare for the pessimistic eventuality that North Korea will only change course when push comes to shove. In this vein, former US National Intelligence Officer for North Korea, Markus Garlauskas, poses a pertinent question: ‘Do you believe that if there were a peace declaration and NK [North Korea] were also no longer under international sanctions, but it still maintained Kim family rule under its current police state and ideology, that it would believe that it no longer needs nuclear weapons?’2⁴ The answer hardly seems a resounding yes, but might Pyongyang fall victim to actions taken out of its own accord?

22 KCNA, ‘On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at 8th Congress of WPK’, 9 January 2021. 23 Timothy Martin and Laurence Norman, ‘North Korea Says It Wants Good U.S. Ties in Rare Meeting with Western Lawmaker’, Wall Street Journal, 31 December 2020. 2⁴ Markus Garlauskas, Twitter Post, 12 October 2020, 8:15PM, https://twitter.com/Mister_G_2/status/ 1315732873836724227 (accessed 23 December 2022).

Epilogue Sanction above all sanctions

By late 2019, US–Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) talks had collapsed. With under a year remaining until the US presidential election in November 2020, North Korea was strategizing for what a future US leadership might bring: a continuation of ‘maximum pressure’ or return to ‘strategic patience’? All these concerns, however, became overshadowed by the onset of the coronavirus pandemic in December 2019. Not even North Korea was immune from the effects of the ravaging coronavirus pandemic. This virus respected no borders. In January 2020, Kim Jong Un announced that the DPRK would close its borders, including that with China, a vital source of trade and income. Pyongyang’s retreat to isolationism would commence. The regime declared a ‘state of emergency’: border closures, travel bans into and out of the country, and a draconian ‘shoot-to-kill’ order—in August 2020—of anyone seen crossing the Sino-North Korean border were all self-imposed actions to prevent the spread of COVID-19.1 These actions reflected the North’s fear that, given its primitive health-care system, any outbreak would have deleterious domestic impacts. Yet, the DPRK would quickly feel the effects of its self-enforced actions: trade volumes with China plummeted by over 70 per cent during 2020 alone. Pyongyang’s coronavirus strategy would do what no sanctions regime had hitherto done. If North Korean denuclearization was becoming a pipe dream on the part of US and South Korean policymakers, so too was Kim Jong Un’s ‘new strategic line’ of domestic economic development. At the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party in January 2021, Kim Jong Un underscored how ‘almost all sectors fell a long way short of the set objectives’.2 Throughout 2021, the toxic combination of coronavirusinduced measures and flooding would take their toll. In response, the Supreme Leader called upon the North Korean people to engage in ‘strenuous effort’ by ‘carrying out the decisions and instructions of the Party’, amidst ‘urgent’ food supply issues.3 Despite such an unforeseen scenario as the pandemic, North Korea’s delinquency did not subside. Whilst there were no inter-continental ballistic missile 1 DPRK Ministry of Social Security, ‘bugbuguggyeongbongswaejagjeon-e jeohaeleul juneun haengwileul haji malde daehayeo’ [‘Decree: Regarding Not Committing Actions that Hamper Lockdown Operations at the Northern Border’], 25 August 2020, in Jeongmin Kim, ‘Full Text: North Korea’s Decree to “Fire at” People Illegally Approaching Border’, NKPro, 26 October 2020. 2 KCNA, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Makes Opening Speech at 8th WPK Congress’, 6 January 2021. 3 KCNA, ‘Third Enlarged Meeting of Political Bureau of 8th C.C., WPK Held’, 3 September 2021.

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(ICBM) launches or nuclear tests in the immediate aftermath of President Trump’s reluctant departure from office, Pyongyang’s provocations had, by then, targeted its southern counterpart.

Coronavirus: The sanction above all sanctions At the time of writing, North Korea shows few signs of economic recovery. Although Sino-North Korean trade volumes since January 2020 peaked in the first quarter of 2022, it remains a far cry from pre-pandemic levels.⁴ Notwithstanding Kim Jong Un’s pledges to complete the construction of the Pyongyang General Hospital by October 2020,⁵ and build 10,000 ‘modern flats’ by the end of 2021,⁶ such projects remain unfinished owing to the cumulated effects of natural disasters, sanctions, and border closures on the movement of goods into the country. For two years, the regime expounded the unconvincing narrative that coronavirus had not infiltrated its borders, refusing vaccines from the UN vaccine provision scheme COVAX throughout 2021.⁷ This story could only last so long. Yet, even as the regime admitted, in May 2022, that domestic cases of a ‘fever’—a euphemism for coronavirus—were ‘exploding’, it continued to rebuff international aid, urging its 26 million people to drink willow leaf tea thrice a day and gargle saline water.⁸ Official—albeit unreliable— North Korean statistics reveal that over 4.5 million suspected COVID-19 cases have been recorded within the state since the announcement of the first outbreak.⁹ Only in early September did Kim Jong Un suggest that from November 2022, a coronavirus vaccination programme would commence, but the damage had already been done.1⁰ Although North Korea continued its delinquent behaviour under the constraints of increasingly stringent sanctions during the presidencies of Obama and Trump, would the self-inflicted sanction above all sanctions trigger a volte-face? In early 2020, as foreign embassies in the DPRK temporarily closed—including that of the United Kingdom in May 2020—and foreign diplomats departed one by one, North Korea was left alone. Coronavirus ‘threw a wet blanket and put a lid’ on any revival of talks between Washington and Pyongyang.11 Would any US–DPRK or inter-Korean dialogue have materialized absent for the pandemic? Evidence points to deteriorating US–DPRK relations following the breakdown of the Stockholm talks, after which point, as one official put it, Kim Jong Un ‘decided that nothing positive is going to ⁴ Ethan Jewell, ‘North Korea–China Trade Climbs to Highest Level since Early 2020: Customs Data’, NKNews, 18 April 2022. ⁵ Rodong Sinmun, ‘KCNA Releases a Detailed Report on Grand Celebration of 75th Anniversary of WPK as Auspicious All-People Event’, 16 October 2020. ⁶ KCNA, ‘Ground-Breaking Ceremony of Project for Building 10 000 Flats Held in Pyongyang’, 24 March 2021. ⁷ Reuters, ‘North Korea Rejects Offer of Nearly 3 Million Sinovac COVID-19 Shots’, 1 September 2021. ⁸ Edward Howell, ‘North Korea Is in the Midst of a Covid Catastrophe’, The Spectator, 16 May 2022. ⁹ 38North, ‘North Korean COVID-19/Fever Data Tracker’, 15 August 2022. 1⁰ Rodong Sinmun, ‘Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at Seventh Session of the 14th SPA of DPRK’, 9 September 2022. 11 ‘An interview with Stephen Biegun’, NKNews Podcast, Episode 191, 14 July 2021.

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happen with the Trump administration […] no-one’s going to stop him from building up his [nuclear] force’.12 This view was reflected in North Korea’s actions immediately after its border closure. In January 2020, veteran diplomat Kim Kye Gwan set the pessimistic tone for North Korea’s strategic thinking at the time. Reaffirming how relations between Trump and Kim Jong Un—witnessed in the exchange of birthday greetings—were purely ‘personal’, Kim clarified that any future US–DPRK dialogue would only occur with the United States’ ‘absolute agreement on the issues raised by the [DPRK]’, as he warned South Korea to avoid ‘lingering hope for the role of “mediator” in the DPRK–U.S. relations’.13 For all the North’s accusations of the United States' inflexible negotiating strategy at Hanoi, Kim’s statement emphasizes the dogmatic nature of North Korean decision-making. Only the proposal to close the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility in exchange for the lifting of select UN sanctions—which the DPRK offered at Hanoi—would be an acceptable minimum concession for the North. Were Washington unamenable to this proposal, Pyongyang would simply continue behaving delinquently, even if doing so would inflict costs. At the UN Conference of Disarmament in January 2020, the DPRK’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Ju Yong Chol, reiterated Pyongyang’s predictable stance whereby ‘the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has seen nothing but betrayal from the United States, which has failed to reciprocate our initial steps and has shown no willingness to honour its commitment, instead increasing pressure, sanctions and military structures’. Rather than outlining further conditions for dialogue, Pyongyang’s exasperation with Washington was manifest in Ju’s conclusion: We feel no necessity, therefore, to return to talks in which one side makes unilateral demands of the other. We hold no expectations that the United States will lift sanctions; nor do we pin our hopes on a so-called bright future with the help of the United States. We know well the path that we have to take.¹⁴

Whilst the North’s emphasis on reciprocity was nothing new, this claim would resonate throughout the year as President Trump’s final months in office ensued. The North revived its rhetoric of being ‘betrayed’ by the United States and asserted how any future talks would only be on terms acceptable to the DPRK. Yet, the DPRK emphasized how it would no longer pursue a constant drumbeat for sanctions easing. As Kim Jong Un admitted at the end of 2019, living under sanctions had become a ‘fait accompli’.1⁵ Far from an act of capitulation to the United States, such a statement ironically asserted Pyongyang’s self-perception of elevated status. It did not want to be seen as a weak power begging for sanctions relief. For Pyongyang, since conflict 12 CIA official (interview, 2020). 13 KCNA, ‘Statement Issued by Advisor of DPRK Foreign Ministry’, 11 January 2020 1⁴ Ju Yong Chol, ‘Statement by Mr. Ju Yong-chol’, United Nations Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.1524, 21 January 2020, 18–19. 1⁵ KCNA, ‘Report on the 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK’, 1 January 2020.

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with Washington would not halt any time soon, it would have little choice but to revert to a self-reliant modus operandi. North Korea would continue to frame the global nuclear order as a discriminatory regime led by an antagonistic United States. Whilst reiterating its ‘efforts for global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation’, North Korea would emphasize the necessity of ‘the buildup of the deterrent […] depending on the future attitude of the U.S. toward the DPRK’, as a ‘prerequisite for its national security’.1⁶ Vindicating its actions as a forced choice contingent upon what Pyongyang conceptualized as an allencompassing US ‘hostile policy’ allowed North Korea to continue to maintain the status quo and, crucially, make no concessions on its nuclear and missile capabilities. It was a strategic logic which Kim Jong Un openly acknowledged in his end-of-year speech to his Party in 2019: ‘If there were not the nuclear issue, the U.S. would find fault with us under other issue, and the U.S. military and political threats would not end.’1⁷ It was not just Donald Trump who would soon leave office. Despite the efforts of South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, to bolster inter-Korean relations, as Moon departed office in May 2022, the outcome remained unchanged. North Korea continued to possess its ‘life insurance’ of nuclear weapons, no substantial nuclear concessions had been offered, and with the construction of the US ‘hostile policy’ in Pyongyang’s hands, the North could appeal to the notion whenever it wanted to do so.1⁸

Practising what one preaches: Thus spake Kim Yo Jong True to its word, spring and summer of 2020 were littered with North Korean provocations: ‘joint strike’ military drills in February were followed by short-range projectile launches in March, the latter assumed to be of a KN-25 ‘our-style powerful tactical guided weapon’ or tactical ballistic missile.1⁹ Growing global concern that the DPRK could develop ‘long-range ballistic missiles with the ability to carry a nuclear warhead’2⁰ were accompanied by calls from Moon Jae-in to find ‘realistic ways to further advance inter-Korean cooperation’.21 Irrespective of Moon’s desperation for an eleventh-hour deal, the North had little intention of negotiating with the United States or the Republic of Korea (ROK). As the Department Director General of the DPRK Foreign Ministry affirmed: ‘we will go our own way. We want the U.S. not to bother us. If the U.S. bothers us, it will be hurt.’22 1⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘DPRK Representative Delivers Statement at Conference of Disarmament’, 24 January 2020. 1⁷ KCNA, ‘Report on the 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK’. 1⁸ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) official (interview, 2020). 1⁹ KCNA, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Observes Demonstration Fire of Tactical Guided Weapon’, 22 March 2020. 2⁰ Mark Esper, ‘Global Security Forum: Emerging Technologies Governance’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 24 January 2020. 21 Moon Jae-in, ‘2020 New Year’s Address by President Moon Jae-in’, Cheong Wa Dae, 7 January 2020. 22 Uriminzokkiri, ‘New Department Director General of DPRK Foreign Ministry for Negotiations with U.S. Issues Statement’, 31 March 2020.

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Continued missile testing and bellicose rhetoric occurred as the US presidential election loomed. Closer to home, as the second anniversary of the Panmunjom Declaration passed, the North threatened to retaliate against the sending of balloons containing anti-DPRK messages across the border, a long-standing activity of activist groups, many of which comprise North Korean defectors. Inter-Korean relations plummeted in June 2020 as Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un—and Deputy Department Director of the Publicity and Information Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK)—condemned such activists as ‘human scum little short of wild animals’ for violating the Panmunjom Declaration. In what would become characteristically scathing rhetoric, Kim Yo Jong warned that if actions were not taken, the South ‘had better get themselves ready’ for several eventualities: North Korea’s withdrawal from the already-closed Kaesong Industrial Complex, the shutdown of the inter-Korean liaison office (opened in April 2018), and ‘scrapping of the north–south agreement in military field which is hardly of any value’.23 Dismissing all rhetoric emanating from the North Korean regime as little more than braggadocio is unwise. In June, North Korea practised what it preached. Marking the second anniversary of the Singapore Summit, a KCNA editorial announced the DPRK’s intention to sever communication lines between the two Koreas, accusing the ‘disgusting riff-raff ’ (namely, South Korea) of having ‘committed hostile acts against the DPRK’ by sending anti-DPRK leaflets. The editorial ended ominously, deeming the severing of communication lines as ‘the first step of the determination to completely shut down all contact means with south Korea and get rid of unnecessary things’.2⁴ According to the North, such ‘unnecessary things’ were manifold: the Singapore Summit joint statement, US calls for dialogue, and that the United States ‘pokes its nose into others’ affairs’.2⁵ Reasserting the centrality of the US ‘hostile policy’ to North Korea’s engagement with the global nuclear order, North Korea insisted that any issues relating to its nuclear ambitions were to be resolved solely with the United States, without South Korea’s involvement. Whilst no visible provocations graced the second-year anniversary of the summit, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a vituperative statement reaffirming its stance towards the United States. Accusing Washington of making ‘empty promises’ and having turned the Korean Peninsula ‘into the world’s most dangerous hotspot haunted uninterruptedly by the ghost of nuclear war’, Ri Son Gwon, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, concluded that ‘there is nothing of factual improvement to be made in the DPRK–U.S. relations simply by maintaining personal relations between our Supreme Leadership and the U.S. President […] Never again will we provide the U.S. chief executive with another package to be used for achievements without receiving any returns.’2⁶ It was an attempt by the DPRK to continue blaming the United 23 KCNA, ‘Kim Yo Jong Rebukes S. Korean Authorities, for Conniving at Anti-DPRK Hostile Act of “Defectors from North”’, 4 June 2020. 2⁴ KCNA, ‘KCNA Report on Cutting Off All North–South Communication Lines’, 8 June 2020. 2⁵ KCNA, ‘Director General of DPRK Foreign Ministry Warns U.S. against Interference in Inter-Korean Relations’, 11 June 2020. 2⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Our Message to U.S. Is Clear: Ri Son Gwon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of DPRK’, 12 June 2020. On 11 June 2022, nearly four years after the Singapore Summit, Ri would be replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs by the acerbic diplomat, Choe Son Hui.

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States, which had earlier—and not incorrectly—accused the North of seeking a deal with the United States for Kim Jong Un’s domestic political benefit. By condemning the United States for seeking rewards without offering any concessions, Pyongyang was accusing Washington of the very behaviour it had itself mastered over the past thirty years: strategic delinquency. The blame game was only just beginning. The next day, another statement from the DPRK’s Foreign Ministry criticized Washington for refusing to commit to dialogue, asserting that ‘we are not what we were two years ago. The change continues and will continue as ever in a tremendous way. It is better to stop a nonsensical talking about denuclearization.’2⁷ Such ‘change’ was not limited to US–DPRK relations. The leaflet issue, amongst others, remained unresolved. The DPRK’s United Front Department—which, by now, was no longer responsible for US–North Korean relations—warned how ‘time will be, indeed, regretful and painful for the south Korean authorities’.2⁸ Escalating such rhetoric, Kim Yo Jong warned that ‘before long, a tragic scene of the useless north–south liaison office completely collapsed would be seen’ and threatened military action.2⁹ The ‘tragic scene’ would become a reality on 16 June. In one of the North’s most visible provocations that year, the DPRK demolished the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong as ‘the first step in the primary action taken by us determined to surely force those, who hurt the dignity of our inviolable supreme leadership, and those, who have shown no sign of remorse or reflection, to pay for their crimes’.3⁰ It was a telling signal to Seoul and Washington. The DPRK had exploited the Moon administration’s mediatory role between North Korea and the United States. Yet, just as it wished to resolve the nuclear issue bilaterally with the United States, North Korea would only resolve the leaflet issue directly with South Korea, without any US involvement. Ties between North Korea and the United States had reached a nadir. North Korean statements in the second half of 2020 emphasized, ad nauseam, the DPRK’s lack of interest in dialogue with the United States.31 Threatening the United States with another elusive ‘Christmas gift’ if US ‘hostility’ did not abate, Kim Yo Jong even underscored how the DPRK ‘should not accept an offer of the summit talks this year, no matter how badly the U.S. wants it’, calling first for ‘major changes made on the other side’.32 It was a strategy to buy time. Such ‘changes’ were unspecified but likely referred to an elimination of the equivocal but expanding ‘hostile policy’. 2⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Statement by Director-General of Department of U.S. Affairs of Foreign Ministry of DPRK’, 13 June 2020. 2⁸ KCNA, ‘North–South Ties Have Reached Uncontrollable Phase: Director of United Front Department of WPK Central Committee’, 13 June 2020. 2⁹ KCNA, ‘First Vice Department Director of WPK Central Committee Issues Statement’, 13 June 2020. 3⁰ KCNA, ‘Ominous Prelude to Total Catastrophe of North–South Relations’, 17 June 2020. See Rodong Sinmun, ‘We Will Never Sit Face to Face with S. Korean Authorities: Director of United Front Department of WPK Central Committee’, 17 June 2020; KCNA, ‘KCNA Report on Cutting off All North–South Communication Lines’, 8 June 2020. 31 KCNA, ‘Statement of First Vice-Foreign Minister of DPRK’, 4 July 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Statement by Director-General of Department of U.S. Affairs of DPRK Foreign Ministry’, 7 July 2020. 32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Statement by Kim Yo Jong, First Vice Department Director of Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea’, 10 July 2020.

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Amidst a waning appetite for negotiations, the regime admitted that, due to the constraints of the coronavirus pandemic, its domestic objectives had been anything but met. Whilst celebrations of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the WPK on 25 October 2020 saw the unveiling of a new ICBM, what would become known as the Hwasong-17, (theoretically, the world’s largest road-mobile ICBM), they were coupled with a lament from Kim Jong Un regarding how his ‘efforts and sincerity have not been sufficient enough to rid out people of the difficulties in their life’.33 In one accurate—if pessimistic—assessment, Andrei Lankov posited how everything from the failed Hanoi summit in 2019 had been a ‘perfect storm of unmitigated disasters’ for the leader.3⁴ Not only had North Korea failed to obtain a nuclear deal with the United States or any sustained economic engagement with South Korea but also, domestically, the ‘new strategic line’ remained unfulfilled.

Strategic patience 2.0: Diplomacy and stern deterrence The election of Joe Biden as President of the United States, on 3 November 2020 saw the DPRK recalibrate its strategy towards the United States at a time when it remained in not-so-splendid isolation. Despite having previously dismissed Biden as a ‘rabid dog’ and ‘profiteer who ran for the two failed presidential candidacies’, state media remained quiet following the election of the forty-sixth President.3⁵ Biden’s campaign revealed that the days of leader-to-leader communication between the United States and North Korea looked to be over. In one pre-election debate with then President Trump, Biden stressed his openness for presidential-level dialogue only if Kim Jong Un—who Biden termed a ‘thug’ and ‘good buddy [of Trump]’—‘would agree that he would be drawing down his nuclear capacity’.3⁶ It was far from unforeseen that upon entering the Oval Office in January 2021, the Biden administration’s policy towards the DPRK would be a far cry from the Twitter diplomacy of his predecessor. More surprising was how North Korea seemed to occupy a low priority for the new administration. Biden faced no easy choices: with each successive US administration, the menu of viable policies towards the DPRK diminishes. These choices become harder, given how North Korea has learnt to exploit any US–DPRK agreements, whether the Agreed Framework or presidential-level dialogue during the Trump administration over two decades later.

33 KCNA, ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Delivers Speech at Military Parade’, 10 October 2020. 3⁴ Andrei Lankov, ‘Kim Jong Un’s Nixed New Year’s Speech Shows Just How Stressed He Really Is’, NKNews, 1 January 2021. 3⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Rabid Dog Must Be Beaten to Death: KCNA Commentary’, 14 November 2019. 3⁶ Stephen Silver, ‘Joe Biden Calls North Korea’s Kim Jong-un a ‘Thug’ during Presidential Debate’, National Interest, 23 October 2020; Joseph R. Biden, ‘Special contribution by U.S. Democratic Presidential Candidate Joe Biden’, Yonhap, 30 October 2020, available at: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/ AEN20201030000500325 (accessed 23 December 2022).

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Emphasizing the US commitment to strengthening the US–South Korean alliance whilst adopting an ambiguous approach of ‘diplomacy and stern deterrence’ towards North Korea’s ‘serious threat to America’s security and world security’, the Biden administration comprises veteran diplomats who have previously negotiated with the DPRK.3⁷ Wendy Sherman, Deputy Secretary of State, served as North Korea Policy Coordinator under the Clinton administration during negotiations for the Agreed Framework; Sung Kim, the United States Special Envoy for the DPRK, was the US Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks during the Bush and first Obama administration, and Ambassador to South Korea during the second Obama administration. In a visit to Seoul in August 2021, Sung Kim stressed his willingness to meet with his North Korean counterparts ‘anywhere and at any time’, reiterating how the United States ‘does not have hostile intention for North Korea’.3⁸ As the Biden administration enters its third year, just what the axiom of ‘diplomacy and stern deterrence’ means in practice remains an unknown unknown. Despite reaffirming its alliance with South Korea following its withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the election of conservative Yoon Suk-yeol to the South Korean presidency in March 2022, the US administration has been reluctant to specify its policy towards the DPRK.3⁹ The Biden administration’s North Korea Policy Review, concluded in May 2021, sheds limited light on the ‘calibrated, practical, measured approach’ that the United States envisages towards ‘achieving the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula’.⁴⁰ This approach suggests a via media between ‘strategic patience’ and ‘maximum pressure’: neither a Trumpian grand bargain of all or nothing nor an approach of waiting for North Korea to take the opening move. Yet, given North Korea’s fundamental reluctance to abandon its existing nuclear programme and development, witnessed in its extensive and accelerating testing of new types of missiles—cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic—throughout 2021 and 2022; desire for international recognition as a nuclear-armed state; and repeated accusations of the United States ‘stifling our state by means of force’,⁴1 any such concessions seem unlikely. Will the US recognize the status value placed by the North upon its nuclear and missile capabilities? A now senior Biden administration official, however, revealed to the author how North Korea has far from abandoned its goal during the Korean War, highlighting how: ‘it’s not status; it’s unification. Why would North Korea need 3⁷ Joe Biden, ‘Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by President Biden—Address to a Joint Session of Congress’, The White House, 28 April 2021. 3⁸ Kim Tong-hyung, ‘Biden’s Special Envoy Urges North Korea to Return to Talks’, Associated Press, 23 August 2021. 3⁹ The White House, ‘Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’, 17 August 2021. ⁴⁰ These comments were made by National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, ‘“This Week” Transcript 5-2-21’, ABC News, 2 May 2021, available at: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-21-jakesullivan-sen-john-barrasso/story?id=77442272 (accessed 23 December 2022). ⁴1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Only Weapon to Ensure Peace and Security Is an Actual Deterrent’, 28 August 2021. On 15 July 2022, the DPRK recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk—after which Ukraine severed ties with the DPRK—and accused Ukraine of aligning with the United States’ ‘illegal hostile policy toward the DPRK’. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Independence of Donetsk and Lugansk’, 15 July 2022.

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to do so much; get so many weapons; do night training underground? If it were status, they could just have one nuclear weapon.’⁴2 Such a remark, whilst not incorrect, underscores the need for scholars and policymakers to delve deeper in understanding the nature of the DPRK’s status ambitions.

The land of least lousy options Victor Cha correctly described the DPRK as the land of ‘least lousy options’ for international policy.⁴3 In light of the regime’s draconian response to coronavirus, these options became even worse. Since January 2021, the DPRK has suffered from severe food shortages owing to the toxic combination of rising food prices, the inability of food aid to reach its borders, limited trade owing to sanctions, and the impacts of typhoons and flooding on crop harvest.⁴⁴ As economic failures engulfed the DPRK, the regime toughened its enforcement of juche ideology—and penalties for noncompliance—on its people, targeting younger North Koreans, their hairstyle, attire, and behaviour.⁴⁵ With reports of youths being sent to re-education camps merely for listening to K-pop and enforcements of the death penalty if individuals are caught listening to or distributing foreign media, the DPRK grappled with the implications of the pandemic by shifting inwards.⁴⁶ In June 2021, Kim Jong Un termed K-pop a ‘vicious cancer’, reviving North Korea’s ‘culture war’ against foreign information. Not only did the DPRK close its physical borders but it also seeks to restrict its population’s mental borders and world views.⁴⁷ Although the regime adamantly refused international assistance of COVID-19 vaccines from COVAX, Russia, and South Korea,⁴⁸ in early 2022, it imported masks, ventilators, and vaccines from China prior to announcing the presence of coronavirus cases.⁴⁹ That the inner circle within the Kim regime may have been vaccinated against COVID-19 long before cases spread within its territory is not an unfathomable prospect. A year earlier, state media portentously warned how vaccines were ‘no panacea’ to the spread of coronavirus and that North Korean society would have ⁴2 Biden administration official (interview, 2020). ⁴3 Victor D. Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, updated edn (New York: HarperCollins, 2018) 246. See also: Victor D. Cha, ‘Denuclearizing North Korea: Six Options for Biden’, War on the Rocks, 22 December 2020. ⁴⁴ Colin Zwirko, ‘North Korea Admits “Food Crisis,” Says Grain to Be Distributed to Population’, NKNews, 20 June 2021. ⁴⁵ Rodong Sinmun, ‘Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Sends Letter to Tenth Congress of Youth League’, 30 April 2021. ⁴⁶ Jong So Yong, ‘Three Teenagers in N. Pyongan Province Sent to Reeducation Camp for Listening to S. Korean Music’, DailyNK, 5 May 2021; Jang Seul Gi, ‘nam-yeongsangmul daelyang yuib-yupo si sahyeong’ [‘Death Penalty for Mass Inflow and Distribution of South Korean Videos’] DailyNK, 15 January 2021. ⁴⁷ Choe Sang-Hun, ‘Kim Jong-un Calls K-Pop a “Vicious Cancer” in the New Culture War’, New York Times, 10 June 2021. ⁴⁸ Sangmi Cha, ‘North Korea Rejected AstraZeneca’s COVID-19 Vaccine over Side Effects, Says ThinkTank’, Reuters, 9 July 2021. ⁴⁹ Stella Qiu, Ellen Zhang, and Josh Smith, ‘North Korea Stockpiled Chinese Masks, Vaccines before Reporting COVID Outbreak’, Reuters, 27 May 2022.

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to cope with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic ‘for a long period of time’.⁵⁰ Over a year later, however, Kim Jong Un’s suggestion that vaccinations for the population would be administrated in November 2022 raises questions of from where North Korea would acquire such vaccines and, given how vaccinations would likely foster greater cross-trade, the regime-state’s desperate economic situation. COVID-19 has also given the regime an excuse to invoke the US ‘hostile policy’, which has persisted even after repeated iterations of having quashed the virus.⁵1 In July 2022, an editorial in Rodong Sinmun highlighted how the first cases of coronavirus within the DPRK emanated from individuals coming into contact with ‘alien things’ near the Demilitarized Zone, including balloons sent by activists from the South.⁵2 As Kim Jong Un dubiously proclaimed ‘victory’ over coronavirus in August 2022, Kim Yo Jong issued an expletive-ridden invective, blaming North Korea’s cases of ‘fever’ on anti-DPRK leaflets sent across the border, threatening to ‘exterminate[e] the south Korean authority bastards’ if ‘the enemies continue to do dangerous shit that could introduce the virus into our country’.⁵3 The message is clear: even if the North has abandoned its narrative of being the land of the COVID-free, it will not forsake its strategy of blaming other states for its own problems.

Quo vadimus? The soubriquet of the ‘hermit kingdom’, frequently applied to the DPRK, may seem more relevant now than ever before, even if, over the past thirty years, the regimestate has attempted to pursue normalization of relations with the United States. As reports emerge of ongoing operations at the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility since August 2021, specifically the 5MW(e) reactor, uranium enrichment plant, and radiochemical laboratory (the latter having been closed by the North in December 2018), the DPRK has little intention of conceding on its nuclear ambitions.⁵⁴ This was the very facility that Kim Jong Un placed on the negotiating table in Hanoi. It takes two to tango. The international community faces a dilemma. It must avoid rewarding the North in exchange for vacuous concessions but also prevent the DPRK’s expanding nuclear ambitions from exacerbating its threat to regional and global security. Incentives to engage with the DPRK are particularly urgent for ⁵⁰ Rodong Sinmun, ‘agseongjeon-yeombyeongsataeui jang-gihwa-e cheoljeohi daecheohaja’ [‘Let’s Deal with the Prolonged Malignant Epidemic Situation Thoroughly’], 4 May 2021. ⁵1 Rodong Sinmun, ‘ulidang bang-yeogjeongchaeg-ui gwahagseong-gwa jeongdangseong-eul gip-i saegigo oneul-ui bang-yeogdaejeon-eseo deutim-eobs-i guhyeonhaenagaja’ [‘Let Us Enshrine the Legitimacy of our Party’s Quarantine Policy, and Implement It Effortlessly in Today’s Quarantine War’], 22 May 2022. ⁵2 Rodong Sinmun, ‘guggabisangbang-yeogsalyeongbu agseongbiluseuui uli nala lyuibgyeongloleul gwahagjeog-eulo haemyeong’ [‘Scientific Explanation for the Entry Route of Malicious Viruses from the National Emergency Quarantine Command’], 1 July 2022. ⁵3 Jeongmin Kim, ‘Kim Yo Jong’s Obscenity-Laced Denunciation of South Korean “Enemies”’, NKPro, 12 August 2022. ⁵⁴ IAEA, ‘Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Report by the Director-General’, GOV/2021/40-GC(65)/22, 27 August 2021; Peter Makowsky, Olli Heinonen, and Jack Liu, ‘North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center: Upgrades around the Complex’, 38North, 24 May 2022.

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the United States and South Korea, even if Yoon Suk-yeol seems reluctant to pursue inter-Korean engagement to the same extent as his predecessor. One plausible means to avoid satisfying the North with a carte blanche but enhance its relations with the United States, South Korea, and integration within international society would be through initiatives that do not inflict substantial costs for both sides. The opening of liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang and resumption of inter-Korean people-to-people exchanges are just two examples. Whilst plans for liaison offices collapsed during and after the Agreed Framework, North Korea in 2023 is not the same as in 1994. Opening liaison offices—though unlikely, given the current nature of dialogue— may enhance trust between the two Koreas and between the United States and North Korea. Yet, with respect to forming a coherent international policy towards addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, a key obstacle remains China’s growing unwillingness to support and enact United Nations sanctions resolutions on the DPRK, even if Sino-DPRK ties may not be as close as lips and teeth, as Mao once alleged. Whilst rhetoric from the Chinese Communist Party may expound its desire for North Korea’s denuclearization, China looks to continue its reluctant tolerance towards its nuclear neighbour, preferring to maintain stability on the Peninsula.⁵⁵ Amidst a cornucopia of uncertainty vis-à-vis the North’s actions, what can be asserted with greater confidence is that North Korea will still view international relations through the ideological lens of the US ‘hostile policy’ and seek international acceptance as a de facto nuclear state. In May 2022, President Biden and President Yoon upgraded US–ROK ties into a ‘comprehensive strategic alliance’, which comprised plans for large-scale joint military exercises in August and September.⁵⁶ It was only a matter of time before Kim Jong Un responded, accusing the United States and South Korea of bringing the Korean Peninsula to the ‘brink of war’, against which Pyongyang would be ‘fully ready to mobilise’ its nuclear deterrent.⁵⁷ The future looks bleak. North Korea’s status ambitions to become a nuclear state will only heighten. On 8 September 2022, the Supreme People’s Assembly— the regime-state’s rubber-stamp Parliament—revised a 2013 law which enshrined North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state and widened the conditions under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons. The new law underscored how North Korea would never bargain away its nuclear weapons and would use its weapons preemptively, such as in the event of a ‘nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces on the state leadership’.⁵⁸ As former US Secretary of Defense, William Perry once highlighted, the world must learn to ‘deal with’ North Korea as it is and ‘not as we might wish it to be’.⁵⁹ ⁵⁵ Evans Revere, ‘Lips and Teeth: Repairing China–North Korea Relations’, The Brookings Institution, November 2019, 8. ⁵⁶ The White House, ‘United States–Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement’, 21 May 2022. ⁵⁷ KCNA, ‘Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at Celebration of 69th Anniversary of Great Victory in War’, 28 June 2022. ⁵⁸ KCNA, ‘Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated’, 9 September 2022. ⁵⁹ Dr William J. Perry, ‘Review of United States Policy toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations’, unclassified report, Washington, DC, 12 October 1999.

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Doing so, however, is problematic. The DPRK’s denuclearization is a fundamental objective of the increasingly fragile global nuclear order, as epitomized by the inconclusive tenth instalment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, in August 2022.⁶⁰ Given how the DPRK’s nuclear aspirations are tethered to its quest for status, amongst other goals, rapid but consequential actions that capitulate to the North’s demands—whether removing US troops from South Korea, ceasing US–ROK military exercises, lifting all sanctions, or prematurely signing a peace treaty to end the Korean War—will only worsen the DPRK’s delinquency and, more widely, regional instability. Furthermore, just as the world may have to accept the possibility of living with a nuclear North Korea, Pyongyang must recognize that it must make some concessions on its nuclear programme if it wishes to become a fully fledged member of international society, not least according to a solidarist conceptualization. Will the United States accept a North Korean proposal to establish diplomatic relations?⁶1 As Kim Jong Un enters his second decade of leadership, the domestic economy is suffering, and the DPRK remains a serial violator of nuclear and human rights norms. A non-nuclear North Korea, however, seems little more than a fantasy. The regime’s obstinance in engaging with South Korea and the United States is far from phlegmatic but is a marker of North Korea’s diplomatic strategy. Pyongyang will engage only if it receives its preferred concessions. Economic pressure and a desire to participate in the International Monetary Fund or World Bank may compel the North to compromise. The million-dollar question is when. Through its rich empirical evidence, this book has argued for the importance of understanding how North Korea orders its external environment, for scholarship and policymaking, if we are to address North Korea’s ever-growing nuclear ambitions more effectively. Our understanding will, however, remain incomplete if, as one former South Korean Director of National Intelligence remarked, ‘we see what we want to see in North Korea’.⁶2 Unpalatable it may be, in addition to seeing North Korea from the perspectives of the United States and its allies, we must try and see the world through Pyongyang’s eyes. There may be no silver bullet vis-à-vis the North Korean nuclear problem, but we can, at least, recognize how the DPRK conceptualizes international order, its nuclear ambitions, and its strategic engagement in delinquency with respect to nuclear and international norms. Only then might we inch closer in deepening our understanding of the known unknown of North Korea. Now, more so than ever, it is time for the world to recognize that, for this country, bad behaviour pays.

⁶⁰ The 2022 RevCon ended without consensus after Russia refused to accept the final document, given its takeover of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in March 2022. See United Nations, ‘UN Chief Disappointed Nuclear Treaty Conference Ends without Consensus’, 27 August 2022, available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1125572#:~:text=The%20Secretary%2DGeneral%20expressed% 20disappointment,in%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%20a%20statement. (accessed 12 January 2023). ⁶1 Ramon Pacheco Pardo, North Korea–US Relations: From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un (London: Routledge, 2020), 208. ⁶2 Former ROK National Intelligence Director (interview, 2018).

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Index 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, 6, 130, 139 38th parallel, 25–7, 29, 31 A abductions, 93–4 Acheson, Dean, 30, 89 Agreed Framework, 118–20 breakdown of, 125–9 criticisms of, 119 negotiations for, 117–22 North Korea’s response to, 131–3, 137 Albright, Madeleine, 129–30 Armistice Agreement (Korean War), 32–4 North Korea’s violations of, 178, 182 ‘axis of evil’, 39, 71, 131–3, 136, 147, 165, 200 B Baik, Bong, 24–5 ballistic missile launches after first nuclear crisis, 218 during Biden administration, 66, 251 during second nuclear crisis, 147 during Trump administration intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), 198, 202–3 short-range ballistic missiles, 220–1, 224 Banco Delta Asia (BDA), 146, 149, 153, 164 Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., 70, 212 n.104 Biden, Joe policy towards North Korea, 36, 242–3, 250–2 Biegun, Stephen, 215–16, 219–20, 224–5, 234, 245 bloody nose, 204 Blue House raid, 91–2 Bolton, John, 136, 208 Hanoi Summit, 213, 216–17 North Korea policy, 207–8, 210, 213, 216, 220–2 removal as National Security Advisor, 224 Bosworth, Stephen, 176, 178, 180 brinkmanship, 65, 68, 73, 78, 82 Burma (Myanmar), 62, 77, 95 Bush, George H.W., 98, 105 Bush, George W., 13 administration of, 124–66 C Carter, Jimmy visit to North Korea, 114–16 Castro, Fidel, 39–40

Cha, Victor, 15, 164, 204, 252 Cheonan, ROKS, 176–8 China and nuclear weapons, 53–4, 78 relations with North Korea. See also Xi Jinping during Cold War, 35, 43, 45, 47–9, 103–4 during Korean War, 29–32 under Kim Jong Un, 205, 252, 254 relations with pre-war Korea, 22–3 relations with South Korea, 47–8, 103–4 and Six-Party Talks, 136–7, 140–2 Chinoy, Mike, 136, 144, 161 Choe, Son Hui as Foreign Minister, 248 Hanoi Summit, 219 and Trump administration, 195, 198, 206, 208, 220, 223–4 Chun, Doo-hwan Rangoon bombing, 95 Chung, Eui-yong, 205, 213 Clapper, James, 58, 74, 191, 232 Clinton, Bill, 113–16, 119 Clinton, Hillary, 2 Cold War arms limitation treaties, 53–4 end of influence on North Korea, 46, 54, 97–8, 104 North Korea during the Cold War, 28–51, 88–9, 102–4 coronavirus implications on US-DPRK relations, 245–7, 253 North Korea’s response to, 244–50, 252–3 CVID (Complete, verifiable, irreversible, dismantlement) 68 and second nuclear crisis, 138 and Trump administration, 207, 210, 212, 233 cyberwarfare North Korea and, 5–6, 185 D declarations and joint statements Inter-Korean North-South Joint Communiqué (1972), 93 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (1991), 105 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (1992), 105–6

296

Index

declarations and joint statements (Continued) Panmunjom Declaration (2018), 79, 207, 224, 233, 248 Six-Party Talks 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, 143–4, 148, 154–5, 164 13 February 2007 Joint Statement, 152, 154 3 October 2007 Joint Statement, 152, 155 US-DPRK US-DPRK Joint Communiqué (2000), 129–30, 139 Singapore Summit Declaration (2018), 210–11 defectors, North Korean, 21, 36, 83, 118 delinquency, 13–14 North Korea in the post-war era, 88–94 Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), 33–4, 43, 113, 223–4 Deng, Xiaoping, 45, 47 deterrence nuclear deterrence during Cold War, 53–4, 65, 72 and strategic delinquency, 72–3 dotard, 200 drug trafficking, 6, 146, 242 E Eisenhower, Dwight, 32–3 Ethiopia, 40–1 F famine, North Korean, 48, 71, 74, 104, 127 Faulkner, William, 66 fire and fury, 69, 74 Funabashi, Yoichi, 94 n.40, 142 n.98 G Gaddafi, Muammar, 171–2, 208 Gallucci, Robert, 96, 118–19 Garlauskas, Markus, 69, 243 Gulf War, 98, 128, 171 and Kim Il Sung, 114 H Hanoi Summit collapse of, 218–20, 233 prelude to, 216–17 Harrison, Selig, 76, 82, 113, 139 Hecker, Siegfried, 148, 158, 177–8 hermit kingdom, 4, 235, 253 highly enriched uranium North Korea’s revelation in 2010, 177 and second nuclear crisis, 132–4, 141, 157, 160, 167 Hill, Christopher, 142, 159–60 Hirohito (Emperor of Japan), 24–5, 27–8 Hitchens, Christopher, 4

hostile policy and coronavirus, 253 definition of, 36–9, 42, 49, 59, 145, 242 regime change, 38, 80, 87, 117, 136, 142, 164, 197, 201 human rights North Korea violations of, 71, 140, 145, 171, 180, 204, 215, 241–2 Hwang, Jang Yop, 35 n.77 Hwasong-12, 197 Hwasong-14, 198 Hwasong-17 (ICBM) 2, 250 hydrogen bomb, 186–7 I Ikenberry, John, 34–5, 91 India and nuclear weapons, 54–5, 63, 94, 128 2005 civil nuclear agreement with United States, 135, 141, 168 intercontinental ballistic missiles. See ballistic missile launches inter-Korean relations communication hotline, 204 inter-Korean liaison office, destruction of, 248–9 joint declarations. See declarations and joint statements leaflet issue, 249 summitry, 79, 129, 177, 208 International Atomic Energy Agency and global nuclear order, 53–4, 63, 67 inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, 108–13 North Korea signing IAEA safeguards, 99, 104–7 North Korea’s removal of IAEA inspectors 133, 157, 162 verification of North Korea’s nuclear programme, 108, 157–9 Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 12, 56, 60, 209 Iraq US invasion of (2003), 130–1, 134–6, 170–2 Israel, 106–7, 155, 240 J Jager, Sheila Miyoshi, 30–1 Jang, Song Thaek, 190 Japan annexation of Korean Peninsula, 23–6 defeat in World War II, 25 influence on Kim Il Sung, 27–8 Jo, Chol Su, 226, 228 Jo, Myong Rok, 129, 171

Index Joseon Dynasty, 22–3 Ju, Yong Chol, 246 Juche and Cold War, 40–8, 93 definition, 34–6 evolution of, 28 and hostile policy, 45–9, 252 relationship with nuclear doctrine, 75, 83 and Third World, 40–1 K Kaesong Industrial Complex, 183, 207, 248 Kang, Sok Ju and Agreed Framework, 119, 126–7 first nuclear crisis, 85, 116, 119 second nuclear crisis, 132–3 Kanter, Arnold, 106, 113, 115 Kelly, James, 136, 140 Khan, A.Q. (nuclear proliferation network), 55, 135, 137, 139 Khrushchev, Nikita, 31 Kim, Dae-jung, 129, 146, 161 Kim, Il Sung death of, 117–20 early years, 24–6 personality cult, 10, 21, 35, 118 rule of, 27–120 ‘socialist paradise’, 93–4 speculation of regime collapse, 98–9, 113–14, 118 Kim, Jong Il death of, 169, 179 as heir apparent, 117 rule of, 120–79 songun (military-first) policy, 10, 149, 182 stroke, 160 ‘strong and prosperous nation’, 13, 183 succession to Kim Jong Un, 160, 179–80 Kim, Jong Nam, 6 Kim, Jong Un byungjin policy, 183, 190, 196–7, 206, 229 heir apparent, 179 moratorium on nuclear and missile testing, 206, 215, 227 new strategic line, 206, 212, 234, 244, 250 Rocket Man, 200 rule of, 179–235, 238–56 Kim, Kye Gwan, 126, 145–7, 178, 180 Six-Party Talks, 138, 146, 151, 154, 156, 176 Stockholm talks, 225, 246 Kim, Myong Gil, 225 Kim, Samuel S., 8, 66, 119 Kim, Suk-Young, 16 n.66, 27 n.32, 33 Kim, Yo Jong, 247–9, 253 Kim, Yong Chol, 58, 70, 74, 208, 214 Kim, Yong Nam, 103, 108, 141, 147, 162–3

297

Kim, Yong Sun, 106, 122 Kim family rule, 9–11, 21, 28 Kissinger, Henry, 44, 120 Koizumi, Junichiro, 94 Korean Airlines Flight 858, 95 Korean Peninsula. See also North Korea; South Korea (Republic of Korea) division of, 25–6 Japanese annexation of, 23–4 prior to World War II, 21–8 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 126, 146 Korean War influence on North Korea’s worldview, 30–9, 238, 251–2 Kim Il Sung’s invasion of South Korea, 29–31 North Korea’s narrative of, 1, 31–2 possible usage of nuclear weapons, 32–3 L Lankov, Andrei, 6, 42, 77, 84, 242, 250 Leap Day Deal, 170, 181–3, 189 Lee, Sung-Yoon, 39 Lee, Myung-bak ‘Vision 3000’ policy, 161 M McEachern, Patrick, 10, 52, 149 Manchuria, 24–5 Mansourov, Alexandre, 44, 88, 117 n.155 Mao, Zedong ‘as close as lips and teeth’, 89, 254 relations with Kim Il Sung, 29–31 relations with Soviet Union, 89–90 Mattis, James, 201 maximum pressure, 205–6 Mearsheimer, John, 54, 241 military exercises (US-ROK) Dong Maeng, 220–1 Foal Eagle, 38, 134, 172 Team Spirit, 96–9, 106, 109, 200 suspension of, 99, 106–7 Moon, Jae-in as mediator between the United States and North Korea, 223–4 North Korea policy, 204, 207–8, 213 Myers, Brian, 8, 27, 28, 35 N Narang, Vipin, 3, 72, 235 National Security Strategy (US), 131 Nixon, Richard, 44 Noland, Marcus, 3, 48 Non-Aligned Movement, 102–3 Nordpolitik, 105

298

Index

norms breaking norms in international relations, 59–61 and global nuclear order, 61–4 Northern Limit Line, 184 North Korea constitution of, 27 n.1, 35, 182 as a de facto nuclear state, 69, 79, 138, 203, 207–9, 228, 238, 240, 254 ‘outpost of tyranny’, 141 regime collapse, 74–5, 98–9, 113–14, 120, 179 as a regime-state, 4 as a rogue state, 4, 12, n.52, 82, 110, 136, 163, 223 nuclear crisis early years of Trump administration, 196–203 first nuclear crisis, 85–124 nomenclature of, 85 resolution of, 115–22 second nuclear crisis, 124–69 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) establishment of, 53, 90 indefinite extension of, 54, 98, 110 North Korea’s threat to withdraw from, 109–10 North Korea’s withdrawal from, 55, 83, 133 NPT Review Conferences, 128, 130, 144, 174, 255 2005, failure of, 144 2010 conference, 173–5 2022 conference, 255 nuclear order criticisms of, 56–9, 92 definition of, 11–12 development of, 52–6 fragility of, 134–7, 139, 144–5, 173–6, 216–17, 222, 255 North Korea’s early engagement with, 96–102 Nuclear Posture Review (US), 131 nuclear tests (by North Korea) first nuclear test, 148–50 subsequent nuclear tests, 162–3, 182–3, 186–8, 199 nuclear weapons denuclearization, 142, 161, 204, 214, 225, 237, 242, 251, 254–5 final, fully verifiable denuclearization, 223 North Korea’s interpretation of, 107, 137, 143–5, 148, 205, 210–11, 214–15 domestic legitimacy, 18, 63, 72–5, 83, 96, 111, 117, 122, 165, 190, 232, 237, 240 O Obama, Barack administration of, 169–94. See also strategic patience

Oberdorfer, Don, 114, 116–17 Operations Plan (OPLAN) 5027, 113–14 P Paek, Nam Sun, 139 Pak, Jung H., 74, 183, 218 Pakistan, 54–8, 67, 128, 135, 138–9, 174 Panmunjom Declaration. See declarations and joint statements Park, Chung-hee, 45, 90–1 Park, Geun-hye, 75 peace treaty (Korean War) international calls for, 129, 155, 255 North Korean calls for, 87, 102, 116, 129, 150 Perry, William, 114, 171–2, 254 Review of North Korea Policy, 129–30 plutonium production and Agreed Framework, 118–20, 122–3, 126–8, 132–3 and second nuclear crisis, 138, 155–8, 175, 218 Pollack, Jonathan, 50, 117 Pompeo, Mike, 212, 214, 220 Pritchard, Charles, 132, 140 n.87 Punggye-ri (nuclear test site), 208, 226 PyeongChang Olympics, 203–4 R Ra, Jong-yil, 28, 66 Republic of Korea. See South Korea (Republic of Korea) Rhee, Syngman, 24, 26–7, 32 Ri, Jong Ryul, 196 Ri, Son Gwon, 248 Ri, Yong Ho, 35 n.82, 107 and aftermath of Hanoi Summit, 218–19 and Trump administration, 198, 200–1 rogue states and global nuclear order, 61, 98 Roh, Moo-hyun, 135–6, 155–6, 161 Roh, Tae-woo, 45, 105 Russia. See also Soviet Union (USSR) collapse of Soviet Union, 46–7, 103–4 establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea, 47–9, 103 relations with North Korea, 58, 103 S Sagan, Scott, 81, 83 sanctions ‘learn to live with sanctions’, 238 ‘May 24 Measures’, 177 and Trump administration, 210–12, 230–1 United Nations Security Council resolutions, 31, 38, 147, 150, 176, 187–8, 192, 200

Index Schäfer, Thomas, 10–11, 213–14, 240 Scowcroft, Brent, 113, 115 Shen, Zhihua, 29, 31, 89 Shultz, George, 4 Singapore Summit, 209–14 prelude to, 208–9 Sino-Soviet split, 43, 45, 49, 89 Six-Party Talks, 137–66 collapse of, 160–3 instigation of, 136–7 joint statements. See declarations and joint statements North Korean dislike of, 150–1, 160–1 songbun, 11 songun, 10, 149, 182 Sony Pictures hack, 5, 185 South Korea (Republic of Korea) constitution of, 27 establishment of, 26–7 ‘Miracle on the Han River’, 42–3 nuclear weapons ambitions of, 44, 90 Soviet Union (USSR) relations with North Korea, 28–30, 45–8, 90 relations with South Korea, 46–8 and World War II, 25–6 Stalin, Joseph, 26, 28–31 State Sponsor of Terrorism (US) North Korea as, 106, 121, 202 removal of North Korea from, 156, 163, 167 status, 14, 61–4 definition of, 12 negative status, 13, 59, 64, 69 and nuclear order, 11–13, 56–9 small states, 62 stigmatisation, 62–4 Stockholm talks, 224–8, 233 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 98 New START, 56, 174 strategic delinquency and breaking norms, 64–5 definition of, 13–17, 64–7 and first nuclear crisis, 67, 69, 71, 74, 76, 80, 120–4 framework of, 67–83 and Kim Jong Un, 228–34 and second nuclear crisis, 71, 74, 80–1, 152t, 163–9 and strategic patience, 188–94 theoretical implications of, 238–40 strategic patience criticisms of, 173–4, 178–9 definition of, 175 end of, 196 era of, 169–94 North Korea’s response to, 170, 178–81

299

summitry. See Hanoi Summit; inter-Korean relations; Singapore Summit Sunshine Policy, 129, 183 Syria, 60, 67, 95, 131, 135 al-Kibar nuclear site, 155 T Terminal High-Altitude Aerial Defence system (THAAD), 186, 188 Third World North Korea’s relations with, 21, 39–43, 45, 105 Tillerson, Rex, 197–8 Tongchang-ri, 212–13, 238 Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), 128, 152, 154 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), 56, 209, 216, 222 Truman, Harry, 26, 29, 33 Trump, Donald, 3–4 election of, 196–7 fire and fury, 69, 74, 199 letters to Kim Jong Un, 194, 213, 215, 221–2, 234 summitry with Kim Jong Un, 223–4. See also Hanoi Summit; Singapore Summit Twitter diplomacy, 197, 201, 216, 223, 226 U Ukraine North Korea and, 251 n.38 Russian invasion of, in 2022, 54, 255 United Nations Commission of Inquiry (2014), 5, 71, 242 United States of America and global nuclear order, 12, 56–8 Indo-Pacific Strategy (2019), 222–3 involvement in Korean War, 29–33 and post-war liberal international order, 34–5, 60–1, 91, 98 removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Korean Peninsula, 105 USS Pueblo, 91–2, 95 W Wada, Haruki, 30, 34 Walker, William, 52 n.7, 55–7, 68, 128, 130, 173 Warmbier, Otto, 5, 202, 204 War on Terror, 6, 60, 171–2 Woodward, Bob, 131, 196, 215–16, 222–3 Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), 10–11, 74, 96 seventy-fifth anniversary of, 1–2, 250 X Xi Jinping meetings with Kim Jong Un, 205, 213, 215–16

300

Index

Y Yeonpyeong Island, 178 Yongbyon Nuclear Facility Agreed Framework, 71, 77, 85, 120, 131 Biden administration, 253 destruction of cooling tower at, 152t, 156–7, 212 establishment of, 88–90, 97

first nuclear crisis, 108, 112, 114–18, 127 Hanoi Summit, 213, 216–18, 246 Obama administration, 175, 177, 184 second nuclear crisis, 133–4, 137–8, 152–9, 162 Yoon Suk-yeol, 251 and Joe Biden, 254 North Korea policy, 253–4 and South Korea’s nuclear weapons, 241 n.13